NOTICE: NOT FOR OFFICIAL PUBLICATION. 

UNDER ARIZONA RULE OF THE SUPREME COURT 111(c), THIS DECISION IS NOT PRECEDENTIAL 

AND MAY BE CITED ONLY AS AUTHORIZED BY RULE.

IN THE 

ARIZONA COURT OF APPEALS

DIVISION ONE

STATE OF ARIZONA, Respondent, 

v.

STEVEN RUSSELL ANTROBUS, Petitioner.

No. 1 CA-CR 13-0641 PRPC 

Appeal from the Superior Court in Mohave County 

No. CR2000-0891 

The Honorable Steven F. Conn, Judge 

REVIEW GRANTED; RELIEF DENIED

COUNSEL 

Office of the Mohave County Attorney, Kingman 

By Matthew J. Smith 

Counsel for Respondent 

Steven Russell Antrobus, Buckeye 

Petitioner 
STATE v. ANTROBUS 

Decision of the Court 

2

MEMORANDUM DECISION 

Presiding Judge Margaret H. Downie delivered the decision of the Court, 

in which Judge Patricia A. Orozco and Judge Maurice Portley joined. 

 

D O W N I E, Judge: 

¶1 Steven Russell Antrobus petitions for review from the 

dismissal of his notice of post-conviction relief. For the following reasons, 

we grant review but deny relief.1 

¶2 Juries in three separate trials found Antrobus guilty of two 

counts of trafficking in stolen property, two counts of theft, and one count 

each of misconduct involving weapons, theft of a credit card, failure to 

appear, and resisting arrest. The trial court sentenced Antrobus to an 

aggregate term of forty-six years’ imprisonment, and we affirmed the 

convictions and sentences on direct appeal. Antrobus now seeks review of 

the summary dismissal of his second post-conviction relief proceeding. We 

have jurisdiction pursuant to Arizona Rule of Criminal Procedure 32.9(c) 

and Arizona Revised Statutes (“A.R.S.”) section 13-4239(C). 

¶3 Antrobus presents two claims of ineffective assistance of trial 

counsel. He argues trial counsel “FD” was ineffective because he failed to 

inform Antrobus of a plea offer that would have required 11.25 years’

imprisonment. He argues other trial counsel, “EE,” was ineffective because 

he failed to inform Antrobus of another plea offer until after trial began, 

and Antrobus could no longer accept that offer. 

¶4 Antrobus argues these claims are timely because they are 

based on newly-discovered evidence. For a defendant to obtain postconviction relief based on newly-discovered evidence: 

(1) [T]he evidence must appear on its face to have existed at 

the time of trial but be discovered after trial; 

 

1 Although some of our analysis differs from the trial court’s, we may 

affirm the decision of a trial court on any basis supported by the record. 

State v. Robinson, 153 Ariz. 191, 199 (1987). 
STATE v. ANTROBUS 

Decision of the Court 

3

(2) [T]he [petition] must allege facts from which the court 

could conclude the defendant was diligent in discovering the 

facts and bringing them to the court’s attention; 

(3) [T]he evidence must not simply be cumulative or 

impeaching; 

(4) [T]he evidence must be relevant to the case; 

(5) [T]he evidence must be such that it would likely have 

altered the verdict, finding, or sentence if known at the time 

of trial. 

State v. Bilke, 162 Ariz. 51, 52-53 (1989). 

¶5 Regarding FD, the “newly discovered evidence” consists of a 

handwritten message to FD that contains the State’s plea offer and is dated 

November 1, 2000. Antrobus stated in his notice of post-conviction relief 

that this message was included in Antrobus’ personal property that his wife 

obtained from the jail and/or in case documents his wife retrieved from 

storage. Therefore, Antrobus possessed this document years ago and offers 

no explanation for why he was purportedly unaware of a document he 

received and maintained in his own copies of case materials. Antrobus has 

failed to demonstrate that he did not know of this document until after trial 

or that he was diligent in discovering the existence of the document and 

bringing it to the court’s attention. 

¶6 Regarding the other plea offer, Antrobus concedes EE told 

him about the alleged offer during trial. Therefore, Antrobus could have 

presented this claim in his first petition for post-conviction relief in 2006. 

Any claim a defendant could have raised in an earlier post-conviction relief 

proceeding is precluded. Ariz. R. Crim. P. 32.2(a); see State v. Swoopes, 216 

Ariz. 390, 398, ¶ 23 (App. 2007) (ineffective assistance claims that could 

have been raised in prior Rule 32 proceedings are waived).2 Antrobus’ lack 

 

2 Antrobus argued below that his first post-conviction relief counsel 

was ineffective for failing to raise this issue, but he does not present that 

issue for our review. Further, ineffective assistance of post-conviction relief 

counsel is not a valid claim under Rule 32 unless made against counsel who 

provided representation in a petition for post-conviction relief “of-right.” 

State v. Pruett, 185 Ariz. 128, 131 (App. 1995). Antrobus’ first post-
STATE v. ANTROBUS 

Decision of the Court 

4

of familiarity with the applicable law does not render this “newly 

discovered evidence” as defined by Arizona law. See Delmastro & Eells v. 

Taco Bell Corp., 228 Ariz. 134, 143, ¶ 29 (App. 2011) (“all people of sound 

mind are presumed to know the law”).

CONCLUSION 

¶7 For the foregoing reasons, we grant review but deny relief. 

 

conviction proceeding was not an “of-right” proceeding because it followed 

a trial and direct appeal. Ariz. R. Crim. P. 32.1.