AIR COMMAND AND STAFF COLLEGE

AIR UNIVERSITY

MARIA J. DOWLING, Major, USAF

VINCENT J. FECK, Major, USAF

Air Command and Staff College

Wright Flyer Paper No. 7

MAXWELL AIR FORCE BASE, ALABAMA

September 1999

Feasibility of a Joint Engineerin

and Logistics Contract
Disclaimer

Opinions, conclusions, and recommendations expressed or implied within 

solely those of the author and do not necessarily represent the views of Air 

versity, the United States Air Force, the Department of Defense, or any othe

government agency. Cleared for public release:distribution unlimited.

ii
iii

Foreword

It is my great pleasure to present another of the Wri

Flyer Papers series. In this series, Air Command and S

College (ACSC) recognizes and publishes the “best of 

best” student research projects from the prior academ

year. The ACSC research program encourages our s

dents to move beyond the school’s core curriculum in th

own professional development and in “advancing ae

space power.” The series title reflects our desire to perp

uate the pioneering spirit embodied in earlier generatio

of airmen. Projects selected for publication combine so

research, innovative thought, and lucid presentation in 

ploring war at the operational level. With this broad p

spective, the Wright Flyer Papers engage an eclectic ran

of doctrinal, technological, organizational, and operatio

questions. Some of these studies provide new solutions 

familiar problems. Others encourage us to leave the fam

iar behind in pursuing new possibilities. By making th

research studies available in the Wright Flyer Pape

ACSC hopes to encourage critical examination of the fi

ings and to stimulate further research in these areas.

John W. Rosa, Brig Gen, US

Commandant

v

Abstract

The Army, Air Force, and Navy currently manage th

own separate engineering and logistics contracts for e

ploying civilian contractors as a force multiplier dur

military operations. Civil augmentation contracts aff

flexibility when the services are limited by the availabi

of manpower resources during contingency operations. 

location of military forces is often constrained by ot

contingency commitments, inactivation of reserve com

nents, and political considerations with a host nation. T

Army first awarded the Logistics Civil Augmentation P

gram (LOGCAP) contract in 1992. The Navy awarded 

Construction Capabilities Contract (CONCAP) in 1995 a

the Air Force followed suit with the Air Force Contrac

Augmentation Program (AFCAP) contract in 1997.

A General Accounting Office (GAO) report published 

1997, however, questioned the validity of executing th

separate contracts and stated that it might be more “eff

tive and efficient” if one service acted as the lead execut

agent to eliminate duplication of services. The GAO rep

also noted that existing military doctrine was vague in 

dressing how to integrate contractor resources prope

with the military force structure during contingency situ

tions.

This research paper addresses two of the import

questions raised in the GAO report regarding the use 

contractors in support of joint military operations. Fi

will a joint engineering and logistics service contract p

vide the combatant and service commanders any ben

over maintaining individual Navy, Army, and Air Fo

service augmentation contracts? Second, does curr

joint doctrine adequately address the use of contrac

services in support of contingency and wartime ope

tions? If not, what information should be included in 

ture joint doctrine?

In conducting our research, we performed in-dep

comparative analyses of the Army’s LOGCAP and 

Force’s AFCAP contracts, but the Navy CONCAP contr

was not analyzed in depth because of its limited scope. 

conducted interviews with key government personnel af
iated with the Army and Air Force contracts to include 

AFCAP and LOGCAP program managers and contract

staffs. We also performed historical research using sou

material from several Department of Defense agencies.

This research project provides an objective review of 

benefits and drawbacks of the Army’s LOGCAP and 

Force’s AFCAP contracts. Since the scope of the two c

tracts is similar, it is our recommendation that a joint c

augmentation program (JCAP) contract be established t

will meet the needs of both services while eliminating d

plication of effort. For JCAP to be a viable option, joint d

trine must be developed to provide guidance on when a

how to use a civil augmentation contract during milit

operations.

vi
Feasibility of a Joint Engineering

and Logistics Contract

Background and Value of Civil

Augmentation Service Contracts

The Army, Air Force, and Navy currently manage se

rate engineering and logistics contracts for employing ci

ian contractors as a force multiplier during military ope

tions. These contracts are commonly referred to as “c

augmentation” contracts. Civil augmentation contra

afford flexibility when the services are limited by the av

ability of force structure during contingency scenari

Active duty forces are often constrained by real wo

requirements or taskings that limit their use, such as h

ing to maintain response capability for a major regio

conflict. At the same time, activation of reserve and gu

forces to fulfill manpower requirements, in certain scen

ios, may be politically sensitive. There are also instan

when the United States would like to stay engaged 

nation-building or peacekeeping operations within a cou

try, but needs to maintain a low military presence due 

political considerations. Other factors, which lead to 

use of an augmentation contract, are the lack of in-pl

host-nation support agreements in numerous underdev

oped countries and troop ceiling restrictions imposed 

those host nations.1(See appendix A for further ba

ground information.)

Significance of Problem

A General Accounting Office (GAO) report, Contingen

Operations: Opportunities to Improve the Logistics C

Augmentation Program, however, questioned the validity 

each military service executing its own separate contr

and stated that the services provided under the separ

contracts were similar in nature. The report implied tha

might be more “effective and efficient” if one service ac

as the lead executive agent to eliminate duplication of s

vices. The GAO report also noted that existing military d

trine was vague in addressing how to integrate contrac

1
resources properly with the military force structure dur

contingency situations.2

Joint Publication (JP) 4-0, Doctrine for Logistic Suppor

Joint Operations, is the primary joint publication provid

combatant commanders and military planners guidan

on the conduct of logistics support during joint operatio

This document outlines the responsibilities for logist

operations to include supply, maintenance, transpor

tion, facilities engineering, health services, command a

control, and several other areas. JP 4-0, however, does 

address the fact that civilian contractors increasingly 

being tasked to provide the aforementioned services 

military operations.

When using civilian contractors, the deployed milit

commander must consider a whole new list of issues 

include contractor security, status of forces agreem

(SOFA) and clearance restrictions, and contractor and m

itary force integration. Unfortunately, existing joint d

trine does not provide guidance as to when and how c

augmentation contracts should be used in support of m

itary operations during wartime and small-scale cont

gencies.

Statement of Research Questions

This research paper addresses two of the import

questions raised in the GAO report regarding the use 

contractors in support of joint military operations. Fi

will a joint engineering and logistics service contract p

vide the combatant and service commanders any ben

over maintaining individual Navy, Army, and Air Force c

augmentation contracts? Second, does current joint d

trine adequately address the use of contractor services 

support of contingency and wartime operations? If n

what information should be included in future joint d

trine?

Preview of Argument

The development of a joint civil augmentation progr

(JCAP) contract will prevent individual program redund

cies, while eliminating possible competition among 

services and providing efficiencies in the areas of pers
nel resources and program costs. As stated in the G

report, unnecessary duplication of effort and functio

may have occurred as a result of employing individ

Army, Air Force, and Navy contracts to provide engine

ing and logistics support in combined forces scenario

However, while some duplication may exist among indiv

ual service contracts, the Army’s Logistics C

Augmentation Program (LOGCAP) contract and the 

Force’s Contractor Augmentation Program (AFCAP) c

tract provide numerous benefits to their individual serv

components. The intent of JCAP is to build upon this fou

dation with a shift in focus to the ultimate customer, 

war-fighting commander in chief (CINC).

This paper will also show that current joint doctr

inadequately addresses the numerous issues regard

employment of contractors in the battlefield. This resea

effort will provide the issues and doctrinal guidance to 

addressed in JP 4-0 and the Joint Task Force (J

Commander’s Handbook for Peace Operations. Such issu

as contractor security, host-nation restrictions, a

deployment issues have to be provided to the CINC pl

ners and deployed commanders for effective employm

of contractor operations during military operations.

Because of its limited scope, the Navy’s Construct

Capabilities Contract (CONCAP) will not be analyzed 

depth. The Navy contract is for emergency construct

and engineering services only and does not include ad

tional support in areas such as services and logistics. T

majority of service-related and contract-specific issues w

be sufficiently addressed in this paper through the ana

sis of the AFCAP and LOGCAP contracts.

Analysis of Logistics Civil

Augmentation Program

LOGCAP was developed based on the Army’s experien

during the Vietnam War. During Vietnam, the Army w

forced to rely on civilian contractors because its Rese

and Guard forces were never activated. In 1992 the Ar

awarded its first centrally managed LOGCAP contr

through the US Army Corps of Engineers (USACE) 
B rown and Root Services Corporation. The cost-p

award-fee (CPAF) contract was awarded for one basic a

four option years. Under this contract, the Army has su

ported six contingency operations beginning w

Operation Restore Hope in Somalia and is currently su

porting Operation Joint Endeavor in Bosnia. Total e

mated contract value to date is $1 billion.4 The Ar

Materiel Command (AMC) in 1997 awarded the LOGC

follow-on contract to DynCorp Aerospace Technology. T

contract is also a CPAF contract with one basic and f

option years, but it contains fixed-price line items for pl

ning efforts.

A team consisting of a program manager and appro

mately 15 other people manages the program. The team 

comprised of two directorates responsible for planning a

business management. The planning directorate wo

with each Army major command (MACOM) and has inc

porated the use of LOGCAP into various operations pla

(OPLAN) and concept plans (CONPLAN). Communicatio

and Electronics Command (CECOM) at Fort Monmou

New Jersey, provides contracting support for LOGC

Defense Contract Management District-Intern a t i o 

(DCMD-I) provides contract administration services dur

contractor operations.

Services Provided

Per the statement of work (SOW), “The objective of LO

CAP is to preplan for the use of commercial contractors 

prepare plans and execute approved plans to provide log

tics services and construction/engineering support w

reasonable assurance of success and within reasona

cost.”5 Under the planning effort, the contractor mainta

three types of permanent management plans: a worldw

management and staffing plan (WMSP), a generic undev

oped and developed country management plan, a

regional management plans (RMP). (See appendix 

Additionally, the LOGCAP contract requires DynCorp 

develop, at the request of the procuring contracting offi

(PCO), CINC/MACOM specific re q u i rements supp

plans. These plans are based upon specific CINC/MACO

requirements, which are generated in support of spec
OPLANs, CONPLANs, and functional plans. In conduct

this effort, the contractor works with the staffs of the su

ported Army MACOM to develop, maintain, and ref

LOGCAP planning documents.6 Cost for the managem

staff, which includes the worldwide plan, is $865,000 

y e a r. Yearly cost to maintain the regional plans 

$30,000.7

Support provided by the LOGCAP contractor dur

wartime or contingency operations can be broken do

into five areas: supply operations, field services, engine

ing and construction, maintenance, and transportati

(See appendix C for a detailed list of services provided.)

Requesting LOGCAP

The Army uses a decision matrix to decide whether 

use LOGCAP to support wartime or contingency ope

tions. (See appendix D for decision criteria.) After the de

sion is made to use the LOGCAP contract, the thea

Army service component commander forwards the requ

to the Department of the Army for a final decision

approved, the request is then passed on to the LOGC

project manager at AMC. The LOGCAP management s

will generate a SOW for the contractor in conjunction w

the theater staff. The PCO generates a delivery order 

the services once funding is received from the theater co

mand. The PCO also delegates contract administration 

DCMD-I and USACE. The LOGCAP management s

deploys to the area of responsibility (AOR) to assist in pl

ning and managing the contract. The LOGCAP mana

ment team consists of a program manager, 

CECOM/PCO, contractor representatives, a USACE rep

sentative for technical advice, DCMD-I personnel to p

form contract administration and quality assurance eva

ation (QAE) duties, a LOGCAP support unit, and a logist

support element. The team falls under the operational a

administrative control of the theater logistics support e

ment commander.

8 To assist potential users of LOGC

services, the LOGCAP Program Management Office h

developed the LOGCAP Battlebook and AMC Pamphlet 7

30 as user’s guides to assist customers in understand

the capabilities of LOGCAP.
Benefits: Force Multiplier

LOGCAP is a force multiplier and provides the Ar

n u m e rous benefits. First, preplanning of contrac

efforts, as with deliberate planning directed by the Jo

Strategic Capabilities Plan (JSCP), lays the groundwork 

quick and smooth execution during military operations. 

in Vietnam, much of the Army’s combat support (CS) a

combat service support (CSS), especially its construct

capability, is maintained in its Reserve compone

Deployment of Reserve forces, however, requires presid

tial activation, time to mobilize, and military strategic 

LOGCAP can fill this force structure gap by mobiliz

immediately upon PCO notification. In accordance with 

contract, DynCorp has to be ready to deploy in 72 hou

with initial support by C+15 and full capability at C+

The LOGCAP contractor also provides its own strategic a

in-theater lift capability. LOGCAP is not dependent on 

Department of Defense (DOD) logistics system; therefore

can source materials independently and lessen the Arm

burden on the logistics system. It also provides the CI

with a suitable workaround when military force caps are 

place. Contractor augmentation lessens the milit

“tooth-to-tail” ratio and enables available troops to c

centrate on mission critical tasks.

Benefit: Cost Control

The LOGCAP contract’s award fee ranges from 0 t

percent for above average performance with no base f

Contractor performance is rewarded in the areas of de

ery, quality of performance, and cost. Learning fr

Bosnia, the LOGCAP management staff (Army progr

managers and contractor personnel) has also improved 

cost reporting procedures and benefited from the oversi

p rovided by the DCMD-I Contingency Contract

Administration Services (CCAS) teams who perform c

tract monitoring. Another potential benefit of LOGCAP 

that according to one recent report by the Logist

Management Institute, “when compared with the costs 

using an equivalent military force, the use of LOGCAP c

tractors is economical.”9 The report stated that the LO

CAP contractor employed 24 percent fewer personnel th
an equivalent military force package for operations c

ducted in Bosnia. Using the equivalent military force pa

age, the report also compared marginal costs and fou

the contractor to be 28 percent less expensive.10 Since 

Army MACOMs do not budget for funding LOGCAP, th

is an initial “sticker shock” felt by both the MACOMs a

the deploying commanders as they try to control co

from their operation and maintenance funds. Over

LOGCAP provides the Army an effective and efficient ca

bility to augment deployed military forces.

Other Benefits

In addition to its capability-related benefits, the LO

CAP contract provides some side benefits within the h

country. The LOGCAP contractor benefits the local eco

my since the contractor hires personnel from the lo

workforce and subcontracts to local vendors. In Operat

Joint Endeavor in Bosnia, 80 percent of the contracto

workforce was local foreign nationals.11 Use of the LOGC

contractor also allows for a reduced US military presen

in the country of operations and minimizes the local re

tion to these forces. The trade-off, however, is in force p

tection, which will be discussed next.

Considerations: Security in a Hostile Environment

The LOGCAP contractor is self-sufficient in its operatio

to support US forces, however, the CINC employing LO

CAP support has an obligation to provide security for 

c o n t r a c t o r. The level of security depends on the degree 

hostility in the area of operations, re g a rdless of whether 

operation is during wartime or a small-scale contingen

Security precautions may include providing military esco

for line-haul operations, requiring the contractor and 

nonlocal employees to live on and conduct operations fr

military compounds, and providing contractor employ

with small arms. The importance of providing contrac

f o rce protection was illustrated during Operation Des

S t o rm. After receiving chemical attack warnings, contrac

personnel providing food service at several Air Force inst

lations walked off the job. The personnel re t u rned to 

installations only after receiving appropriate pro t e c t 
e q u i p m e n t .1 2 In addition to providing for contractor secu

ty, deployed commanders must weigh the risks associa

with providing nonmilitary personnel access to milit

installations. Contract personnel, especially host-nat

personnel, are potential security risks as they may be sy

pathizers with the enemy.1 3

Considerations: Status of Forces and Omnibus

Agreements

The gaining CINC must also ensure that SOFA a

omnibus agreements include provisions concerning 

LOGCAP contractor and its employees. For instance 

Operation Joint Endeavor, Hungary would not allow 

contractor to bring its employees in-country since it w

not part of the omnibus agreement. The Hungarian g

ernment, however, was eventually persuaded to al

these employees access after it received assurances tha

large portion of Brown and Root’s workforce would 

H u n g a r i a n .1 4 The Hungary Ministry of Finance a

imposed a value added tax on Brown and Root and 

income tax on its employees. The US government ended 

reimbursing Brown and Root for the $18 million in co

since the LOGCAP contract is a cost reimbursable c

tract.15 The US government was later able to amend 

omnibus agreement with Hungary and recoup 

money.16

Considerations: Cultural Issues

The LOGCAP contractor’s hiring of foreign nationals 

c reate communication and cultural challenges. F

instance, Saudi truck drivers providing line-haul servi

after Desert Storm routinely cooked meals on sm

propane stoves near their vehicles. This practice w

alarming to Army ordnance personnel, especially when 

cargo being hauled was high explosive ordnance.17

Significant Lessons Learned

Operation Joint Endeavor in Bosnia pointed out so

key lessons. First, this operation showed that LOGCAP 

not always an initial entry capability” because the c
tractor requires time to set up its operations. Howev

Joint Endeavor illustrated that the LOGCAP contractor 

well suited to take over base camp maintenance and op

ations after initial base camp construction.”18 In Bosnia

unique challenge was created for the team consisting of 

F o rce Rapid Engineer Deployable Heavy Operatio

Repair Squadron Engineer (RED HORSE) troops, N

SeaBees, and Brown and Root workers because of 

large number of troops already deployed in-theater, 

harsh Balkan winter, and the decision to build more a

smaller camps. However, their joint effort created a syn

gy that contributed to a greater success than any one s

vice’s engineers could accomplish and allowed the team 

meet the challenge.19

Although the contractor has its own strategic lift ca

bility, the contractor may be subject to the same logisti

constraints as the military. Several factors can result 

degradation of the contractor’s ability to bring equipm

and supplies into theater. These include crowded lines 

communications (LOC), an austere operating environme

and a theater with damaged infrastructure or limited ec

omy. For example in Bosnia, Brown and Root rail a

truck shipping competed against the needs of the v

troops the contractor was there to support. Contractor a

craft also competed with military aircraft for availa

ramp space.20

Doctrine for Logistic Support of Joint Operations p ro v i 

guidance to the geographic combatant commander and r

ommends the establishment of a joint civil-military en

neering board (JCMEB), joint facilities utilization bo

(JFUB), and CINC logistic pro c u rement board (CLPSB

These boards are to be used to establish theater policy, p

c e d u res, direction, and priorities and to provide coord i 

tion for construction and engineering, facilities, and c

tracting activities. The development of a joint acquisit

review board (JARB) and joint contracting committees 

Operation Joint Endeavor and their resulting succ

p roved the merit of the JP 4-0 guidance. Their establi

ment was critical for elimination of competition among 

d i ff e rent contracting activities for local re s o u rces, consoli

tion of re q u i rements, and overall control and managem

of the acquisition system. A JARB located in Hunga
C roatia, and Bosnia reviewed re q u i rements and establish

priorities. The re q u i rements, after being funded, were th

passed to the joint contracting committee, which det

mined whether host-nation support, local purchase thro u 

central region or joint contracting centers, or LOGC

would be used to fulfill the re q u i re m e n t .2 2

Operation Joint Endeavor showed the need for LOGC

program management representation on the CINC pl

ning and management staffs as well as the staffs of 

deployed commanders in Bosnia, Croatia, and Hungary 

provide an understanding of the scope and capabilities 

the contract. Establishment of the JARB eventually help

eliminate misconceptions about the performance of Bro

and Root.23 Appointing base camp “mayors” as focal poi

for the contractor also improved the relationship betwe

the contractor and customer. Communication between 

two parties improved and the contractor gained a clea

understanding of what it deemed constantly chang

requirements.24

Analysis of Air Force Contractor

Augmentation Program

AFCAP is a contingency support contract the Air Fo

developed to relieve or augment military operations 

small-scale contingencies. Primary areas of supp

include logistics, services, engineering, and operations a

maintenance. The contract supports all phases of milit

operations to include planning, mobilization, constructi

sustainment, reconstitution, and restoration. In suppo

ing small-scale contingencies, the AFCAP contract can a

provide relief support for natural disasters worldwi

Since the AFCAP contract was awarded in 1997, it h

only been used for two large-scale taskings—typhoon re

at Anderson Air Force Base (AFB) in Guam and Hurrica

Georges relief at Keesler AFB, Mississippi.

The AFCAP contract was awarded to Readin

Management Support (RMS) as a joint venture betwe

Johnson Controls and Lockheed Martin for a period of o

base year with four option years. The contract is CP

with a fixed-price line item for worldwide manpower ba
fill at military bases. AFCAP has the capacity to handle 

to $452.6 million in task orders over the life of the c

tract.25 The basic annual contract costs cover contrac

program management, development and maintenance o

worldwide management plan (WMP), and two annual v

dation exercises. These basic contract costs are funded 

the Air Force Civil Engineer. Individual task orders 

funded by the requesting Air Force major command (MA

COM) or using agency. 26

The contract is managed by a dedicated managem

team comprised of two full-time program managers assign

to Headquarters Air Force Civil Engineer Support Agen

(AFCESA) and two full-time contracting officers assigned 

the 325th Contracting Squadron, both located at Tynd

AFB, Florida. In addition, either the MAJCOM or DCM

p rovides on-site surveillance.2 7 The Air Force has also dev

oped an AFCAP user’s guide outlining the responsibilities 

AFCESA, contracting, DCMD-I, and the user.

Sustainment versus Beddown

The genesis of AFCAP was a request from Brig Gen Jo

Allen, the Air Combat Command Civil Engineer, at 

1994 Air Force Civil Engineer Worldwide Conferen

General Allen saw a clear need for a worldwide susta

ment contract to relieve military troops from perform

nontraining-related repetitive tasks.28 Although the AFC

contract can accomplish beddown taskings, its focus 

sustainment activities. Beddown taskings provide exc

lent training for such military forces as Prime B

Engineer Emergency Force (Prime BEEF) and R

HORSE, which provide the Air Force organic beddo

capabilities. Examples of beddown taskings include t

setup and utilities installation. As illustrated by the s

cessful support Air Force organic forces provided US for

in Bosnia, the Air Force needs to maintain a responsive 

house beddown capability. AFCAP is primarily a relief 

augmentation tool for prolonged sustainment activities

Responsiveness

The AFCAP contractor’s notional timeline for deploym

is not tied to the initiation of conflict. Since the Air Fo
employs Prime BEEF and RED HORSE for initial beddo

activities, Air Force MAJCOM leaders determine the app

priate time to transition to the AFCAP contractor workfo

to relieve these military forces. Although the contract ty

cally re q u i res RMS to respond within 30 days, the contr

tor responded immediately during its first two deploymen

Worldwide Management Plan

In contrast to the numerous LOGCAP plans, the 

F o rce has re q u i red its AFCAP contractor to develop a

maintain only one generic WMP, at a cost of appro x i m a t 

$300,000, which the Air Force believes can be tailored 

adapted quickly to meet the specific needs of any crisis. T

AFCAP plan is tested or validated twice each year durin

tabletop exercise with the contractor. RMS is re q u i red 

adapt its WMP to the specific scenario and provide an ov

all plan within 24 hours. According to AFCESA pro g r 

management and contracting staff, the worldwide mana

ment plan is very flexible and aff o rds the Air Force gr

versatility at a tremendous cost savings. Since the plan 

n o t country, region, or type of contingency specific, it is l

likely to become outdated than a detailed, site-specific pl

Due to the uncertainty as to where the next crisis will ar

AFCESA personnel believe a generic plan provides an a

quate foundation from which to build a scenario-spec

management plan.

Benefits: Tailored for Air Force Needs

The AFCAP contract was developed by AFCESA to su

port Air Force customer requirements worldwide. The c

tract was specifically tailored to meet on-going Air Fo

needs. As a result, the program managers have a fu

tional understanding of Air Force operations, culture, p

cedures, and regulations. This high level of familiarity w

customer needs translates into increased responsiven

and efficiency on the part of the AFCESA staff.

Benefit: Cost Control

The primary contractual incentive for superb contrac

p e rf o rmance under the AFCAP contract is the award f
“The award fee provides motivation for excellence in su

a reas as quality, timeliness, technical ingenuity, and c

e ffective management.”2 9 The AFCAP award fee is capp

at 6 percent and is comprised of 40 percent for cost c

t rol, 35 percent for technical perf o rmance, and 25 perc 

for management. Aw a rd amounts are determined ev

six months by the Aw a rd Fee Board, and the appro v 

a w a rd percentage is applied to all active task orders 

that period.

Benefit: Force Multiplier

Used as a force multiplier, the AFCAP contract can a

viate several manpower, equipment, and training issu

associated with sustained small-scale contingencies. Th

has been a substantial increase in the number of s

tained contingency deployments Air Force personnel h

supported over the last decade. As a result, home ba

worldwide have endured prolonged losses of both m

power and equipment to support these operations. Th

losses have resulted in higher “ops-tempo” at most ho

bases and have affected the level of base support provid

by many functions. Within civil engineering, for examp

the loss of manpower can degrade a squadron’s ability 

sustain facility maintenance and repair on an installati

Although augmentation of home base manpower is no

primary role of the AFCAP contract, it has the ability 

backfill manpower positions at home bases both wit

and outside the continental United States. The contr

can also provide supplies and equipment to alleviate dep

tion of critical war reserve materiel (WRM) stockpile lev

RMS is generally expected to provide transportation 

both personnel and equipment to the deployed locati

The Air Force may choose to provide airlift for RMS to s

cost; however, the Air Force maintains the flexibility of 

having to provide those lift assets.

Limitation: Nonhostile Work Environment

The AFCAP contract cannot be employed in hostile en

ronments. Under the Air Force’s program, the contract c

be used only in response to natural disaster crisis or sm

scale contingencies that are considered n o n h o s t i l e. If hos
activities should emerge, RMS and AFCESA would det

mine the appropriate time to disengage contractor forc e 

R e g a rdless of the situation, the US government is re s p o n 

ble for perimeter defense in both hostile and nonhos

e n v i ronments. By restricting contractor forces from hos

e n v i ronments, the Air Force limits its exposure to numero 

safety, security, and legal issues.

Other Limitations

The AFCAP contract cannot be used for purchase of su

plies. RMS is restricted to buying supplies in support of 

own operations. Air Force deployed forces depend on c

tingency contracting officers to provide local purchase su

port of supplies and services. On-site military command

often believe a loss of flexibility or responsiveness re s u 

when functions are contracted out. They have less cont

over contract employee actions and can not arbitra

assign tasks as could be done with military forces. As d

cussed in the LOGCAP section, the AFCAP contractor m

also be limited by SOFA and omnibus agreements and 

p roblems associated with hiring foreign nationals.

Significant Lessons Learned

AFCAP was used in December 1997 in reaction to 

typhoon that hit Anderson AFB and in the fall of 1998 

the aftermath of Hurricane Georges at Keesler AFB. A

result of those experiences, two key lessons learned w

generated. First, funding streams need to be address

The MAJCOMs provide the funding for AFCAP use, 

they do not budget for this use. This leads to sticker sho

when contingency costs are provided, even though AFC

is often cheaper compared to life cycle cost with W

assets. Second, commanders at deployed locations m

be educated immediately about the capabilities and lim

tions of AFCAP. As a result of these natural disaster ex

riences, the AFCESA project manager now provides tra

ing immediately upon contract initiation to prevent un

alistic staff expectations and facilitate smooth contr

execution.31
Joint Contract Analysis

After reviewing both contracts, it is apparent that 

LOGCAP and AFCAP contracts are similar in scope. The 

f e rences are due to (1) the Army’s broader need for servi

because of its reliance on Guard and Reserve units to p

vide CS and CSS and (2) the Air Force’s need for a susta

ment force to relieve its troops and equipment from the h

operations tempo that has been experienced since the e

of the cold war. Since the scope of the two contracts is s

i l a r, it would seem possible to develop a joint civil augm

tation program contract to meet the needs of both servic

A joint contract should eliminate duplication of services p

vided and streamline management oversight.

Requirements

The first step in developing a JCAP contract would be 

establish the re q u i rements of both services. Army re q u 

ments would obviously mirror the re q u i rements in 

LOGCAP SOW: (1) Preplanning to include maintenance a

updates of the WMSP, generic underdeveloped and dev

oped country management plans, and the nine RMPs a

(2) CS and CSS augmentation capability broken down 

the categories of supply operations, field services, engine

ing and construction, and maintenance and transportati

Air Force re q u i rements would mirror re q u i rements in 

AFCAP SOW and would focus on the functions perf o rm 

by Prime BEEF teams and Prime Readiness in B

Services (Prime RIBS) teams. The only Air Force uniq

re q u i rements to be added to the Army re q u i rements wo

be home base backfill shop support and airfield suppo

which includes airfield unique facilities, utilities, runway

taxiways/parking ramps, aircraft arresting systems, lig

ing, markings, and emergency power. Construction st

d a rds, as is currently the case in both the AFCAP and LO

CAP SOWs, would be based on JP 4-0.

Contract Type

The JCAP contract would be a task ord e r, indefin

quantity contract. Per Federal Acquisition Regulation (FA 

16.504(b) a task ord e r, indefinite-quantity contract 
a p p ropriate for acquiring services “when the Govern m 

cannot pre d e t e rmine, above a specified minimum, the p

cise quantities of services that will be re q u i red during 

contract period, and it is inadvisable for the Governmen

commit itself for more than a minimum quantity.”3 2 A g a i 

this basic contract, task orders can be written specify

the services re q u i red from the SOW to meet the needs of 

re q u e s t o r. Task orders would be CPAF except for the p

planning re q u i rements and the backfill shop re q u i remen

It is necessary for the government to shoulder the b

den of risk of the contract due to the many unknowns t

may occur in each contingency. The LOGCAP deploym

to Bosnia is an excellent example of the government sho

dering the burden of risk. Various campsites were built 

soil requiring more preparation than anticipated becau

of the harsh and wet Bosnian winter. The contractor co

peted with the military for local sources of supply, es

cially for geo-textile and gravel, which drove mate

prices up and required the contractor to ship or airfrei

material from the United States. Also, the shortage 

available trucking and rail service into the theater furt

compounded the problem of bringing supplies to the AO

Contract type for the JCAP contract would remain co

plus award-fee except for the firm fixed-price line items 

planning efforts and backfill shop support. CPAF is app

priate per FAR 16.405-2(b) because “(1) It is neither fea

ble nor effective to devise predetermined objective inc

tive targets applicable to cost, technical performance 

schedule; (2) the likelihood of meeting acquisition obj

tives will be enhanced by using a contract that effectiv

motivates the contractor toward exceptional performan

and provides the Government with the flexibility to eva

ate both actual performance and the conditions un

which it was achieved; and (3) any additional administ

tive effort and cost required to monitor and evaluate p

f o rmance are justified by the expected benefits

Furthermore, the contract must be able to meet the pr

ciples of logistics from JP 4-0. The CPAF-type task orde

especially supportive of two of the principles: responsi

ness and economy. JP 4-0 defines responsiveness as “

right support in the right place at the right time. Amo

the logistic principles, it is the keystone; all else becom
irrelevant if the logistic system cannot support the conc

of operations of the supported commander.” JP 4-0 defin

economy as “the provision of support at the least cost

The selection of CPAF makes perfect sense to reward 

contractor for achievement of these principles.

Guidelines for Use

Contingency need, as opposed to contractor capabil

should be the deciding factor for contract employment. T

Air Force intends to use its organic forces for ini

response to any contingency and then use civil augmen

tion as a replacement for these forces. The Air Force allo

the MAJCOM responsible for providing support to dec

whether or not to use the AFCAP contract. If the MAJCO

decides to use AFCAP, the contractor typically has 30 d

to respond. The Army has established decision criteria 

determine when to use LOGCAP, based on LOGCAP be

used as a last resort. Therefore, if military capability a

host-nation support are bypassed, the Army needs 

contract to provide the in-scope support requested. “Ar

practice has been to make the force self-sustaining for 

first 30 days in a contingency theater with the troops 

ing under field conditions.”35 These troops depend on co

tingency contracting officers for initial entry support. 

JCAP employment, the standard for full-up respon

should be 30 days from deployment of the first forces. T

contractor should be notified of any required work at 

onset of a military deployment. Until joint doctrine 

developed, the services should retain decision authority 

whether or not to use the contract. The Air Force, ho

ever, needs to follow the Army’s lead and develop decis

criteria for when to use a civil augmentation contract.

The JCAP contract must be employable in hostile en

ronments to meet Army needs. Restricting contractor op

ations to military operations other than war (MOOT

runs the risk of restricting contract use only to huma

tarian and disaster relief operations. LOGCAP operatio

in Bosnia, Somalia, and Haiti have proven MOOTW can 

as dangerous as war for the contractor. Instead of limit

contractor operations to nonhostile environments, the c

tractor and its employees must be provided a secure wo
ing environment. This can be accomplished by carefu

locating contractor operations to minimize risk and 

using military forces to protect the contractor. Ar

Regulation 700-137, Logistics Civil Augmentation Progr

(LOGCAP), specifies that each contract should set ope

tional boundaries for contractor personnel. “Norma

contractor personnel will not be used forward of 

brigade support area.”36 Thus, deliberate planning sho

task military forces to provide contractor security in a h

tile environment. Security provided by military for

should be a special provision in the contract. Contrac

personnel should be deployed during wartime conting

cies only after the area in which they will be working h

been secured.

When the decision is made to use JCAP, it is essen

that a team familiar with the contract deploy. The team 

necessary to provide the JTF staff and base command

an understanding of JCAP’s capabilities and how best 

integrate JCAP into the force structure. This team sho

consist of a program manager, contracting officer, en

neering technical representative, and a contract admin

tration representative from DCMD-I. The interface a

training provided by this team would augment the pea

time coordination that occurs on a regular basis with 

CINC’s logistics staff. The team should also insist on 

creation of a JCMEB, JFUB, and CLPSB, as explained 

JP 4-0, to prevent duplication of effort and requiremen

Training

P roper training of personnel is essential for JCAP s

cess. Engineering technical re p resentatives, administrat

contracting officers, and quality assurance evaluators n

to be trained before deployment since their first experien

with the contract will likely be during an actual depl

ment. Defense Contract Management Command (DCM

in support of its CCAS deployment teams, has developed 

excellent three-phase program to pre p a re its members 

deployment. The training provides CCAS teams, compos

of military and DOD civilian members, essential skills 

general mission readiness, specific mission inform a t i 

and identified AOR training. Just prior to deployme
DCMC provides the team with the most current missi

specific information and conducts a final deploym

re v i e w .3 7 Additionally, it also would be beneficial if 

requesting customers in the AOR were also trained bef

contract initiation. For such prolonged operations 

Bosnia, rotating personnel should receive the training pr

to deployment.

Benefits

The benefits of a JCAP contract are quite obvious. JC

adheres to the principles of unity of command and unity 

effort. One contractor coordinates the entire base oper

ing support for the joint task force. The contractor has 

capability to concentrate resources where needed and 

develop a common standard of support throughout 

theater. A JCAP contract allows the JTF commander 

meet his logistics responsibilities of “effective execution 

approved operations plans, the effectiveness and econo

of operation, and the prevention or elimination of unn

essary duplication of facilities and overlapping of functio

among the Service component commands.”38 Improv

efficiency of operations should result since one contrac

controls the entire operation.

One issue, not researched, impacting unity of effort 

who should provide funding for the contract. Should 

Air Force and Army still be required to provide the fund

to support individual, service-specific operations? Ea

service will want to use its own doctrine to determine h

to employ the contractor if it provides the funding. To su

port unity of effort, the funding stream for JCAP sho

flow from the supported combatant commander. Furt

investigation is required to develop a smooth process 

providing the unified CINC the budget to fund contrac

operations at the onset of a contingency.

Limitations

A JCAP contract would be subject to the many of 

same limitations identified in the LOGCAP and AFC

analyses: requirements for a secure work environme

contractor inclusion in SOFAs, and workforce dependa

ity (especially in hostile environments) and for dealing w
constrained lines of supply in an austere theat

Additionally, due to the bureaucracy inherent in any joi

ly managed contract, the JCAP management team w

need to maintain a strong focus on responsiveness to cu

tomer needs. Ultimately, JCAP must be responsive to 

individual commanders in the field in order to supp

effective and efficient theater operations. Award fee crite

must always grade the contractor on its ability to sat

the needs of field commanders and their troops. The p

gram management staff should be composed of joint s

vice representatives and be cognizant of the various ne

of the deployed commanders and their respective serv

doctrines. Finally, joint doctrine addressing contrac

operations in the battlefield has to be developed to ens

consistency in operations and expectations from theater 

theater.

Evaluation of Joint Doctrine

Over the past decade, the US military has continued 

rely upon contractor re s o u rces as a force multiplier in m

itary operations. However, there is limited information 

joint doctrinal publications re g a rding the use of civil a

mentation service contracts and the interface between c

tractor and military personnel during contingency ope

tions. As a result, each service has determined its own p

icy for the employment of civil augmentation programs a

developed its own contracts. In essence, the suppliers (i

Air Force and Army) are making the rules instead of 

customers (i.e., CINC, MAJCOM, or deployed command

The Army, out of necessity, has led the way in form a 

establishing its own civil augmentation doctrine.

In a 1998 white paper, the Army Training and Doctr

Command (TRADOC) took the first crucial step in ident

ing numerous issues, such as security and deployment 

contractors, that affect the employment of contractor su

port on the battlefield.3 9 The Army is currently drafting Fi

Manuel (FM) 100-10-XX, “Contracting Support to 

Battlefield” to address these doctrinal issues from 

A rmy’s perspective. However, it is imperative that su

re s o u rces as the Army white paper be consolidated and 
issues refined into a new or revised joint service publicati

The following section discusses several contractor- re l a 

issues that should be incorporated in joint doctrine.

Executive Agency

As stated previously, the GAO report highlighted t

the services provided under the LOGCAP, AFCAP, a

CONCAP contracts were similar in nature and that it mi

be more “effective and efficient” if one service acted as 

lead executive agent during contingency operatio

Current joint doctrine in JP 4-0, however, clearly sta

that the services are responsible for providing logist

support to their own forces. The combatant comman

through his combatant command (COCOM) responsib

ties has directive authority for logistics, which allows h

to establish theater priorities and review theater requi

ments. The combatant commander can also determ

that one service should be the lead agent in providing 

theater logistics support. In Operation Joint Endeav

“European Command designated US Army Contract

Command-Europe as executive agent for all US contra

ing in theater.”40 Such action occurs, however, only in l

ited situations when it is beneficial to the theater of op

ations. Also, a theater-by-theater lead executive ag

would not eliminate the duplication highlighted in the G

report. The secretary of defense could delegate lead exe

tive agent authority to the service with the preponderan

of forces in-theater—most likely the Army. 

However, delegating executive agency to one service c

ates the potential that the program will be responsive o

to one service’s needs. In 1995 the Air Force and the N

used LOGCAP for support in Aviano, Italy. Both reali

LOGCAP’s potential. However, Air Force and Navy emp

sis on responsiveness led to the development of th

respective programs. To overcome the executive agen

problem, a joint program office similar to the Joint Str

Fighter program should be created. The program direc

position would be filled by one service while the serv

acquisition executive responsibilities would be provided 

another service. This organizational set up would be 
interim step until joint doctrine for civil augmentat

support is established and JCAP matures past infancy.

Integration

Joint doctrine, in both JP 4-0 and JTF Commande

Handbook for Peace Operations, should establish how c

tractor-provided logistics support should be integra

into unified CINC planning and into the execution of m

tary operations. Currently, the Army has identified th

scenarios in which LOGCAP may be employed: first, at 

tial entry prior to arrival of the main task force; second

initial entry with a task force; or third, as a sustainm

force.41 However, as learned in Operation Joint Endeav

LOGCAP doesn’t necessarily excel in initial entry capab

ty especially when it doesn’t have the appropriate time 

set up operations. Greater synergy is realized through 

combined efforts of Air Force RED HORSE, Navy SeaBe

and LOGCAP contractor. Also, because of contractor sa

ty concerns and the inherent strength of the Air Forc

RED HORSE and Prime BEEF programs, the Air Force o

employs AFCAP in nonhostile, small-scale contingenc

This should not change in the future, as the Air Force h

no intention of decreasing its reliance on active duty R

HORSE and Prime BEEF forces to meet beddown requi

ments. CINC planners need to be aware of both contrac

and service capabilities and plan accordingly.

Joint doctrine should address the limitations of contr

tor responsiveness in civil augmentation. Normally, the c

tractor has 30 days to mobilize fully; there f o re, the milit

must provide alternative means of troop support until 

contractor is ready. Joint doctrine should also establ

parameters similar to the Army’s decision criteria for us

LOGCAP to determine when it is appropriate to use c

augmentation contracts. Adapting the JARB process for u

in deliberate planning would provide an excellent forum 

the application of the decision criteria. More importan

combatant commanders and their planning staffs need to 

involved in developing doctrine for contractor operations 

the joint environment. Since US Atlantic Comma

(USACOM) is charged with the responsibility of integrat

for joint operations, it would be logical for it to champ
this action. Once joint doctrine is established, JCAP sho

transition from the joint program office to the control 

USACOM due to its responsibility for the preponderance 

continental United States (CONUS)-based forces for use 

military operations.

Security

As discussed previously, protection of contractor p

sonnel on the battlefield is an important issue. “The g

ernment’s responsibility for providing force protect

derives from three factors: a legal responsibility to prov

a safe workplace, a contractual responsibility which 

stipulated in most contracts, and thirdly, to enable 

contractors to continue doing their job.”42 Army guidan

recommends against employment of contractors 

instances where the risk to contractor personnel is high 

extremely high, as defined by FM 100-14, Risk Mana

ment. The level of protection provided is situation dep

d e n t .4 3 For example, during LOGCAP operations 

Somalia, Haiti, and Bosnia, the contractor constantly tr

eled between base camps to provide required services. 

Somalia a military escort was usually required because 

the dangerous environment. However, in the Bosnia AO

the contractor logged nearly one million miles a mon

without dedicated escort by maintaining good thr

awareness and traveling with military convoys when p

sible.44 Security, therefore, will be an on-going concern 

military planners and deployed commanders. Doctrine 

JP 4-0 and the JTF Commander’s Handbook for Pe

Operations should define the maximum security risk 

deployment of contractors. It should require planners 

address contractor force protection, explain the secu

risks of deploying contractors as noncombatants to 

AOR, and outline how to mitigate these risks.

Status of Forces Agreement, Clearance,

and Host-Nation Restrictions

The legal status of contractor employees engaged in m

itary operations varies depending on several factors 

include the nature of the military operation (i.e., huma

tarian support versus hostile conflict) and the curr
agreements or restrictions with the host nation.45 “C

tractors are not automatically covered under SOFAs a

may be required to comply with local laws.”46 Planning 

the use of contractors must take into account the lo

political environment. Agreements need to be establish

to enable the contractor to operate with the same freed

as military personnel. “Laws and SOFAs always ta

precedence over contract provisions”;47 therefore, it is n

essary to address their impact on the contractor’s ability 

meet the requirements of the SOW. Currently, the Arm

requesting MACOM, which is located in-theater, and 

LOGCAP management team work these issues. Simila

the Air Force MAJCOM requiring AFCAP support 

responsible for working these types of issues with the St

Department and JTF commander. The Air Force relies 

the local US embassy to make sure all agreements 

coordinated at the appropriate level in the host nation 

ensure broad support. The contractor’s use of subcontr

tors with worldwide contacts also helps to alleviate 

problem of contractor personnel entering a foreign cou

try. The JTF Commander’s Handbook for Peace Operatio

should include additional SOFA guidance on contrac

operations and personnel. Annex D to JP 4-0, “Logis

Checklist for OPLANs,” should also address this issue.

Contractor and Military Force Integration

When developing the requirements for the SOW, pl

ners should address the level at which contract employ

and contractor operations will be integrated with milit

forces. In a contingency situation, contract employees c

be issued firearms and battle dress uniforms (BDU) 

personal protection and be billeted in the same co

pounds as military forces. However, contract employ

cannot be forced to comply with general orders regard

such issues as alcohol consumption unless specifica

stated in their contract. Commanders only have admin

trative authority over these employees. The types of actio

military commanders are authorized to take against c

tractor employees who violate commander policies 

restricted to withdrawing exchange privileges, withhold

medical care, or denying entrance to the military cam
Employment termination is the contractor’s responsibil

but contract provisions can specify removal conditions 

employee misconduct. Contractor employees, however, 

become subject to the Uniform Code of Military Just

during war.

48 Military commanders must weigh the be

fits of collocation, to include security and impact 

morale, with the cost associated with maintaining a se

rate contractor compound.

Planners must also address where the contractor sho

conduct its operations. “The planner should be concern 

with the cost, physical protection re q u i rements, and co

dination of the contractor’s re q u i rements with the milit

re q u i rements. This last factor is often overlooked. In 

a rea where facilities are limited, contractors may be co

peting with the military for facilities.”4 9 A JCMEB and JF

or JARB are excellent forums for making appropriate co

mand decisions and should be established in-theater.

Under AFCAP, the Air Force generally collocates the c

tractor on the military compound to provide security a

facilitate better communication with the contractor’s m

agement staff. When billeted in the same compound, 

contractor’s personnel have to abide by the same “gene

orders” as military personnel. The contractor’s award 

can be reduced if its personnel fail to support the on-s

commander’s directives.

Noncombatant Status

If the contractor’s employees can carry fire a rms, w

BDUs, and live and operate among military forces, a n

ural question is “Are they still considered noncomb

ants?” The answer is yes. The Law of Armed Conf

defines combatants generally as: “1) commanded by a p

son with responsibility; 2) [wearing] a fixed distinctive s

such as a uniform; 3) [carrying] arms openly; and 4) [c

ducting] operations in accordance with the Law of Wa r

The general legal interpretation of this definition lim

combatants to the members of armed forces of a party 

a conflict. All others are considered noncombatants a

include such individuals as prisoners of war, wounded 

sick personnel, chaplains, medics, and civilians. Be

noncombatants in the AOR, contractor employees 
generally not subject to direct, international attack, b

their presence does not hinder attack on legitimate m

tary targets. Although they can protect themselves, th

a re not allowed to violently resist capture . 5 1 The third a

fourth Geneva conventions establish a diff e rence betwe

the treatment of prisoners of war and civilians in time 

w a r. Persons who are not recognized officially as comb

ants and “who commit hostile acts about or behind ene

lines are not treated as prisoners of war and may be tr

and sentenced to execution or imprisonment.”5 2 The ris

for the contractor’s employees are, there f o re, mu

g reater in a hostile situation. Contractors do not want 

participate in a manner in which they could endan

their perceived status as noncombatants. For examp

B rown and Root and DynCorp resist having employ

wear BDUs. Planners and commanders who determ 

contractor scope of work need to be aware of the risks 

the contractor. 

Recommendations for Improvement

Joint doctrine regarding the employment of contrac

support in contingency and wartime scenarios should 

immediately developed. It should be based upon the l

sons learned in major contingency operations (i

Operation Joint Endeavor in Bosnia, Operation Uph

Democracy in Haiti, and Operation Restore Hope 

Somalia), the initial products generated by TRADOC, a

all other documents that provide useful guidance on t

issue. As highlighted earlier, joint doctrine for combat

commanders and their planners should address contrac

operations in the areas of predeployment planni

employment decision criteria, contractor-military fo

integration, security, force protection, and SOFA consid

ations.

Conclusion and Summary

Based on the issues raised in the GAO report on cont

gency operations, this re s e a rch paper addressed two imp

tant questions re g a rding the use of contractors in supp

of military operations. First, will a joint engineering a
logistics service contract provide the combatant and serv

commanders any benefit over maintaining individual Arm 

Air Force, and Navy service augmentation contrac

Second, does current joint doctrine adequately address 

use of contractor services in support of wartime and sm

er scale contingency operations? If not, what inform a t 

should be included in future joint doctrine?

This research effort provided an objective review of 

benefits and limitations of the Army’s LOGCAP and 

Force’s AFCAP contracts. It determined that both the Ar

and Air Force have developed excellent civil augmentat

programs that are responsive and tailored to each servic

individual needs. Additionally, several LOGCAP a

AFCAP lessons learned have been documented for fut

employment of contractors on the battlefield.

The re s e a rch analysis determined, however, that LO

CAP and AFCAP are very similar in scope, as was postu

ed in the GAO report. Each contract provides the sa

basic support activities to DOD customers while duplic

ing engineering and contracting management oversig

T h e re f o re, it is our recommendation that a JCAP contr

be established that will meet the needs of both servi

while eliminating duplication of effort. A joint contr

would provide unity of effort in meeting JTF comman

logistic responsibilities with an end result of improved e

ciency of operations. A JCAP is the next logical step in 

evolution of civil augmentation programs, as it would foc

d i rectly on the needs of the combatant commanders.

Again building upon the analysis of LOGCAP a

AFCAP, it has also been shown that current joint doctr

inadequately addresses the numerous issues regard

employment of contractors in the battlefield. JP 4-0, 

particular, needs to add guidance on contractor-provid

support during wartime and small-scale contingenc

Guidance on such issues as when and how to use c

augmentation contracts, security, host-nation restrictio

and contractor-military integration have to be provided 

planners and commanders for effective employment 

contractor operations during military operations.

Without question, civil augmentation programs 

proven force multipliers. Over the past decade, civil

contractors have been increasingly tasked to provide b
engineering and logistics support to military forces in c

tingency scenarios. It is crucial that joint doctrine be dev

oped to guide military commanders in the employment 

contractors on the battlefield. Ultimately, a JCAP sho

be developed to improve the effectiveness and efficiency 

government-contractor support.

N o t e s

1. Comptroller General of the United States, Report to Congressi

Requestors: Contingency Operations, Opportunities to Improve the Logis

Civil Augmentation Program (Washington, D.C.: GAO, February 1997)

2. Ibid., 5.

3. Ibid.

4. Headquarters Army Materiel Command, responses to Stud

Questionnaire, LOGCAP Project Management Office, January 1999.

5 . LOGCAP Statement of Wo r k, sec. J, attachment 1, cont

DAAB07-97-D-C759, 30 January 1997, 2.

6. David R. Gallay and Charles L. Horne III, LOGCAP Suppor

Operation Joint Endeavor: A Review and Analysis, report prepared for 

DOD (McLean, Va.: Logistic Management Institute [LMI], Septem

1996), 3.

7. John Purdon, LOGCAP contract specialist, CECOM Acquisi

Center, Fort Monmouth, N.J., interviewed by author, February 1999.

8. HQ US Army Materiel Command, LOGCAP Battlebook, Octo

1998, 11–26.

9. Gallay and Horne, 27.

10. Ibid., 23–25.

11. Ibid., 9.

12. Capt Thomas J. Snyder and Stella T. Smith, The Logistic

Waging War: US Military Logistics, 1982–1993, The End of “Brute Fo

L o g i s t i c s (Maxwell AFB–Gunter Annex, Ala.: Air Force Logis

Management Agency, 1998), 23.

13. Contractors on the Battlefield, white paper (Fort Eustis, Va.: A

TRADOC, February 1998), par. 10.a.(2).

14. David L. Young, Operational Planning for Contractors on 

Battlefield, paper submitted to the faculty of the Naval War Coll

Newport, R.I., 18 May 1998, 5.

15. Comptroller General, 15.

16. Young, 5.

17. Snyder and Smith, 34.

18. Initial Impressions Report Task Force Eagle Initial Operat

Operation Joint Endeavor, Army Issue VI: Sustain and Transition to Fu

Operations, Issue E: Sustainment Engineering, Center for Army Less

Learned (CALL), Combined Arms Assessment Team I—Bosnia for 

CALL.

19. Ibid.

20. Ibid.
2 1 . Joint Publication 4-0, Doctrine for Logistic Support of J

Operations, 27 January 1995, B-4–B-5.

22. Operation Joint Endeavor Lessons Learned, US Army Contrac

Command-Europe (USACCE), 3 April 1997, chap. 15.

23. Ibid.

24. Comptroller General, 18–19.

25. Final Acquisition Action Approval for AFCAP, signed by Darlee

Druyun, principal deputy assistant secretary, Acquisition 

Management, SAF/AQC, reference AP no. 96R6014 (96-AP-020), Octo

1996, 7.

26. Col Thomas McDonald, AF/ILEO, AFCAP Powerpoint prese

tion, March 1997.

27. GAO Questions for AFCAP, paper, Air Force Civil Engineer/C

February 1997.

28. Final Acquisition Action Approval for AFCAP, 6.

29. Ibid., 13.

30. Air Force Civil Engineer Support Agency, responses to Stud

Questionnaire, December 1998.

3 1 . AFCESA, “AFCAP Lessons Learned from Hurricane Geo

Recovery,” talking paper.

32. Federal Acquisition Regulation, pt. 16.504(b), Federal Acquisi

Circular 97-10, 16 February 1999.

33. Ibid., pt. 16.405-2(b).

34. JP 4-0, II-1–II-2.

35. Comptroller General, 17.

36. Army Regulation 700-137, Logistics Civil Augmentation Prog

(LOGCAP), December 1985, par. 3.2.d.(1).

37. Defense Contract Management District—International, Con

gency Contract Administration Services (CCAS) Training Plan, Novem

1998, 1-17.

38. JP 4-0, vi.

39. Contractors on the Battlefield, white paper.

40. Operation Joint Endeavor Lessons Learned.

41. LOGCAP Battlebook, 7.

42. Young, 6.

43. Contractors on the Battlefield, white paper, par. 10.

44. Young, 6.

45. Contractors on the Battlefield, white paper, par. 9.

46. Ibid., 7b.

47. Ibid., 2.

48. US Army, Law and Military Operations in Haiti, 1994–19

Center for Law and Military Operations, Judge Advocate General Sch

13a-60.

49. Young, 8.

50. Major Rockwell, USAF, Deployment of Civilians in Suppor

Military Operations, USAF/JAI Fact Paper, 10 June 97.

51. Ibid.

52. Lt Cmdr Stephen R. Sarnowski, JAGC, USNR, “The Status Un

International Law of Civilian Persons Serving with or Accompan

Armed Forces in the Field,” Army Lawyer, July 1994, 33.
Appendix A

The Army was the first service to develop the concept in 

and awarded its first LOGCAP contract in 1992. Althoug

Air Force and Navy could also utilize the LOGCAP contrac

Navy awarded its own version, the CONCAP, in 1995 and th

Force followed suit with the AFCAP contract in 1997. Acco

to a GAO report published in 1997, the Navy and Air Forc

tified development and award of their separate contracts b

upon improved contractor responsiveness and internal co

The GAO report, however, questioned the validity of exec

three separate contracts and stated that the services pro

under the separate contracts were very similar in nature

report implied that it may be more “effective and efficient” 

service acted as the lead executive agent to eliminate du

tion of services. The GAO report also noted that existing 

tary doctrine was vague in addressing how to properly inte

these contractor resources with the military force stru

during contingency situations.1

Notes

1. Comptroller General of the United States, Report to C o n g re s 

Requestors: Contingency Operations, Opportunities to Improve the 

tics Civil Augmentation Program ( Washington, D.C.: GAO, Feb

1997), 1–5.

33

Appendix B

The LOGCAP worldwide management and staffing pl

generic in nature and provides the strategy and methodo

re q u i red to support a force of 25,000 personnel during a co

gency scenario. This plan also provides additional detail to 

port the five major commander in chief areas of re s p o n s i 

E u ropean Command, Pacific Command, Atlantic Comm

S o u t h e rn Command, and Central Command. The second 

the generic undeveloped and developed country manage

plan, re q u i res a generic management plan for a Third W

u n d e rdeveloped nation and a plan for a more industria

diplomatically recognized nation. The objective of the third 

of plan, the regional management plan, “is to consolidate 

tics and engineering planning support and define re s o u rc e 

f r a s t r u c t u re common to specific countries/scenarios w

each defined region in planning for support in that re g i o n . ”

regional plans are currently being developed and maintain

D y n C o r p .

According to the LOGCAP management staff, the level 

tail in these plans is significant. The plans include the sce

how the contractor will accomplish its mission, the contra

internal operating procedures, and the total costs to su

the event with specific breakouts of labor, equipment, and 

sumable items. The plans are updated depending on 

amount of change that has occurred which affects the 

and individual requests from the MACOM. From this revi

is evident that the Army invests a great deal of resources in 

tingency preplanning and the generation and maintenan

both regional and worldwide management plans.

Notes

1. LOGCAP Statement of Work, sec. J, attachment 1, contract DAAB

97-D-C759, 30 January 1997, 3.

37

Appendix C

LOGCAP contractor augmentation may include but is not limite

Supply Operations Field Services Other Operation

and Services

- Class I (Rations) - Laundry and Bath - Maintenance

- Class II (Organizational - Clothing Exchange - Transportation

Clothing and Equipment

and Admin Supplies)

- Clothing Repair - Medical Services - Engineering and

Construction

- Food Service

- Class III (POL-Bulk - Mortuary Affairs - Signal

and Packaging)

- Sanitation - Retrograde

- Class IV (Construction - Billeting - Power Generation 

Materials) Distribution

- Facilities

- Class V (Ammunition) - Management - Stamis Operation

- Class VI (Personal - Morale, Welfare, and Recreation

Demand Items)

- Class VII (Major Items) - Information Management

- Class VIII - Personnel Support

(Medical Supplies)

- Class IX (Repair Parts)

Source: US Army Materiel Command, Briefing on Logistics Civi

mentation Program, 23 September 1998.

41

Appendix D

Army Decision Criteria:

- First the Army looks at whether it can support the o

tion using its own or sister services’ forces. It takes 

consideration such factors as unit availability, troop 

ing, ability to re-deploy to a major regional contingenc

availability, doctrinal employment, soldiers’ living c

tions, and operational costs.

- If it determines that using its own forces is not feasi

then determines whether host nation support can pr

the necessary support.

- If host nation support cannot meet its needs, the

Army will contract locally or use LOGCAP. A key fac

choosing this alternative is the Army’s ability to pr

adequate protection for the contractor against hosti

tion.1

Notes

1. David R. Gallay and Charles L. Horne III, LOGCAP Support in Op

Joint Endeavor: A Review and Analysis, report prepared for the Departm

Defense (McLean, Va.: Logistic Management Institute, September 1996).

45
Glossary

AOR area of responsibility

AFCAP Air Force Contractor Augmentation

Program

AFCESA Air Force Civil Engineer Support Agen

AMC Army Materiel Command

BDU battle dress uniform

CCAS Contingency Contracting Administrati

Services

CECOM Communications and Electronics

Command

CINC commander in chief

CLPSB CINC logistic procurement board

COCOM combatant command

CONCAP construction capabilities contract

CONPLAN concept plan

CONUS continental United States

CPAF cost-plus award-fee

CS combat support (Army)

CSS combat service support (Army)

DCMC Defense Contract Management Comm

DCMD-I Defense Contract Management Distric

International

DOD Department of Defense

FAR federal acquisition regulation

GAO General Accounting Office

JARB joint acquisition review board

JCAP joint civil augmentation program

47
JCMEB joint civil-military engineering board

JFUB joint facilities utilization board

JP joint publication

JSCP Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan

JTF joint task force

LOC lines of communication

LOGCAP Logistics Civil Augmentation Program

MACOM major command (Army)

MAJCOM major command (Air Force)

MOOTW military operations other than war

OPLAN operations plan

PCO procuring contracting officer

Prime BEEF Prime Base Engineer Emergency Force

(Air Force)

Prime RIBS Prime Readiness in Base Services

QAE quality assurance evaluation

RED HORSE Rapid Engineer Deployable Heavy

Operational Repair Squadron Enginee

RMP regional management plan

RMS readiness management support

SOFA status of forces agreement

SOW statement of work

TRADOC Training and Doctrine Command (Arm

USACE United States Army Corps of Engineer

USACOM United States Atlantic Command

WMP worldwide management plan

WMSP worldwide management and staffing p

WRM war reserve materiel

48