U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE

WASHINGTON : 

For sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office

Internet: bookstore.gpo.gov Phone: toll free (866) 512–1800; DC area (202) 512–1800

Fax: (202) 512–2250 Mail: Stop SSOP, Washington, DC 20402–0001

89–006 PDF 2003

VOICES OF THE SMALL HANDFUL: 1989 STUDENT

MOVEMENT LEADERS ASSESS HUMAN RIGHTS

IN TODAY’S CHINA

ROUNDTABLE

BEFORE THE

CONGRESSIONAL-EXECUTIVE

COMMISSION ON CHINA

ONE HUNDRED EIGHTH CONGRESS

FIRST SESSION

JUNE 2, 2003

Printed for the use of the Congressional-Executive Commission on China

(

Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.cecc.gov

CONGRESSIONAL-EXECUTIVE COMMISSION ON CHINA

LEGISLATIVE BRANCH COMMISSIONERS

House Senate

JIM LEACH, Iowa, Chairman

DOUG BEREUTER, Nebraska

DAVID DREIER, California

FRANK WOLF, Virginia

JOE PITTS, Pennsylvania

SANDER LEVIN, Michigan

MARCY KAPTUR, Ohio

SHERROD BROWN, Ohio

DAVID WU, Oregon

CHUCK HAGEL, Nebraska, Co-Chairman

CRAIG THOMAS, Wyoming

SAM BROWNBACK, Kansas

PAT ROBERTS, Kansas

GORDON SMITH, Oregon

MAX BAUCUS, Montana

CARL LEVIN, Michigan

DIANNE FEINSTEIN, California

BYRON DORGAN, North Dakota

EXECUTIVE BRANCH COMMISSIONERS

PAULA DOBRIANSKY, Department of State*

GRANT ALDONAS, Department of Commerce*

D. CAMERON FINDLAY, Department of Labor*

LORNE CRANER, Department of State*

JAMES KELLY, Department of State*

JOHN FOARDE, Staff Director

DAVID DORMAN, Deputy Staff Director

* Appointed in the 107th Congress; not yet formally appointed in the 108th

Congress.

(II)

(III)

C O N T E N T S

Page

STATEMENTS

Liu, Gang, senior engineer, Aerie Networks, Denver, CO ................................... 2

Tong, Yi, associate, Gibson, Dunn, & Crutcher, LLP, New York, NY ................ 5

Wang, Dan, student, department of history and east Asian languages, Harvard University, Cambridge, MA ........................................................................ 7

APPENDIX

PREPARED STATEMENTS

Liu, Gang .................................................................................................................. 24

Tong, Yi .................................................................................................................... 39

Wang, Dan ................................................................................................................ 41

(1)

VOICES OF THE SMALL HANDFUL: 1989 STUDENT MOVEMENT LEADERS ASSESS HUMAN

RIGHTS IN TODAY’S CHINA

MONDAY, JUNE 2, 2003

CONGRESSIONAL-EXECUTIVE

COMMISSION ON CHINA,

Washington, DC.

The roundtable was convened, pursuant to notice, at 2:30 p.m.,

in room 2200, Rayburn House Office building, John Foarde [staff

director] presiding.

Also present: David Dorman, deputy staff director of the Commission; Karin Finkler, office of Representative Joe Pitts; Susan

Weld, general counsel; Andrea Worden, senior counsel; and Keith

Hand, senior counsel.

Mr. FOARDE. Good afternoon. Today, our Commission joins the

many people around the world who commemorate the 14th anniversary of the brutal government suppression of a peaceful student

and workers’ protest in and around Tiananmen Square in Central

Beijing on June 3 and 4, 1989.

All of us who care about China, who care about the Chinese people and their future, and who care about U.S.-China relations remember June 4, 1989, very well, and we continue to be affected by

it.

But rather than look back, we have asked our three distinguished panelists this afternoon to give us their views about the

human rights situation in China today and offer some thoughts

about what the immediate future in China might look like.

Each of our three panelists was active in the democracy movement in China during 1989 in his or her own way, and all three

continued this work after June 4. Each suffered detention and punishment for his or her activities. Each eventually made his or her

way to the United States.

So we are especially privileged to have Liu Gang, Tong Yi, and

Wang Dan here this afternoon to share their views with us.

Panelists, as we have done in previous roundtables, we will ask

each of you to make a presentation of about 10 minutes in length.

After 8 minutes, I will tell you that you have 2 minutes remaining,

and that is your signal to wrap things up.

Inevitably, there are more points that you want to make than

you have time for, and we will try to pick up those points during

our question and answer session after each of you have had a

chance to speak.

2

So let me now introduce our first speaker, Mr. Liu Gang. Liu

Gang started the Democratic Salon in 1988 at Beijing University,

and also established the Beijing Autonomous Association of Students in 1989.

Both of these organizations played important roles in the prodemocratic movement in China, especially the 1989 Beijing Spring

democracy movement. Most of each group’s members became leaders of the students at Tiananmen Square.

Liu Gang and the Beijing Autonomous Association of Students

organized most of the demonstrations in 1989, and after the democracy movement was crushed, Liu was arrested and sentenced to 6

years in prison.

He escaped from China and moved to the United States in 1996.

Since he began working as a scientist at Bell Laboratories, Mr. Liu

has published many technical papers and has been granted over 10

patents.

We are delighted to have you here this afternoon. Thank you for

coming all the way to the east coast to join us. Mr. Liu Gang.

STATEMENT OF LIU GANG, SENIOR ENGINEER, AERIE

NETWORKS, DENVER, CO

Mr. LIU. Thank you. First, I want to thank the members and

staff of the Commission for inviting me to give my views on the democracy movement in China.

The democracy movement of 1989 was not a new occurrence that

suddenly sprang to life in the spring of that year. The movement

of 1989 had many ancestors in China.

All of us who participated could look back in history to Sun Yatsen and Lu Xun for inspiration and even to such Communist Party

leaders as Peng Dehuai and Hu Yaobang.

The jailed dissidents such as Wei Jingsheng, Zhang Zhixin, and

Liu Xiaobo were the fathers of our modern movement. Physics professor Fang Lizhi was our teacher and showed us how to stand up

to the Party and to speak out for democracy and reform.

The students who joined the democracy movement had the opportunity to learn about the importance of non-violence from reading

about Mahatma Gandhi and Martin Luther King, Jr.

Certainly the dissidents in other Communist countries were examples for us. We learned about resistance from Lech Walesa,

Vaclav Havel, and Alexander Dubchek from foreign literature.

The students of the 1980s were different. The student movement

itself had been preparing for several years before 1989. Many students, teachers, and middle-level government employees had been

holding meetings in Beijing and all of China to discuss how to organize a democratic movement and what democracy would mean to

China.

We even held outdoor meetings, what we call ‘‘Democratic Salons,’’ on the Beijing University campus. The Beijing Social Economic Institute and other groups had laid the groundwork for the

democracy movement, and many of their members played a key

role in Tiananmen Square.

Only the timing of the demonstrations was spontaneous. It was

initiated by the death of Hu Yaobang, who had been dismissed in

3

disgrace for being too soft on the students who had held demonstrations in 1986.

So none of the planners controlled the actual start of the movement. It just erupted hours after Hu’s death in Beijing and on campuses throughout China. Chinese students in 1989 were much

more active than other groups. There are many reasons for this.

Groups other than students, such as workers and the mid-level

employees, were easily punished by the Chinese Communist Party

[CCP] Government. Since they could lose their jobs and even be

jailed, it was hard for them to join the democracy movement in

China.

However, once the movement had been started and many people

became involved, it became harder for the government to track

down all the participants, so workers and other groups would feel

less risk and join the democracy movement.

Many workers joined 1989’s democratic movement because of

massive corruption they had to deal with daily. Their participation

also shows that most of the Chinese want to enjoy freedom and

want to change the Communist regime. They were fully aware that

the movement was about freedom.

The Voice of America [VOA] is still one of the best ways of communicating with the Chinese people and getting the truth out. Before and during the 1989 democracy movement, we could find out

what was happening in the world and we could speak out to the

world through the VOA.

The VOA also gave us the news inside of China. We had pretty

primitive communications in 1989, fax, long-distance phone lines,

and students traveling from one place to another. All of this took

money, when the students had very little money.

But Voice of America broadcasts every day told us in what cities

the demonstrations had started and how large they were. From

VOA, we knew the Solidarity labor union in Poland, the Prague

spring, as well as other democratic movements happened all over

the world.

Then we were inspired to have our own solidarity union and to

start our Beijing spring. I do not think we could have made the

advancements we did without the VOA. I hope that the U.S. Government will continue to support such kinds of priceless services,

including VOA and Radio Free Asia.

Western journalists broadcasted our story and interviewed many

Chinese students. They explained our positions to the outside world

and other parts of China. Western news reports were copied and

circulated through the student community. Our petitions are usually first broadcast by Western news agencies. Western diplomatic

officials in China also played important roles in the democratic

movement in China.

Winston Lord, the former American Ambassador in Beijing, and

Betty Bao, his wife, frequently gave speeches at our Democratic

Salon and other cultural seminars in Beijing. Their attendance and

speeches inspired our Chinese people to a great degree. The opportunities to meet with Western diplomatic officials are considered a

great honor for most Chinese.

I must say that most Chinese, including high-ranking CCP officials, would be more interested in meeting with the American

4

Ambassador than meeting with the highest ranking CCP officials,

including Deng Xiaoping, at that time.

After Winston Lord gave a speech on June 1, 1988, at our salon

in Beijing University, some other Western diplomatic officials, including those from Britain, Australia, and even some high-ranking

CCP officials, including Wang Meng, the former minister of the

Ministry of Culture, and Deng Pufang, the eldest son of Deng

Xiaoping, all showed interest in giving speeches to our salon.

By meeting with Western officials, we Chinese not only knew

more about the way of freedom, but also felt more safe and protected. The CCP Government seldom punished people because of

contacts with Western officials. If anyone was punished because of

these contacts, we believed that Western countries would strongly

appeal for our freedom and human rights.

Believe me, the CCP Government listens more to the American

Government, to the American Ambassador, than to the Chinese

people. Furthermore, the Chinese people respect the American Ambassador more than the Chinese Government. So, I wish that the

current American Ambassador in Beijing would do the same as

Winston Lord and Betty Bao did during the 1980s.

I would also like to mention Congresswoman Nancy Pelosi. When

I was in prison, my sister delivered to me some postcards from her.

I heard that she went to Tiananmen Square and expressed her concern about human rights in China when she visited in China in

1992.

I was really excited and inspired when I found out that she and

other American politicians were consistently appealing for us. I am

really thankful to her and all other Congress members who paid

attention to my case, and the cases of other who were imprisoned

for supporting democracy in China.

Finally, my thanks to all of you for your consistent concern and

appeals for releasing Chinese political prisoners. I want to thank

the American people for providing us with political asylum here.

I hope you do not forget the political prisoners, including Wang

Bingzhang, Wang Youcai, Yao Fuxin, Xiao Yunliang, Huang Qi, as

well as the thousands of Falun Gong practitioners who are jailed

in China.

I hope you will continue to speak out for them until all political

prisoners are released. Please remember that your voices are a

very effective tool when talking with the CCP Government.

Thanks.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Liu appears in the appendix.]

Mr. FOARDE. Mr. Liu, thank you very much.

Our next panelist is Ms. Tong Yi. Tong Yi was a student at the

China University of Political Science and Law in 1989 and served

as first secretary to the Beijing College Students Dialogue Delegation during the Tiananmen demonstrations.

She later served as an international liaison to Wei Jingsheng,

and for this work was detained and sentenced to 21⁄2 years of administrative detention in a reeducation through labor camp in

1996.

In 1997, she came to the United States and subsequently obtained a law degree at Columbia University. Information that she

provided about her time in reeducation through labor formed the

5

basis of Human Rights in China’s first report on the practice of

‘‘custody and repatriation [C&R].’’ The report was called ‘‘A Report

on Administrative Detention Under Custody and Repatriation,’’

which was released in 1999.

Ms. Tong currently serves on the board of directors of Human

Rights in China and is an associate in the litigation department in

New York city of the international law firm, Gibson, Dunn, &

Crutcher.

Ms. Tong.

STATEMENT OF TONG YI, ASSOCIATE, GIBSON, DUNN, &

CRUTCHER, LLP, NEW YORK, NY

Ms. TONG. Thank you very much for having me here. Today I am

going to talk about a specific administrative punishment system in

China, ‘‘custody and repatriation.’’

While the SARS outbreak has drawn attention all around the

world, an individual murder case has attracted attention inside

China. The case exposes the serious police abuse that routinely

takes place within the PRC’s custody and repatriation system.

My own personal impressions of this system are very vivid, because in 1996, I spent a hellish 11 days within its clutches. I am

now glad for the opportunity to call your attention to this system

of police-sponsored kidnapping that relies on ‘‘regulations’’ that are

unconstitutional by PRC legal standards. On the C&R issue, China’s human rights certainly have not improved since 1989. They

clearly have gone the other direction.

Sun Zhigang, a college graduate from Hubei Province, went to

Guangzhou early this year to take up employment. On the night

of March 17, police in Guangzhou detained him for failing to show

a temporary resident permit and sent him to a C&R center. Three

days later, a friend of Sun’s was notified to collect his body from

the center’s infirmary.

Sun’s parents in Hubei, incredulous at what had happened to

their son, traveled to Guangdong and approached government

agencies seeking a ‘‘reason’’ why their son had died.

After a month of watching their inquiries fall upon deaf ears,

they decided to bring the story to the Southern Metropolitan News,

which did its own investigation and then published a full account

on April 25. Their conclusion was that Sun was beaten to death

during his 72-hour stay in the C&R center.

Other local and national newspapers then picked up the story

and it quickly became a national issue. Controversy now centers on

three questions: (1) the criminal investigation of cases like this; (2)

the prevalence of police brutality; and (3) the constitutionality of

the C&R system.

The C&R system arose from a 1961 Party directive entitled ‘‘Forbidding Free Movement of the Population.’’ In 1982, the State

Council added ‘‘Measures for the Custody and Repatriation of Vagrant Beggars in Cities.’’

The ostensible purpose of these orders was to provide shelter for

homeless people in cities. More fundamentally, though, the goal

was to strengthen the ‘‘hukou’’ registration system, which privileges urban over rural residents in many ways.

6

A full account of the evils of the ‘‘hukou’’ system is beyond my

scope here, but the system’s fundamental purpose from the government’s viewpoint has always been to enforce the social stability

upon which the security of its political rule depends.

The Party and State Council directives provide a warrant for arresting and deporting back to the countryside any farmer who enters a city ‘‘illegally,’’ even sometimes any urbanites who came from

another city illegally.

Because of the original claim of connection between C&R and

welfare, the day-to-day activities of C&R centers fall under the

Ministry of Civil Affairs. In practice, however, the public security

apparatus, especially local police, run the system.

Detainees in C&R centers tend to be the poor, the mentally ill,

migrant workers, women and children who have been kidnapped

for sale on an underground market, and ‘‘petitioners,’’ meaning

people who have entered cities to seek redress of injustices from

government officials.

Estimates of the numbers detained since 1989 run into the tens

of millions. According to the recent report by Human Rights in

China, in 2000 alone the number was 3.2 million. So now C&R

really is widely and expansively used by the Chinese Government

to control population movement.

High-sounding language about ‘‘welfare’’ notwithstanding, the

C&R system for more than a decade has been dominated by extortion. Police use it to kidnap the powerless and demand ransom

from their families or friends.

The state goes along with this because it serves ‘‘stability,’’ and

because the system can be used to clean up riffraff, and thereby

‘‘beautify’’ city streets in advance of august events like a Party

Congress, the visit of a foreign dignitary, especially during President Bush’s visit, or a bid to host the Olympics. All such values

trump the rights of ordinary citizens.

Arbitrary detention. The most vulnerable citizens are ‘‘Three

No’s’’ people, those with no ID card, no temporary resident permit,

and no work permit. Even people who have such documents can be

swept up if they dress shabbily, have funny-sounding accents, or

seem to loiter.

Recently, a migrant worker who was picked up for his outlandish

accent made the mistake of showing his documents, only to have

he police rip them up and bring him to a C&R center anyway.

Physical abuse. The conditions in the C&R centers are about as

bad as one can imagine. Food and sanitary conditions are abominable, worse than in regular prisons and labor camps.

I had very acute experiences in three places, one in the detention

center, one in the ‘‘reeducation center’’ the labor camp, and one in

the C&R center. Among these three, C&R’s conditions definitely

were the worst.

Detainees are routinely subjected to beatings by police or by cell

bosses. Sun Zhigang is by no means the only detainee to have died

from the torture and the beatings.

Extralegal ransom. For the police, the possibility of using the

C&R system to collect ransom becomes an incentive to detain as

many people as possible. With the collapse of public morality during China’s post-Mao years, added to the devil-take-the-hindmost

7

pursuit of money, there are no effective brakes on this kind of

abuse of police power. C&R becomes an open field from which police rip off whatever they can.

I experienced a small taste of this practice in my own case. In

late 1996 when I was released from 21⁄2 years of reeducation

through labor, I traveled from Wuhan to Beijing to see my sister.

Police met me at the Beijing railway station and sent me straight

to an C&R center with no explanation.

I spent 11 days without enough food. Then the police repatriated

me back to Wuhan. When I arrived, my parents were forced to pay

for my room and board during C&R and my train ticket back.

After the media publicized Sun’s story, the central government

very quickly released investigation results, where 30 suspects have

been arrested. None of them were police officers. But among the

Chinese, people are very suspicious about the results. This was

widely spread among the Chinese who believed that Sun Zhigang

was beaten to death by uniformed policemen.

Another interesting development is that three citizens petitioned

the National People’s Congress to question the constitutionality of

the whole C&R system. They argued that, according to article 37

of the Constitution, a citizen’s freedom can only be infringed

through court with a trial.

Now, the C&R system can deprive citizens’ freedom just randomly, just according to the whim of the police. So anybody who’s

interested in China’s rule of law development may follow this case

very closely.

In conclusion, I call your attention to the very horrible custody

and repatriation system, and hope you can put whatever pressure

you can to abolish the entire system.

Thank you very much.

[The prepared statement of Ms. Tong appears in the appendix.]

Mr. FOARDE. Ms. Tong, thank you very much, not the least for

your discipline. You were right on time. We appreciate that.

Our third panelist this afternoon is Mr. Wang Dan. In 1989,

Wang Dan was a freshman at Beijing University and became a

leader of the Autonomous Federation of Students. After the student

movement was suppressed on June 3 and 4, Wang was arrested

and sentenced to 4 years in prison.

Released in 1993, he was re-arrested in 1995 for subversion and

sentenced to 11 years. In 1998, after 3 more years in prison, he

was released on medical parole and came to the United States,

where he is currently a graduate student in history and East Asian

languages at Harvard University.

Welcome, Wang Dan.

STATEMENT OF WANG DAN, STUDENT, DEPARTMENT OF HISTORY AND EAST ASIAN LANGUAGES, HARVARD UNIVERSITY,

CAMBRIDGE, MA

Mr. WANG. Thank you very much. First, I want to thank the

Commission for allowing me the opportunity to share some of my

opinions and ideas. It is my great honor to be able to speak before

you today.

It has been 14 years since the June 4 Tiananmen Massacre of

1989. If we want to attempt to summarize the changes in China

8

over these past 14 years, I think there are three things that need

to be noted.

First, I think we can all agree that there has been much progress

in China in terms of economic freedoms. Second, even at the social

level, people have more space for freedom.

But in terms of democratic politics and political reform, I can say

that there really has been no change or progress whatsoever. The

lack of transparency and openness was most notably revealed in

the recent case of the cover-up of the SARS epidemic.

With respect to this latter situation, I have five points to share

with you today. I think we can admit that there has been some

progress on human rights. But I think that this progress, at least

partly if not completely, is due to the pressure from the international community.

As an example, we can look at the period between 1992 and

1997. During that time, there was consistent, considerable pressure

from the West. As a result, human rights violations in China

decreased notably.

After 1997, however, when the pressure was relaxed, there was

substantial erosion of China’s human rights record. Therefore, I

strongly believe that the United States and other Western countries should keep up their pressure on China to improve its human

rights situation.

I disagree with those who fear that if the United States keeps

up its human rights pressures on China, that this will have a negative effect on Sino-U.S. relations.

Second, it is obvious that China still lacks a mature civil society.

However, over the last 14 years we have witnessed the gradual

emergence of a developing civil society. I think it is very important

that the United States pay attention to these sprouts of civil society in China and do all that it can do to cultivate them.

I believe that it is short-sighted for the U.S. Government only to

focus on the actors in the Chinese Government and the Chinese

Communist Party. Therefore, I think that U.S.-China policy should

move from only on human rights issues to other issues of political

reform and democratic politics.

One of the things that the United States can do is to provide support for NGOs and universities in China as a way to promote social

contacts.

Third, as the United States is facing the challenge of terrorism

in the new century, I can completely understand the necessity to

strengthen its strategy against terrorism.

However, I am worried that an unfortunate side-effect of this

strategy may be a tightening of the U.S. policy that allows Chinese

students and scholars to come to the States for exchanges, studies,

and visits.

As one of the beneficiaries of this program myself, as well as a

beneficiary of the human rights pressure from the international

community, I sincerely hope that this will not occur.

The current generation of overseas Chinese students sooner or

later may return to China, and I believe they will be a motivating

force for the further development of reform in China, including

political reform.

9

Therefore, I think it is important that the U.S. Government

allow this door to remain open, and to even open it wider by expanding its contacts with the Chinese students already in America.

Fourth, it is not enough for the U.S. Government merely to take

a general stand to promote democracy in China. I think a more detailed and in-depth strategy is required, for instance, based on specific cases such as projects promoting the rule of law, freedom of

the press, or workers’ rights.

There are many worthwhile projects that are being undertaken

in China today and my colleagues and I would be happy to introduce them to you. However, I think a note of caution is necessary

with respect to support from the United States to projects being

carried out within China.

This is a very sensitive issue. There is a thin line between seeing

support for such projects because they are meant to help China and

seeing support for such projects because they are meant to prevent

China from becoming strong.

It is very easy for many Chinese people to misinterpret the

intentions from abroad. Therefore, it is advisable to first make contact with the liberal intellectuals in China who are more openminded about aid and support from abroad.

Finally, when I noted above that the United States should transfer its focus from human rights issues to democracy, I do not mean

to imply that human rights are not important. I would like to use

this chance to raise the cases of Wang Bingzhang, which I am sure

you are all aware of; Yang Jianli, who attempted to return to

China last year and since then has been held incommunicado by

the Chinese Government; and Li Hai, who reported information to

the outside world about prisoners in China and as a result was

sentenced in 1995 to 9 years; and Yang Zili, who organized political

discussions and now faces a long-term sentence; and Huang Qi,

who uses the Internet to spread ideas of political reform and last

month was sentenced to 5 years in prison.

I think China is now entering a crucial period. It is impossible

to predict whether future development will be positive or negative.

But there is one thing that we certainly can all be sure of: there

are a number of things that we on the outside can do to help

China. Even though I am studying now in America, my long-term

plan remains to return to my country.

Working together with a group of young, educated Chinese in the

United States and elsewhere who are concerned about China’s

future, we hope to increase cooperative efforts with all parts of

American society, including Congress, to bring about eventual political change in China.

Thank you very much.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Wang appears in the appendix.]

Mr. FOARDE. Thank you very much, Mr. Wang.

Three excellent presentations, lots of interesting ideas, with a

look backward, but also a look forward.

We would now like to go to our question and answer session.

Each of us up here will get the chance to ask and listen to the responses to questions for 5 minutes, then we will pass the privilege

of questioning you on to another colleague. We will keep going until

we either run out of steam or 4 o’clock, whichever comes first.

10

I would like to exercise the privilege of the Chair and ask a question or two to begin with.

The first question is addressed to Ms. Tong. The photograph that

you showed, I want to just establish for the record what it is so we

can get it into the written record. It is definitely a picture of a prisoner being abused by uniformed personnel, right?

Ms. TONG. Yes.

Mr. FOARDE. Do you have any idea who the person is or when

the picture was taken, and where it was taken?

Ms. TONG. I do not. I just received this photo in my e-mail box

last week, or 2 weeks ago.

Mr. FOARDE. All right.

Ms. TONG. It is widely believed that Sun Zhigang was beaten to

death in this fashion. In this photo, the victim is apparently in the

police station, beaten up by three uniformed police officers.

Mr. FOARDE. And he looks like he is being forced to drink something, probably.

Ms. TONG. No. I think he is in a coma already and the police are

trying to wake him up by pouring water on his face.

Mr. FOARDE. All right.

Mr. WANG. Actually, I found this photo on the Internet. Some

people just change the picture. They asked, who took this picture?

The person who distributed this picture said that some of the

friends of the police took the photo, and the person who was persecuted there was a Falun Gong practitioner. Some people asked

why these policemen can permit people to take such pictures.

Mr. FOARDE. People take pictures of very strange things, I agree.

But there is no telling exactly when or where the picture was

taken, as far as you know. It is circulating relatively widely in

China, is that correct?

Mr. WANG. Right.

Ms. TONG. Right.

Mr. FOARDE. All right.

Ms. Tong, I would ask you another question or two about custody

and repatriation, an issue that we have been looking at and are

very concerned about, as you are.

Are the authorities using C&R as a technique in either Beijing,

Shanghai, or elsewhere to relocate residents for the purposes of redeveloping neighborhoods for modernization?

Ms. TONG. I think not. I think the C&R system is designed to

keep outsiders, especially people from the countryside, from entering into the cities. But the current economic developments made

the leadership realize that restriction on the movement of the population is impossible, so they set up this very complicated regulation system.

In each province, in each city, they have a local regulation to

limit the free movement of the outsiders. The victims of this system

mostly are the people from rural areas, and sometimes people like

me.

I come from Wuhan, and when I went to see my sister in Beijing,

right at the railway station, the police picked me up, without telling me why they detained me, why they sent me to the C&R center.

Later, the Wuhan police told my parents at their end that my

arrest was because I did not have an ID card. I did not have a resiVerDate 11-MAY-2000 10:24 Sep 08, 2003 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00014 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 89006.TXT China1 PsN: China1
11

dency permit card or a work permit card, either, so I was a ‘‘Three

No’’ person.

But my parents said, ‘‘Oh, she went to Beijing to pick up this ID

card from the Beijing police. That is why she went there in the first

place. How could you detain her? ’’

Also, they did not give me a 3-day grace period. According to the

regulation, everybody who goes to a different city has a 3-day grace

period. Within those 3 days you can go to report to the local police

and register. In my case, I was picked up directly from the railway

station.

So they used this system to persecute political dissidents as well.

In the Beijing center, there is a group of petitioners. Their fate is

least known to the outside world. I had very intensive interaction

with them during my 11 days, I feel as though these people were

the real heroes. They got no attention, but they persisted. The injustice imposed on them was horrendous.

Mr. FOARDE. I am out of time. I am going to yield the floor to

my friend and colleague, Dave Dorman, who is the deputy director

of the Commission staff and represents the office of our Co-chairman, Senator Chuck Hagel.

Dave.

Mr. DORMAN. First of all, I would like to echo what John just

said and thank each member of this very distinguished panel who

came today to speak to us. We are addressing an important issue

today and are certainly grateful for you coming to help us understand it.

I would like to focus my question on a comment that was in Mr.

Wang Dan’s testimony, and perhaps ask each of you to comment

on that, if you would be willing.

In your testimony, Wang Dan, you mentioned that there have

been improvements in economic freedom in China, perhaps improvements in social freedom as well, but absolutely no change in

terms of political freedom or democratic reform.

As you know, there are many people in this country who believe

that increased economic freedom, and perhaps increased social freedom, may create the environment, or may create the open space

necessary, for political freedom to develop. I am wondering the extent to which you think that is possible in China. Could each of you

address this issue?

Mr. LIU. By all means, I personally disagree with this point. I

know where this point comes from, but I disagree with it. I do

think we have a real middle class in China. There are officials that

have a lot of involvement with the government. They are now the

real middle class. So there is no hope for the middle class supporting democracy. That is one problem.

I think even though we have economic freedom, we are not seeing democracy, because of what happened in Malaysia or Indonesia. They all had a very good economy a long time ago, and then

they got into trouble. So these cases show me that is not a necessary situation in the future.

Ms. TONG. I want to add a point. I call your attention to the Chinese community here in the United States, which is a highly educated and most cultivated group of people among the Chinese. Yet

12

most of them want to go back to business in China and they try

to take advantage of both worlds.

Here, they can take advantage of political freedom. They have

freedoms of all kinds. Then in China, they can take advantage of

the economic development. Yet, even under the very tight political

oppression, they can still develop. Some people really become millionaires overnight, and they enjoy that.

I am trying to point out that this phenomenon needs your attention. I totally disagree with the premise that economic development

can lead to political freedom in China automatically. The fact of the

matter is that the opposite is true.

The Chinese Government has actually used the political control

system to control the Internet, for example, which is a new phenomenon, and used economic opportunity to develop their control

system.

For example, they give money to the State Security Ministry and

also give money to the Public Security Bureau so that they can better control the migration of the population, and their freedom of

speech. They also control the media. The recent events have shown

that the government has more power and more capacity to do that.

Mr. WANG. Actually, I want to say that most Chinese want freedom, both economic and political. But which will come first? I think

most Chinese do not care whether economic freedom comes first or

political freedom comes first. They will be fine. They are hoping for

both of them. But no one knows what the relationship is between

the two, if economic freedom comes and political freedom follows up

immediately.

Mr. DORMAN. Thank you very much.

Mr. FOARDE. Next, I would like to recognize a colleague representing the office of Congressman Joe Pitts of Pennsylvania,

Karin Finkler.

Karin.

Ms. FINKLER. My question is for Tong Yi about the C&R centers.

Can you give some insight into how you think that U.S. officials

should address this issue with Chinese officials in discussions or

through whatever method you think?

Ms. TONG. The C&R system is like the ‘‘Reeducation Through

Labor’’ system, which is an administrative punishment that can deprive normal citizens of their freedom without going through a trial

or legal procedure. I think another aspect of the Sun Zhigang case,

which I did not have time to address, is the two petitions made to

the National People’s Congress [NPC] recently, one on May 14 and

one on May 23.

Eight legal scholars filed two petitions to the NPC, saying that

the Administrative Punishment Law and the Legislation Law both

provide that a person’s freedom cannot be infringed upon just by

the whim of police officers. The conditions under which the police

can do this should be promulgated by laws. And laws, by definition,

should only be passed by the NPC, not the State Council or the

councils of each province.

This challenge to the constitutionality of the C&R system is a

phenomenal development in China because it means that Chinese

citizens used the Constitution as a weapon to restrain the power

of the State entities. This is the first incident.

13

So I think the U.S. Government may follow up from the rule of

law perspective with this constitutional challenge. I think it is a

very important development. I am very eager to see how the National People’s Congress will respond to these two petitions.

Ms. FINKLER. Thank you.

Mr. FOARDE. We will go on and recognize the general counsel of

the Commission, Susan Roosevelt Weld.

Susan.

Ms. WELD. Thank you very much.

I wanted to say, in 1989 the demonstrators called for democracy

in China. One of the things that we know is that the idea of democracy is seen differently from what we all see democracy to mean.

Do you agree with that statement or do you see that the idea of

democracy you feel is right for China now is the same? I will address it first to Wang Dan, then I would love to hear from the rest.

Mr. WANG. As a student, democracy for me is always political.

But after 4 years in jail, then coming over to the United States, especially since I had a lot of experience with American society and

American democracy, it is not only something political, it is also

something cultural or educational.

So that is why I pay more attention to civil society more than

I do to political democracy. I think the most important thing is that

we must have a very strong and mature civil society as a basis of

democracy. So then will follow democracy due to civil society.

Mr. LIU. From my understanding, and for most of the Chinese,

democracy is something like freedom. They want freedom of speech,

they want freedom to move to other cities, and other freedoms.

Then for people who are in prison, what does freedom mean?

That is, to escape from prison or be released. So most people understand that if they do not have freedom, they know what freedom

they want. Most people just want freedom like that.

Ms. TONG. I just want to add that my initial understanding of

democracy, just like Wang Dan told you, now I sense that the rule

of law really is the core of how democracy can really function in

our daily lives. Just from my study and my practice in a law firm,

I have a very acute sense that China needs to have a true rule of

law, not rule by law, to be able to develop a functional democracy.

So I think the legal profession in China needs to beef up its basic

understanding and be more independent. An independent judiciary

is also essential. The government should be able to fulfill the commitment they make in the Constitution and in the recent laws they

promulgated, they passed, like the Legislation Law.

The C&R system obviously is contradictory to the spirit of the

Legislation Law. How do you correct existing local rules according

to this law? That is a very practical issue for the Chinese leadership right now.

Mr. FOARDE. Susan, you have a couple of minutes. Do you want

to ask another question?

Ms. WELD. Let me pass it to Keith and I will get another chance.

Mr. HAND. I had a question about the scholars’ petition and the

Sun Zhigang case. This is something that the Commission is

watching with a great deal of interest. It seems to be coming on

the heels of some very significant discussions of constitutional law

in China such as Hu Jintao’s speech in December on the 20th anniVerDate 11-MAY-2000 10:24 Sep 08, 2003 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00017 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 89006.TXT China1 PsN: China1
14

versary of the 1982 PRC Constitution discussions in the National

People’s Congress session on constitutional enforcement, and discussion on constitutionalism in the Chinese media.

Do you see these events as connected to the scholars’ petition?

Also, what do you think the most likely response of the National

People’s Congress Standing Committee will be? This issue, I imagine, presents a very difficult problem for the National People’s Congress Standing Committee.

Ms. TONG. Thank you for the question. That is a very pointed

question, but I do not think I can give you an answer. I do not

think that the National People’s Congress can give you a straightforward answer either, because if it answers no, it will ignore the

petition.

It would mean that the National People’s Congress will ignore

article 37 of the Constitution, which means the legislation itself ignores the Constitution, which looks very bad in front of the world,

in front of the Chinese people.

Second, if the NPC is willing to say yes, the C&R system violates

the Constitution, then it means that it has to reform the whole

‘‘hukou’’ system, which is the core of the Chinese control system.

The evils of the ‘‘hukou’’ system are myriad. There are just so

many bad things that happen.

I will just give you one example. I do not want to compete

against my colleagues here, but I will just give you one simple example. I grew up in Wuhan. I had to score 100 points more in order

to get to the same college that my peers from Beijing or Shanghai

went to. It still stays in that fashion.

People who grew up in Shanghai or Beijing are very privileged.

They develop this snobbish attitude toward people from other provinces or from the countryside. This cultural attitude is deeply

entrenched and it is very hard to shake the ‘‘hukou’’ system in

China.

So I do not know how the National People’s Congress will respond, but I am very glad that there are legal scholars in China

that dare to challenge this existing system, who dare to speak out

against this horrendous system. I hope we can succeed eventually.

This is a really phenomenal development.

Mr. FOARDE. All right. Ms. Tong has expressed her views.

Mr. Wang.

Mr. WANG. I cannot see the connection between these scholars,

with encouragement from government. Since there is a group of intellectuals, it is time for them to appeal for political reform and

legal reform.

Mr. FOARDE. Let us go on. I would recognize our friend and colleague, Andrea Worden, also a senior counsel with the Commission

staff.

Andrea.

Ms. WORDEN. Thanks. It is an absolute honor and privilege to be

here today. During April through June, 1989, I was in Changsha,

Hunan teaching English. As you all probably know, every day tens

of thousands of people—students and workers—were out on the

streets protesting in Changsha, including after June 4.

After I left Changsha I kept in touch with many of my students.

In fact, many of them are now in the United States.

15

But during the few years after June 4, 1989 I asked, ‘‘So what

is going on politically? ’’ And they said, ‘‘They were not talking

about politics; just that they were interested in making money. Politics will come later; it may be many years away,’’ they said. But

they were focusing on trying to make money because they had the

freedom to do that.

So my question is—I guess, first to Wang Dan, then I would like

to hear from the rest of the panel—how political are Chinese students today? Is there still a sense of just wanting to focus on making as much money as they can because they have learned a lesson

from Tiananmen? For example, are there salons like the one you

started?

Mr. LIU. Actually, I originally prepared a presentation on the

relationship of the democracy movement and the freedom they had.

In China, the more freedom people have, the more freedom they

want. During the 1980s, the CCP, Hu Yaobang, and Zhao Ziyang,

at that time both of them wanted to give more freedom to the Chinese people.

So at that time we enjoyed more freedom than people enjoy now.

I think in Chinese history, especially after the Communists took

control of China, that is the first time that the Chinese had more

freedom. So the demonstrations, the democracy movement, almost

every year we held that kind of demonstration. Since 1985, I have

set up several discussion groups in Beida and in some hotels. And

other high-ranking officials joined the discussion groups.

At that time, some of them wanted to arrest me, but they did not

do that because at that time they thought that type of activity was

good. Now I believe that if I did the same thing in China, I would

be sentenced to at least 15 years just for setting up such panel

discussion groups.

Wang Juntao was sentenced to 10 years, and Yang Zili was sentenced to 8 years just because they set up such discussion groups.

In 1986, thousands of people joined our discussion groups.

Ms. TONG. I just wanted to add one aspect, and that is the Internet’s impact on the Chinese. I think, due to people’s nature they

are interested in everything. So they posted political commentary

on the Internet, like Liu Di, who is a very young student at a university and who is detained right now for her very pointed comments on the Internet.

The Internet in China is a very complicated story. You cannot

say that, since you will be behaving this way, all the other Chinese

students will behave in this way. For example, after the embassy

bombing, you can tell the Chinese students’ reaction to what happened at the embassy. They threw stones into the compound. Yet

the next week, they were lining up for visas. So this fundamental

cynicism also exists there.

I think another aspect is this ‘‘hukou’’ system, again. So many

Chinese students who go to college from other provinces, for example, go to a Shanghai college or a Beijing college, but after their

graduation they cannot stay there. All of them cannot stay in Beijing or Shanghai. So what’s their venue? They want to come here

to the United States to study and have a better life here.

16

So this is an overflow of the ‘‘hukou’’ system. You might pay

more attention to this unfair, discriminatory system. The United

States actually feels its impact and should pay attention to that.

Mr. FOARDE. That is very useful. We are going to continue. I

would like to pick up the questioning and ask Wang Dan, in your

presentation you mentioned an issue that is very important to me,

and I think to all of the Commission members as well, and the staff

here.

That issue was when you said that there are those people in

China, young people, some old people, who believe that the United

States wishes to keep China weak and powerless, and dominate

China and keep China from developing.

I am wondering what you think we could do as a people, the

American people, and as a government, the U.S. Government, to

combat that impression.

Mr. WANG. My concern is the trend toward nationalism. I think

nationalism is a very important issue. So due to this reason, I

think there are two things we should be careful of. One thing is

to help the American people know more about China.

I do not think the American people know China very well now.

So, just enhance their understanding of what is happening in

China. This is important. Another thing is to try to pay more attention to China. We have a responsibility.

Mr. FOARDE. I am glad you mentioned that, because one of the

answers I always give to my Chinese friends when discussing this

very question, is that the thing that should bother you the most

about the United States, about the American people, is how little

they know about China. Normally I get a very funny reaction from

my Chinese friends when I say that, but I am glad that you said

it as well.

I would like to pick up on another theme that you just mentioned

in your response, and perhaps ask all three panelists to address it.

That is whether or not China’s increasing participation in the

international community is having any positive effect. China has

been a longtime member of the United Nations and participated in

the U.N. system, is newly in the WTO, and is more and more integrated into APEC and other regional bodies.

Is this helping the Chinese Government become more sensitive

to international human rights standards and improved human

rights practices or is it having no effect? What do you think? We

can start with Wang Dan, if you would like.

Mr. WANG. Not only the government, but people have a chance

to go to Western countries.

Mr. FOARDE. Ms. Tong.

Ms. TONG. I think the interaction between the world and China

is very important because the Chinese people, especially the Chinese leaders, always view their prestige by their contacts with

foreigners. This is a very snobbish view, but it is there. Chinese

people who can act more sophisticated with foreigners will be

viewed higher than other Chinese. That is just the way it is.

Also, I think China’s accession to the WTO is very helpful to

push legal reform, at a minimum, because a lot of Chinese regulations have to be abolished and redesigned to fit into the scheme of

17

the WTO. So that is a very strong incentive, so I think that is positive.

On the other hand, I think that U.S. Government officials should

have more direct interaction with the Chinese people, not only with

Chinese Government officials. That is just one dimension.

I think if you go out there more to reach out to a large group

of citizens to help them understand what the American people are,

the U.S. Government is for, their nationalism will probably decrease rather than increase.

Mr. FOARDE. Mr. Wang.

Mr. WANG. Actually, I think that the more interactions between

the Chinese culture and the international community, the better

for the Chinese people. Actually, they give all of the rules and they

do not follow the rules themselves. No one can control them.

But once they join international organizations like the WTO and

such kinds of organizations, finally they find out that they have to

follow the rules. In these organizations, they are willing to follow

these rules. I think for the Chinese people, there is a history of

pushing the government involvement so that they follow the rules.

The people know that there are some organizations working on

that in China.

Mr. LIU. Could I have one comment?

Mr. FOARDE. Please go ahead, Mr. Liu.

Mr. LIU. There are many ways for Western countries to help the

Chinese—many travelers, and the government officials travel widely. So what the U.S. Government can do is give them more support,

send them to China.

Mr. FOARDE. Thank you.

Let me pass the floor on to Susan Weld. Susan.

Ms. WELD. Thank you very much. I want to go back to some of

the detention camps. Especially this question is for Tong Yi. I believe there are special camps for drug addicts. Is that so?

Ms. TONG. What?

Ms. WELD. For people who are addicted to drugs.

Ms. TONG. Yes.

Ms. WELD. Are they run, as far as you know, more or less the

way the C&R camps are run? What systems are there? I am familiar with ‘‘laojiao’’ and C&R and the drug camps that are similar.

Ms. TONG. Yes. The drug camps can detain people for 2 years.

So that is very similar to reeducation through labor camps. The

C&R system really detains people just temporarily, for 10 or 12

days, except for those petitioners.

Those petitioners sometimes stay there for 6 months. And each

time they were detained, the duration is longer than the previous

one, as a way to punish them from coming into Beijing to petition

again.

So far, I think the reeducation through labor and the drug camps

and the C&R centers—one that I know well—I think these are all

extralegal mechanisms in place.

Ms. WELD. So these would all be forbidden by that article of the

Constitution that you mentioned.

Ms. TONG. Yes.

Ms. WELD. All right. But the petition that has been filed so far,

is it filed under——

18

Ms. TONG. The ‘‘Lifa Fa,’’ Legislation Law.

Ms. WELD. Which makes the Constitution the supreme law of

China.

Ms. TONG. Yes. Yes. The funny thing is that in China, it is a very

sad fact, the government, the rulers violate the Constitution and

nothing happens. Yet, if normal citizens violate a tiny regulation,

they have to pay heftily. It is just a reality.

It is very sad, but true. So how to change the Constitution from

a piece of paper to something very effective, like the way the U.S.

Constitution is, this is a long-term project for Chinese legal reform.

Ms. WELD. Thank you.

Would either Liu Gang or Wang Dan want to talk about that

question, that issue?

Mr. LIU. Yes, I could give some comments. Just recently, there

was news that the Chinese Government has a police bureau that

is trying to make more money.

So sometimes they just detain some people. If they do not have

an ID card, they will be sentenced. So after 24 or 48 hours, they

will call your relatives, your parents, and if they can pay 300 yuan

or something like that, then they can go free.

If they cannot buy their freedom, they have to be sent to the

C&R center to work hard to buy themselves free. So this answers

the question of why products from China are so cheap. Some people

wonder why their Chinese neighbors can work so cheaply.

I realized that Chinese labor has to be so cheap because they are

using prisoners. If they do not have some type of job, a low-paying

job, they have to do it. If they do not have enough prisoners, they

just randomly detain some people and send them to C&R.

So, I hope the American Government can pay attention to the

Chinese products, some of them produced by C&R and prisoners.

Mr. FOARDE. All right. Let us go on to Dave Dorman for another

question.

Mr. DORMAN. Thank you, John. There are many people in this

country who are looking at the new leadership of China, studying

their biographies, studying their histories, and trying to make some

determination of whether we may be in store for a change in China

in terms of new policies or different policies.

Could you share your insights regarding this new leadership? Do

you see any room for political reform in China? Will the window

open slightly with this new leadership or will it just be more of the

same?

Mr. LIU. Let me, if I can, fill in a definition. I do not think we

have a real definition of real legal reform.

Ms. TONG. I think all of us are not from the inside of the leadership, and we do not know any more about these people than you

do. On the other hand, I was encouraged by Hu’s talk on the Constitution last year. I do not know whether he will do something

real about turning the Constitution from a piece of paper to something really meaningful for all the citizens in China.

I hope there is some positive development there. I certainly sense

the legal scholars in China may think there might be an environment change. I sincerely hope to see something positive coming out

of it. But on the other hand, just as when were playing under this

19

system, under Deng’s leadership, and Jiang’s leadership, there are

certainly power struggles within the leadership.

From the SARS cover-up, we got a sense of that. So the future

of China’s leadership is anybody’s guess. I really cannot say anything positive or negative about it, probably more negative than

positive.

Mr. WANG. Just one comment. I think there is always the probability among China’s leadership to do political and economic reforms. But I believe that they will not do it if there is no pressure

from the Chinese people and from the international community. So,

I hope the U.S. Government will put pressure on them. I do not

expect that they will do that automatically.

Mr. LIU. There are 30 or 40 years of transition. They are the

hope. They are all of my colleagues or classmates. They all have

changed since 1989. So 5 to 10 years later, there could be new

ideas.

Mr. FOARDE. Very useful comments, indeed.

Let us go to Keith Hand for another question.

Keith.

Mr. HAND. I was interested in the observation made by one of

you that information control, or the Chinese Government’s capacity

for information control, has increased. We have heard some testimony in this Commission about a sort of technological arms race

in terms of controlling the Internet and other mediums of information exchange.

In this most recent case with the SARS outbreak, we have read

a lot here about how e-mail, text messaging, and other new forms

of electronic communications help get the word out about SARS.

Looking back on your experiences in the 1980s, do you feel it is

more difficult now to exchange information freely?

Ms. TONG. I think I made that comment before. It is certainly

easier to communicate with the Chinese people right now through

different mediums, through the Internet, by e-mail, by telephone,

by fax, by letters. Probably people do not use letters anymore.

But I think the Chinese Public Security Bureau is working very

hard to establish firewalls against the free flow of information. I

wish the U.S. Government could do something about that, to get

around or abolish the firewalls on the Internet.

The Internet is a medium which everybody around the world can

have access to. How the international community can do something

about regulating Internet traffic, I think that might be something

the U.S. Government can do with other countries.

Mr. WANG. I think that there are certainly more methods and it

is easier in the 1990s compared with the 1970s and the 1980s. But

it is also more dangerous at this time. People do not know that.

Most people think, if you get something off the Internet, no one will

know.

But actually the police have ways to find out and can get it. But

during the 1970s, during the Cultural Revolution, with Chairman

Mao, they knew that it was dangerous. Now, people whose e-mail

is monitored will be sentenced, so I think it is more dangerous.

Mr. LIU. I agree.

Mr. FOARDE. Let us give the final round of questioning to Andrea

Worden today.

20

Ms. WORDEN. One of you said earlier that there is a link between

civil society and democracy. I was wondering if you could maybe

take another minute to expand and explain your ideas.

Mr. LIU. You know what is happening in China about AIDS.

Journalists or maybe labor organizations, they are an element of

civil society that has tried to change things.

Ms. WORDEN. That is very helpful. Let me ask a follow-up question. In your thinking, will a developed civil society automatically

lead to political reform? Is that an idea that you—— Mr. WANG. I think that to have democracy in China, we must

have legal reform, which will have to operate in the political system. Another thing, more important than this, is to appear as a

democratic anchor. So that is why I say that civil society is more

important.

Mr. LIU. Just one comment. I believe that the more ways we

have for China to move toward the kind of democracy movement

we had in China—for example, Pat Dyson was here attending this

meeting today. When I was at Beijing University in 1986, Pat

Dyson was there and had a lot of friends and students.

Most of these students were a part of the democratic movement

and set an example, and people fought for contact with Western

people, and the Chinese people were influenced and knew much

better about freedom and democracy.

Ms. TONG. I agree with what Wang Dan said. I think a civil society is essential for a functional democracy. People who have their

own homes and property tend to be more stabilized in their country. If they have nothing, if they do not own anything, then they

tend to be more frustrated.

So I think civil society is tied with a functional rule of law

scheme. If China has an effective legal system and then the civil

society can come out of it and maybe someday China’s democracy

will really be realized. That is certainly what we are hoping for

here. Thank you.

Mr. FOARDE. Each of you have mentioned history, some of you

recent history, some of you more ancient history. We are all interested in Chinese history as well. We learn at the feet of our guru,

our resident historian, Susan Weld. So, I am going to give her the

last question today.

Susan.

Ms. WELD. I was very excited to read a speech by Wen Jiabao,

who gave a speech at Qinghua University on May 4, because he referred to the ideals of the May 4 movement as an important way

now for China’s path to the future.

Since all of you were involved in that important experience in

1989, I would like to see now whether those ideals could, in fact,

be part of the future for China and in what ways they might actually play out. Perhaps, Liu Gang.

Mr. LIU. Actually, I remember that when I was with the democratic movement at Beida, it was before June 4. But usually that

was not allowed, even for such kind of activities in China. We, just

to ourselves, started the democratic movement.

I think that there is a relationship and I believe that the May

4 movement was the first democracy movement in China’s history.

After that, for a long time, after the Communists took control of

21

China, from 1949 until 1976, the democracy movement was quiet.

But after that, the 1989 movement and the 1976 movement all

take a look back to May 4.

Ms. TONG. The slogan of the May 4 movement is: ‘‘Mr. Democracy and Mr. Science.’’ In China, so far the Chinese leadership has

paid great attention to Mr. Science. The majority of the Chinese

who are studying here are science majors.

The sad fact of China’s leadership, is the first generation was

ruled by revolutionaries, professional revolutionaries. The second

generation were technocrats who were trained mainly in the Soviet

Union.

We are looking for new leadership, who will be the professionals,

like the lawyers, doctors, political scientists, like what is happening

in the United States. Yet, this process, to go from technocrats to

professional leadership, probably will take a long time. But I hope

someday China will turn into that kind of leadership.

Mr. LIU. I think science and democracy are still very important

issues in China. The May 4 movement passed, almost 90 years

have passed, and we still do not have a democracy.

Mr. FOARDE. Well, our time is up. We are going to have to leave

it there for today. Liu Gang, Tong Yi, and Wang Dan, thank you

very much for your views and expertise, and coming all the way to

Washington today to help us.

We will make an announcement soon about our next issues

roundtable. But for this afternoon, we will bring this session to a

close. Thank you all very much.

[Whereupon, at 4:05 p.m. the roundtable was concluded.]

(23)

A P P E N D I X

24

PREPARED STATEMENTS

PREPARED STATEMENT OF LIU GANG

JUNE 2, 2003

I want to thank the members and staff of the Commission for inviting me to give

my views on the Democracy Movement in China.

PEOPLE WHO INSPIRED THE DEMOCRACY MOVEMENT OF 1989

The Democracy Movement of 1989 was not a new occurrence that suddenly

sprung to life in the spring of that year. The Movement of 1989 had many ancestors

in China. All of us who participated could look back in history to Sun Yat-sun and

Lu Xun for inspiration and even to such Communist Party leaders as Peng Dehuai

and Hu Yaobang. The jailed dissidents such as Wei Jingsheng, Zhang Zhixin and

Liu Xiaobo were the fathers of our modern movement. Physics Professor Fang Lizhi

was our teacher and showed us how to stand up to the Party and to speak out for

democracy and reform. The students who joined the Democracy Movement had the

opportunity to learn about the importance of non-violence from reading about Mahatma Gandhi and Martin Luther King. Certainly the dissidents in other Communists countries were examples for us. We learned about resistance from Lech

Walesa, Vaclav Havel and Dubcek from foreign literature. Gorbachev was a leader

that we hoped would prod the Chinese Communist Party to reform.

THE STUDENTS OF THE 1980S WERE DIFFERENT

The student movement itself had been preparing for several years before 1989.

Many students, teachers and middle-level government employees had been holding

meetings in Beijing and all of China to discuss how to organize a democratic movement and what democracy would mean to China. We held what we call ‘‘Democratic

Salons’’ in Beijing. There were even open outdoor meetings on the Beijing University campus. The Beijing Social Economic Institute and other groups had laid the

ground for the democratic movement and many of their members played key roles

in Tiananmen Square. Only the timing of the demonstrations was spontaneous. It

was initiated by the death of Hu Yaobang who had been dismissed in disgrace for

being too soft on the students who had held demonstrations in 1986. So none of the

planners controlled the actual start of the movement. It just erupted hours after

Hu’s death in Beijing and on campuses throughout China. Chinese students in 1989

were much more active than other groups such as workers. There are many reasons

for this. Students had a good deal of independence from the CCP. They were selected for admission to universities through examinations, rather than Party connections. (Although some of that system still existed.) Their parents paid their expenses

and the Party could not penalize the students very much. The students were also

more educated, and they had more freedom to assemble in groups for discussions.

The increased degree of freedom was a most important factor. The more freedom

they had, the more freedom they wanted. In addition, there were many more opportunities to have contacts with the Western world and to find out how much freedom

to speak and to publish existed in other countries. Almost every campus had foreign

teacher and students. But groups other than students, such as workers and midlevel government employees were easily punished by the CCP government. Since

they could lose their job and even be jailed, it was hard for them to join the democratic movement in China. However, once the movement has been started and many

people have been involved, it became harder for the government to track down all

the participants. So, workers and other groups will feel less risk and joined the

democratic movement. While many workers joined the 1989 democratic movement

because of the massive corruption they had to deal with daily. Their participation

also shows that most of the Chinese want to enjoy freedom and want to change the

communist regime. They were fully aware that the movement was about freedom.

SUPPORTIVE ORGANIZATIONS

The VOA is still one of the best ways of communicating with the Chinese people

and getting the truth out. Before and during the Democracy Movement, we could

find out what was happening in the world and we could speak out to the world

through the VOA. The VOA also gave us the news inside China. We had pretty

primitive communications in 1989—FAX, long distance phone lines and students

traveling from one place to another. All of this took money when the students had

25

very little money. But VOA broadcasts every day told us in what cities the demonstrations had started and how large they were. In that way we knew the spread

and size of the movement. It is from VOA, we knew the Solidarity Labors Union

in Poland, The Prague Spring, as well as other democratic movements happened in

the world. Then we wanted to have our own Solidarity Union and to start our Beijing Spring. I hope that the U.S. government will continue to support this priceless

service generously. I do not think we could have made the advancements we did

without the VOA. Western journalists broadcast our story and interviewed many

Chinese students and senior supporters of democracy. They explained our positions

to the outside world and to other parts of China. Western news reports were copied

and circulated throughout the student community. Our petitions are usually first

broadcast by Western news agencies. Western students in China also played their

part. They helped spread our story and since they lived with us in universities, they

knew our views and understood them better than anyone. I am sure that these two

groups will continue to be valuable sources for information about China’s democracy

movements in the future.

Western diplomatic officials in China can also play important roles in the democratic movement in China. Winston Lord, the former American ambassador in

Beijing, and his wife Betty Bao frequently showed up and gave speeches in our

Democratic Salon at Beijing University and other cultural seminars in Beijing.

Their attendance and speeches inspired our Chinese people to a great degree. The

opportunities of meeting with western diplomatic officials are considered as great

honor for most of Chinese. I must say that most of Chinese including high rank CCP

officials would more interested in meeting with American ambassadors than meeting with the highest rank CCP officials, including Deng Xiaoping at that time.

I’d also like to mention Congresswoman Nancy Pelosi. When I was in prison, my

sister delivered to me some post cards from her, and I heard that she went to

Tiananmen Square and expressed her concern about human rights in China when

she visited China in 1992. I was really excited and inspired when I found out that

she and other American politicians were consistently appealing for us. I’m really

thankful to her and all other Congress members who paid attention to my case, and

the cases of others who were imprisoned for supporting democracy in China.

By meeting with western officials, we Chinese not only can know more about the

value of freedom, but we also felt more safe and protected. The CCP government

seldom punished people because of contacts with western officials. If anyone was

punished because of these contacts, we believed that the western countries would

strongly appeal for our freedom and human rights. After Winston Lord gave speeches on June 1st, 1988, at our Salon in Beijing University, some other western diplomatic officials including those from Britain, Australia, and even some high rank

CCP officials including Wang Meng, the former minister of Chinese Culture Department, and Deng Pufang, the eldest son of Deng Xiaoping, all showed interest in

giving speeches to our Salon. So, I wish the current American ambassador in Beijing

would do the same as Winston Lord and Betty Bao Lord did during 1980s. Believe

me, the CCP government listens more to the American ambassador than to the Chinese people, and the Chinese people respect the American ambassador more than

the Chinese government!

DEMONSTRATIONS AND ORGANIZING

In most cases in Chinese political movements, demonstrations start first and then

organizations are set up during the demonstrations. The June 4th Movement is an

example of demonstrations first, then followed by organization. But political movements are much more successful, if started by mature well-organized groups. The

Falun Gong demonstration in Beijing was successful because it was a well-organized

organization. Unfortunately, it has since been brutally suppressed.

Independent political organizations cannot exist for long in present-day China.

The government soon arrests any leaders such as those of the Chinese Democracy

Party, when they become widely known. I still recommend that any group that intends to have an effect on Chinese politics to stress organization before demonstrations. When demonstrations do break out, it is very helpful if American and other

politicians issue public statements and pass resolutions of support. They are heard

in Beijing. They were in 1989.

26

MY APPEAL

My thanks to all of you for your consistent concern and appeals for releasing

Chinese political prisoners. I want to thank the American people for providing us

with political asylum here. I hope you do not forget the political prisoners, including

Wang Bingzhang, Wang Youcai, Yao Fuxin, Xiao Yunliang, Huang Qi, as well as

the thousands of Falun Gong practitioners who are jailed in China. I hope you will

continue to speak out for them until all political prisoners are released. Please remember that your voices are very effective tool when talking with the CCP government.

27

28

29

30

31

32

33

34

35

36

37

38

39

PREPARED STATEMENT OF TONG YI

JUNE 2, 2003

KIDNAPPING BY POLICE: THE SUN ZHIGANG CASE EXPOSES

‘‘CUSTODY AND REPATRIATION’’

INTRODUCTION

While the SARS outbreak has drawn attention all around the world, an individual

murder case has attracted attention inside China. The case exposes the serious police abuse that routinely takes place within the PRC’s Custody and Repatriation

(C&R) system. My own personal impressions of this system are vivid, because in

1996 I spent a hellish 11 days within its clutches. I am now glad for the opportunity

to call your attention to this system of police-sponsored kidnapping that relies on

‘‘regulations’’ that are unconstitutional even by PRC legal standards. On the C&R

issue, China’s human rights certainly have not improved since 1989. They clearly

have gone the other direction.

THE SUN ZHIGANG CASE

Sun Zhigang, a college graduate from Hubei Province, went to Guangzhou early

this year to take up employment. On the night of March 17, police in Guangzhou

detained him for failing to show a temporary resident permit and sent him to a

C&R center. Three days later, a friend of Sun’s was notified to collect his body from

the center’s infirmary.

Sun’s parents in Hubei, incredulous at what had happened to their son, traveled

to Guangdong and approached government agencies seeking a ‘‘reason’’ why their

son had died. After a month of watching their inquires fall upon deaf ears, they

decided to bring the story to the Southern Metropolitan News, which did its own

investigation and then published a full account on April 25. Other local and national

newspapers then picked up the story and it quickly became a national issue. Controversy now centers on three questions: (1) the criminal investigation of cases like

this; (2) the prevalence of police abuse; and (3) the constitutionality of the C&R

system.

THE GOVERNMENT’S STATED REASONS FOR A C&R SYSTEM

The C&R system arose from a 1961 Party directive entitled ‘‘Forbidding Free

Movement of the Population.’’ In 1982 the State Council added ‘‘Measures for the

Custody and Repatriation of Vagrant Beggars in Cities.’’ The ostensible purpose of

these orders was to provide shelter for homeless people in cities. More fundamentally, though, the goal was to strengthen the ‘‘hukou’’ registry system, which privileges urban over rural residents in many ways. A full account of the evils of the

hukou system is beyond my scope here, but the system’s fundamental purpose, from

the government’s viewpoint, has always been to enforce the social stability upon

which the security of its political rule depends. The Party and State Council directives provide a warrant for arresting and deporting back to the countryside any

farmer who enters a city ‘‘illegally.’’

Because of the original claim of a connection between C&R and welfare, the dayto-day activities of C&R centers fall under the Ministry of Civil Affairs. In practice,

however, the Public Security apparatus, especially local police, run the system. The

official language of the Ministry of Civil Affairs says:

Custody and Repatriation is a forcible administrative apparatus under

which the Civil Affairs departments and Public Security bureaus may send

back to their places of hukou registration any persons whose homes are in

the rural areas and who have entered cities to beg; urban residents who

are roaming the streets and begging; and other persons who are sleeping

in the open or have no means of livelihood. This measure is employed by

the State to provide relief, education and resettlement to those persons who

are indigent and begging in the cities, so as to protect urban social order

and stability and unity.

In practice, detainees in C&R centers tend to be the poor; the mentally ill; migrant workers; women who have been kidnapped for sale on an underground market; and ‘‘petitioners’’—meaning people who have entered cities to seek redress of

injustices from government officials. Estimates of the numbers detained, since 1989,

run into the millions.

40

THE C&R SYSTEM IN PRACTICE

High-sounding language about ‘‘welfare’’ notwithstanding, the C&R system for

more than a decade has been dominated by extortion. Police use it to kidnap the

powerless and demand ransom from their families or friends. The State goes along

with this because it serves ‘‘stability,’’ and because the system can be used to clean

up riffraff and thereby ‘‘beautify’’ city streets in advance of august events like a

Party Congress, the visit of a foreign dignitary, or a bid to host the Olympics. All

such values trump the rights of ordinary citizens.

Arbitrary detention

The most vulnerable citizens are ‘‘Three No’s’’ people-those with no ID card, no

temporary resident permit, and no work permit. Even people who have such documents can be swept up if they dress shabbily, have funny-sounding accents, or seem

to loiter. Recently a migrant worker who was picked up for his outlandish accent

made the mistake of showing his documents—only to have the police rip them up

and bring him to a C&R Center anyway.

Physical abuse

The conditions in the C&R Centers are about as bad as one can imagine. Food

and sanitary conditions are abominable, worse than in regular prisons and labor

camps. Detainees are routinely subjected to beatings by police or by cell bosses. Sun

Zhigang is by no means the only detainee to have died from the torture and beatings.

Extralegal ransom

For the police, the possibility of using the C&R system to collect ransom becomes

an incentive to detain as many people as possible. With the collapse of public morality during China’s post-Mao years, added to the devil-take-the-hindmost pursuit of

money, there are no effective brakes on this kind of abuse of police power. C&R becomes an open field from which police rip off whatever they can. I experienced a

small taste of this practice in my own case. In late 1996, when I was released from

two and a half years of Reeducation through Labor, I traveled from Wuhan to Beijing to see my sister. Police met me at the Beijing railway station and sent me

straight to a C&R center. No explanation. I spent 11 days without enough food and

in filthy conditions. Then the police ‘‘repatriated’’ me to back to Wuhan, and when

I arrived, my parents were forced to pay for my room and board during C&R and

my train ticket back home.

THE INVESTIGATION OF THE SUN ZHIGANG CASE

After the media publicized Sun’s story, the Central Government ordered the ‘‘relevant authorities’’ to investigate the case and punish the perpetrators as seriously

and as quickly as possible. The criminal investigation was then passed down to

Guangdong provincial authorities, where it went forward in secret. There is every

reason to believe—because it happens in similar cases—that the ‘‘investigation’’

eventually fell near or directly to the same authorities who were responsible for the

original crime. In any case, very quickly, on May 13, the New China News Agency

reported that 13 suspects had been arrested. Five were workers at the infirmary

where Sun died, and eight were other detainees at the same infirmary.

Few serious analysts take this official report as much more than a whitewashing.

There is no explanation, for example, for why Sun was moved to an infirmary in

the first place. He had arrived at the C&R center 24 hours before his move to an

infirmary. What happened during those 24 hours? What caused his symptoms, apparently of a beating? Records show that Sun was unconscious during his stay in

the infirmary—and yet the official investigation claims that other detainees at the

infirmary had beaten him. Other sick people were beating an unconscious man?

From a legal point of view, the huge problem that this case points up is that there

is no separation of power between the administrative authority and the investigative authority. Essentially, the police are charged with investigating the police. This

systemic flaw spawns many other abuses: judgment is rushed, innocents are

scapegoated, the true perpetrators are protected, a false story is publicized, and,

after it is announced, only leads to widespread public cynicism.

CONSTITUTIONAL SCRUTINY OF C&R

On or around May 16, three citizens with Ph.D. degrees in law from Beijing University submitted a petition to the National People’s Congress to re-examine the

1982 ‘‘Measures for the Custody of Repatriation of Vagrant Beggars in the Cities.’’

Their petition held that the PRC’s Administrative Punishment Act as well as its

Legislature Act provide that deprivation of a citizen’s freedom can be done only by

41

laws, and that such laws must be passed by the National People’s Congress or its

Standing Committee. The State Council and the various Provinces have no power

to make regulations that in effect deprive citizens of their personal freedom.

This petition highlights the sad fact that, in China, when rulers violate the Constitution nothing happens, but when ordinary citizens violate a local rule, they can

have hell to pay. For this reason some observers feel that the current petition, if

successfully pressed, can have at least as large an impact as the publication of the

Sun Zhigang case. It is the first example in PRC history in which ordinary citizens

are trying to use the Constitution to constrain the power of State organs. Since the

core of the rule of law is to restrain governmental power, this petition deserves the

careful attention of anyone interested in the rule of law in China.

CONCLUSIONS

In view of the expansion of the C&R system in China over the last 15 years, one

can only conclude that the human rights of personal freedom and freedom of movement have suffered setbacks. C&R, like the Reeducation through Labor system, has

no legal basis even under PRC standards. It clearly violates international human

rights norms. It should be abolished in its entirety.

Sun Zhigang’s death has alarmed many people and redirected their attention to

the C&R issue. Some even have begun to use the Constitution to challenge the

whole system. Whether or not this ferment might possibly lead to an end of the

C&R system is hard to say. I sincerely hope that this Commission can help to highlight the issue and do whatever it can to bring pressure to abolish the system.

For more information on C&R in China, please go to Human Rights in China’s web site: www.hrichina.org, where it posts two detailed reports:

(1) Not Welcome at the Party: Behind the ‘‘Clean-Up’’ of China’s Cities-A Report

on Administrative Detention Under ‘‘Custody and Repatriation’’ (1999);

(2) Institutionalized Exclusion: The Tenuous Legal Status of Internal Migrants in

China’s Major Cities (2002).

PREPARED STATEMENT OF WANG DAN

JUNE 2, 2003

First, I want to thank the Commission for allowing me the opportunity to share

some of my opinions and ideas. It is my great honor to be able to speak before you

today.

It has been 14 years since the June 4 Tiananmen massacre of 1989. If we want

to attempt to summarize the changes in China over these past 14 years, I think

there are three things that need to be noted. First, I think we can all agree that

there has been much progress in China in terms of economic freedoms. Second, even

at the social level, people have more space for freedom. But in terms of democratic

politics and political reform, I can say that there really has been no change or

progress whatsoever. The lack of transparency and openness was most notably revealed in the recent case of the cover-up of the SARS epidemic.

With respect to this latter situation I have five points to share with you today.

I think we can admit that there has been some progress on human rights. But I

think that this progress, at least partly, if not completely, is due to the pressure

from the international community. As an example we can look at the period between

1992 and 1997. During that time there was consistent considerable pressure from

the West and as a result human rights violations in China decreased notably. After

1997, however, when the pressure was relaxed, there was substantial erosion of China’s human rights record. Therefore, I strongly believe that the United States and

other Western countries should keep up their ongoing pressure on China to improve

its human rights situation. I disagree with those who fear that if the United States

keeps up its human rights pressures on China that this will have a negative effect

on Sino-U.S. relations.

Second, it is obvious that China still lacks a mature civil society. However, over

the last 14 years we have witnessed the gradual emergence of a developing civil society. I think that it is very important that the United States pay attention to these

sprouts of civil society in China and do all that it can to cultivate them. I believe

that it is short-sighted for the United States Government only to focus on the actors

in the Chinese government and the Chinese Communist Party. Therefore, I think

that the United States China policy should move from attention only on human

rights issues to other issues of political reform and democratic politics. One way

that the United States can do this is to provide support for NGOs and universities

in China as a way to promote social contacts.

42

Third, as the United States is facing the challenge of terrorism in the new century, I can completely understand the necessity to strengthen its strategy against

terrorism. However, I am worried that an unfortunate side-effect of this strategy

may be a tightening of the United States policy that allows Chinese students and

scholars to come to the States for exchanges, study, and visits. As one of the beneficiaries of this program myself, as well as a beneficiary of the human rights pressure from the international community, I sincerely hope that this will not occur. The

current generation of overseas Chinese students, sooner or later, will return to

China, and I believe they will be a motivating force for the further development of

reform in China, including political reform. Therefore, I think it is important that

the United States Government allow this door to remain open, and even to open it

wider by expanding its contacts with the Chinese students already in America.

Fourth, it is not enough for the United States Government merely to take a general stand to promote democracy in China. I think a more detailed and in-depth

strategy is required, for instance based on specific cases, such as projects promoting

the rule of law, freedom of the press, or workers rights. There are many worthwhile

projects that are being undertaken in China today, and I and my colleagues would

be happy to introduce them to you. However, I think a note of caution is necessary

with respect to support from the United States to projects being carried out within

China. This is a very sensitive issue and there is a thin line between seeing support

for such projects because they are meant to help China and seeing support for such

projects because they are meant to prevent China from becoming strong. It is very

easy for many Chinese people to misinterpret the intentions from abroad. Therefore,

it is advisable to first make contacts with the liberal intellectuals in China who are

more open-minded about aid and support from abroad.

Fifth, when I noted above that the United States should transfer its focus from

human rights issues to democracy, I do not mean to imply that human rights issues

are not important. I would like to use this chance to raise the cases of Wang

Bingzhang, which I am sure you are all aware of; Yang Jianli who attempted to return to China last year and since then has been held incommunicado by the Chinese

government; Li Hai who reported information to the outside world about prisoners

in China and as a result was sentenced in 1995 for 9 years; Yang Zili who organized

political discussions and now faces a long-term sentence; and Huang Qi who used

the Internet to spread ideas of political reform and last month was sentenced to 5

years in prison.

China is now entering a crucial period. It is impossible to predict whether future

developments will be positive or negative. But there is one thing that we certainly

can all be sure of. That is, there are a number of things that we on the outside can

do to help China. Even though I am studying in America now, my long-term plan

remains to return to my country. Working together with a group of young educated

Chinese in the States and elsewhere who are concerned about China’s future, we

hope to increase cooperative efforts with all parts of American society, including

Congress, to bring about eventual political change in China.

Æ