SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY

APPELLATE DIVISION

DOCKET NO. A-3366-18T2

WELLS FARGO BANK, 

NATIONAL ASSOCIATION,

as Trustee for Certificate Holders

of Bear Stearns Asset Backed 

Securities I LLC, Asset-Backed 

Certificates, Series 2007-AC6,

Plaintiff-Respondent,

v.

PAUL HAUKE, 

Defendant-Appellant, 

and

MRS. PAUL HAUKE, his wife,

and SOPHIE HENRY,

Defendants. 

___________________________

Submitted March 25, 2020 – Decided April 23, 2020

Before Judges Mayer and Enright.

NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE

APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION

This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court." Although it is posted on the 

internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R. 1:36-3.
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On appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey, 

Chancery Division, Ocean County, Docket No. 

F-015317-17.

Paul R. Hauke, appellant pro se.

Parker Ibrahim & Berg LLP, attorneys for respondent 

(Ben Zev Raindorf and Robert D. Bailey, on the brief).

PER CURIAM

Defendant Paul Hauke appeals from the following: a March 16, 2018 order 

denying his motion to vacate default entered in favor of plaintiff Wells Fargo,

National Association, as Trustee for Certificate Holders of Bear Stearns Asset 

Backed Securities I LLC, Asset-Backed Certificates, Series 2007-AC6 (Bank); 

orders dated June 8, 2018, August 3, 2018, and October 12, 2018 denying 

reconsideration of the March 16, 2018 order; a January 25, 2019 order

overruling defendant's objection to the Bank's motion for Final Judgment; a 

February 15, 2019 order denying reconsideration of the January 25, 2019 order;

and a February 27, 2019 Final Judgment. We affirm all orders on appeal. 

The facts are undisputed. In June 2007, defendant executed a note in the 

amount of $550,000. The note was secured by a mortgage on defendant's 

property in Point Pleasant. The Bank became an assignee of the note and 

mortgage through a valid assignment. Defendant defaulted on payments due 

under the note as of June 1, 2008. 
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The Bank mailed the required notice of intent to foreclose to defendant at 

the mortgaged premises and a post office box provided by defendant more than 

thirty days prior to filing a foreclosure action. On June 21, 2017, the Bank filed 

its foreclosure complaint.

The Bank claimed defendant evaded attempts to personally serve the 

foreclosure complaint. The Bank then served the foreclosure complaint on 

defendant by regular and certified mail directed to the mortgaged premises and 

the post office box used by defendant. The Bank filed a certification of diligent 

inquiry with the trial court, detailing the efforts made to personally serve the 

complaint upon defendant and the mailing of the documents to defendant by 

regular and certified mail. Because defendant failed to timely answer or respond 

to the Bank's foreclosure complaint, on January 23, 2018, the court entered 

default.

On February 12, 2018, defendant moved to vacate default.1 In a March 

16, 2018 order, the judge denied defendant's motion. The judge then denied 

defendant's three subsequent motions seeking reconsideration of the March 16, 

2018 order. 

1

 The Bank sent the notice of default by regular mail to the mortgaged premises

where defendant resides.
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In October 2018, the Bank applied for entry of final judgment. Defendant 

objected to the amount the Bank claimed to be due on the note. In a January 25, 

2019 order, the judge rejected defendant's objection to the amount due and 

owing to the Bank and returned the matter as uncontested to the Office of 

Foreclosure for entry of a final judgment. Defendant sought reconsideration of 

the January 25, 2019 order, which the judge denied. A Final Judgment was 

entered on February 27, 2019. 

Defendant appealed. Upon receipt of defendant's notice of appeal, on May 

6, 2019, Judge Francis R. Hodgson, Jr. issued a thirty-page, single-spaced 

amplification of his prior oral decisions pursuant to Rule 2:5-1(b).

The following are defendant's arguments on appeal:

POINT I

THE TRIAL COURT DID ERR AND ABUSE IT[]S 

DISCRETION BY DENYING DEFENDANT'S 

MOTION TO VACATE THE JANUARY 2, 2018 

DEFAULT.

i. The court improperly denied [d]efendant's [m]otion[]

to vacate the January 2, 2018 default.

ii. Defendant-Appellant did demonstrate good cause 

under R[.] 4:43 to justify vacating the default in this 

matter and reverse the Entry of Final Judgment.

iii. Defendant-Appellant has complied with R[.] 4:43 

by fully articulating legally recognized defenses to the 
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underlying foreclosure action as required to justify 

vacating such an improperly entered default.

POINT II

HONORABLE JUDGE HODGSON, JR. ERRED IN 

REGARD TO HIS "TILA"[2] RULING. 

DEFENDANT/APPELLANT'S "TILA" ARGUMENT 

ESTABLISHES NOT ONLY A VALID 

COUNTERCLAIM BUT A MERITORIOUS 

DEFENSE.

POINT III 

DEFENDANT/APPELLANT DOES NOT NEED 

MERITORIOUS DEFENSES, EVEN THOUGH HE 

HAS THEM, TO REVERSE A DEFAULT WHEN 

DUE PROCESS IN SERVICE HAS NOT BEEN 

EFFECTED.

POINT IV

THE LEGAL STANDARD ON A MOTION FOR 

RECONSIDERATION AS PER R[.] 4:49-2 HAS 

BEEN MET.

POINT V

JUDGE AMPLIFICATION IMPROPER AS IT IS 

FILED LATE AND NOT IN ACCORDANCE WITH 

[R.] 2:5-1(b) AND IS NOT JUST AN 

AMPLIFICATION BUT IS A WRITTEN OPINION 

STATING FACTS AND CONCLUSIONS THAT ARE 

NOT PART OF THE RECORD. IT SHOULD NOT BE 

CONSIDERED.

2

 Truth in Lending Act (TILA), 15 U.S.C. §§ 1601 to 1667f.
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POINT VI

LACHES IS A MERITORIOUS DEFENSE.

Having reviewed the record, we affirm all orders on appeal substantially 

for the reasons expressed in the thorough and well-stated May 6, 2019 written 

amplification provided by Judge Francis R. Hodgson, Jr., as well as his reasons 

placed on the record on March 13, 2018; June 8, 2018; August 3, 2018; October 

12, 2018; January 25, 2019; and February 15, 2019. We add only the following 

comments.

Rule 2:5-1(b) allows a trial judge to supplement a prior opinion, providing 

fifteen days from receipt of a party's notice of appeal to "file and mail to the 

parties an amplification of a prior statement, opinion or memorandum made 

either in writing or orally and recorded pursuant to R[ule] 1:2-2." Defendant 

contends the amplification was untimely because it was served thirteen days 

beyond the time period set forth in Rule 2:5-1(b). He also argues the judge's 

amplification "stat[ed] facts and conclusions that are not part of the record." 

We reject these arguments. There is nothing in the Court Rules, or case 

law, that prevents this court from considering a trial judge's amplification filed 

beyond the fifteen-day timeframe. Here, defendant suffered no prejudice as a 

result of the brief delay in service of the judge's amplification because defendant 
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received the letter several months prior to filing his merits brief. In addition, 

defendant failed to identify any portion of the judge's amplification that was

inconsistent with the prior oral rulings. 

The remainder of defendant's arguments lack sufficient merit to warrant 

discussion in a written opinion. R. 2:11-3(e)(1)(E).

Affirmed.