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John W. Rosa, Brig Gen, Commandant

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AIR COMMAND AND STAFF COLLEGE

AIR UNIVERSITY

Center of Gravity or Center

of Confusion

Understanding the Mystique

SEOW HIANG LEE, Major

Republic of Singapore Air Force

Air Command and Staff College

Wright Flyer Paper No. 10

MAXWELL AIR FORCE BASE, ALABAMA 

December 1999

AIR UNI V ERSITY
Disclaimer

Opinions, conclusions, and recommendations expressed or implied within 

solely those of the author and do not necessarily represent the views o

University, the United States Air Force, the Department of Defense, or any o

US government agency. Cleared for public release: distribution unlimited.

ii
iii

Foreword

It is my great pleasure to present another of the Wri

Flyer Papers series. In this series, Air Command and S

College (ACSC) recognizes and publishes the “best of 

best” student research projects from the prior academ

year. The ACSC research program encourages our s

dents to move beyond the school’s core curriculum in th

own professional development and in “advancing ae

space power.” The series title reflects our desire to p

petuate the pioneering spirit embodied in earlier gene

tions of airmen. Projects selected for publication comb

solid research, innovative thought, and lucid presentat

in exploring war at the operational level. With this bro

perspective, the Wright Flyer Papers engage an ecle

range of doctrinal, technological, organizational, and op

ational questions. Some of these studies provide new so

tions to familiar problems. Others encourage us to leave 

familiar behind in pursuing new possibilities. By mak

these research studies available in the Wright Flyer Pape

ACSC hopes to encourage critical examination of the fi

ings and to stimulate further research in these areas.

John W. Rosa, Brig Gen, US

Commandant
Preface

My interest in the center of gravity (COG) concept beg

in the Republic of Singapore when I noticed with so

amusement that a concept which purports to help ca

paign planners focus their main effort can be embroiled 

such controversy and confusion. While attending the 

Command and Staff College (ACSC), I witnessed how 

same paradoxes dominated seminar discussions. In 

instance, when we were asked to determine the COGs o

certain historical campaign—all given the same set 

background documents, there were as many disagr

ments generated as there were assigned groups. A curs

check with other seminar instructors revealed that 

same pattern prevailed across the seminar groups. W

this evidence of the creativity of ACSC students, or are 

underlying conceptions of the COG so dissimilar that p

ple are talking across each other without even realizing 

I attempt to unravel some of the mystique that surroun

the employment of the COG concept. Hopefully, by dra

ing out the potential sources of confusion that of

accompany the use of the concept, we can soften the d

culties of communication and shift the focus of our ar

ments in a direction that will be more profitable to all. 

I am indebted to Dr. Richard R. Muller for his enco

agement and invaluable advice. Special thanks to Lt 

Christopher Cook and my ACSC colleagues, especially M

Patricia Hoffman, for their insightful comments a

patience in putting up with more Clausewitzian stuff th

they would otherwise choose. I, however, remain so

responsible for any shortcomings that prevail.

v
Abstract

Despite its crucial role in campaign planning, the cen

of gravity (COG) concept remains poorly understood a

inconsistently applied. This research paper seeks 

understand the common sources of confusion that c

occur when the COG concept is employed. It investiga

the extent to which these inconsistencies can be resol

and the implications for the employment of the conc

when these inconsistencies persist. 

To address these core questions, the paper first hi

lights the confusions that are caused by an incomp

reading of Clausewitz’s theoretical framework that und

pins his magnum opus On War. The analysis then proce

to distill the additional sources of confusion that can l

to disagreements during the employment of the conce

This paper discusses the contentious issues of incons

tency in definitions, misunderstandings regarding 

nature of the COG concept, divergent services’ perc

tions, and finally, inconsistencies that are caused by 

inherent unpredictability of war. The ideas are th

applied historically to help understand the anomalies t

arose during the Persian Gulf War. Unlike previous stud

which purport that much of the confusion can be ea

removed by having clearer and more unambiguous def

tions, the findings suggest otherwise; the sources of c

fusion are multifarious, and some may not even 

amenable to complete resolution. The implication of hav

these enduring inconsistencies is neither to jettison 

concept nor to return to a reductionist concept of the C

but to confront nonlinearities by applying the principle

systems thinking, superior leadership, and decisive act

that is supported by a flexible feedback system.

vii
Introduction

Everything in war is very simple, but the simplest thing is

difficult.

—Carl von Clausewitz –

The center of gravity (COG) concept has been describ

in joint doctrine as the “basis for devising both natio

military and theater strategies.”1 Yet, the concept rema

a subject of much confusion, even among seasoned m

tary practitioners and learned analysts. Dr. Eliot A. Coh

director of the Gulf War Air Power Survey, writes the 

lowing:

Clausewitz argued that the essence of strategy lies in discernin

the opponent’s “center of gravity”. . . and directing one’s forc

against it . . . (but) the term is problematic: Can there be only on

center of gravity or several? What happens if a center of gravity i

unreachable? Can one ever determine a center of gravity i

advance, or can it be discerned only retrospectively? And, if a

strategy ultimately involves a clash of forces anyway, what is th

point? The issue . . . is not merely academic. During the plannin

of the coalition’s campaign against Iraq in 1991, the term “center o

gravity” was used repeatedly, but it was not clear what it reall

was—the person of Iraq’s dictator, Saddam Hussein, his system

command and control, the elite forces that were loyal to him (th

Republican Guard), Iraqi military industry, or the forces occupyin

Kuwait that were the proximate cause of war. The confusion ove

the center of gravity had real consequences for planning and fo

action, as American commanders struggled over the priority of var

ious targets for air attack. (Emphasis added)2

Cohen’s comments articulate a puzzle that this pa

addresses. Specifically, this paper examines the core qu

tions: Can we ever resolve the inconsistencies surround

the use of the COG concept? And if not, what are the im

cations of this confusion for the employment of the c

cept? Before proceeding, it is important to highlight t

this research paper has a limited aim of understand

rather than explaining the inconsistencies. These ter

are worth distinguishing as they embody very differ

purposes and suggest the use of different methodologie

“Explainers” usually seek to generate and test hypothe

such as “a change in x caused y.” The process involves 

identification of a particular factor that is deemed to h

caused a particular outcome, followed by a rigorous stu

of a statistically significant number of cases to t

1
whether the factor singled out was indeed the likely ca

or merely a coincidental occurrence. By contrast, 

desire for understanding (as in this paper) involves 

search not so much for the cause of an event as for 

meaning. “Understanders” therefore seek to investigat

particular event or state of affairs, rather than a set 

cases. They delve into history not only as a bank of in

mation that might prove or disprove a theory but also a

narrative that permits a greater appreciation of the origi

evolution, and consequences of an event. 

With this limited aim in mind, the analysis addres

the thorny issue of whether we can ever penetrate the m

tique surrounding the use of the COG concept. The ana

sis identifies the various sources of confusion that give r

to the inconsistencies and examines the extent to wh

they can be resolved. One key assumption is that gr

pling with the inconsistencies is not, as suggested 

Cohen, an intractable enterprise. By carefully identify

the underlying assumptions that accompany the use of 

COG concept, this research paper highlights how much 

the confusion can be understood and in some cases e

be resolved. The analysis traces some of the present c

fusion back to our failure to fully grasp Clausewitz’s thi

ing on the matter. The investigation examines four ot

key sources of confusion. As there is no attempt to app

scientific explanation to each of these sources of con

sion, I label them as propositions, which I apply to a h

torical analysis of the Persian Gulf War. The focus is spe

ically on how these propositions can shed light on 

heated debate of whether the Republican Guard (RG) w

a COG. Unlike previous studies that purport that so

grand unifying definition or determination approach to 

concept can help achieve universal consensus, the m

thrust posits a different hypothesis. It suggests that wh

some of the sources of confusion are amenable to event

resolution, complete consensus is unattainable due to 

unpredictable nature of war. This is not to minimize effo

to secure greater consensus over the employment of 

COG concept, but it is a warning against quick fix

Raising the possibility of unpredictability brings ire 

practitioners who are less interested in intellectual qua

cations than a ready guide for decision making in the r
world. The analysis will therefore be incomplete unles

addresses the application issues. It explores the impli

tions that these enduring inconsistencies have on 

application of the COG concept. It deals with the perenn

paradox of employing the concept in the uncertain en

ronment of war. It proposes an overarching approach 

help us think about and understand the COG concept 

that its users are not paralyzed, and that the usefulnes

the concept is retained. Conclusions of this research a

the lessons learned are summarized.

In the Beginning—Clausewitz’s

Center of Gravity

The teachings of Clausewitz remain and will always remain

ambiguous.

—Raymond Aron ––– ––––––––––

Clausewitz, Philosopher of Wa

Any attempt to study Clausewitz’s ideas on the COG 

Schwerpunkt must avoid two potential pitfalls.4 Fi

because On War is replete with concepts that reflect a c

ative tension,5 a cursory and selective analysis can of

lead to a one-sided and biased understanding of the C

concept. Second, one must take care not to overemphas

the literal meanings of Schwerpunkt. After all, Clausew

warns that “our definitions are aimed only at the center

certain concepts; we neither wish nor can give them sh

outlines.”6 With these points in mind, a comprehensive l

at Clausewitz’s thinking on the matter is done before o

lining the implications that emerge from the overview.

Although the concept is briefly mentioned in book 

Clausewitz’s ideas on the COG are found primarily in bo

6 and 8 of his masterful thesis On War. In book 6, the C

concept is first fully developed when Clausewitz discus

the concept at what we now call the operational level of w

focusing on the armed forces of the enemy. This focus 

lows from his earlier book 4, where he calls the battle 

true COG of war.7 Clausewitz points out that “a cente

gravity is always found where the mass is concentra

most densely. It presents the most effective target fo
blow.”8 After drawing this analogy with war, he launc

into a discussion of unity and cohesion, necessary eleme

of a COG, and illustrates how unity and cohesion can 

found in a single fighting force. It is from this discuss

that some readers mistakenly assume that the enemy’s m

itary force is always the COG in combat. Clausewitz 

quoted as saying in book 6 “those centers of gravity will 

found wherever the forces are most concentrated.”9

This narrow definition of the COG finds a ready au

ence among those who prefer to focus on an enemy’s m

tary rather than on other less tangible elements of pow

James J. Schneider and Lawrence L. Izzo, in their art

“Clausewitz’s Elusive Center of Gravity,” even sugges

that Clausewitz may have gone too far by suggesting p

sonalities and public opinion as COGs.10 Yet, to conclu

that the enemy’s army is always the COG is excessiv

restrictive. At the end of book 6, Clausewitz cautions t

the illustration of the COG concept is incomplete. But b

8 “will describe how this idea of a center of gravity in 

enemy’s force operates throughout the plan of war . . . T

is where the matter properly belongs; we have mer

drawn on it here [in book 6] in order not to leave a gap 

the present argument.”11 Clausewitz acknowledged inc

sistencies in the way the term Schwerpunkt was used 

his drafts of books 2 through 6. He noted in his plans 

revising On War that book 6 was only a sketch, and that 

hoped to clear his mind when writing book 8 and sub

quently revising books 2 through 7 accordingly.12 Si

Clausewitz died before the revisions could be made

becomes crucial that we consider book 8 as we grap

with his overall intent.13

In book 8, Clausewitz described the COG concept 

alluding to the sources of strength that emerge from 

nature of conflict and the unique characteristics and ai

of the belligerents. Even though Clausewitz notes in b

8 that “defeat and destruction of [the enemy’s] fight

force remains the best way to begin, and in every case 

be a very significant feature of the campaign,”14 he arg

that under specific circumstances the enemy’s COG co

be a city, a community of interest among allies, a persona

of a leader, or even public opinion.15 The Clausewitzian c
cept of Schwerpunkt in book 8 extended beyond the destr

tion battle between fielded forces and included both tang

and intangible sources of moral and physical streng

power, and resistance.

For readers accustomed to the unitary concept of 

COG centered on military forces, it becomes even m

unsettling when one also takes into account Clausewi

perception of war in general. In chapter 6 of book 

Clausewitz made his underlying theoretical framew

explicit when he expounded on the primacy of politics o

the military.16 This resonated with the central ideas l

out in book 1, the only one completed to Clausewitz’s s

isfaction. There he discusses the paradoxical trinity ste

ming from primordial violence, the play of probability a

chance, and rational calculation. He notes that we m

develop a theory that “maintains a balance between th

three tendencies, like an object suspended between th

magnets.”17 The trinity is a notion that helps to unify 

the key concepts in On War. Yet, it is also a notion t

reflects the nonlinear worldview of Clausewitz that so

scholars have persuasively pointed out.18

What Does All of This Mean?

Unraveling the Clausewitzian conception of the COG 

made difficult due in part to the methodology of his work

and in part because it was an unfinished masterpiec

Unlike pessimists who would like to relegate the conce

with a myriad of interpretations, to a list of useless “d

trinal buzzwords that obscures the meaning of operatio

art,”21 this author suggests that comprehending Clausew

is not a hopeless endeavor. Specifically, a careful read

of Clausewitz helps us identify two distinct approaches 

interpreting the concept. If one is a “book 6—Clausewitzia

one will highlight Clausewitz’s emphasis on the oppos

army, which is clearly understandable given the contex

his writings in the nineteenth century. This interpretat

has found much favor among writers with a United Sta

Army (USA) background, who by training and experience 

generally prefer a terrain-centric perspective of the ca

paign.22 Words in publications like the 1993 Field Man

(FM) 100-5, Operations, “the ultimate aim of all milit
operations is the destruction of enemy armed forc

further reinforce and perpetuate such a perception. 

the other hand, if one is a “book 8—Clausewitzian,” a

appears Clausewitz would like us to be,23 one will tak

broader and perhaps more amorphous view of the c

cept. In this view, the COG is derived as a function of 

understanding of the paradoxical trinities of the bellig

ents; drawing from that, an understanding of the “hub 

all power” which characterizes the COG of the ene

emerges.24 Knowing these distinctions will help read

understand the underlying assumptions better wh

they next see an invocation of Clausewitz in support o

certain interpretation of the COG.25 Often these assum

tions are unstated and lead to great confusion. As t

discussion has shown, taking fractions of his argume

out of context can lead to a vulgarized variant 

Clausewitz. 

Interpretations of the COG, however, do not end w

Clausewitz. Since then, the concept’s appeal to milit

strategists has not only ensured its survival but has a

produced more numerous and contradictory definitions 

it is continually molded to suit the users’ purpose. T

research paper also traces some of these additio

sources of confusion. 

The Definition and Nature

of Center of Gravity: Revealing

Additional Sources of Confusion

Reaching out into his bag and taking out a stone, he (David)

slung it and struck the Philistine on the forehead. The stone sank

into his forehead, and he fell facedown on the ground. . . . When

the Philistines saw that their hero was dead, they turned

and ran.

—1 Samuel 17:49–51 –

Comprehending the COG is a complex enterprise. O

should therefore be skeptical about single isolated expla

tions for the lack of consensus surrounding the conce

Nevertheless, we need to prune away as much of the und

growth as we can so that we can identify the best lumbe

gainfully employ the concept in war. Otherwise, subsequ
application of the concept can be feckless or even coun

productive. This section suggests that, in addition to the m

reading of Clausewitz, much confusion and disagreem

can be traced back to four key reasons. I denote them 

“propositions.” By highlighting these reasons, hopefully 

can remove some of the COG mystique that continues 

haunt analysts and operational planners today. 

Proposition #1: Confusion Is Caused by a Lack

of Consensus of Definitions

The lack of consensus over the definition of the C

has been one of more commonly studied issues. Y

much confusion still ensues. To provide a flavor of 

spectrum of views on this matter, see table 1 for so

common definitions.26

Table 1

Definitions for Center of Gravity

Sources: (1) Fleet Marine Force Manual 1, Warfighting, 1989, 85; (2) “Book 6—Clausew

Interpretation,” On War, 485; (3) “Book 8—Clausewitzian Interpretation,” On War, 595–9

Joint Publication 3-0, Doctrine for Joint Operations, 1995, III-20 (similar in Air Force Do

Document 1, Air Force Basic Doctrine, 1997 and Field Manual 100-5, Operations, 1993

Naval Doctrine Publication 1, Naval Warfare, 28 March 1994, 35; and (6) author’s adaptat

(1) Center of gravity is “not a source of strength, but rather a critical vulnerab

ity.”

(2) Center of gravity is “always found where the mass is concentrated most

densely.” Alternative but popular version: center of gravity is “a strength not a

vulnerability.”

(3) “One must keep the dominant characteristics of both belligerents in mind

Out of these characteristics a certain center of gravity develops, the hub of al

power and movement, on which everything depends . . . the point at which all

our energies should be directed.”

(4) Centers of gravity are “those characteristics, capabilities, or locations from

which a military force derives its freedom of action, physical strength, or will to

fight.”

(5) The center of gravity is “something the enemy must have to continue mili

tary operations—a source of his strength, but not necessarily strong or a

strength in itself.”

(6) Center of gravity is something that if affected (i.e., destroy, disrupt, neutra

ize, or delay) can cause cascading deterioration that prevents the foe from

achieving his aims and allows the achievement of our aims.
While each of these definitions share some similarit

they also convey different nuances; Definitions (1)27 a

(2)28 even appearing contradictory. Consequently, it is 

surprising that these differences can lead to disagr

ments in the determination of the COG. Is there any w

to arrive at a greater consensus on this issue? To exa

ine this question, we can analyze the pros and cons 

adopting each definition. Definition (6) is adapted 

author.29 The key criteria used for the evaluation is 

extent to which the particular class of definitions provi

a useful focus for campaign planning, the prime purp

for the concept. To facilitate the assessment, the pleth

of definitions is categorized into three main classe

Class A focuses on the notion of critical vulnerabilities, 

example definition (1); Class B focuses on the notion 

strength—definition (2); Class C focuses on the sources 

strength—definitions (3)–(6).31

Class A definitions emphasize the importance of foc

ing on vulnerabilities. Its motivations originate from 

desire to avoid a strength-on-strength clash during a c

flict. This concept is especially popular among writers w

propound the theory of maneuver warfare as it provi

them with a useful tool to distinguish between maneu

and attrition warfare.32 Such a concept, however, is 

removed from what Clausewitz originally had in min

Indeed, theorists who use this definition acknowledge t

and go to great length to explain why the origi

Clausewitzian concept should be avoided. By adoptin

“book 6—Clausewitzian” interpretation of the COG, t

argue that the original definition simply encourages 

bloody head-on clash between two armies, leading to 

attrition battle that is seldom the most efficient form 

warfare. While the call to seek vulnerabilities is laudab

the misappropriation of the term to create an antithesis 

promote the maneuver warfare theory can potentially l

to greater confusion. It is unclear whether the enemy’s v

nerabilities here mean something that is easy for frien

forces to target (i.e., the notion of being open to attack

something which, when hit, makes the enemy vulnera

and leads him to capitulate (i.e., the notion of having 

strength or source of strength removed). Clearly, if it is 

latter, then its distinction from the other classes of def
tions is less significant than many maneuver theor

contend. On the other hand, if it refers to the former not

of being open to attack, one can counter that not all of 

enemy’s critical nodes are inherently weak. Does t

mean that those critical nodes that are strongly defend

should, by definition, be ignored? Surely this would b

dangerous a priori assumption.34 More importantly, 

definition is grossly incomplete as it does not help pl

ners appreciate what critical means and hence fails to p

vide a useful focus for the campaign planning efforts.

Class B definitions emphasize the enemy’s strength a

are most clearly identified with a “book 6—Clausewitzi

concept. These definitions focus the campaign planners 

wherever the forces are most concentrated. COG is the

fore synonymous with the center of mass. Adopting suc

concept raises two questions. First, many observers h

pointed out that the concept of mass has changed so r

ically since the nineteenth century that one can justifia

question the validity of its original concept in this post

dustrial age.35 Second, as maneuver warfare theorists h

warned, this narrow focus on physical mass can potenti

lock its advocates into an attrition warfare approach, resu

ing in a massive and bloody contest of destruction, as 

World War I. Furthermore, such a concept leaves no ro

for the use of operational art to achieve paralysis of 

enemy. As Cohen puts it starkly: “If all strategy ultimat

involves a clash of forces anyway, what is the point?”36

This leads us to the class C definitions, which emp

size the sources of strength. Although there are many v

ants under this category, they share the similar empha

of focusing on the effect it renders on the enemy (i.e.

aims to target the very source of the enemy’s strength). T

distinction between strength and sources of strength is 

often acknowledged, but they have fundamentally differ

underlying assumptions. Unlike the previous two ca

gories, class C does not make a priori assumptions as 

whether the focus for the main effort is inherently stro

or weak. For example, the enemy’s will does not need to 

a physical strong point, but it is clearly a potential sou

of strength. Some theorists try to reconcile these dif

ences by making an arbitrary distinction between the op

ational and strategic levels of war. They argue that at 
operational level the focus is generally on the center of 

enemy’s mass, while at the strategic level the focus 

broader and may include other sources of the enem

strength.37 This distinction is misleading. Even at the op

ational level, a deeper analysis of the sources of 

enemy’s strength can be made, as opposed to arbitra

concluding that the enemy’s massed forces should na

rally be our main focus. This author believes that the c

ceptual differences between classes B and C are rooted 

the philosophical divide between a “book 6” and a “book 

interpretation of Clausewitz.38 The latter goes beyond 

simple emphasis of mass to a broader concept of 

enemy’s characteristics as a whole, sometimes includ

even metaphysical considerations. This author also s

mits that the class C definition guides analysts to consi

the full complexity of the enemy and the nature of war. 

course, even within class C, there are variants of def

tions from which one can choose. By restricting our d

cussion to the selections listed earlier—definitions (3), 

(5), and (6)—it can be argued that definition (6) gives 

operational planners the best focus for their campa

planning. Definition (5) simply defines COGs as source

strength. It is concise and points operational planners 

the right direction but its focus is too broad. Definition 

uses the popular Clausewitzian analogy of the hub 

power and movement to capture the idea of the source 

strength. But the analogy of a hub may provide a misle

ing notion that there is only one COG.39 Definitions (4) a

(6) contain a good elaboration of what might constitut

source of strength. Definition (6) rises to the top beca

of its clear emphasis on cascading deterioration within 

context of systems effects, and its explicit linkage betw

the COG concept and the considerations of friendly a

enemy objectives. 

Two principal implications emerge from this extend

discussion. First, it demonstrates how existing definiti

of the COG contain subtle and important differences t

can lead to confusion during operations. Second, the b

analysis of each definition suggests that obtaining grea

consensus on this issue is not an impossible task.40 Y

much remains to be done in this area, both in updat

doctrine publications, and, more importantly, in sensi
ing students and planners to the nuances of the vario

definitions. Without the latter, the revised definitions 

the publications will merely be words without significan

Proposition #2: Confusion Is Caused by a Lack of

Consensus over Its Nature

The second source of confusion results from two c

tentious issues regarding the nature of the center of gr

ity. First, as highlighted by Cohen: “Is there only one C

or many?” Second, what is the relationship between obj

tives and the COG? We will consider each issue in turn a

assess the possibility of resolving the inconsistencies.

One or Many? The origins of the first paradox c

arguably be traced back to Clausewitz. When Clausew

first adopted the phrase center of gravity, he employe

term that is borrowed from the field of physics. In scient

terms, there can only be one COG for each obj

Additionally, his use of the analogy “the hub of all pow

and movement” further gives the impression that ther

only one COG. Clausewitz’s operational usage of the te

however, has little in common with its physical analog

nor was it his intention that this phrase be taken liter

in a physical sense, as the discussion in the section tit

“In the Beginning—Clausewitz’s Center of Gravity” h

pointed out. More specifically, while his intention was 

emphasize the need to focus the main effort, Clausew

wrote in On War that the state of having one COG was 

ideal one.41 Clearly, there was no inherent reason w

there could not be more than one COG.42 The sooner t

arbitrary conception is removed, the sooner we will red

the confusion generated through the use of the concep

Dominant Characteristics of the Belligerents. T

second contentious issue involves the relations

between objectives and COGs. Much confusion ari

because operational planners fail to make explicit 

underlying objectives they have in mind when they in

that “x is the true COG and not y.” The problem is acc

tuated when one remembers that in any major campai

there are likely to be multiple objectives that might in

vidually be assigned to different parties. Consequen
each party will have a different perspective of where 

main effort should be. Forcing them to share the sa

COG would be counterproductive in this situation. 

resolve the confusion, we need to establish why and h

objectives are linked to the COG. 

One may be tempted to resolve the first question 

whether the objectives are linked to COGs by simply a

lyzing the various definitions of COG; but such an ana

sis quickly becomes a tautology. For example, if the C

is simply defined as a source of strength as found in d

nition (5), one can conceivably apply a five-ring analysi

la Warden) to derive a list of enemy’s sources of streng

regardless of the objectives at hand. On the other hand

one adopts definition (6)—the COG is that which cause

cascading effect on the enemy so that it “prevents the 

from achieving his aims and allows the achievement of 

aims”—then objectives become intricately linked to 

determination of the COG. The way to resolve this dilem

is to introduce a higher criterion, such as judging the alt

native definitions against the original purpose for hav

the concept. If the purpose is not to provide campa

planners with a focus on the enemy’s sources of streng

but instead on those that will “significantly contribute 

our ability to impose our will over the COG at the n

higher level of war,”44 then linking objectives with CO

will be essential. Doing so guides us to target enem

sources of strength that can lead us to eventual victory

If the above argument holds true, the next challe

then is to understand the relationship between objecti

and the COG. Do objectives refer to friendly objectiv

enemy objectives, or both? The short answer is both. 

There is a direct relationship between friendly objecti

and the COG. The point of our main effort should be su

that it (the affected COG) will cause the enemy system 

change in such a way that it functions the way we wan

to (i.e., in accordance with our friendly objectives). An

our objectives are congruent at each level of the war, su

actions will eventually lead us to victory. The relations

between enemy objectives is more subtle and indirect

useful way to understand this is to envisage the enemy 

a system with many nodes. The enemy’s objectives 

determine how the enemy employs its system. This in tu
determines how the nodes in its system work together (i

the linkages) to meet its objectives. In other words, und

standing the enemy’s objectives helps one to understa

the linkages in the enemy’s systems, which will in tu

enable campaign planners to determine the critical no

that have the greatest cascading effects (i.e., COGs) on 

enemy. A failure to understand these dynamic relati

ships has led to unnecessary confusion.

A good example of this was the contention in the ea

stages of the Gulf War over whether the Iraqi Scuds qu

fied as a COG that justified the allocation of scarce 

assets. Initially, Gen H. Norman Schwarzkopf was rel

tant to follow Secretary of Defense Dick Cheney’s direct

to step up the Scud campaign. After all, the accuracy of 

Scuds was poor, and since there was no evidence that 

initial launches contained any payload of poison gas, 

military impact of the Scuds was deemed to be relativ

insignificant (i.e., they did not appear to be a source 

strength. At one point, this insubordination led Secret

Cheney to exclaim to Gen Colin L. Powell, “god---- it, I w

some coverage (against Scuds) out there. If I have to talk 

Schwarzkopf, I’ll do it.”45 In this case, Secretary Chene

judgment turned out to be closer to the mark. W

General Schwarzkopf failed to consider were the ene

and friendly objectives; Saddam Hussein’s objective for 

ing the Scuds was not to target military installatio

which required great precision, but against Israel’s gene

population. With great astuteness, Secretary Che

quickly saw the need to “keep Israel out of the war” a

protect the coalition’s unity. It was only when th

dynamic connections became explicit that everyo

including the US Central Command, began to recogn

how an inaccurate Scud could indeed become Sadda

source of power. 

Proposition #3: Confusion Is Caused by Difference

in Services’ Perspectives and Concept

of Operational Art

Reaching consensus on the definition and nature of 

COG concept is made difficult by a third source of con
sion: inherent differences in services’ perspectives a

underlying theoretical concept of operational a

Organizational inertia and conceptual dissimilarities c

tion against a naive search for quick solutions in resolv

the paradoxes. A brief survey of the diversity of servic

perceptions will reinforce this.

The US Air Force (USAF) generally takes a “targeti

approach.46 In line with the flexibility and versatility of 

power, the USAF prefers to describe multiple COGs 

terms of strategic and operational targets throughout 

theater of operations. On the other hand, as a relativ

small force accustomed to forced entry into a theater, 

US Marine Corps (USMC) naturally prefers to attack 

enemy where it is weak. Thus, for a long time, the US

has elected to describe the COG as a critical vulnerabi

rather than a source of strength. On the other hand, 

USA, being relatively more self-sufficient, has little pr

lem viewing the COG as the enemy’s streng

Furthermore, the Army’s concept of the COG has b

greatly colored by the physical analogies of mass and 

hub of power, leading to a strong insistence that th

should only be one COG. The US Navy (USN) has o

introduced the COG concept into its doctrine in the p

decade. At first, the USA, the service that the Navy has h

much operational experience supporting, heavily in

enced the USN’s COG concept. Consequently, naval d

trine acknowledged the existence of only one COG. With 

emphasis on littoral warfare, naval doctrine has beco

increasingly aligned with the USMC; it now seeks “opp

tunities to access and destroy a COG” through critical v

nerabilities.47

While many of the above inconsistencies can be tra

to disagreements over the definition and nature of 

COG, one must remember that these differences a

reflect a deeper disconnect. This point was made pers

sively by Col Dennis M. Drew, associate dean of the Sch

of Advanced Airpower Studies (SAAS), when he highligh

the differing doctrinal worldviews of the USA and 

USAF. Constrained by geography, the Army’s worldview 

often limited to the immediate problem of enemy forces 

front of them. The airman’s worldview is limited only 

the capability of his equipment. Even when the enemy 
found at great distances, airpower’s speed can make 

airman’s problem as immediate as the soldier’s. These 

fering worldviews often cause differences of opinio

between soldiers and airmen, including their percepti

of the COG.48

Ultimately, differences in services’ perceptions lead 

different theories of war, contributing to disparate conc

tions of COGs. For instance, to view the enemy as com

nents of state systems as in John A. Warden III’s five-r

theory, one will determine the COGs according to the c

centric rings of command, essential production, tra

portation, population, and military forces, with descend

orders of importance.49 On the other hand, to adop

model, as proposed by John Arquilla, that seeks to expl

victory in terms of information dominance, one reache

different conclusion.50

How to resolve these differences––by making a list of 

the existing theories of war and deciding which is the b

to adopt across the services? Besides the impracticality 

consolidating all existing (and indeed future) theor

such a research effort faces another difficulty. Many 

these theories are really perspectives that suggest gene

ized patterns that seem to correlate with history. They 

not, on the whole, present hypotheses that are falsifiab

If one also takes into account the postmodernist c

tention that definitions, perspectives, and theories are 

only ways of representing the facts but are also ways 

constructing facts, the problems appear even m

intractable.

This discussion is a reminder that the road to grea

consensus is not simply a search for clear and unambi

ous definitions, as some commentators appear to s

gest.51 There are no easy answers to the quagmire of h

we can resolve the differences. Colonel Drew’s comme

suggest that each service’s perception of war can 

equally legitimate and yet significantly diverge

Stovepiping each other’s perspective into an artificial c

struct is not necessarily productive or beneficial. Inste

one should strive to gain a deeper appreciation of each s

vice’s concerns and its theoretical conceptions of war. T

will allow us to ask the right questions when there are d

agreements and to better assess and weigh the alternati
during operations. The postmodernist challenge a

reminds us to question the ways in which our perspecti

and theories construct and define the way we view our e

mies, and hence affect the way we define COGs and s

sequently, the way we fight.

Proposition #4: Confusion Is Caused by the

Unpredictability Inherent in War

The fourth reason for the enduring disagreements o

the COGs is the inherent unpredictability of w

Unpredictability of war can be caused by at least two f

tors.52 First, there is a lack of perfect intelligence. T

amount of intelligence required to examine all the linka

within the enemy system will always exceed the resour

available. Even today, eight years after the Gulf War, n

articles continue to suggest that campaign plann

missed some critical information that supposedly rep

sented Iraqi’s true COG.53 Second, there is the spe

force that chance, uncertainty, indirect effects, unintend

consequences, human errors and frailties, and a host 

other nonlinearities exert on the outcomes of actual w

Alan D. Beyerchen reminds us that mapping a seemin

linear concept like Schwerpunkt on the nonlinearities 

real war can prove to be extremely unsettling.54 In a n

shell, we come full circle to the dilemma we faced when 

studied the different interpretations of Clausewitz. Do 

cut through the maze of confusion by adopting a “book 

Clausewitzian” approach of simplifying and linearizing 

COG to a quote: “defeat of the enemy fighting for

remains the best way to begin”?55 Or do we try to und

stand the concept in both its psychological and phys

realms that allow for nonlinearities, as a “book 

Clausewitz” would suggest? This author believes tha

“book 8—Clausewitzian” approach better reflects the co

plexity that real war presents. If this is true, it then s

gests that some disagreements over the COG may never 

resolved. This in turn raises the question of how 

should act in such a situation fraught with uncertain

Does this unpredictability render the concept useless? W

it paralyze those who choose to employ it? 
Summary

The four propositions highlighted represent four m

sources of confusion. They are not mutually exclusive 

do they always operate separately. Yet, these strands 

worth distinguishing carefully as each has something 

say about the questions to ask when faced with disagr

ments over the COG concept and how we might set ab

answering them. The next section applies these propo

tions in a brief historical analysis of the Gulf War.

Analyzing the Gulf War: Will We

Ever Know If the Republican Guard

Was the Only “True” COG?

It doesn’t take a genius to figure out . . . (the center of gravity).

—Gen H. Norman Schwarzkopf–

During the Gulf War, many disagreements arose o

the determination of the “true” COG.56 The following s

tions focus on the central debate concerning the RG. T

analysis is divided into two sections. The first sect

examines how the perceptions of the COGs differed amo

the key participants of the war. The second section o

lines how the propositions listed earlier help to understa

the inconsistencies involving the specific debate about 

RG. This analysis primarily aims to understand 

sources of confusion rather than to present a case for 

true COGs or to fully resolve these inconsistencies. 

Differing Perceptions of the

Center of Gravity

Beginning at the very top, General Schwarzkopf ide

fied the COG as “that thing that if you destroy it, y

destroy his ability to wage war. The centers of gravity w

Saddam Hussein himself because of the highly centrali

leadership. I don’t mean personally destroyed. I mean 

ability to function. Number two, the Republican Gua

And number three, his chemical, biological and nucl

capability. It doesn’t take a genius to figure out tha
those things are gone, his ability to wage war is to 

intents and purposes finished.”57 Clearly, Schwarzk

saw the RG as one of three distinct COGs. 

For the USAF, perceptions differed substantia

between the joint force air component commander, G

Charles A. “Chuck” Horner, and the leader of 

Checkmate planning team, Colonel Warden. Warden’s p

ception of the multiple COGs was clear from the ini

presentation he gave to General Schwarzkopf (table 2).

These 10 target sets (COGs) were more than the th

identified by Schwarzkopf but the plan eventually subm

ted by Horner was expanded to 12 target sets.58 Nota

absences from Warden’s initial list were the RG and 

Scud missiles. 

True to their doctrine, the ground forces identified o

one military COG—the RG.59 The planning of the grou

campaign was highly influenced by graduates from 

School for Advanced Military Studies (SAMS), specificall

small Jedi team headed by Lt Col Joe Purvis. Colonel Pur

later elaborated the rationale for the selection process.

We attempted to identify the center of gravity. This proved difficult due to the normal discussions [that occur in SAMS]. Also,

the CENTCOM staff became more focused on what it [the center of gravity] was as opposed to what do we do with it.

Therefore, we did not use the term, except in the [planning cell].

In any case, at the strategic level, we decided that Saddam was

Table 2

Iraqi Target Systems

Source: Gulf War Air Power Survey (GWAPS), vol. 1, Planning and Command and Co

(Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1993), 145.

Leadership Key Infrastructure Population Fielded Forces

Production

National Electricity Railroads Strategic Air

Leadership Defense

National C2 Oil––Internal Airfields Strategic Chemi

Consumption Warfare Capabil

Military Port

Production
the key, but that we could do nothing about him and cause the

battle to be fought without centralized command. The Republican

Guard was the focus at the operational level. If we could mass

our ground forces on the RG without fighting any other force,

we had perfect success. Also, if the RG left the theater, surrendered, or were defeated, we still had, to our opinion, dealt

appropriately with the “C.G.” (Emphasis added)60

Will We Ever Know If the Republican Guard

Was the Only True COG?

How then can we explain the confusion caused by 

inconsistencies, and how far can we reduce these ano

alies? Although the disagreements over the COGs 

numerous, the focus here is on the debate: Was the RG 

only true COG? 

Definitions

Some of the confusion could have been caused by 

inconsistency in definitions. Warden views COGs as a c

ical vulnerability,61 which possibly embodied both 

notions of weakness and open to attack. Holding suc

perspective may partially explain why he avoided list

the RG as a COG as it would have represented an attrit

strategy of pitting strength against strength, à la the “b

6—Clausewitzian” concept of war. Purvis, on the ot

hand, reflecting the USA’s perspective, appeared to inclu

the notion of attainability into his concept of what con

tutes the COG. He acknowledges that Saddam was the 

but in the same breath dismisses it when he concluded 

(i.e., the Army) could do nothing about him. It was the

fore not surprising that Purvis’s analysis, with his focus 

the enemy’s surface forces, would eventually lead him 

conclude that the RG was the sole COG. However, conf

ing attainability with the determination of the COG led h

to ignore an enemy’s COG just because the Army was in

pable or unwilling to impose its will upon the target. T

feasibility of targeting a COG should be made independ

of its identification. 
Nature: Numbers and Objectives

Inconsistency in the number of target lists (COGs) 

perceived by the various parties, and a failure to recogn

the linkages between mission objectives and the defin

COGs, led to further confusion over what the true CO

were. For instance, the mission the Army received on 

September 1990 was to plan the ground offensive. Gi

such a defined mission, it was perhaps understanda

that the Army focused quickly on the RG as the focus 

their main effort. The USAF, however, was given a mu

broader mission scope because of the flexibility and versa

ity of airpower. With its expanded objectives, its assessme

of the enemy’s hubs of power expanded correspondingly.

Services’ Perspectives and Theoretical Constructs

Dissimilar services’ perspectives and theoretical c

structs also led to very different views of what constitu

the enemy’s source of power. Warden, for instance, wo

ing from his theoretical five-ring framework, saw 

enemy’s leadership as the key focus. The other ring

organic essentials, infrastructure, population, and field

forces, including the RG—were distractions generally b

avoided. These target systems would only be attacked 

necessary to expose the leadership ring to offensive acti

Consequently, Warden ranked the RG as far less sign

cant than did the other planners, who subscribed to 

surface-centric AirLand Battle doctrine.63 Given the c

troversial nature of Warden’s theories, it is interesting 

ask if we can verify these theories retrospectively in 

light of the historical records we now have? Some, like 

Richard Szafranski, USAF, believe that the answer 

straightforward: “Clausewitzian purists can argue o

what the master intended by Schwerpunkt, just as in

lectual purists can argue over what transforms a diagr

into an authentic model. Purism matters less to acti

oriented people than the verifiable consequences of actio

(Emphasis added)64 “They (air operations) worked,”65 p

claims Szafranski, implying by inference, that Warde

theories were validated. If Szafranski is right, then perh

the RG, as suggested by Warden, was not the true C
after all. Historical events may in reality have less verify

power than Szafranski seems to suggest. To fully und

stand this, we turn to the element of unpredictability of w

Unpredictability of War 

Determining the COG requires us to assess the imp

of the cascading effects on the enemy system, and 

extent to which this impact achieves the friendly object

Yet, making that assessment is fraught with great diffic

ties. For example, how do we ascertain the importance 

the RG in a cause-and-effect relationship? To the Arm

the fielded forces defined their view of the enemy, and 

RG was perceived as the source of power that animated 

entire military force. It was also implicitly assumed t

Saddam would value his military capability highly a

hence would be very sensitive to the targeting of the RG

other words, targeting the RG not only caused cascad

effects on the fielded forces but also impacted on Sadda

overall calculations. Warden, however, saw Saddam’s c

culations differently: “Many people have thought of 

Republican Guard as the military primarily responsible 

keeping Saddam in power. In actuality, the Republic

Guard . . . was not the group which undertook the na

day-to-day internal security work. Others did that, a

they were a far more important target than the Republic

Guard soldiers in Kuwait.” (Emphasis added)66

Even if we ignore the possibility of nonlinear seco

and third-order effects of targeting the RG (which wo

compound the element of uncertainty exponentially)

remains clear that there was imperfect information av

able to the coalition during the war to make a defini

judgment on the correctness of each perspective. 

Saddam value his internal security forces more than 

RG, as Warden suggested? After all, Saddam suffered a

endured far more attrition of his ground forces during 

Iran-Iraq War than he actually did during the Gulf W

How could intelligence analysts have known, with co

plete certainty, Saddam’s psychology and the value 

placed on his instruments of power? Ultimately, one m

be resigned to share Col Phillip S. Meilinger’s (professo

strategy, US Naval War College) conclusions: “It is hig
unlikely, however, that it will ever be possible to determ

exactly what drove Saddam to the negotiating table: p

haps Saddam himself would be unable to answer the qu

tion definitively. In truth, given the complexity of war a

human nature, it is most likely that (many) factors w

into Saddam’s decision-making process.”67

Summary

Writing in a Marine Corps University monograph a

the war, Dr. Joe Strange suggested that the debate over 

Republican Guard was caused by a confusion over def

tions.68 Hopefully this analysis demonstrates how the p

viously identified four sources of confusion provide a fu

account of the disagreements involved. Some of these d

agreements could have been clarified if underly

assumptions about the definitions and nature of the c

cept were made more explicit. Greater consensus co

also have been obtained if some of the informal doctri

such as Warden’s infamous five-ring analysis, had a p

opportunity to be disseminated and discussed across 

services. Yet, many of these conditions are counterfact

demands. In reality, fog and friction will always charact

ize real war. This poses an important challenge for ope

tional planners living in the real world and having to m

real decisions in finite time. How should one think about 

concept of COG given the inherent uncertainties in war? 

Implications of Enduring Inconsistencies

How Should One Think about the

Employment of the Concept?

Although our intellect always longs for clarity and certainty,

our nature often finds uncertainty fascinating.

—Carl von Clausewitz––

On War––––––––––––––

A full understanding of the mystique surrounding 

COG concept requires wrestling with the implications 

enduring inconsistencies. Yet, doing so places a dilem

that we all face in an increasingly complex operating en
ronment fraught with contradictions. If we think we kn

we don’t, and if we think we don’t know, we still have to 

as if we do. This thought process produces the leaders

schizophrenia that is so troubling and creates conditi

for potential paralysis. At the very least, leaders may l

away and hope that their rationale for how they w

things done will not be too sorely tested. Can we help 

wonder why positive thinking is so seductive to those fa

with complexity beyond comprehension? This section p

poses three principles that help one think about 

employment of the COG concept. 

Principle #1: Employing the COG Concept

Requires Systems Thinking

One of the key reasons why war is such an unp

dictable affair is the fact that the enemy is not a sta

entity. On the contrary, history suggests that the enem

better portrayed as an organism that continuously a

and reacts internally and with the environment. It emb

ies the interaction of living and nonliving subentities, 

of which multiple COGs arise.69 In order to grasp the p

found implications of indirect effects and unintended c

sequences that pervade war, we need to engage in syste

thinking or learning to view things as a whole.70 The est

lishment of a grand systems theory is beyond the scop

this research paper but the mention of a few key impli

tions of systems thinking is in order.

First, systems thinking refers to the attempt to view 

world in terms of irreducibly integrated systems. It focu

attention on the whole as well as on the complex interre

tionships among its constituent parts. Systems think

assumes that the enemy is a self-organizing system 

which individual parts adapt naturally to create order 

of chaos. The focus is not just on individual entities 

also on the dynamics between those entities and 

embedding context in which the entities operate.

Second, the effects on social institutions, polit

states, and economic systems depend not only on what 

case is but also on what its members and its leaders

believe that it is. And since enemy nations are cultur
conditioned, understanding reality requires appreciation 

historical and cultural dynamics.

Third, we must recognize that systems thinking is 

natural to military practitioners who favor quick and d

sive action. Comprehending complex indirect effects c

appear daunting and with marginal utility. This disdain 

systems thinking has also colored the way we orient 

intelligence establishments.71 Information-gathering ag

cies are more accustomed to either developing diploma

insights into the enemy’s foreign policy, or securing ta

cal information about the enemy’s military strength a

disposition. On the other hand, a detailed understand

of the enemy’s systems and how they interact with ea

other requires a fundamentally different type of milit

intelligence that is capable of conducting second- a

third-order analyses of complicated networks. Such int

disciplinary intelligence is too often ignored.

Fourth, it is important not to exaggerate systems effe

Just because chaos theory predicts that the beating o

butterfly’s wings can influence weather patterns halfw

around the world doesn’t mean that each time a butte

flutters, storms are created. Although thinking in term

one-way linear processes can often be misleading, it 

unlikely that reductionist approaches could have beco

so entrenched if they were never applicable in the r

world. A better way of seeing systems thinking is not as 

alternative but as a complement to the reduction

approach. The former is more comprehensive, embrac

the specialized perspective as one aspect of a general c

cept.

Fifth, although systems are intricately connected, s

tem effects need not cripple human action. One strat

for action is constraining, where systems are rendered l

system-like in their responsiveness, hence foreclos

options and facilitating action. A good example of this w

the operational maneuver conducted during the Gulf W

Through feints and limited objective attacks, the asse

blage of the Iraqi military strength was fixed into a w

defined unit of space detached from its strategic re

affording the coalition the operational opportunity to s

the defending mass from its centralized command auth

ity, its main logistical bases, and its friendly reinfor
ments. A second strategy that could be adopted is pa

lelism. When we are dealing with a system, we can rar

do one thing to produce a desired change. Because of in

rect, delayed, or even unintended reactions by the ene

system, one usually needs to have multiple and simu

neous engagements to constrain and work with 

dynamics of the enemy system to effect a signific

change.72

Still, in the final analysis, one is cautioned that syste

thinking will not lead to a deterministic path. Uncertai

will still prevail, and that brings us to the next essen

element, leadership. 

Principle #2: Employing the COG Concept

Is an Act of Leadership

When discussing COGs, it is tempting to confine on

analysis to concepts, techniques, and theoretical c

struct. Succumbing to this temptation can lead one int

spurious and frustrating effort to strive for more comp

and deterministic theories for discerning the COG, with

paying adequate attention to the people employing th

tools. This oversight is dangerous because ultimately 

effective employment of the COG concept is an act of le

ership. This point is well articulated by Col Michael 

Wyly, who greatly influenced the formation of maneu

warfare doctrine in the Marine Corps: “It takes cour

and moral character to select a main effort. That is why 

weak commander and the amateur so often fail to do th

In fact, the weak commander will actively avoid choosin

main effort. It is convenient for the commander weak 

character to avoid selecting a main effort because, if 

battle goes unfavorably, he can blame someone else for 

mistake. The commander who has taken a stand a

selected his own main effort cannot do this.”73

Although Colonel Wyly was lecturing on the concep

the main effort at the lower operational and tactical lev

it is apparent how these same ideas of leadership can 

pertinent when one interchanges the phrase main ef

with the COG. But what do we mean by leadership? Cyn

may counter that attributing the concept to an act of le
ership or military genius is like ascribing the whole ar

ment to a black box. 

To unravel this puzzle, we return to the originator of 

concept to examine how Clausewitz reconciles a metap

that apparently demands a huge amount of intellige

with the prevailing truth that war is often an unpredicta

affair. According to Clausewitz, uncertainty on the bat

field can only be conquered by the military genius, a m

with a very highly developed mental aptitude for w

Clausewitz is of course never dogmatic in his descriptio

to every rule he prescribes, he immediately notes 

exception or limitation. Nevertheless, three facult

appear to be the cornerstones of military genius. Stren

of character, the “ability to keep one’s head at times 

exceptional stress and violent emotion,” allowed the reas

of the commander to dominate his passions with

destroying his drive.74 Equally important was determi

tion—a willingness to “stand like a rock,”75 to act on be

despite uncertainty, to hold to a consistent course 

action amid confusion. Clausewitz commended the cons

tent pursuit even of an inferior course of acti

Determination (in Clausewitz’s sense) alone can prev

action from being paralyzed by uncertainty and the del

and hesitation caused by thought. The third indispensa

characteristic of a military genius is his instincts. “All gr

commanders have acted on instinct.”76 Clausewitzian c

cept of instincts combined both reason and intuition—

intellect that, even in the darkest hour, retains some gl

merings of the inner light which leads to truth . . . 

quick recognition of a truth that the mind would ordin

ily miss or would perceive only after long study and refl

tion.”77 It is therefore this informed intuition, a conflue

of thought and temperament that can master uncertai

and conquer the battlefield.

While Clausewitz was talking about military genius 

the wider context of war, the same applies if one hopes 

employ the COG concept effectively during operatio

These leadership characteristics are crucial because t

empower the players to act. Understanding the interp

between action and the COG concept is essential if we 

to fully grasp how one should think about COG in a si
ation of uncertainty. This is elaborated in the third a

final principle. 

Principle #3: Determination of the COG Is an

Evolving Process That Begins with Decisive Action

and Sustained with Continuous Feedback

There is often a mistaken belief that one needs to kn

the true COGs with complete certainty before acting. Y

because consensus is never truly achieved, one may be 

to conclude that the concept is rendered operationally u

less. This study suggests otherwise. The more we und

stand the concept, the more we realize that action 

demanded, even from the position of incomplete inform

tion; procrastination can be the greatest hindrance 

exploiting the enemy’s COG. There are two fundamen

reasons why this is so.

First, even though we may not be able to discern 

COGs with complete certainty initially, action and fe

back from enemy’s responses can lead us closer to the t

COGs. The strategic helix, first developed by Colo

Meilinger, best illustrates this point (fig. 1).

At the beginning, planners survey the enemy system 

its entirety and deduce a number of perceived enem

COGs. The true COG may in reality be hidden, as rep

sented by the vertical pillar. Uncertain as it may be, 

planners recommend targeting all the potential CO

through a series of parallel strategies, as suggested 

Principle #1. As the war progresses, the commander, throu

feedback on the effects of his decisive actions and enem

responses, shifts his targeting strategy and moves close

the true COG. This process continues until the true COG 

uncovered and effectively neutralized.78 Determining 

COGs is therefore an evolutionary process that is suppor

by decisive actions and continuous feedback.79

Second, not apparent from the diagram is the dynam

relationship between our actions and the enemy’s t

favors the side that seizes the initiative. Because w

involves the strategic interaction of at least two parties, 

aggressive actions can confound our enemy, denying h

the ability to influence the friendly COGs while enhanc

our own ability for exploitation. When commanders a
they multiply all the conditions of uncertainty for th

adversaries and indirectly compensate for their own imp

fect situational awareness. As opposing wills continue 

interact, this creates further opportunities for either 

Such opportunities are often born of the disorder tha

natural in war. They may be the result of our own actio

enemy mistakes, or even chance. By exploiting opportu

ties, we create in increasing numbers more opportuni

for exploitation. And it is often this ability and willingn

to create and exploit opportunities faster than the op

nent that generate decisive results. That is why decis

action is essential. The player with higher tempo c

stantly forces the opponent to react defensively to a serie

attacks, threats, and feints, all the while advancing his o

plan. At the extreme, the player does not need to be c

cerned very much with the enemy’s intentions, because 

player’s tempo serves as a shield against enemy attac

Time therefore becomes a COG in itself, for without the ti

to respond, the enemy’s tools of war lose their power 

influence, even before they are physically destroyed.80

Center Pole = Key “True” COG

X = Potential Targets

Accuracy

Time

X

Figure 1. Strategic Helix
Summary

This list of three fundamental principles is by no mea

exhaustive. They do however help support the main thr

of this research paper; that is, despite the pervasive 

that characterizes our operating environment, uncertai

need not cloud our understanding of how the COG conc

can effectively be employed. Nor do we have to return to 

age of Laplacian determinism that assumes away the re

ity of unpredictability we find so often in war. 

Conclusions and Lessons

One of the truisms of social science is that we will ne

have complete answers to complex phenomena. T

research paper does not aim to derive a grand unifying t

ory for determining and employing the COG conce

Instead, it is a focused inquiry to discover how one sho

think about and understand the employment of the c

cept. Specifically, it deals with the twin challenges t

Cohen implicitly places on analysts and campaign planne

How do we handle the inconsistencies and disagreeme

that surround the use of the concept? What are the im

cations if some of these inconsistencies remain unresolv

This research paper recommends that to think ab

the COG concept requires a combination of t

approaches. First, we must recognize the sources of c

fusion and take active steps to explicate the contentio

issues where possible. This paper has highlighted four 

areas where disagreements may arise and outlined h

some of these may logically be resolved. It is useful to r

erate that a complete resolution of these disagreement

sometimes less important than a deep appreciation of 

differing perspectives and underlying assumptions. O

then can we hope for a common framework, understood 

all practitioners, from which we can plan to fight as a s

gle team. Second, and equally important, students a

operational planners must learn to combine the art a

science of employing the concept in an uncertain wo

where the desire for complete consensus will always 

frustrated. This paper proposes that one should endea

to grasp the essence of the concept and to think system
ically and creatively. One must realize that its employm

is an act of leadership, where one is compelled to carefu

weigh the alternatives and risks, followed by boldness 

decision making. And with a tinge of humility, one sho

aggressively seek to establish flexible feedback systems 

evaluate the effects of one’s action, for the determinat

of the true COG is ultimately an evolving process. 

Notes

1. Joint Publication (JP) 1, Joint Warfare of the US Armed Forces

November 1991, 65; and JP 1, 10 January 1995, III-8–9 and IV-2.

2. Quoted in Richard H. Shultz et al., Security Studies for the 

Century (Washington, D.C.: Brassey’s, 1997), 365.

3. Martin Hollis and Steve Smith, Explaining and Understan

International Relations (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1990). Hollis 

Smith raise a similar point in their book.

4. Carl von Clausewitz, On War, ed. and trans. Michael Howard 

Peter Paret (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1976). 

English translation of center of gravity comes from Clausewitz’s use o

Latin and German words centra gravitatis and Schwerpunkt in On Wa

book 6, Clausewitz used the term centra gravitatis and subsequently u

Schwerpunkt when discussing the same concept. Howard and Paret, 

tors of the 1984 translation of On War, consider the terms to be syn

mous and translate both as center of gravity.

5. Michael I. Handel, Masters of War: Classical Strategic Tho

(London: Frank Cass and Co., 1996), 181–83. Handel details the ob

vation that there is a creative tension that underlies much of Clausew

understanding of war.

6. Clausewitz, 486.

7. Ibid., 248. In Clausewitz’s time, battles were indeed decisive in 

they often determined the outcome of the war. The course of battle o

realized the exhaustion of resources, and that the reserves were com

ted in the same day. Today, however, the results of a major battle are 

dom sufficient to secure a strategic objective, but instead form part 

larger whole that seeks to achieve a decisive aim.

8. Ibid., 485.

9. Ibid., 486.

10. James J. Schneider and Lawrence L. Izzo, “Clausewitz’s Elu

Center of Gravity,” Parameters, September 1987, 56.

11. Clausewitz, 486.

12. Ibid., 70–71.

13. I am indebted to Timothy J. Keppler for bringing to my atten

Clausewitz’s note regarding his plans to revise On War as well as the s

mary of Clausewitz’s ideas in book 8 of On War.

14. Ibid., 596.

15. Ibid., 595–96.

16. Ibid., 605–6. It is common to treat the primacy of politics over 

itary affairs as a distinct cause-and-effect relationship—first politics 

the goals, then war occurs, and then politics reigns again when the fi

ing stops. Any overlaps suggest political interference in the executio

military operations—conjuring horrid images of the Vietnam experie
that resulted in much disaster. While such a dichotomy serves to pro

the military with a maximum freedom of maneuver, it creates an artif

construct that is founded on a linear sequential paradigm. In reality

Alan D. Beyerchen points out, Clausewitz’s dictum that “war is mere

continuation of policy” appears far more profound as he seems to sug

not simply that political considerations take precedence over mili

deliberations but that war is intrinsically embedded in politics, and e

military act has its accompanying political considerations, intende

otherwise.

17. Ibid., 89.

18. Alan D. Beyerchen, “Clausewitz, Nonlinearity and 

Unpredictability of War,” International Security 17, no. 3 (Winter 19

59–90. See also Alan D. Beyerchen, “Clausewitz, Nonlinearity, and 

Importance of Imagery,” in Complexity, Global Politics, and Nati

Security, eds. David S. Alberts and Thomas J. Czerwinski (Washing

D.C.: National Defense University [NDU], 1997), chap. 7. Similar po

are noted in the writings of Barry D. Watts.

19. Even ardent admirers like Michael Howard concede that “it is 

easy . . . to give a fair and comprehensive summary of Clausewitz’s str

gic doctrine, since it is presented with infuriating incoherence.” Qu

in Lloyd J. Matthews, “On Clausewitz,” Army, February 1988.

20. Raymond Aron, Clausewitz: Philosopher of War, trans. Chris

Booker and Norman Stone (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 19

Aron argues that the incomplete nature of On War is the primary sou

of misunderstanding.

21. John House, Do Doctrinal Buzzwords Obscure the Meanin

Operational Art? (Fort Leavenworth, Kans.: School of Advanced Mili

Studies [SAMS], 1989). The phrase is adopted from the title of this SA

monograph by House.

22. Shimon Naveh, In Pursuit of Military Excellence: The Evolutio

Operational Theory, Cummings Center series (London: Frank Cass 

Co., 1997), 48. Some have even traced the roots of early German fail

in this century (namely Schlieffen’s operational perceptions) back to 

particular reading of the Clausewitzian concept of COG. There is ano

group of analysts who uses this narrow definition to support their as

tion that Clausewitz’s ideas have passed their time by highlighting 

overemphasis on the destruction battle aimed and directed towards 

enemy army as flawed and dangerous.

23. This view is implied by Clausewitz’s own caution against the 

tative nature of book 6, his belief that book 8 was “where the matter 

COG concept) properly belongs” as well as his underlying understan

of the nature of war as outlined in books 1 and 8.

24. Categorizing the concept by a “book 6” and “book 8” distinctio

not to suggest that Clausewitz was schizophrenic. Instead, it is to allud

the creative tension that was highlighted in the opening paragraph of 

research paper. Beyerchen attributes this tension to the nonlinear na

of war. However, unlike Beyerchen who describes the COG as a linear 

cept, this paper posits that the concept that Clausewitz had in mind, 

book 8, shared the same nonlinear foundations as the rest of his mas

piece.

25. John Maynard Keynes, The General Theory of Employm

Interest and Money (New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1965). S

view these inconsistencies as another reason to debunk the whole 

cept. Based on the experience in other social sciences, I submit that d

so will be throwing out the baby with the bath water. One is reminded 
instance that even interpretations of great works such as Keynes’s s

nal work which started the whole field of macroeconomics, continu

elude modern commentators. Some economists would call themse

“chapter 8—Keynesians” and argue that the modern economy is cha

terized by amorphous “animal spirits” that are driven by market and 

sumers’ expectations and confidence. Others see the Keynesian theor

more deterministic: more government expenditure means more econo

growth, ceteris paribus. Neither camp would however reason 

Keynesian ideas should be ignored in entirety.

26. This list is by no means exhaustive, but it does represent 

main spectrum of definitions from which other definitions can be deri

27. Note that the latest version (1997) of Fleet Marine Force Man

(FMFM) 1, Warfighting, has aligned the Marines’ understanding of 

COG with the definition adopted by JP 3-0, Joint Operations. It 

instead introduced an additional concept of critical vulnerabilitie

illustrate the essence of maneuver warfare. Still, the idea of viewing 

ters of gravity as critical vulnerabilities has a long tradition in 

Marines, as well as various military authors such as Robert Leonh

John A. Warden III, and a long list of maneuver warfare theorists, s

as William S. Lind, Steven Canby, and Pierre Sprey. The older defini

is therefore retained for the purposes of this discussion, as it prob

still reflects a popular definition held by many operational planners 

military analysts.

28. Martin van Creveld, Air Power and Maneuver Warfare (Maxwel

Force Base [AFB], Ala.: Air University Press, 1994), 3. Van Creveld i

example of professional analysts who adopt a similar definition in t

writings.

29. Jeffrey E. Thieret et al., “Hit ‘em Where It Hurts: Strategic At

in 2025,” White Papers, vol. 3, bk. 1, Power and Influence: 2025 (Max

AFB, Ala.: Air University Press, November 1996), 174; and Jason 

Barlow, Strategic Paralysis: An Airpower Theory for the Present (Max

AFB, Ala.: Air University Press, 1994). In recent years, some writers h

adopted such definitions as center of value or locus of value. The ide

denoting COG as anything that the enemy holds dear or values is 

incompatible with the classes of definitions but it is too encompassin

be useful for separate treatment and discussion in this research pap

30. Even though definitions 3, 4, and 6 do not explicitly use the t

“sources of strength,” the underlying ideas are similar. Consequen

they are grouped under the same category.

31. Ibid.

32. See for instance works by maneuver warfare theorists like Mic

Lind, Robert Leonhard, and Israeli analyst Shimon Naveh, including 

lier versions of Warfighting.

33. Joe Strange, Centers of Gravity and Critical Vulnerabili

Building on the Clausewitzian Foundation So That We Can All Speak 

Same Language, Perspectives on Warfighting Series no. 4 (Quantico, 

Marine Corps Association, 1996). Doctor Strange has extensively arg

this point in this occasional paper.

34. Wayne P. Hughes Jr., “Naval Maneuver Warfare,” Naval 

College Review, Summer 1997, 25–44. This point is well argued, a

from a naval perspective, and Captain Hughes also warned that b

maneuver warfare and attrition warfare can be successful styles of w

fare, depending on the context.
35. Edward Mann, “One Target, One Bomb: Is the Principle of M

Dead?” Airpower Journal, Spring 1993, 35–43; and Kurtis D. Loh

“Desert Storm’s Siren Song,” Airpower Journal, Winter 1995, 100–11

36. Shultz, 365.

37. K. Phillips Giles and P. Thomas Galvin, Center of Gra

Determination, Analysis, and Application (Carlisle Barracks, Pa.: Ce

for Strategic Leadership, Army War College, 31 January 1996), 13.

38. See the discussion titled “In the Beginning—Clausewitz’s Ce

of Gravity,” which gives a fuller account of the differences.

39. Its importance is further discussed in Proposition #2 at the h

ing “One or Many.”

40. Indeed, subsequent revisions in the Marine Corps doctrinal pu

cations have led to positive steps being taken in the latest editio

Warfighting (20 June 1997), 45–46, to avoid the confusion of treating 

ters of gravity as critical vulnerabilities. It will take some time be

changes in doctrine publications permeate the thinking of the entire Ma

Corps. Meanwhile, appreciation of these differences will be essential.

41. Clausewitz, 617.

42. There are two further arguments in support of the single-COG 

cept that need to be debunked. The first argument finds its support no

virtue of the physical analogies but in the need to focus limited com

power on one single effort. The crux in this case is to ask whether the c

cal nodes of the enemy are a function of our available combat resource

the answer is negative (as this author believes it to be), a better wa

address the concern of constrained resources is not to ignore the existe

of other COGs but to acknowledge that there is a need to engage the m

ple COGs sequentially, one at a time. The alternative is to search for the 

sive single silver bullet that military history warns is likely to be more o

illusion than reality. The second argument claims that multiple COGs 

exist because of the different levels of war (i.e., tactical, operational, 

strategic), but there can only be one COG at each level of war. This argum

is seemingly more sophisticated but it is a red herring. Besides the fact 

the levels of war are not inherently distinct categories but often overlap

contention remains that there is no a priori reason why there should be 

one COG at each level of war. Many of the points raised in the preceding 

cussion remain pertinent to counter this popular fallacy.

43. Giles and Galvin. While this appears to be an obvious conclus

these authors in their study continue to assume that there is only 

center of gravity.

44. William M. Mendel and Lamar Tooke, “Operational Lo

Selecting the Center of Gravity,” Military Review, June 1993, 25. 

tempting to say that the destruction of the center of gravity will lea

immediate victory. In some special cases, this silver bullet strategy 

exist. In most cases, however, such a criterion will be too stringent as 

enemy will inevitably display greater persistence through its abilit

react to friendly attacks. A more realistic end-state of concentrating 

subsequent efforts at the next higher level of war is therefore adop

Mendel and Tooke make a similar point.

45. Michael R. Gordon and Bernard E. Trainor, The Generals’ W

The Inside Story of the Conflict in the Gulf (Boston: Little, Brown and 

1995), 234.

46. Phillip Meilinger, 10 Propositions Regarding Air Po

(Washington, D.C.: Air Force History and Museums Program, 1995). 

the fourth proposition, which begins “In essence, Air Power is targeti

47. Naval Doctrine Publication (NDP) 1, Naval Warfare, March 1994
48. Dennis M. Drew, “Joint Operations, The World Looks Different f

10,000 Feet,” Airpower Journal, Fall 1988, 7–12; and Joseph C. W

Military Strategy: A General Theory of Power Control (New Brunswick, N

Rutgers University Press, 1966), 67. Admiral Wylie made a similar point 

resonates today when he wrote, “There is yet no accepted and recogn

general theory of strategy . . .[that] absorbs within its conceptual framew

the realities of the existing specific concepts of war strategy, the continen

the maritime, and the air theories.” (Emphasis added)

49. John A. Warden III, “Employing Air Power in the Twenty-

Century,” in The Future of Air Power in the Aftermath of the Gulf War, 

Richard H. Shultz Jr. and Robert L. Pfaltzgraff Jr. (Maxwell AFB, Ala.

University Press, July 1992), 64.

50. Naveh; and John Arquilla, “The Strategic Implications of Informa

Dominance,” Strategic Review, Summer 1994, 28. Using a syst

approach focusing on information and examining nations as entities 

attack components of their enemy, this view holds that information beco

the factor on which the outcome of a conflict depends. Another interes

account of differing theories of war leading to different concepts of cente

gravity is given by Naveh, who contrasts the different understanding

Schwerpunkt between the blitzkrieg way of war, the Soviet concept of vne

nost, and the evolution of the AirLand Battle doctrine. Naveh’s land-the

examples are noteworthy as they suggest that differences can arise wi

the same service and also warns military historians that the use of a c

mon term such as the center of gravity can have very different connotat

when the theories of war differ substantially.

51. Strange.

52. Beyerchen, “Clausewitz, Nonlinearity, and the Unpredictabilit

War”; and Pat A. Pentland, “Center of Gravity Analysis and Ch

Theory,” research report (Maxwell AFB, Ala.: Air War College, April 19

53. Timothy D. Hoyt, “Iraq’s Military Industry: A Critical Strat

Target,” National Security Studies Quarterly, Spring 1998, 33–50.

54. Beyerchen, “Clausewitz, Nonlinearity, and the Unpredictabilit

War,” 84.

55. Schneider and Izzo, 50.

56. Eliot Cohen, Gulf War Air Power Survey (GWAPS), vol. 1, Plan

and Command and Control (Washington, D.C.: Government Prin

Office, 1993), 2. The Gulf War is especially useful as a historical 

study on the employment of centers of gravity as the Central Comm

as well as the coalition planners, made explicit use of the concept in 

planning processes.

57. Otto Friedrich, ed., Desert Storm: The War in the Persian 

(Boston: Time Warner, 1991), 40.

58. DOD Interim Report to Congress, 4-2.

59. U.S. News & World Report Staff, Triumph without Victory: 

Unreported History of the Persian Gulf Conflict (New York: Times Bo

1992), 266.

60. Colin Agee, Peeling the Onion: The Iraqi’s Center of Gravity (

Leavenworth, Kans.: SAMS, 1992), 26–27.

61. John A. Warden III, Air Campaign: Planning for Com

(Washington, D.C.: NDU Press, 1988), 9–10.

62. GWAPS, 192. The correspondence between the expanded lis

the Air Force objectives and the perceived centers of gravity was cle

seen by General Horner’s Operations Plan 1002-90 briefing to Gen

Schwarzkopf in April 1990. The briefing slide gave an explicit matc

between the objectives and the centers of gravity (target sets).
63. Publication of Warden’s theoretical assumptions only took p

after the Gulf War, which must have added to the confusion during 

Gulf War.

64. Richard Szafranski, “The Problems with Bees and Bom

Airpower Journal, Winter 1998, 96.

65. Ibid.

66. John A. Warden III, “Success in Modern War: A Respons

Robert Pape,” Security Studies 7, no. 2 (Winter 1997/1998): 182.

67. Phillip S. Meilinger, “Air Targeting Strategies: An Overview,” 

Power Confronts an Unstable World (London: Brassey’s, 1998), 72.

68. Strange, 93.

69. Robert Jervis, System Effects:Complexity in Political and Social 

(Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1997). Jervis provides 

insightful account of how nations react as organic systems in inte

tional relations.

70. Beyerchen, “Clausewitz, Nonlinearity, and the Unpredictabilit

War,” 87; and Ervin Laszlo and Alexander Laszlo, “The Contribution o

Systems Sciences to the Humanities,” Systems Research and Behav

Science, January–February 1997, 5–20. To say that we should 

things as a whole is not to denigrate the importance of a reductio

approach. Both holistic and reductionist approaches have a place in d

ing with complex problems. However, given our ingrained inclination 

the reduction of complex problems, leading to what Beyerchen calls 

truncated expectations of the theory of war,” special emphasis shoul

given to the need for understanding systems in its entirety, rather t

in parts. As systems theory reminds us, there are emergent properties 

are marked by the appearance of novel characteristics exhibiting on 

level of the whole ensemble, but are not by the components in isolatio

71. Richard Hallion, Air Power Confronts an Unstable World (Lon

Brassey’s, 1997), chap. 3. I am indebted to Col Phillip Meilinger for 

observation from his essay “Air Targeting Strategies” published in Halli

72. John A. Warden III, “Employing Air Power in the Twenty-

Century,” in The Future of Air Power in the Aftermath of the Gulf War, 

Richard H. Shultz Jr. and Robert L. Pfaltzgraff Jr. (Maxwell AFB, Ala.

University Press, 1992), 57–82. The idea of parallelism is broader t

the application of airpower. For instance, decisive results during 

Bosnian conflict in 1995 were secured only through the parallel and 

ergistic employment of diplomatic and military power.

73. William S. Lind, Maneuver Warfare Handbook (Boulder, C

Westview, 1985), 112. This quote originated from one of Colonel W

lecture to the Amphibious Warfare School in 1981, when he was hea

the Tactics Department.

74. Ibid., 105–6.

75. Ibid., 117.

76. Ibid., 71.

77. Ibid., 102.

78. McGraw-Hill Encyclopedia of Science and Technology, vol. 3, 

It is interesting to note that the “strategic helix” finds its corollary in 

way our human body tackles the problem of defending against a w

array of possible invaders. Loosely speaking, when a hostile bacterium 

virus enters the body, defense strategies are generated at random un

feedback loop indicates that the correct strategy has been found. 

great challenge is therefore to mimic nature and to find new and us

ways to harness chaos.
79. Barry D. Watts, Foundations of U.S. Air Doctrine: The Problem 

Friction in War (Maxwell AFB, Ala.: Air University Press, 1984), 

Clearly, it is conceivable that the greater the experience of the plan

and the campaign commander, the tighter will be the helix and 

shorter will be the path to the true center of gravity. The emphasis on 

tle experience when operating under the complexities of war is well 

out by Watts.

80. This emphasis on tempo clearly resonates with John R. Bo

concept of observe, orient, decide, act (OODA) loop.