FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

v.

KYLE JASON KORTE,

Defendant-Appellant.

No. 18-50051 

D.C. No. 

8:16-cr-00156-

JLS-1 

OPINION

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Central District of California

Josephine L. Staton, District Judge, Presiding

Argued and Submitted February 11, 2019

Pasadena, California

Filed March 15, 2019

Before: Dorothy W. Nelson, Consuelo M. Callahan, and

John B. Owens, Circuit Judges.

Opinion by Judge Owens;

Concurrence by Judge D.W. Nelson
2 UNITED STATES V. KORTE

SUMMARY*

Criminal Law

The panel affirmed the district court’s denial of the 

defendant’s suppression motions and his convictions for 

bank robbery in a case in which the defendant, who was on 

parole during his crime spree, had consented to suspicionless 

searches of his person, residence, and any property under his 

control.

Rejecting the defendant’s contention that a lawful parole 

search of his car does not extend to the trunk because the 

trunk is not “property under his control,” the panel held that 

the parole search of the defendant’s trunk was lawful.

Following precedent distinguishing Fourth Amendment 

rights in the parolee context, the panel held that the 

warrantless placement of a GPS tracker on the defendant’s 

car did not violate the Fourth Amendment.

The panel held that cell site location information (CSLI) 

acquired before the Supreme Court issued its decision in 

Carpenter v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 2206 (2018) (holding 

that the Government must obtain a warrant to access a 

person’s CSLI from a wireless carrier), is admissible under 

the good-faith exception to the exclusionary rule so long as 

the Government satisfied the Stored Communications Act’s 

then-lawful requirements. The panel took no stance on the 

constitutionality of acquiring a parolee’s CSLI without a 

warrant.

 * This summary constitutes no part of the opinion of the court. It 

has been prepared by court staff for the convenience of the reader.
UNITED STATES V. KORTE 3

Concurring in both the reasoning and the result, Judge 

Nelson wrote separately because she is concerned with the 

ever “diminishing” reasonable expectation of privacy 

afforded to probationers and parolees, especially as it relates 

to digital privacy.

COUNSEL

H. Dean Steward (argued), Attorney at Law, San Clemente, 

California, for Defendant-Appellant.

Julia L. Reese (argued), Assistant United States Attorney, 

Criminal Appeals Section; Nicola T. Hanna, United States 

Attorney; Lawrence S. Middleton, Assistant United States 

Attorney, Chief, Criminal Division; Gregory W. Staples, 

Assistant United States Attorney, Santa Ana Branch Office; 

United States Attorney’s Office, Los Angeles, California; 

for Plaintiff-Appellee.

OPINION

OWENS, Circuit Judge:

Defendant Kyle Korte appeals from his convictions for 

bank robbery. During his crime spree, Korte was on parole 

and had consented to warrantless, suspicionless searches of 

his person, residence, and any property under his control. 

Relying on this parole condition, officers placed a Global 

Positioning System (“GPS”) device on his car and later 

searched its trunk. Officers also obtained Korte’s historical 

cell site location information (“CSLI”) by court order. On 

appeal, Korte primarily challenges the district court’s denial 
4 UNITED STATES V. KORTE

of his suppression motions as to each of these searches. We 

have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, and we affirm.

I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

In a world of cybercrime and identity theft, Korte stole 

money the old-fashioned way — he robbed banks. After 

serving time in state prison for bank robbery, Korte was 

paroled in August 2016. As a parolee in California, Korte 

was “subject to search or seizure . . . at any time of the day 

or night, with or without a search warrant or with or without 

cause.” CAL. PENAL CODE § 3067(b)(3); see also id.

§ 3067(a). On October 25, 2016, Korte acknowledged his 

parole conditions, including that he was now subject to 

searches of “[y]ou, your residence, and any property under 

your control.”

In October 2016, the Los Angeles Sheriff’s Department 

(“LASD”) began investigating a series of bank robberies. 

The first robbery took place on October 7. A masked robber 

entered a bank and demanded “all your hundreds.” The 

frightened teller, protected by bulletproof glass, activated the 

silent alarm and retreated to a back office. The robber left 

with no money. On October 12, the masked robber targeted 

another bank, this time brandishing a toy gun. He was more 

successful this go-around, escaping with $1,600. He then hit 

two more banks on October 27. Again displaying the toy 

gun, the robber pocketed $2,200 and $7,000. In total, the 

masked robber stole less than $11,000 — not a Neil 

McCauley heist by any means.

Working with LASD, the Federal Bureau of 

Investigation (“FBI”) began to suspect that Korte was the 

masked robber. Surveillance video from one of the robberies 

showed a car registered to the address that Korte provided to 

his parole officer. An LASD officer who saw video of the 
UNITED STATES V. KORTE 5

masked robber also reported that the individual resembled 

Korte, who the officer knew was on parole for bank robbery.

On November 4, 2016, without a warrant or Korte’s 

consent, LASD placed a GPS tracking device on Korte’s car 

and periodically monitored the vehicle’s movements over 

the next six days. That same day, the Government obtained 

a court order under the Stored Communications Act 

(“SCA”), 18 U.S.C. § 2703(d), to acquire Korte’s CSLI. 

This information placed Korte’s cell phone near three of the 

four banks at the time of the respective robberies.

On November 10, 2016, LASD learned that the FBI had 

obtained an arrest warrant for Korte. Officers followed 

Korte as he drove from his home to a bank and parked 

nearby, seeming to surveil his next target. An officer saw 

Korte open the car’s trunk and place something inside. 

Shortly thereafter, they arrested Korte and searched the car. 

The officers’ search of the trunk revealed the toy gun used 

during the three armed robberies and the shirt Korte had been 

wearing while casing the bank just prior to his arrest.

A grand jury indicted Korte for one count of attempted 

bank robbery in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2113(a) and three 

counts of bank robbery in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2113(a), 

(d). Korte pled not guilty and moved to suppress (1) the 

evidence found in his car’s trunk, (2) the information derived 

from the GPS tracker on his car, and (3) his CSLI. The 

district court denied all three suppression motions. The court 

reasoned that Korte’s parole status permitted the warrantless 

search of the trunk and placement of the GPS tracker on his 

car. As for the CSLI, it held that even if the acquisition of 

this information violated Korte’s Fourth Amendment rights, 

see Carpenter v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 2206 (2018), the 

good-faith exception clearly applied based on the case law 

at that time.
6 UNITED STATES V. KORTE

Korte went to trial. As to Count 1 — the unsuccessful 

robbery — the bank teller testified that even though 

bulletproof glass separated her from the robber and she saw 

no weapon, she was nevertheless “[k]ind of panicked,” 

“[s]hocked,” and “[s]cared.” Korte filed a motion for a 

judgment of acquittal, under Federal Rule of Criminal 

Procedure 29, focusing on Count 1. The district court 

rejected his argument that the Government failed to prove 

the element of “force and violence, or by intimidation,” as 

18 U.S.C. § 2113(a) requires. Citing the teller’s “testimony 

with regard to a mask and the demand,” the court found 

sufficient evidence of “intimidation” to send the matter to 

the jury.

The jury returned a guilty verdict as to all four counts. 

Korte was sentenced to 210 months in prison.

II. DISCUSSION

We review de novo the denial of Korte’s suppression 

motions. See United States v. Zapien, 861 F.3d 971, 974 (9th 

Cir. 2017) (per curiam). We address each search — of his 

car’s trunk, the GPS tracker on his car, and the acquisition 

of his CSLI — in turn.

A. Search of the Trunk

We first examine whether Korte’s parole-search 

condition authorized the warrantless search of his car’s 

trunk. See United States v. Cervantes, 859 F.3d 1175, 1183 

(9th Cir. 2017) (“A search of a parolee that complies with 

the terms of a valid search condition will usually be deemed 

reasonable under the Fourth Amendment.”).

California Penal Code section 3067(b)(3) provides that 

every parolee “is subject to search or seizure . . . at any time 
UNITED STATES V. KORTE 7

of the day or night, with or without a search warrant or with 

or without cause.” In Samson v. California, 547 U.S. 843, 

846 (2006), the United States Supreme Court reviewed 

California’s parole-search condition to determine “whether 

a suspicionless search, conducted under the authority of 

[section 3067], violates the Constitution.” The Court first 

reasoned that “parole is more akin to imprisonment.” Id. at 

850. Because parolees “have severely diminished 

expectations of privacy by virtue of their status alone” —

even less than probationers — and because “[t]he State’s 

interests” in supervising parolees and reducing recidivism 

“are substantial,” the Court upheld California’s parolesearch condition.1 Id. at 852–53.

Korte does not — and cannot — argue that officers 

unlawfully searched his car. He admits that he rented the car 

and referred to it as “my car.” As “property under [his] 

control,” California’s parole-search condition authorized the 

 1 There are two limitations on this condition. First, the officer 

conducting the search must know at the time that the individual is 

currently on parole. See Moreno v. Baca, 431 F.3d 633, 641 (9th Cir. 

2005). Second, the search cannot be “arbitrary, capricious, or 

harassing.” See CAL. PENAL CODE § 3067(d) (“It is not the intent of the 

Legislature to authorize law enforcement officers to conduct searches for 

the sole purpose of harassment.”); see also Samson, 547 U.S. at 856 

(“The concern that California’s suspicionless search system gives 

officers unbridled discretion to conduct searches . . . is belied by 

California’s prohibition on ‘arbitrary, capricious or harassing’ searches.” 

(citations omitted)).

Here, it is undisputed that the officers knew that Korte was on 

parole, and there is no evidence the officers engaged in an arbitrary, 

capricious, or harassing search. Nor does Korte contend he was unaware 

of the parole-search condition. See People v. Lilienthal, 587 P.2d 706, 

711 (Cal. 1978) (“The condition itself provides general notice to a 

defendant that he or his belongings may be subjected to warrantless 

searches.”).
8 UNITED STATES V. KORTE

warrantless search of it. See, e.g., United States v. Caseres, 

533 F.3d 1064, 1075–76 (9th Cir. 2008) (explaining that a 

search of the parolee’s car would have been lawful if the 

officer had known that the defendant was on parole).

Yet, Korte contends that a lawful parole search of his car 

does not extend to the trunk because the trunk is not similarly 

“property under [his] control.” We reject his narrow 

interpretation of this condition. Property is subject to search 

when a parolee “exhibit[s] a sufficiently strong connection 

to [the property in question] to demonstrate ‘control’ over 

it.” United States v. Grandberry, 730 F.3d 968, 980 (9th Cir. 

2013) (defining “property under [a parolee’s] control”); see 

also Cervantes, 859 F.3d at 1183 (explaining that having a 

key to and belongings inside a hotel room sufficiently 

demonstrate control, even if the room is co-occupied). 

Consistent with our understanding of the condition, the 

Supreme Court of California explained that a parolee 

controls property based on “the nexus between the parolee 

and the area or items searched,” including the “nature of that 

area or item” and “how close and accessible the area or item 

is to the parolee.” People v. Schmitz, 288 P.3d 1259, 1270 

(Cal. 2012) (holding that a parolee, who is only a passenger 

in a third-party’s vehicle, is in control of areas within his 

reach in the passenger compartment).

Korte’s uncontested control over the car was sufficient 

to permit a warrantless search of its trunk. In any event, his 

conduct also illustrated a sufficiently close nexus to the trunk 

itself. Officers observed him putting things inside the trunk.

Permitting a warrantless search of the trunk of a 

parolee’s car is also consistent with broader Fourth 

Amendment precedent. Generally, a lawful search of a fixed 

space or premise extends to its entire area, whether or not 

that requires opening a confined space: “[N]ice distinctions 
UNITED STATES V. KORTE 9

between closets, drawers, and containers, in the case of a 

home, or between glove compartments, upholstered seats, 

trunks, and wrapped packages, in the case of a vehicle, must 

give way to the interest in the prompt and efficient 

completion of the task at hand.” United States v. Ross, 456 

U.S. 798, 821 (1982). This reasoning applies to a car’s 

trunk. See, e.g., id. at 825 (“If probable cause justifies the 

search of a lawfully stopped vehicle, it justifies the search of 

every part of the vehicle and its contents that may conceal 

the object of the search.”); United States v. Ewing, 638 F.3d 

1226, 1231 (9th Cir. 2011) (“[I]f a law enforcement officer 

has probable cause to search a vehicle, that probable cause 

extends to all contents in the vehicle that could be connected 

to the suspected activity.”); United States v. McWeeney, 454 

F.3d 1030, 1035 (9th Cir. 2006) (holding that consent to 

search a defendant’s car extends to the trunk). We also note 

that Korte’s proposed distinction between a car and trunk 

was already rejected by the Supreme Court of California in 

the context of a probationer – who has more Fourth 

Amendment protection than Korte as a parolee. See 

Lilienthal, 587 P.2d at 711 (“We conclude that the officers 

were justified in searching defendant’s car trunk pursuant to 

defendant’s consent to warrantless searches as a condition of 

his probation.”).

As property under his control, Korte fails to explain how 

searching his car’s trunk would offend the Fourth 

Amendment when a warrantless search of his home — the 

apex of constitutionally protected places — would not. See 

United States v. Lopez, 474 F.3d 1208, 1213–14 (9th Cir. 

2007) (upholding the warrantless search of a parolee’s 

home), overruled on other grounds by United States v. King, 

687 F.3d 1189 (9th Cir. 2012) (en banc) (per curiam); see 

also Florida v. Jardines, 569 U.S. 1, 6 (2013) (“But when it 

comes to the Fourth Amendment, the home is first among 
10 UNITED STATES V. KORTE

equals.”). The district court summed it up well: “If an 

individual’s residence falls within the scope of an 

appropriate search under the parolee provisions, how would 

a trunk not?”

Accordingly, the district court correctly held that the 

search of Korte’s trunk was a lawful parole search.

B. Placement and Use of the GPS Tracker

We next decide whether Korte’s parole-search condition 

permitted the warrantless placement of a GPS device on his 

car and the subsequent surveillance of his car’s movements.

Installing a GPS tracker on a car constitutes a search, 

typically requiring a warrant. See United States v. Jones, 

565 U.S. 400, 404 (2012). The application of this principle 

to a parolee’s car, however, is less clear. While the parties 

agree that placing the device on Korte’s car was a search 

under the Fourth Amendment, they disagree on whether 

doing so without a warrant offends the Constitution. In light 

of Samson’s strong pronouncement that parolees in 

California have very limited Fourth Amendment rights, 547 

U.S. at 851–52, we agree with the district court that this was 

a lawful parole search.

Our decision in United States v. Johnson, 875 F.3d 1265 

(9th Cir. 2017), instructs us not to necessarily apply a newly 

established Fourth Amendment protection to parolees. In 

Riley v. California, 573 U.S. 373, 386 (2014), the United 

States Supreme Court held that the warrantless search of an 

arrestee’s cell phone was unlawful. The Court emphasized 

the significant privacy intrusion that arose when searching a 

person’s cell phone. Id. at 393; see also Johnson, 875 F.3d 

at 1274 (noting that Riley was premised on “privacy interests 

implicated in cell phone searches [being] particularly 
UNITED STATES V. KORTE 11

acute”). Cell phones, the Supreme Court said, are now “a 

pervasive and insistent part of daily life” that “place vast 

quantities of personal information literally in the hands of 

individuals.” Riley, 573 U.S. at 385–86. Because cell 

phones “collect[] in one place many distinct types of 

information . . . that reveal much more in combination than 

any isolated record,” searching a cell phone would give law 

enforcement the unparalleled ability to reconstruct “[t]he 

sum of an individual’s private life.” Id. at 394.

Despite the Court’s cautionary words, we held that Riley

did not apply to parolees. Johnson, 875 F.3d at 1275; but 

see United States v. Lara, 815 F.3d 605, 612 (9th Cir. 2016) 

(applying Riley to the warrantless search of a probationer’s 

cell phone). Rather, noting that “the balance of privacy 

interests and factual circumstances in this context are 

different,” we permitted the warrantless search of a parolee’s 

cell phone. Johnson, 875 F.3d at 1273.

In light of our ruling in Johnson, we are hard-put to say 

that the warrantless placement of a GPS tracker on a 

parolee’s car is impermissible. If an officer can conduct a 

warrantless search of a parolee’s cell phone — an object that 

is “[t]he sum of an individual’s private life,” Riley, 573 U.S. 

at 394 — placing a GPS device on a parolee’s car cannot 

logically demand more constitutional protection. Although 

a GPS tracker may create a summary of a parolee’s public 

movements, it offers none of the “vast quantities of personal 

information” that a cell phone does. Id. at 386.

The State’s interest in supervising parolees is also 

particularly strong here. See Samson, 547 U.S. at 853 

(referencing the State’s “substantial” interests in “reducing 

recidivism,” “promoting reintegration,” and deterring future 

criminal conduct). Tracking a parolee’s movements by car 

can be a critical tool for monitoring this group. Its value is 
12 UNITED STATES V. KORTE

well illustrated here: Korte returned to a life of crime just 

months after his release from prison, but LASD was able to 

investigate Korte and prevented other armed robberies by 

tracking his movements. In Johnson, we explained that 

requiring officers to obtain a warrant before searching a 

parolee’s cell phone “would often undermine the state’s 

ability to supervise effectively.” 875 F.3d at 1274. We have 

similar concerns with requiring officers to obtain a warrant 

before tracking a parolee’s vehicular movements.

Lastly, we note that our decision aligns with another 

court’s interpretation of California’s parole-search 

condition. In People v. Zichwic, 114 Cal. Rptr. 2d 733, 738–

39 (Ct. App. 2001), the California Court of Appeal 

considered the warrantless placement of an electronic 

monitoring device on a parolee’s car. It held that even 

“assum[ing] that attaching an electronic tracking device to 

the undercarriage of defendant’s truck constituted a search, 

it was authorized by defendant’s parole search condition.” 

Id. at 740. Granted, Zichwic differs in that it considered the 

use of a beeper, id. at 738, rather than a GPS device —

investigatory methods treated differently under the Fourth 

Amendment. Compare United States v. Karo, 468 U.S. 705, 

713 (1984) (“[N]o Fourth Amendment interest . . . was 

infringed by the installation of the beeper.”), with Jones, 565 

U.S. at 409 n.6 (noting that GPS tracking is a more intrusive 

law enforcement practice than a beeper).

Nonetheless, we believe that Zichwic is, at minimum, 

informative. Although it was decided almost two decades 

before Jones, its holding was unaffected because it had 

assumed that placing a tracking device on a car constituted a 

search. Zichwic, 114 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 740. The Supreme 

Court of California has not since interpreted the parolesearch condition differently. And, while a beeper and GPS 
UNITED STATES V. KORTE 13

device might differ in their tracking capabilities, the court in 

Zichwic at least concluded, as we do, that the State’s need 

for electronically monitoring a parolee’s movements 

outweighs the privacy interests at issue. Id. at 739–40.

We do not disregard the importance of Jones. We 

acknowledge that “GPS monitoring generates a precise, 

comprehensive record of a person’s public movements.” 

Jones, 565 U.S. at 415 (Sotomayor, J., concurring). 

However, in following precedent distinguishing Fourth 

Amendment rights in the parolee context, we hold that the 

warrantless placement of a GPS tracker on Korte’s car does 

not violate the Fourth Amendment.

C. Warrantless CSLI Acquisition

Finally, we consider whether the district court should 

have excluded the CSLI evidence, acquired without a 

warrant, as a Fourth Amendment violation. The Supreme 

Court granted certiorari to resolve the constitutionality of 

warrantless CSLI acquisition before the district court could 

rule on Korte’s suppression motion. Carpenter v. United 

States, 137 S. Ct. 2211 (2017) (mem.). As such, the district 

court did not address the constitutional issue before it, but 

denied Korte’s motion under the Fourth Amendment’s goodfaith exception. We, therefore, consider only a narrow issue: 

whether the good-faith exception applies to the warrantless 

acquisition of a defendant’s CSLI before Carpenter v. 

United States, 138 S. Ct. 2206 (2018).2

 2 We take no stance on the constitutionality of acquiring a parolee’s 

CSLI without a warrant.
14 UNITED STATES V. KORTE

In Carpenter, the Supreme Court summarized CSLI and 

how this technology permits almost real-time compilation of 

a person’s location during any given period:

Cell phones continuously scan their 

environment looking for the best signal, 

which generally comes from the closest cell 

site. Most modern devices . . . tap into the 

wireless network several times a minute 

whenever their signal is on, even if the owner 

is not using one of the phone’s features. Each 

time the phone connects to a cell site, it 

generates a time-stamped record known as

cell-site location information (CSLI).

Id. at 2211. The Court wrestled with how to apply this “new 

phenomenon” under the Fourth Amendment, id. at 2216, 

noting that it “does not fit neatly under existing precedents,” 

id. at 2214. It ultimately concluded, however, that the 

Government must obtain a warrant to access a person’s CSLI 

from a wireless carrier, and could no longer rely on a court 

order under § 2703(d) of the SCA. Id. at 2221.

Although the Government obtained Korte’s CSLI 

without a warrant, he is not automatically entitled to relief. 

See United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 906–07 (1984) 

(explaining that whether there was a Fourth Amendment 

violation and “[w]hether the exclusionary sanction is 

appropriately imposed” are separate questions). Illinois v. 

Krull, 480 U.S. 340, 342, 350 (1987), established an 

important exception to the exclusionary rule: Evidence 

obtained by the Government, acting in “objectively 

reasonable reliance upon a statute” that is “ultimately found 

to violate the Fourth Amendment,” does not require 

suppression.
UNITED STATES V. KORTE 15

Because we find the Government reasonably relied on 

the SCA when it obtained Korte’s CSLI, we affirm the 

district court’s application of the Fourth Amendment’s 

good-faith exception. See also United States v. Camou, 773 

F.3d 932, 944 (9th Cir. 2014) (placing the burden on the 

government to prove it acted in good faith). Before 

Carpenter, the SCA authorized a government entity to 

request “a provider of electronic communication service . . . 

to disclose a record or other information pertaining to a 

subscriber to or a customer of such service.” 18 U.S.C. 

§ 2703(c)(1). The statute explicitly authorized retrieval of 

these records by court order if the Government “offer[ed] 

specific and articulable facts showing that there are 

reasonable grounds to believe that . . . the records or other 

information sought, are relevant and material to an ongoing 

criminal investigation” — a more lenient standard than 

probable cause. Id. § 2703(d).

When the Government obtained Korte’s CSLI — before 

Carpenter was decided — acting by court order was still 

authorized. Moreover, we cannot say that the Government 

had any reason to doubt the SCA’s constitutionality, such 

that it may have been acting in bad faith. See Krull, 480 U.S. 

at 355 (“[T]he standard of reasonableness . . . is an objective 

one.”). CSLI remained a relatively novel form of evidence. 

And, although we had not yet commented on the 

constitutionality of warrantless CSLI acquisition, a number 

of our sister circuits had. All had affirmed the SCA’s 

constitutionality under the Fourth Amendment. See United 

States v. Gilton, No. 16-10109, slip op. at 20 (9th Cir. Mar. 

4, 2019) (explaining that, at least as of 2012, “the prevailing 

belief” was “that CSLI data was not protected by the Fourth 

Amendment”); see also United States v. Graham, 824 F.3d 

421, 424 (4th Cir. 2016) (en banc); United States v. 

Carpenter, 819 F.3d 880, 884 (6th Cir. 2016); United States 
16 UNITED STATES V. KORTE

v. Davis, 785 F.3d 498, 511 (11th Cir. 2015) (en banc); In re 

Application of the U.S. for Historical Cell Site Data, 724 

F.3d 600, 615 (5th Cir. 2013); In re Application of the U.S. 

for an Order Directing a Provider of Elec. Commc’n Serv. 

to Disclose Records to the Gov’t, 620 F.3d 304, 313 (3d Cir. 

2010).

As explained in Krull, it is hardly objectively 

unreasonable to rely on a then-lawful statute when courts 

were upholding it or similar legislative schemes. 480 U.S. 

at 358–59. Officials should not be “expected to question the 

judgment of the legislature that passed the law,” particularly 

when confronted with the pattern of judicial holdings as 

existed here. Id. at 350. Any “defect in the [SCA],” 

therefore, “was not sufficiently obvious so as to render [the 

Government’s] reliance upon the statute objectively 

unreasonable.” Id. at 359. The Supreme Court’s own 

sharply divided opinion in Carpenter brings this point to 

bear. See 138 S. Ct. at 2217 (explaining that the CSLI issue 

presents “novel circumstances”); see also id. at 2223 

(referring to the majority’s decision as a “stark departure 

from relevant Fourth Amendment precedents”) (Kennedy, 

J., dissenting).

Moreover, our application of Krull is anything but novel. 

Several other circuits have already invoked this good-faith 

exception when presented with similar facts. See United 

States v. Goldstein, 914 F.3d 200, 203–05 (3d Cir. 2019); 

United States v. Curtis, 901 F.3d 846, 848–49 (7th Cir. 

2018); see also United States v. Chambers, No. 16-163-cr, 

2018 WL 4523607, at *2 (2d Cir. Sept. 21, 2018) (explaining 

that “the authorities sought information from third parties by 

complying with the SCA” and “[r]eliance on a federal statute 

gives rise to a presumption of good faith” (citing Krull, 480 

U.S. at 349)). Others have analyzed the issue similarly, 
UNITED STATES V. KORTE 17

although without directly invoking Krull. See United States 

v. Joyner, 899 F.3d 1199, 1205 (11th Cir. 2018) (per curiam) 

(noting that “the Government complied with the 

requirements of the SCA in obtaining the orders to compel 

cell site records” while it was still lawful); United States v. 

Chavez, 894 F.3d 593, 608 (4th Cir. 2018) (refusing to apply 

the exclusionary rule because “investigators in this case 

reasonably relied on court orders and the [SCA] in obtaining 

the cell site records”). Similarly, we recently refused to 

exclude CSLI data obtained in good-faith reliance on a 

warrant, later deemed to be defective. Gilton, slip op. at 21.

Finally, we note that our decision accords with the 

exclusionary rule’s limited purpose to deter future Fourth 

Amendment violations, rather than remedy the rights of a 

single aggrieved party. See United States v. Calandra, 414 

U.S. 338, 347–48 (1974); see also Krull, 480 U.S. at 347. 

For us to exclude CSLI, obtained in good faith based on a 

then-lawful legislative scheme, would do nothing to prevent 

future Fourth Amendment violations. See Davis v. United 

States, 564 U.S. 229, 236–37 (2011) (“The [exclusionary] 

rule’s sole purpose, we have repeatedly held, is to deter 

future Fourth Amendment violations.”). With the 

exclusionary rule as “our last resort, not our first impulse,” 

Hudson v. Michigan, 547 U.S. 586, 591 (2006), we hold that 

CSLI acquired pre-Carpenter is admissible — so long as the 

Government satisfied the SCA’s then-lawful requirements 

— under Krull’s good-faith exception.
18 UNITED STATES V. KORTE

III. CONCLUSION

For the reasons provided above, we affirm the district 

court’s denial of Korte’s suppression motions and his 

convictions for bank robbery.3

AFFIRMED.

D.W. NELSON, Circuit Judge, concurring:

I concur in both the reasoning and result—the good-faith 

exception saves the government’s conduct here. I write 

separately, however, because I am concerned with the ever 

“diminishing” reasonable expectation of privacy afforded to 

probationers and parolees, especially as it relates to their 

digital privacy.

In Samson v. California, the United States Supreme 

Court seemingly established a ceiling on a parolee’s 

expectation of privacy. 547 U.S. 843, 846 (2006). The 

Supreme Court, however, did not set a floor. Nor did it offer 

a limiting principle. It is not surprising, therefore, that in the 

decade or so since Samson, our Court has further diminished 

 3 Korte also argues that his Count 1 conviction for attempted bank 

robbery under 18 U.S.C. § 2113(a) cannot stand because there was 

insufficient evidence of “intimidation.” Longstanding precedent 

forecloses this argument. Korte’s demand for money and use of a mask

satisfies “intimidation” under § 2113(a). See, e.g., United States v. 

Hopkins, 703 F.2d 1102, 1103 (9th Cir. 1983) (“[T]he threats implicit in 

[defendant’s] written and verbal demands for money provide sufficient 

evidence of intimidation to support the jury’s verdict.”); United States v. 

Bingham, 628 F.2d 548, 549 (9th Cir. 1980) (“[E]xpress threats of bodily 

harm, threatening body motions, or the physical possibility of concealed 

weapon[s] . . . have never been held to be requirements for a § 2113(a) 

conviction.”).
UNITED STATES V. KORTE 19

probationers’ and parolees’ expectations of privacy. See, 

e.g., United States v. Johnson, 875 F.3d 1265, 1275 (9th Cir. 

2017) (holding that Riley’s prohibition on warrantless phone

searches does not apply to parolees); United States v. 

Cervantes, 859 F.3d 1175, 1183 (9th Cir. 2017) (holding that 

a search of a parolee that complies with the terms of a valid 

search condition is usually reasonable); United States v. 

Grandberry, 730 F.3d 968, 980 (9th Cir. 2013) (defining the 

types of property under a parolee’s control that are 

searchable without a warrant); United States v. Lopez, 474 

F.3d 1208, 1213–14 (9th Cir. 2007) (upholding the 

warrantless search of a parolee’s home).

Justice Stevens, in his Samson dissent, stated that the 

Supreme Court’s precedents did not support “a regime of 

suspicionless searches. . . untethered by any procedural 

safeguards, by law enforcement personnel who have no 

special interest in the welfare of the parolee or probationer.” 

Samson, 547 U.S. at 857 (Stevens, J., dissenting). He 

suggested an individualized suspicion requirement to 

prevent what he warned would be an “unprecedented 

curtailment of liberty.” Id. at 866. His words proved to be a 

prescient warning.

Our physical and digital spaces continue to merge with 

the creation of new technologies. The individual and societal 

benefits of these technologies come with increased risks—

our devices and third parties store ever more deeply 

revealing and private information that is easily accessed by 

law enforcement. The Supreme Court recently reaffirmed 

that the “progress of science” should not come at the expense 

of Fourth Amendment protections. See Carpenter v. United 

States, 138 S. Ct. 2206, 2223 (2018) (quoting Olmstead v. 

United States, 277 U.S. 438, 474 (1928)). I believe, 
20 UNITED STATES V. KORTE

therefore, it is time to revisit the degree of protection the 

Fourth Amendment affords probationers and parolees.