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 September 2021

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Welcome to this installment of The Federal Law Enforcement Informer (The Informer). The Legal Training Division of the Federal 

Law Enforcement Training Centers’ Office of Chief Counsel is dedicated to providing law enforcement officers with quality, useful 

and timely United States Supreme Court and federal Circuit Courts of Appeals reviews, interesting developments in the law, and 

legal articles written to clarify or highlight various issues. The views expressed in these articles are the opinions of the author and 

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by clicking on the link below. 

This edition of The Informer may be cited as 9 INFORMER 21.
2

The Informer – September 2021

Case Summaries

Circuit Courts of Appeals

Second Circuit

United States v. Braggs: Whether the warrantless search of a state parolee’s house that 

resulted in the seizure of evidence that was used in a subsequent federal prosecution was 

reasonable under the Fourth Amendment.........................................................................................4

United States v. Weaver: Whether a police officer’s Terry frisk of the defendant was

reasonable under the Fourth Amendment.........................................................................................5

Third Circuit

United States v. Rought: Whether the defendant’s invocation of the right to counsel

was limited to interrogation concerning the drug-overdose death of his friend, and whether 

the defendant subsequently initiated the post-invocation discussion of his friend’s death

with an FBI agent..............................................................................................................................6

Fourth Circuit

United States v. Caldwell: Whether two warrantless searches of the defendant’s vehicle, 

the second of which occurred thirteen days after the vehicle was impounded, were lawful 

under the automobile exception to the warrant requirement.............................................................8

Seventh Circuit

United States v. McGill: Whether the warrantless seizure of the defendant’s cell phone 

by his probation officer was valid under the plain view exception..................................................10

Eighth Circuit

United States v. Salkil: Whether a police officer unlawfully prolonged the scope and

duration of a traffic stop..................................................................................................................11

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FLETC Informer Webinar Schedule – October 2021

1. Policing and the Mentally Ill

Presented by Debora Gerads, Attorney Advisor/Senior Instructor, Federal Law 

Enforcement Training Centers, Artesia, New Mexico.

Policing the mentally ill is a growing challenge to today’s police forces as mental health 

facilities and services continue to see significant budget cuts. As a result, law enforcement 

are often the first responders to incidents involving those with mental illness. The 

mentally ill are not more violent, but an encounter can escalate quickly, putting everyone 
3

involved in danger. This program will discuss tools to identify mental illness and 

techniques for de-escalating a situation.

Friday, October 13, 2021: 3 p.m. Eastern / 2 p.m. Central / 1 p.m. Mountain / 

12 p.m. Pacific

To participate in this webinar: https://share.dhs.gov/informer

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4

CASE SUMMARIES

Circuit Courts of Appeals

Second Circuit

United States v. Braggs, 5 F.4th 183 (2d Cir. 2021) 

Shammar Braggs was on parole after serving time in prison for a state drug conviction. While on 

parole, Braggs was subject to supervision by the New York State Department of Corrections and 

Community Supervision (DOCCS) and restricted by certain “standard and special conditions of 

release.” Those conditions included a prohibition on possessing firearms, ammunition, or mindaltering substances. Braggs was also required to sign a form wherein he agreed to, among other 

things, “permit [his] Parole Officer to visit [him] at [his] residence and/or place of employment 

and . . . permit the search and inspection of [his] person, residence and property.” A separate 

DOCCS internal policy document, Directive No. 9404, provided that a parole officer may conduct 

a warrantless search of a parolee, “when there is an articulable reason to conduct the search that 

demonstrates a risk to public safety or the parolee’s re-entry into the community,” which was 

essentially, a reasonable suspicion standard.

After receiving an anonymous tip that Braggs may have guns in his house, DOCCS sent several 

parole officers to search his house, where they seized several firearms, ammunition, and drugs. 

During the search, Braggs admitted to owning the firearms. The federal government subsequently 

charged Braggs with drug trafficking and firearms offenses.

Braggs filed a motion to suppress the evidence discovered in the search and his incriminating 

statements. The district court granted the motion, holding that the parole officers needed 

reasonable suspicion that Braggs had violated his parole conditions to lawfully execute the 

warrantless search of his house. Finding that the vague, anonymous tip, by itself, fell short of 

establishing reasonable suspicion, the district court suppressed the evidence seized during the

parole search. The government appealed.

First, the Second Circuit Court of Appeals held that only federal law should be considered in a 

federal court’s analysis when determining whether or not to suppress evidence. Consequently, 

the court held that the district court erroneously used the reasonable suspicion standard outlined 

in DOCCS Directive No. 9404 as the standard by which to analyze the constitutionality of the 

search of Braggs’s house. 

Next, the court found that, in Griffin v. Wisconsin, the Supreme Court recognized that “[a] State’s 

operation of a probation system . . . presents ‘special needs’ beyond normal law enforcement that 

may justify departures from the usual warrant and probable-cause requirements.” In light of these 

special needs, the Court held that “a search of a parolee is permissible so long as it is reasonably 

related to the parole officer's duties.” The Court noted that among these duties are the supervision, 

rehabilitation, and societal reintegration of the parolee, as well as assuring that “the community is 

not harmed by the [parolee’s] being at large.”

Applying the Special Needs Doctrine to the facts of this case, the court concluded that the search 

of Braggs’s house was reasonably related to the performance of the DOCCS officers’ duties. Once 

DOCCS received the anonymous tip suggesting that Braggs might have guns in his house, a clear 
5

violation of his parole conditions, parole officers were permitted to search the house to determine 

whether Braggs was complying with the condition of his release that prohibited the possession of 

firearms. Accordingly, the court vacated the district court’s order of suppression. 

For the court’s opinion: https://cases.justia.com/federal/appellate-courts/ca2/20-892/20-892-

2021-07-13.pdf?ts=1626186609

*****

United States v. Weaver, 2021 U.S. App. LEXIS 24251 (2d Cir. NY Aug. 16, 2021) 

On February 15, 2016, three officers assigned to the Syracuse Police Department’s Gang Violence 

Task Force were on patrol in an unmarked car in a high crime area. At the suppression hearing,

the officers testified that they had personally responded to shootings, stabbings, and homicides 

and that the area was known as an open-air drug market notorious for a high volume of shots fired 

and other gun-related crimes. 

Near dusk, the officers saw Calvin Weaver (Weaver) walking along the curb and staring into their 

patrol car. Weaver’s stare persisted, unbroken as the patrol car approached and passed, and one 

officer used the side view mirror to note that Weaver was still staring after arriving to stand outside 

the passenger’s side door of a gray sedan. As that officer watched, he saw Weaver give an 

“upward tug” to Weaver’s waistband before getting into the sedan’s front passenger’s seat and 

riding away from the scene.

Later that evening, the three officers encountered the gray sedan a second time when they stopped 

it for failing to properly signal a turn. As the car stopped, the rear passenger’s side door quickly 

swung open into traffic, causing the officers to worry that the passenger was getting ready to flee. 

After being ordered to remain in the vehicle, the passenger complied and closed the door, which 

enabled the officers to approach the car. 

Inside the car, the officers found the driver, the back seat passenger, and Weaver, who was in the 

front passenger’s seat. Recognizing Weaver from the dusk encounter, one officer saw Weaver 

use both hands to push down on his pelvic area, squirm from left to right in the seat, and shift his 

hips as if he was “trying to push something down.” Consequently, that officer ordered Weaver to 

show his hands. Weaver responded by raising his hands and saying, “I don’t got nothin’.” 

After safely obtaining Weaver’s identification, the officer ordered Weaver out of the car. Then, 

without touching Weaver, the officer told Weaver to stand at the rear quarter panel with his hands 

on the trunk and his feet spread apart. Although Weaver moved his feet apart and placed his hands 

on the trunk, the officers noticed that Weaver stood unusually close to the car, pressed his pelvic 

area only “a few inches” from the quarter panel, and continuously moved his torso against the 

vehicle. When an officer thereafter asked Weaver to step back from the quarter panel, Weaver 

objected, saying that the ground was too slippery. After examining the ground underneath 

Weaver’s feet and finding nothing slippery, the officer presumably insisted that Weaver step back. 

Weaver then “shuffled backward,” but again tried to press his body to the car at least once before

the officer’s hands touched Weaver for the frisk. According to the officer, with each touch 

thereafter, Weaver pressed his pelvis closer to the car. Ultimately, the frisk revealed a loaded 

semi-automatic handgun with a detachable magazine hidden in Weaver’s groin area, which 

resulted in Weaver’s federal prosecution for possession of a firearm by a convicted felon, among 

other offenses. 
6

During that prosecution, Weaver asked the court to suppress the gun because, he said, the officers 

lacked a reasonable suspicion that he was armed and dangerous at the time of the stop. Arguing 

that the officer’s verbal command for Weaver to stand at the sedan’s rear quarter panel for the 

frisk Weaver was, in itself, a Fourth Amendment search, Weaver insisted that the court could not 

consider any facts discovered thereafter to explain why the officers’ suspicions were reasonable. 

Moreover, Weaver claimed, even assuming that the facts that the officers knew were sufficient to 

show a reasonable suspicion that Weaver was hiding something when the frisk occurred, the facts 

did not warrant the conclusion that the thing that Weaver was hiding might be something that 

could endanger the officers. 

The court disagreed, overturning an earlier panel’s decision. Acknowledging that officers seized 

Weaver’s person when they stopped the sedan and intruded additionally “into his liberty” by 

ordering him to the rear of the car, the court noted that seizing a person was analytically distinct 

from searching a person. The court then reiterated the Supreme Court’s two objective tests for 

identifying a Fourth Amendment search, which is whether police: (1) “physically intrud[es] on a 

constitutionally protected area” under United States v. Jones; or (2) violate a person’s “reasonable 

expectation of privacy” under Katz v. United States. Merely ordering Weaver to stand at the rear 

quarter panel, the court said, even when the officers had the subjective intent to position Weaver 

for a frisk, simply was not a search under either Jones or Katz. Consequently, the court concluded

that no Fourth Amendment search occurred until the frisking officer’s “hands physically came 

into contact with Weaver[‘s]” person. 

Moreover, the court said that when the facts support a reasonable suspicion that a suspect has a 

weapon, as they did here, an officer need not rule out alternative explanations for a suspect’s 

behavior before frisking. Instead, the court explained that because the purpose of a Terry frisk is 

to enable officers to do their jobs safely, officers simply are “not tasked with sorting through 

multiple possible scenarios and conducting a frisk for weapons only if that is the sole, or even the 

most likely, possibility.” 

For the court’s opinion: https://cases.justia.com/federal/appellate-courts/ca2/18-1697/18-1697-

2021-08-16.pdf?ts=1629124208

*****

Third Circuit

United States v. Rought, 2021 U.S. App. LEXIS 25325 (3d Cir. PA Aug. 24, 2021) 

On August 16, 2018, James Rought sold fentanyl to Dana Carichner, and the two men used drugs 

together that evening. At some point, Carichner went home where he died of a fentanyl overdose 

sometime after 2:00 a.m. on August 17, 2018. Law enforcement officers connected Carichner’s 

overdose to Rought and the government charged him with possession of fentanyl with intent to 

distribute resulting in death. 

Three days later, an FBI agent interrogated Rought for approximately one hour. At the outset, the 

agent advised Rought of his Miranda rights, verbally and in writing. When asked if he was willing 

to talk, Rought responded that he was, “to a point.” The agent emphasized that Rought could 

“stop at any time,” and that “those are the ground rules.” Rought then signed the consent form, 

which among other things provided that Rought was willing to answer questions without a lawyer 

present. 
7

For the first twenty-four minutes, Rought answered questions about his drug use, his drug 

supplier, his criminal history, and his relationship with Carichner. After Rought mentioned 

Carichner’s drug use, the agent asked, “So let’s talk about Dana [Carichner]. What happened 

there?” Rought replied, “I mean, don’t really want to talk about that aspect without my lawyer . 

. . that’s a serious situation.” The agent immediately responded that he understood and that “those 

are the ground rules.” The agent then turned the conversation back to Rought’s drug supplier, 

telling Rought that he was interested in the people up the ladder above Rought.

A few minutes after invoking his right to counsel, Rought stated that he did not like addiction any 

more than the agent did and that drug dealers are “killing my friends just as much as, right now, 

you’re trying to say that I killed my friend [Carichner]” The agent told Rought that he was not 

saying that Rought killed Carichner but that Rought “had a role and that’s unfortunate, it is.” 

Afterward, Rought expressed incredulity that “the same dope that he snorted a bag of and died, I 

shot ten bags of right next to him.” Rought also explained that he initially did not believe that 

Carichner had overdosed because it did not make sense that Carichner “got high, drove all the 

way home, 25-30 minutes, and then got into bed, and then died.” The remainder of the 

interrogation focused on Rought’s drug supplier. At one point, the agent offered to question 

Rought about his supplier with a lawyer present, but Rought declined and continued to answer 

questions about his supplier.

Prior to trial, Rought filed a motion to suppress his post-invocation statements on the ground that 

they were obtained in violation of Miranda v. Arizona. The district court denied the motion, and 

upon conviction, Rought appealed. 

First, Rought argued that his invocation of the right to counsel was not limited to the circumstances 

surrounding Carichner’s death but was “for all purposes” and that law enforcement was therefore 

required to cease all interrogation under Edwards v. Arizona.

The Third Circuit Court of Appeals disagreed. In Edwards, the Supreme Court held that a suspect 

who has invoked the right to counsel “is not subject to further interrogation . . . until counsel has 

been made available to him unless the accused himself initiates further communications, 

exchanges, or conversations with the police.” 

In this case, the court found that the agent properly informed Rought of his Miranda rights at the 

beginning of the interrogation and Rought stated that he was willing to talk “to a point.” 

Afterward, Rought discussed a variety of topics, including his addiction, his fentanyl source, his 

relationship with Carichner, and his criminal history. It was only when that agent said, “So let’s 

talk about Dana. What happened there?” that Rought responded, “I don’t really want to talk about 

that aspect without my lawyer . . . That’s a serious situation.” The court concluded that, in context, 

it was plain that “that aspect” referred to the circumstances of Carichner’s death. Consequently, 

the court held that Rought’s invocation of the right to counsel was limited to the circumstances 

concerning Carichner’s death and that Rought left all other subjects open to questioning.

Next, Rought argued that he did not initiate the post-invocation discussion of Carichner’s death

with the agent.

Again, the court disagreed. After Rought’s invocation, the agent responded that he respected 

Rought’s right, and refocused the interrogation on Rought’s drug supplier. In an effort to persuade 

Rought to cooperate in pursuing the supplier, the agent asked for information that would help in 

“going up the ladder” after the supplier and others like him. The agent’s comments prompted 
8

Rought to state that drug dealers are “killing my friends just as much as, right now, you’re trying 

to say that I killed” Carichner. The court held that when Rought made this statement, he 

voluntarily initiated the discussion of Carichner’s death and thereby established his willingness to 

have a generalized discussion about the issue. The court added that the agent’s questions about 

his interest in pursuing drug suppliers and “going up the ladder,” concerned subjects distinct from 

the circumstances surrounding Carichner and were not ones that the agent should have reasonably 

anticipated would prompt Rought to renew discussions about Carichner’s death. 

Finally, Rought argued that any post-invocation waiver of his right to counsel was rendered 

involuntary because he was not “fully aware of the consequences if he were to waive his right to 

counsel to any extent.” 

A waiver to the right to counsel under Miranda is generally held to be knowing and voluntary “if 

the defendant fully understands the nature of the right and how it would likely apply in general in 

the circumstances - even though the defendant may not know the specific detailed consequences 

of invoking it. 

In this case, Rought was read his Miranda rights, signed a form acknowledging that he understood 

them, and consented to questioning. In addition, the court found that Rought’s prior experience 

with the criminal justice system established he knew that his statements to law enforcement could 

be used against him. As a result, the court held that by choosing to speak in detail about the 

circumstances of Carichner’s death after initiating discussion on that topic, Rought knowingly, 

intelligently, and voluntarily waived his right to remain silent and his limited invocation of the 

right to counsel.

For the court’s opinion: https://cases.justia.com/federal/appellate-courts/ca3/20-2667/20-2667-

2021-08-24.pdf?ts=1629824413

*****

Fourth Circuit

United States v. Caldwell, 7 F.4th 191 (4th Cir. 2021)

On December 9, 2016, two young men wearing dark clothing, masks, gloves, and armed with 

revolvers, entered a bank in Charlotte, North Carolina. The men stole nearly $5,800 in cash, which 

contained two embeddedGPS tracking devices, before exiting the bank and fleeing in a car. 

Officers tracked the GPS signal to an address within two miles of the bank, where they stopped 

and exited their vehicle. One of the officers heard rustling in the woods and, turning to look, saw

three individuals running away. The officers called in backup, including a K-9 and helicopter 

units, which arrived within minutes. 

While searching, the police dog alerted to the presence of person, later identified as Anthony 

Caldwell, who was concealed among vines and weeds along a fence. The K-9 unit ultimately 

apprehended Caldwell, with the dog biting his arm in the process. Officers found a black bag 

containing nearly all of the missing cash as well as one of the GPS trackers underneath Caldwell.

Caldwell told the officers he had been carjacked by two men while sitting in a Chevrolet Impala 

near the bank that had been robbed. Caldwell claimed that two carjackers had pistol-whipped him 

several times and forced him to flee with them; that he passed out from being hit in the head; and 

that he only woke up when the police dog bit him. The officers did not believe Caldwell’s story

and arrested him. 
9

Shortly after arresting Caldwell, officers found the Impala nearby. In plain view in the back seat 

were a black jacket, a North Carolina license plate, and a black revolver. Attached to the back of 

the vehicle was an invalid temporary license plate. Officers found a black hooded sweatshirt and 

glove along the fence, as well as a ski mask on the ground next to the Impala. The officers also 

found two loose $20 bills of U.S. currency, a cash wrapper that would go around a stack of bills, 

and the other GPS cash tracker in the front yard of the address where the suspects had fled. 

The officers sealed the vehicle at the scene before towing it to the law enforcement center, where 

they searched it after obtaining a warrant. A search of the passenger compartment revealed a black 

jacket, a revolver, a black ski mask, a black toboggan, and black gloves. However, officers did 

not search the vehicle’s trunk because the car battery was dead, rendering the trunk-opening 

mechanism inoperable. After the initial search, police moved the vehicle to an impound lot. Nearly 

two weeks later, on December 22, officers jump-started the car’s battery and opened the trunk. 

The trunk contained a silver revolver, black gloves, and a black skullcap.

The government charged Caldwell with a variety of criminal offenses related to the bank robbery.

Caldwell filed a motion to suppress the evidence found during the searches of his vehicle, arguing 

that both searches of his vehicle violated the Fourth Amendment: the December 9 search because

the officers failed to follow proper warrant procedures, and the December 22 search of the trunk 

because the warrant was no longer valid, and no exigent circumstances applied. 

The district court disagreed and denied Caldwell’s motion. Caldwell appealed. Without deciding 

the validity of the search warrant or other potentially applicable exceptions, the Fourth Circuit 

Court of Appeals held that the automobile exception justified both searches. 

The automobile exception to the Fourth Amendment’s warrant requirement allows police to 

conduct a warrantless search of a readily mobile vehicle if they have probable cause to believe 

that it contains contraband or evidence of a crime. The court added that even where a significant 

amount of time has passed between the impoundment of a defendant’s car and a subsequent 

warrantless search, the automobile exception still applies as long as probable cause remains to 

justify the search.

The court held that the December 9 search was lawful under the automobile exception; therefore, 

the officers were entitled to search the entire vehicle, including the trunk, without obtaining a 

warrant. 

First. the officers located the Impala at the site where they had followed the GPS trackers 

immediately after the robbery, and an officer saw three individuals fleeing the scene. Second, 

despite the significant commotion and large police presence, Caldwell did not call out for officer 

assistance, but was only located by a police dog, which found him hidden in brush on top of a bag 

containing a GPS tracker and over $5,000 of the stolen money. Third, the officers saw that the 

Impala had an invalid temporary license plate, with a permanent license plate, along with a 

revolver and black jacket in plain view on the back seat. The officers recognized the clothing and 

revolver matched the general description of that used by the robbers. Fourth, the officers found a 

black hooded sweatshirt, a glove, loose currency, a cash wrapper, and a second GPS tracker on 

the ground near the Impala, and a ski mask on the ground next to it. Finally, Caldwell claimed 

that he had been carjacked in the Impala, by individuals the officers had strong reason to believe 

had committed the bank robbery. Based on these facts, the court concluded that the officers had 

probable cause to believe that the Impala contained evidence related to the bank robbery. The 
10

court added, “that the officers chose to take the extra precaution of obtaining a warrant prior to 

the December 9 search does not affect the legal conclusion that a warrantless search was 

permissible.”

Next, the court held that when the officers returned to the Impala thirteen days later on December 

22, they still had probable cause to believe that it contained evidence of the bank robbery. The 

court noted that officers were not able to access the trunk on December 9, that the trunk had 

remained sealed until December 22, and, during that time, officers had not yet located the second 

weapon.

For the court’s opinion: https://cases.justia.com/federal/appellate-courts/ca4/19-4019/19-4019-

2021-08-03.pdf?ts=1628015421

*****

Seventh Circuit

United States v. McGill, 2021 U.S. App. LEXIS 23732 (7th Cir. IL Aug. 10, 2021) 

Mark McGill was serving a term of supervised release after serving a prison sentence following a 

conviction for possession of child pornography. The conditions of McGill’s supervised release 

prohibited him from “commit[ting] another federal, state, or local crime” and required him to 

“permit a probation officer to visit him at any time at home or elsewhere and ... [to] permit 

confiscation of any contraband observed in plain view of the probation officer.”

On February 3, 2017, a probation officer conducted a home visit at McGill’s residence. The 

officer had been employed in his position for five years, had specialized in supervising sex 

offenders for five years, and he had been supervising McGill for approximately nine months. In 

addition, the officer knew that McGill had previously violated the terms of his supervised release 

by viewing sexually stimulating videos and images of minors on his monitored cell phone and 

that he had failed two polygraph tests, administered as part of his sex offender treatment program. 

When the officer entered McGill’s bedroom, he saw a black cell phone that he recognized as 

McGill’s monitored phone and an unknown white cell phone in a black case on a table by the bed.

According to the officer, McGill moved around the room in an attempt to block his view of the 

white cell phone. The officer asked Williams about the phone and McGill told him that it was an 

old cell phone that no longer worked and that he only used it to charge a spare battery for the 

monitored (black) phone. The officer also noticed that McGill’s demeanor changed when he asked 

about the phone, stating that McGill became “deflated” and “sad” and said that he “would go back 

to prison for a long time if the judge found out what was on th[e] phone.” When the officer asked 

if there was child pornography on the phone, McGill replied, “there is.”

At the officer’s request, McGill gave the phone to him. When the officer powered the phone on, 

he saw that the background photo was of a young boy’s face, and then powered it off. The officer 

took the phone with him and turned it over to the FBI, who obtained a search warrant. The 

subsequent search of the phone revealed thousands of images of child pornography. 

The government charged McGill will possession of child pornography. McGill filed a motion to 

suppress the evidence discovered on the phone. McGill claimed that the warrantless seizure of 

the phone was unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment. The district court denied the motion 

and McGill appealed. 
11

The Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals disagreed. One exception to the warrant requirement of the 

Fourth Amendment is the plain-view doctrine. Government officials may seize property without 

a warrant under the plain-view doctrine if: 1) the officer is lawfully present at the place of the 

seizure; 2) the seized object is in the plain view of the officer; and 3) the incriminating nature of 

the object is immediately apparent. 

In this case, the only issue was whether the phone’s incriminating nature was immediately 

apparent. The incriminating nature of an item is “immediately apparent” if an officer has 

“probable cause to believe that the item is contraband or otherwise linked to criminal activity,” 

which includes a violation of a probationer’s conditions of supervised release. 

The court held that, under the circumstances, the incriminating nature of the phone was 

immediately apparent to the probation officer. First, McGill’s supervised-release conditions 

prohibited him from having contact with minors or possessing any sexually stimulating materials, 

including on a cell phone. Second, at the time of the home visit, the officer knew that McGill had 

previously violated the terms of his release by viewing child pornography on a cell phone and that 

he had failed two polygraph tests regarding his compliance with his supervised-release conditions. 

Third, the officer saw a cell phone that he believed was capable of connecting to the internet and 

that might relate to the failed polygraphs. Fourth, McGill attempted to hide the phone from the 

officer’s view and changed his demeanor when asked about the phone. Fifth, McGill’s odd 

explanation for having the phone, to charge an extra battery, further increased the officer’s 

suspicion, as it did not make sense to keep the phone in a case if its only purpose was charging a 

battery. Finally, when the officer powered-on the phone, the officer saw a photo of a young boy 

on the phone’s wallpaper. The court concluded that because the incriminating nature of the phone 

was immediately apparent, the officer’s seizure was lawful under the plain-view doctrine.

Alternatively, for the same reasons previously outlined, the court found that the officer had 

reasonable suspicion to believe that McGill was in violation of his conditions of supervised release 

and that the cell phone was evidence of that violation or other criminal act.

For the court’s opinion: https://cases.justia.com/federal/appellate-courts/ca7/19-2636/19-2636-

2021-08-10.pdf?ts=1628631019

*****

Eighth Circuit

United States v. Salkil, 2021 U.S. App. LEXIS 25511 (8th Cir. IA Aug. 25, 2021) 

Arguing that police unlawfully detained him by extending the scope and duration of a traffic 

stop in violation of the Fourth Amendment, James Salkil (Salkil) appealed his conviction for 

possession of a firearm and a methamphetamine pipe containing residue. Salkil also challenged 

the district court’s denial of his motion to suppress evidence obtained during that traffic stop. 

After stopping Salkil’s car because the rear license plate was not illuminated, as required, 

Sergeant Joshua Paul (Sgt. Paul) conducted a records check that showed that Salkil had a 

relationship with the target of another investigation from whom guns and drugs were recently 

seized. When another officer arrived on the scene, Sgt. Paul decided to issue a warning citation 

to Salkil. 
12

During the next approximately 37 seconds, Sgt. Paul asked Salkil about Salkil’s connection to 

the gun and drug seizure. Then, Sgt. Paul asked for consent to search Salkil’s car. Immediately 

thereafter, approximately 10 minutes and 45 seconds into the stop, Salil agreed. 

As the second officer began writing a warning citation, Sgt. Paul searched the car. During the 

ensuing 3–4-minute search, Sgt. Paul found a scale with white residue, a handgun in Salkil's 

waistband, and methamphetamine and a pipe in Salkil’s pocket. Consequently, Salkil was under 

arrest before the second officer could finish writing the warning citation. 

Salkil made 3 arguments in his motion to suppress. First, Salkil said that Sgt. Paul delayed the 

stop unnecessarily. Specifically, Salkil argued, neither officer gave Salkil the warning citation 

within the twelve minutes that are ordinarily required to conduct an average traffic stop. 

Pointing out that Salkil consented to the search within 10 minutes and 45 seconds after the stop 

began, the court rejected Salkil’s contentions on this point. 

Second, Salkil claimed that Sgt. Paul’s questions about Salkil’s connection to the earlier drug 

and gun seizure also prolonged the detention unconstitutionally. Again, the court disagreed, 

explaining that the 37 seconds during which Sgt. Paul questioned Salkil about the “extraneous” 

matters fell well within the 3-4 minutes necessary to write the warning citation, which was a 

task integral to the original stop. 

Third, Salkil contended that the officers’ decision to hand write the warning citation rather than 

generating a computer printed one prolonged the stop unconstitutionally. Again, the court 

rejected the argument, explaining, “We are not convinced that the constitutional requirement of 

reasonableness mandates that police use only computer-generated warning tickets.” 

Consequently, the court concluded that the district court properly denied Salkil’s motion to 

suppress. 

For the court’s opinion: https://cases.justia.com/federal/appellate-courts/ca8/20-2058/20-2058-

2021-08-25.pdf?ts=1629905452

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