M a c e d o n i a

P revention Can Wo r k

B r i e f l y ...

• Ma c e do n ia begins the new century under the leadership of people who spent most of

t he 1990s in opposition. Outgo i ng pre s ide nt Kiro Gligo rov left of f ice with the state

well established and enjoying no r mal re l a t io ns with its potent ially hostile ne ig h b o r s.

Issues at the fo re f ro nt now inc l ude econo m ic de v e l o p me nt, political re form, and

i m p ro v i ng int e r nal ethnic re l a t io ns.

• T he cent ra l i z a t ion of political power and a “winner takes all” political ethos cont i nu e

to hinder the smooth func t io n i ng of Ma c e do n ian de mo c ra c y, especially the de v e l o pme nt of local go v e r na nce and political partie s.

• T he 1999 pre s ide nt ial electio ns hig h l ig hted the political importance of Ma c e do n ia ’ s

A l b a n ian population, as their votes were key to Boris Tra j kovski’s electoral vic t o r y.

• E t h n ic Ma c e do n ia ns are conc e r ned about the gro w i ng political and de mo g ra p h ic

power of Ma c e do n ia’s Albanian population. Albania ns claim they re main second - c l a s s

c i t i z e ns due to de n ial of cultural and lang ua ge rig hts and unde r - re p re s e nt a t ion in go ve r n me nt employme nt .

• T he re l e v a nt historical legacy is not “a nc ie nt hatre d s,” but ra t her the socio - e c o no mic struc t u re left over from communist Yu go s l a v ia. Concerted efforts are ne e ded to

o v e rc o me obstacles to establishing int e r - e t h n ic re l a t io ns on a basis of mu t ual unde rs t a nd i ng and respect. 

• T he massive influx of re f u gees from Kosovo stra i ned Ma c e do n ia's new coalition go ve r n me nt and population. While the myth of pan-Albanianism has been de f l a t e d, the

i nt e r na t io nal community must realize that de c i s io ns on the final status of Kosovo will

i nevitably impact Ma c e do n ia .

• Ma c e do n ia has eme rged from successive crises—econo m ic blocka de, an assassina t io n

attempt on its pre s ide nt, clashes between citizens and polic e, and the influx of

re f u gees from Kosovo—with its de mo c ra t ic ins t i t u t io ns intact. To secure its future,

Ma c e do n ia needs econo m ic and de v e l o p me nt support, and visible pro g ress toward s

a dm i s s ion into NATO and European ins t i t u t io ns.

w w w. u s i p . o rg

S P E C I A L R E P O R T

1200 17th Street NW • Washington, DC 20036 • 202.457.1700 • fax 202.429.6063

The views ex p ressed in this report do not

necessarily reflect those of the United States

Institute of Pe a c e, which does not 

a d vocate specific policies.

CO N T E N T S

I nt ro duc t io n 2

G l igo rov's Legacy 2

1999 Pre s ide nt ial Electio ns 2

T he Po l i t ics of "Winner Ta kes All" 3

Ma c e do n ian Grie v a nc e s 4

A l b a n ian Conc e r ns 4

T he Dangers of Pa ra l l e l i s m 5

T he Urge nt Need for Dia l o g u e 5

Kosovo: A Key Is s u e 6

Ma c e do n ia’s Other Ne ig h b o r s 7

Ma c e do n ia, Euro p e, and NATO 7

C o nc l u s io ns 7

R e c o m me nda t io ns 8

M a rch 27, 2000

AB O U T T H E RE P O R T

This report focuses on re c e nt de v e l o p me nts in

Ma c e do n ia, and seeks to ide ntify the obstacles to

a nd opportunities for cont i nued de mo c ra t i z a t io n

a nd greater ethnic harmo ny in a country that

h a s — despite ma ny diffic u l t ie s — a v o ided the kind

of vio l e nt conflict seen elsewhe re in the Balka ns

du r i ng the past de c a de. This report, written by

S e n ior Fellow Keith Brown and Research As s i s t a nt s

E dw a rd Bestic and Kristine He r r mann, is based on

i n fo r ma t ion pre s e nted at a me e t i ng of the Balka ns

Wo r k i ng Group in December 1999. The Un i t e d

States Institute of Peace co-spons o red the me e ti ng with the Center for Stra t e g ic and Int e r na t io na l

S t ud ies and the Na t io nal Albanian Ame r ican Council. The Balka ns Wo r k i ng Group is a policy fo r u m

c o n v e ned by the Institute to facilitate discussio n

a nd de v e l o p me nt of policy optio ns by re p re s e nt atives from go v e r n me nt age nc ie s, think tanks, and

no ngo v e r n me ntal org a n i z a t io ns (NGOs).

UNITED STATES INSTITUTE OF PEAC E
I n t ro d u c t i o n

Ma c e do n ia re p re s e nts an appare ntly successful mo del of pre v e ntive diplomacy and

i m p ro v i ng int e r - e t h n ic and inter-state re l a t io ns. It is now ent e r i ng a new phase: after a

c h a nge in go v e r n me nt in 1998, and pre s ide nt ial electio ns in 1999, it begins the ne w

c e ntury under the leadership of people who spent most of the de c a de in opposition. A

party once criticized for ethnic chauvinism, the Int e r nal Ma c e do n ian Revolutio nary Org an i z a t io n – D e mo c ra t ic Party for Ma c e do n ian Unity (VMRO-DPMNE), now operates in coalit ion with a mu l t i - e t h n ic party (the Demo c ra t ic Alternative Party) he a ded by a pro m i ne nt

fo r mer Yu goslav politic ian, and with an Albanian party (the Demo c ra t ic Party of the Alban ia ns) associated in the past with calls for separatism. The new go v e r n me nt, led by Ljubco Georg ievski, weathe red the Kosovo crisis in spring and summer 1999. It also survived

i nt e r nal fric t io ns over the pre s ide nt ial electio ns. 

T he Balka ns Wo r k i ng Group me e t i ng, held in December 1999, sought to ide ntify ke y

a reas for concern in Ma c e do n ia’s future :

• What is the state of play in Ma c e do n ian politics after the pre s ide nt ial electio ns ?

• How have ethnic tens io ns developed in Ma c e do n ia, and how mig ht they be re duced? 

• What initiatives within and outside Ma c e do n ia offer the best hope for the cont i nu e d

security of the Ma c e do n ian state while pro t e c t i ng the hu man and cultural rig hts of

all its citizens ?

• How will de v e l o p me nts in Kosovo and Yu go s l a v ia affect Ma c e do n ia ?

G l i g o rov's Legacy: Independent Macedonia

F o r mer pre s ide nt Kiro Gligo rov of Ma c e do n ia stepped down from his position, in accorda nce with the country’s cons t i t u t ion, at the expiry of his ma ndate on November 19,

1999. He was the first of the ge ne ra t ion of leaders who oversaw the disma nt l i ng of

Yu go s l a v ia to re t i re from politic s. As pre s ide nt, he steered Ma c e do n ia through the difficult times that followed the de c l a ra t ion of inde p e nde nce in 1991. Ma c e do n ia stayed out

of wider conflicts in the re g ion, and although int e r nal tens io ns often rose to high pitch,

Ma c e do n ia’s citizens never resorted to wide s p read vio l e nce of the kind witnessed in othe r

parts of the fo r mer Yu go s l a v ia. 

Ne v e r t he l e s s, Ma c e do n ia faced military, diploma t ic, and econo m ic threats from ne ig hb o r s. Gligo rov himself was the target of an assassina t ion attempt in 1995, and the war

in Kosovo drove approx i mately a quarter of a million Albanian re f u gees into the count r y.

Yet Gligo rov leaves the political stage having earned respect for cons o l ida t ion of the

Ma c e do n ian state, his commitme nt to dia l o g u e, and his shrewd politics of “e q u id i st a nc e.” Ma c e do n ia sought, and re c e i v e d, the United Na t io ns’ most successful pre v e nt i v e

de p l o y me nt (UNPREDEP). By inc re me nts du r i ng his stewardship the re p u b l ic’s re l a t io ns

with potent ially aggressive ne ighbors were no r malized and int e r na t io nal re c o g n i t ion was

a c h ieved (even if the issue of what the country will be called of f ic ially re ma i ns unres o l v e d, especially for Greece). Inde p e nde nce and re c o g n i t ion were no longer on the

a ge nda for pre s ide nt ial cand idates in November and December 1999. What the campaig n

de mo ns t rated instead was the salie nce of other issues: the need for econo m ic de v e l o pme nt, further political re form, and improved re l a t io ns amo ng the differe nt ethnic gro u p s

that have been polarized by events of the re c e nt past.

1999 Presidential Elections

It took Ma c e do n ia’s voters two ro u nd s, and a repeat of the second ro u nd in some elect o ral distric t s, to elect a successor to Gligo ro v. The successful cand ida t e, Boris Tra j ko v -

ski from VMRO-DPMNE, was finally ina u g u rated as pre s ide nt on December 16, 1999. 

2

AB O U T T H E IN S T I T U T E

T he United States Institute of Peace is an

i nde p e nde nt, nonpartisan fede ral ins t i t u t io n

c reated by Cong ress to pro mote re s e a rc h ,

e duc a t ion, and tra i n i ng on the pre v e nt io n ,

ma na ge me nt, and re s o l u t ion of int e r na t io na l

c o n f l ic t s. Established in 1984, the Ins t i t u t e

meets its cong re s s io nal ma ndate through an

a r ray of pro g ra ms, inc l ud i ng re s e a rch gra nt s,

f e l l o w s h i p s, prof e s s io nal tra i n i ng pro g ra ms,

c o n f e re nces and worksho p s, library servic e s,

p u b l ic a t io ns, and other educ a t io nal activitie s.

T he Institute's Board of Directors is appoint e d

by the Pre s ide nt of the United States and

c o n f i r med by the Sena t e.

BOA R D O F DI R E C TO R S

Chester A. Cro c ke r ( C h a i r man), Ja mes R. Schlesinge r

P rofessor of Stra t e g ic Stud ie s, School of Fore ign Servic e,

G e o rgetown University • Max M. Ka m p e l m a n , E s q .

( V ice Chairman), Frie d, Frank, Ha r r i s, Shriver and Ja c o bson, Wa s h i ngton, D.C. • Dennis L. Bark, S e n ior Fellow,

Hoover Ins t i t u t ion on Wa r, Revolution and Pe a c e, Stanfo rd University • Stephen J. Hadley, Esq., Shea and

G a rd ne r, Wa s h i ngton, D.C. • T h e o d o re M. Hesbu rg h ,

P re s ide nt Eme r i t u s, University of No t re Dame • Za l m a y

K h a l i l z a d , RAND Corpora t ion, Wa s h i ngton, D.C. • S eymour Martin Lipset, Hazel Professor of Public Po l ic y,

G e o rge Mason University • W. Scott Thompson, P rof e ssor of Int e r na t io nal Po l i t ic s, Fletcher School of Law and

D i p l o ma c y, Tufts University • Allen Weinstein, P re s ide nt, Center for Demo c ra c y, Wa s h i ngton, D.C. • H a r r i e t

Z i m m e r m a n , V ice Pre s ide nt, Ame r ican Is rael Public

A f fairs Committee, Wa s h i ngton, D.C.

ME M B E R S E X O F F I C I O

J. Stapleton Roy, As s i s t a nt Secretary of State for Int e ll ige nce and Research • Daniel H. Simpson, V ice Pre s ide nt, Na t io nal Defense University • Walter B.

S l o c o m b e, Under Secretary of Defense for Po l icy •

R i c h a rd H. Solomon, P re s ide nt, United States Ins t i t u t e

of Peace (no n v o t i ng )
His victory tested the fa b r ic of political culture in Ma c e do n ia. After the first ro u nd,

t he leading cand idate was Tito Pe t kovski of the Social Demo c ra t ic Allia nce of Ma c e don ia (SDSM), which had become the parlia me ntary opposition in 1998. Fra c t u res within

t he go v e r n i ng coalition, and a tre nd amo ng Ma c e do n ian voters to use the pre s ide nt ia l

vote as a re f e re ndum on the first year of the Georg ievski go v e r n me nt, led to a situa t io n

in which the endo r s e me nt of Albanian political leaders was a key eleme nt in Tra j ko v -

ski’s vic t o r y. Pe t kovski’s ant i - A l b a n ian rhe t o r ic du r i ng the campaign gave Albanian voters a further inc e ntive to turn out and vote against what they saw as a thre a t e n i ng

f u t u re. 

A l t hough observers stated that in most of the country the electio ns were conduc t e d

p ro p e r l y, some districts in Western Ma c e do n ia saw prox y - v o t i ng, especially at the

ex p e nse of women, and ballot-stuffing. Vo t i ng was the re fo re repeated in some distric t s,

with the same result: in those areas of Western Ma c e do n ia whe re Albania ns are in a local

ma j o r i t y, Tra j kovski outpolled Pe t kovski by a massive ma rgin. Without those votes, Tra j -

kovski would have lost, albeit by a slim ma rgin, to Pe t kovski. In the city of Skopje itself,

Pe t kovski outpolled Tra j kovski by a wide ma rgin. Although recognized as legal and cons t i t u t io nal, then, the election hig h l ig hted stark divisio ns in the political land s c a p e. 

Tra j kovski had me e t i ngs with Albanian dia s p o ra org a n i z a t io ns befo re the electio ns,

a nd the re is a ge ne ral cons e nsus within Ma c e do n ia that, without having ma de any fo rmal commitme nt s, he is indebted to the Albanian commu n i t y. Ac c o rd i ng to some

s o u rc e s, the Demo c ra t ic Alternative Party (DA) tried to ex t ract advant a ge for turning

over its pre s ide nt ial votes to Tra j kovski. While its leade r, Vasil Tu p u r kovski, gained a

p o s i t ion as deputy prime minister, the party and its leader can no longer play a “kingma ker” ro l e. Pe t kovski’s drift towards virulent chauvinism in his speeche s, and his success with Ma c e do n ian voters, was also no t e d.

T he electio ns confirmed the electoral do m i na nce of the Demo c ra t ic Party of the Alban ia ns (DPA), the party he a ded by Arben Xhaferi, amo ng the Albanian population of

Ma c e do n ia. In the first ro u nd of electio ns, DPA put fo r w a rd their own cand ida t e, as did

its main rival for Albanian support, the Party for Demo c ra t ic Prosperity (PDP), led by

A b du ra h man Aliti. As the two parties had fo r med a pre - e l e c t ion coalition befo re the parl ia me ntary electio ns of 1998 (despite the fact that at that time PDP was a coalition partner in go v e r n me nt, while DPA was a young opposition party), the pre s ide nt ial electio ns

of 1999 re p re s e nted their first direct trial of stre ngth. The result of this “e l e c t ion within an election” was a convinc i ng victory for DPA, and showed how completely DPA has

s u p p l a nted PDP as the main electoral fo rce amo ng voters in pre do m i na ntly Albanian dist r ic t s. It gave Xhaferi authority to speak for a large cons t i t u e ncy and thus swing the

e l e c t ion decisively by enc o u ra g i ng Ma c e do n ian Albania ns to vote for Tra j kovski in the

s e c o nd ro u nd.

The Politics of “Winner Ta kes All” 

With Tra j kovski’s vic t o r y, the pre s ide ncy and go v e r n me nt are from the same politic a l

a l l ia nc e, as they were until 1998. This arra nge me nt, as with the earlier re g i me, appears

to enc o u ra ge a “winner takes all” attitude in the party in go v e r n me nt. This has re ma i ne d

notable since the election of a new go v e r n me nt in 1998: cont rol over a wide realm of

l i f e, but in particular over a hu ge ra nge of employme nt positio ns, re ma i ns vested in the

executive go v e r n me nt, which is do m i nated by a single party or coalition. The lack of

c o o p e ra t ion between go v e r n me nt and opposition is notable: the parlia me nt, still composed largely of part-time me m b e r s, tends to func t ion only to approve de c i s io ns take n

by the exe c u t i v e. 

A key issue re ma i ns cent ra l i z a t ion of political power, which was a feature of the

Yu goslav perio d. Then the re were only 34 local go v e r n me nts in Ma c e do n ia. Now the re

a re mo re than 123 local go v e r n me nt s, inc l ud i ng 7 in Skopje alone. Ho w e v e r, they have

no econo m ic infra s t r uc t u re or inde p e nde nt sources of re v e nu e. Local go v e r na nce do e s

The 1999 presidential elections

confirmed the electo ra l

dominance of the Democra t i c

Party of the Albanians (DPA ) ,

the party headed by Arben

Xhaferi, among the Albanian 

population of Macedonia. 

3

C o n t rol over a wide realm 

of life, but in particular over 

a huge range of employment 

p o s i t i o n s, remains vested in the

exe c u t i ve government, which is

dominated by a single party 

or coalition.
not really ex i s t — e v e r y t h i ng is cont rolled in Sko p j e. Unless the cent ral go v e r n me nt is

p re p a red to ex t e nd greater fiscal me a ns and accountability to local go v e r n me nt, the

p o l i t ical polarization of Ma c e do n ia's population will cont i nu e. The re l ia nce on ma j o r i t y

rule and disint e rest in bro a de n i ng the appeal of parties will buttress the ex i s t i ng unde rs t a nd i ng of politics as a zero-sum game.

Macedonian Grieva n c e s

In the 1998 election, which bro u g ht an end to six years of SDSM cont rol, the oppositio n

b e nefited from a protest vote ge ne rated by de c l i n i ng living standa rd s, wide s p read corr u p t ion and patro na ge, and no nt ra ns p a re nt tra nsfer of econo m ic assets into private or

fo re ign hand s. Some econo m ic scandals became public, and in part as a cons e q u e nc e

Ma c e do n ia ns in 1998 voted for a coalition between VMRO-DPMNE and DA campaig n i ng

u nder the slogan of “Change s.” 

A year later, the Ma c e do n ian public used the pre s ide nt ial electio ns to send a me s s a ge

of dissatisfa c t ion to the new go v e r n me nt. The changes had been at the level of personnel: the system re ma i ned the same, and Ma c e do n ia ns accused the new coalition go ve r n me nt of perpetua t i ng a re g i me of patro na ge and cro nyism. Civil servants were

replaced for political re a s o ns, ra t her than on gro u nds of competence or qua l i f ic a t io ns.

T he new go v e r n me nt’s fo re ign policy also came in for criticism. Ma c e do n ia ns were part icularly ske p t ical of the go v e r n me nt’s de c i s ion to recognize Taiwan—an action the y

b e l ieved would anger Beijing—in return for what were perceived as vague investme nt

p ro m i s e s. Some critics expected that China, as a perma ne nt member of the Un i t e d

Na t io ns Security Council, would ma ke Ma c e do n ia suffer in the int e r na t io nal are na. 

Add i t io na l l y, Ma c e do n ia ns are conc e r ned about the power that DPA and its leade r,

Arben Xhaferi, appear to have in the go v e r n me nt coalition—a political allia nce fo r me d

only after the electio ns of 1998. The int e r na t io nal community’s support for Albania ns ’

r ig hts in Kosovo and Ma c e do n ia contributes to a fear amo ng Ma c e do n ian voters that the

b o u nda r ies of their state and their position in the state are not secure. Past actio ns by

A l b a n ian ind i v iduals and political partie s, such as their boycott of the re f e re ndum on

Ma c e do n ian inde p e nde nce in 1991, and the tende ncy to celebrate Albania’s inde p e nde nce day but not Ma c e do n ia ’ s, fuel the impre s s ion that Albania ns have only a weak

c o m m i t me nt to the Ma c e do n ian state. Pe t kovski’s election me s s a ge played on such fears. 

Of particular concern to ma ny Ma c e do n ia ns is the specter of fede ra l i z a t ion, whic h

f rom observing fo r mer Yu go s l a v ia and Kosovo they see as the first step on the ro a d

t o w a rds partition and cre a t ion of “Greater Albania.” These fears are he ig ht e ned by a

c o m mon perc e p t ion that the Albanian population of Ma c e do n ia is gro w i ng faster than

t he Ma c e do n ian, and thus that the de mo g ra p h ic balance of power will shift.

Albanian Concerns

A l b a n ian politic ia ns claim that the status quo ma kes them second-class citizens, and

that ra d ical changes are ne e ded in order to no r malize the situa t ion. They stress that the

h igh Albanian turnout in the pre s ide nt ial electio ns de mo ns t rates that Ma c e do n ian Alban ia ns have a stake in Ma c e do n ia’s future, and are curre ntly not int e rested in stirring up

p ro b l e ms in Ma c e do n ia. These politic ia ns emphasize the de n ial of two rig hts: display of

A l b a n ian cultural symbols, and access to hig her educ a t ion in Albanian. They also point

to the unde r - re p re s e nt a t ion of ethnic Albania ns in go v e r n me nt employme nt, inc l ud i ng

t he police fo rce and the army. The perc e nt a ge of Albania ns in the civil service is re ma r kably low—only 4 perc e nt by some estima t e s. Although 40 perc e nt of enlisted soldie r s

a re Albanian, they are not well re p re s e nted in the of f icer corps. The politic ia ns also stre s s

t he impact that the “harde n i ng” of the border between Kosovo and Ma c e do n ia has had

on the social life of the Albanian community of the fo r mer Yu go s l a v ia. Whe reas in fo rUnless the central government is

p re p a red to extend gre a t e r

fiscal means and accounta b i l i t y

to local government, the political polarization of Macedonia’s

population will continue.

4

Past actions by Albanian

individuals and political parties,

such as their boycott of the 

re f e rendum on Macedonian

independence in 1991, and the

t e n d e n cy to celebrate Albania’s

independence day but not Maced o n i a ’ s, fuel the impression that

Albanians have only a we a k

commitment to the 

Macedonian sta t e. 
mer Yu go s l a v ia Albania ns moved freely between Kosovo and Western Ma c e do n ia, the y

now have to cross an int e r na t io nal borde r. 

A l b a n ian politic ia ns trace ma ny of these pro b l e ms to the Ma c e do n ian cons t i t u t ion, in

p a r t icular to the pre c e de nce they claim it gives to the Ma c e do n ian people. Also import a nt are the specific cond i t io ns of the 1980s, when Ma c e do n ian autho r i t ies followed Belg ra de’s lead in Kosovo and, fearful of Albanian political activism, took me a s u res agains t

t he Albanian population. As well as cre a t i ng a reservoir of hostility and mistrust, certain

me a s u res had specific ins t i t u t io nal cons e q u e nc e s, inc l ud i ng legislation on educ a t io n

that re duced the availability of Albania n - l a ng ua ge secondary educ a t ion. In 1995, whe n

t he ex t ralegal Albanian University in Tetovo was fo rcibly closed by autho r i t ie s, and in

1997, when de mo ns t ra t io ns in Gostivar over the display of the Albanian flag were me t

with police vio l e nc e, Albania ns accused the go v e r n me nt of perpetua t i ng the Yu go s l a v -

e ra approach, and collud i ng with Serbia .

The Dangers of Pa ra l l e l i s m

A l b a n ia ns call for cons t i t u t io nal change, arg u i ng that ma ny pro b l e ms will thus be solved.

T hey appear to expect major conc e s s io ns from Prime Minister Ljubco Georg ievski’s go ve r n me nt, which shares a stro ng aversion to certain aspects of the Yu goslav past. Some

a nalysts cons ider in particular that speedy re c o g n i t ion of Tetovo University by the go ve r n me nt would be a major step fo r w a rd, wide n i ng access to educ a t io nal cre de nt ia l s

g a i ned through the medium of the Albanian lang ua ge. 

O t he r s, ho w e v e r, argue that this would serve to confirm and stre ng t hen the polarizat ion of the country’s major population gro u p s, as it would ceme nt in place parallel tra c k s.

Ma c e do n ia at pre s e nt is ma de up of mostly no n - i nt e r s e c t i ng and parallel parts, re p res e nt i ng a curious mix of pluralism and segre g a t ion at the same time. Albanian and Ma c edo n ian are mu t ually unint e l l igible lang ua ge s. Few Ma c e do n ia ns speak Albanian, while

t he majority of Albania ns are mu l t i l i ng ual in Ma c e do n ian, Albanian, and some t i mes Tu r kish. Ho w e v e r, re c o g n i t ion of Tetovo University would re duce the inc e ntive of Albania ns

to learn the Ma c e do n ian lang ua ge, the reby furthe r i ng segre g a t ion—as did Yu goslav polic ies enc o u ra g i ng cultural ex p re s s ion on the part of minority gro u p s, evide nced by the

history of the university in Pristina .

I nt e r - e t h n ic re l a t io ns are often fra med in terms of anc ie nt hatreds with time l e s s

e f f e c t s, but the key historical legacy in Ma c e do n ia is the socio - e c o no m ic struc t u re left

b e h i nd by Yu go s l a v ia. Because of the particular cons t i t u t io nal arra nge me nts of fede ra l

Yu go s l a v ia, Ma c e do n ia ns were recognized as one of the cons t i t u e nt peoples, a ma j o r i t y

in “their” re p u b l ic. Albania ns were only a na t io nality (not a cons t i t u e nt people);

a l t hough mo re Albania ns than Ma c e do n ia ns lived in fede ral Yu go s l a v ia, Albania ns were

d i v ided amo ng the re p u b l ics of Serbia (which inc l uded Kosovo), Mo nt e ne g ro, and Ma c edo n ia. Attempted solutio ns that are based on the no t ion of “peoples” and status, and

that re i n fo rce this “separate but equal” mo del, recall the failed stra t e g ies of the Yu go s l a v

p e r io d.

The Urgent Need for Dialogue

A l t hough ma ny ex t e r nal ana l y s t s, Ma c e do n ian citizens, and politic ia ns emphasize the

w ide divide between Albanian and Ma c e do n ian commu n i t ie s, other perspectives do ex i s t .

It is true that the DA's pre s ide nt ial cand ida t e, Vasil Tu p u r kovski, did poorly; still, the DA

re ma i ns a parlia me ntary party with members from differe nt ethnic commu n i t ie s. The curre nt political leadership coalition offers opportunities for int e r - e t h n ic commu n ic a t ion at

t he top level (as did the pre v ious go v e r n i ng coalition). This na t io nal-level dia l o g u e

needs counterparts at every level. Some NGOs active in Skopje and elsewhe re seek to

b r i ng people toge t her on issues that tra ns c e nd ethnic allegia nc e. The theater and me d ia

Macedonia at present is made

up of mostly non-intersecting

and parallel parts, re p re s e n t i n g

a curious mix of pluralism and

s e g regation at the same time. 

5

Albanian politicians trace 

m a ny of these problems to the

Macedonian constitution, in

particular to the pre c e d e n c e

t h ey claim it gives to the 

Macedonian people. 
c o m mu n i t ies in Skopje also are vibra nt and embrace mu l t ic u l t u ralism. In all these re a l ms,

members of Ma c e do n ia’s smaller ethnic gro u p s, especially Turks and Roma, play a large

ro l e. Cultural and political ide nt i t ies are not necessarily linke d. For ma ny citizens of

Ma c e do n ia, solida r i t ies of prof e s s ion, ne ig h b o r ho o d, ge ne ra t ion, or ge nder are just as

s ig n i f ic a nt as those of ethnic gro u p .

A key eleme nt in Ma c e do n ia’s future would seem to be bro a de n i ng the gro u nd on

w h ich commu n ic a t ion between citizens can take place. Systemic obstacles exist in the

f ield of educ a t ion and in inherited socio - p o l i t ical struc t u re s, but these mig ht be overc o me by concerted effo r t s. Given the curre nt political and econo m ic cent ra l i z a t ion, init iatives must come from the cent ral go v e r n me nt, and the re are enc o u ra g i ng sig ns that

t he curre nt re g i me is pre p a red to take on the task. Yet the atmo s p he re of coopera t io n

between re p re s e ntatives of differe nt views in go v e r n me nt should also be enc o u ra ged and

p ropagated amo ng Ma c e do n ia’s wider population. Above all, Ma c e do n ia needs to ceme nt

t he link between civic rig hts and re s p o ns i b i l i t ie s, and to create a sense of a commo n

s t a ke in the country’s survival and pro s p e r i t y. This process mig ht be served by the ra d ical de c e nt ra l i z a t ion of political and fiscal power from Sko p j e, thus gra nt i ng citizens of

all political allegia nces a greater sense of empowerme nt and re p re s e nt a t io n .

Ko s ovo: A Key Issue

T he question of Kosovo’s future is a key one for Ma c e do n ia. During the 1999 crisis, over

a quarter of a million re f u gees fo u nd temporary haven in Ma c e do n ia, in camps and private ho me s. The influx exerted imme nse pre s s u re on the coalition go v e r n me nt and Ma c edo n ia’s population. Their willing ness to rise to the challenge was a re ma r ka b l e

a c h ie v e me nt that has not yet received the int e r na t io nal re c o g n i t ion it de s e r v e s.

No ne t he l e s s, the end of the war—which was ra t i f ied in a me e t i ng held on Ma c e do n ia n

s o i l — c a me no ne too early. In the long term, the re f u gees would have posed an int o l e rable strain on Ma c e do n ia’s capacity. 

T he Kosovo re f u gee crisis had the potent ial both to re i n fo rce ex i s t i ng sent i me nts of

s o l idarity amo ng Albania ns in the re g ion and to ma ke people aware of their differe nc e s.

S t ro ng ties were created between Kosovo and Ma c e do n ia in the Yu goslav perio d, whe n

P r i s t i na was a major me e t i ng point for people from differe nt re p u b l ic s. Those ties are still

s ig n i f ic a nt, as are econo m ic and kin conne c t io ns. Ho w e v e r, one overlooked cons e q u e nc e

of the war was that Albania ns from Kosovo and in Ma c e do n ia realized they have differe nc e s. The myth of pan-Albanian sent i me nt was de f l a t e d, at least in part. 

O p i n io ns differ on the impact on Ma c e do n ia if Kosovo becomes inde p e nde nt. Some

b e l ieve that an inde p e nde nt Kosovo would have a stabilizing effect on Ma c e do n ia, sati s f y i ng a major Albanian aspira t ion and opening opportunities for Albania ns in Ma c e don ia to work, study, or live in Kosovo, whe re ethnic Albania ns would be the majority of

t he population. Others believe an inde p e nde nt Kosovo would ins p i re separatist sent ime nts amo ng Albania ns in Ma c e do n ia, leading inevitably to conflict within Ma c e do n ia

a nd event ual partition. Albanian leaders would gravitate to Pristina, which would no t

serve the int e rests of the Albanian community in Ma c e do n ia. Inde p e nde nce for Ko s o v o

m ig ht also re-open divisio ns within Ma c e do n ia’s Albanian commu n i t y, between tho s e

w ho see their future in an enlarged Albanian state, and those who are committed to the

security and ex i s t e nce of a mu l t ic u l t u ral Ma c e do n ia. Recognition of Kosovo inde p e nde nce could thus lead to the event ual partition of Ma c e do n ia, which would exa c e r b a t e

t e ns io ns between Ma c e do n ia ns and Albania ns. 

T hese differe nt views share one key dime ns ion: int e r na t io nal initiatives on the status

of Kosovo will simu l t a neously and inevitably impact on Ma c e do n ia, and possible re p e rc u s s io ns within Ma c e do n ia should the re fo re be taken into account. 

C u l t u ral and political identities

a re not necessarily linked. Fo r

m a ny citizens of Macedonia, 

solidarities of profession, neighborhood, generation, or gender

a re just as significant as those

of ethnic gro u p .

6

The influx exerted immense

p re s s u re on the coalition

g overnment and Macedonia’s

population. Their willingness to

rise to the challenge was a

remarkable achievement that

has not yet re c e i ved the

international recognition 

it deserve s. 
M a c e d o n i a ’s Other Neighbors

Pa r t ic i p a nts in the working group observed that with re g a rd to re l a t io ns with ex i s t i ng

ne ig h b o r i ng states, Ma c e do n ia’s situa t ion is as good as it has been since inde p e nde nc e.

S e r b ia cont i nues to pose a potent ial military threat to Ma c e do n ia, and Yu goslav pre s ide nt Slobodan Milosevic ma i nt a i ns influence amo ng some pro - S e r b ian eleme nt s. A tre a t y

of mu t ual re c o g n i t ion between Yu go s l a v ia and Ma c e do n ia was sig ned in April 1996, but

t he border re ma i ns disputed in part. The Republic of Ma c e do n ia did not permit dire c t

a c t ion against Serbia to be taken from its territory du r i ng the NATO action in 1999.

W hen Serbian fo rces drove re f u gees into Ma c e do n ia, it was seen by some as an attempt

to destabilize the re p u b l ic: the pre s e nce of NATO fo rces in Ma c e do n ia would seem to

i nt e rd ict mo re direct assaults on Ma c e do n ian sovere ig nt y. 

VMRO-DPMNE’s ant i - Yu goslav stanc e, although focused on the past, seems likely to

result in closer ties with Bulgaria. The settling of lang ua ge issues between Bulgaria and

Ma c e do n ia in February 1999 lays the gro u nd for closer coopera t ion, and Bulgaria’s re c e nt

gifts of military hardw a re re p re s e nt go o dwill. 

R e l a t io ns between Albania and Ma c e do n ia have been troubled in the past by tre a tme nt of Albania ns in Ma c e do n ia and over Tetova Un i v e r s i t y. Albania seeks to build common gro u nd amo ng Albania ns in differe nt states, urg i ng, for exa m p l e, that they all use

t he same history tex t b o o k s. Albania also sees Ma c e do n ia as a count e r b a l a nce to Gre e c e

a nd Serbia. Pa n - A l b a n ian sent i me nt in Albania is not stro ng, largely because of the ne e d

to deal with pre s s i ng issues in Albania itself. The Kosovo crisis also posed a strain, and

again ma de people aware that while they feel solida r i t y, they also have diverge nt ex p er ie nces that distinguish Albanian commu n i t ies in Ma c e do n ia, Kosovo, and Albania. 

Macedonia, Euro p e, and NATO

A majority of Ma c e do n ia’s citizens are committed to a future as citizens of a sovere ig n

state that is itself part of “Greater Euro p e.” The Republic of Ma c e do n ia in 1991 met the

B a d i nter Commission's criteria for inde p e nde nc e, and Europe then had an opportunity

to recognize it. Failure to ex t e nd imme d iate re c o g n i t ion, whatever the mo t i v a t io ns, contributed to the subsequent worsening of cond i t io ns. Thro u g hout the 1990s, though, the

c o u ntry’s citizens and a majority of its politic ia ns resisted the slide into the ethno -

na t io nalism that has been associated elsewhe re with civil vio l e nc e, the de c l i ne of living

s t a nda rd s, and isolation from the world econo my. The country has vibra nt, free me d ia

a nd an active NGO community; it has been cons i s t e ntly go v e r ned by mu l t i - e t h n ic coalit io ns, and the new pre s ide nt has pledged to uphold the principles of dialogue and no n -

v io l e nt solutio ns set by his pre de c e s s o r. Ma c e do n ia has eme rged from suc c e s s i v e

c r i s e s — e c o no m ic blocka de, an assassina t ion attempt against its pre s ide nt, vio l e nt conf ro nt a t io ns between citizens and polic e, and the influx of a large body of re f u ge e s —

with its de mo c ra t ic ins t i t u t io ns intact. Pa r t ic i p a nts in the Balka ns Wo r k i ng Group all

e m p h a s i z e d, though, that to secure the future of Ma c e do n ia, the country will need assist a nce with its econo my and infra s t r uc t u re. Ena c t me nt of the Stability Pact and pro g re s s

t o w a rds adm i s s ion of Ma c e do n ia into NATO and the European Un ion would also serve to

s ig nal ex t e r nal commitme nt to pra c t ical support of mu l t ic u l t u ral ide a l s. 

Conclusions 

Po l i t ical culture in Ma c e do n ia took a re g rettable re t ro g ra de step du r i ng the last pre s ide nt ial campaign, conducted in the shadow of the Kosovo crisis. The ant i - A l b a n ia n

r he t o r ic of the Social Demo c ra t ic cand ida t e, Tito Pe t kovski, and the conduct of the elect ion itself—in which irre g u l a r i t ies occurred in Albania n - majority are a s — c o m b i ned to

w iden ethnic divisio ns as well as divisio ns within the Ma c e do n ian commu n i t y. Effo r t s

7

The new president has pledged

to uphold the principles of dialogue and non-violent solutions

set by his pre d e c e s s o r. 
s hould be ma de to heal these wound s. This is, above all, the job of the new pre s ide nt ,

w ho has sought to reach out to fo r mer oppone nt s. It is critical that the United States

a nd other int e r na t io nal actors not exacerbate curre nt tens io ns by appearing to be partisan in dire c t i ng their aid and attent io n .

T he status quo in terms of legislation on educ a t ion and cultural symbols is not an

o p t ion, given the re l ia nce of the new pre s ide nt and go v e r n me nt on support from Albanian voters and partie s. Pra g matism and cons i s t e ncy suggest that Albanian claims in the

realm of cultural rig hts be recognized and addre s s e d. The re are sig ns in various parts of

t he Ma c e do n ian commu n i t y — p o l i t ical, acade m ic, and me d ia—that this ackno w l e dgeme nt will be fo r t h c o m i ng. Ind i v iduals and groups that work toward the goal of gre a t e r

r ig hts for all citizens can assist and further this pro c e s s. 

At the same time, the conc e r ns of Ma c e do n ia ns over the future status of the count r y

s hould also be re c o g n i z e d. Albanian political leaders mig ht do mo re to distance the mselves from stateme nts that call for a separate Albanian state. 

On the issue of cons t i t u t io nal change, the re is pro v i s ion within the cons t i t u t ion fo r

g reater local autono my in fiscal and political terms. Gra s s roots de mo c ra t i z a t ion is ma de

mo re feasible if re s o u rces are cont rolled locally. The cent ral go v e r n me nt should take

steps to allow for this, while re t a i n i ng cont rol of key ministrie s, such as de f e ns e, and of

c o u nt r y w ide infra s t r uc t u re. 

A l t hough Ma c e do n ia ns and Albania ns constitute the two largest collectivitie s, legisl a t ion should recognize the rig hts and re s p o ns i b i l i t ies of other cons t i t u e nc ies: Roma ,

Tu r k s, Serbs, Ma c e do n ian Mu s l i ms, and Vlahs. Some believe this would best be achie v e d

by the cons t i t u t io nal re c o g n i t ion of the equal partic i p a t ion and rig hts of all citizens as

i nd i v idua l s, ra t her than as members of ethnic collectivitie s. Others advocate cons t i t ut io nal re c o g n i t ion of Ma c e do n ia ns and Albania ns as state-fo r m i ng na t io na l i t ie s, with full

e q uality and coex i s t e nce gra nted for the other mino r i t ie s.

R e c o m m e n d a t i o n s

• With the state established and the most imme d iate threats of vio l e nt conflict prev e nt e d, Ma c e do n ia needs to focus on econo m ic de v e l o p me nt, further political re fo r m ,

a nd impro v i ng re l a t io ns amo ng ethnic groups that have been polarized by events of

t he re c e nt past.

• Power should be de c e nt ralized from the cent ral go v e r n me nt, and local go v e r n me nt

i ns t i t u t io ns should be stre ng t he ne d.

• Steps should be taken to ma ke the civil service mo re re p re s e ntative of the Ma c e do nian population as a who l e.

• T he ex i s t i ng parallel ethnic commu n i t ies should be enc o u ra ged to int e ract mo re,

e s p e c ially at the gra s s roots level, with the aim of de v e l o p i ng a ge nu i nely mu l t ic u lt u ral polity.

• E f forts should focus on educ a t ion, with the aim of bre a k i ng down ethnic isolatio n

f rom a young age and bre a k i ng the pattern of zero-sum game s ma nship that do m inates ethnic re l a t io ns. 

• T he greater cultural re c o g n i t ion sought by Albania ns needs to be satisfied within the

o v e rall Ma c e do n ian cons t i t u t io nal cont ext and in a way that does not threaten partition. 

• R e v i s i ng the cons t i t u t ion to recognize the equal partic i p a t ion and rig hts of all citiz e ns as ind i v idua l s, ra t her than as members of ethnic collectivitie s, would move Ma c edo n ia beyond the socio - e c o no m ic legacy of communist Yu go s l a v ia and ease ethnic

t e ns io ns.

• T he int e r na t io nal community can learn from the Ma c e do n ian example: it is better to

focus on pre v e ntive diplomacy early than re c o ns t r uc t ion later. The time to do so is

no w.

8

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SP E C I A L RE P O R T 5 8

Macedonia

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Institute of Pe a c e

1200 17th Street NW

Wa s h i ngton, DC 20036