SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY

APPELLATE DIVISION

DOCKET NO. A-5530-18T1

DIANE RAMOS,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

v.

BOARD OF TRUSTEES,

POLICE AND FIREMEN'S

RETIREMENT SYSTEM,

Defendant-Respondent.

__________________________

Argued November 10, 2020 – Decided

Before Judges Gilson and Moynihan.

On appeal from the Board of Trustees, Police and 

Firemen's Retirement System, Department of the 

Treasury, PFRS No. 3-10-52994.

Samuel M. Gaylord argued the cause for appellant 

(Gaylord Popp, LLC, attorneys; Samuel M. Gaylord, on 

the brief).

Alison Keating, Deputy Attorney General, argued the 

cause for respondent (Gurbir S. Grewal, Attorney 

General, attorney; Melissa H. Raksa, Assistant 

NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE

APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION

This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court." Although it is posted on the 

internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R. 1:36-3.

December 23, 2020
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Attorney General, of counsel; Alison Keating, on the 

brief).

PER CURIAM

Appellant Diane Ramos appeals from a final agency decision of the Board 

of Trustees, Police and Firemen's Retirement System of New Jersey (Board), 

which granted her ordinary retirement benefits, but denied her accidental 

disability retirement benefits. Appellant contends that the Board used the wrong 

legal standard and its decision was not supported by credible evidence. We 

disagree and affirm.

I.

Appellant worked as a corrections officer for approximately nine years,

from 2007 to 2016. In March 2010, appellant injured her right knee. She 

underwent arthroscopic surgery in January 2011 and was found to have "a fullthickness chondral lesion of her lateral femoral condyle." She was initially

cleared for full duty in March 2011 but returned to modified duty in April 2011. 

She was again cleared for full duty in June 2011. 

On April 28, 2012, appellant twisted her right knee when she fell over 

during a struggle with an inmate. In May 2012, her treating physician, Dr. 

Bradford Tucker, diagnosed her as having "[r]ight knee lateral femoral condyle 

chondral lesion (exasperation of symptoms)." Dr. Tucker found:
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It is within a reasonable degree of medical probability 

that the patient reinjured the right knee as this cause 

related to the injury at work on December 28, 2011, 

which was originally causally related to an injury at 

work from March 23, 2010, these are all related, it is all 

due to the same problem. She has a chondral lesion on 

lateral femoral condyle.

Following two surgeries on her right knee in November 2012 and 

September 2013, appellant was cleared to return to work "without restrictions" 

in October 2013. She returned to work around November or December 2013. 

In March 2015, appellant stopped working in anticipation of another surgery on 

her right knee, which was performed in June 2015. Thereafter, she did not return 

to work. 

In April 2016, appellant applied for accidental retirement benefits. The 

Board determined that appellant was totally and permanently disabled, granted 

her ordinary disability retirement benefits, but denied her accidental disability 

retirement benefits. The Board found that appellant's disability was "the result 

of a pre-existing disease alone or a pre-existing disease that [was] aggravated or 

accelerated by the work effort." 

Appellant administratively appealed, and the matter was transferred to the 

Office of Administrative Law as a contested case. An Administrative Law Judge 

(ALJ) conducted a two-day hearing in September 2018. The ALJ heard 
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testimony from appellant, Dr. David Weiss, a medical expert for appellant, and 

Dr. Andrew Hutter, a medical expert for the Board.

Appellant testified about the April 28, 2012 incident that led to her knee 

injury. Dr. Weiss reviewed appellant's medical records and diagnosed her with 

an "aggravation of [a] pre-existing chondromalacia of the right knee from [a]

workers' compensation injury [in] 2010 with arthroscopic surgery [in] January 

2011." He concluded that appellant was totally and permanently disabled as a 

direct result of her injury on April 28, 2012. 

Dr. Hutter also reviewed appellant's medical records and agreed that she 

was totally and permanently disabled from working as a corrections officer. He 

concluded that the injury in April 2012 was not the direct cause of her disability. 

While acknowledging that the April 28, 2012 incident "exacerbated the preexisting condition," Dr. Hutter concluded "that injury was not the primary 

cause" of appellant's disability. 

After closing the record in April 2019, the ALJ issued his initial decision 

on June 4, 2019. The ALJ found that appellant had failed to prove "that her 

disability was the direct result of a traumatic event[.]" Accordingly, the ALJ 

recommended that the denial of appellant's application for accidental disability 

benefits be affirmed. 
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On July 9, 2019, the Board adopted the decision by the ALJ affirming the 

denial. In making its ruling, the Board accepted the findings made by the ALJ, 

but corrected certain errors concerning inaccurate dates, inaccurate citations, 

and typographical errors. Appellant now appeals from the Board's final 

decision.

II.

Before us, appellant contends that she demonstrated her disability was 

substantially caused by the April 28, 2012 incident. In support of that position, 

she argues that the ALJ and Board used the wrong legal standard because the 

ALJ found that the April 28, 2012 incident was not the cause of her disability 

without considering whether the incident was a "substantial cause" of her 

disability. 

Our review of an administrative agency determination is limited. In re 

Carter, 191 N.J. 474, 482 (2007). We will sustain a board's decision "'unless 

there is a clear showing that it is arbitrary, capricious, or unreasonable, or that 

it lacks fair support in the record.'" Russo v. Bd. of Trs., Police and Firemen's 

Ret. Sys., 206 N.J. 14, 27 (2011) (quoting In re Herrmann, 192 N.J. 19, 27-28 

(2007)). Under this standard, our scope of review is guided by three major 

inquiries: (1) whether the agency's decision conforms with relevant law; (2) 
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whether the decision is supported by substantial credible evidence in the record; 

and (3) whether in applying the law to the facts, the administrative "'agency 

clearly erred in reaching'" its conclusion. In re Stallworth, 208 N.J. 182, 194 

(2011) (quoting Carter, 191 N.J. at 482-83). 

We are not bound by an agency's statutory interpretation or other legal 

determinations. Russo, 206 N.J. at 27 (quoting Mayflower Sec. Co. v. Bureau 

of Sec., 64 N.J. 85, 93 (1973)). Nevertheless, we accord "substantial deference 

to the interpretation given" by the agency to the statute it is charged with 

enforcing. Bd. of Educ. v. Neptune Twp. Educ. Ass'n, 144 N.J. 16, 31 (1996) 

(citing Merin v. Maglaki, 126 N.J. 430, 436-37 (1992)). "Such deference has 

been specifically extended to state agencies that administer pension statutes[,]" 

because "'a state agency brings experience and specialized knowledge to its task 

of administering and regulating a legislative enactment within its field of 

expertise.'" Piatt v. Police & Firemen's Ret. Sys., 443 N.J. Super. 80, 99 (App. 

Div. 2015) (quoting In re Election Law Enf't Comm'n Advisory Op. No. 01-

2008, 201 N.J. 254, 262 (2010)).

Appellant is a member of the Police and Firemen's Retirement System. 

That pension plan grants accidental disability retirement benefits if "the member 

is permanently and totally disabled as a direct result of a traumatic event 
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occurring during and as a result of the performance of his [or her] regular or

assigned duties." N.J.S.A. 43:16A-7(a)(1). Accordingly, a claimant seeking 

accidental disability retirement benefits must prove five factors:

1. that he [or she] is permanently and totally 

disabled; 

2. as a direct result of a traumatic event that is

a. identifiable as to time and place,

b. undesigned and unexpected, and

c. caused by a circumstance external to the 

member (not the result of pre-existing 

disease that is aggravated or accelerated by 

the work); 

3. that the traumatic event occurred during and as a 

result of the member's regular or assigned duties;

4. that the disability was not the result of the 

member's willful negligence; and 

5. that the member is mentally or physically 

incapacitated from performing his [or her] usual or any 

other duty.

[Richardson v. Bd. of Trs., 192 N.J. 189, 212-13 

(2007).] 

The "direct result" requirement was intended "to impose a more exacting 

standard of medical causation." Gerber v. Bd. of Trs., Pub. Emps. Ret. Sys., 83 

N.J. 174, 185-86 (1980). When there is an underlying condition that is 

aggravated by the trauma, the resulting disability is not accidental. Id. at 186. 
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The traumatic event must "constitute[] the essential significant or the substantial 

contributing cause of the resultant disability." Ibid. See also Petrucelli v. Bd. 

of Trs., Pub. Emps. Ret. Sys., 211 N.J. Super. 280, 281-84 (App. Div. 1986) 

(holding that the applicant's fall down a flight of stairs was a substantial cause

of his disability despite pre-existing non-symptomatic arthritis).

There is no dispute that appellant is permanently disabled from working

as a corrections officer. The issue is whether the April 2012 incident was a 

significant or substantial contributing cause of appellant's disability. The Board, 

relying on the findings by the ALJ, concluded that appellant did not prove 

causation. In reaching that conclusion, the Board relied on the testimony of the 

medical experts, who had reviewed appellant's medical records. We discern 

nothing arbitrary, capricious, or unreasonable in the Board's ruling. We also 

find that the Board's conclusion was supported by substantial credible evidence.

Appellant contends that the ALJ used the wrong legal standard by 

focusing on the "cause" as opposed to the "substantial cause" of her disability. 

A review of the record does not support appellant's argument. Initially, we note 

that we review the decision by the Board, not the decision by the ALJ. 

Nevertheless, the Board adopted the ALJ's findings. In making his findings, the 

ALJ expressly acknowledged that the April 2012 incident did not need to be the 
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sole cause of the disability. In applying his factual findings to the law, the ALJ 

stated: "Where the traumatic event constitutes 'the essential significant or 

substantially contributing cause' of the disability, an accidental disability 

retirement may be awarded." The ALJ then cited Petrucelli, 211 N.J. Super. at 

288. Neither the Board nor the ALJ stated that the April 2012 incident needed 

to be the sole cause of the disability. Accordingly, we construe the decision by 

the Board and the ALJ to be consistent with the governing legal standard.

The evidence at the hearing clearly established that appellant had a preexisting knee condition before the April 2012 incident. Significantly, however, 

appellant did not argue that the pre-existing condition was a traumatic event 

further exacerbated by another traumatic event. Instead, she relied only on the 

argument that the April 28, 2012 incident was a traumatic event significantly or 

substantially contributing to her disability. Both the Board and the ALJ rejected 

that argument and we discern nothing arbitrary, capricious, or unreasonable in 

that determination because there was substantial evidence to support the Board's 

conclusion.

Affirmed.