The Honor able John R
. Adams, United States District Judge f or the Nor

thern District of * Ohio, sitti ng by

desig nation. NO T R EC OM M EN DE D F OR F UL L- TEX T P UB LIC AT ION F ile Nam e: 08a0535n.06 F iled: August 28, 2008 No. 07-5860 UN ITED STA TES C OU RT OF AP P EA LS F OR THE SI XT H C IR CU IT
UNI TED STATES OF AMERI CA, Plaintiff-Appellee , v. CL YDE SANDER COOK, De fe nd ant- Ap pe lla

nt. )

) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ON APPEALFROM THE U NI TED STATES DI STRI CT COURT FOR THE WES TERN DI STRI CT OF TEN NESSEE

Before: ROG ERS an d McK EAGU E, Circuit Judges; ADAM S, District Judge. * ROGERS, Circ uit Jud ge. On April 12, 2007, a jury con v i ct ed d efendant Cly de Sander C o o k o f s e l l i n g c o u n t e r f e i t c u r r e n c y , i n v i o l a t i o n o f 1 8 U
. S
. C
. § 4 7 3 , an d o f be ing a fe lon in po sse ssi on of a fi re arm and a mmunit ion , in vio la tio n of 18 U. S.C. § 92 2( g ). Cook ap peal s his convictions on three g rounds, ar g uing that (1) the e vidence was not suffic ien t t o s upport either conviction; (2) the district court erre d in admitting evide nce of a pre vious arre st under F ed. R. Evid. 404(b), a nd (3) the district c ourt err ed by failing to give a spec ific unanimity instruction to the jury with respec t to the felon-in-posse ss i o n co u n t
. Be cause none of Cook’s a rg uments has merit, we aff irm.No. 07-5860

USA v. Cook

- 2 - I.
On Marc h 17, 2004, a conf ident i al informant name d Albert Settles appr oache d Detec tive Ke vin Th omp so n o f t

he B art le tt, Te nn e sse e Pol ic e De pa rtme nt, cla imingthat he c ou ld o bta in counter feit money from defe ndant Cook. The next day , Thompson a rra ng ed for Settles to make a controlled purc hase of

counter feit m o ney

at Cook’s apa

rtment, which wa s located in the Caf alg er Apar tments complex in Arling ton, Tennesse e. B efor e the ope ration, off icer s from the B artlett Police De pa rtme nt fi t Se ttl e s wi th a wi re tr ans mit tin g de vic e and se arc he d Se ttl e s’ s ve hic le and pe rs on to
e ns ur e that no c on tr a

ba nd wa s p re se nt. Se ttl e s th e n d ro ve him se lf to the Ca fa lg e r A pa rtme nts wi th t h e o ff i ce rs fo l l o wi n g.
Detec tive Thompson stationed him s e lf a t a s c h o o l n e a

r th e a p a r tment complex and posit ioned oth e r o ff ic e rs ins ide of

the c omp le x, tho ug h n o o ff ic e r c ou ld s e e the e ntr anc e of Coo k’ s a pa rtme nt. After Settles entere d the apartment, Thompson was able to make out a conver sation betwee n Settles
and on e oth e r ma le
. B e c a

us e of ba c kg ro un d nois e and po or tr ans mis sio n, ho we ve r, Th omp so n c ou ld not hear the conve rsation betwe en Settles and the apar tment oc cupant. Settles e x ited the apa rtment and drove himself back to the police depar t m ent, ag ain with office rs following . Upon sea rching Se ttl e s, the of

fi c e rs re c ov e re d thr e e tw e nty -d oll ar co un te rf e it b ill s and

on e te n- do lla

r c ounte rf e it b ill
. At trial, Settles testified that, in addition to him self and Cook, two other men wer e present inside the apar tment during the transa ction.No. 07-5860

USA v. Cook

- 3 - Following the oper ation, Detec tive Thompson c ontacted Ag ent Patrick Da vis of the United States Secre t Service. Thompson sche duled a meeting later that day for Davis to meet Settles. At the meeting , Davis decide d to use Settles a s a confide ntial inf ormant, and the Secr et Service assumed command of the investiga tion. Davis and other Secre t Ser vice a g ents org anized a sec ond operation fo r t he nex t da

y , M arc h 1 9, 20 04 . B e fo re that op e ra tio n, a g e nts a g a in s e a

rc he d Se ttl e s and

his vehicle to e nsure that Settles possessed no contra band, and outfitted Settles with a wire tra nsmitt er. Se ttl e s w a s g ive n o ne hund re d d oll ars to pu rcha se bo th c ounte rf e it c ur re nc y and ill e g a l dr

ug s. Settles then drove himself to the a partment c omplex with ag ents and police office rs following
. Prior to Settles’s arriva l, Secre t Service ag ents established surve illance inside the a partment
c omp le x an d were a

ble to o bs e rv e the do or

to C oo k’ s a

pa rtme nt. Whe n Se ttl e s arr ive d, a g e nts
watc he d Se ttl e s w a lk in to Co ok’s a pa rtme nt. Al tho ug h th e wi re tr ans mit te r a g a in b e c a me ineffe ctive, Ag ent Davis wa s able to hea r the voice of one ma le in addition to Settles’s voice. At one point, Settl es re mained in the apa rtment while Cook left the apa rtment and wa lked to the bac kside of the building . Cook re t u rned minutes later holding something in his hand and re -ente red the apar tment. After a

fewminutes, Settl es ex ited the apartment and drove himself to the Ba rtlett Poli ce station, ag ain with office rs and a g ents following
. Upon his arr ival at the police station, officer s and ag ents rec overe d from Settles eig hty dollars in counter feit cur

renc y and a f ew r ocks of c rac k coca ine. At trial, Settles testified that, in addition to him self and Cook, a fema le was pr esent in the a partment during this second transa ction. Settles testified that during both transac tions , h e o b t ained theNo. 07-5860

USA v. Cook

- 4 - c ounte rf e it m on e y fr om C oo k. Ag e nt D a vis te sti fi e d th a t th e c ounte rf e it m on e y ob ta ine d d

ur ingbo th transac tions was produce d using c omputer ink-jet tec hnology
. Ba sed on Settles’s two controlled pur chase s, Ag ent Davis obtaine d a searc h wa rr an t for Cook’s apar

tment. The wa

rra nt was executed on Ma

rch 24 , 2 0 0 4
. When office rs enter ed the apar tment, a fe male wa s prese nt. During the sea rc h , office rs found a .22 caliber

rifle, f our .357
ma g num c art

ri dg e s ins id e a jew e lr

y bo x, and 12 -g a ug e sh otgun

sh e lls in t

he c los e t. O ff

ic e rs a lso found a utility

bill from March 2004 f or the a partment, a

lease fo r t h e ap artment, a nd another do c ume nt t a c ke d to the wa ll, a ll b e ari ngCoo k’ s n a me . Th e of fi c e rs did no t r e c ov e r a

ny c ounte rf e it
mon e y or c ra c k c oc a ine , n or

did the y fi nd any of the mark e d mo ne y

tha t Se ttl e s h a d u se d to purc ha se the cr ack c ocaine and counter feit money . Although office rs found a c omputer in the apa rtment, the computer did not have a sca nner, a nd there wer e no counte rfe it bill s saved on the c omputer.
On J an u ary

1 1 , 2 0 0 6 , a gra n d j u ry re tu rn ed an i n d i ct m en tch ar gi n g C o o k wi t h t ra n s fe rr i n g, selling, or deliveringcounter feit cur renc y with the intent that the curr ency be passe d or used a s true
and g e nu ine , in

vio la tio n o f 18 U. S.C. § 47 3, dis tr ibutio n of c oc a ine ba se , in vio la tio n o f 2 1 U .S. C. § 8 41 (a )( 1) , a

nd be ing a fe lon in po sse ssi on of a fi re arm and a mmunit ion , in

vio la tio n o f 1 8 U .S. C. § 9 22 (g ). Th e c a se we nt to tr ia l on Ap ri l 9, 20 07 . Pr ior to t ri a l, t he g ov e rnme nt f

ile d a mot ion in lim ine re qu e sti ngtha

t th e dis tr ic t c ourt

pe rm it t e sti mony , und e r F e d. R. E vid . 4 04 (b ), re la te d to Cook’s arr est in 2002 for uttering counterf eit curr ency . The dist rict court g rante d the g overnme nt’s motion during trial, a

nd the prior a ct testimony was e licited at trial.No. 07-5860

USA v. Cook

- 5 - On April 12, 2007, the jury convicted Cook of t he counterfe it money count and the f

elon-inpossession count, but acquitted Cook of the narcotics distribution count. On J uly 13, 2007, the district court sentenc ed Cook to 235 months’ imprisonment on eac h count of conviction, to be serve d
c o n c u r r e n t l y.
II.
Be cause the evidenc e wa s sufficient to convic t Cook on each c ount of conviction, and beca use the district cour

t did not otherwise commit error , we a ffirm.

A.
The e vidence was suff

icient to convict Cook on both counts of convic tion. This court revie ws de novo the s ufficie ncy of t he evidence to sustain a convic tion. United States v. Gibson , 896 F.2d 206, 209 ( 6th Cir. 1990). Evidence is sufficient to sustai n a co n v i ct i on if “a fter vie wing the evidenc e in the l ight most favor able to the pr osecution, an d a fte r g iv ing

thego v e rn me nt t

he be ne fit of all inf erenc es that could reasonably be drawn from the testimony , a ny ratio na l tr ie r o f f

a c t c ou ld find the elements of the cr ime bey ond a re asonable doubt.” United States v. M/G Transp. Serv s., Inc. , 1 7 3 F. 3 d 5 8 4 , 5 8 9 (6 t h C i r. 1 9 9 9 ) ( ci t i n g J ac k so n v . V irg ini a , 4 4 3 U
. S
. 3 0 7 , 3 1 9 ( 1 9 7 9 ) )
. In examining claims of insuff icient evidenc e, this court does not “weig h the evidenc e pre sented, consider the cre dibilit y of witnesses, or substitute [ its] judgme nt for that of the jury .” Id. at 588-89.No. 07-5860

USA v. Cook

- 6 - To establish a co n v i ct i o n fo r s el l i n g co u n t er fe i t cu rr en cy u n d er 18 U .S.C. § 473, the g overnme nt was re quired to prove bey ond a rea sonable doubt that Cook (1) boug ht, sold, e x chang ed, transfe rre d, rec eived, or

delivere d; (2) any

false, f org ed, counte rfe ited, or alter ed oblig ation or other
secur ity of the United States; (3) with the intent that the same be passed, publis hed, or used as true
and g e nu ine . 1 8 U .S. C. § 47 3. Coo k c on te sts the su ff ic ie nc y of the e vid e nc e re g ard ingon ly the fi rs t of the se e lem ent s. Co ok argue s th a t, i n li g ht o f t he fa c t th a t of

fi c e rs did no t r e c ov e r c ounte rf

e it
curr ency in his home during the executi o n o f t h e sear ch wa rra nt, the evidenc e at tria l was not sufficie nt to prove that Cook sold Settl es the c ounterfe it curre ncy . This contention lacks mer it.
Detec tive Thompson, Ag ent Davis, Albe rt Settles, and two other law enf orce ment office rs all testified re g ardingthe two co n t ro l l ed buy s during which Settles purcha sed counte rfe it money from Cook. The e vidence at trial established that Settles twice ente red Cook’s a partment, purc hased counter feit money , and left the apartment. On bot h occa sions, upon returning to the police station, Se ttl e s p ro vid e d o ff

ic e rs wi th c ounterfei t feder a l r e se rv e no te s. Se ttl e s te sti fi e d th a t du ri ngbo th transac tions, he purcha sed the c o u n terfe it money from Cook. Be fore eac h operation, officer s
sear ched Settles a

nd his vehicle to ensur e that Settles d i d n o t possess contra band bef ore e ntering Cook’s apar

tment, a nd office rs followed Settles’s car to Cook’s apar tment. During t h e s ec ond operation, Secret Servic e ag ents watc hed Settles enter Cook’s apar

tment. Age n t s als o observe d Cook leave the apar

tment for a short time and re turn to the apa rtment minutes later holding something in his hand.No. 07-5860

USA v. Cook

- 7 - Fr om this evidence, a

rational trier

of fa ct could conc lude beyond a re asonable doubt that Cook sold S ettles the counte rfe it money . This is so reg ardle ss of the fact that no counter feit money was found in the a

partment during the e x ecution of the sear ch wa rra nt. Settles testified that eac h time that he purc hased the counter feit bills from Cook, Cook left the apa rtment for a

short time and returne d with the items Settles was to purcha se. Offic er James Wooten, a Memphis police off icer assig ned to the Secre t Ser vice, c orrobor ated Settles’s testimony . Wooten testified that, during the second tra nsaction, he persona lly observe d Cook le ave the apar tment for a shor

t period of time and
re tur n c arr y ingso me thi ngin h is h and . F ro m th is, a rat io nal ju ro r c ou ld i nf e r t hat Co ok ke pt h is contra band at a location out side of hi s apar tment and, accor dingly , it is of l ittle signific ance that no counter feit money

was re cover ed duringthe sea rch of the apa rtment.
I t is not t rue, a s Cook contends, that his counterf eit money conviction ca

nnot be sustained beca use it rests on m ere ly the uncorroborated t estimony of S ettles, a “ convicted dr ug deale r who wa s paid for his ser

vice.” First, Cook’s ar g ument, at least in par t, seeks to impugn t h e cr ed i bility of Se ttl e s be fo re thi s c ourt
. B ut, a s dis c us se d, thi s c ourt do e s no t c on sid e r t he c re dib ili ty

of wi tne sse s. Second, Settles’s testimony was not the only

evidenc e introduce d reg ar d i n g Cook’s sale of counter feit m o n ey . Detec tive Thompson, Ag ent Davis, a nd two other lawenfor ceme nt office rs testified at trial, a

nd all submitt ed testimony that wa s generally

consistent with and supported Se ttl e s’ s te sti mony . In a dd iti on , th e g ov e rnme nt p re se nte d im a g e s o f, and ide nti fi e d a s c ounte rf

e it, the bills that S ettles turned ove r to police a fter e x iting Cook’s apa rtment. I n total, this evidence w asNo. 07-5860

USA v. Cook

- 8 - sufficie nt for a r ational jury to find all the eleme nts of the counter feit money o ff ense be y ond a
rea sonable doubt.
Cook a lso c ontends that, beca use he was found not guilty on the drug

distribution count, no rational juror

could have come to a differe nt conclusion wit h respe ct t o the counter feit money count g ive n th e “ ide nti c a l evi den ce” p re se nte d f or bo th c ounts . T his c on te nti on la c ks me ri t. Wh ile it i s tr ue that tr ia l te sti mony

e sta bli sh e d th a t, a ft e r t

he se c on d tr ans a c tio n w ithCoo k, Se ttl e s r e tur ne d to the police station with counter feit bills and rocks of cra ck coc aine, the e vidence used to prove e ach count was not ide ntical. As an initial matter , the evidenc e of Cook’s sa le of c ounterfe it money was more robust than the evidenc e o f d ru g distribution. The trial testimony of the lawenfor ceme nt office rs indicated that Settles purchase d counter feit money from C ook on two occa sions, while the purcha se of c rac k coca ine occ urre d on one occa sion. Further , and sig nificantly , during trial Settles
a c kn ow le dg e d th a t he ha d p re vio us ly be e n c on vic te d o f s e lli ngc ra c k c oc a ine him se lf
. B a se d o n th is, it is entirely

possible that the jury

found cr edible Settles’s testimony that Cook was the sourc e of the counter feit bills, but found incredible Settles’s testimony that C o o k was the sour ce of the cr ack
coca ine. See, e .g. , United States v. J ackson , 473 F.3d 660, 670 (6th Cir. 2007) (“ The jury might have conclude d that eac h of t he gover nment’s wit nesses was somewhat—but only somewhat—c redible, and discounted the testimony acc ording ly .”). Finally , even if the verdic ts for the c ounterfe it money char g e and the drug char g e ca n be construe d as inconsistent, that would not require a re versa l of the counter feit money

conviction. As the Supreme Court has explained, evenNo. 07-5860

USA v. Cook

- 9 - wher e truly

inconsistent verdicts have been r eac hed, [ t] he mos t that can be said . . . is that the verdic t shows that either in the a cquittal or the c onviction the jury did not speak the ir rea l conclusions, but that does not show that they wer e not convince d of the def e n d an t’ s g u il t. T h e r

u le th a t t h e d e f e n d an t m ay

n o t u p s e t s u c h a

verdic t embodies a prudent acknowledg ment of a number of fac tors. First . . ., inconsistent verdic ts—even ve rdicts that ac quit on a predic ate of fense while convictingon the compound offe n s e— should not necessa rily be interpr eted a s a windfa ll to the G o v e r n m e n ta tt h e d e f

e n d an t ’ s e x p e n s e . It i s e qu a l l y p o s s i b l e t h a t t h e j u r y, convince d of g uilt, properly rea ched its conc lusion on the compound offe nse, and then throug h mistake, compromise, or le ni ty , arr ived at an inc onsistent conclusion on the lesser

offe nse.
Un ite d S tat es v . P owe ll , 469 U.S. 57, 64-65 (1984) (first and second alterations i n orig inal) (c itation and quotation marks omitted). For these reasons, C ook’s conviction on the counterfeit money count is supported by

sufficie nt evidence
. Cook’s conviction on the felon-in-possession count i s also supported by sufficie nt evidence
. To pro v e a

f e lo n - in

- p o s s e s s io nc h ar g e , th e g o v e r n me n t m u s t e s ta b li s h b e y o n d

a r e a s o n a b le d oubt that Cook (1) had a pr evious conviction for a cr ime punishable by

imprisonment for a ter

m
e xc e e d in g o n e y e ar , ( 2 ) th e r e a f te r kn o w in g ly p o s s e s s e d a f ir e ar m o r a mm

u n it io n , an d ( 3 ) th at the firea rm or ammunition was in or af fec ting inter state commer ce. See United States v. Schre ane , 331 F.3d 548, 560 (6th Cir. 2003)
. On appea l, Cook contests the suff iciency of the e vidence reg arding only the sec ond of these e lements, arguing that the evidenc e wa s insufficient to prove that he possessed the f

irea rm and/or ammuniti on found in his apar tment.
Po s s e s s io n o f a f

ir e ar m o r a mm

u n it io n ma

y b e a c tu a l o r c o n s tr

u ctive. Un i t ed States v. Gardner , 488 F.3d 700, 713 ( 6th Cir. 2007). “Ac tual possession means that the possessor ha dNo. 07-5860

USA v. Cook

- 10 - phy sical control ove r the we apon, whe rea s ‘[c]onst ructive possession e x ists when a per son does not have a c tua l po sse ssi on

bu t in ste a d k

no wi ng ly ha s th e po we r a

nd th e in ten tion at a

g ive n ti me to exercise dominion and control over an objec t, either dire ctly

or throug h others.’” Id. (c i t i n g United States v. Kincaide , 145 F.3d 781, 782 (6th Cir. 1998)). “ Proof that ‘the pe rson has dominion over the pre mis es wher e the f irea rm is located’ is sufficient to establish construc tive possession.” Kincaide , 1 4 5 F. 3 d

at 7 8 2 (q u o t i n g Un ite d S tat es v . Cl e mi

s , 11 F.3d 597, 601 ( 6th Cir. 1993)).
Th e e vid e nc e a t tr ia l w a s suf fi c ie nt fo r a ratio na l trie r of fa c t to c on c lud e be y on d a re a so na ble doubt that Cook constructively possessed the firea rm and ammunit ion found i n his apar tment. Cook
wa s c ha rg e d w ithpo sse ssi nga

.2 2 c a lib e r r if

le , . 35 7 magn

um c art ri dg e s, and

sh otgun sh e lls
. Testimony

established that, upon ex ecution of the s ear ch warra nt, office rs re cover ed the r ifle and the
a mmunit ion

fr om C oo k’ s a

pa rtme nt. Th e ri fl e and the c art ri dg e s we re loc a te d in pla in v ie w w hil e the shotg un shells wer e found in a closet. Testimony also established that Cook had dominion over the pre mises where the fire arm a nd ammunition we re located. Offic ers rec overe d a utility bill and
a pa rtme nt le a se be ari ngCoo k’ s n a me . O ff ic e rs a lso re c ov e re d a

no the r d oc ume nt t a c ke d to a wa ll bear ing Cook’s na

me. Fur ther, S ecr et S ervic e age nts had observed C ook enter ing and leavingthe apar tment on March 19, 2004. B ased on this evidenc e, a r ational jury could conc l u d e bey ond a
re a so na ble do ub t th a t Co ok

kn ow ing ly ha d the po we r a nd the int e nti on

a t a g ive n ti me to e xer c ise dominion and c ontrol over the firea rm and ammunition. Consequently , the evidenc e wa s sufficient to establish that Cook constructively possessed the f

irea rm and ammuniti on.No. 07-5860

USA v. Cook

- 11 - Cook’s contention that the evidence inst ead supports a conclusion that the fe male occ upant of the a partment a ctually

possessed the f

irea rm and ammunition is unava iling. The simple fact that Cook was not prese nt when the se arc h war rant wa s executed does not lead to the conclusion that the jury ’s verdic t was not supported by sufficie nt evidence . There was c onsiderable evidenc e that Cook exercised dominion over the apar tment and, ac cording ly , the jury could have rea sonably

conclude d that the fe male wa s merely a vis itor. Furthe r, construc tive possession “‘ne ed not be e x clusive but may be joint.’” United States v. Hadle y , 4 3 1 F. 3 d

4 8 4 , 5 0 7 (6 t h C i r. 2 0 0 5 ) ( qu o t i n g United States v. Craven , 478 F.2d 1329, 1333 (6th Cir. 1973) ). Thus, at a minimum, the evidence permitted the jury to infer that Cook an d t h e fe male jointly possessed the we apon and a mmuniti on, and Cook points to not hing in the r ecor d to contradic t such an infe renc e.
F or the fo re g oin g re a so ns , th e e vid e nc e wa s su ff ic ie nt t o c on vic t Co ok

on bo th c ounts
. B.
The district cour

t properly admitted, under F ed. R. Evid. 404(b), testimony reg ardingCook’s pr e vio us arr e st f

or utt e ri nga c ounte rf e it b ill in 200 2. F e de ra l Rule of Ev ide nc e 40 4( b) pr ov ide s, in rele vant par

t, that eviden ce o f o ther c rimes, wrong s, or ac ts, although not a dmissibl e to show
c ri min a l pr op e ns ity , ma

y be a dmi ssi ble fo r pur

po se s suc h as “p ro of of mot ive , opp or tun ity , in te nt, pr e pa ratio n, pla

n, kn ow le dg e , id e nti ty , o r a bs e nc e of mis take or

a c c ide nt. ” Th e de c isi on

to a dmi t
e vid e nc e purs ua

nt t o Ru le 40 4( b) is s ub

je c t to a thr e e ste p p ro c e ss:No. 07-5860

USA v. Cook

- 12 - The fir st step require s the district court to de cide whether there is sufficient evide nce that the other act i n question actua lly occur red. I f so, the district cour t must decide whether the evidenc e of the other a ct is probative of a materi al i s s u e o ther than char acte r. F inally , if the evide nce is probat i v e o f a mater ial issue other than char acte r, the district court must de cide whether the probative value of the e vidence is s ub sta nti a lly ou tw e ig he d b y

its po te nti a l pr e

jud ic ia l e ff

e c t. United States v. Hay wood , 280 F.3d 715, 720 ( 6th Cir. 2 0 0 2 ) (c i t at ions and quotation marks omitted).
Coo k c ha lle ng e s th e a dmi ssi on , und e r R u l e 4 0 4 ( b ) , o f

t e sti mony

re g ard inghis pr e vio us a rr e st in 2002 for attempting to pa ss a counter feit bill. After deter mining that the arr est was pr obative of Cook’s inte n t an d k n o wl edg e in the instant ca se, the district cour t allowed Ag ent Davis to testify
re g ard ing his inv olv e me nt in the 20 02 arr e st. Ag e nt D a vis te sti fi e d th a t, i n Jun e 20 02 , th e Me mph is Police Depa

rtment contac ted the Secr et Service afte r Cook ha d attempted to pass a c ounterfe it $100 bill at a Bur g er K ing r estaura nt. A fter arr iving on the scene , Ag ent Davis identified the $100 bill as
co u n t er fe i t
. Ac co rd i n g t o Age n tDa v i s , C o o k cl ai m ed t h at h e re ce i v ed t h e co u n t er fe i tb i l l as ch an ge for the pur chase of marijuana
. Wit h respe ct to the first step of the Rule 404(b) inquiry , Cook contends th at there was not
su ff ic ie nt e vid e nc e to pr ov e that the pr ior a c t in qu e sti on oc c ur re d. Ye t, a s n ote d a

bo ve , A g e nt D a vis testified at trial that in 2002 he participated in the arr est of Cook at a B urg er K ing r estaura nt after Cook tried to pass a counterfe it bill, and Cook does not ex plain why this evidence was insuffic ient to establish that the prior ac t occur red. At oral arg ument, Cook’s counsel see med to argue that Ag ent Davi s ’s t es t i m o ny

did not properly

establish that Cook had intent to defra ud during the 2002No. 07-5860

USA v. Cook

- 13 - incident. B ut that contention is better ana ly zed under the third step of the 404(b) inquiry (probative/prejudice balanc ing) and, in any event, is belied by the re cord. A g ent Davis’s te stimony indicated that police wer e conta cted a fter Cook tried to pa ss a cou n t erfeit bill at a Bur g er K ing restaur ant. The qua lity

of the bill was such that worke rs at the restaurant were able to ascertain the counter feit nature of the bil l befor e calling police. Fr om this, a reasonable infere nce can be draw n that Cook a l so knew that the bill was c ounterfe it and that he intended to pa ss that bill as true and g enuine. In sum, the district court’s conclusion that there was suff icient evidenc e to show that Cook
c omm itt e d th e pr ior

a c t in qu e sti on wa s n ot c le arl y

e rr on e ou s.
Under the sec ond step of t he inqui ry , the di strict court properly deter mined that the evidenc e
o f t h e 2 0 0 2 arre s twa s p ro b at i v e o f a m at er i al i s s ue other t h an ch ar ac t er

— n am el y , C o o k ’s k

n o wl ed ge and intent. As discussed e arlier , to convict Cook under 18 U. S
. C
. § 473, the g overnme nt was require d to prove that Cook sold the counter feit cur renc y with the intent that it be passed, published,
or us e d a s tr ue and g e nu ine . F or

Coo k to po sse ss thi s c ri min a l int e nt, it wa s n e c e ssa ry to e sta bli sh that he knew

that the bills were counterf eit when he sold them to S ettles. These matters we re at issue during trial. Be ca u s e C o o k p l ed not g uilty to the counter feit money char g e, the g overnme nt was obligated t o p ro v e al l the elements of the crime, inc luding the r equisite knowledg e and c riminal intent. See United States v. Me rriweather , 78 F.3d 1070, 1076 (6th Cir. 1996) (“ [T] he g overnme nt’s purpo s e in in tr o d

u c in g th e e v id e n c e mu s t b e to p r o v e a f a c t th a t th e d e f

e n d an t h a s p la c ed, or
c on c e iva bly wi ll p la c e , in

iss ue , o r a

fa c t th a t th e statut or

y e le me nts ob lig a te the g ov e rnme nt t o pr ov e .” ); United States v. Lattner , 385 F.3d 947, 957 (6th Cir. 2004) (“ [I ]t seems log ical that whe nNo. 07-5860

USA v. Cook

- 14 - [defendant] pled not g uilty . . . he put his g ener al intent a nd specific intent at issue, there by g iving the g overnme nt the burden to e stablish both bey ond a re asonable doubt.”).
This court’s de cision in United States v. Crachy , 800 F.2d 83 (6th Cir. 1986), is directly on point in thi s reg ard. The re, the defe ndant was similarly prosec u t ed u n d er § 473 for se lling
co u n t erfeit money

to a g overnme nt informant. Id. a t 8 4

- 8 5
. T h e d e f e n d an t o b je c te d to the admission, under Rule 404(b), of audio tapes in wh ich the def endant spoke of havingpassed counter feit money

on various occ asions in the past. Id. at 85-86. This court held that the a udio tapes relating the pa st acts wer e admissible as proof of the de fenda

nt’s intent. Id. at 87-88. We stated: [T]he de liv e ry

of c ounte rf e it m on e y is n ot a c ri me un de r 1 8 U. S.C. § 47 3 unle ss i t is deliv e r e d “ w it

h th e in te n t th a t th e s a me b e p a s s e d , p u b li s h e d , o r u s e d a s true and g enuine . . . .” The element of intent w as of c ritical importance in this case, and the evidenc e of [defe ndant’s] dealing s in counterf eit money was hig hly rele vant to that issue. . . . The ke y

word he re is “intent.” I f [ d ef endant] had knowing ly

passed counter feit money

befor e; if he ha d knowing ly kept a supply

of it hidden in a locke d fo otl oc ke r; and

if , a ft e r s a mpl e s h a d b e e n r e mov e d b y his ne ph e w, h e had ke pt h is rema ining stock out of c irculation for three y ear s solely beca

use of fea r that the ser ial numbe rs on th e bil ls w ou ld p ro ve ide nti c a l to tho se on the bil ls p a sse d b y

his ne ph e w, t ho se fa c ts c ou ld u nq ue sti on a bly have be e n h e lpf

ul t o th e jur

y in deter m i n i n g . . . the intent with which [defenda nt] turned [the bills] over to [the g overnme nt informant].
. . . The e vidence in question here w as off ere d not to show bad cha rac ter in g ene ra l , b ut to show—very direc tly —the spec ific intent without wh ic h th e . . . tr ans fe r o f c ounte rf e it c ur re nc y is n ot c ri min ou s.
Id. at 87 (sec ond alteration in orig inal). L ike the prior a cts at issue in Crachy , Co ok ’s pr ior a rr e st fo r utte ri nga

c ounte rf e it b ill is h ig hly pr ob a tiv e of and re le va nt t o Co ok ’s kn ow le dg e and int e nt i n thi s c a se . T he e vid e nc e of the a rr e st s ho ws that Cook kn ow ing ly utt e re d a c ounte rf e it b ill in t he pa st,
and thi s e vid e nc e “ c ou ld u

nq ue sti on a bly have be e n he lpf

ul to the jur

y ” in d e te rm ini ngthe int e nt w ithNo. 07-5860

USA v. Cook

- 15 - which Cook sold the bills i n this case. F urthermor e, the pr ior ac t wa s “s u b s tantially simil ar a nd
rea so n ab l y n ear

in time” to the offe nse at issue in this case such that it was probative of Cook’s intent for purposes of § 473. See H aywood , 280 F.3d at 721. And beca use the e vidence of the 2002
arr e st e stabli sh es th a t Co ok de a lt i n c ounte rf

e it m on e y on pr e vio us oc c a sio ns , th a t e vid e nc e a lso tends to prove that Cook knewthat th e b i l l s that he sold to Settles in t his case w ere in fac t counter feit. The district c ourt there fore proper ly deter mined that the evidenc e of the 2002 arr est was probative of

a mater ial issue other than c hara cter
. Cook init ially

conce ded in his brief that the second step o f t h e Rule 404(b) inquiry was satisfied in this case, a

nd that intent was at issue during trial beca use he pled not g uilty . On the day befor e ora l argument, Cook submit ted a Fede ral Rul e of Appellate Procedure 28(j) letter retra cting the conc ession and re fer

ring to this court’s rec ent dec ision in Un ite d S tat es v . B e ll , 5 16 F .3 d 4 32 (6 th Cir. 2008). Howe ver, le aving aside the issue of the timeliness of Cook’s retra ction, Bell does not help Cook. I ndeed, the Be ll decision recog nizes two main premises that support the admis sion of the other a cts evidenc e in this case: (1) that a def endant puts intent at issue whe n he or she pleads
no t g uil ty to a c ri me tha t r e qu ir e s th e g ov e rnme nt to pr ov e int e nt, and (2 ) t hat in te nt i s a

le g iti ma te
rea son to a dmit Rule 404(b) e vidence
. Id. at 442-43. More over, the conclusion in Be ll that the prior act e vidence in that particular case was not suffic iently probative of

intent does not mandate a simil ar conclusion in this case. Crachyis directly on point in thi s case with respec t to the probative va lue of Coo k’ s pr ior arr e st, and Coo k a lto g e the r f a ils to a dd re ss Crachy in his brief a

nd Rule 28(j) letter.No. 07-5860

USA v. Cook

- 16 - Next, C ook argues that, under the third step of the inquiry , the p ro b at i v e value of the
e vid e nc e of

the 20 02 arrest was su

bs tanti a lly

ou tw e ig he d b y

the da ng e r o f u nf a ir pr e jud ic e . T his contention also lacks merit. As discussed, and as wa s the ca se in Crachy , the evidenc e of Cook’s prior ar rest wa s highly

probative of

and re levant to Cook’s knowledg e and intent in t his case. Cook’s prior ar

rest involved conduc t that was substant i al l y simil ar to the c onduct cha rg ed in the ins tant c a se and , unli ke c a se s w he re the g ov e rnme nt h a s a lte rn a tiv e me ans a va ila ble to p ro ve int e nt, see, e .g. , Be ll , 516 F.3d at 445-46 (noting that the g overnme nt ha d a number of evide ntiary

means available apar

t from the 404(b) evidenc e to prove defe ndant’s intent to distribute , i n cl u d i n g the amount of drug s possessed and the prese nce of drug distributi o n equipm ent), ther e we re ( and g ener ally are ) limited means ava ilable to the g overnme nt to prove the intent re quirement of § 473.
Fur ther, the probative value of the evidenc e wa s not substantially outweig hed by

the dang er of unfa ir prejudice
. Cook’s principal contention reg arding unfair prejudice is ag ain base d on the fa ct that he wa s acquitted of the drug count, but convicted of the counter feit m o n ey

count. Cook contends that both c ounts r elied on evidenc e that wa s, with the exception of the testimony relating his 2002 arr est, “identica l.” Acc ording to Cook, the acquittal on the drug c harg e is there fore proof that the e v i dence of his 2002 arr est led the jury to convict on the counte rfe it money count. As d is c u s s e d a

b o v e , h o w e v e r , th e e v id e n c e in tr o d u c e d a t tr ia l w a s n o t, a s Co o k c la im s , id e n ti c a l for
eac h count. Fir st, the jury was pre sented with testimony from law e nforc ement off icer s that relate d two transac tions invol ving c ounterfe it money and only one tra nsaction t hat y ielded crac k coca ine. Second, Settles was a

key witness with r espec t to the proof ag ainst Cook for both the drugcount andNo. 07-5860

USA v. Cook

Cook also briefly argues t hat he was given no notice by the gover nment that Ag ent Davis’s 1 testimony would include the f

act that the c ounterfe it bill that Cook attempted to pass in 2002 was tied to a drugtransac tion. He claims that “[t] his is evide nce of not one prior ba d act, but of two.” Contrary to Cook’s contention, the g overnme nt provided Cook with proper notice for purposes of Rule 404(b). Ag ent Davis’s te stimony conce rned one prior ac t—Cook’s previous ar rest for passing a counte rfe it bill
. That the drug transac tion wa s mentioned by Ag ent Davis to br ing context to t hat arr est does not transf

orm the testimony

into evidence of two pri o r ac t s . Fur ther, the district c ourt g a ve a pr op e r l imi tin g ins tr

uc tio n th a t to ld t

he jur y to c on sid e r the evide nc e on ly wi th r e g a rd

to Cook’s knowledg e and intent c oncer ning the counter feit money char g e. - 17 - the counter feit money

count, and Settles admitted on the s tand t hat he was formerly a cr ack c ocaine deale r himsel f. I n light of this, it is possi ble that the jury found cr edible Settles’s testimony that Cook was the sourc e of the counter fe i t money , but found incre dible Settles’s testimony that he obtained the c rac k coca ine from Cook
. T h u s , C ook’s contention that it was e x clusively the other acts e vidence that led to his counterf eit money conviction is belied by

the re cord. Cook also disreg ards the f act that the district c ourt twice g ave stronglimit ing instruc tions
re g ard ingthe e vid e nc e of his 20 02 a rr e st. “ Al tho ug h, a s w itha ll a dmi tte d e vid e nc e of pr ior ba d a c ts, this Court m ay

assume that some pre

judice potentially i n h ere d,” the district cour t’s limit ing instructions helped to ensure that Cook would not be unfairly prejudice d by

the 404(b) e vidence
. Lattner , 385 F.3d at 958; se e als o Un ite d Sta te s v . I sm ail , 7 5 6 F
. 2 d 1 2 5 3 , 1 2 5 9 ( 6 t h C i r . 1 9 8 5 )
. In sum, the probative va lue of the e vidence of the 2002 a rre st was not subs tantially outweig hed by

the dang er of unfair pr ejudice.
For these re asons, t h e d i s t ri ct cour t did not err in admitting e vidence of Cook’s pre vious
arr est under Rule 404( b). 1No. 07-5860

USA v. Cook

- 18 - C.
F ina lly , th e dis tr ic t c ourt

c omm itt e d n o e rr or , p la in or ot herw ise , b y no t g ivi nga

sp e c if ic unanimity

ins t ruction t o the jury

with respec t to the felon-in-posse ssion charg e. B eca use Cook fa ile d to ob

je c t to the dis tr ic t c ourt ’s jur y ins tr uc tio ns re g ard ing the fe lon -i n- po sse ssi on c ount, his claim is review ed for

plain err or. “To e stablish plain error , a defe ndant must show (1) that an e rror
occur red in the di s t ri ct court; (2) that the er ror wa s plain, i.e., obvious or clea r; (3) that the err or aff ecte d d e f e n d an t’ s s u

b s ta n ti a l r ig h ts ; an d ( 4 ) th a t th is a d v e r s e im p a c t s e r io u s ly a f

f e c te d the f a ir n e s s , in te g r it

y o r p u b li c r e p u tati o n o f th e ju d ic ia l p r o c e e d in g s.” Uni ted Sta te s v . S c hu lte , 264 F.3d 656, 660 ( 6th Cir. 2001).
Cook c laims that the district c ourt should ha ve specific ally instructed the jury that they wer e require d to ag ree unanimously as t o which of the firearms and ammunition charg ed in the indictment Cook possessed befor e they could convict Cook on the felon-in- possession count. Although Cook acknow ledg es that, in g ener al, such a specific unanimity instruction is not necessar y , Cook contends that the fa ctual sce nario in this ca s e cre ated a g enuine r isk that Cook was convicted by differ ent jurors for differ ent ac ts. Cook bases this a rg ument on two fac ts: (1) at the time that ag ents sear ched his apartment, a

fema le was pr esent, a

nd (2) the .357 c artridg es cha rg ed in the i ndictment wer e found in a jewe lry

box . I n light of the se fa cts, Cook argues t hat t here was “ a potential for one or more juror to convict [Cook] based on the .357 car t ri d ges , b ut for y et another juror to re

ject the e vidence of [C ook] being in possession of t he .357 bullets but find that he was in possession of the .22 rif le or t h e s h o t gu ns h el l s . ” C o o k ’s ar gu m en ti s u n av ai l i n g.No. 07-5860

USA v. Cook

- 19 - This court has pr eviously addre ssed the issue of a specif ic unanimity

instruction in the context of a single count that cha rg es possession of multiple firea rms. “The fac t-specif

ic rule is that no unanimity

instruction is required w here multipl e fire arms cha rg ed in a sing le count we re discovere d as par

t of the same tr ansac tion.” United States v. De John , 368 F.3d 533, 540 ( 6th Cir. 2 0 0 4 ) ( ci t i n g United States v. Sims , 975 F .2 d 1 22 5, 12 40 -4 1 ( 6th Cir . 1 99 2) ). As Coo k p oin ts o ut, DeJ ohn acknow ledg ed an e x ception esta blished in Sims for c ases whe re “ a g enuine r isk [ exis ts] that the jury is confused or

that a convic tion may

occur as the re sult of differ ent jurors c oncluding that a def endant c ommitt ed diffe rent a cts.” Id. (q u o t i n g Sims , 975 F.2d at 1241) (a lteration in orig inal). But such a

case is not prese nt here
. The indictment cha rg ed Cook with possessing a .22 caliber

rifle, .357 mag num car

tridg es, and shotg un shells. Testimony at trial established that office rs re cover ed
a .2 2 ca lib e r ri fl e , .35 7 mag num cart ri dg e s, and sh otgun sh e lls wh ile se arc hin g Coo k’ s a pa rtme nt. Offic ers a lso recove red a utilit y bill, apartment lea se, an d another document, all bea

ring Cook’s name. Conseque ntly , this case is not so complex that there exis ted a “ chanc e of jury confusion or of dif fe r i n g o u t c o m e s w i t h r e g ar d t o ” t h e a m m u n i t i o nan d

f i r e ar m s l o c a t e d

i n C o o k ’ s a p art m e n t. Sims , 9 75 F .2 d at 12 41 . Co ok c ann ot c re a te c omple xity by me re ly hig hli g hti ngthe fa c ts that a fe ma le wa s p re se nt in the a pa rtme nt wh e n the wa

rr ant w a s e xec ute d a

nd that th e .3 57 ma g num sh e lls
wer e found in a

jewelr y box . The fa ct re mains that the ammunition and we ap o n charg ed in the ind ic tme nt w e re a ll l oc a te d in th e same sin g le -r oo m a pa rtme nt, and

the e vid e nc e su ff

ic ie ntl y
e sta bli sh e d that Coo k ha d do min ion ov e r that a pa rtme nt. B e c a

us e the a mmunit ion and fi rearms char g ed in the sing le count we re a ll discovered a s part of the same tra nsacti o n , the district court committed no err or by

not givinga spec ific unanimity instruction. Cf. United St ates v. Roac h , No.No. 07-5860

USA v. Cook

- 20 - 93-5776, 1994 WL276729, at *1-*2 (4th Cir. June 21, 1994) (finding no err or i n failing to g ive a specific unanimity

instruction where three wea pons char g ed in the i n d ic tm e nt w e r e f o und in differ ent place s in defenda

nt’s apar tment and wher e def

endant’ s g irlfriend ha d testified that she possessed one of those we apons).
III .
F or the fo re g oin g re a so ns , w e a ff ir m.