## THE ATTORNEY GENERAL OF TEKAS
**AUNTIN.** - 16711

July 10, 1974
The Honorable Norman Manning County Attorney Williamson County Georgetown, Texas 78626 Opinion No. **H-** 343 Re: Whether a district court may designate the **county** attorney as registry ofthe **court** to receive child rupport paymentr. Dear Mr. Manning:

You have requested our opinion an to whether a district court may designate anyone other than the district clerk amregistry of the court to receive child support payments and, if so, whether the county attorney may be so designated. You alro ask whether acounty attorney has any duty to act under the Uniform Reciprocal Enforcement ofSupport Act, 5021.01 et meq.,Family Code, V.T. C.S.

In ajudicial district or county not having a domestic relation0 court, the district court generally exercises jurisdiction in cages of divorce and in other cases which may affect the parent-child relationship. Articles 1906, 1907, V. T. C.S., and see §ll.Ol, Family Code, V.T. C.S. Section 14.05 ofthe Family Code provides that in such cases the court may order either or both parents to make periodic payments or a lump-sum payment, or both, for the support ofthe child until he is 18 years of age “in the manner and to the persons specified bythe court in the decree. I’ This provision confers broad discretion upon the district court in determining towhom child support payments will be made, and under it the court ,mayappoint someone other than the district clerk to ;;;;;-*-‘; such payments.

You ask whether the county attorney could be appointed in that capacity to receive child support payments. The Texas Constitution in

p. 1601’ The Honorable Norman Manning page 2 (H-343)

Art. 5. s21provides that where a county is included in a district in which there is a district attorney the respective duties ofthe district attorney and county attorney are to be regulated. by the Legislature. The courtn have taken the position that byvirtue of this provision the powers ofa county attorney are strictly limited and thata county attorney has no authority toperform an act in respect towhich nodutyhas been made to devolve uponhim by the Legislature. Duncan v. State, 67S.W. 903 (Tex. Civ. App. 1902, nowrit): see also A.B. C. Rendering, Inc. v. State, 342 S.W. 2d 345 (Tex. Civ. App., Houston, 1961,nowrit) and Wexler v. State, 241S.W. 231(Tex. Civ. App., Galveston, 1922, nowrit).

The primary duty assigned to county attorneys by the Legislature is to represent the state in all criminal proceedings under examination in **courts** in their respective counties below the grade of district court. Art. 2.02, V.T. C. C.P. As a rerult the county attorney ordinarily is obligated to represent the state in a prosecution for the class A mirdemeanor of criminal nonsupport. See 025.05, V.T. P. C.

Butto our knowledge there is no statute or other law which gives the county attorney the duty to receive child support payments ordered by a court under 314.05 ofthe Family Code. Since the legislature has never given the county attorney the duty to receive such payments, it is our opinion thathe is not authorized to do so and that a district court may not confer this rerponsibility uponhim.

Your third and final question is whether a county attorney has any duty to act under the Uniform Reciprocal Enforcement ofSupport Act, §021.01et seq., Family Code, V. T. C.S. InAttorney General Opinion C-636 (1966) this office held that when there was also a district attorney in his county a county attorney had no duty toact as prosecuting attorney under the Uniform Reciprocal Enforcement ofSupport Act as then written. But in 1973the 63rd Legislature enacted a new version ofthat Act which changed the definition of “prosecuting attorney” uponwhich that opinion was founded. Under the current version ofthe Act “prosecuting attorney” is defined in 521.03 (15)as “the criminal district attorney or county attorney, or the district attorney where there is no criminal district attorney or county **attorney. ”**  Thus, when there is no criminal district attorney, as in

p, 1602The Honorable Norman Manning page 3 -(H-343)

Williamson County, the county attorney nowbar theduty to act as “proaecuting attorney” in proceedings brought under the Uniform Reciprocal Enforcement ofSupport Act. See Seer. 21.26 and 21.33, Family Code, V.T. C.S. SUMMARY While 014.05 ofthe Family Code confera broad discretion upon the district court in determining to whom child support payments will be made, the court may not require the county attorney in that capacity to receive such payments. In proceedings under the Uniform Reciprocal Enforcement ofSupport Act the county attorney of Williamson County har the duty to act as “prosecuting attorney. ” Very t?y&

f JOHN L. HILL Attorney General ofTexas

DAVID M. KENDALL. Chairman Opinion Committee

p. 1603