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AIR WAR COLLEGE

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Military Culture

A Paradigm Shift?

KAREN O. DUNIVIN

Lieutenant Colonel, USAF

Air War College

Maxwell Paper No. 10

MAXWELL AIR FORCE BASE, ALABAMA

February 1997
DISCLAIMER

This publication was produced in the Department of Defense school environme

the interest of academic freedom and the advancement of national defense re

concepts. The views expressed in this publication are those of the author an

not reflect the official policy or position of the Department of Defense or the U

States government.

This publication has been reviewed by security and policy review authorities a

cleared for public release.

ii
Foreword

In this study, Lt Col Karen O. Dunivin, USAF, exa

ines social change in American military culture and 

plores the current struggle between the military’s tra

tional and exclusionary combat, masculine-warr

(CMW) paradigm or belief system and the contradict

evolving model of military culture characterized by eg

tarianism and inclusiveness. It is a contest between 

thinking and new thinking. The author uses two rec

and ongoing cases to illustrate the divergence betwe

paradigm and model: women in combat and homosex

als in the military.

Colonel Dunivin also examines the long-term conf

within US military culture, suggesting that the Ame

can military is now, once again, undergoing a cultu

paradigm shift—moving away from its traditional CM

beliefs and values of exclusion toward an inclusion

view of soldiering. Assuming that the US military 

tively seeks to create a paradigm shift for its cultur

as evidenced by the evolving model of culture—

author argues the US armed forces must, in the p

cess, reduce their tendencies toward separatism and 

clusiveness. She suggests three strategies for imp

menting a paradigm shift: alter the military’s prevail

combat, masculine image and identity which fosters 

clusion rather than inclusion; proactively embrace a

manage ongoing, major social change; and accept b

institutional and individual commitment and respon

bility for this paradigm shift. Specifically, paradigm p

neers must foster a culture of inclusion and egalitaria

ism. Colonel Dunivin also argues that senior US milit

leaders are the best catalysts to produce a US milit

paradigm shift—they are the true pioneers who can 

stitutionalize a cultural paradigm embodied by an inc

sive whole rather than a paradigm personified by 

exclusive few. But senior leadership must act clea

iii
and decisively and ensure that training, monitoring, a

teamwork accompany their decisions.

Colonel Dunivin concludes that if America expects 

military to reflect society, it is imperative that the m

tary adopt an inclusionary cultural paradigm.

D. BRUCE SMITH

Major General, US

Commandant

Air War College

iv
About the Author

Lt Col Karen O. Dunivin is a military sociolog

whose previous positions include personnel analyst 

the Office of the Secretary of Defense, an associate p

fessor at the US Air Force Academy, and a logist

planner at strategic bomber bases. She earned her P

degree from Northwestern University. Colonel Dunivin 

a 1996 graduate of the Air War College.

v
Military Culture

A Paradigm Shift?

An old world is collapsing and a new world is arising

We have better eyes for the collapse than for the rise

for the old one is the world we know.

—John Updik

In my 1994 article on military culture, I used the an

lytical tools of paradigm and model* to review ongo

change and continuity in the American military cultu

At the risk of oversimplification, Military Culture: A Pa

digm Shift? extends my initial work. First, I briefly summ

rize the previous article. Second, I examine the grow

divergence between the military’s evolving, inclusion

model of culture and its traditional combat, masculi

warrrior (CMW) paradigm from two perspectives: the sho

term battle and the long-term war. This paper illustra

the paradigm/model battle with two recent case stud

women in combat and homosexuals in uniform. Third, 

discussion of the long-term struggle concerning the CM

paradigm raises this question: Is military culture under

ing a fundamental paradigm shift?

If we assume so, then the recommendation in this pa

of the strategies for a successful paradigm shift tow

inclusion must be adopted.

In “Military Culture: Change and Continuity,” it is 

served that the American military continues to unde

fundamental social change, evident by an emerging s

between its traditional cultural paradigm and its evolv

model.2

 I explained how paradigms are important becau

as fundamental belief systems, they shape the types 

models (representations of reality) we create to organ

and explain our social world. That article specifically 

scribed how the CMW paradigm is the foundation of 

US military culture—it influences how the US milit

*Paradigm is defined as the underlying collection of broad, often unst

assumptions, beliefs, and attitudes that shape peoples or organizat

views. Models are representations, usually by means of simplificatio

in miniature, of reality.

1
views soldiering and how it equips and trains its force

Further, it was noted that the military’s core activity (i

raison d’être) is combat—its primary job is to fight and w

wars. Soldiering was viewed primarily as a masculine r

because combat has generally been defined as me

work.4

 Consequently, a deeply entrenched cult of mas

linity (i.e., masculine norms, values, and lifestyles) p

vades US military culture.5

However, to survive and thrive in a dynamic world, c

ture must adapt to changing conditions. Two cultural m

els, the traditional and the evolving, currently operating 

the US military are described in table 1. 6

 The traditio

model is characterized by social conservatism, a homo

neous, predominantly male force with masculine val

and norms, and exclusionary laws and practices. In form

times, the traditional model of military culture comp

mented the CMW paradigm. Thus military culture w

characterized by exclusion—minorities and women w

routinely excluded from military service or limited in th

participation.7

 From its gender-segregated worldview, 

US military maintained distinct gender roles (i.e., approp

ate masculine and feminine behaviors) and restric

women to a limited sphere of military service. 8

 The milit

also banned homosexuals, rationalizing that homosexu

ity was incompatible with military service. 9

At the other end of the spectrum is an evolving mo

characterized by social egalitarianism, a socially hetero

Table 1

US Military Culture

Cultural Variable Traditional Model Evolving Model

Ethnics/Customs Conservatism, Moralism Conservatism, Morali

Enculturation Combat, Masculine

 Warrior

Combat, Masculine

 Warrior

Laws/Policies Exclusion Inclusion

Force Structure Homogeneity Heterogeneity

Attitudes Separatism Egalitarianism

Majority/Minority

 Interactions Hostility Tolerance

2 MILITARY CULTURE
neous force with diverse values and norms, and inclusi

ary laws and policies.10 The 1994 article chronicles t

incremental inclusion by describing the integration 

blacks into the military after World War II. In 1973 

draft was abolished and the US military had to field a fo

of volunteer soldiers. Consequently, the military servi

adopted more inclusionary practices, increasing 

number and proportion of minorities and women in u

form. Table 2 highlights this incremental inclusion of oth

into military service.

Table 2

Incremental Inclusion of Others

1940 Blacks were accepted into training for Army Air Forces.

1942 Navy opened up more career fields (other than steward occupatio

to blacks.

1948 President Harry S. Truman issued Executive Order 9981,

mandating the integratioin of blacks in the military.

1948

Congress passed the Women’s Armed Services Integration Act,

which established a permanent but separate women’s corps in th

military services.

1951 Defense Advisory Committee on Women in the Services

(DACOWITS) was established.

1963

Department of Defense (DOD) established civil rights office and

directed each military service to develop internal civil rights

monitoring systems.

1967

Public Law 90-130 removed the statutory ceiling on the number o

military women (2 percent) and grade limitation (one line colonel

per each service).

1972 Reserve Officer Training Corps (ROTC) admitted women.

1973 Flight training opened to Army and Navy women; Air Force in 197

1974 DOD rescinded its policy which involuntarily separated pregnant

servicewomen.

1976 Military service academies admitted women.

1977 Army began coeducational basic training of women and men

recruits (the Army returned to separate training in 1982).

1977 Air Force assigned the first women to Titan missile launch control

crews.

1978 Public Law 95-485 abolished the Women’s Army Corps (WAC),

fully integrating women into the Regular Army.

1978 First Navy women reported for sea duty aboard USS Vulcan.

DUNIVIN 
While both models of military culture simultaneou

operate in today’s US armed forces, the evolving mo

suggests where the trends of change in military culture 

headed. Moreover, it was concluded that the evolv

model contradicts the military’s entrenched CMW pa

digm; thus we see conflict between cultural continuity (e

bodied by the CMW paradigm and its traditional mode

exclusion) and cultural change (personified by the evolv

model of diversity and inclusion).11 The CMW paradig

however, remains the key to military culture because 

assumptions and beliefs shape both models.

The Battle

The present battle is between the military’s emerg

evolving model of culture which is out of sync with 

underlying CMW paradigm (and complementary traditio

model of culture). Two recent cases vividly illustrate t

dilemma between the CMW paradigm and the evolv

model: women in combat and homosexuals in the milita

Table 2—continued

1980

DOD issued its first sexual harassment policy statement (in 1981

the SecDef issued a memorandum emphasizing that sexual

harassment was unacceptable conduct).

1981 DOD issued a policy that banned homosexuals from military servi

1985 Air Force assigned the first women to Minuteman/Peacekeeper

missile launch crews.

1989 Servicewomen participated in Operation Just Cause.

1990–

1991

More than 40,000 women participated in Operations Desert Shield

and Desert Storm, many in nontraditional roles. Two women were

prisoners of war and five women died due to hostile action.

1993

SecDef directed the military services to open combat aircraft and

ships to women. Congress repealed laws prohibiting women from

assignment aboard combatant vessels.

1993 SecDef directed implementation of “Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell” policy

allowing discreet homosexuals to serve in the military.

1994

Since SecDef Memo, DOD opened an additional 260,000 position

to women. Today 80 percent (versus 67 percent before SecDef

Memo) of military positions are open to women.

4 MILITARY CULTURE
These two issues are particularly contentious because b

reflect and symbolize ongoing social change that cont

dicts and undermines the military’s traditional CMW pa

digm.

Women in Combat

During Operations Desert Shield (1990) and Desert Sto

(1991) more than 40,000 US servicewomen served in 

Persian Gulf War. Similar to their male colleagues, wom

performed their military roles professionally and served th

country with distinction. Shortly after the war, former sec

tary of defense Richard B. Cheney made the declaration t

“women have made a major contribution to this [war] eff

We could not have won without them.” 12

After the war, both US society and Congress question

whether American women should perform combat ro

From this public debate evolved the 1991 Defense Authori

tion Act (or Public Law 102-190) that, among other thin

created a presidential commission to “assess the laws a

policies restricting the assignment of female serviceme

bers.”13 As a compromise between liberal senators (w

wanted to repeal exclusionary laws restricting women fr

flying combat aircraft) and conservative senators (w

wanted to continue excluding military women from all co

bat roles), the commission was formed to study the leg

military, and societal implications of amending the exclusi

ary laws. Over the next year, the commission conducted 

exhaustive study of the complex and emotional issue of d

assignments available to servicewomen, including com

roles. In its 1992 report to the president and Congress, 

commission identified 17 relevant issues, made recomm

dations, and summarized its findings drawn from extens

testimony, reports, and site visits.

Analysis of the commission (both its process and its 

port) demonstrates the fundamental battle between 

military’s CMW paradigm and its evolving cultural mode

Content analysis of the report indicates that the membe

for the most part, came to their commission duties w

entrenched values and beliefs (i.e., a dominant paradig

about the role of women in the military and comba

Often, their values and beliefs were rooted in a fundam

DUNIVIN 
tal ideology about the role of women in society, includ

work and family. Like society’s polarization over this iss

there were two dichotomized camps. Typically, tradition

ists viewed women in limited societal and military ro

while evolutionists saw women in expanded nontraditio

roles, including combat arms.

In turn, the commissioners’ prisms shaped their ana

ses. For example, if traditionalists assumed that wom

generally were the weaker sex, their conception of milit

culture was one where servicewomen were rightfully re

gated to support roles because their participation (es

cially in combat) degraded the military’s mission readin

and war-fighting capability. In short, they favored a tra

tional model of military culture (see table 1). Convers

evolutionists, who generally viewed women as an eq

sex, constructed a conception of military culture in wh

they expected women to be full partners of defense. A

thing short of total equal opportunity and responsibil

including combat, was considered discrimination.

The commissioners’ analyses reflected these contrad

tory perceptual sets. Drawing from the military’s CM

paradigm, traditionalists tended to view women as anom

lies who did not fit conventional images of combat or 

masculine warrior. Their reality was a military wh

women were peripheral figures, especially in war. For 

ample, one commissioner, Brig Gen Samuel G. Cock

ham, USA, Retired, cited military necessity (i.e., natio

security, combat readiness, and mission accomplishme

as the primary consideration when deciding an accepta

role of women in the military. He apparently viewed wom

as detrimental to military necessity when he wrote t

“the introduction of female personnel into the direct co

bat environment . . . is a giant distraction that would 

duce the effectiveness of combat units across the boar

believe an all-male combat force is the most effective o

and that the current policy of excluding women fr

‘closed’ positions be retained.”16

Likewise, Ms. Elaine Donnelly espoused very traditio

views about women in combat, constantly opposing a

changes to existing exclusionary laws and policies. S

wrote in her commissioner statement that “the Americ

6 MILITARY CULTURE
military is the finest in the world, and we have an obli

tion to keep it that way.” 17 Her unstated assumption is t

women undermine mission effectiveness.

Ronald D. Ray also reflected the traditional CMW pa

digm in his statement, “Battles and wars for thousands 

years have involved armies of men. . . . No military 

history has willingly chosen to send women as combata

. . . because men are inherently better designed for su

savage activity.”18 Mr. Ray defended his universal male s

dier paradigm with biblical scripture. “The military laws 

the Old Testament specified the age and gender of com

soldiers: ‘All able-bodied men twenty years old and up w

eligible for military service (Numbers 1:2, 3, 18, 29, 

26:2, 3).’’’19 Mr. Ray quoted Peter in the Bible (3:7) when 

wrote, “Peter, in calling women ‘the weaker vessel,’ d

not berate or demean her, but simply acknowledges biol

and self-evident realty [sic].”20 Obviously this comm

sioner, steeped in biblical law and military tradition, fu

embraced the military’s CMW paradigm supported by 

culture of exclusion.

Finally, the well-respected commissioner, Gen Maxw

R. Thurman, USA, Retired, endorsed the CMW paradigm

He supported exclusion of women from ground combat 

two reasons: increased chance for casualties and increa

sexual activity among members of mixed-sex units (cit

reported experiences from Operations Desert Shield a

Desert Storm). He also favored exclusion of women from 

combat citing women’s risk of capture and subsequent t

ture as prisoners of war. His statement reflects Gene

Thurman’s paternalistic attitude toward women. Likely, 

comes from the traditional school where men prot

women at work, home, and in society. Like other conser

tive commissioners, General Thurman embraced a tra

tional paradigm (or view) of soldiering which, by definiti

excludes women from combat, therefore protecting them

The selection of the 15 members also reflected a cons

vative/liberal fissure. As a politicized body, members w

chosen primarily for their ideology. For example, Dr. Char

C. Moskos (a renowned military sociologist) was a w

known friend of the more traditional Army ethos, shar

its conservative view of servicewomen’s roles. Other hig

DUNIVIN 
qualified social scientists who were less politically or id

logically biased (at least publicly) were available to serve 

the commission; yet they were not chosen. Similarly, Pre

dent George H. Bush appointed two staunch conservat

women. Barton Gellman reported that “when Bush form

the commission, he dropped supporters of women in co

bat from a list of panelists proposed by Defense Secret

Richard B. Cheney and, over Cheney’s objections, add

Kate Walsh O’Beirne of the Heritage Foundation a

Elaine Donnelly of Phyllis Schlafly’s Eagle Forum, acco

ing to sources involved in the selection.” 22

On the other end of the ideological spectrum were m

liberal or egalitarian thinkers such as Meredith A. Neize

former chairwoman of the Defense Advisory Committee 

Women in the Services (DACOWITS). Another memb

Capt Mary M. Finch, USA, probably had experienced so

institutional exclusion during her military career as 

Army helicopter pilot. Similar to conservative membe

these evolutionists likely held strong (but contrary) op

ions about appropriate roles for military women.

Given such strong paradigm roots, the commission’s 

jectivity was suspect—for some commissioners impartia

was not a priority. Certain members came to the comm

sion with entrenched assumptions and ideas (i.e., a pa

digm) about the role of women in military, and their ana

ses and votes reflected prejudicial beliefs and opinio

(whether conservative or liberal) rather than object

analysis of relevant issues or information provided.

As a result of this paradigm chasm, some commissi

ers complained about a lack of objectivity. In his comm

sioner statement, Brig Gen Thomas Draude, USMC, wr

about his frustration.

I reported to the Commission with an open mind regarding th

question of the proper role of women in combat. . . . I took my oath

eagerly and listened carefully to the charge of our Chairman: t

evaluate objectively the evidence . . . I believe, however, tha

objectivity was not the goal of every Commissioner. Some arrived

with a pre-determined agenda and sought to sway the Commission

in their direction. They displayed their bias in their questions, thei

comments, and their absences during testimony with which the

disagreed.23

Another commissioner, Maj Gen Mary E. Clarke, USA, 

tired, expressed frustration as well.

8 MILITARY CULTURE
I accepted the appointment . . . because I believed my experience

serving in the United States Army from WWII until 1981 would

enable me to assess objectively the proper roles for women in th

Armed Forces today. Early on in the deliberations, it became clea

that a number of the Commissioners had come with a set agend

and no amount of facts or testimony would change their minds fo

expanding opportunities for women in the military. This was eviden

in their questioning techniques . . . absenting themselves when the

knew testimony would not support their views, and their insistenc

upon using equal opportunity as a red herring rather than

recognizing women’s capabilities and contributions to the militar

services. . . . Finally, I would comment on those Commissioners

presumably professional adults, who walked out on the rest of th

Commission because they were out-voted on their proposal to amen

the agenda. . . . I believe this action, on their part, impacts on thei

credibility, objectivity, and fairness, and gives credence to the belie

that their minds were made up from the first. 24

The commission reflected society’s division over the 

sue of women in combat. As a politicized decision-mak

body, the commission’s report reflected this ideologi

clash. For example, the report (excluding appendices

121 pages. Section I (“Issues and Recommendations”) id

tified 17 issues and made specific recommendations ba

on the majority vote of the 15 commissioners. This 41-p

section is the heart of the report and reflected the comm

sion’s official findings and recommendations. Interestin

the commission resorted to majority vote rather than c

sensus for their recommendations—they could not rea

consensus because of their divisive paradigms.

The other two sections (Section II, “Alternative View

and Section III, “Commissioner Statements”) reflected d

senting voices by both traditionalists and evolutionis

Section II (38 pages) began with a letter to President Bu

from five traditionalists who offered an alternative view 

the commissioner’s report. The summary emphasized th

adamant opposition to women in combat. Their letter 

President Bush reflected the CMW paradigm, evident 

their concluding remarks. “The Commission learned t

assigning women to combat would adversely affect a s

cessful military. . . . Most importantly, it would overtu

two centuries of settled law and military policy based 

deeply held and commonly shared cultural assumptio

defining how men should treat women. . . . The Arm

Forces should not assign women to combat.” 25

DUNIVIN 
Section III (42 pages) presented the commissione

statements. One statement by seven evolutionists oppo

the recommendation to exclude women from combat 

craft. There were similar statements of dissent with reg

to excluding women from ground combat (three comm

sioners) and amphibious vessels and submarines (sev

commissioners). The report’s first 41 pages provided 

commission’s relatively short official findings, followed 

extensive dissension (80 pages) from both traditional

and evolutionists. Obviously, there was tremendous id

logical disagreement among the politicized commission

as reflected by a report that presents more dissension th

consensus.

Finally, there was the infamous incident where five t

ditionalists walked out of the final deliberation proces

In response to persuasive argument for women in air co

bat, these commissioners staged a walkout in a success

effort to gain control over portions of the commissio

final report by demanding that their opposition on wom

in combat be inserted as part of the final report, su

sequently Section II.27 Such public demonstrations in

cate an overwhelming (and likely dysfunctional) level 

strife among commissioners and the politicized nature 

this commission. It also reflects a genuine concern 

some commissioners about the impartiality of the comm

sion’s findings and report. For example, the chair (G

Robert T. Herres, USAF, Retired) told the commission

shortly before their final vote on women in naval com

(and after the commission had voted to bar women fr

both ground and air combat) that “. . . our report will 

ignored if it rejects any change in status quo.” 28 After fi

deliberations and voting, the only two active duty comm

sioners expressed contempt for the traditional majo

who, in their view, displayed persistent prejudice throu

out the process. Marine general Draude complained t

Ms. Donnelly “uses facts the way a drunk uses a lamppo

not for illumination but for support.” 29

The commission epitomizes the ongoing paradig

model battle over the issue of women in combat. The co

mission’s membership composition, decision-making pr

ess, and final report reflect a deep division between 

10 MILITARY CULTURE
evolving model of culture characterized by inclusion a

the traditional CMW paradigm characterized by exclusi

This clash of polarized worldviews is why the commiss

was formed; the issue was further politicized by the co

mission’s actions.

Although the paradigm/model battle over women 

combat is contentious, this conflict is relatively ben

compared to the embittered controversy over homosexu

in uniform. In fact, some could argue that integration 

women into combat has been helped by the debate o

gays in uniform.30 Gays represent a new minority wh

exclusion (compared to women’s exclusion) is more imp

tant to military men. Therefore, some military leaders m

compromise—allow women in air and naval combat 

exclude open gays from military service.

Homosexuals in the Military

The debate over homosexuals in the US military rep

sents the breaking point between the military’s domin

CMW paradigm and the evolving model. While Americ

military culture (as expressed by inclusionary laws a

policies) has begun to accept women to some degree, th

remains adamant opposition to open homosexuals serv

in uniform. In its study of homosexuals in the milita

RAND concluded that “the prevailing attitudes of both 

[military] leadership and many personnel are hostile to a

change” (i.e., lifting the ban on gays). 31

This hostile attitude is not surprising in the context 

the military’s CMW paradigm. The US military defines it

as a combat, masculine-warrior organization—a char

terization that, by definition, excludes members who 

not perform combat roles (i.e., many women) or who 

not perceived as masculine (gay men). From its CMW pa

digm, military culture fosters traditional gender roles (i

distinct masculine and feminine roles) and embraces h

erosexuality. In her study of Army soldiers, Laura L. Mi

concluded that military men “are unwilling to relinqu

the assumption of universal heterosexuality that gui

their behavior for everyday interaction.”32

Some observers even argue that the military promo

male hyper-heterosexuality especially in its combat arm

DUNIVIN 
M. C. Devilbiss described military aviation as a subcult

with a flyboy mythos characterized by the “hard-chargi

hard drinking, skirt chasing, arrogant conqueror” wh

male hyper-heterosexuality is the ideal to emulate. 34 

long as the military retains its CMW worldview, it will ve

mently resist integrating gays (whom are stereotypic

perceived as effeminate homosexual men) because gays 

viewed by many as moral anomalies who do not fit the m

tary’s image (or paradigm) of masculine combatants.

Until the Clinton administration, there was little supp

for gays in the military. The prevailing DOD policy (adop

in 1981) explicitly proclaimed this nonsupport. “Hom

sexuality is incompatible with military service. The pr

ence in the military environment of persons who engage 

homosexual conduct or who, by their statements, dem

strate a propensity to engage in homosexual conduct, s

ously impairs the accomplishment of the military m

sion.”35 The policy made no distinction betwe

homosexual status (i.e., sexual orientation) and actual s

ual conduct. Although a few individual gays legally ch

lenged their dismissal based upon DOD policy, the cou

traditionally deferred to the military on personnel matte

even when certain laws and policies were discriminatory

While the CMW paradigm remains steadfast, some so

change (i.e., the evolving model) has been observed. Pub

attitudes about homosexuals reflect some level of to

ance, especially in the context of the workplace. 37 Ther

a paradox in public attitudes toward homosexuals. Wh

surveys frame the question of homosexuality as a mo

issue, most Americans do not approve nor accept hom

sexuality, and this trend remains constant. In its literat

review on the topic, RAND found that in the last two d

ades, 70 to 75 percent of the American public consisten

respond that homosexuality is wrong.38 There is gene

disapproval and nonacceptance of homosexuality as an 

ternative lifestyle.

When framed as a civil rights principle, however, op

ions about homosexuality are more tolerant. In recent s

veys, approximately 80 percent of the American public 

lieves homosexuals should not be discriminated agains

the workplace.39 When asked about gays in military se

12 MILITARY CULTURE
ice, there is more divided opinions. Recent surveys sh

40 to 60 percent of Americans approve of homosexu

serving in the military. One poll shows only 21 percent 

polled respondents said that homosexuals “should not 

allowed to serve under any conditions.” 40 In response 

the statement, “homosexuality is incompatible with m

tary service,” 48 percent of the polled American pub

agree; 49 percent disagree.41 However, support decli

(40–45 percent) when asked if open gays should be allow

to serve. Finally, approximately 57 percent disapprove 

ending the ban on gays. RAND concluded that “the Am

can public remains divided on this issue [allowing hom

sexuals in the military].”42

Although the American public is more ambivalent ab

gays in the military, service members overwhelmingly 

pose lifting the ban on gays. A 1993 survey of milit

opinion found 74 percent of military respondents dis

prove of removing the military ban on homosexuals. 43 

surprising, more men (76 percent) disapprove of lifting 

ban than women (55 percent), more combat arms memb

(80 percent) than support members (64 percent). It is 

portant to note, however, that this disapproval is not u

versal and is likely a change from former times if compa

tive survey data were available.

In addition to an evident gradual shift in attitudes, th

has been some erosion of legal support for the militar

ban on gays. In 1993 a federal appeals court ruled that 

armed forces cannot exclude military members solely 

cause of their sexual status.44 The US Court of Appeals 

Washington, D.C., ordered that a former US Naval Ac

emy midshipman be graduated from the academy, co

missioned as an officer, and reinstated into military se

ice. “America’s hallmark has been to judge people by w

they do, and not by who they are . . . a court need not clo

its eyes to the dictates of the Constitution whenever 

military is involved. . . . There is no ‘military exception

the Constitution.”45 The Clinton administration’s s

sequent decision not to appeal this judicial decision s

gests a retreat of sorts from the new policy. 46 Perhaps 

inaction quietly demonstrates the administration’s le

than-enthusiastic support and defense of a policy t

DUNIVIN 
President William J. Clinton pledged to overturn. In 

other 1993 decision by New York’s Supreme Court, m

tary recruiters were banned from the law school at St

University of New York and presumably from all pub

schools and universities in New York. 47 The court ru

that the military’s homosexual ban violates New York’s b

on discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation by a

state agency.

Consequently, there is a slight shift toward inclusion 

gays in uniform despite the military’s relentless oppositi

The most obvious change is the current military poli

“Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell, Don’t Pursue.” 48 Enacted in 19

this policy allows discreet (i.e., closet) homosexuals 

serve in the military without fear of prosecution and d

charge. As a compromise between the conservative milit

culture and more liberal factions of American society, 

military will not ask service members (or applicants) ab

their sexuality. In turn, gay members cannot procla

their homosexual status nor engage in homosexual acts 

at least don’t get caught) while in the military.

Theoretically the military and discreet, abstinent hom

sexuals will coexist peacefully. Practically, however, 

policy will fail because inclusion of gays contradicts a

undermines the military’s CMW paradigm. Phrased dif

ently, there is a lag between the evolving model of cult

(as expressed by greater inclusionary policies and pr

tices) and the military’s dominant paradigm (as expres

by CMW norms, values, and attitudes). Therefore, cert

individuals and organizations will work feverishly to u

dermine the unpopular policy because it contradicts th

fundamental CMW paradigm in which homosexuals (es

cially gay men) do not fit the stereotypic warrior ima

Already there is evidence of this circumvention. The fi

version of the policy (enacted into law on 30 Novem

1993) reflected Congress’s successful codification of a m

restrictive policy than envisioned by President Clinton 

proposed by Les Aspin, former secretary of defense. 49 A

recently, former congressman Bob Dornan successfu

worked to pass legislation that discharges service memb

who test positive for the HIV virus. 50

14 MILITARY CULTURE
In the case of gays in military service, the CMW pa

digm will prevail, at least temporarily (depending on fi

judicial rulings and legislation). Similar to its long hist

of resistance to women in combat, the military will c

tinue to vigorously rebuff the integration of gays into 

ranks. For example, when President Clinton asked 

military to examine the impact of lifting the homosex

ban, two independent study groups were formed. The 

ternal group, led by senior military officers (all men), 

ported widespread hostility toward gays and recommend

no policy change. As noted by Thomas W. Lippman, t

group concluded that “all homosexuality is incompati

with military service.”51 This group embraced the sta

quo (i.e., retention of the outright ban that prohibits 

homosexuals from military service). However, since 

president’s directions precluded the status quo, the pa

reluctantly accepted the proposed “Don’t Ask, Don’t T

compromise where sexual orientation is considered a p

vate matter and not grounds for discharge.

In contrast, RAND’s 1993 study (a 518-page compreh

sive analysis) concluded that most of the concerns rega

ing gays in uniform were unfounded. 52 According to t

independent (and likely more objective) study, sexual 

entation, by itself, was not germane in determining w

may serve. RAND reported that the military could integr

gays into military service with little adverse impact on m

tary effectiveness or our nation’s defenses. RAND c

cluded that “such a policy [a successful policy to end d

crimination] emphasizes actual homosexual conduct, 

behavior presumed because of sexual orientation, a

holds all service members to the same standard of prof

sional conduct. It requires tolerance and restraint to fos

the good of the group, but implies no endorsement o

‘homosexual lifestyle.’”53

Not surprisingly, the CMW paradigm reigned supreme 

this particular battle between traditional paradigm and 

alternative model. In his analysis of the new policy, As

believed that “you need enthusiastic support in the se

ices in order to implement any kind of complicated soc

change.”54 Since the military services adamantly oppo

lifting the ban, RAND’s study was virtually ignored by 

DUNIVIN 
fense policy makers. “The RAND report seems to h

played no role in the formulation of the policy.” 55 While 

Washington Times acknowledged that the study was 

impressive research effort, it was not the paramount fac

in this issue. “The question of open gays serving in 

military is simply not going to be resolved on the basis 

‘systematic research and analysis.’ . . . It is one that m

be left . . . to the common sense and experience of th

who live, and die, with the exigencies of military service.

Some observers claimed that RAND’s study was su

pressed when its findings did not support the militar

antigay position. “The Defense Department now ackn

ledges that it covered up a $1.3 million study that show

gays could be readily absorbed into the armed forces wi

out jeopardizing military effectiveness. . . . The findin

[RAND’s] were conveniently ignored when they didn’t ag

with the tradition. . . . Another $1.3 million in tax mon

wasted.”57 RAND’s report was not released until the ne

media persistently asked for the report to compare it to 

military’s internal report.

Regardless of its future success or failure, the curr

homosexual conduct policy graphically illustrates the 

cremental progress of cultural change occurring in 

military culture and the ongoing battle between the m

tary’s traditional CMW paradigm and its evolving, inc

sionary model of culture. Until the military’s paradigm a

model of culture complement each other, the military w

continue to resist social change that it finds repulsive. 

multaneously, social activists will continue to shake 

foundation of military culture, chipping away at its exc

sionary policies toward homosexuals.

The debates regarding women in combat and gays 

uniform are microcosms of society’s battle over comp

and controversial social change. This battle will c

tinue—social change is inevitable thus problems (e.g., s

ism and gay bashing) will persist because the evolv

model contradicts and undermines the military’s unde

ing CMW paradigm or belief system. Although military c

ture has shifted toward greater inclusion of others, ma

military members still embrace a CMW paradigm and t

itly endorse excluding others who contradict their image 

16 MILITARY CULTURE
the combat, masculine warrior. Traditionalists will d

gently work to protect their world by resisting cultu

change reflected by the evolving model of military cultu

Conversely, evolutionists will passionately fight to prom

an egalitarian, inclusionary paradigm and instill soc

change in military culture.

The War

Although the current battle is between the military’s CM

paradigm and an evolving cultural model, the long-term w

centers around the paradigm. Will the military retain its t

ditional CMW paradigm or adopt an inclusionary view of s

diering, or will the military be a proactive agent of so

change or a reactive guardian of the status quo? The m

tary’s paradigm is the key to its cultural future.

Is the military undergoing a cultural paradigm shift

paradigm shift is a major change in a person’s wor

view—the way we see the world. 58 Paradigm shifts oc

when some major change causes us to view the world 

ferently. For example, Darwin’s theory of evolution force

paradigm shift in how a majority of academicians view h

man development, shifting from a paradigm of creationi

to evolutionism.59 Similarly, dramatic social change 

create a paradigm shift as illustrated by the American c

rights movement during the 1960s. From this volatile e

many Americans altered their views of blacks and r

relations, adopting a more egalitarian (versus racist) pa

digm of civil rights for all citizens.

Culture, however, is far more difficult to change th

structures because underlying cultural beliefs and a

tudes are more enduring than institutional structures t

are reflections of cultural values. The lag between cult

and structure is apparent in the US military’s process 

racial integration. Primarily in response to external pr

sures (e.g., President Truman’s executive order to racia

integrate the military, lawsuits, President Clinton’s dec

on lifting the homosexual ban, and changes in laws), m

tary structure has changed over time, allowing blac

women, and closet gays to serve in its ranks and perfo

nontraditional jobs. Yet traditional military culture, ep

DUNIVIN 
mized by the CMW paradigm, resists such inclusion, es

cially for gays in uniform. While attitudes toward women 

combat have softened somewhat (at least in some milit

circles), there remains adamant opposition to gays in u

form.

Regarding the inclusion of women in combat arms, 

military’s underlying CMW paradigm (and traditio

model) defines soldiering as a CMW role. Thus many p

ponents of a CMW prism assume a universal male mode

combatant and filter out women from their prism becau

women do not conform to their image of a combat, mas

line warrior. Of course, some observers argue that tra

tionalists have a distorted view of soldiering—nostalgic

mythical and simplistic given today’s complex and dive

military.60 Judith H. Stiehm argues that since the warr

role is synonymous with masculinity, the restriction 

women from this role becomes a priority for men who v

the combat, masculine warrior as a role exclusive to men

In turn, this paradigm can engender prejudice—throu

a CMW prism some people may view service women 

second-class citizens who do not share full responsibilit

of soldiering.62 As a group, women are judged prima

upon their ascribed status as women. Consequently, p

ple with a CMW paradigm mind-set see women essentia

as a gender class, not as warriors, peers, or even as in

viduals. It is a small leap from myopic cultural assum

tions about women as not real warriors to prejudice (e

stereotypic attitudes), discrimination (e.g., sexual hara

ment), and violence against perceived inferiors. 63 Con

quently, relational clashes (e.g., sexual harassment) 

persist. As long as the military (particularly its leade

narrowly defines soldiering as a CMW role, integrat

women will remain problematic because its CMW paradi

(universal male image of warrior) excludes women from 

cultural core, especially in combat. Tailhook ‘91 hi

lighted this dilemma, as Devilbiss points out. “The G

War showed what women could do given the opportun

while the Tailhook scandal pointed out graphically w

the underlying values and attitudes toward women in 

military actually were.”64

18 MILITARY CULTURE
Some observers argue that the military’s CMW paradi

is archaic because it represents a distorted view of sold

ing in today’s complex military.65 In her address befor

military conference, Cynthia Enloe described how the m

tary’s myopic focus on hypermasculinity instills a distor

view of masculinity and soldiering.66 Such distortions, 

argued, can turn off whole groups of well-qualified recru

(both men and women). Instead, she proposed that 

military portray the whole experience of soldiering, hi

lighting the technical and professional aspects of the j

not just the romanticized masculine ideal. A. J. Bacev

similarly observed that “the convergence of profound c

tural changes and spectacular technological advan

threaten to render obsolete the military’s warrior mystique

From the military’s point of view, however, its 

trenched CMW paradigm, inculcated over generations, h

served the military and nation well, producing superb s

diers who win wars. Drawing from a CMW paradigm, tra

tionalists stress that the military’s core activity rema

combat, and the military should not be a laboratory 

social experimentation.68 Two marines emphasized t

point. “The institutional values that once defined a pro

force are rapidly being eroded by inroads into its culture 

feminist and homosexual-interest groups who view 

military as a platform for their politically correct agendas.” 

Such traditionalists cite combat readiness and unit 

hesion as essential to success, and thus resist soc

change (e.g., integration of women or homosexuals) t

may destroy combat effectiveness, degrade cohesion a

morale, or create an ill-trained, unprepared hollow for

This military effectiveness argument was the basis of 

traditionalists’ decisions on the presidential commissio

Traditionalists conclude that both the military and nat

will lose if sweeping social change subsequently destroys 

military’s cohesion, readiness, and ability to fight and win.

Yet views are changing (i.e., a paradigm shift) as ill

trated by the evolving model of military culture. Desp

the US military’s entrenched CMW worldview and res

tance to change, incremental inclusion proceeds forwa

Recent legislative changes and military policy changes ref

greater inclusion of women and homosexuals. For exam

DUNIVIN 
in a 1993 policy memorandum, former secretary of defen

Aspin directed the armed forces to open combat aircr

and additional ships to women.71 In 1994 he replaced 

restrictive 1988 DOD risk rule (which barred women fr

most combat jobs) with a less restrictive direct grou

combat rule.72 These two actions, in effect, dismissed 

presidential commission’s recommendations (i.e., keep

the status quo) and opened up approximately 260,000 

ditional positions (80 percent of all DOD military po

tions—99.7 percent of Air Force, 94 percent of Navy, 

percent of Army, and 62 percent of Marine Corps). 73 

Aspin noted in 1994, “Expanding roles for women in 

military is right, and it’s smart. It allows us to assign 

most qualified individual to each military job.” 74 Su

sweeping changes reflect a fundamental shift in how m

tary leaders and society view the role of servicewomen.

At the presidential commission, the issue of women 

combat was of paramount importance as well. Ms. Je

Appleby Jackson, a former chairwoman of DACOWI

made an eloquent plea for inclusion when she appea

before the commission shortly before its final deliberatio

“As you complete your work . . . I only ask you on behal

the 362,061 servicewomen worldwide to think in terms 

inclusion, rather than exclusion, opportunities rather th

limitations and possibilities rather than problems. . . . I h

the Commission’s recommendations will be in terms of us

our best people, not just our best men. . . . Let them [servi

women] be a part of the whole team.” 75

Drawing from a paradigm of inclusion and equality, e

lutionists note that the military, as a servant of socie

must reflect societal core values or be labeled an anach

nism.76 Without a paradigm shift, the military runs t

risk—divorcing itself from society. In turn, this insu

military may lose public confidence, respect, and supp

(e.g., funding, resources, recruits). Evolutionists advoc

an ideology of equality and denounce the military’s pract

of exclusion. They believe that social change is both m

datory and manageable. For example, in testimony bef

the Senate Armed Services Committee, former assist

secretary of defense Lawrence Korb argued that the inc

sion of gays is not that disruptive. “I find no convinc

20 MILITARY CULTURE
evidence that changing the current policy would und

mine unit cohesion any more than the other social chan

that society has asked the armed forces to make over 

past 50 years.”77 According to Korb, training and str

leadership can minimize any disruption. In its analysis 

the military’s homosexual policy, RAND made similar 

servations.78

Like traditionalists, evolutionists also are concern

with military necessity. However, these activists cite m

tary necessity as justification for social change. They c

tend that when the military excludes whole groups of o

ers (e.g., women and gays), the pool of talent is reduc

which undermines military readiness and effectivenes

As early as 1981, General Clarke, appealed for milit

effectiveness (via inclusion of more servicewomen) in 

Army. “The bottom line for the Army is the mission. 

women really contribute to mission readiness? Anyone w

asks that question seriously, man or woman, needs 

question his or her assumptions and prejudices, and inst

face the facts. It is the quality of women’s service which g

an affirmative answer to the readiness question.” 80

Until the military and society embrace a mutua

shared cultural paradigm—whether CMW, inclusion, 

some combination—clashes will persist. External and 

ternal pressures will force the military to adopt some soc

change; evolutionists will push for inclusion and equa

for all service members. In response, the military will res

social change that challenges its core CMW paradigm, 

raison d’être for its existence. While the military will acc

some social change (evident by the recent inclusion 

women in air and naval combat), it has drawn a line in 

sand over other change (e.g., declared homosexuals in 

ranks) and resists that which threatens its core valu

personified by its CMW paradigm.

Dr. Robert Wood, a renowned national security analy

cited seven US national security concerns, one of which 

called “tribalism.”81 Tribalism (or ethnic identity/ultra

tionalism) in a multipolar world with diverse people a

ideologies often leads to acts of ethnic cleaning and repr

sion because majority/minority relationships emerge a

the powerful majority cannot (or will not) accommod

DUNIVIN 
change and diversity. Doctor Wood also noted that we 

belong to tribes (e.g., familial, religious, political, gend

race) yet these affiliations must be politically insignific

in the United States, else we run the risk of tribalism 

America—we must subordinate our tribal affiliations in 

der to sustain a strong national identity as an American

The traditional CMW paradigm is a form of tribalism 

American military culture. Through tribalism, the 

trenched CMW paradigm (and its attendant traditio

model of culture) promotes homogeneity, separatism, a

exclusion. The military has fought hard to preserve 

dominant CMW paradigm, as evidenced by the painfu

slow and incremental integration of blacks, women, a

homosexuals into its ranks. The CMW paradigm (and as

ciated tribalism) does not accommodate diversity and 

clusion which is the direction military culture is headed 

evidenced by its evolving model. Consequently, maj

ity/minority (or we/they) relationships can flourish, a

“ism” (e.g., racism, sexism, gayism) occurs too often.

Strategies for a Paradigm Shift

Social change is the genesis of any paradigm shif

through change, new ideas, beliefs, assumptions, and a

tudes evolve (i.e., a paradigm shift). 82 For example, 

1960s American civil rights movement was the catalyst 

dramatic social change (e.g., new laws, relational beh

iors, and educational systems). Over time a new paradi

or framework of reality emerged—how American citiz

thought of and viewed race relations in the United Stat

The evolving model of culture reflects fundamental so

change in the military and suggests that a paradigm sh

is, indeed, under way.

As an institution, the US military is moving tow

greater inclusion and diversity in terms of its functio

(i.e., roles and missions), its demographic composition 

personnel, and its organizational culture (as reflected 

the evolving model of military culture). It is unlikely t

the US military can retain its traditional CMW paradig

especially in an American society (and the current Dem

cratic Party administration) which expects inclusion, so

22 MILITARY CULTURE
equality, and diversity. It is difficult to reverse the train 

social change in our democratic, egalitarian society, 

cluding our military institution. If the military retains 

CMW paradigm and moves in a cultural direction contr

to that of US society, it may become an isolated count

culture—an alienated warrior class divorced from the so

ety it serves and defends. Some military oppose such div

gence, including former Air Force chief of staff Gen Mer

A. McPeak who said “we simply must not permit toda

debates about . . . social issues to divide us from the so

ety we serve.”83

Recommendations

A paradigm shift begins with the ability to recognize 

necessity. Assuming that the American military genuin

seeks to replace its CMW paradigm with an inclusion

paradigm (evident by the evolving model characterized 

heterogeneity and egalitarianism), how can it proactiv

implement and facilitate such a paradigm shift? Phra

differently, how can the military lessen its tribalism t

dency by adopting an inclusionary paradigm that comp

ments the evolving model emerging in today’s military? T

leap from exclusion to inclusion requires not only str

tural (model) alterations but fundamental cultural (pa

digm) change—a monumental struggle, to say the least, 

a military that prides itself on tradition. Until the US m

tary and its senior leadership voluntarily embrace so

diversity, endorse cultural pluralism,84 and reduce exc

sionary policies and practices, a paradigm shift toward 

clusion will not occur. Instead, the evolving cultural mo

will continue to clash with the CMW, and there will be li

institutional or individual commitment to social change.

To implement fundamental social change in Americ

military culture, paradigm pioneers85 (people both wit

and outside the military) must willingly step forward a

take significant risks to institute a paradigm shift. As J

A. Barker notes, successful paradigm pioneers must p

sess three characteristics: (1) intuition to recognize the 

idea, the emerging paradigm; (2) courage to act on th

intuition and their unpopular idea; and (3) commitmen

see their paradigm shift through to fruition. 86 It takes t

DUNIVIN 
to institute fundamental social change; therefore, it ta

special people (i.e., pioneers) with the intuition, courage, 

commitment to effect a paradigm shift in today’s military.

To facilitate a paradigm shift, the military must f

examine its traditional combat identity and alter its CM

paradigm. Does the exclusive combat identity fully port

today’s military workforce where only one in six enlis

members perform combat roles?87 As demonstrated by 

cent military operations including disaster relief (Hurrica

Andrew) and humanitarian support (Somalia and Ha

the military is not merely an instrument of war. The m

tary must adopt an identity that encompasses war fighti

peacekeeping, and humanitarian roles.

There appears to be some paradigm shift from the m

tary’s traditional combat identity. In his Bottom-Up Rev

(presented to the House Armed Services Committee on 

March 1993), then secretary of defense Aspin noted t

Fiscal Year 1994’s military budget included $398 mill

for anticipated peacekeeping and humanitarian/disas

relief operations. In addition, Aspin listed economic dan

as one of the four post-cold-war dangers that the milit

must plan for in the future, and he added national e

nomic security as an official mission of the military. 88

Moreover, the Army adopted new doctrinal think

which, for the first time, included peacekeeping, huma

tarian assistance, and disaster relief among its milit

missions.89 The former chairman of the Joint Chiefs 

Staff, Gen Colin L. Powell, proclaimed that it is time for 

military to diversify and accept peacekeeping, humanit

ian relief, and domestic improvement as military fu

tions.90 President Clinton’s 1996 national security strat

listed three goals: (1) to sustain America’s security w

military force; (2) to bolster America’s economic revitali

tion; and (3) to promote democracy abroad. 91 Interestin

the last two goals addressed economic and political e

ments of national security. National security now enco

passes more than the traditional framework of natio

security (i.e., combat). All of these actions suggest a pa

digm shift from the conventional combat identity to a broa

view of military service that encompasses both combat a

noncombat missions and roles. The traditional view of 

24 MILITARY CULTURE
military’s exclusive combat identity may be obsolete. C

sequently, the military must adopt a paradigm that tr

scends the conventional war-fighting image and enco

passes the myriad military functions includ

peacekeeping, humanitarian relief, and drug interdict

operations.

In addition, the military must alter its prevailing view 

warrior as a male-only masculine vocation. In the emerg

pluralistic, egalitarian military, combat includes soldi

(e.g., gays and women) who do not fit the traditional image 

masculine warrior. Their very existence and successes ch

lenge the military’s narrow image of warrior. Therefore, 

military must define a professional warrior as one whose r

extends beyond conventional combat arms and whose abi

transcends one’s sex or sexual orientation.

There appears to be some shift from the military’s tra

tional masculine-warrior identity as well. For example

the wake of Tailhook ‘91, former chief of naval operatio

Adm Frank Kelso acknowledged that “Tailhook brought 

light the fact that we [Navy] had an institutional problem 

how we treated women. . . . In that regard, it was a watersh

event that has brought about cultural changes.” 92 Sho

after his statement, Admiral Kelso opened more com

roles to women. Such statements and actions indicat

change in the Navy (or at least in Admiral Kelso), shift

from an exclusionary masculine-warrior paradigm to 

more inclusionary, egalitarian paradigm of warrior.

The Air Force chief of staff seems to be distancing hi

self from the old paradigm of a male-only, masculine-w

rior identity. In one of his first speeches as the new ch

Gen Ronald R. Fogleman described the Air Force as a m

saic of civilians, guardsmen, reservists, active-duty 

men, and their families.93 He then described how all p

sonnel, regardless of occupation (e.g., combat arms 

support) or social identification (e.g., religious, ethnic, s

ual, or racial identity), are members of an inclusive to

team of the Air Force. He concluded that the Air Force w

not tolerate harassment (zero tolerance policy) because i

the right thing to do, it is the law of the land, but m

importantly, “we cannot expect people to achieve th

maximum potential in an environment where harassm

DUNIVIN 
or prejudice exists.”94 Obviously, General Fogleman is c

ating a climate of inclusion that transcends the traditio

CMW paradigm.

As noted previously, social change is the genesis of pa

digm shifts, and the incidents described above reflect so

level of commitment to change. Furthermore, there is h

torical precedence for implementing major social cha

(both policies and practices) which produced a paradi

shift in the American military. Perhaps most notable w

President Truman’s 1948 executive order which manda

the end of segregation by requiring “equality of treatm

and opportunity for all persons in the armed services wi

out regard to race, color, religion or national origin.” 95 

terestingly, this unpopular social change was implemen

with little public consensus or military support. The ca

lyst of such drastic social change was civilian lead

ship—initiative and oversight by civilian leaders were n

essary to implement unpopular change (similar to toda

changing policies regarding homosexuals in uniform 

women in combat). Yet this event showed the militar

ability, as an institution, to adapt to social change, a

ultimately to adopt a paradigm shift regarding race re

tions in the profession of arms.

Such historical precedence provides insight into imp

menting major social change and a paradigm shift in 

day’s US military.96 Generally, dramatic social change a

a paradigm shift in the American military will be m

successful when the following list of recommendatio

which are prescriptive in nature, are considered. 97

• Senior leaders (military and civilian) are active age

of social change. Without their direct involvement a

commitment, successful implementation of soc

change (especially that which is unpopular) is u

likely. And without fundamental social change, th

can be no paradigm shift. They must assume the r

of paradigm pioneers. The message of change (e

personnel drawdown, women in combat, homosexu

in uniform, or zero-tolerance harassment policy) 

unambiguous, consistently delivered, and uniform

enforced. There can be no doubt about new polic

and acceptable practices and behaviors. For examp

26 MILITARY CULTURE
zero tolerance of racial or sexual harassment must 

clearly conveyed and consistently enforced.

• The proposed change (via policy and practice) is 

plemented quickly and decisively. Incremental cha

(e.g., women in combat) reflects unresolved conflict

views and opinions about the change, thus reduc

the chances for successful change. Once the nation 

military (as a servant of society) is committed 

change, leaders must act swiftly to implement su

change.

• Training is conducted to teach and sensitize peo

about changing policies and attendant practic

Training should emphasize changes in expected 

haviors rather than entrenched attitudes and valu

so to reduce the emotionalism associated with u

popular change. In addition, training must be initia

focused on the leaders who must implement and 

force the new policies and practices. While lead

cannot change attitudes and values, they can con

behaviors and actions.

• Civilian oversight monitors implementation of polic

and practices. Without strong civilian oversight, res

tant military leadership can undermine social chan

The recent policy change regarding homosexuals 

uniform illustrate the need for civilian oversight 

implementing unpopular policies and practices.

• Team spirit is fostered thus enhancing unit cohesi

inclusion, and a sense of responsibility and accou

ability. A focus on inclusion (i.e., an integrative, wh

team) rather than on exclusion (i.e., in- and o

groups) reduces majority/minority dynamics a

tribalism. Additionally, focusing on task cohesion a

commonalties (versus social cohesion and differenc

will reduce divisiveness along social lines.

Institutional Action

Monolithic organizations resist social change. In parti

lar, the military is averse to social change (i.e., change 

its traditions, customs, and culture).98 Moreover, extern

imposed social change (e.g., homosexual conduct pol

further challenges the military’s acceptance of an inc

DUNIVIN 
sionary paradigm that many may view as detrimen

and/or unnecessary. In fact, some characterize su

change as social experimentation rather than military 

cessity. Columnist Ross Mackenzie wrote, “Driven by s

ual politics, the military appears less directed toward co

bat readiness and mission accomplishment and m

toward becoming a sociological lab for redressing of p

ceived gender differences.”99 Given such hostility tow

social change, successful implementation of a cultu

paradigm shift rests simultaneously with the military in

tution and its members. To meet the challenge of ongo

social change, military members both collectively and in

vidually must embrace a paradigm that complements 

social world of the future, not the nostalgic culture of 

past.

Successful adoption of an inclusionary military pa

digm lies with the institution and its leadership. Sen

military and civilian leadership must assume a proact

role, continually removing structural barriers that seg

gate its members. Table 2 highlights structural chan

toward an inclusionary military that have occurred in 

last 50 years. The institution, via its senior military a

civilian leaders, must continue to institute policies t

promote inclusion rather than exclusion. Recent po

changes that opened up combat arms opportunities 

women reflect such structural change at the institutio

level. However, structural change is only one element 

fundamental social change and a paradigm shift.

The military as an institution (via its leadership) m

also enhance a social climate where team spirit flourish

and cultural barriers diminish. Senior leaders are key 

lasting cultural changes so that Tailhook incidents 

truly relics of the past CMW world. The services’ rec

zero tolerance policy on harassment is a step in the ri

direction in cultivating a healthier work climate for all 

members, including women, blacks, and homosexua

Leaders’ enforcement of such policies (e.g., punish

members who display sexist and racist behaviors) also w

signal strong institutional commitment to a culture of 

clusion rather than exclusion. Leaders must let their 

haviors speak for the institution—don’t say one thing (i

28 MILITARY CULTURE
lip service to a policy) but do another action (e.g., toler

“ism” attitudes or behaviors).

The military as an institution of US society is the p

mary architect and agent of social change in the milit

and its leaders are key to successful adaptation of an 

clusionary paradigm. Many leaders are beginning to rec

nize the need for social change, a new cultural paradig

They recognize that social change is inevitable and 

military must adjust its own paradigm to reflect chang

times. They accept the fact that it is not whether the m

tary will accommodate inclusion and diversity, but rathe

matter of when it will accept social change and alter 

cultural paradigm. Senior leadership’s strong advoc

and unequivocal actions are crucial to this paradigm sh

Equally important are individual actions.

Individual Action

Each service member must also embrace social chan

and a paradigm shift. Each person must accept milit

policies (whether they agree with them or not) and be h

accountable and responsible for his or her actions, inclu

ing violations of policies and rules. Education and train

of new policies must be conducted so individuals und

stand the policies and consequences of their actio

Training is essential to individual acceptance of soc

change (e.g., unpopular homosexual conduct policy). H

ever, the training must emphasize professional cond

(e.g., proper behaviors) rather than empathizing with 

norities’ positions which one may disagree with—a foc

on behaviors versus attitudes is key to successful adap

tion to social change. Individuals must also uniformly 

force proper conduct and correct those who transgre

Service members cannot tolerate colleagues who tell rac

or sexist jokes. Nor can they tolerate sexual miscondu

whether heterosexual or homosexual conduct. In sh

they must police themselves and others so to promot

culture of diversity and inclusion.

Individuals must focus on the task at hand rather th

on people and their differences. In military work, serv

members must emphasize professional conduct rat

than ascribed, arbitrary attitudes and standards (e.g., s

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race, sexual orientation, military rank, or combat ar

status). By imposing arbitrary standards of conduct (e

“flying is man’s work”), one discriminates against oth

and whole groups of people are dismissed based on cl

status (e.g., sex) rather than on performance. In particu

service members must desexualize the professions 

arms—focus on members’ performance and contributi

rather than on their sex or sexual orientation so to cont

inherent biases and prejudices in the workplace.

In 1995, Air Force chief of staff General Fogleman o

lined three core values of all airmen: integrity first, serv

before self, and excellence in all we do. 100 If service me

bers approach their work with these values in mind, ma

interaction problems associated with the CMW paradi

will diminish. If we act with integrity, we are less likely 

discriminate against and exclude others and more likely 

act in a professional manner. If we place service before s

we will focus on work and professional conduct rat

than on arbitrary differences that do not matter in 

workplace. And if we strive in excellence in all we do, 

will build task cohesion and team spirit (i.e., inclusi

because we are all working toward a shared goal. O

time, a paradigm of inclusion will evolve to replace 

exclusionary CMW paradigm.

As a servant of American society, the military (and 

members) must reflect changing societal norms and valu

“Commanders are under pressure to bring the military i

line with the emerging norms of civilian culture . . . Ame

cans both inside and out of the services don’t expect 

military to be a model of democratic freedom. But at 

same time they are uncomfortable with a warrior class t

drifts too far from the civilian mainstream.” 101

If America expects its military to reflect society, it 

imperative that the military adopt an inclusionary pa

digm of culture. The success or failure of a paradigm sh

rests with the military. Together its leaders and memb

are the catalysts for permanent social change—they are 

paradigm pioneers who can institutionalize a cultu

paradigm characterized by an inclusive whole rather th

a paradigm personified by an exclusive few.

30 MILITARY CULTURE
Summary

As expressed in the introductory quote by John Updi

military culture is at the crossroads of two worlds—the 

(exclusion) and the new (inclusion). Historically, the m

tary has been comfortable with the old world with its CM

paradigm and complementary traditional model of cult

that excluded others. But this old world is collapsing in 

rapid flurry of social change. In response to growing eg

tarian societal attitudes and increasing social pressur

the military is reducing its exclusionary personnel polic

and practices. In its place, a new world is arising— grea

integration of others, including women in combat and 

mosexuals in uniform.

This transformation process has encountered many 

stacles, both past and present, evident by the ongo

paradigm/model battle. This battle reflects the value cla

between conservatives and liberals in both American so

ety and its military. Traditionalists view the military fr

one prism (CMW paradigm) to construct reality, while e

lutionists see the military from another prism (egalitar

paradigm) to construct their reality. This battle will c

tinue indefinitely because the evolving military culture 

inclusion contradicts and undermines the military’s fun

mental CMW paradigm or belief system.

As demonstrated by the two current social batt

(women in combat and homosexuals in uniform), the m

tary is still tinkering at the margins rather than imp

menting fundamental social change that it disapprov

Throughout this century, the military has resisted in

grating women by severely limiting their numbers, restr

ing their military roles, condoning prejudice and discri

nation, and now delaying implementing policy th

increases their participation in combat arms. While 

military boasts of equal opportunity and treatment for 

members, actions suggest otherwise. During the last d

ade, the military has fought equally hard to exclude gay

spending millions of tax dollars kicking out homosexu

and fighting a legal war to maintain its ban on gays. W

does the military work so hard to preserve the old world 

exclusion and rebuff the new world of inclusion? The 

swer lies in its paradigm.

DUNIVIN 
The real war of military culture centers around its fut

paradigm. Given that social change is inevitable but oft

times unpopular, will the military work feverishly to p

serve its CMW paradigm (and continue to promote a c

ture of exclusion); or will it reform its identity and adop

more egalitarian paradigm (thus embrace a culture of 

clusion)? Without a paradigm shift, lasting and perman

social change in military culture is doomed because trib

ism and exclusion will continue to flourish.

Assuming that the military seeks a paradigm shift for 

culture, it must reduce its tribalism tendencies and adopt 

inclusionary paradigm that complements its evolving cultu

model (see table 1). The key to implementing such fun

mental social change rests with paradigm pioneers who de

onstrate the required intuition, courage, and commitmen

effect a lasting culture of inclusion. Specific strategies to 

cilitate this paradigm shift include: (1) alter the milita

prevailing combat, masculine image and identity which f

ters exclusion rather than inclusion; (2) proactively embr

and manage ongoing, major social change; and (3) acc

both institutional and individual commitment and respon

bility for this paradigm shift. These strategies (and more) 

enhance the smoother transition from the old to the n

world of military culture.

Notes

1. Karen O. Dunivin, “Military Culture: Change and Continu

Armed Forces and Society 20, no. 4 (Summer 1994): 531–47.

2. Ibid.

3. Ibid., 533–34.

4. See, for example, Martin Binkin and Shirley S. Bach, Women 

the Military (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution, 1977); Cynthia 

loe, Does Khaki Become You? The Militarization of Women’s Lives (Bos

Mass.: South End Press, 1983), 7–15.

5. Judith H. Stiehm, Bring Me Men and Women (Berkeley, Calif.: 

versity of California Press, 1981), 65–66; Michael L. Rustad, Wome

Khaki: The American Enlisted Woman (New York: Praeger, 1982); 

Enloe.

6. Dunivin, 535.

7. Prior to President Truman’s Executive Order in 1948, black serv

men were segregated from whites and performed prima

combat-support jobs.

8. Judith H. Stiehm, Arms and the Enlisted Woman (Philadelphia, 

Temple University Press, 1989), 40.

32 MILITARY CULTURE
9. For a comprehensive review of history of military policy regard

homosexuality, see Sexual Orientation and US Military Personnel Po

Options and Assessment (Santa Monica, Calif.: RAND, 1993), chap

and 11.

10. Dunivin, 537–40.

11. Ibid., 540–43.

12. Quoted in Jeanne Holm, Women in the Military: An Unfinis

Revolution, rev. ed. (Novato, Calif.: Presidio Press, 1992), 470.

13. Report to the President, November 15, 1992: The Presidential C

mission on the Assignment of Women in the Armed Forces (Washing

D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1992), iii.

14. As a servicewoman with a vested interest, I attended the comm

sion proceedings as time permitted. I followed the proceedings thro

various media sources (both conservative and liberal). I also carefully r

the report to understand the commission’s process and role in formu

ing and implementing future policy and law regarding the assignmen

women in the military.

15. Silvana Rubino, “When Gender Goes to Combat” (paper presen

at the 1993 Biennial Conference of the Inter-University Seminary 

Armed Forces and Society, Baltimore, Md., October 1993).

16. Report to the President, 100.

17. Ibid., 103.

18. Ibid., 114.

19. Ibid., 116.

20. Ibid.

21. Ibid., 117–19.

22. Barton Gellman, “Panel Asks Women Held from Combat,” W

ington Post, 4 November 1993, 3.

23. Report to the President, 104.

24. Ibid., 98–99.

25. Ibid., 48.

26. Rowan Scarborough, “US Panel Says No to Women in Comb

Washington Times, 4 November 1992, 1.

27. Gellman, 3.

28. Quoted in ibid. General Herres was correct in his assessment. 

year after the presidential commission report, the secretary of defe

directed the military services to open both combat aircraft and ship

women, and Congress repealed laws that barred women aboard com

ant vessels.

29. Quoted in Gellman, 3.

30. M. C. Devilbiss, “The Tailhook Debacle: Sex Discrimination 

Military Values” (paper presented at the 1993 Biennial Conference of 

Inter-University Seminar on the Armed Forces and Society, Baltim

Md., October 1993), 32.

31. Sexual Orientation, 3.

32. Laura L. Miller, “Fighting for a Just Cause: Soldiers’ Views 

Gays in the Military” (paper presented at the 1993 Biennial Confere

Inter-University Seminar on Armed Forces and Society, Baltimore, M

October 1993), 1.

DUNIVIN 
33. Stiehm, Arms and the Enlisted Woman; Cynthia Enloe, “Wom

Men and Soldiering after the Cold War” (paper presented at the Mili

Conference at the US Naval Academy, Annapolis, Md., September 1993

34. Devilbiss, 37.

35. Quoted in Sexual Orientation, 338.

36. For a comprehensive review of military laws and policies regard

homosexuals in uniform, see Sexual Orientation, chaps. 1 and 11.

37. For a summary of recent public attitudes toward homosexu

including those in the military, see Sexual Orientation, chaps. 1, 6, 

appendix F.

38. Sexual Orientation, appendix F.

39. Ibid.

40. Wall Street Journal survey, cited in Sexual Orientation, table F-

41. Cited in Sexual Orientation, 203.

42. Sexual Orientation, 24.

43. Los Angeles Times survey, cited in Sexual Orientation, 210–14.

44. John Lancaster and Michael York, “Court Reinstates Gay M

shipman,” Washington Post, 17 November 1993, A-7.

45. Quoted in ibid.

46. John Lancaster, “Administration Decision Not to Defend Ho

sexual Ban Is a Retreat of Sorts,” Washington Post, 31 December 1

12.

47. Kevin Sack, “Ruling Bans Recruiters of Military from SUNY,” 

York Times, 19 November 1993, 1.

48. Les Aspin, “Homosexual Conduct in the Armed Forces,” Se

Policy Memorandum, 19 July 1993.

49. Beatrice Dohrn, “No More Exclusions,” Washington Post, 29 

vember 1993, 19.

50. See, for example, Dana Priest, “Army Sergeant with HIV F

Deserted by Policy,” Washington Post, 1 February 1996, 3; Rowan S

borough, “HIV-Positive Troops Lose Special Treatment,” Washin

Times, 5 March 1996, 3. Interestingly, the military services do not sup

the legislation. For example, the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, 

John M. Shalikashvili, denounced the legislation as unfair and wast

(“Military AIDS Concerns,” USA Today, 6 March 1996, 2).

51. Thomas W. Lippman, “Pentagon’s Studies on Gays Confl

Washington Post, 27 August 1993, 10.

52. Sexual Orientation.

53. Ibid., xxiv.

54. Quoted in John Lancaster, “Final Rules on Gays Set,” Washin

Post, 23 December 1993, 10.

55. Washington Times, “Rand’s $1.3 Million Question,” 30 Au

1993, E-2.

56. Ibid.

57. Syracuse Post Standard, “Missing Evidence,” 28 August 1993, 

58. For an interesting discussion of the concepts of paradigm 

paradigm shift in contemporary America, see Stephen R. Covey, T

Habits of Highly Effective People (New York: Simon & Schuster, 19

23–32.

34 MILITARY CULTURE
59. William C. Levin, Sociological Ideas (Belmont, Calif.: Wadsw

Publishing Co., 1991), 26–31.

60. Cynthia Enloe, “Women, Men and Soldiering after the Cold W

(paper presented at a military conference titled “A Military of Volunte

Yesterday, Today, and Tomorrow,” US Naval Academy, Annapolis, M

September 1993).

61. Stiehm, Arms and the Enlisted Woman.

62. Devilbiss.

63. Ibid., 42.

64. Ibid., 41–42.

65. Ibid.

66. Enloe, “Women, Men and Soldiering.”

67. A. J. Bacevich, “Clinton’s Military Problem—And Ours,” Nati

Review, 13 December 1993, 36.

68. Jim Wooten, “Don’t Make Military a Laboratory,” Atlanta Jou

and Constitution, 11 April 1993, G-5.

69. Quoted in Susanne Fields, “When the Uniform Is Not Cut to 

Washington Times, 8 April 1993, G-1.

70. See Section II of Report to the President.

71. Les Aspin, “Policy on the Assignment of Women in the Arm

Forces,” SecDef Policy Memorandum, 28 April 1993.

72. Les Aspin, “Direct Ground Combat Definition and Assignm

Rule,” SecDef Policy Memorandum, 13 January 1994.

73. “Assignment of Women in the Military” (briefing viewgrap

Washington, D.C.: Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Person

and Readiness, 3 August 1994.

74. “Secretary of Defense Aspin Expects to Open New Opportun

for Women with New Direct Ground Combat Rule,” news release (Wa

ington, D.C.: Office of Assistant Secretary of Defense, Public Affairs

January 1994).

75. Jean Appleby Jackson, “Statement before the Presidential C

mission on the Assignment of Women in the Armed Forces,” 

September 1992), 11–12.

76. Lawrence Korb, “New Roles and Missions for Military Person

(paper presented at a military conference titled “A Military of Volunte

Yesterday, Today, and Tomorrow,” US Naval Academy, Annapolis, M

September 1993).

77. Quoted in Eric Schmitt, “Calm Analysis Dominates Panel Hea

on Gay Ban,” New York Times, 1 April 1993, 1.

78. Sexual Orientation, 385–90.

79. M. C. Devilbiss, Women and Military Service: A History, Analy

and Overview of Key Issues (Maxwell AFB, Ala.: Air University Pr

1990).

80. Quoted in Holm, Women in the Military, 402.

81. Dr. Robert Wood, speech on US national security at the Air 

College, Maxwell AFB, Ala., 1 December 1995.

82. Social change is the avenue for any paradigm shift. Through so

change, new models of culture emerge (e.g., the evolving model of mili

culture), thus cultural practices (i.e., behaviors) start to change. O

time, fundamental paradigms (i.e., assumptions, beliefs, attitudes) b

DUNIVIN 
to change, reflecting the social change. A simple example is found in 

history of racial integration in the US military in this century.

83. Quoted in John Lancaster, “Accused of Ridiculing Clinton, G

eral Faces Air Force Probe,” Washington Post, 8 June 1993, 1.

84. For the purpose of this analysis, “assimilation” is synonym

with the “Americanization” tradition where minorities adopt the majo

group’s culture, giving up minority cultural traits and traditions. 

problem, though, is that some minorities do not want to be assimilated

contrast, “pluralism” occurs when diverse cultures coexist peacefu

maintain their unique cultural heritage, tolerate each other’s differen

and mutually respect each other, see James W. Vander Zanden, So

ogy: The Core, 2d ed. (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1990), 191.

85. This phrase is borrowed from Joel A. Barker’s film, Paradigm 

neers (Burnsville, Minn.: Chart House, 1994).

86. Ibid.

87. Janice H. Laurence, “The Military: Purveyor of Fine Skills 

Comportment for a Few Good Men” (paper prepared for the National C

ter on the Educational Quality of the Work Force, University 

Pennsylvania, 1993), 3.

88. Les Aspin, “Report on the Bottom-Up Review,” SecDef Report, 

tober 1993, 11.

89. Field Manual (FM) 100-5, Operations, 14 June 1993; Barton G

man, “Army’s New Doctrine Manual Sees High-Tech, Distant Batt

Washington Post, 15 June 1993, 19.

90. William Matthews, Sean D. Naylor, and Jim Tice, “The Clin

Army,” Army Times, 13 September 1993, 3.

91. A National Security Strategy of Engagement and Enlargem

(Washington, D.C.: The White House), February 1996, i.

92. Quoted in John Lancaster, “Tailhook Probe Implicates 140 O

cers,” Washington Post, 24 April 1993, 1.

93. Gen Ronald R. Fogleman, USAF, “Air Force Direction: Team wi

a Team,” speech to the Air Force Association Symposium, Los Ange

Calif., 28 October 1994. Speech was published in Defense Issues, vo

no. 85.

94. Ibid., 5.

95. Sexual Orientation, 163.

96. For a comprehensive discussion of implementation strategies, 

ibid., chap. 12.

97. This list of recommendations is prescriptive in nature and is 

an inclusive list by any means. It presents some potential suggestion

reflect over and ponder—Do the suggestions offer tangible ways to s

toward inclusionary thinking? I composed this list from several sour

including Sexual Orientation; Miller; George C. Wilson, “A Few Easy 

sons to Prevent New Tailhooks,” Navy Times, 7 March 1994, 33; and A

G. Steinberg, Beverly C. Harris, and Jacquelyn Scarville, Why Promot

Female Officers Leave the Army, Study Report 93-04 (Alexandria, Va.

Army Research Institute, 1993).

98. Carl Builder, The Masks of War: American Military Styles in S

egy and Analysis (Baltimore, Md.: Johns Hopkins University Press, 19

36 MILITARY CULTURE
99. Ross Mackenzie, “Sexual Politics Are Harming Combat Re

ness,” Richmond Times-Dispatch, 6 March 1994, F7.

100. Air Force Policy Directive (AFPD) 90-5, Command Policy: Qu

Air Force, 1 August 1995, 5.

101. “Shrinking the Military,” Newsweek, 30 August 1993, 30.

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