The Honorable Carol Bagley Amon, United States District Judge for the Eastern District of *

New York, sitting by designation.

1

09-2346-cv 

Surac v. Cavalry Portfolio Services, LLC

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT

SUMMARY ORDER

Rulings by summary order do not have precedential effect. Citation to summary orders

filed after January 1, 2007, is permitted and is governed by this court’s Local Rule 32.1 and

Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 32.1. In a brief or other paper in which litigant cites a

summary order, in each paragraph in which a citation appears, at least one citation must either

be to the Federal Appendix or be accompanied by the notation: “(summary order).” A party

citing a summary order must serve a copy of that summary order together with the paper in

which the summary order is cited on any party not represented by counsel unless the summary

order is available in an electronic database which is publicly accessible without payment of fee

(such as the database available at http://www.ca2.uscourts.gov/). If no copy is served by

reason of the availability of the order on such a database, the citation must include reference

to that database and the docket number of the case in which the order was entered. 

At a stated term of the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, held at the

Daniel Patrick Moynihan United States Courthouse, 500 Pearl Street, in the City of New York,

on the seventeenth day of December, two thousand nine.

PRESENT:

JOSÉ A. CABRANES,

BARRINGTON D. PARKER,

Circuit Judges,

CAROL BAGLEY AMON,

*

District Judge.

- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x

DAVOR SURAC, 

Plaintiff-Appellant,

 v. No. 09-2346-cv

CAVALRY PORTFOLIO SERVICES, LLC, CAVALRY SPV I, LLC,,

Defendants-Appellees,

EXPERIAN, TRANSUNION, EQUIFAX, AT&T CORP.,

Defendants.
2

- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x

COUNSEL FOR APPELLANT: JOSHUA N. BLEICHMAN, Spring Valley, NY.

COUNSEL FOR APPELLEES: JONATHAN ELLIOT, Zeldes, Needle &

Cooper, Bridgeport, CT.

Appeal from a judgment of the United States District Court for the Eastern District of New York

(Brian M. Cogan, Judge).

UPON CONSIDERATION WHEREOF, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED,

AND DECREED that the judgment of the District Court is hereby AFFIRMED.

Plaintiff Davor Surac (“plaintiff” or “Surac”) appeals from the May 11, 2009 order of the

District Court denying Surac’s motion to reopen his case alleging violations of the Fair Debt

Collection Practices Act against, inter alia, defendants Cavalry Portfolio Services, LLC and Cavalry

SPV I, LLC (jointly “defendants” or “Cavalry”). On appeal, plaintiff argues that the District Court

erred in denying plaintiff’s motion to reopen. We assume the parties’ familiarity with the facts and

procedural history of this case.

Any request to modify a district court judgment must be filed within ten days of the entry of

that judgment. Fed. R. Civ. P. 59(e). If a motion to set aside a judgment for any reason other than

clerical error is filed more than ten days after the entry of that judgement, as happened in this case,

“it is properly considered a motion under Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b).” Branum v. Clark, 927 F.2d 698, 704

(2d Cir. 1991). 

Pursuant to Rule 60(b), a motion for relief from a judgment or order may be granted if there

is “mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect” or for “any other reason that justifies

relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b)(1), (6). This relief is available only in “exceptional circumstances.” 

Ruotolo v. City of New York, 514 F.3d 184, 191 (2d Cir. 2008). We review an order of the district

court denying a Rule 60(b) motion for abuse of discretion. See SEC v. McNulty, 137 F.3d 732, 738

(2d Cir. 1998); cf. Sims v. Blot, 534 F.3d 117, 132 (2d Cir. 2008) (“A district court has abused its

discretion if it based its ruling on an erroneous view of the law or on a clearly erroneous assessment

of the evidence or rendered a decision that cannot be located within the range of permissible

decisions.” (internal alteration, citations, and quotation marks omitted)).

Plaintiff argues that the District Court’s refusal to reopen proceedings “was erroneous and

an abuse of discretion.” Pl. Br. 6. Plaintiff, however, seems to challenge only the March 11, 2009

order of the District Court denying Surac’s motion to enforce the settlement agreement—an order

from which plaintiff has not appealed. With respect to the May 11, 2009 order denying his motion,

from which plaintiff does appeal, he makes no showing of “exceptional circumstances” that would
3

warrant relief under Rule 60(b). Accordingly, we conclude that the District Court did not err in

denying Surac’s motion to reopen proceedings.

CONCLUSION

 For the reasons stated above, the judgment of the District Court is AFFIRMED. 

FOR THE COURT: 

Catherine O’Hagan Wolfe, Clerk

By:___________________________