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AIR COMMAND AND STAFF COLLEGE

AIR UNIVERSITY

Second World War Deception

Lessons Learned for Today’s Joint Plan

Donald J. Bacon

Major, USAF

Air Command and Staff College

Wright Flyer Paper No. 5

MAXWELL AIR FORCE BASE, ALABAMA

December 1998
Disclaimer

Opinions, conclusions, and recommendations expressed or implied within are sole

of the author and do not necessarily represent the views of Air University, the Unite

Air Force, the Department of Defense, or any other US government agency. Cle

public release: distribution unlimited.

ii
Foreword

It is my great pleasure to present another of the Wright 

Papers series. In this series, Air Command and Staff C

(ACSC) recognizes and publishes the “best of the best” stu

research projects from the prior academic year. The ACS

search program encourages our students to move beyon

school’s core curriculum in their own professional develop

and in “advancing aerospace power.” The series title reflect

desire to perpetuate the pioneering spirit embodied in e

generations of airmen. Projects selected for publication com

solid research, innovative thought, and lucid presentati

exploring war at the operational level. With this broad per

tive, the Wright Flyer Papers engage an eclectic range o

trinal, technological, organizational, and operational ques

Some of these studies provide new solutions to familiar 

lems. Others encourage us to leave the familiar behind in 

suing new possibilities. By making these research studies 

able in the Wright Flyer Papers, ACSC hopes to enco

critical examination of the findings and to stimulate fu

research in these areas.

John W. Rosa, Col, U

Commandant

iii

Abstract

Second World War history offers the military strateg

cornucopia of lessons learned on how to apply the art of 

tary deception. This paper analyzed six Allied deception o

tions to identify the fundamental reasons why Allied dece

efforts were the most successful in history. The six dece

operations reviewed were Barclay, Cockade, and Bodygua

well as the Soviet deception operations at Stalingrad, K

and White Russia. A critical analysis of these six opera

identified seven major factors that made Allied deception e

extremely effective. These seven factors were that the 

controlled all key channels of information, had great i

gence “feedback” on their deception operations, had high

and centralized control over deception planning, prac

sound deception techniques, subordinated deception to s

gic and operational objectives, maintained adequate se

and provided sufficient time for deception execution. Thes

tors are relevant for today’s operations and should be imbe

within US doctrine.

This study then examined Joint Publication 3-58, Join

trine for Military Deception, and determined it could bett

corporate the lessons learned from World War II. Current 

doctrine could be improved by underscoring the contrib

that deception provides to surprise, the importance of int

ing deception within all three levels of war, and the impor

of exploiting an adversary’s preexisting beliefs when creat

deception story. Applying these World War II lessons wil

ster US deception capabilities.

v
Second World War Deception:

Lessons Learned for Today’s Joint Plan

Military deception is the art of misleading the enemy into doin

something, or not doing something, so that his strategic or tactica

position will be weakened.

—Charles Cruickshan

The German high command delayed the transfer of the fighter forc

to France because for a time it believed Normandy was a feint.

—Adolf Gallan

Deception Operations in the Second World W

Military deception has always played a vital role in wa

and will continue to do so as long as mankind has a pro

sity to wage war. Sun Tzu alluded to this role more 

2,500 years ago when he stated that all “war is base

deception.”1

 The importance of deception has surely n

minished over the millennia and, in fact, may be gaini

importance. With declining defense budgets, shrinking 

structures, growing costs of high technology, and incre

reluctance to risk human life, today’s military strategist

planners should be studying and applying deception w

renewed and heightened vigor. Military deception is a p

force multiplier that can shape the battlefield by prov

surprise and security for military operations and forces. 

deception enables the joint force commander (JFC) to 

quickly achieve mission objectives and to do so at a lowe

in casualties and resources—or in other words, deceptio

lows the JFC to do more with less.

A study of the Second World War offers the military stra

a cornucopia of historical examples and lessons learne

applying the art of military deception. Military deception 

successfully planned and executed by the Allies on a worl

basis in support of decisive military campaigns. 2

 The 

particularly in the European theater, used deception in 

major joint campaign. The three main Allies—Great Br

United States, and the Soviet Union—all started the war 

unfledged deception concepts and ended the war with sop

1
cated and perfected deception programs. The trials and e

of Allied deception and its maturation are well recorded in 

tory and should be a focal point for any analysis of mi

deception.

This research project analyzed six large Allied deceptio

erations to identify the fundamental reasons why Allied d

tion efforts were the most successful in history. This an

reviewed the British and American Operations Barclay, 

ade, and Bodyguard along with the Soviet deception opera

in the battles of Stalingrad, Kursk, and White Russia (the 

summer offensive). This review provided the foundation fo

research project.

A critical analysis of these six deception operations iden

seven major factors that made Allied deception efforts extr

effective. These seven factors were that the Allies controll

key channels of information, had superior intelligence 

back” on deception operations, had high-level and centr

control over deception, practiced sound deception techn

subordinated deception to strategic and operational objec

maintained adequate secrecy, and provided sufficient tim

deception execution. These seven factors made Allied dece

successful, and they still have relevance for today’s dece

planners.

Since these factors are still relevant, this study then rev

Joint Publication (Pub) 3-58, Joint Doctrine for Military D

tion, and found that, although the joint doctrine some

reflected the seven factors, it did so insufficiently. This res

showed that the joint publication could be improved by u

scoring the contribution that deception provides to ach

surprise, the importance of integrating deception with

three levels of war, and the importance of exploiting an a

sary’s preexisting beliefs when creating a deception story. 

three aspects were clearly critical to Allied deception opera

and are reflected in the seven factors that are reviewed in 

later in this study.

In short, this research highlighted the important role 

deception played in World War II and the emphasis that d

tion should continue to receive today. Allied deception e

during the Second World War significantly helped the 

gain a decisive victory over Nazi Germany and at a reduced 

in casualties. Deception can have the same impact for to
operations if the lessons of the past are applied. For Wi

Churchill’s admonition that “in wartime, the truth is so 

cious that she should always be attended by a bodygua

lies” is still undeniably true.3

All critical analysis should start by reviewing the 

Therefore, the next section provides a concise review 

major deception operations conducted by the Allies and 

marizes their results. This review provides the foundatio

analyzing Allied deception efforts.

Allied Deception Operations

The Allies extensively employed deception against Ger

and Italy during the Second World War. The primary go

Allied deception were to gain surprise for offensive opera

and to provide increased security for forces by masking m

objectives, planning, preparations, and operations. Thes

ception efforts were most notable in Operations Barclay, 

ade, and Bodyguard as well as in Soviet deception operatio

Stalingrad, Kursk, and White Russia.

Operation Barclay—1943. Operation Barclay was des

to mask Operation Husky—the Allied invasion of Sicily. Ba

called for sham attacks on southern France and the Balka

include Greece and Crete. Barclay was designed to achieve 

prise for the Husky invasion force and to cause the Germa

misallocate their resources so they would not strengthen 

defenses in Sicily before and after the actual invasion. Fu

more, Barclay was intended to keep the Italian fleet i

Adriatic Sea close to the Balkans and away from Sicily. 

this, the Allies created a sham army in the eastern Medi

nean, called the Twelfth Army, which consisted of 12 fict

divisions.4

 This deception exploited Hitler’s preexisting fea

he often suspected the Allies would invade Europe throug

Balkans.5

 The Allies spread this deception story throug

use of double agents, false communications, dummy enc

ments, recruiting of Greek interpreters, and collection of 

and French maps and currencies.6

Operation Mincemeat. Operation Mincemeat was c

out in conjunction with Barclay. Mincemeat involved the p

ing of a dead body off the coast of Spain. The corpse app

to be that of a courier who apparently had fallen from an 

ship and drowned. More importantly, a briefcase, which 
attached to the body, contained documents detailing 

plans to invade Europe through Greece. Interestingly, an

doubt deliberately, the fake plan to invade Greece was 

called Husky. After finding the body, the Spanish autho

forwarded copies of the “secret” documents to the Germ

According to Ultra, which was intelligence gained from the 

phering of German Enigma radio communications, Hitle

other senior German leaders believed the story and 

preparations to defend Greece. Fremde Heere West (FHW

German intelligence department that focused on we

threats, called the apparent intelligence coup “absolutely 

vincing.” Sir Michael Howard, the renowned British hist

claimed that Mincemeat was “perhaps the most successfu

ception operation in the war.”7

Results of Barclay and Mincemeat. Operations B

and, its supporting plan, Mincemeat were very succe

First, the Allies gained total surprise against both the 

mans and the Italians when they invaded Sicily. Second

Germans misallocated their defenses by bolstering 

ground forces in the Balkans from eight to 18 

sions—valuable assets that could have been better us

Sicily and Italy. Third, because of deception efforts

Oberkommando der Wehrmacht (OKW), the German a

forces high command, had overestimated by 100 percen

number of Allied divisions in the eastern Mediterranean

inaccurate order of battle lent credence to the Germa

sessment that the Allies were going to invade throug

Balkans. Of note, the OKW believed this exaggerated ord

battle through the remainder of the war, simplifying f

Allied deception efforts in the Mediterranean. 8

Operation Cockade—1943. Operation Cockade was a 

of deception operations designed to alleviate German pre

on Allied operations in Sicily and on the Soviets on the ea

front by feinting various attacks into western Europe. Add

ally, the Allies hoped to use Cockade to bait the Luftwaffe 

massive air battle with the Metropolitan Royal Air Force an

Eighth Air Force that would enable the Allies to gain air 

riority over western Europe. Cockade involved three sub

nate deception operations: Starkey, Wadham, and Tindal

eration Starkey was to occur in early September, Oper

Tindall in middle September, and Operation Wadham in 
September—all in 1943. The three deception plans were 

woven into one large deception story. 9

 The Allies sent the 

ade story to the Germans by using double agents, deco

nals, fake troop concentrations, and increased reconnais

and bombing missions into the areas of Boulogne, Brest

Norway.10

Operation Starkey involved a sham British and Can

amphibious invasion into the Boulogne, France, area. Fo

Americans, the original Starkey deception plan involved 

heavy bomber, 3,700 fighter, and four hundred medium b

er sorties to strike targets near Boulogne with the goal of 

vincing the Germans that the British and Canadian inv

preparations were authentic.11 Additionally, the British w

provide another three thousand heavy bomber sorties int

Boulogne area.12 Starkey was to culminate with a large 

involving sailing an amphibious force, consisting of 30 s

off the Boulogne coast, hoping to lure in the Luftwaffe.

The Starkey plan encountered difficulties from the star

Gen Ira C. Eaker, Eighth Air Force commander, crit

Starkey by saying that the plan would force the America

abandon their strategic bombing offensive. In a letter t

preme Headquarters, Allied Expeditionary Force (SH

Eaker said Starkey called for 2,300 heavy bomber sorties 

14 days “when the command had only flown 5,356 co

sorties in the past 8 months.” 13 Although Eaker conv

SHAEF to lower the American commitment to three hu

heavy bomber sorties, he promised to provide as many bo

sorties as possible from newly organized bomber units und

ing training. When it was over, Eighth Air Force had flo

total of 1,841 bomber sorties. Other problems were en

tered as well. Headquarters, VIII Air Support Command 

that Starkey planners had a difficult time agreeing on the 

of engagement for striking targets in occupied France. Add

ally, the British and Americans unwittingly duplicated e

on several occasions by flying the same missions within 

days of each other.14 The Royal Navy (RN) did not fully en

the deception plan either. Starkey planners had want

place two RN battleships within the amphibious force to a

“cheese in the mouse trap” for the Luftwaffe. The RN wa

willing to risk its battleships in such a manner. 15 In shor
Starkey planners had to make several amendments to th

ception plan.

Planners for Operation Wadham wanted the Germans 

lieve that the Americans were going to invade in the ar

Brest, France. This story, which was totally fictional an

volved minimal “real” forces, had an amphibious group s

directly from the United States and another force from 

Britain—13 divisions in all—to conduct an invasion at Br

The premise of this story was that the Americans were pla

to invade Brest following the successful invasion at Boul

Although the air commitment for this plan was conside

less than Starkey’s, Eaker also criticized Wadham by s

that the combined bomber offensive would provide more 

tiveness at destroying the Luftwaffe than the diverted bo

resources could provide in support of Wadham. 17 Other th

assets, the Americans only had to provide 75 dummy la

craft to aid in the deception effort. 18 The primary weakn

Wadham’s story was that the US forces were going to 

outside of Allied tactical air support range. Prior to the o

tion, the Army Operations Branch called Wadham a “very 

plan,” but “essential as a part of COCKADE to rein

STARKEY.”19

Operation Tindall involved the story that the British 

Americans were going to attack Norway, with the hypoth

goal of capturing Stavanger and its airfield. Stavanger an

airfield were critical to the story, for once again the Allies 

planning a deception operation outside of tactical air su

range and needed a way to increase the plausibility o

plan.20 The five divisions that were to be used in the 

invasion were actual divisions camped in Scotland. Add

ally, the Allies had adequate aircraft and naval assets in 

land to make the deception plan plausible. The only “sho

the Allies had with Tindall was their lack of gliders. 21 The 

hoped Tindall would induce the Germans to maintain th

divisions they had assigned to Norway. 22

Results of Cockade. Operation Cockade failed to ac

its objectives. German leadership did not believe the 

were going to invade western Europe in 1943, and Coc

did not trigger the air battle the Allies desired. 23 The 

exception was Field Marshal Gerd von Rundstedt, the 

mander in chief of Western Command, who believed the 
were going to invade at Boulogne and was angry at the Ge

high command for removing 10 divisions from France. 2

invasion stories, particularly Starkey and Wadham, wer

plausible and lacked credibility. There were no significant 

man reactions to these deception operations, to include a 

of air reconnaissance and neither a naval nor Luftwaf

sponse to the Starkey amphibious feint. 25 The fact the Ger

moved 10 divisions out of northern France to other the

indicated that Starkey and Wadham were abject failures

Norway, the Germans did keep force levels at 12 divis

indicating the Germans assessed a higher threat there. 

sides being implausible, Cockade also failed because the 

expended inadequate resources in making the deception 

real. As noted earlier, the Royal Navy did not want to ri

battleships, and Eaker did not want to divert resources 

the strategic bombing offensive.28 Cockade did have one 

cess: the Germans believed the story that the Allies ha

divisions in the British Isles, when in reality there were on

divisions. This became a factor for deception operatio

1944. Overall, however, Cockade was best summarized b

Arthur “Bomber” Harris, commander of the British Bo

Command, when he said the deception plan was “at b

piece of harmless play acting.”29

Operation Bodyguard—1944. Operation Bodyguard w

deception plan that supported the Normandy invasion—O

tion Overlord. The Bodyguard objective, which was specif

the initial plan dated 20 January 1944, was to induce Ger

to make “faulty strategic dispositions” before Operations 

lord and Anvil. The deception planners wanted the Germa

misallocate their resources by inducing them to rein

northern Italy, the Balkans, Greece, and Scandinavia. 30 

guard consisted of three primary operations—Zeppelin, 

tude North, and Fortitude South—and numerous seconda

erations.

Operation Zeppelin. Zeppelin involved a sham attack 

Balkans by British and American forces encamped in nor

Africa. The goal was to induce the Germans to maintain a 

defensive presence in the Balkans to prevent reinforcem

into northern France. The Allies accomplished this object

increasing the number of decoy landing craft in the ea

Mediterranean and by convincing the Germans that the 
had 39 divisions available to invade the Balkans. In re

there were only 18 divisions in the theater. Hitler acknowl

this threat on 8 May when he referred to the proven “pre

of battle-strength enemy divisions in Egypt.” The sham 

for the fictional British Twelfth Army to attack Greece an

real American Seventh Army to attack Yugoslavia. The 

primarily used five double agents to transmit this story. 3

pelin also entailed cooperation with the Soviets. The S

were to conduct amphibious feints towards Romania and 

garia that were to be timed in conjunction with the sham 

ish and American invasion in the Balkans. 32

Operation Fortitude North. Fortitude North invol

sham attack on Norway. The story was that the western 

were going to attack Norway in the spring of 1944 with the 

of gaining an early lodgment in Denmark. As part of this 

the Allies created a fictional Fourth Army in Scotland that 

tained three corps with 250,000 troops—eight divisions 

all.33 One corps, the fictitious British VII Corps, was to ca

Narvik while the other two corps, the British II Corps an

US XV Corps, were to capture Stavanger. To transmit this 

to the Germans, the Allies used numerous double agents, 

radio nets, and decoy camps. The Soviets colluded by f

offensive preparations aimed at Finland and northern Norw

Additionally, Fortitude North was supported by Oper

Graffham which involved using diplomatic pressure to 

over-flight rights and logistics support from Sweden. The 

hoped that Sweden would leak these initiatives to Germ

thereby inducing the Nazis into thinking that future Allie

erations were likely in Scandinavia. Both FHW and OKW 

sessed the threat to Norway as “credible.” 35

Operation Fortitude South. Fortitude South was a 

phase deception plan centered on the Pas de Calais area

first phase was intended to induce the Germans into thi

the main attack was going to occur in the Pas de Calais 

and not in Normandy, and that the invasion was going to 

in late July. The second phase, designed to start after Ove

had the goal of convincing the Germans that the Norm

invasion was just a feint to draw in German reserves in p

ration for the main effort that was going to occur in the P

Calais region.36 The Allies created a fictional army group, 

the First United States Army Group (FUSAG), and plac
under command of Gen George S. Patton Jr. FUSAG cons

of 150,000 “simulated” troops, including nine US and tw

nadian divisions, and was located in eastern England

most logical staging ground for an attack in the Pas de C

area.37 Along with the “creation” of the FUSAG, the Allie

sured that the Pas de Calais area received more bombin

reconnaissance missions than Normandy.38 In addition, t

lies used double agents, false radio signals, the press

decoy sites to send this story to the Germans. Fortitude S

was the centerpiece of the Bodyguard plan.

Other Bodyguard Stories. Operation Bodyguard use

merous other stories to mask Overlord. One story was tha

strategic bombing campaign was siphoning resources 

from a cross-channel invasion and that the invasion w

have to be delayed. A similar story portrayed the Allies as 

convinced that strategic bombing alone would defeat Germ

and thus an invasion would not be necessary. The Allies 

tried to sell a story through diplomatic leaks that the S

were going to conduct a major offensive in July which was 

synchronized with the Allied invasion—this tale complem

the Fortitude South plan. In another story, the Allies were 

to continue making their main effort in Italy, where they 

been fighting since 1943.39 Finally, the Allies also cond

Operation Copperhead which involved sending a man im

sonating Gen Bernard Montgomery on a trip to Gibralta

Algiers a week prior to the Normandy invasion. Copperhea

intended to convince the Germans that the invasion wa

imminent, for Montgomery would not be traveling just be

big operation.40

Results of Bodyguard. Bodyguard was a tremendous 

cess. The Germans were totally surprised on 6 June 1944 

the Allies landed in Normandy. This success was made ev

on 5 June when Rundstedt disseminated a message statin

invasion was not imminent. Moreover, most of the senio

cers of the German Seventh Army, which was assigned i

Normandy area, were out of garrison on the night of the 

sion.41 Even after the Allies landed at Normandy, the Ger

still did not know for certain if Normandy was just a feint o

main effort.

Bodyguard used a combination of stories and tactics to 

fuse and misdirect the Germans. For example, Zeppelin 
Fortitude North were “ambiguity-type” deception opera

These two operations created uncertainty and inhibited 

rate intelligence assessments, resulting in a German misa

tion of forces to defend southern Europe and Scandina

Fortitude South was an example of a “misleading-type” d

tion operation since it was designed to reduce “ambiguit

“building up the attractiveness of one wrong alternative.

three operations provided tangible results to the Allies.

Fortitude South was the most successful element of B

guard. Hitler, Rundstedt, and Gen Alfred Jodl (chief o

OKW operations staff) were all on record stating that P

Calais would be where the invasion would occur. The 

mander of Army Group B, Field Marshal Erwin Rommel

had experienced numerous deceptions in the North Af

campaign, was suspicious of this story because he no

the Luftwaffe had an easy time flying reconnaissance 

sions over the FUSAG area, whereas the air defenses 

southern England were nearly impenetrable. 44 Despite 

the Germans were convinced of FUSAG’s existence 

thought it would play a key role in the invasion. This 

was reinforced by FHW and Abwehr (intelligence bran

the German armed forces) assessments in May 1944 tha

Allies had 79 divisions in England, when in reality there 

only 52—the difference primarily being FUSAG. Further

the FHW believed the Allies had sufficient sea-lift to tran

15 divisions.45 The second phase of Fortitude South was 

ticularly effective. The Germans held the Fifteenth Arm

the Pas de Calais area until 25 July awaiting FUSAG’s o

tions. In all, the Germans held a total of 19 divisions—

admittedly understrength—in Belgium and Holland. 4

withholding of these units helped ensure Normandy’s 

cess.

Fortitude North did its job by inducing the Germans to m

tain their 12 divisions in Norway. Hitler was concerned 

the threat to Norway, but not enough to increase the num

divisions there. In total, the Germans kept 18 divisio

Scandinavia during and immediately after the Normandy 

sion.47

Zeppelin achieved similar results. The Germans maint

22 divisions in the Balkans and did not transfer any of th

northern France during the preparation period of Ove
Only one division was moved to northern France from the 

kans (another division was put in its place), but it did not 

in time to influence the Allied lodgment. 48 The perceived 

posed by the Allies in the eastern Mediterranean was pa

responsible for this result, but can not be considered the 

explanation. Partisan activities in Yugoslavia and Greece 

enced German decisions as well.

Soviet Maskirovka Efforts. An analysis of World War 

ception would not be complete without at least a brief rev

Soviet maskirovka efforts. The Soviets learned early i

“Great Patriotic War” that maskirovka was essential to d

ing the Germans. The Russian concept of maskirovka de

using deception, concealment, camouflage, and secrecy to 

prise an adversary.49 Soviet deception efforts were prim

used to conceal large troop movements and concentratio

attain surprise for offensives. Although the Soviets were in

tive in their use of maskirovka in 1941, by 1943 they 

experts. By then maskirovka was imbedded in all opera

and at all levels of war. Its impact was evident in the batt

Stalingrad, Kursk, and the 1944 Soviet summer offens

White Russia.

Stalingrad was the first real success for maskirovka. D

the German drive to capture Stalingrad in the fall and win

1942, the Soviets pretended to be preparing for a winter 

sive in the central theater near Moscow. This, combined 

the stubborn Soviet defense of Stalingrad, gave the Germ

false sense of security that the Soviets were not going to a

their flanks in the southern theater. Soviet deception m

the movement and concentration of three hundred thou

troops, one thousand tanks, and five thousand guns that 

the encirclement of the German Sixth Army at Stalingra

note, the Soviet feints in the central theater prior to the e

clement were so successful that the Germans sent 12 div

to Army Group Center that were initially intended to su

their Stalingrad and Caucasus operations.50

The battle of Kursk was also an example of effective S

maskirovka. While the Germans were preparing for their K

offensive, the Soviets created a story that they intended to 

duct only defensive operations at Kursk. The reality wa

Soviets planned a large counteroffensive at Kursk once 

blunted the German attack. The Soviets concealed the S
Front, which consisted of five armies, behind the Kursk a

operations.51 The Germans did not detect this Soviet bu

Gen Reinhard Gehlen, chief of Foreign Armies East, er

ously predicted the Soviets would conduct only “local” at

around Kursk to “gain a better jumping off place for the w

offensive.”52 Thus, the Steppe Front achieved total su

when it counterattacked, and it pushed the Nazis back 

than two hundred kilometers in some areas.

The most successful Soviet maskirovka effort occurred 

ing the 1944 summer offensive against Germany’s Army G

Center in White Russia. The Soviet story simulated pre

tions for a large offensive in the southern Ukraine and C

areas. In reality the Soviets secretly massed eight armies

sisting of four hundred thousand troops and three thou

tanks in the central theater.53 Once again, Gehlen was t

fooled. His assessment in the spring of 1944 said Army G

Center could expect a “calm summer.” 54 Consequently, th

mans were totally surprised when Army Group Center wa

tacked, leading to the group’s virtual annihilation. The 

mans lost over 350,000 troops during the course of the S

offensive—three German armies ceased to exist. 55

In short, the Soviets achieved their greatest victories by 

integrating maskirovka into their operational planning and 

cution, and it was effectively integrated at all echelons

result was the Germans often knew only the frontline S

troop dispositions—everything behind the front line w

“blur.” The Germans routinely underestimated Soviet offe

strengths by 50 percent.56

As just seen, most Allied deception operations were suc

ful. Barclay helped ensure Husky was a success, and thu

invasion of Sicily achieved operational surprise against the 

mans and Italians. The most significant British and Ame

deception operation was Bodyguard, which supported the 

mandy invasion. William B. Breuer called Bodyguar

“greatest hoax that mankind has known.” 57 The Soviets e

sively used maskirovka to help defeat the Germans at S

grad, Kursk, and White Russia. The only major Allied dece

plan that failed was Cockade. The following section provi

detailed analysis of the Allied deception operations an

sesses why they were generally successful.
Deception Lessons Learned from the Secon

World War

There is, by the way, very little doubt that the greatest deception

efforts ever invested in a military operation were part of the prepara 

tion for the invasion of Normandy.

—Michael I. Hande

An analysis of Second World War deception operations 

significant lessons for future practitioners of military dece

Seven primary factors enabled successful Allied deceptio

erations. Despite all the changes in technology and m

doctrine, these seven deception factors are relevant for to

military strategists conducting joint operations planning.

Control Key Channels

The primary reason the British and Americans were suc

ful with Operations Barclay and Bodyguard was that MI-5 

ish security service responsible for security matters withi

United Kingdom) controlled the Abwehr agents assigned ag

the western Allies. By the end of 1941, all of the German a

operating within Great Britain had been identified by MI-

had either switched their allegiances and were working fo

Allies or had been executed.58 More than 120 Abwehr a

worked for MI-5 at one time or another. 59 The significan

MI-5’s success can not be overestimated. These double a

became the Abwehr’s and, by extension, Hitler’s primary s

of intelligence on western Allied strategic plans and m

preparations. It was not uncommon for Hitler to read Ab

intelligence reports that had been written by the Allies onl

days earlier.60 Bodyguard gave the double agents, wh

termed “special means,” a central role in conveying the va

deception stories created to mask the Normandy invasion

short, the western Allies were in the enviable position of h

a direct conduit to the senior German leaders for their d

tion stories.

Along with the double agents, the Allies also used b

communications networks to buttress the stories that the 

ble agents were sending. For example, when the double a

sent information on FUSAG and the Fourth Army, the 

units located in east England and in Scotland, the Allies 
plemented the stories by developing fake communications 

to convince German signals intelligence (SIGINT) autho

that there were large military formations in these areas

double agents and SIGINT were often the only intelli

sources available to the Germans after mid-1943.

This lesson has relevance for today’s joint planners 

deception stories still have to be introduced and con

through the adversary’s intelligence channels. Military s

gists still have to identify the most appropriate means of 

veying deception stories to the enemy and to ensure that a

various channels of intelligence accessible to the adversary 

vey information consistent with those stories. The dece

story has to be sent while the truth has to remain hi

Consequently, deception planners need to either exploit or 

critical channels of information available to the enemy. 62 T

fore, information warfare, which includes actions “tak

achieve information superiority by affecting adversary inf

tion, information-based processes, information systems

computer-based networks,” will be critical to future dece

operations.63

Intelligence Preparation and Intelligence Feedback Are

Critical

Allied deception planners had accurate and responsive 

ligence. They received intelligence on Germany’s leaders, 

deception vulnerabilities, and their perceptions of Allied 

bilities and likely courses of action. The Allies also had 

precedented feedback about Allied deception efforts. Thi

perb intelligence was largely due to Ultra, which 

intelligence derived from decrypting German signals encip

by the Enigma machine.

Ultra was the second most important reason for Allied d

tion successes. British intelligence broke the Abwehr’s 

codes by January 1940 and the Enigma cipher by Dece

1941.64 Eventually, all of the various Enigma systems 

broken by the British. By the end of the war, British and A

can intelligence organizations were reading two thousa

four thousand deciphered German messages every day. 65

Ultra provided intelligence on German senior leader

perceptions and gave valuable feedback on deception o

tions that the Allies were conducting. A perfect example o
occurred with Fortitude South. On 9 June 1944, just 

days after Overlord, Hitler ordered the Fifteenth Army i

Pas de Calais region to deploy to Normandy to attack the 

beachhead. Ultra quickly provided this information to th

lies. Subsequently, the Allies had a double agent send a 

sage to the Abwehr that FUSAG was preparing to initiate 

phibious landings in the Pas de Calais area. 66 Hitler 

countermanded his initial order on 11 June and had th

teenth Army redeploy to the Pas de Calais area, where 

mained until 25 July awaiting the FUSAG attack. 67

Soviet intelligence was also effective in enhancing dece

operations. Although the Soviets did not have direct acce

Ultra (the British did relay some Ultra information to the 

ets), their intelligence, following Stalingrad, was success

identifying Germany’s strategic and operational plans 

with German deception efforts. It also provided accurate 

back on Soviet deception operations. For example, the Ger

conducted fake offensive preparations in the Caucasus b

the battle of Kursk to deceive the Soviets as to where the 

summer offensive would be directed. Soviet intelligence, 

ever, was able to identify Kursk as the target. Soviet part

behind German lines contributed significantly to this effor

partisans also provided feedback to the Soviets on their 

deception efforts to mask the looming Soviet counteroffens

Allied intelligence effectiveness was vastly greater than 

of Germany, especially in comparison to Abwehr operatio

the West. Abwehr’s operations, as already mentioned, 

compromised early in the war by Ultra. The Ultra operatio

facilitated by the Poles who gave the British a captured En

machine in 1939.68 But Ultra was just a part of the Germ

problem. The German intelligence community had deep an

nisms, especially between the Abwehr and the Sicherhe

enst (SD), the Nazi security service. 69 The Abwehr and S

not cooperate with each other and often worked at cross

poses. In addition to Ultra and the contentions betwee

Abwehr and SD, MI-6 (British security service, also know

the Secret Intelligence Service, responsible for collecting fo

intelligence) had penetrated the Abwehr before the war. 

had an agent who worked in the Abwehr intelligence s

located in Hamburg.70 As a result, the British were ab

identify many of the early German agents before they eve
German soil. The Abwehr never recovered from these earl

backs and the conflict with the SD. Thus, the German in

gence community was susceptible to Allied deception and 

exploitable by Allied intelligence.

Today’s joint planner needs to ensure that intelligen

closely integrated into deception planning and operations

ception planners need intelligence to identify enemy pe

tions, channels of information, and susceptibility to dece

Planners also need methods to gather feedback. Allied i

gence successfully provided such information, whereas 

many’s intelligence failed. The Allies won the intelligenc

and the impact was most prominent with Allied deceptio

forts.

Need High-Level and Centralized Deception Planning

The Allies had to build a deception organization that 

exploit double agents and Ultra before their deception o

tions could become effective. The British early in the war h

overcome compartmentalization of their deception efforts, 

ble agents, and Ultra. In 1941 the British organized the Lo

Controlling Section (LCS) which was to provide centralize

high-level deception planning. In July 1942 the LCS integ

its deception planning with MI-5, to include its subordina

Committee that controlled the double agents, and with 

which directed Ultra operations. Moreover, the LCS was 

subordinate to the service chiefs to guarantee that dece

plans were organized in support of strategic and opera

objectives.71 The synergistic merging of the double agent

tra, and operations into deception planning created the fou

tion for success with Operations Barclay and Bodyguard.

Great Britain was not the only Allied state to have a ce

ized controlling authority for deception. The Americans, la

at the behest of the British, created the Joint Security Co

to coordinate US deception efforts. 72 The Americans, alth

slow to embrace deception, became full partners with the 

ish in carrying out the Bodyguard deception efforts. Even 

so than the British and Americans, the Soviets develope

ception plans at the highest levels of their government, 

Stalin and Gen Georgi Zhukov, chief of the Soviet genera

and a deputy supreme commander, often developing str

deception plans themselves. The various organizations the 
ish, Americans, and Soviets developed all provided high

and centralized control of deception operations. This en

that deception and operational plans were cohesive and 

the various governmental elements portrayed the same d

tion stories.

This principle of centralized control must be a bedroc

today’s joint deception planning. Strategic and operation

ception planning must be centralized and located high w

the combatant command organization, and those plans s

be coordinated with the National Security Council. Thi

ensure all instruments of power are integrated into dece

planning, and all actions are consistent with the dece

story. High-level centralized planning ensures that critic

formation, which otherwise might remain compartmenta

can be shrewdly exploited for deception purposes.

Sound Deception Execution

Although the Allies had the tools and organization to co

successful deception operations, they still had to smartly 

cute those deception plans to bring them to fruition. The A

with only a few exceptions, did a superb job executing d

tion plans. They were particularly effective in creating cr

stories, in using “conditioning,” and in transmitting the s

to the Germans.

Plausible Stories and Preexisting Beliefs. The Allie

the most success with their deception operations when 

created deception stories that were deemed credible by th

wehr and German senior leaders, especially when those s

conformed to Hitler’s preexisting beliefs. The most succ

deception stories were apparently as reasonable as the 

Operations Fortitude South, Zeppelin, and Barclay, as w

Soviet deception in support of the operations at Stalin

Kursk, and the 1944 summer offensive, all exploited Ge

leadership’s preexisting beliefs and were, therefore, incr

effective. For example, Hitler called Norway the “zone of de

of this war” and was, consequently, quick to believe Allie

ception stories that involved the invasion of Norway. 73 In 

trast, Operations Wadham and Starkey were failures for 

had implausible stories and were not believed by Hitler. I

inconceivable, for example, that American forces would la
Brittany without air protection or that the British would 

duct a major landing without battleship support. 74

Exploiting enemy perceptions and expectations will re

critical in future deception operations. The Central Intelli

Agency (CIA) underscored this point in 1980 when it rep

an analysis of a 131 battles that showed deception opera

will be successful, defined as attaining surprise, 96 perc

the time when the deceiver exploits the adversary’s preex

beliefs.75

Conditioning. The Allies used conditioning to make 

deception stories more credible. It is human nature to 

expectations on what has been seen in the past, even if 

past experiences represent only a small sample size. 76 D

the 1944 summer offensive against Germany’s Army G

Center, the Soviets conducted a deception campaign to 

vince the Germans that the Red Army was going to atta

the southern theater. The Germans were conditioned to b

this as most of the Soviet offensives in 1943 and 1944 to 

point were conducted in the southern theater. 77 Similarl

British LCS conditioned Abwehr and Hitler to believe the 

ble agents by frequently having the double agents send 

rate, but harmless, intelligence that the Germans could v

A good example was when the LCS had a double agent s

report that a British warship was sailing to Gibraltar. The 

ish first used Ultra to verify that no German submarines 

intercept the warship. German spies in Spain later verifie

arrival of the warship at Gibraltar, enhancing the credibi

that double agent.78 Conditioning is still a viable tactic tha

be exploited by our strategists.

Putting the Puzzle Together. The Allies routinely gav

German intelligence organizations only bits and pieces o

deception story at any given time and allowed the Germa

develop their own faulty assessments. The Allies did not 

the deception stories too obvious, for then the Germans w

have been more apt to detect the deception efforts. Instea

Allies sent only elements of the stories through various 

nels and hoped the Germans would piece the puzzle togeth

a way that matched the Allied story. And this the Ger

usually did. German intelligence organizations worked 

only to build faulty assessments that were pleasing to 

strategists. This is an effective tactic since intelligence “
falls” are subject to close scrutiny and are not usually bel

“Targets” are increasingly apt to believe a deception stor

more they have to work at finding it. 79 This premise is 

stated by Charles Cruickshank, a historian on World W

deception. “The perfect deception plan is like a jigsaw p

Pieces of the information are allowed to reach the enem

such a way as to convince him that he has discovered the

accident.”80 Col Dudley W. Clarke, the chief of “A” Force 

group that directed all deception operations in the Medi

nean theater), underscored this concept as well when he s

that “A” Force “will arrange to plant the BARCLAY sto

piecemeal fashion up the enemy’s secret service.” 81

Deception Supports Strategic and Operational Objectiv

Allied deception efforts successfully supported strategi

operational aims and, thus, played a major role in Allied 

ries. The most successful operations, like Fortitude S

caused the Germans to make decisions and take actions 

benefited Allied strategic and operational goals—this shou

the aim of all deception. Deception must not be done ju

the sake of doing deception. It must be closely integrated 

operational and strategic planning to ensure that the a

and deception objectives are cohesive.82 For example, Ope

Cockade may have hindered Overlord by trying to convinc

Germans that the Allies were ready for a 1943 cross-ch

invasion. After exaggerating the threat in 1943, the Allies 

had to backtrack in 1944 and underplay the threat s

Germans would think the Allies would not be ready for a c

channel attack until July or August, vice June.

Today’s strategists need to realize that deception may 

unintended consequences that could hinder future opera

The best way to minimize this risk is to integrate dece

planning at the beginning of strategic and operational plan

This planning should start with the commander providin

itial direction—a commander’s intent—and stating desire

results to deception planners.83

Maintain Secrecy

Sir Michael Howard identified security as one of th

pillars of deception, the other being intelligence. 84 The 
demonstrated exceptional security by vigorously conc

their operational and deception campaign plans. For exa

Churchill, on behalf of Gen Dwight D. Eisenhower, too

extraordinary security measures of prohibiting all diplo

communications and travel out of Great Britain for two m

prior to Overlord.85 Moreover, when building false commu

tion nets, Great Britain and the United States would even 

pher their false communications in such a manner that 

would be deemed realistic by the Germans if they were 

phered—in other words, the Allies ruled out enciphered 

munications filled with “nonsense.”86 Similarly, the S

showed security consciousness by not printing orders 

through rigid compartmentalization.87 Often, Soviet soldie

not know their orders until just before their attacks. The 

experience shows successful deception requires dema

that security be based on a strict “need to know” philos

Both the actual and the deception plans are symbiotic 

therefore, both must be vigorously protected. As an exa

the plan for Barclay stated that “none of the deception 

sures are likely to be effective unless complete security c

achieved in respect of the destination and date of departu

the Husky forces.”88 The converse would have also been 

about Husky if Barclay had been compromised. In ge

deception plans should receive the same level of secur

actual operation plans—no more and no less. 89

Although security is critical to deception, there has 

some coordination between key agencies to execute dece

plans. Too much security can cause deception operations 

ineffective. This was the case prior to 1942 when British d

tion planners did not have access to double agents or Ultr

to overcompartmentalization. Without access to the d

agents and Ultra, Allied deception efforts in World War II 

would have failed. This conclusion illustrates the dilemm

tween coordination and compartmentalization—the premi

hind “need to know” policies—and shows that a careful ba

between the two must be found.

Deception Requires Time

Deception operations need to be planned and executed 

advance of actual operations.90 Last minute stories are ha

convey to the adversary without creating suspicion. Oper
Starkey is an example of a deception plan that was given 

eral late changes that helped doom it to failure. The Britis

Americans withdrew key naval and air assets from this d

tion plan just before its execution. Despite the changes

LCS tried to execute a quickly modified deception plan

results were predictable in that the Germans failed to show 

reaction to the deception operation.91 Much time is requi

send elements of the story to the enemy and for the enem

piece those elements together to form a picture. Deceptio

quires forethought and methodical planning and execution

In summary, Allied deception efforts displayed seven 

characteristics, or factors, that guaranteed their success

most important of these factors was that the Allies cont

the key channels of information. The next most importan

tor was that the Allies had superior intelligence and rec

feedback on their deception operations. The other factors 

that the Allies had centralized controlled over their dece

planning, effectively practiced proven deception tactics, en

deception operations were subordinate to strategic objec

maintained stringent secrecy, and provided enough time t

cute deception plans shrewdly. All of these factors are rel

for today’s deception planning and execution. These dece

factors provided what Barton Whaley described in his an

of deception theory when he said, “The ultimate goal of s

gem is to make the enemy quite certain, very decisive

wrong.”92

US Joint Doctrine and the Lessons

from World War II

Although deceit is detestable in all other things, yet in the conduct o

war it is laudable and honorable, and a commander who vanquishe

an enemy by stratagem is equally praised with one who gains vic 

tory by force.

—Niccolo Machiavel

Joint Pub 3-58, Joint Doctrine for Military Deception, pro

comprehensive doctrine on deception planning and opera

for the operational level of war. Accordingly, the joint pu

tion presents principles and guidelines that adequately r

“the seven factors” identified from analysis of Second W

War deception operations. As such, the terminology and th
covered in the publication mirror those given in the 1947 

ings presented at the Naval War College and the Nationa

College on why Operation Bodyguard was successful. The 

rent deception doctrine shows that the fundamentals of d

tion have not changed significantly since World War II.

Potential Areas for Improvement

Although Joint Doctrine for Military Deception reflect

critical lessons learned from World War II, the public

could be improved by adding more emphasis on the impor

of deception in achieving surprise, by showing the need to 

grate deception planning at the strategic level so that all in

ments of power can be exploited, and by further describin

importance of exploiting the target’s preexisting belie

short, this publication can be improved with minor mod

tions.

Correlate Deception with Surprise. Although Joint 

trine for Military Deception defines deception, identifie

principles of deception, and describes various planning g

lines for deception, it does not highlight the importance an

value of conducting deception in support of military opera

The publication should encourage the use of deceptio

stressing how it has often been the central element in ach

surprise in warfare. Joint Pub 3-58 simply says that dece

“assists a commander in attaining surprise, security, mass

economy of force.”93 This is not enough. Deception should 

critical strand in most operation plans. Thus, planners mu

convinced of the importance of deception.

The history of World War II deception underscores th

cessity. According to Gen Vasil I. Chuikov, the command

the Eighth Guards Army that fought from Stalingrad to B

the Soviets were able to consistently defeat the Germans 

Stalingrad when they integrated maskirovka into their o

tions. When the Red Army did not fully employ maskirovk

Germans were able to prepare solid defenses and blunt S

attacks.94 The Soviets from 1943 to 1944 could only ac

military success against the Germans by gaining surprise

they could only achieve surprise through maskirovka. The 

mandy invasion also attests to the importance of deception

western Allies could have suffered a crushing defeat if the 

man high command had not accepted the Fortitude Sout
ception story and had, in turn, expected an invasion in 

mandy. The Fifteenth Army, which was held in the P

Calais region, could have jeopardized the entire Normand

eration. Therefore, Bodyguard was instrumental to the su

of Overlord. These results are not unusual. The 1980 CIA 

showed that past deception operations have been 81 pe

effective in helping military operations achieve surprise ag

adversaries.95 Joint Pub 3-58 needs to do more than just d

and explain deception. The publication should encourag

use of deception by showing its value as a force multiplier.

Deception Should be Integrated at All Levels of Wa

joint doctrine on deception primarily focuses its applicati

the operational level of war, which is to be expected since 

Pub 3-58 is primarily intended for use within combatant 

mands. This emphasis, however, means that the importan

deception is not discussed as it relates to the strategic le

war. Deception viewed solely from the operational level ten

ignore the value of involving all the instruments of pow

deception campaign planning.

Deception should to be incorporated and integrated in

three levels of war to be most effective. Strategic, operat

and tactical level deception operations must be cohesive 

as Colonel Clarke stated in 1942, should be viewed as “dif

instruments that play in a single orchestra for which th

only one conductor.”96 Because the Allies planned decept

the highest levels, they were able to achieve unity of effo

coordinating operations that involved all four instrumen

power, not just the military instrument. For example, the 

ish were able to influence the Norwegian and Swedish 

markets in support of Fortitude North. They used diplo

maneuvering against the Swedes in support of Fortitude 

and the Turks in support of Zeppelin. 97 Such efforts req

coordination beyond just SHAEF.

The bottom line here is that deception can not be left a

combatant command level and below. Deception obje

must be supported at levels above the combatant comman

provide unity of effort. The supported commander in chief 

coordinate a strategic level deception strategy with the c

man of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and with the National Sec

Council. It is only at this level that future US deception e
can match the successes of Allied deception operations i

Second World War.

Exploiting Preexisting Beliefs Works Best. Although 

Pub 3-58 alludes to the importance of knowing the en

perceptions and in creating deception stories that are plau

it does not adequately stress the importance of exploiting p

isting beliefs. Donald Daniel and Katherine Herbig, two ex

and authors on military deception, observe that decep

“which slant the target’s mind-set in directions he is p

posed to take have a higher probability of convincing him 

those which run against the grain of his expectations an

sumptions.” Furthermore, they note that the stronger a ta

predispositions, the “more a target will ignore informatio

consistent with them.”98 World War II showed their analy

be accurate. Hitler feared Allied attacks on Norway, Greece

the Pas de Calais region, and Allied deception efforts invo

these areas were most effective. US joint doctrine should 

ther stress this critical facet of deception.

In summary, contrasting the key factors of World W

deception operations with the Joint Doctrine for Military D

tion shows some minor improvements could be made t

doctrine. Joint Pub 3-58 should encourage the use of dece

by presenting the cause and effect relationship between d

tion and surprise, by describing the importance of integr

deception at all levels of war, and by further highlightin

positive effect associated with using preexisting beliefs fo

ception stories. These minor improvements would bolst

already comprehensive and effective joint publication.

Conclusion

The Second World War showed the critical role deceptio

play in achieving campaign objectives. This research p

reviewed and analyzed six major Allied deception opera

Five of these operations were successful in helping the 

achieve devastating victories over the Germans. A tho

analysis of these operations revealed seven key factors 

enabled the Allies to plan and execute successful dece

operations. These factors are relevant for today’s joint pla

Because of their continued relevance, Joint Pub 3-58, 

Doctrine for Military Deception, should reflect these seve
tors. A careful review of the publication, however, showed 

some minor improvements could be made to the doctri

better reflect the still viable lessons that brought Allied su

in the deception domain.

The Allies were able to use deception as a tremendous 

multiplier through shrewd planning and execution. To

strategists and planners should be prepared to use this 

multiplier with equal flair. Understanding and applying th

sons learned from World War II will provide a foundatio

success for future deception operations. General Eisenho

admonition is still true today. “No major operation shou

undertaken without planning and executing appropriate d

tion measures.”99

Notes

1. Sun Tzu, The Art of War, trans. Samuel Griffith (Oxford: Oxford 

sity Press, 1971), 106.

2. Naval War College, Briefing on Military Cover and Deception (St

(Maxwell AFB, Ala.: Air Force Historical Research Agency (AFHRA), USA

lection, call no. 180.9811-4, 1947), 2.

3. Michael Howard, British Intelligence in the Second World War, 

Strategic Deception (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1990), 107.

4. Dudley W. Clarke, “A” Force commander, Operation Barclay (M

AFB, Ala.: AFHRA, USAF Collection, call no. MF25242, IRIS no. 020

1943).

5. Howard, 92.

6. Clarke.

7. Howard, 89.

8. Ibid., 92.

9. Secretary, Chiefs of Staff Committee, Offices of the War Cabinet, 

tion Cockade (Maxwell AFB, Ala.: AFHRA, USAF Collection, call no. 505

IRIS no. 00286425, 3 June 1943).

10. Charles Cruickshank, Deception in World War II (Oxford: Oxford 

sity Press, 1979), 75.

11. G-5 Section, ETOUSA, U.S. Commitments to Operation Cockade.

12. Secretary, Chiefs of Staff Committee, Offices of the War Cabinet, 

tion Cockade.

13. Ira C. Eaker to Lt Gen Jacob L. Devers, letter, subject: Operation 

ade, 7 June 1943, Maxwell AFB, Ala.: AFHRA, USAF Collection, c

505.61-15, IRIS no. 00286425.

14. Headquarters, VIII Air Support Command, Starkey Summary (M

AFB, Ala.: AFHRA, USAF Collection, call no. 532.5401B, IRIS no. 002321

September 1943).

15. Historical Subsection, Office of Secretary, General Staff, Supreme 

quarters, Allied Expeditionary Force (SHAEF), The History of COSSAC (M
AFB, Ala.: AFHRA, USAF Collection, call no. 506.01A, IRIS no. 002

1945), 19.

16. Army Operations Branch, Operation Wadham (Maxwell AFB, A

HRA, USAF Collection, call no. 502.451, IRIS no. 00205091, 15 June 194

17. Eaker to Devers, letter.

18. G-5 Section, ETOUSA, U.S. Commitments to Operation Cockade.

19. Army Operations Branch, Operation Wadham.

20. Chiefs of Staff Committee, Offices of the War Cabinet, Operation 

(Maxwell AFB, Ala.: AFHRA, USAF Collection, call no. 505.61-45, IR

00206455, 1943).

21. Historical Subsection, Office of Secretary, General Staff, SHAE

History of COSSAC, 19.

22. Cruickshank, 77–78.

23. Royal Air Force, RAF Narrative on the Liberation of North West 

(Maxwell AFB, Ala.: AFHRA, USAF Collection, call no. 512.041-38 vol. 

no. 00895753, 1946), 59.

24. Howard, 103.

25. Office of Deputy Chief of Staff, Headquarters VIII Air Support Com

Memorandum Concerning Feedback on Operation Starkey (Maxwell AFB

AFHRA, USAF Collection, call no. 532.4501B, IRIS no. 00232193, 1943).

26. Cruickshank, 73.

27. Howard, 82.

28. Royal Air Force, RAF Narrative on the Liberation of North West E

58.

29. Cruickshank, 63.

30. Combined Chiefs of Staff, United States and United Kingdom

Bodyguard (Maxwell AFB, Ala.: AFHRA, USAF Collection, call no. 119.04-

no. 00110617, 1944).

31. Howard, 136–37.

32. Combined Chiefs of Staff, United States and United Kingdom

Bodyguard.

33. William B. Breuer, Hoodwinking Hitler: The Normandy Invasion 

port, Conn.: Praeger Publishers, 1993), 123.

34. Combined Chiefs of Staff, United States and United Kingdom

Bodyguard.

35. Howard, 117.

36. Commander in Chief, 21st Army Group, Allied Navy Expeditionar

Commander, and Commander in Chief of Allied Expeditionary Air Force, 

tion Overlord: Cover and Diversionary Plans—Fortitude Plan (Maxwell AF

AFHRA, USAF Collection, call no. 505.61-2, IRIS no. 00206431, 1944), 1.

37. Breuer, 110.

38. Howard, 122.

39. Combined Chiefs of Staff, United States and United Kingdom

Bodyguard.

40. Breuer, 169.

41. Ibid., 183.

42. Donald C. Daniel and Katherine L. Herbig, “Propositions on M

Deception,” in Military Deception and Strategic Surprise, eds. J. Gooch 

Perlmutter et al. (London: Frank Cass, 1982), 157.

43. Breuer, 158.
44. Ibid., 183.

45. Howard, 114.

46. Ibid., 187.

47. Cruickshank, 113.

48. Howard, 115.

49. David M. Glantz, Soviet Military Deception in the Second Wor

(London: Frank Cass, 1989), 2.

50. Ibid., 109–111.

51. Ibid., 154.

52. David Kahn, Hitler’s Spies: German Military Intelligence in World 

(New York: Macmillian Publishing Company, 1978), 440.

53. Glantz, 362–70.

54. Kahn, 440.

55. Glantz, 362–70.

56. Ibid., 291, 565.

57. Breuer, 238.

58. Howard, 4.

59. Cruickshank, 217.

60. National War College, Briefing on Measures to Deceive the Enemy 

well AFB, Ala.: AFHRA, USAF Collection, call no. 175.1-14, IRIS no. 010

1947), 6.

61. Combined Chiefs of Staff, United States and United Kingdom

Bodyguard.

62. Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), Deception Maxims: Fact and F

(Office of Research and Development, 1980), 25.

63. Air Force Doctrine Document (AFDD) 1, Air Force Basic Doctrin

tember 1997, 81.

64. Howard, 14.

65. Breuer, 46.

66. Ibid., 221.

67. Naval War College, 27.

68. Diane T. Putney, ed., ULTRA and the Army Air Forces in World 

(Washington, D.C.: Office of Air Force History, 1987), 77.

69. Jock Haswell, D-Day: Intelligence and Deception (New York: 

Books, 1979), 47.

70. Ibid., 58.

71. Howard, 22–26.

72. Ibid., 28.

73. Kahn, 465–66.

74. Cruickshank, 84.

75. CIA, Deception Maxims, 5.

76. Ibid., 9.

77. Glantz, 370–77.

78. Breuer, 99.

79. CIA, Deception Maxims, 40.

80. Cruickshank, 1.

81. Clarke.

82. Naval War College, 29.

83. National War College, 4.

84. Howard, ix.
85. Breuer, 142.

86. Cruickshank, 105.

87. Glantz, 569.

88. Clarke.

89. Naval War College, 29.

90. Ibid.

91. Cruickshank, 62–73.

92. Michael I. Handel, “Intelligence and Deception,” in Military De

and Strategic Surprise, eds. J. Gooch and A. Perlmutter et al. (London: 

Cass, 1982), 121.

93. Joint Publication 3-58, Joint Doctrine for Military Deception, 199

94. Glantz, 221.

95. CIA, Deception Maxims, 9.

96. Howard, 39.

97. Cruickshank, 135.

98. Daniel and Herbig, “Propositions on Military Deception,” 172.

99. Thomas A. Savoie, “Are We Deceiving Ourselves?” Military R

March 1987, 38.
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