Filed 12/13/22 Miranda v. Nissan Motor Company CA2/3

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

Cal ifornia Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions 

not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(a). This opinion has 

not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115(a). 

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION THREE

KARLA MIRANDA,

Plaintiff and Appellant,

v.

NISSAN MOTOR COMPANY, 

LTD., et al.,

Defendants and Respondents.

B316592

Los Angeles County

Super. Ct. No.

19STCV02649

APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of Los

Angeles County, Mark C. Kim, Judge. Affirmed.

Law Offices of Ugo O. Asobie and Ugo O. Asobie for 

Plaintiff and Appellant.

SJL Law, Julian Senior; Bowman and Brooke, Mike H. 

Madokoro and Robert A. Brundage for Defendant and 

Respondent Nissan Motor Company, Ltd. 

_______________________________________
2

INTRODUCTION

Oscar Miranda (Miranda) worked as a truck driver at a 

facility in Long Beach, California. On December 18, 2018, he was 

assigned to transport a container that was not properly installed

on his truck. To rectify the problem, Miguel Rodriguez used a 

forklift to align the container to the chassis of the truck but part 

of the forklift broke off and struck Miranda or caused him to fall. 

Miranda died from his injuries the following day. In addition to 

suing Rodriguez and other defendants for negligence and 

premises liability, plaintiff and appellant Karla Miranda 

(plaintiff) sued defendant and respondent Nissan Motor Co., Ltd.

(Nissan) for product liability.

1 Plaintiff alleged that Nissan 

designed, manufactured, or assembled the forklift, or supplied 

parts to the manufacturer, and the defective forklift was a 

substantial factor in causing Miranda’s death.

The trial court granted Nissan’s motion to quash service of 

summons for lack of personal jurisdiction. Plaintiff appeals, 

arguing that Nissan is subject to specific jurisdiction in 

California because it purposely availed itself of the benefits and 

protections of the forum. We affirm.

BACKGROUND

In February 2020, plaintiff filed an unverified second 

amended complaint in the Superior Court of the State of 

California for the County of Los Angeles. She sued numerous 

defendants including the owner of the facility where the 

container was located, the owner of the container, the owner of 

1 Plaintiff sued in her individual capacity, as Miranda’s successor in 

interest, and as guardian of Miranda’s children.
3

the defective truck chassis, and the owner and driver of the 

forklift, for negligence and premises liability. She also sued Doe 

defendants 90 through 100 for product liability. Relevant here, 

plaintiff alleged Does 90 through 95 “designed, manufactured 

and/or assembled the forklift and/or supplied parts to the 

manufacturer.” She also alleged that a different set of 

defendants, Does 96 through 100, sold the forklift “to the public 

and ultimately the final owners of the forklift at the time of the 

subject incident.” In January 2021, nearly a year after plaintiff 

filed her operative pleading, she filed an amendment to the 

complaint identifying Nissan as Doe defendant No. 93.2

In February 2021, Nissan appeared specially and moved to 

quash service of summons for lack of personal jurisdiction. In 

support of its motion, Nissan submitted the declarations of its 

Deputy General Manager (Jacquelyn Trussell) and its attorney of 

record (Victor Balladares). Nissan argued the court does not have 

general or specific jurisdiction over Nissan. As for specific 

jurisdiction, Nissan contended that plaintiff has not alleged it 

purposely availed itself of California’s benefits, plaintiff does not 

allege claims arising from Nissan’s contacts with California, and 

finding personal jurisdiction over Nissan would not comport with 

traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice. Nissan 

emphasized that it is a Japanese corporation based in Japan, 

does no business in California, and has no employees or presence 

in California. In addition, Nissan does not conduct any sales, 

service, or other business activities in California, nor has Nissan 

2 She named a different entity, Nissan Motor Corporation, as Doe 

defendant No. 94. At plaintiff’s request, that entity was dismissed as a

defendant in August 2021. 
4

directed its efforts or those of its employees for any of these 

purposes. Further, “the forklift which is the subject of this 

lawsuit was manufactured in 1986, and [Nissan] did not export 

the subject forklift to California or the United States.” Although a 

different entity, Nissan North America, Inc. (NNA), is a 

California corporation and a wholly owned subsidiary of Nissan, 

NNA and Nissan are independent and separate legal entities, 

NNA is not Nissan’s agent, and Nissan does not exercise any 

control over the business decisions made by NNA relating to the 

distribution and sale of Nissan and Infiniti vehicles in the United 

States.

Plaintiff requested and received a continuance to conduct 

jurisdictional discovery. After the continuance, plaintiff 

submitted a supplemental opposition and additional evidence. 

Much of it was held inadmissible in rulings plaintiff does not 

challenge on appeal. The remainder did not include any evidence 

that Nissan ever did any business or directed products into 

California. 

Primarily, plaintiff relied on the declaration of Paul 

Herbert, a self-described “trucking and forklift expert.” Herbert 

concluded that the forklift at issue was manufactured by Nissan

“for export to the United States and Canada.” In paragraph 19(e) 

of his declaration, he also concluded that the specific forklift in 

this case “was exported by Nissan Motor Co Ltd., directly or 

indirectly, to the United States.” Herbert did not say what he 

meant by “directly or indirectly.” He also did not claim the forklift

was exported to California.

Herbert next opined that in or around 1986, Nissan was 

“marketing, selling, servicing and advertising their forklifts, 

including forklift model number DF05N70V, in California”—but 
5

also that in or around 1986, Nissan was “marketing, selling and 

advertising their forklifts, directly or indirectly, to California 

residents.” (Italics added.) The court later found that these two 

statements conflicted and the latter statement in paragraph 

19(g)—the one including the words “directly or indirectly”—

controlled.

Herbert did not identify the factual basis for his “directly or 

indirectly” opinion in paragraph 19(g). To the extent he relied on 

a United States International Trade Commission report for this 

opinion, the court denied plaintiff’s request for judicial notice of 

that report, finding that “[n]othing in the report discusses 

California, or discusses how the imports got from [Nissan] to the 

United States ... or, more specifically, to CA.” And to the extent 

Herbert relied on a series of newspaper advertisements and 

articles involving the sale of forklifts, the court also denied 

plaintiff’s request for judicial notice of those documents.

Herbert also opined in paragraph 19(h) that in or around 

1986, Nissan was “providing after-market service, including 

issuing service and technical bulletins, for their forklifts that 

were located in California.” The court found this statement to be 

unsupported by the cited exhibits.

Last, Herbert opined in paragraph 19(i) that Nissan

“fostered ongoing relationships with the residents of California 

that owned their forklifts by ... supplying their original forklift 

parts to California residents and issuing service, advisory and 

technical bulletins, for forklifts that were located in California.”

The court found this statement to be unsupported, and sustained 

Nissan’s objection.

Following an unreported hearing on August 26, 2021, the 

court granted the motion to quash. The court found that plaintiff 
6

“failed to show, under the test of J. McIntyre [v. Machinery, Ltd.

v. Nicastro (2011) 564 U.S. 873 (J. McIntyre)], that [Nissan] is 

subject to jurisdiction in California.”

3 The court also found 

plaintiff failed to show that Nissan “marketed its products in 

California and/or provided after-market service for its products in 

California.” This appeal followed.

DISCUSSION

1. The Appellant’s Burden on Appeal

The most fundamental rule of appellate review is that the 

judgment or order challenged on appeal is presumed to be correct, 

and “it is the appellant’s burden to affirmatively demonstrate 

error.” (People v. Sanghera (2006) 139 Cal.App.4th 1567, 1573.) 

“ ‘All intendments and presumptions are indulged to support it on 

matters as to which the record is silent, and error must be 

affirmatively shown.’ ” (Denham v. Superior Court (1970) 2 

Cal.3d 557, 564.)

The appellant has the burden to show error, even if the 

appellant did not bear the burden in the trial court. (See 

Claudio v. Regents of the University of California (2005) 134 

Cal.App.4th 224, 230.) When an opening brief fails to make 

appropriate references to the record in connection with points 

urged on appeal, the appellate court may treat those points as 

waived or forfeited. (See, e.g., Lonely Maiden Productions, LLC v. 

3 This case held that merely placing a product into the stream of

commerce, even with knowledge that the product might enter the

forum state, is not a sufficient basis for personal jurisdiction over a

nonresident defendant. (J. McIntyre, supra, 564 U.S. 873, 885–886

(plur. opn.).)
7

GoldenTree Asset Management, LP (2011) 201 Cal.App.4th 368, 

384; Dietz v. Meisenheimer & Herron (2009) 177 Cal.App.4th 771, 

779–801 [several contentions on appeal forfeited because 

appellant failed to provide record citations demonstrating it 

raised those contentions at trial].) Matters not properly raised or 

that lack adequate legal discussion will be also deemed forfeited. 

(See Keyes v. Bowen (2010) 189 Cal.App.4th 647, 655–656.)

A party who contends that a particular finding is not 

supported by substantial evidence is obligated to set forth in its 

brief all the material evidence on the point, not merely the 

party’s own evidence. (Boeken v. Philip Morris, Inc. (2005) 127 

Cal.App.4th 1640, 1657–1659.) Facts must be presented in the 

light most favorable to the judgment (id. at pp. 1657–1658), and 

the burden on appellant to provide a fair summary of the 

evidence “ ‘ “grows with the complexity of the record. 

[Citation.]” ’ ” (Myers v. Trendwest Resorts, Inc. (2009) 178 

Cal.App.4th 735, 739 (Myers); see Cal. Rules of Court, rule 

8.204(a)(1)(C)4 [briefs must support any reference to a matter in 

the record with a citation to the record]; rule 8.204(a)(2)(C) 

[appellant’s opening brief must “[p]rovide a summary of the 

significant facts limited to matters in the record”].) The appellant 

forfeits or waives a claim of lack of substantial evidence to 

support a finding by failing to set forth, discuss and analyze all 

the evidence on that point. (See Foreman & Clark Corp. v. Fallon

(1971) 3 Cal.3d 875, 881 [error is deemed to be waived]; Myers, 

supra, 178 Cal.App.4th at p. 749 [same].)

An appellant has the burden not only to show error but 

prejudice from that error. (Cal. Const., art. VI, § 13.) If an 

4 All further rule citations are to the California Rules of Court.
8

appellant fails to satisfy that burden, his argument will be 

rejected on appeal. (Century Surety Co. v. Polisso (2006) 139 

Cal.App.4th 922, 963.) “[W]e cannot presume prejudice and will 

not reverse the judgment in the absence of an affirmative 

showing there was a miscarriage of justice. [Citations.] Nor will 

this court act as counsel for appellant by furnishing a legal 

argument as to how the trial court’s ruling was prejudicial. 

[Citations.]” (Ibid.)

2. Legal Principles and Standard of Review

“California courts may exercise personal jurisdiction on any

basis consistent with the Constitutions of California and the

United States.” (Pavlovich v. Superior Court (2002) 29 Cal.4th

262, 268 (Pavlovich); Code Civ. Proc., § 410.10.) A state court’s

assertion of personal jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant

who has not been served with process within the state comports

with the requirements of the due process clause of the federal

Constitution if the defendant has such minimum contacts with

the state that the assertion of jurisdiction does not violate

traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice. (Vons

Companies, Inc. v. Seabest Foods, Inc. (1996) 14 Cal.4th 434, 444

(Vons); Ford Motor Company v. Montana Eighth Judicial Dist.

Court (2021) 592 U.S. ___ [209 L.Ed.2d 225, 141 S.Ct. 1017, 

1024].)

“Personal jurisdiction may be either general or specific.”

(Vons, supra, 14 Cal.4th at p. 445.) Here, plaintiff does not

contend Nissan is subject to general jurisdiction. We therefore 

consider only whether Nissan is subject to this California lawsuit 

based on specific jurisdiction. There are three requirements for

the exercise of specific jurisdiction: (1) the defendant has

purposefully availed itself of forum benefits; (2) the controversy is
9

related to or arises out of the defendant’s contacts with the

forum; and (3) the assertion of personal jurisdiction would

comport with fair play and substantial justice. (Pavlovich, supra,

29 Cal.4th at p. 269.)

“When a defendant moves to quash service of process on 

jurisdictional grounds, the plaintiff has the initial burden of 

demonstrating facts justifying the exercise of jurisdiction. 

[Citation.] Once facts showing minimum contacts with the forum 

state are established, however, it becomes the defendant’s burden 

to demonstrate that the exercise of jurisdiction would be 

unreasonable. [Citation.] When there is conflicting evidence, the 

trial court’s factual determinations are not disturbed on appeal if 

supported by substantial evidence. [Citation.] When no conflict in

the evidence exists, however, the question of jurisdiction is purely

one of law and the reviewing court engages in an independent

review of the record. [Citation.]” (Vons, supra, 14 Cal.4th at p.

449.) Moreover, “whenever conflicting evidence is presented in 

affidavits on a motion to quash, it is presumed the trial court 

resolved such conflicts against the appellant and in support of its 

order.” (Kroopf v. Guffey (1986) 183 Cal.App.3d 1351, 1359.) “An 

unverified complaint has no evidentiary value in meeting the 

plaintiff’s burden of proving minimum contacts. [Citation.] The 

appellate court generally may not consider evidence not before 

the trial court.” (DVI, Inc. v. Superior Court (2002) 104

Cal.App.4th 1080, 1090–1091.)

3. Plaintiff’s appellate briefs are fatally deficient.

We begin with several observations about plaintiff’s

appellate briefs. As just explained, the applicable standard of 

review requires us to examine the legal basis of the claim at 

issue, the evidence presented by the moving party, and the 
10

evidence submitted by the opposing party, to determine whether 

the court erred in granting Nissan’s motion to quash. But as 

acknowledged by plaintiff in her reply brief, other than the 

purposeful availment requirement, she does not address the two 

other requirements for exercising specific jurisdiction over a 

nonresident: whether the controversy arises out of Nissan’s 

contact with the forum and whether the assertion of personal 

jurisdiction would comport with notions of fair play and 

substantial justice. This omission is fatal. Any claimed error 

concerning the court’s purposeful availment determination 

cannot be prejudicial unless plaintiff also carried her burden of 

proving all the requirements for establishing specific jurisdiction 

over Nissan. (See Pavlovich, supra, 29 Cal.4th at p. 269 [specific

jurisdiction requirements]; Century Surety Co. v. Polisso, supra,

139 Cal.App.4th at p. 963 [prejudice].) Notably, plaintiff provides 

no authority to support her position that “there was no need for 

[plaintiff] to address the related to/arise out of, and the fair 

play/substantial justice, elements because the trial court did not 

base its decision on it.”

Nor does the opening brief include any meaningful

discussion or analysis of the evidence presented by Nissan, or of 

the three cases cited by plaintiff to support her claim of error. 

Instead, plaintiff asserts, without providing any context 

whatsoever, that the evidence relied upon by the court to rule on 

Nissan’s motion to quash is not in dispute. She also does not 

explain how the cited cases provide a basis for finding specific 

jurisdiction over Nissan and reversing the court’s order. 

(See Howard v. American National Fire Ins. Co. (2010) 187 

Cal.App.4th 498, 523 [“Conclusory assertions of error are 

ineffective in raising issues on appeal.”].) In any event, plaintiff is 
11

mistaken. The evidence supporting the exercise of specific 

jurisdiction over Nissan was in dispute. At minimum, Herbert’s 

assertion that Nissan was marketing, selling, and advertising its

forklifts, directly or indirectly, to California residents conflicted 

with Trussell’s declaration that Nissan does not conduct business 

in California, does not sell or distribute vehicles or parts in 

California, and never exported the forklift to California or the 

United States.

To the extent plaintiff suggests that Nissan conducted 

business in California indirectly through a third party, Trussell 

stated that its California subsidiary, NNA—the entity 

responsible for the distribution and sale of vehicles in the United 

States—is not Nissan’s agent and Nissan does not exercise any 

day-to-day control over NNA. It is also well-settled that “neither 

ownership nor control of a subsidiary corporation by a foreign 

parent corporation, without more, subjects the parent to the 

jurisdiction of the state where the subsidiary does business.”

(Sonora Diamond Corp. v. Superior Court (2000) 83 Cal.App.4th

523, 540.)

In addition, it is not enough to merely assert that Nissan 

should be subjected to California’s jurisdiction because Trussell 

did not say that Nissan was not indirectly marketing, selling, and 

advertising its forklifts to California residents. It is plaintiff’s 

burden to present evidence and analysis supporting her chosen 

jurisdictional theory. Moreover, as noted, much of plaintiff’s 

evidence involving Nissan’s purported business activities was 

held inadmissible or unpersuasive and she does not challenge 

those rulings on appeal. And while the court may have found 

Herbert’s statement in paragraph 19(g) that Nissan indirectly

marketed, sold, serviced, or advertised forklifts in California 
12

through a distributor admissible, the court did not find that the 

statement was true or persuasive. Put another way, plaintiff’s 

contention that the court “accepted” plaintiff’s evidence is 

undermined by its ultimate finding that she did not show that 

Nissan is subject to jurisdiction in California.

We could conclude our analysis here based upon plaintiff’s

failure to carry her burden on appeal. Instead, we briefly address 

her contention that the court erred in finding that Nissan did not 

purposely avail itself of California’s benefits and protections.

4. Plaintiff did not show that Nissan purposely availed 

itself of the benefits and protections of this forum.

Although not entirely clear, plaintiff contends the trial

court had specific jurisdiction over Nissan because it directed 

some unidentified subsidiary or distributor to carry out business 

activities in California on Nissan’s behalf. We are not persuaded.

When commercial activities are conducted on behalf of an 

out-of-state party, “those activities may sometimes be ascribed to 

the party, [citation], at least where he is a ‘primary [participant]’ 

in the enterprise and has acted purposefully in directing those 

activities[.]” (Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz (1985) 471 U.S.

462, 479, fn. 22.) For example, Empire Steel Corp. v. Superior

Court (1961) 56 Cal.2d 823 held a foreign corporation could be 

subject to specific jurisdiction in California where the claims 

asserted arose out of the parent’s manipulation of the subsidiary. 

(Id. at p. 832.) The court concluded the parent corporation was 

subject to jurisdiction in California because it “knowingly caused 

its California subsidiary to make the contracts in suit” and 

therefore “engaged in activities creating substantial contacts 

within California in relation to the claim asserted.” (Ibid.)
13

Here, there is no such evidence or finding.

5 In the portion of 

his declaration relied on by plaintiff, Herbert said Nissan 

marketed, sold and advertised its forklifts “directly or indirectly” 

to California residents. This statement did not compel the court 

to conclude that Nissan deliberately directed someone else to 

market, sell or advertise forklifts in California. Saying 

“indirectly” does not differentiate, for example, between Nissan 

deliberately directing another entity to market forklifts in 

California, and Nissan merely selling forklifts to that entity and 

the entity marketing them in California. The former might be 

purposeful availment; the latter is not. Put differently, selling a 

product to another entity, even with knowledge that the entity 

will then sell it in California, is not, by itself, purposeful 

availment. (See Bombardier Recreational Products Inc. v. Dow 

Chemical Canada ULC (2013) 216 Cal.App.4th 591, 604

[although the company knew when it contracted to provide fuel 

tanks that they would be used in personal watercraft that would 

be sold in California, it would still not provide sufficient 

minimum contacts with California].)

To summarize, Herbert’s conclusory declaration could be

consistent with the possibility of purposeful availment. But it 

could also be consistent with the possibility Nissan merely sold 

forklifts to a third party with knowledge they might be marketed 

or resold in California. And, of course, we defer to the trial court’s 

resolution of evidentiary conflicts and express and implied 

findings. (See Kroopf v. Guffey, supra, 183 Cal.App.3d at p. 1359.)

5 We disregard plaintiff’s citation to evidence submitted by a different 

party after the court granted Nissan’s motion.
14

For these reasons, plaintiff has not met her burden of 

demonstrating that the court erred in granting Nissan’s motion 

to quash.

DISPOSITION

The order is affirmed. Defendant and respondent Nissan 

Motor Co., Ltd. shall recover its costs on appeal.

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

LAVIN, J.

WE CONCUR:

EDMON, P. J.

RICHARDSON, (ANNE K.) J.*

* Judge of the Los Angeles Superior Court, assigned by the Chief 

Justice pursuant to article VI, section 6 of the California Constitution.