### IN THE COURT OF CRIMI NAL AP PEALS OF TENNES SEE AT KNOXVI LLE A ssi gne d on Br ie fs Jun e 29, 200 5

STA TE OF TEN NES SEE v. TER ESA C. GR AV ES

Direc t Appeal from the Cr im inal Cou rt for Loudon County

No. 10100 E. Eugene Eb len, Jud ge

No. E2004-02620-CC A-R3- CD - F iled October 3, 2005

The defe ndant, Tere sa C. G rave s, was convicted of theft of property over $1,000 but l es s t h an $10,000, a Class D fe lony , for whic h she wa s sentenc ed as a Rang e I I I , persistent offe nder, to nine y ear s in the Depa

rtment of Corre ction. The de fenda nt was g rante d a d el ay ed rig ht of appe al and raises two issues: (1) whether she should be g i v en a n ew trial bec ause of ineffe ctive assistanc e of

c ou ns e l; a nd(2 ) w he the r the e vid e nc e is s uf fi c ie nt t o s up po rt

he r c on vic tio n. Th e Sta te a lso app e a ls

a nd raise s tw o iss ue s: (1 ) wh e the r the de la y e d app e a l is tim e ba rr e d by the po st- c on vic tio n s ta tut e of limitations; and (2) whether the trial court erre d by

not sentencing the def

end an t as a ca

ree r offe nder. F ollowing our

revie w, we conclude that (1) the defe ndant’s delay ed appeal is not barre d by t h e p ost-conviction statute of limitations; (2) the defe ndant’s inef fec tive assistance of counse l claim i s not properly

befor e this court; (3) the evidenc e is sufficie nt to support the defe ndant’s conviction; and (4) the def endant should have been se ntence d as a c are er of fende r. Ther efor e, we
rema nd to the trial court f or re sentenc ing a s a ca

ree r off ender

.
Te nn. R . A pp. P . 3 App e al a s o f Rig ht ; J udgm e nt of t he Cr im ina l C our t A ffirm e d and Re m ande d forRe se nt e nc ing

A L AN E. G L EN N , J ., delivere d the o p i n i o n of the c ourt, in which J A M ES C UR WO OD W I TT , J R . and R OB E R T W. W EDEMEYER , J J ., joined.

Paul G . Su mme rs , A tto rn e y Ge ne ra l a ndRe po rt e r; Kathy D. As lin g e r, As sis ta nt A tto rn e y Ge ne ra l; Scott McCluen, District Attorney Gene ral; and Roge r De lp, Assistant District Attorney Gene ral, for the appe llant/appellee, State of Tenne ssee.

Ma ry Kathe ri ne L on g wo rth, L ou do n, Te nn e sse e , f or the app e lle e /app e lla nt, Te re sa C. G ra ve s.

OP IN ION

F AC TS

P roce dural Hi storyT he r ecor d i s un cl ear as t o w hy t he defendan t ’ s mo t i on for a new t r i al was amended t o a wr i t of er r or c oram 1

no b i s. T he wri t of error co ram no b i s heari ng t rans cri p t i s no t a pa rt of t he ap p el l at e reco rd. Fro m t he o rder d enyi ng the w rit, i t ap p e a rs the d e fen d a n t’s atto rn e y intro d u c e d w h a t he felt w a s n e w e v id e n c e to the trial c o u rt. T h e trial c o u rt, f i ndi ng t he defendan t “ f ai l ed t o es t abl i s h her al l ega t i ons t hat ‘ N ewl y D i s cover ed E vi dence ’ requi r ed t hat s he be gr ant ed

a n ew t r i al , ” den i ed t he wr i t

. T he r ecor d i s al s o u ncl ear about t he prec i s e dat e of t he hea r i ng

. T he t r i al cour t ’ s order deny i ng t he wr i t , ent er ed Jun e 2 4, 2 00 3, st at es t he he ar i ng dat e wa s Ap r i l 20, 200 3. I n a l et t er t o t he defendan t dat ed M ay 13, 2003, t r i al cou n s el t ol d t h e de fen dan t t h at he at t en ded a h ea r i n g on t h e def en dan t ’ s mot i on for a n ew t r i al on M ay 12, 200 3, an d t he t r i al co ur t d eni ed t he mo t i on. W e can onl y p r es ume t r i al co un s el , not advi s i ng t he defendan t t hat her mo t i on for a ne w t r i al was am ended t o a wri t o f err or coram nob i s , was i n fact r ef er r i ng t o t he wr i t of

er r or c oram
n o b is he a rin g . In a n y e v e n t, the d e n ia l o f t h e w rit o f er ro r c o ra m no b is is no t an issu e in this a p p e a l an d the e x a c t d a te

o f t h e he a rin g is o f no c o n se q u e n c e

.

T hi s l et t er does not cont ai n a “ Fi l ed” s t amp by t he cour t cl er k’ s off i ce and we ar e, t her efore, un s ur e of t he exa ct 2
d a te tha t t h e re q u e st w a s fil e d

.

T he defendan t appare nt l y s ent t hi s l et t er i n r es po ns e t o t r i al coun s el ’ s M ay 13, 200 3 l et t er t o her , wh i ch advi s ed 3
h e r to no tif

y the trial c o u rt in w riting if sh e w ish e d to p ro c e e d w ith a p o st-co n v ic tio n re lief su it.

-2- Th is c a se ha s a rathe r c omp lic a te d pr oc e du ra l his tory that w e wi ll s e t ou t in de ta il. On Ap ri l 10, 2000, the def

endant wa s indicted by

the L o u d o n CountyGra nd J ury on char g es of a g g ravated burg lary and thef t of property

over $1,000 but less than $10,000. After a jury trial, the def endant wa s
ac q uitted of ag g ravated burg lary and convic ted of thef

t of property

over $1,000 but less than $10,000, and on June 7, 2002, was sentenced as a persistent offe nder to nine y ear s in the Depa rtment of Cor re c tio n. On Ap ri l 15 , 20 03 , the de fe nd a nt, thr ou g h tr ia l c ou ns e l, f ile d a mot ion fo r a

ne w t ri a l. The trial c ourt, having amende d the def endant’ s motion to a writ of err or cor am nobis, denied the defe ndant’s motion. On May 18 , 2 0 0 3 , the def

endant se nt a handwritten letter to the L oudon 1 CountyCriminal Court C lerk seeking a post-convic tion suit alleg ing ine ffe ctive assistanc e of 2

co u n s el an d re q u es t i n g ap p o i n t m e n t o f c o u n s el

. On S ep t em b er1 6 , 2 0 0 3 , t h e d ef en d an t , t h ro u gh 3 newly appointed counsel, filed an amende d petition for post-conviction relief , setting out de tailed

rea sons why

she had ine ffe ctive assistanc e o f counsel and see king to ha ve her conviction and sentenc e set aside. I n October 2004, afte r a post-conviction relief hearing , the trial court gr anted the defe ndant post-conviction re lief by finding she wa s entitled to a delay ed appe al and a lso reinstated the State’s rig ht to appea l the defendant’s sentence

. On Novembe r 3, 2004, the de fenda nt filed her notice of a

ppeal. Subseque ntly , on November 5, 2004, the def

endant f iled a motion to amend the motion for a new trial that was filed previously by trial counsel, asking the trial court for a judg ment of a c qu itt a l or , a lte rn a tiv e ly , a ne w t ri a l, b a se d o n in e ff

e c tiv e a ssi sta nc e of

c ou ns e l. T he tr ia l c ou rt , afte r g ranting the def

endant pe rmission to amend, denied the motion. The defe ndant filed an appe al from the or der g ranting her post-c onviction r el i ef , whi ch allowe d a delay ed appe al, ar g uing the evidenc e wa s insufficient to support her conviction; and fr om the ord er deny ing the defe ndant’s amende d motion for judgme nt of ac quit t al o r, al t ernatively , a new trial, arg uing the defe ndant

rec eived inef

fec tive assistance of counsel. The State, in turn, appea led, arg uing the trial court e rre d in sentencing the def

endant a s a per sistent offende r, rather than a s a ca ree r off ender

.W eaver exp l ai ned t hat he est i m at ed the val ue o f t he p enni es i n t he P ep si bo t t l e b y de ci d i ng t hat i t wo ul d t ake 4 2, 50 0 penni es t o f

i l l a t hr ee l i t er bot t l e.

T her e a r e v ar i ous s pel l i ng s i n t he r ecor d of M s

. N ewby ’ s f

i r s t na me, of

wh i ch we h ave s el ect ed one. 5

-3- Jury Trial

The victim, Ma

rvin Weaver , testified that during J uly 1999, he lived in a mobile home that was “ at an ang le across” from the defendant’s mobil e home. Weaver said that while he was a way for the wee kend of J uly 16 throug h 19, 1999, someone broke i nto his mobile home bybrea king out a g lass louver from his back door. H e said whe n he re turned home, “ [t ]he cushions were out of the couch, dr awe rs had be en dumped on the f loor, and [his] television and VC R we re m i ssing.” The te le vis ion wa s a

20 " Mit su bishi MG A t able top that We a ve r e sti ma te d w a s w orth “ app ro xima te ly $3 00 .” Th e VC R w a s a

Mit su bis hi “ fo ur he a d VC R, wi th the S de fi nit ion fe a tur e , wh ic h at th e tim e
was one of the hig her upg rade s y ou could g et. I t w as stereo. I t ha d sever al editing features. At the time [ Weaver ] purchased it, it was at the top of the line that y ou could g et , at that time.” Weaver said he paid “a

littl e bit over a

thousand dollars” a nd estimated it was worth “[a]pprox imately $700.” I n addition, Weaver was mi ssing a pigg y bank that contained silver coins and whe at pennies, va lued

a t “ app ro xima te ly

$2 00 ,” a thr e e -l ite r Pep si bot tle tha t con ta ine d p e nn ie s, va lue d at “ app ro xima te ly $25,” and a L eathe rman tool, valued at “proba bly about $35.00.” W ea v er contacte d police and 4 filled out a loss property

form listing the e stimated values and the serial number to the VCR.

On cr oss-examination, W ea v er denied knowing Renae Newby and denie d that she wa s 5 house-sitting f

or him the wee kend his home was burg larized. Asked about the television, Weaver acknow ledg ed that he paid $499 for the tele vision, that it was a few y ear s old, and that he e stimated the value at $300 beca

use he felt that was what he “could have sold it for at the time.” Reg arding the VCR, known as a “ super VH S,” Weaver said he boug ht it new but could not say when he boug ht it a ndthat it ha d be e n disc on tin ue d. Wea ve r te sti fi e d tha t he did no t re se arc h how muc h it wo uld ha ve c os t to re pla c e the VC R. A sk e d ab ou t th e pig g y ba nk , We a ve r s a id i t w e ig he d a pp ro xima te ly t w e n t y- f i v e p o u n d s a n d a g r e e d t h a tw h o e v e r s t o l e i th a d t o b e c ap ab l e o f l i f t i n g a n d c arr yi n g t w e n t yfi ve po un ds

.
L arry Sto ke ly te sti fi e d that du ri ng July 19 99 , h e liv e d a c ro ss the str e e t f ro m th e de fe nd a nt. Sto ke ly e xpla ine d th a t hi s st e ps on , G re g B arry , a ssi ste d h im i n b uying a te le vis ion a ndVC R on July 19, 1999, and t h at h e paid $80 for both of them, “[s]i x ty dollars ($60.00) in c ash and $20.00 by chec k” made out to the defe ndant. He acknow ledg ed he ha d no persona l contact with the de fenda nt during this transac tion. The cance lled chec k, identified by Stokely and ente red into evide nce, ha d

“ TV & VC R” wri tte n in the me mo b loc k a ndha d th e de fe nd a nt’ s si g natur e on the ba c k. Sto ke ly testi fi ed t h at t h e television and V CR were c onfiscate d in Dece mber 1999 by a police inve stigator wh o w a s in ve sti g a tin g a

br e ak- in at th e Sto ke ly

re sid e nc e . Ask e d whe the r the te le vis ion a ndVC R
wer e Mitsubishi products, St okely answe red that he was “ sure one of them wa s.”-4-

On cr oss-examination, S tokely testified that he did not give the che ck to the def endant but g ave it to his stepson, Greg Ba rry . He a cknowledg ed that the de fenda nt did not give him the television or VCR, but that they , “[m] y steriously enoug h,” we re le ft on his b ac k p o rc h during the night. Aske d how he knew the television and VCR wer e for sale, Stokely

said that his stepson called him from the defe ndant’s home and told him s he had the m for sale for $80. Aske d if he kne w if the defe ndant eve r g ot the $80, Stokely said he c ould not say

“for a fa ct that she g ot the money , no.”

Gre g Ba rry testified that during J uly

1999, he lived with his mother and stepf ather , near

the de fe nd a nt’ s mo bil e ho me . B arry sa id the de fe nd a nt ha d him a sk his ste pf a the r i f h e wo uldlik e to buy a television and V CR to “ h el p h er o u t t o g et to Geor g ia.” In a stateme nt to police, that was enter ed into evidenc e as a n exhibi t, Ba rry explained how the transa ction took place:
[The defe ndant] ask [ sic] me to call my pare nts, she had a T.V. and V CR for sale. My dad wa nted the V.C.R. to see if it worke d . I took the V.C.R. from [t he de fe nd a nt], sh e wa s li vin g in the tr a ile r n e ar the ro a d. He sa w i t w or ke d, he wr ote
a $ 2 0

. 0 0 c h e c k a n d g a v e me $ 6 0

. 0 0 c a s h a n d I to o k it to [t h e d e f e n d a n t]

. T h e n e xt morning , I went to g et t he T.V. and Ig ot the wrong T.V. My mother aske d what the T.V. wa s on the bac k porch on the fre ezer. I took [ the def

endant’ s] T.V. back to her.

B arry te sti fi e d th a t th e de fe nd a nt f ir st “ g a ve me the VC R. [T he de fe nd a nt] h a nd e d me the VC R in my hands. I took the VCR to mydad to see if it worked. He plugg ed it in the wall and sa id he’d take it. He sa id i t w a s w orth w hat sh e wa s a sk ing fo r it. ” Af te r g e tti ng the VC R, B arry ’s ste pf a the r w ro te the $20 che ck and g ave him the c ash, which he then hande d to the defe ndant.

Asked a bout the delivery

of the tele vision, Bar

ry testified:

I woke up a

bout 10:00 o’clock in the morning

. Every body was up. We w as g etting

re a dy to e a t. T he n I

we nt d ow n to [the de fe nd a nt’ s], g ot he r TV , br ou g ht it up to m y house. Then [the de fe n d ant] called my fathe r and sa id that we had g ot [ sic] the wrong TV. That our TV was s[i ]t ting on the back porch. So we went out on the bac k porch, a nd there was a n older model TV s[i] tting ther e.

Asked how the television g ot on his back por ch, B arry said that the def

endant’ s boy friend, Cha d Gar rett, “was the one that broug ht the TV. He ’s the one that broug ht the TV to our house. A nd he had set it on our back porch.” He further explained that Garr ett must have deliver ed the tele vision sometime “betwe en 1:00 o’c lock in the morning and 6:00 o’c lock in the morning .”

Asked who ow ned the tele vision, Bar ry said, “It was suppose[d ] t o have be en [the defe ndant’s] and her boy friend at the time. I t was their T V. ” Ba rry later a cknowledg ed that the defe ndant “ne ver actua lly claimed owner ship of ” the television and that he did not “know whose TV it was. . . . [He] di dn’t ask no [si c] questions about the TV or nothing . [He] j ust -- it was suppose[d] to have be en Chad or Cha d’s mother’s TV .”T he St at e i ni t i al l y al l ege d t he defendan t ha d t wo count s o f credi t card t hef

t but not ed t he defendan t t es t i f i ed 6

at t ri al t o havi ng only one co unt

. D espit e reque st i ng a cert i f i ed co p y of t hi s co nvi ct i o n, the St at e d i d not recei ve o ne and (c o n tinu e d ...)
-5- Asked if he knew Renae Newby , Ba rry testified that she wa s a house sitter f or the victim and that “ [s]he ha d th e fr on t do or ke y to h is ho us e , fr om wh a t sh e sa id. ” B arry de nie d p art ic ipatin g in the bu rg lary

of the vic tim ’s ho me , s a y ing he wa s a t ho me wi th h is p are nts

.
I nvestig ator Freddie Gene Walker, of the L oudon CountySheriff’ s Depa rtment, testified that he wa s c a lle d to inv e sti g a te the bu rg lary of the vic tim ’s ho me in Jul y 19 99 . H e sa id that late r w hil e investigating a

brea k-in at S tokely ’s residence, he asked Stokelyif “he ’d had a ny dealing s with [ the defe ndant], and he said he’ d boug ht a TV and a VCR of f of her . And I

asked him whe n. And at that point I went and g ot the VCR, ran the serial numbers on it, and it came back a s [t he victim’s] VCR .” I nv e sti g a tor

Wal ke r the n took c us tod y of the te le vis ion , V CR, a ndthe c a nc e lle d c he c k th a t Sto ke ly had written to the defe ndant for pay ment. Asked whether he knew if the words “T V and VCR” we re written on the c heck at the time it was neg otiated at the bank or a dded af ter the c heck w as re turned from the ba nk, Walker said he did not know but testified t hat S tokely did not tell him he adde d the words af ter he g ot the chec k back f rom the ban k

. I t wa s Walker’s opinion that the def endant ha d burg larized the victim’s home.

Th e de fe nd a nt t e sti fi e d th a t sh e ha d p ri or c on vic tio ns for arme d r ob be ry , c re dit c ardthe ft , and “a lot of forg erie s.” Asked how she g ot the $20 chec k from Stokely , the def endant e x plained:

Gre g [Barry ] and Chad [ Gar rett] had come to me a nd told me they wer e g oing to g et some money

from Gr eg ’s dad. And the y didn’t want him t o k n o w the money was coming to Greg ’s, so he a sked me if I would ca s h a chec k in my name f or him for $20.00. And I

ag ree d.

The de fenda nt said she re ceive d the che ck f ro m Ba rry and denie d selling Stokely a television or VCR. She also testified that, when she cashe d the $20 chec k, the words “TV a nd VCR” wer e not on the fa ce of

the che ck. She denied that Gar rett was her boy friend but a cknowledg ed that he lived in her home. She de nied asking Gar rett to burg larize any one’s home.

After deliberations, the jury

acquitted the de fenda nt of the ag g ravated burgla ry ch ar g e but convicted he r of thef

t of property

over $1,000 but less than $10,000.

Se nt e nc ing He ar ing

Pr ior to the se nte nc ing he ari ng , th e Sta te fi le d a no tic e of int e nt to se e k a n e nh a nc e d p e na lty for the defe ndant based on her prior felony rec ord. At the sentenc ing hearing, the State introduce d evidenc e of the defe ndant’s ce rtified convic tion for armed robbery in G eorg ia on May 1, 1978, for wh ic h s he re c e ive d a

fi ve -y e ar se nte nc e

. Th e Sta te a lso no te d the de fe nd a nt w a s c on vic te d o f c re dit

car d theft in Geor g ia on J uly 13, 1993, for which she rec eived a three -y ear sentenc e. Finally , the 6(

. . . con t i n u ed) 6

we , t h er ef

or e, do n ot h av e a copy i n t h e appe al r ec or d.

D espit e t he Stat e’ s no t i ng t hat t he t hi rt y

- t wo fo rgery judgm ent s were cert i f i ed b y t he Lo ud o n C o unt y C o urt 7
C l erk f o r present at i o n to th e tr ia l c o urt , t hese j ud gm ent s were no t ent ered i nt o evi d ence and are not i ncl ud ed i n t he appe l l at e r ec or d.

A l ar g e por t i on of

t h e pos t

- con v i ct i on h ea r i n g w as de di ca t ed t o i s sues c on ce r n i n g t h e def en dan t ’ s c l ai m of 8
i nef fect i ve ass i st ance o f

co unsel

. B ecause we have d et erm i ned , a s we wi l l e xp l ai n, that t hi s i ss ue i s no t pro p erl y be fo re this c o u rt, w e fo rg o a d d ing tes tim o n y c o n c e rn ing this issu e to the o p inio n

. -6- S t a t e s a i d t h e d e f

e n d a n t h a d b e e n c o n v i c t e d o f th i r t y

- t w o c o u n t s o f f o r g e r y i n Lo u d o n C o u n t y, Te nn e sse e , o n A ug us t 19 , 19 96 , c ov e ri ng se ve n se pa rate date s. Sta tin g the de fe nd a nt ha d at le a st

7 nine prior felony convictions on rec ord, the State a rg ued she w as a c are er of

fende r under

Tenne ssee Cod e An no ta te d s e c tio n 4 0- 35 -1 08 a nda sk e d th a t sh e be se nte nc e d to tw e lve y e ars a t sixty pe rc e nt.

De fe ns e c ou ns e l, a c kn ow le d g i n g th at th e de fe nd a nt h a d at le a st n ine prior fe lon y c on vic tio ns , arg ue d th a t th e pe rs ist e nt o ff e nd e r s ta tut e

appe ar s to give the [c]ourt som e latitude in that it talks about a per sistent offende r b e i n g a d e f

e n d a n t w h o h a s r e c e i v e d a c o m b i n a t i o n o f f i v e o r m o r e p r i o r

f e l o n i e s

. It appea rs that it does g ive the [c]ourt some latitude in making the de termination, wher e the def endant stands be fore the [c]ourt convicted as a persistent offe nder or a ca ree r offe nder.

Counsel asked the trial court to use this “latitude” to find the def endant a persistent off

ender rathe r than a c are er of

fende r. The trial court, a

ppare ntly ag ree ing, sta t ed : “[K] ind of looking be hind the conviction a little bit. The [c] ourt fee ls that she would and should fit in the per s i s t ent offe nder cate g ory , and sente nce he r to nine y ear s as a pe rsistent offe nder, to be serve d.”

P ost-Conviction Hearing

At the po st- c on vic tio n h e ari ng , tria l c ou ns e l te sti fi e d that, a lth ou g h the de fe nd a nt a sk e d h im to appea l her c ase subse quent t o the s entenc ing hearing, he never di d so, nor di d he file a waiver of appea l. Trial counse l acknowle dg ed that the defe ndant “wa s alway s very adama nt that she wante d 8

a n a pp e a l” de sp ite the fa c t that the Sta te a dv ise d him it wo uldapp e a l he r s e nte nc e if sh e dida nd , in fac t, identified numerous letter s the defe ndant wrote him from prison, reque sting he appea l her sentenc e. Although the defe ndant was se ntence d on J une 7, 2002, trial c o unsel did not file a motion for a new tria l until April 15, 2003, saying he had proble ms ge tting the tra nscript of the de fenda nt’s trial and mistakenly

believed he had thirty day s afte r delivery of the transcript to file the motion for

a new trial. Trial c ounsel identified a le tter he wrote the defe ndant on May 13, 2003, in which heT r i al c ou n s el a ppar en t l y di d n ot i n for m t h e de fen dan t t h at he r m ot i on f or a ne w t r i al h ad bee n a men ded t o a 9

w rit o f er ro r c o ra m no b is.

-7- e xpla ine d th a t th e tr ia l c ou rt de nie d he r mot ion fo r a ne w t ri a l a nda dv ise d h e r that if sh e wi sh e d “ to 9 proce ed with a post-c onviction relief suit for ineffe ctive assist ance of counsel, [she] must noti fy [t he trial court] in writing by

way of the c ourt cler

k.”

The de fenda nt testified at the post-convic tion hearing that she di d not understand how long she had to file her appea l. She said trial counsel never discussed with her that there w as a de adline for f iling. She also de nied eve r pre viouslyfiling a n appea l. She said she did not learn that trial counsel wa s not going to file an a ppeal on he r beha lf until she rec eived a letter fr om him advising he r t o w ri te the c ou rt c le rk to se e k po st- c on vic tio n re lie f ba se d on ine ff e c tiv e a ssi sta nc e of

c ou ns e l.

At the c on c lus ion of

the po st- c on vic tio n h e ari ng , the tr ia l cou rt he ld that “ [t]he pe tit ion is

over ru le d a s to th e n e w tria l. T h e [c ]o u r t w il l g r a n t a d e lay e d ap p e a l. A n d th e [c ]o u r t f inds tha t [t rial counse l] should have filed an appea l be cause of the insistence of the def endant that she wanted an appe al. And I

g rant he r a de lay ed appe al.” I n a subseque nt written order g ranting a delay ed appea l, the trial court a lso reinstated the State’ s rig ht to appeal the de fenda nt’s sentenc e.

AN AL YSI S

I. De lay e d Ap pe al a nd St at ut e of Lim it at ion
First, we addre ss whether the def endant’ s delay ed appe al is proper ly befor e this court. The S t at e ar g ues that the de fenda nt’s delay ed appe al is barr ed by the post-conviction statute of limit ations. The def

endant c ounters that the State waived this issue by failing to r aise it with the trial court, a

pplication of the one -y ear statute of limitatio n s t o t his case w ould violate the defe ndant’s due pr ocess rights, a nd the defendant’s May 2003 letter to t he L oudon CountyCriminal Court can se rve a s a post-convic tion relief pe tition.

Under the Post-Conviction P roce dure A ct, a pe rson in custody m u s t fi l e a pe tition for post-conviction re lief “if no a ppeal is take n, within one (1) y ear of the date on which the judg ment became final, or c onsideration of suc h petition shall be barred." Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-30-102( a) (2003). F urther, " [t ]i me is of the essenc e of the rig ht to file a petition for post-c onviction relief .

. . a ndthe on e -y e ar l imi ta tio ns pe ri odis a n e le me nt o f the ri g ht t o f ile su c h a n a c tio n a ndis a

c on dit ion up on its e xer c ise ." I d. Th e Ac t re qu ir e s a pe tit ion e r fi le “ wi th the c le rk of the c ou rt in which the c onviction occur red, a written petit ion naming the s tate as the respondent.” Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-30-104( a) (2003). A “pe titioner shall provide all information required by this section” including “ all claims known to the petitioner f or g ranting post-convi c ti o nr e li e f ” and all “a lleg ations of fa c t s u p p o r ti n g e a c h c laim f o r r e li e f

. ” I d

. a t § 4 0

- 3 0

- 1 0 4 ( b ) , ( d ) , ( e )

. I f a tria l c ourt, afte r conducting a post-convic tion hearing ,-8-

finds that the petit ioner was denied the rig ht to an appeal from the orig inal conviction in violation of the Consti tution of the United S tates or the Consti tution of Tennessee and that there i s an adequate rec ord of the original t rial proc eeding available for suc h

re vie w, the jud g e c a n .

. . g rant a de la y e d a

pp e a l.
Tenn. Code Ann. § 40- 30-113(a )(1) (2003). As such, “the statute of limitations for post-conviction relief applies to delay ed appe als as we ll, because the petitioner must complywith the post-conviction pr oc e du re a c t to ob ta in a

de la y ed app eal .” Sta te v. Hand le y , 8 89 S.W. 2d22 3, 22 4 ( Te nn . Crim. App. 1994).

The de fenda nt’s judgme nt, which was not a ppeale d, became final on July7, 2002. On May 18, 2003, the def

endant wr ote the L oudon CountyCriminal Court C lerk the f ollowing letter :

D e ar [C o u r t C le rk ],

I am writing this letter to notify [t he trial c ourt], byway

of y ou (court clerk) that I would like to proce ed my case with a post-conviction relief suit for ineff

ective

a ssi sta nc e of

c ou ns e l.

I wo ulda lso a t th is t ime lik e to r e qu e st a pp oin tme nt o f c ou ns e l to he lp m e with the post conviction relief

. Please notify

me as soon as possible to let me know that my l et t er was
re c e ive d a ndif

the jud g e wi ll h on or

my re qu e st.

R e s p e c t f u l l y [Th e de fe nd a nt]
Although w ritten within one y ear of her judgme nt, the State, for the first time on appea l, arg ues that the de fe nd a nt’ s May 20 03 le tte r t o th e tr ia l c ou rt c le rk c a nn ot b e c on ve rt e d to a pe tit ion fo r p os tconviction re lief because it fails to meet the r equire ments of Tenne ssee Code A nnotated sec tion 40- 30-104. The State a

rg ues, i nstead, that the defendant’s amended petition for post-conviction relief filed September 16, 2003, is he r only post-conviction relief petition a nd, having been f iled more than a y ear afte r her judgme nt beca me final, is ac cording ly time-barr ed by the post-conviction statute of lim itatio ns

.
Th is c ou rt

ha s h e ld that “ [a] p art y

ma y no t r a ise a n is su e fo r the fi rs t ti me in the app e llate court.” State v. Turner , 919 S.W .2d 346, 356-57 ( Tenn. Crim. App. 1995) ( citing L awr ence v. Sta nf or d, 65 5 S. W.2 d 9 27 , 92 9- 30 (T e nn

. 19 83 ); Sta te v. Da vis , 7 51 S.W. 2d16 7, 17 1 ( Te nn . Crim. App. 1988 )). A n appellatecourt should “not permit a pa rty to ta ke advanta g e of its adversa ry when it is too late to reme dy the basis of t he objection.” State v. Adkisson, 899 S.W .2d 626, 635 (Tenn. Cr im. Ap p. 19 94 ). Th e tria l cou rt he re app are ntl y tr e a te d the de fe nd a nt’ s May 20 03 le tte r a s a

va lid po st- c on vic tio n r e lie f p e tit ion . Re g ard le ss o f w he the r the Ma y 20 03 le tte r c on sti tut e d a

va lidpo st--9-

c on vic tio n r e lie f p e tit ion , th e Sta te wa ive d th is i ssu e fo r a pp e a l w he n it faile d to tim e ly bring thi s issue befor e the tria l court. I n addition, we also c onclude that the trial court a ppropriate ly

g rante d the def endan t a delay ed appe al in this case. De spite numerous re quests by the def endant, tria l

c ou ns e l f a ile d to fi le a n a

pp e a l. H is a c tio ns un c on sti tut ion a lly den ied th e de fe nd a nt h e r rig ht t o
app e a l he r o ri g ina l c on vic tio n a nd , a c c or din g ly , w e fi ndhe r d e la y e d a pp e a l is pr op e rl y

be fo re thi s court.

II. Ine ffec ti ve As sis ta nc e of C ouns e l

I n addition to her dela y ed appe al, the def endant a rg ues the trial c ourt err ed in denying he r amend e d mo ti o n f

o r ju d g me n t o f

a c q u itta l, o r

a lt e r n a ti v e ly , a

n e w tria l b a s e d o n in e ffe ctive assistance of counse l. The State ar g ues this claim is not properly before t h i s court be cause the defe ndant was g rante d a delay ed appe al and the trial court lost jurisdiction to hear the motion once the def endant f iled her notice of appe al. Tennessee Supreme C ourt Rule 28, § 9(D)( 1)(b) (i) provide s that w he n a

tr ia l c ou rt

e nte rs a n o rd e r g ranti ng a del ay ed app e a l, the c ou rt sh a ll “ stay [] the po stc on vic tio n p ro c e e din g s p e nd ing the fi na l disp os iti on of the de la y e d ap pe a l.” Ac c or din g ly , th is c la im is w ith ou t me ri t.

I n this c ase, the defe ndant filed a post-conviction relief petition ba sed on i n ef fec tive assistance of counse l. After the post-convictio n hearing, the trial court de nied the def endant’ s reque st for a ne w t rial based on ineffe ctive assist ance of counse l but gr anted the de fenda nt a delay ed appea l. Once the trial court g rante d this delay ed appe al, the collate ral attack on the de fenda nt’s conviction base d on ineffe ctive assistanc e of counsel wa s appropriately denied. Gibson, 7 S.W.3d at 49 (“ A petition for post-convic tion relief, c omp laining of the orig inal conviction and se ntence , may not be maintained while a direc t appea l of the same c onviction and sentenc e is being prosec uted.”)

.
I n addition, the defe ndant filed he r notice of appea l on November 3, 2004, and her amende d motion for judgme nt of acquittal or, alternatively , a new trial on November 5, 2004. Upon the filing of the no tic e of app e a l, the tr ia l c ou rt no lon g e r h a d ju ri sd ic tio n in thi s matte r. Sta te v. Pe nd e rg ra ss, 937 S.W .2d 834, 837 (Tenn. 1996) (" The jurisdiction of the Court of Criminal Appe als attac hes upon the filing of the not i ce o f appeal and, the ref ore, the trial court loses jurisdiction." ) (c iting State v. Peak, 823 S.W.2d 228, 229 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1991) ). More ver, the trial judg e’s c onsideration of the de fe nd a nt’ s a me nd e d mot ion that wa s f ile d a ft e r the tr ia l c ou rt

los t ju ri sd ic tio n w ill no t va lid a te the moti o n. State v. Martin, 940 S.W.2d 567, 569 (Tenn. 1997) (“ The trial judg e' s err oneous
c on sid e ratio n o f r

uli ng on a mot ion fo r n e w t

ri a l not time ly

fi le d, a s in thi s c a se , d oe s n ot v a lid a te the motion.”) (c iting State v. Dodson, 780 S.W.2d 778, 780 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1989)).

The de fenda nt arg ues that she should hav e been a llowed to file her amende d motion for a new tria l because “the trial court did not grant thirty day s for the f

iling of a Motion for New Trial as it should have and the state filed its notice of a ppeal f irst,” there by

dep ri v i n g her of

her due p r o c e s s r ig h ts b y p r e v e n ti n g h e r f r o m f il in g th is mo ti o n

. T h e d e f e n d a n t is mi s r e a d in g Tenne ssee Cod e An no ta te d s e c tio n 4 0- 30 -1 13 (a ) ( 20 03 ), wh ic h s ta te s:-10- (a) When the trial judg e conducting a hearing pursuant to this part finds that the pe tit ion e r w a s d e nie d th e ri ght to an appea l f ro m th e orig ina l c on vic tio n in viola t i o n of the Constituti on of the United States or the Constitut ion of Tenne ssee and that ther e is a n adequate rec ord of the orig inal trial proce eding available for suc h revie w, the judg e can:
(1 ) I f a tr a ns c ri pt w a s f

ile d, g rant a

de la y e d a

pp e a l;
(2) I f, in the orig inal proce eding s, a motion for a ne w trial was fi l ed and

overr uled but no transcript was filed, authorize the fi ling of the transc ript in the convicting court; or
( 3 ) I f n o mo ti o n f

o r a n e w tria l w a s f

il e d in th e o r ig in a l p r o c e e d in g , a u th o r iz e such motion to be made befor e the orig inal trial court within thirty (30) day s. Such motion shall be disposed of by the orig inal trial court a s if the m otion had bee n filed under authority

of Rule 59 of the Rules of Civil Procedur e.

The statute clea

rly does not a llow both a delay ed appea l and a motion for a ne w trial. He re, the trial

c ou rt g rante d a de la y app e a l. A s su c h, the de fe nd a nt w a s n ot al so e nti tle d to thirty da y s in w hic h to file a motion for a

new tria l; and the t rial court did not err in not gr anting such. The State, ha ving be e n g rante d le a ve to a

pp e a l th e de fe nd a nt’ s se nte nc e , w a s f re e to f ile its no tic e of app e a l wh e n it did . Co ns e qu e ntl y , o nly the c la ims re la te d to th e de fe nd a nt’ s d e la y e d a pp e a l are pr op e rl y

be fo re thi s court.

III. Su ff iciency of Evid ence

I n her de lay ed appe al, t he defenda nt contends that the evidence was insuffic ient to support the jury ’s ve rd ic t. T he de fe nd a nt a rg ue s th a t “ [t]he e vid e nc e a s to the va lue of the pr op e rt y a lle g e dly taken is spec ulative at best” and that ther e wa s no evidenc e establishing that she exercised c ontrol

over any of the other stolen property aside fr om the television and VCR. The State ar g ues that the evidenc e wa s sufficient to support the jury ’s ver dict.

I n considering this issue, we apply the familiar rule that wher e sufficie ncy of the convicting evidenc e is cha lleng ed, the r eleva nt question of the re viewing court is "w hether , afte r vi ewing the evidenc e in the l ight most favor able to the pr osecution, any rational trier of fa ct could have found the essential elements of the crime bey ond a rea sonable doubt." J ackson v. V irg inia, 443 U.S. 307, 3 1 9 , 9 9 S

. C t

. 2 7 8 1 , 2 7 8 9 , 6 1 L

. E d

. 2 d 5 6 0 , 5 7 3 (1 9 7 9 ); s ee al s o T en n

. R

. Ap p

. P

. 1 3 (e ) ( "Fi n d i n gs of g uilt in c ri min a l a c tio ns wh e the r b y the tr ia l c ou rt

or jury sh a ll b e se t a sid e if

the e vid e nc e is ins uf fi c ie nt t o s up po rt

the fi nd ing s b y

the tr ie r o f f

a c t of g uil t b ey on d a

re a so na ble do ub t." ); Sta te v. Evans, 8 3 8 S.W .2d 185, 190-92 (Te nn. 1992); State v. Ander son, 835 S.W .2d 600, 604 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1992). All questions involving the cre dibilit y of witnesses, the weig ht and value to be g iven the evide nce, and all fac tual issues are resolved by the trier of fac t. See State v. Pappas, 754 S.W .2d 620, 623 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1987). "A g uiltyverdic t by the jury , approve d by

the trial judg e,-11-

acc redits the testimony of the witnesses for the State and resolves all conflicts in favor of the theory of t h e S t at e. " S t ate v. Gr ace , 493 S.W .2d 474, 476 (Tenn. 1973) . Our supre me court stated the

ratio na le fo r this ru le :

This well-settled rule rests on a sound f oundation. The trial judg e and the jury see the witnesses fac e to f ace , hear their testimony and obser ve their de meanor on the stand. Thus the trial judge and jury are the primary

instrumentality

of justice t o d e t e r m i n e t h e w e i g h ta n d c r e d i b i l i t y t o b e g i v e n t o t h e t e s t i m o n y o f w i t n e s s e s

. In the trial for

um alone is there human atmosphere and the tota l i t y o f t h e evide nce cannot be repr oduced w ith a written re cord in this Court.

Bolin v. State, 219 Tenn. 4, 11, 405 S.W.2d 768, 771 (1966) (citing Carroll v. State, 212 Tenn. 464, 370 S.W .2d 523 (1963)) . I n other wor ds, the State is e ntitled to the strong est leg itimate view of the evidenc e and a ll reasona

ble infer ence s that might be dr awn f rom the evide nce. See State v. Cabbag e, 57 1 S. W.2 d 8 32 , 835 (T e nn . 197 8) . A ju ry c on vic tio n r e mov e s th e pr e su mpt ion of inn oc e nc e wi th which a de fenda nt is ini tially cloake d and repla ces it with one of g uilt, so t hat on appe al, a c onvicted defe ndant has the bur den of de monstrating that the evidenc e is insufficient. See State v. Tug g le, 639 S.W .2d 913, 914 (Tenn. 1982)

.
I n T e nn e sse e , a

pe rs on c omm its the c ri me of the ft of pr op e rt y wh e n th a t pe rs on " kn ow ing ly obtains or exercise s control over the prope rty " of

another without the owner' s eff

ective c onsent and

w i t h t h e i n t e n tt o d e p r i v e t h e o w n e r o f t h e p r o p e r t y

. S e e T e n n

. C o d e A n n

. § 3 9

- 1 4

- 1 0 3 ( 2 0 0 3 )

. If the prope rty

has a va lue of $1,000 or more, but le ss tha n $10,000, the theft is a Class D fe lony . See Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-14-105( 3) (2003). The defe ndant ar g ues that the e vidence reg arding the value of the prope rty

was “ speculative at best.” “ Value” i s d efine d as “[t] he fa ir marke t value of the property

. . . at the time and place of the offe nse” but “ [i ]f the fair marke t va lue of the popery cannot be asc erta ined, the cost of r eplac ing the property within a reas o n ab l e t ime afte r the off ense.” See Te nn . Co de An n. § 3 9- 11 -1 06 (a )( 36 )( A) (i ), (i i) (2 00 3) . It is up to the jur y to d e te rm ine the fair

m ark e tv a l u e o f t h e i t e m s s t o l e n

. S t a t e v

. H a m m , 6 1 1 S

. W

. 2 d 8 2 6 , 8 2 8

- 2 9 ( T e n n

. 1 9 8 1 ) ( “ In de te rm ini ng the va lue of sto le n pr op e rt y in l arc e ny

c a se s, the tr ie r o f f

a c t is to d e te rm ine the fair c a sh marke t value of the stolen property at the time and plac e of the theft; neither the orig inal value nor the re place ment value of

the stolen g oods are rec og nized for this purpose.”)

.
The de fenda nt arg ues the e v idence was not suffic ient for a rational jury

to determine the value o f th e it e ms s to le n w a s a c tu a ll y $ 1 , 0 0 0

. We d is a g r e e

. U n d e r th e T e n n e s s e e Ru le s of Ev ide nc e , a “ wi tne ss ma y te sti fy to the va lue of the wi tne ss' s o wn pr op e rt y or se rv ic e s. ” Te nn . R. Evid. 701(b). The victim, in detail, desc ribed his stolen television as a 20" Mitsubis hi tabletop that he boug ht new for

$499 and which he v al u ed at $ 3 0 0 at t he time of the the ft. Also in detail, the victim described his stol en “super VHS” VCR that he purcha sed for $1,000 and value d at $700 at the time of the thef

t. He acknow ledg ed that he was not a war e of a ny one who would ha ve boug ht the VCR for $700 but pointed out that he was not try ing to se ll it. The $700 was what he would have asked f or fr om a willing buy er to buy it if he had decide d to se ll it. The de fenda nt was fr ee to put-12-

on evide n ce t o contra dict these va lues but did not do so. Under these c ircumstance s, a jury

rea sonably

could have found the c ombined value of the television and VCR to be $1,000.

Th e de fe nd a nt c ite s State v. Rob e rt Ni x, No . 136 , 199 1 WL 17 06 88 (T e nn . Crim . A pp . Se pt. 6, 1991), perm. to appeal denied (Tenn. Dec . 30, 1991), to arg ue that the victim’s opinion testimony reg arding the value of

his property

is “essentially

conjec ture or g uess-wor

k” and “is insufficient.” We f indNi x re a dil y

dis tin g uis ha

ble fr om the pr e se nt a

pp e a l. In N ix, th e vic tim of a larc e ny ini tia lly g uessed at the fac e value of some coins that we re stolen a nd later a dmitted to not knowing the value of the c oins at all. I d. at *2. This court, finding the evidenc e insuffic ient to determine the value of the coins, explained “[t] he evide nce upon which this [c]ourt must rely and the infe renc es there from to which the state is entitled must be base d upon proper foundation and not upon g uess work.” I d. Her e, ther e wa s no g uess work c oncerning the value of the television and VCR. The victim stated wh a t he wo uld se ll the te le vis ion a nd VC R fo r in the e ve nt of a sa le . H e ne ve r t e sti fi e d th a t he did not know what the va lue of the items wa s. He a lso describe d the items with sufficient detail to allow th e j u ryto decide if

the estimated va lues wer e appr opriate. We c onclude that this evidenc e wa s sufficie nt for a r ational jury to find the television and VCR wer e worth $1,000.

The de fenda nt also arg ues there was no e vidence showing that she had c ontrol over a ny of the other items that w ere stolen from the victim: the pigg y bank, the Pepsi-bottle full of pe nnies, and the L eathe rman tool. Even a cce pting, arguendo , that this is t rue, it does not af fec t the outcome of this case. We have alre ady determined that the evidenc e was sufficie nt to support the determination that the television and VCR wer e worth $1,000.
IV. Sentencing

As a c ondition of the defe ndant’s delay ed appe al, the State wa s g iven permissi on by the trial court to appe al the def

endant’ s sentence

. The State contends that the defe ndant should have be en sentenc ed as a

car eer , rathe r than a

persistent, off

ender beca use of her prior fe lony

rec ord. The defe ndant ar g ues that the re cord on appea l is insufficient to review the sentenc ing de termination.

Whe n th e Sta te c ha lle ng e s th e le ng th, rang e , or ma nn e r of se rv ic e of a se nte nc e , it is the du ty of this court to conduc t a de novo revie w on the rec ord with a presumption that "the determinations made by the court from which the a ppeal is take n ar e co rr ec t." Te nn. Code Ann. § 40-35- 402(d) (2003). This pre sumption i s "c onditioned upon the aff irmative showing in the rec ord t hat the trial

c o u r t c o n s i d e r e d t h e s e n t e n c i n g p r i n c i p l e s a n d a l l r e l e v a n tf a c t s a n d c i r c u m s t a n c e s

. " S t a t e v

. A s h b y, 823 S.W .2d 166, 169 (Tenn. 1 9 9 1 ). T h e pre sumption does not apply to the leg al conc lusions

rea ched by the trial court in sentenc ing the acc used or to the de terminations made by the trial court wh ic h a re pr e dic ate d u po n u nc on tr ov e rt e d f a c ts. Sta te v. B utl e r, 90 0 S. W.2 d 3 05 , 3 11 (T e nn . Crim. App. 1994); State v. Smit h, 891 S.W .2d 922, 929 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1994) ; State v. Bone stel, 871 S.W .2d 163, 166 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1993) , overr u l ed o n o t h er g rounds by State v. Hooper , 29 S

. W

. 3 d 1 , 9 (T e n n

. 2 0 0 0 ). Ho we v er , t h i s co u rt i s re q u i re d t o gi v e gr ea twe i gh tt o t h e t ri al co u rt 's determination of controve rted fac ts a s the trial court' s determination of these fa cts is predicated upon t h e w i t n es s es ' d em ea n o r a n d ap p ea ra n ce wh en t es t i fy i n g.-13-

I n conducting a de novo r e v ie w o f a s e n te n c e , th is c o u r t mu s t c o n s id e r ( a ) a nyevidenc e
rec eived at the trial and/or se ntencing h ea ri n g , (b) the pr esente nce r eport, (c ) the princ iples of sentenc ing, ( d) the a

rg uments of counse l relative to sente ncing alternatives, (e) the nature and char acte ristics of t he offense, (f) any mitigating or enhance ment fac tors, (g ) any statements made by the ac cused in his own behalf, and (h) the ac cused' s potential or lack of potential for r ehabilitation or tre at m en t

. Tenn. Code Ann. §§ 40- 35-103, -210 ( 2003); State v. Tay lor, 63 S.W .3d 400, 411 (Tenn. Crim. App. 2001)

. The pa rty challeng ing the sentenc e imposed by the trial court has t he burden of esta blishing that the sentenc e is err oneous. Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-35-402, Sente ncing Commi ssion Cm ts.; Ashby , 8 2 3 S

. W

. 2 d at 169. I f the a ppellate c ourt determines the sentenc e is err oneous, it “may aff irm, vacate, set as i de, incr ease or re duce the sentenc e imposed or r emand the c ase or direc t the entry of an a ppropriate order .” Te nn. Code Ann. § 40-35- 402(c) (2003).

A ca ree r off ender is a defe ndant who has at least six pri o r fe lony convictions of any classification (Classes A, B, C, D, or E) if the def endant' s curr ent conviction off ense is a Class D or E f e lon y . T e nn. Co de Ann . § 40 -3 5- 10 8( a )( 3) (2 00 3) . A s p re vio us ly dis c us se d, the ft

of pr op e rt y having a value of $1,000 or more but less than $10,000 is a Class D felo n y

. I n d et er m ining the number of prior convictions for the purpose of offender status, "[c]onvictions for mult iple felonies committed a s part of a single course of conduct within twe nty -four (24) hours cons t i t u t e o n e ( 1) conviction for the purpose of determining prior convictions." Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-35- 108(b)( 4) (2003). This is often r efe rre d to as the " twenty -four -hour mer g er ru l e. " A def endant’ s “prior convictions” will include “ convictions under the law s o f anyother state, g overnme nt, or country wh ic h, if c omm itt e d in thi s st a te , w ou ld h a ve c on sti tut e d a n o ff e ns e c og niza

ble by the la ws of

thi s state.” Te nn. Code Ann. § 4 0 -3 5 -1 0 8 (b)(5) (2003). I f the trial c ourt finds a de fenda nt is a car eer offe nder be y ond a reasonable doubt, the defendant “ shall rec eive the ma x imum sentence w ithin the

app lic able Ra ng e I I I .” Te nn . Code An n. § 40- 35 -1 08 (c ) (2 00 3) . When a de fe nd a nt h a s th e re qu isi te number of prior felonies, “ a trial c ourt has no discretion with re spect to the leng th of the sentenc e
a ndmus t impo se the ma ximum se nte nc e pu rs ua nt to Te nn

. Cod e An n. § 4 0- 35 -1 08 .” Sta te v. Rita Davis, No. M2000-03227- CCA-R3-CD, 2001 WL 1398138, at *3 (Tenn. Crim. App. Nov. 9, 2001), perm. to appe al denied ( Tenn. May 6, 2002). Either pa

rty may appea l the finding that the def endant is or is not a car eer

offe nder. Te nn. Code Ann. § 40-35- 108(d) ( 2003).
The sole que stion on appeal c oncerning the defe ndant’s sente ncing i s wh et h er she was
corr ectly determined to be a pe rsistent, rather than a c ar ee r, o ffender. A fter a revie w of he r prior felony rec ord, we concludethat t h e d ef endant should have bee n sentenc ed as a car eer offe nder beca use she has more than six prior felonies. He r pre sentenc e re port shows that she has two prior felony convictions fr o m Geor g ia: (1) a 1978 arme d robbery

from De Kalb County

for whic h she

rec eived a

five-y ear sentenc e; and ( 2) a 1983 c redit ca rd theft f rom DeK alb County

for whic h she

rec eived a three -y ear sentenc e. The pre sentenc e re port also shows the def endant pled g uiltyin 1996 to thirty -two counts of f

org ery in L oudon County , Tenne ssee, rec eiving a total f our-y ear sentenc e.D u rin g th e s ent enci ng heari ng, bo t h t he Stat e and de fense counsel s t at ed t hese f o rgeri es t o o k place ove r a 10

se v e n -d a y p e rio d . B e c a u se w e d o no t ha v e the c e rtifi e d c o p ie s o f t h e ju d g m e n ts, we c a n n o t ex p la in th e d isc re p a n c y.
-14- A c c o r d i n g t o t h e p r e s e n t e n c e r e p o r t , t h e s e t h i r t y- t w o c o u n t s s tr e t c h e d o u to v e r e i g h ts e p ar a t e d a ys

10 in October

1994: (1) one c ount of

forg ery on October

19; (2) five counts of for g ery on October

20; (3) se ven counts of f

org ery on October

21; (4) six counts of forg ery on October 22; (5) one c ount of forg ery on October

23; (6) five counts of for g ery o n Oc t o b er 24; (7) five counts of for g ery on October 25; (8) two counts of f

org ery on October 26. Under Tenne ssee Code A nnotated sec tion 40- 35-108, the de fenda nt meets the criteria for being a ca

ree r offender and, as such, t he trial c ourt err ed in sentencing her a s a per sistent offende r.

The defenda nt corr ectly points out that the record on appea l does not contain ce rtified copie s of judg ments for a ll of these convic tions. The rec ord on appe al contains a certified copy of only

the G e o r g ia ar me d r o b b e r y ju d g me n t f r o m 1 9 7 8 , th e d o c u me n t b e in g in tr o d u c e d in to e v id e nce a t the

se nte nc ing he ari ng

. Th e de fe nd a nt a lso c or re c tly no te s th a t “ [i]t is the du ty of the app e a lin g pa

rt y to p r e p ar e a

f a ir , a c c u r a te a n d c o mp le te r e c o r d o n ap p e a l t o e n ab le me a n in g f u l a p p e ll a te r e view.” State v. Walker, 29 S.W .3d 885, 895 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1999) (citing Tenn. R. App. P. 24(b)). The defe ndant ar g ues that we cannot use the pre sentenc e re port as part of our de novo revie w bec ause, althoug h it is part of the tec hnical re cord, it wa s never o ff ere d into evidence at the sente ncing hearing, use d by

the trial court in reac hing its sentenc ing de cision, and conta ins “triple hea rsay .”

Addre ssing the de fenda nt’s arg uments conce rning the pre sentenc e re port, we first find she has wa ived her

arg ument that the pre senten ce report cannot be c onsidered on a ppellate r eview beca use it c ontains “triple hear say .” The time to make this arg ument was at the trial court leve l and is not appro p ri at e t o bring up for the f irst time on appeal. In addition, though the r ecor d is not entirely clea r, it would appea

r that the trial c ourt d i d have a copy of the pre sentenc e re port during the sentenc ing he aring , as the State made ref ere nce during the hearing to the report. F inally , even if we did not consider

the pre sentenc e re port to make t h e d et er m i n ati on that the def endant ha d at least six prior felonies, the convictions that wer e discussed at the sentenc ing hearing are sufficie nt to fi nd the de fe nd a nt ha d mor e than six prior fe lon y c on vic tio ns . A t th e se nte nc ing he ari ng , th e Sta te la id ou t in de ta il the de fe nd a nt’ s p ri or c on vic tio ns , a ndthe se we re no t ob je c te d to by

the de fe nd a nt. I n f a c t, h e r atto rn e y

a ndthe Sta te bo th a g re e d tha t sh e ha d tw o p ri or

fe lon y c on vic tio ns in G e or g ia and that the thirt y -t wo forge ry convictions happe ned over a seve n-day

period. De fense counsel ag ree d that, even w ithout counting the Geor g ia convictions, the defe ndant had more than six prior felonies whe n just c onsidering the thirty -two counts of forg ery from L oudon County . As such, we find the re cord is suff

icient to support the finding that the defe ndant has more than six prior fe lonies and, pursua nt to Tennessee Code Annotated se ction 40-35-402( c), r emand to t h e t ri al court for

corr ect se ntencing as a c are er of fende r.-15- CO NC LU SION

Ba sed upon the for eg oing a uthorities and re asoning , we a ffirm the de fendant’s conviction and re mand for r esente ncing as a c are er of fende r.

___________________________________

ALAN E. GL

ENN, JUDGE