area handbook series

Ghana

a country study



Ghana

a country study

Federal Research Division

Library of Congress

Edited by

LaVerle Berry

Research Completed

November 1 994
On the cover: Gold weight in the form of a portrait

mask (Asante)

Third Edition, First Printing, 1995.

Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data

Ghana : a country study / Federal Research Division, Library

of Congress ; edited by LaVerle Berry.—3rd ed.

p. cm. — (Area handbook series, ISSN 1057-5294)

(DA Pam; 550-153)

"Supersedes the 1971 edition of Ghana : a country

study, coauthored by Irving Kaplan et al."—T.p. verso. "Research completed November 1994." Includes bibliographical references (pp. 319-349) and

index.

ISBN 0-8444-0835-2 (he : alk. paper)

1. Ghana. I. Berry, LaVerle Bennette, 1942- . II. Library of Congress. Federal Research Division. III. Series. IV. Series: DA Pam ; 550-153

DT510.G44 1995 95-18891

966.7—dc20 CIP

Headquarters, Department of the Army

DA Pam 550-153

For sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office Washington, D.C. 20402
Foreword

This volume is one in a continuing series of books prepared

by the Federal Research Division of the Library of Congress

under the Country Studies/Area Handbook Program sponsored by the Department of the Army. The last two pages of this

book list the other published studies.

Most books in the series deal with a particular foreign country, describing and analyzing its political, economic, social, and

national security systems and institutions, and examining the

interrelationships of those systems and the ways they are shaped by cultural factors. Each study is written by a multidisciplinary team of social scientists. The authors seek to provide a

basic understanding of the observed society, striving for a dynamic rather than a static portrayal. Particular attention is devoted to the people who make up the society, their origins,

dominant beliefs and values, their common interests and the

issues on which they are divided, the nature and extent of their

involvement with national institutions, and their attitudes

toward each other and toward their social system and political

order.

The books represent the analysis of the authors and should

not be construed as an expression of an official United States

government position, policy, or decision. The authors have

sought to adhere to accepted standards of scholarly objectivity.

Corrections, additions, and suggestions for changes from readers will be welcomed for use in future editions.

Louis R. Mortimer

Chief

Federal Research Division

Library of Congress

Washington, DC 20540-5220

iii

Acknowledgments

The authors wish to acknowledge the contributions of the

coauthors of the 1971 edition of Ghana: A Country Study. Their

work provided general background for the present volume.

The authors also gratefully acknowledge the numerous individuals in various government agencies and private institutions

who gave of their time, research materials, and expertise in the

production of this book. These individuals include Ralph K. Benesch, who oversees the Country Studies/Area Handbook

program for the Department of the Army.

The staff of the Federal Research Division who contributed

directly to preparation of the manuscript also deserve recognition. These people include Sandra W. Meditz, who reviewed all drafts and served as liaison with the sponsoring agency; Marilyn L. Majeska, who managed editing and production; Andrea

T. Merrill, who edited tables and figures; Ramon Miro and Tim

L. Merrill, who provided research support; and Barbara Edgerton and Izella Watson, who did word processing. Stephen C.

Cranton, David R Cabitto, and Janie L. Gilchrist prepared the

camera-ready copy.

Also involved in preparing the text were PeterJ. Tietjen, who

edited the text; Helen Chapin Metz, who helped with editing;

and Carolyn Hinton, who performed the prepublication editorial review. Joan C. Cook compiled the index.

David R Cabitto prepared the graphics. Harriett R. Blood

prepared the topography and drainage map; Thomas D. Hall

drafted the remaining maps. David R Cabitto and the firm of

Greenhorne and O'Mara prepared the final maps. Special

thanks go to Teresa Kamp, who prepared the illustrations on

the title page of each chapter and the cover art. The editor and the authors acknowledge the generosity of

the Embassy of Ghana, the White House, James Sanders, and

Brook, Rose, and Cooper Le Van, who allowed their photographs to be used in this study. Staff of the Embassy of Ghana

in addition provided invaluable guidance in the drafting of the

rank and insignia charts. Finally, the editor wishes to acknowledge the support given by authors David Owusu-Ansah, Maxwell Owusu, and Thomas R Ofcansky to this volume. Their

devotion clearly exceeded the normal call of duty.

Contents

Page

Foreword iii Acknowledgments v Preface xiii Table A. Chronology of Important Events xv Country Profile xix

Introduction xxix

Chapter 1. Historical Setting 1 James L. McLaughlin and David Owusu-Ansah

THE PRECOLONIAL PERIOD 5 ARRIVAL OF THE EUROPEANS 8

Early European Contact and the Slave Trade 8 Britain and the Gold Coast: The Early Years 13

THE COLONIAL ERA: BRITISH RULE OF THE

GOLD COAST 16

Colonial Administration , . 17

Economic and Social Development 21

THE GROWTH OF NATIONALISM AND THE END

OF COLONIAL RULE 24

Early Manifestations of Nationalism 24

The Politics of the Independence Movements 26

INDEPENDENT GHANA 30

Nkrumah, Ghana, and Africa 32

The Growth of Opposition to Nkrumah 35

THE FALL OF THE NKRUMAH REGIME AND

ITS AFTERMATH 36

The National Liberation Council and the

Busia Years, 1966-71 37

The National Redemption Council Years,

1972-79 42

GHANA AND THE RAWLINGS ERA 46

The Second Coming of Rawlings: The First Six

vii
Years, 1982-87 48

The District Assemblies 53

Chapter 2. The Society and Its Environment 59

David Owusu-Ansah

PHYSICAL SETTING 62

Location and Size 62

Geographical Regions 63

Rivers and Lakes 70

Climate 72

POPULATION 73

Population Distribution 74

Urban-Rural Disparities 75

Family Planning 77

ETHNIC GROUPS AND LANGUAGES 79

Language Diversity 82

Major Ethnic Groups 83

SOCIAL ORGANIZATION AND SOCIAL CHANGE 90

Traditional Patterns of Social Relations 90

Social Change 93

Urban Society 96

The Position of Women 99

RELIGION AND SOCIETY 102

Christianity and Islam in Ghana 104

Traditional Religion 107

Syncretic Religions 108

HEALTH AND WELFARE 109

HealthCare Ill

Acquired Immune Deficiency

Syndrome (AIDS) 114

SOCIAL WELFARE 115

EDUCATION 117

The Education System 120

Problems in Education 123

Adult Education 124

Chapter 3. The Economy 129

Nancy L. Clark

HISTORICAL BACKGROUND 1 32

OVERVIEW OF THE CURRENT ECONOMY 1 36

STRUCTURE OF THE ECONOMY 137

viii
Gross Domestic Product 139

Debt and Inflation 140

Trade 140

ROLE OF THE GOVERNMENT 1 44

The Economic Recovery Program 144

State Enterprises 146

Budgets 148

BANKING AND CURRENCY 150

Banking 151

Currency 153

LABOR FORCE 155

National Requirements 155

Income and Wages 157

AGRICULTURE 158

Cocoa 160

Other Commercial Crops 162

Food Crops and Livestock 164

Forestry 165

Fishing 167

MINING AND PETROLEUM INDUSTRIES 1 68

Gold 169

Diamonds 173

Manganese 173

Petroleum Exploration 174

MANUFACTURING AND TOURISM 1 75

Manufacturing 175

Electric Power 178

Tourism 179

TRANSPORTATION AND TELECOMMUNICATIONS .... 180

Roads and Railroads 181

Ports and Shipping 181

Civil Aviation 183

Telecommunications 183

FOREIGN INVESTMENTS AND ASSISTANCE 1 84

Investment 186

Foreign Assistance and Loans 187

Balance of Trade and Payments 188

GROWTH TRENDS AND POTENTIAL 1 89

Chapter 4. Government and Politics 191

Maxwell Owusu

IX
THE PROVISIONAL NATIONAL DEFENCE COUNCIL. . . 194

The Political Scene under the PNDC 196

Revolutionary Organs 199

THE TRANSITION FROM MILITARY RULE TO

DEMOCRATIC GOVERNMENT 200

Political Ferment under the PNDC 200

Interest Groups and National Politics 203

District Assembly Elections 206

Charting the Political Transition 208

Presidential Elections 211

Parliamentary Elections 215

THE FOURTH REPUBLIC 216

The 1992 Constitution 216

The Judiciary 219

The Civil Service 222

The Media 222

Regional and Local Government 224

POLITICAL DYNAMICS UNDER THE

FOURTH REPUBLIC 227

Launching the Fourth Republic 227

Developing Democratic Institutions 230

FOREIGN RELATIONS 235

Guiding Principles and Objectives 235

Relations with Immediate African Neighbors 237

The Organization of African Unity

and the Rest of Africa 243

Britain and the Commonwealth 245

The United States 246

Other Countries 248

International Organizations 251

FUTURE DEMOCRATIC PROSPECTS 252

Chapter 5. National Security 255

Thomas P. Ofcansky

INTERNATIONAL SECURITY CONCERNS 258

INTERNAL SECURITY CONCERNS 260

THE ARMED FORCES IN NATIONAL LIFE 261

The Armed Forces in the Past 262

The Development of the Modern Army 268

THE MILITARYAND THE GOVERNMENT 270

The National Liberation Council, 1966-69 270

x
The Acheampong Regime, 1972-78 271

The Akuffo Coup, 1978 272

The 1979 Coup and the First Rawlings

Government 273

The 1981 Coup and the Second Rawlings

Government 273

THE MILITARYAND THE ECONOMY 276

ARMED FORCES MISSION, ORGANIZATION,

AND STRENGTH 277

MILITARY MANPOWER, TRAINING, AND MORALE 278

Manpower 278

Training 279

Morale 281

Uniforms, Ranks, and Insignia 282

FOREIGN MILITARYASSISTANCE 282

Britain 283

Canada. . 286

Soviet Union 286

German Democratic Republic 288

China 288

Israel 289

United States 289

Italy 289

Libya 290

STATE SECURITYSERVICES 290

CRIMINALJUSTICE 293

Criminal Code and Courts 294

Prison System 296

HUMAN RIGHTS 298

MILITARY TRENDS 301

Appendix. Tables 305

Bibliography 319

Glossary 351

Index 355

Contributors 379

List of figures

1 Administrative Divisions of Ghana, 1994 xxviii

xi
2 Asante Expansion and Major European Fortresses

in the Eighteenth Century 10

3 Administrative Divisions of the Gold Coast,

mid-1950s 18

4 Topography and Drainage 66

5 Estimated Population by Age and Gender, 1990 — 76

6 Principal Ethnolinguistic Groups 80

7 Economic Activity, 1994 138

8 Gross Domestic Product (GDP) by Sector, 1991 ... 142

9 Employment by Sector, 1988 156

10 Transportation System, 1994 182

1 1 Structure of Provisional National Defence Council

(PNDC), 1982-88 198

12 Structure of Government of the Fourth

Republic, 1994 218

13 Structure of Local Government, 1994 226

14 Officer Ranks and Insignia, 1994 284

15 Enlisted Ranks and Insignia, 1994 285

xii
Preface

This study replaces Ghana: A Country Study, which was completed in 1971 during the second effort to establish republican

government in Ghana under Kofi Abrefa Busia. Since then,

Ghana has experienced four military governments and a third

attempt at representative democracy before the inauguration

of the Fourth Republic in January 1993. Since the early 1980s,

the dominant developments in Ghana have been the adoption

of an economic structural adjustment program backed by

international lending agencies and a prolonged transition to a new form of elective government, both presided over by a military government headed by Flight Lieutenant Jerry John Rawlings. Rawlings continues to dominate political life, having been

elected president in national elections in November 1992, one

of the crucial steps in the latest attempt at representative government.

This edition of Ghana: A Country Study examines the record

of the military government after 1981 and of the first two years

of the Fourth Republic, 1992-94. Subsequent events are discussed in the Introduction.

This study is an attempt to treat in a concise and objective

manner the dominant historical, social, economic, political,

and national security aspects of contemporary Ghana. Sources

of information used in preparing this volume include scholarly

books, journals, and monographs; official reports of governments and international organizations; Ghanaian newspapers;

the authors' previous research and observations; and numerous periodicals. Chapter bibliographies appear at the end of

the book; brief comments on some of the more valuable

sources recommended for further reading appear at the end of

each chapter.

All measurements in this book are given in the metric sys- tem. A conversion table is provided to assist those readers who

are unfamiliar with metric measurements (see table 1, Appendix) . A Glossary is also included to explain terms with which

the reader may not be familiar.

Place-names follow the system adopted by the United States Board on Geographic Names (BGN) . The authors have fol- lowed current and more accurate usage by using the term

Asante rather than Ashanti in referring to one of the most

xiii
prominent of Ghana's peoples and indigenous states. The term

Ashanti, which was generally employed during the pre-independence period, does, however, still appear in some geographic

and commercial contexts. The reader should refer to the Glossary for further explanation.

The body of the text reflects information available as of

November 1994. Certain other portions of the text, however,

have been updated. The Introduction discusses significant

events that have occurred since the completion of research, the

Country Profile and Chronology include updated information

as available, and the Bibliography lists recently published

sources thought to be particularly helpful to the reader.

xiv
Table A. Chronology ofImportant Events

Period Description EARLY HISTORY

ca. 10,000 B.C.

ca. 4000 B.C.

ca. 100 B.C. FORMATIVE

CENTURIES

ca. AD. 1200

ca. 1298

1471-82 1500-1807

1697-1745 NINETEENTH CENTURY

1843-44

1873-74

1874

1878 1896

TWENTIETH CENTURY

1900

1902 1914-18

1919

1925

Earliest recorded probable human habitation within modern Ghana at

site on Oti River. Oldest date for pottery at Stone Age site near Accra.

Early Iron Age at Tema.

Guan begin their migrations down Volta Basin from Gonja toward Gulf

of Guinea. Akan kingdom of Bono (Brong) founded. Other states had arisen or were beginning to rise about this time.

First Europeans arrive. Portuguese build Elmina Castle. Era of slave raids and wars and of intense state formation in Gold Coast.

Rise and consolidation of Asante Empire.

British government signs Bond of 1844 with Fante chiefs.

Last Asante invasion of coast. British capture Kumasi.

Britain establishes Gold Coast Colony. Cocoa introduced to Ghana.

Anglo-Asante war leads to exile of asantehene znd British protectorate over Asante.

First Africans appointed to colony's Legislative Council. Northern Territories proclaimed a British protectorate. Gold Coast Regiment serves with distinction in East Africa. German Togo becomes a mandate under Gold Coast administration.

Constitution of 1925 calls for six chiefs to be elected to Legislative Council. 1939-45 Gold Coast African forces serve in Ethiopia and Burma.

XV
Table A. Chronology ofImportant Events

Period Description

1947 United Gold Coast Convention founded. 1949 Kwame Nkrumah breaks with United Gold Coast Convention and forms

Convention People's Party. 1951 New constitution leads to general elections. Convention People's Party wins two-thirds majority. 1954 New constitution grants broad powers to Nkrumah's government

1956 Plebiscite in British Togoland calls for union with Gold Coast

Convention People's Party wins 68 percent of seats in legislature and

passes an independence motion, which British Parliament approves. 1957 British Colony of the Gold Coast becomes independent Ghana

on March 6. 1958 Entrenched protection clauses of constitution repealed; regional assemblies abolished; Preventive Detention Act passed. 1960 Plebiscite creates a republic on July 1, with Nkrumah as president 1964 Ghana declared a one-party state. Completion of Akosombo Dam.

1966 While Nkrumah is in China, army stages widely popular coup. National

Liberation Council comes to power. 1969 Progress Party, led by Kofi Abrefa Busia, wins National Assembly elections. 1972 Lieutenant Colonel Ignatius Acheampong leads a military coup in January that brings National Redemption Council to power.

1 978 Fellow military officers ease Acheampong from power. 1979 Junior officers stage Ghana's first violent coup, June 4. Armed Forces Revolutionary Council formed under Flight LieutenantJerry John

Rawlings. Hilla Limann elected president in July. 1981 Rawlings stages second coup, December 31. Provisional National Defence Council established with Rawlings as chairman.

1 983 First phase of Economic Recovery Program introduced with World Bank

and International Monetary Fund support. 1985 National Commission for Democracy, established to plan the democratization of Ghana's political system, officially inaugurated in January. 1988-89 Elections for new district assemblies begin in early December and continue through February 1989. 1990 Various organizations call for return to civilian government and multi- parry politics, among them Movement for Freedom andJustice, founded in August.
Table A. Chronology ofImportant Events

Period Description

1991 Provisional National Defence Council announces its acceptance, in May, of multipartyism in Ghana. June deadline set for creation of Consultative Assembly to discuss nation's new constitution. 1992 National referendum in April approves draft of new democratic constitution. Formation and registration of political parties become legal in May. JerryJohn Rawlings elected president November 3 in national

presidential election. Parliamentary elections of December 29 boycotted by major opposition parties, resulting in landslide victory for National Democratic Congress. 1993 Ghana's Fourth Republic inaugurated January 4 with the swearing in of

Rawlings as president. Late 1994- Ghana hosts peace talks for warring factions of Liberian civil war.

early 1995

1995 President Rawlings pays official visit to the United States, March 8-9, first such visit by a Ghanaian head of state in more than thirty years.

Country Profile

Country

Formal Name: Republic of Ghana.

Short Form: Ghana.

Term for Citizens: Ghanaian (s). Capital: Accra.

Date of Independence: March 6, 1957.

Note—The Country Profile contains updated information as available.

xix
Geography

Size: 238,533 square kilometers, roughly the size of the states of

Illinois and Indiana.

Topography: Generally low physical relief except in the east. Five distinct geographical regions: low plains inland from

Atlantic coast; northern plateau stretching from western

border to Volta River Basin averaging 450 meters in height;

mountainous uplands along eastern border, bisected in south

by Volta River Gorge; Volta River Basin in center; and dissected

plateau up to 300 meters high in north.

Climate: Tropical climate governed by interaction of dry

continental airmass from the northeast and moist southwest

equatorial system. Annual mean temperature between 26°C

and 29°C. Annual rainfall varies from more than 2,100

millimeters in southwest to 1,000 millimeters in north.

Vegetation heaviest in south, thinning to savanna and dry

plains in north.

Society

Population: Estimated at 17.2 million in mid-1994, up from

about 6.7 million in 1960; approximately half under age

fifteen. Growth rate more than 3 percent per year since 1980.

1990 population density sixty-three persons per square

kilometer; density highest in southwestern third of country,

thinnest in center, higher in north. About 33 percent urban in

1992.

Ethnolinguistic Groups: Approximately 100 ethnolinguistic

groups, all further subdivided into numerous cultural and

linguistic units. Major ethnic groups are the Akan, Ewe, MoleDagbane, Guan, and Ga-Adangbe. Languages belong either to Kwa or to Gur subfamily of Niger-Congo language family. Kwa

speakers, found to south of Volta River, include the Akan, Ewe,

and Ga-Adangbe. Gur speakers live north of Volta River and

include the Grusi, Gurma, and Mole-Dagbane. English is official language used in government, large-scale business,

national media, and school beyond primary level. Akan, Ewe,

Ga, Nzema, Dagbane, and Hausa (a trade language from

Nigeria) also used in radio and television broadcasting.

Religion: According to 1985 estimate, 62 percent Christian, 15

xx
percent Muslim, 22 percent indigenous or nonbelievers.

Christians composed of Protestants (25 percent, Methodists

and Presbyterians especially numerous), Roman Catholics (15

percent), Protestant Pentecostals (8 percent), and

Independent African Churches (about 14 percent). Muslims

mostly Sunni. Christianity predominates in center and south,

Islam in north.

Health: Large number of infectious diseases endemic to tropics, including cholera, typhoid, tuberculosis, anthrax,

pertussis, yellow fever, hepatitis, trachoma, and malaria. Other

diseases include schistosomiasis, guinea worm, dysentery,

onchocerciasis, venereal diseases, and poliomyelitis.

Malnutrition also widespread. Average life expectancy fifty-six

years in 1993. Severe shortage of hospital beds and doctors.

Since late 1980s, government has emphasized immunization

and primary health care programs. Incidence of acquired

immune deficiency syndrome (AIDS) second highest in West

Africa and rising.

Education: Education system consists of primary (six years)

,

junior secondary (three years), and senior secondary (three

years) after reforms of mid-1980s eliminated former middle

schools; polytechnic institutions; and four universities.

Universal education remains an unrealized goal, but most

children have access to primary and junior secondary schools.

Local vernacular is language of instruction on primary level,

English thereafter. All students pay textbook fees. Enrollments

for 1990-91: primary 1.8 million, junior secondary 609,000,

senior secondary 200,000. In 1989-90 about 11,500 students

attended polytechnic schools. Enrollment in universities at Legon, Kumasi, and Cape Coast totaled 9,251 in 1989-90; in

1993 a fourth university opened at Tamale. In early 1990s, the

government instituted fees for boarding and lodging,

provoking student demonstrations. Adult literacy rate

reportedly about 40 percent in 1989.

Economy

General Character: At independence, economy based on cocoa and gold; country relatively prosperous. After mid-1960s,

economy stagnated, characterized by weak commodity

demand, outmoded equipment, overvalued currency,

smuggling, and foreign debt. Since 1983 Economic Recovery

xxi
Program (a structural adjustment program) has resulted in

new investment and rising exports of cocoa, gold, and timber,

but also in high foreign debt and little improvement in general

standard of living.

Gross Domestic Product (GDP): In 1992 GDP was US$6.1

billion; per capita income US$380.

Budget: In 1993 about 0667 billion, including £119 billion

deficit (roughly US$1.1 billion and US$187 million,

respectively, based on mid-1993 exchange rate).

Agriculture, Forestry, and Fishing: In 1991 agriculture most

important sector of economy, constituting just under half of

GDP, down from 60 percent in 1983. Production of exports

and food crops fell steadily after mid-1960s; major recovery

began in 1980s. Cocoa most important cash crop; Ghana

world's third largest cocoa producer as of 1992-93 crop year. Other cash crops—palm oil, cotton, tobacco, sugarcane,

rubber, and kenaf (used in fiber bags) —much less important.

Major food crops: yams, corn, cassava, and other root crops.

Forests cover southern third of country. Commercial forestry

major industry; deforestation serious problem. Livestock

production negligible outside far north. Limited commercial

fishing industry.

Industry: In 1960s largest manufacturing industries included

aluminum, saw mills and timber processing, cocoa processing,

breweries, cement, oil refining, textiles, and vehicle assembly.

Factory output fell as low as 21 percent of capacity by 1982 but

recovered to average of 40 percent in 1989. In early 1990s,

many textile, pharmaceutical, leather, and electronics factories

reportedly closed because of economic liberalization and

foreign competition.

Mining: Major minerals are gold, bauxite, manganese, and

diamonds. Mineral production fell precipitously during 1970s,

recovered during 1980s. Minerals second highest export

earner in early 1990s. Gold most important mineral, long

associated with ancient and contemporary Ghana. Production

in 1992 more than 1 million fine ounces and rising, surpassing cocoa as chief export earner. One of world's leading producers

of manganese, but early 1990s production less than half mid1970s output. Diamonds mostly industrial grade; 1992

production 694,000 carats and increasing. Large bauxite

xxii
reserves little exploited.

Energy: Commercial quantities of petroleum offshore, but

output negligible in early 1990s. Hydroelectric generating

capacity nearly 1.2 megawatts, mostly at Akosombo Dam on

Volta River; 60 percent consumed by Volta Aluminum

Company, remainder consumed domestically or sold to Togo

and Benin. Significant expansion planned. Northern regions

being connected to national power grid.

Foreign Trade: Major exports—cocoa, gold, timber, and

industrial diamonds—mainly to Germany, Britain, United

States, and Japan. Major imports—capital goods, oil, consumer

goods, and intermediate goods—mostly from Britain, Nigeria,

United States, and Germany Ghana's trade balance, negative

since 1980s, estimated at -US$190 million for 1994.

External Debt: US$4.6 billion in 1993.

Currency and Exchange Rate: Cedi(0), divided into 100

pesewas. In April 1995, US$1.00 = 01,105.

Fiscal Year: Calendar Year. Transportation and Telecommunications

Roads: Most regions accessible by road network of more than

32,000 kilometers; 12,000 classified as main roads. About 6,000

kilometers paved, remainder gravel or earth. Since 1985 major

repairs under way on all main and some feeder roads.

Railroads: 953 kilometers of narrow gauge (1.067 meter) track;

only thirty-two kilometers double-tracked. Serve only southern

industrial/commercial centers, mainly connecting Accra,

Sekondi-Takoradi, and Kumasi. Limited renovation under way

as part of Economic Recovery Program.

Civil Aviation: Eleven airfields, including Kotoka International

Airport at Accra and major domestic airports at SekondiTakoradi, Kumasi, and Tamale. Ghana Airways operates small

fleet on domestic and international routes. In early 1990s,

runways, lighting, and freight and terminal buildings upgraded

at Kotoka.

Ports and Waterways: Two deep artificial harbors—Tema (2.7-

million-ton capacity) and Takoradi (projected 1.6-million-ton

capacity). More than 1,100-kilometer navigable network on

Lake Volta, with additional ports planned; 168 kilometers of

xxiii
Ankobra River, Tano River, and Volta River navigable. Small

merchant marine of one refrigerated and five cargo ships.

Telecommunications: Relatively limited telecommunications

system. About 45,000 telephones in 1993, concentrated in

Accra. Two domestic radio-relay systems, one east-west serving

coastal cities, one north-south connecting Accra with Burkina

Faso. International telecommunications via link with

International Telecommunications Satellite Corporation

(Intelsat) Atlantic Ocean Satellite. Four AM and one FM radio

stations; four television stations; two domestic shortwave

transmitters broadcast in English and six local languages; one

international transmitter broadcasts in English, French, and

Hausa.

Government and Politics

Government: A parliamentary democracy at independence in

1957, followed by alternating military and civilian

governments. In January 1993, military government gave way

to Fourth Republic after presidential and parliamentary

elections in late 1992. The 1992 constitution divides powers

among a president, parliament, cabinet, Council of State, and

an independent judiciary. Government elected by universal

suffrage.

Administrative Divisions: Ten administrative regions divided

into 110 districts, each with its own District Assembly. Below

districts are various types of councils, including fifty-eight town

or area councils, 108 zonal councils, and 626 area councils.

16,000 unit committees on lowest level. Judicial System: Legal system based on Ghanaian common law,

customary (traditional) law, and the 1992 constitution. Court

hierarchy consists of Supreme Court of Ghana (highest court)

,

Court of Appeal, and High Court ofJustice. Beneath these

bodies are district, traditional, and local courts. Extrajudicial

institutions include public tribunals, vigilante groups, and asafo

companies. Since independence, courts relatively

independent; this independence continues under Fourth

Republic. Lower courts being redefined and reorganized

under Fourth Republic.

Politics: Since mid-1992 political parties legal after ten-year

hiatus. Under Fourth Republic, major parties are National

Democratic Congress, led by Jerry John Rawlings, which won

xxiv
presidential and parliamentary elections in 1992; New Patriotic

Party, major opposition party; People's National Convention,

led by former president Hilla Limann; and (new) People's

Convention Party, successor to Kwame Nkrumah's original

party of same name.

Foreign Relations: Since independence, fervently devoted to ideals of nonalignment and Pan-Africanism, both closely

identified with first president, Kwame Nkrumah. Favors

international and regional political and economic

cooperation. Active member of United Nations and

Organization of African Unity. In 1994 President Rawlings

elected chairman of Economic Community of West African

States. National Security

Armed Forces: In 1994 armed forces totaled about 6,859 active

personnel, consisting of army, 5,000; air force, 1,000; and navy, 850. Missions are to protect against foreign aggression and to maintain internal security. Armed forces aided in these

missions by various paramilitary forces.

Major Military Units: Army largest and best-equipped service

and primary unit of defense. Air force and navy both smaller

and subordinate to army. All three services hindered by

equipment maintenance problems and low states of combat

readiness.

Military Equipment: Army equipment mostly older and poorly

maintained weapons, largely of British, Brazilian, Swiss,

Swedish, Israeli, and Finnish manufacture. Air force equipped

with combat, transport, and training aircraft. Navy possesses

eight sizable ships, including two corvettes and four fast-attack

craft. All three services experience budgetary and maintenance

problems.

Defense Budget: Defense spending high in 1960s, declined in

1970s and 1980s. In 1992 defense budget about US$105

million, less than 2 percent of budgetary expenditures.

Foreign Military Relations: During colonial and early

independence periods, military training and equipment came

from Britain. In 1960s and after, military relations diversified to include Soviet Union, China, German Democratic Republic

(East Germany), and Libya. In 1990s Ghana revived military

xxv
ties with Britain, United States, and other Western countries.

Ghana also providing military units for peacekeeping

operations in Liberia and Rwanda and observers and police for

several United Nations missions.

Internal Security Forces: Consist of more than 16,000 General

Police, 5,000-member People's Militia, and National Civil

Defence Force composed of all able-bodied citizens. Since

independence, stature of police has varied according to role in

suppression of dissent, extortion, and bribery. In 1990s police

involved in various United Nations international peacekeeping

operations.

xxvi

f (g) UPPER EASp

f

Bolgatanga y-.

• ; .. ; /;. ;-1Vh

International boundary

Region boundary ® National capital ® Region capital

Figure 1. Administrative Divisions of Ghana, 1994

xxviii
Introduction

WHEN GHANA ACHIEVED INDEPENDENCE from colonial

domination in 1957, the first country in sub-Saharan Africa to do so, it enjoyed economic and political advantages unrivaled

elsewhere in tropical Africa. The economy was solidly based on

the production and export of cocoa, of which Ghana was the

world's leading producer; minerals, particularly gold; and timber. It had a well-developed transportation network, relatively

high per capita income, low national debt, and sizable foreign

currency reserves. Its education system was relatively advanced,

and its people were heirs to a tradition of parliamentary government. Ghana's future looked promising, and it seemed destined to be a leader in Africa.

Yet during the next twenty-five years, rather than growth and

prosperity, Ghanaians experienced substantial declines in all of

the above categories, and the country's image became severely

tarnished. Beginning in the early 1980s and continuing into

the mid-1990s, efforts were undertaken to rebuild the government and the economy and to restore the luster of Ghana's name. It is this attempt at reconstruction that constitutes the

major focus of the present volume.

The region of modern Ghana has been inhabited for several

thousand years, but little is known of Ghana's early inhabitants

before the sixteenth century. By then, however, the major population groups were on the scene and in their present locales.

More than 100 separate ethnic groups are found in Ghana

today, a number of which are immigrant groups from neighboring countries.

One of the most important is the Akan, who live in the

coastal savannah and forest zones of southern Ghana. The

Akan were living in well-defined states by the early sixteenth

century at the latest. By the end of that century, the states of

Mamprusi, Dagomba, and Gonja had come into being among

the Mole-Dagbane peoples of northern Ghana. These peoples

and states were significantly influenced by Mande-speaking

peoples from the north and the northeast. In the extreme

north of present-day Ghana are a number of peoples who did

not form states in pre-colonial times. These peoples, such as the Sisala, Kasena, and Talensi, are organized into clans and

look to the heads of their clans for leadership. Like the Molexxix
Dagbane, they have been heavily influenced by Islam, introduced into the region centuries ago by trans-Saharan traders or by migrants from the north.

The best-known of the indigenous states of Ghana is without

doubt Asante, a term that applies to both people and state. Beginning in the mid-seventeenth century, this Akan-based

society began to expand from the area around Kumasi, its capital, allying with or subduing neighboring Akan states such as Denkyira and Akwapim. Eventually, Asante incorporated non- Akan peoples and kingdoms, including Gonja, Dagomba, and

Mamprusi, into an empire that encompassed much of modern

Ghana and parts of neighboring Cote d'lvoire. Along a net- work of roads radiating from Kumasi flowed communications,

tribute, and, above all, gold, over which the Asante held a monopoly.

Gold is found in several regions of West Africa, including

the headwaters of the Niger River and the forest zone of modern Ghana. The West African gold trade was well-established in

antiquity, and it helped tie the peoples of Ghana into a trans- Saharan commercial network that stretched from the West Afri- can forest zone across the Sahara to ports on the Mediterra- nean. Aside from providing material benefits, trade seems to have been one of the major factors in state formation in

Ghana.

Gold drew European traders to the Gulf of Guinea. The first to arrive in the late fifteenth century were the Portuguese, who

set up an outpost on Ghana's coast. During the next century,

the lure of gold gave way to the slave trade because of the

demand for labor in the Americas. Trading in slaves as well as gold, the Dutch, the Danes, the English, and the Swedes eventually joined the Portuguese on what had come to be known as the "Gold Coast." By the early nineteenth century, the British were the most important European power on the Gold Coast.

Thereafter, the British extended their control inland via treaties and warfare until by 1902 much of present-day Ghana was a

British crown colony. Ghana's current borders were realized in

1956 when the Volta region voted to join Ghana.

British colonial government, while authoritarian and centralized, nonetheless permitted Ghanaians a role in governing

the colony. This was true not only of central governing bodies

such as the Legislative Council and later the Executive Council,

but of local and regional administration as well. The British

policy of indirect rule meant that chiefs or other local leaders

xxx
became agents of the colonial administration. This system of

rule gave Ghanaians experience with modern, representative

government to a degree unparalleled elsewhere in sub-Saharan

Africa.

During the colonial period, the Gold Coast began to develop

economically. Roads, railroads, and a harbor at Takoradi were

constructed. In 1878 a Ghanaian brought cacao pods into the

country, introducing what eventually became the country's

major cash crop. Large-scale commercial gold mining began,

and Western-style education was introduced, culminating in

the founding of the University College of the Gold Coast in

1948. The education system trained a class of Ghanaians that

found employment in the colonial administration. In the twentieth century, this same class increasingly sought economic,

political, and social improvements as well as self-government,

and, eventually, independence for Ghanaians.

After World War II, the drive for independence began in ear- nest under the auspices of the United Gold Coast Convention

and the Convention People's Party, the latter founded by

Kwame Nkrumah in 1949. Britain granted independence on

March 6, 1957, under a governor general as representative of

the crown and Nkrumah as prime minister. In 1960 a new constitution created the Republic of Ghana, the same year that

Nkrumah was elected president.

Nkrumah saw Ghana as the "Star of Black Africa." He

believed that Ghana should lead the effort to free- Africa from

the shackles of Western colonialism and envisioned a union of

independent African states that would command respect in the

world. Nkrumah also helped found the Non-Aligned Movement, a grouping of world states that attempted to pursue policies independent of East and West. His ideas about African

unity proved immensely appealing in the late 1950s and early

1960s; indeed, the Pan-Africanist dream still resonates across

Africa in the 1990s.

Nkrumah's pursuit of Pan-Africanism proved expensive and

ultimately futile, and it partially accounts for the economic

problems that Ghana encountered during the early 1960s.

More important, however, were Nkrumah's domestic policies.

He believed in centralization, both political and economic.

Constitutional safeguards against authoritarianism were abolished, political opposition was stifled, and, shortly after the

1960 elections, Nkrumah was declared president for life. By the

xxxi
mid-1960s, Ghana had become a one-party state under a powerful president.

Nkrumah also believed in a rapid transformation of the Ghanaian economy along socialist lines. He channeled investment

into new industrial enterprises and agricultural projects,

nationalized foreign-owned enterprises, and wherever possible

"Ghanaianized" the public and private sectors. State-sponsored

enterprises such as the Akosombo Dam and the Volta Aluminum Company were undertaken, roads were built, and schools

and health services were expanded. The former Northern Territories, the northernmost third of the country which had been

neglected by the British, received special attention in an

attempt to address the imbalance in infrastructure and social

services between North and South.

Ghana, however, lacked sufficient resources to finance the

public-sector projects that Nkrumah envisioned. When foreign

currency reserves were exhausted, the government resorted to deficit financing and foreign borrowing to pay for essential

imports. Trained manpower to allocate resources and to operate old and new state enterprises was equally in short supply,

and internal financial controls necessary to implement development led almost naturally to corruption. Despite obvious

gains from investment in roads, schools, health services, and

import-substituting industries, by the mid-1960s Ghana was a nation ensnared in debt, rising inflation, and economic mismanagement, the result of Nkrumah's ill-conceived development policies. An overvalued currency discouraged exports,

corruption was increasingly a fact of life, and the political sys- tem was intolerant of dissent and authoritarian in practice.

In 1966 Nkrumah was overthrown and a military government assumed power. But neither military nor civilian governments during the next fifteen years were able to deal

successfully with the host of problems that Nkrumah had

bequeathed. In particular, under the Supreme Military Council

(1972-79), Ghana's economy and political institutions deteriorated at an alarming rate. The 1970s were a period of steadily

falling agricultural production, manufacturing output, and per

capita income. Declining cocoa production and exports were accompanied by a corresponding rise in smuggling of the crop

to neighboring countries, especially Cote dTvoire, and largely

accounted for chronic trade deficits. Personal enrichment and

corruption became the norm of government.

xxxii
Beyond these serious problems loomed much larger issues

that needed to be addressed if Ghana were to resume its position at the forefront of Africa's leading nations. Among these

were the fear of an overly centralized and authoritarian

national executive, the burden of accumulated foreign debt,

and the need to forge a nation from Ghana's diverse ethnic

and regional interests. In particular, the challenge was to devise a system of government that would bridge the enormous gap

that had developed between the political center and society at large. For most Ghanaians, the nation-state by the late 1970s

had become a largely irrelevant construct that had ceased to provide economic benefits or opportunities for meaningful

political participation. As a consequence, local, ethnic, and

regional interests had become much more prominent than

those of Ghana as a whole.

Such were the challenges that lay before the group of military officers who seized power at the end of 1981. During its first year, the Provisional National Defence Council (PNDC)

spoke vaguely about socialism and established people's and

workers' defence committees and extra-judicial public tribunals as a way to involve Ghanaians in public administration. In

1983, however, the council, under its leader, Jerry John Rawlings, abandoned its socialist leanings and negotiated a struc- tural adjustment program with the World Bank and the

International Monetary Fund as the best and perhaps only

method of rejuvenating the economy. Called the Economic

Recovery Program, it was designed to stimulate economic

growth and exports, to enhance private initiative and investment, and to reduce the role of the state in economic affairs. On the one hand, Ghana's structural adjustment program

was and continues to be one of a half dozen models for such

programs backed by international lending agencies. It suc- ceeded in reversing the downward trend in production and

exports, especially in the cocoa, mining, and timber industries.

During the 1980s, gross national product grew at annual rates of 5 percent or more a year, per capita income slowly began to

rise, and inflation abated. Since 1990, economic growth has

slowed, but trends in the economy remain positive.

On the other hand, Ghana has incurred new debts to finance its Economic Recovery Program, unemployment has

risen, and new fees for basic services such as education and

health care have added to the burdens of ordinary citizens.

Indeed, for many Ghanaians, structural adjustment has not yet

xxxiii
significantly improved their lives. Additionally, per capita

income, while continuing to rise, is unevenly distributed

throughout the population, and private overseas investment

has largely failed to materialize. In Ghana's case, structural

adjustment is clearly a long-term process. Despite problems

and shortcomings, the government of the present Fourth

Republic, which succeeded the PNDC in 1993, remains committed to it. Equally significant were steps to devise new political institutions that would allow a large number of Ghanaians to participate in governing the country. The creation of defence

committees and public tribunals in the early 1980s was a step in

this direction. In 1988 and early 1989, nonpartisan elections were held to fill seats in representative assemblies constituted

in each of Ghana's ten administrative regions; similar bodies were eventually seated in cities, towns, and villages. Thereafter,

the overriding question was what form the national government would take. After initial reluctance to commit themselves

to a multiparty political system, Rawlings and the PNDC

yielded in the face of domestic and international pressures. In

April 1992, a new constitution that called for an elected parliament and chief executive won overwhelming approval in a

national referendum. Political parties, banned since 1982, were

the mechanism by which the system was to work.

Presidential elections were held in November 1992, followed

in December by elections for the 200-member national parliament. After a heated campaign, Jerry Rawlings was elected

president. His party, the National Democratic Congress

(NDC), won control of parliament. In January 1993, Rawlings

and the new parliamentarians were sworn into office, thereby

launching Ghana's fourth attempt at republican government

since independence.

The new political order in Ghana, unfortunately, did not get

off to a happy start. The four opposition parties that had candidates running in the presidential race charged that fraud and

voting irregularities accounted for Rawlings's victory. When

their demands for a revised voters register were rejected

because of cost and time factors, they boycotted the parliamentary elections. This stance by the opposition resulted in what is in effect a one-party republic, which imparts a hollowness to Ghana's latest effort at democratic government. Although the

opposition parties have accepted the status quo for the time

being and have taken on the role of watchdog even though

xxxiv
they are not represented in parliament, they have continued to press for a new voters list before elections scheduled for 1996

and remain basically unreconciled to NDC rule. As a result, the

first two years of the Fourth Republic were marked by a series

of skirmishes and quarrels between the government and the

opposition.

In its campaign against the NDC government, the opposition, resorting to the courts, won several cases against the government in 1993 and early 1994. Since 1993 a small but

vigorous independent press has developed, which the opposition has used to publicize its views. Despite publication of what

at times have been sensational or even libelous charges against

members of the NDC, including Rawlings, the government has

made no move to censor or suppress independent newspapers

and magazines. Official spokesmen, however, have repeatedly

denounced what they consider irresponsible reporting in the

private press. In late 1994 and early 1995, controversy over the media con- tinued unabated. The most contentious issue involved the

attempt to establish a private radio station as an alternative to the official Ghana Broadcasting Corporation. Known as "Radio

Eye" and dedicated to providing a wider range of political opinion and information than the government network, it began

broadcasting in November 1994. The government promptly

shut it down and seized its equipment, charging that Radio Eye

had not been licensed. The opposition parties protested that

the government's action was an affront to democratic procedures and turned once more to the courts, challenging the

government's licensing practices and the constitutionality of its actions.

By early 1995, the case was before the Supreme Court of

Ghana. Meanwhile, in early February the government

announced that properly authorized private radio stations

would begin broadcasting in February. The large number of

license applications received by the government—more than

sixty—indicated the interest in private, independent radio

broadcasting.

Prospects for abatement in the media battles between the

government and its critics were nil, given the degree of antipathy between the two sides and preparations for national elections in 1996. Even so, both appeared to accept the basic rules

of democratic procedure. In a statement marking the second

anniversary of the Fourth Republic, the New Patriotic Party

xxxv
called on Rawlings (and the NDC) to respect the 1992 constitution to ensure that this latest exercise in democracy would suc- ceed. Most significantly, the statement added, "Let us recognise

that the eras of violent and revolutionary change of government in Ghana are over." Aside from freedom of the press and speech, other basic

human rights also appeared to enjoy increased respect in mid1995. There were persistent reports of police abuse, especially

in areas distant from Accra, as well as of unwarranted detentions, beatings, and similar infringements of rights, but, in general, the number and severity of human rights violations

continued to decline. The judiciary in particular showed clear

evidence of preserving its independence, in keeping with Ghanaian tradition and the requirements of democratic gover- nance. Such a state of affairs was encouraging, given the role of the

armed forces and the police in Ghana's postindependence his- tory. Of the ten governments since 1957, six were composed of

military officers who came to power via coups. The PNDC was one such regime, and even though it handed over power to a

civilian, constitutional government in 1993, the question of the

role of Ghana's military in the Fourth Republic was still an

important one. Under the Economic Recovery Program, funding of the armed forces was reduced, and equipment and facili- ties were allowed to deteriorate. In recognition of this fact and

of the continuing mission of the armed forces in matters of

defense and international peacekeeping, Rawlings called for

renewed attention to the needs of the armed forces in his

speech marking the second anniversary of the Fourth Republic

in January 1995.

On the economic scene, the government was determined to continue with structural adjustment. Tight fiscal controls in

central and local government accounts, an essential element in

structural adjustment, had been relaxed as the 1992 elections

approached, leading to an increase in the government deficit,

inflation, and interest rates. Indications were that this situation

had not been brought under control in mid-1995.

Ghana faced other major problems with its Economic Recovery Program in the mid-1990s as well. These included the progressive fall in the value of the cedi, the national currency; a high rate of inflation (more than 30 percent in mid-1995); the

lack of private-sector investment, especially in manufacturing;

and rising levels of unemployment as a result of international

xxxvi
competition, domestic factory closings, and downsizing of parastatals and the government bureaucracy. Added to these problems were the difficulty of reconciling the rigors of free-market

economic reforms with popular demands for improved public

services and living standards, and a population growing by well over 3 percent a year. Preliminary data for the whole of 1994 showed that the

country had achieved a budget surplus, with another anticipated for 1995, and that gross domestic product adjusted for

inflation amounted to 3.8 percent, short of the target of 5 percent but still commendable. Ghana's trade deficit, however,

amounted to US$200 million, with a similar figure projected

for 1995. Total international debt for 1993, the most recent

year for which revised figures were available, stood at US$4.6

billion; its rate of increase, however, showed signs of slowing. In

January 1995, the government granted a 52 percent increase in

the minimum wage under pressure from the Trade Union Congress. On the whole, Ghana's economy seemed to be headed in the

right direction in the mid-1990s, even if sustained economic

recovery was not yet a reality more than a decade after introduction of the Economic Recovery Program and even if the

country continued to rely on cocoa, gold, and timber for most

of its foreign currency earnings. Nonetheless, in spite of real

problems, Ghana was still the model for structural adjustment

in Africa in the eyes of Western lending institutions.

The fragility of the economic and political transition underway in Ghana was evident from events in the spring of 1995. On

March 1 , the government introduced a new value-added tax to replace the national sales tax. Set at 17.5 percent of the price of

many commodities and services, the new tax immediately

resulted in rising prices and contributed to an already high rate of inflation. It thereby added to the deprivation many Ghanaians had been experiencing for more than a decade under the

Economic Recovery Program. For many, it was simply too

much. Discontent among civil servants, teachers, and others

led to street demonstrations and finally, on May 1 1 , to the largest protest demonstration in Accra against government policies

since Rawlings and the PNDC came to power. Five people were

killed and seventeen injured in clashes between supporters and

opponents of the government. Demonstrators not only criti- cized what they considered harsh economic policies, but some

also called openly for Rawlings to step down.

xxxvii
The protests, organized by opposition parties, provided

Rawlings's opponents with a rallying cry. For the first time since

1993, the Rawlings government appeared politically vulnerable. In the face of continued protests and increasing doubts

about the viability of the value-added tax, the government in

early June announced plans to replace it with a new national

sales tax. In the meantime, one of the NDC's partners in the

Progressive Alliance, the National Convention Party, withdrew

from the alliance in late May. The party's leaders claimed that it had not been allowed to participate in affairs of government as had been promised when the alliance was formed to contest

the 1992 elections. The National Convention Party, therefore,

would no longer be bound by the agreement, and it would feel

free to associate with the opposition if it chose to do so. In early 1995, Rawlings, as chairman of the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), continued his efforts to find a solution to the civil war in Liberia. At a December

meeting in Accra, the major combatants agreed to form a new

governing council and to implement a cease-fire. As of April,

however, the combatants had not been able to agree fully on

the new council's membership despite another meeting in

Accra in January, and even the cease-fire threatened to come

unraveled as renewed fighting broke out in Liberia. So disappointed were Rawlings and other West African leaders that they

threatened to withdraw their peacekeeping troops if the Liberi- ans continued to obstruct the ECOWAS peace process.

In support of another peacekeeping mission, on March 1, 1995, Ghana dispatched a contingent of 224 officers and men

as part of its long-term commitment to the United Nations

peacekeeping forces in Lebanon. Other Ghanaians continued

to serve as military observers, police, or soldiers in international peacekeeping missions in Western Sahara, the former

Yugoslavia, Mozambique, and Rwanda. The warming in relations with neighboring Togo also continued. After the arrival

of a new Ghanaian ambassador in Lome in mid-November,

Togolese authorities reopened their western border in December and were expected to name an ambassador to Accra during

1995.

As the home of Pan-Africanism, Ghana hosted the second

Pan-African Historical and Theatre Festival (Panafest) from

December 9 to 18, 1994. As with the first Panafest in Accra in

1992, the 1994 festival was designed to foster unity among Afri- cans on the continent and abroad. Unfortunately, attendance

xxxviii
at Panafest 94 was lower than expected, one reason the festival was a disappointment to its sponsors.

Finally, in early March 1995, Rawlings paid an official visit to Washington, where he met with President Bill Clinton. The two

presidents discussed a variety of topics, including regional sta- bility in West Africa and trade and investment in Ghana. Clinton noted Ghana's prominence in international peacekeeping

missions, especially in Liberia, and pledged continued United

States support for Ghanaian efforts at regional conflict resolution. Rawlings's visit was the first to the United States by a Ghanaian head of state in at least thirty years. By mid-1995, Ghana had emerged at the forefront of change

in sub-Saharan Africa. Its structural adjustment program was a model for other developing nations on the continent, and its pursuit of popular, representative government and democratic

institutions made it a pacesetter in the political realm.

Endowed with both human and natural resources and with a

political leadership seemingly determined to reverse decades

of economic and political decline, Ghana had the potential to become one of Africa's leading nations once again. Whether

Ghana would resume its status as the "Star of Black Africa" envisioned by Kwame Nkrumah, however, remained to be seen.

August 1, 1995 LaVerle Berry

xxxix

Chapter 1. Historical Setting
A pectoral of cast gold (Akan)
ACCORDING TO TRADITION, most present-day Ghanaians

are descended not from the area's earliest inhabitants but from

various migrant groups, the first of which probably came down

the Volta River Basin in the early thirteenth century. By the six- teenth century, most ethnic groups constituting the population

of Ghana (formerly the British colony of the Gold Coast) had

settled in their present locations. Prior to British control in the

nineteenth century, political developments in the area largely

revolved around the formation, expansion, and contraction of

a number of states—a situation that often entailed much population movement. Some people, however, lived in so-called seg- mentary societies and did not form states, particularly in

northern Ghana.

Early states in Ghana made every effort to participate in or, if possible, to control, trade with Europeans, who first arrived on

the coast in the late fifteenth century. These efforts in turn

influenced state formation and development. Much more

important to the evolution of these states, however, were their

responses to pre-European patterns of trade. This was particularly true of commercial relations between the Akan states of

southern Ghana and trading centers in the western Sudan.

Competition among the traditional societies ultimately facili- tated British efforts to gain control of what Europeans called

the "Gold Coast." Traditional authorities, who with their elders

had hitherto exercised autonomous control over their territories, became agents of the British colonial government under

the policy of indirect rule. As was the case in many sub-Saharan African countries, the

rise of a national consciousness in Ghana developed largely in

the twentieth century in response to colonial policies. The call to freedom came from a few elites, but it was only after World

War II that the concept of independence captured the imagination of large numbers of people and gained popular support. Differences existed between the two leading political

parties, however, on such issues as the timetable for independence and the powers to be vested in the modern state. Ghana's first independent administration was inaugurated on March 6, 1957, with Kwame Nkrumah as prime minister. On

July 1, 1960, Ghana was declared a republic, with Kwame Nkrumah as its president. Earlier, parliament had passed the Preven3
Ghana: A Country Study

tive Detention Act of 1958, which granted authority to the head

of state to detain without trial those who were considered a

threat to the nation. By means of such measures, Nkrumah and

his party intimidated leading members of the opposition. Some

opponents were co-opted; others were either exiled or jailed.

As leader of Ghana at the time of the Cold War, Nkrumah

forged alliances that increasingly placed him in the camp of

the Eastern Bloc. Western governments understood Nkrumah's agenda to be socialist and worried about his influence

on other African leaders. Some observers believed that Nkrumah's obsession with what he called the "total liberation of

Africa" compelled him to create an authoritarian political sys- tem in Ghana. Critics of the regime accused Nkrumah of introducing patterns of oppression into Ghanaian politics and of

tolerating widespread corruption among party leaders. The

regime paid too much attention to urban problems at the

expense of the more productive rural sector, they felt, and it embraced unrealistic economic and foreign assistance policies

that led the nation to accrue huge foreign debts. The Nkrumah administration was overthrown by the military in February

1966. Many analysts maintain that the political instability and

economic problems faced by the country since the mid-1960s

are by-products of the Nkrumah era. By 1981 Ghana had undergone seven major changes of government since the fall of Nkrumah. Each change was followed

by alienation of the majority of the population and by military

intervention, touted to end the rule that was responsible for

the country's problems. Each time, the new government, civil or military, failed to stabilize the political and economic conditions of the country.

As its fourth decade of independence began in 1987, Ghana

was under the administration of the Provisional National

Defence Council, a military government led by Flight Lieutenant Jerry John Rawlings that had come to power in December

1981. Like the Nkrumah administration three decades earlier,

the Provisional National Defence Council and Rawlings were

criticized for their populism and desire for radical change.

Despite the difficult early years of the Rawlings regime,

Ghana's economy had begun to show signs of recovery by the

late 1980s, and preparations were underway to return the

country to some form of democratic government.

4
Historical Setting

The Precolonial Period

By the end of the sixteenth century, most ethnic groups constituting the modern Ghanaian population had settled in their

present locations. Archaeological remains found in the coastal zone indicate that the area has been inhabited since the early

Bronze Age (ca. 4000 B.C.), but these societies, based on fish- ing in the extensive lagoons and rivers, left few traces. Archaeological work also suggests that central Ghana north of the

forest zone was inhabited as early as 3,000 to 4,000 years ago.

Oral history and other sources suggest that the ancestors of

some of Ghana's residents entered this area at least as early as the tenth century A.D. and that migration from the north and

east continued thereafter.

These migrations resulted in part from the formation and

disintegration of a series of large states in the western Sudan

(the region north of modern Ghana drained by the Niger

River). Prominent among these Sudanic states was the Soninke

kingdom of Ghana. Strictly speaking, ghana was the title of the

king, but the Arabs, who left records of the kingdom, applied

the term to the king, the capital, and the state. The ninth-century Arab writer, Al Yaqubi, described ancient Ghana as one of

the three most organized states in the region (the others being

Gao and Kanem in the central Sudan). Its rulers were

renowned for their wealth in gold, the opulence of their

courts, and their warrior-hunting skills. They were also masters

of the trade in gold, which drew North African merchants to the western Sudan. The military achievements of these and

later western Sudanic rulers and their control over the region's

gold mines constituted the nexus of their historical relations

with merchants and rulers of North Africa and the Mediterranean. Ghana succumbed to attacks by its neighbors in the eleventh

century, but its name and reputation endured. In 1957 when

the leaders of the former British colony of the Gold Coast

sought an appropriate name for their newly independent

state—the first black African nation to gain its independence

from colonial rule—they named their new country after

ancient Ghana. The choice was more than merely symbolic

because modern Ghana, like its namesake, was equally famed

for its wealth and trade in gold.

Although none of the states of the western Sudan controlled

territories in the area that is modern Ghana, several small kingdoms that later developed in the north of the country were

5
Ghana: A Country Study

ruled by nobles believed to have immigrated from that region.

The trans-Saharan trade that contributed to the expansion of

kingdoms in the western Sudan also led to the development of

contacts with regions in northern modern Ghana and in the

forest to the south. By the thirteenth century, for example, the

town ofJenne in the empire of Mali had established commercial connections with the ethnic groups in the

savanna-woodland areas of the northern two-thirds of the Volta

Basin in modern Ghana. Jenne was also the headquarters of

the Dyula, Muslim traders who dealt with the ancestors of the

Akan-speaking peoples who occupy most of the southern half

of the country.

The growth of trade stimulated the development of early

Akan states located on the trade route to the goldfields in the

forest zone of the south. The forest itself was thinly populated,

but Akan-speaking peoples began to move into it toward the

end of the fifteenth century with the arrival of crops from

Southeast Asia and the New World that could be adapted to forest conditions. These new crops included sorghum,

bananas, and cassava. By the beginning of the sixteenth century, European sources noted the existence of the gold-rich

states of Akan and Twifu in the Ofin River Valley.

Also in the same period, some of the Mande, who had stimulated the development of states in what is now northern Nigeria (the Hausa states and those of the Lake Chad area), moved

southwestward and imposed themselves on many of the indige- nous peoples of the northern half of modern Ghana and of

Burkina Faso (Burkina—formerly Upper Volta), founding the

states of Dagomba and Mamprusi. The Mande also influenced

the rise of the Gonja state.

It seems clear from oral traditions as well as from archaeological evidence that the Mole-Dagbane states of Mamprusi,

Dagomba, and Gonja, as well as the Mossi states of Yatenga and

Wagadugu, were among the earliest kingdoms to emerge in

modern Ghana, being well established by the close of the six- teenth century. The Mossi and Gonja rulers came to speak the

languages of the peoples they dominated. In general, however,

members of the ruling class retained their traditions, and even

today some of them can recite accounts of their northern ori- gins.

Although most rulers were not Muslims, they either brought

with them or welcomed Muslims as scribes and medicine men,

and Muslims also played a significant role in the trade that

6
Historical Setting

linked southern with northern Ghana. As a result of their pres- ence, Islam substantially influenced the north. Muslim influ- ence, spread by the activities of merchants and clerics, has been

recorded even among the Asante (also seen as Ashanti—see Glossary) to the south. Although most Ghanaians retained

their traditional beliefs, the Muslims brought with them certain

skills, including writing, and introduced certain beliefs and

practices that became part of the culture of the peoples among

whom they settled (see Christianity and Islam in Ghana, ch. 2). In the broad belt of rugged country between the northern

boundaries of the Muslim-influenced states of Gonja, Mamprusi, and Dagomba and the southernmost outposts of the

Mossi kingdoms lived a number of peoples who were not incorporated into these entities. Among these peoples were the

Sisala, Kasena, Kusase, and Talensi, agriculturalists closely

related to the Mossi. Rather than establishing centralized states themselves, they lived in so-called segmented societies, bound

together by kinship ties and ruled by the heads of their clans.

Trade between the Akan states to the south and the Mossi kingdoms to the north flowed through their homelands, subjecting

them to Islamic influence and to the depredations of these

more powerful neighbors.

Of the components that would later make up Ghana, the

state of Asante was to have the most cohesive history and would

exercise the greatest influence. The Asante are members of the

Twi-speaking branch of the Akan people. The groups that

came to constitute the core of the Asante confederacy moved

north to settle in the vicinity of Lake Bosumtwi. Before the

mid-seventeenth century, the Asante began an expansion

under a series of militant leaders that led to the domination of

surrounding peoples and to the formation of the most powerful of the states of the central forest zone. Under Chief Oti Akenten (r. ca. 1630-60), a series of suc- cessful military operations against neighboring Akan states brought a larger surrounding territory into alliance with

Asante. At the end of the seventeenth century, Osei Tutu (d.

1712 or 1717) became asantehene (king of Asante). Under Osei

Tutu's rule, the confederacy of Asante states was transformed

into an empire with its capital at Kumasi. Political and military

consolidation ensued, resulting in firmly established centralized authority. Osei Tutu was strongly influenced by the high

priest, Anokye, who, tradition asserts, caused a stool of gold to descend from the sky to seal the union of Asante states. Stools

7
Ghana: A Country Study

already functioned as traditional symbols of chieftainship, but

the Golden Stool of Asante represented the united spirit of all the allied states and established a dual allegiance that superimposed the confederacy over the individual component states. The Golden Stool remains a respected national symbol of the

traditional past and figures extensively in Asante ritual. Osei Tutu permitted newly conquered territories thatjoined

the confederation to retain their own customs and chiefs, who

were given seats on the Asante state council. Osei Tutu's gesture made the process relatively easy and nondisruptive

because most of the earlier conquests had subjugated other

Akan peoples. Within the Asante portions of the confederacy,

each minor state continued to exercise internal self-rule, and

its chief jealously guarded the state's prerogatives against

encroachment by the central authority. A strong unity developed, however, as the various communities subordinated their

individual interests to central authority in matters of national concern. By the mid-eighteenth century, Asante was a highly organized state. The wars of expansion that brought the northern

states of Mamprusi, Dagomba, and Gonja under Asante influ- ence were won during the reign of Asantehene Opoku Ware I (d. 1750), successor to Osei Tutu. By the 1820s, successive rul- ers had extended Asante boundaries southward. Although the

northern expansions linked Asante with trade networks across the desert and in Hausaland to the east, movements into the

south brought the Asante into contact, sometimes antagonistic,

with the coastal Fante, Ga-Adangbe, and Ewe peoples, as well as with the various European merchants whose fortresses dotted

the Gold Coast (see fig. 2).

Arrival of the Europeans

Early European Contact and the Slave Trade

When the first Europeans arrived in the late fifteenth century, many inhabitants of the Gold Coast area were striving to consolidate their newly acquired territories and to settle into a secure and permanent environment. Several African immigrant groups had yet to establish firm ascendancy over earlier

occupants of their territories, and considerable displacement

and secondary migrations were in progress. Ivor Wilks, a leading historian of Ghana, has observed that Akan purchases of

slaves from Portuguese traders operating from the Congo

8
Historical Setting

region augmented the labor needed for the state formation

that was characteristic of this period. Unlike the Akan groups

of the interior, the major coastal groups, such as the Fante,

Ewe, and Ga, were for the most part settled in their homelands.

The Portuguese were the first to arrive. By 1471, under the

patronage of Prince Henry the Navigator, they had reached the area that was to become known as the Gold Coast. Europeans

knew the area as the source of gold that reached Muslim North

Africa by way of trade routes across the Sahara. The initial Portuguese interest in trading for gold, ivory, and pepper

increased so much that in 1482 the Portuguese built their first permanent trading post on the western coast of present-day

Ghana. This fortress, Elmina Castle, constructed to protect

Portuguese trade from European competitors and hostile Afri- cans, still stands.

With the opening of European plantations in the New World

during the 1500s, which suddenly expanded the demand for

slaves in the Americas, slaves soon overshadowed gold as the

principal export of the area. Indeed, the west coast of Africa

became the principal source of slaves for the New World. The

seemingly insatiable market and the substantial profits to be

gained from the slave trade attracted adventurers from all over Europe. Much of the conflict that arose among European

groups on the coast and among competing African kingdoms

was the result of rivalry for control of this trade.

The Portuguese position on the Gold Coast remained secure

for almost a century. During that time, Lisbon leased the right

to establish trading posts to individuals or companies that

sought to align themselves with the local chiefs and to exchange trade goods both for rights to conduct commerce

and for slaves provided by the chiefs. During the seventeenth

and eighteenth centuries, adventurers—first Dutch, and later

English, Danish, and Swedish—were granted licenses by their

governments to trade overseas. On the Gold Coast, these European competitors built fortified trading stations and challenged the Portuguese. Sometimes they were also drawn into

conflicts with local inhabitants as Europeans developed commercial alliances with local chiefs.

The principal early struggle was between the Dutch and the

Portuguese. With the loss of Elmina in 1642 to the Dutch, the

Portuguese left the Gold Coast permanently. The next 150

years saw kaleidoscopic change and uncertainty, marked by

local conflicts and diplomatic maneuvers, during which various

9
Ghana: A Country Study

MOSSI STATES

To Hausaland

To Hausaland

MA2M^Accra M

Chrlstiansborg U

Cape Coast Qutfof guinea

M Axim

Boundary representation not necessarily authoritative

Present-day international boundary 1 Asante heartland

- Maximum extent of Asante expansion Main line of Asante

expansion

- Main road of Asante

empire

25 50 75 Kilometers

• Populated place EWE People AHAFO State U European fortress 1745 Date of Asante

expansion to that point

25 50

Source: Based on information from Daryll Forde and P. M. Kaberry, eds., West African Kingdoms in the Nineteenth Century, London, 1967, 208; and Ivor G. Wilks, Asante

in the Nineteenth Century, London, 1975, 19. Figure 2. Asante Expansion and Major European Fortresses in the Eighteenth Century

European powers struggled to establish or to maintain a position of dominance in the profitable trade of the Gold Coast lit- toral. Forts were built, abandoned, attacked, captured, sold,

10
Historical Setting

and exchanged, and many sites were selected at one time or another for fortified positions by contending European

nations.

Both the Dutch and the British formed companies to advance their African ventures and to protect their coastal

establishments. The Dutch West India Company operated

throughout most of the eighteenth century. The British Afri- can Company of Merchants, founded in 1750, was the succes- sor to several earlier organizations of this type. These

enterprises built and manned new installations as the companies pursued their trading activities and defended their respective jurisdictions with varying degrees of government backing.

There were short-lived ventures by the Swedes and the Prussians. The Danes remained until 1850, when they withdrew

from the Gold Coast. The British gained possession of all Dutch coastal forts by the last quarter of the nineteenth century, thus making them the dominant European power on the

Gold Coast.

During the heyday of early European competition, slavery was an accepted social institution, and the slave trade overshadowed all other commercial activities on the West African coast. To be sure, slavery and slave trading were already firmly

entrenched in many African societies before their contact with

Europe. In most situations, men as well as women captured in local warfare became slaves. In general, however, slaves in Afri- can communities were often treated as junior members of the

society with specific rights, and many were ultimately absorbed

into their masters' families as full members. Given traditional

methods of agricultural production in Africa, slavery there was

quite different from that which existed in the commercial plantation environments of the New World.

Another aspect of the impact of the trans-Atlantic slave trade

on Africa concerns the role of African chiefs, Muslim traders,

and merchant princes in the trade. Although there is no doubt

that local rulers in West Africa engaged in slaving and received

certain advantages from it, some scholars have challenged the

premise that traditional chiefs in the vicinity of the Gold Coast

engaged in wars of expansion for the sole purpose of acquiring

slaves for the export market. In the case of Asante, for example, rulers of that kingdom are known to have supplied slaves

to both Muslim traders in the north and to Europeans on the

coast. Even so, the Asante waged war for purposes other than

simply to secure slaves. They also fought to pacify territories

11
Ghana: A Country Study

that in theory were under Asante control, to exact tribute payments from subordinate kingdoms, and to secure access to trade routes—particularly those that connected the interior

with the coast.

It is important to mention, however, that the supply of slaves to the Gold Coast was entirely in African hands. Although powerful traditional chiefs, such as the rulers of Asante, Fante, and

Ahanta, were known to have engaged in the slave trade, individual African merchants such as John Kabes, John Konny,

Thomas Ewusi, and a broker known only as Noi commanded

large bands of armed men, many of them slaves, and engaged

in various forms of commercial activities with the Europeans on the coast. The volume of the slave trade in West Africa grew rapidly

from its inception around 1500 to its peak in the eighteenth

century. Philip Curtin, a leading authority on the African slave

trade, estimates that roughly 6.3 million slaves were shipped

from West Africa to North America and South America, about

4.5 million of that number between 1701 and 1810. Perhaps

5,000 a year were shipped from the Gold Coast alone. The

demographic impact of the slave trade on West Africa was probably substantially greater than the number actually enslaved

because a significant number of Africans perished during slav- ing raids or while in captivity awaiting transshipment. All

nations with an interest in West Africa participated in the slave

trade. Relations between the Europeans and the local populations were often strained, and distrust led to frequent clashes.

Disease caused high losses among the Europeans engaged in

the slave trade, but the profits realized from the trade continued to attract them.

The growth of anti-slavery sentiment among Europeans

made slow progress against vested African and European interests that were reaping profits from the traffic. Although individual clergymen condemned the slave trade as early as the

seventeenth century, major Christian denominations did little to further early efforts at abolition. The Quakers, however,

publicly declared themselves against slavery as early as 1727.

Later in the century, the Danes stopped trading in slaves; Sweden and the Netherlands soon followed.

The importation of slaves into the United States was outlawed in 1807. In the same year, Britain used its naval power

and its diplomatic muscle to outlaw trade in slaves by its citizens

and to begin a campaign to stop the international trade in

12
Historical Setting

slaves. These efforts, however, were not successful until the

1860s because of the continued demand for plantation labor in

the New World.

Because it took decades to end the trade in slaves, some his- torians doubt that the humanitarian impulse inspired the abolitionist movement. According to historian Walter Rodney, for

example, Europe abolished the trans-Atlantic slave trade only

because its profitability was undermined by the Industrial Revolution. Rodney argues that mass unemployment caused by the

new industrial machinery, the need for new raw materials, and

European competition for markets for finished goods are the

real factors that brought an end to the trade in human cargo

and the beginning of competition for colonial territories in

Africa. Other scholars, however, disagree with Rodney, arguing

that humanitarian concerns as well as social and economic fac- tors were instrumental in ending the African slave trade.

Britain and the Gold Coast: The Early Years

By the early nineteenth century, the British, through con- quest or purchase, had become masters of most of the forts

along the coast. Two major factors laid the foundations of British rule and the eventual establishment of a colony on the Gold

Coast: British reaction to the Asante wars and the resulting

instability and disruption of trade, and Britain's increasing preoccupation with the suppression and elimination of the slave

trade.

During most of the nineteenth century, Asante, the most

powerful state of the Akan interior, sought to expand its rule

and to promote and protect its trade. The first Asante invasion

of the coastal regions took place in 1807; the Asante moved

south again in 1811 and in 1814. These invasions, though not

decisive, disrupted trade in such products as gold, timber, and

palm oil, and threatened the security of the European forts. Local British, Dutch, and Danish authorities were all forced to come to terms with Asante, and in 1817 the African Company

of Merchants signed a treaty of friendship that recognized

Asante claims to sovereignty over large areas of the coast and its peoples.

The coastal people, primarily some of the Fante and the

inhabitants of the new town of Accra, who were chiefly Ga,

came to rely on British protection against Asante incursions,

but the ability of the merchant companies to provide this security was limited. The British Crown dissolved the company in

13
Ghana: A Country Study

1821, giving authority over British forts on the Gold Coast to Governor Charles MacCarthy, governor of Sierra Leone. The

British forts and Sierra Leone remained under common

administration for the first half of the century. MacCarthy's

mandate was to impose peace and to end the slave trade. He

sought to do this by encouraging the coastal peoples to oppose

Kumasi rule and by closing the great roads to the coast. Incidents and sporadic warfare continued, however. MacCarthy was

killed, and most of his force was wiped out in a battle with

Asante forces in 1824. An Asante invasion of the coast in 1826

was defeated, nonetheless, by British and local forces, including the Fante and the people of Accra.

When the British government allowed control of the Gold

Coast settlements to revert to the British African Company of

Merchants in the late 1820s, relations with Asante were still problematic. From the Asante point of view, the British had

failed to control the activities of their local coastal allies. Had

this been done, Asante might not have found it necessary to attempt to impose peace on the coastal peoples. MacCarthy's

encouragement of coastal opposition to Asante and the subsequent 1824 British military attack further indicated to Asante

authorities that the Europeans, especially the British, did not

respect Asante.

In 1830 a London committee of merchants chose Captain

George Maclean to become president of a local council of merchants. Although his formal jurisdiction was limited, Maclean's

achievements were substantial; for example, a peace treaty was arranged with Asante in 1831. Maclean also supervised the

coastal people by holding regular court in Cape Coast, where

he punished those found guilty of disturbing the peace.

Between 1830 and 1843, while Maclean was in charge of affairs on the Gold Coast, no confrontations occurred with Asante,

and the volume of trade reportedly increased threefold.

Maclean's exercise of limited judicial power on the coast was so

effective that a parliamentary committee recommended that

the British government permanently administer its settlements

and negotiate treaties with the coastal chiefs that would define

Britain's relations with them. The government did so in 1843,

the same year crown government was reinstated. Commander

H. Worsley Hill was appointed first governor of the Gold Coast.

Under Maclean's administration, several coastal tribes had submitted voluntarily to British protection. Hill proceeded to define the conditions and responsibilities of his jurisdiction

14
Historical Setting

over the protected areas. He negotiated a special treaty with a number of Fante and other local chiefs that became known as the Bond of 1844. This document obliged local leaders to submit serious crimes, such as murder and robbery, to British jurisdiction and laid the legal foundation for subsequent British

colonization of the coastal area. Additional coastal states as well as other states farther inland

eventually signed the Bond, and British influence was

accepted, strengthened, and expanded. Under the terms of the

1844 arrangement, the British gave the impression that they

would protect the coastal areas; thus, an informal protectorate

came into being. As responsibilities for defending local allies and managing the affairs of the coastal protectorate increased,

the administration of the Gold Coast was separated from that

of Sierra Leone in 1850.

At about the same time, growing acceptance of the advantages offered by the British presence led to the initiation of

another important step. In April 1852, local chiefs and elders

met at Cape Coast to consult with the governor on means of

raising revenue. With the governor's approval, the council of

chiefs constituted itself as a legislative assembly. In approving

its resolutions, the governor indicated that the assembly of

chiefs should become a permanent fixture of the protectorate's

constitutional machinery, but the assembly was given no specific constitutional authority to pass laws or to levy taxes without the consent of the people.

In 1872 British influence over the Gold Coast increased fur- ther when Britain purchased Elmina Castle, the last of the

Dutch forts along the coast. The Asante, who for years had con- sidered the Dutch at Elmina as their allies, thereby lost their

last trade outlet to the sea. To prevent this loss and to ensure

that revenue received from that post continued, the Asante

staged their last invasion of the coast in 1873. After early successes, they finally came up against well-trained British forces

who compelled them to retreat beyond the Pra River. Later

attempts to negotiate a settlement of the conflict with the British were rejected by the commander of their forces, Major

General Sir Garnet Wolseley. To settle the Asante problem permanently, the British invaded Asante with a sizable military

force. The attack, which was launched in January 1874 by 2,500

British soldiers and large numbers of African auxiliaries,

resulted in the occupation and burning of Kumasi, the Asante

capital.

15
Ghana: A Country Study

The subsequent peace treaty required the Asante to renounce any claim to many southern territories. The Asante

also had to keep the road to Kumasi open to trade. From this

point on, Asante power steadily declined. The confederation

slowly disintegrated as subject territories broke away and as protected regions defected to British rule. The warrior spirit of

the nation was not entirely subdued, however, and enforcement of the treaty led to recurring difficulties and outbreaks of

fighting. In 1896 the British dispatched another expedition

that again occupied Kumasi and that forced Asante to become

a protectorate of the British Crown. The position of asantehene was abolished, and the incumbent was exiled.

The core of the Asante federation accepted these terms

grudgingly. In 1900 the Asante rebelled again but were

defeated the next year, and in 1902 the British proclaimed

Asante a colony under the jurisdiction of the governor of the

Gold Coast. The annexation was made with misgivings and

recriminations on both sides. With Asante subdued and

annexed, British colonization of the region became a reality.

The Colonial Era: British Rule of the Gold Coast

Military confrontations between Asante and the Fante contributed to the growth of British influence on the Gold Coast.

It was concern about Asante activities on the coast that had

compelled the Fante states to sign the Bond of 1844. In theory,

the bond allowed the British quite limited judicial powers—the

trying of murder and robbery cases only. Also, the British could

not acquire further judicial rights without the consent of the

kings, chiefs, and people of the protectorate. In practice, however, British efforts to usurp more and more judicial authority were so successful that in the 1850s they considered establishing European courts in place of traditional African ones. As a result of the exercise of ever-expanding judicial powers

on the coast and also to ensure that the coastal peoples

remained firmly under control, the British, following their

defeat of Asante in 1874, proclaimed the former coastal protectorate a crown colony. The Gold Coast Colony, established on

July 24, 1874, comprised the coastal areas and extended inland

as far as the ill-defined borders of Asante.

The coastal peoples did not greet this move with enthusiasm.

They were not consulted about this annexation, which arbitrarily set aside the Bond of 1844 and treated its signatories like

conquered territories. The British, however, made no claim to

16
Historical Setting

any rights to the land, a circumstance that probably explains

the absence of popular resistance. Shortly after declaring the

coastal area a colony, the British moved the colonial capital

from Cape Coast to the former Danish castle at Christiansborg

in Accra.

The British sphere of influence was eventually extended to include Asante. Following the defeat of Asante in 1896, the

British proclaimed a protectorate over the kingdom. Once the

asantehene and his council had been exiled, the British

appointed a resident commissioner to Asante, who was given

both civil and criminal jurisdiction over the territories. Each

Asante state was administered from Kumasi as a separate entity

and was ultimately responsible to the governor of the Gold

Coast. As noted above, Asante became a colony following its final defeat in 1901. In the meantime, the British became interested in the broad

areas north of Asante, known generally as the Northern Territories. This interest was prompted primarily by the need to

forestall the French and the Germans, who had been making

rapid advances in the surrounding areas. British officials had

first penetrated the area in the 1880s, and after 1896 protection was extended to northern areas whose trade with the coast had been controlled by Asante. In 1898 and 1899, European

colonial powers amicably demarcated the boundaries between

the Northern Territories and the surrounding French and German colonies. The Northern Territories were proclaimed a

British protectorate in 1902.

Like the Asante protectorate, the Northern Territories were

placed under the authority of a resident commissioner who was

responsible to the governor of the Gold Coast. The governor

ruled both Asante and the Northern Territories by proclamations until 1946.

With the north under British control, the three territories of

the Gold Coast—the Colony (the coastal regions), Asante, and

the Northern Territories—became, for all practical purposes, a

single political unit, or crown colony, known as "the dependency" or simply as the Gold Coast. The borders of present-day

Ghana were realized in May 1956 when the people of the Volta

region, known as British Mandated Togoland, voted in a plebiscite to become part of modern Ghana (see fig. 3).

Colonial Administration

Beginning in 1850, the coastal regions increasingly came

17
Ghana: A Country Study

Region boundary

Source: Based on information from William Ernest Ward, A History of Ghana, London,

1958, 24. Figure 3. Administrative Divisions of the Gold Coast, mid-1 950s

under control of the governor of the British fortresses, who was

assisted by the Executive Council and the Legislative Council.

The Executive Council was a small advisory body of European

officials that recommended laws and voted taxes, subject to the

governor's approval. The Legislative Council included the

members of the Executive Council and unofficial members ini- tially chosen from British commercial interests. After 1900

three chiefs and three other Africans were added to the Legis18
Historical Setting

lative Council, these being chosen from the Europeanized

communities of Accra, Cape Coast, and Sekondi. The inclusion

of Africans from Asante and the Northern Territories did not

take place until much later. Prior to 1925, all members of the

Legislative Council were appointed by the governor. Official

members always outnumbered unofficial members.

The gradual emergence of centralized colonial government

brought about unified control over local services, although the

actual administration of these services was still delegated to local authorities. Specific duties and responsibilities came to be

clearly delineated, and the role of traditional states in local

administration was also clarified. The structure of local government had its roots in traditional patterns of government. Village councils of chiefs and

elders were almost exclusively responsible for the immediate

needs of individual localities, including traditional law and

order and the general welfare. The councils, however, ruled by

consent rather than by right. Chiefs were chosen by the ruling

class of the society; a traditional leader continued to rule not

only because he was the choice of what may be termed the

nobility, but also because he was accepted by his people. The

unseating or destooling of a chief by tribal elders was a fairly

common practice if the chief failed to meet the desires or expectations of the community (see Traditional Patterns of

Social Relations, ch. 2).

Traditional chiefs figured prominently in the system of indi- rect rule adopted by British authorities to administer their col- onies in Africa. According to Frederick Lugard, architect of the

policy, indirect rule was cost effective because it reduced the

number of European officials in the field. By allowing local rul- ers to exercise direct administrative control over their people,

opposition to European rule from the local population would

be minimized. The chiefs, however, were to take instructions

from their European supervisors. The plan, according to Lugard, had the further advantage of civilizing the natives

because it exposed traditional rulers to the benefits of European political organization and values. This "civilizing" process

notwithstanding, indirect rule had the ultimate advantage of

guaranteeing the maintenance of law and order.

The application of indirect rule in the Gold Coast became

essential, especially after Asante and the Northern Territories were brought under British rule. Before the effective colonization of these territories, the intention of the British was to use

19
Ghana: A Country Study

both force and agreements to control chiefs in Asante and the

north. Once indirect rule was implemented, the chiefs became

responsible to the colonial authorities who supported them. In many respects, therefore, the power of each chief was greatly

enhanced. Although Lugard pointed to the civilizing influence

of indirect rule, critics of the policy argued that the element of

popular participation was removed from the traditional political system. Despite the theoretical argument in favor of decentralization, indirect rule in practice caused chiefs to look to Accra (the capital) rather than to their people for all decisions.

Many chiefs and elders came to regard themselves as a ruling aristocracy. Their councils were generally led by government commissioners, who often rewarded the chiefs with

honors, decorations, and knighthood. Indirect rule tended to preserve traditional forms and sources of power, however, and

it failed to provide meaningful opportunities for the growing

number of educated young men anxious to find a niche in

their country's development. Other groups were dissatisfied

because there was not sufficient cooperation between the

councils and the central government and because some felt that the local authorities were too dominated by the British district commissioners.

In 1925 provincial councils of chiefs were established in all three territories of the colony, partly to give the chiefs a colonywide function. This move was followed in 1927 by the promulgation of the Native Administration Ordinance, which replaced an 1883 arrangement that had placed chiefs in the Gold Coast

Colony under British supervision. The purpose was to clarify

and to regulate the powers and areas of jurisdiction of chiefs

and councils. Councils were given specific responsibilities over disputed elections and the unseating of chiefs; the procedure

for the election of chiefs was set forth; and judicial powers were

defined and delegated. Councils were entrusted with the role

of defining customary law in their areas (the government had

to approve their decisions), and the provincial councils were empowered to become tribunals to decide matters of customary law when the dispute lay between chiefs in different hierarchies. Until 1939, when the Native Treasuries Ordinance was

passed, however, there was no provision for local budgets. In

1935 the Native Authorities Ordinance combined the central

colonial government and the local authorities into a single governing system. New native authorities, appointed by the governor, were given wide powers of local government under the

20
Historical Setting

supervision of the central government's provincial commissioners, who assured that their policies would be those of the central government.

The provincial councils and moves to strengthen them were

not popular. Even by British standards, the chiefs were not

given enough power to be effective instruments of indirect

rule. Some Ghanaians believed that the reforms, by increasing

the power of the chiefs at the expense of local initiative, permitted the colonial government to avoid movement toward any

form of popular participation in the colony's government.

Economic and Social Development

The years of British administration of the Gold Coast during

the twentieth century were an era of significant progress in

social, economic, and educational development. Transportation, for example, was greatly improved. The Sekondi-Tarkwa

railroad, begun in 1898, was extended until it connected most

of the important commercial centers of the south, and by 1937,

there were 9,700 kilometers of roads. Telecommunication and

postal services were initiated as well. New crops were also introduced and gained widespread

acceptance. Cacao trees, introduced in 1878, brought the first cash crop to the farmers of the interior; cocoa became the

mainstay of the nation's economy in the 1920s when disease

wiped out Brazil's trees. The production of cocoa was largely in

the hands of Africans. The Cocoa Marketing Board was created

in 1947 to assist farmers and to stabilize the production and

sale of their crop. By the end of that decade, the Gold Coast

was supplying more than half of the world's cocoa. The colony's earnings increased further from the export of

timber and gold. Gold, which initially brought Europeans to the Gold Coast, remained in the hands of Africans until the

1890s. Traditional techniques of panning and shaft mining,

however, yielded only limited output. The development of

modern modes of extracting minerals made gold mining an

exclusively foreign-run enterprise. For example, Ashanti Goldfields Corporation, which was organized in 1897, gained a concession of about 160 square kilometers in which to prospect

commercially for gold. Although certain tribal authorities profited greatly from the granting of mining concessions, it was the

European mining companies and the colonial government

that accumulated much of the wealth. Revenue from export of

the colony's natural resources financed internal improvements

21
Ghana: A Country Study

in infrastructure and social services. The foundation of an educational system more advanced than any other in West Africa

also resulted from mineral export revenue. Many of the economic and social improvements in the Gold

Coast in the early part of the twentieth century have been

attributed to Frederick Gordon Guggisberg, governor from

1919 to 192V. Born in Toronto, Canada, Guggisberg joined the

British army in 1889. During the first decade of the twentieth

century, he worked as a surveyor in the British colonies of the

Gold Coast and Nigeria, and later, during World War I, he

served in France.

At the beginning of his governorship of the Gold Coast,

Guggisberg presented a ten-year development program to the

Legislative Council. He suggested first the improvement of

transportation. Then, in order of priority, his prescribed

improvements included water supply, drainage, hydroelectric

projects, public buildings, town improvements, schools, hospitals, prisons, communication lines, and other services. Guggisberg also set a goal of filling half of the colony's technical

positions with Africans as soon as they could be trained. His

program has been described as the most ambitious ever proposed in West Africa up to that time. Another of the governor's

programs led to the development of an artificial harbor at Takoradi, which then became Ghana's first port. Achimota College, which developed into one of the nation's finest secondary

schools, was also a Guggisberg idea.

During the colonial years, the country's educational institutions improved markedly. From beginnings in missionary

schools, the early part of the twentieth century saw significant

advances in many fields, and, although the missions continued

to participate, the government steadily increased its interest

and support. In 1909 the government established a technical

school and a teachers' training college at Accra; several other

secondary schools were set up by the missions. The government steadily increased its financial backing for the growing

number of both state and mission schools. In 1948 the country

opened its first center of higher learning, the University College. It was through British-style education that a new Ghanaian elite gained the means and the desire to strive for

independence.

The colony assisted Britain in both World War I and World

War II. From 1914 to 1918, the Gold Coast Regiment served

with distinction in battles against German forces in Cameroon

22
Asantehene Otumfuo Nana Opoku Ware II sitting in state to receive homagefrom his subjects

Courtesy Embassy of Ghana, Washington

The paramount chief ofNakong, Kasena people, far northern Ghana

Courtesy life in general (Brook, Rose, and Cooper Le Van)

23
Ghana: A Country Study

and in the long East Africa campaign. In World War II, troops

from the Gold Coast emerged with even greater prestige after

outstanding service in such places as Ethiopia and Burma. In

the ensuing years, however, postwar problems of inflation and

instability severely hampered readjustment for returning veter- ans, who were in the forefront of growing discontent and

unrest. Their war service and veterans' associations had broadened their horizons, making it difficult for them to return to the humble and circumscribed positions set aside for Africans

by the colonial authorities.

The Growth of Nationalism and the End of Colonial

Rule

As the country developed economically, the focus of government power gradually shifted from the hands of the governor

and his officials into those of Ghanaians. The changes resulted

from the gradual development of a strong spirit of nationalism

and were to result eventually in independence. The development of national consciousness accelerated quickly after World

War II, when, in addition to ex-servicemen, a substantial group

of urban African workers and traders emerged to lend mass

support to the aspirations of a small educated minority. Once

the movement had begun, events moved rapidly—not always

fast enough to satisfy the nationalist leaders, but still at a pace

that surprised not only the colonial government but also many

of the more conservative Africans.

Early Manifestations of Nationalism

As early as the latter part of the nineteenth century, a growing number of educated Africans found an arbitrary political

system that placed almost all power in the hands of the gover- nor through his appointment of council members increasingly

unacceptable. In the 1890s, some members of the educated

coastal elite organized themselves into the Aborigines' Rights

Protection Society to protest a land bill that threatened traditional land tenure. This protest helped lay the foundation for

political action that would ultimately lead to independence. In 1920 one of the African members of the Legislative Council,

Joseph E. Casely-Hayford, convened the National Congress of

British West Africa, which sent a delegation to London to urge

the Colonial Office to consider the principle of elected representation. The group, which claimed to speak for all British

24
Historical Setting

West African colonies, represented the first expression of political solidarity between intellectuals and nationalists of the area. Even though the delegation was not received in London (on

the grounds that it represented only the interests of a small

group of urbanized Africans), its actions aroused considerable

support among the African elite at home.

Notwithstanding their call for elected representation as opposed to a system whereby the governor appointed council

members, these nationalists insisted that they were loyal to the

British Crown and that they merely sought an extension of British political and social practices to Africans. Notable leaders

included Africanus Horton, Jr., J.M. Sarbah, and S.R.B.

Attah-Ahoma. Such men gave the nationalist movement a dis- tinctly elitist flavor that was to last until the late 1940s.

The constitution of 1925, promulgated by Guggisberg, cre- ated provincial councils of paramount chiefs for all but the

northern provinces of the colony. These councils in turn

elected six chiefs as unofficial members of the Legislative

Council. Although the new constitution appeared to recognize

African sentiments, Guggisberg was concerned primarily with

protecting British interests. For example, he provided Africans

with a limited voice in the central government; yet, by limiting

nominations to chiefs, he drove a wedge between chiefs and

their educated subjects. The intellectuals believed that the

chiefs, in return for British support, had allowed the provincial

councils to fall completely under control of the government.

By the mid-1930s, however, a gradual rapprochement between

chiefs and intellectuals had begun.

Agitation for more adequate representation continued.

Newspapers owned and managed by Africans played a major

part in provoking this discontent—six were being published in

the 1930s. As a result of the call for broader representation, two

more unofficial African members were added to the Executive

Council in 1943. Changes in the Legislative Council, however,

had to await a different political climate in London, which

came about only with the postwar election of a British Labour

Party government.

The new Gold Coast constitution of 1946 (also known as the

Burns constitution after the governor of the time) was a bold

document. For the first time, the concept of an official majority was abandoned. The Legislative Council was now composed of

six ex-officio members, six nominated members, and eighteen

elected members. The 1946 constitution also admitted repre25
Ghana: A Country Study

sentatives from Asante into the council for the first time. Even

with a Labour Party government in power, however, the British

continued to view the colonies as a source of raw materials that were needed to strengthen their crippled economy. Change

that would place real power in African hands was not a priority

among British leaders until after rioting and looting in Accra

and other towns and cities in early 1948 over issues of pensions

for ex-servicemen, the dominant role of foreigners in the econ- omy, the shortage of housing, and other economic and politi- cal grievances.

With elected members in a decisive majority, Ghana had

reached a level of political maturity unequaled anywhere in

colonial Africa. The constitution did not, however, grant full self-government. Executive power remained in the hands of

the governor, to whom the Legislative Council was responsible.

Hence, the constitution, although greeted with enthusiasm as a

significant milestone, soon encountered trouble. World War II had just ended, and many Gold Coast veterans who had served

in British overseas expeditions returned to a country beset with

shortages, inflation, unemployment, and black-market practices. These veterans, along with discontented urban elements,

formed a nucleus of malcontents ripe for disruptive action.

They were nowjoined by farmers, who resented drastic governmental measures that mandated the cutting down of diseased cacao trees in order to control an epidemic, and by many others who were unhappy that the end of the war had not been fol- lowed by economic improvements.

The Politics of the Independence Movements

Although political organizations had existed in the British

colony, the United Gold Coast Convention (UGCC) was the

first nationalist movement with the aim of self-government "in

the shortest possible time." Founded in August 1947 by educated Africans such as J.B. Danquah, A.G. Grant, R.A.

Awoonor-Williams, Edward Akufo Addo (all lawyers except for

Grant, who was a wealthy businessman), and others, the leadership of the organization called for the replacement of chiefs on

the Legislative Council with educated persons. For these political leaders, traditional governance, exercised largely via indi- rect rule, was identified with colonial interests and the past.

They believed that it was their responsibility to lead their country into a new age. They also demanded that, given their education, the colonial administration should respect them and

26
Historical Setting

accord them positions of responsibility. As one writer on the

period reported, "The symbols of progress, science, freedom,

youth, all became cues which the new leadership evoked and

reinforced." In particular, the UGCC leadership criticized the

government for its failure to solve the problems of unemployment, inflation, and the disturbances that had come to characterize the society at the end of the war. Their opposition to the colonial administration notwithstanding, UGCC members were conservative in the sense that

their leadership did not seek drastic or revolutionary change.

This was probably a result of their training in the British way of

doing things. The gentlemanly manner in which politics were

then conducted was to change after Kwame Nkrumah created

his Convention People's Party (CPP) in June 1949.

Nkrumah was born at Nkroful in the Nzema area and educated in Catholic schools at Half Assini and Achimota. He

received further training in the United States at Lincoln University and at the University of Pennsylvania. Later, in London,

Nkrumah became active in the West African Students' Union

and the Pan-African Congress. He was one of the few Africans

who participated in the Manchester Congress of 1945 of the

Pan-Africanist movement. During his time in Britain, Nkrumah

came to know such outspoken anti-colonialists and intellectuals

as the West Indian George Padmore and the African-American

W.E.B. Du Bois. In 1947, when the UGCC was created in the

Gold Coast to oppose colonial rule, Nkrumah was invited from

London to become the movement's general secretary.

Nkrumah's tenure with the UGCC was a stormy one. In

March 1948, he was arrested and detained with other leaders of

the UGCC for political activism. Later, after the other members

of the UGCC were invited to make recommendations to the

Coussey Committee, which was advising the governor on the

path to independence, Nkrumah broke with the UGCC and

founded the CPP. Unlike the UGCC, which called for self-government "in the shortest possible time," Nkrumah and the CPP

asked for "self-government now." The party leadership, made

up of Nkrumah, Kojo Botsio, Komla A. Gbedemah, and a group of mostly young political professionals known as the

"Verandah Boys," identified itself more with ordinary working

people than with the UGCC and its intelligentsia.

Nkrumah's style and the promises he made appealed directly

to the majority of workers, farmers, and youths who heard him;

he seemed to be the national leader on whom they could focus

27
Ghana: A Country Study

their hopes. He also won the support of influential market

women, who, through their domination of small-scale trade,

served as effective channels of communication at the local

level. The majority of the politicized population, stirred in the

postwar years by outspoken newspapers, was separated from

both the tribal chiefs and the Anglophile elite nearly as much

as from the British by economic, social, and educational factors. This majority consisted primarily of ex-servicemen, liter- ate persons who had some primary schooling, journalists, and

elementary school teachers, all of whom had developed a taste for populist conceptions of democracy. A growing number of

uneducated but urbanized industrial workers also formed part

of the support group. Nkrumah was able to appeal to them on

their own terms. By June 1949, when the CPP was formed with

the avowed purpose of seeking immediate self-governance,

Nkrumah had a mass following.

The constitution of 1951 resulted from the report of the

Coussey Committee, created because of disturbances in Accra

and other cities in 1948. In addition to giving the Executive

Council a large majority of African ministers, it created a Legislative Assembly, half the elected members of which were to come from the towns and rural districts and half from the tra- ditional councils, including, for the first time, the Northern

Territories. Although it was an enormous step forward, the new

constitution still fell far short of the CPP's call for full

self-government. Executive power remained in British hands,

and the legislature was tailored to permit control by traditionalist interests.

With increasing popular backing, the CPP in early 1950 initi- ated a campaign of "positive action," intended to instigate widespread strikes and nonviolent resistance. When some violent

disorders occurred, Nkrumah, along with his principal lieutenants, was promptly arrested and imprisoned for sedition. But

this merely increased his prestige as leader and hero of the

cause and gave him the status of martyr. In February 1951, the

first elections were held for the Legislative Assembly under the

new constitution. Nkrumah, still in jail, won a seat, and the

CPP won an impressive victory with a two-thirds majority of the

104 seats. The governor, Sir Charles Arden-Clarke, released Nkrumah

and invited him to form a government as "leader of government business," a position similar to that of prime minister.

28
Historical Setting

Nkrumah accepted. A major milestone had been passed on the

road to independence and self-government. Nonetheless,

although the CPP agreed to work within the new constitutional

order, the structure of government that existed in 1951 was cer- tainly not what the CPP preferred. The ministries of defense,

external affairs, finance, and justice were still controlled by

British officials who were not responsible to the legislature.

Also, by providing for a sizable representation of traditional

tribal chiefs in the Legislative Assembly, the constitution accentuated the cleavage between the modern political leaders and

the traditional authorities of the councils of chiefs.

The start of Nkrumah's first term as "leader of government

business" was marked by cordiality and cooperation with the

British governor. During the next few years, the government

was gradually transformed into a full parliamentary system.

The changes were opposed by the more traditionalist African

elements, particularly in Asante and the Northern Territories.

This opposition, however, proved ineffective in the face of con- tinuing and growing popular support for a single overriding

concept—independence at an early date.

In 1952 the position of prime minister was created and the

Executive Council became the cabinet. The prime minister was made responsible to the Legislative Assembly, which duly

elected Nkrumah prime minister. The constitution of 1954

ended the election of assembly members by the tribal councils.

The Legislative Assembly increased in size, and all members

were chosen by direct election from equal, single-member constituencies. Only defense and foreign policy remained in the

hands of the governor; the elected assembly was given control

of virtually all internal affairs of the colony.

The CPP pursued a policy of political centralization, which

encountered serious opposition. Shortly after the 1954 election, a new party, the Asante-based National Liberation Movement (NLM), was formed. The NLM advocated a federal form

of government, with increased powers for the various regions.

NLM leaders criticized the CPP for perceived dictatorial ten- dencies. The new party worked in cooperation with another

regionalist group, the Northern People's Party. When these two

regional parties walked out of discussions on a new constitution, the CPP feared that London might consider such disunity an indication that the colony was not yet ready for the next

phase of self-government.

29
Ghana: A Country Study

The British constitutional adviser, however, backed the CPP

position. The governor dissolved the Legislative Assembly in

order to test popular support for the CPP demand for immediate independence. The crown agreed to grant independence if so requested by a two-thirds majority of the new legislature.

New elections were held in July 1956. In keenly contested elections, the CPP won 57 percent of the votes cast, but the fragmentation of the opposition gave the CPP every seat in the

south as well as enough seats in Asante, the Northern Territories, and the Trans-Volta Region to hold a two-thirds majority of

the 104 seats. Prior to the July 1956 general elections in the Gold Coast, a

plebiscite was conducted under United Nations (UN) auspices

to decide the future disposition of British Togoland and

French Togoland. The British trusteeship, the western portion

of the former German colony, had been linked to the Gold

Coast since 1919 and was represented in its parliament. The

dominant ethnic group, the Ewe, were divided between the

Gold Coast proper and the two Togos. A clear majority of British Togoland inhabitants voted in favor of union with their

western neighbors, and the area was absorbed into the Gold

Coast. There was, however, vocal opposition to the incorporation from some of the Ewe in southern British Togoland.

Independent Ghana

On August 3, 1956, the newly elected Legislative Assembly

passed a motion authorizing the government to request independence within the British Commonwealth. The opposition

did not attend the debate, and the vote was unanimous. The

British government accepted this motion as clearly representing a reasonable majority. On March 6, 1957, the 113th anniversary of the Bond of 1844, the former British colony of the

Gold Coast became the independent state of Ghana. The

nation's Legislative Assembly became the National Assembly,

and Nkrumah continued as prime minister. According to an independence constitution also drafted in 1957, Queen Elizabeth II was to be represented in the former colony by a gover- nor general, and Sir Arden-Clarke was appointed to that

position. This special relationship between the British Crown

and Ghana would continue until 1960, when the position of

governor general was abolished under terms of a new constitution that declared the nation a republic.

30
Ghana's monument to independence, Black Star Square, Accra

CourtesyJames Sanders

31
Ghana: A Country Study

The independence constitution of 1957 provided protection

against easy amendment of a number of its clauses. It also

granted a voice to chiefs and their tribal councils by providing

for the creation of regional assemblies. No bill amending the

entrenched clauses of the constitution or affecting the powers

of the regional bodies or the privileges of the chiefs could

become law except by a two-thirds vote of the National Assembly and by simple majority approval in two-thirds of the

regional assemblies. When local CPP supporters gained control

of enough regional assemblies, however, the Nkrumah government promptly secured passage of an act removing the special

entrenchment protection clause in the constitution, a step that

left the National Assembly with the power to effect any constitutional change the CPP deemed necessary.

Among the CPP's earliest acts was the outright abolition of

regional assemblies. Another was the dilution of the clauses

designed to ensure a nonpolitical and competitive civil service.

This action allowed Nkrumah to appoint his followers to positions throughout the upper ranks of public employment.

Thereafter, unfettered by constitutional restrictions and with an obedient party majority in the assembly, Nkrumah began his

administration of the first independent African country south

of the Sahara.

Nkrumah, Ghana, and Africa

Nkrumah has been described by author Peter Omari as a

dictator who "made much of elections, when he was aware that

they were not really free but rigged in his favor." According to Omari, the CPP administration of Ghana was one that manipulated the constitutional and electoral processes of democracy

to justify Nkrumah's agenda. The extent to which the government would pursue that agenda constitutionally was demonstrated early in the administration's life when it succeeded in

passing the Deportation Act of 1957, the same year that ethnic,

religious, and regional parties were banned. The Deportation

Act empowered the governor general and, therefore, subsequent heads of state, to expel persons whose presence in the

country was deemed not in the interest of the public good.

Although the act was to be applied only to non-Ghanaians, sev- eral people to whom it was later applied claimed to be citizens. The Preventive Detention Act, passed in 1958, gave power to the prime minister to detain certain persons for up to five years

without trial. Amended in 1959 and again in 1962, the act was

32
Historical Setting

seen by opponents of the CPP government as a flagrant restric- tion of individual freedom and human rights. Once it had been

granted these legal powers, the CPP administration managed

to silence its opponents. J. B. Danquah, a leading member of

the UGCC, was detained until he died in prison in 1965. Kofi

Abrefa Busia, leader of the opposition United Party (UP),

formed by the NLM and other parties in response to Nkrumah's outlawing of so-called separatist parties in 1957, went

into exile in London to escape detention, while other UP members still in the countryjoined the ruling party.

On July 1, 1960, Ghana became a republic, and Nkrumah

won the presidential election that year. Shortly thereafter,

Nkrumah was proclaimed president for life, and the CPP

became the sole party of the state. Using the powers granted

him by the party and the constitution, Nkrumah by 1961 had

detained an estimated 400 to 2,000 of his opponents. Nkrumah's critics pointed to the rigid hold of the CPP over the

nation's political system and to numerous cases of human

rights abuses. Others, however, defended Nkrumah's agenda

and policies.

Nkrumah discussed his political views in his numerous writings, especially in Africa Must Unite (1963) and in Neo-Colonialism (1965). These writings show the impact of his stay in Britain

in the mid-1940s. The Pan-Africanist movement, which had

held one of its annual conferences, attended by Nkrumah, at Manchester in 1945, was influenced by socialist ideologies. The

movement sought unity among people of African descent and

also improvement in the lives of workers, who, it was alleged,

had been exploited by capitalist enterprises in Africa. Western

countries with colonial histories were identified as the exploiters. According to the socialists, "oppressed" people ought to identify with the socialist countries and organizations that best

represented their interests; however, all the dominant world

powers in the immediate post-1945 period, except the Soviet

Union and the United States, had colonial ties with Africa.

Nkrumah asserted that even the United States, which had

never colonized any part of Africa, was in an advantageous position to exploit independent Africa unless preventive efforts were taken.

According to Nkrumah, his government, which represented

the first black African nation to win independence, had an

important role to play in the struggle against capitalist interests on the continent. As he put it, "The independence of Ghana

33
Ghana: A Country Study

would be meaningless unless it was tied to the total liberation

of Africa." It was important, then, he said, for Ghanaians to "seek first the political kingdom." Economic benefits associated

with independence were to be enjoyed later, proponents of

Nkrumah's position argued. But Nkrumah needed strategies to pursue his goals.

On the domestic front, Nkrumah believed that rapid modernization of industries and communications was necessary

and that it could be achieved if the workforce were completely

Africanized and educated. Even more important, however,

Nkrumah believed that this domestic goal could be achieved

faster if it were not hindered by reactionary politicians—elites in the opposition parties and traditional chiefs—who might

compromise with Western imperialists. From such an ideological position, Nkrumah's supporters justified the Deportation

Act of 1957; the Detention Acts of 1958, 1959, and 1962; parliamentary intimidation of CPP opponents; the appointment of

Nkrumah as president for life; the recognition of his party as the sole political organization of the state; the creation of the

Young Pioneer Movement for the ideological education of the

nation's youth; and the party's control of the civil service. Government expenditures on road building projects, mass education of adults and children, and health services, as well as the

construction of the Akosombo Dam, were all important if Ghana were to play its leading role in Africa's liberation from

colonial and neo-colonial domination.

On the continental level, Nkrumah sought to unite Africa so

it could defend its international economic interests and stand

up against the political pressures from East and West that were

a result of the Cold War. His dream for Africa was a continuation of the Pan-Africanist dream as expressed at the Manchester conference. The initial strategy was to encourage

revolutionary political movements in Africa, beginning with a Ghana, Guinea, and Mali union, that would serve as the psy- chological and political impetus for the formation of a United

States of Africa. Thus, when Nkrumah was criticized for paying

little attention to Ghana or for wasting national resources in

supporting external programs, he reversed the argument and

accused his opponents of being short-sighted.

But the heavy financial burdens created by Nkrumah's development policies and Pan-Africanist adventures created new

sources of opposition. With the presentation in July 1961 of the

country's first austerity budget, Ghana's workers and farmers

34
Historical Setting

became aware of and critical of the cost to them of Nkrumah's

programs. Their reaction set the model for the protests over

taxes and benefits that were to dominate Ghanaian political cri- ses for the next thirty years. CPP backbenchers and UP representatives in the National

Assembly sharply criticized the government's demand for

increased taxes and, particularly, for a forced savings program.

Urban workers began a protest strike, the most serious of a number of public outcries against government measures during 1961. Nkrumah's public demands for an end to corruption

in the government and the party further undermined popular

faith in the national government. A drop in the price paid to cocoa farmers by the government marketing board aroused

resentment among a segment of the population that had

always been Nkrumah's major opponent.

The Growth of Opposition to Nkrumah

Nkrumah's complete domination of political power had

served to isolate lesser leaders, leaving each a real or imagined

challenger to the ruler. After opposition parties were crushed,

opponents came only from within the CPP hierarchy. Among

its members was Tawia Adamafio, an Accra politician. Nkrumah had made him general secretary of the CPP for a brief

time. Later, Adamafio was appointed minister of state for presidential affairs, the most important post in the president's staff at Flagstaff House, which gradually became the center for all decision making and much of the real administrative machinery for both the CPP and the government. The other leader

with an apparently autonomous base was John Tettegah, leader

of the Trade Union Congress. Neither, however, proved to have

any power other than that granted to them by the president.

By 1961, however, the young and more radical members of

the CPP leadership, led by Adamafio, had gained ascendancy

over the original CPP leaders like Gbedemah. After a bomb

attempt on Nkrumah's life in August 1962, Adamafio, Ako

Adjei (then minister of foreign affairs), and Cofie Crabbe (all

members of the CPP) were jailed under the Preventive Detention Act. The CPP newspapers charged them with complicity in

the assassination attempt, offering as evidence only the fact

that they had all chosen to ride in cars far behind the president's when the bomb was thrown.

For more than a year, the trial of the alleged plotters of the

1962 assassination attempt occupied center stage. The accused

35
Ghana: A Country Study

were brought to trial before the three-judge court for state

security, headed by the chiefjustice, Sir Arku Korsah. When the

court acquitted the accused, Nkrumah used his constitutional

prerogative to dismiss Korsah. Nkrumah then obtained a vote

from the parliament that allowed retrial of Adamafio and his

associates. A new court, with a jury chosen by Nkrumah, found

all the accused guilty and sentenced them to death. These sen- tences, however, were commuted to twenty years' imprisonment.

In early 1964, in order to prevent future challenges from the

judiciary, Nkrumah obtained a constitutional amendment

allowing him to dismiss any judge. At the same time, Ghana

officially became a single-party state, and an act of parliament

ensured that there would be only one candidate for president.

Other parties having already been outlawed, no non-CPP can- didates came forward to challenge the party slate in the general elections announced for June 1965. Nkrumah had been

re-elected president of the country for less than a year when

members of the National Liberation Council (NLC) overthrew

the CPP government in a military coup on February 24, 1966.

At the time, Nkrumah was in China. He took up asylum in

Guinea, where he remained until he died in 1972.

The Fall of the Nkrumah Regime and Its Aftermath

Leaders of the 1966 military coup, including army officers

Colonel E.K. Kotcka, Major A.A. Afrifa, Lieutenant General

(retired) J.A. Ankra, and Police Inspector General J.W.K. Hartley, justified their takeover by charging that the CPP administration was abusive and corrupt. They were equally disturbed

by Nkrumah's aggressive involvement in African politics and by

his belief that Ghanaian troops could be sent anywhere in

Africa to fight so-called liberation wars, even though they never did so. Above all, they pointed to the absence of democratic

practices in the nation—a situation they claimed had affected

the morale of the armed forces. According to Kotoka, the military coup of 1966 was a nationalist one because it liberated the

nation from Nkrumah's dictatorship—a declaration that was

supported by Alex Quaison-Sackey, Nkrumah's former minister

of foreign affairs. Despite the vast political changes brought about by the over- throw of Nkrumah, many problems remained. For example,

the underlying ethnic and regional divisions within society had

to be addressed. The apparent spirit of national unity that

36
Historical Setting

seemed to have developed during the Nkrumah years turned

out to have resulted in part from his coercive powers as well as from his charisma. As a consequence, successive new leaders

faced the problem of forging disparate personal, ethnic, and

sectional interests into a real Ghanaian nation. The economic

burdens, aggravated by what some described as past extravagance, would cripple each future government's ability to foster

the rapid development needed to satisfy even minimal popular

demands for a better life. The fear of a resurgence of an overly

strong central authority would continue to dominate the constitutional agenda and to pervade the thinking of many educated, politically minded Ghanaians. Others, however, felt that a strong government was essential.

A considerable portion of the population had become con- vinced that effective, honest government was incompatible

with competitive political parties. Many Ghanaians remained

committed to nonpolitical leadership for the nation, even in

the form of military rule. The problems of the Busia administration, the country's first elected government after Nkrumah's

fall, illustrated the problems Ghana would continue to face.

The National Liberation Council and the Busia Years, 1966-71

The leaders of the coup that overthrew Nkrumah immediately opened the country's borders and its prison gates to allow

the return from exile or release from preventive detention of

all opponents of Nkrumah. The National Liberation Council

(NLC), composed of four army officers and four police officers, assumed executive power. It appointed a cabinet of civil servants and promised to restore democratic government as quickly as possible. The ban on the formation of political parties remained in force until late 1968, but activity by individual

figures began much earlier with the appointment of a succession of committees composed of civil servants and politicians as the first step in the return to civilian and representative rule.

These moves culminated in the appointment of a representative assembly to draft a constitution for the Second Republic

of Ghana. Political party activity was allowed to commence with

the opening of the assembly. By election time in August 1969,

the first competitive nationwide political contest since 1956,

five parties had been organized.

The major contenders were the Progress Party (PP), headed

by Kofi A. Busia, and the National Alliance of Liberals (NAL),

led by Komla A. Gbedemah. Critics associated these two lead37
Ghana: A Country Study

ing parties with the political divisions of the early Nkrumah

years. The PP found much of its support among the old opponents of Nkrumah's CPP—the educated middle class and traditionalists of Ashanti Region and the North. This link was

strengthened by the fact that Busia had headed the NLM and

its successor, the UP, before fleeing the country to oppose

Nkrumah from exile. Similarly, the NAL was seen as the succes- sor of the CPP's right wing, which Gbedemah had headed until

he was ousted by Nkrumah in 1961.

The elections demonstrated an interesting voting pattern.

For example, the PP carried all the seats among the Asante and

the Brong. All seats in the northern regions of the country were closely contested. In the Volta Region, the PP won some

Ewe seats, while the NAL won all seats in the non-Ewe northern

section. Overall, the PP gained 59 percent of the popular vote

and 74 percent of the seats in the National Assembly. The PP's

victories demonstrated some support among nearly all ethnic

groups. An estimated 60 percent of the electorate voted.

Immediately after the elections, Gbedemah was barred from

taking his seat in the National Assembly by a Supreme Court

decision involving those CPP members who had been accused

of financial crimes. Gbedemah retired permanently from active

participation in politics. The NAL, left without a strong leader,

controlled thirty seats; in October 1970, it absorbed the members of three other minor parties in the assembly to form the

Justice Party (JP) under the leadership ofJoseph Appiah. The

JP's combined strength constituted what amounted to a south- ern bloc with a solid constituency among most of the Ewe and

the peoples of the coastal cities. Busia, the PP leader in both parliament and the nation,

became prime minister when the National Assembly met in

September. An interim three-member presidential commission, composed of Major Afrifa, Police Inspector General Harlley of the NLC, and the chief of the defense staff, Major

General A.K. Ocran, served in place of an elected president for

the first year and a half of civilian rule. The commission dis- solved itself in August 1970. Before stepping down, Afrifa criti- cized the constitution, particularly provisions that served more

as a bar to the rise of a dictator than as a blueprint for an effective, decisive government. The electoral college chose as president Chief Justice Edward Akufo Addo, one of the leading

nationalist politicians of the UGCC era and one of the judges

dismissed by Nkrumah in 1964.

38
Historical Setting

All attention, however, remained focused on Prime Minister

Busia and his government. Much was expected of the Busia

administration because its parliamentarians were considered

intellectuals and, therefore, more perceptive in their evaluations of what needed to be done. Many Ghanaians hoped that

their decisions would be in the general interest of the nation,

as compared with those made by the Nkrumah administration,

which were judged to satisfy narrow party interests and Nkrumah's personal agenda. The NLC had given assurances that

there would be more democracy, more political maturity, and

more freedom in Ghana because the politicians allowed to run

in the 1969 elections were proponents of Western democracy.

In fact, these were the same individuals who had suffered

under the old regime and were, therefore, thought to understand the benefits of democracy.

Two early measures initiated by the Busia government were

the expulsion of large numbers of noncitizens from the country and a companion measure to limit foreign involvement in

small businesses. The moves were aimed at relieving the unemployment created by the country's precarious economic situa- tion (see Historical Background, ch. 3). The policies were

popular because they forced out of the retail sector of the

economy those foreigners, especially Lebanese, Asians, and

Nigerians, who were perceived as unfairly monopolizing trade

to the disadvantage of Ghanaians. Many other Busia moves,

however, were not popular. Busia's decision to introduce a loan

program for university students, who had hitherto received

free education, was challenged because it was interpreted as introducing a class system into the country's highest institutions of learning. Some observers even saw Busia's devaluation

of the national currency and his encouragement of foreign

investment in the industrial sector of the economy as conservative ideas that could undermine Ghana's sovereignty.

The opposition JP's basic policies did not differ significantly

from those of the Busia administration. Still, the party

attempted to stress the importance of the central government

rather than that of limited private enterprise in economic

development, and it continued to emphasize programs of primary interest to the urban work force. The ruling PP emphasized the need for development in rural areas, both to slow the

movement of population to the cities and to redress regional

imbalance in levels of development. The JP and a growing

number of PP members favored suspension of payment on

39
Ghana: A Country Study

some foreign debts of the Nkrumah era. This attitude grew

more popular as debt payments became more difficult to meet.

Both parties favored the creation of a West African economic

community or an economic union with neighboring West Afri- can states. Despite broad popular support garnered at its inception and

strong foreign connections, the Busia government fell victim to an army coup within twenty-seven months. Neither ethnic nor

class differences played a role in the overthrow of the PP government. The crucial causes were the country's continuing

economic difficulties, both those stemming from the high for- eign debts incurred by Nkrumah and those resulting from

internal problems. The PP government had inherited US$580

million in medium- and long-term debts, an amount equal to 25 percent of the gross domestic product (GDP—see Glossary)

of 1969. By 1971 the US$580 million had been further inflated

by US$72 million in accrued interest payments and US$296

million in short-term commercial credits. Within the country, an even larger internal debt fueled inflation.

Ghana's economy remained largely dependent upon the

often difficult cultivation of and market for cocoa. Cocoa

prices had always been volatile, but exports of this tropical crop

normally provided about half of the country's foreign currency

earnings. Beginning in the 1960s, however, a number of factors

combined to limit severely this vital source of national income.

These factors included foreign competition (particularly from

neighboring Cote dTvoire), a lack of understanding of freemarket forces (by the government in setting prices paid to farmers), accusations of bureaucratic incompetence in the

Cocoa Marketing Board, and the smuggling of crops into Cote

d'lvoire. As a result, Ghana's income from cocoa exports con- tinued to fall dramatically.

Austerity measures imposed by the Busia administration,

although wise in the long run, alienated influential farmers,

who until then had been PP supporters. These measures were

part of Busia's economic structural adjustment efforts to put

the country on a sounder financial base. The austerity programs had been recommended by the International Monetary

Fund (IMF—see Glossary). The recovery measures also

severely affected the middle class and the salaried work force,

both of which faced wage freezes, tax increases, currency devaluations, and rising import prices. These measures precipitated

protests from the Trade Union Congress. In response, the gov40
Colonel Ignatius Kutu

Acheampong, head of state and

chairman of the National

Redemption Council and

Supreme Military Council,

1972-78

Courtesy Embassy of Ghana,

Washington

ernment sent the army to occupy the trade union headquarters

and to block strike actions—a situation that some perceived as negating the government's claim to be operating democratically.

The army troops and officers upon whom Busia relied for

support were themselves affected, both in their personal lives and in the tightening of the defense budget, by these same austerity measures. As the leader of the anti-Busia coup declared

onJanuary 13, 1972, even those amenities enjoyed by the army

during the Nkrumah regime were no longer available. Knowing that austerity had alienated the officers, the Busia government began to change the leadership of the army's combat

elements. This, however, was the last straw. Lieutenant Colonel

Ignatius Kutu Acheampong, temporarily commanding the First

Kwame Nkrumah, prime

minister and president,

1957-66

Courtesy Embassy of Ghana,

Washington

41
Ghana: A Country Study

Brigade around Accra, led a bloodless coup that ended the Second Republic.

The National Redemption Council Years, 1972-79

Despite its short existence, the Second Republic was significant in that the development problems the nation faced came

clearly into focus. These included uneven distribution of

investment funds and favoritism toward certain groups and

regions. Furthermore, important questions about developmental priorities emerged. For example, was rural development

more important than the needs of the urban population? Or,

to what extent was the government to incur the cost of university education? And more important, was the public to be

drawn into the debate about the nation's future? The impact of

the fall of Ghana's Second Republic cast a shadow across the

nation's political future because no clear answers to these problems emerged.

According to one writer, the overthrow of the PP government revealed that Ghana was no longer the pace-setter in

Africa's search for workable political institutions. Both the radical left and the conservative right had failed. In opposing

Nkrumah's one-party state, Busia allegedly argued that socialist

rule in Ghana had led to unemployment and poverty for many

while party officials grew richer at the expense of the masses. But in justifying the one-party state, Nkrumah pointed to the

weaknesses of multiparty parliamentary democracy, a system

that delayed decision-making processes and, therefore, the

ability to take action to foster development. The fall of both the

Nkrumah and the Busia regimes seemed to have confused

many with regard to the political direction the nation needed

to take. In other words, in the first few years after the Nkrumah

administration, Ghanaians were unable to arrive at a consensus on the type of government suited to address their national

problems.

It was this situation—the inability of the PP government to

satisfy diverse interest groups—that ostensibly gave Acheampong an excuse for the January 13 takeover. Acheampong's

National Redemption Council (NRC) claimed that it had to act

to remove the ill effects of the currency devaluation of the previous government and thereby, at least in the short run, to improve living conditions for individual Ghanaians. Under the

circumstances, the NRC was compelled to take immediate measures. Although committed to the reversal of the fiscal policies

42
Historical Setting

of the PP government, the NRC, by comparison, adopted policies that appeared painless and, therefore, popular. But unlike

the coup leaders of the NLC, members of the NRC did not outline any plan for the return of the nation to democratic rule.

Some observers accused the NRC of acting simply to rectify

their own grievances.

To justify their takeover, coup leaders leveled charges of cor- ruption against Busia and his ministers. In its first years, the

NRC drew support from a public pleased by the reversal of

Busia's austerity measures. The Ghanaian currency was revalued upward, and two moves were announced to lessen the burden of existing foreign debts: the repudiation of US$90 million

of Nkrumah's debts to British companies, and the unilateral

rescheduling of the rest of the country's debts for payment

over fifty years. Later, the NRC nationalized all large foreignowned companies. But these measures, while instantly popular

in the streets, did nothing to solve the country's real problems.

If anything, they aggravated the problem of capital flow. Unlike the NLC of 1966, the NRC sought to create a truly

military government; hence, in October 1975, the ruling council was reorganized into the Supreme Military Council (SMC),

and its membership was restricted to a few senior military officers. The intent was to consolidate the military's hold over government administration and to address occasional

disagreements, conflicts, and suspicions within the armed

forces, which by now had emerged as the constituency of the

military government. Little input from the civilian sector was

allowed, and no offers were made to return any part of the government to civilian control during the SMC's first five years in

power. SMC members believed that the country's problems

were caused by a lack of organization, which could be remedied by applying military organization and thinking. This was

the extent of the SMC philosophy. Officers were put in charge

of all ministries and state enterprises; junior officers and ser- geants were assigned leadership roles down to the local level in

every government department and parastatal organization.

During the NRC's early years, these administrative changes

led many Ghanaians to hope that the soldiers in command

would improve the efficiency of the country's bloated bureaucracies. Acheampong's popularity continued into 1974 as the

government successfully negotiated international loan agreements and rescheduled Ghana's debts. The government also

provided price supports for basic food imports, while seeking

43
Ghana: A Country Study

to encourage Ghanaians to become self-reliant in agriculture

and in the production of raw materials. In the Operation Feed

Yourself program, all Ghanaians were encouraged to undertake some form of food production, with the goal of eventual

food self-sufficiency for the country. The program enjoyed

some initial success, but support for it gradually waned.

Whatever limited success the NRC had in these efforts, however, was overridden by other basic economic factors. Industry

and transportation suffered greatly as world oil prices rose during and after 1974, and the lack of foreign exchange and credit

left the country without fuel. Basic food production continued

to decline even as the population grew, largely because of poor

price management and urbanization. When world cocoa prices rose again in the late 1970s, Ghana was unable to take advantage of the price rise because of the low productivity of its old

orchards. Moreover, because of the low prices paid to cocoa

farmers, some growers along the nation's borders smuggled

their produce to Togo or Cote d'lvoire. Disillusionment with

the government grew, particularly among the educated. Accusations of personal corruption among the rulers also began to surface.

The reorganization of the NRC into the SMC in 1975 may

have been part of a face-saving attempt. Shortly after that time,

the government sought to stifle opposition by issuing a decree

forbidding the propagation of rumors and by banning a number of independent newspapers and detaining their journalists.

Also, armed soldiers broke up student demonstrations, and the

government repeatedly closed the universities, which had

become important centers of opposition to NRC policies.

Despite these efforts, the SMC by 1977 found itself constrained by mounting nonviolent opposition. To be sure, dis- cussions about the nation's political future and its relationship

to the SMC had begun in earnest. Although the various opposition groups (university students, lawyers, and other organized

civilian groups) called for a return to civilian constitutional

rule, Acheampong and the SMC favored a union government—a mixture of elected civilian and appointed military

leaders—but one in which party politics would be abolished.

University students and many intellectuals criticized the union

government idea, but others, such as Justice Gustav KorantengAddow, who chaired the seventeen-member ad hoc committee

appointed by the government to work out details of the plan,

defended it as the solution to the nation's political problems.

44
Historical Setting

Supporters of the union government idea viewed multiparty

political contests as the perpetrators of social tension and com- munity conflict among classes, regions, and ethnic groups.

Unionists argued that their plan had the potential to depoliticize public life and to allow the nation to concentrate its energies on economic problems.

A national referendum was held in March 1978 to allow the

people to accept or reject the union government concept. A

rejection of the union government meant a continuation of

military rule. Given this choice, it was surprising that so narrow

a margin voted in favor of union government. Opponents of

the idea organized demonstrations against the government,

arguing that the referendum vote had not been free or fair. The Acheampong government reacted by banning several

organizations and by jailing as many as 300 of its opponents.

The agenda for change in the union government referendum called for the drafting of a new constitution by an SMCappointed commission, the selection of a constituent assembly

by November 1978, and general elections in June 1979. The ad

hoc committee had recommended a nonparty election, an

elected executive president, and a cabinet whose members

would be drawn from outside a single-house National Assembly. The military council would then step down, although its members could run for office as individuals.

In July 1978, in a sudden move, the other SMC officers

forced Acheampong to resign, replacing him with Lieutenant

General Frederick W.K. Akuffo. The SMC apparently acted in

response to continuing pressure to find a solution to the country's economic dilemma. Inflation was estimated to be as high

as 300 percent that year. There were shortages of basic commodities, and cocoa production fell to half its 1964 peak. The

council was also motivated by Acheampong's failure to dampen

rising political pressure for changes. Akuffo, the new SMC

chairman, promised publicly to hand over political power to a new government to be elected byJuly 1, 1979.

Despite Akuffo's assurances, opposition to the SMC persisted. The call for the formation of political parties intensified.

In an effort to gain support in the face of continuing strikes over economic and political issues, the Akuffo government at length announced that the formation of political parties would

be allowed after January 1979. Akuffo also granted amnesty to former members of both Nkrumah's CPP and Busia's PP, as well as to all those convicted of subversion under Acheampong.

45
Ghana: A Country Study

The decree lifting the ban on party politics went into effect on January 1, 1979, as planned. The commission that had been

working on a new constitution presented an approved draft

and adjourned in May. All appeared set for a new attempt at constitutional government in July, when a group of young army

officers overthrew the SMC government in June 1979.

Ghana and the Rawlings Era

On May 15, 1979, less than five weeks before constitutional

elections were to be held, a group of junior officers led by

Flight Lieutenant Jerry John Rawlings attempted a coup. Initially unsuccessful, the coup leaders were jailed and held for

court-martial. On June 4, however, sympathetic military offic- ers overthrew the Akuffo regime and released Rawlings and his

cohorts from prison fourteen days before the scheduled election. Although the SMC's pledge to return political power to civilian hands addressed the concerns of those who wanted

civilian government, the young officers who had staged the

June 4 coup insisted that issues critical to the image of the army

and important for the stability of national politics had been

ignored. Naomi Chazan, a leading analyst of Ghanaian politics,

aptly assessed the significance of the 1979 coup in the following statement:

Unlike the initial SMC II [the Akuffo period, 1978-

1979] rehabilitation effort which focused on the power

elite, this second attempt at reconstruction from a situa- tion of disintegration was propelled by growing alienation. It strove, by reforming the guidelines of public

behavior, to define anew the state power structure and to revise its inherent social obligations. . . . In retrospect the most irreversible outcome of this phase was the systematic eradication of the SMC leadership. . .

.

[Their] executions signaled not only the termination of

the already fallacious myth of the nonviolence of Ghanaian politics, but, more to the point, the deadly serious

determination of the new government to wipe the politi- cal slate clean. Rawlings and the young officers formed the Armed Forces

Revolutionary Council (AFRC). The armed forces were purged

of senior officers accused of corrupting the image of the military. In carrying out its goal, however, the AFRC was caught

46
A military shrine of an asafo company, Fante people, coastal region

Courtesy life in general (Brook, Rose, and Cooper Le Van)

between two groups with conflicting interests, Chazan

observed. These included the "soldier-supporters of the AFRC

who were happy to lash out at all manifestations of the old

regimes; and the now organized political parties who decried

the undue violence and advocated change with restraint."

Despite the coup and the subsequent executions of former

heads of military governments (Afrifa of the NLC; Acheampong and some of his associates of the NRC; and Akuffo and

leading members of the SMC), the planned elections took

place, and Ghana had returned to constitutional rule by the

end of September 1979. Before power was granted to the

elected government, however, the AFRC sent the unambiguous

message that "people dealing with the public, in whatever

capacity, are subject to popular supervision, must abide by fundamental notions of probity, and have an obligation to put the

good of the community above personal objective." The AFRC

position was that the nation's political leaders, at least those

from within the military, had not been accountable to the people. The administration of Hilla Limann, inaugurated on September 24, 1979, at the beginning of the Third Republic, was

thus expected to measure up to the new standard advocated by

the AFRC.

47
Ghana: A Country Study

Limann's People's National Party (PNP) began the Third

Republic with control of only seventy-one of the 140 legislative

seats. The opposition Popular Front Party (PFP) won forty-two

seats, while twenty-six elective positions were distributed

among three lesser parties. The percentage of the electorate

that voted had fallen to 40 percent. Unlike the country's previ- ous elected leaders, Limann was a former diplomat and a noncharismatic figure with no personal following. As Limann

himself observed, the ruling PNP included people of conflicting ideological orientations. They sometimes disagreed

strongly among themselves on national policies. Many observers, therefore, wondered whether the new government was

equal to the task confronting the state. The most immediate threat to the Limann administration,

however, was the AFRC, especially those officers who organized

themselves into the 'June 4 Movement" to monitor the civilian

administration. In an effort to keep the AFRC from looking

over its shoulder, the government ordered Rawlings and sev- eral other army and police officers associated with the AFRC

into retirement; nevertheless, Rawlings and his associates

remained a latent threat, particularly as the economy continued its decline. The first Limann budget, for fiscal year (FY

see Glossary) 1981, estimated the Ghanaian inflation rate at 70

percent for that year, with a budget deficit equal to 30 percent

of the gross national product (GNP—see Glossary). The Trade

Union Congress claimed that its workers were no longer earn- ing enough to pay for food, much less anything else. A rash of

strikes, many considered illegal by the government, resulted,

each one lowering productivity and therefore national income.

In September the government announced that all striking public workers would be dismissed. These factors rapidly eroded

the limited support the Limann government enjoyed among

civilians and soldiers. The government fell on December 31,

1981, in another Rawlings-led coup.

The Second Coming of Rawlings: The First Six Years, 1982-87

The new government that took power on December 31,

1981, was the eighth in the fifteen years since the fall of Nkrumah. Calling itself the Provisional National Defence Council

(PNDC), its membership included Rawlings as chairman, Brigadier Joseph Nunoo-Mensah (whom Limann had dismissed as army commander), two other officers, and three civilians.

Despite its military connections, the PNDC made clear that it

48
Historical Setting

was unlike other soldier-led governments. This was immediately proved by the appointment of fifteen civilians to cabinet

positions. In a radio broadcast on January 5, 1982, Rawlings presented

a detailed statement explaining the factors that had necessitated termination of the Third Republic. The PNDC chairman

assured the people that he had no intention of imposing himself on Ghanaians. Rather, he "wanted a chance for the people,

farmers, workers, soldiers, the rich and the poor, to be part of

the decision-making process." He described the two years since

the AFRC had handed over power to a civilian government as a period of regression during which political parties attempted

to divide the people in order to rule them. The ultimate purpose for the return of Rawlings was, therefore, to "restore

human dignity to Ghanaians." In the chairman's words, the

dedication of the PNDC to achieving its goals was different

from any the country had ever known. It was for that reason

that the takeover was not a military coup, but rather a "holy

war" that would involve the people in the transformation of the

socioeconomic structure of the society. The PNDC also served

notice to friends and foes alike that any interference in the

PNDC agenda would be "fiercely resisted."

Opposition to the PNDC administration developed nonetheless in different sectors of the political spectrum. The most

obvious groups opposing the government were former PNP

and PFP members. They argued that the Third Republic had

not been given time to prove itself and that the PNDC administration was unconstitutional. Further opposition came from

the Ghana Bar Association (GBA), which criticized the government's use of public tribunals in the administration ofjustice.

Members of the Trade Union Congress were also angered

when the PNDC ordered them to withdraw demands for

increased wages. The National Union of Ghanaian Students

(NUGS) went even further, calling on the government to hand

over power to the attorney general, who would supervise new

elections.

By the end ofJune 1982, an attempted coup had been dis- covered, and those implicated had been executed. Many who

disagreed with the PNDC administration were driven into

exile, where they began organizing their opposition. They

accused the government of human rights abuses and political

intimidation, which forced the country, especially the press,

into a "culture of silence."

49
Ghana: A Country Study

Meanwhile, the PNDC was subjected to the influence of contrasting political philosophies and goals. Although the revolutionary leaders agreed on the need for radical change, they

differed on the means of achieving it. For example, John Ndebugre, secretary for agriculture in the PNDC government, who

was later appointed northern regional secretary (governor),

belonged to the radical Kwame Nkrumah Revolutionary

Guards, an extreme left-wing organization that advocated a Marxist-Leninist course for the PNDC. He was detained and

jailed for most of the latter part of the 1980s. Other members

of the PNDC, including Kojo Tsikata, P.V. Obeng, and Kwesi

Botchwey, were believed to be united only by their determination either to uplift the country from its desperate conditions

or to protect themselves from vocal opposition.

In keeping with Rawlings's commitment to populism as a

political principle, the PNDC began to form governing coalitions and institutions that would incorporate the populace at large into the machinery of the national government. Workers'

Defence Committees (WDCs) People's Defence Committees

(PDCs), Citizens' Vetting Committees (CVCs), Regional

Defence Committees (RDCs), and National Defence Committees (NDCs) were all created to ensure that those at the bottom

of society were given the opportunity to participate in the decision-making process. These committees were to be involved in

community projects and community decisions, and individual

members were expected to expose corruption and "anti-social

activities." Public tribunals, which were established outside the

normal legal system, were also created to try those accused of

antigovernment acts. And a four-week workshop aimed at making these cadres morally and intellectually prepared for their

part in the revolution was completed at the University of

Ghana, Legon, in July and August 1983.

Various opposition groups criticized the PDCs and WDCs,

however. The aggressiveness of certain WDCs, it was argued,

interfered with management's ability to make the bold decisions needed for the recovery of the national economy. In

response to such criticisms, the PNDC announced on December 1, 1984, the dissolution of all PDCs, WDCs, and NDCs, and

their replacement with Committees for the Defence of the Revolution (CDRs). With regard to public boards and statutory

corporations, excluding banks and financial institutions, Joint

Consultative Committees (JCCs) that acted as advisory bodies

to managing directors were created.

50
Historical Setting

The public tribunals, however, despite their characterization

as undemocratic by the GBA, were maintained. Although the

tribunals had been established in 1982, the law providing for

the creation of a National Public Tribunal to hear and determine appeals from, and decisions of, regional public tribunals was not passed until August 1984. Section 3 and Section 10 of

the PNDC Establishment Proclamation limited public tribunals

to cases of a political and an economic nature. The limitations

placed on public tribunals by the government in 1984 may

have been an attempt by the administration to redress certain

weaknesses. The tribunals, however, were not abolished; rather,

they were defended as "fundamental to a good legal system"

that needed to be maintained in response to "growing legal

consciousness on the part of the people."

At the time when the foundations of these sociopolitical

institutions were being laid, the PNDC was also engaged in a debate about how to finance the reconstruction of the national

economy. The country had indeed suffered from what some

described as the excessive and unwise, if not foolish, expenditures of the Nkrumah regime. The degree of decline under the

NRC and the SMC had also been devastating. By December

1981, when the PNDC came to power, the inflation rate topped

200 percent, while real GDP had declined by 3 percent per

annum for seven years. Not only cocoa production but even diamonds and timber exports had dropped dramatically. Gold

production had also fallen to half its preindependence level. Ghana's sorry economic condition, according to the PNDC,

had resulted in part from the absence of good political leadership. In fact, as early as the AFRC administration in 1979, Rawlings and his associates had accused three former military

leaders (generals Afrifa, Acheampong, and Akuffo) of corruption and greed and of thereby contributing to the national crisis and had executed them on the basis of this accusation. In

other words, the AFRC in 1979 attributed the national crisis to internal, primarily political, causes. The overthrow of the

Limann administration by the PNDC in 1981 was an attempt to prevent another inept administration from aggravating an

already bad economic situation. By implication, the way to resolve some of the problems was to stabilize the political situation and to improve the economic conditions of the nation radically.

At the end of its first year in power, the PNDC announced a four-year program of economic austerity and sacrifice that was

51
Ghana: A Country Study

to be the first phase of an Economic Recovery Program (ERP).

If the economy were to improve significantly, there was need

for a large injection of capital—a resource that could only be

obtained from international financial institutions of the West.

There were those on the PNDC's ideological left, however, who

rejected consultation with such agencies because these institutions were blamed in part for the nation's predicament. Precisely because some members of the government also held

such views, the PNDC secretary for finance and economic planning, Kwesi Botchwey, felt the need to justify World Bank (see

Glossary) assistance to Ghana in 1983:

It would be naive and unrealistic for certain sections of

the Ghanaian society to think that the request for eco- nomic assistance from the World Bank and its affiliates means a sell-out of the aims and objectives of the Ghanaian revolution to the international community. ... It does

not make sense for the country to become a member of

the bank and the IMF and continue to pay its dues only to decline to utilize the resources of these two institutions. The PNDC recognized that it could not depend on friendly

nations such as Libya to address the economic problems of

Ghana. The magnitude of the crisis—made worse by widespread bush fires that devastated crop production in 1983-84

and by the return of more than one million Ghanaians who

had been expelled from Nigeria in 1983, which had intensified

the unemployment situation—called for monetary assistance

from institutions with more resources. Phase One of the ERP began in 1983. Its goal was economic

stability. In broad terms, the government wanted to reduce

inflation and to create confidence in the nation's ability to recover. By 1987 progress was clearly evident. The rate of infla- tion had dropped to 20 percent, and between 1983 and 1987,

Ghana's economy reportedly grew at 6 percent per year. Official assistance from donor countries to Ghana's recovery program averaged US$430 million in 1987, more than double that

of the preceding years. The PNDC administration also made a remarkable payment of more than US$500 million in loan

arrears dating to before 1966. In recognition of these achievements, international agencies had pledged more than US$575

million to the country's future programs by May 1987. With

these accomplishments in place, the PNDC inaugurated Phase

Two of the ERP, which envisioned privatization of state-owned

52
Historical Setting

assets, currency devaluation, and increased savings and investment, and which was to continue until 1990.

Notwithstanding the successes of Phase One of the ERP,

many problems remained, and both friends and foes of the

PNDC were quick to point them out. One commentator noted

the high rate of Ghanaian unemployment as a result of the

belt-tightening policies of the PNDC. In the absence of employment or redeployment policies to redress such problems, he

wrote, the effects of the austerity programs might create cir- cumstances that could derail the PNDC recovery agenda.

Unemployment was only one aspect of the political problems facing the PNDC government; another was the size and

breadth of the PNDCs political base. The PNDC initially

espoused a populist program that appealed to a wide variety of

rural and urban constituents. Even so, the PNDC was the object

of significant criticism from various groups that in one way or another called for a return to constitutional government.

Much of this criticism came from student organizations, the

GBA, and opposition groups in self-imposed exile, who questioned the legitimacy of the military government and its declared intention of returning the country to constitutional

rule. So vocal was the outcry against the PNDC that it appeared

on the surface as if the PNDC enjoyed little support among

those groups who had historically molded and influenced Ghanaian public opinion. At a time when difficult policies were

being implemented, the PNDC could ill afford the continued

alienation and opposition of such prominent critics. By the mid-1980s, therefore, it had become essential that the

PNDC demonstrate that it was actively considering steps toward

constitutionalism and civilian rule. This was true notwithstanding the recognition of Rawlings as an honest leader and the

perception that the situation he was trying to redress was not of

his creation. To move in the desired direction, the PNDC

needed to weaken the influence and credibility of all antagonistic groups while it created the necessary political structures

that would bring more and more Ghanaians into the process of

national reconstruction. The PNDC's solution to its dilemma

was the proposal for district assemblies.

The District Assemblies

Although the National Commission for Democracy (NCD)

had existed as an agency of the PNDC since 1982, it was not

until September 1984 that Justice Daniel F. Annan, himself a

53
Ghana: A Country Study

member of the ruling council, was appointed chairman. The

official inauguration of the NCD in January 1985 signaled

PNDC determination to move the nation in a new political

direction. According to its mandate, the NCD was to devise a

viable democratic system, utilizing public discussions. Annan

explained the necessity for the commission's work by arguing

that the political party system of the past had lost track of the

country's socio-economic development processes. There was

the need, therefore, to search for a new political order that

would be functionally democratic. Constitutional rules of the

past, Annan continued, were not acceptable to the new revolutionary spirit, which saw the old political order as using the ballot box "merely to ensure that politicians got elected into

power, after which communication between the electorate and

their elected representative completely broke down."

After two years of deliberations and public hearings, the

NCD recommended the formation of district assemblies as local governing institutions that would offer opportunities to the ordinary person to become involved in the political process. The PNDC scheduled elections of the proposed assemblies for the last quarter of 1988.

If, as Rawlings said, the PNDC revolution was a "holy war,"

then the proposed assemblies were part of a PNDC policy

intended to annihilate enemy forces or, at least, to reduce

them to impotence. The strategy was to deny the opposition a

legitimate political forum within which it could articulate its objections to the government. It was for this reason, as much as

it was for those stated by Annan, that a five-member District

Assembly Committee was created in each of the nation's 110

administrative districts and was charged by the NCD with

ensuring that all candidates followed electoral rules. The district committees were to disqualify automatically any candidate

who had a record of criminal activity, insanity, or imprisonment

involving fraud or electoral offenses in the past, especially after

1979. Also barred from elections were all professionals accused

of fraud, dishonesty, and malpractice. The ban on political parties, instituted at the time of the Rawlings coup, was to continue.

By barring candidates associated with corruption and mismanagement of national resources from running for district

assembly positions, the PNDC hoped to establish new values to govern political behavior in Ghana. To do so effectively, the

government also made it illegal for candidates to mount cam54
Makola Market, the largest market in Accra

Courtesy life in general (Brook, Rose, and Cooper Le Van)

paign platforms other than the one defined by the NCD. Every

person qualified to vote in the district could propose candidates or be nominated as a candidate. Candidates could not be

nominated by organizations and associations but had to run

for district office on the basis of personal qualifications and ser- vice to their communities.

Once in session, an assembly was to become the highest

political authority in each district. Assembly members were to be responsible for deliberation, evaluation, coordination, and

implementation of programs accepted as appropriate for the

district's economic development; however, district assemblies were to be subject to the general guidance and direction of the

central government. To ensure that district developments were

in line with national policies, one-third of assembly members

were to be traditional authorities (chiefs) or their representatives; these members were to be approved by the PNDC in consultation with the traditional authorities and other "productive

economic groups in the district." In other words, a degree of

autonomy may have been granted to the assemblies in the

determination of programs most suited to the districts, but the

PNDC left itself with the ultimate responsibility of making sure

55
Ghana: A Country Study

that such programs were in line with the national economic

recovery program.

District assemblies as outlined in PNDC documents were

widely discussed by friends and foes of the government. Some

hailed the proposal as compatible with the goal of granting the

people opportunities to manage their own affairs, but others

(especially those of the political right) accused the government

of masking its intention to remain in power. If the government's desire for democracy were genuine, a timetable for

national elections should have been its priority rather than the

preoccupation with local government, they argued. Some questioned the wisdom of incorporating traditional chiefs and the

degree to which these traditional leaders would be committed

to the district assembly idea, while others attacked the election

guidelines as undemocratic and, therefore, as contributing to a

culture of silence in Ghana. To such critics, the district assemblies were nothing but a move by the PNDC to consolidate its position.

Rawlings, however, responded to such criticism by restating

the PNDC strategy and the rationale behind it: Steps towards more formal political participation are being taken through the district-level elections that we

will be holding throughout the country as part of our

decentralisation policy. As I said in my nationwide broadcast on December 31, if we are to see a sturdy tree of

democracy grow, we need to learn from the past and nurture very carefully and deliberately political institutions

that will become the pillars upon which the people's

power will be erected. A new sense of responsibility must

be created in each workplace, each village, each district; we already see elements of this in the work of the CDRs,

the 31st December Women's Movement, the June 4

Movement, Town and Village Development Committees,

and other organizations through which the voice of the

people is being heard.

As for the categorization of certain PNDC policies as "leftist" and "rightist," Rawlings dismissed such allegations as "remarkably simplistic. . . . What is certain is that we are moving for- wardl" For the PNDC, therefore, the district elections

constituted an obvious first step in a political process that was

to culminate at the national level.

56
Historical Setting

Rawlings's explanation notwithstanding, various opposition

groups continued to describe the PNDC-proposed district

assemblies as a mere public relations ploy designed to give

political legitimacy to a government that had come to power by

unconstitutional means. Longtime observers of the Ghanaian

political scene, however, identified two major issues at stake in

the conflict between the government and its critics: the means

by which political stability was to be achieved, and the problem

of attaining sustained economic growth. Both had preoccupied

the country since the era of Nkrumah. The economic recovery

programs implemented by the PNDC in 1983 and the proposal

for district assemblies in 1987 were major elements in the government's strategy to address these fundamental and persistent

problems. Both were very much part of the national debate in

Ghana in the late 1980s.

* * *

Ghana, formerly the Gold Coast, was not a distinct entity

until late in the nineteenth century. Its history before the

arrival of the Europeans and even after the consolidation of

British colonial rule must be studied as a part of the history of

the portion of West Africa extending from Sierra Leone to Nigeria and northward into the Sahara. This is the region from

which came the people and the social and political organizations that most influenced Ghanaians. Peoples and Empires of

West Africa, 1000-1800by G.T. Stride and Caroline Ifeka gives a

rich view of this period, with adequate attention to the future

Ghana. So does the classic treatment byJ.D. Fage in his A History of West Africa: An Introductory Survey. Robert Lystad's The

Ashanti and Ivor Wilks's Asante in the Nineteenth Century: The

Structure and Evolution of a Political Order both provide a comprehensive look at the history of the most influential of the purely

Ghanaian kingdoms, without which an understanding of later Ghanaian history would be impossible. For the years of European commercial activities on the Guinea Coast, see Arnold

Walter Lawrence's Trade, Castles, and Forts of West Africa and also

his Fortified Trade-posts: The English in West Africa, 1645-1822.

Other supplementary readings on the period can be found in

works by Kwame Arhin, A. Adu Boahen, Nehemia Levtzion,

Michael Crowder, andJohn K. Fynn.

57
Ghana: A Country Study

Military readers may enjoy Paul Mmegha Mbaeyi's British

Military and Naval Forces in West African History, 1807-1874,

which provides an interesting view of the introductory years of

colonial rule. The third part of William M. Hailey's Native

Administration in the British African Territories provides exhaustive

detail on the colonial period, while R.E. Wraith's Guggisberg is a

fine description of an era when colonial policy could even have

been defined as progressive. For information on the ending of

British rule and the birth of nationalism, David E. Apter's The

Gold Coast in Transition (revised and reprinted as Ghana in Transition) still provides an outstanding assessment. There are many

books, polemic and scholarly, on the Nkrumah years. Peter T. Omari's Kwame Nkrumah: Anatomy of an African Dictatorship is most often cited. See also Bob Beck Fitch and Mary Oppenheimer's Ghana: End of an Illusion. Among the most valuable

sources on what Ghana faced in the post-Nkrumah era are

those by Deborah Pellow, Naomi Chazan, Maxwell Owusu, and

Kwame Ninsin. (For further information and complete cita- tions, see Bibliography.)

58
Chapter 2. The Society and Its Environment
An akuaba (fertility doll) (Asante)
GHANA, FORMERLYTHE BRITISH colony of the Gold Coast,

lies on the West African coast, just north of the equator. Its warm, humid climate is typical of the tropics. Ghana covers an

area of approximately 239,000 square kilometers, much of it drained by the Volta River system. The population speaks languages that belong to the Kwa and Gur subfamilies of the

Niger-Congo language group and is divided into more than

100 linguistic and cultural units. Ghana's population, as in

most sub-Saharan African countries, consists of urban and

rural workers, herders, traders, and fishermen. Matrilineal,

patrilineal, and double-descent systems of social organization

as well as villages and chiefdoms contribute to the national

mosaic.

The precolonial social systems to which Ghanaians belonged

consisted of both non-stratified and highly stratified societies.

Virtually without exception, however, their organizing principles were based on locality, kinship/family, and clan structures. This is still true in the mid-1990s. Chiefs, who may be influential on the national level, were and still are selected from senior

members of the lineages that are considered to have been

among the founders of the community or ethnic group. Membership in a chiefly lineage carries some prestige.

Ghana's precolonial social order, in which kinship, lineage,

and locality provided the framework of social, political, reli- gious, and economic organization, has been undergoing profound change since before the colonial era. The

modernization of Ghanaian economic, social, and political life intensified with independence in 1957. Fundamental to this

change were improvements in communications and infrastructure, urbanization, the growth of the export and cash-crop

economy, and the expansion of Western education. To accelerate the pace of modernization, the Education Act of 1960

made formal instruction both free and compulsory, but atti- tudes toward change varied from group to group. For example,

in certain areas, especially in the north, compulsory education was not welcomed because it took children away from homes

that depended on their labor in the fields. Although the benefits of education are understood today, the percentage of

female enrollment in secondary and tertiary institutions of

61
Ghana: A Country Study

higher learning has remained disproportionately low in rela- tion to the number of women in the general population.

As Ghana's population swelled from about 6.7 million in

1960 to 8.5 million in 1970 to an estimated 17.2 million in

1994, the central government found it increasingly difficult to bring about improvements in the standard of living at the same

time that population growth threatened to outstrip food production and economic growth. The issue of effective family

planning also required attention and resources, and the presence of acquired immune deficiency syndrome (AIDS)

alarmed the medical community and the Ghanaian population

alike. Although the ancestral extended family served as an

effective mutual aid group in the rural areas, many village communities lacked modern amenities. In urban centers, housing

shortages continued to be a major problem.Women's associations, such as the National Council on Women and Development, became a force for change, demanding educational and

economic opportunities denied under indigenous and colonial

rulers.

In the 1980s, the governing Provisional National Defence

Council tried to address the nation's education problems by

introducing a system that emphasized vocational and technical

training for all students. A rural electrification program was

also initiated. At the same time, village- and community-based

primary care organizations enhanced child-care and nutritional programs aimed at illiterate mothers and those who held

traditional notions about marital relations. Although it is diffi- cult to evaluate the effectiveness of these programs in the short

term, at least some major problems have been recognized and

steps have been taken to deal with them. The success of such

programs, however, depends on the extent to which indige- nous and modern institutions and cultural values are balanced

and, especially, on the manner in which conflict is resolved.

Physical Setting

Location and Size

Ghana, which lies in the center of the West African coast,

shares borders with the three French-speaking nations of Cote

dTvoire to the west, Togo to the east, and Burkina Faso

(Burkina, formerly Upper Volta) to the north. To the south are the Gulf of Guinea and the Atlantic Ocean.

62
The Society and Its Environment

With a total area of 238,533 square kilometers, Ghana is about the size of Britain. Its southernmost coast at Cape Three

Points is 4° 30' north of the equator. From here, the country

extends inland for some 670 kilometers to about 11° north.

The distance across the widest part, between longitude 1° 12' east and longitude 3° 15' west, measures about 560 kilometers.

The Greenwich Meridian, which passes through London, also

traverses the eastern part of Ghana at Tema.

Geographical Regions

Ghana is characterized in general by low physical relief.

Indeed, the Precambrian rock system that underlies most of

the nation has been worn down by erosion almost to a plain.

The highest elevation in Ghana, Mount Afadjato in the

Akwapim-Togo Ranges, rises only 880 meters above sea level. There are, nonetheless, five distinct geographical regions.

Low plains stretch across the southern part of the country. To

their north lie three regions—the Ashanti Uplands, the

Akwapim-Togo Ranges, and the Volta Basin. The fifth region,

the high plains, occupies the northern and northwestern sec- tor of the country (see fig. 4). Like most West African countries, Ghana has no natural harbors. Because strong surf

pounds the shoreline, two artificial harbors were built at Takoradi and Tema (the latter completed in 1961) to accommodate

Ghana's shipping needs.

The Low Plains

The low plains comprise the four subregions of the coastal

savanna, the Volta Delta, the Accra Plains, and the Akan Lowlands. A narrow strip of grassy and scrubby coast runs from a point near Takoradi in the west to the Togo border in the east. This coastal savanna, only about eight kilometers in width at its western end, stretches eastward through the Accra Plains,

where it widens to more than eighty kilometers, and terminates

at the southeastern corner of the country at the lower end of

the Akwapim-Togo Ranges.

Almost flat and featureless, the Accra Plains descend gradually to the gulf from a height of about 150 meters. The topography east of the city of Accra is marked by a succession of ridges

and spoon-shaped valleys. The hills and slopes in this area are the favored lands for cultivation. Shifting cultivation is the

usual agricultural practice because of the swampy nature of the

very low-lying areas during the rainy seasons and the periodic

63
Ghana: A Country Study

blocking of the rivers at the coast by sandbars that form

lagoons. A plan to irrigate higher elevations of the Accra Plains was announced in 1984. Should this plan come to reality, much

of the area could be opened to large-scale cultivation.

To the west of Accra, the low plains contain wider valleys and

rounded low hills, with occasional rocky headlands. In general,

however, the land is flat and covered with grass and scrub.

Dense groves of coconut palms front the coastline. Several

commercial centers, including Winneba, Saltpond, and Gape

Coast, are located here. Although Winneba has a small live- stock industry and palm tree cultivation is expanding in the

area away from the coast, the predominant occupation of the

coastal inhabitants is fishing by dug-out canoe. The Volta Delta, which forms a distinct subregion of the low

plains, extends into the Gulf of Guinea in the extreme southeast. The delta's rock formation—consisting of thick layers of

sandstone, some limestone, and silt deposits—is flat, featureless, and relatively young. As the delta grew outward over the

centuries, sandbars developed across the mouths of the Volta

and smaller rivers that empty into the gulf in the same area, forming numerous lagoons, some quite large, making road

construction difficult. To avoid the lowest-lying areas, for example, the road between Accra and Keta makes an unusual detour

inland just before reaching Ada and finally approaches Keta

from the east along the narrow spit on which the town stands.

This notwithstanding, road links with Keta continue to be a problem. By 1989 it was estimated that more than 3,000 houses

in the town had been swallowed by flooding from the lagoon.

In addition, about 1,500 other houses were destroyed by ero- sion caused by the powerful waves of the sea. Ironically, it is this flat, silt-composed delta region with its abundance of water that supports shallot, corn, and cassava cultivation in the region. Moreover, the sandy soil of the delta gave

rise to the copra industry. Salt-making, from the plentiful supply in the dried beds of the lagoons, provides additional

employment. The main occupation of the delta people, however, continues to be fishing, an industry that supplies dried

and salted fish to other parts of the country.

The largest part of the low plains is the Akan Lowlands.

Some experts prefer to classify this region as a subdivision of

the Ashanti Uplands because of the many characteristics they

share. Unlike the uplands, however, the height of the Akan

Lowlands is generally between sea level and 150 meters. Some

64


The Society and Its Environment

ranges and hills rise to about 300 meters, but few exceed 600

meters. The lowlands that lie to the south of the Ashanti

Uplands receive the many rivers that make their way to the sea. The Akan Lowlands contain the basins of the Densu River,

the Pra River, the Ankobra River, and the Tano River, all of

which play important roles in the economy of Ghana. The

Densu River Basin, location of the important urban centers of

Koforidua and Nsawam in the eastern lowlands, has an undulating topography. Many of the hills here have craggy summits,

which give a striking appearance to the landscape. The upper

section of the Pra River Basin, to the west of the Densu, is relatively flat; the topography of its lower reaches, however, resembles that of the Densu Basin and the area is a rich cocoa and

food-producing region. The valley of the Birim River, one of

the main tributaries of the Pra, is the country's most important

diamond-producing area. The Ankobra River Basin and the middle and lower basins of

the Tano River to the west of the lowlands form the largest subdivision of the Akan Lowlands. Here annual rainfall between

1,500 and 2,150 millimeters helps assure a dense forest cover. In addition to timber, the area is rich in minerals. The Tarkwa

goldfield, the diamond operations of the Bonsa Valley, and

high-grade manganese deposits are all found in this area. The

middle and lower Tano basins have been intensely explored for

oil and natural gas since the mid-1980s. The lower basins of the

Pra, Birim, Densu, and Ankobra rivers are also sites for palm

tree cultivation.

Ashanti Uplands

Comprising the Southern Ashanti Uplands and the Kwahu

Plateau, the Ashanti Uplands lie just north of the Akan Lowlands and stretch from the Cote d'lvoire border in the west to the elevated edge of the Volta Basin in the east. Stretching in a northwest-to-southeast direction, the Kwahu Plateau extends

193 kilometers between Koforidua in the east and Wenchi in

the northwest. The average elevation of the plateau is about

450 meters, rising to a maximum of 762 meters. The relatively

cool temperatures of the plateau were attractive to Europeans,

particularly missionaries, who founded many well-known

schools and colleges in this region.

The plateau forms one of the important physical divides in

Ghana. From its northeastern slopes, the Afram and Pru rivers

flow into the Volta River, while from the opposite side, the Pra,

67
Figure 4. Topography and Drainage

66


The Society and Its Environment

ranges and hills rise to about 300 meters, but few exceed 600

meters. The lowlands that lie to the south of the Ashanti

Uplands receive the many rivers that make their way to the sea. The Akan Lowlands contain the basins of the Densu River,

the Pra River, the Ankobra River, and the Tano River, all of

which play important roles in the economy of Ghana. The

Densu River Basin, location of the important urban centers of

Koforidua and Nsawam in the eastern lowlands, has an undulating topography. Many of the hills here have craggy summits,

which give a striking appearance to the landscape. The upper

section of the Pra River Basin, to the west of the Densu, is relatively flat; the topography of its lower reaches, however, resembles that of the Densu Basin and the area is a rich cocoa and

food-producing region. The valley of the Birim River, one of

the main tributaries of the Pra, is the country's most important

diamond-producing area. The Ankobra River Basin and the middle and lower basins of

the Tano River to the west of the lowlands form the largest subdivision of the Akan Lowlands. Here annual rainfall between

1,500 and 2,150 millimeters helps assure a dense forest cover. In addition to timber, the area is rich in minerals. The Tarkwa

goldfield, the diamond operations of the Bonsa Valley, and

high-grade manganese deposits are all found in this area. The

middle and lower Tano basins have been intensely explored for

oil and natural gas since the mid-1980s. The lower basins of the

Pra, Birim, Densu, and Ankobra rivers are also sites for palm

tree cultivation.

Ashanti Uplands

Comprising the Southern Ashanti Uplands and the Kwahu

Plateau, the Ashanti Uplands lie just north of the Akan Lowlands and stretch from the Cote d'lvoire border in the west to the elevated edge of the Volta Basin in the east. Stretching in a northwest-to-southeast direction, the Kwahu Plateau extends

193 kilometers between Koforidua in the east and Wenchi in

the northwest. The average elevation of the plateau is about

450 meters, rising to a maximum of 762 meters. The relatively

cool temperatures of the plateau were attractive to Europeans,

particularly missionaries, who founded many well-known

schools and colleges in this region.

The plateau forms one of the important physical divides in

Ghana. From its northeastern slopes, the Afram and Pru rivers

flow into the Volta River, while from the opposite side, the Pra,

67
Ghana: A Country Study

Birim, Ofin, Tano, and other rivers flow south toward the sea. The plateau also marks the northernmost limit of the forest zone. Although large areas of the forest cover have been

destroyed through farming, enough deciduous forest remains

to shade the headwaters of the rivers that flow from the plateau. The Southern Ashanti Uplands, extending from the foot of

the Kwahu Plateau in the north to the lowlands in the south,

slope gently from an elevation of about 300 meters in the north

to about 150 meters in the south. The region, however, contains several hills and ranges as well as several towns of historical and economic importance, including Kumasi, Ghana's

second largest city and former capital of the Asante (also seen

as Ashanti—see Glossary) empire (see The Precolonial Period,

ch. 1). Obuasi and Konongo, two of the country's gold-mining

centers, are also located here. The region is the country's chief

producer of cocoa, and its tropical forests continue to be a vital source of timber for the lumber industry.

Akivapim-Togo Ranges

The Akwapim-Togo Ranges in the eastern part of the country consist of a generally rugged complex of folded strata, with

many prominent heights composed of volcanic rock. The

ranges begin west of Accra and continue in a northeasterly

direction, finally crossing the frontier into Togo.

In their southeastern part, the ranges are bisected by a deep, narrow gorge cut by the Volta River. The head of this gorge is the site of the Akosombo Dam, which impounds the river to form Lake Volta. The ranges south of the gorge form the

Akwapim section of the mountains. The average elevation in

this section is about 450 meters, and the valleys are generally

deep and relatively narrow. North of the gorge, for about

eighty kilometers, the Togo section has broader valleys and low

ridges. Beyond this point, the folding becomes more complex

and heights increase greatly, with several peaks rising more

than 610 meters above sea level. The country's highest point,

Mount Afadjato, is located in this area. The ranges are largely covered with deciduous forests, and

their higher elevation provides a relatively cooler, pleasant cli- mate. Small-scale subsistence farming is typical in the ranges.

In addition to the cultivation of rice and other staples, coffee

plantations are found in the Togo section of the ranges.

68
The Society and Its Environment

Volta Basin

Occupying the central part of Ghana, the Volta Basin covers about 45 percent of the nation's total land surface. Its northern

section, which lies above the upper part of Lake Volta, rises to a height of 150 to 215 meters above sea level. Elevations of the

Konkori Scarp to the west and the Gambaga Scarp to the north

reach from 300 to 460 meters. To the south and the southwest,

the basin is less than 300 meters. The Kwahu Plateau marks the

southern end of the basin, although it forms a natural part of

the Ashanti Uplands.

The basin is characterized by poor soil, generally of Voltaian

sandstone. Annual rainfall averages between 1,000 and 1,140

millimeters. The most widespread vegetation type is savanna,

the woodlands of which, depending on local soil and climatic

conditions, may contain such trees as Red Ironwood and Shea.

The basin's population, principally made up of farmers, is low in density, especially in the central and northwestern areas, where tsetse flies are common. Archaeological finds indicate,

however, that the region was once more heavily populated.

Periodic burning evidently occurred over extensive areas for

perhaps more than a millennium, exposing the soil to excessive

drying and erosion, rendering the area less attractive to cultivators.In contrast with the rest of the region are the Afram Plains,

located in the southeastern corner of the basin. Here the ter- rain is low, averaging 60 to 150 meters in elevation, and annual

rainfall is between 1,140 and about 1,400 millimeters. Near the

Afram River, much of the surrounding countryside is flooded

or swampy during the rainy seasons. With the construction of

Lake Volta (8,515 hectares in surface area) in the mid-1960s,

much of the Afram Plains was submerged. Despite the construction of roads to connect communities displaced by the

lake, road transportation in the region remains poor. Renewed

efforts to improve communications, to enhance agricultural

production, and to improve standards of living began in ear- nest only in the mid-1980s.

The High Plains

The general terrain in the northern and northwestern part

of Ghana outside the Volta Basin consists of a dissected plateau,

which averages between 150 and 300 meters in elevation and,

in some places, is even higher. Rainfall averages between 1,000

and 1,150 millimeters annually, although in the northwest it is

69
Ghana: A Country Study

closer to 1,350 millimeters. Soils in the high plains are more

arable than those in the Volta Basin, and the population density is considerably higher. Grain and cattle production is the

major economic activity in the high plains of the northern

region. Since the mid-1980s, when former United States President Jimmy Carter's Global 2000 program (see Glossary)

adopted Ghana as one of a select number of African countries

whose local farmers were to be educated and financially supported to improve agricultural production, there has been a dramatic increase in grain production in northern Ghana. The

virtual absence of tsetse flies in the region has led, moreover, to increased livestock raising as a major occupation in the north.

In fact, the region is the country's largest producer of cattle. Rivers and Lakes

Ghana is drained by a large number of streams and rivers. In

addition, there are a number of coastal lagoons, the huge man- made Lake Volta, and Lake Bosumtwi, southeast of Kumasi,

which has no outlet to the sea. In the wetter south and southwest areas of Ghana, the river and stream pattern is denser, but

in the area north of the Kwahu Plateau, the pattern is much

more open, making access to water more difficult. Several

streams and rivers also dry up or experience reduced flow during the dry seasons of the year, while flooding during the rainy seasons is common.

The major drainage divide runs from the southwestern part

of the Akwapim-Togo Ranges northwest through the Kwahu

Plateau and then irregularly westward to the Cote d'lvoire border. Almost all the rivers and streams north of this divide form

part of the Volta system. Extending about 1,600 kilometers in

length and draining an area of about 388,000 square kilometers, of which about 158,000 square kilometers lie within

Ghana, the Volta and its tributaries, such as the Afram River

and the Oti River, drain more than two-thirds of the country.

To the south of the divide are several smaller, independent riv- ers. The most important of these are the Pra River, the Tano

River, the Ankobra River, the Birim River, and the Densu River.

With the exception of smaller streams that dry up in the dry

seasons or rivers that empty into inland lakes, all the major riv- ers in the country flow into the Gulf of Guinea directly or serve

as tributaries to other major rivers. The Ankobra and Tano are navigable for considerable distances in their lower reaches.

70
The Society and Its Environment

Navigation on the Volta River has changed significantly since

1964. Construction of the dam at Akosombo, about eighty kilometers upstream from the coast, created vast Lake Volta and

the associated 768,000-kilowatt hydroelectric project. Arms of

the lake extend into the lower-lying areas, forcing the relocation of 78,000 people to newly created townships on the lake's higher banks. The Black Volta River and the White Volta River

flow separately into the lake. Before their confluence was submerged, the rivers came together in the middle of the country

to form the main Volta River. The Oti River and the Daka River,

the principal tributaries of the Volta in the eastern part of the

country, and the Pru River, the Sene River, and the Afram

River, major tributaries to the north of the Kawhu Plateau, also

empty into flooded extensions of the lake in their river valleys.

Lake Volta is a rich source of fish, and its potential as a source

for irrigation is reflected in an agricultural mechanization

agreement signed in the late 1980s to irrigate the Afram Plains.

The lake is navigable from Akosombo through Yeji in the middle of the country; a twenty-four-meter pontoon was commissioned in 1989 to link the Afram Plains to the west of the lake

with the lower Volta region to the east. Hydroelectricity generated from Akosombo supplies Ghana, Togo, and Benin.

On the other side of the Kwahu Plateau from Lake Volta are

several river systems, including the Pra, Ankobra, Tano and

Densu. The Pra is the easternmost and the largest of the three

principal rivers that drain the area south of the Volta divide.

Rising south of the Kwahu Plateau and flowing southward, the

Pra enters the Gulf of Guinea east of Takoradi. In the early part

of the twentieth century, the Pra was used extensively to float

timber to the coast for export. This trade is now carried by

road and rail transportation.

The Ankobra, which flows to the west of the Pra, has a relatively small drainage basin. It rises in the hilly region of Bibiani

and flows in a southerly direction to enter the gulfjust west of

Axim. Small craft can navigate approximately eighty kilometers

inland from its mouth. At one time, the Ankobra helped trans- port machinery to the gold-mining areas in the vicinity of

Tarkwa. The Tano, which is the westernmost of the three rivers,

rises near Techiman in the center of the country. It also flows

in a southerly direction, but it empties into a lagoon in the

southeastern corner of Cote dTvoire. Navigation by steam

launch is possible on the southern sector of the Tano for about

seventy kilometers.

71
Ghana: A Country Study

A number of rivers are found to the east of the Pra. The two

most important are the Densu and Ayensu, which are major

sources of water for Accra and Winneba, respectively. The

country has one large natural lake, Lake Bosumtwi, located

about thirty-two kilometers southeast of Kumasi. It occupies

the steep-sided caldera of a former volcano and has an area of

about forty-seven square kilometers. A number of small streams

flow into Lake Bosumtwi, but there is no drainage from it. In

addition to providing an opportunity for fishing for local

inhabitants, the lake serves as a tourist attraction.

Climate

The country's warm, humid climate has an annual mean

temperature between 26°G and 29°C. Variations in the principal elements of temperature, rainfall, and humidity that govern the climate are influenced by the movement and

interaction of the dry tropical continental air mass, or the harmattan, which blows from the northeast across the Sahara, and

the opposing tropical maritime or moist equatorial system. The

cycle of the seasons follows the apparent movement of the sun back and forth across the equator.

During summer in the northern hemisphere, a warm and

moist maritime air mass intensifies and pushes northward

across the country. A low-pressure belt, or intertropical front,

in the airmass brings warm air, rain, and prevailing winds from

the southwest. As the sun returns south across the equator, the

dry, dusty, tropical continental front, or harmattan, prevails.

Climatic conditions across the country are hardly uniform.

The Kwahu Plateau, which marks the northernmost extent of

the forest area, also serves as an important climatic divide. To

its north, two distinct seasons occur. The harmattan season,

with its dry, hot days and relatively cool nights from November

to late March or April, is followed by a wet period that reaches

its peak in late August or September. To the south and southwest of the Kwahu Plateau, where the annual mean rainfall

from north to south ranges from 1,250 millimeters to 2,150

millimeters, four separate seasons occur. Heavy rains fall from

about April through late June. After a relatively short dry

period in August, another rainy season begins in September

and lasts through November, before the longer harmattan sea- son sets in to complete the cycle.

The extent of drought and rainfall varies across the country.

To the south of the Kwahu Plateau, the heaviest rains occur in

72
The Society and Its Environment

the Axim area in the southwest corner of Ghana. Farther to the

north, Kumasi receives an average annual rainfall of about

1,400 millimeters, while Tamale in the drier northern savanna

receives rainfall of 1,000 millimeters per year. From Takoradi

eastward to the Accra Plains, including the lower Volta region,

rainfall averages only 750 millimeters to 1,000 millimeters a

year.Temperatures are usually high at all times of the year

throughout the country. At higher elevations, temperatures are more comfortable. In the far north, temperature highs of 31°C

are common. The southern part of the country is characterized

by generally humid conditions. This is particularly so during

the night, when 95 to 100 percent humidity is possible. Humid

conditions also prevail in the northern section of the country

during the rainy season. During the harmattan season, however, humidity drops as low as 25 percent in the north.

Population

Ghana's first postindependence population census in 1960

counted about 6.7 million inhabitants. By 1970 the national census registered 8.5 million people, about a 27 percent

increase; the most recent official census in 1984 recorded a fig- ure of 12.3 million—almost double the 1960 figure (see table

2, Appendix). The nation's population was estimated to have

increased to about 15 million in 1990 and to an estimated 17.2

million in mid-1994. With an annual growth rate of 2.2 percent

for the period between 1965 and 1980, a 3.4 percent growth

rate for 1981 through 1989, and a 1992 growth rate of 3.2 percent, the country's population is projected to surpass 20 million by the year 2000 and 35 million by 2025.

Increasing population is reflected in other statistical representations as well. Between 1965 and 1989, a constant 45 percent of the nation's total female population was of childbearing

age. The crude birth rate of 47 per 1,000 population recorded

for 1965 dropped to 44 per 1,000 population in 1992. Also, the

crude death rate of 18 per 1,000 population in 1965 fell to 13

per 1,000 population in 1992, while life expectancy rose from

an average of forty-two years for men and forty-five years for

women in 1970-75 to fifty-two and fifty-six years, respectively, in

1992. The 1965 infant mortality rate of 120 per 1,000 live births

also improved to 86 per 1,000 live births in 1992. With the fertility rate averaging about seven children per adult female and

expected to fall only to five children per adult female by the

73
Ghana: A Country Study

year 2000, the population projection of 35 million in 2025

becomes more credible. A number of factors, including

improved vaccination against common diseases and nutritional

education through village and community health-care systems,

contributed to the expanding population. The rise in the

nation's population generated a corresponding rise in the

demand for schools, health facilities, and urban housing.

The gender ratio of the population, 97.3 males to 100

females, was reflected in the 1984 figures of 6,063,848 males to 6,232,233 females (see fig. 5). This was slightly below the 1970

figure of 98 males to 100 females, but a reversal of the 1960

ratio of 102.2 males to 100 females. The fall in the proportion

of males to females may be partly attributed to the fact that

men have left the country in pursuit ofjobs.

Also significant in the 1984 census figures was the national

age distribution. About 58 percent of Ghana's population in

1984 was either under the age of twenty or above sixty-five.

Approximately 7 million people were represented in this cate- gory, about 4 million of them under the age of ten and, therefore, economically unproductive. The large population of

young, economically unproductive individuals appeared to be

growing rapidly. In the early 1990s, about half of Ghana's population was under age fifteen. If the under-twenty group and

those above the age of sixty are regarded as a dependent

group, the social, political, and economic implications for the

1990s and beyond are as grave for Ghana as they are for subSaharan Africa as a whole.

Population Distribution

Population density increased steadily from thirty-six per

square kilometer in 1970 to fifty-two per square kilometer in

1984; in 1990 sixty-three persons per square kilometer was the

estimate for Ghana's overall population density. These averages, naturally, did not reflect variations in population distribution. For example, while the Northern Region, one of ten

administrative regions, showed a density of seventeen persons

per square kilometer in 1984, in the same year Greater Accra

Region recorded nine times the national average of fifty-two

per square kilometer. As was the case in the 1960 and 1970 fig- ures, the greatest concentration of population in 1984 was to the south of the Kwahu Plateau. The highest concentration of

habitation continued to be within the Accra-Kumasi-Takoradi

triangle, largely because of the economic productivity of the

74
The Society and Its Environment

region. In fact, all of the country's mining centers, timber-producing deciduous forests, and cocoa-growing lands lie to the

south of the Kwahu Plateau. The Accra-Kumasi-Takoradi triangle also is conveniently linked to the coast by rail and road sys- tems—making this area an important magnet for investment

and labor (see fig. 10).

By contrast, a large part of the Volta Basin is sparsely populated. The presence of tsetse flies, the relative infertility of the

soil, and, above all, the scarcity of water in the area during the

harmattan season affect habitation. The far north, on the other

hand, is heavily populated. The eighty-seven persons per

square kilometer recorded in the 1984 census for the Upper

East Region, for example, was well above the national average.

This density may be explained in part by the somewhat better

soil found in some areas and the general absence of the tsetse

fly; however, onchocerciasis, or river blindness, a fly-borne dis- ease, is common in the north and has caused abandonment of

some land. With the improvement of the water supply through

well-drilling and the introduction of intensive agricultural

extension services as part of the Global 2000 program since the

mid-1980s, demographic figures for the far north could be

markedly different by the next census. Another factor affecting Ghana's demography is refugees. At

the end of 1994, approximately 110,000 refugees resided in

Ghana. About 90,000 were Togolese who had fled political violence in their homeland beginning in early 1993 (see Relations

with Immediate African Neighbors, ch. 4). Most Togolese set- tled in the Volta region among their ethnic kinsmen. About

20,000 Liberians were also found in Ghana, having fled the

civil war in their country (see International Security Concerns,

ch. 5). Many were long-term residents. As a result of ethnic

fighting in northeastern Ghana in early 1994, at least 20,000

Ghanaians out of an original group of 150,000 were still internally displaced at the end of the year. About 5,000 had taken

up residence in Togo because of the strife. Urban-Rural Disparities

Localities of 5,000 persons and above have been classified as urban since 1960. On this basis, the 1960 urban population

totalled 1,551,174 persons, or 23.1 percent of total population.

By 1970, the percentage of the country's population residing in

urban centers had increased to 28 percent. That percentage

75
Ghana: A Country Study

TOTAL POPULATION = ca. 15 MILLION

AGE-GROUP

POPULATION IN MILLIONS

Source: Based on information from Eduard Bos, My T. Vu, Ann Levin, and Rudolfo A.

Bulatao, World Population Projections, 1992-93 Edition, Baltimore, 1992, 238. Figure 5. Estimated Population by Age and Gender, 1990

rose to 32 in 1984 and was estimated at 33 percent for 1992

(see table 3, Appendix).

Like the population density figures, the rate of urbanization

varies from one administrative region to another. While the

Greater Accra Region showed an 83-percent urban residency,

the Ashanti Region matched the national average of 32 percent

in 1984. The Upper West Region of the country recorded only

10 percent of its population in urban centers that year, which

reflected internal migration to the south and the pattern of

development that favored the south, with its minerals and for- est resources, over the north. Urban areas in Ghana have cus- tomarily been supplied with more amenities than rural

locations. Consequently, Kumasi, Accra, and many towns within

76
The Society and Its Environment

the southern economic belt have attracted more people than

the savanna regions of the north; only Tamale in the north has

been an exception. The linkage of the national electricity grid

to the northern areas of the country in the late 1980s may help

to stabilize the north-to-south flow of internal migration.

The growth of urban population notwithstanding, Ghana

continues to be a nation of rural communities. The 1984 enu- meration showed that six of the country's ten regions had rural

populations of 5 percent or more above the national average of

68 percent. Rural residency was estimated to be 67 percent of

the population in 1992. These figures, though reflecting a trend toward urban residency, are not very different from the

1970s when about 72 percent of the nation's population lived

in rural areas. In an attempt to perpetuate this pattern of rural-urban resi- dency and thereby to lessen the consequent socioeconomic

impact on urban development, the "Rural Manifesto," which

assessed the causes of rural underdevelopment, was introduced

in April 1984. Development strategies were evaluated, and

some were implemented to make rural residency more attractive. As a result, the Bank of Ghana established more than 120

rural banks to support rural entrepreneurs, and the rural electrification program was intensified in the late 1980s. The government, moreover, presented its plans for district assemblies

as a component of its strategy for rural improvement through

decentralized administration, a program designed to allow

local people to become more involved in planning development programs to meet local needs (see District Assembly Elections, ch. 4).

Family Planning

A survey carried out between 1962 and 1964 in rural areas of

the country and among the economically better-off urban population indicated the nature of the problem with population

control in Ghana. The survey showed that rural families

favored a total of seven or eight children and that the actual

number of children in the better-off urban family ran between

five and six. In neither case was there much interest in limiting

the size of the family, although the urban group stated that it would recommend a maximum of three or four children to newly married couples.

The Ghanaian government has long shown an active interest

in the population question. It was a cosponsor of a resolution

77
Ghana: A Country Study

on population growth and economic development in the

1962-63 session of the United Nations (UN) General Assembly

and was the first sub-Saharan country to sign the "World Leaders' Declaration on Population" in 1967 that called attention to the population question. In 1969 it issued a general policy

paper, "Population Planning for National Progress and Prosperity," that included provisions for family planning services.

Subsequently, in 1969, it carried out a mass publicity and education campaign on family planning and during late 1970

sponsored an awareness week designed to encourage acceptance of family planning.

Some family planning services have been available since

1966, when the Planned Parenthood Association of Ghana was formed. In the early 1990s, branch offices of the organization were still functioning in regional capitals out of which field

officers (usually women) organized community awareness campaigns. In addition to the obvious family planning activities,

the Planned Parenthood Association and the United States

government furnished technical and financial support to the

government's effort to control population expansion. This support included aid for the demographic unit of the Sociology

Department of the University of Ghana in the collection of

data on attitudes toward population control and on family

planning practices during the 1970s. The aid program also

funded pilot projects that incorporated family planning education into basic health services and that provided training of

medical and paramedical personnel.

Although many adult Ghanaians have at least some knowledge of family planning, data from the 1980s suggest almost no

change in attitudes and practices from the 1960s. For example,

most Ghanaian women still prefer large families and probably

see their child-bearing abilities as a form of social and eco- nomic security (see The Position of Women, this ch.). In

Africa, where the infant mortality rate is generally high, large

families ensure that some children will survive. It is, therefore,

not surprising that Ghana's population continues to grow rapidly in the 1990s.

In an effort to regulate the effects of rapid population

growth, the government launched a substantial public education program for women in the late 1980s that continued into

the 1990s. In numerous newspaper articles and at community

health centers, the campaign stressed child nutrition and

immunization and the spacing of births. Although family plan78
The Society and Its Environment

ning had been incorporated into basic women's health ser- vices, no attention was given to the role of men in family

planning until the beginning of the 1990s when a campaign to control the spread of acquired immune deficiency syndrome

(AIDS) addressed male promiscuity and the practice of polygamy (see Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndrome, this ch.).

Because of government efforts and increased aid from the

United States, some increase in the use of contraceptives and

modern methods of birth control has occurred during the

early 1990s. As is to be expected, family planning is more likely to be practiced among women who live in urban areas with

greater access to family planning services and whose level of

education is junior secondary school or above.

Ethnic Groups and Languages

In 1960 roughly 100 linguistic and cultural groups were

recorded in Ghana. Although later censuses placed less emphasis on the ethnic and cultural composition of the population,

differences, of course, existed and had not disappeared by the

mid-1990s (see fig. 6). The major ethnic groups in Ghana

include the Akan, Ewe, Mole-Dagbane, Guan, and Ga-Adangbe. The subdivisions of each group share a common cultural

heritage, history, language, and origin. These shared attributes were among the variables that contributed to state formation in

the precolonial period. Competition to acquire land for culti- vation, to control trade routes, or to form alliances for protection also promoted group solidarity and state formation. The

creation of the union that became the Asante confederacy in

the late seventeenth century is a good example of such processes at work in Ghana's past (see The Precolonial Period, ch.

i).

Ethnic rivalries of the precolonial era, variance in the impact

of colonialism upon different regions of the country, and the

uneven distribution of social and economic amenities in

postindependence Ghana have all contributed to present-day

ethnic tensions. For example, in February 1994, more than

1,000 persons were killed and 150,000 displaced in the northeastern part of Ghana in fighting between Konkomba on one

side and Nanumba, Dagomba, and Gonja on the other. The

clashes resulted from long-standing grievances over land ownership and the prerogatives of chiefs. A military task force

restored order, but a state of emergency in the region

remained in force until mid-August.

79
Ghana: A Country Study

Figure 6. Principal Ethnolinguistic Groups

Although this violence was certainly evidence of ethnic ten- sion in the country, most observers agreed that the case in

point was exceptional. As one prolific writer on modern

Ghana, Naomi Chazan, has aptly observed, undifferentiated

recourse to ethnic categories has obscured the essential fluidity

that lies at the core of shared ties in the country Evidence of

this fluidity lies in the heterogeneous nature of all administrative regions, in rural-urban migration that results in interethnic

80
The Society and Its Environment

mixing, in the shared concerns of professionals and trade

unionists that cut across ethnic lines, and in the multi-ethnic

composition of secondary school and university classes. Ethnicity, nonetheless, continues to be one of the most potent factors

affecting political behavior in Ghana. For this reason, ethnically based political parties are unconstitutional under the

present Fourth Republic.

Despite the cultural differences among Ghana's various peoples, linguists have placed Ghanaian languages in one or the

other of only two major linguistic subfamilies of the NigerCongo language family, one of the large language groups in

Africa. These are the Kwa and Gur groups, found to the south

and north of the Volta River, respectively. The Kwa group,

which comprises about 75 percent of the country's population,

includes the Akan, Ga-Adangbe, and Ewe. The Akan are further divided into the Asante, Fante, Akwapim, Akyem,

Akwamu, Ahanta, Bono, Nzema, Kwahu, and Safwi. The GaAdangbe people and language group include the Ga, Adangbe,

Ada, and Krobo or Kloli. Even the Ewe, who constitute a single

linguistic group, are divided into the Nkonya, Tafi, Logba, Sontrokofi, Lolobi, and Likpe. North of the Volta River are the

three subdivisions of the Gur-speaking people. These are the

Gurma, Grusi, and Mole-Dagbane. Like the Kwa subfamilies,

further divisions exist within the principal Gur groups.

Any one group may be distinguished from others in the same linguistically defined category or subcategory, even when

the members of the category are characterized by essentially

the same social institutions. Each has a historical tradition of

group identity, if nothing else, and, usually, of political autonomy. In some cases, however, what is considered a single unit

for census and other purposes may have been divided into

identifiable separate groups before and during much of the

colonial period and, in some manner, may have continued to be separate after independence.

No part of Ghana, however, is ethnically homogeneous.

Urban centers are the most ethnically mixed because of migration to towns and cities by those in search of employment.

Rural areas, with the exception of cocoa-producing areas that

have attracted migrant labor, tend to reflect more traditional

population distributions. One overriding feature of the country's population is that groups to the south who are closer to the Atlantic coast have long been influenced by the money

economy, Western education, and Christianity, whereas Gur81
Ghana: A Country Study

speakers to the north, who have been less exposed to those

influences, have come under Islamic influence. These influ- ences were not pervasive in the respective regions, however, nor were they wholly restricted to them.

Language Diversity

More than 100 languages and dialects are spoken in Ghana.

In view of these linguistic and associated cultural differences,

and, as a result of the country's colonial past, English has

become Ghana's official language. It is used for all government

affairs, large-scale business transactions, educational instruction, and in national radio and television broadcasts. In fact,

the constitution of 1969 required that members of parliament

speak, read, and understand English. In an effort to increase

"grassroots participation" in government and to encourage

non-English speakers to run for elective office, however, the

1992 Consultative Assembly on the Constitution recommended

that the ability to communicate in English no longer be

required of future members of parliament. In the mid-1980s,

the Ministry of Education also encouraged teachers to use local

languages for instruction during the first six years of formal

education. These changes, however, have not lessened the

importance of English in Ghanaian society.

Although Fante-Twi (a major Akan language), Ga, and Ewe

are the most important Kwa languages spoken in the south,

three subdivisions of the Gur branch—Mole-Dagbane, Grusi,

and Gurma—dominate the northern region. Hausa, a language of northern Nigeria which spread throughout West

Africa through trade, is also understood by some inhabitants in

the northeastern part of the country. In northwestern Ghana,

among the Dagari-speaking people and around frontier towns

in western Brong-Ahafo, various dialects of the Mande language are spoken. Akan, Ewe, Ga, Nzema, Dagbane, and Hausa

are the country's principal indigenous languages and are used

in radio and television programming.

The literary tradition of northern Ghana has its roots in

Islam, while the literature of the south was influenced by Chrisdan missionaries. As a result of European influence, a number

of Ghanaian groups have developed writing systems based on

Latin script, and several indigenous languages have produced a

rich body of literature. The principal written Ghanaian languages are the Twi dialects of Asante, Akwapim, and Fante.

Other written languages are Nzema, Ewe, Dagbane, Ga, and

82
The Society and Its Environment

Kasena (a Grusi language). Most publications in the country,

however, are written in English.

Major Ethnic Groups

On the basis of language and culture, historical geographers

and cultural anthropologists classify the indigenous people of

Ghana into five major groups. These are the Akan, the Ewe, the

Guan, the Mole-Dagbane and related peoples of the north, and

the Ga-Adangbe.

The Akan Group

The Akan people occupy practically the whole of Ghana

south and west of the Black Volta River. Historical accounts suggest that Akan groups migrated from the north to occupy the

forest and coastal areas of the south as early as the thirteenth

century. Some of the Akan ended up in the eastern section of

Cote d'lvoire, where they created the Baule community.

When Europeans arrived at the coast in the fifteenth century, the Akan were established there. The typical political unit was the small state under the headship of an elder from one of

the seven or eight clans (see Glossary) that composed Akan

society. From these units emerged several powerful states, of

which the oldest is thought to be Bono (also called Brong). As

a result of military conquests and partial assimilation of weaker

groups, well-known political entities, such as Akwamu, Asante

(also seen as Ashanti—see Glossary), Akyem, Denkyira, and

Fante emerged before the close of the seventeenth century.

Asante, for example, continued to expand throughout the

eighteenth century and survived as an imperial power until the

end of the nineteenth century, when it succumbed to British

rule (see The Precolonial Period, ch. 1).

The coastal Akan (Fante) were the first to have relations with

Europeans. As a result of long association, these groups

absorbed aspects of British culture and language. For example,

it became customary among these people to accept British

names as family names. The primary form of Akan social organization is the

extended family or the abusua—the basic unit in a society

based on matriclans (see Glossary). Through the exogamous

matriclan system, local identity and individual status, inheritance, succession to wealth and to political offices, and even

basic relations within the village community are determined.

Every lineage (see Glossary) is a corporate group with its own

83
Ghana: A Country Study

identity, group solidarity, exclusive property, and symbols. The

ownership of a symbolic carved chair or stool, usually named

after the female founder of the matriclan, became the means

through which individuals traced their ancestry. These lineages

have segmented into branches, each led by an elder, headman,

or chief, but a branch, although it possesses a stool, is not an autonomous political or social unit. Possession of a ritually

important stool is seen as vital, not only to the existence of each

abusua but to the matriclan as a whole.

Despite the matrilineal focus of Akan societies, most traditional leadership positions are held by men. Male succession to inherited positions is, however, determined by relationship to mothers and sisters. Consequently, a man's valuable property is passed on not to his children, but to his brother or his sister's son. A man may also be expected to support the children of a maternal relative, whether deceased or alive, an expectation

that may conflict with the interests of his own children. Matrilineal (see Glossary under "matrilineage") succession to property has been the cause of much litigation. There have been

instances of wives and children turning to the courts for

redress. In 1986 the government passed a number of laws that

sought to bring the traditions of inheritance in line with

changes that had occurred in the country. These laws, which

included the Intestate Succession Law, the Customary Marriage and Divorce (Registration) Law, the Administration of

Estate (Amendment) Law, and the Head of Family (Accountability) Law, recognized the nuclear family as the prime eco- nomic unit. Provision was made, however, for the identification

of collective properties that belonged to the extended family.

Notwithstanding the 1986 legislation, the matriclan system

of the Akan continued to be economically and politically

important. Each lineage controlled the land farmed by its members, functioned as a religious unit in the veneration of its ancestors, supervised marriages, and settled internal disputes

among its members (see Traditional Religion, this ch.). It was from the lineages and the associations they cultivated that the

village, town, and even the state emerged. The Akan state,

therefore, comprehended several kin-based units, one of

which, usually the most prominent lineage, provided the paramount chief, who exercised at least some authority over incorporated groups. Every one of the incorporated groups,

lineages, or territorial units had some autonomy under its own

headman, chief, or elders. In any case, all chiefs were subject to

84
The Society and Its Environment

removal from office if they acted in any manner that alienated a substantial number of people, especially influential ones. The relative homogeneity of Akan cultures, languages, and

authority structures has not led to political unity; the most

important conflicts of the Akan in precolonial and colonial

times, for example, were with other Akan groups. This is understandable if the state is seen as the arena of political life and as a set of institutions concerned with power, especially for

internal regulation, and for the defense of its component

members. The development of the Asante Empire, for example, was largely at the expense of the independence of the sur- rounding Akan, who were quick to reassert their autonomy,

especially after 1896, when Asante was defeated and its king,

the asantehene (king of Asante), was exiled to the Seychelles by

the British. In the struggle for independence and in the period

since then, political alignments have followed local interests

rather than any conception of Akan ethnic unity.

The Ewe

The Ewe occupy southeastern Ghana and the southern parts

of neighboring Togo and Benin. On the west, the Volta separates the Ewe from the Ga-Adangbe, Ga, and Akan. Subdivisions of the Ewe include the Anglo (Anlo), Bey (Be), and Gen

on the coast, and the Peki, Ho, Kpando, Tori, and Ave in the

interior. Oral tradition suggests that the Ewe immigrated into

Ghana before the mid-fifteenth century. Although the Ewe

have been described as a single language group, there is considerable dialectic variation. Some of these dialects are mutually intelligible, but only with difficulty.

Unlike the political and social organization of the Akan,

where matrilineal rule prevails, the Ewe are essentially a patrilineal (see Glossary under "patrilineage") people. The founder

of a community became the chief and was usually succeeded by

his paternal relatives. The largest independent political unit was a chiefdom, the head of which was essentially a ceremonial

figure who was assisted by a council of elders. Chiefdoms

ranged in population from a few hundred people in one or two

villages to several thousand in a chiefdom with a large number

of villages and surrounding countryside. Unlike the Asante

among the Akan, no Ewe chiefdom gained hegemonic power

over its neighbor. The rise of Ewe nationalism in both Ghana

and Togo was more of a reaction to the May 1956 plebiscite

85
Ghana: A Country Study

that partitioned Eweland between the Gold Coast and Togo

than to any sense of overriding ethnic unity.

Substantial differences in local economies were characteristic of the Ewe. Most Ewe were farmers who kept some livestock,

and there was some craft specialization. On the coast and

immediately inland, fishing was important, and local variations

in economic activities permitted a great deal of trade between one community and another, carried out chiefly by women.

The Guan

The Guan are believed to have begun to migrate from the

Mossi region of modern Burkina around A.D. 1000. Moving

gradually through the Volta valley in a southerly direction, they

created settlements along the Black Volta, throughout the

Afram Plains, in the Volta Gorge, and in the Akwapim Hills

before moving farther south onto the coastal plains. Some

scholars postulate that the wide distribution of the Guan suggests that they were the Neolithic population of the region.

Later migrations by other groups such as the Akan, Ewe, and

Ga-Adangbe into Guan-settled areas would then have led to the

development of Guan-speaking enclaves along the Volta and

within the coastal plains. The Guan have been heavily influenced by their neighbors. The Efutu, a subgroup of the Guan,

for example, continue to speak Guan dialects, but have

adopted (with modifications) the Fante version of some Akan

institutions and the use of some Fante words in their rituals. As

far as the other Guan subgroups are concerned, the AnumBoso speak a local Ewe dialect, whereas the Larteh and Kyerepong have customs similar to Akwapim groups.

Constituting about a quarter of the Guan, the Gonja to the

north have also been influenced by other groups. The Gonja

are ruled by members of a dynasty, probably Mande in origin.

The area is peopled by a variety of groups, some of which do

not speak Guan. The ruling dynasty, however, does speak

Guan, as do substantial numbers of commoners. Although neither the rulers nor most of the commoners are Muslims, a group of Muslims accompanied the Mande invaders and have

since occupied a special position as scribes and traders.

The Gonja founded one of several northern kingdoms (see

The Precolonial Period, ch. 1). In the eighteenth century, they,

like their neighbors, were defeated by the expanding Asante

Empire. Gonja became part of the British Northern Territories

after the fall of Asante. Even though long-distance commerce

86
Fishermen offer their daily catch for sale on a beach near Accra

CourtesyJames Sanders

led to the development of major markets, the Gonja continued

to be subsistence farmers and migrant workers.

The Mole-Dagbane and Related Peoples of the North

Apart from the Guan-speaking Gonja, the Kyokosi or Chokosi (an Akan-speaking fragment), and the Mande-speaking

Busanga in the northeasternmost part of Ghana, the ethnic

groups to the north of the Black Volta speak Gur or Voltaic languages of the Niger-Congo language family. Three subgroups

of Gur languages—the Mole-Dagbane (sometimes called

Mossi-Grunshi), Gurma, and Grusi—are represented in this

region. Of the three Gur subfamilies, Mole-Dagbane is by far

the largest, being spoken by about 15 percent of the nation's

population. Its speakers are culturally the most varied; they

include the Nanumba, Dagomba, Mamprusi, Wala, Builsa,

Frafra, Talensi, and Kusase.

For centuries, the area inhabited by the Gur has been the scene of movements of people engaged in conquest, expansion, and north-south and east-west trade. For this reason, a

considerable degree of heterogeneity, particularly of political

structure, developed here.

The structure of many small groups, varied as they are, suggests that most Gur-speakers once lived in small, autonomous

communities and that the links among these communities were

provided by kinship ties, which in their larger extensions cut across community boundaries, and by intermarriage. The

salient figure was not political but ritual—it was the priest

(tendaana; a Mole-Dagbane term) of the earth cult and shrine.

87
Ghana: A Country Study

Although primarily a religious figure, the tendaana's influence was keenly felt in kin-group and community decision making.

In some cases (for example, that of the Talensi), an independent community or chiefdom was aware that others like it shared the same culture and social structure, and there were

occasional common rituals that brought independent communities together. In other cases (for example, the Dagaba), political and cultural boundaries were not sharp, and there was no

sense that an ethnic group included some communities and

excluded others, although shifting distinctions were made

based on various cultural traits. In the case of the Dagaba, the

most important or recurrent of these distinctions seemed to be, and in the mid-twentieth century continued to be, whether

inheritance was exclusively determined in the patrilineal line

or, at least in part, followed the matrilineal line. In a few cases, some Mole-Dagbane people developed societies of larger scale under a ruling dynasty. These included the

Dagomba, Mamprusi, and Gonja, who, like the Akan to the

south, were known to have founded centralized states. Rulers

of the centralized Mole-Dagbane societies were believed to be

related to those of the Mossi kingdoms of Burkina and the

smaller Nanumba kingdoms of Ghana. Historical research suggests that migrants imposed their rule on peoples already set- tled in the area. In some cases, these migrants extended their

rule to other groups, at least for a time. Thus, many of the

Gurma-speaking Konkomba were subject to Dagomba control.

The ruling groups still maintain a clear sense of their own identity and some cultural and linguistic peculiarities, but in general they speak the local language.

The Ga-Adangbe

The Ga-Adangbe people inhabit the Accra Plains. The Adangbe are found to the east, the Ga groups to the west, of the

Accra coastlands. Although both languages are derived from a common proto-Ga-Adangbe ancestral language, modern Ga

and Adangbe are mutually unintelligible. The modern Adangbe include the people of Shai, La, Ningo, Kpone, Osudoku,

Krobo, Gbugble, and Ada, who speak different dialects. The Ga

also include the Ga-Mashie groups occupying neighborhoods

in the central part of Accra, and other Ga-speakers who

migrated from Akwamu, Anecho in Togo, Akwapim, and sur- rounding areas.

88
The Society and Its Environment

Debates persist about the origins of the Ga-Adangbe people.

One school of thought suggests that the proto-Ga-Adangbe

people came from somewhere east of the Accra plains, while

another suggests a distant locale beyond the West African coast. In spite of such historical and linguistic theories, it is agreed

that the people were settled in the plains by the thirteenth century. Both the Ga and the Adangbe were influenced by their

neighbors. For example, both borrowed some of their vocabulary, especially words relating to economic activities and state- craft, from the Guan. The Ewe are also believed to have

influenced the Adangbe.

Despite the archaeological evidence that proto-Ga-Adangbe

speakers relied on millet and yam cultivation, the modern Ga

reside in what used to be fishing communities. Today, such

former Ga communities as Labadi and Old Accra are neighborhoods of the national capital of Accra. This explains why, in

1960, when the national enumeration figures showed the ethnic composition of the country's population, more than 75 percent of the Ga were described as living in urban centers. The

presence of major industrial, commercial, and governmental

institutions in the city, as well as increasing migration of other

people into the area, has not prevented the Ga people from

maintaining aspects of their traditional culture.

The Central Togo

The Central Togo groups are found to the north of Ewe

country in the Akwapim-Togo Ranges. These groups are sometimes called the Togo remnants, on the assumption that they

represent what is left of a once more widespread people who

were absorbed either by the Akan or by the Ewe. Although

some of the Central Togo groups are indigenous to the area, many are believed to have come to the mountain location for

refuge from the numerous wars that were fought after the end

of the seventeenth century by the Gonja, Asante, Dahomeans,

and Akwamu. The refugees found protection and land and,

therefore, settled in the ranges. Descent and inheritance seem

to be patrilineal, and each group is autonomously organized

under a chief.

The traditional mode of economic activity among the Central Togo people was the cultivation of rice, but today a substantial number of the people are engaged in cocoa farming. More

than any Kwa or Gur group, the Central Togo people define

themselves as Christian. A relatively high level of literacy and

89
Ghana: A Country Study

school attendance and a high proportion of professionals and

technical workers characterize the Central Togo groups.

Social Organization and Social Change

The essential characteristic of the Ghanaian social system is its dual but interrelated nature. Even though the majority of

the population still lives in rural areas and observes ancestral

customs and practices, the process of modernization associated

with urban life has, nonetheless, affected all Ghanaians' social

behavior and values. Peoples, ideas, goods, and services flow

constantly between urban and rural areas, blurring the distinction between so-called traditional and modern life. Relationships within traditional society are based on family

membership, inherited status, and ancestral beliefs. In modern

society, relationships are determined by achieved status, formalized education, membership in professional associations,

and ethnic affiliation. Contemporary society, however, is grafted onto traditional roots, and although traditional social

relationships have often been partially transformed to fit the

needs of modern life, they continue to endure. The result is that, even those who live primarily in the modern urban setting are still bound to traditional society through the kinship system

and are held to the responsibilities that such associations

entail. Traditional Patterns of Social Relations

The extended family system is the hub around which traditional social organization revolves. This unilineal descent

group functions under customary law. It is a corporate group

with definite identity and membership that controls property,

the application of social sanctions, and the practice of religious

rituals. Many local variations exist within the general framework of the lineage system. In some ethnic groups, the individual's loyalty to his or her lineage overrides all other loyalties; in

other groups, a person marrying into the group, though never becoming a complete member of the spouse's lineage, adopts

its interests.

Among the matrilineal Akan, members of the extended family include the man's mother, his maternal uncles and aunts,

his sisters and their children, and his brothers. A man's children and those of his brothers belong to the families of their

respective mothers. Family members may occupy one or several

90
An example ofdomestic

architecture of the Kasena

people at Nakong, far

northern Ghana

Courtesy life in general

(Brook, Rose, and Cooper

Le Van)

houses in the same village. The wife and her children traditionally reside at their maternal house where she prepares her

food, usually the late evening meal, to be carried to her husband at his maternal house. Polygamy as a conjugal arrangement is on the decline for economic reasons; but where it has

been practiced, visitation schedules with the husband were

planned for the wives.

For the patrilineal and double-descent peoples of the north,

the domestic group often consists of two or more brothers with

their wives and children who usually occupy a single homestead with a separate room for each wife. Also, the largest

household among the patrilineal Ewe includes some or all of

the sons and grandsons of one male ancestor together with

their wives, children, and unmarried sisters. Irrespective of the composition of the family in either matrilineal or patrilineal societies, each family unit is usually headed

by a senior male or headman who might either be the founding member of the family or have inherited that position. He

acts in council with other significant members of the family in

the management of the affairs of the unit. Elderly female members of matrilineal descent groups may be consulted in the

decision-making process on issues affecting the family, but

often the men wield more influence.

91
Ghana: A Country Study

Family elders supervise the allocation of land and function

as arbitrators in domestic quarrels; they also oversee naming

ceremonies for infants, supervise marriages, and arrange

funerals. As custodians of the political and spiritual authority of

the unit, the headman and his elders ensure the security of the

family. These obligations that bind the group together also

grant its members the right of inheritance, the privilege to receive capital (either in the form of cattle or fishing nets) to begin new businesses, and the guarantee of a proper funeral

and burial upon death. The extended family, therefore, functions as a mutual aid society in which each member has both

the obligation to help others and the right to receive assistance

from it in case of need.

To ensure that such obligations and privileges are properly

carried out, the family also functions as a socializing agency.

The moral and ethical instruction of children is the responsibility of the extended family. Traditional values may be trans- mitted to the young through proverbs, songs, stories, rituals,

and initiations associated with rites of passage. Among the

Krobo, Ga, and Akan, puberty rites for girls offer important

occasions for instructing young adults. These methods of communication constitute the informal mode of education in the

traditional society. It is, therefore, through the family that the

individual acquires recognition and social status. As a result,

the general society sees the individual's actions as reflecting the

moral and ethical values of the family. Debts accrued by him

are assumed by the family upon a member's death, and, therefore, his material gains are theirs to inherit.

Land is ordinarily the property of the lineage. Family land is thought of as belonging to the ancestors or local deities and is held in trust for them. As a result, such lands are administered

by the lineage elders, worked by the members of the kinship

group, and inherited only by members of that unit. Although

sectors of such land may be leased to others for seasonal agricultural production, the land remains within the family and

usually is not sold. However, it is not unusual for a man to set aside a portion of his acquired property as "reasonable gifts"

for his children or wife, as has been the case, particularly,

among matrilineal groups. For such gifts to be recognized, tra- dition requires that the presentation be made public during

the lifetime of the donor, allowing the recipient to hold the

public as witnesses should the gift be contested afterward, especially following the death of the donor.

92
The Society and Its Environment

A network of mutual obligations also joins families to chiefs

and others in the general community. Traditional elders and

chiefs act for the ancestors as custodians of the community.

Thus, in both patrilineal and matrilineal societies, and from

the small village to the large town, the position of the chief and

that of the queen mother are recognized.

The chief embodies traditional authority. Chiefs are usually

selected from the senior members of the lineage or several lin- eages that are considered to be among the founders of the

community or ethnic group. Chiefs have extensive executive

andjudicial authority. Decisions on critical issues, such as those

made by family elders, are based on wide discussions and consultations with adult representative groups of both sexes. Traditionally, legislation has not been a primary issue, for the rules

of life are largely set by custom. Discussions are usually focused

on the expediency of concrete actions within the framework of

customary rules. Decisions, when taken by chiefs, are normally

taken by chiefs-in-council and not by lone dictatorial flat. The

legitimacy of traditional authority, therefore, has usually been

based on public consensus sanctioned by custom.

Although chiefs or other authority figures might come from

designated families or clans, the interest of the common people is never ignored. Where the process of selecting as well as of advising chiefs is not given directly to the populace, it has

often been vested in representatives of kin or local residence

groups, elders, or other types of councils. Among the Akan, for

example, the asafo (traditional men's associations, originally

fighting companies—see Glossary) have played important roles

as political action groups to protect the interests of the com- mon people. The priests of some local shrines also acquired

substantial authority that helped balance the powers of local

chiefs. It was such checks and balances within the traditional

scheme of authority relations, especially among the Akan, that

led the British anthropologist, Robert S. Rattray, to refer to the

traditional political structure as a "domestic democracy."

Social Change

Needless to say, contact with Europeans, Christians, and

Muslims as well as colonialism greatly affected and modified

indigenous customs, institutions, and values. A good example

of this process is the office of local chief. British influence has

been present for generations, and by the time of independence

in 1957, the British had exercised substantial political authority

93
Ghana: A Country Study

over certain southern regions for more than a century. The

office of the chief, traditionally used to manage the affairs of

the village community and the ethnic group, was retained by

the British as one of the most important agencies through

which the populace received colonial instructions. As the archi- tect of the British colonial policy of indirect rule, Frederick

Lugard argued in his Dual Mandate in British Tropical Africa that

the preservation of the office of the traditional chief was cost- effective because it presented the appearance of continuity in

the changing political environment. As was the case in many

British colonies in Africa, traditional chiefs in Ghana were

allowed to hold court in matters relating to traditional customs.

They also controlled some local lands for agricultural production, even when the timber and mineral resources were

exploited by the colonial government.

Chiefs continued to be appointed by their own people during colonial times, but native administrators became increasingly accountable to the colonial government. Inevitably, the

presence of other colonial agents, such as the small but effective colonial police and the resident commissioners, influenced

the power of chiefs. Also, with the abolition of slavery, the

imposition of colonial taxes, and the establishment of bureaucratic and judicial procedures, the social relationships that had

existed in the precolonial period between chiefs and people

were altered—at times radically and always permanently. Some

individuals and groups lost power, while others gained influ- ence as the British abolished some traditional functions and

established new ones. A combination of factors affected customary notions about

the exercise of power—colonial rule, Christianity, the money

economy, and Western-style education. Christian missionaries

established the first Western schools (see Education, this ch.).

Products of this formal school system became the new elite

class of literate graduates who functioned as intermediaries

between the indigenous people and the colonial power and,

later, the world at large. Freed from lineage property as the

sole means of attaining wealth and social status, the new elite developed new forms of social institutions and patterns of

interaction. Such modes of behavior associated with modernization and urbanization and acquired through formal education and the formal market economy introduced certain value

systems that were distinctly different from those within the tra- ditional culture.

94
The Society and Its Environment

Of course, Western knowledge, technology, and organizations were not uniformly introduced throughout the country.

They appeared first and in most concentrated form on the

coast or in the Gold Coast Colony, where European influence was greatest and where many schools were established compared with Asante and other northern regions. Consequently,

the coastal and southern peoples were the greatest beneficiaries of the new economic and social opportunities and, conversely, suffered the greatest social upheaval—especially in

conflicts between the Western-educated Africans and their tra- ditional chiefs. Traditional society adapted with particular swift- ness to life in urban areas, in part because of the concentration

of economic development and social infrastructure in such

areas. The pace of change intensified in 1952 when Kwame

Nkrumah, the first African-born prime minister of the Gold

Coast, introduced the Accelerated Development Plan for Education (see The Education System, this ch.).

The impact of the urban region on rural, traditional life has

been great. Migrations by Ghanaians from rural areas to urban

centers either by those in search of work or for the pure enjoyment of urban conditions greatly increased after 1969 (see

Population Distribution, this ch.). The result was a decline in

rural agricultural productivity and an increased dependence

on urban wage-earners by extended family relatives. What has

been described as "rural dependency on the urban wageearner" was acceptable to those within the traditional system,

who saw the individual as socially important because he continued to function in a matrix of kin and personal relationships

and obligations, because his social identity could not be separated from that of his lineage, and because the wealth or positions attained could be shared by, or would benefit, all members of the extended family. Such a position, however,

contradicted the Western view of the individual as a free and

separate social agent whose legal obligations were largely contractual rather than kin-based and whose relationships with

other people depended on individual actions and interests.

The very difficult economic conditions of the 1970s brought

even more pressure to bear on the relationship between traditional and urban values; nonetheless, the modern and the tra- ditional societies continued to exist side by side, and

individuals continued to adapt themselves to the requirements

of each.

95
Ghana: A Country Study

Urban Society

In 1960, 23.1 percent of the population of Ghana resided in

urban centers. The figure rose to 28 percent in 1970, 32 percent according to the 1984 census report, and an estimated 33

percent in 1994. The census figures show that while a majority

of Ghanaians still live in rural areas, larger towns and cities

continue to attract more immigrants than small ones. There is a high correlation between both the economic well-being of

the individual and his or her educational level, and the ten- dency to migrate. A large number of migrants come from areas immediately adjacent to urban areas. Urban populations are therefore multiethnic in character. Even in this multiethnic

urban environment, however, ethnic associations play important social roles—from the initial reception of new migrants to the burial of urban residents.

Formed by people from the same village, district, region, or ethnic background, ethnic associations in urban centers function like extended families in which membership entails obligations and benefits. Apart from the obvious assistance that such

associations may render—such as introducing newcomers to the urban environment, organizing credit unions, or helping

with weddings and funeral activities—associations may also

contribute to the development of their home areas. For example, urban residents from towns and villages in the Kwahu Plateau area are known throughout Ghana for their mutual aid

societies. Through their fund-raising activities, Kwahu associations have contributed to school building construction, rural

electrification, and general beautification projects in their vil- lages.

In urban centers, the degree of traditionalism or modernism

demonstrated by an individual is determined to a large extent

by the length of residency in an urban setting; by the level of

education and, therefore, the degree of Westernization; by liv- ing habits; by the nature of work; and, in some measure, by reli- gious affiliation. For analytic purposes, one scholar has divided

Ghanaian urban residents, especially those in the upper ranks

of urban society, into groups according to occupation. Within

these groups are individuals who, on the basis of their education, professional standing, and participation in the urban

milieu, are accorded high status. They include professionals in

economics, politics, education, administration, medicine, law,

and similar occupations who constitute the elite of their respective groupings.

96
View of central Accra along Kwame Nkrumah Avenue

Courtesy Embassy of Ghana, Washington

A main thoroughfare in Cape Coast

CourtesyJames Sanders

97
Ghana: A Country Study

Taken as a whole, however, such elites do not compose an upper class. The individuals who constitute the elites come

from different social and ethnic backgrounds and base their

power and social status on a variety of cultural values. Most of

them continue to participate in some aspects of traditional

society and socialize with members of their own or other lin- eage groups. Most important, they do not regard themselves as an elite group.

The working class constitutes the rank and file of the various

trade union groups. The majority of them have completed the

Middle School Leaving Certificate Examination. Some have

secondary and technical educations. Unions have been politically active in the country since the 1960s. During the 1970s,

members of the Trade Union Congress, the umbrella organization of workers, and the nation's university students joined

together to call for political changes. In the 1980s, however,

long-standing good relations with student organizations suf- fered when certain trade union groups attacked demonstrating

university students. The primary function of the Trade Union

Congress as a mutual aid group is to conduct negotiations with

the government in an effort to improve the conditions and the

wages of workers. Apart from such joint actions within the

unions, the lives of working people in urban centers, like those

of their elite counterparts, revolve around friends, family, and

other mutual-aid networks.

Family life in more affluent urban areas approximates West- ern behavior in varying degrees. Decisions in the urban family are increasingly made by both parents, not just one. As children spend increasing amounts of time away from home, more

of their values come from their peers and from adults who are not members of their lineage. Social activities organized by

schools have become more important in the life of urban chil- dren and have reduced sibling interaction. As a result, a greater amount of socialization is taking place outside the kin

group and immediate family. This contrasts with rural society

in which family and lineage remain the most significant institutions.

As a result of weakening lineage ties in urban centers and of

population movements that separate more and more individuals from kinsmen upon whom they would ordinarily depend

for assistance, companionship, and entertainment, many

urban residents have turned to voluntary-membership clubs

and to organizations composed of people with shared interests

98
The Society and Its Environment

rather than inherited links. Popular examples of such clubs are the Ghana Red Cross Society, the Accra Turf Club, and the

Kristo Asafo (Christian Women's Club). Other organizations

such as the Ghana Bar Association, the Registered Nurses Association, the Ghana Medical Association, and the Ghana

National Association of Teachers address professional concerns. The Position of Women

Women in premodern Ghanaian society were seen as bearers of children, retailers of fish, and farmers. Within the traditional sphere, the childbearing ability of women was explained

as the means by which lineage ancestors were allowed to be

reborn. Barrenness was, therefore, considered the greatest misfortune. In precolonial times, polygamy was encouraged, especially for wealthy men. Anthropologists have explained the

practice as a traditional method for well-to-do men to procreate additional labor. In patrilineal societies, dowry received

from marrying off daughters was also a traditional means for

fathers to accumulate additional wealth. Given the male domi- nance in traditional society, some economic anthropologists

have explained a female's ability to reproduce as the most

important means by which women ensured social and eco- nomic security for themselves, especially if they bore male chil- dren.

In their Seven Roles of Women: Impact ofEducation, Migration,

and Employment on Ghanaian Mothers (1987), Christine Oppong

and Katherine Abu recorded field interviews in Ghana that

confirmed this traditional view of procreation. Citing figures

from the Ghana fertility survey of 1983, the authors concluded

that about 60 percent of women in the country preferred to have large families of five or more children. A statistical table

accompanying the research showed that the largest number of

children per woman was found in the rural areas where the tra- ditional concept of family was strongest. Uneducated urban

women also had large families. On the average, urbanized, educated, and employed women had fewer children. On the

whole, however, all the interviewed groups saw childbirth as an

essential role for women in society, either for the benefits it bestows upon the mother or for the honor it brings to her family.The security that procreation provided was greater in the

case of rural and uneducated women. By contrast, the number

of children per mother declined for women with post-elemen99
Ghana: A Country Study

tary education and outside employment. With a guaranteed

income and little time at her disposal in her combined role as mother and employee, a woman's desire to procreate declined.

In rural areas of Ghana where non-commercial agricultural

production was the main economic activity, women worked the

land. Coastal women also sold fish caught by men. Many of the

financial benefits that accrued to these women went into

upkeep of the household, while those of the man were reinvested in an enterprise that was often perceived as belonging to

his extended family. This traditional division of wealth placed

women in positions subordinate to men. The persistence of

such values in traditional Ghanaian society may explain some

of the resistance to female education in the past.

In traditional society, marriage under customary law was

often arranged or agreed upon by the fathers and other senior

kinsmen of the prospective bride and bridegroom. This type of

marriage served to link the two groups together in social rela- tionships; hence, marriage within the ethnic group and in the

immediate locality was encouraged. The age at which marriage was arranged varied among ethnic groups, but men generally

married women somewhat younger than they were. Some of

the marriages were even arranged by the families long before

the girl attained nubility. In these matters, family considerations outweighed personal ones—a situation that further reinforced the subservient position of the wife.

The alienation of women from the acquisition of wealth, even in conjugal relationships, was strengthened by traditional

living arrangements. Among matrilineal groups, such as the

Akan, married women continued to reside at their maternal

homes. Meals prepared by the wife would be carried to the husband at his maternal house. In polygamous situations, visita- tion schedules would be arranged. The separate living patterns

reinforced the idea that each spouse is subject to the authority

of a different household head, and because spouses are always

members of different lineages, each is ultimately subject to the

authority of the senior men of his or her lineage. The wife, as an outsider in the husband's family, would not inherit any of

his property, other than that granted to her by her husband as

gifts in token appreciation of years of devotion. The children

from this matrilineal marriage would be expected to inherit

from their mother's family (see Traditional Patterns of Social

Relations, this ch.).

100
The Society and Its Environment

The Ewe and the Dagomba, on the other hand, inherit from

fathers. In these patrilineal societies where the domestic group

includes the man, his wife or wives, their children, and perhaps

several dependent relatives, the wife is brought into closer

proximity to the husband and his paternal family. Her male

children also assure her of more direct access to wealth accu- mulated in the marriage with her husband.

The transition into the modern world has been slow for

women. On the one hand, the high rate of female fertility in

Ghana in the 1980s showed that women's primary role continued to be that of child-bearing. On the other hand, current

research supported the view that, notwithstanding the Education Act of 1960, which expanded and required elementary

education, some parents were reluctant to send their daughters

to school because their labor was needed in the home and on

farms. Resistance to female education also stemmed from the

conviction that women would be supported by their husbands.

In some circles, there was even the fear that a girl's marriage

prospects dimmed when she became educated.

Where girls went to school, most of them did not continue

after receiving the basic education certification. Others did not even complete the elementary level of education. At numerous

workshops organized by the National Council on Women and

Development (NCWD) between 1989 and 1990, the alarming

drop-out rate among girls at the elementary school level

caused great concern. For this reason, the council called upon

the government to find ways to remedy the situation. The dis- parity between male and female education in Ghana was again

reflected in the 1984 national census. Although the ratio of

male to female registration in elementary schools was fifty-five to forty-five, the percentage of girls at the secondary school

level dropped considerably, and only about 17 percent of registered students in the nation's universities in 1984 were female.

According to United Nations Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) figures published in 1991, the

percentage of the female population registered at various levels of the nation's educational system in 1989 showed no improvement over those recorded in 1984 (see table 5, Appendix).

Despite what these figures might suggest, women have risen

to positions of professional importance in Ghana. Early 1990s

data showed that about 19 percent of the instructional staff at the nation's three universities in 1990 was female. Of the teaching staff in specialized and diploma-granting institutions, 20

101
Ghana: A Country Study

percent was female; elsewhere, corresponding figures were 21

percent at the secondary school level, 23 percent at the middle

school level, and as high as 42 percent at the primary school

level. Women also dominated the secretarial and nursing professions in Ghana. When women were employed in the same

line of work as men, they were paid equal wages, and they were

granted maternity leave with pay. For women of little or no education who lived in urban centers, commerce was the most common form of economic activ- ity in the 1980s. At urban market centers throughout the

country, women from the rural areas brought their goods to trade. Other women specialized in buying agricultural produce

at discounted prices at the rural farms and selling it to retailers

in the city. These economic activities were crucial in sustaining

the general urban population. From the mid-1970s through

the early 1980s, however, urban market women, especially

those who specialized in trading manufactured goods, gained

reputations for manipulating market conditions and were

accused of exacerbating the country's already difficult eco- nomic situation. With the introduction of the Economic Recovery Program in 1983 and the consequent successes reported

throughout that decade, these accusations began to subside

(see Economic Recovery Program, ch. 3).

The overall impact of women on Ghanaian society cannot be

overemphasized. The social and economic well-being of

women, who as mothers, traders, farmers, and office workers

compose slightly more than half of the nation's population,

cannot be taken for granted. This was precisely the position

taken by NCWD, which sponsored a number of studies on

women's work, education, and training, and on family issues

that are relevant in the design and execution of policies for the

improvement of the condition of women. Among these considerations, the NCWD stressed family planning, child care, and

female education as paramount.

Religion and Society

The religious composition of Ghana in the first postindependence population census of 1960 was 41 percent Christian, 38

percent traditionalist, 12 percent Muslim, and the rest (about 9

percent) no religious affiliation. A breakdown of the 1960 population according to Christian sects showed that 25 percent were Protestant (non-Pentecostal); 13 percent, Roman Catholic; 2 percent, Protestant (Pentecostal); and 1 percent, Inde102
Woman pounding cassava

to make foo foo, a starchy

staple of the Ghanaian diet Courtesy life in general

(Brook, Rose, and Cooper

Le Van)

pendent African Churches. The 1970 population census did

not present figures on the religious composition of the nation.

The percentage of the general population considered to be

Christian rose sharply to 62 percent according to a 1985 esti- mate. Whereas the Protestant (non-Pentecostal) sector

remained at 25 percent, the percentage of Catholics increased

to 15 percent. A larger rise, however, was recorded for Protestants (Pentecostals) —8 percent compared with their 2 percent

representation in 1960. From being the smallest Christian sect, with a 1 percent representation among the general population

in 1960, membership in the Independent African Churches

rose the most—to about 14 percent by 1985. The 1985 estimate

also showed that the Muslim population of Ghana rose to 15

percent. Conversely, the sector representing traditionalists and

non-believers (38 and 9 percent, respectively, in 1960), saw dramatic declines by 1985—to 21 and about 1 percent, respectively. This shift, especially the increase in favor of the

Independent African Churches, attests to the success of

denominations that have adjusted their doctrines to suit local

beliefs (see Syncretic Religions, this ch.).

Religious tolerance in Ghana is very high. The major Christian celebrations of Christmas and Easter are recognized as national holidays. In the past, vacation periods have been

103
Ghana: A Country Study

planned around these occasions, thus permitting both Christians and others living away from home to visit friends and family in the rural areas. Ramadan, the Islamic month of fasting, is observed by Muslims across the country. Important traditional

occasions are celebrated by the respective ethnic groups. These

festivals include the Adae, which occur fortnightly, and the

annual Odwira festivals of the Akan. On these sacred occasions,

the Akan ancestors are venerated. There are also the annual

Homowo activities of the Ga-Adangbe, during which people

return to their home towns to gather together, to greet new

members of the family, and to remember the dead. The reli- gious rituals associated with these festivities are strictly

observed by the traditional elders of the respective ethic

groups.

Christianity and Islam in Ghana

The presence of Christian missionaries on the coast of

Ghana has been dated to the arrival of the Portuguese in the

fifteenth century. It was the Basel/Presbyterian and Wesleyan/

Methodist missionaries, however, who, in the nineteenth century, laid the foundation for the Christian church in Ghana.

Beginning their conversions in the coastal area and among the

Akwapim, these missionaries established schools as "nurseries

of the church" in which an educated African class was trained.

Almost all major secondary schools today, especially exclusively

boys and girls schools, are mission- or church-related institutions. Although churches continue to influence the development of education in the country, church schools have been

opened to all since the state assumed financial responsibility

for formal instruction under the Education Act of 1960.

Various Christian denominations are well represented in

Ghana. The Volta region has a high concentration of Evangelical Presbyterians. Many Akwapim are Presbyterians, and the

Methodist denomination is strongly represented among the

Fante. The Roman Catholic Church is fairly well represented in

Central Region and Ashanti Region. Although no official fig- ures exist to reflect regional distribution of the various denominations, it is generally agreed that the southern part of the

nation is more Christian, while the north is more Islamic.

The unifying organization of Christians in the country is the

Christian Council of Ghana, founded in 1929. Representing

the Methodist, Anglican, Mennonite, Presbyterian, Evangelical

Presbyterian, African Methodist Episcopal Zionist, Christian

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The Society and Its Environment

Methodist, Evangelical Lutheran, F'Eden, and Baptist

churches, and the Society of Friends, the council serves as the

link with the World Council of Churches and other ecumenical

bodies. The National Catholic Secretariat, established in 1960,

also coordinates the different in-country dioceses. These Christian organizations, concerned primarily with the spiritual

affairs of their congregations, have occasionally acted in cir- cumstances described by the government as political. Such was

the case in 1991 when both the Catholic Bishops Conference

and the Christian Council of Ghana called on the military government of the Provisional National Defence Council (PNDC)

to return the country to constitutional rule. The Roman Catholic newspaper, The Standard, was often critical of PNDC policies.

In the north, Islam predominates. Islam is based on what

Muslims believe are the divine revelations received in seventhcentury Arabia by the Prophet Muhammad. His life is recounted as the early history of the religion, beginning with

his travels from the Arabian town of Mecca about A.D. 610. His

condemnation of the polytheistic practices of the people of

Mecca caused him to become an outcast. In A.D. 622 Muhammad was invited to the town of Yathrib, which became known as Medina (the city) through its association with him. The move,

or hijra, known in the West as the hegira, marks the beginning

of the Islamic Era and the Islamic calendar, as well as the inauguration of Islam as a powerful force in history. In Medina,

Muhammad continued his preaching, ultimately defeated his

detractors in battle, and consolidated his influence as both

temporal and spiritual leader of most Arabs before his death in

A.D. 632.

After Muhammad's death, his followers compiled those of

his words that were regarded as coming directly from God into

the Quran, the holy scripture of Islam. Other sayings and

teachings as well as precedents of his behavior as recalled by

those who knew him became the hadith ("sayings"). From

these sources, the faithful constructed the Prophet's customary

practice, or sunna, which they endeavor to emulate. The

Quran, hadith, and sunna form a comprehensive guide to the

spiritual, ethical, and social life of the faithful in most Muslim

countries.

The God preached by Muhammad was previously known to

his countrymen. Rather than introducing a new deity, Muhammad denied the existence of the pantheon of gods and spirits

worshipped before his prophethood and declared the omnipo105
Ghana: A Country Study

tence of God, the unique creator. Muhammad is the "Seal of

the Prophets," the last of the prophetic line. His revelations are

said to complete for all time the series of revelations that were

given earlier to Jews and Christians. Islam reveres as sacred

only the message, not the Prophet. It accepts the concepts of

guardian angels, the Day ofJudgment, resurrection, and the

eternal life of the soul. The central requirement of Islam is submission to the will of

God (Allah), and, accordingly, a Muslim is a person who has

submitted his will to God. The most important demonstration

of faith is the shahada (profession of faith), which states that

"There is no God but God (Allah), and Muhammad is his

prophet." Salat (daily prayer), zakat (almsgiving), sawm (fasting), and hajj (pilgrimage to Mecca) are also required of all Muslims.

The spread of Islam into West Africa, beginning with ancient

Ghana in the ninth century, was mainly the result of the commercial activities of North African Muslims (see The Precolonial Period, ch. 1). The empires of both Mali and Songhai that

followed ancient Ghana in the Western Sudan adopted the reli- gion. Islam made its entry into the northern territories of modern Ghana around the fifteenth century. Mande or Wangara

traders and clerics carried the religion into the area. The

northeastern sector of the country was also influenced by Muslims who escaped the Hausa jihads of northern Nigeria in the

early nineteenth century.

Most Ghanaian Muslims are Sunni, following the Maliki ver- sion of Islamic law. Sufism, involving the organization of mystical brotherhoods (tariqa) for the purification and spread of

Islam, is not widespread in Ghana. The Tijaniyah and the Qadiriyah brotherhoods, however, are represented. The

Ahmadiyah, a Shia (see Glossary) sect originating in nineteenth-century India, is the only non-Sunni order in the country.Despite the spread of Islamism (popularly known as Islamic

fundamentalism) in the Middle East, North Africa, and even in

Nigeria since the mid-1970s, Ghanaian Muslims and Christians

have had excellent relations. Guided by the authority of the

Muslim Representative Council, religious, social, and eco- nomic matters affecting Muslims have often been redressed

through negotiations. The Muslim Council has also been

responsible for arranging pilgrimages to Mecca for believers

who can afford the journey. In spite of these achievements, the

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The Society and Its Environment

council has not succeeded in taking initiatives for the upgrading of Islamic schools beyond the provision of basic Quranic

instruction. This may explain the economic and technological

gap between Muslims and non-Muslims. The Ghanaian

Ahmadiyah Movement, which has established a number of

vocational training centers, hospitals, and some secondary

schools, is an exception.

Traditional Religion

Despite the presence of Islam and Christianity, traditional

religions in Ghana have retained their influence because of

their intimate relation to family loyalties and local mores. The

traditional cosmology expresses belief in a supreme being

(referred to by the Akan as Nyame and by the Ewe as Mawu).

The supreme being is usually thought of as remote from daily

religious life and is, therefore, not directly worshipped. There

are also lesser gods that take "residency" in streams, rivers,

trees, and mountains. These gods are generally perceived as intermediaries between the supreme being and society. Ancestors and numerous other spirits are also recognized as part of

the cosmological order.

For all Ghanaian ethnic groups, the spirit world is considered to be as real as the world of the living. The dual worlds of

the mundane and the sacred are linked by a network of mutual

relationships and responsibilities. The action of the living, for

example, can affect the gods or spirits of the departed, while

the support of family or "tribal" ancestors ensures prosperity of

the lineage or state. Neglect, it is believed, might spell doom.

Veneration of departed ancestors is a major characteristic of

all traditional religions. The ancestors are believed to be the

most immediate link with the spiritual world, and they are thought to be constantly near, observing every thought and

action of the living. Some ancestors may even be reincarnated

to replenish the lineage. Barrenness is, therefore, considered a great misfortune because it prevents ancestors from returning

to life. To ensure that a natural balance is maintained between the

world of the sacred and that of the profane, the roles of the

chief within the state, family elders in relation to the lineage,

and the priest within society are crucial. The religious functions, especially of chiefs and lineage heads, are clearly demonstrated during such periods as the Odwira of the Akan, the

Homowo of the Ga-Adangbe, or the Aboakyir of the Efutu

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Ghana: A Country Study

(coastal Guan), when the people are organized in activities that renew and strengthen relations with their ancestors. Such activities include the making of sacrifices and the pouring of liba- tions.

The religious activities of chiefs and lineage heads are generally limited to the more routine biweekly and annual festivities,

but traditional priests—given their association with specific

shrines—are regarded as specialized practitioners through

whom the spirits of the gods may grant directions. Priests

undergo vigorous training in the arts of medicine, divination,

and other related disciplines and are, therefore, consulted on a more regular basis by the public. Because many diseases are believed to have spiritual causes, traditional priests sometimes

act as doctors or herbalists. Shrine visitation is strongest among

the uneducated and in rural communities. This fact, however,

does not necessarily suggest that the educated Ghanaian has

totally abandoned tradition; some educated and missiontrained individuals do consult traditional oracles in times of crisis. Syncretic Religions

The rise of Apostolic or Pentecostal churches across the

nation partly demonstrates the impact of social change and the

eclectic nature of traditional cultures. These establishments,

referred to by some as separatist or spiritual churches or cults,

combine traditional beliefs in magic and divination with ele- ments of Christianity. The major emphasis of the cults is on

curative and preventive remedies, chants, and charms, such as "holy water," designed to ward off the power of witches and

malevolent forces. Cults also offer social activities in addition to their religious and medical roles. Some have rival drum societies and singing groups that are highly popular among the

young and women. To their adherents, these cults seem to

offer a sense of security derived from belonging to a religious

group that is new yet maintains the characteristics of traditional forms of occult consultation. The increasing popularity

of these churches (Independent African and Pentecostal) is reflected in figures for membership, which rose from 1 and 2

percent, respectively, in 1960, to 14 and 8 percent, respectively,

according to a 1985 estimate.

Although freedom of religion exists in Ghana, a Religious

Bodies (Registration) Law 2989 was passed in June 1989 to reg- ulate churches. By requiring certification of all Christian reli108
A tendaana, or priest of the land, in front of his shrine

infar northern Ghana

(Talensi area)

Courtesy life in general

(Brook, Rose, and Cooper

Le Van)

gious organizations operating in Ghana, the government

reserved the right to inspect the functioning of these bodies

and to order the auditing of their financial statements. The

Ghana Council of Churches interpreted the Religious Bodies

Law as contradicting the concept of religious freedom in the

country. According to a government statement, however, the

law was designed to protect the freedom and integrity of genuine religious organizations by exposing and eliminating groups

established to take advantage of believers. The PNDC repealed

the law in late 1992. Despite its provisions, all orthodox Christian denominations and many spiritual churches continued to operate in the country.

Health and Welfare

In precolonial Ghana, as in the rest of sub-Saharan Africa,

traditional priests were important in providing treatment for

the sick. The role of village priests in the medical sphere

reflected the belief that unexplained illness, misfortune, and

premature death were caused by supernatural agents. In the

treatment of illness, therefore, the usual process was for the

priest to use divination to determine the source of the malady

and to suggest sacrifices to appease the causal agents before

herbal medicine was prescribed for the patient. Since the intro109
Ghana: A Country Study

duction of Islam in Ghana in the fourteenth century, Muslim

clerics have also been known to provide spiritual treatment and

protection in the form of charms and amulets derived from

Quranic beliefs.

The role of the village priests, who provided medical advice

and sometimes treatment for the sick, has often been stressed over that of the herbalists, who served their communities solely

as dispensers of medicinal herbs. Recent scholarship, however,

has shown that villagers in the premodern era understood ill- ness and misfortune to originate from both natural and supernatural sources. Even after a spiritually caused ailment was

identified and the proper rituals performed, the final cure was

usually via the application of medicinal herbs—a situation that

made knowledge of the medicinal value of plants and herbs

important. Herbal medicine was used in the treatment of diarrhea and stomach pains, for dressing wounds, as an antidote

for poisons, and to stabilize pregnancies. Traditional healers

continue to be relied upon, especially in the rural areas where

modern health services are limited.

The medical value of traditional remedies varies. While the

medicinal properties of herbs cannot be denied, in some cases herbs may be harmful and may result in severe infections or even death. It was for this reason that an association of traditional healers was formed in the 1960s with its headquarters at Nsawam in Greater Accra Region. The Traditional Healers'

Association has tried to preserve the integrity of traditional

medicinal practice. Its members have also attempted to assure the government, through the Ministry of Health, that the dis- pensation of herbal medicine has a role to play in modern

medical practice in Ghana.

Western medicine was first introduced into the Gold Coast

by Christian missionaries and missionary societies in the nineteenth century. Missionaries were almost the sole providers of

modern medicine until after World War I. Important missionary medical facilities in Ghana today include Catholic-affiliated

hospitals in Sunyani and Tamale, the Muslim Ahmadiyah facili- ties at Efiduasi-Asokori, and a Presbyterian hospital at Agogo in

Eastern Region.

Attempts by the central government to expand Western

medical care in the country were given serious consideration

during the tenure of Frederick Gordon Guggisberg ( 1919-2V)

as governor of the Gold Coast. As part of his ten-year development program, Guggisberg proposed town improvements,

110
The Society and Its Environment

improved water supply, and the construction of hospitals. It was during his era that Korle Bu, the first teaching hospital in the

Gold Coast, was completed in 1925.

Since the end of World War II, the World Health Organization (WHO) and the United Nations Children's Fund

(UNICEF) have provided financial and technical assistance for

the elimination of diseases and the improvement of health

standards. A shortage of medical specialists exists, however, and

local facilities for training medical personnel need to be

expanded and updated. As a consequence, many Ghanaians in

the immediate post-World War II period continued to rely on

traditional doctors and herbalists.

Despite efforts to improve medical conditions in the decades

following World War II, the first postindependence census of

1960 did not provide data on the medical situation in Ghana.

There was still no regular system for gathering medical statis- tics by the mid-1960s and no suggestion that one would be

developed by 1970. During that period, available figures were

gathered from scattered samplings and were collected on a haphazard basis or were the summation of hospital records and

United Nations projections. Thus, only partial information

about the total health situation was available. Records from the

1984 census and newspaper reports on seminars conducted on

health-related issues, especially since the mid-1980s, now make

it easier to evaluate national health.

Health Care

Ghana has the full range of diseases endemic to a subSaharan country. According to WHO, common diseases

include cholera, typhoid, pulmonary tuberculosis, anthrax,

pertussis, tetanus, chicken pox, yellow fever, measles, infectious

hepatitis, trachoma, malaria, and schistosomiasis. Others are guinea worm or dracunculiasis, various kinds of dysentery, river

blindness or onchocerciasis, several kinds of pneumonia, dehydration, venereal diseases, and poliomyelitis. According to a 1974 report, more than 75 percent of all preventable diseases

at that time were waterborne. In addition, malnutrition and

diseases acquired through insect bites continued to be com- mon.WHO lists malaria and measles as the leading causes of premature death in Ghana. Among children under five years of

age, 70 percent of deaths are caused by infections compounded by malnutrition. Guinea worm reached epidemic

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Ghana: A Country Study

proportions, especially in the northern part of the country, in

1988-89. Cerebral spinal meningitis also spread in the country

and claimed a number of victims in the late 1980s. All these

afflictions are either typical of tropical regions or common in

developing countries.

To improve health conditions in Ghana, the Ministry of

Health emphasized health services research in the 1970s. In

addition, WHO and the government worked closely in the

early 1980s to control schistosomiasis in man-made bodies of

water. Efforts have been intensified since 1980 to improve the

nation's sanitation facilities and access to safe water. The percentage of the national population that had access to safe water

rose from 49.2 in 1980 to 57.2 percent in 1987. During that same period, the 25.6 percent of the population with access to sanitation services (public latrines, rubbish disposal, etc.) rose

to 30.3 percent. According to WHO, however, many of the

reported sanitation advances have been made in urban areas and not in rural communities where the majority of the population lives. On the whole, however, Ghana's health conditions are

improving. The result is reflected in the decline in infant mortality from 120 per 1,000 live births in 1965 to 86 per 1,000 live births in 1989, and a rate of overall life expectancy that

increased from an average of forty-four years in 1970 to fifty-six

years in 1993. To reduce the country's infant mortality rate further, the government initiated the Expanded Program on

Immunization in February 1989 as part of a ten-year Health

Action Plan to improve the delivery of health services. The government action was taken a step farther by the Greater Accra

Municipal Council, which declared child immunization a prerequisite for admission to public schools.

Modern medical services in Ghana are provided by the central government, local institutions, Christian missions (private

nonprofit agencies), and a relatively small number of private

for-profit practitioners. According to the United Nations,

about 60.2 percent of the country's total population in 1975

depended on government or quasi-government health centers

for medical care. Of the available health facilities represented

in the 1984 census, about 62.9 percent were still described as government and quasi-government institutions. Mission hospitals represented a large percentage of the remainder, while private hospitals constituted less than 2 percent of modern

medical care facilities (see table 4, Appendix).

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The Society and Its Environment

The medical system in Ghana comes under the jurisdiction

of the Ministry of Health, which is also charged with the control of dangerous drugs, narcotics, scientific research, and the

professional qualifications of medical personnel. Regional and

district medical matters fall under the jurisdiction of trained

medical superintendents. Members of the national Psychic and

Healers' Association have also been recognized by the government since 1969. Over the years, all administrative branches of

the Ministry of Health have worked closely with city, town, and

village councils in educating the population in sanitation matters.Many modern medical facilities exist in Ghana, but these are not evenly distributed across the country. Ministry of Health

figures for 1990 showed that there were 18,477 hospital beds

for the estimated national population of 15 million. World

Bank (see Glossary) figures showed that in 1965 there was one

physician to every 13,740 patients in Ghana. The ratio widened

to one to 20,460 in 1989. In neighboring Togo, the doctor-topatient ratio of one to 23,240 in 1965 improved to one to 8,700

in 1989; it was one to 29,530 in 1965 and one to 6,160 in 1989

for Nigeria, whereas in Burkina, the ratio of one to 73,960 in

1965 worsened to one to 265,250 in 1989. These figures show

that while the doctor-patient ratio in Ghana gradually became

less favorable, the ratio in neighboring countries, with the

exception of Burkina, was rapidly improving.

The ratio of nurses to patients in Ghana (one to 3,730 in

1965), however, improved to one to 1,670 by 1989. Compared

to Togo (one nurse to 4,990 patients in 1965 and one to 1,240

in 1989) and Burkina (one to 4,150 in 1965 and one to 1,680 in

1989), the rate of improvement in Ghana was slow. The

improvement in Nigeria's nurse-to-patient ratio from one to 6,160 in 1965 to one to 1,900 in 1989 was exceptional. A rapidly

growing Ghanaian population was not the only reason for unfavorable ratios of medical staff to patients; similar population

growth was experienced in neighboring West African countries. Insofar as the Ghana Medical Association and the various nurses associations were concerned, better salaries and working conditions in Nigeria, for example, were significant variables in explaining the attraction of that country for Ghanaian

physicians and other medical personnel. This attraction was

especially true for male and, therefore, more mobile medical

workers, as shown by the arguments of various health workers'

113
Ghana: A Country Study

associations in 1990 during demonstrations in support of

claims for pay raises and improved working conditions.

Ghana adopted a number of policies to ensure an improved

health sector. These included the introduction of minimum

fees paid by patients to augment state funding for health ser- vices and a national insurance plan introduced in 1989. Also in

1989, the construction of additional health centers was intensified to expand primary health care to about 60 percent of the

rural community. Hitherto, less than 40 percent of the rural

population had access to primary health care, and fewer than

half of Ghanaian children were immunized against various

childhood diseases. The training of village health workers,

community health workers, and traditional birth attendants was also intensified in the mid-1980s in order to create a pool

of personnel to educate the population about preventive measures necessary for a healthy community.

Since 1986 efforts to improve health conditions in Ghana

have been strengthened through the efforts of Global 2000

(see Glossary). Although primarily an agricultural program,

Global 2000 has also provided basic health education, especially in the northern parts of the country where the spread of

guinea worm reached epidemic proportions in 1989. Reports

on the impact of Global 2000 on health have been positive in

other ways as well. For example, participating farmers have significantly increased their agricultural output—a development

that has contributed to a decline in malnutrition. Also, the

number of cases of guinea worm had dropped significantly by

early 1993.

Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndrome (AIDS)

In March 1986, the first case of acquired immune deficiency

syndrome (AIDS) was reported in Ghana. In January 1991, a more detailed report on AIDS in Ghana appeared in which 107

human immunodeficiency virus (HIV) positive cases were said

to have been recorded in 1987. Three hundred thirty-three

people were identified as HIV positive by the end of March

1988, and there was a further increase to 2,744 by the end of

April 1990. Of the April 1990 number, 1,226 were reported to have contracted AIDS. According to WHO annual reports, the

disease continued to spread in the country. During 1991 the

Komfo Anokye Teaching Hospital reported about fifty AIDS

cases each month.

114
The Society and Its Environment

Although the reported figures were far below the number of

known cases in East Africa and Central Africa, they were still alarming for a medical system already overburdened by traditional health problems. Seminars and conferences held to dis- cuss the disease included the 1990 annual conference of the

Ghana Academy of Arts and Sciences. The conference theme

was the impact of international prostitution and the spread of

AIDS. The Ministry of Health, with funding from WHO, had

also set up surveillance systems to track the AIDS virus as part

of its medium-term (1989-93) plan. According to the program,

a countrywide sample of both high- and low-risk groups had

been identified for testing at regular intervals to measure the

prevalence of the disease. A thirty-member National Advisory

Council on AIDS was established in late 1989 to advise the government on policy matters relating to the control and prevention of AIDS in the country. The Ministry of Health lacks

adequately trained personnel and information management

systems to combat the disease.

Because of the continued spread of infection and improved

reporting, the country recorded 12,500 AIDS cases by the end

of 1994, placing Ghana second only to neighboring Cote d'lvoire, where more than 16,600 cases of AIDS were recorded, in

the West Africa subregion. Of the Ghanaian AIDS cases, about

8,000 were people aged fifteen to forty-five; the remainder

were mostly children aged five to ten. At the same time, Ghanaian health officials estimated the number of HIV positive cases

at about 300,000. The incidence of HIV positive and AIDS

cases was highest in Ashanti Region.

The most-affected age-group in Ghana is young working

adults. Some 70 percent of the total infected population is female; on the basis of this finding, the Ministry of Health

anticipates a significant increase in HIV-positive births in the

future. Considering the gravity of the problem, in February

1994 the National Parliament recommended that a select committee on education and health be established to study and

make recommendations for measures to control AIDS. In the

meantime, radio, television, and billboard advertisements are being used as part of a national AIDS awareness program.

Social Welfare

In precolonial Ghanaian societies, it was normal for individuals to receive economic assistance from members of their

extended families—including paternal and maternal uncles,

115
Ghana: A Country Study

aunts, grandparents, and cousins. The practice of expecting

assistance from family members grew out of the understanding

that the basis of family wealth derived from land and labor,

both inherited from common ancestors. Even as individuals

sought help from extended family members, they were in turn

required to fulfill certain responsibilities, such as contributing

labor when needed or participating in activities associated with

rites of passage of family members. It is because of this mutual

interdependence of the members of the family that anthropologist Robert S. Rattray defined the extended family in Ghana

as the primary political unit. Today, the same system of welfare

assistance prevails in rural areas, where more than two-thirds of

the country's population resides.

Legislation for the provision of a modern national social

security system went into effect in 1965. Further legislation was

passed in 1970 to convert the system into a pension plan to provide for sickness, maternity, and work-related injury benefits.

Government welfare programs at the time were the responsibility of the Department of Social Welfare under the Ministry of

Labour and Social Welfare (now the Ministry of Mobilization

and Social Welfare). As the national economy was reformed,

the Workers' Compensation Act of 1986 was passed to guarantee wages to workers in the private sector while they were

undergoing treatment for work-related injuries.

These plans, however, applied only to individuals employed

in the formal sector of the economy. With about two-thirds of

the country's population residing in rural areas, and with most

urban residents engaged outside the formal economy, the tra- ditional pattern of social security based on kin obligations still functions. In rural areas, individuals continue to turn to members of the extended family for financial aid and guidance, and

the family is expected to provide for the welfare of every member. In villages, towns, and cities, this mutual assistance system

operates within the larger kinship units of lineage and clan. In large urban areas, religious, social, and professionally based

mutual assistance groups have become popular as a way to address professional and urban problems beyond the scope of

the traditional kinship social security system (see Urban Society, this ch.).

According to a 1988 newspaper report, housing has become

a major problem for city dwellers. The report indicated that

former governments largely ignored the problem, thereby

allowing the situation to reach an alarming state. The result is

116
The Society and Its Environment

an acute shortage of affordable rental housing for urban workers and students, who have to pay exorbitant rents. This shortage in turn has resulted in working husbands' leaving their

families in their home villages and returning only when their

work schedules allow them time to visit. The introduction of the "Rural Manifesto" of 1984 was an attempt by the PNDC administration to address a general

development problem that included urban housing. According

to thel984 plan, many services, such as the provision of pipeborne water, banking facilities, and electricity, were to be introduced to the rural areas, thereby making such locations attrac- tive to workers and others who might otherwise migrate to towns and cities. Because the implementation of these services,

especially rural electrification, began in earnest only in the late 1980s, the plan's impact on rural-urban flow was as yet uncertain in the early 1990s.

Education

The dominant mode of transmitting knowledge in the precolonial societies of the Guinea Coast was through apprenticeship as smiths, drummers, or herbalists. By observing adult

skills, or through proverbs, songs, and stories, children learned

proper roles and behavior. Also, at various stages in life, especially during the puberty rites for young adults, intensive moral

and ethical instruction from family or societal elders was given.

The purpose of that "informal" education was to ensure that

the individual was able to satisfy the basic traditional or com- munal needs, such as motherhood for women, and hunting,

long-distance trading, or farming for men. It was also important that the religious sanctions associated with the various professions and stages in life be understood because the

traditional society saw close relationships between religious

and mundane activities. Western-style education was introduced into the Gold Coast

by missionaries as early as 1765. Many of these institutions,

established by Presbyterian and Methodist missionaries, were

located in the south of the country in what became the British

Gold Coast Colony (see Christianity and Islam in Ghana, this

ch.). In 1852 the British colonial government instituted a poll

tax to raise money to support public schools, but the measure became unpopular and was abolished in 1861. Mission schools

continued to spread, however, and by 1881 more than 139 had

been established with an enrollment of about 5,000 students.

117
Ghana: A Country Study

A board of education was set up in the 1880s to inspect

schools and to standardize their management. Grants were

established for private schools that met government standards,

and the government devised regulations for the recognition of

new schools. Primary education was emphasized until limited

secondary education was introduced in the early 1900s.

After World War I, the development of education was given

additional impetus under Governor Guggisberg. His education

policies stressed the need for improved teacher training, equal

education for girls, a greater emphasis on vocational training,

and the establishment of secondary schools. In the governor's

ten-year development plan, which was announced in 1919, education was given a special place, partly because of his goal of

replacing Europeans with educated Africans in many administrative positions within the country. The policies were not fully

implemented, especially at the secondary and vocational levels,

but the Achimota School, a first-class secondary school

designed to train Ghanaians for the lower levels of the civil ser- vice, was established in 1927. Although English remained the

principal language of instruction in the school system, vernacular languages were also allowed in the primary schools, and the

publication of textbooks in these languages began in earnest. Stimulated by nationalist ideas of political and economic

self-determination from the 1930s through the 1940s, popular

demand for education reached such proportions that the com- bined efforts of the colonial government and the missions

could not satisfy it. The result was the opening of hundreds of

schools by local groups and individuals. The Convention People's Party (CPP) promise of free instruction during the 1951

election campaign was made in response to an increasing

demand for education. Whereas some parents in the northern

regions of the country resisted enrollment of their children,

many in the south encouraged formal instruction because it was regarded as a virtual guarantee of acquiring white-collar

jobs and wage-earning positions. Western education was

accepted more readily in the southern sector of the country

because Christian missionaries had been in that area longer

than they had been in the north. The purpose of the CPP's free

and compulsory education policy was to make formal education available to all at minimum cost. In 1952 the CCP-led government drew up the Accelerated

Development Plan for Education. The program, which became

a reality in 1961, was designed to provide an education for

118
Korle Bu Hospital in Accra

Courtesy Embassy of Ghana, Washington

The University of Ghana at Legon

Courtesy Embassy of Ghana, Washington

119
Ghana: A Country Study

every child aged six and above. To achieve this goal, the central

government took responsibility for teacher training and

funded schools through the Ministry of Education. Since this

time, a considerable portion of the national budget has been

spent on educating the population. Various attempts to shift

the cost to students and parents, especially at the university

level, have met great resistance.

The Education System

The country's education system at the beginning of the

1993-94 academic year comprised primary schools, junior sec- ondary schools, senior secondary schools, polytechnic (technical and vocational) institutions, teacher training colleges, and

university-level institutions.

In 1990-91, the latest year for which preliminary government statistics were available, 1.8 million pupils were attending

more than 9,300 primary schools; 609,000 students were

enrolled in about 5,200 junior secondary schools; and nearly

200,000 students were enrolled in some 250 senior secondary

schools (see table 5, Appendix). In the mid-1980s, teachers on

each of these levels numbered approximately 51,000, 25,000,

and 8,800, respectively. In addition, 1989-90 enrollment in

Ghana's approximately twenty-six polytechnic schools totalled

almost 11,500 students; the teacher corps for these schools

numbered 422. Education is free, although students have

recently begun to pay textbook fees. The Education Act of 1960

foresaw universal education, but the constraints of economic

underdevelopment meant that by the early 1990s this goal had

not been realized. On the primary level, instruction is con- ducted in the local vernacular, although English is taught as a second language. Beyond primary school, however, English is the medium of instruction in an education system that owes much to British models.

Before the introduction of reforms in the mid-1980s, stu- dents at what was then the middle-school level took either the

Middle School Leaving Certificate Examination and terminated their studies, or, at any time from seventh to tenth grade,

the Common Entrance Examination, which admitted them to secondary or technical study. With the traditional six years of

primary education, four years of middle schooling, and a seven-year secondary education (five years of preparation

toward the Ordinary Level Certificate and two years of

Advanced Level training) before entering degree-granting

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The Society and Its Environment

institutions, the average age of the first-year university student

in Ghana was often about twenty-five.

Most students, however, did not continue formal instruction

after the first ten years of education. Of the 145,400 students

completing middle school in 1960, for example, only 14,000

sought secondary education. In 1970 only 9,300 of the more

than 424,500 leaving middle school were admitted into secondary schools. Ministry of Education data for the 1984-85 aca- demic year showed that of the 1.8 million students completing

ten years of primary and middle schooling, only 125,600 continued into secondary schools, while fewer than 20,000 entered

vocational and technical institutions. That same year, approximately 7,900 students were enrolled in the universities.

Although the government provides free tuition to all children of school age, and notwithstanding the fact that schools can be found all across the country, 1989-90 government statis- tics showed that more males continued to be enrolled in

schools than females. In the first six grades of the educational

system, only 45 percent of the students enrolled were female.

The percentage of females in the school system decreased to 33

percent at the secondary school level, to 27 percent in polytechnical institutions, and to as low as 19 percent within the

universities. Disparities in the male-female ratios found in the

schools had not improved significantly by 1990-91. The

emphasis on male education doubtless reflects traditional

social values, which view the reproductive abilities of women as their primary role in life, while men are valued as breadwinners and, therefore, in need of education to compete in the

contemporary economy (see The Position of Women, this ch.).

Despite a number of committee reports and proposals for

educational reform, until mid-1980 the education system con- tinued to place emphasis on traditional academic studies. Proponents of reform argued that the country's development

needs required an education system that, beginning at the middle-school level, placed equal emphasis on training students in

vocational and technical skills. It was further suggested that

reforms could contribute to reducing the number of students

who dropped out of school for lack of interest in traditional

academic studies.

Partly as a result of earlier proposals for reform and partly in

keeping with the government's economic reform program,

fundamental change in the educational structure of the country was undertaken in the mid-1980s. The overall goals were to

121
Ghana: A Country Study

make curricula at all levels more relevant to the economic

needs of the country, to reduce the length of pre-university

instruction, and to improve the quality of teacher preparation.

Increased enrollment in primary schools and a reduction in

the rate of illiteracy were also to be pursued. The reforms were

to be implemented in two phases: those for primary and middle schools were to be introduced in 1987-89, and those for

secondary schools and the universities, in 1990-93.

The much-discussed changes in education became a reality

in 1987 when all seventh-grade students, who otherwise would

have entered the traditional first year of middle school, were

instead admitted into new junior secondary schools (JSS) to begin a three-year combined training program in vocational,

technical, and academic studies. The JSS system was a radical

change in the structure of education in the country. It replaced

the four-year middle school and the first three years of the tra- ditional five-year secondary school system. After three years at the JSS, three years further training would be available in

senior secondary schools (SSS), after which students could

enter polytechnic institutions or the universities.

Pioneers in the JSS system sat for the first Basic Certificate of

Education Examination in 1990. In this same year, seniors of

the old middle-school system took the last Middle School Leaving Certificate Examination. Supporters of the JSS argued that

the system would attract more students into technical, vocational, business, and agricultural institutions. It was also suggested that those students who did not gain admission into the

SSS would be better equipped to enter the job market. Results

of the first SSS certificate examination, announced in May

1994, however, showed that only 3.9 percent of students

received passing marks. This poor showing was attributed to lack of textbooks, equipment, and trained teachers, and to inadequate time to prepare for the examination. Despite loud

protests from students and parents, reform of the education

system remained on course. In addition to revamping middle-school education, changes were also introduced on all other educational levels. Fees for

textbooks and supplies were instituted, primary curricula were

revised, and food and housing subsidies were reduced or eliminated in secondary schools and the universities. In the early

1990s, however, the government appeared to be moving slowly

in implementing further proposed reforms, such as new curricula in secondary schools and restructuring of the universities.

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The Society and Its Environment

In the early 1990s, higher education was available at three

institutions—the University of Ghana (located principally at Legon outside Accra), founded in 1948 as the University College of the Gold Coast; the University of Science and Technology at Kumasi, opened officially in 1952 as the Kumasi College

of Technology; and the University of Cape Coast at Cape Coast,

founded in 1961. In 1989-90 enrollment at all three institutions totalled 9,251, of whom 19 percent were female. In addition, large numbers of Ghanaians went abroad for university

education, as they had in the past.

In anticipation that the newJSS and SSS structures would

increase the number of students seeking advanced technical

training, two more universities were proposed. The specialist

institutions or colleges at Winneba, which offered post-secondary teacher training in such subjects as art, music, and physical

education, were to be upgraded into an independent university

college or were to be given associate relations with the University of Cape Coast. In September 1993, the University of Development Studies at Tamale opened. Designed initially to train

agricultural specialists, it will eventually also offer degrees in

health and development studies.

Problems in Education

At least two major educational issues faced Ghana in the

early 1990s—the effort to shift part of the expense of education onto students, especially in the universities, and the future

of the JSS innovation. Since the introduction of the Accelerated Development Plan for Education in 1952, the central government has shouldered much of the financial burden of

education. In 1972, for example, about 20.1 percent of the

total central government expenditure was spent on education.

This figure rose to 25.7 percent in 1989. Compared with Nigeria, where only 4.5 percent and 2.8 percent of the total government expenditure was spent on education in 1972 and 1989,

respectively, the Ghana figure was high even among its peers.

Efforts by the central government to shift the cost of education onto students, particularly at the university level, have

been challenged. But despite the many demonstrations that were organized by the various student representative councils

and the National Union of Ghanaian Students, the government resolved in the latter part of the 1980s to make university

students pay for their boarding and lodging through loans.

This policy, among others, was the cause of the unsettled rela123
Ghana: A Country Study

tionship between university students and the government that

characterized the early 1990s. In March 1993, an especially seri- ous confrontation occurred in Accra between university stu- dents and police over the proposed charges. Such protests

notwithstanding, the Ministry of Education proceeded with the

changes for university funding on grounds that they were in

line with the nation's Economic Recovery Program introduced

in 1983 (see The Economic Recovery Program, ch. 3).

The introduction of the JSS system was also problematic. It had been agreed upon after the Dzobo Committee, chaired by

N.K. Dzobo of the University of Cape Coast, reported in 1974

that the nation's educational establishment needed overhauling. In fact, this committee afforded education specialists and

the public the opportunity to respond to a 1972 Ministry of

Education proposal for the introduction ofjunior secondary

schools. Despite the favorable evaluation of the Ministry of

Education proposal by the Dzobo Committee, the proposed

changes in the structure and content of primary and secondary

education were never implemented, perhaps because of the

difficult economic situation of the country in the mid-1970s.

When the JSS system was implemented in 1987, it was hailed

by its supporters as the answer to the country's educational,

social, and economic problems. Detractors, however, con- demned it because of the limited time allowed for the development of necessary infrastructure, such as the provision of

workshops, before the system went into effect. As a communitysponsored program, the JSS became a source of endless irrita- tion to parents and guardians who had to contribute to building and equipping JSS workshops. There was also the concern

that the JSS system would ultimately lead to an unfair distribution of educational resources because wealthier communities were likely to provide better facilities than those in poorer

areas. Finally, it was argued that the JSS program did not challenge students enough because, unlike the former Middle

School Leaving Certificate Examinations, all students writing

the Basic Certificate of Education Examination conducted for

the JSS received certificates of participation. The validity of

these arguments, as well as the long-term impact of the new

structure and content of education on the nation's development, remained to be demonstrated in the early 1990s.

Adult Education

A mass literacy campaign was started in 1951 as part of an

overall community development program. The primary aim

124
The Society and Its Environment

was to teach adults to read and write in their own languages as well as in English. Efforts continued during the 1950s and the

1960s, and in the 1970s an extensive literacy campaign was launched under the direction of the Ministry of Labor and

Social Welfare using mass education teams. Literacy classes for

adults were also conducted by local units of the Peoples' Education Association, a voluntary organization founded in 1949.

This group, which included teachers, graduates, students, and

interested persons, had branches throughout the country.

Despite such organizational efforts, it was estimated by the

United Nations in 1970 that about 70 percent of the nation's

inhabitants above the age of fifteen (57 percent of males and

82 percent of females) were illiterate. The 1970 figure was a 5

percent improvement over an estimated 1960 adult literacy

rate of 25 percent.

Responding to the continued high level of illiteracy in the

country, the government established the Institute of Adult

Education in 1970 at the University of Ghana. The Institute was

to furnish resident tutorial staff drawn from universities, colleges, and secondary schools to teach a wide range of classes in

different parts of the country The Institute also organized an annual New Year School attended by leading educators, government officials, and numerous social welfare organizations.

At such times, the achievements of the Institute as well as the

future direction of adult education in Ghana were assessed.

During the 1989 New Year School held at the University of

Ghana, for example, the relationship between adult education

and economic development was emphasized in a speech read

by Flight Lieutenant Jerry John Rawlings, the head of state. Also in 1989, reliable press reports held that the adult literacy rate in Ghana was about 40 percent of the total population; of

the 60 percent of the population that was illiterate, 57 percent was female. Even though the 1989 figure was an improvement

over that of 1970, the National Council on Women and Development still expressed concern and described the low percentage of literate adult females as alarming. The council

attributed female illiteracy to high dropout rates in the ele- mentary schools and called on the government to find ways to enforce compulsory education in the country (see The Position of Women, this ch.). Despite such calls for educational

improvement, there was little reason to believe that the situation with respect to literacy had changed significantly by the

mid-1990s.

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Ghana: A Country Study

As part of an effort to improve the overall awareness of

women's education, various nursing and para-medical associations organized drama troupes as a means of instructing illiter- ate as well as rural women about the importance of nutrition,

of child care, of family planning, and of sending their children

to school. In the early 1990s, the impact of such activities on

the nation's literacy rate could not yet be assessed.

Information on the geography of Ghana appears in a variety

of sources. E.A. Boateng's A Geography of Ghana, published in

1966, is probably the most valuable. Basic archaeological data are in publications by Timothy F. Garrard, Kwaku EffahGyamfi, David Kiyaga-Mulindwa, Merrick Posnansky, Peter L. Shinnie, and L.B.Crossland. Kwamina Dickson's A Historical

Geography of Ghana and James Anquandah's Rediscovering

Ghana's Past are recommended as good reconstructions of

Ghana's past.

Ethnographic information on the peoples of Ghana may be

found in the works of Robert Sutherland Rattray, KwabenaJ.H.

Nketia, Kwesi Yanka, Kofi Abrefa Busia, Minion Morrison, Margaret J. Field, Jack Goody, and Marion Johnson. For more

recent information, see M.E. Kropp Dakubu's The Languages of

Ghana.

Much of the recent literature on Ghana describes changes in

traditional society as it adjusts to the contemporary world.

These often focus on the position of chiefs in relation to the

modern state. Kofi Abrefa Busia's The Position of the Chief in the Modern Political System ofAshanti, A. Adu Boahen's Ghana: Evolution and Change in the Nineteenth and Twentieth Centuries, and

Kwame Arhin's Traditional Rule in Ghana: Past and Present are among the most impressive. Also significant is Peter K. Sarpong's Ghana in Retrospect: Some Aspects of Ghanaian Culture. An

extensive bibliography on the cultural environment of the

country can be found in E.Y. Amedekey's The Culture of Ghana:

A Bibliography.

Population figures on Ghana and other statistical information can be found in the Quarterly Digest ofStatistics published by

the Government of Ghana, Statistical Service. The same office

also published the Preliminary Report on the 1984 Census. For

complete bibliographical information on the country's census

figures, see Population of Ghana: An Annotated Bibliography,

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The Society and Its Environment

1980-1988, published by the Regional Institute for Population

Studies at the University of Ghana. Excellent sources on

women and on economic and social developments include the

works of such scholars as Claire Robertson, Christine Oppong,

Mason Oppenheim, and Gwendolyn Mikell. (For further information and complete citations, see Bibliography.)

127

Chapter 3. The Economy
Gold weight in theform of a striking scorpion (Asante)
GHANA'S ECONOMY HAS LEFT an indelible imprint on the

country's social and political structures. Just as the presence of

gold gave rise to the Asante confederacy and empire and

attracted European traders and colonial rulers, so, too, were modern-day politicians moved to try to protect the country's

wealth by establishing the first socialist regime in twentieth-century Africa. As the ambitious plans initiated by Ghana's first president, Kwame Nkrumah, unraveled in the late 1960s, however, military officers seized control of the country and promised to overturn what they perceived as a corrupt ruling class enriching itself from the nation's coffers. In the 1980s, military

and civilian officials failed to revive the economy through strin- gent anti-corruption measures and embarked instead upon a restructuring of the economy.

The transformation of Ghana's economy undertaken in the

1980s was considered a test case for "structural adjustment"

prescriptions advocated by international banking institutions.

Faced with growing impoverishment in Africa as well as in

much of the so-called developing world, the World Bank and

the International Monetary Fund proposed radical programs

to revive troubled economies and to restore their productivity.

The government ofJerryJohn Rawlings turned to these agencies in 1983 and accepted their recommendations in exchange

for assistance packages to ease Ghana's economic and social

transformation. Foremost among the changes enacted in

Ghana were the disengagement of the government from an

active role in the economy and the encouragement of free-market forces to promote the efficient and productive development of local resources. The reformers cut government

budgets, privatized state enterprises, devalued the currency,

and rebuilt industrial infrastructure by means of assistance programs. As in other countries of Africa in the 1980s, government

was identified as the problem, and free-market forces were seen

as the solution.

By the 1990s, the effects of structural adjustment in Ghana

were beginning to be assessed. According to the World Bank

and other Western financial institutions, the economy had

become much more stable, and production was on a more

solid footing than it had been a decade earlier. Exports were

up, government deficits had been reduced, and inflation was

131
Ghana: A Country Study

down. Many Ghanaians, however, questioned whether the

structural adjustment benefited all Ghanaians or just a few sec- tors of the economy. Critics of the World Bank charged, moreover, that it concentrated on infrastructure such as airports,

roads, and other macro-economic projects that did little to improve the lives of the average Ghanaian.

Under the sway of free-market forces, production had

increased in Ghana's traditionally strong sectors, cocoa and

gold, thereby reverting to the pre-independence economic

structure; still, a more broadly based economy had not developed. In addition, substantial loans had been incurred by the

government to promote those sectors—at the expense of cur- rent budget expenditures such as health and education—without a compensatory increase in government revenues.

Ironically, the tax breaks prescribed to encourage these sectors worked against increased government revenues, so that by

1992 tax revenues began to drop. In addition, jobs not only

had been cut from the once bloated public sector but also had

not expanded in the more successful export sectors. Although

the government claimed its finances were much healthier in

the 1990s than in the 1980s, the long-term economic and social

impact of structural adjustment was uncertain.

Relying heavily on the exploitation of some non-renewable

and even endangered resources, Ghana's economy will have to expand to create a broader and better balanced economy. In

addition to cocoa, Ghana's leading export commodities are

gold, a non-renewable resource, and timber, the harvesting of

which has included more than eighteen endangered species of

trees and has led to alarming deforestation. Furthermore,

Ghana's ocean waters are seriously overfished, leading the government to ban the catching of shellfish.

According to the government, Ghana's resources could be

used to develop local manufacturing, the goal Nkrumah tried to reach through direct state intervention thirty years ago.

Local manufacturing could create jobs, cut the import bill, and

provide a more diversified economic base. The question for

Ghana is whether free-market forces will be more successful in

promoting healthy economic expansion than the failed policies of direct state intervention.

Historical Background

Endowed with gold and oil palms and situated between the

trans-Saharan trade routes and the African coastline visited by

132
The Economy

successive European traders, the area known today as Ghana

has been involved in all phases of Africa's economic development during the last thousand years. As the economic fortunes

of African societies have waxed and waned, so, too, have

Ghana's, leaving that country in the early 1990s in a state of

arrested development, unable to make the "leap" to Africa's

next, as yet uncertain, phase of economic evolution.

As early as the thirteenth century, present-day Ghana was drawn into long-distance trade, in large part because of its gold

reserves. The trans-Saharan trade, one of the most wide-ranging trading networks of pre-modern times, involved an

exchange of European, North African, and Saharan commodities for the products of the African savannas and forests, including gold, kola nuts, and slaves. Present-day Ghana, named the

Gold Coast by European traders, was an important source of

the gold traded across the Sahara. Centralized states such as Asante controlled prices by regulating production and marketing of this precious commodity (see The Pre-Colonial Period,

ch. 1). As European navigational techniques improved in the

fifteenth century, Portuguese and later Dutch and English trad- ers tried to circumvent the Saharan trade by sailing directly to

its southernmost source on the West African coast. In 1482 the

Portuguese built a fortified trading post at Elmina and began

purchasing gold, ivory, and pepper from African coastal merchants.

Although Africans for centuries had exported their raw

materials—ivory, gold, kola nuts—in exchange for imports

ranging from salt to foreign metals, the introduction of the

Atlantic slave trade in the early sixteenth century changed the

nature of African export production in fundamental ways (see

Arrival of the Europeans, ch. 1). An increasing number of Ghanaians sought to enrich themselves by capturing fellow Africans

in warfare and selling them to slave dealers from North America and South America. The slaves were transported to the

coast and sold through African merchants, using the same

routes and connections through which gold and ivory had for- merly flowed. In return, Africans often received guns as payment, which could be used to capture more slaves and, more

importantly, to gain and preserve political power.

An estimated ten million Africans, at least half a million

from the Gold Coast, left the continent in this manner. Some

economists have argued that the slave trade increased African

economic resources and therefore did not necessarily impede

133
Ghana: A Country Study

development, but others, notably historian Walter Rodney,

have argued that by removing the continent's most valuable

resource—humans—the slave trade robbed Africa of unknown

invention, innovation, and production. Rodney further argues

that the slave trade fueled a process of underdevelopment,

whereby African societies came to rely on the export of

resources crucial to their own economic growth, thereby precluding local development of those resources. Although some

scholars maintain that the subsequent economic history of this region supports Rodney's interpretation, no consensus exists

on this point. Indeed, in recent years, some historians not only

have rejected Rodney's interpretation but also have advanced

the notion that it is the Africans themselves rather than an

array of external forces that are to blame for the continent's

economic plight.

When the slave trade ended in the early years of the nineteenth century, the local economy became the focus of the so- called legitimate trade, which the emerging industrial powers

of Europe encouraged as a source of materials and markets to aid their own production and sales. The British, in particular,

gained increasing control over the region throughout the nineteenth century and promoted the production of palm oil and

timber as well as the continuation of gold production. In

return, Africans were inundated with imports of consumer

goods that, unlike the luxuries or locally unavailable imports of

the trans-Saharan trade, quickly displaced African products,

especially textiles. In 1878 cacao trees were introduced from the Americas.

Cocoa quickly became the colony's major export; Ghana produced more than half the global yield by the 1920s. African

farmers used kinship networks like business corporations to spread cocoa cultivation throughout large areas of southern

Ghana. Legitimate trade restored the overall productivity of

Ghana's economy; however, the influx of European goods

began to displace indigenous industries, and farmers focused

more on cash crops than on essential food crops for local con- sumption.

When Ghana gained its independence from Britain in 1957,

the economy appeared stable and prosperous. Ghana was the

world's leading producer of cocoa, boasted a well-developed

infrastructure to service trade, and enjoyed a relatively

advanced education system. At independence, President

Kwame Nkrumah sought to use the apparent stability of the

134
The Economy

Ghanaian economy as a springboard for economic diversification and expansion. He began the process of moving Ghana

from a primarily agricultural economy to a mixed agriculturalindustrial one. Using cocoa revenues as security, Nkrumah

took out loans to establish industries that would produce

import substitutes as well as process many of Ghana's exports.

Nkrumah's plans were ambitious and grounded in the desire to reduce Ghana's vulnerability to world trade. Unfortunately, the

price of cocoa collapsed in the mid-1960s, destroying the fundamental stability of the economy and making it nearly impossible for Nkrumah to continue his plans. Pervasive corruption

exacerbated these problems. In 1966 a group of military offic- ers overthrew Nkrumah and inherited a nearly bankrupt country.Since 1966 Ghana has been caught in a cycle of debt, weak

commodity demand, and currency overvaluation, which has

resulted in the decay of productive capacities and a crippling

foreign debt. Once the price of cocoa fell in the mid-1960s,

Ghana obtained less of the foreign currency necessary to repay

loans, the value of which jumped almost ten times between

1960 and 1966. Some economists recommended that Ghana

devalue its currency, the cedi (£; for value of the cedi—see

Glossary), to make its cocoa price more attractive on the world

market, but devaluation would also have rendered loan repayment in United States dollars much more difficult. Moreover,

such a devaluation would have increased the costs of imports,

both for consumers and nascent industries.

Until the early 1980s, successive governments refused to devalue the currency (with the exception of the government of

Kofi Abrefa Busia, which devalued the cedi in 1971 and was

promptly overthrown). Cocoa prices languished, discouraging cocoa production altogether and leading to smuggling of exist- ing cocoa crops to neighboring countries, where francs rather

than cedis could be obtained in payment. As production and

official exports collapsed, revenue necessary for the survival of

the economy was obtained through the procurement of further

loans, thereby intensifying a self-destructive cycle driven by

debt and reliance on vulnerable world commodity markets.

By the early 1980s, Ghana's economy was in an advanced

state of collapse. Per capita gross domestic product (GDP—see Glossary) showed negative growth throughout the 1960s and

fell by 3.2 percent per year from 1970 to 1981. Most important

was the decline in cocoa production, which fell by half between

135
Ghana: A Country Study

the mid-1960s and the late 1970s, drastically reducing Ghana's

share of the world market from about one-third in the early

1970s to only one-eighth in 1982-83. At the same time, mineral

production fell by 32 percent; gold production declined by 47

percent, diamonds by 67 percent, manganese by 43 percent,

and bauxite by 46 percent. Inflation averaged more than 50

percent a year between 1976 and 1981, hitting 116.5 percent in

1981. Real minimum wages dropped from an index of 75 in

1975 to one of 15.4 in 1981. Tax revenue fell from 17 percent

of GDP in 1973 to only 5 percent in 1983, and actual imports

by volume in 1982 were only 43 percent of average 1975-76 levels. Productivity, the standard of living, and the government's

resources had plummeted dramatically.

In 1981 a military government under the leadership of

Flight LieutenantJerry John Rawlings came to power. Calling

itself the Provisional National Defence Council (PNDC), the

Rawlings regime initially blamed the nation's economic problems on the corruption of previous governments. Rawlings soon discovered, however, that Ghana's problems were the

result of forces more complicated than economic abuse. Following a severe drought in 1983, the government accepted

stringent International Monetary Fund (IMF—see Glossary)

and World Bank (see Glossary) loan conditions and instituted

the Economic Recovery Program (ERP).

Signaling a dramatic shift in policies, the ERP fundamentally

changed the government's social, political, and economic orientation. Aimed primarily at enabling Ghana to repay its foreign debts, the ERP exemplified the structural adjustment

policies formulated by international banking and donor insti- tutions in the 1980s. The program emphasized the promotion

of the export sector and an enforced fiscal stringency, which

together aimed to eradicate budget deficits. The PNDC fol- lowed the ERP faithfully and gained the support of the international financial community. The effects of the ERP on the

domestic economy, however, led to a lowered standard of living

for most Ghanaians.

Overview of the Current Economy

In the early 1990s, Ghana's economic recovery still appeared

uneven and was geared primarily to the export rather than

domestic market. GDP had risen by an average of 5 percent per

year since 1984, inflation had been reduced to about 20 percent, and export earnings had reached US$1 billion. Most pro136
The Economy

duction came from the export sector, and by the 1992-93 crop

year, cocoa production surpassed 300,000 tons, placing Ghana

third in the world. In 1990 exports of minerals—primarily gold

but also diamonds, manganese, and bauxite—brought in

US$234 million, an increase of 23.2 percent from the year

before (see fig. 7). Nevertheless, salaries were low, and because

the cost of public services continued to rise, Ghana's poor bore

the brunt of the negative effects of the austerity program.

Despite devaluations by the Rawlings regime and rising

exports, the government has been unable to fulfill a key stabili- zation goal of reducing the trade and current account deficits. To stimulate production in various sectors, the government has

incurred loans to finance imports of necessary inputs such as machinery, fertilizer, and petroleum. As a result, the country's

foreign debt exceeded US$4 billion in 1991. According to World Bank estimates, the country's debt continued to rise in

1992, and was equivalent to almost 63 percent of gross national

product (GNP—see Glossary). In 1992 the debt service ratio

(debt service as a proportion of exports) was 27 percent, an improvement over late 1980s levels, which averaged as high as 62.5 percent. To cover the deficits that result from loans and

increased imports, the government came to rely on rising levels of foreign aid, with net aid disbursements increasing to an esti- mated US$550 million by 1990. Unfortunately, foreign investment, compared with aid, was weak except in the mining

sector, and domestic savings were insufficient to finance the

country's ambitious development projects.

Government policies have produced mixed results in terms

of productivity and debt, and they have also incurred significant social costs through job elimination and reduced public

expenditure policies. The government has addressed this problem by launching a special initiative to create 40,000 jobs providing services to the poorest groups. Spending on health and

education also has increased as a proportion of GDP, but the

central government believes that major poverty alleviation can come only with even faster and higher economic growth.

Structure of the Economy

Most government efforts to restore the productivity of the

Ghanaian economy have been directed toward boosting the

country's exports. These policies, however, have had numerous

consequences. Following the initiation of the ERP in 1983 and

the devastating drought of 1983, Ghana's GDP has registered

137
Ghana: A Country Study

® National capital

Figure 7. Economic Activity, 1994

steady growth, most of it attributable to the export sector,

including cocoa and minerals and, to some extent, timber processing. The cost of this growth is apparent, however, in

Ghana's growing external debts, which have financed rehabilitation of the export sector, and in the country's steady rate of

inflation which has curbed consumer imports. The government has tried with limited success to avoid some of the country's historical pitfalls by broadening the range of both exports

138
The Economy

and trading partners. Nevertheless, prices for the goods that

most Ghanaians purchase have been rising faster than the

wages they receive for their work.

Gross Domestic Product

In current prices, Ghana's GDP rose from £511 billion in

1986 to £3 trillion in 1992. In constant 1987 prices, these GDP

figures amounted to £713 billion (US$4.62 billion) in 1986 and

£934 billion (US$6.06 billion) in 1992 (see table 6, Appendix).

During the 1980s, Ghana's economy registered strong

growth of approximately 5 percent per year because of a reversal in the steadily declining production of the previous decade.

Ghana's worst years were 1982 and 1983, when the country was

hit with the worst drought in fifty years, bush fires that

destroyed crops, and the lowest cocoa prices of the postwar

period. Growth throughout the remainder of the decade

reflected the pace of the economic recovery, but output

remained weak in comparison with 1970 production levels. The same was true of consumption, minimum wages, and

social services.

Growth fell off considerably in 1990 when another drought

caused real GDP growth to decline by nearly two percentage

points. Government estimates claimed that real GDP growth in

1993 was 6.1 percent, which reflected a recovery in cocoa out- put and an increase in gold production. At the same time,

gross domestic fixed investment rose from 3.5 percent of the

total in 1982 to 12.9 percent in 1992. The share of public con- sumption in GDP fell from a peak of 11.1 percent in 1986 to 9.9 percent in 1988, but appeared to have risen again to 13.3

percent in 1992.

Significant changes have taken place in the structure of

GDP since the ERP began. Agriculture continues to be the bedrock of Ghana's economy, accounting for more than 48 percent of GDP in 1991. Agriculture's long-term importance has

declined, however, in favor of that of industry, the contribution

of which to GDP more than doubled from 1988 to 1991, when

it constituted almost 16 percent of GDP, and in favor of services, the contribution of which was 35.3 percent in 1991. Notable changes have also occurred within the broader sectors: cocoa's share rose from 5.6 percent in 1983 to 9.5 percent in

1991; manufacturing's contribution increased from 3.9 percent

to 8.7 percent; and construction output from 1.5 percent to 3.5

percent (see fig. 8; table 7, Appendix).

139
Ghana: A Country Study

Debt and Inflation

ERP policies during the 1980s resulted in increased external

debts as well as in relatively high inflation rates (see table 8,

Appendix). Most ERP projects were funded by foreign loans,

notably from the IMF. At the same time, the government

repeatedly devalued the country's currency to raise producer

prices for exports and to encourage production, but devaluation also led to price rises on all other goods as well. ERP

attempts to promote production have, at least in the short

term, resulted in higher debts and inflation.

World Bank figures show that Ghana's total external debt

exceeded US$4 billion by 1991; this figure rose to nearly

US$4.3 billion in 1992. The external deficit and requirements

for repayments on principal were met through additional

loans. The debt figures revealed a strong reliance on official

creditors, who accounted for about 92 percent of public disbursed debt, and on concessional funding, which approached

60 percent of total external debt in 1992. In addition, Ghana

began to borrow on international capital markets in 1991. Nevertheless, the country's debt service ratio fell at an annual aver- age of 25 percent in 1991 and 1992, reflecting repayment of

large IMF obligations and the ending of the government's use of IMF funding at the end of 1991. An additional factor was

debt cancellation by a number of leading bilateral creditors

totaling US$1.5 billion since 1989.

In the early 1990s, the government was unable to reduce

high inflation significantly. Although down from the staggering

levels of the early 1980s when inflation hit 123 percent because

of drought, inflation in the following six years averaged almost

30 percent. Recovery in agricultural output in 1984 and 1985

helped shrink inflation rates, but a marginal decline in food

production in 1986 was accompanied by an upward trend in

inflation. For the next four years, ever higher food prices,

driven by devaluation, contributed greatly to high inflation. By

late 1994, the country's inflation rate stood at about 28 percent. Trade

The promotion of Ghana's foreign trade has been central to

all government plans to revive the economy since 1983. Under

the ERP, export-producing industries received the most direct

support; they also received the most indirect support through

140
The Economy

the improvement of their proximate infrastructure. By promoting exports, the government sought to obtain foreign

exchange essential to repay debts and to ease the country's

restrictions on imports. Imports, of course, are also necessary

to upgrade many of the export industries hamstrung for lack of

equipment.

Prior to 1983, economic conditions conspired to erode the

terms of trade to such an extent that Ghanaians had reverted

to smuggling goods across the borders as well as to trading on

the black market on a significant scale. Ghanaians who had

anything to sell could multiply their earnings by selling their

goods in French-speaking countries, especially neighboring

Cote d'lvoire, and then changing the resultant francs into cedis

at black-market rates. Smuggling cut down the amount of foreign exchange available for official transactions, leading to a reduction in imports, which hit manufacturing enterprises

dependent on imported equipment and raw materials especially hard. As a result, many consumer goods were no longer

available in Ghana, which further boosted smuggling across borders of those countries where such goods could be

obtained. By 1982 the World Bank estimated that transactions

on the parallel, or black, market constituted 32.4 percent of all domestic trade.

Since the start of the ERP in 1983, the government has introduced several policies to adjust the pattern of Ghana's trade

structure. These include devaluing the currency as well as rais- ing producer prices for crucial exports such as cocoa to offset

the advantages of smuggling such goods across borders. In

addition, the government introduced an interbank foreign

exchange market to facilitate currency exchange. To ease the

importation of essential capital goods, but not necessarily con- sumer goods, the government revised and reduced numerous

import duties and trade taxes. By the early 1990s, government efforts had resulted in the

restoration of many of Ghana's historical trade relationships.

Exports were again dominated by cocoa, which earned US$280

million in 1993. Other significant export commodities in 1993 were gold (US$416 million) and timber (US$140 million), fol- lowed by electricity, diamonds, and bauxite. Ghana's nontraditional exports, such as furniture, cola nuts, and pineapples,

have also increased significantly. On the import side, fuel and

energy, mainly oil, accounted for 16 percent of 1990 imports,

followed by capital goods, 43 percent; intermediate goods, 28

141
Ghana: A Country Study

GDP1 1991 = $ 2.6 billion 2 OTHER

4.3 %

TRANSPORTATION AND

COMMUNICATIONS

4.5 %

MINING

1 .8 %

GOVERNMENT

SERVICES

9.4 %

MANUFACTURING

8.7 %

GDP at current prices. ELECTRICITY CONSTRUCTION

AND WATER 3.5 %

2.0 %

For value of the Ghanaian cedi-see Glossary.

Source: Based on information from Economist Intelligence Unit, Country Profile: Ghana,

1994-95, London, 1994, 16. Figure 8. Gross Domestic Product (GDP) by Sector, 1991

percent; and consumer goods, 10 percent, according to the

World Bank.

In addition to supporting traditional export industries such

as cocoa and gold, the government also attempted to diversify

the content of Ghana's exports. To encourage nontraditional

exports in the fishing and agriculture sectors, the government

offered to refund 95 percent of import duties on goods destined for reexport and even to cancel sales taxes on manufactured goods sold abroad. In addition, the government devised

a scale of tax rebates ranging from 20 percent to 50 percent

determined by the volume of total production that was

exported. These incentives generated considerable response.

By 1988 more than 700 exporters were dealing in 123 export

products, the major items being pineapples, marine and fish

products (especially tuna), wood products, aluminum products, and salt. By 1990, the last year for which figures were avail142
The Economy

able, the value of nontraditional exports had risen to US$62

million.

In 1992 the government's Ghana Export Promotion Council

announced a plan to raise nontraditional exports to US$335

million by 1997 through increased market research, trade missions, trade fairs and exhibitions, and training. Among its most

ambitious specific targets were increases in tuna and shrimp

sales to US$45 million and US$32 million, respectively, by

1995, and increases in pineapple sales to US$12.5 million. In

the manufacturing sector, wood products, aluminum goods,

and processed rubber were targeted to yield US$44 million,

US$42 million, and US$23 million, respectively. Earnings from

salt were projected to rise to US$20 million.

In the early 1990s, Ghana continued to trade primarily with

the European Community, particularly Britain and Germany.

Britain continued to be the principal market for Ghanaian

cocoa beans, absorbing approximately 50 percent of all cocoa

beans exported. In 1992, Germany was the single most important destination of Ghana's exports, accounting for some 19

percent of all exports. Britain was next, accounting for about

12 percent, followed by the United States, 9 percent, and

Japan, 5 percent. The same year, Britain supplied approximately 20 percent of Ghana's imports, followed by Nigeria,

which provided 11 percent. The United States and Germany

were third and fourth, respectively.

Ghana also belongs to the sixteen-member Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), founded in 1975

with headquarters in Abuja, Nigeria. ECOWAS is designed to promote the cultural, economic, and social development of its component states. To achieve these ends, ECOWAS seeks to

foster regional cooperation in several areas, including removal

of barriers to the movement of peoples and trade, harmonization of agricultural policies, improvements in infrastructure,

and, as of 1991, renewed commitment to democratic political

processes and non-aggression against member states. Ghana also has a number of barter trade agreements with

several East European countries, China, and Cuba. Under the

agreements, imports of goods and services are paid for mainly

by cocoa from Ghana. A major change occurred in 1991 when

the German Democratic Republic (GDR, or East Germany)

abrogated its barter trade agreement with Ghana following the

union of the two Germanies. In spite of this, agreement was

reached between the two countries to honor existing commit143
Ghana: A Country Study

merits. In late 1991, the Ghanaian government showed

renewed interest in trade with the countries of Eastern Europe

following the adoption of free-market systems in the wake of

political upheavals in those countries. Ghanaian trade officials expect that the barter trade system will give way to open market

operations.

Role of the Government

In the 1990s, the government continued to play a decisive

role in the direction and pace of economic development in

Ghana. Under the Economic Recovery Program initiated in

1983, the Rawlings government tried to shift the burden of eco- nomic growth from government to the private sector through a dual strategy of cutting government spending and promoting

private production. In particular, the government tried to boost export production through currency devaluations, tax

incentives, and government-funded development projects. At

the same time, budget deficits were almost entirely wiped out. These measures caused drastic cutbacks in current government

spending and widespread privatization, while the government

incurred further loans (and thereby debt) to balance the country's budget.

The Economic Recovery Program

In 1983 the government launched the Economic Recovery

Program (ERP) under the guidance of the World Bank and the

IMF. The overriding purpose of the ERP was to reduce Ghana's

debts and to improve its trading position in the global econ- omy. The stated objectives of the program focused on restoring

economic productivity at minimum cost to the government

and included the following policies: lowering inflation through

stringent fiscal, monetary, and trade policies; increasing the

flow of foreign exchange into Ghana and directing it to priority sectors; restructuring the country's economic institutions;

restoring production incentives; rehabilitating infrastructure

to enhance conditions for the production and export of goods;

and, finally, increasing the availability of essential consumer

goods. In short, the government hoped to create an economic

climate conducive to the generation of capital.

The ERP was carried out in roughly three phases. Beginning

in 1983, the government focused on reducing its expenditures

while creating incentives for private production. Initial expen144
The Economy

diture cuts and improved tax collection brought the budget

deficit down from 6.3 percent of GDP in 1982 to 0.1 percent by

1986, relieving government pressure on the banking system,

while a series of cedi devaluations boosted export activity. During the second phase, which lasted from 1987 to 1989, the government moved to divest itself of many assets through

privatization and to institute radical foreign exchange reforms

to devalue the cedi further. Although privatization was sluggish, the hard-currency black market was nearly eliminated

with the introduction of foreign exchange bureaus in 1988. In

the ERP's third phase, the government intensified monetary

reforms and reduced private corporate taxes to boost private- sector growth.

By the end of 1991, ERP efforts had improved the country's

international financial reputation because of its ability to make

loan repayments (although not wipe out foreign debt) and its first entry onto the international capital market in almost two

decades. Critics maintained, however, that the ERP had failed

to bring about a fundamental transformation of the economy,

which still relied on income earned from cocoa and other agricultural commodities. Critics also contended that many Ghanaians had seen few, if any, benefits from the program.

In addition to its focus on stabilizing the country's financial

structure, the ERP also aimed to promote production, especially in the export sectors. In 1986 the government began to rebuild infrastructure through a US$4.2 billion program, more

than half of which was provided by external sources. This

amount was divided roughly equally among infrastructure

repair, energy imports (oil for machinery), and export industries. Increased imports financed by the IMF, the World Bank,

and other sources made possible the rehabilitation and repair

of some key parts of the infrastructure through the supply of

spare parts and inputs for industry, mining, utilities, and agriculture.

Although the ERP was geared primarily toward restoring the

country's international economic standing, it came under popular criticism inside Ghana for ignoring the plight of those not

involved in the export sector. The overwhelming shift in resources was toward cocoa rehabilitation and other export

sectors, not toward food production. Government employees,

especially those in state enterprises, were actively targeted, and

many lost their jobs. Farmers suffered as the percentage of the

total budget devoted to agriculture fell from 10 percent in 1983

145
Ghana: A Country Study

to 4.2 percent in 1986 and to 3.5 percent in 1988, excluding

foreign aid projects. Although cocoa contributed less to Ghana's GDP than food crops, cocoa nonetheless received 9

percent of capital expenditures in the late 1980s; at the same

time, it received roughly 67 percent of current agricultural

expenditures because of its export value.

In response to criticism of such policies, the government ini- tiated the US$85 million Program of Action to Mitigate the

Social Costs of Adjustment (PAMSCAD). Beginning in 1988,

the program sought to create 40,000 jobs over a two-year

period. It was aimed at the poorest individuals, small-scale miners and artisans in particular, and communities were to be

helped to implement labor-intensive self-help projects.

As part of PAMSCAD, £10 billion was slated in the 1993 budget for the rehabilitation and development of rural and urban

social infrastructure. The new program, organized through

PAMSCAD and the new district assemblies, was designed to focus on improving water supply, sanitation, primary education, and health care. An additional 051 billion was set aside for

redeployment and end-of-service benefits for those who had

lost their jobs in civil service and parastatal reorganizations.

In the early 1990s, the government was committed to con- tinuing the policies of the ERP. New agreements were con- cluded with the World Bank to continue credit arrangements

on condition that Ghana review and revise its various economic

laws and regulations and support private-sector development.

In particular, the government agreed to revise or to repeal

existing laws and regulations affecting private investment that

undermine the spirit of deregulation, economic liberalization,

and exchange-rate reforms. The government also agreed to develop and to strengthen the institutional framework that

would facilitate private investment. Key priorities for 1992 and

afterward included giving new impetus to state enterprise

reform, broadening the scope of banking-sector reforms, liber- alizing the administrative framework, and strengthening public-sector management. Basic education and primary health- care services were to receive attention over the long term as

well. State Enterprises

State-owned enterprises in Ghana date to the colonial

period and especially to the post-World War II era. For example, the British organized a number of public utilities, such as

146
Craftsmen making canefurniture in Accra

CourtesyJames Sanders

water, electricity, postal and telegraph services, rail and road

networks, and bus services. To foster exports of coffee, palm

kernels, and cocoa, the Agricultural Produce Marketing Board

was founded in 1949. In addition, the colonial government

established the Industrial Development Corporation and the

Agricultural Development Corporation to promote industries

and agriculture. In the mid-1970s, the National Redemption

Council under L K. Acheampong also emphasized state enterprises. The Acheampong government established a number of

new enterprises and partly or wholly nationalized a number of

foreign-owned companies, including Ashanti Goldfields Corporation and Consolidated African Selection Trust. Intermittent efforts to improve performance and efficiency often led to the transferral of duties and functions to alternative state bodies but not to the wholesale privatization of ownership rights

and assets. By the 1980s, state enterprises were suffering along with

most businesses in Ghana, but they were also held to blame for

the economy's general condition. In particular, many were

heavily subsidized and were draining much of the country's

domestic loan capital. Under pressure from the World Bank

and in accordance with the principles of the ERP, in 1984 the

147
Ghana: A Country Study

government began to sell state enterprises to private investors,

and it initiated the State-Owned Enterprise Reform Program in

1988.

In 1984 there were 235 state enterprises in Ghana. The government announced that twenty-two sensitive enterprises

would not be sold, including major utilities as well as transport,

cocoa, and mining enterprises. In 1988 thirty-two were put up

for sale, followed by a further forty-four in 1990 under what was termed the Divestiture Implementation Committee. By December 1990, thirty-four enterprises had been either partially or

totally divested. Four were sold outright, a further eight were

partially sold through share issues, and twenty-two were liquidated. Divestiture of fifteen additional enterprises was also

underway, and by 1992 plans were afoot to privatize some of

the nation's banks.

Joint ventures were set up for four enterprises, including two

state mining companies, Prestea Goldfields and Ghana Consolidated Diamonds. In 1992 the Divestiture Implementation

Committee considered resource-pooling programs to enable

smaller domestic investors to buy up state enterprises. Such

pooling would accelerate the program, but more importantly,

it would enable the Provisional National Defence Council

(PNDC) to deflect charges that it was auctioning off the

nation's assets to foreigners.

The government also introduced a performance monitoring

and evaluation system to improve state enterprise productivity

and efficiency as well as to provide incentives for strong performers and disincentives for weak performers. By 1989 fifteen

enterprises had responded positively, turning a combined pretax loss of 0418 million from the previous year into pre-tax

profits of ^19 billion, following a 9 percent cut in costs and a 30

percent increase in sales. In early 1992, the chairman of the

State Enterprises Commission announced that the government

would pass legislation requiring state-owned enterprises to register as limited liability companies by 1993 to stimulate competition and to improve their performances.

Budgets

Major policies of the ERP and conditions of IMF funding

were that the budget deficit be reduced and that resources be

directed from current to capital spending. Consequently, the

government achieved a budget surplus each year between 1986

and 1989 and simultaneously boosted the percentage of spend148
The Economy

ing for development projects. During the mid-1980s, budget

deficits as a percentage of GDP consistently declined, falling

from 4.7 percent in 1982 to 2.7 percent in 1983 to 0.3 percent

in 1987. To accomplish this, the government cut spending and

reversed its budgetary priorities, raising capital investment at the expense of increased current consumption in order to promote future growth. The government allocated 62 percent of

the budget to physical infrastructure and about 33 percent to the country's productive sector. At the same time, spending on

social programs, including health, education, and welfare,

declined drastically to between 4.7 and 5 percent. As a percentage of GDP, expenditures on health care fell from 1.2 percent

in 1970 to 0.26 percent in 1980-83; during the same period,

spending on education dropped from 3.9 percent to 0.85 percent. The 1993 budget, consistent with ERP policies and objectives, aimed to stimulate private-sector growth through lowering taxes on commerce and corporations and by internally

balancing accounts. The previous budget reduced the tax rate for commerce, printing, and publishing businesses from 50

percent to 35 percent, bringing these sectors into line with

agriculture, manufacturing, real estate, construction, and ser- vices, the taxes on which were cut in 1991.

Relief for the financial sector was less generous. The tax rate was reduced from 50 percent to 45 percent to encourage more

lending and better terms for borrowers and to reduce the 8

percent to 9 percent gap between deposit and lending rates of

interest. The government also reduced the withholding tax on

dividends from 15 percent to 10 percent, in line with 1991 cuts from 30 percent. The annual standard personal exemption for

individual taxpayers was set at £150,000 (US$380), up from the

previous £126,000. This figure reflected a 19 percent increase,

1 percent above Ghanaian inflation the previous year. The top

marginal rate of tax was raised from 25 percent to 35 percent,

payable on earnings over £14 million, compared with the previ- ous level of £3 million. Finally, import taxes were reduced or abolished, including duties and sales taxes on all building

materials. The super sales tax on luxury goods, introduced in

1990, was also abolished. A maximum rate of 10 percent was set on such imports.

Tax evasion and corruption, both of which are rampant

throughout Ghana, severely affected the government's ability to collect taxes in all categories. In December 1993, the Ghana149
Ghana: A Country Study

ian parliament passed the Serious Fraud Office Bill. This act empowered the Serious Fraud Office to investigate fraud and

embezzlement crimes against the state. Despite this action, it is unlikely that the authorities will be able to stop tax evasion or other white-collar crimes anytime soon. Reform of the tax base and prudent fiscal management contributed to budget surpluses and dramatically reduced government recourse to the banking sector. By the early 1990s,

nonetheless, Ghana still relied heavily on external grants to achieve its twin goals of running balanced budgets and increasing necessary capital expenditures (see table 9, Appendix).

Moreover, compared with the rest of sub-Saharan Africa, total

government revenue as a proportion of GDP continued to be

relatively low. It was less than 16 percent in 1990 (including

grants), compared with an average of 19 percent for subSaharan Africa as a whole. In 1993 revenue raising efforts

aimed to secure income equivalent to 22.2 percent of GDP.

By 1992 the government's financial position had weakened.

From 1986 to 1991, government finances were in surplus. In

1992, however, tax receipts from all sources of revenue were

below projected levels, and with national elections in view, the

government relaxed its tight controls on spending. Despite

inclusion of foreign funding as a source of revenue, the deficit

for 1992 was estimated at £177 billion but fell to £119 billion in

1993. To rectify the situation, the government proposed to raise taxes on gasoline, kerosene, diesel fuel, and liquefied

petroleum gas by as much as 60 percent.

Banking and Currency

Control of money-supply growth and liquidity management

have been among the ERP's most difficult tasks, and expansion

generally exceeded targets for most of the 1980s. The initial

phase of monetary policy (1983-86) focused on reducing government borrowing from the domestic banking system and on

using quantitative controls via credit ceilings. Although these

succeeded in reducing domestic credit growth, larger than

expected foreign earnings and the money market's inability to process them efficiently contributed to a rapid expansion in

the broad money supply until the late 1980s.

The subsequent introduction of more dynamic monetary

policies in 1989 involved a phase-in of indirect controls and

market-based policy instruments. A further series of measures was introduced in 1990 to strengthen the responsiveness of

150
The Economy

interest rates to changes in liquidity conditions. There followed

a phased increase in the Bank of Ghana's rediscount rate from

26 percent to 35 percent by mid-1991, the introduction of

three- and five-year instruments later that year, and a widening

of access to Bank of Ghana financial instruments in favor of the

non-bank financial sector. The policies were quite effective.

Money supply growth was brought convincingly under control

in 1990 and 1991; however, a decline in interest rates and in

monetary control, compounded by salary increases in the public sector, prompted monetary growth in 1992.

In January 1994, the Bank of Ghana relaxed its monetary

policy. As a result, the government's 91-day treasury bill discount rate was lowered five percentage points to 27 percent.

The interest rate equivalent of the discount rate fell from 34.78

percent to 28.95 percent. Savings deposit rates also fell in

December 1993 from 17.5-22 percent to 15-22 percent. The

wider range suggests competition for funds in the banking

market. The range for longer-term money (two-year) declined

from 22-32 percent to 25.2-28 percent.

Banking

Ghana has a well-developed banking system that was used

extensively by previous governments to finance attempts to develop the local economy. By the late 1980s, the banks had

suffered substantial losses from a number of bad loans in their

portfolios. In addition, cedi depreciation had raised the banks'

external liabilities. In order to strengthen the banking sector,

the government in 1988 initiated comprehensive reforms. In

particular, the amended banking law of August 1989 required

banks to maintain a minimum capital base equivalent to 6 percent of net assets adjusted for risk and to establish uniform

accounting and auditing standards. The law also introduced

limits on risk exposure to single borrowers and sectors. These

measures strengthened central bank supervision, improved the

regulatory framework, and gradually improved resource mobilization and credit allocation.

Other efforts were made to ease the accumulated burden of

bad loans on the banks in the late 1980s. In 1989 the Bank of

Ghana issued temporary promissory notes to replace non-performing loans and other government-guaranteed obligations

to state-owned enterprises as of the end of 1988 and on private- sector loans in 1989. The latter were then replaced by interestbearing bonds from the Bank of Ghana or were offset against

151
Ghana: A Country Study

debts to the bank. Effectively, the government stepped in and

repaid the loans. By late 1989, some £62 billion worth of non- performing assets had been offset or replaced by central bank

bonds totaling about £47 billion.

In the early 1990s, the banking system included the central

bank (the Bank of Ghana), three large commercial banks

(Ghana Commercial Bank, Barclays Bank of Ghana, and Standard Chartered Bank of Ghana), and seven secondary banks.

Three merchant banks specialized in corporate finance, advisory services, and money and capital market activities—Merchant Bank, Ecobank Ghana, and Continental Acceptances;

the latter two were both established in 1990. These and the

commercial banks placed short-term deposits with two discount houses set up to enhance the development of Ghana's

domestic money market—Consolidated Discount House and

Securities Discount House, established in November 1987 and

June 1991, respectively. At the bottom of the tier were 100 rural

banks, which accounted for only 5 percent of the banking sys- tem's total assets. By the end of 1990, banks were able to meet the new capital

adequacy requirements. In addition, the government

announced the establishment of the First Finance Company in

1991 to help distressed but potentially viable companies to

recapitalize. The company was established as part of the financial sector adjustment program in response to requests for eas- ier access to credit for companies hit by ERP policies. The

company was a joint venture between the Bank of Ghana and

the Social Security and National Insurance Trust. Despite offering some of the highest lending rates in West

Africa, Ghana's banks enjoyed increased business in the early

1990s because of high deposit rates. The Bank of Ghana raised

its rediscount rate in stages to around 35 percent by mid-1991,

driving money market and commercial bank interest rates well

above the rate of inflation, thus making real interest rates substantially positive. As inflation decelerated over the year, the

rediscount rate was lowered in stages to 20 percent, bringing

lending rates down accordingly.

At the same time, more money moved into the banking sys- tem in 1991 than in 1990; time and savings deposits grew by 45

percent to £94.6 billion, and demand deposits rose to £118.7

billion. Loans also rose, with banks' claims on the private sector up by 24.1 percent, to £117.4 billion. Banks' claims on the central government continued to shrink in 1991, falling to a mere

152
The Economy

£860 million from £2.95 billion in 1990, a reflection of continued budget surpluses. Claims on nonfinancial public enterprises rose by 12.6 percent to £27.1 billion.

Foreign bank accounts, which were frozen shortly after the

PNDC came to power, have been permitted since mid-1985, in a move to increase local supplies of foreign exchange. Foreign

currency accounts may be held in any of seven authorized

banks, with interest exempt from Ghanaian tax and with trans- fers abroad free from foreign-exchange control restrictions.

Foreign-exchange earnings from exports, however, are specifically excluded from these arrangements.

The Ghana Stock Exchange began operations in November

1990, with twelve companies considered to be the best performers in the country. Although there were stringent minimum investment criteria for registration on the exchange, the

government hoped that share ownership would encourage the

formation of new companies and would increase savings and

investment. After only one month in operation, however, the

exchange lost a major French affiliate, which reduced the start- ing market capitalization to about US$92.5 million.

By the end of 1990, the aggregate effect of price and volume

movements had resulted in a further 10.8 percent decrease in

market capitalization. Trading steadily increased, however, and

by mid-July 1992, 2.8 million shares were being traded with a value of £233 million, up from 1.7 million shares with a value of

£145 million in November 1991. The market continued to be

small, listing only thirteen companies, more than half in retail- ing and brewing. In June 1993, Accra removed exchange control restrictions and gave permission to non-resident

Ghanaians and foreigners to invest on the exchange without

prior approval from the Bank of Ghana. In April 1994, the

exchange received a considerable boost after the government

sold part of its holdings in Ashanti Goldfields Corporation.

Currency

One of the most pressing economic problems faced by all postindependence Ghanaian governments was the overvaluation of the currency. In 1961 Ghana broke with the British

pound sterling and pegged the value of the cedi to the United

States dollar. As Ghana's terms of trade worsened in the 1960s,

the real value of the cedi fell; however, successive governments

feared either to float the cedi or to adjust its value, thereby rais- ing the cost of imports and consumer prices. The overthrow of

153
Ghana: A Country Study

the Kofi A. Busia regime in 1971, following the introduction of

a devaluation package, reinforced the unpopularity of such a move. The Acheampong government reversed course and

revalued the cedi. It also increased the money supply to pay

Ghana's debts, leading to a sharp divergence between the offi- cial and the real rates of exchange.

The overvalued cedi, on the one hand, and low, regulated

prices for commodities, on the other, led to a robust smuggling

industry and to an extensive black market in currency. It became common practice for Ghanaians, especially those liv- ing along the country's border, to smuggle Ghanaian produce

such as cocoa and minerals into neighboring francophone

countries. After selling on the local market, Ghanaians would

then return home and trade their hard-currency Central Afri- can francs for cedis on the black market, making handsome

profits. Smuggling and illegal currency operations had become

so extensive by 1981 that the black-market rate for cedis was 9.6

times higher than the official rate, up from 1.3 in 1972. At the same time, reliable estimates placed transactions in the parallel

economy at fully one-third of Ghana's GDP.

Fifteen months after the PNDC came to power, in April

1983, the government began efforts to devalue the cedi. Rawlings introduced a system of surcharges on imports and bonuses

on exports that effectively devalued the currency because the

surcharges on imports amounted to 750 percent of the amount

being spent and the discounts on exports amounted to 990

percent. Further, an official devaluation began in October

1983 in which the exchange rate reached £90 to US$1 by

March 1986. By 1993, £720 equaled US$1; by late 1994, £1,023

equaled US$1.

In September 1986, the government sought alternative

methods for establishing the value of the cedi. At that time, the

government relinquished its direct role in determining the

exchange rate. The rate was instead determined at regular cur- rency auctions under the pressure of market forces on the basis

of a two-tier exchange-rate system, with one rate for essentials

and another for non-essentials. In April 1987, the two auctions were unified. In subsequent reforms also designed to diminish

smuggling and illegal currency dealings, private foreignexchange bureaus were permitted to trade in foreign currencies beginning at the end of March 1988. By July 1989, there were 148 such bureaus operating, ninety-nine in Accra and

154
The Economy

thirty in Ashanti Region, with the remainder in other urban

centers. In 1987, US$207 million was allocated through the auction;

and in 1988, US$267 million. By comparison, the foreignexchange bureaus in the first year of operation, ending in

March 1989, traded US$77 million worth of foreign currency, or about one-fourth the amount of foreign exchange allocated

through the auction. Initially, prices at the auction and those at the foreign-exchange bureaus differed greatly. Efforts to

reduce the difference, however, brought the gap from 29 percent in March 1988 to approximately 6 percent by February

1991. In early 1992, the auction was closed, although no official

announcement was made. Purchasers were referred to the

Bank of Ghana, which used an exchange rate determined

largely on the basis of market forces.

The government also successfully slowed growth in the

money supply. In the late 1980s, the average annual growth

rate reached 61 percent. By 1990 it had dropped to 13.3 percent but then accelerated slightly to 16.7 percent, standing at £317 million the following year. In 1991 the Bank of Ghana

introduced a £1,000 note, the highest denomination issued

since independence in 1957. Previously, the highest denomination had been £500. A total of £50 billion of the new notes was

printed.

Labor Force

Despite the revival of the export sector, most Ghanaians con- tinued to find employment with the government or to rely on

informal employment for their livelihood. An increasing number of Ghanaians also turned to smuggling or to crime to earn

a living. Reductions in the number of government workers had

not been offset by increased employment in the export sector by the early 1990s. At the same time, wages had not kept up

with the cost of living. The government also sought to reform

the education system, because increased education often led to better jobs and higher wages. However, because students were

expected to bear an increasing portion of the cost of their education, it was unlikely that the poorest Ghanaians would be

able to take full advantage of the school system.

National Requirements

Although the Ghanaian labor force grew throughout the

155
Ghana: A Country Study

TRANSPORTATION AND ASR£ce-TMv ' COMMUNICATIONS l"UHtb 1 HY' 5.1 %

MINING

7.1%

MANUFACTURING

14.2%

FINANCE AND

BUSINESS SERVICES

5.1 %

ELECTRICITY,

WATER, AND GAS

2%

DOMESTIC TRADE

AND CATERING

4.9 %

CONSTRUCTION

5.4 %

AND FISHING

8.8 %

Source: Based on information from Ghana, Statistical Service, Quarterly Digest of

Statistics, Accra, December 1991, Table 42. Figure 9. Employment by Sector, 1988

1980s, the structure of employment remained relatively stable

(see fig. 9). Between 1981 and 1988, the official number of

workers grew by almost 100,000. Despite efforts under the ERP

to stimulate private production, public-sector jobs still accounted for more than 80 percent of total employment over

the decade. Employment in the public sector rose every year

between 1981 and 1985 (from 175,700 to 397,100), but thereafter fell three years in a row, standing at 251,500 in 1988. By

1992 the number of public-sector workers had grown to an esti- mated 595,000, although some 55,000 had been declared

redundant.

Considering the relative importance of public-sector

employment, ERP policies to reduce the scope of state enterprises had a profound impact on patterns of unemployment.

In the mid-1980s, cutbacks at the Ghana Cocoa Board (20,000

jobs), the Ghana National Trading Corporation (2,000 jobs),

and the shipping enterprise, the Black Star Line (1,000 jobs),

contributed to nearly 30,000 job losses in the parastatal sector

156
The Economy

alone by the end of 1986. The civil service lost an estimated

15,000 jobs in the same period. In 1990 fifteen of the remaining state-owned enterprises reduced their payrolls by about

13,000 employees; no figures were available for losses resulting

from the liquidation of an additional twenty-two state enterprises that year. Although ERP policies resulted in the loss of many jobs for

Ghanaians, their implementation met relatively minor resistance from organized labor. The most serious challenge came

in 1986 on the issue of income rather than that of layoffs. The

unions threatened action in response to the government's decision (under pressure from the IMF) to abolish leave allowances, a crucial benefit that substantially supplemented low

public-sector wages. In response, the government reversed its decision and revised the 1986 budget. After that, the government stepped up taxes on allowances and, in some cases, con- solidated them into wages and salaries. Meanwhile, the

unemployed continued to express concern over the slow materialization of end-of-service payments. In response, the 1992

budget contained proposals for packages comprising down

payments, shares in profitable state-owned enterprises, and

interest on deferred payments.

Income and Wages

During the 1980s, per capita income rose slightly but was overshadowed by the increased cost of living. Per capita

income climbed from the decade low of US$340 in 1983 to US$400 by 1988 because of the devaluation of the cedi and ris- ing producer prices. The same factors, however, worked to increase consumer prices four-fold from 1985 to 1988. This

trend continued throughout the early 1990s as consumer

prices rose from 393.2 in 1990 to 634.7 in 1993 based on a 1985

price index of 100.

Real wages and salaries are estimated to have fallen by an enormous 83 percent between 1975 and 1983 and to have con- tinued to fall through 1989, forcing many workers to seek additional sources of income. The level of real wages reached in

1988 was less than half that attained in the mid-1970s; nevertheless, the government was committed under the ERP to holding down inflation and, hence, wages. In the 1990 budget, the

government linked pay increases to productivity, inflation, and

companies' ability to pay. With some exceptions, notably a one- time allowance for civil servants to compensate for increased

157
Ghana: A Country Study

fuel and transport costs in 1990, public-sector wages increased

roughly in line with projected inflation in 1989, 1990, and

1991. In 1992, however, the government, which had scheduled

elections late in the year, granted a salary increase to publicsector workers. Although no recent data were available for the

private sector, wage increases under collective bargaining

arrangements appeared to have been relatively modest.

Although increases in the minimum daily wage under the

PNDC appear spectacular, they are linked to the steady devaluation of the cedi and have not overcome a constant erosion of

worker purchasing power. Beginning in April 1984, the government increased the minimum daily wage to 035, then to 070 in

January 1985, £90 in January 1986, and 0122 in 1987. In March

1990, the minimum wage was raised to 0218, and by August

1991, it had risen to 0460, an increase of 111 percent as agreed

to by the government, the Trade Union Congress, and the

Ghana Employers Association.

In the face of popular elections and increasing strikes, the

government agreed to massive pay raises at the end of 1992,

including a 70 percent increase for nurses. Overall, civil service

pay raises added more than 050 billion to the wage bill, reaching 0175 billion in 1992, or 50 percent of government revenue. At the same time, the government moved to contain the wage

bill by freezing staff recruitment in public-sector organizations

as well as state salaries that exceeded those in the civil service.

Agriculture

Agriculture is Ghana's most important economic sector,

employing more than half the population on a formal and

informal basis and accounting for almost half of GDP and

export earnings. The country produces a variety of crops in

various climatic zones, which range from dry savanna to wet

forest and which run in east-west bands across the country.

Agricultural crops, including yams, grains, cocoa, oil palms,

kola nuts, and timber, form the base of Ghana's economy.

Although Nkrumah attempted to use agricultural wealth as a springboard for the country's overall economic development,

Ghanaian agricultural output has consistently fallen since the

1960s. Beginning with the drop in commodity prices in the late 1960s, farmers have been faced with fewer incentives to produce as well as with a general deterioration of necessary infrastructure and services. Farmers have also had to deal with

increasingly expensive inputs, such as fertilizer, because of

158
The Economy

overvaluation of the cedi. Food production has fallen as well,

with a decline in the food self-sufficiency ratio from 83 percent

in 1961-66 to 71 percent in 1978-80, coupled with a four-fold

increase in food imports in the decade prior to 1982. By 1983,

when drought hit the region, food shortages were widespread,

and export crop production reached an all-time low

When the Rawlings government initiated the first phase of

the ERP in 1984, agriculture was identified as the economic

sector that could rescue Ghana from financial ruin. Accordingly, since that time, the government has invested significant

funds in the rehabilitation of agriculture. Primarily through

the use of loans and grants, the government has directed capital toward repairing and improving the transportation and dis- tribution infrastructure serving export crops. In addition,

specific projects aimed at increasing cocoa yields and at developing the timber industry have been initiated. Except for specific development programs, however, the government has

tried to allow the free market to promote higher producer

prices and to increase efficiency.

Although the government was criticized for focusing on

exports rather than on food crops under the ERP, by the early

1990s the PNDC had begun to address the need to increase

local production of food. In early 1991, the government

announced that one goal of the Medium Term Agricultural

Development Program 1991-2000 was to attain food self-suffi- ciency and security by the year 2000. To this end, the government sought to improve extension services for farmers and to improve crop-disease research. Despite the statements con- cerning the importance of food crops, however, the plan was

still heavily oriented toward market production, improvement

of Ghana's balance-of-payments position, and provision of

materials for local industrial production. Furthermore, following World Bank guidelines, the government planned to rely

more heavily on the private sector for needed services and to reduce the role of the public sector, a clear disadvantage for

subsistence producers. In particular, industrial tree crops such

as cocoa, coffee, and oil palm seedlings were singled out for

assistance. Clearly, agricultural sectors that could not produce

foreign-exchange earnings were assigned a lower priority

under the ERP.

The government attempted to reduce its role in marketing

and assistance to farmers in several ways. In particular, the

Cocoa Marketing Board steadily relinquished its powers over

159
Ghana: A Country Study

pricing and marketing. The government, furthermore, established a new farmers' organization, the Ghana National Association of Farmers and Fishermen, in early 1991 to replace the

Ghana Federation of Agricultural Cooperatives. The new organization was to be funded by the farmers themselves to operate

as a cooperative venture at the district, regional, and national

levels. Although the government argued that it did not want to be accused of manipulating farmers, the lack of government

financial support again put subsistence producers at a disadvantage.

Cocoa

Cocoa production occurs in the forested areas of the country—Ashanti Region, Brong-Ahafo Region, Central Region,

Eastern Region, Western Region, and Volta Region—where

rainfall is 1,000-1,500 millimeters per year. The crop year

begins in October, when purchases of the main crop begin,

while the smaller mid-crop cycle starts in July. All cocoa, except

that which is smuggled out of the country, is sold at fixed prices

to the Cocoa Marketing Board. Although most cocoa production is carried out by peasant farmers on plots of less than

three hectares, a small number of farmers appear to dominate

the trade. Indeed, some studies show that about one-fourth of

all cocoa farmers receive just over half of total cocoa income.

In 1979 the government initiated reform of the cocoa sector, focusing on the government's role in controlling the industry through the Cocoa Marketing Board. The board was

dissolved and reconstituted as the Ghana Cocoa Board (Cocobod). In 1984 it underwent further institutional reform aimed

at subjecting the cocoa sector to market forces. Cocobod's role was reduced, and 40 percent of its staff, or at least 35,000

employees, was dismissed. Furthermore, the government

shifted responsibility for crop transport to the private sector. Subsidies for production inputs (fertilizers, insecticides, fungicides, and equipment) were removed, and there was a measure

of privatization of the processing sector through at least one

joint venture. In addition, a new payment system known as the

Akuafo Check System was introduced in 1982 at the point of

purchase of dried beans. Formerly, produce-buying clerks had

often held back cash payments, abused funds, and paid farmers

with false checks. Under the Akuafo system, a farmer was given

a check signed by the produce clerk and the treasurer that he

could cash at a bank of his choice. Plantation divestiture pro160
The Economy

ceeded slowly, however, with only seven of fifty-two plantations

sold by the end of 1990.

Although Ghana was the world's largest cocoa producer in

the early 1960s, by the early 1980s Ghanaian production had

dwindled almost to the point of insignificance. The drop from

an average of more than 450,000 tons per year to a low of

159,000 tons in 1983-84 has been attributed to aging trees,

widespread disease, bad weather, and low producer prices. In

addition, bush fires in 1983 destroyed some 60,000 hectares of cocoa farms, so that the 1983-84 crop was barely 28 percent of

the 557,000 tons recorded in 1964-65. Output then recovered

to 228,000 tons in 1986-87. Revised figures show that production amounted to 301,000 tons in 1988-89, 293,000 tons in

1990-91, and 305,000 tons in 1992-93. After declining to

255,000 tons in 1993-94, the crop was projected to return to the 300,000 ton range in 1994-95.

In the early 1990s, Cocobod continued to liberalize and to

privatize cocoa marketing. The board raised prices to producers and introduced a new system providing greater incentives

for private traders. In particular, Cocobod agreed to pay traders a minimum producer price as well as an additional fee to cover the buyers' operating and transportation costs and to provide some profit. Cocobod still handled overseas shipment

and export of cocoa to ensure quality control.

In addition to instituting marketing reforms, the government also attempted to restructure cocoa production. In 1983

farmers were provided with seedlings to replace trees lost in

the drought and trees more than thirty years old (about one- fourth of the total number of trees in 1984). Until the early

1990s, an estimated 40 hectares continued to be added each

year to the total area of 800,000 hectares under cocoa production. In addition, a major program to upgrade existing roads

and to construct 3,000 kilometers of new feeder roads was launched to ease the transportation and sale of cocoa from

some of the more neglected but very fertile growing areas on

the border with Cote d'lvoire. Furthermore, the government

tried to increase Ghana's productivity from 300 kilograms per

hectare to compete with Southeast Asian productivity of almost

1,000 kilograms per hectare. New emphasis was placed on

extension services, drought and disease research, and the use of fertilizers and insecticides. The results of these measures

were to be seen in rising cocoa production in the early 1990s.

161
Ghana: A Country Study

Other Commercial Crops

The main industrial crops are oil palms, cotton, rubber,

sugar cane, tobacco, and kenaf, which is used in the production of fiber bags. None is of strategic economic importance,

and all, apart from oil palms, have suffered as a result of the

country's economic difficulties. Despite claims that such crops

could assist local industrialization efforts, the government has

not focused the same attention on this sector as on export

crops. For example, sugar cane output has diminished with the

closure of the country's two sugar mills, which produced

237,000 tons per year in 1974-76, but only 110,000 tons in

1989.

The government has actually encouraged the export rather

than the local processing of rubber, rehabilitating more than

3,000 hectares of plantations specifically for export production

rather than revitalizing the local Bonsa Tire Company, which

could produce only 400 tires per day in 1988 despite its installed capacity for 1,500 per day.

By the 1990s, the tobacco sector was expanding and moving

toward higher export production. Ghana's dark-fired leaf probably grows too fast and requires too rich a soil to compete effectively with rival crops, but the potential for flue-cured and

Burley varieties is good. Pricing difficulties had reduced

tobacco production from 3,400 tons in the early 1970s to an

estimated 1,433 tons in 1989. Output began to improve in

1990, however, reaching 2,080 tons. The Leaf Development Company was established in 1988 to produce tobacco leaf for the local market and to lay the basis

for a future export industry. In 1991 the company's first commercial crop amounted to 300 tons of flue-cured, 50 tons of

Burley, and 50 tons of dark-fired tobacco (all green-leaf

weights), of which 250 tons were exported, earning

US$380,000. In 1991 Rothmans, the British tobacco company,

acquired a 49.5 percent stake in the company and took over management of the Meridian Tobacco Company in partnership with the state-owned Social Security and National Insur- ance Trust. Another firm, the Pioneer Tobacco Company,

announced a 92 percent increase in post-tax profits of more

than <t\ billion for 1991. The company declared dividends

worth £360 million, double the amount paid out in 1990.

Cotton production expanded rapidly in the early and mid1970s, reaching 24,000 tons in 1977, but it fell back to onethird of this figure in 1989. Since the reorganization of the

162
Felling timber. Forestry is one of Ghana's major industries

and sources of exports.

Preparing a field for planting yams

Courtesy Embassy of Ghana, Washington

163
Ghana: A Country Study

Ghana Cotton Development Board into the Ghana Cotton

Company, cotton production has steadily increased from 4 percent of the country's national requirement to 50 percent in

1990. Between 1986 and 1989, Ghana saved US$6 million

through local lint cotton production. The company expected

that between 1991 and 1995, about 20,000 hectares of land

would be put under cotton cultivation, enabling Ghana to produce 95 percent of the national requirement.

Food Crops and Livestock

The main food crops are corn, yams, cassava, and other root

crops. Despite government efforts to encourage farmers to switch to production of staples, total food production fell by an

average of 2.7 percent per year between 1971-73 and 1981-83.

By 1983 Ghana was self-sufficient in only one staple food

crop—plantains. Food imports rose from 43,000 tons in 1973

to 152,000 tons in 1981.

There were various reasons for this poor performance,

including growing urbanization and a shift in consumer prefer- ence from starchy home-grown staples to rice and corn. However, farmers also suffered from shortages of production

inputs, difficulties in transporting produce to market, and

competition from imported foods that were underpriced

because of the vastly overvalued cedi. Weather also played a major part, particularly in 1983, when drought cut cereal production from 518,000 tons in 1982 to only 450,000 tons at a time when an extra million people had to be fed after the

expulsion of Ghanaians from Nigeria. Food imports in 1982-83

amounted to 115,000 tons (40 percent as food aid), with the

1983-84 shortfall estimated at 370,000 tons (of which food aid

commitments covered 91,000 tons).

There was a spectacular improvement beginning in 1984,

mainly because of recovery from the prior year's drought. By

1988 the agricultural sector had vastly expanded, with food

crops responsible for the bulk of the increase. Drought conditions returned in 1990, bringing massive falls in the production

of all food crops apart from rice, but better weather and

improved production brought prices down in 1991.

In August 1990, the government moved to liberalize the agricultural sector, announcing the end of minimum crop prices.

The measure's impact was difficult to gauge because higher

production meant more food was available at better prices anyway. The government's medium-term plan, outlined in 1990,

164
The Economy

sought to raise average crop yields and to increase food security, with special attention to improved producer incentives and

storage facilities. Livestock production is severely limited by the incidence of

the tsetse fly in Ghana's forested regions and by poor grazing

vegetation elsewhere. It is of major importance only in the relatively arid north and has not been earmarked for special treat- ment in Ghana's recovery program. In 1989 there were an

estimated 1.2 million cattle, 2.2 million sheep, 2 million goats,

550,000 pigs, and 8 million chickens in Ghana.

Forestry

Forests cover about one-third of Ghana's total area, with

commercial forestry concentrated in the southern parts of the

country. This sector accounted for 4.2 percent of GDP in 1990;

timber was the country's third largest foreign-exchange earner. Since 1983 forestry has benefited from more than US$120 million in aid and commercial credits and has undergone substantial changes, resulting in doubled earnings between 1985 and

1990. In 1993 timber and wood products earnings totalled

US$140 million against a targeted level of US$130 million.

Between January and November 1994, exports amounted to 919,000 tons and earned US$212 million.

Until the 1980s, forestry production suffered because of the

overvalued cedi and deterioration of the transportation infrastructure. Log production declined by 66 percent during

1970-81 and sawed timber by 47 percent. Exports fell from

US$130 million in 1973 to US$15 million in 1983, and four

nationalized firms went bankrupt during that period.

The forestry sector was given a large boost in 1986, mainly

because of the World Bank's US$24 million timber rehabilitation credit, which financed imports of logging equipment. As a consequence, log production rose 65 percent in 1984-87, and

export revenues rose 665 percent in 1983-88. Furthermore,

the old Ghana Timber Marketing Board was disbanded and

replaced by two bodies: the Timber Export Development

Board, responsible for marketing and pricing; and the Forest

Products Inspection Bureau, responsible for monitoring contracts, maintaining quality standards, grading products, and

acting as a watchdog for illegal transactions. Some of the exter- nal financing underwrote these institutional changes, while

much of the rest financed forestry management and research

165
Ghana: A Country Study

as well as equipment for logging, saw milling, and manufacturing.

The sector, however, faced several problems. The most

important was severe deforestation. A century ago, Ghana's

tropical hardwood forest extended from about the middle of

the country southward to the sea. Moreover, nearly half the

country was covered with forests, which included 680 species of

trees and several varieties of mahoganies. Most of this wood has

been cut. By the early 1990s, only about one-third of the country was still forested, and not all of this was of commercial

value. This situation has forced the government to make diffi- cult choices between desperately needed hard currency earn- ings and conservation. The Forest Resource Management

Project, part of the ERP, was initiated in 1988, and in 1989 the

government banned log exports of eighteen species. The government later extended the list and imposed high duties on

other species, planning to phase out log and air-dried timber

exports altogether by 1994.

Instead, the government hoped to increase sales of wood

products to replace earnings from logs. Government figures

showed that one cubic meter of lumber and plywood was worth

more than twice as much as the same amount of logs; veneers earned five times as much; and other products, such as furniture and floorings, earned six times the price of an equivalent

volume of logs. Improvements in the processing sector caused

wood products (excluding lumber) to rise to about 20 percent

of export earnings in 1991, accounting for 6.9 percent of volume exports. By comparison, wood products represented 11

percent of earnings and 5.5 percent of volume in 1985. The fall in the proportion of volume sales accounted for by logs was accompanied by a dramatic fall in their share in earnings, from

50-60 percent in the mid-1980s to 23 percent in 1990.

By the early 1990s, there were approximately 220 lumber

processors in Ghana, but the industry operated under several

constraints. Most overseas demand is for kiln-dried products,

and Ghanaian manufacturers lack sufficient kilns to meet that

demand. The cheap air-dried processing method is not satisfac- tory because air-dried wood tends to destabilize over time. For- eign investment incentives are not so attractive in this sector as in other sectors, for example, mining. Furthermore, infrastructure in the Western Region, where lumber processing is located, continues to be relatively neglected compared with

mining and cocoa production regions. Other difficulties

166
The Economy

include lack of expertise at technological and managerial levels.Scandals have been reported in Ghana's forestry industry

since 1986, and they erupted again in early 1992. The most

notable case involved African Timber and Plywood, once

Ghana's largest exporter of round logs. In the mid-1980s, the

government embarked on a US$36 million rehabilitation

project to boost the company's production. In 1992 as much as US$2.3 million was alleged to have been siphoned off from the

project through various malpractices, and a number of officials were arrested. Furthermore, the environmental group, Friends

of the Earth, alleged that there had been additional thefts by

numerous foreign companies totaling almost US$50 million in

hard currency during the 1980s. In 1992 the government

began investigating the activities of hundreds of companies,

both foreign and local, that were alleged to have entered into a range of illegal dealings, including smuggling, fraudulent

invoicing, violations of local currency regulations, corruption,

bribery, and nonpayment of royalties. The corruption is so widespread, however, that it is unlikely that the Ghanaian

authorities will stop timber-related crimes anytime soon.

Fishing

Fishing increased considerably in the late 1960s, from

105,100 tons of marine fish caught in 1967 to 230,100 tons in

1971. In 1982 the yield was 234,100 tons, composed of 199,100

tons of marine varieties and 35,000 tons of freshwater fish from

Lake Volta. The industry was hit by fuel shortages, inadequate

storage facilities, and the general economic difficulties of the

1970s and the 1980s. Nevertheless, by 1988 the fish catch was

302,900 tons; by 1991 it amounted to 289,675 tons, down from

more than 319,000 tons in 1990.

Large-scale poaching by foreign vessels has severely depleted

fish stocks in Ghana's 200-nautical-mile maritime Exclusive

Economic Zone, causing major government concern. The

most affected stocks are sea bottom-feeding fish. Tuna stocks

reportedly remain unaffected. A 1992 Ministry of Food and

Agriculture report recommended that the government acceler- ate mobilization of surveillance and enforcement units and

step up regulation of trawler fleets. That same year, the government passed a fisheries law to curb overfishing and to help protect the marine environment. Fishermen were banned from

catching specified shellfish, and all fishing vessel operators

167
Ghana: A Country Study

were required to obtain licenses. The law provided for a regulatory body—the Fisheries Monitoring, Control, Surveillance,

and Enforcement Unit—as well as a fisheries advisory council.

These organizations, however, both of which are underfunded

and undermanned, are unlikely to stop illegal fishing activities anytime soon. Mining and Petroleum Industries

Ghana's mineral sector had started to recover by the early

1990s after its severe decline throughout the 1970s. One indicator of the scale of decline was that by 1987, only four gold

mines were operating in Ghana, compared with eighty in 1938.

Throughout the 1970s, the output of gold, as well as bauxite,

manganese, and diamonds, fell steadily. Foreign-exchange

shortages inhibited mine maintenance, new exploration, and

development investment. The overvalued cedi and spiraling

inflation exacerbated mining companies' problems, as did

smuggling and the deteriorating infrastructure. Energy supplies failed to meet the industry's growing needs; foreignexchange shortages constrained oil imports, and domestically

generated hydroelectricity was unable to make up the shortfall. After 1983, however, the government implemented a series

of measures to enhance the sector's appeal. In 1986 new mining legislation for the gold and diamond sectors replaced the

previous complex and obsolete regulations, and a generous

incentives system was established that allowed for external for- eign-exchange retention accounts, capital allowances, and a

flexible royalties payment system. Since 1986 the sector has

benefited from a wave of fresh investment totaling US$540 million, and by the early 1990s mining was the country's second

highest foreign-exchange earner. Under legislation passed after 1983, the government liberalized and regularized the mining industry. For the first time, the

government made small claim-holding feasible, with the result

that individual miners sold increasing amounts of gold and diamonds to the state-operated Precious Minerals Marketing Corporation. In 1990 the company bought 490,000 carats of

diamonds and 20,000 ounces of gold and earned a total of

US$20.4 million through sales, 70 percent of it from diamond

sales and 30 percent from gold bought from small-scale operators. Diamond output totaled 688,000 carats in 1991 and

694,000 carats in 1992, while gold production amounted to 843,000 fine ounces in 1991 and 1,004,000 fine ounces in 1992.

168
The Economy

Furthermore, the government succeeded in attracting significant foreign investment into the sector and, by early 1991, had

signed more than sixty mining licenses granting prospecting

rights to international companies. To forestall domestic criti- cism of large-scale foreign control of the sector, the government announced in mid-1991 the establishment of a state- controlled holding company to buy shares in mines on behalf

of foreign investors.

Gold

Ghana has produced and exported gold for centuries. In

precolonial times, present-day Ghana was one source of the

gold that reached Europe via trans-Saharan trade routes. In the

fifteenth century, Portuguese sailors tried to locate and to control gold mining from the coast but soon turned to more easily

obtained slaves for the Atlantic slave trade. Most gold mining

before the mid-nineteenth century was alluvial, miners recover- ing the gold from streams. Modern gold mining that plumbs

the rich ore deposits below the earth's surface began about

1860, when European concessionaires imported heavy machinery and began working in the western areas of present-day

Ghana. The richest deposit, the Obuasi mine, was discovered

by a group of Europeans who sold their rights to E.A. Cade, the

founder of Ashanti Goldfields Corporation (AGC). Since the

beginning of the twentieth century, modern mining in the

Gold Coast has been pursued as a large-scale venture, necessitating significant capital investment from European investors.

Under British colonial rule, the government controlled

gold mining to protect the profits of European companies. The

colonial government also restricted possession of gold as well

as of mercury, essential in recovering gold from the ore in

which it is embedded. Following independence, foreign control of the sector was tempered by increasing government

involvement under the Nkrumah regime; however, production

began to decline in the late 1960s and did not recover for

almost twenty years. In the mid-1960s, many mines began to hit

poorer gold reefs. Despite the floating of the international

gold price in the late 1960s, few investors were willing to invest,

and the government failed to provide the capital necessary to expand production into new reefs. Of the two major gold mining enterprises, neither the State Gold Mining Corporation

nor AGC (40 percent controlled by the government) expanded

or even maintained production.

169
Ghana: A Country Study

Under the ERP, the mining sector was targeted as a potential source of foreign exchange, and since 1984, the government

has successfully encouraged the rejuvenation of gold mining.

To offer incentives to the mining industry, the Minerals and

Mining Law was passed in 1986. Among its provisions were generous capital allowances and reduced income taxes. The corporate tax rate was set at 45 percent, and mining companies could

write off 75 percent of capital investment against taxes in the

first year and 50 percent of the remainder thereafter. The government permitted companies to use offshore bank accounts

for service of loans, dividend payments, and expatriate staff

remuneration.

Companies are permitted to retain a minimum of 25 percent

of gross foreign-exchange earnings from minerals sales in their

accounts, a level that can be negotiated up to 45 percent.

Reconnaissance licenses are issued for one-year renewable periods, prospecting licenses are valid for three years, and mining

licenses are in force for up to thirty years. The government has

the right to 10 percent participation in all prospecting and to extend its share if commercial quantities of a mineral are dis- covered. In response, between 1985 and 1990, eleven companies became active with foreign participation, representing

investments totaling US$541 million. Since 1986 there has

been a gradual recovery in overall production.

More than 90 percent of gold production in the early 1990s

came from underground mines in western Ashanti Region,

with the remainder coming from river beds in Ashanti Region

and Central Region. AGC, the country's largest producer,

mined 62,100 fine ounces in January 1992, the highest monthly

production ever recorded since the company began operation

in 1897. The company also lowered its costs in relation to production during the last quarter of 1991 from 0.26 percent in

October to 0.24 percent in December. Production during the

company's fiscal year of October 1990 to September 1991 was

569,475 fine ounces, 42 percent more than the previous year's

figure of 400,757 fine ounces and the largest amount ever produced by the mine. The second largest amount produced was

533,000 fine ounces, produced in 1972.

AGC planned major expansions in the early 1990s funded by

World Bank loans. In early 1991, the corporation announced

the discovery of new reserves estimated at more than 8 million

ounces, in addition to its known reserves of 22.3 million

ounces. The new reserves include lower-grade and remnant

170
Production in a textile factory

Goldfields and processing plant at Obuasi, south ofKumasi

Courtesy Embassy of Ghana, Washington

171
Ghana: A Country Study

ores that the corporation had been unwilling to mine because

of high costs. AGC planned to lower costs through capitalintensive operations and a sharp reduction of labor costs. It also planned then to raise output from a projected 670,000 fine ounces for 1992 to more than 1 million fine ounces a year in

1995. The expansion was to be funded by an International

Finance Corporation loan package totaling US$140 million.

AGC was to put up the balance, estimated to exceed US$200

million.

AGC was not the only company to benefit from an upsurge

in production. Despite its increased production, the company's

overall share of the domestic gold market declined from 80

percent to 60 percent in the same period that other operators

entered the industry. Provisional figures for 1991 showed that

two new mines, Teberebie and Billiton Bogoso, produced

100,000 fine ounces each, while other companies, including

State Gold Mining Corporation, Southern Cross Mining Company, Goldenrae, Bonte, and Okumpreko, were stepping up

production.

Several other enterprises were on the drawing board or were about to open by mid-1992. The British company Cluff

Resources had raised US$10.2 million to finance a new mine at Ayanfuri. The company had been involved in exploration since

1987 and planned to produce as much as 50,000 ounces of

gold annually. A Canadian-Ghanaian joint-venture gold mine

and associated processing facilities was commissioned in mid1991 in Bogoso, western Ghana. Finally, in May 1992, a jointventure company was created to prospect for gold in the Aowin

Suamang district in Western Region. Shareholders in the new

company included the Chinese government (32.68 percent),

private investors in Hong Kong (32 percent), the Ghanaian

government (10 percent), and private Ghanaian interests.

In 1992 Ghana's gold production surpassed 1 million fine

ounces, up from 327,000 fine ounces in 1987. In March 1994,

the Ghanaian government announced that it would sell half of

its 55 percent stake in AGC for an estimated US$250 million,

which would then be spent on development projects. The

authorities also plan to use some of the capital from the stock

sale to promote local business and to boost national reserves. The minister of mines and energy dispelled fears that the stock

sale would result in foreign ownership of the country's gold

mines by saying that the government would have final say in all major stock acquisitions.

172
The Economy

Diamonds

The government also is trying to expand Ghana's diamondmining industry, which has produced primarily industrialgrade gems from alluvial gravels since the 1920s. More than 11

million carats of proven and probable reserves are located

about 110 kilometers northwest of Accra. The main producer is the state-owned Ghana Consolidated Diamonds (GCD), which

operates in the Birim River Basin. In the 1960s, the company

mined 2 million carats of diamonds a year, but annual production in 1991 amounted to only 146,000 carats. This downturn

resulted from technical problems and GCD's weak financial

position. Production from all mines came to 688,000 carats in

1991 and to 694,000 carats in 1992.

In the early 1990s, the government announced plans to

privatize its diamond-mining operations and to expand production. At Accra's invitation, De Beers of South Africa agreed

to undertake an eighteen-month feasibility study to determine

the extent of the Birim River Basin diamond reserves. The sur- vey was to cost US$1 million. A De Beers subsidiary will be the

operator and manager of GCD, while Lazare Kaplan International, a New York-based diamond polishing and trading company, will produce and market the diamonds.

In 1989 the government established the Precious Minerals

Marketing Corporation (PMMC) to purchase minerals from

small producers in an effort to stem diamond smuggling. Esti- mates suggested that as much as 70 percent of Ghana's diamonds was being smuggled out of the country in the mid1980s. In its first sixteen months of operation, the PMMC

bought 382,423 carats of diamonds and 20,365 ounces of gold

and sold 230,000 carats of diamonds worth US$8 million. The

corporation also earned £130 million in 1991 on its jewelry

operations, up 48 percent from the previous year, and it planned to establish joint marketing ventures with foreign

firms to boost sales abroad. Nevertheless, because of new complaints over raw gem sales, the government in March 1992

ordered an investigation into the operations of the state agency

and suspended its managing director.

Manganese

Ghana is one of the world's leading exporters of manganese;

however, only 279,000 tons were produced in 1992, compared

with the all-time high of 638,000 tons in 1974-75. Ghana has

173
Ghana: A Country Study

reserves exceeding 60 million tons, and considerable rehabilitation of the sector took place in the 1980s. Ghana National

Manganese Corporation's mine and the surrounding infrastructure were repaired, helping to raise production from a low

of 159,000 tons in 1983 to 284,000 tons in 1989 and 247,000

tons in 1990. The corporation earned US$20 million from its exports in 1991, up from US$11.6 million in 1989 and US$14.2

million in 1990. Approximately US$85 million was also

invested by private investors at the newly explored Kwesikrom

deposit.

Petroleum Exploration

Although commercial quantities of offshore oil reserves were discovered in the 1970s, by 1990 production was still negligible. In 1983 the government established the Ghana

National Petroleum Corporation (GNPC) to promote exploration and production, and the company reached agreements

with a number of foreign firms. The most important of these

permitted US-based Amoco to prospect in ten offshore blocks

between Ada and the western border with Togo. Petro Canada

International has prospected in the Tano River Basin and Diamond Shamrock in the Keta Basin. In 1989 three companies,

two American and one Dutch, spent US$30 million drilling

wells in the Tano basin. On June 21, 1992, an offshore Tano

basin well produced about 6,900 barrels of oil daily.

In the early 1990s, GNPC reviewed all earlier oil and gas dis- coveries to determine whether a predominantly local operadon might make exploitation more commercially viable. GNPC

wanted to set up a floating system for production, storage, off- loading, processing, and gas-turbine electricity generation,

hoping to produce 22 billion cubic feet per day, from which

135 megawatts of power could be generated and fed into the

national and regional grid. GNPC also won a contract in 1992

with Angola's state oil company, Sonangol, that provides for

drilling and, ultimately, production at two of Sonangol's off- shore oil fields. GNPC will be paid with a share of the oil. The country's refinery at Tema underwent the first phase of

a major rehabilitation in 1989. The second phase began in

April 1990 at an estimated cost of US$36 million. Once rehabilitation is completed, distribution of liquified petroleum gas will

be improved, and the quantity supplied will rise from 28,000 to 34,000 barrels a day Construction on the new Tema-Akosombo

oil products pipeline, designed to improve the distribution sys174
The Economy

tern further, began in January 1992. The pipeline will carry

refined products from Tema to Akosombo Port, where they will be transported across Lake Volta to northern regions. Distribution continues to be uneven, however. Other measures to improve the situation include a US$28 million project to set up

a national network of storage depots in all regions.

The Tema Lube Oil Company commissioned its new oil

blending plant, designed to produce 25,000 tons of oil per

year, in 1992. The plant will satisfy all of Ghana's requirements

for motor and gear lubricants and 60 percent of the country's

need for industrial lubricants, or, in all, 90 percent of Ghana's

demand for lubricant products. Shareholders include Mobil,

Shell, and British Petroleum (together accounting for 48 percent of equity), GNPC, and the Social Security and National

Insurance Trust. Manufacturing and Tourism

Manufacturing

At independence in 1957, the Nkrumah government

launched an industrialization drive that increased manufacturing's share of GDP from 10 percent in 1960 to 14 percent in

1970. This expansion resulted in the creation of a relatively

wide range of industrial enterprises, the largest including the

Volta Aluminum Company (Valco) smelter, saw mills and timber processing plants, cocoa processing plants, breweries,

cement manufacturing, oil refining, textile manufacturing

operations, and vehicle assembly plants. Many of these enterprises, however, survived only through protection. The overvalued cedi, shortages of hard-currency for raw materials and

spare parts, and poor management in the state sector led to stagnation from 1970 to 1977 and then to decline from 1977 to 1982.

Thereafter, the manufacturing sector never fully recovered,

and performance remained weak into the 1990s. Underutilization of industrial capacity, which had been endemic since the

1960s, increased alarmingly in the 1970s, with average capacity

utilization in large- and medium-scale factories falling to 21

percent in 1982. Once the ERP began, the supply of foreign

exchange for imported machinery and fuel substantially

improved, and capacity utilization climbed steadily to about 40

percent in 1989. Nevertheless, by 1987 production from the

175
Ghana: A Country Study

manufacturing sector was 35 percent lower than in 1975 and 26

percent lower than in 1980.

Ghana's record with industrialization projects since independence is exemplified by its experience with aluminum, the

country's most conspicuous effort to promote capital-intensive

industry. This venture began in the mid-1960s with the construction of a 1,186-megawatt hydroelectric dam on the lower

Volta River at Akosombo. Built with assistance from Britain, the

United States, and the World Bank, the Akosombo Dam was

the centerpiece of the Volta River Project (VRP), which the

Nkrumah government envisioned as the key to developing an

integrated aluminum industry based on the exploitation of

Ghana's sizable bauxite reserves and its hydroelectric potential.

Foreign capital for the construction of an aluminum smelter in

Tema was obtained from US-based Kaiser Aluminum, which

acquired a 90 percent share in Valco, and from US-based Reynolds Aluminum, which held a 10 percent share. Valco became

the principal consumer of VRP hydroelectricity, using 60 percent of VRP-generated power and producing up to 200,000

tons of aluminum annually during the 1970s.

Changing global economic conditions and severe drought

dramatically affected the Ghanaian aluminum industry during

the 1980s. The discovery of vast bauxite reserves in Australia

and Brazil created a global oversupply of the mineral and

induced a prolonged recession in the aluminum trade. Under

these conditions, Valco found it far more economical to import

semi-processed alumina fromJamaica and South Korea than to

rely on local supplies, despite the discovery in the early 1970s

of sizable new deposits at Kibi. Valco's refusal to build an aluminum production facility brought Kaiser and Reynolds into bit- ter conflict with the government.

Severe drought compounded the effects of unfavorable market conditions by reducing the electricity generating capacity

of the Akosombo Dam and by forcing a temporary shutdown of

the smelter from 1983 to 1985. Aluminum production was slow

to recover in the wake of the shutdown. In the early 1990s, aluminum production and exports continued to be negligible.

Drastic currency devaluation after 1983 made it exceptionally expensive to purchase inputs and difficult to obtain bank

credit, which hurt businessmen in the manufacturing sector. Furthermore, the ERP's tight monetary policies created liquidity crises for manufacturers, while liberalization of trade meant

that some enterprises could not compete with cheaper

176
The Economy

imports. These policies hurt industries beset by long recession,

hyperinflation, outmoded equipment, weak demand, and

requirements that they pay 100 percent advances for their own

inputs. Local press reports have estimated the closure of at

least 120 factories since 1988, mainly because of competitive

imports. The garment, leather, electrical, electronics, and

pharmaceuticals sectors have been particularly hard hit. In

1990, even the New Match Company, the only safety match

company in the country, closed.

ERP strategies made it difficult for the government to assist local enterprises. Committed to privatization and the rule of

free-market forces, the government was constrained from offering direct assistance or even from moderating some policies

that had an obviously detrimental impact on local manufacturers. Nevertheless, the Rawlings government initiated programs

to promote local manufacturing.

In 1986 the government established the Ghana Investment

Center to assist in creating new enterprises. Between 1986 and

1990, the vast majority of projects approved—444 of 621—were

in the manufacturing sector. Projected investment for the

approved ventures was estimated at US$138 million in 1989

and at US$136 million in 1990. In the initial phase, timber was

the leading sector, giving way in 1990 to chemicals. In 1991 the

government established an office to deal with industrial dis- tress in response to complaints that "unrestrained imports" of

foreign products were undermining local enterprises. The

1992 budget included assistance for local industrialists; £2 bil- lion was set aside as financial support for "deserving enterprises."

The dominant trends in manufacturing, nonetheless, were

the involvement of foreign capital and the initiation ofjoint

ventures. Significant new enterprises included a US$8 million

Taiwanese-owned factory, capable of turning out ten tons of

iron and steel products per hour, which began trials at Tema in

1989. Although approximately 500 projects had been approved

since the investment code came into force in 1985, almost half

had still not been launched by the end of 1989. Between 90

and 95 percent of the approved projects were joint ventures

between foreign and local partners, 80 percent of which were

in the wood industry. Restructuring of the sector was proceeding through divestiture, import liberalization, and promotion

of small-scale industries.

177
Ghana: A Country Study

Electric Power

In the early 1990s, Ghana's total generating capacity was about 1,187 megawatts, and annual production totalled

approximately 6 million kilowatt hours. The main source of

supply is the Volta River Authority with six 127-megawatt tur- bines. The authority's power plant at Akosombo provides the

bulk of all electricity consumed in Ghana, some 60 percent of

which is purchased by Valco for its smelter. The power plant

also meets most of the energy needs of Togo and Benin, which

amounted to an estimated equivalent of 180,000 tons of oil in

1991. The balance of Ghana's electricity is produced by diesel

units owned by the Electricity Corporation of Ghana, by mining companies, and by a 160-megawatt hydroelectric plant at Kpong, about forty kilometers downstream from Akosombo. A

third dam at Bui on the Black Volta River has been under study

for some time, with the aim of increasing power supplies in

northern Ghana or of selling power to Cote d'lvoire and

Burkina Faso (Burkina, formerly Upper Volta). There have

been difficulties, however, in raising the funds needed for the

450-megawatt generating plant. Other sites with the potential

for power generation, on the Pra River, the Tano River, the

White Volta River, and the Ankobra River, would also require

substantial investment.

Ghana has attempted to increase distribution of its electricity throughout the country. One program, funded by the

World Bank's International Development Association, will provide reliable and widespread electricity in the urban and south- ern parts of the country. In addition, the extension of the

national grid to the Northern Region was commissioned in

1989. The extension links northern Ghana to the power generated from the Akosombo Dam.

The second phase of the extension will connect major towns

in Upper East Region with the regional capital, Bolgatanga, at a cost of US$100 million. The final phase will see exports of

electricity across the northern border to Burkina. In early

1991, furthermore, the International Development Association

announced a loan to the Electricity Corporation of Ghana to finance the supply and expansion of electricity networks in the

northwestern areas of Accra. The corporation aims to extend

the supply of electricity to all isolated centers where diesel is the main source of power.

Plans were also afoot to increase the supply of electricity by

utilization of thermal energy. Construction was anticipated by

178
Hydroelectric sluices in the Akosombo Dam

Courtesy Embassy of Ghana, Washington

late 1994 on the country's first thermal power generating plant near Takoradi. Scheduled for completion in 1997, the plant

will contribute 300 megawatts of electricity to the national grid.

Ghana has a National Nuclear Research Institute, which

trains undergraduate and postgraduate students in the techniques of nuclear science application in such areas as agriculture, medicine, and research. In late 1994, work was nearing

completion on a nuclear reactor at Kwabenyan, near Accra, to be used to aid research in these fields. In addition, a second

nuclear physics center is to be established in Kumasi on the

recommendation of the Ghana Atomic Energy Commission.

Tourism

Under Ghana's 1985 investment code, tourism is a priority

sector with incentives and benefits for investors. The govern179
Ghana: A Country Study

ment hopes to triple its foreign exchange earnings from tour- ism under a five-year tourism plan, based on a projection that

between 1991 and 1995, the number of tourists visiting Ghana

every year will double from the 1991 base of 145,000. Jobs in

the tourism industry are projected to reach 270,000, with more

created in other sectors that derive business from the tourist

trade. There are also incentives for star-rated hotels, approved

tourist villages and beaches, and holiday recreational resorts. Investors are involved in the development of other tourist

attractions, such as waterfalls, beaches, forts, castles, and historical sites, and even in specialized restaurants, tourist coaches,

and buses. Incentives in this sector include tax and rate exemptions on building properties for three years in addition to investment and depreciation allowances.

Transportation and Telecommunications

Ghana's transportation and communications networks are centered in the southern regions, especially the areas in which

gold, cocoa, and timber are produced. The northern and central areas are connected through a major road system; some

areas, however, remain relatively isolated.

The deterioration of the country's transportation and communications networks has been blamed for impeding the distri- bution of economic inputs and food as well as the transport of

crucial exports. Consequently, the first priority of the ERP was

to repair physical infrastructure. Under the program's first phase (1983-86), the government allocated US$1.5 billion, or 36 percent of total investment, for that purpose and an additional US$222 million in 1987 for road and rail rehabilitation.

In 1991 the Ghanaian government allocated 27 percent of its budget for various road schemes.

Foreign donor support helped to increase the number of

new vehicle registrations from 8,000 in 1984 to almost 20,000

in 1989. The distribution of vehicles was skewed, however,

because, by 1988, more than half of all vehicles were in Accra,

which contained approximately 7 percent of the country's population. Furthermore, most new vehicles are intended for pri- vate use rather than for hauling goods and people, a reflection

of income disparities. Transportation is especially difficult in

eastern regions, near the coast, and in the vast, underdeveloped northern regions, where vehicles are scarce. At any one

time, moreover, a large percentage of intercity buses and Accra

city buses are out of service.

180
The Economy

Roads and Railroads

Ghana contains about 32,250 kilometers of roads, of which

about 12,000 kilometers are main roads. Approximately 6,000

kilometers are paved; the remainder are gravel, crushed stone, or graded earth. The country's rail network is 953 kilometers in

length; all track is 1.067 meter (narrow) gauge and all but

thirty-two kilometers are single track. The network connects

Sekondi-Takoradi with Kumasi and Accra; branch lines run to Prestea, Awaso, Kade, Tema, and Shai Hills (see fig. 10). Poor

rural infrastructure has been blamed for problems in agriculture, partly because transportation costs account for about 70

percent of the difference between farm prices and retail prices.

Only about one-third of the feeder road network can carry

vehicular traffic. The government has no plans to extend the railway system

beyond its limited coverage of the southwestern regions of the

country. The western section of the rail system (TakoradiKumasi) was renovated under a US$240 million program, the

bulk of which the World Bank financed. Figures indicate a downward trend in passenger traffic from a high of 389 per

kilometer in 1988 to 277 per kilometer in 1990. Freight steadily

increased throughout the 1980s from forty-four million tons

per kilometer in 1984 to a decade high of 131 million tons per

kilometer in 1989.

The government has instead focused on improvement of the

road system. Since 1985 all trunk roads and about 2,900 kilometers of feeder roads as well as a number of bridges and

drainage systems have been undergoing repairs. For example,

275 kilometers of the Accra-Kumasi road's northern section are

slated to be repaved, but as of early 1994 only the 135 kilometers from Kumasi to Anyinam had been completed. In 1987

Japan offered US$80 million to rehabilitate the main road

between Kumasi and Takoradi, which carries cocoa and timber

exports; this project was well under way in 1993. By the early

1990s, a World Bank loan of US$22 million was funding the

rehabilitation of three major roads in Accra in yet another

effort to ease import and export traffic. The road between

Tema and Akosombo, an important link in the transportation

network between the Gulf of Guinea and Burkina, was also due

for improvement.

Ports and Shipping

Ghana has two deep artificial harbors, one at Tema and the

181
Ghana: A Country Study

not necessarily authoritative

Figure 10. Transportation System, 1994

other at Takoradi. The first stage of the government's five-year

plan to improve Ghana's physical infrastructure began with the

expenditure of US$80 million to rehabilitate the port at Tema.

As a result of the work, the port's capacity for handling dry ton- nage rose by 50 percent to 2.7 million tons. Work planned at Takoradi should increase capacity by 128 percent to 1.6 million

tons. The Volta River, the Ankobra River, and the Tano River

provide 168 kilometers of perennial navigation for launches

182
The Economy

and lighters. Lake Volta provides 1,125 kilometers of arterial

and feeder waterways. In addition, the government is developing new ports on Lake Volta to create an inland waterway net- work. Ghana's merchant marine service includes six ships (five

cargo and one refrigerated)

.

Civil Aviation

On July 4, 1958, the Ghanaian government established

Ghana Airways (GA) to replace the former African Airways

Corporation. By the mid-1990s, GA operated international

scheduled passenger and cargo service to numerous European,

Middle Eastern, and African destinations, including London,

Dusseldorf, Rome, Abidjan, Dakar, Lagos, Lome, and Johannesburg. The airline also operates direct service to New York.

The GA fleet includes two Fokker 28s, one McDonnell Douglas

DC-10, and one McDonnell Douglas DC-9. Since the late

1980s, GA has received overhaul and maintenance service

from, among others, Swissair, Field Aircraft Services, and Fokker Aviation. Historically, the airline has suffered from chronic

financial problems and thus has had difficulties meeting its for- eign debt obligations. Additionally, GA has been unable to purchase new aircraft to bolster its domestic and regional routes. Ghana has eleven airports, six with hard surfaced runways.

The most important are Kotoka International Airport at Accra

and airports at Sekondi-Takoradi, Kumasi, and Tamale that

serve domestic air traffic. In 1990 the government spent US$12

million to improve Accra's facilities. Workmen resurfaced the

runway, upgraded the lighting system, and built a new freight

terminal. Construction crews also extended and upgraded the

terminal building at Kumasi. In early 1991, the government

announced further plans to improve Accra's international air- port. The main runway was upgraded, improvements were made in freight landing and infrastructure, and the terminal

building and the airport's navigational aids were upgraded.

Telecommunications

Despite improvements carried out in the 1980s under the

auspices of the Economic Community of West African States

(ECOWAS), Ghana's telecommunications system continues to be one of the least developed in Africa. In 1994 the country

counted about 50,000 telephones, or approximately 2.6 tele- phones per 1,000 people, one of the world's lowest figures.

Telephone service is heavily concentrated in Accra, and even in

183
Ghana: A Country Study

the capital, only government offices, large commercial concerns, or wealthier households have telephone service. Domestic long-distance communications are carried over two radiorelay systems, one that extends east-west through the major

coastal cities, and another that goes north from the capital to Burkina. International telecommunications, except to neighboring countries, are sent via a satellite ground station near

Accra. This station, working with the International Telecommunications Satellite Organization (Intelsat) Atlantic Ocean

Satellite, provides high-quality telephone, television, and data

links to countries in Africa, Europe, and the Americas.

Broadcast service is typical of African countries. The country

has four amplitude modulation (AM) radio stations and one

frequency modulation (FM) radio station. Three shortwave

transmitters provide countrywide service: two for domestic

reception that broadcast in English and six local languages,

and one international transmitter that broadcasts in English,

French, and Hausa. There are four (eight translators) television stations. Television transmitters are located at or near

Accra, Cape Coast, Kumasi, and Bolgatanga; eight low-power

television repeaters are located in smaller cities. In 1993 the

country had an estimated 4 million radio receivers and 250,000

television sets. In 1992 the Ghanaian government approved the formation

of a National Communications Commission. This organization

undertakes numerous missions, including the promotion of

research and development, improvement of communications,

management of the radio frequency spectrum, and encouragement of private ownership in the telecommunications sector. Given Ghana's lack of resources and the difficulty of acquiring

foreign aid, it is unlikely that the commission will make any significant improvements in the country's telecommunications

system in the near future.

Foreign Investments and Assistance

Despite efforts to increase private capital participation in the

Ghanaian economy, in the early 1990s foreign investments con- tinued to be sparse, and the economy relied heavily on aid and

loans. By 1991 the external debt exceeded US$4 billion, and it was nearly US$4.3 billion in 1992, an amount equal to the level

of assistance provided by donors over the previous decade. The

country continued to experience trade and service deficits even though exports increased.

184
Buses, such as this one at Navrongo in far northern Ghana, are a vital part of local transportation.

Courtesy life in general (Brook, Rose, and Cooper Le Van)

Traffic on the highway between Winneba and Accra

CourtesyJames Sanders

185
Ghana: A Country Study

Investment

Despite efforts to induce foreign investment in the economy,

interest has been restricted primarily to the mining sector. Although at least eleven mining companies enjoyed some for- eign participation by 1990, the government had succeeded in

creating only two joint ventures in former state enterprises outside the mining industry.

In 1985 the government adopted an investment code to encourage foreign investment. It excluded the petroleum and

mining sectors, for which the government introduced a separate code in 1986; and it offered special conditions for agriculture, manufacturing (for export, using local raw materials, and

for the production of agricultural equipment, spare parts, and

machine tools), construction, and tourism. Agricultural

projects were given a 45 percent corporate income tax allowance, a 100 percent allowance on plant and equipment, and a 10 percent investment allowance. In manufacturing and construction, the investment allowance was 7.5 percent, with

depreciation and capital allowances of 40 percent and 50 percent, respectively, the latter two halved in subsequent years.

Finally, in tourism, the investment allowance was 7.5 percent,

and the depreciation allowances were 50 percent for plant and

20 percent for buildings, which also were halved in subsequent

years. In all cases, imports required for the projects were

exempted from duties. Additional tax reductions were granted

to projects located in Kumasi and Sekondi-Takoradi, while

other areas (excluding Accra-Tema) were given even larger

reductions.

Some activities (retail and wholesale trade, except where

employed capital was over US$500,000; land transport; travel- advertising; estate agencies) were reserved for Ghanaianowned firms. Foreign investors were required to supply a minimum of US$60,000 in the case of partnerships with Ghanaians,

or US$100,000 in the case of fully owned enterprises. Only net

foreign-exchange earning ventures were allowed to be fully

owned by foreigners. The code guaranteed investments against

nationalization, and where disputes needed arbitration, they were to be settled through existing international forums.

Transfers abroad were allowed for dividend payments, debt ser- vicing, charges for technology transfers, or liquidation of enter- prises. Implementation of the code and processing of

applications by potential investors were made the responsibilities of the Ghana Investment Center.

186
The Economy

In mid-1993 Minister of Finance Kwesi Botchwey announced

that a new investment code had been presented to Ghana's parliament. Under the new code, minimum foreign capital

requirements for joint ventures will be dropped from

US$60,000 to US$10,000, and the minimum for fully owned

foreign enterprises will be reduced to US$50,000. Companies

established solely for export will be exempt from the minimum

capital requirement. The new code outlaws government expropriations and provides a five-year tax holiday for the agricultural and real estate sectors. Foreign Assistance and Loans

Ghana's economic well-being and recovery program are

closely tied to significant levels of foreign loans and assistance,

especially from the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund. Altogether, between 1982 and 1990 foreign and

multilateral donors disbursed a total of approximately US$3.5

billion in official development assistance; at the same time, the

country's external debt reached US$3.5 billion. By 1991 the

largest bilateral donors were Germany, the United States,

Japan, and Canada, which together provided Ghana with

US$656 million in development assistance. The largest multilateral donors in 1991 included the European Community, the

IMF, and the International Development Association, which

furnished almost US$435 million to Ghana.

In addition, the government obtained five IMF programs

amounting to approximately US$1.6 billion: three standby

loans, simultaneous Extended Fund Facility and Structural

Adjustment Facility loans, and an Enhanced Structural Adjustment Facility loan in 1988. The government signed more than

twenty policy-based program loans with the World Bank. The

World Bank also sponsored six consultative group meetings;

the first, held in November 1983, resulted in pledges of

US$190 million. Between 1984 and 1991, almost US$3.5 billion

more was raised at five additional meetings.

In 1991 Ghana successfully raised the country's first syndicated loan in almost twenty years in the amount of US$75 million. The loan's collateral was a proportion of the country's cocoa crop. Special arrangements were made to ensure that a

specific amount of the crop was purchased using letters of

credit. Then in March 1992, the IMF announced that following

the expiration of Ghana's third and final arrangement under

the Enhanced Structural Adjustment Facility, Ghana needed

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Ghana: A Country Study

no further IMF financing. Even so, the Ghanaian government

asked the IMF to monitor progress on the country's economic

program and to continue policy dialogue.

In early 1994, Ghana accepted the obligations of Article VIII of the IMF's Articles of Agreement. According to the IMF,

Ghana will no longer impose restrictions on payments and

transfers for current international transactions or engage in

discriminatory currency arrangements or multiple currency

practice without IMF approval. Ghana's decision undoubtedly

will enhance its image with foreign investors and bankers.

Balance of Trade and Payments

Despite efforts under the ERP to stabilize the country's bal- ance of payments, Ghana's current account remained in deficit

throughout the 1980s and into the early 1990s. Both trade and

services deficits continued into the 1990s, given the country's

dependence on concessional inflows and IMF funding. The

current account deficit fell by US$91 million in 1986 from

US$134 million in 1985, but it rose again by US$54 million in

1987. After another recovery in 1988, the deficit was back at US$99 million in 1989 and widened to US$228 million in 1990,

US$253 million in 1991, and US$378 million in 1992. It was

projected to fall to US$190 million in 1994 (see table 10,

Appendix).

The government did succeed, however, in building up at

least some external reserves. By the end of 1991, official foreign-exchange reserves totaled US$538 million, more than

double the level at the end of 1990 and the highest amount for

at least a decade. The increase resulted from the Bank of

Ghana's attempt to boost reserves to cover more than four

months' imports. For example, the government allowed

exporting companies to retain some of their foreign-exchange

earnings inside the country. For Ashanti Goldfields Corporation, the portion is 45 percent. Exporters of other products,

except cocoa, may keep up to 35 percent of earnings in reten- tion accounts, and the Ghana Cocoa Board may keep 10 percent. The retained export earnings can be used for the import

of equipment, spare parts, and essential inputs as well as for

meeting the exporters' external financial obligations. By late December 1991, foreign exchange reserves were sufficient to finance almost twenty weeks of imports. In 1992 foreignexchange reserves dropped to US$291.6 million because the

government had to use its reserves to cover current foreign

188
The Economy

obligations. By September 1993, the foreign-exchange reserve

totalled US$276.9 million.

Foreign assets and liabilities of the Ghanaian banking system

as a whole showed a positive trend. Compared with the first half of 1991, Ghana's assets with reporting banks rose by 14.7

percent to US$1 billion in the second half of the year. Assets at the end of 1991 were 12.7 percent higher than the US$923 million on hand at the end of 1990. Liabilities also rose significantly from US$368 million to US$437 million during the first half of 1991 and by 25.9 percent during the year as a whole.

Overall, however, there was a positive net increase. Net assets stood at US$603 million at the end of 1991 as against US$539

million in June 1991 and US$576 million in December 1990.

Growth Trends and Potential

During the 1980s, the Ghanaian government successfully

rehabilitated major economic sectors that had deteriorated

since the 1960s. Throughout the decade, Ghana saw growth in

GDP and the repair of some of its economic infrastructure.

Through fiscal austerity, the government achieved balanced

budgets at the same time that it invested in development

projects. In particular, the export sector regained some

strength by the early 1990s with a resurgence in cocoa, gold,

and timber exports.

The cost of this growth, however, raised serious questions

about the long-term viability of the government's programs.

Growth has been possible only through foreign assistance and

loans, which totaled US$7 billion by 1990. Although the government has been effective in directing these funds toward

productive sectors, it has cut current spending on social ser- vices, which will require attention in the future. Currency

devaluations, while helping exports, have increased both the

cost of living and prices for imports. Most important, the government has emphasized export production, while subjecting

import-substitution industries to stiff foreign competition and

neglecting local crop production, leading to an increasing reli- ance on imports of goods and food. Thus, although exports

have increased, they have been offset by rising imports, with

the result that Ghanaians are increasingly subjected to higher

prices.

The Economic Recovery Program has succeeded in allowing

Ghana to regain its international credit standing and has

curbed the worst excesses of economic protectionism. The

189
Ghana: A Country Study

country is in a position to exploit its considerable agricultural

and mineral potential. At the same time, sustained long-term

growth will require that attention be given to domestic industries and to consumption rather than exclusively to exports and

the wealth generated thereby.

* * *

Sources on Ghana's economic past and present are relatively

rich and varied because of the country's continuing promi- nence in discussions about economic development and structural adjustment programs on the African continent. For good

historical studies, see Kwame Yeboah Daaku's Trade and Politics on the Gold Coast, 1600-1720 and Edward Reynolds's Trade and

Economic Change on the Gold Coast, 1807-1874. Polly Hill's study,

The Migrant Cocoa-Farmers of Southern Ghana: A Study in Rural

Capitalism, is a seminal examination of African economic initia- tive and enterprise during the colonial period. For the independence period, see Tony Killick's Development Economics in

Action: A Study ofEconomic Policies in Ghana, Douglas Rimmer's

Staying Poor: Ghana's Political Economy, 1950-1990, and Donald

Rothchild's "Ghana and Structural Adjustment: An Overview."

The multilateral assistance organizations have also published

numerous studies of Ghana in light of its prominence as a showcase of structural adjustment policies. They include the

Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development

study by Alan Roe and Hartmut Schneider, Adjustment and

Equity in Ghana, the World Bank's Ghana: 2000 and Beyond: Set- ting the Stage for Accelerated Growth and Poverty Reduction, and the

International Monetary Fund's Ghana: Adjustment and Growth,

1983-91. For statistics and current information, see Ghana in

Figures, Quarterly Digest of Statistics, and Statistical Newsletter, all published by the Ghanaian government's Statistical Service,

and the Economist Intelligence Unit's quarterly Country Report:

Ghana and annual Country Profile: Ghana. Numerous periodicals contain much information about Ghana's economy,

including African Business, Africa Economic Digest, and Africa

Research Bulletin. (For further information and complete cita- tions, see Bibliography.)

190
Chapter 4. Government and Politics
A wooden stool, decorated -with silver, from the palace asantehene in Kumasi; traditional symbol of authority (Asante)
AFTER AN UNHAPPY SURVEY of the tragic history of liberal

democracy in post-colonial Africa—a survey in which Ghana

was certainly at the forefront—two astute observers of the Afri- can political scene asked, "If Western democracy . . . ended up

looking like a sad cross between paternalism and corruption,

what are the alternatives? What might an indigenous African

form of democracy look like?" They claimed that the answer had to be sought in the ideas and forms of equality and participation found in the village council and similar institutions of

community governance. Thus, according to them, a "greater

reliance on modern variations of these forms might succeed

where Western forms of democracy had failed."

Ideas similar to these helped inspire the 31st December 1981

Revolution in Ghana. The revolution set in motion a process of

national democratic transformation linked to the unfulfilled

democratic ideals and aspirations of the June 4, 1979, popular

uprising led byJerryJohn Rawlings, chairman of what became

the Provisional National Defence Council (PNDC) after 1981.

The PNDC leadership insisted that the revolution was not a car- bon copy of any other revolution and that it was aimed at resolving Ghana's socio-economic problems, using Ghana's his- torical experiences and cultural traditions as a basis. Thus, the

PNDC leadership effectively challenged the notion that the

options for Ghana's evolving democratic institutions and popular grass-roots structures were limited to different versions of

Marxism-Leninism, Western-style liberalism of the "left" or

"right," or military rule, which had been practiced before the

revolution and had not worked.

Accordingly, four major, related themes of PNDC rule

remained relatively constant throughout the tumultuous transition to constitutional democracy, a movement that had widespread popular support. These were: a rejection of extreme

ideological tendencies and of multiparty politics as practiced in

Ghana since independence, which had been divisive, corrupt,

and elitist; decentralization, aimed at the practical application

of the ideas of mass participation going back to the early

nationalist struggles against colonialism and at achieving a fundamental restructuring of the machinery of government; establishment of democratic structures and institutions at every level of society; and national unity and commitment to the ideals of

193
Ghana: A Country Study

Pan-Africanism, nonalignment, and noninterference in the

internal affairs of other countries.

What perhaps ultimately distinguished the PNDC period

from others were, on the negative side, the extent of political

violence, repression of political dissent, and widespread human

rights violations, which especially characterized the early

period of PNDC rule. On the positive side, the PNDC was noted for its extraordinary ability to put together a capable

team with the political will and resourcefulness to pull the

country out of its deepest economic crisis in living memory

and to return the country to democracy in the face of persistent "counterrevolutionary" pressures, numerous coup

attempts, and moves to destabilize the regime.

The PNDC government lasted for eleven turbulent years and

survived presidential and parliamentary elections in 1992. In

January 1993, Rawlings effected a relatively peaceful transition

from military ruler to elected president of the Fourth Republic. His pledge of policy continuity has ensured that in many

significant respects the PNDC remains in power, but there is an important difference. The present government was elected

under a new democratic constitution that guarantees fundamental human rights, independence of the media, civil liberties, and the rule of law. The Provisional National Defence Council

Within thirty-five years of Ghana's becoming a sovereign

state, the country experienced, before its fourth return to multiparty democratic government in January 1993, nine different

governments (three civilian and six military), including a Westminster-style parliamentary democracy, a socialist single-party

republic, and several military regimes following coups in 1966,

1972, 1979, and 1981 (see Independent Ghana; The Fall of the

Nkrumah Regime and Its Aftermath; and Ghana and the Rawlings Era, ch. 1; table 11, Appendix).

The national leadership of postcolonial Ghana inherited

state machinery that had evolved under British rule and that

emphasized strong centralization of power and top-down decision making. Kwame Nkrumah—prime minister, 1957-60;

president, 1960-66—unsuccessfully attempted to create a

socialist economy in the early 1960s, but his effort merely

served to compound the inevitable problems and dangers of

administrative centralization and state intervention in the

economy. These problems, which survived Nkrumah, included

194
Government and Politics

political corruption, self-enrichment, misuse of power, lack of

public accountability, and economic mismanagement, leading

in turn to economic decline and stagnation and to the rapid

erosion of political legitimacy and attendant coups d'etat.

Authoritarian or arbitrary styles of leadership that limited genuine democratic participation and public debate on policy as well as the lack of political vision of successive postcolonial

regimes (with the exception of Nkrumah's) contributed greatly

to political instability and to the rapid alternation of civilian

and military rule. One of the changes in government came on June 4, 1979,

when a handful of junior officers seized power less than a month before scheduled elections. An Armed Forces Revolutionary Council (AFRC) was formed with the overriding objective of ridding Ghana of official corruption, indiscipline in

public life, and economic mismanagement before handing

over power to a civilian government. A relatively unknown

twenty-nine-year-old air force flight lieutenant, JerryJohn Rawlings, emerged as the leader of the AFRC. The so-called housecleaning exercise embarked upon by the AFRC was extended

to a variety of civilian economic malpractices such as hoarding,

profiteering, and black-marketing.

Parliamentary elections were duly held on June 18, 1979, as planned. A party of the Nkrumahist tradition, the People's

National Party (PNP), won a majority of the parliamentary

seats, and its leader, Hilla Limann, became president after a run-off election. On September 24, 1979, the AFRC handed

over government to the PNP. At this time, Rawlings warned the

PNP government that it was on probation and admonished the

incoming officials to put the interest of the people first. The PNP administration was short-lived. On December 31,

1981, Rawlings returned to office for the second time as head

of the Provisional National Defence Council (PNDC). He

insisted that the 31st December 1981 Revolution was necessitated, among other factors, by the failure of the PNP administration to provide effective leadership and by the virtual

collapse of the national economy and of state services. Upon

assuming power, Rawlings immediately declared a "holy war"

aimed at restructuring national political institutions, establishing genuine democracy based on Ghanaian ideals and traditions, and rehabilitating the economy.

195
Ghana: A Country Study

The Political Scene under the PNDC

For democracy to function effectively in Ghana, it was necessary to relate Western democratic processes to Ghanaian political traditions. Peter Du Sautoy, a former district commissioner,

recalled his attempt to explain British democracy in the country before independence. His audience understood the process

of election, but he was asked how one got rid of one's representative when he no longer seemed to be representative. Du Sautoy explained that one waited until the next election four or

five years later. His Ghanaian audience felt that "this was most

undemocratic—from time immemorial they had been able to get rid of their chiefs at any time, when, after mature consideration and discussion, they felt they no longer had confidence

in them."

This observation clearly defines one enduring aspect of the

relationship between politics and democracy as understood by

the ordinary Ghanaian. It also highlights the significance of

indigenous political ideology and attitudes that constitute the core elements of the contemporary Ghanaian political tradition. This political tradition, along with inherited colonial and

Christian elements, informs and shapes the institutional pattern of political life. Its basic principles influence disputes and

conflicts over the organization, distribution, maintenance,

exercise, and transfer of power, and the allocation of economic

resources in Ghanaian society.

The published speeches of Rawlings provide evidence of the

effective use of symbols and principles drawn from ancestral

religious beliefs, Christianity, and chieftaincy. Indeed, Rawlings

insisted throughout PNDC rule that the revolution's main and

long-term goal was to create a more just society in which the

interests of the majority were not repressed in favor of those of

a tiny minority and in which the productivity of all Ghanaians

would increase. He saw participatory democracy as the best

guarantee of such a society.

The PNDC leadership could scarcely avoid the ideological

tension and strife generic to Ghanaian popular movements

and mass-based political programs. Ironically, the ideological

strife that haunted the PNDC leadership was similar to that

which wrecked the PNP. In 1980 Limann, PNP leader and president of Ghana, had complained helplessly that the PNP as a mass party spanned the whole range of political ideas. He

pointed out that party members included pragmatists, leftists,

rightists, and centrists, and he stressed that no national party

196
Government and Politics

with a broad social base could escape this mix. The left wing of

the PNP—for example, the Kwame Nkrumah Revolutionary

Guards—was Limann's severest critic. Some of the leaders of

the same left wing and similar organizations joined the PNDC

and attempted unsuccessfully in the early years of the revolutionary period to transform what was clearly a nationalist, popular revolution in the direction of Marxism-Leninism (see The

Second Coming of Rawlings: The First Six Years, 1982-87, ch.

In the first year after the 1981 revolution, the PNDC regime

established new political structures and legal institutions. The

new administration rebuilt or reformed much of the pre-existing local, regional, and national administrative machinery of

governance in accordance with the avowed goals of the revolution. During the following ten years, many of these new struc- tures of governance and consultation were modified in

response to the demands of efficiency, social and economic

realities, and internal and external political pressures. A number of these institutional and structural changes were incorporated into the 1992 constitution of the Fourth Republic.

One such institution was the National Commission for

Democracy (NCD), which evolved from the Electoral Commission of the Third Republic. In 1984 the NCD invited the public

to submit proposals on the future form of democratic government for the country. In addition, public meetings were held to discuss ways to realize true democracy in Ghana. As a result of

these and other efforts, the NCD published its "Blue Book" on

the creation of district political authority and on holding elections. These efforts culminated in the district elections of 1988

and the subsequent establishment of 110 district assemblies. In

July 1990, the NCD initiated more public debates on the future

political system of the country. This marked a significant step

in the transition to democracy, which ended with the presidential and parliamentary elections in November and December

1992.

By the late 1980s, the PNDC comprised nine members, the

most important being Rawlings, the chairman. It was the highest legislative and administrative body of the state. Below the

PNDC was the Committee of Secretaries (cabinet), made up of

nineteen secretaries (ministers) who met on a weekly basis

under the chairmanship of a PNDC member (see fig. 11). The

most prominent of the secretaries were those in charge of

finance and economic planning, foreign affairs, education and

197
Ghana: A Country Study

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198
Government and Politics

culture, local government and rural development, agriculture,

health, mobilization and productivity, and chieftaincy affairs. Revolutionary Organs

To lay the foundation for true democracy in Ghana, the

PNDC created a controversial countrywide network of People's

Defence Committees (PDCs) and Workers' Defence Committees (WDCs), reorganized and renamed in late 1984 as Committees for the Defence of the Revolution (CDRs). Established

in villages, urban communities, and workplaces, the CDRs were

intended to be organs of popular power and political initiative. Forces' Defence Committees were established in the armed

forces and the police service.

The most important aspect of the reorganization of the

PDCs and the WDCs from the standpoint of the political and

socioeconomic functions of the CDRs was the opening up of

membership to all Ghanaians. This decision reversed the earlier exclusion from PDC/WDC membership of elite groups,

such as chiefs and so-called exploiting classes. The change

returned the revolution to its original objective of involving all Ghanaians in decision making and opened up possibilities for

genuine national reconciliation. According to official directives, the principal functions of the CDRs were to ensure democratic participation in decision making in all communities and

workplaces; to guard against corruption, abuse of power, sabotage, and social injustice; and to promote sustained national

productivity by focusing efforts on the productive sectors of the

economy.

The other mass organizations of the revolution were the

National Mobilisation Program, the 31st December Women's

Movement, the Civil Defence Organisation (the militia), the

National Youth Organising Commission, and the June Fourth

Movement. The National Mobilisation Program started as an emergency program to receive and resettle Ghanaian returnees from Nigeria in 1983. It soon developed into a cooperative

movement engaged in a variety of economic and community

development projects throughout Ghana. The 31st December

Women's Movement aimed to bring about the political, social,

and economic emancipation of Ghanaian women, especially

rural women.

The Civil Defence Organisation, popularly known as the

militia, was set up as a paramilitary institution to assist other

state organizations in national emergencies such as invasions,

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Ghana: A Country Study

bush fires, and floods. Members received special training in

combat readiness to defend the nation against internal and

external aggression and economic sabotage. The militia, in

addition to combating crime in local communities, engaged in

voluntary social and economic activities to help promote community development. In this effort, it was often assisted by the

National Youth Organising Commission, created in 1982 as part of the PNDC's efforts to establish a youth movement to carry out the objectives of the 31st December 1981 Revolution.

The June Fourth Movement was a militant mass revolutionary movement dedicated to keeping alive the ideals of the June

4, 1979, uprising that Rawlings had led. It sought to arouse the

population at large to assist in establishing so-called people's

power within the avowed objectives of the revolutionary process. On a practical level, it worked with the militia and the

National Youth Organising Commission in various community

development projects.

Participatory opportunities of the ordinary Ghanaian citizen were significantly expanded through membership in revolutionary organs. Before the establishment of the district assemblies in 1989, the PNDC government was thus able to reach the

rural population and to broaden its base of support by direct

consultation. This was achieved through chiefs, the CDRs, and

other national bodies such as the Democratic Youth League of

Ghana, which in 1988 claimed a nationwide membership of

more than 100,000. Other such groups included farmers' organizations, market women's associations, trade union groups,

students' organizations, and religious and other bodies. The

PNDC's political opposition, however, hotly contested the democratic nature of such organs and saw them as nothing but

state-sponsored vigilantes engaged in intimidation and human

rights abuses.

The Transition from Military Rule to Democratic

Government

Political Ferment under the PNDC

As the country prepared to move toward constitutional rule

in the late 1980s, the major concern of Ghanaians was how to ensure a relatively smooth and peaceful democratic transition.

This concern was shared by the opposition, the activities of

which were under constant surveillance by the national security agencies, and by the ruling PNDC, under pressure to

200
Government and Politics

present a clear, firm timetable and program for a return to constitutional government.

The transition process had unsavory features that many Ghanaians believed could lead to an outbreak of violence. Intense

mutual suspicion and antipathy existed between the PNDC

leadership and the opposition going back to the June 4, 1979,

uprising and the draconian measures taken by the AFRC. On

one side, Rawlings and the PNDC saw the opposition leaders

not as individuals genuinely interested in real democracy but as

elitist, corrupt, and self-seeking "big men" who had vowed to

fight to the bitter end to reverse the gains of the revolution and

to restore the old system of corruption and exploitation.

On the other side, the opposition viewed Rawlings and his

Ewe ethnic henchmen, notably Kojo Tsikata, his chief of security, as a bloodthirsty group with the worst human rights record

in postcolonial Ghanaian history and one that was determined

to retain power by any means. Many opposition leaders could

not forgive Rawlings for the loss of lives, power, and property,

and for the incarcerations inflicted on friends and relatives, if not on themselves, by the PNDC regime. The once respectable

professional elite of comfortable lawyers, doctors, university

professors, businessmen, and politicians in exile abroad could

not hide their outrage at Ghana's being ruled by, in their view, a young, inexperienced, half-educated military upstart.

It is against this background of intense mutual hostility and

distrust and vicious political rivalry that the evolution of the

democratic transition between 1988 and the inauguration of

the Fourth Republic in January 1993 should be assessed and

understood. This long transition process was characterized by

two related struggles: the struggle for recovery from decades of

economic decline and for better living standards for the aver- age Ghanaian; and the struggle for "true democracy," the

meaning of which was hotly debated and gradually shifted,

especially after 1988. These national struggles led to the reconstitution of old political alliances and to the emergence of new

political groupings.

That it took the PNDC more than ten years to lift the ban

imposed on political parties at the inception of PNDC rule not

only demonstrated the PNDC's control over the pace and

direction of political change but also confirmed the shallowness of the political soil in which the party system was rooted.

Party activity had been banned under all of the military governments that had dominated nearly twenty out of the thirty-five

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Ghana: A Country Study

years of Ghana's postcolonial existence. Even during periods of

civilian administration, party organization had been largely

urban centered and rudimentary. It had depended far more

on personal alliances and on ethnic and local ties, as well as on

patron-client relationships, than on nationally institutionalized structures. Party politics had tended to generate corruption

and factionalism. The party system, therefore, never had any

real hold on the consciousness of the average Ghanaian, especially the rural Ghanaian.

All the same, three major electoral political traditions have

emerged in Ghana since the 1950s, namely, the Nkrumahist

tradition, the Danquah-Busiaist tradition, and the more recent

Rawlingsist tradition. These traditions are identified with their

founders—each a commanding political figure—and are not

necessarily mutually exclusive. In political terms, the Nkrumahists are generally considered "leftist" and "progressive," the

Danquah-Busiaists more "rightist" and more "conservative,"

and the Rawlingsists "populist" and "progressive." In practice,

however, the traditions are less distinguishable by ideological

orientation than by dominant personalities and ethnic origins.

Against this background, the opposition call for multiparty

democracy had to overcome great odds, not least of which was

the intense prejudice of the chairman of the PNDC against

political parties. Rawlings strongly believed that party politics

had hitherto produced two forms of abuse of power—the "cor- rupt dictatorship" of the Kofi Abrefa Busia regime (1969-72)

and the "arrogant dictatorship" of the Nkrumah (1957-66)

and Limann (1979-81) governments. Nonpartisan, honest,

and accountable government would provide an effective antidote to these abuses, he argued. Indeed, Rawlings appeared to have an almost fanatical belief that corruption was at the root

of nearly all of Ghana's problems and that, if only it could be

stamped out, the country would return to its former prosperity.

In reaction to Rawlings's position, opposition groups, such as the London-based Ghana Democratic Movement and the Campaign for Democracy in Ghana, and individuals within and out- side Ghana committed to multiparty democracy, grew

increasingly desperate as they focused on the single aim of

overthrowing the PNDC regime. Between 1983 and 1986, at

least a dozen coup plots were uncovered by an efficient and

much-feared state security system (see The 1981 Coup and the

Second Rawlings Government, ch. 5). At the same time, vigor- ous debates occurred within the PNDC, radical organizations,

202
Government and Politics

and trade unions over the direction of economic policy, the

content and form of true democracy, and the desirability of

accepting International Monetary Fund (IMF—see Glossary)

support for Ghana's Economic Recovery Program (ERP) (see

The Economic Recovery Program, ch. 3).

Urban workers and students especially exhibited growing

frustration at their inability to influence policy or to express

dissent through readily available channels. Many urban workers felt the CDRs did not effectively represent the opinions of

workers in the way that the PDCs and the WDCs had done

before their reorganization. In general, public criticism of government policy was discouraged. In the face of repeated coup

plots and destabilization attempts, which lasted throughout the

PNDC period, the regime was eager to retain tight control of

the political situation, and an independent press had difficulty

surviving. All the same, the PNDC was clearly aware of the

urgent need for the government to provide genuine democratic channels and institutions to enable workers, students,

professional bodies, and other interest groups to express dis- sent and to provide constructive criticism of government policy. There was, therefore, a concerted effort to transform the

CDRs and other revolutionary organs into real instruments of

grass-roots democracy. The implementation of the government

decentralization program and the establishment of district

assemblies were likewise aimed at furthering the process of

genuine popular democratization.

Interest Groups and National Politics

Among the politically active and influential organizations

and interest groups are the Trade Union Congress (TUC), the

Ghana Bar Association (GBA), the Christian Council of Ghana

(CCG), the Catholic Bishops Conference (CBC), the Ghana

Journalists Association, the National Union of Ghanaian Students (NUGS), the regional houses of chiefs, and the National

House of Chiefs. Because political parties in Ghana have been

weak and the national political system itself has been unstable,

the enduring nature of some of these firmly established interest groups has often substituted for political stability. As a result

of their stabilizing and quasi-political institutional role, interest

groups such as the CBC, the CCG, and the GBA have exerted

enormous influence on national policy. The relationship

between incumbent governments and these powerful interest

groups has never been easy, however; the government has

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Ghana: A Country Study

invariably tried to co-opt or to control, if not to intimidate, the

leadership of these urban-based organizations.

Of all politically active organizations, the TUC has always

had the largest following, with a total membership in the early

1990s of more than 500,000. This figure includes workers and

salaried employees in the public and the private sectors who

are members of the seventeen unions that are affiliated with

the TUC. Since independence, successive governments have

made repeated attempts to control it. Rawlings enjoyed the

support of the TUC during the first two years of PNDC rule,

but the stringent austerity measures introduced in the ERP in

1983 led to discontent among union members adversely

affected by devaluation, wage restraints, and lay-offs. By 1985

the original support enjoyed by the PNDC in labor circles had

all but disappeared. The PNDC worked hard to regain union

support, however, and the National Democratic Congress government of the Fourth Republic has continued to woo the

unions through tripartite consultations involving itself, the

TUC, and employers.

From the inception to the end of PNDC rule in 1992, the

CCG, the CBC, the GBA, NUGS, and the National House of

Chiefs played prominent roles in the transition to democracy.

These organizations took the provisional nature of the PNDC

regime quite literally, calling for a quick return to democratic

national government. Although NUGS and the GBA consistently demanded a return to multiparty democracy, the CCG,

the CBC, and the national and regional houses of chiefs

favored a nonpartisan national government. While the NUGS

and GBA leadership used methods that frequently provoked

confrontation with the PNDC, the CBC and the national and

regional houses of chiefs preferred a more conciliatory

method of political change, emphasizing national unity.

The CCG, the CBC, and the national and regional houses of

chiefs function openly as independent national lobbies to promote common rather than special interests. They insist on

negotiation and mediation in the management of national dis- putes, and they advocate policy alternatives that stress the longterm needs of society. In the past, they have taken bold initia- tives to attain the abrogation of state measures and legislation

that violate human rights or that threaten law and order. All

three bodies share a commitment to democracy, the rule of

law, and the creation of political institutions that reflect Ghanaian cultural traditions.

204
Government and Politics

The GBA, like the other professional associations in Ghana,

is concerned with maintaining the dignity of the legal profession through a code of professional ethics and with promoting

further learning and research in the profession. The main

objectives of the GBA according to its constitution include the

defense of freedom and justice, the maintenance ofjudicial

independence, and the protection of human rights and fundamental freedoms as defined under the United Nations Universal Declaration of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms.

These objectives, by definition, have inevitably pitted the GBA

against both military regimes and one-party governments,

which on their part have considered the GBA at best a necessary evil. NUGS and its national executive, representing the more

than 8,000 students of Ghana's three universities in AccraLegon, Kumasi, and Cape Coast, are among the most vocal and

articulate pressure groups in Ghana. By reason of their higher

education in a largely illiterate society, students have often

been in a position to agitate for far-reaching political, eco- nomic, and social change. Indeed, students have been in the

forefront of political activism in Ghana since independence.

NUGS was most vocal in its support of Rawlings and the PNDC

in 1982, but this changed as the PNDC adopted policies that

NUGS considered to be against the welfare of students in particular and of Ghanaians in general.

The CCG, another vocal and influential interest group, was founded in 1929. The CCG's principal function is advisory; it acts through consultation among its member churches. The

CCG operates through several committees, including education, social action (national affairs), and literacy campaigns.

The CCG is a member of the World Council of Churches and

other ecumenical bodies, and it is a strong advocate of human

rights.

The CBC, the highest local unifying authority of the Roman

Catholic Church in Ghana, dates to 1950, although the church

itself has been in Ghana since the fifteenth century. The CBC

has established a Joint Social Action Committee for cooperation between it and the CCG.

The National House of Chiefs and the ten regional houses of

chiefs represent more than 32,000 recognized traditional rul- ers who exercise considerable influence throughout Ghana,

especially in the countryside. As trustees of communal lands

and natural resources, chiefs are often the pivot around which

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Ghana: A Country Study

local socio-economic development revolves. The 1992 constitution, like all previous constitutions, guarantees the institution

of chieftaincy together with its traditional councils as established by customary law and usage. To preserve their role as symbols of national unity, however, chiefs are forbidden from

active participation in party politics.

District Assembly Elections

The main political preoccupations of the PNDC and the

Ghanaian public in 1988 were the implementation of the government's decentralization program and the elections to the

new District Assemblies (DAs). In a speech commemorating his

fifth year in power in January 1987, Rawlings had announced

proposals for the decentralization of government. These had

included promises of elections for DAs and a national debate

on the ERR The debate on the ERP never materialized, but

debates on the elections and the DAs did.

Among the radical changes introduced in local government

elections were provisions that no cash deposits were required

of candidates for district-level elections and that illiteracy in

English was no longer a disqualification. To accommodate nonEnglish speakers in the DAs and to make assembly debates

accessible to the majority of constituents, local languages could

be used in the DAs. The elections were to be nonpartisan: the

ban on political parties was not lifted. Implementation of the

decentralization program and preparation for the district elections did not completely silence the opposition, nor did it remove the sources of public discontent and disaffection

toward the government within some sections of the Ghanaian

population.

In 1988 there was no indication of what political structures

and institutions would be established above the DAs at regional

and national levels. Nor was it clear whether creation of the

DAs was intended to broaden the civilian support base of the

PNDC, thereby legitimizing and perpetuating PNDC rule

indefinitely. Some felt that the word "provisional" in the

regime's name sounded a bit hollow after five years in power.

Indeed, many read the proposed district elections as a strategy

similar to the union government proposal in 1978 that had not

been implemented because of its widespread unpopularity (see

The National Redemption Council Years, 1972-79, ch. 1). In February 1988, Adu Boahen, a retired history professor

and later a presidential candidate and Rawlings's main chal206
Sessional Meeting ofa House of Chiefs

Courtesy Embassy of Ghana, Washington

lenger, delivered three lectures in which he severely criticized

military rule in Ghana and the PNDC regime in particular as the causes of political instability. He affirmed that the AFRC

led by Rawlings in 1979 was completely unnecessary. He

attacked the alleged domination of the PNDC regime and of

major national institutions by the Ewe and called for an interim

coalition government within a year and for a return to multiparty democracy by 1992. The state-owned national media

attacked Boahen's criticism of the PNDC but did not report the

original text of the lectures.

For the DA elections, the country was divided into three zones by region. Zone one consisted of Western Region, Central Region, Ashanti Region, and Eastern Region; zone two, of

Upper East Region, Upper West Region, and Northern Region;

and zone three, of Greater Accra Region, Volta Region, and

207
Ghana: A Country Study

Brong-Ahafo Region (see fig. 1). The first round of the nonpartisan elections took place on December 6, 1988, in zone one of

the country, with polling in zones two and three following on

January 31 and February 28, 1989, respectively (see table 12,

Appendix). District election committees disqualified several

candidates in a number of districts for various offenses, including nonpayment of taxes, refusal to participate in communal

labor, and shirking other civic responsibilities. With an esti- mated average turnout rate of about 60 percent of registered

voters (some rural districts had a 90 percent turnout), the

highest for any election in two decades, most Ghanaians saw

this first step toward the establishment of national democratic

institutions as quite successful. The opposition, although criti- cal of the composition of the DAs, accepted the assemblies in

principle.

The DAs gave new momentum to the exercise of grass-roots

democracy as well as to local determination of and implementation of development projects. The principle of nonpartisan,

decentralized political structure proved popular. By-laws passed

by the DAs had to be deposited with the PNDC secretariat

immediately after their passage. If within twenty-one days the

PNDC raised no objection to them, they automatically became

law.Some elected representatives, a majority of whom were farmers and school teachers, resented the fact that PNDC appointees, mostly chiefs and professionals who constituted one-third

of the memberships of the DAs, often sought to dominate the

proceedings. Also, most of the districts and their people were

poor, and the DAs' quick resort to taxes and numerous levies to

raise much-needed revenue proved burdensome and unpopular. In some parts of the country, for example Cape Coast and

Accra, there were protests and tax revolts. In August 1989,

regional coordinating councils were formed in all ten regions

to streamline the work of the DAs and to coordinate district

policies and projects. The PNDC made it clear that DAs had no

power to collect or to levy income taxes. Charting the Political Transition

The inauguration of the DAs removed some of the political

pressures on the PNDC, but political ferment continued in

some sectors of the population. So, too, did the arrest and

detention of leading opponents of the PNDC regime. The

most publicized of the latter was the arrest and detention in

208
Government and Politics

September 1989 of Major Courage Quarshigah, ex-commandant of the Ghana Military Academy and a former close ally of

Rawlings. He was accused of leading an attempted coup and of an alleged plot to assassinate Rawlings (see The 1981 Coup and

the Second Rawlings Government, ch. 5).

A new phase of the political struggle of the opposition

against the PNDC opened in January 1990 when the GBA

called on the PNDC to initiate immediately a referendum that

would permit the Ghanaian people to determine openly the

form of constitutional government they wished for themselves.

In his end-of-year message in 1989, Rawlings had promised that

the government would strengthen participatory democracy at the grass-roots level. He also proposed that the NCD initiate

nationwide consultations with various groups to determine the

country's economic and political future. These consultations

consisted of a series of seminars, in all ten regional capitals,

that ran from July 5 to November 9, 1990, at which the public was invited to express its views.

Meanwhile, the CBC issued a communique calling for a national debate on Ghana's political future. On July 24, the

Kwame Nkrumah Revolutionary Guards (KNRG) issued a state- ment calling for a return to multiparty democracy, for the lift- ing of the ban on political parties, and for the creation of a constituent assembly to draft a new constitution to be approved

by a national referendum. On August 1, the KNRG, other

opposition organizations, and some prominent Ghanaians

formed the Movement for Freedom and Justice (MFJ). Adu

Boahen was named interim chairman. The MFJ identified the

restoration of multiparty democracy and the rule of law in

Ghana as its main objectives. Its leaders immediately complained about harassment by the security agencies and about

denial of permits to hold public rallies by the police.

Debate about the country's political future dominated 1991.

In his broadcast to the nation on New Year's Day, Rawlings out- lined steps toward the next stages in the country's political evolution, which included issuance of an NCD report on what

form of democracy Ghanaians preferred. The PNDC made it clear that it did not favor multiparty democracy, although its spokesmen indicated that the PNDC had an open mind on the

matter. The MFJ immediately called for a constituent assembly,

where all parties, including the PNDC, would submit proposals

for Ghana's constitutional future. Meanwhile, the PNDC

unveiled a statue ofJ.B. Danquah, Nkrumah's political oppo209
Ghana: A Country Study

nent, after an announcement in 1990 that it would build a statue and a memorial park for Nkrumah. This was a clear

attempt to placate and to woo both the Ghanaian "political

right" and Nkrumahists of the "left" simultaneously.

In late March, the NCD presented its findings on "true

democracy" to the PNDC. After receiving the NCD report, the

PNDC announced in May that it accepted the principle of a multiparty system. In its response to the NCD report, the

PNDC pledged to set up a committee of constitutional experts

that would formulate the draft constitutional proposals to be

placed before a national consultative assembly. The committee

came into being in May. A 258-member National Consultative

Assembly was elected in June with the task of preparing a draft

constitution for submission to the PNDC not later than December 31, 1991. The PNDC was then to submit the draft constitution to a national referendum, after which, if approved, it was

to enter into force on a date set by the PNDC.

In August Rawlings announced that presidential and parliamentary elections would be held before the end of 1992 and

that international observers would be allowed. By the end of

1991, however, the PNDC had not announced when the ban on

political parties would be lifted, although many individuals and

organizations, such as the Kwame Nkrumah Welfare Society,

the Friends of Busia and Danquah, and the Eagle Club, had

formed or reemerged and were active as parties in all but name. Despite persistent acrimony surrounding the management and control of the transition process, the PNDC

appointed an independent Interim National Electoral Commission in February 1992. The commission was responsible for

the register of voters, the conduct of fair elections, and the

review of boundaries of administrative and electoral areas. In a nationwide radio and television broadcast on March 5

marking the thirty-fifth anniversary of Ghana's independence,

Rawlings officially announced the following timetable for the

return to constitutional government: presentation of the draft

constitution to the PNDC by the end of March 1992; a referendum on the draft constitution on April 28, 1992; lifting of the

ban on political parties on May 18, 1992; presidential elections on November 3, 1992; parliamentary elections on December 8, 1992; and the inauguration of the Fourth Republic on January

7, 1993.

The PNDC saw the constitutional referendum as an essential

exercise that would educate ordinary Ghanaians about the

210
Government and Politics

draft constitution and that would create a national consensus. The PNDC opposition urged its supporters and all Ghanaians

to support the draft constitution by voting for it. In the April

1992 national referendum, the draft constitution was over- whelmingly approved by about 92 percent of voters. Although

the turnout was lower than expected (43.7 percent of registered voters), it was higher than that of the 1978 referendum

(40.3 percent) and that of the 1979 parliamentary elections

(35.2 percent). The new constitution provided that a referendum should have a turnout of at least 35 percent, with at least 70 percent in favor, in order to be valid.

After the lifting of the ban on party politics in May, several

rival splinter groups or offshoots of earlier organizations, notably the so-called Nkrumahists and Danquah-Busiaists, as well as new groups, lost no time in declaring their intention to register

as political parties and to campaign for public support. In June

the Washington-based International Foundation for Electoral

Systems, which had sent a team to Ghana to observe the April

referendum, issued a report recommending re-registration of

voters as quickly as possible if Ghana were to have truly competitive presidential and parliamentary elections. The foundation

claimed that the total number of registered voters—8.4 million—was improbable. Given an estimated national population

of about 16 million—of whom about half were under age fif- teen—the Foundation concluded that with a voting age of

eighteen, the total registrable population ought not to be

above 7.75 million.

This discovery fueled a persistent opposition demand to reopen the voters register, but constraints of time, technology,

and money made such an effort impossible. Instead, the

Interim National Electoral Commission embarked on a "voters register cleansing." Only about 180,000 names were removed

from the referendum register, however, leaving the total registered voters at 8.23 million, a statistical impossibility, the opposition insisted. Estimates put the actual number of registered

voters at about 6.2 million, making the 3.69 million turn-out at the referendum an adjusted 59.5 percent.

Presidential Elections

Despite protests and demands for a new voters register,

which had not been met when nominations for presidential

candidates for the November 3 elections closed on September

29, 1992, five presidential candidates representing five political

211
Ghana: A Country Study

parties filed their nomination papers. Apart from Rawlings,

who after months of uncertainty decided to run as a candidate

for the National Democratic Congress (NDC), the other four

presidential candidates were Adu Boahen of the New Patriotic

Party (NPP); Hilla Limann, former president of Ghana, of the

People's National Convention (PNC); Kwabena Darko, a multimillionaire businessman, of the National Independence Party

(NIP); and Lieutenant General (retired) Emmanuel Erskine,

of the People's Heritage Party (PHP). The PNC, the NIP, and

the PHP were all Nkrumahists. A much-discussed alliance

among these fractious and disorganized parties did not materialize, even though just before the elections there was talk of a

possible grand anti-Rawlings coalition.

The real issue of the 1992 presidential election was whether

Rawlings would succeed in holding on to power as a democratically elected head of state after nearly eleven years as an

unelected one. The slogan of the NDC was "continuity," meaning the continuity of PNDC policies. In fact, to many Ghanaians, the NDC party was the same as the PNDC without the

initial "P." The opposition, by contrast, could not articulate a

clear, consistent, and convincing alternative program.

The most serious challenge to Rawlings came from Boahen,

who had significant support among the urban middle classes

and among his ethnic kin in Ashanti Region. The inevitable

split of the Nkrumahist vote weakened the chances of each of

the three Nkrumahist candidates. Darko was hardly known out- side Kumasi and Accra, and Limann was popularly seen as a weak and dull leader. Erskine was hardly a household word,

even in his home area of Central Region. The presidential election was not fought over ideology or clearly presented political

programs, but rather over personalities, over Rawlings' s human

rights record, and over allegations that he had been in power

for too long.

After elections in 200 constituencies (sixty new electoral constituencies had been added to the old 140) on November 3,

1992, Rawlings won a convincing majority over all his opponents combined. The margin of victory surprised not only Rawlings, but his political rivals as well. The hoped-for run-off

election did not materialize because Rawlings had gained an

outright majority of almost 60 percent of the nearly 4 million

votes cast. Rawlings won resoundingly in regions where his opponents,

especially Boahen, had been expected to carry the day. Boahen

212
ERSKINE FOR PRESIDE*

Campaign billboards erected for the national elections of late 1992. Such

billboards appeared throughout Ghana, an indication of the competitive nature of the elections. CourtesyJames Sanders

213
Ghana: A Country Study

received 30.4 percent of the total votes; Limann, 6.7 percent;

Darko, 2.8 percent; Erskine, 1.7 percent; and Rawlings, 58.3

percent. Rawlings even won 62 percent of the vote in BrongAhafo Region, which was considered a stronghold of the Danquah-Busiaist political tradition. He also won in Greater Accra

Region, where NUGS, the GBA, the TUC, and the middle-class

opposition had been unsparing in their anti-PNDC attacks.

Boahen received a majority vote in his NPP heartland, Ashanti

Region, and in Eastern Region where he was born.

A public opinion poll conducted in late 1990 and early 1991

in Accra, Kumasi, and Sekondi-Takoradi indicated some of the reasons for Rawlings's victory. The poll suggested that, in spite

of the PNDC's record of human rights abuses and the negative

impact of the ERP, the PNDC was more popular in urban areas than had been thought. The PNDC was perceived as having

done much to rehabilitate the country's infrastructure, to

instill national pride, and to improve the efficiency and honesty of government spending. Although many of the respondents felt that their standard of living had worsened since the

PNDC came to power and since the implementation of the

Structural Adjustment Program, a significant number also indicated that they and the country would have been worse off

without the ERP. Although many considered the PNDC too

authoritarian, Rawlings personally continued to be very popular and received much of the credit for the PNDC's successes, while the PNDC as a whole was blamed for its more negative

characteristics.

The shock of the NPP's electoral defeat led immediately to disturbances in some regional capitals. A curfew was imposed

in Kumasi, but in most of the country, the results were

accepted without incident. The opposition parties, however,

immediately protested, crying fraud as well as rigging of the

ballot and asking the interim electoral commission not to declare a winner until allegations of irregularities had been

investigated. On November 10, however, the commission for- mally declared Rawlings the winner.

Meanwhile, the opposition parties had announced their

intention to boycott the parliamentary elections rescheduled

from December 8 to December 29, following an appeal to the

interim electoral commission. Efforts to get the opposition to reconsider its boycott proved unsuccessful, even after the

National House of Chiefs announced in late November that it felt the presidential election had been fair and free. Many

214
Government and Politics

European ambassadors in Accra likewise announced that they

had no difficulty recognizing Rawlings's victory. International

election monitoring teams from the Organization of African

Unity, the Commonwealth of Nations, and the Carter Center in

the United States also endorsed the results of the presidential

election, although with reservations in some cases. Parliamentary Elections

The PNDC indicated that it intended to proceed with parliamentary elections with or without the opposition parties. In a gesture to its opponents, however, the PNDC extended the

deadline for all parties to register independent candidates, but

opposition party officials threatened to deal severely with any

party member who ran as an independent candidate. Amid

sporadic political violence—some of it linked to the opposition, arrests of members of opposition groups by state security

officers, and accusations of PNDC intimidation and harassment by the four opposition parties boycotting the elections

parliamentary elections were held on December 29, 1992, without the participation of the opposition parties.

Ironically, in boycotting the parliamentary elections, the

opposition offered the PNDC the continuity it had been vigorously campaigning for and undermined any possibility of multiparty parliamentary democracy in the first term of the Fourth

Republic. At the close of nominations for the elections on

December 1, the NDC was unopposed in fifteen of the 200 constituencies. Only five candidates from the four main opposition

parties had registered. According to the Interim National Electoral Commission, of the 7.3 million registered voters, more

than 2 million voted on election day. The supporters of the

four opposition parties stayed away, as did many NDC supporters, who felt that an NDC landslide victory was a foregone conclusion. The number of registered voters excluded twentythree constituencies where the candidates were elected unopposed, so the turnout represented 29 percent of voters in 177

constituencies. The NDC swept the board, winning 189 of the

200 parliamentary seats, including the twenty-three who were

elected unopposed. Two other parties allied with the NDC in

what was called the Progressive Alliance—the National Convention Party and the Every Ghanaian Living Everywhere Party

won eight seats and one seat, respectively. The remaining two

seats were captured by two independent women candidates,

215
Ghana: A Country Study

part of a group of sixteen women elected to parliament, the

largest number ever in Ghana.

In the presidential election, almost 4 million out of 8.3 million registered voters had cast their votes in all 200 constituencies combined, for a turnout of 48 percent. The total votes cast in the parliamentary elections represented 51.5 percent of the

votes cast in the presidential election. The opposition parties were quick to ascribe the low turnout to the effectiveness of

their boycott. But the low turnout was also explained in part by

the absence of real issues and the fact that many people chose

to stay at home over the Christmas holidays.

Rawlings and the NDC won the elections because the opposition was divided for the most part and failed to present a credible alternative to the PNDC. The programs on which the

opposition campaigned did not differ substantially from those

the PNDC had been implementing since 1983. The opposition

parties, for example, advocated a free enterprise economy,

political decentralization, rural development, and liberal

democracy—measures already on the PNDC agenda.

When external pressures in line with political reforms else- where on the continent persuaded Rawlings to return to multiparty democracy at the national level, he could do so without

taint of corruption. Despite widespread human rights abuses in

the early years of the revolution, he had demonstrated genuine concern for the well-being of the people of Ghana.

Rawlings also won because, as head of state for more than a decade, his name had become a household word, and he was

able to exploit the advantages of incumbency. He had won

favor with a wide range of interest groups, influential chiefs,

and local leaders. Rawlings had behind him a well-established

nationwide network of CDRs, the 31st December Women's

Movement, other so-called revolutionary organs, and dedicated district secretaries and chiefs for the propagation of his

message. All these bodies and groups had been active long

before the fractious political parties, the rival leaders of which

were hardly known beyond the major cities, had struggled into

existence. Finally, Rawlings won because of widespread belief

in his personal sincerity and integrity.

The Fourth Republic

The 1992 Constitution

The 1992 Constitution of the Republic of Ghana that came

216
Government and Politics

into effect on January 7, 1993, provides the basic charter for

the country's fourth attempt at republican democratic government since independence in 1957. It declares Ghana to be a

unitary republic with sovereignty residing in the Ghanaian people. Drawn up with the intent of preventing future coups, dictatorial government, and one-party states, it is designed to foster

tolerance and the concept of power-sharing. The document

reflects the lessons drawn from the abrogated constitutions of

1957, 1960, 1969, and 1979, and it incorporates provisions and

institutions drawn from British and United States constitutional models.

The 1992 constitution, as the supreme law of the land, provides for the sharing of powers among a president, a parliament, a cabinet, a Council of State, and an independent

judiciary (see fig. 12). Through its system of checks and bal- ances, it avoids bestowing preponderant power on any specific

branch of government. Executive authority is shared by the

president, the twenty-five-member Council of State, and

numerous advisory bodies, including the National Security

Council. The president is head of state, head of government,

and commander in chief of the armed forces of Ghana. He also

appoints the vice president.

Legislative functions are vested in the National Parliament,

which consists of a unicameral 200-member body plus the president. To become law, legislation must have the assent of the

president, who has a qualified veto over all bills except those to which a vote of urgency is attached. Members of parliament are popularly elected by universal adult suffrage for terms of four

years, except in war time, when terms may be extended for not

more than twelve months at a time beyond the four years. The structure and the power of the judiciary are independent of the two other branches of government. The Supreme

Court has broad powers ofjudicial review. It is authorized by

the constitution to rule on the constitutionality of any legislative or executive action at the request of any aggrieved citizen.

The hierarchy of courts derives largely from British juridical

forms. The hierarchy, called the Superior Court ofJudicature,

is composed of the Supreme Court of Ghana, the Court of

Appeal (Appellate Court), the High Court ofJustice, regional

tribunals, and such lower courts or tribunals as parliament may

establish. The courts have jurisdiction over all civil and criminal matters.

217
Ghana: A Country Study

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218
Government and Politics The legal system is based on the constitution, Ghanaian

common law, statutory enactments of parliament, and assimilated rules of customary (traditional) law. The 1992 constitution, like previous constitutions, guarantees the institution of

chieftaincy together with its traditional councils as established

by customary law and usage. The National House of Chiefs,

without executive or legislative power, advises on all matters

affecting the country's chieftaincy and customary law. The 1992 constitution contains the most explicit and comprehensive provisions in Ghana's postcolonial constitutional

history regarding the system of local government as a decentralized form of national administration. These provisions were

inspired to a large extent by current law and by the practice of

local government under the PNDC. Another constitutional

innovation is the enshrinement of fundamental human rights

and freedoms enforceable by the courts. These rights include

cultural rights, women's rights, children's rights, the rights of

disabled persons, and the rights of the ill. The constitution also

guarantees the freedom and independence of the media and

makes any form of censorship unconstitutional. In addition,

the constitution protects each Ghanaian's right to be represented by legitimately elected public officials by providing for

partisan national elections and non-partisan district elections.

Every citizen of Ghana eighteen years of age or above and of

sound mind has the right to vote. The right to form political

parties is guaranteed—an especially important provision in

light of the checkered history of political parties in postcolonial Ghana. Political parties must have a national character and

membership and are not to be based on ethnic, religious,

regional, or other sectional divisions.

Finally, highly controversial provisions of the constitution

indemnify members and appointees of the PNDC from liability

for any official act or omission during the eleven years of

PNDC rule. These provisions seem designed to prevent the real

possibility of retribution, should a new government hostile to the PNDC replace it, and to foster a climate of peace and reconciliation.

The Judiciary

Since independence in 1957, the court system, headed by

the chief justice, has demonstrated extraordinary independence and resilience. The structure and jurisdiction of the

courts were defined by the Courts Act of 1971, which estab219
Ghana: A Country Study

lished the Supreme Court of Ghana (or simply the Supreme

Court), the Court of Appeal (Appellate Court) with two divi- sions (ordinary bench and full bench), and the High Court of

Justice (or simply the High Court), a court with both appellate

and original jurisdiction. The act also established the so-called

inferior and traditional courts, which, along with the above

courts, constituted the judiciary of Ghana according to the

1960, 1979, and 1992 constitutions.

Until mid-1993, the inferior courts in descending order of

importance were the circuit courts, the district courts (magistrate courts) grades I and II, and juvenile courts. Such courts

existed mostly in cities and large urban centers. In mid-1993,

however, Parliament created a new system of lower courts, consisting of circuit tribunals and community tribunals in place of

the former circuit courts and district (magistrate) courts (see

Developing Democratic Institutions, this ch.). The traditional

courts are the National House of Chiefs, the regional houses of

chiefs, and traditional councils. The traditional courts are constituted by the judicial committees of the various houses and

councils. All courts, both superior and inferior, with the exception of the traditional courts, are vested with jurisdiction in

civil and criminal matters. The traditional courts have exclusive

power to adjudicate any case or matter affecting chieftaincy as defined by the Chieftaincy Act of 1971.

Judicial appointments are made by the chiefjustice on the

advice of the independent Judicial Council of Ghana and are subject to government approval. The PNDC Establishment

Proclamation abolished the Judicial Council, but it was reestablished by the 1992 constitution.

Ghana also has quasi-judicial agencies and institutions.

Examples of these are the Reconciliation Committee of the

Department of Social Welfare and Community Development,

provision for private hearings at home, and the use of various

spiritual agencies, such as shrines, churches, Muslim malams,

and specialists in the manipulation of supernatural powers to whom many ordinary people resort. Noteworthy for both the colonial and the postcolonial periods up to the present are the special courts, public tribunals,

politico-military bodies such as asafo companies (see Glossary),

and vigilante groups. These bodies exercise quasi-judicial,

extra-judicial, and law enforcement functions that often complement, and in some cases attempt to supplant, the functions

of the regular or traditional courts.

220
Government and Politics

Of these special courts, the former public tribunals deserve

special mention. Following the 1981 revolution, the PNDC

established a number ofjudicial institutions intended to check

abuse and corruption within the regular courts. These special

courts, called people's courts or public tribunals, were established in August 1982 as a separate system for administering

justice alongside the country's regular courts. Their purpose

was to regulate the administration ofjustice to prevent frivolous abuse of court powers and to obtain the truth by concentrating on the facts of the case rather than on questions of law. The public tribunals, which consisted of the National Public

Tribunal, regional public tribunals, and district and community public tribunals, were an attempt to "democratize" the

administration ofjustice by making it possible for the public at large to participate actively injudicial decision making. They

were also meant to correct perceived deficiencies of the regular courts, to enhance the general accessibility of law to the

common people, to promote social justice, and to provide insti- tutional safeguards that would secure public accountability.

The right of appeal against the verdict of the tribunals was not

originally provided for until public outcry led to the introduction of appeals procedures in 1984.

Under the PNDC, the public tribunals exercised only criminal jurisdiction. They dealt with three categories of offenses

against the state: criminal offenses referred to them by the

PNDC government, certain offenses under the country's Criminal Code, and offenses listed in the Public Tribunals Law of

1984. Proceedings of the tribunals were generally public and

swift; sentences were frequently harsh and included death by

firing squad. Under the Public Tribunals Law of 1984, without

prejudice to the appellate system set out in the law itself, no

court or other tribunal could question any decision, order, or proceeding of a public tribunal.

The creation of public tribunals and the PNDC's violent

attack on lawyers set the PNDC on a collision course with the

Ghana Bar Association, which forbade its members to sit on

public tribunals. Many of the rulings of the public tribunals were cited by Amnesty International and other human rights

organizations as violations of such rights as freedom of the

press and habeas corpus (see Human Rights, ch. 5). Under the

Fourth Republic, the public tribunals were incorporated into

the existing court hierarchy (see Developing Democratic Insti- tutions, this ch.).

221
Ghana: A Country Study

The Civil Service

The civil service, an integral part of the executive branch of

government, is a major component of the public services of

Ghana, which come under supervision of the Public Services

Commission. Ghana's civil service is organized along British

lines and constitutes one of the most enduring legacies of British colonial rule. The 1992 constitution provides that the president, acting in accordance with the advice of the Public

Services Commission, appoint a public officer to head the civil service.

The civil service is Ghana's single largest employer, and its union is large and strong. It recruits graduates of Ghana's three

universities and other educational institutions through a sys- tem of competitive examinations. Staffing of the civil and the

public services with competent personnel is the principal function of the Public Services Commission, which serves as the

government's central personnel agency.

The Office of the Head of Civil Service includes a large team

of administrators, executive and management analysts, and

other technical experts. These officials supervise a hierarchy of

graded personnel working in such areas as health, agriculture,

transportation and communications, and local government.

Working in cooperation with them are other state bodies such

as the Chieftaincy Secretariat, Audit Service, Public Services

Commission, and Ghana Cocoa Board. Since the launching in

1983 of the ERP, an austere economic program that the NDC

government of the Fourth Republic continues to implement,

the civil service has been cut drastically. Despite the retrenchment, civil servants have not engaged in organized protests or

strikes, although they have threatened to do so. The Media

The Ghanaian government owns the only two major daily

newspapers, the Daily Graphic (known as the People's Daily

Graphic under the PNDC) and the Ghanaian Times, with 1994

daily circulations of 80,000-100,000 and 60,000-70,000, respectively (circulation varies according to the availability of newsprint). The other daily, The Pioneer, established in 1930, is an independent paper with a circulation of about 30,000. There

are also a number of weekly newspapers with substantial circulations, including the independents, the Christian Messenger and

the Standard, and the state-owned Sunday Mirror and Weekly

222
Government and Politics

Spectator, the latter two with 1994 circulations of 85,000 and

about 90,000, respectively. A number of state-owned and independent periodicals appear in English and in African languages.

The 1979 constitution, which the PNDC suspended after tak- ing power, was the first to give special attention to Ghana's mass

media. It prohibited press licensing, outlawed censorship, and

guaranteed freedom of expression and equal access to the

state-owned media. The constitution also provided for the

establishment of an independent press commission, the

responsibilities of which included appointing chief executives

and boards of directors for the state-owned media, preserving

press freedom, and maintaining the highest professional stan- dards.

Under the PNDC, self-censorship was the rule in the media.

The government considered it the responsibility of the state- owned media, if not the media in general, to project a good

image of the government and to defend government programs

and policies. To ensure compliance with this policy, the PNDC

hired and dismissed editorial staff and other media personnel

of government-owned publications. The Ghana Journalists

Association, which acted as a pressure group for the advancement of the professional interests ofjournalists, had little real

influence. The Newspaper Licensing Law, reintroduced by the

PNDC in 1983, discouraged or inhibited the establishment and

the freedom of private media.

The state-owned media and some of the privately owned

local newspapers attacked Ghanaian journalists who worked or wrote for the foreign press, accusing them of supporting or col- laborating with organizations opposed to the PNDC. With the

suspension of the 1979 constitution, such rights as freedom of

the press, freedom of assembly, and freedom of association were not guaranteed but were merely granted at the discretion

of the PNDC; however, numerous professional and civic organizations and independent newspapers that were non-political were allowed to exist and to operate freely.

The Committee of Experts (Constitution) Law of May 1991,

which established the Committee of Experts to draw up proposals for a draft constitution, required that the proposals

should assure the freedom and the independence of the

media. Accordingly, the 1992 constitution guarantees fundamental human rights and civil liberties, including the freedom

and the independence of the media. To protect the indepen223
Ghana: A Country Study

dence of the media, the National Media Commission was cre- ated in 1993 in accordance with a constitutional provision. The

commission, an independent body, is charged with ensuring

that all types of media, private as well as state-owned, are free of

government control and interference. Under the Fourth

Republic, the press has begun to enjoy a significant degree of

toleration and freedom of expression.

Regional and Local Government

Before the changes in regional and local administration

under the PNDC, Ghana had a highly centralized government

structure in which local people and communities were little involved in decision making. Local government services were poor and depended largely on funds and personnel provided

by the national government in Accra. Since the 31st December

1981 Revolution, however, local government has increasingly

benefited from the decentralization of government ministries

and from the establishment of district assemblies in 1989.

Ghana is divided into ten administrative regions, each

headed by a regional secretary. The ten regions and their

regional capitals are: Greater Accra Region (Accra), Eastern

Region (Koforidua), Central Region (Cape Coast), Western

Region (Sekondi-Takoradi) , Volta Region (Ho), Ashanti

Region (Kumasi), Brong-Ahafo Region (Sunyani), Northern

Region (Tamale), Upper East Region (Bolgatanga) , and Upper

West Region (Wa) (see fig. 1). After taking power, the PNDC

launched a decentralization plan in December 1982 designed

to restructure government machinery to promote democracy

and greater efficiency. The plan proposed a three-tier system of

local government to replace the four-tier system established in

1978.

This early decentralization plan, however, was not implemented. Instead, interim management committees were organized to manage the affairs of the district councils. PNDC

district secretaries were appointed chairmen of their respective

district councils and were responsible for day-to-day administration. Membership of the interim management committees nor- mally consisted of respected citizens of the district, such as

chiefs, headmasters, retired administrators, and teachers. At

the lowest levels, local government remained in the hands of

village, town, or area development committees; People's

Defence Committees; and chiefs and their traditional councils,

who still wielded considerable influence in most rural areas.

224
Government and Politics On July 1, 1987, the PNDC launched a three-tier system of

local government. The principal innovations of the new system

included creating 110 administrative districts to replace the

sixty-five districts that had existed before and changing the

name District Council to District Assembly. The District Assembly was to be the highest political and administrative authority

in each district, with deliberative, executive, and legislative

powers; it was responsible for creating the two lower-level tiers,

town or area councils and unit committees, within its jurisdiction (see fig. 13).

The membership of the District Assembly included a district

secretary appointed by the PNDC. Two-thirds of the members

were directly elected by universal adult suffrage on a non-parti- san basis; the other third were appointed by the PNDC from

the district in consultation with traditional authorities and vari- ous associations. Appointed members held office for a maximum of two consecutive terms, that is six years. Elections to the

District Assembly were to be held every three years (the 1992

constitution provides for a four-year term and reduces the

number of appointed members from one-third to no more

than thirty percent of the total membership). The District

Assembly was made responsible for the overall development of

the district. A 1990 law ensures that people at the grass-roots level have

the opportunity to help make decisions that affect them

regardless of their education or socio-economic backgrounds,

as long as they are eighteen years or older and are customarily

residents of the district. Finally, in each of the ten regions, a Regional Coordinating Council was established consisting of

the regional secretary, the deputies of the regional secretaries

acting as ex-officio members, all district secretaries in the

region, and all presiding members of the district assemblies in

the region. The 1992 constitution added at least two chiefs to the membership of each council. The functions of the council

include the formulation and the coordination of programs

through consultation with district assemblies in the region.

The council is responsible for harmonizing these programs

with national development policies and priorities, and for

monitoring, implementing, and evaluating programs and

projects within the region.

A local government law passed in 1991 created thirteen submetropolitan district councils and fifty-eight town or area councils under three metropolitan assemblies; 108 zonal councils

225
Ghana: A Country Study

226
Government and Politics

under four municipal assemblies; and thirty-four urban, 250

town, and 626 area councils under 103 district assemblies. (District assemblies, of which there are 110, are designated metropolitan and municipal assemblies in metropolitan centers and

major cities.) In addition, 16,000 unit committees were established under metropolitan, municipal, and district assemblies

throughout the country. No Urban Council, Zonal Council,

Town Council, or Unit Committee has the power to levy any

taxes without the approval of the relevant assembly.

The functions of urban, zonal, and town councils include

assuming the functions of the former town and village development committees and assisting any person authorized by the

assembly to collect revenues due the assembly. In addition, the

councils organize annual congresses of the people within their

respective jurisdictions to discuss economic development and

to raise contributions to fund such development. Membership

in urban, zonal, or town councils and in unit committees consists of both elected and appointed people from within the

respective jurisdiction.

Each of the ten regions is administered from the regional

headquarters or capital by a regional secretary, who is the

regional political and administrative head. The regional secre- tary is supported by metropolitan and municipal secretaries

and their metropolitan and municipal assemblies as well as by

district secretaries and the district assemblies they head. At the

regional headquarters, the regional secretary is assisted by a Regional Consultative Council and a Regional Coordinating

Council, both chaired by the regional secretary. The number

of administrative districts within regions varies—Ashanti

Region having the most—eighteen—and Greater Accra Region

and Upper West Region, the fewest—five. The establishment

of a district assembly in each region ensured that, with the local

people in control of their own affairs, no part of the country

would be neglected.

Political Dynamics under the Fourth Republic

Launching the Fourth Republic

The coming into force of the new constitution with the inauguration of the Fourth Republic and the installation ofJerry

Rawlings as the first popularly elected president of Ghana on

January 7, 1993, opened a new chapter in Ghana. In spite of

the heat of partisan politics, the country's political climate

227
Ghana: A Country Study

remained encouragingly peaceful on the whole. There were

clear indications that both the ruling National Democratic

Congress (NDC) and opposition parties and groups as well as the general public were committed to making constitutional

democracy work.

The new government faced several challenges in early 1993.

One of the most serious, of course, was the problem of persis- tent and widespread economic hardship. Another was the insti- tutionalization of democratic practice and constitutionalism in a de facto single-party parliament that resulted from the opposition boycott of parliamentary elections. In boycotting the

elections, the main opposition parties, who together received

about 40 percent of the total vote in the presidential election,

denied themselves not only potential cabinet appointments but

also any direct representation in parliament and any opportunity for real power-sharing.

This was regrettable, because throughout Ghana's postindependence history, the legislature has been the weakest of the

three branches of government. Without sitting in parliament,

the opposition could hardly constitute an effective shadow cabinet or function as a credible government-in-waiting. The cre- ation of a new voters register and a national individual

identification system as called for by the opposition, which

Rawlings publicly acknowledged as necessary, would also help

build a more effective and durable multiparty democracy. A

step in this direction came in early 1994 when the National

Electoral Commission, created in 1993, set up the Inter-Party

Advisory Committee to advise it on electoral issues. This gesture has helped dispel the opposition's view that the electoral

commission is a pro-government body.

Since the 1992 elections, the opposition parties, notably the

NPP led by Adu Boahen, have sought to prove their commitment to constitutionalism by organizing public rallies, peaceful

demonstrations, and press conferences. They have been aided

by the emergence of a vigorous private press and by state-con- trolled media that have sought to report the views of opposition groups. The opposition also has chosen to go to court

against alleged breaches of the constitution rather than to resort to confrontation and violence. Indeed, the NPP has

urged its supporters to familiarize themselves with their constitutional rights, to criticize the government when it is wrong,

and, whenever necessary, to resort to the courts and not to violence.

228
Government and Politics

Such tactics on the part of the opposition are consistent with

the principal concerns raised by Rawlings at the inauguration

of the Fourth Republic. In his presidential address, Rawlings

called for consultation and cooperation with all political

groups in the country. He said that the NDC government

would continue to reach out to the opposition parties that had

boycotted the elections because it was the government's aim to establish a culture of tolerance, consultation, and consensusbuilding based on mutual respect.

In his address, Rawlings also indicated the basic orientation

of his government. He emphasized that the condition of the

national economy "must be the foundation of Ghana's democratic aspirations and remained the government's greatest challenge." He noted that his government was determined to continue the Economic Recovery Program (ERP) and that the

new constitutional order could not be divorced from the

changes brought about by the 31st December 1981 Revolution.

In addition, he remarked that he bore no personal grudge

against any person or any group (having in mind the pre- and

postpresidential election disturbances and violence) and

invited others to adopt the same attitude.

Rawlings assured the armed forces that they would remain

actively involved in all national endeavors and also indicated

that Ghana's role in world affairs would not change. The continuity in domestic, economic, and foreign policy that Rawlings

stressed is reflected in the government's ministerial and other

appointments. For example, at the end of May 1993, twentyone of thirty-five ministers had been secretaries under the

former PNDC government; many of them held the same portfolios that they had previously held.

Despite some positive steps toward national reconciliation,

part of the opposition continued to distrust the new administration. In the view of these critics, the PNDC was still in power,

and, accordingly, they referred to the new administration as "P/NDC" or "(P)NDC." Some members of the opposition also saw the new parliament as merely a rubber-stamp of the ruling

NDC administration. The reappointment of numerous PNDC

secretaries to the new NDC administration as well as the NDC

pledge of continuity in economic and social policy confirmed

the worst fears of the opposition. The same could be said of a

presidential order in January 1993 to the effect that persons

who had been in office as PNDC secretaries for ministries,

regions, or districts should continue in their offices to avoid

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Ghana: A Country Study

the breakdown of the machinery of government. As the opposition was quick to point out, the presidential order technically

violated the constitution; however, given the extenuating cir- cumstances created by the postponement of the parliamentary

elections, the order was probably unavoidable.

Developing Democratic Institutions

The growing importance of the legislative arm of the government in national affairs was reflected in several developments.

At the state opening of parliament on April 29, 1993, President

Rawlings gave an address in which he emphasized that the contributions of all citizens are necessary in order to achieve the

national goals of economic development and social justice. He

reminded Ghanaians that the proper forum for political

debate under constitutional rule is parliament and called upon

the leaders of the parties in his ruling Progressive Alliance (the

NDC, the National Convention Party (NCP), and the Every

Ghanaian Living Everywhere Party) to welcome serious dialogue with the opposition outside parliament. Such a move

would enable the opposition parties that had boycotted the

parliamentary elections to contribute to national political

debate. The NPP made its views on national policy heard

through invited participation in parliamentary committees,

thus attempting to influence debates and particular legislation.

The executive and the legislative branches worked to ensure passage of nine measures that would establish certain major

state institutions by the July 7, 1993, deadline stipulated in the

constitution. The institutions created were the National Commission on Civic Education, the National Electoral Commission, the District Assemblies Common Fund, the Commission

on Human Rights and Administrative Justice, the Minerals

Commission, the Forestry Commission, the Fisheries Commission, the National Council for Higher Education, and the

National Media Commission.

The Courts Act ofJuly 6, 1993, incorporated the public tri- bunals created under the PNDC into the established court sys- tem. It defined the jurisdiction of regional tribunals and

established lower courts—circuit tribunals and community tri- bunals—to replace the circuit courts and the district (magistrate) courts. It also established the National House of Chiefs,

the regional houses of chiefs, and traditional councils, and it provided that parliament could create other tribunals as the

need arose. The tribunals are empowered to try criminal and

230
Government and Politics

civil cases. Throughout 1993 and 1994, however, the Judicial

Council of Ghana was working to amend the Courts Act to allow the pre-existing circuit and district courts to hear cases meant for circuit and community tribunals until such time as the new tribunals become fully operational. The establishment

of the lower tribunals has been delayed because of lack of staff and of suitable court buildings in all 110 districts, most of

which are poor and rural.

Parliament also passed the controversial Serious Fraud

Office Bill. This bill established a Serious Fraud Office as a specialized agency of the state to monitor, investigate, and, on the

authority of the attorney general, prosecute fraud and serious

economic crimes. According to the bill's proponents, complex

fraud and economic crimes were being committed that posed a

direct threat to national security and that were possibly linked

to illegal drug trafficking, but they could not be adequately

investigated and prosecuted under existing law. Critics of the bill, which included the Ghana Bar Association, saw it as an attempt on the part of the ruling NDC to destroy the NPP, which considers itself the party of business.

They also viewed it as containing provisions conflicting directly

with constitutionally guaranteed fundamental rights to liberty

and property. Under the bill's provisions, anyone can be investigated for fraud except the president, in whose case the constitution provides elaborate procedures for impeachment in case of abuse of power and trust. Parliament's success can be attributed to the leaders of the

opposition and the ruling Progressive Alliance, who chose to

settle their differences through dialogue and constitutional

means rather than through confrontation. The same tendency

to operate within the framework of the new constitution

applies to the judicial realm as well, where the opposition,

especially the NPP, declared itself the principal watchdog and

custodian of civil liberties and of the 1992 constitution. This

task is consistent with the leading role played by the opposition

in the demand for a return to constitutional rule during the

PNDC era. On July 22, 1993, a week after celebrating its first anniversary, the NPP won three major and surprising victories in the

Supreme Court. The court, which the opposition believed to be under the control of the executive, upheld two suits

intended to nullify certain existing laws and decrees that the

NPP claimed conflicted with the 1992 constitution. In the first

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Ghana: A Country Study

suit, the court ordered the Ghana Broadcasting Corporation to grant the NPP "fair and equal access to its facilities within two

weeks" to enable the party to articulate its views on the 1993

budget in the same manner as the ruling NDC.

In the second judgment, the court ruled that certain sec- tions of Public Order Decree 1972 were inconsistent with the

1992 constitution, which grants the individual the right to demonstrate or to take part in a procession without necessarily

obtaining a permit from the police. The NPP had challenged

as unconstitutional the arrest and subsequent prosecution of

some of its members for demonstrating against the 1993 budget on February 15, 1993. On that day, the Accra police had

assaulted the demonstrators, severely injuring many of them.

The verdict in the NPP suit also applied to the shooting attack

on university students by commandos on March 22-23. The

students were protesting the government's refusal to meet their

demand for an increase in student loans from 90,000 to

200,000 cedis (for value of the Ghanaian cedi—see Glossary)

because of a rise in the cost of living. A third suit, which con- cerned police powers with respect to public assemblies, did not

go forward because the law had been repealed.

Two months later, the NPP scored another victory in the

Supreme Court when the party sought a declaration to stop the

election of district chief executives (DCEs) ahead of anticipated District Assembly elections. The NPP noted that the election of DCEs by sitting district assemblies that had only a few

months' remaining tenure in office would infringe the letter

and the intent of the constitution, which requires that newly

elected assemblies, not outgoing assemblies, elect DCEs. The

court granted the NPP's application for an interim injunction

and ordered the suspension of DCE elections until the court

could examine the constitutionality of the elections process.

Candidates for election as DCEs had been nominated by President Rawlings. Within a few days, an announcement was made

that Rawlings had only appointed acting district secretaries, not

DCEs, for all 110 district assemblies; the president's appointees,

however, appeared to be mostly the same individuals nominated as DCEs. The opposition then took this matter to the

Supreme Court on a charge of unconstitutionality, but the

court upheld Rawlings's action in May 1994.

To crown the constitutional victories of the NPP, the

Supreme Court ruled at the end of 1993 that December 31,

marking the 31st December 1981 Revolution, should no longer

232
JerryJohn Rawlings being sworn in as president of the Fourth Republic

of Ghana, January 1993

Courtesy Embassy of Ghana, Washington

be celebrated as a public holiday. The NPP had been particularly outraged when newly elected President Rawlings declared

that any interpretation of the 1992 constitution would be subject to the spirit of the June 4, 1979, uprising and the 31st

December 1981 Revolution. For the opposition, these events

had ushered in the most repressive and bloody decade in the

country's postcolonial history, and they had no place in the

new democratic constitutional order.

The NPP, after documenting alleged irregularities of the

November 1992 presidential elections, consolidated its position as the main opposition party in the country. It presented

itself as the "constitutional" party, the objectives of which are to ensure that constitutional rule is established in Ghana and that

the private sector becomes the engine of growth and development. Furthermore, at a widely reported press conference in

233
Ghana: A Country Study

July 1993 marking the first anniversary of the NPP, the party's

chairman proclaimed his party's readiness to "do business" with

the NDC government.

Doing business with the government did not mean, as many

NPP members had feared, that some members of the NPP

executive would take posts in the NDC administration. It meant talking face-to-face with the president, the legislature,

and the judiciary as well as with independent institutions of

state. These dealings were intended to enhance the constitutional rights of all Ghanaians and to ensure respect for human

rights and proper management of the economy.

The new NPP policy—that of promoting dialogue between

the NPP and the government, which began in November

1993—contributed to a reduction of political tension in the

country. Unlike some of its West African neighbors that are haunted by political uncertainty and torn by war and civil strife,

Ghana continued to enjoy relative peace and political stability.

This was true despite the flare-up of interethnic violence and

killing in the northern region between the Konkomba and the

Nanumba in early 1994, leading to the declaration of a brief

state of emergency in the region.

The minor opposition parties of the Nkrumahist tradition,

which had boycotted dialogue with the NDC government, also

managed after a long period of internal bickering to put their

houses in order in anticipation of the 1996 presidential and

parliamentary elections. The parties subscribing to the ideals

of Nkrumah's Convention People's Party, with the exception of

the People's National Convention led by former president

Limann, united to form the new People's Convention Party,

receiving a certificate of registration in January 1994.

One of the major concerns of the NPP and other opposition

parties was the existence in the Fourth Republic of paramilitary groups and revolutionary organs, such as CDRs, which had

not been disbanded. In August 1993, all CDRs were put into a new organization known as the Association of Committees for

the Defence of the Revolution. This new association was to con- tinue mobilizing the populace for community development

and local initiatives within the framework of the 1992 constitution.

The NPP persisted in its demands for a new voters register

and for national identity cards to ensure free and fair elections

in 1996. When President Rawlings suggested that it was

cheaper to revise the voters register than to issue national iden234
Government and Politics

tity cards, the cost of which would be prohibitive for the government, the NPP threatened to boycott the 1996 elections

unless both electoral demands were met. The potential boycott was seemingly averted in February 1994 when the United

States pledged to fund the printing of identity cards for voters

in the 1996 elections.

The following August, the chairman of the National Electoral Commission promised that the commission would take

appropriate steps to ensure that the presidential and parliamentary elections in 1996 would be free and fair. These steps were to include the training of some 80,000 party agents as observers. The National Electoral Commission later indicated

that identification cards would be issued to voters during registration for a new and revised electoral roll in September 1995.

The Commission also favored holding the elections on the same day and felt that Ghanaians living abroad should have the

right to vote. Eventually the NDC government promised to ensure that the 1996 elections would be free and fair and that

international observers would be allowed.

Meanwhile, on March 22, 1994, the first nonpartisan district- level elections to be conducted under the Fourth Republic

were successfully held in all but thirteen districts, mostly in the

north, where polling was postponed because of interethnic

conflicts. About 10,880 candidates, 383 of them women, competed for 4,282 seats in ninety-seven district, municipal, and

metropolitan assemblies. The new district assemblies were

inaugurated in June 1994, marking another step in the establishment of a democratic system of local government.

By mid-1994, there was general agreement that the government's human rights record had improved considerably. The

improvement resulted in part from the activities of the many

human rights groups being established in the country. The

Ghana Committee on Human and People's Rights, founded by

a group of dedicated lawyers, trade unionists, and journalists

and inaugurated in January 1991, was perhaps the most prominent of these. Another was the Commission on Human Rights

and Administrative Justice, a government body established in

1993 designed to deal with human rights issues and violations

(see Human Rights, ch. 5).

Foreign Relations

Guiding Principles and Objectives

Ghana's foreign policy since independence has been charac235
Ghana: A Country Study

terized by a commitment to the principles and ideals of non- alignment and Pan-Africanism as first enunciated by Kwame

Nkrumah in the early 1960s. For Nkrumah, nonalignment

meant complete independence from the policies and alliances

of both East and West and support for a worldwide union of so- called nonaligned nations as a counter to both East and West

power blocs. Pan-Africanism, by contrast, was a specifically Afri- can policy that envisioned the liberation of African peoples

from Western colonialism and the eventual economic and

political unity of the African continent (see The Organization

of African Unity and the Rest of Africa, this ch.).

The PNDC, like most of its predecessors, made serious and

consistent attempts at the practical application of these ideals

and principles, and its successor, the NDC government, promises to follow in the PNDC's footsteps. Under the NDC, Ghana

remains committed to the principle of nonalignment in world

politics. Ghana is also opposed to interference in the internal

affairs of both small and large countries. This is a departure

from Nkrumah's foreign policy approach; Nkrumah was fre- quently accused of subverting African regimes, such as Togo

and Cote d'lvoire, which he considered ideologically conservative. The NDC government, like the PNDC before it, believes in

the principle of self-determination, including the right to political independence and the right of people to pursue their eco- nomic and social development free from external interference.

Another feature of NDC rule carried over from the PNDC era

is faithfulness to what a leading scholar of Africa has called

"one of the most successful neoclassical economic reform

efforts supported by the IMF and the World Bank."

The broad objectives of Ghana's foreign policy thus include

maintaining friendly relations and cooperation with all countries that desire such cooperation, irrespective of ideological

considerations, on the basis of mutual respect and noninterfer- ence in each other's internal affairs. Africa and its liberation

and unity are naturally the cornerstones of Ghana's foreign

policy. Because Ghana was a founding member of the Organization of African Unity (OAU), NDC policy is to adhere faithfully to the OAU Charter.

Another important principle of Ghana's foreign policy

involves the closest possible cooperation with neighboring

countries with which the people of Ghana share cultural history, ties of blood, and economics. The results have included

various bilateral trade and economic agreements and perma236
Government and Politics

nent joint commissions involving Ghana and its immediate

neighbors, sometimes in the face of latent ideological and

political differences and mutual suspicion, as well as numerous

reciprocal state visits by high-ranking officials. These measures have contributed significantly to subregional cooperation,

development, and the reduction of tension.

As an example of Ghana's interest in regional cooperation,

the country enthusiastically endorsed formation of the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) in 1975.

This organization was created specifically to foster intraregional economic and political cooperation (see Trade, ch.

3). It has served as a useful vehicle for contacts with neighboring West African governments and for channeling increased

Ghanaian exports to regional markets. Since 1990 ECOWAS

has been engaged in a peacekeeping mission in Liberia to which Ghana has contributed a large contingent of troops.

Ghana has participated in other international peacekeeping

efforts as well, sending soldiers to operations of the United

Nations (UN) in Cambodia in 1992-93 and Rwanda in 1993-94

(see International Security Concerns, ch. 5).

In August 1994, Rawlings became ECOWAS chairman, a post

that had eluded him since the PNDC came to power. He immediately undertook several initiatives to reduce tensions and

conflict in West Africa. Notable among them was the Akosombo Accord of September 12, 1994, designed to end civil war

in Liberia.

Relations with Immediate African Neighbors

The NDC government continues to work to improve and to strengthen relations with all of its neighbors, especially Togo,

Cote d'lvoire, Nigeria, and Burkina Faso (Burkina, formerly

Upper Volta). In the early days of PNDC rule, relations with

Togo, Cote d'lvoire, and Nigeria were particularly cool and

even antagonistic. By 1994 Ghana's relations with its West Afri- can neighbors, especially Cote d'lvoire and Togo, had

improved significantly.

Togo and Cote d'lvoire

In the early 1980s, Cote d'lvoire and Togo worried that "the

Rawlings fever," the "revolution," might prove contagious. Both

countries were headed by long-lived conservative governments

faced with potentially dangerous internal and external opposition. The strains in relations among Ghana, Togo, and Cote

237
Ghana: A Country Study

d'lvoire have a long history; in Togo's case, they go back to preindependence days.

After 1918, following the defeat of Germany, the League of

Nations divided the German colony of Togoland from north to south, a decision that divided the Ewe people among the Gold

Coast, British Togoland, and French Togoland. After 1945, the

UN took over the Togoland mandates. During the 1950s, when

the independence of Ghana was in sight, demands grew for a

separate Ewe state, an idea that Kwame Nkrumah, leader of the

Gold Coast independence movement, opposed. Following a UN plebiscite in May 1956, in which a majority of the Ewe

voted for union with Ghana, British Togoland became part of

the Gold Coast. After Togolese independence in 1960, relations between Togo and Ghana deteriorated, aggravated by

political differences and incidents such as smuggling across

their common border. At times, relations have verged on open

aggression.

During the mid-1970s, Togolese President General Gnassingbe Eyadema for a time revived the claim to a part or all of

former British Togoland. Two leading Ewe members from the

Volta Region sent a petition to the UN in 1974. By 1976 a Togoland Liberation Movement and a National Liberation Movement for Western Togoland existed and were agitating for

separation from Ghana. The Eyadema government publicly

backed their demands, although it subsequently agreed to cooperate with the Ghanaian government against the separatist

movements and against smuggling. A factor influencing Eyadema's cooperative attitude was doubtless Togo's dependence

upon electricity from Ghana's Akosombo Dam.

A consistent preoccupation of Ghana, Togo, and Cote d'lvoire is that of national security. The PNDC regime repeatedly

accused both Togo and Cote d'lvoire of harboring armed Ghanaian dissidents who planned to overthrow or to destabilize the

PNDC. The PNDC also accused both countries of encouraging

the smuggling of Ghanaian products and currencies across

their borders, thus undermining Ghana's political and eco- nomic stability at a time when Ghana was experiencing a deep

economic crisis. In June 1983, when the PNDC was barely eighteen months

old, groups opposed to the PNDC made a major attempt to overthrow it. Most of the rebels reportedly came from Togo. In

August 1985, Togo in turn accused Ghana of complicity in a

series of bomb explosions in Lome, the Togolese capital. In

238
Government and Politics

July 1988, an estimated 124 Ghanaians were expelled from

Togo. Nevertheless, relations subsequently improved significantly, leading in 1991 to the reactivation of several bilateral

agreements.

Greatly improved relations between Ghana and Togo, especially after October 1990 when opposition pressure forced Eyadema to agree to a transition to multiparty democracy,

however, could hardly disguise the persistence of old mutual

fears about threats to internal security. For instance, less than

three weeks after Ghana's Fourth Republic was inaugurated, an immense refugee problem was created in Ghana. Following

random attacks and killings of civilians in Lome by Eyadema's

army on January 26, 1993, hundreds of thousands of terrorized

Togolese began fleeing into Ghana. At the end ofJanuary,

Ghanaian troops were placed on high alert on the Ghana-Togo

border, although Obed Asamoah, the Ghanaian minister of

foreign affairs, assured all concerned that there was no conflict

between Ghana and Togo.

Sporadic shooting incidents in the spring continued to produce a regular flow of refugees into Ghana. By May, following

Togo's partial closure of the border, all persons living in Togo,

including diplomats, had to obtain a special permit from the

Togolese interior ministry to travel to Ghana by road. Travelers

from Ghana were allowed into Togo but were not permitted to return. By early June, half of Lome's 600,000 residents were

estimated to have fled to neighboring Ghana and Benin.

At the beginning of 1994, relations between Ghana and

Togo became even worse. On January 6, a commando attack

occurred in Lome, which Togolese authorities described as an attempt to overthrow Eyadema. The Togolese government

accused Ghana of direct or indirect involvement and arrested

Ghana's charge d'affaires in Lome. Togolese troops then bombarded a border post, killing twelve Ghanaians. Camps for

Togolese refugees in Ghana also were reportedly bombarded.

The Ghanaian government announced that it would press

Togo to compensate the families of those killed. By mid-year,

however, relations had improved markedly. In August Togo

supported the nomination of Rawlings for the post of ECOWAS chairman. Thereafter, a joint commission was set up to examine border problems, in mid-November a Ghanaian

ambassador took up residence in Togo for the first time since

the early 1980s, and Togo was considering the reopening of its border with Ghana.

239
Ghana: A Country Study

Ghana-Cote d'lvoire relations suffered from the same ups

and downs that characterized Ghana-Togo relations. In early

1984, the PNDC government complained that Cote d'lvoire was allowing Ghanaian dissidents to use its territory as a base

from which to carry out acts of sabotage against Ghana. Ghana

also accused Cote d'lvoire of granting asylum to political agita- tors wanted for crimes in Ghana. Relations between Ghana and

Cote d'lvoire improved significantly, however, after 1988. In

1989, after fifteen years without progress, the Ghana-Cote

d'lvoire border redemarcation commission finally agreed on

the definition of the 640-kilometer border between the two

countries. The PNDC thereafter worked to improve the trans- portation and communication links with both Cote d'lvoire

and Togo, despite problems with both countries.

By 1992 Ghana's relations with Cote d'lvoire were relatively

good. Hopes for lasting improvement, however, were quickly

dashed following a series of violent incidents in late 1993 and

early 1994. The incidents began on November 1, 1993, with the

return of sports fans to Cote d'lvoire following a championship

soccer match in Kumasi, Ghana, that had resulted in the elimination of Cote d'lvoire from competition. Ghanaian immigrants in Cote d'lvoire were violently attacked, and as many as forty or more Ghanaians were killed. Thereafter, scores of other Ghanaians lost their property as they fled for their lives. Some 1,000 homes and businesses were

looted. More than 10,000 Ghanaians out of the approximately

1 million living in Cote d'lvoire were immediately evacuated by

the Ghanaian government, and more than 30,000 Ghanaians were reported to have sought refuge in the Ghanaian and

other friendly embassies. A twenty-member joint commission

(ten from each country) was established to investigate the

attacks, to recommend compensation for victims, and to find

ways of avoiding similar incidents in the future. In October

1994, the two nations resumed soccer matches after a Togolese

delegation helped smooth relations between them.

Burkina

With the coming to power of Thomas Sankara in Burkina in

1983, relations between Ghana and Burkina became both

warm and close. Indeed, Rawlings and Sankara began discussions about uniting Ghana and Burkina in the manner of the

defunct Ghana-Guinea-Mali Union, which Nkrumah had

sought unsuccessfully to promote as a foundation for his

240
JerryJohn Rawlings,

president of the Fourth

Republic of Ghana

Courtesy

Embassy of Ghana,

Washington

dream of unified continental government (see The OAU and

the Rest of Africa, this ch.). Political and economic ties

between Ghana and Burkina, a poorer country, were strengthened through joint commissions of cooperation and through

border demarcation committee meetings. Frequent high-level

consultations and joint military exercises, meant to discourage

potential dissidents and to protect young "revolutions" in each

country, were fairly regular features of Ghana-Burkina relations.

Ethnic ties between the people of far northern Ghana (notably the Mossi) and Burkina, divided by artificial borders inherited from colonial rule, grew stronger as easy border crossings

and the free exchange of goods and services contributed to marked improvements in the material and the social welfare of

peoples on both sides of the border. The PNDC, for example,

established road, air, and telecommunications links between

Ghana and Burkina.

Ghana's warm relations with Burkina received a serious but

temporary setback with the assassination of Sankara in October

1987. His successor, Blaise Campaore, was widely believed to have been responsible for the assassination. As a result, relations between Ghana and Burkina cooled. Rawlings and Campaore met briefly for the first time in early 1988 in Tamale, the

241
Ghana: A Country Study

capital of Ghana's Northern Region, to discuss Ghana-Burkina

relations.

The outbreak of civil war in Liberia in 1989 found the two

countries on opposite sides of the conflict (see International

Security Concerns, ch. 5). Ghana, at great financial and human

cost, immediately repatriated about 10,000 Ghanaians living in

Liberia and, beginning in mid-1990, contributed a contingent

to a multinational peacekeeping force second in size only to one sent by Nigeria. From 1990 to 1993, Campaore's role in the

Liberian conflict was at odds with an ECOWAS peace initiative

spearheaded by Ghana and Nigeria, because Burkina was

believed to be supplying arms to rebel leader Charles Taylor,

long regarded as the main obstacle to peace. In 1994 relations

between Burkina and Ghana showed signs of warming at a time

when Campaore appeared to be reassessing his policies in

Liberia and toward Ghana and Nigeria.

Nigeria

Ghana's relations with Nigeria, West Africa's leading country,

began on a sour note in the early period of PNDC rule. Tension rose immediately after the PNDC deposed Limann in

1981. In protest, Nigeria refused to continue much-needed oil supplies to Ghana. At the time, Ghana owed Nigeria about

US$150 million for crude oil supplies and depended on Nigeria for about 90 percent of its petroleum needs. Nigeria's

expulsion of more then 1 million Ghanaian immigrants in

early 1983, when Ghana was facing severe drought and eco- nomic problems, and of another 300,000 in early 1985 on short

notice, further strained relations between the two countries.

In April 1988, a joint commission for cooperation was established between Ghana and Nigeria. A bloodless coup in August

1985 had brought Major General Ibrahim Babangida to power

in Nigeria, and Rawlings took advantage of the change of

administration to pay an official visit. The two leaders discussed

a wide range of issues focusing on peace and prosperity within

West Africa, bilateral trade, and the transition to democracy in

both countries. In early January 1989, Babangida reciprocated

with an official visit to Ghana, which the PNDC hailed as a watershed in Ghana-Nigeria relations.

Subsequent setbacks that Babangida initiated in the democratic transition process in Nigeria clearly disappointed Accra.

Nonetheless, the political crisis that followed Babangida's

annulment of the results of the June 1993 Nigerian presiden242
Government and Politics

tial election and Babangida's resignation from the army and

presidency two months later did not significantly alter the exist- ing close relations between Ghana and Nigeria, two of the most

important members of ECOWAS and the Commonwealth of

Nations. After the takeover in November 1993 by General Sani

Abacha as the new Nigerian head of state, Ghana and Nigeria

continued to consult on economic, political, and security issues

affecting the two countries and West Africa as a whole. Between

early August 1994, when Rawlings became ECOWAS chairman,

and the end of the following October, the Ghanaian president

visited Nigeria three times to discuss the peace process in

Liberia and measures to restore democracy in that country.

The Organization of African Unity and the Rest of Africa

Beginning with the independence of Ghana in 1957 under

Kwame Nkrumah, Pan-Africanism, as a movement uniting all peoples of the African continent, was attempted in earnest.

Pan-Africanism became identified with Nkrumah more than

with any other African leader. From 1950 to 1965, the aim was

to achieve political, cultural, and economic integration at the

continental level. Beginning in 1958 with the formation of the Ghana-Guinea

Union, followed shortly by the Ghana-Guinea-Mali Union,

Nkrumah relentlessly pursued his goal of a Union of African

States. Working with leaders of other independent African

countries, he convened a series of conferences to promote the

Pan-African cause. Finally, a summit conference met in Addis

Ababa in May 1963 to resolve the divisions, unite the leaders,

and establish a common Pan-African organization.

After many proposals and counterproposals at the Addis

Ababa conference, thirty African heads of states and governments signed the historic Charter of African Unity, which established the Organization of African Unity (OAU). The charter,

however, fell far short of Nkrumah's ideal of African continental government. At subsequent meetings of the OAU until his

overthrow in 1966, Nkrumah continued to campaign vigorously but unsuccessfully for the transformation of the OAU

into a continental government of a United States of Africa.

Ironically, as independent African states concentrated on

domestic problems and internal developments, they found

themselves compelled to strengthen ties with their former colonial rulers rather than with each other. In Ghana's case, this

243
Ghana: A Country Study

meant closer relations with Britain, particularly after the over- throw of Nkrumah.

In recognition of Nkrumah's stature in the Pan-Africanist

cause, PNDC chairman Rawlings in June 1985 dedicated the

W.E.B. DuBois Memorial Center for Pan-African Culture in

Accra. The DuBois center was established to serve as a Pan-Afri- can research center and library for scholars and students of

Pan-Africanism and to promote research and scholarship in

the tradition of the African-American scholar, W.E.B. DuBois.

The PNDC made a determined effort to revive Ghana's his- torical role as a leader in the OAU and in the struggle against

apartheid in South Africa. The PNDC stepped up material and

financial assistance and diplomatic support to the OAU Liberation Committee, to the African National Congress in South

Africa, and to the South West Africa People's Organisation in

South-West Africa, now Namibia. In 1987 Ghana also became a member of the permanent steering committee of the OAU,

which was charged with forging a common African position on

the continent's debt problem. The same year, Ghana made a

substantial financial contribution of US$5 million to the Afri- can Fund set up by the Non-Aligned Movement to assist Afri- can liberation movements and to strengthen resistance to South African destabilization activities in southern Africa. The

PNDC also contributed US$1.3 million annually to the OAU

budget. Ghana contributed generously to the OAU's Liberation Fund for Namibia as well as US$5 million to the African

Fund for the repatriation of Namibians to enable them to participate in pre-independence elections in February 1990.

The PNDC regime sought to strengthen ties with all African

countries. Good relations with the countries of eastern and

southern Africa were established in the spirit of Pan-Africanism

and nonalignment. In addition to visiting many West African

countries, Rawlings traveled to Mozambique in October 1986

for the funeral of Samora Machel. Ghana's contribution of

US$250,000 toward famine relief in Mozambique was a practical demonstration of commitment to the principles of the

OAU. In late January 1989, Rawlings paid a three-day official

visit to Uganda on the occasion of the third anniversary of the

government's victory in a long civil war. He also visited Tanzania and Zimbabwe.

Ghana's political and diplomatic resurgence in Africa and in

world affairs under PNDC leadership was evident from the

number of reciprocal visits to promote bilateral ties and coop244
Government and Politics

eration. Among those visiting Ghana between 1987 and 1994

were Zambia's President Kenneth Kaunda; Uganda's President

Yoweri Museveni; Tanzania's former President Julius Nyerere,

who received Ghana's highest state award, the Order of the

Star of Ghana, in recognition of his life-long devotion to PanAfricanism and the nonaligned movement; Libya's Colonel

Muammar al Qadhafi; and Zimbabwe's President Robert

Mugabe. In September 1994, President Rawlings paid a ten-day

visit to Botswana, Namibia, and Zimbabwe, signing bilateral

agreements in the latter two countries for political cooperation, trade, and industrial development. Ghanaian diplomats

are expected to arrive in Pretoria, the Republic of South Africa,

in early 1995 to open Ghana's new High Commission.

Britain and the Commonwealth

By historical tradition and choice, Ghana's political future

has been bound up with that of Britain and the Commonwealth of Nations. Indeed, Nkrumah led the way for independent African states that were former British colonies to join the

Commonwealth.

The close bond between Ghana and Britain was evident in

1959 when Queen Elizabeth II, the head of the Commonwealth

of Nations, visited Ghana and received a warm reception. At

the 1964 Commonwealth Conference, Nkrumah proposed the

establishment of a permanent Commonwealth secretariat, in

order, as Nkrumah put it, "to make the Commonwealth move

in tune with the common aspirations of its members." According to one observer, Nkrumah believed the Commonwealth

was an example of how a free association of independent states should work. The Commonwealth provided a vehicle for the

transfer of technology and for economic and cultural cooperation. It also served as a place for developing the most effective

methods for ending colonialism without revolution or violence

and under conditions in which a former colonial territory

could retain a close association with the former imperial power.

Nkrumah again took the lead in forcing South Africa out of

the Commonwealth in 1961. In 1965 Ghana was forced to break diplomatic relations with Britain in order to support the

OAU resolution over Rhodesia's (later, Zimbabwe) unilateral

declaration of independence and imposition of a white minority government. Relations were restored the next year, however,

following the overthrow of Nkrumah.

245
Ghana: A Country Study

Following the 31st December 1981 Revolution, Ghana lost its membership in the Commonwealth Parliament Association,

which promotes interchange and understanding among parliamentarians of member states. Ghana was readmitted to the

association in September 1993, the same year it was also readmitted to the Inter-Parliamentary Union, another Commonwealth institution. With its readmission to these two bodies,

Ghana became a major player in Commonwealth affairs. In

May 1994, Ghana hosted a Commonwealth conference on local

government that attracted participants from several West Afri- can countries. At the end of the year, Ghana remained the only

West African Commonwealth country with an elected government, the other three members—Nigeria, Sierra Leone, and

Gambia—all being under military rule. As a contribution

toward Ghanaian democracy, the Commonwealth, along with

the OAU and the Carter Center in the United States, provided

international observer teams to monitor Ghana's presidential

election in November 1992.

Ghana's relations with Britain continued to be generally

good under the PNDC. British Minister of State for Foreign

and Commonwealth Affairs, Mrs. Lynda Chalker, paid a successful official visit to Ghana in early 1987 which resulted in

enhanced British aid for Ghana' economic reforms. Since the

ERP began in 1983, Britain has given Ghana more than £69

million as balance of payments support. Ghana has reportedly

garnered more aid from Britain than any African country

except Zimbabwe. Britain, along with other Western countries

and international development agencies, also provided much

needed technical, logistical, and financial support for the

implementation of Ghana's governmental decentralization

effort, for the first District Assembly elections in 1988-89, as well as for the presidential and parliamentary elections in

1992.

The United States Ghana has in general enjoyed good relations with the

United States since independence, except for a period of

strained relations during the later years of the Nkrumah

regime. Ghana was the first country to which United States

Peace Corps volunteers were sent in 1961. Ghana and the

United States are signatories to twenty agreements and treaties

covering such matters as agricultural commodities, aviation,

defense, economic and technical cooperation, education,

246
The Kwame Nkrumah Mausoleum in Accra, dedicated in 1992

Courtesy Embassy of Ghana, Washington

extradition, postal matters, telecommunications, and treaty

obligations. The refusal of the United States to join the Inter- national Cocoa Agreement, given Ghana's heavy dependence

on cocoa exports to earn hard currency, is the most serious

bilateral issue between the two countries.

Relations between the United States and Ghana were particularly rocky in the early 1980s, apparently because of Ghana's

relations with Libya. The PNDC government restored diplomatic relations with Libya shortly after coming to power. Libya

came to the aid of Ghana soon afterward by providing muchneeded economic assistance. Libya also has extensive financial

holdings in Ghana. Rawlings has supported Libya's position

that two Libyans accused of bombing a Pan American Airlines

flight over Lockerbie, Scotland, in 1988 should be tried in a neutral country rather than in Britain or the United States.

247
Ghana: A Country Study

Relations between the United States and Ghana were further

strained by a series of diplomatic incidents in the mid-1980s. In

July 1985, a distant relative of Rawlings, Michael Soussoudis, was arrested in the United States and charged with espionage.

Despite Soussoudis's conviction, he was exchanged the following December for several known United States Central Intelli- gence Agency (CIA) agents in Accra, but not before diplomats

had been expelled in both Accra and Washington. In March

1986, a Panamanian-registered ship carrying arms and a number of mercenaries and United States veterans of the Vietnam

War was seized off the coast of Brazil. The PNDC charged that

the arms and soldiers were destined for Ghana and that they

had been financed by a Ghanaian dissident with links to the

CIA. During their trial, several crew members admitted that the

charges were substantially true. Although they were convicted

and imprisoned, three subsequently escaped with what the

PNDC alleged was CIA assistance.

In spite of these incidents, relations between the United

States and Ghana had improved markedly by the late 1980s.

Former United States president Jimmy Carter visited Ghana in

1986 and again in 1988 and was warmly received by the PNDC.

His Global 2000 agricultural program (see Glossary), which is quite popular with Ghanaian farmers, is helping promote good

relations with the United States. In 1989 the United States for- gave US$114 million of Ghana's foreign debt, part of a larger

debt relief effort by Western nations. The United States has

strongly favored Ghana's economic and political reform policies, and since the birth of the Fourth Republic and Ghana's

return to constitutional rule, has offered assistance to help

Ghana institutionalize and consolidate its steps toward democratic governance. In FY 1994, United States development aid

totaled about US$38 million; in addition, the United States

supplied more than US$16 million in food aid. Other Countries

After 1981, PNDC foreign policy was designed to promote

the country's economic growth and well-being by establishing

friendly relations and cooperation with all countries irrespective of their economic and political philosophies or ideological

orientation. PNDC policy also sought new markets for Ghana's

exports, the expansion of existing markets, and new investment opportunities.

248
Government and Politics

Ghana's relations with Canada were quite good under the

PNDC, as were Ghana's relations with the European Community and its member countries. In 1987, as part of its cancellation of the debts of several African countries, Canada canceled

a Ghanaian debt of US$77.6 million. In 1989 Germany canceled US$295 million of Ghana's foreign debt, and France can- celed US$26 million.

A number of Western countries, including France and Canada, continued to cancel debts in 1991, reflecting the generally

cordial relations between Ghana and Western countries and

the confidence the West had in PNDC policies. In early July

1991, Rawlings paid a three-day official visit to Paris, which symbolized the close ties that had developed between the PNDC

and the French government. Western countries have continued to show keen interest in, and support for, the ERP and

Ghana's transition to democratic government.

In line with its commitment to the principles of nonalignment, the PNDC sought to develop close relations with the

socialist regimes in Eastern Europe, Cuba, the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (North Korea), and China. In the early

days of PNDC rule, Rawlings made official visits to China and

Ethiopia, the latter then headed by a Marxist-Leninist regime.

During these visits, various economic, trade, and cultural

agreements were concluded. Notable was the PNDC agreement

with the German Democratic Republic (GDR or East Germany) for the improvement of roads in Kumasi, Ghana's sec- ond largest city, and of the Kumasi-Accra highway. The GDR

also supplied Ghana with new railroad coaches. Barter trade

with East European countries, especially the GDR, Romania,

and Bulgaria, also increased. The PNDC established a State

Committee for Economic Cooperation to ensure more effective cooperation with socialist countries and showed keen inter- est in developing relations with the Council for Mutual

Economic Assistance.

The PNDC policy of restructuring Ghana's education sys- tem, moving from purely academic curricula to vocational and

technical training, benefited from Ghana's close ties with

socialist countries, notably Cuba. By 1985 Cuba was training

some 1,000 Ghanaian school children and middle-level technicians. Cuba also offered Ghanaians training in political leadership for "revolutionary organs" and national security.

Hundreds of Ghanaian youths left for various socialist countries to pursue professional and technical courses. The Soviet

249
Ghana: A Country Study

Union, China, and other socialist countries awarded scholarships to Ghanaians for both academic and technical courses. In

addition, short-term training was offered for Ghana's Committees for the Defence of the Revolution. Bulgaria provided training in political organization and leadership, and the Soviet

Union furnished education in medicine, veterinary sciences,

and engineering.

The PNDC believed that Cuba provided a fruitful field for

cooperation in areas other than education. The PNDC agreed

to a joint commission for economic cooperation and signed a number of scientific and technical agreements with Cuba ranging from cultural exchanges to cooperation in such fields as health, agriculture, and education. Cuba trained Ghana's

national militia, gave advice in the creation of mass organizations such as the CDRs, and provided military advisers and

medical and security officers for the PNDC leadership. The two

countries also signed agreements for the renovation of Ghana's

sugar industry and for three factories to produce construction

materials. In 1985 Ghana and Cuba signed their first barter

agreement, followed by new trade protocols in 1987 and 1988.

Cuban medical brigades worked in Tamale in the Northern

Region, one of the poorest areas in Ghana. Cubans coached

Ghanaian boxers and athletes and taught Spanish in Ghanaian

schools.

Ghana's relations with Cuba continue to be strong despite

Ghana's return to multiparty democracy and the severe eco- nomic crisis in Cuba in 1993 and 1994. Ajoint commission for

cooperation between the two countries meets biennially in the

alternate venues of Accra and Havana. Cuba is helping to cre- ate a faculty of medical sciences in Ghana's new University of

Development Studies at Tamale (see The Education System,

ch. 2). At the end of 1994, thirty-three medical specialists were working in Ghanaian hospitals. A bilateral exchange of technology and experts in mining and agriculture was also underway. Cuba is training 600 Ghanaians, mostly in technical

disciplines, including engineering, architecture, and medicine.

The two countries are engaged in successful business ventures,

too, including a first-class tourist resort at Ada in Greater Accra

Region and a Ghana-Cuba construction company.

Economic relations between Ghana andJapan are quite cordial, having improved considerably under the PNDC. Japan

offered Ghana about US$680 million toward the rehabilitation

of its telephone and television services. Following the visit to

250
Government and Politics

Japan of a Ghanaian delegation in early 1987, Japan pledged a

total of US$70 million toward Ghana's economic development.

In early 1994, Japan offered a further US$16.6 million to modernize rail transport and to improve water supplies. In October

1994, Ghana joined in urging the UN Security Council to admitJapan and Germany, two countries that in 1993 and 1994 were among Ghana's largest aid donors, in recognition of the

international political and economic stature of both countries.

Ghana's relations with Arab countries were also generally

good during the PNDC period, and they remained so under

the new NDC administration. Considerable economic assis- tance flowed into Ghana from the Arab world. Ghana signed

loan agreements with the Saudi Arabian Fund for Development for various development projects in Ghana, including the

promotion of Islamic education. In early January 1994, loan

agreements totaling US$16.5 million from the Kuwaiti Fund

for Arab Economic Development were signed to fund a thermal power plant at Takoradi.

Following the peace accord between Israel and the Palestine

Liberation Organization in September 1993, Ghana reestablished diplomatic relations with Israel in August 1994. Diplomatic relations between the two countries had been broken in

1973 in support of member Arab states of the OAU who were at war with Israel. In urging resumption of diplomatic ties, parliament noted that Ghana stood to gain access to Israeli technology, notably in water engineering and irrigation, sewerage

construction, and agriculture.

Finally, in June 1994, a new Ghanaian ambassador presented

his credentials to Russian president Boris Yeltsin in Moscow At

the time, the Ghanaian government expressed its hope that

democratic restructuring in both Ghana and Russia and the

advent of a market economy in Russia would lead to new and

diversified bilateral trade and economic cooperation.

International Organizations

Ghana belongs to sixteen UN organizations and twenty-four

other international organizations, including the Commonwealth. Nkrumah saw the UN as the most effective forum for

small, poor countries such as Ghana to exert some influence in a world dominated by more powerful nations. As it had with

the Commonwealth, Ghana, a leader among countries of the

developing world, sought to enlarge the UN role in economic

development and to make it an effective force for world peace.

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Ghana: A Country Study

Ghana was also a leader of the African countries that lobbied to advance the cause of freedom in Africa. Nkrumah made the

UN Charter a plank of Ghana's foreign policy and helped to make the UN a forum for nonalignment as he maneuvered

with other Afro-Asian leaders between East and West. Among

Ghanaians who have achieved world prominence in the UN is Kenneth Dadzie, who from 1986 to 1994 was secretary general

of the UN Conference on Trade and Development.

The PNDC preserved Ghana's commitment to the ideals and

objectives of the UN. In recognition of Ghana's strong commitment to African causes and its active involvement in the General Assembly, Ghana became one of the African countries

elected to a non-permanent seat in the UN Security Council

during 1986-87. Ghana has also contributed troops to UN

peacekeeping operations around the world, including IraqKuwait (1991), Cambodia (1992-93), and Rwanda (1993-94)

(see International Security Concerns, ch. 5).

The PNDC also maintained Ghana's active membership in

the Non-Aligned Movement. Indeed, the diplomatic highlight

of the PNDC government in 1991 was its successful hosting, in

Accra in early September, of the tenth ministerial conference

of the Non-Aligned Movement. The meeting attracted one of

the largest contingents of foreign ministers of all recent Afri- can conferences.

Ghana also hosted a well-attended conference of nongovernmental organizations in Accra in late August 1991 as a prelude

to the nonaligned conference. The conference concerned

itself with economic development, peace, and a just world

order.

In honor of Kwame Nkrumah, Ghana's first president and a founding member of the Non-Aligned Movement and of PanAfricanism, the PNDC commissioned the Kwame Nkrumah

Memorial Park and the Nkrumah Mausoleum in Accra on July

1, 1992. The remains of the late president were brought from

Nkroful, his birthplace, and reinterred in a moving public cere- mony. The park and the mausoleum fulfilled a pledge made by

the PNDC in 1990 to commemorate Nkrumah's contributions

to Ghana and to Africa by means of an appropriate memorial.

Future Democratic Prospects

At the end of 1994, Ghana's young democracy seemed intact

and on course. Although the electoral processes of the Fourth

Republic were riddled with controversy and even some vio252
Government and Politics

lence, the prospects for multiparty democracy appeared bright.

This was true despite the opposition boycott of the parliamentary elections, leading to a virtual one-party state in practice.

The NDC government had so far demonstrated a willingness to abide by the strictures of the 1992 constitution; the legislature

appeared unrestricted in its deliberations, which were open to public scrutiny and opposition criticism despite the absence of

a formal parliamentary opposition; and the judiciary had established its independence, unfettered by executive interference

in its decisions, a majority of which had gone against the government.

Another positive development since the establishment of the

Fourth Republic in January 1993 has been the growing acceptance by the NDC-dominated government of the crucial distinction between the interests of a ruling party and those of the

state or civil society. This distinction was virtually nonexistent

under military rule or the one-party state. This development in

turn has resulted in the emergence and growth of independent

civic institutions and organizations.

In celebrating two years of democracy at the end of 1994,

Ghanaians were not forgetful of the painful fact that each of

the last two attempts at constitutional rule had come to an

abrupt end after only two years. Given the record since 1992,

however, there was cause for cautious optimism. It may be that

the return ofJerry Rawlings in 1981 will turn out to be the

coup that ended the cycle of coups and the act that led at last to a new political era in Ghana.

* * * A rich body of literature exists on government and politics in

Ghana during the colonial and early postindependence periods. Individual works range from general historical surveys to important case studies produced by Ghanaian and foreign specialists. The politics and government of the PNDC and the

Fourth Republic, however, are less fully documented.

Among classic studies of the early decolonization and postindependence periods are Dennis Austin's Politics in Ghana,

1946-1960, David E. Apter's Ghana in Transition, and Maxwell

Owusu's Uses and Abuses ofPolitical Power: A Case Study of Continuity and Change in the Politics of Ghana. The standard works on

foreign policy covering the Nkrumah period (1957-66),

namely Willard S. Thompson's Ghana's Foreign Policy, 1957-

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Ghana: A Country Study

1966: Diplomacy, Ideology, and the New State and Michael DeiAnang's The Administration of Ghana's Foreign Relations, 1957-

1965: A Personal Memoir, are equally relevant for a complete

understanding of foreign policy under the PNDC and the

Fourth Republic, which remains basically Nkrumahist.

Zaya Yeebo's Ghana, the Struggle for Popular Power: Rawlings,

Saviour orDemagogue and Donald I. Ray's Ghana: Politics, Economics, and Society are leftist and partisan but contain useful

insights. Ghana under PNDC Rule, 1982-1989, edited by E. Gyimah-Boadi, with contributions by eleven Ghanaian academics

at the University of Ghana, provides a balanced if brief over- view of the years of PNDC rule. Good preliminary studies of

party politics in the Fourth Republic are presented in the vol- ume entitled Political Parties and Democracy in Ghana 1 s Fourth

Republic, edited by Kwame A. Ninsin and Francis K. Drah.

Jeffrey Herbst's The Politics ofReform in Ghana, 1982-1991 is a good critical examination of the politics of economic reform

under the PNDC. The most systematic and comprehensive

study of the presidential and parliamentary elections of 1992 is by Richard Jeffries and Clare Thomas, "The Ghanaian Elections of 1992." Maxwell Owusu's "Custom and Coups: AJuridical Interpretation of Civil Order and Disorder in Ghana,"

"Rebellion, Revolution and Tradition: Reinterpreting Coups in

Ghana," and "Democracy and Africa—A View From the Village" provide in-depth analysis as well as a cultural and historical perspective on the PNDC period. (For further information

and complete citations, see Bibliography)

254
er 5. National Security
Ceremonial state sword, symbol ofchiefly authority and power among theAkan
GHANA HAS A RICH AND VARIED military history. During

the nineteenth century, the Asante, one of the major ethnic

groups in the country, relied on military power to extend their

rule throughout most of what eventually became the modern

state of Ghana. The Asante also engaged in a series of military

campaigns against the British (in 1873, 1896, and 1900) for

control of the country's political and economic systems. After

the British established a protectorate, thousands of Ghanaians

served in the Royal West African Frontier Force. In the two

world wars of the twentieth century, tens of thousands of Ghanaians fought with the Western allies. From 1945 until 1957,

the British used the Ghanaian army to maintain internal security.At independence in 1957, Ghana's armed forces were

among the best in Africa. However, President Kwame Nkrumah

(1960-66) gradually destroyed this heritage by transforming

the armed forces from a traditional military organization into one that he hoped would facilitate the growth of African socialism and Pan-Africanism, would aid in the fight against neocolonialism, and would help implement Nkrumah's radical foreign

policy. Nkrumah also Africanized the officer corps as rapidly as possible. In 1966 the armed forces moved to end its use as a

political tool by overthrowing Nkrumah. For the next twentyfive years, the military repeatedly intervened in the political

process to stabilize Ghana and to improve the country's econ- omy. In 1992, however, Ghana's military regime presided over

multiparty elections, which the regime hoped would return the

country to a parliamentary system of government.

The Ghanaian military, with a personnel strength of 6,850 in

1994, helped to maintain internal security and to preserve

Ghana's territorial integrity. Throughout the 1980s, the generally pro-Western armed forces relied on a variety of sources for

foreign military assistance, including the United States, Italy,

Libya, and the Soviet Union. Organized into a 5,000-member

army, a 1,200-member air force, and a 1,000-member navy, the

military was capable of performing its missions. During the

1980s and early 1990s, moreover, the Ghanaian armed forces

and some police personnel participated in United Nations

peacekeeping operations in Cambodia, Croatia, Western

Sahara, Iraq/Kuwait, Rwanda, and Lebanon. Ghana also con257
Ghana: A Country Study

tributed troops to the Economic Community of West African

States Monitoring Group peacekeeping force in Liberia.

International Security Concerns

As of the mid-1990s, there was no external threat against

Ghana; however, Ghana has experienced periodic tensions

with two West African states, Togo and Liberia, which at the

time some observers believed could lead to armed conflict.

The parties involved in these disputes avoided hostilities by

relying on diplomacy rather than on military force to resolve

their problems.

In January 1976, Ghanaian-Togolese relations deteriorated

after Togo urged a readjustment of their common border in

Togo's favor. Ghana rejected this demand, citing the 1956

United Nations (UN) referendum, which had given western

Togoland's population the choice of staying in Togo or ofjoining Ghana. Nevertheless, in March 1976, the Ghanaian government banned the National Liberation Movement for Western

Togoland (NLMWT). Later that month, Ghanaian security

forces arrested ten people near Togo's border and charged

them with subversion for contacting Ghanaian dissidents in

Togo. Although the NLMWT threatened to use force against

Ghana unless the UN intervened in the crisis, it failed to launch a successful guerrilla war against Ghana.

In September 1982, Ghana closed the border to prevent

Ghanaian dissidents who lived in Togo from crossing into

Ghana. Nevertheless, tensions between the two countries resur- faced after Flight LieutenantJerryJohn Rawlings seized power

in Ghana at the end of 1981. Rawlings warned the Togolese

against allowing Ghanaian dissidents to use Togo's territory as a base from which to launch attacks against Ghana. In early

1984, after Ghana had reopened the border, the Togolese government calmed Accra's fears by threatening to arrest any Ghanaian exiles who held meetings in Togo.

In 1986 relations with Togo again deteriorated after Ghanaian security forces captured a group of armed dissidents who

had crossed the border from Togo. Ghana's secretary for for- eign affairs protested the use of neighboring countries as bases

for subversive activities against the Rawlings regime. In September 1986, Lome claimed that Togolese dissidents, operating

from Ghana, had attempted a coup against the government of

Togo's president, General Gnassingbe Eyadema. As a result,

Togo temporarily closed the border with Ghana and then

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National Security

deported 233 Ghanaians. In January 1989, relations between

the two countries became strained again when Togo expelled

120 Ghanaians. After Togo reopened its land, air, and sea borders with Ghana in October 1990, relations between the two

countries gradually improved.

On January 30, 1993, clashes that pitted Togolese security

forces loyal to Eyadema against several opposition groups

prompted approximately 55,000 refugees to flee to Ghana.

Accra, which sided with Eyadema's opponents, responded by

placing the Ghanaian armed forces on full alert, ostensibly to aid the refugees. Rawlings claimed that because of this trouble,

he was considering a recall of all Ghanaian troops serving on

missions abroad for the UN and in Liberia. After attackers

stormed Eyadema's home in Lome on March 25, 1993, the

Togolese government closed its border with Ghana and

accused the Rawlings regime of providing a safe haven for the

raiders.

In early 1994, the two countries almost went to war following

yet another incident. According to Togolese authorities, more

than 100 armed Togolese crossed the border from Ghana in

early January to assassinate Eyadema and to take control of the

government. Togo immediately closed its border with Ghana,

and each nation then accused the other's armed forces of

launching cross-border raids. Although tensions eased later in

the year, the Ghanaian minister of foreign affairs warned of

further incidents unless Eyadema introduced basic democratic

reforms.

Ghanaian-Liberian relations suffered a setback in September

1989 over rumors that Monrovia planned a forceful repatriation of resident Ghanaians following the return of more than

400 Liberians from Ghana. Although Accra denied that it had

deported the Liberians, Monrovia retaliated by expelling 350

Ghanaians. A more serious problem occurred in 1990, when a rebel force known as the National Patriotic Front of Liberia

reportedly seized about 2,000 Ghanaians living in Liberia.

Many Ghanaians also resented the presence of approximately

6,000 Liberian refugees who had settled in a camp at Bruburam near Accra; they argued that Ghanaian security

forces should halt the influx of refugees by detaining them at the border, by force if necessary.

Despite these difficulties, beginning in mid-1990 the Ghanaian government deployed three battalions of troops to Liberia

as part of the Economic Community of West African States

259
Ghana: A Country Study

Monitoring Group (ECOMOG) peacekeeping force. These

troops served eight-month tours. In late 1994, about 1,000 Ghanaian troops were still serving in Liberia despite the government's growing impatience with the mission and the lack of

progress toward a settlement of the conflict.

The ECOMOG operation was but one in a long list of international peacekeeping missions in which Ghana has participated. As early as 1978, Ghana contributed soldiers to the UN

Interim Force in Lebanon; nearly 800 were still on duty there

in mid-1994. Other UN missions to which Ghana has contributed include the Iraq-Kuwait Observation Mission (1991-94);

Cambodia, where more than 1,000 Ghanaians served as security personnel during UN-supervised elections in 1992-93;

Somalia (1994); and Rwanda, where nearly 850 Ghanaians

troops were part of a 2,500-member peacekeeping force in

1994. Assignments with ECOMOG and other international

peacekeeping operations were avidly sought after, in part

because they presented opportunities for self-enrichment, such

as black-market dealings, otherwise unavailable to the average

soldier. So lucrative were UN assignments that there were

reports of bribery for selecting such forces.

Internal Security Concerns

Ghana has a long history of internal division, rooted in

antagonisms and conflicts among the country's various ethnic

groups. For example, the Asante (also seen as Ashanti—see

Glossary) in the center of the country have long been at odds

with southern peoples such as the Ga, Fante, Akwapim, Nzema,

and Ewe. In the seventeenth century, the Asante began con- quering smaller northern states. The Asante then moved

south, where they came into contact with the Fante. Conflicts

between these two groups ultimately led to British intervention. For much of the nineteenth century, the British battled

the Asante for control of most of the territory that became

modern Ghana (see Arrival of the Europeans and The Colonial Era: British Rule of the Gold Coast, ch. 1). Even after the

country gained independence as the new nation of Ghana in

1957, ethnic divisions continued to trouble Ghanaian society.

Several dissident organizations, however, most of which had

been created by exiles during the 1980s, dedicated themselves

to deemphasizing ethnicity and to facilitating the growth of

nationalism. In April 1982, various members of Ghana's

banned political parties established the Campaign for Democ260
National Security

racy in Ghana and opened offices in Lagos and London. This

group characterized the Rawlings regime as "an instrument of

terror" and urged all Ghanaians to employ all legitimate means

to ensure that democracy and constitutional order were

restored in the country. In April 1984, J. H. Mensah, who had

been the minister of finance in the Kofi Abrefa Busia government (1969-71), formed the Ghana Democratic Movement,

which welcomed all citizens who believed in "the restoration of

democracy in Ghana."

In the precolonial era, political opposition was tolerated

only up to point, after which retribution was likely. During the

colonial period in the Gold Coast, later renamed Ghana, the

British jailed outspoken nationalists. Since independence,

Ghana's security policy toward dissidents and political opponents has been harsh. During Kwame Nkrumah's presidency

(1960-66), security personnel permeated all levels of Ghanaian

society. Additionally, the Ghana Young Pioneers, created in

June 1960, regularly reported all suspected dissident activities to the authorities. Nkrumah also encouraged rivalries among

senior officials to discourage them from taking united action

against him. Individuals who fell afoul of Nkrumah usually

ended up in jail; more dangerous people received long-term

sentences in the maximum security prison at Nsawam.

Since the downfall of Nkrumah, all governments except that

of Hilla Limann (1979-81) have dealt harshly with any individual or organization deemed to be a threat to the established

political order. Informants watched military personnel, members of political parties, academics, students, and ordinary citi- zens for signs of disloyalty, antigovernment activity, or coupplotting. During the early years of the second Rawlings regime

in the 1980s, the authorities also sought to prevent the emer- gence of prodemocracy groups. In mid-1987, for example, the

police arrested members of the New Democratic Movement

(NDM) and the Kwame Nkrumah Revolutionary Guards

(KNRG), supposedly for plotting to overthrow the government. Gradually, however, Western and domestic pressures persuaded the Ghanaian government to permit political

competition and to hold multiparty elections in late 1992.

The Armed Forces in National Life

Ghana has a rich and varied military history. The military

traditions of the Asante and several other Ghanaian peoples

dominated the precolonial era. During the British period, the

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Ghana: A Country Study

military consisted of a modest army organized along infantry

lines. At independence, Nkrumah expanded the armed forces

to enhance the country's national prestige. The army grew in

size and complexity, and the government established a separate

air force and navy. This growth exceeded Ghana's national

security requirements, however, and imposed an economic

burden on the new state. In the decades since independence,

Ghana has continued to maintain a comparatively large military force. By the early 1990s, it had become clear that the government would have to respond to popular demands for

greater economic growth by reducing the size of the military

establishment.

The Armed Forces in the Past The armed forces have traditionally played a significant role

in Ghanaian society. The most important factors associated

with the growth of the military's role in national life include

the emergence of Asante militarism, the British conquest, and

the political activities of the armed forces following independence.

The Asante Wars

Historically, the Asante, who are members of the Twi-speaking branch of the Akan people, have exercised considerable

influence in the region. The groups that constituted the core

of the Asante confederacy moved north and settled in the vicinity of Lake Bosumtwi. Prior to the mid-seventeenth century,

several Asante leaders, one of them Oti Akenten (r. ca. 1630-

60), embarked on a program of military expansion that

enabled the Asante to dominate surrounding groups, establish

the most powerful state in the central forest zone, and form an

alliance with neighboring states known as the Asante confederation.

In the late seventeenth century, Osei Tutu (d. 1712 or 1 71 7)

became asantehene (king of Asante). During his reign, the

Asante confederation destroyed the influence of Denkyira,

which had been the strongest state in the coastal hinterland

and which had been exacting tribute from most of the other

Akan groups in the central forest. Asante authorities then

moved the confederation's capital to Kumasi and continued

their policy of military expansion. During one southern expedition, rebels ambushed and killed Osei Tutu and most of his

generals. The Asante confederation, which allowed newly con262
National Security

quered territories to retain their customs and chiefs, survived

this catastrophe and continued to expand its boundaries, in

the process transforming itself into an empire. Under succeeding leaders, Asante armies extended the empire's frontier

southward. By the beginning of the nineteenth century, the

Asante governed a territory as large as modern-day Ghana and

were challenging the Fante states for control of the coast,

where European traders had established a network of posts and

fortifications.

The rapid growth of the Asante empire aroused the suspicions of the Fante, who believed that the Asante sought to subjugate the coastal states. Asante-Fante relations, therefore,

remained hostile for most of the second half of the eighteenth

century. Specific problems between the two Akan states included the Fante refusal to allow Asante traders direct access

to the coast; a Fante law that prohibited the sale of firearms

and ammunition to the Asante army; Fante support of Denkyira, Akyem, and other states in their revolts against Asante

authority; and the Fante practice of granting sanctuary to refugees from the Asante empire. To resolve these problems, the

Asante launched three successful military expeditions (in 1807,

1811, and 1816) against the Fante and by 1820 had become the

strongest power in West Africa.

The Asante army, which achieved these and numerous other

victories, relied on troops mobilized for specific campaigns

rather than on a standing, professional force. Evasion of military service was punishable by death. The army, which lacked

cavalry, possessed superior infantry comprising musketeers,

bowmen, and spearsmen. The armed force also included

scouts (akwansrafo); an advance guard (twafo); a main force

(adonten); the king's personal bodyguard (gyase); a rear guard

(kyidom); and two wings, the left (benkum) and the right {nifa).

Additionally, the Asante army had a medical corps (esumankwafo) that treated the army's wounded and removed the dead

from the battlefield.

The Asante army's success against the Fante, coupled with

the Asante's determination to preserve their empire, posed a threat to the British, who also wanted to control the coast for

strategic, political, and economic reasons. Britain's commitment to stopping the slave trade made it impossible for the

British to maintain good relations with the Asante, who, by

1820, had become the main source of slaves on the coast. Many

British policy makers believed, moreover, that it was their duty

263
Ghana: A Country Study

to promote Christianity and Western civilization. Some British

merchants also believed that if Asante power could be

destroyed, a vast market would be opened to them.

Given the differences between the British and the Asante, a

military clash between them was inevitable. After the Asante

executed a Fante soldier who served in a British garrison for

insulting their king, the British launched a military expedition

against a 10,000-member Asante force near the village of Bonsaso. The Asante not only outnumbered the British but also

used superior tactics. The fighting, which began onJanuary 22,

1824, initially favored the Asante, who encircled the British

force and killed Governor Charles MacCarthy. Eventually, however, the British drove the Asante back to Kumasi.

After reorganizing and re-equipping, the Asante in 1826

again invaded the coast, attacking the British and their allies. During the fighting on the open plains of Accra, the British

used Congreve rockets, which frightened Asante warriors who

believed the enemy was using thunder and lightning against

them. The Asante panicked and fled to Kumasi. According to a peace treaty concluded in 1831, the asantehene recognized the

independence of the coastal states and agreed to refer all future disputes to the British for adjudication. In exchange, the

coastal states promised to allow the Asante to engage in legal

trade on the coast and to respect the asantehene. During much

of the following two decades, Captain George Maclean, president of a local council of British merchants, used tact and

diplomacy to enforce the peace treaty.

After the British government resumed responsibility for the

administration of the coastal forts in 1843, relations with the

Asante gradually deteriorated. In addition to assaults on Asante

traders, the asantehene believed that the British and their Fante

allies no longer treated him with respect. When British Gover- nor Richard Pine refused to return an Asante chief and a run- away slave to the asantehene, the Asante prepared for war. In

April 1863, they invaded the coast and burned thirty villages.

Pine responded by deploying six companies along the Pra

River, the border between states allied with the British and the

Asante. The deployed force built a network of stockades and a

bridge, but it returned home without engaging the enemy after

inexplicably having lost its guns, ammunition, and supplies.

The Second Asante War (1873-74) began as a result of the

asantehene^ attempt to preserve his empire's last trade outlet to the sea at the old coastal fort of Elmina, which had come into

264
Ghanaian infantry depart Accrafor a peacekeeping

mission in Liberia.

Courtesy Embassy of Ghana, Washington

British possession in 1872. In early 1873, a 12,000-member

Asante army crossed the Pra River and invaded the coastal area but suffered a defeat at Elmina. The British government then

appointed Major General Garnet Wolseley administrator and

commander in chief and ordered him to drive the Asante from

the coastal region. In December 1873, Wolseley's African levies were reinforced by the arrival of several British units.

Approximately one month later, Wolseley sent an advance

party across the Pra, warning the asantehene that he intended to begin hostilities. Wolseley, however, also offered an armistice.

When negotiations failed, both sides prepared for war. The most significant battle of the Second Asante War

occurred at Amoafo, near the village of Bekwai. Although the

Asante performed admirably, superior weapons allowed the

British to carry the day. Asante losses were unknown; the British lost four men and had 194 wounded. In the following days,

Wolseley captured Bekwai and then Kumasi. On March 14,

1874, the two sides signed the Treaty of Fomena, which

required the Asante to pay an indemnity of 50,000 ounces of

gold, to renounce claims to Elmina and to all payments from

the British for the use of forts, and to terminate their alliances

265
Ghana: A Country Study

with several other states, including Denkyira and Akyem. Additionally, the asantehene agreed to withdraw his troops from the

coast, to keep the trade routes open, and to halt the practice of

human sacrifice. The British victory and the Treaty of Fomena ended the

Asante dream of bringing the coastal states under their power.

The northern states of Brong, Gonja, and Dagomba also took

advantage of the Asante defeat by asserting their independence. The Asante empire was near collapse. In 1896 the British declared a protectorate over Asante and exiled the

asantehene, Prempeh, his immediate family, and several close

advisers to the Seychelles Islands.

The last Anglo-Asante war occurred in 1899-1900, when the

British twice tried to take possession of the asantehene'^ Golden

Stool, symbol of Asante power and independence. In April

1900, the Asante reacted to these attempts by launching an armed rebellion and by laying siege to the Kumasi fort, where

the British governor and his party had sought refuge. The British eventually defeated the Asante, both capturing and exiling

the rebellion's leader, Yaa Asantewaa, and fifteen of her closest

advisers. The conclusion of the last Anglo-Asante war resulted

in the formal annexation of the Asante empire as a British possession.

World War I

After establishing supremacy in the Gold Coast, the British

created the Gold Coast Regiment as a component of the West

African Frontier Force (WAFF), which kept peace throughout

the territories of the Gold Coast, Nigeria, Sierra Leone, and

the Gambia. In 1928 the WAFF became the Royal West African

Frontier Force (RWAFF). British officers and noncommissioned officers organized, trained, and equipped the Gold

Coast Regiment. For much of the colonial period, the British

recruited African enlisted personnel only from ethnic groups

in the Northern Territories Protectorate, the northern third of

the colony (see fig. 3). Eventually, the Gold Coast Regiment

accepted a few African officers along with an increasing number of African noncommissioned officers from the south. Nevertheless, the north-south division continued to characterize

the Gold Coast Regiment.

OnJuly 31, 1914, four days before the British declaration of war on Germany, Accra mobilized its military forces. The Gold

Coast Regiment included thirty-eight British officers, eleven

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National Security

British warrant or noncommissioned officers, 1,584 Africans,

(including 124 carriers for guns and machine guns), and about

300 reservists. Additionally, the four Volunteer Corps (Gold

Coast Volunteers, Gold Coast Railway Volunteers, Gold Coast

Mines Volunteers, and Ashanti Mines Volunteers) fielded about

900 men. These forces participated in the campaigns in Togo,

Cameroon, and East Africa.

Deployment of the country's armed forces required the

reduction of the British colonial establishment by 30 percent

between 1914 and 1917 and the closure of several military

installations in the Northern Territories. These actions persuaded many Gold Coast residents that British colonial rule was about to end. As a result, a series of disorders and protests

against British colonial rule occurred throughout the country.

During August and September 1914, for example, riots

broke out in Central Province and Ashanti, followed three

years later by unrest at Old Nigo. The wartime weakening of

the administrative structure in the Northern Territories also

fueled opposition to chiefs who used their positions to exploit

the people they ruled, to encourage military recruitment, or to advance the cause of British colonial rule. Disturbances among

the Frafra at Bongo in April 1916 and in Gonja in March 1917

prompted the authorities to deploy a detachment of troops to the Northern Territories to preserve law and order.

World WarU

Although many of the more radical Pan-Africanists and

Marxist-Leninists hoped to enlist northern black troops and ex- servicemen in their anticolonial struggle, there was little unrest

during the interwar period. During World War II, approximately 65,000 Ghanaians served in the RWAFF. The Gold Coast

Regiment participated in campaigns in East Africa and Burma

and in maneuvers in the Gambia.

Military service, particularly overseas, enhanced the political

and economic understanding of many individual soldiers, a development that facilitated the growth of postwar nationalism. Military service, however, also underscored cultural and

ethnic differences among Ghanaians. Many Asante and most

southerners looked down upon northerners, who made up the

majority of the Gold Coast Regiment. These divisions carried over into postwar politics and, according to some observers,

have continued to prevent the development of a strong sense of national identity to the present day.

267
Ghana: A Country Study

The Gold Coast also played a significant role in the Allied war effort. OnJune 27, 1942, the United States Army activated

the Air Transport Command in Cairo under Brigadier General

Shepler W. Fitzgerald. Ten days later, Fitzgerald moved his

headquarters to Accra and organized the Africa-Middle East

Wing. In late 1942, the United States Army expanded its pres- ence in Accra by activating the Twelfth Ferrying Group Headquarters, the Forty-first Ferrying Squadron, and the Fortysecond Ferrying Squadron. The Twelfth Ferrying Group,

which was part of a transportation network reaching from the

United States, via Africa, to the China-Burma-India theater of

operations, ensured the movement of men and materiel

through Senegal, Ghana, and Chad.

In contrast with the post-World War I era, Ghanaian veterans

engaged in widespread political activities after World War II. In

1946 some former soldiers established the Gold Coast Ex-Servicemen's Union, which sought to improve economic conditions and to increase employment for veterans. During a February 1948 union-sponsored march, police killed two demonstrators and wounded several others. Unrest quickly spread

throughout the country. Eventually, the union joined the

United Gold Coast Convention and then became part of the

Convention People's Party (CPP), which worked for independence under Nkrumah's leadership. After independence, the

government passed the Ghana Legion Act, which outlawed ex- servicemen's organizations and which created instead a

national Ghana Legion. Although it supposedly represented all Ghanaians, the establishment of the Ghana Legion marked the

end of independent political action by ex-servicemen.

The Development of the Modern Army

After independence, Ghana opted out of the RWAFF.

According to Nkrumah, this action was necessary because the

RWAFF was "one of the trappings of colonialism." The Ghanaian army had grown in size and complexity, moreover, and the

government created a separate air force and navy. The military's ostensible mission was to aid the national police in maintaining internal security; however, Nkrumah wanted to use the

armed forces to buttress his foreign policy and Pan-Africanist

goals.

British officers who served in the Ghanaian armed forces

thwarted Nkrumah's plans to use the military as a political tool. As a result, in September 1961 Nkrumah dismissed all British

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National Security

military personnel and ordered the Africanization of the

armed forces. By removing the British from command positions, Nkrumah destroyed an apolitical safeguard and exposed

the military to political manipulation. However, much of the

British-trained Ghanaian officer corps resisted Nkrumah's

attempts to indoctrinate them with the political ideology of the

CPP. Moreover, the officer corps shunned the political commissars whom Nkrumah had introduced into all units.

To break the power of the traditional Ghanaian military

establishment, Nkrumah created his own private army in violation of the country's constitution. The Soviet Union supported

this effort by providing military advisers and weaponry. After an unsuccessful attempt on his life, Nkrumah ordered the

expansion of the presidential guard company to regimental

strength. On the recommendation of Soviet security advisers,

Nkrumah also added a civilian unit to the bodyguard. The military and civilian wings formed the Presidential Guard Department. In 1963 Nkrumah changed the name of this

organization to the Presidential Detail Department. By February 1966, this unit's First Guard Regiment included a 1,500-

member battalion, and the Second Guard Regiment was in the

process of being formed and trained by Soviet advisers.

The Presidential Detail Department also supervised secret

storage depots and training camps for Nkrumah's constantly

expanding private army. These facilities were located at Elmina

Castle, Akosombo, Afianya, and Okponglo. After Nkrumah's

downfall, Ghanaian authorities discovered an array of weapons,

including heavy machine guns, mortars, and artillery, at these

sites. Anti-Nkrumah elements insisted that such weaponry,

which exceeded the needs of the Presidential Detail Department, was destined for Nkrumah's private army.

Apart from trying to create a parallel military establishment,

Nkrumah also established a multifaceted intelligence apparatus. In early 1963, one of Nkrumah's closest supporters,

Ambrose Yankey, established the Special Intelligence Unit to monitor the activities of antigovernment individuals and

groups. By 1966 this unit included 281 people, all of whom

reportedly received training from Soviet and other communist

advisers. Another intelligence unit, Department III, Military

Intelligence, was not part of the Ministry of Defence. Instead,

its task was to check independently on the loyalty of the regular

armed forces. Department III, Military Intelligence, maintained an interrogation center at Burma Gamp. The Bureau

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Ghana: A Country Study

for Technical Assistance conducted espionage in other African

countries. Additionally, on October 1, 1965, the bureau established an all-African intelligence service known as the Special

African Service (also known as the Technical Unit), which was

designed to penetrate the intelligence services of other African

countries. By 1966 this organization had grown from forty to sixty-seven personnel.

The Military and the Government

The National Liberation Council, 1966-69

The officer corps of the regular armed forces viewed the

activities of the Nkrumah regime with increasing alarm. As a

result, on February 24, 1966, a small number of army officers

and senior police officials, led by Colonel E.K. Kotoka, com- mander of the Second Army Brigade at Kumasi; Major A.A.

Afrifa, staff officer in charge of army training and operations;

Lieutenant General (retired) J.A. Ankra; andJ.W.K. Harlley,

the police inspector general, successfully launched a coup

d'etat against the Nkrumah regime. The new government,

known as the National Liberation Council (NLC), justified its action by citing Nkrumah's abuse of power, widespread political repression, sharp economic decline, and rampant corruption.

On April 17, 1967, a group of junior officers of the army

reconnaissance squadron based at Ho in the Volta region

launched a countercoup; however, intervention by other military units and the lack of a coherent plan on the part of the

mutineers saved the NLC. After an investigation, the two young

lieutenants who commanded the mutiny were tried by a military court, convicted, and executed. The courts also passed

lengthy prison sentences on twenty-six of the reconnaissance

squadron's noncommissioned officers who supported the coup

attempt.

Pro-Nkrumah elements also plotted against the NLC. In late 1968, the authorities arrested Air Marshal M.A. Otu, who had

succeeded Kotoka as general officer commanding the armed

forces but not as an NLC member, and his aide, a navy lieutenant, for alleged subversive activity. A military court charged

both men with plans to overthrow the NLC and to return Nkrumah to power, but eventually the two were acquitted.

There were no further incidents or threats to the NLC. After a civilian government came to power in October 1969, the

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armed forces reverted to their traditional roles of maintaining

internal security and safeguarding territorial integrity.

The Acheampong Regime, 1972-78

On January 13, 1972, the military seized control of the government for the second time under the leadership of Lieutenant Colonel I.K. Acheampong. The army justified its action by

accusing the civilian government, headed by Busia, of having

failed to resolve the various problems confronting the Ghanaian armed forces.

The origin of the army's disaffection lay in the 1971-72 austerity budget, according to which defense expenditures were

too large for a country as small as Ghana. The subsequent

reductions affected maintenance and materials. Reductions

also increased the difficulties facing younger army officers. By

the early 1970s, the lack of funds had forced the Ghana Military Academy to reduce the size of its annual class from about

120 to twenty-five cadets.

Many senior army officers had also complained that the

1966 coup had interrupted the normal promotion cycle. They

maintained that officers who supported Kotoka received

quicker promotions, whereas those whose loyalty was in question were held back. Ewe officers, who had been shunted aside

since the end of the NLC regime, believed that Acheampong

would restore an equitable ethnic balance to the officer corps.

Lastly, the army objected to the Busia government's decision to broaden the army's mission to include such nonmilitary functions as engaging in anti-smuggling patrols, supporting anticholera drives, facilitating flood relief work, and participating

in reconstruction projects.

To rule Ghana, Acheampong established the National

Redemption Council (NRC) and acted as its chairman. Initially, the NRC consisted of six army officers and one civilian;

however, Acheampong eventually broadened the NRC's membership to include officers from all the services. Newcomers

included the air force and navy commanders and the inspector

general of the police. Acheampong dropped the two lowerranking army officers and the civilian member. The NRC

assumed legislative and executive powers while the NRC chairman became head of state and commander in chief. The NRC

chairman also was responsible for all NRC appointments and

removals with the advice of not less than two-thirds of the NRC

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Ghana: A Country Study

members. The NRC could remove the chairman by a unanimous decision.

The NRC appointed nine military officers who ranked from

major to colonel to serve as regional commissioners. Customarily, these commissioners worked in their traditional homelands.

The NRC and the regional commissioners constituted the

Executive Council. The NRC and the Executive Council, which

together included about thirty senior military officers, ruled

Ghana. The NRC militarized Ghanaian society, moreover, by

appointing senior military officers to positions in all major

departments, regional bodies, state corporations, and public

boards. Additionally, Acheampong wanted to change the constitution to end party politics and to create a union government composed of civilians, military personnel, and police.

Such a system, Acheampong believed, would create national

unity, end tribalism, and facilitate economic development.

The failure to achieve these goals and the 1975 decision to transform the NRC into the Supreme Military Council (SMC)

marked the beginning of Acheampong's downfall. The government maintained that the SMC would restore the military hierarchy that the 1972 coup had destroyed. Over the next two

years, the Acheampong regime gradually lost popular support

because of growing corruption, economic problems, and

clashes between the SMC and the general public, culminating

in violent disturbances during the 1978 referendum on union

government.

The Akuffo Coup, 1 978

As public hostility toward the SMC increased, Ghana became

increasingly ungovernable. On July 5, 1978, junior officers on

the Military Advisory Committee persuaded senior officers, led

by Lieutenant General Frederick W.K. Akuffo, to force

Acheampong to resign. The creation of what was termed SMC

II, however, failed to restore public confidence in the government, largely because Akuffo refused to abandon the idea of a union government without party politics. As a result, there were about eighty strikes in a four-month period to protest the

regime's economic policies. In November 1978, when junior

civil servants went on strike, the regime declared a state of

emergency and dismissed more than 1,000 public employees.

Akuffo eventually succumbed to this pressure by announcing

that the ban on political parties would be lifted on January 1, 1979, and that free elections would be held.

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The 1979 Coup and the First Rawlings Government

Ghana's third military coup was planned by a small group of

disgruntled officers. On May 15, 1979, less than five weeks

before the national elections, Flight Lieutenant Jerry John

Rawlings and several members of the air force (junior officers

and corporals) unsuccessfully tried to overthrow the government. During the court martial of the coup's seven plotters,

Rawlings justified his action by claiming that official corruption

had eroded public confidence in the government and had tar- nished the image of the armed forces. Rawlings also charged

that Syrian and Lebanese businessmen living in Ghana had

gained control of the country's economy at the expense of the

African majority.

On the night ofJune 4, 1979, a group ofjunior officers and

enlisted personnel of the Fifth Battalion and the Reconnaissance Regiment in Burma Camp freed Rawlings and staged a coup. These individuals then formed the Armed Forces Revolutionary Council (AFRC) to rule the country. The AFRC

included a cross section of ranks from private and lance corporal to staff sergeant, airman, lieutenant, and naval commander.

Although the scheduled elections occurred as planned onJune

18, 1979, the AFRC retained power until September 24, 1979,

when President Hilla Limann and the People's National Party

(PNP) assumed control of the government.

Meanwhile, the AFRC purged the senior ranks of the armed

forces and executed eight officers, three of whom had been

former heads of state (Acheampong, Akuffo, and Afrifa). From

July to September 1979, special courts held hearings and sen- tenced 155 military officers, former officials, and wealthy busi- nessmen to prison terms ranging from six months to ninety-five

years. Additionally, the AFRC collected back taxes from numerous government officials and threatened to seize the assets of

many others unless they refunded money to the state that they

had allegedly embezzled or stolen. The AFRC also charged

hundreds of military officers with corruption and sentenced

them to long prison terms. Many civil servants fell victim to the

purge and lost their jobs as well. The 1981 Coup and the Second Rawlings Government

The combination of official corruption, Rawlings's continued political activities, and deteriorating economic conditions

doomed the Limann government. On December 31, 1981,

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Ghana: A Country Study

Rawlings, supported by lower-ranking soldiers, most of whom

served in the Reconnaissance Regiment, seized power. Rawlings then established the Provisional National Defence Council

(PNDC) to rule the country, dissolved parliament, and banned

all political parties. OnJanuary 21, 1982, Rawlings appointed a sixteen-member civilian government with a cabinet of secretaries and told them to "serve the people sacrificially." The PNDC

also assumed control of the Ministry of Defence. The Rawlings

regime further consolidated its power by promulgating PNDC

Law 42, which suspended the constitution and gave the government wide powers over Ghanaian citizens.

Shortly after seizing power, Rawlings took action against

individuals who had allegedly committed crimes against the

Ghanaian people. In January 1982, for example, the PNDC

ordered former members of the banned PNP and other undesirable elements to report to the nearest police station or army

barracks. The authorities detained some of these individuals

and released others after registering their names. The police

and army continued this roundup by arresting allegedly cor- rupt individuals who had served in the Limann government,

former members of parliament, businessmen suspected of trading on the black market, and alleged coup plotters. On June

30, 1982, one or more members of the PNDC and their accomplices abducted and then murdered three High Court ofJustice judges and the personnel director of the Ghana Industrial

Holdings Corporation.

Despite the popularity of the Rawlings regime, there were

two coup attempts in late 1982 and in early 1983. On November 23, 1982, a group of soldiers tried to overthrow the regime,

initiating hostilities at Gondar Barracks. Government forces,

however, defeated the rebels and the police arrested more than

twenty people. The second coup attempt occurred on February 27, 1983, when security forces arrested nine soldiers and

two civilians in Achimota, near Accra. The authorities claimed

that they also discovered heavy machine guns, rockets, ammunition, and a list of people to be assassinated. Kojo Tsikata, special adviser to the PNDC, also accused the United States

embassy of involvement in the coup attempt, but the Ghanaian

government never proved this allegation.

Challenges to the Rawlings regime continued throughout

the 1980s. During 1985 and 1986, for example, there were at least seven coup attempts. On September 24, 1989, two days

after Rawlings had assumed direct command of the armed

274
Lieutenant General

Frederick W K. Akuffo, head

of state and chairman of the Supreme Military Council,

1978-79

Courtesy Embassy of Ghana,

Washington

Armored personnel carriers of the Ghanaian army

Courtesy Embassy of Ghana,

Washington

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Ghana: A Country Study

forces, the government announced that it had foiled yet

another attempted coup. The attempt was led by Major Courage Quarshigah, a popular officer in the Ghanaian armed

forces, former commandant of the Ghana Military Academy,

and a former close ally of Rawlings. Quarshigah and four other

army officers were arrested. They were accused of planning to assassinate Rawlings as part of the coup, but several of the

accused allegedly favored a return to constitutional rule under

a civilian government.

Despite the so-called Quarshigah Affair and other attempted

coups, Rawlings remained in control of the PNDG and the

armed forces, which he commanded from September 1989

until June 1990. An Economic Recovery Program (ERP), supported by the International Monetary Fund (IMF—see Glossary) and the World Bank (see Glossary), was adopted to improve the lives of Ghanaians. The Rawlings regime also

acceded to popular demands for a democratic, multiparty election. Despite these accomplishments, however, corruption,

authoritarianism, and the misuse of power have continued to be significant problems.

The Military and the Economy

Military costs have fluctuated widely since independence.

During the Nkrumah era, the government maintained a large,

relatively well-equipped military for reasons of national prestige. After the 1966 coup, the ruling NLC sought to improve

the country's economy by lowering military spending. The

NLC, however, was unwilling to reduce military manpower for

fear of alienating the armed forces; instead, it saved money by

canceling plans to purchase new equipment. To update its military inventory, Ghana strengthened links with nations such as Britain, Canada, and the United States, all of which represented possible sources of military assistance.

Since the downfall of Nkrumah, the level of Ghana's military

spending has fluctuated widely, partly because of several major

currency devaluations. According to the World Bank, however,

Ghana's military spending has declined overall. In 1972 Ghana

earmarked about 7.9 percent of total expenditures for defense, a figure that by 1989 was down to 3.2 percent. Since then,

defense expenditures have declined even further. In 1992, the

most recent year for which reliable figures are available, Ghana

allocated about US$105 million for the armed forces, or less than 2 percent of total budgetary expenditures.

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Armed Forces Mission, Organization, and Strength

Since independence, the mission of the armed forces has

been twofold: to protect Ghana's territorial integrity from foreign aggression, and to maintain internal security. In the mid1990s, ground forces held the dominant role in the defense

establishment. In terms of organization, the military is composed of the army and its subordinate air and naval elements,

numbering in all 6,850 active-duty personnel in 1994. The military command structure extends from the minister of defense

in the national government to commanders in the field. Military units are deployed in the capital, Accra, and in Ghana's

border regions. The 5,000-member Ghanaian army, which has an eastern and a western command, is organized into two brigades, with six infantry battalions; one reconnaissance regiment, with two reconnaissance squadrons; one airborne force,

with one paratroop company; one artillery regiment; and one

field engineer regiment.

Military equipment consists predominantly of older weapons

of British, Brazilian, Swiss, Swedish, Israeli, and Finnish origin.

Servicing of all types of equipment has been extremely poor,

largely because of inadequate maintenance capabilities. As a

result, foreign military advisers or technicians perform all major maintenance tasks. Included in the Ghanaian inventory

are FV-601 Saladin and EE-9 Cascavel reconnaissance vehicles;

MOWAG Piranha armored personnel carriers; 81mm and

120mm mortars; 84mm recoilless launchers; and 14.5mm

ZPU-4 and 23mm ZU-23-2 air defense guns.

The 1,000-member Ghanaian air force consists of one counterinsurgency squadron equipped with MB-326K and MB-339

aircraft; three transport squadrons equipped with F-27 and F28 Fokkers, a C-212 Aviocar, and Skyvan aircraft; and one training squadron equipped with MB-326F, Bulldog, and L-29

Delfin aircraft. The air force also has Bell, Mi-2 Hoplite, and

SA-319 helicopters. It operates from bases in Accra (headquarters and main transport base), Tamale (combat and training

base), Takoradi (training base), and Kumasi (support base).

The air force's mission is to perform counterinsurgency operations and to provide logistical support to the army. Since independence, performance has been hindered by a lack of spare

parts and by poor maintenance capabilities. On September 18,

1987, Air Force Commander J. E.A. Kotei announced plans to begin internal passenger service to supplement the efforts of

Ghana Airways. Under this program, the government autho277
Ghana: A Country Study

rized the transformation of Tamale airport into a civil-military

airport.

Ghana's navy provides coastal defense, fisheries protection,

and security on Lake Volta. During World War II, the Gold

Coast Volunteer Naval Force, which had been established in

1936, provided sea patrols and conducted mine-detection and

neutralization operations along the coast. In 1959 the Ghanaian government established a true navy and assigned a former

Royal Navy officer the duties of chief of staff with the rank of

commodore. In 1961 a Ghanaian army brigadier replaced the

British commodore. On July 14, 1989, the navy recommissioned two ships, GNS Yogaga and GNS Dzata, at the western

naval base in Sekondi. The vessels had been refurbished by a

British shipyard, Swan Hunter. In 1994 the navy was organized

into an eastern command, with headquarters at Tema, and a western command, with headquarters at Sekondi. The naval

inventory includes two Kromantse-class corvettes and two

Achimote-class and two Dazata-class fast attack craft. The Ghanaian navy has experienced low readiness rates

because of spare parts shortages. In the late 1980s and early

1990s, budgetary constraints and a lack of serviceable equipment forced the navy to reduce its manpower from about 1,200

to approximately 850 personnel. Nevertheless, in 1990 Ghana's

navy deployed some of its ships to support the Economic Community of West African States Monitoring Group (ECOMOG)

mission in Liberia. In late 1992, two of the navy's ships were in

France for refitting.

Paramilitary forces consist of the 5,000-member People's

Militia, which serves as a home guard force and is responsible

for preventing and controlling civil disturbances and insurrection. A small, elite Presidential Guard consisting of one infantry battalion provides security for the president. The Ghanaian

government also has created a National Civil Defence Force

(also known as the Committees for the Defence of the Revolution) , which includes all citizens able to perform military ser- vice. According to the country's defense plans, the National

Civil Defence Force would be required to guard important

installations in times of crisis to relieve pressure on the regular

armed forces.

Military Manpower, Training, and Morale

Manpower

There is a two-year national service requirement for male

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Ghanaians, but military manpower levels have always been

maintained by voluntary enlistment. A limited number of

women also serve in the armed forces, but all women are found

in administrative positions, not in operational units. Since mid1988, all national service personnel have undergone a sixmonth military training program that stresses drilling, weapons

handling, physical fitness, and first aid.

The armed forces offer commissions to qualified individuals

from civilian life or to those who have completed cadet training. The term of service usually is five years with reserve obligations thereafter. Most technical services officers are selected

from civilian life on the basis of professional qualifications.

Recruits for combat or combat support branches are required

to complete two years of cadet training before receiving their

commissions.

Enlisted personnel are recruited for particular service

branches to satisfy specific branch needs. Enlistments last up to twelve years with various active- and reserve-duty options. Reenlistments are authorized for a total of eighteen years. In addition, unit commanders are empowered to extend this term of

service on a case-by-case basis. Specifically, enlisted recruits for

the technical services are required to possess at least a middle

school or junior secondary school education. All personnel

must pass a physical examination and be at least eighteen years

of age.

Training

Military training for all officer candidates of the army, air

force, and navy is conducted at the Ghana Military Academy

near Accra. Entrance to the academy is by examination, and

the curriculum includes military and general subjects. Army

cadets train for two years. At the end of the first six months, a few candidates may be selected to finish their studies at foreign

institutions such as the Royal Military Academy at Sandhurst in

Britain. The Ghana Military Academy, established in 1960, also

provides short courses in higher military education for the

officers of the three services. The best senior officers are

selected periodically to attend the Army Staff College at Camberley in Britain or one of several other senior service schools

in foreign countries.

The Armed Forces Training School at Kumasi trains army,

air force, and navy recruits. The basic army training course

lasts nine months and is followed by advanced individual train279
Ghana: A Country Study

ing in the assigned unit. This school also provides specialist

training. A parachute training school is located at Tamale and

a jungle warfare school at Achiasi.

The army has conducted numerous field exercises with a

variety of code names, including Hot Foot, Deep Thrust, Operation Swift Sword, Full Impact, and Starlight Stretch. These

exercises test an array of skills. Full Impact 88, for example,

marked the first time that Ghanaian army, air force, and navy

units trained together. Deep Thrust 89 emphasized jungle warfare, junior leadership, and physical fitness. Starlight Stretch

89, which was held at Daboya in the northern region, improved

low-level operations for company groups in the infantry battal- ion.

To enhance regional collective security, the Ghanaian army

also has participated in joint exercises with Burkina Faso

(Burkina, formerly Upper Volta). In November 1983 and in

early 1985, the two countries sponsored joint exercises codenamed Bold Union and Teamwork 85. The latter involved

5,500 troops and ninety officers from the two armed forces.

These personnel engaged in maneuvers in which government

soldiers defended themselves against a battalion-strong enemy

force which had installed itself on Dwarf Island near the strate- gically critical Akosombo Dam.

The Ghanaian government subsequently pledged to help

defend its neighbor in case of armed aggression. As a result of

this agreement, Ghana and Burkina have continued joint exercises. In late 1986, a 3,000-member contingent of soldiers from

Ghana and Burkina participated in a week-long exercise to test the combat readiness of their armed forces and security agencies. Then, in September 1987, the two countries staged a three-day exercise code-named Operation Vulcan in northern

Ghana's Tamale region. During this exercise, paratroopers of

the two countries parachuted into "friendly" territory to give

support to ground forces under simulated enemy fire. Later

that year, Ghana and Burkina concluded a three-month exercise in which four British trainers participated.

Historically, the Ghanaian air force has relied on foreign military assistance from India, Israel, Canada, Britain, and Italy for

pilot training. In early 1959, Indian and Israeli officers supervised the formation of Ghana's air force. In mid-1959, an

Indian air force senior air commodore established a headquarters for the service at Accra. In July 1959, Israeli air force

instructors trained the first group of Ghanaian cadet fliers at

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Accra International Airport. Two years later, ten Ghanaians

qualified as pilots.

In late I960, Ghana terminated the training agreement with

Israel. Shortly thereafter, Accra and London signed an accord

whereby 150 officers and airmen from the British Royal Air

Force (RAF) assumed responsibility for training the Ghanaian

air force. The commander of this RAF contingent also replaced

the Indian air commodore as chief of staff of the Ghanaian air

force. In mid-1961 a small group from the Royal Canadian Air

Force (RCAF) supplemented the British mission. In September

1961, as part of his Africanization program, Nkrumah

appointed an army brigadier as chief of staff and relieved all RAF officers of their commands. The RAF contingent

remained in Ghana, however, to help develop the Ghanaian air force as part of the British Joint Services Training Mission.

In more recent years, Ghana has relied on Nigeria for air

force training. In late 1989, twenty-five Ghanaian pilots and

technicians graduated from various training programs in Kano,

Nigeria. In 1989 Nigeria donated twelve Czech-built L-29

Delfin trainers to the Ghanaian air force. The Ghanaian and

Nigerian air forces also conducted joint operations under the

auspices of the ECOMOG peacekeeping force in Liberia in the

early 1990s.

Naval training has concentrated on improving the skills of

personnel both on shore and at sea. In addition, the Ghanaian

navy regularly participates in joint air-and-sea search-and-res- cue operations. The United States navy has supplemented

these efforts by allowing United States ships participating in

the West African Training Cruise to visit Ghana. During the

1990 training cruise, the United States donated an array of

educational materials and conducted a symposium on fisheries

enforcement. Inclement weather forced the cancellation of a

joint amphibious exercise, however.

The paramilitary People's Militia usually receives its training

during evenings, weekends, and short periods of attachment to regular army units. The Presidential Guard, which evolved

from the President's Own Guard Regiment established by

Nkrumah, enjoys a higher training priority and commands a

greater proportion of the military's resources (see The Development of the Modern Army, this ch.).

Morale

Morale in the Ghanaian armed forces has been influenced

by several factors. During the early postindependence period,

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Ghana: A Country Study

military morale suffered because of ethnic tensions and the low

esteem attached to the armed forces by the civilian sector. The

politicization of the army and jealousy between officers and

noncommissioned officers also lowered morale. During the

years of military rule, morale gradually improved. In the ranks,

however, esprit de corps has generally remained low because of

poor pay and a lack of opportunities for education and promotion.

A 1979 purge of the armed forces reversed this trend. By the

late 1980s, morale throughout the armed forces was generally

good because service conditions and the public perception of

the military had improved. Also, the PNDC had improved the

professionalism of the army. After Ghana contributed troops to the ECOMOG peacekeeping force in Liberia in mid-1990, however, morale declined once more, especially among enlisted

personnel, who opposed what they perceived to be an openended commitment to a war irrelevant to Ghana. Controversy

arose when some individual Ghanaian soldiers exploited their

position as peacekeepers to enrich themselves by engaging in

black-market activities and other questionable behavior.

Uniforms, Ranks, and Insignia

Each component service has its own distinctive uniforms

and insignia. At independence Ghana opted to retain the British order of military ranks and corresponding insignia. In the

1990s, Ghanaian ranks are still identical with British ranks and

insignia except that Ghana has substituted a black star or the

Ghanaian coat of arms for the British crown on appropriate

insignia (see fig. 14; fig. 15).

Officers in the army, air force, and navy and enlisted men in

the army and air force wear their insignia on the shoulder.

Naval enlisted men wear their insignia as cap badges except for

leading seamen and first and second class petty officers, who

wear cap badges and shoulder insignia. Field uniforms of the

army are olive green, those of the navy are dark blue, and those

of the air force are light blue. Service caps are identical with

British service caps. Foreign Military Assistance

Like most African armed forces, the Ghanaian military has

depended on foreign military assistance since independence.

Initially, Ghana looked to the West, especially Britain, for

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equipment, training, and command support. As Ghanaian politics became radicalized and the world divided along East-West

lines, Ghana's military diversified its sources of military aid by

developing ties to radical states such as the former Soviet

Union, China, the German Democratic Republic (GDR, or

East Germany), and Libya. After the Cold War ended, Ghana

again turned to the West for most of its military needs.

Britain

Between 1958 and 1961, Britain not only satisfied all Ghana's

military requirements but also allowed British military personnel to serve in various command positions in the Ghanaian

armed forces. By the end of 1961, the British had trained fortythree Ghanaian army cadets at Sandhurst and thirty-four at the

British Officer Cadet School, Eaton Hall.

Although it initially had opposed the formation of a Ghanaian air force and navy, Britain eventually agreed to help train

personnel from these services. In 1960 the British instituted an

air force training and supply program on condition that the

Indian and Israeli advisers who had established the air force were withdrawn. Additionally, between 1960 and 1963, Britain

supplied twelve Chipmunk trainers, three Heron transports,

and nine Whirlwind and Wessex helicopters.

The Ghanaian navy also benefited from British training.

Each year from 1960 to 1966, four or five Ghanaian naval

cadets attended the Britannia Royal Naval College at Dartmouth. By early 1967, eighty-seven Ghanaian naval officers and

740 enlisted personnel were serving in British home bases or were receiving training with the Royal Navy. There also were

twenty-seven officers and forty senior enlisted personnel from

the Royal Navy in Ghanaian command and training positions.

In April 1962, Accra allowed Britain to consolidate its military presence in Ghana by creating the Joint Services Training

Team (JSTT). This organization, which was composed of offic- ers and ranks from the three services under the command of a

brigadier, began its work with a total personnel strength of 248

officers and men. The JSTT provided training and advisory

support; some British officers also assumed command positions

in the Ghanaian air force and navy. There were no British com- manders in the army. The JSTT continued to function until

1971, when Ghana terminated its training agreement with Britain.

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Ghana: A Country Study

Even after Accra diversified its sources of foreign military

assistance and Africanized the armed forces, however, Britain

continued to be active in Ghana. In 1974-75 the Vosper

Thornycroft shipyard refitted a corvette warship under a US$2.5 million contract. In 1978 Fairey Marine provided a Spear MK 2 Class coastal patrol boat to the Ghanaian navy. In

March 1984, the British firm Plessy reported that it had

arranged to furnish Ghana with equipment for air traffic control. The British also received an August 1985 contract for

about US$75,000 worth of electronics equipment. A few years

later, Britain agreed to refurbish four Skyvan military and VIP

transports; by mid-1991, the British had completed work on

two of these aircraft and delivered them to Ghana. A limited

number of British military personnel also participated in joint

exercises with the Ghanaian armed forces.

Canada

From 1962 to 1968, Canada maintained a significant military

presence in Ghana. This relationship began on January 8,

1962, when Ottawa established a thirty-member Canadian

Armed Forces Training Team (CAFTTG) to assist with the

training of young Ghanaian officers. Except for pay and allow- ances, Ghana bore the cost of this training program. During

their time in Ghana, CAFTTG personnel served at the Teshi

Military Academy (later Ghana Military Academy), the Military

Hospital, the Ministry of Defence, Army Headquarters, the

Armed Forces Training School (Kumasi), the Air Force Station

(Takoradi), the Airborne School (Tamale), and the Training

School (Accra). RCAF pilots also augmented the RAF team

that was training Ghanaian air force pilots. In 1969, the Canadian government decided to phase out all military assistance

programs in developing countries. Ottawa later reversed this

decision, however, and established a one-man CAFTTG office

in Ghana until 1982, when this individual returned to Canada.

Apart from training assistance, Canada also provided a modest amount of military equipment to Ghana during the immediate postindependence period. Shortly after the Ghanaian air force was formed, Ghana purchased numerous aircraft from

Canada, including fourteen Beavers, twelve Otters, and eight

twin-engined Caribou transports.

Soviet Union

In January 1958, Ghana and the Soviet Union opened diplomatic relations. According to many Western observers, Moscow

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planned to use Ghana as a base to extend its influence and

communism throughout West Africa. Nkrumah, on the other

hand, hoped that close relations with the Soviet Union would

enable him to diversify Ghana's sources of military assistance.

Ghana temporarily achieved its goal; Moscow, however, failed

to establish a communist foothold in West Africa.

The two countries maintained a multifaceted military relationship. In 1961 Ghana purchased eight Ilyushin-18s, on

credit, at more than US$1.5 million each. High operating coats forced the Ghanaian government to return four of these air- craft to the Soviet Union and to transfer the other four to

Ghana Airways. Two years later, Moscow presented an Mi-4

helicopter to Nkrumah as a personal gift. In 1965, after a year

of internal unrest and several assassination attempts against

him, Nkrumah concluded an arms deal with the Soviet Union

for the purchase of weapons for the presidential guard. The

shipment included twenty-four light artillery pieces, twenty-one

medium mortars, fifteen antiaircraft guns, twenty heavy

machine guns, and a large amount of ammunition.

Apart from these military sales and the gift of a helicopter,

the Soviet Union deployed an array of military, security, and

technical advisers to Ghana in the 1960s. In 1964, for example,

Soviet crews manned four patrol boats based at Tema; according to anti-Nkrumah elements, these patrol boats cruised the

coast of Ghana and carried arms to opposition groups in

nearby countries. By early 1966, the Soviet Union had begun

construction of a new air base near Tamale in northern Ghana.

Soviet instructors worked at secret Bureau of African Affairs

camps, at the Kwame Nkrumah Ideological Institute in Winneba, and at numerous other security and military training

facilities. Additionally, at least seventy-six Ghanaian army offi- cer cadets attended military schools in the Soviet Union.

Ghana Young Pioneers also received training at Komsomol

schools in the Soviet Union.

After the downfall of Nkrumah in 1966, up to 1,100 Soviet

personnel were expelled from Ghana. The new government

broke diplomatic relations with Moscow and terminated all military assistance agreements. In the following years, SovietGhanaian cooperation was minimal. In the mid-1980s, Ghana

unsuccessfully petitioned the Soviet Union to reactivate some

of the projects that had been abandoned after Nkrumah was

overthrown. In late 1986, Ghana's National Secretariat of Committees for the Defence of the Revolution reportedly signed an

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Ghana: A Country Study

agreement with the Soviet Union for assistance in training

national cadres. At the end of the 1980s, an unknown number

of secret service personnel and commandos received training

in the Soviet Union. As of late 1994, there was no indication

that Ghana and Russia, the most powerful of the successor

states of the former Soviet Union, had concluded any military

assistance agreements.

German Democratic Republic

Like other major communist powers, East Germany sought

to exploit Kwame Nkrumah's radicalism to erode Western

influence in Ghana and to use Ghana as a base for spreading

communism throughout West Africa. The relationship between

the two countries began in 1964, when Ghana's Bureau of Afri- can Affairs approached the East German Trade Mission in

Accra and requested intelligence training for its staff. Subsequently, two East German officers who worked for the Ministry

of State Security traveled to Ghana to assess the bureau's training requirements. One of these officers remained in Ghana

and inaugurated a "Secret Service and Intelligence Work"

course for seven members of the Bureau of African Affairs.

This officer later offered an "Intelligence Work Under Diplomatic Cover" course for six other people who worked in the

Bureau of African Affairs and who eventually were assigned to posts in Zambia, Nigeria, Kenya, Sierra Leone, Tanzania, and

Burundi. East Germany also helped the Ghanaian government

to create an intelligence section in the Bureau of African

Affairs. These activities ended after Nkrumah's downfall.

China

Next to the former Soviet Union, China was the most active

communist nation in Ghana. Chinese activities began in October 1962, when Beijing provided a loan for the construction of

two arms factories; Ghana, however, never used the funds. Two

years later, the two countries signed a secret agreement for the

provision of military equipment and advisers for Ghana's "free- dom fighters." In late 1964, a five-member team of Chinese

guerrilla warfare experts arrived at Half Assini Training Camp.

Shortly thereafter, this team inaugurated a twenty-day course

that consisted of training in the manufacture and the use of

explosives, guerrilla tactics, and "basic guiding and thinking on

armed struggle." Other Chinese instructors offered another

course at Obenimase Camp in Ashanti Region on strategy and

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tactics, explosives, weapons use, telecommunications, and battlefield first aid. An unknown number of Ghanaians also

attended a three-month espionage training course in China.

Students from many other African nations, including Zaire,

Niger, Cameroon, Fernando Po, Tanzania, Zambia, Rwanda,

Togo, Cote d'lvoire, Burkina, Gabon, Nigeria, and Guinea, also

received intelligence training from the Chinese in Ghana.

After the 1966 change of government, Ghana expelled 430

Chinese nationals, including three intelligence officers and

thirteen guerrilla warfare specialists. Although they resumed

diplomatic relations in 1972, Ghana and China never re-initi- ated significant military ties.

Israel In April 1959, Israel, with help from India, supervised the

establishment of the Ghanaian air force. A small Israeli team

also trained aircraft maintenance personnel and radio technicians at the Accra-based Air Force Trade Training School.

Although the British persuaded Nkrumah to withdraw Israeli

advisers from Ghana in 1960, Ghanaian pilots continued to receive some training at aviation schools in Israel. After Nkrumah's overthrow, Israeli military activities in Ghana ended.

United States

Military relations between Ghana and the United States have

been minimal and have been concentrated in the International Military Education and Training (IMET) program,

which includes professional military education, management,

and technical training. Between fiscal year (FY) 1950 and FY

1990, the value of training under the IMET program amounted

to US$3.5 million. Estimated IMET figures for FY 1991 were US$252,000; for FY 1992, US$175,000; and for FY 1993,

US$250,000. No credits under the United States Foreign Military Sales program were given to Ghana after 1955; in FY 1995,

however, $300,000 in credits was reportedly made available. Private United States companies received about US$905,000

worth of commercial export licenses for Ghanaian arms purchases from FY 1950 to FY 1990.

Italy

Since independence, Ghana has relied on Italy for an array

of military aircraft. In early 1966, the Ghanaian air force estab289
Ghana: A Country Study

lished a jet fighter/ground-attack squadron, which was composed of seven Italian Aermacchi MB-326s (within two years, three of these aircraft crashed and were later replaced). A

small group of Italian Air Force instructors supervised this

squadron. In 1983 and 1984, the Ghanaian air force accepted

delivery of eight SIAI-Marchetti SF-260TP turboprop trainers.

In mid-1987, Ghana ordered two Aermacchi MB-339 jet train- ers from Italy.

Libya

Little is known about the Ghanaian-Libyan military relationship. An unknown number of Libyan military personnel have

participated in Ghanaian military exercises as observers. During the second Rawlings regime, an undetermined number of

Libyan soldiers received jungle warfare training in Ghana. In

May 1983, the Ghanaian government acknowledged that it had

received unspecified quantities of military equipment, mostly

artillery pieces and ammunition, as gifts from Libya. To all appearances, Accra's ties to Libya weakened after Ghana

moved closer to the West in the late 1980s.

State Security Services

The origins of Ghana's police force lie in efforts by the British council of merchants to protect trading routes and depots.

In 1830 the committee hired numerous guards and escorts. Fourteen years later, the British established the 120-member

Gold Coast Militia and Police (GCMP). The authorities disbanded this force in 1860 and created a ninety-member corps

called the Queen's Messengers. Military units assumed the

GCMP's paramilitary duties.

During the Asante wars, the Queen's Messengers joined the

Hausa Constabulary, imported from Nigeria, and formed the

Gold Coast Armed Police Force. In 1876 the British reorganized this unit into the Gold Coast Constabulary, which was

divided into two forces in 1901, with the paramilitary mission

assigned to the Gold Coast Regiment and the police functions

given to the Gold Coast Police Force. The Northern Territories

Constabulary, which the British created in 1907, joined the

Gold Coast Police Force shortly after World War I. This left the

Gold Coast with one police force, a situation that prevailed

until independence.

290
Ghanaian airforce personnel on parade

Contingent of the Ghanaian navy on parade

Courtesy Embassy of Ghana, Washington

291
Ghana: A Country Study

During the 1950s, the British instituted several changes in

the Gold Coast Police Force to modernize, enlarge, and better

equip the force. Of greater importance was Britain's decision

to Africanize the police. During the first decade of this century,

the British had restricted access to senior positions in all branches of the colonial administration. This restriction

became a major concern of Ghanaian nationalists, who agitated against it, an action that gradually caused a reduction in

the number of British officers. In 1951, for example, sixty-four

of eighty senior police officers were foreigners; however, by

1958, only eleven of 128 senior officers were foreigners.

This Africanization continued under Nkrumah. In 1958

Nkrumah appointed the first Ghanaian police commissioner,

E.R.T. Madjitey. By the early 1960s, the only expatriates who

remained on the force were a few technical advisers and

instructors. Nkrumah, however, distrusted the police. After an

unsuccessful assassination attempt against Nkrumah in 1964 by

a police constable, he disarmed the police, discharged nine

senior officers, detained eight others, and removed the Border

Guards unit from the police and placed it under military control. Nkrumah also reduced the size of the police force from

13,247 in 1964 to 10,709 in 1965.

After the demise of the Nkrumah regime, the size of the

police force increased from 17,692 in 1966 to 19,895 in 1968.

The government also restored the Border Guards unit to police control (in 1972 this unit again became an autonomous

unit). By the early 1980s, the police enjoyed respect from most

Ghanaians because, for the most part, they were not involved

with government attempts to suppress political dissidents or to punish those suspected of trying to overthrow the Rawlings

regime, duties normally assigned to the armed forces. In 1993 Ghana's law enforcement establishment consisted of

351 police officers, 649 inspectors, and 15,191 personnel in

other grades distributed among 479 stations. The national

headquarters are in Accra; they operate under command of an

inspector general. An eight-member Police Council, established in 1969, advises the inspector general on all personnel

and policy matters. The inspector general supervises ten police

regions, each commanded by an assistant commissioner of

police. The police regions in turn are divided into districts, sta- tions, and posts. The police service is composed of General

Administration, Criminal Investigations Department, Special

Branch, Police Hospital, and National Ambulance Service.

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National Security

Recruitment into the police is conducted at the rank-and-file

and the commissioned-officer levels. All recruits must be

between eighteen and thirty-four years of age, must pass a medical examination, and must have no criminal record. Escort

Police applicants must have at least basic facility in spoken

English, General Police applicants must have completed middle school or junior secondary school, and officer corps appli- cants must hold a university degree.

Training for rank-and-file personnel in the Escort and the

General Police forces is conducted at the Elmina police depot;

Escort Police also have been trained at several regional depots.

Since 1975 recruits have attended a nine-month course of

instruction in physical training and drill, firearms use,

unarmed combat, and first aid. Escort Police are given general

education and instruction in patrol and escort duties. General

Police are trained in criminal law and procedures, methods of

investigation, current affairs, and social sciences.

The Accra Police College, established in 1959, offers a ninemonth officer cadet course and two- to six-week refresher

courses in general and technical subjects. Police officers staff

the college; guest lecturers come from the police, other government agencies, and universities. The officer cadet course

offers instruction in criminal law and procedures, laws of evi- dence, police administration, finance, social sciences, practical

police work, and physical fitness. Upon graduation, cadets are sworn in and promoted to assistant superintendent.

Since the early 1990s, the reputation of the police has

improved, primarily because fewer individual officers have

used their positions to extort money from civilians. Moreover, an increasing number of police have been deployed overseas to support Ghana's commitment to international peacekeeping

operations. In 1992-93, for example, a police contingent

served with the United Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia. In addition to supervising local police and maintaining

law and order, this contingent also tried to prevent gross violations of human rights and fundamental freedoms.

Criminal Justice

Prior to the advent of British imperial rule, traditional law,

which sought to maintain social equilibrium and to ensure communal solidarity, governed social relations among Ghana's

peoples. Among the Talensi ethnic group of northern Ghana,

for example, homicide was viewed as a transgression against

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Ghana: A Country Study

the earth, one's ancestors, and the victim's lineage. Deterrence

from crime or rehabilitation of an offender were not objectives

of the legal system. Among the Asante, the same concern with

social equilibrium and communal solidarity prevailed. Serious

crimes such as murder, unintentional homicide, suicide, sexual

offenses, treason, cowardice in war, witchcraft, and crimes

against the chief were termed oman akyiwade, offenses that

threatened the mystical communion between the community

on the one hand and one's ancestors and Asante gods on the

other. The authorities punished such behavior with a sentence

of death in the case of murder or by the sacrifice of an appropriate animal in the case of lesser offenses. Efisem, or minor

crimes, did not rupture this relationship; hence, an offender

could repay his debt to society with a ritual impata, or compensation.

The British imposed upon Ghana's traditional societies criminal laws and penal systems designed to "keep the multitude in

order" rather than to preserve the equilibrium between the

human and spiritual worlds. The development of penal law,

however, was uneven. From 1828 to 1842, a council of merchants exercised criminal jurisdiction in and around British

forts on the coast. The council often abused this power,

thereby alienating many Ghanaians. After creating the Gold

Coast Colony in 1874, the British gradually reformed and

improved the legal and the penal systems. After more than a century of legal evolution, the application of traditional law to criminal acts disappeared. Since 1961 the criminal law administered by the court system has been statutory and based on a Criminal Code. This code is founded on British common law,

doctrines of equity, and general statutes which were in force in

Britain in 1874, as amended by subsequent Ghanaian ordi- nances. Criminal Code and Courts

Two of the three categories of offenses cited in the Criminal

Code concern transgressions against the individual. The third

category includes a series of offenses against public order,

health and morality, and the security of the state, as well as piracy, perjury, rioting, vagrancy, and cruelty to animals. Several offenses reflect Ghana's traditional laws, including drumming with the intent to provoke disorder, cocoa smuggling,

and settlement of private disputes by methods of traditional

ordeal.

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National Security

Criminal Court procedure is guided by the Criminal Procedure Code of 1960 as subsequently amended. As in British law,

habeas corpus is allowed, and the courts are authorized to release suspects on bail. Ghana's legal system does not use grand juries, but, in accordance with constitutionally guaranteed fundamental rights, defendants charged with a criminal

offense are entitled to a trial byjury.

Five degrees of offenses are recognized in Ghana. Capital

offenses, for which the maximum penalty is death by hanging,

include murder, treason, and piracy. First-degree felonies punishable by life imprisonment are limited to manslaughter, rape,

and mutiny. Second-degree felonies, punishable by ten years'

imprisonment, include intentional and unlawful harm to persons, perjury, and robbery. Misdemeanors, punishable by vari- ous terms of imprisonment, include assault, theft, unlawful

assembly, official corruption, and public nuisances. Increased

penalties apply to individuals with a prior criminal record. Corporal punishment is not permitted. Punishments for juveniles are subject to two restrictions: no death sentence may be

passed against a juvenile, and no juvenile under age seventeen

may be imprisoned. Regulations and laws such as these are not

applied equitably. Indeed, defendants habitually resort to one

or another measure to avoid or ameliorate punishment.

The Ghanaian court system is a multifaceted organization.

The Supreme Court of Ghana, which consists of the chiefjustice and four other justices, is the final court of appeal and has

jurisdiction over matters relating to the enforcement or the

interpretation of constitutional law. The Court of Appeal,

which includes the chiefjustice and not fewer than five other

judges, has jurisdiction to hear and to determine appeals from

any judgment, decree, or High Court ofJustice order. The

High Court ofJustice, which consists of the chiefjustice and

not fewer than twelve other justices, has jurisdiction in all matters, civil and criminal, other than those involving treason. Before mid-1993, lower courts consisted of circuit courts,

which had jurisdiction in civil matters and in all criminal cases except offenses in which the maximum punishment was death

or the offense was treason; district or magistrate courts, with

jurisdiction over civil suits and criminal cases except first- degree felonies; and juvenile courts, empowered to hear

charges against persons under seventeen years of age. In 1982

the PNDC created a parallel hierarchy of special courts called

public tribunals, which exercised only criminal jurisdiction,

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Ghana: A Country Study

including some offenses under the Criminal Code (see The

Judiciary, ch. 4). Members of the public tribunals and their

panels were mostly lay people who sat with lawyers. Proceedings were often swift and could result in death sentences.

There were no provisions for appeals until 1984, when the

PNDC established the National Public Tribunal, which consisted of three to five members, to receive appeals from lower

tribunals. Its decisions, however, were final and could not be

appealed. In 1982 a five- to seven-member Special Military Tribunal was also established to handle crimes committed by military personnel.

InJuly 1993, the Parliament of the Fourth Republic incorporated the public tribunals into the existing lower courts system,

except for the National Public Tribunal, which was abolished.

A new hierarchy of lower courts was established consisting of

community tribunals, circuit tribunals, and regional tribunals.

The tribunals have original jurisdiction in both civil and criminal cases, and decisions can be appealed through higher

courts. In late 1994, indications were that the new tribunals

had not yet begun to function in many parts of the country, at

least partly for lack of funds.

Prison System

There was no prison system in traditional Ghanaian societies. In the mid-nineteenth century, the British council of merchants established a network of harsh prisons in forts such as Cape Coast Castle. By 1850 four such prisons could hold up to 129 prisoners. Convicts usually worked on road gangs. The Pris- ons Ordinance of 1860 outlined regulations for the safe-keeping of prisoners. Later ordinances further defined the nature

of the colony's prison regimen, or "separate system," which

required solitary confinement by night, penal labor, and a minimum diet. By the early 1900s, British colonial officials administered the country's prisons and employed Europeans to work

as guards in the prisons. After World War II, Ghanaians gradually replaced these individuals. By 1962 Ghanaians staffed all positions in the prison system.

Under Nkrumah the government showed little concern for

reform and modernization of the penal system. After Nkrumah's overthrow, the National Liberation Council (NLC)

authorized a civilian commission to investigate the prison sys- tem and to make recommendations for improvements. The

commission's report, issued in 1968, revealed numerous prob296
National Security

lems. Of the country's twenty-nine prisons, nine were judged

unfit for human habitation, two were suitable only for police

lockups, and thirteen were appropriate only for short-term

detainment. Because of corruption and incompetence, however, the NLC failed to act upon the commission's recommendations. As a result, prison conditions continued to be

substandard, with poor ventilation, sanitation, and food-preparation facilities. Ministerial responsibility for the prison system has shifted

periodically since independence, but the operation of prisons

is fixed by statute and is divided into adult and juvenile correction. The former is governed by the Prisons Ordinance, which

outlines rules for prison operation and treatment of prisoners.

The constitution of 1969 established a Prison Service, the

director of which is appointed by the chief executive and is responsible to the minister of interior. The Criminal Procedure

Code determines procedures for handling young offenders.

The Prisons Service Board formulates prison policy and regulations and administers the country's prisons. The board consists of a Public Services Commission member as chairman, the

prison services director, a medical officer of the Ghana Medical

Association, a representative of the attorney general, the principal secretary of the Ministry of Employment and Social Welfare, and three other appointed members, one of whom must

be a woman and two of whom must be representatives of reli- gious organizations.

To ensure the welfare and the proper treatment of prisoners, the constitution requires the Prisons Service Board to ensure that prison conditions are reviewed at intervals of not

less than two years. Reports of unjustified treatment of prisoners and recommendations for reform measures are required of

the board.

The prisons service is a career establishment with a promotion system based on training and merit; its members have

retirement privileges similar to those of other public services.

Prisons service standards require one staff member for every

three prisoners, but the ratio in many institutions has risen to one to five or more. Although understaffing has been a long-standing problem,

the quality of prison officers and guards has improved over the

years. Women are included in both categories. Although

recruited from all over the country, prison personnel largely

come from the Ewe and Ga ethnic groups. The prisons service

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Ghana: A Country Study

maintains a training school and depot at Mamobi, near Accra.

This facility offers a six-month training course for senior staff members, special courses for matrons, and preparatory courses

for promotion examinations.

In 1992, the most recent year for which data were available,

the prison system consisted of twenty-seven institutions, including six central prisons for men at Accra (Ussher Fort andJames

Fort), Sekondi, Kumasi, Tamale, and Nsawam; two for women

at Ekuasi (near Sekondi) and at Ho; fifteen local prisons sited

throughout the country, six of which have annexes for women;

and two "open" prisons, one at James Camp near Accra, and

the other at Ankaful near Cape Coast. About 70 percent of

commitments are for less than six months. Outside the criminal justice system, the Ministry of Employment and Social Welfare operates probation homes in Accra andJakobu Ashanti for

boys and in Kumasi for girls; detention centers in Accra,

Sekondi, Cape Coast, and Kumasi handle juveniles of both

sexes. Persons convicted and sentenced to a period of police supervision (parole) rather than imprisonment are subject to a

licensing arrangement. Violations of the license terms are punishable by one-year imprisonment. Upon convicting an

offender of any age, a court may release that individual on probation for six months to three years. Failure to comply with the

terms of the probation can result in the probationer's having to serve the sentence for the original offense. Probation has been

used mainly for young persons.

Human Rights

Ever since the Nkrumah government of the late 1950s and

early 1960s, successive Ghanaian governments have devised

policies to contain or to eliminate political opposition. Observers, both domestic and international, point to the Preventive

Detention Act of 1958 as the first major official act of human

rights infringement. Subsequently, international human rights

organizations such as Amnesty International and Africa Watch

have reported many cases of abuse.

The NLC, which ousted Nkrumah in 1966, used authoritarian tactics against real and imagined adversaries. The Busia

government, which followed the NLC, also employed harsh

measures against its opponents. Beginning in 1972 when

Acheampong seized power, respect for the state and its institutions and laws withered, a development that in turn caused an

298
PresidentJerry John

Rawlings, on an official visit to Washington in

March 1995, discussed

Ghana's role in

international peacekeeping,

regional stability in West

Africa, trade, and mutual

cooperation with President

WilliamJ. Clinton.

Courtesy The White House

increase in human rights violations. In 1979 Jerry Rawlings

sought to redress this situation by launching an army mutiny,

which led to several executions, including those of three

former heads of state. Following a second coup on December 31, 1981, Rawlings

promised to put power in the hands of the people by revolutionizing the country's political and economic system. To

achieve this goal, Rawlings suspended the constitution, banned

political parties, and arrested numerous party leaders. On February 18, 1983, the Rawlings government promulgated PNDC

Law 42, the Provisional National Defence Council (Establishment) Proclamation (Supplementary and Consequential Provisions) Law, which was retroactive to December 31, 1981.

According to Amnesty International, this law gave the PNDC

and its chairman, Rawlings, "wide and apparently arbitrary

power over the citizens of Ghana." Additionally, Amnesty Inter- national voiced concern about the establishment of public tri- bunals to try political criminals, the detention without trial of

suspected government opponents, the imprisonment after an

unfair trial of such people, reports of arbitrary killings by

armed forces personnel, and the beating and ill treatment of

political opponents and criminals by armed forces personnel.

Since the late 1980s, Ghana has continued to experience

human rights problems. These include restrictions on such

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Ghana: A Country Study

basic rights as freedom of speech, freedom of the press, freedom of religion, and freedom of assembly; the right of citizens to change their government; and due process of law. In June

1989, Ghanaian authorities established regulations for registering all religious organizations, froze the assets of four

churches, and expelled expatriate missionaries who were Jehovah's Witnesses or Mormons. Additionally, the PNDC detained

the president and the secretary general of the Ghana Bar Association without charge for more than a week after the association announced its intention to hold a conference

commemorating the 1982 murder of three judges by soldiers.

After the association canceled its plans, the government

released the president and the secretary general.

Ghanaian authorities also arrested numerous American citi- zens who belonged to a religious group known as the Black

Hebrews and held them without charge for lengthy periods. In

September 1989, the Ministry of Defence ordered the imprisonment of Major Courage Quarshigah and four others for

"their alleged involvement in activities which could have compromised the security of the state," that is, for having attempted

a coup. Eventually, the government detained another group of

five people in connection with the so-called Quarshigah Affair.

By the end of 1989, there were about 200 political detainees

and prisoners. The government failed to respond to appeals by

Amnesty International to investigate reported mistreatment of

these detainees and prisoners.

Significant restrictions on personal freedoms continued in

1990. Summary arrests and detention without formal charges were also numerous. Additionally, Lebanese and other resident

foreign businessmen were jailed and held without formal

charges and without benefit of trial. In August 1990, authorities

charged the chairman and other officials of the Movement for

Freedom and Justice, a political group that advocated greater

respect for human rights and democratization, with conspiracy

and publication of a false statement regarding their detention.

The movement's officials later retracted their charge of illegal

detention and apologized to the government.

According to Africa Watch, the Ghanaian government in

1991 continued to hold at least seventy-six political prisoners

and other detainees. In a radio interview on May 31, 1991, Secretary for Foreign Affairs Obed Asamoah claimed that some of

these detainees were subversives. If they were brought to trial, Asamoah added, they would be convicted and executed. In late

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1991, the PNDC arrested several opposition leaders for criticiz- ing the Rawlings regime. Human-rights advocates also reported

various examples of mistreatment of prisoners, such as keeping

them in isolation for long periods and in dark, small cells without clothes or bedding. During political demonstrations, the

police were often accused of using excessive force against antigovernment elements.

With the introduction of the 1992 constitution, observers

hoped that Ghana's human rights record would improve

because the new constitution contains a system of checks and

balances, it guarantees basic human rights and freedoms, and

it provides for an autonomous organization called the Commission on Human Rights and Administrative Justice. This commission, established in September 1993, is empowered to investigate alleged human rights violations, and it may take

action to remedy proven abuses.

When the commission uncovers a human rights violation, it can seek resolution through negotiation, report the incident to the attorney general or auditor general, or institute proceedings. As of late 1994, the commission had received some 2,500

complaints and petitions from Ghanaians with human rights

grievances against present and past governments, of which

about 1,000 had been dealt with.

Another prominent human rights organization is the Ghana

Committee on Human and People's Rights. Established in

early 1991 specifically to watch for and to publicize violations of

basic freedoms, it was credited with contributing to an

improved human rights climate in the early 1990s.

Military Trends

Like many African militaries, the Ghanaian armed forces are

in a state of transition. In the past, the military was an important instrument of state power, the purposes of which were to defend the country's national security, to suppress domestic

dissidents, and, when necessary, to assume the reins of government. In the 1990s, growing popular demands for a better

material life, for democratization, and for respect for human

rights are slowly changing the nature of Ghana's military establishment.

After seizing power in 1981, the Rawlings regime assigned a high priority to economic development, and it downplayed the

necessity for a large, traditional military. As part of an international financial and economic aid program, the World Bank

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Ghana: A Country Study

and the IMF forced Ghana to keep its military budget low. For

this reason, there have been no major weapons purchases for at least a decade, and many of Ghana's more sophisticated weapons systems have fallen into disrepair. By the late 1980s, it had

also become evident that most Ghanaians favored a multiparty,

rather than a military, form of government and that they

opposed the use of the armed forces as an instrument to

silence political debate.

These trends are likely to continue for the foreseeable

future. By the beginning of the twenty-first century, additional

budget cuts doubtless will have further reduced the size of the

Ghanaian armed forces. Moreover, the government will be

increasingly unwilling or unable to finance the high costs of

acquiring, operating, and maintaining advanced weapons.

Despite the inevitable downsizing of the Ghanaian military

establishment, Accra undoubtedly will maintain and perhaps

will increase its commitment to international peacekeeping

forces. Ghana also is likely to support efforts to persuade the

Organization of African Unity to take up the role of peacekeeper on the African continent. The success of Ghana's future

participation in peacekeeping operations will depend on the

ability of its armed forces to adapt to highly demanding service

in far-off countries.

* * *

Historically, the Ghanaian armed forces have played a significant role in the life of the country. As a result, there is abundant literature about the growth and the development of the

Ghanaian military. Useful historical works include Henry

Brackenbury's The Ashanti War: A Narrative, Mary Alice Hodgson's The Siege ofKumassi, Alan Lloyd's The Drums of Kumasi: The

Story of the Ashanti Wars, and Frederick Myatt's The Golden Stool: An Account of the Ashanti War of 1900.

The best account of the military during the colonial period

is The History of the Royal West African Frontier Force by A. Haywood and F.A.S. Clarke. Other important studies of this era include Hugh Charles Clifford's The Gold Coast Regiment in the East African Campaign and Sir Charles Prestwood Lucas's The

Gold Coast and the War. The postindependence evolution of the Ghanaian armed

forces is examined in Simon Baynham's The Military and Politics in Nkrumah's Ghana, Robert Pickney's Ghana under Military

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Rule, 1966-1969, Albert Kwesi Ocran's Politics of the Sword: A Per- sonal Memoir on Military Involvement in Ghana and of Problems of

Military Government, and Politicians and Soldiers in Ghana, 1966-

1972, edited by Dennis Austin and Robin Luckham.

Material about Ghana's military is also available in a variety

of periodical sources, including West Africa, African DefenceJournal, Africa Research Bulletin, and Africa Confidential. Other useful

publications include New African, Africa Events, and TheJournal

ofModern African Studies. Two International Institute for Strate- gic Studies annuals, The Military Balance and Strategic Survey, are

essential for anyone wishing to understand the evolution of

Ghana's security forces. The same is true of three other annuals: Africa Contemporary Record, Africa South of the Sahara, and

World Armaments and Disarmament. The last is published by the

Stockholm International Peace Research Institute. (For further

information and complete citations, see Bibliography.)

303

Appendix

Table

1 Metric Conversion Coefficients and Factors

2 Population Distribution by Region, 1960, 1970, and 1984

3 Population Density, Growth Rate, and Rural-Urban Distribution by Region, 1970-84

4 Medical and Paramedical Personnel in Government Insti- tutions by Region, 1989

5 Enrollment and Gender Breakdown by Education Level,

Selected Academic Years, 1980-81 to 1990-91

6 Gross Domestic Product (GDP) at Market Prices, Selected

Years, 1986-92

7 Gross Domestic Product (GDP) by Sector, 1983 and 1991

8 External Debt, Selected Years, 1986-92

9 Public Finance, Selected Years, 1988-94

10 Balance of Payments, Selected Years, 1986-94

11 Major Political Parties and Military Regimes, 1897-1994

12 Voting Patterns in the District Assembly Elections by Region, 1988-89

305

Appendix

Table 1. Metric Conversion Coefficients and Factors When you know Multiply by To find

Millimeters 0.04 inches

0.39 inches Meters 3.3 feet Kilometers 0.62 miles Hectares (10.0002

) 2.47 acres Square kilometers 0.39 square miles Cubic meters 35.3 cubic feet 0.26 gallons Kilograms 2.2 pounds

Metric tons 0.98 long tons

1.1 short tons 2,204 pounds

Degrees Celsius (Centigrade) 1.8 degrees Fahrenheit and add 32

Table 2. Population Distribution by Region, 1960, 1970, and 1984

(in thousands)

Region 1960 1970 1984

Ashanti 1,109.1 1,481.7 2,090.1 Brong-Ahafo 587.9 766.5 1,206.6 Central 751.4 890.1 1,142.3 Eastern 777.3 1,209.8 1,680.9 Greater Accra 491.82 903.4 1,431.1 Northern 531.6 727.6 1,164.6 Upper East 3 542.9 772.7 Upper West 757.33 319.9 438. J Volta 1,094.2 947.3 1,211.9 Western 626.2 770.1 1,157.8 TOTAL 6,726.8 8,559.3 12,296.0

1 Latest available data. Ghana's 1994 population is estimated at 17.2 million, but no regional breakdown is available.

2 Represents only Accra administrative area. The rest of what is now Greater Accra Region was part of East- ern Region in 1960.

3 In 1960 Upper East and Upper West regions were combined in Upper Region. Source: Based on information from Ghana, Monthly Economic Bulletin, Accra, 3, May

1970, 2; Ghana, Statistical Service, Quarterly Digest ofStatistics, Accra, December

1991, Table 95; and United States, Central Intelligence Agency, The World Factbook, Washington, 1994, 151.

307
Ghana: A Country Study

Table 3. Population Density, Growth Rate, and Rural-Urban

Distribution by Region, 1970-84

Region 4 Area

Population

Density1 Growth

Rate2

-

Population

Distribution3 1970 1984 Rural Urban

24 389 61 86 2 5 67.5 32.5 39,557 19 31 3 3 73.4 26.6 Central 9,826 91 116 1 8 71.2 28.8 Eastern 19,323 63 87 2 4 72.3 27.7 Greater Accra 3,245 278 441 3 3 17.0 83.0 Northern 70,384 10 17 3 4 74.8 25.2 Upper East 8,842 61 87 2 6 87.1 12.9 Upper West 18,476 17 24 2 3 89.1 10.9 Volta 20,570 46 59 1 8 79.5 20.5 Western 23.921 32 48 3 77.4 22.6 GHANA 238,533 36 52 2 6 68.0 32.0

1 Persons per square kilometer.

2 Average annual compound rate for 1970-84 period, in percentages.

3 In percentages, for 1984; towns with 5,000 or more inhabitants.

4 In square kilometers. Source: Based on information from Ghana, Statistical Service, Quarterly Digest of Statistics, Accra, December 1991, Tables 94, 95, and 96.

308
Appendix

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Ghana: A Country Study

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Appendix

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Ghana: A Country Study

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312
Appendix

Table 6. Gross Domestic Product (GDP) at Market Prices, Selected

Years, 1986-921

1986 1988 1990 1992

Total GDP (in billions of cedis) 2 At current prices 511 1,051 2,032 3,009 713 787 854 934

Real change (in percentages) 5.1 5.5 3.3 3.9 In billions of United States dollars 4.62 5.11 5.55 6.06

er capita GDP (in thousands of cedis) At current prices 38.8 74.8 135.5 188.5 At constant 1987 prices 54.2 56.0 56.9 58.5 Real change (in percentages) 1.7 2.2 0.0 0.9 In United States dollars 352 364 369 380

Latest available data. For value of the cedi—see Glossary. Source: Based on information from Ghana, Statistical Service, Quarterly Digest of Statistics, Accra, December 1991, Table 87; and Economist Intelligence Unit, Country Profile: Ghana, 1994-95, London, 1994, 16.

313
Ghana: A Country Study

Table 7. Gross Domestic Product (GDP) by Sector, 1983 and 1991

1983 1991

Sector Value2 Percentage Value2 Percentage

Agriculture 92 047 50.0 873 403 33 Q Cocoa production and

marketing 10,227 5.6 244,602 9.5 5,609 3.0 99,986 3.9 2,044 1.1 33.942 1.3 Total agriculture 109,927 59.7 1,252,024 48.6

TnHii«ti*v Mining and (quarrying 1 944 1.1 45,587 1.8 7,101 3.9 225,078 8.7

Electricity and water 358 0.2 51,950 2.0 Construction 2.796 1.5 89.195 3.5 Total industry 12,199 6.6 411,811 16.0 Services Transportation and 4.2 communications 7,663 114,688 4.5 43,120 23.4 442,787 17.2 Finance and insurance 3,311 1.8 107,391 4.2 Government and other 8.670 4.7 243.456 9.4 Total services 62,764 34.1 908,322 35.3 Less imputed bank service charges -2,259 -1.2 -35,461 -1.4 Import duties 1,407 0.8 38,077 1.5 GDP at market prices 184,038 100.0 2,574,774 100.0

Figures may not add to totals because of rounding. At current prices, in millions of cedis (for value of the cedi—see Glossary)

Source: Based on information from Ghana, Statistical Service, Quarterly Digest of Statistics, Accra, 1987, Table 74; and Economist Intelligence Unit, Country Profile: Ghana, 1994-95, London, 1994, 15.

314
Appendix

Table 8. External Debt, Selected Years, 1986-921 (in millions of United States dollars)

1986 1988 1990 1992

External debt Long-term

Short-term IMF credit2 Total external debt

Public disbursed debt

Official creditors

Private creditors Total public disbursed debt Debt service Principal

Interest Total debt service

Figures may not add to totals because of rounding. IMF—see Glossary.

1,754 2,214 2,705 3,131 187 72 312 404

786 762 745 740

2,726 3,048 3,761 4,275

1,464 1,892 2,483 2,894 252 290 189 202

1,716 2,182 2,672 3,096

112 424 250 185

111 128 105 115 223 552 356 300

Source: Based on information from Economist Intelligence Unit, Country Profile: Ghana, 1994-95, London, 1994, 34.

Table 9. Public Finance, Selected Years, 1988-94

(in millions of cedisj i

1988 1990 1992 1994

Revenue 153,791 267,347 400,000 1,078,069 -111,004 -198,193 -283,000 -742,376 Balance 42,787 69,154 117,000 335,693 Development expenditure -32,893 -56,280 -157,000 -174,200 Net lending2 -5,983 -9,487 n^3 -93,457

Overall balance 3,911 3,387 n.a. 68,036 Financing Domestic -6,166 -27,977 n.a. -151,813

External 2,255 24,590 n.a. 83,777

For value of the cedi—see Glossary. Net loans, advances, and investment in public boards, corporations, and companies,

n.a.—not available. Source: Based on information from Ghana, Statistical Service, Quarterly Digest of Statistics, Accra, December 1991, Table 33; and Economist Intelligence Unit, Country Profile: Ghana, 1994-95, London, 1994, 28.

315
Ghana: A Country Study

Table 10. Balance ofPayments, Selected Years, 1986-94

(in millions of United States dollars)

1986 1988 1990 1992 19942

Merchandise exports 773 881 891 986 1,246 Merchandise imports -713 -993 -1,199 -1,457 -1,760 Trade balance 61 -112 -308 -470 -514

Exports of services 45 78 93 129 n.a.

3 Imports of services -344 -400 -429 -505 n.a. Net private transfers 72 172 202 255 n.a. Net official transfers 123 196 214 214 n.a. Current account balance -43 -66 -228 -378 -190

4 5 15 22 n.a. Other capital 59 204 310 299 n.a. Capital account balance 63 209 325 321 n.a.

1 Figures may not add to totals because of rounding.

2 Estimated.

3

n.a.—not available. Source: Based on information from Economist Intelligence Unit, Country Profile: Ghana, 1993-94, London, 1993, 32; Economist Intelligence Unit, Country

Report: Ghana [London], No. 3, 1994, 6; and Economist Intelligence Unit, Country Profile: Ghana, 1994-95, London, 1994, 32.

316
Appendix

Table 11. Major Political Parties and Military Regimes, 1897-1994

Period Description

1897-1 920s British West Africa Aborigine Rights Protection Society. Founded by small urban elite to protect property rights from British encroachment. Became

limited vehicle for later tribal leader protest as well. 1920s National Congress of British West Africa. Regional educated elites' first effort

to influence British to provide some elected voice for Africans. 1947-55 United Gold Coast Convention (UGCC). Postwar movement of educated

Africans demanding a voice in government. Brought Kwame Nkrumah back from Britain as its secretary. 1949-66 Convention People's Party (CPP) . Founded by Nkrumah. Served as main

force for independence, then as his vehicle to power and rule. Governing

party, 1957-66. Abolished after 1966 coup. 1954-56 National Liberation Movement (NLM). Conservative, federalist opposition

to CPP in crucial 1956 election. Largely Asante-based. Joined United Party (UP). 1955-1 960s United Party (UP) . Led by Kofi A Busia. Unified NLM and other CPP opponents as CPP's primary opposition. Gradually crushed by government.

1966-70 National Liberation Council (NLC) . Name adopted by army and police leaders of coup that overthrew Nkrumah. Dedicated to return to democratic

civilian rule. 1969-72 Progress Party (PP) . Led by Busia and consisting of former UP supporters. Won 1969 election. Lost support of people and army through efforts to impose order on country's economy.

National Alliance of Liberals (NAL). Led by KA Gbedemah and consisting of other followers of CPP's right wing. Defeated by PP in 1969. Joined others

in opposi don Justice Party (JP). 1972-75 National Redemption Council (NRC). Name adopted by Lieutenant Colonel

Ignatius K Acheampong and associates after overthrow of Busia govern- ment. Ruled country without civilian input, with soldiers assigned to every

organization. 1975-79 Supreme Military Council (SMC). Created by Acheampong out of the NRC.

After ouster of Acheampong in 1978, began steps toward civilian rule, calling

for elections in June 1979. On eve of elections, overthrown byjunior officers of Armed Forces Revolutionary Council (AFRC)

.

1978-81 People's National Party (PNP). Created t$> contest 1979 elecdon. Attracted former NAL members and others. Chose Hilla Limann as its candidate and won election by slim majority. Popular Front Party (PFP). Party of former Busia supporters. Formed opposition in new parliament. 1979 Armed Forces Revolutionary Council (AFRC). Name adopted by Flight Lieu- tenantJerry Rawlings and associates after Ghana's first violent coup. Without

concrete platform except to punish corruption. Withdrew in favor of elected Limann government after four months in power. 1982-92 Provisional National Defence Council (PNDC) . Composed of leaders of Rawlings's second coup. With considerable evolution of personnel and objectives, continued until 1992 to be sole center of political power in Ghana.

1992-94 National Democratic Congress (NDC) , National Independence Party (NIP)

,

New Patriotic Party (NPP), People's Heritage Party (PHP), and People's National Convention (PNC) were major parties organized to contest 1992

presidential election. NDC party of Rawlings and PNDC; NPP largely Asantebased, nominated Adu Boahen; NIP, PHP, and PNC all Nkrumahists. NDC

317
Ghana: A Country Study

Table 11. Major Political Parties and Military Regimes, 1897-1994

Period Description

1992-94 elected, formed first government under Fourth Republic; remaining parties formed opposition. In 1993 NIP and PHP formed (new) People's Convention Party (PCP).

Table 12. Voting Patterns in the District Assembly Elections by Region,

1988-89

Region District Candidates

Registered

Voters Votes Cast Percentage Turnout

18 2,211 950,222 577,735 60.8 Brong-Ahafo 13 1,629 650,143 391,489 60.2 Central 12 1,421 549,564 307,668 56.0 Eastern 15 1,825 744,160 452,449 60.8 Greater Accra 5 693 792,012 350,861 44.3 Northern 13 1,471 508,560 308,191 60.6 Upper East 6 822 358,174 222,068 62.0 Upper West 5 458 212,192 143,017 67.4 Volta 12 1,343 568,590 334,445 58.6 Western 11 969 589,221 328,479 55.3 GHANA 110 12,842 5,922,838 3,416,402 58.9 Source: Based on information from Ghana, Local Government Information Digest, Special Editions I and II, Nos. 4-5, Accra, 1989.

9

318
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"V:

349

Glossary

asafo—Traditional warrior organization of the Akan and other

coastal peoples of southern Ghana, originating in the early

seventeenth century or earlier. Traditionally, the asafo

served as an independent outlet for popular dissatisfaction, and they had a voice in the enthronement (enstoolment) and dethronement (destoolment) of chiefs. Among

other tasks, the asafo performed police and militia duties,

collected tribute, and built roads. People's Defence Committees and Committees for the Defence of the Revolution

of the Provisional National Defence Council era were

inspired in part by the asafo tradition.

Asante/Ashanti—Terms used interchangeably to refer to what

are probably the best-known people and state among the

Akan. Asante is the original Akan term. Ashanti, according

to popular accounts, is a corruption that originated early

in the colonial period. Although Asante is now preferred,

Ashanti remains in use in contemporary Ghana, for example, Ashanti Region.

cedi (pi. cedis; £ or c) —Ghanaian unit of currency, composed

of 100 pesewas. Introduced after independence by Kwame

Nkrumah, it has undergone several devaluations, including one that proved politically unpopular in December

1971. In 1982 the value of the cedi was US$1.00 = 2.75

cedis. In October 1983, the Provisional National Defence

Council further devalued the cedi, which produced an

exchange rate of US$1.00 = 90 cedis in March 1986. Beginning in September 1986, the cedi was freed to float against

other currencies, which yielded an exchange rate of

US$1.00 = 326 cedis by 1990 and US$1.00 = 1,040 cedis by

late 1994.

clan—A group whose members are descended in the male line

from a putative common male ancestor (patrician) or in

the female line from a putative common female ancestor

(matriclan). Clans may be divided into subclans organized on the same principle or into lineages (q. v.) believed to be

linked by descent from a common ancestor less remote

than the founding ancestor of the clan.

fiscal year (FY) —An annual period established for accounting

purposes. In Ghana, the government's fiscal year is the

351
Ghana: A Country Study

same as the calendar year. Global 2000—Program founded and chaired byJimmy Carter,

former president of the United States, to deliver agricultural assistance to farmers in the developing world. Provides improved seedlings, financial assistance, and

extension services, and has as its goal the attainment of

agricultural self-sufficiency in participating countries.

Ghana became a member country in the mid-1980s.

gross domestic product (GDP)—A measure of the total value of

goods and services produced by the domestic economy

during a given period, usually one year. Obtained by adding the value contributed by each sector of the economy in

the form of profits, compensation to employees, and

depreciation (consumption of capital). The income aris- ing from investments and possessions owned abroad is not

included, hence the use of the word domestic to distinguish

GDP from gross national product (q.v.).

gross national product (GNP)—Total market value of all final

goods and services produced by an economy during a year. Obtained by adding the gross domestic product {q.v.) and

the income received from abroad by residents minus payments remitted abroad to nonresidents.

International Monetary Fund (IMF) —Established on July 22,

1944, the IMF began operating along with the World Bank

(q.v.) on December 27, 1945. The IMF is a specialized

agency affiliated with the United Nations that takes

responsibility for stabilizing international exchange rates and payments. The IMF's main business is the provision of

loans to its members when they experience balance-of-payments difficulties. These loans often carry conditions that

require substantial internal economic adjustments by the

recipients.

lineage—A group whose members are descended through

males from a common male ancestor (patrilineage) or through females from a common female ancestor (matrilineage). Such descent can in principle be traced. Lineages vary in genealogical depth from the lineage ancestor

to living generations; the more extensive ones often are

internally segmented. A lineage is generally a branch of a

clan (q.v.).

matriclan—A group of men and women who are descended in

the female line from a putative common female ancestor,

matrilineage—A group of male and female descendants of a

352
Glossary

female ancestor, each of whom is related to the common

ancestor through female forebears.

patrician—A group of men and women who are descended in

the male line from a putative common male ancestor. patrilineage—A group of male and female descendants of a male ancestor, each of whom is related to the common

ancestor through male forebears.

Shia (also Shiite, from Shiat Ali, the Party of Ali) —A member

of the smaller of the two great divisions of Islam. In the

mid-seventh century, the Shia supported the hereditary

claim of Ali, the Prophet Muhammad's cousin and son-inlaw, and of his descendants to presumptive right to the

Islamic caliphate and leadership of the Muslim community. On this issue, they divided from the Sunnis, the larger

of the two great divisions of Islam.

World Bank—Informal name used to designate a group of four

affiliated international institutions: the International Bank

for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD) , the International Development Association (IDA), the International

Finance Corporation (IFC) , and the Multilateral Invest- ment Guarantee Agency (MIGA). The IBRD, established

in 1945, has the primary purpose of providing loans to developing countries for productive projects. The IDA, a

legally separate loan fund administered by the staff of the

IBRD, was set up in 1960 to furnish credits to the poorest

developing countries on much easier terms than those of

conventional IBRD loans. The IFC, founded in 1956, supplements the activities of the IBRD through loans and

assistance specifically designed to encourage the growth of

productive private enterprises in the less developed countries. The MIGA, founded in 1988, insures private foreign

investment in developing countries against various non- commercial risks. The president and certain senior offi- cers of the IBRD hold the same positions in the IFC. The

four institutions are owned by the governments of the

countries that subscribe their capital. To participate in the

World Bank group, member states must first belong to the

International Monetary Fund (IMFq.u).

353

Index

Abacha, Sani, 243

Aborigines' Rights Protection Society, 24 Abu, Katharine, 99

Accelerated Development Plan for Education, 95, 118-20, 123

Accra, 14, 224; airport at, 183; as capital, 17; rioting in, 26; water for, 72 Accra Plains, 63-64; agriculture of, 63-

64; topography of, 63 Accra Police College, 293 Accra Turf Club, 99 Acheampong, Ignatius Kutu, 41-42, 147, 154; executed, 47, 51, 273; forced to

resign, 45, 272 Acheampong government. See National Redemption Council; Supreme Mili- tary Council Achimota College, 22 Achimota School, 118 acquired immune deficiency syndrome

(AIDS), 62, 114-15; awareness pro- gram, 115; number of cases of, 114,

115; surveillance systems for, 115 Ada people, 81,88

Adamafio, Tawia: jailed, 35, 37; opposition of, to Nkrumah, 35; trial of, 35-

36 Adangbe people, 81 Addo, Edward Akufo, 38

Adjei, Ako: jailed, 35, 37; trial of, 35-36

Administration of Estate (Amendment) Law (1986), 84 Advanced Level education, 120

Afadjato, Mount, 63, 68 Afram Plains, 69 Afram River, 67, 70, 71 AFRC. See Armed Forces Revolutionary Council

Africa Must Urate (Nkrumah) , 33

African Airways Corporation, 183

African Company of Merchants, 11; dis- solved, 13-14; Gold Coast controlled

by, 14; treaty of, with Asante, 13

African Fund, 244

African Methodist Episcopal Church,

104

African National Congress, 244

African Timber and Plywood, 167

Africa Watch, 298, 300

Afrifa, A.A.: in Busia government, 38; in coup of 1966, 36, 270; executed, 47,

51, 273

agricultural development, 159

Agricultural Development Corporation, 147

Agricultural Produce Marketing Board,

147

agricultural production, xxxii, 140, 158

agricultural products {see also under indi- vidual crops) , 6; bananas, 6; cacao {see also cocoa), xxxi, 21, 134, 158, 159;

cassava, 6; coffee, 68, 159; commercial

crops, 162-64; cotton, 162-64; food

crops, 164-65; kenaf, 162; kola nuts, 133, 158; palm, 64, 158, 159, 162; rice, 68; rubber, 162; smuggling of, xxxii, 40, 44, 135; sorghum, 6; sugar, 162;

timber, 158, 159; tobacco, 162

agriculture, 158-68; in the Accra Plains, 63-64; in Akwapim-Togo Ranges, 68; in Ashanti Uplands, 68; Cuban sup- port for, 250; employment in, 158; government budget for, 145-46, 159;

in the high plains, 70; investment in, 186; irrigation in, 64, 71; liberalization

of, 164-65; as percentage of export

earnings, 158; as percentage of gross domestic product, 139, 158; subsidies

for, 160; under Supreme Military

Council, xxxii; taxes on, 149; in Volta

Delta, 64 Ahanta people, 81 AIDS. See acquired immune deficiency

syndrome

Airborne School, 286

air force: aircraft of, 277, 286, 289-90;

bases, 277, 287; creation of, 268, 289; foreign assistance to, 280; insignia, 282; number of personnel, 257, 277; problems in, 181; ranks, 282; training,

355
Ghana: A Country Study

280-81, 283, 289; uniforms, 282

Air Force Station, 286

Air Force Trade Training School, 289

airports, 183, 278 Akan language, 79, 81 Akan Lowlands, 63, 64-67; topography

of, 67 Akan people, 83-85; chiefs of, 84-85;

conflicts among, 85; ethnic groups of,

7, 83; families in, 83-84; geographical

distribution of, xxix, 83; influences

on, 83; inheritance among, 84; migration of, 6, 83; political system of, 83,

84; religion of, 107-8; religious festi- vals of, 103-4; slave trade by, 8-9;

socialization of children by, 92; social organization of, 83-84; stool of, 84; women, 100 Akan states, 6 Akenten, Oti, 7, 262 Akosombo Accord (1994), 237 Akosombo Dam, xxxii, 68, 176, 178, 238; construction of, 34, 71, 176; relocation for, 71 Akuafo Check System, 160 Akuffo, Frederick W.K., 45, 272; executed, 47, 51, 273 Akufo-Addo, Edward, 26 Akwamu people, 81, 83, 89 Akwapim language, 82 Akwapim people, 81; conflict of, with other ethnic groups, 260; religion of, 104 Akwapim-Togo Ranges, 63, 68; climate

of, 68; ethnic groups in, 89 Akyem people, 81, 83 aluminum industry, 176

Al Yaqubi, 5 Amnesty International, 221, 298, 299

Anglican Church, 104 Anglo people, 85 Ankobra River, 67, 70, 71; navigation on,

70, 182-38

Ankra, JA.: in coup of 1966, 36, 270 Anlo people. See Anglo people

Annan, Daniel F, 53-54

Anokye, 7 Anum-Boso people, 86 Appiah, Joseph, 38

archaeological research, 5, 69, 89

Arden-Clarke, Sir Charles, 28, 30

area councils, 225, 227

armed forces, xxxvi; Africanization of, 268-69, 278, 286; and black market,

260, 274, 282; British officers in, 268-

69, 283; under British rule, 261; cor- ruption in, 260; deployment of, 277; educational qualification for, 279; growth of, 262; history of, 262-66;

materiel of, 269, 277, 286, 289-90,

302; missions of, xxxvi, 229, 257, 268, 271, 277; morale, 281-82; under

Nkrumah, 262; number of personnel

in, 257, 277, 279; organization of, 277; peacekeeping role of, xxxvi, xxxix,

257-58, 302; political organs of, 199;

political role of, xxxvi; purged, 46-47,

273, 282; term of service in, 279; train- ing, 279; uniforms, ranks, and insignia

of, 282; women in, 279 Armed Forces Revolutionary Council

(AFRC) (1979), 46-47, 195; formed,

46, 273; objectives of, 195; political

repression by, 201; support for, 47 Armed Forces Training School, 279, 286

army: deployment of, 237; development

of, 268-70; field exercises, 280; insignia, 282; joint exercises, 280; number

of personnel in, 257, 277; organization of, 277; ranks, 282; training of, 279-80; uniforms, 282 Army Staff College at Camberley, 279

asafo. See men's associations Asamoah, Obed, 239, 300 Asante confederacy, 79; expansion of, 262-63 Asante (Ashanti) empire, xxx, 7-8; armed forces of, 261, 263; British inva- sion of, 15-16, 263, 264; as British col- ony, 16, 17; and Europeans, 13; expansion of, xxx, 7-8, 260; influence

of, 7; slave trade by, 8-9, 263; trade through, xxx, 133; treaties of, with

Europeans, 13, 14, 16, 264

Asante (Ashanti) language, 82 Asante (Ashanti) people, 17, 81, 89; criminal justice system of, 294; ethnic group of, 7, 83; Muslim influence on,

7; opposition of, to British-style gov- ernment, 29; political parties of, 29,

38; relations of, with British, 14; rela- tions of, with Fante, 263 Asante (Ashanti) wars, 12-15, 257, 263-

66; British intervention in, 13-14, 260

356
Index

Ashanti. See Asante Ashanti Goldfields Corporation, 21,

169; earnings of, 188; expansion of, 170; nationalized, 147; privatized, 153, 172; production by, 170

Ashanti Mines Volunteers, 267

Ashanti Region, 224; administrative districts in, 227; agriculture in, 160; AIDS

in, 115; elections of 1992 in, 214; mining in, 170; political affiliations in, 38; religion in, 104; representation of, in Legislative council, 26; urbanization

in, 76

Ashanti Uplands, 63, 67-68, 69; agricul- ture in, 68; forests in, 68; and the Kwahu Plateau, 67-68; mining in, 68; missionaries in, 67; rivers in, 68; southern, 67, 68; temperatures in, 67 Association of Committees for the

Defence of the Revolution, 234

associations (see also under individual types of associations) , 98-99

Attah-Ahoma, S.R.B., 25 Audit Service, 222 Ave people, 85

Awoonor-Williams, R.A., 26

Ayanfuri mine, 172 Ayensu River, 72

Babangida, Ibrahim, 242

balance of payments, 188-89

balance of trade, 188-89

banking, 150, 151-53; assets and liabili- ties of, 189; laws, 151; reforms, 146 Bank of Ghana, 77, 152, 188; interest

rates of, 151, 152 banks (see also Bank of Ghana): commercial, 152; deposits in, 152; discount

houses, 152; foreign, 153; interest

rates of, 151, 152; loans by, 152; losses

by, 151-52; merchant, 152; privatiza- tion of, 148; rural, 77, 152; secondary, 152

Baptist Church, 105

Barclays Bank of Ghana, 152

Basic Certificate of Education Examination, 122, 124

Battle of Amoafo, 265

bauxite, 176; export of, 137, 141; production, 136, 168 Be people. SeeBey people

Benin: electricity exported to, 178; Ewe

people in, 85 Bey people, 85

Billiton Bogoso mine, 172

Birim River, 67, 68, 70

Birim River Basin: mining in, 173

birth control. See family planning

Black Hebrews, 300

black market, 26, 141, 145, 154, 195; participation by soldiers in, 260, 274, 282;

as percentage of gross domestic product, 154; as percentage of trade, 141 Black Star Line: job cuts in, 156

Black Volta River, 71 Boahen, Adu, 206-7, 209; in election of

1992, 212

Bolgatanga, 224 Bond of 1844, 15, 16 Bono (Brong) people, 81, 83; political

affiliations of, 38 Bonsa Tire Company, 162 Bonsa Valley, 67 Bonte mining company, 172 Border Guards, 292

border problems: with Togo, 239

borders, 62; under British rule, 17; with Burkina Faso, 62; with Cote d'lvoire, 62, 67, 240; along Gulf of Guinea, 62; with Togo, 62, 239

Botchwey, Kwesi, 50, 52, 187

Botsio, Kojo: in Convention People's

Party, 27

Botswana: state visit to, 245

Brazil: materiel from, 277

Britain: abolition movement in, 12-13,

263; aid from, 176, 246; Elmina Castle purchased by, 15; invasion of Asante

by, 15-16, 260, 264; materiel from,

277; military assistance from, 280, 282, 283-86; military exercises with, 286; military training provided by, 278,

280; protection by, 15; relations of, with Asante, 13, 14, 263-64; relations

with, 244, 245-46, 276; slave trade by,

9; trade with, 143; trading companies,

11; treaties of, with chiefs, 14-15;

treaty of, with Asante (1831) , 16, 264

Britannia Royal Naval College at Dart- mouth, 283

British Joint Services Training Mission, 281

British rule, xxx, 16-24; administration

357
Ghana: A Country Study

under, 17-21; armed forces under,

261-62, 266-68; borders under, 17; capital under, 17; chiefs under, xxxxxxi; economic development under,

21-24; education under, 22, 117; elite under, xxx-xxxi, 94; Executive Council under, xxx-xxxi, 18-19; foundations of, 13; indirect rule by, xxx-xxxi,

19-20, 94; influences of, 83, 93-94,

217, 222; judicial powers under, 16,

20; legal system under, 20; Legislative Council under, xxx-xxxi, 18-19; mining under, 169; opposition to, 27, 257, 261, 267; police under, 94, 290; postal service under, 21; prison system

under, 22, 294, 296; social develop- ment under, 21-24; state enterprises

under, 146-47; taxes under, 117; tele- communications under, 21; transportation under, 21

British traders, xxx, 133, 264; of slaves, xxx, 9 Brong-Ahafo Region, 224; agriculture in, 160; elections of 1992 in, 214 Brong people. See Bono people

budget deficit. See government budget

deficit Bui dam, 178

Builsa people, 87

Bulgaria: relations with, 249 Bureau of African Affairs, 287, 288; intel- ligence section, 288 Bureau for Technical Assistance, 269-70

Burkina Faso: border with, 62; electricity exported to, 178; health care professionals in, 113; military exercises with, 241, 280; relations with, 237, 240-42 Burns constitution. See constitution of

1946 bush fires

? 139, 161

Busia, Kofi Abrefa: exile of, 33; as head

of Progress Party, 37-38; overthrown,

40, 153-54; as prime minister, 38

Busia government. See Second Republic

business: taxes on, 149

cacao {see also cocoa): introduction of, xxxi, 21, 134 Cade, EA., 169 Cambodia: peacekeeping mission in, 237, 252, 257, 260, 293

Campaign for Democracy in Ghana, 202;

established, 260-61 Campaore, Blaise, 241 Canada: assistance from, 187, 249; joint ventures with, 172; materiel from, 286;

military training by, 280, 286; relations

with, 249, 276; state visit to, 249 Canadian Armed Forces Training Team,

286 Cape Coast, 64, 224

Carter, Jimmy, 70, 247

Carter Center: election monitors from,

215, 246

Casely-Hayford, Joseph E., 24-25

cassava, 6 Catholic Bishops Conference (CBC),

105, 203, 204, 205; and return to democracy, 204

Catholicism, Roman, 104; percentage of

followers in population, 102, 103

Catholic missions. See missions CBC. See Catholic Bishops Conference CCG. See Christian Council of Ghana

CDRs. See Committees for the Defence of

the Revolution

cedi. See currency

census: of 1960, 73; of 1970, 73; of 1984,

73, 77

Central Region, 224; agriculture in, 160; mining in, 170; religion in, 104

Central Togo people, 89-90; education

of, 90; inheritance among, 89; occupations of, 89; religion of, 89

Chalker, Lynda, 246

Chazan, Naomi, 46, 47, 80 chiefs {see also National House of

Chiefs), 61; adjudication for, 220; Akan, 84-85; authority of, 93; under

British rule, xxx-xxxi; under constitu- tion of 1957, 32; under constitution of

1992, 206; in district assemblies, 55; Ewe, 85; and families, 93; indirect rule

by, 19-20, 94; in legislative assembly,

15, 25, 29; political participation by, 199; political role of, 224; and Rawlings, 216; regional houses of, 203, 204, 205-6, 220, 230; relations of, with

intellectuals, 25, 95; relations of, with

subjects, 94; religious role of, 107-8; and return to democracy, 204; selec- tion of, 19, 93, 196; slave trade by, 11-

12; treaties of, with Britain, 14-15; vil358
Index

lage councils of, 19, 20, 32, 220

Chieftaincy Act of 1971, 220

Chieftaincy Secretariat, 222

children: child care for, 62, 126; health

of, 111; immunization for, 112, 114;

nutritional programs for, 62, 74; pre- ferred number of, 77, 78, 99-100;

rights of, 219; socialization of, 92, 98, 117; urban, 98

China, People's Republic of: education

in, 250; joint ventures with, 172; mili- tary advisers from, 288; military assis- tance from, 283, 288-89; relations

with, 249, 289; trade with, 143

Christian Council of Ghana (CCG), 104-

5, 203, 204, 205; and return to democracy, 204

Christianity {see also under individual denominations): conversion to, 104,

264; distribution of, 81, 89, 104; holi- days of, 103-4; influence of, 82, 93, 94; involvement of, in politics, 105; per- centage of followers in population,

102, 103; syncretic, 108

Christian Messenger, 222

Christian Methodist Church, 105

Christian missions. See missions; missionaries churches {see also under individual denominations) : regulation of, 108-9

Citizens' Vetting Committees (CVCs), 50

civil aviation, 183

Civil Defence Organisation, 199-200

civil service, 222; Convention People's

Party control of, 34; inefficiency of, 43; job cuts in, 145, 155, 156-57, 222; jobs in, 155; pay in, 158; staffing of, 222; union for, 222

clans, 61; of Akan people, xxix, 83

climate, 61, 72-73; of Akwapim-Togo

Ranges, 68; drought, 72-73; humidity,

72; rainfall, 69-70, 72-73; temperature, 72, 73

Clinton, William J., xxxix cocoa {see also cacao), 160-61; area

planted in, 161; dependence on, xxxvii, 40, 145; earnings of, 188; export

of, xxix, xxxii, xxxiii, xxxvii, 40, 134, 138, 141, 147; as percentage of gross domestic product, 139, 146; plantations, 160-61; prices, 135, 139, 141, 161; privatized, 161; production of,

xxix, xxxii, xxxiii, 45, 51, 67, 68, 89, 132, 135-36, 137, 158, 159, 160, 161; productivity of, 161; smuggling of,

xxxii, 40, 135 Cocoa Marketing Board {see also Ghana

Cocoa Board), 159-60; created, 21; dissolved, 160; incompetence of, 40; role of, 160; subsidies for, 160 Cocobod. See Ghana Cocoa Board

coffee, 68, 146, 147, 159 Cold War, 4 Commission on Human Rights and

Administrative Justice, 230, 235, 301 Committee of Experts, 223 Committee of Experts (Constitution) Law (1991), 223 Committee of Secretaries, 197-99 Committees for the Defence of the Revolution (CDRs), 50, 199, 216, 250, 278; functions of, 199; opposition to, 203;

training of, 287-88 Common Entrance Examination, 120 Commonwealth Conference (1964), 245 Commonwealth Inter-Parliamentary

Union, 246 Commonwealth of Nations: election monitors from, 215, 246; membership

in, 243, 245-46, 251 Commonwealth Parliament Association, 246 communications. See telecommunications Congo region: slave trade from, 8-9 Consolidated African Selection Trust:

nationalized, 147

Consolidated Discount House, 152

constitution of 1925, 25

constitution of 1946, 25-26

constitution of 1951, 28

constitution of 1954, 29

constitution of 1957, 30; amendments

to, 32; chiefs under, 32

constitution of 1960, xxxi, 220; amendments to, xxxi, 33-34

constitution of 1969: draft of, 37; lan- guage under, 82; opposition to, 38

constitution of 1979, 220; suspended,

274, 299

constitution of 1992, 217-27; censorship

under, 223; checks and balances in, 217, 301; chiefs under, 206; civil ser- vice under, 222; draft of, 210; execu359
Ghana: A Country Study

tive under, 217; government reform

under, 197, 219; judiciary under, 217, 220; legislature under, 217; media

under, 219, 223-24; model for, 217; promulgated, 217; referendum on,

210-11; rights in, 219

construction: investment in, 186; as per- centage of gross domestic product,

139; taxes on, 149

Consultative Assembly on the Constitution (1992), 82 consumer goods, 144; prices for, 157, 189

Continental Acceptances (bank), 152 Convention People's Party (CPP), xxxi, 234, 268; control of government by, 34; in elections of 1956, 30; formed,

xxxi, 27; leaders of, 27; platform of, 27, 29, 118; positive action campaign,

28; as sole party, 33, 34, 36 corruption, 149-50, 295; in armed

forces, 260; in government, xxxii, 202, 272, 276; among party leaders, 4; in

politics, 195 Cote d'lvoire: AIDS in, 115; border with, 62, 67; competition by, 40; dissidents

in, 238, 240; electricity exported to, 178; migrations to, 83; relations with, 237-40; smuggling into, xxxii, 44, 141; violence in, 240

cotton, 162-64 Council of State: under constitution of

1992, 217 coups d'etat {see also under revolution)

,

xxxvi; in Nigeria, 242; of 1966, xxxii,

4, 36, 135, 194, 257, 270; of 1972, 40, 41-42, 43, 154, 194, 271; of 1978, 272; of 1979, 193, 194, 195, 273; of 1981,

xxxiii, 48, 49, 51, 136, 193, 194, 195, 273-74, 299 coups d'etat, attempted, 202, 203, 274; of

1967, 270; of 1968, 270; of 1979, 46; of 1982, 49, 274; of 1983, 238, 274; of

1985, 274; of 1986, 274; of 1989, 209, 274-76, 300; in Togo, 258

courts: of appeals, 217, 220, 295; under

British rule, 16; hierarchy of, 217, 220;

inferior, 220, 230, 295-96; jurisdiction

of, 217, 219-20; procedures, 295;

structure of, 219-20, 295; traditional, 220; trials in, 295; tribunals, xxxiii, 50, 51, 220, 221, 230-31, 295-96, 299

Courts Act of 1971,219-20

Courts Act of 1993, 230

Coussey Committee, 27, 28

CPP. See Convention People's Party Crabbe, Cofie: jailed, 35, 37; trial of, 35-

36

crime, 155 Criminal Code, 221, 294-96; categories

in, 294, 295; traditional laws in, 294

criminal justice system {see also courts; judiciary; prisons), 219, 293-98;

under British rule, 20, 294; customary,

20; revisions of, 146; parole in, 298;

traditional, 293-94

Criminal Procedure Code of 1960, 295, 297

Croatia: peacekeeping missions in, xxxviii, 257 Cuba: economic cooperation with, 250; education in, 249-50; relations with,

249; trade with, 143 currency {see also monetary policy;

money supply), 150, 153-55; on black market, 154; depreciation of, xxxvi,

151; devaluation of, 53, 131, 135, 137,

140, 141, 144, 145, 154, 176, 189; over- valuation of, xxxii, 153-54, 165, 168,

175; revaluation of, 43

current account deficit, 137, 188

Curtin, Philip, 12 Customary Marriage and Divorce (Registration) Law (1986), 84 CVCs. See Citizens' Vetting Committees

Dadzie, Kenneth, 252 Dagbane language, 82 Dagomba kingdom, xxix, xxx; founded,

6; influences on, xxix, 7 Dagomba people, xxix, 79-80, 87; cul- ture of, 88; inheritance among, 101 Dahomean people, 89

Daily Graphic, 222 Daka River, 71 Danquah, J.B., 26, 33, 209; death of, 33

Darko, Kwabena: in election of 1992, 212 De Beers of South Africa, 173 debt servicing: ratio, 137, 140

defense spending: decrease in, 271, 301-

2; under Nkrumah, 276

democracy, return to, xxxiv-xxxvi, 193,

196, 200-203, 208-11, 230-35; interest

360
Index

groups in, 204; prospects for, 252-53; seminars on, 209; timetable for, 210 Democratic Youth League of Ghana, 200

demonstrations. See political demonstrations Denkyira, 83, 262 Denmark: and the Asante empire, 13;

slave trade by, xxx, 9, 12; trade by, xxx,

11 Densu River, 67, 70, 72 Department of Social Welfare and Community Development, 220 Department III, Military Intelligence, 269-70

deportation: under Armed Forces Revolutionary Council, 201; under Busia government, 39; of Liberians, 259; under Rawlings, 49, 259; return from,

52, 199 Deportation Act (1957), 32; justification

of, 34

Detention Act. See Preventive Detention Act development committees, 224 diamonds, 173; exports of, 51, 137, 141; production of, 67, 136, 168; reserves

of, 173; smuggling of, 173 Diamond Shamrock, 174

district assemblies, 53-57; candidates for, 54-55; chiefs in, 55; elections for, 54, 197, 206-8, 225, 232, 235, 246; estab- lishment of, 197, 224; justification of, 56-57; members of, 55, 225; reaction

to, 56; role of, 54, 208, 225

District Assemblies Common Fund, 230

District Assembly Committee, 54

district councils, 225

Divestiture Implementation Committee,

148

drainage: under British rule, 22; divide, 70-71; improvements in, 22

drought, 72-73, 136, 139, 161, 164, 176 Dual Mandate in British Tropical Africa (Lugard), 94

DuBois, W.E.B., 27, 244 Du Sautoy, Peter, 196 Dutch traders, 9-11, 133; and the Asante

empire, 13; of slaves, 9 Dutch West India Company, 1

1

Dyula (Muslim traders), 6

Dzobo, N.K., 124 Dzobo Committee, 124

Eagle Club, 210

Eastern Europe, 4; relations with, 249

Eastern Region, 224; agriculture in, 160; elections of 1992 in, 214

East Germany. See German Democratic

Republic EC. See European Community

Ecobank Ghana, 152 ECOMOG. See Economic Community of West African States Monitoring Group

Economic Community of West African

States (ECOWAS), 183; founded, 143; goals of, 143; membership in, 143,

237, 242; peacekeeping missions of, 258, 259-60, 302; Rawlings in, xxxviii, 237, 239, 243 Economic Community of West African States Monitoring Group (ECOMOG): peacekeeping missions of, 278, 281, 282, 302 economic development: under British

rule, 21-24; under Economic Recovery Program, 144; effects of, 94; priorities in, 42; problems with, 42 economic infrastructure, 189 economic instability: protests against, 26; after World War II, 24 Economic Recovery Program (ERP),

xxxiii, xxxvii, 52, 102, 136, 140, 144-

46, 203, 229, 276; defense spending

under, 301-2; education under, 124; exports under, 136; foreign debt

under, 138, 140; goals of, 52-53, 136, 144, 148; gross domestic product

under, 139; impact of, 214; launched,

144; phases of, 52-53, 144-45; prob- lems with, xxxvi-xxxvii; purpose of, 144; results of, 189-90; trade under,

140-41 economy: under British rule, xxix; dependence of, on cocoa, xxxvii, 40, 145; diversification of, 135; in First Republic, 134-35; growth of, 139, 189; market, 94, 131; problems in, 37; recovery of, 4; restructuring of, 131;

role of government in, 131; structure

of, 137-44 ECOWAS. See Economic Community of West African States education {see also schools) , 117-126;

361
Ghana: A Country Study

adult, 124-26; apprenticeship, 117; under British rule, xxix, 22, 117; compulsory, 61; Cuban support for, 250; demand for, 118; development of, 118; distribution of, 81; effects of, 94; of elite, 81; by ethnic group, 90; fees

for, xxxiii, 36, 118, 122, 123-24, 155;

foreign, 123, 249-50; gender ratio in, 101; government spending on, 22, 34, 123, 137, 149; and migration, 96; pri- mary, 146; problems in, 123-24;

reform, 95, 121-22, 124, 249-50; sec- ondary, 118; subsidies for, 122; system,

22, 120-23; technical, 62; vocational,

62, 118; Western, xxxi, 61, 94, 117; of women, 61-62, 101, 118, 121, 126 Education Act of 1960, 61, 104, 120

Efutu people, 86; religion of, 107-8

elders, 92; religious role of, 107-8

elections: candidates in, 54-55, 211-12,

215, 235; for constitution of 1992, 211; for district assemblies, 54, 197, 206-8,

225, 232, 235, 246; fraud charges in, xxxiv, 32; Ghanaian idea of, 196; for

Legislative Assembly, 28, 29; for local

office, 232, 235; of 1951, 28; of 1954,

29; of 1956, 30; of 1960, 33; of 1965,

36; of 1969, 37-38; of 1978, 45; of

1979, 47, 195, 273; of 1988, xxxiv, 54, 197, 206, 208, 246; of 1989, xxxiv, 208,

246; of 1994, 235; for parliament, 195, 197, 210, 214, 215-16, 217; for presi- dent, xxxiv, 195, 197, 210, 211-15,

216, 246; turnout for, 208, 211, 216;

for union government, 45; women in, 215-16, 235

elections of 1992, xxxiv, 194, 197, 210, 211-15, 246; Boahen in, 212-14; boycott of, xxxiv, 214, 228; candidates in, 211-12, 215; Erskine in, 212, 214;

international monitoring of, 215, 246; investigations of, 214, 233: issues in, 212; Limann in, 212, 214; for parlia- ment, 215-16; Rawlings in, xxxiv, 212, 214, 216; in regions, 214; turnout for, 215, 216

Electricity Corporation of Ghana, 178

electric power {see also hydroelectricity), 178-79; under British rule, 147; capacity, 178; distribution of, 178; export of, 141, 178, 238; grid, 77; production,

178, 251; in rural areas, 62, 77, 117;

thermal, 178-79, 251

elite class, 96-98; background of, 96-98; under British rule, xxxi, 94; education

of, 22; nationalism among, 24, 25;

political participation by, 199; religion

of, 108

Elizabeth II, Queen, 245 Elmina Castle, 9, 133; purchased by Brit- ain, 15 employment, 156

English language, 82; broadcasts in, 82, 184; under constitution of 1969, 82; as language of instruction, 82, 118; as

official language, 82, 83, 206; publications in, 223 ERR See Economic Recovery Program

Erskine, Emmanuel, 212, 214

Ethiopia: relations with, 249

ethnic associations, 96

ethnic groups {see also under individual

groups), xxix; distinctions among, 81, 267; fighting among, 75, 79, 234, 260; geographic distribution of, 81, 241;

identification with, 81; migration of, 3,

5; rivalries among, 79-80, 85, 235, 282;

solidarity among, 79

ethnicity, 260

Europe, Eastern: trade with, 143-44 European Community (EC): aid from,

187; relations with, 249; trade with, 143

Evangelical Lutheran Church, 105

Evangelical Presbyterian Church, 104 Every Ghanaian Living Everywhere

Party: in Progressive Alliance, 215, 230 Ewe language, 79, 81, 82, 85, 86 Ewe people, 8, 9, 30, 81, 85-86, 89, 297; chiefs of, 85; conflict of, with other

ethnic groups, 260; ethnic groups of, 85; geographic distribution of, 85, 238; inheritance among, 101; migration of, 85; political affiliations of, 38;

political organization of, 85-86; politi- cal power of, 201, 207, 271; religion

of, 107; trade by, 86; women, 86

Ewusi, Thomas, 12 exchange rate, 154

Exclusive Economic Zone, 167

executive branch {see also president), 217

Executive Council, 28, 272 Expanded Program on Immunization,

112

362
Index

exports {see also under individual products), 61, 137, 141; of bauxite, 137,

141; of cocoa, xxix, xxxii, xxxiii, xxxvii, 40, 51, 134, 138, 141, 147; of coffee, 147; under colonial rule, 146; of

crops, 162; destinations of, 143; of dia- monds, 51, 137, 141; diversification of, 138-39, 142; earnings from, 136, 158; under Economic Recovery Program,

136, 144; of electricity, 141, 178, 238; of gold, xxix, xxxvii, 5, 21, 67, 132, 133, 137, 141; of ivory, 133; of kola

nuts, 133, 141; of manganese, 137,

173; of minerals, xxix, xxxiii, 137, 138, 141, 173; of natural resources, 21-22; of palm oil, 146, 147; promotion of, 145; of slaves, 9, 12-13; under structural adjustment program, 131; of tim- ber, xxix, xxxiii, xxxvii, 21, 51, 132,

138, 141, 165, 166; value of, 143

external debt, 184, 187 Eyadema, Gnassingbe, 238; coup

attempt against, 258; opposition to, 259

families: and chiefs, 93; elders of, 92, 107-8; head of, 91; inheritance in, 92; land of, 92; preferred size of, 77, 78, 99-100; religious role of, 107-8; rural, 77; socialization in, 92; urban, 77, 98

families, extended, 62, 90-92; of Akan

people, 83-84, 90-91; economic assis- tance from, 115-16; members of, 90, 91; and modernization, 95; in urban

areas, 96

family planning, 62, 77-79, 126; education in, 78; and men, 79; practice of, 79; publicity for, 78 Fante language, 82

Fante people, 8, 9, 81, 83; in Asante wars, 13-14, 263; conflict of, with other eth- nic groups, 260; relations of, with

Asante, 263; religion of, 104; treaty of, with British, 15 Fante-Twi language, 82

farmers, 26, 87; Nkrumah's appeal for, 27-28; organizations of, 200; protests

by, 34-35 FEden Church, 105

Finland: materiel from, 277

First Finance Company, 152

First Republic (1960-66) (Nkrumah gov- ernment): armed forces under, 257,

262, 276; corruption in, 202; declared,

30; domestic policies of, xxxi; econ- omy under, 134-35; problems in, 194-

95; socialism under, 257

Fisheries Commission, 230

Fisheries Monitoring, Control, Surveillance, and Enforcement Unit, 168

fishing, 72, 100, 167-68; catch, 167; in Accra Plains, 64; by Ga-Adangbe people, 89; poaching, 167; problems in, 167; restrictions on, 132, 167-68; in Volta Delta, 64

Fitzgerald, Shepler W., 268

food: aid, 247; crops, 164-65; import of, 159, 164; as percentage of gross domestic product, 146; prices, 140; production, 44, 67, 140, 145, 159, 164; shortages, 159; subsidies for, 43

Forces' Defence Committees, 199

foreign assistance {see also military assis- tance), 52, 137, 184, 186-87; for agri- culture, 165; from Britain, 176, 246; from Canada, 187, 249; dependence

on, 150; from European Community,

187; from France, 249; from Germany,

187, 249; from International Monetary Fund, 131, 187-88; for industry,

177; fromJapan, 187, 250, 251; lack of, 44; from Libya, 247; under Rawlings,

52; from the United States, 78, 176,

187, 235, 247; from the World Bank,

52, 131, 146, 176, 187

foreign borrowing, xxxii, 144; to finance

imports, 137

foreign currency, 40; reserves, xxix, xxxii foreign debt, xxxiii, xxxvii, 132, 140, 187-88; under Busia government, 40, 135; cancellation of, 140; under Eco- nomic Recovery Program, 138, 144; under Fourth Republic, 52; as per- centage of gross domestic product, 40;

as percentage of gross national product, 137; repudiation of, 43; rescheduling of, 43

foreign earnings, 150

foreign exchange: bureaus, 145, 154-55;

earnings, 153, 165; under Economic

Recovery Program, 144; interbank

market, 141; lack of, 44; reforms, 145;

reserves, 188-89

363
Ghana: A Country Study

foreign investment {see also investment),

xxxiv, 137, 184, 187-88; in agriculture, 186; in construction, 186; encourage- ment of, 186; in industry, 177, 186; in mining, 137, 168, 169; in tourism, 186

foreign relations, 235-52; armed forces and, 268; objectives of, 235-37

Forest Products Inspection Bureau, 165 Forest Resource Management Project, 166

forestry {see also timber), 165-67; constraints on, 166-67; earnings from,

165; as percentage of gross domestic

product, 165; problems in, 166; products, 166; scandals in, 167

Forestry Commission, 230

forests {see also timber): in AkwapimTogo Ranges, 68; in Ashanti Uplands,

68; deforestation of, 132, 166

forest zone, xxix; central, 7; gold in, xxx; migration to, 6 Fourth Republic (1993- ), 48, 194, 197; armed forces' role in, xxxvi; chal- lenges for, 228; continuity in, 229-30;

goals of, 229; inauguration of, xxxiv, 201, 210, 227-30; nonalignment

under, 236; opposition to, xxxivxxxvi, 53; paramilitary groups under,

234; press under, 224; relations of, with opposition, 229, 234; revolution- ary organs under, xxxiii, xxxiv, 50, 56, 199, 203, 216, 224, 234, 250, 278, 287-

88; structural adjustment under, xxxiv; unions under, 204

Frafra people, 87

France: aid from, 249; colonial ambitions of, 17; relations with, 249 French language: broadcasts in, 184

Friends of Busia and Danquah, 210

Friends of the Earth, 167

fuel {see also petroleum): imports of, 137, 141; shortages of, 167; taxes on, 150

GA. See Ghana Airways

Ga-Adangbe language, 79, 81, 88 Ga-Adangbe people, 8, 81, 88-89; ethnic components of, 88; geographic distri- bution of, 88; influences on, 89; occupations of, 89; origins of, 89; religious

festivals of, 103-4, 107-8 Ga language, 82

Ga-Mashie people, 88 Gambaga Scarp, 69 Ga people, 9, 81, 297; in Asante wars, 13-14; conflict of, with other ethnic

groups, 260; socialization of children

by, 92

gas, natural: exploration for, 67 GBA. See Ghana Bar Association Gbedemah, Komla A.: in Convention

People's Party, 27; as head of National

Alliance of Liberals, 37-38 Gbugble people, 88 GDP. See gross domestic product

Gen people, 85 geographical regions, 63-70, 224;

administration of, 227; Akwapim-Togo

Ranges, 68; Ashanti Uplands, 67-68; high plains, 69-70; low plains, 63-67;

Volta Basin, 69 German Democratic Republic (East Ger- many): military assistance from, 283, 288 Germany: aid from, 187, 249; colonial ambitions of, 17; relations with, 249;

trade with, 143 Ghana: etymology of, 5 Ghana Airways (GA), 183, 277 Ghana Atomic Energy Commission, 179 Ghana Bar Association (GBA), 99, 203,

209, 221; objectives of, 205; opposition

of, to Rawlings, 49, 53; and return to democracy, 204, 231 Ghana Broadcasting Corporation, 507, 232 Ghana Cocoa Board (Cocobod) {see also Cocoa Marketing Board), 160, 188,

222; job cuts in, 156; privatization by, 161 Ghana Commercial Bank, 152 Ghana Committee on Human and People's Rights, 235, 301 Ghana Consolidated Diamonds, 148, 173 Ghana Cotton Company, 164 Ghana Cotton Development Board, 164 Ghana Council of Churches, 109 Ghana Democratic Movement, 202, 261 Ghana Employers Association, 158 Ghana Export Promotion Council, 143 Ghana Federation of Agricultural Cooperatives, 160 Ghana-Guinea-Mali Union, 240-41, 243 Ghana-Guinea Union, 243

364
Index

Ghanaian Ahmadiyah Movement, 107 Ghanaian Times, 222 Ghana Investment Center, 177, 186 GhanaJournalists Association, 203, 223 Ghana Legion, 268 Ghana Medical Association, 99, 113 Ghana Military Academy, 271, 276, 279, 286 Ghana National Association of Farmers and Fishermen, 160 Ghana National Association of Teachers, 99 Ghana National Manganese Corporation, 174 Ghana National Petroleum Corporation,

174, 175 Ghana National Trading Corporation, 156 Ghana Red Cross Society, 99 Ghana Stock Exchange, 153 Ghana Timber Marketing Board, 165 Global 2000 program, 70, 75, 114, 247 GNP. See gross national product

gold {see also under mining), xxx, 6, 131,

132, 133, 169-72; export of, xxix, xxxvii, 5, 21, 67, 132, 133, 137, 141; mines,

xxxi, 68, 168; prices, 133; production,

xxix, 67, 132, 134, 136, 139, 168;

reserves, 170-72; trade in, xxx, 5, 9, 13, 133 Gold Coast Armed Police Force, 290 Gold Coast Colony, 17, 95; administration of, 17-21; established, 16 Gold Coast Constabulary, 290 Gold Coast Ex-Servicemen's Union, 268 Gold Coast Militia and Police, 290 Gold Coast Mines Volunteers, 267 Gold Coast Police Force, 290, 292; Afri- canized, 292 Gold Coast Railway Volunteers, 267 Gold Coast Regiment, 22, 266-67, 290 Gold Coast Volunteer Naval Force, 278 Gold Coast Volunteers, 267 Goldenrae mining company, 172 Golden Stool of Asante (Ashanti), 8, 266 Gonja kingdom, xxix, xxx, 6; influences

on, xxix, 7 Gonja people, xxix, 79-80, 86, 89; cul- ture of, 88; occupations of, 87 government (see also under individual

administrations): under British rule, xxix; corruption in, xxxii, 202, 272,

276; decentralization of, 193, 203, 219, 224, 246; health care, 112; informants

for, 261; and interest groups, 203-4; reform of, xxix, xxxiii, xxxiv, 197; role

of, in economy, 131, 144-50 government, local (see also under district assemblies), 219, 224-27; under British

rule, 19, 20-21, 25-26; system of, 225 government budget, 148-50; for agriculture, 145-46, 159; austerity, 34, 40, 43, 137, 271; cuts, 131, 144; for infrastruc- ture, 146, 149; for 1961, 34-35; for 1993, 149; as percentage of gross

domestic product, 145; surplus, xxxvii; in Third Republic, 48 government budget deficit, xxxvi, 150;

efforts to limit, 148-49; under Eco- nomic Recovery Program, 144, 148-

49; as percentage of gross domestic

product, 145, 149; as percentage of

gross national product, 48; reduced,

131, 144 government debt, 40; repudiation of, 43; rescheduling of, 43 government revenue: as percentage of

gross domestic product, 150; from

taxes, 132, 136 government spending: cuts, 144, 145; on

education, 22, 34, 42, 123, 149; on

health care, 34, 114, 137, 149; justifica- tion of, 34; on roads, 34; on social welfare, 149 government, union, 44-45, 206, 272;

opposition to, 45, 272; platform of, 45; referendum on, 45, 272

Grant, A.G., 26

Greater Accra Municipal Council, 112 Greater Accra Region, 224; administrative districts in, 227; elections of 1992

in, 214; population density in, 74; urbanization in, 76 gross domestic product (GDP), 136,

137-38, 139; under Economic Recov- ery Program, 139; under Rawlings,

xxxvii, 51; per capita, 135

gross domestic product fractions: agri- culture, 139, 158; black market, 154; budget deficit, 145, 149; cocoa, 139,

146; construction, 139; expenditures,

149; food, 146; forestry, 165; govern- ment debt, 40; government revenue,

150; government services, 137; indus365
Ghana: A Country Study

try, 139; manufacturing, 139, 175; ser- vice sector, 139; tax revenue, 136

gross national product (GNP), xxxiii; budget deficit as percentage of, 48; debt as percentage of, 137

Grusi language, 82, 83

Grusi people, 81, 87 Guan language, 79, 86 Guan people, 86-87, 89

Guggisberg, Frederick Gordon, 22, 110-

11; development under, 22, 118

Guinea: potential union with, 34

Gulf of Guinea, 62, 70, 71 Gur language, 61, 81, 81, 82, 87 Gurma language, 82 Gurma people, 81, 87

harbors, xxxi, 22, 63, 181, 182

Harlley, J.W.K.: in Busia government, 38; in coup of 1966, 36, 270 Hausa Constabulary, 290 Hausa language, 82; broadcasts in, 184 Head of Family (Accountability) Law

(1986), 84

health, 109-115; and causes of death,

111; of children, 111; and disease, 75, 111-12; and malnutrition, 111, 114 Health Action Plan, 112

health care, xxxii, 111-14, 146; access to, 114; Cuban support for, 250; fees for, xxxiii; government spending on, 34, 114, 137, 149; herbal, 110; immunization, 112; providers, 112; in rural

areas, 114; Western, 110

health care professionals: herbalists, 110, 117; priests as, 108, 109, 110; number

of, 113-14; pay for, 158; training for, 78,114

health facilities: under British rule, 22; demand for, 74; improvements in, 22 Henry the Navigator, Prince, 9 High Court ofJustice, 217, 220, 295

high plains, 63, 69-70

Hill, H. Worsley, 14-15

holidays: national, 103-4, 232-33; reli- gious, 103-4 Hong Kong: joint ventures with, 172 Ho, 224 Ho people, 85 Horton, Africanus, Jr., 25

housing: destroyed by floods, 64; shortages, 62, 74, 116-17; in urban areas,

62, 74, 116-17 human rights, 219, 235, 298-301; abuses, xxxvi, 194, 201, 214, 216, 221, 298, 299; under Acheampong, 298-99; under Busia government, 298; under

Provisional National Defence Council, 214

hydroelectricity, 71, 178; under British

rule, 22; improvements in, 22; potential, 176, 178

IDA. See International Development

Association IMET. See International Military Education and Training

IMF. See International Monetary Fund

immunization, 112, 114

imports, 134, 141-42, 189; borrowing

for, 137, 145; duties on, 141; of food,

43, 164; of fuel, 137, 141; subsidies for, 43; taxes on, 149 income {see also wages): distribution,

xxxiv, 100; per capita, xxix, xxxii,

xxxiii, 157 independence, xxix, 33; approved, xxxi,

30; requested, 30 independence movements, xxxi; politics

of, 26-30 Independent African Churches: percent- age of followers in population, 102-3, 108

India: military advisers from, 283; mili- tary training by, 280

indirect rule, xxx-xxxi, 19-20, 26, 94

Industrial Development Corporation,

147

industry: closings in, 177; economic

problems of, 44; financial assistance

for, 177; as percentage of gross domestic product, 139; privatization in, 177;

revived, 131

inflation, xxxiii, xxxvi, xxxvii, 140, 168; attempts to reduce, 52, 144; under

British rule, 26, 27; under Busia gov- ernment, 40; rate of, 52, 136, 136, 152; under Rawlings, 51, 52, 138; under

structural adjustment program, 131-

32; under Supreme Military Council,

45; under Third Republic, 48; after World War II, 24

366
Index

infrastructure, 166; budget for, 146, 149; improvements in, 22, 61, 144, 145,

146; industrial, 131; transportation, 165

inheritance, 84, 89, 92, 100, 101

Institute of Adult Education, 125

intellectuals, 27; opposition of, to mili- tary government, 44; relations of, with

chiefs, 25, 95

intelligence: services, 269-70, 288; train- ing, 288

interest groups, 203-6; and government,

203-4; and Rawlings, 216

Interim National Electoral Commission,

210, 211, 215

internal security: intelligence services, 269-70, 288

Intelsat. See International Telecommunications Satellite Organization

International Cocoa Agreement, 247

International Development Association

(IDA), 178, 187

International Finance Corporation, 172

International Foundation for Electoral

Systems, 211 International Military Education and

Training (IMET) program, 289 International Monetary Fund (IMF):

assistance packages, 131, 187-88; austerity program of, xxxiii, 40, 131, 203, 236, 276, 301-2; conditions imposed

by, 148; loan from, 136, 140, 145

International Telecommunications Satellite Organization (Intelsat), 184

Inter-Party Advisory Committee, 228

Intestate Succession Law (1986), 84

investment {see also foreign investment)

,

xxxiv, xxxvi, 186-87; in agriculture,

186; in construction, 186; laws, 187; in manganese, 174; in manufacturing,

186; and taxes, 186; in tourism, 186

Iraq: peacekeeping mission in, 252, 257, 260

Iraq-Kuwait Observation Mission, 260

irrigation: in Accra Plains, 64; from Lake

Volta, 71 Islam {see also Muslims) , 105-6; distribu- tion of, 86, 104; education of, 251; festivals of, 103-4; introduction of, xxixxxx; percentage of followers in population, 102, 103; ritual obligations of, 106; sects of, 106; spread of, 106;

tenets of, 105-6

Islamism, 106

Israel, 251; materiel from, 277; military

advisers from, 283,289; military train- ing by, 280-81,289

Italy: materiel from, 277; military train- ing by, 280-81, 289-90

ivory, 9, 133

Ivory Coast. See Cote d'lvoire

Japan, 250-51; aid from, 187, 250, 251 JCCs. SeeJoint Consultative Committees

Jehovah's Witnesses, 300

jobs, 132; civil service, 155, 156, 157, 222; creation of, 137, 146; elimination of, 137, 145, 155, 156-57, 160, 222

Joint Consultative Committees (JCCs), 50

Joint Services Training Team, 283

Joint Social Action Committee, 205

joint ventures, 148, 172, 177

journalists, 223; detained, 44; Nkrumah's appeal for, 28

JP. SeeJustice Party judges: appointment of, 220

Judicial Council of Ghana, 220, 231

judiciary, xxxvi, 217, 219-21; jurisdiction

of, 219-20; quasi-judicial agencies,

220-21; structure of, 219-20 June 4 Movement, 48, 56, 199, 200

Justice Party (JP), 38; formed, 38; plat- form of, 39-40; support for, 38

Kabesjohn, 12

Kaiser Aluminum, 176 Kasena language, 83 Kasena people: government structure of, xxix, 7; Muslim influence on, xxixxxx, 7 Kaunda, Kenneth, 245

kenaf, 162

Kloli people, 81 KNRG. See Kwame Nkrumah Revolutionary Guards

Koforidua, 67, 224

kola nuts, 133, 141, 158 Komfo Anokye Teaching Hospital, 114 Konkomba people, 79-80 Konkori Scarp, 69 Konny.John, 12

367
Ghana: A Country Study

Konongo, 68 Koranteng-Addow, Gustav, 44

Korea, Democratic People's Republic of (North Korea): relations with, 249

Korle Bu teaching hospital, 111 Korsah, Sir Arku, 36

Kotei, J.EA., 277

Kotoka, E.K: in coup of 1966, 36, 270 Kotoka International Airport, 183 Kpando people, 85 Kpone people, 88 Kpong hydroelectric plant, 178

Kristo Asafo (Christian Women's Club), 99 Krobo people, 81, 88, 92 Kumasi, xxx, 7, 68, 224, 262; airport at, 183; rainfall in, 73 Kumasi College of Technology, 123 Kusase people, 87; government structure

of, 7; Muslim influence on, 7 Kuwait: peacekeeping mission in, 252,

257, 260

Kuwaiti Fund for Arab Economic Devel- opment, 251 Kaw language, 61 Kwahu people, 81; ethnic associations of, 96 Kwahu Plateau, 67-68, 69, 71; as climatic

divide, 72; mutual aid societies in, 96; population density in, 74-75 Kwa language group, 81 Kwame Nkrumah Ideological Institute, 287 Kwame Nkrumah Memorial Park, 252 Kwame Nkrumah Revolutionary Guards (KNRG),50, 197, 209, 261 Kwame Nkrumah Welfare Society, 210 Kwesikrom mine, 174 Kyerepong people, 86

labor force. See work force labor unions. See trade unions Lake Bosumtwi, 70, 72 Lake Volta, 68, 69, 70, 183; irrigation

from, 71

land: area, 61, 63; of families, 92; tenure, 24 language {see also under individual lan- guages), 61; for broadcasts, 82, 184;

diversity of, 82-83; of education, 82, 118; official, 82, 83, 206; written, 82-

83 La people, 88

Larteh people, 86

Lazare Kaplan International, 173 Leaf Development Company, 162 Lebanon: immigrants from, 300; peace- keeping mission in, xxxviii, 257, 260

legal system. See criminal justice system

Legislative Assembly, 28; chiefs in, 15, 25, 29; dissolved, 30; elections for, 28, 29

Legislative Council, 25-26

Liberia: civil war in, xxxviii, 242; Ghanaians expelled from, 259; peacekeeping

mission in, xxxviii, xxxix, 237, 242,

257, 278, 281, 282; refugees from, 75, 259; relations with, 258, 259-60

Libya: financial aid from, 247; military

assistance from, 290; relations with, 247

Likpe people, 81 Limann, Hilla, 47, 48, 234; in election of

1992, 212, 214; as president, 195, 273 Limann government. See Third Republic

lineage, 61; of Akan people, 83-84; stool

of, 84; in urban areas, 98

literacy, 89; programs, 124-25; rate, 125

livestock, 164-65; in Accra Plains, 64; in high plains, 70; production, 166

living standards, 62, 136, 214 Logba people, 81 Lolobi people, 81 low plains, 63-67; agriculture in, 63-64; subregions of, 63; topography of, 63

Lugard, Frederick: and indirect rule, 19, 20, 94

MacCarthy, Charles, 14, 264

Machel, Samora, 244

Maclean, George, 14, 264

Madjitey, E.R.T., 292

Mali, 6; empire, 106; potential union

with, 34; trade with, 6 Mamprusi kingdom, xxix, xxx; founded,

6; influences on, xxix, 7 Mamprusi people, xxix, 87; culture of, 88 Manchester Congress of 1945, 27 Mande language, 82 manganese, 173-74; earnings from, 174; export of, 137, 173; investment in, 174; production, 136, 168, 173, 174;

368
Index

reserves, 174

manufacturing, 175-77; capacity utiliza- tion, 175; investment in, 186; local, 132; as percentage of gross domestic

product, 139, 175; production, xxxii, 175-76; under Supreme Military

Council, xxxii; taxes on, 149 Marxism-Leninism, 197, 267 mass organizations, 199-200

materiel, 277, 302; air force, 277, 286, 289-90; armed forces, 269, 277, 286, 289-90, 302; from Brazil, 277; from

Britain, 277, 286; from Canada, 286; from China, 288; from Finland, 277; from Israel, 277; from Italy, 289-90; from Libya, 290; maintenance of, 277;

navy, 286; from the Soviet Union, 269, 287; from Sweden, 277; from Switzer- land, 277

media, 222-24; censorship of, 219, 223; under constitution of 1992, 219, 223-

24; controversy over, 507 Medium Term Agricultural Develop- ment Program 1991-2000, 159 men: education of, 101; as family head,

91; and family planning, 79; literacy

of, 125; occupations of, 100; prisons

for, 298; promiscuity of, 79; as tradi- tional leaders, 84 Mennonite Church, 104 men's associations, 93 Mensah, J.H., 261 Merchant Bank, 152 merchant marine, 183 merchants: British, xxx, 9, 133, 264; Dutch, 9-11, 13, 133; European, xxx,

3, 8, 93, 95, 264; Muslim, 6, 11-12;

Portuguese, xxx, 8-11, 133, 169 Meridian Tobacco Company, 162 Methodist Church, 104, 117 middle class: under austerity program,

40; Nkrumah's appeal for, 28; political

affiliations in, 38 Middle School Leaving Certificate Examination, 98, 120, 122, 124

migration: of ethnic groups, 3, 5, 83, 85, 86; factors affecting, 96; southern, 76; urban. See urban migration

military advisers: from China, 288; from

India, 283; from Israel, 283, 289; from

the Soviet Union, 269, 287

Military Advisory Committee, 272

military assistance, 282-90; from Britain, 280, 282, 283-86; from Canada, 280, 286; from China, 283, 288-89; from

German Democratic Republic, 283,

288; from India, 280; from Israel, 280-

81; from Italy, 280; from Libya, 290; from Soviet Union, 283, 286-88

military exercises: with Britain, 286; with Burkina Faso, 241; with United States, 281

Military Hospital, 286

military officers: Africanization of corps

of, 257; corruption of, 273; coups

d'etat by, 270; difficulties for, 271; exe- cutions of, 273; term of service for, 279; training of, 279

military training, 279-81; by Britain, 281; by China, 288-89; by India, 289; by

Israel, 289; by Italy, 280-81; by Libya,

290; by Nigeria, 281; by Soviet Union,

287; by United States, 289

militia. See Civil Defence Organisation;

People's Militia minerals: export of, xxix, 137, 138, 141, 173; production of, xxix, 136, 168,

173, 174

Minerals and Mining Law (1986), 170

Minerals Commission, 230

mines, 169, 172; gold, xxxi, 68, 168 mining, xxxiii, 51, 168-74; decline in, 168, 169; of diamonds, 173; foreign investment in, 137, 168, 169; of gold,

xxxi, 68, 169; legislation, 168; rejuve- nation of, 170

Ministry of Defence, 286

Ministry of Education, 124

Ministry of Employment and Social Welfare, 298

Ministry of Food and Agriculture, 167

Ministry of Health, 110, 112, 113, 115

Ministry of Labour and Social Welfare,

116, 125

Ministry of Mobilization and Social Welfare, 116

missionaries: arrival of, 104; expelled,

300; geographic distribution of, 67; hospitals of, 110; influence of, 82, 94; schools of, 67

missions, Christian: health care by, 112; schools of, 22, 67, 104, 117 modernization, 61, 90, 94; and women,

101

369
Ghana: A Country Study

Mole-Dagbane language, 79, 81, 82 Mole-Dagbane people, 87-88; culture of, 88; ethnic groups of, 87; influences

on, xxix-xxx; political structure of, 87; religion of, 87-88 monetary policy, 150-51 money supply {see also currency), 150-

51, 155 Mormon missionaries, 300

Mossi-Grunshi. See Mole-Dagbane Movement for Freedom andJustice, 300; formed, 209; platform of, 209 Mozambique: financial aid to, 244; peacekeeping missions in, xxxviii Muhammad (the Prophet), 105 Museveni, Yoweri, 245 Muslim clerics: health care by, 110 Muslim Representative Council, 106-7 Muslims {see also Islam): hospitals of, 110; influence of, xxix-xxx, 7, 82, 93; schools for, 107 Muslim traders, 6; role of, 6-7; slave trade by, 11-12 mutual assistance groups, 116

NAL. See National Alliance of Liberals NAM. See Non-Aligned Movement

Namibia: financial aid to, 244; state visit to, 245 Nanumba people, 79-80, 87

National Advisory Council on AIDS, 115

National Alliance of Liberals (NAL) , 37-

38

National Catholic Secretariat, 105 National Civil Defence Force. See Committees for the Defence of the Revolution National Commission for Democracy

(NCD), 53-54, 197; mandate of, 54; report on democracy, 210 National Commission on Civic Education, 230

National Communications Commission,

184

National Congress of British West Africa, 24-25

National Consultative Assembly, 210

National Council for Higher Education, 230

National Council on Women and Devel- opment (NCWD), 62, 101, 102, 125

National Convention Party, xxxviii; in Progressive Alliance, 215, 230

National Defence Committees (NDCs),

50 National Democratic Congress (NDC),

228; in election of 1992, xxxiv, 212,

215, 216; in Progressive Alliance, 230 National Electoral Commission, 228,

230, 235

National House of Chiefs, 203, 204, 205-

6, 214, 220; and return to democracy,

204, 230; role of, 219

national identification cards, 228, 234-

35

National Independence Party (NIP), 212

nationalism, 24-26, 260, 267

nationalization, 43, 147

National Liberation Council (NLC) , 36, 298; members of, 37 National Liberation Council govern- ment (1966-69), 270-71; prison sys- tem under, 296

National Liberation Movement (NLM)

,

29; platform of, 29

National Liberation Movement for West- ern Togoland, 238, 258

National Media Commission, 224, 230

National Mobilisation Program, 199

National Nuclear Research Institute, 179

National Patriotic Front of Liberia, 259

National Public Tribunal, 51, 221, 295,

296, 299; creation of, xxxiv National Redemption Council (NRC)

(1972-79) {see also Supreme Military

Council), 42, 147, 271-72; corruption

in, 272; human rights under, 298-99; members of, 271; platform of, 43; reorganized, 44

national security, 202, 238

national security agencies, 290-93; sur- veillance by, 200

National Security Council: under consti- tution of 1992, 217

National Union of Ghanaian Students (NUGS), 123, 203; members of, 205; opposition of, to Rawlings, 49; and

return to democracy, 204; support of, for Rawlings, 205

national unity, 193; problem of forging, 36-37 National Youth Organising Commission, 199, 200

370
Index

Native Administration Ordinance

(1927), 20

Native Authorities Ordinance (1935), 20

Native Treasuries Ordinance (1939), 20

natural resources: exports of, 21-22

navy: Africanization of, 278; creation of, 268; fleet of, 278, 286; insignia, 282;

joint exercises, 281; materiel, 278; military advisers to, 278; mission of, 278; number of personnel in, 257, 278;

organization of, 278; ranks, 282; train- ing, 281, 283; uniforms, 282 NCD. See National Commission for Democracy

NCWD. See National Council on Women

and Development

NDC. See National Democratic Congress NDCs. See National Defence Committees

Ndebugre, John, 50

Neo-Colonialism (Nkrumah), 33 Netherlands (see also under Dutch) : slave trade by, xxx, 9, 12; trade by, xxx, 9-11 New Democratic Movement, 261 New Patriotic Party (NPP), xxxv-xxxvi;

in election of 1992, 212, 233; litigious strategies of, 231-32; opposition strat- egies of, 228-29; platform of, 233-34;

relations of, with government, 229, 234 Newspaper Licensing Law (1983), 223 newspapers (see alsojournalists; media),

xxxv, 222-23; banned, 44; political agi- tation by, 25, 28 New Year School, 125 Niger-Congo language group, 61

Nigeria, 199; coup d'etat in, 242; education budget in, 123; expulsion of Ghanians from, 242; health care professionals in, 113; intelligence officers

in, 288; military training by, 281; rela- tions with, 237, 242-43; trade with, 143 Ningo people, 88

NIP. See National Independence Party Nkonya people, 81 Nkrumah, Kwame, 131, 234, 236, 238; attempt to assassinate, 35, 269, 292; background of, 27; charisma of, 27-

28; in Convention People's Party, xxxi, 27; in elections of 1951, 28; in elections of 1960, 33; goals of, xxxi, 32-34,

95; jailed, 28; as leader of government

business, 28-29; and Non-Aligned

Movement, xxxi, 236; opposition to, 34-36, 37, 261; overthrown, xxxii, 4, 36, 135, 257; and Pan-Africanism,

xxxi, 33-34, 236, 243, 257; as president, xxxi, 3, 33, 34, 194; as prime

minister, xxxi, 3, 29, 30, 194; private army of, 269; writings of, 33 Nkrumah government. See First Republic

Nkrumah Mausoleum, 252 NLC. See National Liberation Council NLM. See National Liberation Movement

Noi (a merchant), 12 Non-Aligned Movement (NAM), 244,

252; founded, xxxi nonalignment, 194, 236, 244, 252

north, the: Muslim influence on, 7, 82, 104; political affiliations in, 38; reli- gion in, 104, 105; social status in, 267 Northern People's Party, 29 Northern Region, 224; electricity in, 178; ethnic conflict in, 234; population

density in, 74 Northern Territories, xxxii, 17, 28, 29, 86 Northern Territories Constabulary, 290 Northern Territories Protectorate, 266 North Korea. See Korea, Democratic People's Republic of

north-south dichotomy, 267; under British, 266 NPP. S<?<?New Patriotic Party NRC. See National Redemption Council Nsawam, 67 NUGS. See National Union of Ghanaian

Students Nunoo-Mensah, Joseph: in Provisional National Defence Council, 48

nutrition, 62, 74; education in, 62, 78-79

Nyerere, Julius, 245 Nzema language, 82 Nzema people, 81; conflict of, with other

ethnic groups, 260

OAU. See Organization of African Unity

Obeng, P.V., 50

Obuasi, 68; gold mine at, 169 Ocran, A.K, 38

Office of the Head of Civil Service, 222

Officer Cadet School, Eaton Hall (Brit- ain), 283

371
Ghana: A Country Study

Ofin River, 68

Ofin River Valley: gold in, 6

oil {see also petroleum) : exploration for, 67; price increases, 44 Okumpreko mining company, 172 Omari, Peter, 32 Operation Feed Yourself, 44 Oppong, Christine, 99 Order of the Star of Ghana, 245 Ordinary Level education, 120 Organization of African Unity (OAU),

243-44, 302; election monitors from,

215, 246; financial assistance to, 244;

liberation funds, 244; membership in, 236

Organization of African Unity Charter,

236, 243 Organization of African Unity Liberation Committee, 244 Osudoku people, 88

Oti River, 71 Otu, M.A., 270

Padmore, George, 27

Palestine Liberation Organization, 251 palm trees and products, 132, 159, 162;

cultivation, 64, 158; exports of, 146,

147; oil, 13, 134, 147 PAMSCAD. See Program of Action to Mitigate the Social Costs of Adjustment

PANAFEST. See Pan-African Historical and Theatre Festival Pan-African Congress, 27

Pan-African Historical and Theatre Festi- val (PANAFEST), xxxviii-xxxix Pan-Africanism, xxxi, 33-34, 194, 236,

243, 244, 257, 267; armed forces and,

268; under Nkrumah, xxxi, 33-34,

236, 243, 257; strategy for, 34

parliament, 231; under constitution of

1992, 217; dissolved, 274; elections for, 195, 197, 210, 214, 215-16, 217; legis- lation by, 217; members of, 217; terms

in, 217; women elected to, 215-16

patron-client relationship, 202 PDCs. See People's Defence Committees

Peace Corps, 246

Peki people, 85

Pentecostals: percentage of, in population, 102, 103, 108

People's Convention Party, 234

People's Daily Graphic, 222

People's Defence Committees (PDCs),

xxxiii, 50, 199; creation of, xxxiv; functions of, 224; opposition to, 50, 203

People's Education Association, 125

People's Heritage Party (PHP), 212

People's Militia, 278; training of, 281

People's National Convention (PNC),

234; in election of 1992, 212

People's National Party (PNP), 48, 196-

97, 273; members of, 196-97; opposition of, to Rawlings, 49

pepper: trade in, 9, 133 petroleum {see also oil), 174-75; exploration, 174-75; imports of, 137; production, 174; refining of, 174; reserves, 174

PFP. See Popular Front Party PHP See People's Heritage Party

Pine, Richard, 264

Pioneer, The, 222

Pioneer Tobacco Company, 162 Planned Parenthood Association of

Ghana, 78 PNC. See People's National Convention

PNDC. See Provisional National Defence

Council PNP. See People's National Party

police, colonial, 94, 290

police, national, xxxvi, 290, 292; educational requirements for, 293; human

rights abuses by, xxxvi; number of per- sonnel in, 292; organization of, 292; in peacekeeping operations, 293; politi- cal organs of, 199; recruitment for, 293; reputation of, 293; training for, 293

Police Council, 292

political activity: of newspapers, 25; of

religious groups, 105

political demonstrations: against austerity budget, 34-35, 40-41, 232; by stu- dents, 44, 232; against taxes, xxxviixxxviii, 208; against union government, 45, 272; by veterans, 268

political detention, 32-33, 299; under

Armed Forces Revolutionary Council,

201, 208-9, 274, 299; ofjournalists, 44; of politicians, 49

political dissidents, 238, 240, 258, 301

political opposition, xxxiv-xxxvi, 228,

234, 298, 301; under British, 261, 267;

372
Index

election boycott by, 228; intimidation

of, xxxi, xxxii, 4, 44; under Nkrumah,

261; platform of, 216; precolonial,

261; protests by, xxxviii, 228; relations

of, with government, 229; strategies

of, 228-29

political oppression: under Nkrumah, 4; under Rawlings, 194, 201

political parties {see also under individual

parties): allowed, 37-38, 46, 211; aver- sion toward, 202; under constitution of 1992, 219; of ethnic groups, 81, 219; formation of, 37-38; outlawed,

xxxii, 33, 36, 81, 201-2, 274, 299; reg- istration of, 215; restrictions on, 32, 219

political traditions, 202

political unrest: in Accra, 26; under Pro- visional National Defence Council,

208, 214

polygamy, 79,91,99, 100 Popular Front Party (PFP), 48; opposition of, to Rawlings, 49

population, 73-79; in agriculture, 158;

density, 69, 74; distribution of, 74-75;

projected, 73, 74; rural, 77; in urban

areas, 75-76, 96 "Population Planning for National

Progress and Prosperity" (1969), 78 population statistics: birth rate, 73; death

rate, 73; fertility rate, 73-74, 101; gen- der ratio, 74; growth rate, 62, 73; infant mortality rate, 73, 78, 112; life expectancy, 73, 112

ports, 181-83

Portugal: explorers from, 9, 104 Portuguese traders, xxx, 9, 133, 169; departure of, 9-11; slave trade by, 8-9, 169

postal service: under British rule, 21, 147

PP. See Progress Party Pra River, 67, 70 Precious Minerals Marketing Corporation, 168, 173 Prempeh: exiled, 16, 17, 85, 266

Presbyterian Church, 104, 117 president {see also executive branch): under constitution of 1992, 217

Presidential Detail Department, 269

Presidential Guard, 278; training of, 281

Presidential Guard Department, 269

President's Own Guard Regiment, 281

press {see alsojournalists; media; newspapers), 507; censorship of, 49; under

Rawlings, 224

Prestea Goldfields, 148

Preventive Detention Act (1958, 1959,

1962), 4, 32-33, 298; justification of, 34; opponentsjailed under, 35, 37

prices: of cocoa, 135, 139, 141, 161; con- sumer, 157, 189; control of, 133; of

food, 140; of gold, 133; of oil, 144; producer, 141

priests, 107-8; health care by, 108, 109 prime minister, 29

prisons, 296-98; Africanization of, 296; under British rule, 22, 294, 296; conditions in, 297; improvements in, 22; for

juveniles, 298; locations of, 298; number of, 298; operation of, 297; personnel in, 297-98; problems in, 296-97

Prisons Ordinance of 1860, 296, 297

Prisons Service Board, 297

privatization, 52-53, 131, 144, 145; in

agriculture, 161; in industry, 177 Program of Action to Mitigate the Social Costs of Adjustment (PAMSCAD), 146

Progressive Alliance, xxxviii, 215, 231; members of, 215, 230

Progress Party (PP) , 37-38; in elections of 1961, 38; platform of, 39-40; sup- port for, 38

Protestantism {see also under individual

denominations) : percentage of followers in population, 102, 103

Provisional National Defence Council

(PNDC) (1982-92), xxxiii, 4, 62, 105,

136, 193, 194-200, 274-76; attempts to overthrow, 238; austerity program, 51-

52, 137; constitutional protection of, 219; decentralization plan of, 224;

established!, 274; goals of, 50; human

rights abuses under, 214; media

under, 223; members of, 48, 197; and

nonalignment, 236; opposition to, 4, 49, 105, 207, 208; and Pan-Africanism,

236; platform of, 50; political scene

under, 196-99; principles of, 193-94,

195; privatization under, 148; Rawlings

as leader of, 195; support for, 53; and

urban areas, 214

Provisional National Defence Council

(Establishment) Proclamation (Supplementary and Consequential Provi373
Ghana: A Country Study

sions) Law (1983), 299 Pru River, 67, 71

Prussia: trade by, 1

1

Psychic and Healers' Association, 113

Public Order Decree 1972, 232

Public Services Commission, 222

Public Tribunals Law of 1984, 221

public tribunals, xxxiii, 50, 51, 221, 230-

31, 295-96, 299

Qadhafi, Muammar al, 245

Quaison-Sackey, Alex, 36

Quakers, 12, 105 Quarshigah, Courage, 209, 276, 300 Queen's Messengers, 290

radio, 184; broadcast languages of, 82, 184; private, 507

Radio Eye, 507

railroads, 147, 181; construction of, xxxi, 21

Rattray, Robert S., 93, 116

Rawlings, Jerry John, xxxiii, 125, 131; as Armed Forces Revolutionary Council

leader, 195, 273; coup by, 48, 136; coup attempt by, 46, 193, 273; in ECOWAS, xxxviii, 237, 239, 243; in elec- tions of 1992, 212, 214, 216;

international security under, 258;

jailed, 46; opposition to, 4, 49, 53, 201, 261; as president, 227; speeches of, 196, 229, 230; state visits by, xxxix,

244, 245, 249; support for, 204, 205,

214, 216 Rawlings government, first. See Armed

Forces Revolutionary Council

Rawlings government, second. See Provi- sional National Defence Council Rawlings government, third. See Fourth

Republic RDCs. See Regional Defence Committees

Reconciliation Committee, 220

refugees, 75, 199, 259

regional assemblies, 32

Regional Consultative Council, 227 Regional Coordinating Council, 225, 227

Regional Defence Committees (RDCs),

50

regional tribunals, 230-31

regions. See geographic regions

Registered Nurses Association, 99

religion {see also under individual sects), 102-9; distribution of, 81, 86, 104; tra- ditional, 102, 103, 107-8 Religious Bodies (Registration) Law

(1989), 108-9

religious organizations, 300

religious tolerance, 103

revolution of 1979, 193, 201

revolution of 1981, 193, 195, 224

Reynolds Aluminum, 176

rice, 68

roads, 147, 181; construction of, xxxi,

xxxii, 34; maintenance of, 181 Rodney, Walter, 13, 134 Roman Catholic Church. See Catholicism, Roman

Romania: relations with, 249

Royal Air Force (Britain), 281

Royal Canadian Air Force, 281 Royal Military Academy at Sandhurst,

279, 283

Royal Navy (Britain), 278, 283 Royal West African Frontier Force

(RWAFF),257, 266, 267

rubber, 162

rural areas: banks in, 77, 152; develop- ment in, 42; electricity in, 62, 77, 117; families in, 77; health care in, 114;

infrastructure of, 146; political partici- pation in, 200; population in, 77; urban influence on, 95; women in, 100

Rural Manifesto (1984), 77, 117

rural-urban disparities, 75-77

Russia {see also Soviet Union) : relations

with, 251, 288 RWAFF. See Royal West African Frontier Force Rwanda: peacekeeping missions in, xxxviii, 237, 252, 257, 260

Safwi people, 81

salaries. See income; wages

salt, 64

Saltpond, 64

sanitation, 112, 113, 146

Sankara, Thomas, 240, 241

Sarbah, J.M., 25 Saudi Arabian Fund for Development,

374
Index

251

savannah, 69; coastal, xxix, 63, 95

schools, xxxii, 74; under British rule, 22; enrollment in, 90, 101, 117, 120, 121; improvements in, 22; Islamic, 107; lan- guage of instruction in, 82; mission,

22, 67, 104, 117; postsecondary, 67; primary, 120; private, 118; regulation

of, 118; secondary, 118, 120, 121;

socialization by, 98, 117; technical, 120 Second Republic (1969-71) (Busia gov- ernment), 37-42, 271; austerity pro- gram of, 40, 43, 137, 271; corruption

in, 202; debts of, 40; deportations by, 39; expectations of, 39; human rights under, 298; inflation under, 40; members of, 38

Securities Discount House, 152 segmentary societies. See society, segmentary Sekondi-Tarkwa railroad, 21 Sekondi-Takoradi, 224; airport at, 183 Sene River, 71 Serious Fraud Office, 150, 231 Serious Fraud Office Bill (1993), 150, 231

service sector: as percentage of gross domestic product, 139; taxes on, 149

Seven Roles of Women (Oppong and Abu)

,

99

Shai people, 88

shipping, 181-83

shortages, 26, 45; of food, 159; of fuel, 167; of housing, 62, 74, 116-17

Sisala people: government structure of, xxix, 7; Muslim influence on, xxixxxx, 7

slavery: abolition of, 12, 94; acceptance

of, 11

slaves: demand for, 9; export of, 9, 12-

13; supply of, 12, 263; treatment of, 11,12

slave trade, xxx, 133; by Africans, 8-9, 11-12, 133, 263; by British, xxx, 9; from the Congo region, 8-9; by Danes

xxx, 9; demographic impact of, 12; by

Dutch, xxx, 9; end of, 12, 94, 134; importance of, 11, 133-34; by Muslims, 11-12; by Portuguese, xxx, 8-9, 169; suppression of, 13, 263; by

Swedes, xxx, 9; volume of, 12, 133 smuggling, 141, 154, 155, 238; of cocoa,

xxxii, 40, 135; of crops, xxxii, 40, 44,

135; of diamonds, 173

social change, 93-95

social development, 21-24

social relations, 90-93

social services, 22, 139

socialism, xxxii, 33

Social Security and National Insurance

Trust, 152, 162, 175

social welfare, 115-17; and extended

families, 115-16; government spending on, 149

society, segmentary, 3, 7; Muslim influ- ence on, 7

Society of Friends. See Quakers

Somalia: United Nations operations in, 260 Sonangol oil company, 174 Songhai empire, 106 Soninke kingdom of Ghana, 5; military achievements of, 5 Sontrokofi people, 81 sorghum, 6

Soussoudis, Michael, 247

south, the: under British rule, 95; ethnic groups in, xxix, 81; political affilia- tions in, 38; religion in, 104; social sta- tus in, 81, 267

South Africa: relations with, 245 Southern Cross Mining Company, 172 South West Africa People's Organisation, 244

Soviet Union (see also Russia): education

in, 249-50; materiel from, 269, 286;

military advisers from, 269, 287; mili- tary assistance from, 283, 286-88; mili- tary training in, 287 Special African Service (Technical

Unit), 270

Special Intelligence Unit, 269

Special Military Tribunal, 296

Standard, The, 105, 222

Standard Chartered Bank of Ghana, 152

State Committee for Economic Cooperation, 249

state enterprises, xxxii, 146-48; effi- ciency of, 148; job cuts in, 157; number of, 148; origins of, 146-47;

privatized, 131, 147-48; subsidized, 147

State Enterprises Commission, 148

State Gold Mining Corporation, 169, 172

375
Ghana: A Country Study

State-Owned Enterprise Reform Pro- gram, 148

stock exchange, 153

strikes: of 1961, 35; of 1978, 272; of 1992, 158

structural adjustment program, xxxiii- xxxiv, xxxvi, 131, 136; effects of,

xxxiii-xxxiv, 131-32, 214

student associations, 98, 200

student demonstrations, 44, 123, 232

students: fees for, xxxiii, 39, 118, 122, 123-24, 155; opposition of, to Provi- sional National Defence Council, 53, 203

subsidies: for agriculture, 160; for education, 122; for food, 43; for imports, 43; for state enterprises, 147-48

suffrage. See voting

sugar, 162 Sunday Mirror, 222

Sunyani, 224

Superior Court ofJudicature, 217 Supreme Court of Ghana, 217, 220, 295; decisions of, 231-32 Supreme Military Council (1972-79),

xxxii, 272; established, 43, 44; infla- tion under, 45; members of, 43; opposition to, 44, 45; overthrown, 46; platform of, 43 Sweden: materiel from, 277; slave trade

by, xxx, 9, 12; trade by, xxx, 9, 11 Switzerland: materiel from, 277

Tafi people, 81 Takoradi: harbor at, xxxi, 22, 63, 182;

rainfall in, 73; thermal power plant at, 251

Talensi people, 87; criminal justice sys- tem of, 293-94; government structure

of, xxix, 7; Muslim influence on, xxixxxx, 7 Tamale, 77, 224; airport at, 183, 278;

rainfall in, 73 Tano River, 67, 68, 70; navigation on, 70, 71, 182-83

Tanzania: intelligence officers in, 288;

state visit to, 244 Tarkwa goldfield, 67

taxes, 141, 157; under British rule, 117; collection of, 149-50; demonstrations

against, 208, xxxvii-xxxviii; under

Economic Recovery Program, 144,

145; on economic sectors, 149; evasion

of, 149-50; on fuel, 150; on imports,

149; on individuals, 149; and invest- ment, 186; as a percentage of gross domestic product, 136; sales, xxxviii; revenue from, 132, 136; value-added,

xxxvii, xxxviii Taylor, Charles, 242

teachers: Nkrumah's appeal for, 28; number of, 120; training of, 22, 120; women as, 101-2

Teberebie mine, 172 Technical Unit (Special African Service), 270

telecommunications, 180, 183-84; under

British rule, 21, 147; deterioration of, 180; improvements in, 61, 183

telephones, 183; rehabilitation of, 250;

service, 183-84

television, 184; broadcast languages of, 82; rehabilitation of, 250 Tema-Akosombo oil pipeline, 174-75 Tema harbor, 63, 181, 182 Tema Lube Oil Company, 175

Teshi Military Academy, 286

Tettegah, John: opposition of, to Nkrumah, 35 Third Republic (1979-81), 47-48, 202;

established, 47; overthrown, 48

31st December 1981 Revolution. See rev- olution of 1981

31st December Women's Movement, 56, 199, 216

timber (see also forests; forestry): export

of, xxix, xxxiii, xxxvii, 21, 51, 132, 138,

141, 165, 166; production, xxix, xxxiii, 134, 158, 159; trade in, 13 Timber Export Development Board, 165

tobacco, 162 Togo: border with, 62; dissidents from,

258; dissidents in, 238, 258; electricity exported to, 178, 238; Ewe people in, 85; Ghanaians expelled from, 239,

259; health care professionals in, 113; refugees from, 75, 239, 259; relations with, xxxviii, 237-40, 258-59; smuggling into, 44

Togoland: division of, 238; plebiscite for union, 30, 238 Togoland Liberation Movement, 238

Tori people, 85

376
Index

tourism, 179-80, 250; investment in, 186 Town and Village Development Committees, 56 town councils, 227

trade {see also balance of trade; exports; imports), 140-44; black market as per- centage of, 141; deficit, xxxii, xxxvii, 137; diversification of, 138-39; under

Economic Recovery Program, 140-

41; European merchants in, xxx, 3, 8; by Ewe, 86; gold, xxx, 5, 9, 133; ivory,

9; Muslims in, 6-7; in slaves, xxx, 8-9, 11-12, 13, 94, 133-34, 169, 263; spices, 9 Trade Union Congress (TUC), xxxvii, 48, 98, 158, 203; functions of, 98; membership of, 204; opposition of, to Nkrumah, 35; opposition of, to Rawlings, 49; protests by, 40-41; relations

of, with government, 204; support of, for Rawlings, 204

trade unions, 157, 200; civil service, 222; under Fourth Republic, 204

traditional councils, 224, 230

Traditional Healers' Association, 110

Training School, 286

transportation, 180-83; under British

rule, xxix, 21, 22, 147; cost of, 181; deterioration of, 180; economic prob- lems of, 44; infrastructure, 165, 180;

public, 147; railroads, 21, 147; repair

of, 180; roads, 147; vehicles, 180;

water, 182-83

Treaty of Fomena, 265-66

tribunals {see also courts), xxxiii, 50, 51, 220, 221, 230, 295-96; military, 296; national public, xxxiv, 51, 221, 295, 296, 299; public, 230-31, 299;

regional, 230-31

Tsikata, Kojo, 50, 201, 274 TUC. See Trade Union Congress

Tutu, Osei, 7-8, 262

Twifu kingdom: gold in, 6 Twi language, 7

Uganda: state visit to, 244 UGCC. See United Gold Coast Convention unemployment, 53, 157; attempts to alle- viate, 39; under British rule, 26, 27; under Fourth Republic, xxxiii, xxxvixxxvii, 52 UNESCO. See United Nations Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization Union of African States, 243

unit committees, 227 United Gold Coast Convention (UGCC),

xxxi, 26-27, 33, 268; founded, xxxi,

26; Nkrumah in, xxxi, 27; platform of, 26-27 United Nations: Children's Fund, assis- tance from, 111; Conference on Trade and Development, 252; Educational,

Scientific, and Cultural Organization

(UNESCO), 101; membership in, 251; peacekeeping missions, xxxviii, xxxix, 237, 252, 257, 260, 293, 302; Security

Council, 252 United Party (UP), 33 United States: aid from, 78, 176, 187, 235, 247; covert activities of, 247;

imports of slaves by, 12-13; influences

of, 217; military exercises with, 281; military training by, 289; Rawlings's

visit to, xxxix; relations with, 246-48,

276; trade with, 143; treaties with, 246-47; in World War II, 268 United States of Africa, 34, 243

Universal Declaration of Human Rights

and Fundamental Freedoms, 205

universities: closed, 44; enrollment in, 121; fees for, 39, 123-24, 155; govern- ment funding for, 42; proposed new,

123; women in, 101 University College of the Gold Coast,

xxxi, 22, 123

University of Cape Coast, 124

University of Development Studies, 123, 250

University of Ghana, 123; adult education in, 125; demographic unit of, 78

University of Science and Technology,

123

UP. See United Party Upper East Region, 224; electricity in, 178; population density in, 75 Upper Volta. See Burkina Faso Upper West Region, 224; administrative

districts in, 227; urbanization in, 76 urban areas: children in, 98; definition

of, 75; ethnic groups in, 81; families

in, 77, 98; housing shortages in, 62,

377
Ghana: A Country Study

74, 116-17; influence of, on rural

areas, 95; infrastructure of, 146; lin- eage in, 98; population in, 75-76, 96; Provisional National Defence Council

and, 214; women in, 102 urban councils, 227

urbanization, 42, 61, 76, 94, 95 urban migration, 81, 95, 96 urban society, 96-99

Valco. SeeVoltz. Aluminum Company

Verandah Boys, 27

veterans, 24, 26 Volta Aluminum Company (Valco),

xxxii, 175

Volta Basin, 6, 63, 69, 75

Volta Delta, 63, 64; agriculture in, 64

Voltaic languages, 87

Volta Region, xxx, 224; agriculture in, 160; political affiliations in, 38; reli- gious groups in, 104

Volta River, 61, 67, 68, 70; navigation on,

71, 182-83

Volta River Authority, 178

Volta River Project, 176

Volunteer Corps, 267

voters: number of, 211, 215; register of, xxxiv, xxxv, 211, 216, 228, 234-35

voting: under constitution of 1992, 219;

rights, 219

Wa, 224 wages (see also income), 137, 155, 157-

58; minimum, xxxvii, 136, 139, 158 Wala people, 87 Ware I, Opoku, 8 water: under British rule, 22, 147; improvements in, 22; safe, 112;

sources of, 72; supply, 146 WDCs. See Workers' Defence Committees

W.E.B. DuBois Memorial Center for PanAfrican Culture, 244

Weekly Spectator, 222-23 West African Frontier Force, 266 West African Students' Union, 27 Western Region, 224; agriculture in, 160; infrastructure in, 166; mining in, 172 Western Sahara: peacekeeping missions

in, xxxviii, 257 White Volta River, 71

WHO. See World Health Organization

Wilks, Ivor, 8 Winneba, 64; water for, 72

Wolseley, Sir Garnet, 15, 265 women: AIDS in, 115; Akan, 100; in armed forces, 279; and child-bearing,

78, 99, 101; education of, 61-62, 101,

118, 121, 126; Ewe, 86; family education for, 78-79; influence of, 102; inheritance by, 100, 101; literacy of, 125; marriage of, 99; and modernization, 101; Nkrumah's appeal for, 28; nutritional programs for, 62, 78; occupations of, 100, 101-2, 297; in politics, 215-16, 235; position of, 99-102; pris- ons for, 298; rights of, 219; roles of, 99;

rural, 100; urban, 102 women's associations, 62, 200

workers: Nkrumah's appeal for, 27-28; number of, 156; opposition of, to Provisional National Defence Council,

203; protests by, 34-35; under Third

Republic, 48

Workers' Compensation Act (1986), 116

Workers' Defence Committees (WDCs),

xxxiii, 50, 199; opposition to, 50, 203 work force, 155-58; under austerity pro- gram, 40; Nkrumah's goals for, 34 World Bank, 137; aid from, 52, 131, 146,

176, 187; loan from, 136, 145, 165-66,

170, 181; structural adjustment pro- gram, xxxiii, 131, 236, 276, 301-2 World Council of Churches, 105, 205 World Health Organization (WHO):

assistance from, 111, 112, 114, 115 "World Leaders' Declaration on Population" (1967), 78 World War I, 22-24, 266-67 World War II, 22, 24, 267-68

Yaa Asantewaa, 266

Yankey, Ambrose, 269 Yatenga kingdom, 6

Yeltsin, Boris, 251 Young Pioneer Movement, 34, 261, 287

youth: Nkrumah's appeal for, 27-28

Zimbabwe: state visit to, 244, 245

zonal councils, 225

378
Contributors

LaVerle Berry is Senior Research Specialist for Africa with the

Federal Research Division, Library of Congress.

Nancy L. Clark is Associate Professor of History at California

Polytechnic State University.

James L. McLaughlin is a retired United States Army colonel

who has written numerous articles on Africa and the Middle East. Thomas P. Ofcansky is Senior African Analyst with the Department of Defense.

Maxwell Owusu is Professor of Anthropology at the University

of Michigan.

David Owusu-Ansah is Associate Professor of History at James

Madison University.

379

Published Country Studies

550-65 Afghanistan

550-98 Albania

550-44 Algeria

550-59 Angola

550-73 Argentina

550-111 Armenia, Azerbaijan,

and Georgia

550-169 Australia

550-176 Austria

550-175 Bangladesh

550-112 Belarus and Moldova

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550-66 Bolivia

550-20 Brazil 550-168 Bulgaria

550-61 Burma

550-50 Cambodia

550-166 Cameroon

550-159 Chad

550-77 Chile

550-60 China

550-26 Colombia

550-33 Commonwealth Carib

bean, Islands of the 550-91 Congo

550-90 Costa Rica

550-69 Cote d'lvoire (Ivory

Coast)

550-152 Cuba

550-22 Cyprus

550-158 Czechoslovakia

(Area Handbook Series)

550-36 Dominican Republic

and Haiti 550-52 Ecuador

550-13 Egypt

550-150 El Salvador

550-28 Ethiopia

550-167 Finland

550-173 Germany, East 550-155 Germany, Fed. Rep. of

550-153 Ghana

550-87 Greece

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550-154 Indian Ocean

550-39 Indonesia

550-68 Iran 550-31 Iraq

550-25 Israel 550-182 Italy

550-30 Japan

550-34 Jordan

550-56 Kenya

550-81 Korea, North

550-41 Korea, South

550-58 Laos

550-24 Lebanon

550-38 Liberia

381
550-85 Libya 550-184 Singapore

550-172 Malawi 550-86 Somalia

550-45 Malaysia 550-93 South Africa

550-161 Mauritania 550-95 Soviet Union

550-79 Mexico 550-179 Spain

550-76 Mongolia 550-96 Sri Lanka

550-49 Morocco 550-27 Sudan

550-64 Mozambique 550-47 Syria

550-35 Nepal and Bhutan 550-62 Tanzania

550-88 Nicaragua 550-53 Thailand

550-157 Nigeria 550-89 Tunisia

550-94 Oceania 550-80 Turkey

550-48 Pakistan 550-74 Uganda

550-46 Panama 550-97 Uruguay

Para trnav 550-71 Venezuela

550-185 Persian Gulf States 550-32 Vietnam

550-42 Peru 550-183 Yemens, The

550-72 Philippines 550-99 Yugoslavia

550-162 Poland 550-67 Zaire

550-181 Portugal 550-75 Zambia

550-160 Romania 550-171 Zimbabwe

550-37 Rwanda and Burundi

550-51 Saudi Arabia

550-70 Senegal

550-180 Sierra Leone

382





PIN: 006965-000