In his initial motion Defendant indicated an intention to supplement his Motion “with 1

specificity upon receipt of the completed transcript.” Defendant has failed to do so.

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA

UNITED STATES :

: CRIMINAL ACTION

:

v. :

:

: NO. 05-CR-532

ANTHONY SPRUILL :

SURRICK, J. OCTOBER 6, 2006

MEMORANDUM & ORDER

Presently before the Court is Defendant Anthony Spruill’s pro se Motion For Judgment

Of Acquittal And Motion For A New Trial (Doc. No. 72) and the Government’s Response in

opposition thereto (Doc. No. 73). For the following reasons, Defendant’s Motion will be denied.

I. BACKGROUND

Defendant Anthony Spruill was indicted on one count of possession with intent to

distribute cocaine in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1) and 841(b)(1)(A) (Count One). On

May 25, 2006 defendant was found guilty by a jury. On the verdict sheet, the jury unanimously

agreed that the amount of cocaine involved was five kilograms or more. (Doc. No. 69.) 

Defendant now seeks relief pursuant to Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure 29 and 33 on the

grounds that the evidence was not sufficient to support a finding that Defendant knowingly

possessed cocaine with the intent to distribute.1

Case 2:05-cr-00532-RBS Document 79 Filed 10/06/06 Page 1 of 7
 Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 29(a) provides, in pertinent part: “[t]he court on the 2

defendant’s motion must enter a judgment of acquittal of any offense for which the evidence is

insufficient to sustain a conviction.” The “sole foundation upon which a judgment of acquittal

should be based is a successful challenge to the sufficiency of the government's evidence.” 

United States v. Frumento, 426 F. Supp. 797, 802 n.5 (E.D. Pa. 1976) quoted in United States v.

Carter, 966 F. Supp. 336, 340 (E.D. Pa. 1997); see also 2A Charles Alan Wright, Federal

Practice and Procedure § 466 (3d ed. 2000) (“There is only one ground for a motion for a

judgment of acquittal. This is that the evidence is insufficient to sustain a conviction of one or

more of the offenses charged in the indictment or information.” (internal quotation omitted)).

 Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 33(a) provides, in pertinent part: “Upon the 3

defendant’s motion, the court may vacate any judgment and grant a new trial if the interest of

justice so requires.”

2

II. LEGAL STANDARD

In considering a post-verdict motion for judgment of acquittal under Rule 29, we must

2

determine “whether, after viewing the evidence in a light most favorable to the prosecution, any

rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable

doubt.” Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319 (1979). The evidence must be examined as a

whole in the light most favorable to the prosecution, with the presumption being that the jury

properly evaluated credibility of the witnesses, found the facts, and drew rational inferences. See

United States v. Iafelice, 978 F.2d 92, 94 (3d Cir. 1992). The verdict of the jury must be upheld

unless, viewing the evidence in this fashion, no rational jury could have found the defendant

guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. Jackson, 443 U.S. at 319; United States v. Ashfield, 735 F.2d

101, 106 (3d Cir. 1984).

Pursuant to Rule 33(a) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, the court may

exercise its discretion to grant a defendant a new trial if required in the interest of justice. Such 3

motions should be granted sparingly and only where the failure to do so would result in a

miscarriage of justice. See United States v. Copple, 24 F.3d 535, 547 n.17 (3d Cir. 1994). In

Case 2:05-cr-00532-RBS Document 79 Filed 10/06/06 Page 2 of 7
3

considering a motion under Rule 33, “[t]he court may weigh the evidence, but may set aside the

verdict and grant a new trial only if it determines that the verdict constitutes a miscarriage of

justice, or if it determines that an error at trial had a substantial influence on the verdict.” United

States v. Enigwe, Crim. A. No. 92-00257, 1992 WL 382325, at *4 (E.D. Pa. Dec. 9, 1992)

(citation omitted). In contrast to a motion under Rule 29, a motion for a new trial does not

require the court to view the evidence in the light most favorable to the government. Rather, the

court must weight the evidence and evaluate the credibility of witnesses. See United States v.

Rennert, No. Crim. A. 96-51, 1997 WL 597854, at *17 (E.D. Pa. Sept. 17, 1997) (citing United

States v. Martinez, 763 F.2d 1297, 1312 (11th Cir. 1985)).

III. LEGAL ANALYSIS

Defendant argues that the evidence presented at trial was legally insufficient to support

the jury’s finding that Defendant possessed cocaine with the intent to distribute. Defendant’s

argument is wholly devoid of merit. 

As mentioned above, we consider Defendant’s Rule 29 Motion viewing the evidence in

the light most favorable to the prosecution. See Iafelice, 978 F.2d at 94. The verdict must be

sustained unless “‘no reasonable juror could accept the evidence as sufficient to support the

conclusion of the defendant’s guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.’” United States v. Stratton, No.

Crim. A. 99-326, 2000 WL 892840, at *3 (E.D. Pa. July 6, 2000) (quoting United States v.

Coleman, 811 F.2d 804, 807 (3d Cir. 1987) (citation omitted)). “The evidence need not

unequivocally point to the defendant’s guilt as long as it permits the jury to find the defendant

guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.” United States v. Pungitore, 910 F.2d 1084, 1129 (3d Cir.

1990). 

Case 2:05-cr-00532-RBS Document 79 Filed 10/06/06 Page 3 of 7
4

In order to establish Defendant’s guilt, the Government was required to prove 1) that 

Defendant possessed cocaine, 2) that Defendant knew that he possessed cocaine, and 3) that 

Defendant possessed the cocaine with the intent to distribute it. See 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1).

The following facts were established by the testimony and evidence presented at trial. 

On May 10, 2005, Special Agent Edward J. Gallant III of the Federal Bureau of Investigation 

learned that the Philadelphia Police Department had issued a warrant for Defendant. (May 23,

2006 Trial Tr. at 7.) Subsequently, Gallant arrested Defendant in the Strawberry Mansion area

of Philadelphia. (Id.) Gallant along with Detective Sean Brennan transported Defendant to the

Philadelphia Police Department in an unmarked police car. While in the car, Gallant advised

Defendant not to speak but to listen. Gallant explained to Defendant that he was under

investigation for federal drug trafficking charges and that the FBI had arrested several

individuals who had received drugs from Defendant. Gallant indicated that Defendant would

eventually be indicted on the federal charges, and that Defendant should consider cooperating

with the FBI. (Id. 8-9.) The next day, while incarcerated, Defendant called Gallant and

requested that Gallant meet with him at the correctional facility. (Id. at 10.) On May 12th,

Gallant and Brennan met with Defendant at the correctional facility and Defendant gave a

voluntary statement to Gallant. (Id. at 12.) Defendant later gave two more voluntary statements

to Gallant. (Id. at 28-29; 43-44) 

During these interviews, Defendant told Gallant that he was trafficking in as much as

thirty kilograms of cocaine a month during 2003 and 2004. (Id. at 16.) He also told Gallant that

Alexander Medley was his supplier, and that he had paid Medley as much as $700,000 for one

large shipment of cocaine. (Id. at 17.) He also told Gallant that he paid Medley approximately

Case 2:05-cr-00532-RBS Document 79 Filed 10/06/06 Page 4 of 7
 Spider is the street name for Vernon Douglas. (May 23, 2006 Trial. Tr. at 28.) 4

5

$24,000 a kilogram for cocaine. (Id.) In April 2003, Defendant was provided half a kilogram of

cocaine by Medley. (Id. at 48.) Other transactions with Medley involved twelve, fifteen, and

thirty kilograms of cocaine. (Id. at 50.) Gallant testified that Defendant told him he had

delivered at least seventy-two kilograms of cocaine. (Id. at 55-56.) Defendant explained to

Gallant that he supplied cocaine and/or crack to Jermain Burston, Vernon Douglas, Reginald

Alexander, and Malik Mohammed. (Id. at 27-28; 36-37.) Defendant also stated that he had been

providing Antonio Williams with kilogram quantities of cocaine. (Id. at 33.) 

Jermain Burston testified at trial that Defendant supplied him with crack cocaine for

about a year and a half, and that the amounts of crack cocaine he bought from Defendant ranged

from four and a half ounces to eighteen ounces. (May 24, 2006 Trial Tr. at 46-48.) Burston

further testified that he was with Defendant when Defendant gave approximately nine ounces of

cocaine to another individual named Spider. (Id. at 54-55.) On another occasion, Burston 4

observed Defendant demand payment from Spider and Spider give Defendant money. (Id. at 56-

57.) 

Ricardo Castro also testified at trial that he supplied cocaine on behalf of his father-inlaw, Alexander Medley, to Defendant on approximately five to eight occasions in 2002 and 2003

and in amounts ranging from two kilograms to fifteen kilograms. (Id. at 95-97; 99-100; 105.) 

Typically, Castro would not supply Defendant with a new quantity of cocaine until Defendant

had paid in full for the previous quantity. (Id. at 103-04.) Defendant paid Castro in installments,

approximately $100,000 for five kilograms. (Id. at 104.) 

Special Agent Gallant testified that Defendant had told him that he stored cocaine in his

Case 2:05-cr-00532-RBS Document 79 Filed 10/06/06 Page 5 of 7
6

apartment at 2201 Bryn Mawr Avenue in Philadelphia and in the car of Derrick Shaw, his

business partner. (May 23, 2006 Trial Tr. at 20-23.) Defendant also said that he kept a pistol,

rifle and machine gun in his apartment, as well as money. (Id. at 24-25.) Gallant later confirmed

that the apartment in question was leased to Defendant’s wife. (Id. at 25-26.) Gallant had

observed Defendant’s vehicle parked behind the apartment building in November 2004. (Id. at

26-27.) 

Viewing the evidence and the logical inferences to be drawn therefrom in the light most

favorable to the government, we are satisfied that there is more than sufficient evidence to

support the jury’s conclusion that Defendant knowingly possession cocaine with the intent to

distribute it. Defendant described his drug-trafficking activities in detail during the three

interviews with Gallant. Much of the information that he gave to Gallant was corroborated by

the testimony of Burston, who bought drugs from Defendant, and Castro, who delivered cocaine

to Defendant. While Defendant questioned the accuracy of the testimony of Burston and Castro

during the trial, the jury was entitled to assess the credibility of the witnesses and to weigh the

testimony of each in considering all of the evidence and testimony offered at trial. 

The evidence against this Defendant was overwhelming. We are satisfied that the

evidence and testimony presented at trial was more than sufficient to permit the jury to find

beyond a reasonable doubt that Defendant knowingly possessed cocaine with the intent to

distribute. Moreover, we are satisfied that there was no miscarriage of justice here. 

Accordingly, Defendant’s Motion for judgment of acquittal or a new trial will be denied.

An appropriate Order follows. 

Case 2:05-cr-00532-RBS Document 79 Filed 10/06/06 Page 6 of 7
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA

UNITED STATES :

: CRIMINAL ACTION

:

v. :

:

: NO. 05-CR-532

ANTHONY SPRUILL :

ORDER

AND NOW, this 6th day of October, 2006 upon consideration of Defendant Anthony

Spruill’s Pro Se Motion For Judgment Of Acquittal And Motion For A New Trial (Doc. No. 72)

and after a review of the evidence and testimony presented at trial, it is ORDERED that the 

Motion is DENIED. 

IT IS SO ORDERED. 

BY THE COURT:

/s/ R. Barclay Surrick

U.S. District Court Judge Judge

Case 2:05-cr-00532-RBS Document 79 Filed 10/06/06 Page 7 of 7