area handbook series

India

a country study



India

a country study

Federal Research Division

Library of Congress

Edited by

James Heitzman and

Robert L. Worden

Research Completed

September 1995

^ ^ ^

4%
On the cover: The peafowl, or peacock (P. cristatus), the

national bird of India, is protected under the Indian

Wild Life Protection Act of 1972. A traditional fixture

in literature, folklore, legends, and art, the peafowl

inhabits most of peninsular India, Jammu and Kashmir, eastern Assam, and southern Mizoram. Art of

this type is found in parts of Uttar Pradesh and Rajasthan and is based on traditional paper stencil art

(sanzi khaka) used on festive occasions for floor decorations employing marble dust and colored powders.

From the Dover Pictorial Archive Series; used with

permission of Dover Publications.

Fifth Edition, First Printing, 1996.

Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data

India : a country study / Federal Research Division, Library

of Congress ; edited by James Heitzman and Robert L. Worden.—5th ed.

p. cm. — (Area handbook series, ISSN 1057-5294)

(DA Pam; 550-21)

"Supersedes the 1985 edition of India : a country study,

edited by Richard F. Nyrop."—T.p. verso. "Research completed September 1995."

Includes bibliographical references (pp. 671-785) and

index.

ISBN 0-8444-0833-6 (hardcover : alk. paper)

1. India. I. Heitzman, James, 1950- . II. Worden,

Robert L., 1945- . III. Library of Congress. Federal

Research Division. IV. Series. V. Series: DA pam ; 550—21.

DS407.I4465 1996 96-19266

954__dc20 CIP

Headquarters, Department of the Army

DA Pam 550-21

For sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office Washington, D.C. 20402
Foreword

This volume is one in a continuing series of books prepared

by the Federal Research Division of the Library of Congress

under the Country Studies/Area Handbook Program sponsored by the Department of the Army. The last two pages of this

book list the other published studies.

Most books in the series deal with a particular foreign country, describing and analyzing its political, economic, social, and

national security systems and institutions, and examining the

interrelationships of those systems and the ways they are shaped by historical and cultural factors. Each study is written

by a multidisciplinary team of social scientists. The authors

seek to provide a basic understanding of the observed society,

striving for a dynamic rather than a static portrayal. Particular

attention is devoted to the people who make up the society,

their origins, dominant beliefs and values, their common interests and the issues on which they are divided, the nature and

extent of their involvement with national institutions, and their

attitudes toward each other and toward their social system and

political order.

The books represent the analysis of the authors and should

not be construed as an expression of an official United States

government position, policy, or decision. The authors have

sought to adhere to accepted standards of scholarly objectivity.

Corrections, additions, and suggestions for changes from readers will be welcomed for use in future editions.

Louis R. Mortimer

Chief

Federal Research Division

Library of Congress

Washington, DC 20540-4840

iii

Acknowledgments

The authors wish to thank individuals in various agencies of

the Indian and United States governments and private institutions who gave their time, research materials, and special

knowledge to provide information and perspective. These individuals include Hardeep Puri, Joint Secretary (America) of the

Ministry of External Affairs; Madhukar Gupta, Joint Secretary

(Kashmir) of the Ministry of Home Affairs; Bimla Bhalla,

Director General of Advertising and Visual Publications, Ministry of Information and Broadcasting; Amulya Ratna Nanda,

Registrar General of India; AshokJain, director of the National

Institute of Science, Technology and Development Studies; T. Vishwanthan, director of the Indian National Scientific Documentation Centre; G.P. Phondke, director of the Publications

and Information Directorate of the Council for Scientific and

Industrial Research; Air Commander Jasjit Singh, director of

the Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses; G. Madhavan,

deputy executive secretary of the Indian Academy of Sciences;

Sivaraj Ramaseshan, distinguished emeritus professor, Raman

Research Institute; H.S. Nagaraja, public relations officer of

the Indian Institute of Science; Virendra Singh, director of the

Tata Institute of Fundamental Research; Bhabani Sen Gupta of

the Centre for Policy Research; Pradeep Mehendiratta, Vice

President and Executive Director, Indian Institute of American

Studies; and Richard J. Crites, Chat Blakeman, Peter L.M. Heydemann, and Marcia S.B. Bernicat of the United States

Embassy in New Delhi. Special thanks go to Lygia M. Ballantyne, director, and Alice Kniskern, deputy director, and the

staff of the Library of Congress New Delhi Field Office, particularly Atish Chatterjee, for supplying bounteous amounts of

valuable research materials on India and arranging interviews

of Indian government officials. Appreciation is also extended to Ralph K. Benesch, who for- merly oversaw the Country Studies/Area Handbook Program

for the Department of the Army, and to the desk officers in the

Department of State and the Department of the Army who

reviewed the chapters. Thanks also are offered to William A.

Blanpied, Mavis Bowen, Ainslie T. Embree, Jerome Jacobson,

Suzanne Hanchett, Barbara Leitch LePoer, Owen M. Lynch,

v
and Sunalini Nayudu, who either assisted with substantive

information or read parts of the manuscript or did both.

The authors also wish to thank those who contributed

directly to the preparation of the manuscript. They include

Sandra W. Meditz, who reviewed all textual and graphic materials, served as liaison with the Department of the Army, and provided numerous substantive and technical contributions;

Sheila Ross, who edited the chapters; Andrea T. Merrill, who

edited the tables and figures; Marilyn Majeska, who supervised

editing and managed production; Alberta Jones King, who

assisted with research, making wordprocessing corrections to various versions of the manuscript, and proofreading; Barbara

Edgerton and Izella Watson, who performed the final wordprocessing; Maria D. Woodson, who assisted with proofreading;

and Janie L. Gilchrist, David P. Cabitto, Barbara Edgerton, and

Izella Watson, who prepared the camera-ready copy. Catherine

Schwartzstein performed the final prepublication editorial

review, andJoan C. Cook compiled the index.

Graphics support was provided by David P. Cabitto, who

oversaw the production of maps and graphics and, with the

assistance of Wayne Home, designed the cover and the illustra- tions on the chapter title pages; and Harriet Blood and Maryland Mapping and Graphics, who assisted in the preparation of

the maps and charts. Thanks also go to Gary L. Fitzpatrick and

Christine M. Anderson, of the Library of Congress Geography

and Map Division, for assistance in preparing early map drafts. Avery special thank you goes to Janice L. Hyde, who did the

research on and selection of cover and title-page illustrations

and photographs, translated some of the photograph captions

and textual references, and helped the editors on numerous

matters of substance and analysis. Shantha S. Murthy of the

Library of Congress Serial Record Division provided Indian

language assistance. Clarence Maloney helped identify the subjects of some of the photographs.

Finally the authors acknowledge the generosity of individuals and public and private organizations who allowed their

photographs to be used in this study. They have been acknowledged in the illustration captions.

vi
Contents

Page

Foreword iii Acknowledgments v Preface xvii Table A. Selected Acronyms, Abbreviations, and

Full Party Names xix

Table B. Chronology of Important Events xxi

Country Profile xxv Introduction xxxv Chapter 1. Historical Setting 1 John J. Paul

ANTECEDENTS 4

Harappan Culture 4

Vedic Aryans 5 KINGDOMS AND EMPIRES 8

The Mauryan Empire 9

The Deccan and the South 11 THE CLASSICAL AGE 12

Gupta and Harsha 12

The Southern Rivals 14

THE DELHI SULTANATE 15

The Coming of Islam 15

Southern Dynasties 17

THE MUGHAL ERA 19

The Mughals 19

The Marathas 26

The Sikhs 27

The Coming of the Europeans 27

THE BRITISH EMPIRE IN INDIA 30

Company Rule, 1757-1857 30

The British Raj, 1858-1947 35

vii
THE INDEPENDENCE MOVEMENT 38

Origins of the Congress and the Muslim League ... 38

War, Reforms, and Agitation 40

Mahatma Gandhi 41

Political Impasse and Independence 45

INDEPENDENT INDIA 46

National Integration 46

Nehru's Legacy 50

The Rise of Indira Gandhi 51

Rajiv Gandhi 55

Chapter 2. Geographic and Demographic

Setting 61

Karl E. Ryavec

GEOGRAPHY 64

Principal Regions 64

Rivers 74

Climate 76

Earthquakes 81

POPULATION 81

Structure and Dynamics 81

Population Projections 88

Population and Family Planning Policy 89

HEALTH 94

Health Conditions 94

Health Care 99

EDUCATION 103

Administration and Funding. 103

Primary and Secondary Education 105

Colleges and Universities 108

Education and Society 110

Chapter 3. Religious Life 117

James Heitzman

THE ROOTS OF INDIAN RELIGION 121

The Vedas and Polytheism 121

Karma and Liberation 122

THE MONASTIC PATH 1 25

Jainism 125

Buddhism 128

The Tradition of the Enlightened Master 132

viii
THE WORSHIP OF PERSONAL GODS 133

Vishnu 135

Shiva 138

Brahma and the Hindu Trinity 140

The Goddess 141

Local Deities 143

THE CEREMONIES OF HINDUISM 145

Domestic Worship 145

Life-Cycle Rituals 146

Public Worship 148

ISLAM 155

Origins and Tenets 155

Islamic Traditions in South Asia 158

SIKHISM 162

Early History and Tenets 162

Twentieth-Century Developments 166

OTHER MINORITY RELIGIONS 167

Tribal Religions 167

Christianity 169

Zoroastrianism 171

Judaism 173

MODERN TRANSFORMATIONS 1 74

Chapter 4. Language, Ethnicity, and Regionalism ... 179

Allen W. Thrasher

LINGUISTIC RELATIONS 181

Diversity, Use, and Policy 181

Languages of India 1 85

Hindi and English 187

Linguistic States 194

The Social Context of Language 197

ETHNIC MINORITIES 199

Tribes 199

Descendants of Foreign Groups 211

REGIONALISM 214

Telangana Movement 214

Jharkhand Movement 218

Uttarakhand 221

Gorkhaland 223

Ladakh 226

The Northeast 226

ix
Outlook 228

Chapter 5. Social Systems 231

Doranne Jacobson

THEMES IN INDIAN SOCIETY 234

Hierarchy 234

Purity and Pollution 235

Social Interdependence 240

FAMILYAND KINSHIP 241

Family Ideals 241

Variations in Family Structure 243

Large Kinship Groups 244

Family Authority and Harmony 247

Veiling and the Seclusion of Women 248

Life Passages 251

CASTE AND CLASS 266

Varna, Caste, and Other Divisions 266

Intercaste Relations 272

Changes in the Caste System 273

Classes 276

The Fringes of Society 279

THE VILLAGE COMMUNITY 281

Settlement and Structure 281

Village Unity and Divisiveness 283

URBAN LIFE 285

The Growth of Cities 285

Urban Inequities 286

Cities as Centers 290

FUTURE TRENDS 292

Chapter 6. Character and Structure of the Economy 295

John D. Rogers

STRUCTURE OF THE ECONOMY 298

Independence to 1979 298

Growth since 1980 299

Liberalization in the Early 1990s 302

THE ROLE OF GOVERNMENT 304

Early Policy Developments 304

Antipoverty Programs 307

Development Planning 309

FINANCE 312

x
Budget 313

Fiscal Administration 315

Monetary Process 316

FOREIGN ECONOMIC RELATIONS 318

Aid 318

Trade 321

Foreign-Exchange System 323

External Debt 324

LABOR 325

Size and Composition of the Work Force 325

Labor Relations 327

INDUSTRY 328

Government Policies 329

Manufacturi ng 331

Construction 335

Energy 335

Mining and Quarrying 341

TRANSPORTATION 342

Railroads 345

Rapid Transit 346

The Road System 349

Motor Vehicles 350

Ports, Maritime Transportation, and Inland

Waterways 350

Civil Aviation 352

TELECOMMUNICATIONS 354

National Policy 354

Telephone 355

Radio 356

Television 356

TOURISM 357

Robert L. Worden

SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY 358

Origin and Development 358

Infrastructure and Government Role 363

Resource Allocation 365

Major Research Organizations 368

Prospects in Science and Technology 376

Chapter 7. Agriculture 379

Ashok Bhargava

XI
LAND USE 383

Himalayas 383

Indo-Gangetic Plain 384

Peninsular India 385

LAND TENURE 386

Landholding Categories 386

Land Reform 388

ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT 391

Evolution of Policy 391

Development Programs 393

PRODUCTION 404

Crop Output 404

The Green Revolution 410

LIVESTOCK AND POULTRY 412

FORESTRY 413

FISHING 415

AGRICULTURAL CREDIT 418

AGRICULTURAL TAXATION 421

MARKETING, TRADE, AND AID 421

Marketing and Marketing Services 421

External Trade 424

External Aid 426

IMPACT OF ECONOMIC REFORMS ON AGRICULTURE 427

Chapter 8. Government and Politics 429

John Echeverri-Gent

THE CONSTITUTIONAL FRAMEWORK 432

Fundamental Rights 434

Directive Principles of State Policy 435

Group Rights 436

Emergency Provisions and Authoritarian

Powers 438

THE STRUCTURE OF GOVERNMENT 441

The Legislature 441

The Executive 446

The Judiciary 449

Election Commission 454

State Governments and Territories 455

Local Government 458

The Civil Service 461

xii
THE POLITICAL PROCESS 462

Elections 462

Political Parties 463

Political Issues 491

Corruption and the Anti-Establishment Vote 498

THE MEDIA 499

The Press 499

Broadcast Media 501

THE RISE OF CIVIL SOCIETY 503

Chapter 9. Foreign Relations 507

Roxane D.V. Sismanidis

FOREIGN POLICYFORMULATION 511

Role of the Prime Minister 511

Ministry of External Affairs 512

Other Government Organizations 514

The Role of Political and Interest Groups 515

DETERMINANTS OF FOREIGN RELATIONS 516

Historical Legacy 516

Security Perceptions 516

Nonalignment 518

OVERVIEW OF FOREIGN RELATIONS 519

South Asia 519

China 531

Southeast Asia 536

Middle East 537

Central Asia 540

Russia 541

United States 546

Britain, Australia, Canada, Western Europe, and

Japan 553

PARTICIPATION IN INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS 555

United Nations 555

Commonwealth of Nations 556

Nonaligned Movement 557

South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation 559

Chapter 10. National Security 561

Sumit Ganguly

xiii
COLONIAL-ERA DEVELOPMENTS 565

Company Armies 565

The Indian Military under the British Raj 566

POSTINDEPENDENCE DEVELOPMENTS 569

The National Forces 569

The Experience of Wars 570

Peacekeeping Operations 576

NATIONAL SECURITY STRUCTURE 579

Civil-Military Relations 579

Defense Spending 581

ORGANIZATION AND EQUIPMENT OF THE ARMED

FORCES 583

The Army 583

The Navy 587

The Air Force 590

Recruitment and Training 591

Conditions of Service 594

Uniforms, Ranks, and Insignia 595

Paramilitary and Reserve Forces 598

Space and Nuclear Programs 601

Intelligence Services 602

MilitaryJustice 604

PUBLIC ORDER AND INTERNAL SECURITY 605

Military Role Expansion 605

Civil Liberties, Human Rights, and the Armed

Forces 606

Insurgent Movements and External Subversion .... 607

LAW ENFORCEMENT . 612

National-Level Agencies 612

State and Other Police Services 613

THE CRIMINALJUSTICE SYSTEM 616

Criminal Law and Procedure 616

The Penal System 618

NATIONAL SECURITY CHALLENGES 619

Appendix. Tables 623

Bibliography 671

Glossary 787

Index 797

xiv
Contributors 847

List of Figures

1 Administrative Divisions of India, 1995 xxxiv

2 Indus Valley Culture Sites, ca. 2500-1600 B.C 6

3 Mughal Empire, Late Seventeenth Century 22

4 British Indian Empire, 1947 48

5 Topography and Drainage 66

6 Rainfall 80

7 Temperature 84

8 Population by Age and Sex, 1990 and 2000 86

9 Principal Languages by State and Union

Territory 190

10 Major Industrial and Energy Activity, 1995 334

11 Major Minerals, 1995 344

12 Transportation System, 1995 348

13 Major Agricultural Activity, 1995 406

14 Structure of the Government, 1995 442

15 Evolution of Major Political Parties, 1885-1994

(Simplified) 464

16 National Security Structure, 1995 582

17 Area Commands of the Army, Navy, and Air

Force, 1995 586

18 Officer Ranks and Insignia, 1995 596

19 Enlisted andJunior Noncommissioned Officer

Ranks and Insignia, 1995 597

xv

Preface

This edition supersedes the fourth edition of India: A Country Study, published in 1985 under the editorship of Richard F. Nyrop. The new edition provides updated information on the

world's second most populous and fastest-growing nation.

Although much of India's traditional behavior and organizational dynamics reported in 1985 have remained the same,

internal and regional events have continued to shape Indian

domestic and international policies.

To the extent possible, place-names used in the text conform

to the United States Board on Geographic Names, but equal

weight has been given to spellings provided by the official Survey of India. Selected acronyms and abbreviations are clarified

in Table A, and a Chronology covering the long span of Indian

history is given in Table B; both of these tables appear in the

front of the book. Measurements are given in the metric sys- tem; a conversion table is provided to assist readers unfamiliar

with metric measurements (see table 1, Appendix).

Users of this book are encouraged to consult the chapter

bibliographies at the end of the book. They include several

general and specialized bibliographies that will lead readers to further resources on India. Additionally, users may wish to consult the annual editions of the Association for Asian Studies'

Bibliography of Asian Studies, as well as later editions of yearbooks listed in the bibliography of this volume. Other bibliographic sources of interest are N. Gerald Barrier's India and

America: American Publishing on India, 1930-1985 (New Delhi:

American Institute of Indian Studies, 1986) and David Nelson's

Bibliography of South Asia (Metuchen, NewJersey: Scarecrow,

1994). Those who read Indian classical and vernacular languages will find publications available in those languages in the

Library of Congress and other major research libraries.

The illustrations on the cover and chapter title pages represent a variety of contemporary folk-art motifs from various

parts of India.

The body of the text reflects information available as of September 1, 1995. Certain other portions of the text, however,

have been updated. The Introduction discusses significant

events that have occurred since the completion of research; the

Country Profile includes updated information as available; and

xvii
the Bibliography lists recently published sources thought to be

particularly helpful to the reader.

xviii
Table A. Selected Acronyms, Abbreviations, and Full Party

Names

Acronym or Abbreviation Organization or Term ABSU All Bodo Students' Union AGP Asom Gana Parishad (Assam People's Assembly) AIADMK All-India Anna Dravida Munnetra Kazhagam (All-India Anna

Dravidian Progressive Federation) AIDS acquired immune deficiency syndrome

ASEAN Association of Southeast Asian Nations (see Glossary) ASLV Augmented Satellite Launch Vehicle Arabsat Arab Satellite Communication Organization BAMCEF All-India Backward, Scheduled Caste, Scheduled Tribe, Other

Backward Classes, and Minority Communities Employees

Federation BJP BharatiyaJanata Party (Indian People's Party) BKD Bharatiya Krand Dal BLD Bharatiya Lok Dal (Indian People Party) BPAC Bodo People's Acdon Committee BSP Bahujan Samaj Party (Party of Society's Majority)

ca. circa CCN Cable News Network CFD Congress for Democracy

Congress Indian National Congress

Congress (I) Congress (Indira) Congress (O) Congress (Organisation) Congreess (R) Congress (Requisition) Congress (S) Congress (Socialist and Secular) Congress (U) Congress (Urs) CPI Communist Party of India CPI (M) Communist Party of India (Marxist) CPI (M-L) Communist Party of India (Marxist-Leninist) CSIR Council of Scientific and Industrial Research DK Dravida Kazhagam (Dravidian Federation) DMK Dravida Munnetra Kazhagam (Dravidian Progressive Federation) DMKP Dalit Mazdoor Kisan Party (Oppressed Workers' and Peasants'

Party) DNA deoxyribonucleic acid DRDO Defence Research and Development Organisation ESCAP Economic and Social Commission for Asia and the Pacific of the UN (q.v.) FAO Food and Agriculture Organization (see Glossary) of the UN

(q.v.) FY fiscal year (see Glossary) GATT General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade GDP gross domestic product (see Glossary)

xix
Table A. (Continued) Selected Acronyms, Abbreviations, and Full

Party Names

Acronym or Abbreviation Organization or Term GNP gross national product (see Glossary) GSLV Geostationary Launch Vehicle HIV human immunodeficiency virus IIT Indian Institute of Technology IMF International Monetary Fund (see Glossary) INA Indian National Army (Azad Hind Fauj) INS Indian Naval Ship

Insat Indian National Satellite System

Intelsat International Telecommunications Satellite Organization

IFF Indian People's Front IPKF Indian Peace Keeping Force ISRO Indian Space Research Organisation Jana Sangh People's Union

Janata Janata Party Janata Dal People's Party Lok Dal People Party LITE Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam NISTADS National Institute of Science, Technology, and Development

Studies OPEC Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries (see Glossary) PSLV polar satellite launch vehicle PSP Praja Socialist Party

r. reigned RSS Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh (National Volunteer Organisation) SAARC South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (see Glossary) Samajwadi Samajwadi Party (Socialist Party) Samajwadi Janata Socialist People's Party SSP Samyukta Socialist Party Swatantra Swatantra Party Telugu Desam Telugu National Party ULFA United Liberation Front of Assam UN United Nations UNESCO United Nations Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization UNDP United Nations Development Programme

VHP Vishwa Hindu Parishad (World Hindu Council) VSTOL vertical and short takeoff and landing WHO World Health Organization

XX
Table B. Chronology ofImportant Events

Period Description ANCIENT EMPIRES

ca. 2500-1600 B.C.

ca. 1500-500 B.C.

ca. 1000 B.C.

ca. 563-ca. 483 B.C.

ca. 326-184 B.C.

ca. 180 B.C.-A.D. 150

ca. AD. 320-550 606-47

711

750-1150

1150-1202 GROWTH OF ISLAM

997-1027

1202

1206-1398

1398 1414-50 1451-1526 THE MUGHAL PERIOD

1526

1556-1605

1605-27

1628-58 1658-1707

1707-1858 BRITISH PERIOD

1757

1835

1857-58

1858

1885

Indus Valley culture. Migrations of Aryan-speaking tribes; the Vedic Age.

Settlement of Bengal by Dravidian-speaking peoples.

Life of Siddartha Gautama—the Buddha; founding

of Buddhism. Mauryan Empire; reign of Ashoka (269-232 B.C.); spread of Buddhism. Shaka dynasties in Indus Valley. Gupta Empire; classical age in North India. North Indian empire of Harsha. Arab invaders conquer Sindh, establish Islamic pres- ence in India. Pala Dynasty. Sena Dynasty. Mahmud of Ghazni raids Indian subcontinent from

Afghanistan. Turkish conquerors defeat Sena Dynasty and over- run Bengal. Delhi Sultanate. Timur sacks Delhi. Sayyid Dynasty, renewal of Delhi Sultanate. Lodi Dynasty.

Babur lays foundation of Mughal Empire; wins First Battle of Panipat. Akbar expands and reforms the empire; Mughals

win Second Battle of Panipat. Reign ofJahangir; in 1612 East India Company

opens first trading post (factory). Reign of Shah Jahan. Reign of Aurangzeb, last great Mughal ruler. Lesser emperors; decline of the Mughal Empire.

Battle of Plassey—British victory over Mughal forces

in Bengal; British rule in India begins.

Institution of British education and other reform

measures.

Revolt of Indian sepoys (soldiers) against East India Company.

East India Company dissolved; rule of India under

the British crown—the British Raj—begins with Government of India Act; formal end of Mughal

Empire.

Indian National Congress (Congress) formed.

xxi
Table B. ( Continued) Chronology ofImportant Events

Period Description

1905

1906

1909

1912

1916

1919

1935

1940

August 16, 1946 INDEPENDENT INDIA

August 15, 1947

August 15, 1947-May27, 1964

October 22, 1947-January 1, 1949

January 30, 1948 October 20-November 21, 1962 June 9, 1964-January 11, 1966

August 5-September 23, 1965 January 24, 1966-March 24, 1977

December 3-16, 1971

June 25, 1975-January 18, 1977 March 24, 1977-July 28, 1979

July 28, 1979-January 14, 1980

January 14, 1980-October 31, 1984 October 31, 1984

Partition of Bengal into separate provinces of East- ern Bengal and Assam, West Bengal.

All-India Muslim League (Muslim League) founded. Morley-Minto Reforms; separate electorates for Muslims. Partition of Bengal annulled; new province of Bihar and Orissa formed; plans to move capital from

Calcutta to Delhi announced.

Congress-League Scheme of Reforms (often referred to as Lucknow Pact) signed. Montagu-Chelmsford Reforms; Government of India

Act. Government of India Act of 1935. Muslim League adopts Lahore Resoludon; "Two

Nations" theory articulated by Muslim League

leader Mohammad Ali Jinnah and others. "Direct Acdon Day" of Muslim League.

Partition of British India; India achieves indepen- dence and incorporates West Bengal and Assam;

Jawaharlal Nehru becomes prime minister of

India. Pakistan is created and incorporates East Bengal (the East Wing, or East Pakistan) and ter- ritory in the northwest (the West Wing, or West

Pakistan); Jinnah becomes governor general of

Pakistan. Jawaharlal Nehru serves as prime minister and

leader of Congress-controlled government. Undeclared war with Pakistan; ends with United

Nations-arranged ceasefire. Mahatma Gandhi assassinated in New Delhi. Border war with China.

Lai Bhadur Shastri serves as prime minister of Congress-led government. Second war with Pakistan. Indira Gandhi serves as prime minister for first time, head of government initially led by Congress,

later Congress (R). Third war with Pakistan; Bangladesh becomes inde- pendent following Indian invasion of East Pakistan. State of Emergency proclaimed by Indira Gandhi.

Morarji Desai serves as prime minister as head of a

multiparty front, Janata Party, India's first nonCongress government. Chaudhury Charan Singh serves as prime minister as head of a Janata-led coalition government.

Indira Ganhdi serves as prime minister for second

time, head of Congress (I) government.

Indira Gandhi assassinated in New Delhi.
Table B. (Continued) Chronology ofImportant Events

Period Description

October 31, 1984-December 2, 1989 December 2, 1989-November 7, 1990 November 10, 1990-June 20, 1991 May 21, 1991 June 20, 1991-Mayl5, 1996 December 6, 1992 January-March 1993

May 1995

April 27-May 7, 1996 May 15-28, 1996

June 1, 1996

Rajiv Gandhi serves as prime minister of Congress

(I)-led government.

Vishwanath Pratap Singh serves as prime minister of National Front-led coalition government. Chandra Shekhar serves as prime minister, heading

Samajwadi Janata Party government.

Rajiv Gandhi assassinated near Madras.

P.V. Narasimha Rao serves as prime minister of Congress (I)-led government.

Babri Masjid in Ayodhya, Uttar Pradesh, destroyed by Hindu activists. Communal violence in wake of Babri Masjid destruction wracks Indian cities, especially Bombay,

which suffered from a series of bomb blasts in March. Unpopular Terrorist and Disruptive Activities (Pre- vention) Act of 1985 allowed to lapse General elections for Lok Sabha oust Congress (I) government of P.V. Narasimha Rao. Minority Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) government

led by Prime Minister Atal Bihari Vajpayee resigns

after thirteen days. Haradanahalli (H.D.) Deve Gowda, head of thirteen- party United Front, sworn in as India's eleventh prime minster.

Country Profile

Country

Formal Name: Republic of India (The official, Sanskrit name

for India is Bharat, the name of the legendary king in the

Mahabhrata) . Short Form: India.

Term for Citizens: Indian (s). Capital: New Delhi (National Capital Territory of Delhi).

Date of Independence: Proclaimed August 15, 1947, from

xxv
Britain.

National Holiday: Independence Day, August 15. Geography

Size: Total land area 2,973,190 square kilometers. Total area, including territorial seas, claimed is 3,287,590 square

kilometers.

Topography: Three main geological regions: Indo-Gangetic

Plain and Himalayas, collectively known as North India; and

Peninsula or South India. Ten physiological regions: IndoGangetic Plain, northern mountains of the Himalayas, Central

Highlands, Deccan or Peninsular Plateau, East Coast

(Coromandel Coast in south), West Coast (Konkan, Kankara,

and Malabar coasts), Great Indian Desert (known as Thar

Desert in Pakistan) and Rann of Kutch, valley of the

Brahmaputra River in Assam, northeastern hill ranges

surrounding Assam Valley, and islands of Arabian Sea and Bay

of Bengal.

Climate: Climate varies significantly from Himalayas in north

to tropical south. Four seasons: relatively dry, cool winter

December to February; dry, hot summer March to May;

southwest monsoon June to September when predominating

southwest maritime winds bring rains to most of country; and

northeast, or retreating, monsoon October and November.

Society

Population: 936,545,814 estimated in July 1995, with 1.8

percent annual growth rate. About 74 percent in rural areas in

1991; high population density—284 persons per square

kilometer national average, major states more than 700

persons per square kilometer; 100 persons or fewer per square

kilometer in some border states and insular territories. Bombay

(officially renamed Mumbai in 1995) largest city, with 12.6

million in 1991; twenty-three other cities with populations of

more than 1 million.

Health: In 1995 life expectancy for men 58.5 years, for women

59.6 years; infant mortality rate 76.3 per 1,000 live births.

Malaria, fiTariasis, leprosy, cholera, pneumonic plague,

tuberculosis, trachoma, goiter, and diarrheal diseases all occur.

xxvi
In 1991 primary health centers, subcenters, and community

health centers at local levels included more than 10,000

hospitals, 24,000 dispensaries, and 811,000 beds.

Education: Twelve-year education system; mandatory primary

and middle levels, optional secondary education; high dropout rate even at compulsory levels. System supervised by

Department of Education, part of Ministry of Human Resource

Development. National adult literacy rate 52.2 percent in 1991

(male 63.9 percent, female 39.4 percent). More than 180

universities, some 500 teacher training colleges, and several

thousand other colleges.

Religion: Most (82 percent) observe Hinduism; 12.1 percent

Muslim, 2.3 percent Christian, 1.9 percent Sikh, 0.8 percent

Buddhist, 0.4 percent Jains, 0.4 percent other, 0.1 percent not

identified.

Language: Official language Hindi; English also has official status. For use in certain official capacities, constitution

recognizes eighteen Scheduled Languages (see Glossary):

Assamese, Bengali, Gujarati, Hindi, Kannada, Kashmiri,

Konkani, Malayalam, Manipuri, Marathi, Nepali, Oriya,

Punjabi, Sanskrit, Sindhi, Tamil, Telugu, and Urdu. Four major

language families include officially 112 "mother tongues," each

with 10,000 or more speakers; thirty-three languages spoken by

1 million or more persons. Total number of languages and

dialects varies depending on source and how counted; between

179 and 188 languages and between forty-nine and 544 dialects

have been tabulated; census respondents in 1961 provided

names for 1,652 different "mother tongues."

Ethnic Groups: Indo-Aryan 72 percent, Dravidian 25 percent,

Mongoloid and other 3 percent. Caste system, although no

longer sanctioned by government, prevails. Some 16 percent

listed as members of Scheduled Castes (see Glossary), 8

percent as members of Scheduled Tribes (see Glossary).

Economy

Salient Features: Economy transformed from primarily

agriculture, forestry, fishing, and textile manufacturing in 1947

to major heavy industry, transportation, and telecommunications industries by late 1970s. Central government

planning 1950 through late 1970s giving way to economic

reforms and more private-sector initiatives in 1980s and 1990s.

xxvii
Agriculture predominates and benefits from infusion of

modern technology by government. World Bank Group and

developed nations provide most aid; Japan largest donor.

Major trade partners United States, Japan, European Union,

and nations belonging to Organization of the Petroleum

Exporting Countries (OPEC—see Glossary).

Currency and Exchange Rate: Rupee; US$1 = Rs35.67 (July

1996).

Fiscal Year (FY): April 1-March 31.

Gross Domestic Product (GDP): Rs36.7 trillion (nearly US$1.2

trillion) in 1994 (estimated). GDP annual average growth rate

3.8 percent in 1994.

Foreign Trade: Principal export trade with European Union,

United States, and Japan. Main commodities agricultural and

allied products, gems and jewelry, and ready-made garments.

Iron ore, minerals, and leather and leather products also

important. Exports 7.7 percent of GDP in FY 1992. Principal

import trade with European Union, United States, and Japan.

Major imports (28 percent of total) oil products from Middle

East. Other major imports chemicals, dyes, plastics,

pharmaceuticals, uncut precious stones, iron and steel,

fertilizers, nonferrous metals, and pulp paper and paper

products. Imports 9.3 percent of GDP in FY 1992.

Balance of Payments: Negative trade balance in late 1980s and

early 1990s. In 1993 estimated exports US$22.7 billion versus US$23.9 billion imports.

Foreign Aid: Most aid provided by Aid-to-India Consortium,

consisting of World Bank Group and Austria, Belgium, Britain,

Canada, Denmark, Germany, France, Italy, Japan, Netherlands,

Norway, Sweden, and United States. Japan largest aid granter

and lender; US$337 million grants between 1984 and 1993,

US$2.4 billion loans in same period. Indian aid program to Bhutan and Nepal; smaller programs assist Bangladesh and

Vietnam.

Industry: Increasing share (27.4 percent in FY 1991) of GDP,

but employed only about 9 percent of the work force in 1991.

Basic industries: textiles, steel and aluminum, fertilizers and

petrochemicals, and electronics and motor vehicles.

Energy: India importer of petroleum and natural gas but has

abundant coal, hydroelectric power (especially in parts of

xxviii
North India), and burgeoning nuclear power industry.

Minerals: Less than 2 percent share of GDP in FY 1990 and 1 percent of labor force involved in mining and quarrying in

1991. Basic minerals: iron, bauxite, copper, lead, zinc, mica,

uranium ore, rare earths.

Services: Some 39.8 percent of GDP in FY 1991, then

employing about 13 percent of work force. Large and diverse

transportation system.

Agriculture: Declining share (32.8 percent) of GDP but

employed majority of workers (67 percent of total labor force)

in FY 1991. Around 45 percent (136 million hectares) of total

land cultivated, 27 percent double cropped, effectively giving

India 173 million hectares of cultivated land. Another 5

percent (15 million hectares) permanent pastureland or planted in tree crops or groves. Farming by smallholders; large

landholders divested in 1970s. Rice, wheat, pulses, and oilseeds

dominate production, but millet, corn (maize), and sorghum

important; commercial crops—sugar (India world's largest

producer), cotton, jute also important. Green Revolution

technological advances and improved high-yielding variety

seeds, and increased fertilizer production and irrigation

between mid-1960s and early 1980s. Dairy farming, fishing, and

forestry important parts of agricultural sector. Agricultural

products around 18 percent of total exports.

Science and Technology: Major government investment (80

percent of total) in and control of science and technology

sector; 200 national laboratories, 200 government-sector

research and development institutions, and about 1,000

research and development units in industrial sector supported

by both public and private funds. Substantial investments in

research and development in defense, nuclear science, space,

and agriculture.

Transportation and Telecommunications

Railroads: Track route length 62,458 in mid-1990s, fourth most

heavily used system in world, both for passengers and freight;

all government-owned and operated by Indian Railways. Some

14,600 kilometers double or multiple tracked; 11,000

kilometers electrified, 116,000 bridges; some high-speed

routes; domestic production of most rolling stock and other

components. Major government investment in modernization

xxix
in 1990s. Full metro system in Calcutta, rapid transit system in

Madras, and major system planned for New Delhi: Bombav

served bv suburban rail network.

Roads: Almost 2 million kilometers: 960.000 kilometers

surfaced roads, and more than 1 million kilometers

constructed of gravel, crushed stone, or earth. Fifty-three

highways, almost 20.000 kilometers in total length., rated as national highways: carry about 40 percent of road traffic.

Around 60 percent of all passenger traffic travels bv road.

Urban transit dominated bv motor vehicles: increasing use of

two- and three-wheel vehicles., automobiles, minibuses., buses,

trucks. Large cities have major urban bus systems. Bullocks,

camels, elephants, and other beasts of burden seen throughout

India.

Maritime Transport: Eleven major ports and 139 minor ports.

In 1995 three government-owned and between fifty and sixty

privately owned shipping companies. Four major and three

medium-sized shipyards, all government run. thirtv-five smaller

shipyards in private sector. Major coastal and ocean trade

routes., more than 16.000 kilometers of inland waterways, more

than 3.600 kilometers navigable bv lar^e vessels, although onlv

about 2.000 kilometers used.

Airports: Two airlines (.Air India and Indian .Airlines) and one

helicopter service (Pawan Hans) owned bv government and six privately owned airlines: latter account for onlv 10 percent of

domestic air traffic. Of 288 airports, 208 permanent-surface

runways and two runways of more than 3.659 meters. Major

international airports at Bombav (Mumbai). Delhi, Calcutta.

Madras, and Thiruvananthapuram (Trivandrum).

International service also from Mamargao (Goa). Bangalore,

and Hyderabad. Major regional airports at Ahmadabad.

Allahabad. Pune. Srinas;ar. Chandigarh. Kochi (Cochin).

Xagpur, and Thiruvananthapuram.

Telecommunications: National system controlled bv

government, with public corporations running service in New

Delhi and Bombav: some basic telephone services opened to private-sector competition in 1994: telephone line density onlv

0.7 per 100 persons in 1994, among lowest of major nations of

.Asia. Submarine cables link India to Malaysia and United .Arab

Emirates. Paging, cellular phone service, and electronic mail

being introduced. Government-owned radio (Akashvani) and

television I Doordarshan | networks with extensive national and

xxx
local coverage; private-sector television networks via cable and

satellite becoming prolific.

Government and Politics

Government: Federal republic based on separation of powers

into executive, legislative, and judicial branches. Central

government known as union government. Constitution of 1950

in force but much amended; power concentrated in

Parliament with upper house—Rajya Sabha (Council of

States) —appointed by president and elected by state and

territory assemblies and lower house—Lok Sabha (House of

the People) —popularly elected. Supreme Court highest court

of land; high courts in states. Administrative Divisions: Twenty-five states with 476 districts,

one national capital territory, six union territories. State

governors appointed by president, chief minister member of

popularly elected state assembly; central-government agencies

prevalent at local levels. Constitution allows central control of

state government (President's Rule) during time of emergency

on recommendation of governor. Districts subdivided into

taluqs or tehsils, townships that contain from 200 to 600 villages.

Small, centrally controlled union territories with lieutenant

governor or chief commissioner appointed by president.

Politics: With 354 million voters, some 14,700 candidates, more

than 500 parties, and nearly 595,000 polling stations in AprilMay 1996 elections, India often called "world's largest democracy." Since independence, dominated by Indian National

Congress (Congress—see Glossary) and its factions; occasional

rule by minority-party and coalition governments; Janata Party,

Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP), communist parties, and several

regional parties also important.

Foreign Relations: Member of United Nations (UN), South

Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC),

Nonaligned Movement, and numerous other international

organizations. Relations with all major nations based on

principles of nonalignment.

National Security

Armed Forces: Armed forces of India total active-duty

personnel in 1994 approximately 1,104,000. Component

xxxi
services: army, 940,000; navy, 54,000, of which 5,000 naval

aviation and 1,000 marines; air force, 110,000. Reserve forces

personnel total 1,964,554; also twelve paramilitary forces under

control of various ministries with total strength of 762,735 in

1994.

Military Units: Army structured as twelve corps (twenty-two

infantry divisions) under central control, organized into five

tactical area commands. Navy units in three area commands.

Air Force units in five operational commands. Police

commands coincide with state boundaries.

Military Equipment: Army main battle tanks, armored

personnel carriers (APCs), towed and self-propelled artillery,

helicopters. Navy: aircraft carriers, submarines, destroyers,

frigates, fast-attack patrol craft, amphibious ships, fixed-wing

aircraft, helicopters, and marine reconnaissance aircraft. Air

Force: ground-attack fighters, transports, trainers, and

helicopters. Emphasis on domestic production of most items;

most imports from Britain, France, Germany, and Russia.

Older equipment from Soviet Union.

Military Budget: Approximately US$6.9 billion, or less than 5

percent of gross national product in FY 1994.

Foreign Military Relations: Long-term ties with Soviet Union

and, later, Russia. Occasional joint operations with Indian

Ocean nations and United States. Peacekeeping forces sent to

Sri Lanka and Maldives. Since 1950 Indian military and police

contingents also have participated in UN peacekeeping forces

in Korea, Suez Canal, Sinai Peninsula, Gaza, Congo, Lebanon,

Yemen, West Irian, Iran-Iraq border, Costa Rica, El Salvador,

Guatemala, Honduras, Nicaragua, Namibia, Angola, former

Yugoslavia, Mozambique, Cambodia, and Somalia.

Internal Security Forces: Paramilitary forces guard coasts,

borders, and sensitive military areas; paramilitary sent by

central government to aid local police forces and against

insurgencies. Provincial Armed Constabulary and Central

Reserve Police Force handle police duties.

xxxii


Introduction

INDIA IS A LAND of ancient civilization, with cities and vil- lages, cultivated fields, and great works of art dating back 4,000

years. India's high population density and variety of social, eco- nomic, and cultural configurations are the products of a long

process of regional expansion. In the last decade of the twentieth century, such expansion has led to the rapid erosion of

India's forest and wilderness areas in the face of ever-increasing

demands for resources and gigantic population pressures

India's population is projected to exceed 1 billion by the

twenty-first century!

Such problems are a relatively recent phenomenon. Rhinoceros inhabited the North Indian plains as late as the sixteenth

century. Historical records and literature of earlier periods

reveal the motif of the forest everywhere. Stories of merchant

caravans typically included travel through long stretches ofjungle inhabited by wild beasts and strange people; royal adventures usually included a hunting expedition and meetings with

unusual beings. In the Mahabharata and the Ramayana, early

epics that reflect life in India before 1000 B.C. and 500 B.C.,

respectively, the forest begins at the edge of the city, and the

heroes regularly spend periods of exile wandering far from civ- ilization before returning to rid the world of evil. The formulaic rituals of the Vedas also reflect attempts to create a regulated, geometric space from the raw products of nature.

The country's past serves as a reminder that India today, with

its overcrowding and scramble for material gain, its poverty

and outstanding intellectual accomplishments, is a society in

constant change. Human beings, mostly humble folk, have

within a period of 200 generations turned the wilderness into one of the most complicated societies in the world. The process

began in the northwest in the third millennium B.C., with the

Indus Valley, or Harappan, civilization, when an agricultural

economy gave rise to extensive urbanization and long-distance

trade. The second stage occurred during the first millennium

B.C., when the Ganga-Yamuna river basin and several southern

river deltas experienced extensive agricultural expansion and

population growth, leading to the rebirth of cities, trade, and a

sophisticated urban culture.

xxxv
liinnt I Administrative Divisions of India, 1995

XXXIV

By the seventh century A.D., a dozen core regions based on

access to irrigation-supported kingdoms became tied to a pan-Indian cultural tradition and participated in increasing

cross-cultural ties with other parts of Asia and the Middle East. India's inclusion within a global trading economy after the thir- teenth century culminated in the arrival of Portuguese explorers, traders, and missionaries, beginning in 1498. Although

there were ebbs and flows in the pattern, the overall tendency

was for peasant cultivators and their overlords to expand agriculture and animal husbandry into new ecological zones, and

to push hunting and gathering societies farther into the hills. By the twentieth century, most such tribal (see Glossary)

groups, although constituting a substantial minority within

India, lived in restricted areas under severe pressure from the

caste-based agricultural and trading societies pressing from the

plains. Because this evolution took place over more than forty

centuries and encompassed a wide range of ecological niches

and peoples, the resulting social pattern is extremely complicated and alters constantly.

India had its share of conquerors who moved in from the

northwest and overran the north or central parts of the country. These migrations began with the Aryan peoples of the sec- ond millennium B.C. and culminated in the unification of the

entire country for the first time in the seventeenth century

under the Mughals. Mostly these conquerors were nomadic or seminomadic people who adopted or expanded the agricultural economy and contributed new cultural forms or religions,

such as Islam.

The Europeans, primarily the English, arrived in force in the

early seventeenth century and by the eighteenth century had

made a profound impact on India. India was forced, for the

first time, into a subordinate role within a world system based

on industrial production rather than agriculture. Many of the

dynamic craft or cottage industries that had long attracted for- eigners to India suffered extensively under competition with

new modes of mass production fostered by the British. Modern

institutions, such as universities, and technologies, such as rail- roads and mass communication, broke with Indian intellectual

traditions and served British, rather than Indian, economic

interests. A country that in the eighteenth century was a magnet for trade was, by the twentieth century, an underdeveloped

and overpopulated land groaning under alien domination.

Even at the end of the twentieth century, with the period of

xxxvi
colonialism well in the past, Indians remain sensitive to foreign

domination and are determined to prevent the country from

coming under such domination again.

Through India's long history, religion has been the carrier

and preserver of culture. One distinctive aspect of the evolution of civilization in India has been the importance of hereditary priesthoods, often Brahmans (see Glossary), who have

functioned as intellectual elites. The heritage preserved by

these groups had its origin in the Vedas and allied bodies of lit- erature in the Sanskrit language, which evolved in North India

during the second millennium B.C. This tradition always

accepted a wide range of paths to ultimate truth, and thus

encompassed numerous rituals and forms of divinity within a

polytheistic system. Generally, Brahmans supported the phenomenon known as Sanskritization, or the inclusion of local or regional traditions within Sanskrit literary models and

pan-Indian cultural motifs. In this way, there has been a steady

spread of North Indian cultural and linguistic forms throughout the country. This process has not gone unopposed. Siddhartha Gautama (the Buddha) and Mahavira (founder of

Jainism) in the fifth century B.C. represented alternative methods for truth-seekers; they renounced the importance of priesthoods in favor of monastic orders without reference to birth.

The largest challenge came from Islam, which rests on Arabic

rather than Sanskritic cultural traditions, and has served, especially since the eleventh century, as an important alternative

religious path. The interaction of Brahmanical religious forms

with local variations and with separate religions creates another

level of complexity in Indian social life. Closely allied with religious belief, and deeply rooted in his- tory, caste remains an important feature of Indian society.

Caste in many Indian languages is jati, or birth—a system of

classifying and separating people from birth within thousands

of different groups labeled by occupation, ritual status, social

etiquette, and language. Scholars have long debated the origins of this system, and have suggested as the origin religious

concepts of reincarnation, the incorporation of many ethnic

groups within agricultural systems over the millennia, or occupational stratification within emerging class societies. What is certain is that nineteenth-century British administrators, in

their drive to classify and regulate the many social groups they

encountered in everyday administration, established lists or

schedules of different caste groups. At that time, it seemed that

xxxvn
the rules against intermarriage and interdining that defined

caste boundaries tended to freeze these groups within

unchanging little societies, a view that fit well with imperialistic

models imposed on India as a whole. Experience during the

twentieth century has demonstrated that the caste system is capable of radical change and adaptation.

Modernization and urbanization have led to a decline in the

outward display of caste exclusiveness, so that issues of caste may never emerge directly on public transit or in the workplace. Entire castes have changed their status, claiming higher

positions as they shed their traditional occupations or accumulate money and power. In many villages, however, the segregation of castes by neighborhood and through daily behavior still exists at the end of the twentieth century. In the cities, segregation takes more subtle forms, emerging directly at times of

marriage but existing more often as an undercurrent of discrimination in educational opportunities, hiring, and promotion. The British schedules of different castes, especially those

of very low or Untouchable (Dalit—see Glossary) groups, later

became the basis for affirmative-action programs in independent India that allowed some members of the most oppressed

caste groups access to good education and high-paying jobs.

The reservation of positions for Backward Classes (see Glossary) has remained a sore point with higher-ranked groups and

has contributed to numerous political confrontations. Meanwhile, attempts by low-ranking (and desperately poor) castes to organize and agitate against discrimination have been met with

violence in most Indian states and territories. Caste, therefore,

is a very live issue.

Religious, caste, and regional diversity exist in India against a background of poverty. At independence in 1947, the British

left India in terrible condition. The country emerged from

World War II with a rudimentary scientific and industrial base

and a rapidly expanding population that lived primarily in vil- lages and was divided by gross inequalities in status and wealth.

Under the leadership ofJawaharlal Nehru, India's first prime

minister (1947-64), India addressed its economic crisis

through a combination of socialist planning and free enterprise. During the 1950s and 1960s, large government investments made India as a whole into one of the most

industrialized nations in the world. Considerable expenditure

on irrigation facilities and fertilizer plants, combined with the

introduction of high-yield variety seeds in the 1960s, allowed

xxxviii
the Green Revolution to banish famine. The abolition of

princely states and large land holdings, combined with (mostly

ineffective) land redistribution schemes, also eliminated some

of the most glaring inequalities in the countryside and in some

areas, such as Punjab, stimulated the growth of middle-sized

entrepreneurial farms. Building on the education system

bequeathed by the British, India established an infrastructure

of universities, basic research institutes, and applied research

facilities that trained one of the world's largest scientific and

technical establishments.

The socialist model of development remained dominant in

India through the 1970s, under the leadership of Prime Minister Indira Gandhi, Nehru's daughter. Government-owned firms

controlled iron and steel, mining, electronics, cement, chemicals, and other major industries. Telecommunications media,

railroads, and eventually the banking industry were nationalized. Import-substitution policies, designed to encourage

Indian firms and push out multinational corporations,

included strict and time-consuming procedures for obtaining

licenses and laws that prohibited firms from operating in India

without majority ownership by Indian citizens or corporations.

These rules were instrumental, for example, in driving IBM

from India in the 1970s, leading to the growth of an indige- nous Indian computer industry. By the late 1980s, however,

after Mrs. Gandhi's 1984 assassination, the disadvantages of the

centrally planned economy began to outweigh its benefits.

Inefficiency in public-sector firms, lack of entrepreneurial

innovation, excessive bureaucracy, and the inability of the

Indian scientific and technical apparatus to transfer technology

to marketable goods kept many Indian firms from being competitive in international markets.

Under Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi and his successors, the

national and state-level (states, union territories, and the

national capital territory) governments liberalized licensing

requirements and eventually rescinded rules on foreign ownership, while taking steps to scale down government market

share in a number of high-technology markets. Multinational

firms began to reenter India in the late 1980s and the early

1990s, as the government encouraged private enterprise and

international sales in its search for foreign exchange. India

began to open its economy to the world.

Indian-style socialism was probably necessary in the years

after independence to protect the nation from foreign ecoxxxIX
nomic domination, but its biggest problem was that it did not

eliminate poverty. The vast majority of India's population con- tinued to live in small agricultural villages with few public

amenities. A significant minority of the population in the 1990s

live below the Indian definition of the poverty line, surviving at subsistence level, unemployed or underemployed, with little education or opportunity for training, and suffering from a

variety of curable health problems. There are also some 200

million people who live above the official poverty line, but

whose lives remain precariously balanced on the border of destitution. The per capita income of India as a whole remains

among the lowest in the world. One of the biggest issues facing

India as its economy has changed direction is that free-market

capitalism offers little help for this large mass of people, who

lack the skills or opportunity to participate in the new economy.

The big social story of India in the 1980s and the 1990s is the

emergence of the middle class. This group includes members

of prosperous farming families, as well as the primarily

urban-based professional, administrative, and business elites

who benefited from forty years of government protection and

training. By the mid-1990s, the drive toward modernization

had transformed 26.1 percent of the country into urban areas, where, amid masses of impoverished citizens, a sizable class of consumers has arisen. The members of this increasingly vocal

middle class chafe under the older, regulated economy and

demand a loosening of economic controls to make consumer

goods available on the free market. They want education for

their children that prepares them for technical and professional careers, increasingly in the private sector instead of the

traditional sinecures in government offices. They build their

well-appointed brick houses in exclusive suburban neighborhoods or surround their lots with high walls amid urban squalor, driving their scooters or automobiles to work while their

children attend private schools.

The result of these processes over the course of fifty years is a dynamic, modernizing India with major class cleavages. The

upper 1 or 2 percent of the population includes some of the

wealthiest people in the world, who can be seen at the race- track in the latest fashions from Paris or Tokyo, who travel

extensively outside India for business, pleasure, or advanced

medical care, and whose children attend the most exclusive

English-language schools within India and abroad. For the

x!
middle class, which makes up between 15 and 25 percent of the

population, the end of the twentieth century is a time of relative prosperity: incomes generally keep pace with inflation and

jobs may still be obtained through family connections. The

increase in consumer goods, such as washing machines and

electric kitchen appliances, makes life easier and reduces

dependence on lower-class (and low-caste) servants. For the

industrial working class, the 1990s are a period of transition as dynamic new industries grow, mostly in the private sector, while

many large government-sponsored plants are in jeopardy. The

trade union movement, closely connected in some states with

communist parties, finds itself under considerable pressure

during a period of structural change in the economy. For large

numbers of peasants and dwellers in urban slums, a way out of

poverty remains as elusive as it had seemed for their grandparents at independence.

The political system responsible for these gigantic successes and failures has been democratic; India has called itself "the

world's largest democracy." Paradoxically, it was the autocratic

rule of the British that gave birth to the rule of the people.

Democratization started when a group of concerned British cit- izens in India and well-to-do Indian professionals gathered in

Bombay in 1885 to form a political debating society, the Indian

National Congress (Congress—see Glossary). Originally conceived as a lobbying group, the Congress after 1900 became

radicalized and took the forefront in a drive for home rule that

encompassed elected assemblies and parliamentary procedure.

In the face of British intransigence, the Congress soon became

the leading organization within a broad-based freedom struggle that finally forced the British out in 1947. Mohandas

Karamchand Gandhi (the Mahatma or Great Soul) was a central figure in this struggle because he was able to turn the Congress from an elite pressure group into a mass movement that

mobilized hundreds of millions of people against the immorality of a foreign, nondemocratic system.

Gandhi perfected nonviolent techniques for general strikes

and civil disobedience, and coordinated demonstrations with mass publicity; the techniques that he popularized have played

a part in later Indian and world politics (including the United

States civil rights movement). He evolved a philosophy of political involvement as sacrifice for the good of the world and

played the role of a holy man who was also a cagey politician

xli
an image that remained important for Indian political figures

after independence.

In a move to undercut British industrial superiority, Gandhi

encouraged a return to a communal, rustic life and village

handicrafts as the most humane way of life. Finally, he railed

against the segregation of the caste system and religious bigotry that reduced large minorities within India to second-class

citizenship. Gandhi was thus able to unite European humanistic and democratic ideas with Indian concepts of an interdependent, responsible community to create a unique political

philosophy complete with action plan. In the last years before

his assassination in 1948, Gandhi's idiosyncratic program fell out of step with the modernization paradigm of Nehru and the

leadership of an independent India, and his ideas became a background theme within Indian political economy. On a regular basis, however, Indian leaders continue to hearken back to

his message and employ his organizational and media tactics

on the independent Indian political scene. The Congress remained the most important political organization in India after independence. Except for brief periods in

the late 1970s and late 1980s and until the mid-1990s, the Congress always controlled Parliament and chose the prime minister. The political dynasty ofJawaharlal Nehru (1947-64), his

daughter Indira Gandhi (1965-77, 1980-84), and her son Rajiv

Gandhi (1984-89) was crucial in keeping the Congress in

power and also providing continuity in leadership for the country. The party was able to appeal to a wide segment of the poor

(including low castes and Muslims) through its ideology of

social equality and welfare programs, while appealing to the

more prosperous voters—usually from upper castes—by preserving private property and supporting village community

leadership. Because it stayed in power so long, the Congress was able to dispense government benefits to a wide range of

constituencies, which prompted charges of corruption and led

to Congress reversals in the late 1980s. Because it affected a

type of socialist policy, the Congress diffused or incorporated

left-wing political rhetoric and prevented the growth of a communist-led insurrection that might have been expected

under the difficult social conditions existing in India.

Although a vibrant communist movement remains a force in

Indian politics, it manifests itself at the state level of government rather than in national political power or large-scale revo- lutionary turmoil. Challenges from the right were small as well

xlii
until the early 1990s, when the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP

Indian People's Party) emerged as a serious contender for

national leadership. The BJP advocated a blend of Hindu

nationalism that inserted religious issues into the heart of

national political debates, unlike the secular ideology that offi- cially dominated Indian political thought after independence.

In the early 1990s, however, the Congress, after having entered

its second century of dominance over the Indian political landscape, continued to hold on to power with a middle-of-the-road

message and smaller majorities.

The federal structure of India, embodied in the constitution

of 1951, attempts to strike a balance between a strong central

government and the autonomous governments of the

nation-sized states, each with a distinct culture and deep historical roots, that make up the union. A formidable array of powers at the center makes it possible for the central government

to intervene in state issues; these powers include control over

the military, the presence of an appointed governor to monitor

affairs within each state, and the ability of the president to sus- pend state-level legislatures in times of internal disorder and

declare direct President's Rule. In theory, these powers should

come into play rarely because the regular administration of the

states resides with elected assemblies and chief ministers

appointed through parliamentary procedures. State governments have extensive powers over almost all of their internal

affairs. The framers of the national constitution constructed a

series of checks and balances among the legislative, executive,

and judicial branches at the center, and between the center

and the states, designed to provide national security while

allowing a maximum of state autonomy within the diversified

union.

The Indian political system has proven to be flexible and

durable, but major internal conflicts have threatened the constitution. In practice, the elected office of the nation's president has gravitated toward the formal and ritual aspects of

executive power, while the office of the prime minister, backed

up by a majority in Parliament, the cabinet, national security

forces, and the bureaucracy of the Indian Administrative Service, has wielded the actual power. The national Parliament has

not developed an independent committee structure and criti- cal tradition that could stand against the force of the executive

branch. The judiciary, while remaining independent and at times crucial in determining national policy, has stayed in the

xliii
background and is subject to future change through constitutional amendments. The constitution itself has been subject to numerous amendments since its adoption in 1950. By August

1996, the constitution had been amended eighty times.

National politics have become contests to set up the appointment of the prime minister, who then has considerable power

to interfere directly or through a cooperative president in all aspects of national life. The most drastic example of this power

occurred in 1975, when Indira Gandhi implemented the constitutional provision for a declaration of Emergency, suspending civil rights for eighteen months, using Parliament as a tool

for eliminating opposition, and ruling with the aid of a small

circle of advisers. The more common form of executive interference has been the suspension of state legislatures under a

variety of pretexts and the implementation of President's Rule.

This typically has occurred when opposition parties have captured state legislatures and set in motion policies unfavorable

to the prime minister's party. After Indira Gandhi's assassination in 1984, her successors engaged in such overt acts of interference less often.

The main opposition to the national executive comes from

the states, in a variety of legal and extralegal struggles for

regional autonomy. Most of the states have developed specific

political identities based on forms of ethnicity that claim a long

historical past. The most common identifying characteristic is language. Agitation in what became the state of Andhra

Pradesh led the way in the 1950s, resulting in the reorganization of state boundaries along linguistic lines. Agitations in the

state of Tamil Nadu in the 1960s resulted in domination of the

state by parties dedicated officially to Tamil nationalism.

In the northeast, regional struggles have coalesced around

tribal identities, leading to the formation of a number of small

states based on dominant tribal groupings. Farther south, in

Kerala and West Bengal, communist parties have upheld the

banner of regionalism by capturing state assemblies and implementing radical socialist programs against the wishes of the

central government.

The regional movements most threatening to national integration have occurred in the northwest. The state of Punjab

was divided by the Indian government twice after independence—Haryana and Himachal Pradesh were sliced off

before it achieved a Sikh majority population in what remained

of Punjab. That majority allowed the Sikh-led Akali Dal (Eterxliv
nal Party) to capture the state assembly in the early 1980s. By

then radical separatist elements were determined to fight for an independent Sikh Punjab. The result was an army attack on

Sikh militants occupying the Golden Temple in Amritsar,

Indira Gandhi's assassination by her Sikh bodyguards, both in

1984, and a ten-year internal security struggle that has killed

thousands. In India's state of Jammu and Kashmir (often

referred to as Kashmir), where Muslims constitute the majority

of the population, regional struggle takes a different religious

form and has created intense security problems that keep bilat- eral relations with Pakistan, which also lays claim to Kashmir, in a tense mode.

The central government usually has been able to defuse

regional agitations by agreeing to redefinition of state boundaries or by guaranteeing differing degrees of regional autonomy, including acquiescence in the control of the state

government by regional political parties. This strategy defused

the original linguistic agitations through the 1970s, and led to the resolution of the destructive political and ethnic crises in

Assam in the mid-1980s. When national security interests came

into play, however, as in Punjab and Jammu and Kashmir, the

central government did not hesitate to use force.

In the mid-1990s, India remains a strong unified nation, with

a long history of constitutional government and democracy,

but at any moment there are half a dozen regional political agitations underway and a dozen guerrilla movements in different

parts of the country advocating various types of official recognition or outright independence based on ethnic affiliation. The

unity of the country as a whole has never been seriously threatened by these movements. Because the benefits of union

within India have outweighed the advantages of independence

for most people within each state, there have always been moderate elements within the states willing to make deals with the

central government, and security forces have proven capable of

repressing any armed struggle at the regional level. In addition, state-level opposition, whether in the legislatures or in the

streets, has been an effective means of preventing massive

interference from New Delhi in the day-to-day lives of citizens,

and thus has provided a crucial check that has preserved the

democratic system and the constitution.

One of the most serious challenges to India's internal security and democratic traditions has come from so-called communal disorders, or riots, based on ethnic cleavages. The most

xlv
typical form is a religious riot, mostly between Hindus and

Muslims, although some of these disturbances also occur between different castes or linguistic groups. Most of these

struggles start with neighborhood squabbles of little significance, but rapidly escalate into mob looting and burning,

street fighting, and violent intervention by the police or paramilitary forces.

Religious ideology has played only a small part in these

events. Instead, the pressures of urban life in overcrowded,

poorer neighborhoods, combined with competition for limited

economic opportunities, create an environment in which ethnic differences become convenient labels for defining enemies,

and criminal behavior becomes commonplace. Whether

ignited by a street accident or a major political event, passions

in these areas may be directed into mob action. However, after

the catastrophe of independence (when hundreds of thousands in North India died during the partition of India and

Pakistan and at least 12 million became refugees), and because

the pattern of rioting has continued annually in various cities, a culture of distrust has grown up among a sizable minority of

Hindus and Muslims. This distrust has manifested itself in the

nationwide agitations fomented by elements of the BJP and

communal Hindu parties in the early 1990s. It reached a peak

in December 1992 with the dramatic destruction of the Babri

Masjid, a mosque in Ayodhya (in Uttar Pradesh), and communal riots and bombings in major cities throughout India in

early 1993. In this manner, the frictions of daily life in an over- crowded, poor nation have had a major impact on the national

political agenda.

The internal conflict between Hindus and Muslims has

received some of its stimulus since 1947 from the international

conflict between India and Pakistan. One of the great tragedies

of the freedom struggle was the relentless polarization of opinion between the Congress, which came to represent mostly

Hindus, and the All-India Muslim League (Muslim League

see Glossary), which eventually stood behind a demand for a separate homeland for a Muslim majority. This division,

encouraged under British rule by provisions for separate elec- torates for Muslims, led to the partition of Pakistan from India

and the outbreak of hostilities over Kashmir. Warfare between

India and Pakistan occurred in 1947, 1965, and 1971; the last conflict led to the independence of Bangladesh (formerly East

Pakistan) and a major strategic victory by India.

xlvi
The perception of Pakistan as an enemy nation has over- shadowed all other Indian foreign policy considerations

because neither country has relinquished claims over Kashmir,

and a series of border irritations continue to bedevil attempts

at rapprochement. In the late 1980s, tensions over large-scale

military maneuvers almost led to war, and regular fighting over

glacial wastelands in Kashmir continues to keep the pressure

high. An added dimension emerged in 1987 when Pakistan

publicly admitted that it possessed nuclear weapons capability,

matching Indian nuclear capabilities demonstrated in 1974. In

the mid-1990s, both nations continue to devote a large percentage of their military budgets to developing or to purchasing

advanced weaponry, which is mostly aimed at each other—

a

serious drain of resources needed for economic growth.

Nehru and the early leadership of independent India had

envisioned a nation at peace with the rest of the world, in keeping with Gandhian ideals and socialist goals. Under Nehru's

guidance, India distanced itself from Cold War politics and

played a major part in the Nonaligned Movement (see Glossary). Until the early 1960s, India spent relatively little on

national defense and enjoyed an excellent relationship with

the United States, a relationship that peaked in John F. Kennedy's presidency. India's strategic position changed after

China defeated the Indian army in the border war of 1962 and

war with Pakistan occurred in 1965. During this period, the sit- uation became more precarious because India had opponents

on two fronts. In addition, Pakistan began to receive substantial

amounts of military assistance from the United States, ostensibly to support anticommunism, but it was no secret that most

of the weapons purchased with United States aid were a deterrent projected against India. Under these circumstances, India

began to move closer to the Soviet Union, purchasing outright

large amounts of military hardware or making agreements to produce it indigenously.

Relations between the United States and India reached a low

point in 1971 during the Bangladesh war of independence,

when a United States naval force entered the Bay of Bengal to show support for Pakistan although doing nothing to forestall

its defeat. This display of force, which could not be opposed by

India or the Soviet Union, served only to strain the relationship

between India and the United States and heightened Cold War

tensions in South Asia. During the 1970s, as the United States and China improved relations and China became closer in

xlvii
turn to Pakistan, India's strategic position became more

entwined with Cold War issues, and the Soviet connection

became even more important. These international postures

contrasted dramatically with the increasing importance to India of American scientific and economic links, which were

strengthened by the increasing emigration of Indian citizens to North America. The overall result, however, was India's weaker

international situation in the view of some Americans.

During the 1980s, then, India was still officially a nonaligned

nation but in fact found itself deeply embedded in Cold War

strategy. India's reaction to the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan was a disquieting feature of Indian foreign policy, in that

India decried the Soviet military presence but did nothing

against it. Continued United States support for Pakistan, plus

the buildup of United States strike forces on the small island of

Diego Garcia in the Indian Ocean, heightened tensions. It was no coincidence, therefore, that the 1980s witnessed a major

expansion of Indian naval forces, with the addition of two air- craft carriers, a submarine fleet, and major surface ships,

including transport craft. But although the Indian buildup

made the United States unhappy, India's technological capacities remained inferior to those of the United States Navy, and

the Indian navy was never a large threat to United States interests. Instead, the growth of the Indian navy had major implications for the regional balance of power within South Asia. The

Indian navy could potentially create a second front against

Pakistan should major hostilities recur. India's military buildup allowed it to intervene in low-intensity conflicts throughout South Asia. From 1987 to 1990, the

Indian Peace Keeping Force of more than 60,000 personnel

was active in Sri Lanka and became embroiled in a fruitless war

against Tamil separatist guerrillas. And, in 1988 Indian forces

briefly intervened in Maldives to prevent a coup. Regular border problems with Bangladesh after 1971, the Indian annexation of Sikkim in 1975, and the 1989 closure of the border

with Nepal over economic disagreements all added up to the

picture of a big country bullying its smaller neighbors, a vision

Indian leaders took great pains to dispel. Thus, even though

the country officially remained at peace during the 1980s,

India's growing military power and the intersecting problems

of regional dominance and Cold War ambivalence drove an

ambitious foreign policy.

xlviii
The Indian strategic position changed dramatically in the

early 1990s. The end of the Cold War, and then the disintegration of the Soviet Union itself, deprived India of a great ally but

also put a stop to many of the worldwide tensions that had

relentlessly pulled India into global alignments. When the

United States cut off military aid to Pakistan in 1990, it defused

one of the most intractable barriers to good relations with

India. Then, in 1992, the Persian Gulf War against Iraq

brought India grudgingly into an alignment with both Pakistan

and the United States, a connection strengthened in 1994

when troops from all three nations cooperated in Somalia

under the aegis of the United Nations.

The possession of nuclear weapons by Pakistan and India

immersed them in a familiar scenario of mutually assured

destruction and made it more problematic for India, despite its military superiority, to overrun Pakistan. Thus, in the mid1990s, despite continuing hostility over Kashmir, which intensified as the internal situation there disintegrated in the 1990s,

the long-term possibilities for official peace between the two

countries remained good. Threats from other South Asian

nations were negligible. Issues with China were unresolved but

not very significant. No other country in the world presented a

strategic threat. As budgetary problems beset the government

in the mid-1990s, therefore, the Indian military began cut- backs. The military also expanded contacts with a variety of

other nations, including Russia and the United States. India

hence has entered a period of relative security and multilateral

contacts quite different from its twenty-five-year Cold War

immersion.

India is a complex geographic, historical, religious, social,

economic, and political entity. India is one of the oldest human

civilizations and yet displays no cultural features common to all

its members. It is one of the richest nations in history, but most

of its people are among the poorest in the world. Its ideology

rests on some of the most sublime concepts of humanism and

nonviolence, but deep-seated discrimination and violent

responses are daily news. It has one of the world's most stable

political structures, but that structure is constantly in crisis. The nation is seeking a type of great power status, but no one is sure what that involves. India, in the end, defies easy analysis.

* * *

xlix
The most notable event that occurred in India after the

manuscript for this book was completed in the summer of 1995 was the nationwide general elections for the Lok Sabha, the

lower house of Parliament, held in April and May 1996. The

elections were held in the wake of a US$18 million bribery

scandal and resignations involving seven cabinet members and

numerous others. Prime Minister P.V. Narasimha Rao, leader

of the ruling Congress (I), was accused of accepting substantial

bribes. Lai Krishna Advani, head of the BJP, the leading opposition party, was arrested for his alleged acceptance of bribes. For

many voters, this scandal was the culmination of scandals and

corruption associated for years with old-guard politicians.

The world's largest democracy went to the polls, except in

Jammu and Kashmir, over three days between April 27 and May

7 with nearly 14,700 candidates from 522 parties running for

543 of the 545 Lok Sabha seats (the other two seats are filled

with Anglo-Indians appointed by the president). Some 16,900

others vied for 914 seats in six state and union territory assembly elections. The candidates were as diverse as ever, with a plethora of Backward Class candidates rising to challenge highcaste hopefuls. Prominent among them was Janata Dal Party

candidate Laloo Prasad Yadev, the chief minister of Bihar, who

ran on an anti-Brahman caste platform. Phoolan Devi, a former convicted outlaw, who became world-famous as India's

"Bandit Queen," also successfully ran for office. One highly

favored potential candidate who decided not to run was Sonia

Gandhi, widow of Rajiv Gandhi, daughter-in-law of Indira Gandhi, and granddaughter-in-law of Jawaharlal Nehru. She

resisted the honor amidst tensions between herself and Rao

and, in the minds of some observers, ended the Nehru-Gandhi

dynasty while sealing the fate of the Congress (I)

Some 60 percent of India's 590 million voters turned out,

but failed to elect a majority government. The BJP, which had

tried to tone down its Hindu nationalist rhetoric, won with its allies 194, or 37 percent, of the seats announced on May 10.

The Congress (I) won 136, or 25 percent, of the seats. The

National Front-Left Front won 110 seats (21 percent), with the

remaining ninety-four seats (17 percent) going to unaligned

regional parties, independents, and others. The Congress,

which had held national power for all but four years since

1947, received the lowest votes ever as many of its traditional

Muslim and low-caste constituents defected to other parties

and high-caste voters sided with the BJP.

1
After thirteen days in office as the head of a BJP minority

government, Prime Minister Atal Bihari Vajpayee resigned on

May 28, three days before a vote of no confidence would have

brought down his government. He was succeeded as India's

eleventh prime minister by the chief minister of Karnataka, the

Janata Dai's Haradanahalli (H.D.) Deve Gowda, who headed a minority coalition with thirteen parties—the United Front

made up of some members of the National Front, the Left

Front, and regional parties. Deve Gowda, a sixty-three-year-old

civil engineer of middle-class, lower-caste farmer background,

proclaimed the United Front as representative of India's great

diversity and reaffirmed his commitment to modern India's

secular heritage.

Although the Congress is not part of the left-center coalition, the United Front is dependent on it for survival. The

United Front sought Congress and bipartisan support by

declaring that the economic reforms started by the Congress were "irreversible" and committing itself to continued reforms

and attracting foreign investment. Despite the Congress's electoral debacle, the party continued to be an important behindthe-scenes force in the new government. Former Prime Minister Rao's legal problems led him to resign as president of the

Congress in September 1996. His successor, Sitaram Kesri,

pledged to continue backing the coalition.

Because of continuing unrest in Jammu and Kashmir, longawaited special elections for six Lok Sabha seats were held

under tight security between May 7 and 30. The central government's Election Commission proclaimed that the elections were "relatively free and fair" despite the efforts of militants

and separatists to sabotage them. There were widespread

reports, however, that Indian security forces had coerced people into voting. In September state-level elections were held in

Jammu and Kashmir for the first time in nine years. Farooq

Abdullah's National Conference party won the violence-prone

contest. In foreign affairs, India and Pakistan continued to seek ways

to reduce tensions between the two nations. Deve Gowda

offered conciliatory signs to Benazir Bhutto, his counterpart in

Islamabad, as the two sides moved toward high-level talks. Despite the opposition of the United States and the withdrawal

of technical support from Russia, in April 1996 India completed its own design of a 7.5-ton cryogenic engine capable of

launching rockets with 2,500-kilogram payloads. Such a develli
opment was a major technological advance for Indian science

and gave India the potential to move into the company of the

other space-exploring nations. India continued to maintain its stand in regard to nuclear weapons proliferation and in August

1996 refused to ratify the United Nations-sponsored Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty unless the treaty required the destruction of the world's existing nuclear weapons within a prescribed period. To concur with the treaty as it stood, some

Indian observers felt, would limit the country's sovereignty.

Meanwhile, several senior active-duty and retired military and

foreign servicers proposed that India should formally declare

itself a nuclear-weapons state and give a "no-first-use" assur- ance.

October 1, 1996 James Heitzman and Robert L. Worden

lii
Chapter 1. Historical Setting
A leather puppetfrom Andhra Pradesh
THOSE "WHO WEAR COTTON CLOTHES, use the decimal

system, enjoy the taste of [curried] chicken, play chess, or roll dice, and seek peace of mind or tranquility through meditation," writes historian Stanley Wolpert, "are indebted to India."

India's deep-rooted civilization may appear exotic or even

inscrutable to casual foreign observers, but a perceptive individual can see its evolution, shaped by a wide range of factors:

extreme climatic conditions, a bewildering diversity of people,

a host of competing political overlords (both local and outsiders), enduring religious and philosophical beliefs, and complex linguistic and literary developments that led to the

flowering of regional and pan-Indian culture during the last three millennia. The interplay among a variety of political and

socioeconomic forces has created a complex amalgam of cul- tures that continue amidst conflict; compromise, and adaptation. "Wherever we turn," says Wolpert, "we find . . . palaces,

temples, mosques, Victorian railroad stations, Buddhist stupas,

Mauryan pillars; each century has its unique testaments, often

standing incongruously close to ruins of another era, sometimes juxtaposed one atop another, much like the ruins of

Rome, or Bath."

India's "great cycle of history," as Professor Hugh Tinker put

it, entails repeating themes that continue to add complexity

and diversity to the cultural matrix. Throughout its history,

India has undergone innumerable episodes involving military

conquests and integration, cultural infusion and assimilation,

political unification and fragmentation, religious toleration

and conflict, and communal harmony and violence. A few

other regions in the world also can claim such a vast and differentiated historical experience, but Indian civilization seems to have endured the trials of time the longest. India has proven its remarkable resilience and its innate ability to reconcile opposing elements from many indigenous and foreign cultures.

Unlike the West, where modern political developments and

industrialization have created a more secular worldview with

redefined roles and values for individuals and families, India

remains largely a traditional society, in which change seems

only superficial. Although India is the world's largest democracy and the seventh-most industrialized country in the world,

the underpinnings of India's civilization stem primarily from its

3
India: A Country Study

own social structure, religious beliefs, philosophical outlook,

and cultural values. The continuity of those time-honed traditional ways of life has provided unique and fascinating patterns

in the tapestry of contemporary Indian civilization.

Antecedents

Harappan Culture

The earliest imprints of human activities in India go back to the Paleolithic Age, roughly between 400,000 and 200,000 B.C.

Stone implements and cave paintings from this period have

been discovered in many parts of the South Asia (see fig. 1).

Evidence of domestication of animals, the adoption of agriculture, permanent village settlements, and wheel-turned pottery

dating from the middle of the sixth millennium B.C. has been

found in the foothills of Sindh and Baluchistan (or Balochistan

in current Pakistani usage), both in present-day Pakistan. One

of the first great civilizations—with a writing system, urban centers, and a diversified social and economic system—-appeared

around 3,000 B.C. along the Indus River valley in Punjab (see

Glossary) and Sindh. It covered more than 800,000 square kilometers, from the borders of Baluchistan to the deserts of Rajasthan, from the Himalayan foothills to the southern tip of

Gujarat (see fig. 2). The remnants of two major cities

Mohenjo-daro and Harappa—reveal remarkable engineering

feats of uniform urban planning and carefully executed layout,

water supply, and drainage. Excavations at these sites and later

archaeological digs at about seventy other locations in India

and Pakistan provide a composite picture of what is now generally known as Harappan culture (2500-1600 B.C.).

The major cities contained a few large buildings including a

citadel, a large bath—perhaps for personal and communal

ablution—differentiated living quarters, flat-roofed brick

houses, and fortified administrative or religious centers enclosing meeting halls and granaries. Essentially a city culture,

Harappan life was supported by extensive agricultural production and by commerce, which included trade with Sumer in

southern Mesopotamia (modern Iraq). The people made tools

and weapons from copper and bronze but not iron. Cotton was woven and dyed for clothing; wheat, rice, and a variety of vegetables and fruits were cultivated; and a number of animals,

including the humped bull, were domesticated. Harappan cul- ture was conservative and remained relatively unchanged for

4
Historical Setting

centuries; whenever cities were rebuilt after periodic flooding,

the new level of construction closely followed the previous pat- tern. Although stability, regularity, and conservatism seem to have been the hallmarks of this people, it is unclear who

wielded authority, whether an aristocratic, priestly, or commercial minority.

By far the most exquisite but most obscure Harappan arti- facts unearthed to date are steatite seals found in abundance at Mohenjo-daro. These small, flat, and mostly square objects with

human or animal motifs provide the most accurate picture

there is of Harappan life. They also have inscriptions generally

thought to be in the Harappan script, which has eluded scholarly attempts at deciphering it. Debate abounds as to whether

the script represents numbers or an alphabet, and, if an alphabet, whether it is proto-Dravidian or proto-Sanskrit (see Languages of India, ch. 4).

The possible reasons for the decline of Harappan civilization

have long troubled scholars. Invaders from central and western

Asia are considered by some historians to have been the

"destroyers" of Harappan cities, but this view is open to reinterpretation. More plausible explanations are recurrent floods

caused by tectonic earth movement, soil salinity, and desertification.

Vedic Aryans

A series of migrations by Indo-European-speaking seminomads took place during the second millennium B.C. Known as Aryans, these preliterate pastoralists spoke an early form of

Sanskrit, which has close philological similarities to other IndoEuropean languages, such as Avestan in Iran and ancient

Greek and Latin. The term Aryan meant pure and implied the

invaders' conscious attempts at retaining their tribal identity

and roots while maintaining a social distance from earlier

inhabitants.

Although archaeology has not yielded proof of the identity

of the Aryans, the evolution and spread of their culture across the Indo-Gangetic Plain is generally undisputed (see Principal

Regions, ch. 2). Modern knowledge of the early stages of this

process rests on a body of sacred texts: the four Vedas (collections of hymns, prayers, and liturgy), the Brahmanas and the

Upanishads (commentaries on Vedic rituals and philosophical

treatises), and the Puranas (traditional mythic-historical

works). The sanctity accorded to these texts and the manner of

5
India: A Country Study

Present-day international boundary

Settled areas O Modern city ® Excavated city • Town

• Prehistoric site

50 100 Kilometers 50 100 Miles

Source: Based on information from Joseph E. Schwartzberg, ed., A Historical Atlas of South Asia, New York, 1992, 9. Figure 2. Indus Valley Culture Sites, ca. 2500-1600 B.C.

their preservation over several millennia—by an unbroken oral

tradition—make them part of the living Hindu tradition (see

Themes in Indian Society, ch. 5).

These sacred texts offer guidance in piecing together Aryan

beliefs and activities. The Aryans were a pantheistic people, fol- lowing their tribal chieftain or raja, engaging in wars with each

other or with other alien ethnic groups, and slowly becoming

settled agriculturalists with consolidated territories and differentiated occupations. Their skills in using horse-drawn chariots

and their knowledge of astronomy and mathematics gave them

a military and technological advantage that led others to

accept their social customs and religious beliefs (see Science

and Technology, ch. 6). By around 1,000 B.C., Aryan culture

had spread over most of India north of the Vindhya Range and

6
Historical Setting

in the process assimilated much from other cultures that preceded it (see The Roots of Indian Religion, ch. 3).

The Aryans brought with them a new language, a new pantheon of anthropomorphic gods, a patrilineal and patriarchal

family system, and a new social order, built on the religious and

philosophical rationales of varnashramadharma. Although precise translation into English is difficult, the concept varnashramadharma, the bedrock of Indian traditional social

organization, is built on three fundamental notions: varna

(originally, "color," but later taken to mean social class—see Glossary), ashrama (stages of life such as youth, family life,

detachment from the material world, and renunciation), and

dharma (duty, righteousness, or sacred cosmic law). The

underlying belief is that present happiness and future salvation are contingent upon one's ethical or moral conduct; therefore,

both society and individuals are expected to pursue a diverse

but righteous path deemed appropriate for everyone based on

one's birth, age, and station in life (see Caste and Class, ch. 5).

The original three-tiered society—Brahman (priest; see Glossary), Kshatriya (warrior), and Vaishya (commoner) —eventually expanded into four in order to absorb the subjugated

people—Shudra (servant) —or even five, when the outcaste

peoples are considered (see Varna, Caste, and Other Divisions,

ch. 5).

The basic unit of Aryan society was the extended and patriarchal family. A cluster of related families constituted a village,

while several villages formed a tribal unit. Child marriage, as practiced in later eras, was uncommon, but the partners'

involvement in the selection of a mate and dowry and brideprice were customary. The birth of a son was welcome because

he could later tend the herds, bring honor in battle, offer sacrifices to the gods, and inherit property and pass on the family name. Monogamy was widely accepted although polygamy was

not unknown, and even polyandry is mentioned in later writings. Ritual suicide of widows was expected at a husband's

death, and this might have been the beginning of the practice

known as sati in later centuries, when the widow actually burnt

herself on her husband's funeral pyre.

Permanent settlements and agriculture led to trade and

other occupational differentiation. As lands along the Ganga

(or Ganges) were cleared, the river became a trade route, the

numerous settlements on its banks acting as markets. Trade was

restricted initially to local areas, and barter was an essential

7
India: A Country Study

component of trade, cattle being the unit of value in large-scale

transactions, which further limited the geographical reach of

the trader. Custom was law, and kings and chief priests were the

arbiters, perhaps advised by certain elders of the community.

An Aryan raja, or king, was primarily a military leader, who

took a share from the booty after successful cattle raids or battles. Although the rajas had managed to assert their authority,

they scrupulously avoided conflicts with priests as a group,

whose knowledge and austere religious life surpassed others in

the community, and the rajas compromised their own interests

with those of the priests.

Kingdoms and Empires

From their original settlements in the Punjab region, the

Aryans gradually began to penetrate eastward, clearing dense

forests and establishing "tribal" settlements along the Ganga

and Yamuna (Jamuna) plains between 1500 and ca. 800 B.C. By

around 500 B.C., most of northern India was inhabited and

had been brought under cultivation, facilitating the increasing

knowledge of the use of iron implements, including ox-drawn

plows, and spurred by the growing population that provided

voluntary and forced labor. As riverine and inland trade flourished, many towns along the Ganga became centers of trade,

culture, and luxurious living. Increasing population and sur- plus production provided the bases for the emergence of independent states with fluid territorial boundaries over which

disputes frequently arose. The rudimentary administrative system headed by tribal

chieftains was transformed by a number of regional republics

or hereditary monarchies that devised ways to appropriate rev- enue and to conscript labor for expanding the areas of settle- ment and agriculture farther east and south, beyond the

Narmada River. These emergent states collected revenue

through officials, maintained armies, and built new cities and

highways. By 600 B.C., sixteen such territorial powers—including the Magadha, Kosala, Kuru, and Gandhara—stretched

across the North India plains from modern-day Afghanistan to Bangladesh. The right of a king to his throne, no matter how it was gained, was usually legitimized through elaborate sacrifice

rituals and genealogies concocted by priests who ascribed to the king divine or superhuman origins.

The victory of good over evil is epitomized in the epic

Ramayana (The Travels of Rama, or Ram in the preferred mod8
Historical Setting

ern form), while another epic, Mahabharata (Great Battle of

the Descendants of Bharata), spells out the concept of dharma

and duty. More than 2,500 years later, Mohandas Karamchand

(Mahatma) Gandhi, the father of modern India, used these

concepts in the fight for independence (see Mahatma Gandhi,

this ch.). The Mahabharata records the feud between Aryan

cousins that culminated in an epic battle in which both gods

and mortals from many lands allegedly fought to the death,

and the Ramayana recounts the kidnapping of Sita, Rama's

wife, by Ravana, a demonic king of Lanka (Sri Lanka), her res- cue by her husband (aided by his animal allies), and Rama's

coronation, leading to a period of prosperity andjustice. In the

late twentieth century, these epics remain dear to the hearts of

Hindus and are commonly read and enacted in many settings.

In the 1980s and 1990s, Ram's story has been exploited by

Hindu militants and politicians to gain power, and the much

disputed Ramjanmabhumi, the birth site of Ram, has become

an extremely sensitive communal issue, potentially pitting

Hindu majority against Muslim minority (see Public Worship,

ch. 3; Political Issues, ch. 8).

The Mauryan Empire

By the end of the sixth century B.C., India's northwest was

integrated into the Persian Achaemenid Empire and became

one of its satrapies. This integration marked the beginning of

administrative contacts between Central Asia and India.

Although Indian accounts to a large extent ignored Alexander the Great's Indus campaign in 326 B.C., Greek writers

recorded their impressions of the general conditions prevailing

in South Asia during this period. Thus, the year 326 B.C. provides the first clear and historically verifiable date in Indian his- tory. A two-way cultural fusion between several Indo-Greek

elements—especially in art, architecture, and coinage

occurred in the next several hundred years. North India's political landscape was transformed by the emergence of Magadha

in the eastern Indo-Gangetic Plain. In 322 B.C., Magadha,

under the rule of Chandragupta Maurya, began to assert its hegemony over neighboring areas. Chandragupta, who ruled

from 324 to 301 B.C., was the architect of the first Indian imperial power—the Mauryan Empire (326-184 B.C.) —whose capital was Pataliputra, near modern-day Patna, in Bihar.

Situated on rich alluvial soil and near mineral deposits, especially iron, Magadha was at the center of bustling commerce

9
India: A Country Study

and trade. The capital was a city of magnificent palaces, temples, a university, a library, gardens, and parks, as reported by

Megasthenes, the third-century B.C. Greek historian and

ambassador to the Mauryan court. Legend states that Chandragupta's success was due in large measure to his adviser Kautilya,

the Brahman author of the Arthashastra (Science of Material

Gain), a textbook that outlined governmental administration

and political strategy. There was a highly centralized and hierarchical government with a large staff, which regulated tax col- lection, trade and commerce, industrial arts, mining, vital

statistics, welfare of foreigners, maintenance of public places

including markets and temples, and prostitutes. A large standing army and a well-developed espionage system were maintained. The empire was divided into provinces, districts, and

villages governed by a host of centrally appointed local officials, who replicated the functions of the central administration.

Ashoka, grandson of Chandragupta, ruled from 269 to 232

B.C. and was one of India's most illustrious rulers. Ashoka's

inscriptions chiseled on rocks and stone pillars located at stra- tegic locations throughout his empire—such as Lampaka

(Laghman in modern Afghanistan), Mahastan (in modern

Bangladesh), and Brahmagiri (in Karnataka) —constitute the

second set of datable historical records. According to some of

the inscriptions, in the aftermath of the carnage resulting from

his campaign against the powerful kingdom of Kalinga (modern Orissa), Ashoka renounced bloodshed and pursued a policy of nonviolence or ahimsa, espousing a theory of rule by

righteousness. His toleration for different religious beliefs and

languages reflected the realities of India's regional pluralism

although he personally seems to have followed Buddhism (see

Buddhism, ch. 3). Early Buddhist stories assert that he con- vened a Buddhist council at his capital, regularly undertook

tours within his realm, and sent Buddhist missionary ambassadors to Sri Lanka.

Contacts established with the Hellenistic world during the

reign of Ashoka's predecessors served him well. He sent diplomatic-cum-religious missions to the rulers of Syria, Macedonia,

and Epirus, who learned about India's religious traditions,

especially Buddhism. India's northwest retained many Persian

cultural elements, which might explain Ashoka's rock inscriptions—such inscriptions were commonly associated with Persian rulers. Ashoka's Greek and Aramaic inscriptions found in

10
Historical Setting

Kandahar in Afghanistan may also reveal his desire to maintain

ties with people outside of India.

After the disintegration of the Mauryan Empire in the sec- ond century B.C., South Asia became a collage of regional powers with overlapping boundaries. India's unguarded

northwestern border again attracted a series of invaders

between 200 B.C. and A.D. 300. As the Aryans had done, the

invaders became "Indianized" in the process of their conquest

and settlement. Also, this period witnessed remarkable intellectual and artistic achievements inspired by cultural diffusion

and syncretism. The Indo-Greeks, or the Bactrians, of the

northwest contributed to the development of numismatics;

they were followed by another group, the Shakas (or Scythians), from the steppes of Central Asia, who settled in western

India. Still other nomadic people, the Yuezhi, who were forced

out of the Inner Asian steppes of Mongolia, drove the Shakas

out of northwestern India and established the Kushana Kingdom (first century B.C. -third century A.D.) . The Kushana

Kingdom controlled parts of Afghanistan and Iran, and in

India the realm stretched from Purushapura (modern Peshawar, Pakistan) in the northwest, to Varanasi (Uttar Pradesh) in

the east, and to Sanchi (Madhya Pradesh) in the south. For a short period, the kingdom reached still farther east, to

Pataliputra. The Kushana Kingdom was the crucible of trade

among the Indian, Persian, Chinese, and Roman empires and

controlled a critical part of the legendary Silk Road. Kanishka,

who reigned for two decades starting around A.D. 78, was the

most noteworthy Kushana ruler. He converted to Buddhism

and convened a great Buddhist council in Kashmir. The Kushanas were patrons of Gandharan art, a synthesis between Greek

and Indian styles, and Sanskrit literature. They initiated a new

era called Shaka in A.D. 78, and their calendar, which was for- mally recognized by India for civil purposes starting on March

22, 1957, is still in use. The Deccan and the South

During the Kushana Dynasty, an indigenous power, the Sata- vahana Kingdom (first century B.C.-third century A.D. ), rose

in the Deccan in southern India. The Satavahana, or Andhra,

Kingdom was considerably influenced by the Mauryan political

model, although power was decentralized in the hands of local

chieftains, who used the symbols of Vedic religion and upheld

the varnashramadharma. The rulers, however, were eclectic and

11
India: A Country Study

patronized Buddhist monuments, such as those in Ellora

(Maharashtra) and Amaravati (Andhra Pradesh). Thus, the

Deccan served as a bridge through which politics, trade, and

religious ideas could spread from the north to the south.

Farther south were three ancient Tamil kingdoms—Chera

(on the west), Chola (on the east), and Pandya (in the

south) —frequently involved in internecine warfare to gain

regional supremacy. They are mentioned in Greek and Ashokan sources as lying at the fringes of the Mauryan Empire. A

corpus of ancient Tamil literature, known as Sangam (academy) works, including Tolkappiam, a manual of Tamil grammar

by Tolkappiyar, provides much useful information about their

social life from 300 B.C. to A.D. 200. There is clear evidence of

encroachment by Aryan traditions from the north into a predominantly indigenous Dravidian culture in transition.

Dravidian social order was based on different ecoregions

rather than on the Aryan varna paradigm, although the Brahmans had a high status at a very early stage. Segments of society were characterized by matriarchy and matrilineal succession

which survived well into the nineteenth century—cross-cousin

marriage, and strong regional identity. Tribal chieftains

emerged as "kings" just as people moved from pastoralism

toward agriculture, sustained by irrigation based on rivers,

small-scale tanks (as man-made ponds are called in India) and

wells, and brisk maritime trade with Rome and Southeast Asia.

Discoveries of Roman gold coins in various sites attest to extensive South Indian links with the outside world. As with

Pataliputra in the northeast and Taxila in the northwest (in

modern Pakistan), the city of Madurai, the Pandyan capital (in

modern Tamil Nadu), was the center of intellectual and liter- ary activities. Poets and bards assembled there under royal

patronage at successive concourses and composed anthologies

of poems, most of which have been lost. By the end of the first century B.C., South Asia was crisscrossed by overland trade

routes, which facilitated the movements of Buddhist and Jain

missionaries and other travelers and opened the area to a synthesis of many cultures (seejainism, ch. 3).

The Classical Age

Gupta and Harsha

The Classical Age refers to the period when most of North

India was reunited under the Gupta Empire (ca. A.D. 320-

12
Historical Setting

550). Because of the relative peace, law and order, and extensive cultural achievements during this period, it has been

described as a "golden age" that crystallized the elements of

what is generally known as Hindu culture with all its variety,

contradiction, and synthesis. The golden age was confined to the north, and the classical patterns began to spread south only

after the Gupta Empire had vanished from the historical scene. The military exploits of the first three rulers—Chandragupta I (ca. 319-335), Samudragupta (ca. 335-376), and Chandragupta II (ca. 376-415)—brought all of North India under their

leadership. From Pataliputra, their capital, they sought to

retain political preeminence as much by pragmatism and judicious marriage alliances as by military strength. Despite their

self-conferred titles, their overlordship was threatened and by

500 ultimately ruined by the Hunas (a branch of the White

Huns emanating from Central Asia), who were yet another

group in the long succession of ethnically and culturally different outsiders drawn into India and then woven into the hybrid

Indian fabric.

Under Harsha Vardhana (or Harsha, r. 606-47), North India was reunited briefly, but neither the Guptas nor Harsha controlled a centralized state, and their administrative styles rested

on the collaboration of regional and local officials for administering their rule rather than on centrally appointed personnel.

The Gupta period marked a watershed of Indian culture: the

Guptas performed Vedic sacrifices to legitimize their rule, but

they also patronized Buddhism, which continued to provide an

alternative to Brahmanical orthodoxy.

The most significant achievements of this period, however, were in religion, education, mathematics, art, and Sanskrit lit- erature and drama. The religion that later developed into

modern Hinduism witnessed a crystallization of its components: major sectarian deities, image worship, devotionalism,

and the importance of the temple. Education included grammar, composition, logic, metaphysics, mathematics, medicine,

and astronomy. These subjects became highly specialized and

reached an advanced level. The Indian numeral system—sometimes erroneously attributed to the Arabs, who took it from

India to Europe where it replaced the Roman system—and the

decimal system are Indian inventions of this period. Aryabhatta's expositions on astronomy in 499, moreover, gave calculations of the solar year and the shape and movement of astral bodies with remarkable accuracy. In medicine, Charaka and

13
India: A Country Study

Sushruta wrote about a fully evolved system, resembling those

of Hippocrates and Galen in Greece. Although progress in

physiology and biology was hindered by religious injunctions

against contact with dead bodies, which discouraged dissection

and anatomy, Indian physicians excelled in pharmacopoeia,

caesarean section, bone setting, and skin grafting (see Science

and Technology, ch. 6).

The Southern Rivals

When Gupta disintegration was complete, the classical patterns of civilization continued to thrive not only in the middle

Ganga Valley and the kingdoms that emerged on the heels of

Gupta demise but also in the Deccan and in South India, which

acquired a more prominent place in history. In fact, from the

mid-seventh to the mid-thirteenth centuries, regionalism was

the dominant theme of political or dynastic history of South

Asia. Three features, as political scientist Radha Champakalakshmi has noted, commonly characterize the sociopolitical realities of this period. First, the spread of Brahmanical religions was a two-way process of Sanskritization of local cults and localization of Brahmanical social order. Second was the ascendancy

of the Brahman priestly and landowning groups that later dominated regional institutions and political developments. Third,

because of the seesawing of numerous dynasties that had a remarkable ability to survive perennial military attacks,

regional kingdoms faced frequent defeats but seldom total

annihilation.

Peninsular India was involved in an eighth-century tripartite

power struggle among the Chalukyas (556-757) of Vatapi, the

Pallavas (300-888) of Kanchipuram, and the Pandyas (seventh

through the tenth centuries) of Madurai. The Chalukya rulers were overthrown by their subordinates, the Rashtrakutas, who

ruled from 753 to 973. Although both the Pallava and Pandya

kingdoms were enemies, the real struggle for political domination was between the Pallava and Chalukya realms.

Despite interregional conflicts, local autonomy was preserved to a far greater degree in the south where it had prevailed for centuries. The absence of a highly centralized

government was associated with a corresponding local autonomy in the administration of villages and districts. Extensive

and well-documented overland and maritime trade flourished

with the Arabs on the west coast and with Southeast Asia. Trade

facilitated cultural diffusion in Southeast Asia, where local

14
Historical Setting

elites selectively but willingly adopted Indian art, architecture,

literature, and social customs.

The interdynastic rivalry and seasonal raids into each other's

territory notwithstanding, the rulers in the Deccan and South

India patronized all three religions—Buddhism, Hinduism,

andJainism. The religions vied with each other for royal favor,

expressed in land grants but more importantly in the creation

of monumental temples, which remain architectural wonders.

The cave temples of Elephanta Island (near Bombay, or Mumbai in Marathi) , Ajanta, and Ellora (in Maharashtra), and struc- tural temples of Kanchipuram (in Tamil Nadu) are enduring

legacies of otherwise warring regional rulers. By the mid-seventh century, Buddhism andJainism began to decline as sectar- ian Hindu devotional cults of Shiva and Vishnu vigorously

competed for popular support.

Although Sanskrit was the language of learning and theology in South India, as it was in the north, the growth of the

bhakti (devotional) movements enhanced the crystallization of

vernacular literature in all four major Dravidian languages:

Tamil, Telugu, Malayalam, and Kannada; they often borrowed

themes and vocabulary from Sanskrit but preserved much local

cultural lore. Examples of Tamil literature include two major

poems, Cilappatikaram (The Jewelled Anklet) and Manimekalai

(The Jewelled Belt); the body of devotional literature of

Shaivism and Vaishnavism—Hindu devotional movements; and

the reworking of the Ramayana by Kamban in the twelfth century. A nationwide cultural synthesis had taken place with a minimum of common characteristics in the various regions of

South Asia, but the process of cultural infusion and assimilation would continue to shape and influence India's history

through the centuries.

The Delhi Sultanate

The Coming of Islam

Islam was propagated by the Prophet Muhammad during

the early seventh century in the deserts of Arabia. Less than a century after its inception, Islam's presence was felt throughout the Middle East, North Africa, Spain, Iran, and Central

Asia. Arab military forces conquered the Indus Delta region in

Sindh in 711 and established an Indo-Muslim state there.

Sindh became an Islamic outpost where Arabs established

trade links with the Middle East and were later joined by teach15
India: A Country Study

ers or sufis (see Glossary), but Arab influence was hardly felt in

the rest of South Asia (see Islam, ch. 3) . By the end of the tenth

century, dramatic changes took place when the Central Asian

Turkic tribes accepted both the message and mission of Islam.

These warlike people first began to move into Afghanistan and

Iran and later into India through the northwest. Mahmud of

Ghazni (971-1030), who was also known as the "Sword of

Islam," mounted seventeen plundering expeditions between

997 and 1027 into North India, annexing Punjab as his eastern

province. The invaders' effective use of the crossbow while at a

gallop gave them a decisive advantage over their Indian opponents, the Rajputs. Mahmud's conquest of Punjab foretold omi- nous consequences for the rest of India, but the Rajputs appear

to have been both unprepared and unwilling to change their

military tactics, which ultimately collapsed in the face of the

swift and punitive cavalry of the Afghans and Turkic peoples.

In the thirteenth century, Shams-ud-Din Iletmish (or Iltut- mish; r. 1211-36), a former slave-warrior, established a Turkic

kingdom in Delhi, which enabled future sultans to push in

every direction; within the next 100 years, the Delhi Sultanate

extended its sway east to Bengal and south to the Deccan, while

the sultanate itself experienced repeated threats from the

northwest and internal revolts from displeased, independentminded nobles. The sultanate was in constant flux as five dynasties rose and fell: Mamluk or Slave (1206-90), Khalji (1290-

1320), Tughluq (1320-1413), Sayyid (1414-51), and Lodi

(1451-1526). The Khalji Dynasty under Ala-ud-Din (r. 1296-

1315) succeeded in bringing most of South India under its control for a time, although conquered areas broke away quickly.

Power in Delhi was often gained by violence—nineteen of the

thirty-five sultans were assassinated—and was legitimized by

reward for tribal loyalty. Factional rivalries and court intrigues were as numerous as they were treacherous; territories controlled by the sultan expanded and shrank depending on his

personality and fortunes.

Both the Quran and sharia (Islamic law) provided the basis

for enforcing Islamic administration over the independent

Hindu rulers, but the sultanate made only fitful progress in the

beginning, when many campaigns were undertaken for plunder and temporary reduction of fortresses. The effective rule

of a sultan depended largely on his ability to control the strate- gic places that dominated the military highways and trade

routes, extract the annual land tax, and maintain personal

16
Wrought-iron pillar erected in

honor of Vishnu by Gupta

monarch Chandragupta II (ca. A.D. 376-415), located near

the Qutb Minar, New Delhi

Courtesy Robert L. Worden

authority over military and provincial governors. Sultan Ala-udDin made an attempt to reassess, systematize, and unify land

revenues and urban taxes and to institute a highly centralized

system of administration over his realm, but his efforts were

abortive. Although agriculture in North India improved as a result of new canal construction and irrigation methods,

including what came to be known as the Persian wheel, prolonged political instability and parasitic methods of tax collection brutalized the peasantry. Yet trade and a market economy,

encouraged by the free-spending habits of the aristocracy,

acquired new impetus both inland and overseas. Experts in

metalwork, stonework, and textile manufacture responded to the new patronage with enthusiasm.

Southern Dynasties

The sultans' failure to hold securely the Deccan and South

India resulted in the rise of competing southern dynasties: the

Muslim Bahmani Sultanate (1347-1527) and the Hindu Vijayanagar Empire (1336-1565). Zafar Khan, a former provincial

governor under the Tughluqs, revolted against his Turkic over- lord and proclaimed himself sultan, taking the title Ala-ud-Din

Bahman Shah in 1347. The Bahmani Sultanate, located in the

northern Deccan, lasted for almost two centuries, until it frag17
India: A Country Study

merited into five smaller states in 1527. The Bahmani Sultanate

adopted the patterns established by the Delhi overlords in tax

collection and administration, but its downfall was caused in

large measure by the competition and hatred between deccani

(domiciled Muslim immigrants and local converts) and

paradesi (foreigners or officials in temporary service). The Bahmani Sultanate initiated a process of cultural synthesis visible in

Hyderabad, where cultural flowering is still expressed in vigor- ous schools of deccani architecture and painting.

Founded in 1336, the empire of Vijayanagar (named for its capital Vijayanagar, "City of Victory," in present-day Karnataka)

expanded rapidly toward Madurai in the south and Goa in the

west and exerted intermittent control over the east coast and

the extreme southwest. Vijayanagar rulers closely followed

Chola precedents, especially in collecting agricultural and

trade revenues, in giving encouragement to commercial guilds,

and in honoring temples with lavish endowments. Added reve- nue needed for waging war against the Bahmani sultans was

raised by introducing a set of taxes on commercial enterprises,

professions, and industries. Political rivalry between the Bahmani and the Vijayanagar rulers involved control over the

Krishna-Tunghabadhra river basin, which shifted hands

depending on whose military was superior at any given time.

The Vijayanagar rulers' capacity for gaining victory over their

enemies was contingent on ensuring a constant supply of

horses—initially through Arab traders but later through the

Portuguese—and maintaining internal roads and communication networks. Merchant guilds enjoyed a wide sphere of operation and were able to offset the power of landlords and

Brahmans in court politics. Commerce and shipping eventually

passed largely into the hands of foreigners, and special facili- ties and tax concessions were provided for them by the ruler.

Arabs and Portuguese competed for influence and control of

west coast ports, and, in 1510, Goa passed into Portuguese possession.

The city of Vijayanagar itself contained numerous temples

with rich ornamentation, especially the gateways, and a cluster

of shrines for the deities. Most prominent among the temples was the one dedicated to Virupaksha, a manifestation of Shiva,

the patron-deity of the Vijayanagar rulers. Temples continued

to be the nuclei of diverse cultural and intellectual activities,

but these activities were based more on tradition than on con- temporary political realities. (However, the first Vijayanagar

18
Cow consuming left-over offerings in 1, OOO-pillared hall, an example

of the Vijayanagar style of architecture, Madurai, Tamil Nadu

Courtesy World Transportation Commission Collection,

Library of Congress

ruler—Harihara I—was a Hindu who converted to Islam and

then reconverted to Hinduism for political expediency.) The

temples sponsored no intellectual exchange with Islamic theologians because Muslims were generally assigned to an

"impure" status and were thus excluded from entering temples.

When the five rulers of what was once the Bahmani Sultanate

combined their forces and attacked Vijayanagar in 1565, the

empire crumbled at the Battle of Talikot.

The Mughal Era

The Mughals

In the early sixteenth century, descendants of the Mongol,

19
India: A Country Study

Turkish, Iranian, and Afghan invaders of South Asia—the

Mughals—invaded India under the leadership of Zahir-ud-Din

Babur. Babur was the great-grandson of Timur Lenk (Timur

the Lame, from which the Western name Tamerlane is derived), who had invaded India and plundered Delhi in 1398

and then led a short-lived empire based in Samarkand (in modern-day Uzbekistan) that united Persian-based Mongols

(Babur's maternal ancestors) and other West Asian peoples.

Babur was driven from Samarkand and initially established his

rule in Kabul in 1504; he later became the first Mughal ruler

(1526-30). His determination was to expand eastward into

Punjab, where he had made a number of forays. Then an invi- tation from an opportunistic Afghan chief in Punjab brought

him to the very heart of the Delhi Sultanate, ruled by Ibrahim

Lodi (1517-26). Babur, a seasoned military commander,

entered India in 1526 with his well-trained veteran army of

12,000 to meet the sultan's huge but unwieldy and disunited

force of more than 100,000 men. Babur defeated the Lodi sul- tan decisively at Panipat (in modern-day Haryana, about ninety

kilometers north of Delhi). Employing gun carts, moveable

artillery, and superior cavalry tactics, Babur achieved a resounding victory. A year later, he decisively defeated a Rajput

confederacy led by Rana Sangha. In 1529 Babur routed the

joint forces of Afghans and the sultan of Bengal but died in

1530 before he could consolidate his military gains. He left behind as legacies his memoirs {Babur Namah) , several beautiful gardens in Kabul, Lahore, and Agra, and descendants who

would fulfill his dream of establishing an empire in Hindustan.

When Babur died, his son Humayun (1530-56), also a soldier, inherited a difficult task. He was pressed from all sides by

a reassertion of Afghan claims to the Delhi throne, by disputes over his own succession, and by the Afghan-Rajput march into

Delhi in 1540. He fled to Persia, where he spent nearly ten

years as an embarrassed guest at the Safavid court. In 1545 he

gained a foothold in Kabul, reasserted his Indian claim,

defeated Sher Khan Sur, the most powerful Afghan ruler, and

took control of Delhi in 1555.

Humayun's untimely death in 1556 left the task of further

imperial conquest and consolidation to his thirteen-year-old son, Jalal-ud-Din Akbar (r. 1556-1605). Following a decisive

military victory at the Second Battle of Panipat in 1556, the

regent Bayram Khan pursued a vigorous policy of expansion

on Akbar's behalf. As soon as Akbar came of age, he began to

20
Historical Setting

free himself from the influences of overbearing ministers,

court factions, and harem intrigues, and demonstrated his own

capacity for judgment and leadership. A "workaholic" who sel- dom slept more than three hours a night, he personally over- saw the implementation of his administrative policies, which

were to form the backbone of the Mughal Empire for more

than 200 years. He continued to conquer, annex, and consolidate a far-flung territory bounded by Kabul in the northwest,

Kashmir in the north, Bengal in the east, and beyond the Narmada River in the south—an area comparable in size to the

Mauryan territory some 1,800 years earlier (see fig. 3).

Akbar built a walled capital called Fatehpur Sikri (Fatehpur

means Fortress of Victory) near Agra, starting in 1571. Palaces

for each of Akbar's senior queens, a huge artificial lake, and

sumptuous water-filled courtyards were built there. The city,

however, proved short-lived, perhaps because the water supply was insufficient or of poor quality, or, as some historians

believe, Akbar had to attend to the northwest areas of his

empire and simply moved his capital for political reasons. Whatever the reason, in 1585 the capital was relocated to Lahore and in 1599 to Agra.

Akbar adopted two distinct but effective approaches in

administering a large territory and incorporating various ethnic groups into the service of his realm. In 1580 he obtained

local revenue statistics for the previous decade in order to understand details of productivity and price fluctuation of dif- ferent crops. Aided by Todar Mai, a Rajput king, Akbar issued a revenue schedule that the peasantry could tolerate while providing maximum profit for the state. Revenue demands, fixed

according to local conventions of cultivation and quality of soil,

ranged from one-third to one-half of the crop and were paid in

cash. Akbar relied heavily on land-holding zamindars (see Glossary) . They used their considerable local knowledge and influ- ence to collect revenue and to transfer it to the treasury,

keeping a portion in return for services rendered. Within his

administrative system, the warrior aristocracy (mansabdars)

held ranks (mansabs) expressed in numbers of troops, and indicating pay, armed contingents, and obligations. The warrior

aristocracy was generally paid from revenues of nonhereditary

and transferrable jagirs (revenue villages).

An astute ruler who genuinely appreciated the challenges of

administering so vast an empire, Akbar introduced a policy of

reconciliation and assimilation of Hindus (including Maryam

21
Approximate limit of Mughal Empire

Source: Based on information fromJoseph E. Schwartzberg, ed., A Historical Atlas of South Asia, New York, 1992, 46. Figure 3. Mughal Empire, Late Seventeenth Century

al-Zamani, the Hindu Rajput mother of his son and heir, Jahangir), who represented the majority of the population. He

recruited and rewarded Hindu chiefs with the highest ranks in

government; encouraged intermarriages between Mughal and

Rajput aristocracy; allowed new temples to be built; personally

22
Historical Setting

participated in celebrating Hindu festivals such as Dipavali, or

Diwali, the festival of lights; and abolished the jizya (poll tax)

imposed on non-Muslims. Akbar came up with his own theory

of "rulership as a divine illumination," enshrined in his new

religion Din-i-Ilahi (Divine Faith), incorporating the principle

of acceptance of all religions and sects. He encouraged widow

marriage, discouraged child marriage, outlawed the practice of

sati, and persuaded Delhi merchants to set up special market

days for women, who otherwise were secluded at home (see

Veiling and the Seclusion of Women, ch. 5). By the end of

Akbar's reign, the Mughal Empire extended throughout most

of India north of the Godavari River. The exceptions were Gondwana in central India, which paid tribute to the Mughals,

and Assam, in the northeast.

Mughal rule under Jahangir (1605-27) and Shah Jahan

(1628-58) was noted for political stability, brisk economic activity, beautiful paintings, and monumental buildings. Jahangir

married the Persian princess whom he renamed Nur Jahan

(Light of the World), who emerged as the most powerful individual in the court besides the emperor. As a result, Persian

poets, artists, scholars, and officers—including her own family

members—lured by the Mughal court's brilliance and luxury,

found asylum in India. The number of unproductive, timeserving officers mushroomed, as did corruption, while the

excessive Persian representation upset the delicate balance of

impartiality at the court. Jahangir liked Hindu festivals but promoted mass conversion to Islam; he persecuted the followers of

Jainism and even executed Guru (see Glossary) Arjun Das, the

fifth saint-teacher of the Sikhs (see Sikhism, ch. 3). Nurjahan's

abortive schemes to secure the throne for the prince of her

choice led Shah Jahan to rebel in 1622. In that same year, the

Persians took over Kandahar in southern Afghanistan, an event

that struck a serious blow to Mughal prestige.

Between 1636 and 1646, Shah Jahan sent Mughal armies to conquer the Deccan and the northwest beyond the Khyber

Pass. Even though they demonstrated Mughal military

strength, these campaigns consumed the imperial treasury. As

the state became a huge military machine, whose nobles and

their contingents multiplied almost fourfold, so did its demands for more revenue from the peasantry. Political unification and maintenance of law and order over wide areas encouraged the emergence of large centers of commerce and

crafts—such as Lahore, Delhi, Agra, and Ahmadabad—linked

23
India: A Country Study

by roads and waterways to distant places and ports. The worldfamous Taj Mahal was built in Agra during Shah Jahan's reign

as a tomb for his beloved wife, Mumtaz Mahal. It symbolizes

both Mughal artistic achievement and excessive financial

expenditures when resources were shrinking. The economic

position of peasants and artisans did not improve because the

administration failed to produce any lasting change in the

existing social structure. There was no incentive for the reve- nue officials, whose concerns primarily were personal or familial gain, to generate resources independent of dominant

Hindu zamindars and village leaders, whose self-interest and

local dominance prevented them from handing over the full amount of revenue to the imperial treasury. In their ever- greater dependence on land revenue, the Mughals unwittingly

nurtured forces that eventually led to the break-up of their

empire.

The last of the great Mughals was Aurangzeb (r. 1658-1707),

who seized the throne by killing all his brothers and imprisoning his own father. During his fifty-year reign, the empire

reached its utmost physical limit but also witnessed the unmistakable symptoms of decline. The bureaucracy had grown

bloated and excessively corrupt, and the huge and unwieldy

army demonstrated outdated weaponry and tactics. Aurangzeb

was not the ruler to restore the dynasty's declining fortunes or

glory. Awe-inspiring but lacking in the charisma needed to attract outstanding lieutenants, he was driven to extend

Mughal rule over most of South Asia and to reestablish Islamic

orthodoxy by adopting a reactionary attitude toward those

Muslims whom he had suspected of compromising their faith.

Aurangzeb was involved in a series of protracted wars

against the Pathans in Afghanistan, the sultans of Bijapur and

Golkonda in the Deccan, and the Marathas in Maharashtra.

Peasant uprisings and revolts by local leaders became all too

common, as did the conniving of the nobles to preserve their

own status at the expense of a steadily weakening empire. The

increasing association of his government with Islam further

drove a wedge between the ruler and his Hindu subjects.

Aurangzeb forbade the building of new temples, destroyed a number of them, and reimposed the jizya. A puritan and a censor of morals, he banned music at court, abolished ceremonies,

and persecuted the Sikhs in Punjab. These measures alienated

so many that even before he died challenges for power had

already begun to escalate. Contenders for the Mughal throne

24
Akbar, the third Mughal emperor, who reignedfrom

1556 to 1605

Courtesy Robert L. Worden

fought each other, and the short-lived reigns of Aurangzeb's

successors were strife-filled. The Mughal Empire experienced

dramatic reverses as regional governors broke away and

founded independent kingdoms. The Mughals had to make

peace with Maratha rebels, and Persian and Afghan armies

invaded Delhi, carrying away many treasures, including the

Peacock Throne in 1739.

25
India: A Country Study

The Marathas

The tale of the Marathas' rise to power and their eventual

fall contains all the elements of a thriller: adventure, intrigue,

and romanticism. Maratha chieftains were originally in the ser- vice of Bijapur sultans in the western Deccan, which was under

siege by the Mughals. Shivaji Bhonsle (1627-80), a tenacious

and fierce fighter recognized as the "father of the Maratha

nation," took advantage of this conflict and carved out his own

principality near Pune, which later became the Maratha capital. Adopting guerrilla tactics, he waylaid caravans in order to sustain and expand his army, which soon had money, arms, and

horses. Shivaji led a series of successful assaults in the 1660s

against Mughal strongholds, including the major port of Surat.

In 1674 he assumed the title of "Lord of the Universe" at his

elaborate coronation, which signaled his determination to challenge the Mughal forces as well as to reestablish a Hindu

kingdom in Maharashtra, the land of his origin. Shivaji's battle

cries were swaraj (translated variously as freedom, self-rule,

independence), swadharma (religious freedom), and goraksha

(cow protection). Aurangzeb relentlessly pursued Shivaji's suc- cessors between 1681 and 1705 but eventually retreated to the

north as his treasury became depleted and as thousands of lives had been lost either on the battlefield or to natural calamines.

In 1717 a Mughal emissary signed a treaty with the Marathas

confirming their claims to rule in the Deccan in return for

acknowledging the fictional Mughal suzerainty and remission

of annual taxes. Yet the Marathas soon captured Malwa from

Mughal control and later moved east into Orrisa and Bengal;

southern India also came under their domain. Recognition of

their political power finally came when the Mughal emperor

invited them to act as auxiliaries in the internal affairs of the

empire and still later to help the emperor in driving the

Afghans out of Punjab.

The Marathas, despite their military prowess and leadership,

were not equipped to administer the state or to undertake

socioeconomic reform. Pursuing a policy characterized by

plunder and indiscriminate raids, they antagonized the peasants. They were primarily suited for stirring the Maharashtrian

regional pride rather than for attracting loyalty to an all-India

confederacy. They were left virtually alone before the invading

Afghan forces, headed by Ahmad Shah Abdali (later called

Ahmad Shah Durrani), who routed them on the blooddrenched battlefield at Panipat in 1761. The shock of defeat

26
Historical Setting

hastened the break-up of their loosely knit confederacy into

five independent states and extinguished the hope of Maratha

dominance in India.

The Sikhs

The Afghan defeat of the Maratha armies accelerated the

breakaway of Punjab from Delhi and helped the founding of

Sikh overlordship in the northwest. Rooted in the bhakti move- ments that developed in the second century B.C. but swept

across North India during the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries, the Sikh religion appealed to the hard-working peasants.

The Sikh khalsa (army of the pure) rose up against the eco- nomic and political repressions in Punjab toward the end of

Aurangzeb's rule. Guerrilla fighters took advantage of the

political instability created by the Persian and Afghan

onslaught against Delhi, enriching themselves and expanding

territorial control. By the 1770s, Sikh hegemony extended

from the Indus in the west to the Yamuna in the east, from Multan in the south to Jammu in the north. But the Sikhs, like the

Marathas, were a loose, disunited, and quarrelsome conglomerate of twelve kin-groups. It took Ranjit Singh (1780-1839), an individual with modernizing vision and leadership, to achieve supremacy over the other kin-groups and establish his

kingdom in which Sikhs, Hindus, and Muslims lived together

in comparative equality and increasing prosperity. Ranjit Singh

employed European officers and introduced strict military dis- cipline into his army before expanding into Afghanistan, Kashmir, and Ladakh.

The Coming of the Europeans

The quest for wealth and power brought Europeans to

Indian shores in 1498 when Vasco da Gama, the Portuguese

voyager, arrived in Calicut (modern Kozhikode, Kerala) on the

west coast. In their search for spices and Christian converts, the

Portuguese challenged Arab supremacy in the Indian Ocean,

and, with their galleons fitted with powerful cannons, set up a network of strategic trading posts along the Arabian Sea and

the Persian Gulf. In 1510 the Portuguese took over the enclave

of Goa, which became the center of their commercial and

political power in India and which they controlled for nearly

four and a half centuries.

Economic competition among the European nations led to the founding of commercial companies in England (the East

27
India: A Country Study

India Company, founded in 1600) and in the Netherlands

(Verenigde Oost-Indische Compagnie—the United East India

Company, founded in 1602), whose primary aim was to capture

the spice trade by breaking the Portuguese monopoly in Asia.

Although the Dutch, with a large supply of capital and support

from their government, preempted and ultimately excluded

the British from the heartland of spices in the East Indies

(modern-day Indonesia), both companies managed to establish trading "factories" (actually warehouses) along the Indian

coast. The Dutch, for example, used various ports on the Coromandel Coast in South India, especially Pulicat (about twenty

kilometers north of Madras), as major sources for slaves for

their plantations in the East Indies and for cotton cloth as early

as 1609. (The English, however, established their first factory at what today is known as Madras only in 1639.) Indian rulers

enthusiastically accommodated the newcomers in hopes of pitting them against the Portuguese. In 1619 Jahangir granted

them permission to trade in his territories at Surat (in Gujarat)

on the west coast and Hughli (in West Bengal) in the east. These and other locations on the peninsula became centers of

international trade in spices, cotton, sugar, raw silk, saltpeter,

calico, and indigo.

English company agents became familiar with Indian cus- toms and languages, including Persian, the unifying official

language under the Mughals. In many ways, the English agents

of that period lived like Indians, intermarried willingly, and a

large number of them never returned to their home country.

The knowledge of India thus acquired and the mutual ties

forged with Indian trading groups gave the English a competitive edge over other Europeans. The French commercial inter- est—Compagnie des Indes Orientales (East India Company,

founded in 1664) —came late, but the French also established

themselves in India, emulating the precedents set by their competitors as they founded their enclave at Pondicherry (Puduchcheri) on the Coramandel Coast.

In 1 71 7 the Mughal emperor, Farrukh-siyar (r. 1713-19),

gave the British—who by then had already established themselves in the south and the west—a grant of thirty-eight villages near Calcutta, acknowledging their importance to the continuity of international trade in the Bengal economy. As did the

Dutch and the French, the British brought silver bullion and

copper to pay for transactions, helping the smooth functioning

of the Mughal revenue system and increasing the benefits to

28
Historical Setting

local artisans and traders. The fortified warehouses of the British brought extraterritorial status, which enabled them to administer their own civil and criminal laws and offered

numerous employment opportunities as well as asylum to foreigners and Indians. The British factories successfully competed with their rivals as their size and population grew. The

original clusters of fishing villages (Madras and Calcutta) or

series of islands (Bombay) became headquarters of the British

administrative zones, or presidencies as they generally came to be known. The factories and their immediate environs, known

as the White-town, represented the actual and symbolic preeminence of the British—in terms of their political power—as well

as their cultural values and social practices; meanwhile, their

Indian collaborators lived in the Black-town, separated from

the factories by several kilometers.

The British company employed sepoys—European-trained

and European-led Indian soldiers—to protect its trade, but

local rulers sought their services to settle scores in regional

power struggles. South India witnessed the first open confrontation between the British and the French, whose forces were

led by Robert Clive and Francois Dupleix, respectively. Both

companies desired to place their own candidate as the nawab,

or ruler, of Arcot, the area around Madras. At the end of a protracted struggle between 1744 and 1763, when the Peace of

Paris was signed, the British gained an upper hand over the

French and installed their man in power, supporting him further with arms and lending large sums as well. The French and

the British also backed different factions in the succession

struggle for Mughal viceroyalty in Bengal, but Clive intervened

successfully and defeated Nawab Siraj-ud-daula in the Battle of

Plassey (Palashi, about 150 kilometers north of Calcutta) in

1757. Clive found help from a combination of vested interests

that opposed the existing nawab: disgruntled soldiers, landholders, and influential merchants whose commercial profits were closely linked to British fortunes.

Later, Clive defeated the Mughal forces at Buxar (Baksar,

west of Patna in Bihar) in 1765, and the Mughal emperor

(Shah Alam, r. 1759-1806) conferred on the company administrative rights over Bengal, Bihar, and Orissa, a region of

roughly 25 million people with an annual revenue of 40 million

rupees (for current value of the rupee—see Glossary). The

imperial grant virtually established the company as a sovereign

power, and Clive became the first British governor of Bengal.

29
India: A Country Study

Besides the presence of the Portuguese, Dutch, British, and

French, there were two lesser but noteworthy colonial groups.

Danish entrepreneurs established themselves at several ports

on the Malabar and Coromandel coasts, in the vicinity of Calcutta and inland at Patna between 1695 and 1740. Austrian

enterprises were set up in the 1720s on the vicinity of Surat in

modern-day southeastern Gujarat. As with the other non-British enterprises, the Danish and Austrian enclaves were taken

over by the British between 1765 and 1815.

The British Empire in India

Company Rule, 1 757-1857

A multiplicity of motives underlay the British penetration

into India: commerce, security, and a purported moral uplift of

the people. The "expansive force" of private and company

trade eventually led to the conquest or annexation of territories in which spices, cotton, and opium were produced. British

investors ventured into the unfamiliar interior landscape in

search of opportunities that promised substantial profits. British economic penetration was aided by Indian collaborators,

such as the bankers and merchants who controlled intricate

credit networks. British rule in India would have been a frustrated or half-realized dream had not Indian counterparts provided connections between rural and urban centers. External

threats, both real and imagined, such as the Napoleonic Wars

(1796-1815) and Russian expansion toward Afghanistan (in

the 1830s), as well as the desire for internal stability, led to the

annexation of more territory in India. Political analysts in Britain wavered initially as they were uncertain of the costs or the

advantages in undertaking wars in India, but by the 1810s, as the territorial aggrandizement eventually paid off, opinion in

London welcomed the absorption of new areas. Occasionally

the British Parliament witnessed heated debates against expansion, but arguments justifying military operations for security reasons always won over even the most vehement critics. The British soon forgot their own rivalry with the Portuguese and the French and permitted them to stay in their

coastal enclaves, which they kept even after independence in

1947 (see National Integration, this ch.). The British, however,

continued to expand vigorously well into the 1850s. A number

of aggressive governors-general undertook relentless campaigns against several Hindu and Muslim rulers. Among them

30
Taj Mahal, a monumental white marble garden tomb built at Agrafor

Mumtaz Mahal, the beloved wife ofMughal emperor ShahJahan

Courtesy Robert L. Worden

were Richard Colley Wellesley (1798-1805), William Pitt

Amherst (1823-28), George Eden (1836-42), Edward Law

(1842-44), and James Andrew Brown Ramsay (1848-56; also

known as the Marquess of Dalhousie) . Despite desperate

efforts at salvaging their tottering power and keeping the British at bay, many Hindu and Muslim rulers lost their territories:

Mysore (1799, but later restored), the Maratha Confederacy

(1818), and Punjab (1849). The British success in large measure was the result not only of their superiority in tactics and

weapons but also of their ingenious relations with Indian rulers

through the "subsidiary alliance" system, introduced in the

early nineteenth century. Many rulers bartered away their real

responsibilities by agreeing to uphold British paramountcy in

India, while they retained a fictional sovereignty under the

rubric of Pax Britannica. Later, Dalhousie espoused the "doc31
India: A Country Study

trine of lapse" and annexed outright the estates of deceased

princes of Satara (1848), Udaipur (1852), Jhansi (1853), Tanjore (1853), Nagpur (1854), and Oudh (1856).

European perceptions of India, and those of the British

especially, shifted from unequivocal appreciation to sweeping

condemnation of India's past achievements and customs.

Imbued with an ethnocentric sense of superiority, British intellectuals, including Christian missionaries, spearheaded a move- ment that sought to bring Western intellectual and

technological innovations to Indians. Interpretations of the

causes of India's cultural and spiritual "backwardness" varied,

as did the solutions. Many argued that it was Europe's mission

to civilize India and hold it as a trust until Indians proved

themselves competent for self-rule. The immediate consequence of this sense of superiority was

to open India to more aggressive missionary activity. The contributions of three missionaries based in Serampore (a Danish

enclave in Bengal) —William Carey, Joshua Marshman, and

William Ward—remained unequaled and have provided inspiration for future generations of their successors. The missionaries translated the Bible into the vernaculars, taught company

officials local languages, and, after 1813, gained permission to proselytize in the company's territories. Although the actual

number of converts remained negligible, except in rare

instances when entire groups embraced Christianity, such as the Nayars in the south or the Nagas in the northeast, the missionary impact on India through publishing, schools, orphanages, vocational institutions, dispensaries, and hospitals was

unmistakable.

The British Parliament enacted a series of laws, among

which the Regulating Act of 1773 stood first, to curb the company traders' unrestrained commercial activities and to bring

about some order in territories under company control. Limiting the company charter to periods of twenty years, subject to review upon renewal, the 1773 act gave the British government

supervisory rights over the Bengal, Bombay, and Madras presidencies. Bengal was given preeminence over the rest because

of its enormous commercial vitality and because it was the seat of British power in India (at Calcutta), whose governor was ele- vated to the new position of governor-general. Warren Hastings was the first incumbent (1773-85). The India Act of 1784,

sometimes described as the "half-loaf system," as it sought to mediate between Parliament and the company directors,

32
Historical Setting

enhanced Parliament's control by establishing the Board of

Control, whose members were selected from the cabinet. The

Charter Act of 1813 recognized British moral responsibility by

introducing just and humane laws in India, foreshadowing

future social legislation, and outlawing a number of traditional

practices such as sati and thagi (or thugee, robbery coupled

with ritual murder).

As governor-general from 1786 to 1793, Charles Cornwallis

(the Marquis of Cornwallis), professionalized, bureaucratized,

and Europeanized the company's administration. He also out- lawed private trade by company employees, separated the commercial and administrative functions, and remunerated

company servants with generous graduated salaries. Because

revenue collection became the company's most essential

administrative function, Cornwallis made a compact with Bengali zamindars, who were perceived as the Indian counterparts

to the British landed gentry. The Permanent Settlement sys- tem, also known as the zamindari system, fixed taxes in perpetuity in return for ownership of large estates; but the state was excluded from agricultural expansion, which came under the

purview of the zamindars. In Madras and Bombay, however, the

ryotwari (peasant) settlement system was set in motion, in

which peasant cultivators had to pay annual taxes directly to the government.

Neither the zamindari nor the ryotwari systems proved effective in the long run because India was integrated into an international economic and pricing system over which it had no

control, while increasing numbers of people subsisted on agriculture for lack of other employment. Millions of people

involved in the heavily taxed Indian textile industry also lost

their markets, as they were unable to compete successfully with

cheaper textiles produced in Lancashire's mills from Indian raw materials.

Beginning with the Mayor's Court, established in 1727 for

civil litigation in Bombay, Calcutta, and Madras, justice in the

interior came under the company's jurisdiction. In 1772 an

elaborate judicial system, known as adalat, established civil and

criminal jurisdictions along with a corrfplex set of codes or

rules of procedure and evidence. Both Hindu pandits (see

Glossary) and Muslim qazis (sharia court judges) were

recruited to aid the presiding judges in interpreting their cus- tomary laws, but in other instances, British common and statu- tory laws became applicable. In extraordinary situations where

33
India: A Country Study

none of these systems was applicable., the judges were enjoined

to adjudicate on the basis of 'justice., equity, and good conscience." The legal profession provided numerous opportunities for educated and talented Indians who were unable to secure positions in the company, and., as a result.. Indian lawyers later dominated nationalist politics and reform movements.

Education for the most part was left to the charge of Indians

or to private agents who imparted instruction in the vernaculars. But in 1813.. the British became convinced of their "duty"

to awaken the Indians from intellectual slumber bv exposing

them to British literary traditions., earmarking a paltry sum for

the cause. Controversy between two groups of Europeans—the

"Orientalists" and "Anglicists" —over how the monev was to be

spent prevented them from formulating anv consistent policv

until 1S35 when William Cavendish Bentinck. the governorgeneral from 1S2S to 1S35. finally broke the impasse bv resolving to introduce the English language as the medium of

instruction. English replaced Persian in public administration

and education.

The company's education policies in the 1830s tended to reinforce existing lines of socioeconomic division in society

rather than bringing general liberation from ignorance and

superstition. Whereas the Hindu English-educated minority

spearheaded manv social and religious reforms either in direct

response to government policies or in reaction to them. Muslims as a group initially failed to do so, a position they endeavored to reverse. Western-educated Hindu elites sought to rid

Hinduism of its much criticized social evils: idolatry the caste svstem. child marriage, and sati. Religious and social activist

Ram Mohan Rov (1772-1833). who founded the Brahmo

Samaj (Society of Brahma) in 1828, displayed a readiness to synthesize themes taken from Christianity*. Deism, and Indian

monism, while other individuals in Bombay and Madras initi- ated literary and debatine; societies that grave them a forum for

open discourse. The exemplary educational attainments and

skillful use of the press bv these early reformers enhanced the

possibility of effecting broad reforms without compromising

societal values or religious practices.

The 1850s witnessed the introduction of the three "engines

of social improvement" that heightened the British illusion of

permanence in India. Thev were the railroads, the telegraph,

and the uniform postal service, inaugurated during the tenure

34
Historical Setting

of Dalhousie as governor-general. The first railroad lines were

built in 1850 from Howrah (Haora, across the Hughli River

from Calcutta) inland to the coalfields at Raniganj, Bihar, a dis- tance of 240 kilometers. In 1851 the first electric telegraph line was laid in Bengal and soon linked Agra, Bombay, Calcutta,

Lahore, Varanasi, and other cities. The three different presidency or regional postal systems merged in 1854 to facilitate

uniform methods of communication at an all-India level. With

uniform postal rates for letters and newspapers—one-half anna and one anna, respectively (sixteen annas equalled one

rupee) —communication between the rural and the metropolitan areas became easier and faster. The increased ease of com- munication and the opening of highways and waterways

accelerated the movement of troops, the transportation of raw

materials and goods to and from the interior, and the

exchange of commercial information.

The railroads did not break down the social or cultural dis- tances between various groups but tended to create new cate- gories in travel. Separate compartments in the trains were

reserved exclusively for the ruling class, separating the educated and wealthy from ordinary people. Similarly, when the

Sepoy Rebellion was quelled in 1858, a British official

exclaimed that "the telegraph saved India." He envisaged, of

course, that British interests in India would continue indefinitely.

The British Raj, 1 858-1 947

Sepoy Rebellion, 1857-59

On May 10, 1857, Indian soldiers of the British Indian Army,

drawn mostly from Muslim units from Bengal, mutinied in

Meerut, a cantonment eighty kilometers northeast of Delhi.

The rebels marched to Delhi to offer their services to the

Mughal emperor, and soon much of north and central India was plunged into a year-long insurrection against the British.

The uprising, which seriously threatened British rule in

India, has been called many names by historians, including the

Sepoy Rebellion, the Great Mutiny, and the Revolt of 1857;

many people in South Asia, however, prefer to call it India's

first war of independence. Undoubtedly, it was the culmination

of mounting Indian resentment toward British economic and

social policies over many decades. Until the rebellion, the British had succeeded in suppressing numerous riots and "tribal"

35
In dia: A Co u n try Stu dy

wars or in accommodating them through concessions, but two

events triggered the violent explosion of wrath in 1857. First, was the annexation in 1856 of Oudh, a wealthv princelv state that generated huge revenue and represented a vestige of

Mughal authority. The second was the British blunder in using

cartridges for the Lee-Enfield rifle that were allegedly greased

with animal fat. which was offensive to the religious beliefs of

Muslim and Hindu sepoys. The rebellion soon engulfed much

of North India, including Oudh and various areas once under

the control of Maratha princes. Isolated mutinies also occurred

at military posts in the center of the subcontinent. Initially, the

rebels, although divided and uncoordinated, gained the upper

hand, while the unprepared British were terrified, and even

paralvzed, without replacements for the casualties. The civil war inflicted havoc on both Indians and British as each vented

its fury on the other: each community suffered humiliation

and triumph in battle as well, although the final outcome was

victory for the British. The last major sepoy rebels surrendered

on June 21. 1858, at Gwalior (Madhva Pradesh) , one of the

principal centers of the revolt. A final battle was fought at Sirwa

Pass on May 21, 1859, and the defeated rebels fled into Nepal.

The spontaneous and widespread rebellion later fired the

imagination of the nationalists who would debate the most

effective method of protest against British rule. For them, the

rebellion represented the first Indian attempt at gaining independence. This interpretation, however, is open to serious

question.

Post-Rebellion Developments

The civil war was a major turning point in the history of

modern India. In May 1858, the British exiled Emperor Bahadur Shah II (r. 1837-57) to Burma, thus formally liquidating

the Mughal Empire. At the same time, thev abolished the British East India Company and replaced it with direct rule under

the British crown. In proclaiming the new direct-rule policy to "the Princes. Chiefs, and Peoples of India." Queen Victoria

(who was given the title Empress of India in 1877) promised

equal treatment under British law, but Indian mistrust of British rule had become a legacv of the 1857 rebellion. Many exist- ing economic and revenue policies remained virtually

unchanged in the post-1857 period, but several administrative

modifications were introduced, beginning with the creation in

London of a cabinet post, the secretary of state for India. The

36
Historical Setting

governor-general (called viceroy when acting as the direct representative of the British crown), headquartered in Calcutta, ran the administration in India, assisted by executive and legislative councils. Beneath the governor-general were the provincial governors, who held power over the district officials, who

formed the lower rungs of the Indian Civil Service. For

decades the Indian Civil Service was the exclusive preserve of

the British-born, as were the superior ranks in such other professions as law and medicine. The British administrators were imbued with a sense of duty in ruling India and were rewarded

with good salaries, high status, and opportunities for promotion. Not until the 1910s did the British reluctantly permit a few Indians into their cadre as the number of English-educated

Indians rose steadily.

The viceroy announced in 1858 that the government would

honor former treaties with princely states and renounced the

"doctrine of lapse," whereby the East India Company had

annexed territories of rulers who died without male heirs.

About 40 percent of Indian territory and between 20 and 25

percent of the population remained under the control of 562

princes notable for their religious (Islamic, Sikh, Hindu, and

other) and ethnic diversity. Their propensity for pomp and cer- emony became proverbial, while their domains, varying in size

and wealth, lagged behind sociopolitical transformations that

took place elsewhere in British-controlled India.

A more thorough reorganization was effected in the constitution of army and government finances. Shocked by the

extent of solidarity among Indian soldiers during the rebellion,

the government separated the army into the three presidencies

(see Company Armies, ch. 10).

British attitudes toward Indians shifted from relative openness to insularity and xenophobia, even against those with comparable background and achievement as well as loyalty. British

families and their servants lived in cantonments at a distance

from Indian settlements. Private clubs where the British gathered for social interaction became symbols of exclusivity and

snobbery that refused to disappear decades after the British

had left India. In 1883 the government of India attempted to remove race barriers in criminal jurisdictions by introducing a

bill empowering Indian judges to adjudicate offenses committed by Europeans. Public protests and editorials in the British

press, however, forced the viceroy, George Robinson, Marquis

of Ripon (who served from 1880 to 1884), to capitulate and

37
India: A Country Study

modify the bill drastically. The Bengali Hindu intelligentsia

learned a valuable political lesson from this "white mutiny": the

effectiveness of well-orchestrated agitation through demonstrations in the streets and publicity in the media when seeking

redress for real and imagined grievances.

The Independence Movement

Origins of the Congress and the Muslim League

The decades following the Sepoy Rebellion were a period of

growing political awareness, manifestation of Indian public

opinion, and emergence of Indian leadership at national and

provincial levels. Ominous economic uncertainties created by

British colonial rule and the limited opportunities that awaited

the ever-expanding number of Western-educated graduates

began to dominate the rhetoric of leaders who had begun to think of themselves as a "nation," despite fissures along the

lines of region, religion, language, and caste. Inspired by the

suggestion made by A.O. Hume, a retired British civil servant,

seventy-three Indian delegates met in Bombay in 1885 and

founded the Indian National Congress (Congress—see Glossary) . They were mostly members of the upwardly mobile and

successful Western-educated provincial elites, engaged in professions such as law, teaching, and journalism. They had

acquired political experience from regional competition in the

professions and from their aspirations in securing nomination

to various positions in legislative councils, universities, and special commissions.

At its inception, the Congress had no well-defined ideology

and commanded few of the resources essential to a political

organization. It functioned more as a debating society that met

annually to express its loyalty to the Raj and passed numerous

resolutions on less controversial issues such as civil rights or

opportunities in government, especially the civil service. These

resolutions were submitted to the viceroy's government and,

occasionally, to the British Parliament, but the Congress's early

gains were meager. Despite its claim to represent all India, the

Congress voiced the interests of urban elites; the number of

participants from other economic backgrounds remained negligible.

By 1900, although the Congress had emerged as an all-India

political organization, its achievement was undermined by its singular failure to attract Muslims, who had by then begun to

38
Historical Setting

realize their inadequate education and underrepresentation in

government service. Muslim leaders saw that their community

had fallen behind the Hindus. Attacks by Hindu reformers

against religious conversion, cow killing, and the preservation

of Urdu in Arabic script deepened their fears of minority status and denial of their rights if the Congress alone were to represent the people of India. For many Muslims, loyalty to the British crown seemed preferable to cooperation with Congress

leaders. Sir Sayyid Ahmad Khan (1817-98) launched a move- ment for Muslim regeneration that culminated in the founding

in 1875 of the Muhammadan Anglo-Oriental College at Aligarh, Uttar Pradesh (renamed Aligarh Muslim University in

1921). Its objective was to educate wealthy students by emphasizing the compatibility of Islam with modern Western knowledge. The diversity among India's Muslims, however, made it impossible to bring about uniform cultural and intellectual

regeneration.

Sir George Curzon, the governor-general (1899-1905),

ordered the partition of Bengal in 1905. He wanted to improve

administrative efficiency in that huge and populous region,

where the Bengali Hindu intelligentsia exerted considerable

influence on local and national politics. The partition created

two provinces: Eastern Bengal and Assam, with its capital at Dhaka (then spelled Dacca), and West Bengal, with its capital

at Calcutta (which also served as the capital of British India).

An ill-conceived and hastily implemented action, the partition

outraged Bengalis. Not only had the government failed to consult Indian public opinion but the action appeared to reflect

the British resolve to "divide and rule." Widespread agitation

ensued in the streets and in the press, and the Congress advocated boycotting British products under the banner of swadeshi

(home-made—see Glossary).

The Congress-led boycott of British goods was so successful

that it unleashed anti-British forces to an extent unknown since

the Sepoy Rebellion. A cycle of violence, terrorism, and repression ensued in some parts of the country. The British tried to mitigate the situation by announcing a series of constitutional

reforms in 1909 and by appointing a few moderates to the

imperial and provincial councils. In 1906 a Muslim deputation

met with the viceroy, Gilbert John Elliot (1905-10), seeking

concessions from the impending constitutional reforms,

including special considerations in government service and

electorates. The All-India Muslim League (Muslim League

39
India: A Country Study

see Glossary) was founded the same year to promote loyalty to the British and to advance Muslim political rights, which the

British recognized bv increasing the number of elective offices

reserved for Muslims in the India Councils Act of 1909. The

Muslim League insisted on its separateness from the Hindudominated Congress, as the voice of a "nation within a nation."

In what the British saw as an additional goodwill gesture, in

1911 King-Emperor George A' (r 1910-36) visited India for a durbar ( a traditional court held for subjects to express fealty to their ruler), during which he announced the reversal of the

partition of Bengal and the transfer of the capital from Calcutta to a newly planned citv to be built immediately south of

Delhi, which became New Delhi.

War, Reforms, and Agitation

World "War I began with an unprecedented outpouring of

lovaltv and goodwill toward the British, contrary to initial British fears of an Indian revolt. India contributed generously to the British war effort, by providing men and resources. About

1.3 million Indian soldiers and laborers served in Europe.

Africa, and the Middle East, while both the Indian government

and the princes sent large supplies of food, money and ammunition. But disillusionment set in earlv High casualty rates,, soaring inflation compounded bv heaw taxation, a widespread

influenza epidemic, and the disruption of trade during the war

escalated human suffering in India. The prewar nationalist

movement revived as moderate and extremist groups within

the Congress submerged their differences in order to stand as a unified front. The Congress even succeeded in forging a temporarv alliance with the Muslim League—the Lucknow Pact, or Congress-League Scheme of Reforms—in 1916. over the issues

of devolution of political power and the future of Islam in the

Middle East. The British themselves adopted a "carrot and stick"

approach in recognition of India's support during the war and

in response to renewed nationalist demands. In August 1917.

Edwin Montagu, the secretary of state for India, made the his- toric announcement in Parliament that the British policy for

India was "increasing association of Indians in every branch of

the administration and the gradual development of self-governing institutions with a view to the progressive realization of

responsible government in India as an integral part of the British Empire. The means of achieving the proposed measure

40
Historical Setting

were later enshrined in the Government of India Act of 1919,

which introduced the principle of a dual mode of administration, or dyarchy, in which both elected Indian legislators and

appointed British officials shared power. The act also

expanded the central and provincial legislatures and widened

the franchise considerably. Dyarchy set in motion certain real

changes at the provincial level: a number of noncontroversial

or "transferred" portfolios—such as agriculture, local government, health, education, and public works—were handed over

to Indians, while more sensitive matters such as finance, taxation, and maintaining law and order were retained by the provincial British administrators.

The positive impact of reform was seriously undermined in

1919 by the Rowlatt Acts, named after the recommendations

made the previous year to the Imperial Legislative Council by

the Rowlatt Commission, which had been appointed to investigate "seditious conspiracy." The Rowlatt Acts, also known as the

Black Acts, vested the viceroy's government with extraordinary

powers to quell sedition by silencing the press, detaining political activists without trial, and arresting any suspected individuals without a warrant. No sooner had the acts come into force

in March 1919—despite opposition by Indian members on the

Imperial Legislative Council—than a nationwide cessation of

work {hartal) was called by Mohandas Karamchand Gandhi

(1869-1948). Others took up his call, marking the beginning

of widespread—although not nationwide—popular discontent.

The agitation unleashed by the acts culminated on April 13,

1919, in Amritsar, Punjab. The British military commander,

Brigadier Reginald E.H. Dyer, ordered his soldiers to fire at point-blank range into an unarmed and unsuspecting crowd of

some 10,000 men, women, and children. They had assembled

at Jallianwala Bagh, a walled garden, to celebrate a Hindu festi- val without prior knowledge of the imposition of martial law. A

total of 1,650 rounds were fired, killing 379 persons and

wounding 1,137 in the episode, which dispelled wartime hopes

and goodwill in a frenzy of postwar reaction.

Mahatma Gandhi

That India opted for an entirely original path to solving this

crisis and obtaining swaraj (independence) was due largely to Gandhi, commonly known as "Mahatma" (or Great Soul) or, as he himself preferred, "Gandhiji" (an honorific term for Gandhi). A native of Gujarat who had been educated in Britain, he

41
India: A Country Study

was an obscure and unsuccessful provincial lawyer. Gandhi had

accepted an invitation in 1893 to represent indentured Indian

laborers in South Africa, where he stayed on for more than

twenty years, emerging ultimately as the voice and conscience

of thousands who had been subjected to blatant racial discrimination. He returned to India in 1915, virtually a stranger to public life but "fired with a religious vision of a new India,

whose swaraj . . . would [be] a moral reformation of a whole

people which would either convert the British also or render

their Raj impossible by Indian withdrawal of support for it and

its modern values," according to historian Judith M. Brown.

Gandhi's ideas and strategies of nonviolent civil disobedi- ence (satyagraha—see Glossary), first applied during his South

Africa days, initially appeared impractical to many educated

Indians. In Gandhi's own words, "Civil disobedience is civil breach of unmoral statutory enactments," but as he viewed it, it had to be carried out nonviolently by withdrawing cooperation

with the corrupt state. Observers realized Gandhi's political

potential when he used the satyagraha during the anti-Rowlatt

Acts protests in Punjab. In 1920, under Gandhi's leadership,

the Congress was reorganized and given a new constitution,

whose goal was swaraj. Membership in the party was opened to anyone prepared to pay a token fee, and a hierarchy of committees—from district, to province, to all-India—was established and made responsible for discipline and control over a hitherto amorphous and diffuse movement. During his first nationwide satyagraha, Gandhi urged the people to boycott

British education institutions, law courts, and products (in

favor of swadeshi); to resign from government employment; to refuse to pay taxes; and to forsake British titles and honors.

The party was transformed from an elite organization to one of mass national appeal.

Although Gandhi's first nationwide satyagraha was too late to influence the framing of the new Government of India Act

of 1919, the magnitude of disorder resulting from the move- ment was unparalleled and presented a new challenge to foreign rule. Gandhi was forced to call off the campaign in 1922

because of atrocities committed against police. However, the

abortive campaign marked a milestone in India's political

development. For his efforts, Gandhi was imprisoned until

1924. On his release from prison, he set up an ashram (a rural

commune), established a newspaper, and inaugurated a series

of reforms aimed at the socially disadvantaged within Hindu

42
i T*

Mahatma Gandhi spinning thread, 1925

Courtesy Biographic Collection, Library of Congress

society, the rural poor, and the Untouchables (see Changes in

the Caste System, ch. 5). His popularity soared in Indian politics as he reached the hearts and minds of ordinary people,

winning support for his causes as no one else had ever done

before. By his personal and eclectic piety, his asceticism, his

vegetarianism, his espousal of Hindu-Muslim unity, and his

firm belief in ahimsa, Gandhi appealed to the loftier Hindu

ideals. For Gandhi, moral regeneration, social progress, and

national freedom were inseparable.

Emerging leaders within the Congress—Jawaharlal Nehru,

Vallabhbhai Patel, Rajendra Prasad, C. Rajagopalachari, Maulana Abdul Kalam Azad, Subhas Chandra Bose, and Jayaprakash (J. P.) Narayan—accepted Gandhi's leadership in artic- ulating nationalist aspirations but disagreed on strategies for

wresting more concessions from the British. The Indian political spectrum was further broadened in the mid-1920s by the

43
India: A Country Study

emergence of both moderate and militant parties, such as the

Swaraj Party (sometimes referred to as the Swarajist Party), the

Mahasabha Party (literally, great council; an orthodox Hindu

communal party), the Unionist Party, the Communist Party of

India, and the Socialist Independence for India League.

Regional political organizations also continued to represent

the interests of non-Brahmans in Madras, Mahars in Maharashtra, and Sikhs in Punjab.

The Congress, however, kept itself aloof from competing in

elections. As voices inside and outside the Congress became

more strident, the British appointed a commission in 1927,

under Sir John Simon, to recommend further measures in the

constitutional devolution of power. The British failure to appoint an Indian member to the commission outraged the

Congress and others, and, as a result, they boycotted it throughout India, carrying placards inscribed "Simon, Go

Back." In 1929 the Congress responded by drafting its own constitution under the guidance of Motilal Nehru (Jawaharlal's

father) demanding full independence (puma swaraj) by 1930;

the Congress went so far as to observe January 26, 1930, as the

first anniversary of the first year of independence.

Gandhi reemerged from his long seclusion by undertaking

his most inspired campaign, a march of about 400 kilometers

from his commune in Ahmadabad to Dandi, on the coast of

Gujarat between March 12 and April 6, 1930. At Dandi, in protest against extortionate British taxes on salt, he and thousands

of followers illegally but symbolically made their own salt from

sea water. Their defiance reflected India's determination to be

free, despite the imprisonment of thousands of protesters. For

the next five years, the Congress and government were locked

in conflict and negotiations until what became the Government of India Act of 1935 could be hammered out. But by

then, the rift between the Congress and the Muslim League

had become unbridgeable as each pointed the finger at the

other acrimoniously. The Muslim League disputed the claim by

the Congress to represent all people of India, while the Congress disputed the Muslim League's claim to voice the aspirations of all Muslims.

The 1935 act, the voluminous and final constitutional effort

at governing British India, articulated three major goals: establishing a loose federal structure, achieving provincial autonomy, and safeguarding minority interests through separate

electorates. The federal provisions, intended to unite princely

44
Historical Setting

states and British India at the center, were not implemented

because of ambiguities in safeguarding the existing privileges

of princes. In February 1937, however, provincial autonomy

became a reality when elections were held; the Congress

emerged as the dominant party with a clear majority in five

provinces and held an upper hand in two, while the Muslim

League performed poorly.

Political Impasse and Independence

The Congress neither acknowledged the Muslim League's

performance, albeit poor, in the elections nor deigned to form

a coalition government with the League, a situation that led to the collapse of negotiations and mutual trust between the leaders. Mohammad Alijinnah, a Western-educated Muslim lawyer,

took over the presidency of the moribund Muslim League and

galvanized it into a national force under the battle cry of "Islam

in danger." Jinnah doubted the motives of Gandhi and Nehru

and accused them of practicing Hindu chauvinism. He relentlessly attacked the Congress-led ministries, accusing them of

casteism, corruption, and nepotism. Skillfully, he succeeded in

unifying various regional Islamic organizations and factions in

Punjab and Bengal under the umbrella of the Muslim League.

Electoral gains by the Congress in 1937 were rendered

ephemeral as its leaders ordered provincial ministries to resign

in November 1939, when the viceroy (Victor Alexander John

Hope, Marquis of Linlithgow—1936-43) declared India's

entrance into World War II without consulting Indian leaders.

Jinnah and the Muslim League welcomed the Congress withdrawal from government as a timely opportunity and observed

a day of thanksgiving on December 22, 1939. Jinnah persuaded

the participants at the annual Muslim League session in

Lahore in 1940 to adopt what later came to be known as the

Pakistan Resolution, demanding the division of India into two

separate sovereign states, one Muslim, the other Hindu.

Although the idea of Pakistan had been introduced as early as 1930 at Allahabad, very few had responded to it. However, the

volatile political climate, the personal hostilities between the

leaders, and the opportunism ofJinnah transformed the idea

of Pakistan into a popular demand.

Between 1940 and 1942, the Congress launched two abortive

agitations against the British, and 60,000 Congress members

were arrested, including Gandhi and Nehru. Unlike the uncooperative and belligerent Congress, the Muslim League sup45
India: A Country Study

ported the British during World War II (see The Indian

Military under the British Raj, ch. 10). Belated but perhaps sin- cere British attempts to accommodate the demands of the two

rival parties, while preserving the unitary state in India, seemed

unacceptable to both as they alternately rejected whatever proposal was put forward during the war years. As a result, a threeway impasse settled in: the Congress and the Muslim League

doubted British motives in handing over power to Indians,

while the British struggled to retain some hold on India while

offering to give greater autonomy.

The Congress wasted precious time denouncing the British

rather than allaying Muslim fears during the highly charged

election campaign of 1946. Even the more mature Congress

leaders, especially Gandhi and Nehru, failed to see how genuinely afraid the Muslims were and how exhausted and weak the

British had become in the aftermath of the war. When it appeared that the Congress had no desire to share power with

the Muslim League at the center, Jinnah declared August 16,

1946, Direct Action Day, which brought communal rioting and

massacre in many places in the north. Partition seemed preferable to civil war. OnJune 3, 1947, Viscount Louis Mountbatten,

the viceroy (1947) and governor-general (1947-48),

announced plans for partition of the British Indian Empire

into the nations of India and Pakistan, which itself was divided

into east and west wings on either side of India (see fig. 4). At

midnight, on August 15, 1947, India strode to freedom amidst

ecstatic shouting of "Jai Hind" (roughly, Long Live India),

when Nehru delivered a memorable and moving speech on

India's "tryst with destiny."

Independent India

National Integration

The euphoria of independence was short-lived as partition

brought disastrous consequences for India in the wake of com- munal conflict. Partition unleashed untold misery and loss of

lives and property as millions of Hindu and Muslim refugees

fled either Pakistan or India. Both nations were also caught up

in a number of conflicts involving the allocation of assets,

demarcation of boundaries, equitable sharing of water

resources, and control over Kashmir. At the same time, Indian

leaders were faced with the stupendous task of national integration and economic development.

46


Historical Setting

When the British relinquished their claims to paramountcy,

the 562 independent princely states were given the option to join either of the two nations. A few princely states readily

joined Pakistan, but the rest—except Hyderabad (the largest of

the princely states with 132,000 square kilometers and a population of more than 14 million), Jammu and Kashmir (with 3

million inhabitants), andjunagadh (with a population of

545,000) —merged with India. India successfully annexed

Hyderabad andjunagadh after "police actions" and promises

of privileges to the rulers. The Hindu maharajah of predominantly Muslim Jammu and Kashmir remained uncommitted

until armed tribesmen and regular troops from Pakistan infil- trated his domain, inducing him to sign the Instrument of

Accession to India on October 27, 1947. Pakistan refused to accept the legality of the accession, and, as a result, war broke

out (see The Experience of Wars, ch. 10). Kashmir remains a source of friction between the neighbors (see South Asia, ch.

9). The assassination of Mahatma Gandhi on January 30, 1948,

in New Delhi, by a Hindu extremist opposed to Gandhi's openness to Muslims ended the tenuous celebration of independence and deepened the hatred and mutual suspicion in

Hindu-Muslim relations.

Economic backwardness was one of the serious challenges

that India faced at independence. Under three successive five- year plans, inaugurated between 1951 and 1964 under Nehru's

leadership, India produced increasing amounts of food.

Although food production did not allow self-sufficiency until

fiscal year (FY—see Glossary) 1984, India has emerged as the

nation with the seventh largest gross national product (GNP

see Glossary) in the world (see Industry, ch. 6; Production, ch.

7).

Linguistic regionalism eventually reached a crisis stage and

undermined the Congress' attempts at nation building.

Whereas in the early 1920s, the Congress had deemed that the use of regional vernaculars in education and administration

would facilitate the governance of the country, partition made

the leaders, especially Nehru, realize how quickly such provincial or subnational interests would dismantle India's fragile

unity (see Diversity, Use, and Policy, ch. 4). However, in the

face of widespread agitation for linguistic separation of states, beginning with the Telangana Movement in 1953, in 1956

Nehru reluctantly accepted the recommendations of the States Reorganisation Commission, and the number of states grew by

49
•r <xt?

/^JAMMU AND KASHMIR /'

\ Peshawar f _ „

- _ ^ # ^ • Snnagar ^

,

i \

A

\ 9

QueUa

Lahore y • PUNJAB CjN < v -1

International boundary, demarcated

International boundary, undemarcated

Province, princely state, or state agency boundary

Viceregal capital Populated place

Princely state French or Portuguese colony

150 300 Kilometers

-fc« , U NCv ! ...... /

• rj

\^Jdelh.

Source: Based on information from Joseph E. Schwanzberg, ed., A Historical Atlas ofSouth Asia, New York, 1992, 66.

Figure 4. British Indian Empire, 1947

India: A Country Study

reorganization along linguistic lines. The states became the

loci for democratization of political processes at district levels,

for expression of regional culture and popular demands

against a national culture and unity for economic development at strategic localities in the rural areas, and for proliferation of opposition parties that ended the possibility of a panIndian two-party system (see Political Parties, ch. 8).

Nehru's Legacy

Jawaharlal Nehru (1889-1964), India's first prime minister, was the chief architect of domestic and foreign policies

between 1947 and 1964. Born into a wealthv Kashmiri Brahman familv and educated at Oxford, Xehru embodied a synthesis of ideals: politicallv an ardent nationalist, ideologically a pragmatic socialist, and secular in religious outlook, Xehru

possessed a rare combination of intellect, breadth of vision,

and personal charisma that attracted support throughout

India. Nehru's appreciation for parliamentarv democracv cou- pled with concerns for the poor and underprivileged enabled

him to formulate policies that often reflected his socialist leanings. Both as prime minister and as Congress president, Xehru

pushed through the Indian Parliament, dominated by members of his own partv, a series of legal reforms intended to emancipate Hindu women and bring equalitv. These reforms

included raising the minimum marriageable a^e from twelve to fifteen, empowering women to divorce their husbands and

inherit property and declaring illegal the ruinous dowrv sys- tem (see Life Passages, ch. 5).

The threat of escalating violence and the potential for "red

revolution" across the countrv seemed daunting in the face of

the countrv's growing population, unemplovment, and eco- nomic inequalitv Xehru induced Parliament to pass a number

of laws abolishing absentee landlordism and conferring titles to land on the actual cultivators who could document their

right to occupancv. Under his direction, the central Planning

Commission allocated resources to heaw industries, such as steel plants and hvdroelectric projects, and to revitalizing cot- tage industries. Whether producing sophisticated defense

materiel or manufacturing evervdav consumer goods, industrial complexes emerged across the countrv, accompanied by

the expansion of scientific research and teaching at universities, institutes of technologv, and research centers (see Education, ch. 2: Science and Technologv ch. 6).

50
Historical Setting

Nehru demonstrated tremendous enthusiasm for India's

moral leadership, especially among the newly independent

Asian and African nations, in a world polarized by Cold War

ideology and threatened by nuclear weapons. His guiding principles were nationalism, anucolonialism, internationalism, and

nonalignment. He attained international prestige during his

first decade in office, but after the Soviet invasion of Hungary

in 1956—when New Delhi tilted toward Moscow—criticisms

grew against his inconsistency in condemning Western but not

communist aggression. In dealing with Pakistan, Nehru failed

to formulate a consistent policy and was critical of the improving ties between Pakistan and the United States; mutual hostility and suspicion persisted as a result (see United States, ch. 9).

Despite attempts at improving relations with China, based on

his much-publicized five principles (Panch Shila—see Glossary) —territorial integrity and sovereignty, nonaggression,

noninterference, equality and cooperation, and peaceful coexistence—war with China erupted in 1962. The war was a rude

awakening for Nehru, as India proved ill-equipped and unprepared to defend its northern borders. At the conclusion of the

conflict, the Chinese forces were partially withdrawn and an

unofficial demilitarized zone was established, but India's prestige and self-esteem had suffered. Physically debilitated and

mentally exhausted, Nehru suffered a stroke and died in office

in May 1964. His legacy of a democratic, federal, and secular

India continues to survive in spite of attempts by later leaders

to establish either an autocratic or a theocratic state. The Rise of Indira Gandhi

Nehru's long tenure in office gave continuity and cohesion

to India's domestic and foreign policies, but as his health deteriorated, concerns over who might inherit his mantle or what

might befall India after he left office frequently surfaced in

political circles. After his death, the Congress Caucus, also

known as the Syndicate, chose Lai Bahadur Shastri as prime

minister in June 1964. A mild-mannered person, Shastri

adhered to Gandhian principles of simplicity of life and dedication to the service of the country. His short period of leadership was beset with three major crises: widespread food

shortages, violent anti-Hindi demonstrations in the state of

Madras (as Tamil Nadu was then called) that were quelled by

the army, and the second war with Pakistan over Kashmir. Shastri's premiership was cut short when he died of a heart attack

51
India: A Country Study

on January 11, 1966, the day after having signed the Soviet-brokered Tashkent Declaration. The agreement required both

sides to withdraw all armed personnel by February 26, 1966, to the positions they had held prior to August 5, 1965, and to observe the cease-fire line. Indira Gandhi held a cabinet portfolio as minister of information and broadcasting in Shastri's government. She was the

only child of Nehru, who was also her mentor in the nationalist

movement. The Syndicate selected her as prime minister when

Shastri died in 1966 even though her eligibility was challenged

by Morarji Desai, a veteran nationalist and long-time aspirant

to that office. The Congress "bosses" were apparently looking

for a leading figure acceptable to the masses, who could com- mand general support during the next general election but

who would also acquiesce to their guidance. Hardly had Indira

Gandhi begun in office than she encountered a series of problems that defied easy solutions: Mizo tribal uprisings in the

northeast; famine, labor unrest, and misery among the poor in

the wake of rupee devaluation; and agitation in Punjab for lin- guistic and religious separatism.

In the fourth general election in February 1967, the Congress majority was greatly reduced when it secured only 54 percent of the parliamentary seats, and non-Congress ministries were established in Bihar, Kerala, Orissa, Madras, Punjab, and

West Bengal the next month. A Congress-led coalition government collapsed in Uttar Pradesh, while in April Rajasthan was brought under President's Rule—direct central government

rule (see The Executive, ch. 8). Seeking to eradicate poverty,

Mrs. Gandhi pursued a vigorous policy in 1969 of land reform

and placed a ceiling on personal income, private property, and

corporate profits. She also nationalized the major banks, a bold

step amidst a growing rift between herself and the party elders.

The Congress expelled her for "indiscipline" on November 12,

1969, an action that split the party into two factions: the Congress (O) —for Organisation—under Desai, and the Congress

(R) —for Requisition—under Gandhi. She continued as prime

minister with support from communists, Sikhs, and regional

parties.

Gandhi campaigned fiercely on the platform "eliminate poverty" (garibi hatao) during the fifth general election in March

1971, and the Congress (R) gained a large majority in Parliament against her former party leaders whose slogan was "eliminate Indira" (Indira hatao). India's decisive victory over

52
The site ofMahatma Gandhi's

last steps and assassination on January 30, 1948, New Delhi

Courtesy Robert L. Worden

Pakistan in the third war over Kashmir in December 1971, and

Gandhi's insistence that the 10 million refugees from Bangladesh be sent back to their country generated a national

surge in her popularity, later confirmed by her party's gains in

state elections in 1972. She had firmly established herself at the

pinnacle of power, overcoming challenges from the Congress

(O), the Supreme Court, and the state chief ministers in the

early 1970s. The more solidified her monopoly of power

became, the more egregious was her intolerance of criticisms, even when they were deserved. As head of her party and the

government, Gandhi nominated and removed the chief ministers at will and frequently reshuffled the portfolios of her own

cabinet members. Ignoring their obligations to their constituencies, party members competed with each other in parading

their loyalty to Gandhi, whose personal approval alone seemed

crucial to their survival. In August 1971, Gandhi signed the

twenty-year Treaty of Peace, Friendship, and Cooperation with

the Soviet Union because ties with the United States, which

had improved in Nehru's later years, had eroded (see Russia,

ch. 9).

Neither Gandhi's consolidation of power, nor her imperious

style of administration, nor even her rhetoric of radical reforms was enough to meet the deepening economic crisis spawned by

the enormous cost of the 1971 war. A huge additional outlay

53
India: A Country Study

was needed to manage the refugees, the crop failures in 1972

and 1973, the skyrocketing world oil prices in 1973-74, and the

overall drop in industrial output despite a surplus of scientifically and technically trained personnel. No immediate sign of

economic recovery or equity was visible despite a loan obtained

from the International Monetary Fund (IMF—see Glossary) in

1974. Both Gandhi's office and character came under severe

tests, beginning with railroad employee strikes, national civil disobedience advocated by J. P. Narayan, defeat of her party in

Gujarat by a coalition of parties calling itself the Janata Morcha

(People's Front), an all-party, no-confidence motion in Parliament, and, finally, a writ issued by the Allahabad High Court

invalidating her 1971 election and making her ineligible to occupy her seat for six years. What had once seemed a remote possibility took place on

June 25, 1975: the president declared an Emergency and the

government suspended civil rights. Because the nation's president, Fakhruddin Ali Ahmed (1974-77), and Gandhi's own

party members in Parliament were amenable to her personal

influence, Gandhi had little trouble in pushing through

amendments to the constitution that exonerated her from any

culpability, declaring President's Rule in Gujarat and Tamil

Nadu where anti-Indira parties ruled, and jailing thousands of

her opponents. In her need to trust and confide in someone

during this extremely trying period, she turned to her younger

son, Sanjay, who became an enthusiastic advocate of the Emergency. Under his watchful eyes, forced sterilization as a means

of birth control was imposed on the poor, increased numbers

of urban squatters and slum dwellers in Delhi were evicted in

the name of beautification projects, and disgruntled workers were either disciplined or their wages frozen. The Reign of Terror, as some called it, continued until January 18, 1977, when

Gandhi suddenly relaxed the Emergency, announced the next

general election in March, and released her opponents from

prison.

With elections only two months away, both J. P. Narayan and

Morarji Desai reactivated the multiparty front, which cam- paigned as the Janata Party and rode anti-Emergency sentiment to secure a clear majority in the Lok Sabha (House of the

People), the lower house of Parliament (see The Legislature,

ch. 8). Desai, a conservative Brahman, became India's fourth

prime minister (1977-79), but his government, from its inception, became notorious for its factionalism and furious internal

54
Historical Setting

competition. As it promised, the Janata government restored

freedom and democracy, but its inability to effect sound

reforms or ameliorate poverty left people disillusioned. Desai

lost the support ofJanata's left-wing parties by the early sum- mer of 1979, and several secular and liberal politicians abandoned him altogether, leaving him without a parliamentary

majority. A no-confidence motion was about to be introduced

in Parliament in July 1979, but he resigned his office; Desai's

government was replaced by a coalition led by Chaudhury Charan Singh (prime minister in 1979-80). Although Singh's life- long ambition had been to become prime minister, his age and

inefficiency were used against him, and his attempts at governing India proved futile; new elections were announced in January 1980.

Gandhi and her party, renamed Congress (I) —I for Indira

campaigned on the slogan "Elect a Government That Works!"

and regained power. Sanjay Gandhi was elected to the Lok

Sabha. Unlike during the Emergency, when India registered

significant economic and industrial progress, Gandhi's return

to power was hindered by a series of woes and tragedies, beginning with Sanjay's death in June 1980 while attempting to perform stunts in his private airplane. Secessionist forces in

Punjab and in the northeast and the Soviet occupation of

Afghanistan in December 1979 consumed her energy. She

began to involve the armed forces in resolving violent domestic

conflicts between 1980 and 1984. In May 1984, Sikh extremists

occupied the Golden Temple in Amritsar, converting it into a haven for terrorists. Gandhi responded in early June when she

launched Operation Bluestar, which killed and wounded hundreds of soldiers, insurgents, and civilians (see Insurgent Movements and External Subversion, ch. 10). Guarding against

further challenges to her power, she removed the chief ministers ofJammu and Kashmir and Andhra Pradesh just months

before her assassination by her Sikh bodyguards on October

31, 1984. The news of Indira Gandhi's assassination plunged

New Delhi and other parts of India into anti-Sikh riots for three

days; several thousand Sikhs were killed.

Rajiv Gandhi

When Rajiv Gandhi, Indira's eldest son, reluctantly consented to run for his brother's vacant Lok Sabha seat in 1980,

and when he later took over the leadership of the Congress

youth wing, becoming prime minister was the last thing on his

55
India: A Country Study

mind; equally, his mother had her own misgivings about

whether Rajiv would bravely "take the brutalities and the ruthlessness of politics." Yet on the day Indira was assassinated, Rajiv was sworn in as prime minister at the age of forty. He brought

into politics energy, enthusiasm, and vision—qualities badly

needed to lead the divided country. Moreover, his looks, personal charm, and reputation as "Mr. Clean" were assets that

won him many friends in India and abroad, especially in the

United States. Rajiv also had a clear mandate to rule the country with an overwhelming majority in Parliament.

Rajiv seemed to have understood the magnitude of the most

critical and urgent problems that faced the nation when he

assumed office. As Paul H. Kreisberg, a former United States

foreign service officer, put it, Rajiv was faced with an unenviable four-pronged challenge: resolving political and religious

violence in Punjab and the northeast; reforming the demoralized Congress (I), which was often identified with the interests

of the upper and upper-middle classes; reenergizing the sag- ging economy in terms of productivity and budget control; and

reducing tensions with neighbors, especially Pakistan and Sri

Lanka. As Rajiv tackled these issues with singular determination, there was optimism and hope about the future of India.

Between 1985 and 1987, temporary calm was restored by

accommodating demands for regional control in the northeast

and by granting more concessions to Punjab. Although Rajiv

acknowledged the gradual attrition of the Congress, he was

unwilling to relinquish control of the leadership, tolerate

"cliques," or conduct new elections for offices at the state and

district levels. Economic reforms and incentives to private investors were introduced by easing government tax rates and licensing

requirements, but officials manipulated the rules and frequently accepted bribes. These innovative measures also came

under attack from business leaders, who for many years had

controlled both markets and prices with little regard for quality When the Ministry of Finance began its own investigation of

tax and foreign-exchange evasion amounting to millions of dollars, many of India's leading families, including Rajiv's political

allies, were found culpable. Despite these hindrances, Rajiv's

fascination with electronics and telecommunications resulted

in revamping the antiquated telephone systems to meet public

demands. Collaboration with the United States and several

56
Historical Setting

European governments and corporations brought more investment in research in electronics and computer software.

India's perennial, see-sawing tensions with Pakistan, whose

potential nuclear-weapons capacity escalated concerns in the

region, were ameliorated when the South Asian Association for

Regional Cooperation (SAARC—see Glossary) was inaugurated in December 1985. Both nations signed an agreement in

1986 promising that neither would launch a first strike at the

other's nuclear facilities. However, sporadic conflicts persist

along the cease-fire line in Kashmir (see South Asia, ch. 9).

Relations with Sri Lanka degenerated because of unresolved

Sinhalese-Tamil controversies and continued guerrilla warfare

by Tamil militants, under the leadership of the Liberation

Tigers of Tamil Eelam, who had bases in Tamil Nadu. Beginning in 1987, India's attempt to disarm and subdue the Tigers

through intervention of the Indian Peace Keeping Force

proved disastrous as thousands of Indian soldiers and Tamil

militants were killed or wounded (see Peacekeeping Operations, ch. 10).

Rajiv Gandhi's performance in the middle of his term in

office was best summed up, as Kreisberg put it, as "good intentions, some progress, frequently weak implementation, and

poor politics." Two major scandals, the "Spy" and the "Bofors"

affairs, tarnished his reputation. In January 1985, Gandhi con- firmed in Parliament the involvement of top government offi- cials, their assistants, and businessmen in "a wide-ranging

espionage network." The ring reportedly infiltrated the prime

minister's office as early as 1982 when Indira was in power and

sold defense and economic intelligence to foreign diplomats at the embassies of France, Poland and other East European

countries, and the Soviet Union. Although more than twentyfour arrests were made and the diplomats involved were

expelled, the Spy scandal remained a lingering embarrassment

to Rajiv's administration.

In 1986 India purchased US$1.3 billion worth of artillery

pieces from the Swedish manufacturer A.B. Bofors, and

months later a Swedish radio report remarked that Bofors had

won the "biggest" export order by bribing Indian politicians

and defense personnel. The revelation caught the nation's

attention immediately because of the allegations that somehow

Rajiv Gandhi and his friends were connected with the deal.

When Vishwanath Pratap (V.P.) Singh, as minister of defence,

investigated the alleged kickbacks, he was forced to resign, and

57
India: A Country Study

he became Rajiv's Janata political rival. Despite relentless

attacks and criticisms in the media as well as protests and resignations from cabinet members, Rajiv adamantly denied any

role in the affair. But when he called parliamentary elections in

November 1989, two months ahead of schedule, the opposition

alliance, the National Front, vigorously campaigned on "removing corruption and restoring the dignity of national institutions," as did another opposition party, Janata Dal. Rajiv and his

party won more seats in the election than any other party, but,

being unable to form a government with a clear majority or a mandate, he resigned on November 29. Rajiv Gandhi was assas- sinated by Sri Lankan terrorists on May 21, 1991, near Madras.

The Gandhi era, as future events would prove, was over, at least for the near term (see Political Parties, ch. 8).

* * * The literature on Indian history in the English language

alone is exhaustive as demonstrated in South Asian Civilizations:

A Bibliographic Synthesis by Maureen L.P. Patterson. The most

commonly used text is the two-volume A History of India by

Romila Thapar (volume 1) and Percival Spear (volume 2).

Monographs, such as Stanley Wolpert's A New History of India

and Hermann Kulke and Dietmar Rothermund's A History of

India, cover major epochs.

Critical works by Gregory L. Possehl ( The Harappan Civilization), A.L. Basham (The Wonder That Was India), Kallidaikurchi

Aiyah Nilakanta Sastri (History of South India from Prehistoric

Times to theFallofVijayanagar), and Burton Stein (Peasant, State, and Society in Medieval South India) offer valuable insights as well

as theoretical foundations for understanding India prior to Mughal rule. Essays in The Cambridge Economic History of India,

edited by Tapan Raychaudhuri and Irfan Habib, provide a full account of life in India from the twelfth to the eighteenth centuries. The Mughal Empire, by John Richards, a volume in The

New Cambridge History of India, reflects the current discussion

on the dynamic nature and quality of the rulers; Irfan Habib's

An Atlas of Mughal Empire and The Agrarian System of Mughal

India, 1556-1707 focus on the administrative and economic

aspects of the empire. Bamber Gascoigne's The Great Mughals

has photographs along with texts from original sources. Several scholars have written about British activities from the

mid-eighteenth century to independence and have incorpo58
Historical Setting

rated new data garnered from various state archives and family

histories as well as vernacular sources; their works reflect a deviation from the conventional approach of focusing on governor-generals or viceroys. They include C.A. Bayly's Rulers,

Townsmen, and Bazaars, Robin Jeffrey's People, Princes, and Paramount Power, Judith M. Brown's Modern India: The Origins of an

Asian Democracy, and Sumit Sarkar's Modern India, 1885-1947.

The nationalist movement also has generated numerous his- tories, both authoritative and controversial. Anil Seal's The

Emergence of Indian Nationalism was followed by a group representing the "Cambridge School" whose critical examination of

the background of personalities and the issues that dominated

Indian politics has spawned much discussion. The literature on

Mahatma Gandhi has increased over the decades. His An Autobiography: The Story of My Experiments with Truth is a leading

source for the first half of his life, while Joan V. Bondurant's

The Conquest of Violence and Erick H. Erikson's Gandhi's Truth

offer probing insights into his strategies and personality.

Postindependence India has been portrayed variously

depending on the writer's ideology, use of sources, and analysis. Sarvepalli Gopal's Jawaharlal Nehru and Zaheer Masani's

Indira Gandhi provide lucid accounts of the period from the

perspectives of the prime ministers. Scathing criticism from the

view of the common man is found in Dilip Hiro's Inside India

Today and Arun Shourie's Symptoms ofFascism. Pupul Jayakar's

Indira Gandhi: A Biography presents a balanced view. Although a

critical biography on Rajiv Gandhi has yet to appear, a number

of works, such as Rajiv Gandhi: Life and Message by Arun Bhattacharjee and Rajiv Gandhi and Parliament edited by C.K. Jain,

provide valuable insights. (For further information and complete citations, see Bibliography.)

59

Chapter 2. Geographic and Demographic Setting
Embroidered peacock depicted on a Rabari petticoat from Gujarat
INDIA IS A COUNTRY of great diversity with a wide range of

landform types, including major mountain ranges, deserts, rich

agricultural plains, and hilly jungle regions. Indeed, the term

Indian subcontinent aptly describes the enormous extent of the

earth's surface that India occupies, and any attempt to generalize about its physiography is inaccurate. Diversity is also evident

in the geographical distribution of India's ethnic and linguistic

groups. In ancient times, the major river valleys of the IndoGangetic Plain of South Asia were among the great cradles of

civilization in Asia, as were the valleys of the Tigris and Euphrates rivers in West Asia and the Huang He (Yellow River) in East

Asia. As a result of thousands of years of cultural and political

expansion and amalgamation, contemporary India has come

to include many different natural and cultural regions.

The Himalayas (and the nations of Nepal and Bhutan) form

India's northern frontier with China. Pakistan borders India to the west and Bangladesh (formerly East Pakistan) to the east. Although both were formerly part of the British Indian

Empire, India and Pakistan became separate countries in 1947

and East Pakistan became independent Bangladesh in 1971.

The boundaries of the Indian polity are not fully demarcated

because of regional ethnic and political disputes and are the source of occasional tensions.

When the 1991 national census was taken, India's population was approximately 846.3 million. The annual population

growth rate from 1981 to 1991 was 2 percent. Accounting for

only 2.4 percent of the world's landmass, India is home to 16

percent of the world's population. Every sixth person in the

world in the early 1990s was an Indian. It is generally assumed

that India's population will surpass the 1 billion mark some

time before the next census in 2001. In July 1995, the population was estimated at 936.5 million.

Some 38 percent of all Indians were officially listed as living

below the poverty line in fiscal year (FY—see Glossary) 1991.

This number represented an increase from the low mark of 26

percent in FY 1989, but the rise was believed to be only temporary by some observers. Although government-sponsored

health clinics are widely available in the mid-1990s, their

emphasis is on curative techniques rather than preventive medicine. However, the lack of such basic amenities as safe, potable

63
India: A Country Study

water for much of the population is indicative of the severity of

health problems. This situation has traditionally led most Indi- ans to have large families as their only form of insurance

against sickness and for their care in old age. Although family

planning programs are becoming integrated with the programs

of urban and rural health clinics, no official birth control programs have widespread support. The severity of the acquired

immune deficiency syndrome (AIDS) epidemic in India has

become increasingly apparent to health specialists, but local awareness of the causes of and ways to prevent the spread of

AIDS is growing slowly.

Although many public schools are inadequate, improvements to the education system overall have been substantial

since 1947. In the mid-1990s, however, only about 50 percent of

children between the ages of six and fourteen are enrolled in

schools. The goal of compulsory and free primary and middle

school education is embodied in the Indian constitution but

has been elusive. The National Policy on Education of 1986

sought to institutionalize universal primary education by set- ting 1990 as a target date for the education of all children up to eleven years of age. The ability of India's education system to meet this goal has been constrained by lack of adequate financial resources. Important achievements have been made, however, with implementation of the nonformal education system

and adult education programs. Whereas public education is generally below standard, education standards in private

schools are very high. There also are high standards among the

elite institutions in the higher education system.

Geography

Principal Regions

India's total land mass is 2,973,190 square kilometers and is divided into three main geological regions: the Indo-Gangetic

Plain, the Himalayas, and the Peninsula region (see fig. 5). The

Indo-Gangetic Plain and those portions of the Himalayas

within India are collectively known as North India. South India

consists of the peninsular region, often termed simply the Peninsula. On the basis of its physiography, India is divided into

ten regions: the Indo-Gangetic Plain, the northern mountains

of the Himalayas, the Central Highlands, the Deccan or Peninsular Plateau, the East Coast (Coromandel Coast in the south),

the West Coast (Konkan, Kankara, and Malabar coasts), the

64



Figure 5. Topography and Drainage

66


Geographic and Demographic Setting

Great Indian Desert (a geographic feature known as the Thar

Desert in Pakistan) and the Rann of Kutch, the valley of the

Brahmaputra in Assam, the northeastern hill ranges surrounding the Assam Valley, and the islands of the Arabian Sea and

the Bay of Bengal.

Indo-Gangetic Plain

In social and economic terms, the Indo-Gangetic Plain is the

most important region of India. The plain is a great alluvial

crescent stretching from the Indus River system in Pakistan to the Punjab Plain (in both Pakistan and India) and the Haryana

Plain to the delta of the Ganga (or Ganges) in Bangladesh

(where it is called the Padma). Topographically the plain is homogeneous, with only floodplain bluffs and other related

features of river erosion and changes in river channels forming

important natural features.

Two narrow terrain belts, collectively known as the Terai,

constitute the northern boundary of the Indo-Gangetic Plain.

Where the foothills of the Himalayas encounter the plain,

small hills known locally as ghar (meaning house in Hindi)

have been formed by coarse sands and pebbles deposited by

mountain streams. Groundwater from these areas flows on the

surface where the plains begin and converts large areas along

the rivers into swamps. The southern boundary of the plain

begins along the edge of the Great Indian Desert in the state of

Rajasthan and continues east along the base of the hills of the

Central Highlands to the Bay of Bengal (see fig. 1). The hills,

varying in elevation from 300 to 1,200 meters, lie on a general

east-west axis. The Central Highlands are divided into north- ern and southern parts. The northern part is centered on the

Aravalli Range of eastern Rajasthan. In the northern part of

the state of Madhya Pradesh, the Malwa Plateau comprises the

southern part of the Central Highlands and merges with the

Vindhya Range to the south. The main rivers that flow through

the southern part of the plain—the Narmada, the Tapti, and

the Mahanadi—delineate North India from South India (see

Rivers, this ch.).

Some geographers subdivide the Indo-Gangetic Plain into

three parts: the Indus Valley (mostly in Pakistan), the Punjab

(divided between India and Pakistan) and Haryana plains, and

the middle and lower Ganga. These regional distinctions are based primarily on the availability of water. By another definition, the Indo-Gangetic Plain is divided into two drainage

67
India: A Country Study

basins by the Delhi Ridge; the western part consists of the Punjab Plain and the Haryana Plain, and the eastern part consists

of the Ganga-Brahmaputra drainage systems. This divide is only

300 meters above sea level, contributing to the perception that

the Indo-Gangetic Plain appears to be continuous between the

two drainage basins. The Punjab Plain is centered in the land

between five rivers: the Jhelum, the Chenab, the Ravi, the Beas,

and the Sutlej. (The name Punjab comes from the Sanskrit pancha ab, meaning five waters or rivers.)

Both the Punjab and Haryana plains are irrigated with water

from the Ravi, Beas, and Sutlej rivers. The irrigation projects

emanating from these rivers have led to a decrease in the flow

of water reaching the lower drainage areas in the state of Punjab in India and the Indus Valley in Pakistan. The benefits that

increased irrigation has brought to farmers in the state of

Haryana are controversial in light of the effects that irrigation

has had on agricultural life in the Punjab areas of both India

and Pakistan.

The middle Ganga extends from the Yamuna River in the

west to the state of West Bengal in the east. The lower Ganga

and the Assam Valley are more lush and verdant than the middle Ganga. The lower Ganga is centered in West Bengal from

which it flows into Bangladesh and, after joining the Jamuna

(as the lower reaches of the Brahmaputra are known in Bangladesh), forms the delta of the Ganga. The Brahmaputra

(meaning son of Brahma) rises in Tibet (China's Xizang

Autonomous Region) as the Yarlung Zangbo River, flows

through Arunachal Pradesh and Assam, and then crosses into

Bangladesh. Average annual rainfall increases moving west to

east from approximately 600 millimeters in the Punjab Plain to 1,500 millimeters around the lower Ganga and Brahmaputra.

The Himalayas

The Himalayas, the highest mountain range in the world,

extend along the northern frontiers of Pakistan, India, Nepal,

Bhutan, and Burma. They were formed geologically as a result

of the collision of the Indian subcontinent with Asia. This process of plate tectonics is ongoing, and the gradual northward

drift of the Indian subcontinent still causes earthquakes (see

Earthquakes, this ch.). Lesser ranges jut southward from the

main body of the Himalayas at both the eastern and western

ends. The Himalayan system, about 2,400 kilometers in length

and varying in width from 240 to 330 kilometers, is made up of

68
Geographic and Demographic Setting

three parallel ranges—the Greater Himalayas, the Lesser

Himalayas, and the Outer Himalayas—sometimes collectively

called the Great Himalayan Range. The Greater Himalayas, or northern range, average approximately 6,000 meters in height

and contain the three highest mountains on earth: Mount

Everest (8,796 meters) on the China-Nepal border; K2 (8,611

meters, also known as Mount Godwin-Austen, and in China as Qogir Feng) in an area claimed by India, Pakistan, and China;

and Kanchenjunga (8,598 meters) on the India-Nepal border.

Many major mountains are located entirely within India, such

as Nanda Devi (7,817 meters) in the state of Uttar Pradesh.

The snow line averages 4,500 to 6,000 meters on the southern

side of the Greater Himalayas and 5,500 to 6,000 on the north- ern side. Because of climatic conditions, the snow line in the

eastern Himalayas averages 4,300 meters, while in the western

Himalayas it averages 5,800 meters.

The Lesser Himalayas, located in northwestern India in the

states of Himachal Pradesh and Uttar Pradesh, in north-central

India in the state of Sikkim, and in northeastern India in the

state of Arunachal Pradesh, range from 1,500 to 5,000 meters

in height. Located in the Lesser Himalayas are the hill stations

of Shimla (Simla) and Darjiling (Darjeeling). During the colonial period, these and other hill stations were used by the British as summer retreats to escape the intense heat of the plains.

It is in this transitional vegetation zone that the contrasts

between the bare southern slopes and the forested northern

slopes become most noticeable.

The Outer or Southern Himalayas, averaging 900 to 1,200

meters in elevation, lie between the Lesser Himalayas and the

Indo-Gangetic Plain. In Himachal Pradesh and Uttar Pradesh,

this southernmost range is often referred to as the Siwalik

Hills. It is possible to identify a fourth, and northernmost

range, known as the Trans-Himalaya. This range is located

entirely on the Qinghai-Xizang Plateau, north of the great westto-east trending valley of the Yarlung Zangbo River. Although

the Trans-Himalaya Range is divided from the Great Himalayan Range for most of its length, it merges with the Great

Himalayan Range in the western section—the Karakoram

Range—where India, Pakistan, and China meet.

The southern slopes of each of the Himalayan ranges are too

steep to accumulate snow or support much tree life; the north- ern slopes generally are forested below the snow line. Between

the ranges are extensive high plateaus, deep gorges, and fertile

69
India: A Country Study

valleys, such as the vales of Kashmir and Kulu. The Himalayas

serve a very important purpose. They provide a physical screen

within which the monsoon system operates and are the source

of the great river systems that water the alluvial plains below

(see Climate, this ch.). As a result of erosion, the rivers coming

from the mountains carry vast quantities of silt that enrich the

plains.

The area of northeastern India adjacent to Burma and Bangladesh consists of numerous hill tracts, averaging between

1,000 and 2,000 meters in elevation, that are not associated

with the eastern part of the Himalayas in Arunachal Pradesh.

The Naga Hills, rising to heights of more than 3,000 meters,

form the watershed between India and Burma. The Mizo Hills are the southern part of the northeastern ranges in India. The

Garo, Khasi, and Jaintia hills are centered in the state of

Meghalaya and, isolated from the northeastern ranges, divide

the Assam Valley from Bangladesh to the south and west. The Peninsula

The Peninsula proper is an old, geologically stable region

with an average elevation between 300 and 1,800 meters. The

Vindhya Range constitutes the main dividing line between the

geological regions of the Indo-Gangetic Plain and the Peninsula. This range lies north of the Narmada River, and when

viewed from there, it is possible to discern the prominent

escarpments that rise between 800 and 1,400 meters. The

Vindhya Range defines the north-central and northwestern

boundary of the Peninsula, and the Chota Nagpur Plateau of

southern Bihar forms the northeastern boundary. The uplifting of the plateau of the central Peninsula and its eastward tilt formed the Western Ghats, a line of hills running from the

Tapti River south to the up of the Peninsula. The Eastern Ghats

mark the eastern end of the plateau; they begin in the hills of

the Mahanadi River basin and converge with the Western

Ghats at the Peninsula's southern tip.

The interior of the Peninsula, south of the Narmada River,

often termed the Deccan Plateau or simply the Deccan (from

the Sanskrit daksina, meaning south), is a series of plateaus

topped by rolling hills and intersected by many rivers. The plateau averages roughly 300 to 750 meters in elevation. Its major

rivers—the Godavari, the Krishna, and the Kaveri—rise in the

Western Ghats and flow eastward into the Bay of Bengal.

70
Geographic and Demographic Setting

The coastal plain borders the plateau. On the northwestern

side, it is characterized by tidal marshes, drowned valleys, and

estuaries; and in the south by lagoons, marshes, and beach

ridges. Coastal plains on the eastern side are wider than those

in the west; they are focused on large river deltas that serve as the centers of human settlement.

Offshore Islands

India's offshore islands, constituting roughly one-quarter of

1 percent of the nation's territory, lie in two groups located off

the east and west coasts. The northernmost point of the union

territory of the Andaman and Nicobar Islands lies 1,100 kilometers southeast of Calcutta. Situated in the Bay of Bengal in a chain stretching some 800 kilometers, the Andaman Islands

comprise 204 islands and islets, and their topography is characterized by hills and narrow valleys. Although their location is tropical, the climate of the islands is tempered by sea breezes;

rainfall is irregular. The Nicobar Islands, which are south of the

Andaman Islands, comprise nineteen islands, some with flat, coral-covered surfaces and others with hills. The islands have a nearly equatorial climate, heavy rainfall, and high temperatures. The union territory of Lakshadweep (the name means

100,000 islands) in the Arabian Sea, comprises—from north to south—the Amindivi, Laccadive, Cannanore, and Minicoy

islands. The islands, only ten of which are inhabited, are spread

throughout an area of approximately 77,000 square kilometers.

The islands are low-lying coral-based formations capable of limited cultivation.

Coasts and Borders

India has 7,000 kilometers of seacoast and shares 14,000 kilometers of land frontier with six nations: Pakistan, China, Nepal,

Bhutan, Bangladesh, and Burma. India claims a twelve-nautical-mile territorial sea and an exclusive economic zone of 200

nautical miles. The territorial seas total 314,400 square kilometers.In the mid-1990s, India had boundary disagreements with

Pakistan, China, and Bangladesh; border distances are therefore approximations. The partition of India in 1947 established

two India-Pakistan frontiers: one on the west and one on the

east (East Pakistan became Bangladesh in 1971).

Disputes over the state ofJammu and Kashmir led to hostilities between India and Pakistan in 1947. The January 1, 1949,

71
India: A Country Study

cease-fire arranged by the United Nations (UN) divided control of Kashmir. India controls Jammu, the Vale of Kashmir,

and the capital, Srinagar, while Pakistan controls the mountainous area to the northwest. Neither side accepts a divided Kashmir as a permanent solution. India regards as illegal the 1963

China-Pakistan border agreement, which ceded to China a portion of Pakistani-controlled Kashmir. The two sides also dispute

the Siachen Glacier near the Karakoram Pass. Further IndiaPakistan hostilities in the 1965 war were settled through the

Soviet-brokered Tashkent Declaration.

In 1968 an international tribunal settled the dispute over the

Rann of Kutch, a region of salt flats that is submerged for six

months of the year in the state of Gujarat. The following year, a new border was demarcated that recognized Pakistan's claim to about 10 percent of the area. In 1992 India completed fencing most of the 547-kilometerlong section of the boundary between the Indian state of Punjab and the Pakistani province of Punjab. This measure was undertaken because of the continuing unrest in the region

caused by both ethnic and religious disputes among the local

Indian population and infiltrators from both sides of the frontier. The more rugged terrain north of Punjab along the entire

cease-fire line between India and Pakistan in Jammu and Kashmir continues to be subject to infiltration and local strife (see

Political Issues, ch. 8: South Asia, ch. 9; Insurgent Movements

and External Subversion, ch. 10).

The 2,000-kilometer-long border with China has eastern,

central, and western sections. In the western section, the border regions ofJammu and Kashmir have been the scene of conflicting claims since the nineteenth century. China has not

accepted India's definitions of the boundary and has carried

out defense and economic activities in parts of eastern Kashmir

since the 1950s. In the 1960s, China finished construction of a motor road across Aksai Chin (a region under dispute between

India and China), the main transportation route linking

China's Xinjiang-Uygur Autonomous Region and Tibet. In the eastern section, the China-India boundary follows the

McMahon Line laid down in 1914 by Sir Arthur Henry McMahon, the British plenipotentiary to a conference of Indian, British, and Chinese representatives at Simla (now known as Shimla, Himachal Pradesh). The Simla Convention, as the

agreement is known, set the boundary between India and

Tibet. Although the British and Tibetan representatives signed

72
1

{

Elephants bathing in the Gomati River, a tributary of the Ganga in Uttar Pradesh

Courtesy Foreign Geography Collection, Library of Congress

the agreement on July 3, 1914, the Chinese delegate declined

to sign. The line agreed to by Britain and Tibet generally fol- lows the crest of the eastern Himalayas from Bhutan to Burma.

It serves as a legal boundary, although the Chinese have never formally accepted it. China continued to claim roughly the

entire area of Arunachal Pradesh south of the McMahon Line

in the early 1990s. In 1962 China and India fought a brief border war in this region, and China occupied certain areas south

of the line for several months (see Nehru's Legacy, ch 1; The

Experience of Wars, ch. 10). India and China took a major step

toward resolving their border disputes in 1981 by opening

negotiations on the issue. Agreements and talks held in 1993

and 1995 eased tensions along the India-China border (see

China, ch. 9). Sikkim, which became an Indian state in 1975,

forms the small central section of India's northern border and

lies between Nepal and Bhutan.

India's border with Bangladesh is essentially the same as it was before East Pakistan became Bangladesh in 1971. Some

minor disputes continued to occur over the size and number of

the numerous enclaves each country had on either side of the

73
India: A Country Study

border. These enclaves were established during the period

from 1661 to 1712 during righting between the Mughal Empire

and the principality of Cooch Behar. This complex pattern of

enclaves was preserved by the British administration and

passed on intact to India and Pakistan.

The 1,300-kilometer frontier with Burma has been delimited

but not completely demarcated. On March 10, 1967, the

Indian and Burmese governments signed a bilateral treaty

delimiting the boundary in detail. India also has a maritime

boundary with Burma in the area of the northern Andaman

Islands and Burma's Coco Islands in the Bay of Bengal. India's

borders with Nepal and Bhutan have remained unchanged

since the days of British rule. In 1977 India signed an accord

with Indonesia demarcating the entire maritime boundary

between the two countries. One year earlier, a similar accord

was signed with the Maldives.

Rivers

The country's rivers are classified as Himalayan, peninsular,

coastal, and inland-drainage basin rivers. Himalayan rivers are snow fed and maintain a high to medium rate of flow throughout the year. The heavy annual average rainfall levels in the

Himalayan catchment areas further add to their rates of flow.

During the monsoon months ofJune to September, the catchment areas are prone to flooding. The volume of the rain-fed

peninsular rivers also increases. Coastal streams, especially in

the west, are short and episodic. Rivers of the inland system,

centered in western Rajasthan state, are few and frequently dis- appear in years of scant rainfall. The majority of the South

Asia's major rivers flow through broad, shallow valleys and

drain into the Bay of Bengal.

The Ganga River basin, India's largest, includes approximately 25 percent of the nation's area; it is bounded by the

Himalayas in the north and the Vindhya Range to the south.

The Ganga has its source in the glaciers of the Greater Himalayas, which form the frontier between India and Tibet in northwestern Uttar Pradesh. Many Indians believe that the

legendary source of the Ganga, and several other important

Asian rivers, lies in the sacred Mapam Yumco Lake (known to the Indians as Manasarowar Lake) of western Tibet located

approximately 75 kilometers northeast of the India-ChinaXepal tripoint. In the northern part of the Ganga River basin,

practically all of the tributaries of the Ganga are perennial

74
Geographic and Demographic Setting

streams. However, in the southern part, located in the states of

Rajasthan and Madhya Pradesh, many of the tributaries are not

perennial.

The Brahmaputra has the greatest volume of water of all the

rivers in India because of heavy annual rainfall levels in its catchment basin. At Dibrugarh the annual rainfall averages

2,800 millimeters, and at Shillong it averages 2,430 millimeters.

Rising in Tibet, the Brahmaputra flows south into Arunachal

Pradesh after breaking through the Great Himalayan Range

and dropping rapidly in elevation. It continues to fall through

gorges impassable by man in Arunachal Pradesh until finally

entering the Assam Valley where it meanders westward on its way to joining the Ganga in Bangladesh.

The Mahanadi, rising in the state of Madhya Pradesh, is an important river in the state of Orissa. In the upper drainage

basin of the Mahanadi, which is centered on the Chhattisgarh

Plain, periodic droughts contrast with the situation in the delta

region where floods may damage the crops in what is known as the rice bowl of Orissa. Hirakud Dam, constructed in the middle reaches of the Mahanadi, has helped in alleviating these

adverse effects by creating a reservoir.

The source of the Godavari is northeast of Bombay (Mumbai

in the local Marathi language) in the state of Maharashtra, and

the river follows a southeasterly course for 1,400 kilometers to

its mouth on the Andhra Pradesh coast. The Godavari River

basin area is second in size only to the Ganga; its delta on the

east coast is also one of the country's main rice-growing areas.

It is known as the "Ganga of the South," but its discharge,

despite the large catchment area, is moderate because of the

medium levels of annual rainfall, for example, about 700 milli- meters at Nasik and 1,000 millimeters at Nizamabad.

The Krishna rises in the Western Ghats and flows east into

the Bay of Bengal. It has a poor flow because of low levels of

rainfall in its catchment area—660 millimeters annually at Pune. Despite its low discharge, the Krishna is the third longest

river in India.

The source of the Kaveri is in the state of Karnataka, and the

river flows southeastward. The waters of the river have been a source of irrigation since antiquity; in the early 1990s, an esti- mated 95 percent of the Kaveri was diverted for agricultural use before emptying into the Bay of Bengal. The delta of the Kaveri

is so mature that the main river has almost lost its link with the

75
India: A Country Study

sea, as the Kollidam, the distributary of the Kaveri, bears most

of the flow.

The Narmada and the Tapti are the only major rivers that

flow into the Arabian Sea. The Narmada rises in Madhya

Pradesh and crosses the state, passing swiftly through a narrow

valley between the Vindhya Range and spurs of the Satpura

Range. It flows into the Gulf of Khambhat (or Cambay). The

shorter Tapti follows a generally parallel course, between

eighty kilometers and 160 kilometers to the south of the Narmada, flowing through the states of Maharashtra and Gujarat

on its way into the Gulf of Khambhat.

Harnessing the waters of the major rivers that flow from the

Himalayas is an issue of great concern in Nepal, India, and

Bangladesh. Issues of flood control, drought prevention,

hydroelectric power generation, job creation, and environmental quality—but also traditional lifestyles and cultural continuities—are at stake as these countries grapple with the political

realities, both domestic and international, of altering the flow

of the Ganga and Brahmaputra. Although India, Nepal, and

Bangladesh seek to alleviate problems through cooperation

over Himalayan rivers, irrigation projects altering the flow of

Punjab-area rivers are likely to continue to be an irritant

between India and Pakistan—countries between which cooperation is less likely to occur—in the second half of the 1990s.

Internally, large dam projects, such as one on the Narmada

River, are also controversial (see Development Programs, ch.

7).

Climate

The Himalayas isolate South Asia from the rest of Asia.

South of these mountains, the climate, like the terrain, is highly diverse, but some geographers give it an overall, one- word characterization—violent. What geographers have in

mind is the abruptness of change and the intensity of effect

when change occurs—the onset of the monsoon rains, sudden

flooding, rapid erosion, extremes of temperature, tropical

storms, and unpredictable fluctuations in rainfall. Broadly

speaking, agriculture in India is constantly challenged by

weather uncertainty.

It is possible to identify seasons, although these do not occur uniformly throughout South Asia. The Indian Meteorological

Service divides the year into four seasons: the relatively dry,

cool winter from December through February; the dry, hot

76
Geographic and Demographic Setting

summer from March through May; the southwest monsoon

from June through September when the predominating southwest maritime winds bring rains to most of the country; and the

northeast, or retreating, monsoon of October and November.

The southwest monsoon blows in from sea to land. The

southwest monsoon usually breaks on the west coast early in

June and reaches most of South Asia by the first week in July

(see fig. 6). Because of the critical importance of monsoon

rainfall to agricultural production, predictions of the monsoon's arrival date are eagerly watched by government planners

and agronomists who need to determine the optimal dates for

plantings.

Theories about why monsoons occur vary. Conventionally,

scientists have attributed monsoons to thermal changes in the

Asian landmass. Contemporary theory cites other factors—the

barrier of the Himalayas and the sun's northward tilt (which

shifts the jet stream north). The hot air that rises over South

Asia during April and May creates low-pressure areas into

which the cooler, moisture-bearing winds from the Indian

Ocean flow. These circumstances set off a rush of moisture-rich

air from the southern seas over South Asia.

The southwest monsoon occurs in two branches. After

breaking on the southern part of the Peninsula in early June,

the branch known as the Arabian Sea monsoon reaches Bombay around June 10, and it has settled over most of South Asia

by late June, bringing cooler but more humid weather. The

other branch, known as the Bay of Bengal monsoon, moves

northward in the Bay of Bengal and spreads over most of

Assam by the first week ofJune. On encountering the barrier

of the Great Himalayan Range, it is deflected westward along

the Indo-Gangetic Plain toward New Delhi. Thereafter the two

branches merge as a single current bringing rains to the

remaining parts of North India in July.

The withdrawal of the monsoon is a far more gradual process than its onset. It usually withdraws from northwest India by

the beginning of October and from the remaining parts of the

country by the end of November. During this period, the

northeast winds contribute to the formation of the northeast

monsoon over the southern half of the Peninsula in October. It

is also known as the retreating monsoon because it follows in

the wake of the southwest monsoon. The states of Tamil Nadu,

Karnataka, and Kerala receive most of their rainfall from the

northeast monsoon during November and December. How77
India: A Country Study

ever, 80 percent of the country receives most of its rainfall from

the southwest monsoon from June to September.

South Asia is subject to a wide range of climates—from the

subfreezing Himalayan winters to the tropical climate of the

Coromandel Coast and from the damp, rainy climate in the

states of Assam and West Bengal to the arid Great Indian

Desert. Based on precipitation and temperature, experts

define seven climatic regions: the Himalayas, Assam and West

Bengal, the Indo-Gangetic Plain, the Western Ghats and coast,

the Deccan (the interior of the Peninsula south of the Xarmada River), and the Eastern Ghats and coast (see fig. 7).

In the Himalayan region, climate varies with altitude. At

about 2,000 meters, the average summer temperature is near

18°C; at 4,500 meters, it is rarely above 0°C. In the valleys, sum- mer temperatures reach between 32°C and 38°C. The eastern

Himalayas receive as much as 1,000 to 2,000 millimeters more

precipitation than do the Western Himalayas, and floods are common.

Assam and West Bengal are extremely wet and humid. The

southeastern part of the state of Meghalaya has the world's

highest average annual rainfall, some 10,900 millimeters.

The Indo-Gangetic Plain has a varied climatic pattern. Rainfall and temperature ranges vary significantly between the east- ern and western extremes (see table 2, Appendix). In the

Peninsula region, the Western Ghats and the adjoining coast

receive heavy rains during the southwest monsoon. Rainfall in

the peninsular interior averages about 650 millimeters a year, although there is considerable variation in different localities

and from year to vear. The Eastern Ghats receive less rainfall

than the western coast. Rainfall there ranges between 900 and

1,300 millimeters annually.

The northern Deccan region, bounded by the Western

Ghats, the Vindhya Range and the Narmada River to the north,

and the Eastern Ghats, receives most of its annual rainfall during the summer monsoon season. The southern Deccan area is in a "rain shadow" and receives only fifty to 1,000 millimeters of

rainfall a year. Temperature ranges are wide—from some 15°C

to 38°C—making this one of India's most comfortable climatic

areas. Throughout most of non-Himalayan India, the heat can be

oppressive and sometimes, such as was experienced in 1994

and 1995, literally can be a killer. Hot, relatively dry weather is the norm before the southwest monsoons, which, along with

78


Geographic and Demographic Setting

heavy rains and high humidity, bring cloud cover that lowers

temperatures slightly. Temperatures reach the upper 30s°C

and can reach as high as 48°C during the day in the premonsoon months.

Earthquakes

India has experienced some of the world's most devastating

earthquakes. Some 19,000 people died in Kangra District,

northeastern Himachal Pradesh, in April 1905, and more than

30,000 died in Maharashtra and Andhra Pradesh in September

1993. Although resulting in less extensive loss of life, major

earthquakes occurred in Assam in 1950 (more than 1,500

killed) and in Uttarkashi District, Uttar Pradesh, in 1991 (1,600

killed).

Population

Structure and Dynamics

The 1991 final census count gave India a total population of

846,302,688. However, estimates of India's population vary

widely. According to the Population Division of the United

Nations Department of International Economic and Social

Affairs, the population had already reached 866 million in

1991. The Population Division of the United Nations Economic and Social Commission for Asia and the Pacific

(ESGAP) projected 896.5 million by mid-1993 with a 1.9 percent annual growth rate. The United States Bureau of the Census, assuming an annual population growth rate of 1.8 percent,

put India's population in July 1995 at 936,545,814. These

higher projections merit attention in light of the fact that the

Planning Commission had estimated a figure of 844 million for

1991 while preparing the Eighth Five-Year Plan (FY 1992-96;

see Population Projections, this ch.).

India accounts for some 2.4 percent of the world's landmass

but is home to about 16 percent of the global population. The

magnitude of the annual increase in population can be seen in

the fact that India adds almost the total population of Australia or Sri Lanka every year. A 1992 study of India's population

notes that India has more people than all of Africa and also

more than North America and South America together.

Between 1947 and 1991, India's population more than doubled.

81
Figure 6. Rainfall

80

India: A Country Study

Throughout the twentieth century, India has been in the

midst of a demographic transition. At the beginning of the century, endemic disease, periodic epidemics, and famines kept

the death rate high enough to balance out the high birth rate. Between 1911 and 1920, the birth and death rates were virtually equal—about forty-eight births and forty-eight deaths per

1,000 population. The increasing impact of curative and preventive medicine (especially mass inoculations) brought a steady decline in the death rate. By the mid-1990s, the esti- mated birth rate had fallen to twenty-eight per 1,000, and the

estimated death rate had fallen to ten per 1,000. Clearly, the

future configuration of India's population (indeed the future

of India itself) depends on what happens to the birth rate (see

fig. 8). Even the most optimistic projections do not suggest that

the birth rate could drop below twenty per 1,000 before the

year 2000. India's population is likely to exceed the 1 billion

mark before the 2001 census. The upward population spiral began in the 1920s and is reflected in intercensal growth increments. South Asia's population increased roughly 5 percent between 1901 and 1911 and

actually declined slightly in the next decade. Population

increased some 10 percent in the period from 1921 to 1931

and 13 to 14 percent in the 1930s and 1940s. Between 1951 and

1961, the population rose 21.5 percent. Between 1961 and

1971, the country's population increased by 24.8 percent.

Thereafter a slight slowing of the increase was experienced:

from 1971 to 1981, the population increased by 24.7 percent,

and from 1981 to 1991, by 23.9 percent (see table 3, Appendix).

Population density has risen concomitantly with the massive

increases in population. In 1901 India counted some seventy- seven persons per square kilometer; in 1981 there were 216

persons per square kilometer; by 1991 there were 267 persons

per square kilometer—up almost 25 percent from the 1981

population density (see table 4, Appendix). India's average

population density is higher than that of any other nation of

comparable size. The highest densities are not only in heavily

urbanized regions but also in areas that are mostly agricultural.

Population growth in the years between 1950 and 1970 cen- tered on areas of new irrigation projects, areas subject to refugee resettlement, and regions of urban expansion. Areas where

population did not increase at a rate approaching the national

average were those facing the most severe economic hardships,

82
Figure 7. Temperature

84
A

® National capital • Populated place Average annual temperature

(in degrees Celsius) P~l Below 20°

I I 20°-27.5° r~~l Above 27.5° 300 Kilometers 150 300 Miles

ANDAMAN °r\ ISLANDS f.

NICOBAR

ISLANDS %
Geographic and Demographic Setting

overpopulated rural areas, and regions with low levels of urbanization.

The 1991 census, which was carried out under the direction

of the Registrar General and Census Commissioner of India

(part of the Ministry of Home Affairs), in keeping with the previous two censuses, used the term urban agglomerations. An

urban agglomeration forms a continuous urban spread and

consists of a city or town and its urban outgrowth outside the

statutory limits. Or, an urban agglomerate may be two or more

adjoining cities or towns and their outgrowths. A university

campus or military base located on the outskirts of a city or

town, which often increases the actual urban area of that city or

town, is an example of an urban agglomeration. In India urban

agglomerations with a population of 1 million or more—there were twenty-four in 1991 —are referred to as metropolitan

areas. Places with a population of 100,000 or more are termed

"cities" as compared with "towns," which have a population of

less than 100,000. Including the metropolitan areas, there were

299 urban agglomerations with more than 100,000 population

in 1991. These large urban agglomerations are designated as Class I urban units. There were five other classes of urban

agglomerations, towns, and villages based on the size of their

populations: Class II (50,000 to 99,999), Class III (20,000 to 49,999), Class IV (10,000 to 19,999), Class V (5,000 to 9,999),

and Class VI (villages of less than 5,000; see table 5, Appendix).

The results of the 1991 census revealed that around 221 million, or 26.1 percent, of Indian's population lived in urban

areas. Of this total, about 138 million people, or 16 percent,

lived in the 299 urban agglomerations. In 1991 the twenty-four

metropolitan cities accounted for 51 percent of India's total

population living in Class I urban centers, with Bombay and

Calcutta the largest at 12.6 million and 10.9 million, respectively (see table 6, Appendix).

In the early 1990s, growth was the most dramatic in the cities of central and southern India. About twenty cities in those two

regions experienced a growth rate of more than 100 percent

between 1981 and 1991. Areas subject to an influx of refugees

also experienced noticeable demographic changes. Refugees

from Bangladesh, Burma, and Sri Lanka contributed substantially to population growth in the regions in which they settled. Less dramatic population increases occurred in areas where

Tibetan refugee settlements were founded after the Chinese

annexation of Tibet in the 1950s.

85
Figure 7. Temperature

84

India: A Country Study

AGE-GROUP

75 and over 70-74

65-69

60-64

55-59

50-54

45-49

40-44

35-39

30-34

25-29

20-24

15-19

10-14

5-9

0-4

60 50 40 30 20 10 10 20 30 40 50 60 POPULATION IN MILLIONS

1990

Source: Based on information from Eduard Bos, My T. Vu, Ann Levin, and Rodolfo A. Bulatao, World Population Projections, 1992-93 Edition, Baltimore, 1992, 266. Figure 8. Population by Age and Sex, 1990 and 2000

The majority of districts had urban populations ranging on

average from 15 to 40 percent in 1991. According to the 1991

census, urban clusters predominated in the upper part of the

Indo-Gangetic Plain: in the Punjab and Haryana plains, and in

part of western Uttar Pradesh. The lower part of the IndoGangetic Plain in southeastern Bihar, southern West Bengal,

and northern Orissa also experienced increased urbanization.

Similar increases occurred in the western coastal state of

Gujarat and the union territory of Daman and Diu. In the Central Highlands in Madhva Pradesh and Maharashtra, urbanization was most noticeable in the river basins and adjacent

plateau regions of the Mahanadi, Narmada, and Tapti rivers.

86
Geographic and Demographic Setting

AGE-GROUP

75 and over 70-74

65-69

60-64

55-59

50-54

45-49

40-44

35-39

30-34

25-29

20-24

15-19

10-14

5-9

0-4

MALES

60 50

FEMALES

40 30 20 10 10 20 30 40 50 60 POPULATION IN MILLIONS

(Projected)

2000

The coastal plains and river deltas of the east and west coasts

also showed increased levels of urbanization.

The hilly, inaccessible regions of the Peninsular Plateau, the

northeast, and the Himalayas remain sparsely settled. As a general rule, the lower the population density and the more

remote the region, the more likely it is to count a substantial

portion of tribal (see Glossary) people among its population

(see Tribes, ch. 4). Urbanization in some sparsely settled

regions is more developed than would seem warranted at first glance at their limited natural resources. Areas of western

India that were formerly princely states (in Gujarat and the

desert regions of Rajasthan) have substantial urban centers

that originated as political-administrative centers and since

independence have continued to exercise hegemony over their

hinterlands.

The vast majority of Indians, nearly 625 million, or 73.9 percent, in 1991 lived in what are called villages of less than 5,000

87
India: A Country Study

people or in scattered hamlets and other rural settlements (see

The Village Community, ch. 5) . The states with proportionately

the greatest rural populations in 1991 were the states of Assam

(88.9 percent), Sikkim (90.9 percent) and Himachal Pradesh

(91.3 percent), and the tiny union territory of Dadra and

Nagar Haveli (91.5 percent). Those with the smallest rural populations proportionately were the states of Gujarat (65.5 percent), Maharashtra (61.3 percent), Goa (58.9 percent), and

Mizoram (53.9 percent) . Most of the other states and the union

territory of the Andaman and Nicobar Islands were near the

national average.

Two other categories of population that are closely scrutinized by the national census are the Scheduled Castes (see

Glossary) and Scheduled Tribes (see Glossary). The greatest

concentrations of Scheduled Caste members in 1991 lived in

the states of Andhra Pradesh (10.5 million, or nearly 16 percent of the state's population), Tamil Nadu (10.7 million, or 19

percent), Bihar (12.5 million, or 14 percent), West Bengal (16

million, or 24 percent), and Uttar Pradesh (29.3 million, or 21

percent). Together, these and other Scheduled Caste members

comprised about 139 million people, or more than 16 percent

of the total population of India. Scheduled Tribe members represented only 8 percent of the total population (about 68 million). They were found in 1991 in the greatest numbers in

Orissa (7 million, or 23 percent of the state's population),

Maharashtra (7.3 million, or 9 percent), and Madhya Pradesh

(15.3 million, or 23 percent). In proportion, however, the populations of states in the northeast had the greatest concentrations of Scheduled Tribe members. For example, 31 percent of

the population of Tripura, 34 percent of Manipur, 64 percent

of Arunachal Pradesh, 86 percent of Meghalaya, 88 percent of

Nagaland, and 95 percent of Mizoram were Scheduled Tribe

members. Other heavy concentrations were found in Dadra

and Nagar Haveli, 79 percent of which was composed of Scheduled Tribe members, and Lakshadweep, with 94 percent of its population being Scheduled Tribe members.

Population Projections

The Registrar General and Census Commissioner of India

(both positions are held by the same person) oversees an ongoing intercensal effort to help maintain accurate annual esti- mates of population. The projection method used in the mid1980s to predict the 1991 population, which was accurate

88
Geographic and Demographic Setting

enough to come within 3 million (843 million) of the official,

final census count in 1991 (846 million), was based on the Sample Registration System. The system employed birth and death

rates from each of the twenty-five states, six union territories,

and one national capital territory plus statistical data on effective contraceptive use. Assuming a 1.7 percent error rate,

India's projection for 1991 was close to those made by the

World Bank and the UN.

Projections of future population growth prepared by the

Registrar General, assuming the highest level of fertility, show

decreasing growth rates: 1.8 percent by 2001, 1.3 percent by

2011, and 0.9 percent by 2021. These rates of growth, however,

will put India's population above 1.0 billion in 2001, at 1.2 bil- lion in 2011, and at 1.3 billion in 2021. ESGAP projections published in 1993 were close to those made by India: nearly 1.2

billion by 2010, still considerably less than the 2010 population

projection for China of 1.4 billion. In 1992 the Washingtonbased Population Reference Bureau had a similar projection to ESCAP's for India's population in 2010 and projected nearly

1.4 billion by 2025 (nearly the same as projected for 2025 by

the United Nations Department of International Economic

and Social Affairs). According to other UN projections, India's

population may stabilize at around 1.7 billion by 2060.

Such projections also show an increasingly aging population,

with 76 million (8 percent of the population) age sixty and

above in 2001, 102 million (9 percent) in 2011, and 137 million

(11 percent) in 2021. These figures coincide closely with those

estimated by the United States Bureau of the Census, which

also projected that whereas the median age was twenty-two in

1992, it was expected to increase to twenty-nine by 2020, placing the median age in India well above all of its South Asian

neighbors except Sri Lanka.

Population and Family Planning Policy

Population growth has long been a concern of the government, and India has a lengthy history of explicit population

policy. In the 1950s, the government began, in a modest way,

one of the earliest national, government-sponsored family

planning efforts in the developing world. The annual population growth rate in the previous decade (1941 to 1951) had

been below 1.3 percent, and government planners optimistically believed that the population would continue to grow at roughly the same rate.

89
India: A Country Study

Implicitly, the government believed that India could repeat

the experience of the developed nations where industrialization and a rise in the standard of living had been accompanied

by a drop in the population growth rate. In the 1950s, existing

hospitals and health care facilities made birth control information available, but there was no aggressive effort to encourage

the use of contraceptives and limitation of family size. By the

late 1960s, many policy makers believed that the high rate of

population growth was the greatest obstacle to economic development. The government began a massive program to lower

the birth rate from forty-one per 1,000 to a target of twenty to twenty-five per 1,000 by the mid-1970s. The National Population Policy adopted in 1976 reflected the growing consensus among policy makers that family planning would enjoy only

limited success unless it was part of an integrated program

aimed at improving the general welfare of the population. The

policy makers assumed that excessive family size was part and

parcel of poverty and had to be dealt with as integral to a general development strategy. Education about the population

problem became part of school curriculum under the Fifth

Five-Year Plan (FY 1974-78). Cases of government-enforced

sterilization made many question the propriety of state-sponsored birth control measures, however.

During the 1980s, an increased number of family planning

programs were implemented through the state governments

with financial assistance from the central government. In rural

areas, the programs were further extended through a network

of primary health centers and subcenters. By 1991, India had

more than 150,000 public health facilities through which family planning programs were offered (see Health Care, this ch.).

Four special family planning projects were implemented under

the Seventh Five-Year Plan (FY 1985-89). One was the All-India

Hospitals Post-partum Programme at district- and subdistrictlevel hospitals. Another program involved the reorganization

of primary health care facilities in urban slum areas, while

another project reserved a specified number of hospital beds

for tubal ligature operations. The final program called for the

renovation or remodelling of intrauterine device (IUD) rooms

in rural family welfare centers attached to primary health care

facilities. Despite these developments in promoting family planning,

the 1991 census results showed that India continued to have

one of the most rapidly growing populations in the world.

90
A family planning billboard exhorting "Fewer children, Happy

people" and "2 or 3 children, that's all" Courtesy DoranneJacobson

Between 1981 and 1991, the annual rate of population growth

was estimated at about 2 percent. The crude birth rate in 1992 was thirty per 1,000, only a small change over the 1981 level of

thirty-four per 1,000. However, some demographers credit this

slight lowering of the 1981-91 population growth rate to moderate successes of the family planning program. In FY 1986, the

number of reproductive-age couples was 132.6 million, of

whom only 37.5 percent were estimated to be protected effectively by some form of contraception. A goal of the seventh

plan was to achieve an effective couple protection rate of 42

percent, requiring an annual increase of 2 percent in effective use of contraceptives.

The heavy centralization of India's family planning programs often prevents due consideration from being given to regional differences. Centralization is encouraged to a large

extent by reliance on central government funding. As a result,

many of the goals and assumptions of national population control programs do not correspond exactly with local attitudes

toward birth control. At the Jamkhed Project in Maharashtra,

which has been in operation since the late 1970s and covers approximately 175 villages, the local project directors noted

that it required three to four years of education through direct

91
India: A Country Study

contact with a couple for the idea of family planning to gain

acceptance. Such a timetable was not compatible with targets.

However, much was learned about policy and practice from the

Jamkhed Project. The successful use of women's clubs as a means of involving women in community-wide family planning

activities impressed the state government to the degree that it set about organizing such clubs in every village in the state. The project also serves as a pilot to test ideas that the government wants to incorporate into its programs. Government

medical staff members have been sent to Jamkhed for training,

and the government has proposed that the project assume the

task of selecting and training government health workers for an area of 2.5 million people.

Another important family planning program is the Project

for Community Action in Family Planning. Located in Karnataka, the project operates in 154 project villages and 255 control villages. All project villages are of sufficient size to have a health subcenter, although this advantage is offset by the fact

that those villages are the most distant from the area's primary

health centers. As at Jamkhed, the project is much assisted by

local voluntary groups, such as the women's clubs. The local

voluntary groups either provide or secure sites suitable as dis- tribution depots for condoms and birth control pills and also

make arrangements for the operation of sterilization camps.

Data provided by the Project for Community Action in Family

Planning show that important achievements have been realized

in the field of population control. By the mid-1980s, for example, 43 percent of couples were using family planning, a full 14

percent above the state average. The project has significantly

improved the status of women, involving them and empowering them to bring about change in their communities. This

contribution is important because of the way in which the

deeply entrenched inferior status of women in many communities in India negates official efforts to decrease the fertility rate. Studies have found that most couples in fact regard family

planning positively. However, the common fertility pattern in

India diverges from the two-child family that policy makers

hold as ideal. Women continue to marry young; in the mid1990s, they average just over eighteen years of age at marriage.

When women choose to be sterilized, financial inducements,

although helpful, are not the principal incentives. On average,

those accepting sterilization already have four living children,

of whom two are sons.

92
Geographic and Demographic Setting

The strong preference for sons is a deeply held cultural ideal

based on economic roots. Sons not only assist with farm labor

as they are growing up (as do daughters) but they provide

labor in times of illness and unemployment and serve as their

parents' only security in old age. Surveys done by the New

Delhi Operations Research Group in 1991 indicated that as many as 72 percent of rural parents continue to have children

until at least two sons are born; the preference for more than

one son among urban parents was tabulated at 53 percent.

Once these goals have been achieved, birth control may be

used or, especially in agricultural areas, it may not if additional

child labor, later adult labor for the family, is deemed desirable.

A significant result of this eagerness for sons is that the

Indian population has a deficiency of females. Slightly higher

female infant mortality rates (seventy-nine per 1,000 versus sev- enty-eight per 1,000 for males) can be attributed to poor health

care, abortions of female fetuses, and female infanticide.

Human rights activists have estimated that there are at least

10,000 cases of female infanticide annually throughout India.

The cost of theoretically illegal dowries and the loss of daughters to their in-laws' families are further disincentives for some

parents to have daughters. Sons, of course continue to carry on

the family line (see Family Ideals, ch. 5). The 1991 census

revealed that the national sex ratio had declined from 934

females to 1,000 males in 1981 to 927 to 1,000 in 1991. In only

one state—Kerala, a state with low fertility and mortality rates and the nation's highest literacy—did females exceed males.

The census found, however, that female life expectancy at birth

had for the first time exceeded that for males.

India's high infant mortality and elevated mortality in early

childhood remain significant stumbling blocks to population

control (see Health Conditions, this ch.). India's fertility rate is decreasing, however, and, at 3.4 in 1994, it is lower than those

of its immediate neighbors (Bangladesh had a rate of 4.5 and

Pakistan had 6.7). The rate is projected to decrease to 3.0 by

2000, 2.6 by 2010, and 2.3 by 2020.

During the 1960s, 1970s, and 1980s, the growth rate had

formed a sort of plateau. Some states, such as Kerala, Tamil

Nadu, and, to a lesser extent, Punjab, Maharashtra, and Karnataka, had made progress in lowering their growth rates, but

most did not. Under such conditions, India's population may

not stabilize until 2060.

93
In di a: A Co u n try Stu dy

Health

Health Conditions

Life Expectancy and Mortality

The average Indian male born in the 1990s can expect to

live 58.5 years; women can expect to live onlv slightlv longer

(59.6 years), according to 1995 estimates. Life expectancv has

risen dramatically throughout the centurv from a scant twenty

vears in the 1911-20 period. Although men enjoved a slightlv

longer life expectancv throughout the first part of the twentieth centurv, by 1990 women had slightlv surpassed men. The

death rate declined from 48.6 per 1.000 in the 1910-20 period

to fifteen per 1.000 in the 1970s, and improved thereafter,

reaching ten per 1.000 by 1990,. a rate that held steady through

the mid-1990s. India's high infant mortality rate was estimated

to exceed 76 per 1.000 live births in 1995 (see table 7. Appendix). Thirtv percent of infants had low birth weights., and the

death rate for children aged one to four years was around ten

per 1.000 of the population.

According to a 1989 National Nutrition Monitoring Bureau

report., less than 15 percent of the population was adequately

nourished, although 96 percent received an adequate number

of calories per dav. In 1986 dailv average intake was 2.238 calories as compared with 2.630 calories in China. According to UN

findings, caloric intake per dav in India had fallen slightlv to 2.229 in 1989. lending credence to the concerns of some

experts who claimed that annual nutritional standards statistics cannot be relied on to show whether poverty is actually being

reduced. Instead., such studies may actually pick up short-term

amelioration of poverty as the result of a period of good crops

rather than a long-term trend.

Official Indian estimates of the poverty level are based on a person's income and corresponding access to minimum nutritional needs (see Growth since 1980. ch. 6). There were 332

million people at or below the poverty level in FY 1991. most of

whom lived in rural areas. Communicable and Noncommunicable Diseases

A number of endemic communicable diseases present a seri- ous public health hazard in India. Over the years, the government has set up a variety of national programs aimed at controlling or eradicating these diseases, including the

94
Geographic and Demographic Setting

National Malaria Eradication Programme and the National

Filaria Control Programme. Other initiatives seek to limit the

incidence of respiratory infections, cholera, diarrheal diseases,

trachoma, goiter, and sexually transmitted diseases.

Smallpox, formerly a significant source of mortality, was

eradicated as part of the worldwide effort to eliminate that dis- ease. India was declared smallpox-free in 1975. Malaria

remains a serious health hazard; although the incidence of the

disease declined sharply in the postindependence period,

India remains one of the most heavily malarial countries in the

world. Only the Himalaya region above 1,500 meters is spared.

In 1965 government sources registered only 150,000 cases, a notable drop from the 75 million cases in the early postindependence years. This success was short-lived, however, as the

malarial parasites became increasingly resistant to the insecticides and drugs used to combat the disease. By the mid-1970s,

there were nearly 6.5 million cases on record. The situation

again improved because of more conscientious efforts; by 1982

the number of cases had fallen by roughly two-thirds. This

downward trend continued, and in 1987 slightly fewer than 1.7

million cases of malaria were reported.

In the early 1990s, about 389 million people were at risk of

infection from filaria parasites; 19 million showed symptoms of

filariasis, and 25 million were deemed to be hosts to the parasites. Efforts at control, under the National Filaria Control Programme, which was established in 1955, have focused on

eliminating the filaria larvae in urban locales, and by the early

1990s there were more than 200 filaria control units in operation.

Leprosy, a major public health and social problem, is endemic, with all the states and union territories reporting

cases. However, the prevalence of the disease varies. About 3

million leprosy cases are estimated to exist nationally, of which

15 to 20 percent are infectious. The National Leprosy Control

Programme was started in 1955, but it only received high priority after 1980. In FY 1982, it was redesignated as the National

Leprosy Eradication Programme. Its goal was to achieve eradication of the disease by 2000. To that end, 758 leprosy control

units, 900 urban leprosy centers, 291 temporary hospitalization

wards, 285 district leprosy units, and some 6,000 lower-level

centers had been established by March 1990. By March 1992,

nearly 1.7 million patients were receiving regular multidrug

95
India: A Country Study

treatment, which is more effective than the standard single

drug therapy (Dapsone monotherapy)

.

India is subject to outbreaks of various diseases. Among

them is pneumonic plague, an episode of which spread quickly

throughout India in 1994 killing hundreds before being

brought under control. Tuberculosis, trachoma, and goiter are endemic. In the early 1980s, there were an estimated 10 million cases of tuberculosis, of which about 25 percent were infectious. During 1991 nearly 1.6 million new tuberculosis cases were detected. The functions of the Trachoma Control Programme, which started in 1968, have been subsumed by the

National Programme for the Control of Blindness. Approximately 45 million Indians are vision-impaired; roughly 12 million are blind. The incidence of goiter is dominant throughout

the sub-Himalayan states from Jammu and Kashmir to the

northeast. There are some 170 million people who are exposed

to iodine deficiency disorders. Starting in the late 1980s, the

central government began a salt iodinization program for all edible salt, and by 1991 record production—2.5 million tons

of iodized salt had been achieved. There are as well anemias

related to poor nutrition, a variety of diseases caused by vitamin

and mineral deficiencies—beriberi, scurvy, osteomalacia, and

rickets—and a high incidence of parasitic infection.

Diarrheal diseases, the primary cause of early childhood

mortality, are linked to inadequate sewage disposal and lack of

safe drinking water. Roughly 50 percent of all illness is attributed to poor sanitation; in rural areas, about 80 percent of all children are infected by parasitic worms. Estimates in the early

1980s suggested that although more than 80 percent of the

urban population had access to reasonably safe water, fewer

than 5 percent of rural dwellers did. Waterborne sewage sys- tems were woefully overburdened; only around 30 percent of

urban populations had adequate sewage disposal, but scarcely

any populations outside cities did. In 1990, according to

United States sources, only 3 percent of the rural population

and 44 percent of the urban population had access to sanitation services, a level relatively low by developing nation stan- dards. There were better findings for access to potable water:

69 percent in the rural areas and 86 percent in urban areas, rel- atively high percentages by developing nation standards. In the

mid-1990s, about 1 million people die each year of diseases

associated with diarrhea.

96
Infant vaccination, rural

Madhya Pradesh

Courtesy DoranneJacobson

India has an estimated 1.5 million to 2 million cases of cancer, with 500,000 new cases added each year. Annual deaths

from cancer total around 300,000. The most common malignancies are cancer of the oral cavity (mostly relating to tobacco

use and pan chewing—about 35 percent of all cases), cervix,

and breast. Cardiovascular diseases are a major health problem; men and women suffer from them in almost equal numbers (14 million versus 13 million in FY 1990).

Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndrome

The incidence of AIDS cases in India is steadily rising amidst concerns that the nation faces the prospect of an AIDS epidemic. By June 1991, out of a total of more than 900,000

screened, some 5,130 people tested positive for the human

immunodeficiency virus (HIV). However, the total number

infected with HIV in 1992 was estimated by a New Delhi-based

official of the World Health Organization (WHO) at 500,000,

and more pessimistic estimates by the World Bank in 1995 suggested a figure of 2 million, the highest in Asia. Confirmed

cases of AIDS numbered only 102 by 1991 but had jumped to 885 by 1994, the second highest reported number in Asia after

Thailand. Suspected AIDS cases, according to WHO and the

Indian government, may be in the area of 80,000 in 1995.

97
India: A Country Study

The main factors cited in the spread of the virus are heterosexual transmission, primarily by urban prostitutes and migrant

workers, such as long-distance truck drivers; the use of unsterilized needles and syringes by physicians and intravenous drug

users; and transfusions of blood from infected donors. Based

on the HIV infection rate in 1991, and India's position as the

second most populated country in the world, it was projected

that by 1995 India would have more HIV and AIDS cases than

any other country in the world. This prediction appeared true. By mid-1995 India had been labeled by the media as "ground

zero" in the global AIDS epidemic, and new predictions for

2000 were that India would have 1 million AIDS cases and 5

million HIV-positive.

In 1987 the newly formed National AIDS Control Programme began limited screening of the blood supply and monitoring of high-risk groups. A national education program

aimed at AIDS prevention and control began in 1990. The first AIDS prevention television campaign began in 1991. By the

mid-1990s, AIDS awareness signs on public streets, condoms

for sale near brothels, and media announcements were more

in evidence. There was very negative publicity as well. Posters

with the names and photographs of known HIV-positive per- sons have been seen in New Delhi, and there have been reports

of HIV patients chained in medical facilities and deprived of

treatment.

Fear and ignorance have continued to compound the diffi- culty of controlling the spread of the virus, and discrimination

against AIDS sufferers has surfaced. For example, in 1990 the

All-India Institute of Medical Sciences, New Delhi's leading

medical facility, reportedly turned away two people infected

with HIV because its staff were too scared to treat them.

A new program to control the spread of AIDS was launched

in 1991 by the Indian Council of Medical Research. The council looked to ancient scriptures and religious books for traditional messages that preach moderation in sex and describe

prostitution as a sin. The council considered that the great

extent to which Indian life-styles are shaped by religion rather

than by science would cause many people to be confused by

foreign-modeled educational campaigns relying on television

and printed booklets.

The severity of the growing AIDS crisis in India is clear,

according to statistics compiled during the mid-1990s. In Bombay, a city of 12.6 million inhabitants in 1991, the HIV infection

98
Geographic and Demographic Setting

rate among the estimated 80,000 prostitutes jumped from 1 percent in 1987 to 30 percent in 1991 to 53 percent in 1993.

Migrant workers engaging in promiscuous and unprotected

sexual relations in the big city carry the infection to other sex- ual partners on the road and then to their homes and families.

India's blood supply, despite official blood screening efforts,

continues to become infected. In 1991 donated blood was

screened for HIV in only four major cities: New Delhi, Calcutta,

Madras, and Bombay. One of the leading factors in the contamination of the blood supply is that 30 percent of the blood

required comes from private, profit-making banks whose practices are difficult to regulate. Furthermore, professional

donors are an integral part of the Indian blood supply network,

providing about 30 percent of the annual requirement nationally. These donors are generally poor and tend to engage in

high-risk sex and use intravenous drugs more than the general

population. Professional donors also tend to donate frequently

at different centers and, in many cases, under different names. Reuse of improperly sterilized needles in health care and

blood-collection facilities also is a factor. India's minister of

health and family welfare reported in 1992 that only 138 out of

608 blood banks were equipped for HIV screening. A 1992

study conducted by the Indian Health Organisation revealed

that 86 percent of commercial blood donors surveyed were

HIV-positive.

Health Care

Role of the Government

The Indian constitution charges the states with "the raising

of the level of nutrition and the standard of living of its people

and the improvement of public health" (see The Constitutional Framework, ch. 8). However, many critics of India's

National Health Policy, endorsed by Parliament in 1983, point

out that the policy lacks specific measures to achieve broad

stated goals. Particular problems include the failure to integrate health services with wider economic and social development, the lack of nutritional support and sanitation, and the

poor participatory involvement at the local level. Central government efforts at influencing public health

have focused on the five-year plans, on coordinated planning

with the states, and on sponsoring major health programs. Government expenditures are jointly shared by the central and

99
India: A Country Study

state governments. Goals and strategies are set through central- state government consultations of the Central Council of

Health and Family Welfare. Central government efforts are administered by the Ministry of Health and Family Welfare,

which provides both administrative and technical services and

manages medical education. States provide public services and

health education.

The 1983 National Health Policy is committed to providing

health services to all by 2000 (see table 8, Appendix; The Legislature, ch. 8). In 1983 health care expenditures varied greatly

among the states and union territories, from Rsl3 per capita in

Bihar to Rs60 per capita in Himachal Pradesh (for value of the

rupee—see Glossary), and Indian per capita expenditure was low when compared with other Asian countries outside of

South Asia. Although government health care spending progressively grew throughout the 1980s, such spending as a percentage of the gross national product (GNP—see Glossary)

remained fairly constant. In the meantime, health care spending as a share of total government spending decreased. During

the same period, private-sector spending on health care was

about 1.5 times as much as government spending.

Expenditures

In the mid-1990s, health spending amounts to 6 percent of

GDP, one of the highest levels among developing nations. The

established per capita spending is around Rs320 per year with

the major input from private households (75 percent). State

governments contribute 15.2 percent, the central government

5.2 percent, third-party insurance and employers 3.3 percent,

and municipal government and foreign donors about 1.3,

according to a 1995 World Bank study. Of these proportions,

58.7 percent goes toward primary health care (curative, preventive, and promotive) and 38.8 percent is spent on secondary and tertiary inpatient care. The rest goes for nonservice

costs. The fifth and sixth five-year plans (FY 1974-78 and FY 1980-

84, respectively) included programs to assist delivery of preventive medicine and improve the health status of the rural population. Supplemental nutrition programs and increasing the

supply of safe drinking water were high priorities. The sixth

plan aimed at training more community health workers and

increasing efforts to control communicable diseases. There

100
The Mysore Plateau from

Chamundi Hill, Karnataka

Courtesy Robert L. Worden

were also efforts to improve regional imbalances in the distri- bution of health care resources. The Seventh Five-Year Plan (FY 1985-89) budgeted Rs33.9

billion for health, an amount roughly double the outlay of the

sixth plan. Health spending as a portion of total plan outlays,

however, had declined over the years since the first plan in

1951, from a high of 3.3 percent of the total plan spending in

FY 1951-55 to 1.9 percent of the total for the seventh plan.

Mid-way through the Eighth Five-Year Plan (FY 1992-96), however, health and family welfare was budgeted at Rs20 billion, or

4.3 percent of the total plan spending for FY 1994, with an

additional Rs3.6 billion in the nonplan budget.

Primary Services

Health care facilities and personnel increased substantially

between the early 1950s and early 1980s, but because of fast

population growth, the number of licensed medical practitio- ners per 10,000 individuals had fallen by the late 1980s to three

per 10,000 from the 1981 level of four per 10,000. In 1991

there were approximately ten hospital beds per 10,000 individuals.Primary health centers are the cornerstone of the rural

health care system. By 1991, India had about 22,400 primary

101
India: A Country Study

health centers, 11,200 hospitals, and 27,400 dispensaries.

These facilities are part of a tiered health care system that funnels more difficult cases into urban hospitals while attempting

to provide routine medical care to the vast majority in the

countryside. Primary health centers and subcenters rely on

trained paramedics to meet most of their needs. The main

problems affecting the success of primary health centers are the predominance of clinical and curative concerns over the

intended emphasis on preventive work and the reluctance of

staff to work in rural areas. In addition, the integration of

health services with family planning programs often causes the

local population to perceive the primary health centers as hostile to their traditional preference for large families. Therefore,

primary health centers often play an adversarial role in local

efforts to implement national health policies.

According to data provided in 1989 by the Ministry of

Health and Family Welfare, the total number of civilian hospitals for all states and union territories combined was 10,157. In

1991 there was a total of 811,000 hospital and health care facili- ties beds. The geographical distribution of hospitals varied

according to local socioeconomic conditions. In India's most

populous state, Uttar Pradesh, with a 1991 population of more

than 139 million, there were 735 hospitals as of 1990. In Kerala,

with a 1991 population of 29 million occupying an area only

one-seventh the size of Uttar Pradesh, there were 2,053 hospitals. In light of the central government's goal of health care for

all by 2000, the uneven distribution of hospitals needs to be

reexamined. Private studies of India's total number of hospitals

in the early 1990s were more conservative than official Indian

data, estimating that in 1992 there were 7,300 hospitals. Of this

total, nearly 4,000 were owned and managed by central, state, or local governments. Another 2,000, owned and managed by

charitable trusts, received partial support from the government, and the remaining 1,300 hospitals, many of which were

relatively small facilities, were owned and managed by the private sector. The use of state-of-the-art medical equipment,

often imported from Western countries, was primarily limited

to urban centers in the early 1990s. A network of regional cancer diagnostic and treatment facilities was being established in

the early 1990s in major hospitals that were part of government

medical colleges. By 1992 twenty-two such centers were in operation. Most of the 1,300 private hospitals lacked sophisticated

medical facilities, although in 1992 approximately 12 percent

102
Geographic and Demographic Setting

possessed state-of-the-art equipment for diagnosis and treat- ment of all major diseases, including cancer. The fast pace of

development of the private medical sector and the burgeoning

middle class in the 1990s have led to the emergence of the new

concept in India of establishing hospitals and health care facili- ties on a for-profit basis. By the late 1980s, there were approximately 128 medical colleges—roughly three times more than in 1950. These medical

colleges in 1987 accepted a combined annual class of 14,166

students. Data for 1987 show that there were 320,000 registered

medical practitioners and 219,300 registered nurses. Various

studies have shown that in both urban and rural areas people

preferred to pay and seek the more sophisticated services provided by private physicians rather than use free treatment at public health centers. Indigenous or traditional medical practitioners continue to practice throughout the country. The two main forms of traditional medicine practiced are the ayurvedic (meaning science

of life) system, which deals with causes, symptoms, diagnoses,

and treatment based on all aspects of well-being (mental, physical, and spiritual), and the unani (so-called Galenic medicine)

herbal medical practice. A vaidya is a practitioner of the

ayurvedic tradition, and a hakim (Arabic for a Muslim physician) is a practitioner of the unani tradition. These professions

are frequently hereditary. A variety of institutions offer training

in indigenous medical practice. Only in the late 1970s did offi- cial health policy refer to any form of integration between

Western-oriented medical personnel and indigenous medical

practitioners. In the early 1990s, there were ninety-eight

ayurvedic colleges and seventeen unani colleges operating in

both the governmental and nongovernmental sectors. Education

Administration and Funding

Education is divided into preprimary, primary, middle (or

intermediate), secondary (or high school), and higher levels. Primary school includes children of ages six to eleven, organized into classes one through five. Middle school pupils aged

eleven through fourteen are organized into classes six through

eight, and high school students ages fourteen through seven- teen are enrolled in classes nine through twelve. Higher education includes technical schools, colleges, and universities.

103
India: A Country Study

Article 42 of the constitution, an amendment added in 1976,

transferred education from the state list of responsibilities to the central government. Prior to this assumption of direct

responsibility for promoting educational facilities for all parts

of society, the central government had responsibility only for

the education of minorities. Article 43 of the constitution set the goal of free and compulsory education for all children

through age fourteen and gave the states the power to set stan- dards for education within their jurisdictions. Despite this joint

responsibility for education by state and central governments,

the central government has the preponderant role because it drafts the five-year plans, which include education policy and

some funding for education. Moreover, in 1986 the implementation of the National Policy on Education initiated a long-term

series of programs aimed at improving India's education system

by ensuring that all children through the primary level have

access to education of comparable quality irrespective of caste,

creed, location, or sex. The 1986 policy set a goal that, by 1990,

all children by age eleven were to have five years of schooling

or its equivalent in nonformal education. By 1995 all children

up to age fourteen were to have been provided free and compulsory education. The 1990 target was not achieved, but by

setting such goals, the central government was seen as expressing its commitment to the ideal of universal education.

The Department of Education, part of the Ministry of

Human Resource Development, implements the central government's responsibilities in educational matters. The ministry

coordinates planning with the states, provides funding for

experimental programs, and acts through the University

Grants Commission and the National Council of Educational

Research and Training. These organizations seek to improve

education standards, develop and introduce instructional

materials, and design textbooks in the country's numerous languages (see The Social Context of Language, ch. 4). The

National Council of Educational Research and Training collects data about education and conducts educational research.

State-level ministries of education coordinate education programs at local levels. City school boards are under the supervision of both the state education ministry and the municipal

government. In rural areas, either the district board or the panchayat (village council—see Glossary) oversees the school

board (see Local Government, ch. 8). The significant role the

panchayats play in education often means the politicization of

104
A primary school class, Dharmsala, Himachal Pradesh

Courtesy KarlE. Ryavek

elementary education because the appointment and transfer

of teachers often become emotional political issues.

State governments provide most educational funding,

although since independence the central government increasingly has assumed the cost of educational development as out- lined under the five-year plans. India spends an average 3

percent of its GNP on education. Spending for education

ranged between 4.6 and 7.7 percent of total central government expenditures from the 1950s through the 1970s. In the

early 1980s, about 10 percent of central and state funds went to education, a proportion well below the average of seventy-nine

other developing countries. More than 90 percent of the

expenditure was for teachers' salaries and administration. Per

capita budget expenditures increased from Rs36.5 in FY 1977

to Rsll2.7 in FY 1986, with highest expenditures found in the

union territories. Nevertheless, total expenditure per student

per year by the central and state governments declined in real

terms.

Primary and Secondary Education

Several factors work against universal education in India.

Although Indian law prohibits the employment of children in

105
India: A Country Study

factories, the law allows them to work in cottage industries,

family households, restaurants, or in agriculture. Primary and

middle school education is compulsory. However, only slightly

more than 50 percent of children between the ages of six and

fourteen actually attend school, although a far higher percentage is enrolled. School attendance patterns for children vary

from region to region and according to gender. But it is noteworthy that national literacy rates increased from 43.7 percent

in 1981 to 52.2 percent in 1991 (male 63.9 percent, female 39.4

percent), passing the 50 percent mark for the first time. There

are wide regional and gender variations in the literacy rates,

however; for example, the southern state of Kerala, with a 1991

literacy rate of about 89.8 percent, ranked first in India in

terms of both male and female literacy. Bihar, a northern state, ranked lowest with a literacy rate of only 39 percent (53 percent for males and 23 percent for females). School enrollment

rates also vary greatly according to age (see table 9, Appendix).

To improve national literacy, the central government

launched a wide-reaching literacy campaign in July 1993. Using

a volunteer teaching force of some 10 million people, the government hoped to have reached around 100 million Indians by

1997. A special focus was placed on improving literacy among

women.

A report in 1985 by the Ministry of Education, entitled Challenge ofEducation: A Policy Perspective, showed that nearly 60 percent of children dropped out between grades one and five. (The Ministry of Education was incorporated into the Ministry

of Human Resources in 1985 as the Department of Education.

In 1988 the Ministry of Human Resources was renamed the

Ministry of Human Resource Development.) Of 100 children

enrolled in grade one, only twenty-three reached grade eight.

Although many children lived within one kilometer of a primary school, nearly 20 percent of all habitations did not have

schools nearby. Forty percent of primary schools were not of

masonry construction. Sixty percent had no drinking water

facilities, 70 percent had no library facilities, and 89 percent

lacked toilet facilities. Single-teacher primary schools were commonplace, and it was not unusual for the teacher to be

absent or even to subcontract the teaching work to unqualified

substitutes (see table 10, Appendix).

The improvements that India has made in education since

independence are nevertheless substantial. From the first plan

until the beginning of the sixth (1951-80), the percentage of

106
Geographic and Demographic Setting

the primary school-age population attending classes more than

doubled. The number of schools and teachers increased dramatically. Middle schools and high schools registered the steepest rates of growth. The number of primary schools increased

by more than 230 percent between 1951 and 1980. During the same period, however, the number of middle schools increased

about tenfold. The numbers of teachers showed similar rates of

increase. The proportion of trained teachers among those

working in primary and middle schools, fewer than 60 percent

in 1950, was more than 90 percent in 1987 (see table 11,

Appendix). However, there was considerable variation in the

geographical distribution of trained teachers in the states and

union territories in the 1986-87 school year. Arunachal

Pradesh had the highest percentage (60 percent) of untrained

teachers in primary schools, and Assam had the highest percentage (72 percent) of untrained teachers in middle schools.

Gujarat, Tamil Nadu, Chandigarh, and Pondicherry (Puduchcheri) reportedly had no untrained teachers at either kind of

school.

Various forms of private schooling are common; many

schools are strictly private, whereas others enjoy government

grants-in-aid but are run privately. Schools run by church and

missionary societies are common forms of private schools.

Among India's Muslim population, the madrasa, a school

attached to a mosque, plays an important role in education

(see Islamic Traditions in South Asia, ch. 3). Some 10 percent

of all children who enter the first grade are enrolled in private

schools. The dropout rate in these schools is practically nonexistent. Traditional notions of social rank and hierarchy have greatly

influenced India's primary school system. A dual system existed

in the early 1990s, in which middle-class families sent their chil- dren to private schools while lower-class families sent their chil- dren to underfinanced and underequipped municipal and

village schools. Evolving middle-class values have made even

nursery school education in the private sector a stressful event

for children and parents alike. Tough entrance interviews for

admission, long classroom hours, heavy homework assignments, and high tuition rates in the mid-1990s led to charges of

"lost childhood" for preschool children and acknowledgment

of both the social costs and enhanced social benefits for the

families involved.

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India: A Country Study

The government encourages the study of classical, modern,

and tribal languages with a view toward the gradual switch from

English to regional languages and to teaching Hindi in nonHindi speaking states. As a result, there are schools conducted

in various languages at all levels. Classical and foreign language

training most commonly occurs at the postsecondary level,

although English is also taught at the lower levels (see Diversity,

Use, and Policy; Hindi and English, ch. 4).

Colleges and Universities

Receiving higher education, once the nearly exclusive

domain of the wealthy and privileged, since independence has

become the aspiration of almost every student completing high

school. In the 1950-51 school year, there were some 360,000

students enrolled in colleges and universities; by the 1990-91

school year, the number had risen to nearly 4 million, a more

than tenfold increase in four decades. At that time, there were

177 universities and university-level institutions (more than six

times the number at independence), some 500 teacher training colleges, and several thousand other colleges.

There are three kinds of colleges in India. The first type,

government colleges, are found only in those states where private enterprise is weak or which were at one time controlled by

princes (see Company Rule, 1757-1857, ch. 1). The second

kind are colleges managed by religious organizations and the

private sector. Many of the latter institutions were founded

after 1947 by wealthy business owners and politicians wishing

to gain local fame and importance. Professional colleges comprise the third kind and consist mostly of medical, teachertraining, engineering, law, and agricultural colleges. More than

50 percent of them are sponsored and managed by the government. However, about 5 percent of these colleges are privately run without government grant support. They charge fees of

ten to twelve times the amount of the government-run colleges. The profusion of new engineering colleges in India in

the late 1980s and early 1990s caused concern in official education circles that the overall quality and reputation of India's

higher education system would be threatened by these new

schools, which operated mainly on a for-profit basis. As the government tightened its support to higher education in the early

1990s, colleges and universities came under considerable financial stress.

108
Geographic and Demographic Setting

The All-India Council of Technical Education is empowered

to regulate the establishment of any new private professional

colleges to limit their proliferation. In 1992 the Karnataka

High Court directed the state government to rescind permission to nine organizations to start new engineering and medical colleges in the state. Gaining admission to a nonprofessional college is not

unduly difficult except in the case of some select colleges that are particularly competitive. Students encounter greater diffi- culties in gaining admission to professional colleges in such

fields as architecture, business, medicine, and dentistry.

There are four categories of universities. The largest number are teaching universities that maintain and run a large

number of colleges. Unitary institutions, such as Allahabad

University and Lucknow University, make up the second kind.

The third kind are the twenty-six agricultural universities, each

managed by the state in which it is located. Technical universities constitute the fourth kind. In the late 1980s, more technical universities, such as the Jawaharlal Nehru Technological

University in the state of Hyderabad, were founded. There

were also proposals to found medical universities in some

states. By 1990 Andhra Pradesh and Tamil Nadu already had

established such universities. Out of the 177 universities in the

country, only ten are funded by the central government. The

majority of universities are managed by the states, which establish them and provide funding.

There was a high rate of attrition among students in higher

education in the 1980s. A substantial portion failed their examinations more than once, and large numbers dropped out; only

about one out of four students successfully completed the full course of studies. Even those students who were successful

could not count on a university degree to assure them employment. In the early postindependence years, a bachelor's degree

often provided entrance to the elite, but in contemporary

India, it provides a chance to become a white-collar worker at a

relatively modest salary. The government traditionally has been

the principal employer of educated manpower.

State governments play a powerful role in the running of all but the national universities. Political considerations, if not

outright political patronage, play a significant part in appointments. The state governor is usually the university chancellor,

and the vice chancellor, who actually runs the institution, is usually a political appointee. Appointments are subject to polit109
India: A Country Study

ical jockeying, and state governments have control over grants

and other forms of recognition. Caste affiliation and regional

background are recognized criteria for admission and appointments in many colleges. To offset the inequities implicit in

such practices, a certain number of places are reserved for

members of Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes.

Education and Society

Historically, Indian education has been elitist. Traditional

Hindu education was tailored to the needs of Brahman (see

Glossary) boys who were taught to read and write by a Brahman teacher (see The Roots of Indian Religion, ch. 3). During

Mughal rule (1526-1858), Muslim education was similarly elitist, although its orientation reflected economic factors rather

than those of caste background. Under British company and

crown rule (1757-1947), official education policies reinforced

the preexisting elitist tendencies of South Asian education. By

tying entrance and advancement in government service to aca- demic education, colonial rule contributed to the legacy of an

education system geared to preserving the position and prerogatives of the more privileged. Education served as a "gatekeeper," permitting an avenue of upward mobility to those few

able to muster sufficient resources. Even the efforts of the nationalistic Indian National Congress (the Congress—see Glossary) faltered in the face of the

entrenched interests defending the existing system of education (see Origins of the Congress and the Muslim League, ch.

1). Early in the 1900s, the Congress called for national education, placing an emphasis on technical and vocational training.

In 1920 the Congress initiated a boycott of government-aided

and government-controlled schools; it founded several

"national" schools and colleges, but to little avail. The rewards

of British-style education were so great that the boycott was

largely ignored, and the Congress schools temporarily disappeared.

Postprimary education has traditionally catered to the interests of the higher and upwardly mobile castes (see Changes in

the Caste System, ch. 5). Despite substantial increases in the

spread of middle schools and high schools' growth in enrollment, secondary schooling is necessary for those bent on social

status and mobility through acquisition of an office job.

In the nineteenth century, postprimary students were disproportionately Brahmans; their traditional concern with

110
learning gave them an advantage under British education policies. By the early twentieth century, several powerful cultivator

castes had realized the advantages of education as a passport to

political power and had organized to acquire formal learning.

"Backward" castes (usually economically disadvantaged Shudras) who had acquired some wealth took advantage of their

status to secure educational privilege. In the mid-1980s, the

vast majority of students making it through middle school to high school continued to be from high-level castes and middleto upper-class families living in urban areas (see Varna, Caste,

and Other Divisions, ch. 5). A region's three or four most powerful castes typically dominated the school system. In addition,

the widespread role of private education and the payment of

fees even at government-run schools discriminated against the

poor.

The goals of the 1986 National Policy on Education

demanded vastly increased enrollment. In order to have

attained universal elementary education in 1995, the 1981

enrollment level of 72.7 million would have had to increase to 160 million in 1995. Although the seventh plan suggested the

adoption of new education methods to meet these goals, such

as the promotion of television and correspondence courses

(often referred to as "distance learning") and open school sys- tems, the actual extended coverage of children was not very

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India: A Country Study

great. Many critics of India's education policy argue that total

school enrollment is not actually a goal of the government considering the extent of society's vested interest in child labor. In

this context, education can be seen as a tool that one social

class uses to prevent the rise of another. Middle-class Indians

frequently distinguish between the children of the poor as "hands," or children who must be taught to work, and their

own children as "minds," or children who must be taught to learn. The upgraded curriculum with increased requirements

in English and in the sciences appears to be causing difficulties

for many children. Although all the states have recognized that

curriculum reform is needed, no comprehensive plan to link

curricular changes with new ways of teaching, learning, teacher

training, and examination methods has been implemented.

The government instituted an important program for

improving physical facilities through a phased drive in all primary schools in the country called Operation Blackboard.

Under Operation Blackboard, Rsl billion was allocated—but

not spent—in 1987 to pay for basic amenities for village

schools, such as toys and games, classroom materials, blackboards, and maps. This financial allotment averaged Rs2,200

for each government-run primary school. Additional goals of

Operation Blackboard included construction of classrooms

that would be usable in all weather, and an additional teacher,

preferably a woman, in all single-teacher schools.

The nonformal education system implemented in 1979 was

the major government effort to educate dropouts and other

unenrolled children. Special emphasis was given to the nonformal education system in the nine states regarded by the government as having deficient education systems: Andhra

Pradesh, Assam, Bihar, Jammu and Kashmir, Madhya Pradesh,

Orissa, Rajasthan, Uttar Pradesh, and West Bengal. A large

number of children who resided in these states could not

attend formal schools because they were employed, either with

or without wages. Seventy-five percent of the country's children

who were not enrolled in school resided in these states in the

1980s.

The 1986 National Policy on Education gave new impetus to the nonformal education system. Revised and expanded programs focused on involving voluntary organizations and training talented and dedicated young men and women in local

communities as instructors. The results of a late 1980s integrated pilot project for nonformal and adult education for

112
m - ^

Temple complex dedicated toJagannath—one of the names of

Vishnu—viewedfrom the monastery library opposite,

atPuri, Orissa

Courtesy Bernice Huffman Collection, Library of Congress

113
India: A Country Study

women and girls in the Lucknow district of Uttar Pradesh provide important data for analyzing recent implementation

trends and initial results of both the nonformal education sys- tem and adult education in India. Under this project, 300 centers were opened in rural parts of the district with the approval

of the Department of Education, the central government, and

the state government of Uttar Pradesh with financial and advisory support from the United Nations Educational, Scientific,

and Cultural Organization (UNESCO).

Because of the shortage of women teachers in rural areas of

Uttar Pradesh, in the pilot project nonformal education for

girls aged six to fourteen was integrated with the adult education program for women aged fifteen to thirty-five, so that the

same staff and infrastructure could be used. Most of the families of the project participants were in subsistence farming or engaged as farmhands, clerical workers, and petty merchants.

Often the brothers of female participants attended a formal

school situated about one or two kilometers from their homes.

Most of the 300 instructors for the 300 centers were young

women between the ages of eighteen and thirty-five. Each center averaged twenty-five women and twenty girl participants.

The physical facilities of the centers varied from village to vil- lage. Classes might be held on the balcony of a brick house,

within a temple, in a room of a mud-walled house, or under

open thatch-roof structures. Besides focusing on the acquisition of literacy skills, the project increased participant motivation by also offering instruction in household work, such as sewing, knitting, and preserving food. In 1987 a UNESCO mission to evaluate progress in this project in the areas of functional literacy, vocational skills, and civic awareness observed

that randomly chosen participants in both nonformal and

adult education classes effectively demonstrated their reading

and writing skills at appropriate levels. As a result of many such

local programs, literacy rates improved between 1981 and

1991. Male literacy increased from 56.5 percent in 1981 to 64.2

percent in 1991 while women's literacy rate increased from

29.9 percent in 1981 to 39.2 percent in 1991.

Understanding India's health care and education systems

contributes to the larger understanding of this complex

nation's diverse society. General trends and averages concerning social conditions on a national level may not adequately

describe how human activity is expressed spatially and temporally in specific areas. The great variations in local environmen114
Geographic and Demographic Setting

tal and social conditions require that national and state or union territory programs aimed at improving the quality of life not adhere too strictly to any one standard plan. Local climate,

topography, and drainage patterns all need to be considered in

terms of how they relate to local forms of land use and ethnic

and linguistic groupings. Increasing urbanization in India also

complicates efforts at monitoring local conditions. Only with

the full support and understanding of India's many rural and

urban residents will new ways of focusing India's immense

human resources toward the goals of developing and conserv- ing renewable natural resources, limiting population growth,

providing increased health care, and achieving education for

all be successful.

# # *

Indian atlases useful for gaining a basic understanding of

India's physical, political, and cultural geography include A

Social and Economic Atlas ofIndia edited by S. Muthiah and the

River Basin Atlas of India prepared by the Central Board for the

Prevention and Control of Water Pollution. V.S. Katiyar's The

Indian Monsoon and Its Frontiers provides a good description and

analysis of one of the major facets of South Asian climatology.

A standard work on postpartition Indian boundaries in terms

of their political status is John Robert Victor Prescott's Map of

Mainland Asia by Treaty. A Historical Atlas of South Asia edited by

Joseph E. Schwartzberg, is another extremely useful resource.

Official information on India's demography can be found in

the Census of India 1991, Final Population Totals. These results

also provide useful data on literacy levels in India. Additional

insight into the contemporary field of Indian population policy

is given in G. Narayana andJ.F. Kantner's Doing the Needful: The

Dilemma of India's Population Policy. Concise official data on

health care are listed in the Ministry of Planning's annual Statistical Abstract. An informed outsider's view of the health situation in India is presented in RogerJeffery's The Politics ofHealth

in India.

Contemporary official education plans and goals are outlined inJ.C. Aggarwal's National Policy on Education: Agenda for

India 2001. A more critical account of India's education system

has been compiled by UNESCO's Asia-Pacific Program of Education for All and published in National Studies: India. Detailed

field results of a recent UNESCO project to provide nonformal

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India: A Country Study

and adult education for women and girls can be found in

Simultaneous Education for Women and Girls: Report of a Project.

Myron Weiner's The Child and State in India has useful analysis

of education policy. (For further information and complete

citations, see Bibliography.)

116
Chapter 3. Religious Life
Embroidered floral motif depicted on a Rabari petticoat from Gujarat
IT IS IMPOSSIBLE TO KNOW INDIA without understanding

its religious beliefs and practices, which have a large impact on

the personal lives of most Indians and influence public life on

a daily basis. Indian religions have deep historical roots that are recollected by contemporary Indians. The ancient culture of

South Asia, going back at least 4,500 years, has come down to India primarily in the form of religious texts. The artistic heritage, as well as intellectual and philosophical contributions, has

always owed much to religious thought and symbolism. Contacts between India and other cultures have led to the spread

of Indian religions throughout the world, resulting in the

extensive influence of Indian thought and practice on Southeast and East Asia in ancient times and, more recently, in the

diffusion of Indian religions to Europe and North America.

Within India, on a day-to-day basis, the vast majority of people

engage in ritual actions that are motivated by religious systems

that owe much to the past but are continuously evolving. Religion, then, is one of the most important facets of Indian his- tory and contemporary life. A number of world religions originated in India, and others

that started elsewhere found fertile ground for growth there.

Devotees of Hinduism, a varied grouping of philosophical and

devotional traditions, officially numbered 687.6 million people, or 82 percent of the population in the 1991 census (see

table 13, Appendix). Buddhism andjainism, ancient monastic

traditions, have had a major influence on Indian art, philosophy, and society and remain important minority religions in

the late twentieth century. Buddhists represented 0.8 percent

of the total population while Jains represented 0.4 percent in

1991.

Islam spread from the West throughout South Asia, from the

early eighth century, to become the largest minority religion in

India. In fact, with 101.5 million Muslims (12.1 percent of the

population), India has at least the fourth largest Muslim population in the world (after Indonesia with 174.3 million, Pakistan

with 124 million, and Bangladesh with 103 million; some analysts put the number of Indian Muslims even higher—128 million in 1994, which would give India the second largest Muslim

population in the world).

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India: A Country Study

Sikhism, which started in Punjab in the sixteenth century,

has spread throughout India and the world since the mid-nineteenth century. With nearly 16.3 million adherents, Sikhs represent 1.9 percent of India's population.

Christianity, represented by almost all denominations, traces

its history in India back to the time of the apostles and counted

19.6 million members in India in 1991. Judaism and Zoroastrianism, arriving originally with traders and exiles from the West,

are represented by small populations, mostly concentrated on

India's west coast. A variety of independent tribal religious

groups also are lively carriers of unique ethnic traditions.

The listing of the major belief systems only scratches the sur- face of the remarkable diversity in Indian religious life. The

complex doctrines and institutions of the great traditions, preserved through written documents, are divided into numerous

schools of thought, sects, and paths of devotion. In many cases, these divisions stem from the teachings of great masters, who

arise continually to lead bands of followers with a new revelation or path to salvation. In contemporary India, the migration

of large numbers of people to urban centers and the impact of

modernization have led to the emergence of new religions,

revivals, and reforms within the great traditions that create

original bodies of teaching and kinds of practice. In other

cases, diversity appears through the integration or acculturation of entire social groups—each with its own vision of the

divine—within the world of village farming communities that

base their culture on literary and ritual traditions preserved in

Sanskrit or in regional languages. The local interaction

between great traditions and local forms of worship and belief,

based on village, caste, tribal, and linguistic differences, creates

a range of ritual forms and mythology that varies widely

throughout the country. Within this range of differences,

Indian religions have demonstrated for many centuries a considerable degree of tolerance for alternate visions of the divine

and of salvation.

Religious tolerance in India finds expression in the definition of the nation as a secular state, within which the government since independence has officially remained separate

from any one religion, allowing all forms of belief equal status before the law. In practice it has proven difficult to divide reli- gious affiliation from public life. In states where the majority of

the population embrace one religion, the boundary between

government and religion becomes permeable; in Tamil Nadu,

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Religious Life

for example, the state government manages Hindu temples,

while in Punjab an avowedly Sikh political party usually controls the state assembly. One of the most notable features of

Indian politics, particularly since the 1960s, has been the steady

growth of militant ideologies that see in only one religious tra- dition the way toward salvation and demand that public institutions conform to their interpretations of scripture. The vitality

of religious fundamentalism and its impact on public life in the

form of riots and religion-based political parties have been

among the greatest challenges to Indian political institutions in

the 1990s.

The Roots of Indian Religion

The Vedas and Polytheism

Hinduism in India traces its source to the Vedas, ancient

hymns composed and recited in Punjab as early as 1500 B.C.

Three main collections of the Vedas—the Rig, Sama, and

Yajur—consist of chants that were originally recited by priests

while offering plant and animal sacrifices in sacred fires. A

fourth collection, the Atharva Veda, contains a number of for- mulas for requirements as varied as medical cures and love

magic. The majority of modern Hindus revere these hymns as sacred sounds passed down to humanity from the greatest

antiquity and as the source of Hindu tradition.

The vast majority of Vedic hymns are addressed to a pantheon of deities who are attracted, generated, and nourished

by the offerings into the sacred flames and the precisely

chanted mantras (mystical formulas of invocation) based on

the hymns. Each of these deities may appear to be the supreme

god in his or her own hymns, but some gods stand out as most

significant. Indra, god of the firmament and lord of the

weather, is the supreme deity of the Vedas. Indra also is a god of war who, accompanied by a host of storm gods, uses thunderbolts as weapons to slay the serpent demon Vritra (the name

means storm cloud), thus releasing the rains for the earth.

Agni, the god of fire, accepts the sacrificial offerings and trans- mits them to all the gods. Varuna passes judgment, lays down

the law, and protects the cosmic order. Yama, the god of death,

sends earthly dwellers signs of old age, sickness, and approaching mortality as exhortations to lead a moral life. Surya is the sun god, Chandra the moon god, Vayu the wind god, and Usha

the dawn goddess.

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India: A Country Study

Some of the later hymns of the Rig Veda contain speculations that form the basis for much of Indian religious and

philosophical thought. From one perspective, the universe

originates through the evolution of an impersonal force manifested as male and female principles. Other hymns describe a personal creator, Prajapati, the Lord of creatures, from whom

came the heavens and the earth and all the other gods. One

hymn describes the universe as emerging from the sacrifice of a cosmic man (purusha) who was the source of all things but who

was in turn offered into the fire by gods. Within the Vedic

accounts of the origin of things, there is a tension between

visions of the highest reality as an impersonal force, or as a cre- ator god, or as a group of gods with different jobs to do in the

universe. Much of Hinduism tends to accept all these visions

simultaneously, claiming that they are all valid as different facets of a single truth, or ranks them as explanations with different levels of sophistication. It is possible, however, to follow

only one of these explanations, such as believing in a single

personal god while rejecting all others, and still claim to be fol- lowing the Vedas. In sum, Hinduism does not exist as a single

belief system with one textual explanation of the origin of the

universe or the nature of God, and a wide range of philosophies and practices can trace their beginnings somewhere in

the hymns of the Vedas.

By the sixth century B.C., the Vedic gods were in decline

among the people, and few people care much for Indra, Agni,

or Varuna in contemporary India. These gods might appear as background characters in myths and stories about more important deities, such as Shiva or Vishnu; in some Hindu temples,

there also are small statues of Vedic deities. Sacrificial fire,

which once accompanied major political activities, such as the

crowning of kings or the conquest of territory, still forms the

heart of household rituals for many Hindus, and some Brahman (see Glossary) families pass down the skill of memorizing

the hymns and make a living as professional reciters of the

Vedas (see Domestic Worship, this ch.). One of the main legacies of Brahmanical sacrifice, seen even among traditions that

later denied its usefulness, was a concentration on precise rit- ual actions and a belief in sacred sound as a powerful tool for

manifesting the sacred in daily life. Karma and Liberation

The Upanishads, originating as commentaries on the Vedas

122
First century B. C. Buddhist stupa at Sanchi, Madhya Pradesh

Courtesy American Institute ofIndian Studies

between about 800 and 200 B.C., contain speculations on the

meaning of existence that have greatly influenced Indian reli- gious traditions. Most important is the concept of atman (the

human soul), which is an individual manifestation of brahman

(see Glossary) . Atman is of the same nature as brahman, characterized either as an impersonal force or as God, and has as its goal the recognition of identity with brahman. This fusion is not

possible, however, as long as the individual remains bound to the world of the flesh and desires. In fact, the deathless atman

that is so bound will not join with brahman after the death of

the body but will experience continuous rebirth. This fundamental concept of the transmigration of atman, or reincarnation after death, lies at the heart of the religions emerging

from India.

Indian religious tradition sees karma (see Glossary) as the source of the problem of transmigration. While associated with

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India: A Country Study

physical form, for example, in a human body, beings experi- ence the universe through their senses and their minds and

attach themselves to the people and things around them and

constantly lose sight of their true existence as atman, which is of

the same nature as brahman. As the time comes for the dropping of the body, the fruits of good and evil actions in the past

remain with atman, clinging to it, causing a tendency to continue experience in other existences after death. Good deeds

in this life may lead to a happy rebirth in a better life, and evil deeds may lead to a lower existence, but eventually the conse- quences of past deeds will be worked out, and the individual

will seek more experiences in a physical world. In this manner,

the bound or ignorant atman wanders from life to life, in heav- ens and hells and in many different bodies. The universe may

expand and be destroyed numerous times, but the bound

atman vAW not achieve release.

The true goal of atman is liberation, or release (moksha),

from the limited world of experience and realization of oneness with God or the cosmos. In order to achieve release, the

individual must pursue a kind of discipline (yoga, a "tying,"

related to the English word yoke) that is appropriate to one's

abilities and station in life. For most people, this goal means a course of action that keeps them rather closely tied to the

world and its ways, including the enjoyment of love (kama), the

attainment of wealth and power (artha), and the following of

socially acceptable ethical principles (dharma—see Glossary).

From this perspective, even manuals on sexual love, such as the

Kama Sutra (Book of Love), or collections of ideas on politics

and governance, such as the Arthashastra (Science of Material

Gain), are part of a religious tradition that values action in the

world as long as it is performed with understanding, a karmayoga or selfless discipline of action in which every action is offered as a sacrifice to God. Some people, however, may be

interested in breaking the cycle of rebirth in this life or soon

thereafter. For them, a wide range of techniques has evolved

over the thousands of years that gives Indian religion its great

diversity. The discipline that involves physical positioning of

the body (hatha-yoga), which is most commonly equated with

yoga outside of India, sees the human body as a series of spiritual centers that can be awakened through meditation and

exercise, leading eventually to a oneness with the universe.

Tantrism is the belief in the Tantra (from the Sanskrit, context

or continuum), a collection of texts that stress the usefulness of

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Religious Life

rituals, carried out with a strict discipline, as a means for attaining understanding and spiritual awakening. These rituals

include chanting powerful mantras; meditating on complicated or auspicious diagrams (mandalas); and, for one school

of advanced practitioners, deliberately violating social norms

on food, drink, and sexual relations.

A central aspect of all religious discipline, regardless of its emphasis, is the importance of the guru, or teacher. Indian

religion may accept the sacredness of specific texts and rituals

but stresses interpretation by a living practitioner who has personal experience of liberation and can pass down successful

techniques to devoted followers. In fact, since Vedic times, it has never been possible, and has rarely been desired, to unite

all people in India under one concept of orthodoxy with a sin- gle authority that could be presented to everyone. Instead,

there has been a tendency to accept religious innovation and

diversity as the natural result of personal experience by successive generations of gurus, who have tailored their messages to particular times, places, and peoples, and then passed down

their knowledge to lines of disciples and social groups. As a

result, Indian religion is a mass of ancient and modern traditions, some always preserved and some constantly changing,

and the individual is relatively free to stress in his or her life the

beliefs and religious behaviors that seem most effective on the

path to deliverance.

The Monastic Path

By about 500 B.C., some teachers had moved so far down the

path of liberation that they no longer viewed the standard perception of life in the social world as valid for the dedicated spiritual devotee. They formed communities of religious

renunciants (shramanas) who withdrew from the world and

evolved a full-time monastic discipline. The most successful of

these early communities, the Jains (or, in Sanskrit, Jaina) and

the Buddhists, rejected the value of the Vedas and created independent textual traditions based on the words and examples of

their early teachers, eventually evolving entirely new ways for

interacting with the lay community.

Jainism

The oldest continuous monastic tradition in India is Jainism,

the path of the Jinas, or victors. This tradition is traced to Var125
India: A Country Study

dhamana Mahavira (The Great Hero; ca. 599-527 B.C.), the

twenty-fourth and last of the Tirthankaras (Sanskrit for fordmakers). According to legend, Mahavira was born to a ruling

family in the town of Vaishali, located in the modern state of

Bihar. At the age of thirty, he renounced his wealthy life and

devoted himself to fasting and self-mortification in order to purify his consciousness and discover the meaning of exist- ence. He never again dwelt in a house, owned property, or wore clothing of any sort. Following the example of the teacher

Parshvanatha (ninth century B.C.), he attained enlightenment

and spent the rest of his life meditating and teaching a dedicated group of disciples who formed a monastic order following rules he laid down. His life's work complete, he entered a

final fast and deliberately died of starvation.

The ancient belief system of the Jains rests on a concrete

understanding of the working of karma, its effects on the living

soul (jiva), and the conditions for extinguishing action and the

soul's release. According to the Jain view, the soul is a living

substance that combines with various kinds of nonliving matter

and through action accumulates particles of matter that adhere

to it and determine its fate. Most of the matter perceptible to human senses, including all animals and plants, is attached in

various degrees to living souls and is in this sense alive. Any

action has consequences that necessarily follow the embodied

soul, but the worst accumulations of matter come from violence against other living beings. The ultimate Jain discipline,

therefore, rests on complete inactivity and absolute nonviolence (ahimsa) against any living beings. Some Jain monks and

nuns wear face masks to avoid accidently inhaling small organisms, and all practicing believers try to remain vegetarians.

Extreme renunciation, including the refusal of all food, lies at the heart of a discipline that purges the mind and body of all desires and actions and, in the process, burns off the conse- quences of actions performed in the past. In this sense, Jain

renunciants may recognize or revere deities, but they do not

view the Vedas as sacred texts and instead concentrate on the

atheistic, individual quest for purification and removal of

karma. The final goal is the extinguishing of self, a "blowing

out" (nirvana) of the individual self. By the first century A.D., the Jain community evolved into

two main divisions based on monastic discipline: the Digambara or "sky-clad" monks who wear no clothes, own nothing,

and collect donated food in their hands; and the Svetambara

126
The mid-nineteenth-century ParesnathJain Temple, Calcutta

Courtesy Bernice Huffman Collection, Library of Congress

or "white-clad" monks and nuns who wear white robes and

carry bowls for donated food. The Digambara do not accept

the possibility of women achieving liberation, while the Svetambara do. Western and southern India have been Jain strongholds for many centuries; laypersons have typically formed

minority communities concentrated primarily in urban areas and in mercantile occupations. In the mid-1990s, there were

about 7 million Jains, the majority of whom live in the states of

Maharashtra (mostly the city of Bombay, or Mumbai in

Marathi), Rajasthan, and Gujarat (see Structure and Dynamics,

ch. 2). Karnataka, traditionally a stronghold of Digambaras,

has a sizable Jain community.

The Jain laity engage in a number of ritual activities that

resemble those of the Hindus around them (see The Ceremonies of Hinduism, this ch.). Special shrines in residences or in

public temples include images of the Tirthankaras, who are not

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India: A Country Study

worshiped but remembered and revered; other shrines house

the gods who are more properly invoked to intercede with

worldly problems. Daily rituals may include meditation and

bathing; bathing the images; offering food, flowers, and

lighted lamps for the images; and reciting mantras in

Ardhamagadhi, an ancient language of northeast India related

to Sanskrit. ManyJain laity engage in sacramental ceremonies

during life-cycle rituals, such as the first taking of solid food,

marriage, and death, resembling those enacted by Hindus.

Jains may also worship local gods and participate in local

Hindu or Muslim celebrations without compromising their

fundamental devotion to the path of the Jinas. The most

important festivals ofJainism celebrate the five major events in

the life of Mahavira: conception, birth, renunciation, enlightenment, and final release at death.

At a number of pilgrimage sites associated with great teachers ofJainism, the gifts of wealthy donors made possible the

building of architectural wonders. Shatrunjaya Hills (Siddhagiri) in Gujarat is a major Svetambara site, an entire city of

about 3,500 temples. Mount Abu in Rajasthan, with one Digambara and five Svetambara temples, is the site of some of India's

greatest architecture, dating from the eleventh through thirteenth centuries A.D. In Karnataka, on the hill of Sravana Belgola, stands the monolithic seventeen-meter-high statue of the

naked Bhagwan Bahubali (Gomateshvara), the first person in

the world believed by the faithful to have attained enlightenment, so deep in meditation that vines are growing around his

legs. At this site every twelve years, a major concourse ofJain

ascetics and laity participate in a purification ceremony in

which the statue is anointed from head to toe. Carved in 981,

the statue is considered the holiest Jain shrine. In addition to

its lavish patronage of shrines, the Jain community, with its long scriptural tradition and wealth gained from trade, has

always been known for its philanthropy and especially for its support of education and learning. Prestigious Jain schools are located in most major cities. The largest concentrations ofJains

are in Maharashtra (more than 965,000) and Rajasthan (nearly

563,000), with sizable numbers also in Gujarat and Madhya

Pradesh.

Buddhism

Buddhism began with the life of Siddhartha Gautama (ca.

563-483 B.C.), a prince from the small Shakya Kingdom

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ItinerantJain nuns along a road in Rajasthan

Courtesy DoranneJacobson

located in the foothills of the Himalayas in Nepal. Brought up

in luxury, the prince abandoned his home and wandered forth

as a religious beggar, searching for the meaning of existence.

The stories of his search presuppose the Jain tradition, as Gautama was for a time a practitioner of intense austerity, at one point almost starving himself to death. He decided, however, that self-torture weakened his mind while failing to advance him to enlightenment and therefore turned to a milder style of renunciation and concentrated on advanced

meditation techniques. Eventually, under a tree in the forests

of Gaya (in modern Bihar), he resolved to stir no farther until

he had solved the mystery of existence. Breaking through the

final barriers, he achieved the knowledge that he later

expressed as the Four Noble Truths: all of life is suffering; the cause of suffering is desire; the end of desire leads to the end of

suffering; and the means to end desire is a path of discipline

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India: A Country Study

and meditation. Gautama was now the Buddha, or the awakened one, and he spent the remainder of his life traveling

about northeast India converting large numbers of disciples. At

the age of eighty, the Buddha achieved his final passing away

(parinirvana) and died, leaving a thriving monastic order and a dedicated lay community to continue his work.

By the third century B.C., the still-young religion based on

the Buddha's teachings was being spread throughout South

Asia through the agency of the Mauryan Empire (ca. 326-184

B.C.; see The Mauryan Empire, ch. 1). By the seventh century

A.D., having spread throughout East Asia and Southeast Asia,

Buddhism probably had the largest religious following in the

world.

For centuries Indian royalty and merchants patronized Buddhist monasteries and raised beautiful, hemispherical stone

structures called stupas over the relics of the Buddha in rever- ence to his memory. Since the 1840s, archaeology has revealed

the huge impact of Buddhist art, iconography, and architecture

in India. The monastery complex at Nalanda in Bihar, in ruins

in 1993, was a world center for Buddhist philosophy and reli- gion until the thirteenth century. But by the thirteenth century, when Turkic invaders destroyed the remaining

monasteries on the plains, Buddhism as an organized religion

had practically disappeared from India. It survived only in Bhutan and Sikkim, both of which were then independent Himalayan kingdoms; among tribal groups in the mountains of

northeast India; and in Sri Lanka. The reasons for this disappearance are unclear, and they are many: shifts in royal patronage from Buddhist to Hindu religious institutions; a constant

intellectual struggle with dynamic Hindu intellectual schools,

which eventually triumphed; and slow adoption of popular reli- gious forms by Buddhists while Hindu monastic communities

grew up with the same style of discipline as the Buddhists, leading to the slow but steady amalgamation of ideas and trends in

the two religions.

Buddhism began a steady and dramatic comeback in India

during the early twentieth century, spurred on originally by a combination of European antiquarian and philosophical inter- est and the dedicated activities of a few Indian devotees. The

foundation of the Mahabodhi Society (Society of Great

Enlightenment) in 1891, originally as a force to wrest control

of the Buddhist shrine at Gaya from the hands of Hindu man130
Religious Life

agers, gave a large stimulus to the popularization of Buddhist

philosophy and the importance of the religion in India's past.

A major breakthrough occurred in 1956 after some thirty

years of Untouchable, or Dalit (see Glossary), agitation when

Bhimrao Ramji (B.R.) Ambedkar, leader of the Untouchable

wing within the Congress (see Glossary), announced that he

was converting to Buddhism as a way to escape from the impediments of the Hindu caste system (see Varna, Caste, and Other

Divisions, ch. 5). He brought with him masses of Untouchables—also known as Harijans (see Glossary) or Dalits—and

members of Scheduled Castes (see Glossary), who mostly came

from Maharashtra and border areas of neighboring states and

from the Agra area in Uttar Pradesh. By the early 1990s, there were more than 5 million Buddhists in Maharashtra, or 79 percent of the entire Buddhist community in India, almost all recent converts from low castes. When added to longtime Buddhist populations in hill areas of northeast India (West Bengal,

Assam, Sikkim, Mizoram, and Tripura) and high Himalayan

valleys (Ladakh District in Jammu and Kashmir, Himachal

Pradesh, and northern Uttar Pradesh), and to the influx of

Tibetan Buddhist refugees who fled from Tibet with the Dalai

Lama in 1959 and thereafter, the recent converts raised the

number of Buddhists in India to 6.4 million by 1991. This was a 35.9 percent increase since 1981 and made Buddhism the fifth largest religious group in the country.

The forms of Buddhism practiced by Himalayan communities and Tibetan refugees are part of the Vajrayana, or "Way of

the Lightning Bolt," that developed after the seventh century

A.D. as part of Mahayana (Great Path) Buddhism. Although

retaining the fundamental importance of individual spiritual

advancement, the Vajrayana stresses the intercession of bodhisattvas, or enlightened beings, who remain in this world to aid

others on the path. Until the twentieth century, the Himalayan

kingdoms supported a hierarchy in which Buddhist monks,

some identified from birth as bodhisattvas, occupied the highest positions in society.

Most other Buddhists in India follow Theravada Buddhism,

the "Doctrine of the Elders," which traces its origin through Sri

Lankan and Burmese traditions to scriptures in the Pali language, a Sanskritic dialect in eastern India. Although replete

with miraculous events and legends, these scriptures stress a more human Buddha and a democratic path toward enlightenment for everyone. Ambedkar's plan for the expanding Bud131
India: A Country Study

dhist congregation in India visualized Buddhist monks and

nuns developing themselves through service to others. Convert

communities, by embracing Buddhism, have embarked on

social transformations, including a decline in alcoholism, a

simplification of marriage ceremonies and abolition of ruinous

marriage expenses, a greater emphasis on education, and a heightened sense of identity and self-worth.

The Tradition of the Enlightened Master

A number of avowedly Hindu monastic communities have

grown up over time and adopted some of the characteristics

associated with early Buddhism and Jainism, while remaining

dedicated to the Hindu philosophical traditions. One of the

oldest and most respected of the Hindu orders traces its origin

to the teacher Shankara (788-820), believed by many devotees

to have lived hundreds of years earlier. Shankara's philosophy

is a primary source of Vedanta, or the "End of the Veda," the

final commentary on revealed truth, which is one of the most

influential trends in modern Hinduism. His interpretation of

the Upanishads portrays brahman as absolutely one and without

qualities. The phenomenal world is illusion (maya), which the

embodied soul must transcend in order to achieve oneness

with brahman. As a wandering monk, Shankara traveled

throughout India, combating Buddhist atheism and founding

five seats of learning at Badrinath (Uttar Pradesh), Dwaraka

(Gujarat), Puri (Orissa), Sringeri (Karnataka), and Kanchipuram (Tamil Nadu). In the 1990s, those seats are still held

by successors to Shankara's philosophy (Shankara Acharyas),

who head an order of orange-clad monks that is highly

respected by the Hindu community throughout India. Activities of the acharyas, including their periodic trips away from

their home monasteries to visit and preach to devotees, receive

exposure in regional and national media. Their conservative

viewpoints and pronouncements on a variety of topics,

although not binding on most believers, attract considerable

public attention.

The initiation of a renunciant usually depends on the judgment of an acharya who determines whether a candidate is dedicated and prepared or not; he then gives to the disciple

training and instructions including the initiate's own secret for- mula or mantra. After initiation, the disciple may remain with

his teacher or in a monastery for an indefinite period or may

wander forth in a variety of careers. The Ramanandi order in

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North India, for example, includes holy men (sadhus) who

practice ascetic disciplines, militant members of fortified temples, and priests in charge of temple administration and ritual. There are other orders of renunciants who lead still more

austere existences, including naked ascetics who wander begging for their food and assemble for spectacular parades at major festivals. A few dedicated seekers still withdraw to the

fastness of the Himalayas or other remote spots and work on

their meditation and yoga in total obscurity. Others beg in populated areas, sometimes engaging in fierce austerities such as piercing their bodies with pins and knives. They are a reminder

to all people that the path of renunciation waits for anyone

who has the dedication and the courage to leave the world

behind.

Another kind of renunciation appears in the cult of Sai

Baba, who achieved national and international fame in the

twentieth century. The first person known by this name was a holy man—Sai Baba (died 1918) —who appeared in 1872 in

Maharashtra and lived a humble life that blended meditation

and devotional techniques from a variety of sources. This saint

has a small but dedicated following throughout India. A later

incarnation was Satya Sai Baba (satya means true), born in

1926 in Andhra Pradesh. At age thirteen, he experienced the

first of several seizures that resulted in a changed personality

and intense devotional activity, leading to his statement that he

is the second incarnation of Sai Baba. By 1950 he had set up a

retreat at Puttaparti in what later became Andhra Pradesh and

was accepting disciples. His fame spread along with numerous

apocryphal stories of his ability to perform miracles, including

the manifestation of sacred ash and, according to some

accounts, watches or other objects, from thin air or from his

own body. The cult has expanded to include publishing, social

service, and education institutions and includes an international association of thousands of believers. Devotion to Satya

Sai Baba does not preclude attachment to other religious

observances but concentrates instead on worship and veneration of the holy man himself, often in the form of a photograph. Thousands of pilgrims have traveled to his retreat

annually to participate in group activities, obtain mementos,

and perhaps a view of the teacher himself.

The Worship of Personal Gods

For the vast majority of Hindus, the most important religious

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India: A Country Study

path is bhakti (devotion) to personal gods. There are a wide

variety of gods to choose from, and although sectarian adher- ence to particular deities is often strong, there is a widespread

acceptance of choice in the desired god (ishta devata) as the

most appropriate focus for any particular person. Most devotees are therefore polytheists, worshiping all or part of the vast pantheon of deities, some of whom have come down from

Vedic times. In practice, a worshiper tends to concentrate

prayers on one deity or on a small group of deities with whom

there is a close personal relationship.

Puja (worship) of the gods consists of a range of ritual offerings and prayers typically performed either daily or on special

days before an image of the deity, which may be in the form of

a person or a symbol of the sacred presence. In its more developed forms, puja consists of a series of ritual stages beginning

with personal purification and invocation of the god, followed

by offerings of flowers, food, or other objects such as clothing,

accompanied by fervent prayers. Some dedicated worshipers

perform these ceremonies daily at their home shrines; others

travel to one or more temples to perform puja, alone or with

the aid of temple priests who receive offerings and present

these offerings to the gods. The gifts given to the gods become

sacred through contact with their images or with their shrines,

and may be received and used by worshipers as the grace (prasadd) of the divine. Sacred ash or saffron powder, for example,

is often distributed after puja and smeared on the foreheads of

devotees. In the absence of any of these ritual objects, however,

puja may take the form of a simple prayer sent toward the

image of the divine, and it is common to see people stop for a moment before roadside shrines to fold their hands and offer

short invocations to the gods.

Since at least the seventh century A.D., the devotional path

has spread from the south throughout India through the liter- ary and musical activities of saints who have been some of the

most important representatives of regional languages and tra- ditions. The hymns of these saints and their successors, mostly

in vernacular forms, are memorized and performed at all levels of society. Every state in India has its own bhakti tradition and

poets who are studied and revered. In Tamil Nadu, groups

called Nayanmars (devotees of Shiva) and Alvars (devotees of

Vishnu) were composing beautiful poetry in the Tamil language as early as the sixth century. In Bengal one of the greatest poets was Chaitanya (1485-1536), who spent much of his

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A sadhu with sacred rudraksha

beads, Varanasi. The writing on

his shawl says Om Ram, a

phrase invoking the name

of the Lord Ram.

Courtesy DoranneJacobson

life in a state of mystical ecstasy. One of the greatest North

Indian saints was Kabir (ca. 1440-1518), a common leatherworker who stressed faith in God without devotion to images,

rituals, or scriptures. Among female poets, Princess Mirabai

(ca. 1498-1546) from Rajasthan stands out as one whose love

for Krishna was so intense that she suffered persecution for her

public singing and dancing for the lord.

A recurring motif that emerges from the poetry and the

hagiographies of these saints is the equality of all men and

women before God and the ability of people from all castes and

occupations to find their way to union with God if they have

enough faith and devotion. In this sense, the bhakti tradition

serves as one of the equalizing forces in Indian society and culture. Vishnu

As one of the most important gods in the Hindu pantheon,

Vishnu is surrounded by a number of extremely popular and

well-known stories and is the focus of a number of sects

devoted entirely to his worship. Vishnu contains a number of

personalities, often represented as ten major descents (avatars)

in which the god has taken on physical forms in order to save

earthly creatures from destruction. In one story, the earth was

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India: A Country Study

drowning in a huge flood, so to save it Vishnu took on the body

of a giant turtle and lifted the earth on his back out of the

waters. A tale found in the Vedas describes a demon who could

not be conquered. Responding to the pleas of the gods, Vishnu

appeared before the demon as a dwarf. The demon, in a classic

instance of pride, underestimated this dwarf and granted him

as much of the world as he could tread in three steps. Vishnu

then assumed his universal form and in three strides spanned

the entire universe and beyond, crushing the demon in the

process.

The incarnation of Vishnu known to almost everyone in

India is his life as Ram (Rama in Sanskrit), a prince from the

ancient north Indian kingdom of Ayodhya, in the cycle of sto- ries known as the Ramayana (The Travels of Ram). On one

level, this is a classic adventure story, as Ram is exiled from the

kingdom and has to wander in the forests of southern India

with his beautiful wife Sita and his loyal younger brother Lakshman. After many adventures, during which Ram befriends

the king of the monkey kingdom and joins forces with the

great monkey hero Hanuman, the demon king Ravana kidnaps

Sita and takes her to his fortress on the island of Lanka (modern Sri Lanka). A huge war then ensues, as Ram with his animal allies attacks the demons, destroys them all, and returns in

triumph to North India to occupy his lawful throne. Village sto- rytellers, street theater players, the movies, and the national

television network all have their versions of this story. In many

parts of the country, but especially in North India, the annual

festival of Dussehra celebrates Ram's adventures and his final

triumph and includes the public burning of huge effigies of

Ravana at the end of several days of parties. Everyone knows

that Ram is really Vishnu, who came down to rid the earth of

the demons and set up an ideal kingdom of righteousness

Ram Raj—which stands as an ideal in contemporary India. Sita

is in reality his consort, the goddess Lakshmi, the ideal of feminine beauty and devotion to her husband. Lakshmi, also

known as Shri, eventually became the goddess of fortune, sur- plus, and happiness. Hanuman, as the faithful sidekick with

great physical and magical powers, is one of the most beloved

images in the Hindu pantheon with temples of his own

throughout the country.

Another widely known incarnation is Krishna. In the Mahabharata (Great Battle of the Descendants of Bharata), the

gigantic, multivolume epic of ancient North Indian kingdoms,

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Religious Life

Krishna appears as the ruler of one of the many states allied

either with the heroic Pandava brothers or with their treacher- ous cousins, the Kauravas. Bharata was an ancient king whose

achievements are celebrated in the Mahabharata and from

whose name derives one of the names for modern India, that is Bharat. During the final battle, Krishna serves as charioteer for

the hero Arjuna, and before the fighting starts he bolsters

Arjuna's faltering will to fight against his kin. Krishna reveals

himself as Vishnu, the supreme godhead, who has set up the

entire conflict to cleanse the earth of evildoers according to his

inscrutable will. This section of the epic, the Bhagavad Gita, or Song of the Lord, is one of the great jewels of world religious

literature and of central importance in modern Hinduism.

One of its main themes is karma-yoga, or selfless discipline in

offering all of one's allotted tasks in life as a devotion to God

and without attachment to consequences. The true reality is the soul that neither slays nor is slain and that can rejoin God

through selfless dedication and through Krishna's saving grace.

A completely different cycle of stories portrays Krishna as a young cowherd, growing up in the country after he was saved

from an evil uncle who coveted his kingdom. In this incarnation, Krishna often appears as a happy, roly-poly infant, well

known for his pranks and thefts of butter. Although his ene- mies send evil agents to destroy him, the baby miraculously sur- vives their attacks and kills his demonic assailants. Later, as he

grows into an adolescent, he continues to perform miracles

such as saving the cowherds and their flocks from a dangerous

storm by holding up a mountain over their heads until the

weather clears. His most striking exploits, however, are his

affairs as a young adult with the gopis (cowherding maidens),

all of whom are in love with him because of his good looks and

talent with the flute. These explicitly sexual activities, including stealing the

clothes of the maidens while they are bathing, are the basis for a wide range of poetry and songs to Krishna as a lover; the devotee of the god takes on a female role and directs toward the

beloved lord the heartfelt longing for union with the divine.

Krishna's relationship with Radha, his favorite among the gopis,

has served as a model for male and female love in a variety of

art forms, and since the sixteenth century appears prominently

as a motif in North Indian paintings. Unlike many other deities, who are depicted as very fair in color, Krishna appears in

all these adventures as a dark lord, either black or blue in color.

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India: A Country Study

In this sense, he is a figure who constantly overturns accepted

conventions of order, hierarchy, and propriety, and introduces

a playful and mischievous aspect of a god who hides from his

worshipers but saves them in the end. The festival of Holi at the

spring equinox, in which people of all backgrounds play in the

streets and squirt each other with colored water, is associated

with Krishna.

In iconography Vishnu may appear as any of his ten incarnations but often stands in sculpture as a princely male with four arms that bear a club, discus, conch, and lotus flower. He may

also appear lying on his back on the thousand-headed king of

the serpents, Shesha-Naga, in the milk ocean at the center of

time, with his feet massaged by Lakshmi, and with a lotus growing from his navel giving birth to the god Brahma, a four-headed representation of the creative principle. Vishnu in

this representation is the ultimate source of the universe that

he causes to expand and contract at regular cosmic intervals

measuring millions of years. On a more concrete level, Vishnu

may become incarnate at any moment on earth in order to continue to bring sentient creatures back to himself, and a number of great religious teachers (including, for example,

Chaitanya in Bengal) are identified by their followers as incarnations of Vishnu.

Shiva

The god Shiva is the other great figure in the modern pantheon. In contrast to the regal attributes of Vishnu, Shiva is a figure of renunciation. A favorite image portrays him as an

ascetic, performing meditation alone in the fastness of the

Himalayas. There he sits on a tiger skin, clad only in a loincloth, covered with sacred ash that gives his skin a gray color.

His trident is stuck into the ground next to him. Around his

neck is a snake. From his matted hair, tied in a topknot, the

river Ganga (Ganges) descends to the earth. His neck is blue, a reminder of the time he drank the poison that emerged while

gods and demons competed to churn the milk ocean. Shiva

often appears in this image as an antisocial being, who once burned up Kama, the god of love, with a glance. But behind

this image is the cosmic lord who, through the very power of

his meditating consciousness, expands the entire universe and

all beings in it. Although he appears to be hard to attain, in

reality Shiva is a loving deity who saves those devotees who are wholeheartedly dedicated to him.

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Religious Life

The bhakti literature of South India, where Shiva has long

been important, describes the numerous instances of

pure-hearted devotion to the beautiful lord and the final revelation of himself as Shiva after testing his devotees. Shiva often

appears on earth in disguise, perhaps as a wandering Brahman

priest, to challenge the charity or belief of a suffering servant,

only to appear eventually in his true nature. Many of these

divine plays are connected directly with specific people and

specific sites, and almost every ancient Shiva temple can claim

a famous poem or a famous miracle in its history. The hundreds of medieval temples in Tamil Nadu, almost all dedicated

to Shiva, contain sculptured panels depicting the god in a variety of guises: Bhikshatana, the begging lord; Bhairava, a horrible, destructive image; or Nataraja, the lord of the dance,

beating a drum that keeps time while he manifests the universe. Because he withholds his sexual urges and controls them,

Shiva is able to transmute sexual energy into creative power, by

generating intense heat. It is, in fact, the heat generated from

discipline and austerity (tapas) that is seen as the source for the

generative power of all renunciants, and in this sense Shiva is often connected with wandering orders of monks in modern

India. For the average worshiper, the sexual power of Shiva is seen in the most common image that represents him, the lin- gam. This is typically a cylindrical stone several feet tall, with a rounded top, standing in a circular base. On one level, this is the most basic image of divinity, providing a focus for worship

with a minimum of artistic embellishment, attempting to represent the infinite. The addition of carved anatomical details on

many lingams, however, leaves no doubt for the worshiper that

this is an erect male sexual organ, showing the procreative

power of God at the origin of all things. The concept of reality as the complex interplay of opposite principles, male and

female, thus finds its highest form in the mythology of Shiva

and his consort Parvati (also known as Shakti, Kali, or Durga),

the daughter of the mountains. This most controlled deity, the

meditating Shiva, then has still another form, as the erotic

lover of Parvati, embracing her passionately.

Shiva and Parvati have two sons, who have entire cycles of

myths and legends and bhakti cults in their own right. One son

is called variously Karttikeya (identified with the planet Mars)

or Skanda (the god of war or Subrahmanya) . He is extremely

handsome, carries a spear, and rides a peacock. According to

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India: A Country Study

some traditions, he emerged motherless from Shiva when the

gods needed a great warrior to conquer an indestructible

demon. In southern India, where he is called Murugan, he is a lord of mountain places and a great friend of those who dedicate themselves to him. Some devotees vow to carry on their

shoulders specially carved objects of wood for a determined

number of weeks, never putting them down during that time.

Others may go further, and insert knives or long pins into their

bodies for extended periods.

Another son of Shiva and Parvati is Ganesh, or Ganapati, the

Lord of the Ganas (the hosts of Shiva), who has a male

human's body with four arms and the head of an elephant.

One myth claims that he originated directly from Parvati's

body and entered into a quarrel with Shiva, who cut off his

human head and replaced it later with the head of the first animal he found, which happened to be an elephant. For most

worshipers, Ganesh is the first deity invoked during any cere- mony because he is the god of wisdom and remover of obstacles. People worship Ganesh when beginning anything, for

example, at the start of a trip or the first day of the new school

year. He is often pictured next to his mount, the rat, symbol of

the ability to get in anywhere. Ganesh is therefore a clever fig- ure, a trickster in many stories, who presents a benevolent and

friendly image to those worshipers who placate him. His image

is perhaps the most widespread and public in India, visible in

streets and transportation terminals everywhere. The antics of

Ganesh and Karttikeya and the interactions of Shiva and Parvati have generated a series of entertaining myths of Shiva as a henpecked husband, who would prefer to keep meditating but

instead is drawn into family problems, providing a series of

morality tales in households throughout India.

Brahma and the Hindu Trinity

It is often said that the Hindu pantheon has three gods at its head: Brahma, the creator of the universe; Vishnu, the preserver of life; and Shiva, the destroyer of ignorance. Brahma is a representation of the impersonal brahman in a human form,

usually with four faces facing the cardinal directions and four arms (see Karma and Liberation, this ch.). In reality, Brahma

receives little devotion from worshipers, who may mention him

in passing while giving their attention to the other main gods.

There are few temples in India dedicated to him; instead, his

image may stand in niches on the walls of temples built for

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Lavishly decorated mid-seventhcentury A.D. Parasuramesvar

temple, dedicated to Shiva,

Bhubaneshwar, Orissa

Courtesy Bernice Huffman

Collection, Library of Congress

other deities. Religious stories usually place Brahma as an intermediate authority who cannot handle a problem and passes it on to either Vishnu or Shiva. The concept of the trinity

(trimurti), expressed in beautiful art works or invoked even by

believers, is in practice a philosophical construct that unites all deistic traditions within Hinduism into one overarching symbol.

The Goddess

Philosophical musings as far back as the Rig Veda contemplated the universe as the result of an interplay between the

male principle (purusha) , the prime source of generative

power but quiescent, and a female principle that came to be

known as prakriti, an active principle that manifests reality, or power (shakti), at work in the world. On a philosophical level,

this female principle ultimately rests in the oneness of the

male, but on a practical level it is the female that is most significant in the world. The vast array of iconography and mythology

that surround the gods such as Vishnu and Shiva is a backdrop

for the worship of their female consorts, and the male deities

fade into the background. Thus it is that the divine is often

female in India.

Vishnu's consort, Lakshmi, has a number of well-known

incarnations that are the center of cults in their own right. In

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India: A Country Study

the Ramayana, for example, female characters are responsible

for most of the important events, and the dutiful Sita, who

resists the advances of lustful Ravana, is a much beloved figure

of devotion. Lakshmi receives direct worship along with Ram

during the big national festival of Dipavali (Diwali), celebrated

with massive fireworks demonstrations, when people pray for

success and wealth during the coming year. The Mahabharata is equally packed with tales of male and female relationships in

which women hold their own, and the beautiful Draupadi, wife

of the five Pandava heroes, has her own cult in scattered locations throughout India.

Parvati, in a variety of forms, is the most common focus of

devotion in India. She presents two main facets to her worshipers: a benign and accepting personality that provides assistance

and a powerful and dangerous personality that must be placated. The benign vision exists in many temples to Shiva

throughout the country, where the goddess has her own shrine

that is in practice the most frequented site of heartfelt devotion. During annual festivals in which the god and goddess

emerge from their shrines and travel in processions, it is often

the goddess who is most eagerly anticipated. In North India,

for example, life-like statues of the loving goddess Kali, who is ultimately a manifestation of Parvati, are carried through huge

crowds that line village and city streets. In South India, where

gigantic temples are the physical and social centers of town life, the shrines and their annual festivals are often known by the

names of their goddesses. One of the more famous is the six- teenth- and seventeenth-century Minakshi Temple in Madurai,

Tamil Nadu. The temple is named after the "fish-eyed goddess"

Minakshi, described in myths as a dark queen born with three

breasts, who set out to conquer the universe. After overrunning

the world and vanquishing the gods, Minakshi finally met Shiva

and, when her third breast disappeared, accepted him as her

lord. This motif of physical power and energy appears in many

stories where the goddess is a warrior or conqueror of demons

who in the end joins with Shiva.

Alternative visions, however, portray a goddess on the loose,

with the potential for causing havoc in the world unless

appeased. The goddess Durga is a great warrior who carries

swords and a shield, rides a tiger, and destroys demons when

the gods prove incapable; in this incarnation, she never submits, but remains capable of terrible deeds of war. The goddess

Kali often appears as an even more horrific vision of the divine,

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Religious Life

with garlands of human skulls around her neck and a severed

head in her hand; her bloody tongue hangs from her mouth,

and the weapons in her arms drip gore. This image attempts to capture the destructive capacity of the divine, the suffering in

the world, and the ultimate return of all things to the goddess

at death.

In many small shrines throughout India, in marked contrast

to the large and ornate temples dominated by Brahmanical

principles and the philosophy of nonviolence, the female divinity receives regular gifts of blood sacrifices, usually chickens

and goats. In addition, the goddess may manifest herself as the

bearer of a number of diseases. The goddess of smallpox,

known as Shitala in North India and Mariamman in South

India, remains a feared and worshiped figure even after the

official elimination of the disease, for she is still capable of

afflicting people with a number of fevers and poxes. Many

more localized forms of goddesses, known by different names

in different regions, are the focus for prayers and vows that

lead worshipers to undertake acts of austerity and pilgrimages

in return for favors.

Local Deities

Along many paths in the countryside, and in some urban

neighborhoods, there are sacred spots at the base of trees, or

small stones set in niches, or simply made statues with flowers or a small flame burning in front of them. These are shrines

for deities who are locally honored for protecting the people

from harm caused by natural disasters or evil influences. Worshipers often portray these protectors as warriors, and, in some

cases, they may be traced back to great human fighters who

died for their village and later became immortalized. In South

India, there are thousands of hero stones, simple representations of warriors on slabs of stone, found in and around agricultural settlements, in memory of nameless local fighters who

may have died while protecting their communities hundreds of

years ago. At one time, these stones may have received regular

signs of devotion, but they are mostly ignored in contemporary

India. In the fields on the outskirts of many villages, there are

large, multicolored, terra-cotta figures of warriors with raised

swords or figures of war horses; these are open-air shrines of

the god Aiyanar, who serves as the village protector and who

has very few connections with the great tradition of Hinduism.

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Local deities may begin to attract the attention of worshipers

from a wide geographical area, which may include many vil- lages or neighborhoods, or from a large percentage of the

members of particular castes, who come to the deity seeking

protection or boons. These deities have their own shrines,

which may be simple, independent enclosures with pillared

halls or may stand as separate establishments attached to temples of Shiva, Vishnu, or any other great god. Deities at this

level attract expressive and ecstatic forms of worship and tend

to possess special devotees on a regular basis or enter into their

believers during festivals. People who are possessed by the god

may speak to their families and friends concerning important

personal or social problems, predicting the future or clarifying

mysteries. These local gods often expect offerings of animals,

usually goats or chickens, which are killed in the vicinity of the

shrines and then consumed in communal meals by families

and friends.

In the twentieth century, there has been an increase in the

number of new, regional gods attracting worshipers from many

different groups, spurred by vast improvements in transport

and communication. For example, in the hills bordering the

states of Tamil Nadu and Kerala is a shrine for the god Ayyappan, whose origin is uncertain but who is sometimes called the

offspring of Shiva and Vishnu in his female form. Ayyappan's

annual festival is a time of pilgrimage for ever-growing numbers of men from throughout South India. These devotees fast and engage in austerities under the leadership of a teacher for

weeks beforehand and then travel in groups to the shrine for a glimpse of the god. Bus tickets are hard to obtain for several

weeks as masses of elated men, clad in distinctive ritual dhotis

of various colors, throng public transportation during their trip to the shrine. In northwestern India, the popularity of the goddess Vaishno Devi has risen meteorically since independence.

Vaishno Devi, who combines elements of Lakshmi and Durga,

is an extremely benevolent manifestation of the eternal virgin

who gives material well-being to her worshipers. One million

pilgrims travel annually to her cave shrine in the foothills of

the Himalayas, about fifty kilometers north of the city of

Jammu.

Since the 1950s, the most spectacular example of a deity's

increasing influence throughout northern and central India is the cult of Santoshi Ma (Mother of Contentment). Her myths

recount the sufferings of a young woman left alone by her

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working husband and abused by her in-laws, who nevertheless

remains loving and faithful to her man and, by performing simple vows to the goddess (fasting one day every week), eventually sees the return of her now-rich husband and moves with

him into her own house. Santoshi Ma, thought to be the

daughter of Ganesh, is worshiped mostly by lower middle-class

women who also pray for material goods. In the 1980s and early

1990s, her shrines were spreading everywhere and even taking over older temples, aided by the release in the 1970s of an

extremely popular film version of her story, Jay Santoshi Ma.

The Ceremonies of Hinduism

The ritual world of Hinduism, manifestations of which differ

greatly among regions, villages, and individuals, offers a number of common features that link all Hindus into a greater

Indian religious system and influence other religions as well.

The most notable feature in religious ritual is the division

between purity and pollution. Religious acts presuppose some

degree of impurity or defilement for the practitioner, which

must be overcome or neutralized before or during ritual procedures. Purification, usually with water, is thus a typical feature

of most religious action. Avoidance of the impure—taking animal life, eating flesh, associating with dead things, or body flu- ids—is another feature of Hindu ritual and is important for

repressing pollution. In a social context, those individuals or groups who manage to avoid the impure are accorded

increased respect. Still another feature is a belief in the efficacy

of sacrifice, including survivals of Vedic sacrifice. Thus, sacrifices may include the performance of offerings in a regulated

manner, with the preparation of sacred space, recitation of

texts, and manipulation of objects. A third feature is the con- cept of merit, gained through the performance of charity or good works, that will accumulate over time and reduce sufferings in the next world.

Domestic Worship

The home is the place where most Hindus conduct their

worship and religious rituals. The most important times of day

for performance of household rituals are dawn and dusk,

although especially devout families may engage in devotion

more often. For many households, the day begins when the

women in the house draw auspicious geometric designs in

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chalk or rice flour on the floor or the doorstep. For orthodox

Hindus, dawn and dusk are greeted with recitation from the

Rig Veda of the Gayatri Mantra for the sun—for many people,

the only Sanskrit prayer they know. After a bath, there is personal worship of the gods at a family shrine, which typically

includes lighting a lamp and offering foodstuffs before the

images, while prayers in Sanskrit or a regional language are

recited. In the evenings, especially in rural areas, mostly female

devotees may gather together for long sessions of singing

hymns in praise of one or more of the gods.

Minor acts of charity punctuate the day. During daily baths,

there are offerings of a little water in memory of the ancestors. At each meal, families may set aside a handful of grain to be

donated to beggars or needy persons, and daily gifts of small

amounts of grain to birds or other animals serve to accumulate

merit for the family through their self-sacrifice. Life-Cycle Rituals

A detailed series of life-cycle rituals (samskara, or refinements) mark major transitions in the life of the individual.

Especially orthodox Hindu families may invite Brahman priests

to their homes to officiate at these rituals, complete with sacred

fire and recitations of mantras. Most of these rituals, however,

do not occur in the presence of such priests, and among many

groups who do not revere the Vedas or respect Brahmans,

there may be other officiants or variations in the rites. Ceremonies may be performed during pregnancy to ensure

the health of the mother and growing child. The father may

part the hair of the mother three times upward from the front

to the back, to assure the ripening of the embryo. Charms may

serve to ward off the evil eye and witches or demons. At birth,

before the umbilical cord is severed, the father may touch the

baby's lips with a gold spoon or ring dipped in honey, curds,

and ghee. The word vak (speech) is whispered three times into

the right ear, and mantras are chanted to ensure a long life. A

number of rituals for the infant include the first visit outside to a temple, the first feeding with solid food (usually cooked

rice), an ear-piercing ceremony, and the first haircut (shaving

the head) that often occurs at a temple or during a festival

when the hair is offered to a deity.

A crucial event in the life of the orthodox, upper-caste

Hindu male is an initiation (upanayana) ceremony, which takes

place for some young males between the ages of six and twelve

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to mark the transition to awareness and adult religious responsibilities. At the ceremony itself, the family priest invests the

boy with a sacred thread to be worn always over the left shoulder, and the parents instruct him in pronouncing the Gayatri

Mantra. The initiation ceremony is seen as a new birth; those

groups entitled to wear the sacred thread are called the twiceborn (see Glossary). In the ancient categorization of society

associated with the Vedas, only the three highest groups—Brahman, warrior (Kshatriya), and commoner or merchant

(Vaishya) —were allowed to wear the thread, to make them dis- tinct from the fourth group of servants (Shudra). Many individuals and groups who are only hazily associated with the old

"twice-born" elites perform the upanayana ceremony and claim

the higher status it bestows. For young Hindu women in South

India, a different ritual and celebration occurs at the first menses. The next important transition in life is marriage. For most

people in India, the betrothal of the young couple and the

exact date and time of the wedding are matters decided by the

parents in consultation with astrologers. At Hindu weddings,

the bride and bridegroom represent the god and the goddess,

although there is a parallel tradition that sees the groom as a prince coming to wed his princess. The groom, decked in all his finery, often travels to the wedding site on a caparisoned

white horse or in an open limousine, accompanied by a procession of relatives, musicians, and bearers of ornate electrified

lamps. The actual ceremonies in many cases become extremely

elaborate, but orthodox Hindu marriages typically have at their

center the recitation of mantras by priests. In a crucial rite, the

new couple take seven steps northward from a sacred household fire, turn, and make offerings into the flames. Independent traditions in regional languages and among different

caste groups support wide variations in ritual (see Life Passages, ch. 5).

After the death of a family member, the relatives become

involved in ceremonies for preparation of the body and a procession to the burning or burial ground. For most Hindus, cre- mation is the ideal method for dealing with the dead, although

many groups practice burial instead; infants are buried rather

than cremated. At the funeral site, in the presence of the male

mourners, the closest relative of the deceased (usually the

eldest son) takes charge of the final rite and, if it is cremation,

lights the funeral pyre. After a cremation, ashes and fragments

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of bone are collected and eventually immersed in a holy river. After a funeral, everyone undergoes a purifying bath. The

immediate family remains in a state of intense pollution for a

set number of days (sometimes ten, eleven, or thirteen) . At the

end of that period, close family members meet for a ceremonial meal and often give gifts to the poor or to charities. A particular feature of the Hindu ritual is the preparation of rice

balls (pinda) offered to the spirit of the dead person during

memorial services. In part these ceremonies are seen as contributing to the merit of the deceased, but they also pacify the

soul so that it will not linger in this world as a ghost but will pass

through the realm of Yama, the god of death.

Public Worship

Temples

The basic form of the temple in India is a square cell, oriented to the four cardinal directions, containing a platform

with an image of the deity in the center, a flat roof overhead,

and a doorway on the east side. In front of the doorway is a porch or platform, shaded by a roof supported by pillars,

where worshipers gather before and after approaching the

god. At the founding of the temple, priests establish a sanctified area in the center of the shrine and, while praying and performing rituals, set up the image of the god. The deity is then

said to be one with the image, which contains or manifests the

power of the god on earth. Every Hindu temple in India, then,

exists as the center of the universe, where the god overlooks his or her domain and aids devotees.

Worship at the temple is not congregational. Instead, individuals or small groups of devotees approach the sanctum in

order to obtain a vision (darshana) of the god, say prayers, and

perform devotional worship. Because the god exists in totality

in the shrine, any objects that touch the image or even enter

the sanctum are filled with power and, when returned to their

givers, confer the grace of the divine on the human world.

Only persons of requisite purity who have been specially

trained are able to handle the power of the deity, and most

temple sanctums are operated by priests who take the offerings

from worshipers, present them directly to the image of the

deity, and then return most of the gifts to the devotees for use

or consumption later at home.

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Since the sixth century, after the decline of Buddhism as the

main focus of religious patronage, temples have been accumulating generous donations from kings, nobles, and the wealthy.

The result is a huge number of shrines throughout the country, many of which, especially in South India, date back hundreds of years. The statuary and embellishment in some of the

ancient shrines constitute one of the world's greatest artistic

heritages. The layout of major temples has expanded into

gigantic architectural complexes.

Along with architectural elaboration has come a complex

administrative system to manage the many gifts bestowed by

wealthy donors in the past and continually replenished by the

piety of devotees in the present. The gods are legal landholders

and command substantial investment portfolios throughout

the country. The management of these fortunes in many states

lies in the hands of private religious endowments, although in

some states, such as Tamil Nadu, the state government manages most of the temples directly. Struggles over the control of

temple administration have clogged the courts for several hundred years, and the news media readily report on the drama of

these battles. Several cases have had an impact on religious, or communal, affairs. The most spectacular case involved ownership of a site in Ayodhya, Uttar Pradesh, claimed by Hindus as the site of Ram's birth but taken over by Muslims as the site for a mosque, the Babri Masjid, built in 1528. After much posturing by the conservative Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP—Indian

People's Party) and its nationalist parent organization, the

Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh (RSS—National Volunteer

Organisation), matters came to a head in December 1992 (see

Modern Transformations, this ch.; Political Parties, ch. 8).

Some 200,000 militant Hindus, under the direction of RSS

marshals, descended on Ayodhya, razing the Babri Masjid to the ground on December 6, 1992. Reprisals and communal violence occurred throughout India and in neighboring Pakistan

and Bangladesh (see Political Issues, ch. 8).

Pilgrimage

India is covered with holy sites associated with the exploits of

the gods, the waters of a sacred river, or the presence of holy

men. Texts called the Puranas (ancient lore in Sanskrit) contain lengthy sections that describe numerous sacred places and

the merit gained by traveling to them in a devout manner.

Bathing at such sites is a specially meritorious act. With the

149

Ghats on the banks of the Ganga at Varanasi, Uttar Pradesh

Courtesy Bernice Huffman Collection, Library of Congress

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India: A Country Study

expansion of public transportation in the twentieth century,

there has been a vast increase in the numbers of people who

visit these spots to partake of the divine and visit new places. In

fact, for many Indians pilgrimage is the preferred form of tour- ism, involving family and community groups in enjoyable and

uplifting vacations.

Certain important sites are well-known throughout India

and attract hundreds of thousands of pilgrims annually. Probably the most significant is Varanasi (also known as Banaras,

Benares, or Kashi) in southeastern Uttar Pradesh on the north

bank of the Ganga. It is sacred to Hindus, Buddhists, andJains,

who flock to the ghats, or steps, leading from temples down to the banks of the sacred Ganga in their search for an auspicious

site for death, cremation, or immersion of ashes. Hardwar, in

northwestern Uttar Pradesh, far up the Ganga in the foothills

of the Himalayas, is theVaranasi of northwest India for Hindus

living there and is a favorite spot for ritual bathing. There are numerous destinations in the Himalayas, including Badrinath

and Kedarnath, isolated sites in northern Uttar Pradesh that once required a long journey on foot. In southern India, the

rivers Kaveri, Krishna, and Godavari attract pilgrims to a large

number of bathing sites, and the coastline features major temples such as the Ramalingesvara Temple in Ramesvaram, Tamil

Nadu, where Ram and his army crossed over to Lanka to rescue

Sita. Pandharpur, in Maharashtra, is the destination for many

thousands of devotees of Vitthala, an incarnation of Vishnu,

whose tradition goes back at least to the thirteenth century and

was written about by the great Marathi bhakti poets Namdev,

Tukaram, and Eknath. There are smaller sites near almost

every river or scenic hilltop.

For many pilgrims, the process of getting to their destination

involves preliminary vows and fasting, intensive cooperative

efforts among different families and groups, extensive traveling on foot, and the constant singing of devotional songs. On

arrival, groups of pilgrims often make contact with priests who

specialize in the pilgrim trade and for a fee plan the group's

schedule and ritual activity. At some of the major sites, the families of the priests have served as hereditary guides for groups

of pilgrims over many generations. Where a shrine is the focus,

the devotee may circumambulate the buildings and wait in line

for long hours just for a glimpse of the deity's image as security

personnel move the crowds along. At auspicious bathing sites,

pilgrims may have to wade through the crush of other devotees

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to dip into the sacred waters of a river or a tank. Worshipers

engaged in special vows or in praying for the cure of a loved one may purchase shrine amulets to give to the god (which are circulated back to the shrine's shop) or purchase foodstuffs,

sanctified by the god's presence, to take to friends and family.

Nearby, souvenir hawkers and shopkeepers and sometimes

even amusement parks contribute to a lively atmosphere that is certainly part of the attraction of many pilgrimage sites.

Festivals

A vast number of local Hindu festivals revolve around the

worship of gods at the neighborhood, village, or caste level. All over India, at least once a year the images of the gods are taken

from their shrines to travel in processions around their

domains. The images are carried on palanquins that require

human bearers or on human-drawn, large-wheeled carts. The

images may be intricately made up in order for the stone or wooden statues to appear lifelike. They may wear costly vest- ments, and flower garlands may surround their necks or entire

shrines. The gods move down village or city streets in parades

that may include multiple palanquins and, at sites of major

temples, even elephants decked out in traditional vestments. As

the parade passes, throngs of worshipers pray and make vows to the gods while the community as a whole looks on and participates in the spectacle. In many locations, these public parades

go on for a number of days and include special events where

the gods engage in "play" (lila) that may include mock battles

and the defeat of demons. The ceremonial bathing of the

images and displays of the gods in all their finery in public halls

also occur. In the south, where temples stand at the geographic

and psychological heart of village and town, some "chariots" of

the gods stand many stories tall and require the concerted

effort of dozens of men to pull them through the streets. There are a number of Hindu religious festivals that are offi- cially recognized by the government as "closed holidays," on

which work stops throughout the country. The biggest of these occur within two blocks of time after the end of the southwest

monsoon. The first comes at the end of the ten-day festival of

Dussehra, late in the month of Asvina (September-October)

according to the Shaka calendar, India's official calendar (see

table 14, Appendix). This festival commemorates Ram's victory over Ravana and the rescue of his wife Sita (see Vishnu, this

ch.). On the ninth day of Dusshera, people bless with sandal153
India: A Country Study

wood paste the "weapons" of their business life, including

everything from plows to computers. On the final day of Dussehra, in North India celebrating crowds set fire to huge paper

effigies of Ravana. Several weeks later comes Dipavali (Diwali), or the Festival of Lights, in the month of Kartika (OctoberNovember). This is officially a one-day holiday, but in reality it becomes a week-long event when many people take vacations.

One tradition links this festival to the victory of Krishna over

the demon Naraka, but for most devotees the holiday is a recre- ation of Ram's triumphant return with Sita, his wife, from his

adventures. People light rows of lamps and place them on sills around their houses, set off gigantic amounts of fireworks, pray

for wealth and good fortune, distribute sweets, and send greeting cards to friends and business associates.

The other closed holidays associated with Hindu festivals

include Mahashivaratri, or the great night of Shiva, during the

month of Magha (January-February). This festival celebrates

Shiva's emanation of the universe through his cosmic dance,

and is a day of fasting, visiting temples, and in many places staying up all night to sing devotional songs. On the fourth day in

the month of Bhadra (August-September) comes the festival

of Ganesh Chaturthi. Families and businesses prepare for this

festival by purchasing brightly painted images of Ganesh and

worshiping them for a number of days. On the festival itself,

with great celebration, participants bathe the images (and in

most cases permanently dump them) in nearby rivers, lakes, or

seas. Janmashtami, the birthday of Krishna, also occurs in the

month of Bhadra.

There are a large number of "restricted holidays" celebrated

by the vast majority of the population and resulting in closures

of business establishments. Major Hindu events include

Ramanavami, the birthday of Ram in the month of Chaitra

(March-April), and Holi, celebrated at the end of the month

of Phalguna (February-March), when people engage in cross- dressing, play tricks on each other, and squirt colored water or powder on each other. These primarily northern festivals

receive varying amounts of attention in other parts of the country. A separate series of restricted holidays allow regional cul- tures to celebrate their own feasts, such as the harvest festival of

Pongal in Tamil Nadu in midjanuary, which celebrates the harvest and the sun's entrance into Capricorn.

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Islam

Islam is India's largest minority religion, with Muslims offi- cially comprising 12.1 percent of the country's population, or

101.6 million people as of the 1991 census. The largest concentrations—about 52 percent of all Muslims in India—live in the

states of Bihar (12 million), West Bengal (16 million), and

Uttar Pradesh (24 million), according to the 1991 census. Muslims represent a majority of the local populations only in

Jammu and Kashmir (not tabulated in 1991 but 65 percent in

1981) and Lakshadweep (94 percent). As a faith with its roots

outside South Asia, Islam also offers some striking contrasts to those religions that originated in India.

Origins and Tenets

Islam began with the ministry of the Prophet Muhammad

(570-632), who belonged to a merchant family in the trading

town of Mecca in Arabia. In his middle age, Muhammad

received visions in which the Archangel Gabriel revealed the

word of God to him. After 620 he publicly preached the message of these visions, stressing the oneness of God (Allah),

denouncing the polytheism of his fellow Arabs, and calling for

moral uplift of the population. He attracted a dedicated band

of followers, but there was intense opposition from the leaders

of the city, who profited from pilgrimage trade to the shrine

called the Kaaba. In 622 Muhammad and his closest supporters

migrated to the town of Yathrib (now renamed Medina) to the

north and set up a new center of preaching and opposition to the leadership of Mecca. This move, the hijrah or hegira,

marks the beginning of the Islamic calendar and the origin of

the new religion of Islam. After a series of military engagements, Muhammad and his followers were able to defeat the

authorities in Mecca and return to take control of the city.

Before his death in 632, Muhammad was able to bring most of

the tribes of Arabia into the fold of Islam. Soon after his death,

the united Arabs conquered present-day Syria, Iraq, Egypt, and

Iran, making Islam into a world religion by the end of the sev- enth century.

Islam means submission to God, and a Muslim is one who

has submitted to the will of God. At the center of the religion is an intense concentration on the unity of God and the separation between God and his creatures. No physical representation of God is allowed. There are no other gods. The duty of

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India: A Country Study

humanity is to profess the simple testimony: "There is no god

but God (Allah), and Muhammad is his Prophet." Obedience

to God's will rests on following the example of the Prophet in

one's own life and faithfulness to the revelations collected into

the most sacred text, the Quran. The Five Pillars of Islam are

reciting the profession of faith; praying five times a day; almsgiving to the poor; fasting (abstaining from dawn to dusk from

food, drink, sexual relations, and smoking) during the month

of Ramazan (the ninth month of the Islamic calendar, known

as Ramadan in Arab countries), the holy month when God's

revelations were received by Muhammad; and making the pilgrimage (hajj) to Mecca at least once during one's life if possible. People who obey God's commandments and live a good

life will go to heaven after death; those who disobey will go to

hell. All souls will be resurrected for a last judgment at the end

of the world. Muslims view themselves as followers of the same

tradition preserved in the Judaic and Christian scriptures,

accept the prophetic roles of Ibrahim (Abraham), Musa

(Moses), and Isa (Jesus), and view Islam as the final statement

of revealed truth for the entire world.

Regulation of the Muslim community rests primarily on

rules in the Quran, then on authenticated tales of the conduct

(sunna) of the Prophet Muhammad, then on reasoning, and

finally on the consensus of opinion. By the end of the eighth

century, four main schools of Muslim jurisprudence had

emerged in Sunni (see Glossary) Islam to interpret the sharia

(Islamic law). Prominent among these groups was the Hanafi

school, which dominated most of India, and the Shafii school,

which was more prevalent in South India. Because Islam has no

ordained priesthood, direction of the Muslim community rests on the learning of religious scholars (ulama) who are expert in

understanding the Quran and its appended body of commentaries. Early leadership controversies within the Muslim community

led to divisions that still have an impact on the body of believers. When Muhammad died, leadership fell to his father-in-law,

Abu Bakr, who became the first caliph (khalifa, or successor), a position that combined spiritual and secular power. A separate

group advocated the leadership of Ali, the cousin and

son-in-law of the Prophet, who had married his daughter

Fatima. Leadership could have fallen to Ali's son Husayn, but,

in the power struggle that followed, in 680 Husayn and seventytwo followers were murdered at Karbala (now in modern Iraq)

.

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Religious Life

This leadership dispute formed the most crucial dividing

point in Islamic history: the victorious party went on to found

the Umayyad Dynasty (661-750), which had its headquarters at Damascus, leading the majority of Muslims in the Sunni path.

The disaffected Shiat Ali (or Party of Ali) viewed only his line

as legitimate and continued to follow descendants of Husayn as their leader (imam—see Glossary). Among the followers of this

Shia (see Glossary) path, there is a party of "Seveners" who

trace the lineage of imams down to Ismail (d. 762), the Seventh

Imam and eldest son of the Sixth Imam. The Ismailis are the

largest Shia group in India, and are concentrated in Maharashtra and Gujarat. A second group, the "Twelvers" (the most

numerous Shia group worldwide), traces the lineage of imams

through twelve generations, believing that the last or Twelfth

Imam became "hidden" and will reappear in the world as a savior, or Mahdi, at some time in the future.

The division between Sunni and Shia dates back to purely

political struggles in the seventh century, but over time

between the two major communities many divisive differences

in ritual and legal interpretations have evolved. The vast majority of Muslims are Sunni, and in contemporary India 90 percent of Muslims follow this path. Sunnis have recognized no

legitimate caliph after the position was abolished in Turkey in

1924, placing the direction of the community clearly with the

ulama.

Public worship for the average Muslim consists of going to a mosque (masjid) —normally on Fridays, although mosques are well attended throughout the week—for congregational

prayers led by a local imam, following the public call to prayer,

which may be intoned from the top of a minaret ( minar) at the

mosque. After leaving their footwear at the door, men and

women separate; men usually sit in front, women in back,

either inside the mosque or in an open courtyard. The prayer

leader gives a sermon in the local regional language, perhaps

interspersed with Arabic or Farsi (sometimes called Persian or

Parsi) quotations, depending on his learning and the sophistication of the audience. Announcements of events of interest

that may include political commentary are often included.

Then follow common prayers that involve responses from the

worshipers who stand, bow, and kneel in unison during devotions.

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Islamic Traditions in South Asia

Muslims practice a series of life-cycle rituals that differ from

those of Hindus, Jains, or Buddhists. The newborn baby has

the call to prayer whispered into the left ear, the profession of

faith whispered into the right ear, honey or date paste placed

in the mouth, and a name selected. On the sixth day after

birth, the first bath occurs. On the seventh day or a multiple of

the seventh, the head is shaved, and alms are distributed, ideally in silver weighing as much as the hair; a sacrifice of animals

imitates the sheep sacrificed instead of Ishmael (Ismail) in biblical times. Religious instruction starts at age four years, four

months, and four days, beginning with the standard phrase: "In the name of God, the Beneficent, the Merciful." Male circumcision takes place between the ages of seven and twelve. Marriage

requires a payment by the husband to the wife and the solemnization of a marital contract in a social gathering. Marriage cer- emonies include the donning of a nose ring by the bride, or in

South India a wedding necklace, and the procession of the

bridegroom. In a traditional wedding, males and females

attend ceremonies in different rooms, in keeping with the seg- regation of sexes in most social settings. After death the family

members wash and enshroud the body, after which it is buried

as prayers from the Quran are recited. On the third day, friends

and relatives come to console the bereaved, read the Quran,

and pray for the soul of the deceased. The family observe a mourning period of up to forty days.

The annual festivals of Islam are based on a lunar calendar

of 354 days, which makes the Islamic holy year independent of

the Gregorian calendar. Muslim festivals make a complete cir- cuit of the solar year every thirty-three years. The beginning of the Islamic calendar is the month of

Muharram, the tenth day of which is Ashura, the anniversary of

the death of Husayn, the son of Ali. Ashura, a major holiday, is of supreme importance for the Shia. Devotees engage in ritualized mourning that may include processions of colorful repli- cas of Husayn's tomb at Karbala and standards with palms on

top, which are carried by barefoot mourners and buried at an

imitation Karbala. In many areas of India, these parades provide a dramatic spectacle that draws large numbers of

non-Muslim onlookers. Demonstrations of grief may include

bouts of self-flagellation that can draw blood and may take

place in public streets, although many families retain personal

mourning houses. Sunni Muslims may also commemorate

158
A late nineteenth-century view of theJama Masjid (Friday Mosque),

India's largest mosque, built in the seventeenth century, Delhi

Courtesy Stereograph Collection, Library of Congress

Husayn's death but in a less demonstrative manner, concentrating instead on the redemptive aspect of his martyrdom.

The last day of Ramazan is Id al Fitr (Feast of Breaking the

Fast), another national holiday, which ends the month of fast- ing with almsgiving, services in mosques, and visits to friends

and neighbors. Bakr Id, or Id al Zuha (Feast of Sacrifice),

begins on the tenth day of the Islamic month of Dhul Hijjah

and is a major holiday. Prescribed in the Quran, Id al Zuha

commemorates Ibrahim's willingness to sacrifice Ishmael

(rather than Ishaq—Isaac—as in the Judeo-Christian tradition)

according to God's command, but it is also the high point of

the pilgrim's ritual cycle while on the hajj in Mecca. All of these

festivals involve large feasts, gifts given to family and neighbors,

and the distribution of food for charitable purposes.

A significant aspect of Islam in India is the importance of

159
India: A Country Study

shrines attached to the memory of great Sufi saints. Sufism is a

mystical path (tariqat) as distinct from the path of the sharia. A

Sufi attains a direct vision of oneness with God, often on the

edges of orthodox behavior, and can thus become a pir (living

saint) who may take on disciples (murids) and set up a spiritual

lineage that can last for generations. Orders of Sufis became

important in India during the thirteenth century following the

ministry of Muinuddin Chishti (1142-1236), who settled in

Ajmer, Raj asthan, and attracted large numbers of converts to Islam because of his holiness. His Chishtiyya order went on to become the most influential Sufi lineage in India, although

other orders from Central Asia and Southwest Asia also

reached to India and played a large role in the spread of Islam.

Many Sufis were well known for weaving music, dance, intoxicants, and local folktales into their songs and lectures. In this

way, they created a large literature in regional languages that

embedded Islamic culture deeply into older South Asian traditions.

In the case of many great teachers, the memory of their holi- ness has been so intense that they are still viewed as active inter- cessors with God, and their tombs have become the site of rites

and prayers by disciples and lay people alike. Tales of miraculous deeds associated with the tombs of great saints have

attracted large numbers of pilgrims attempting to gain cures

for physical maladies or solutions to personal problems. The

tomb of the pir thus becomes a dargah (gateway) to God and

the focus for a wide range of rituals, such as daily washing and

decoration by professional attendants, touching or kissing the

tomb or contact with the water that has washed it, hanging petitions on the walls of the shrine surrounding the tomb, lighting

incense, and giving money.

The descendants of the original pir are sometimes seen as inheritors of his spiritual energy, and, as pirs in their own right,

they might dispense amulets sanctified by contact with them or with the tomb. The annual celebration of the pir's death is a major event at important shrines, attracting hundreds of thousands of devotees for celebrations that may last for days. Free

communal kitchens and distribution of sweets are also big

attractions of these festivals, at which Muslim fakirs, or wandering ascetics, sometimes appear and where public demonstrations of self-mortification, such as miraculous piercing of the

body and spiritual possession of devotees, sometimes occur. Every region of India can boast of at least one major Sufi shrine

160
A Muslim bride, Madhya

Pradesh

Courtesy DoranneJacobson

that attracts expressive devotion, which remains important,

especially for Muslim women.

The leadership of the Muslim community has pursued vari- ous directions in the evolution of Indian Islam during the twentieth century. The most conservative wing has typically rested

on the education system provided by the hundreds of religious

training institutes (madrasa) throughout the country, which

have tended to stress the study of the Quran and Islamic texts in Arabic and Persian, and have focused little on modern managerial and technical skills (see Education and Society, ch. 2).

Several national movements have emerged from this sector of

the Muslim community. The Jamaati Islami (Islamic Party),

founded in 1941, advocates the establishment of an overtly

Islamic government through peaceful, democratic, and nonmissionary activities. It had about 3,000 active members and

40,000 sympathizers in the mid-1980s. The Tablighi Jamaat

(Outreach Society) became active after the 1940s as a movement, primarily among the ulama, stressing personal renewal,

prayer, a missionary and cooperative spirit, and attention to orthodoxy. It has been highly critical of the kind of activities

that occur in and around Sufi shrines and remains a minor if respected force in the training of the ulama. Other ulama have

161
India: A Country Study

upheld the legitimacy of mass religion, including exaltation of

pin and the memory of the Prophet. A powerful secularizing

drive led to the founding of Aligarh Muslim University

(founded in 1S75 as the Muhammadan Anglo-Oriental College) —with its modern curriculum—and other major Muslim

universities. This educational drive has remained the most

dominant force in guiding the Muslim community.

Sikhism

Sikhism has about 20 million believers worldwide but has an importance far bevond those numbers because Sikhs have

plaved a disproportionately large role in the armed forces and

public affairs in India for the last 400 years. Although most

Indian Sikhs ( 79 percent) remain concentrated in the state of

Punjab, nearlv 3.5 million Sikhs live outside the state, while

about 4 million live abroad. This Sikh diaspora, driven bv ambition and economic success, has made Sikhism a world religion

as well as a significant minority force within the country

Early History and Tenets

Sikhism be^an with Guru Xanak ( 1469-1539). a member of

a trading caste in Punjab who seems to have been employed for

some time as a government servant, was married and had two

sons, and at age forty-five became a religious teacher. At the

heart of his message was a philosophy of universal love, devotion to God. and the equality of all men and women before

God. He set up congregations of believers who ate together in

free communal kitchens in an overt attempt to break down

caste boundaries based on food prohibitions. As a poet, musician, and enlightened master. Xanak's reputation spread, and

bv the time he died he had founded a new religion of "disciples" ( shiksha or sikh) that followed his example.

Xanak's son. Baba Sri Chand. founded the Udasi sect of celi- bate ascetics, which continued in the 1990s. However. Xanak

chose as his successor not his son but Angad (1504-52) . his

chief disciple, to carrv on the work as the second guru. Thus

began a lineage of teachers that lasted until 1 70S and

amounted to ten gurus in the Sikh tradition, each of whom is \iewed as an enlightened master who propounded directly the

word of God. The third guru3 Amar Das | 1479-1574). established missionary centers to spread the message and was so well

respected that the Mughal emperor Akbar visited him ( see The

162
Religious Life

Mughals, ch. 1). Amar Das appointed his son-in-law Ram Das

(1534-81) to succeed him, establishing a hereditary succession

for the position of guru. He also built a tank for water at Amritsar in Punjab, which, after his death, became the holiest center

of Sikhism.

By the late sixteenth century, the influence of the Sikh reli- gion on Punjabi society was coming to the notice of political

authorities. The fifth guru, Arjun Das (1563-1606), was exe- cuted in Lahore by the Mughal emperor Jahangir (r. 1605-27)

for alleged complicity in a rebellion. In response, the next

guru, Hargobind (d. 1644), militarized and politicized his position and fought three battles with Mughal forces. Hargobind

established a militant tradition of resistance to persecution by

the central government in Delhi that remains an important

motif in Sikh consciousness. Hargobind also established at Amritsar, in front of the Golden Temple, the central shrine

devoted to Sikhism, the Throne of the Eternal God (Akal

Takht) from which the guru dispensed justice and administered the secular affairs of the community, clearly establishing

the tradition of a religious state that remains a major issue. The

ninth guru, Tegh Bahadur (1621-75), because he refused

Mughal emperor Aurangzeb's order to convert to Islam, was

brought to Delhi and beheaded on a site that later became an important gurdwara (abode of the guru, a Sikh temple) on

Chandni Chauk, one of the old city's main thoroughfares.

These events led the tenth guru, Gobind Singh (1666-

1708), to transform the Sikhs into a militant brotherhood dedicated to defense of their faith at all times. He instituted a baptism ceremony involving the immersion of a sword in sugared

water that initiates Sikhs into the Khalsa (khalsa, from the Persian term for "the king's own," often taken to mean army of the

pure) of dedicated devotion. The outward signs of this new

order were the "Five Ks" to be observed at all times: uncut hair

(kesh), a long knife (kirpari), a comb (kangha), a. steel bangle

(kard), and a special kind of breeches not reaching below the

knee (kachha). Male Sikhs took on the surname Singh (meaning lion), and women took the surname Kaur (princess). All

made vows to purify their personal behavior by avoiding intoxicants, including alcohol and tobacco. In modern India, male

Sikhs who have dedicated themselves to the Khalsa do not cut

their beards and keep their long hair tied up under turbans,

preserving a distinctive personal appearance recognized

throughout the world.

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India: A Country Study

Much of Guru Gobind Singh's later life was spent on the

move, in guerrilla campaigns against the Mughal Empire.,

which was entering the last days of its effective authority under

Aurangzeb (1658-1707). .After Gobind Singh's death, the line

of gurus ended, and their message continued through the Adi

Granth (Original Book), which dates from 1604 and later

became known as the Guru Granth Sahib (Holy Book of the

Gurus). The Guru Granth Sahib is revered as a continuation of

the line of gurus and as the living word of God bv all Sikhs and

stands at the heart of all ceremonies.

Most of the Sikh gurus were excellent musicians, who composed songs that conveved their message to the masses in the

saints' own language, which combined variants of Punjabi with

Hindi and Braj and also contained Arabic and Persian vocabulary Written in Gurmukhi script, these songs are one of the

main sources of earlv Punjabi language and literature. There

are 5. $94 hvmns in all. arranged according to the musical measure in which thev are sung. An interesting feature of this liter- ature is that 937 songs and poems are bv well-known bhakti

saints who were not members of the lineage of Sikh gurus,

including the North Indian saint Kabir and five Muslim devotees. In the Guru Granth Sahib, God is called bv all the Hindu

names and bv Allah as well. From its beginnings, then. Sikhism was an inclusive faith that attempted to encompass and enrich

other Indian religious traditions.

The belief system propounded bv the gurus has its origins in

the philosophy and devotions of Hinduism and Islam, but the

formulation of Sikhism is unique. God is the creator of the uni- verse and is without qualities or differentiation in himself. The

universe ( samsar) is not sinful in its origin but is covered with

impurities: it is not suffering, but a transitory opportunity for

the soul to recognize its true nature and break the cvcle of

rebirth. The unregenerate person is dominated bv self-interest

and remains immersed in illusion ( ma\a). leading to bad

karma. Meanwhile. God desires that his creatures escape and

achieve enlightenment (nirvana) bv recognizing his order in

the universe. He does this bv manifesting his grace as a holy

word, attainable through recognition and recitation of God's

holv name ( nam). The role of the guru, who is the manifestation of God in the world, is to teach the means for praver

through the Guru Granth Sahib and the community of believers.

The guru in this system, and bv extension the Guru Granth

164
The Golden Temple of the Sikhs, Amritsar, Punjab, in a late nineteenth-century photograph

Courtesy Stereograph Collection, Library of Congress

Sahib, are coexistent with the divine and play a decisive role in

saving the world.

Where the Guru Granth Sahib is present, that place becomes

a gurdwara. Many Sikh homes contain separate rooms or designated areas where a copy of the book stands as the center of

devotional ceremonies. Throughout Punjab, or anywhere there

is a substantial body of believers, there are special shrines

where the Guru Granth Sahib is displayed permanently or is installed daily in a ceremonial manner. These public gurdwaras

are the centers of Sikh community life and the scene of periodic assemblies for worship. The typical assembly involves

group singing from the Guru Granth Sahib, led by distinguished

believers or professional singers attached to the shrine, distri- bution of holy food, and perhaps a sermon delivered by the

custodian of the shrine.

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India: A Country Study

As for domestic and life-cycle rituals, well into the twentieth

century many Sikhs followed Hindu customs for birth, marriage, and death ceremonies, including readings from Hindu

scriptures and the employment of Brahmans as officiants.

Reform movements within the Sikh community have purged

many of these customs, substituting instead readings from the

Guru Granth Sahib as the focus for rituals and the employment

of Sikh ritual specialists. At major public events—weddings,

funerals, or opening a new business—patrons may fund a reading of the entire Guru Granth Sahib by special reciters.

Twentieth-Century Developments

The existence of the Khalsa creates a potential division

within the Sikh community between those who have undergone the baptism ceremony and those who practice the system

laid down in the Guru Granth Sahib but who do not adopt the

distinctive life-style of the Khalsa. Among the latter is a sect of

believers founded by Baba Dayal (d. 1853) named the Nirankaris, who concentrate on the formless quality of God and his

revelation purely through the guru and the Guru Granth Sahib,

and who accept the existence of a living, enlightened teacher

as essential for spiritual development. The dominant tendency

among the Sikhs since the late nineteenth century has been to

stress the importance of the Khalsa and its outward signs.

Revivalist movements of the late nineteenth century centered on the activities of the Singh Sabha (Assembly of Lions),

who successfully moved much of the Sikh community toward

their own ritual systems and away from Hindu customs, and

culminated in the Akali (eternal) mass movement in the 1920s

to take control of gurdwaras away from Hindu managers and

invest it in an organization representing the Sikhs. The result was passage of the Sikh Gurdwara Act of 1925, which established the Central Gurdwara Management Committee to manage all Sikh shrines in Punjab, Haryana, and Himachal Pradesh

through an assembly of elected Sikhs. The combined revenues

of hundreds of shrines, which collected regular contributions

and income from endowments, gave the committee a large

operating budget and considerable authority over the religious

life of the community. A simultaneous process led to the Akali

Dal (Eternal Party), a political organization that originally

coordinated nonviolent agitations to gain control over gurdwaras, then participated in the independence struggle, and

since 1947 has competed for control over the Punjab state gov166
Religious Life

eminent. The ideology of the Akali Dal is simple —

single-minded devotion to the guru and preservation of the

Sikh faith through political power—and the party has served to mobilize a majority of Sikhs in Punjab around issues that stress Sikh separatism.

There is no official priesthood within Sikhism or any widely

accepted institutional mechanism for policy making for the

entire faith. Instead, decisions are made by communities of

believers (sangat) based on the Guru Granth Sahib—a tradition

dating back to the eighteenth century when scattered bodies of

believers had to fight against persecution and manage their

own affairs. Anyone may study the scriptures intensively and

become a "knower" (giant) who is recognized by fellow believers, and there is a variety of training institutes with full-time stu- dents and teachers.

Leaders of sects and sectarian training institutions may feel

free to issue their own orders. When these orders are combined with the prestige and power of the Central Gurdwara

Management Committee and the Akali Dal, which have explicitly narrow administrative goals and are often faction-ridden, a mixture of images and authority emerges that often leaves the

religion as a whole without clear leadership. Thus it became

possible for Sant Jarnail Singh Bhindranwale, head of a training institution, to stand forth as a leading authority on the

direction of Sikhism; initiate reforms of personal morality; participate in the persecution of Nirankaris; and take effective

control of the holiest Sikh shrine, the Golden Temple in Amritsar, Punjab, in the early 1980s. His takeover of the Golden Temple led to a violent siege and culminated in the devastation of

the shrine by the army in 1984 (see The Rise of Indira Gandhi,

ch. 1; Insurgent Movements and External Subversion, ch. 10).

Later terrorist activities in Punjab, carried out in the name of

Sikhism, were performed by a wide range of organizations

claiming to represent an authoritative vision of the nature and

direction of the community as a whole.

Other Minority Religions

Tribal Religions

Among the 68 million citizens of India who are members of

tribal groups, the religious concepts, terminologies, and practices are as varied as the hundreds of tribes, but members of

these groups have one thing in common: they are under con167
India: A Country Study

stant pressure from the major organized religions. Some of this

pressure is intentional, as outside missionaries work among

tribal groups to gain converts. Most of the pressure, however,

comes from the process of integration within a national political and economic system that brings tribes into increasing contact with other groups and different, prestigious belief systems.

In general, those tribes that remain geographically isolated in

desert, hill, and forest regions or on islands are able to retain

their traditional cultures and religions longer. Those tribes that

make the transition away from hunting and gathering and

toward sedentary agriculture, usually as low-status laborers,

find their ancient religious forms in decay and their place filled

by practices of Hinduism, Islam, Christianity, or Buddhism.

One of the most studied tribal religions is that of the Santal

of Orissa, Bihar, and West Bengal, one of the largest tribes in

India, having a population estimated at 4.2 million. According

to the 1991 census, however, only 23,645 people listed Santal as their religious belief.

According to the Santal religion, the supreme deity, who ulti- mately controls the entire universe, is Thakurji. The weight of

belief, however, falls on a court of spirits (bonga), who handle

different aspects of the world and who must be placated with

prayers and offerings in order to ward off evil influences.

These spirits operate at the village, household, ancestor, and

subclan level, along with evil spirits that cause disease, and can

inhabit village boundaries, mountains, water, tigers, and the

forest. A characteristic feature of the Santal village is a sacred

grove on the edge of the settlement where many spirits live and

where a series of annual festivals take place.

The most important spirit is Maran Buru (Great Mountain),

who is invoked whenever offerings are made and who

instructed the first Santals in sex and brewing of rice beer.

Maran Buru's consort is the benevolent Jaher Era (Lady of the

Grove).

A yearly round of rituals connected with the agricultural

cycle, along with life-cycle rituals for birth, marriage and burial

at death, involves petitions to the spirits and offerings that

include the sacrifice of animals, usually birds. Religious leaders are male specialists in medical cures who practice divination

and witchcraft. Similar beliefs are common among other tribes

of northeast and central India such as the Kharia, Munda, and

Oraon.

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Religious Life

Smaller and more isolated tribes often demonstrate less articulated classification systems of the spiritual hierarchy,

described as animism or a generalized worship of spiritual

energies connected with locations, activities, and social groups.

Religious concepts are intricately entwined with ideas about

nature and interaction with local ecological systems. As in Santal religion, religious specialists are drawn from the village or

family and serve a wide range of spiritual functions that focus

on placating potentially dangerous spirits and coordinating rit- uals.Unlike the Santal, who have a large population long accus- tomed to agriculture and a distinguished history of resistance

to outsiders, many smaller tribal groups are quite sensitive to ecological degradation caused by modernization, and their

unique religious beliefs are under constant threat. Even among

the Santal, there are 300,000 Christians who are alienated from

traditional festivals, although even among converts the belief

in the spirits remains strong. Among the Munda and Oraon in

Bihar, about 25 percent of the population are Christians.

Among the Kharia of Bihar (population about 130,000), about

60 percent are Christians, but all are heavily influenced by

Hindu concepts of major deities and the annual Hindu cycle of

festivals. Tribal groups in the Himalayas were similarly affected

by both Hinduism and Buddhism in the late twentieth century.

Even the small hunting-and-gathering groups in the union ter- ritory of Andaman and Nicobar Islands have been under severe pressure because of immigration to this area and the resulting

reduction of their hunting area. Christianity

The first Christians in India, according to tradition and legend, were converted by Saint Thomas the Apostle, who arrived

on the Malabar Coast of India in A.D. 52. After evangelizing

and performing miracles in Kerala and Tamil Nadu, he is believed to have been martyred in Madras and buried on the

site of San Thome Cathedral. Members of the Syro-Malabar

Church, an eastern rite of the Roman Catholic Church,

adopted the Syriac liturgy dating from fourth century Antioch.

They practiced what is also known as the Malabar rite until the

arrival of the Portuguese in the late fifteenth century. Soon

thereafter, the Portuguese attempted to latinize the Malabar

rite, an action which, by the mid-sixteenth century, led to charges of heresy against the Syro-Malabar Church and a

169
India: A Country Study

lengthy round of political machinations. By the middle of the

next century, a schism occurred when the adherents of the

Malankar rite (or Syro-Malankara Church) broke away from

the Syro-Malabar Church. Fragmentation continued within the

Syro-Malabar Church up through the early twentieth century

when a large contingent left to join the Nestorian Church,

which had had its own roots in India since the sixth or seventh

century. By 1887, however, the leaders of the Syro-Malabar

Church had reconciled with Rome, which formally recognized

the legitimacy of the Malabar rite. The Syro-Malankara Church

was reconciled with Rome in 1930 and, while retaining the Syriac liturgy, adopted the Malayalam language instead of the

ancient Syriac language.

Throughout this period, foreign missionaries made numerous converts to Christianity. Early Roman Catholic missionaries, particularly the Portuguese, led by the Jesuit Saint Francis

Xavier (1506-52), expanded from their bases on the west coast

making many converts, especially among lower castes and outcastes. The miraculously undecayed body of Saint Francis

Xavier is still on public view in a glass coffin at the Basilica of

BomJesus in Goa. Beginning in the eighteenth century, Protes- tant missionaries began to work throughout India, leading to the growth of Christian communities of many varieties.

The total number of Christians in India according to the

1991 census was 19.6 million, or 2.3 percent of the population.

About 13.8 million of these Christians were Roman Catholics,

including 300,000 members of the Syro-Malankara Church.

The remainder of Roman Catholics were under the Catholic

Bishops' Conference of India. In January 1993, after centuries

of self-government, the 3 .5-million-strong Latin-rite

Syro-Malabar Church was raised to archepiscopate status as part of the Roman Catholic Church. In total, there were nineteen archbishops, 103 bishops, and about 15,000 priests in

India in 1995.

Most Protestant denominations are represented in India, the

result of missionary activities throughout the country, starting

with the onset of British rule. Most denominations, however,

are almost exclusively staffed by Indians, and the role of foreign missionaries is limited. The largest Protestant denomination in the country is the Church of South India, since 1947 a union of Presbyterian, Reformed, Congregational, Methodist,

and Anglican congregations with approximately 2.2 million

members. A similar Church of North India has 1 million mem170
Religious Life

bers. There are 473,000 Methodists, 425,000 Baptists, and

about 1.3 million Lutherans. Orthodox churches of the Malankara and Malabar rites total 2 million and 700,000 members,

respectively.

All Christian churches have found the most fertile ground

for expansion among Dalits, Scheduled Castes, and Scheduled

Tribe groups (see Tribes, ch. 4). During the twentieth century,

the fastest growing Christian communities have been located in

the northeast, among the Khasis, Mizos, Nagas, and other hill tribes. Christianity offers a non-Hindu mode of acculturation

during a period when the state and modern economy have

been radically transforming the life-styles of the hill peoples.

Missionaries have led the way in the development of written

languages and literature for many tribal groups. Christian

churches have provided a focus for unity among different ethnic groups and have brought with them a variety of charitable

services.

Zoroastrianism

According to the 1991 census, there were 79,382 members of

the Zoroastrian faith. Some 79 percent lived in Maharashtra

(primarily in Bombay) and most of the rest in Gujarat. Zoroastrians are primarily descendants of tenth-century immigrants

from Persia who preserved the religion of Zoroaster, a prophet

of Iran who taught probably in the sixth century B.C. Although

the number of Parsis steadily declined during the twentieth

century as a result of emigration and low birth rates, their reli- gion is significant because of the financial influence wielded by

this mostly trading community and because they represent the

world's largest surviving group of believers in this ancient faith.

Originally, the Parsis were shipbuilders and traders located

in the ports and towns of Gujarat. Their freedom from food or occupational restrictions based on caste affiliation enabled

them to take advantage of the numerous commercial opportunities that accompanied the colonial expansion of trade and

control. Substantial numbers moved to Bombay, which served

as a base for expanding their business activities throughout

India and abroad. A combination of Western commercial contacts and English-language education during the colonial

period made the Parsis arguably the most cosmopolitan community in India. Socially, they were equally at home with Indi- ans and Westerners; Parsi women enjoyed freedom of

movement earlier than most high-caste Hindu or upper-class

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India: A Country Study

Muslim women. In contemporary India, Parsis are the most

urban, elite, and wealthy of any of the nation's religious groups.

Their role in the development of trade, industry, finance, and

philanthropy has earned them an important place in the country's social and economic life, and several have achieved high

rank in government.

The source of Parsi religion is a body of texts called the

Avesta, which includes a number of sections in archaic language attributed to Zoroaster himself, and which preserve the

cult of the fire sacrifice as the focus of ritual life. The supreme

spirit is Ahura Mazda (or Ohrmazd), whose will is manifest in

the world through the actions of bountiful immortals or good

spiritual attributes that support life and love. Opposing the

supreme spirit is the force of evil, Angra Mainyu (or Ahriman),

which is the cause of all destruction and corruption in the

world. Equipped with free will, humans can choose sides in this

struggle and after death will appear at the bridge ofjudgment.

People who choose to do good deeds go to heaven, those who

commit evil go to hell. The opposed cosmic forces battle

through the history of the universe, until at the end of time

there will be a final judgment and a resurrection of the dead to a perfect world.

The extensive ritual life of devout Parsis revolves around

sacred fires, of which there are three grades dependent on

extensive ceremonial preparation. The highest two grades can

only be maintained in fire temples by hereditary priests, who

undergo extensive purificatory rites and wear special face

masks to prevent polluting the flames with breath or saliva,

while the third grade of fire can exist in the household. The

most important rite for most lay people is the Navjote, which

occurs between the seventh and fifteenth year of life, and ini- tiates the young person into the adult community. The cere- mony involves purifying bathing, reciting Av£5ta-based

scriptures, and being invested with a sacred shirt (sudrah) and

waist thread (kusti) that should always be worn thereafter. Marriage is also an important rite, complete with scriptural recitations. At death, great care is taken to avoid pollution from the

body, and funeral services usually take place within twenty-four

hours. The dead are then disposed of by exposure to vultures

on large, circular "towers of silence" (dakhma). Most rituals

take place in the home or in special pavilions; congregational

worship at fire temples is limited to spring and autumn festivals.

172
San Thome Cathedral, the burial place ofSaint Thomas the Apostle, in Madras, Tamil

Nadu

Courtesy Robert L. Worden

The towns of Sanjan, Nausari, and Udvada in Gujarat are of

prime importance to Parsis, having long served as community

centers before mass migration to Bombay in the nineteenth

century Bombay is home to 70 percent of India's Parsis, where

the management of Parsi affairs rests in the hands of a panchayat (see Glossary), the assembly that serves as a charitable

and educational organization providing a comprehensive

social welfare system at the local level. Judaism

Trade contacts between the Mediterranean region and the

west coast of India probably led to the presence of small Jewish

settlements in India as long ago as the early first millennium

B.C. In Kerala a community ofJews tracing its origin to the fall ofJerusalem in A.D. 70 has remained associated with the cities of Cranganore and Kochi (formerly known as Cochin) for at

least 1,000 years. The Pardesi Synagogue in Kochi, rebuilt in

1568, is in the architectural style of Kerala but preserves the

archaic ritual style of the Sephardic rite, with Babylonian and

Yemenite influence as well. The Jews of Kochi, concentrated

mostly in the old 'Jew Town," were completely integrated into

local culture, speaking Malayalam and taking local names while

preserving their knowledge of Hebrew and contacts with

173
In dm: A Co u n try St u dy

Southwest Asia. A separate community ofJews, called the Bene

Israel., had lived along the Konkan Coast in and around Bombay. Pune. and Ahmadabad for almost 2.000 Years. Unlike the

Kochi Jews, they became a village-based society and maintained

little contact with other Jewish communities. Thev always

remained within the orthodox Jewish fold, practicing the

Sephardic rite without rabbis, with the synagogue as the center

of religious and cultural life. A third group ofJews immigrated

to India, becnnnins: at the end of the eighteenth century fol- lowing the trade contacts established bv the British Empire.

These Baghdad Jews came mostly from the area of modern

Iraq and settled in Bombay and Calcutta., where manv of them

became wealthy and participated in the economic leadership

of these growings cities. The population of the Kochi Jews, always small, had

decreased from 5.000 in 1951 to about fifty in the earlv 1990s.

During the same period., the Bene Israel decreased from about

20,000 to 5.000. while the Baghdadjews declined from 5..000 to 250. Emigration to Australia. Israel. Britain, and North America accounts for most of this decline. According to the 1981

Indian census, there were 5.61 8 Jews in India., down from 5.825

in 1971. The 1991 census showed a further decline to 5.271.

most of whom lived in Maharashtra and Mizoram.

Modern Transformations

The process of modernization in India, well under way during the British colonial period (1757-1947 ) . has brought with

it major changes in the organizational forms of all religions.

The missionary societies that came ^sith the British in the earlv

nineteenth centurv imported, along with modern concepts of

print media and propaganda, an ideology of intellectual competition and religious conversion. Instead of the customary

interpretation of rituals and texts along received sectarian

lines. Indian religious leaders began devising intellectual syn- theses that could encompass the varied beliefs and practices of

their traditions within a framework that could withstand Christian arguments.

One of the most important reactions was the Arya Samaj

(Arva Society), founded in 1875 bv Swami Davananda (1824-

83). which went back to the Vedas as the ultimate revealed source of truth and attempted to purge Hinduism of more

recent accretions that had no basis in the scriptures. Originally

active in Punjab., this small society still works to purify Hindu

174
Religious Life

rituals, converts tribal people, and runs centers throughout

India. Other responses include the Ramakrishna order of

renunciants established by Swami Vivekananda (1863-1902),

which set forth a unifying philosophy that followed the Vedanta

teacher Shankara and other teachers by accepting all paths as ultimately leading toward union with the undifferentiated brahman (see The Tradition of the Enlightened Master, this ch.).

One of the primary goals of the Ramakrishna movement has

been to educate Hindus about their own scriptures; the move- ment also runs book stores and study centers in all major cities. Both of these paths are directly modeled on the institutional

and intellectual forms used by European missionaries and reli- gious leaders.

During the 1930s and 1940s, again responding to institutional models from Europe, the more activist Rashtriya

Swayamsevak Sangh (RSS—National Volunteer Organisation)

emerged to protect Hinduism. The RSS had been founded in

1925 by Keshav Baliram Hedgewar (1889-1944), a native of

Maharashtra who was concerned that Hinduism was in danger

of extinction from its external foes and needed a strong, militant force of devotees to protect it. Members believe that the

Indian nation is the divine mother to whom the citizen devotes

mind and body through karma-yoga, or disciplined service.

Training consists of daily early morning meetings at which the

saffron, white, and green Indian flag and the swallow-tailed,

red-ocher RSS banner are raised as rows of members salute

silently. There are then group drills in gymnastic exercises,

sports, discussions of patriotic themes from a primarily Hindu

viewpoint, group singing of nationalist songs, and a final assembly with saluting. Throughout India in the early 1990s, there were cells (shakha) of fifty to 100 members from all walks of life (the RSS rejects class differences) who were devoted to the

nation. Although it has attracted hundreds of thousands of

members from all over India, the RSS has never projected itself as a political party, always remaining a national club that is ready to send its members to trouble spots for the defense of

the nation and the national culture, embodied in Hinduism.

The Jana Sangh, established in 1951, was the RSS's political

arm until it joined the Janata Party in 1977 and its membership

split away in 1980 to form the BJR

Another activist organization is the Vishwa Hindu Parishad

(VHP—World Hindu Council), founded in 1964. The VHP

runs schools, medical centers, hostels, orphanages, and mass

175
India: A Country Study

movements to support Hinduism wherever it is perceived as threatened. This ultraconservative organization played a role

in the extensive agitation for the demolition of a mosque in

Ayodhya, leading to the destruction of the structure during a huge demonstration in 1992. As a result of the VHP's complicity in the affair, the Ministry of Home Affairs imposed a twoyear ban on the Vishwa Hindu Parishad under the Unlawful

Activities Act. When the ban expired in December 1994, the

government reimposed it for two additional years. The spread of Hindu "communal" (that is, religious) sentiment parallels a similar rise in religious chauvinism and "fundamentalist" ideologies among religious minorities, including

Muslims and Sikhs. Against this background of agitation, the

periodic outbreak of communal riots in urban areas throughout India contributes to an atmosphere of religious tension

that has been a hallmark of the national political scene during

the twentieth century. Hindu-Muslim riots, especially in North

India, reached a peak during the partition of India in 1947 and

periodically escalated in urban areas in the early 1990s (see

Political Impasse and Independence, ch. 1). This strife typically

involves low-income groups from both communities in struggles over land, jobs, or local resources that coalesced around a

religious focus after seemingly trivial incidents polarized the

two communities. In practice, although members of other reli- gious communities are the victims of violence, rioters are rarely

motivated by religious instructors, although fundamentalist

agitators are often implicated. The situation in North India

became complicated during the 1980s by Sikh terrorism con- nected with the crisis in Punjab, the widespread anti-Sikh riots

after Prime Minister Indira Gandhi's assassination in November 1984 by her Sikh bodyguards, and a series of terrorist or

counterterrorist actions lasting into the 1990s. In all of these

cases, many observers believe that religion has appeared as a cover for political and economic struggles.

The perception that one's religion is in danger receives periodic reinforcement from the phenomenon of public mass reli- gious conversion that receives coverage from the news media.

Many of these events feature groups of Scheduled Caste members who attempt to escape social disabilities through conver- sion to alternative religions, usually Islam, Buddhism, or

Christianity. These occasions attract the attention of fundamentalist organizations from all sides and heighten public con- sciousness of religious divisions. The most conspicuous

176
Religious Life

movement of this sort occurred during the 1950s during the mass conversions of Mahars to Buddhism (see Buddhism, this

ch.)- In the early 1980s, the primary example was the conver- sion of Dalits to Islam in Meenakshipuram, Tamil Nadu, an

event that resulted in considerable discussion in the media and

an escalation of agitation in South India. Meanwhile, conversions to Christianity among tribal groups continue, with growing opposition from Hindu revivalist organizations.

Alongside the more publicized violent outbreaks, there have

been major nonviolent changes, as new sectarian movements

continue to grow and as established movements change. For

example, the Radhasoami Satsang movement of North India,

which includes adherents in Punjab and Uttar Pradesh, encompasses yogic ideas on the relationship between humans and the

universe, the bhakti saint tradition including select Sikh influ- ences, and the veneration of the enlightened guru. The dominant tendency of these new religions, following the example of

the great teachers of the past that was reiterated by Mahatma

Gandhi and most modern gurus, remains nonviolence to all living beings and acceptance of the remarkable diversity of

Indian religion.

* * *

Introductory sources on Hinduism include David R. Kinsley's Hinduism: A Cultural Perspective and David M. Knipe's Hinduism: Experiments in the Sacred. For a deeper immersion into

the classical textual tradition, a number of books by Wendy

Doniger O'Flaherty, including Hindu Myths: A Source Book Translated from the Sanskrit, provide excellent translations and

straightforward commentary. David Shulman has prepared a number of up-to-date translations of Tamil literature, including

Songs of the Harsh Devotee. Lawrence A. Babb has written several

introductions to modern Hinduism, such as The Divine Hierarchy, which deals with rural life, and Redemptive Encounters, which

discusses recent innovations, mostly among urbanites. A good

study of pilgrimage and modern devotion, in this case in Maharashtra, is Palkhi: An Indian Pilgrimage by D.B. Mokashi. A short

study of temples as architectural and social institutions is George Michell's The Hindu Temple.

For Jainism, a good survey is Padmanabh S. Jaini's TheJaina

Path of Purification. Historical introductions to Buddhism

include Edward J. Thomas's The Life of Buddha as Legend and

111
India: A Country Study

History, Richard H. Robinson and Willard J. Johnson's The Buddhist Religion, and Peter Harvey's An Introduction to Buddhism.

For Islam, The Muslims ofIndia: Beliefs and Practices edited by

Paul Jackson provides a good overview. More detailed studies

include Shias and Shia Islam in India, by Nadeem Nasnain and

Abrar Husain, and Muslim Shrines in India, edited by Christian

W. Troll. An excellent short study of modern Sufi shrines is Peter Van der Veer's article, "Playing or Praying: A Sufi Saint's

Day in Surat" in the Journal ofAsian Studies. A good starting point for Sikhism is the Sri Guru Granth

Sahib: An Anthology translated and introduced by Gopal Singh.

Another helpful book is W.H. McLeod's The Sikhs: History, Reli- gion, and Society. More recent studies of the situation in Punjab

include Tragedy of Punjab by Kuldip Nayar and Kushwant Singh

and Agony ofPunjab by VD. Chopra, R.K. Mishra, and Nirmal

Singh.

Tribal belief and practice are described in R.S*. Mann and

Vijoy S. Sahay's Nature-Man-Spirit Complex in Tribal India, J

.

Troisi's Tribal Religion, Abdesh Prasad Sinha's Religious Life in

Tribal India, and Christoph von Furer-Haimendorfs Tribal Populations and Cultures of the Indian Subcontinent. The Catholic

Bishop's Conference of India's Catholic Directory of India

describes the modern organization of Christianity in detail,

Lionel Caplan presents a case study of Christianity in Class and

Culture in Urban India, and Frederick S. Downs, in Christianity in

North East India, describes proselytization among tribal groups.

Introductions to Zoroastrianism in India are Eckehard Kulke's

The Parsees in India and Cyrus R. Pangborn's Zoroastrianism: A

Beleaguered Faith. For Judaism, see Thomas A. Timberg's Jews in

India.

An exhaustive survey of writings on Indian religion until the

1980s can be found in Maureen L.P. Patterson's Bibliography of

South Asia and more recent updates in the annual Bibliography

of Asian Studies published by the Association for Asian Studies.

(For further information and complete citations, see Bibliography.)

178
Chapter 4. Language, Ethnicity, and Regionalism

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INDIA'S ETHNIC, LINGUISTIC, AND REGIONAL complexity

sets it apart from other nations. To gain even a superficial

understanding of the relationships governing the huge number of ethnic, linguistic, and regional groups, the country

should be visualized not as a nation-state but as the seat of a major world civilization on the scale of Europe. The population—estimated at 936.5 million in 1995—is not only immense

but also has been highly varied throughout recorded history;

its systems of values have always encouraged diversity. The lin- guistic requirements of numerous former empires, an independent nation, and modern communication are superimposed on a heterogeneous sociocultural base. Almost 8 percent of the

population, approaching 65 million people at the time of the

1991 census, belongs to social groups recognized by the government as Scheduled Tribes (see Glossary), with social struc- tures somewhat different from the mainstream of society.

Powerful trends of "regionalism"—both in the sense of an

increasing attachment to the states as opposed to the central

government, and in the sense of movements for separation

from the present states or greater autonomy for regions within

them—threaten the current distribution of power and delineation of political divisions of territory.

Linguistic Relations

Diversity, Use, and Policy

The languages of India belong to four major families: IndoAryan (a branch of the Indo-European family), Dravidian, Austroasiatic (Austric), and Sino-Tibetan, with the overwhelming

majority of the population speaking languages belonging to the first two families. (A fifth family, Andamanese, is spoken by

at most a few hundred among the indigenous tribal peoples in

the Andaman Islands, and has no agreed upon connections

with families outside them.) The four major families are as dif- ferent in their form and construction as are, for example, the

Indo-European and Semitic families. A variety of scripts are employed in writing the different languages. Furthermore,

most of the more widely used Indian languages exist in a number of different forms or dialects influenced by complex geographic and social patterns.

181
India: A Country Study

Sir George Grierson's twelve-volume Linguistic Survey of

India, published between 1903 and 1923, identified 179 languages and 544 dialects. The 1921 census listed 188 languages

and forty-nine dialects. The 1961 census listed 184 "mother

tongues," including those with fewer than 10,000 speakers.

This census also gave a list of all the names of mother tongues

provided by the respondents themselves; the list totals 1,652

names. The 1981 census—the last census to tabulate languages—reported 112 mother tongues with more than 10,000

speakers and almost 1 million people speaking other languages. The encyclopedic People of India series, published by

the government's Anthropological Survey of India in the 1980s

and early 1990s, identified seventy-five "major languages"

within a total of 325 languages used in Indian households. In

the early 1990s, there were thirty-two languages with 1 million

or more speakers (see table 15, Appendix).

The Indian constitution recognizes official languages (see

The Constitutional Framework, ch. 8). Articles 343 through

351 address the use of Hindi, English, and regional languages

for official purposes, with the aim of a nationwide use of Hindi

while guaranteeing the use of minority languages at the state and local levels. Hindi has been designated India's official language, although many impediments to its official use exist. The constitution's Eighth Schedule, as amended by Parliament in 1992, lists eighteen official or Scheduled Languages

(see Glossary). They are Assamese, Bengali, Gujarati, Hindi,

Kannada, Kashmiri, Konkani, Malayalam, Manipuri, Marathi,

Nepali, Oriya, Punjabi, Sanskrit, Sindhi, Tamil, Telugu, and

Urdu. (Precise numbers of speakers of these languages are not

known. They were not reported in the 1991 census, and esti- mates are subject to considerable variation because of the use of multiple languages by individual speakers.) Of the official

languages, approximately 403 million people, or about 43 percent of the estimated total 1995 population, speak Hindi as their mother tongue. Telugu, Bengali, Marathi, and Tamil rank

next, each the mother tongue of about 4 to 5 percent (about

37 million to 47 million people); Urdu, Gujarati, Malayalam,

Kannada, and Oriya are claimed by between 2 and 3 percent

(roughly 19 million to 28 million people); Bhojpuri, Punjabi,

and Assamese by 1 to 2 percent (9 million to 19 million people); and all other languages by less than 1 percent (less than 9

million speakers) each.

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Language, Ethnicity, and Regionalism

Since independence in 1947, linguistic affinity has served as a basis for organizing interest groups; the "language question"

itself has become an increasingly sensitive political issue.

Efforts to reach a consensus on a single national language that

transcends the myriad linguistic regions and is acceptable to diverse language communities have been largely unsuccessful.

Many Indian nationalists originally intended that Hindi

would replace English—the language of British rule (1757-

1947) —as a medium of common communication. Both Hindi

and English are extensively used, and each has its own supporters. Native speakers of Hindi, who are concentrated in North

India, contend that English, as a relic from the colonial past

and spoken by only a small fraction of the population, is hopelessly elitist and unsuitable as the nation's official language.

Proponents of English argue, in contrast, that the use of Hindi

is unfair because it is a liability for those Indians who do not

speak it as their native tongue. English, they say, at least represents an equal handicap for Indians of every region.

English continues to serve as the language of prestige.

Efforts to switch to Hindi or other regional tongues encounter

stiff opposition both from those who know English well and

whose privileged position requires proficiency in that tongue

and from those who see it as a means of upward mobility. Parti- sans of English also maintain it is useful and indeed necessary

as a link to the rest of the world, that India is lucky that the

colonial period left a language that is now the world's predominant international language in the fields of culture, science,

technology, and commerce. They hold, too, that widespread

knowledge of English is necessary for technological and eco- nomic progress and that reducing its role would leave India a backwater in world affairs. Linguistic diversity is apparent on a variety of levels. Major

regional languages have stylized literary forms, often with an

extensive body of literature, which may date back from a few

centuries to two millennia ago. These literary languages differ

markedly from the spoken forms and village dialects that coexist with a plethora of caste idioms and regional lingua francas

(see Village Unity and Divisiveness, ch. 5). Part of the reason

for such linguistic diversity lies in the complex social realities of

South Asia. India's languages reflect the intricate levels of

social hierarchy and caste. Individuals have in their speech repertoire a variety of styles and dialects appropriate to various

social situations. In general, the higher the speaker's status, the

183
In dm: A Co u n try St u dy

more speech forms there are at his or her disposal. Speech is adapted in countless ways to reflect the specific social context

and the relative standing of the speakers.

Determining what should be called a language or a dialect is more a political than a linguistic question. Sometimes the word

language is applied to a standardized and prestigious form, rec- ognized as such over a large geographic area, whereas the word

dialect is used for the various forms of speech that lack prestige or that are restricted to certain regions or castes but are still regarded as forms of the same language. Sometimes mutual

intelligibility is the criterion: if the speakers can understand

each other, even though with some difficulty, they are speaking

the same language, although thev mav speak different dialects.

However, speakers of Hindi, Urdu, and Punjabi can often

understand each other, vet thev are regarded as speakers of dif- ferent languages. Whether or not one thinks Konkani—spoken

in Goa, Karnataka, and the Konkan region of Maharashtra—is a distinct language or a dialect of Marathi has tended to be

linked with whether or not one thinks Goa ought to be merged

with Maharashtra. The question has been settled from the central government's point of view by making Goa a state and Konkani a Scheduled Language. Moreover, the fact that the Latin

script is predominantly used for Konkani separates it further

from Marathi, which uses the Devanagari (see Glossary) script.

However, Konkani is also sometimes written in Devanagari and

Kannada scripts.

Regional languages are an issue in the politically charged

atmosphere surrounding language policy. Throughout the

1950s and 1960s, attempts were made to redraw state boundaries to coincide with linguistic usa^e. Such efforts have had

mixed results. Linguistic affinity has often failed to overcome

other social and economic differences. In addition, most states have linguistic minorities, and questions surrounding the definition and use of the official lan^ua^e in those regions are fraught with controversv.

States have been accused of failure to fulfill their obligations

under the national constitution to provide for the education of

linguistic minorities in their mother tongues, even when the

minority language is a Scheduled Language. Although the constitution requires that legal documents and petitions may be

submitted in any of the Scheduled Languages to any government authority, this right is rarely exercised. Under such cir- cumstances, members of linguistic minorities may feel they and

184
Language, Ethnicity, and Regionalism

their language are oppressed by the majority, while people who

are among linguistic majorities may feel threatened by what

some might consider minor concessions. Thus, attempts to make seemingly minor accommodations for social diversity

may have extensive and volatile ramifications. For example, in

1994 a proposal in Bangalore to introduce an Urdu-language

television news segment (aimed primarily at Muslim viewers)

led to a week of urban riots that left dozens dead and millions

of dollars in property damage.

Languages of India

About 80 percent of all Indians—nearly 750 million people

based on 1995 population estimates—speak one of the IndoAryan group of languages. Persian and the languages of

Afghanistan are close relatives, belonging, like the Indo-Aryan

languages, to the Indo-Iranian branch of the Indo-European

family. Brought into India from the northwest during the sec- ond millennium B.C., the Indo-Aryan tongues spread throughout the north, gradually displacing the earlier languages of the

area.Modern linguistic knowledge of this process of assimilation

comes through the Sanskrit language employed in the sacred

literature known as the Vedas (see The Vedas and Polytheism,

ch. 3). Over a period of centuries, Indo-Aryan languages came

to predominate in the northern and central portions of South

Asia (see Antecedents, ch. 1).

As Indo-Aryan speakers spread across northern and central

India, their languages experienced constant change and development. By about 500 B.C., Prakrits, or "common" forms of

speech, were widespread throughout the north. By about the

same time, the "sacred," "polished," or "pure" tongue—Sanskrit—used in religious rites had also developed along independent lines, changing significantly from the form used in the

Vedas. However, its use in ritual settings encouraged the reten- tion of archaic forms lost in the Prakrits. Concerns for the

purity and correctness of Sanskrit gave rise to an elaborate sci- ence of grammar and phonetics and an alphabetical system

seen by some scholars as superior to the Roman system. By the

fourth century B.C., these trends had culminated in the work

of Panini, whose Sanskrit grammar, the Ashtadhyayi (Eight

Chapters), set the basic form of Sanskrit for subsequent generations. Panini's work is often compared to Euclid's as an intellectual feat of systematization.

185
India: A Country Study

The Prakrits continued to evolve through everyday use. One

of these dialects was Pali, which was spoken in the western portion of peninsular India. Pali became the language of Theravada Buddhism; eventually it came to be identified exclusively

with religious contexts. By around A.D. 500, the Prakrits had

changed further into Apabhramshas, or the "decayed" speech;

it is from these dialects that the contemporary Indo-Aryan languages of South Asia developed. The rudiments of modern

Indo-Aryan vernaculars were in place by about A.D. 1000 to 1300.

It would be misleading, however, to call Sanskrit a dead language because for many centuries huge numbers of works in all genres and on all subjects continued to be written in Sanskrit.

Original works are still written in it, although in much smaller

numbers than formerly. Many students still learn Sanskrit as a second or third language, classical music concerts regularly feature Sanskrit vocal compositions, and there are even television

programs conducted entirely in Sanskrit.

Around 18 percent of the Indian populace (about 169 million people in 1995) speak Dravidian languages. Most Dravidian speakers reside in South India, where Indo-Aryan influence was less extensive than in the north. Only a few isolated groups

of Dravidian speakers, such as the Gonds in Madhya Pradesh

and Orissa, and the Kurukhs in Madhya Pradesh and Bihar,

remain in the north as representatives of the Dravidian speakers who presumably once dominated much more of South

Asia. (The only other significant population of Dravidian

speakers are the Brahuis in Pakistan.)

The oldest documented Dravidian language is Tamil, with a

substantial body of literature, particularly the Cankam poetry,

going back to the first century A.D. Kannada and Telugu developed extensive bodies of literature after the sixth century,

while Malayalam split from Tamil as a literary language by the

twelfth century. In spite of the profound influence of the Sanskrit language and Sanskritic culture on the Dravidian languages, a strong consciousness of the distinctness of Dravidian

languages from Sanskrit remained. All four major Dravidian

languages had consciously differentiated styles varying in the

amount of Sanskrit they contained. In the twentieth century, as part of an anti-Brahman movement in Tamil Nadu, a strong

movement arose to "purify" Tamil of its Sanskrit elements, with

mixed success. The other three Dravidian languages were not

much affected by this trend.

186
Language, Ethnicity, and Regionalism

There are smaller groups, mostly tribal peoples, who speak

Sino-Tibetan and Austroasiatic languages. Sino-Tibetan speakers live along the Himalayan fringe from Jammu and Kashmir

to eastern Assam (see fig. 9). They comprise about 1.3 percent, or 12 million, of India's 1995 population. The Austroasiatic languages, composed of the Munda tongues and others thought

to be related to them, are spoken by groups of tribal peoples

from West Bengal through Bihar and Orissa and into Madhya

Pradesh. These groups make up approximately 0.7 percent

(about 6.5 million people) of the population.

Despite the extensive linguistic diversity in India, many

scholars treat South Asia as a single linguistic area because the

various language families share a number of features not found

together outside South Asia. Languages entering South Asia were "Indianized." Scholars cite the presence of retroflex consonants, characteristic structures in verb formations, and a significant amount of vocabulary in Sanskrit with Dravidian or

Austroasiatic origin as indications of mutual borrowing, influ- ences, and counterinfluences. Retroflex consonants, for example, which are formed with the tongue curled back to the hard

palate, appear to have been incorporated into Sanskrit and

other Indo-Aryan languages through the medium of borrowed

Dravidian words.

Hindi and English

For the speakers of the country's myriad tongues to function

within a single administrative unit requires some medium of

common communication. The choice of this tongue, known in

India as the "link" language, has been a point of significant

controversy since independence. Central government policy

on the question has been necessarily equivocal. The vested

interests proposing a number of language policies have made a

decisive resolution of the "language question" all but impossible.The central issue in the link-language controversy has been

and remains whether Hindi should replace English. Proponents of Hindi as the link language assert that English is a for- eign tongue left over from the British Raj (see Glossary).

English is used fluently only by a small, privileged segment of

the population; the role of English in public life and governmental affairs constitutes an effective bar to social mobility and

further democratization. Hindi, in this view, is not only already

spoken by a sizable minority of all Indians but also would be

187
India: A Country Study

easier to spread because it would be more congenial to the cultural habits of the people. On the other hand, Dravidian-speaking southerners in particular feel that a switch to Hindi in the

well-paid, nationwide bureaucracies, such as the Indian Administrative Service, the military, and other forms of national ser- vice would give northerners an unfair advantage in government examinations (see The Civil Service, ch. 8). If the

learning of English is burdensome, they argue, at least the burden weighs equally on Indians from all parts of the country. In

the meantime, an increasing percentage of Indians send their

children to private English-medium schools, to help assure

their offspring a chance at high-privilege positions in business,

education, the professions, and government.

Hindi

The development of Hindi and Urdu gives a glimpse of the

processes at work in language evolution in South Asia.

Hindi and Urdu are essentially one language with two

scripts, Devanagari and Persian-Arabic, respectively. In their

most formal literary forms, the two languages have two vocabularies (Hindi taking words by preference from Sanskrit, Urdu

from Persian and Arabic) and tend to be culturally connected

with Hindu and Islamic culture, respectively. Hindi-Urdu developed from the Khari Boli dialect of Delhi, the capital city of the

Delhi Sultanate, and it was the speech of the classes and neighborhoods most closely connected with the Mughal court

(1556-1858). In time, the language spread even into South

India because it served as a common medium of communication for trade, administration, and military purposes. Classical

Urdu appropriated a large number of words from Persian, the

official language of the Mughal Empire, and through Persian

from Arabic.

By the late seventeenth and early eighteenth centuries, Urdu

had developed into a highly stylized form written in a PersianArabic script. After the British took over from the Mughals,

whose language of administration was Persian, Urdu began to serve as the language of administration in lower courts in the

north. British administrators and missionaries, however, felt that the high literary form of Urdu was too remote from everyday life and was suffused by a Persian vocabulary unintelligible

to the masses. Therefore, they instigated the development of

modern standard Hindi in Devanagari script. Hindi now predominates in a number of states, including Uttar Pradesh,

188
ll

A

Language, Ethnicity, and Regionalism

Bihar, Madhya Pradesh, Rajasthan, Haryana, and Himachal

Pradesh, and in the National Capital Territory of Delhi. Urdu

is the majority language in no large region but is more com- monly spoken in North India and is the official administrative

language of the state ofJammu and Kashmir. In South India,

people in urban Muslim communities in former administrative

capitals, such as Hyderabad or Bangalore, may regularly use Urdu at home or in their workplace.

Hindi has spread throughout North India as a contemporary

lingua franca. Its speakers range from illiterate workers in large

cities to highly educated civil servants. Many city dwellers learn

Hindi as a second or third language even if they speak another

regional language, such as Marathi, Bengali, or Gujarati. As

professionals have become increasingly mobile, they rely more

heavily on Hindi as a means of communication; those aspiring

to career advancement need to learn standard Hindi. Speakers

of other Indo-Aryan languages tend to chose Hindi for their

third language in school because of similarities in grammar,

vocabulary, or script with their own mother tongue and

because it has a wider use than another regional language.

Hindi, especially in the less highly Sanskritized form used in

everyday speech, is barely distinct from everyday Urdu, which

before independence was called Hindustani. However, Hindi

has long had pan-Indian uses extending beyond the regions

where it is the majority language. Hindi is the lingua franca at pilgrimage sites in all regions and is used to deal with devotees

from all parts of the country. It is also the common means of

communication of wandering Hindu holy men in their discussions with each other and is used frequently in preaching.

Many publishers issue Sanskrit classics on religion, astrology,

medicine, and other subjects with Hindi translations, cribs, or commentaries to help purchasers who may not be confident of

their Sanskrit ability. Purchasers appear to find those aids useful, even though Hindi may not be their primary spoken or

written language. Although there are major cinema industries

in several other languages, the Hindi cinema (centered in

Bombay, also known as Mumbai in the Marathi language) dominates the Indian motion picture market, and Hindi films (the

songs tend to be in Urdu) are shown around the country without subtitles or dubbing (see The Media, ch. 8).

A number of former literary languages with established and

major bodies of literature, such as Braj, Avadhi, and Maithili,

have been essentially subsumed under the rubric of Hindi.

191
Source: Based on information from Francis Robinson, ed., The Cambridge Encyclopedia ofIndia, Pakistan, Bangladesh, Sri Lanka, Nepal, Bhv

Cambridge, 1989, 404;S. Muthiah, ed., A Socialand Economic Atlas ofIndia, Delhi, 1992, 39; andjoseph E. Schwartzberg, ed.,AH

Asia, New York, 1992, 102.

Figure 9. Principal Languages by State and Union Territory

190

India: A Country Study

Maithili, spoken in northern Bihar, has a body of literature and

its own grammar. Proponents of its use insist that it is a language in its own right and that it is related more closely to east- ern Indo-Aryan tongues than to Hindi. Nonetheless, efforts to revive Maithili have had minimal success beyond its use in ele- mentary education. Other regional tongues that lack literary

forms, such as Marwari (in Rajasthan) and Magadhi (in south- ern Bihar), are considered variants of Hindi. Some of them dif- fer from Hindi considerably more than does Urdu. In general,

religious affiliation is the distinguishing characteristic of Hindi

and Urdu speakers; Muslims speak Urdu, and Hindus speak

Hindi, although what they actually say in informal situations is likely to be about the same. The use of two radically different

scripts is a statement of cultural identity. However, there are

still Hindu religious periodicals published in Urdu, and Urdu

writers who are Hindu by religion.

English

There is little information on the extent of knowledge of

English in India. Books and articles abound on the place of

English in the Indian education system, job competition, and

culture; and on its sociolinguistic aspects, pronunciation and

grammar, its effect on Indian languages, and Indian literature

in English. Little information is available, however, on the

number of people who "know" English and the extent of their

knowledge, or even how many people study English in school. In the 1981 census, 202,400 persons (0.3 percent of the population) gave English as their first language. Fewer than 1 percent

gave English as their second language while 14 percent were

reported as bilingual in two of India's many languages. However, the census did not allow for recording more than one sec- ond language and is suspected of having significantly

underrepresented bilingualism and multilingualism.

The 1981 census reported 13.3 percent of the population as bilingual. The People of India project of the Anthropological

Survey of India, which assembled statistics on communities

rather than on individuals, found that only 34 percent of communities reported themselves as monolingual. An Assamese

who also knew Bengali, or someone from a Marathi-speaking

family living in Delhi who attended a Hindi-medium school,

might give Bengali or Hindi as his or her second language but

also know English from formal school instruction or picking it up on the street. It is suspected that many people identify lan192
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A temple entrance sign,

Thanjavur, Tamil Nadu. It includes instructions in Tamil,

English, Hindi, Telugu,

Kannada, and Malayalam.

Courtesy DoranneJacobson

guage with literacy and hence will not describe themselves as knowing a language unless they can read it and, conversely,

may say they know a language if they can make out its alphabet.

Thus people who speak English but are unable to read or write

it may say they do not know the language.

English-language daily newspapers have a circulation of 3.1

million copies per day, but each copy is probably read by sev- eral people. There are estimates of about 3 percent (some 27

million people) for the number of literates in English, but even

if this percentage is valid, the number of people with a speaking knowledge is certainly higher than of those who read it. And, the figure of 3 percent for English literacy may be low.

According to one set of figures, 17.6 million people were

enrolled in English classes in 1977, which would be 3.2 percent

of the population of India according to the 1971 census. Taking the most conservative evaluation of how much of the

instruction would "stick," this still leaves a larger part of the

population than 3 percent with some English literacy.

Some idea of the possibilities of studying English can be

found in the 1992 Fifth All-India Education Survey. According

to the survey, only 1.3 percent of primary schools, 3.4 percent

of upper primary schools, 3.9 percent of middle schools, and

13.2 percent of high schools use English as a medium of

instruction. Schools treating English as the first language

193
India: A Country Study

(requiring ten years of study) are only 0.6 percent of rural primary schools, 2.8 percent of rural high schools, and 9.9 percent of urban high schools. English is offered as a second

language (six years of study) in 51 percent of rural primary

schools, 55 percent of urban primary schools, 57 percent of

rural high schools, and 51 percent of urban high schools. As a

third language (three years of study), English is offered in 5

percent of rural primary schools, 21 percent of urban primary

schools, 44 percent of rural high schools, and 41 percent of

urban high schools. These statistics show a considerable desire

to study English among people receiving a mostly vernacular

education, even in the countryside.

In higher education, English continues to be the premier

prestige language. Careers in business and commerce, government positions of high rank (regardless of stated policy), and

science and technology (attracting many of the brightest) continue to require fluency in English. It is also necessary for the

many students who contemplate study overseas. English as a prestige language and the tongue of first choice

continues to serve as the medium of instruction in elite schools

at every level without apology. All large cities and many smaller

cities have private, English-language middle schools and high

schools (see Education, ch. 2). Even government schools run

for the benefit of senior civil service officers are conducted in

English because only that language is an acceptable medium of

communication throughout the nation.

Working-class parents, themselves rural-urban migrants and

perhaps bilingual in their village dialect and the regional stan- dard language, perceive English as the tool their children need

in order to advance. Schools in which English is the medium of

instruction are a "growth industry." Facility in English

enhances a young woman's chances in the marriage market

no small advantage in the often protracted marriage negotiations between families (see Life Passages, ch. 5). The English

speaker also encounters more courteous responses in some sit- uations than does a speaker of an indigenous language.

Linguistic States

The constitution and various other government documents

are purposely vague in defining such terms as national languages and official languages and in distinguishing either one

from officially adopted regional languages. States are free to adopt their own language of administration and educational

194
Language, Ethnicity, and Regionalism

instruction from among the country's officially recognized languages, the Scheduled Languages. Further, all citizens have the

right to primary education in their native tongue, although the

constitution does not stipulate how this objective is to be

accomplished.

As drafted, the constitution provided that Hindi and English were to be the languages of communication for the central government until 1965, when the switch to Hindi was mandated.

The Official Languages Act of 1963, pursuing this mandate,

said that Hindi would become the sole official national language in 1965. English, however, would continue as an "associate additional official language." After ten years, a parliamentary committee was to consider the situation and whether

the status of English should continue if the knowledge of Hindi

among peoples of other native languages had not progressed

sufficiently. The act, however, was ambiguous about whether

Hindi could be imposed on unwilling states by 1975. In 1964

the Ministry of Home Affairs requested all central ministries to

state their progress on the switch to Hindi and their plans for

the period after the transition date in 1965. The news of this

directive led to massive riots and self-immolations in Tamil

Nadu in late 1964 and early 1965, leading the central government, then run by the Congress (see Glossary), to back away

from its stand. A conference of Congress leaders, cabinet ministers, and chief ministers of all the states was held in New Delhi

in June 1965. Non-Hindi-speaking states were assured that

Hindi would not be imposed as the sole language of communication between the central government and the states as long

as even one state objected. In addition any of the Scheduled

Languages could be used in taking examinations for entry into

the central government services.

Before independence in 1947, the Congress was committed

to redrawing state boundaries to correspond with linguistics.

The States Reorganisation Commission, which was formed in

1953 to study the problems involved in redrawing state boundaries, viewed language as an important, although by no means

the sole, factor. Other factors, such as economic viability and

geographic realities, had to be taken into account. The commission issued its report in 1955; the government's request for

comments from the populace generated a flood of petitions

and letters. The final bill, passed in 1956 and amended several

times in the 1960s, by no means resolved even the individual

states' linguistic problems.

195
India: A Country Study

Even regions with a long history of agitation for a linguistic state sometimes have found the actual transition less than

smooth. For example, proponents began lobbying for a Telugu-speaking state in the early twentieth century. In 1956 the

central government formed a single state, Andhra Pradesh,

composed of the predominantly Telugu-speaking parts of what

in British India had been the Madras Presidency and the large

polyglot princely state of Hyderabad. Although more than 80

percent of the residents (some 53 million people as of 1991) of

Andhra Pradesh speak Telugu, like most linguistic states it has

a sizable linguistic minority. In this case, the minority consists

of Urdu speakers centered in the state's capital, Hyderabad,

where nearly 40 percent (some 1.7 million people in 1991) of

the population speak that language. Linguistic affinity did not

form a firm basis for unity between the two regions from which

the state had been formed because they were separated by cultural and economic differences. Although there were riots in

the late 1960s and early 1970s in support of the formation of

two separate states, the separation did not occur. The violence that broke out in the state of Assam in the early

1980s reflected the complexities of linguistic and ethnic politics in South Asia (see Political Issues, ch. 8). The state has a

significant number of Bengali-speaking Muslims—immigrants

and their descendants who began settling the region in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. The Muslims came in

response to a British-initiated colonization plan to bring under

cultivation land left fallow by the Assamese. By the 1931 census, the Assamese not only had lost a hefty portion of their land but

also had become a disadvantaged minority in their traditional

homeland. They represented less than 33 percent of the total

population of Assam, and the Muslim immigrants (who

accounted for roughly 25 percent of the population) dominated commerce and the government bureaucracy.

Assamese-Bengali rioting started in 1950, and in the 1951

census many Bengalis listed Assamese as their native tongue in an effort to placate the Assamese. Further immigration of Bengali speakers after the formation of Bangladesh in 1971 and a resurgence of pro-Bengali feeling among earlier immigrants

and their descendants reawakened Assamese fears of being out- numbered. Renewed violence in the early and mid-1980s was

sufficiently serious for the central government to avoid holding

general elections in Assam during December 1984 (see Insur- gent Movements and External Subversion, ch. 10).

196
Language, Ethnicity, and Regionalism

The Social Context of Language

Contemporary languages and dialects, as they figure in the

lives of most Indians, are a far cry from the stylized literary

forms of Indo-Aryan or Dravidian languages. North India especially can be viewed as a continuum of village dialects. As a proverb has it, "Every two miles the water changes, every four

miles the speech." Spoken dialects of more distant villages will be less and less mutually understandable and finally become

simply mutually unintelligible outside the immediate region.

In some cases, a variety of caste dialects coexist in the same vil- lage or region. In addition, there are numerous regional dialects that villagers use when doing business in nearby towns or

bazaars.

Since the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries,

regional languages, such as Bengali, Punjabi, and Marathi,

have become relatively standardized and are now used

throughout their respective states for most levels of administration, business, and social intercourse. Each is associated with a body of literature. British rule was an impetus for the official

codification of these regional tongues. British colonial administrators and missionaries learned regional languages and often

studied their literatures, and their translations of English-language materials and the Bible encouraged the development of

written, standard languages. To provide teaching materials,

prose compositions, grammars, and textbooks were often commissioned and, in some cases, were closer to everyday speech

than was the standard literary language. Industrialization,

modernization, and printing gave a major boost to the vocabulary and standardization of regional tongues, especially by making possible the wide dissemination of dictionaries.

Such written forms still often differ widely from spoken ver- naculars and village dialects. Diglossia—the coexistence of a highly elaborate, formal language alongside a more colloquial

form of the same tongue—occurs in many instances. For example, spoken Bengali is so divergent from written Bengali as to be nearly another tongue. Similarly, Telugu scholars waged a

bitter battle in the early twentieth century over proper language style. Reformers favored a simplified prose format for

written Telugu, while traditional classicists wished to continue

using a classical literary poetic form. In the end, the classicists won, although a more colloquial written form eventually began

to appear in the mass media. Diglossia reinforces social barri197
India: A Country Study

ers because only a fraction of the populace is sufficiently educated to master the more literary form of the language.

The standard regional language may be the household

tongue of only a small group of educated inhabitants of the

region's major urban center that has long exercised politicoeconomic hegemony in a region. Even literate villagers may

have difficulty understanding it. The more socially isolated

women and Dalits (see Glossary) —tend to be more parochial

in their speech than people of higher caste, who are often able

to use a colloquial form of the regional dialect, the caste patois,

and the regional standard dialect. An educated person may

master several different speech forms that are often so different as to be considered separate languages. Western-educated

scholars may well use the regional standard language mixed

with English vocabulary with their colleagues at work. At home,

a man may switch to a more colloquial vernacular, particularly

if his wife is uneducated. Even the highly educated frequently

communicate in their village dialects at home.

Only around 3 percent of the population (about 28 million

people in 1995) is truly fluent in both English and an Indian

language. By necessity, a substantial minority are able to speak

two Indian languages; even in the so-called linguistic states,

there are minorities who do not speak the official language as their native tongue and must therefore learn it as a second language. Many tribal people are bilingual. Rural-urban migrants

are frequently bilingual in the regional standard language as well as in their village dialect. In Bombay, for example, many

migrants speak Hindi or Marathi in addition to their native

tongue. Religious celebrations, popular festivals, and political

meetings are typically carried on in the regional language,

which may be unintelligible to many attendees. Bilingualism in

India, however, is inextricably linked to social context. South

Asia's long history of foreign rule has fostered what Clarence

Maloney terms "the linguistic flight of the elite." Language

either Sanskrit, Persian, or English—has formed a barrier to advancement that only a few have been fortunate enough to overcome. Throughout the twentieth century, radio, television, and the

print media have fostered standardization of regional dialects,

if only to facilitate communication. Linguistic standardization

has contributed to ethnic or regional differentiation insofar as language has served as a cultural marker. Mass communication

forces the adoption of a single standard regional tongue; typi198
Graffiti protesting the use ofHindi, Madras, Tamil Nadu

Courtesy Robert L. Worden

cally, the choice is the dialect of the majority in the region or of

the region's preeminent business or cultural center. The use of

less standard forms clearly labels speakers outside their immediate home base. To fulfill its purposes, the regional language

must be standardized and taught to an increasing percentage

of the population, thereby encroaching both on its own dialects and the minority languages of the region. The language

of instruction and administration affects the economic and

career interests and the self-respect of an ever-greater proportion of the population.

Ethnic Minorities

Tribes

Composition and Location

Tribal peoples constitute roughly 8 percent of the nation's

total population, nearly 68 million people according to the

1991 census. One concentration lives in a belt along the Himalayas stretching through Jammu and Kashmir, Himachal

Pradesh, and Uttar Pradesh in the west, to Assam, Meghalaya,

Tripura, Arunachal Pradesh, Mizoram, Manipur, and Nagaland

199
India: A Country Study

in the northeast (see fig. 1). Another concentration lives in the

hilly areas of central India (Madhya Pradesh, Orissa, and, to a

lesser extent, Andhra Pradesh); in this belt, which is bounded

by the Narmada River to the north and the Godavari River to the southeast, tribal peoples occupy the slopes of the region's

mountains. Other tribals, the Santals, live in Bihar and West

Bengal. There are smaller numbers of tribal people in Karnataka, Tamil Nadu, and Kerala, in western India in Gujarat and

Rajasthan, and in the union territories of Lakshadweep and the

Andaman and Nicobar Islands.

The extent to which a state's population is tribal varies considerably. In the northeastern states of Arunachal Pradesh,

Meghalaya, Mizoram, and Nagaland, upward of 90 percent of

the population is tribal. However, in the remaining northeast

states of Assam, Manipur, Sikkim, and Tripura, tribal peoples

form between 20 and 30 percent of the population. The largest

tribes are found in central India, although the tribal population there accounts for only around 10 percent of the region's

total population. Major concentrations of tribal people live in

Maharashtra, Orissa, and West Bengal. In the south, about 1 percent of the populations of Kerala and Tamil Nadu are tribal,

whereas about 6 percent in Andhra Pradesh and Karnataka are members of tribes.

There are some 573 communities recognized by the government as Scheduled Tribes and therefore eligible to receive special benefits and to compete for reserved seats in legislatures

and schools. They range in size from the Gonds (roughly 7.4

million) and the Santals (approximately 4.2 million) to only

eighteen Chaimals in the Andaman Islands. Central Indian

states have the country's largest tribes, and, taken as a whole,

roughly 75 percent of the total tribal population live there.

Apart from the use of strictly legal criteria, however, the

problem of determining which groups and individuals are

tribal is both subtle and complex. Because it concerns eco- nomic interests and the size and location of voting blocs, the

question of who are members of Scheduled Tribes rather than

Backward Classes (see Glossary) or Scheduled Castes (see Glossary) is often controversial (see The Fringes of Society, ch. 5).

The apparently wide fluctuation in estimates of South Asia's

tribal population through the twentieth century gives a sense

of how unclear the distinction between tribal and nontribal can

be. India's 1931 census enumerated 22 million tribal people, in

1941 only 10 million were counted, but by 1961 some 30 mil200
Language, Ethnicity, and Regionalism

lion and in 1991 nearly 68 million tribal members were

included. The differences among the figures reflect changing

census criteria and the economic incentives individuals have to maintain or reject classification as a tribal member.

These gyrations of census data serve to underline the complex relationship between caste and tribe. Although, in theory,

these terms represent different ways of life and ideal types, in

reality they stand for a continuum of social groups. In areas of

substantial contact between tribes and castes, social and cultural pressures have often tended to move tribes in the direction of becoming castes over a period of years. Tribal peoples

with ambitions for social advancement in Indian society at large have tried to gain the classification of caste for their

tribes; such efforts conform to the ancient Indian traditions of

caste mobility (see Caste and Class, ch. 5). Where tribal leaders

prospered, they could hire Brahman priests to construct credible pedigrees and thereby join reasonably high-status castes. On occasion, an entire tribe or part of a tribe joined a Hindu

sect and thus entered the caste system en masse. If a specific

tribe engaged in practices that Hindus deemed polluting, the

tribe's status when it was assimilated into the caste hierarchy

would be affected.

Since independence, however, the special benefits available

to Scheduled Tribes have convinced many groups, even Hindus and Muslims, that they will enjoy greater advantages if so designated. The schedule gives tribal people incentives to maintain their identity. By the same token, the schedule also

includes a number of groups whose "tribal" status, in cultural

terms, is dubious at best; in various districts, the list includes

Muslims and a congeries of Hindu castes whose main claim

seems to be their ability to deliver votes to the party that

arranges their listing among the Scheduled Tribes.

A number of traits have customarily been seen as establishing tribal rather than caste identity. These include language,

social organization, religious affiliation, economic patterns,

geographic location, and self-identification. Recognized tribes

typically live in hilly regions somewhat remote from caste settle- ments; they generally speak a language recognized as tribal. Unlike castes, which are part of a complex and interrelated

local economic exchange system, tribes tend to form self-suffi- cient economic units. Often they practice swidden farming

clearing a field by slash-and-burn methods, planting it for a number of seasons, and then abandoning it for a lengthy fallow

201
India : A Co u n try Stu dy

period—rather than the intensive farming typical of most of

rural India (see Land Use. ch. 7). For most tribal people., land- use rights traditionally derive simply from tribal membership.

Tribal society tends to be egalitarian, its leadership being based on ties of kinship and personality rather than on hereditary sta- tus. Tribes typically consist of segmentary lineages whose

extended families provide the basis for social organization and

control. Unlike caste religion, which recognizes the hegemony

of Brahman priests, tribal religion recognizes no authority outside the tribe. Any of these criteria can be called into question in specific

instances. Lan2"ua°;e is not always an accurate indicator of tribal or caste status. Especially in regions of mixed population, many

tribal groups have lost their mother tongues and simply speak

local or resdonal languages. Linguistic assimilation is an on°;oing process of considerable complexity In the highlands of

Orissa, for example, the Bondos—a Munda-language-speaking

tribe—use their own tonsrue among themselves. Oriva. however, serves as a lingua franca in dealings with Hindu neighbors. Oriva as a prestige language (in the Bondo view),

however, has also supplanted the native tongue as the language

of ritual. In parts of Assam, historically divided into warring

tribes and villages, increased contact amon? villagers began

during the colonial period and has accelerated since independence. A pidgin Assamese developed while educated tribal

members learned Hindi and. in the late twentieth century.

English.

Self-identification and group loyalty are not unfailing markers of tribal identity either. In the case of stratified tribes, the

loyalties of clan, kin, and family may well predominate over those of tribe. In addition, tribes cannot always be viewed as people living apart: the degree of isolation of various tribes has

varied tremendously The Gonds, Santals. and Bhils traditionally have dominated the regions in which they have lived.

Moreover, tribal society is not always more egalitarian than the

rest of the rural populace: some of the larger tribes, such as the

Gonds. are highly stratified. Economic and Political Conditions

Most tribes are concentrated in heavilv forested areas that

combine inaccessibility with limited political or economic significance. Historically the economy of most tribes was subsistence agriculture or hunting and Catherine. Tribal members

202
A painter of the Warli tribe, Maharashtra

Courtesy DoranneJacobson

traded with outsiders for the few necessities they lacked, such

as salt and iron. A few local Hindu craftsmen might provide

such items as cooking utensils. The twentieth century, however,

has seen far-reaching changes in the relationship between trib- als and the larger society and, by extension, traditional tribal

economies. Improved transportation and communications

have brought ever deeper intrusions into tribal lands; merchants and a variety of government policies have involved tribal

peoples more thoroughly in the cash economy, although by no means on the most favorable of terms. Large areas fell into the

hands of nontribals around 1900, when many regions were opened by the government to homestead-style settlement.

Immigrants received free land in return for cultivating it. Tribal people, too, could apply for land titles, although even

title to the portion of land they happened to be planting that season could not guarantee their ability to continue swidden

cultivation. More important, the notion of permanent, individual ownership of land was foreign to most tribals. Land, if seen

in terms of ownership at all, was viewed as a communal

resource, free to whoever needed it. By the time tribals

accepted the necessity of obtaining formal land titles, they had

lost the opportunity to lay claim to lands that might rightfully

have been considered theirs. Generally, tribals were severely

disadvantaged in dealing with government officials who

203
India: A Country Study

granted land titles. Albeit belatedly, the colonial regime realized the necessity of protecting tribals from the predations of

outsiders and prohibited the sale of tribal lands. Although an important loophole in the form of land leases was left open,

tribes made some gains in the mid-twentieth century. Despite

considerable obstruction by local police and land officials, who

were slow to delineate tribal holdings and slower still to offer

police protection, some land was returned to tribal peoples.

In the 1970s, the gains tribal peoples had made in earlier

decades were eroded in many regions, especially in central

India. Migration into tribal lands increased dramatically, and

the deadly combination of constabulary and revenue officers

uninterested in tribal welfare and sophisticated nontribals will- ing and able to bribe local officials was sufficient to deprive

many tribals of their landholdings. The means of subverting

protective legislation were legion: local officials could be persuaded to ignore land acquisition by nontribal people, alter

land registry records, lease plots of land for short periods and

then simplv refuse to relinquish them, or induce tribal members to become indebted and attach their lands. Whatever the

means, the result was that many tribal members became landless laborers in the 1960s and 1970s, and regions that a few

years earlier had been the exclusive domain of tribes had an

increasingly heterogeneous population. Unlike previous eras

in which tribal people were shunted into more remote forests,

by the 1960s relatively little unoccupied land was available.

Government efforts to evict nontribal members from illegal

occupation have proceeded slowly; when evictions occur at all, those ejected are usually members of poor, lower castes. In a 1985 publication, anthropologist Christoph von Furer-Haimendorf describes this process in Andhra Pradesh: on average only

25 to 33 percent of the tribal families in such villages had managed to keep even a portion of their holdings. Outsiders had

paid about 5 percent of the market value of the lands they

took.

Improved communications, roads with motorized traffic,

and more frequent government intervention figured in the

increased contact that tribal peoples had with outsiders. Tribes

fared best where there was little to induce nontribals to settle: cash crops and commercial highways frequently signaled the

dismemberment of the tribes. Merchants have long been a link

to the outside world, but in the past they were generally petty

traders, and the contact thev had with tribal people was tran204
Language, Ethnicity, and Regionalism

sient. By the 1960s and 1970s, the resident nontribal shopkeeper was a permanent feature of many villages. Shopkeepers

often sold liquor on credit, enticing tribal members into debt

and into mortgaging their land. In the past, tribes made up

shortages before harvest by foraging from the surrounding forest. More recently shopkeepers have offered ready credit—with

the proviso that loans be repaid in kind with 50 to 100 percent

interest after harvest. Repaying one bag of millet with two bags

has set up a cycle of indebtedness from which many have been

unable to break loose.

The possibility of cultivators growing a profitable cash crop,

such as cotton or castor-oil plants, continues to draw merchants

into tribal areas. Nontribal traders frequently establish an

extensive network of relatives and associates as shopkeepers to serve as agents in a number of villages. Cultivators who grow a cash crop often sell to the same merchants, who provide con- sumption credit throughout the year. The credit carries a highinterest price tag, whereas the tribal peoples' crops are bought

at a fraction of the market rate. Cash crops offer a further dis- advantage in that they decrease the supply of available foodstuffs and increase tribal dependence on economic forces

beyond their control. This transformation has meant a decline

in both the tribes' security and their standard of living.

In previous generations, families might have purchased sil- ver jewelry as a form of security; contemporary tribal people

are more likely to buy minor consumer goods. Whereas jewelry

could serve as collateral in critical emergencies, current purchases simply increase indebtedness. In areas where gathering

forest products is remunerative, merchants exchange their

products for tribal labor. Indebtedness is so extensive that

although such transactions are illegal, traders sometimes "sell" their debtors to other merchants, much like indentured ser- vants. In some instances, tribes have managed to hold their own in

contacts with outsiders. Some Chenchus, a hunting and gathering tribe of the central hill regions of Andhra Pradesh, have

continued to specialize in collecting forest products for sale. Caste Hindus living among them rent land from the Chenchus

and pay a portion of the harvest. The Chenchus themselves

have responded unenthusiastically to government efforts to induce them to take up farming. Their relationship to nontribal people has been one of symbiosis, although there were

indications in the early 1980s that other groups were beginning

205
India: A Country Study

to compete with the Chenchus in gathering forest products. A

large paper mill was cutting bamboo in their territory in a manner that did not allow regeneration, and two groups had begun

to collect for sale the same products the Chenchus sell. Dalits

settled among them with the help of the Chenchus and

learned agriculture from them. The nomadic Banjara herders

who graze their cattle in the forest also have been allotted land

there. The Chenchus have a certain advantage in dealing with

caste Hindus; because of their long association with Hindu hermits and their refusal to eat beef, they are considered an unpolluted caste. Other tribes, particularly in South India, have

cultural practices that are offensive to Hindus and, when they

are assimilated, are often considered Dalits.

The final blow for some tribes has come when nontribals,

through politica l jockeying, have managed to gain legal tribal

status, that is, to be listed as a Scheduled Tribe. The Gonds of

Andhra Pradesh effectively lost their only advantage in trying

to protect their lands when the Banjaras, a group that had been

settling in Gond territory, were classified as a Scheduled Tribe

in 1977. Their newly acquired tribal status made the Banjaras

eligible to acquire Gond land "legally" and to compete with

Gonds for reserved political seats, places in education institutions, and other benefits. Because the Banjaras are not scheduled in neighboring Maharashtra, there has been an influx of

Banjara emigrants from that state into Andhra Pradesh in

search of better opportunities.

Tribes in the Himalayan foothills have not been as hardpressed by the intrusions of nontribals. Historically, their political status was always distinct from the rest of India. Until the

British colonial period, there was little effective control by any

of the empires centered in peninsular India; the region was populated by autonomous feuding tribes. The British, in

efforts to protect the sensitive northeast frontier, followed a

policy dubbed the "Inner Line"; nontribal people were allowed

into the areas only with special permission. Postindependence

governments have continued the policy, protecting the Himalayan tribes as part of the strategy to secure the border with

China (see Principal Regions, ch. 2).

This policy has generally saved the northern tribes from the

kind of exploitation that those elsewhere in South Asia have

suffered. In Arunachal Pradesh (formerly part of the NorthEast Frontier Agency), for example, tribal members control

commerce and most lower-level administrative posts. Govern206
Young Khond tribal women, Orissa

Courtesy DoranneJacobson

ment construction projects in the region have provided tribes

with a significant source of cash—both for setting up busi- nesses and for providing paying customers. Some tribes have

made rapid progress through the education system. Instruction was begun in Assamese but was eventually changed to Hindi; by

the early 1980s, English was taught at most levels. Both education and the increase in ready cash from government spending

have permitted tribal people a significant measure of social

mobility. The role of early missionaries in providing education was also crucial in Assam.

Government policies on forest reserves have affected tribal

peoples profoundly. Wherever the state has chosen to exploit

forests, it has seriously undermined the tribes' way of life. Government efforts to reserve forests have precipitated armed (if

futile) resistance on the part of the tribal peoples involved.

Intensive exploitation of forests has often meant allowing outsiders to cut large areas of trees (while the original tribal inhabitants were restricted from cutting), and ultimately replacing

mixed forests capable of sustaining tribal life with single-product plantations. Where forests are reserved, nontribals have

proved far more sophisticated than their forest counterparts at bribing the necessary local officials to secure effective (if extra207
India: A Country Study

legal) use of forestlands. The system of bribing local officials

charged with enforcing the reserves is so well established that

the rates of bribery are reasonably fixed (by the number of

plows a farmer uses or the amount of grain harvested). Tribal

people often end up doing unpaid work for Hindus simply

because a caste Hindu, who has paid the requisite bribe, can at least ensure a tribal member that he or she will not be evicted

from forestlands. The final irony, notes von Furer-Haimendorf,

is that the swidden cultivation many tribes practiced had maintained South Asia's forests, whereas the intensive cultivating

and commercial interests that replaced the tribal way of life have destroyed the forests (see Forestry, ch. 7).

Extending the system of primary education into tribal areas and reserving places for tribal children in middle and high

schools and higher education institutions are central to government policy, but efforts to improve a tribe's educational sta- tus have had mixed results (see Education, ch. 2). Recruitment

of qualified teachers and determination of the appropriate language of instruction also remain troublesome. Commission

after commission on the "language question" has called for

instruction, at least at the primary level, in the students' native

tongue. In some regions, tribal children entering school must

begin by learning the official regional language, often one

completely unrelated to their tribal tongue. The experiences of

the Gonds of Andhra Pradesh provide an example. Primary

schooling began there in the 1940s and 1950s. The government selected a group of Gonds who had managed to become

semiliterate in Telugu and taught them the basics of written

script. These individuals became teachers who taught in Gondi,

and their efforts enjoyed a measure of success until the 1970s,

when state policy demanded instruction in Telugu. The switch

in the language of instruction both made the Gond teachers

superfluous because they could not teach in Telugu and also

presented the government with the problem of finding reason- ably qualified teachers willing to teach in outlying tribal

schools.

The commitment of tribes to acquiring a formal education

for their children varies considerably. Tribes differ in the

extent to which they view education positively. Gonds and Par- dhans, two groups in the central hill region, are a case in point.

The Gonds are cultivators, and they frequently are reluctant to send their children to school, needing them, they say, to work

in the fields. The Pardhans were traditionally bards and ritual

208
Language, Ethnicity, and Regionalism

specialists, and they have taken to education with enthusiasm.

The effectiveness of educational policy likewise varies by

region. In those parts of the northeast where tribes have generally been spared the wholesale onslaught of outsiders, schooling has helped tribal people to secure political and economic

benefits. The education system there has provided a corps of

highly trained tribal members in the professions and highranking administrative posts.

Many tribal schools are plagued by high dropout rates. Children attend for the first three to four years of primary school

and gain a smattering of knowledge, only to lapse into illiteracy

later. Few who enter continue up to the tenth grade; of those

who do, few manage to finish high school. Therefore, very few

are eligible to attend institutions of higher education, where

the high rate of attrition continues.

Practices

The influx of newcomers disinclined to follow tribal ways has

had a massive impact on social relations and tribal belief sys- tems. In many communities, the immigrants have brought on

nothing less than the total disintegration of the communities

they entered. Even where outsiders are not residents in villages,

traditional forms of social control and authority are less effective because tribal people are patently dependent on politicoeconomic forces beyond their control. In general, traditional

headmen no longer have official backing for their role in vil- lage affairs, although many continue to exercise considerable

influence. Headmen can no longer control the allocation of

land or decide who has the right to settle in the village, a loss of

power that has had an insidious effect on village solidarity.

Some headmen have taken to leasing village land to outsiders, thus enriching themselves at the expense of the rest of the

tribes. Conflict over land rights has introduced a point of cleavage into village social relations; increased factional conflict has

seriously eroded the ability of tribes to ward off the intrusion of

outsiders. In some villages, tribal schoolteachers have emerged

as a new political force, a counterbalance to the traditional

headman. Changes in landholding patterns have also altered

the role of the joint family. More and more couples set up separate households as soon as they marry. Because land is no

longer held and farmed in common and has grown more

scarce, inheritance disputes have increased.

209
In di a: A Co u ntry Stu dy

Hunters and gatherers are particularly vulnerable to these

far-reaching changes. The lack of strong authority figures in

most hunting and gathering groups handicaps these tribes in

organizing to negotiate with the government. In addition,

these tribes are too small to have much political leverage.

Forced settlement schemes also have had a deleterious impact

on the tribes and their environment. Government-organized

villages are typically larger than traditional hunting and gathering settlements. Forest reserves limit the amount of territory over which tribes can ran^e freelv. Larger villages and smaller

territories have led, in some instances, to an increase in crime

and violence. Traditionally, hunters and gatherers "settled"

their disputes by arranging for the antagonists simply to avoid

one another: new, more circumscribed villages preclude this

arrangement.

Tribal beliefs and rituals have altered in the face of increased

contact with Hindus and missionaries of a variety of persuasions (see Tribal Religions, ch. 3). Among groups in more

intense contact with the Hindu majority, there have been vari- ous transformations. The Gonds, for example, traditionally

worshiped clan gods through elaborate rites, with Pardhans

organizing and performing the necessary rituals. The increasing impoverishment of large sections of the Gond tribe has

made it difficult, if not impossible, to support the Pardhans as a

class of ritual specialists. At the same time, many Gonds have

concluded that the tribal gods were losing their power and effi- cacy. Gonds have tended to seek the assistance of other deities,

and thus there has been widespread Hinduization of Gondi

belief and practice. Some tribes have adopted the Hindu practice of having costly elaborate weddings—a custom that contributes to indebtedness (as it has in many rural Indian

families) and subjects them to the cash economy on the most

deleterious of terms. Some families have adapted a traditional

marriage pattern—that of capturing a bride—to modern conditions, using the custom to avoid the costly outlays associated

with a formal wedding.

Christian missionaries have been active among sundry tribes

since the mid-nineteenth century. Conversion to Christianity

offers a number of advantages, not the least of which is education. It was through the efforts of various Christian sects to translate the Bible into tribal languages that those tongues

acquired a written script. Christian proselytizing has served to preserve tribal lore and language in written form at the same

210
Language, Ethnicity, and Regionalism

time that it has tended to change drastically the tribe's cultural

heritage and belief systems. In some instances, the introduction of Christianity has driven a wedge between converts and

their fellow tribal members who continue to adhere to traditional beliefs and practices (see Christianity, ch. 3).

Descendants of Foreign Groups

Jews and Parsis

There are several groups descended from ancient settlers in

India. These groups include the Jews, the first group of whom

are said to have migrated from West Asia and to have settled in

Cranganore (also the traditional first site where Muslims later

arrived in India) on the Malabar Coast of Kerala in the first century A.D., a second group ofJews who fled the Arabian Peninsula in the face of Muslim ascendancy in the seventh century,

and the Parsis, who came to India in the eighth century A.D. to escape Muslim persecution in Persia (see Zoroastrianism; Judaism, ch. 3).

Portuguese

The European powers left a small ethnic imprint on India.

The Portuguese came first and left last, but at no time had they

extensive dominions such as the Indian kingdoms and empires

or the lands of the British in India. The Austrians, Danish,

Dutch, and French had yet smaller territories for shorter periods. By the time truly large numbers of Europeans came to spend their working lives in India as part of the British Raj, racist prejudices that were largely absent in earlier centuries had

developed in the Europeans. Improvements in transportation

(the steamship and the Suez Canal) also had made travel

swifter and safer so at least the more prosperous classes could

return to Europe on leave to marry or choose brides coming

on the so-called "fishing fleets" for tourism and husband-hunting.

There are around 730,000 Portuguese Indians, commonly

known as Goans or Goanese, about half of whom live in the

state of Goa and the others elsewhere in India. They are descended from Indians in the former Portuguese colony who

assimilated to Portuguese culture and in many cases are the

descendants of Indo-Portuguese marriages, which the Portuguese civil and religious authorities encouraged.

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India: A Country Study

Anglo-Indians

The largest group of European Indians, however, are descendants of British men, generally from the colonial service and

the military, and lower-caste Hindu or Muslim women. From

some time in the nineteenth century, both the British and the

Indian societies rejected the offspring of these unions, and so the Anglo-Indians, as they became known, sought marriage

partners among other Anglo-Indians. Over time this group

developed a number of caste-like features and acquired a special occupational niche in the railroad, postal, and customs ser- vices. A number of factors fostered a strong sense of community among Anglo-Indians. The school system focused on

English language and culture and was virtually segregated, as were Anglo-Indian social clubs; the group's adherence to Christianity also set members apart from most other Indians; and

distinctive manners, diet, dress, and speech contributed to

their segregation.

During the independence movement, many Anglo-Indians

identified (or were assumed to identify) with British rule, and,

therefore, incurred the distrust and hostility of Indian nationalists. Their position at independence was difficult. They felt a

loyalty to a British "home" that most had never seen and where

they would gain little social acceptance. They felt insecure in an India that put a premium on participation in the independence movement as a prerequisite for important government

positions. Some Anglo-Indians left the country in 1947, hoping

to make a new life in Britain or elsewhere in the Commonwealth of Nations, such as Australia or Canada. Many of these

people returned to India after unsuccessful attempts to find a place in "alien" societies. Most Anglo-Indians, however, opted

to stay in India and made whatever adjustments they deemed

necessary.

Like the Parsis, the Anglo-Indians are essentially urban

dwellers. Unlike the Parsis, relatively few have attained high lev- els of education, amassed great wealth, or achieved more than

subordinate government positions. In the 1990s, Anglo-Indians

remained scattered throughout the country in the larger cities and those smaller towns serving as railroad junctions and communications centers. Constitutional guarantees of the rights of communities and

religious and linguistic minorities permit Anglo-Indians to maintain their own schools and to use English as the medium

of instruction. In order to encourage the integration of the

212
A Bhil tribal woman at the BaneshwarFair, Rajasthan

Courtesy DoranneJacobson

community into the larger society, the government stipulates

that a certain percentage of the student body come from other

Indian communities. There is no evident official discrimination against Anglo-Indians in terms of current government

employment. A few have risen to high posts; some are highranking officers in the military, and a few are judges. In occupational terms, at least, the assimilation of Anglo-Indians into

the mainstream of Indian life was well under way by the 1990s.

Nevertheless, the group will probably remain socially distinct as long as its members marry only other Anglo-Indians and its European descent continues to be noted.

Africans

Still another foreign-origin group, usually known collectively

as Siddhis, are the descendants of Africans brought to India as

slaves. Although most African-origin Indians are descendants

of the large influx of slaves brought to western India in the sev- enteenth century, the first Africans reportedly arrived on the

Konkani Coast in the first century A.D. as a result of the Arab

slave trade, and there was an important African presence,

including several short-term rulers, in Bengal in the fifteenth

century. Siddhis (the name means lord or prince in African

usage) sometimes rose to prominent—even ruling—govern213
India: A County Study

mental and military positions during the Mughal and British

periods.

Most modern-day Siddhis are Muslims and are engaged in

agricultural pursuits. Thev are found in Gujarat. Daman and

Diu. Maharashtra. Karnataka.. Andhra Pradesh, and other

states and union territories, where thev are designated as Scheduled Tribe members.

Regionalism

The formation of states along linguistic and ethnic lines has

occurred in India in numerous instances since independence

in 1947 i^see Linguistic States, this ch.). There have been

demands, however, to form units within states based not only

along linguistic, ethnic, and religious lines but also, in some

cases, on a feeling of die distinctness of a geographical region

and its culture and economic interests. The most volatile move- ments are those ongoing in Jammu and Kashmir and Punjab

see Political Issues, ch. 8: Insurgent Movements and External

Subversion, ch. 9). How the central government responds to these demands will be an area of scrutiny through the late

1990s and beyond. It is believed bv some officials that conceding regional autonomy is less arduous and takes less time and

fewer resources than does meeting agitation, violence., and

demands for concessions.

Telangana Movement

An earlv manifestation of regionalism was the Telangana

movement in what became the state of Andhra Pradesh. The

princely ruler of Hvderabad. the nizam. had attempted unsuccessfullv to maintain Hvderabad as an independent state separate from India in 1947. His efforts were simultaneous with the

largest agrarian armed rebellion in modern Indian historv.

Starting inJuly 1946, communist-led guerrilla squads began

overthrowing local feudal village resumes and organizing land

reform in Telugu-speaking areas of Hvderabad, collectively

known as Telangana (an ancient name for the region dating

from the Yijavanagar period). In time, about 3.000 villages and

some 41.000 square kilometers of territory were involved in the

revolt. Faced with the refusal of the nizam of Hvderabad to accede his territory to India and the violence of the communist-led rebellion, the central government sent in the armv in

September 194S. Bv November 1949. Hvderabad had been

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Language, Ethnicity, and Regionalism

forced to accede to the Indian union, and, by October 1951,

the violent phase of the Telangana movement had been suppressed. The effect of the 1946-51 rebellion and communist

electoral victories in 1952 had led to the destruction of Hyderabad and set the scene for the establishment of a new state along

linguistic lines. In 1953, based on the recommendation of the

States Reorganisation Commission, Telugu-speaking areas were

separated from the former Madras States to form Andhra,

India's first state established along linguistic lines. The commission also contemplated establishing Telangana as a separate

state, but instead Telangana was merged with Andhra to form

the new state of Andhra Pradesh in 1956.

The concerns about Telangana were manifold. The region

had a less developed economy than Andhra, but a larger reve- nue base (mostly because it taxed rather than prohibited alcoholic beverages), which Telanganas feared might be diverted

for use in Andhra. They also feared that planned dam projects

on the Krishna and Godavari rivers would not benefit Telangana proportionately even though Telanganas controlled the

headwaters of the rivers. Telanganas feared too that the people

of Andhra would have the advantage in jobs, particularly in

government and education.

The central government decided to ignore the recommendation to establish a separate Telangana state and, instead,

merged the two regions into a unified Andhra Pradesh. However, a "gentlemen's agreement" provided reassurances to the

Telangana people. For at least five years, revenue was to be

spent in the regions proportionately to the amount they contributed. Education institutions in Telangana were to be

expanded and reserved for local students. Recruitment to the

civil service and other areas of government employment such

as education and medicine was to be proportional. The use of

Urdu was to continue in the administration and the judiciary

for five years. The state cabinet was to have proportional membership from both regions and a deputy chief minister from

Telangana if the chief minister was from Andhra and vice versa.

Finally, the Regional Council for Telangana was to be responsible for economic development, and its members were to be

elected by the members of the state legislative assembly from

the region.

In the following years, however, the Telangana people had a number of complaints about how the agreements and guarantees were implemented. The deputy chief minister position was

215
India: A Country Study

never filled. Education institutions in the region were greatly

expanded, but Telanganas felt that their enrollment was not

proportionate to their numbers. The selection of the city of

Hyderabad as the state capital led to massive migration of people from Andhra into Telangana. Telanganas felt discriminated

against in education employment but were told by the state government that most non-Telanganas had been hired on the

grounds that qualified local people were unavailable. In addition, the unification of pay scales between the two regions

appeared to disadvantage Telangana civil servants. In the atmosphere of discontent, professional associations that earlier had

amalgamated broke apart by region.

Discontent with the 1956 gentlemen's agreement intensified

in January 1969 when the guarantees that had been agreed on

were supposed to lapse. Student agitation for the continuation

of the agreement began at Osmania University in Hyderabad

and spread to other parts of the region. Government employees and opposition members of the state legislative assembly

swiftly threatened "direct action" in support of the students.

The Congress-controlled state and central governments

offered assurances that non-Telangana civil servants in the

region would be replaced by Mulkis, disadvantaged local people, and that revenue surpluses from Telangana would be

returned to the region. The protestors, however, were dissatisfied, and severe violence, including mob attacks on railroads,

road transport, and government facilities, spread over the

region. In addition, seventy-nine police firings resulted in

twenty-three deaths according to official figures, the education

system was shut down, and examinations were cancelled. Calls

for a separate Telangana state came in the midst of counter violence in Andhra areas bordering Telangana. In the meantime,

the Andhra Pradesh High Court decreed that a central government law mandating replacement of non-Telangana government employees with Mulkis was beyond Parliament's

constitutional powers.

Although the Congress faced dissension within its ranks, its leadership stood against additional linguistic states, which were

regarded as "antinational." As a result, defectors from the Congress, led by M. Chenna Reddy, founded the Telangana People's Association (Telangana Praja Samithi). Despite electoral

successes, however, some of the new party leaders gave up their

agitation in September 1971 and, much to the disgust of many

216
A Kuruvikkaran tribalforest dweller south ofMadras,

Tamil Nadu

Courtesy DoranneJacobson

separatists, rejoined the safer political haven of the Congress

ranks.

In 1972 the Supreme Court reversed the Andhra Pradesh

High Court's ruling that the Mulki rules were unconstitutional.

This decision triggered agitation in the Andhra region that

produced six months of violence.

Throughout the 1970s, Andhra Pradesh settled into a pattern of continuous domination by Congress (R) and later Congress (I), with much instability and dissidence within the state party and constant interference from Indira Gandhi and the

national party. Chenna Reddy, the erstwhile opposition leader, was for a time the Congress (I) state chief minister. Congress

domination was only ended by the founding of the Telugu

National Party by N.T. Rama Rao in 1982 and its overwhelming

victory in the state elections in 1983.

Polls taken after the end of the Telangana movement

showed a certain lack of enthusiasm for it, and for the idea of a separate state. Although urban groups (students and civil ser- vants) had been most active in the movement, its support was

stronger in rural areas. Its supporters were mixed: low and middle castes, the young and the not so young, women, illiterates

and the poorly educated, and rural gentry. Speakers of several

other languages than Telugu were heavily involved. The move- ment had no element of religious communalism, but some

217
India: A Country Study

observers thought Muslims were particularly involved in the

movement. Other researchers found the Muslims were unenthusiastic about the movement and noted a feeling that migration from Andhra to Telangana was creating opportunities that were helping non-Telanganas. On the other hand, of the two

locally prominent Muslim political groups, only one supported

a separate state; the other opposed the idea while demanding

full implementation of the regional safeguards. Although Urdu

speakers were appealed to in the agitation (e.g., speeches were

given in Urdu as well as Telugu), in the aftermath Urdu disappeared from the schools and the administration.

The Telangana movement grew out of a sense of regional

identity as such, rather than out of a sense of ethnic identity,

language, religion, or caste. The movement demanded redress

for economic grievances, the writing of a separate history, and

establishment of a sense of cultural distinctness. The emotions

and forces generated by the movement were not strong

enough, however, for a continuing drive for a separate state. In the late 1980s and early 1990s, the People's War Group, an ele- ment of the Communist Party of India (Marxist-Leninist),

renewed violence in Andhra Pradesh but was dealt with by state police forces. The Telangana movement was never directed

against the territorial integrity of India, unlike the insurrections in Jammu and Kashmir and some of the unrest in northeastern India.

Jharkhand Movement

The word Jharkhand, meaning "forest region," applies to a

forested mountainous plateau region in eastern India, south of

the Indo-Gangetic Plain and west of the Ganga's delta in Bangladesh. The term dates at least to the sixteenth century. In the

more extensive claims of the movement, Jharkhand comprises

seven districts in Bihar, three in West Bengal, four in Orissa,

and two in Madhya Pradesh. Ninety percent of the Scheduled

Tribes in Jharkhand live in the Bihar districts. The tribal peoples, who are from two groups, the Chotanagpurs and the Santals, have been the main agitators for the movement.

Jharkhand is mountainous and heavily forested and, therefore, easy to defend. As a result, it was traditionally autonomous

from the central government until the seventeenth century

when its riches attracted the Mughal rulers. Mughal administration eventually led to more outside interference and a

218
A Kuruvikkaran tribal girl with a chipmunk on her shoulder,

Mahabalipuram, Tamil Nadu

Courtesy DoranneJacobson

change from the traditional collective system of land ownership to one of private landholders.

These trends intensified under British colonial rule, leading

to more land being transferred to the local tribes' creditors and

the development of a system of "bonded labor," which meant

permanent and often hereditary debt slavery to one employer.

Unable to make effective use of the British court system, tribal

peoples resorted to rebellion starting in the late eighteenth

century. In response, the British government passed a number

of laws in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries to restrict

alienation of tribal lands and to protect the interests of tribal

cultivators.

The advent of Christian missions in the region in 1845 led to major cultural changes, which were later to be important in the

Jharkhand movement. A significant proportion of the tribes

converted to Christianity, and schools were founded for both

sexes, including higher institutions to train tribal people as teachers.

Jharkhand's mineral wealth also has been a problem for the

tribes. The region is India's primary source of coal and iron.

Bauxite, copper, limestone, asbestos, and graphite also are found there. Coal mining began in 1856, and the Tata Iron and

Steel Factory was established injamshedpur in 1907.

219
India: A Country Study

The modern Jharkhand movement dates to the earlv part of

the twentieth century: activity was initially anions: Christian J

7 / / o

tribal students but later also among non-Christians and even some nontribals. Rivalries developed among the various Protestant churches and with the Roman Catholic Church, but most

of the groups coalesced in the electoral arena and achieved

some successes on the local level in the 1930s. The movement

at this period was directed more at Indian dikus (outsiders)

than at the British. Jharkhand spokesmen made representations to British constitutional commissions requesting a separate state and redress of Grievances, but without much success. Independence in 1947 brought emphasis on planned industrialization centering; on heaw industries, including a large

expansion of mining. A measure of the economic importance

of the Jharkhand mines is that the region produces more than

73 percent of the revenue of Bihar, a large state. The socialist

pattern of development pursued bv the central government led

to forced sales of tribal lands to the government, with the usual

problem of perceived inadequate compensation. On the other

hand, government authorities felt that because the soils of the

region are poor, industrialization was particularly necessary for

the local people, not just for the national good. However,

industrial development brought about further influx of outsiders, and local people considered that they were not being hired

in sufficient numbers. The nationalization of the mines in 1971

allegedly was followed bv the firing of almost 50.000 miners

from Jharkhand and their replacement bv outsiders.

Land was also acquired bv the government for building

dams and their reservoirs. However, some observers thought

that very little of the electricity and water produced by the

dams was going to the region. In addition, government forestry

favored the replacement of species of trees that had multiple

uses to the forest dwellers with others useful onlv for commercial sales. Traditional shifting cultivation and forest grazing were restricted, and the local people felt that the prices paid by

the government for forest products they gathered for sale were

too low. In the decades since independence, these problems

have persisted and intensified.

On the political front, in 1949 the Jharkhand Party, under

the leadership of Jaipal Singh, swept the tribal districts in the

first general elections. When the States Reorganisation Commission was formed, a memorandum was submitted to it asking

for an extensive region to be established as Jharkhand, which

220
Language, Ethnicity, and Regionalism

would have exceeded West Bengal in area and Orissa in population. The commission rejected the idea of a Jharkhand state, however, on the grounds that it lacked a common language. In

the 1950s, the Jharkhand Party continued as the largest opposition party in the Bihar legislative assembly, but it gradually

declined in strength. The worst blow came in 1963 when Jaipal

Singh merged the party into the Congress without consulting

the membership. In the wake of this move, several splinter

Jharkhand parties were formed, with varying degrees of electoral success. These parties were largely divided along tribal

lines, which the movement previously had not seen. There also has been dissention between Christian and nonChristian tribal people because of differences in level of education and economic development. Non-Christian tribals formed

separate organizations to promote their interests in the 1940s

and again in the 1960s. In 1968 a parliamentary study team vis- ited Ranchi investigating the removal of groups from the offi- cial list of Scheduled Tribes (thereby depriving these groups of

various compensatory privileges). Mass meetings were held

and petitions submitted to the study team maintaining that

Christians had ceased to be tribals by conversion from tribal

religions, and that they benefitted unfairly both from mission

schooling and from government protection as members of

Scheduled Tribes. In the following years, there were accusations that the missionaries were foreign outside agitators,

In August 1995, the state government of Bihar established

the 180-member Provisional Jharkhand Area Autonomous

Council. The council has 162 elected members (two each from

eighty-one assembly constituencies in the Jharkhand area) and

eighteen appointed members.

Uttarakhand

The term Uttarakhand, meaning "northern tract" or "higher

tract," refers to the Himalayan districts of Uttar Pradesh,

between the state of Himachal Pradesh to the west and Nepal

to the east. It contains the eight districts of the Kumaon and

Garhwal divisions. The main local languages are Kumaoni,

Garhwali, and Pahari ("mountain"), a language of the IndoAryan family. The language of the elite, business, and administration is Hindi.

The Uttarakhand movement is motivated by regional factors

along with economic factors stemming from its particular geography. There is no protest against the dominance of Hindi in

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India: A Country Study

education and administration in the state. As regards religion,

the population of the hills is almost entirely Hindu, like the

large majority of Uttar Pradesh. The influx of outsiders has not

become an issue; indeed, the problem has rather been the

need for natives of the region to leave it. The residents of hill districts have felt themselves lost in the

large state of Uttar Pradesh and their needs ignored by the politicians more concerned with wider regional issues. There has

been almost no development of industry or higher education,

although the 1962 border war with China resulted in some

infrastructure development, particularly roads, which also were extended to make the more remote pilgrimage sites more

accessible.

Men of the region are forced to leave their families in the

hills and seek employment in the plains, where they mostly find

menial positions as domestic servants, which they consider

undignified and inappropriate to their caste. Students must

also go to the plains for higher education. All find the heat of

the lowlands very oppressive.

The major potential in Uttarakhand for hydroelectric power

from the Ganga and Yamuna rivers and for tourism has not

been developed, locals feel. Springs, which are essential for

drinking and irrigation water, have been allowed to dry up.

The particular needs of hill agriculture have been ignored.

The plains produce grain primarily, whereas fruit growing is more promising in the hills. On the other hand, adjacent

Himachal Pradesh, which consists of Himalayan districts formerly in Punjab or in associated princely states, became a state in 1948. Himachal Pradesh is geographically and culturally

quite similar to Uttarakhand and has enjoyed satisfying

progress in power generation, tourism, and cultivation. Some

administrators observe that small states such as Himachal

Pradesh can make more rapid progress just by virtue of being

smaller, so that the problems are less overwhelming and local

needs are not lost. The first demand for a separate Uttarakhand state was

voiced by P.C. Joshi, a member of the Communist Party of

India (CPI), in 1952. However, a movement did not develop in

earnest until 1979 when the Uttarakhand Kranti Dal (Uttarakhand Revolutionary Front) was formed to fight for separation. In 1991 the Uttar Pradesh legislative assembly passed a

resolution supporting the idea, but nothing came of it. In 1994

student agitation against the state's implementation of the

222
Language, Ethnicity, and Regionalism

Mandal Commission (see Glossary) report increasing the number of reserved government positions and university places for

lower caste people (the largest caste of Kumaon and Garhwal is the high-ranking Rajput Kshatriya group) expanded into a struggle for statehood. Violence spread on both sides, with

attacks on police, police firing on demonstrators, and rapes of

female Uttarakhand activists. In 1995 the agitation was

renewed, mostly peacefully, under the leadership of the Uttarakhand Samyukta Sangharsh Samiti (Uttarakhand United Struggle Association), a coalition headed by the Uttarakhand Kranti

Dal. The Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP), seeing the appeal of

statehood to its high-caste constituencies, also supported the

movement, but wanted to act on its own. To distinguish its activities, the BJP wanted the new state to be called Uttaranchal, meaning "northern border or region," essentially a syn- onym for Uttarakhand. In 1995 various marches and

demonstrations of the Uttarakhand movement were tense with

the possibility of conflict not just with the authorities, but also

between the two main political groups. Actual violence, however, was rare. A march to New Delhi in support of statehood was being planned later in the year. An interesting development was that women were playing an active leadership role in

the agitation.

Gorkhaland

The Gorkhaland movement grew from the demand of Nepalis living in Darjiling District of West Bengal for a separate state for themselves. The Gorkhaland National Liberation Front led

the movement, which disrupted the district with massive violence between 1986 and 1988. The issue was resolved, at least

temporarily, in 1988 with the establishment of the Darjiling

Gorkha Hill Council within West Bengal.

Historically, Darjiling belonged to the kingdom of Sikkim,

which had lost it several times since the eighteenth century.

The ethnic identity "Gorkha" comes from the kingdom with

that name that united Nepal in the late eighteenth century and

was the focal point of Nepalese in the British army.

Immigration from Nepal expanded with British rule in

India, and some 34 percent of the population of Darjiling in

1876 was of Gorkha (also seen as Gurkha) ethnicity. By the start of the twentieth century, Nepalese immigrants made a modest

socioeconomic advance through government service, and a

small anglicized elite developed among them. In 1917 the Hill223
India: A Country Study

men's Association came into being and petitioned for the

administrative separation of Darjiling in 1917 and again in

1928 and 1942. In 1928 the Akhil Bharatiya Gorkha League

(All India Gorkha League) was formed. It gained additional

support after World War II with the influx of ex-soldiers from

the Gurkha regiments who had been exposed to nationalist

movements in Southeast Asia during service there.

During the 1940s, the CPI organized Gorkha tea workers. In

presentations to the States Reorganisation Commission in

1954, the CPI favored regional autonomy for Darjiling within

West Bengal, with recognition of Nepali as a Scheduled Language. The All India Gorkha League preferred making the area a union territory under the national government (see

Local Government, ch. 8).

The state of West Bengal nominally has been supportive of

the use of the Nepali language. The West Bengal Official Language Act of 1961 made Nepali the official language of the hill subdivisions of Darjiling, Kalimpong, and Kurseong, where

Nepalese are a majority. The state legislative assembly passed a resolution in 1977 that led Parliament to amend the national

constitution to include Nepali as a Scheduled Language. However, the Gorkhaland National Liberation Front has accused

the state government of failure to actually implement use of

the language.

The Gorkhaland movement distinguished Darjiling Gorkhas

from nationals of Nepal legally resident in India, from Nepalispeaking Indian citizens from other parts of the country, and

even from the majority in neighboring Sikkim, where Nepali is the official language. The movement was emphatic that it had

no desire to separate from India, only from the state of West

Bengal. Gorkhaland supporters therefore preferred to call the

Gorkhas' language Gorkhali rather than Nepali, although they

did not attempt to claim there is any linguistic difference from

what other people call Nepali. The 1981 census of India,

whether in deference to this sentiment or for some other rea- son, called the language Gorkhali/Nepali. However, when the

Eighth Schedule of the constitution was amended in 1992 to make it a Scheduled Language, the term Nepali alone was used.

In 1986 the Gorkhaland National Liberation Front, having

failed to obtain a separate regional administrative identity from

Parliament, again demanded a separate state of Gorkhaland.

The party's leader, Subhash Ghising, headed a demonstration

that turned violent and was severely repressed by the state gov224
Young Pathan Muslim woman

in gold and pearljewelry,

Bhopal, Madhya Pradesh

Courtesy DoranneJacobson

ernment. The disturbances almost totally shut down the districts' economic mainstays of tea, tourism, and timber. The Left

Front government of West Bengal, which earlier had supported

some form of autonomy, now opposed it as "antinational." The

state government claimed that Darjiling was no worse off than

the state in general and was richer than many districts. Ghising

made lavish promises to his followers, including the recruitment of 40,000 Indian Gorkhas into the army and paying

Rsl00,000 (for value of the rupee—see Glossary) for every

Gorkha writer. After two years of fighting and the loss of at least 200 lives, the government of West Bengal and the central government finally agreed on an autonomous hill district. In July

1988, the Gorkhaland National Liberation Front gave up the

demand for a separate state, and in August the Darjiling

Gorkha Hill Council came into being with Ghising as chair- man. The council had authority over economic development

programs, education, and culture.

However, difficulties soon arose over the panchayat (see Glossary) elections. Ghising wanted the hill council excluded from

the national law on panchayat elections. Rajiv Gandhi's government was initially favorable to his request and introduced a constitutional amendment in 1989 to exclude the Darjiling

Gorkha Hill Council, along with several other northeast hill states and regions (Nagaland, Meghalaya, Mizoram, and the

225
India: A Country Study

hill regions of Manipur), but it did not pass. However, in 1992

Parliament passed the Seventy-third Amendment, which

seemed to show a newly serious commitment to the idea of

local self-government by panchayats. The amendment excluded

all the hill areas just mentioned except Darjiling. Ghising

insisted this omission was a machination of West Bengal and

threatened to revive militant agitation for a Gorkhaland state. He also said the Gorkhaland National Liberation Front would

boycott the village panchayat elections mandated by the amendment. A large portion of his party, however, refused to accept

the boycott and split off under the leadership of Chiten Sherpa

to form the All India Gorkha League, which won a sizable number of panchayat seats. In 1995 it was unclear whether the region would remain content with autonomy rather than statehood. In August 1995,

Sherpa complained to the state government that Ghising's government had misused hill council funds, and West Bengal chief

minister Jyoti Basu promised to investigate. Both Gorkha parties showed willingness to use general shutdowns to forward

their ends. The fact that so many people were willing to follow

Sherpa instead of the hitherto unchallenged Ghising may indi- cate that they will be satisfied with regional autonomy.

Ladakh

The region of Ladakh is isolated in the Himalayas next to Tibet and differs radically from the rest of the state in that the

majority of the population is culturally, ethnically, religiously,

and linguistically close to Tibet. There also is a Muslim minority. The region has no interest in the separatist and Islamicist

sentiments of the Vale of Kashmir.

Following several years of discontent and agitation about the

position of Ladakh District in the state ofjammu and Kashmir,

the central government passed the Ladakh Autonomous Hill

Development Councils Act in May 1995. The 1995 act established councils for the Leh and Kargil subdistricts and allotted

them powers for economic development, land use, and taxation. Elections for the Leh council were held in August 1995.

Congress (I) won all twenty-two elective seats unopposed; the

governor ofjammu and Kashmir was authorized to appoint

four members from among minorides and women.

The Northeast

Northeastern India is made up of the states of Assam,

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Language, Ethnicity, and Regionalism

Meghalaya, Tripura, Arunachal Pradesh, Mizoram, Manipur,

and Nagaland. Certain tensions exist between these states and

a relatively distant central government and between the tribal

peoples, who are natives of these states, and migrant peoples

from other parts of India. These tensions have led the natives

of these states to seek a greater participation in their own governance, control of their states' economies, and their role in

society. Emerging from these desires for greater self-gover- nance are new regional political parties and continued insurgent movements (see Political Parties, ch. 8; Insurgent

Movements and External Subversion, ch. 10). In addition to the more frequently analyzed regional movements in Jammu

and Kashmir, Punjab, and states such as Assam and Nagaland

in the northeast, there are other regional movements, such as those in the Tripura and Miso tribal areas. In May 1995, the state government of Tripura extended the area covered by the Tripura Tribal Areas Autonomous District

Council, a result of the tripartite accord among the central government, the state government, and the Tripura National Volunteers movement concluded in 1988. In the elections in July

1995, the Left Front, led by the Communist Party of India

(Marxist), defeated the alliance of the Congress (I) and the

local Tripura Tribal Youth Association (Tripura Upajati Juba

Samiti), which had controlled the council since 1990. The new

council proceeded to dissolve the more than 400 development

committees at various levels under its jurisdiction for corruption and inaction and promised to constitute new ones swiftly.

In June 1995, the Assam government signed an agreement

with two organizations of the Mising tribe, the Mising Autonomous Demand Committee and the Mising Greater Council

(Mising Bane Kebang), to set up an autonomous council for

the Misings. The council will include villages with majority

tribal populations in four districts of Assam, with a total population expected to be about 315,000. However, villages in so- called Reserve Forest Areas will be included only with the

approval of the central minister of state with independent

charge of environment and forests. This decision is a possible source of discontent because tribals frequently feel themselves

hampered by restrictions on the use of forests by the government. However, in July 1995 the Mising Bane Kebang boycotted the swearing in of the interim council because it said the

Mising Autonomous Demand Committee had kept it out of its formation.

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India: A Country Study

Outlook

In the 1990s, the central government has seemed far more

willing than previously to grant demands for regional political

entities within states, acceding to more demands and doing so

after less agitation. This change may be part of a wider willing- ness to decentralize manifested in the recent trend of serious

support of panchayati raj, granting more taxing, legislative, and

development powers to panchayats at various levels and holding

long-delayed elections to them. The demands on money, time,

and military and police personnel caused by the disturbances

in Jammu and Kashmir, Punjab, and the northeastern states,

and other military actions, such as that in Sri Lanka, may have

made the central authorities more reluctant to resist demands

if resistance might require military suppression. This trend to concede substate entities presages a number of possible outcomes for the Indian polity.

It should be noted that any of these regional changes, from

the purely legal point of view, could be reversed by the central

government on its own accord. Most constitutional amendments require only a two-thirds vote of Parliament. However, once in place, the various regional entities create a heavy self- interest among their office-holders and employees, in addition

to those who feel served by their creation. An attempt to reverse the delegation of power could arouse agitations at least

as intense as the original movements to force the issue.

The traditional worry about further divisions of or within

states was that they would be "antinational, " weakening

national unity. Although the reorganization of states on linguistic lines was initiallv resisted as a challenge to national unity, once established, new states were not regarded as a threat, perhaps because they just had to be accepted as a fait accompli,

and no attempt to reverse the organization of states on linguistic grounds has been suggested. This attitude prevails in spite

of the secessionist sentiment that used to exist in Tamil Nadu

and still does in Punjab and Jammu and Kashmir. Once the

substate entities are operational, their continued existence may

be regarded as similarly inevitable. However, as has been

observed, the regionalist movements have mostly preached,

with apparent sincerity, their attachment to the nation; their

complaints have rather been with state apparatuses. Anyone

concerned about the possibility of secession from India might

consider that a process granting more regional government

bodies might in fact strengthen national unity. The regional

228
Language, Ethnicity, and Regionalism

governments within linguistic states could serve as additional

centers of loyalty, benefits, and patronage in competition with

the linguistic states, weakening a state's ability to attract an

exclusive attachment and be seen as a candidate to be an independent national entity.

Whereas regional sentiment is partly linguistic, promotion of

the local languages may provide a counterweight to the ten- dencies of states to insist on the spread of the state language at the expense of all others, a spread which, to the extent that it succeeds, makes the state something more nearly approaching

a nation-state. The substate regions have been granted financial and other political powers, which, if they wish, they can use

to encourage the formation or intensification of ethnic consciousness, as the states also can. But, since the regions are smaller bodies, they are less likely to contemplate independence or to concur with a move toward independence if the

states should do so. Apart from the reduction of threats to national unity, the

recognition of regionalism may have further political benefits.

First is the reduction of the violence that ensues from regional

movements and their repression. It is hoped that intermediate

governments also will be able to reduce political violence by

allowing the swifter expression and solution of the woes of dis- contented peoples. Such action cannot be guaranteed; it depends in part on which politicians get elected. Resolution of

problems neglected by central and state authorities and that

originally motivated the movements is also possible. Moreover,

such resolution may result in greater participation in democratic government by those voting or holding office in organizations closer to local concerns and groups than is the national

Parliament or even the state legislatures. In this way, there is a continuation of the political mobilization started in the course

of the movements.

If substate regions proliferate, including regional entities

within regional entities, the process will resemble traditional

Indian polities with imperial powers, feudatory monarchies,

subinfeudation within those, and real political power at the

local level. Arguably, this situation would accommodate the

true nature of the society better than the quite centralized sys- tem India has had since independence and provide scope for

real democracy.

* * *

229
India: A Country Study

Michael Shapiro and Harold Schiffmann's Language and Society in South Asia is the best summation of research on the languages of the region and their place in social life. Among

somewhat older works, Language and Civilization Change in

South Asia, edited by Clarence Maloney, remains useful, and in

particular the introduction by the editor gives a good general

overview. An excellent summary of the history and current

state of research on the linguistics, sociolinguistics, and history

of Indo-Aryan languages is found in Colin P. Masica's The IndoAryan Languages.

Language statistics, as well as lists of languages, are found in

the decennial Indian census. Useful statistics gathered on dif- ferent principles, counting communities (Scheduled Castes,

Scheduled Tribes, and other categories) rather than individuals, gathered by the Anthropological Survey of India are found

in the volumes edited by Kumar Suresh Singh, in the series People of India. Particularly useful on tribes are K.S. Singh's An

Anthropological Atlas, which includes maps covering culture, language, physical anthropology, and other useful categories; his

The Scheduled Tribes is a thorough encyclopedia of all the tribes.

On the construction of linguistic and other identities, Paul

R. Brass's Language, Religion and Politics in North India remains

basic to an understanding of the subject. Themes in it are updated in his The Politics ofIndia since Independence.

All of Christoph von Ftirer-Haimendorf's works on India's

tribal people are useful. His Tribal Populations and Cultures of the Indian Subcontinent provides a contemporary view of some of

the country's larger tribes. Moonis Raza and Aijazuddin

Ahmad's An Atlas of Tribal India is also useful.

Bernard S. Cohn's India: The Social Anthropology of a Civilization and David G. Mandelbaum's two-volume Society in India

remain essential background works. (For further information

and complete citations, see Bibliography.)

230
Chapter 5. Social Systems
Wedding scenefrom a drawing, Madhubani, Bihar
INDIA IS JUSTLY FAMOUS for its complex social systems.

Indian society is multifaceted to an extent perhaps unknown in

any other of the world's great civilizations. Virtually no generalization made about Indian society is valid for all of the nation's

multifarious groups. Comprehending the complexities of

Indian social structure has challenged scholars and other

observers over many decades.

The ethnic and linguistic diversity of Indian civilization is more like the diversity of an area as variable as Europe than

like that of any other single nation-state. Living within the

embrace of the Indian nation are vast numbers of different

regional, social, and economic groups, each with different cultural practices. Particularly noteworthy are differences between

social structures in the north and the south, especially in the

realm of kinship systems. Throughout the country, religious

differences can be significant, especially between the Hindu

majority and the large Muslim minority; and other Indian

groups—Buddhists, Christians, Jains, Jews, Parsis, Sikhs, and

practitioners of tribal religions—all pride themselves on being

unlike members of other faiths. Access to wealth and power varies considerably, and vast dif- ferences in socioeconomic status are evident everywhere. The

poor and the wealthy live side by side in urban and rural areas.

It is common in city life to see a prosperous, well-fed man or woman chauffeured in a fine car pass gaunt street dwellers

huddled beneath burlap shelters along the roadway. In many

villages, solid cement houses of landowners rise not far from

the flimsy thatched shacks of landless laborers. Even when not

so obvious, distinctions of class are found in almost every settle- ment in India.

Urban-rural differences can be immense. Nearly 74 percent

of India's population dwells in villages, with agriculture providing support for most of these rural residents. In villages, mudplastered walls ornamented with traditional designs, dusty

lanes, herds of grazing cattle, and the songs of birds at sunset

provide typical settings for the social lives of most Indians. In

India's great cities, however, millions of people live amidst

cacophony—roaring vehicles, surging crowds, jammed apartment buildings, busy commercial establishments, loudspeakers

233
India: A Country Study

blaring movie tunes—while breathing the poisons of industrial

and automotive pollution.

Gender distinctions are pronounced. The behavior

expected of men and women can be quite different, especially

in villages, but also in urban centers. Prescribed ideal gender

roles help shape the actions of both sexes as they move

between family and the world outside the home.

Crosscutting and pervading all of these differences of

region, language, wealth, status, religion, urbanity, and gender

is the special feature of Indian society that has received most

attention from observers: caste. The people of India belong to thousands of castes and castelike groups—hierarchically

ordered, named groups into which members are born. Caste

members are expected to marry within the group and follow

caste rules pertaining to diet, avoidance of ritual pollution, and

many other aspects of life. Given the vast diversity of Indian society, any observation

must be tempered with the understanding that it cannot apply

to all Indians. Still, certain themes or underlying principles of

life are widely accepted in India.

Themes in Indian Society

Hierarchy

India is a hierarchical society. Within Indian culture,

whether in the north or the south, Hindu or Muslim, urban or

village, virtually all things, people, and groups of people are ranked according to various essential qualities. If one is attuned to the theme of hierarchy in India, one can discern it everywhere. Although India is a political democracy, in daily

life there is little advocacy of or adherence to notions of equality.Castes and castelike groups—those quintessential groups

with which almost all Indians are associated—are ranked.

Within most villages or towns, everyone knows the relative

rankings of each locally represented caste, and people's behavior toward one another is constantly shaped by this knowledge.

Between the extremes of the very high and very low castes,

however, there is sometimes disagreement on the exact relative

ranking of castes clustered in the middle.

Castes are primarily associated with Hinduism but also exist

among other Indian religious groups. Muslims sometimes

expressly deny that they have castes—they state that all Muslims

234
Social Systems

are brothers under God—but observation of Muslim life in var- ious parts of India r eveals the existence of castelike groups and

clear concern with social hierarchy. Among Indian Christians,

too, differences in caste are acknowledged and maintained.

Throughout India, individuals are also ranked according to their wealth and power. For example, there are "big men" (bare

admi, in Hindi) and "little men" (chhote admi) everywhere. "Big

men" sit confidently on chairs, while "little men" come before

them to make requests, either standing or crouching down on

their haunches, certainly not presuming to sit beside a man of

high status as an equal. Even men of nearly equal status who

might share a string cot to sit on take their places carefully

the higher-ranking man at the head of the cot, the lower-ranking man at the foot.

Within families and kinship groupings, there are many dis- tinctions of hierarchy. Men outrank women of the same or similar age, and senior relatives outrank junior relatives. Several

other kinship relations involve formal respect. For example, in

northern India, a daughter-in-law of a household shows defer- ence to a daughter of a household. Even among young siblings

in a household, there is constant acknowledgment of age dif- ferences: younger siblings never address an older sibling by

name, but rather by respectful terms for elder brother or elder

sister. However, an older sibling may address the younger by

name (see Linguistic Relations, ch. 4).

Even in a business or academic setting, where colleagues

may not openly espouse traditional observance of caste or class ranking behavior, they may set up Active kinship relations,

addressing one another by kinship terms reflecting family or

village-style hierarchy. For example, a younger colleague might

respectfully address an older colleague as chachaji (respected

father's younger brother), gracefully acknowledging the superior position of the older colleague.

Purity and Pollution

Many status differences in Indian society are expressed in

terms of ritual purity and pollution. Notions of purity and pollution are extremely complex and vary greatly among different

castes, religious groups, and regions. However, broadly speaking, high status is associated with purity and low status with pollution. Some kinds of purity are inherent, or inborn; for

example, gold is purer than copper by its very nature, and, similarly, a member of a high-ranking Brahman (see Glossary), or

235
India: A Country Study

priestly caste is born with more inherent puritv than a member

of a low-ranking- Sweeper (Mehtar. in Hindi * caste. Unless the

Brahman defiles himself in some extraordinary way throughout his life he will always be purer than a Sweeper. Other kinds

of puritv are more transitory—a Brahman who has just taken a bath is more ritually pure than a Brahman who has not bathed

for a dav. This situation could easily reverse itself temporarily,

depending: on bath schedules, participation in polluting activities, or contact with temporarily polluting; substances.

Puritv is associated with ritual cleanliness—daily bathing in

flowing water, dressing in properly laundered clothes of

approved materials, eating onlv the foods appropriate for one's

caste, refraining from physical contact with people of lower

rank, and avoiding; involvement with rituallv impure substances. The latter include body wastes and excretions, most

especially those of another adult person. Contact with the

products of death or violence are typically polluting and threatening to ritual puritv

During: her menstrual period, a woman is considered polluted and refrains from cooking, worshiping, or touching anyone older than an infant. In much of the south, a woman

spends this time sitting outside." resting in an isolated room or shed. During her period, a Muslim woman does not touch the

Quran. At the end of the period, purity is restored with a complete bath. Pollution also attaches to birth, both for the mother

and the infant's close kin. and to death, for close relatives of

the deceased <see The Ceremonies of Hinduism: Islam, ch. 3).

Members of the highest priestly castes, the Brahmans. are

srenerallv vegetarians i although some Bengali and Maharashtrian Brahmans eat fish I and avoid eating meat, the product of

violence and death. High-ranking Warrior castes (fohatriyas),

however, typically consume nonvegetarian diets, considered

appropriate for their traditions of valor and physical strength.

A Brahman born of proper Brahman parents retains his

inherent puritv if he bathes and dresses himself properly,

adheres to a vegetarian diet, eats meals prepared onlv by per- sons of appropriate rank, and keeps his person awav from the

bodih" exuviae of others (except for necessary contact with the

secretions of family infants and small children).

If a Brahman happens to come into bodily contact with a polluting substance, he can remove this pollution bv bathing

and changing his clothing. However, if he were to eat meat or commit other transgressions of the rigid dietary codes of his
Social Systems

particular caste, he would be considered more deeply polluted

and would have to undergo various purifying rites and payment

of fines imposed by his caste council in order to restore his

inherent purity.

In sharp contrast to the purity of a Brahman, a Sweeper born

of Sweeper parents is considered to be born inherently polluted. The touch of his body is polluting to those higher on the

caste hierarchy than he, and they will shrink from his touch,

whether or not he has bathed recently Sweepers are associated

with the traditional occupation of cleaning human feces from

latrines and sweeping public lanes of all kinds of dirt. Traditionally, Sweepers remove these polluting materials in baskets

carried atop the head and dumped out in a garbage pile at the

edge of the village or neighborhood. The involvement of

Sweepers with such filth accords with their low-status position

at the bottom of the Hindu caste hierarchy, even as their ser- vices allow high-status people, such as Brahmans, to maintain

their ritual purity.

Members of the Leatherworker (Chamar) caste are ascribed

a very low status consonant with their association with the caste occupation of skinning dead animals and tanning the leather.

Butchers (Khatiks, in Hindi), who kill and cut up the bodies of

animals, also rank low on the caste hierarchy because of their

association with violence and death.

However, castes associated with ruling and warfare—and the

killing and deaths of human beings—are typically accorded

high rank on the caste hierarchy. In these instances, political

power and wealth outrank association with violence as the key

determinant of caste rank.

Maintenance of purity is associated with the intake of food

and drink, not only in terms of the nature of the food itself, but

also in terms of who has prepared it or touched it. This requirement is especially true for Hindus, but other religious groups

hold to these principles to varying degrees. Generally, a person

risks pollution—and lowering his own status—if he accepts beverages or cooked foods from the hands of people of lower caste

status than his own. His status will remain intact if he accepts

food or beverages from people of higher caste rank. Usually,

for an observant Hindu of any but the very lowest castes to accept cooked food from a Muslim or Christian is regarded as highly polluting.

In a clear example of pollution associated with dining, a Brahman who consumed a drink of water and a meal of wheat

237
India: A Country Study

bread with boiled vegetables from the hands of a Sweeper

would immediately become polluted and could expect social

rejection by his caste fellows. From that moment, fellow Brahmans following traditional pollution rules would refuse food

touched by him and would abstain from the usual social interaction with him. He would not be welcome inside Brahman

homes—most especially in the ritually pure kitchens—nor would he or his close relatives be considered eligible marriage

partners for other Brahmans.

Generally, the acceptance of water and ordinary foods

cooked in water from members of lower-ranking castes incurs

the greatest pollution. In North India, such foods are known as kaccha khana, as contrasted with fine foods cooked in butter or

oils, which are known as pakka khana. Fine foods can be

accepted from members of a few castes slightly lower than one's own. Local hierarchies differ on the specific details of these

rules.

Completely raw foods, such as uncooked grains, fresh

unpeeled bananas, mangoes, and uncooked vegetables can be

accepted by anyone from anyone else, regardless of relative status. Toasted or parched foods, such as roasted peanuts, can also

be accepted from anyone without ritual or social repercussions.

(Thus, a Brahman may accept gifts of grain from lower-caste

patrons for eventual preparation by members of his own caste, or he may purchase and consume roasted peanuts or tangerines from street vendors of unknown caste without worry.)

Water served from an earthen pot may be accepted only

from the hands of someone of higher or equal caste ranking,

but water served from a brass pot may be accepted even from

someone slightly lower on the caste scale. Exceptions to this

rule are members of the Waterbearer (Bhoi, in Hindi) caste,

who are employed to carry water from wells to the homes of

the prosperous and from whose hands members of all castes may drink water without becoming polluted, even though

Waterbearers are not ranked high on the caste scale. These and a great many other traditional rules pertaining to purity and pollution constantly impinge upon interaction

between people of different castes and ranks in India.

Although to the non-Indian these rules may seem irrational

and bizarre, to most of the people of India they are a ubiquitous and accepted part of life. Thinking about and following

purity and pollution rules make it necessary for people to be

constantly aware of differences in status. With every drink of

238
Woman operating a hand pump

Courtesy DoranneJacobson

water, with every meal, and with every contact with another

person, people must ratify the social hierarchy of which they

are a part and within which their every act is carried out. The

fact that expressions of social status are intricately bound up

with events that happen to everyone every day—eating, drinking, bathing, touching, talking—and that transgressions of

these rules, whether deliberate or accidental, are seen as having immediately polluting effects on the person of the transgressor, means that every ordinary act of human life serves as a constant reminder of the importance of hierarchy in Indian

society.

There are many Indians, particularly among the educated

urban elite, who do not follow traditional purity and pollution

practices. Dining in each others' homes and in restaurants is common among well-educated people of diverse backgrounds,

particularly when they belong to the same economic class. For

these people, guarding the family's earthen water pot from

inadvertent touch by a low-ranking servant is not the concern it

is for a more traditional villager. However, even among those

people whose words and actions denigrate traditional purity

rules, there is often a reluctance to completely abolish consciousness of purity and pollution from their thinking. It is surely rare for a Sweeper, however well-educated, to invite a

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India: A Country Study

Brahman to dinner in his home and have his invitation unselfconsciously accepted. It is less rare, however, for educated

urban colleagues of vastly different caste and religious heritage

to enjoy a cup of tea together. Some high-caste liberals pride

themselves on being free of "casteism" and seek to accept food

from the hands of very low-caste people, or even deliberately

set out to marry someone from a significantly lower caste or a

different religion. Thus, even as they deny it, these progressives

affirm the continuing significance of traditional rules of purity,

pollution, and hierarchy in Indian society.

Social Interdependence

One of the great themes pervading Indian life is social interdependence. People are born into groups—families, clans, subcastes, castes, and religious communities—and live with a constant sense of being part of and inseparable from these

groups. A corollary is the notion that everything a person does

properly involves interaction with other people. A person's

greatest dread, perhaps, is the possibility of being left alone,

without social support, to face the necessary challenges of life. This sense of interdependence is extended into the theological

realm: the very shape of a person's life is seen as being greatly

influenced by divine beings with whom an ongoing relationship must be maintained.

Social interaction is regarded as being of the highest priority, and social bonds are expected to be long lasting. Even eco- nomic activities that might in Western culture involve

impersonal interactions are in India deeply imbedded in a

social nexus. All social interaction involves constant attention

to hierarchy, respect, honor, the feelings of others, rights and

obligations, hospitality, and gifts of food, clothing, and other

desirable items. Finely tuned rules of etiquette help facilitate

each individual's many social relationships. - Western visitors to India are sometimes startled to find that

important government and business officials have left their

posts—often for many days at a time—-to attend a cousin's wedding or participate in religious activities in a distant part of the

country. "He is out of station and will be back in a week or two,"

the absent official's officemates blandly explain to the frustrated visitor. What is going on is not laziness or hedonistic rec- reation, but is the official's proper recognition of his need to continually maintain his social ties with relatives, caste fellows,

other associates, and God. Without being enmeshed in such

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Social Systems

ties throughout life, a person cannot hope to maintain longterm efficacy in either economic or social endeavors. Social

bonds with relatives must be reinforced at family events or at

rites crucial to the religious community. If this is not done, people who could offer vital support in many phases of life would

be alienated.

In every activity, there is an assumption that social ties can

help a person and that their absence can bring failure. Seldom

do people carry out even the simplest task on their own. From

birth onward, a child learns that his "fate" has been "written" by

divine forces and that his life will be shaped by a plan decided

by more powerful beings. When a small child eats, his mother

puts the mouthfuls of food into his mouth with her own hand.

When a boy climbs a tree to pluck mangoes, another stands

below with a basket to receive them. When a girl fetches water

from the well in pots on her head, someone at her home helps

her unload the pots. When a farmer stacks sheaves of grain

onto his bullock cart, he stands atop the cart, catching the

sheaves tossed up to him by his son. A student applying to a college hopes that he has an influential relative or family friend who can put in a good word for

him with the director of admissions. At the age of marriage, a young person expects that parents will take care of finding the

appropriate bride or groom and arranging all the formalities.

At the birth of a child, the new mother is assured that the

child's kin will help her attend to the infant's needs. A businessman seeking to arrange a contract relies not only on his own

abilities but also on the assistance of well-connected friends

and relatives to help finalize the deal. And finally, when facing

death, a person is confident that offspring and other relatives

will carry out the appropriate funeral rites, including a commemorative feast when, through gifts of clothing and food,

continuing social ties are reaffirmed by all in attendance.

Family and Kinship

Family Ideals

In India, people learn the essential themes of cultural life within the bosom of a family. In most of the country, the basic

units of society are the patrilineal family unit and wider kinship

groupings. The most widely desired residential unit is the joint

family, ideally consisting of three or four patrilineally related

generations, all living under one roof, working, eating, wor241
Indi a : A Co u n try Stu dy

shiping, and cooperating together in mutually beneficial social

and economic activities. Patrilineal joint families include men

related through the male line, along with their wives and children. Most voung women expect to live with their husband's

relatives after marriage, but they retain important bonds with

their natal families.

Despite the continuous and growing impact of urbanization,

secularization, and Westernization, the traditional joint household, both in ideal and in practice, remains the primarv social

force in the lives of most Indians. Loyalty to family is a deeply

held ideal for almost evervone. Large families tend to be flexible and w

Tell-suited to modern

Indian life, especiallv for the 67 percent of Indians who are farmers or agricultural workers or w

Tork in related activities (see

Size and Composition of the Workforce, ch. 6) . As in most primarily agricultural societies, few individuals can hope to achieve economic securitv without being part of a cooperating

group of kinsmen. The joint familv is also common in cities, wrhere kinship ties can be crucial to obtaining scarce jobs or financial assistance. Numerous prominent Indian families,

such as the Tatas, Birlas, and Sarabhais, retain joint family

arrangements even as thev wx>rk together to control some of

the countrv's largest financial empires.

The joint familv is an ancient Indian institution, but it has

undergone some change in the late twentieth centurv.

Although several Generations livinp: together is the ideal, actual

living arrangements varv widelv depending on region, social

status, and economic circumstance. Many Indians live in joint

families that deviate in various ways from the ideal, and many

live in nuclear families—a couple with their unmarried children—as is the most common pattern in the West. However,

even where the ideal joint familv is seldom found (as, for example, in certain regions and among impoverished agricultural

laborers and urban squatters), there are often strong networks

of kinship ties through which economic assistance and other

benefits are obtained. Not infrequently, clusters of relatives live very near each other, easilv available to respond to the give and

take of kinship obligations. Even when relatives cannot actuallv

live in close proximity, they tvpicallv maintain strong bonds of

kinship and attempt to provide each other with economic help,

emotional support, and other benefits.

As joint families grow ever larger, they inevitably divide into

smaller units, passing through a predictable cvcle over time.

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Social Systems

The breakup of a joint family into smaller units does not necessarily represent the rejection of the joint family ideal. Rather, it is usually a response to a variety of conditions, including the

need for some members to move from village to city, or from

one city to another to take advantage of employment opportunities. Splitting of the family is often blamed on quarrelling

women—typically, the wives of coresident brothers. Although

women's disputes may, in fact, lead to family division, men's dis- agreements do so as well. Despite cultural ideals of brotherly

harmony, adult brothers frequently quarrel over land and

other matters, leading them to decide to live under separate

roofs and divide their property. Frequently, a large joint family

divides after the demise of elderly parents, when there is no

longer a single authority figure to hold the family factions

together. After division, each new residential unit, in its turn,

usually becomes joint when sons of the family marry and bring

their wives to live in the family home.

Variations in Family Structure

Some family types bear special mention because of their

unique qualities. In the sub-Himalayan region of Uttar

Pradesh, polygyny is commonly practiced. There, among Hindus, a simple polygynous family is composed of a man, his two

wives, and their unmarried children. Various other family types occur there, including the supplemented subpolygynous

household—a woman whose husband lives elsewhere (perhaps

with his other wife), her children, plus other adult relatives.

Polygyny is also practiced in other parts of India by a tiny

minority of the population, especially in families in which the

first wife has not been able to bear children.

Among the Buddhist people of the mountainous Ladakh

District ofJammu and Kashmir, who have cultural ties to Tibet,

fraternal polyandry is practiced, and a household may include

a set of brothers with their common wife or wives. This family

type, in which brothers also share land, is almost certainly

linked to the extreme scarcity of cultivable land in the Himalayan region, because it discourages fragmentation of holdings.

The peoples of the northeastern hill areas are known for

their matriliny, tracing descent and inheritance in the female

line rather than the male line. One of the largest of these

groups, the Khasis—an ethnic or tribal people in the state of

Meghalaya—are divided into matrilineal clans; the youngest

daughter receives almost all of the inheritance including the

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India: A Country Study

house. A Khasi husband goes to live in his wife's house. Khasis,

many of whom have become Christian, have the highest liter- acy rate in India, and Khasi women maintain notable authority

in the family and community.

Perhaps the best known of India's unusual family types is the

traditional Nayar taravad, or great house. The Nayars are a clus- ter of castes in Kerala. High-ranking and prosperous, the

Nayars maintained matrilineal households in which sisters and

brothers and their children were the permanent residents.

After an official prepuberty marriage, each woman received a

series of visiting husbands in her room in the taravad at night.

Her children were all legitimate members of the taravad. Property, matrilineally inherited, was managed by the eldest brother

of the senior woman. This system, the focus of much anthropological interest, has been disintegrating in the twentieth century, and in the 1990s probably fewer than 5 percent of the

Nayars live in matrilineal taravads. Like the Khasis, Nayar

women are known for being well-educated and powerful within

the family.

Malabar rite Christians, an ancient community in Kerala,

adopted many practices of their powerful Nayar neighbors,

including naming their sons for matrilineal forebears. Their

kinship system, however, is patrilineal. Kerala Christians have a very high literacy rate, as do most Indian Christian groups (see

Christianity, ch. 3).

Large Kinship Groups

In most of Hindu India, people belong not only to coresident family groups but to larger aggregates of kin as well. Subsuming the family is the patrilineage (known in northern and

central India as the khandan, kutumb, or kul), a locally based set of males who trace their ancestry to a common progenitor a few generations back, plus their wives and unmarried daughters. Larger than the patrilineage is the clan, commonly known

as the gotra or got, a much larger group of patrilineally related

males and their wives and daughters, who often trace common

ancestry to a mythological figure. In some regions, particularly

among the high-ranking Rajputs of western India, clans are

hierarchically ordered. Some people also claim membership in

larger, more amorphous groupings known as vansh and sakha.

Hindu lineages and clans are strictly exogamous—that is, a person may not marry or have a sexual alliance with a member

of his own lineage or clan; such an arrangement would be con244
Social Systems

sidered incestuous. In North India, rules further prohibit marriage between a person and his mother's lineage members as

well. Among some high-ranking castes of the north, exogamy is also extended to the mother's, father's mother's, and mother's

mother's clans. In contrast, in South India, marriage to a member of the mother's kin group is often encouraged.

Muslims also recognize kinship groupings larger than the

family. These include the khandan, or patrilineage, and the azizdar, or kindred. The azizdar group differs slightly for each individual and includes all relatives linked to a person by blood or marriage. Muslims throughout India encourage marriage

within the lineage and kindred, and marriages between the

children of siblings are common.

Within a village or urban neighborhood, members of a lin- eage recognize their kinship in a variety of ways. Mutual assis- tance in daily work, in emergencies, and in factional struggles

is expected. For Hindus, cooperation in specific annual rituals

helps define the kin group. For example, in many areas, at the

worship of the goddess deemed responsible for the welfare of

the lineage, patrilineally related males and their wives join in

the rites and consume specially consecrated fried breads or other foods. Unmarried daughters of the lineage are only spectators at the rites and do not share in the special foods. Upon

marriage, a woman becomes a member of her husband's lin- eage and then participates regularly in the worship of her husband's lineage goddess. Lineage bonds are also evident at life- cycle observances, when kin join together in celebrating births,

marriages, and religious initiations. Upon the death of a lin- eage member, other lineage members observe ritual death pollution rules for a prescribed number of days and carry out

appropriate funeral rites and feasts. For some castes, especially in the north, careful records of

lineage ties are kept by a professional genealogist, a member of

a caste whose traditional task is maintaining genealogical

tomes. These itinerant bards make their rounds from village to village over the course of a year or more, recording births,

deaths, and glorious accomplishments of the patrilineal

descent group. These genealogical services have been especially crucial among Rajputs, Jats, and similar groups whose lin- eages own land and where power can depend on fine

calculations of pedigree and inheritance rights.

Some important kinship linkages are not traced through

men but through women. These linkages involve those related

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India: A Country Study

to an individual by blood and marriage through a mother, married sisters, or married daughters, and for a man, through his

wife. Anthropologist David Mandelbaum has termed these

"feminal kin." Key relationships are those between a brother

and sister, parents and daughters, and a person and his or her

mother's brother. Through bonds with these close kin, a per- son has links with several households and lineages in many set- tlements. Throughout most of India, there are continuous

visits—some of which may last for months and include the

exchange of gifts at visits, life-cycle rites, and holidays, and

many other key interactions between such relatives. These rela- tionships are often characterized by deep affection and willingly offered support.

These ties cut across the countryside, linking each person

with kin in villages and towns near and far. Almost everywhere

a villager goes—especially in the north, where marriage networks cover wide distances—he can find some kind of relative.

Moral support, a place to stay, economic assistance, and political backing are all available through these kinship networks.

The multitude of kinship ties is further extended through

the device of fictive kinship. Residents of a single village usually use kinship terms for one another, and especially strong ties of

fictive kinship can be ceremonially created with fellow religious

initiates or fellow pilgrims of one's village or neighborhood. In

the villages and cities of the north, on the festival of Raksha

Bandhan (the Tying of the Protective Thread, during which sis- ters tie sacred threads on their brothers' wrists to symbolize the

continuing bond between them), a female may tie a thread on

the wrist of an otherwise unrelated male and "make him her

brother." Fictive kinship bonds cut across caste and class lines

and involve obligations of hospitality, gift-giving, and variable

levels of cooperation and assistance.

Neighbors and friends may also create fictive kinship ties by

informal agreement. Actually, any strong friendship between

otherwise unrelated people is typically imbued with kinshiplike qualities. In such friendships, kinship terms are adopted

for address, and the give and take of kinship may develop. Such

bonds commonly evolve between neighbors in urban apartment buildings, between special friends at school, and between

close associates at work. The use of kinship terms enhances

affection in the relationship. In Gujarat, personal names usually include the word for "sister" and "brother," so that the use

246
Social Systems

of someone's personal name automatically sounds affectionate

and caring.

Family Authority and Harmony

In the Indian household, lines of hierarchy and authority

are clearly drawn, shaping structurally and psychologically

complex family relationships. Ideals of conduct are aimed at creating and maintaining family harmony.

All family members are socialized to accept the authority of

those ranked above them in the hierarchy. In general, elders

rank above juniors, and among people of similar age, males

outrank females. Daughters of a family command the formal

respect of their brothers' wives, and the mother of a household

is in charge of her daughters-in-law. Among adults in a joint

family, a newly arrived daughter-in-law has the least authority.

Males learn to command others within the household but

expect to accept the direction of senior males. Ideally, even a mature adult man living in his father's household acknowledges his father's authority on both minor and major matters. Women are especially strongly socialized to accept a position

subservient to males, to control their sexual impulses, and to subordinate their personal preferences to the needs of the family and kin group. Reciprocally, those in authority accept

responsibility for meeting the needs of others in the family

group.

There is tremendous emphasis on the unity of the family

grouping, especially as differentiated from persons outside the

kinship circle. Internally, efforts are made to deemphasize ties between spouses and between parents and their own children

in order to enhance a wider sense of harmony within the entire

household. Husbands and wives are discouraged from openly

displaying affection for one another, and in strictly traditional

households, they may not even properly speak to one another

in the presence of anyone else, even their own children. Young

parents are inhibited by "shame" from ostentatiously dandling

their own young children but are encouraged to play with the

children of siblings.

Psychologically, family members feel an intense emotional

interdependence with each other and the family as an almost

organic unit. Ego boundaries are permeable to others in the

family, and any notion of a separate self is often dominated by a sense of what psychoanalyst Alan Roland has termed a more

inclusive "familial self." Interpersonal empathy, closeness, loy247
India: A Country Study

alty, and interdependency are all crucial to life within the family.Family resources, particularly land or businesses, have traditionally been controlled by family males, especially in high-sta- tus groups. Customarily, according to traditional schools of

Hindu law, women did not inherit land or buildings and were

thus beholden to their male kin who controlled these vital resources. Under Muslim customary law, women are entitled to inherit real estate and often do so, but their shares have typically been smaller than those of similarly situated males. Under

modern law, all Indian women can inherit land.

Veiling and the Seclusion of Women

A particularly interesting aspect of Indian family life is purdah (from the Hindi parda, literally, curtain), or the veiling and

seclusion of women. In much of northern and central India,

particularly in rural areas, Hindu and Muslim women follow

complex rules of veiling the body and avoidance of public

appearance, especially in the presence of relatives linked by

marriage and before strange men. Purdah practices are inextricably linked to patterns of authority and harmony within the

family. Rules of Hindu and Muslim purdah differ in certain key

ways, but female modesty and decorum as well as concepts of

family honor are essential to the various forms of purdah. In

most areas, purdah restrictions are stronger for women of highstatus families.

The importance of purdah is not limited to family life; rather, these practices all involve restrictions on female activity

and access to power and the control of vital resources in a male-dominated society. Restriction and restraint for women in

virtually every aspect of life are the basic essentials of purdah.

In India, both males and females are circumscribed in their

actions by economic disabilities, hierarchical rules of defer- ence in kinship groups, castes, and the larger society. But for

women who observe purdah, there are additional constraints.

For almost all women, modest dress and behavior are important. Clothing covering most of the body is common; only in

tribal groups and among a few castes do women publicly bare

their legs or upper bodies. In most of the northern half of

India, traditionally dressed women cover the tops of their

heads with the end of the sari or scarf (dupatta). Generally,

females are expected to associate only with kin or companions

approved by their families and to remain sexually chaste.

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Social Systems

Women are not encouraged to roam about on pleasure junkets, but rather travel only for explicit family-sanctioned purposes. In North India, women do relatively little shopping;

most shopping is done by men. In contrast to females, males

have much more freedom of movement and observe much less body modesty.

For both males and females, free association with the opposite sex is limited, and dating in the Western sense is essentially

limited to members of the educated urban elite. In all areas,

illicit liaisons do occur. Although the male may escape social

repudiation if such liaisons become known, the female may suf- fer lasting damage to her own reputation and bring dishonor

to her family. Further, if a woman is sexually linked with a man

of lower caste status, the woman is regarded as being irremediably polluted, "like an earthen pot." A male so sullied can be

cleansed of his temporary pollution, "like a brass pot," with a

ritual bath.

Such rules of feminine modesty are not considered purdah

but merely proper female behavior. For traditional Hindus of

northern and central India, purdah observances begin at marriage, when a woman acquires a husband and in-laws. Although

she almost never observes purdah in her natal home or before

her natal relatives, a woman does observe purdah in her husband's home and before his relatives. As a young woman, she

remains inside her husband's house much of the time (rather

than going out into lanes or fields), absents herself or covers her face with her sari in the presence of senior males and

females related by marriage, and, when she does leave the

house in her marital village, covers her face with Jrer sari. Through use of the end of the sari as a face veil and defer- ence of manner, a married woman shows respect to her affinal

kin who are older than or equal to her husband in age, as well

as certain other relatives. She may speak to the women before

whom she veils, but she usually does not converse with the

men. Exceptions to this are her husband's younger brothers,

before whom she may veil her face, but with whom she has a warm joking relationship involving verbal banter.

Initially almost faceless and voiceless in her marital home, a married woman matures and gradually relaxes some of these

practices, especially as elder in-laws become senescent or die

and she herself assumes senior status. In fact, after some years, a wife may neglect to veil her face in front of her husband

249
India: A Country Study

when others are present and may even speak to her husband in

public.

Such practices help shield women from unwanted male

advances and control women's sexuality but also express relations within and between groups of kin. Familial prestige,

household harmony, social distance, affinal respect, property

ownership, and local political power are all linked to purdah.

Restricting women to household endeavors rather than

involving them in tasks in fields and markets is associated with

prestige and high rank in northern India. There the wealthiest

families employ servants to carry water from the well and to work in the fields alongside family males. Mature women of

these families may make rare appearances in the fields to bring

lunch to the family males working there and sometimes to supervise laborers. Thus elitism is expressed in women's exclusive domesticity, with men providing economic necessities for

the family.

Only women of poor and low-ranking groups engage in

heavy manual labor outside the home, especially for pay. Such

women work long hours in the fields, on construction gangs,

and at many other tasks, often veiling their faces as they work.

For Muslim women, purdah practices involve less emphasis

on veiling from in-laws and more emphasis on protecting

women from contact with strangers outside the sphere of kinship. Because Muslims often marry cousins, a woman's in-laws

may also be her natal relatives, so veiling her face within the

marital home is often inappropriate. Unlike Hindus, Muslim

women do not veil from other women as do Hindus. Traditional Muslim women and even unmarried girls, however, often

refrain from appearing in public, or if they do go out, they wear an all-covering garment known as a burka, with a full face

covering. A burka protects a woman—and her family—from

undue familiarity with unknown outsiders, thus emphasizing

the unity of the family vis-a-vis the outside world. Because Muslim women are entitled to a share in the family real estate, controlling their relationships with males outside the family can be

crucial to the maintenance of family property and prestige. In rural communities and in older sections of cities, purdah

observances remain vital, although they are gradually diminishing in intensity. Among the educated urban and rural elite,

purdah practices are rapidly vanishing and for many have all but disappeared. Chastity and female modesty are still highly

valued, but, for the elite, face-veiling and the burka are consid250
Rajasthani village women and children participate in a

wedding ritual. Courtesy Janice Hyde

ered unsophisticated. As girls and women become more widely

and more highly educated, female employment outside the

home is commonplace, even for women of elite families.

Life Passages

In India, the ideal stages of life have been most clearly articulated by Hindus. The ancient Hindu ideal rests on childhood,

followed by four stages: undergoing religious initiation and

becoming a celibate student of religious texts, getting married

and becoming a householder, leaving home to become a forest

hermit after becoming a grandparent, and becoming a homeless wanderer free of desire for all material things. Although

few actually follow this scheme, it serves as a guide for those

attempting to live according to valued standards. For Hindus,

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India: A Country Study

dharma (a divinely ordained code of proper conduct), karma

(the sum of one's deeds in this life and in past lives), and kismat

(fate) are considered relevant to the course of life (see The

Roots of Indian Religion, ch. 3). Crucial transitions from one

phase of life to another are marked by sometimes elaborate

rites of passage.

Children and Childhood

Throughout much of India, a baby's birth is celebrated with

rites of welcome and blessing—songs, drums, happy distribution of sweets, auspicious unguents, gifts for infant and mother,

preparation of horoscopes, and inscriptions in the genealogist's record books. In general, children are deeply desired and

welcomed, their presence regarded as a blessing on the household. Babies are often treated like small deities, pampered and

coddled, adorned with makeup and trinkets, and carried about

and fed with the finest foods available to the family. Young girls are worshiped as personifications of Hindu goddesses, and lit- tle boys are adulated as scions of the clan.

In their children, parents see the future of the lineage and

wider kin group, helpers in daily tasks, and providers of security in the parents' old age. These delightful ideals are articulated and enacted over and over again; yet, a coexisting harsher

reality emerges from a close examination of events and statistics. Many children lead lives of striking hardship, and many

die premature deaths. In general, conditions are significantly worse for girls than for boys.

Birth celebrations for baby daughters are more muted than

for sons and are sometimes absent altogether. Although India was once led by a woman prime minister, Indira Gandhi, and

Indian women currently hold a wide range of powerful positions in every walk of life, there is a strong cultural bias toward

males. Girls are frequently victims of underfeeding, medical

neglect, sex-selective abortion, and outright infanticide.

According to the 1991 census final population totals, there were 927 females per 1,000 males in India—a figure that has

gradually declined from 972 females per 1,000 males in 1901

and from 934 just since 1981. Much of this imbalance is attained through neglecting the nutritional and health needs

of female children, and much is also the result of inadequate

health care for women of childbearing years. The sex ratio is even more imbalanced in urban areas (894 per 1,000 in 1991)

than in rural areas (938 per 1,000 in 1991), partially because a

252
Social Systems

large number of village men go to work in cities, leaving their

wives and children behind in their rural homes (see Structure

and Dynamics, ch. 2).

That girls are victims of fatal neglect and murder has been

thoroughly discussed in the Indian press and in scholarly investigations. It has been noted that infant girls are killed with

potions of opium in Rajasthan and pastes of poisonous oleander in Tamil Nadu—most especially girls preceded by the birth

of several sisters. Clinics offering ultrasound and amniocentesis

in order to detect and abort female fetuses have become popular in various parts of the country, and many thousands of

female fetuses have been so destroyed. In Maharashtra, Rajasthan, and Punjab such selective abortions have been outlawed

•because of pressure from feminist groups. More usually, girls are simply fed and cared for less well than their brothers.

The sex ratio is particularly unfavorable to females in the

central northern section of the country. For example, in Uttar

Pradesh there are only eighty-eight females per 100 males; in

Haryana, eighty-seven per 100; and in Rajasthan ninety-one per

100. By contrast, in Kerala, on the southwest coast, a region tra- ditionally noted for matriliny, the sex ratio is reversed, with

females outnumbering males 104 to 100. In Andhra Pradesh

and Tamil Nadu, two large southern states, there are ninety- seven females per 100 males.

Parents favor boys for various reasons. In the north, a boy's

value in agricultural endeavors is higher than a girl's, and after

marriage a boy continues to live with his parents, ideally supporting them in their old age. Political scientist Philip Oldenburg notes that in some violence-prone regions of the north,

having sons may enhance families' capacity to defend themselves and to exercise power. A girl, however, moves away to live with her husband's relatives, and with her goes a dowry. In the

late twentieth century, the values of dowries have been increasing, and, furthermore, groups that never gave dowries in the

past are being pressured to do so. Thus, a girl child can represent a significant economic liability to her parents. In ricegrowing areas, especially in the south, girls receive better treat- ment, and there is some evidence that the better treatment is related to the value of women as field workers in wet-rice culti- vation. Throughout most of India, for Hindus it is important to have a son conduct funeral rites for his parents; a daughter, as a member of her husband's lineage, has not traditionally been

able to do so.

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India: A Country Study

For both boys and girls, infant mortality rates tend to be

high, and in the absence of confidence that their infants will

live, parents tend to produce numerous offspring in the hope

that at least two sons will survive to adulthood. Family planning measures are used to a modest degree in India; perhaps 37.5

percent of couples use contraceptives at least occasionally (see

Population and Family Planning Policy, ch. 2). Abortion is legal, condoms are advertised on colorful billboards, and government health services offer small bounties for patients

undergoing vasectomies and tubal ligations. In some regions,

most notably Kerala, better health care and higher infant survival rates are associated with lowered fertility rates (see Health

Conditions, ch. 2).

Most children survive infancy and do not fall victim to the

cultural and economic pressures alluded to above. The majoritv of children grow up as valued members of a family, trea- sured by their parents and encouraged to participate in

appropriate activities. Although relative ages of children are

alwavs known and reflected in linguistic and deference behavior, there is little asre-STadine: in dailv life. Children of all asres associate with each other and with adults, unlike the situation

in the West, where age-grading is common.

Studies of Indian psychology by Sudhir Kakar, Alan Roland,

and others stress that the young Indian child grows up in inti- mate emotional contact with the mother and other mothering

persons. Because conjugal marital relationships are deemphasized in the joint household, a woman looks to her children to

satisfy some of her intimacy needs. Her bond to her children,

especially her sons but also her daughters, becomes enor- mously strong and lasting:. A child is suckled on demand, sometimes for years, sleeps with a parent or grandparent, is bathed

by doting relatives, and is rarely left alone. Massaged with oil,

carried about, gently toilet-trained, and gratified with treats,

the young child develops an inner core of well-being and a profound sense of expectation of protection from others. Such

indulgent and close relationships produce a symbiotic mode of

relating to others and effect the development of a person with

a deeply held sense of involvement with relatives, so vital to the

Indian family situation.

The young child learns early about hierarchy within the family, as he watches affectionate and respectful relationships

between seniors and juniors, males and females. A young child

is often carried about bv an older sibling, and strong and close

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Social Systems

sibling bonds usually develop. Bickering among siblings is not

as common as it is in the West; rather, most siblings learn to think of themselves as part of a family unit that must work

together as it meets the challenges of the outside world.

Young children are encouraged to participate in the numerous rituals that emphasize family ties. The power of sibling rela- tionships is recognized, for example, when a brother touches

his sister's feet, honoring in her the principle of feminine divinity, which, if treated appropriately, can bring him prosperity. In

calendrical and life-cycle rituals in both the north and the

south, sisters bless their brothers and also symbolically request

their protection throughout life. After about four or five years of indulgence, children typically experience greater demands from family members. In vil- lages, children learn the rudiments of agricultural labor, and

young children often help with weeding, harvesting, threshing,

and the like. Girls learn domestic chores, and boys are encour- aged to take cattle for grazing, learn plowing, and begin to drive bullock carts and ride bicycles. City children also learn

household duties, and children of poor families often work as servants in the homes of the prosperous. Some even pick

through garbage piles to find shreds of food and fuel. In some areas, children work as exploited laborers in factories, where they weave carpets for the export market and make

matches, glass bangles, and other products. At Sivakasi, in

Tamil Nadu, some 45,000 children work in the match, fire- works, and printing industries, comprising perhaps the largest

single concentration of child labor in the world. Children

reportedly as young as four years old work long hours each day.

Education in a school setting is available for most of India's

children, and many young people attend school (see Primary

and Secondary Education, ch. 2). Officials state that education

is "compulsory," but the reality is that a significant percentage

of children—especially girls—fail to become literate and

instead carry out many other tasks in order to contribute to family income. More than half of India's children between the

ages of six and fourteen—82.2 million—are not in school.

Instead they participate in the labor force, even as more privileged children study at government and private schools and

prepare for more prestigious jobs. Thus children learn early

the realities of socioeconomic and urban-rural differentiation

and grow up to perpetuate India's hierarchical society.

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India: A Country Study

For many children, especially boys, an important event of

young adolescence is religious initiation. Initiation rituals vary

among different regions, religious communities, and castes

(see Life-Cycle Rituals, ch. 3). In the north, girls reach puberty

without public notice and in an atmosphere of shyness,

whereas in much of the south, puberty celebrations joyously

announce to the family and community that a young girl has

grown to maturity

Marriage

In India there is no greater event in a family than a wedding,

dramatically evoking every possible social obligation, kinship

bond, traditional value, impassioned sentiment, and economic

resource. In the arranging and conducting of weddings, the

complex permutations of Indian social systems best display

themselves.

Marriage is deemed essential for virtually everyone in India.

For the individual, marriage is the great watershed in life,

marking the transition to adulthood. Generally, this transition,

like everything else in India, depends little upon individual

volition but instead occurs as a result of the efforts of many

people. Even as one is born into a particular family without the

exercise of any personal choice, so is one given a spouse without any personal preference involved. Arranging a marriage is a critical responsibility for parents and other relatives of both

bride and groom. Marriage alliances entail some redistribution

of wealth as well as building and restructuring social realignments, and, of course, result in the biological reproduction of

families.

Some parents begin marriage arrangements on the birth of

a child, but most wait until later. In the past, the age of marriage was quite young, and in a few small groups, especially in

Rajasthan, children under the age of five are still united in marriage. In rural communities, prepuberty marriage for girls tra- ditionally was the rule. In the late twentieth century, the age of

marriage is rising in villages, almost to the levels that obtain in

cities. Legislation mandating minimum marriage ages has been

passed in various forms over the past decades, but such laws

have little effect on actual marriage practices.

Essentially, India is divided into two large regions with

regard to Hindu kinship and marriage practices, the north and

the south. Additionally, various ethnic and tribal groups of the

central, mountainous north, and eastern regions follow a vari256
Social Systems

ety of other practices. These variations have been extensively

described and analyzed by anthropologists, especially Irawati

Karve, David G. Mandelbaum, and Clarence Maloney.

Broadly, in the Indo-Aryan-speaking north, a family seeks

marriage alliances with people to whom it is not already linked

by ties of blood. Marriage arrangements often involve looking

far afield. In the Dravidian-speaking south, a family seeks to strengthen existing kin ties through marriage, preferably with

blood relatives. Kinship terminology reflects this basic pattern.

In the north, every kinship term clearly indicates whether the

person referred to is a blood relation or an affinal relation; all blood relatives are forbidden as marriage mates to a person or

a person's children. In the south, there is no clear-cut distinction between the family of birth and the family of marriage.

Because marriage in the south commonly involves a continuing

exchange of daughters among a few families, for the married

couple all relatives are ultimately blood kin. Dravidian terminology stresses the principle of relative age: all relatives are arranged according to whether they are older or younger than

each other without reference to generation.

On the Indo-Gangetic Plain, marriages are contracted outside the village, sometimes even outside of large groups of vil- lages, with members of the same caste beyond any traceable

consanguineal ties. In much of the area, daughters should not

be given into villages where daughters of the family or even of

the natal village have previously been given. In most of the

region, brother-sister exchange marriages (marriages linking a brother and sister of one household with the sister and brother

of another) are shunned. The entire emphasis is on casting the

marriage net ever-wider, creating new alliances. The residents

of a single village may have in-laws in hundreds of other vil- lages.

In most of North India, the Hindu bride goes to live with

strangers in a home she has never visited. There she is sequestered and veiled, an outsider who must learn to conform to new ways. Her natal family is often geographically distant, and

her ties with her consanguineal kin undergo attenuation to varying degrees.

In central India, the basic North Indian pattern prevails,

with some modifications. For example, in Madhya Pradesh, vil- lage exogamy is preferred, but marriages within a village are not uncommon. Marriages between caste-fellows in neighboring villages are frequent. Brother-sister exchange marriages are

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India: A Country Study

sometimes arranged, and daughters are often given in marriage to lineages where other daughters of their lineage or vil- lage have previously been wed.

In South India, in sharp contrast, marriages are preferred

between cousins (especially cross-cousins, that is, the children

of a brother and sister) and even between uncles and nieces

(especially a man and his elder sister's daughter). The principle involved is that of return—the family that gives a daughter

expects one in return, if not now, then in the next generation.

The effect of such marriages is to bind people together in relatively small, tight-knit kin groups. A bride moves to her in-laws'

home—the home of her grandmother or aunt—and is often

comfortable among these familiar faces. Her husband may well

be the cousin she has known all her life that she would marry.

Many South Indian marriages are contracted outside of such

close kin groups when no suitable mates exist among close relatives, or when other options appear more advantageous. Some

sophisticated South Indians, for example, consider cousin marriage and uncle-niece marriage outmoded.

Rules for the remarriage of widows differ from one group to another. Generally, lower-ranking groups allow widow remarriage, particularly if the woman is relatively young, but the

highest-ranking castes discourage or forbid such remarriage.

The most strict adherents to the nonremarriage of widows are Brahmans. Almost all groups allow widowers to remarry. Many

groups encourage a widower to marry his deceased wife's

younger sister (but never her older sister).

Among Muslims of both the north and the south, marriage

between cousins is encouraged, both cross-cousins (the children of a brother and sister) and parallel cousins (the children

of two same-sex siblings). In the north, such cousins grow up

calling each other "brother" and "sister", yet they may marry.

Even when cousin marriage does not occur, spouses can often

trace between them other kinship linkages.

Some tribal people of central India practice an interesting

permutation of the southern pattern. Among the Murias of

Bastar in southeastern Madhya Pradesh, as described by

anthropologist Verrier Elwin, teenagers live together in a dormitory (ghotul), sharing life and love with one another for sev- eral blissful years. Ultimately, their parents arrange their

marriages, usually with cross-cousins, and the delights of teen- age romance are replaced with the serious responsibilities of

adulthood. In his survey of some 2,000 marriages, Elwin found

258
Jain wedding ceremony, with

bride, groom, and sacredfire, Jodhpur, Rajasthan

Courtesy DoranneJacobson

only seventy-seven cases of ghotul partners eloping together

and very few cases of divorce. Among the Muria and Gond

tribal groups, cross-cousin marriage is called "bringing back

the milk," alluding to the gift of a girl in one generation being

returned by the gift of a girl in the next. Finding the perfect partner for one's child can be a challenging task. People use their social networks to locate potential brides and grooms of appropriate social and economic

status. Increasingly, urban dwellers use classified matrimonial

advertisements in newspapers. The advertisements usually

announce religion, caste, and educational qualifications, stress female beauty and male (and in the contemporary era, sometimes female) earning capacity, and may hint at dowry size. In rural areas, matches between strangers are usually

arranged without the couple meeting each other. Rather, parents and other relatives come to an agreement on behalf of the

couple. In cities, however, especially among the educated

classes, photographs are exchanged, and sometimes the couple

are allowed to meet under heavily chaperoned circumstances,

such as going out for tea with a group of people or meeting in

the parlor of the girl's home, with her relatives standing by.

Young professional men and their families may receive inquiries and photographs from representatives of several girls' families. They may send their relatives to meet the most promising

259
India: A Country Study

candidates and then go on tour themselves to meet the young

women and make a final choice. In the early 1990s, increasing

numbers of marriages arranged in this way link brides and

grooms from India with spouses of Indian parentage resident

in Europe, North America, and the Middle East. Almost all Indian children are raised with the expectation

that their parents will arrange their marriages, but an increasing number of young people, especially among the collegeeducated, are finding their own spouses. So-called love marriages are deemed a slightly scandalous alternative to properly

arranged marriages. Some young people convince their parents to "arrange" their marriages to people with whom they

have fallen in love. This process has long been possible for

Indians from the south and for Muslims who want to marry a

particular cousin of the appropriate marriageable category. In

the upper classes, these semi-arranged love marriages increasingly occur between young people who are from castes of

slightly different rank but who are educationally or professionally equal. If there are vast differences to overcome, such as is the case with love marriages between Hindus and Muslims or between Hindus of very different caste status, parents are usually much less agreeable, and serious family disruptions can

result. In much of India, especially in the north, a marriage establishes a structural opposition between the kin groups of the

bride and groom—bride-givers and bride-takers. Within this

relationship, bride-givers are considered inferior to bride-takers and are forever expected to give gifts to the bride-takers.

The one-way flow of gifts begins at engagement and continues

for a generation or two. The most dramatic aspect of this asymmetrical relationship is the giving of dowry.

In many communities throughout India, a dowry has traditionally been given by a bride's kin at the time of her marriage.

In ancient times, the dowry was considered a woman's wealth

property due a beloved daughter who had no claim on her

natal family's real estate—and typically included portable valuables such as jewelry and household goods that a bride could

control throughout her life. However, over time, the larger proportion of the dowry has come to consist of goods and cash

payments that go straight into the hands of the groom's family. In the late twentieth century, throughout much of India, dowry

payments have escalated, and a groom's parents sometimes

insist on compensation for their son's higher education and

260
Social Systems

even for his future earnings, to which the bride will presumably

have access. Some of the dowries demanded are quite oppressive, amounting to several years' salary in cash as well as items

such as motorcycles, air conditioners, and fancy cars. Among

some lower-status groups, large dowries are currently replacing

traditional bride-price payments. Even among Muslims, previously not given to demanding large dowries, reports of exorbitant dowries are increasing.

The dowry is becoming an increasingly onerous burden for

the bride's family. Antidowry laws exist but are largely ignored,

and a bride's treatment in her marital home is often affected by

the value of her dowry. Increasingly frequent are horrible incidents, particularly in urban areas, where a groom's family

makes excessive demands on the bride's family—even after

marriage—and when the demands are not met, murder the

bride, typically by setting her clothes on fire in a cooking "accident." The groom is then free to remarry and collect another

sumptuous dowry. The male and female in-laws implicated in

these murders have seldom been punished.

Such dowry deaths have been the subject of numerous

media reports in India and other countries and have mobilized

feminist groups to action. In some of the worst areas, such as the National Capital Territory of Delhi, where hundreds of

such deaths are reported annually and the numbers are increasing yearly, the law now requires that all suspicious

deaths of new brides be investigated. Official government fig- ures report 1,786 registered dowry deaths nationwide in 1987;

there is also an estimate of some 5,000 dowry deaths in 1991.

Women's groups sometimes picket the homes of the in-laws of

burned brides. Some analysts have related the growth of this

phenomenon to the growth of consumerism in Indian society.

Fears of impoverishing their parents have led some urban

middle-class young women, married and unmarried, to commit

suicide. However, through the giving of large dowries, the

newly wealthy are often able to marry their treasured daughters

up the status hierarchy so reified in Indian society.

After marriage arrangements are completed, a rich panoply

of wedding rituals begins. Each religious group, region, and

caste has a slightly different set of rites. Generally, all weddings

involve as many kin and associates of the bride and groom as possible. The bride's family usually hosts most of the ceremonies and pays for all the arrangements for large numbers of

guests for several days, including accommodation, feasting,

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India: A Country Study

decorations, and gifts for the groom's party. These arrangements are often extremely elaborate and expensive and are intended to enhance the status of the bride's family. The

groom's party usually hires a band and brings fine gifts for the

bride, such as jewelry and clothing, but these are typically far

outweighed in value by the presents received from the bride's

side.

After the bride and groom are united in sacred rites

attended by colorful ceremony, the new bride may be carried

away to her in-laws' home, or, if she is very young, she may

remain with her parents until they deem her old enough to depart. A prepubescent bride usually stays in her natal home

until puberty, after which a separate consummation ceremony

is held to mark her departure for her conjugal home and married life. The poignancy of the bride's weeping departure for

her new home is prominent in personal memory, folklore, lit- erature, song, and drama throughout India.

Adulthood

In their new status, a young married couple begin to accept

adult responsibilities. These include work inside and outside of

the home, childbearing and childrearing, developing and

maintaining social relationships, fulfilling religious obligations,

and enhancing family prosperity and prestige as much as possible.The young husband usually remains resident with his natal

family, surrounded by well-known relatives and neighbors. The

young bride, however, is typically thrust into a strange household, where she is expected to follow ideal patterns of chaste

and cheerfully obedient behavior.

Ideally, the Hindu wife should honor her husband as if he

were her personal god. Through her marriage, a woman

becomes an auspicious wife (suhagan), adorned with bangles

and amulets designed to protect her husband's life and imbued

with ritual powers to influence prosperity and procreation. At

her wedding, the Hindu bride is likened to Lakshmi, the Goddess of Wealth, in symbolic recognition of the fact that the

groom's patrilineage can increase and prosper only through

her fertility and labors. Despite this simile, elegantly stated in

the nuptial ritual, the young wife is pressed into service as the

most subordinate member of her husband's family. If any misfortunes happen to befall her affinal family after her arrival,

she may be blamed as the bearer of bad luck. Not surprisingly,

262
Social Systems

some young women find adjusting to these new circumstances

extremely upsetting. A small percentage experience psychological distress so severe that they seem to be possessed by outspoken ghosts and spirits.

In these difficult early days of a marriage, and later on

throughout her life, a woman looks to her natal kin for moral

and often economic support. Although she has become part of

another household and lineage, she depends on her natal relatives—especially her brothers—to back her up in a variety of

circumstances. A wide range of long visits home, ritual obligations, gifts, folklore, and songs reflect the significance of a woman's lifelong ties to her blood relatives.

By producing children, especially highly valued sons, and,

ultimately, becoming a mother-in-law herself, a woman gradually improves her position within the conjugal household. In

motherhood the married woman finds social approval, eco- nomic security, and emotional satisfaction.

A man and his wife owe respect and obedience to his parents

and other senior relatives. Ideally, all cooperate in the joint

family enterprise. Gradually, as the years pass, members of the

younger generation take the place of the older generation and

become figures of authority and respect. As this transition

occurs, it is generally assumed that younger family members

will physically care for and support elders until their demise.

In their adult years, men and women engage in a wide variety of tasks and occupations strongly linked to socioeconomic

status, including caste membership, wealth, place of residence,

and many other factors. In general, the higher the status of a

family, the less likely its members are to engage in manual

labor and the more likely its members are to be served by

employees of lower status. Although educated women are

increasingly working outside the home, even in urbane circles

some negative stigma is still attached to women's employment.

In addition, students from high-status families do not work at temporary menial jobs as they do in many Western countries.

People of low status work at the many menial tasks that highstatus people disdain. Poor women cannot afford to abstain

from paid labor, and they work alongside their menfolk in the

fields and at construction projects. In low-status families,

women are less likely than high-status women to unquestioningly accept the authority of men and even of elders because

they are directly responsible for providing income for the family. Among Sweepers, very low-status latrine cleaners, women

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India: A Country Study

carry out more of the -aditional tasks than do men and hold a

relatively less subordinate position in their families than do

women of traditional high-status families. Such women are, nonetheless, less powerful in the society at large than are women of economically prosperous high-status families, who

control and influence the control of more assets than do poor

women.

Along with economically supporting themselves, their

elders, and their children, adults must maintain and add to the

elaborate social networks upon which life depends. Offering

gracious hospitality to guests is a key ingredient of proper adult

behavior. Adults must also attend to religious matters, carrying

out rites intended to protect their families and communities.

In these efforts, men and women constantly work for the benefit of their kin groups, castes, and other social units.

Death and Beyond

The death of an infant or young child—a common event in

India—causes sorrow but usually not major social disruption.

The death of a married adult has wider repercussions. Among

Hindus, the demise of a lineage member immediately ritually

pollutes the entire lineage for a period of several days. As part

of the mourning process, closely related male mourners have

their heads and facial hair shaved, thus publicly declaring their

close links to the deceased. Various funeral rites, feasts, and

mourning practices affirm kinship ties with the deceased and

among survivors. Crucial social bonds become visible to all concerned.

Although a man may grieve for his deceased wife, a widow

may face not only a personal loss but a major restructuring of

her life. Becoming a widow in India is not a benign or neutral

event. A man's death, particularly if it occurs when he is young,

may be attributed to ill fortune brought upon him by his wife,

possibly because of her sins in a past life. With the death of her husband, a woman's auspicious wifehood ends, and she is plunged into dreaded widowhood. The

very word widow is used as an epithet. As a widow, a woman is devoid of reason to adorn herself. If she follows tradition, she

may shave her head, shed her jewelry, and wear only plain

white or dark clothing.

Widows of low-ranking groups have always been allowed to remarry, but widows of high rank have been expected to

remain unmarried and chaste until death. In earlier times, for

264
Street vendor, Jaipur, Rajasthan

Courtesy Sandra Day O'Connor

child brides married to older men and widowed young, these

strictures caused great hardship and inspired reform movements in some parts of the country.

In past centuries, the ultimate rejection of widowhood

occurred in the burning of the Hindu widow on her husband's

funeral pyre, a practice known as sati (meaning, literally, true or virtuous one). Women who so perished in the funeral flames were posthumously adulated, and even in the late twentieth

century are worshiped at memorial tablets and temples erected

in their honor. In western India, Rajput lineages proudly point

to satis in their history. Sati was never widespread, and it has

been illegal since 1829, but a few cases of sati still occur in

India every year. In choosing to die with her husband, a woman

evinces great merit and power and is considered able to bring

boons to her husband's patrilineage and to others who honor

her. Thus, through her meritorious death, a widow avoids dis265
India: A Country Study

dain and achieves glory, not only for herself, but for all of her

kin as well.

By restricting widow remarriage, high-status groups limit

restructuring of the lineage on the death of a male member.

An unmarried widow remains a member of her husband's lin- eage, with no competing ties to other groups of in-laws. Her

rights to her husband's property, traditionally limited though

they are to management rather than outright inheritance,

remain uncomplicated by remarriage to a man from another

lineage. It is among lower-ranking groups with lesser amounts

of property and prestige that widow remarriage is most frequent.

Most Indians see their present lifetimes as but a prelude to an afterlife, the quality of which depends on their behavior in

this life. Muslims envision heaven and hell, but Hindus conceptualize a series of rebirths ideally culminating in union with the

divine (see The Monastic Path, ch. 3). Some Hindus believe

they are destined to marry the same person in each of their

lifetimes. Thus people feel connected with different permutations of themselves and others over cosmic cycles of time.

Caste and Class

Varna, Caste, and Other Divisions

Although many other nations are characterized by social inequality, perhaps nowhere else in the world has inequality been

so elaborately constructed as in the Indian institution of caste. Caste has long existed in India, but in the modern period it has

been severely criticized by both Indian and foreign observers.

Although some educated Indians tell non-Indians that caste has been abolished or that "no one pays attention to caste anymore," such statements do not reflect reality.

Caste has undergone significant change since independence, but it still involves hundreds of millions of people. In its preamble, India's constitution forbids negative public discrimination on the basis of caste. However, caste ranking and caste- based interaction have occurred for centuries and will continue to do so well into the foreseeable future, more in the

countryside than in urban settings and more in the realms of

kinship and marriage than in less personal interactions.

Castes are ranked, named, endogamous (in-marrying)

groups, membership in which is achieved by birth. There are thousands of castes and subcastes in India, and these large kin266
Social Systems

ship-based groups are fundamental to South Asian social struc- ture. Each caste is part of a locally based system of interdependence with other groups, involving occupational specialization, and is linked in complex ways with networks that stretch across regions and throughout the nation.

The word caste derives from the Portuguese casta, meaning

breed, race, or kind. Among the Indian terms that are sometimes translated as caste are varna (see Glossary), jati (see Glossary), jat, biradri, and samaj. All of these terms refer to ranked

groups of various sizes and breadth. Varna, or color, actually

refers to large divisions that include various castes; the other

terms include castes and subdivisions of castes sometimes

called subcastes.

Many castes are traditionally associated with an occupation,

such as high-ranking Brahmans; middle-ranking farmer and

artisan groups, such as potters, barbers, and carpenters; and

very low-ranking "Untouchable" leatherworkers, butchers,

launderers, and latrine cleaners. There is some correlation

between ritual rank on the caste hierarchy and economic prosperity. Members of higher-ranking castes tend, on the whole, to be more prosperous than members of lower-ranking castes. Many lower-caste people live in conditions of great poverty and

social disadvantage.

According to the Rig Veda, sacred texts that date back to oral

traditions of more than 3,000 years ago, progenitors of the four

ranked varna groups sprang from various parts of the body of

the primordial man, which Brahma created from clay (see The

Vedas and Polytheism, ch. 3). Each group had a function in sus- taining the life of society—the social body. Brahmans, or

priests, were created from the mouth. They were to provide for

the intellectual and spiritual needs of the community. Kshatriyas, warriors and rulers, were derived from the arms. Their role was to rule and to protect others. Vaishyas—landowners and

merchants—sprang from the thighs, and were entrusted with

the care of commerce and agriculture. Shudras—artisans and

servants—came from the feet. Their task was to perform all manual labor.

Later conceptualized was a fifth category, "Untouchable"

menials, relegated to carrying out very menial and polluting

work related to bodily decay and dirt. Since 1935 "Untouchables" have been known as Scheduled Castes, referring to their

listing on government rosters, or schedules. They are also often

called by Mohandas Karamchand (Mahatma) Gandhi's term

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India: A Country Study

Harijans, or "Children of God." Although the term Untouchable

appears in literature produced by these low-ranking castes, in

the 1990s, many politically conscious members of these groups

prefer to refer to themselves as Dalit (see Glossary), a Hindi

word meaning oppressed or downtrodden. According to the

1991 census, there were 138 million Scheduled Caste members

in India, approximately 16 percent of the total population.

The first four varnas apparently existed in the ancient Aryan

society of northern India. Some historians say that these cate- gories were originally somewhat fluid functional groups, not

castes. A greater degree of fixity gradually developed, resulting

in the complex ranking systems of medieval India that essentially continue in the late twentieth century.

Although a varna is not a caste, when directly asked for their

caste affiliation, particularly when the questioner is a Westerner, many Indians will reply with a varna name. Pressed further, they may respond with a much more specific name of a

caste, or jati, which falls within that varna. For example, a Brahman may specify that he is a member of a named caste group,

such as a Jijotiya Brahman, or a Smartha Brahman, and so on. Within such castes, people may further belong to smaller subcaste categories and to specific clans and lineages. These finer

designations are particularly relevant when marriages are being arranged and often appear in newspaper matrimonial

advertisements.

Members of a caste are typically spread out over a region,

with representatives living in hundreds of settlements. In any

small village, there may be representatives of a few or even a score or more castes. Numerous groups usually called tribes (often referred to as Scheduled Tribes) are also integrated into the caste system to varying degrees. Some tribes live separately from others—particularly in the far northeast and in the forested center of the

country, where tribes are more like ethnic groups than castes. Some tribes are themselves divided into groups similar to subcastes. In regions where members of tribes live in peasant vil- lages with nontribal peoples, they are usually considered

members of separate castes ranking low on the hierarchical

scale. Inequalities among castes are considered by the Hindu faithful to be part of the divinely ordained natural order and are expressed in terms of purity and pollution. Within a village, rel- ative rank is most graphically expressed at a wedding or death

268
A Potter (Kumhar) caste woman

painting ceramic pots, Madhya

Pradesh

Courtesy DoranneJacobson

feast, when all residents of the village are invited. At the home

of a high-ranking caste member, food is prepared by a member

of a caste from whom all can accept cooked food (usually by a Brahman). Diners are seated in lines; members of a single caste

sit next to each other in a row, and members of other castes sit in perpendicular or parallel rows at some distance. Members of

Dalit castes, such as Leatherworkers and Sweepers, may be

seated far from the other diners—even out in an alley. Farther

away, at the edge of the feeding area, a Sweeper may wait with a large basket to receive discarded leavings tossed in by other

diners. Eating food contaminated by contact with the saliva of

others not of the same family is considered far too polluting to be practiced by members of any other castes. Generally, feasts

and ceremonies given by Dalits are not attended by higherranking castes. Among Muslims, although status differences prevail, brotherhood may be stressed. A Muslim feast usually includes a cloth

laid either on clean ground or on a table, with all Muslims, rich

and poor, dining from plates placed on the same cloth. Muslims who wish to provide hospitality to observant Hindus, however, must make separate arrangements for a high-caste Hindu

cook and ritually pure foods and dining area. Castes that fall within the top four ranked varnas are sometimes referred to as the "clean castes," with Dalits considered

269
India : A Co u n try Stu dy

"unclean." Castes of the top three ranked varnas are often designated "twice-born," in reference to the ritual initiation undergone by male members., in which investiture with the Hindu

sacred thread constitutes a kind of ritual rebirth. Non-Hindu

castelike groups generally fall outside these designations.

Each caste is believed by devout Hindus to have its own

dharma. or divinelv ordained code of proper conduct. Accordingly, there is often a histfi decree of tolerance for divergent

lifestvles among different castes. Brahmans are usuallv

expected to be nomiolent and spiritual., according with their

traditional roles as vegetarian teetotaler priests. Kshatrivas are supposed to be strong, as fighters and rulers should be. with a

taste for a2;onression. eating meat, and drinking alcohol. Vaishvas are stereotyped as adept businessmen, in accord with their

traditional activities in commerce. Shudras are often described

bv others as tolerably pleasant but expectably somewhat base in

behavior, whereas Dalits—especially Sweepers—are often

regarded bv others as followers of vulvar life-stvles. Conversely,

lower-caste people often view people of high rank as haughty

and unfeeling.

The chastitv of women is strongly related to caste status. Generally, the higher rankine the caste, the more sexual control its women are expected to exhibit. Brahman brides should

be virginal, faithful to one husband, and celibate in widowhood. Bv contrast, a Sweeper bride mav or mav not be a virgin,

extramarital affairs mav be tolerated, and, if widowed or

divorced, the woman is encouraged to remarrv For the higher

castes, such control of female sexuality helps ensure purity of

lineage—of crucial importance to maintenance of high status. Amons: Muslims, too. high status is stronely correlated with

female chastitv

Within castes explicit standards are maintained. Transgressions mav be dealt with bv a caste council ( panchayat—see Glossary), meeting periodically to adjudicate issues relevant to the

caste. Such councils are usually formed of groups of elders,

almost alwavs males. Punishments such as fines and outcasting,

either temporary or permanent, can be enforced. In rare cases, a person is excommunicated from the caste for gross infractions of caste rules. An example of such an infraction might be

marrying or openlv cohabiting with a mate of a caste lower

than one's own; such behavior would usually result in the

higher-caste person dropping to the status of the lower-caste

person.

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Social Systems

Activities such as farming or trading can be carried out by

anyone, but usually only members of the appropriate castes act

as priests, barbers, potters, weavers, and other skilled artisans,

whose occupational skills are handed down in families from

one generation to another. As with other key features of Indian

social structure, occupational specialization is believed to be in

accord with the divinely ordained order of the universe.

The existence of rigid ranking is supernaturally validated

through the idea of rebirth according to a person's karma, the

sum of an individual's deeds in this life and in past lives. After

death, a person's life is judged by divine forces, and rebirth is assigned in a high or a low place, depending upon what is deserved. This supernatural sanction can never be neglected,

because it brings a person to his or her position in the caste

hierarchy, relevant to every transaction involving food or drink,

speaking, or touching.

In past decades, Dalits in certain areas (especially in parts of

the south) had to display extreme deference to high-status people, physically keeping their distance—lest their touch or even

their shadow pollute others—wearing neither shoes nor any

upper body covering (even for women) in the presence of the

upper castes. The lowest-ranking had to jingle a little bell in

warning of their polluting approach. In much of India, Dalits were prohibited from entering temples, using wells from which

the "clean" castes drew their water, or even attending schools.

In past centuries, dire punishments were prescribed for Dalits

who read or even heard sacred texts. Such degrading discrimination was made illegal under legislation passed during British rule and was protested against by

preindependence reform movements led by Mahatma Gandhi

and Bhimrao Ramji (B.R.) Ambedkar, a Dalit leader. Dalits agitated for the right to enter Hindu temples and to use village

wells and effectively pressed for the enactment of stronger laws

opposing disabilities imposed on them. After independence,

Ambedkar almost singlehandedly wrote India's constitution,

including key provisions barring caste-based discrimination.

Nonetheless, discriminatory treatment of Dalits remains a fac- tor in daily life, especially in villages, as the end of the twentieth

century approaches.

In modern times, as in the past, it is virtually impossible for an individual to raise his own status by falsely claiming to be a member of a higher-ranked caste. Such a ruse might work for a time in a place where the person is unknown, but no one

271
India: A Country Study

would dine with or intermarry with such a person or his off- spring until the claim was validated through kinship networks.

Rising on the ritual hierarchy can only be achieved by a caste as a group, over a long period of time, principally by adopting

behavior patterns of higher-ranked groups. This process,

known as Sanskritization, has been described by M.N. Srinivas

and others. An example of such behavior is that of some Leatherworker castes adopting a policy of not eating beef, in the

hope that abstaining from the defiling practice of consuming

the flesh of sacred bovines would enhance their castes' status. Increased economic prosperity for much of a caste greatly aids

in the process of improving rank.

Intercaste Relations

In a village, members of different castes are often linked in

what has been called the jajmani system, after the word jajman,

which in some regions means patron. Members of various ser- vice castes perform tasks for their patrons, usually members of

the dominant, that is, most powerful landowning caste of the

village (commonly castes of the Kshatriya varnd). Households

of service castes are linked through hereditary bonds to a household of patrons, with the lower-caste members providing

services according to traditional occupational specializations.

Thus, client families of launderers, barbers, shoemakers, car- penters, potters, tailors, and priests provide customary services

to their patrons, in return for which they receive customary

seasonal payments of grain, clothing, and money. Ideally, from

generation to generation, clients owe their patrons political

allegiance in addition to their labors, while patrons owe their

clients protection and security.

The harmonious qualities of the jajmani system have been

overidealized and variations of the system overlooked by many

observers. Further, the economic interdependence of the sys- tem has weakened since the 1960s. Nevertheless, it is clear that

members of different castes customarily perform a number of

functions for one another in rural India that emphasize cooperation rather than competition. This cooperation is revealed

in economic arrangements, in visits to farmers' threshing floors

by service caste members to claim traditional payments, and in

rituals emphasizing interdependence at life crises and calendrical festivals all over South Asia. For example, in rural Karnataka, in an event described by anthropologist Suzanne

Hanchett, the annual procession of the village temple cart

272
Social Systems

bearing images of the deities responsible for the welfare of the

village cannot go forward without the combined efforts of representatives of all castes. It is believed that the sacred cart will

literally not move unless all work together to move it, some

pushing and some pulling.

Some observers feel that the caste system must be viewed as a system of exploitation of poor low-ranking groups by more

prosperous high-ranking groups. In many parts of India, land is largely held by dominant castes—high-ranking owners of property—that economically exploit low-ranking landless laborers

and poor artisans, all the while degrading them with ritual

emphases on their so-called god-given inferior status. In the

early 1990s, blatant subjugation of low-caste laborers in the

northern state of Bihar and in eastern Uttar Pradesh was the

subject of many news reports. In this region, scores of Dalits

who have attempted to unite to protest low wages have been

the victims of lynchings and mass killings by high-caste land- owners and their hired assassins.

In 1991 the news magazine India Today reported that in an

ostensibly prosperous village about 160 kilometers southeast of

Delhi, when it became known that a rural Dalit laborer dared

to have a love affair with the daughter of a high-caste landlord,

the lovers and their Dalit go-between were tortured, publicly

hanged, and burnt by agents of the girl's family in the presence

of some 500 villagers. A similar incident occurred in 1994,

when a Dalit musician who had secretly married a woman of

the Kurmi cultivating caste was beaten to death by outraged

Kurmis, possibly instigated by the young woman's family. The

terrified bride was stripped and branded as punishment for her

transgression. Dalit women also have been the victims of gang

rapes by the police. Many other atrocities, as well as urban riots

resulting in the deaths of Dalits, have occurred in recent years. Such extreme injustices are infrequent enough to be reported

in outraged articles in the Indian press, while much more com- mon daily discrimination and exploitation are considered vir- tually routine.

Changes in the Caste System

Despite many problems, the caste system has operated successfully for centuries, providing goods and services to India's

many millions of citizens. The system continues to operate, but

changes are occurring. India's constitution guarantees basic

rights to all its citizens, including the right to equality and

273
India: A Country Study

equal protection before the law. The practice of untouchabilitv

as well as discrimination on the basis of caste, race. sex. or reli- 00. gion, has been legally abolished. All citizens have the rieht to vote, and political competition is livelv. Voters from everv stra- tum of society have formed interest groups., overlapping and

crosscutting castes, creating an evolving new stvle of integrating

Indian society

Castes themselves, however, far from being abolished, have

certain rights under Indian law. As described bv anthropologist

Owen M. Lvnch and other scholars, in the expanding political arena caste groups are becoming more politicized and forced

to compete with other interest groups for social and economic

benefits. In the growing cities, traditional intercaste interdependencies are negligible.

Independent India has built on earlier British efforts to remedy problems suffered bv Dalits bv granting them some benefits of protective discrimination. Scheduled Castes are entitled

to reserved electoral offices, reserved jobs in central and state governments, and special educational benefits. The constitution mandates that one-seventh of state and national legislative seats be reserved for members of Scheduled Castes in order to guarantee their voice in government. Reserving seats has

proven useful because few. if any Scheduled Caste candidates

have ever been elected in nonreserved constituencies.

Educationally Dalit students have benefited from scholarships, and Scheduled Caste literacy increased (from 10.3 percent in 1961 to 21.4 percent in 1981. the last vear for which

such figures are available), although not as rapidlv as among

the general population. Improved access to education has

resulted in the emergence of a substantial group of educated

Dalits able to take up white-collar occupations and fight for

their rights.

There has been tremendous resistance amon^ non-Dalits to

this protective discrimination for the Scheduled Castes, who

constitute some 16 percent of the total population, and efforts

have been made to provide similar advantages to the so-called

Backward Classes (see Glossary), who constitute an estimated

52 percent of the population. In August 1990. Prime Minister

Vishwanath Pratap (V.P. ) Singh announced his intention to enforce the recommendations of the Backward Classes Commission (Mandal Commission—see Glossary), issued in

December 19S0 and largely ignored for a decade. The report,

which urged special advantages for obtaining civil service posi274
Social Systems

tions and admission to higher education for the Backward

Classes, resulted in riots and self-immolations and contributed

to the fall of the prime minister. The upper castes have been

particularly adamant against these policies because unemployment is a major problem in India, and many feel that they are being unjustly excluded from posts for which they are better

qualified than lower-caste applicants.

As an act of protest, many Dalits have rejected Hinduism

with its rigid ranking system. Following the example of their

revered leader, Dr. Ambedkar, who converted to Buddhism

four years before his death in 1956, millions of Dalits have

embraced the faith of the Buddha (see Buddhism, ch. 3). Over

the past few centuries, many Dalits have also converted to

Christianity and have often by this means raised their socioeconomic status. However, Christians of Dalit origin still often suf- fer from discrimination by Christians—and others—of higher

caste backgrounds.

Despite improvements in some aspects of Dalit status, 90 percent of them live in rural areas in the mid-1990s, where an

increasing proportion—more than 50 percent—work as landless agricultural laborers. State and national governments have

attempted to secure more just distribution of land by creating

land ceilings and abolishing absentee landlordism, but evasive

tactics by landowners have successfully prevented more than

minimal redistribution of land to tenant farmers and laborers.

In contemporary India, field hands face increased competition

from tractors and harvesting machines. Similarly, artisans are being challenged by expanding commercial markets in mass- produced factory goods, undercutting traditional mutual obligations between patrons and clients. The spread of the Green

Revolution has tended to increase the gap between the prosperous and the poor—most of whom are low-caste (see The

Green Revolution, ch. 7).

The growth of urbanization (an estimated 26 percent of the

population now lives in cities) is having a far-reaching effect on

caste practices, not only in cities but in villages. Among anonymous crowds in urban public spaces and on public transportation, caste affiliations are unknown, and observance of purity

and pollution rules is negligible. Distinctive caste costumes

have all but vanished, and low-caste names have been modified,

although castes remain endogamous, and access to employment often occurs through intracaste connections. Restrictions

on interactions with other castes are becoming more relaxed,

275
India: A Country Study

and, at the same time, observance of other pollution rules is declining—especially those concerning birth, death, and menstruation. Several growing Hindu sects draw members from

many castes and regions, and communication between cities

and villages is expanding dramatically. Kin in town and country

visit one another frequently, and television programs available

to huge numbers of villagers vividly portray new lifestyles. As

new occupations open up in urban areas, the correlation of

caste with occupation is declining.

Caste associations have expanded their areas of concern

beyond traditional elite emulation and local politics into the

wider political arenas of state and national politics. Finding

power in numbers within India's democratic system, caste

groups are pulling together closely allied subcastes in their

quest for political influence. In efforts to solidify caste bonds,

some caste associations have organized marriage fairs where

families can make matches for their children. Traditional hierarchical concerns are being minimized in favor of strengthening horizontal unity. Thus, while pollution observances are

declining, caste consciousness is not. Education and election to political office have advanced the

status of many Dalits, but the overall picture remains one of

great inequity. In recent decades, Dalit anger has been

expressed in writings, demonstrations, strikes, and the activities of such groups as the Dalit Panthers, a radical political party

demanding revolutionary change. A wider Dalit movement,

including political parties, educational activities, self-help centers, and labor organizations, has spread to many areas of the

country.

In a 1982 Dalit publication, Dilip Hiro wrote, "It is one of the

great modern Indian tragedies and dangers that even well

meaning Indians still find it so difficult to accept Untouchable

mobility as being legitimate in fact as well as in theory. ..." Still, against all odds, a small intelligentsia has worked for many

years toward the goal of freeing India of caste consciousness.

Classes

In village India, where nearly 74 percent of the population

resides, caste and class affiliations overlap. According to anthropologist Miriam Sharma, "Large landholders who

employ hired labour are overwhelmingly from the upper

castes, while the agricultural workers themselves come from

the ranks of the lowest—predominantly Untouchable—castes."

276
A member of a Weaver caste at work, Rajasthan

Courtesy DoranneJacobson

She also points out that household-labor-using proprietors

come from the ranks of the middle agricultural castes. Distribution of other resources and access to political control follow

the same pattern of caste-cum-class distinctions. Although this

congruence is strong, there is a tendency for class formation to occur despite the importance of caste, especially in the cities,

but also in rural areas. In an analysis of class formation in India, anthropologist

Harold A. Gould points out that a three-level system of stratifi- cation is taking shape across rural India. He calls the three lev- els Forward Classes (higher castes), Backward Classes (middle

and lower castes), and Harijans (very low castes). Members of

these groups share common concerns because they stand in

approximately the same relationship to land and production

that is, they are large-scale farmers, small-scale farmers, and

landless laborers. Some of these groups are drawing together

within regions across caste lines in order to work for political

power and access to desirable resources. For example, since the

late 1960s, some of the middle-ranking cultivating castes of

northern India have increasingly cooperated in the political arena in order to advance their common agrarian and marketoriented interests. Their efforts have been spurred by competition with higher-caste landed elites.

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India: A Country Study

In cities other groups have vested interests that crosscut

caste boundaries, suggesting the possibility of forming classes

in the future. These groups include prosperous industrialists

and entrepreneurs, who have made successful efforts to push

the central government toward a probusiness stance; bureaucrats, who depend upon higher education rather than land to preserve their positions as civil servants; political officeholders,

who enjoy good salaries and perquisites of all kinds; and the

military, who constitute one of the most powerful armed forces

in the developing world (see Organization and Equipment of

the Armed Forces, ch. 10).

Economically far below such groups are members of the

menial underclass, which is taking shape in both villages and

urban areas. As the privileged elites move ahead, low-ranking

menial workers remain economically insecure. Were they to join together to mobilize politically across lines of class and

religion in recognition of their common interests, Gould

observes, they might find power in their sheer numbers.

India's rapidly expanding economy has provided the basis

for a fundamental change—the emergence of what eminent

journalist Suman Dubey calls a "new vanguard" increasingly

dictating India's political and economic direction. This group

is India's new middle class—mobile, driven, consumer-oriented, and, to some extent, forward-looking. Hard to define

precisely, it is not a single stratum of society, but straddles town

and countryside, making its voice heard everywhere. It encompasses prosperous farmers, white-collar workers, business people, military personnel, and myriad others, all actively working

toward a prosperous life. Ownership of cars, televisions, and

other consumer goods, reasonable earnings, substantial sav- ings, and educated children (often fluent in English) typify this

diverse group. Many have ties to kinsmen living abroad who

have done very well. The new middle class is booming, at least partially in

response to a doubling of the salaries of some 4 million central

government employees in 1986, followed by similar increases

for state and district officers. Unprecedented liberalization and

opening up of the economy in the 1980s and 1990s have been

part of the picture (see Growth since 1980, ch. 6).

There is no single set of criteria defining the middle class,

and estimates of its numbers vary widely. The mid-range of fig- ures presented in a 1992 survey article by analyst Suman Dubey

is approximately 150 to 175 million—some 20 percent of the

278
Social Systems

population—although other observers suggest alternative fig- ures. The middle class appears to be increasing rapidly. Once

primarily urban and largely Hindu, the phenomenon of the

consuming middle class is burgeoning among Muslims and

prosperous villagers as well. According to V.A. Pai Panandikar,

director of the Centre for Policy Research, New Delhi, cited by

Dubey, by the end of the twentieth century 30 percent—some

300 million—of India's population will be middle class. The middle class is bracketed on either side by the upper

and lower echelons. Members of the upper class—around 1 percent of the population—are owners of large properties,

members of exclusive clubs, and vacationers in foreign lands,

and include industrialists, former maharajas, and top executives. Below the middle class is perhaps a third of the population—ordinary farmers, tradespeople, artisans, and workers. At

the bottom of the economic scale are the poor—estimated at 320 million, some 45 percent of the population in 1988—who

live in inadequate homes without adequate food, work for pittances, have undereducated and often sickly children, and are the victims of numerous social inequities.

The Fringes of Society

India's complex society includes some unique members

sadhus (holy men) and hijras (transvestite-eunuchs). Such people have voluntarily stepped outside the usual bonds of kinship

and caste to join with others in castelike groups based upon

personal—yet culturally shaped—inclinations.

In India of the 1990s, several hundred thousand Hindu and

Jain sadhus and a few thousand holy women (sadhvis) live an

ascetic life. They have chosen to wear ocher robes, or perhaps

no clothing at all, to daub their skin with holy ash, to pray and

meditate, and to wander from place to place, depending on the

charity of others. Most have given up affiliation with.their caste and kin and have undergone a funeral ceremony for themselves, followed by a ritual rebirth into their new ascetic life. They come from all walks of life, and range from illiterate vil- lagers to well-educated professionals. In their new lives as renunciants, they are devoted to spiritual concerns, yet each is affiliated with an ascetic order or subsect demanding strict

adherence to rules of dress, itinerancy, diet, worship, and ritual

pollution. Within each order, hierarchical concerns are exhibited in the subservience novitiates display to revered gurus (see

The Tradition of the Enlightened Master, ch. 3). Further, at pil279
India: A Country Study

grimage sites, different orders take precedence in accordance

with an accepted hierarchy. Thus, although sadhus have fore- sworn many of the trappings of ordinary life, they have not

given up the hierarchy and interdependence so pervasive in

Indian society.

The most extreme sadhus, the aghoris, turn normal rules of

conduct completely upside down. Rajesh and Ramesh Bedi,

who have studied sadhus for decades, estimate that there may

be fewer than fifteen aghoris in contemporary India. In the

quest for great spiritual attainment, the aghori lives alone, like

Lord Shiva, at cremation grounds, supping from a human skull

bowl. He eats food provided only by low-ranking Sweepers and

prostitutes, and in moments of religious fervor devours his own

bodily wastes and pieces of human flesh torn from burning

corpses. In violating the most basic taboos of the ordinary

Hindu householder, the aghori sadhu graphically reminds himself and others of the correct rules of social behavior.

Hijras are males who have become "neither man nor

woman," transsexual transvestites who are usually castrated and

are attributed with certain ritual powers of blessing. As

described by anthropologist Serena Nanda, they are distinct

from ordinary male homosexuals (known as zenana, woman, or anmarad, un-man), who retain their identity as males and continue to live in ordinary society. Most hijras derive from a middle- or lower-status Hindu or Muslim background and have

experienced male impotency or effeminacy. A few originally

had ambiguous or hermaphroditic sexual organs. An estimated

50,000 hijras live throughout India, predominantly in cities of

the north. They are united in the worship of the Hindu goddess Bahuchara Mata.

Hijras voluntarily leave their families of birth, renounce male

sexuality, and assume a female identity, name, and dress. A hijra

undergoes a surgical emasculation in which he is transformed

from an impotent male into a potentially powerful new person.

Like Shiva—attributed with breaking off his phallus and throwing it to earth, thereby extending his sexual power to the uni- verse (recognized in Hindu worship of the lingam) —the

emasculated hijra has the power to bless others with fertility

(see Shiva, ch. 3). Groups of hijras go about together, dancing

and singing at the homes of new baby boys, blessing them with

virility and the ability to continue the family line. Hijras are also

attributed with the power to bring rain in times of drought.

Hijras receive alms and respect for their powers, yet they are

280
Social Systems

also ridiculed and abused because of their unusual sexual condition and because some act as male prostitutes.

The hijra community functions much like a caste. They have

communal households; newly formed Active kinship bonds,

marriage-like arrangements; and seven nationwide "houses," or symbolic descent groups, with regional and national leaders,

and a council. There is a hierarchy of gurus and disciples, with

expulsion from the community a possible punishment for fail- ure to obey group rules. Thus, although living on the margins

of society, hijras are empowered by their special relationship

with their goddess and each other and occupy an accepted and

meaningful place in India's social world.

The Village Community

Settlement and Structure

Scattered throughout India are approximately 500,000 vil- lages. The Census of India regards most settlements of fewer

than 5,000 as a village. These settlements range from tiny hamlets of thatched huts to larger settlements of tile-roofed stone

and brick houses (see Structure and Dynamics, ch. 2). Most vil- lages are small; nearly 80 percent have fewer than 1,000 inhabitants, according to the 1991 census. Most are nucleated

settlements, while others are more dispersed. It is in villages

that India's most basic business—agriculture—takes place.

Here, in the face of vicissitudes of all kinds, farmers follow

time-tested as well as innovative methods of growing wheat,

rice, lentils, vegetables, fruits, and many other crops in order to accomplish the challenging task of feeding themselves and the

nation. Here, too, flourish many of India's most valued cultural

forms.

Viewed from a distance, an Indian village may appear deceptively simple. A cluster of mud-plastered walls shaded by a few

trees, set among a stretch of green or dun-colored fields, with a few people slowly coming or going, oxcarts creaking, cattle lowing, and birds singing—all present an image of harmonious

simplicity. Indian city dwellers often refer nostalgically to "simple village life." City artists portray colorfully garbed village

women gracefully carrying water pots on their heads, and writ- ers describe isolated rural settlements unsullied by the complexities of modern urban civilization. Social scientists of the

past wrote of Indian villages as virtually self-sufficient communities with few ties to the outside world.

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India: A Country Study

In actuality, Indian village life is far from simple. Each village

is connected through a variety of crucial horizontal linkages

with other villages and with urban areas both near and far. Most villages are characterized by a multiplicity of economic,

caste, kinship, occupational, and even religious groups linked

vertically within each settlement. Factionalism is a typical feature of village politics. In one of the first of the modern anthropological studies of Indian village life, anthropologist Oscar

Lewis called this complexity "rural cosmopolitanism."

Throughout most of India, village dwellings are built very

close to one another in a nucleated settlement, with small lanes

for passage of people and sometimes carts. Village fields sur- round the settlement and are generally within easy walking dis- tance. In hilly tracts of central, eastern, and far northern India,

dwellings are more spread out, reflecting the nature of the

topography. In the wet states of West Bengal and Kerala, houses

are more dispersed; in some parts of Kerala, they are constructed in continuous lines, with divisions between villages not

obvious to visitors. In northern and central India, neighborhood boundaries

can be vague. The houses of Dalits are generally located in sep- arate neighborhoods or on the outskirts of the nucleated settle- ment, but there are seldom distinct Dalit hamlets. By contrast,

in the south, where socioeconomic contrasts and caste pollution observances tend to be stronger than in the north, Brahman homes may be set apart from those of non-Brahmans, and

Dalit hamlets are set at a little distance from the homes of

other castes. The number of castes resident in a single village can vary

widely, from one to more than forty. Typically, a village is dominated by one or a very few castes that essentially control the vil- lage land and on whose patronage members of weaker groups

must rely. In the village of about 1,100 population near Delhi

studied by Lewis in the 1950s, the Jat caste (the largest cultivating caste in northwestern India) comprised 60 percent of the

residents and owned all of the village land, including the house

sites. In Nimkhera, Madhya Pradesh, Hindu Thakurs and Brahmans, and Muslim Pathans own substantial land, while lowerranking Weaver (Koli) and Barber (Khawas) caste members

and others own smaller farms. In many areas of the south,

Brahmans are major landowners, along with some other relatively high-ranking castes. Generally, land, prosperity, and

power go together.

282
Social Systems

In some regions, landowners refrain from using plows themselves but hire tenant farmers and laborers to do this work. In

other regions, landowners till the soil with the aid of laborers,

usually resident in the same village. Fellow villagers typically

include representatives of various service and artisan castes to supply the needs of the villagers—priests, carpenters, blacksmiths, barbers, weavers, potters, oilpressers, leatherworkers,

sweepers, waterbearers, toddy-tappers, and so on. Artisanry in

pottery, wood, cloth, metal, and leather, although diminishing,

continues in many contemporary Indian villages as it did in

centuries past. Village religious observances and weddings are occasions for members of various castes to provide customary

ritual goods and services in order for the events to proceed

according to proper tradition.

Aside from caste-associated occupations, villages often

include people who practice nontraditional occupations. For

example, Brahmans or Thakurs may be shopkeepers, teachers,

truckers, or clerks, in addition to their caste-associated occupations of priest and farmer. In villages near urban areas, an

increasing number of people commute to the cities to take up

jobs, and many migrate. Some migrants leave their families in

the village and go to the cities to work for months at a time.

Many people from Kerala, as well as other regions, have temporarily migrated to the Persian Gulf states for employment and

send remittances back to their village families, to which they

will eventually return. At slack seasons, village life can appear to be sleepy, but usually villages are humming with activity. The work ethic is strong,

with little time out for relaxation, except for numerous divinely

sanctioned festivals and rite-of-passage celebrations. Residents

are quick to judge each other, and improper work or social

habits receive strong criticism. Villagers feel a sense of village

pride and honor, and the reputation of a village depends upon

the behavior of all of its residents.

Village Unity and Divisiveness

Villagers manifest a deep loyalty to their village, identifying

themselves to strangers as residents of a particular village, harking back to family residence in the village that typically extends

into the distant past. A family rooted in a particular village does

not easily move to another, and even people who have lived in a

city for a generation or two refer to their ancestral village as "our village."

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India: A Country Study

Villagers share use of common village facilities—the village

pond (known in India as a tank), grazing grounds, temples and

shrines, cremation grounds, schools, sitting spaces under large

shade trees, wells, and wastelands. Perhaps equally important,

fellow villagers share knowledge of their common origin in a

locale and of each other's secrets, often going back generations. Interdependence in rural life provides a sense of unity

among residents of a village.

A great many observances emphasize village unity. Typically,

each village recognizes a deity deemed the village protector or

protectress, and villagers unite in regular worship of this deity,

considered essential to village prosperity. They may cooperate

in constructing temples and shrines important to the village as a whole. Hindu festivals such as Holi, Dipavali (Diwali), and

Durga Puja bring villagers together (see Public Worship, ch.3).

In the north, even Muslims mayjoin in the friendly splashing

of colored water on fellow villagers in Spring Holi revelries,

which involve villagewide singing, dancing, and joking. People

of all castes within a village address each other by kinship

terms, reflecting the fictive kinship relationships recognized

within each settlement. In the north, where village exogamy is important, the concept of a village as a significant unit is clear. When the all-male groom's party arrives from another village,

residents of the bride's village in North India treat the visitors

with the appropriate behavior due to them as bride-takers

men greet them with ostentatious respect, while women cover

their faces and sing bawdy songs at them. A woman born in a

village is known as a daughter of the village while an in-married

bride is considered a daughter-in-law of the village. In her conjugal home in North India, a bride is often known by the name

of her natal village; for example, Sanchiwali (woman from Sanchi). A man who chooses to live in his wife's natal village—usually for reasons of land inheritance—is known by the name of

his birth village, such as Sankheriwala (man from Sankheri).

Traditionally, villages often recognized a headman and lis- tened with respect to the decisions of the panchayat, composed

of important men from the village's major castes, who had the

power to levy fines and exclude transgressors from village social

life. Disputes were decided within the village precincts as much

as possible, with infrequent recourse to the police or court sys- tem. In present-day India, the government supports an elective

panchayat and headman system, which is distinct from the traditional council and headman, and, in many instances, even

284
Social Systems

includes women and very low-caste members. As older systems

of authority are challenged, villagers are less reluctant to take

disputes to court. The solidarity of a village is always riven by conflicts, rivalries,

and factionalism. Living together in intensely close relationships over generations, struggling to wrest a livelihood from

the same limited area of land and water sources, closely watching some grow fat and powerful while others remain weak and

dependent, fellow villagers are prone to disputes, strategic contests, and even violence. Most villages include what villagers call "big fish," prosperous, powerful people, fed and serviced

through the labors of the struggling "little fish." Villagers com- monly view gains as possible only at the expense of neighbors.

Further, the increased involvement of villagers with the wider

economic and political world outside the village via travel,

work, education, and television; expanding government influence in rural areas; and increased pressure on land and

resources as village populations grow seem to have resulted in

increased factionalism and competitiveness in many parts of

rural India.

Urban Life

The Growth of Cities

Accelerating urbanization is powerfully affecting the trans- formation of Indian society. Slightly more than 26 percent of

the country's population is urban, and in 1991 more than half

of urban dwellers lived in 299 urban agglomerates or cities of

more than 100,000 people. By 1991 India had twenty-four cities with populations of at least 1 million. By that year, among cities of the world, Bombay (or Mumbai, in Marathi), in Maharashtra, ranked seventh in the world at 12.6 million, and Calcutta,

in West Bengal, ranked eighth at almost 11 million. In the

1990s, India's larger cities have been growing at twice the rate of smaller towns and villages. Between the 1960s and 1991, the

population of the Union Territory of Delhi quadrupled, to 8.4

million, and Madras, in Tamil Nadu, grew to 5.4 million. Bangalore, in Karnataka; Hyderabad, in Andhra Pradesh; and

many other cities are expanding rapidly. About half of these

increases are the result of rural-urban migration, as villagers

seek better lives for themselves in the cities. Most Indian cities are very densely populated. New Delhi,

for example, had 6,352 people per square kilometer in 1991.

285
India: A Country Study

Congestion, noise, traffic jams, air pollution, and major shortages of key necessities characterize urban life. Every major city

of India faces the same proliferating problems of grossly inadequate housing, transportation, sewerage, electric power, water

supplies, schools, and hospitals. Slums and jumbles of pavement dwellers' lean-tos constantly multiply. An increasing number of trucks, buses, cars, three-wheel autorickshaws, motorcycles, and motorscooters, all spewing uncontrolled fumes, surge

in sometimes haphazard patterns over city streets jammed with

jaywalking pedestrians, cattle, and goats. Accident rates are high (India's fatality rate from road accidents, the most com- mon cause of accidental death, is said to be twenty times higher

than United States rates), and it is a daily occurrence for a city

dweller to witness a crash or the running down of a pedestrian.

In 1984 the citizens of Bhopal suffered the nightmare of India's

largest industrial accident, when poisonous gas leaking from a Union Carbide plant killed and injured thousands of city dwellers. Less spectacularly, on a daily basis, uncontrolled pollutants

from factories all over India damage the urban environments

in which millions live. Urban Inequities

Major socioeconomic differences are much on display in cit- ies. The fine homes—often a walled compound with a garden,

servants' quarters, and garage—and gleaming automobiles of

the super wealthy stand in stark contrast to the burlap-covered

huts of the barefoot poor. Shops filled with elegant silk saris

and air-conditioned restaurants cater to the privileged, while

ragged dust-covered children with outstretched hands wait outside in hopes of receiving a few coins. The wealthy and the middle class employ servants and workers of various kinds, but

jajmani-like ties are essentially lacking, and the rich and the

poor live much more separate lives than in villages. At the same

time, casual interaction and physical contact among people of

all castes is constant, on public streets and in buses, trains, and

movie theaters.

As would-be urbanites stream into the cities, they often seek

out people from their village, caste, or region who have gone

before them and receive enough hospitality to tide them over

until they can settle in themselves. They find accommodation

wherever they can, even if only on a quiet corner of a sidewalk, or inside a concrete sewer pipe waiting to be laid. Some are for- tunate enough to find shelter in decrepit tenements or in open

286
A busy street inJaipur, Rajasthan

Courtesy Sandra Day O'Connor

areas where they can throw up flimsy structures of mud, tin

sheeting, or burlap. In such slum settlements, a single outhouse may be shared by literally thousands of people, or, more

usually, there are no sanitary facilities at all. Ditches are awash

in raw sewage, and byways are strewn with the refuse of people

and animals with nowhere else to go. Despite the exterior appearance of chaos, slum life is highly

structured, with many economic, religious, caste, and political

interests expressed in daily activity. Living conditions are extremely difficult, and slum dwellers fear the constant threat

of having their homes bulldozed in municipal "slum clearance"

efforts; nonetheless, slum life is animated by a strong sense of

joie de vivre.

In many sections of Indian cities, scavenging pigs, often

owned by Sweepers, along with stray dogs, help to recycle fecal

287
India: A Country Study

material. Piles of less noxious vegetal and paper garbage are sorted through by the poorest people, who seek usable or sal- able bits of things. Cattle and goats, owned by entrepreneurial

folk, graze on these piles, turning otherwise useless garbage

into valuable milk, dung (used for cooking fuel), and meat.

These domestic animals roam even in neighborhoods of fine

homes, outside the compound walls that protect the privileged

and their gardener-tended rose bushes from needy animals

and people.

Finding employment in the urban setting can be extremely

challenging, and, whenever possible, networks of relatives and

friends are used to help seek jobs. Millions of Indians are unemployed or underemployed. Ingenuity and tenacity are the

hallmarks of urban workers, who carry out a remarkable multitude of tasks and sell an incredible variety of foods, trinkets,

and services, all under difficult conditions. Many of the urban

poor are migrant laborers carrying headloads of bricks and

earth up rickety bamboo scaffolding at construction sites, while

their small children play about at the edge of excavations or huddle on mounds of gravel in the blazing sun. Nursing mothers must take time out periodically to suckle their babies at the

edge of construction sites: such "recesses" are considered rea- son to pay a woman less for a day's work than a man earns

(male construction workers earned about USS1 a day in 1994).

Moreover, women are seen as physically weaker by some

employers and thus not deserving of equal wages with men. These construction projects are financed by governments

and by business enterprises, which are run by cadres of welleducated, healthy, well-dressed men and, increasingly, women,

who occupy positions of power and make decisions affecting

many people. India's major cities have long been headquarters

for the country's highest socioeconomic groups, people with

transnational and international connections whose choices are taking India into new realms of economic development and

social change. Among these well-placed people, intercaste marriages raise few eyebrows, as long as marital unions link people

of similar upper- or upper-middle-class backgrounds. Such

marriages, sometimes even across religious lines, help knit

India's most powerful people together.

Increasingly conspicuous in India's cities are the growing

ranks of the middle class. In carefully laundered clothes, they

emerge from modest and semiprosperous homes to ride buses

and motorscooters to their jobs in offices, hospitals, courts, and

288
An urban street scene in Delhi

Courtesy Robert L. Worden

commercial establishments. Their well-tended children are educated in properly organized schools. Family groups go out

together to places of worship, social events, snack shops, and to bazaars bustling with consumers eager to buy the necessities of

a comfortable life. Members of the middle class cluster around

small stock-market outlets in cities all over the country. Even in

Calcutta, notorious for slums and street dwellers, the dominant

image is of office workers in pressed white garments riding

crowded buses—or Calcutta's world-class subway line—to their

jobs as office workers and professionals (see Transportation,

ch. 6).

For nearly everyone within the highly challenging urban

environment, ties to family and kin remain crucial to prosperity. Even in the harshest urban conditions, families show

remarkable resilience. Neighborhoods, too, take on impor289
India: A Country Stud\

tance. and neighbors from various backgrounds develop cooperative ties with one another. Neighborhood solidarity is expressed at such annual Hindu festivals as Ganesh's Birthdav

(Ganesh Chaturthi) in Bombay and Durga Puja in Calcutta,

when neighborhood associations create elaborate images of

the deities and take them out in grand processions.

Cities as Centers

Cosmopolitan cities are the great hubs of commerce and

government upon which the nation's functioning depends.

Bombay. India's largest citv and port., is India's economic powerhouse and locus of the nation's atomic research. The

National Capital Territory of Delhi, where a series of seven cit- ies was built over centuries, is the site of the capital—New

Delhi—and political nerve center of the world's largest democracy. Calcutta and Madras fill major roles in the country's eco- nomic life, as do high-tech Bangalore and Ahmadabad (in

Gujarat ) , famous for textiles. Great markets in foods., manufactured goods, and a host of kev commodities are centered in

urban trading and distribution points. Most eminent institutions of higher learning, cradles of intellectual development

and scientific investigation., are situated in cities. The visual

arts, music, classical dancing, poetrv. and literature all flourish

in the urban setting. Critical political and social commentary

appears in urban newspapers and periodicals. Creative new

trends in architecture and design are conceptualized and

brought to reality in cities. Cities are the source of television broadcasts and those great

favorites of the Indian public, movies. Bombay, sometimes

called "Bollvwood." and Madras are major centers of film production, bringing depictions of urban lifestyles before the eves of small-town dwellers and villagers all over the nation. With

the continuing national proliferation of television sets, videocassette recorders, and movie videocassettes. the influence of

such productions should not be underestimated.

Social revolutions, too, receive the support of urban visionaries. Among the more important social developments in con- temporary India is the growing women's movement, largely led

bv educated urban women. Seeking to restructure society and

gender relations, activists, scholars, and workers in the

women's movement have come together in numerous loosely

allied and highly diverse organizations focusing on issues of

rights and equality, empowerment, and justice for women.

290
Bombay's skyline

Courtesy Robert L. Worden

Some of these groups exist in rural areas, but most are city

based.

The escalating issues of dowry-related murder and suicide are most pressing in New Delhi, where groups such as Saheli

(Woman Friend) provide essential support to troubled women.

The pathbreaking feminist publication Manushi is published in

New Delhi and distributed throughout the country. The over- whelming economic needs of self-employed poor female workers in Ahmadabad inspired Ela Bhatt and her coworkers in the

Self-Employed Women's Association, which has been highly

successful in helping poor women improve their own lives. Urban women have initiated protests challenging female

feticide, child marriage, child prostitution, domestic violence,

polygyny, sati, sexual harassment, police rape of female plaintiffs, and other gender-related injustices. Their efforts have

brought new ways of thinking out of elite, educated circles into

the broader public arena of India's multilevel society.

In 1994, two attractive urban Indian women won the most

prominent international beauty contests, the Miss Universe

and the Miss World competitions. Thousands of young Indian

women idolized the glamorous beauties and many newspapers

gushed about the victories, but women's groups and feminist

commentators decried this adulation. They pointed out that

the deprivations and injustices experienced by a high proportion of Indian women were being given short shrift. While the

beauty contest winners were being paraded about in crowns and white chariots before admiring throngs, almost ignored by

the public and the media were the torture-slaying of a village

291
India: A Country Study

woman accused of theft bv a soothsayer and the historic qualification of six women as the Indian air force's first female pilots

(see The Air Force, ch. 10). In 1995. the All India Democratic

Women's Association and other groups protested in New Delhi

against the Miss India contest. Future Trends

Bv the twenty-first century, India's population will be more

than 1 billion. Approximately one-third of this enormous population will live in urban areas, which means adding the population of another Calcutta.. Bombay, or Madras to India's

already overburdened cities each vear into the foreseeable

future. In rural areas, pressures on land and other resources

will continue to intensify. In India's democracy ideas are often vociferously expressed,

and members of different groups are increasingly demanding

what thev consider a fair share of resources and benefits. Toler- ance for inequity is diminishing among the less privileged, even as inequitv is increasing in both rural and urban areas. As

competition for scarce resources and benefits grows,, some

political leaders have been encouraging the populace to blame

these problems on religious differences.

Prosperity is available to many and access to education and

an expanding range of consumer goods is possible for an ever- increasing number of people. At the same time, the sheer numbers of the poor and less privileged are increasing as thev are

left behind, inadequately educated, and forced bv circumstance to labor under insecure conditions. Class and gender

justice, widelv sought bv a significant number of people,

remains an elusive goal.

India is part of a much wider community of nations facing

these and other problems, so it will not be alone in seeking

solutions. In this endeavor, the great structural principles of

hierarchy and interdependence that have held Indian society

together over the millennia will be brought to the fore. Creating manageable order from complexity, bringing together

widely disparate groups in structured efforts to benefit the

wider society, encouraging harmony among people with divergent interests., knowing that close family and friends can rely

on each other in times of stress, allocating different tasks to those with different skills, and striving to do what is morallv

right in the eves of the divine and the human community

292
Social Systems

these are some of the great strengths upon which Indian society can rely as it meets the challenges of the future.

* * * The English-language literature on Indian society is enor- mous. Many of the most highly regarded works have been published in both India and the United States. Among these are David G. Mandelbaum's two-volume Society in India, a classic

synthesis of sociological and anthropological research; historian Stanley Wolpert's India, a highly readable introduction to many aspects of Indian culture and history; Owen M. Lynch's

The Politics of Untouchability; Sudhir Kakar's The Inner World;

M.N. Srinivas's Social Change in Modern India; Pauline M.

Kolenda's Caste in Contemporary India; Miriam Sharma's The Politics of Inequality; and V.S. Naipaul's India: A Million Mutinies

Now.

Works published in the United States, which may also be

available in India, include Maureen L.P. Patterson's comprehensive South Asian Civilizations: A Bibliographic Synthesis, an

essential reference; Clarence Maloney's Peoples of South Asia, an

extremely useful overview; Robert W. Stern's Changing India, an

introduction to India's modern history and social institutions;

and Myron Weiner's The Child and the State in India, a thoughtprovoking examination of children's place in Indian social

structure. To stay abreast of current events, it is worthwhile to read the fortnightly news magazine India Today, published in

both Indian and American editions. (For further information

and complete citations, see Bibliography.)

293

Chapter 6. Character and Structure of the

Economy
A traditional-style printer using a wood block to print designs onfabric
INDIA'S ECONOMY HAS MADE great strides in the years

since independence. In 1947 the country was poor and shattered by the violence and economic and physical disruption

involved in the partition from Pakistan. The economy had stagnated since the late nineteenth century and industrial development had been restrained to preserve the area as a market

for British manufacturers. In fiscal year (FY—see Glossary)

1950, agriculture, forestry, and fishing accounted for 58.9 percent of the gross domestic product (GDP—see Glossary) and

for a much larger proportion of employment. Manufacturing,

which was dominated by the jute and cotton textile industries,

accounted for only 10.3 percent of GDP at that time.

India's new leaders sought to use the power of the state to direct economic growth and reduce widespread poverty. The

public sector came to dominate heavy industry, transportation,

and telecommunications. The private sector produced most

consumer goods but was controlled directly by a variety of government regulations and financial institutions that provided

major financing for large private-sector projects. Government

emphasized self-sufficiency rather than foreign trade and

imposed strict controls on imports and exports. In the 1950s,

there was steady economic growth, but results in the 1960s and

1970s were less encouraging.

Beginning in the late 1970s, successive Indian governments

sought to reduce state control of the economy. Progress toward

that goal was slow but steady, and many analysts attributed the

stronger growth of the 1980s to those efforts. In the late 1980s,

however, India relied on foreign borrowing to finance development plans to a greater extent than before. As a result, when

the price of oil rose sharply in August 1990, the nation faced a balance of payments crisis. The need for emergency loans led

the government to make a greater commitment to economic

liberalization than it had up to this time. In the early 1990s,

India's postindependence development pattern of strong centralized planning, regulation and control of private enterprise,

state ownership of many large units of production, trade protectionism, and strict limits on foreign capital was increasingly

questioned not only by policy makers but also by most of the

intelligentsia.

297
India: A Country Study

As India moved into the mid-1990s, the economic outlook was mixed. Most analysts believed that economic liberalization

would continue, although there was disagreement about the

speed and scale of the measures that would be implemented. It seemed likely that India would come close to or equal the relatively impressive rate of economic growth attained in the 1980s,

but that the poorest sections of the population might not benefit. Structure of the Economy

Independence to 1979

At independence the economy was predominantly agrarian.

Most of the population was employed in agriculture, and most

of those people were very poor, existing by cropping their own

small plots or supplying labor to other farms. Landownership,

land rental, and sharecropping rights were complex, involving

layers of intermediaries (see Land Use, ch. 7). Moreover, the

structural economic problems inherited at independence were

exacerbated by the costs associated with the partition of British

India, which had resulted in about 12 million to 14 million ref- ugees fleeing past each other across the new borders between

India and Pakistan (see National Integration, ch. 1). The settle- ment of refugees was a considerable financial strain. Partition

also divided complementary economic zones. Under the British, jute and cotton were grown in the eastern part of Bengal,

the area that became East Pakistan (after 1971, Bangladesh),

but processing took place mostly in the western part of Bengal,

which became the Indian state of West Bengal in 1947. As a

result, after independence India had to employ land previously

used for food production to cultivate cotton and jute for its mills.

India's leaders—especially the first prime minister, Jawaharlal Nehru, who introduced the five-year plans—agreed that

strong economic growth and measures to increase incomes

and consumption among the poorest groups were necessary

goals for the new nation. Government was assigned an important role in this process, and since 1951 a series of plans have

guided the country's economic development. Although there was considerable growth in the 1950s, the long-term rates of

growth were less positive than India's politicians desired and

less than those of many other Asian countries. From FY 1951 to FY 1979, the economy grew at an average rate of about 3.1 per298
Character and Structure of the Economy

cent a year in constant prices, or at an annual rate of 1.0 percent per capita (see table 16, Appendix). During this period,

industry grew at an average rate of 4.5 percent a year, compared with an annual average of 3.0 percent for agriculture.

Many factors contributed to the slowdown of the economy after

the mid-1960s, but economists differ over the relative importance of those factors. Structural deficiencies, such as the need

for institutional changes in agriculture and the inefficiency of

much of the industrial sector, also contributed to economic

stagnation. Wars with China in 1962 and with Pakistan in 1965

and 1971; a flood of refugees from East Pakistan in 1971;

droughts in 1965, 1966, 1971, and 1972; currency devaluation

in 1966; and the first world oil crisis, in 1973-74, all jolted the

economy.

Growth since 1980

The rate of growth improved in the 1980s. From FY 1980 to FY 1989, the economy grew at an annual rate of 5.5 percent, or

3.3 percent on a per capita basis. Industry grew at an annual

rate of 6.6 percent and agriculture at a rate of 3.6 percent. A

high rate of investment was a major factor in improved eco- nomic growth. Investment went from about 19 percent of GDP

in the early 1970s to nearly 25 percent in the early 1980s. India,

however, required a higher rate of investment to attain comparable economic growth than did most other low-income developing countries, indicating a lower rate of return on

investments. Part of the adverse Indian experience was

explained by investment in large, long-gestating, capital-intensive projects, such as electric power, irrigation, and infrastructure. However, delayed completions, cost overruns, and underuse of capacity were contributing factors.

Private savings financed most of India's investment, but by

the mid-1980s further growth in private savings was difficult

because they were already at quite a high level. As a result, during the late 1980s India relied increasingly on borrowing from

foreign sources (see Aid, this ch.). This trend led to a balance

of payments crisis in 1990; in order to receive new loans, the

government had no choice but to agree to further measures of

economic liberalization. This commitment to economic

reform was reaffirmed by the government that came to power

in June 1991.

India's primary sector, including agriculture, forestry, fish- ing, mining, and quarrying, accounted for 32.8 percent of GDP

299
India: A Counts Stud\

in FY 1991 (see table 17, Appendix). The size of the agricultural sector and its vulnerability to the vagaries of the monsoon

cause relativelv large fluctuations in the sector's contribution to GDP from one vear to another (see Crop Output, ch. 7).

In FY 1991. the contribution to GDP of industry, including

manufacturing, construction, and utilities, was 27.4 percent;

services, including trade, transportation, communications, real

estate and finance, and public- and private-sector services, contributed 39. S percent. The steadv increase in the proportion of

services in the national economv reflects increased

market-determined processes, such as the spread of rural banking, and government activities, such as defense spending (see

Agricultural Credit, ch. 7; Defense Spending, ch. 10).

Despite a sometimes disappointing rate of growth, the

Indian economv was transformed between 1947 and the early

1990s. The number of kilowatt-hours of electricitv generated,

for example, increased more than fiftvfold. Steel production

rose from 1.5 million tons a vear to 14.7 million tons a year. The countrv produced space satellites and nuclear-power

plants, and its scientists and engineers produced an atomic

explosive device (see Major Research Organizations, this ch.; Space and Nuclear Programs, ch. 10). Tife expectancy

increased from twenty-seven years to fifty-nine years. .Although

the population increased by 485 million between 1951 and

1991, the availability of food grains per capita rose from 395

grams per dav in FY 1950 to 466 grams in FY 1992 (see Structure and Dynamics, ch. 2).

However, considerable dualism remains in the Indian econ- omv. Officials and economists make an important distinction

between the formal and informal sectors of the economv. The

informal, or unorganized, economv is largely rural and encompasses farming, fishing, forestry and cottage industries. It also

includes petty vendors and some small-scale mechanized industrv in both rural and urban areas. The bulk of the population is employed in the informal economv. which contributes more

than 50 percent of GDP. The formal economv consists of large

units in the modern sector for which statistical data are relatively crood. The modern sector includes lar^e-scale manufacturing and mining, major financial and commercial businesses,

and such public-sector enterprises as railroads, telecommunications, utilities, and government itself. The greatest disappointment of economic development is the failure to reduce more substantially India's widespread pov300
Character and Structure of the Economy

erty. Studies have suggested that income distribution changed

little between independence and the early 1990s, although it is possible that the poorer half of the population improved its position slightly Official estimates of the proportion of the

population that lives below the poverty line tend to vary sharply

from year to year because adverse economic conditions, especially rises in food prices, are capable of lowering the standard

of living of many families who normally live just above the subsistence level. The Indian government's poverty line is based

on an income sufficient to ensure access to minimum nutritional standards, and even most persons above the poverty line

have low levels of consumption compared with much of the

world.

Estimates in the late 1970s put the number of people who

lived in poverty at 300 million, or nearly 50 percent of the population at the time. Poverty was reduced during the 1980s, and

in FY 1989 it was estimated that about 26 percent of the population, or 220 million people, lived below the poverty line. Slower

economic growth and higher inflation in FY 1990 and FY 1991

reversed this trend. In FY 1991, it was estimated that 332 million people, or 38 percent of the population, lived below the

poverty line. Farmers and other rural residents make up the large majority of India's poor. Some own very small amounts of land while

others are field hands, seminomadic shepherds, or migrant

workers. The urban poor include many construction workers

and petty vendors. The bulk of the poor work, but low productivity and intermittent employment keep incomes low. Poverty

is most prevalent in the states of Orissa, Bihar, Uttar Pradesh,

and Madhya Pradesh, and least prevalent in Haryana, Punjab,

Himachal Pradesh, andJammu and Kashmir.

By the early 1990s, economic changes led to the growth in

the number of Indians with significant economic resources. About 10 million Indians are considered upper class, and

roughly 300 million are part of the rapidly increasing middle

class. Typical middle-class occupations include owning a small

business or being a corporate executive, lawyer, physician,

white-collar worker, or land-owning farmer. In the 1980s, the

growth of the middle class was reflected in the increased con- sumption of consumer durables, such as televisions, refrigerators, motorcycles, and automobiles. In the early 1990s,

domestic and foreign businesses hoped to take advantage of

301
India: A Ccuntj Study

India s economic liberalization to increase the range of con- sumer products ottered to this market.

Housing and the ancillarv utilities of sewer and water sys- tems lag considerably behind the population's needs. India's

cities have large shantvtowns built of scrap or readilv available

natural materials erected on whatever space is available, including; sidewalks. Such dwellings lack piped water, sewerage, and

electricity. The government has attempted to build housing

facilities and utilities for urban development, but the efforts

have fallen far short of demand. Administrative controls and

other aspects of government polio' have discouraged many pri- vate investors from constructing housing units.

Liberalization in the Ear l\ 1 990s

Increased borrowing from foreign sources in the late 1950s,

which helped fuel economic growth, led to pressure on the bal- ance of payments. The problem came to a head in August 1990

when Iraq invaded Kuwait, and the price of oil soon doubled.

In addition, many Indian workers resident in Persian Gulf

states either lost their jobs or returned home out of fear for

their safer.", thus reducing the flow of remittances isee Size and

Composition of the Work Force, this ch.). The direct economic

impact of the Persian Gulf conflict was exacerbated by domestic social and political developments. In the earlv 1990s, there was violence over two domestic issues: the reservation of a proportion of public-sector jobs for members of Scheduled Castes

see Glossary) and the Hindu-Muslim conflict at Ayodhya (see

Public Worship, ch. 5; Political Issues, ch. S>. The central government fell in November 1990 and was succeeded by a minority government. The cumulative impact of these events shook

international confidence in India's economic viability, and the

country found it increasingly difficult to borrow internationally As a result. India made various agreements with the Inter- national Monetary Fund (IMF—see Glossary) and other

organizations that included commitments to speed up liberalization (see United Nations, ch. 9). In the early 1990s, considerable progress was made in loosening government regulations, especially in the area of foreign

trade. Mam" restrictions on private companies were lifted, and

new areas were opened to private capital. However, India

remains one of the world s most tight.lv regulated major economies. Manv powerful vested interests, including private firms

that have benefited from protectionism, labor unions, and

5:_
Telephone manufacturingfactory, Maharashtra

Courtesy India Abroad News Service

much of the bureaucracy, oppose liberalization. There is also

considerable concern that liberalization will reinforce class and

regional economic disparities.

The balance of payments crisis of 1990 and subsequent policy changes led to a temporary decline in the GDP growth rate,

which fell from 6.9 percent in FY 1989 to 4.9 percent in FY 1990

to 1.1 percent in FY 1991. In March 1995, the estimated growth

rate for FY 1994 was 5.3 percent. Inflation peaked at 17 percent

in FY 1991, fell to 9.5 percent in FY 1993, and then accelerated

again, reaching 11 percent in late FY 1994. This increase was

attributed to a sharp increase in prices and a shortfall in such

critical sectors as sugar, cotton, and oilseeds. Many analysts

agree that the poor suffer most from the increased inflation

rate and reduced growth rate.

303
India: A Country Study

The Role of Government

Early Policy Developments

Many early postindependence leaders, such as Nehru, were

influenced by socialist ideas and advocated government intervention to guide the economy, including state ownership of key

industries. The objective was to achieve high and balanced eco- nomic development in the general interest while particular

programs and measures helped the poor. India's leaders also

believed that industrialization was the key to economic development. This belief was all the more convincing in India

because of the country's large size, substantial natural

resources, and desire to develop its own defense industries.

The Industrial Policy Resolution of 1948 gave government a monopoly in armaments, atomic energy, and railroads, and

exclusive rights to develop minerals, the iron and steel industries, aircraft manufacturing, shipbuilding, and manufacturing

of telephone and telegraph equipment. Private companies

operating in those fields were guaranteed at least ten years

more of ownership before the government could take them

over. Some still operate as private companies.

The Industrial Policy Resolution of 1956 greatly extended

the preserve of government. There were seventeen industries

exclusively in the public sector. The government took the lead

in another twelve industries, but private companies could also

engage in production. This resolution covered industries producing capital and intermediate goods. As a result, the private

sector was relegated primarily to production of consumer

goods. The public sector also expanded into more services. In

1956 the life insurance business was nationalized, and in 1973

the general insurance business was also acquired by the public

sector. Most large commercial banks were nationalized in 1969.

Over the years, the central and state governments formed

agencies, and companies engaged in finance, trading, mineral

exploitation, manufacturing, utilities, and transportation. The

public sector was extensive and influential throughout the

economy, although the value of its assets was small relative to the private sector. Controls over prices, production, and the use of foreign

exchange, which were imposed by the British during World

War II, were reinstated soon after independence. The Industries (Development and Regulation) Act of 1951 and the Essential Commodities Act of 1955 (with subsequent additions)

304
Character and Structure of the Economy

provided the legal framework for the government to extend

price controls that eventually included steel, cement, drugs,

nonferrous metals, chemicals, fertilizer, coal, automobiles, tires and tubes, cotton textiles, food grains, bread, butter, vegetable

oils, and other commodities. By the late 1950s, controls were

pervasive, regulating investment in industry, prices of many

commodities, imports and exports, and the flow of foreign

exchange.

Export growth was long ignored. The government's extensive controls and pervasive licensing requirements created

imbalances and structural problems in many parts of the econ- omy. Controls were usually imposed to correct specific problems but often without adequate consideration of their effect

on other parts of the economy. For example, the government

set low prices for basic foods, transportation, and other commodities and services, a policy designed to protect the living

standards of the poor. However, the policy proved counterproductive when the government also limited the output of

needed goods and services. Price ceilings were implemented

during shortages, but the ceiling frequently contributed to black markets in those commodities and to tax evasion by

black-market participants. Import controls and tariff policy

stimulated local manufacturers toward production of importsubstitution goods, but under conditions devoid of sufficient

competition or pressure to be efficient.

Private trading and industrial conglomerates (the so-called

large houses) existed under the British and continued after

independence. The government viewed the conglomerates

with suspicion, believing that they often manipulated markets

and prices for their own profit. After independence the government instituted licensing controls on new businesses, especially in manufacturing, and on expanding capacity in existing

businesses. In the 1960s, when shortages of goods were extensive, considerable criticism was leveled at traders for manipulating markets and prices. The result was the 1970 Monopolies

and Restrictive Practices Act, which was designed to provide

the government with additional information on the structure

and investments of all firms that had assets of more than Rs200

million (for value of the rupee—see Glossary), to strengthen

the licensing system in order to decrease the concentration of

private economic power, and to place restraints on certain busi- ness practices considered contrary to the public interest. The

act emphasized the government's aversion to large companies

305
India: A Country Study

in the private sector, but critics contended that the act resulted

from political motives and not from a strong case against big

firms. The act and subsequent enforcement restrained private

investment.

The extensive controls, the large public sector, and the many

government programs contributed to a substantial growth in

the administrative structure of government. The government

also sought to take on many of the unemployed. The result was

a swollen, inefficient bureaucracy that took inordinate

amounts of time to process applications and forms. Business

leaders complained that they spent more time getting government approval than running their companies. Many observers

also reported extensive corruption in the huge bureaucracy.

One consequence was the development of a large underground economy in small-scale enterprises and the services sector.India's current economic reforms began in 1985 when the

government abolished some of its licensing regulations and

other competition-inhibiting controls. Since 1991 more "new

economic policies" or reforms have been introduced. Reforms

include currency devaluations and making currency partially

convertible, reduced quantitative restrictions on imports,

reduced import duties on capital goods, decreases in subsidies,

liberalized interest rates, abolition of licenses for most industries, the sale of shares in selected public enterprises, and tax reforms. Although many observers welcomed these changes

and attributed the faster growth rate of the economy in the late 1980s to them, others feared that these changes would create

more problems than they solved. The growing dependence of

the economy on imports, greater vulnerability of its balance of

payments, reliance on debt, and the consequent susceptibility

to outside pressures on economic poliq7 directions caused concern. The increase in consumerism and the display of conspic- uous wealth by the elite exacerbated these fears. The pace of liberalization increased after 1991. By the mid1990s, the number of sectors reserved for public ownership was

slashed, and private-sector investment was encouraged in areas such as energy, steel, oil refining and exploration, road building, air transportation, and telecommunications. An area still closed to the private sector in the mid-1990s was defense industry. Foreign-exchange regulations were liberalized, foreign

investment was encouraged, and import regulations were simplified. The average import-weighted tariff was reduced from

306
Character and Structure of the Economy

87 percent in FY 1991 to 33 percent in FY 1994. Despite these

changes, the economy remained highly regulated by international standards. The import of many consumer goods was banned, and the production of 838 items, mostly consumer

goods, was reserved for companies with total investment of less than Rs6 million. Although the government had sold off

minority stakes in public-sector companies, it had not in 1995

given up control of any enterprises, nor had any of the loss- making public companies been closed down. Moreover,

although import duties had been lowered substantially, they were still high compared to most other countries.

Political successes in the mid-1990s by nationalist-oriented

political parties led to some backlash against foreign investment in some parts of India (see Political Parties, ch. 8). In

early 1995, official charges of serving adulterated products were made against a KFC outlet in Bangalore, and Pepsi-Cola

products were smashed and advertisements defaced in New

Delhi. The most serious backlash occurred in Maharashtra in

August 1995 when the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP—Indian

People's Party)-led state government halted construction of a US$2.8 million 2,015-megawatt gas-fired electric-power plant

being built near Bombay (Mumbai in the Marathi language) by

another United States company, Enron Corporation.

Antipoverty Programs

The government has initiated, sustained, and refined many

programs since independence to help the poor attain self suffi- ciency in food production. Probably the most important initia- tive has been the supply of basic commodities, particularly food

at controlled prices, available throughout the country. The

poor spend about 80 percent of their income on food while the

rest of the population spends more than 60 percent. The price

of food is a major determinant of wage scales. Often when food

prices rise sharply, rioting and looting follow. Until the late

1970s, the government frequently had difficulty obtaining adequate grain supplies in years of poor harvests. During those

times, states with surpluses of grain were cordoned off to force

partial sales to public agencies and to keep private traders from

shipping grain to deficit areas to secure very high prices; state governments in surplus-grain areas were often less than cooperative. After the late 1970s, the central government, by holding reserve stocks and importing grain adequately and early,

maintained sufficient supplies to meet the increased demand

307
India: A Country Study

during drought years. It also provided more remunerative

prices to farmers.

In rural areas, the government has undertaken programs to mitigate the worst effects of adverse monsoon rainfall, which

affects not only farmers but village artisans and traders when

the price of grain rises. The government has supplied water by

financing well digging and, since the early 1980s, by powerassisted well drilling; rescinded land taxes for drought areas; tried to maintain stable food prices; and provided food

through a food-for-work program. The actual work accomplished through food-for-work programs is often a secondary

consideration, but useful projects sometimes result. Employment is offered at a low daily wage, usually paid in grain, the

rationale being that only the truly needy will take jobs at such

low pay. In the 1980s and early 1990s, Indian government programs

attempted to provide basic needs at stable, low prices; to

increase income through pricing and regulations, such as supplying water from irrigation works, fertilizer, and other inputs;

to foster location of industry in backward areas; to increase

access to basic social services, such as education, health, and

potable water supply; and to help needy groups and deprived

areas. The total money spent on such programs for the poor was not discernible from the budget data, but probably

exceeded 10 percent of planned budget outlays.

India has had a number of antipoverty programs since the

early 1960s. These include, among others, the National Rural

Employment Programme and the Rural Landless Employment

Guarantee Programme. The National Rural Employment Programme evolved in FY 1980 from the earlier Food for Work

Programme to use unemployed and underemployed workers

to build productive community assets. The Rural Landless

Employment Guarantee Programme was instituted in FY 1983

to address the plight of the hard-core rural poor by expanding

employment opportunities and building the rural infrastruc- ture as a means of encouraging rapid economic growth. There were many problems with the implementation of these and

otherschemes, but observers credit them with helping reduce

poverty. To improve the effectiveness of the National Rural

Employment Programme, in 1989 it was combined with the

Rural Landless Employment Guarantee Programme and

renamed Jawahar Rozgar Yojana, or Jawahar Employment Plan

(see Development Programs, ch. 7).

308
Character and Structure of the Economy

State governments are important participants in antipoverty

programs. The constitution assigns responsibility to the states in a number of matters, including ownership, redistribution,

improvement, and taxation of land (see The Constitutional

Framework, ch. 8). State governments implement most central

government programs concerned with land reform and the sit- uation of small landless farmers. The central government tries to establish programs and norms among the states and union

territories, but implementation has often remained at the

lower bureaucratic levels. In some matters concerning subsoil

rights and irrigation projects, the central government exerts

political and financial leverage to obtain its objectives, but the

states sometimes modify or retard the impact of central government policies and programs.

Development Planning

Planning in India dates back to the 1930s. Even before independence, the colonial government had established a planning

board that lasted from 1944 to 1946. Private industrialists and

economists published three development plans in 1944. India's

leaders adopted the principle of formal economic planning

soon after independence as an effective way to intervene in the

economy to foster growth and social justice.

The Planning Commission was established in 1950. Responsible only to the prime minister, the commission is independent of the cabinet. The prime minister is chairperson of the

commission, and the minister of state with independent charge

for planning and program implementation serves as deputy

chairperson. A staff drafts national plans under the guidance

of the commission; draft plans are presented for approval to the National Development Council, which consists of the Planning Commission and the chief ministers of the states. The

council can make changes in the draft plan. After council

approval, the draft is presented to the cabinet and subsequently to Parliament, whose approval makes the plan an operating document for central and state governments (see The

Legislature; Local Government, ch. 8).

The First Five-Year Plan (FY 1951-55) attempted to stimulate

balanced economic development while correcting imbalances

caused by World War II and partition. Agriculture, including

projects that combined irrigation and power generation,

received priority. By contrast, the Second Five-Year Plan (FY

1956-60) emphasized industrialization, particularly basic,

309
India: A Country Study

heavy industries in the public sector, and improvement of the

economic infrastructure. The plan also stressed social goals,

such as more equal distribution of income and extension of the

benefits of economic development to the large number of dis- advantaged people. The Third Five-Year Plan (FY 1961-65)

aimed at a substantial rise in national and per capita income

while expanding the industrial base and rectifying the neglect

of agriculture in the previous plan. The third plan called for

national income to grow at a rate of more than 5 percent a

year; self-sufficiency in food grains was anticipated in the

mid-1960s.

Economic difficulties disrupted the planning process in the

mid-1960s. In 1962, when a brief war was fought with China on

the Himalayan frontier, agricultural output was stagnating,

industrial production was considerably below expectations,

and the economy was growing at about half of the planned rate (see Nehru's Legacy, ch. 1). Defense expenditures increased

sharply, and the increased foreign aid needed to maintain

development expenditures eventually provided 28 percent of

public development spending. Midway through the third plan,

it was clear that its goals could not be achieved. Food prices rose in 1963, causing rioting and looting of grain warehouses

in 1964. War with Pakistan in 1965 sharply reduced the foreign

aid available. Successive severe droughts in 1965 and 1966 fur- ther disrupted the economy and planning. Three annual plans

guided development between FY 1966 and FY 1968 while plan

policies and strategies were reevaluated. Immediate attention

centered on increasing agricultural growth, stimulating

exports, and searching for efficient uses of industrial assets. Agriculture was to be expanded, largely through the supply of

inputs to take advantage of new high-yield seeds becoming

available for food grains. The rupee was substantially devalued

in 1966, and export incentives were adjusted to promote

exports. Controls affecting industry were simplified, and

greater reliance was placed on the price mechanism to achieve

industrial efficiency.

The Fourth Five-Year Plan (FY 1969-73) called for a 24 percent increase over the third plan in real terms of public development expenditures. The public sector accounted for 60

percent of plan expenditures, and foreign aid contributed 13

percent of plan financing. Agriculture, including irrigation,

received 23 percent of public outlays; the rest was mostly spent

on electric power, industry, and transportation. Although the

310
Character and Structure of the Economy

plan projected national income growth at 5.7 percent a year, the realized rate was only 3.3 percent.

The Fifth Five-Year Plan (FY 1974-78) was drafted in late

1973 when crude oil prices were rising rapidly; the rising prices

quickly forced a series of revisions. The plan was subsequently

approved in late 1976 but was terminated at the end of FY 1977

because a new government wanted different priorities and programs. The fifth plan was in effect only one year, although it provided some guidance to investments throughout the

five-year period. The economy operated under annual plans in

FY 1978 and FY 1979.

The Sixth Five-Year Plan (FY 1980-84) was intended to be

flexible and was based on the principle of annual "rolling"

plans. It called for development expenditures of nearly Rsl.9

trillion (in FY 1979 prices), of which 90 percent would be

financed from domestic sources, 57 percent of which would

come from the public sector. Public-sector development spending would be concentrated in energy (29 percent); agriculture

and irrigation (24 percent); industry including mining (16 percent); transportation (16 percent); and social services (14 percent). In practice, slightly more was spent on social services at the expense of transportation and energy. The plan called for

GDP growth to increase by 5.1 percent a year, a target that was

surpassed by 0.3 percent. A major objective of the plan was to increase employment, especially in rural areas, in order to reduce the level of poverty. Poor people were given cows, bullock carts, and handlooms; however, subsequent studies indicated that the income of only about 10 percent of the poor

rose above the poverty level. The Seventh Five-Year Plan (FY 1985-89) envisioned a

greater emphasis on the allocation of resources to energy and

social spending at the expense of industry and agriculture. In

practice, the main increase was in transportation and communications, which took up 17 percent of public-sector expenditure during this period. Total spending was targeted at nearly

Rs3.9 trillion, of which 94 percent would be financed from

domestic resources, including 48 percent from the public sector. The planners assumed that public savings would increase

and help finance government spending. In practice that

increase did not occur; instead, the government relied on for- eign borrowing for a greater share of resources than expected.

The schedule for the Eighth Five-Year Plan (FY 1992-96) was

affected by changes of government and by growing uncertainty

311
India: A County Study

over what role planning could usefully perform in a more lib- eral economv. Two annual plans were in effect in FY 1990 and

FY 1991. The eighth plan was finally launched in April 1992

and emphasized market-based policy reform rather than quantitative targets. Total spending was planned at RsS.7 trillion, of

which 94 percent would be financed from domestic resources, 45 percent of which would come from the public sector. The

eighth plan included three general goals. First, it sought to cut

back the public sector bv selling off failing and inessential

industries while encouraging private investment in such sectors

as power, steel, and transport. Second, it proposed that agriculture and rural development have priority Third, it sought to renew the assault on illiteracy and improve other aspects of

social infrastructure, such as the provision of fresh drinking

water. Government documents issued in 1992 indicated that

GDP growth was expected to increase from around 5 percent a vear during the seventh plan to 5.6 percent a vear during the

eighth plan. However, in 1994 economists expected annual

growth to be around 4 percent during the period of the eighth

plan.

Four decades of planning show that India's economy a mix

of public and private enterprise, is too large and diverse to be

whollv predictable or responsive to directions of the planning

authorities. Actual results usually differ in important respects

from plan targets. Major shortcomings include insufficient

improvement in income distribution and alleviation of poverty

delaved completions and cost overruns on manv public-sector

projects, and far too small a return on many public-sector

investments. Even though the plans have turned out to be less effective than expected, thev help guide investment priorities,

policv recommendations, and financial mobilization.

Finance

The earlv governments after independence operated with

onlv modest budget deficits, but in the 1970s and 1980s the

amount of the budget deficit as a proportion of GDP increased

gradually, reaching 8.4 percent in FY 1990. Following eco- nomic reforms, the deficit declined to 6.7 percent by FY 1994.

More than SO percent of the public debt was financed from

domestic sources, but the proportion of foreign debt rose

steadily in the late 1980s. However, although foreign aid to India was substantial, it was much lower than most other developing countries when calculated on a per capita basis. Banking

312
Character and Structure of the Economy

and credit were dominated by government-controlled institutions, but the importance of the private sector in financial ser- vices was increasing slowly.

Budget

India's public finance system follows the British pattern. The

constitution establishes the supremacy of the bicameral Parliament—specifically the Lok Sabha (House of the People) —in

financial matters. No central government taxes are levied and

no government expenditure from public funds disbursed without an act of Parliament, which also scrutinizes and audits all government accounts to ensure that expenditures are legally

authorized and properly spent. Proposals for taxation or

expenditures, however, may be initiated only within the Council of Ministers—specifically by the minister of finance. The

minister of finance is required to submit to Parliament, usually

on the last day of February, a financial statement detailing the

estimated receipts and expenditures of the central government

for the forthcoming fiscal year and a financial review of the

current fiscal year. The Lok Sabha has one month to review and modify the government's budget proposals. If by April 1, the beginning of the

fiscal year, the parliamentary discussion of the budget has not

been completed, the budget as proposed by the minister of

finance goes into effect, subject to retroactive modifications

after the parliamentary review. On completion of its budget

discussions, the Lok Sabha passes the annual appropriations

act, authorizing the executive to spend money, and the finance

act, authorizing the executive to impose and collect taxes. Supplemental requests for funds are presented during the course

of the fiscal year to cover emergencies, such as war or other

catastrophes. The bills are forwarded to the Rajya Sabha

(Council of States—the upper house of Parliament) for comment. The Lok Sabha, however, is not bound by the comments,

and the Rajya Sabha cannot delay passage of money bills. When

signed by the president, the bills become law. The Lok Sabha

cannot increase the request for funds submitted by the executive, nor can it authorize new expenditures. Taxes passed by

Parliament may be retroactive.

Each state government maintains its own budget, prepared

by the state's minister of finance in consultation with appropriate officials of the central government. Primary control over

state finances rests with the state legislature in the same man313
In did : A Conntry Stu dy

ner as at the central government level. State finances are supervised by the central government, however, through the

comptroller and the auditor general; the latter reviews state government accounts annually and reports the findings to the

appropriate state governor for submission to the state's legisla- ture. The central and state budgets consist of a budget for cur- rent expenditures, known as the budget on revenue account,

and a capital budget for economic and social development

expenditures.

The national railroad (Indian Railways), the largest publicsector enterprise, and the Department of Posts and Telegraph

have their own budgets, funds, and accounts (see Railroads;

Telecommunications, this ch.). The appropriations and disbursements under their budgets are subject to the same form

of parliamentary and audit control as other government reve- nues and expenditures. Dividends accrue to the central government, and deficits are subsidized by it, a pattern that holds

true also, directly or indirectly, for other government enterprises.

During the eighth plan, the states were expected to spend

nearly Rsl.9 trillion, or 42.9 percent of the public outlay.

Because of its greater revenue sources, the central government

shared with the states its receipts from personal income taxes

and certain excise taxes. It also collected other minor taxes, the

total proceeds of which were transferred to the states. The divi- sion of the shared taxes is determined bv financial commissions established by the president, usually at five-year intervals.

In the early 1990s, the states received 75 percent of the revenue

collected from income taxes and around 43 percent of the

excise taxes. The central government also provided the states with grants to meet their commitments. In FY 1991, these

grants and the states' share of taxes collected by the central

government amounted to 40.9 percent of the total revenue of

state governments.

The states' share of total public revenue collected declined

from 48 percent in FY 1955 to about 42 percent in the late

1970s, and to about 33 percent in the early 1990s. An important cause of the decline was the diminished importance of the

land revenue tax, which traditionally had been the main direct

tax on agriculture. This tax declined from 8 percent of all state and central tax revenues in FY 1950 to less than 1 percent in

the 1980s and early 1990s. The states have jurisdiction over

taxes levied on land and agricultural income, and vested inter314
Character and Structure of the Economy

ests exerted pressure on the states not to raise agricultural taxa- tion. As a result, in the 1980s and early 1990s agriculture

largely escaped significant taxation, although there has long

been nationwide discussion about increasing land taxes or

instituting some sort of tax on incomes of the richer portion of

the farm community. The share of direct taxes in GDP

increased from 2.1 percent in FY 1991 to 2.8 percent in FY

1994.

Since independence government has favored more politically palatable indirect taxes—customs and excise duties—over direct taxes. In the 1980s and early 1990s, indirect taxes

accounted for around 75 percent of all tax revenue collected

by the central government. State governments relied heavily on

sales taxes. Overall, indirect taxes accounted for 84.1 percent

of all government tax revenues in FY 1990. Total government

tax revenues amounted to 17.1 percent of GDP in that year, up

from 9.0 percent in FY 1960, 11.5 percent in FY 1970, and 14.9

percent in FY 1980. In FY 1990, the share of the public sector in

GDP was 26.4 percent. In terms of rupees (in current prices),

total government income rose from Rs259.8 billion in FY 1981

to Rsl.3 trillion in FY1992 (see table 18, Appendix).

Comprehensive tax reforms were implemented with the FY

1985 budget. Corporate tax was cut, income taxes simplified

and lowered for high-income groups, and wealth taxes

reduced. Tax receipts in FY 1985 rose by 20 percent over FY

1984 as a result of tightened enforcement, and taxpayers

responded to lower taxes with greater compliance. In FY 1986,

another major change was made with the launching of a long-term program of tax reform designed to eliminate annual

changes, which had produced uncertainty. However, in FY

1987, when the monsoon failed, the government raised taxes

on higher income groups. The emergency budget of FY 1991,

designed to cope with the nation's 1990 balance of payments

crisis, increased indirect and corporate taxes, but the budgets

for FY 1992 and FY 1993 reflected the policy of economic liberalization. They reduced and simplified direct taxes, removed

the wealth tax from financial investments, and indexed the capital gains tax. The highest marginal rate of personal income tax was 42.5 percent in FY 1992.

Fiscal Administration

Historically, the Indian government has pursued a cautious

policy with regard to financing budgets, allowing only small

315
India: A Counties Study

amounts of deficit spending. Budget deficits increased in the

late 1980s, and the necessity of financing these deficits from

foreign borrowing contributed to the 1990 balance of payments crisis. The central government budget deficit reached

8.4 percent of GDP in FY 1990, up from 2.6 percent in FY 1970,

5.9 percent in FY19S0. and 7.8 percent in FY 1989. The deficit was cut to 5.9 percent in FY 1991 and 5.2 percent in FY 1992,

but widened to 7.4 percent in FY 1993. It was expected to recede to 6.2 percent in FY 1995.

The central government's budget deficits during the 1980s

increased the total public debt rapidly until in FY 1991 it stood

at Rs3.9 trillion. The bulk of this debt was owed to citizens and

domestic institutions and firms, particularly the central bank.

Readers of Indian monetary statistics should be alert to the use

of the terms lakh (see Glossary) and crore (see Glossary), which

are used to express higher numbers.

Monetary Process

The basic elements of the financial system were established

during British rule (1757-1947). The national currency, the

rupee, had long been used domestically before independence

and even circulated abroad, for example, in the Persian Gulf

region. Foreign banks, mainly British and including some from

such other parts of the empire as Hong Kong, provided banking and other services. The Reserve Bank of India was formed

in 1935 as a private bank, but it also carried out some central

bank functions. This colonial banking system, however, was

geared to foreign trade and short-term loans. Banking was concentrated in the major port cities. The Reserve Bank was nationalized on January 1, 1949, and

given broader powers. It was the bank of issue for all rupee

notes higher than the one-rupee denomination; the agent of

the Ministry of Finance in controlling foreign exchange; and

the banker to the central and state governments, commercial

banks, state cooperative banks, and other financial institutions.

The Reserve Bank formulated and administered monetary policv to promote stable prices and higher production. It was

given increasing responsibilities for the development of banking and credit and to coordinate banking and credit with the

five-year plans. The Reserve Bank had a number of tools with

which to affect commercial bank credit.

.After independence the government sought to adapt the

banking system to promote development and formed a num316
Character and Structure of the Economy

ber of specialized institutions to provide credit to industry, agriculture, and small businesses. Banking penetrated rural areas, and agricultural and industrial credit cooperatives were promoted. Deposit insurance and a system of postal savings banks

and offices fostered use by small savers. Subsidized credit was

provided to particular groups or activities considered in need

and which deserved such help. A credit guarantee corporation

covered loans by commercial banks to small traders, transport

operators, self-employed persons, and other borrowers not

otherwise effectively covered by major institutions. The system

effectively reached all kinds of savers and provided credit to many different customers.

The government nationalized fourteen major private commercial banks in 1969 and six more in 1980. Nationalization

forced commercial banks increasingly to meet the credit

requirements of the weaker sections of the nation and to eliminate monopolization by vested interests of large industry,

trade, and agriculture.

The banking system expanded rapidly after nationalization.

The number of bank branches, for instance, increased from

about 7,000 in 1969 to more than 60,000 in 1994, two-thirds of

which were in rural areas. The deposit base rose from Rs50 bil- lion in 1969 to around Rs3.5 trillion in 1994. Nevertheless, cur- rency accounted for well over 50 percent of all the money

supply circulating among the public. In 1992 the nationalized

banks held 93 percent of all deposits.

In FY 1990, twenty-three foreign banks operated in India.

The most important were ANZ Grindlays Bank, Citibank, the

Hongkong and Shanghai Banking Corporation, and Standard

Chartered Bank.

Public-sector banks are required to reserve their lending

based on 40 percent of their deposits for priority sectors, especially agriculture, at favorable rates. In addition, 35 percent of

their deposits have to be held in liquid form to satisfy statutory

liquidity requirements, and 15 percent are needed to meet the

cash reserve requirements of the Reserve Bank. Both these percentages represent an easing of earlier requirements, but only

a small proportion of public-sector banks' resources can be

deployed freely. In late 1994, the rate of interest on bank loans was deregulated, but deposit rates were still subject to ceilings.

More than 50 percent of bank lending is to the government

sector. With the onset of economic reform, India's banks were

experiencing major financial losses as the result of low produc317
India: A Country Study

tivity, bad loans, and poor capitalization. Seeking to stabilize

the banking industry, the Reserve Bank of India developed new

reporting formats and has initiated takeovers and mergers of

smaller banks that were operating with financial losses. India has a rapidly expanding stock market that in 1993

listed around 5,000 companies in fourteen stock exchanges,

although only the stocks of about 400 of these companies were

actively traded. Financial institutions and government bodies

controlled an estimated 45 percent of all listed capital. In April

1992, the Bombay stock market, the nation's largest with a market capital of US$65.1 billion, collapsed, in part because of rev- elations about financial malpractice amounting to USS2

billion. Afterward, the Securities and Exchange Board of India,

the government's capital market regulator, implemented

reforms designed to strengthen investor confidence in the

stock market. In the mid-1990s, foreign institutional investors

took greater interest than ever before in the Indian stock markets, investing around USS2 billion in FY 1993 alone.

Despite increases in energy costs and other pressures from

the world economy, for most of the period since independence

India has not experienced severe inflation. The underlying

average rate of inflation, however, has tended to rise. Consumer prices rose at an annual average of 2.1 percent in the

1950s, 6.3 percent in the 1960s, 7.8 percent in the 1970s, and

8.5 percent in the 1980s.

Three factors lav behind India's relative price stability. First,

the government has intervened, either directlv or indirectlv, to keep stable the price of certain staples, including wheat, rice,

cloth, and sugar. Second, monetary regulation has restricted

growth in the money supply. Third, the overall influence of the

labor unions on wages has been small because of the weakness

of the unions in India's labor surplus economy.

Foreign Economic Relations

Aid

Since independence India has had to draw on foreign investments to finance part of its economic development. .Although

the government has attempted to be as self-reliant as possible,

the absolute amount of foreign aid received has been high. In

per capita terms, however, it has been much less than most

other developing countries receive.

318
Two of the many modes of transportation found in India

Courtesy Robert L. Worden

In August 1958, the World Bank (see Glossary) organized

the Aid-to-india Consortium, consisting of the World Bank

Group and thirteen countries: Austria, Belgium, Britain, Canada, Denmark, the Federal Republic of Germany (at that time,

West Germany), France, Italy, Japan, the Netherlands, Norway,

Sweden, and the United States. The consortium was formed to coordinate aid and establish priorities among India's major

sources of foreign assistance and to simplify India's requests for

aid based on its plans for development. Consortium aid was

bilateral government-to-government aid from the thirteen con- sortium countries, and almost all of the aid, including that

from the World Bank Group, was for specific projects judged to be valuable contributions to India's development. Of the Rs630

billion in aid authorized by all aid donors between FY 1974 and

FY 1989, more than 60 percent was provided by the consortium.

319
India: A Country Study

Collectively, the Western nations have donated a substantial

amount of aid to India. In 1980 this aid totaled nearly US$1.5

billion and reached US$2.5 billion in 1990. In 1992 Western

aid reached a new height: US$3.9 billion, which represented

49.8 percent of all Western multilateral and bilateral aid given

to South Asian nations that year. The largest bilateral donor is Japan. Between 1984 and 1993, Japan's official development

assistance grants to India totaled US$337 million. Much

greater than the outright grants has been Japan's large-scale

loan program, which supports economic infrastructure development (power plants and delivery systems, and road improvement) and environmental protection. Between 1984 and 1993,

Japanese loans to India totaled nearly US$2.4 billion. A ¥125

billion (US$1.2 billion) loan financing major projects was

granted in December 1994, bringing Japanese loans to India

since 1957 to a total of ¥1.6 trillion. United States assistance was significant in the late 1950s and

1960s but, because of strained India-United States relations,

fell off sharply in the 1970s (see United States, ch. 9). The

United States accounted for 8.6 percent of all of the aid India

received from independence through FY 1988, but for only 0.7

percent in FY 1989 and 0.6 percent in FY 1990. United States

aid to India remained relatively insignificant in the early 1990s

when it took the form of grants for food aid and consultants in a wide variety of economic growth areas, such as computers,

steel, telecommunications, and energy production. In FY 1993,

actual United States obligations through the United States

Agency for International Development totaled almost US$161

million. The bulk of this aid was provided as United States Public Law 480 food aid grants with lesser amounts for development assistance (including energy and the environment,

population control, child survival, acquired immune deficiency

syndrome (AIDS) prevention, and economic growth) and

housing guaranty loans. Germany and Britain also have substantial aid-to-india programs.

Among countries not in the World Bank consortium, the

Soviet Union was the most important contributor, providing

more than 16 percent of all aid between 1947 and FY 1988.

Since 1991, however, Russia has provided little aid.

About 90 percent of all aid received by India has been in the

form of loans. Aid disbursements from all providers for FY 1990 were Rs67 billion.

320
Character and Structure of the Economy

India maintains a small but well-established foreign aid program of its own. In FY 1990, Rsl.6 billion of aid was authorized,

of which Rs582 million was for Bhutan and Rs578 million for

Nepal. Bangladesh and Vietnam received significant amounts

of aid during the 1980s, but, as the result of changing world

political and economic conditions, these programs were small

by the early 1990s (see South Asia; Southeast Asia, ch. 9).

Trade

Despite its size, India plays a relatively small role in the world

economy. Until the 1980s, the government did not make

exports a priority. In the 1950s and 1960s, Indian officials

believed that trade was biased against developing countries and

that prospects for exports were severely limited. Therefore, the

government aimed at self-sufficiency in most products through

import substitution, with exports covering the cost of residual

import requirements. Foreign trade was subjected to strict government controls, which consisted of an all-inclusive system of

foreign exchange and direct controls over imports and

exports. As a result, India's share of world trade shrank from

2.4 percent in FY 1951 to 0.4 percent in FY 1980. Largely

because of oil price increases in the 1970s, which contributed

to balance of payments difficulties, governments in the 1970s

and 1980s placed more emphasis on the promotion of exports.

They hoped exports would provide foreign exchange needed

for the import of oil and high-technology capital goods. Nevertheless, in the early 1990s India's share of world trade stood at only 0.5 percent. In FY 1992, imports accounted for 9.3 percent

of GDP and exports for 7.7 percent of GDP.

Based on trends throughout the 1980s and early 1990s, it appears likely that the balance of trade will remain negative for

the foreseeable future (see table 19, Appendix). The 1979

increase in the price of oil produced a Rs58.4 billion deficit in

FY 1980, close to 5 percent of GNP. The deficit was barely

reduced in nominal rupee terms over the next five years,

although it improved considerably as a share of GNP (to 2.3

percent in FY 1984) and in dollar terms (from US$7.4 billion

in FY 1980 to US$4.3 billion in FY 1984). Pressure on the bal- ance of trade continued through the late 1980s and worsened

with the attempted annexation of Kuwait by Iraq in August

1990, which led to a temporary but sharp increase in the price

of oil. In FY 1990, the balance of trade deficit reached a record

level in rupees (Rsl06.5 billion) and in dollars (US$6 billion).

321
India: A Country Study

Import controls and devaluation of the rupee allowed the

trade deficit to fall to US$1.6 billion in FY 1991. However, it widened to USS3.3 billion in FY 1992 before falling to an esti- mated USS1 billion in FY 1993. However, one optimistic sign,

noted by India's minister of finance in March 1995, was that

exports had come to finance 90 percent of India's imports,

compared with only 60 percent in the mid-1980s.

No one product dominates India's exports. In FY 1993,

handicrafts, gems, and jewelry formed the most important sec- tor and accounted for an estimated US$4.9 billion (22.2 percent) of exports. Since the early 1990s, India has become the

world's largest processor of diamonds (imported in the rough

from South Africa and then fabricated into jewelry for export).

Along with other semiprecious commodities, such as gold,

India's gems and jewelry accounted for 11 percent of its foreign-exchange receipts in early 1993. Textiles and ready-made

garments combined were also an important category, accounting for an estimated US$4.1 billion (18.5 percent) of exports.

Other significant exports include industrial machinery, leather

products, chemicals and related products (see table 20, Appendix).

The dominant imports are petroleum products, valued in FY

1993 at nearly USS5.8 billion, or 24.7 percent of principal

imports, and capital goods, amounting to US$4.2 billion, or

21.8 percent of principal imports. Other important import cat- egories are chemicals, dyes, plastics, pharmaceuticals, uncut

precious stones, iron and steel, fertilizers, nonferrous metals,

and pulp paper and paper products (see table 21, Appendix).

India's most important trading partners are the United

States, Japan, the European Union, and nations belonging to the Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries

(OPEC). From the 1950s until 1991, India also had close trade

links with the Soviet Union, but the breakup of that nation into

fifteen independent states led to a decline of trade with the

region. In FY 1993, some 30 percent of all imports came from

the European Union, 22.4 percent from OPEC nations, 11.7

percent from the United States, and 6.6 percent fromJapan. In

that same year, 26 percent of all exports were to the European

Union, 18 percent to the United States, 7.8 percent to Japan,

and 10.7 to the OPEC nations (see table 22, Appendix).

Trade and investment with the United States seemed likely to experience an upswing following a January 1995 trade mission from the United States led by Secretary of Commerce

322
Character and Structure of the Economy

Ronald H. Brown and including top executives from twenty-six

United States companies. During the weeklong visit, some

US$7 billion in business deals were agreed on, mostly in the

areas of infrastructure development, transportation, power and

communication systems, food processing, health care services,

insurance and financing projects, and automotive catalytic converters. In turn, greater access for Indian goods in United

States markets was sought by Indian officials. In February 1995, in a bid to improve commercial prospects

in Southeast Asia, India signed a four-part agreement with the

Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN—see Glossary). The pact covers trade, investment, science and technology, and tourism, and there are prospects for further

agreements on joint ventures, banks, and civil aviation.

India's balance of payments position is closely related to the

balance of trade. Foreign aid and remittances from Indians

employed overseas, however, make the balance of payments

more favorable than the balance of trade (see Size and Composition of the Work Force, this ch.).

Foreign- Exchange System

The central government has wide powers to control transac- tions in foreign exchange. Until 1992 all foreign investments

and the repatriation of foreign capital required prior approval

of the government. The Foreign-Exchange Regulation Act,

which governs foreign investment, rarely allowed foreign

majority holdings. However, a new foreign investment policy

announced in July 1991 prescribed automatic approval for for- eign investments in thirty-four industries designated high priority, up to an equity limit of 51 percent. Initially the

government required that a company's automatic approval

must rely on matching exports and dividend repatriation, but

in May 1992 this requirement was lifted, except for low-priority

sectors. In 1994 foreign and nonresident Indian investors were

allowed to repatriate not only their profits but also their capital. Indian exporters are also free to use their export earnings

as they see fit. However, transfer of capital abroad by Indian

nationals is only permitted in special circumstances, such as emigration. Foreign exchange is automatically made available

for imports for which import licenses are issued.

Because foreign-exchange transactions are so tightly controlled, Indian authorities are able to manage the exchange

rate, and from 1975 to 1992 the rupee was tied to a trade323
India: A Country Study

weighted basket of currencies. In February 1992, the government began moves to make the rupee convertible, and in

March 1993 a single floating exchange rate was implemented.

In July 1995, Rs31.81 were worth USS1, compared with Rs7.86

in 1980, Rsl2.37 in 1985, and Rsl7.50 in 1990.

External Debt

India has frequently encountered balance of payments diffi- culties (see table 23, Appendix). The usual recourse has been

to contract imports, thereby reducing production and eco- nomic growth, although the amount of foreign aid available

has been an important factor in how harsh the restrictions have

become. Following the first round of oil price increases in

1973-74, increased foreign aid and some belt-tightening over- came the country's balance of payments problems. The growth

of exports and the increased remittances from Indians working

abroad in the late 1970s permitted a buildup of substantial for- eign-currency reserves. Toward the end of the 1970s, the country's external payments situation was more favorable than it had been for many years. The second large oil price increase, in the 1979-80 period,

quicklv altered India's terms of trade and balance of payments

situation. Between FY 1978 and FY 1980, India's oil bill

increased threefold, by about USS4.6 billion. The deficit on the

balance of trade rose from US$1.5 billion in FY 1979 to US$7.7

billion in FY 1980. Officials negotiated a substantial loan from

the IMF, which, along with the foreign-exchange reserves, for- eign aid, and export possibilities, made adjustments possible.

The intent was to keep annual economic growth at 5 percent

or more to reduce poverty, while making structural adjustments in the economy to compensate for the change in the

external environment. Nonetheless, the external debt rose from USS20.6 billion in 1980 to nearly US$70.2 billion in 1990.

In FY 1990, commercial loans accounted for 26.3 percent of

the external debt: loans from international institutions, especially the World Bank, made up 45.2 percent: borrowing from

foreign governments accounted for 28.5 percent. The largest sums were owed to Japan, Germany, and the United States. At

the time of the economic crisis of 1990, external debt was

increasing at around US$8 billion a year. By 1993-94, the

annual increase had been cut to less than US$1 billion and was expected to be further reduced. India's foreign currency

324
Character and Structure of the Economy

reserves, which stood at US$1 billion in June 1991, had

reached a record level of US$20 billion by March 1995.

Labor

Size and Composition of the Work Force

Based on the 1991 census, the government estimated that

the labor force had grown by more than 65 million since 1981

and that the total number of "main workers"—the "economically active population"—had reached 285.9 million people.

This total did not include Jammu and Kashmir, which was not

enumerated in the 1991 census. Labor force statistics for 1991

covered nine main-worker "industrial" categories: cultivators

(39 percent of the main-worker force); agricultural laborers

(26 percent); livestock, forestry, fishing, hunting, plantations,

orchards, and allied activities (2 percent); mining and quarrying (1 percent); manufacturing (household 2 percent, other

than household 7 percent); construction (2 percent); trade

and commerce (8 percent); transportation, storage, and communications (3 percent); and "other services" (10 percent).

Another 28.2 million "marginal workers" were also counted in

the census but not tabulated among the nine categories even though unpaid farm and family enterprise workers were

counted among the nine categories. Of the total work force

both main and marginal workers—29 percent were women,

and nearly 78 percent worked in rural areas. Included in the labor force are some 55 million children,

other than those working directly for their parents. The Ministry of Labour and nongovernmental organizations estimate

that there are 25 million children employed in the agricultural

sector, 20 million in service jobs (hotels, shops, and as servants

in homes), and 5 million in the handloom, carpet-making,

gem-cutting, and match-making industries. With mixed success, nongovernmental organizations monitor the child labor

market for abuse and conformity to child labor laws. In government organizations throughout the nation and in

nonagricultural enterprises with twenty-five persons or more in

1991, the public sector employed nearly 19 million people

compared with about 8 million people employed in the private

sector. Most of the growth in the organized work force between

1970 and 1990 was in the public sector. Observers expected

that this trend might be reversed if the government's policy of

economic liberalization continued. Labor law makes it very dif325
India: A Country Study

ficultfor companies to lay off workers. Some observers feel that

this restriction deters companies from hiring because they fear

carrying a bloated workforce in case of an economic turndown.

A new source of employment appeared after OPEC sharply

increased crude oil prices in 1974. The Middle East

oil-exporting countries quickly undertook massive development programs based on their large oil revenues. Most of these

countries required the importation of labor, both skilled and

unskilled, and India became one of many nations supplying

the labor. Because some labor agents and employers took

advantage of expatriate workers, especially those with little education or few skills, in 1983 India enacted a law governing

workers going abroad. In general, the new legislation provided

more protection and required fairer treatment of Indians

employed outside the country. By 1983 some 900,000 Indian

workers were registered as temporary residents in the Middle

East. In the mid-1980s, there was a shift in the kinds of skills needed. Fewer laborers, metalworkers, and engineers, for

example, were required for construction projects, but the need

for maintenance workers and operating staff in power plants,

hospitals, and offices increased. In 1990 it was estimated that

more than 1 million Indians were resident in the Middle East. India benefited not only from the opening ofjob opportunides

but also from the remittances the workers sent back, which

amounted to around US$4.3 billion of foreign exchange in FY

1988. Both employment and remittances suffered as a result of

the 1991 Persian Gulf War, when about 180,000 Indian workers

were displaced. In the mid-1990s, the outlook for Indian

employment in the Middle East was only fair. India's labor force exhibits extremes ranging from large

numbers of illiterate workers unaccustomed to machinery or

routine, to a sizable pool of highly educated scientists, technicians, and engineers, capable of working anywhere in the

world. A substantial number of skilled people have left India to work abroad; the country has suffered a brain drain since independence. Nonetheless, many remain in India working alongside a trained industrial and commercial work force.

Administrative skills, particularly necessary in large projects or programs, are in short supply, however. In the mid-1990s, sala- ries for top administrators and technical staff rose sharply,

partly in response to the arrival of foreign companies in India.

326
\' 1

Indian Oil Corporation refinery in Guwahati, Assam

Courtesy Indian Ministry ofExternal Affairs

Labor Relations

The Trade Unions Act of 1926 provided recognition and

protection for a nascent Indian labor union movement. The

number of unions grew considerably after independence, but

most unions are small and usually active in only one firm.

Union membership is concentrated in the organized sector,

and in the early 1990s total membership was about 9 million.

Many unions are affiliated with regional or national federations, the most important of which are the Indian National

Trade Union Congress, the All-India Trade Union Congress,

the Centre of Indian Trade Unions, the Indian Workers' Association, and the United Trade Union Congress. Politicians have

often been union leaders, and some analysts believe that strikes

and other labor protests are called primarily to further the

interests of political parties rather than to promote the interests of the work force.

327
India: A Country Study

The government recorded 1,825 strikes and lockouts in

1990. As a result, 24.1 million workdays were lost, 10.6 million

to strikes and 13.5 million to lockouts. More than 1.3 million

workers were involved in these labor disputes. The number and

seriousness of strikes and lockouts have varied from year to

year. However, the figures for 1990 and preliminary data from

1991 indicate declines from levels reached in the 1980s, when

in some years as many as 35 million workdays were lost because

of labor disputes.

The isolated, insecure, and exploited laborers in rural areas and in the urban unorganized sectors present a stark contrast

to the position of unionized workers in many modern enterprises. In the early 1990s, there were estimates that between 10

percent and 20 percent of agricultural workers were bonded

laborers. The International Commission of Jurists, studying

India's bonded labor, defines such a person as one who works

for a creditor or someone in the creditor's family against nominal wages in cash or kind until the creditor, who keeps the

books and sets the prices, declares the loan repaid, often with

usurious rates of interest. The system sometimes extends to a debtor's wife and children, who are employed in appalling

working conditions and exposed to sexual abuse. The constitution, as interpreted by India's Supreme Court, and a 1976 law

prohibit bonded labor. Implementation of the prohibition,

however, has been inconsistent in many rural areas. Many in the urban unorganized sector are self-employed

laborers, street vendors, petty traders, and other services providers who receive little income. Along with the unemployed,

they have no unemployment insurance or other benefits.

Industry

At independence, industrialization was viewed as the engine

of growth for the rest of the economy and the supplier ofjobs

to reduce poverty. By the early 1990s, substantial progress had

been made, but industrial growth had failed to live up to expectations. Industrial production rose an average of 6.1 percent in

the 1950s, 5.3 percent in the 1960s, and 4.2 percent in the

1970s. Although this increase was respectable, it was less than

the rate achieved by some other developing countries and less than what the planners expected and the economy needed to bring about a large reduction in poverty. The emphasis on

large-scale, capital-intensive industries created far fewer jobs

than the estimated 10 million annual entrants into the labor

328
Character and Structure of the Economy

force required. Hence unemployment and underemployment

remained growing problems. In the 1980s, however, industrial

production rose at an average rate of 6.6 percent. Observers

believed that this increase was largely a response to economic

liberalization, which led to increased investment and competition.

Government Policies

Government has played an important role in industry since

independence. The government has both owned a large proportion of industrial establishments and has tightly regulated

the private sector. From the late 1970s, the government sought

to reduce its role, but progress remained slow throughout the

1980s. The Congress (I) government that came to power in

June 1991 had a renewed commitment to cutting back the role

of government, and in the mid-1990s the liberalization program made progress, although many uncertainties remained

about its implementation.

The Industrial Policy Resolution of 1948 gave the government the go-ahead to build and operate key industries, which

largely meant those producing capital and intermediate goods

(see Early Policy Developments, this ch.). This policy partly

reflected socialist ideas then current in India. It was believed

that public ownership of basic industry was necessary to ensure development in the interest of the whole population. The decision also reflected the belief that private industrialists would

find establishment of many of the basic industries on the scale

that the country needed either unattractive or beyond their

financial capabilities. Moreover, there was concern that private

industrialists could enlarge their profits by dominating markets

in key commodities. The industrial policy resolutions of 1948

and 1956 delineated the lines between the public and private

sectors and stressed the need for a large degree of

self-sufficiency in manufacturing, the basic strategy that guided

industrialization until the mid-1980s.

Another early decision on industrial policy mandated that

defense industries would be developed by the public sector. Building defense industries for a modern military force

required the concomitant development of heavy industries,

including metallurgy and machine tools. Production often

started under foreign licensing, but as much as possible, design

and production became Indianized. India was one of only a few

329
India: A Country Studx

developing countries to produce a variety of high-technologv

militarv equipment to supply its own needs.

Before independence there was a strong tendency for ownership or control of much of the large-scale private industrial

economv to be concentrated in managing agencies, which

became powerful under the British because thev had access to London money markets. Through diversified investments and

interlocking directorates, the individuals who controlled the

managing agencies controlled much of the preindependence

economv. After independence Parliament passed legislation to restrain further concentration, used the development of the

stock market to induce the sale of stock in tightly held companies to the public, and applied high corporate tax rates to such

companies. It also attempted to offset the monopolv effects of

the managing agencies bv fixing prices on a number of basic

commodities, including cement, steel, and coal, and assumed

considerable control of their distribution. The government

eventually abolished some of the managing agencies in 1969

and the remainder in 1971. In 1970 the Monopolies and

Restrictive Practices Act supplied the government with additional authority to diminish concentrations of private eco- nomic power and to restrict business practices contrary to the

public interest. This act was strengthened in 19S4.

Industrialization occurred in a protected environment,

which led to distortions that, after the mid-1960s, contributed

to the sagging industrial growth rate. Tariffs and quantitative

controls largely kept foreign competition out of the domestic

market, and most Indian manufacturers looked on exports

only as a residual possibility Industry paid insufficient attention to the quality of products, technological development else- where, and economies of scale. Management was weak in many

private and public plants. Shortfalls in reaching plan goals in

public enterprises, moreover, denied the rest of the industrial sector key inputs, such as coal and electricity

In the 1980s and earlv 1990s.. India began increasingly to remove some of the controls on industry Nevertheless, in the

mid-1990s, there were state monopolies for most energy and

communications production and services, and the state dominated the steel, nonferrous metal, machine tool, shipbuilding,

chemical, fertilizer, paper, and coal industries. In FY 1992. public enterprises had a turnover of Rsl.7 trillion (see table 24,

Appendix). Well over 50 percent of this total was accounted for

bv ten enterprises, the most important of which were the oil,

330
Character and Structure of the Economy

steel, and coal companies. Public enterprises in aggregate

made a net profit after tax of 2.4 percent on capital in FY 1992,

but the three oil companies earned 95 percent of these net

profits. In fact, 106 of the 233 public companies sustained

losses. Some analysts believed that the inefficiency of the public

sector was concealed by passing on to consumers the high costs of monopoly products.

Manufacturing

Textiles Cotton textiles is a well-established manufacturing industry

and employs more workers than any other sector. Production

in FY 1992 was 19 billion square meters of cloth (see table 25,

Appendix). In Indian textile mills, yarn is spun, woven into fabrics, and processed under one roof. Production as a share of

the manufacturing industry fell from 79 percent in 1951 to under 30 percent in the early 1990s as a result of curbs on

capacity expansion and new equipment and differential excise

duties. The main export market is Russia and other former

Soviet republics. The power-loom sector forms the largest portion of the decentralized part of the textile industry. It expanded from 24,000 units in 1951 to 800,000 units in 1989.

Power-loom fabric dominates India's garment export industry.

There is also a substantial handloom sector, which provides

employment in rural areas (see fig. 10).

Steel and Aluminum

After independence, successive governments placed great

emphasis on the development of a steel industry. In FY 1991,

the six major plants, of which five were in the public sector,

produced 10 million tons. The rest of the steel production, 4.7

million tons, came from 180 small plants, almost all of which

were in the private sector. Steel production more than doubled

during the 1980s but still did not meet demand in FY 1991,

when 2.7 million tons were imported. In the mid-1990s, the

government is seeking private-sector investment in new steel

plants. Production is projected to increase substantially as the

result of plans to set up a 1 million ton steel plant and three

pig-iron plants totalling 600,000 tons capacity in West Bengal,

with Chinese technical assistance and financial investment.

The aluminum industry grew from 5,000 tons a year at independence to 483,000 tons in FY 1992, of which 113,000 tons

331
India: A Country Study

were exported. Analysts believe the industry has a good

long-term future because of India's abundant supply of bauxite.

Fertilizer and Petrochemicals

The fertilizer industry is another major industrial sector. In

FY 1991, production reached 7.4 million tons of nitrogen and

2.6 million tons of phosphate. In the early 1990s, an increasing

share of fertilizer production came from private-sector plants.

Substantial imports were necessary in FY 1990, but the prospects for expansion of domestic production are good.

In the early 1990s, the petrochemical industry was expanding rapidly. It produces a wide variety of thermoplastics, elas- tomers, synthetic fibers, and chemicals. Substantial imports,

however, are required to meet domestic demand. Analysts forecast a major expansion in production during the 1990s.

Electronics and Motor Vehicles

The engineering sector is large and varied and provides

around 12 percent of India's exports in the mid-1990s. Two

subsectors, electronics and motor vehicles, are the most

dynamic.

Electronics companies benefited from the economic liberalization policies of the 1980s, including the loosening of restrictions on technology and component imports, delicensing,

foreign investment, and reduction of excise duties. Output

from electronics plants grew from Rsl.8 billion in FY 1970 to Rs8.1 billion in FY 1980 and to Rsl23 billion in FY 1992. Most

of the expansion took place in the production of computers

and consumer electronics.

Computer production rose from 7,500 units in 1985 to

60,000 units in 1988 and to an estimated 200,000 units in 1992.

During this period, major advances were made in the domestic

computer industry that led to further sales. Consumer electronics account for about 30 percent of total

electronics production. In FY 1990, production included 5 million television sets, 6 million radios, 5 million tape recorders, 5

million electronic watches, and 140,000 video cassette recorders.A similar expansion occurred in the motor vehicle industry.

Until the 1980s, the government considered automobiles an

unnecessary luxury and discouraged their production and use.

332
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334
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300 Miles
Character and Structure of the Economy

Production rose from 30,000 cars in FY 1980 to 181,000 cars in

FY 1990.

The largest company, Maruti, which is publicly owned,

exports some automobiles to Eastern Europe and to France

and became a net foreign-exchange earner in FY 1991. The

production of other motor vehicles is also expanding. In FY

1990, India produced 176,000 commercial vehicles, such as trucks and buses, and 1.8 million two-wheeled motor vehicles.

Following the government's abolition of the manufacturing

licensing system in March 1993, British, French, German, Ital- ian, and United States manufacturers and firms in the Republic of Korea (South Korea) announced they would join

Japanese and other South Korean companies already operating

in India in joint-venture passenger car production in 1995. The

growth of the Indian middle class sustains such industrial

expansion and is forcing old-line domestic companies, such as Hindustan Motors, to become more competitive.

Construction

Construction contributes 5 to 6 percent of GDP and employs

a similar proportion of the organized labor force plus large

numbers of people in the informal sector. In the early 1990s,

construction absorbed around 40 percent of public-sector plan

outlays, and more than 1 million workers were engaged in public-sector construction projects. Indian firms also won many

construction contracts in the Middle East during the 1980s and

early 1990s. Most companies are small and lack access to modern equipment.

House building has not been a priority of the government,

and a housing shortage persists in both urban and rural areas. Analysts believe that one-third of the population of big cities

live in areas officially regarded as slums.

Energy

India produces nearly 90 percent of its energy requirements,

65 percent of which are met by coal. Although commercial

energy production has expanded substantially since independence, an inadequate supply of energy remains a constraint on

industrial growth. Overall growth in the demand for energy

was rapid in the early 1990s, but commercial energy consumption was among the lowest in the world. Much energy use in the

subsistence sector, such as the use of firewood and cattle dung,

is unrecorded. Analysts believe that the share of noncommer335


India: A Country Study

rial energy fell from around 65 percent in the early 1950s to 23

percent in 1991, and they expect this proportion to fall further

during the 1990s. Most commercial energy production and dis- tribution are in the public sector, but in the mid-1990s, the government was moving slowly to encourage the entry of private

capital.

Coal

The coal industry is a key segment of the economy. Reserves

are estimated at 192 billion tons, 78 billion tons of which are proven reserves. Additional coal exists in small seams, at great

depths, and in undiscovered locations. The bulk of the coal

found has been in Bihar, Madhya Pradesh, Orissa, and West

Bengal. Known reserves should last well into the twenty-first

century. In the 1980s, development of strip mines was stressed over underground mines because of the speed with which they

could be exploited. Most of the industry was nationalized in

the early 1970s. Coal India Limited was established in 1975 as the government's holding company for several operating subsidiaries. Production stagnated in the second half of the 1970s

at around 105 million tons after an initial surge in production

following nationalization. In the late 1970s and throughout the

1980s, the industry was plagued by the flooding of mines, seri- ous power outages, delays in commissioning new mines, labor

unrest, lack of explosives, poor transportation, and environmental problems. Government-set coal prices did not cover operating expenses of the more technically difficult mines.

The central government was the main source of investment

funds.

Throughout the late 1970s and 1980s, the coal industry

along with the electric power and transportation sectors—was a

critical bottleneck in the economy and particularly handicapped industrial growth. The Seventh Five-Year Plan (1985-

89) set a target of 226 million tons for coal production in FY

1989, but actual production reached only 214 million tons. Production rose to 241 million tons in FY 1991 and to 251 million

tons in FY 1992. The annual demand for coal in the mid-1990s was around 320 million tons, a level that appeared to be out of

reach without a significant leap in efficiency and large-scale

investment. Subsurface mine fires in Bihar, some of which have

been burning since 1916, have consumed some 37 million tons

of coal and make another 2 billion tons inaccessible.

336
Character and Structure of the Economy

Oil and Natural Gas

India has significant amounts of oil and natural gas, and four

of India's top six revenue-generating companies are in the oil

and natural gas business. India has indigenous sources for

around 60 percent of its oil needs and has worked diligently to use substitute forms of energy to fulfill the other 40 percent.

Oil in commercial quantities was first discovered in Assam in

1889. The Oil and Natural Gas Commission was established in

1954 as a department of the Geological Survey of India, but a 1959 act of Parliament made it, in effect, the country's national

oil company. Oil India Limited, at one time one-third government owned, was also established in 1959 and developed an oil field that had been discovered by the Burmah Oil Company. By

1981 the government had purchased all of the Burmah Oil

Company's assets in India and completely owned Oil India

Limited. The Oil and Natural Gas Commission discovered oil in Gujarat in 1959 and opened other fields in the 1960s and

1970s.

The early oil fields discovered in India were of modest size. Oil production amounted to 200,000 tons in 1950 and 400,000

tons in 1960. By the early 1970s, production had increased to more than 8 million tons. In 1974 the Oil and Natural Gas

Commission discovered a large field—called the Bombay

High—offshore from Bombay. Production from that field was

responsible for the rapid growth of the country's total crude oil production in the late 1970s and throughout the 1980s. In FY

1989, oil production peaked at 34 million tons, of which Bombay High accounted for 22 million tons. In the early 1990s,

wells were shut in offshore fields that had been inefficiently

exploited, and production fell to 27 million tons in FY 1993.

That amount did not meet India's needs, and 30.7 million tons

of crude oil were imported in FY 1993.

India has thirty-five major fields onshore (primarily in Assam

and Gujarat) and four major offshore oil fields (near Bombay,

south of Pondicherry, and in the Palk Strait). Of the 4,828

wells, in 1990 2,514 were producing at a rate of 664,582 barrels

per day. The oil field with the greatest output is Bombay High,

with 402,797 barrels per day production in 1990, about fifteen

times the amount produced by the next largest fields. Total

reserves are estimated at 6.1 billion barrels.

The government has sanctioned ambitious exploration

plans to raise production in line with demand and to exploit

new discoveries as rapidly as possible. In the late 1980s and

337
India: A Country Study

early 1990s, there were encouraging finds in Tamil Nadu,

Gujarat, Andhra Pradesh, and Assam; many of these discoveries were made offshore. Officials estimated that by the mid-1990s

these new fields could contribute as much as 15 million to 20

million tons in new production and that total crude oil production could increase to 51 million tons in FY 1994. In the early

1990s, the government renewed attempts, which had begun in

the early 1980s, to interest foreign oil companies in purchasing

exploration and production leases. These efforts drew only a modest response because the terms offered were difficult, and

foreign companies remained suspicious of India's investment

climate. One response, agreed on in January 1995, was an

Indian-Kuwaiti joint venture to invest in a new oil refinery to be

built on the east coast of India.

Substantial quantities of natural gas are produced in association with crude oil production. Until the 1980s, most of this gas was flared off because there were no pipelines or processing

facilities to bring it to customers. In the early 1980s, large

investments were made to bring gases from Bombay High and

other offshore fields ashore for use as fuel and to supply feedstock to fertilizer and petrochemical plants, which also had to be constructed or converted to use gas. By the mid-1980s, natural gas could be delivered to facilities near Bombay and near Kandla in Gujarat. In the mid-1990s, a 1,700-kilometer

trans-India pipeline was being built; the pipeline will link the

facilities near Bombay and Kandla to a series of gas-based fertil- izer plants and power stations. Officials envisage a grid system

covering 11,500 kilometers by FY 2004, which will supply 120

million cubic meters of gas a day. Total production in FY 1992

was 18.1 billion cubic meters.

India's need for oil and petroleum-based products—about

40 million tons per year—far exceeded its domestic production

capabilities of 28 million tons per year in the early 1990s. Given

India's dependency on Persian Gulf resources, proposals were made in the early 1990s to develop natural gas pipelines from

Iran, Qatar, and Oman that would run under the Arabian Sea

to one or more west coast terminals. To assist with oil and natural gas production, in 1992 the government decided to open

reserves to private offshore developers. In February 1994, contracts were awarded for three offshore fields in the Arabian Sea

to an Indian-United States consortium and one in the Bay of

Bengal to an Indian-Australian-Japanese consortium. In June

338
Character and Structure of the Economy

1995, an agreement was reached to set a joint-venture company

to construct the first leg of the pipeline, from Iran to Pakistan.

Electric Power

The electric power industry is both a supplier and a con- sumer of primary energy, depending on the kind of energy

used to turn the generators. Hydroelectric and nuclear power

plants add to the country's supply of primary energy. The total installed electricity capacity in public utilities in 1992 was

69,100 megawatts, of which 70 percent was thermal, 27 percent

hydropower, and 3 percent nuclear. The total installed capacity was programmed to reach around 100,000 megawatts by FY

1996 through a package of government-supported incentives

to the private sector. Because they cannot always depend on public utilities, many

larger industrial enterprises have developed their own power

generation systems. In 1992 there was a capacity of 9,000 megawatts outside the public utility system. Overall, the generation

and transmission of power—with an average 57 percent plant

load factor in FY 1992 in thermal plants and transmission losses

of 22 percent—were inefficient. About 322 billion kilowatthours of power were generated by utilities in FY 1992, approximately 8.5 percent shy of demand. The resulting deficit led to acute shortages in some states. This trend continued the next

year when 315 billion kilowatt-hours were produced. Many fac- tors contributed to the shortfall of electric power, including

slow completion of new installations, low use of installed capacity because of insufficient maintenance and coal, and poor

management. In FY 1990, industry accounted for 45 percent of

electricity consumed, agriculture 26 percent, and domestic use

16.5 percent. Other sectors, including commerce and rail- roads, accounted for the remaining 12.5 percent.

Rural electrification made great progress in the 1980s; more

than 200,000 villages received electricity for the first time. In

1990 around 84 percent of India's villages had access to electricity. Most of the villages without electricity were in Bihar,

Orissa, Rajasthan, Uttar Pradesh, and West Bengal. Villagers

complain that government figures on electrification of villages are artificially inflated. Actually, although lines have been run

to most villages, electricity is provided only sporadically (for

example, only nine to twelve hours per day), and villagers feel

they cannot depend on electricity to operate pumps and other

339
India: A Country Study

equipment. Electricity to cities also is sporadic; blackouts occur

every day in most cities. India's first hydroelectric station was constructed in 1897 in

Darjiling (then Darjeeling). In FY 1990, installed capacity for

hydroelectric power was 18,000 megawatts. The country has a

large economically exploitable hydroelectric potential, especially in the foothills of the Himalayas, but no large increase in

capacity is predicted for the mid-1990s. Hydroelectric facilities have to be coordinated with other sources of electricity because

seasonal and annual variations in rainfall affect the amount of

water needed to turn the generators and consequently the

amount of electricity that can be produced.

Hydroelectric power projects have not been without controversy. Dams for irrigation and power generation have displaced

people and raised the specter of ecological problems.

Nuclear Power

Nuclear-power developments are under the purview of the

Nuclear Power Corporation of India, a government-owned

entity under the Department of Atomic Energy. The corporation is responsible for designing, constructing, and operating

nuclear-power plants. In 1995 there were nine operational

plants with a potential total capacity of 1,800 megawatts, about

3 percent of India's total power generation. There are two units

each in Tarapur, north of Bombay in Maharashtra; in Rawatbhata in Rajasthan; in Kalpakkam near Madras in Tamil Nadu;

and in Narora in Uttar Pradesh; and one unit in Kakrapur in

southeastern Gujarat. However, of the nine plants, all have

been faced with safety problems that have shut down reactors

for periods ranging from months to years. The Rajasthan

Atomic Power Station in Rawatbhata was closed indefinitely, as of February 1995. Moreover, environmental problems, caused

by radiation leaks, have cropped up in communities near

Rawatbhata. Other plants operate at only a fraction of their

capacity, and some foreign experts consider them the most

inefficient nuclear-power plants in the world.

In addition to the nine established plants, seven reactors are under construction in the mid-1990s: one at Kakrapur and two

each at Kaiga, on the coast of Karnataka, Rawatbhata, and Tarapur, which, when finished, will bring an additional 2,320 megawatts of energy online. Construction of ten additional reactors

is in the planning stage for Kaiga, Rawatbhata, and Kudangulam in Tamil Nadu, which, when combined, will supply 4,800

340
Character and Structure of the Economy

megawatts capacity. The overall plan is to increase nuclear-generation capacity to 10,000 megawatts by FY 2000, but work has

been slowed because of financial shortages. India partially over- came its shortage of enriched uranium—needed to fuel the

Tarapur units—by imports from China, starting in 1995.

Mining and Quarrying

For a country of its size, India does not have a great deal of

mineral wealth (see fig. 11). Mining accounted for less than 2

percent of GDP in FY 1990. Nonetheless, iron and bauxite are found in sufficient quantities to base industries on their extrac- tion and processing. Assessment of the country's resources by

the Geological Survey of India is still far from complete in the

mid-1990s, and observers do not rule out the possibility of

important new finds.

In 1992 reserves of iron ore were estimated at among the

world's largest—at 19.2 billion tons. Extraction capacity is 67

million tons of ore per year, but only 53 million tons were produced in FY 1992. About 60 percent of output is exported,

mainly to the South Korea andJapan. The largest iron ore mining project is at Kudremukh, Chikmagalore District, Karnataka.

India also has abundant bauxite, the main mineral source for

aluminum. Reserves are estimated at about 2.7 billion tons, or

8 percent of the world total. In FY 1991, 512,000 tons of aluminum were produced, of which 61,000 tons were exported. Most

bauxite mines are in Bihar and Karnataka. India is the world's

third largest producer of manganese, and its mines extracted

around 1.4 million tons of manganese ore per year in the early

1990s from a total estimated reserve of 180 million tons. India

also has significant reserves of copper, estimated at 422 million

tons. However, the production of copper, at 46,000 tons in FY

1991, fell well short of domestic demand. Most copper mines

are in Bihar and Rajasthan. Smaller amounts of lead, zinc, and

mica are also produced.

Ownership and the power to grant mineral concessions generally have rested with the state governments. The central government, however, has exerted considerable influence over such leases, particularly in cases of important and strategic

minerals. In fact, most mining of important and strategic minerals is undertaken by central government enterprises in which

states sometimes hold part ownership. In the early 1990s, ura- nium ore was mined, milled, and processed only in Bihar; rare earths—including mineral sands, monazite, ilmenite, rutile,

341
India: A Country Study

zircon, rare earths chloride, and others—were mined in Tamil

Nadu, Kerala, and Orissa. During this period, the central government was attempting to increase the private sector's share

of this industry.

Transportation

Transportation is a large and varied sector of the economy.

Modes of conveyance for goods range from people's heads (on

which loads are balanced) and bicycle rickshaws to trucks and

railroad cars. The national railroad was the major freight

hauler at independence, but road transport grew rapidly after

1947. Both rail and road transport remain important.

The share of transportation investments in total public

investment declined during the period from the early 1950s to the early 1980s; real public transportation investment also

declined during much of that period because of the need for

funds in the rest of the economy. As a consequence, by the

early 1980s the transportation system was barely meeting the

needs of the nation or preparing for future economic growth.

Many roads, for example, were breaking up because of overuse and lack of maintenance; railroads required new track and roll- ing stock. Ports needed equipment and facilities, particularly

for bulk and container cargo; and at many airports the national

civil airlines needed supporting equipment, including provision for instrument landings. The government planned to devote 19 percent of the Eighth Five-Year Plan (1992-96) budget to transportation and communications, up from the 16 percent devoted to the sector during the seventh plan.

Although there is a large private-sector involvement in trans- portation, government plays a large regulatory and developmental role. The central government has ministries to handle

civil aviation, railroads, and surface transportation. Counterpart agencies are found at the state and union territory level. Critical to improving the entire transportation sector in the

late 1990s is the ability of the sector to adjust to the central government's national reform initiatives, including privatization,

deregulation, and reduced subsidies. The sector must also

adjust to foreign trade expansion, demographic pressures and

increasing urbanization, technological change and obsolescence, energy availability, and environmental and public safety concerns.

342


Character and Structure of the Economy

Railroads

India's railroad system is the government's largest public

enterprise (see fig. 12). Its route length extends 62,458 kilometers. The railroads of India are the fourth most heavily used sys- tem in the world, which suggests the large investment made in

rail transportation. In the mid-1990s, the railroad system

employed 1.7 million people and carried around 66 percent of

India's goods traffic (some 350 million tons in FY 1992) and 40

percent of passenger traffic (3.7 billion passenger journeys in

FY 1992).

Indian Railways is administered and managed by the Railway

Board, which is subordinate to the Ministry of Railways. The

minister of railways is assisted by the minister of state for rail- ways. Indian Railways is Asia's largest railroad system and the

second largest state-owned system under a single management

in the world. The 62,458 kilometers of route-length track run

in three gauges: narrow gauge (610 and 762 millimeters),

meter gauge (1,000 millimeters), and broad gauge (1,676 milli- meters). Around 17 percent, or about 11,000 kilometers, of all gauges is electrified, and about 27 percent, or 10,859 kilometers, of the broad-gauge track is electrified. Some 14,600 kilometers are double or multiple tracked. As of FY 1991, there were some 116,000 railroad bridges and some 7,100 railroad

stations.

The railroad system is divided into nine zones: central, east- ern, northern, northeastern, northeast frontier, southern,

south-central, southeastern, and western. As of FY 1993, Indian

Railways had 1,725 steam, 4,069 diesel, and 2,012 electric locomotives; 3,444 electric multiple-unit coaches; 30,298 conventional passenger coaches; 6,163 other passenger cars

(including luggage and mail cars in which passengers sometimes travel); and 337,562 freight cars of all kinds.

The Eighth Five-Year Plan provided for a Rs45 trillion investment in railroad development. Priority was to be given to track

and roadbed renovation, additional electrification, conversion

of high-use meter-gauge lines to broad-gauge track, the

replacement of all steam locomotives, and improved signalling

and telecommunications. By 1992, however, the funds actually

approved by the government were only 80 percent of the

eighth plan's amount, and only 42 percent would be covered by

the central government budget. Indian Railways was expected

to come up with the balance. Thus, in FY 1994, the outlay was

set at Rs65.1 billion; Rsll.5 billion was to come from central

345
344

India: A Country Study

government revenues, Rs43.1 billion from internal railroad

resources, and Rsl0.5 billion from loans. Some of the investment funds, as in the past, were expected from the World

Bank. The only way to cover these outlays with such low budgetary support was with drastic increases in fares and rates in passenger service. In FY 1993, Indian Railways made capital

expenditures amounting to US$2 billion for items such as new

rolling stock, new line construction, track renewal, and electrification.

An example of the scale of new rail line construction is the

new broad-gauge high-speed Konkan Railway, a 760-kilometer

coastal connection between Bombay and Mangalore featuring

fifty-five stations, seventy-three tunnels, 143 major bridges, and

some 1,670 minor bridges. The line crosses several mountain

ranges and runs some 380 kilometers through an earthquakeprone zone. Besides opening up an all-weather transportation

infrastructure between two important cities, it cuts the distance

by rail between them by 1,127 circuitous kilometers.

India has a major railroad-equipment production industry.

Although some state-of-the-art electrical components and

equipment are imported, India is developing sufficient industrial capacity to meet most of its standard locomotive and passenger-car and ancillary equipment needs and has made plans

to export locomotives. The Research, Design, and Standards

Organisation of Indian Railways engages in research and simulations aimed at further improving the quality of domestic

achievements, which have included high-speed passenger

trains (up to 140 kilometers per hour) and freight trains (up to 80 kilometers per hour) and solid-state signalling equipment.

Because some two-thirds of the nation's freight is carried by

train, there is a serious freight car shortage. To overcome this

and other industry-related rail transportation problems, Indian

Railways envisions having to import up to 5,000 freight cars a

year. Rapid Transit

India also has two rapid-rail systems and a third in the planning stage. The most advanced is the world-class metro system

in Calcutta that opened in 1984 and carried 50,000 passengers

daily in 1992-93. It uses Indian-made subway cars that run on

the initial ten kilometers of what will be a 16.5 kilometer-long,

seventeen-station (eleven stations were in service in 1995)

route scheduled for completion in 1995. Plans for more than

346
Figure 12. Transportation System, 1995

348
International boundary

International boundary in dispute

National capital Populated place Major railroad National highway

Major airport Major port 150 300 Kilometers 150 300 Miles

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/ of 'Bengal

ANDAMAN °n ISLANDS

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citation 'thoritative
Character and Structure of the Economy

sixty additional kilometers are on the books. Calcutta is also

served by a seventy-seven-kilometer-long tramway network,

which is to be phased out because of large annual losses despite

a government subsidy. In 1992 Calcutta Tramways started run- ning more reliable buses on some routes. Rapid transit systems are also in operation or being planned

for Madras and New Delhi. The Madras system opened 8.5 kilometers—of a planned 21.7 kilometers—of single-track service

in 1991, using broad-gauge Indian Railways electric multipleunit vehicles. When completed in 2011, the New Delhi system,

in the planning stages since the late 1980s, will include some

220 kilometers of underground and elevated track and a lightrail system of 300 kilometers. In 1994 the Ministry of State for

Surface Transport tendered bids for the first phase, a 167-kilometer elevated high-speed tram system to operate on nine cor- ridors throughout the National Capital Territory of Delhi.

Bombay is served by a suburban rail network that began operation in 1992.

The Road System

India has nearly 2 million kilometers of roads: 960,000 kilometers of surfaced roads and more than 1 million kilometers of

roads constructed of gravel, crushed stone, or earth. Fifty-three

highways, just under 20,000 kilometers in total length, are

rated as national highways, but they carry about 40 percent of

the road traffic. To improve road transportation, significant

efforts were begun in the 1980s to build roads to link major

highways, to widen existing roads from single to double lanes,

and to construct major bridges.

These road-building achievements represent an impressive

expansion from the 1950 total of 400,000 kilometers of roads

of all kinds, but more than 25 percent of villages still have no

road link, and about 60 percent have no all-weather road link.

These statistics, however, mask important regional variations.

Almost all villages in Kerala, Haryana, and Punjab are served

by all-weather roads. By contrast, only 15 percent of villages in

Orissa and 21 percent in Rajasthan are connected with all- weather roads. The quality of roads, including major highways,

is poor by international standards. Nonetheless, roads carry

about 60 percent of all passenger traffic. The central and state governments share responsibilities for

road building and maintaining roads and for some transportation companies. The Ministry of State for Surface Transport

349
Figure 12. Transportation System, 1995

348

India: A Country Study

administers the national highway system, and state highways

and other state roads are maintained by state public works

departments. Minor roads are maintained by municipalities,

districts, and villages. Still other roads, about 22,000 kilometers

in total in 1991, are under the jurisdiction of the Border Roads

Development Board, a central government organization established in 1960 to facilitate economic development and defense

preparedness, especially in the north and northeast.

Motor Vehicles

The number of registered vehicles increased from 300,000

in FY 1950 to 5.2 million in FY 1980 and 23.4 million in FY

1991. India now has more than 375,000 buses and 800,000

trucks. About 40 percent of bus transport is in the public sector. Major urban bus lines are found in cities such as Bombay,

Calcutta, New Delhi, Madras, and other major urban agglomerates. Bombay, India's largest city, for example, had some 3,000

buses running on 339 routes and carrying 1.6 billion passengers per year in FY 1992. The National Capital Territory of

Delhi, with more than 3,800 buses and 870 routes, carried

nearly 1.4 billion passengers in that year, and the Madras bus

system, with some 2,300 vehicles and 428 routes, carried

around 1.3 billion passengers. Because it has a subway system in

place, Calcutta's bus service is considerably smaller. Calcutta

had 1,200 buses and 202 routes and carried 308 million passengers per year in FY 1992. There are also unregulated bus ser- vices in some cities as well as extensive suburban and

interurban and rural bus services.

Truck transportation is largely in private hands. Two-wheel

and three-wheel vehicles also play a major role in hauling passengers and freight. Emissions control is very low by international standards, and fumes from motor vehicles contribute

mightily to India's air pollution. New Delhi ranks among the

ten most polluted cities in the world, according to the World

Health Organization. Automotive traffic causes much of the

pollution.

Ports, Maritime Transportation, and Inland Waterways

India has eleven major seaports: Kandla, Bombay, Nhava

Sheva, Marmagao, New Mangalore, and Kochi (formerly

known as Cochin) on the west coast, and Calcutta-Haldia, Paradip, Vishakhapatnam, Madras, and Tuticorin on the east coast. The port at Nhava Sheva, located across the harbor from Bom350
Passenger train arriving in New Delhi

Courtesy Robert L. Worden

bay Port, was established in 1982 under the administration of

the Jawaharlal Nehru Port Trust as a separate port rather than an adjunct to Bombay. The eleven ports are the responsibility

of the Ministry of State for Surface Transport but are managed

by semi-independent port trusts overseen by boards appointed

by the ministry from government departments, including the

navy, port labor and industry, and ship owners and shipping

companies.

In order of gross weight tonnage conveyed annually, Bombay, Vishakhapatnam, Madras, and Marmagao are the most

important ports. In addition, there are some 139 minor working ports along the two coasts and on offshore islands administered by local, state, or union territory maritime

administrations. Total traffic at the eleven major ports

increased from 107 million tons in FY 1984 to 179 million tons

in FY 1993. In FY 1993, some US$250 million in profits were

earned, an achievement that attracted some US$4.5 billion in

foreign investments in the ports in FY1992-FY1993.

In 1995 there were three government-owned shipping cor- porations, the most important of which was the Shipping Corporation of India. There were also between fifty and sixty

private companies operating a total of 443 vessels amounting to

351
India: A Country Study

6.3 million gross registered tons, more than 300 of which were

1,000 gross registered tons or more. Indian tonnage represented 1.7 percent of the world total. Overall, the share of

Indian vessels in total Indian trade is around 35 percent.

Approximately 40 to 50 percent of capacity is underused. As a

result of the global slump of the late 1980s, shipping companies experienced financial difficulties; the leading private shipping company, Scindia Steam Navigation Company, collapsed

in 19S7. The collapse left most Indian shipping under public

ownership. The government's director general of shipping provides oversight for all aspects of shipping.

India has four major and three medium-sized shipyards, all government run. The Cochin Shipyards in Kochi, Hindustan

Shipyard in Vishakhapatnam, and Hooghly Dock and Port

Engineers in Calcutta are the most important shipbuilding

enterprises in India. Thirn-five smaller shipvards are in the pri- vate sector. Drydocks at Kochi and Vishakhapatnam accommodate the nation's major ship repair needs.

In addition to its coastal and ocean trade routes, India has

more than 16,000 kilometers of inland waterways. Of that number, more than 3,600 kilometers are navigable by large vessels,

although in practice only about 2,000 kilometers are used.

Inland waters are regulated by the Inland Waterways Authority

of India, which was established in 1986 to develop, maintain,

and regulate the nation's waterways and to advise the central

and state governments on inland waterway development.

Civil Aviation

Air transportation is under the purview of the Department

of Civil Aviation, a part of the Ministry of Civil Aviation and

Tourism. In 1995 the government owned two airlines and one

helicopter service, and private companies owned six airlines.

The government-owned airlines dominated India's air trans- portation in the mid-1990s. Air India is the international carrier: it carried more than 2.2 million passengers in FY 1992.

Indian Airlines is the major domestic carrier and also runs

international flights to nearby countries. It carried 9.8 million

passengers in FY 1989, when it had a load factor of more than

80 percent in its fifty-nine airplanes. Analysts, however, attributed this high load factor to a shortage of capacity rather than

efficiency of operation. A major expansion was planned for the

1990s, but an airplane crash in 1990 and a pilots' strike in 1991

damaged the airline, which carried only 7.8 million passengers

352
A bus in rural Rajasthan

CourtesyJanice Hyde

Semi-articulated double-decker bus, Bangalore, Karnataka

Courtesy Robert L. Worden

353
India: A Country Study

in FY 1992. Two other accidents in 1993, plus several hijackings, put constraints on the growth of both airlines.

A third government-owned airline, Vayudoot, was also a domestic carrier in the early 1990s. It provided feeder service

between smaller cities and the larger places served by Air India

and Indian Airlines. By 1994 Indian Airlines had taken over Vayudoot. Another publicly owned company, Pawan Hans, runs

helicopter service, mostly to offshore locations and other areas

that cannot be served by fixed-wing aircraft.

In 1995 India's six private airlines accounted for more than

10 percent of domestic air traffic. Both the number of carriers

and their market share are expected to rise in the mid-1990s.

The four major private airlines are East West Airlines, Jagsons

Airlines, Continental Aviation, and Damania Airways.

In addition to the Indian-owned airlines, many foreign air- lines provide international service. In 1995 forty-two airlines

operated air services to, from, and through India.

In the mid-1990s, India had 288 usable airports. Of these,

208 had permanent-surface runways and two had runways of

more than 3,659 meters, fifty-nine had runways of between

2,400 and 3,659 meters, and ninety-two had runways between

1,200 and 2,439 meters. There are major international airports

at Bombay, Delhi, Calcutta, Madras, and Thiruvananthapuram

(Trivandrum), under the management of the International

Airport Authority of India. International service also operates

from Marmagao, Bangalore, and Hyderabad. A consortium of

Indian and British companies signed a memorandum of understanding with the state government of Maharashtra in June

1995 to build a new international airport for Bombay, across the harbor from the main city and to be linked by a cross-harbor roadway. Major regional airports are located at Ahmadabad, Allahabad, Pune, Srinagar, Chandigarh, Kochi, and

Nagpur.

Telecommunications

National Policy

In 1994 the government issued its National Telecommunications Policy. The policy was issued in recognition of the "urgent

need" to provide universal access to basic telecommunications

services by 1997 and offers guidelines for entry of the private sector into basic telecommunications services. To facilitate pri- vate-sector participation, licensing procedures were established

354
Character and Structure of the Economy

in the Department of Telecommunications, and equity participation for companies registered in India (with 51 or more percent Indian ownership) was anticipated. Private-sector licenses,

however, were to be granted only for local (versus long-distance) telecommunications networks. An autonomous body,

the Telecommunications Authority of India, was established to regulate private-sector activity.

Telephone

The telephone system, like many other aspects of telecommunications, is in the government sector, under the control of

the Ministry of Information and Broadcasting. The modernization of the telephone system has been underway since 1986

when Mahanagar Telephone Nigam, a government corporation, was established to operate systems in Bombay and New

Delhi, and Videsh Sanchar Nigam, also government owned,

was set up as the overseas carrier. Progress was slow, however;

the rest of the nation's service continued as a civil-service-run

operation under the Department of Telecommunications until

1994 when basic telephone services were opened to private-sec- tor competition.

The number of telephone connections rose from 800,000 in

FY 1968 to 8 million in FY 1994. The system remains substandard by international standards, however, and there is a waiting

list for connections of 2.8 million people. Sometimes several

years elapse between application and installation of a telephone line. Close to 1 million new connections a year are being established in the mid-1990s. Plans for increasing the

capacity of the system to handle more directly dialed calls were being implemented in the early 1990s, and 20 million lines

should be in operation by FY 2000. This number is very low for a population that by then will probably exceed 1 billion. Telephone line density was less than 0.7 per 100 persons in 1994, one of the lowest densities among the major nations of Asia.

There also are submarine telecommunications cables linking India with Malaysia and the United Arab Emirates.

Although the government is a major manufacturer of telephone equipment, the private sector—especially foreign ventures—is becoming increasingly involved in manufacturing in

the mid-1990s and paging, cellular phone service, and electronic mail are being introduced.

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India: A Country Study

Radio

Radio broadcasting is a government monopoly under the

Directorate General of All India Radio—established in 1936

and since 1957 also known as Akashvani—a governmentowned, semicommercial operation of the Ministry of Information and Broadcasting. From only six stations at the time of

independence, All India Radio's network had expanded by the

mid-1990s to 146 AM stations plus a National Channel, the

Integrated North-East Service (aimed at tribal groups in northeast India), and the External Service. There are five regional

headquarters for All India Radio: the North Zone in New

Delhi; the North-East Zone in Guwahati, Assam; the East Zone

in Calcutta; the West Zone in Bombay; and the South Zone in

Madras.

The government-owned network provides both national and

local programs in Hindi, English, and sixteen regional languages. Commercial services, which were inaugurated in 1967,

are provided by Vividh Bharati Service, headquartered in Bombay. Vividh Bharati, which accepts advertisements, broadcasts

from thirty-one AM and FM stations in the mid-1990s.

India has an extensive network of mediumwave and short- wave stations. In 1994 there were eighty-five FM stations and

seventy-three shortwave stations that covered the entire country. The broadcasting equipment is mostly Indian made and

reaches special audiences, such as farmers needing agroclimatic, plant protection, and other agriculture-related information. The number of radio receivers increased almost fivefold

between 1970 and 1994, from around 14 million to nearly 65

million. Most radios are also produced within India.

The foreign broadcast service is a function of the External

Services Division of All India Radio. In 1994 seventy hours of

news, features, and entertainment programs were broadcast

daily in twenty-five languages using thirty-two shortwave trans- mitters. The principal target audiences are listeners in neighboring countries and the large overseas Indian community.

Television

Television service is available throughout the country.

Broadcasting is a central government monopoly under the

Ministry of Information and Broadcasting, but the only net- work system, Doordarshan, also known as TV1, accepts advertisements for some programs. Doordarshan, established in

356
Character and Structure of the Economy

1959 and a part of All India Radio until 1976, consists of one

national network and seven regional networks. In 1992 there

were sixty-three high-power television transmitters, 369

medium-power transmitters, seventy-six low-power transmitters,

and twenty-three transposers. Regular satellite transmissions

began in 1982 (the same year color transmission began).

By 1994 some 6 million people were receiving television

broadcasts via satellite, and the number was expected to

increase rapidly throughout the rest of the decade. Cable tele- vision was even more prolific, with an estimated 12 to 15 million subscribers in 1994. Besides Doordarshan, Zee TV—an

independent station broadcasting from Bombay since 1992

uses satellite transmissions. In fact, because Doordarshan is the

only network that is permitted to broadcast television signals

domestically, Zee TV and other entrepreneurs broadcast their

Indian-made videotapes via foreign transmitters. Other networks joining the fray are Cable News Network (CNN—starting

in 1990); Asia Television Network (1991); Hong Kong-based

Star TV (1991); Jain TV, near Bombay (1994); EL TV, a spinoff

of Zee TV in Bombay (1994); HTV, an affiliate of the Hindustan

Times in New Delhi (1994); and Sun TV, a Tamil-language ser- vice in Madras (1994) (see Broadcast Media, ch. 8). In a communications breakthrough in July 1995, Doordarshan agreed,

for a US$1.5 million annual fee and 50 percent of advertising revenue when it exceeds US$1.5 million, to allow CNN to broadcast twenty-four hours a day via an Indian satellite. Doordarshan offers national, regional, and local service.

The number of television sets increased from around 500,000

in 1976 to 9 million in early 1987 and to around 47 million in

1994; increases are expected to continue at around 6 million

sets per year. More than 75 percent of television sets were black

and white models in 1992, but the proportion of color sets is increasing annually. Most television sets are produced in India.

Tourism

Tourism has not been a government priority, but it nonetheless provides around 6 percent of foreign-exchange earnings.

The total number of visitors to India was estimated at nearly 1.8

million in FY 1992. The Eighth Five-Year Plan estimated an

annual increase of 6 to 7 percent in visitor arrivals; tourists

from Europe and North America were targeted. In the mid1990s, the government offered special tax incentives to the

industry to help alleviate a shortage of hotel rooms. Estimated

357
India: A Country Study

gross export earnings from tourism were Rs24 billion and net

earnings Rsl7 billion, making the industry an important foreign-exchange earner. With under 0.3 percent of the world's

tourists and around 1 percent of world tourism spending,

India, however, has barely tapped its tourism potential.

Science and Technology

Origin and Development

Indian scientific research and technological developments

since independence in 1947 have received substantial political

support and most of their funding from the government. Sci- ence and technology initiatives have been important aspects of

the government's five-year plans and usually are based on ful- filling short-term needs, while aiming to provide the institutional base needed to achieve long-term goals. As India has

striven to develop leading scientists and world-class research

institutes, government-sponsored scientific and technical

developments have aided diverse areas such as agriculture, biotechnology, cold regions research, communications, environment, industry, mining, nuclear power, space, and

transportation. As a result, India has experts in such fields as astronomy and astrophysics, liquid crystals, condensed matter

physics, molecular biology, virology, and crystallography.

Observers have pointed out, however, that India's emphasis on

basic and theoretical research rather than on applied research

and technical applications has diminished the social and eco- nomic effects of the government's investments. In the mid1990s, government funds supported nearly 80 percent of

India's research and development activities, but, as elsewhere

in the economic sector, emphasis increasingly was being put on

independent, nongovernmental sources of support (see Liberalization in the Early 1990s; Resource Allocation, this ch.).

India has a long and proud scientific tradition. Nehru, in his

Discovery of India published in 1946, praised the mathematical

achievements of Indian scholars, who are said to have developed geometric theorems before Pythagoras did in the sixth

century B.C. and were using advanced methods of determining

the number of mathematical combinations by the second cen- tury B.C. By the fifth century A.D., Indian mathematicians

were using ten numerals and by the seventh century were treat- ing zero as a number. These breakthroughs, Nehru said, "liberated the human mind . . . and threw a flood of light on the

358
Character and Structure of the Economy

behavior of numbers." The conceptualization of squares, rect- angles, circles, triangles, fractions, the ability to express the

number ten to the twelfth power, algebraic formulas, and

astronomy had even more ancient origins in Vedic literature,

some of which was compiled as early as 1500 B.C. The concepts

of astronomy, metaphysics, and perennial movement are all embodied in the Rig Veda (see The Vedas and Polytheism, ch.

3). Although such abstract concepts were further developed by

the ancient Greeks and the Indian numeral system was popularized in the first millennium A.D. by the Arabs (the Arabic

word for number, Nehru pointed out, is hindsah, meaning

"from Hind (India)"), their Indian origins are a source of

national pride.

Technological discoveries have been made relating to pharmacology, brain surgery, medicine, artificial colors and glazes,

metallurgy, recrystalization, chemistry, the decimal system,

geometry, astronomy, and language and linguistics (systematic

linguistic analysis having originated in India with Panini's

fourth-century B.C. Sanskrit grammar, the Ashtadhyayi) . These

discoveries have led to practical applications in brick and pottery making, metal casting, distillation, surveying, town planning, hydraulics, the development of a lunar calendar, and the

means of recording these discoveries as early as the era of

Harappan culture (ca. 2500-1500 B.C.; see Harappan Culture,

ch. 1).

Written information on scientific developments from the

Harrapan period to the eleventh century A.D. (when the first permanent Muslim settlements were established in India) is found in Sanskrit, Pali, Arabic, Persian, Tamil, Malayalam, and

other classical languages that were intimately connected to Indian religious and philosophical traditions. Archaeological

evidence and written accounts from other cultures with which

India has had contact have also been used to corroborate the

evidence of Indian scientific and technological developments.

The technology of textile production, hydraulic engineering,

water-powered devices, medicine, and other innovations, as well as mathematics and other theoretical sciences, continued

to develop and be influenced by techniques brought in from

the Muslim world by the Mughals after the fifteenth century.

The practical applications of scientific and technical developments are witnessed, for example, by the proliferation of

hundreds of thousands of water tanks for irrigation in South

India by the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. Although

359
India: A Countn Studx

each tank was built through local efforts, together, in effect,

they created a closely integrated network supplying water

throughout the region. The science of metallurgy led to the

construction of numerous small but sophisticated furnaces for

producing; iron and steel. By the late eighteenth century, it is estimated that production capability may have reached 200.000

tons per year. High leyels of textile production—making India

the world's leading producer and exporter of textiles before

1800—were the result of refinements in spinning technology.

Several millennia of interest in astronomy in India eyentuallv

resulted in the invention and construction of a network of

sophisticated, large-scale astronomical obseryatories—the Jantar Mantars (meaning "house of instruments" ) —in the early

eighteenth century Constructed of stone, brick, stucco, and

marble, the Jantar Mantar complexes were used to determine

the seasons, phases of the moon and sun. and locations of stars and planets from points in Delhi. Mathura. Jaipur. Yaranasi.

and Ujjain. The Jantar Mantars were designed and built by a renowned astronomer and city planner. Sawaijai Singh II. the

Hindu maharajah of Amber, between 1725 and 1734. after he

been asked by Mohammad Shah, the tenth Mughal emperor,

to reform the calendar. These complexes had the patronage of

the Mughal emperors and haye long attracted the attention of

Western scholars and trayelers. some of whom haye found

them anachronistic in light of the use of telescopes in Europe

and China more than a century before Jai Singh's projects. As

United States scientist William A. Blanpied has pointed out. Jai

Singh, who subscribed to Hindu cosmology, was aware of West- ern developments but preferred to perfect his naked-eye observations rather than concentrate on precise calculational

astro nomy.

The arrival of the British in India in the early seyenteenth

century—the Portuguese. Dutch, and French also had a presence, although it was much less pervasive—led eyentually to new scientific deyelopments that added to the indigenous

achieyements of the previous millennia (see The Coming of

the Europeans, ch. 1 >. Although colonization subverted much

of Indian culture, turning the region into a source of raw materials for the factories of England and France and leaving only

low-technology production to local entrepreneurs, a new organization was brought to science in the form of the British education system. Science education under British rule (by the

East India Company from 1757 to 1S57 and by the British gov360
Character and Structure of the Economy

ernment from 1858 to 1947) initially involved only rudimentary mathematics, but as greater exploitation of India took

place, there was more need for surveying and medical schools

to train indigenous people to assist Europeans in their explorations and research. What new technologies were implemented

were imported rather than developed indigenously, however,

and it was only during the immediate preindependence period

that Indian scientists came to enjoy political patronage and

support for their work (see The Independence Movement, ch.

i).

Western education and techniques of scientific inquiry were added to the already established Indian base, making way for

later developments. The major result of these developments

was the establishment of a large and sophisticated educational

infrastructure that placed India as the leader in science and

technology in Asia at the time of independence in 1947. Thereafter, as other Asian nations emerged, India lost its primacy in

science, a situation much lamented by India's leaders and sci- entists. However, the infrastructure was in place and has continued to produce generations of top scientists. One of the most famous scientists of the pre- and postindependence era was Indian-trained Chandrasekhara Venkata

(C.V.) Raman, an ardent nationalist, prolific researcher, and

writer of scientific treatises on the molecular scattering of light

and other subjects of quantum mechanics. In 1930 Raman was awarded the Nobel prize in physics for his 1928 discovery of

the Raman Effect, which demonstrates that the energy of a photon can undergo partial transformation within matter. In

1934-36, with his colleague Nagendra Nath, Raman propounded the Raman-Nath Theory on the diffraction of light by

ultrasonic waves. He was a director of the Indian Institute of

Science and founded the Indian Academy of Sciences in 1934

and the Raman Research Institute in 1948.

Another leading scientist was Homi Jehangir Bhabha, an eminent physicist internationally recognized for his contributions to the fields of positron theory, cosmic rays, and muon

physics at the University of Cambridge in Britain. In 1945, with

financial assistance from the Sir Dorabji Tata Trust, Bhabha

established the Tata Institute of Fundamental Research in

Bombay (see Major Research Organizations, this ch.).

Other eminent preindependence scientists include Sir Jagadish Chandra (J.C.) Bose, a Cambridge-educated Bengali physicist who discovered the application of electromagnetic waves

361
India: A Country Study

to wireless telegraphy in 1895 and then went on to a second

notable career in biophysical research. Meghnad Saha, also

from Bengal, was trained in India, Britain, and Germany and

became an internationally recognized nuclear physicist whose

mathematical equations and ionization theory gave new insight

into the functions of stellar spectra. In the late 1930s, Saha

began promoting the importance of science to national eco- nomic modernization, a concept fully embraced by Nehru and

several generations of government planners. The Bose-Einstein

Statistics, used in quantum physics, and Boson particles are named after another leading scientist, mathematician Satyendranath (S.N.) Bose. S.N. Bose was trained in India, and his

research discoveries gave him international fame and an

opportunity for advanced studies in France and Germany. In

1924 he sent the results of his research on radiation as a form

of gas to Albert Einstein. Einstein extended Bose's statistical

methods to ordinary atoms, which led him to predict a new

state of matter—called the Bose-Einstein Condensation—that was scientifically proved in United States laboratory experiments in 1995. Prafulla Chandra Ray, another Bengali, earned

a doctorate in inorganic chemistry from the University of Edinburgh in 1887 and went on to a devoted career of teaching and

research. His work was instrumental in establishing the chemical industry in Bengal in the early twentieth century.

At the onset of independence, Nehru called science "the

very texture of life" and optimistically declared that "science

alone . . . can solve problems of hunger and poverty, of insanitation and illiteracy, of superstition and deadening customs."

Under his leadership, the government set out to cure numerous societal problems. The Green Revolution, educational

improvement, establishment of hundreds of scientific laboratories, industrial and military research, massive hydraulic

projects, and entry into the frontiers of space all evolved from

this early decision to embrace high technology (see The Green

Revolution, ch. 7).

One of the early planning documents was the Scientific Policy Resolution of 1958, which called for embracing "by all appropriate means, the cultivation of science and scientific

research in all its aspects—pure, applied, and educational" and

encouraged individual initiatives. In 1983 the government

issued a similar statement, which, while stressing the importance of international cooperation and the diffusion of scientific knowledge, put considerable emphasis on self-reliance and

362
Part of the eighteenth-centuryJantar Mantar observatory, New Delhi

Courtesy Robert L. Worden

the development of indigenous technology. This goal is still in

place in the mid-1990s.

Infrastructure and Government Role

Science and technology policy and research have largely

been the domains of government since 1947 and are largely

patterned after the structure left behind by the British. Within

the central government, there are a top-down apparatus and a plethora of ministries, departments, lower-level agencies, and

institutions involved in the science and technology infrastructure.Government-administered science and technology emanate

from the Office of the Prime Minister, to which a chief science

adviser and the Science Advisory Council, when they are

appointed, have direct input. The prime minister de jure controls the science and technology sector through the National

Council on Science and Technology, the minister of state for

science and technology (who has control over day-to-day operations of the science and technology infrastructure), and ministers responsible for ocean development, atomic energy,

electronics, and space. Other ministries and departments also

have significant science and technology components and

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India: A Country Study

answer to the prime minister through their respective ministers. Among them are agriculture, chemicals and fertilizers,

civil aviation and tourism, coal, defence, environment, food,

civil supplies, forests and wildlife, health and family welfare,

home affairs, human resource development, nonconventional

energy sources, petrochemicals, and petroleum and natural

gas, as well as other governmental entities.

The Ministry of Science and Technology was established in

1971 to formulate science and technology policies and implement, identify, and promote "frontline" research throughout

the science and technology infrastructure. The ministry,

through its subordinate Department of Science and Technology, also coordinates intragovernmental and international

cooperation and provides funding for domestic institutions

and research programs. The Department of Scientific and

Industrial Research, a technology transfer organization, and

the Department of Biotechnology, which runs a number of

developmental laboratories, are the ministry's other administrative elements. Indicative of the level of importance placed

on science and technology is the fact that Prime Minister P.V. Narasimha Rao held the portfolio for this ministry in the early

and mid-1990s. Some argued, however, that Rao could truly

strengthen the sector by appointing, as his predecessors did, a chief science adviser and a committee of leading scientists to provide high-level advice and delegate the running of these

ministries to others.

The National Council on Science and Technology is at the

apex of the science and technology infrastructure and is chaired by the prime minister. The integration of science and

technology planning with national socioeconomic planning is carried out by the Planning Commission (see Development

Planning, this ch.). Scientific advisory committees in individual

socioeconomic ministries formulate long-term programs and

identify applicable technologies for their particular area of

responsibility. The rest of the infrastructure has seven major

components. The national-level component includes government organizations that provide hands-on research and development, such as the ministries of atomic energy and space, the

Council of Scientific and Industrial Research (CSIR—a component of the Ministry of Science and Technology), and the

Indian Council of Agricultural Research. The second component, organizations that support research and development,

includes the departments or ministries of biotechnology, non364
Character and Structure of the Economy

conventional energy sources, ocean development, and science

and technology. The third-echelon component includes state government research and development agencies, which are

usually involved with agriculture, animal husbandry, irrigation,

public health, and the like and that also are part of the national

infrastructure. The four other major components are the university system, private research organizations, public-sector

research and development establishments, and research and

development centers within private industries. Almost all internationally recognized university-level research is carried out in

government-controlled or government-supported institutions.

The results of government-sponsored research are transferred

to public- and private-sector industries through the National

Research and Development Corporation. This corporation is part of the Ministry of Science and Technology and has as its purpose the commercialization of scientific and technical

know-how, the promotion of research through grants and

loans, promotion of government and industry joint projects,

and the export of Indian technology.

Resource Allocation

Central government financial support of research and development—including subsidies to public-sector industries—was

75.7 percent of total financial support in FY 1992. State governments provided an additional 9.3 percent. However, even when

combined with the private-sector contribution (15.0 percent),

research and development expenditures were onlyjust over 0.8

percent of the GDP in FY 1992. Although there was growth in

research and development expenditures during the 1980s and

early 1990s, the rate of growth was less than the GNP rate of

growth during the same period and was a cause of concern for

government planners. Moreover, the bulk of government

research and development expenditures (80 percent in FY

1992) goes to only five agencies: the Defence Research and

Development Organisation (DRDO), the Ministry of Space,

the Indian Council of Agricultural Research, the Ministry of

Atomic Energy, and CSIR, and to their constituent organizations.

Despite long-term government commitment to research and

development, India compares poorly with other major Asian

countries. In Japan, for example, nearly 3 percent of GDP goes

to research and development; in South Korea and Taiwan, the

figure is nearly 2 percent. In India, research and development

365
India: A Country Study

receives only 0.8 percent of GDP; only China among the major

players spends less (0.7 percent). However, India's share of

GDP expenditure on research and development has increased

slightly: in 1975 it stood at 0.5 percent, in 1980 at 0.6 percent,

and in 1985 at 0.8, where it has become static. Because of the allocation of financial inputs, India has been

more successful at promoting security-oriented and large-scale

scientific endeavors, such as space and nuclear science programs, than at promoting industrial technology. Part of the lat- ter lack of achievement has been attributed to the limited role

of universities in the research and development system.

Instead, India has concentrated on government-sponsored specialized institutes and provided minimal funding to university

research programs. The low funding level has encouraged university scientists to find jobs in the more liberally funded public-sector national laboratories. Moreover, private industry in

India plays a relatively minor role in the science and technology system (15 percent of the total investment compared with

Japan's 80 percent and slightly more than 50 percent in the

United States). This low level of private-sector investment has

been attributed to a number of factors, including the preponderance of trade-oriented rather than technology-oriented

industries, protectionist tariffs, and rigid regulation of foreign

investment. The largest private-sector research and development expenditures during the FY 1990-FY 1992 period were in

the areas of engineering and technology, particularly in the

industrial development, transportation, communications, and

health services sectors. Nonetheless, they were relatively small

expenditures when compared with government and public-sector inputs in the same fields. The key element for Indian industry to benefit from the greater government and public-sector

efforts in the 1990s is the ability of the government and publicsector laboratories to develop technologies with broad applications and to transfer these technologies—as is done by the

National Research and Development Corporation—to private- sector industries able to apply them with maximum efficiency.

India ranks eleventh in the world in its number of active sci- entific and technical personnel. Including medical personnel,

they were estimated at around 188,000 in 1950, 450,000 in

1960, 1.2 million in 1970, 1.8 million in 1980, and 3.8 million

in 1990. India's universities, university-level institutions, and

colleges have produced more than 200,000 science and technology graduates per year since 1985. Doctorates are awarded

366
Character and Structure of the Economy

each year to about 3,000 people in science, between 500 and

600 in engineering, around 800 in agricultural sciences, and

close to 6,000 in medicine. However, in 1990 India had the lowest number of scientific and engineering personnel (3.3) per

10,000 persons in the national labor force of the major Asian

nations. For example, Japan, had nearly seventy-five per 10,000,

South Korea had more than thirty-seven per 10,000, and China

had 5.6 per 10,000.

The quality of higher education in the sciences has not

improved as quickly as desired since independence because of

the flight of many top scientists from academia to higher-paying jobs in government-funded research laboratories. Foreign

aid, aimed at counteracting university faculty shortages, has

produced top-rate graduates as intended. However, because of

limited job prospects at home, many of the brightest physicians, scientists, and engineers have been attracted by opportunities abroad, particularly in Western nations. Since the early

1990s, this trend has appeared to be changing as more hightechnologyjobs, especially in fields requiring computer science

skills, have begun to open in India as a result of economic lib- eralization. The "brain bank" network of Indian scientists

abroad that was seen as a potential source of talent by some

observers in the 1980s has proven to be a valuable resource in

the 1990s.

Using imported technology, scientists made major advances

in microprocessors during the 1980s that brought the country

to only one generation (three to four years) behind international leaders. A sign of how much microcomputer use has

developed could be seen in sales: from US$93 million in FY

1983 to US$488 million in FY 1988. Facilitating the use of automation has been a counterpart to the expansion of the data

communication field. The development of the "Param 9000"

supercomputer prototype, reportedly capable of billions of

floating point operations per second, was completed in December 1994 and was announced by the state-owned Centre for

Development of Advanced Computing as ready for sale to operational users in March 1995. Earlier Param models, using

parallel processing technologies to achieve near-supercomputer performance, were produced in sufficient quantity for

export in the early 1990s.

DRDO developed its own parallel processing computer,

which was unveiled by Prime Minister Rao in April 1995. Developed by DRDO's Advanced Numerical Research and Analysis

367
India: A Country Study

Group in Hyderabad, the supercomputer is capable of 1 billion

points per second speed and can be used for geophysics, image

processing, and molecular modeling.

Major Research Organizations

Agriculture

The Indian Council of Agricultural Research was established

in 1929 as an autonomous clearinghouse-type organization

charged with conducting, aiding, promoting, and coordinating

agricultural and animal husbandry research. It has seventy-six

institutes, bureaus, centers, and project directorates and sev- enty-one nationwide coordinated research projects. Education

programs are mostly operated through India's twenty-six agricultural universities. The council has administrative links to the

Department of Agricultural Research and Education of the

Ministry of Agriculture (see Development Programs, ch. 7).

The council supports numerous research institutes throughout the states and union territories. They include laboratories

doing research on arid zones, birds, aquaculture, cattle,

agroengineering, horticulture, wool, salinity, soils, veterinary

science, animal and plant genetics, land use, dairy production,

and a variety of crops, including rice, jute, cotton, tobacco, oil- seeds, potatoes, and others.

Biotechnology

India has placed considerable effort on biotechnology. At

the national level, the Department of Biotechnology, established in 1986 as part of the Ministry of Science and Technology, is responsible for biotechnology research and

development and biotechnology-related manufacturing,

including bio-safety regulation. It also acts as the government's

agent for biotechnology imports. The department supports two

autonomous laboratories, the National Institute of Immunobiology in New Delhi and the National Facility for Animal Tissue

and Cell Culture in Pune, Maharashtra. Research and development takes place in the areas of burn, heart, and cornea treat- ment; germplasma banks for plants, animals, algae, and

microbes; viral vaccine; animal embryo technology; animal and

human fertility control; communicable and genetic disease

prevention; and biofertilizer, biocontrol, and biomass agents.

The department also controls two state-owned enterprises

involved in vaccine production, the Bharat Immunologicals

368
Parallel supercomputer developed in India

Courtesy Indian Ministry ofExternal Affairs

and Biologicals Corporation and the Indian Vaccines Corporation, both in New Delhi.

CSIR oversees numerous subnational biotechnology institutions. These include the Central Drug Research Institute in

Lucknow, Uttar Pradesh; the Centre for Cellular and Molecular

Biology in Hyderabad, Andhra Pradesh; the Indian Institute of

Chemical Biology in Calcutta; and the Institute of Microbial

Technology in Chandigarh among others.

Defense

DRDO is subordinate to the Ministry of Defence, and its director general is the chief scientific adviser to the minister of

defence. DRDO, which was established in 1958, has forty-five

research laboratories and institutes serving the research and

development needs of the armed forces. Its significant achievements include the development of light combat aircraft, air- craft engines, light field artillery, ballistic bomb fuses, smoke

and incendiary devices, combat vehicles, satellite communications terminals, encryption devices, sonar systems, torpedo

propulsion devices, high-performance inertial guidance sys- tems, target acquisition and ground electronics, and various

rocket and missile systems.

Education Institutions

The Indian Institute of Science is a university-level organization that has contributed much to Bangalore's development as a technology capital. The institute was founded in 1909 on land

in Bangalore donated by the maharajah of Mysore, using an endowment provided by one of the major benefactors of mod369
India: A Country Study

ern Indian science, Jamsetji Nusserwanji (J.N.) Tata, for the

development of experimental science. Before independence

and for some years after independence, the institute had a primarily British and British-trained faculty committed to raising

India's scientific levels. In 1956 the institute was given university status. The Indian Institute of Science has more than forty departments, centers, laboratories, and education programs organized for the study of biological, chemical, electrical,

mathematical, mechanical, and physical sciences. It also has a major library, the National Centre for Science Information,

and a fee-based Centre for Scientific and Industrial Consultancy.

The Indian Academy of Sciences is also located in Bangalore. The academy was founded by C.V. Raman in 1934 "to promote the progress and uphold the cause of science, both in the

pure and applied branches." Although the academy is not a research institute, it provides scholarships and fellowships,

publishes research results, and bestows honors on deserving

scientists, both Indian and foreign. The academy is half funded

by the Department of Science and Technology, and the

remainder of the budget is met through subscriptions to its publications. Raman also founded the Raman Research Insti- tute in 1948 as an independent, private science laboratory at which he and others continued to conduct ground-breaking

research on the campus of the Indian Institute of Science.

The Indian Institute of Technology (IIT) is a university-level

entity providing undergraduate and graduate education in

engineering and technology. The five autonomous IIT campuses listed in order of their founding, are located in Kharagpur (West Bengal; 1950), Bombay (1958), Madras (1959),

Kanpur (Uttar Pradesh; 1960), and New Delhi (1961). The IIT

system was founded by the central government in 1950 and

raised to an "institution of national importance" by Parliament

by means of the Indian Institute of Technology Act of 1956 and

its subsequent amendments. Besides receiving central government support in the early years, IIT received assistance from

West Germany, the Soviet Union, Britain, the United Nations

Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization (UNESCO),

and the United States. Instructional and research departments

range from agricultural engineering to aeronautical engineering and from earth sciences and postharvest technology to naval architecture and ocean engineering. To round out stu370
Character and Structure of the Economy

dents' education, the IIT system also offers humanities and

social science courses. For example, the Madras campus of IIT teaches economics, history, English, psychology, and business

at the undergraduate level in support of other departments

and at the graduate level leading to a master's degree in industrial management. While each campus has departments in the

basic physical sciences, there are unique departments and specializations at each of the five sites. Admission to IIT is highly

competitive; some 100,000 applicants take placement examinations for 2,000 student positions each year. Although most important research is done in governmentand industry-sponsored laboratories, several universities, in

addition to the Indian Institute of Science and the five IIT campuses, are involved in significant research. Those with notable

science programs are Delhi University, Benares Hindu University in Varanasi, Uttar Pradesh, Aligarh Muslim University in

Aligarh, Uttar Pradesh, and Shanti Niketan University in Shanti

Niketan, West Bengal.

Information Science

The Indian National Scientific Documentation Centre (INSDOC) is a major government science and technology information agency. Established in 1952 as part of CSIR, INSDOC has

its main office in New Delhi and regional centers in Bangalore,

Calcutta, and Madras. The center provides document delivery, a wide range of on-line database services, directed research and

bibliographic services, translation services, training and test- ing, and other science information services. It also publishes

science and technology-related bibliographies, abstracts,

library science documentation, conference proceedings, directories, and reference aids, and operates the National Science

Library. INSDOC serves government agencies, academia, and

public and private organizations and individuals throughout

India and South Asia on a partial cost-recovery and partially

subsidized basis. Like many government agencies and government-funded organizations, INSDOC in the early 1990s was compelled to recover ever-increasing percentages—upward of

50 percent for some institutes in 1993—of its annual budget

from nonappropriated sources. Industry

Founded in 1942, CSIR is headquartered in New Delhi, but

its network of laboratories is spread throughout the nation.

371
India: A Country Study

Although heavily involved in science, biotechnology, and information science activities, it also emphasizes industrial research.

The president of CSIR is ex officio the prime minister, a situation that gives the council considerable political prestige.

CSIR's network of nearly 200 national laboratories has links

throughout the nation to another 200 government-sector

research and development institutions and about 1,000

research and development units in the industrial sector that

are supported by both public and private funds (see Early Policy Developments, this ch.). Beyond pure and applied research,

CSIR also has outreach programs such as those under the aus- pices of the National Institute of Science, Technology, and

Development Studies (NISTADS), established in 1974 as a center and raised to institute level in 1981.

CSIR also conducts and funds studies, organizes conferences

and training programs, prepares exhibits, and publishes

reports on the history and organization of Indian science, resource allocation and planning, analyses of the science and

technology community (including behavioral research on sci- entists), the societal and environmental impact of science and

technology, and international cooperation. Part of CSIR's publication program is directed at elementary and secondary

school students with the intention of popularizing science at early ages. The emphasis on industrial research is observable in the

organizations supported by CSIR. They include, among others,

the Central Electrochemical Research Institute in Karaikudi,

Tamil Nadu; the Central Electronics Engineering Institute in

Pilani, Rajasthan; the Central Glass and Ceramic Research

Institute in Calcutta; the Central Leather Research Institute in

Madras; the Indian Institute of Petroleum in Dehra Dun, Uttar

Pradesh; the National Metallurgical Laboratory in Jamshedpur,

Bihar; and the National Physical Laboratory in New Delhi.

Nuclear Power

The key policy-planning body for India's nuclear energy program is the Atomic Energy Commission, which was founded in

1948 and has offices in New Delhi and Bombay. The chairman

of the commission is concurrently the secretary of the Department of Atomic Energy (later the Ministry of Atomic Energy),

which was established in 1954 (with Homi Bhabha as is first head) and exercises executive control over nuclear programs

and executes India's development and utilization of nuclear

372
Character and Structure of the Economy

energy for peaceful purposes. To carry out its avowed peaceful- use mission, the department has policy bodies involved with

regulatory and safety issues; research and development centers,

both integral to the department and private concerns that

receive government funding; organizations involved with

nuclear fuel and heavy water development; and public-sector rare earths and uranium mining and electronics companies

(see Energy, this ch.). The department also funds numerous

research institute- and university-based projects.

As a far-reaching result of India's 1974 test of a nuclear

explosive device, nuclear proliferation problems continue to confront both the department and the commission (see Space

and Nuclear Programs, ch. 10). Divisive issues between India

and the United States over nuclear-fuel supplies for the Tarapur nuclear power plant (which the United States wants cut

off) were compounded in 1993 when the Ministry of Atomic

Energy announced it was seeking foreign buyers for surplus

heavy water being made by India's seven operating heavy water

plants. The plants were developed originally because of the

fuel shortage that confronted India after the Treaty on the

Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons was signed by most

other nuclear nations in 1968. Over time the plants met domestic needs and began to produce an exportable surplus, leading

to India-United States friction. The Atomic Energy Commission's January 1994 announcement that it planned to continue

its development of fast breeder reactors also was likely to cause

international concern. India also has made a major commitment to the use of

nuclear power for the generation of electricity. Major resources have been devoted to research, power station construction, and

delivery services.

Space

The space program had its genesis in the Indian National

Committee of Space Research, which was established in 1962 as part of the Department of Atomic Energy. In 1972 the Department of Space and the Space Commission were established as the executive and policy wings of the program. The Department of Space operates the Indian Space Research Organisation (ISRO, established in 1969) and four independent

projects: the Indian National Satellite Space Segment Project,

the Natural Resource Management System, the National

Remote Sensing Agency, and the Physical Research Laboratory.

373
India: A Country Study

The department also sponsors research in various academic

and research institutions. The ISRO is headquartered in Bangalore and has operating units at twenty-two sites throughout

the country that deal with space systems, propulsion, communications, telemetry and tracking, research, launches, and

other facets of the space program. The major achievements of

the space program have been in the area of the domestic

design, production, and launching of remote sensing and communications satellites. The primary goal of the space program

is to have independent remote sensing and communications

satellite systems with launcher autonomy

In 1992 the ISRO set up the Antrix Corporation to market

space and telecommunications products to help recover some

of the costs of the annual space budget. That budget increased

from Rs3.8 billion in FY 1990 to an estimated Rs7.5 billion in

FY 1994. The majority of the FY 1994 expenditures were slated

for rocket development (50 percent) and communications and

remote sensing satellite operations (26.8 percent).

Space research began with the establishment of the Thumba

Equatorial Rocket Launching Station near Thiruvananthapuram, Kerala. From Thumba Indian scientists launched

United States-made rockets carrying French satellites to study

the upper atmospheric winds over the magnetic equator. From

this station, Indian scientists also have carried out original

research in electrojet currents over the magnetic equator, vertical profiles of airglow, and cosmic X-ray background radiation.

The first Indian experimental satellite was launched in 1975,

followed by four others: operational communications and

remote sensing satellites have been launched as part of the

Indian National Satellite System (Insat). Insat is an interagency

project operated by the Department of Space for domestic

radio relay, computer network, television, rural telegraph net- work, and weather, emergency, and other radio communications.

Three satellites operated by Insat were in use in the mid1990s in cooperation with the International Telecommunication Union's International Telecommunications Satellite

(Intelsat) system. The three satellites (the first-generation

Insat-1D in June 1990, the second-generation Insat-2A in July

1992, and Insat-2B in July 1993) were indigenously built under

the direction of the ISRO and put into geostationary orbit over the Indian Ocean using French rockets launched in French

Guiana. Additional and more advanced communications satel374
Character and Structure of the Economy

lites—Insat-2C, Insat-2D, and Insat-2E—were planned for

launch in FY 1994, FY 1995, and FY 1996.

Although early Indian satellites were launched by the Soviet

Union, the United States, and the European Space Agency, in

1980 India began using domestically produced launch vehicles

for its Rohini and Stretched Rohini experimental satellites.

The ISRO has launch ranges at Thumba, Sriharikota Island on

the east coast of Andhra Pradesh, and Balasore in Orissa.

Foreign observers in 1993 believed that the launch vehicle

program was the least developed part of the space program

and had fallen behind the satellite program in technological

capability. Supporting this belief was the September 1993

launch of India's liquid-and-solid-fuel Polar Satellite Launch

Vehicle (PSLV), designed to carry a 1,000-kilogram satellite, at Sriharikota. Although the PSLV-D1 was successfully launched,

it malfunctioned before reaching orbit. Despite such setbacks,

the national goal of achieving launcher autonomy has been set for 2000.

In May 1994, after several failed launches, India's five-stage,

solid-fuel Augmented Satellite Launch Vehicle (ASLV) program, which started its test phase in 1987, succeeded in deploying a 133-kilogram satellite and placing it in a low earth orbit

via a solid-fuel launch vehicle, the ASLV-D4. The ASLV-D4 was launched from Sriharikota. In March 1995, the head of the

ISRO announced that India would become self-reliant in

launcher technology by 1997-98 when the first Geostationary

Launch Vehicle (GSLV) flight was planned.

Through international cooperation programs, India also has

put a man in space with the Soviet Union, has participated in

various French and German space ventures, and has had a payload aboard the United States Space Shuttle. It also provided

technical expertise to the Arab Satellite Communication Organization (Arabsat) and entered into a cooperative space

research agreement with the Ukrainian National Space Agency.

Indian weather satellites help nations throughout the Indian

Ocean littoral by providing weather information and real-time

distress alert services. Like the nuclear energy program, the

space program has military implications that are contentious

international political issues (see Russia; United States, ch. 9).

Other Leading Institutions

Although much of the top executive authority of the science

and technology infrastructure resides in New Delhi, some pre375
India: A Country Study

mier science and technology institutions are located elsewhere.

Bangalore, the capital of Karnataka, is a center for high-technology industry and a major research and development site. Much of the activity in Bangalore's "Silicon Valley" is carried

out through collaborative arrangements with multinational

corporations in fields such as aeronautics, communications,

electronics, and machine tools. By 1990 there were more than

100,000 people employed by 3,000 companies in the electronics industry alone.

The Tata Institute of Fundamental Research in Bombay conducts fundamental research in astronomy, mathematics, molecular biology, and physics; and applied research in computer

science, ion accelerators, material science, and solid state electronics. Organizationally, the institute is a component of the

Department of Atomic Energy. When the atomic energv program began in 1948, the Tata Institute provided trained staff,

and in 1955, because of the important role it p laved in nuclear

energy research, the institute was recognized as the National

Centre of the Government of India for Advanced Study and

Fundamental Research in Nuclear Science and Mathematics.

In this capacity, the institute became a world-class nuclear

research facility, recognized for its discoveries in the field of

strange particles.

Research on applied mathematics, astrophysics, deoxyribonucleic acid (DNA), high-power microwaves, stratospheric and

underground nuclear physics, theoretical computer science,

and other high-technology fields is carried out by the Tata

Institute in Bombay and at its facilities in Bangalore and Kolar

in Karnataka, Hyderabad in Andhra Pradesh, Pachmarhi in

Madhva Pradesh, Pune in Maharashtra, and Udhagamandalam

(Ooty) in Tamil Nadu.

Tata Institute scientists designed the first Indian digital computer in the 1960s and since then have contributed directly to the manufacture of microwave components and devices. Joint

work has been conducted with foreign laboratories, such as accelerator experiments with Switzerland and the United

States. The Tata Institute also provides both formal and informal science education aimed at improving the quality of sci- ence education and developing remedial measures for

improving scholastic performance.

Prospects in Science and Technology

Some observers of the Indian science and technology com376
Character and Structure of the Economy

munity, while acknowledging its strong points, complain that

there is a lack of communication and coordination among the

numerous science and technology institutes. They also have

commented that because of a lack of materials and purpose,

the quality of some government laboratories is low and that

quality-control research is found primarily in the private sector. Although little movement is being made toward privatization

of science and technology research, the government is trying

to bring private industry—where there is more innovation and

competitiveness—into the research process. In the 1990s, a considerable amount of discussion and experimentation is occurring in the area of technology transfer from fundamental

research institutes to the marketplace.

On a more fundamental level, it has been observed that

there often is, at best, a tenuous link between major financial

investment in research and development and the results

enjoyed by India's society and economy. Despite major achievements in such fields as agriculture, telecommunications, health

care, and nuclear energy—many of which derived from foreign

technology inputs—parts of India's population face malnutrition, depend on bullock carts for transportation, suffer from

diseases wiped out in many other nations, and use cow dung

and wood for fuel. Although the government has decentralized

to some extent, inordinate government control over planning

and operation of research institutions continues, and the weak

link between the research and industrial sectors persists. However, with its sizable domestic- and foreign-trained base of sci- entists and engineers and considerable participation in the

scientific programs of official international organizations,

India has immense potential for self-fulfillment and technological aid to other Asian nations in the early twenty-first century.

In the mid-1990s, the Indian economy appears to be at a

crossroads. The economic system established after independence, which was marked by a large public sector, a tightly regulated private sector, and a limited role for foreign trade, is under attack from many quarters. However, the extent to which

the government is willing and able to make changes remains

unclear, and the opposition of vested interests to liberalization

makes it likely that reforms will continue to take place only

gradually.

* * *

377
India: A Country Study

A good survey of the Indian economy from independence

until the mid-1980s is V.N. Balasubramanyam's The Economy of

India. The various essays in The Indian Economy: Recent Development and Future Prospects, edited by Robert E.B. Lucas and

Gustav F. Papanek, cover the same period and also evaluate the

early stage of the "new economic policy" of the mid-1980s. For

more recent developments, the periodical literature is the most

useful, especially the articles in Economic and Political Weekly

[Bombay]. Also helpful are Bimaljalan's India's Economic Crisis,

which covers the 1990 balance of payments crisis, and the volume he edited, The Indian Economy: Problems and Prospects, which

reviews India's economic conditions since 1947. India in Transition: Freeing the Economy, byjagdish Bhagwati, is also an important contribution to the analysis of India's economic reforms.

The most current and easily accessible sources on the econ- omy are two publications of the Economist Intelligence Unit in

London: Country Profile: India, Nepal, an annual survey of the

economy; and Country Report: India, Nepal, a quarterly publication that includes the latest economic information. The annual

Economic Survey, prepared by India's Ministry of Finance,

reviews economic developments in each fiscal year. The Ministry of Planning's Statistical Abstract, which is published at irregular intervals, provides considerable statistical information,

including the most recent released by the government.

There are numerous works on Indian science and technology. A.K. Bag's Science and Civilization in India, Abdur Rahman's

Science and Technology in Indian Culture, and the Directory ofScientific Research Institutions in India, published by the Indian

National Scientific Documentation Centre, are useful. Also

very useful are annual and other reports from various scientific

institutions, such as the Indian Institute of Science, and government science agencies, such as the Council of Scientific and

Industrial Research and the Indian Space Research Organisation. Several articles by William A. Blanpied are helpful cri- tiques of India's scientific and technology developments. (For

further information and complete citations, see Bibliography.)

378
Chapter 7. Agriculture
A cow drawn in the paper stencil art (sanzi khakaj stylefound in parts of Uttar Pradesh and Rajasthan
AGRICULTURE HAS ALWAYS BEEN INDIA'S most important

economic sector. In the mid-1990s, it provides approximately

one-third of the gross domestic product (GDP—see Glossary)

and employs roughly two-thirds of the population. Since independence in 1947, the share of agriculture in the GDP has

declined in comparison to the growth of the industrial and ser- vices sectors. However, agriculture still provides the bulk of

wage goods required by the nonagricultural sector as well as numerous raw materials for industry. Moreover, the direct

share of agricultural and allied sectors in total exports is around 18 percent. When the indirect share of agricultural

products in total exports, such as cotton textiles and jute

goods, is taken into account, the percentage is much higher.

Dependence on agricultural imports in the early 1960s con- vinced planners that India's growing population, as well as con- cerns about national independence, security, and political

stability, required self-sufficiency in food production. This perception led to a program of agricultural improvement called

the Green Revolution, to a public distribution system, and to price supports for farmers (see The Green Revolution, this

ch.). In the 1980s, despite three years of meager rainfall and a drought in the middle of the decade, India managed to get

along with very few food imports because of the growth in

food-grain production and the development of a large buffer

stock against potential agricultural shortfalls. By the early

1990s, India was self-sufficient in food-grain production. Agricultural production has kept pace with the food needs of the

growing population as the result of increased yields in almost

all crops, but especially in cereals. Food grains and pulses

account for two-thirds of agricultural production in the mid1990s. The growth in food-grain production is a result of con- centrated efforts to increase all the Green Revolution inputs

needed for higher yields: better seed, more fertilizer, improved

irrigation, and education of farmers. Although increased irri- gation has helped to lessen year-to-year fluctuations in farm

production resulting from the vagaries of the monsoons, it has

not eliminated those fluctuations.

Food-grain production increased from 50.8 million tons in

fiscal year (FY—see Glossary) 1950 to 176.3 million tons in FY

1990. The compound growth rate from FY 1949 to FY 1987 was

381
India: A Counties Study

2.7 percent per annum. Overall, wheat was the best performer,

with production increasing more than eightfold in forty years. Wheat was followed by rice, which had a production increase of

more than 350 percent. Coarse grains had a poorer rate of

increase but still doubled in output during those years: production of pulses went up by less than 70 percent. The increase in

oilseed production, however, was not enough to fill consumer

demands, and India went from being an exporter of oilseeds in

the 1950s to a major importer in the 1970s and the early 1980s.

The agricultural sector attempted to increase oilseed production in the 1980s and early 1990s. These efforts were successful:

oilseed production doubled and the need for imports was

reduced. In the early 1990s, India was on the verge of self-suffi- ciency in oilseed production.After independence in 1947, the

cropping pattern became more diversified, and cultivation of

commercial crops received a new impetus in line with domestic

demands and export requirements. Xontraditional crops, such

as summer mung (a variety of lentil, part of the pulse family),

sovbeans, peanuts, and sunflowers, were gradually gaining

importance.

The per capita availability of a number of food items

increased significantly in the postindependence period despite

a population increase from 361 million in 1951 to 846 million

in 1991. Per capita availability of cereals went up from 334

grams per dav in 1951 to 470 grams per day in 1990. Availability

of edible oils increased significantly, from 3.2 kilograms per

year per capita in FY 1960 to 5.4 kilograms in FY 1990. Similarly, the availability of sugar per capita increased from 4.7 to 12.5 kilograms per year during the same period. The one area

in which availability decreased was pulses, which went from

60.7 grams per day to 39.4 grams per day. This shortfall presents a serious problem in a country where a large part of the

population is vegetarian and pulses are the main source of protein.There are large disparities among India's states and territories in agricultural performance, only some of which can be

attributed to differences in climate or initial endowments of

infrastructure such as irrigation. Realizing the importance of

agricultural production for economic development, the central

government has played an active role in all aspects of agricultural development. Planning is centralized, and plan priorities,

policies, and resource allocations are decided at the central

level. Food and price policy also are decided by the central gov3S2
Agriculture

ernment. Thus, although agriculture is constitutionally the

responsibility of the states rather than the central government,

the latter plays a key role in formulating policy and providing

financial resources for agriculture.

Land Use

In FY 1987, field crops were planted on about 45 percent of

the total land mass of India. Of this cultivated land, almost 37

million hectares were double-cropped, making the gross sown

area equivalent to almost 173 million hectares. About 15 million hectares were permanent pastureland or were planted in

various tree crops and groves. Approximately 108 million hectares were either developed for nonagricultural uses, forested, or unsuited for agriculture because of topography. About 29.6

million hectares of the remaining land were classified as culti- vable but fallow, and 15.6 million hectares were classified as cultivable wasteland. These 45 million hectares constitute all the

land left for expanding the sown area; for various reasons, however, much of it is unsuited for immediate cropping. Expansion

in crop production, therefore, has to come almost entirely

from increasing yields on lands already in some kind of agricultural use (see table 26; table 27, Appendix).

Topography, soils, rainfall, and the availability of water for

irrigation have been major determinants of the crop and live- stock patterns characteristic of the three major geographic

regions of India—the Himalayas, the Indo-Gangetic Plain, and

the Peninsula—and their agro-ecological subregions (see fig. 5; Principal Regions, ch. 2). Government policy as regards irrigation, the introduction of new crops, research and education,

and incentives has had some impact on changing the traditional crop and livestock patterns in these subregions. The

monsoons, however, play a critical role in determining whether

the harvest will be bountiful, average, or poor in any given year. One of the objectives of government policy in the early 1990s was to find methods of reducing this dependence on the monsoons. Himalayas

The Himalayan region, with some 520,000 square kilometers

of land, ranks well behind the other two regions in agricultural

importance. Despite generally adequate rainfall, the rugged

topography allows less than 10 percent of the land to be used

383
India: A Country Study

for agriculture. The sandy, loamy soils on the hillsides and the

alluvial clays in the region's premier agricultural subregion, the

Vale of Kashmir—located in the northwestern part of the state ofJammu and Kashmir—provide fertile land for agricultural

use. The main crops are rice, corn, wheat, barley, millet, and

potatoes. Most of India's temperate-zone fruits (apples, apricots, cherries, and peaches) and walnuts are grown in the vale. Sericulture and sheepherding also are being undertaken. In

the eastern Himalayan subregion, the soils are moderately rich

in organic matter and are acidic. Although much of the farming is done on terraced hillsides, there is a significant amount

of shifting cultivation, which has resulted in deforestation and

soil erosion. Rice, corn, millet, potatoes, and oilseeds were the

main crops in the early 1990s. The region also is well known for

the tea plantations of the mountainous Darjiling (Darjeeling) area in the northern tip of West Bengal.

Indo-Gangetic Plain

The vast Indo-Gangetic Plain, extending from Punjab to

Assam, is the most intensively farmed zone of the country and

one of the most intensively farmed in the world. Rainfall, most

of which comes with the southwest monsoon, is generally adequate for summer-grown crops, but in some years vast areas are seared by drought. Fortunately, much of the land has access, or potential access, to irrigation waters from wells and rivers,

ensuring crops even in years of drought and making possible a winter crop as well as a summer harvest. Wheat is the main

crop in the west, rice in the east. Pulses, sorghum, oilseeds, and

sugarcane are among other important crops. Mango orchards

are common. Other fruits of the subregion include guavas,

jackfruit, plums, lemons, oranges, and pomegranates.

In the Great Indian Desert, rainfall is scanty and erratic.

About 20 percent of the total area is under cultivation, mostly

in Haryana and Gujarat states, and comparatively little in Rajasthan. The Indira Gandhi Canal—begun in 1958 as the Rajasthan Canal—was designed to bring water from the north.

Progress was slow, and only the first stage was close to completion by the end of the Seventh Five-Year Plan (FY 1985-89). By

then, the canal had substantially increased the area under culti- vation in Rajasthan, and a new completion date of 1999 is anticipated (see Development Programs, this ch; Development

Planning, ch. 6). The cultivable area is expected to expand further with the development of the canal's second stage during

384
Agriculture

the 1990s. The leading crops of the subregion are millet, sor- ghum, wheat, and peanuts. Vast expanses of sparse vegetation

provide sustenance for sheep and goats. In the late 1980s, dairy

farming became important in locations that had sufficient pastureland.

Peninsular India

The east and west coasts, the coastal plains, and the deltaic

tracts that extend inland for some 100 to 200 kilometers in

Peninsular India benefit from both the June-to-September

southwest monsoon and the October-to-November northeast

monsoon. Farther inland, as the topography and climate

change, so does the pattern of agriculture. The proportion of

land under cultivation ranges from about 50 percent along the

coastal plain and in the western part of Andhra Pradesh to about 25 percent in eastern Madhya Pradesh. Except in areas of certain developed river valleys, double-cropping is rare. Rice

is the predominant crop in high-rainfall areas and sorghum in

low-rainfall areas. Other crops of significance along the east coast and in the Central Highlands in the early 1990s were

pigeon peas, mustard, peanuts, millet, linseed, castor beans,

cotton, and tobacco.

On the Deccan Plateau, deep, alluvial black soils that retain

moisture for a long time are the basis for much of the region's

output of farm products. However, the region also has many

farming areas that are covered by thin, light-textured soils that

suffer quickly from drought. Whether a crop is made or lost is, therefore, often dependent on the availability of supplementary water from ponds and streams. About 60 percent of the

land in the state of Maharashtra was under cultivation in the

early 1990s, less in Madhya Pradesh. About 75 percent of the

cropland of the Deccan during this period was planted in food

crops, such as millet, sorghum, rice, wheat, and peanuts; most

of the remaining cropland was planted in fodder crops.

In the far south of the Peninsula, the area under cultivation

varies from about 10 percent in the Western Ghats, to 25 percent in the western coastal tract, to 55 percent on the Karnataka Plateau. Here is the India—the land of spices—that Vasco

da Gama and other European navigators came searching for in

the fifteenth century. On the Karnataka Plateau, sorghum, millet, pulses, cotton, and oilseeds are the main crops on the 90

percent of the cultivated land that is dry-farmed; rice, sugarcane, and vegetables predominate on the 10 percent that was

385
India: A County Study

irrigated in the late 1980s. Coconuts,, areca. coffee., pepper,

rubber, cashew nuts, tapioca., and cardamom are widely grown

on plantations in the Xilgiri Hills and on the western slopes of

the Western Ghats.

Land Tenure

Matters concerning the ownership, acquisition, distribution,

and taxation of land are, bv provision of the constitution.,

under the jurisdiction of the states (see Local Government., ch.

S . Because of the diverse attitudes and approaches that would

result from such freedom if there were no general guidelines,

the central government has at times laid down directives dealing with the main problems affecting the ownership and use of

land. But it remains for the state governments to implement

the central government guidelines. Such implementation has

varied widelv among the states. Landholding Categories

India is a land of small farms, of peasants cultivating their

ancestral lands mainly bv familv labor and. despite the spread

of tractors in the 1980s., bv pairs of bullocks. About 50 percent

of all operational holdings in 19S0 were less than one hectare

in size. About 19 percent fell in the one-to-two hectare range.

16 percent in the two-to-four hectare range, and 11 percent in

the four-to-ten hectare range. Onlv 4 percent of the working

farms encompassed ten or more hectares.

Although farms are tvpicallv small throughout the country,

the average size holding bv state ranges from about 0.5 hectare

in Kerala and 0.75 hectare in Tamil Nadu to three hectares in

Maharashtra and five hectares in Rajasthan. Factors influencing this range include soils, topographs rainfall, rural population densitv. and thoroughness of land redistribution

programs.

Manv factors—historical., political, economic, and demographic—have affected the development of the prevailing

land-tenure status. The operators of most agricultural holdings

possess vested rights in the land thev till, whether as full owners

or as protected tenants. By the earlv 1990s, there were tenancy

laws in all the states and union territories except Nagaland.

Meghalava. and Mizoram. The laws provide for states to confer

ownership on tenants., who can buv the land thev farm in

return for fair pavment: states also oversee provision of security

356
3A

Indira Gandhi Canal, Rajasthan

Courtesy Indian Ministry ofExternal Affairs

of tenure and the establishing of fair rents. The implementation of these laws has varied among the states. West Bengal,

Karnataka, and Kerala, for example, have achieved more suc- cess than other states. The land tenure situation is complicated, and it has varied widely from state to state. There is, however, much less variation in the mid-1990s than in the

postindependence period.

Independent India inherited a structure of landholding that was characterized by heavy concentration of cultivable areas in

the hands of relatively large absentee landowners (zamindars

see Glossary), the excessive fragmentation of small landholdings, an already growing class of landless agricultural workers,

and the lack of any generalized system of documentary evidence of landownership or tenancy. Land was important as a

status symbol; from one generation to the next, there was a ten- dency for an original family holding to be progressively subdi387
India: A Country Study

vided, a situation that continued in the early 1990s. This

phenomenon resulted in many landholdings that were too

small to provide a livelihood for a family. Borrowing money

against land was almost inevitable and frequently resulted in

the loss of land to a local moneylender or large landowner, further widening the gap between large and small landholders.

Moreover, inasmuch as landowners and moneylenders tended

to belong to higher castes and petty owners and tenants to lower castes, land tenure had strong social as well as economic

impact (see Varna, Caste, and Other Divisions; Settlement and

Structure, ch. 5).

By the early 1970s, after extensive legislation, large absentee

landowners had, for all practical purposes, been eliminated;

their rights had been acquired by the state in exchange for

compensation in cash and government bonds. More than 20

million former zamindar-system tenants had acquired occu- pancy rights to the land they tilled. Whereas previously the

landlord collected rent from his tenants and passed on a portion of it as land revenue to the government, starting in the

early 1970s, the state collected the rent directly from cultivators

who, in effect, had become renters from the state. Most former

tenants acquired the right to purchase the land they tilled, and

payments to the state were spread out over ten to twenty years. Large landowners were divested not only of their cultivated

land but also of ownership of forests, lakes, and barren lands.

They were also stripped of various other economic rights, such

as collection of taxes on sales of immovable property within

their jurisdiction and collection of money for grazing privileges

on uncultivated lands and use of river water. These rights also were taken over by state governments in return for compensation. By 1980 more than 6 million hectares of waste, fallow, and

other categories of unused land had been vested in state governments and, in turn, distributed to landless agricultural

workers.

Land Reform

A major concern in rural India is the huge number of landless or near-landless families, many of whom are wholly dependent on a few weeks of work at the peak planting and

harvesting seasons. The number of landless rural families has

grown steadily since independence, both in absolute terms and

as a proportion of the population. In 1981 there were 195.1

million rural workers: 55.4 million were agricultural laborers

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Agriculture

who depended primarily on casual farm work for a livelihood.

In the early 1990s, the rural work force had grown to 242 million, of whom 73.7 million were classified as agricultural laborers. Approximately 33 percent of the employed rural workers were classified as casual wage laborers.

Because of the large number of landless farmers and the fre- quent neglect of land by absentee landlords in the early years

of independence, the principle that there should be a ceiling

on the size of landholdings, depending on the crop planted

and the quality of the land, was embodied in the First Five-Year

Plan (FY 1951-55). An agricultural census was conducted to provide guidance in setting such ceilings. During the Second

Five-Year Plan (FY 1956-60), most states legislated fixed ceil- ings, but there was little uniformity among the states; ceilings

ranged from six to 132 hectares. Certain specialized branches

of agriculture, such as horticulture, cattle breeding, and dairy

farming, were usually exempted from ceilings.

All the states instituted programs to force landowners to sell their over-the-ceiling holdings to the government at fixed

prices; the states, in turn, were to redistribute the land to the

landless. But adamant resistance, high costs, sloppy record

keeping, and poor administration in general combined to weaken and delay this aspect of land reform. The delays in legislation allowed large landowners to circumvent the intent of

the laws by spurious partitioning, sales, gifts to family members,

and other methods of evading ceilings. Many exemptions were

granted so that there was little surplus land.

To ensure more uniformity in income, to combat evasion of

the intent of the laws, and to secure more land for distribution

to the landless, the central government in the 1970s pushed for

greatly reduced ceilings. For a family of five, the central government guidelines called for not more than 10.9 hectares of

good, irrigated land suitable for double-cropping, not more

than 10.9 hectares of land suited for one crop annually, and

not more than 21.9 hectares for orchards. Exemptions were

continued for land used as cocoa, coffee, tea, and rubber plantations; land held by official banks and other government

units; and land held by agricultural schools and research organizations. At the option of the states, land held by religious,

educational, and charitable trusts also could be exempted. To

protect the states from legal challenges to their land reform

laws, the constitution was amended in 1974 to include in its Ninth Schedule the state laws that had been enacted in con389
India: A Country Study

formance with national guidelines. Land reform laws enacted

after 1974 also were included in the amendment.

By the beginning of the 1990s, all states and union territories, except Goa, Arunachal Pradesh, Nagaland, Manipur,

Mizoram, and Tripura, had passed ceiling laws to conform to central government guidelines. In Maharashtra, for example,

the revised ceiling law that became effective in 1975 set upper

limits at perennially irrigated land, 7.2 hectares; seasonally irri- gated land, 10.8 hectares; paddy land in an assured rainfall area, 14.6 hectares; and other dry land, 21.9 hectares. By the

early 1980s, about 150,000 hectares had been declared surplus

under this act, about 100,000 of which had been distributed to 6,500 landless persons. A 1973 land reform amendment in

Bihar set a range of ceilings on holdings for a family of five,

from six to eighteen hectares depending on land quality, and

offered an allowance for each additional family member, subject to a maximum of one-and-one-half times the holding.

Within five years, the Bihar government had acquired 94,000

hectares of surplus land and had distributed 53,000 hectares to 138,000 landless families. Success nationwide was limited. Of

the 2.9 million hectares of land declared surplus, nearly 1.9

million hectares had been distributed by the end of the seventh

plan, leaving 1 million hectares still to be distributed as of early

1993.

By the early 1990s, nearly all the states had enacted legislation aimed at the consolidation of each tiller's landholdings

into one contiguous plot. Implementation was patchy and sporadic, however. By the early 1980s, the work had been completed only in Punjab, Haryana, and western Uttar Pradesh

and had begun in Orissa and Bihar. In most of the other states, nothing had been accomplished by the early 1990s. The Sixth

Five-Year Plan (FY 1980-84) set a goal for the completion of

the consolidation of holdings within ten years, which was not

achieved.

In order to protect tenants from exorbitant rents (often up

to 50 percent of their produce), the states passed legislation to regulate rents. The maximum rate was fixed at levels not

exceeding 20 to 25 percent of the gross produce in all states except Andhra Pradesh, Haryana, and Punjab. The states also

adopted various other measures for the protection of tenants,

including moratoriums on evictions, minimum periods of ten- ure, and security of tenure subject to eviction on prescribed

grounds only.

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Agriculture

By the early 1980s, most of the cultivated area had been sur- veyed and records of rights prepared. In most states, revenue assessment—the tax on land—against farmland had been

revised upward in keeping with a rise in farm prices (see Agricultural Taxation, this ch.). In several states, steps were taken to associate village assemblies, or panchayat (see Glossary), with

the maintenance of land records, the collection of land reve- nue, and the management of lands belonging to government;

the results of these efforts have frequently been unsatisfactory.

Economic Development

Evolution of Policy

The British colonial government of India did not pursue an

active policy of agricultural development despite modest

efforts to formulate a policy (see The British Raj, 1858-1947,

ch. 1). One such effort was the appointment in 1926 of the

Royal Commission on Agriculture, which made some recommendations for improving agriculture and promoting the welfare of the rural population. Most of the commission's recommendations were deferred because of the Great Depression of

the 1930s. One outcome, however, was the establishment of the

Imperial (later Indian) Council of Agricultural Research in

1929. During World War II, disruptions in international trade

also led the government to initiate the Grow More Food Campaign. The government adopted its first agricultural policy

statement in the wake of famine in Bengal in 1943. The policy

objectives included increased production of food grains, use of

better methods of production, improved marketing, better

prices for the producers, fair wages for agricultural labor, fair

distribution of food, increased production of raw materials,

and improvements in research and education. This statement was the basis of many of the policies adopted soon after independence, especially in the First Five-Year Plan, when the central government was committed to giving priority to

agricultural production to increase the food supply in the

country.

The prolonged neglect of agriculture meant that there was

almost no growth in the agricultural sector. From 1891 to 1946,

output of all crops grew at 0.4 percent a year; the rate for food

grains was only 0.1 percent per year. The land tenure system

led to exploitative agrarian relations and stagnation (see Land

Tenure, this ch.). Farmers had little incentive to invest, and

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India: A Country Study

despite great strides in foreign agricultural technology, Indian

agricultural technology stagnated. Specifically, there were few

improvements in seeds, agricultural implements, machines, or chemical fertilizers. At the time of independence in 1947, agriculture and allied sectors provided well over 70 percent of the country's employment and more than 50 percent of the gross national product

(GNP—see Glossary). Agricultural development was a key to a number of national goals, such as reducing rural poverty, providing an adequate diet for all citizens, supplying agricultural raw materials for the textile industry and other industries, and

expanding exports. In the mid-1960s, the goal of self-reliance was added to this list. The central government has played a progressively more important role on the agricultural front by providing overall leadership and coordination, as well as by

providing a significant part of the financing for agricultural

programs. However, the primary responsibility for the design

and implementation of agricultural programs, in accordance

with the constitution, remained with the states in the late twentieth century (see The Constitutional Framework, ch. 8).

India's agricultural growth strategy after independence

evolved over three distinct phases. In the first phase, roughly

covering the period through the Second Five-Year Plan, agricultural growth rested on removing basic socioeconomic constraints through land reform, change in the village power

structure, reorganization of the rural poor into cooperatives,

and better citizen participation in planning. The initial

assumption was that changing the land tenure system by abolishing the zamindar system—a method of revenue collecting

and landholding developed during the Mughal and British

colonial periods—would stimulate agricultural output (see The

Mughal Era; The British Empire in India, ch. 1).

The second phase occurred during the Third Five-Year Plan

(FY 1961-65). The continuing shortages of food in the 1960s

and the consequent crises convinced planners that raising agricultural output, especially food grains, was essential for political stability and independence from foreign food aid.

Self-sufficiency in food-grain production and development of an adequate buffer stock through procurement became clearly

defined goals in the mid-1960s. Keeping in mind the variety of

socioeconomic and agroclimatic differences, the government

adopted an area-specific approach, and emphasized programs

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Agriculture

such as the Intensive Area Agricultural Programme and the

Intensive Agricultural District Programme.

The third phase is identified predominantly as the Green

Revolution. This phase relied on better seeds, more water via

irrigation, and improved quantity and quality of fertilizer during the Fourth Five-Year Plan (FY 1969-73), the Fifth Five-Year

Plan (FY 1974-78), and the Sixth Five-Year Plan (FY 1980-84).

The Green Revolution was successful in meeting the goals of

self-sufficiency in food-grain production and adequate buffer

stocks by the end of the 1970s. Production was more than 100

million tons in 1978 and 1979. Imports were negligible, and

the year-end buffer stocks from 1976-79 averaged more than

17 million tons. After 1980 buffer stocks fell below 10 millions

tons only once, in 1988.

In the mid-1990s, the major goals of agricultural policy con- tinued to be self-sufficiency in food staples and adequate food

supplies at affordable prices for consumers. Expanding cereal

production continued to be a major objective because of the

population growth rate of almost 2 percent per year. The budgetary share of agriculture, together with irrigation and flood

control projects, remained almost constant in the first six

plans, varying between 21 percent and 24 percent.

The Eighth Five-Year Plan (FY 1992-96), as conceived in the

early 1990s, not only aimed at continued self-sufficiency in

food production, but also included plans to generate surpluses

of some agricultural commodities for export. It also aimed at spreading the Green Revolution to more regions of the country with an emphasis on dryland farming.

Development Programs

Within the broad framework of policy, the government has

undertaken a wide variety of programs in agriculture to build

up the physical and information infrastructures necessary for

sustained development. There are programs for the betterment of the rural population; research, education, and extension programs; irrigation development schemes; plans to increase the supply of agricultural inputs, such as seeds, fertiliz- ers, and pesticides; plans to change the institutional framework

of land ownership; plans to improve agricultural financing; better marketing techniques; and plans to improve technology.

These programs are administered, financed, and run by the

central government and by the state governments, and both

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India: A Country Study

levels encourage private-sector development through direct or

indirect programs.

Some of the specialized programs in place in the 1990s were

introduced during the Fifth Plan. Among them were the Small

Farmers Development Agency, Minimum Needs Programme,

Hill Area Development Programme, and Drought-Prone Areas

Programme. In 1989 two other programs, the National Rural

Employment Programme and the Rural Landless Employment

Guarantee Programme, were merged into a single program

called the Jawahar Employment Plan (Jawahar Rozgar Yojana;

Jawahar in memory ofJawaharlal Nehru [1889-1964], India's

first prime minister; rozgar means daily employment in Hindi;

and yojana means project or plan).

The Integrated Rural Development Programme, launched

in FY 1978 and extended throughout India by FY 1980, is a self-employment program intended to raise the income-generation capacity of target groups among the poor. The aim is to

raise recipients above the poverty line by providing substantial

opportunities for self-employment. During the seventh plan,

the total expenditure under the program was Rs33.2 million

(for value of the rupee—see Glossary), and Rs53.7 million of

term credit was mobilized. Some 13 million new families participated, bringing total coverage under the program to more

than 18 million families. These development programs have

played an important role in increased agricultural production

by educating farmers and providing them with financial and

other inputs to increase yields. They have also alleviated some

problems of the rural poor. However, further success has been

limited by the lack of efficient administrative mechanisms, the

limitation of resources, the magnitude of the task, and the lack

of willingness to change the status quo. Many of the program

results appear better on paper than the actual results in the

field because of lack of implementation and poor monitoring.

Research, Education, and Extension

The central government's Department of Agricultural

Research and Education was established in 1973 in the Ministry

of Agriculture and Rural Development (later, the Ministry of

Agriculture). The department is responsible for coordinating

research and educational facilities in agriculture, animal husbandry, and fisheries. The department also provides support

services to the Indian Council of Agricultural Research (see

Major Research Organization, ch. 6).

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Sowing wheat in central India

Courtesy DoranneJacobson

Higher education has also seen advances. India has twentyeight agricultural universities, which include 164 colleges specializing in agriculture, veterinary science, agricultural engineering, home science, fisheries, dairy technology, forestry,

horticulture, sericulture, food science, and food-handling technology. They are located through most of the states in India.

One of them is a central university that has specialized extension colleges in the seven northeastern states. The undergraduate student enrollment in the early 1990s was around 9,600 and

there was a capacity for some 4,500 graduate students (see Colleges and Universities, ch. 2).

Agricultural, animal husbandry, and forestry research is con- ducted under the auspices of the Indian Council of Agricultural Research, central research institutes, and various

commodity committees. The council had forty-six institutes in

operation in 1992. India's largest such institute is the Indian

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India: A Country Study

Agricultural Research Institute, established in 1905 at Pusa,

Bihar. Because of an earthquake at Pusa, the research institute

moved to New Delhi in 1936. The institute was later accorded

university status. In addition to these agricultural research and education

institutions, the Indian Council of Agricultural Research also

has a large network of organizations to disseminate agricultural

technology information. In the mid-1990s, there were national

centers used to demonstrate new crop varieties and production

technologies in forty-eight districts throughout the country.

There also were seventy nationwide coordinated research

projects operating at 120 centers to test specific production

technologies.

Agricultural Extension

After independence in 1947, the government's first step

toward building an agricultural extension system was expansion of the World War II Grow More Food Campaign. Administrators and extension workers were exhorted to convince

cultivators of the gains in yields that could be obtained through

the use of improved seeds, compost, farmyard manure, and

better cultivation practices. Rural agents, often inundated with

other assignments, had little or no training for extension work,

however. Gains in yields were minimal, and India's leaders

came to realize that converting millions of poor farmers to the use of new technologies was a colossal task. The Community Development Programme was inaugurated

in 1952 to implement a systematic, integrated approach to

rural development. The nation was divided into development

blocks, each consisting of about 100 villages having populations of 60,000 to 70,000 people. By 1962 the entire country

was covered by more than 5,000 such blocks. The key person in

the program was the village-level worker, who was responsible

for transmitting to about ten villages not only farming technology, but also village uplift programs such as cooperation, adult

literacy, health, and sanitation. Although each block was staffed

with extension workers, the villagers themselves were expected

to provide the initiative and much of the needed financial and

labor resources, which they were not in a position to do or

inclined to do. Although progress had been made by the early

1960s, it was apparent that the program was spread too thin to bring about the hoped-for increase in agricultural production.

Criticism of the program led to more specialized development

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Agriculture

projects, and some of the functions were taken up by local vil- lage bodies. There was only a negligible allocation for community development in the sixth plan, however, and the program

was phased out in the early 1980s.

The Intensive Agricultural District Programme, launched in

five districts in 1960 by the central government in cooperation

with the United States-based Ford Foundation, used a distinctly

different approach to boosting farm yields. The program operated under the premise that concentrating scarce inputs in the

potentially most productive districts would increase farm-crop

yield faster than would a wider but less concentrated distribution of resources in less productive districts. Among these

inputs were technical staff, fertilizers, improved seeds, and

credit. Under the technical guidance of American cooperative

specialists, the program placed unusual emphasis on organizational structures and administrative arrangements. For the first time, modern technology was systematically introduced to Indian farmers. Within a decade, the program covered fifteen

districts, 28,000 villages, and 1 million inhabitants. The Intensive Agricultural District Programme was thus a significant

influence on the forthcoming Green Revolution.

Irrigation

Except in southeastern India, which receives most of its rain

from the northeast monsoon in October and November, dryland cultivators place their hopes for a harvest on the southwest monsoon, which usually reaches India in earlyJune and by

mid-July has extended to the entire country. There are great

variations in the average amount of rainfall received by the var- ious regions—from too much for most crops in the eastern

Himalayas to never enough in Rajasthan. Season-to-season variations in rainfall are also great. The consequence is bumper

harvests in some seasons, crop-searing drought in others.

Therefore, the importance of irrigation cannot be overemphasized.

Irrigation has been a high priority in economic development

since 1951; more than 50 percent of all public expenditures on

agriculture have been spent on irrigation alone. The land area under irrigation expanded from 22.6 million hectares in FY

1950 to 59 million hectares in FY 1990, an increase of 161 percent in four decades (see table 28, Appendix). This increase was about 33 percent of the estimated potential. The overall

strategy has been to concentrate public investments in surface

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India: A Country Study

svstems. such as large dams, long canals, and other large-scale

works requiring huge outlays of capital oyer a period of years, and in deep-well projects that also involve large capital outlavs.

Shallow-well schemes and small surface-water projects, mainlv

ponds (called tanks in India)., have been supported bv government credit but were otherwise installed and operated by private entrepreneurs. Roughly 42 percent of the net irrigated area in FY 1990 was from surface water sources. Tanks, step

wells, and tube wells provided another 51 percent: the rest came from other sources. Between 1951 and 1990, nearly 1,350 large- and mediumsized irrigation works were started, and about 850 were completed. The most ambitious of these projects was the Indira

Gandhi Canal, with an anticipated completion date of close to 1999. When completed, the Indira Gandhi Canal will be the

world's longest irrigation canal. Besrinniner at the Hairke Barrage, a few kilometers below the confluence of the Sutlej and

Beas rivers in western Punjab, it will run south-southwest for

650 kilometers, terminating deep in Raj as than near Jaisalmer,

close to the border with Pakistan. A dramatic change already

had taken place in this hot and inhospitable wasteland bv the

late 1980s. As a result, desert dwellers switched from raising

goats and sheep to raising wheat, and outsiders flocked in to purchase six-hectare plots for the equivalent of USS3.000.

Progress in irrigation has not been without problems. Large

dams and long canals are costly and also highly visible indicators of progress: the political pressure to launch such projects was frequently irresistible. But because funds and technical

expertise were in short supply many projects moved forward at a slow pace. The Indira Gandhi Canal project is a leading

example. And the central government's transfer of huge

amounts of water from Punjab to Haryana and Rajasthan, fre- quently cited as a source of grievance bv Sikhs in Punjab, con- tributed to the civil unrest in Punjab during the 1980s and

earlv 1990s (see Political Issues, ch. 8: Insurgent Movements

and External Subversion, ch. 10).

Problems also have arisen as ground water supplies used for

irrigation face depletion. Drawing water off from one area to

irrigate another often leads to increased salinity in the supply

area with resultant effects on crop production there. Some

areas receiving water through irrigation are poorly managed or inadequately designed: the result often is too much water and

water-logged fields incapable of production. To alleviate this

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Agriculture

problem, more emphasis is being placed on using irrigation

water to spray fields rather than allowing it to flow through

ditches. Furthermore, charges of corruption and mismanagement have been levied against government-operated facilities. Cases of bribery, maldistribution of water, and carelessness are frequently raised in the media.

Another major problem has been the displacement of thousands of people, usually poor people, by large hydroelectric

projects. Critics also claim that the projects are damaging to the ecology. Smaller projects and such traditional methods for

irrigation as tanks and wells are seen as having less serious

impact. In the late 1980s and early 1990s, the debate between

large-scale versus small-scale projects came to the fore because

of the US$3 billion Sardar Sarovar project on the Narmada

River. Sardar Sarovar, as conceived, was one of the world's larg- est hydroelectric and irrigation projects. Some 37,000 hectares

of land in Madhya Pradesh, Gujarat, and Maharashtra were

slated to be submerged following the construction of some

3,000 dams, 75,000 kilometers of canals, and an electric power

generating capacity of 1,450 megawatts of power per year.

Included among the 3,000 dams was the proposed 160-meterhigh Sardar Sarovar Dam. In 1985 the World Bank (see Glossary) agreed to loan US$450 million for the project. Environmentalists in India and abroad, however, argued that the

project was ecologically undesirable. In the face of this strong

protest, the World Bank appointed a two-member team in 1991

to review the project. Despite a negative review of the environmental impact by the team, World Bank funding and the

project continued. By 1993, however, in the face of continued

international protest as well as opposition and a call for a satyagraha (passive resistance—see Glossary) by villages in the

affected areas, the central government cancelled the dam

project loan. Work on the Sardar Sarovar project continues,

however, with funds provided by the central government and

the governments of the three states involved.

Although India had the second largest irrigated area in the

world, the area under assured irrigation or with at least minimal drainage is inadequate. The irrigation potential estimated

to have been created by the early 1990s was about 82.8 million

hectares. This amount includes the gross irrigated area plus

the potential for double cropping provided by irrigation.

There was a cumulative gap in irrigated land use of about 8.6

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India: A Country Study

million hectares until FY 1990, by which time the gap had

decreased through improved land management.

Seeds

The central government established the National Seeds Corporation in 1963 and the State Farm Corporations of India in

1969 to encourage production and distribution of certified

seeds of various crops. Thirteen state seed corporations were

established to arrange production and distribution of certified

seeds. Production of breeder seed was organized by the Indian

Council of Agricultural Research through interested breeders

and scientists. The National Seeds Corporation and State Farm

Corporations of India also produced breeder seeds. The avail- ability of breeder seeds increased eightfold during the 1980s,

from 391.4 tons in FY 1981 to 3,213 tons in FY 1988.

The production and availability of seeds has increased enor- mously since the late 1970s. The distribution of certified and

quality seeds showed an increase from 140,000 tons in FY 1979

to 568,000 tons in FY 1988. A buffer stock of seeds is maintained by the National Seeds Corporation for the northeastern

states and by the State Farm Corporations of India for the

other states against such unforeseen contingencies as floods,

droughts, and diseases.

Fertilizer

The rate of fertilizer consumption increased dramatically

after independence, although it was still lower than in most

other countries worldwide. India used only sixty-nine kilograms

per hectare in 1989, ranking it fifty-sixth worldwide and below

all its South Asian neighbors except Nepal. Fertilizer consumption increased from approximately 69,000 tons of nutrients in

FY 1950 to 12.6 million tons in FY 1990, and was expected to be

about 13.8 million tons in FY 1993. Punjab used the highest

amount of fertilizer per hectare followed by Tamil Nadu. The

use of fertilizers was high in Punjab and Harayana in the north

because of adequate irrigation. In the south, other than in

Tamil Nadu, consumption, especially in Andhra Pradesh and

Kerala, was higher than the national average. The disparity in

the use of fertilizers across states was decreasing, however. Cow

dung is an important source of fertilizer—and fuel—in India.

Statistics on its usage, however, are not available.

The fertilizer subsidy has been growing since FY 1976. The

initial subsidy was a response to the increase in the price of

400
Women at step well, Rajasthan

Courtesy Janice Hyde

crude oil by the Organization of the Petroleum Exporting

Countries (OPEC—see Glossary). The price increase led to a

rise in the cost of naphtha, which in turn increased fertilizer

prices. The fertilizer subsidy increased from Rs600 million in

FY 1976 to Rs32 billion in FY 1988, to nearly Rs44 billion in FY

1990. Further increases are expected as the decade progresses.

Plans in 1992 to cut the subsidy by 40 percent were curtailed

following heavy political opposition from the major farming

states. Plant Protection and Pesticides

The government has introduced integrated pest management at the central and state levels for purposes of plant protection. Twenty-five central, integrated pest-management

centers have been established in twenty-two states and one

union territory for pest surveillance and monitoring, promotion of biocontrol methods of conservation, promotion of

nonchemical methods of pest control, training of extension

workers and farmers, and demonstration farms.

The use of synthetic pesticides has increased steadily

because of the spreading use of new high-yielding varieties of

seeds and their greater vulnerability to plant pests and diseases.

The sale of synthetic pesticides jumped from 8,620 tons in crop

year 1960-61 to 65,000 tons in 1982-83 and 85,660 tons in

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India: A Country Study

1989-90. In 1960 only about 6 million hectares received chemical pesticides, but by the early 1980s some 100 million hectares were being treated, and the growth in coverage continues in

the 1990s. The rapid rise in the use of plant protection led to the enactment of the Insecticides Act of 1968 to regulate the

import, sale, transport, distribution, and use of insecticides.

Technology and Mechanization

Despite the pervasive, large-scale use of draft animals

throughout India, agricultural machinery and implements,

tractors, in particular, have had an important place in increasing agricultural productivity. The stock of tractors increased

from 8,600 in FY 1950 to 518,500 in FY 1982 and continued to grow rapidly throughout the 1980s (see table 29, Appendix).

The number and sale of power tillers and combine harvesters

produced and sold was small, with 4,678 tillers and 110 harvesters sold in FY 1988. There was a significant increase in the

number of electric pumps and oil pump sets for irrigation during the 1980s.

The production and use of machinery are hampered by the

small size of many operational holdings. However, a number of

improved agricultural implements are available for tilling,

seeding and fertilizer application, weeding, harvesting, and

threshing. The implements include moldboard plows, disc harrows, cultivators, seed drills (more than 110,000 were sold

annually in the early 1990s), and mechanical power threshers.

These tools have the potential of increasing yields for all crops,

but the adoption rate of improved machinery is low. The Central Institute of Agricultural Engineering at Bhopal, Madhya

Pradesh, under the aegis of the Indian Council for Agricultural

Research, is responsible for coordinating the manufacture and

promotion of technology for small and marginal farmers. The

government introduced an incentive scheme in 1990 to subsidize the cost of machinery by up to 50 percent to small and

marginal farms. Additionally, farmers' agroservice centers are being established to provide custom service for improved

implements and machinery. The eighth plan includes a major

thrust for upgrading and adopting proven technology

In a country with a large and growing labor force, too much

mechanization in the short run could create fossil fuel shortages as well as social and economic problems (see Size and

Composition of the Work Force, ch. 6). There is, nevertheless,

room for improvements in technology. Since FY 1983, there

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Agriculture

have been attempts to popularize improved animal-drawn agricultural implements and hand tools through demonstrations

and subsidies to small and marginal farmers.

Despite these advances in mechanization, most crops are still sown, transplanted, weeded, and harvested through laborintensive human work. Most grains are harvested by teams of

laborers wielding hand-forged iron sickles, binding up sheaves

of grain, and carrying loads of sheaves on their heads to bullock carts to be transported to threshing floors. Teams of bullocks are then driven over the sheaves to separate the grains

from the stalks, and workers toss basketloads of grain into the

air to separate the grain from the chaff. Lentils, a crucial part

of the Indian diet, also are harvested through labor-intensive means. Groups of laborers squat down in fields for hours at a time, ripping out lentil plants at the root by hand. Machinery

available to lentil farmers has proven difficult to use, and traditional methods are preferred.

Price Policy and Terms of Trade

After independence, India's initial price policy could be

characterized as serving the interests of the consumers, particularly where food grains were concerned, and most of all in

regard to wheat. Food prices were kept low to provide cheap

food for urban consumers under the theory that a cheap and

easy supply of wage goods—of which food grains formed the

main component—would inhibit inflationary pressures on the

economy. This policy, buttressed with imports under the

United States Public Law 480 Food for Peace Program, kept

prices at a low level during the late 1950s and early 1960s but

did not provide incentives for Indian farmers to invest or

increase production. The terms of trade vis-a-vis manufacturing were favorable to agriculture in FY 1959 and then on a par with

other sectors for three years. Thereafter, when manufacturing

prices went up faster than agricultural prices as a result of government policy, terms of trade favored manufacturing and

turned against the agricultural sector. This change led to a food crisis in the mid-1960s when agricultural production fell. From about 1965, the need to guarantee remunerative

prices to farmers was stressed to ensure self-sufficiency in foodgrain production as soon as possible. The Agricultural Prices

Commission—in 1993 called the Commission for Agricultural

Costs and Prices—was set up to advise the government on agricultural prices, keeping in view the interests of both the con403
India: A Country Study

sumer and the producer. Of particular concern were prices for

wheat, rice, coarse grains, pulses, sugarcane, oilseeds, cotton,

and jute. In the late 1980s and early 1990s, the commission was

supplied with cost of production data, compiled through sample surveys, to improve its effectiveness in setting prices. The

commission was reasonably successful in providing remunerative prices for farmers. It used the price mechanism to increase

the production of commodities in demand, such as oilseeds at the end of the 1980s, and to keep prices at a reasonable level

for consumers. Production

Crop Output

The average rate of output growth since the 1950s has been

more than 2.5 percent per year and was greater than 3 percent

during the 1980s, compared with less than 1 percent per

annum during the period from 1900 to 1950. Most of the

growth in aggregate crop output was the result of an increase

in yields, rather than an increase in the area under crops. The

yield performance of crops has varied widely (see table 30,

Appendix).

The national growth rates mask variability in the performance of different states, but in the regions with the greatest

increases three categories are discernible. The first category

includes states or areas that have an exceptionally high agricultural growth rate—Punjab, Haryana, and western Uttar

Pradesh. The second is states or areas that have high growth

rates, but not as high as the first category—Andhra Pradesh,

Maharashtra, and Jammu and Kashmir. A third category has a

lesser growth rate and includes Bihar, Gujarat, Karnataka,

Orissa, Rajasthan, Tamil Nadu, eastern Uttar Pradesh, and

West Bengal. These eight states, however, comprise 55 percent

of the total food-grains area (see fig. 13).

Some observers believe that the increase in productivity has

been an important factor explaining the satisfactory growth of

food-grain production since the mid-1960s. However, the gains

in productivity remain confined to select areas. Between FY

1960 and FY 1980, yields increased by 125.6 percent in North

India (Punjab, Haryana, and western Uttar Pradesh). The

increase in the other regions was much less: central India, 36

percent; eastern, 22.7 percent; southern, 58.3 percent; and

western India, 31.6 percent. The national average was nearly

404


Agriculture

40.9 percent. Part of this disparity can be explained by the fact

that during this period Punjab and Haryana were way ahead of

other states in terms of irrigated area, intensity of irrigation,

and intensity of cropping. Availability of irrigation is one of the

crucial factors governing regional variations.

As a result of a good monsoon during FY 1990, food grain

production reached 176 million tons, 3 percent more than in

FY 1989. The production of rice and wheat was 74.6 million

and 54.5 million tons, respectively. Among the commercial

crops, sugarcane and oilseeds reached production levels of

240.3 million tons and 21.8 million tons, respectively. The

increased production in FY 1990 was mainly the result of continuing increases in yields for all the main crops—rice, wheat,

pulses, and oilseeds. In the case of oilseeds and sugarcane,

higher production was also the result of the increased number

of hectares planted (see table 31, Appendix).

The growth in food-grain production did not occur in a lin- ear trend, but as a series of spurts depending mostly on the

weather, input availability, and price policy. Aggregate growth was composed of an even split between area expansion and

yield growth before FY 1964. Since FY 1967, the contribution of

growth in yields has become dominant and attests to the vigor

with which agriculture has responded to the opportunities

opened up by new seed, water, and fertilizer technology.

Food-Grain Production

Food grains include rice, wheat, corn (maize), coarse grains

(sorghum and millet), and pulses (beans, dried peas, and lentils). In FY 1990, approximately 127.5 million hectares were sown with food grains, about 75 percent of the total planted

area. The total number of hectares increased by 31 percent

over the forty-year period from FY 1950 to FY 1990. Most of this

increase occurred in the 1950s; there was almost no change in

the sown number of hectares through the 1980s. Around 33

percent of cropland was given over to rice, about 29 percent to coarse grains, and the rest evenly divided between wheat and

pulses.

Rice, India's preeminent crop, is the staple food of the people of the eastern and southern parts of the country. Production increased from 53.6 million tons in FY 1980 to 74.6 million

tons in FY 1990, a 39 percent increase over the decade. By FY

1992, rice production had reached 111 million tons, second in

the world only to China with its 182 million tons. Since 1950

407


India: A Country Study

the increase has been more than 350 percent. Most of this

increase was the result of an increase in yields; the number of

hectares increased only 40 percent during this period. Yields

increased from 1,336 kilograms per hectare in FY 1980 to 1,751

kilograms per hectare in FY 1990. The per-hectare yield

increased more than 262 percent between 1950 and 1992.

Wheat production showed an 843 percent increase, from

nearly 6.5 million tons in FY 1950 to 54.5 million tons in FY

1990 to 56.7 million tons in FY 1992. Most of this greater production was the result of an increase in yields that went from

663 kilograms per hectare in FY 1950 to 2,274 kilograms in FY

1990. Along with the excellent performance in yields,

improved wheat production resulted from an increase in the

area planted from nearly 9.8 million hectares in FY 1950 to 24.0

million hectares in FY 1990.

Sorghum and millet, the principal coarse grains, are dryland

crops most frequently grown as staples in central and western

India. Corn and barley are staple foods grown mainly near and

in the Himalayan region. As the result of increased yields, the

production of coarse grains has doubled since 1950; there was

hardly any change in the area sown for these grains. The production of pulses did not fare well, increasing by only 68 percent over the four decades. Land devoted to pulses increased

by 28 percent, and yields were up by 30 percent. Pulses are an

important source of protein in the vegetarian diet; the small

improvement in production along with the increase in population meant a reduced availability of pulses per capita.

Before the Green Revolution, coarse grains showed satisfactory rates of growth but afterward lost cultivated areas to wheat

and rice, and their growth declined. The area sown with coarse

grains increased from FY 1950 to FY 1970 by roughly 20 percent but declined subsequently up to the early 1990s. In FY

1990 the area sown was 3 percent less than in FY 1950 and 20

percent less than in FY 1970. The area sown with two coarse

grains, jowar (barley) and bajra (millet), increased from FY

1950 to FY 1970 and then declined during the 1970s and the

1980s. The area sown with jowar increased from 15.6 million

hectares in FY 1950 to 17.4 million hectares in FY 1970 and

then decreased to 14.5 million hectares in FY 1990. The area sown with bajra increased from 9.0 million hectares in FY 1950

to 12.9 million hectares in FY 1970 and stood at 10.4 million

hectares in FY 1990. A similar pattern existed for other coarse

grains. Overall, India's coarse-grain production increased from

408
Agriculture

15.4 million tons in 1950 to 29 million tons in 1980 to 33.1 million tons in 1990 and 33.7 million tons in 1993.

Oilseeds

India in the mid-1990s has almost attained self-sufficiency in

the production of oilseeds to extract vegetable oil, essential in

the Indian diet. Peanuts, grown mainly as a rain-fed crop on

part of the semiarid areas of western and southern India,

account for the largest source of the nation's production of

vegetable oils. The second-ranking source of vegetable oils in

the early 1990s was rapeseed. Cottonseed, an important

by-product of cotton fiber and once mostly fed to cattle, was

another source of vegetable oils. Soybeans and sunflower seeds were relatively new as significant oilseeds, but their production

increased rapidly in the 1980s.

The production of oilseeds increased from 5.2 million tons

in FY 1950 to 21.8 million tons in FY 1990. Specific information

regarding area planted is not available for all oilseeds, but it increased in the 1980s, as did the yields. The growth of production before the mid-1970s was not adequate to meet the needs

of the increasing population, and large quantities had to be

imported from the 1970s to the mid-1980s, using scarce foreign

exchange.

Commercial Crops

India is the largest producer of sugar in the world, harvesting 12 million tons in 1993, followed by Brazil's 9 million tons

and China's 7 million tons. Sugar availability per capita

increased from 4.7 kilograms per year in FY 1960 to 12.5 kilograms per year in FY 1990, following the more than fourfold

increase in production from 57 million tons in FY 1950 to 240

million tons in FY 1990. This increase in production was a

result of the doubling of the yield per hectare and a doubling

of the area sown with sugar. Imports of sugar were negligible in

FY 1992 and FY 1993. However, in the FY 1995 budget presentation to the Lok Sabha in March 1995, Minister of Finance Manmohan Singh said it was necessary to supplement the public

distribution system with "necessary imports of sugar."

Raw cotton is the most important nonfood commodity produced on India's farms. Cotton was an important export crop

in the 1950s, but thereafter it provided the raw material for

India's textile industry, which grew greatly to meet the needs of an expanding population (see Manufacturing, ch. 6). Cotton

409
India: A Country Study

fabrics found an expanding international market in the 1980s

and earned valuable foreign exchange. The foreign exchange

earned from raw cotton, cotton yarn, and fabrics of all textile

materials increased from US$163 million in FY 1960 to US$1.4

billion in FY 1980 to nearly US$3.9 billion in FY 1990 and

US$3.8 billion by FY 1992. Cotton production increased from

600,000 tons in FY 1950 to nearly 1.7 million tons in FY 1990.

These improvements largely resulted from increased yields, as there was little increase in the sown area devoted to cotton. Raw jute is second only to cotton as a farm-produced industrial raw material. Before partition in 1947, India was the

world's main supplier ofjute and jute goods used as packaging

material. As a result of the partition of India and Pakistan, the

main jute growing area was in East Pakistan (eastern Bengal,

after 1971 the independent nation of Bangladesh), and the fac- tories manufacturing jute goods were in West Bengal, which

remained part of India after partition. Jute also had been

India's main source of export earnings. As a result, there was a concerted effort to increase raw jute production. The area sown with jute increased from 571,000 hectares in FY 1950 to nearly 1.2 million hectares in FY 1985 but then decreased to 692,000 hectares in FY 1988. Yields increased steadily from

1,040 kilograms per hectare in FY 1950 to 1,803 kilograms per

hectare in FY 1990. These two factors combined to more than

double jute production from 595 million tons in FY 1950 to 1.4

billion tons in FY 1990, with a maximum production of nearly 2

billion tons in FY 1985. Because technological changes in packaging reduced the worldwide demand for jute, production in

the early 1990s was mainly for the domestic market. In FY 1990,

jute provided less than 1 percent of export earnings.

The Green Revolution

The introduction of high-yielding varieties of seeds after

1965 and the increased use of fertilizers and irrigation are known collectively as the Green Revolution, which provided

the increase in production needed to make India self-sufficient

in food grains. The program was started with the help of the

United States-based Rockefeller Foundation and was based on

high-yielding varieties of wheat, rice, and other grains that had

been developed in Mexico and in the Philippines. Of the highyielding seeds, wheat produced the best results. Production of coarse grains—the staple diet of the poor—and pulses—the

410
Mechanized threshing, Uttar Pradesh

Courtesy Robert L. Worden

main source of protein—lagged behind, resulting in reduced

per capita availability.

The total area under the high-yielding-varieties program was

a negligible 1.9 million hectares in FY 1960. Since then growth

has been spectacular, increasing to nearly 15.4 million hectares

by FY 1970, 43.1 million hectares by FY 1980, and 63.9 million

hectares by FY 1990. The rate of growth decreased significantly

in the late 1980s, however, as additional suitable land was not

available (see table 32, Appendix).

The major benefits of the Green Revolution were experienced mainly in northern and northwestern India between

1965 and the early 1980s; the program resulted in a substantial

increase in the production of food grains, mainly wheat and

rice. Food-grain yields continued to increase throughout the

1980s, but the dramatic changes in the years between 1965 and

1980 were not duplicated. By FY 1980, almost 75 percent of the

total cropped area under wheat was sown with high-yielding

varieties. For rice the comparable figure was 45 percent. In the

1980s, the area under high-yielding varieties continued to

increase, but the rate of growth overall was slower. The eighth

plan aimed at making high-yielding varieties available to the

whole country and developing more productive strains of

other crops.

The Green Revolution created wide regional and interstate

disparities. The plan was implemented only in areas with

assured supplies of water and the means to control it, large

inputs of fertilizers, and adequate farm credit. These inputs were easily available in at least parts of the states of Punjab,

Haryana, and western Uttar Pradesh; thus, yields increased

411
India: A Country Study

most in these states. In other states, such as Andhra Pradesh

and Tamil Nadu, in areas where these inputs were not assured,

the results were limited or negligible, leading to considerable

variation in crop yields within these states. The Green Revolution also increased income disparities: higher income growth

and reduced incidence of poverty were found in the states where yields increased the most and lower income growth and

little change in the incidence of poverty in other states. Livestock and Poultry

A large number of farmers depend on livestock for their live- lihood. In addition to supplying milk, meat, eggs, and hides,

animals, mainly bullocks, are the major source of power for

both farmers and drayers. Thus, animal husbandry plays an

important role in the rural economy. The gross value of output

from this sector was Rs358 billion in FY 1989, an amount that

constituted about 25 percent of the total agricultural output of

Rsl.4 trillion. In FY 1992, India had approximately 25 percent of the

world's cattle, with a collective herd of 193 million head. India

also had 110 million goats, 75 million water buffalo, 44 million

sheep, and 10 million pigs. Milk production in FY 1990 was esti- mated to have reached 53.5 million tons, and egg production

had reached a level of 23.3 billion eggs. Dairy farming provided supplementary employment and an additional source of

income to many small and marginal farmers. The National

Dairy Development Board was established in 1965 under the

auspices of Operation Flood at Anand, in Gujarat, to promote,

plan, and organize dairy development through cooperatives; to provide consultations; and to set up dairy plants, which were

then turned over to the cooperatives. There were more than

63,000 Anand-style dairy cooperative societies with some 7.5

million members in the early 1990s. The milk produced and

sold by these farmers brought Rs320 million a day, or more

than RslO trillion a year. The increase in milk production permitted India to end imports of powdered milk and milk-related

products. In addition, 30,000 tons of powdered milk were

exported annually to neighboring countries.

Operation Flood, the world's largest integrated dairy development program, attempted to establish linkages between

rural milk producers and urban consumers by organizing

farmer-owned and -managed dairy cooperative societies. In the

early 1990s, the program was in its third phase and was receiv412
Agriculture

ing financial assistance from the World Bank and commodity

assistance from the European Economic Community. At that

time, India had more than 64,000 dairy cooperative societies,

with close to 7.7 million members. These cooperatives established a daily processing capacity of 15.5 million liters of whole

milk and 727 tons of milk powder.

Forestry

Some 50 million hectares, about 17 percent of India's land

area, were regarded as forestland in the early 1990s. In FY 1987,

however, actual forest cover was 64 million hectares. However,

because more than 50 percent of this land was barren or brushland, the area under productive forest was actually less than 35

million hectares, or approximately 10 percent of the country's

land area. The growing population's high demand for forest resources continued the destruction and degradation of forests

through the 1980s, taking a heavy toll on the soil. An estimated

6 billion tons of topsoil were lost annually. However, India's 0.6

percent average annual rate of deforestation for agricultural

and nonlumbering land uses in the decade beginning in 1981 was one of the lowest in the world and on a par with Brazil.

Many forests in the mid-1990s are found in high-rainfall,

high-altitude regions, areas to which access is difficult. About

20 percent of total forestland is in Madhya Pradesh; other

states with significant forests are Orissa, Maharashtra, and

Andhra Pradesh (each with about 9 percent of the national

total); Arunachal Pradesh (7 percent); and Uttar Pradesh (6

percent). The variety of forest vegetation is large: there are 600

species of hardwoods, sal (Shorea robusta) and teak being the

principal economic species.

Conservation has been an avowed goal of government policy

since independence. Afforestation increased from a negligible

amount in the first plan to nearly 8.9 million hectares in the

seventh plan. The cumulative area afforested during the 1951-

91 period was nearly 17.9 million hectares. However, despite

large-scale tree planting programs, forestry is one arena in

which India has actually regressed since independence. Annual

fellings at about four times the growth rate are a major cause. Widespread pilfering by villagers for firewood and fodder also

represents a major decrement. In addition, the forested area has been shrinking as a result of land cleared for farming,

inundations for irrigation and hydroelectric power projects,

413
India: A Country Study

and construction of new urban areas, industrial plants, roads,

power lines, and schools.

India's long-term strategy for forestry development reflects

three major objectives: to reduce soil erosion and flooding; to supply the growing needs of the domestic wood products

industries; and to supply the needs of the rural population for

fuelwood, fodder, small timber, and miscellaneous forest produce. To achieve these objectives, the National Commission on

Agriculture in 1976 recommended the reorganization of state forestry departments and advocated the concept of social forestry. The commission itself worked on the first two objectives,

emphasizing traditional forestry and wildlife activities; in pursuit of the third objective, the commission recommended the

establishment of a new kind of unit to develop community forests. Following the leads of Gujarat and Uttar Pradesh, a number of other states also established community-based forestry

agencies that emphasized programs on farm forestry, timber

management, extension forestry, reforestation of degraded forests, and use of forests for recreational purposes.

Such socially responsible forestry was encouraged by state community forestry agencies. They emphasized such projects

as planting wood lots on denuded communal cattle-grazing

grounds to make villages self-sufficient in fuelwood, to supply

timber needed for the construction of village houses, and to provide the wood needed for the repair of farm implements.

Both individual farmers and tribal communities were also

encouraged to grow trees for profit. For example, in Gujarat,

one of the more aggressive states in developing programs of

socioeconomic importance, the forestry department distributed 200 million tree seedlings in 1983. The fast-growing eucalyptus is the main species being planted nationwide, followed

by pine and poplar.

The role of forests in the national economy and in ecology was further emphasized in the 1988 National Forest Policy,

which focused on ensuring environmental stability, restoring

the ecological balance, and preserving the remaining forests.

Other objectives of the policy were meeting the need for fuelwood, fodder, and small timber for rural and tribal people

while recognizing the need to actively involve local people in

the management of forest resources. Also in 1988, the Forest

Conservation Act of 1980 was amended to facilitate stricter

conservation measures. A new target was to increase the forest cover to 33 percent of India's land area from the then-official

414
Building a haystack, Uttar Pradesh

Courtesy Robert L. Worden

estimate of 23 percent. In June 1990, the central government

adopted resolutions that combined forest science with social

forestry, that is, taking the sociocultural traditions of the local

people into consideration.

Since the early 1970s, as they realized that deforestation

threatened not only the ecology but their livelihood in a variety

of ways, people have become more interested and involved in

conservation. The best known popular activist movement is the

Chipko Movement, in which local women decided to fight the

government and the vested interests to save trees. The women

of Chamoli District, Uttar Pradesh, declared that they would

embrace—literally "to stick to" (chipkna in Hindi) —trees if a sporting goods manufacturer attempted to cut down ash trees in their district. Since initial activism in 1973, the movement

has spread and become an ecological movement leading to

similar actions in other forest areas. The movement has slowed

down the process of deforestation, exposed vested interests,

increased ecological awareness, and demonstrated the viability

of people power.

Fishing

Fish production has increased more than fivefold since independence. It rose from only 800,000 tons in FY 1950 to 4.1 mil415
India: A Country Study

lion tons in the early 1990s. Special efforts have been made to promote extensive and intensive inland fish farming, modernize coastal fisheries, and encourage deep-sea fishing through

joint ventures. These efforts led to a more than fourfold

increase in coastal fish production from 520,000 tons in FY

1950 to 2.4 million tons in FY 1990. The increase in inland fish

production was even more dramatic, increasing almost eightfold from 218,000 tons in FY 1950 to 1.7 million tons in FY

1990. The value of fish and processed fish exports increased

from less than 1 percent of the total value of exports in FY 1960

to 3.6 percent in FY 1993.

The important marine fish in the mid-1990s are mackerel,

sardines, Bombay duck, shark, ray, perch, croaker, carangid,

sole, ribbonfish, whitebait, tuna, silverbelly, prawn, and cuttlefish. The main freshwater fish are carp and catfish; the main

brackish-water fish are hilsa (a variety of shad), and mullet.

Great potential exists for expanding the nation's fishing

industry. India's exclusive economic zone, stretching 200 nautical miles into the Indian Ocean, encompasses more than 2 million square kilometers. In the mid-1980s, only about 33 percent

of that area was being exploited. The potential annual catch

from the area has been estimated at 4.5 million tons. In addition to this marine zone, India has about 1.4 million hectares

of brackish water available for aquaculture, of which only

60,000 hectares were being farmed in the early 1990s; about 1.6

million hectares of freshwater lakes, ponds, and swamps; and

nearly 64,000 kilometers of rivers and streams.

In 1990 there were 1.7 million full-time fishermen, 1.3 million part-time fishermen, and 2.3 million occasional fishermen, many of whom worked as saltmakers, ferrymen, or seamen, or operated boats for hire. In the early 1990s, the fish- ing fleet consisted of 180,000 traditional craft powered by sails or oars, 26,000 motorized traditional craft, and some 34,000

mechanized boats.

Fisheries research and training institutions are supported by

central and state governments that deserve much of the credit

for the expansion and improvements in the Indian fishing

industry. The principal fisheries research institutions, all of

which operate under the Indian Council of Agricultural

Research, are the Central Institute of Marine Fisheries

Research at Kochi (formerly Cochin), Kerala; the Central

Inland Fisheries Institute at Barrackpore, West Bengal; and the

Central Institute of Fisheries Technology at Willingdon Island

416
Agriculture

near Kochi. Most fishery training is provided by the Central

Institute for Fishery Education in Bombay (or Mumbai in

Marathi), which has ancillary institutions in Barrackpore, Agra

(Uttar Pradesh), and Hyderabad (Andhra Pradesh). The Central Fisheries Corporation in Calcutta is instrumental in bringing about improvements in fishing methods, ice production,

processing, storing, marketing, and constructing and repairing

fishing vessels. Operating under a 1972 law, the Marine Products Export Authority, headquartered in Kochi, has made sev- eral market surveys abroad and has been instrumental in

introducing and enforcing hygiene standards that have gained

for Indian fishery export products a reputation for cleanliness

and quality.

The implementation of two programs for inland fisheries

establishing fish farmers' development agencies and the

National Programme of Fish Seed Development—has led to encouragingly increased production, which reached 1.5 million tons during FY 1990, up from 0.9 million tons in FY 1984.

A network of 313 fish farmers' development agencies was functioning in 1992. Under the National Programme of Fish Seed

Development, forty fish-seed hatcheries were commissioned.

Fish-seed production doubled from 5 billion fry in FY 1983 to 10 billion fry in FY 1989. A new program using organic waste

for aquaculture was started in FY 1986. Inland fish production

as a percent of total fish production increased from 36 percent

in FY 1980 to 40 percent by FY 1990.

Apart from four main fishing harbors—Kochi (Kerala),

Madras (Tamil Nadu), Vishakhapatnam (Andhra Pradesh),

and Roychowk in Calcutta (West Bengal) —twenty-three minor

fishing harbors and ninety-five fish-landing centers are designated to provide landing and berthing facilities to fishing craft. The harbors at Vishakhapatnam, Kochi, and Roychowk were completed by 1980; the one at Madras was completed in the

1980s. A major fishing harbor was under construction at Sas- soon Dock in Bombay in the early 1990s, as were thirteen additional minor fishing harbors and eighteen small landing

centers. By early 1990, there were 225 deep-sea fishing vessels

operating in India's exclusive economic zone. Of these, 165 were owned by Indian shipping companies, and the rest were

chartered foreign fishing vessels. The government provides subsidies to poor fishermen so

that they can motorize their traditional craft to increase the

range and frequency of operation, with a consequent increase

417
India: A Country Study

in the catch and earnings. A total of about 26,171 traditional

craft had been motorized under the program by 1992.

The banning of trawling by chartered foreign vessels and the

speedy motorization of traditional fishing craft in the 1980s led

to a quantum jump in marine fish production in the late 1980s.

The export of marine products rose from 97,179 tons (Rs531

billion) in FY 1987 to 210,800 tons (Rsl7.4 trillion) in FY 1992,

making India one of the world's leading seafood exporting

nations. This achievement was largely a result of significant

advancements in India's freezing facilities since the 1960s,

advancements that enabled India's seafood products to meet

international standards. Frozen shrimp, a high-value item, has

become the dominant seafood export. Other significant export

items are frozen frog legs, frozen lobster tails, dried fish, and

shark fins, much of which is exported to seafood-loving Japan.

During the eighth plan, marine products were identified as having major export potential.

There are several specialized institutes that train fishermen.

The Central Institute of Fisheries Nautical and Engineering

Training in Kochi instructs operators of deep-sea fishing vessels

and technicians for shore establishments. It has facilities in

Madras and Vishakhapatnam for about 500 trainees a year. The

Integrated Fisheries Project, also headquartered in Kochi, was

established for the processing, popularizing, and marketing of

unusual fish. Another training organization, the Central Insti- tute of Coastal Engineering for Fisheries in Bangalore, has

done techno-economic feasibility studies on locations of fishing harbor sites and brackish-water fish farms.

To improve returns to fishermen and provide better products for consumers, several states have organized marketing

cooperatives for fishermen. Nevertheless, most traditional fish- ermen rely on household members or local fish merchants for

the disposal of their catches. In some places, marketing is car- ried on entirely by fisherwomen who carry small quantities in

containers on their heads to nearby places. Good wholesale or

retail markets are rare. Agricultural Credit

Credit institutions serving agricultural-sector needs developed in three phases. In the first phase, which lasted from 1947

to 1969, cooperative agencies were the primary vehicle providing credit. In the second phase, after nationalization of banks

in 1969, commercial banks were assigned a role in providing

418
Fishing boats, Bombay, Maharashtra

Courtesy Bernice Huffman Collection, Library of Congress

agricultural credit but were supplementary to cooperatives (see

Fiscal Administration, ch. 6). In the last phase starting in 1975,

regional rural banks were established to provide credit. In the

1990s, agricultural credit is provided through a multiagency

approach in the form of cooperatives, commercial banks, and

regional rural banks. These institutions have gradually ensured

that credit reaches the most remote agricultural and rural

areas. Since the inception of central economic planning in 1950,

the government has favored cooperative societies as a channel

for providing credit and as a means of broadening the experi- ence of villagers in such activities as marketing, community

farming, and consumer purchasing. Credit societies were the

first to be established and continue to be the most extensive

and important group of cooperatives. Of the roughly 250,000

cooperatives in India in 1980, about 100,000 were primarily

419
India: A Country Study

agricultural credit cooperatives. By the late 1980s, because

regional rural banks were doing more lending, the number of

agricultural credit cooperatives had decreased to 87,300. By

1988 there were 93,000 primary agricultural credit societies

operating in rural areas, with a membership of 89.8 million.

The societies aimed for universal membership in order that

poorer members of society could join cooperatives and use

their services. Total loans advanced by such societies amounted

to nearly Rs36.9 billion during FY 1987. These agricultural

credit societies had a share capital of about RslO.l billion at the

end ofJune 1988.

Cooperatives played a significant role in the production and

distribution of agricultural inputs. For example, during FY

1988 nearly 3.5 million tons, representing more than 33 percent of total fertilizer (less cow dung), were distributed

through a network of 76,000 cooperative retail outlets. Cooperatives also distributed other inputs, such as seeds, pesticides,

and agricultural implements.

The overall control of rural credit for the development of

agriculture and the rural sector is under the control of the

National Bank for Agriculture and Rural Development, which

was established in July 1980. It was chartered to oversee the

workings of regional rural banks, and in the mid-1990s was

slated to establish a rural infrastructure development fund to provide loans to state governments and state-owned corporations to enable completion of irrigation, soil conservation,

watershed management, and other rural infrastructure

projects in progress. By June 1991, there were 14,522 regional

rural banks in India.

Public-sector banks, including commercial and regional

rural banks, increased their activities in the countryside after

the nationalization of banks. Many bank branches were opened

in rural areas. One indicator of increased availability of credit

through public-sector banks was the increase in the number of

accounts. The number went from 164,000, with outstanding

loans of Rsl.6 billion, to nearly 21.8 million accounts, with an

outstanding balance of nearly Rsl65.2 billion in March 1990.

In economic terms, the growth in credit supply has been sat- isfactory, but the growth in deposits has not kept pace with

credit supply and there has been a high rate of loan defaults.

Field-level rural financial institutions have increased, however, even though there are fewer primary agricultural credit societies. The large increase in the number of branches of commer420
Agriculture

rial banks in the rural areas and the expansion of regional

rural banks led to the reduction.

Agricultural Taxation

Agricultural property and some agricultural income were

being taxed in the early 1990s, but the revenue from these

taxes was negligible. In the early 1950s, however, land revenue

agricultural property taxes were a significant form of government income, providing just under 10 percent of the tax reve- nue of the central, state, and union territory governments. At

the end of the 1980s, that proportion was less than 1 percent

because land revenue had been fixed. For instance, land reve- nue was an average of Rs28 per hectare in Kerala and Rs23 per

hectare in Uttar Pradesh, the two states with the highest assess- ment rates. The national average was Rs 16.50 per hectare. Agricultural property also was subject to stamp duties and

registration fees. (All property transactions have to be made on

official, stamped forms, and registration fees have to be paid to register transactions.) No data were available in early 1993 on

the proportion of these fees that came from the agricultural

sector, but a taxation inquiry committee put it at approximately

20 percent. Between 1950 and 1990, only about 1.5 percent of

the total taxes collected by the central, state, and union terri- tory governments came from the agricultural sector. Overall,

the impact of tax on agricultural property was negligible but

was a likely target for economic reform in the mid-1990s.

Since the 1950s, agricultural income tax has been collected

as a federal tax, but it has been levied only on income from

plantations. All other agricultural income has been exempt

from tax. The total collection from this tax was less than 1 percent of the total taxes collected by the central, state, and union

territory governments in FY 1950; in the late 1980s, it had

dropped below 0.3 percent.

Marketing, Trade, and Aid

Marketing and Marketing Services

The agricultural marketing system operates primarily

according to the forces of supply and demand in the private

sector. Government intervention is limited to protecting the

interests of producers and consumers and promoting organized marketing of agricultural commodities. In 1991 there

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India: A Country Study

were 6,640 regulated markets to which the central government

provided assistance in the establishment of infrastructure and

in setting up rural warehouses. Various central government

organizations are involved in agricultural marketing, including

the Commission for Agricultural Costs and Prices, the Food

Corporation of India, the Cotton Corporation of India, and the

Jute Corporation of India. There also are specialized marketing boards for rubber, coffee, tea, tobacco, spices, coconut, oil- seeds, vegetable oil, and horticulture.

A network of cooperatives at the local, state, and national

levels assist in agricultural marketing. The major commodities

handled are food grains, jute, cotton, sugar, milk, and areca

nuts. Established in 1958 as the apex of the state marketing federations, the National Agricultural Cooperative Marketing Federation of India handles much of the domestic and most of the

export marketing for its member organizations.

Large enterprises, such as cooperative sugar factories, spinning mills, and solvent-extraction plants mostly handle their

own marketing operations independently. Medium- and smallsized enterprises, such as rice mills, oil mills, cotton ginning

and pressing units, and jute baling units, mostly are affiliated

with cooperative marketing societies.

In the late 1980s, there were some 2,400 agroprocessing

units in the cooperative sector. Of all the cooperative agroprocessing industries, cooperative sugar factories achieved the

most notable success. The number of licensed or registered

units remained at 232, of which 211 had been installed by

March 1988. During the October 1987-September 1988 sugar

season, 196 cooperative sugar factories were in production.

They produced nearly 5.3 million tons of sugar, accounting for

about 57.5 percent of the country's total production of 9.2 million tons. The National Federation of Cooperative Sugar Factories rendered advice to member cooperatives on technical

improvement, financial management, raw materials development, and inventory control. In the early 1990s, the cooperative marketing structure comprised 6,777 primary marketing societies: 2,759 general-purpose societies at the mandi (wholesale market) level and 4,018

special commodities societies for oilseeds and other such commodities. There were also 161 district or central societies cover- ing nearly all important mandis in the country and twenty-nine

general-purpose state cooperative marketing federations. The

total value of agricultural produce marketed by cooperatives

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Agriculture

amounted to about Rs54.2 billion in FY 1988, compared with

Rsl8 billion in FY 1979. The total value of food grains handled

by marketing cooperatives increased from Rs5 billion in FY

1979 to about Rsll.3 billion in FY 1986.

The Ministry of Agriculture's Directorate of Marketing and

Inspection is responsible for administering federal statutes con- cerned with the marketing of agricultural produce. Another

function is market research. The directorate also works closely

with states to provide agricultural marketing services that constitutionally come under state purview.

Under the Agricultural Produce (Grading and Marketing)

Act of 1937, more than forty primary commodities are compulsorily graded for export and voluntarily graded for internal

consumption. Although the regulation of commodity markets

is a function of state government, the Directorate of Marketing

and Inspection provides marketing and inspection services and

financial aid down to the village level to help set up commodity

grading centers in selected markets.

By the 1980s, warehouses for storing agricultural produce

and farm supplies played an increasing role in government

price support and price control programs and in distributing

farm commodities and farm supplies. Because the public ware- houses issue a receipt to the owners of stored goods on which

loans can be raised, warehouses are also becoming important

in agricultural finance. The Central Warehousing Corporation, an entity of the central government, operates warehouses at major points within its jurisdictions, and cooperatives operate

warehouses in towns and villages. The growth of the warehousing system has resulted in a decline in weather damage to produce and in loss to rodents and other pests.

Most agricultural produce is sold by farmers in the private

sector to moneylenders (to whom the farmer may be indebted)

or to village traders. Produce is sold in various ways. It might be

sold at a weekly village market in the farmer's own village or in a neighboring village. If these outlets are not available, then

produce might be sold at irregularly held markets in a nearby

village or town, or in the mandi Farmers also can sell to traders

who come to the work site. The government has adopted various measures to improve

agricultural marketing. These steps include establishing regulated markets, constructing warehouses, grading and standardizing produce, standardizing weights and measures, and

providing information on agricultural prices over All India

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India: A Country Study

Radio (Akashvani), the national radio network (see Radio, ch.

6; The Media, ch. 8).

The government's objective of providing reasonable prices

for basic food commodities is achieved through the Public Distribution System, a network of 350,000 fair-price shops that are monitored by state governments. Channeling basic food commodities through the Public Distribution System serves as a conduit for reaching the truly needy and as a system for keeping general consumer prices in check. More than 80 percent of

the supplies of grain to the Public Distribution System is provided by Punjab, Haryana, and western Uttar Pradesh.

The Food Corporation of India was established in 1965 as the public-sector marketing agency responsible for implementing government price policy through procurement and public

distribution operations. It was intended to secure for the government a commanding position in the food-grain trade. By

1979 the corporation was operating in all states as the sole

agent of the central government in food-grain procurement.

The corporation uses the services of state government agencies

and cooperatives in its operations.

The Food Corporation of India is the sole repository of food

grains reserved for the Public Distribution System. Food grains,

primarily wheat and rice, account for between 60 and 75 percent of the corporation's total annual purchases. Food-grain

procurement was 8.9 million tons in FY 1971, 13.0 million tons

in FY 1981, and 17.8 million tons in FY 1991. Food grains supplied through the Public Distribution System amounted to 7.8

million tons in FY 1971, 13.0 million tons in FY 1981, and 17.0

million tons in FY 1991. The corporation has functioned effectively in providing price supports to farmers through its procurement scheme and in keeping a check on large price

increases by providing food grains through the Public Distribution System.

External Trade

Agricultural exports were 44 percent of total exports in FY

1960; they decreased to 32 percent in FY 1970, to 31 percent in

FY 1980, to 18.5 percent in FY 1988, and to 15.3 percent in FY

1993. This drop in agriculture's share was somewhat misleading

because agricultural products, such as cotton and jute, that

were exported in the raw form in the 1950s, have been

exported as cotton yarn, fabrics, ready-made garments, coir

yarn, and jute manufactures since the 1960s.

424
Women washing water buffalo, Agra, Uttar Pradesh

Courtesy Sandra Day O'Connor

The composition of agricultural and allied products for

export changed mainly because of the continuing growth of

demand in the domestic market. This demand cut into the sur- plus available for export despite a continuing desire, on the

part of government, to shore up the constant foreign-exchange

shortage (see Foreign-Exchange System, ch. 6). In FY 1960, tea was the principal export by value. Oil cakes, tobacco, cashew

kernels, spices, and raw cotton were about equal in value but were only one-eighth of the value of tea exports. By FY 1980,

tea was still dominant, but coffee, rice, fish, and fish products

came close, followed by oil cakes, cashew kernels, and cotton.

In 1992-93 fish and fish products became the primary agricultural export, followed by oil meals, then cereals, and then tea. The share of fish products rose steadily from less than 2 percent of all agricultural exports in FY 1960, to 10 percent in FY

1980, to approximately 15 percent for the three-year period

425
India: A Country Study

ending in FY 1990, and to 23 percent in FY 1992. The share of

tea in agricultural exports fell from 40 percent in FY 1960 to roughly 17 percent in the FY 1988-FY1990 period, and to only

13 percent by FY 1992.

External Aid

Foreign aid—financial and technical—since the 1950s has

made a significant contribution to the agricultural progress in

rural India. Aid has come from many sources: the United States government, the Ford Foundation, the Rockefeller Foundation, the World Bank, the Food and Agriculture Organization

(FAO—see Glossary) of the United Nations (UN), the European Economic Community, the former Soviet Union, Britain,

andJapan, among others (see Aid, ch. 6).

Agricultural aid also has come in many forms. Between 1963

and 1972, for example, under a program of the United States

Agency for International Development, some 400 American

scientists and scholars served on the faculties of India's agricultural universities, while more than 500 faculty members from

Indian institutions received advanced training in the United

States and other countries. Several hundred agricultural

research projects, financed with funds generated from sales of

American farm commodities under the United States Public

Law 480 program, fueled technological breakthroughs in

Indian agriculture.

Aid to the agricultural sector continued in the late 1980s and

the early 1990s; the FAO, the European Union, the World

Bank, and the United Nations Development Programme

(UNDP) provided the bulk of the assistance. The FAO provided technical assistance in a number of emerging areas; it provided quality control for exports; videos for rural communication and training; and market studies for wool processing,

mushroom production, and egg and poultry marketing. Operation Flood—a dairy development program—was jointly sponsored by the European Economic Community, the World Bank,

and India's National Dairy Development Board (see Livestock

and Poultry, this ch.). The UNDP provided technical assistance

by sending foreign experts, consultants, and equipment to

India. The World Bank and its affiliates supported agricultural

extension, social (community-based) forestry, agricultural

credit, dairy development, horticulture, seed development,

rain-fed fish farms, storage, marketing, and irrigation.

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Agriculture

India has not only been a receiver of aid. Increasingly since

independence, India has been sharing its agricultural technology with other developing countries. Numerous foreign scientists have received special and advanced training in India;

hundreds of foreign students have attended Indian state agricultural universities. Among other international agricultural

endeavors, India has contributed scientists, services, and funds

to the work of the International Rice Research Institute, headquartered in the Philippines. In the late 1980s and early 1990s,

India provided short- and long-term training courses to hundreds of foreign specialists each year under a variety of programs, including the Technical Cooperation Scheme of the

Colombo Plan for Cooperative Economic and Social Development in Asia and the Pacific (Colombo Plan—see Glossary)

and the Technical Cooperation Scheme of the Commonwealth

of Nations Assistance Program (see Participation in International Organizations, ch. 9).

Impact of Economic Reforms on Agriculture

The serious foreign-exchange crisis in 1990 led to a number

of well-publicized economic reforms in the early 1990s dealing

with trade, industrial licensing, and privatization. The reforms

had an impact on the agricultural sector through the central

government's effort to withdraw the fertilizer subsidy and place

greater emphasis on agricultural exports. The cut in the fertil- izer subsidy was a result of the government's commitment to reduce New Delhi's fiscal deficit by removing grants and subsidies from the budget. The government action led to a reduction in the use of chemical fertilizers and protests by farmers

and opposition political parties. The government was forced to continue the subsidies but at a somewhat lower level. New import and export policies aim at enhancing export

capabilities of the agricultural sector by increasing productivity

and promoting modernization and competitiveness. The measures to facilitate export growth include allowing the import of

capital for the agricultural sector, reducing the list of agricultural products that cannot be exported, and removing the minimum export price from a number of products. Agricultural

exports increased by 30 percent in FY 1991 and 14 percent in

FY 1992 in terms of rupee value, but declined by 8 percent

from FY 1990 to FY 1992 in United States dollar terms because

of the devaluation of the rupee in 1991.

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India: A Country Study

In the mid-1990s, it was expected that agriculture would continue to be the most important sector of the economy for the

rest of the decade in terms of the proportion of GDP. However, even when it is not the sector providing the largest share of

GDP, the importance of agriculture is not likely to diminish

because of its critical role in providing food, wage goods,

employment, and raw materials to industries. Despite their preoccupation with industrial development, India's planners and

policy makers have had to acknowledge the critical role of agriculture in the early 1990s by changing basic policy. The gains in

agricultural production should not lead to complacency, however. Continuing increases in productivity, developing allied

activities in rural areas, and building infrastructure in rural

areas are essential if India is to continue to be self-reliant in

food and agricultural products and provide a modest surplus

for exports.

* * * There is abundant literature on Indian agriculture, and

much of it is highly detailed. A source that brings together a wide variety of useful information is Subhash C. Kashyap's

National Policy Studies, which provides a good overview of agricultural policy. A critical review of agricultural development

and policy is provided by B.M. Bhatia's Indian Agriculture: A Policy Perspective. N.S.S. Narayana, K.S. Parikh, and T.N. Srini- vasan's Agriculture, Growth, and Redistribution ofIncome is a more

rigorous analysis of policy issues that also contains a large

amount of descriptive information. The Indian Ministry of

Information and Broadcasting's India: A Reference Annual is a valuable source. The Ministry of Finance's annual Economic Survey gives a detailed account of developments in agriculture.

The Economic and Political Weekly is India's premier source of news and analysis regarding all issues connected with agriculture. (For further information and complete citations, see Bibliography.)

428
Chapter 8. Government and Politics
Geometric and floral floor design, Rajasthan
INDIAN POLITICS ENTERED a new era at the beginning of

the 1990s. The period of political domination by the Congress

(I) branch of the Indian National Congress (see Glossary)

came to an end with the party's defeat in the 1989 general elections, and India began a period of intense multiparty political

competition. Even though the Congress (I) regained power as a minority government in 1991, its grasp on power was precarious. The Nehruvian socialist ideology that the party had used

to fashion India's political agenda had lost much of its popular

appeal. The Congress (I) polidcal leadership had lost the mantle of moral integrity inherited from the Indian National Congress's role in the independence movement, and it was widely

viewed as corrupt. Support among key social bases of the Congress (I) political coalition was seriously eroding. The main

alternative to the Congress (I), the Bharatiya Janata Party

(BJP—Indian People's Party), embarked on a campaign to reorganize the Indian electorate in an effort to create a Hindu

nationalist majority coalition. Simultaneously, such parties as the Janata Dal (People's Party), the Samajwadi Party (Socialist

Party), and the Bahujan Samaj Party (BSP—Party of Society's

Majority) attempted to ascend to power on the crest of an alli- ance of interests uniting Dalits (see Glossary), Backward

Classes (see Glossary), Scheduled Tribes (see Glossary), and

religious minorities.

The structure of India's federal—or union—system not only

creates a strong central government but also has facilitated the

concentration of power in the central government in general

and in particular in the Office of the Prime Minister. This centralization of power has been a source of considerable controversy and political tension. It is likely to further exacerbate

political conflict because of the increasing pluralism of the

country's party system and the growing diversity of interestgroup representation.

Once viewed as a source of solutions for the country's eco- nomic and social problems, the Indian polity is increasingly seen by political observers as the problem. When populist political appeals stir the passions of the masses, government institutions appear less capable than ever before of accommodating

conflicts in a society mobilized along competing ethnic and

religious lines. In addition, law and order have become increas431
India: A Country Study

ingly tenuous because of the growing inability of the police to curb criminal activities and quell communal disturbances.

Indeed, many observers bemoan the "criminalization" of

Indian politics at a time when politicians routinely hire "muscle

power" to improve their electoral prospects, and criminals

themselves successfully run for public office. These circumstances have led some observers to conclude that India has

entered into a growing crisis of governability.

Few analysts would deny the gravity of India's problems, but

some contend they have occurred amidst the maturation of

civil society and the emergence of new, more democratic political practices. Backward Classes, the Dalits, and tribal peoples

increasingly have refused to rest content with the patronage

and populism characteristic of the "Congress system." Mobilization of these groups has provided a viable base for the political

opposition and unraveled the fabric of the Congress. Since the

late 1970s, there has been a proliferation of nongovernmental

organizations. These groups made new demands on the political system that required a substantial redistribution of political

power, economic resources, and social status. Whether or not developments in Indian politics exacerbate

the continuing problems or give birth to greater democracy

broadly hinges on efforts to resolve three key issues. How will

India's political system, now more than ever based on egalitarian democratic values, accommodate the changes taking place

in its hierarchical social system? How will the state balance the

need to recognize the interests of the country's remarkably heterogeneous society with the imperatives of national unity? And,

in the face of the declining legitimacy of the Indian state and

the continuing development of civil society, can the Indian

state regenerate its legitimacy, and if it is to do so, how should it redefine the boundaries between state and society? India has

confronted these issues throughout much of its history. These

issues, with their intrinsic tensions, will continue to serve as sources of change in the continuing evolution of the Indian

polity.

The Constitutional Framework

The constitution of India draws extensively from Western

legal traditions in its outline of the principles of liberal democracy. It is distinguished from many Western constitutions, however, in its elaboration of principles reflecting the aspirations to end the inequities of traditional social relations and enhance

432
Government and Politics

the social welfare of the population. According to constitutional scholar Granville Austin, probably no other nation's constitution "has provided so much impetus toward changing and

rebuilding society for the common good." Since its enactment,

the constitution has fostered a steady concentration of power

in the central government—especially the Office of the Prime

Minister. This centralization has occurred in the face of the

increasing assertiveness of an array of ethnic and caste groups

across Indian society. Increasingly, the government has

responded to the resulting tensions by resorting to the formidable array of authoritarian powers provided by the constitution. Together with the public's perception of pervasive

corruption among India's politicians, the state's centralization

of authority and increasing resort to coercive power have

eroded its legitimacy. However, a new assertiveness shown by

the Supreme Court and the Election Commission suggests that

the remaining checks and balances among the country's political institutions continue to support the resilience of Indian

democracy.

Adopted after some two and one-half years of deliberation

by the Constituent Assembly that also acted as India's first legislature, the constitution was put into effect on January 26, 1950.

Bhimrao Ramji (B.R.) Ambedkar, a Dalit who earned a law

degree from Columbia University, chaired the drafting committee of the constitution and shepherded it through Constituent Assembly debates. Supporters of independent India's

founding father, Mohandas Karamchand (Mahatma) Gandhi,

backed measures that would form a decentralized polity with

strong local administration—known as panchayat (pi., panchayats—see Glossary) —in a system known as panchayati raj,

that is rule by panchayats. However, the support of more modernist leaders, such as Jawaharlal Nehru, ultimately led to a parliamentary government and a federal system with a strong

central government (see Nehru's Legacy, ch. 1). Following a

British parliamentary pattern, the constitution embodies the

Fundamental Rights, which are similar to the United States Bill of Rights, and a Supreme Court similar to that of the United

States. It creates a "sovereign democratic republic" called

India, or Bharat (after the legendary king of the Mahabharata)

,

which "shall be a Union of States." India is a federal system in

which residual powers of legislation remain with the central

government, similar to that in Canada. The constitution provides detailed lists dividing up powers between central and

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India: A Country Study

state governments as in Australia, and it elaborates a set of

Directive Principles of State Policy as does the Irish constitution.

The 395 articles and ten appendixes, known as schedules, in

the constitution make it one of the longest and most detailed

in the world. Schedules can be added to the constitution by

amendment. The ten schedules in force cover the designations

of the states and union territories; the emoluments for hififh- level officials; forms of oaths; allocation of the number of seats in the Rajya Sabha (Council of States—the upper house of Par- liament) per state or territory; provisions for the administration and control of Scheduled Areas (see Glossary) and

Scheduled Tribes (see Glossary) ; provisions for the administration of tribal areas in Assam; the union (meaning central government), state, and concurrent (dual) lists of responsibilities;

the official languages; land and tenure reforms; and the association of Sikkim with India; i The Indian constitution is also one of the most frequently

amended constitutions in the world. The first amendment

came onlv a year after the adoption of the constitution and

instituted numerous minor changes. Many more amendments

followed, and through June 1995 the constitution had been

amended seventy-seven times, a rate of almost two amendments per year since 1950. Most of the constitution can be

amended after a quorum of more than half of the members of

each house in Parliament passes an amendment with a twothirds majority vote. Articles pertaining to the distribution of

legislative authority between the central and state governments

must also be approved by 50 percent of the state legislatures.

Fundamental Rights

The Fundamental Rights embodied in the constitution are guaranteed to all citizens. These civil liberties take precedence

over any other law of the land. They include individual rights

common to most liberal democracies, such as equality before

the law, freedom of speech and expression, freedom of association and peaceful assembly, freedom of religion, and the right

to constitutional remedies for the protection of civil rights such

as habeas corpus. In addition, the Fundamental Rights are aimed at overturning the inequities of past social practices.

They abolish "untouchability"; prohibit discrimination on the

grounds of religion, race, caste, sex, or place of birth; and for- bid traffic in human beings and forced labor. They go beyond

434
Government and Politics

conventional civil liberties in protecting cultural and educational rights of minorities by ensuring that minorities may pre- serve their distinctive languages and establish and administer

their own education institutions. Originally, the right to property was also included in the Fundamental Rights; however, the

Forty-fourth Amendment, passed in 1978, revised the status of

property rights by stating that "No person shall be deprived of

his property save by authority of law." Freedom of speech and

expression, generally interpreted to include freedom of the

press, can be limited "in the interests of the sovereignty and

integrity of India, the security of the State, friendly relations

with foreign States, public order, decency or morality, or in

relation to contempt of court, defamation or incitement to an

offence" (see The Media, this ch.).

Directive Principles of State Policy

An important feature of the constitution is the Directive

Principles of State Policy. Although the Directive Principles are asserted to be "fundamental in the governance of the country,"

they are not legally enforceable. Instead, they are guidelines

for creating a social order characterized by social, economic,

and political justice, liberty, equality, and fraternity as enunciated in the constitution's preamble.

In some cases, the Directive Principles articulate goals that,

however admirable, remain vague platitudes, such as the

injunctions that the state "shall direct its policy towards secur- ing . . . that the ownership and control of the material

resources of the community are so distributed to subserve the

common good" and "endeavor to promote international peace

and security." In other areas, the Directive Principles provide

more specific policy objectives. They exhort the state to secure work at a living wage for all citizens; take steps to encourage

worker participation in industrial management; provide for

just and humane conditions of work, including maternity leave;

and promote the educational and economic interests of Scheduled Castes, Scheduled Tribes, and other disadvantaged sectors of society. The Directive Principles also charge the state with

the responsibility for providing free and compulsory education

for children up to age fourteen (see Administration and Funding, ch. 2).

The Directive Principles also urge the nation to develop a uniform civil code and offer free legal aid to all citizens. They

urge measures to maintain the separation of the judiciary from

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India: A Country Study

the executive and direct the government to organize village

panchayats to function as units of self-government. This latter

objective was advanced by the Seventy-third Amendment and

the Seventy-fourth Amendment in December 1992. The Directive Principles also order that India should endeavor to protect

and improve the environment and protect monuments and

places of historical interest.

The Forty-second Amendment, which came into force in

January 1977, attempted to raise the status of the Directive

Principles by stating that no law implementing any of the

Directive Principles could be declared unconstitutional on the

grounds that it violated anv of the Fundamental Rigdits. The

amendment simultaneously stated that laws prohibiting "antinational activities" or the formation of "antinational associations" could not be invalidated because they infringed on any

of the Fundamental Rights. It added a new section to the constitution on "Fundamental Duties" that enjoined citizens "to promote harmony and the spirit of common brotherhood

among all the people of India, transcending religious, linguistic and regional or sectional diversities." However, the amendment reflected a new emphasis in governing circles on order

and discipline to counteract what some leaders had come to perceive as the excessively freewheeling style of Indian democracy. After the March 1977 general election ended the control

of the Congress (Congress (R) from 1969) over the executive

and legislature for the first time since independence in 1947,

the new Janata-dominated Parliament passed the Forty-third

Amendment (1977) and Forty-fourth Amendment (1978).

These amendments revoked the Forty-second Amendment's

provision that Directive Principles take precedence over Fundamental Rights and also curbed Parliament's power to legislate against "antinational activities" (see The Legislature, this

ch.).

Group Rights

In addition to stressing; the rig-fit of individuals as citizens,

Part XVI of the constitution endeavors to promote social justice bv elaborating; a series of affirmative-action measures for

disadvantaged groups. These "Special Provisions Relating to Certain Classes" include the reservation of seats in the Lok

Sabha (House of the People) and in state legislative bodies for

members of Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes. The number of seats set aside for them is proportional to their share of

436
President Shankar Dayal Sharma being driven in a coach to Rashtrapatri Bhavan, the Presidential Palace, after his July 26, 1992,

swearing-in ceremony

Courtesy India Abroad News Service

the national and respective state populations. Part XVI also reserves some government appointments for these disadvantaged groups insofar as they do not interfere with administrative efficiency. The section stipulates that a special officer for

Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes be appointed by the

president to "investigate all matters relating to the safeguards

provided" for them, as well as periodic commissions to investigate the conditions of the Backward Classes. The president, in

consultation with state governors, designates those groups that

meet the criteria of Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes.

Similar protections exist for the small Anglo-Indian community.

The framers of the constitution provided that the special

provisions would cease twenty years after the promulgation of

437
India: A Country Study

the constitution, anticipating that the progress of the disadvantaged groups during that time would have removed significant

disparities between them and other groups in society. However,

in 1969 the Twenty-third Amendment extended the affirmative-action measures until 1980. The Forty-fifth Amendment of

1980 extended them again until 1990, and in 1989 the Sixtysecond Amendment extended the provisions until 2000. The

Seventy-seventh Amendment of 1995 further strengthened the

states' authority to reserve government-service positions for

Scheduled Caste and Scheduled Tribe members.

Emergency Provisions and Authoritarian Powers

Part XVIII of the constitution permits the state to suspend

various civil liberties and the application of certain federal

principles during presidentially proclaimed states of emergency. The constitution provides for three categories of emergencies: a threat by "war or external aggression" or by "internal

disturbances"; a "failure of constitutional machinery" in the

country or in a state; and a threat to the financial security or

credit of the nation or a part of it. Under the first two categories, the Fundamental Rights, with the exception of protection

of life and personal liberty, may be suspended, and federal

principles may be rendered inoperative. A proclamation of a

state of emergency lapses after two months if not approved by

both houses of Parliament. The president can issue a proclamation dissolving a state government if it can be determined,

upon receipt of a report from a governor, that circumstances

prevent the government of that state from maintaining law and

order according to the constitution. This action establishes

what is known as President's Rule because under such a proclamation the president can assume any or all functions of the

state government; transfer the powers of the state legislature to Parliament; or take other measures necessary to achieve the

objectives of the proclamation, including suspension, in whole

or in part, of the constitution. A proclamation of President's

Rule cannot interfere with the exercise of authority by the

state's high court. Once approved, President's Rule normally

lasts for six months, but it may be extended up to one year if Parliament approves. In exceptional cases, such as the violent

revolt in Jammu and Kashmir during the early and mid-1990s,

President's Rule has lasted for a period of more than five years. President's Rule has been imposed frequently, and its use is often politically motivated. During the terms of prime minis438
Government and Politics

ters Nehru and Lai Bahadur Shastri, from 1947 to 1966, it was imposed ten times. Under Indira Gandhi's two tenures as prime minister (1966-77 and 1980-84), President's Rule was imposed forty-one times. Despite Mrs. Gandhi's frequent use of

President's Rule, she was in office longer (187 months) than

any other prime minister except Nehru (201 months). Other

prime ministers also have been frequent users: Morarji Desai

(eleven times in twenty-eight months), Chaudhury Charan

Singh (five times in less than six months), Rajiv Gandhi (eight

times in sixty-one months), Vishwanath Pratap (V.P.) Singh

(two times in eleven months), Chandra Shekhar (four times in seven months), and P.V. Narasimha Rao (nine times in his first forty-two months in office).

State of emergency proclamations have been issued three

times since independence. The first was in 1962 during the

border war with China. Another was declared in 1971 when

India went to war against Pakistan over the independence of

East Pakistan, which became Bangladesh. In 1975 the third

Emergency was imposed in response to an alledged threat by

"internal disturbances" stemming from the political opposition

to Indira Gandhi (see The Rise of Indira Gandhi, ch. 1; National-Level Agencies, ch. 10).

The Indian state has authoritarian powers in addition to the

constitution's provisions for proclamations of Emergency Rule

and President's Rule. The Preventive Detention Act was passed

in 1950 and remained in force until 1970. Shortly after the start of the Emergency in 1962, the government enacted the

Defence of India Act. This legislation created the Defence of

India Rules, which allow for preventive detention of individuals

who have acted or who are likely to act in a manner detrimental to public order and national security. The Defence of India

Rules were reimposed during the 1971 war with Pakistan; they

remained in effect after the end of the war and were invoked

for a variety of uses not intended by their framers, such as the

arrests made during a nationwide railroad strike in 1974.

The Maintenance of Internal Security Act promulgated in

1971 also provides for preventive detention. During the 1975-

77 Emergency, the act was amended to allow the government

to arrest individuals without specifying charges. The government arrested tens of thousands of opposition politicians

under the Defence of India Rules and the Maintenance of

Internal Security Act, including most of the leaders of the

future Janata Party government (see Political Parties, this ch.).

439
India: A Country Study

Shortly after the Janata government came to power in 1977,

Parliament passed the Forty-fourth Amendment, which revised

the domestic circumstances cited in Article 352 as justifying an emergency from "internal disturbance" to "armed rebellion."

Duringjanata rule, Parliament also repealed the Defence of

India Rules and the Maintenance of Internal Security Act.

However, after the Congress (I) returned to power in 1980,

Parliament passed the National Security Act authorizing security forces to arrest individuals without warrant for suspicion of

action that subverts national security, public order, and essential economic services. The Essential Services Maintenance Act

of 1981 permits the government to prohibit strikes and lockouts in sixteen economic sectors providing critical goods and

services. The Fifty-ninth Amendment, passed in 1988, restored

"internal disturbance" in place of "armed rebellion" as just cause for the proclamation of an emergency.

The Sikh militant movement that spread through Punjab

during the 1980s spurred additional authoritarian legislation

(see Insurgent Movements and External Subversion, ch. 10).

In 1984 Parliament passed the National Security Amendment

Act enabling government security forces to detain prisoners for

up to one year. The 1984 Terrorist Affected Areas (Special

Courts) Ordinance provided security forces in Punjab with

unprecedented powers of detention, and it authorized secret

tribunals to try suspected terrorists. The 1985 Terrorist and

Disruptive Activities (Prevention) Act imposed the death penalty for anyone convicted of terrorist actions that led to the

death of others. It empowered authorities to tap telephones, censor mail, and conduct raids when individuals are alleged to pose a threat to the unity and sovereignty of the nation. The

legislation renewing the act in 1987 provided for in camera tri- als, which may be presided over by any central government offi- cer, and reversed the legal presumption of innocence if the

government produces specific evidence linking a suspect to a

terrorist act. In March 1988, the Fifty-ninth Amendment

increased the period that an emergency can be in effect without legislative approval from six months to three years, and it eliminated the assurance of due process and protection of life and liberty with regard to Punjab found in articles 20 and 21.

These rights were restored in 1989 by the Sixty-third Amendment.

By June 30, 1994, more than 76,000 persons throughout

India had been arrested under the Terrorist and Disruptive

440
Government and Politics

Activities (Prevention) Act. The act became widely unpopular,

and the Rao government allowed the law to lapse in May 1995.

The Structure of Government

The union government, as India's central government is known, is divided into three distinct but interrelated branches:

legislative, executive, and judicial (see fig. 14). As in the British

parliamentary model, the leadership of the executive is drawn

from and responsible to the legislative body. Although Article

50 stipulates the separation of the judiciary from the executive,

the executive controls judicial appointments and many of the

conditions of work. In addition, one of the more dramatic insti- tutional battles in the Indian polity has been the struggle

between elements wanting to assert legislative power to amend

the constitution and those favoring the judiciary's efforts to preserve the constitution's basic structure. The Legislature

Parliament consists of a bicameral legislature, the Lok Sabha

(House of the People—the lower house) and the Rajya Sabha

(Council of States—the upper house). Parliament's principal

function is to pass laws on those matters that the constitution

specifies to be within its jurisdiction. Among its constitutional

powers are approval and removal of members of the Council of

Ministers, amendment of the constitution, approval of central

. government finances, and delimitation of state and union terri- tory boundaries (see State Governments and Union Territories, this ch.).

The president has a specific authority with respect to the

function of the legislative branch (see The Executive, this ch.).

The president is authorized to convene Parliament and must

give his assent to all parliamentary bills before they become

law. The president is empowered to summon Parliament to meet, to address either house or both houses together, and to require attendance of all of its members. The president also

may send messages to either house with respect to a pending

bill or any other matter. The president addresses the first ses- sion of Parliament each year and must give assent to all provisions in bills passed.

Lok Sabha

The Lok Sabha in 1995 constitutionally had 545 seats. For a

441
India: A Coun try St u dy

JUDICIARY EXECUTIVE LEGISLATURE

SUPREME COURT

OF INDIA PRESIDENT

VICE PRESIDENT PARLIAMENT

LOK SABHA

(HOUSE OF

THE PEOPLE)

COUNCIL OF MINISTERS

PRIME MINISTER

GOVERNOR

RAJYA SABHA

(COUNCIL OF

STATES)

HIGH COURTS

COUNCIL OF

MINISTERS _ CHIEF MINISTER _

MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS OR COMMITTEES

LEGISLATURE

LOWER COURTS DISTRICT ZILA PARISHAD

I DEVELOPMENT PANCHAYAT

BLOCK SAMITI

1 VILLAGE-LEVEL PANCHAYAT WORKER

15= < O K «2

Source: Based on information from India, Ministry of Information and Broadcasting. Research and Reference Division. India, 1994: A Reference Annual, New Delhi. 1995, 28-94.

Figure 14. Structure of the Government, 1995

442
Government and Politics

variety of reasons, elections are sometimes not held in all constitutiencies, leaving some seats vacant and giving the appear- ance of fewer seats in the lower house. A member must be at

least twenty-five years of age. Two members are nominated by

the president as representatives of the Anglo-Indian community, and the rest are popularly elected. Elections are held on a

one-stage, "first-past-the-post" system, similar to that in the

United States. As in the United States, candidates from larger

parties are favored because each constituency elects only the

candidate winning the most votes. In the context of multiplecandidate elections, most members of Parliament are elected

with pluralities of the vote that amount to less than a majority.

As a result, political parties can gain commanding positions in

the Parliament without winning the support of a majority of

the electorate. For instance, Congress has dominated Indian

politics without ever winning a majority of votes in parliamentary elections. The best-ever Congress performance in parliamentary elections was in 1984 when Congress (I) won 48

percent of the vote and garnered 76 percent of the parliamentary seats. In the 1991 elections, Congress (I) won 37.6 percent

of the vote and 42 percent of the seats. The usual Lok Sabha term is five years. However, the president may dissolve the house and call for new elections should

the government lose its majority in Parliament. Elections must

be held within six months after Parliament is dissolved. The

prime minister can choose electorally advantageous times to recommend the dissolution of Parliament to the president in an effort to maximize support in the next Parliament. The

term of Parliament can be extended in yearly increments if an emergency has been proclaimed. This situation occurred in

1976 when Parliament was extended beyond its five-year term

under the Emergency proclaimed the previous year. The constitution stipulates that the Lok Sabha must meet at least twice a year, and no more than six months can pass between sessions.

The Lok Sabha customarily meets for three sessions a year. The

Council of Ministers is responsible only to the Lok Sabha, and

the authority to initiate financial legislation is vested exclusively

in the Lok Sabha.

The powers and authority of the Lok Sabha and the Rajya

Sabha are not differentiated. The index of the constitution, for

example, has a lengthy list of the powers of Parliament but not

for each separate house. The key differences between the two

houses lie in their disparate authority in the legislative process.

443
India: A Country Study

Rajya Sabha

The Rajya Sabha has a maximum of 250 members. All but

twelve are elected by state and territory legislatures for six-year

terms. Members must be at least thirty years old. The president

nominates up to twelve members on the basis of their special

knowledge or practical experience in fields such as literature,

science, art, and social service. No further approval of these

nominations is required by Parliament. Elections are staggered

so that one-third of the members are elected every two years. The number of seats allocated to each state and territory is determined on the basis of relative population, except that

smaller states and territories are awarded a larger share than

their population justifies.

The Rajya Sabha meets in continuous session. It is not subject to dissolution as is the Lok Sabha. The Rajya Sabha is designed to provide stability and continuity to the legislative

process. Although considered the upper house, its authority in

the legislative process is subordinate to that of the Lok Sabha.

Legislative Process The initiative for substantial legislation comes primarily

from the prime minister, cabinet members, and high-level officials. Although all legislation except financial bills can be introduced in either house, most laws originate in the Lok Sabha. A

legislative proposal may go through three readings before it is voted on. After a bill has been passed by the originating house,

it is sent to the other house, where it is debated and voted on. The second house can accept, reject, or amend the bill. If the

bill is amended by the second house, it must be returned to the

originating house in its amended form. If a bill is rejected by

the second house, if there is disagreement about the proposed

amendments, or if the second house fails to act on a bill for six months, the president is authorized to summon a joint session

of Parliament to vote on the bill. Disagreements are resolved by

a majority vote of the members of both houses present in a joint session. This procedure favors the Lok Sabha because it has more than twice as many members as the Rajya Sabha.

When the bill has been passed by both houses, it is sent to the president, who can refuse assent and send the bill back to Parliament for reconsideration. If both houses pass it again,

with or without amendments, it is sent to the president a sec- ond time. The president is then obliged to assent to the legisla444
Government and Politics

tion. After receiving the president's assent, a bill becomes an

act on the statute book.

The legislative procedure for bills involving taxing and

spending—known as money bills—is different from the procedure for other legislation. Money bills can be introduced only

in the Lok Sabha. After the Lok Sabha passes a money bill, it is sent to the Rajya Sabha. The upper house has fourteen days to act on the bill. If the Rajya Sabha fails to act within fourteen

days, the bill becomes law. The Rajya Sabha may send an amended version of the bill back to the Lok Sabha, but the lat- ter is not bound to accept these changes. It may pass the original bill again, at which point it will be sent to the president for

his signature.

During the 1950s and part of the 1960s, Parliament was

often the scene of articulate debate and substantial revisions of

legislation. Prime ministers Indira Gandhi, Rajiv Gandhi, and

P.V. Narasimha Rao, however, showed little enthusiasm for parliamentary debate. During the 1975-77 Emergency, many

members of Parliament from the opposition as well as dissi- dents within Indira's own party were arrested, and press cover- age of legislative proceedings was censored. It is generally

agreed that the quality of discourse and the expertise of members of Parliament have declined since the 1960s. An effort to halt the decline of Parliament through a reformed committee

system giving Parliament new powers of oversight over the

executive branch has had very limited impact.

Under the constitution, the division of powers between the

union government and the states is delimited into three lists: the Union List, the State List, and the Concurrent List. Parliament has exclusive authority to legislate on any of the ninety- seven items on the Union List. The list includes banking, communications, defense, foreign affairs, interstate commerce, and

transportation. The State List includes sixty-seven items that are under the exclusive jurisdiction of state legislatures, including agriculture, local government, police, public health, public

order, and trade and commerce within the state. The central

or union—government and state governments exercise con- current jurisdiction over forty-four items on the Concurrent

List, including criminal law and procedure, economic and

social planning, electricity, factories, marriage and divorce,

price control, social security and social insurance, and trade

unions. The purpose of the Concurrent List is to secure legal

and administrative unity throughout the country. Laws passed

445
India: A Country Study

by Parliament relevant to Concurrent List areas take precedence over laws passed by state legislatures.

The Executive

The executive branch is headed by the president, in whom

the constitution vests a formidable array of powers. The president serves as head of state and the supreme commander of

the armed forces. The president appoints the prime minister,

cabinet members, governors of states and territories, Supreme

Court and high court justices, and ambassadors and other diplomatic representatives. The president is also authorized to

issue ordinances with the force of acts of Parliament when Par- liament is not in session. The president can summon and prorogue Parliament as well as dissolve the Lok Sabha and call for

new elections. The president also can dismiss state and territory governments. Exercise of these impressive powers has

been restricted by the convention that the president acts on the

advice of the prime minister. In 1976 the Forty-second Amendment formally required the president to act according to the

advice of the Council of Ministers headed by the prime minister. The spirit of the arrangement is reflected in Ambedkar's

statement that the president "is head of the State but not of the

Executive. He represents the nation but does not rule the

nation." In practice, the president's role is predominantly symbolic and ceremonial, roughly analogous to the president of

Germany or the British monarch.

The president is elected for a five-year term by an electoral

college consisting of the elected members of both houses of

Parliament and the elected members of the legislative assemblies of the states and territories. The participation of state and

territory assemblies in the election is designed to ensure that

the president is chosen to head the nation and not merely the

majority party in Parliament, thereby placing the office above

politics and making the incumbent a symbol of national unity.

Despite the strict constraints placed on presidential authority, presidential elections have shaped the course of Indian politics on several occasions, and presidents have exercised

important power, especially when no party has a clear parliamentary majority. The presidential election of 1969, for example, turned into a dramatic test of strength for rival factions

when Prime Minister Indira Gandhi put up an opponent to the

official Congress candidate. The electoral contest contributed

to the subsequent split of the Congress. In 1979, after the Ja446
India's Parliament, New Delhi

Courtesy Robert L. Worden

nata Party began to splinter, President Neelam Sanjiva Reddy

(1977-82) first selected Janata member Chaudhury Charan

Singh as prime minister (1979-80) to form a minority government and then dissolved Parliament and called for new elections while ignoring Jagjivan Ram's claim that he could

assemble a stable government and become the country's first Scheduled Caste prime minister.

Tensions between President Giani Zail Singh (1982-87) and

Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi (1984-88) also illustrate the

potential power of the president. In 1987 Singh refused to sign

the Indian Post Office (Amendment) Bill, thereby preventing

the government from having the authority to censor personal

mail. Singh's public suggestion that the prime minister had not

treated the office of the president with proper dignity and the

persistent rumors that Singh was plotting the prime minister's

ouster contributed to the erosion of public confidence in Rajiv

Gandhi that ultimately led to his defeat in the 1989 elections.

In November 1990, President Ramaswami Venkataraman

(1987-92) selected Chandra Shekhar as India's eleventh prime

minister, even though Chandra Shekhar's splinter Samajwadi

Janata Dal held only fifty-eight seats in the Lok Sabha. Chandra

447
India: A Country Study

Shekhar resigned in June 1991 when the Congress (I) withdrew

its support.

In the same manner as the president, the vice president is elected by the electoral college for a five-year term. The vice

president is ex officio chairman of the Rajya Sabha and acts as president when the latter is unable to discharge his duties

because of absence, illness, or any other reason or until a new

president can be elected (within six months of the vacancy)

when a vacancy occurs because of death, resignation, or removal. There have been three instances since 1969 of the

vice president serving as acting president.

The prime minister is by far the most powerful figure in the

government. After being selected by the president, typically

from the party that commands the plurality of seats in Parliament, the prime minister selects the Council of Ministers from

other members of Parliament who are then appointed by the

president. Indivi duals who are not members of Parliament may

be appointed to the Council of Ministers if they become a member of Parliament either through election or appointment

within six months of selection. The Council of Ministers is com- posed of cabinet ministers (numbering seventeen, representing thirty-one portfolios in 1995), ministers of state (forty-five,

representing fifty-three portfolios in 1995), and deputy ministers (the number varies). Cabinet members are selected to accommodate different regional groups, castes, and factions

within the ruling party or coalition as well as with an eye to

their administrative skills and experience. Prime ministers fre- quently retain key ministerial portfolios for themselves.

Although the Council of Ministers is formally the highest

policy-making body in the government, its powers have

declined as influence has been increasingly centralized in the

Office of the Prime Minister, which is composed of the topranking administrative staff. After the Congress split to form

the Congress (R) —Rfor Requisition—and the Congress (O)

O for Organisation—in 1969, Indira Gandhi (who headed the

Congress (R)) increasingly concentrated decision-making

authority in the Office of the Prime Minister. When Rajiv Gandhi became prime minister in 1984, he promised to delegate

more authority to his cabinet members. However, power rapidly shifted back to the Office of the Prime Minister and a small

coterie of Rajiv's personal advisers. Rajiv's dissatisfaction with

his cabinet ministers became manifest in his incessant reshuffling of his cabinet. During his five years in office, he changed

448
Government and Politics

his cabinet thirty-six times, about once every seven weeks.

When P.V. Narasimha Rao became prime minister in June

1991, he decentralized power, giving Minister of Finance Manmohan Singh, in particular, a large measure of autonomy to develop a program for economic reform. After a year in office,

Rao began again to centralize authority, and by the end of

1994, the Office of the Prime Minister had grown to be as powerful as it ever was under Rao's predecessors. As of August

1995, Rao himself held the portfolios in thirteen ministries,

including those of defense, industry, and Kashmir affairs. The Judiciary

Supreme Court

The Supreme Court is the ultimate interpreter of the constitution and the laws of the land. It has appellate jurisdiction over all civil and criminal proceedings involving substantial

issues concerning the interpretation of the constitution. The

court has the original and exclusive jurisdiction to resolve dis- putes between the central government and one or more states and union territories as well as between different states and

union territories. And the Supreme Court is also empowered

to issue advisory rulings on issues referred to it by the president. The Supreme Court has wide discretionary powers to hear special appeals on any matter from any court except those

of the armed services. It also functions as a court of record and

supervises every high court. Twenty-five associate justices and one chiefjustice serve on

the Supreme Court. The president appoints the chiefjustice.

Associate justices are also appointed by the president after consultation with the chiefjustice and, if the president deems necessary, with other associate justices of the Supreme Court and

high court judges in the states. The appointments do not

require Parliament's concurrence. Justices may not be removed

from office until they reach mandatory retirement at age sixtyfive unless each house of Parliament passes, by a vote of twothirds of the members in attendance and a majority of its total membership, a presidential order charging "proved misbehavior or incapacity."

The contradiction between the principles of parliamentary

sovereignty andjudicial review that is embedded in India's constitution has been a source of major controversy over the years. After the courts overturned state laws redistributing land from

449
India: A Country Study

zamindar (see Glossary) estates on the grounds that the laws

violated the zamindars' Fundamental Rights, Parliament

passed the first (1951), fourth (1955), and seventeenth amendments (1964) to protect its authority to implement land redistribution. The Supreme Court countered these amendments in

1967 when it ruled in the Golaknath v State of Punjab case that

Parliament did not have the power to abrogate the Fundamental Rights, including the provisions on private property. On

February 1, 1970, the Supreme Court invalidated the government-sponsored Bank Nationalization Bill that had been

passed by Parliament in August 1969. The Supreme Court also

rejected as unconstitutional a presidential order of September

7, 1970, that abolished the titles, privileges, and privy purses of

the former rulers of India's old princely states. In reaction to Supreme Court decisions, in 1971 Parliament

passed the Twenty-fourth Amendment empowering it to

amend any provision of the constitution, including the Fundamental Rights; the Twenty-fifth Amendment, making legislative

decisions concerning proper land compensation nonjusticiable; and the Twenty-sixth Amendment, which added a constitutional article abolishing princely privileges and privy purses.

On April 24, 1973, the Supreme Court responded to the parliamentary offensive by ruling in the Keshavananda Bharati v the State of Kerala case that although these amendments were constitutional, the court still reserved for itself the discretion to

reject any constitutional amendments passed by Parliament by

declaring that the amendments cannot change the constitution's "basic structure." During the 1975-77 Emergency, Parliament passed the

Forty-second Amendment in January 1977, which essentially

abrogated the Keshavananda ruling by preventing the Supreme

Court from reviewing any constitutional amendment with the

exception of procedural issues concerning ratification. The

Forty-second Amendment's fifty-nine clauses stripped the

Supreme Court of many of its powers and moved the political

system toward parliamentary sovereignty. However, the Fortythird and Forty-fourth amendments, passed by the Janata government after the defeat of Indira Gandhi in March 1977,

reversed these changes. In the Minerva Mills case of 1980, the

Supreme Court reaffirmed its authority to protect the basic

structure of the constitution. However, in the Judges Transfer case on December 31, 1981, the Supreme Court upheld the

450
President ShankarDayal

Sharma

Courtesy Embassy ofIndia,

Washington

government's authority to dismiss temporary judges and trans- fer high courtjustices without the consent of the chiefjustice.

The Supreme Court continued to be embroiled in controversy in 1989, when its US$470 million judgment against Union

Carbide for the Bhopal catastrophe resulted in public demonstrations protesting the inadequacy of the settlement (see The

Growth of Cities, ch. 5). In 1991 the first-ever impeachment

motion against a Supreme Court justice was signed by 108

members of Parliament. A year later, a high-profile inquiry

found Associate Justice V. Ramaswamy "guilty of willful and

gross misuses of office . . . and moral turpitude by using public

funds for private purposes and reckless disregard of statutory

rules" while serving as chief justice of Punjab and Haryana.

Despite this strong indictment, Ramaswamy survived parliamentary impeachment proceedings and remained on the

Supreme Court after only 196 members of Parliament, less than the required two-thirds, voted for his ouster. During 1993 and 1994, the Supreme Court took measures to bolster the integrity of the courts and protect civil liberties in

the face of state coercion. In an effort to avoid the appearance

of conflict of interest in the judiciary, ChiefJustice Manepalli

Narayanrao Venkatachaliah initiated a controversial model

code of conduct forjudges that required the transfer of high

court judges having children practicing as attorneys in their

451
India: A Country Study

courts. Since 1993, the Supreme Court has implemented a policy to compensate the victims of violence while in police custody. On April 27, 1994, the Supreme Court issued a ruling that

enhanced the rights of individuals placed under arrest by stipulating elaborate guidelines for arrest, detention, and interrogation.

High Courts

There are eighteen high courts for India's twenty-five states, six union territories, and one national capital territory. Some

high courts serve more than one state or union territory. For

example, the high court of the union territory of Chandigarh

also serves Punjab and Haryana, and the high court in Gauhati

(in Meghalaya) serves Assam, Nagaland, Meghalaya, Mizoram,

Manipur, Tripura, and Arunachal Pradesh. As part of the judicial system, the high courts are institutionally independent of

state legislatures and executives. The president appoints state high court chiefjustices after consulting with the chiefjustice

of the Supreme Court and the governor of the state. The president also consults with the chiefjustice of the state high court

before he appoints other high court justices. Furthermore, the

president may also exercise the right to transfer high court justices without consultation. These personnel matters are becoming more politicized as chief ministers of states endeavor to exert their influence with New Delhi and the prime minister

exerts influence over the president to secure politically advantageous appointments.

Each high court is a court of record exercising original and

appellate jurisdiction within its respective state or territory. It also has the power to issue appropriate writs in cases involving

constitutionally guaranteed Fundamental Rights. The high

court supervises all courts within its jurisdiction, except for

those dealing with the armed forces, and may transfer constitutional cases to itself from subordinate courts (see Criminal Law

and Procedure, ch. 10). The high courts have original jurisdiction on revenue matters. They try original criminal cases by a

jury, but not civil cases. Lower Courts

States are divided into districts (zillas), and within each a judge presides as a district judge over civil cases. A sessions

judge presides over criminal cases. The judges are appointed

452
The Supreme Court, New Delhi

Courtesy Robert L. Worden

by the governor in consultation with the state's high court. District courts are subordinate to the authority of their high court. There is a hierarchy of judicial officials below the district

level. Many officials are selected through competitive examination by the state's public service commission. Civil cases at the

subdistrict level are filed in ?7zwrm/(subdistrict) courts. Lesser

criminal cases are entrusted to the courts of subordinate magistrates functioning under the supervisory authority of a district

magistrate. All magistrates are under the supervision of the

high court. At the village level, disputes are frequently resolved

by panchayats or lok adalats (people's courts).

The judicial system retains substantial legitimacy in the eyes

of many Indians despite its politicization since the 1970s. In

fact, as illustrated by the rise of social action litigation in the

1980s and 1990s, many Indians turn to the courts to redress

453
India: A Country Study

grievances with other social and political institutions. It is fre- quently observed that Indians are highly litigious, which has

contributed to a growing backlog of cases. Indeed, the

Supreme Court was reported to have more than 150,000 cases pending in 1990, the high courts had some 2 million cases pending, and the lower courts had a substantially greater backlog. Research findings in the early 1990s show that the backlogs

at levels below the Supreme Court are the result of delays in

the litigation process and the large number of decisions that are appealed and not the result of an increase in the number

of new cases filed. Coupled with public perceptions of politicization, the growing inability of the courts to resolve disputes

expeditiously threatens to erode the remaining legitimacy of

the judicial system.

Election Commission

Article 324 of the constitution establishes an independent

Election Commission to supervise parliamentary and state elections. Supervising elections in the world's largest democracy is by any standard an immense undertaking. Some 521 million

people were eligible to vote in 1991. Efforts are made to see

that polling booths are situated no more than two kilometers

from a voter's place of residence. In 1991, this objective

required some 600,000 polling stations for the country's 3,941

state legislative assembly and 543 parliamentary constituencies.

To attempt to ensure fair elections, the Election Commission

deployed more than 3.5 million officials, most of whom were

temporarily seconded from the government bureaucracy, and

2 million police, paramilitary, and military forces.

Over the years, the Election Commission's enforcement of

India's remarkably strict election laws grew increasingly lax. As

a consequence, candidates flagrantly violated laws limiting

campaign expenditures. Elections became increasingly violent

(350 persons were killed during the 1991 campaign, including

five Lok Sabha and twenty-one state assembly candidates), and

voter intimidation and fraud proliferated.

The appointment of T.N. Seshan as chief election commissioner in 1991 reinvigorated the Election Commission and

curbed the illegal manipulation of India's electoral system. By

cancelling or repolling elections where improprieties had

occurred, disciplining errant poll officers, and fighting for the

right to deploy paramilitary forces in sensitive areas, Seshan

forced candidates to take the Election Commission's code of

454
Government and Politics

conduct seriously and strengthened its supervisory machinery.

In Uttar Pradesh, where more than 100 persons were killed in

the 1991 elections, Seshan succeeded in reducing the number

killed to two in the November 1993 assembly elections by

enforcing compulsory deposit of all licensed firearms, banning

unauthorized vehicular traffic, and supplementing local police

with paramilitary units. In state assembly elections in Andhra

Pradesh, Goa, Karnataka, and Sikkim, after raising ceilings for

campaign expenditures to realistic levels, Seshan succeeded in

getting candidates to comply with these limits by deploying 336

audit officers to keep daily accounts of the candidates' election

expenditures. Although Seshan has received enthusiastic support from the public, he has stirred great controversy among

the country's politicians. In October 1993, the Supreme Court

issued a ruling that confirmed the supremacy of the chief election commissioner, thereby deflecting an effort to rein in Ses- han by appointing an additional two election commissioners.

Congress (I)'s attempt to curb Seshan's powers through a constitutional amendment was foiled after a public outcry weakened its support in Parliament.

State Governments and Territories

India has twenty-five states, six union territories, and one

national capital territory, with populations ranging from

406,000 (Sikkim) to 139 million (Uttar Pradesh). Ten states each have more than 40 million people, making them countrylike in significance (see Structure and Dynamics, ch. 2) . There

are eighteen official Scheduled Languages (see Glossary),

clearly defined since the reorganization of states along linguistic lines in the 1950s and 1960s (see The Social Context of Languages, ch. 4). Social structures within states vary considerably,

and they encompass a great deal of cultural diversity, as those

who have watched India's Republic Day (January 26) celebrations will attest (see Larger Kinship Groups, ch. 5).

The constitution provides for a legislature in each state and

territory. Most states have unicameral legislatures, but Andhra

Pradesh, Bihar, Jammu and Kashmir, Maharashtra, Tamil

Nadu, and Uttar Pradesh have bicameral legislatures. The

lower house, known as the vidhan sabha, or legislative assembly,

is the real seat of legislative power. Where an upper house

exists, it is known as the vidhan parishad, or legislative council;

council functions are advisory, and any objections expressed to a bill may be overridden if the assembly passes the bill a second

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India: A Country Study

time. Members of the assembly serve five-year terms after being

chosen by direct elections from local constituencies. Their

numbers vary, from a minimum of sixty to a maximum of 500.

Members of the council are selected through a combination of

direct election, indirect election, and nomination. Their six- year terms are staggered so that one-third of the membership is renewed every two vears. Whether in the upper or lower house,

membership in the assembly has come to reflect the predominantly rural demography of most states and the distribution of

social power resulting from the state's agrarian and caste structures. The structure of state governments is similar to that of the

central government. In the executive branch, the governor

plays a role analogous to that of the president, and the elected

chief minister presides over a council of ministers drawn from

the legislature in a manner similar to the prime minister. Many

of the governor's duties are honorific; however, the governor

also has considerable power. Like the president, the governor

selects who may attempt to form a government; he may also

dismiss a state's government and dissolve its legislative assembly. All bills that the state legislature passes must receive the

assent of the governor. The governor may return bills other

than money bills to the assembly. The governor may also

decide to send a bill for consideration to the president, who

has the power to promulgate ordinances. The governor may

also recommend to the president that President's Rule be

invoked. Governors are appointed to office for a five-year term

by the president on the advice of the prime minister, and their

conduct is supposed to be above politics.

Since 1967 most state legislatures have come under the control of parties in opposition to the majority in Parliament, and

governors have frequently acted as agents of the ruling party in

New Delhi. Increasingly, governors are appointed more for

their loyalty to the prime minister than for their distinguished

achievements and discretion. The politicization of gubernatorial appointments has become such a widespread practice that

in 1989, shortly after the National Front government replaced

the Congress (I) government, Prime Minister V.P. Singh

(1989-90) asked eighteen governors to resign so that he could

replace them with his own choices. Governors not only attempt

to keep opposition state governments in line, but also, while

keeping the state bureaucracy in place, have exercised their

456
Government and Politics

power to dismiss the chief minister and his or her council of

ministers.

The strength of the central government relative to the states

is especially apparent in constitutional provisions for central

intervention into state jurisdictions. Article 3 of the constitution authorizes Parliament, by a simple majority vote, to establish or eliminate states and union territories or change their

boundaries and names. The emergency powers granted to the

central government by the constitution enable it, under certain

circumstances, to acquire the powers of a unitary state. The

central government can also dismiss a state government

through President's Rule. Article 249 of the constitution

enables a two-thirds vote of the Rajya Sabha to empower Parliament to pass binding legislation for any of the subjects on the

State List. Articles 256 and 257 require states to comply with

laws passed by Parliament and with the executive authority of

the central government. The articles empower the central government to issue directives instructing states on compliance in

these matters. Article 200 also enables a state governor, under

certain circumstances, to refuse to give assent to bills passed by

the state legislature and instead refer them to the president for

review.

The central government exerts control over state governments through the financial resources at its command. The

central government distributes taxes and grants-in-aid through

the decisions of finance commissions, usually convened every

five years as stipulated by Article 275. The central government

also distributes substantial grants through its development

plans as elaborated by the Planning Commission. The dependence of state governments on grants and disbursements grew

throughout the 1980s as states began to run up fiscal deficits

and the share of transfers from New Delhi increased. The

power and influence of central government finances also can be seen in the substantial funds allocated under the central

government's five-year plans to such areas as public health and

agriculture that are constitutionally under the State List (see

Health Care, ch. 2; Development Programs, ch. 7).

Besides its twenty-five states, India has seven centrally supervised territories. Six are union territories; one is the National

Capital Territory of Delhi. Jurisdictions for territories are

smaller than states and less populous. The central government

administers union territories through either a lieutenant gov- ernor or a chief commissioner who is appointed by the presi457
India: A Country Study

dent on the advice of the prime minister. Each territory also

has a council of ministers, a legislature, and a high court; however, Parliament may also pass legislation on issues in union ter- ritories that in the case of states are usually reserved for state assemblies. The Sixty-ninth Amendment, passed in December

1991, made Delhi the national capital territory effective February 1, 1992. Although not having the same status as statehood,

Delhi was given the power of direct election of members of its legislative assembly and the power to pass its own laws.

Local Government

The district is the principal subdivision within the state (union territories are not subdivided). There are 476 districts

in India; the districts vary in size and population. The average

size of a district is approximately 4,300 square kilometers, and

the average population numbered nearly 1.8 million in the

early 1990s. The district collector, a member of the Indian

Administrative Service, is the preeminent official in the district

(see The Civil Service, this ch.). During the colonial period,

the collector was responsible for collecting revenue and maintaining law and order. In the 1990s, the collector's role in most

states is confined to heading the district revenue department

and coordinating the efforts of the other departments, such as agriculture, irrigation, public works, forestry, and public

health, that are responsible for promoting economic development and social welfare.

Districts are subdivided into taluqs or tehsils, areas that contain from 200 to 600 villages. The taluqdar or tehsildar, who

serves in much the same capacity as the collector, is the chief

member of the taluq revenue department and is the preeminent official at this level. Economic development and social

welfare departments are also likely to have offices at the taluq

level. Although the revenue department may have village representatives, generally known as patwaris (village record-keepers), to maintain land records, the development and welfare

departments generally do not have offices below the taluq level. Article 40 of the constitution directs the government to

establish panchayats to serve as institutions of local self-government. Most states began implementing this Directive Principle

along the lines of the recommendations of the government's

Balwantrai Mehta Commission report. According to these rec- ommendations, the popularly elected village council (gram panchayat) is the basic unit. Village council chairs, elected by the

458
The Vidhana Saudha, the seat of the Karnataka state

legislature, Bangalore

Courtesy Robert L. Warden

members of the village council, serve as members of the block

council (panchayat samiti). A block is a large subunit of a district. In some states, blocks are coterminous with taluqs or tehsils. In other states, taluqs or tehsils are divided into blocks. The

district council (zilla parishad) is the top level of the system. Its jurisdiction includes all village and block councils within a district. Its membership includes the block council chairs.

Deficient in funds and authority, the panchayats in most

states were largely inactive until the late 1970s. However, efforts were then initiated to reinvigorate the panchayats. West Bengal

led the way by transferring substantial funds and authority over

rural development projects to the panchayats and then holding

popular elections for panchayat representatives at all three lev- els in which political parties were allowed to field candidates

for the first time. In the mid-1980s, the state of Karnataka also

made important efforts to revive the panchayats.

In 1989 Rajiv Gandhi's government took two major initiatives designed to enhance the panchayats' role in local government and economic development. It initiated the Jawahar

Employment Plan (Jawahar Rozgar Yojana), which provided

funding directly to village councils to create jobs for the unem459
India: A Country Study

ployed through public works projects. Rajiv Gandhi's government also proposed the Sixty-fourth Amendment Bill to make

it mandatory for all states to establish a three-tiered (village,

block, and district) system of panchayats in which representatives would be directly elected for five-year terms. Panchayats were to be given expanded authority and funding over local

development efforts. Despite the popular appeal of transferring power to panchayats, the Sixty-fourth Amendment Bill was

rejected by the Rajya Sabha. Its hasty introduction in an election year made it appear to be a popular gimmick. Opposition

to the bill also arose from those who feared that the transfer of

authority from state governments to panchayats was designed to reduce the power of state legislatures under opposition control

and promote "greater centralization through decentralization"

by enabling the central government to establish direct relations

with panchayats.

On December 22, 1992, the Congress (I) government passed

the Seventy-third Amendment, which gave panchayats constitutional status (previously panchayat matters were considered a

state subject). The amendment also institutionalized a threetiered system of panchayats (except for states with a population

of less than 2 million), with panchayats at the village, block, and

district levels. The amendment also stipulated that all panchayat

members be elected for five-year terms in elections supervised

by state election commissions.

The 26 percent of the population living in urban areas are governed by municipal corporations and municipal councils.

The municipal corporations governing the larger cities are composed of elected councils and a president or mayor elected

from within the council. The state governor appoints a commissioner who acts as the chief executive of the municipal cor- poration. The municipal councils administering the smaller

cities have elected committees or boards. The municipal government is responsible for education, health, sanitation, safety,

and maintaining roads and other public facilities. The country's municipal governments have long been troubled, in part

because of their limited authority and lack of funds. The fre- quent intervention of state governments to suspend the activi- ties of municipal administrations has also undermined them.

For instance, state or union territory governments suspended

the elected bodies of forty-four out of sixty-six municipal corporations in 1986. The Seventy-fourth Amendment was passed in

December 1992 in order to revive municipal governments.

460
Government and Politics Among other things, it mandates that elections for municipal

bodies must be held within six months of the date of their dis- solution. The amendment also provides for financial review of

the municipalities in order to enable recommendations con- cerning the distribution of proceeds from taxes, duties, tolls,

and fees. The Civil Service

During the colonial period, the British built up the elite

Indian Civil Service, often referred to as the "steel frame" of

the British Raj. Nehru and other leaders of the independence

movement initially viewed the colonial civil service as an instrument of foreign domination, but by 1947 they had come to appreciate the advantages of having a highly qualified institutionalized administration in place, especially at a time when

social tensions threatened national unity and public order.

The constitution established the Indian Administrative Ser- vice to replace the colonial Indian Civil Service and ensure uniform and impartial standards of administration in selected

fields, promote effective coordination in social and economic

development, and encourage a national point of view. In the

early 1990s, this small elite accounted for fewer than 5,000 of

the total 17 million central government employees. Recruits

appointed by the Union Public Service Commission are university graduates selected through a rigorous system of written and

oral examinations. In 1988 only about 150 out of a candidate

pool of approximately 85,000 recruits received appointments

in the Indian Administrative Service. Indian Administrative

Service officers are primarily from the more affluent and educated classes. However, efforts to recruit women and individuals from the Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes have

enhanced the diversity of the civil service.

Recruits are trained as administrative generalists at an academy at Mussoorie (in Uttar Pradesh). After a period of apprenticeship and probation in the central and state governments,

an Indian Administrative Service officer is assigned to increasingly more responsible positions, such as a district collector

after six or seven years. Approximately 70 percent of all officers serve in state administrations; the rest serve in the central government.

A larger organization, the Central Public Services, staffs a broad variety of administrative bureaus ranging from the

Indian Foreign Service to the Audits and Accounts Service and

461
India: A Country Study

the Postal Service. The states (but not Delhi or the union terri- tories) have independent services within their own jurisdictions that are regulated by local laws and public service

commissions. The governor usually appoints members of the

state public services upon the recommendation of the state public service commission. To a large extent, states depend

upon nationwide bodies, such as the Indian Administrative Ser- vice and Indian Police Service, to staff top administrative posts.

Although the elite public services continue to command

great prestige, their social status declined in the decades after

independence. In the 1990s, India's most capable youths

increasingly are attracted to private-sector employment where

salaries are substantially higher. Public opinion of civil servants

has also been lowered by popular perceptions that bureaucrats

are unresponsive to public needs and are corrupt. Although

the ranks of the civil service are filled with many dedicated

individuals, corruption has been a growing problem as civil ser- vants have become subject to intense political pressures.

The Political Process

The decline of the Congress (I) since the late 1980s has

brought an end to the dominant single-party system that had

long characterized India's politics. Under the old system, conflict within the Congress was often a more important political

dynamic than was conflict between the Congress and the opposition. The Congress had set the political agenda and the opposition responded. A new party system, in which the Congress

(I) is merely one of several major participants, was in place by

1989 (see fig. 15). As often as not in the mid-1990s, the Congress (I) seems to respond to the initiatives of other parties

rather than set its own political agenda.

Elections

At least once every five years, India's Election Commission

supervises one of the largest, most complex exercises of collective action in the world. India's elections in the 1990s involve

overseeing an electorate of about 521 million voters who travel to nearly 600,000 polling stations to chose from some 8,950

candidates representing roughly 162 parties. The elections

reveal much about Indian society. Candidates span a wide spectrum of backgrounds, including former royalty, cinema superstars, religious holy men, war heroes, and a growing number of

462
Government and Politics

farmers. Campaigns utilize communications technologies ranging from the latest video van with two-way screens to the traditional rumor traveling by word of mouth. Increasing violence

also has come to characterize elections. In 1991, some 350 people, including former Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi, four other

parliamentary candidates, and twenty-one candidates running

in state legislative assembly elections, were killed in electionrelated violence.

Political Parties

India's party system is in the throes of historic change. The

1989 general elections brought the era of Congress dominance

to an end. Even though the Congress (I) regained power in

1991, it was no longer the pivot around which the party system

revolved. Instead, it represented just one strategy for organizing a political majority, and a declining one at that. While the

Congress (I) was encountering growing difficulties in maintaining its coalition of upper-caste elites, Muslims, Scheduled

Castes, and Scheduled Tribes, the BJP was endeavoring to organize a new majority around the appeal of Hindu nationalism.

The Janata Dal and the BSP, among others, were attempting to fashion a new majority out of the increasingly assertive Backward Classes, Dalits, Scheduled Castes, Scheduled Tribes, and

religious minorities.

The Congress

The Congress has, by any standards, remarkable political

accomplishments to its credit. As the Indian National Congress, its guidance fashioned a nation out of an extraordinarily

heterogeneous ensemble of peoples. The party has played an

important role in establishing the foundations of perhaps the

most durable democratic political system in the developing

world. As scholars Francis Robinson and Paul R. Brass point

out, the Congress constituted one of the few political organizations in the annals of decolonialization to "make the transition

from being sole representative of the nationalist cause to being

just one element of a competitive party system."

The Congress dominated Indian politics from independence until 1967. Prior to 1967, the Congress had never won

less than 73 percent of the seats in Parliament. The party won

every state government election except two—most often exclusively, but also through coalitions—and until 1967 it never won

463
India: A Country Study

464
Government and Politics

less than 60 percent of all elections for seats in the state legislative assemblies.

There were four factors that accounted for this dominance.

First, the party acquired a tremendous amount of good will and

political capital from its leadership of the nationalist struggle.

Party chiefs gained substantial popular respect for the years in

jail and other deprivations that they personally endured. The

shared experience of the independence struggle fostered a sense of cohesion, which was important in maintaining unity in

the face of the party's internal pluralism.

The second factor was that the Congress was the only party

with an organization extending across the nation and down to the village level. The party's federal structure was based on a system of internal democracy that functioned to resolve disputes among its members and maintain party cohesion. Inter- nal party elections also served to legitimate the party

leadership, train party workers in the skills of political competition, and create channels of upward mobility that rewarded its most capable members.

A third factor was that the Congress achieved its position of

political dominance by creating an organization that adjusted

to local circumstances rather than transformed them, often

reaching the village through local "big men" (bare admi) who

controlled village "vote banks." These local elites, who owed

their position to their traditional social status and their control over land, formed factions that competed for power within the

Congress. The internal party democracy and the Congress's

subsequent electoral success ultimately reinforced the local

power of these traditional elites and enabled the party to adjust

to changes in local balances of power. The nonideological

pragmatism of local party leadership made it possible to coopt

issues that contributed to opposition party success and even

incorporate successful opposition leaders into the party. Intra- party competition served to channel information about local

circumstances up the party hierarchy.

Fourth, patronage was the oil that lubricated the party

machine. As the state expanded its development role, it accu- mulated more resources that could be distributed to party

members. The growing pool of opportunities and resources

facilitated the party's ability to accommodate conflict among its members. The Congress enjoyed the benefits of a "virtuous

cycle," in which its electoral success gave it access to economic

465
Indi a : A Cou n try St u dy

and political resources that enabled the partv to attract new

supporters.

The halcvon days of what Indian political scientist Rajni

Kothari has called "the Congress svstem" ended with the eeneral elections in 1967. The party lost seventy-eight seats in the

Tok Sabha. retaining a majority of onlv twentv-three seats. Even

more indicative of the Congress setback was its loss of control

over six of the sixteen state legislatures that held elections. The

proximate causes of the reversal included the failure of the

monsoons in 1965 and 1966 and the subsequent hardship

throughout northern and eastern India, and the unpopular

currency devaluation in 1966. However, profound changes in

India's polity also contributed to the decline of the Congress.

The rapid .growth of the electorate, which increased by 45 percent from 1952 to 1967. brought an influx of new voters less appreciative of the Congress's role in the independence movement. Moreover, the simultaneous spread of democratic values

produced a political awakening that mobilized new groups and

created a more pluralistic constellation of political interests.

The development of new and more-differentiated identities

and patterns of political cleavage made it virtually impossible

for the Congress to contain the competition of its members

within its organization. Dissidence and ultimately defection

greatlv weakened the Congress's electoral performance.

It was in this context that Indira Gandhi asserted her independence from the leaders of the partv organization by

attempting to take the partv in a more populist direction. She

ordered the nationalization of India's fourteen largest banks in

1969.. and then she supported former labor leader and Acting

President Yarahagiri Yenkata Giri's candidacy for president

despite the fact that the partv organization had already nominated the more conservative Xeelam Sanjiva Reddv .After Giri's election, the partv organization expelled Indira Gandhi from

the Congress and ordered the parliamentary partv to choose a new prime minister. Instead. 226 of the 291 Congress members

of Parliament continued to support Indira Gandhi. The Congress split into two in 1969. the new factions being the Congress (O) —for Organisation—and Mrs. Gandhi's Congress

(R) —for Requisition. The Congress (R) continued in power

with the support of non-Congress groups, principally the Communist Partv of India I CPI ) and the Dravida Munnetra

Kazhagam (DMK—Dravidian Progressive Federation).

466
Government and Politics

With the Congress (O) controlling most of the party organization, Indira Gandhi adopted a new strategy to mobilize popular support. For the first time ever, she ordered parliamentary

elections to be held separately from elections for the state government. This delinking was designed to reduce the power of

the Congress (O)'s state-level political machines in national

elections. Mrs. Gandhi traveled throughout the country, energetically campaigning on the slogan "garibi hatao" (eliminate

poverty), thereby bypassing the traditional Congress networks

of political support. The strategy proved successful, and the

Congress (R) won a dramatic victory. In the 1971 elections for

the Lok Sabha, the Congress (R) garnered 44 percent of the

vote, earning it 352 seats. The Congress (O) won only sixteen

seats and 10 percent of the vote. The next year, after leading

India to victory over Pakistan in the war for Bangladesh's independence, Indira Gandhi and the Congress (R) further consolidated their control over the country by winning fourteen of

sixteen state assembly elections and victories in 70 percent of

all seats contested.

The public expected Indira Gandhi to deliver on her mandate to remove poverty. However, the country experienced a severe drought in 1971 and 1972, leading to food shortages,

and the price of food rose 20 percent in the spring of 1973.

The decision by the Organization of the Petroleum Exporting

Countries (OPEC) to quadruple oil prices in 1973-74 also led

to inflation and increased unemployment. Jayaprakash (J.P)

Narayan, a socialist leader in the preindependence Indian

National Congress who, after 1947, left to conduct social work

in the Sarvodaya movement (sarvodaya means uplift of all),

came out of retirement to lead what eventually became widely

known as the 'J.P. movement." Under Narayan's leadership, the

movement toppled the government of Gujarat and almost

brought down the government in Bihar; Narayan advocated a

radical regeneration of public morality that he labelled "total

revolution."

After the Allahabad High Court ruled that Mrs. Gandhi had

committed electoral law violations and Narayan addressed a massive demonstration in New Delhi, at Indira Gandhi's

behest, the president proclaimed an Emergency on June 25,

1975. That night, Indira Gandhi ordered the arrest of almost

all the leaders of the opposition, including dissidents within

the Congress. In all, more than 110,000 persons were detained

without trial during the Emergency.

467
India: A Country Study

Indira Gandhi's rule during the Emergency alienated her

popular support. After postponing elections for a year following the expiration of the five-year term of the Lok Sabha, she

called for new elections in March 1977. The major opposition

party leaders, many of whom had developed a rapport while

they were imprisoned together under the Emergency regime,

united under the banner of the Janata Party. By framing the

key issue of the election as "democracy versus dictatorship," the

Janata Party—the largest opposition party—appealed to the

public's democratic values to rout the Congress (R). The vote

share of the Congress (R) dropped to 34.5 percent, and the

number of its seats in Parliament plunged from 352 to 154.

Indira Gandhi lost her seat. The inability of Janata Party factions to agree proved the

party's undoing. Indira Gandhi returned to win the January

1980 elections after forming a new party, the Congress (I—for

Indira), in 1978.

The Congress (I) largely succeeded in reconstructing the

traditional Congress electoral support base of Brahmans (see

Glossary), Muslims, Scheduled Castes, and Scheduled Tribes

that had kept Congress in power in New Delhi during the three

decades prior to 1977. The Congress (I)'s share of the vote

increased by 8.2 percent to 42.7 percent of the total vote, and

its number of seats in the Lok Sabha grew to 353, a majority of

about two-thirds. This success approximated the levels of support of the Congress dominance from 1947 to 1967. Yet, as

political scientist Myron Weiner observed, "The Congress party

that won in 1980 was not the Congress party that had governed

India in the 1950s and 1960s, or even the early 1970s. The party was organizationally weak and the electoral victory was primarily Mrs. Gandhi's rather than the party's." As a consequence,

the Congress's appeal to its supporters was much more tenuous

than it had been in previous decades.

Indira Gandhi's dependence on her flamboyant son Sanjay

and, after his accidental death in 1980, on her more reserved son Rajiv gives testimony to the personalization and centralization of power within the Congress (I). Having developed a means to mobilize support without a party organization, she

paid little attention to maintaining that support. Rather than

allowing intraparty elections to resolve conflicts and select

party leaders, Indira Gandhi preferred to fill party posts herself

with those loyal to her. As a result, party leaders at the state

level lost their legitimacy among the rank and file because their

468
Even if 1 die in the

Service ofIhe Nation

Imu^jjpoudofii

mm

iQ

Campaign advertisementfor Youth Congress candidate, West Bengal

Courtesy India Abroad News Service

positions depended on the whims of Indira Gandhi rather than

on the extent of their popular support. In addition, centralization and the demise of democracy within the party disrupted

the flow of information about local circumstances to party lead- ers and curtailed the ability of the Congress (I) to adjust to

social change and incorporate new leaders.

When Rajiv Gandhi took control after his mother's assassination in November 1984, he attempted to breathe new life into

the Congress (I) organization. However, the massive electoral

victory that the Congress (I) scored under Rajiv's leadership

just two months after his mother's assassination gave him neither the skill nor the authority to succeed in this endeavor.

Rajiv did, however, attempt to remove the more unsavory ele- ments within the party organization. He denied nominations to one-third of the incumbent members of Parliament during the

1984 Lok Sabha campaign, and he refused to nominate two of

every five incumbents in the state legislative assembly elections

held in March 1985.

Another of Rajiv's early successes was the passage of the AntiDefection Bill in January 1985 in an effort to end the bribery

that lured legislators to cross partisan lines. Speaking at the

Indian National Congress centenary celebrations in Bombay

469
India: A Country Study

(officially called Mumbai as of 1995), Rajiv launched a vitriolic

attack on the "culture of corruption" that had become so pervasive in the Congress (I). However, the old guard showed little enthusiasm for reform. As time passed, Rajiv's position was weakened by the losses that the party suffered in a series of

state assembly elections and by his government's involvement

in corruption scandals. Ultimately, Rajiv was unable to over- come the resistance within the party to internal elections and

reforms. Ironically, as Rajiv's position within the party weakened, he turned for advice to many of the wheelers and dealers

of his mother's regime whom he had previously banished.

The frustration of Rajiv Gandhi's promising early initiatives

meant that the Congress (I) had no issues on which to campaign as the end of his five-year term approached. On May 15,

1989, just months before its term was to expire, the Congress

(I) introduced amendments that proposed to decentralize government authority to panchayat and municipal government

institutions. Opposition parties, many of whom were on record

as favoring decentralization of government power, vehemently

resisted the Congress (I) initiative. They charged that the ini- tiative did not truly decentralize power but instead enabled the

central government to circumvent state governments (many of

which were controlled by the opposition) by transferring

authority from state to local government and strengthening

the links between central and local governments. After the

Congress (I) failed to win the two-thirds vote required to pass

the legislation in the Rajya Sabha on October 13, 1989, it called

for new parliamentary elections and made "jana shakti" (power

to the people) its main campaign slogan.

The Congress (I) retained formidable campaign advantages

over the opposition. The October 17, 1989, announcement of

elections took the opposition parties by surprise and gave them

little time to form electoral alliances. The Congress (I) also blatantly used the government-controlled television and radio to promote Rajiv Gandhi. In addition, the Congress (I) campaign

once again enjoyed vastly superior financing. It distributed

some 100,000 posters and 15,000 banners to each of its 510

candidates. It provided every candidate with six or seven vehicles, and it commissioned advertising agencies to make a total

of ten video films to promote its campaign.

The results of the 1989 elections were more of a rebuff to the Congress (I) than a mandate for the opposition. Although

the Congress (I) remained the largest party in Parliament with

470
Government and Politics

197 seats, it was unable to form a government. Instead, the Ja- nata Dal, which had 143 seats, united with its National Front

allies to form a minority government precariously dependent

on the support of the BJP (eighty-five seats) and the communist parties (forty-five seats). Although the Congress (I) lost

more than 50 percent of its seats in Parliament, its share of the

vote dropped only from 48.1 percent to 39.5 percent of the

vote. The Congress (I) share of the vote was still more than

double that of the next largest party, the Janata Dal, which

received support from 17.8 percent of the electorate. More

grave for the long-term future of the Congress (I) was the ero- sion of vital elements of the traditional coalition of support for

the Congress (I) in North India. Alienated by the Congress

(I)'s cultivation of Hindu activists, Muslims defected to the Janata Dal in large numbers. The Congress (I) simultaneously lost a substantial share of Scheduled Caste voters to the BSP in

Haryana, Madhya Pradesh, and Uttar Pradesh and to the

Indian People's Front in Bihar.

To offset these losses, the Congress (I) attempted to play a "Hindu card." On August 14, 1989, the Supreme Court ruled

that no parties or groups could disturb the status quo of the

Babri Masjid, a sixteenth-century mosque in Ayodhya, Uttar

Pradesh. The mosque was controversial because Hindu nationalists claim it was on the site of the birthplace of the Hindu god

Ram and that, as such, the use by Muslims was sacrilegious (see

Vishnu, ch. 3). Despite the court ruling, in September the Congress (I) entered into an agreement with the Vishwa Hindu

Parishad (VHP—World Hindu Council), a conservative reli- gious organization with close ties to Hindu nationalists, to allow the VHP to proceed with a ceremony to lay the foundation for the Ramjanmabhumi (birthplace of Ram) Temple.

(The VHP had been working toward this goal since 1984.) In

return, the Congress (I) secured the VHP's agreement to perform the ceremony on property adjacent to the Babri Masjid

that was not in dispute. By reaching this agreement, the Congress (I) attempted to appeal to Hindu activists while retaining

Muslim support. Rajiv Gandhi's decision to kick off his campaign less than six kilometers from the Babri Masjid and his

appeal to voters that they vote for the Congress (I) if they

wished to bring about "Ram Rajya" (the rule of Ram) were

other elements of the Congress (I)'s strategy to attract the

Hindu vote (see Political Issues, this ch.)

471
India: A Country Study

The 1991 elections returned the Congress (I) to power but

did not reverse important trends in the party's decline. The

Congress (I) won 227 seats, up from 197 in 1989, but its share

of the vote dropped from 39.5 percent in 1989 to 37.6 percent.

Greater division within the opposition rather than growing

popularity of the Congress (I) was the key element in the

party's securing an increased number of seats. Also troubling was the further decline of the Congress (I) in heavily populated Bihar and Uttar Pradesh, which together account for

more than 25 percent of all seats in Parliament. In Uttar

Pradesh, the number of seats that the Congress (I) was able to win went down from fifteen to two, and its share of the vote

dropped from 32 percent to 20 percent. In Bihar the seats won

by the Congress (I) fell from four to one, and the Congress (I) share of the vote was reduced from 28 percent to 22 percent.

The Congress (I) problems in these states, which until 1989

had been bastions of its strength, were reinforced by the party's

poor showing in the November 1993 state elections. These

elections were characterized by the further disintegration of

the traditional Congress coalition, with Brahmans and other

upper castes defecting to the BJP and Scheduled Castes and

Muslims defecting to the Janata Dal, the Samajwadi Party

(Socialist Party), and the BSP.

Strong evidence indicates that the Congress (I) would have

fared significantly worse had it not been for the assassination of

Rajiv Gandhi in the middle of the elections. A wave of sympathy

similar to that which helped elect Rajiv after the assassination

of his mother increased the Congress (I) support. In the round

of voting that took place before Rajiv's death, the Congress (I) won only 26 percent of the seats and 33 percent of the vote. In

the votes that occurred after Rajiv's death, the Congress (I)

won 58 percent of the seats and 40 percent of the popular vote.

It may also be that Rajiv's demise ended the "anti-Congressism"

that had pervaded the political system as a result of his family's

dynastic domination of Indian politics through its control over

the Congress.

Rajiv Gandhi was assassinated by a Tamil suicide bomber

affiliated with the Sri Lankan Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam

(LTTE) during a political campaign in May 1991. Only after his

assassination did hope for reforming the Congress (I) reappear. The end of three generations of Nehru-Gandhi family

leadership left Rajiv's coterie of political manipulators in

search of a new kingpin. The bankruptcy of the Congress (I)

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Government and Politics

leadership was highlighted by the fact that they initially turned

to Sonia Gandhi, Rajiv's Italian-born wife, to lead the party.

Sonia's primary qualification was that she was Rajiv's widow.

She had never held elected office and, during her early years in

India, she had expressed great disdain for political life. However, although she did not assume a leadership role, she continued to be seen as a "kingmaker" in the Congress (I). Her advice was sought after, and she was called on to lead the party in the

mid-1990s. An unusual public speech by Sonia Gandhi criticiz- ing the government of P.V. Narasimha Rao in August 1995 fur- ther fueled speculation that she was a candidate for political

leadership.

Sonia Gandhi's refusal in 1991 to become president of the

Congress (I) led the mantle of party leadership to fall on Rao.

Rao was a septuagenarian former professor who had retired

from politics before the 1991 elections .after undergoing heartbypass surgery. Rao had a conciliatory demeanor and was

acceptable to the party's contending factions. Paradoxically,

the precariously positioned Rao was able to take more substantial steps in the direction of party reform than his predecessors.

First, Rao had to demonstrate that he could mobilize popular

support for himself and the party, a vital currency of power for

any Congress (I) leader. He did so in the November 15, 1991,

by-elections by winning his own seat in Andhra Pradesh unopposed and leading the party to victory in a total of eight of the

fifteen parliamentary by-elections. By the end of 1991, Rao had

succeeded in initiating the first intraparty elections in the Congress in almost twenty years. Although there was widespread

manipulation by local party bosses, the elections enhanced the

legitimacy of party leaders and held forth the prospect of a rejuvenated party organization. The process culminated in

April 1992 at the All-India Congress (I) Committee at Tirupati,

Andhra Pradesh, where elections were held for the ten vacant

seats in the Congress Working Committee.

In the wake of the Tirupati session, Rao became less interested in promoting party democracy and more concerned with

consolidating his own position. The change was especially

apparent in the 1993 All-India Congress (I) Committee session

at Surajkund (in Haryana), where Rao's supporters lavishly

praised the prime minister and coercively silenced his opponents. However, Rao's image was damaged in July 1993 after

Harshad Mehta, a stockbroker under indictment for allegedly

playing a leading role in a US$2 billion stock scam in 1992,

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India: A Country Study

accused Rao of personally accepting a bribe that he had delivered on November 4, 1991. The extent of the press coverage of

the charges and their apparent credibility among the public was evidence of the pervasive public cynicism toward politicians. Rao's stock in the party and Congress (I)'s position

within Parliament were greatly weakened. OnJuly 28, 1993, his

government barely survived a no-confidence motion in the Lok

Sabha. Rao's position was temporarily strengthened at the end

of 1993 when he was able to cobble together a parliamentary

majority. However, support for Rao and the Congress (I)

declined again in 1994. The party was rocked by a scandal relat- ing to the procurement of sugar stocks that cost the government an estimated Rs6.5 billion (US$210 million; for value of

the rupee—see Glossary) and by losses in legislative assembly

elections in Andhra Pradesh—Rao's home state, where he personally took control over the campaign—and Karnataka. The

Congress (I) again lost in three of four major states in elecdons

held in the spring of 1995. The political fallout in New Delhi was an increase in dissident activity within the Congress (I) led

by former cabinet members Narain Dutt Tiwari and Arjun

Singh and other Rao rivals who sought to split the Congress

and form a new party.

Opposition Parties

Opposition to the Congress has always been fragmented.

Opposition parties range from Hindu nationalist parties such

as the BJP on the right to communist parties on the left (see

table 33, Appendix). The divisiveness of the opposition, combined with the "first-past-the-post" electoral system, has enabled

the Congress to dominate Indian politics without ever winning

a majority of the vote from the national electorate. The extent

of electoral alliances among the opposition is an important

predictor of its ability to win seats in Parliament. The first two

instances when the opposition succeeded in forming a government at the center occurred after it united under the Janata

Party banner in 1977 and after the formation of the Janata Dal

and the National Front in 1988. In each of these cases, the

unity that was facilitated by anti-Congress sentiment prior to the elections collapsed in the face of rivalry and ambition once

the opposition came into power.

The Rise and Decline of "Janata Politics"

Prior to 1967, the opposition was divided into an array of

474
Prime Minister RV. Narasimha Rao

Courtesy Embassy ofIndia, Washington

small parties. While the Congress garnered between 45 percent

and 48 percent of the vote, no opposition party gained as much

as 11 percent, and during the entire period, only two parties

won 10 percent. Furthermore, in each election, independent

candidates won between 12 percent and 20 percent of the vote. The opposition's first significant attempt to achieve electoral

unity occurred during the 1967 elections when opposition

party alliances won control of their state governments in Bihar,

Kerala, Orissa, Punjab, and West Bengal. In Rajasthan an opposition coalition prevented the Congress from winning a majority in the state legislature and forced it to recruit independents

to form a government. The Congress electoral debacle encour- aged even more dissidence within the party, and in a matter of

weeks after the elections, defections brought down Congress

governments in Haryana, Madhya Pradesh, and Uttar Pradesh.

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India: A Country Study

By July 1967, state governments of two-thirds of the country were under opposition rule. However, opposition rule in many

cases was short-lived. The aftermath of the 1967 elections initi- ated a climate of politics by defection in which the Congress,

and to a lesser extent the opposition, attempted to overthrow

governments by winning over their state legislators with promises of greater political power and outright bribes. Needless to

say, this period seriously undermined the ability of most parties

to discipline their members. The increase in opposition-ruled

state governments after 1967 also prompted the Congress to use President's Rule to dismiss opposition-led state governments with increasing frequency (see Emergency Provisions

and Authoritarian Powers, this ch.).

Although the centrist and right-wing opposition formed a "grand alliance" during the 1971 parliamentary elections, it was not until the general elections of 1977 that opposition

efforts culminated in electoral success at the national level. Imprisoned together under the authoritarian measures of the

Emergency, India's senior opposition leaders found their personal animosity toward Indira Gandhi and the Congress to be a powerful motivation to overcome their division and rivalry. In

January 1977, opposition parties reactivated a pre-Emergency

multiparty front, campaigned under the banner of the Janata

Party, and won a dramatic electoral victory in March 1977. The

Janata Party was made up of the Congress (O), thejana Sangh,

the Bharatiya Lok Dal (Indian People Party), the Samajwadi

Party (Socialist Party), a handful of imprisoned Congress dissi- dents, and the Congress for Democracy—a group led by Scheduled Caste leader Jagjivan Ram that had splintered off from the

Congress during the election campaign.

Despite the diversity of this assemblage of parties and the dif- ferent social strata that they represented, members of the Ja- nata Party achieved surprising ideological and programmatic

consensus by passing a program stressing decentralization,

development of rural industries, and employment opportunities. It was not ideology, but rather an inability to consolidate

partisan organizations and political rivalry among the leadership that led to the demise of the Janata government in 1979.

The Janata's three most senior leaders—Morarji Desai, Charan

Singh, and Jagjivan Ram—each aspired to be prime minister.

The rivalry continued during Desai's tenure (March 1977-July

1979). Desai, Charan Singh, and Ram continually conspired to discredit each other. Their connivances ultimately discredited

476
Government and Politics

the Janata Party and allowed the Congress (I) to return to power in 1980.

Just as key defections from the Congress were essential to the

Janata electoral success in 1977, so too did V.P. Singh's defection from the Congress (I) in 1987 enable opposition factions

from the Janata Party and Bharatiya Lok Dal to unite the Janata

Dal in 1988. Regional parties, such as the Telugu Desam Party

(Telugu National Party), the DMK, and the Asom Gana Parishad (AGP—Assam People's Assembly), together formed the

National Front, led by Janata Dal, which defeated Rajiv Gandhi's Congress (I) in the 1989 parliamentary elections. With

V.P. Singh as prime minister, the National Front government

earned the appellation of "the crutch government" because it depended on the support of the Communist Party of India

(Marxist—CPI (M)) on its left and the BJP on the right.

On August 7, 1990, V.P. Singh suddenly announced that his

government would implement the recommendations of the

Mandal Commission (see Glossary) to reserve 27 percent of

central government jobs for the Backward Classes, defined to include around 52 percent of the population. Although Singh's

Janata Dal had pledged to implement the Mandal Commission

recommendations as part of its election manifesto, his

announcement led to riots throughout North India. Some sev- enty-five upper-caste youths died after resorting to self-immolation to dramatize their opposition, and almost 200 others were

killed in clashes with the police.

BJP president Lai Kishan (L.K.) Advani announced that he

would traverse the country on a pilgrimage to Ayodhya where

he would lead Hindu activists in the construction of the Ramjanmabhumi Temple on the site of the Babri Masjid. As the pilgrimage progressed, riots between Hindus and Muslims broke

out throughout the country. The National Front government

decided to end the agitation, and Janata Dal chief minister of

Bihar, Laloo Prasad Yadav, arrested Advani on October 23,

1990. On October 30, religious militants attempted to storm

the Babri Masjid despite a massive military presence, and as many as twenty-six activists were killed. The BJP's withdrawal of

support for the National Front government proved fatal, and

V.P. Singh lost a parliamentary vote of confidence on November 7, 1990.

Two days before the vote, Chandra Shekhar, an ambitious

Janata Dal rival who had been kept out of the National Front

government, joined with Devi Lai, a former deputy prime min477
India: A Country Study

ister under V.P. Singh, to form the Samajwadi Janata Party

Samajwadi meaning socialist—with a total of sixty Lok Sabha

members. The day after the collapse of the National Front government, Chandra Shekhar informed the president that by

gaining the backing of the Congress (I) and its electoral allies he enjoyed the support of 280 members of the Lok Sabha, and

he demanded the right to constitute a new government. Even

though his rump party accounted for only one-ninth of the

members of the Lok Sabha, Chandra Shekhar succeeded in

forming a new minority government and becoming prime minister (with Devi Lai as deputy prime minister) . However, Chandra Shekhar's government fell less than four months later, after

the Congress (I) withdrew its support.

The Janata Dal and the Samajwadi Janata Party declined

after the fall of the Chandra Shekhar government. In the MayJune 1991 parliamentary elections, their share of the vote

dropped from 17.8 percent to 15.1 percent, and the number of

seats in Parliament that they won fell from 142 to sixty-one.

The parties were able to win seats only in Bihar, Orissa, and

Uttar Pradesh. The factional rivalry and ineffectiveness that

impeded the National Front government's efforts to provide

effective government tarnished the Janata Dal image. In the

absence of strong national leadership, the party was rendered a confederation of ambitious regional leaders whose rivalry prevented the establishment of a united party organization. The

Janata Dai's persistent backing of the Mandal Commission rec- ommendations made the party highly unpopular among highcaste people in the middle and upper classes, creating fundraising difficulties. Although the Janata Dal won state elections

in Karnataka in 1994 and Bihar in the spring of 1995, its poor

showing in most other states gave the impression that its support was receding to a few regional bastions.

The BharatiyaJanata Party and the Rise ofHindu Nationalism

The BJP is unique among India's political parties in that neither it nor its political predecessors were ever associated with

the Congress. Instead, it grew out of an alternative nationalist

organization—the Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh (RSS

National Volunteer Organisation). The BJP still is affiliated

with the network of organizations popularly referred to as the

RSS family. The RSS was founded in 1925 by Keshav Baliram

Hedgewar. Until 1928 a member of the Congress with radical

nationalist political leanings, Hedgewar had grown increasingly

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Government and Politics

disenchanted with the leadership of Mahatma Gandhi.

Hedgewar was particularly critical of Gandhi's emphasis on

nonviolence and civil disobedience, which he felt discouraged

the forceful political action necessary to gain independence.

He established the RSS as an organization that would provide

training in martial arts and spiritual matters to rejuvenate the

spiritual life of the Hindu community and build its unity.

Hedgewar and his successor, M.S. Golwalkar, scrupulously

endeavored to define the RSS's identity as a cultural organization that was not directly involved in politics. However, its rapidly growing membership and the paramilitary-like uniforms

and discipline of its activists made the political potential of the

RSS apparent to everyone on the political scene. There was

considerable sentiment within the Congress that RSS members

should be permitted to join, and, in fact, on October 7, 1947,

the Congress Working Committee voted to allow in RSS members. But in November 1947, the Congress passed a rule requiring RSS members to give up their affiliation before joining.

The RSS was banned in 1948 after Nathuram Godse, a former

RSS member, assassinated Mahatma Gandhi. The ban was

lifted in 1949 only after the RSS drafted an organizational constitution that was acceptable to the government. Intensely loyal

RSS members refused to give up their affiliation to join the

Congress and, instead, channeled their political energies to the

Jana Sangh (People's Union) after its founding in 1951.

The Jana Sangh grew slowly during the 1950s and 1960s,

despite the efforts of RSS members, who quickly took control

of the party's organization. Although the Jana Sangh suc- ceeded in displacing the Hindu Mahasabha (a communal party

established in 1914 as a counter to Muslim separatists) as the

preeminent party of Hindu activists in the Indian political sys- tem, it failed to develop into a major rival to the Congress.

According to political scientist Bruce Graham, this failure

occurred because of the Jana Sangh's inability "to transcend

the limitations of its origins," in particular, its identification

with the Hindi-speaking, northern heartland and its Brahmanical interpretation of Hinduism rather than the more inclusive

and syncretic values of popular Hinduism. However, the experi- ence of the Jana Sangh during the 1970s, especially its increasing resort to populism and agitational tactics, provided

essential ingredients for the success of the BJP in the 1980s.

In 1977 the Jana Sangh joined the Janata Party, which

defeated Indira Gandhi and the Congress (I) in parliamentary

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India: A Country Study

elections and formed a government through the end of 1979.

The rapid expansion of the RSS under Janata rule soon

brought calls for all members of the RSS family to merge with

Janata Party affiliates. Ultimately, intraparty tensions impelled

those affiliated with the Jana Sangh to leave the Janata Party

and establish a new party—the BJP. The BJP was formed in April 1980, under the leadership of

Atal Behari Vajpayee. Although the party welcomed members

of the RSS, the BJP's effort to draw from the legacies of the Ja- nata Party as well as that of theJana Sangh were suggested by its new name, its choice of a green and saffron flag similar to that

of the Janata Party rather than the solid saffron flag of the old

Jana Sangh, its adoption of a decentralized organizational

structure along the lines of the Janata Party rather than the

more centralized model of the Jana Sangh, and its inclusion in

its working committee of several non-Jana Sangh individuals,

including Sikandar Bakht—a Muslim. The invocation of Gandhian socialism as one of the guiding principles of the BJP

rather than the doctrine of "integral humanism" associated

with the Jana Sangh was another indication of the impact of

the party members' experience in the Janata Party and "J. P. movement."

The new synthesis, however, failed to achieve political success. In 1984 the BJP won only two seats in the parliamentary

elections. In the wake of the 1984 elections, the BJP shifted course. Advani replaced Vajpayee as party president. Under

Advani's leadership, the BJP appealed to Hindu activists by crit- icizing measures it construed as pandering to minorities and

advocating the repeal of the special status given to the Muslim

majority state ofJammu and Kashmir. Simultaneously, it cooperated more closely with other RSS affiliates, particularly the

VHP. During the 1980s, the BJP-VHP combine developed into a dynamic political force through its brilliant use of religious

symbolism to rouse the passions of the public. The BJP and

VHP attained national prominence through their campaign to convert back to Hinduism members of the Scheduled Castes

who had converted to Islam. The VHP also agitated to reclaim

the Babri Masjid site and encouraged villagers throughout the

country to hold religious ceremonies to consecrate bricks

made out of their own clay and send them to be used in the

construction of the Ramjanmabhumi Temple in Ayodhya.

In the general elections of 1991, the BJP expanded its support more than did any other party. Its number of seats in the

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Government and Politics

Lok Sabha increased from eighty-five to 119, and its vote share

grew from 11.4 percent to 21.0 percent. The party was particularly successful in Uttar Pradesh, where it increased its share of

the vote from 7.6 percent (eight seats) in 1989 to 35.3 percent

(fifty seats) in 1991, and in Gujarat, where its votes and seats climbed from 30 percent (twelve seats) to 52 percent (twenty

seats). In addition, BJP support appeared to be spreading into

new areas. In Karnataka, its vote rose from 2.6 percent to 28.1

percent, and in West Bengal the BJP's share of the vote

expanded from 1.6 to 12.0 percent. However, the elections also

revealed some of the limitations of the BJP juggernaut. Exit

polls showed that while the BJP received more upper-caste support than all other parties and made inroads into the constituency of Backward Classes, it did poorly among Scheduled

Castes and Scheduled Tribes, constituencies that it had long

attempted to cultivate. In Himachal Pradesh, Madhya Pradesh,

and Rajasthan, three state governments run by the BJP since

1990, the BJP lost parliamentary seats although its share of the

vote increased. In Uttar Pradesh, where the BJP also won control of the state government in 1991, veteran political analyst

Paul R. Brass cogently argued that the BJP had reached the limits of its social base of support.

The limits of the BJP's Hindu nationalist strategy were further revealed by its losses in the November 1993 state elections.

The party lost control over the state-level governments of

Himachal Pradesh, Madhya Pradesh, and Uttar Pradesh while

winning power in Gujarat and the National Capital Territory of

Delhi. In the aftermath of the Hindu activists' dismantling of

the Babri Masjid in December 1992, the evocative symbolism of

the Ramjanmabhumi controversy had apparently lost its capacity to mobilize popular support. Nevertheless, the BJP, by giving

more emphasis to anticorruption and social issues, achieved

unprecedented success in South India, where it won 28 percent

of the vote and came in second in elections in Karnataka in

November 1994. In the spring of 1995, the BJP won state elections in Gujarat and became the junior partner of a coalition

with Shiv Sena (Army of Shivaji—Shivaji Bhonsle was a seven- teenth-century Maratha guerrilla leader who kept Mughal

armies at bay) in Maharashtra (see The Marathas, ch. 1). In

view of the potential demise of the Congress (I), the BJP stands

poised to emerge as India's largest party in the 1990s. However,

it is likely to have to play down the more divisive aspects of

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India: A Country Study

Hindu nationalism and find other issues to expand its support

if it is to win a majority in the Lok Sabha.

Communist Parties

The Communist Party of India (CPI) was founded on

December 26, 1925, at an all-India conference held at Kanpur,

Uttar Pradesh, in late December 1925 and early January 1926.

Communists participated in the independence struggle and, as members of the Congress Socialist Party, became a formidable

presence on the socialist wing of the Indian National Congress.

They were expelled from the Congress Socialist Party in March

1940, after allegations that the communists had disrupted party

activities and were intent on coopting party organizations.

Indeed, by the time the communists were expelled, they had

gained control over the entire Congress Socialist Party units in

what were to become the southern states of Kerala, Tamil

Nadu, and Andhra Pradesh. Communists remained members

of the Indian National Congress although their support of the

British war effort after the German invasion of the Soviet

Union and their nationalist policy supporting the right of reli- gious minorities to secede from India were diametrically

opposed to Congress policies. As a result, the communists

became isolated within the Congress. After independence,

communists organized a peasant uprising in the Telangana

region in the northern part of what was to become Andhra

Pradesh. The uprising was suppressed only after the central

government sent in the army. Starting in 1951, the CPI shifted

to a more moderate strategy of seeking to bring communism to India within the constraints of Indian democracy. In 1957 the

CPI was elected to rule the state government of Kerala only to have the government dismissed and President's Rule declared

in 1959.

In 1964, in conjunction with the widening rift between

China and the Soviet Union, a large leftist faction of the CPI

leadership, based predominantly in Kerala and West Bengal,

split from the party to form the Communist Party of India

(Marxist), or CPI (M). The CPI (M)-led coalition victory in the

1967 West Bengal state elections spurred dissension within the

party because a Maoist faction headed a peasant rebellion in

the Naxalbari area of the state, just south of Darjiling (Darjeeling). The suppression of the Naxalbari uprising under the

direction of the CPI (M) -controlled Home Ministry of the state government led to denunciations by Maoist revolutionary fac482
A communist campaign rally, Kerala

Courtesy Mary Orr

tions across the country. These groups—commonly referred to

as Naxalites—sparked new uprisings in the Srikakulam region

of Andhra Pradesh, Bihar, and other parts of West Bengal. In

1969 several Naxalite factions joined together to form a new

party—the Communist Party of India (Marxist-Leninist) —CPI

(M-L). However, pursuit of insurrectionary tactics in the face of

harsh repression by the government along with an array of

ideological disputes kept Naxalite factions isolated in their

local bases.

In the 1990s, the CPI (M) enjoys the most political strength

of any communist group. Nationally, its share of the vote has

gradually increased from 4.2 percent in 1967 to 6.7 percent in

1991, but it has largely remained confined to Kerala, Tripura,

and West Bengal. In Kerala the CPI (M) in coalition with other

parties wrested control from the Congress and its allies (fre483
India: A Country Study

quently including the CPI) in 1967, in 1980, and in 1987. Support for the CPI (M) in Kerala in general elections has ranged

from 19 percent to 26 percent, but the party has never won

more than nine of Kerala's twenty seats in Parliament. From

1977 to 1989, the CPI (M) dominated Tripura's state government. It won two parliamentary seats in 1971, 1980, and 1984,

but it lost all of its seats in 1977, 1989, and 1991. In West Bengal, the CPI (M) has ruled the state government with a coalition of other leftist parties since 1977, and, since that time, the

party has also dominated West Bengal's parliamentary delegation.

Support for the CPI is more evenly spread nationwide, but it is weak and in decline. The CPI share of the parliamentary vote

has more than halved from 5.2 percent in 1967 to 2.5 percent

in 1991.

In 1982 a CPI (M-L) faction entered the parliamentary

arena by forming the Indian People's Front. In the 1989 general elections, the front won a parliamentary seat in western

Bihar, and in 1990 it won seven seats in the Bihar legislative

assembly. However, the Indian People's Front lost its parliamentary seat in the 1991 parliamentary elections when its vote

in Bihar declined by some 20 percent.

Regional Parties

Given India's social, cultural, and historical diversity, it is only natural that regional parties play an important role in the

country's political life. Because of India's federal system, state assembly votes are held in an electoral arena that often enables

regional parties to obtain power by espousing issues of regional concern. Simultaneously, the single-member district, first-pastthe-post electoral system has given the advantage to national

parties, such as the Congress, which possess a realistic chance

of gaining or retaining power at the national level and the

opportunity to use central government resources to reward

their supporters. Although regional parties have exercised

authority at the state level, collectively they receive only from 5

to 10 percent of the national vote in parliamentary elections.

Only during the governments of the Janata Party (1977-79)

and the National Front (1989-90) have they participated in

forming the central government. However, as India's party sys- tem becomes more fragmented with the decline of the Congress (I), the regional parties are likely to play an important

role at the national level.

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Government and Politics

Regional political parties have been strongest in Tamil

Nadu, where they have dominated state politics since 1967.

Regional parties in the state trace their roots to the establishment of the Justice Party by non-Brahman social elites in 1916

and the development of the non-Bhraman Self-Respect Movement, founded in 1925 by E.V. Ramaswamy Naicker. As leader

of the Justice Party, in 1944 Ramaswamy renamed the party the

Dravida Kazhagam (DK—Dravidian Federation) and

demanded the establishment of an independent state called

Dravidasthan. In 1949, charismatic film script writer C.N. Annadurai, who was chafing under Ramaswamy's authoritarian leadership, split from the DK to found the DMK in an attempt to achieve the goals of Tamil nationalism through the electoral

process. The DMK dropped its demand for Dravidasthan in

1963 but played a prominent role in the agitations that successfully defeated attempts to impose the northern Indian language of Hindi as the official national language in the mid1960s. The DMK routed the Congress in the 1967 elections in

Tamil Nadu and took control of the state government. With

the deterioration of Annadurai's health, another screen writer,

M. Karunanidhi, became chief minster in 1968 and took control of the party after Annadurai's death in 1969.

Karunanidhi's control over the party was soon challenged by

M.G. Ramachandran (best known by his initials, M.G.R.), one

of South India's most popular film stars. In 1972 M.G.R. split

from the DMK to form the All-India Anna Dravida Munnetra

Kazhagam (AIADMK). Under his leadership, the AIADMK

dominated Tamil politics at the state level from 1977 through

1989. The importance of personal charisma in Tamil politics was dramatized by the struggle for control over the AIADMK

after M.G.R's death in 1988. His widow, Janaki, herself a former

film star, vied for control with Jayalalitha, an actress who had

played M.G.R. s leading lady in several films. The rivalry

allowed the DMK to gain control over the state government in

1989. The AIADMK, securely under the control ofJayalalitha,

who was cast as a "revolutionary leader," recaptured the state government in 1991. However, since 1980, the Congress (I),

usually in alliance with the AIADMK, has won a majority of

Tamil Nadu's seats in Parliament.

After three decades of Congress rule, the politics of Andhra

Pradesh during the 1980s also became dominated by a charismatic film star who stressed regional issues. In 1982 N.T Rama

Rao (popularly known as N.T.R.), an actor who frequently

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India: A Country Study

played Hindu deities in Telugu-language films, formed the Telugu Desam. The party ruled the state from 1983 to 1989. It also won thirty of Andhra Pradesh's forty-two parliamentary

seats in 1984. With the objective of enhancing Andhra

Pradesh's regional autonomy, N.T.R. played a key role in the

formation of the National Front coalition government in 1989.

However, in the 1989 elections, the Telugu Desam won only

two parliamentary seats and lost control over the state government to the Congress (I). It was able to improve its showing to thirteen seats in Parliament in the 1991 elections. The Telugu

Desam returned to power in Andhra Pradesh after winning the

state legislative assembly elections in November 1994.

The Akali Dal (Eternal Party) claims to represent India's

Sikhs, who are concentrated primarily in Punjab. It was first formed in the early 1920s to return control of gurdwaras (Sikh

places of worship) to the orthodox Sikh religious community.

During the 1960s, the Akali Dal played an important role in the

struggle for the creation of Punjab as a separate state with a Sikh majority. Even with the majority Sikh population, the

Akali Dai's political success has been limited by the Congress's

ability to win votes from the Sikh community. The Akali Dal

won nine of Punjab's thirteen parliamentary seats in the general elections of 1977 and seven in 1984 but only one in the

1971 and 1980 elections. Similarly, the Akali Dal headed coalition state governments in 1967 and 1977 and formed the state government in 1985, but it lost state government elections to the Congress (R) in 1972, and to Congress (I) in 1980 and in

1992. As the 1980s progressed, the Akali Dal became increasingly factionalized. In 1989 three Akali Dal factions ran in the

elections, winning a total of seven seats. The Akali Dal factions

boycotted parliamentary and state legislative elections that were held in February 1992. As a result, voter turnout dropped

to 21.6 percent, and the Congress (I) won twelve of Punjab's

thirteen seats in Parliament and a majority of seats in the legislative assembly (see Twentieth-Century Developments, ch. 3).

The National Conference, based in Jammu and Kashmir, is a regional party, which, despite its overwhelmingly Muslim fol- lowing, refused to support the All-India Muslim League (Muslim League—see Glossary) during the independence

movement; instead it allied itself with the Indian National Congress. The National Conference was closely identified with its leader, Sheikh Mohammed Abdullah, a personal friend of

Nehru, and, after Abdullah's death in 1982, with his son,

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Government and Politics

Farooq Abdullah. Friendship, however, did not prevent Nehru

from imprisoning Sheikh Abdullah when he became con- cerned that the "Lion of Kashmir" was disposed to demand

independence for his state. Ultimately, Sheikh Abdullah struck

a deal with Indira Gandhi, and in 1975 he became chief minister of Jammu and Kashmir. The National Conference

remained Jammu and Kashmir's dominant party through the

1980s and maintained control over the state government for

most of the period. In parliamentary elections, it won one of

Kashmir's six parliamentary seats in 1967, none in 1971, two in

1977, and three in 1980, 1984, and 1989. However, popular

support for the National Conference was badly eroded by alle- gations of electoral fraud in the 1987 state elections—which

were won by the National Conference in alliance with the Congress (I) —and the widespread corruption of the subsequent

state government under the leadership of Farooq Abdullah.

There was little popular sympathy for Farooq Abdullah and the

National Conference even after the government was dissolved

and President's Rule declared in 1990. Jammu and Kashmir

remained under President's Rule through 1995, and the

absence of elections makes it difficult to ascertain the extent of

the National Conference's popular support. Nevertheless, it appears that Farooq and the National Conference remain dis- credited.

During the late 1980s, the AGP rose to power in Assam on

the crest of Assamese nationalism. Immigration to Assam—primarily by Muslim Bengalis from neighboring Bangladesh—had

aroused concern that the Assamese would become a minority

in their own state. By 1979 attention was focused on the controversial issue of determining how many immigrants would be

allowed on the state's list of eligible voters. The Congress (I),

which gained a substantial share of the immigrants' votes, took

a more expansive view of who should be included while the

Assamese nationalist organizations demanded a more restrictive position. An attempt to hold state elections in February

1983, and in effect to force the Assamese nationalists to accept

the status quo, resulted in a breakdown of law and order and

the deaths of more than 3,000 people. The subsequent formation of a Congress (I) government led by Hiteshwar Saikia was

widely viewed in Assam as illegitimate, and it was dissolved as part of the terms of the Assam Accord that was signed between

Rajiv Gandhi and Assamese nationalists on August 15, 1985.

The Assam Accord also included a compromise on the voter

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eligibility issue, settled the issue of the citizenship status of

immigrants, and stipulated that new elections were to be held

in December. The AGP was formed by Assamese student leaders after the signing of the accord, and the new party won the

December 1985 elections with 35 percent of the vote and sixtyfour of 108 seats in the state legislature.

The victory of the AGP did not end the controversy over Assamese nationalism. The AGP was unable to implement the

accord's provisions for disenfranchising and expelling illegal

aliens, in part because Parliament passed legislation making it more difficult to prove illegal alien status. The AGP's failure to implement the accord along with the general ineffectiveness

with which it operated the state government undercut its popular support, and in November 1990 it was dismissed and President's Rule declared. As the AGP floundered, other nationalist

groups of agitators flourished. The United Liberation Front of

Assam (ULFA) became the primary torchbearer of militant

Assamese nationalism while the All Bodo Students' Union

(ABSU) and Bodo People's Action Committee (BPAC) led an

agitation for a separate homeland for the central plain tribal

people of Assam (often called Bodos). By 1990 ULFA militants ran virtually a parallel government in the state, extorting huge

sums from businesses in Assam, especially the Assamese tea

industry. The ULFA was ultimately subdued through a shrewd

combination of ruthless military repression and generous

terms of surrender for many of its leaders. The ABSU/BPACled mass agitation lasted from March 1987 until February 1993

when the ABSU signed an accord with the state government

that had been under the Congress (I) control since 1991. The

accord provided for the creation of a Bodoland Autonomous

Council with jurisdiction over an area of 5,186 square kilometers and 2.1 million people within Assam. Nevertheless, Bodo

agitation continued in the mid-1990s as a result of the demands

of many Bodo leaders, who insisted that more territory be

included under the Bodoland Autonomous Council.

Caste-Based Parties

One irony of Indian politics is that its modern secular

democracy has enhanced rather than reduced the political

salience of traditional forms of social identity such as caste. Part of the explanation for this development is that India's

political parties have found the caste-based selection of candidates and appeals to the caste-based interests of the Indian

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Woman voting, Uttar Pradesh

Courtesy India Abroad News

Service

Muslim woman voting, Delhi

Courtesy India Abroad News

Service
India: A Country Study

electorate to be an effective way to win popular support. More

fundamental has been the economic development and social

mobility of those groups officially designated as Backward

Classes and Scheduled Castes. Accounting for 52 and 15 percent of the population, respectively, the Backward Classes and

Scheduled Castes, or Dalits as they prefer to be called, consti- tute a diverse range of middle, lower, and outcaste groups who

have come to wield substantial power in most states. Indeed,

one of the dramas of modern Indian politics has been the

Backward Classes and Dalits' jettisoning of their political subordination to upper castes and their assertion of their own interests.The Backward Classes are such a substantial constituency

that almost all parties vie for their support. For instance, the

Congress (I) in Maharashtra has long relied on Backward

Classes' backing for its political success. The 1990s have seen a growing number of cases where parties, relying primarily on

Backward Classes' support, often in alliance with Dalits and

Muslims, catapult to power in India's states. Janata Dal governments in Bihar and Karnataka are excellent examples of this

strategy. An especially important development is the success of

the Samajwadi Party, which under the leadership of Mulayam

Singh Yadav won the 1993 assembly elections in India's most

populous state, Uttar Pradesh, relying almost exclusively on

Backward Classes and Muslim support in a coalition with the

Dalit-supported BSP.

The growing support of the BSP also reflects the importance

of caste-based politics and the assertiveness of the Dalits in particular. The BSP was founded by Kanshi Ram on April 13, 1984,

the birthday of B.R. Ambedkar. Born as a Dalit in Punjab, Kanshi Ram resigned from his position as a government employee

in 1964 and, after working in various political positions,

founded the All-India Backward, Scheduled Caste, Scheduled

Tribe, Other Backward Classes, and Minority Communities

Employees Federation (BAMCEF) in 1978. Although both the

BAMCEF and BSP pursue strategies of building support among

Backward Classes, Scheduled Tribes, and Muslims as well as

Dalits, Kanshi Ram has been most successful in building support among the Dalit Chamar (Leatherworker) caste in North

India. In the November 1993 Uttar Pradesh state elections,

Ram's BSP achieved the best showing of any Dalit-based party

by winning sixty-seven seats. At the same time, the BSP

increased its representation in the Madhya Pradesh state legis490
Government and Politics

lature from two to twelve seats. OnJune 1, 1995, the BSP withdrew from the state government of Uttar Pradesh and, with the

support of the BJP, formed a new government, making its leader, Mayawati, the first Dalit ever to become a chief minister

of Uttar Pradesh. The alliance, however, was seen by observers

as doomed because of political differences.

Political Issues Punjab andJammu and Kashmir

Conflicts in Punjab and Jammu and Kashmir are each the

result of centralized power operating in a predominantly heterogeneous society. Although tensions in the two states have

important historical roots, they have been fueled by controversy over the policies of India's central government. Opposition is built upon the feeling that political power in New Delhi

is inaccessible and unresponsive to local needs. Furthermore,

in each case, the Congress (I) leadership has attempted to intervene in the conflicts to advance its partisan interests only

to have its intervention backfire and aggravate regional tensions.

The confrontation in Punjab began in 1973 when the Akali

Dal issued the Anandpur Sahib Resolution calling for the establishment of a "Sikh Autonomous Region" with its own constitution. It also called for the transfer of Chandigarh, a union

territory, to Punjab as the state's capital—promised by the central government in 1970—and demanded that the central government establish a more favorable allocation of river waters

used for irrigation. A particular concern was the shared distri- bution of water from the Beas and Sutlej rivers with neighboring Haryana (see Rivers, ch. 2). The Akali Dal further

demanded changes involving greater symbolic recognition of

Sikhism. These demands included the recognition of Amritsar,

the site of the Sikhs' Golden Temple, as a holy city; exemption

from antihijacking regulations to enable Sikhs flying on Indian

airlines to wear their kirpan (ceremonial saber); and the passage of the All-India Gurdwara Act to place the management of

all gurdwaras in the country under a single administration (see

Early History and Tenets, ch. 3).

Akali Dal members were engaged in a heated competition

with the Congress (I) over control of the Punjab assembly. It was in this context that the Congress (I) found it advantageous

to encourage Sikh fundamentalism. Giani Zail Singh, who was

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India: A Country Study

the Congress (I) chief minister in Punjab from 1972 to 1977

and minister of home affairs in the central government from

1980 to 1982, developed links with the fiery Sikh militant Sant

Jarnail Singh Bhindranwale. By encouraging Bhindranwale,

the Congress (I) hoped to reap advantage from sowing division

in the already fractious Akali Dal. However, what may have

been good for the interests of the Congress (I) turned out to be bad for the country. By the spring of 1984, Bhindranwale

and his followers had taken over the Akal Takht (Throne of the

Eternal God) shrine facing the Golden Temple and transformed it into a headquarters and armory for Sikh militants.

Indira Gandhi sent in the army, which, during a bloody threeday siege, almost destroyed the Akal Takht, did some damage

to the Golden Temple, and killed Bhindranwale and hundreds

of his followers (see Insurgent Movements and External Subversion, ch. 10). The army's action generated widespread

resentment among India's Sikhs. The subsequent assassination

of Indira Gandhi by Sikh members of her bodyguard on October 31, 1984, unleashed a wave of riots throughout India in

which more than 2,700 Sikhs were killed.

Rajiv Gandhi attempted to put an end to the crisis by signing an agreement with Akali Dal moderate Harchand Singh Longowal in August 1985. The Gandhi-Longowal Accord acquiesced to many Akali Dal demands and called for elections to put an end to central government control over the state government through President's Rule, which had been in effect

since October 1983. Although the accord was criticized by Sikh

activists as being a sellout, it apparently had widespread support, as evidenced by the public's defiance of the militants' call for a boycott of the ensuing elections and the mandate given to Akali Dal moderates to form a new government. Public support

for the Akali Dal government, however, was soon undermined

by Rajiv Gandhi's failure to fulfill his commitments, such as the

transfer of Chandigarh to Punjab, as enunciated in the GandhiLongowal Accord. With the failure to implement the accord,

the popularity of the Akali Dal state government led by Surjit

Singh Barnala declined, and its internal divisions grew. As a

result, its efforts to combat the militants' increasing violence

became ineffective. In May 1987, the Punjab assembly was dis- solved and replaced with President's Rule.

The violence of Sikh militants spread throughout Punjab

during the 1980s. In many cases, activist groups became undisciplined or were taken over by criminals. Armed robbery,

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Government and Politics

extortion, and murder became a way of life. Police actions also

became more repressive. The residents of Punjab were caught

in a vise of indiscriminate militant and police violence. After an unprecedented five years of President's Rule, the central government gambled by holding elections for Parliament and the

state legislative assembly in February 1992. Most Akali Dal

groups and militants called for a boycott of the poll, and the

election turnout was a record low of 20 percent. Not surprisingly, the Congress (I) emerged victorious, winning twelve of

thirteen seats in Parliament and control over the state government. After the elections, the police and paramilitary forces

under the leadership of K.P.S. Gill scored a series of successes

in infiltrating activist groups and capturing or killing their

members. Popular participation in the conventional political

process increased; voter turnout for municipal elections in September 1992 and gram panchayats in January 1993 exceeded 70

percent. Although violence diminished during 1993 and 1994,

the sources of many of the tensions remained, and resentments

among the Sikhs continue to simmer in the mid-1990s.

Ethnic and regional tensions also raged out of control in the

strategically sensitive Jammu and Kashmir. The conflict assumes considerable symbolic as well as strategic importance

because, as India's only Muslim-majority state, Jammu and

Kashmir validates India's national identity as a religiously and

culturally diverse society held together by a common history

and cultural heritage. The roots of the Kashmir conflict extend

at least as far back as 1947 when Maharaja Hari Singh, the

princely state's Hindu ruler, decided to cede his domain with

its predominantly Muslim population to the Indian Union at a time when Kashmir was under attack by a Muslim paramilitary

force supported by Pakistan. Tensions persisted through the

mid-1980s. The National Conference, led by Sheikh Abdullah

until his death in 1983, first supported the accession to India

and its provisions under Article 370 of the constitution for special autonomy, but later made demands for greater autonomy

as popular resentment against India's central government

began to spread. The status of Kashmir was the cause of two

wars between India and Pakistan, in 1947 and 1965, and was an

issue in the third war, in 1971 (see The Experience of Wars, ch.

10).

The Kashmir crisis of the 1990s is reflective of trends occur- ring throughout the Indian polity: the increasing intervention

of the central government in local affairs, the resort to coer493
India: A Country Study

cion to resolve social conflict and maintain social order, and

the increasing political assertiveness of the Indian public. The

National Conference government, which had been elected in

1983 under the leadership of Farooq Abdullah, son of Sheikh

Abdullah, was brought down in 1984 after leaders of the Congress (I) supported Ghulam Mohammad Shah's split of the

National Conference and formation of a separate government.

The Congress (I) switched its support back to Farooq in 1986,

and the National Conference under Farooq's leadership participated in the 1987 state elections in alliance with the Congress

(I). The alliance served to discredit Farooq and the National

Conference in the eyes of many Kashmiris, and the coalition

faced stiff competition from an alliance of Muslim activists

under the banner of the Muslim United Front. The National

Conference-Congress (I) coalition won the election, but only

after creating a popular perception of widespread election rigging. Farooq's government proved to be inept and corrupt, further alienating the Kashmiri public. The activists, feeling that

they had been electorally defrauded, incited an increasing

number of demonstrations, strikes, bombings, and assassinations.

The problem reached a climax in December 1989 when militants took as hostage the daughter of Mufti Mohammed

Sayeed, the minister of home affairs of the newly formed

National Front government. When the militants exchanged

their hostage for the release of five jailed militant leaders, a

jubilant public showed its support for the militants with massive

demonstrations in Srinagar, the capital. It became obvious to

all that Farooq's government had lost control over the state,

and President's Rule was declared. Insurgency broke out as fighting spread between the Kashmiri militants and paramilitary forces. Reports by human rights groups left little doubt

that each side had perpetrated gross atrocities and that victims

included large numbers of innocent civilians. The issue was further complicated by charges that the insurgents had received

sanctuary and support from Pakistan and from movements like

the Ekta Yatra (Unity Pilgrimage—a BJP political pilgrimage

from the southern tip of India to Srinagar from December

1991 to January 1992).

The conflict raged through 1994 as the government sent in

paramilitary and army troops in an effort to break the back of

the resistance and convince the Kashmiri public of the futility

of the struggle. By then the militants had fragmented into

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Government and Politics

more than 100 groups. The Jammu and Kashmir Liberation

Front, which demands independence from both India and

Pakistan, had the widest support, but a number of heavily

armed groups, the most prominent being the Hezb-ul Mujahideen, which favored union with Pakistan, also had support.

Events offered a glimmer of hope that the crisis might be

resolved through negotiation. Earlier, in November 1993, the

government had successfully negotiated the settlement of a crisis at the Hazratbal—a Srinagar mosque, which is one of the

holiest Muslim shrines in India because it is believed to house a

hair of the Prophet Muhammad. The government negotiated

the settlement with the All-Party Hurriyat Conference by agreeing to the departure of the occupying militant forces. In April

1994, the leaders of the conference further raised hopes by

coming to New Delhi to discuss ways of resolving the conflict

with the leaders of non-Muslim communities in Kashmir. The

government responded by releasing more moderate activist

leaders from prison and beginning preparations for elections.

But with tension growing and the destruction in May 1995 by

fire of a Sufi mausoleum and mosque in the town of Charar

Sharif—each side blamed the other for the conflagration—the

central government postponed plans for elections. This event

posed new impediments to resolving the conflict.

Hindu-Muslim Tensions

The kindling of Hindu-Muslim tensions during the 1990s was neither a reawakening of ancient hatreds nor a conse- quence of religious fundamentalism. Rather it occurred

because of the interaction between the various socioeconomic

developments in India during the 1980s and 1990s and the

strategies and tactics of India's politicians.

Rapid urbanization has uprooted individuals from their previous occupations and communities and placed many in competition for new livelihoods. Newcomers who succeed

frequently arouse resentment, and many riots have targeted

successful Muslim merchants, business owners, and Muslim

returnees from the Persian Gulf states, where they often earn incomes many times higher than they would have earned in

India. High-caste Hindus, fearing the loss of their social prestige, have provided an important social base for Hindu militancy. Hard-pressed members of these high-caste groups have

been an especially receptive constituency for appeals to curtail

the "special privileges of pampered minorities." In addition,

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India: A Country Study

the economy was unable to provide jobs for all who wanted to enter the labor market, and the 1980s and early 1990s saw an

increase in the ranks of the unemployed. Some of the unemployed have become involved in gangs whose strong-arm tactics are used by politicians wishing to intimidate or incite communal tensions. Other unemployed youths join militant religious

organizations like the Bajrang Dal (Party of the Adamani [Diamond] -Bodied, a reference to Bajrang, a Hindu god) and Shiv

Sena. The militant groups provide security for temples and

members of their religion but are also sources of communal

violence.

Changes in the nature of India's political process also have

contributed to the rise of religious tensions. Analysts from a

variety of perspectives have commented on the increasing will- ingness of India's politicians to exploit religious and ethnic ten- sions for short-term political gain, regardless of their longerterm social consequences. Political scientist Rajni Kothari, for

example, charges that there has been a general decline in the

morality of Indian politicians. He alleges that politicians play a "numbers game," in which they appeal to chauvinistic caste and

religious sentiments to win elections, despite the longer-term

social tensions that their campaigns create. The support of the

Congress for Article 370 in the constitution, which provides a

special status for the Muslim majority state ofJammu and Kashmir, and the measures taken to provide India's Muslim community with distinctive rights have contributed to the popular

resonance of the BJP's charges that the Congress (I) stands for

minority appeasement and "pseudo-secularism." The violence

of religious militants in Punjab and Jammu and Kashmir has

also contributed to sentiment among the Hindu majority that

religious minorities employ aggressive tactics to win special

concessions from the government.

The 1985 Shah Bano controversy put state-religion relations

in the forefront of the political agenda. Shah Bano was a sev- enty-three-year-old Muslim woman from Madhya Pradesh who

filed for alimony after being divorced according to Muslim law

by her husband after forty-three years of marriage. The

Supreme Court ruled in Shah Bano's favor, creating outrage

among sectors of the Muslim community who felt that the

sharia (Islamic law), which does not provide for alimony, had

been slighted. In apparent capitulation to this important political constituency, Rajiv Gandhi pushed the Muslim Women

(Protection of Rights on Divorce) Bill, which removed Muslim

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Government and Politics

divorce cases from India's civil law and recognized the jurisdiction of sharia. The legislation, in turn, enraged large sectors of

Hindus, whose personal conduct is judged under India's secular civil code.

Shortly thereafter, in a ploy that Rajiv Gandhi may have misguidedly conceived to placate Hindu militants, the courts ruled

that the doors of the Babri Masjid should be opened to Hindu

worshipers. The VHP was joined by the BJP in a campaign to reclaim the disputed birthplace of Ram. In 1989 the VHP

launched a campaign encouraging Hindu devotees from across India each to bring a brick from their villages to Ayodhya. Outbreaks of violence between Hindus and Muslims spread as the

campaign progressed, and the BJP successfully prevailed upon

the VHP to withdraw the campaign before the 1989 elections.

Tensions heated up again in the summer of 1990 when BJP

leader Advani embarked on a 10,000-kilometer tour of the

country in a Toyota van decorated to resemble the mythological chariot of Ram. Advani's arrest did not prevent clashes at Ayodhya between paramilitary forces and Hindu activists; the

clashes sparked a wave of communal violence and left more

than 300 dead.

The Ramjanmabhumi Temple mobilization appeared to pay

substantial dividends in terms of the BJP's remarkable growth

of support in North India in the 1991 elections, and the VHP

and BJP kept the issue alive despite the fact that their actions

put tremendous pressure on the newly elected BJP state government in Uttar Pradesh. Its July 1992 kar sewa (mass mobilization force work service) to build the temple ended peacefully

only through last-minute negotiations with Prime Minister Rao;

Rao had been promised by BJP leader L.K. Advani that the

December 6, 1992, kar sewa would also be peaceful. Despite

Advani's promise, thousands of Hindu activists broke through a

police cordon and destroyed the Babri Masjid (see Public Worship, ch. 3). This event and the subsequent riots throughout

the country left no doubt that tensions between Hindus and

Muslims had reached a high pitch.

During the following week, riots spread throughout the

countryside, killing some 1,700 people. Riots broke out again

in Bombay from January 9 through January 11, killing 500

more people. In March 1993, the Bombay Stock Exchange and

other prominent places in the city were shaken, and some 200

people were killed by bombs that the central government

alleges were placed by members of India's criminal underworld

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India: A Country Study

at the behest of Pakistan's intelligence service. The manipulation of India's religious tensions by militants, criminals, and

politicians highlighted the extent to which religious sentiments

in India had become an object of exploitation. Religious ten- sions eased somewhat and incidents of communal violence

declined during the remainder of 1993 and through 1994, but

the persistence of the social conditions that gave birth to violence and the continued opportunism of India's politicians

suggest that the relative peace may be only an interlude.

Corruption and the Anti-Establishment Vote

Corruption not only has become a pervasive aspect of

Indian politics but also has become an increasingly important

factor in Indian elections. The extensive role of the Indian

state in providing services and promoting economic development has always created the opportunity for using public

resources for private benefit. As government regulation of busi- ness was extended in the 1960s and corporate donations were banned in 1969, trading economic favors for under-the-table

contributions to political parties became an increasingly widespread political practice. During the 1980s and 1990s, corruption became associated with the occupants of the highest

echelons of India's political system. Rajiv Gandhi's government

was rocked by scandals, as was the government of P.V. Narasimha Rao. Politicians have become so closely identified

with corruption in the public eye that a Times of India poll of

1,554 adults in six metropolitan cities found that 98 percent of

the public is convinced that politicians and ministers are cor- rupt, with 85 percent observing that corruption is on the

increase.

The prominence of political corruption in the 1990s is hardly unique to India. Other countries also have experienced

corruption that has rocked their political systems. What is remarkable about India is the persistent anti-incumbent sentiment among its electorate. Since Indira's victory in her 1971

"garibi hatao" election, only one ruling party has been reelected

to power in the central government. In an important sense, the

exception proves the rule because the Congress (I) won reelection in 1984 in no small measure because the electorate saw in

Rajiv Gandhi a "Mr. Clean" who would lead a new generation of

politicians in cleansing the political system. Anti-incumbent

sentiment is just as strong at the state level, where the ruling

parties of all political persuasions in India's major states lost

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eleven of thirteen legislative assembly elections held from 1991

through spring 1995.

The Media

The Press

Compared with many other developing countries, the

Indian press has flourished since independence and exercises a large degree of independence. British colonialism allowed

for the development of a tradition of freedom of the press, and

many of India's great English-language newspapers and some

of its Indian-language press were begun during the nineteenth

century. As India became independent, ownership of India's

leading English-language newspapers was transferred from

British to Indian business groups, and the fact that most

English-language newspapers have the backing of large busi- ness houses has contributed to their independence from the

government. The press has experienced impressive growth

since independence. In 1950 there were 214 daily newspapers,

with forty-four in English and the rest in Indian languages. By

1990 the number of daily newspapers had grown to 2,856, with

209 in English and 2,647 in indigenous languages. The expansion of literacy and the spread of consumerism during the

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1980s fueled the rapid growth of news weeklies and other periodicals. By 1993 India had 35,595 newspapers—of which 3,805 were dailies—and other periodicals. Although the majority of

publications are in indigenous languages, the English-language

press, which has widespread appeal to the expanding middle

class, has a wide multicity circulation throughout India.

There are four major publishing groups in India, each of

which controls national and regional English-language and ver- nacular publications. They are the Times of India Group, the

Indian Express Group, the Hindustan Times Group, and the

Anandabazar Patrika Group. The Times oflndiais India's largest

English-language daily, with a circulation of 656,000 published

in six cities. The Indian Express, with a daily circulation of

519,000, is published in seventeen cities. There also are seven other daily newspapers with circulations of between 134,000

and 477,000, all in English and all competitive with one

another. Indian-language newspapers also enjoy large circulations but usually on a statewide or citywide basis. For example,

the Malayalam-language daily Malayala Manorama circulates

673,000 copies in Kerala; the Hindi-language Dainik Jagran cir- culates widely in Uttar Pradesh and New Delhi, with 580,000

copies per day; Punjab Kesari, also published in Hindi and avail- able throughout Punjab and New Delhi, has a daily circulation

of 562,000; and the Anandabazar Patrika, published in Calcutta

in Bengali, has a daily circulation of 435,000. There are also

numerous smaller publications throughout the nation. The

combined circulation of India's newspapers and periodicals is in the order of 60 million, published daily in more than ninety

languages.

India has more than forty domestic news agencies. The

Express News Service, the Press Trust of India, and the United

News of India are among the major news agencies. They are headquartered in Delhi, Bombay, and New Delhi, respectively,

and employ foreign correspondents.

Although freedom of the press in India is the legal norm—it

is constitutionally guaranteed—the scope of this freedom has

often been contested by the government. Rigid press censorship was imposed during the Emergency starting in 1975 but

quickly retracted in 1977. The government has continued,

however, to exercise more indirect controls. Government

advertising accounts for as much as 50 percent of all advertisements in Indian newspapers, providing a monetary incentive to limit harsh criticism of the administration. Until 1992, when

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Government and Politics

government regulation of access to newsprint was liberalized,

controls on the distribution of newsprint could also be used to reward favored publications and threaten those that fell into

disfavor. In 1988, at a time when the Indian press was publishing investigative reports about corruption and abuse of power

in government, Parliament passed a tough defamation bill that

mandated prison sentences for offending journalists. Vocifer- ous protests from journalists and opposition party leaders ulti- mately forced the government to withdraw the bill. Since the

late 1980s, the independence of India's press has been bolstered by the liberalization of government economic policy and

the increase of private-sector advertising provided by the

growth of India's private sector and the spread of consumerism.

Broadcast Media

The national television (Doordarshan) and radio (All India

Radio, or Akashwani) networks are state-owned and managed

by the Ministry of Information and Broadcasting. Their news

reporting customarily presents the government's point of view.

For example, coverage of the 1989 election campaign blatantly

favored the government of Rajiv Gandhi, and autonomy of the

electronic media became a political issue. V.R Singh's National

Front government sponsored the Prasar Bharati (Indian

Broadcasting) Act, which Parliament considered in 1990, to provide greater autonomy to Doordarshan and All India Radio.

The changes that resulted were limited. The bill provided for

the establishment of an autonomous corporation to run Doordarshan and All India Radio. The corporation was to operate

under a board of governors to be in charge of appointments

and policy and a broadcasting council to respond to complaints. However, the legislation required that the corporation

prepare and submit its budget within the framework of the central budget and stipulated that the personnel of the new broadcasting corporation be career civil servants to facilitate

continued government control. In the early 1990s, increasing

competition from television broadcasts transmitted via satellite appeared the most effective manner of limiting the progovernment bias of the government-controlled electronic media (see

Telecommunications, ch. 6).

Since the 1980s, India has experienced a rapid proliferation

of television broadcasting that has helped shape popular culture and the course of politics. Although the first television

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India: A Country Study

program was broadcast in 1959, the expansion of television did

not begin in earnest until the extremely popular telecast of the

Ninth Asian Games, which were held in New Delhi in 1982.

Realizing the popular appeal and consequent influence of tele- vision broadcasting, the government undertook an expansion

that by 1990 was planned to provide television access to 90 percent of the population. In 1993, about 169 million people were

estimated to have watched Indian television each week, and, by

1994, it was reported that there were some 47 million households with televisions. There also is a growing selection of satellite transmission and cable services available (see Television,

ch. 6).

Television programming was initially kept tightly under the

control of the government, which embarked on a self-conscious effort to construct and propagate a cultural idea of the

Indian nation. This goal is especially clear in the broadcasts of

such megaseries as the Hindu epics Ramayana and Mahabharata. In addition to the effort at nation-building, the politicians of India's ruling party have not hesitated to use television

to build political support. In fact, the political abuse of Indian

television led to demands to increase the autonomy of Doordarshan; these demands ultimately resulted in support for the

Prasar Bharati Act. The 1990s have brought a radical transformation of television in India. Transnational satellite broadcasting made its debut in January 1991, when owners of satellite dishes—initially mostly at major hotels—began receiving Cable News Network (CNN) coverage of the Persian Gulf War. Three months

later, Star TV began broadcasting via satellite. Its fare initially

included serials such as "The Bold and the Beautiful" and MTV

programs. Satellite broadcasting spread rapidly through India's

cities as local entrepreneurs erected dishes to receive signals

and transmitted them through local cable systems. After its October 1992 launch, Zee TV offered stiff competition to Star

TV. However, the future of Star TV was bolstered by billionaire

Rupert Murdock, who acquired the network for US$525 million in July 1993. CNN International, part of the Turner Broadcasting System, was slated to start broadcasting entertainment

programs, including top Hollywood films, in 1995.

Competition from the satellite stations brought radical

change to Doordarshan by cutting its audience and threatening its advertising revenues at a time when the government was

pressuring it to pay for expenditures from internal revenues. In

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Government and Politics

response, Doordarshan decided in 1993 to start five new channels in addition to its original National Channel. Programming

was radically transformed, and controversial news shows, soap

operas, and coverage of high-fashion events proliferated. Of

the new Doordarshan channels, however, only the Metro Channel, which carries MTV music videos and other popular shows,

has survived in the face of the new trend for talk programs that

engage in a potpourri of racy topics.

The Rise of Civil Society

Political participation in India has been transformed in

many ways since the 1960s. New social groups have entered the

political arena and begun to use their political resources to shape the political process. Scheduled Castes and Scheduled

Tribes, previously excluded from politics because of their position at the bottom of India's social hierarchy, have begun to take full advantage of the opportunities presented by India's

democracy. Women and environmentalists constitute new political categories that transcend traditional distinctions. The

spread of social movements and voluntary organizations has

shown that despite the difficulties of India's political parties

and state institutions, India's democratic tendency continues to

thrive.

An important aspect of the rise of civil society is the proliferation of voluntary or nongovernmental organizations. Estimates of their number ranged from 50,000 to 100,000 in 1993.

To some extent, the rise of voluntary organizations has been

sponsored by the Indian state. For instance, the central government's Seventh Five-Year Plan of fiscal years (FY—see Glossary)

1985-89 recognized the contributions of voluntary organizations in accelerating development and substantially increased

their funding. A 1987 survey of 1,273 voluntary agencies

reported that 47 percent received some form of funding from

the central government. Voluntary organizations also have

thrived on foreign donations, which in 1991-92 contributed

more than US$400 million to some 15,000 organizations. Some

nongovernmental organizations cooperate with the central

government in a manner that augments its capacity to implement public policy, such as poverty alleviation, for example, in a decentralized manner. Other nongovernmental organizations also serve as watchdogs, attempting to pressure government agencies to uphold the spirit of the state's laws and

implement policies in accord with their stated objectives. Non503
India: A Country Study

governmental organizations also endeavor to raise the political

consciousness of various social groups, encouraging them to demand their rights and challenge social inequities. Finally,

some social groups serve as innovators, experimenting with

new approaches to solving social problems.

Beginning in the 1970s, activists began to form broad-based

social movements, which proved powerful advocates for interests that they perceived as neglected by the state and political

parties. Perhaps the most powerful has been the farmers' movement, which has organized hundreds of thousands of demonstrators in New Delhi and has pressured the government for

higher prices on agricultural commodities and more investment in rural areas. Members of Scheduled Castes led by the

Dalit Panthers have moved to rearticulate the identity of

former Untouchables. Women from an array of diverse organizations now interact in conferences and exchange ideas in

order to define and promote women's issues. Simultaneously, an environmental movement has developed that has attempted

to compel the government to be more responsive to environmental concerns and has attempted to redefine the concept of

"development" to include respect for indigenous cultures and

environmental sustainability.

With its highly competitive elections, relatively independent

judiciary, boisterous media, and thriving civil society, India continues to possess one of the most democratic political systems

of all developing countries. Nevertheless, Indian democracy is under stress. Political power within the Indian state has

become increasingly centralized at a time when India's civil society has become mobilized along lines that reflect the country's remarkable social diversity. The country's political parties,

which might aggregate the country's diverse social interests in a way that would ensure the responsiveness of state authority, are

in crisis. The Congress (I) has been in a state of decline, as reflected in the erosion of its traditional coalition of support

and the implication of Congress (I) governments in a series of

scandals. The party has failed to generate an enlightened leadership that might rejuvenate it and replace the increasingly dis- credited Nehruvian socialism with a novel programmatic

appeal. The Congress (I)'s split in May 1995 added a new

impediment to efforts to reinvigorate the party.

The BJP, although it has a stronger party organization, in

1995 had yet to find a way to transcend the limits of its militant

Hindu nationalism and fashion a program that would appeal to

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Government and Politics

diverse social groups and enable it to build a majority coalition

in India. The Janata Dal continued to suffer from lack of leadership, inadequate resources, and incessant factionalism. As its bases of power shrink, it stood in danger of being reduced to a party with only a few regional strongholds. As regional groupings and members of the lower echelons of India's caste system

become more assertive, regional and caste parties may play a more prominent role in India's political system. At this point,

however, it is difficult to envision how they might stabilize

India's political system.

The unresponsiveness of India's political parties and government has encouraged the Indian public to mobilize through

nongovernmental organizations and social movements. The

consequent development of India's civil society has made Indi- ans less confident of the transformative power of the state and

more confident of the power of the individual and local community. This development is shifting a larger share of the initia- tive for resolving India's social problems from the state to

society. Fashioning party and state institutions that will accom- modate the diverse interests that are now mobilized in Indian

society is the major challenge confronting the Indian polity in

the 1990s.

* * *

Robert L. Hardgrave, Jr., and Stanley A. Kochanek's India:

Government and Politics in a Developing Nation provides a thorough and insightful overview of Indian politics. The second

edition of Paul R. Brass's The Politics ofIndia since Independence is a useful account written by a scholar with detailed knowledge

of India's grass roots. Atul Kohli's Democracy and Discontent is the definitive study of

India's growing crisis of governability, with special emphasis on

the decay of Indian political parties. State Against Democracy by

Rajni Kothari, India's eminent political scientist, is a critique of

the Indian state as well as a hopeful analysis of the rise of civil society. Lloyd I. Rudolph and Susanne Hoeber Rudolph's In

Pursuit of Lakshmi offers an illuminating account of the politics

of India's development. Dominance and State Power in Modern

India, edited by Francine R. Frankel and M.S.A. Rao, is a study

of the changing relationship between caste and politics that

describes the diversity of politics in India's states and documents the rise of the Backward Classes. Paul R. Brass's Ethnicity

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India: A Country Study

and Nationalism: Theory and Comparison includes observations

about the dynamics of ethnic politics in India. India Votes, edited by Harold A. Gould and Sumit Ganguly, offers an

account of India's elections in 1989 and 1991. David Butler,

Ashok Lahiri, and Prannoy Roy's India Decides: Elections 1952-

1991 includes copious data about election outcomes.

India Today, India's leading weekly news magazine, offers

excellent investigative journalism and news analysis. Economic

and Political Weekly includes trenchant analyses of India's political economy. Asian Survey regularly publishes articles analyzing

Indian politics. Seminar provides monthly symposia that gather

analyses from leading Indian experts on problems confronting

Indian society. The "clari.world.asia.india" electronic news- group provides releases from Reuters and the Associated Press

that are an excellent way to keep up with current events. (For

further information and complete citations, see Bibliography.)

506
Chapter 9. Foreign Relations
Depiction of a boat from a coastal area ofSouth India
INDIA'S FOREIGN RELATIONS reflect a traditional policy of

nonalignment (see Glossary), the exigencies of domestic eco- nomic reform and development, and the changing post-Cold

War international environment. India's relations with the

world have evolved considerably since the British colonial

period (1757-1947), when a foreign power monopolized exter- nal relations and defense relations. On independence in 1947,

few Indians had experience in making or conducting foreign

policy. However, the country's oldest political party, the Indian

National Congress (the Congress—see Glossary), had established a small foreign department in 1925 to make overseas

contacts and to publicize its freedom struggle. From the late 1920s on, Jawaharlal Nehru, who had the most long-standing

interest in world affairs among independence leaders, formulated the Congress stance on international issues. As a member

of the interim government in 1946, Nehru articulated India's

approach to the world.

During Nehru's tenure as prime minister (1947-64), he

achieved a domestic consensus on the definition of Indian

national interests and foreign policy goals—building a unified

and integrated nation-state based on secular, democratic principles; defending Indian territory and protecting its security

interests; guaranteeing India's independence internationally

through nonalignment; and promoting national economic

development unencumbered by overreliance on any country

or group of countries. These objectives were closely related to the determinants of India's foreign relations: the historical legacy of South Asia; India's geopolitical position and security

requirements; and India's economic needs as a large developing nation. From 1947 until the late 1980s, New Delhi's foreign

policy goals enabled it to achieve some successes in carving out an independent international role. Regionally, India was the

predominant power because of its size, its population (the

world's second-largest after China), and its growing military

strength. However, relations with its neighbors, Pakistan in particular, were often tense and fraught with conflict. In addition,

globally India's nonaligned stance was not a viable substitute

for the political and economic role it wished to play.

India's international influence varied over the years after

independence. Indian prestige and moral authority were high

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India: A Country Study

in the 1950s and facilitated the acquisition of developmental

assistance from both East and West. Although the prestige

stemmed from India's nonaligned stance, the nation was

unable to prevent Cold War politics from becoming intertwined with interstate relations in South Asia. In the 1960s and

1970s, New Delhi's international position among developed

and developing countries faded in the course of wars with

China and Pakistan, disputes with other countries in South

Asia, and India's attempt to balance Pakistan's support from

the United States and China by signing the Treaty of Peace,

Friendship, and Cooperation with the Soviet Union in August

1971. Although India obtained substantial Soviet military and

economic aid, which helped to strengthen the nation, India's

influence was undercut regionally and internationally by the

perception that its friendship with the Soviet Union prevented

a more forthright condemnation of the Soviet presence in

Afghanistan. In the 1980s, New Delhi improved relations with

the United States, other developed countries, and China while

continuing close ties with the Soviet Union. Relations with its South Asian neighbors, especially Pakistan, Sri Lanka, and

Nepal, occupied much of the energies of the Ministry of External Affairs.

In the 1990s, India's economic problems and the demise of

the bipolar world political system have forced New Delhi to reassess its foreign policy and to adjust its foreign relations.

Previous policies proved inadequate to cope with the serious

domestic and international problems facing India. The end of

the Cold War gutted the core meaning of nonalignment and

left Indian foreign policy without significant direction. The

hard, pragmatic considerations of the early 1990s were still viewed within the nonaligned framework of the past, but the

disintegration of the Soviet Union removed much of India's

international leverage, for which relations with Russia and the

other post-Soviet states could not compensate.

Pragmatic security, economic considerations, and domestic

political influences have reinforced New Delhi's reliance on

the United States and other developed countries; caused New

Delhi to abandon its anti-Israeli policy in the Middle East; and

resulted in the courtship of the Central Asian republics and the

newly industrializing economies of East and Southeast Asia.

Although India shares the concerns of Russia, China, and

many members of the Nonaligned Movement (see Glossary)

about the preeminent position of the United States and other

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Foreign Relations

developed countries, different national interests and perceptions make it improbable that India can turn cooperation with

these countries to its advantage on most international issues.

Furthermore, although Cold War politics have ceased to be a

factor in South Asia, the most intractable problems in India's

relations with Pakistan—conflict over Kashmir, support for separatists, and nuclear and ballistic missile programs—still face

the two countries.

Foreign Policy Formulation

Role of the Prime Minister

Nehru set the pattern for the formation of Indian foreign

policy: a strong personal role for the prime minister but a weak

institutional structure. Nehru served concurrently as prime

minister and minister of external affairs; he made all major for- eign policy decisions himself after consulting with his advisers

and then entrusted the conduct of international affairs to senior members of the Indian Foreign Service. His successors continued to exercise considerable control over India's international dealings, although they generally appointed separate

ministers of external affairs. India's second prime minister, Lai Bahadur Shastri (1964-

66), expanded the Office of Prime Minister (sometimes called

the Prime Minister's Secretariat) and enlarged its powers (see

The Executive, ch. 8). By the 1970s, the Office of the Prime

Minister had become the de facto coordinator and supraministry of the Indian government. The enhanced role of the office

strengthened the prime minister's control over foreign policy

making at the expense of the Ministry of External Affairs.

Advisers in the office provided channels of information and

policy recommendations in addition to those offered by the

Ministry of External Affairs. A subordinate part of the office

the Research and Analysis Wing—functioned in ways that significantly expanded the information available to the prime

minister and his advisers. The Research and Analysis Wing

gathered intelligence, provided intelligence analysis to the

Office of the Prime Minister, and conducted covert operations

abroad.

The prime minister's control and reliance on personal advis- ers in the Office of the Prime Minister was particularly strong

under the tenures of Indira Gandhi (1966-77 and 1980-84)

and her son, Rajiv (1984-89), who succeeded her, and weaker

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India: A Country Study

during the periods of coalition governments under Morarji

Desai (1977-79), Viswanath Pratap (V.P.) Singh (1989-90),

Chandra Shekhar (1990-91), and P.V. Narasimha Rao (starting

in June 1991). Although observers find it difficult to determine

whether the locus of decision-making authority on any particular issue lies with the Ministry of External Affairs, the Council

of Ministers, the Office of the Prime Minister, or the prime

minister himself, nevertheless in the 1990s India's prime ministers retain their dominance in the conduct of foreign relations.

Ministry of External Affairs

The Ministry of External Affairs is the governmental body

most concerned with foreign affairs, with responsibility for

some aspects of foreign policy making, actual implementation

of policy, and daily conduct of international relations. The

ministry's duties include providing timely information and

analysis to the prime minister and minister of external affairs,

recommending specific measures when necessary, planning

policy for the future, and maintaining communications with

foreign missions in New Delhi. In 1994 the ministry administered 149 diplomatic missions abroad, which were staffed

largely by members of the Indian Foreign Service. The ministry

is headed by the minister of external affairs, who holds cabinet

rank and is assisted by a deputy minister and a foreign secretary, and secretaries of state from the Indian Foreign Service.

In 1994 the total cadre strength of the Indian Foreign Service numbered 3,490, of which some 1,890 held posts abroad

and 1,600 served at the Ministry of External Affairs headquarters in New Delhi. Members of the Indian Foreign Service are recruited through annual written and oral competitive examinations and come from a great variety of regional, economic,

and social backgrounds. The Foreign Service Training Institute

provides a wide range of courses for foreign service officers,

including a basic professional course, a comprehensive course

in diplomacy and international relations for foreign service

recruits, a refresher course for commercial representatives,

and foreign language training.

The Ministry of External Affairs has thirteen territorial divi- sions, each covering a large area of the world, such as Eastern

Europe and the post-Soviet states, or smaller areas on India's

periphery, such as Afghanistan, Iran, and Pakistan. The ministry also has functional divisions dealing with external publicity,

protocol, consular affairs, Indians abroad, the United Nations

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Jawaharlal Nehru, India's first prime minister

Courtesy Biographic Collection,

Library of Congress

(UN) and other international organizations, and international

conferences. Two of the eighteen specialized divisions and

units of the ministry are of special note. The Policy Planning

and Research Division conducts research and prepares briefs

and background papers for top policy makers and ministry offi- cials. The briefs cover wide-ranging issues relating to India's

foreign policy and role in the changing international environment, and background papers provide information on issues

concerning international developments. The Economic Division has the important task of handling foreign economic rela- tions. This division augments its activities to reflect changes in

the government's economic policy and the international eco- nomic environment (see Liberalization in the Early 1990s, ch.

6). In 1990 the division established the Economic Coordination Unit to assess the impact on India of the Persian Gulf crisis arising from Iraq's invasion of Kuwait, changes in Eastern

Europe and the Soviet Union, and formation of a single market in the European Economic Community (after 1993 the

European Union), as well as to promote foreign investment.

The Economic Division also runs India's foreign aid programs,

including the Indian Technical and Economic Cooperation

Programme, the Special Commonwealth African Assistance

Programme, and aid to individual developing countries in

South Asia and elsewhere. The ministry runs the Indian Coun513
India: A Country Study

cil for Cultural Relations, which arranges exhibits, visits, and

cultural exchanges with other countries and oversees the activities of foreign cultural centers in India.

The Ministry of External Affairs had a budget of Rs8.8 bil- lion (for value of the rupee—see Glossary) for fiscal year (FY

see Glossary) 1994. The largest single expense was the mainte- nance of missions abroad: Rs3.8 billion, or close to 44 percent

of the ministry's expenditures. Foreign aid totaled Rsl.3 bil- lion, or 15.1 percent of the ministry's expenditures. The single

largest recipient—as in most previous years—was Bhutan

(Rs690 million), whose government operations and development are heavily subsidized by India.

Other Government Organizations

Besides the Office of the Prime Minister and the Ministry of

External Affairs, there are other government agencies that

have foreign policy-making roles. In theory, the ministers of

defence, commerce, and finance provide input to foreign policy decisions discussed in cabinet meetings, but their influence

in practical terms is overshadowed by the predominant position of the prime minister and his advisers. The armed forces are removed from policy making and have influence only

through the minister of defence, to whom they are subordinate

(see Organization and Equipment of the Armed Forces, ch.

10).

Only a limited role in foreign policy making is provided for

India's bicameral Parliament (see The Legislature, ch. 8).

Negotiated treaties and international agreements become

legally binding on the state but are not part of domestic law

unless passed by an act of Parliament, which also has no say in

the appointment of diplomats and other government representatives dealing with foreign affairs. For the most part, because

of the widespread domestic support for India's foreign policy,

Parliament has endorsed government actions or sought information. The most important official link between Parliament

and the executive in the mid-1990s is the Committee on Exter- nal Affairs of the Lok Sabha (House of the People), the lower

chamber of Parliament. The committee meets regularly and

draws its membership from many parties. Usually it has served

either as a forum for government briefings or as a deliberative

body.

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Foreign Relations

The Role of Political and Interest Groups

Institutional connections between public opinion and foreign policy making are tenuous in the mid-1990s, as they have

been since independence. Although international issues

receive considerable attention in the media and in academic

circles, the views expressed by journalists and scholars in these

publications have little impact on foreign policy making. Interest groups concerned with foreign relations exist inside and

outside Parliament but are less organized or articulate than in

most other democracies. These organizations include such

business groups as the Federation of Indian Chambers of Commerce International; religious groups, especially among Muslims; and various friendship or cultural societies promoting

closer ties with specific countries. Among the latter are informal groups known as the "Russian" and "American" lobbies.

Opposition political parties often have more effectively artic- ulated differing views regarding foreign policy, but even these

views had little impact on policy making until the 1990s. Other

than the Congress (I) —(I for Indira), only the communist parties, the Janata Party, and the Jana Sangh and one of its successors, the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP—Indian People's Party),

developed coherent platforms on foreign policy (see Political

Parties, ch. 8). After the mid-1950s, the communist parties were broadly supportive of Indian foreign policy. At the beginning ofJanata Party rule (1977-79), Prime Minister Desai

promised to return to "genuine nonalignment." However, security considerations forced Desai and his minister of external

affairs, Jana Sangh stalwart Atal Behari Vajpayee, to adhere to the foreign policy path carved out by the Congress (I) —non- alignment with a pro-Soviet orientation. BJP foreign policy

positions differed most strongly from those of the Congress (I). The BJP criticized nonalignment and advocated a more vigor- ous use of India's power to defend national interests from ero- sion at the hands of Pakistan and China. The BJP also favored

the overt acquisition of nuclear weapons. By the early 1990s,

the rising political fortunes of the BJP had an impact on the

conduct of foreign policy, forcing the coalition government of

V.P. Singh, which depended on BJP support, to take a hard line

in the Kashmir crisis in 1990. Pressure from the Congress (I)

also had an impact on India's response to the Persian Gulf crisis (see Middle East; Central Asia, this ch.).

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India: A Country Study

Determinants of Foreign Relations

Historical Legacy

During the British colonial period, India was a large political

entity bordered by the buffer states of Afghanistan, Nepal, Sikkim, Bhutan, and Tibet to the north and Ceylon (as Sri Lanka

was then called) to the south. The withdrawal of the British and

partition in 1947, which created India and Pakistan, resulted in

geographical boundaries that cut across regional religious,

social, ethnic, and linguistic groups, and disrupted economic

and cultural ties. A slice of eastern India and the westernmost

part of India became the East Wing and West Wing of Pakistan,

respectively, and in 1971 the East Wing became Bangladesh.

After independence India's leaders attempted to build a sec- ular state in which national identity would supersede regional,

religious, or cultural identities. They regarded the movements

for regional autonomy or independence in Punjab, Jammu and

Kashmir, Tamil Nadu, and Assam as threats to Indian unity, particularly because Indian leaders believed that their neighbors—Pakistan, later Bangladesh, and Sri Lanka—supported

these movements. Furthermore, despite the commitment of

Congress (I) leaders to the secular ideal, communal tensions

and the rising influence of Hindu political parties pushed the

Indian government increasingly to identify Indian greatness

with Hinduism. The inability of Indian leaders to restrain antiMuslim communal violence and the Kashmir policy of the

Indian government resulted in continual tensions in relations

with its Muslim neighbors. Thus, internal security and domestic political considerations, which stemmed from the perceived

goals of building national identity and preserving national

unity, permeated India's relations with its neighbors.

Security Perceptions

The British colonial rulers regarded most of South Asia as a

strategic unit and endeavored to exclude external powers from

the region (see The British Empire in India, ch. 1). In defending this strategic unit, the British established a barrier of buffer

states around India, attempting to cut off India from Russia

and China, which could threaten from the north, and used

naval power to protect India from the south. India's postindependence leaders adapted this concept by defining a position

in cultural as well as geographical terms. This view led them to

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Foreign Relations

view India as the region's preeminent power whose right to involve itself in its neighbor's affairs was justified in terms of

the common ethnicity and common security needs of South

Asia.

This geostrategic perception affected India's foreign relations in three ways. First, India endeavored, by treaty, alliance, or threats of force or economic embargo, to overturn any move

by its neighbors that it deemed inimical to its own security

interests. Of its neighbors, only Pakistan and China have been

able to resist or thwart Indian actions. The Indian elite

regarded their country as a regional peacekeeper whose moves

were entirely defensive, rather than as a regional enforcer who

imposed onerous conditions on its neighbors by virtue of its size and military might. Second, India viewed the intrusion of

extraregional powers into South Asia as a threat to Indian security and to India's position as the predominant country in the

region. India opposed any attempts by powers external to the

region, whether by invitation of New Delhi's neighbors or not,

to involve themselves or to establish a presence in the region.

Therefore India was critical of Pakistan's alliance with China,

the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, and the United States naval

presence on Diego Garcia in the central Indian Ocean and its military relations with Pakistan. India also resisted Moscow's

entreaties to grant the Soviet navy base rights despite the 1971

friendship treaty with the Soviet Union.

India's program to build the military might necessary to defend its territory and security interests became intertwined

in its foreign policy. New Delhi's defense buildup—particularly

its covert nuclear weapons program and its drive to develop

ballistic missiles—affected relations with Pakistan, China, and

the United States. India's refusal to sign the 1968 Treaty on the

Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons stemmed as much from

Pakistan's similar stance as from India's belief that the treaty

discriminated against the development of peaceful nuclear

technology by nonnuclear weapons states and failed to prevent

the qualitative and quantitative vertical proliferation of nuclear

weapons among the nations already possessing nuclear arms.

In 1995, when 174 other nations approved an indefinite extension of the treaty, India continued to refuse to sign, denouncing the treaty as "perpetuating nuclear discrimination." In

addition, in the early 1990s India's sizable defense expenditures became an issue in New Delhi's attempts to secure assis517
India: A Country Study

tance from developed countries and multilateral lending

bodies (see Defense Spending, ch. 10).

Nonalignment

Nonalignment had its origins in India's colonial experience

and the nonviolent independence struggle led by the Congress, which left India determined to be the master of its fate in an international system dominated politically by Cold War alli- ances and economically by Western capitalism. The principles

of nonalignment, as articulated by Nehru and his successors, were preservation of India's freedom of action internationally

through refusal to align India with any bloc or alliance, particularly those led by the United States or the Soviet Union; nonviolence and international cooperation as a means of settling

international disputes; the Panch Shila (see Glossary), or the

five principles of peaceful coexistence, as the basis for relations

between states; opposition to colonialism and racism; and

international cooperation to alleviate poverty and promote

economic development (see Nehru's Legacy, ch. 1). Nonalignment was a consistent feature of Indian foreign policy by the

late 1940s and enjoyed strong, almost unquestioning support

among the Indian elite. In the 1950s and 1960s, Nehru's concept of nonalignment

brought India considerable international prestige among

newly independent states that shared India's concerns about

the military confrontation between the superpowers and the

influence of the former colonial powers. New Delhi used non- alignment to establish a significant role for itself as a leader of

the Third World in such multilateral organizations as the

United Nations (UN) and the Nonaligned Movement (see Participation in International Organizations, this ch.). The signing

of the Treaty of Peace, Friendship, and Cooperation between

India and the Soviet Union in 1971 and India's involvement in

the internal affairs of its smaller neighbors in the 1970s and

1980s tarnished New Delhi's image as a nonaligned nation and

led some observers to note that in practice, nonalignment

applied only to India's relations with countries outside South

Asia.

The early 1990s demise of the bipolar world system, which

had existed since the end of World War II, shook the underpinnings of India's foreign policy. The Cold War system of alli- ances had been rendered meaningless by the collapse of the

East European communist states, the dissolution of the Warsaw

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Foreign Relations

Treaty Organization (Warsaw Pact), and the demise of the

Soviet Union. In the early 1990s, most colonies had become

independent, and apartheid in South Africa was being dismantled, diminishing the value of anticolonialism and making it impossible for antiracism to serve as a rallying point for international political action (India and South Africa restored full diplomatic relations in 1993 after a thirty-nine-year lapse). The

Panch Shila, peaceful resolution of international disputes, and

international cooperation to spur economic development

which was being enhanced by domestic economic reforms

were broad objectives in a changing world. Thus, the 1990s saw

India redefining nonalignment and the view of India's place in

the world.

Overview of Foreign Relations

South Asia

Pakistan

Relations with Pakistan have demanded a high proportion of

India's international energies and undoubtedly will continue

to do so. India and Pakistan have divergent national ideologies

and have been unable to establish a mutually acceptable power

equation in South Asia. The national ideologies of pluralism,

democracy, and secularism for India and of Islam for Pakistan

grew out of the preindependence struggle between the Congress and the All-India Muslim League (Muslim League—see Glossary), and in the early 1990s the line between domestic

and foreign politics in India's relations with Pakistan remained

blurred. Because great-power competition—between the

United States and the Soviet Union and between the Soviet

Union and China—became intertwined with the conflicts

between India and Pakistan, India was unable to attain its goal

of insulating South Asia from global rivalries. This superpower

involvement enabled Pakistan to use external force in the face

of India's superior endowments of population and resources. The most difficult problem in relations between India and

Pakistan since partition in August 1947 has been their dispute over Kashmir. Pakistan's leaders did not accept the legality of

the Instrument of Accession of Kashmir to India, and undeclared war broke out in October 1947 (see The Experience of

Wars, ch. 10). It was the first of three conflicts between the two

countries. Pakistan's representatives ever since have argued

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India: A Country Study

that the people of Kashmir should be allowed to exercise their

right to self-determination through a plebiscite, as promised by

Nehru and required by UN Security Council resolutions in

1948 and 1949. The inconclusive fighting led to a UN-arranged

cease-fire starting on January 1, 1949. OnJuly 18, 1949, the two

sides signed the Karachi Agreement establishing a cease-fire

line that was to be supervised by the UN. The demarcation left Srinagar and almost 139,000 square kilometers under Indian

control and 83,807 square kilometers under Pakistani control.

Of these two areas, China occupied 37,555 square kilometers in

India's Ladakh District (part of which is known as Aksai Chin)

in 1962 and Pakistan ceded, in effect, 5,180 square kilometers

in the Karakoram area to China when the two countries demarcated their common border in 1961-65, leaving India with

101,387 square kilometers and Pakistan with 78,387 square

kilometers. Starting in January 1949, and still in place in 1995,

the UN Military Observer Group in India and Pakistan was

tasked with supervising the cease-fire in Kashmir. The group

comprises thirty-eight observers—from Belgium, Chile, Denmark, Finland, Italy, Norway, Sweden, and Uruguay—who

rotate their headquarters every six months between Srinagar

(summer) and Rawalpindi, Pakistan (winter).

In 1952 the elected and overwhelmingly Muslim Constituent

Assembly ofJammu and Kashmir, led by the popular Sheikh

Mohammed Abdullah, voted in favor of confirming accession

to India. Thereafter, India regarded this vote as an adequate

expression of popular will and demurred on holding a plebiscite. After 1953 Jammu and Kashmir was identified as standing

for the secular, pluralistic, and democratic principles of the

Indian polity. Nehru refused to discuss the subject bilaterally

until 1963, when India, under pressure from the United States and Britain, engaged in six rounds of secret talks with Pakistan

on "Kashmir and other related issues." These negotiations

failed, as did the 1964 attempt at mediation made by Abdullah,

who recently had been released from a long detention by the

Indian government because of his objections to Indian control.

Armed infiltrators from Pakistan crossed the cease-fire line,

and the number of skirmishes between Indian and Pakistani

troops increased in the summer of 1965. Starting on August 5,

1965, India alleged, Pakistani forces began to infiltrate the

Indian-controlled portion ofJammu and Kashmir. India made

a countermove in late August, and by September 1, 1965, the

second conflict had fully erupted as Pakistan launched an

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attack across the international line of control in southwest

Jammu and Kashmir. Indian forces retaliated on September 6

in Pakistan's Punjab Province and prevailed over Pakistan's

apparent superiority in tanks and aircraft. A cease-fire called by

the UN Security Council on September 23 was observed by

both sides. At Tashkent, Uzbekistan, in January 1966, the belligerents agreed to restore the status quo ante and to resolve

outstanding issues by negotiation.

The third war between India and Pakistan, in December

1971, centered in the east over the secession of East Pakistan

(which became Bangladesh), but it also included engagements

in Kashmir and elsewhere on the India-West Pakistan front.

India's military victory was complete. The independence of

Bangladesh was widely interpreted in India—but not in Pakistan—as an ideological victory disproving the "Two Nations

Theory" pushed by the Muslim League and that led to partition in 1947. At Shimla (Simla), Himachal Pradesh, on July 2,

1972, Indira Gandhi and Pakistan's President Zulfikar Ali

Bhutto signed the Simla Accord by which India would return

all personnel and captured territory in the west and the two

countries would "settle their differences by peaceful means

through bilateral negotiations." External bodies, including the

UN, were excluded from the process. The fighting had resulted

in the capture of each other's territory at various points along

the cease-fire line, but the Simla Accord defined a new line of

control that deviated in only minor ways from the 1949 ceasefire line. The two sides agreed not to alter the actual line of

control unilaterally and promised to respect it "without prejudice to the recognized position of either side." Both sides further undertook to "refrain from the threat or use of force in

violation of the line." During the late 1970s and early 1980s, Jammu and Kashmir

prospered under a virtually autonomous government led first by Sheikh Abdullah and then by his son Farooq Abdullah. In

the summer of 1984, differences between Srinagar and New

Delhi led to the dismissal of Farooq's government by highly

questionable means. Kashmir once again became an irritant in

bilateral relations. Indian diplomats consistently accused Paki- stan of trying to "internationalize" the Kashmir dispute in violation of the Simla Accord.

In the mid- to late 1980s, the political situation in Kashmir

became increasingly unstable. In March 1986, New Delhi

invoked President's Rule to remove Farooq's successor, Ghulam

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India: A Country Study

Mohammed Shah, as chief minister, and replace his rule with

that of Governor Jagmohan, who had been appointed by the

central government in 1984. In state elections held in 1987,

Farooq's political party, the National Conference, forged an

alliance with Rajiv Gandhi's Congress (I), which won a majority

in the state elections. Farooq's government failed to deal with

Kashmir's economic problems and the endemic corruption of

its public institutions, providing fertile ground for militant

Kashmiris who demanded either independence or association

with Pakistan.

A rising spiral of unrest, demonstrations, armed attacks by

Kashmiri separatists, and armed suppression by Indian security

forces started in 1988 and was still occurring in the mid-1990s.

New Delhi charged Islamabad (Pakistan's capital) with assisting

insurgents in Jammu and Kashmir, and Prime Minister V.P. Singh warned that India should be psychologically prepared

for war. In Pakistan Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto stated that

Pakistan was willing to fight a "thousand-year war" for control

of Kashmir. Under pressure from the United States, the Soviet

Union, and China to avoid a military conflict and solve their

dispute under the terms of the Simla Accord, India and Pakistan backed off in May 1990 and engaged in a series of talks on

confidence-building measures for the rest of the year. Tensions

reached new heights in the early and mid-1990s with increasing

internal unrest in Jammu and Kashmir, charges of human

rights abuses, and repeated clashes between Indian paramilitary forces and Kashmiri militants, allegedly armed with Pakistani-supplied weapons (see Political Issues, ch. 8; Insurgent

Movements and External Subversion, ch. 10).

A concurrent irritant related to the Kashmir dispute was the

confrontation over the Siachen Glacier near the Karakoram

Pass, which is located in northeast Jammu and Kashmir. In

1984, Indian officials, citing Pakistan's "cartographic aggression" extending the line of control northeast toward the Karakoram Pass, contended that Pakistan intended to occupy the

Siachen Glacier in order to stage an attack into Indian-controlled Kashmir. After New Delhi airlifted troops into the west- ern parts of the Saltoro Mountains, Islamabad deployed troops

opposite them. Both sides maintained 5,000 troops in temperatures averaging -40°C. The estimated cost for India was about

10 percent of the annual defense budget for FY 1992. After sev- eral skirmishes between the opposing troops, negotiations to resolve this confrontation began with five rounds of talks

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between 1986 and 1989. After a three-year hiatus because of

tensions caused by the other Kashmir conflict, a sixth round of

talks was held in November 1992. Some progress was made on

the details of an agreement. In March 1994, Indian diplomats

garnered enough support at the UN Human Rights Commission to force Pakistan to withdraw a resolution charging India

with human rights violations in Jammu and Kashmir. The two

sides were encouraged to resolve their dispute through bilateral talks. After the Soviet Union invaded Afghanistan in December

1979 and Indira Gandhi returned to power in 1980, she quickly

dispatched a special emissary to assure Pakistani president

General Mohammad Zia ul Haq that he could remove as many

divisions as he wished from the Indian border without fear of

any advantage being taken by India and suggested talks on

reduction of force levels. Indian officials worked hard to prevent Zia from using the Afghan crisis as an opportunity to alter

the regional balance of power by acquiring advanced weapons

from the United States. In addition, Indira Gandhi attempted

to avoid antagonizing the Soviet Union, democratic elements

in Pakistan, and the substantial anti-Pakistan lobby within

India. These largely secret efforts culminated in the visit of

Minister of External Affairs PV. Narasimha Rao to Pakistan in

June 1981, during which time he declared publicly that India was "unequivocally committed to respect Pakistan's national

unity, territorial integrity, and sovereign equality" as well as its right to obtain arms for self-defense.

Despite the setback suffered when the United States and

Pakistan announced a new security and military assistance program, regular meetings took place between high Indian and

Pakistani officials. These meetings were institutionalized in late 1982 in the Indo-Pakistan Joint Commission, which included

subcommissions for trade, economics, information, and travel. Indira Gandhi also received Zia on November 1, 1982, in New

Delhi, and during their meeting they authorized their foreign

ministers and foreign secretaries to proceed with talks leading

to the establishment of the South Asian Association for

Regional Cooperation (SAARC—see Glossary).

In the mid- and late 1980s, India-Pakistan relations settled

into a pattern of ups and downs. Despite the signing of an eco- nomic and trade agreement, little progress was made in con- cluding a comprehensive, long-term economic agreement to have nondiscriminatory bilateral trade. In addition, New Delhi

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India: A Country Study

charged Islamabad with arming and training Sikh terrorists in

Punjab. The government's 1984 White Paper on the Punjab Agitation stated that India's strength, unity, and secularism were tar- gets of attack. The December 1985 visit of Zia to India, during

which both sides agreed not to attack each other's nuclear facilities, ushered in a brief phase of cordiality, in which another

agreement expanding trade was signed. The cordiality evaporated in early 1986, with further Indian unhappiness over Pakistan's alleged interference in Punjab and the bungled Pakistani

handling of the terrorist seizure of a Pan American airliner in

which many Indians died. For its part, Pakistan was disturbed

by anti-Muslim riots in India, and Zia accused India of assisting

the political campaign of Benazir Bhutto.

Between November 1986 and February 1987, first India,

then Pakistan, conducted provocative military maneuvers

along their border that raised tensions considerably. India's

"Operation Brass Tacks" took place in Rajasthan, across from

Pakistan's troubled Sindh Province, and Pakistan's maneuvers

were located close to India's state of Punjab. The crisis atmosphere was heightened when Pakistan's premier nuclear scientist Abdul Qadir Khan revealed in a March 1987 interview that

Pakistan had manufactured a nuclear bomb. Although Khan

later retracted his statement, India stated that the disclosure was "forcing us to review our option." The tensions created by

the military exercises and the nuclear issue were defused fol- lowing talks at the foreign secretary level in New Delhi (January 31-February 4) and Islamabad (February 27-March 2),

during which the two sides agreed to a phased troop withdrawal to peacetime positions.

The sudden death of Zia in an air crash in August 1988 and

the assumption of the prime ministership by Benazir Bhutto in

December 1988 after democratic elections provided the two

countries with an unexpected opportunity to improve relations. Rajiv Gandhi's attendance at the SAARC summit in

Islamabad in December 1988 permitted the two prime ministers to establish a personal rapport and to sign three bilateral

agreements, including one proscribing attacks on each other's

nuclear facilities. Despite the personal sympathy between the

two leaders and Bhutto's initial emphasis on the 1972 Simla

Accord as the basis for warmer bilateral ties, domestic political

pressures, particularly relating to unrest in Sindh, Punjab, and

Kashmir effectively destroyed the chances for improved relations in 1989 and 1990. For her part, Bhutto backed away from

524
her comments on the Simla Accord by continuing to press the

Kashmir issue internationally, and Indian public opinion

forced Rajiv Gandhi and his successor, V.P. Singh, to take a hard line on events relating to Kashmir.

In the early 1990s, Indian-Pakistani relations remained trou- bled despite bilateral efforts and changes in the international

environment. High-level dialogue on a range of bilateral issues

took place between foreign ministers and prime ministers at the UN and at other international meetings. However, discussions over confidence-building measures, begun in the summer

of 1990 as a response to the Kashmir confrontation, were can- celed in June 1992 following mutual expulsions of diplomats

for alleged espionage activities. In June 1991, Pakistani prime

minister Mian Nawaz Sharif proposed talks by India, Pakistan,

the United States, the Soviet Union, and China to consider

making South Asia a nuclear-free zone, but the minority governments of Chandra Shekhar and subsequently that of

Narasimha Rao declined to participate. Nevertheless, negotiations concerning the Siachen Glacier resumed in November

1992 after a hiatus of three years. By the mid-1990s, little had

occurred to improve bilateral relations as unrest in Jammu and

Kashmir accelerated and domestic politics in both nations were

unsettled.

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India: A Country Study

Bangladesh

Although India played a major role in the establishment of an independent Bangladesh on April 17. 1971. New Delhi's

relations with Dhaka, the capital of Bangladesh, were neither

close nor free from dispute (see The Rise of Indira Gandhi, ch.

1). In 1975 Bangladesh began to move awav from the linguistic

nadonalism that had marked its liberation struggle and linked

it to India's West Bengal state. Instead. Dhaka stressed Islam as the binding force in Bangladeshi nationalism. The new emphasis on Islam., combined with Bangladeshi concern over India's

military buildup and bilateral disputes over riparian borders,

shared water resources,, and illegal immigration of Bangladeshis into West Bengal, made for fluctuations in India-Bangladesh relations.

Relations are generally orood. nevertheless: the two countries

have maintained a dialogue on a variety of issues and initiated a modest program of joint economic cooperation. In 1977 New

Delhi and Dhaka signed an agreement—that is renewed annually—on sharing the waters of the Ganga (Ganges) River during the drv season, but the two sides made little progress in

achieving a permanent solution to their other problems. The

main item of contention is the Farakka Barrage, where the

Gan^a divides into two branches and India has built a feeder

canal that controls the flow by rechanneling water on the

Indian side of the river. The two nations were still at odds,

despite high-level talks, in the mid-1990s.

In the mid- and late 1980s. India's plan to erect a fence to prevent cross-border migration from Bangladesh and Bangladesh's desire that Chakma insurgents not receive Indian

covert assistance and refuge in India were major irritants in

bilateral relations. As agreed eighteen years earlier, in June

1992 India granted a perpetual lease to Bangladesh for the nar- row. 1.5-hectare Tin Bigha corridor in the Ganga's delta that

had long separated an enclave of Bangladeshis from their

homeland. The two countries signed new agreements to enhance economic cooperation. Bangladesh also received

Indian developmental assistance, but that aid was minor compared with the amounts India granted to Nepal,. Bhutan. Sri

Lanka, and Maldives. The year 1991 also witnessed the first- ever visit of an Indian armv chief of staff to Dhaka.

Sri Lanka

The two major factors influencing India's relations with Sri

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Lanka have been security and the shared ethnicity of Tamils liv- ing in southern India and in northern and eastern Sri Lanka.

Before 1980 common security perceptions and New Delhi's

reluctance to intervene in internal affairs in Sri Lanka's capital

of Colombo made for relatively close ties between the two

countries' governments. Beginning in the mid-1950s, and coinciding with the withdrawal of Britain's military presence in the

Indian Ocean, India and Sri Lanka increasingly came to share

regional security interests. In the 1970s, New Delhi and

Colombo enjoyed close ties on the strength of the relationship

between Indira Gandhi and Sri Lanka's prime minister, Mrs.

Sirimavo Ratwatte Dias (S.R.D.) Bandaranaike. India fully

approved Sri Lanka's desire to replace the British security

umbrella with an Indian one, and both sides pursued a policy

of nonalignment and cooperated to minimize Western influ- ence in the Indian Ocean.

In the 1980s, ethnic conflict between Sri Lankan Sinhalese

in the south and Sri Lankan Tamils in the north escalated, and

Tamil separatists established bases and received funding, weapons, and, reportedly, training in India. The clandestine assis- tance came from private sources and, according to some

observers, the state government of Tamil Nadu, and was toler- ated by the central government until 1987. Anti-Tamil violence

in Colombo in July 1983 prompted India to intervene in the

Tamil-Sinhalese conflict, but mediatory efforts failed to prevent the deterioration of the situation. In May 1987, after the

Sri Lankan government attempted to regain control of the

Jaffna region, in the extreme northern area of the island, by

means of an economic blockade and military action, India supplied food and medicine by air and sea to the region. On July

29, 1987, Indian prime minister Rajiv Gandhi and Sri Lankan

president Junius Richard (J.R.) Jayawardene signed an accord

designed to settle the conflict by sending the Indian Peace

Keeping Force (IPKF) to establish order and disarm Tamil separatists, to establish new administrative bodies and hold elections to accommodate Tamil demands for autonomy, and to repatriate Tamil refugees in India and Sri Lanka. The accord

also forbade the military use of Sri Lankan ports or broadcasting facilities by outside powers. The Liberation Tigers of Tamil

Eelam (LTTE), the most militant separatist group, refused to disarm, and Indian troops sustained heavy casualties while fail- ing to destroy the LTTE. In June 1989, newly elected Sri Lankan president Ranasinghe Premadasa demanded the

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India: A Country Study

withdrawal of the IPKF. Despite the tensions between the two

countries created by this request, New Delhi completed the

withdrawal in March 1990 (see Peacekeeping Operations, ch.

10).

Bilateral relations improved somewhat in the early 1990s, as the government attempted to expand economic, scientific, and

cultural cooperation. India continued to take an interest in the

status of Sri Lankan Tamils, but without the direct intervention

that characterized the 1980s. The May 1991 assassination of

Rajiv Gandhi, allegedly by the LTTE, forced New Delhi to crack

down on the LTTE presence in Tamil Nadu and to institute

naval patrols in the Palk Strait to interdict LTTE movements to India. In January 1992, repatriation of Tamil refugees to Sri

Lanka commenced and was still underway in 1994.

Nepal

Relations between India and Nepal are close yet fraught with

difficulties stemming from geography, economics, the problems inherent in big power-small power relations, and common

ethnic and linguistic identities that overlap the two countries'

borders. In 1950 New Delhi and Kathmandu initiated their

intertwined relationship with the Treaty of Peace and Friendship and accompanying letters that defined security relations

between the two countries, and an agreement governing both

bilateral trade and trade transiting Indian soil. The 1950 treaty

and letters stated that "neither government shall tolerate any

threat to the security of the other by a foreign aggressor" and

obligated both sides "to inform each other of any serious fric- tion or misunderstanding with any neighboring state likely to cause any breach in the friendly relations subsisting between

the two governments." These accords cemented a "special rela- tionship" between India and Nepal that granted Nepal preferential economic treatment and provided Nepalese in India the

same economic and educational opportunities as Indian citi- zens.In the 1950s, Nepal welcomed close relations with India, but

as the number of Nepalese living and working in India

increased and the involvement of India in Nepal's economy

deepened in the 1960s and after, so too did Nepalese discomfort with the special relationship. Tensions came to a head in

the mid-1970s, when Nepal pressed for substantial amendments in its favor in the trade and transit treaty and openly crit- icized India's 1975 annexation of Sikkim as an Indian state. In

528
Rajiv Gandhi, prime minister

from 1984 to 1989

Courtesy Embassy ofIndia,

Washington

1975 King Birendra Bir Bikram Shah Dev proposed that Nepal

be recognized internationally as a zone of peace; he received

support from China and Pakistan. In New Delhi's view, if the

king's proposal did not contradict the 1950 treaty and was

merely an extension of nonalignment, it was unnecessary; if it was a repudiation of the special relationship, it represented a

possible threat to India's security and could not be endorsed.

In 1984 Nepal repeated the proposal, but there was no reaction

from India. Nepal continually promoted the proposal in international forums, with Chinese support; by 1990 it had won the

support of 112 countries.

In 1978 India agreed to separate trade and transit treaties,

satisfying a long-term Nepalese demand. In 1988, when the two

treaties were up for renewal, Nepal's refusal to accommodate

India's wishes on the transit treaty caused India to call for a sin- gle trade and transit treaty. Thereafter, Nepal took a hard-line

position that led to a serious crisis in India-Nepal relations.

After two extensions, the two treaties expired on March 23,

1989, resulting in a virtual Indian economic blockade of Nepal

that lasted until late April 1990. Although economic issues were a major factor in the two countries' confrontation, Indian

dissatisfaction with Nepal's 1988 acquisition of Chinese weaponry played an important role. New Delhi perceived the arms

purchase as an indication of Kathmandu's intent to build a mil529
India: A Country Study

itary relationship with Beijing, in violation of the 1950 treaty

and letters exchanged in 1959 and 1965, which included Nepal

in India's security zone and precluded arms purchases without

India's approval. India linked security with economic relations

and insisted on reviewing India-Nepal relations as a whole.

Nepal had to back down after worsening economic conditions

led to a change in Nepal's political system, in which the king was forced to institute a parliamentary democracy. The new

government sought quick restoration of amicable relations

with India.

The special security relationship between New Delhi and

Kathmandu was reestablished during the June 1990 New Delhi

meeting of Nepal's prime minister Krishna Prasad Bhattarai

and Indian prime minister V.P. Singh. During the December

1991 visit to India by Nepalese prime minister Girijad Prasad

Koirala, the two countries signed new, separate trade and transit treaties and other economic agreements designed to accord

Nepal additional economic benefits.

Indian-Nepali relations appeared to be undergoing still more reassessment when Nepal's prime minister Man Mohan

Adhikary visited New Delhi in April 1995 and insisted on a major review of the 1950 peace and friendship treaty. In the

face of benign statements by his Indian hosts relating to the

treaty, Adhikary sought greater economic independence for

his landlocked nation while simultaneously striving to improve

ties with China.

Bhutan

Despite the long and substantial involvement of India in

Bhutan's economic, educational, and military affairs, and

India's advisory role in foreign affairs embodied in the August

8, 1949, Treaty of Friendship Between the Government of

India and the Government of Bhutan, Thimphu's autonomy

has been fully respected by New Delhi. Bhutan's geographic

isolation, its distinctive Buddhist culture, and its deliberate

restriction on the number and kind of foreigners admitted

have helped to protect its separate identity. Furthermore, Bhutan's relationship with China, unlike Nepal's, has not become

an issue in relations with India. Bhutanese subjects have the

same access to economic and educational opportunities as Indian citizens, and Indian citizens have the right to carry on

trade in Bhutan, with some restrictions that protect Bhutanese

industries. India also provides Bhutan with developmental

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Foreign Relations

assistance and cooperation in infrastructure, telecommunications, industry, energy, medicine, and animal husbandry. Since

joining the UN in 1971, Bhutan has increasingly established its international status in a concerted effort to avoid the fate of

Sikkim's absorption into India following the reduction of Sikkim's indigenous people to minority status. Maldives

India and Maldives have enjoyed close and friendly relations

since Maldives became independent in 1965. Disputes between

the two countries have been few, and both sides amicably set- tled their maritime boundary in 1976. In November 1988, at the behest of the Maldivian government, Indian paratroopers

and naval forces crushed a coup attempt by mercenaries.

India's action, viewed by some critics as an indication of Indian

ambitions to be a regional police officer, were regarded by the

United States, the Soviet Union, Britain, Nepal, and Bangladesh as legitimate assistance to a friendly government and

in keeping with India's strategic role in South Asia. In the 1980s

and 1990s, Indian and Maldivian leaders maintained regular

consultations at the highest levels. New Delhi also has provided

developmental assistance to Male (Maldives' capital) and has

participated in bilateral cooperation programs in infrastructure development, health and welfare, civil aviation, telecommunications, and labor resources development.

China

Although India and China had relatively little political contact before the 1950s, both countries have had extensive cultural contact since the first century A.D., especially with the

transmission of Buddhism from India to China (see Buddhism,

ch. 3). Although Nehru based his vision of "resurgent Asia" on

friendship between the two largest states of Asia, the two countries had a conflict of interest in Tibet (which later became

China's Xizang Autonomous Region), a geographical and

political buffer zone where India had inherited special privileges from the British colonial government. At the end of its civil war in 1949, China wanted to reassert control over Tibet

and to "liberate" the Tibetan people from Lamaism (Tibetan

Buddhism) and feudalism, which it did by force of arms in

1950. To avoid antagonizing China, Nehru informed Chinese

leaders that India had neither political nor territorial ambitions, nor did it seek special privileges in Tibet, but that tradi531
India: A Country Study

tional trading rights must continue. With Indian support,

Tibetan delegates signed an agreement in May 1951 recognizing Chinese sovereignty and control but guaranteeing that the

existing political and social system in Tibet would continue.

Direct negotiations between India and China commenced in an atmosphere improved by India's mediatory efforts in ending the Korean War (1950-53).

In April 1954, India and China signed an eight-year agreement on Tibet that set forth the basis of their relationship in

the form of the Panch Shila. Although critics called the Panch

Shila naive, Nehru calculated that in the absence of either the

wherewithal or a policy for defense of the Himalayan region,

India's best guarantee of security was to establish a psychological buffer zone in place of the lost physical buffer of Tibet.

Thus the catch phrase of India's diplomacy with China in the

1950s was Hindi-Chini bhai-bhai (Hindi for "India and China are

brothers"). Up to 1959, despite border skirmishes and discrepancies between Indian and Chinese maps, Chinese leaders amicably had assured India that there was no territorial controversy on the border.

When an Indian reconnaissance party discovered a completed Chinese road running through the Aksai Chin region of

the Ladakh District ofJammu and Kashmir, border clashes and

Indian protests became more frequent and serious. In January

1959, Chinese premier Zhou Enlai wrote to Nehru, rejecting

Nehru's contention that the border was based on treaty and

custom and pointing out that no government in China had

accepted as legal the McMahon Line, which in the 1914 Simla

Convention defined the eastern section of the border between

India and Tibet. The Dalai Lama—spiritual and temporal head

of the Tibetan people—sought sanctuary in Dharmsala, Himachal Pradesh, in March 1959, and thousands of Tibetan refugees settled in northwestern India, particularly in Himachal

Pradesh. China accused India of expansionism and imperialism in Tibet and throughout the Himalayan region. China

claimed 104,000 square kilometers of territory over which

India's maps showed clear sovereignty, and demanded "rectifi- cation" of the entire border.

Zhou proposed that China relinquish its claim to most of

India's northeast in exchange for India's abandonment of its claim to Aksai Chin. The Indian government, constrained by

domestic public opinion, rejected the idea of a settlement

532
Foreign Relations

based on uncompensated loss of territory as being humiliating

and unequal.

Chinese forces attacked India on October 20, 1962. Having

pushed the unprepared, ill-equipped, and inadequately led

Indian forces to within forty-eight kilometers of the Assam

plains in the northeast and having occupied strategic points in

Ladakh, China declared a unilateral cease-fire on November 21

and withdrew twenty kilometers behind its new line of control

(see The Experience of Wars, ch. 10).

Relations with China worsened during the rest of the 1960s

and the early 1970s as Chinese-Pakistani relations improved

and Chinese-Soviet relations worsened. China backed Pakistan

in its 1965 war with India. Between 1967 and 1971, an all- weather road was built across territory claimed by India, linking China's Xinjiang Uygur Autonomous Region with Pakistan;

India could do no more than protest. China continued an

active propaganda campaign against India and supplied ideological, financial, and other assistance to dissident groups,

especially to tribes in northeastern India. China accused India

of assisting the Khampa rebels in Tibet. Diplomatic contact

between the two governments was minimal although not formally severed. The flow of cultural and other exchanges that

had marked the 1950s ceased entirely. In August 1971, India

signed its Treaty of Peace, Friendship, and Cooperation with

the Soviet Union, and the United States and China sided with

Pakistan in its December 1971 war with India. By this time,

Beijing was seated at the UN, where its representatives

denounced India as being a "tool of Soviet expansionism."

India and China renewed efforts to improve relations after

the Soviet Union invaded Afghanistan in December 1979.

China modified its pro-Pakistan stand on Kashmir and

appeared willing to remain silent on India's absorption of Sikkim and its special advisory relationship with Bhutan. China's

leaders agreed to discuss the boundary issue—India's priority—as the first step to a broadening of relations. The two countries hosted each others' news agencies, and Kailash

(Kangrinboge Feng) and Mansarowar Lake (Mapam Yumco

Lake) in Tibet—the mythological home of the Hindu pantheon—were opened to annual pilgrimages from India. In

1981 Chinese minister of foreign affairs Huang Hua was invited

to India, where he made complimentary remarks about India's

role in South Asia. Chinese premier Zhao Ziyang concurrently

toured Pakistan, Nepal, and Bangladesh.

533
India: A Country Study

After the Huang visit,. India and China held eight rounds of

border negotiations between December 1981 and November

19S7. These talks initiallv raised hopes that progress could be

made on the border issue. However, in 1985 China stiffened its position on the border and insisted on mutual concessions

without defining the exact terms of its "package proposal" or where the actual line of control lay. In 1986 and 1987. the

negotiations achieved nothing, given the charges exchanged

between the two countries of militarv encroachment in the

Sumdorune Chu vallev of the Tawane tract on the eastern sec- tor of the border. China's construction of a militarv post and

helicopter pad in the area in 1986 and India's grant of state- hood to Arunachal Pradesh (formerly the North-East Frontier

Agencv) in February 1987 caused both sides to deplov new

troops to the area, raising tensions and fears of a new border

war. China relayed warnings that it would "teach India a lesson"

if it did not cease "nibbling" at Chinese territorv. By the sum- mer of 1987, however, both sides had backed away from conflict and denied that militarv clashes had taken place.

A warming trend in relations was facilitated bv Rajiv Gandhi's visit to China in December 1988. The two sides issued a joint communique that stressed the need to restore friendlv

relations on the basis of the Panch Shila and noted the importance of the first visit bv an Indian prime minister to China

since Nehru's 1954 visit. India and China agreed to broaden

bilateral ties in various areas, working to achieve a "fair and rea- sonable settlement while seeking a mutually acceptable solution' to the border dispute. The communique also expressed

China's concern about agitation by Tibetan separatists in India

and reiterated China's position that Tibet was an integral part

of China and that anti-China political activities bv expatriate

Tibetans was not to be tolerated. Rajiv Gandhi signed bilateral

agreements on science and technology cooperation, on civil aviation to establish direct air links, and on cultural exchanges.

The two sides also agreed to hold annual diplomatic consultations between foreign ministers, and to set up a joint ministerial committee on economic and scientific cooperation and a joint working group on the boundarv issue. The latter group

was to be led bv the Indian foreign secretary and the Chinese

vice minister of foreign affairs. As the mid-1990s approached, slow but steadv improvement

in relations with China was visible. Top-level dialogue continued with the December 1991 visit of Chinese premier Li Peng

534
Foreign Relations

to India and the May 1992 visit to China of Indian president

Ramaswami Venkataraman. Six rounds of talks of the IndianChinese Joint Working Group on the Border Issue were held

between December 1988 and June 1993. Progress was also

made in reducing tensions on the border via confidence-building measures, including mutual troop reductions, regular

meetings of local military commanders, and advance notification of military exercises. Border trade resumed in July 1992

after a hiatus of more than thirty years, consulates reopened in

Bombay (or Mumbai in the Marathi language) and Shanghai

in December 1992, and, in June 1993, the two sides agreed to open an additional border trading post. During Sharad Pawar's

July 1992 visit to Beijing, the first ever by an Indian minister of

defence, the two defense establishments agreed to develop aca- demic, military, scientific, and technological exchanges and to schedule an Indian port call by a Chinese naval vessel. Substantial movement in relations continued in 1993. The

sixth- round joint working group talks were held in June in

New Delhi but resulted in only minor developments. However,

as the year progressed the long-standing border dispute was

eased as a result of bilateral pledges to reduce troop levels and

to respect the cease-fire line along the India-China border.

Prime Minister Narasimha Rao and Chinese premier Li Peng

signed the border agreement and three other agreements (on

cross-border trade, and on increased cooperation on the environment and in radio and television broadcasting) during the

former's visit to Beijing in September. A senior-level Chinese

military delegation made a six-day goodwill visit to India in

December 1993 aimed at "fostering confidence-building measures between the defense forces of the two countries." The

visit, however, came at a time when press reports revealed that, as a result of improved relations between China and Burma,

China was exporting greater amounts of military materiel to Burma's army, navy, and air force and sending an increasing

number of technicians to Burma. Of concern to Indian security officials was the presence of Chinese radar technicians in

Burma's Coco Islands, which border India's Union Territory of

the Andaman and Nicobar Islands. Nevertheless, movement

continued in 1994 on troop reductions along the Himalayan

frontier. Moreover, in January 1994 Beijing announced that it not only favored a negotiated solution on Kashmir, but also

opposed any form of independence for the region.

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India: A Country Study

Talks were held in New Delhi in February 1994 aimed at con- firming established "confidence-building measures" and discussing clarification of the "line of actual control," reduction of

armed forces along the line, and prior information about

forthcoming military exercises. China's hope for settlement of

the boundary issue was reiterated.

The 1993 Chinese military visit to India was reciprocated by

Indian army chief of staff General B.C. Joshi. During talks in

Beijing in July 1994, the two sides agreed that border problems

should be resolved peacefully through "mutual understanding

and concessions." The border issue was raised in September

1994 when Chinese minister of national defense Chi Haotian

visited New Delhi for extensive talks with high-level Indian

trade and defense officials. Further talks in New Delhi in

March 1995 by the India-China Expert Group led to an agreement to set up two additional points of contact along the 4,000-

kilometer border to facilitate meetings between military personnel. The two sides also were reported as "seriously engaged"

in defining the McMahon Line and the line of actual control

vis-a-vis military exercises and prevention of air intrusion. Talks

in Beijing in July 1995 aimed at better border security and combating cross-border crimes and in New Delhi in August 1995 on

additional troop withdrawals from the border made* further

progress in reducing tensions.

Possibly indicative of the further relaxation of India-China

relations—at least there was little notice taken in Beijing—was

the April 1995 announcement, after a year of consultation, of

the opening of the Taipei Economic and Cultural Center in

New Delhi. The center serves as the representative office of

Taiwan and is the counterpart of the India-Taipei Association

in Taiwan; both institutions have the goal of improving relations between the two sides, which have been strained since

New Delhi's recognition of Beijing in 1950.

Southeast Asia

In the 1970s and 1980s, India's close ties with the Soviet

Union and its pro-Soviet, pro-Vietnamese policies toward Cambodia precluded development of any constructive relations

between India on the one hand and the countries of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN—see Glossary) on

the other. Furthermore, India's military buildup, particularly

of its naval capabilities and naval installations in the Andaman

and Nicobar Islands, worried ASEAN policy makers, who saw

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India as a potential threat to regional security. Indian-ASEAN

relations improved in the 1990s as the result of the end of the

bipolar world system, the UN-brokered peace settlement in

Cambodia, and the breakup of the Soviet Union. For its part,

New Delhi sought to boost economic and trade ties with the

region and to establish closer political and defense ties in order

to counteract China's growing influence in Southeast Asia.

ASEAN countries grew less concerned with India's regional

ambitions after New Delhi's decision to curtail its naval buildup

because of financial restraints. In January 1992, ASEAN

accepted India's proposal to become a "sectoral dialogue partner" in the areas of trade, technical and labor development,

technology, and tourism. India's new role was expected to facil- itate economic cooperation. In January 1993, India and Malaysia signed a memorandum of understanding on defense

cooperation.

India has had close ties with Cambodia, Laos, and Vietnam

as a result of its 1954-73 chairmanship of the International

Commissions of Control and Supervision established by the

1954 Geneva Accords on Indochina. These relations were

enhanced by India's friendship with the Soviet Union, particularly after 1971 and, in the case of Vietnam, shared perceptions

of the threat from China. With regard to Cambodia, India rec- ognized the Vietnamese-installed regime in 1980 and worked

to avert censure of the regime in the annual UN General

Assembly and triennial Nonaligned Movement summit meetings. In the late 1980s, Indian diplomats attempted to facilitate

the search for peace in Cambodia, and India participated in

the 1989 Paris Peace Conference on Cambodia and in subsequent efforts to find a solution to the Cambodian situation.

New Delhi played a minor but nevertheless constructive role

before and after the Agreement on a Comprehensive Political

Settlement of the Cambodia Conflict and three other documents were signed in Paris on October 23, 1991. India contributed more than 1,700 civilian, military, and police personnel to the United Nations Advanced Mission in Cambodia and the

United Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia.

Middle East India has traditionally pursued a pro-Arab policy regarding

the Arab-Israeli conflict in order to counteract Pakistani influ- ence in the region and to secure access to Middle East petroleum resources. In the 1950s and early 1960s, this pro-Arab

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India: A Country Study

stance did not help India in establishing good relations with all Arab countries but may have served to keep peace with its own

Muslim minority. India concentrated on developing a close

relationship with Egypt on the strength of Nehru's ties with

Egyptian president Gamel Abdul Nasser. But the New DelhiCairo friendship was insufficient to counteract Arab sympathy

for Pakistan in its dispute with India. Furthermore, IndianEgyptian ties came at the expense of cultivating relations with

such countries as Saudi Arabia and Jordan and thus limited

India's influence in the region.

In the late 1960s and in the 1970s, India successfully

improved bilateral relations by developing mutually beneficial

economic exchanges with a number of Islamic countries, particularly Iran, Iraq, Saudi Arabia, and the other Persian Gulf

states. The strength of India's economic ties enabled it to build

strong relationships with Iran and Iraq, which helped India

weather the displeasure of Islamic countries stemming from

India's war with Pakistan in 1971. Indian-Middle Eastern relations were further strengthened by New Delhi's anti-Israeli

stance in the Arab-Israeli wars of 1967 and 1973 and by Indian

support for the fourfold oil price rise in 1973 by the Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC). Closer ties with Middle Eastern countries were dictated by India's dependency on petroleum imports. Oil represented 8 percent of

India's total imports in 1971; 42 percent in 1981; and 28 percent in 1991. India purchased oil from Iran, Iraq, Saudi Arabia,

the United Arab Emirates, and Kuwait and, in return, provided

engineering services, manufactured goods, and labor. The

1980-88 Iran-Iraq War forced India to shift its oil purchases

from Iran and Iraq to Saudi Arabia and the Persian Gulf states. Saudi Arabia and the Gulf states also have received large numbers of Indian workers and manufactures and have become the

regional base for Indian business operations.

Two events in 1978 and 1979—the installation of the Islamic

regime under Ayatollah Sayyid Ruhollah Musavi Khomeini in

Iran and the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in support of the

pro-Soviet Marxist regime in Kabul—complicated India's relations with Middle East countries. From the Indian perspective,

these two events and the Iran-Iraq War changed the balance of

power in West Asia by weakening Iran as a regional power and

a potential supporter of Pakistan, a situation favorable to India.

At the same time, proxy superpower competition in Afghanistan strengthened the hand of India's adversary Pakistan by vir538
Foreign Relations

tue of the military support Pakistan received from the United

States, China, and Arab states led by Saudi Arabia. In the 1980s,

India performed a delicate diplomatic balancing act. New

Delhi took a position of neutrality in the Iran-Iraq War, maintained warm ties with Baghdad, and built workable political

and economic relations with Tehran despite misgivings about

the foreign policy goals of the Khomeini regime. India managed to improve relations with Middle Eastern countries that

provided support to the Afghan mujahideen and Pakistan by

redirecting Indian petroleum purchases to Saudi Arabia and

the Persian Gulf countries. New Delhi, which traditionally had

had close relations with Kabul, condemned the Soviet invasion

only in the most perfunctory manner and provided diplomatic,

economic, and logistic support for the Marxist regime.

In the early 1990s, India stepped back from its staunch antiIsraeli stance and support for the Palestinian cause. Besides

practical economic and security considerations in the postCold War world, domestic politics—especially those influenced

by Hindu nationalists—played a role in this reversal. In December 1991, India voted with the UN majority to repeal the UN

resolution equating Zionism with racism. In 1992, following

the example of the Soviet Union and China, India established

diplomatic relations with Israel. During the 1990-91 Persian Gulf War, Indian policy makers were torn between adopting a traditional nonaligned policy

sympathetic to Iraq or favoring the coalition of moderate Arab

and Western countries that could benefit Indian security and

economic interests. India initially adopted an ambivalent

approach, condemning both the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait and

the intrusion of external forces into the region. When the

National Front government led by V.P. Singh was replaced by

the Chandra Shekhar minority government in November 1990,

the Indian response changed. Wary of incurring the displea- sure of the United States and other Western nations on whom

India depended to obtain assistance from the International

Monetary Fund (IMF—see Glossary), New Delhi voted for the

UN resolution authorizing the use of force to expel Iraqi

troops from Kuwait and rejected Iraq's linkage of the Kuwaiti

and Palestinian problems. In January 1991, India also permitted United States military aircraft to refuel in Bombay. The

refueling decision stirred such domestic controversy that the

Chandra Shekhar government withdrew the refueling privileges in February 1991 to deflect the criticism of Rajiv Gandhi's

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India: A Country Study

Congress (I), which argued that India's nominal pro-United

States tilt betrayed the country's nonaligned principles.

Prime Minister Narasimha Rao's September 1993 visit to Iran was hailed as "successful and useful" by the Indian media

and seen as a vehicle for speeding up the improvement of bilat- eral relations. Kev developments included discussions on the

construction of a pipeline to supply Iranian natural gas to India and allowing India to develop transit facilities in Iran for

Indian products destined for the landlocked Central Asian

republics. India also sought to assuage its concerns over a possible Iranian-Central Asian republics nuclear nexus, which some

saw as a potential and very serious threat to India should Pakistan also join in an Islamic nuclear front aimed at India and

Israel, When Iranian president Hashemi Rafsanjani visited

India m April 1995 to sign a major trade accord (the accord

also was signed by the minister of foreign affairs of Turkmenistan' and five bilateral agreements, India-Iranian relations

could be seen to be on the upswing.

Central Asia

Until large parts of Central Asia were incorporated into the

Russian Empire in the mid-nineteenth century, relations

between India and Central Asia had been close. During the

post-1971 era of close Indian-Soviet relations, cultural

exchanges flourished between India and the Central Asian

republics. The dissolution of the Soviet Union forced India to construct policies to deal with the new political situation in the

Central Asian republics. In 1991 and 1992, India established

diplomatic relations with Kazakstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan,

Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan and worked with these newly

independent states to develop frameworks for diplomatic, eco- nomic. and cultural cooperation. Besides its long historical

connections with this region, India sought good relations for

several reasons: to prevent Pakistan from developing an antiIndia coalition with the Central Asian states in the dispute over Kashmir, to persuade those states not to provide Pakistan with

assistance in its nuclear program, to ensure continued contacts

with long-standing commercial and military suppliers, and to provide new opportunities to Indian businesses.

Normal diplomatic and trade relations are an Indian goal in

relations with the Central Asian republics. For example, eco- nomic and cultural affairs were the focal point of Indian prime

minister P.V. Narahimsa Rao's official visit to Uzbekistan and

540
Foreign Relations

Kazakstan in May 1993. Security matters also are important as witnessed by a February 1995 visit to India by Kazakstan's

defense minister. Adherence to democracy and secularism by

these countries also was regarded by India as desirable in order

to ensure stability and social progress. The geopolitical competition between India and Pakistan for influence in these countries is likely to be a long-tern factor. With regard to Afghanistan, India supported the Marxist

regime in Kabul until its collapse in the spring of 1992. India

then attempted to regain some influence in the country by

cooperating with Iran to provide assistance to Dari-speaking

and other minorities against the Pashtun groups backed by

Pakistan in the ensuing civil war. Russia

Despite the disintegration of the Soviet Union in 1991, the

relationship between India and Russia remains one of considerable importance to both countries. Since the early 1950s,

New Delhi and Moscow had built friendly relations on the basis

of realpolitik. India's nonalignment enabled it to accept Soviet

support in areas of strategic congruence, as in disputes with

Pakistan and China, without subscribing to Soviet global policies or proposals for Asian collective security. Close and cooperative ties were forged in particular in the sectors of Indian

industrial development and defense production and purchases. But the relationship was circumscribed by wide differ- ences in domestic and social systems and the absence of

substantial people-to-people contact—in contrast to India's

relations with the United States (see United States, this ch.).

Ties between India and the Soviet Union initially were dis- tant. Nehru had expressed admiration for the Soviet Union's

rapid economic transformation, but the Soviet Union regarded

India as a "tool of Anglo-American imperialism." After Josef

Stalin's death in 1953, the Soviet Union expressed its hopes for

"friendly cooperation" with India. This aim was prompted by

the Soviet decision to broaden its international contacts and to cultivate the nonaligned and newly independent countries of

Asia and Africa. Nehru's state visit to the Soviet Union in June

1955 was the first of its kind for an Indian prime minister. It was

followed by the trip of Premier Nikolai Bulganin and General

Secretary Nikita Khrushchev to India in November and December 1955. The Soviet leaders endorsed the entire range of

Indian foreign policy based on the Panch Shila and supported

541
India: A Country Study

India's position against Pakistan on Kashmir. The Soviet Union

also supported India's position vis-a-vis Portugal on Goa, which

was territorially integrated into India as a union territory by the

Indian armed forces in December 1961 (it became a state in

May 1987).

The Soviet Union and some East European countries

offered India new avenues of trade and economic assistance.

By 1965 the Soviet Union was the second largest national contributor to India's development. These new arrangements contributed to India's emergence as a significant industrial power

through the construction of plants to produce steel, heavy

machinery and equipment, machine tools, and precision

instruments, and to generate power and extract and refine

petroleum. Soviet investment was in India's public-sector industry, which the World Bank (see Glossary) and Western industrial powers had been unwilling to assist until spurred by Soviet

competition. Soviet aid was extended on the basis of long-term,

government-to-government programs, which covered successive phases of technical training for Indians, supply of raw

materials, progressive use of Indian inputs, and markets for fin- ished products. Bilateral arrangements were made in nonconvertible national currencies, helping to conserve India's scarce foreign exchange. Thus the Soviet contribution to Indian eco- nomic development was generally regarded by foreign and

domestic observers as positive (see Foreign Economic Relations, ch. 6).

Nehru obtained a Soviet commitment to neutrality on the

India-China border dispute and war of 1962. During the IndiaPakistan war of 1965, the Soviet Union acted with the United

States in the UN Security Council to bring about a cease-fire.

Soviet premier Aleksei N. Kosygin went further by offering his

good offices for a negotiated settlement, which took place at Tashkent on January 10, 1966. Until 1969 the Soviet Union

took an evenhanded position in South Asia and supplied a limited quantity of arms to Pakistan in 1968. From 1959 India had

accepted Soviet offers of military sales. Indian acquisition of

Soviet military equipment was important because purchases were made against deferred rupee payments, a major concession to India's chronic shortage of foreign exchange. Simultaneous provisions were made for licensed manufacture and

modification in India, one criterion of self-reliant defense on

which India placed increasing emphasis. In addition, Soviet

sales were made without any demands for restricted deploy542
Foreign Relations

ment, adjustments in Indian policies toward other countries,

adherence to Soviet global policies, or acceptance of Soviet

military advisers. In this way, Indian national autonomy was not

compromised.

The most intimate phase in relations between India and the

Soviet Union was the period between 1971 and 1976: its highlight was the twenty-year Treaty of Peace, Friendship, and

Cooperation of August 1971. Articles 8, 9, and 10 of the treaty

committed the parties "to abstain from providing any assistance

to any third party that engages in armed conflict with the

other" and "in the event of either party being subjected to an

attack or threat thereof ... to immediately enter into mutual

consultations." India benefited at the time because the Soviet

Union came to support the Indian position on Bangladesh and

because the treaty acted as a deterrent to China. New Delhi

also received accelerated shipments of Soviet military equipment in the last quarter of 1971. The first state visit of Soviet

president Leonid Brezhnev to India in November 1973 was

conducted with tremendous fanfare and stressed the theme of

economic cooperation. By the late 1970s, the Soviet Union was

India's largest trading partner.

The friendship treaty notwithstanding, Indira Gandhi did

not alter important principles of Indian foreign policy. She

made it clear that the Soviet Union would not receive any special privileges—much less naval base rights—in Indian ports,

despite the major Soviet contribution to the construction of

shipbuilding and ship-repair facilities at Bombay on the west

coast and at Vishakhapatnam on the east coast. India's advocacy of the Indian Ocean as a zone of peace was directed

against aggrandizement of the Soviet naval presence as much

as that of other extraregional powers. By repeatedly emphasizing the nonexclusive nature of its friendship with the Soviet

Union, India kept open the way for normalizing relations with

China and improving ties with the West.

After the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan, Indian diplomats avoided condemnatory language and resolutions as useless Cold War exercises that could only antagonize the Soviet

Union and postpone political settlement. They called instead

for withdrawal of all foreign troops and negotiation among

concerned parties. In meetings with Soviet leaders in New

Delhi in 1980 and in Moscow in 1982, Indira Gandhi privately

pressed harder for the withdrawal of Soviet troops and for the

543
India: A County Study

restoration of .Afghanistan's traditional nonalignment and

independence.

Rajiv Gandhi journeyed to the Soviet Union in 1985, 1986,.

1987, and 1989, and Soviet president Mikhail S. Gorbachev

traveled to India in 1986 and 1988. These visits and those of

other high officials evoked effusive references to the "exemplary" (in Gorbachev's term) friendship between the two countries and also achieved the conclusion of agreements to expand

economic, cultural, and scientific and technological cooperation. In 1985 and 1986, and again in 1988, both nations signed

pacts to boost bilateral trade and provide Soviet investment

and technical assistance for Indian industrial, telecommunications, and transportation projects. In 1985 and 1988, the Soviet

Union also extended to India credits of 1 billion rubles and 3

billion rubles, respectively (a total of about USS2.4 billion), for

the purchase of Soviet machinery and goods. Protocols for sci- entific cooperation, signed in 1985 and 1987, provided the

framework for joint research and projects in space science and

such high-technology areas as biotechnology, computers, and

lasers. The flow of advanced Soviet military equipment also

continued in the mid- and late 1980s (see The Air Force, ch.

10).

When the Soviet Union disintegrated, India was faced with

the difficult task of reorienting its external affairs and forging

relations with the fifteen Soviet successor states, of which Russia was the most important (see Central Asia, this ch.). In 1993

New Delhi and Moscow worked to redefine their relationship

according to post-Cold War realities. During the Januarv 1993

visit of Russian president Boris Yeltsin to India, the two countries signed agreements that signaled a new emphasis on eco- nomic cooperation in bilateral relations. The 1971 treaty was

replaced with the new Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation, wr hich dropped securitv clauses that in the Cold War were

directed against the United States and China. Yeltsin stated

that Russia would deliver cryogenic engines and space technology for India's space program under a USS350 million deal

between the Indian Space Research Organisation (ISRO) and

the Russian space agency, Glavkosmos, despite the imposition

of sanctions on both organizations by the United States. In

addition, Yeltsin expressed strong support for India's stand on

Kashmir. A defense cooperation accord aimed at ensuring the

continued supply of Russian arms and spare parts to satisfy the

requirements of India's military and at promoting the joint

544
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production of defense equipment. Bilateral trade, which had

fallen drastically during the 1990-92 period, was expected to revive following the resolution of the dispute over New Delhi's

debt to Moscow and the May 1992 decision to abandon the

1978 rupee-ruble trade agreement in favor of the use of hard

currency.

Pressure from the United States, which believed the engines

and technology could be diverted to ballistic missile development, led the Russians to cancel most of the deal in July 1993.

Russia did, however, supply rockets to help India to develop the

technology to launch geostationary satellites, and, with cryogenic engine plans already in hand, the ISRO was determined

to produce its own engines by 1997 (see Space and Nuclear

Programs, ch. 10).

Despite Yeltsin's call for a realignment of Russia, India, and

China to balance the West, Russia shares interests with the

developed countries on nuclear proliferation issues. In November 1991, Moscow voted for a Pakistani-sponsored UN resolution calling for the establishment of a South Asian nuclear-free zone. Russia urged India to support the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons and decided in March 1992 to apply "full-scope safeguards" to future nuclear supply agreements. Russia also shares interests with the United States in

cooling antagonisms between India and Pakistan, particularly

with regard to Kashmir, thus making it unlikely that India

could count on Russia in a future dispute with Pakistan.

Rao reciprocated Yeltsin's visit in July 1994. The two leaders

signed declarations assuring international and bilateral goodwill and continuation of Russian arms and military equipment

exports to India. Rao's Moscow visit lacked the controversy that

characterized his May 1994 visit to the United States and was deemed an important success because of the various accords, one of which restored the sale of cryogenic engines to India.

Bilateral relations between India and Russia improved as a

result of eight agreements signed in December 1994. The

agreements cover military and technical cooperation from

1995 to 2000, merchant shipping, and promotion and mutual

protection of investments, trade, and outer space cooperation.

Political observers saw the visit of Russian prime minister Viktor Chernomyrdin that occasioned the signing of the eight

agreements as a sign of a return to the earlier course of warm

relations between New Delhi and Moscow. In March 1995,

India and Russia signed agreements aimed at suppressing ille545
India: A Country Study

gal weapons smuggling and drug trafficking. And when Russian nationalist Vladimir V. Zhirinovsky visited India in March

1995, he declared that he would give India large supplies of arms and military hardware if he were elected president of Russia. United States

With the end of the Cold War and the emergence of India's

more outward-looking economic policies, the United States

became increasingly important for India. In the mid-1990s, the

United States was India's largest trading partner and a major

source of technology and investment (see Aid; Trade, ch. 6).

Indian students more than ever sought higher education in the

United States, especially in the areas of science and engineering. Moreover, the presence of the more than 1 million Indians

and Indian Americans residing in the United States was a factor

in the relationship. Some foreign policy makers also saw India's

strong democratic tradition, although much younger than that

of the United States, as an important ingredient in IndiaUnited States relations. Despite the asymmetrical relationship

that had existed since 1947, the areas of common interest con- verged in the early 1990s as the benefits of good relations were

perceived on both sides. Some Indian observers, however, felt that the United States had a "negative agenda" concerning

India with respect to human rights, the nuclear program, and

the pace of economic reforms. Furthermore, India's long

adherence to the principles of nonalignment has had an inhibiting effect on its evolving relations with the United States. Nevertheless, some opinion makers believed that an India-United

States strategic alliance later in the 1990s was a possibility.

Until 1971 nonalignment had a dual effect on United States policies in South Asia. On the one hand, Washington considered Indian economic and political stability necessary to prevent that important regional player from succumbing to communism and Soviet influence; hence the United States

gave economic assistance and support to India during its 1962 war with China (see External Aid, ch. 7). On the other hand,

India's nonalignment had led the United States in 1954 to ally itself with Pakistan, which appeared to support Western security interests. The United States-Pakistan alliance was renewed

in 1959, with accompanying assurances from President Dwight

D. Eisenhower to Nehru that the arms supplied to Pakistan

would not be used in any aggressive war. When Pakistan and

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India went to war in 1965, the United States government

refused to support India and suspended military transfers to both countries.

In 1971 the intertwining of the United States-Soviet, Chinese-Soviet, and Indian-Pakistani conflicts dragged IndiaUnited States relations to the nadir. That year, while Washington initiated a new relationship with Beijing, New Delhi signed

a friendship treaty with Moscow to counteract United States

and Chinese influence in South Asia. As the situation in East

Pakistan deteriorated, India was unable to convince the United

States to cease arms deliveries to Pakistan and persuade Pakistan's leaders to reach a political settlement with East Pakistan's

elected representatives. Indira Gandhi's November 1971 visit to Washington failed to alter President Richard M. Nixon's proPakistan stance. When war formally began after Pakistani

strikes on Indian airfields in early December 1971, the United

States and China voted for a cease-fire in the UN Security

Council, but the Soviet Union's veto prevented any resolution

from coming into effect. Washington's subsequent deployment

of a naval task force to the Bay of Bengal left many in India con- vinced that the United States was a major security threat.

Relations between India and the United States verged on the

antagonistic throughout the 1970s. After Nixon abruptly terminated US$82 million in economic assistance, India closed

down a large United States Agency for International Development program. The Indian government also restricted the flow

of American scholars and students to India. India's criticisms of

United States policies in Vietnam and Cambodia increased,

and it upgraded its representation in Hanoi. When the United

States expanded its naval base on the island of Diego Garcia

and engaged in naval exercises with Pakistan in the Indian

Ocean in 1974, India saw its security further threatened. Both

governments, however, attempted to limit the damage to bilat- eral relations. A 1973 agreement defused a dispute over United

States rupee holdings by writing off more than 50 percent of

the debt and directing use of the remainder to mutually acceptable programs. In 1974 the Indo-United States Joint Commission was established to insulate bilateral dealings in education

and culture, economics, and science and technology from

political controversy and to provide mechanisms for regular

exchanges at high levels of public life. Hopes for improved relations were expressed in 1977 when

Jimmy Carter became president of the United States and the

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India: A Country Study

Janata Party government led by Morarji Desai took over in

India (see Political Parties, ch. 8). These expectations came to an abrupt end two years later when the Soviet Union invaded

Afghanistan. The promulgation of the Carter Doctrine, establishment of the Rapid Deployment Force (later called the

United States Central Command) and an Indian Ocean fleet,

planned expansion of the naval base at Diego Garcia, and

arrangements to supply Pakistan with US$3.2 billion in military

and economic aid over five years all appeared as direct United

States intervention in the countries of the Persian Gulf and

Indian Ocean. These actions fueled instability in the region

and, in India's view, threatened India's security.

The personal rapport between Indira Gandhi and United

States president Ronald Reagan, established during a series of

meetings in the early 1980s, enabled the two countries gradually to begin improving bilateral relations. The Reagan administration reassessed its policy toward India and decided to expand areas of cooperation, particularly in the economic and

scientific realms, as a means of counteracting Soviet influence

in the region. Washington also regarded New Delhi's status as the major regional power in South Asia in a more favorable

light. For her part, Gandhi realized that India was unable to block United States arms sales to Pakistan, but that improved

dialogue with the United States could open other areas of

interaction that could benefit Indian interests. Indira Gandhi's

highly successful 1982 state visit to the United States was fol- lowed by a series of high-level exchanges, including the visits of

Vice President George Bush and Secretary of State George

Shultz to India. In addition, in 1982 the two sides resolved their

dispute concerning supplies of fuel and spare parts for the

nuclear power plant at Tarapur. In 1984 the United States

decided to expand technology transfers to India.

The warming trend in relations between New Delhi and

Washington continued with the 1985 and 1987 visits by Prime

Minister Rajiv Gandhi to Washington. Furthermore, as the

United States appreciation of India's role as a force for stability

in South Asia grew, Washington supported New Delhi's moves

in Sri Lanka in 1987 and in Maldives in 1988. In the mid- and

late 1980s, visits exchanged by the United States secretary of

defense and the Indian minister of defence symbolized a modest but growing program of cooperation in military technology

and other defense matters. In 1988 Washington and New Delhi

finalized an accord to provide United States technology for

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India's light combat aircraft program and also agreed to trans- fer technology for the F-5 fighter. Cooperation between India

and the United States in a variety of scientific fields followed

the signing of a bilateral agreement on scientific and technological exchanges in 1985. Nonmilitary technology transfers

also accelerated, and in 1987 India purchased a Cray supercomputer for agricultural research and weather forecasting

and accepted stringent United States safeguards to preclude

military uses. Furthermore, economic liberalization measures paved the way for increased trade and United States investment

in India. In 1988 the improved economic climate resulted in

the conclusion of a deal for a Pepsi-Cola plant and the signing

of a bilateral tax treaty. In 1989 United States investment in

India reached US$1 billion.

In the 1980s, the Indian and United States governments had

divergent views on a wide range of international issues, including Afghanistan, Cambodia, the Middle East, and Central

America. Serious differences also remained over United States policy toward Pakistan and the issue of nuclear proliferation.

India was repeatedly incensed in the 1980s when the United

States provided advanced military technology and other assis- tance to Pakistan. New Delhi also found objectionable Washington's unwillingness to cut off military assistance to Islamabad despite United States concerns about Pakistan's

covert nuclear program. For its part, Washington continued to urge New Delhi to sign the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of

Nuclear Weapons and, after the successful test launch of the

Indian Agni intermediate-range ballistic missile in May 1989,

called on New Delhi to refrain from developing a ballistic missile capability by adhering to the restrictions of the Missile

Technology Control Regime. India rejected these appeals on

the grounds that it had a right to develop such technology and

that the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

and the United States-sponsored Missile Technology Control

Regime discriminated against nonnuclear states. Bureaucratic and private-sector resistance to foreign participation in the economy, infrastructure problems, bureaucratic

red tape, and legal problems remained formidable obstacles to significant Indian-United States economic cooperation. In the

late 1980s, India had differences with the United States over improving its legal protection of intellectual property rights,

opening its markets to American service industries, and liberalizing its foreign investment regulations. In April 1991, the

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India: A Country Study

Office of the United States Trade Representative placed India

on Washington's watch list over intellectual property rights

issues. Six months later, the United States gave India a threemonth grace period before imposing retaliatory sanctions

against India's pharmaceutical industry for inadequate patent

protection. India resisted United States pressure to adopt a less protectionist stance in the Uruguay Round of negotiations to renew the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT).

In the early 1990s, economic reforms permitted a qualitative

breakthrough in relations between India and the United

States. Washington was instrumental in speeding a US$1.8 bil- lion IMF credit that New Delhi obtained in January 1991 to deal with a severe external-debt-payments crisis. In 1990 India

and the United States signed a double taxation pact designed

to facilitate American investment in India, further breaking a

thirty-year deadlock in economic relations. The United States

provided only modest bilateral economic assistance in the form

of food aid but was India's largest trading partner and an

important source of investments and technology. In December

1990, the United States approved the export of a second Cray

supercomputer for the Indian Institute of Science in Bangalore, Karnataka, although the deal fell through two years later

because of India's unwillingness to accept safeguards to prevent the computer's diversion to military uses. The Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan in 1989 had led

Washington to reassess its relationship with Pakistan, with positive ramifications for New Delhi. Without containment of the

Soviet Union as the driving factor behind close PakistaniUnited States ties, and concerns mounting about Pakistan's

nuclear weapons program, the United States suspended military and economic assistance to that country in October 1990.

New Delhi appreciated this action and was relieved in summer

1991 when the United States Congress voted not to include

India in the Pressler Amendment, which forbade United States assistance to Pakistan if it violated nuclear nonproliferation cri- teria. Washington also took a more evenhanded approach to the Kashmir problem in 1990, urging both antagonists to

resolve their dispute peacefully under the terms of the Simla

Accord. Furthermore, the United States began pressuring Pakistan to end its support for Kashmiri and Punjabi Sikh separatists. This pressure was in addition to efforts initiated in the

1980s to prevent assistance to Sikh terrorists from the Sikh

expatriate community in the United States (see Rajiv Gandhi,

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Foreign Relations

ch. 1). In the wake of terrorist bombings in Bombay in March

1993—widely believed in India to have been instigated by Pakistanis—and stepped-up activities among Kashmiri militants,

Indian politicians and the media reveled in the possibility that

the United States might declare Pakistan a practitioner of state- sponsored terrorism. Washington's decision in July 1993 not to declare Pakistan a terrorist-supporting state displeased many

prominent Indians, and Indian political analysts accused the

United States of having a "double standard" in regard to specific states sponsoring terrorism.

Military cooperation also grew. Exchanges of senior military

officials became frequent, a high-level bilateral conference on

regional security affairs was held, and Minister of Defence

Sharad Pawar journeyed to Washington in April 1992 to discuss arms supplies and military technology. Not only did United

States navy ships make occasional ports calls in India, but the

two navies conducted their first-ever joint exercise in May 1992.

Indian officials came to have a greater appreciation of United

States interests in maintaining a military presence on Diego

Garcia and in the Persian Gulf.

In 1993, India and the United States appeared committed to improve relations and bilateral cooperation despite differences over India's refusal to sign the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation

of Nuclear Weapons and to participate in discussions with the

United States, Russia, China, and Pakistan on establishing a South Asian nuclear-free zone. Nevertheless, Washington

directed its efforts to creating a climate of restraint between

New Delhi and Islamabad in order to freeze or roll back their

nuclear weapons programs. However, India and the United

States remained wary of each other's long-term strategy regionally and globally.

Some Indian political analysts criticize the United States for

following a "two-track policy." On the one hand, Washington

has supported New Delhi's economic reform and has facili- tated international loans to India, but, on the other, it has

relentlessly pursued an agenda to force India's accession to United States nonproliferation goals and has used human

rights issues to try to force India to meet Washington's political

objections. Moreover, many Indians have expressed worries

that, with the emergence of the United States as the sole superpower, and as the leader of a Western-dominated coalition after

the Persian Gulf War, Washington might attempt to impose its own standards for democratic values, human rights, and free

551
India: A Country Study

markets. India fears that a United States vision of a new world

order not only would hurt the interests of Third World countries economically and politically, but also would damage

India's drive to become a leading power in a multipolar system.

Washington's decision not to place Pakistan on its list of

nations that sponsor terrorism and its successful efforts in getting Russia to cancel the sale of cryogenic engines to India are seen as detrimental to good Indian-United States relations.

In the midst of increasing anti-United States political rhetoric and newspaper headlines, Indian and United States officials

have seemed to agree on only one thing, that bilateral relations

had reached their lowest point in two decades. Observers in

both countries believe that the administration of President William Clinton places a low priority on relations with India

despite the fact that the United States has become India's

prime trade partner. Against this backdrop, Prime Minister Rao

visited the United States in May 1994 for an uneventful round

of talks with President Clinton, who encouraged India's eco- nomic reforms. Six memorandums of understanding were

signed with the intent of expanding official contacts, reviewing

and updating a 1984 understanding on high-technology transfer, enhancing defense cooperation, stimulating bilateral ties,

and establishing a business partnership initiative. High-level visits to India in early 1995 portended greater sta- bility in India-United States relations. Secretary of Defense William J. Perry visited New Delhi in January to sign a "landmark

agreement" on military cooperation that was seen by some

local observers as a convergence in India-United States security

perceptions after nearly fifty years of divergent viewpoints (see

National Security Challenges, ch. 10). Following the Perry visit was a commercial mission led by Secretary of Commerce

Ronald H. Brown that also occurred in January. Agreements

signed by Indian and United States businesses during the visit resulted in US$7 billion in contracts and investments in the

communications, health care, insurance, finance, and automotive sectors. Some of the deals consummated were intended to build the infrastructure needed by foreign firms to do business

in India. In March 1995, Hilary Rodham Clinton, the wife of

the United States president, toured India as part of an extensive South Asian goodwill tour. In April, Secretary of the Treasury Robert E. Rubin visited New Delhi to sign a bilateral

investment protection treaty reflecting the substantial increases

in United States investment in India since 1991 and Washing552
Prime Minister RV. Narasimha Rao and President William Clinton in

Washington

Courtesy The White House

ton's encouragement to India to apply for Agency for International Development loans.

Britain, Australia, Canada, Western Europe, and Japan

From the late 1940s to the mid-1960s, independent India's

most important relationship was with Britain. New Delhi and

London had special relations because of common historical

ties, political institutions, interest in economic development,

high levels of trade between India and Britain, and British

investment in India. Despite this special relationship, Nehru's

policy of nonalignment was designed, in part, to prevent India

from becoming too dependent on Britain and other former

colonial powers. In spite of cooperation with Australia, Britain,

and Canada in the Commonwealth of Nations—which was

553
India: A Country Study

established by Britain in 1931—India's nonaligned stance fre- quently put India at odds with Britain, the United States, and

other Western countries on Cold War and anticolonial issues

(see Commonwealth of Nations, this ch.). Nevertheless, com- mon democratic principles and the willingness of the developed countries to provide economic assistance prompted India

to build modest but constructive relations with these countries.

India's relations with Britain remain important. India has so

successfully diversified its economic ties that London's domination is no longer a consideration for New Delhi; British trade,

investment, and aid, however, are still significant. A substantial

community of people of Indian origin live in Britain, contributing to the business and intellectual life of the country. Economic relations were improving in the early and mid-1990s

with the implementation of India's economic reforms. Political

differences stemming from India's nonaligned stance tended

to dissipate with the end of the Cold War and the collapse of

the apartheid system in South Africa.

From the mid-1960s until the early 1980s, the difficulties

encountered in conducting trade and investing in India caused

countries such as Japan and the Federal Republic of Germany

(West Germany) to seek more fruitful commercial opportunities elsewhere in the developing world. In the sphere of international politics, the intricacies of balancing ties with India and

Pakistan, India's tilt toward the Soviet Union beginning in

1971, divergent views on nuclear proliferation issues, and the

situations in Afghanistan and Cambodia left little room for

improvement of relations with Japan and Western Europe.

Modest moves taken to liberalize the Indian economy in the

early and mid-1980s and increased availability of private investment and official developmental assistance from developed

countries, however, provided India with the opportunity to increase trade and obtain aid and investment from Japan and

Europe. Indian trade with countries of the European Economic Community rose dramatically, andJapan became India's

largest aid donor. By the late 1980s, Indian, West European,

andJapanese leaders exchanged regular visits. In the early 1990s, expanding Indian exports and attracting

investment from developed countries became a major priority

in India's bilateral relations. India developed closer ties with

Berlin—now the capital of a united Germany—Tokyo, and the

European Economic Community (later the European Union)

to promote Indian economic interests and enhance its diplo554
Indian naval contingent marching in an Australia Day parade,

Canberra

Courtesy Embassy ofIndia, Washington

matic maneuverability. Japan remained India's major source of

bilateral assistance, and Berlin was New Delhi's largest trading

partner in the European Economic Community. Nevertheless,

India and the developed countries had differences over security and nuclear issues and the attachment of political criteria to developmental assistance.

Relations with Australia suffered in 1990 and 1991 as India

expressed its displeasure with Australia's sale of Mirage fighters

to Pakistan. In 1991 the German government announced it was

cutting official aid to India because of "excessive armament,"

while the British, Canadian, andJapanese governments warned

India that future assistance would be cut back if India did not

curtail its high levels of military spending, which the developed

countries contend suppressed economic development. In addition, Britain, France, and Germany also increased pressure on

India to sign the nonproliferation treaty, and France cautioned

India that any future agreements to supply India with nuclear

material and technology must adhere to "full-scope safeguards"

to prevent diversion to nuclear weapons production. Finally,

India remained concerned that developed countries would

impose human rights conditions as criteria for economic aid.

Participation in International Organizations

United Nations

During the Cold War, India's participation in the UN was

notable for its efforts to resist the imposition of superpower dis555
India: A Country Study

putes on UN General Assembly debates and to focus international attention on the problems of economic development. In

the early 1950s, India attempted unsuccessfully to help China

join the UN. India's mediatory role in resolving the stalemate over prisoners of war in Korea led to the signing of the armistice ending the Korean War. India chaired the five-member

Neutral Nations Repatriation Commission while the Indian

Custodian Force supervised the process of interviews and repatriation that followed. The UN entrusted Indian armed forces

with subsequent peace missions in the Middle East, Cyprus,

and the Congo (since 1971, Zaire). India also served as chair of

the three international commissions for supervision and control for Vietnam, Cambodia, and Laos established by the 1954

Geneva Accords on Indochina (see Peacekeeping Operations,

ch. 10).

Although not a permanent member of the UN Security

Council, India has been elected periodically to fill a nonpermanent seat, and during the 1991-92 period served in that capacity. In the early 1990s, New Delhi supported reform of the UN

in the hope of securing a permanent seat on the Security

Council. This development would recognize India's position as the second-largest population (possibly the largest in the early

twenty-first century) in the world, with an economy projected

by some to become the fourth largest, after China, the United

States, andJapan, by 2020.

India also has served as a member of many UN bodies

including the Economic and Social Council, the Human Rights

Commission, and the Disarmament Commission—and on the

board of governors of the International Atomic Energy Agency.

In addition, India played a prominent role in articulating the

economic concerns of developing countries in such UN-sponsored conferences as the triennial UN Conference on Trade

and Development and the 1992 Conference on the Environment and Development in Rio de Janeiro.

Commonwealth of Nations

India is a member of the Commonwealth of Nations, the

multinational association of Britain and its former colonies.

Although Nehru initially considered withdrawal from this organization, he decided to retain membership to prevent isolation

in the bipolar international system, to prevent the Commonwealth from becoming pro-Pakistan, to have access to Western

economic assistance and military equipment without excessive

556
Nehru and Indian delegation at the United Nations, 1960

Courtesy U.S. News and World Report Collection, Library of Congress

dependence on the United States, and to convert the Commonwealth from an extension of the British Empire to a multiracial association of equal states. India actively participates m

Commonwealth affairs and has found the organization a useful

forum in which to voice its concerns on such matters as apartheid, race relations, and citizenship rights, as well as a source oi

economic assistance under the Colombo Plan for Cooperative

Economic and Social Development in Asia and the Pacific

(Colombo Plan-see Glossary). In 1989 the Indian government under Rajiv Gandhi sponsored Pakistan's reapphcation

for Commonwealth membership under the civilian leadership

of Benazir Bhutto. In the early 1990s, with Indian approval,

Commonwealth priorities were enlarged to include the importance of democratic institutions and human rights.

Nonaligned Movement

India played an important role in the multilateral move557
India: A Country Study

ments of colonies and newly independent countries that developed into the Nonaligned Movement. The movement had its origins in the 1947 Asian Relations Meeting in New Delhi and

the 1955 Asian-African Conference in Bandung, Indonesia.

India also participated in the 1961 Belgrade Conference that

officially established the Nonaligned Movement, but Nehru's

declining prestige limited his influence. In the 1960s and

1970s, New Delhi concentrated on internal problems and bilat- eral relations, yet retained membership in an increasingly factionalized and radicalized movement. During the contentious

1979 Havana summit, India worked with moderate nations to reject Cuban president Fidel Castro's proposition that "socialism" (that is, the Soviet Union) was the "natural ally" of nonalignment.

Under Indira Gandhi in the early 1980s, India attempted to reassert its prominent role in the Nonaligned Movement by

focusing on the relationship between disarmament and eco- nomic development. By appealing to the economic grievances

of developing countries, Indira Gandhi and her successors exercised a moderating influence on the Nonaligned Movement, diverting it from some of the Cold War issues that

marred the controversial 1979 Havana meeting. Although hosting the 1983 summit boosted Indian prestige within the movement, its close relations with the Soviet Union and its proSoviet positions on Afghanistan and Cambodia limited its influ- ence. The end of the Cold War left the Nonaligned Movement

without its original raison d'etre, and its membership became

deeply divided over international disputes, strategy, and organization. During the 1992 Jakarta summit, India took a middle

position between countries favoring confrontation with developed nations on international economic issues, such as Malaysia, and those that favored a more cooperative approach, such

as Indonesia. Although New Delhi played a minor role compared with Kuala Lumpur andJakarta on most issues facing the

summit, India formulated the Nonaligned Movement position

opposing developed countries' linkage of foreign aid to human

rights criteria. India also is a founding member of the Group of Fifteen

(see Glossary) , a group of developing nations established at the

ninth Nonaligned Movement summit in Belgrade in 1989 to facilitate dialogue with the industrialized countries. India

played host to the fourth Group of Fifteen summit in March

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Foreign Relations

1994. At the summit, Prime Minister Rao and other leaders

expressed concern over new trade barriers being raised by the

industrialized countries despite the conclusion of a new world

trade agreement.

South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation

India is a member of SAARC, along with Pakistan, Bangladesh, Nepal, Bhutan, Sri Lanka, and Maldives. SAARC,

which slowly emerged out of the initiative of Bangladesh in

1980, was formally inaugurated in 1985. SAARC, which has a permanent secretariat in Kathmandu, is funded by voluntary

contributions and operates on the principle of unanimity in

decision making. Discussion of contentious bilateral issues is excluded from the SAARC charter at Indian insistence.

Instead, SAARC programs exist in the areas of agriculture,

rural development, transportation and telecommunications,

meteorology, health and population control, postal services,

science and technology, culture and sports, women in development, drug trafficking and abuse, and terrorism. By the mid1990s, SAARC had yet to become an effective regional organization, largely because of mutual distrust between India and its neighbors. India's lukewarm support for SAARC stems from

the concern that its neighbors might coalesce against it to the

detriment of Indian interests. The reluctance of India and

other South Asian countries to turn SAARC into a forum for

resolving major regional disputes hampers SAARC's ability to deal with many of South Asia's economic and political problems. Nonetheless, when SAARC's eighth summit was held in

New Delhi in May 1995, the conferees declared their nations'

commitment to eradicating poverty in South Asia by 2002.

* * * There is an extensive English-language literature on India's

foreign relations. Indian government publications—the Ministry of External Affairs's Annual Report and the monthly Foreign

Affairs Record, and the Parliament's Compendium ofPolicy State- ments Made in the Parliament: External Affairs—are important

official sources of information. The annual edition of Yearbook on India's Foreign Policy contains a useful survey of foreign policy trends as well as articles on bilateral relations. The Economic

and Political Weekly [Bombay] provides a nongovernmental

point of view on a wide range of current issues. Asia Yearbook,

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India: A Country Study

published by the Far Eastern Economic Review in Hong Kong,

also includes a review of India's foreign relations for the previ- ous year. A large number of books and articles are published each

year on specific subjects such as nonalignment, foreign aid,

nuclear issues, and specific bilateral relations. The speeches

and writings of Jawaharlal Nehru offer considerable insight

into the rationale and direction of Indian foreign policy during

the Cold War period. Norman D. Palmer's The United States and

India, Selig Harrison and Geoffrey Kemp's India and America

after the Cold War, Robert C. Horn's Soviet-Indian Relations, and

Peter J. S. Duncan's The Soviet Union and India are good analytical studies of India's relations with the superpowers. Comprehensive surveys of Indian foreign relations before the end of

the Cold War are found in Charles Heimseth and Surjit

Mansingh's A Diplomatic History of Modern India for the period

1911-65, Mansingh's India's Search for Power: Indira Gandhi's Foreign Policy, 1966-1982, and Robert W. Bradnock's India 's Foreign

Policy since 1971. Two books that deal with India's foreign policy

decision making and the domestic political structure underlying it are Jayant Bandyopadhyaya's The Making ofIndia's Foreign

Policy and Shashi Tharoor's Reasons of State. Articles on the

changes in India's foreign policy and foreign relations since the

end of the Cold War have appeared in the scholarly and periodical literature, of which Asian Survey and Far Eastern Economic

Review are good sources. Annual editions of the Association for

Asian Studies' Bibliography ofAsian Studies provide comprehensive retrospective source citations. (For further information

and complete citations, see Bibliography.)

560
Chapter 10. National Security
Battling horseman from a nineteenth-century wall painting, Gujarat
THE INDIAN ARMED FORCES have undergone a substantial

metamorphosis since the emergence of India and Pakistan

from the British Indian Empire in 1947. India's first prime minister, Jawaharlal Nehru (1947-64), had deliberately limited the

expansion and modernization of the armed forces. The rationale was twofold: Nehru was acutely concerned about the

accelerating costs of defense spending, and he feared that an

excessive emphasis on the armed forces would lead to the militarization of society and undermine the nation's fledgling democratic institutions. The disastrous performance of the Indian

army during the 1962 border war with China, however, led to a reappraisal of defense strategy and spending. Nehru's legacy

eroded rapidly as increasing emphasis was placed on defense

needs. The success of the Indian military against Pakistan during their 1971 war contributed to restoring the morale and

standing in society of the armed forces. During the rest of the

1970s and in the 1980s, India bolstered its regional preemi- nence with wide-ranging arms transfers from the Soviet Union.

In the late 1980s, in an effort to reduce its dependence on

Soviet weaponry, India began to diversify its arms sources. It purchased aircraft, submarines, and long-range artillery pieces

from France, the Federal Republic of Germany (West Germany), Sweden, and Britain. Simultaneously, it continued its efforts to expand and strengthen domestic capabilities to manufacture a range of weaponry to maximize self-reliance. The

results of these purchases and self-reliance efforts have been

mixed.

The 1980s saw not only substantial growth in Indian defense

expenditures but also the use of the armed forces in support of

larger foreign and security policy goals. Specifically, the army

saw action against Pakistani military personnel in disputed

areas along the Siachen Glacier in Jammu and Kashmir,

deployed at considerable cost as diplomatic efforts failed. All

three branches of the armed forces, but particularly the army, were used to pursue India's security and foreign policy objectives in Sri Lanka in the late 1980s (see South Asia, ch. 9). More

than 60,000 soldiers were deployed in Sri Lanka as part of the

Indian Peace Keeping Force (IPKF) to enforce the terms of the

1987 Indo-Sri Lankan Accord. Designed to serve as a neutral

force between contending ethnic forces, the IPKF became

563
India: A Country Study

enmeshed in operations against the Liberation Tigers of Tamil

Eelam (LTTE). In 1989 the new Sri Lankan president, Ranasinghe Premadasa, ended a five-and-a-half-year state of emer- gency and asked India to withdraw the IPKF. Accordingly,

Indian army units returned home with most goals unmet.

In 1988 a smaller, much shorter-lived Indian expedition successfully ended a military coup attempt in Maldives and demonstrated the military's effective use of airborne and naval

forces in a joint operation.

India is the preeminent military power in South Asia, but its margin of superiority over Pakistan—its principal South Asian

rival—has eroded because the central government of India is faced with severe budgetary constraints. In addition, the armed

forces are no longer able to obtain sophisticated weaponry at highly subsidized prices from Russia, and substantial numbers

of army units are tied down in various internal security duties.

Insurgencies in Assam, Jammu and Kashmir, and Punjab have

necessitated the use of the army in "aid-to-the-civil power"

when the local police and central paramilitary forces are unable to maintain public order. Increasingly frequent outbreaks of communal violence also have necessitated the use of

the army to restore calm.

The increased reliance on the army for internal security

duties generated concern among senior officers in the early

1990s. Then chief of army staff General Sunith Francis Rodrigues repeatedly expressed his misgivings about the inordinate use of the army to deal with civil problems because such actions

increased the risk of politicizing the armed forces and reduced

their battle readiness. Moreover, the very nature of counterinsurgent and counterterrorist operations exposed the army to charges of human rights violations. In 1993, at the insistence of

the army, the government agreed to examine this growing

problem. Discussions focused on improving the recruitment,

training, and organization of the various central paramilitary

forces.

The air force and the navy underwent considerable growth

and modernization during the 1980s, although their plans for

modernization and expansion, like those of the army, were hobbled by financial constraints. Nevertheless, the navy has

adequate capabilities for coastal defense as well as the protection of offshore union territories in the Bay of Bengal and the

Arabian Sea. The air force is equipped with modern combat

aircraft and has moderate airlift capabilities.

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National Security

Human rights violations in Assam, Jammu and Kashmir,

Punjab, and other parts of the country have largely been attributed to the paramilitary forces. The army has willingly acknowledged that some lapses have occurred within its own ranks. It also has court-martialed officers and enlisted personnel

charged with breaches of proper discipline and conduct. However, the army has refused to divulge any details about the

extent of these problems. The numbers of individuals prosecuted, their ranks, and their names remain outside the public

domain. Nevertheless, Amnesty International and Asia Watch

have reported on incidents they have been able to document.

Colonial-Era Developments

Company Armies

The roots of the modern Indian army are traced to the

forces employed by the English (later British) East India Company, chartered in 1600, and the French East India Company

(Compagnie des Indes Orientales), established in 1664. The

French, headquartered at Pondicherry (Puduchcheri) by the

1670s, were the first to raise Indian companies and use them in

conjunction with European soldiers. Subsequently, in the

1740s, the British started to organize and train Indian units.

British units were divided into three armies corresponding to the company's centers of Bengal (headquartered at Fort William in Calcutta), Bombay (or Mumbai in the Marathi language), and Madras (headquartered at Fort Saint George). In

1748 the East India Company armies were brought under the

command of Stringer Lawrence, who is regarded by historians

as the progenitor of the modern Indian army. Under his guidance, British officers recruited, trained, and deployed these

forces. Although formally under a unified command, the three

armies in practice exercised considerable autonomy because of

the great distances that separated them.

Toward the end of the eighteenth century, the vast majority

of the soldiers of each army was composed of Indian troops

known as sepoys (from the Hindi sipahi, meaning police offi- cer, or, later, soldier). Sepoy units had Indian junior commissioned officers who could exercise only low-level command.

British officers held all senior positions. No Indian had any

authority over non-Indians. In addition to these all-Indian

units, the British deployed some units of the British Army.

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India: A Country Study

The Indian Military under the British Raj

Post-Sepoy Rebellion Reorganization

Shortly after the Sepoy Rebellion of 1857-58, the role of the

presidency armies was reevaluated (see The British Raj, 1858-

1947, ch. 1). In 1861 the Bengal Army was disbanded, and the

total number of sepoys was reduced from 230,000 to 150,000

while the British element was increased from 40,000 to 75,000.

Most Indian artillery units were disbanded, and artillery was

placed under British control. Under the aegis of the imperial

"divide and rule" policy, which had its inception at this time,

the British ensured that a sense of nationality would not be

allowed to develop among the sepoys. The growth of such feel- ings, it was feared, would undermine the prospects of imperial

control. Accordingly, Indian regiments increasingly were organized on a territorial basis; individual companies—and in some

cases entire regiments—were drawn from the same religious,

tribal, or caste backgrounds. When companies from several

regiments were grouped into battalions, considerable efforts were made to promote cultural and social distinctions among

companies of different compositions.

"Martial Races" Theory

By the end of the nineteenth century, recruitment was con- fined to certain social classes and communities—principally

those in the northern border areas and Punjab. The narrowing

recruitment base was a response to the Sepoy Rebellion and

reflected the needs of prevailing security requirements. The

bulk of the rebels in the Bengal Army came from the IndoGangetic Plain while those that had remained loyal were mostly

from Punjab.

The experience of the mutiny also gave rise to a pseudo-ethnological construction, the concept of "martial races" in South

Asia. The popularization of this notion was widely attributed to Frederick Sleigh Roberts, Earl of Kandahar, Pretoria, and

Waterford; Roberts was an Indian-born veteran of the British

forces that put down the Sepoy Rebellion and the commander

in chief of the British Indian Army from 1885 to 1893. Roberts

believed that the most martial races were located in northwest- ern India. He regarded Bengalis, Marathas, and southern ethnic groups as lacking in martial virtues. Their warlike

propensities, he contended, had dissipated because of the ease of living and the hot, enervating climate of these regions.

566
National Security

Roberts's views profoundly influenced the composition of

the British Indian army in the last decades of the nineteenth

century. For example, when the Bengal Army was reestablished

in 1885, its new units were drawn from Punjab. In 1892 army

policy was changed significantly. Units were no longer raised

on a territorial basis but along what was referred to as "class"

lines. In effect, regiments admitted only those having similar

ethnic, religious, or caste backgrounds. Between 1892 and

1914, recruitment was confined almost entirely to the martial

races. These modes of recruitment and organization created a professional force profoundly shaped by caste and regional fac- tors and loyal and responsive to British command. The procedures also perpetuated regional and communal ties and

produced an army that was not nationally based.

Administrative Reform and World War I

Administrative reforms in 1895 abolished the presidency

armies, and command was centralized under the aegis of a sin- gle army headquarters at Delhi. In the early twentieth century,

the process of centralization continued; and during this

period, the separation between military and civilian spheres of

influence and the ultimate primacy of civilian authority gained

final acceptance in both civilian and military circles. During World War I, India's contribution of troops, money,

and supplies to the Allied cause was substantial. More than 1 million Indian soldiers were sent abroad, and more than

100,000 were either killed or wounded.

The mobilization for the war effort revealed a number of

shortcomings in the military establishment. Officer casualties

had a particularly pernicious effect on military formations

because only the British officers assigned to a battalion had the

authority and standing to exercise overall command. In addition, Indian officers from one company could rarely be trans- ferred to another having a different ethnic, religious, or caste makeup. As a consequence, after the war most battalions were

reorganized to ease reinforcement among component companies. Strong pressure from the Indian public also drove the

British to begin training a small complement of Indians for

commissions as a first step in the Indianization of the officer

corps. The Royal Indian Air Force was established in 1932, and

a small Indian marine unit was reorganized into the Royal

Indian Navy in 1934. Indian artillery batteries were first formed

only in 1936. Although the practice of limiting recruitment to

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India: A Country Study

the martial races had proved inadequate during World War I and entry had been opened to "nonmartial" groups, the traditional recruitment emphasis on martial races was nonetheless

resumed after demobilization.

World WarU

The political situation in India underwent a fundamental

transformation at the time of Britain's entry into World War II (see Political Impasse and Independence, ch. 1). The viceroy

and governor general of India, Victor Alexander John Hope,

Marquis of Linlithgow, without consulting Indian political leaders, declared India to be at war with Germany on September 3,

1939. The legislature sustained the viceregal decree and passed

the Defence of India Bill without opposition, as the representatives of the Indian National Congress (the Congress—see Glossary) boycotted the session. Between 1939 and mid-1945, the

British Indian Army expanded from about 175,000 to more

than 2 million troops—entirely through voluntary enlistment.

The incipient naval and air forces were also expanded, and the

Indian officer corps grew from 600 to more than 14,000.

Indian troops were deployed under overall British command in

Africa, Italy, the Middle East, and particularly in Burma and

Southeast Asia. The great expansion in strength, the overseas

service of Indian forces, and the demonstrated soldierly ability

of Indians from all groups did much to dispel the martial races

theory.

In Asia the Japanese sought to exploit Indian nationalism

and anti-British sentiment by forming and supporting the

Indian National Army (INA—Azad Hind Fauj), which was composed primarily of 25,000 of the 60,000 Indian troops who had

surrendered to the Japanese in Singapore in February 1942.

The army was led by Subhas Chandra Bose, a former militant

president of the Congress, who also appointed himself head of

the Provisional Government of Azad India (Free India). An

unusual feature of the INA was an all-woman, intercaste regiment composed of some 1,500 Indian women from Burma,

Malaya, and Singapore. Both the women and the 25,000-strong

male contingent were organized to fight alongside the Japa- nese in Burma, but they actually saw little action. Only 8,000

were sent to the front. Japanese and INA troops invaded

Manipur in March 1944 and fought and were defeated in battles at Imphal and Kohima (see fig. 1). By May 1945, the INA

had disintegrated because of acute logistical problems, defec568
National Security

tions, and superior British-led forces. It is widely held that Bose

was killed in an air crash in Taiwan as he fled at the end of the

war. The British court martialed three INA officers. Nationalistminded lawyers, including Nehru, defended them as national

heroes, and the British, feeling intense public pressure, found

them guilty but cashiered them without any further punishment. However, after independence Nehru refused to reinstate

them into the Indian armed forces, fearing that they might sow

discord among the ranks.

Postindependence Developments

The National Forces

Following independence in 1947, important organizational

changes strengthened civilian control over the military. The

position of commander in chief was abolished in 1955, and the

three service chiefs were placed on an equal footing beneath

the civilian Ministry of Defence. These changes significantly

reduced the influence of the numerically superior army, to which the other services had been subordinate, and limited the

service chiefs to advisory roles in the defense decision-making

process. The changes reflected the ambiguous feelings of the

civilian leadership toward the military. Nehru and other Indian

nationalists saw the military as an institution strongly wedded

to the colonial past. The heritage of nonviolence (ahimsa) of

Mohandas Karamchand Gandhi also was important to the

national political leadership (see Mahatma Gandhi, ch. 1).

Independence and the partition from Pakistan imposed significant costs on the Indian defense establishment that took

years to redress. The partition of the country had entailed the

division of the armed forces personnel and equipment. Predominantly Muslim units went to Pakistan, followed later by

individual transfers. Close to two-thirds of all army personnel

went to India. As a secular state, India accepted all armed

forces personnel without regard to religious affiliation. The

division of the navy was based on an estimation of each nation's

maritime needs. A combination of religious affiliation and military need was applied to the small air force. As a result of partition, India also received about two-thirds of the materiel and

stores. This aspect of the division of assets was complicated by

the fact that all sixteen ordnance factories were located in

India. India was allowed to retain them with the proviso that it

569
India: A Country Study

would make a lump sum payment to Pakistan to enable it to develop its own defense production infrastructure.

Independence also resulted in a dramatic reduction of the

number of experienced senior personnel available. In 1947

only six Indians had held brigade-level commands, and only

one had commanded a division. British officers, out of necessity, were retained for varying periods of time after independence. British chiefs stayed on the longest in the navy and the

air force. The navy had a British service chief until 1962 and

the air force until 1954. The armed forces also integrated qualified members of the armies of the former princely states that

acceded to India (see National Integration, ch. 1). The term

sepoy, made popular during the colonial era, was dropped

about this time, and the word jawan (Hindi for able-bodied

man) has been used ever since when referring to the Indian

soldier.

The Experience of Wars

Pakistan

The first test for the Indian armed forces came shortly after

independence with the first Indo-Pakistani conflict (1947-48).

The military was called upon to defend the borders of the state ofJammu and Kashmir when tribals—principally Pathans

attacked from the northwest reaches of Kashmir on October

22, 1947. India's 161st Infantry Brigade was deployed and

thwarted the advance of the tribal forces. In early November

1947, the 161st counterattacked and successfully broke

through the enemy defenses. Despite early successes, the

Indian army suffered a setback in December because of logistical problems. The problems enabled the forces of Azad Kashmir (Free Kashmir, as the part of Kashmir under Pakistani

control is called) to take the initiative and force the Indian

troops to retreat from the border areas. In the spring of 1948,

the Indian side mounted another offensive to retake some of

the ground that it had lost. No doubt fearing that the war

might move into Pakistan proper, regular units of the Pakistani

army became more actively involved. As the conflict escalated,

the Indian leadership was quick to recognize that the war could

not be brought to a close unless Pakistani support for the Azad

Kashmir forces could be stopped. Accordingly, on the advice of

Governor General Earl Louis Mountbatten (Britain's last viceroy in India in 1947 and governor general of India, 1947-48),

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National Security

the Indian government sought United Nations (UN) mediation of the conflict on December 31, 1947. There was some

opposition to this move within the cabinet by those who did

not agree with referring the Kashmir dispute to the UN. The

UN mediation process brought the war to a close on January 1, 1949. In all, 1,500 soldiers died on each side during the war. The second Indo-Pakistani conflict (1965) was also fought

over Kashmir and started without a formal declaration of war.

It is widely accepted that the war began with the infiltration of

Pakistani-controlled guerrillas into Indian Kashmir on about

August 5, 1965. Skirmishes with Indian forces started as early as August 6 or 7, and the first major engagement between the regular armed forces of the two sides took place on August 14.

The next day, Indian forces scored a major victory after a prolonged artillery barrage and captured three important mountain positions in the northern sector. Later in the month, the

Pakistanis counterattacked, moving concentrations near Tithwal, Uri, and Punch. Their move, in turn, provoked a powerful

Indian thrust into Azad Kashmir. Other Indian forces captured

a number of strategic mountain positions and eventually took

the key Haji Pir Pass, eight kilometers inside Pakistani territory.

The Indian gains led to a major Pakistani counterattack on

September 1 in the southern sector, in Punjab, where Indian

forces were caught unprepared and suffered heavy losses. The

sheer strength of the Pakistani thrust, which was spearheaded

by seventy tanks and two infantry brigades, led Indian commanders to call in air support. Pakistan retaliated on September 2 with its own air strikes in both Kashmir and Punjab. The

war was at the point of stalemate when the UN Security Council

unanimously passed a resolution on September 20 that called

for a cease-fire. New Delhi accepted the cease-fire resolution

on September 21 and Islamabad on September 22, and the war ended on September 23. The Indian side lost 3,000 while the

Pakistani side suffered 3,800 battlefield deaths. The Soviet-brokered Tashkent Declaration was signed on January 10, 1966. It required that both sides withdraw by February 26, 1966, to positions held prior to August 5, 1965, and observe the ceasefire line agreed to onJune 30, 1965.

The origins of the third Indo-Pakistani conflict (1971) were

different from the previous conflicts. The Pakistani failure to accommodate demands for autonomy in East Pakistan in 1970

led to secessionist demands in 1971 (see The Rise of Indira

Gandhi, ch. 1). In March 1971, Pakistan's armed forces

571
India: A Country Study

launched a fierce campaign to suppress the resistance move- ment that had emerged but encountered unexpected mass

defections among East Pakistani soldiers and police. The Pakistani forces regrouped and reasserted their authority over most

of East Pakistan by May.

As a result of these military actions, thousands of East Pakistanis died at the hands of the Pakistani army. Resistance fight- ers and nearly 10 million refugees fled to sanctuary in West

Bengal, the adjacent Indian state. By midsummer, the Indian

leadership, in the absence of a political solution to the East

Pakistan crisis, had fashioned a strategy designed to assist the

establishment of the independent nation of Bangladesh. As

part of this strategy, in August 1971, India signed a twenty-year

Treaty of Peace, Friendship, and Cooperation with the Soviet

Union. One of the treaty's clauses implied that each nation was expected to come to the assistance of the other in the event of

a threat to national security such as that occurring in the 1965 war with Pakistan. Simultaneously, India organized, trained,

and provided sanctuary to the Mukti Bahini (meaning Liberation Force in Bengali), the East Pakistani armed resistance

fighters.

Unable to deter India's activities in the eastern sector, on

December 3, 1971, Pakistan launched an air attack in the west- ern sector on a number of Indian airfields, including Ambala

in Haryana, Amritsar in Punjab, and Udhampur in Jammu and

Kashmir. The attacks did not succeed in inflicting substantial

damage. The Indian air force retaliated the next day and

quickly achieved air superiority. On the ground, the strategy in

the eastern sector marked a significant departure from previ- ous Indian battle plans and tactics, which had emphasized set- piece battles and slow advances. The strategy adopted was a

swift, three-pronged assault of nine infantry divisions with

attached armored units and close air support that rapidly con- verged on Dhaka, the capital of East Pakistan. Lieutenant

General Sagat Singh, who commanded the eighth, twentythird, and fifty-seventh divisions, led the Indian thrust into East

Pakistan. As these forces attacked Pakistani formations, the

Indian air force rapidly destroyed the small air contingent in

East Pakistan and put the Dhaka airfield out of commission. In

the meantime, the Indian navy effectively blockaded East Pakistan. Dhaka fell to combined Indian and Mukti Bahini forces

on December 16, bringing a quick end to the war.

572
Indian infantry during the 1962 border war with China

Courtesy U.S. News and World

Report Collection, Library of

Congress

Action in the western sector was divided into four segments,

from the cease-fire line in Jammu and Kashmir to the marshes

of the Rann of Kutch in northwestern Gujarat. On the evening

of December 3, the Pakistani army launched ground operations in Kashmir and Punjab. It also started an armored operation in Rajasthan. In Kashmir, the operations were

concentrated on two key points, Punch and Chhamb. The

Chhamb area witnessed a particularly intense battle where the

Pakistanis forced the Indians to withdraw from their positions.

In other parts of Kashmir, the Indians made some small gains

along the cease-fire line. The major Indian counteroffensive

came in the Sialkot-Shakargarh area south and west of

Chhamb. There, two Pakistani tank regiments, equipped with

United States-made Patton tanks, confronted the Indian First

Armored Corps, which had British Centurion tanks. In what

proved to be the largest tank battle of the war, both sides suf- fered considerable casualties.

Though the Indian conduct of the land war on the western

front was somewhat timid, the role of the Indian air force was

both extensive and daring. During the fourteen-day war, the air

force's Western Command conducted some 4,000 sorties.

There was little retaliation by Pakistan's air force, partly

because of the paucity of non-Bengali technical personnel.

573
India: A Country Study

Additionally, this lack of retaliation reflected the deliberate

decision of the Pakistan Air Force headquarters to conserve its forces because of heavy losses incurred in the early days of the

war. China

The Chinese have two major claims on what India deems its own territory. One claim, in the western sector, is on Aksai

Chin in the northeastern section of Ladakh District injammu

and Kashmir. The other claim is in the eastern sector over a region included in the British-designated North-East Frontier

Agency, the disputed part of which India renamed Arunachal

Pradesh and made a state. In the fight over these areas, the

well-trained and well-armed troops of the Chinese People's Liberation Army overpowered the ill-equipped Indian troops, who

had not been properly acclimatized to fighting at high alti- tudes.

Unable to reach political accommodation on disputed terri- tory along the 3,225-kilometer-long Himalayan border, the Chi- nese attacked India on October 20, 1962. At the time, nine

divisions from the eastern and western commands were

deployed along the Himalayan border with China. None of

these divisions was up to its full troop strength, and all were

short of artillery, tanks, equipment, and even adequate articles

of clothing.

In Ladakh the Chinese attacked south of the Karakoram Pass

at the northwest end of the Aksai Chin Plateau and in the

Pangong Lake area about 160 kilometers to the southeast. The

defending Indian forces were easily ejected from their posts in

the area of the Karakoram Pass and from most posts near Pangong Lake. However, they put up spirited resistance at the

key posts of Daulat Beg Oldi (near the entrance to the pass)

and Chushul (located immediately south of Pangong Lake and

at the head of the vital supply road to Leh, a major town and

location of an air force base in Ladakh). Other Chinese forces

attacked near Demchok (about 160 kilometers southeast of

Chusul) and rapidly overran the Demchok and the Jara La

posts.

In the eastern sector, in Assam, the Chinese forces advanced

easily despite Indian efforts at resistance. On the first day of the

fighting, Indian forces stationed at the Tsang Le post on the

northern side of the Namka Chu, the Khinzemane post, and

near Dhola were overrun. On the western side of the North574
National Security

East Frontier Agency, Tsang Dar fell on October 22, Bum La on

October 23, and Tawang, the headquarters of the Seventh

Infantry Brigade, on October 24. The Chinese made an offer

to negotiate on October 24. The Indian government promptly

rejected this offer. With a lull in the fighting, the Indian military desperately

sought to regroup its forces. Specifically, the army attempted to strengthen its defensive positions in the North-East Frontier

Agency and Ladakh and to prepare against possible Chinese

attacks through Sikkim and Bhutan. Army units were moved

from Calcutta, Bihar, Nagaland, and Punjab to guard the

northern frontiers of West Bengal and Assam. Three brigades were hastily positioned in the western part of the North-East

Frontier Agency, and two other brigades were moved into Sikkim and near the West Bengal border with Bhutan to face the

Chinese. Light Stuart tanks were drawn from the Eastern Command headquarters at Calcutta to bolster these deployments.

In the western sector, a divisional organization was established in Leh; several battalions of infantry, a battery of twentyfive-pounder guns, and two troops of AMX light tanks were air- lifted into the Chushul area from Punjab. On November 4, the

Indian military decided that the post at Daulat Beg Oldi was

untenable, and its defenders were withdrawn over the 5,300-

meter-high Sasar Brangsa Pass to a more defensible position.

The reinforcements and redeployments in Ladakh proved

sufficient to defend the Chushul perimeter despite repeated

Chinese attacks. However, the more remote posts at Rezang La

and Gurung Hill and the four posts at Spanggur Lake area fell to the Chinese.

In the North-East Frontier Agency, the situation proved to be

quite different. Indian forces counterattacked on November 13

and captured a hill northwest of the town of Walong. Concerted Chinese attacks dislodged them from this hard-won

position, and the nearby garrison had to retreat down the

Lohit Valley.

In another important section of the eastern sector, the

Kameng Frontier Division, six Chinese brigades attacked across the Tawang Chu near Jang and advanced some sixteen kilometers to the southeast to attack Indian positions at Nurang, near

Se La, on November 17. Despite the Indian attempt to regroup

their forces at Se La, the Chinese continued their onslaught,

wiping out virtually all Indian resistance in Kameng. By November 18, the Chinese had penetrated close to the outskirts of

575
India: A Country Study

Tezpur, Assam, a major frontier town nearly fifty kilometers

from the Assam-North-East Frontier Agency border.

The Chinese did not advance farther and on November 21

declared a unilateral cease-fire. They had accomplished all of

their territorial objectives, and any attempt to press farther into

the plains of Assam would have stretched their logistical capabilities and their lines of communication to a breaking point.

By the time the fighting stopped, each side had lost 500 troops.

The fighting war was over, but a new diplomatic war had

begun. After more than thirty years of border tension and stale- mate, high-level bilateral talks were held in New Delhi starting

in February 1994 to foster "confidence-building measures"

between the defense forces of India and China, and a new

period of better relations began (see China, ch. 9).

Peacekeeping Operations

In addition to the experience gained in wars with Pakistan

and China, the Indian army has been involved in two regional

peacekeeping operations. The first was in Sri Lanka from 1987

to 1990, the second in Maldives in 1988. In addition, Indian

forces have participated in ten UN peacekeeping forces.

Sri Lanka

Since the early 1970s, ethnic conflict has pitted Sri Lanka's

Tamil minority against the Sinhalese majority over issues of

power sharing and local autonomy. The main combatants are the Sri Lankan army and the secessionist Liberation Tigers of

Tamil Eelam. Indian involvement, encouraged by pro-Tamil

sentiments in its state of Tamil Nadu, which is close to Sri

Lanka, and the Indian government's covert aid to and training

of Tamil militants between 1977 and 1987, drew India into the

conflict. The Indo-Sri Lankan Accord, signed on July 29, 1987,

committed New Delhi to deploying a peacekeeping force on

the island, making the Indian government the principal guarantor of a solution to the ethnic violence that had heightened

dramatically since 1983. Nearly 60,000 Indian troops drawn

from two divisions (one from the Central Command and the

other from the Southern Command) were in Sri Lanka as the

Indian Peace Keeping Force (IPKF) between 1987 and 1990.

Originally sent to Sri Lanka as a neutral body with a mission

to ensure compliance with the accord, the IPKF increasingly

became a partisan force fighting against Tamils. The popularity

of Indian forces, which was never high, decreased still further

576
National Security

amidst charges of rape and murder of civilians. Despite the

considerable experience that Indian troops had gained in

fighting insurgencies in India's northeast, the IPKF was at a marked disadvantage in Sri Lanka. In fighting Naga and Mizo

guerrillas in northeast India, the army had fought on home

ground, and the central government could couple the army's

efforts with direct political negotiations. In Sri Lanka, the

Indian forces did not possess an adequate local intelligence

network. Despite the growth of the IPKF to 70,000 strong, the

predominantly urban context of northern Sri Lanka imposed

constraints on the use of force. It also is widely believed that Sri

Lankan forces offered only grudging cooperation. Given the

inability of the IPKF to prevent either Sinhalese or Tamil

extremist actions, it steadily lost the support of both sides in

the conflict.

As the Sri Lankan presidential elections approached in

December 1988, both the contending parties, the ruling

United National Party led by then Prime Minister Ranasinghe

Premadasa, and the three-party United Front led by former

Prime Minister Sirimavo Ratwatte Dias Bandaranaike,

expressed their reservations about the 1987 accord. Premadasa

was elected, and after he was inaugurated, he declared an end

to the five-and-a-half-year state of emergency and asked India

to withdraw the IPKF. In July 1989, the IPKF started a phased

withdrawal of its remaining 45,000 troops, a process that took

until March 1990 to complete.

During the three-year involvement, some 1,500 Indian

troops were killed and more than 4,500 were wounded during

this operation. Another casualty resulting from the Sri Lanka

mission was the assassination of former Prime Minister Rajiv

Gandhi by a Tamil militant in 1991. As a participant in what

began as a peacekeeping mission, the Indian armed forces

learned some valuable lessons. These included the realization

that better coordination is needed between military and political decision makers for such missions. One of the commanders

of the IPKF also noted that training, equipment, and command

and control needed improvement.

In 1995, at the request of the Sri Lankan government,

Indian naval ships and air force surveillance aircraft established a quarantine zone around the LTTE stronghold in the

Jaffna area. The supply of military materiel by Indian sympathizers to the Tamil insurgents in Sri Lanka from Tamil Nadu,

577
India: A Country Study

just thirty-five kilometers across the Palk Strait, was an ongoing

problem that continued to keep India involved in the conflict.

Maldives

In 1988, the Indian Army experienced a small success in

squashing an attempted coup in Maldives, 600 kilometers

south of India in the Indian Ocean. Maldivian minister of for- eign affairs Fathullah Jameel had called Rajiv Gandhi (India's

prime minister from 1984 to 1989) at 5:30 a.m. on November

3, 1988 to request India's assistance. By 9:00 a.m. the same

morning, India's Cabinet Committee on Political Affairs had

been convened. At noon the same day, the committee gave its approval for military support to the regime of President Maumoon Abdul Gayoom. Later in the day, the first Indian troops were airlifted from a military base at Agra, Uttar Pradesh. Some

1,600 Indian troops were dispatched within hours. During the

next three days, the mercenaries involved in the attempted

coup were rounded up by Indian troops who had parachuted

in. The Indian navy also effectively blocked maritime escape

routes the coup leaders might have taken. The operation was completed by November 6. Three important inferences can be made from this successful attempt at force projection. First, it demonstrated that suffi- cient interservice cooperation existed to allow the armed

forces to respond rapidly to political directives. Second, it showed the capability of the armed forces to airlift troops

regionally at short notice. And third, it demonstrated the will- ingness of the Indian political leadership to use its military

strength in the region to support a friendly regime.

United Nations Peacekeeping Forces Indian armed forces personnel have been involved in a variety of UN-sponsored peacekeeping missions and military

observer operations, giving them invaluable experience in

interacting with the armed forces of other nations. In addition,

although it was not a peacekeeping force per se, an Indian air- borne field ambulance unit participated in the Korean War

(1950-53).

Indian infantry, supply, transportation, and signal units

served between 1956 and 1967 with the First United Nations

Emergency Force in the Suez Canal, Sinai Peninsula, and Gaza.

From 1960 to 1964, Indian infantry, aircraft, and medical personnel, and air dispatch, signal, supply, and postal units served

578
National Security

in the Congo (as Zaire was then named). Indian military

observers participated in UN observation groups in Lebanon

in 1958; Yemen in 1963-64 (where India supplied one of the

chiefs of staff); West Irian (which later became Indonesia's

Irian Barat Province) in 1962-63; the Iran-Iraq border in 1988-

91; Angola in 1989-91; and Costa Rica, El Salvador, Guatemala,

Honduras, and Nicaragua in 1989-92. Military observers,

police monitors, and election supervisors were sent to Namibia

in 1989 and 1990 to help oversee elections.

In the 1990s, more military observers were sent abroad.

There was a second observers' mission to Angola (1991-92) as well as missions to El Salvador (starting in 1991), former Yugoslavia (starting in 1992), and Mozambique (starting in 1992).

The last was a force of more than 900 administrative, engineering, and logistic personnel. A sappers' contingent charged with

clearing landmines and related construction projects participated in the United Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia in 1992-93. An infantry brigade—including army

physicians, nurses, veterinarians, a tank sqaudron, a mechanized battalion, a 120-millimeter mortar battery, an engineer

company, and two flights of helicopters—and an air force helicopter detachment, a force totalling nearly 5,000 personnel, were sent to Somalia in 1993-94 to participate in peacekeeping

and humanitarian relief efforts. In an effort to achieve some joint operational understanding

with other nations' forces, India has also cooperated in various

peacetime joint exercises with Indian Ocean nations and with

the United States. In 1992, India and the United States con- ducted joint naval exercises in the Arabian Sea near Kochi

(Cochin), and in 1994 Indian marine commandos and United

States Marines conducted joint exercises with little fanfare.

National Security Structure

Civil-Military Relations

The pattern of civil-military relations prevailing in India was

created by the staff of Lord Mountbatten as a three-tier system

extending from the prime minister to the three service chiefs.

At the apex of this structure is the Political Affairs Committee

of the Cabinet. The second level is the Defence Minister's Committee of the Cabinet, and the third level is the Chiefs of Staff

Committee. Other committees, such as the Joint Intelligence

Committee, the Defence Science Advisory Committee, and the

579
India: A Country Study

Joint Planning Committee, assist the higher committees. There

were proposals in the mid-1990s to establish a joint defense

staff for better integration of interservice resources, programs,

policies, and operations (see fig. 16).

In the immediate postindependence period, the Defence

Minister's Committee of the Cabinet did not play an active role

in policy formulation. The higher organization of defense was

vested largely with the minister of defence. From 1957 to 1962,

this position was held by V.K. Krishna Menon, whose authority

far exceeded that usually accorded a minister of defence. A

confidante of Nehru's through much of the late preindependence period, Menon functioned as Nehru's alter ego for

national security and defense planning. Consequently, the

locus of decision making shifted from the cabinet to the

Defence Minister's Committee. Menon was in many ways

responsible for laying the foundations of India's military-industrial base.

Among other endeavors, Menon was responsible for the

development of ordnance facilities to manufacture the

Ichapore semiautomatic rifle; a tank manufacturing complex

at Avadi. Tamil Nadu: facilities to build frigates at the Mazagon

Dock naval shipyard in Bombay; and the licensed manufacture

of Soviet-designed MiG—23 fighter aircraft in Nasik. Maharashtra. However, his highly idiosyncratic manners, his highhanded ways, and his involvement in the tactical aspects of military decision making had negative consequences. For example, he quarrelled with the professional military, particularly

India's third chief of armv staff, General K.S. Thimayya, over Thimayya's attempt to warn Menon and Nehru about the

emerging Chinese threat as early as 1959. When Thimayya

resigned in protest, Nehru prevailed upon him to withdraw his

resignation. Unfortunately, when questioned in the Lok Sabha

(House of the People) , the lower house of the Parliament,

about Thimawa's resignation, Nehru offered a rather weak

defense of the general's actions and sought to deflect the criti- cisms of his minister of defence (see The Legislature, ch. 8).

When Thimayya retired as chief of army staff in May 1961,

Menon passed over Thimawa's designated successor, Lieutenant General S.P.P. Thorat, and instead appointed a junior offi- cer, Lieutenant General P.N. Thapar. The appointment not

only created a rift between the professional military and political leadership but also alienated a number of high-ranking offi- cials in the Ministry of Defence. Menon's actions also

580
National Security

demoralized competent personnel in the Chilian and military

bureaucracies, which led to important gaps in defense preparedness and planning. Menon's dominance of the defense

planning process significantly contributed to the military debacle of 1962.

The Indian defeat led to the establishment of a new Emergency Committee of the Cabinet. This committee introduced a system of "morning meetings" with the minister of defence and

the three service chiefs. The morning meetings, which are con- ducted without a predetermined agenda, deal with current

defense issues on a regular basis. The meetings are also

attended by the cabinet secretary, the defence secretary, and

the scientific adviser to the minister of defence. These morning

meetings continue to take place.

In the Chiefs of Staff Committee, formal equality prevails

among the three service chiefs despite the fact that the army

remains the largest of the three branches of the armed ser- vices. This formal equality among the three services came

about with independence.

To facilitate defense planning, the government established

two organizations: the Defence Coordination and Implementation Committee and the Defence Planning Staff. The Defense

Coordination and Implementation Committee is chaired by

the defence secretary and meets on an ad hoc basis. Its membership includes the three service chiefs, representatives from

civilian and military intelligence organizations, and the secre- tary of defence production. The Defence Planning Staff, a permanent body, was established in 1986. Composed of officers

drawn from all three services, it is responsible for developing

overall national security strategy. It is also charged with briefing

the Chiefs of Staff Committee on long-term threats to national

security.

Defense Spending

Until 1962 defense spending was deliberately limited. In the

wake of the war with China, defense spending rose from 2.1

percent of the gross national product (GXP—see Glossary) in

fiscal year (FY—see Glossary) 1962 to 4.5 percent in FY 1964. In

FY 1994, defense spending was slightly less than 5 percent of

gross domestic product (GDP—see Glossary). In terms of dollars, FY 1994 total defense services expenditures were projected

at USS7.2 billion (but are likely to have been close to USS7.8

billion). Proportionately, based on figures provided by the gov581
India: A Country Study

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582
National Security

eminent, 48.4 percent of expenditures were for the army, 15.7

percent for the air force, 5.9 percent for the navy, and 30 percent for capital outlays for defense services and defense ordnance factories. The latter provide materiel to the armed

forces through some thirty-nine ordnance factories and eight

public-sector enterprises that build ships, aircraft, and major

defense items. The defense budget for FY 1994 was 6.5 percent

higher than the revised estimate for FY 1993. The allocation

increased to 14.9 percent of the total central government budget, up from 13 percent in the previous two fiscal years.

Nuclear energy and space research are not fully accounted for

in the defense budget, but most paramilitary forces fall within

the purview of the Ministry of Defence.

Organization and Equipment of the Armed Forces

The Army

In 1994 the army had approximately 940,000 men and

women in its ranks and more than 36,000 in reserve forces.

The army is headquartered in New Delhi and is under the

direction of the chief of the army staff, always a full general.

The chief of the army staff is assisted by a vice chief, two deputy

chiefs, a military secretary, and the heads of four main staff

divisions: the adjutant general, the quartermaster general, the

master general of ordnance, and the engineer in chief.

The army has five tactical area commands: the Northern

Command headquartered at Udhampur in Jammu and Kashmir, the Western Command headquartered at Chandimandir

in Chandigarh, the Central Command headquartered at Lucknow in Uttar Pradesh, the Eastern Command headquartered at Calcutta, and the Southern Command headquartered at Pune

in Maharashtra (see fig. 17). Each command is headed by a lieutenant general. The principal combat formations within

the scope of these commands are armored divisions and independent armored brigades, infantry divisions, mountain infantry divisions, independent infantry brigades, airborne/

commando brigades, and independent artillery brigades (see

table 34, Appendix). These units are organized in twelve corpslevel formations.

The army is equipped with some 3,400 main battle tanks. Of

these, 1,200 are indigenously manufactured Vijayanta tanks.

Additionally, the army has some T-55, T-72, and PT-76 tanks.

The Arjun main battle tank has been under development by

583
India: A Country Study

the Defence Research and Development Organisation

(DRDO) since 1983, and, in 1995, limited production was

expected to begin in 1996.

To complement indigenous production, however, it was

reported in 1994 that Russia had agreed to help India modernize its T-72 tanks and to sell and lease other types of weapons.

It is generally understood that about 70 percent of India's military equipment is of Soviet origin. Some army officials continue to favor Russian-made equipment, such as the T-72 tank, over Indian adaptations of the same items, such as the T-72 MI

tank developed by the DRDO.

The army also has substantial artillery forces. The best esti- mate places the army's towed artillery capabilities at more than

4,000 pieces. In addition to the towed artillery, the army has

self-propelled artillery. Finally, it has substantial numbers of

surface-to-air missile capabilities, the total number being more

than 1,200. In 1986 air observation post units were transferred

from the air force to the army to form the Army Aviation

branch. Using nine helicopter squadrons, Army Aviation has

supported ground units in the Siachen Glacier in Jammu and

Kashmir and in Sri Lanka, as well as counterinsurgency operations in various parts of the country. Army Aviation has also

participated in disaster relief. Apart from its nine squadrons of helicopters, the army has

eight air observation squadrons and six antitank/ transport

squadrons. It relies on the air force for air support, lift capabilities, and air supply (see table 35, Appendix).

An extensive body of schools and centers supports army

operations. The officer corps is largely drawn from the

National Defence Academy at Khadakvasla, Maharashtra, a

joint services training institution that provides educational

equivalents to the bachelor of arts or bachelor of science

degrees to cadets for all three service arms. Cadets spend their

first three years at the National Defence Academy and then are sent to their respective service academies for further training

before being commissioned in the armed forces. A preparatory

school, the Rashtriya Indian Military College, at Dehra Dun,

Uttar Pradesh, provides education to candidates for the

National Defence Academy. After completing their studies at the National Defence Academy, army cadets are sent to the

Indian Military Academy at Dehra Dun. Other Indian Military

Academy cadets are graduates of the Army Cadet College or

are direct-entry students who have qualified by passing the

584
300 Kilometers 150 300 Miles \ AFGHANISTAN ) ""V

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ISLANDS

(India)

Caccadive Sea MALDIVES

Boundary rep, not necessarit

Figure 17. Area Commands of the Army, Navy, and Air Force, 1995

586
International boundary

International boundary in dispute

State or union territory boundary Army area command boundary

National capital • Populated place Army area command headquarters vL1 Naval area command headquarters

4" Air force operational command headquarters JL Triservice area command*

Reports to Eastern Naval Command headquarters

ft

f Arunachal Pradesh^

Eastern Air / ( Command Assam /Nagaland ^ Jit i s- Y

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1 NICOBAR

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! (India)

"esentation y authoritative
National Security

Union Public Service Commission Examination. They spend

between twelve and twenty-four months at the Indian Military

Academy before being commissioned in the army as second

lieutenants. Still other officer training occurs at the Officers1 Training Academy in Madras, Tamil Nadu, where a forty-fourweek session is offered to university graduates seeking a shortservice commission.

In addition to the Indian Military Academy, the army runs a number of military education establishments. The more prominent ones include the College of Combat at Mhow, Madhya

Pradesh; the High Altitude Warfare School at Gulmarg, Jammu

and Kashmir; and the Counter-Insurgency and Jungle Warfare

School at Vairengte, Mizoram. The army also operates the

Defence Services Staff College at Wellington in the Nilgiri Hills

in Tamil Nadu, which provides master of science-level joint-service training for mid-level staff appointments and promotes

interservice cooperation.

In 1994 it was reported that there were 200 women in the

armed forces. In the army, which employs women as physicians

and nurses, the participation of women is small but growing.

The Indian Military Nursing Service was formed in 1926 and

has eight nursing schools (five army, two navy, and one air

force) and one nursing college in Pune. Bachelor of science

graduates are commissioned as lieutenants in the Medical

Nursing Service and attached to the various components of the

armed forces. Ranks as high as colonel can be attained by

career officers. In the mid-1990s, a small but increasing number of women officers were being assigned to nonmedical ser- vices. In 1994, there were fifty women nonmedical army

officers and another twenty-five in training. They are university

graduates who have been put through rigorous training and

are reported to be eager for combat unit assignments.

The Navy

The origins of the modern Indian navy are traced to a maritime force established by the East India Company in the seven- teenth century. This force had a variety of names—the Bombay

Marine, the Indian Navy, and the Indian Marine. In 1934 the

Royal Indian Navy was established, with Indians serving primarily in lower-level positions. After independence the navy was

the most neglected of the three services because the national

leadership perceived that the bulk of the threats to India were

land-based.

587
International boundary

International boundary in dispute

State or union territory boundary Army area command boundary

National capital

Populated place Army area command headquarters

Naval area command headquarters

Air force operational command headquarters

Triservice area command*

Reports to Eastern Naval Command headquarter:

J Arunachal Pradesh^

^BHUTAN J^of/

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^ West/-1 Cafcutte Bengal \ «» BURMA

Say 0/" (Bayed

ANDAMAN :X ISLANDS

Andaman and Nicobar Islands

i NICOBAR

.ISLANDS °Q

! (/note)

Boundary representation not necessarily authoritative

Figure 17. Area Commands of the Army, Navy, and Air Force, 1995

586

India: A Country Study

The first efforts at naval rearmament emerged in the 1964—

69 Defence Plan, which called for the replacement of India's

aging fleet and the development of a submarine service.

Between 1947 and 1964, fiscal constraints had prevented the

implementation of ambitious plans for naval expansion. Consequently, many of the vessels were obsolete and of little operational value. As part of this expansion program, the British

helped develop the Mazagon Dock shipyard for the local production of British Leander-class frigates. The Soviets, however, were willing to support all phases of the planned naval expansion. Accordingly, they supplied naval vessels, support systems,

and training on extremely favorable terms. By the mid-1960s,

they had replaced Britain as India's principal naval supplier

(see table 36, Appendix).

During the 1980s, Indian naval power grew significantly.

During this period, the naval facilities at Port Blair in the Andaman Islands, in the Nicobar Islands, and in Lakshadweep were

significantly upgraded and modernized. A new line of Leanderclass frigates was manufactured at Mazagon Dock in collaboration with Vickers and Yarrow of Britain. These frigates, redesignated as the Godavari class, have antisubmarine warfare

capabilities and can carry two helicopters. During the 1980s,

plans were also finalized for the licensed manufacture of a line

of West German Type 1500 submarines (known as the Shishumar class in India). In addition to these developments at Mazagon Dock, the naval air arm also was upgraded. India

purchased nearly two squadrons of the vertical and short takeoff and landing (VSTOL) Sea Harriers to replace an earlier

generation of Sea Hawks.

In the mid-1990s, India was preparing for a major modernization program that was to include completion of three 5,000-

ton Delhi-class destroyers, the building of three 3,700-ton frig- ates based on Italian Indian Naval Ship (INS)-IO design, and

the acquisition of four hydrographic survey ships. Also to be

built were an Indian-designed warship called Frigate 2001; six

British Upholder-class submarines; an Indian-designed and

Indian-built missile-firing nuclear submarine—the Advanced

Technology Vessel—based on the Soviet Charlie II class; and an

Indian-designed and Indian-built 17,000-ton air defense ship

capable of carrying between twelve and fifteen aircraft. The air- defense ship will be, in effect, a replacement for India's two

aging British aircraft carriers, the INS Vikrant, the keel of which

was laid in 1943 but construction of which was not completed

588
Aircraft on the flight deck of the INS Viraat

Courtesy Embassy ofIndia, Washington

until 1961 and which was slated for decommissioning by 2000,

and the INS Viraat, which entered service in 1987 and is likely to be decommissioned by 2005. The problems encountered

with modernizing these and other foreign-source ships led

India to decide against acquiring an ex-Soviet Kiev-class aircraft

carrier in 1994.

In the spirit of international military cooperation, India has

made moves in the early and mid-1990s to enhance jointnation interoperability. Indian naval exercises have taken place

with ships from the Russian navy and those of Indian Ocean lit- toral states and other nations, including the United States. Naval headquarters is located in New Delhi. It is under the

command of the chief of naval staff—a full admiral. The chief

of naval staff has four principal staff officers: the vice chief of

naval staff, the vice chief of personnel, the chief of material,

and the deputy chief of naval staff. The total strength of the

589
India: A Country Study

navy in 1994 was 54,000, including 5,000 naval aviation personnel and 1,000 marines (one regiment, with a second reportedly

forming).

Women were inducted into the navy for the first time in

1992, when twenty-two were trained as education, logistics, and

law cadres. In 1993 additional women were recruited for air

traffic control duties. By 1994 there were thirty-five women

naval officers.

The navy is deployed under three area commands, each

headed by a flag officer. The Western Naval Command is headquartered in Bombay on the Arabian Sea; the Southern Naval

Command in Kochi (Cochin), in Kerala, also on the Arabian

Sea; and the Eastern Naval Command in Vishakhapatnam,

Andhra Pradesh, on the Bay of Bengal. Additionally, the navy

has important bases in Calcutta and Goa.

The Southern Naval Command is responsible for naval offi- cer training, which occurs at the Indian Naval Academy in Goa.

Officer candidates are largely drawn from the National

Defence Academy. After commissioning, officers are offered

specialized training in antisubmarine warfare, aviation, communications, electronic warfare, engineering, hydrography,

maritime warfare, missile warfare, navigation, and other naval

specialties at various naval training institutions, many of which

are collocated with the Training Command headquarters on

Wiilingdon Island, near Kochi.

The Air Force

The air force was established in 1932. In 1994 it had 110,000

personnel and 779 combat aircraft. The air force, which is headquartered in New Delhi, is headed by the chief of air staff, an air chief marshal. He is assisted by six principal staff officers:

the vice chief of air staff, the deputy chief of air staff, the air

officer in charge of administration, the air officer in charge of

personnel, the air officer in charge of maintenance, and the

inspector general of flight safety. The air force is deployed into

five operational commands: the Western Air Command, headquartered at New Delhi; the Southwestern Air Command,

headquartered at Jodhpur, Rajasthan; the Eastern Air Command, headquartered at Shillong, Meghalaya; the Central Air

Command, headquartered at Allahabad, Uttar Pradesh; and

the Southern Air Command, headquartered at Thiruvananthapuram (Trivandrum), Kerala. Additionally, there are two

functional commands: the Training Command at Bangalore,

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National Security

Karnataka, and the Maintenance Command at Nagpur, Maharashtra.

As of 1994, the air force was equipped with twenty-two squad- rons of ground attack fighters. Five of these squadrons had a

total of eighty-nine British Jaguar aircraft. Another five squad- rons had 120 Soviet-origin MiG—27 aircraft. The air force also

fielded twenty fighter squadrons, two of which were equipped

with a total of thirty-five French-built Mirage 2000 H/TH air- craft. There were also twelve squadrons of transport aircraft in

the inventory (see table 37, Appendix). Because of the large

number of Soviet-origin aircraft, the air force is dependent on

Russia for spare parts and equipment and weapons upgrades.

In March 1995, Russia agreed to upgrade India's MiG—21 air- craft. Aside from the Training Command at Bangalore, the center

for primary flight training is located at the Air Force Academy

at Hyderabad, Andhra Pradesh, followed by operational training at various air force schools. Advanced training is also con- ducted at the Defence Services Staff College; specialized

advanced flight training schools are located at Bidar, Karnataka, and Hakimpet, Andhra Pradesh (also the location for

helicopter training). Technical schools are found at a number

of other locations.

In 1991 the government approved the induction of women

into nontechnical air force officer billets, such as administration, logistics, accounting, education, and meteorology. In

1992 opportunities for "pioneer women officers" were opened

in the areas of transportation, helicopters, and navigation, and

the first group of thirteen women cadets entered the Air Force

Academy. During their flight training, they qualified on HPT32 and Kiran aircraft to earn their air force commissions. After

completing ten months' training, five of the seven successful course graduates received further training on various transport

aircraft. By 1994, there were fifty-five women officers in the air

force.

Recruitment and Training

Under the Indian constitution, as amended in 1977, each cit- izen has a fundamental duty to "defend the country and render

national service when called upon to do so" (see The Constitutional Framework, ch. 8). However, the three services have

always been all-volunteer forces, and general conscription has never proved necessary. Military service has long been deemed

591
India: A Country Study

an attractive option for many in a society where employment

opportunities are scarce. The technical branches of the armed

forces, however, have experienced problems with recruitment.

Since the 1980s, as a result of the growth and diversification of

India's industrial base, employment opportunities for individuals with technical training have expanded substantially. Consequently, fewer trained individuals have sought employment

opportunities in the armed services.

The army and navy maintain a combined recruitment organization that operates sixty offices in key cities and towns

nationwide. The air force has a separate recruiting organization with twelve offices. Army and navy recruitment officers

tour rural districts adjacent to their stations and also draw from

nearby urban areas. The air force and the navy draw a disproportionate number of their recruits from the urban areas, where educational opportunities are adequate to generate

applicants capable of mastering technical skills. The army also

recruits outside India, admitting ethnic Gurkhas (also seen as Gorkhas) from Nepal into a Gurkha regiment.

Initial enlistments vary in length, depending on the service

and the branch or skill category, but fifteen years is considered

the minimum. The tour of duty is generally followed by two to

five years of service in a reserve unit. Reenlistment is permitted

for those who are qualified, particularly those possessing necessary skills. The minimum age for enlistment is seventeen years;

the maximum varies between twenty and twenty-seven, depending on the service and skill category. The compulsory retirement age for officers also varies, ranging from forty-eight for

army majors, navy lieutenant commanders, and air force

squadron leaders and below, to sixty for army generals, navy

admirals, and air force air chief marshals. On occasion a twoyear extension is granted on the grounds of exceptional organizational needs or personal ability.

Candidates have to meet minimum physical standards,

which differ among the three services and accommodate the

various physical traits of particular ethnic groups. Since 1977

recruiting officers have relaxed physical standards slightly

when evaluating the only sons of serving or former military

personnel—both as a welfare measure and as a means of maintaining a family tradition of military service.

Educational standards for enlisted ranks differ according to service and skill category; the army requirement varies from

basic literacy to higher secondary education (see Primary and

592
Women naval officers Courtesy Embassy ofIndia, Washington

Secondary Education, ch. 2). The other two services require

higher educational levels, reflecting their greater need for

technical expertise. The air force requires at least a higher sec- ondary education, and the navy insists on graduation from a secondary school for all except cooks and stewards. Officer

candidates have to complete a higher secondary education and

pass a competitive qualifying exam for entry into precommission training. All services also accept candidates holding university degrees in such fields as engineering, physics, or medicine for direct entry into the officer corps.

Enlistment was legally opened to all Indians following independence in 1947. In 1949 the government abolished recruitment on an ethnic, linguistic, caste, or religious basis.

Exceptions were army infantry regiments raised before World

War II, where cohesion and effectiveness were thought to be

rooted in long-term attachment to traditions. Some army regi593
India: A Country Study

ments have a homogeneous composition; other regiments seg- regate groups only at battalion or company levels. Others are completely mixed throughout. In general, the army has

steadily evolved into a more heterogeneous service since 1947.

Regiments raised during and after World War II have recruited

Indians of almost all categories, and the doubling of the army's

size after the 1962 border war with China sped up the process.

The armed forces have made a concerted effort to recruit

among underrepresented segments of the population and,

during the late 1970s and the early 1980s, reformed the recruiting process to eliminate some of the subjectivity in the candidate selection process. Since 1989 the government has sought

to apportion recruitment from each state and union territory

according to its share of the population. Both the air force and

the navy are now almost completely "mixed" services and display considerable heterogeneity in their composition.

Conditions of Service

Pay and allowances for armed forces personnel compare

favorably with civilian employment. Monthly salaries vary

according to the service, although personnel usually earn similar pay for equivalent duties. Additionally, there is an extensive

and complex system of special allowances that depend on conditions and kind of service. Free food for personnel in both

field and garrison areas was extended after 1983 to all personnel up to the rank of colonel. All personnel are entitled to annual leaves of varying lengths, and, other than for a few

exceptions, the services bear transportation costs for personnel

and their families. Commissioned officers and other designated ranks contribute to the Armed Forces Provident Fund, a form of life insurance.

Personnel retiring after twenty years of service as an officer or fifteen years of enlisted service receive pensions based on

the rank held at retirement. Retirees without the minimum ser- vice requirement receive special one-time bonuses. Additional

remuneration accrues to those disabled in the line of service or—in the event of the death of active-duty personnel—to their

surviving dependents.

The Soldiers', Sailors', and Airmen's Board, chaired by the

minister of defence, is one of the most important organizations

dealing with the welfare of active-duty personnel and their

dependents. The board works closely with the Directorate of

Resettlement in the Ministry of Defence to assist former service

594
National Security

personnel and their dependents to find employment on their

return to civilian life. The directorate also operates cooperative

industrial and agricultural estates and training programs to prepare former service personnel for employment in new

fields. Both central and state-level governments reserve a percentage of vacancies in the public sector for former military

personnel.

Uniforms, Ranks, and Insignia

Indian military uniforms resemble those in the corresponding British services: olive drab for the army, dark blue for the

navy, and sky blue for the air force. More uniform variations

exist in the army than in the other services, with certain army

regiments preserving traditional accoutrements. Sikhs may

wear turbans instead of standard military headgear, for example (see Sikhism, ch. 3).

The rank structure in the three services, especially in the

commissioned officer ranks, for the most part follows conventional British practice. The army, however, has the category of

junior commissioned officer, for which there is no precise

equivalent in the United States or British services. Junior commissioned officers are promoted on a point system from within

the enlisted ranks of their regiments, filling most of the junior

command slots, such as platoon leaders. The senior junior

commissioned officer usually acts as the principal assistant to the commanding officer. Rank insignia closely follow the British system. Combinations of stars, Lion of Sarnath (the national emblem) badges,

crossed sabers, and crossed batons in a wreath show respective

army ranks from junior commissioned officer up through field

marshal. The latter rank has been granted to only two distinguished Indian officers: K.M. Cariappa, a highly decorated vet- eran of the 1947-48 war with Pakistan, and S. H.F.J. "Sam"

Manekshaw, the strategist of the 1971 war with Pakistan. Arm

chevrons worn with the point down indicate enlisted ranks.

Naval insignia follow the convention of sleeve stripes for offi- cers and fouled anchor badges for enlisted personnel. The air

force uses broad and narrow sleeve stripe combinations for

officer ranks and combinations of chevrons, Lion of Sarnath

badges, and wing symbols for enlisted ranks (see fig. 18; fig.

19).

595
India: A Country Study

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National Security
India: A Country Study

Paramilitary and Reserve Forces

Paramilitary Forces In addition to the regular armed forces, India also has paramilitary forces. These forces have grown dramatically since

independence. There are twelve paramilitary organizations,

which have an authorized strength of around 1.3 million personnel. In 1994, their reported actual strength was 692,500.

These organizations include the Coast Guard Organisation and

the Defence Security Force, which are subordinate to the Ministry of Defence. Paramilitary forces subordinate to the Ministry of Home Affairs include the Assam Rifles, the Border

Security Force, the Central Industrial Security Force, the Central Reserve Police Force, the Indo-Tibetan Border Police, and

the Rashtriya Rifles (National Rifles). The National Security

Guards, a joint anti terrorist contingency force, are charged

with protection of high-level persons (the so-called very very

important persons—WIPs) and are subordinate to the Office

of the Prime Minister (also sometimes known as the Prime

Minister's Secretariat.) The guards are composed of elements

of the armed forces, the Central Reserve Police Force, and the

Border Security Force. The Special Frontier Force also is subordinate to the Office of the Prime Minister. The Railway Protection Force is subordinate to the Ministry of Railways. At the

local level, there is the Provincial Armed Constabulary, which is controlled by the governments of the states and territories (see

State and Other Police Services, this ch.).

During the 1960s, 1970s, and 1980s, local police forces could

not deal with the mounting array of sectarian, ethnic, and

regional conflicts, and paramilitary forces were increasingly

called on for assistance. In addition to security and guard

duties, paramilitary organizations assist local and state-level

police forces in maintaining public order and shield the army

from excessive use in "aid-to-the-civil-power" operations. These

operations essentially involve quelling public disorder when

local police forces prove inadequate to the task. The Coast Guard Organisation was constituted as an Armed

Force of the Union in 1978 under the administrative control of

the Ministry of Defence (although it is funded by the Ministry

of Home Affairs), following its 1977 establishment as a temporary navy element. Its principal mission is to protect the country's maritime assets, particularly India's 200-nautical-mile

exclusive economic zone and the marine resources contained

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National Security

in the area, which comprises nearly 2.8 million square kilometers. The coast guard is also responsible for the prevention of

poaching and smuggling, the control of marine pollution, and

carrying out search-and-rescue missions. Under the command

of a director general, the coast guard is organized into three

national maritime zones: the Western Maritime Zone, headquartered at Bombay; the Eastern Maritime Zone, headquartered at Madras; and the Andaman and Nicobar Maritime

Zone, headquartered at Port Blair. The zones are further subdivided into district headquarters, one each for the eight maritime states on the mainland and two in the Andaman and

Nicobar Islands. In times of emergency, the coast guard is expected to work with the navy. In the late 1980s, coast guard

units from the eastern zone supported Indian peacekeeping

efforts in Sri Lanka. The coast guard's equipment includes

about fifty ships, nine helicopters, and thirteen fixed-wing air- craft (see table 38, Appendix).

Another Ministry of Defence paramilitary organization has a

security mission. The Defence Security Force guards Ministry

of Defence facilities throughout India.

The Border Security Force was established in the closing

days of the 1965 Indo-Pakistani conflict. Its principal mission

involves guarding the Indo-Pakistani line of actual control in

Jammu and Kashmir as well as borders with Bangladesh and

Burma. It works in internal security and counterinsurgency

operations in Assam, Jammu and Kashmir, and Punjab. The

border force has also been used to deal with communal rioting.

Another Ministry of Homes Affairs paramilitary force

deployed in Jammu and Kashmir is the Rashtriya Rifles. In

1994 it had 5,000 troops, all of whom served in Jammu and

Kashmir. Some observers expected the force to grow to thirty

battalions, with around 25,000 personnel. In March 1995,

Indian television referred to the Delta Force of the "fledgling"

Rashtriya Rifles. It was reported that the force was operating

against "terrorists" and "foreign mercenaries" in Doda District

in south-central Jammu and Kashmir.

Founded in 1939, the Central Reserve Police Force is the

country's oldest paramilitary organization. It maintains internal order when local and state-level forces prove inadequate to the task. The Central Reserve Police Force in Assam, Jammu

and Kashmir, and Punjab has worked in counterinsurgency

operations. This force also was dispatched to Sri Lanka during

India's 1987-90 involvement there. The Ministry of Defence's

599
India: A Country Study

weekly armed forces magazine, Sainik Samachar, reported that

the Mahila Battalion (Women's Battalion) of the Central

Reserve Police Force had "proved its mettle in hot warlike conditions in Sri Lanka," and had established women as "a force to reckon with" in the paramilitary.

Another significant paramilitary organization is the IndoTibetan Border Police, established in 1962 in the aftermath of

the war with China. It is primarily responsible for the security

of the border with China.

The Special Frontier Force, established in 1962 in the after- math of the war with China, is less well publicized by the government. Apparently it is an elite, parachute-qualified

commando unit, nominally subordinate to the army and

deployed along sensitive areas of the border with China, and

recruited partially from among border-area hill tribes and

Tibetan refugees. The Special Frontier Force also appears to have a domestic security role; members of the force were

involved in the Golden Temple siege in 1984. In 1994 its reported strength was 3,000, making it one of the smallest paramilitary forces.

Reserve Forces

India's "second line of defense" is composed of several citi- zen mass organizations. These include the Territorial Army, a

voluntary, part-time civilian force that receives military training

and serves as a reserve force for the army "to relieve [it] of

static duties, to aid the civil power, and to provide units for the

regular Army, if and when required." It was raised in 1949 and

has been used in times of war and domestic disturbances. Organizationally, Territorial Army personnel are raised from among

employees of government agencies and public-sector enterprises and are formed into departmental units. Nondepartmental units are raised from other citizens, including former

active-duty military personnel. In the early 1990s, Territorial

Army units saw service in Jammu and Kashmir and along the

northern and western borders of India and in support of paramilitary units subordinate to the Ministry of Home Affairs.

The National Cadet Corps, which is open to young men and

women, was established in 1948 to develop discipline and leadership qualities useful in life and particularly for potential ser- vice in the armed forces. The semiautonomous organization

receives guidance from the ministries of education and

defence at the central level and from state-level governments at

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National Security

the local level. It is organized into army, navy, and air force

wings, and its ranks correspond to those in the respective

armed forces.

Civil Defence Volunteers are under the leadership of a small

paid cadre, who are trained to provide early warning communications at the town level. They also participate in civil works

construction projects and natural disaster relief work. Subordination is through the local state or territory government and

the Ministry of Home Affairs.

The Home Guards are a voluntary force raised by state and

territory governments under the guidance of the Ministry of

Home Affairs. Home Guards undergo minimal training and

receive pay only when called for duty. They assist the police in

crime prevention and detection; undertake watch and patrol

duties; and aid in disaster relief, crowd control, and the supervision of elections. The central government reimburses the

states and territories at varying rates for expenses incurred in

the performance of Home Guard duties.

Space and Nuclear Programs

India detonated its first and only nuclear device at Pokharan

in the Rajasthan Desert in May 1974. Subsequently and in all likelihood as a consequence of international pressure, India

has chosen not to conduct any further tests. At a formal level,

Indian officials and strategists deny that India possesses nuclear

weapons and refer to India's position as an "options strategy,"

which essentially means maintaining the nuclear weapons

option and exercising it should regional and international conditions so warrant. In pursuit of this end, India refuses to sign

the 1968 Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons.

Formally, Indian officials argue that India's refusal to sign the

treaty stems from its fundamentally discriminatory character;

the treaty places restrictions on the nonnuclear weapons states but does little to curb the modernization and expansion of the

nuclear arsenals of the nuclear weapons states. The Indian ballistic missile program has some elements in

common with the nuclear program. Under the aegis of the

Integrated Guided Missile Development Programme, India is developing rockets of varying ranges: the Agni, the Prithvi, the

Akash, the Trishul, and the Nag. The Agni, which former

Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi referred to as a "technology demonstrator," was first test fired in May 1989 and again in May

1992. In 1995 it was not yet operational, but it has interconti601
India: A Country Study

nental ballistic missile potential. The Prithvi—which some

sources reported had an operational unit raised in 1995 and

deployed along the Pakistani border—is a tactical, short-range

surface-to-surface missile designed by the DRDO as part of

India's antimissile defense system. Based on the Soviet Scud

missile, its 250-kilogram payload can be launched from a mobile launcher. The Trishul is a sea-skimming short-range

missile. The Akash is a multitarget surface-to-air missile that was being test fired in 1994 and 1995. The Nag is essentially an

antitank missile.

The Indian missile program has been of concern to the

United States, which, under the terms of the Missile Technology Control Regime, imposed sanctions against the Indian

Space Research Organisation (ISRO) in June 1992. In July

1993, the United States prevailed upon the Russian space

agency, Glavkosmos, not to transfer cryogenic rocket engines

to India (see Russia; United States, ch. 9). The ISRO decided it would develop the engine on its own by 1997 while continuing

to seek purchase of modified versions of the engines from Russia. Seven such cryogenic engines were scheduled for delivery

by Glavkosmos between 1996 and 1999. In keeping with its agreement with the United States, Glavkosmos was not going to transfer additional technology for cryogenic engines. However,

cryogenic engine technology transfer had begun in 1991, and

hence leading ISRO officials were confident about their 1997

projection.

Intelligence Services

The first post-independence military intelligence service was

the Intelligence Bureau established in 1947 under the aegis of

the Ministry of Home Affairs. Until 1962 the Intelligence

Bureau had wide-ranging responsibilities for the collection,

collation, and assessment of both domestic and foreign intelli- gence. The failure of the Intelligence Bureau to assess adequately the nature of the Chinese threat, however, led to a reevaluation of its role and functions in the early 1960s. Military Intelligence, which in the words of one retired Indian general was "little more than a post office," was reactivated and

given the task of reporting to the revamped Joint Intelligence

Committee. The Joint Intelligence Committee is the key body

coordinating and assessing intelligence brought to it by the

Intelligence Bureau, Military Intelligence, and the Research

and Analysis Wing of the Office of the Prime Minister. Estab602
Navy missile destroyer, INS Rana

Sailors in a ship's operations room

Courtesy Embassy ofIndia, Washington

603
India: A Country Study

lished in 1968, the Research and Analysis Wing is primarily

responsible for gathering external intelligence. Despite a substantial budget and extensive foreign postings, the wing's

efforts to gather intelligence even in South Asia are inadequate

according to some foreign analysts (see Role of the Prime Minister, ch. 9).

Each of the armed services has a directorate charged with

the collection and dissemination of intelligence. Critics have

charged that there is inadequate cooperation and coordination among the service intelligence directorates, the Intelligence Bureau, and the Research and Analysis Wing. There is, however, an interservice Joint Cipher Bureau, which is in

charge of cryptology and signals intelligence. The Research

and Analysis Wing includes officers from the armed services

and also has a chief military intelligence adviser.

Military Justice

The Manual of Military Law and Regulations spells out rules

and procedures for the investigation, prosecution, and punishment of military offenses and crimes in the armed forces. Basic

authority rests in the constitution, the Army Act of 1954, the

Air Force Act of 1950, and the Navy Act of 1957.

The army and air force have three kinds of courts. They are, in descending order of power, the General Court, which conducts general courts-martial; the District Court; and the Summary General Court. Additionally, the army has a fourth kind

of court, the Summary Court. Local commanding officers con- duct this court with powers similar to nonjudicial punishment

in the United States armed forces. The navy uses general

courts-martial in addition to the nonjudicial powers established

for commanders in the Navy Act. Courts-martial can be convened by the prime minister, minister of defence, chief of staff of the service concerned, or

other officers so designated by the ministry or the chief of staff. There are channels of appeal and stages of judicial review,

although procedures differ among the three services.

Members of the armed forces remain subject concurrently

to both civilian and military law, and criminal courts with

appropriate jurisdictions assume priority over military courts in

specific cases. With the approval of the government, a person

convicted or acquitted by a court-martial can undergo retrial

by a criminal court for the same offense and on the same evi604
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dence. Once tried by a civilian court, however, one cannot be

tried by a military court for the same offense.

Each of the three services has its own judge advocate general's department, relatively free and independent of the other

branches in the discharge of its judicial functions. The various

departments have officers among the adjutant general's staff at army headquarters, in the chief of personnel's staff at navy

headquarters, and in the administration staff of the air force

headquarters.

Public Order and Internal Security

Military Role Expansion

The army has four major roles or functions in the mainte- nance of public order and internal security. One is to defend

India's territorial integrity and to maintain the inviolability of

its borders. Another involves dealing with internal security

threats stemming from secessionist demands and externally

supported insurgencies. The army also is called upon to assist Chilian authorities in maintaining civil order when local police

forces and the paramilitary prove inadequate to the task.

Finally, the army can also be mobilized to deal with natural

disasters such as earthquakes and floods, the only domestic

function that the army performs with enthusiasm.

Despite the existence of numerous paramilitary forces, the

army has had to quell outbreaks of civil violence, primarily in

the states of Assam, Jammu and Kashmir, and Punjab (see Paramilitary Forces and Reserve Forces, this ch.). By the early

1990s, army involvement in Assam and Punjab had diminished

significantly as insurgencies waned. However, the role of the

army in Jammu and Kashmir expanded substantially as both

police and paramilitary forces failed to maintain law and order.

In 1993 upper-echelon army officers warned that excessive use of the army to restore civil order might have a number of

corrosive effects. First, it might damage the morale of troops

who might be distressed at having to shoot civilians. Second, it might have the effect of politicizing the army. The outgoing

chief of army staff, General Sunith Francis Rodrigues, publicly

articulated his misgivings on this subject. Furthermore, in June

1993, Rodrigues presented a report entitled "Maximizing Effectiveness of Central Police Organizations" to the Committee of

Secretaries (composed of a "core group", the secretaries of

defence, finance, and home affair, chaired by the cabinet secre605
India: A Country Study

tary, and meeting on a weekly basis). The report called for the

army to take over the training of paramilitary forces.

Civil Liberties, Human Rights, and the Armed Forces

In response to a range of insurgencies since the early 1980s,

the central government has enacted an extensive array of legislation that places substantial curbs on civil liberties. The

National Security Act of 1980, the National Security Amendment Act of 1984, the Terrorist and Disruptive Activities (Prevention) Act of 1985 (which was renewed in 1987 and

suspended in 1995), and the Armed Forces (Jammu and Kashmir) Special Powers Act of 1990 are the most significant laws in

force. The ramifications of these four laws are sweeping. Under

their aegis, the central government has the right of preventive

detention, may seek in-camera trials, may send accused individuals before designated courts, and may destroy property

belonging to suspected terrorists. Furthermore, under the

terms of the Armed Forces (Jammu and Kashmir) Special Powers Act, members of the armed forces cannot be prosecuted for

actions committed in good faith in pursuance of the provisions

of this law. During the 1980s and 1990s, both international and domestic human rights groups asserted that human rights violations are rampant. The principal international organizations making

these allegations are the International Commission ofJurists,

Amnesty International, and Asia Watch. Two Indian counterparts are the People's Union for Civil Liberties and the People's United Democratic Front. Indian and foreign press

reports have alleged that local police and paramilitary forces

have engaged in rape, torture, and beatings of suspects in

police custody. Numerous "militants" reportedly have simply

disappeared in Jammu and Kashmir. On other occasions, especially in Punjab, security forces on various occasions allegedly

captured insurgents and then shot them in staged "encounters"

or "escapes." The government has either vigorously challenged

these allegations or asserted that condign punishment had

been meted out against offenders. The government has made

efforts to blunt the barrage of domestic and foreign criticism.

One such effort was the establishment of the five-member

National Human Rights Commission in 1993 composed of

senior retired judges. A report released by the commission in

November 1993 cited eighty Bombay police officials for "atrocities, ill treatment, collusion, and connivance" and for "being

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National Security

openly on the side of the Hindu aggressors" during the December 1992 Hindu-Muslim riots. The commission's mandate does

not extend to violations in Jammu and Kashmir and northeast

India, and it must rely on state investigative agencies for its field work.

Insurgent Movements and External Subversion

Kashmir

In the mid-1990s, India was grappling with three separate

insurgencies of varying strengths in the states of Assam, Jammu

and Kashmir, and Punjab. The insurgency in Jammu and Kashmir has the most serious implications for India. The long-term

roots of the Kashmir problem can be traced to the partition of

India (see National Integration, ch. 1). The crisis centers on a

militant secessionist demand that the Indian state has harshly

suppressed. Its proximate causes are located in the central government's attempts to manipulate state-level politics for shortterm political ends. Since 1989, approximately 10,000 civilians

have died at the hands of security forces or militants. Although

the origins of the crisis are quintessentially indigenous, there is widespread agreement among both Indian and foreign observers that the Inter-Services Intelligence Agency of Pakistan has

actively aided and abetted some of the insurgent groups, most

notably, the radical Islamic Hezb-ul-Mujahideen.

The counterinsurgency strategy that the Indian government

has adopted in Jammu and Kashmir was developed in the context of dealing with guerrilla movements in India's northeast in

the late 1970s. This strategy involves denying the guerrillas any

sanctuaries, sealing the porous Indo-Pakistani border, and

using both army and paramilitary forces to conduct house-tohouse "cordon-and-search" operations. Whether this strategy

will lead eventually to the collapse of the insurgency in Jammu

and Kashmir remains an open question; violence has continued to accelerate since 1993, with mounting casualties on both

sides and the destruction of an ancient mosque and shrine in

1995 (see Political Issues, ch. 8; South Asia, ch. 9).

Punjab

The insurgency in the state of Punjab originated in the late 1970s. The roots of this insurgency are complex. The Green

Revolution, a package of agricultural inputs, transformed the

socioeconomic landscape of Punjab (see The Green Revolu607
India: A Country Study

tion, ch. 7). Amidst this new-found prosperity, large numbers

of Sikhs started to shed some of the trappings of their faith.

This propensity rekindled an age-old fear in the Sikh community—that of being absorbed into the Hindu fold. In turn,

many Punjabi Sikhs, who were dispossessed of their land as a consequence of agricultural transformation, found solace in

various revivalistic practices. One of the leaders of this revivalistic movement was Sant Jar nail Singh Bhindranwale, a politically ambitious itinerant Sikh preacher. The second factor

contributing to the insurgency was the attempt by Indira Gandhi (India's prime minister, 1966-77 and 1980-84), the Congress, and from 1978 Congress (I) to use Bhindranwale to undermine the position of the Akali Dal (Eternal Party), a regional party (see Political Parties, ch. 8). Bhindranwale and

his followers were encouraged to verbally intimidate Akali Dal

politicians. Although this strategy met with some success, Bhindranwale and his followers became a source of mayhem and

disruption in Punjab. Eventually, in June 1984, Gandhi had to order units of the Indian army to flush out Bhindranwale and

his followers, who had taken refuge in the Golden Temple

complex, Sikhism's most holy shrine, in Amritsar, Punjab (see

Sikhism, ch. 3).

This exercise, Operation Bluestar, was, at best, a mixed success. After all efforts at negotiation failed, Indira Gandhi

ordered the army to storm the temple. A variety of army units,

along with substantial numbers of paramilitary forces, sur- rounded the temple complex on June 3, 1984. After the

demands to surrender peacefully were met with volleys of gunfire from within the confines of the temple, the army was given

the order to take the temple by force. Indian intelligence

authorities had underestimated the firepower possessed by the

militants, however, and the army brought in tanks and heavy

artillery to suppress the antitank and machine-gun fire. After a

twenty-four-hour firefight, the army successfully took control of

the temple. According to Indian government sources, eightythree army personnel were killed and 249 injured. Insurgent

casualties were 493 killed and eighty-six injured. Indian observers assert that the number of Sikh casualties was probably

higher.

The attack on the Golden Temple had the effect of inflaming significant segments of the Sikh community. It is widely

believed that the two Sikh bodyguards who assassinated Indira

Gandhi on October 31, 1984, were driven by their anger over

608
m

An Indian Air Force crew prepares for takeoff. Courtesy Indian Ministry ofExternal Affairs

A Sea Harrierjet, from the Indian Navy's White Tigers Squadron, on patrol

Courtesy Embassy ofIndia, Washington

609
India: A Country Study

the Golden Temple episode. In the wake of Indira Gandhi's

assassination, mobs rampaged through the streets of New Delhi

and other parts of India over the next few days, killing several

thousand Sikhs. The New Delhi police proved to be partisan

observers and did little to stop or apprehend the rioters. Only

after the deployment of the army, almost three days after the

onset of the riots, was order fully restored.

The New Delhi riots had repercussions in Punjab as militants

stepped up their activities. Gandhi's son and political successor, Rajiv Gandhi, sought unsuccessfully to bring peace to Punjab

with an accord signed with Harchand Singh Longowal, a moderate Sikh leader. Rajiv Gandhi's successors, belonging to the

Janata factions, proved to be no more adept at resolving the crisis. In fact, between 1987 and 1991, Punjab was placed under

President's Rule and governed directly from New Delhi (see

The Executive, ch. 8). Eventually, an election was held in the

state in February 1992. Voter turnout, however, was poor; only

about 24 percent of the population participated in the elections. Despite its narrow mandate, the newly elected Congress

(I) government gave a free hand to the police chief of the

state, K.P.S. Gill. His ruthless methods significantly weakened

the insurgent movement. Most political observers, however,

assert that long-term political stability in Punjab depends on

addressing the underlying grievances of segments of the Sikh

community.

Assam and the Northeast

The origins of the insurgency in Assam are quite different

from those in Kashmir and Punjab. The principal grievance of

the radical student movement, the United Liberation Front of

Assam, is nativist. Front members are violently opposed to the

presence of Bengalis from the neighboring state of West Bengal and waves of illegal immigrants from Bangladesh. Various

rounds of negotiations between the United Liberation Front of

Assam and two successive central governments resulted in the

Assam Accord of August 15, 1985. Under the provisions of this

accord, persons who entered the state illegally betweenJanuary

1966 and March 1971 were allowed to remain but were disenfranchised for ten years, while those who entered after 1971

faced expulsion. A November 1985 amendment to the Indian

citizenship law allows noncitizens who entered Assam between

1961 and 1971 to have all the rights of citizenship except the

right to vote for a period of ten years.

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National Security

In 1993 an accord was reached between the Bodo tribe and

the central and state governments. The accord established the

Bodoland Autonomous Council, which gave the Bodos limited

political and administrative autonomy. Nevertheless, violence

broke out in 1994: members of the Bodo Security Force, in the

wake of demands for a "liberated Bodoland" burned several vil- lages and killed around 100 immigrant villagers. Both local

counterinsurgency forces and army units were sent in to engage the Bodo militants.

A number of other insurgencies in the northeast have

required extensive use of army and paramilitary forces. Four

states in particular have witnessed various insurgent and guerrilla movements. The first and perhaps the most significant

insurgency originated in Nagaland in the early 1950s; it was

eventually quelled in the early 1980s through a mixture of

repression and cooptation. In 1993 Nagaland experienced

recrudescent violence as two ethnic groups, the Nagas and the

Kukis, engaged in brutal conflict with each other. Adding to India's internal unrest in this region were the links established

between the Bodo insurgents in Assam and the National Socialist Council of Nagaland, which, in turn, had links to other

active insurgent groups and, reportedly, operatives in Thailand.

In neighboring Manipur, militants organized under the

aegis of the People's Liberation Army long fought to unite the

Meitei tribes of Burma and Manipur into an independent state. This insurgent movement had been largely suppressed by the

mid-1990s.

In Mizoram the Mizo National Front fought a running battle

with the Indian security forces throughout the 1960s. As in

Nagaland, this insurgency was suppressed in the early 1980s

through a mixture of political concessions and harsh military

tactics. In the state of Tripura, tribal peoples organized under the

leadership of the Tripura National Front were also responsible

for terrorist activity. This movement has, for the most part, also

been brought under control by the government.

The central government's success in quelling these insurgencies was not without human and material costs. Although no

assessments of these costs exist in the public domain, it is widely believed that the paramilitary forces and the army were

given a free hand in suppressing the uprisings. A prominent

Indian human rights activist and attorney, Nandita Haksar, has

611
India: A Country Study

alleged that harsh methods were routinely used, including collective punishment of villagers accused of harboring terrorists

in remote areas. Because of the continued level of insurgency

by Assamese and other groups, which had bases in neighboring

Burma, India and Burma started joint counterinsurgency operations against the rebels in May 1995, the first such operations

since the 1980s.

Law Enforcement

National-Level Agencies

The constitution assigns responsibility for maintaining law

and order to the states and territories, and almost all routine

policing—including apprehension of criminals—is carried out

by state-level police forces. The constitution also permits the

central government to participate in police operations and

organization by authorizing the maintenance of the Indian

Police Service. Police officers are recruited by the Union Public Service Commission through a competitive nationwide

examination. On completion of a nationwide basic public-service course, police officer candidates attend the National

Police Academy at Hyderabad, Andhra Pradesh. They are then

assigned to particular state or union territory forces, where

they usually remain for the rest of their careers. About 50 percent of the officers are regularly assigned to states or territories

other than their own in an effort to promote national integration.

The constitution also authorizes the central government to maintain whatever forces are necessary to safeguard national

security. Under the terms of the constitution, paramilitary

forces can be legally detailed to assist the states but only if so requested by the state governments. In practice, the central

government has largely observed these limits. In isolated

instances, the central government has deployed its paramilitary

units to protect central government institutions over the protest of a state government. During the Emergency of 1975-77,

the constitution was amended (effective February 1, 1976) to permit the central government to dispatch and deploy its paramilitary forces without regard to the wishes of the states (see

The Rise of Indira Gandhi, ch. 1). This action proved unpopular, and the use of the paramilitary forces was controversial.

After the Emergency was lifted, the constitution was amended

in December 1978 to make deployment of central government

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paramilitary forces once again dependent on the consent of

the state government. According to apologists for the central

government, this amendment prevented the government from

sending in paramilitary forces to protect the Babri Masjid

(Babri Mosque) in Ayodhya, Uttar Pradesh, in December 1992

(see Public Worship, ch. 3).

The principal national-level organization concerned with

law enforcement is the Ministry of Home Affairs, which supervises a large number of government functions and agencies

operated and administered by the central government. The

ministry is concerned with all matters pertaining to the mainte- nance of public peace and order, the staffing and administration of the public services, the delineation of internal

boundaries, and the administration of union territories.

In addition to managing the Indian Police Service, the Ministry of Home Affairs maintains several agencies and organizations dealing with police and security. Police in the union

territories are the responsibility of the Police Division, which

also runs the National Police Academy and the Institute of

Criminology and Forensic Science. The Central Bureau of

Investigation investigates crimes that might involve public offi- cials or have ramifications for several states. The ministry also is the parent organization of the Border Security Force.

State and Other Police Services

The Police Act of 1861 established the fundamental principles of organization for police forces in India, and, with minor

modifications, continues in effect. Consequently, although

state-level police forces are separate and may differ in terms of

the quality of equipment and resources, their patterns of organization and operation are markedly similar.

An inspector general, answerable to the home secretary of

the state, heads each state, union territory, or national capital

territory police force. Under the inspector general are a number of police "ranges" composed of three to six districts,

headed by deputy inspectors general. District police headquarters are commanded by superintendents. District superintendents have wide discretionary powers and are responsible for

overseeing subordinate police stations as well as specialty elements, such as criminal investigation detachments, equipment

storehouses and armories, and traffic police. Many large districts also have several assistant district superintendents.

613
India: A Country StudyMost preventive police work is carried out bv constables

assigned to police stations. Depending on the number of sta- tions there, a district may be subdivided and., in some states,

further divided into police "circles" to facilitate the supervision

from district headquarters. Most of the major metropolitan

areas such as New Delhi. Bombay Calcutta, and Madras have

separate municipal forces headed bv commissioners. Police in

the states and union territories are assisted bv units of volunteer Home Guards, maintained under guidelines formulated

bv the Ministry of Home Affairs.

In most states and territories, police forces are functionally

divided into civil (unarmed) police and armed contingents.

The former staff police stations, conduct investigations, answer routine complaints, perform traffic duties, and patrol the

streets. Thev usually carry lathis—bamboo staffs weighted or tipped with iron.

Contingents of armed police are divided into two groups,

the district armed police and the Provincial .Armed Constabulary The district armed police are organized along the lines of an army infantry battalion. Thev are assigned to police stations

and perform guard and escort duties. Those states that maintain distinct armed contingents employ them as a reserve strike

force for emergencies. Such units are organized either as a mobile armed force under direct state control or in the case of

district armed police (who are not as well equipped) as a force

directed bv district superintendents and generally used for riot- control duty

The Provincial Armed Constabulary (Pradeshik) is an armed reserve maintained at kev locations in some states and

active onlv on orders from the deputy inspector general and

higher-level authorities. Armed constabulary are not usually in

contact with the public until thev are assigned to VIP duty or assigned to maintain order during fairs, festivals, athletic

events, elections, and natural disasters. Thev mav also be sent

to quell outbreaks of student or labor unrest., organized crime,

and communal riots: to maintain kev guard posts; and to participate in antiterrorist operations. Depending on the type of

assignment, the Provincial .Armed Constabulary mav carry only

lathis. At all levels, the senior police officers answer to the police

chain of command and respond to the general direction and

control of designated civilian officials. In the municipal force..

614
Police officer directing traffic in

Bangalore

Courtesy Robert L. Worden

the chain of command runs directly to the state home secretary

rather than to the district superintendent or district officials. Working conditions and pay are poor, especially in the lower

echelons of the police forces. Recruits receive only around

Rsl,900 per month (about US$64). Opportunities for promotion are limited because of the system of horizontal entry into

higher grades. Allegations of bribery, attributable to the low

pay and poor working conditions, have been widespread.

Since the late 1980s, women have entered in larger numbers

into the higher echelons of the Indian police, mostly through

the Indian Police Service system. Women police officers were

first used in 1972, and a number of women hold key positions

in various state police organizations. However, their absolute

numbers, regardless of rank, are small. Uniformed and undercover women police officers have been deployed in New Delhi

as the Anti-Eve Teasing Squad, which combats sexual harassment against women ("Eves"). Several women-only police sta- tions have also been established in Tamil Nadu to handle sex crimes against women.

Police uniforms vary widely according to grade, region, and

kind of duty performed. Among the armed police, uniforms

tend to resemble army dress rather than conventional police

uniforms. The khaki uniforms of the Indian Police Service offi615
India: A Country Study

cers are similar in all states, but headgear varies widely, especially among metropolitan areas. The Criminal Justice System

The criminal justice system descends from the British model.

The judiciary and the bar are independent although efforts

have been made by some politicians to undermine the autonomy of the judiciary. From about the time of Indira Gandhi's

tenure as prime minister, the executive has treated judicial

authorities in an arbitrary fashion. Judges who handed down

decisions that challenged the regime in office have on occasion

been passed over for promotion, for example. Furthermore,

unpopular judges have been given less-than-desirable assignments. Because the pay and perquisites of the judiciary have

not kept up with salaries and benefits in the private sector,

fewer able members of the legal profession have entered the

ranks of the senior judiciary.

Despite the decline in the caliber and probity of the judiciary, established procedures for the protection of defendants,

except in the case of strife-torn areas, are routinely observed.

The penal philosophy embraces the ideals of preventing crime

and rehabilitating criminals.

Criminal Law and Procedure

Under the constitution, criminal jurisdiction belongs concurrently to the central government and the states. The prevailing law on crime prevention and punishment is embodied in

two principal statutes: the Indian Penal Code and the Code of

Criminal Procedure of 1973. These laws take precedence over any state legislation, and the states cannot alter or amend

them. Separate legislation enacted by both the states and the

central government also has established criminal liability for

acts such as smuggling, illegal use of arms and ammunition,

and corruption. All legislation, however, remains subordinate

to the constitution.

The Indian Penal Code came into force in 1862; as amended, it continued in force in 1993. Based on British criminal law, the code defines basic crimes and punishments, applies

to resident foreigners and citizens alike, and recognizes

offenses committed abroad by Indian nationals.

The penal code classifies crimes under various categories:

crimes against the state, the armed forces, public order, the

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human body, and property; and crimes relating to elections,

religion, marriage, and health, safety, decency, and morals.

Crimes are cognizable or noncognizable, comparable to the

distinction between felonies and misdemeanors in legal use in

the United States. Six categories of punishment include fines,

forfeiture of property, simple imprisonment, rigorous imprisonment with hard labor, life imprisonment, and death. An

individual can be imprisoned for failure to pay fines, and up to three months' solitary confinement can occur during rare rig- orous imprisonment sentences. Commutation is possible for

death and life sentences. Executions are by hanging and are

rare—there were only three in 1993 and two in 1994—and are

usually reserved for crimes such as political assassination and

multiple murders.

Courts of law try cases under procedures that resemble the

Anglo-American pattern. The machinery for prevention and

punishment through the criminal court system rests on the

Code of Criminal Procedure of 1973, which came into force on

April 1, 1974, replacing a code dating from 1898. The code

includes provisions to expedite the judicial process, increase

efficiency, prevent abuses, and provide legal relief to the poor.

The basic framework of the criminal justice system, however, was left unchanged.

Constitutional guarantees protect the accused, as do various

provisions embodied in the 1973 code. Treatment of those

arrested under special security legislation can depart from

these norms, however. In addition, for all practical purposes,

the implementation of these norms varies widely based on the

class and social background of the accused. In most cases, police officers have to secure a warrant from a magistrate

before instituting searches and seizing evidence. Individuals

taken into custody have to be advised of the charges brought

against them, have the right to seek counsel, and have to appear before a magistrate within twenty-four hours of arrest. The magistrate has the option to release the accused on bail. During trial a defendant is protected against self-incrimination,

and only confessions given before a magistrate are legally valid.

Criminal cases usually take place in open trial, although in limited circumstances closed trials occur. Procedures exist for

appeal to higher courts. India has an integrated and relatively independent court sys- tem. At the apex is the Supreme Court, which has original,

appellate, and advisory jurisdiction (see The Judiciary, ch. 8).

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India: A Country Study

Below it are eighteen high courts that preside over the states and union territories. The high courts have supervisory

authority over all subordinate courts within their jurisdictions.

In general, these include several district courts headed by dis- trict magistrates, who in turn have several subordinate magistrates under their supervision. The Code of Criminal

Procedure established three sets of magistrates for the subordinate criminal courts. The first consists of executive magistrates,

whose duties include issuing warrants, advising the police, and

determining proper procedures to deal with public violence.

The second consists ofjudicial magistrates, who are essentially

trial judges. Petty criminal cases are sometimes settled in panchayat (see Glossary) courts. The Penal System

The constitution assigns the custody and correction of criminals to the states and territories. Day-to-day administration of

prisoners rests on principles incorporated in the Prisons Act of

1894, the Prisoners Act of 1900, and the Transfer of Prisoners

Act of 1950. An inspector general of prisons administers prison

affairs in each state and territory.

By the prevailing standards of society, prison conditions are often adequate. Some prison administrators concede that the

prevailing conditions of poverty in Indian society contribute to recidivism because a prison sentence guarantees minimal levels of food, clothing, and shelter. Despite this overall view, India's

prisons are seriously overcrowded, prisoners are given better or worse treatment according to the nature of their crime and

class status, sanitary conditions are poor, and punishments for

misbehavior while incarcerated have been known to be particularly onerous.

Prison conditions vary from state to state. The more prosper- ous states have better facilities and attempt rehabilitation programs; the poorer ones can afford only the most bare and

primitive accommodations. Women prisoners are mostly incarcerated in segregated areas of men's prisons. Conditions for

holding prisoners also vary according to classification. India

retains a system set up during the colonial period that mandates different treatment for different categories of prisoners.

Under this system, foreigners, individuals held for political rea- sons, and prisoners of high caste and class are segregated from

lower-class prisoners and given better treatment. This treat- ment includes larger or less-crowded cells, access to books and

618
Public security awareness sign in New Delhi

Courtesy Robert L. Worden

newspapers, and more and better food. Despite laws that mandate egalitarian treatment of Dalits (see Glossary), members of

Scheduled Tribes (see Glossary), and members of the so-called

Backward Glasses (see Glossary), a rigid class system that cir- cumvents the spirit of these laws exists within the prison system

(see Varna, Caste and Other Divisions, ch. 5).

The press and human rights groups periodically raise the

subject of prison conditions, including problems of overcrowding, the plight of prisoners detained for long periods while

awaiting trial, and the proper treatment of women andjuvenile

prisoners (children are often incarcerated with their parents)

.

Reports have also surfaced alleging that torture, beatings, rape,

sexual abuse, and unexplained suicides occur on many occasions in police stations and prisons. Because of a shortage of

mental institutions, numerous "non-criminal lunatics" are imprisoned, often under conditions worse than those afforded

criminals. The government concedes that problems exist, but

insists that its attempts at prison reform have suffered from a

paucity of resources. National Security Challenges

As the twenty-first century approaches, India faces a number

619
India: A Country Study

of key challenges to its national security. The vast majority of

emergent threats are essentially from within.

Because of increased educational opportunities, greater

political awareness, and media exposure, hitherto quiescent

ethnic minorities are steadily claiming their rights in the political arena. This form of political assertiveness has generated a backlash from the well-entrenched segments of India's majority

population. Much violence has accompanied this process of

social change. Increased use of coercion alone, however, is unlikely to contain ethnoreligious violence. Further development of India's political institutions and social policies is also

needed.

A related national security problem in the region is linked to the porous borders and cross-national ethnic ties that characterize South Asia. Consequently, Pakistan has found it expedient to support Muslim militants in Jammu and Kashmir and, to a lesser degree, Sikh insurgents in Punjab. India, on occasion,

has retaliated in Pakistan's Sindh Province, supporting various

movements for Sindhi autonomy. Furthermore, India has also

been involved in supporting the Tamil extremists in Sri Lanka.

As long as governments in the region yield to these temptations for short-term gains, continued fratricidal violence is inevitable.

The other major source of instability in the region stems

from the proliferation of nuclear and ballistic missile capabilities in both India and Pakistan. The long-standing border dis- pute with China and the memories of the 1962 military debacle

have encouraged India's efforts to acquire these capabilities.

India's acquisition of weapons of mass destruction may well

precipitate a three-way arms race in the region involving India,

Pakistan, and China. Such an arms race not only would be stra- tegically destabilizing but also would impose enormous costs on resource-poor societies.

* * *

Stephen Philip Cohen's The Indian Army is the best work on

the historical evolution of the Indian army. One of the earliest

and still useful accounts of India's security problems is LomeJ. Kavic's India's Questfor Security. Raju G.C. Thomas's Indian Security Policy is probably the most comprehensive, although not

necessarily the most analytic, treatment of Indian security questions. Basic armed forces information appears in SP's Military

620
National Security

Yearbook and the weekly armed forces news magazine Sainik

Samachar (available in thirteen languages), both published in

New Delhi. Analyses of the state of India's armed forces, including its paramilitary forces, periodically appear in the journal

Armed Forces and Society. Within India the best discussions of

security issues are found in the privately produced Indian

Defence Review and the Institute ofDefence Studies and Analyses

Journal, the house journal of the government-supported think

tank, the Institute of Defence Studies and Analyses. Broader

discussions of regional security issues can be found in Survival,

published by the International Institute of Strategic Studies in

London.

The various wars that have taken place in the region are well

documented. The best analyses are Lionel Protip Sen's Slender

Was the Thread on the 1947-48 conflict, D.K. Palit's War in the High Himalaya and Stephen Hoffmann's India and The China

Crisis on the 1962 India-China border war, Russell Brines's The

Indo-Pakistani Conflict on the 1965 war, and Robert Jackson's

South Asian Crisis and Richard Sisson and Leo E. Rose's War and

Secession on the 1971 Indo-Pakistani conflict. Sumit Ganguly's

The Origins of War in South Asia is the only comparative and

comprehensive account of the three Indo-Pakistani conflicts.

Civil-military relations and defense decision-making issues have

been discussed in articles written jointly byjerrold F. Elkin and

W. Andrew Ritezel and by Sumit Ganguly.

An excellent discussion of nuclear proliferation issues is found in Stephen Philip Cohen's Nuclear Proliferation in South

Asia. Indian nuclear and ballistic missile programs are discussed in some detail in Brahma Chellaney's Nuclear Proliferation: The U.S. -Indian Conflict. For an early analysis of the

motivations underlying the Indian nuclear program, see Sumit

Ganguly's "Why India Joined the Nuclear Club." Another useful analysis of India's nuclear and ballistic missile programs is Raju G.C. Thomas's "India's Nuclear and Space Programs:

Defense or Development?" An important discussion of Indian

strategic culture and doctrine is George K. Tanham's "Indian

Strategic Culture." (For further information and complete cita- tions, see Bibliography.)

621

Appendix

Table

1 Metric Conversion Coefficients and Factors

2 Annual Climatic Statistics, Selected Stations, 1990

3 Area, Population, and Population Density by State and

Union Territory, 1981 and 1991

4 Population and Population Density, Actual and Projected,

Selected Years, 1901-2020

5 Distribution of Urban Population by Size of City, Selected

Years, 1901-91

6 Population and Population Increase in Urban Agglomerates with More Than 1 Million Persons, 1971-91

7 Infant Mortality, Selected Years, 1911-95

8 Health Care Services, Selected Fiscal Years, 1960-91

9 Enrollment of School Children by Age, Selected School

Years, 1950-91

10 Number of Schools and Teachers, Selected School Years,

1950-51 to 1986-87

11 Enrollment by Education Level, Selected School Years,

1950-51 to 1990-91

12 Enrollment of School-Age Population by Gender, Selected

School Years, 1960-61 to 1986-87

13 Religious Affiliations, 1991

14 National Calendar and Government Holidays

15 Vernacular Languages with More Than 1 Million Speakers,

1991

16 Growth of Gross National Product, Fiscal Years 1951-89

17 Gross Domestic Product by Sector, Selected Fiscal Years,

1970-91

18 Government Income and Expenditure, Fiscal Years 1981,

1989, and 1992

19 Balance of Trade, Selected Fiscal Years, 1980-93

20 Principal Exports, Fiscal Years 1990-93

21 Principal Imports, Fiscal Years 1990-93

22 Major Trading Partners, Fiscal Years 1990-93

23 Balance of Payments, Fiscal Years 1988-93

24 Share of Public and Private Sectors in Gross Domestic

623
India: A Country Study

Product (GDP), Fiscal Years 1981 and 1992

25 Production of Selected Industrial Products, Selected Fiscal

Years, 1970-92

26 Area Planted in Principal Crops, Selected Fiscal Years,

1950-90

27 Land Use, Selected Fiscal Years, 1970-87

28 Harvested and Irrigated Areas, Selected Fiscal Years, 1970-

90

29 Production and Sale of Selected Mechanized Agricultural

Equipment, Selected Fiscal Years, 1986-91

30 Yield of Principal Crops, Selected Fiscal Years, 1950-90

31 Production of Principal Crops, Selected Fiscal Years, 1950-

90

32 Area under High-Yielding Varieties, Selected Fiscal Years,

1950-90

33 Lok Sabha Elections, 1952-91

34 Order of Battle for the Armed Forces, 1994

35 Major Army Equipment, 1994

36 Major Naval Equipment, 1994

37 Major Air Force Equipment, 1994

38 Major Coast Guard Equipment, 1994

624
Appendix

Table 1. Metric Conversion Coefficients and Factors

When you know Multiply by To find

Millimeters 0.04 inches Centimeters 0.39 inches Meters 3.3 feet Kilometers 0.62 miles 2.47 acres Square kilometers 0.39 square miles Cubic meters 35.3 cubic feet Liters 0.26 gallons Kilograms 2.2 pounds

Metric tons 0.98 long tons

1.1 short tons

2,204.0 pounds

Degrees Celsius (Centigrade) 1.8 degrees Fahrenhei and add 32

Table 2. Annual Climatic Statistics, Selected Stations, 1990

Approximate Average Temperature Range

c . T) rr . (in degrees Celsius) Station Precipitation v 5 1 (in millimeters) Minimum Maximum

Bangalore 750 14.5 34.7 Bombay 877 19.8 33.2 Calcutta 2,167 14.2 34.5

Darjiling 2,783 1.7 21.6 Hyderabad 1,596 15.0 38.8 Madras 1,058 19.8 36.1 New Delhi 911 8.3 39.9 Patna 1,011 9.4 36.4 Port Blair 2,257 22.1 31.9 Shillong 2,427 7.1 24.2 Shimla 1,767 4.0 25.3 Srinagar 1,239 -1.7 30.8 Thiruvananthapuram 2,357 22.1 33.6 Vishakhapatnam 2,004 21.0 32.9 Source: Based on information from India, Ministry of Planning, Department of Statistics, Central Statistical Organisation, Statistical Pocket Book, 1991, New Delhi, 1992, 225-28.

625
India: A Country Study

Table 3. Area, Population, and Population Density by State and

Union Territory, 1981 and 1991

State or Union Territory

Area (in square

kilometers)

Population

(in thousands)

Population Density (persons per square

kilometer) 1981 1991 1981 1991

8,249 189 281 23 34 275,045 53,550 66,508 195 242

83,743 632 865 8 10 78,438 18.041 1 22,414 230 286

173,877 69,915 86,374 402 497

114 452 642 3,961 5,632

491 104 138 211 282

112 79 102 705 907

1,483 6,220 9,420 4,194 6,352

3,702 1,008 1,170 272 316

196,024 34,086 41,310 174 211

44,212 12,922 16,464 292 372

55,673 4,281 5,171 77 93

222,236 5,987 7,719s 59 76

191,791 37,136 44,977 194 235

38,863 25,454 29,098 655 749

32 40 52 1,258 1,616 443,446 52,179 66,181 118 149

307,713 62,784 78,937 204 257

22,327 1,421 1,837 64 82

22,249 1,336 1,774 60 79

21,081 494 690 23 33

16,579 775 1,210 47 73

155,707 26,370 31,660 169 203

492 604 807 1,229 1,642 50,362 16,789 20,282 333 403

342,239 34,262 44,005 100 129

7,096 316 406 45 57

130,058 48,408 55,859 372 429

10,486 2,053 2,757 196 263

Andaman and Nicobar

Islands Andhra Pradesh Arunachal Pradesh Assam

Bihar Chandigarh Dadra and Nagar

Haveli Daman and Diu

Delhi Goa

Gujarat Haryana

Himachal Pradesh Jammu and Kashmir. . . Karnataka

Kerala Lakshadweep

Madhya Pradesh Maharashtra Manipur

Meghalaya Mizoram

Nagaland

Orissa Pondicherry

Punjab

Rajasthan Sikkim Tamil Nadu

Tripura

626
Appendix

Table 3. (Continued) Area, Population, and Population Density by State and Union Territory, 1981 and 1991

Area (in „ . . Population Density Population . r ' square thousands)

(persons per square

State or Union Territory kilometers) v ' kilometer) 1981 1991 1981 1991

Uttar Pradesh 294,411 110,863 139,112 377 473 West Bengal 88,752 54,581 68,078 615 767 INDIA3 3,287,263 683,329 846,303 216 257

The 1981 census was not conducted in Assam. The population figures for 1981 for Assam have been calculated by

interpolation by Indian census officials.

2 The 1991 census was not conducted in Jammu and Kashmir. The population figures for 1991 forjammu and Kash- mir were projected by the Standing Committee of Experts on Population Projections in October 1989. They do

not include the population of areas controlled by Pakistan and China.

3 Numbers may not add to totals because of rounding. Source: Based on information from India, Ministry of Home Affairs, Registrar General and Census Commissioner, Census of India 1991: Final Population Totals: Brief Analysis of Primary Census Abstract, Series-1, Paper-2 of 1992, New Delhi, 1993,

78-97.

627
India: A Country Study

Table 4. Population and Population Density, Actual and Projected, Selected Years, 1901-2020

Population Density

Year Population 1 (persons per square

kilometer)

1901

.

238,396,327 77

1911 252,093,390 82

1921 251,321,213 81 1931 278,977,238 90

1941 318,660,580 103

1951 361,088,090 117

1961 439,234,771 142

1971 548,159,652 177

1981 683,329,097 216

1991 846,302,688 267

19952 936,545,814 284 20002 1,018,105,000 309 20102 1,173,621,000 357 20202 1,320,746,000 401

1 Data before 1951 include population of prepartition India, which included areas that later became Pakistan and

Bangladesh.

2 Projected by United States Bureau of the Census. Source: Based on information from India, Ministry of Home Affairs, Registrar General and Census Commissioner, Census of India 1991, Provisional Population Totals, Series-1, Paper-1 of 1991, New Delhi, March 1991, 43; India, Ministry of Home

Affairs, Registrar General and Census Commissioner, Census of India 1991, Final Population Totals: BriefAnalysis of Primary Census Abstract, Series-1, Paper-2

of 1992, New Delhi, 1993, 78 and 86; and United States, Bureau of the Census,

World Population Profile: 1994, Washington, February 1994, A-5.

628
Appendix

Table 5. Distribution of Urban Population by Size of City, Selected

Years, 1901-91

(in percentages of total urban population)

Size Numberof Urban

or Inhabitants Center and ^ ^ ^ ^

Class I (100,000 and above) . . . 26.0 44.6 51.4 57.2 60.4 65.2

Class n (50,000 to 99,999) 11.3 10.0 11.2 10.9 11.6 10.9

Class HI (20,000 to 49,999) 15.6 15.7 16.9 16.0 14.3 13.2

Class IV (10,000 to 19,999)... . 20.8 13.6 12.8 10.9 9.5 7.8 Class V (5,000 to 9,999) 20.1 13.0 6.9 4.5 3.6 2.6 Class VI (less than 5,000) 6.1 3.1 0.8 0.4 0.5 0.3 Total2 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0

1 Figures for 1981 and 1991 exclude Assam and Jammu and Kashmir.

2 Figures may not add to totals because of rounding. Source: Based on information from Tata Services, Department of Economics and Statistics, Statistical Outline ofIndia, 1994-95, Bombay, 1994, 48.

629
India: A Country Study

Table 6. Population and Population Increase in Urban Agglomerates

with More Than 1 Million Persons, 1971-91

Urban Agglomerate , , . Increase, 1971-81 Increase, 1981-91 ^° (in thousands) .. . ,. (in percentages) (in percentages) Bombay1 12,572 42.9 33.4 Calcutta 10,916 23.9 18.7 Delhi 8,375 57.1 46.2 Madras 5,361 35.3 25.0 Hyderabad 4,280 42.7 67.0 Bangalore 4,087 75.6 39.9 Ahmadabad 3,298 45.9 28.9 Pune 2,485 48.6 47.4 Kanpur 2,111 23.5 28.8 Nagpur 1,661 40.8 36.2 Lucknow 1,642 23.8 63.0 Surat 1,517 87.4 64.2 Jaipur 1,514 59.4 49.2 Kochi 1,140 48.8 38.1 Coimbatore 1,136 25.0 23.4 Vadodara 1,115 67.4 42.5 Indore 1,104 47.9 33.1 Patna 1,099 66.7 19.6 Madurai 1,094 27.6 20.5 Bhopal 1,064 74.4 58.5 Vishakhapatnam 1,052 66.1 74.3 Varanasi 1,026 25.5 28.8 Kalyan 1,014 36.7 645.4 Ludhiana 1,012 51.3 66.7

1 Greater Bombay. The population of the Bombay Municipal Corporation was 9,910,000. Source: Based on information from Tata Services, Department of Economics and Statistics, Statistical Outline ofIndia, 1994-95, Bombay, 1994, 50-52.

630
Appendix

Table 7. Infant Mortality, Selected Years, 1911-95

Period Deaths per 1,000 Live Births

1911-15 204 1916-20 219 1921-25 7-~" 174 1926-30 178 1931-35 174 1936-40 161 1941^5 161 1946-50 134 1951-61 146 1961-71 129 1975-81 133 1992 91 1994 78 1995 (estimate) 76 Source: Based on information from Sudipto Mundle, "Recent Trends in the Condition

of Children in India: A Statistical Profile," World Development [London], 12, No.

3, 1984, 301; "World Population Data Sheet of the Population Reference

Bureau, Inc.," Washington, 1992; United States, Bureau of the Census, World

Population Profile: 1994, Washington, February 1994, A-28; and United States, Central Intelligence Agency, The World Factbook, 1995, Washington, 1995, 196.

Table 8. Health Care Services, Selected Fiscal Years, 1960-91

(in thousands)

Service 1960 1973 1984 1991

Primary health centers1 2.8 5.3 7.3 22.4 Hospitals 4.0 4.0 7.4 11.2 Dispensaries 9.9 10.8 21.9 27.4 Hospital beds2 186.0 406.0 625.0 811.0

Physicians (registered) 76.0 172.4 297.0 394.0 Nurses (registered) 32.7 94.0 171.0 n.a.

:

Figures for primary health centers relate to a fiscal year—see Glossary.

2 Includes beds in dispensaries and other nonhospital health care facilities.

3 n.a. —not available. Source: Based on information from Tata Services, Department of Economics and Statistics, Statistical Outline of India, 1988-89, Bombay, 1988, 175; and Tata Services, Department of Economics and Statistics, Statistical Outline ofIndia, 1994-

95, Bombay, 1994, 190.

631
India: A Country Study

Table 9. Enrollment of School Children by Age, Selected School Years, 1950-91

(in percentages of total population in age-group)

Primary School Middle School High School

(ages 6-11) (ages 11-14) (ages 14-17)

1950-51 42.6 12.7 5.3 1955-56 52.8 16.5 7.4 1960-61 62.4 22.5 10.6 1965-66 76.7 30.8 16.2 1970-71 76.4 34.2 n.a. 1975-76 83.8 36.7 18.3 1980-81 80.5 41.9 n.a. 1985-86 93.1 52.0 n.a. 1990-91 100.0 60.1 n.a.

n.a.—not available

.

Source: Based on information from Tata Services, Department of Economics and Statistics, Statistical Outline ofIndia, 1988-89, Bombay, 1988, 171; and India, Ministry of Information and Broadcasting, Research and Reference Division, India: A Reference Annual, 1988-89, New Delhi, December 1989, 73.

632
Appendix

Table 10. Number of Schools and Teachers, Selected School Years, 1950-51 to 1986-87

Type 1950-51 1960-61 1970-71 1980-81 1986-87

Schools Primary 209,671 330,399 408,378 485,538 530,728

lo.oyo AQ4y,oo3 fifi^ yu.ouu 1 1 A AAl 1 10,44 / n.a. High 7,288 17,257 36,700 47,755 206.6693 1,377 2,738 2,337 8,708 2,627

Universities/

colleges 27 45 100 132 159

Total schools 231,959 400,102 538,115 658,580 740,183 Teachers

537,918 741,515 1,376,176 1,345,376 1,530,938 Middle 85,496 345,228 n.a. 830,649 n.a. High 126,504 296,305 948,8872 902,332 2.148.2393 Technical 28,283 58,851 33,454 30,055 53,161

University/

college 18,648 41,759 113,037 185.558 277,747

Total teachers 796,849 1,483,658 2,471,554 3,293,970 4,010,085

n.a.—not available.

2 Data for middle and high school combined for 1970-71

.

3 Data for middle and high school combined for 1986-87. Source: Based on information from Tata News Services, Statistical Outline ofIndia, 1988-

89, Bombay, 1988, 171; India, Ministry of Information and Broadcasting, Research and Reference Division, India: A Reference Annual, 1988-89, New

Delhi, December 1989, 73; and India, Ministry of Planning, Department of

Statistics, Central Statistical Organisation, Statistical Abstract, 1990, New Delhi, 1990, 499-500.

633
India: A Country Study

Table 11. Enrollment by Education Level, Selected School Years, 1950-51 to 1990-91

(in millions)

. v

Primary School Middle School High School

(Classes I-V) (Classes VI-VHI) (Classes DC-XII)

1950-51 19.2 3.1 1.2 1955-56 25.2 4.3 1.9 1960-61 35.0 6.7 2.9 1965-66 50.5 10.5 5.0 1970-71 57.0 13.3 6.6 1975-76 65.7 16.0 7.4 1980-81 73.8 20.7 10.8 1985-86 86.5 28.1 15.1

1 990-91 1 99.1 33.3 20.9

Provisional. Source: Based on information from Tata Services, Department of Economics and Statistics, Statistical Outline of India, 1988-89, Bombay, 1988, 171; Tata Services, Department of Economics and Statistics, Statistical Outline of India, 1994—95,

Bombay, 1994, 187; and India, Ministry of Information and Broadcasting, Research and Reference Division, India: A Reference Annual, 1993, New Delhi, January 1994, 85.

Table 12. Enrollment ofSchool-Age Population by Gender, Selected School Years, 1960-61 to 1986-87

(in percentages)

Level and Gender 1960-61 1975-76 1980-31 1986-87

Primary school 62.4 79.3 80.5 95.9 Males 82.6 95.7 95.8 111.8 Females 41.4 62.0 64.1 79.2 Middle school 22.5 35.6 41.9 53.1 Males 33.2 47.0 54.3 66.5 Females 11.3 23.3 28.6 38.9 High school 11.4 18.3 28.2 n.a.

1 Males 18.2 25.6 40.8 n.a. Females 4.4 10.5 14.3 n.a.

n.a.—not available. Source: Based on information from United Nations Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization, Principal Regional Office for Asia and the Pacific, National

Studies: India, Bangkok, 1991, 12.

634
Appendix

Table 13. Religious Affiliations, 1991

Religious Group

Adherents

of Total Growth Number of Percentage Percentageof Total Growth

Population since 1981

Hindus 687,646,721 82.0 22.8 Muslims 101,596,057 12.1 32.8

Christians 19,640,284 2.3 16.9 Sikhs 16,259,744 1.9 25.5 Buddhists 6,387,500 0.8 35.9 Jains 3,352,706 0.4 4.4 Other religions1 3,269,355 0.4 13.2 Religion not stated 415,569 0.1 573.5

Total2 838,567,936 lOOO nTa?

1 Sixty-three "other religions" were listed, including animists (1,458), atheists (1,782), Jews (5,271), non-Christians

(9,615) , pagans ( 1 ,71 1) , Zoroastrians (76,382) , and unclassified (212,652)

.

2 Total tabulated for religious affiliations is different from total tabulated for total national population.

(846,302,688), which includes a projected figure forjammu and Kashmir where the census was not taken in 1991.

s n.a.—not applicable. Source: Based on information from India, Ministry of Home Affairs, Registrar General and Census Commissioner, Census of India 1991: Religion, Series-1, Paper-1 of 1995, New Delhi, January 1995, x-xxiii, 18-60.

Table 14. National Calendar and Government Holidays

National Calendar Name of Month Dates on Gregorian Calendar

Chaitra March 22-April 201 Vaisakha April 21-May 21

Jyaistha May 22-June 21 Ashada June 22-July 22

Sravana July 23-August 22 Bhadra August 23-September 22

Asvina September 23-October 22

Kartika October 23-November 22 Agrahayana November 23-December 21 Pausa December 22-January 20 Magha Janaury 21-February 19 Phalguna February 20-March 21

635
India: A Country Study

Table 14. (Continued) National Calendar and Government Holidays

NOTE: In 1957 the Indian government adopted a uniform, national calendar based on the Gregorian calendar and the Shaka Era (starting in A.D. 78) for civil government purposes. Using this calendar, the year A.D. 1995 is 1917 of the

revised Shaka Era. The Shaka calendar has been used at least since the first century A.D. Because the Shaka calendar is based on solar and lunar observations, some of the dates of holidays listed below are subject to change in a

given year and from one part of India to another. The dates shown below

are from 1993 (Shaka 1915). An unofficial but widely used calendar in North India dates from the ninth century A.D., is based on the Vikrama Era

(beginning in 57 B.C.) , and starts in Chaitra. The Muslim calendar (starting with A.D. 622) is widely used among the Muslim population. The Buddhist

calendar—based on the death of Buddha (483 B.C.) —and the Zcroastrian calendar (starting with 632 B.C.) are also used.

Government Holidays, 1993

Holiday Significance o Date Commemorates 1950 proclamation

of the Republic of India January 262

Holi Hindu spring festival March 8 IdalFitr Marks end of the month of fasting during Ramadan (Ramzan), the ninth month on the Islamic cal- endar

March 25

Ramanavami Commemorates birthday of Ram April 1 Mahavira Jayanti Mahavira' s birthday April 5 Good Friday Commemorates death of Christ April 9 Buddha Purnima Commemorates birth, death, and

enlightenment of the Buddha May 6

Id al Zuha (Bakr Id) Commemorates Abraham's williness

to sacrifice his son Ishmael June 1 Muharram Muslim New Year's Julyl Janmashtami Birthday of Krishna August 11 Independence Day Marks independence from Britain August 152 Milad-un-Nabi (Id-e-Milad) . . . Prophet Muhammad's birthday August 31 Mahatma Gandhi's Birthday . . Commemorates birth of Mohandas K Gandhi

October 2

2

Dussehra (Vijaya Dasami) .... Commemorates triumph of Ram

over Ravana, tenth day of Asvina October 24

Dipavali (Diwali) Hindu festival of lights November 13 Guru Nanak's Birthday Commemorates birth of Sikh leader November 29

Christmas Day Commemorates birth of Christ December 252

Starts on March 2 1 in leap year. Fixed date on Gregorian calendar. Source: Based on information from Hindustan Year Book and Who's Who, 1994, Calcutta, 1994, 26-27; India, Ministry of Information and Broadcasting, Directorate of

Advertising and Visual Publicity, "List of Government of India Holidays for 1993," New Delhi, 1993; and M.N. Saha and N.C. Lahiri, History of the Calendar

in Different Countries Through the Ages, New Delhi, 1992, 254, 258.

636
Appendix

Table 15. Vernacular Languages with More Than 1 Million Speakers,

1991

Estimated Number States and Union Territories °^ ° of Speakers Where Use Is Most Prevalent HINDI 153,729,062 Andaman and Nicobar Islands, Andhra

Pradesh, Bihar, Chandigarh, Delhi,

Gujarat, Haryana, Himachal Pradesh, Jammu and Kashmir, Karnataka, Madhya Pradesh, Maharashtra,

Orissa, Punjab, Rajasthan, Uttar Pradesh, West Bengal TELUGU 44,707,697 Andhra Pradesh, Karnataka, Madhya

Pradesh, Maharashtra, Orissa, Pondicherry, West Bengal BENGALI 44,521,533 Andaman and Nicobar Islands, Assam,

Bihar, Madhya Pradesh, Meghalaya,

Orissa, Tripura, Uttar Pradesh, West

Bengal MARATHI 41,723,893 Andhra Pradesh, Goa, Gujarat, Karnataka, Maharashtra, Madhya Pradesh, TAMIL 37,592,794 Andaman and Nicobar Islands, Andhra

Pradesh, Karnataka, Kerala, Maharashtra, Pondicherry, Tamil Nadu URDU 28,600,428 Andhra Pradesh, Bihar, Delhi, Gujarat, Haryana, Jammu and Kashmir, Kar- nataka, Madhya Pradesh, Orissa, Rajasthan, Uttar Pradesh, West Bengal GUJARATI 25,656,274 Daman and Diu, Gujarat, Maharashtra, Madhya Pradesh MALAYALAM 21,917,430 Kerala, Lakshadweep, Maharashtra KANNADA 21,595,019 Andhra Pradesh, Karnataka, Maharashtra, Tamil Nadu, ORIYA 19,726,745 Andhra Pradesh, Bihar, Madhya

Pradesh, Orissa, West Bengal

Bhojpuri 14,340,564 Assam, Bihar, Madhya Pradesh, Uttar Pradesh PUNJABI 13,900,202 Bihar, Chandigarh, Delhi, Haryana, Himachal Pradesh, Jammu and Kashmir, Madhya Pradesh, Maharashtra,

Punjab, Rajasthan, Uttar Pradesh ASSAMESE 8,958,977 Assam

Chhatisgarhi 6,693,445 Madhya Pradesh Magadhi 6,638,495 Bihar, West Bengal Manipuri (Meithei) 6,121,922 Meghalaya Marwari 4,714,094 Rajasthan

Santali 3,693,558 Assam, Bihar, Orissa, Tripura, West Bengal KASHMIRI 2,421,760 Jammu and Kashmir

Rajasthani 2,093,557 Rajasthan Gondi 1,548,070 Andhra Pradesh, Madhya Pradesh, Maharashtra

637
India: A Country Study

Table 15. (Continued) Vernacular Languages with More Than 1 Million Speakers, 1991

T Estimated Number States and Union Territories £ua°

e of Speakers Where Use Is Most Prevalent KONKANI 1,522,684 Karnataka, Goa, Maharashtra,

Dogri-Kangri 1,298,885 Jammu and Kashmir NEPALI 1,286,824 Sikkim, West Bengal

Garhwali 1,227,151 Jammu and Kashmir, Uttar Pradesh

Pahari 1,269,651 Himachal Pradesh, Jammu and Kashmir

Bhili 1,250,312 Dadra and Nagar Haveli, Haryana, Madhya Pradesh, Maharashtra, Rajas- than Oraon (Kurukh) 1,240,395 Bihar, Madhya Pradesh, West Bengal Kumaoni 1,234,939 Assam, Bihar, Delhi, Madhya Pradesh,

Uttar Pradesh SINDHI 1,204,678 Gujarat, Madhya Pradesh, Maharashtra,

Raj asthan Lamani (Lambadi) 1,203,338 Andhra Pradesh, Gujarat, Himachal

Pradesh, Karnataka, Madhya

Pradesh, Maharashtra, Orissa, Tamil Nadu, West Bengal Tulu 1,156,950 Karnataka, Kerala

Bagri 1,055,607 Punjab, Rajasthan Note: Languages shown in UPPER CASE print are Scheduled Languages (see Glossary). The other Scheduled Language—Sanskrit—has an estimated 2,200 speakers. Some observers estimate that more than 28 million people use English as a

first, second, or third language with varying degrees of proficiency. Source: Based on information from Hindustan Year-Book and Who's Who, 1994, Calcutta, 1994, Part II, 207-208; Barbara E Grimes, ed., Ethnologue: Languages of the World, Dallas, 1992, 532-65; and Kumar Suresh Singh, ed., People of India, 11: An Anthropological Atlas, New Delhi, 1993, 77.

638
Appendix

Table 16. Growth of Gross National Product, Fiscal Years 1951-89

(in percentage change from previous year at constant FY 1980 prices)

Period GNP1 GNP per Capita

1951-55 3.6 1.7 1956-60 3.9 1.9 1961-65 2.3 0.1 1966-68 2.2 -0.1 1969-73 3.3 0.9 1974-79 3.1 2.6 1980-84 5.4 3.2 1985-89 5.5 3.3 GNP—gross national product (see Glossary). Source: Based on information from Economist Intelligence Unit, Country Profile: India, Nepal, 1993-94, London, 1993, 14.

Table 1 7. Gross Domestic Product by Sector, Selected Fiscal Years, 1987-92

(in percent share)

Sector 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 19921

Primary (agriculture,

forestry, fishing, mining,

quarrying) 32.5 34.8 33.8 33.5 32.8 32.3 Secondary (manufacturing,

construction, electricity, other) 28.8 26.9 27.0 27.7 27.4 26.9 Trade, transportation, and

17.2 17.5 18.5 18.0 18.0 18.3 Real estate and finance 9.4 9.5 9.9 10.7 10.7 10.9

Services, including public administration and

defense 12.1 11.3 10.8 11.1 11.1 11.6 TOTAL 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0

Provisional. Source: Based on information from Economist Intelligence Unit, Country Profile: India, Nepal, 1994-95, London, 1995, 21.

639
India: A Country Study

Table 18. Government Income and Expenditure, Fiscal Years 1981,

1989, and 19921 (in billions of rupees at current prices)

1981 1989 1992

Direct taxes 44.6 113.5 210.6

Indirect taxes 200.9 668.8 994.3

Profits -10.5 -23.2 -28.4

Interest receipts 11.1 36.3 64.6 Property receipts 9.8 33.8 62.0 Miscellaneous 3.9 18.7 31.4

Total income 259.8 847.9 1,334.5 Total outlay 241.8 1,044.3 1,537.2 Savings3 17.9 -176.4 -202.7

Savings as percentage of GNP41.1 -3.9 -2.9

Including administrative departments and departmental enterprises, excluding railroads and telecommunications.

2 For value of the rupee—see Glossary.

3 As published.

4 GNP—gross national product (see Glossary)

.

Source: Based on information from Tata Services, Department of Economics and Statistics, Statistical Outline ofIndia, 1992-93, Bombay, 1992, 20; and Tata Services, Department of Economics and Statistics, Statistical Outline of India, 1994-95,

Bombay, 1994, 22.

640
Appendix

Table 19. Balance of Trade, Selected Fiscal Years, 1980-93

(in billions of rupees) 1

Year Imports Exports Balance"

1980 125.5 67.1 -58.4 1985 196.6 109.0 -87.6 1986 200.9 124.5 -76.4 1987 222.4 156.7 -65.7 1988 282.4 202.3 -80.0 1989 353.3 276.6 -76.7 1990 432.0 325.5 -106.5

1991 478.5 440.4 -38.1 1992 633.8 536.9 -96.9 19934 728.1 695.5 -32.6

For value of the rupee—see Glossary.

2 Including reexports.

3 Figures may not add to balances because of rounding.

4 Provisional figures. Source: Based on information from Tata Services, Department of Economics and Statistics, Statistical Outline ofIndia, 1992-93, Bombay, 1992, 93; and Tata Services, Department of Economics and Statistics, Statistical Outline of India, 1994-95,

Bombay, 1994, 101.

641
India: A Country Study

Table 20. Principal Exports, Fiscal Years 1990-93 (in billions of

United States dollars)

Commodity

1990

Value Percentage

1991 Value Percentage

Agriculture and allied products Cashew kernels Coffee

Fish and fish products

Oil meals Raw cotton Rice

Spices Sugar Tea and mate Tobacco

Total agriculture and allied products Ore and minerals

Iron ore Other ore and minerals

Total ore and minerals .... Manufactured goods

Chemicals

Handicrafts Gems and jewelry Other handicrafts

Total handicrafts

Industrial machinery

Jute manufactures

Leather and leather products Ready-made garments

Textiles Total manufactured goods

Mineral fuels and lubricants Petroleum, oil, and lubri- cants Other mineral fuels and

lubricants Total mineral fuels and

lubricants Other commodities TOTAL1

0.3

0.1 0.5 0.3

0.5

0.3

0.1 0.2

0.6 0.2

3.1

0.6 0.3

0.8

1.4

2.9 0.5

3.4

2.2

0.2

1.5 2.2

1.2

12.1

0.5

0.0

0.5

0.3

1.4 0.8 2.9

1.9 2.6

1.4 0.7

0.1 3.3

0.8

15.0

3.2

1.4 4.6

7.8

16.1 2.9 19.0

11.9

0.9

8.0 12.3 6.5

66.4

2.9

0.0

0.3

0.1 0.6

0.4

0.1 0.3 0.2

0.1 0.5 0.2

2.5

0.6 02

0.8

1.6

2.7

0.7

3.4

2.2

0.2

1.3 2.2

1.3

12.2

0.4

0.0 0.0 0.1

1.5 0.7

3.3

2.1 0.7

1.7 0.8

0.4

2.7 0.9

14.8

3.3

1.3 4.6

8.9

15.3 3.7 19.0

12.5

0.9

7.1 12.3

7.3

6.8

2.3

0.1

2.9 0.2

0.4

0.2

2.4 10.2

18.1 100.0 17.9 100.0

642
Appendix

Table 20. (Continued) Principal Exports, Fiscal Years 1990-93 (in

billions of United States dollars)

1992 1993 Commodity

Value Percentage Value Percentage

Agriculture and allied products Cashew kernels 0.3 1.4 0.3 1.5 Coffee 0.1 0.7 0.2 0.8 Fish and fish products 0.6 3.2 0.8 3.6

0.5 2.9 0.7 3.3 Raw cotton 0.1 0.3 0.2 0.9 Cereals 0.3 1.9 0.4 1.9 Spices 0.1 0.7 0.2 0.8 Fruits and vegetables 0.1 0.6 0.1 0.6 Tea 0.3 1.8 0.3 1.4 Tobacco (unmanufactured) . . . 0.1 0.7 0.1 0.5 Total agriculture and allied products 2.5 14.2 3.3 15.3 Ore and minerals

Iron ore 0.4 2.1 0.4 1.9

\ 8 ft 9 9

ft 9 i ft ft 9 i ft Total ore and minerals ft 7 3.y ft Q u.y 3.o ^Manufactured goods

Drugs, pharmaceuticals, and

fine chemicals 0.5 2.9 0.6 2.9 Dyes and coal tar chemicals. . . . 0.3 1.8 0.4 1.6 Electronic goods 0.2 1.1 0.3 1.4 Gems and jewelry 3.1 16.6 4.0 18.0 Handicrafts 0.9 4.7 0.9 4.2 Iron and steel, primary and

semifinished 0.2 0.9 0.4 1.9 Leather and leather products

(including footwear) 1.3 6.9 1.3 6.0 Machinery and instruments. . . . 0.5 2.9 0.6 2.9 Metal manufactures 0.6 3.0 0.7 3.1 Ready-made garments 2.4 12.9 2.6 11.6

Textiles, cotton yarns, fabrics. .

.

1.4 7.3 1.5 6.9 Transportation equipment .... 0.5 0.6 _£6

Total manufactured goods .

.

11.9 13.9 16.8 83.1 Crude oil and petroleum products 0.5 2.6 0.4 1.8 Other commodities 0.2 0.9 0.1 0.8 TOTAL1 18.5 100.0 22.2 100.0 Figures may not add to totals because of rounding.

Source: Based on information from India, Ministry of Finance, Economic Division, Eco- nomic Survey, 1992-93, New Delhi, 1993, 102; and India, Ministry of Finance,

Economic Division, Economic Survey, 1994-95, New Delhi, 1994, 95-96.

643
India: A Country Study

Table 21. Principal Imports, Fiscal Years 1990-93 (in billions of

United States dollars)

Commodity

1990

Value Percentage

1991 Value Percentage

Bulk imports Food and allied products

Cereals Edible oils Pulses Total food and allied products

FuelsPetroleum, oil, and lubri- cants Coal

Total Fuels Ore and minerals

Iron and steel Nonferrous metals Ores and metal scrap .... Total ore and minerals.

Fertilizers Paper, board, and pulp

Total bulk imports. . Nonbulk imports

Capital goods

Export-related imports

Pearls and precious stones Chemicals

Textile yarn, fabric, and

other Cashew nuts

Total export-related imports Other nonbulk items

Professional instruments and other Chemicals

Plastics and resins Nonmetallic minerals .... Total other nonbulk

items

Total nonbulk

imports Other imports

TOTAL1

0.1 0.2 0.3

0.6

6.0

0.5

6.5

1.2 0.6 0.9

2.7

1.0 0.5 11.2

5.8

2.1

1.3

0.3

0.1

3.8

0.6

0.5 0.6

0.1

1.8

11.3

1.6

0.4 0.8

1.1

2.3

25.1

1.8 26.9

4.9

2.5

3.5 10.9

4.1

2.1 46.3

24.2

8.7

5.3

1.0 0.3

15.3

2.5

2.1 2.5

0.5

7.6

47.1

6.5

0.1 0.1 0.1

0.3

5.4

0.4

5.8

0.8

0.3 0.5

1.6

1.0 0.3

9.0

4.2

2.0

1.4

0.1 0.1

3.6

0.4

0.4

0.6

0.1

1.5

9.3

1.2

0.4 0.5

0.5

1.4

27.6

2.2 29.8

4.1

1.8 2.4

8.3 4.9

1.7 46.1

21.8

10.1

7.1

0.7 0.6

18.5

2.1 2.2

2.9

0.5

7.7

47.9

5.9 24.2 100.0 19.5 100.0

644
Appendix

Table 21. (Continued) Principal Imports, Fiscal Years 1990-93 (in

billions of United States dollars)

1992 1993 Commodity

Value Percentage Value Percentage

Food and allied products

0.1 0.6 0.2 0.7 0.3 1.5 0.1 0.4 Edible oils 0.1 0.6 0.1 0.7 Pulses 0.1 0.5 0.2 0.8 Total food and allied products 0.7 3.2 0.6 2.4 FuelsPetroleum, oil, and lubri- 5.9 27.0 5.8 24.7 Coal 0.5 1.

1

0.5 2.0 6.4 29.2 6.3 26.7

Fertilizers 1.0 4.5 0.8 3.6 Paper board, paper manufactures, and newsprint 0.2 0.8 0.2 1.0 Capital goods

Machinery (except for electrical machine tools) 1.7 7.6 2.2 9.4

Electrical machinery 0.8 3.8 0.8 3.4 Transportation equipment .... A C U.D 1. 1 1.3 0.4

1.3 5.8 1.4 6.0 Total capital goods 4.3 19.3 5.7 24.2 Other items

Pearls, precious stones, and semi- precious stones 2.4 11.2 2.6 11.3 Professional instruments, optical goods, and other 0.5 2.3 0.5 2.1 2.0 9.2 2.0 8.5 Iron and steel 0.7 3.3 0.8 3.4 Nonferrous metals 0.4 1.8 0.5 2.0 Total other items 6.0 27.8 6.4 27.3

3.0 13.8 3.1 13.1 TOTAL1 21.6 100.0 23.3 100.0

1 Figures may not add to totals because of rounding.

Source: Based on information from India, Ministry of Finance, Economic Division, Eco- nomic Survey, 1992-93, New Delhi, 1993, 100; India, Ministry of Finance, Eco- nomic Division, Economic Survey, 1994-95, New Delhi, 1994, 97-98.

645
India: A Country Study

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646
Appendix

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647
India: A Country Study

Table 23. Balance ofPayments, Fiscal Years 1988-93

(in billions of United States dollars)

1988 1989 19902 1991 2 1992 19933

Current Account

Exports f.o.b. 4 14.3 Imports c.i.f. 5 23.6 Trade balance -9.4

Invisibles (net) 6 1.4 Current account bal- ance -8.0

Capital account

External aid (net) 2.2 Commercial borrowings

(net) 1.9 Nonresident deposits

(net) 2.5 Other capital flows8 .... 1.4 Capital account bal- ance 8.1 IMF9 borrowings (net) .... -1.8

Official reserves

10 +1.0

1 Figures may not add to totals because of rounding.

2 Provisional data.

3 "Quick estimates."

4 Free on board.

5 Cargo, insurance, and freight.

5 Includes nonfactor services, investment income, private transfers, and grants.

7 Includes India Development Bonds.

8 Includes delayed export receipts, errors and omissions, and, for FY 1992, errors and omissions arising out of dual exchange rates.

9 International Monetary Fund—see Glossary.

10 Minus means increase, plus means decrease. Source: Based on information from India, Ministry of Finance, Economic Division, Eco- nomic Survey, 1992-93, New Delhi, 1993, 96; and India, Ministry of Finance,

Economic Division, Economic Survey, 1994-95, New Delhi, 1994, 87.

17.0 18.5 18.3 18.9 22.70

24.4 27.9 21.1 23.2 23.99

-7.5 -9.4 -2.8 -4.4 -1 9Q

0.6 -0.2 1.6 0.8 0.97

-6.8 -9.7 -1.2 -3.5 -0.32

1.9 2.2 3.0 1.9 1.70

1.8 2.2 1.57 -0.4 0.84

2.4 1.5 0.3 2.0 0.94

0.9 2.3 0.3 -0.2 2.15

7.0 8.4 4.8 4.3 9.18 -0.9 1.2 0.8 1.3 0.19

+0.7 +1.3 -3.6 -0.7 -8.87

648
Appendix

Table 24. Share ofPublic and Private Sectors in Gross Domestic

Product (GDP) 1

, Fiscal Years 1981 and 1992

(in trillions of rupees at current prices)

1981 19923 Sector Value Percentage Value Percentage GDP (at factor cost) Public sector 0.3 20.8 1.7 27.2

Private sector 1.1 79.2 4.6 72.8 Total GDP (at factor cost) 1.4 100.0 6.3 100.0

ross domestic savings Public sector 0.1 21.7 0.2 9.5 Private sector 0.3 78.3 1.4 90.5 Total gross domestic savings3 .... 0.3 100.0 1.6 100.0 Gross domestic capital Public sector 0.2 41.9 0.7 41.4

Private sector 0.2 58.1 1.0 58.6 Total gross domestic capital4 .... 0.4 100.0 1.8 100.0

1 GDP—see Glossary.

2 For value of the rupee—see Glossary.

3 Provisional figures.

4 Figures may not add to totals because of rounding. Source: Based on information from Tata Services, Department of Economics and Statistics, Statistical Outline ofIndia, 1992-93, Bombay, 1992, 20; and Tata Services, Department of Economics and Statistics, Statistical Outline of India, 1994-95,

Bombay, 1994, 22.

649
India: A Country Study

Table 25. Production of Selected Industrial Products, Selected Fiscal

Years, 1970-92

Product Unit 1970 1980 1990 1992

Air conditioners (room) thousands of units 11.0 28.0 39.2 35.1 Aluminum thousands of tons 169.0 199.0 449.0 483.0 Aluminum conductors -do- 64.2 86.0 67.6 24.1

Cars, jeeps, and Land

Rovers thousands of vehicles 46.7 49.4 220.8 198.1 Caustic soda thousands of tons 371.0 578.0 981.0 1,079.0 Cement millions of tons 14.3 18.6 48.8 54.3 Commercial vehicles. . .

.

thousands of vehicles 41. Z

71/ 1 . 7/ 143.

D

13Z.0 thousands of tons y.o AC\ C 4U.O 4o.3

billions of square meters

7 ft /.o Q fi y.o 17 ft 1 /.o ion

Diesel engines

(stationary) thousands of units 65.0 174.0 158.0 165.0

millions of tons 4.6 6.8 13.5 15.2

-do- 1.

1

1 A 1.4 1.4 1.3 Machinery for cement

plants billions of rupees

1 0.0 0.3 2.8 1.8 Machinery for cotton

textiles Kio- 0.3 3.0 9.5 10.1 Machinery for sugar

mills -do- 0.1 0.2 0.9 1.0 Machine tools -do 0.4 1.7 7.9 9.7 Paper and board millions of tons 0.8 1.1 2.1 2.2 Pig iron -do- 7.0 9.6 12.1 13.2 Power transformers millions of kilovolt- amperes

8.1 19.5 36.6 34.1

Refrigerators thousands of units 0.1 0.3 1.3 1.0 Soda ash millions of tons 0.4 0.6 1.4 1.39

Steel ingots -do- 6.1 10.3 13.5 15.2

For value of the rupee—see Glossary. Source: Based on information from Tata Services, Department of Economics and Statistics, Statistical OutUne ofIndia, 1992-93, Bombay, 1992, 71-73; and Tata Services, Department of Economics and Statistics, Statistical Outline ofIndia, 1994-

95, Bombay, 1994, 79-81.

650
Appendix

Table 26. Area Planted in Principal Crops, Selected Fiscal Years, 1950-90

(in thousands of hectares)

Crop 1950 1960 1970 1980 19901

Food grains Cereals

Rice 30 810 34 128 37,592 40,152 42,687 Wheat 9,746 12,927 18,241 22,279 24,167 Coarse grains 37,674 44.963 45,950 41.779 36.319

Total cereals 78,230 92,018 101,783 104,210 103,173

Pulses 19,091 23.563 22.534 22.457 24.662

Total food grains . . . 97,321 115,581 124,317 126,667 127,835 Percent change n.a.

2 19 8 2 1 Oilseeds Peanuts 4,494 6,463 7,326 6,801 8,309 Rapeseed and mustard

seed 2,071 2,883 3,323 4,113 5,700 Cottonseed 3 7,823 7,355 Sesame 2,204 2,169 2,450 2,472 2,595 Soybeans 392 2,365 Sunflower 119 1,642 Other oilseeds 1.958 2,255 2,336 4,072 1,977 Total oilseeds 10,727 13,770 15,435 25,792 29,943 Sugarcane 1,707 2,415 2,615 2,667 3,686 Cotton 5,882 7,610 7,605 7,823 7,440 Jute 571 629 749 941 778

Preliminary.

2 n.a.—not available.

3 —means negligible. Source: Based on information from United States, Embassy in New Delhi, Annual Commodity Report, Oilseeds and Products, 1992, New Delhi, 1992, 2, 13, 18, 21, 24, 32-

33; India, Ministry of Finance, Economic Division, Economic Survey, 1991-92, 2: Sectoral Developments, New Delhi, 1992, S17-S19; India, Ministry of Planning,

Department of Statistics, Central Statistical Organisation, Statistical Abstract 1990, India, New Delhi, 1991, 49; and India, Ministry of Information and

Broadcasting, Research and Reference Division, India 1993: A Reference Annual, New Delhi, 1994, 398-99.

651
India: A Country Study

Table 27. Land Use, Selected Fiscal Years, 1970-87

(in millions of hectares)

Category 1970 1980 1985 1987 Percentage of Area Classified, iyo /

Forest 63.9 67.4 67.0 66.9 19.6 Not available for cultivation Nonagricultural uses n.a.

1 n.a. 20.5 20.8 6.1 Barren and uncultivable n.a. n.a. 20.2 20.4 6.0 Total not available for culti- vation 44.6 39.6 40.7 41.2 12.1 Other uncultivated land Permanent pastures and grazing

lands 13.3 12.0 12.0 11.9 3.5 Tree crops and groves 4.3 3.5 3.5 3.5 1.0 Cultivable wasteland 17.5 16.7 15.7 15.6 4.6 Fallow land 19.4 24.6 24.9 29.6 8.7 Total other uncultivated land 54.5 56.8 56.1 60.6 17.8 Cropped area Net area sown 140.8 140.0 140.9 136.2 39.9 Area sown more than once per

year 25.0 32.6 37.0 36.7 10.7 Total cropped area 165.8 172.6 177.9 172.9 50.6 Total area classified 328.8 336.4 341.7 341.6 100.0

n.a. —not available. Source: Based on information from United States, Embassy in New Delhi, India: Agricultural Situation, Annual Report, 1992, Washington, 1992, table 11; India, Ministry of Planning, Central Statistical Organization, Department of Statistics, Statistical Abstract 1990, India, New Delhi, 1991, 46-47; and Tata Services, Department of Economics and Statistics, Statistical Outline of India, 1992-93,

Bombay, 1992, 56.

652
Appendix

Table 28. Harvested and Irrigated Areas, Selected Fiscal Years, 1970-90

(in millions of hectares)

Area 1970 1980 1987 1990

Harvested area Gross 165.8 172.6 172.9 182.5 Net 140.1 140.0 136.2 143.0 Cropping intensity (percentage) 1 118.4 123.3 127.0 127.6

Irrigated area Gross 38.2 49.8 56.2 59.0 Net 31.1 38.7 43.1 47.0

Irrigation intensity (percentage) 2 23.0 29.0 33.0 32.3

1 Gross area harvested divided by net area harvested.

2 Gross irrigated area divided by gross harvested area. Source: Based on information from United States, Embassy in New Delhi, India: Agricultural Situation, Annual Report, 1992, Washington, 1992, table 10; and Tata

Services, Department of Economics and Statistics, Statistical Outline of India, 1992-93, Bombay, 1992, 56-57.

Table 29. Production and Sale of Selected Mechanized Agricultural

Equipment, SelectedFiscalYears, 1986-91

(in number of units)

Equipment 1986 1987 1988 1991

Tractors Produced 80,004 92,092 109,987 151,759 Sold 78,823 93,157 110,323 150,582 Power tillers Produced 3,325 3,005 4,798 7,580 Sold 3,209 3,097 4,678 7,528 Combine harvesters Produced 57 149 109 187 Sold 57 144 110 189 Source: Based on information from Hindustan Year Book and Who's Who, 1994, New

Delhi, 1994, 236; and India, Ministry of Agriculture, Department of Agriculture and Co-operation, Annual Report, 1994-95, New Delhi, 1994, 67.

653
India: A Country Study

Table 30. Yield ofPrincipal Crops, Selected Fiscal Years, 1950-90

(in kilograms per hectare)

Crop 1950 1960 1970 1980 19901

Food grains Cereals Rice 668 1,013 1,123 1,336 1,751 Wheat 663 851 1,306 1,630 2,274 Coarse grains 408 528 665 695 n.a.

2 All cereals3 542 693 949 1,142 1,573

Pulses 441 539 524 473 576

All food grains3. . 522 710 872 1,023 1,382 Oilseeds Peanuts 775 744 834 736 919 Rapeseed and mustard

seed 368 467 594 560 900

202 147 232 180 n.a. Soybeans n.a. n.a. n.a. 1,128 1,022 Sunflower n.a. n.a. n.a. 555 540 Other oilseeds 470 505 604 305 n.a. All oilseeds3 481 507 579 532 769

Sugarcane 33,421 46,133 48,324 57,836 65,000 Cotton 88 125 106 152 224

Jute 1,040 1,180 1,186 1,245 1,803

Preliminary.

2 n.a.—not available.

3 Numbers in this row represent weighted averages rather than totals. Source: Based on information from India, Ministry of Finance, Economic Division, Eco- nomic Survey, 1991-92, 2: Sectoral Developments, New Delhi, 1992, 5-18; and

United States, Embassy in New Delhi, Annual Commodity Report, Oilseeds and

Products, 1992, New Delhi, 1992, 22, 25.

654
Appendix

Table 31. Production ofPrincipal Crops, Selected Fiscal Years, 1950-90

(in thousands of tons)

Crop 1950 1960 1970 1980 19901

Food grains Cereals

Rice 20,576 34,574 42,225 53,631 74,600 Wheat 6,462 10,997 23,832 36,313 54,500 Coarse grains 15,376 23,743 30,547 29,018 33,100

Total cereals . . . 42,414 69,314 96,604 118,962 162,200

8 411 12.704 11 818 10,627 14 100

Total food

grains. 50,825 82,018 108,422 129,589 176,300

Oilseeds Peanuts 3,481 4,812 6,111 5,005 7,600 Rapeseed and mustard seed 762 1,347 1,976 2,002 5,200 Cottonseed 2 2,700 3,900 445 318 568 446 810 Soybeans 442 2,400 Sunflower 66 889 Other oilseeds 470 505 604 1,242 1,001 Total oilseeds 5,158 6,982 9,259 11,903 21,800 Sugarcane 57,050 111,410 126,368 154,248 240,300 Cotton 600 1,004 809 1,326 1,666 Jute 595,000 744,000 882,000 1,170,000 1,404,000

Preliminary. —means negligible. Source: Based on information from India, Ministry of Finance, Economics Division, Economic Survey, 1991-92, 2: Sectoral Developments, New Delhi, 1992, S16; and

United States, Embassy in New Delhi, India: Agriculture Situation, Annual Report, 1992, Washington, 1992, table 19.

655
India: A Country Study

Table 32. Area under High-Yielding Varieties, Selected Fiscal Years, 1950-90

Category 1960 1970 1980 19901

Area sown with high-yielding varieties (millions of hectares) 1.9 15.4 43.1 63.9 Seeds

Production, breeder seeds (millions of kilograms) n.a.

2 n.a. 527 n.a. Fertilizer consumption

Total (millions of tons) 0.3 2.2 5.5 12.6 Per hectare (units) 1.9 13.1 31.8 68.8 Cooperative credit (billions of rupees) 214.4 678.8 2,216.3 3,187.0 Area sown in rice (millions of hectares) n.a. 5.6 18.2 28.1 Percentage of area sown in rice n.a. 14.9 45.3 65.9 Area sown in wheat (millions of

hectares) n.a. 6.5 13.5 20.4 Percentage of area sown in wheat n.a. 35.6 60.6 85.0 Area sown for coarse grains (millions

n.a. 3.3 8.8 15.4 Percentage of area sown in coarse

grains n.a. 7.2 21.0 42.2

Preliminary.

n.a. —not available. Source: Based on information from India, Ministry of Information and Broadcasting, Research and Reference Division, India 1993: A Reference Annual, New Delhi, January 1994, 392; and India, Ministry of Finance, Economic Division, Eco- nomic Survey, 1991-92, 2: Sectoral Developments, New Delhi, 1992, S22.

656
Appendix

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657
India: A Country Study

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658
Appendix

659
India: A Country Study

Table 34. Order ofBattlefor the Armed Forces, 1994

Branch and Units Personnel or Unit Army

Personnel 940,000 Regional commands : . . . 5 Corps 12 Armored divisions 2 Tank regiments 55 Mechanized divisions 1 Infantry divisions 22

Battalions 355 Mountain infantry divisions 10 Independent brigades 14 Airborne/commando 1 Armored 5

Artillery 3 Regiments 290

Infantry 7 Mountain 1 Surface-to-surface missile brigade 1 Air defense brigades 6 Engineer brigades 3 Army aviation Air observation squadrons 8 Antitank/ transport squadrons 6 Navy

Personnel

Line and staff 48,000 Naval air force 5,000 Marines 1,000

Total navy personnel 54,000 Commands 3

Fleets 2 Naval bases 9

Air Force Personnel 110,000

Air commands 5 Reserve forces personnel

Territorial Army 36,456 National Cadet Corps 1,120,000

Civil Defence Volunteers 336,000 Home Guards 472,098

Total reserve forces personnel 1,964,554

660
Appendix

Table 34. (Continued) Order of Battlefor the Armed Forces, 1994

Branch and Units Personnel or Unit

Paramilitary forces personnel Assam Rifles 40,000 Border Security Force 90,000

Coast Guard Organisation 3,173 Central Industrial Security Force 83,781

Central Reserve Police Force 90,000 Defence Security Force 30,000

Indo-Tibetan Border Police 14,000

Rashtriya Rifles 5,000 National Security Guards 83,781

Provincial Armed Constabulary 250,000

Railway Protection Force 70,000

Special Frontier Force 3,000

Total paramilitary forces personnel 762,735 Source: Based on information from The Military Balance, 1994-1995, London, 1994, 153-56; and SP's Military Yearbook, 1993-94, ed.J. Baranwal, New Delhi, 1993, 291,305, 319,358, and 363.

661
India: A Country Study

Table 35. Major Army Equipment, 1994

Type and Description Country of Origin Number in Inventory

Armored vehicles Tanks

Arjun MBT-90 main battle India

Vijayanta main battle -do- T—55 main battle -do- T-72/M1 main battle -do- PT-76 light amphibious -do- Reconnaissance and personnel BRDM-2 reconnaissance vehicles -do- Ferret (IS) reconnaissance vehicles Britain BMP-1, BMP-2 armored infantry fighting

vehicles (Sarath) India OT-62, OT-64 armored personnel

carriers -do- BTR-50, BTR-60, BTR-152 armored

personnel carriers -do- FV432 armored personnel carriers Britain Recovery

Vijayanta India

Artillery Towed 75mm 75/24 mountain howitzers India 76mm M-48 mountain guns "Yugoslavia 85mm D-48 antitank guns Soviet Union

25-pounder field guns Britain 100mm M-1944 towed howitzers Soviet Union 105mm (including M-56 pack) howitzers. . . India, Italy 105mm IFG Mk I/Mk II howitzers India 105mm light field guns -do- 130mm M^16 towed howitzers Soviet Union

5.5-inch medium howitzers Britain 155mm FH-77B howitzers Sweden 180mm S-23 howitzers Soviet Union

Self-propelled 25-pounder howitzers Britain 105mm Abbott howitzers India 155mm howitzers n.a. 130mm M-46 Catapult howitzers India Multiple rocket launchers 122mm BM-21 -do- 122mm BM-24 -do1,200 800

1,400 100

n.a.

2

n.a.

900

157

100

n.a.

900 215

n.a.

n.a. 185

50

1,200 533 550

n.a. 410

n.a.

80

100

so

662
Appendix

Table 35. (Continued) Major Army Equipment, 1994

Type and Description Country of Origin Number in Inventory

Mortars 81mm E-l 120mm E-l 120mm M-43 120mm Brandt AM-50, E-l 160mm M-l 60

Antitank and guided weapons 57mm M-18 recoilless rifles 84mm Carl Gustav recoilless rifles 106mm M-40A1 recoilless rifles MILAN

Nag

AT-3 Sagger AT-4 Spigot AT-5 Spandrel ENTAC

Mines, antipersonnel M14 M16A

Mines, antitank MIA

M3A

Antiaircraft weapons 20mm Oerlikon, towed 23mm ZU 32/2 air defense guns 23mm ZSU 23 air defense guns 23mm ZSU 23/4 self-propelled air defense guns 30mm 2S6 self-propelled air defense guns .

.

40mm L40/60 air defense guns 40mm L40/70 automatic guns

Surface-to-air missiles SA-2 Guideline SA-3 Goa

SA-6 Gainful SA-7 Grail SA-8A and SA-8B Gecko

SA-9Gaskin

SA-11 Gadfly SA-13 Gopher

SA-16

Trishul

India

-do- Soviet Union

Netherlands

Soviet Union

Brazil Sweden

United States India4 -do- Soviet Union

-do-

-do- France

India

-do-

-do- -doSwitzerland

Soviet Union

-do-

-do-

-do- Sweden

-doSoviet Union

-do-

-do-

-do- -do-

-do-

-do- -do-

-do- India

n.a.

n.a. 1,000 500

200

n.a.

n.a. 1,000

n.a.

n.a.

5

n.a.

n.a.

n.a.

n.a.

n.a.

n.a.

n.a.

n.a.

n.a. 140

n.a.

75

1,245 1,000

n.a.

n.a. 100 620

48 200

50

45 200

n.a.

5

663
India: A Country Study

Table 35. (Continued) Major Army Equipment, 1994

Type and Description Country of Origin N^umbcr in Inventory

Agni -do- n.a.

5 Akash -do- n.a.

5 Surface-to-surface missiles

Prithvi -do- 15

Helicopters Cheetah SA-315 .... India 40 ChetakSA-319 -do- 50 HAL advanced light helicopter -do- l 6

1 Prototype; developed since 1974; completed trials in 1993; no production as ofJune 1994; production expected to

start 1996.

2 n.a. —not available.

3 120 sought from foreign source, 1994; 480 to be produced under license in India.

4 Under contract with France.

5 Under development.

6 Prototype, shared with Air Force. Source: Based on information from The Military Balance, 1994-1995, London, 1994,

154; Jane's Infantry Weapons, 1994-95, Coulsdon, United Kingdom, 1994, 389-

90; Jane1s Armour and Artillery, 1994-95, Coulsdon, United Kingdom, 1994, 61-

63, 154, 351-52, 543, 614-15, 692, 773; andJane 's Military Vehicles and Logistics, 1994-95, Coulsdon, United Kingdom, 1994, 34, 199-200.

664
Appendix

Table 36. Major Naval Equipment, 1994

Type and Description Country of Origin Number in Inventory

Navy Ships Submarines Sindhugosh class (Soviet Kilo (Type 877EM) class) Kursura class (Soviet Foxtrot (Type 641) class) Shishumar class (German 209 class, Type HDW 1500)

Carriers INS Viraat (Hermes class) with 12 Sea Harriers FRS Mk 51, 7 Sea

Kings, Mk 42B/C, 1 Ka-27 helicopter INS Vikrant (Majestic class) with 6 Sea Harriers FRS Mk 51, 9 Sea

Kings Mk 42, 1 Chetak SAR

Destroyers Rajput class (Soviet Kashin II class) with Goa surfaceto-air missiles, Styx surface-to-surface

missiles, 533mm torpedo tubes, antisub- marine rocket launchers, and Ka-28 heli- copter Delhi class with SS-N-22 Sunburn and SA-N-7 missiles; 324mm torpedo tubes; 2 Sea King Mk42B or HAL advanced light helicopters

Frigates Godavari class with Sea King helicopters, antisubmarine torpedo tubes, and Styx surface-to- surface

missiles

Nilgiri class (British Leander class) with antisubmarine torpedo tubes, Limbo antisubmarine

warfare mortars, Chetak and Sea King

helicopters, antisubmarine warfare rocket

launchers, and 114mm guns Kamorta class (Soviet Petya II class) with antisubmarine

rocket launchers, 533mm torpedo tubes, and minelaying capabilities Corvettes Khukri class (antisubmarine warfare) with Styx surfaceto-surface missiles and helicopter deck Durg class (Soviet Nanuchka II class) with Styx sur- face-to-surface missiles

Soviet Union

-doGermany, India

Britain

-doSoviet Union

India

-do-

-doSoviet Union

India

Soviet Union

665
India: A Country Study

Table 36. (Continued) Major Naval Equipment, 1994

Type and Description Country of Origin Number in Inventory

Veer class Soviet Union, India

(Soviet Tarantul I class) with Styx surfaceto-surface missiles Abhay class -do-

(Soviet Pauk II class) with antisubmarine torpedo tubes and andsubmarine mortars

Patrol forces ships Vidyut class Soviet Union

(Soviet Osa II class) with Styx surface-to- surface missiles Sukanya patrol ship, offshore South Korea, India with 1 Oerlikon 20mm gun, 1 Chetak heli- copter SDB Mk 2 patrol ship, inshore India SDB Mk 3 patrol ship, inshore -do- Mine warfare and countermeasure ships Pondicherry minesweeper, ocean Soviet Union

(Soviet Natya I class) with minelaying

capabilities Mahe minesweeper, inshore -do- (Soviet Yevgenya class) Bulsar minesweeper, inshore Britain, India (Bridsh Ham class) Amphibious ships Magar class India landing ship, tank, 200 troops, 12 tanks, 1 helicopter Vasco da Gama class (Mk 3) -do- landing ship, utility, 287 troops Ghorpad class Soviet Union

landing ship, medium (Soviet Polnocny C

and D), 140 troops, 6 tanks Naval Air Force

Attack aircraft Sea Harrier FRS Mk 5 1 Britain HALJaguar (Shamsher) India Andsubmarine helicopters Chetak -do- HAL advanced light helicopter -do- Ka-25 Hormone Soviet Union

Ka-28 Helix -do- Sea King Mk 4 Britain Sea King Mk 4A/4B -do- Marine reconnaissance and andsubmarine warfare aircraft PBN-2B Defender (utility) -do- 11-38 May Soviet Union Tu-142M Bear F -do12

666
Appendix

Table 36. (Continued) Major Naval Equipment, 1994

Type and Description Country of Origin Number in Inventory HAL Dornier-228-201 India10 1011 Communications aircraft BN-2 Islander Britain 5 HAL Dornier-228 India 2 Chetak helicopters -do- 3 Search and rescue helicopters Sea King Mk 42C Britain 6 Training aircraft Sea Harrier T-Mk 60 (training) -do- 3 Kiran HJT-16 India 6 Deepak HPT-32 -do- A

Training helicopters Chetak -do- 2 MD Hughes 300 United States 4

Missiles

Air-to-air R-550 Magic I and II France 45 Antisubmarine

Sea Eagle n.a.

12 Sea Skua -do- n.a. Two built in Germany, two built in India; one other under construction; one more planned in India.

2 Two launched but not yet commissioned; one other under construction.

3 Two more under construction; one more planned.

4 One more under construction; two more planned.

5 Five built in Soviet Union, four built in India; two more planned.

6 Three built in South Korea, five built in India; one more planned.

7 Two built in Britain, two built in India.

8 One more under construction.

9 Prototype.

10 Under license with Germany.

11 Seventeen more planned or in production.

12 n.a.—not available. Source: Based on information from The Military Balance, 1994-1995, London, 1994, 154-55; Jane's Fighting Ships, 1994-95, Coulsdon, United Kingdom, 1994, 279-

93; and Jane's All the World's Aircraft, 1994-95, Coulsdon, United Kingdom,

1994, 119, 121-23.

667
India: A Country Study

Table 3 7. Major Air Force Equipment, 1 994

Type and Description Country of Origin Number in Inventory

Fighters, ground-attack MiG—21MF/PFMA

MiG-23 BN/UM

Shamsher (Jaguar) Babhadur (MiG-27)

Fighters HAL light combat aircraft MiG-21 FL/U

MiG-21 bis/U MiG-23 MF/UM

MiG-29 UB

Mirage 2000H/TH

Electric countermeasures Canberra B (I) 58 Airborne surveillance warning and control system (ASWACS)

HS-758

Maritime attack Jaguar with Sea Eagle

Helicopters, attack Mi-25

Mi-35 HAL advanced light helicopter Reconnaissance aircraft Canberra PR-57 Camberra PR-67

Andover HS-728 MiG-23R

MiG-23U

Maritime reconnaissance /survey aircraft Gulfstream IV SRA

Learjet 29

Transport aircraft An-32 Sutlej 11-76 Gajraj BAe-748

Dornier-228

Transport helicopters Mi-8

Mi-17 Mi-26

Soviet Union

-doBritain, India

India2

-do- Soviet Union

-do-

-do-

-do- France

Britain

India4

Britain

Soviet Union

-do- India

Britain

-do- -do- Soviet Union

-doUnited States

-doSoviet Union

-do- Britain Germany

Soviet Union

-do-

-do144

54891 120

n.a

3 74

17026

59

35

18

18

l5

6

2

46

2

2

2

10524

33

30

668
Appendix

Table 37. (Continued) Major Air Force Equipment, 1994

Type and Description Country of Origin inventory

1

VIP aircraft Boeing 707-337C United States 2 Boeing 737 -do- 3 BAe-748 Britain 7 Liaison aircraft BAe-748 -do- 16 Training aircraft BAe-748 -do- 28 Hunter F-56 -do- 20 Hunter T-66 -do- 18 Canberra T-54 -do- 2 Canberra TT-18 -do- 5 Jaguar IB France, Britain 15 Kiran I India 120

Kiran II -do- 56 Deepak HPT-32 -do- 88 HT-2 -do- 60 HTT-35 -do- n.a.

6 MiG-29 UB Soviet Union 5 IskaraTS-11 ac Poland 44

Training helicopters Chetak India 20 Mi-24 Soviet Union 2 Mi-35 -do- 2

Missiles Air-to-surface Akash India n.a. AM-39 Exocet France n.a. AS-7 Kerry Soviet Union n.a. AS-10 Karen -do- n.a. AS-11B France n.a. AS-30 -do- n.a. FAB-500 Soviet Union n.a. FAB-750 -do- n.a. FAB-1000 -do- n.a. Sea Eagle Britain n.a. Air-to-air AA-2 Atoll Soviet Union n.a. AA-7 Apex -do- n.a. AA-8 Aphid -do- n.a. AA-10 Alamo -do- n.a. AA-11 Archer -do- n.a.

669
India: A Country Study

Table 37. (Continued) Major AirForce Equipment, 1994

Type and Description Country of Origin Number in Inventory

R-550 Magic France n.a. Super 530D -do- n.a. Surface-to-air Divina V75SM/VK (SA-2, SA-3, and

SA-5) Soviet Union 280 Some assembled in India; additional inventory to be manufactured in India under license with Britain.

2 Under license with Soviet Union and Russia.

3 n.a. —not available.

4 Prototype; first flights expected in 1995 and 1996; initial operational capability in 2002; up to 200 units.

5 With India, French, and German equipment.

6 Prototype, shared with army. Source: Based on information from The Military Balance, 1994-1995, London, 1994,

155; Jane's AU the World's Aircraft, 1994-95, Coulsdon, United Kingdom, 1994,

117, 119-21, 123; and Jane's Radar and Electronic Warfare Systems, 1994-95,

Coulsdon, United Kingdom, 1994, 242.

Table 38. Major Coast Guard Equipment, 1994

Type and Description Country of Origin Number in Inventory

Patrol forces Offshore Samar India 3 Vikram (Type P-957) -do- 9 Inshore

Jija Bai (Type 956) -do- 7

Raj (SDB Mk 2) -do- 5

32-ton patrol craft South Korea 8

Jija Bai (Mod 1) Singapore, India 11 49-ton patrol craft India 7

Aircraft HAL Dornier-228 maritime surveillance Germany, India ll 1 Chetak helicopter India 9 F-27 maritime Netherlands 2

1 Three built in Germany, eight built in India; twenty-two more on order. Source: Based on information from Kailish Kohli, "Aviation in Indian Coast Guard,"

Sainik Samachar [New Delhi], 41, No. 5, January 30, 1994, 11; Jane's Fighting

Ships, 1994-95, Coulsdon, United Kingdom, 1994, 294-95; and Jane's All the World's Aircraft, 1994-95, Coulsdon, United Kingdom, 1994, 123.

670
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785

Glossary

All-India Muslim League (Muslim League) —Founded in 1906

in Dacca (Dhaka), in what then was the province of East- ern Bengal and Assam, by Muslim representatives from

throughout India and Burma as a counterpoise to the

Indian National Congress (q.v.).

Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN)—Founded in

1967 for the purpose of promoting regional stability, eco- nomic development, and cultural exchange. ASEAN's

membership includes Brunei, Indonesia, Malaysia, the

Philippines, Singapore, Thailand, and Vietnam. India is a "dialogue partner" along with Austria, Canada, China,

Japan, New Zealand, the Republic of Korea (South Korea),

Russia, and the United States. Backward Classes—Citizens of India otherwise defined as members of Scheduled Castes (q.v.), Scheduled Tribes (q.v.),

and other low-ranking and disadvantaged groups (sometimes referred to as Other Backward Classes). Discrimination against the Backward Classes is prohibited by Article

15 of the Indian constitution. The Backward Classes

reportedly constitute an estimated 52 percent of India's

population. The Mandal Commission (q.v.) identified

3,743 Backward Classes.

Brahman (s) —From the Sanskrit brahmana, one of four major

caste groups (varna) or social classes. Brahmans are the

highest caste group, traditionally made up of priests, philosophers, scholars, and religious leaders. Not to be confused with brahman (q.v., the Absolute Reality).

brahman—The Absolute Reality, the eternal, supreme, or ulti- mate principle. A state of pure transcendence. In some

Vedantic schools of Hindu thought, a Supreme Being who

is the cause of the universe, with theistic attributes. Not to be confused with Brahman (q.v., the priestly caste group).

British Raj (1858-1947)—The period of direct rule of India by

the British government. The period began with the demise

of the Mughal Empire and of East India Company rule

and ended with the achievement of independence by

India and Pakistan. During this time, the British crown was

represented in India by a viceroy.

Colombo Plan for Cooperative Economic and Social Develop787
India: A Country Study

ment in Asia and the Pacific (Colombo Plan) —Founded

in 1950 to coordinate and aid development among newly

independent countries. Members include nations

throughout the Asia-Pacific region. Donor countries

include Australia, Britain, Canada, India, Japan, New

Zealand, and the United States. The headquarters are in

Colombo, Sri Lanka.

Congress—See Indian National Congress. crore—A unit of measure equal to 10 million (or 100 lakh,

q.v.).

Dalit(s) —Sanskrit word meaning burst, split, broken, crushed,

or destroyed but, since the nineteenth century, often

taken to mean downtrodden; used in reference to

Untouchables (Harijans, q.v.), outcastes, Scheduled Castes

{q.v.), and others living in a reduced social state. Devanagari—Literally, "the script of the city of the gods." Script

used in the written forms of Hindi, Marathi, Nepali,

Tibetan, Sanskrit, and in some forms of Konkani. In use in

North India throughout the second millennium A.D.

dharma—A divinely ordained code of proper conduct.

fiscal year (FY) —April 1 to March 31. The fiscal year from April

1, 1995 through March 31, 1996, for example, is designated FY 1995.

Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO)—A United Nations

specialized agency established in 1945 to raise living stan- dards and increase the availability of agricultural products.

gross domestic product (GDP) —A value measure of the flow of

domestic goods and services produced by an economy

over a period of time, such as a year. Only output values of

goods for final consumption and intermediate production

are assumed to be included in the final prices. GDP is sometimes aggregated and shown at market prices, meaning that indirect taxes and subsidies are included; when

these indirect taxes and subsidies have been eliminated,

the result is GDP at factor cost. The word gross indicates

that deductions for depreciation of physical assets have

not been made. See also gross national product.

gross national product (GNP)—Gross domestic product (q.v.)

plus net income or loss stemming from transactions with

foreign countries, including income received from abroad

by residents and subtracting payments remitted abroad to nonresidents. GNP is the broadest measurement of the

output of goods and services by an economy. It can be cal788
Glossary

culated at market prices, which include indirect taxes and

subsidies. Because indirect taxes and subsidies are only

transfer payments, GNP is often calculated at factor cost by

removing indirect taxes and subsidies.

Group of Fifteen (G-15) —Group of Third World countries

that participated in the Conference on International Economic Cooperation held in several sessions between

December 1975 and June 1977. At the Ninth Nonaligned

Movement Summit in Belgrade in May 1989, the G-15 was

designated a "Summit Level Group of South-South Consultation and Cooperation" and charged with opening a dialogue with the industrialized nations, specifically the

members of the Group of Seven (Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, Britain, and the United States). G-15

summits were held in Kuala Lumpur (June 1990), Caracas

(November 1991), Dakar (November 1992), and New

Delhi (March 1994). The group includes Algeria, Argentina, Brazil, Egypt, India, Indonesia, Jamaica, Malaysia,

Mexico, Nigeria, Peru, Senegal, Venezuela, Yugoslavia, and

Zimbabwe.

guru—In the Sikh faith, one of ten spiritual leaders and teachers, the first of whom was Nanak Dev, the last being

Gobind Singh. In Hinduism, a religious teacher or guide.

Harijans—Term introduced by Mahatma Gandhi for Untouchables. Literal meaning is children of God. Militant members of this group prefer to be called Dalit (q.v.) in self- recognition of their historical oppression.

imam(s) —In general use and lower-cased, imam means the

leader of congregational prayers; as such it implies no

ordination or special spiritual powers beyond sufficient

education to carry out this function. Imam is also used figuratively by many Sunni (q.v.) Muslims to mean the leader

of the Islamic community. Among Shia (q.v.) Muslims, the

word is usually upper-cased and takes on many complex

and controversial meanings; in general, however, it indi- cates that particular descendant of the House of Ali who is believed to have been God's designated repository of the

spiritual authority inherent in that line. The identity of

this individual and the means of ascertaining his identity

have been the major issues causing divisions among Shias.

Indian National Congress—Founded in 1885; before and after

1947, popularly called Congress or the Congress. A major

force in the independence movement, the Congress has

789
India: A Country Study

been dominant in Parliament and formed governments

from 1947 to 1977, 1980 to 1985, and 1991 to 1996. In

1969 the Congress split, and the ruling party under Indira

Gandhi became known as Congress (R) —R for Requisition—while the faction opposed to her was called Congress (O)—O for Organisation. In 1978 she renamed her

party Congress (I) —I for Indira. There also have been

Congress (S) —S for Socialist or Secular—and Congress

(U) —for Urs, named after its founder Devanaj Urs—splinter groups.

International Monetary Fund (IMF) —Established along with

the World Bank (q.v.) in 1945, the IMF is a specialized

agency affiliated with the United Nations and is responsible for stabilizing international exchange rates and payments. The main business of the IMF is the provision of

loans to its members (including industrialized and developing countries) when they experience balance of payments difficulties. These loans frequently carry conditions

that require substantial internal economic adjustments by

the recipients, most of which are developing countries.

jati—Literally, birth group. Basic endogamous unit of the caste system. There are approximately 3,000 jatis in contemporary society. The word jati is also sometimes used for ethnic, religious, or linguistic groups.

karma—Literally, action. Spiritual merit or demerit that a being acquired in a previous incarnation and is acquiring

in present existence.

lakh—A unit of measure equal to 100,000. Also see crore (q.v.).

Mandal Commission—A government-appointed commission,

officially the Second Backwards Classes Commission,

chaired by former member of Parliament Bindhyeshwari

Prasad Mandal from December 1978 to December 1980.

Of the five members, four were from Backward Classes

(q.v.) and one was from a Scheduled Caste (q.v.). The commission's controversial December 1980 report (the Mandal

Commission Report of the Backward Classes Commission) called

for reserving 27 percent of all services and public-sector

undertakings under the central government and 27 percent of all admissions to institutions of higher education

(except in states that have reserved higher percentages)

for Backward Class members and Dalits (q.v.). In August

1990, Prime Minister Vishwanath Pratap Singh announced

his support for the radical affirmative-action 1980 propos790
Glossary

als. The First Backward Classes Commission existed from

January 1950 to March 1955.

Muslim League—See All-India Muslim League.

Nonaligned Movement—Established in September 1961 with

the aim of promoting the concept of political and military

nonalignment (q.v.) apart from the traditional East and

West blocs. India was among the original members. The

Nonaligned Movement in 1995 included 107 members

plus the Palestine Liberation Organization, twenty-one

observer nations and organizations, and twenty-one

"guest" nations.

nonalignment—The ideological basis of Indian foreign policy,

first articulated byjawaharlal Nehru: refusal to align India

with any bloc or alliance, peaceful settlement of international disputes, the Panch Shila (q.v.), anticolonialism,

antiracism, and international cooperation to promote eco- nomic development.

Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC)

Established on September 14, 1960, with the aim of coor- dinating the members' petroleum policies and prices.

Members include Algeria, Gabon, Indonesia, Iran, Iraq,

Kuwait, Libya, Nigeria, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, United Arab

Emirates, and Venezuela.

Panch Shila—Literally, five principles of foreign policy: mutual

respect for territorial integrity and sovereignty, mutual

nonaggression, mutual noninterference in internal affairs,

equality and mutual benefit, and peaceful coexistence.

The Panch Shila were enunciated byjawaharlal Nehru in

April 1954 in a trade agreement with China and adopted

as a keystone of relations among nations at the Asian-Afri- can Conference (the Bandung Conference) held in Bandung, Indonesia, in 1955.

panchayat—A council of five or more. Found both in villages

and in jatis (q.v.). Also refers to an administrative grouping

of villages under constitutionally mandated elected councils. pandit(s) —Honorific for erudite individual, sometimes taken

as personal or family name. Various Brahmans (q.v.) (such

as the family ofJawaharlal Nehru) were known as pandits.

Sometimes transliterated as pundit.

Punjab—State in India (and a province in adjacent Pakistan).

Term the Punjab usually refers to either the pre-1947 state of British India or the geographic region centered on the

791
India: A Country Study

five major rivers, whence its name, panch ab, meaning five

waters, or rivers. rupee (Rp; Rs—plural) —Basic unit of currency consisting of

100 paise. From September 1949 to June 1966, the official

value of the rupee was Rs4.76 per US$1. From June 1966

through mid-December 1971, the official value was Rs7.50

per US$1, and from mid-December 1971 to late June 1972,

the value was Rs7.28 per US$1. Thereafter, the official

value of the rupee as compared with the United States dollar began to fall, from Rs7.44 in 1971-72 to Rs 8.08 in

1979-80 to Rsl2.24 in 1985-86 to Rsl4.48 in 1988-89,

Rsl6.66 in 1989-90, Rsl7.95 in 1990-91, Rs24.52 in 1991-

92, and Rs26.41 in 1992-93. A dual exchange-rate system was established in March 1992, and, starting in March

1993, the exchange rate was reunified at the free-market

rate. As ofJuly 1996, US$1 was worth Rs35.67. Aluminummagnesium, stainless steel, and cupro-nickel coins are minted at the Calcutta and Bombay mints for circulation

in five, ten, twenty, twenty-five, and fifty paise and Rsl and

Rs2 denominations. Bank notes issued by the Reserve

Bank of India are issued in denominations of Rsl, Rs2,

Rs5, RslO, Rs20, Rs50, RslOO, and Rs500.

satyagraha—Method employed by Mahatma Gandhi and his

followers to secure sociopolitical reform by nonviolent,

passive resistance and noncooperation; the individual fol- lowing the method is called a satyagrahi.

Scheduled Areas—Article 244 of the Indian constitution allows

the government to compile a schedule (list) of areas of the

country occupied by Scheduled Tribes (q.v.). The Sixth

and Ninth Schedules of the constitution list the Scheduled

Areas.

Scheduled Castes—Article 341 of the Indian constitution

allows thegovernment to compile a schedule (list) of

castes, races, or tribes or parts of groups within castes,

races, or tribes that are economically and socially disadvantaged and are therefore entitled to protection and specified benefits under the constitution. Untouchables, also

known as Harijans (q.v.) or Dalits (q.v.), constitute the bulk

of Scheduled Castes. See also Scheduled Tribes (q.v.). The

1991 census tabulated 138 million Scheduled Caste members throughout India, representing about 16 percent of

the total population. The largest numbers were in Uttar

Pradesh, West Bengal, Bihar, Andhra Pradesh, and Tamil

792
Glossary

Nadu. The schedule in the constitution does not list the

Scheduled Castes by name.

Scheduled Languages—Article 351 of the Indian constitution

allows the government to compile a schedule (list) of languages recognized by the government for use in state legislatures. The Eighth Schedule, written in 1950, lists Assamese, Bengali, Gujarati, Hindi, Kannada, Kashmiri,

Malayalam, Marathi, Oriya, Punjabi, Sanskrit, Tamil,

Telugu, and Urdu. Sindhi was added to the schedule in

1967, and Konkani, Manipuri, and Nepali were added in

1992. Article 343 of the constitution designates Hindi written in Devanagari (q.v.) as the official language of India.

Even though it was supposed to be phased out by 1965,

English continues as India's other official language for use

in Parliament, the Supreme Court, and the high courts

unless otherwise authorized by the president.

Scheduled Tribes—Article 342 of the Indian constitution

includes a schedule (list) of tribes or tribal communities

that are economically and socially disadvantaged and are

entitled to specified benefits. The tribes are listed in the

Fifth Schedule. The 1991 census tabulated 67.8 million

members of Scheduled Tribes throughout India, representing about 8 percent of the total population. The largest numbers are in Maharashtra, Orissa, and West Bengal.

See also Scheduled Castes (q.v.).

Shia (from Shiat Ali, the Party of Ali) —A member of the

smaller of the two great divisions of Islam. The Shia supported the claims of Ali and his line to presumptive right

to the caliphate and leadership of the Muslim community,

and on this issue they divided from the Sunnis (q.v.) in the

major schism of Islam. Later schisms have produced further divisions among the Shia over the identity and number of imams (q.v.). Most Shia revere twelve Imams, the

last of whom is believed to be hidden from view.

South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC)

Comprises the seven nations of South Asia: Bangladesh,

Bhutan, India, Maldives, Nepal, Pakistan, and Sri Lanka;

founded as the South Asia Regional Cooperation (SARC)

organization at a meeting of foreign ministers in New

Delhi on August 1-2, 1983. A second organizational meeting of foreign ministers was held in Thimphu in May 1985,

followed by the inaugural meeting of heads of state and

government in Dhaka on December 7-8, 1985. SAARC's

793
India: A Country Study

goal is to effect economic, technical, and cultural cooperation and to provide a forum for discussions of South Asian

political problems.

Sufi(s) —Comes from suf, the Arabic word for "wool." The term

derives from the practice of wearing a woolen robe, a sign

of dedicating oneself to the mystical life, known in Islam as becoming a Sufi. Sufis seek mystical union with God and

have been condemned by some Sunni (q.v.) legal schools.

Sunni—Comes from sunna, meaning "custom," with connotations of orthodoxy. One of the two great divisions of Islam,

the Sunnis supported the traditional method of election to the caliphate and accepted the Umayyad line. On this

issue, they divided from the Shia (q.v.) belief in the first great schism within Islam.

swadeshi—Literally, of one's own country. A preindependence

movement to further the use of Indian-made items, particularly cottage-industry products, such as hand-loomed

cloth, and to oppose British-made goods.

tribal—In addition to its use as an adjective—tribal land or

tribal customs—the word is also used as a noun to describe

a tribesperson, tribesman, or tribeswoman.

twice-born—Referring to jatis (q.v.) claiming membership in

one of the three upper varnas (q.v.), that is, Brahman

(q.v), Kshatriya, and Vaishya. Male member's natural birth

is followed by a sprititual rebirth in a rite involving investiture with a sacred thread. varna—Literally, color. One of the four large caste groups

(Brahman (q.v.) Kshatriya, Vaishya, and Sudra) from

which most jatis (q.v.) are believed to derive.

World Bank—Informal name used to designate a group of four

affiliated international institutions: the International Bank

for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD), the International Development Association (IDA), the International

Finance Corporation (IFC), and the Multilateral Invest- ment Guarantee Agency (MIGA). The IBRD, established

in 1945, has the primary purpose of providing loans at market-related rates of interest to developing countries at more advanced stages of development. The IDA, a legally

separate loan fund but administered by the staff of the

IBRD, was set up in 1960 to furnish credits to the poorest

developing countries on much easier terms than those of

conventional IBRD loans. The IFC, founded in 1956, supplements the activities of the IBRD through loans and

794
Glossary

assistance designed specifically to encourage the growth of

productive private enterprises in the less-developed countries. The MIGA, founded in 1988, insures private foreign

investment in developing countries against various non- commercial risks. The president and certain officers of the

IBRD hold the same positions in the IFC. The four institutions are owned by the governments of the countries that

subscribe their capital. To participate in the World Bank

group, member states must first belong to the International Monetary Fund (q.v.).

zamindar(s) —Landlord, but particularly the group of landlords and the zamindar system that emerged after the British Permanent Settlement (Landlease) Act of 1793. In

essence, the former revenue collectors of the Mughal

period (1526-1858) became landlords under the British.

795

Index

Abdullah, Farooq, li, 487, 494, 521; cor- ruption under, 494; dismissed, 521

Abdullah, Sheikh Mohammed, 486, 493, 494; accession to India under, 520; arrested, 487; as chief minister of Jammu and Kashmir, 487

abortion, 254; of female fetuses, 93, 252, 253, 291 Abu Bakr, 156 Achaemenid Empire, 9

acharyas, 1 32-33 acquired immune deficiency syndrome

(AIDS) , 64; and blood supply, 99; and

HIV infection, 97, 98, 98-99; discrimi- nation against people with, 98; spread

of, 98, 99; suspected cases of, 97, 98

Adhikary, Man Mohan, 530

Adi Granth (Original Book), 164

Advani, Lai Krishna, 1; arrested, 477, 497;

in BJP, 480; Ramjanmabhumi Temple

pilgrimage of, 477, 497

Afghanistan: border with, 516; relations

with, 541; Soviet invasion of, xlviii, 55, 517, 523, 538-39, 543-44, 548; Soviet withdrawal from, 551

Africans, 213-14; under British, 213-14; geographic distribution of, 214; under

Mughals, 213-14; religion of, 214

aghoris, 280

Agni, 121 AGP. See Asom Gana Parishad Agra, 23 Agreement on a Comprehensive Politi- cal Settlement of the Cambodia Conflict, 537

agricultural cooperatives, 392, 412; agri- cultural processing in, 422; credit from, 418, 419-20; dairy, 412-13;

inputs from, 420; marketing by, 422, 423; value of produce marketed by, 422-23

agricultural credit, 317, 418-21; from

banks, 418-19; from cooperatives,

418, 419-20; support for, 426

agricultural development, 391-404;

under British, 391; goals of, 392; gov- ernment role in, 382-83, 392; policy, 391-93

agricultural development programs,

393-404; administration of, 393-94; education, 393, 394-96; extension,

393, 394-97; finance, 393; in five-year plans, 394; marketing, 393, 423;

research, 393, 394-96; technology,

393, 402-3; types of, 393

agricultural growth, 299; rates, 404-7

agricultural inputs, 393, 400-2, 397; dis- tribution of, 420; fertilizer, xxxviii, 305, 400-1, 407; machinery, 402-3;

pesticides, 401-2; production of, 420;

seeds, xxxviii, 310, 400, 407, 410, 426

agricultural marketing, 421-24; cooperatives for, 422; government control of, 421-22, 423-24; support for, 426

agricultural policy: goals of, 393

agricultural prices, 403-4; policy for, 403-4; supports for, 381

Agricultural Prices Commission, 403

Agricultural Produce (Grading and Marketing) Act (1937), 423

agricultural production, 402, 404-12;

decreases in, 403; increases in, 394;

limitations on, 394

agricultural products (see also under indi- vidual crops): barley, 384; commercial

crops, 382, 407, 409-10; corn, 384,

407; cotton, 298, 303, 305, 331, 368,

381, 385, 404, 409-10, 422, 425; crop

failures of 1972-73, 54; fodder crops,

385; fruit, 384; grading of, 423; grain,

4, 300, 305, 307-8, 310, 381-82, 391, 392-93, 403, 404, 407-9, 411, 422,

423, 424; inspection of, 423; jute, 297,

298, 368, 381, 404, 409, 410, 422; millet, 384, 385, 407, 408; nontraditional

crops, 382; nuts, 384, 386; oilseeds,

303, 368, 382, 384, 385, 404, 407, 409; output, 404-10; potatoes, 384; pulses, 381, 382, 384, 385, 403, 404, 407, 408, 410-11; rice, 75, 368, 382, 384, 385,

797
India: A Country Study

404, 407-8, 411, 425, 427; silk, 384; sorghum, 384, 385, 407, 408; sugar,

303, 382, 384, 385, 404, 407, 409, 422;

tea, 384, 425-26, 488; tree crops, 383; vegetables, 385; warehouses for, 423, 426; wheat, 382, 384, 385, 404, 407,

408, 410-11; yield, 404

agricultural taxation, 314-15, 421

agricultural workers: as bonded labor, 328; families of, 242; land distributed

to, 388; as percentage of work force, 325, 389-89; wages for, 391

agriculture, 281; aid to, 426-27; ancient,

4; in budget, 393; cropping patterns

in, 382, 383; under Delhi Sultanate,

17; and economic reforms, 427-28; education in, 391; employment in, 297, 381, 392; energy consumed by, 339; exports, 381, 424-26; under

five-year plans, 309, 310, 311, 312; in Godavari River basin, 75; in Great

Indian Desert, 384; growth in, 391-92;

in Himalayas, 383-84; importance of, 233; in Indo-Gangetic Plain, 384-85;

livestock patterns in, 383; mechanization in, 402-3; as percentage of gross domestic product, 297, 299-300, 381;

as percentage of gross national product, 392; research in, 364, 368, 368,

391; SAARC program for, 559; scientific and technical support for, 358, 402-3 ahimsa (nonviolence), xli, 10, 126, 177, 569 Ahmad Shah Abdali, 26 Ahmad Shah Durrani, 26 Ahmadabad, 23, 290; airport, 354 Ahmed, Fakhruddin Ali, 54 Ahriman, 172 Ahura Mazda (Ohrmazd), 172 AIADMK. See All-India Anna Dravida Munnetra Kazhagam

AIDS. See acquired immune deficiency

syndrome

aircraft manufacturing: government

control of, 304

air transportation, 352-54; accidents,

352, 354; government control of, 342; hijackings, 354, 524; investment in, 306

air force, 590-91; aircraft of, 590, 591; area commands, 590-91; British officers in, 570; budget for, 583; chief of

staff, 569, 590; creation of, 567, 590;

diversity in, 594; educational qualifica- tion for, 393; expansion of, 564, 568;

insignia, 595; intelligence, 604; inter- nal security mission of, 564; judge

advocate general's department, 605; modernization of, 564; number of

personnel, 590; ranks, 595; recruit- ment, 592; surveillance by, 577; in third Indo-Pakistani war, 573-74;

training, 590, 591; uniforms, 595; women in, 292

Air Force Academy, 591

Air Force Act of 1950, 604

Air India, 352

airlines, 352

airports, 354; upgrades needed, 342

Aiyanar, 143

Akali Dal (Eternal Party), xliv-xlv, 166-

67; attempts to undermine, 608; constituency of, 486; origins of, 166, 486; platform of, 167, 486, 491

Akashvani. See All-India Radio

Akbar,Jalal-ud-Din (1556-1605), 20-23,

162; administrative system of, 21-23; expansion under, 20-21; reforms

under, 23; taxes under, 21 Akhil Bharatiya Gorkha League. SeeAXl India Gorkha League

Aksai Chin: China's occupation of, 520,

574; dispute over, 532-33, 574

Alam, Shah, 29

Ala-ud-din, 16, 17

Ala-ud-Din Bahman Shah (Zafar Khan),

17

alcoholism, 132 Alexander the Great, 9

Ali, 156 Aligarh Muslim University (see also Muhammadan Anglo-Oriental College), 162; science program, 371 Allahabad airport, 354

Allahabad University, 109

All Bodo Students' Union, 488 All-India Anna Dravida Munnetra

Kazhagam (AIADMK), 485

All-India Backward, Scheduled Caste, Scheduled Tribe, Other Backward

Classes, and Minority Communities

Employees Federation (BAMCEF),

490

798
Index

All-India Congress (I) Committee, 473

All-India Council of Technical Education, 109

All India Democratic Women's Association, 292

All-India Education Survey, 194

All India Gorkha League (Akhil

Bharatiya Gorkha League), 224, 226

All-India Gurdwara Act, 491 All-India Hospitals Post-partum Pro- gramme, 90

All-India Institute of Medical Sciences, 98

All-India Muslim League. See Muslim

League

All India Radio (Akashvani), 356, 501

All-India Trade Union Congress, 327

All-Party Hurriyat Conference, 495 aluminum, 341; reserves, 341 aluminum industry, 331-32; exports by, 332, 341; growth of, 331

al-Zamani, Maryam, 21-22 Amar Das, Guru, 162-63 Ambedkar, Bhimrao Ramji (B.R.), 131,

271, 275; constitution drafted by, 433

Amherst, William Pitt, 31 Amindivi Islands, 71 Amnesty International, 565, 606

Amritsar, 163, 491 Anandabazar Patrika, 500 Anandabazar Patrika Group, 500 Anandpur Sahib Resolution (1973), 491 Andaman and Nicobar Islands, 71; cli- mate of, 71; language of, 181; military

installations on, 536; rural population

of, 88; topography of, 71; tribes in, 169, 200 Andamese language, 181 Andhra Kingdom. See Satavahana Kingdom

Andhra Pradesh (state): Africans in, 214; agriculture in, 385, 404; education in, 112, 216; fertilizer consumption in, 400; forests in, 413; formed, xliv, 215; Green Revolution in, 412; language

in, 215; language minorities in, 196; language riots in, 196; legislature of, 455; oil in, 338; political uprisings in, 483; political violence in, 214-15, 216, 217; politics of, 485-86; proportionality in, 215-16; Scheduled Castes in, 88; sex ratio in, 253; Telangana Movement in, 49, 214-18; tribes in, 200;

universities in, 109 Angad, Guru, 162 Anglican Church, 170 Anglo-Indians, 212-13; affirmative

action for, 437, 443; assimilation of, 213; language of, 212; occupations of, 212, 213; origins of, 212; rejection of, 212; schools of, 212-13; segregation

of, 212

Angola: peacekeeping forces in, 579 Angra Mainyu, 172 Annadurai, C.N., 485 Anthropological Survey of India, 182, 192

Anti-Defection Bill, 469

Anti-Eve Teasing Squad, 615

Antrix Corporation, 374 ANZ Grindlays Bank, 317 Apabhramshas, 186

aquaculture, 416; research, 368 Arabian Sea: islands in, 71

Arab-Israeli dispute, 537-38

Arabs: influence of, 18; Islam introduced

by, 15; and mathematics, 359; in Sindh, 15; trade with, 14, 15

Arabsat. See Arab Satellite Communication Organization Arab Satellite Communication Organization (Arabsat), 375

archaeological research, 4, 5 Arjun Das, Guru: executed, 23, 163 armed forces {see also paramilitary

forces; see also under individual services;

see also under military), 569-70; under

British Raj, 565-69; British officers in, 570; buildup of, 517, 536; commander

in chief, 446, 569; conditions of ser- vice, 594-95; cooperation of services, 578; cutbacks in, xlix; diversity in, 594; educational qualification for, 592-93; expansion of, 563; impact of partition on, 569; intelligence, 604; internal

security missions of, 564, 605-7; in Jammu and Kashmir, 494; modernization of, 563; pay and benefits in, 594; peacekeeping role of, 599; pensions, 594; physical standards for, 592; recruitment for, 566, 568, 591-94;

reserves, 592, 600-601; restructuring

of, 566; retirement, 594; selectivity of, 592; term of service in, 592; training,

799
India: A Country Study

591-94; uniforms, ranks, and insignia

of, 595 Armed Forces (Jammu and Kashmir)

Special Powers Act (1990), 606 Armed Forces Provident fund, 594

army, 583-87; area commands, 583; artil- lery, 584; aviation, 584; under British, 37, 565; British officers in, 570; budget

for, 583; chief of staff, 569, 580, 583; deployment of, 237; diversity in, 594; educational standards for, 592-93; Gorkhas in, 592; insignia, 595; intelli- gence, 604; internal security by, 564,

605; judge advocate general's department, 605; materiel, 583-84; of Mauryan Empire, 10; number of personnel

in, 583; ranks, 595; recruitment, 592; reorganization of, 37; training of, 584-87; uniforms, 595 Army Act of 1954, 604 Army Cadet College

Army of Shivaji. See Shiv Sena

art: Buddhist, 130; religious influence

on, 119, 130

Arthashastra (Science of Material Gain),

10, 124

artisans: and caste, 267, 271; displace- ment of, 275; status of, 267, 279; in vil- lages, 283 Arunachal Pradesh, 534; forests in, 413; Scheduled Tribes in, 88; teachers in, 107; tensions of, with central govern- ment, 227; tribes in, 199, 200, 206-7

Aryabhatta, 13 Aryan people, xxxvi, 5-8; culture of, 6-7; geographic distribution of, 6-7, 8; lan- guage of, 7; law of, 8; religion of, 7 Arya Samaj (Arya Society) , 1 74-75 Arya Society. See Arya Samaj

ASEAN. See Association of Southeast

Asian Nations Ashoka (269-232 B.C.), 10 Ashura, 158-59

ashrama {see also life stages) , 7 Ashtadhyayi (Panini), 185, 359

Asia. See Central Asia; South Asia; Southeast Asia

Asian-African Conference (1955), 558

Asian Relations Meeting (1947), 558

Asia Television Network, 357

Asia Watch, 565,606

Asom Gana Parishad (AGP—Assam People's Assembly): formed, 488; in National Front, 477; platform of, 487 Assam (state): agriculture in, 196; auton- omy movement in, 516; Buddhists in, 131; climate of, 78; education in, 112; human rights violations in, 565; immigrants to, 196, 487, 610; insurgency in, 564, 605, 610; language riots in, 196;

oil in, 337, 338; political parties in, 487; under President's Rule, 488; rural population of, 88; teachers in, 107;

tensions of, with central government,

226; tribes in, 199,200, 227 Assam Accord (1985) , 487-88, 610 Assamese language, 182; as language of

instruction, 207; native speakers of, 182; pidgin version, 202 Assam People's Assembly. See Asom Gana

Parishad Assam Rifles, 598 Assam Valley, 68 Assembly of Lions. See Singh Sabha

Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), 536-37; agreement with, 323

astronomy, 360; in Rig Veda, 359 atomic energy: government control of, 304 Atomic Energy Commission, 372

atomic weapons, 300

Audits and Accounts Service, 461 Augmented Satellite Launch Vehicle, 375 Aurangzeb (1658-1707), 24, 26, 164

Austin, Granville, 433

Australia: relations with, 555

Austria: in Aid-to-india Consortium, 319;

traders from, 30, 211

Austroasiatic languages, 181; number of

speakers of, 187 automobile industry: price controls on, 305 Avadhi language, 191

Avesta, 172

Avestan language, 5 Ayodhya: mosque in, 149, 176; violence

in, 149, 176, 302 Ayyappan, 144 Azad, Maulana Abdul Kalam: as Congress leader, 43 Azad Hind Fauj. See Indian National

Army

800
Index

Azad Kashmir (Free Kashmir) , 570, 571

Baba Dayal, 166 BabaSri Chand, 162 Babri Masjid (see also Ramjanmabhumi

Temple), 149; agitation against, 477, 480; destroyed, xlvi, 149, 176, 481,

497; opened to Hindus, 497; police

protection of, 613; Supreme Court

decision on, 471; violence over, 302

Babur, Zahir-ud-Din (1526-30), 20 Babur Namah (Babur), 20 Backward Classes Commission report.

See Mandal Commission report Backward Classes: definition of members

of, 200, 437; education of, 111; as per- centage of population, 274, 490; polit- ical activities of, X, 431, 432; political

affiliation of, 463, 481, 490; in prison, 619

Bactrian people, 11 Badrinath: Hindu seat of learning at, 132; pilgrimage to, 152 Baghdad Jews, 174 Bahadur Shah II (1837-57): exiled, 36 Bahmani Sultanate (1347-1527), 17-18; collapse of, 18; rivalry of, with Vija- yanagar, 18; taxes under, 18 Bahuchara Mata, 280 Bahujan Samaj Party (BSP—Party of

Society's Majority), 431; constituency

of, 471, 472; founded, 490; support

for, 490

Bajrang Dal (Party of the Adamani-Bodied) , 496

Bakht, Sikandar, 480 Bakr Id, 159 balance of payments: and balance of

trade, 323; crisis, 297, 299, 302-3, 315;

difficulties, 321, 324; and foreign assis- tance, 323; pressure on, 302; vulnerability of, 306 balance of trade: and balance of pay- ments, 323

ballistic missiles, 511, 517, 549, 601-2, 620

Baluchistan: ancient civilization in, 4 Balwantrai Mehta Commission report, 458 BAMCEF. See All-India Backward, Sched- uled Caste, Scheduled Tribe, Other

Backward classes, and Minority Communities Employees Federation

Banaras. SeeVaranasi Bandaranaike, Sirimavo Ratwatte Dias, 527,577

Bangalore, 290; airport, 354; population

of, 285; Tata Institute facility in, 376; technology in, 369, 376 Bangladesh: aid to, 321, 526; border

with, 63, 71, 73-74, 516; fertility rate

in, 93; independence of, xlvi, xlviii, 521; membership of, in SAARC, 559; refugees from, 53, 85, 299, 526, 610;

relations with, 509, 526, 543; water dis- tribution with, 526

Banjara tribe: living with Chenchu tribe, 206; migration of, 206; as Scheduled

Tribe, 206

banking: government control of, 312-

13; deposit insurance, 317; nationalized, xxxix, 316; in rural areas, 300, 317 Bank Nationalization Bill, 450 banks {see also Reserve Bank of India):

agricultural credit from, 418-19, 420; branches of, 317, 420-21; foreign,

317; government loans by, 317-18;

interest rates in, 317; lending by, 317, 420; liquidity requirements for, 317;

nationalized, 52, 304, 317, 450, 466; number of accounts, 420; postal savings, 317; priorities in, 317; rural, 317

Bano, Shah, 496

Baptist Church: number of members,

171 Barnala, Surjit Singh, 492

Basu, Jyoti, 226

Battle of Buxar (1765), 29

Battle of Panipat (1526), 20

Battle of Panipat, Second (1556), 20

Battle of Plassey (1757), 29

Battle ofTalikot (1565), 19

bauxite, 341; mines, 341; reserves, 341 Bay of Bengal: islands in, 71 Beas River, 68; irrigation from, 68 Belgium: in Aid-to-india Consortium,

319

Belgrade Conference (1961), 558

Benares. See Varanasi Benares Hindu University: science pro- gram, 371 Bene Israel Jews, 174

801
India: A Country Study

Bengal: bhakti tradition in, 134; British presidency in, 32; chemical industry

in, 362; famine in, 391; partition of, 39, 40 Bengal Army, 566; disbanded, 566; orga- nization of, 566-67; recruitment for, 566-67; reestablished, 567

Bengali language, 182, 196; native speakers of, 182; publications in, 500; as regional language, 197

Bentinck, William Cavendish, 34 Bhabha, Homi Jehangir, 361, 372 Bhagavad Gita, 1 37 Bhagwan Bahubali (Gomateshvasa), 128;

statue of, 1 28

bhakti literature, 134-35, 139, 139-10 Bharat Immunologicals and Biologicals

Corporation, 368-69

Bharatiyajanata Party (BJP—Indian People's Party), xlvi, 149, 223, 431, 471, 478-82, 504-5; constituency of, 1, 472;

in elections, 480-81, 497; and foreign

policy, 515; formed, 175, 480; opposition of, to Congress, 474, 477; in Par- liament, 471; platform of, 497;

support for, xliii, 480-81, 497

Bharatiyajanata Party government, 307

Bharatiya Lok Dal (Indian People Party)

:

in Janata Party, 476; in Janata Dal, 477

Bhatt, Ela, 291

Bhattarai, Krishna Prasad, 530

Bhil tribe, 202 Bhindranwale, Santjarnail Singh, 167, 492, 608; killed, 492 Bhojpuri language: native speakers of, 182 Bhopalgas leak, 286,451 Bhutan: aid to, 321, 514, 526, 531; bor- der with, 63, 71, 74, 516; membership

of, in SAARC, 559; relations with, 509, 530-31; relations with China, 530

Bhutto, Benazir: as prime minister, 524;

political campaign of, 524 Bihar (state): agricultural growth in, 404; caste problems in, 273; coal in, 336; education in, 112; elections in, 475; electricity in, 339; Hindi in, 191; land reform in, 390; legislature of, 455; literacy rate in, 106; mining in, 341; Muslims in, 155; political parties

in, 490; political uprisings in, 483;

political representation in, 52; poverty

in, 301; Santals in, 168, 200; urban

areas in, 86

Bijapur: Mughal war with, 24

bilingualism, 192, 198 biotechnology: international cooperation in, 544; research organizations in, 368-69; scientific and technical sup- port for, 358 Birendra Bir Bikram Shah Dev (king), 529

Birla family, 242

birth: pollution associated with, 236;

rate, 82

birth control {see also family planning): forced sterilization for, 54; information, 90; methods, 92, 254; percent of population using, 91

BJP. See Bharatiyajanata Party Black Acts. See Rowlatt Acts Blanpied, William A, 360 Board of Control: established, 33 Bodoland Autonomous Council, 488,

611 Bodo People's Action Committee, 488 Bodo Security Force, 611 Bodo tribe, 611 Bombay, 290; airport, 354; as British

presidency, 29, 32; fishing in, 417; IIT campus in, 370; Jews in, 174; population of, 285; port of, 350, 351; public

transportation in, 349, 350; stock market, 318; Tata Institute facility in, 376 Bombay High oil field, 337 Bombay Marine, 587 Bondo tribe: language of, 202 border problems: with Bangladesh, 71, 73-74, 516; with China, 71, 72, 533-

34, 535, 542, 576, 620; with Pakistan, 46,57, 71,72,516, 524 Border Roads Development Board, 350

borders, 71-74; with Bangladesh, 63, 71, 73-74; with Bhutan, 63, 71, 74, 516;

with Burma, 71 , 74; with China, 63, 71

,

72, 535; of Indo-Gangetic Plain, 67; with Indonesia, 74; with Maldives, 74, 531; military maneuvers along, 524; with Nepal, 63, 71, 74, 516; with Pakistan, 63, 71; in Punjab, 72 Border Security Force, 598, 599

Bose, Sir Jagadish Chandra (J.C.), 361-

62

Bose, Satyendranath (S.N.), 362

802
Index

Bose, Subhas Chandra: as Congress

leader, 43; death of, 569; in Indian

National Army, 568

Bose-Einstein Condensation, 362

Bose-Einstein Statistics, 362

boycotts of British goods, 39 Brahma, 138, 140-41 Brahmans (priests), xxxvii; in Aryan sys- tem, 7, 8; ascendancy of, 14; brides of, 270; dharma of, 270; diets of, 236; education of, 110-11; neighborhoods

of, 282; occupations of, 271, 283; ori- gins of, 267; political affiliation of, 468, 472; pollution of, 236-37; purity

of, 236-37; recitation of Vedas by, 122; rules for accepting food, 237-38; sta- tus of, 267; Tamil movement against, 186; in villages, 282,283

Brahmaputra River, 68, 75; etymology,

68; source of, 75 Brahmaputra River basin: rainfall in, 75 Brahmo Samaj (Society of Brahma), 34

Braj language, 191

Brass, Paul, 463

Brezhnev, Leonid, 543

bribery, 1, 208, 474; efforts to end, 469; of police, 615; rates of, 208

brideprice, 7

brides: Brahman, 270; child, 23, 244,

256, 262, 265, 291; dowry for, 7, 259, 260-61; duties of, 262; English-speaking, 193; family situation of, 242, 257,

258, 262; names of, 284; Sweeper, 270; unhappiness of, 263

Britain: aid from, 319, 320, 370, 426,

554; in Aid-to-india Consortium, 319; boycott of goods from, 39; investment

by, 554; materiel from, 563, 588; motor vehicle production, 335; rela- tions with, 553-54; trade with, 28, 554

British East India Company, 27-28; abolished, 36; army of, 565, 567; founded,

28; maritime force of, 587

British Empire, 30-46; company rule (1757-1857), 30-35; Raj (1858-1947), 35-38

British expansion, 30-32; collaboration

with, 30; doctrine of lapse, 31-32; land

distribution under, 33; legal system

under, 33-34; motives of, 30; subsidiary alliance system, 31; support for, 30; territory acquired in, 31; textile

industry under, 33

British government: supervision by, of

presidencies, 32

British Indian Army, 568

British Raj (1858-47), xxxvi, 35-38;

administration of, 36-37, 40-41; Afri- cans under, 213-4; agriculture under,

391; armed forces under, 565-69; civil service under, 461; currency under,

316; dyarchy under, 40-41; economic

planning under, 309; foreign relations under, 516; language of administration under, 188; Muslim loyalty to, 39, 40; race prejudice of, xxxvii, 36, 37, 211; science education under, 360-61;

scientific developments under, 360;

tribes under, 206

British traders, 28-29; administrative zones of, 29; armies of, 565; conflict

of, with French traders, 29; factories

of, 28, 29; military operations of, 29; race prejudice of, 32, 211; sepoys

under, 29, 565,566

Brown, Judith M., 42 Brown, Ronald H., 323, 552 BSR See Bahujan Samaj Party Buddha (see abo Gautama, Siddhartha),

xxxvii, 130, 131; death of, 130 Buddhism, 10, 11, 15, 128-32; art of, 130; conversions to, 131,176, 177, 275; forms of, 131; Four Noble Truths of, 129-30; and Hinduism, 130; impact

of, 130; introduced to China, 531;

meditation in, 129; missionaries of, 12; number of followers of, 119; origins

of, 128-30; regeneration of, 130-31;

spread of, 130; stupas of, 130; temples

of, 15; waning of, 130 Buddhism, Mahayana, 131 Buddhism, Theravada, 131-32; language

of, 186; origins of, 131 Buddhism, Vajrayana, 131 Buddhists: convert communities of, 132; education of, 132; geographic distri- bution of, 131; number of, 131; refu- gees from Tibet, 131 budget, 313-15; agriculture in, 393;

approval of, 313; emergency, 315; pro- posals, 313; of state governments,

313-14 budget deficit, 316; as percentage of

gross domestic product, 31

2

803
India: A Country Study

Bulganin, Nikolai, 541 bureaucracy (see also Indian Administrative Service): corruption in, 306; of Mughals, 24 Burma: border with, 71, 74; materiel acquired by, 535; refugees from, 85; relations with, 509 Burmah Oil Company, 337

Bush, George, 548

business, 300; credit, 317; energy con- sumed by, 339; English as language of, 193; fictive kinship in, 235; govern- ment aversion to large, 305; hierarchy

in, 235; licensing for, 305

business class, 278 Butcher (Khatik) caste: status of, 237, 267

cabinet: committees of, 579, 581; morning military meetings in, 581; Rajiv Gandhi's reshuffling of, 448-49; sci- ence portfolios in, 363-65

Cable News Network (CNN) , 357; cover- age of Persian Gulf War, 502

Calcutta, 290; airport, 354; as British presidency, 29; as British capital, 39,

40; fishing in, 417; Jews in, 174; population of, 285; port of, 350; public

transportation in, 350; shipyards in, 352; subway system of, 289, 346-49; tramway in, 349

calendars, 153-54, 158; reform of, 360 Cambodia: peacekeeping missions in, 556, 579; relations with, 537

Canada: in Aid-to-india Consortium, 319 Cannanore Islands, 71 capital city: Calcutta as, 39, 40; New

Delhi as, 40

Carey, William, 32

Cariappa, K.M., 595

Carter, Jimmy, 547

Carter Doctrine, 548

caste (see also varna; Scheduled Castes;

see also under individual castes), 266—76;

attempts to reform, 50, 162, 266; cate- gories of, 268; changing the system,

xxxviii, xlii, 273-76; and class, 276;

council (panchayat), 270; defined, 266; dharma of, 270; discrimination based

on, xxxviii, 266, 271; etymology of, 267; excommunication from, 270;

geographic distribution of, 268;

improving, 271-72; and karma, 271; and landownership, 273; and lan- guage, 183-84; legal rights of, 274; and occupation, 263, 267, 271; origins

of, xxxvii; pervasiveness of, 234, 238-

39; political affiliation and, 488-91;

political influence of, 276, 481, 505; and pollution, 235-40, 268-69, 270; and purity, 235-40, 268-69; rankings

of, 234, 267, 268-69, 271; relations, 272-73; roles in, 263; and tribe, 201,

268; and urbanization, 275

castes, cultivator: education of, 111

Catholicism, Roman: missionaries, 170

Catholic missions. See missions

Catholics, Roman: number of, 170 cement industry, xxxix; price controls

on, 305

census of 1991, 81, 85, 325

Central Asia: cultural exchanges with, 540; Islam in, 16; relations with, 510, 540-41

Central Bureau of Investigation, 613

Central Council of Health and Family

Welfare, 100

Central Drug Research Institute, 369

Central Electrochemical Research Insti- tute, 372

Central Electronics Engineering Insti- tute, 372

Central Fisheries Corporation, 417

Central Glass and Ceramic Research

Institute, 372

Central Gurdwara Management Committee, 166, 167

Central Highlands, 64, 67; agriculture

in, 385; urbanization in, 86

Central Industrial Security Force, 598

Central Inland Fisheries Institute, 416

Central Institute for Fishery Education, 417

Central Institute of Agricultural Engineering, 402

Central Institute of Coastal Engineering

for Fisheries, 418

Central Institute of Fisheries Nautical and Engineering Training, 418

Central Institute of Fisheries Technology, 416

Central Institute of Marine Fisheries

Research, 416

804
Index

Central Leather Research Institute, 372

Central Public Service, 461 Central Reserve Police Force, 598, 599-

600; founded, 599; missions of, 599-

600; women in, 600

Central Warehousing Corporation, 423

Centre for Cellular and Molecular Biol- ogy, 369 Centre for Development of Advanced

Computing, 367

Centre for Scientific and Industrial Consultancy, 370

Centre of Indian Trade Unions, 327 Chaimal tribe: population of, 200

Chaitanya, 134-35, 138

Challenge ofEducation: A Policy Perspective, 106 Chalukya Kingdom (556-757), 14 Chamar caste. See Leatherworker caste Champakalakshmi, Radha, 14 Chandigarh: airport, 354; teachers in, 107 Chandra, 121 Chandragupta I (319-335), 13 Chandragupta II (376-415), 13 Chandragupta Maurya (324-301 B.C.), 9 Charaka, 13 Charter Act (1813), 33

chemicals: imported, 322; research on, 372 chemicals industry, 362; government

control of, xxxix, 330; price controls on, 305 Chenab River, 68 Chenchu tribe: Banjaras in, 206; Dalits

in, 206; economy of, 205-6 Chera Kingdom, 12 Chernomyrdin, Viktor, 545

Chi Haotian, 536

children, 252-56; employment of, 105-6, 112, 255, 325; family roles of, 255; importance of male, 92-93, 253; initia- tion ceremonies for, 146-47, 172, 256; marriage of, 23, 244, 256, 291; mortality of, 93, 94, 264; neglect of female,

252, 253; prostitution by, 291; school enrollment of, 64, 255, 289; treatment

of, 252, 254

China: border agreement with, 535; bor- der with, 63, 71, 72, 533-34, 542, 576, 620; Buddhism introduced to, 531;

Rajiv Gandhi's visit to, 534; imports

from, 341; influence of, in Southeast

Asia, 537; international competition

of, 519, 547; materiel supplied to Burma by, 535; materiel supplied to Nepal by, 529-30; occupation by, of

Aksai Chin, 520, 532-33, 574; relations

of, with Bhutan, 530; relations of, with Pakistan, 517, 533, 539; territorial claims of, 574; as threat, 515, 517, 537, 543,574; war with (1962), xlvii, 51, 73, 299, 310, 510, 542, 563, 574-76, 581 China-India relations, 509, 510, 517,

531-36; conflict with, over Tibet, 531-

34; cooperation with, 534

China, Republic of (Taiwan): relations

with, 536 Chipko Movement, 415

Chishti, Muinuddin, 160 Chola Kingdom, 12 ChotaNagpur Plateau, 70 Chotanagpur tribe, 218

Christian churches: language of, 1 70

Christianity (see also under individual

denominations), 169-71; conversion to, 169, 170, 176-77, 219, 275; sects of, 169-70

Christian missions. Seg missions; missionaries Christians: and caste, 235; literacy rate

of, 244 Church of North India: number of members of, 170-71 Church of South India, 170; number of members of, 1 70

Cilappatikaram (The Jewelled Anklet), 15

Citibank, 317

civil aviation, 306, 342, 352-54; cooperation with China, 534

Civil Defence Volunteers, 601

civil disobedience. See satyagraha

civil-military relations, 579-81

civil rights: suspended, 54, 606

civil servants, 278; corruption of, 462; examinations for, 461; training of, 461

civil service. See Indian Administrative

Service

clans, 244; hierarchy of, 244

class, 276-79, 292; and caste, 276; in cit- ies, 278; distinctions, 233; formation

of, 277; menial underclass, 278

Classical Age, 12-15

climate, 76-81; characteristics of, 76;

805
India: A Country Study

northeast monsoon, 77, 385, 397; of offshore islands, 71; rainfall, 68, 71,

75, 77, 78, 384; regions of, 78; seasons,

76; southwest monsoon, 76-77, 384,

385, 397; temperature, 78-81

Clinton, Hilary Rodham, 552

Clinton, William J., 552

Clive, Robert, 29 CNN. See Cable News Network

coal, 335, 336; demand for, 336; earnings

from, 331; government control of, 330; in Jharkand, 219; mines, 336;

price controls on, 305; production,

336; reserves, 336

Coal India Limited, 336

coastal plain, 71 Coast Guard Organisation, 598-99;

founded, 598; materiel of, 599; missions of, 598-99; structure of, 599

coastline, 71 Cochin. SeeKochi Cochin Shipyards, 352 Code of Criminal Procedure (1973),

615, 617, 618 Cold War, xlvii-xlviii; end of, 510-11; change in balance of power following,

510-11,518-19

College of Combat, 587 Colombo Plan for Cooperative Eco- nomic and Social Development in Asia and the Pacific, 427, 557 Commission for Agricultural Costs and

Prices, 403, 422 commoner caste. See Vaishya caste Commonwealth of Nations, 553-54 Commonwealth of Nations Assistance Program, 427, 556-57 communications. See telecommunications communist parties, xlii, xliv, 474, 482-84; and foreign policy, 515 Communist Party of India (CPI), 44,

222, 466; in Andhra Pradesh, 215, 218;

in elections of 1995, 227; founded,

482; opposition of, to Congress, 474; support for, 484; in Tripura, 227 Communist Party of India (Marxist):

founded, 482; support for, 483-84 Communist Party of India

(Marxist-Leninist), 484; founded, 483

communists: in Congress, 482 Community Development Programme,

396; phased out, 397 Compagnie des Indes Orientales. See French East India Company

Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, lii computer industry: investment in, 57

computers: development of, xxxix, 367-

68, 376; international cooperation in, 544, 551 Congo: peacekeeping missions in, 556, 579

Congregational Church, 170 Congress for Democracy: in Janata Party, 476 Congress-League Scheme of Reforms

(Lucknow Pact), 40 Congress party (Indian National Congress), li, 463-74; boycotts led by, 39, 110; under British rule, 509; communists in, 482; constitution drafted by, 44; decline of, xlii, 432, 466; and education, 110; in elections of 1937, 45; in elections of 1967, 466; in elections of

1991, 472; in elections of 1995, 227;

factions, 52, 466; foreign department,

509; foreign policy of, 509; friction in, 43; under Mohandas Gandhi, xli, 42; goals of, 38-39; in independence

movement, xlvi, 465; leaders of, 4; opposition to, 474; origins of, xli, 38-

39; patronage in, 465-66; pragmatism

of, 465; relations of, with Muslim

League, xlvi, 40, 44; reorganized, 42; role of, 463; RSS members in, 479;

structure of, 465, 473; support for, xlii, 463-65; and World War II, 45 Congress (I) party: constituency of, 1, 463, 468; corruption in, xlii, 431;

decline of, 431, 462, 504; defections from, 471, 472, 475; dissidents in, 474,

475; in elections of 1980, 468; in elec- tions of 1981, 55; and foreign policy, 515; formed, 468; in local governments, 487, 494, 522; in Parliament,

471; reform of, 56; scandals in, 504 Congress (O) party, 52, 466; in Janata

Party, 476

Congress (R) party, 52, 466

Congress Working Committee, 473

Constituent Assembly, 433

constitution, Congress (1929), 44

constitution of 1951, 432-41; affirmative action under, 436, 437-38; amend806
Index

ments to, xliv, 434, 450; authoritarian powers under, 433, 438-41; caste under, 266, 271, 273, 434, 435, 438; Concurrent List, 445-46; Directive

Principles of State Policy, 434, 435-36;

discrimination prohibited under, 434; drafted, 433; education under, 435; environment under, 436; equality

under, 273; Fundamental Duties, 436; Fundamental Rights, 433, 434-35,

438, 450, 452; group rights under, 436-38; languages under, 182, 195; law and order under, 612; legal aid under, 435; limits on rights under,

435, 438; military justice under, 604; minorities under, 435; panchayats

under, 460; parliamentary pattern of, 433; police under, 612; power distribu- tion under, 433-34, 435-36, 445-46;

President's Rule under, 438; promulgated, 433; schedules in, 182, 434,

435; social welfare in, 432-33, 436;

State List, 445, 457; State of Emergency under, 438-41; Supreme Court, 433; tribes under, 435, 438; Union

List, 445; work under, 435; workers

under, 435

construction, 335; employment in, 335; of housing, 302, 335; as percentage of

gross domestic product, 300, 335; per- centage of work force in, 325; workers,

288, 301 consumer goods: manufacture of, 304; and middle class, xl, xli, 278, 301-2; production of, 307

consumerism, 306

Continental Aviation, 354

Cornwallis, Charles, 33 Coromandel Coast, 64; climate of, 78 corruption: attack on, 469-70; in civil service, 462; in Congress (I), 431; in elections, 498; in government, 470; under Mughals, 23; in police force,

615; of politicians, 1, 432, 433

Costa Rica: peacekeeping forces in, 579

cotton, 385, 409-10; cultivation of, 298; export of, 381, 410, 425; foreign

exchange earned from, 410; marketing of, 422; price controls on, 305; prices, 404; production of, 410;

research on, 368; shortages of, 303;

textiles, 4, 297, 305,331,409

Cotton Corporation of India, 422 Council of Ministers, 443, 448; powers

of, 448 Council of Scientific and Industrial Research (CSIR), 364, 365, 369, 371-

72 Counter-Insurgency and Jungle Warfare

School, 587

courts, high, 452, 618; judges of, 452;

jurisdiction of, 452, 618

courts, lower, 452-54, 618; civil cases in, 452; criminal cases in, 452; judges of, 452-53, 618

courts, military, 604-5

courts, sharia: judges from, in British

legal system, 33

courts-martial, 604

court system: under British, 33; social action litigation in, 453-54

CPI. See Communist Party of India.

credit: agriculture, 317; business, 317;

industrial, 317; subsidies, 317

crime: capital punishment for, 440; cate- gories of, 616-17; ineffectiveness of

police against, 432

criminal justice system {see alsojudiciary;

see also under courts), 615—20; death

sentences, 617; procedure in, 615-18; punishment in, 617; rights of accused

in, 617

criminal law, 615-18 CSIR. See Council of Scientific and

Industrial Research

cultivators. See agricultural workers;

farmers

currency: under British rule, 316; circu- lation of, 316; convertibility of, 306, 323-24; devaluation of, 52, 299, 306, 310,466

Curzon, Sir George, 39 customs service: employment in, 212

Cyprus: peacekeeping missions in, 556

Dadra and Nagar Haveli: rural population of, 88; Scheduled Tribes in, 88

DainikJagran, 500

Dalai Lama, 131, 532 Dalhousie, Marquess of. See Ramsay,

James Andrew Brown

Dalit Panthers, 276, 504

Dalits ("untouchables") (see also Sched807
India: A Country Study

uled Castes), 267; affirmative action

for, xxxviii, 274; atrocities committed

against, 273; conversion of, to Bud- dhism, 131, 275; conversion of, to Christianity, 171, 275; conversion of, to Islam, 177; dharma of, 270; discrim- ination against, xxxviii, 271, 273, 274, 619; language use of, 198; literacy of, 274; living in Chenchu tribe, 206; neighborhoods of, 282; origins of, 267-68; as percentage of population,

490; political activities of, 431, 432;

political affiliation of, 463, 490; politi- cal agitation by, 276, 490; pollution of, 269-70; in prison, 619; reforms

regarding, 43; in rural areas, 275; stu- dents, 274 Daman and Diu: Africans in, 214; urbanization in, 86 Damania Airways, 354

dams, 75, 76, 340; injharkand, 220

Darjeeling. See Darjiling

Darjiling, 69; electricity in, 340; Gorkhas

in, 223; language in, 224; regional

autonomy for, 224; tea plantations in, 384 Dayananda, Swami, 174 death, 264-66; and afterlife, 266; by

assassination, 49, 55, 58, 463, 469, 472, 479, 492, 494; ceremonies, 147-48,

172; dowry murders, 261, 291; in elections, 454, 455, 463; by infanticide, 93, 252, 253; by lynching, 273; by massacre, 41, 46, 273; mourning for, 264; murders, 493; pollution following,

148, 236, 264; rate, 82, 93, 94; in riots, 222-23, 274-75, 477, 492, 497; from

road accidents, 286; by sati, 7, 23, 33, 291; by suicide, 7, 261,291

debt. See foreign debt Deccan Plateau, 64, 70; agriculture in, 385; climate of, 78; coastal plain of, 71; elevation of, 70; etymology, 70; population density in, 87; rivers of, 70 Defence Coordination and Implementation Committee, 581 Defence of India Act, 439 Defence of India Bill (1939), 568 Defence of India Rules, 439; politicians arrested under, 439; repealed, 440 Defence Planning Staff, 581 Defence Research and Development

Organisation (DRDO), 369, 584; Advanced Numerical Research and

Analysis Group, 367-68; computer

development in, 367-68; funding for, 365 Defence Security Force, 598, 599 Defence Services Staff College, 587, 591 defense industry, domestic, xlvii, 542,

563, 580; desire to develop, 304; gov- ernment control of, 304, 329-30; impact of partition on, 569-70;

research organizations, 369

defense spending, 300, 581-83; budget,

583; and foreign aid, 517-18; under

Nehru, 563; as percentage of gross

national product, 581; on Siachen Glacier dispute, 522

Delhi, 23; airport, 354; population of, 285

Delhi, National Capital Area of {see also New Delhi), 290, 458; dowry murders

in, 261; Hindi in, 191; public transportation in, 349, 350

Delhi Sultanate: agriculture under, 17; dynasties of, 16; expansion of, 16-17; government of, 16-17; invasion of, 20; Islam in, 16; taxes in, 16, 17; trade in, 16; transportation in, 16 Delhi University: science program, 371 demonstrations. See political demonstrations Denmark: in Aid-to-india Consortium,

319; traders from, 30, 211 Department of Atomic Energy, 340, 373, 376 Department of Posts and Telegraphs:

finances of, 314 Department of Space, 373, 374 Department of Telecommunications,

355

Desai, Morarji, 52; in elections of 1977, 54; foreign policy under, 515; in Janata government, 476-77; personal advisers to, 512; President's Rule

invoked by, 439; as prime minister, 54-

55, 512, 548; resignation of, 55 Deve Gowda, Haradanahalli (H.D.), li Devi, Phoolan, 1 dharma, 7, 252; and caste, 270; in Mahabharata, 9 diamond processing, 322

Dibrugarh: rainfall in, 75

808
Index

Diego Garcia: United States naval pres- ence on, xlviii, 517, 547, 551

diet (see also food): calories per day, 94; and malnutrition, 94, 96

Din-i-Ilahi, 23

Dipavali (Diwali) festival, 23, 142, 154, 284

Direct Action Day (August 16, 1946), 46

Directive Principles of State Policy, 434

Directorate General of All India Radio

(Akashvani) , 356

Discovery ofIndia (Nehru), 358

divorce, 270; by women, 50

Diwali. See Dipavali DK. See Dravida Kazhagam

DMK. See Dravida Munnetra Kazhagam

doctrine of lapse, 31-32; renounced, 37 Doordarshan (TV1), 356-57, 501, 503

dowry, 7, 259, 260-61; declared illegal, 50, 261; murders, 261,291

drainage, 74; in Indo-Gangetic Plain, 67-

68 Dravida Kazhagam (DK—Dravidian Federation), 485 Dravida Munnetra Kazhagam (DMK

Dravidian Progressive Federation),

466; founded, 485; in National Front, 477

Dravidian culture: social order of, 12 Dravidian languages (see also under indi- vidual languages), 15, 181, 186; litera- ture in, 15; speakers of, 186 Dravidian Federation. See Dravida

Kazhagam

Dravidian Progressive Federation. See Dravida Munnetra Kazhagam

DRDO. See Defence Research and Devel- opment Organisation drought, 397; in Indo-Gangetic Plain, 384; in 1965,

299, 310; in 1966, 299, 310; in 1971,

299, 467; in 1972, 299, 467; in 1987,

315, 381; in Orissa, 75; prevention, 76 Drought-Prone Areas Programme, 394 drug trafficking: SAARC program for, 559

drugs. See pharmaceuticals

Dubey, Suman, 278

Dupleix, Franois, 29 Durga, 139-40, 142-43 Durga Puja festival, 284, 290 Dussehra festival, 136, 153-54

Dwaraka: Hindu seat of learning at, 132

Dyer, Reginald E.H., 41

earthquakes, 81, 396; in 1905, 81; in

1950, 81; in 1991, 81; in 1993, 81 East Coast, 64; climate of, 78

Eastern Ghats, 70; climate of, 78

East India Company. See British East India Company; French East India Company

East West Airlines, 354 economic crisis: of 1971, 53-54; of 1990, 324 economic development, xxxix; aid for, 320; foreign investment in, 318; and

population growth, 90; spending on,

311 economic growth, 298-99; under

five-year plans, 31

1

economic infrastructure: under five-year plans, 310 economic liberalization, xxxix, 297-98,

299, 302-3; and agriculture, 427-28; and newspapers, 501; opposition to, 302-3 economic planning (see also under individ- ual plans), 309-12; annual plans, 310; under British rule, 309; grants to

states through, 457; under Nehru, 49 economic policy: developments, 304-7;

pressures on, 306 economic reform: under Rajiv Gandhi,

56, 306 economy, 300; agriculture in, 428; for- estry in, 414; under Rajiv Gandhi, 56; government role in, 49, 298; problems

in, 49; tribal, 202-9; underground,

306 economy, informal, 300; as percentage

of gross domestic product, 300

Eden, George, 31 education (see also schools), 103-15, 255;

access to, 111, 216; administration of, 103-5; adult, 64, 113; in agriculture, 391 , 393, 394-96; under British, xxxix,

34, 391; of Buddhists, 132; and caste, 111; under constitution, 435; distance, 111; funding for, 1 04, 1 05; of girls, 113; government responsibility for, 104; in Gupta Empire, 13; higher, 103, 108-110, 209, 395; historical elitism

in, 110-11; impact of, 285; improve809
India: A Country Study

ments in, 64, 106-7; ofJains, 128; lan- guages of instruction in, 34, 108, 184, 193-94, 195, 207, 212; of linguistic minorities, 184, 195; in mathematics,

361; middle, 103; of middle class, xl, 107; of Muslims, 39; nonformal, 64, 112, 113; as percentage of gross

national product, 105; policy, 104; pri- mary, 103, 105-8; programs, 104—5; in rural areas, 104-5, 285, 308; in sci- ence, 361, 369-70, 372; secondary,

103, 105-8; and society, 110; in tech- nology, 361, 369-70; of tribal people, 207-9; in urban areas, 104-5; of women, 113

educational development, 222 EEC. See European Economic Community Egypt: relations with, 538

Einstein, Albert, 362

Eisenhower, Dwight D., 546

Ekta Yatra (Unity Pilgrimage) , 494

Election Commission, 454-55; assertive- ness of, 433; functions of, 462

election laws, 454-55; enforcement of, 454-55

elections {see also voting), 462-63; cor- ruption in, 498; killings in, 454, 455,

463; of 1937, 45; of 1952, 215; of 1967,

52, 466, 475; of 1969, 446; of 1 971 , 52-

53, 467; of 1972, 467; of 1977, 54, 476; of 1981, 55; of 1983, 217; of 1989, 58, 470-71; of 1991, 472, 473, 478, 480-

81, 497; of 1992, 486; of 1993, 481; of

1995, 227; of 1996, 1; panchayat, 225-

26; parliamentary, 443, 470; violence

in, 454

electric power (see also energy), 339-40;

capacity, 339; consumption of, 339; under five-year plans, 309, 310; generation, 300, 307, 309, 339; hydro, 76, 222, 339, 340; investment in, 299, 312; nuclear, 339, 373; in rural areas, 339;

shortages, 286, 339, 340; thermal, 339; transmission, 339; in urban areas, 340

electronics industry, xxxix, 332; employment in, 376; growth of, 332; invest- ment in, 57; research in, 372, 373

elite class, xxxvii, xl; backlash by, 620; conspicuous consumption by, 306; employment in, 251; Parsis as, 171,

172; as percentage of population, xl,

279; political affiliation of, 463, 481;

political activities of, 495; and pollution and purity practices, 239^10; population of, 301; women, 251

Elliot, GilbertJohn, 39

El Salvador: peacekeeping forces in, 579 EL TV, 357 employment: affirmative action in, 302; in agriculture, 297, 381, 392; of

Anglo-Indians, 212, 213; of children,

105-6, 112, 255, 325; in cities, 288; of college graduates, 109; in construction, 335; in electronics industry, 376;

in fishing, 297, 416; under five-year

plans, 311; in forestry, 297; and job

creation, 76, 306, 328; of people with

technical training, 592; of poor people, 308; in private sector, 325; in public sector, 302, 325; in railroads, 212,

345; requirements, 329; in rural areas, 311; in textiles industry, 331; of women, 251 energy (see also electricity; see also under

individual energy sources), 335—41; commercial, 335, 336; consumption, 335; under five-year plans, 311; govern- ment control of, 330; investment in, 306; noncommercial, 335-36;

nuclear, 300; production, 335; sources

of, 335

English, 187-88, 192-94; broadcasts in, 356; knowledge of, 192, 198; as lan- guage of instruction, 34, 194-94, 207, 212; as official language, 182, 183, 187-88, 195; publications in, 194, 499,

500; teaching of, 193, 194 Enron Corporation, 307 environment: under constitution, 436; and forestry, 414; as political issue, 503, 504; protection programs, 320,

414; quality of, 76 environmental problems: motor vehicle emissions, 350; radiation leaks, 340;

scientific and technical support for, 358

Essential Commodities Act (1955), 304-

5 Essential Services Maintenance Act

(1981), 440

Eternal Party. SeeAkali Dal

ethnic diversity, 233

ethnic minorities, 199-214

810
Index

European Economic Community (EEC):

aid from, 426; impact of single market

of, 513; relations with, 554-55 European Space Agency, 375 European Union: aid from, 426; trade

with, 322 exchange rate, 323-24; floating, 324

exclusive economic zone, 416

executions, 617

executive branch, 446-49; president in, 446-48; prime minister, 448-49; vice president, 448

exports (see also under individual products)

,

321; of agricultural products, 381, 393, 424-26; of aluminum, 332; of cotton, 381, 410, 424, 425; earnings, 323; of

fish, 416, 417, 418, 425; of gems and

jewelry, 322; government control of, 297, 305; growth of, 305, 324; imports financed by, 322; of iron, 341; ofjute, 381, 410, 424; of milk, 412; of motor

vehicles, 335; of oilseeds, 382; as per- centage of gross domestic product,

321; policies on, 427; promotion of, 310; of rice, 425; of tea, 425-26; of textiles, 322, 331,381

Express News Service, 500

families (see also kinship), 241-66; in Aryan system, 7; authority in, 247-48; cooperation in, 245, 247-48, 254; in

life-cycle observances, 245; genealogy

of, 245; hierarchy in, 235, 247, 254-55;

ideals of, 241-43; landless, 388; matrilineal, 243-44; nuclear, 242; patrilineal, 241-12; purdah in, 249-50; sibling bonds in, 255; size of, 64; tribal, 209; urban, 289; and worship, 245

families, joint, 241-42, 242-43; and agri- culture, 242; cooperation in, 263; divi- sion of, 243; in urban areas, 242

family planning (see also birth control)

,

64, 254; community activities for, 92; percentage of couples using, 92, 254;

policy, 89-93; programs, 90, 91-92,

102,559

family structure, 243-44; fraternal poly- andry, 243; of hijras, 281; of Khasis, 243-44; of Murias, 258-59; of Nayars,

244; polygyny, 243, 291 FAO. See United Nations Food and Agriculture Organization Farakka Barrage, 526

farmers: armed rebellion of, 214; and

caste, 267; debt of, 423; forestry

projects of, 414; as percentage of work

force, 325; political activities of, 504; poverty of, 301; price supports for, 381; status of, 267, 279; technology

for, 402

farming, 300; dairy, 389, 412, 426; fish, 416, 417, 426; swidden, 201-2, 203; by

tribes, 201-2

farms: size of, 386

Farrukh-Siyar ( 1 71 3-1 9) , 28 Fatehpur Sikri, 21 Fatima, 156 Federal Republic of Germany. See Ger- many, Federal Republic of Federation of Cooperative Sugar Factories, 422

Federation of Indian Chambers of Commerce International, 515

fertility: rate, 93, 254; research, 368

fertilizer, xxxviii, 332, 400-1; consumption of, 400; government control of, 330; import of, 322; price controls on,

305; production of, 332; subsidies for, 400-1 , 427

finance, 312-18; budget, 313-15; as per- centage of gross domestic product,

300

fish: exports of, 416, 417, 418, 425; farming, 416, 417, 426; production, 415-

16, 417, 418; seed, 417; varieties of, 416

fishing, 300, 415-18; education, 394,

395, 417; employment in, 297, 416;

fleet, 416, 417; marketing cooperatives, 418; as percentage of gross domestic product, 297, 299-300; per- centage of work force in, 325;

research, 394, 395, 416; subsidies for, 417-18

Five-Year Plan, First (1951-55), 309

Five-Year Plan, Second (1956-60), 309-

10

Five-Year Plan, Third (1961-65), 310

Five-Year Plan, Fourth (1969-73), 310-

11; agriculture under, 393

Five-Year Plan, Fifth (1974-78), 311; agriculture under, 393, 394; health

care under, 100-1

811
India: A Country Study

Five-Year Plan, Sixth (1980-84), 311; agriculture under, 393, 397; health

care under, 100-1

Five-Year Plan, Seventh (1985-89), 311; agriculture under, 394; family planning projects under, 90; health care under, 101

Five-Year Plan, Eighth (1992-96), 311-

12; agriculture under, 393, 402; coal production under, 336; exports under, 418; health care under, 101;

market-based targets in, 312; population estimate in, 81; states under, 314; telecommunications under, 342; tour- ism under, 357; transportation under,

342, 345-46

floods, 74; control of, 76, 393; in Orissa, 75 food (see also diet): aid, 320, 551; avail- ability of, 382; distribution of, 391; income spent on, 307; prices, 307,

310, 403, 424, 467; production, 49; and ritual pollution, 237-38, 269; and

ritual purity, 237-38, 269;

self-sufficiency in, 49, 307; shortages,

51, 392,403; work for, 308 Food Corporation of India, 422; established, 424; food-grain procurement

by, 424; marketing by, 424 Food for Peace Program, 403 Food for Work Programme, 308 food grains (see also grain; Green Revolution): area sown in, 407, 411; availability of, 300; buffer stocks, 392-93;

distribution of, 424; growth rate, 381-

82; imports, 393; marketing of, 422,

423; price controls on, 305; production, 381, 391, 393, 407-9, 411;

self-sufficiency in, 310, 381, 392-93,

403,410 Ford Foundation, 426; support for agri- culture, 397

foreign assistance, 312, 318-21; to Afri- can countries, 513; for agriculture, 426-27; amount of, 319, 320; from

Austria, 319; and balance of payments,

323; to Bangladesh, 321, 526; from

Belgium, 319; to Bhutan, 321, 514,

526, 531; from Britain, 319, 320, 370,

426, 554; from Canada, 319; coordination of, 513; and defense spending, 517-18; from Denmark, 319; from

European Economic Community, 426; from European Union, 426; from

Food and Agriculture Organization

of the United Nations, 426; from Ford Foundation, 426; from France, 319; from Germany, 319, 320, 370; from

Italy, 319; from Japan, 319, 320, 426;

to Maldives, 526, 531; to Nepal, 321, 526; from Netherlands, 319; from

Norway, 319; from Rockefeller Foundation, 426; from Soviet Union, 320,

370, 426, 510, 542; to Sri Lanka, 526,

548; from Sweden, 319; from United

States, 319, 320, 426, 547, 550; to Viet- nam, 321; from World Bank, 426

foreign borrowing, 302, 316; to finance development, 297, 299, 320; from IMF,

54, 324; from Germany, 324; from

Japan, 320, 324; from United Nations Development Programme, 426; from

United States, 324; from World Bank, 324

foreign currency reserves, 324-25

foreign debt, 312, 316, 324-25; crisis, 551; reliance on, 306; sources of, 324

foreign economic relations, 318-25, 513

foreign exchange, xxxix, 323-24; earnings from cotton, 410; earnings from

tourism, 357, 358; evasion scandal, 56; government control of, 304, 305, 321, 323; liberalization of, 306; shortage, 425

Foreign Exchange Regulation Act, 323

foreign investment (see also investment): backlash against, 307; from Britain, 554; cooperation with ASEAN, 323;

for economic development, 318; policy, 323, 513; from United States, 322-

23, 546, 549

foreign policy: formulation of, 511-15; and military policy, 517; under Ministry of External Affairs, 512; under

Nehru, 51; role of Parliament in, 514;

role of prime minister in, 511

foreign relations: with Afghanistan, 541; with Australia, 555; with Bangladesh,

509, 526, 543; with Bhutan, 509, 530-

31; with Britain, 553-54; under British, 516; buffer states and, 516; with Burma, 509; with Cambodia, 537; with Central Asia, 510, 540-41; with China,

51, 509, 510, 517, 531-36; determi812
Index

nants of, 516-19; with Egypt, 538; with European Economic Community,

554-55; with France, 555; with Ger- many, 554-55; interest groups con- cerned with, 515; with Iran, 538, 540; with Iraq, 538; with Israel, 539; with Japan, 554-55; with Laos, 537; with Nepal, 509, 510, 528-30; nonalign- ment in, 509; with Pakistan, 51, 56, 509, 510, 511, 517, 519-25, 542; with

Portugal, 542; reputation in, 509-10;

with Russia, 541, 544-46; with Saudi

Arabia, 538; security perceptions in, 516-18; with South Africa, 519; with

Soviet Union, 51, 510; with Sri Lanka,

56, 57, 509, 510, 526-28; with Taiwan,

536; with United States, xlvii, 51, 320,

510, 517, 546-53; with Vietnam, 537

Foreign Service Training Institute, 512

Forest Conservation Act of 1980, 414

forestry, 300, 413-15; development strat- egy, 414; employment in, 297; policy, 220; reforestation schemes in, 413; as percentage of gross domestic product,

297, 299-300; percentage of work

force in, 325; research, 395; social, 415, 426; support for, 426

forests, xxxv; conservation of, 413, 414—

15; destruction of, xxxv, 208, 413-14;

exploitation of, 413; geographic distri- bution of, 413; in Jharkand, 220; land area of, 413; regeneration of, 413;

reserve policies, 207, 227 Four Noble Truths, 129-30

France: in Aid-to-india Consortium, 319; materiel from, 563; motor vehicle pro- duction, 335; relations with, 555;

space program of, 375

Free Kashmir. &tfAzad Kashmir French East India Company (Compagnie des Indes Orientales), 28, 565; founded, 28 French traders, 28, 30; conflict of, with

British traders, 29; racial prejudice of, 211; scientific developments under, 360

funerals: and caste, 268-69; Hindu, 147-

48; Zoroastrian, 172 Furer-Haimendorf, Christoph von, 204, 208

Gama, Vasco da, 27

Ganapati, 140 Gandhara Kingdom, 8 Gandhi, Indira: assassination of, xlv, 55, 469, 492, 608-10; in elections, 55, 467,

468; foreign relations under, 520, 523,

527, 547, 548; intolerance of criticism, 53; land reform under, 52; nationaliza- tions under, 52, 466; no-confidence

vote against, 54; Office of the Prime

Minister under, 448; opposition to, 468; personal advisers to, 511; Presi- dent's Rule invoked by, xliv, 439; as prime minister, xxxix, xlii, 52-55, 445, 468-69; and regionalist movements,

217; rise of, 51-52; State of Emergency

under, xliv, 54, 439, 467-68; talks of, with Zia, 520, 523 Gandhi, Mohandas Karamchand

(Mahatma), xli-xlii, 41-45, 177, 569;

arrested, 42, 45; ashram of, 42; assassi- nated, 49, 479; background of, 41; education of, 41 ; government plan of, 433; imprisoned, 42; newspaper of, 42; reforms of, xli, 42-43, 271; in South

Africa, 42; support for, 43 Gandhi, Rajiv, 55-58, 468; assassinated,

58, 463, 472, 528, 577; cabinet reshuffling by, 448-49; Congress (I) under,

469; foreign policy under, 56, 527;

Office of the Prime Minister under,

448, 511; personal advisers to, 511; Punjab political crises under, 492, 610; President's Rule invoked by, 439; as prime minister, xlii, 56, 445, 447, 487; reforms under, 56, 306, 469-70, 498;

at SAARC summit, 524; scandals

involving, 56, 470, 498; state visits of, 534, 544, 548 Gandhi, Sanjay, 54; death of, 55, 468; in Lok Sabha, 55 Gandhi, Sonia, 1, 473; Congress (I) under, 473 Gandhi-Longowal Accord (1985), 492, 610 Ganesh, 140 Ganesh Chaturthi festival, 154, 290 Ganga-Brahmaputra drainage system, 68 Ganga Plain, 67, 68 Ganga River, 68; dam on, 222; distribu- tion of water from, 526; source of, 74, 138

813
India: A Country Study

Ganga-Yamuna river basin, 74-75; area

of, 74 Ganges River. See Ganga River gangs, 496

Garhwali language, 221

gas, natural, 337-39; pipelines, 338, 339, 540 GATT. See General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade Gautama, Siddhartha (the Buddha),

xxxvii, 129-30 Gayoom, Maumoon Abdul, 578

Gaza: peacekeeping forces in, 578 GDR See gross domestic product gems and jewelry: export of, 322

genealogies, 245 General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) : Uruguay Round, 551

general strike. See hartal Geneva Accords on Indochina (1954),

537, 556

Geological Survey of India, 337, 341 George V ( 1 91 0-36) : visit of, 40

Geostationary Launch Vehicle, 375

'geostrategic situation: and foreign rela- tions, 516-17 Germany, Federal Republic of (West

Germany): aid from, 320, 370; in Aid-to-india Consortium, 319; invest- ment by, 554-55; loans from, 324;

materiel from, 563, 588; motor vehicle production, 335; relations with, 554-

55; space program of, 375; trade with, 554-55

Ghising, Subhash, 224, 226

Gill, K.P.S.,493, 610

Giri, Varahagiri Venkata, 466

Glavkosmos, 544, 602 GNR See gross national product

Goa, 542; Portuguese possession of, 18,

27; rural population of, 88 Goans, 211 Gobind Singh, Guru, 163; militant

reforms of, 1 63-64 Godavari River, 70, 75; dam on, 215;

source of, 75 Godavari River basin: agriculture in, 75; area of, 75; pilgrimage to, 152; rainfall

in, 75 Godse, Nathuram, 479

Golaknath v. State ofPunjab, 450 Golden Temple, 163; occupation of, xlv,

55, 167, 492; siege of, xlv, 167, 492, 608 Golkonda: Mughal war with, 24

Golwalkar, M.S., 479

Gomateshvasa. S^Bhagwan Bahubali Gond tribe, 186, 202; education in, 208; landholdings of, 206; population of, 200; religion in, 210

Gorbachev, Mikhail S., 544 Gorkha Hill Council, 223, 225 Gorkhaland, 223-26 Gorkhaland movement, 223; origins of, 223 Gorkhaland National Liberation Front,

223, 224

Gorkhali language, 224

Gorkhas: immigration of, 223

Gould, Harold A, 277 government (see also public sector), 300; bank loans to, 317-18; concentration

of power in, 431, 433; disease-eradica- tion programs, 94-95; education

under, 104; English as language of, 194; growth in, 306; ineffectiveness of, 431-32; irrigation policy, 383; Muslims

in, 39; powers of, 433-34, 445-46; role

of, in agricultural development, 382-

83, 392; role of, in health care, 99-

100; role of, in research and development, 363-68; state budgets under,

314; structure of, xliii, 433, 441-62;

universities, 108 government, local, 458-61; municipal,

460-61 , 470; panchayats in, 458-60 government, state, 455-58; antipoverty programs under, 309; budgets of, 313-

14; central government control of, 457; civil service, 462; dissolution of, 438; divisions of, 458; education

under, 104-5; elections to, 456; executive of, 456-57; land tenure under,

386; legislatures of, 455-56; powers of,

xliii, 433-34, 445-46; structure in, 456; terms in, 456 government control, xxxix, xliii, 330-31; of agricultural marketing, 421-22,

423-24; of aircraft manufacturing,

304; of atomic energy, 304; of banking, xxxix, 312-13; of chemicals,

xxxix, 330; of coal, 330; of defense

industry, 304; of economy, 49, 298, 304-25; of energy, 330; of exports,

814
Index

297, 305; of fertilizer, 330; of foreign

exchange, 304, 305, 321, 323; of

imports, 297, 305; of industry, xxxix, 297, 329; of investment, 305; of iron and steel, xxxix, 304, 330; of land ten- ure, 386; of metals, 330; of mining,

xxxix, 304; of newspapers, 500-1; of

oil, 330; of prices, 304, 305; of production, 304; of railroads, xxxix, 304; of

services, 304; of shipbuilding, 304, 330; of state governments, 457; of

taxes, 457; of telecommunications,

xxxix, 297, 304, 330, 355, 356, 501; of

territories, 457-58; of trade, 302, 321; of transportation, 297, 342 government finance: reorganized, 37 Government of India Act (1919), 41; satyagraha against, 42 Government of India Act (1935), 44;

goals of, 44-45 government spending: on education,

105; on health care, 100-101; on non- governmental organizations, 503; on

research and development, 50, 358, 363-68

governors, 456-57; appointment of, 456 Graham, Bruce, 479

grain (see also food grains): area sown in, 407; availability of, 382; harvesting

methods for, 403; prices, 404; production, 408-9, 410-11; supplies, 307-8 Great Depression: agriculture during,

391 Greater Himalayan Range, 69 Great Indian Desert, 67, 384-85; agricul- ture in, 384; climate of, 78, 384

Greece: influence of, 9, 10; and mathematics, 359 Green Revolution, xxxviii-xxxix, 362, 381, 393, 410-12; area sown under,

411; benefits of, 411; criteria for, 411; growth of, 411; socioeconomic impact

of, 275, 412, 607-8; support for, 410

Grierson, George, 182

gross domestic product (GDP): growth

rate, 303, 311; agriculture, 297, 299-

300, 381; budget deficit, 312; communications, 300; construction, 300, 335; exports, 321; finance, 300; fishing, 297, 299-300; forestry, 297, 299-300;

health care, 100; imports, 321; industry, 300; informal economy, 300;

investment, 299; manufacturing, 297,

300; mining and quarrying, 299-300,

341; real estate, 300; research and

development, 365; services sector, 300;

taxes, 315; textile industry, 297; trade, 300; transportation, 300; utilities, 300

gross national product (GNP), 49; agri- culture as a percentage of, 392;

defense spending as a percentage of, 581; education spending as a percent- age of, 105; health care spending as a percentage of, 100 Group of Fifteen, 558-59 Grow More Food Campaign, 391 Guatemala: peacekeeping forces in, 579

guest workers: in Middle East, 326; in Persian Gulf, 302, 326; remittances

from, 283, 302, 326

Gujarat: Africans in, 214; agricultural

growth in, 404; elections in, 481; for- estry agency in, 414; Jains in, 127, 128; hydroelectric projects in, 399; irriga- tion projects in, 399; nuclear power

plant in, 340; oil in, 337, 338; Parsis in, 171; personal names in, 246-47; politi- cal parties in, 481; under President's Rule, 54; rural population of, 88; teachers in, 107; tribes in, 200; urbanization in, 86, 87

Gujarati language, 182; native speakers

of, 182 Gupta Empire (320-550), 12-14; disinte- gration of, 14; education in, 13; medicine in, 13-14; religion in, 13

gurdwaras, 166, 167, 486, 491 Guru Granth Sahib (Holy Book of the

Gurus), 164, 165 gurus, 125, 279; role of, 164-65; Sikh,

163, 164-65

Haksar, Nandita, 611-12 Hanuman, 136 Harappa, 4 Harappan culture (Indus Valley culture), xxxv, 4-5; cities in, 4; decline in,

5; discoveries in, 359; economy of, 4-

5; languages in, 5 Hardwar: pilgrimage to, 152 Hargobind, Guru, 163

Hariharal, 19

Harijans. See Dalits

815
India: A Country Study

Harsha Vardhana (606-647), 13

hartal (general strike): of 1919, 41 Haryana (state), xliv; agricultural growth

in, 404; elections in, 475; fertilizer consumption in, 400; Green Revolution in, 411-12; Hindi in, 191; irriga- tion in, 407; land reform in, 390;

poverty in, 301; roads in, 349; sex ratio

in, 253; Sikh shrines in, 166 Haryana Plain, 67, 68; irrigation of, 68; urban areas in, 86

Hastings, Warren, 32

Hazratbal mosque, 495

health, 94-99; influences on, 94; SAARC

program for, 559; research in, 366

health, public, 99; vaccine production, 368-69

health care, 99-103; ayurvedic, 103; dis- coveries in, 359; in Gupta Empire, 13-

14; impact of, on population growth,

82; for poor people, 308; role of gov- ernment in, 99-100; unani, 103

health care professionals, 101, 103; number of, 101, 103, 366; training of, 103, 361 health facilities, 63, 101-3; adversarial

role of, 102; dispensaries, 102; equip- ment in, 102-3; family planning pro- grams in, 90, 102; geographic

distribution of, 102; hospitals, 102, 286; number of, 101, 102; primary

health centers, 101-2; problems in, 102; rural, 102; urban, 286

health problems, xl, 64; AIDS, 97-99;

attempts to control, 94-95; blindness,

96; cancer, 97; cardiovascular disease,

97; diarrheal diseases, 96; disease, 94-

97; filaria, 95; goiter, 96; HIV infection, 97; leprosy, 95-96; malaria, 95; malnutrition, 94, 96; pneumonic

plague, 96; smallpox, 143; tuberculosis, 96

heavy water, 373 Hedgewar, Keshav Baliram, 175, 478-79

Hezb-ul Mujahideen, 495, 607

hierarchy, 234-35, 292; academic, 235;

in business, 235; of caste, 267; of clans, 244; in families, 235, 247, 254-55; of

hijras, 280; in Islam, 234-35; ofjudges,

453; and language, 183-85; marriage up in, 261; of renunciants, 280; of

sadhus, 280; by sex, 247

High Altitude Warfare School, 587

hijras (transvestite-eunuchs) , 279, 280-

81; hierarchy of, 281; living arrange- ments of, 281; population of, 280; powers of; worship by, 280

Hill Area Development Programme, 394

Hillmen's Association, 223-24; origins

of, 224 Himachal Pradesh (state), xliv; Buddhists in, 131; development of, 222;

elections in, 481; Hindi in, 191; politi- cal parties in, 481; poverty in, 301; ref- ugees in, 532; rural population of, 88; Sikh shrines in, 166; tribes in, 199

Himalayas, 63, 64, 68-70; agriculture in, 384; area of, 383; climate of, 78; crop and livestock patterns in, 383; extent

of, 68; formation of, 68; land use in, 383-84; livestock in, 384; population

density in, 87; soil in, 384; tea plantations in, 384; tribes in, 169, 206 Hindi language {see also Urdu), 182, 187-92; in British Raj, 188; broadcasts

in, 356; cinema, 191; demonstrations

against, 51, 195, 485; dominance of, 188-91; geographic distribution of, 191; as language of instruction, 207; as lingua franca, 191; literary forms of, 188, 191; mutual intelligibility of, with Punjabi and Urdu, 184, 191; native speakers of, 182; as official language,

182, 183, 187-88, 195, 485; origins of, 188; publications in, 500; script, 188; spread of, 188; standard, 188-91 Hindu: charity, 146; enlightened masters, 132-33; gurus, 125; inheritance

laws of, 248; influence, 210; life-cycle rituals, 146-48; monastic communities, 132-33; pilgrimages, 149-53; pil- grims, 144, 152; refugees, 46;

traditions, 5-6 Hindu festivals, 153-54; Dipavali, 23, 142, 154; Dussehra, 136; Ganesh

Chaturthi, 154; Holi, 138, 154; Jan- mashtami, 154; Mahashivaratri, 154; parades in, 153; participation in, 128; plays in, 153; Pongal, 154; Ramanavami, 154 Hindu goddesses, 141-43; blood sacri- fice to, 143; local, 143; of smallpox,

143 Hindu gods, 121, 122; hymns of, 134; as

816
Index

legal landholders, 149; local, 143-45;

offerings to, 134, 144, 145; possession

by, 144; shrines to, 143, 144; trinity of, 140-41; worship of, 133-45 Hindu-Muslim tensions, 495-98; causes

of, 495 Hindu-Muslim violence, xlv-xlvi, 176, 302,477, 497,516,524, 607 Hindu nationalism, xliii, 478-82, 516, 539 Hindu rituals, 124-25; at birth, 146; initi- ation, 146-47; life-cycle, 146-48; dur- ing pregnancy, 146 Hindu temples, 15, 121, 148-49, 152; administration of, 149; donations for, 149; form of, 148; layout of, 149 Hindu worship, 133-45; domestic, 145-

46; public, 148-54; by women, 145-46 Hinduism, 15; and Buddhism, 130;

castes in, 234, 266-76; ceremonies of, 145-54; Dalit rejection of, 131, 171,

177, 275; dharma in, 252; female principle in, 141; influence of, 176; karma

in, 122-25, 252, 271; kismat in, 252; male principle in, 141; merit in, 145; number of followers of, 119; origins

of, 13, 121; pollution in, 145, 148; pur- dah in, 248; purification in, 145, 235-

40; reincarnation in, 123-24, 266 Hinduism, Shaivist: devotional literature

of, 15 Hinduism, Vaishnavist: devotional litera- ture of, 15 Hindu Mahasabha, 479 Hindu renunciants, 132-33, 279-80;

generative power of, 139 Hindus: assimilation of, under Mughals,

21; language of, 192; in middle class, 279; political affiliation of, 463, 516; reforms by, 34

Hindustani. See Urdu language Hindustan Motors, 335 Hindustan Shipyard, 352

Hindustan Times, 357 Hindustan Times Group, 500 Hirakud Dam, 75

Hiro, Dilip, 276

history: themes of, 3 Holi festival, 138, 154, 284 Holy Book of the Gurus. See Guru Granth

Sahib holy men. Seesadhus

holy women. See sadhvis Home Guards, 601, 614

homosexuals, 280 Honduras: peacekeeping forces in, 579 Hongkong and Shanghai Banking Corporation, 317 Hooghly Dock and Port Engineers, 352 Hope, Victor Alexander John, Marquis

of Linlithgow, 45, 568

horticulture, 389; support for, 426

housing: construction, 302, 335; short- ages, 286, 302, 335; in urban areas, 286 HTV, 357 Huang Hua, 533 human rights abuses, 494, 564, 565, 606, 611-12, 619 Humayun (1530-56), 20 Hume, A.O., 38 Hunas (White Huns), 13 hunting: percentage of work force in, 325 Hyderabad: airport, 354; destruction of, 215; merger of, with India, 49, 214; population of, 285; Tata Institute facility in, 376

hydraulic engineering: technological

developments in, 359, 362

hydroelectric power, 76, 222, 339, 340;

capacity, 340; controversy over, 340;

projects, 399

IdalFitr, 159

Idal Zuha, 159

IIT See Indian Institute of Technology

Iletmish, Shams-ud-din (1211-36), 16

IMF. See International Monetary Fund

immigration: to Assam, 196, 487, 610; from Bangladesh, 526, 610 Imperial Council of Agricultural

Research, 391

imports: of chemicals, 322; from China,

341; dependence on, 306; of fertiliz- ers, 322; financed by exports, 322; of food, 393; government control of, 297, 305; of iron, 322; liberalization

of, 306-7; of metals, 322; of oilseeds, 382; as percentage of gross domestic

product, 321; of petroleum, 322, 332,

337, 538; of pharmaceuticals, 322; policies on, 427; restrictions on, 306, 306-

817
India: A Country Study

7; of steel, 322, 331; of uranium, 341 import substitution, xxxix, 321; goods, 305

INA. See Indian National Army

income (see also wages): under five-year plans, 310; spent on food, 307; taxes, 421 income distribution, 301; attempts to improve, 312 independence, 569; movement, 38-46

India Act (1784), 32-33

India-China Expert Group, 536

Indian Academy of Sciences, 361, 370; founded, 370; funding, 370 Indian Administrative Service {see also bureaucracy), xliii, 37, 461-62; affir- mative action in, 216; corruption in, 462; examinations for, 461; district col- lectors in, 458; diversity in, 461; train- ing in, 461 Indian Agricultural Research Institute, 395-96

Indian Airlines, 352

Indian-Chinese Joint Working Group on

the Border Issue, 535

Indian Civil Service. Sa? Indian Administrative Service Indian Council for Cultural Relations, 513-14

Indian Council of Agricultural Research,

364, 394; fishing under, 416; functions

of, 368; funding for, 365; origins of, 368, 391; programs of, 395-96, 400, 402

Indian Council of Medical Research, 98

Indian Custodian Force, 556

Indian Express, 500

Indian Express Group, 500

Indian Foreign Service, 461, 511; diplo- matic missions of, 512 Indian Institute of Chemical Biology, 369

Indian Institute of Petroleum, 372 Indian Institute of Science, 361, 369; computer for, 551; faculty of, 370; founded, 369; organization of, 370 Indian Institute of Technology (IIT),

370; admission to, 371; campuses, 370; departments of, 370-71; support for, 370 Indian Institute of Technology Act

(1956), 370

Indian Marine, 587

Indian Meteorological Service, 76

Indian Military Academy, 584, 587

Indian Military Nursing Service, 587

Indian National Army (INA—Azad Hind

Fauj), 568; dissolution of, 568-69; women in, 568 Indian National Committee of Space

Research, 373

Indian National Congress. See Congress

party Indian National Satellite Space Segment

Project, 373

Indian National Satellite System (Insat), 374

Indian National Scientific Documentation Centre, 371; National Science

Library, 371 Indian National Trade Union Congress, 327

Indian Naval Academy, 590

Indian Ocean: military cooperation in, 589; as zone of peace, 543 Indian Peace Keeping Force: atrocities committed by, 577; casualties of, 577;

in Sri Lanka, xlviii, 527, 563-64, 576-

77; support for Tamils by, 576; with- drawal of, 577

Indian Penal Code, 615; categories of crime under, 616-17; categories of punishment under, 617

Indian People's Front, 484 Indian People's Party. See Bharatiya

Janata Party Indian Police Service, 612, 613 Indian Post Office (Amendment) Bill, 447

Indian Railways, 345; finances of, 314; Research, Design, and Standards

Organisation, 346 Indian Space Research Organisation,

373, 374, 544; sanctions against, 602

Indian Technical and Economic Cooperation Programme, 513

Indian Vaccines Corporation, 369

Indian Workers' Association, 327

India-Taipei Association, 536

Indira Gandhi Canal, 384-85, 398; completion date, 384, 398

Indo-Aryan languages, 181, 185, 221 Indo-European languages (see also under

individual languages), 5

818
Index

Indo-Gangetic Plain, 64, 67-68; agricul- ture in, 384-85; area of, 67; borders

of, 67; climate of, 78; crop and live- stock patterns in, 383; irrigation in, 384; marriage in, 257; rainfall in, 68, 384; regions of, 67; topography of, 67; urban areas in, 86

Indonesia: maritime border with, 74

Indo-Pakistan Joint Commission, 523

Indo-Pakistani war (1947), xlvi, 493, 510, 519, 570-71; casualties in, 571;

cease-fire in, 520, 571; origins of, 570

Indo-Pakistani war (1965), xlvi, xlvii, 51, 299, 310, 493, 510; casualties in, 571;

cease-fire in, 521, 542, 571; China's support for Pakistan in, 533; origins

of, 520-21, 571; setdement of, 72, 521

Indo-Pakistani war (1971), xlvi, xlvii, 52-

53, 299, 493, 510, 571-74; cease-fire

in, 547, 572; economic crisis caused

by, 53-54; end of, 521, 572; foreign

support for Pakistan in, 533, 538; ori- gins of, 521, 572; State of Emergency

during, 439; strategy of, 572; success

of, 563, 572; western front of, 573-74

Indo-Sri Lankan Accord (1987), 563,

576,577

Indo-Tibetan Border Police, 598, 600 Indo-United States Joint Commission,

547

Indra, 121

industrial conglomerates, 305

industrial development, 222; under

five-year plans, 310; under Nehru, 50; research in, 366

industrial growth, 299, 328

industrialization, 304, 328, 330; under

five-year plans, 309-10

industrial output, 328, 329

industrial policy, 304, 329-31

Industrial Policy Resolution (1948), 304, 329

Industrial Policy Resolution (1956), 304, 329

Industries (Development and Regulation) Act (1951), 304-5

industry, xxxvi, 328-42; cottage, xxxvi,

50, 300; credit for, 317; energy con- sumed by, 339; exports by, 330; under

five-year plans, 310, 311; government

control of, 297, 310, 329; heavy, 50, 297; investment in, 305; liberalization

of, 329; management in, 330; managing agencies for, 330; as percentage of

gross domestic product, 300; public

ownership of, 329; quality in, 330; research organizations in, 371-72,

377; scientific and technical support

for, 358 Indus Valley, 67

infant mortality, 264; causes of, 93, 252,

253; rate, 93, 94, 254

inflation, 467; rate of, 303, 318

information science: research organizations in, 371

infrastructure: development of, 222, 320; under economic planning, 310; invest- ment in, 299

inland waterways, 352 Inland Waterways Authority of India, 352

Insat. See Indian National Satellite Sys- tem

Insecticides Act (1968), 402

Institute of Criminology and Forensic

Science, 613

Institute of Microbial Technology, 369 Instrument of Accession of Kashmir to India, 519

insurance services: deposit, 317; nationalized, 304

Integrated Fisheries Project, 418

Integrated Guided Missile Development

Programme, 601-2 Integrated Rural Development Pro- gramme, 394

intellectual property violations, 549-50

intelligence: analysis, 511; gathering,

511, 602-4; services, 602-4

Intelligence Bureau, 602

Intelsat. See International Telecommunications Satellite Corporation

Intensive Area Agricultural Programme,

393 Intensive Agricultural District Pro- gramme, 393, 397

interest rates: on bank loans, 317; liberal- ization of, 306

internal security, 605-12; as mission of armed forces, 605-6

International Airport Authority of India, 354 International Commission of Jurists, 328, 606

819
India: A Country Study

International Commissions of Control and Supervision, 537

International Monetary Fund (IMF): lib- eralization required by, 302; loan

from, 54, 324; negotiations with, 302

International Rice Research Institute, 427

International Telecommunications Satellite Corporation (Intelsat), 374 International Telecommunications

Union, 374

Inter-Services Intelligence Agency of

Pakistan, 607

investment {see also foreign investment):

in electric power, 299, 312; in energy,

306; in industry, 305; in infrastructure, 299; in irrigation, 299; in oil, 306; as percentage of gross domestic product,

299; private, 56, 299, 306, 312; regula- tion of, 305; in research, 57; in steel, 306, 312; in transportation, 312, 342

'Iran: gas pipeline from, 338, 339, 540; Islamic government of, 538-39; oil from, 538; relations with, 538, 540;

state visits to, 540

Iran-Iraq War, 538

Iraq: invasion of Kuwait by, 302, 321,

513; oil from, 538; relations with, 538

iron, 341; export of, 341; government

control of, xxxix, 304; import of, 322;

in Jharkand, 219; in Karnataka, 341; production, 341, 360; reserves, 341

irrigation, xxxviii, 381, 397-400; dams

for, 340, 399; under Delhi Sultanate,

17; development programs, 393; dis- placement of people by, 399; of Dra- vidian people, 12; under five-year

plans, 309, 310, 311; funding for, 399;

in Haryana, 407; importance of, 397;

in Indo-Gangetic Plain, 384; invest- ment in, 299; from Kaveri River, 75; land area under, 397, 398, 399-400; management of, 398-99; network,

360; policy, 383; and population, 82; problems with, 398; projects, 68, 76,

82, 393, 398, 399; pump sets for, 402;

in Punjab, 407; spending on, 397; sup- port for, 426; systems, 397-98; technological developments in, 359-60

Islam {see also Muslims), xxxvii, 155-62;

afterlife in, 266; calendar of, 158; in Central Asia, 16; circumcision in, 158;

conversion to, 23, 176-77; festivals of, 128, 158, 160; Five Pillars of, 156; fun- damentalist, 176; hierarchy in, 234-

35; Hindu criticisms of, 39; inherit- ance laws of, 248; introduction of, xxxvi, 15-17; marriage in, 158, 258;

origins of, 155; purdah in, 248, 250; schools of, 161; sects of, 157; sharia,

16, 496-97; South Asian traditions of, 158-62; spread of, 119; Sufi, 160;

tenets of, 155-57; ulama of, 161

Islamic Party. .Seejamaati Islami

islands, 71

Israel: policy toward, 510; relations with, 539

Italy: in Aid-to-india Consortium, 319; motor vehicle production, 335

Jagmohan, 522

Jagsons Airlines, 354 Jahangir (1605-27), 22, 163; expansion

under, 23-24

Jainism, xxxvii, 15, 125-28; discipline of, 126; festivals of, 128; karma in, 126; missionaries of, 12; and nirvana, 126; number of followers of, 119; origins

of, 125-26; philanthropy in, 128; pil- grimage sites of, 128; rituals of, 127-

28; soul in, 126; temples of, 15, 127-

28; women in, 127

Jainism, Digambara, 126, 127

Jainism, Svetambara, 126-27

Jains: education of, 128; geographic dis- tribution of, 127, 128; persecution of, 23; population of, 127

Jain TV, 357

Jai Singh II, Sawai, 360

jajmani system, 272

Jallianwala Bagh massacre, 41 Jamaati Islami (Islamic Party), 161 Jameel, Fathullah, 578 Jamkhed Project, 91-92 Jammu and Kashmir (state): accession

vote in, 520; agriculture in, 384, 404; armed forces in, 494, 563; Buddhists

in, 131; Chinese claim to, 574; conflicts over, xlv, 46, 57, 71, 511, 542,

544, 545, 550, 570; education in, 112; elections in, li; fraternal polyandry in, 243; government of, 487, 494; human

rights violations in, 565; legislature of,

820
Index

455; merger of, with India, 49; Muslims in, 155; Pakistan's claim to, xlv,

xlvii, xlix, 511, 519-22; political unrest

in, xlv, 491 , 493-95, 515, 522, 524, 551, 564, 605, 607, 620; poverty in, 301; under President's Rule, 438, 487, 494, 521; proposed plebiscite in, 520;

regionalist movement in, 214, 516;

secessionist movement in, 228, 516,

522, 607; tribes in, 199; Urdu in, 191; wars over. 51, 52-53 Jammu and Kashmir Liberation Front, 495 Jamuna River. See Yamuna River Janaki (widow of M.G. Ramachandran),

485 Jana Sangh, 175, 479; and foreign policy, 515; in Janata Party, 476, 479 Janata Dal (People's Party), 1, 58, 431,

471; constituency of, 471, 472; decline

of, 478, 505; formed, 477; in local gov- ernments, 490; opposition of, to Congress, 474; in Parliament, 471 Janata government, 54-55, 484, 548; demise of, 476

Janata Morcha (People's Front) , 54 Janata Party, 54, 175; components of, 476, 479; in elections, 476; established, 468; factions in, 468; and for- eign policy, 515; in Janata Dal, 477; opposition of, to Congress, 474, 476; platform of, 476

Janata politics, 474-78 Janmashtami festival, 154 Jantar Mantars observatory complex,

360

Japan: aid from, 320, 426; in Aid-to-india Consortium, 319; investment by, 554-

55; loans from, 320, 324; motor vehicle production, 335; relations with, 554-55; trade with, 322, 554-55; in World War II, 568

Jats: kinship of, 245 Jawahar Employment Plan. See Jawahar

Rozgar Yojana

Jawaharlal Nehru Port Trust, 351 Jawaharlal Nehru Technological University, 109 Jawahar Rozgar Yojana (Jawahar Employ- ment Plan), 308, 394, 459-60

Jayalalitha, 485

Jayawardene, Junius Richard (J.R.), 527

Jay Santoshi Ma, 1 45 Jewelled Anklet. See Cilappatikaram Jewelled Belt. See Manimekalai Jews {see also Judaism) : emigration of, 173; geographic distribution of, 173-

74; immigration of, 211; number of, 174

Jhansi: annexed by British, 32 Jharkhand: administration of, 218-19;

minerals in, 219; request of, for state

status, 220-21 Jharkhand Movement, 218-21; claims of, 218; dams in, 220; forestry in, 220; ori- gins of, 220 Jharkhand Party, 220, 221 Jhelum River, 68

Jinnah, Mohammad Ali, 45; as president

of Muslim League, 45

jizya, 23, 24

Joint Cipher Bureau, 604

Joint Intelligence Committee, 602

Joshi, B.C., 536

Joshi.P.C, 222 Judaism (see alsoJews) , 173-74; introduction of, 120

judges, 615, 618; appointment of, 452-

53; under British, 33; code of conduct

for, 451-52; hierarchy of, 453; retire- ment of, 449; Supreme Court, 449;

transfer of, 452

Judges Transferca.se, 450-51

judiciary, xliii-xliv, 449-54; under British, 33 Junagadh: merger of, with India, 49

Justice Party, 485

jute: area sown in, 410; cultivation of, 298; export of, 381, 410; industry, 297; marketing of, 422; prices, 404; production, 410; research on, 368

Jute Corporation of India, 422

Kabir, 135

Kailash, 533

Kakar, Sudhir, 254

Kali, 139-40, 142-43 Kalimpong: language in, 224 Kamban, 15 Kanchenjunga, 69 Kanchipuram: Hindu seat of learning at, 132

Kandla, port of, 350

821
India: A Country Study

Kanishka (78-108), 11 Kankara Coast, 64 Kannada language, 15, 182, 186; native speakers of, 182 Kanpur: IIT campus in, 370

Karachi Agreement (1949) , 520 Karakoram Range, 69 karma: and caste, 271; in Hinduism,

122-25, 252, 271; in Jainism, 126; in Sikhism, 164

karma-yoga, 175 Karnataka (state): Africans in, 214; agri- culture in, 385, 404; elections in, 481;

iron in, 341; Jains in, 127; land tenure

in, 387; mining in, 341; political parties in, 481, 490; population growth

rate in, 93; rainfall in, 77; tribes in, 200 Karnataka High Court, 1 09

Karttikeya, 1 39-40

Karunanidhi, M., 485

Kashi. SeeVaranasi Kashmir (state). S^Jammu and Kashmir

(state) Kashmiri language, 182

Kautilya, 10 Kaveri River, 70, 75-76; irrigation from,

75; pilgrimage to, 152; source of, 75

Kazakstan: relations with, 540; Rao's visit to, 541; security cooperation with, 541 Kedarnath: pilgrimage to, 152

Kerala (state): agricultural taxes in, 421;

elections in, 475; farms in, 386; fertility in, 254; fertilizer consumption in, 400; Jews in, 173; land tenure in, 387;

literacy rate in, 106, 244; mining in, 342; political parties in, xliv, 483, 484;

political representation in, 52; population growth rate in, 93; under Presi- dent's Rule, 482; rainfall in, 77; roads

in, 349; sex ratio in, 253; tribes in, 200 Keshavananda Bharati v. the State ofKerala, 450

Kesri, Sitaram, li Khalji Dynasty (1290-1320), 16 Khan, Abdul Qadir, 524 Khan, Bayram, 20 Khan, Sayyid Ahmad, 39 Khan, Zafar (Ala-ud-Din Bahman

Shah), 17 Kharagpur: IIT campus in, 370

Kharia tribe: religious beliefs of, 168, 169

Khasi tribe: Christians in, 171; family

structure in, 243-44; literacy rate of, 244; women in, 244

Khatik caste. See Butcher caste Khomeini, Ruholla Mussaui (Ayatollah), 538-39

Khrushchev, Nikita, 541

kinship (see also families) , 241-66, 244-

47; clan, 244; cooperation in, 245,

246, 254; matrilineage, 245-46; of Muslims, 245; patrilineage, 241-42,

244, 245; and purdah, 249-50; recognition of, 245

kinship, Active, 246-47; in business, 235; of hijras, 281; in universities, 235; in

villages, 284

kinship systems: Dravidian, 12

kismat, 252

Kochi: airport, 354; fishing in, 417; port

of, 350; shipyards in, 352 Kochi Jews, 173

Koirala, Girij ad Prasad (CP.) , 530

Kolar: Tata Institute facility in, 376 Konkan Coast, 64 Konkani language, 182; mutual intelligi- bility of, with Marathi, 184; as Scheduled Language, 184 Korea, Republic of (South Korea): motor vehicle production, 335 Korean War (1950-53): end of, 556; par- ticipation in, 578

Kosala Kingdom, 8 Kosygin, Aleksei N., 542

Kothari, Rajni, 466, 496

Kreisberg, Paul H., 56, 57

Krishna, 136-37; birthday of, 154; depictions of, 137 Krishna River, 70, 75; dam on, 215; pil- grimage to, 152; source of, 75 Krishna River basin, 18; rainfall in, 75 Kshatriya (warrior) castes: in Aryan sys- tem, 7; dharma of, 270; diet of, 236;

origins of, 267 K2 (Mount Godwin-Austen), 69 Kumaoni language, 221 Kurseong: language in, 224 Kuru Kingdom, 8 Kurukhs, 186 Kushana Kingdom, 11 Kuwait: Iraqi invasion of, 302, 321, 513; joint venture with, 338; oil from, 538

Kyrgyzstan: relations with, 540

822
Index

labor {see also work force), 325-28; bonded, 219, 328; child, 105-6, 112,

255, 325; disputes, 328; by women, 250

labor relations, 327-28

labor unions, xli; membership in, 327

Laccadive Islands, 71 Ladakh, 226 Ladakh Autonomous Development

Councils Act (1995), 226 Ladakh District, 520, 574

Lahore, 23 Lakshadweep, 71; Muslims in, 155; Scheduled Tribes in, 88; tribes in, 200 Lakshmi, 136, 138; incarnations of, 141—

42

Lai, Devi, 477, 478

land: arable, 383; area, 64; borrowing

against, 388; cropping patterns, 383;

cultivated, 383; double-cropped, 383,

399; illegal occupation of, 204; rental, 298, 390; sharecropping of, 298; subdivisions, 387-88; taxes, 314-15, 421;

tenants, 390; tribal, 203-4, 209, 219

land distribution, 275, 386, 390; to agri- cultural workers, 388; and farm size, 386

landholding: categories, 386-88; ceiling on size of, 389, 390; consolidation of, 390; structure of, 387 landowners {see also zamindars): absentee, 50, 388; caste of, 273; labor of, 283; tribal, 219; village, 282

landownership, 298 land reform, 309, 388-91, 392; in Andhra Pradesh, 214; exemptions,

389-90; under Indira Gandhi, 52;

laws, 389-90, 449-50

land tenure, 386-91; factors affecting,

386; laws, 386-87; state control of, 386

land use, 383-86

language, national: attempts to choose,

183; English as, 183; Hindi as, 183 language policy, 184 languages {see also Scheduled Languages; see also under individual lan- guages and language families; see also under linguistic) , 5, 7, 15, 51, 185-94;

broadcasts in, 198-99, 356; and caste, 183-84; and Christian missionaries,

171; and dialect, 185, 197; features of South Asian, 187; and hierarchy, 183-

84; of instruction, 34, 108; knowledge

of, 192, 193; link, 187; literary, 183;

local, 229; number of, 182; official, 182, 194-95, 224; political considerations regarding, 184; regional, 182,

184, 197, 198, 356; and social context, 197-99; spoken, 5, 186, 197-98; stan- dardization of, 197, 198-99; of tribes, 171; written, 171, 197-98, 210

language use, 184; and state boundaries, 184

Laos: peacekeeping missions in, 556;

relations with, 537 Launderer caste: status of, 267

Law, Edward, 31 law enforcement, 612-16

Lawrence, Stringer, 565

lawyers, 34 Leatherworker (Chamar) caste: politi- cal affiliation of, 490, 491; status of, 237, 267, 269, 272 Lebanon: peacekeeping forces in, 579

Left Front, 1 legal system: codes in, 33

legislation, 433; introduction of, 444;

involving finance, 445; vote on, 444

legislative process, 444-46

legislature, 441-46

Lesser Himalayas, 69

Liberation Force. See Mukti Bahini Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam

(LTTE) , 57, 472, 527, 528; materiel supplied to, 577-78; operations

against, 564, 576; surveillance of, 577

life-cycle rituals: birth, 146, 158, 166,

168; death, 147-48, 158, 166, 172; funeral, 147-48, 168, 172; Hindu,

146-48; initiation, 146-47, 172, 256; interdependence in, 272-73, 284;

Jain, 128; marriage, 147, 158, 166, 168, 172; Muslim, 158; Santal, 168; Sikh,

166; Zoroastrian, 172

life stages (ashrama), 251-66; adulthood,

262-64; in Aryan system, 7; childhood,

252-56; ideal, 251

linguistic diversity, 181, 183, 233; reasons

for, 183-84

linguistic minorities, 184—85, 229; education of, 184

linguistic regionalism, 49-50

linguistic relations, 181-99

linguistics: discoveries in, 185, 359

linguisitic separatism: in Punjab, 52

823
India: A Country Study

linguistic states, 184, 194-95; organization of, 195

Linguistic Survey ofIndia (Grierson), 182 Lion of Kashmir. See Abdullah, Sheikh

Mohammed

Li Peng, 534-35

literacy: in English, 193

literacy rate, 106; in Bihar, 106; campaigns to improve, 106, 312; of Christians, 244; female, 106, 113; in Kerala, 106, 244; in Khasi tribe, 244; male,

106, 113

literature: Tamil, 12; tribal, 1 71 livestock, 412-13; ancient, 4; cattle, 412; education, 394, 395; in Himalayas,

384; in Indo-Gangetic Plain, 385; land- holdings for, 389; patterns, 383; per- centage of work force in, 325;

research, 368, 394, 395; as source of

energy, 41

2

Lodi, Ibrahim (1517-26), 20 Lodi Dynasty (1451-1526), 16 Lok Sabha, 441-44; Committee on

External Affairs, 514; foreign affairs under, 514; functions of, 441; govern- ment budget under, 313; members of, 443; money bills in, 445; number of

seats in, 441; powers of, 441; reserved

seats in, 436-37, 443; sessions of, 443; term in, 443

Longowal, Harchand Singh, 492, 610 LTTE. See Liberation Tigers of Tamil

Eelam

Lucknow: education in, 113 LucknowPact (Hi), 40 Lucknow University, 109 Lutheran Church: number members of, 171

Madras, 290; airport, 354; as British pres- ident, 29, 32; fishing in, 417; IIT cam- pus in, 370; population of, 285; port

of, 350, 351; public transportation in, 349, 350 Madras (state) (see also Tamil Nadu)

:

demonstrations in, 51; political representation in, 52 Madhya Pradesh: agriculture in, 385;

coal in, 336; education in, 112; elec- tions in, 475, 481; family structure in, 258-59; forests in, 413; Hindi in, 191;

hydroelectric projects in, 399; irriga- tion projects in, 399; Jains in, 128;

political parties in, 481, 490-91; poverty in, 301; Scheduled Tribes in, 88;

tribes in, 200; urbanization in, 86 Magadha Kingdom, 8, 9-10 Magadhi language, 192 Mahabharata (Great Battle of the Descen- dants of Bharata), xxxv, 9, 136-37,

142; broadcast of, 502 Mahabodhi Society (Society of Great

Enlightenment), 130-31 Mahanadi River, 67, 75 Mahanagar Telephone Nigam, 355 Maharashtra: Africans in, 214; agricul- ture in, 385, 404; Buddhists in, 131; farms in, 386; forests in, 413; hydroelectric projects in, 399; irrigation

projects in, 399; land distribution in, 390; landholding ceiling in, 390; legis- lature of, 455; Jains in, 127, 128; nuclear power plant in, 340; Parsis in, 171; population growth rate in, 93; rural population of, 88; Scheduled

Tribes in, 88; tribes in, 200; urbanization in, 86 Mahars: conversion of, to Buddhism, 177

Mahashivaratri festival, 154

Mahavira, Vardamana, xxxvii, 1 25-26 Mahmud of Ghazni, 16 Maintenance of Internal Security Act

(1971), 439; politicians arrested

under, 439; repealed, 440

Maithili language, 191, 192 Malabar Coast, 64 Malayala Manorama, 500 Malayalam language, 15, 182, 186; in Christian churches, 170; native speakers of, 182; publications in, 500

Malaysia: military cooperation with, 537

Maldives: aid to, 526, 531; border with,

74, 531; coup attempt in, xlviii, 531, 548, 564, 578; membership of, in SAARC, 559; military assistance to,

xlviii, 531, 548, 564, 578 Malwa Plateau, 67 Mamluk Dynasty (1206-90), 16 Manasarowar Lake, 74 Mandal Commission report: opposition

to, 222-23, 274-75, 477; support for, 478 Manekshaw, S.H.EJ. (Sam), 595

824
Index

Manimekalai (The Jewelled Belt), 15 Manipur: Scheduled Tribes in, 88; ten- sions of, with central government,

227, 611; tribes in, 199, 200 Manipuri language, 182 Mansarowar Lake, 533 Manual of Military Law and Regulation, 604 manufacturing, 300, 331-35; of con- sumer goods, 304; government control of, 304; as percentage of gross domestic product, 297, 300; percent- age of work force in, 325;

self-sufficiency in, 329

Manushi, 291 Mapam Yumco Lake, 74, 533 Maratha Confederacy: British acquisition of, 31 Marathi language, 182; mutual intelligi- bility of, with Konkani,184; native

speakers of, 182; as regional language, 197

Marathas, 26-27; Mughal war with, 24 Marine Products Export Authority, 417 Marmagao: airport, 354; port of, 350, 351 Marquess of Dalhousie. See Ramsay,

James Andrew Brown

marriage {see also brides; dowry; widows), 256-62; age, average, 92; age, minimum, 50, 256; arranged, 7, 194,

256, 257, 259-60; Buddhist, 132; child, 23, 244, 256, 262, 291; cross-cousin,

12, 258; Dravidian, 12, 257; emotional

ties in, 247, 250; exogamous, 245-46, 257-58; in Indo-Gangetic Plain, 257;

intercaste, 270, 288; interethnic, 22; for love, 260; matchmaking fairs for, 276; of Murias, 258-59; of Nayars, 244; polygamous, 7, 243, 244; reform of, 132; in rural areas, 256, 259-60; tribal, 209; up in the hierarchy, 261; in urban

areas, 259; of widows, 258, 264-65,

266, 270

marriage ceremonies, 261-62; and caste, 268-69; and consummation ceremonies, 262; Hindu, 147; interdepen- dence in, 284; tribal, 210; Zoroastrian, 172 Marshman, Joshua, 32

martial races theory, 566-67; discredited, 568; recruitment based on, 568

Maruti motor vehicles, 335 Marwari language, 192 mass transit, 346-49; buses, 349; in Cal- cutta, 346-49; light rail, 349; in Madras, 349; in New Delhi, 349; subways, 346-49; trams, 349 materiel (see also ballistic missiles; nuclear weapons): air force, 591;

army, 583-84; from Britain, 563, 588, 591; budget for, 583; Coast Guard,

599; division of, following partition, 569; domestic, 563, 580, 58-84; from

France, 563, 591; from Germany, 563, 588; from Russia, 546, 584; from

Soviet Union, xlvii, 542-43, 544-45,

563, 584, 588, 591; from Sweden, 563 mathematics: ancient discoveries in, 358-59; education, 361; in Gupta

Empire, 13 Mauryan Empire (326-184 B.C.), 9-11; army of, 10; Buddhism in, 130; diplo- matic missions of, 10; disintegration

of, 11; government of, 10; origins of, 9

Mayawati, 491 Mayor's Court, 33-34; established, 33 McMahon, Sir Arthur Henry, 72 McMahon Line, 72, 532, 536 media (see also newspapers; press), 499-

503; broadcast, 501-3; print, 499-501

Medical Nursing Service, 587

Megasthenes, 10 Meghalaya: rainfall in, 78; Scheduled

Tribes in, 88; tensions of, with central government, 227; tribes in, 199, 200

Mehta, Harshad, 473 men: employment of, 288; freedoms of, 249; initiation ceremonies for, 146-47,

256; literacy rate of, 106, 113; names

of, 284; prescribed roles for, 234, 263; relations of, with women, 249-50;

social rank of, 247 Menon, V.K. Krishna, 580-81

metallurgy: discoveries in, 359, 360;

research in, 372

metals: import of, 322; government control of, 330; price controls on, 305 Methodist Church, 170; number members of, 171 middle class, 278-79; consumption by,

xl, 301-2; growth of, xl, 301; members

of, 278; occupations of, 301; as per- centage of the population, xli, 278-79;

825
India: A Country Study

population of, 278, 301; in urban

areas, 288-89 Middle East: guest workers in, 326; peacekeeping missions in, 556; rela- tions with, 537-40; trade with, 15 migration {see also urban migration): to Assam, 196, 487, 610; of Banjaras, 206; ofJews, 173; to North America, xlviii; into tribal lands, 204

military assistance: of foreign countries

for Pakistan, 539; from Soviet Union,

510

military class, 278

military cooperation: with Malaysia, 537; between Pakistan and United States, 547; with Russia, xlix, 545, 589; with United States, xlix, 551, 552, 579, 589

Military Intelligence, 602

militaryjustice, 604-5

military officers: British, 570; increase in, 568; Indians in, under British, 567;

qualifying exams for, 393; retirement age for, 592; training of, 584, 590; women as, 587, 590, 591

military personnel: division of, follow- ing partition, 569

military planning, 581

military policy: and foreign policy, 517; formulation of, 580

military power: erosion of, 564

military training, 584-87, 590, 591

millet, 384, 385, 407, 408

Minakshi, 142; temple of, 142

minerals: government control of, 304; in Jharkand, 219 Minerva Mills case, 450

mines: bauxite, 341; coal, 336; copper,

341; fires in, 336; iron, 341; manganese, 341; nationalized, 220; rare

earths, 341-42, 373; uranium, 341, 373 Minicoy Islands, 71 Minimum Needs programme, 394 mining and quarrying, xxxix, 300, 341-

42; expansion of, 220; under five-year plans, 311; in Jharkand, 219, 220; as percentage of gross domestic product,

299-300, 341; percentage of work

force in, 325; problems with, 336; sci- entific and technical support for, 358

Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Devel- opment, 368; Department of Agricultural Research and Education, 368, 394; Directorate of Marketing and

Inspection, 423 Ministry of Atomic Energy, 372-73;

funding for, 365

Ministry of Civil Aviation and Tourism: Department of Civil Aviation, 352

Ministry of Defence, 369, 569

Ministry of External Affairs, 510, 512-13;

areas of operation in, 512-13; budget

of, 514; Economic Coordination Unit, 513; Economic Division, 513; foreign

affairs under, 512; foreign policy making under, 512; functions of, 512; missions abroad, 514; Policy Planning and

Research Division, 513

Ministry of Finance, 56; taxation under, 313

Ministry of Health and Family Welfare, 100 Ministry of Home Affairs: languages

under, 195; law enforcementunder,

613; Police Division, 613; Registrar General and Census Commissioner,

85, 88

Ministry of Human Resource Development: Department of Education, 104

Ministry of Information and Broadcasting, 355; radio under, 356, 501; televi- sion under, 356, 501

Ministry of Labour, 325

Ministry of Railways, 345 Ministry of Science and Technology,

364, 368; Council of Scientific and

Industrial Research (CSIR), 364, 365,

369, 371-72; Department of Biotechnology, 364, 368; Department of Sci- ence and Technology, 364; Department of Scientific and Industrial Research, 364; National

Research and Development Corporadon, 365, 366

Ministry of Space: funding for, 365

Ministry of State for Surface Transport, 349-50; ports under, 351

minorities: under constitution, 435

Mirabai, 135 Mising Autonomous Demand Committee, 227

Mising Bane Kebang. See Mising Greater Council Mising Greater Council (Mising Bane

826
Index

Kebang), 227

Missile Technology Control Regime, 549

missionaries, Christian: activities of, xxxvi, 32; conversions by, 170; impact

of, 32, 174, 210-11, 219; language

under, 171, 210

missions, Christian: schools of, 107, 210 Mizo Hills, 70 Mizo National Front, 61

1

Mizoram: Buddhists in, 131; rural population of, 88; Scheduled Tribes in, 88; tensions of, with central government,

227, 611; tribes in, 199, 200 Mizo tribe: Christians in, 171; uprisings

by, 52 modernization, xxxviii, xl; and religion, 120, 174 Mohammad Shah, 360

Mohenjo-daro, 4 Monopolies and Restrictive practices Act

(1970), 305-6, 330 monsoons, 407; causes of, 77; dependence on, 383; failure of, 466; northeast, 77, 385, 397; patterns of, 77; southwest, 76-77, 384, 385, 397;

unpredictability of, 300, 397 Montagu, Edwin, 40 motor vehicles {see also transportation),

332-35, 350; accidents of, 286; exports

of, 335; hazards of, 286; joint ventures,

335; number of, 350; pollution caused

by, 350; production of, 335 Mount Abu, 128 Mountbatten, Louis, 570, 579 mountains: Himalyan, 68-69; in Indo-Gangetic Plain, 67 Mount Everest, 69 Mount Godwin-Austen (K2) , 69

movies, 290; influence of, 290 Mozambique: peacekeeping forces in, 579 Mughal Empire, 19-30; administrative

system of, 21-23, 24, 218- 19; Africans under, 213-4; corruption under, 23; dissolved, 24- 25, 36; expansion

under, xxxvi, 20-21, 23-24; language

of, 188; reforms under, 23; religion

under, 21 , 23; Sikh campaigns against, 164; taxes under, 21; temples under,

22; warriors under, 21; wars of, 24, 29; women under, 23; zamindars under,

21

Mughals, 19-23; expansion by, 20-21;

invasion by, 20 Muhammad (the Prophet), 155; succession to, 156-57 Muhammadan Anglo-Oriental College

{see also Aligarh Muslim University)

,

162; founded, 39 Mukti Bahini (Liberation Force), 572 Mumtaz Mahal, 24 Munda language, 202 Munda tribe: religious beliefs of, 168, 169 Murdock, Rupert, 502 Muria tribe: family structure of, 258-59 Murugan, 140 Muslim courts. See courts, sharia Muslimjurisprudence: schools of, 156 Muslim League, All-India: in elections of

1937, 45; goals of, 40; leadership of, 45; loyalty of, to British, 39, 40; origins

of, 38-39, 39-40; relations of, with

Congress, xlvi, 40, 44; reorganized, 45; and world War II, 45-46 Muslim revival, 39 Muslims {see also Islam): Africans as, 214;

chastity of women, 270; defined, 155-

56; diversity among, 39; education of, 39, 107; food customs of, 269; and for- eign policy, 515; fundamentalist, 176, 620; in government, 39; kinship

groupings of, 245; languages of, 192,

196; in middle class, 279; number of, 119, 155; as percentage of population,

155; political affiliation of, 463, 468,

471; public worship of, 157; reforms

by, 34; as refugees, 46 Muslim shrines, 159-61 Muslim United Front, 494 Muslim Women (Protection of Rights on

Divorce) Bill), 496-97

Mysore: British acquisition of, 31

Naga Hills, 70 Nagaland: Scheduled Tribes in, 88; ten- sions of, with central government,

227, 611; tribes in, 199, 200 Naga tribes, 88; Christians in, 171 Nagpur: airport, 354; annexed by British, 32

Naicker, E.V. Ramaswamy, 485 Nalanda monastery, 1 30

827
India: A Country Study

Namibia: election supervisors in, 579 Nanak, Guru, 162 Nanda Devi, 69 Napoleonic Wars (1796-1815), 30 Narayan, Jayaprakash (J. P.): civil disobe- dience under, 54; as Congress leader, 43; in elections of 1977, 54; political

activities of, 467 Narmada River, 67, 76

Nasik: rainfall in, 75

Nasser, Gamel Abdul, 538

Nath, Nagendra, 361 National Agricultural Cooperative Marketing Federation of India, 422

National AIDS Control Programme, 98

National Bank for Agriculture and Rural Development, 420

National Cadet Corps, 600-1 National Centre for Science Information, 370 National Centre of the Government of

India for Advanced Study and Funda- mental Research in Nuclear Science and Mathematics, 376 National Commission on Agriculture:

forestry under, 414

National Conference party, li, 486, 493;

alliance with Congress (I) , 494, 522; in Jammu and Kashmir government, 494 National Council of Educational

Research and Training, 104

National Council on Science and Technology, 363, 364 National Dairy Development Board,

412-13,426

National Defence Academy, 584, 590

National Development Council, 309

National Facility for Animal Tissue and

Cell Culture, 368

National Filaria Control Programme, 95

National Forest Policy, 414

National Front, 1, 58; government, 484,

486; members of, 477; opposition of, to Congress, 474; in Parliament, 471 National Health Policy, 99, 100; criti- cisms of, 99 National Human Rights Commission,

606-7

National Institute of Immunobiology,

368 National Institute of Science, Technology, and Development Studies, 372

nationalization: of banks, xxxix, 52, 304, 316, 317, 450, 466; of insurance, 304; of mines, 220; under Indira Gandhi,

52 National Leprosy Control Programme,

95 National Leprosy Education Pro- gramme, 95-96 National Malaria Eradication Pro- gramme, 95

National Metallurgical Laboratory, 372

National Physical Laboratory, 372

National Police Academy, 613

National Policy on Education (1986), 64, 104; goals of, 111; nonformal education under, 112

National Population Policy, 90

National Programme for the Control of

Blindness, 96

National Programme of Fish Seed Devel- opment, 417

National Remote Sensing Agency, 373

National Rifles, 598, 599 National Rural Employment Pro- gramme, 308, 394

national security, 516-18; challenges to, 620; China as threat to, 515, 517; and

Nepal, 530; Pakistan as threat to, 515,

517; and Sri Lanka, 527; structure of, 579-83; United States as threat to, 547, 548

National Security Act (1980), 440, 606 National Security Amendment Act

(1984), 440, 606

National Security Guards, 598

National Seeds Corporation, 400

National Socialist Council of Nagaland,

611 National Telecommunications Policy

(1994), 354 National Volunteer Organisation. See Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh

Natural Resource Management System, 373

Nausari: Parsis in, 173

navy, 587-90; air arm, 588; area commands, 590; British officers in, 570; budget for, 583; buildup of, 536; chief of staff, 569, 589-90; diversity in, 594; educational qualification for, 393; expansion of, xlviii, 564, 568, 588;

fleet of, 588-89; insignia, 595; intelli828
Index

gence, 604; internal security missions

of, 564; joint exercises with United

States, 551; judge advocate general's

department, 605; materiel, 588; modernization of, 564, 588-89; origins of, 567, 587; ranks, 595; rearmament of, 588; recruitment, 592; surveillance

by, 577; training of, 590; uniforms,

595; women in, 590 Navy Act of 1957, 604

Nayars: family structure of, 244; marriage of, 244; women, 244 Nehru, Jawaharlal, 358, 394; armed

forces under, 563; arrested, 45; back- ground of, 50; as Congress leader, 43; death of, 51; economic planning

under, xxxviii, 49, 298; foreign policy

of, xlvii, 51, 509, 541; government

plan of, 433; legacy of, 50-51; non- alignment under, 518; President's Rule invoked by, 439; as prime minister, xlii, 49, 50; reforms under, xxxviii, 50 Nehru, Motilal: constitution drafted by, 44 neighborhoods: solidarity in, 290; urban, 289-90; village, 282 Nepal: aid to, 321, 526; border with,

xlviii, 63, 71, 74, 516; citizens of, in India, 528; economy of, 528; Gorkhas

from, 223, 592; materiel acquired by, 529-30; membership of, in SAARC,

559; relations with, 509, 510, 528-30;

security relations with, 530; as zone of

peace, 529

Nepali language, 182, 224

Nestorian Church, 170 Netherlands: in Aid-to-india Consortium, 319; scientific developments

under, 360; traders from, 28, 211 Neutral Nations Repatriation Commission, 556 New Delhi, 290; air pollution, 350; as

capital, 40; IIT campus in, 370; plans

for, 40; population density of, 285; public transportation in, 349, 350; women in, 291 New Mangalore, port of, 350 news agencies, 500 newspapers {see also press; media): in English, 193, 499, 500; Gandhi's, 42; Indian-language, 499, 500; languages

of, 198-99, 499, 500; number of, 499-

500 Nhava Sheva, port of, 350-51

Nicaragua: peacekeeping forces in, 579

Nixon, Richard M., 547

Nizamabad: rainfall in, 75 Non-Aligned Movement, 557-58; membership in, xlvii, 518; summits of, 537

nonalignment, xlviii, 509, 515, 518-19,

553-54; extent of, 518; under Nehru,

518; origins of, 518; principles of, 518; with pro-Soviet orientation, xlviii, 515, 541; and relations with United

States, 546; and reputation, 509-10 nongovernmental organizations, 503-4; demands of, 432, 503-4; funding of, 503; number of, 503

nonviolence (ahimsa), 10 Norway: in Aid-to-india Consortium, 319

nuclear power: research organizations

in, 372-73, 376 Nuclear Power Corporation of India, 340

nuclear power plants, 300, 339, 340-41,

373; capacity, 340; construction of, 340-41; locations of, 340; safety prob- lems with, 340; scientific and technical support for, 358

nuclear weapons, xlvii, xlix, li, 511, 551, 601-2, 620; acquisition of, 515; deto- nation of, xlvii, 601; foreign reaction

to, 545; of Pakistan, xlvii, xlix, 524,

551; program, 517, 551 Nurjahan, 23

occupation: of Brahmans, 271, 283; and

caste, 263, 267, 271, 283; of middle

class, 301; in rural areas, 283; of Sweepers, 237, 263-64; of Thakurs,

283

Officers' Training Academy, 587

Official Languages Act (1963), 195 Ohrmazd, 172

oil, petroleum {see also petroleum), 337-

39; discoveries of, 337, 338; earnings

from, 330; exploration, 337-38; fields, 337; imports of, 337, 538; investment

in, 306; production, 337; reserves, 337

oil, vegetable: availability of, 382; price

controls on, 305

Oil and Natural Gas Commission, 337

829
India: A Country Study

Oil India Limited, 337

oil price shocks: and fertilizer prices, 400-401; of 1973. 54, 299, 311, 321,

324, 467, 538; of 1979, 324; of 1990,

297, 302

oilseeds, 385, 409; area sown in. 409; exports of, 382; imports of, 382, 409;

prices, 404; production of, 382, 384,

407, 409; research on. 368; shortages

of, 303 Oldenburg, Philip. 253 Oman: gas pipeline from, 338

Ootv. S^Udhagamandalam

OPEC. See Organization of the Petro- leum Exporting Countries Operation Blackboard, 112 Operation Flood. 412-13, 426 Oraon tribe: religious beliefs of. 168. 169 Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC). 467, 538

Original Book. SeeAdi Granth Orissa (state): agricultural growth in, 404; coal in, 336; droughts in. 75; education in. 112; elections in. 475; electricity in. 339; floods in, 75; forests in, 413; land reform in. 390; mining in, 342; political representation in, 52; poverty in, 301; roads in, 349; Santal

in. 168; tribes in. 200; urban areas in, 86 Oriya language, 182; as lingua franca.

202; native speakers of, 182 Osmania University 216 Oudh: annexed by British, 32. 36 Outer Himalayas, 69 Outreach Society. Tablighi Jamaat

Pachmarhi: Tata Institute facility in, 376

Pahari language, 221

Pakistan: border with. 63. 71, 72, 516,

524; claim of, to Jammu and Kashmir,

xlix, 71, 494, 620; competition with, for influence, 540-41; conflicts with,

xlvi. li. 76. 620; defense industry of, 5 70; fertility rate in. 93; foreign mili- tary assistance for. xlix. 539; idea of, 45; membership of. in SAARC. 559; negotiations with, 520. 523; nuclear weapons of, xlvii, xlix, 524, 550, 551;

origins of, 46; princely states in, 49; Rao's visit to, 523; refugees from, 46,

572; refugees in, 46; relations of, with China, xlvii-xlviii, 517, 533; relations

of, with United States, xlvii, xlix, 51, 517, 523, 539, 546, 547, 550; secession of east wing from, 5 71-72; as threat,

xlvii, 515, 517; trade with, 524; wars

with, xlvii, 51, 52-53, 71-72, 299, 310,

493, 510, 519, 520, 521, 533, 563, 570-

74

Pakistan-India relations, 51, 56, 509, 510, 517, 519-25; conflicting ideologies in, 519; international reaction to, 542; andJammu and Kashmir, 511, 519-22, 542

Pakistan Resolution, 45

Paleolithic Age, 4

Pali language, 186

Pallava Kingdom (300-888), 14 pan ch ay at, 433, 458-60, 618; constitu- tional status, 460; efforts to revive, 459-60, 470; elections to, 225-26;

legal disputes heard by, 453; low castes

in, 285; organization of, 458-59; and

land reform, 391; present-day, 225-26, 284-85; traditional, 270, 284; women

in, 285 Panch Shila, 518, 519, 534; and Soviet Union, 541; and Tibet, 532 Pandharpur: pilgrimage to, 152

pandits: in British legal system, 33 Pandya Kingdom, 12. 14

Panini, 185, 359

Paradip. port of, 350 paramilitary forces, 598-600; deploy- ments of, 612-13; functions of, 598; human rights violations by, 565, 606-

7; number of personnel in, 598

Pardesi Synagogue, 173 Pardhan tribe: education in, 208-9; reli- gion in, 210

Paris Peace Conference on Cambodia,

537

Parliament, xliii; debate in, 445; disputes

of, with Supreme Court, 449-51; dis- solved, 443; elections for, 443; foreign

policy under. 514; members of,

arrested, 445; powers of, 443, 457

Parshvanatha, 126

Parsis (see also Zoroastrianism) , 171; immigration of, 211; number of, 171; women, 171-72

partition, xlvi; impact of, on armed

830
Index

forces, 569; and national integration, 46-50; plans for, 46; refugees from,

xlvi, 298

Party of Society's Majority. See Bahujan

Samaj party Party of the Adaman i-Bodied. See Bajrang Dal

Parvati, 139-40; incarnations of, 139-40; worship of, 142

Pataliputra, 13

Patel, Vallabhbhai: as Congress leader, 43

Pathans: in first Indo-Pakistan war, 570; Mughal war with, 24

patron-client relationship, 272 Pawan Hans helicopter service, 354 peacekeeping operations, 556, 563-64,

576-79, 599

Peace of Paris (1763), 29 Peacock Throne, 25 peasants, xli, 386; under British, 33; uprisings by, 24, 482 penal system {see also prison system), 618-19

Peninsula region, 64, 70-71; agriculture

in, 385-86; coastal plain of, 71; crop and livestock patterns in, 383; eleva- tion of, 70; monsoons in, 385

Peninsular Plateau. SoeDeccan Plateau

People ofIndia, 182, 192

People's Liberation Army, 611

People's Front. SeeJanata Morcha

People's Party. SeeJanata Dal

People's Union for civil Liberties, 606

People's United Democratic Front, 606

People's War Group, 218 Permanent Settlement system. Se<?zamin- dari system

Perry, William J., 552

Persia: influence of, 23 Persian Gulf states: guest workers in, 283, 302, 326, 538; oil from, 538

Persian Gulf War: impact of, 302, 326, 513, 538; response to, xlix, 515, 539-

40; television coverage of, 502

Persian language: as language of instruction, 34 petroleum {see also oil): imports of, 322,

332; research in, 372

pharmaceuticals: import of, 322; price

controls on, 305; research, 369

philosophy: religious influences on, 119

Physical Research Laboratory, 373

pilgrimages, 149-53; process of, 152-53;

to Tibet, 533; as tourism, 152 Planning Commission, 50, 309, 457;

established, 309; population estimates, 81; science and technology under,

364; role of, 309

plantations: percentage of work force in, 325

Polar Satellite Launch Vehicle, 375

police, 612-16; armed, 614; arrest guidelines, 452; candidates, 612; chain of command in, 614-15; civil (unarmed), 614; corruption of, 615; human rights abuses by, 606-7; inef- fectiveness of, 432, 598; inspector gen- eral, 613; national, 612-13;

organization of, 613-14; paramilitary

assistance to, 598; pay of, 615; rape by, 291, 606; repression by, 493;

state-level, 613; uniforms, 615-16; vic- tims of, 452; women in, 615; working

conditions of, 615

Police Act of 1861, 613

political candidates, 1; financing of, 470;

killing of, 454, 455, 463; variation among, 462-63

political demonstrations: by Dalits, 276,

620; against Hindi, 51; in Jammu and

Kashmir, 494, 522

political parties (see also under individual

parties), 463-91, 504; caste-based, 488-

91, 505; constituencies of, 463; Hindu,

516; number of, 462; platforms of, 463; regional, 484-88, 505; unresponsiveness of, 505

political unrest, xlv, 620; in Andhra

Pradesh, 216, 483; in Assam, 564; attempts to quell, 432, 611-12; in Bihar, 483; in Gorkhaland, 224-25;

ineffectiveness of police against, 432; over partition of Bengal, 39; by peasants, 24, 482; in Punjab, 52, 56, 72, 398, 440, 524, 564; in Sindh, 524; by

tribes, xxxvii, 52, 611; in Uttarakhand,

222, 223; in West Bengal, 483; by women's movement, 291

political violence {see also riots): over

affirmative action, xxxviii, 302; in Andhra Pradesh, 214-15, 216, 217,

218; over Babri Masjid mosque, 149, 176, 302, 497; against British, 39; in

831
India: A Country Study

elections, 454, 455, 463; injammu and

Kashmir, 494, 522, 524, 564; against

Mandal Commission report, 222-23,

274-75, 477; in Punjab, 56, 492-93; reduction of, 228, 229; in Uttara- khand, 223

politicians: arrests of, 439, 467, 476; cor- ruption of, 1, 432, 433, 498; incitement

of religious and ethnic tensions, 496, 498

pollution (ritual), 145, 235-40; adhering

to rules of, 238-39, 275-76; and caste, 235-40; following birth, 236; following

death, 148. 236, 264; in women, 236 polygamy, 243; in Jammu and Kashmir,

243; of Xavars, 244; in Uttar Pradesh, 243 Pondicherry (Puduchcheri) : teachers in, 107; trading post at, 28 Pongal festival. 154

population: age distribution in. 89; in Bangalore, 285; of Bombay. 285; of Buddhists. 131; of Calcutta, 285; of

Christians, 170. 171; distribution of, 82, 85; of Goans. 211; in Hyderabad,

285; ofjains, 127, 128; ofJews, 174; in Madras, 285; of Muslims, 155; of Parsis, 171; of poor, 279, 301; of Roman

Catholics, 170; rural, 85. 88; of Sched- uled Castes, 88, 268; of Scheduled

Tribes, 88, 181; in Sikkim, 455; of

tribal members, 167, 199, 200-201; in Union Territory of Delhi, 285; urban,

85, 86; in Uttar Pradesh, 455 population count: in 1991, 63, 81; in 1995, 63, 181; projected, xxxv, 63, 88-

89, 292 population density, 82; and farm size, 386; of New Delhi, 285 population fractions: Austroasiatic lan- guage speakers, 187; of Backward

Classes, 274. 490; bilinguals in. 192,

198; Buddhists in. 119; Christians in, 120, 170; Dalits in, 490; elite class in,

xl, 279; Hindus in, 119; Jains in, 119; Jews in, 120; middle class in, xli, 278-

79; Muslims in, 119, 155; Parsis in, 120; in poverty, 63, 279, 301; Scheduled Castes in, 268. 274. 490; Sikhs in. 120; tribal members in, 199; in urban

areas, 285; in villages, 233, 276;

Sino-Tibetan language speakers, 187

population statistics: birth rate, 82; death

rate, 82; fertility rate, 93, 254; growth

rate, 63, 81, 82, 89-90, 91, 393; infant

mortality rate, 93, 94, 252; life expectancy, 93, 94, 300; mortality rate, 94; sex ratio, 93, 252-53

ports, 350-51; foreign investments in, 351; profits from, 351; traffic at, 351; upgrades needed, 342 Portugal: explorers from, xxxvi, 27; immigrants from, 211; influence of, 18; missionaries from, xxxvi, 170; rela- tions with, 542; scientific develop- ments under, 360; traders from, xxxvi, 30

postal savings banks, 317

Postal Service, 462; employment in, 212; introduced, 34-35; SAARC program

for, 559

poverty, xxxviii; estimates of, 94; failure

to reduce, xl-xli, 300-301; increase in, 63; line, xl, 301; percentage of population in, 63, 279, 301; population in, 279, 301 poverty, programs to combat, 307-9,

312; and food self-sufficiency, 307; Green Revolution, 412; state govern- ment role in, 309

Prakrits, 185; evolution of, 186

Prasad, Rajendra: as Congress leader, 43

Prasar Bharati (Indian Broadcasting)

Act), 501, 502 Premadasa, Ranasinghe, 527-28, 564, 577

Presbyterian Church, 170 president (see also executive branch),

xliii, 446-48; as commander of armed

forces, 446; powers of, 441, 446; term

of, 446

President's Rule, xliii, xliv, 456, 457, 476; Assam under, 488; under constitution, 438; Gujarat under, 54; Jammu and

Kashmir under. 438, 487, 494, 521; Kerala under, 482; Punjab under, 492,

610; Rajasthan under, 52; Tamil Nadu

under, 54

press (see also media; newspapers), 499-

501; censored, 445, 500; freedom of, 499, 500; government controls on, 500-501; growth of. 499-500

Pressler Amendment, 550

Press Trust of India, 500

832
Index

Preventive Detention Act, 439

prices: agricultural, 381; controls on,

304, 305; for food, 307, 310, 403, 424, 467; increases in, 303, 307, 310, 318; supports for, 381; stability of, 318

priests (see also Brahmans) , 271 prime minister, xliii, 448-49; appoint- ments by, 456; portfolios of, 448; powers of, 448; role of, in foreign affairs, 511 Prime Minister, Office of the: concentration of power in, 431, 433, 511; covert operations by, 511; under Indira Gandhi, 448, 511; under Rajiv Gandhi,

448, 511; members of, 448; under Rao,

449; Research and Analysis Wing, 511, 602-4; Science Advisory Council, 363; science and technology under, 363; under Shastri, 511

princely states: distribution of, 49

Prisoners Act of 1900, 618

Prisons Act of 1894, 618 prison system, 618-19; conditions in, 618-19; human rights abuses in, 619; women in, 618

private sector: employment in, 325;

investment, 56, 299, 306, 312; manufacture of consumer goods by, 304; spending on research and develop- ment, 366

privatization, 312

production: controls on, 304

Project for Community Action in Family

Planning, 92

Prophet. See Muhammad

prostitutes: child, 291; infected with HIV,

99 Protestantism (see also under individual denominations): denominations of, 170-71; members of, 170-71; missionaries, 170

Provincial Armed Constabulary, 598, 614

Provisional Government of Azad India

(Free India), 568

Provisional Jharkhand Area Autono- mous Council, 221 Public Distribution System, 424; food

grains supplied by, 424

public enterprises: sale of shares in, 306 public sector {see also government):

defense industries in, 329-30; employ- ment in, 302, 325; industrial sector in,

329; services sector in, 304

Pulicat: as Dutch trading post, 28

pulses, 385; area sown in, 407, 408; avail- ability of, 382; harvesting methods for, 403; prices, 404; production of, 381, 382,384, 407, 408,410-11

Pune: airport, 354; rainfall in, 75; Tata

Institute facility in, 376 Punjab: British acquisition of, 31; ety- mology of, 68; fencing of border in, 72; regionalist movement in, 214; Sikh

influence in, 163; Sikh shrines in, 166 Punjab (state), xliv; agricultural growth

in, 404; elections in, 475; fertilizer consumption in, 400; Green Revolution in, 411-12, 607-8; human rights violations in, 565; irrigation in, 407; land reform in, 390; political repre- sentation in, 52; political unrest in,

xlv, 52, 56, 72, 398, 440, 491-93, 524, 564, 605, 607-10, 620; population

growth rate in, 93; poverty in, 301; under President's Rule, 492, 610;

roads in, 349; secessionist movement

in, 55, 228, 516; Sikhism in, xliv, 121, 163, 166, 167; terrorism in, 167; vio- lence in, 56, 492-93; water distribution in, 491 Punjabi language, 182; mutual intelligi- bility of, with Hindi and Urdu, 184; native speakers of, 182; as regional

language, 197

Punjab Kesari, 500 Punjab Plain, 67, 68; irrigation of, 68; urban areas in, 86

Puranas, 5-6, 149 purdah: Hindu, 248; Muslim, 248, 250;

in rural areas, 250-51

Puri: Hindu seat of learning at, 132

purity (ritual), 145, 235-40; and caste, 235-40; following rules of, 238-39;

physical, 236; ritual, 236

Qatar: gas pipeline from, 338

qazis: in British legal system, 33 Qinghai-Xizang Plateau Qogir Feng. See K2

Quran, 16

Radhasoami Satsang movement, 177

833
India: A Country Study

radio, 501; foreign broadcast service,

356; government control of, 356, 501; languages of, 198-99, 356; number of

receivers, 356

Rafsanjani, Hashemi, 540

railroads, xxxvi, 300, 342, 345-46;

bridges, 345; development of, 345-46; employment in, 212, 345; employee

strike, 54; energy consumed by, 339; equipment production industry, 346;

fares, 346; under five-year plans, 345-

46; freight transport on, 342, 345; gov- ernment control of, xxxix, 304; intro- duced, 34-35; passenger transport on,

345; route length, 345; stations, 345;

strike, 54, 439; track, 345; trains, 345;

zones, 345

Railway Board, 345

Railway Protection Force, 598

rainfall (see also climate): and agriculture, 381, 397; in Brahmaputra River

basin, 75; in Deccan Plateau, 78; and

farm size, 386; in Godavari River

basin, 75; in Great Indian Desert, 384;

in Indo-Gangetic Plain, 68, 384; in Karnataka, 77; in Kerala, 77; in Krishna River basin, 75; in Meghalaya,

78; from northeast monsoon, 77; in offshore islands, 71; in Tamil Nadu, 77

Rajagopalachari, C: as Congress leader, 43

rajas, 8 Rajasthan (state) , 52; agricultural growth

in, 404; education in, 112; elections

in, 475, 481; electricity in, 339; farms

in, 386; Hindi in, 191; Jains in, 127,

128; marriage in, 256; mining in, 341; nuclear power plant in, 340; political parties in, 481; roads in, 349; sex ratio

in, 253; tribes in, 200; urbanization in, 87

Rajasthan Atomic Power Station, 340 Rajasthan Canal. See Indira Gandhi

Canal

Rajputs, 16; attacked by Mughals, 20; kinship of, 245 Rajya Sabha, 444; elections for, 444;

functions of, 441; members of, 444; number of seats in, 434, 444; powers

of, 441; sessions of, 444 Raksha Bandhan festival, 246 Ram (Rama), 8, 136; birthday of, 154

Ram, Jagjivan, 447, 476; in Janata gov- ernment, 476-77 Ram, Kanshi, 490 Rama. See Ram

Ramachandran, M.G, 485 Ramakrishna renunciants, 175 Ramalingesvara Temple: pilgrimage to, 152 Raman, Chandrasekhara Venkata

(C.V.), 361, 370 Ramanavami, 154 Raman Effect, 361 Raman-Nath Theory, 361 Raman Research Institute, 361, 370 Ramaswamy, V., 451 Ramayana (Travels of Rama), xxxv, 8-9,

15, 136, 142 Ram Das, Guru, 163 Ramjanmabhumi, 9 Ramjanmabhumi Temple (see also Babri

Masjid), 471, 481; desire to build, 477, 480-81,497

Ramsay, James Andrew Brown (Marquess

of Dalhousie), 31-32, 34-5 Rana Sangha, 20 Rann of Kutch, 67; dispute over, 72 Rao, P.V. Narasimha, li, 364; corruption

charges against, 1, 474, 498; foreign

relations under, 535; no-confidence

motion against, 474; Office of the Prime Minister under, 449, 512; per- sonal advisers to, 512; portfolios held

by, 449; President's Rule invoked by, 439; as prime minister, 445, 473, 525;

visit to Central Asia, 540-41; visit to

Iran, 540; visit to Pakistan, 523; visit to

Russia, 545; visit to United States, 552

Rao, N.T. Rama, 217, 485-86

Rashtrakuta Kingdom (753-973), 14

Rashtriya Indian Military College, 584

Rashtriya Rifles, 598, 599

Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh (RSS

National Volunteer Organisation),

149, 175, 478-79; banned, 479; expansion of, 480; founded, 478-79; members in Congress, 479

Ravana, 136

Ravi River, 68; irrigation from, 68

Ray, Prafulla Chandra, 362

Reagan, Ronald, 548

real estate: as percentage of gross domestic product, 300

834
Index

Reddy, M. Chenna, 216, 217 Reddy, Neelam Sanjiva, 466; as presi- dent, 447

reform: under Akbar, 23; of Congress

(I), 56; economic, 56; under Rajiv

Gandhi, 56; by Mohandas Gandhi, 42-

43; by Hindus, 34; in Lucknow Pact,

40; by Muslims, 43; under Nehru, 50; regarding Dalits, 50 Reformed Church, 170

refugees, 54; from Bangladesh, 53, 85, 299, 526; from Burma, 85; distribution

of, 82, 85; Hindu, xlvi, 46; from India, 46; Muslim, xlvi, 46; number of, 298; from Pakistan, xlvi, 46, 572; resettle- ment of, 82, 298; from Sri Lanka, 85, 528; from Tibet, 85, 131, 532; in West

Bengal, 572 regionalism (see also under individual

regionalist movements), 181, 214-29;

effects of, 228; and local languages,

229; and national unity, 228-29, 516; outlook for, 228-29

Regulating Act (1773), 32

reincarnation, 123-24, 164, 266; breaking the cycle of, 124, 164

religion (see also under individual sects): of Akbar, 23; ancient origins of, 119, 121-25; Brahman ical, 14; diversity of, 125; in Gupta Empire, 13; influences

of, xxxvii, 119; introduction of new,

120; monastic, 125-33; polytheism in, 121-22, 134; and Sanskritization, 14; spread of, 14, 119; tribal, 120, 167-69

religious diversity, 1 20

religious festivals: as closed holidays, 153-54; of Hindus, 23, 128, 136, 138, 153-54; interdependence in, 272-73,

284; ofJains, 128; of Muslims, 128; as restricted holidays, 154

religious fundamentalism, 121, 176

religious minorities: political activities

of, 431

religious persecution: of Jains, 23; of

Sikhs, 24

religious separatism: in Punjab, 52

religious tensions: causes of, 496; in

tribes, 221

religious tolerance, 120

religious violence: in Punjab, 56

remittances, 283, 323, 324, 326 renunciants: Hindu, 132-33, 139;

Ramakrishna, 175 research and development {see also sci- ence; technology), 362; in agriculture, 391, 393, 394-96; atomic, 290; funding for, 358, 358; government agencies

for, 365; government support for, 50, 358, 363-68; and industry, 377; infra- structure, 363-65; investment in, 57;

as percentage of gross domestic product, 365; private-sector spending on,

366; policy, 363-65; quality of, 377; resource allocation, 365; role of universities in, 366; specialized institutes

for, 366 Reserve Bank of India: founded, 316;

functions of, 316; nationalized, 316

Reserve Forest Areas, 227

rice, 384, 385; area sown in, 407, 411; exports of, 425; farming areas, 75; prices, 404; production, 382, 384,

407-8, 411; research on, 368, 427

riots {see also political violence), xlv-xlvi; anti-Sikh, 176, 492, 610; over Babri

Masjid, xlvi, 497; deaths in, 222-23,

274-75, 477, 492; on Direct Action

Day, 46; over food price increases, 307,

310; following Indira Gandhi's assassi- nation, 55; Hindu-Muslim, xlv-xlvi, 176, 477, 495, 524, 607; language, 195, 196; against Mandal Commission

report, 222-23, 274-75, 477; religious,

xlvi, 176, 497

rivers, 74-76; flooding of, 74; in Indo-Gangetic Plain, 67; types of, 74

roads, xxxvi, 35, 349-50; construction of, 306, 349-50; deterioration of, 342,

349; freight transport on, 342; highways, 349; maintenance of, 342, 349-

50; network of, 349; passenger traffic on, 349

Rockefeller Foundation, 410, 426

Roland, Alan, 254

Roberts, Frederick Sleigh, Earl of Kandahar, Pretoria, and Waterford, 566

Robinson, Francis, 463

Robinson, George, Marquis of Ripon, 37

Rodrigues, Sunith Francis, 564, 605 Roman Empire: trade with, 12 RowlattActs (Black Acts) (1919), 41; satyagraha against, 42

Rowlatt Commission, 41

Roy, Ram Mohan, 34

835
India: A Country Study

Royal Commission on Agriculture, 391 Royal Indian .Air Force, 567

Royal Indian Navy, 567, 587

RSS. S^Rashtriva Swavamsevak Sangh

Rubin, Robert E., 552

rural areas {see also villages): banking in, 300, 317, 420-21; Dalits in, 275; devel- opment in, 312, 396-97, 420, 559;

electrification of, 339; employment in, 311, 331; farm size in, 386; health care

in, 102; housing in, 335; infrastructure

of, 420; interdependence in, 272-73, 283-85; landless families in, 388; lan- guages in, 194; marriage in, 256; population in, 85, 88; poverty in, 43, 301; purdah in, 250-51; workers in, 328, 388-89

rural development, 312; goals of, 396; problems with, 396-97; SAARC pro- gram for, 559

Rural Landless Employment Guarantee

Program, 308, 394

Russia {see also Soviet Union): expansion

by, 30; exports to, 331; materiel from,

546; military cooperation with, 545,

589; relations with, 541, 5 44-46; scientific cooperation with, 545; state visits to, 544; trade with, 545

ryotwari settlement system: under British, 33

sadhus (holy men), 279, 280

sadhvis (holy women), 279

Saha, Meghnad (M.N.), 362

SaheU (Woman Friend) , 291

Sai Baba, 133

Saikia, Hiteshwar, 487

Samajwadi Janata Dal, 447

Samajwadi Janata Partv: decline of, 478; formed, 478 Samajwadi Partv (Socialist Party). 431, 490; constituency of, 472; in Janata

Party, 476 Samudragupta. 13 Sangam works, 12

sanitation services: access to, 96

Sanjan: Parsis in, 173

Sanskrit, xxxvii, 182; common (Prakrits), 185, 186; grammar and phonetics of, 185, 359; literary, 185; spoken, 5, 186

Sanskritization, xxxvii, 14, 272

Santal tribe, 168, 169, 202; geographic

distribution of, 200; in Jharkhand

Movement, 218; population of, 200

Santal religion, 168; life-q'cle rituals of, 168; followers of, 168; spirits in, 168 San Thorn Cathedral, 169

Santoshi Ma, 144-45

Sarabhai family, 242

Sardar Sarovar Dam, 399

Sarvodava movement, 467

Satara: annexed by British, 32 Satavahana Kingdom, 11-12

satellites, 375; launch vehicle program,

375, 545; weather, 375

sati, 7, 265-66; outlawed, 23, 33; protests

against, 291

satyagraha (civil disobedience), xli, 42; against Government of India Act, 42; against Indira Gandhi, 54; against

Rowlatt Acts, 42; against salt tax, 44; against Sardar Sarovar Dam, 399;

against World War II, 45

SatyaSai Baba, 133 Saudi Arabia: oil from, 538; relations of, with Pakistan, 539; relations with, 538

Sayeed, Mufti Mohammed, 494

Sayvid Dynasty (1414-51), 16

scandals: Bofors, 57-58; involving Rajiv

Gandhi, 56, 57-58, 470, 498; involving Rao, 1, 474, 498; spy, 57; stock trading, 473-74 Scheduled Areas: under constitution, 434 Scheduled Castes {see also Dalits), 267-

68; affirmative action for, 110, 274,

302; in civil service, 461; under consti- tution, 435; conversion of, to Buddhism, 131, 176-77; conversion of, to Christianity, 171, 176-77; conversion

of, to Islam, 176-77; definition of members of, 200, 437; discrimination

against, 271, 503; geographic distribu- tion of, 88; government seats reserved

for. 436-37, 438; literacy of, 274; as percentage of population, 268, 274,

490; political activities of, 503; politi- cal affiliation of, 463, 468, 471, 472,

481, 490, 505; population of, 88, 268;

in village panchayats, 285 Scheduled Languages, 182, 184, 224;

instruction in, 194; number of, 455 Scheduled Tribes, 200; affirmative

836
Index

action for, 110; Africans in, 214; in

civil service, 461; classification of, 206; under constitution, 434, 435; conversion of, to Christianity, 171; definition of members of, 200, 437; geographic

distribution of, 88; government seats reserved for, 436-37, 438; political

activities of, 431, 503; political affilia- tions of, 463, 468; population of, 88; in prison, 619

schools: Anglo-Indian, 212-13; atten- dance at, 106; attrition from, 106, 107, 209; church-run, 107; condition of, 106, 112; Congress boycott of, 110; curriculum of, 90, 112; enrollment in, 64, 106, 111; fees of, 111; Jain, 128; languages of instruction in, 34, 108, 194; madrasa, 107; middle, 106; mission, 107, 210, 219; Muslim, 161; pres- sures in, 107; primary, 106, 209;

private, xl, 64, 107; problems in, 64; public, 64; rural, 194; tribal, 219;

urban, 194, 286, 289

science {see also research and develop- ment; technology), li, 358-77; brain drain from, 367; cooperation with ASEAN, 323; cooperation with China,

534; cooperation with Soviet Union,

544; education in, 361; English as lan- guage of, 194; government support

for, 50, 363-65; in Gupta Empire, 13; infrastructure, 363-65; personnel,

366; policy, xxxix, 362, 363-65; pros- pects in, 376-77; quality of, 377

Science Advisory Council, 363

Scientific Policy Resolution (1958), 362

Scindia Steam Navigation Company, 352

Scythian people, 11 Securities and Exchange Board of India, 318

seeds: high-yield, xxxviii, 310

Self-Employed Women's Association, 291

Self-Re spect Movement, 485 Sepoy Rebellion (1857-59), 35-36; ori- gins of, 36; response to, 566

sepoys, 29, 565, 570; number of, 566

servant caste. See Shudra caste services sector: as percentage of gross domestic product, 300; public sector control of, 304

Seshan,T.N., 454-55

Shah, Ghulam Mohammad, 494, 521-22

Shahjahan: expansion under, 23-24

Shaka people, 1

1

Shakti, 139-40

Shankara, 132, 175

Shanti Niketan University: science pro- gram, 371

shantytowns, 54, 286, 302 Sharad Pawar, 535, 551

Sharif, Mian Nawaz, 525 Sharma, Miriam, 276

Shastri, Lai Bahadur: death of, 51-52;

foreign policy under, 511; President's Rule invoked by, 439; as prime minister, 51 Shatrunjaya Hills, 128 Shekhar, Chandra, 477; personal advis- ers to, 512; President's Rule invoked

by, 439; as prime minister, 447-48,

478,512,525

Sherpa, Chiten, 226

Shesha-Naga, 138

Shillong: rainfall in, 75 Shimla (Simla) , 69 shipbuilding: government control of, 304, 330; Soviet support for, 543

Shipping Corporation of India, 351

shipyards, 352

Shiva, 15, 122, 138-40; images of, 138; incarnations of, 139; and renunciation, 138, 139; sexual power of, 139

Shivaji Bhonsle, 26, 481

Shiv Sena (Army of Shivaji) , 481 , 496 Shudra (servant) caste: in Aryan system,

7; dharma of, 270; origins of, 267

Shultz, George, 548 Siachen Glacier: armed forces in, 563;

dispute over, 72, xlvii, 522-23; negotiations over, 525

Siddhis, 213-14

Sikh Autonomous Region: demand for, 491 Sikh Gurdwara Act of 1925, 1 66 Sikhism, 162-67; Akali mass movement

in, 166; division within, 166; fundamentalist, 176, 491-92, 608; gurus in, 163, 164-65; inclusive nature of, 164; influence of, on Punjabi society, 163; karma in, 164; Khalsa of, 163, 166; leadership of, 167; life-cycle rituals, 166; militant resistance to persecution, 163; nirvana in, 164; origins of, 120, 162; reincarnation in, 164; sects

837
India: A Country Study

of, 162, 166, 167; shrines of, 165, 166; songs of, 164; spread of, 120; temples

of, 163, 165; tenets of, 162; worship in, 165 Sikh khalsa, 27

Sikhs, 27; ascetic, 162; baptism of, 163; in government, 121; militant movement

of, 440, 492-93; number of, 120; occu- pation of Golden Temple by, 55; per- secution of, 24; riots against, 176, 492,

610; surnames of, 163

Sikkim, xlviii, 73; border with, 516; Buddhists in, 131; under constitution, 434; population of, 455; rural population

of, 88; tribes in, 200

Simla. SeeShimla

Simla Accord (1972), 521,525

Simla Convention (1914) , 72-73, 532 Simon, John, 44

Sinai Peninsula: peacekeeping forces in, 578

Sindh: ancient civilization in, 4; Arabs in,

15;' unrest in, 524, 620

Sindhi language, 182

Singh, Arjun, 474

Singh, Chaudhury Charan: in Janata

government, 476-77; President's Rule invoked by, 439; as prime minister, 55, 447

Singh, Giani Zail, 491-92; as president, 447

Singh, Maharaja Hari, 493

Singh, Jaipal, 220, 221 Singh, Manmohan, 409, 449

Singh, Ranjit, 27

Singh, Sagat, 572

Singh, Vishwanath Pratap (V.P.), 57-58,

274, 456; foreign policy under, 515,

530; no-confidence vote against, 477; personal advisers to, 512; President's Rule invoked by, 439

Singh Sabha (Assembly of Lions), 166

Sino-Indian war (1962) , xlvii, 51, 73, 299, 310, 510, 542, 574-76; armed forces performance in, 563, 574, 581; casualties in, 576; cease-fire in, 576; international reaction to, 546; origins of, 574;

State of Emergency during, 439; strat- egy in, 574-76

Sino-Tibetan languages, 181; number of

speakers of, 187, 187

Siraj-ud-daula, Nawab, 29

Sir Dorabji Tata Trust, 361

Sita, 136, 142

Siwalik Hills, 69 Skanda, 139-40

slavery, 219

slaves, 213

slums, xli, 286, 335; evictions from, 54; structure of life in, 286-88

Small Farmers Development Agency, 394

social interdependence, 240-41, 263,

292; in families, 247, 248; in villages, 272-73, 284

Socialist Independence for India

League, 44

Socialist Party. Samajwadi Party

social services: under five-year plans,

311, 312

social structure: religious influences on, 119

Society of Brahma. See Brahmo Samaj

Society of Great Enlightenment. See Mahabodhi Society

soil, 384, 385, 386

Soldiers', Sailors', and Airmen's Board, 594-95

Somalia: peacekeeping mission in, xlix sorghum, 384, 385, 407, 408 South Africa: Gandhi's work in, 42; rela- tions with, 519 South Asia: as nuclear-free zone, 525,

545, 551; relations with, 519-31 South Asian Association for Regional

Cooperation (SAARC) , 57, 559; funding of, 559; members of, 559; origins

of, 57, 523; programs of, 559; summit

of 1988, 524 Southeast Asia: China's influence in, 537; relations with, 536-37; trade with,

12, 14 Southern Himalayas, 69 South Korea. See Korea, Republic of

Soviet republics, former: exports to, 331 Soviet Union {see also Russia; Soviet republics, former): Afghanistan

invaded by, xlviii, 55, 517, 523, 538-39, 543-44, 548; aid from, 320, 370, 426, 510, 542; international competition

of, 519, 547; materiel from, xlvii, 542, 544-45, 563; military assistance from,

510, 543; satellites launched by, 375;

scientific cooperation with, 544; and

Southeast Asia, 536; space program of,

838
Index

375, 544; trade with, 542, 543, 544;

treaties with, 53, 510, 518, 533, 543,

572; visits to, 544

Soviet-Indian relations, xlvii, 51, 53, 510, 537; and nonalignment, 515, 541

space, 362; international cooperation in, 544, 545; program, li, 373-74, 602;

research organizations in, 373-75; sci- entific and technical support for, 358 Space Commission, 373

Special Commonwealth African Assis- tance Programme, 513

Special Frontier Force, 598, 600

Sravana Belgola, 128

Srigeri: Hindu seat of learning at, 132

Srinagar airport, 354

Sri Lanka, 516; aid to, 526, 548; armed

forces in, xlviii, 563; ethnic conflict in, 527, 620; membership of, in SAARC,

559; peacekeeping missions in, xlviii, 576-78, 599, 620; refugees from, 85, 528; and regional security, 527; rela- tions with, 56, 57, 509, 510, 526-28

Standard Chartered Bank, 317

Star TV, 357, 502

State Farm Corporations of India, 400

State of Emergency (see also President's Rule): arrests under, 445, 467, 476; cause for proclamation of, 439-40; censorship under, 445, 500; under

Indira Gandhi, xliv, 54, 439, 467-68;

in 1962, 439; in 1971, 439; in 1975,

xliv, 439, 443, 445, 450, 467-68, 500,

612; police under, 612

states: autonomy of, 45; divisions of, 452;

political parties in, 484; reorganization of, xliv, 49, 195, 215

States Reorganisation Commission, 49,

195; formation of Andhra Pradesh by,

xliv, 215; request to, for Gorkhaland,

224; request to, for Jharkhand, 220-21

steel, xxxix, 331; earnings from, 331; import of, 322, 331; price controls on,

305; production, 300, 331, 360

steel industry, 331; development of, 331; government control of, 304, 330;

investment in, 306, 312

stock market, 318; collapse of Bombay,

318; development of, 330; reforms, 318

stock scandals, 473-74

strikes: by Dalits, 276; general, 41; in

Jammu and Kashmir, 494; motives for, 327; number of, 328; by pilots, 352;

railroad, 54, 439

student demonstrations, 216; against

Mandal Commission, 222

students: employment of, 109; in United

States, 546

subsidiary alliance system, 31 subsidies: credit, 317; decreases in, 306;

fertilizer, 400-401, 427; fishing, 417-

18 Suez Canal: peacekeeping forces in, 578

suffrage. See voting

sugar, 385; availability of, 382; imports

of, 409; marketing of, 422; prices, 404; production of, 384, 407, 409, 422;

shortages of, 303 Sumer: trade with, 4 Sun TV, 357 Supreme Court, 449-52; Babri Masjid

decision, 471; under constitution, 433; disputes of, with Parliament, 449-51;

election laws decisions, 455; jurisdiction of, 449, 617; justices of, 449; land

distribution decision, 449; Union Car- bide decision, 451

Sur, Sher Khan, 20

Surya, 121 Sushruta, 14

Sutlej River, 68; irrigation from, 68

Swaraj Party, 44 Sweden: in Aid-to-india Consortium,

319; materiel from, 563 Sweeper caste {see also Dalits): brides of, 270; dharma of, 270; occupations of, 237, 263-64, 267, 287-88; pollution

of, 237; status of, 267, 269; women in, 263-64

Switzerland: joint research with, 376 Syro-Malabar Church, 169-70; number

members of, 1 71 Syro-Malankara Church, 170; members

of, 170, 171

Tablighi Jamaat (Outreach Society), 161-62

Taipei Economic and Cultural Center, 536

Taiwan. See China, Republic of

Tajikistan: relations with, 540

Taj Mahal, 24

839
India: A Country Study

Tamerlane. SeeTunur Lenk

Tamil kingdoms, 12 Tamil language, 15, 182, 186; broadcasts

in, 357; native speakers of, 182; purifi- cation of, 186 Tamil Nadu (state) (see also Madras)

:

agricultural growth in, 404;

anti-Brahman movement in, 186; anti-Hindi riots in, 195; bhak ti tradi- tion in, 134; farms in, 386; fertilizer consumption in, 400; Green Revolution in, 412; legislature of, 455; mining in, 342; nuclear power plant in, 340; oil in, 338; political parties in, 485; population growth rate in, 93; under President's Rule, 54; rainfall in, 77; Scheduled Castes in, 88; secessionist movement in, xliv, 228, 516; sex

ratio in, 253; support for Sri Lankan

rebels by, 577-78; teachers in, 107; temples in, 120-21, 139, 149; tribes in, 200; universities in, 109 Tamil people: literature of, 12, 15 Tamil separatists: aid to, 576, 620

Tanjore: annexed by British, 32

Tapti River, 67, 76 Tarapur nuclear power plant, 373 Tashkent Declaration, 72, 521, 542, 571

Tata, Jamsetji Nusserwanji (J.N.), 370

Tata family, 242

Tata Institute of Fundamental Research,

361 , 376; campuses of, 376

Tata Iron and Steel Factory, 219

taxes: agricultural, 314-15, 421; under

Bahmani Sultanate, 18; customs, 315; under Delhi Sultanate, 16, 17; direct, 315; evasion of, 56; excise, 314, 315; income, 314, 315; indirect, 315; land

revenue, 314-15; under Mughals, 21, 24; on non-Muslims, 23, 24; as per- centage of gross domestic product,

315; proposals for, 313; receipts from,

315; reforms, 306, 315; on salt, 44; shared, 314, 457; on textile industry, 33; under Vijayanagar Empire, 18; wealth, 315

teachers, 107; geographical distribution

of, 107

tea: exports, 425-26; plantations, 384,

488; workers, 224

technology (see also research and devel- opment; science), 358-77; brain drain

from, 367; cooperation with ASEAN,

323; cooperation with China, 534; dis- coveries in, 359; education in, 361; government support for, 363-65;

infrastructure, 363-65; personnel,

366; policy, xxxix, 363-65; prospects

in, 376-77; quality of, 377; SAARC

program for, 559; from United States, 546, 548-49 Tegh Bahadur, Guru, 163 Telangana movement, 49, 214-18, 482; demands of, 218; support for, 217-18;

violence in, 214-15, 216 Telangana People's Association (Telan- gana PrajaSamithi), 216-17 Telangana Praja Samithi. See Telangana

People's Association telecommunications, 300, 354—57; under

five-year plans, 311; government control of, xxxix, 297, 330; introduced,

34-35; investment in, 306; licensing

procedures, 354-55; national policy, 354-55; as percentage of gross domestic product, 300; percentage of work

force in, 325; research in, 366; SAARC

program for, 559; satellite, 374-75; sci- entific and technical support for, 358; under Vijayanagar, 1

8

Telecommunications authority of India, 355

telegraph, 34-35

telephones: government control of, 304; number of, 355 telephone system, 355; government control of, 304, 355; improvements in, 56, 355; line density, 355

television, 290, 356-57, 501; access to, 502; cable, 357; government control

of, 356, 501; growth of, 501-2; influ- ence of, 276, 285; languages of, 198-

99, 357; programming, 502, 503; satellite, 357, 501 Telugu language, 15, 182, 186; in Andhra Pradesh, 196; native speakers

of, 182; purity of, 197 Telugu Desam Party. See Telugu National

Party Telugu National Party (Telugu Desam

Party): founded, 217, 486; in National

Front, 477

temperature (see also climate), 78-81; in Deccan Plateau, 78; in Himalayas, 78

840
Index

temples, 15, 142; administration of, 149; government management of, 120-21; Hindu, 148-49, 152; layout of, 149; under Mughals, 22, 24; Sikh, 163, 165; under Vijayanagar, 18-19

Territorial Army, 600

territories: government control of, 458; government of, 458

terrorism, 551; against British, 39; in Punjab, 167; SAARC program for, 559; by Sikhs, 167 Terrorist Affected Areas (Special

Courts) Ordinance (1984), 440

Terrorist and Disruptive Activities (Pre- vention) Act (1985), 440; allowed to lapse, 441; number arrested under,

440-41

terrorists: penalties for, 440

textile industry: British taxes on, 33; cot- ton for, 409-10; employment in, 331; exports by, 322, 331, 381; as percent- age of gross domestic product, 297;

price controls on, 305; production by, 331, 360; technological developments

in, 359

thagi (thugee): oudawed, 33

Thakurs: occupations of, 283

Thakurji, 168 Thapar,P.N.,580

Thar Desert. See Great Indian Desert Thimayya, K.S.,580

Thiruvananthapuram (Trivandrum) air- port, 354 Thomas the Aposde, 169

Thorat, S.P.P.,580 thugee. See thagi Tibet (see also Xizang Autonomous

Region): agreement with China on

(1954), 532; border with, 516; conflict with China over, 531-32; pilgrimages

to, 533; refugees from, 85, 131, 532

Times ofIndia, 500 Times of India Group, 500 Timur Lenk (Tamerlane), 20

Tinker, Hugh, 3

tires: price controls on, 305

Tiwari, Nairan Dutt, 474 Todar Mai, 21

Tolkappiam, 12

Tolkappiyar, 12 topography: and farm size, 386; of

Indo-Gangetic Plain, 67; of offshore

islands, 71 tourism, 357-58; cooperation with

ASEAN, 323; earnings from, 358; under five-year plans, 357;

foreign-exchange earnings, 357, 358; number of visitors, 357; pilgrimage as, 152; potential for, 222 Trachoma Control Programme, 96

trade {see also balance of trade; exports; imports), 14-15, 321-23; agricultural, 424; with Arabs, 14; in Aryan system,

7-8; with Britain, 28, 554; in cotton,

28; deficit, 321-22, 324; under Delhi

Sultanate, 16; European merchants in, xxxvi, 28; with European Union, 322; with France, 28; government regulation of, 302, 321; with Japan, 322; lib- eralization of, 302; with Middle East,

15; with Netherlands, 28; with Pakistan, 524; Parsis in, 171; as percentage

of gross domestic product, 300; per- centage of work force in, 325; with Roman Empire, 12; with Russia, 545;

in silk, 28; with Southeast Asia, 12, 14; with Soviet Union, 542, 543, 544; in

spices, 27, 28; in sugar, 28; with Sumer,

4; with United States, 322-23, 546; under Vijayanagar, 1

8

Trade Unions Act (1926) , 327

trading factories, 28, 29

Transfer of Prisoners Act of 1950, 618

Trans-Himalayas, 69 transportation (see also mass transit; motor vehicles), xxxii, 342-54; air, 306, 342, 352-54; airports, 342; under

Delhi Sultanate, 16; under five-year

plans, 310, 311, 342; of freight, 342,

345; government control of, 297, 342; investment in, 306, 312, 342; maritime, 351-52; of passengers, 345; as percentage of gross domestic product,

300; percentage of work force in, 325;

ports, 342; public, 152, 289, 342, 346-

49, 350; railroads, 342, 345-46; rapid

transit, 289, 346-49; research in, 366; roads, 18, 35, 306, 342, 349-50;

SAARC program for, 559; scientific and technical support for, 358; urban,

286, 289; under Vijayanagar, 18; water, 35

transvestite-eunuchs. See hijras Travels of Rama. See Ramayana

841
India: A Country Study

Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation

with Russia (1993) , 544

Treaty of Friendship Between the Gov- ernment of India and the Govern- ment of Bhutan (1949), 530 Treaty of Peace and Friendship with Nepal (1950) , 528; review of, 530; vio- lation of, 529-30

Treaty of Peace, Friendship, and Cooperation with the Soviet Union (1971),

53, 510,518,533, 543,572

Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (1968), 373; refusal

to sign, 517, 545, 549, 551, 555, 601

tribal areas: under constitution, 434

tribal languages, 181

tribal religions, 120, 167-69; animist,

169; life-cycle rituals of, 168; outside

pressure on, 168; Santal, 168, 169

tribes (see also Scheduled Tribes) , 199-

211; agriculture of, 202, 205; in Aryan

system, 7; beliefs of, 210; under British rule, 206; and caste, 201, 268; Christians in, 169. 177, 219; economy of, 202-9; education in, 207-9; families

in, 209; farming by, 201-2, 203; for- estry projects of; forced settlement of, xxxvi, 210; geographic distribution of, xxxvi, 87, 168, 169, 199-200, 206; hunting and gathering, 202, 210; indebtedness of, 205, 219; infringe- ments on, 207, 209; land ownership

of, 203-4, 209, 219; languages of, 181, 201, 202, 210; marriage in, 209, 210; missionaries to, 210-11; number of members of, 167, 199, 200-201 ; as per- centage of population, 199; political

activities of, xliv, 432, 620; political

organization of, 202-9; population of, 200-201; practices of, 209-11; reli- gious dissention in, 221; slavery of, 219; social organization of, 201-2;

trade by, 203; traits of, 201; uprisings

by, 52, 611

Tripura: Buddhists in, 131; political parties in, 483; Scheduled Tribes in, 88; tensions of, with central government,

227, 611; tribes in, 199, 200 Tripura National Front, 611 Tripura National Volunteers movement,

227

Tripura Tribal Areas Autonomous District Council, 227 Tripura Tribal Youth Association

(Tripura Upajatijuba Samiti), 227

Tripura Upajatijuba Samiti. See Tripura

Tribal Youth Association Trivandrum. S^Thiruvananthapuram

Tughluq Dynastv (1320-1413), 16 Tunghabadhra River basin, 18 Turkmenistan: relations with, 540

Tuticorin, port of, 350 TVl. SeeDoordarshan

Udaipur: annexed by British, 32 Udhagamandalam (Ooty): Tata Insti- tute facility in, 376 Udvada: Parsis in, 173 Ukrainian National Space Agency, 375 ULFA. See United Liberation Front of Assam Umavyad Dynasty (661-750), 157 underemployment, xl, 329; in cities, 288 unemployment, xl, 275, 328, 329, 467; in cities, 288; andjob creation, 306;

social problems caused by, 496 UNESCO. See United Nations Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization Union Carbide: and Bhopal accident,

286; Supreme Court decision against, 451 Union Public Service Commission, 461; examinations, 587, 612

Unionist Party, 44

United Arab Emirates: oil from, 538 United East India Company. See Yerenigde Oost-Indische Compagnie

United Front (Sri Lanka) , 577

L'nited Front coalition government, li United Liberation Front of Assam

(ULFA), 488, 610 United National Party (Sri Lanka), 577 United Nations, 555-56; activities in, 556; membership in, 518; peacekeeping forces, 578-79; peacekeeping

forces in India and Pakistan, 520; peacekeeping missions, xlix, 556; population projections, 89; resolutions on Jammu and Kashmir, 520 United Nations Advanced Mission in Cambodia, 537 United Nations Educational. Scientific,

842
Index

and Cultural Organization

(UNESCO) , 1 1 3; aid from, 370 United Nations Food and Agriculture

Organization: aid from, 426 United Nations Security Council:

cease-fires called by, 521, 542, 547,

571; seat on, 556 United Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia, 537 United News of India, 500 United States: aid from, 319, 320, 426,

547, 550; in Aid-to-india Consortium,

319; Indira Gandhi's visit to, 547;

Indian students in, 546; international competition of, 519, 547; investment

from, 322-23, 546, 549; joint research

with, 376; loans from, 324; military

cooperation with, 551, 552, 579, 589; motor vehicle production, 335; naval

installation on Diego Garcia, xlviii, 517, 547, 551; relations of, with Pakistan, xlvii, xlix, 51, 517, 523, 533, 539, 546, 547, 550; satellites launched by, 375; as security threat, 547, 548; space program of, 375; technology from,

546, 548-49; trade with, 322-23, 550, 552 United States Agency for International Development, 320, 426, 547 United States-Indian relations, xlvii, 51, 320, 510, 546-53; disagreements in, 549; military policy and, 517; nonalignment and, 546; obstacles to, 549-

50, 551-52; state visits to, 548, 552 United States Public Law 480 programs,

320, 426 United Trade Union Congress, 327

Unity Pilgrimage. See Ekta Yatra

universities, 108-110; administration of, 109-110; admission to, 109; agricultural, 109, 395, 427; attrition from,

109; English in, 194; enrollment in, 108, 395; Active kinship in, 235; financial problems of, 108; foreign students

in, 427; government, 108; hierarchy

in, 235; professional, 108; religious, 108; science and technology graduates, 366-67; science training in, xxxix, 367; scientific research at, 50, 366; teaching, 109; technical, xxxix,

109; unitary, 109

University Grants Commission, 104

Unlawful Activities Act, 176 Untouchables. See Dalits Upanishads, 5-6, 122-23; interpretation

of, 132 uranium: imports of, 341; mining of, 341 urban agglomerations, 85; public trans- portation in, 350 urban areas: and caste, xxxviii, 275, 278;

electricity in, 340; employment in, 288; expansion of, 82, 85; families in, 242, 289; garbage in, 287-88; growth

of, 285; housing in, 335; languages in, 194; lifestyle in, 233-34, 285-86; marriage in, 259, 288; middle class in, 288-89; municipal corporations in, 460-61; municipal councils in, 460-

61; neighborhoods in, 289-90; per- centage of population in, 285; pollution and purity practices in, 239-40;

population in, 85, 86; poverty in, 301; problems in, 286; scavenging pigs in, 286; shantytowns in, 54, 286, 302;

slums in, 54, 286, 335; socioeconomic

differences in, 286-89; transportation

in, 286; types of, 85; underemploy- ment in, 288; unemployment in, 288; women in, 290-92; workers in, 328

urbanization, xxxv, xxxviii, xl, 285; in Gujarat, 87; social problems caused by, 495; in Rajasthan, 87 urban migration, 286; accommodation

of, 286-87; and religion, 120

urban-rural differences, 233, 255 Urdu language {see also Hindi): in British Raj, 188; geographic distribution of, 191, 215; mutual intelligibility of, with Punjabi and Hindi, 184, 191; native

speakers of, 1 82 Usha, 121

utilities, 300; as percentage of gross domestic product, 300; sewerage, 96, 286; shortages, 302 Uttarakhand, 221-23; area of, 221; lack of development in, 222; languages of, 221 Uttarakhand Kranti Dal (Uttarakhand

Revolutionary Front) , 222, 223 Uttarakhand movement: motivations of, 221; origins of, 222 Uttarakhand Revolutionary Front. See Uttarakhand Kranti Dal Uttarakhand Samyukta Sangharsh

843
India: A Country Study

Samiti (Uttarakhand United Struggle

Association), 223 Uttarakhand United Struggle Association. See Uttarakhand Samyukta Sang- harsh Samiti Uttar Pradesh (state): agricultural

growth in, 404; agricultural taxes in, 421; Buddhists in, 131; caste problems

in, 273; education in, 112, 113; elec- tions in, 455, 475, 481; electricity in, 339; forestry agency in, 414; forests in, 413; government of, 491; Green Revolution in, 411-12; Hindi in, 191; land reform in, 390; legislature of, 455; Muslims in, 155; nuclear power plant

in, 340; political parties in, 481, 490;

political representation in, 52; polyg- yny in, 243; population of, 455; poverty in, 301; Scheduled Castes in, 88; sex ratio in, 253; tribes in, 199; urban

areas in, 86 Uzbekistan: relations with, 540; Rao's

visit to, 540

Vaishno Devi, 144

Vaishya (commoner) caste: in Aryan sys- tem, 7; dharma of, 270; origins of, 267

Vajpayee, Atal Behari, li, 480, 515

Vale of Kashmir, 384

Varanasi: pilgrimage to, 152 vama {see also caste), 7, 267; origins of, 267

varnashramadharma, 7, 11 Varuna, 121 Vayu, 121 Vayudoot airline, 354

Vedas, xxxv, xxxvii, 5-6, 121-22, 126; col- lections of, 121; language of, 185; ori- gins of the universe in, 122; recitation

of, 122; science in, 359; varnas in, 267

vendors, 301 Venkatachaliah, Manepalli Narayanrao,

451 Venkataraman, Ramaswami, 535; as president, 447 Verenigde Oost-Indische Compagnie

(United East India Company), 28; founded, 28 VHP. SeeVishwa Hindu Parishad

Vickers and Yarrow, 588

Victoria (queen), 36

Videsh San char Nigam, 355 Vietnam: aid to, 321; peacekeeping missions in, 556; relations with, 537

Vijayanagar (city), 18 Vijayanagar Empire (1336-1565), 17; collapse of, 19; communications

under, 18; expansion of, 18; founded,

18; rivalry of, with Bahmani, 18; taxes under, 18; trade under, 18; transportation under, 18

villages (see also rural areas), 281-85; in Aryan system, 7; caste in, xxxviii, 276, 282; class in, 276; common facilities

in, 284; definition of, 87-88, 281; electricity in, 339; factionalism of, 282,

285; image of, 281; interdependence

in, 272-73, 283-85; kinship in, 284; landowning in, 282; layout of, 282; lif- estyle in, 233; loyalty to, 283; neighborhoods of, 282; network of, 282; number of, 281; panchayat, 284-85;

percentage of population in, 233, 276; roads in, 349; services in, 283; shopkeepers in, 204—5; size of, 281; weddings in, 283, 284; work ethic in, 283; worship in, 284 Vindhya Range, 67, 70 Vishakhapatnam: fishing in, 417; port of, 350, 351; shipyards in, 352 Vishnu, 15, 122, 135-38, 140; icons of, 138; personalities of, 135-36, 138 Vishwa Hindu Parishad (VHP—World

Hindu Council), 175-76; and Ramjanmabhumi Temple, 471, 480, 497; banned, 176 Vivekananda, Swami, 175 Vividh Bharati Service, 356

voters: number of eligible, 454, 462;

turnout of, 1 voting (see also elections): anti-incumbent, 498-99; polling stations for, 454, 462

Vritra, 121

wages: for construction workers, 288; for women, 288 Ward, William, 32

warrior castes. See Kshatriya castes warriors: under Akbar, 21

water: accepting drinks of, 238; conflicts

over, 46, 491; quality, 63-64; resources,

844
Index

46; and ritual pollution, 238; and rit- ual purity, 238; salinity, 398; sharing, 398, 491, 526; shortages, 286; supply, 308; territorial, 71; transfer, 398 Waterbearer caste, 238; status of, 238

Weiner, Myron, 468

Wellesley, Richard Colley, 31 West Bengal (state): agricultural growth

in, 404; Buddhists in, 131; climate of, 78; coal in, 336; education in, 112;

elections in, 475, 481; electricity in, 339; immigrants from, 196, 487, 610; land tenure in, 387; language in, 224; Muslims in, 155; peasant rebellion in, 482; political parties in, xliv, 481, 483;

political representation in, 52; refu- gees in, 572; Santals in, 168, 200; Scheduled Castes in, 88; urban areas

in, 86 West Bengal Official Language Act

(1961), 224 West Coast, 64; climate of, 78 Western Ghats, 70; agriculture in, 385,

386; climate of, 78 West Germany. See Germany, Federal

Republic of West Irian: peacekeeping forces in, 579

wheat, 384, 385; area sown in, 408, 411;

high-yield, 410, 411; prices, 404; production, 382, 384, 407, 408, 410-11 White Huns. See Hunas

White Paper on the Punjab Agitation ( 1 984)

,

524 widows (see also marriage): remarriage

of, 258, 264-65, 266, 270; ritual sui- cide of, 7, 23, 33, 265-66, 291 Wolpert, Stanley, 3 Woman Friend. See Saheli women: under Akbar, 23; in armed

forces, 292, 568, 587, 590, 591, 600; and caste, 270; chastity of, 270; in civil service, 461; education of, 113; elite, 250, 251; emancipation of, 50; employment of, 250, 251, 263, 288;

inheritance by, 248; initiation ceremonies for, 147, 256; andjainism, 127; in Khasi tribe, 244; kinship ties of, 242, 245-46; language use of, 198; literacy rate of, 106, 113; low-caste, 263-64;

marriage of, 92, 194, 243, 244; murder

of, 261, 291; Nayar, 244; Parsi, 171-72;

in police force, 615; political influence of, 223, 285, 291, 415, 503, 504;

pollution in, 236; poor, 250; in prison, 618; relations of, with men, 249-50;

relations of, with women, 249-50;

restrictions on, 248-49; roles of, 234, 263; SAARC program for, 559; seclu- sion of, 248-51; social rank of, 247;

status of, 92; suicide of, 261, 291;

urban, 290-92; veiling of, 248-51; worship by, 1 45-46 women's associations: family planning

activities in, 92 women's movement, 290-92

workers: under constitution, 435; marginal, 325; rural, 328, 388-89;

self-employed, 328, 394; status of, 279; urban, 328 work ethic, 283 work force (see also labor), 325-26; brain drain from, 326; categories of, 325;

rural, 388-89; size of, 325 World Bank: aid from, 426; Aid-to-india Consortium, 319; loans from, 324, 399 World Bank Group: in Aid-to-india Consortium, 319 World Hindu Council. SeeVishwa Hindu

Parishad World War I, 40, 567-68; casualties of, 567; impact of, 40; mobilization for, 567 World War II, 568-69; enlistment for, 568; India's entrance into, 45, 568;

resistance to, 45; support for, 45-46

Xavier, St. Francis, 170 Xizang Autonomous Region (see also Tibet), 531

Yadev, Laloo Prasad, 1, 477

Yadev, Mulayam Singh, 490 Yama, 121 Yamuna River, 68; dam on, 222

Yarlung Zangbo River, 68, 69

Yeltsin, Boris, 544

yoga, 124, 175

Yuezhi people, 11

zamindari system: abolished, 388, 392; under British, 33; Supreme Court

845
India: A Country Study

decision on, 449-50

zamindars, 387; under Akbar, 21 Zee TV, 357, 502

Zhirinovsky, Vladimir V, 546 Zhao Ziyang, 533 Zhou Enlai, 532

Zia ul Haq, Mohammad: death of, 524;

talks of, with Indira Gandhi, 520, 523

Zoroaster, 171 Zoroastrianism {see also Parsis), 171-73;

life-cycle rituals of, 172; geographic

distribution of, 171; introduction of, 120; number of followers of, 171; rituals of, 172; sacred fires of, 172; tenets

of, 172; worship of, 172

846
Contributors

Ashok Bhargava is Professor of Economics at the University of

Wisconsin-Whitewater, Whitewater, Wisconsin.

John Echeverri-Gent is Associate Professor of Government and

Foreign Affairs at the University of Virginia.

Sumit Ganguly is Professor of Political Science, Hunter College, and the Graduate School of the City University of

New York.

James Heitzman is Associate Professor of Information Science

at Cazenovia College, Syracuse, New York.

Doranne Jacobson is a South Asian area research consultant

and Director of International Images, Springfield, Illinois. John J. Paul is Associate Professor of History, Fitchburg State

College, Fitchburg, Massachusetts.

John D. Rogers is Lecturer on Social Studies, Harvard University, Cambridge, Massachusetts.

Karl E. Ryavec, formerly an analyst at the Defense Mapping

Agency, is a doctoral candidate, Department of Geography, University of Hawaii, Honolulu.

Roxane D.V. Sismanidis is an Asian area consultant and a Program Officer with the United States Institute of Peace,

Washington, D.C.

Allen W. Thrasher is Senior Reference Librarian, Southern

Asian Section, Asian Division, Library of Congress, Washington, D.C.

Robert L. Worden is head of the Regional Section, Federal

Research Division, Library of Congress, Washington, D.C.

847

Published Country Studies

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550-65 Afghanistan 550-36 Dominican Republic

550-98 Albania and Haiti 550_44 *Algeria ilkvl LCI 550-52 Fmarloi*

550-59 Angola -* ill fcWIU 550-43 Rcjvnt

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849
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850



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