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Air Command and Staff College

John W. Rosa, Brig Gen, Commandant

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AIR COMMAND AND STAFF COLLEGE

AIR UNIVERSITY

Strategic Implications of Cultu

Historical Analysis of China’s Cultur

and Implications for United States Pol

KIMBERLY A. CRIDER

Major, USAFR

Air Command and Staff College

Wright Flyer Paper No. 8

MAXWELL AIR FORCE BASE, ALABAMA

September 1999
Disclaimer

Opinions, conclusions, and recommendations expressed or implied within are sole

of the author and do not necessarily represent the views of Air University, the Unite

Air Force, the Department of Defense, or any other US government agency. Cle

public release: distribution unlimited.

ii
Foreword

It is my great pleasure to present another of the Wright 

Papers series. In this series, Air Command and Staff C

(ACSC) recognizes and publishes the “best of the best” stu

research projects from the prior academic year. The ACS

search program encourages our students to move beyon

school’s core curriculum in their own professional develop

and in “advancing aerospace power.” The series title reflect

desire to perpetuate the pioneering spirit embodied in e

generations of airmen. Projects selected for publication com

solid research, innovative thought, and lucid presentati

exploring war at the operational level. With this broad per

tive, the Wright Flyer Papers engage an eclectic range o

trinal, technological, organizational, and operational ques

Some of these studies provide new solutions to familiar 

lems. Others encourage us to leave the familiar behind in 

suing new possibilities. By making these research studies 

able in the Wright Flyer Papers, ACSC hopes to enco

critical examination of the findings and to stimulate fu

research in these areas.

John W. Rosa, Brig Gen, 

Commandant

iii

Preface

I wanted to research and write a paper that will prov

culturally based view of social and political change an

strategic implications those changes might have on int

tional relations and, specifically, military policy and plann

is my hope that this research will give policy makers and 

ners cause to consider carefully the important underlyin

tural factors that inevitably influence the strategic goals 

behaviors of nations as they respond to a dynamic conte

environment and interact with each other on the global sta

I wish to acknowledge and thank my research adviso

Abigail Gray-Briggs, for her assistance in helping me de

this research topic and for her insightful guidance in cr

this paper. I also want to thank Dr. Kathleen Mahoney-N

and Dr. Tim Castle for sharing their expertise in political sc

and strategic area studies and for providing me with their 

lectual counsel as I explored and developed this research to

v

Abstract

In today’s dynamic and multipolar strategic environ

there is a heightened potential for greater conflict. One r

for this lies in the different ways in which state and non

actors interpret and respond to the myriad challenges an

portunities of a much more turbulent global context. Thes

ferences in interpretation and response are largely rooted i

ferences in culture, for it is culture that forms the subcons

set of shared meanings that guide group behaviors and pe

tions. Understanding culture in terms of the deep, unde

assumptions and shared mind-sets held by both state and 

state actors is critical for today’s strategic military plann

attempting to predict the potential for conflict and in pla

for effective conflict resolution.

In this paper, the author uses Mary Douglas’s group-gr

pology model for framing culture to describe the strategic 

cations of culture and culture’s response to a changing g

context. The author then applies these concepts to analyz

effect of cultural change in China and its implications for 

rent and future US-China relations. Through this analysi

author reveals important differences in cultural perspectiv

tween China and the United States. These cultural differ

encourage different solutions to the common strategic pro

of security and prosperity and, thus, potentially cause m

ceptions and dangerous miscalculations in policy. Long

strategic cooperation with China requires that US planner

policy makers understand these cultural differences and 

them into every realm of engagement with China.

vii
Strategic Implications of Culture

Historical Analysis of China’s Culture

and Implications for United States Policy

Leaders of the world’s nations today face a common chal

how to ensure their nations’ security and prosperity in a 

that has become increasingly dynamic and uncertain. Whi

problems of national security and prosperity may be sim

shared, the solutions selected to solve these problems m

fact be very different. Solutions vary because the ways 

perceive and respond to opportunities and challenges are 

enced in large degree by what Glen Fisher refers to as “cul tu

established mental frameworks or mindsets.”1

 These mind-

based on established cultural beliefs, values, and biase s—

different means of evaluating events, different decision-m

frameworks, and different objectives which could all have 

tive or negative effects on international relations. 2

 Fisher a

that anyone concerned with international affairs needs t

derstand the ways in which these mind-sets affect them 

those they are interacting with, if they intend to build alli

and partnerships to sustain regional and global stability. 3

This assertion is particularly important for United State

policy makers and military planners engaged in effor

“shape the international environment and create conditio

vorable to US interests and global security.” 4

 This key s

the strategic approach to both the US National Security 

egy and National Military Strategy requires that the U

States exert global leadership in partnering with other cou

around the world to deal with the challenges and opportu

presented by today’s uncertain security environment. Sh

the international environment implies, therefore, the ne

develop an appreciation of culture and how culturally 

mind-sets influence the solutions that may be selected b

tors around the world to respond to common security and 

perity challenges. Understanding these concepts as they 

to US National Security Strategy and National Military Str

objectives is critical for both policy makers and military 

ners as a way to predict the potential for conflict as well 

plan effective strategies to preclude future conflict.

1
Unfortunately, an appreciation of the sociocultural fa

that influence the actions of nations are not often includ

the planning efforts of US diplomats and military strategis

Paul M. Belbutowski asserts, “Culture, comprised of all t

vague and intangible, is not generally integrated into str

planning except at the most superficial levels.” 5

 A lack o

type of understanding can lead to serious misperception

miscalculations in policy which, as Jack S. Levy warns, 

historically been factors in the outbreak of war. 6

This paper helps to rectify this weakness in US strategic 

ning by first presenting a working definition of culture bas

the current thinking of social anthropologists. The autho

plores Fons Trompenaar’s definition of culture as a mean

solving problems, Edgar Schein’s model for describing cu

and a theoretical concept of culture as the way of life a gro

people chooses to follow. That way of life provides the ba

the shared values, beliefs, biases, and accepted patterns of 

relations among a culture’s constituent members.

Next, the author introduces the group-grid analysis m

developed by Mary Douglas as a means of explaining four 

mon organizing principles found in cultures throughou

world. Using this model, the author explores Douglas’s 

primary typologies for differentiating culture, examines how 

why cultures may transition along the continuum between 

typological extreme, and considers the strategic implicatio

conflict that may occur in cultures experiencing transition.

Following this discussion, the author applies the definit

culture and the group-grid analysis model to a historical a

sis of China’s culture. China provides a rich opportuni

cultural study for several reasons. The culture of China 

world’s oldest existing culture. China’s culture is greatly 

fied, allowing a broad-based analysis using the definiti

culture and group-grid typology framework described in 

paper. Chinese culture remains largely homogeneous, alth

change has occurred throughout the centuries and impo

subcultures have gained prominence in recent years, a

intriguing dimensions to the analysis. Moreover, China

newed economic strength, booming population, and incre

influence in the Asia-Pacific region have made more coope

relations with the United States a key aspect of the US Na

Security Strategy. Understanding Chinese culture, includi
historical underpinnings and pressures for change, allow

policy makers and military planners to more clearly com

hend how China responds to the common challenges of se

and prosperity in today’s uncertain strategic environment. 

the insight developed using the cultural lens crafted an

plied in earlier sections, this paper concludes with a cult

based analysis of current US-China relations, particularly 

regard to the issue of broader democratization in China an

implications for long-term strategic cooperation.

Defining Culture

Culture is often overlooked in military strategic plannin

diplomatic policy making because by its very nature cult

largely hidden from everyday awareness. It is nevertheles

nipresent, subconsciously guiding the behavior, choices

interactions of its constituent members. This section sh

light on the elusive nature of culture and offers a working 

nition of culture based on a survey of several of the most 

rent writings and theories regarding sociocultural phenomen

Trompenaar’s assertion that culture is like gravity, “y

not experience it until you jump six feet in the air,” 7

 is a co

ling metaphor when one considers that the only time cu

biases are apparent is when one attempts to do somethi

contradiction to that bias. When it comes to effective int

tional relations and military strategic planning; however

particularly imprudent to delay one’s appreciation of cu

biases among would-be allies and strategic partners unt

potentially disastrous occurrence of a cultural faux pas.

One approach to a more tangible understanding of cult

to think about it as “the way in which a group of people s

problems.”8

 The word “culture” is derived from the same ro

the verb “to cultivate,” meaning to till the soil. Culture

cultivating, implies a way in which people act upon natu

solve common problems.9

 Trompenaar asserts culture, 

essence, “is nothing more than the way in which groups 

organized themselves over the years to solve the problem

challenges presented to them” in the most effective way possi

Central to understanding the elusive yet encompassin

ture of culture and its affect on human decisions and beh

is Schein’s model, which depicts culture in three layers. 
most basic assumptions about existence, how to cope wit

problems of daily life, and how to perceive, think, and f

relation to those problems are hidden deep in a group’s su

scious, forming the very core of its culture. These basi

sumptions are manifested in more explicit ways in terms 

shared norms a group holds about what is right or wron

what is good and bad. Norms and values reside at what S

calls the middle layer of culture. The most explicit mani

tions, at the outer layer of culture, are the more obvious fa

such as language, dress, artwork, social structures, and 

ernment systems.

Implicit in Schein’s model is the concept from Mi

Thompson, Richard Ellis, and Aaron Wildavsky’s work on 

tural theory12 that states culture encompasses “the total w

life of a people, their interpersonal relations as well as 

attitudes.”13 Thompson, Ellis, and Wildavsky provide thre

portant concepts that further support understanding of cu

and emphasize the importance of Schein’s middle layer o

ture—cultural bias, social relations, and ways of life. Cu

bias refers to shared values and beliefs. Using the Schein m

described earlier, shared values and beliefs, or the ide

group holds about what is right and wrong, are usually fou

the middle layer of culture. Social relations are patterns 

terpersonal relations and fall into the category of norms 

found at the middle layer of culture. Cultural biases and 

relations are based on underlying assumptions about h

solve life’s basic problems and are made explicit in specif

haviors and structures. A way of life, according to Thom

Ellis, and Wildavsky, refers to “a viable combination of 

relations and cultural bias.”14

Social relations and cultural biases, indeed norms and v

ideally exist in a reciprocal, mutually reinforcing state. Ther

just as “cultures become unstable when the norms do not r

the values of a group,” social relations and cultural biases 

support each other for a way of life to remain viable. 15

Thompson, Ellis, and Wildavsky refer to this phenomen

the “compatibility condition,” arguing that “a way of lif

remain viable only if it inculcates in its constituent indivi

the cultural bias that justifies it.” 16 A lack of compatibili

tween shared values and the social relations they help legi

tize is the basis for how ways of life fail to maintain thems
over time and thus leads to cultural change—a subject ana

in more detail and then applied to China later in this p

Central to understanding cultural change and the implica

for potential conflict is an assessment of what happens a

middle layer of culture to cause incompatibility betwee

established cultural biases and patterns of social relation

make a way of life no longer viable for its membership.

For the purposes of this paper, culture is defined as a w

life based upon a shared set of meanings that people use 

confronted with problems to “interpret their experience 

guide their action.”17 This definition is derived from the f

ing operating premises. First, the most basic assump

about how to cope with life’s problems are hidden deep a

ture’s core, guiding reactions and solutions in a subcons

but powerful way. Second, these underlying meaning

manifested in certain cultural biases (i.e., values) and pat

of social relations. Third, a way of life (i.e., culture) is consi

viable by its membership when there is compatibility be

what people value and how people interact with one anoth

the normal pattern of social relations.

What can US policy makers and military planners take 

from this definition of culture? Belbutowski writes that t

“more than ever, a sense of vision is required for senior le

and policy makers to estimate the intangible forces [of cu

at work in the environment within which the United State

have to function into the 21st century.” 18 In today’s co

and dynamic international environment, different cultures 

apply different meanings to the problems presented to 

Those meanings may in turn drive potentially disparate 

tions that could lead to misunderstandings and create the 

for violence and conflict.

Thus, one culture’s strategy for ensuring its security 

stability in a complex and unstable world may be geopo

isolation and strict internal control via one-party rule. W

this cultural way of life, the strict patterns of social co

dictated by the one-party system are legitimized by an 

arching bias in favor of stability for the collective good. C

has, for example, followed this type of strategy for much 

last century. The United States, on the other hand, seeks 

rity by promoting democracy, open market economies, an

own values throughout the globe. The way of life for Ame
culture is biased toward more individual autonomy and 

patterns of social relations that afford individual freedo

choice as its solution for stability. Clearly, these strategie

dichotomous and can lead to misperceptions, mistrust, an

tential conflict. To be effective in developing cooperative int

tional relations, senior leaders, planners, and policy m

responsible for US national security must develop an app

tion for culture and its importance in driving differen

sometimes conflicting solutions to common geopolitical 

lems.

Group-Grid Typology: A Model for Differentia

Culture and Understanding Culture Chang

Developing practical insight into the nature of cultu

quires that US leaders have not only a working definiti

culture but also an understanding of how to examine cu

using a typological construct, how cultural change o

within the construct, and the strategic implications of 

changes in culture.

As previously discussed, social anthropologists generally 

that in every culture, “a limited number of universally s

human problems need to be solved. One culture can be d

guished from another by the specific solutions it choos

those problems.”19 Where the researchers tend to disagree, 

ever, is in how those universally shared problems are conc

alized. In the literature on the subject, two dimensions of com

problems appear to cut across the various studies and su

These two dimensions are the relationship between the indiv

and the group (or individualism versus collectivism) and the 

tionship to authority (or rules versus relationships). On

searcher, Mary Douglas, offers a typology based on thes

dimensions that provides a useful way for differentiating cult

Douglas asserts that group and grid are two dimensio

sociality that can adequately capture the variability of an 

vidual’s involvement in social life.20 The group dimension 

extent to which individuals see themselves as members 

group and therefore act in accordance with group norms (c

tivism). Within this dimension, the higher the group ratin

more individuals are willing to sacrifice their own interes

the welfare of the group. High-group societies find people l 
together in “common residence, shared work, shared reso

and recreation.”21 The grid dimension denotes the degree 

cial regulation and stratification. Douglas describes a high

social context as one in which “an explicit set of institution

classifications keeps [individuals] apart and regulates their 

actions.”22 In this setting, strict rules and lines of authori

established and definitive roles separate men from wome

thers from sons, rulers from peasants. Cultures with a low

rating have less definitive separations as individuals ar

creasingly expected to negotiate their own relationships 

others.”23 For further explanation, see figure 1 below.

Taken together, the two dimensions of the group-grid f

work define four basic ways of life: hierarchy, egalitaria

individualism, and fatalism. Thompson, Ellis, and Wild

maintain that these four ways of life each meet the “cond

of viability”—meaning that each is distinguished from an

by a certain pattern of social relations that supports a

High Group

Low Group

Low Grid Hig

Egalitarian Hierarchic

Individualistic Fatalist

Figure 1. Group-Grid Typology
supported by very specific shared values and beliefs. 24 E

we defined culture as a way of life based on a shared s

meanings for solving life’s problems and manifested in a sp

pattern of social relations and shared cultural biases (v

and beliefs). Cultures are considered viable ways of life by 

membership when the patterns of social relations are com

ible with the group’s values and beliefs. In each of the four 

ways of life defined by the group-grid model, there is a 

social relations compatible with certain values and beliefs

pattern and its complementary biases are the basis for diff

tiating one way of life from another.

Hierarchies are characterized by strong group bound

and binding social prescriptions. Individuals in this socia

text are bound both by group norms and socially imposed 

Authority is legitimized on the grounds of accepted social s

fication and the belief that “different roles for different p

enable people to live together more harmoniously than alt

tive arrangements.”25

Egalitarian environments are distinguished by strong 

boundaries with minimal prescriptions regarding social re

tion. Egalitarians place a high degree of value on the equa

each individual member of the group. Because these typ

groups lack internal role differentiation and no individuals 

positions of authority from which to exercise control over 

ers, conflict resolution can be very difficult. Decision m

can be a lengthy process as the group strives for conse

With no named authority figures, relations among member

be ambiguous at best.

In individualistic societies, all boundaries are temp

and subject to change and negotiation. Self-regulation i

governing norm as individuals are neither bound by g

norms nor prescribed roles. Individuals in such environm

seek power by negotiating profitable relationships with o

Democracies and free-market societies are examples of thi

of social context.

People who find themselves excluded from group membe

and bound by strict regulations or role separations typif

fatalistic way of life. Like hierarchists, fatalists have little 

vidual autonomy. Their decisions about how they spend 

time, with whom they associate, what they wear, and w

they work are strictly controlled. Yet, unlike hierarchists, 
ists live in social isolation, “excluded from membership i

group responsible for making the decisions that rule their 

One can use the Douglas model to differentiate one gr

culture from another. Most important, however, the m

provides insight into how cultural change occurs and th

plications of those changes for both domestic and int

tional relations.

Indeed today, more than ever, cultures exist in a dyn

information-rich global environment, making change inevi

Cultural change occurs when an existing way of life is no l

viable and a new way of life emerges to replace it. As ment

earlier, cultural theory posits that a way of life will endure 

if it can continuously instill certain values and beliefs, an

culcate a supporting pattern of social relations to susta

When this occurs, a way of life with its accompanying s

values and social relations provides its adherents with “th

ric of meaning,” that is, the necessary and appropriate solu

for life’s problems.27 Changes in culture happen when “p

realize that certain old ways of doing things do not work 

more.”28

Cultural change is usually not sudden since values an

liefs hidden at the subconscious middle layer of cultur

difficult to influence directly. But change can and will 

“when successive events intervene in such a manner as to 

vent a way of life from delivering on the expectations i

generated, thereby prompting individuals to seek more pr

ing alternatives.”29 A useful analogy to this process is fou

science.30 Scientific theories lose their adherents when a s

cant amount of successive anomalies build up against 

theories. As real-world evidence mounts, doubts build an

fections follow. “A persistent pattern of surprises forces 

viduals to cast around for alternative ways of life (or the

that can provide a more satisfying fit with the world as it is

While gradual, cultural change can occur in several dive

directions, making a change much more difficult to contro

producing potentially undesirable effects. Douglas’s res

shows that given the four ways of life in the group-grid typ

shifts may occur in up to three different and potentially s

taneous directions—along the group dimension, along th

dimension, and diagonally.32 Thus, replacing a hierarchic 

system with a more individualistic one (such as demo cracy) 
simply a direct shift from hierarchy to individualism. This 

of change often brings with it accompanying or interme

changes that may produce some unexpected or undesirabl

effects.

One possible accompanying or intermediate change in a 

from hierarchy to individualism is a shift down the grid d

sion from stratified relationships to more equality in 

status. This change represents a shift toward egalitaria

Some individuals may want their society to move in this 

tion, believing that authoritative institutions and social st

cations create too much disparate privilege between the 

and have-nots. US policy makers and military strategic 

ners should note that such frustration has fueled the id

aspirations of many socialist reform movements, incl

those which helped to drive Mao Tse-tung’s Cultural Revo

in China.

Problems with this type of change can lead, however, 

creased domestic conflict that has subsequent effects. F

stance, the problems associated with egalitarian systems 

of internal role differentiation, arduous conflict resolution

lengthy decision-making processes) may frustrate the lead

large egalitarian societies who find it difficult to maintain 

without strict social regulation and therefore revert t

higher-grid orientations that worked so well in the past. 

may have been the case in China when, after the Cultural 

lution, the cadre leadership formed to become the new 

governing body on behalf of the masses. As John King Fair

argued in 1974, despite Mao’s revolution, China did no

itself from its hierarchical Confucianist past. 33

A second possible change step, which may occur simulta

to or independent of other changes in a move from hierarc

individualism, is a shift down the group dimension from c

tive interests to individualized ones. When the change f

greater individualism with no increase in autonomy, it is a 

toward fatalism. In this situation, group membership no l

provides a safety net for individuals at the bottom strata. 

individual is left to his or her own devices and resources. 

will get by while others will find themselves powerless and so

isolated in a seemingly uncaring world. The inevitable, 

unintended, consequence of increased fatalism in any pus

ward greater individualism presents a strong destabili zi
cial tension. As self-seeking interests are zealously pur

expectations are raised to the point that many must b

pressed by strict control mechanisms to preclude a dege

tion into lawlessness and anarchy. Those finding thems

among the newly disenfranchised fatalists in a transiti

culture may wonder if the promise of liberalization is 

worth it, and may desire a return to the days when they 

not outcasts but members of the larger social sphere. For e

ple, when the regime in modern China began reforming i

ban economy in the 1980s through increased decentraliz

and commercialization, “[it] released strong entrepreneuri

pulses all over China.”34 Today, however, “between 30-20

lion people in China are in search of employment, encamp

and around temporary cities and creating a potentially vo

pool of poor and discontented citizens.” 35 These obvious de

lizing side effects “make the vast majority of Chinese (both 

side and inside the power structure) worried about the da

of chaos . . . and most therefore go along with the cu

emphasis to preserve stability.”36

In the examples discussed above, cultural change wr

serious consequences that caused those in power to recon

the value of the change and to attempt to lessen the desta

ing effects by reverting to old, familiar cultural biases an

cial patterns. These examples also demonstrate the util

the group-grid typology as a model not only to describe 

tures in terms of their particular biases and social pat

but, more important, to assess the potential side effects 

may occur when cultural change is initiated. The potenti

cultural destabilization must be carefully considered bo

domestic leaders attempting internal change and would-b

ternational partners who may wish to influence change w

another culture.

The remaining sections of this paper provide a more de

analysis of China’s culture. Using the group-grid typolog

author explores the nature of China’s historically predom

way of life (in terms of its established pattern of social rela

and cultural biases), the influences that shaped cu

change, the subsequent effects of those changes, and the 

cations for US-China relations, in particular. China rema

mystery to many US policy makers and military planner

through careful analysis of China’s cultural experience
United States may find better understanding that will le

improved international relations and strategic partnering.

Nature of China’s Culture: Past and Presen

One of the remarkable features of Chinese culture is tha

based on the oldest continuing cultural tradition in the 

and yet, as John King Fairbank notes, recent archeol

studies show that “distinctive features of Chinese life t

such as autocratic government, come down directly from 

historic times.”37 These “distinctive features” were the cu

biases and patterns of social relations that developed d

China’s early period in the form of a collective, highly struc

social system that solved the problem of how best to gover

maintain the security and prosperity of a large, diverse agr

populace. Four examples of China’s bias toward a high-

and high-grid way of life that emerged early in its history 

the emphasis on kinship relations, the role and legitimizat

patriarchal authority, the Confucianist concept of bureau

governance, and the system of tribute.

Archeological evidence indicates that as early as the Neo

age (some 12,000 years ago), when the spread of agricu

communities began in China, villagers organized themselv

clustered kinship units, grouped to maximize their abil

survive by reaping the most from the limited cultivable 

available.38 Survival under oftentimes harsh and unpredi

conditions required family members and neighbors to 

closely together, and this strong reliance on each other “a

tomed the Chinese people to a collective life in which the g

normally dominates the individual.”39 The sense of collect

was further reinforced during the dynastic age (circa 221 

when a “legal system of mutual responsibility” was enfor

This system held all family members and their neighbors acc

able for one another, strengthening the collective bias and 

taining order by impelling people to keep an eye on one anoth

Not only did the agrarian-based family tradition estab

strong collective bias in Chinese culture, it was also the 

for China’s autocratic social structure (i.e., high-grid bia

Fairbank notes, the family was the social unit led by the 

arch.42 Within the traditional family group, age domi

youth and men dominated women. Stability in the family 
was maintained by the high value placed on respect for 

place and the harmony of working within the established 

order.

As contact between the early farming villages grew, ki

networks and alliances created an opportunity for broade

ernment along a central family line. Eventually, the comm

ties evolved into dynasties, ruled by a patriarchal emperor

problem of how to ensure the legitimate authority of the r

family was solved through the concept of heaven’s mand

According to this central cultural belief, the patriarch o

state, while at the top of the human order of society, h

middle position in the hierarchy of heaven and earth, and m

tained legitimate authority over the Chung Kuo (Middle 

dom) through heaven’s conferred mandate to rule.

These early traditions of collectivism and the strict pat

of social relations necessary to support the hierarchical sy

were reinforced with the rise of Confucianism, in the se

century B.C., as the central ideology of the Chinese way o

For example, Confucianism postulated that “a true civiliz

was to be achieved under the leadership of an elite educat

its ideals and dedicated to the service of those under the

This belief allowed the formation of a well-organized bur

racy to manage a growing population (swarming to over 53 

lion by the second century B.C.). Membership in the elite 

at the top of the bureaucracy was available only to the we

and literate, thus restricting officialdom to those at the t

the social strata. Although Confucianist belief in China cha

over the centuries, the bureaucracy persisted as a pow

means of reinforcing the high-grid and high-group ce

autocracy, and it created a formidable governmental hier

highly effective in managing a huge mass of people.

Confucianism also helped to establish China’s origina

tem of foreign policy—a system based on an institution of 

ute. The tributary system was rooted in China’s belief th

culture was not only the most viable way of life for its pe

but that it also was superior to other forms of civilizat

According to Mark Borthwick, China’s ancient leaders be

“the rest of the world was culturally inferior, inhabited by 

barians whose natural inclination would be to seek favo

relations with [their country].”46 Thus, any foreigners wi

access to China were required to bring tribute to the emper
“kowtowing” before him and acknowledging him as the cen

all civilization.47 This system provided a setting for foreign 

More important, it preserved the prestige of the empire 

reinforced an ethnocentric view that the Middle Kingdom 

mankind’s only true civilization.

As this analytical review of China’s early history de

strates, China’s historical culture, in terms of the group

typology, was strongly hierarchical. This way of life rem

viable for centuries by virtue of the compatibility of biase

social patterns that manifested themselves in such early 

tions as the importance of familial bonds and the role and 

imization of patriarchal authority in the hierarchy of h

and earth. Confucianist orthodoxy further reinforced the 

ture through its emphasis on bureaucratic governance a

system of tribute that strengthened China’s view of the pr

nence of its way of life over other forms of civilization.

The Chinese belief in the viability and superiority 

ancient hierarchical culture was strongly challenged wit

arrival of British trade ships at the beginning of the 

teenth century.48 A “clash of civilizations” 49 occurred 

the British found the Chinese tributary system intole

China, faced with the destabilizing effects of an expl

population and the demoralization that emerged from a 

ing demand for British-supplied opium, “tried to coerc

British within the framework of the outworn tribute 

tem.”50 The result was the Opium War in which “the B

thought themselves the righteous champions of mo

(Western) civilization over Chinese backwardness.” 51 Ac

ing to Fairbank, British trade pressure and the war tha

lowed set a dangerous precedent for Western relations 

China, “for the British were demanding that China joi

international order according to Western rules.” 52 Nev

less, for the first time in three thousand years, China’s 

ture was severely challenged by external pressure an

Douglas’s group-grid theory indicates, was confronted 

the question of its own viability and need to change.

For the next century, Western expansion caused many 

nese to question the compatibility of old solutions with th

problems of security and prosperity in a changing worl

every sphere of social activity, the old order was challe

attacked, undermined, or overwhelmed by a complex ser
processes—political, economic, social, ideological, cultura

set in motion by the penetration of an alien and more pow

society.”53 Western missionaries preaching egalitarianism, 

vidualism, and democracy presented new ideas that u

mined the high-group and high-grid orientation of the 

fucianist way of life and created a rising undercurrent of 

unrest against the imperial regime.54 By 1900 the imperial 

tution came under full attack by Chinese revolutionaries 

denounced the monarchy as the source of China’s wea

and incapacity to deal with modern challenges.

Note that Western expansion was merely the trigger 

caused the Chinese to question the viability of their cultu

pointed out earlier, cultural change occurs when “people r

that certain old ways of doing things do not work any mo

Thus, culture change may be influenced by an external s

but the constituent members of the culture carry it out. Ac

ing to Fairbank, “The Chinese in the nineteenth century 

undone by the very factors that had given them such early 

cess in the art of government.” 56 The strict pattern of 

relations maintained via a system of central authority and o

doxy, and the collectivist bias that emphasized responsibi

and superiority of the empire had allowed the ancient Chin

solve one problem of stability after another. “When the 

broke in and presented new problems, the old solutions 

produced and tried again, but they would not work.” 57 L

demanded by the ancient Chinese way of life was not t

leadership or the nation-state (indeed, the dynasties and 

ruling leaders were prone to change under the theory of hea

mandate).58 Instead loyalty was “to the ancient culture and 

tutions. When China’s ancient culture proved inadequate t

with modern challenges, [it lost its viability] and the Ch

were left without a focus.”59

By the first quarter of the twentieth century, with th

ability of its hierarchical way of life questioned, China 

struggling for cultural solutions to meet the new challeng

its security and prosperity. As indicated by Douglas

search on the nature of cultural change, China was no

ing pulled in at least three divergent directions alon

dimensions of the group-grid construct. Western influ

favoring greater individualism, emancipation of women

technological progress continued to pull the Chinese w
life away from its high-grid and high-group orientation. M

while, a new nationalism arose as patriotic Chinese y

sought to revive the power of central authority and mainta

hierarchy.60 At the same time, “with no monarchic syste

guide them, the swollen numbers of peasantry were living 

cariously” in a fatalistic state, and growing more and more 

cerned.61 These pressures continued to bring into questio

ancient way of life while new ways of life, based on diff

cultural biases and social patterns, struggled to emerge.

Eventually, two competing, organized movements for revo

arose, and while both offered the promise of an alternative w

life to better meet the demands of the current environment

ther could break through the underlying assumptions inher

the traditional hierarchic culture. Sun Yat-sen and his Ku

tang Nationalist movement offered the promise of “Nation

People’s Rights or Democracy, and People’s Livelihood” an

plied a move toward greater individualism.62 The Chinese Co

nist Party (CCP) meanwhile pursued a Marxist-Leninist ins

drive toward socialism, or increased egalitarianism.

The thrust toward greater democracy under the Natio

movement failed when the Kuomintang “developed no h

aim than the preservation of [its own] power” and lost th

portunity to be a powerful force of social change. 63 Natio

leaders set up a centralized bureaucratic regime much lik

of the ancient dynasties, managed by an official elite 

feathered their private nests in the domination of industr

finance.”64 As Fairbank observes, “the Kuomintang had 

desire for change once they were in power and instead s

the existing class system to keep them in power and, i

sence, keep the tradition of [hierarchy] in place.” 65

The Chinese Communists “offered the down-trodden 

ants at the bottom of the hierarchical system [the most] ho

economic betterment,”66 and a way out of the fatalistic 

they had found themselves in since the decline of the ar

racy. Searching for a viable means to support China’s colla

rural society, Mao Tse-tung and his revolutionaries ide

an egalitarian brotherhood that would free the people 

the traditional hierarchic evils of “the four olds—old idea

habits, old customs, old culture.” 67 Yet, despite the ega

ian fervor, the communist revolution could not free C

from its Confucianist past. While proclaiming to be lab
for the welfare of the people as a whole, the Communists 

tinued to reinforce the basic Confucianist system of bureau

with its need for an elite ruling body educated in the c

ideology and dedicated to the service of the masses. 68 Additio

just as ancient Chinese tradition emphasized the family stru

as the basic societal pattern, the CCP “built an even tighter 

cal family for politicizing culture, law, economics and p

life,”69 ordered by a strict hierarchical authority that esp

Marxism as its new central orthodoxy. The egalitarian idea

never achieved as the Communists reorganized China un

totalitarian polity and a command economy, pulling China 

toward the age-old high-grid and high-group way of life. Per

as Fairbank states, China realized it would have to “remain 

kind of bureaucratic state, essentially inward looking (beca

the sheer mass and growing complexity of the body politic

concerned with social order more than growth.” 70

Unable to compete politically or economically with the 

market world, the overplanned and overcentralized Chinese 

munist system could not fulfill its promise of economic b

ment.71 Thus, by the end of the Maoist era, the Chinese way 

again came under attack, faced with divergent internal pres

for cultural change. As Thompson, Ellis, and Wildavsky ob

“the outcome of the Maoist era was so at odds with the pro

that it enabled rival [hierarchical and individualist] ways of 

attract adherents and gain political power.”72 Some 150 year

the fall of the aristocracy, China was still struggling to rec

itself to the hierarchical traditions that had given it so 

strength in the past, while at the same time hoping to find a 

means to ensure its security and prosperity in the current 

ronment.

When Deng Xiaoping came into power in 1978, his re

attempted, for the first time, to balance China’s deep-set h

chic orientation with the promise of more liberalized struc

to support national security and prosperity. While a prod

China’s totalitarian regime, Deng realized that the only w

restore China to its rightful and respected position of grea

was through economic strength to be realized by a chan

favor of a more liberal, individualistic way of life, at least 

an economic point of view. As a result, he instituted swe

agricultural reform, urban economic commercialization, 

new “open policy” toward foreign trade, which enabled Ch
“double the size of its economy, raise living standards t

three times and join the world economy for the first time.” 7

As Douglas’s group-grid theory predicts, however, cu

change and the subsequent positive results achieved th

the Deng reforms prompted dangerous destabilizing ten

Turbulent economic cycles, corruption, and varied stresse

duced by rapid social change were the inevitable outcom

society transitioning to support greater economic growth

trepreneurial impulses unleashed by decentralization and 

mercialization raised hopes for more local autonomy 

greater individualism), higher living standards, and greate

ralism. Meanwhile, rising inflation heightened fears of a 

toward increased fatalism for those less privileged, ambi

or lucky in the game of free market economics. Tension

each side of the change were directed at the central leade

as a tide of cynicism (fostered by newly sophisticated urba

rose against what was perceived as a corrupt, ineffective of

dom standing on an irrelevant ideology.

The boiling point of all of the social, economic, and po

tension was reached with the Tiananmen crisis in 1989

roots of which “can be found in a mixture of the ref

successes and shortcomings.”74 Ronald N. Montaperto 

this explanation: “Deng’s open policy gave China the opp

nity to compare itself with the non-Chinese world, an

reform policies brought a new stress on incentive and a

tion.”75 At the same time, the reforms produced “unse

effects of inflation and corruption.” 76 Between the new 

and opportunities, the current highly authoritarian way 

was called into question. A serious vacuum of values a

much like the void created by the decline of imperial a

racy more than 150 years earlier, 77 and the outcome w

standoff between the ardent representatives of two dive

ways of life.

While A. Doak Barnett asserts, “the decision to suppres

demonstrations with military force was a tragic failure of le

ship,” in many ways it was a predictable response when 

considers the cultural factors described earlier in this pa

First, “China’s leaders have viewed their mandate to gover

the role of the state in terms that are as old as China itself.

allow any type of rebellion to occur which could threate

mestic stability would bring into question the ruling p
mandate to govern and, thus, its legitimate authority. Se

as the research for this paper has shown, China’s le

have always been concerned with the potential for c

given the sheer size of its population. To control such a 

and diverse mass of people, some form of collectivist, h

structured governance has been the system of choice for 

turies. Third, in putting down the demonstration, the 

government relied on the age-old Chinese bias that sup

suppressing individualism in favor of the collective good

government knew the population was vulnerable to pres

to conform and acquiesce, and it, therefore, could an

take firm action.

Nevertheless, the tense frustrations and desires that gre

of the Deng reforms shook the most basic foundational bel

China’s still hierarchical way of life—perhaps more violently 

ever before. Once again, the viability of the existing way 

had been brought into question, and in the aftermath of Tia

men, strong undercurrents calling for a new way of life per

and continue today.

In today’s China, some leaders seem prepared to proceed 

tiously with gradual change, and assert that even now, C

has moved “from an extreme form of Maoist totalitarianism 

much looser, and in some respects partially liberalized fo

authoritarianism.”80 However many Chinese, both inside 

outside the power structure, still cling to the cultural trad

that give highest priority to the need to preserve stability 

prevent social disorder.

While much of the above appears promising for those in 

of increased, albeit gradual liberalization in China, deeply r

collectivism and social stratification have existed for cent

have survived violent periods of change over the last two 

dred years, and remain strong influences in the Chinese w

life. The historical analysis in this section provides US 

makers and military planners with a foundation from which 

can begin to assess China’s potential response to today’s s

gic challenges and United States efforts to shape China’s r

the international environment. More specific recommenda

for how the United States should proceed in dealing with C

as it explores future cultural change in light of its long-sta

traditions follow.
Analyzing US-China Relations

through a Cultural Lens

The United States has identified three core objectives 

National Security Strategy that it wishes to pursue in the 

national environment: enhanced security, economic prosp

and promotion of democracy abroad. China’s booming econ

increasing modernization, and large population (creating 

tentially strong market for US products) make effective int

tional relations with China important to the achieveme

each of these objectives. Therefore, the United States is p

ing a strategy of peacetime engagement with China in the 

of facilitating “a stable, open, prosperous People’s Repub

China (PRC) that assumes its responsibilities for build

more peaceful world.”81

Developing successful peacetime engagement strategies 

China depends on the ability of the United States to app

understanding of culture and how culturally established m

sets affect diplomatic and military planning efforts. Earl

this paper, the author showed that these mind-sets, bas

the established cultural biases and patterns of social rela

influence the way people of different cultures view the 

and solve the problems presented to them. The historical a

sis revealed the cultural lens through which China view

world, providing US policy makers and military planners w

better sense of the cultural prescriptions that have sh

China’s way of life, its challenges with culture change, an

strategies for security and prosperity. The author now a

this understanding by analyzing how culture affects cu

US-China relations, particularly with regard to the iss

broader democratization in China and the implications for 

term strategic cooperation.

Historians and political analysts generally agree tha

China relations have been hindered by a lack of consis

and “punctuated by one crisis after another.” 82 Susan M. P

asserts that the inconsistent nature of US-China relation

flected as a “boom-bust paradigm,” is based on a deep “pe

tual gap” caused by “philosophical and cultural differences

torical experiences and ideological differences.”83 As disc

earlier, China’s highly collectivist and structured way o

reinforced by centuries of experience, has inculcated c

values and beliefs many Chinese continue to hold relevan
viable—despite internal tensions that have recently m

China gradually toward more liberal preferences. The Ame

experience, on the other hand, has instilled in most Amer

a much more individualistic worldview biased toward liber

tion in all facets of society and government. These funda

tally different perspectives shape fundamentally different 

tions to the common problems of security and prosperity 

“help explain why miscommunication often arises bet

China and the US.”84

Long-term strategic cooperation with China requires th

United States understand how these cultural differences 

sent the potential for misperception and dangerous misca

tions in policy. Moreover, US leaders must factor these d

ences into cooperative plans for every realm of engagemen

China. The question of increased democratization in Chin

critical issue in which cultural differences may danger

cloud successful strategic cooperation.

China’s powerful hierarchic tradition demands that its 

ers continue to resist pressures for democratization, g

“highest priority . . . to the need to preserve political sta

and prevent major social and political disorders,” 85 despit

found change in many facets of Chinese society over th

two decades. While many Chinese leaders “seem prepar

proceed cautiously . . . with gradual change,” 86 broad dem

tization is extremely “problematic for China’s leaders who 

as a direct . . . threat to [national stability] that could poten

throw the country into the chaos of internal revolution.” 8

apparent incongruity among China’s leadership regardin

mocratization also exists in other influential circles of Ch

society. Thomas A. Metzgar states that “despite the Tiana

demonstrations in 1989, there is not a clear dichotomy 

among many Chinese intellectuals between the existing 

line and the democracy movement.”88 He cites the writin

one of China’s most prominent intellectuals, Li Tse-hou, n

that Li appears to stride both camps, affirming Maoist 

while persistently supporting the democratic values of eq

and freedom.89 This ambivalence gets at the crux of Ch

cultural dilemma as it struggles to reconcile its bias tow

collectivism and social control with the pressures for g

democratization without causing the country to disinte

into chaos.
It is also important to note that China’s desire to curb de

ratization and willingness to use coercion in the proces

evidence at Tiananmen Square and via the continued imp

ment and harsh treatment of political dissidents) are cons

with the underlying beliefs of its hierarchic culture. Acco

to Sun-Ki Chai and Aaron Wildavsky in their application 

Douglas group-grid model to predict the causes of politica

lence, hierarchists “see anyone who opposes the hierarchy 

threat to the group and to themselves [and] are likely to r

to coercion to control recalcitrant behavior.” 90

To US observers, these ambivalent and seemingly irra

domestic policies in China are confusing and, in many 

diametrically opposed to the American cultural mind-se

cording to Douglas’s group-grid model, the American way 

is oriented toward a much more individualistic view o

world. As such, American culture emphasizes “inalienable

“self-evident” rights to “life, liberty, and the pursuit of h

ness” as universal truths. Many Americans, therefore, hav

ficulty understanding China’s view on human rights, “

more on the collective good than on the rights of the in

ual.”91 Additionally, Geert H. Hofstede notes that “individ

societies not only practice individualism, but they also con

it superior to other forms of [culture].” 92 Thus, American

the spread of their individualist values (e.g., democracy 

liberty for all) as part of their “Manifest Destiny” and criti

US security and prosperity.93 As a result, US National Se

Strategy has made the promotion of democracy and free-m

economies around the world one of its core objectives.

Given the dangerous cultural gap with regard to democr

tion, how then should the United States proceed in devel

effective bilateral relations with China in a way that sup

the concerns and goals of both countries? First, Seymour 

tin Lipset argues the United States must recognize that “p

ing for immediate democratization is not necessarily the 

effective way to democratize, and that . . . in some cases n

mocratic, authoritarian rule may be advisable during perio

transition during which the social requisites of democratiz

can be further realized.”94 Indeed this seems to be the prev

attitude among many today in China. As Barnett notes, 

who favor political change [in China] hope for an increm
process of political liberalization leading in a democratic 

tion.”95

Additionally, the United States must realize that other e

ples of democratization in East Asia, while very different 

the American model, may be much more applicable to C

Barnett suggests, “the Taiwan and South Korean models, w

the progression from rapid economic growth to major 

change to the start of real democratization took two to 

decades, seem most relevant to China.” 96 Another rel

model is Singapore whose founding leader built a stabl

derly, and highly prosperous system based on a “benev

democratized authoritarianism.”97 As discussed earlier, th

tion of an incremental approach to cultural change as a w

avoid the potentially destabilizing and violent consequen

change is consistent with Douglas’s group-grid theory. Elli

Coyle, remarking on the group-grid concept, state that “r

than expecting dramatic changes when someone p

through no-man’s land from one culture to another, [one

recognize that the passage may involve only a series of m

incremental shifts in the weighting of preferences.” 98 Mo

portant, the United States must exercise caution and 

mindedness in its efforts to shape the international env

ment, recognizing that, to China’s leaders, the spre

Western values “is seen as a threat to China and to t

Chinese.”99 The Opium War occurred because the “British 

manded] China join the international order according to 

ern rules.”100 This triggered a series of turbulent chang

China that led to the downfall of the ancient empire and 

ously challenged the hierarchical way of life. As a resul

Chinese believe “China has experienced ‘a century of hu

ation’ at the hands of Western powers.” 101 This belief s

causes many Chinese leaders to “be hypersensitive to issu

national sovereignty or anything that might appear to be 

ference in China’s internal affairs.”102

Herein lies the great potential for conflict and miscalcula

in policy between the United States and China regardin

mocratization. As Alastair Johnston warns, while many s

ars have persistently argued that “China’s strategic cultu

essentially nonthreatening,” China believes, nevertheless

“the best way of dealing with security threats is to elim

them through the use of force.” 103 American military pla
and policy makers must carefully consider the cultural d

ences between the United States and China regarding su

sues as democratization. It is unclear just how far China w

with democratization, but the process is certain to b

proached slowly and cautiously. China’s form of democr

tion will be molded by its own biases and traditions, an

have the most chance of success when influenced, not fro

external source, but from “changes in the perceptions and 

tices of the Chinese people themselves.” 104

While the potential for conflict over such issues as demo

zation exists, most military observers in Asia and the U

States believe that “it will take China at least ten years b

they can acquire enough military power to threaten US 

ests.”105 An effective strategy for peacetime engagement 

the promise of not only deterring future conflict but a

securing a long-term strategic partnership between the U

States and China. Achieving this partnership requires th

leaders and planners strive to overcome the boom-bust 

digm of inconsistent relations with China and establish a c

ent and articulate strategy that addresses cultural differ

and their effect on strategic cooperation.

Conclusion

The avoidance of hostilities between any two parties lies 

ability of each to develop and sustain a mutual understand

and respect for the other’s challenges and aspirations. An u

standing of cultural theory and its implications for interna

relations is an important resource for US leadership in form

ing the types of exchanges and dialogues that will lead to 

structive partnering and resolution of differences.

In this paper, the author explains the important role 

culture plays in domestic and international relations. The u

the group-grid typology model shows how certain ways of lif

differ from others and illustrates the tensions inherent in 

transition from one way of life to another. The author als

plies this model to frame an analysis of China’s culture

transitional challenges that have shaped China’s way of lif

the last two hundred years, and the impact of culture on 

China relations and prospects for future strategic cooperati
In today’s dynamic strategic environment, with the exp

of global communications, new ideas are being promul

literally at the speed of light. The rapid-fire exchange of 

inevitably will drive new expectations, hopes, and fears as 

cultures grapple with their existing biases and patterns of 

relations in light of the new opportunities presented from 

worldviews. China stands at the forefront of this dilemm

tempting to adapt its traditional way of life to these oppor

ties while preserving its security and prosperity.

With a 1.4 billion population, an economy that has gro

to 9 percent annually, nuclear power, and a modernizing 

tary force, China is critically important to US National Se

Strategy and National Military Strategy. Building a strong 

tegic partnership with China demands that the United S

exert a constructive influence on China’s development by 

ing first to understand the powerful nature of China’s an

cultural traditions and the challenges faced by Chinese le

as their country transitions. Armed with this understan

US policy makers and military planners will be more effect

building strong bilateral communications, expanding trad

security links, and assisting in China’s full integration as 

leader in the international community.

Notes

1. Glen Fisher, Mindsets: The Role of Culture and Perception in Intern

Relations (Yarmouth, Maine: Intercultural Press, 1988), 1.

2. Ibid.

3. Ibid.

4. Joint Chiefs of Staff, National Military Strategy of the United St

America: Shape, Respond, Prepare Now: A Military Strategy for a Ne

(Washington, D.C.: Joint Chiefs of Staff, 1997), 1.

5. Paul M. Belbutowski, “The Strategic Implications of Cultures in Co

Parameters 26, no. 1 (Spring 1996): 34.

6. Jack S. Levy, “Misperception and the Causes of War: Theoretical Li

and Analytical Problems,” World Politics 36, no. 1 (October 1983): 99.

7. Fons Trompenaar, Riding the Waves of Culture (Chicago: Irwin P

ing, 1994), 6.

8. Ibid., 7.

9. Ibid.

10. Ibid., 25.

11. Edgar Schein, “What Is Culture,” in Reframing Organizational C

ed. Peter J. Frost et al. (Newbury Park, Calif.: Sage Publications, 1991), 25

12. Richard J. Ellis and Dennis J. Coyle, Politics, Policy and Culture 

der, Colo.: Westview Press, 1994), 2. The use of the term cultural theory 
paper is based on the argument presented by Richard Ellis and Dennis C

the introduction to their book, Politics, Policy and Culture. Ellis and Coyle 

that cultural theory should “create measures of culture that allow for co

sons across time and space and relate values and beliefs to social relatio

institutions. Fundamental to this method is the assumption that it is t

the mundane encounters of everyday life that we develop our values and 

and learn how our aspirations . . . are interrelated with our preferences 

social institutions and organizations.”

13. Michael Thompson, Richard Ellis, and Aaron Wildavsky, Cultural 

(Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1990), 1. The authors state that Am

anthropologists largely agree with this inclusive concept and refer rea

Ruth Benedict, Patterns of Culture (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1934).

14. Thompson, Ellis, and Wildavsky, 1.

15. Trompenaar, 24.

16. Thompson, Ellis, and Wildavsky, 2.

17. Clifford Geertz, The Interpretation of Cultures: Selected Essay

York: Basic Books, 1973), 27.

18. Belbutowski, 32.

19. Trompenaar, 29. Geert H. Hofstede supports this assertion in hi

Cultures and Organizations: Software of the Mind (New York: McGra

1997), 13. Hofstede cites the work of Ruth Benedict, Margaret Mead

Inkeles, and David Levinson as important contributors to this idea.

20. Thompson, Ellis, and Wildavsky, 5.

21. Mary Douglas, “Cultural Bias,” in In the Active Voice, ed. Mary D

(London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1982), 191.

22. Ibid., 203.

23. Thompson, Ellis, and Wildavsky, 6.

24. Ibid., 3.

25. Ibid., 6.

26. Ibid., 7.

27. Geertz, 27.

28. Trompenaar, 25.

29. Thompson, Ellis, and Wildavsky, 3.

30. Ibid., 69.

31. Ibid.

32. Douglas, 191.

33. John King Fairbank, China Perceived: Images and Policies in C

American Relations (New York: Alfred A. Knopf Publishers, 1974), 7.

34. A. Doak Barnett, US China Policy—Building a New Consensus (W

ton, D.C.: Center for Strategic and International Studies, 1994), 7.

35. Ibid., 44.

36. Ibid., 40.

37. John King Fairbank, China: A New History (Cambridge, Mass.: B

Press, 1992), 25.

38. Ibid., 32.

39. Ibid., 17.

40. John King Fairbank, China: The People’s Middle Kingdom and the 

(Cambridge, Mass.: Belknap Press, 1967), 7.

41. Ibid.

42. Fairbank, China: A New History, 18.
43. Yosef Lapid and Friedrich Kratochwil, eds., The Return of Cultu

Identity in IR Theory (Boulder, Colo.: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1996), 30

44. Kenneth Scott Latourette, The Chinese: Their History and Cultur

York: Macmillian, 1964), 400.

45. Lapid and Kratochwil, 28. This idea is also found in Mark Bort

Pacific Century: The Emergence of Modern Pacific Asia (Boulder, Colo.: W

Press, 1996), 30.

46. Borthwick, 30.

47. Fairbank, China: The People’s Middle Kingdom and the U.S.A., 8.

48. Ibid., 10.

49. Samuel Huntington, “The Clash of Civilizations?” in Strategic E

ment, vol. 4, eds. Gwen Story and Eva Hensley (Maxwell AFB, Al

Command and Staff College, October 1997), 48.

50. Ibid.

51. Ibid.

52. Ibid.

53. Ssu-yu Teng and John K. Fairbank, China’s Response to the W

Documentary Survey 1839–1923 (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University 

1954), 1.

54. Fairbank, China: The People’s Middle Kingdom and the U.S.A., 1

violent rebellions of 1850 in which Chinese peasants mobilized again

Peking dynasty highlighted the threat to the Chinese Confucian way of life

55. Trompenaar, 25.

56. Fairbank, China: The People’s Middle Kingdom and the U.S.A., 13

57. Ibid.

58. Ibid.

59. Ibid.

60. Ibid., 37.

61. Ibid.

62. Fairbank, China: A New History, 281.

63. Ibid., 288.

64. Ibid., 289.

65. Fairbank, China Perceived, 20.

66. Ibid.

67. Fairbank, China: The People’s Middle Kingdom and the U.S.A., viii

68. Borthwick, 404. Under the Communist Party’s 1950–1953 Land 

Movement, some 40 percent of China’s cultivated land changed hands a

lords were deposed and property was redistributed to peasantry assoc

that were consolidated under party control. By 1956, “over 90% of a

families had been organized into about 700,000 higher level Agricultur

ducer Cooperatives (APC). Peasants turned over the land and tools 

collective, receiving pay in the form of work points.”

69. Ronald N. Montaperto, “China Prepares for the Future: The Cha

for the United States,” in The Future of US-China Relations (Washington

Center for Strategic and International Studies, September 1992), 32.

70. Fairbank, China Perceived, 58.

71. Fairbank, China: The People’s Middle Kingdom and the U.S.A., xi.

72. Thompson, Ellis, and Wildavsky, 88.

73. Barnett, 6.

74. Montaperto, 32.
75. Ibid.

76. Ibid.

77. Ibid.

78. Barnett, 38.

79. Borthwick, 403.

80. Barnett, 38.

81. A National Security Strategy for a New Century (Washington

White House, October 1998), 43.

82. Susan M. Puska, “New Century, Old Thinking: The Dangers of P

tual Gap in US-China Relations” (Carlisle Barracks, Pa.: US Army War C

Strategic Studies Institute, 10 August 1998), 1.

83. Ibid., 2.

84. Ibid., 7.

85. Barnett, 39.

86. Ibid.

87. Puska, 12.

88. Thomas A. Metzgar, “The US Quest for Morality in Foreign Policy a

Issue of Chinese Democratization,” in Greater China and US Foreign Poli

Choice between Confrontation and Mutual Respect, eds. Thomas A. Metzg

Ramon H. Myers (Stanford, Calif.: Hoover Institute Press, 1996), 96.

89. Ibid.

90. Sun-Ki Chai and Aaron Wildavsky, “Culture, Rationality and Vio

in Politics, Policy and Culture, eds. Richard J. Ellis and Dennis J. Coyle 

der, Colo.: Westview Press, 1994), 170.

91. Puska, 12.

92. Hofstede, 71.

93. Puska, 7.

94. Summarization of Seymour Martin Lipset in his 1993 president

dress to the American Sociological Association, quoted in Metzgar, 87.

95. Barnett, 40.

96. Ibid.

97. Ibid.

98. Ellis and Coyle, 220.

99. Puska, 9.

100. Fairbank, China: The People’s Middle Kingdom and the U.S.A., 1

101. Kim R. Holmes and James J. Przystup, eds ., Between Diploma

Deterrence: Strategies for US Relations with China (Washington, D.C.: H

Foundation, 1997), 24.

102. Ibid.

103. Alastair I. Johnston, Cultural Realism: Strategic Culture and 

Strategy in Chinese History (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University 

1995), 214.

104. Nancy Bernkopf Tucker, “A Precarious Balance: Clinton and C

Current History, September 1998, 244.

105. Richard Halloran, “China: Restoring the Middle Kingdom,” Para

28, no. 2 (Summer 1998): 68.