IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA

MARK JACKSON : CIVIL ACTION

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:

v. :

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ROHM & HAAS COMPANY, et al. : NO. 05-4988

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

M. FAITH ANGELL January 20, 2011

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

On January 7, 2011, the Honorable Louis H. Pollak referred to me, for Report and

Recommendation, the Motion of Lori Hamlin and Nancy Mayo for an Injunction and/or to Hold

Mark Jackson in Contempt. See Docket Entry No. 263. Presently before me is the above- 1

mentioned motion and Plaintiffs Amended Response in Opposition. For the reasons stated below,

it is recommended that the motion be denied.

I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

As stated by the Third Circuit Court of Appeals,

This case’s lengthy history begins in state court. In 1999,

Jackson filed an invasion of privacy suit against his employer, Rohm

and Haas Company (“Rohm and Haas”), in the Pennsylvania Court

of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County. The ultimate outcome was

not favorable to Jackson: although the jury awarded Jackson

$150,000 in damages, the trial court granted Rohm and Haas’ motion

for judgment notwithstanding the verdict based on its determination

that the Pennsylvania Workers’ Compensation Act barred Jackson’s

privacy claim.

On September 19, 2003, shortly after the Pennsylvania

Hereinafter “Motion”.

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Superior Court affirmed the trial court’s decision, Jackson filed suit

against Rohm and Haas and its attorneys in federal court, asserting

violations of the RacketeerInfluenced and Corrupt Organizations Act

(RICO) and related common law claims based on the defendants’

alleged misconduct during the state court proceedings (“Jackson I”). 

Finding that Jackson lacked standing to bring the RICO claim, the

District Court dismissed the complaint on June 30, 2005.

On September 19, 2005, Jackson filed a second complaint

(“Jackson II”) against a longer list of defendants, including Harkins

Cunningham LLP (“Harkins”), the law firm that represented Rohm

and Haas in Jackson I, and Liberty Life Assurance Company of

Boston (“Liberty Life”), which allegedly suspended Jackson’s

disability benefits during his state and federal litigation in order to

harass and intimidate him. The defendants responded with a Rule 11

motion for sanctions. On March 9, 2006, 2006 WL 680933, the

District Court determined that the Jackson II complaint was

“unwarranted and frivolous within the meaning of Rule 11(b)(2)” and

sanctioned Jackson in the amount of two-thirds of the expenses and

attorney’s fees reasonably incurred by the defendants in preparing the

Rule 11 motion and related motions to dismiss. (App. at 123, 132.) 

Magistrate Judge Angell calculated the amount to be $81,710.99, and

the District Court adopted the sum.

Jackson proceeded to file a third federal complaint (“Jackson

[III]”), and, on April 21, 2008, the District Court referred the

protracted litigation to Judge Angell. Judge Angell required the

represented parties to attend, with counsel, a hearing held on May 22,

2008. At the hearing, Judge Angell expressed concerns regarding

Jackson’s counsel’s litigation tactics and ordered Jackson to

consolidate his second and third federal lawsuits into a single

Consolidated Amended Complaint (“CAC”) that would allege only

those claims for which Jackson had a good faith basis. Although

Judge Angell did not put a page limit on the CAC, she did caution, “I

would hesitate if I saw a consolidated document that was a hundred

pages or more.” (Id. at 1240.)

On June 11, 2008, Jackson filed the CAC - it was 152 pages

long and asserted 25 counts against 51defendants, 25 of whom were

“John Does.” The defendants filed a motion to dismissthe CAC with

prejudice, and Judge Angell issued an R & R recommending that the

motion be granted. Judge Angell found that the CAC’s length, its

failure to make allegations against specific defendants, and its

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“inflammatory and unwarranted conclusory allegations” violated

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8 and, by thwarting her prior orders,

also Rule 41(b). (Id. at 135.) Applying our decision in Poulis v. State

Farm Fire & Casualty Co., 747 F.2d 863, 868 (3d Cir. 1984), Judge

Angell concluded that at least five of the six Poulis factors weighed

in favor of dismissal: (1) Jackson’s presence at the May 22, 2008

hearing made him personally responsible for the CAC (App. at 146);

(2) the defendants were prejudiced by having to answer ten

complaints with claims that were frivolous and broad in scope (id. at

147); (3) Jackson’s “pattern of continued failure to file a proper

complaint” created a history of dilatoriness (id. at 148-49); (4)

Jackson’s refusal to file a proper CAC as directed “can only be

viewed as willful or in bad faith” (id. at 149); and (5) “no alternative

sanctions ... will be effective” in light of the fact that the previous

$80,000 fine was unsuccessful (id.). On March 19, 2009, 2009 WL

773936, the District Court adopted only part of the R & R; the Court

dismissed with prejudice 21 of the 25 claims in the CAC but,

applying the sixth Poulis factor, allowed those few claims that the

Court viewed as having colorable merit. (Id. at 73-74.)

Finally, Jackson filed three additional motions in the District

Court that are relevant to this appeal. First, prior to filing the CAC,

Jackson filed a motion to disqualify Harkins. Judge Angell denied

the motion, and the District Court confirmed the denial on March 20,

2009, 2009 WL 948741. Second, after filing the CAC, Jackson filed

a motion for a preliminary injunction to enjoin both the merger

between Rohm and Haas and The Dow Chemical Company, and the

acquisition of Liberty Life by Safeco Insurance Company. The

District Court adopted Judge Angell’s R & R and denied Jackson’s

motion on March 20, 2009. Lastly, Jackson filed a motion to vacate

the reference to Judge Angell pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §636(c)(4),

alleging bias. On March 19, 2009, the District Court denied the

motion: “[T]he record demonstrates not that Judge Angell has failed

to conduct the extended and elaborate proceedings capably, but,

rather, that the plaintiff, through his counsel, has handled his role in

the proceedings in a continuously counterproductive manner. Judge

Angell has fulfilled her responsibilities impeccably.” (Id. at 69.)

Jackson v. Rohm &Haas Company, et al., 2010 WL 601350 *344-345 (3d Cir. February 22, 2010). 

Mr. Jackson voluntarily dismissed the remaining counts of his consolidated amended complaint on

March 23, 2009. See Docket Entries No.252, 253. On March 24, 2009, Mr. Jackson filed a Notice

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of Appeal; thereby, removing this matter from this Court’s docket and jurisdiction. SeeDocket Entry

No. 254. On February 22, 2010, the Court of Appeals affirmed the District Court’s findings. Id.

at **6. Ultimately, Mr. Jackson filed a petition for writ of certiorari with the Supreme Court of the

United States. On October 4, 2010, his petition was denied. Jackson v. Rohm & Haas Company,

et al., 131 S. Ct. 206 (2010).

On November 2, 2010, Mr. Jackson filed yet another federal RICO lawsuit; however, this

time he sued in the United States District Court for the District of Delaware - Jackson v. The Dow

Chemical Company, et al., CA No. 10-938. See Motion, Exhibit B. Included in his eighteen

defendants, plus fifteen “John Does”, are Movants Lori Hamlin and Nancy Mayo. The “Factual

Allegations” in this Complaint include the following topics:

 1) The Original State Court Case

2) The First Federal Case (Jackson I)

3) The November 2004 Termination of Plaintiff’s Benefits

4) The Second Federal Case (Jackson II)

5) The Report to the Justice Department, Plaintiff’s Release to Return

to Work, and the Termination of Plaintiff’s Employment and Related

Benefits

6) The Third Federal Case (Jackson III)

7) Events occurring Subsequent to the Filing of the Original Jackson

III Complaint

8) The Decisions on Defendants’ Dispositive Motions and the

Termination of Plaintiff’s COBRA Benefits

9) Defendants’ Answers to the Jackson I-III Complaints

10) The Greenetz Affidavit, the ‘Discovery’ of the ‘Original’ Notes,

and Greenetz’ Answer to the Jackson I Complaint

11) There was Intentional Interference with, and repeated Failure and

Refusal to Provide, Handwriting Exemplars and/or Proper Normal

Course Writings for Royce Warrick, Esquire

12) The Greenetz Deposition/Exemplar

13) The Order of December 4, 2007, the Warrick Exemplar, and

Defendants’ Production of Normal Course Writings

14) The Hearing of January 8, 2008

15) The Order of March 13, 2008 and the Failure to Produce the ASO

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Agreements between Rohm and Haas Company and Liberty Life

Assurance Company of Boston

16) The Rohm and Haas Long-Term Disability (LTD) Plan is funded

from the General Assets of the corporation and therefore is not an

ERISA Governed Plan

17) Rohm and Haas Company’s Filings with the U.S. Securities and

Exchange Commission (SEC) have been a part of, and facilitated, the

Longstanding Pattern of Fraud and Litigation Misconduct

18) Liberty Mutual concealed the Jackson Cases from Regulatory

Authorities during its Acquisitions of Ohio CasualtyCorporation and

Safeco

19) Dismissal of the 21 of 25 Claims in the CAC as a Pleading

Violation and Dismissal of the Motion for Preliminary Injunction as

Moot

20) Dow’s Intentional Misdirection of Plaintiff’s Notice of the Class

Action Settlement Agreement in the Matter of Williams v. R&H

Pension Plan

21) Dow assumed the Role of R&H in the R&H/LibertyMutual Joint

Enterprise after the Close of the Merger.

 Id. The Delaware Complaint consists of the following counts:

Count 1 - Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act;

Mail/Wire Fraud

Count 2 - Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act,

Obstruction of Justice - 18 U.S.C. §1503 (catch all provision)

Count 3 - Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act,

Obstruction of Justice - 18 U.S.C. §1512(b)(1)

Count 4 - Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act,

Obstruction of Justice - 18 U.S.C. §1512(b)(2)

Count 5 - Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act,

Obstruction of Justice - 18 U.S.C. §1512(b)(3)

Count 6 - Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act,

Obstruction of Justice - 18 U.S.C. §1512©

Count 7 - Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act,

Obstruction of Justice - 18 U.S.C. §1512(k)

Count 8 - Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act,

Obstruction of Justice - 18 U.S.C. §1513(e)

Count 9 - Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act,

Obstruction of Justice - 18 U.S.C. §1513(f)

Count 10 - Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act,

Conspiracy - 18 U.S.C. §1962(d)

Count 11 - RacketeerInfluenced and Corrupt Organizations under the

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State of Indiana’s RICO Statute, Indiana Code Ann. §35-45-6-2

Count 12 - Americans with Disabilities Act

Count 13 - Americans with Disabilities Act, Retaliation

Count 14 - Abuse of Process

Count 15 - Fraud

Count 16 - Wrongful Discharge

Count 17 - Negligent Misrepresentation

Count 18 - Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress

Count 19 - Negligent Infliction of Emotional Distress

Id. All of the defendants in the Delaware matter have moved to transfer that case to this Court. Only

Ms. Hamlin and Ms. Mayo move for an injunction.

II. DISCUSSION

Ms. Hamlin and Ms. Mayo assert that this Court should enjoin Mr. Jackson from prosecuting

the Delaware action under the All Writs Act and also because the filing of the Delaware action

constitutes a contempt of this Court’s previous orders. See Motion at 11.

A. All Writ’s Act

The All Writs Act, 28 U.S.C. §1651(a), provides that:

The Supreme Court and all courts established by Act of Congress

may issue all writs necessary or appropriate in aid of their respective

jurisdictions and agreeable to the usages and principles of law.

In re Grand Jury Proceedings, 654 F.2d 268, 275 (3d Cir. 1981) (internal quotations omitted). “The

All Writs Act confers on courts extraordinary powers that are firmly circumscribed.” Grider v.

Keystone Health Plan Central, Inc., et al., 500 F.3d 322, 328 (3d Cir. 2007). “The Act . . . does not

vest plenary powerin the federal courts. Rather, it provides them with the procedural tools necessary

to exercise their limited jurisdiction. The language of the Act suggests two fundamental limitations

on its scope: the purpose of an order issued pursuant to the Act must be to aid the court in the

exercise of its jurisdiction, and the means selected must be comparable to a common law writ.” In

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re Grand Jury Proceedings, 654 F.2d at 275-276 (3d Cir. 2007). 

The broad authority that the Act invests in the federal courts

to utilize traditional equitable tools is not unlimited. The Act does

not create subject matter jurisdiction for courts where such

jurisdiction would otherwise be lacking. . . . Instead, the Act provides

courts with a procedural tool to enforce jurisdiction they have already

derived from anothersource. . . . It is settled that ... the All Writs Act,

by itself, creates no jurisdiction in the district courts. It empowers

them only to issue writs in aid of jurisdiction ... acquired on some

other independent ground.

Burr & Forman, et al. v. Blair, et al., 47 F.3d 1019, 1027 (11 Cir., 2006) (internal quotations and th

citations omitted). Usually, the All Writs Act has been used by federal courts to enjoin actions by

state courts that threaten the federal court’s jurisdiction. See Grider, 500 F.3d at 328 (3d Cir. 2007). 

“The All Writs Act empowers a federal court to enjoin a party before it from attempting to relitigate

an issue in a state court to prevent any interference with the federal court’s judgment.” A. J. Foyt,

Jr., et al. v. Championship Auto Racing Teams, Inc., 947 F.Supp. 290, 294 (S.D.Texas, 1996). 

Nonetheless, “[d]istrict courts have discretion to enjoin the filing of related lawsuits in other U. S.

district courts”. Municipal Energy Agency of Mississippi v. Big Rivers Electric Corporation, 804

F.2d 338, 343 (5 Cir., 1986). “However, such injunctions are extreme remedies that should be th

narrowly tailored and sparingly used.” Butera, Beausang, Cohen &Brennan, P.C. v. Ryan, 2000WL

1824171 *3 (E.D.Pa. December 11, 2000).

There is “general judicial reluctance to enjoin a party from proceeding with a suit in another

district or state in the absence of specific conditions that do not apply here”. Transcore, LP v. Mark 2

As the Honorable Gene E. K. Pratter opined:

2

In Cenergy Corporation v. Bryson Oil & Gas P.L.C., 657 F.Supp. 867 (D. Nev.

1987), the court surveyed various district court and circuit court decisions and set

forth a useful framework for analyzing a request to restrain proceedings in another

federal district:

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IV Industries Corp., 2009 WL 3365870 (E.D. Pa., October 15, 2009). The Act is generally used to

prohibit activities in another court that threaten to undermine a pending settlement in the enjoining

court. See Grider, 500 F.3d at 330 (3d Cir. 2007). 

There is no pending settlement in this Court concerning this matter; in fact, there is no

controversy before the Eastern District of Pennsylvania concerning Mr. Jackson at all. The majority

of the claims raised in this Court by Mr. Jackson were dismissed with prejudice by the Honorable

Louis H. Pollak pursuant to Opinion and Order dated March 19, 2009. See Docket Entry No. 247. 

The remainder of the claims were voluntarily dismissed by Mr. Jackson on March 23, 2009. See

Docket Entries No. 252, 253. Upon leaving the jurisdiction of this Court, Mr. Jackson proceeded

to the Third Circuit Court of Appeals then to the Supreme Court of the United States, both of which

resolved the issues before them. Mr. Jackson has filed his most recent complaint in the District of

Delaware, which will provide him with an adequate remedy at law of his claims raised there. The

Writ is not indispensable to the resolution of Mr. Jackson’s claims by the District of Delaware. This

is a case in which a plaintiff has decided to pursue his interests in a particular court; it is not a case

that will interfere with the Eastern District of Pennsylvania’s “own path to judgment”. Grider, 500

F.3d at 333 (3d Cir. 2007). There is no interference with the judgment of this court, nor is its

jurisdiction threatened. Furthermore, the framework described by Judge Pratter (see Footnote 2) has

First, the court issuing the restraining order or injunction must be the court in which

the action is first filed. That is, only the court which has initial jurisdiction over the

parties and the subject matter has the power to enjoin subsequent lawsuits. In

addition, the parties and the causes of action in the subsequent lawsuit must be

identical to those in the initial suit for the injunction to issue. Finally, the party

seeking the injunction must ask the second court to stay its prosecution in view of

the first action before injunctive relief is appropriate. Only after the stay is sought

and denied by the second court may a party then approach the first court for the

injunction.

Transcore, L.P. v. Mark IV Industries Corp., 2009 WL 3365870 *8 (E.D.Pa. October 15, 2009).

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not been followed. It is true that Mr. Jackson first presented his claims to our court. Though

admittedly several of the claims in the District of Delaware action refer back to those claims, the

causes of action are not identical. There is no indication that the District of Delaware has been asked

to stay its prosecution in view of Mr. Jackson’s previous presence in the Eastern District of

Pennsylvania, nor that a request to stay has been denied.

I can discern no basis to justify this Court’s use of its writ authority to grant the remedy Ms.

Hamlin and Ms. Mayo request. The extreme remedy of intervention by the Eastern District of

Pennsylvania ia into the proceeding of another federal court is not required. I recommend that this

Court decline to exercise its writ authority in this matter. See Butera, Beausang, Cohen &Brennan,

P.C., 2000 WL 1824171 *3 (E.D.Pa. December 11, 2000).

B. Contempt of this Court’s Orders

“To prove civil contempt the court must find that (1) a valid court order existed, (2) the

defendant had knowledge of the order, and (3) the defendant disobeyed the order.” John T. v. The

Delaware County Intermediate Unit, 318 F.3d 545, 552 (3d Cir. January 30, 2003) (internal

quotations omitted). “In order to justify a contempt remedy, the provisions of the order which were

allegedly violated must be clear and all ambiguities must be resolved in favor of the alleged

contemnor.” Synthes Spine Company, L.P. v. Walden, et al., 2006 WL 3053317 *11 (E.D.Pa.

October 23, 2006). “To establish civil contempt, it is not necessary to establish that the

noncomplying party acted willfully or in bad faith. . . .[T]he purpose is not to punish the contemnor

but rather to enforce compliance with an order of the court or to compensate for losses or damages

sustained by reason of noncompliance.” Concerned Citizens of Bridesburg, et al. v. Philadelphia,

1987 WL 6013 *3 (E.D.Pa. January 28, 1987).

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The final Order entered by this Court in this matter reads:

AND NOW, this 19 day of March, 2009, after review of the th

Report and Recommendation of Judge M. Faith Angell and the

responses of the parties, it is hereby ORDERED that:

1. The December 16, 2008 Report and Recommendation of

Magistrate Judge Angell (Docket No. 230) is APPROVED and

ADOPTED IN PART.

2. Plaintiff’s Objections (Docket No. 234) are OVERRULED.

3. The Rohm & Haas Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss the

Consolidated Amended Complaint (Docket No. 170) and the Liberty

Life Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss the Consolidated Amended

Complaint (Docket No. 171) are GRANTED IN PART and DENIED

IN PART:

a. Counts I - XV of the Consolidated Amended complaint

(CAC) (Docket No. 168) are DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE;

b. Counts XVII and XIX of the CAC are DISMISSED as to

defendants Raj Gupta, Robert Lonergan, and Ellen Friedell;

c. Counts XX - XXV of the CAC are DISMISSED WITH

PREJUDICE.

4. Plaintiff will be permitted to file a second consolidated amended

complaint that pleads any of the remaining claims from the CAC that

he elects to pursue; this amended complaint is to be filed by April 6,

2009.

5. On or before April 27, 2009, defendants are to file responses to

this second CAC.

6. Pursuant to the court’s Memorandum/Order of Sept. 12, 2007

(Docket No. 125), 28 U.S.C. §636©, and the Opinion and Order of

this court dated March 19, 2009 denying plaintiff’s motion to vacate

the reference, this case remains assigned to Magistrate Judge M. Faith

Angell.

Opinion and Order (Docket Entry No. 247). Rather than filing a second consolidated amended

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complaint, Mr. Jackson chose to voluntarily dismiss the remaining counts in his first amended

consolidated complaint. See Docket Entries No. 252, 253. The only specific conduct this Order

required of Mr. Jackson was to file a second consolidated amended complaint, if he so chose. Rather

than choosing to do that, he voluntarily dismissed the remaining claims. There has been no violation

of this court’s order for which Mr. Jackson can be held in contempt.

III. CONCLUSION

For the reasons stated above, I recommend that the motion of Defendants Lori Hamlin and

Nancy Mayo for an injunction and/or to hold Mark Jackson in contempt be denied.

BY THE COURT:

 S/M. FAITH ANGELL__ 

M. FAITH ANGELL

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA

Robert N. C. Nix, Sr. Federal Building, S/211

900 Market Street

PHILADELPHIA, PENNSYLVANIA 19107

 Chambers of

 M. FAITH ANGELL P: (215) 597-6079

 United States Magistrate Judge F: (215) 580-2165

 FAX / MAIL COVER SHEET

CASE NO: 05-4988 DISTRICT COURT JUDGE: LP

TODAY’S DATE: January 20, 2011 LAW CLERK’S INITIALS:LFS 

VIA FAX;

NAME: FAX NUMBER:

1. Colleen Healy Simpson, Esq. ((215) 851-6710

Eleanor Morris Illoway, Esq.

John G. Harkins, Jr., Esq.

Steven A. Reed, Esq.

2. Michael Miller, Esq. (215) 988-2757

Daniel B. Scott, Esq.

Grant E. Nichols, Esq.

Jason P. Gosselin, Esq.

VIA MAIL:

NAME AND ADDRESS:

1. Mr. Mark Jackson

104 West Shunk Street

Box 16A

Philadelphia, PA 19148