AIR WAR COLLEGE

AIR UNIVERSITY

A Separate Space Force

An 80-Year-Old Argument

MICHAEL C. WHITTINGTON, CHAPLAIN

Colonel, USAF

Air War College

Maxwell Paper No. 20

MAXWELL AIR FORCE BASE, ALABAMA

May 2000

AIR UNI V ERSITY
Disclaimer

Opinions, conclusions, and recommendations expressed or implied within are

solely those of the author and do not necessarily represent the views of Air

University, the United States Air Force, the Department of Defense, or any other

US government agency. Cleared for public release: distribution unlimited.

ii

This Maxwell Paper, and others in the series, is

available electronically at the Air University

Research web site http://research.maxwell.af.mil

under “Research Papers” then “Special Collections.”
Foreword

Since the end of the Gulf War, the debate over whether

there should be a separate space service, equal with the

Air Force, Army, and Navy, has grown in proportion to the

indispensable value of space operations to our nation’s

defense. Increasing dependency on space-systems is a

fact of military life. In this well-documented essay, Col

Michael C. Whittington compares the leading arguments

for a separate space force to the cogent arguments for an

independent air force made by airpower advocates during

the interwar years of 1920–1940. The airpower issues in

1920 and the space power issues of today are strikingly

similar, revolving around four key issues: leadership, doctrine, technology, and funding. The irony, of course, is

that these arguments, which helped create an independent air force in 1947, are challenged by many within

today’s Air Force leadership, which leads Colonel

Whittington to ask, “If they were cogent in 1920, would

they not be relevant today?”

Interestingly, the author, though a professional Air

Force officer, is neither a space operator nor a pilot.

Colonel Whittington’s purpose is not to propose a separate

space force but rather to provide the reader with an unbiased perspective of the arguments for and against.

Though all agree that aerospace power is at a critical

juncture, senior leaders are divided as to which direction

the Air Force should pursue regarding space. Space separatists want space warfare freed from control of “air” commanders, argue that space power doctrine cannot be built

upon airpower doctrine, contend that space is a wholly

different technological medium, and want to free space

funding from competition with Air Force fighter and

bomber programs.

Whichever road is taken—whether a separate space

force or an Air Force with a greater emphasis in space—

the shift from an airpower to a space power culture is

inevitable. And, when this shift occurs, the author argues,

the Air Force “would do well to remember its own history.”

iii
As with all Maxwell Papers, this study is provided in the

spirit of academic freedom, open debate and serious consideration of the issues. We encourage your responses.

DAVID F. MacGHEE, JR.

Major General, USAF 

Commandant, Air War College

iv
About the Author

Col Michael C. Whittington is an Air Force chaplain who

has served in every chaplain leadership position at the

wing level and as chief of the Education Division at the

Chaplain Service Institute. His academic degrees include a

bachelor of arts from Oklahoma Christian University of

Science and Arts, a master of science and a master of

divinity from Abilene Christian University, and an earned

doctorate from Saint Paul School of Theology. He graduated with honors from both the Air Command and Staff

College (residence) in 1990 and the Air War College (seminar) in 1993, and is currently a resident student at the Air

War College.

v
A Separate Space Force

An 80-Year-Old Argument

At the close of World War I, the Army General Staff viewed military aviation as a servant of ground forces. . . . As a result,

advocates of new roles and missions for aviation, such as Billy

Mitchell, sought organizational independence to implement

their ideas.

—Sen Bob Smith (R-N.H.)

In 1972 Dr. Werner von Braun predicted, “One hundred

years from now, people will look back and wonder how

man could ever have managed his affairs on this planet

without the tools provided by the space program. That

there ever could have been a world without spacecraft will

be just as difficult for them to perceive as for us to imagine living in a world without telephones or airliners.”1

Considering the dependency of the United States military

on America’s space program, Pentagon officials would differ with Dr. Von Braun: It took less than two decades.

In the 18 years following Von Braun’s prediction, the US

military gradually became dependent on space assets for

operational wartime support, a fact that few senior military

leaders seemed to grasp. Their level of awareness would

change dramatically on 17 January 1991, when, during

the first 14 hours of Operation Desert Storm, more than

1,200 combat sorties were flown and 106 cruise missiles

were launched.2 The Gulf War “represented the first major

trial by fire for space forces, whereby military space systems could fulfill their promise as crucial ‘force multipliers.’”3 As Gen Thomas S. Moorman said, “Desert Storm . . .

opened the eyes of senior military leaders. Now, space is

like air-conditioning—everyone who needs and wants

information from space wonders how we ever got along

without it.”4 Since the end of the war on 28 February 1991,

the debate over whether space should become a separate

service, equal with the Air Force, Army, and Navy, has

grown in proportion to its indispensable value to our

nation’s defense. 

1
Though some senior military and political leaders have

expressed opposing views, everyone agrees that the era of

space-system dependency has arrived. Some Air Force

leaders, such as Gen Charles A. “Chuck” Horner, the air

commander of the Gulf War and former commander of the

United States Space Command (USSPACECOM), considers

the process a healthy one. He advised senior leadership to

“talk about it, debate it.”5

Interestingly, the debate itself sounds very similar to the

cogent arguments for an independent Air Force made by

senior airmen in the interwar years of 1920–1940. The

irony, of course, is that the same arguments that helped

create an independent Air Force in 1947 are challenged by

many within today’s Air Force leadership. Space separatists would argue that these senior airmen are still dominated by the culture of the “manned strategic bomber,”

and any new missions, to include space, would have to

serve that culture.6 If the accusation is accurate, the Air

Force’s view of military space is strikingly reminiscent of

General of the Army John J. Pershing’s perception that the

primary mission of airpower was to support the Army commander. “[If] success is to be expected,” he argued, “the

military air force must be controlled in the same way,

understand the same discipline, and act in accordance

with the Army commander under precisely the same conditions as the other combat arms.”7

Though there have been many arguments postulated as

to why Congress and the Department of Defense (DOD)

ought to consider an independent space force, the debate

seems to focus on four issues: leadership, doctrine, technology, and funding. The issue of leadership is central and

is corroborated by the tangential issues of doctrine, technology, and funding. 

Space separatists firmly believe that in order for military

space to reach its potential, those who command Air Force

space organizations must be experienced space operators

who have risen within the rank and file of the space community and, therefore, clearly understand this new dimension of warfare. In the absence of experienced space leaders, space power theory and doctrine will continue to be

built on airpower theory and doctrine, space systems will

2 A SEPARATE SPACE FORCE
be limited to an information-support role, and innovative

weapon technology will not be funded. 

The purpose of this paper is not to propose that the

United States establish a separate space force, however

inevitable that may be, but to compare the arguments

articulated during the interwar years for an independent

air force with the reasons offered today for a separate

space force. Even a cursory review reveals that the arguments are strikingly similar, which leads to the logical

question: “If they were cogent in 1920, would they not be

relevant today?”

Leadership

To leave aviation essentially under the dominance and direction of another department is to absolutely strangle its development, because it will be looked on by them merely as an

auxiliary and not as a principal thing.

—Gen William “Billy” Mitchell, 1919

Long before aviation was proven to be a substantial military power, airmen believed that the key to obtaining victory through airpower lay in establishing an independent

air force “free of control by surface commanders and led by

airmen possessing special expertise.”8 All notable airpower

enthusiasts agreed. British Air Marshall Sir Hugh

Trenchard, the first chief of the Royal Air Force and its

commander from 1919 to 1930, believed the airplane to be

an inherently strategic weapon that must be employed to

“break the morale of factory workers by targeting enemy

industry.”9 As early as 1914, Giulio Douhet of Italy was

arguing that the airplane could become a dominant

weapon only if “freed from the fetters of ground commanders who did not understand [the] new invention.”10

Consequently, only an airman could understand and

employ its use. 

Only Airmen Can Understand Airpower

America’s most vocal advocate of airpower and one

who bitterly complained that Army officers “did not know

what airpower meant”11 was Brig Gen William “Billy”

WHITTINGTON 3
Mitchell. Agreeing with Trenchard that the airplane was,

at its core, a strategic weapon, Mitchell proposed dividing

the air contingent of the American Expeditionary Force

(AEF) into tactical and strategic arms. When General

Pershing authorized only 59 tactical squadrons in 1917

(excluding the strategic arm altogether), Mitchell bitterly

complained. His adamant belief that airpower’s primary

mission was strategic bombardment, not tactical close air

support to the ground forces, soon became the basis for

his argument for an independent air force, separate from

Army control. 

Many of these airmen, not the least of whom was

Mitchell, were considered radical by the War Department.

Pershing’s chief of staff, Maj Gen James W. McAndrew,

was unmistakably clear in a War Department memo

admonishing air officers who stressed independent air

operations. The memo read: “It is therefore directed that

these officers be warned against any idea of independence

and that they be taught from the beginning that their

efforts must be closely coordinated with those of the

remainder of the Air Service and those of the ground

army.”12 When Mitchell was pointedly asked by

Congressman C. Bauscom Slemp, on 4 January 1921, why

he was unable to convince the Army senior staff of the

necessity of an independent air force, Congressman Louis

C. Cramton interrupted and exclaimed that Mitchell “simply could not get their ear.”13 Mitchell agreed. Airpower

advocates never doubted that tactical airpower enabled

success on the battlefield. They simply argued that nonflyers had little appreciation or understanding for the airplane’s unique capabilities (e.g., its strategic application)

and therefore would limit its potential.14

Space Leadership Demands Operational Experience

Just as the early flyers had a difficult time persuading

senior Army officers to allow airmen to lead the air forces,

so the struggle to get space experts into positions of leadership at the USSPACECOM and Air Staff has been a long

and mostly unsuccessful journey. Gen Howell M. Estes III,

former commander of USSPACECOM, complained that

even when space experts actually were assigned to Air

4 A SEPARATE SPACE FORCE
Staff, they were a “lone voice in the wind.”15 Unfortunately,

potential space leaders will never be realized until the Air

Force undergoes a “painful ‘cultural change’ in which

space flight operations are as important to the rank and

file as aeronautics and aviation.”16

Limited promotion beyond colonel within the space community has fueled the controversy and sent an unmistakable message that space officers are not competitive with

their rated colleagues for promotion to general officer.

Henry Cooper, former chief of the Strategic Defense

Initiative Organization, alluded to the transfer of Maj Gen

William R. Looney III from Langley’s First Fighter Wing to

become director of operations for the Air Force Space

Command (AFSPACECOM), as symptomatic of the problem.17 Sen Bob Smith (R-N.H.) expressed his concern that

the Air Force’s practice of sending nonspace officers to lead

space organizations would undermine the development of

a true space power culture. The numbers substantiate his

apprehension. Of the 11 general officers at AFSPACECOM,

none are career space officers, which prompted Smith to

quip, “How many general officers at Air Combat Command

are not command pilots?”18

The Air Force, however, is initiating changes that

should, one day, help to remedy the situation. Although

AFSPACECOM is a full operational command, the Air

Force continues to launch programs to get space experts

into war-fighting positions. As Secretary of the Air Force F.

Whitten Peters explained, “One of the lessons learned from

Kosovo is that we didn’t have people trained to work at the

Air Operations Center (AOC) at the levels we needed. We

need to standardize the AOC and turn it into a weapons

system.”19 With the AOC as the heart of the combat air

force, opening up opportunities for career officers to gain

operational experience as space leaders is a step in the

right direction, though critics argue that it is too little, too

late. Col Vic Budura, former Space Chair at the Air War

College, lamented: “It is probable that the first commander of the [Space] Force (circa 2025) will be a young lieutenant in the first class of the Air and Space Basics Course

in 1999.”20

WHITTINGTON 5
Where Is Space’s Billy Mitchell? 

Part of the problem is the absence of a space leader with

the charisma of a Billy Mitchell or a Hap Arnold. Mitchell

addressed the War Department, Congress, special aircraft

boards, and the public in an all-out effort to educate and

persuade the nation of the value of airpower and the need

for an independent air force. Even the White House was

aware of his fervor. Mitchell’s headlines in the press tended to “swell the mailbags of members of Congress, thus

producing indirectly flurries of what President Calvin

Coolidge contemptuously called ‘Mitchell Resolutions.’”21

But at least Mitchell, as assistant chief of the Air Service

in 1921, held a rank commensurate to his position. 

When the Second World War began, Arnold, just promoted to lieutenant general, was appointed to the United

States Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Anglo-American

Combined Chiefs of Staff, an “unprecedented recognition

that the air force was equal to and independent of sea and

land power.”22 Moreover, General Arnold was to play a critical role in gaining independence for the air force, rising

through the ranks to become the Chief of the Air Corps.

Conversely, there has never been a commanding general at

AFSPACECOM who has a heritage in space. 

Without space advocates in key leadership positions

(and wearing the commensurate rank), military space may

never be fully exploited. Regardless of charisma, a colonel

just doesn’t have the clout to contend with the Air Staff.

Fortunately for the future of the Air Force, the Army did

promote a few airmen to a rank where their voice could be

heard in the War Department, albeit grudgingly. The Air

Force, however, has not taken the initiative to groom its

space leaders in the 17-year history of Space Command.

As Budura explained, “Even though we’ve had a space

command since 1 September 1982, a whole generation of

potential leaders in space operations has been lost or at

least not mentored to assume the mantle of future responsibility.”23 Granted, a viable space presence within the

ranks of the senior leadership would not be a cure-all, but

it would at least be the beginning of a legitimate effort to

exploit this new dimension of warfare.

6 A SEPARATE SPACE FORCE
The Fourth Dimension of Warfare

Perhaps the mistaken notion that space is merely an

extension of the atmosphere has lulled the Air Force into

believing that an airman can lead space forces as well as

an experienced space operator. Air and space, of course,

are not an indivisible whole. Space has introduced a fourth

dimension into warfare just as air introduced a third. 

The early air theorists exerted enormous energy persuading the military leaders of their day that enemy governments, industry, and people, previously shielded by

their armies, were now vulnerable to attack by air. “A

nation’s nerve system,” B. H. Liddell Hart wrote, is “no

longer covered by the flesh of its troops.”24 Mitchell corroborated Liddell Hart’s assessment when he wrote, “We

have launched ourselves into what we call the air, a fluid

that covers the whole earth like a deep blanket. Wherever

this blanket extends, there we can go. As it covers the

whole world, all places are accessible to the flyer.”25 And

again, “[It] is a common medium all over the world. It is

bounded by no oceans, mountains, rivers or deserts.”26

True, space vastly extends Mitchell’s metaphorical “blanket,” but the analogy ends there. 

Access to the air is as simple as “throwing a rock or a

glider,”27 but we have no immediate access to space. The

air realm, which varies with altitude, is a medium of dense

substance, screened from cosmic radiation, and finite,

whereas space is void of substance, immersed in radiation,

and infinite.28 These variances demand significant differences in technology in order to navigate in these mediums.

Correspondingly, they require an altogether different

expertise and training. With similar leadership skills, a soldier trained in heavy artillery could lead USSPACECOM as

well as a pilot trained in aeronautics. An experienced

space operator, however, with commensurate rank and

comparable leadership skills, would have a clear advantage over both.

The history of airpower is a history of the airman having

the freedom to capitalize on the airplane’s unique capabilities. Mitchell bemoaned the Army’s efforts to restrict aviation to battlefield support because he understood the

strategic power of the airplane. Military airpower advoWHITTINGTON 7
cates, from Mitchell to Arnold to the present day, have tendered sound arguments defending the fact that an “airman” is clearly the best choice to lead an “air force.” Dr.

Douglas Freeman, a renowned military historian who twice

won the Pulitzer Prize, delivered a lecture at the Naval War

College in 1949 in which he succinctly said the most

important quality of a leader was, “know your stuff.”29

Eight decades of military aviation history have corroborated this simple truth. Likewise, to fully exploit space, the

leader must know his stuff.

Doctrine

At the heart of warfare lies doctrine. It represents the central

beliefs for waging war in order to achieve victory. Doctrine . . .

is the building material for strategy. It is fundamental to sound

judgment.

—Gen Curtis Emerson LeMay, 1968

By the mid-1920s, airmen believed that airpower had

altered the nature of war and that the time had come for

an independent service led by airmen. After eight years of

arduous work, the Army Air Corps issued its first doctrine

publication in 1926 describing in precise terms how military aviation could decisively win the next war. But the

War Department, dominated by ground combat officers,

changed the doctrine entirely. Training Regulation (TR)

440-15, Fundamental Principles for the Employment of the

Air Service, relegated the role of aviation to “aid the ground

forces to gain decisive success.”30 What ensued were two

decades of debate.

Inordinate Focus on Service Survival

Dr. James Mowbray believes that this “long, drawn-out,

often bitter struggle between airmen and nonairmen . . .

produced a paranoid state of mind in airmen that has been

transmitted from one generation of airmen to the next. It

has been this paranoia that has been largely responsible

for keeping modern airmen focused on ‘survival of the

service’ [and] it persists to this day.”31 Fifty years after the

Air Force became a separate service, its doctrine continued

8 A SEPARATE SPACE FORCE
to reflect this distrust. “The US Air Force’s assigned mission is to ‘organize, train, equip, and provide forces for the

conduct of prompt and sustained combat operations in the

air’ . . . not in support of other tasks as with air arms of the

other services but as its sole reason for being.” (Emphasis

in original)32

One could argue that this inordinate focus on service

survival has subconsciously prevented today’s Air Force

from an objective discussion on the future of space. All

military senior staffs understand that the “era of spacesystem dependency has arrived.”33 But the Air Force, by

virtue of its predominant role in space, is the only service

culture that could legitimately be threatened. The USAF

publication, Global Engagement may have contributed to

this anxiety when it wrote that the air and space force was

on an evolutionary path to a space and air force.34 Soon

after, the terminology changed. Some would argue that the

regressive change in wording from “air and space” back to

“aerospace” is symptomatic of this paranoia. 

Need For Intellectual Debate

A further symptom may be the absence of an academic

environment, similar to the Air Corps Tactical School

(ACTS),35 where space operators could engage in intellectual debate and begin to articulate a true space doctrine.36

The Air Force Space Warfare Center and the Space

Battlelab could evolve into a viable space warfare school,

but they are presently focused on “putting information into

the cockpit,” not exploiting the promise of space power.37

Though space courses are included in the Air Command

and Staff College and the Air War College curricula, the

predominant foci, and understandably so, are the theory,

strategy, and doctrine of airpower.

Space Power Doctrine Cannot Be

Built On Airpower Doctrine

The Air Force has taken traditional airpower terms and

freely applied them to space. Offensive counterair becomes

offensive counterspace; air superiority becomes space

superiority; and, airlift becomes spacelift.38 Just as airWHITTINGTON 9
power independence was hampered by the prevailing Army

culture, which lacked the expertise to articulate a “wellreasoned, universal set of principles about the proper use

of air power,”39 so space power theory and doctrine cannot

be built on an aviation foundation.40 Space operations are

as fundamentally different from air operations as air is

from ground operations. If space power is to be fully

exploited, it must not be squeezed into an air mold.41

In December 1919, Mitchell protested to Congress, “To

leave aviation essentially under the dominance and direction

of another department is to absolutely strangle its development, because it will be looked on by them merely as an auxiliary and not as a principal thing.”42 Doctrine drives technology, and until there is a cadre of space experts similar to

those who developed airpower doctrine between 1920 and

1940 at the ACTS, space technology will continue to focus on

supporting the ground, sea, and air warrior.

Technology

With India, China, Russia, and many private companies rapidly crowding into space, keeping the U.S. edge will require

more than technological superiority. That’s why the Pentagon

is tiptoeing down the path toward space warfare.

— Richard J. Newman

In calling for an offensive use of space, Senator Smith

exclaimed, “With a credible offensive and defensive space

control, we will deter and dissuade our adversaries, reassure our allies, and guard our nation’s growing reliance on

global commerce. . . . Without it, we will become vulnerable beyond our worst fears.”43 Mitchell would have agreed.

In one of his many testimonies before Congress, he

explained that a strong offensive and defensive air force

were absolutely essential to the security of the United

States for two reasons: first, to combat any would-be

enemy, and second, to protect American commerce.44

The Emergence of Space Power

In rebuttal, critics of an independent air force claimed

airpower was merely a new weapon of warfare and as such

10 A SEPARATE SPACE FORCE
did not warrant a separate service, but the faculty at the

ACTS believed otherwise. Capt Robert Webster of the ACTS

faculty candidly wrote, “Airpower is not a new weapon of

warfare. It cannot be likened to the rifle, the machine gun,

or the cannon. . . . It constitutes a new force, as separate

from land power and sea power as each is separated from

the other.”45 Mitchell added, “The air is a common medium

all over the world. It is bounded by no oceans, mountains,

rivers or deserts.”46 Reminiscent of Mitchell’s critics, some

senior leaders today consider space solely as an “enabler”

that supports all warriors,47 while others understand it to

be a wholly other medium of warfare, inevitably bound for

force application.48 Just as sea power and airpower

emerged as uniquely separate forms of military power, so

“space power is on the threshold of something much more

prominent.”49

The Threat To Space

Former Air Force chief of staff Gen Ronald Fogleman

reminded the Air Force, “When you think about protecting

this nation’s global interests, you have to remember it

starts with space.”50 Dependence on space is growing

exponentially and with it, the need to protect United States

national interests. Political and military leaders agree that

space weapons will probably be needed in the future to

protect American interests, but there is little reason to

defend satellites now.51 However, those who believe an

adversary would have a difficult time taking down the

NAVSTAR (navigation satellite timing and ranging) Global

Positioning System (GPS) satellite constellation should

study the history of warfare and the innovative response to

every revolution of military affairs (RMA). The 24-satellite

GPS constellation does pose a formidable challenge to

those who would seek to degrade it, but “GPS has become

so critically important to U.S. military performance that

U.S. enemies must be extraordinarily strongly motivated to

try to meet the challenge.”52 Dr. Colin Gray and John B.

Sheldon remind us that “physics textbooks have a way of

dating rapidly; both heavier-than-air flight and the atomic

bomb were proclaimed by distinguished experts to be

impossible.”53

WHITTINGTON 11
Technology proliferation, asymmetric strategy,

increased commercialization of space, and terrorism in the

hands of rogue states and substates are considerable challenges to the United States. Barry R. Schneider describes

the most dangerous group of these rogue states as

“NASTIs”—Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical (NBC)

Arming Sponsors of Terrorism and Intervention.54 There

are 195 states presently on the planet, seven of which have

declared nuclear capabilities. Terrorism still remains the

“weapon of the weak,” but when combined with nuclear

and ballistic missile technologies, it becomes a serious

matter of national security. Any one of these NASTIs could

attach a crude nuclear device to a rocket and “fry every

satellite in low Earth orbit.”55

Defending Military and Commercial Space

General Estes asserted, “It is not the future of military

space that is critical to the United States—it is the continued commercial development of space that will provide

continued strength critical for our great country in the

decades ahead.”56 The context of the general’s remarks did

not imply an abdication of the military from space, but

rather a bona fide cooperation with commercial space in

order to work within the present economic constraints.

The nation’s military will be called upon to protect the

DOD space assets but also commercial systems, which are

essential to economic stability. US companies are projected to invest $500 billion in space by 2010,57 and the US

military must be prepared to defend these space assets

just as the American Navy protected sea commerce in the

eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. 

As early as 1993, General Horner told the Senate Armed

Services Committee, “Tomorrow’s national military strategy must fundamentally accept that potential adversaries

with the capabilities to do so will conduct military hostilities beyond the terrestrial arena, and into the limits of

space.”58 It is naive to oppose a vigorous space force based

upon the faulty premise that our space assets will never be

challenged. 

12 A SEPARATE SPACE FORCE
Funding

You [Congress] have two considerations to think about. One is

the amount of money you should put into something, and, the

other, how much you can get out of it.

—Gen William “Billy” Mitchell, 1921

Whether developing air or space power, there is one

immutable fact—it takes money. On 4 January 1921, Billy

Mitchell appeared before Congress asking for an increase

to the $33 million already allocated to the Air Service.

Mitchell reasoned, “In order to apportion the money for

national defense properly, we should make an accurate

estimate of all of the capabilities of each branch of the

service, that is, what the Army can do, what the Navy can

do, and what the Air Force can do. If we do not make an

accurate estimate and a possible enemy does make one,

we will be under a great disadvantage in case of a great

emergency.”59 Mitchell’s conviction that a strong air force

was absolutely critical to national defense led him to

believe that if Congress would only ask itself “how much

will we get for the money?” they would increase funding for

the fledgling Air Service. Space advocates contend that the

same question is valid today. Like Mitchell, they argue that

“all we want is to have you put the money where it will do

the greatest good.”60

Both Air and Space Programs Adversely Affected

Five years ago the secretary of the Air Force and the

chief of staff challenged the Air Force Scientific Advisory

Board to “search the world for the most advanced aerospace ideas and project them into the future.”61 The

board concluded that in order for the United States to

retain its superpower status in space it must develop the

capability of space-based kinetic or direct energy

weapons,62 but information technology and access to

space have taken priority over space weapons. Both are

critical to America’s national defense and commercial

interests, and they have been the cornerstone of US

space and technology investment for over a decade63 but

WHITTINGTON 13
only a viable offensive space capability can secure this

nation into the next century. 

General Horner was right when he admitted that the Air

Force is finding itself where the Army was in the 1920s,

when the value of military airpower was outpacing the

Army’s ability to realize it.64 The Air Force is doing its best

to keep pace, but budget constraints, compounded by the

temptation to continually fund the latest technologically

superior aircraft, is hurting the space mission. While all

services buy and operate space systems, the Air Force has

the lion’s share—80 percent of the total military space

budget and 90 percent of the personnel who operate the

systems.65

When Congress cut Discover II (joint space-based radar

demonstration) and delayed the Space-Based Infrared

System (SBIRS), the Air Force voiced little protest.66

However, when the embattled Lockheed Martin F-22 fighter was challenged, senior leadership responded vigorously.67 General Estes lamented, “They’ve [AF] shown their

true colors in the F-22.”68 This, however, is the base argument of the space separatist; it is, after all, the “Air” Force,

not a space force. When choices have to be made, it is difficult to rise above embedded culture. Just as the War

Department insisted that the airplane’s primary mission

was to support the ground troops and should be funded

accordingly, so it is not surprising to determine which

resources the Air Staff will choose to fight for. 

The Air Force has been accused of wanting the space

mission solely because of its lucrative funding,69 but both

air and space programs are adversely affected. If the Air

Force insists on leading military space, then budget tradeoffs will have to be made between the two missions. While

the $60 billion F-22 is soaking up funds that could be used

for cutting-edge space programs, space expenditures are

also costing the Air Force billions of dollars that could be

used in traditional airpower missions. The projected loss of

both airpower and space power systems prompted General

Horner to conclude, “A separate space force would benefit

the taxpayer, it would benefit the military, and it would

benefit the Air Force.”70

14 A SEPARATE SPACE FORCE
Conclusion

Someday the US will recognize the need for a separate space

force, and it behooves us to think through the implications and

the promise of an almost certain future event.

—Col Vic Budura

Early military aviators legitimately argued that the airplane would become a dominant weapon only when “freed

from the fetters of the ground commander.” The Army disagreed, and the debate continued for three decades. When

the War Department authorized the establishment of the

Air Service School in 1920,71 aviation had its cadre of

champions. Airpower theory and doctrine would drive

technology, eventually leading to the development of the B17 and B-29—airframes built upon the premise of strategic bombing. Aviators understood that the future of airpower depended upon appropriate-level funding, and they

continually appealed to the War Department and Congress

for additional monies.

These issues, persuasively argued from 1920–1940, are

strikingly similar to the concerns of the space community

in today’s Air Force. With leadership skills equal, space

operators argue that space, as the fourth dimension of

warfare, will never reach its full potential until freed from

the fetters of the “air” commander. Some space advocates

contend that this freedom can only exist within the autonomy of a separate service––a space force flexing the same

bureaucratic and political muscle that the Army, Navy,

and Air Force flex today.72 Others argue for an organizational change within USSPACECOM, vesting the commander with authority similar to that held by the United

States Special Operations Command—control over development, acquisitions, promotions, and assignments within the space community.73 Still others opt to create a

Space Corps, similar to the Army Air Corps of 1926.74

Though few recommend that the space mission remain

organizationally unchanged, even they admit “the time

may well come when [a Space Force] is going to be the right

answer.”75

The solutions differ, but all agree that there must be a

significant shift from an airpower to a space power culture

WHITTINGTON 15
or a completely separate space force. Whichever direction

the Air Force chooses, it would do well to remember its

own history. 

Notes

1. Col Vic Budura, “The Next Force,” Future Conflict Studies Reader

(Maxwell AFB, Ala.: Air War College, August 1998), 405. Colonel Budura

was a former Space Chair at the Air War College.

2. Walter J. Boyne, Beyond the Wild Blue (New York: St. Martin’s

Press, 1997), 416.

3. David N. Spires, Beyond Horizons (Peterson Air Force Base,

Colorado: Air Force Space Command, n.d.), 244.

4. Thomas S. Moorman Jr., “The Explosion of Commercial Space and

the Implications for National Security,” Airpower Journal, no. 1 (Spring

1999): 6–7. A speech delivered by retired Gen Thomas S. Moorman Jr., to

the National Convention of the American Institute of Aeronautics at Reno,

Nevada, on 13 January 1998.

5. Steven Watkins, “Is the Space Mission too Big to Handle?” Defense

Trends, 7 October 1996, 33. Quoting General Horner from a previous

interview.

6. Joan Johnson-Freese, “Transitioning To a Space & Air Force:

Moving Beyond Rhetoric?” Report for Asia Pacific Center for Security

Studies (Honolulu, n.d.), 1.

7. Lt Col Peter R. Faber, “Interwar US Army Aviation and the Air

Corps Tactical School: Incubators of American Airpower,” in The Paths of

Heaven, ed. Col Phillip S. Meilinger (Maxwell AFB, Ala.: Air University

Press, 1997), 184.

8. Lt Col Mark A. Clodfelter, “Molding Airpower Convictions:

Development and Legacy of William Mitchell’s Strategic Thought,” in The

Paths of Heaven, ed. Col Phillip S. Meilinger (Maxwell AFB, Ala.: Air

University Press, 1997), 79. Quoting from the Mitchell Papers, 21

December 1919.

9. Col Phillip S. Meilinger, “Trenchard, Slessor, and Royal Air Doctrine

before World War II,” in The Paths of Heaven, ed. Col Phillip S. Meilinger

(Maxwell AFB, Ala.: Air University Press, 1997), 41.

10. Col Phillip S. Meilinger, “Giulio Douhet and the Origins of

Airpower Theory,” in The Paths of Heaven, ed. Col Phillip S. Meilinger

(Maxwell AFB, Ala.: Air University Press, 1997), 2.

11. Clodfelter, 89.

12. Ibid., 88.

13. William Mitchell, “Statement of Brigadier General William

Mitchell, Assistant Chief of the Air Service before Congress, 4 January

1921” (Maxwell AFB, Ala.: Historical Research Library Archives), 8-9. The

response to Congressman Slemp’s question was answered by

Congressman Cramton.

14. Herman S. Wolk, “The Quest for Independence,” Winged Shield,

Winged Sword: A History of the United States Air Force, vol. I, ed. Bernard

16 A SEPARATE SPACE FORCE
C. Nalty (Washington, D.C.: Air Force History and Museums Program,

1997), 5–6.

15. Legislative Update, 10 September 1999. Prepared by CINC’s

Action Group and Commander’s Action Group, USSPACECOM/AFSPC

CX IS, 15.

16. Johnson-Freese, 2.

17. Legislative Update, 16.

18. Sen Bob Smith, “The Challenge of Space Power,” Airpower

Journal, Spring 1999, 35.

19. Legislative Update, 5.

20. Budura, 406.

21. R. Earl McClendon, Autonomy of the Air Arm (Maxwell AFB, Ala.:

Air Force History and Museums Program, 1996), 48.

22. Boyne, 22.

23. Budura, 405

24. Capt Basil H. Liddell Hart, Paris, or the Future of War (New York:

Global Publishers, 1972 [c1925]), 36–37.

25. Lt Col Johnny R. Jones, USAF, William “Billy” Mitchell’s Air Power

(Maxwell AFB, Ala.: Airpower Research Institute, September 1997), 1.

Colonel Jones quotes from Mitchell’s final book, published a few years

before his death, Skyways: A Book on Modern Aeronautics (Philadelphia,

Penn.: J. B. Lippincott Co., 1930), 5.

26. Jones, 1. Colonel Jones quotes from one of Mitchell’s earliest writings, Our Air Force: The Keystone of National Defense (New York: E. P.

Dutton & Co., 1921), xix.

27. Maj Bruce M. DeBlois, “Ascendant Realms: Characteristics of

Airpower and Space Power,” The Paths of Heaven (Maxwell AFB, Ala.: Air

University Press, 1997), 547.

28. Ibid., 555.

29. Douglas Freeman, “Leadership,” Concepts for Air Force

Leadership, ed. Richard I. Lester (Maxwell AFB, Ala.: College of Aerospace

Doctrine, Research, and Education, 1996), 390.

30. James A. Mowbray, “Air Force Doctrine Problems: 1926-Present,”

Airpower Journal, Winter 1995, 23.

31. Ibid., 24.

32. Air Force Doctrine Document (AFDD) 1, Air Force Basic Doctrine,

September 1997, 43–44.

33. Colin S. Gray and John B. Sheldon, “Space Power and the

Revolution in Military Affairs,” Airpower Journal, Fall 1999, 32.

34. Global Engagement: A Vision for the 21st Century Air Force

(Washington, D.C.: Department of the Air Force, 1997), 7.

35. Robert T. Finney, History of the Air Corps Tactical School,

1920–1940 (Maxwell AFB, Ala.: Research Studies Institute, USAF

Historical Division, March 1955), 5–7. The school was first called the Air

Service School and was established on 25 February 1920. Its name was

changed in November 1922 to the Air Service Tactical School (ASTS) and

in 1926, when the Air Service became the Air Corps, to the Air Corps

Tactical School (ACTS).

36. In 1998, the RAND National Defense Research Institute agreed

that the operational, doctrinal, and organizational issues are far more difWHITTINGTON 17
ficult than the technological problems and proposed three broad strategic options for the emerging US space program: the minimalist, the

enhanced, and the aerospace force. But no serious effort has been

attempted to articulate the more basic “space doctrine.” See Dana J.

Johnson, Scott Pace, and C. Bryan Gabbard, Space Emerging Options for

National Power (Washington, D.C.: RAND National Defense Research

Institute, 1998), 48.

37. David Atkinson, “Smith Calls For New Space Force, ‘Offensive’

Use of Space,” Defense Daily, 23 November 1998, 5.

38. AFDD 1, 43–48.

39. Faber, 185.

40. DeBlois, 547.

41. Maj Lloyd F. Hubbard, “Full Spectrum Security: The Role of a

Separate Force,” Research Report no. 127/1998-04 (Maxwell AFB, Ala.:

Air Command and Staff College, 1998), 20.

42. Clodfelter, 79—quoting from The Mitchell Papers, 21 December

1919.

43. Atkinson.

44. Mitchell, 1–2.

45. Faber, 183. Quoting Robert Webster, Air Corps Tactical School,

“Orientation (Lecture 1) to Air Force Course,” 5 September 1935, pt. 2,

11, AFHRA, file no. 248.2017A.

46. William “Billy” Mitchell, Our Air Force: The Keystone of National

Defense (New York: E. P. Dutton & Co., 1921), xix.

47. DeBlois, 567. See RAdm Richard Macke’s opening statement in

publication JDTTP 3-14, Joint Doctrine, Tactics, Techniques and

Procedures for Space Operations, 1. “Space cannot be considered a separate warfare arena. It crosses all warfare areas and all warfare services.

Just as space surrounds and encompasses the entire globe, it surrounds,

encompasses, and supports all warriors.”

48. Gray, 24.

49. Ibid., 25.

50. Air Force Doctrine Document 2-2 draft, “Space Operations,”

February 1997, 5.

51. Richard J. Newman, “The New Space Race,” U.S. News & World

Report, 8 November 1999, n.p. On-line internet.

52. Gray, 37.

53. Ibid., 30.

54. Barry R. Schneider, Future War and Counterproliferation

(Westport, Conn.: Praeger, 1999), 3.

55. Newman.

56. Howell M. Estes, “The Promise of Space Potential for the Future,”

Speech delivered to the US Space Foundation’s 1997 National Space

Symposium, Colorado Springs, Colorado, 3 April 1997.

57. Newman.

58. Gen Charles A. Horner, “Space Seen as Challenge, Military’s Final

Frontier,” Defense Issues 8, no. 34, 7.

59. Mitchell, statement, 4 January 1921, 1.

60. Ibid., 16.

61. Smith, 34

18 A SEPARATE SPACE FORCE
62. Estes.

63. Ibid.

64. Watkins, 33. Quoting General Horner from a previous interview.

65. Ibid.

66. Gen Richard B. Myers, USSPACECOM commander, wrote a 30

November 1999 letter to Deputy Defense Secretary John Hamre voicing

his “strong support for Discoverer II.” See Legislative Update, 7 December

1999, USSPACECOM/AFSPC CX, 7.

67. Legislative Update, 10 September 1999, 15.

68. Ibid.

69. $11 billion in 1998. See Watkins, 32.

70. Watkins, 32. Quoting General Horner from a previous interview.

71. Finney, 5–7.

72. Smith, 38.

73. Quoting General Estes in Legislative Update, 10 September 1999,

5. See also Smith, 37–38.

74. Col Gordon Middleton, “Space Organization and Management:

Time For An Air Force Space Corps?” Report from SAF/SX, 25 January

1994, 6.

75. Watkins, 33. Quoting Maj Gen Robert Dickman, Defense

Department’s space-acquisition program manager.

WHITTINGTON 19