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AIR UNIVERSITY

China as Peer Competitor?

Trends in Nuclear Weapons,

Space, and Information Warfare

KATHRYN L. GAUTHIER

Lieutenant Colonel, USAF

Air War College

Maxwell Paper No. 18

MAXWELL AIR FORCE BASE, ALABAMA

July 1999
Disclaimer

Opinions, conclusions, and recommendations expressed or implied within are solely

those of the author and do not necessarily represent the views of Air University, the

United States Air Force, the Department of Defense, or any other US government

agency. Cleared for public release: distribution unlimited.

ii
In China as Peer Competitor? Trends in Nuclear Weapons,

Space, and Information Warfare Lt Col Kathryn L. Gauthier

analyzes the potential for China to emerge as a peer com -

petitor of the United States in the coming decades. First,

she examines two traditional pillars of national strength—

China’s status as a nuclear weapons state and as a space

power. Second, she then explores China’s growing focus on

information warfare (IW) as a means to wage asymmetric

warfare against a technologically advanced adversary. Third,

the author carefully examines the status of the three pro -

grams, highlights areas of concern and potential conflict with

the United States, and analyzes the implications of these

issues for the United States.

The author concludes that China does have the potential to become a peer competitor, based on a number of

factors. The United States’s military advantages over China

are narrowing in the critical areas of nuclear weapons, space

technology, and information warfare. China is developing

nuclear weapons with increased accuracy, mobility, and

range. Beijing’s growing prowess in space—including a possi -

ble manned presence within the decade—will also provide it

significant benefits in the military realm. In selected areas,

Beijing has demonstrated its ability to “leapfrog” over more

rudimentary stages of technological development. Finally,

China’s previously rapid economic growth has supported technological modernization and an improved defense posture.

Colonel Gauthier emphasizes that Beijing does not—

either philosophically or militarily—have to approach US

levels of capability or proficiency to pose a threat to the

United States or to US interests in the region. There is

clear evidence the Chinese are vigorously analyzing, pur -

suing, and acquiring the means to wage asymmetric war -

fare against a more powerful adversary. Asymmetric warfare

can be cheap, low tech, readily available, and devastatingly

effective against the United States. For these reasons, information warfare may prove to be the “weapon of choice”

for the Chinese; given the vulnerability of the US infra -

structure and China’s more rudimentary military information systems, China could actually hold the “high ground”

iii
ing cultural and strategic traditions, Beijing would likely

attempt to “defeat the enemy without fighting” by playing

its information deterrence card. Alternatively, it could at -

tempt to carry out a surprise IW attack with sufficient

deception to avoid retaliation.

The author does not believe it is inevitable that China

will become an adversary of the United States. But this

possibility could become a self-fulfilling prophecy if the

United States mishandles its relationship with China.

Colonel Gauthier advocates a policy of constructive engagement with the People’s Republic of China, believing

the United States holds some of the cards with which to

positively shape the future of Sino-US relations, and the

specter of a militarily capable and potentially hostile China

makes a compelling case for doing so. The Air War College

encourages a debate of these views.

LANCE L. SMITH

Major General, USAF

Commandant

Air War College

iv
Lt Col Kathryn L. Gauthier is assigned to the J5 direc -

torate of the Joint Staff. Her 18-year Air Force career in -

cludes recent tours as chief of inspections for the Air Intel -

ligence Agency Inspector General team and commander of

the 426th Intelligence Squadron. She has also served as a

joint intelligence center branch chief, political-economic

analyst, telemetry systems development engineer, and air -

borne mission coordinator, with duty stations in Latin

America, Asia, Europe, and the United States. While an

Olmsted Scholar, Colonel Gauthier earned master’s degrees

in political science and international public policy through

advanced studies in Caracas, Venezuela, and Washington, D.

C. She is a graduate of the Spanish Air Staff College in Ma -

drid, Spain, and the Air War College, Maxwell Air Force Base,

Alabama.

v
By the early 21st century, the PLA’s nuclear arsenal will be

more capable, accurate, flexible, and will allow the PRC to

threaten most parts of the globe. Land-based missile systems

will be mobile, enhancing survivability and making detection

much more difficult. Sea-based systems, with longer ranges,

will also be tremendously improved.

—John Caldwell and Alexander T. Lennon

“China’s Nuclear Modernization Program”

Strategic Review 23, no. 4 (Fall 1995) 

What threat will the People’s Republic of China (PRC)

pose to the United States? To some, it is an expansionist

power set on regaining the hegemony it enjoyed centuries

ago in Asia. Beijing’s aggressive moves toward Taiwan and

its moves in the South China Sea are used as evidence of

such poorly concealed ambitions. Some further claim the

PRC is set on achieving global power status. This raises the

specter of an awakened China set on redrawing the maps,

restoring the splendor, and recreating the power of the

“Middle Kingdom” before it fell to the advances of Western

imperialism.

Others argue that today’s China has a quite distinct

worldview. They see an inwardly focused, nonaggressive,

developing nation. This China is so burdened with internal

problems arising from the necessity to provide basic services for a quarter of the planet’s population that it has

neither the time nor the inclination to harbor hegemonic

aspirations in the foreseeable future. Further, any change

in that status is likely to take decades, allowing for ample

strategic warning time and the opportunity to respond ap -

propriately when the time comes.

This paper sets out to analyze the threat, if any, that

China poses to the United States as the world’s sole re -

maining superpower. Specifically, it seeks to answer the

question, “Does China have the potential to become a peer

competitor of the United States in the coming decades?” A

search for the answer to that question requires an exhaus -

tive analysis of not only military and industrial potential

but also the economic, social, and political trends that are

sweeping the nation. Even then, since the issue involves

1
tive but never definitive.

Given both the complexities of the issue and the time

constraints, this paper focuses on three strategic factors in

the peer-competitor equation. It examines two traditional

pillars of national power—China’s status as a nuclear

weapons state and as a nation in space. Then it explores

China’s increasing focus on information warfare as a

means of waging asymmetric war against a more powerful

adversary. Why the selection of these three factors?

One of the lessons of the Gulf War was the inability of a

strong adversary to defeat a technologically superior foe

with conventional weapons and war-fighting techniques

alone. An enemy facing the United States with a nuclear

arsenal—or even one bomb—however, quickly changes the

equation. So does one with self-sustaining access to space

or one armed with antisatellite weapons. Finally, an adver -

sary unwilling to confront the United States “head on”

might still seek to achieve strategic objectives through

such asymmetric means as attacking the information sys -

tems of the United States, a nation highly dependent on

access to information in both peacetime and conflict. In

sum, since these three elements—nuclear weapons, access

to space, and capabilities in the information-warfare

arena—could arguably pose the greatest threat to the

United States in a future military conflict with China, they

were considered a foundation for China’s potential emer -

gence as a peer competitor to the United States.

China’s Nuclear Arsenal

China became a nuclear weapons state in 1964 and

since that time has conducted 45 nuclear weapon tests

with yields ranging between approximately 1 kiloton and 4

megatons.1

Characteristics

While China has never disclosed the size and disposition

of its nuclear force, analysts estimate the entire arsenal

consists of perhaps 250 to three hundred strategic war -
knowledged the existence of any tactical nuclear weapons

in its inventory.3

 The US Defense Department believes

China has more than one hundred warheads currently de -

ployed on ballistic missiles.4

 China is also estimated to

have a stockpile of fissile material sufficient to double or

triple the size of its current nuclear arsenal. 5

Doctrine

Although it is ranked as the world’s third largest nuclear

power,6

 China has a nuclear inventory that is small relative

to those of the United States and Russia. Beijing maintains

that its small nuclear arsenal is for self-defense purposes

only.7

 China has always maintained a policy of No First

Use (NFU) and has long provided negative security assur -

ances (NSA) that it would never “use or threaten to use

nuclear weapons against non-nuclear-weapon states or

nuclear-weapon-free zones.”8

 China has frequently called

on the other nuclear powers to adopt an NFU policy. In the

words of China’s disarmament ambassador: “In the postcold war era of today, it is obviously anachronistic to con -

tinue with the policy of nuclear deterrence based on the

first-use of nuclear weapons and thus subjecting other

countries to nuclear threat.”9

 China officially supports a

goal of total nuclear disarmament by all nations but has

stated it would only join Strategic Arms Reduction Talks

(START) negotiations when the US and Russian stock -

piles were reduced below the levels established by START

II.

10

Notwithstanding its official pronouncements, the actual

nuclear doctrine of Beijing has been shrouded in an ambi -

guity that may be deliberate.11 The Chinese nuclear posture is believed to be based on a countervalue secondstrike capability12 but may have evolved from a doctrine of

“minimum deterrence” to one that envisages a limited warfighting capability. The current consensus is that China’s

nuclear doctrine is best characterized by the concept of

“limited deterrence,” which is based on “communicating

China’s ability to inflict costly damage on the adversary at

every rung on the escalation ladder.” 13 Limited deterrence
theater, and strategic nuclear forces to deter the escalation

of conventional or nuclear war. If deterrence fails, this ca -

pability should be sufficient to control escalation and to

compel the enemy to back down.” 14 China does not currently have all the capabilities to implement this concept

but may be using it as a “wish-list of capabilities”—within

budgetary and arms control constraints—from which to

choose.15 Limited deterrence capabilities—such as the need

to improve strike accuracy—are likely framing China’s current nuclear modernization program.

Delivery Systems

China relies on a strategic triad of delivery sys -

tems—land-based ballistic missiles, submarine-launched

ballistic missiles (SLBM), and bombers. The primary deliv -

ery means is the land-based missile, the most capable sys -

tem being the liquid-fueled Dongfeng (DF)-5A, known in

the West as the CSS-4.16 The DF-5A carries a payload of

3,200 kilograms and has a range in excess of 13,000 kilo -

meters, making it capable of striking targets in the United

States.17 John Caldwell and Alexander T. Lennon write that

“four missiles, each with one 3–5 megaton warhead, are

currently deployed in hardened underground silos.” 18

China has also developed a mobile solid-fuel missile, the

DF-21, assessed to be capable of delivering a 200–300 kilo -

ton warhead a distance of 1,800 kilometers. 19 Also, in the

inventory is the short-range DF-15, known by its ex port

designator M-9, assessed to be a “nuclear-capable, tactical missile with a maximum range of 600 kilometers.” 20

In the SLBM category, China developed the Julang-1

(JL-1) single-warhead missile with a payload of 200–300

kilotons and a range of 1,700 kilometers. 21 China’s only

ballistic missile submarine, the Xia, can carry 12 JL-1 missiles.22 In terms of aircraft delivery systems, China has

more than 100 H-6 medium bombers, of which at least 40

are believed to be nuclear-capable.23

Figure 1 summarizes the current inventory of Chinese

nuclear delivery systems.
Modernization

As a result of reductions in the United States and Rus -

sian nuclear arsenals—which under START II will draw

down to thirty-five hundred and three thousand respec -

tively by the year 200324—the Chinese nuclear arsenal has

improved quantitatively. It is also taking steps to improve

its force qualitatively. Beijing concluded a series of nuclear

tests just before signing the Comprehensive Test Ban

Treaty (CTBT) in 1996. Chinese officials claimed the tests

were conducted to improve the safety and reliability of its

nuclear arsenal, but it appears the tests were also moti -

vated by Beijing’s desire to develop smaller and more pow -

erful nuclear weapons.25 Added one source, “Smaller warheads are crucial to the development of a MIRV (multiple

independently targeted reentry vehicle) capability, as well

as to the development of more mobile missiles.” 26 Concurrently, advances in solid-fuel technology will reduce launch

DF-5 ICBM 7

DF-4 ICBM 10

DF-3 IRBM 38

DF-21 IRBM 8

CSS-N-3 SLBM 12

DF-15 4

DF-11 ?

H-6 Bomber 120

H-5 Bomber 200

SSBN 1

Source: Jane’s Defence Weekly, 10 February 1999, in Anthony H. Cordesman, “China and

the Asian Military Balance” (China database) (Monterey, Calif.: Center for Strategic and International Studies, March 1999), 51; and on-line, Internet, 27 March 1999.

Figure 1. Chinese Nuclear Delivery Systems
nuclear arsenal.

7

China is making efforts to improve all three pillars of its

strategic triad. Two land-based missiles, the DF-31 and

DF-41, are under development and will give the Chinese a

solid-fueled, road-mobile capability.28 According to the National Air Intelligence Center, the DF-31—slated to be de -

ployed around the year 2000—“will narrow the gap be -

tween current Chinese, US, and Russian ballistic missile

designs.”29 These new missiles will slash launch-preparation

times to less than 15 minutes for the DF-31 and less than

five minutes for the DF-41, and they will be MRV-(multiple

reentry vehicle) or MIRV-capable.30

China is also developing a second-generation subma -

rine-launched ballistic missile, the 8,000-kilometer-range

JL-2, which may be deployed on a new class of nuclear

submarine.31 With respect to the air-breathing leg of the

triad, China is developing the H-7 (B-7) bomber and may

also decide to modify SU-27s purchased from Russia to

make them nuclear-capable.32

The immediate goal of these programs is to improve the

accuracy, range, guidance systems, and control of China’s

strategic forces.33 The ultimate objective—whether to

strengthen a power-projecting great power or to buttress a

“fortress China”—is subject to considerable debate.

Proliferation Concerns and

Commitments

China’s record on nuclear nonproliferation has been far

from stellar, but Beijing has certainly “come a long way” in

the last three decades. As Secretary of State Madeleine K.

Albright recently noted: “On proliferation, China has pro -

gressed from advocating the spread of nuclear weapons to

signing the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty [and] the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty.”34 In the 1970s the US-USSR

Strategic Arms Limitations Talks were denounced by China

as a cover for the arms race between the superpowers. 35 By

the 1980s Beijing appeared to begin to appreciate the ad -

vantages of free riding on the various arms control agree -

ments between Moscow and Washington, as subsequent
nated their intermediate-range missiles, and limited their

antiballistic missile systems.36 In the 1990s Beijing has

come to recognize that it derives both political and security

benefits from participating in multilateral negotiations to

control nuclear weapons.37 China’s gradual and growing

acceptance of international nonproliferation norms has been

due in large part to “U.S. sanctions, laws, and policies, as

well as positive inducements.”38 These inducements include recognition of China’s major-power status by the in -

ternational community and “access to international trade,

capital, and technology.”39

Before acceding to the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty

(NPT) in 1992, China provided assistance to the Pakistani

nuclear weapons program, which it saw as a balance to the

conventional and nuclear strength of its rival India. 40 A

1997 US Arms Control and Disarmament Agency report

warned that “Questions remain about contacts between

Chinese entities and elements associated with Pakistan’s

nuclear weapons program.”41 China also assisted the Iranian nuclear program under International Atomic Energy

Agency (IAEA) safeguards but has since agreed not to pro -

vide further nuclear assistance to that nation. 42 China’s

support to the “peaceful” nuclear programs of Pakistan,

Iran, and Algeria has raised concern about dual-use appli -

cations of materiel and technology.43 A May 1996 Pentagon

report notes that China’s undermining of nonproliferation

goals stems primarily from “the role of Chinese companies

in supplying a wide range of materials, equipment and

technologies that could contribute to NBC [nuclear, bio -

logical, and chemical] weapons and missile programs in

countries of proliferation concern.”44

China has recently taken meaningful steps toward be -

coming a responsible partner in the international nonpro -

liferation regime. A member of IAEA since 1983, China

acceded to the NPT in 1992. It also honored its commit -

ment to support a comprehensive ban on nuclear tests

(after completing a series of tests in 1996), becoming one of

the first signers of the CTBT that same year. 45 More recently, China became a member of the Zangger Committee

in October 1997, joining other NPT states in agreeing not
under IAEA safeguards.

6 Beijing is not yet a member of

the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) but has

entered into a bilateral agreement with the United States to

abide by MTCR guidelines.47

There have been setbacks in China’s growing coopera -

tion, however, as in the case of alleged 1994–95 deliveries

of ring magnets—used in uranium enrichment—to Paki -

stan.48 The Chinese government denied awareness of the

transfers, indicating the possibility of a “center-periphery

problem” where Beijing may not have specifically approved

the initiative of a Chinese enterprise to export the mate -

rial.49 In the wake of considerable controversy and highlevel negotiations, the United States decided not to respond

with sanctions against China based on the following three

factors:

(1) the finding that senior-level Chinese officials were

unaware of the ring magnet transfer;

(2) China’s new public commitment not to “provide

assistance to unsafeguarded nuclear facilities”; and

(3) China’s pledge to engage in a dialogue with the Unite d

States on improving export controls.50

Recently, China sharply criticized the May 1998 Paki -

stani and Indian nuclear tests, saying they “have not only

seriously impeded international non-proliferation efforts,

but have produced a grave impact on regional and world

peace and stability.”51 Beijing has good reason to fear a

nuclear arms race on her southern border, especially in

light of her long-standing rivalry with India.

Other recent positive developments in nuclear nonprolif -

eration cooperation include the following:

• China and the United States have jointly stated their

intention to pursue negotiation of a fissile material

cut-off treaty (October 1994).52

• China joined the other original nuclear powers in pro -

viding positive security assurances to nonnuclear

weapon states which are signatories of the NPT

(April1995).53

• China and the United States reached an accord to

de-target strategic nuclear weapons that had been
the two capitals (June 1998).5

Implications for the United States

Unarguably, based on recent developments in Chinese

nuclear nonproliferation cooperation, the United States

has much with which to be satisfied. As described above,

in addition to China’s more complete integration into the

international nonproliferation regime, the number of bilat -

eral United States–China agreements in this arena has

been growing. Despite the progress, however, there remain

a number of areas of friction and divergence between the

United States and China.

More to Do in Nonproliferation

China is not a member of the Nuclear Suppliers Group

and does not require full-scope safeguards in the destina -

tion country as a precondition for Chinese nuclear ex -

ports.55 There is also apprehension about Chinese sales of

nuclear-related or destabilizing conventional arms to countries with proliferation concerns. These include exports of

such missiles and missile technology as the reported

transfers of Chinese M-11 missiles to Pakistan. 56 In Proliferation: Threat and Response the Office of the Secretary of

Defense maintains that “in most cases, Beijing agrees pub -

licly on the danger and inadvisability of NBC weapons and

missile proliferation.” On the other hand, China’s continuing and long-standing economic and security relationships

provide incentives for activities that are inconsistent with

some nonproliferation norms.57

Chinese Opposition to TMD/NMD

China is very concerned about potential deployments by

the United States of theater missile defense (TMD) systems

in East Asia as well as developments in the national mis -

sile defense arena. Both of these will have the effect of

undermining the deterrent value of China’s nuclear arse -

nal. In 1995 a Chinese official publicly reiterated Beijing’s
ballistic missile defense system as a development that would

“trigger an arms race in outer space” and “increase the

danger of nuclear war.”58 Beijing has also warned that the

deployment of a TMD system would be met with an expan -

sion in Chinese offensive systems.59

Modernization of China’s Nuclear Arsenal

As described earlier, China’s efforts to expand and mod -

ernize its nuclear arsenal are well under way. It should be

noted that China is not constrained in these efforts by any

arms control agreement (SALT, START, etc.), such as those

governing the United States and Russia. 60 In fact, “as the

United States and Russia reduce the size of their arsenals

as mandated by the START treaties, improvements to China’s

nuclear weapons will mean that asymmetries between

China’s nuclear forces and those of the major nuclear pow -

ers will narrow.”61

Regional Security

Some analysts warn of the adverse impact China’s nu -

clear modernization efforts may have on the region. Bei -

jing’s assessment of its nuclear force requirements may be

driven by such factors as stability on the Korean penin -

sula, Chinese concerns vis-à-vis Japan, the Indian-Pakistani

dispute, and Taiwanese stirrings for independence.62 Additionally, China’s modernization efforts might stimulate a

“nuclear modernization race” among neighboring countries, including India and Russia.63

Taiwan

Taiwan is one issue over which the interests of the

United States and China seem destined to collide. On the

one hand, the United States has long been committed to

the security of Taiwan and is opposed to a resolution of the

matter by force. The Chinese government, on the other

hand, recently reaffirmed that “the issue of Taiwan is en -

tirely an internal affair of China. . . . The Chinese govern -
peaceful means, but will not commit itself not to resort to

force [emphasis added].”64

Chinese “saber rattling” near Taiwan in 1996 evoked a

quick and powerful show of force by the United States.

However, a future similar scenario may involve an entirely

different calculus and drive completely distinct results. As

one analyst recently emphasized, “China’s possession of a

credible nuclear arsenal may provide a deterrent against

any state seeking to intervene in the Taiwan Strait. . . .

[W]ould the United States risk a nuclear confrontation over

Taiwan with a more assertive, more capable China?” 65

There is also the risk that China’s nuclear modernization

efforts might convince Taiwanese leaders they need a nuclear program of their own.66

The Chinese Space Program

Evidence is growing that the Chinese are working toward the

launch of a domestic, manned spacecraft around the turn of

the millennium.

—Phillip Clark, “Chinese Designs on the Race for Space”

Jane’s Intelligence Review 9, no. 4 (April 1997) 

A nation’s prowess in space confers both prestige and

power, and China has garnered a good measure of both in

almost three decades of space activity. China’s space pro -

gram takes on special significance for the United States at

the dawn of the twenty-first century, both because of the

strategic advantages it confers to Beijing in the military

realm and because of China’s decision to open its space

launches to international customers.

Satellite Launchers

China has been a space-faring nation since 1970, when

it launched its first Dong Fang Hong (“East is Red”) satellite

using a Chang Zheng (CZ/“Long March”) launch vehicle.67

A more advanced vehicle, the CZ-2C, was first launched in

1975 and has become China’s most utilized launcher. 68 It

is capable of lifting 2,000 kilograms to low Earth orbit

(LEO) and has been used with a recoverable microgravity
years of service, 14 of these two-stage vehicles were

launched, with a 100-percent success rate. 70 In the 1980s

the CZ-3 and CZ-4 launch vehicles, building on the CZ-2

design, added geosynchronous Earth orbit (GEO) and sunsynchronous capabilities to the Chinese launch program. 71

The CZ-3 launcher includes a cryogenic (very cold liquefied

gases) third stage; with the first launch of this vehicle in

January 1984, China became the third user—joining the

US and the European Space Agency—of cryogenic propul -

sion.72 The CZ-3 can place 1,400 kilograms into geosyn -

chronous transfer orbit or 5,000 kilograms into LEO and

has achieved a 73-percent success rate. 73 The CZ-4 similarly grew out of predecessor launch vehicle programs. CZ4 lift capability is advertised to be 2,500 kilograms to sunsynchronous orbit and 4,000 kilograms to LEO. 74 Two

launches have been conducted since 1988, with 100 percent

success.75 The comparative dimensions of the CZ family of

launch vehicles are shown in figure 2.

Chinese Satellites

Given China’s information-restricted society, it is not

surprising that open sources vary in precision about such

details regarding the total number of satellite launches

Source: Sketch downloaded from Dragon in Space Internet site, 15 December 1998.

Figure 2. Long March Launch Vehicles

 CHEN LAN
Space Almanac sets the figure as at least 50,

76 while the

Federation of American Scientists reports a total of 60 sat -

ellite launches by the Chinese, “of which 49 were com -

pletely successful, with another 7 failing to reach orbit and

4 suffering post-launch failures.”77 Jane’s Space Directory

itemizes 56 launches of 58 satellites between 1970 and

1996.78

Chinese satellites can be divided into three broad cate -

gories. The most numerous are the recoverable Fanhui Shi

Weixing satellites, originally designed for photoreconnaissance but later modified to add a remote-sensing capabil -

ity.79 A second category of satellites includes those de -

signed for communications, which China began launching

in 1984.80 The latest version—the Dong Fang Hong 3—was

launched into geosynchronous orbit in May 1997 to pro -

vide voice and video communications.81 Satellites designed

for remote sensing and meteorology comprise the third

category of Chinese satellites. Two Feng Yun-1 satellites

launched into sun-synchronous orbit in 1988 and 1990

subsequently suffered problems in orbit, but the June

1997 launch of a Feng Yun-2 meteorological satellite into

geosynchronous orbit was successful.82 Additional test and

scientific satellites have been launched throughout the

length of the Chinese space program.

Chinese Launch Infrastructure

The Chinese space industry has three major launch

complexes. The nation’s first launch center was built at

Jiuquan (40.6N/99.9E) in northern China. To avoid vehicle

overflight of Russia and Mongolia, launches from that site

are limited to a southeasterly direction into orbits between

57 and 70 degrees.83 The Chinese have launched more

than 25 satellites into low Earth orbit from Jiuquan since

1970.84 Additionally, a new launch pad is being con -

structed at this site, reportedly to support a manned space

flight program.85 The Xichang launch center in south

China (28N/102E) became operational in 1984 and is the

nation’s primary site for launches into geostationary or -

bit.86 Xichang was also the site for China’s first foreign
newest launch facility, Taiyuan, is located in northeastern

China (38N/112E). Active since 1988, the site is used to

launch satellites into polar orbit for remote-sens ing,

weather, and reconnaissance missions.88

Operations at these sites as well as telemetry, tracking,

and commanding (TT&C) functions are performed by the

China Satellite Launch and TT&C general organization,

while the China Academy of Launch Vehicle Technology

provides on-site launch supervision.89 According to the

Dragon in Space Internet site, the control and tracking

network for China is comprised of the Beijing Aerospace

Command and Control Center, Xian Satellite Control Center,

numerous domestic tracking stations throughout China, an

overseas tracking station located in the south Pacific on

Kiribati, and three tracking ships. 90 The Federation of

American Scientists identifies domestic tracking sites at

the following locations: Changchun, Guiyang, Khashi, Minxi,

Nanning, Weinan, Xiamen, and Yilan.91

Commercial Launch Services

After its first successful GEO launch in 1984, China

began offering launch services to international customers.92 The first foreign commercial launch took place in

1990. Among the companies that signed up for Chinese

services are Intelsat, Globalstar, APStar, and EchoStar; 93

great international interest notwithstanding, the program

has been plagued by several mission failures, including the

1996 loss of a US satellite. There have also been allega -

tions of unfair pricing, leading to a 1988 agreement that

limited Chinese launches to nine foreign satellites by the

end of 1994.94 The agreement was revised in 1995 to per -

mit an additional 11 satellites to be put into GEO by the

year 2001.95 Provisions in the accord allow this figure to

increase “if the annual global requirement is at least 20

satellites or if western [sic] vehicles cannot accommodate

the market.”96

With the expansion of space technology and the corre -

sponding increase in the number of space-faring nations,

competition for scarce launch capabilities is intense.
launches are projected to take place over the next 10 years,

exacerbating the approximate three-year global backlog for

launcher space.97 With only three other competitors—the

United States, Russia, and the European Union—on the

supply side of space launches, the significance of China’s

commercial launch capability is evident.

Technology Transfer Issues

Then come US concerns about technology transfer to

China, a potential future adversary, and known prolifera -

tor of advanced technologies to such “rogue states” as Iran

and North Korea. The current controversy regarding US

use of Chinese launchers stems from the February 1996

accident involving a US Loral/Intelsat satellite aboard a

Long March (CZ) 3B launcher. Accident investigation documents given to the Chinese by the Loral Corporation may

have contained sensitive guidance technology.98 Consequently, the House of Representatives voted in May 1998

to ban exports of all US satellites to China because China

could use the technology to upgrade its intercontinental

ballistic missiles (ICBM).99 Additionally, in the wake of the

May 1998 nuclear tests in South Asia, Congress allocated

$2.5 million to investigate technology transfers to China. 100

Some of the furor surrounding this issue is likely related

to antagonism over China’s pricing of its Long March

launches—reportedly some 30 percent cheaper than its US

competitor.101 However, given this country’s limited space

launch infrastructure and its focus on promoting national

competitiveness and economic growth, the United States

may have no realistic alternative but to allow its companies

to take advantage of China’s excess launch capacity.

Trends in the Chinese Space

Program and Their Implications for

the United States

Just as the doctrine and disposition governing China’s

nuclear program are shrouded in ambiguity, so too are the

capabilities and military implications of China’s space pro -
gation which had toured the Chinese space industry noted

the difference between that nation’s actual and stated ca -

pabilities: “Their [China’s] own frequently cited description

of their [space] technology as primitive is excessively mod -

est. Advanced but simple is more apt.” 102

While it is not unusual for civilian space programs to

have military applications, the program of China has been

described as “distinct in the degree of its military involve -

ment, the extent of its military functions, and the scale of

its military significance.”103 In fact, China’s progress in its

space program has been linked closely to progress in its

ballistic missile program, with activities and tests in the former

used to advance objectives in the latter.104

At least five strategic objectives of the Chinese space

program can be identified:

(1) improve the accuracy of ICBM guidance systems;

(2) enhance the command, control, and communications (C3

) of Chinese strategic forces;

(3) improve intelligence-gathering capabilities;

(4) provide early warning for Chinese civil and air defense; and

(5) lay the foundation for possible future capabilities in

strategic defense.105

The Chinese appear to have been working towards ac -

quiring a manned space capability since the 1970s. 106 By

the late 1980s China had officially disclosed its intention

to launch a space shuttle by the year 2000 107 and was

beginning to discuss a program for a limited space station. 108

In 1990, after the first flight of its CZ-2E launcher,

China reportedly began to study a spacecraft that could be

launched onto that vehicle with four astronauts aboard. 109

A 1995 ITAR-TASS news report stated China was seeking

to buy Russian equipment for use in a manned space pro -

gram—to be launched around the 2000–2002 time

frame—and that it also intended to build an orbital space

station around the year 2015.110 One year later, the same

news agency reported two “Chinese cosmonauts” were undergoing training in Russia for a mission on a Chinese

spacecraft, planned for 1999 to coincide with the 50th an -
China.111 A Russian defense analyst recently stated that

the Chinese space shuttle program has been officially un -

der way since 1992 and that the first launch is due in 2005

from a site on Hainan Island. 112 While the specifics remain

unclear, the evidence points to a Chinese attempt to achieve

a recurring manned presence in space within the decade.

As China’s capabilities in the space industry have ad -

vanced, so apparently has its determination to begin to

“level the playing field” in this arena. Although Beijing re -

cently officially reaffirmed its opposition to the development of antisatellite weapons,113 a November 1998 Pentagon report indicates the Chinese may be involved in exactly

such an endeavor. The report warns that the Chinese may

be building an antisatellite laser, possibly with assistance

from scientists from the former Soviet Union. 114 Such efforts could lead to a weapon that could cripple orbiting US

satellites.

Many analysts have emphasized the importance of the

1991 Gulf War in convincing China of its need for defense

modernization. Lessons learned from that conflict appar -

ently inspired the Chinese to abandon the 1980s-era strat -

egy of fighting “a people’s war under modern conditions” to

one focused on fighting “modern warfare under high-tech

conditions.”115 The need to upgrade China’s command,

control, communications, and intelligence (C3

I) system is

now a top priority, and space-based assets are considered

vital to that effort.116 One example is a proposal to create a

dedicated network for defense satellite communications,

since the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) currently has only

limited access to China’s six communications satellites. 117

Other Chinese efforts to prepare for high-tech wars of the

future will be explored later.

It should be noted that China does not need to close the

technological gap with the United States in a sequential

manner. China has repeatedly demonstrated the ability to

leapfrog over developmental stages in a number of select

defense programs, a talent especially well suited for the

current information age with its wealth of available tech -

nology and data. Also international commercial services

can help fill the gaps between current and desired capabili -
positioning and timing data to users around the globe— information with both navigational and targeting applications.

Commercially available satellite imagery is also widely available from such systems as SPOT (satellite pour l’observation de la terre) and LANDSAT (land satellite). These two

systems—with resolutions of 10 to 30 meters—clearly demonstrated their military utility during the Gulf War. 118

Information Warfare, Chinese Style

A 1-ounce integrated-circuit chip in a computer will perhaps be

much more useful than a ton of uranium.

—Wang Xusheng, Su Jinhai, and Zhang Hong 

“China: Information Revolution, Defense Security”

Beijing Jisuanji Shijie [China Computerworld], 11 August

1997, 12 January 1999 

In the networked world of the future, every chip is a potential

threat and every computer a potential weapon.

—US Embassy Beijing Report 

“PRC Computer Security Concerns Grow”

China’s booming economy has allowed it to pursue se -

lective modernization of its military capabilities, including

certain conventional weapon systems and, as discussed

already, its nuclear arsenal and space assets. In addition,

Chinese strategists are studying a newly emphasized form

of warfare that focuses on gaining and exploiting informa -

tion, attacking the information available to an adversary,

and defending against attacks on one’s own information

and information systems.

Chinese Views on Information Warfare

Operation Desert Storm has been described as the first

“information war,”119 and China is carefully studying the

lessons learned from that conflict. While the Gulf War did

not initiate Chinese thinking about future warfare, the

conflict apparently stimulated the 1992 decision by PLA

leaders to focus on preparing China’s armed forces to wage

high-tech warfare.120 China not only gained an apprecia -

tion for high-tech weaponry, it also saw the need to mod -
space-based communication and navigational systems.121

Chinese military analysts understand that information-age

technologies have changed how wars are fought.

Shen Weiguang, a Chinese IW expert, notes that con -

cerns about Chinese vulnerability to IW have grown in the

past decade.122 China’s response has been vigorous and

broadly focused. According to a recent China Defense News

article, war games are used to train China’s IW experts,

Chinese military schools offer such courses as “IW Com -

mand and Control” and “IW Technology,” and the ministry

of education now offers a specialization in information warfare.123 Further indicators are the appearance of special -

ized publications dedicated to the study of IW. In addition,

the Chinese Academy of Sciences has established an “Information Security Engineering Center.”124

A survey of Chinese military literature reveals the scope

and depth of Chinese interest in information warfare. Maj

Gen Wang Pufeng, former director of the strategy depart -

ment of China’s Academy of Military Science, describes the

role of information warfare for the PLA: “In the near future,

information warfare will control the form and future of war.

We recognize this developmental trend. . . and see it has a

driving force in the modernization of China’s military and

combat readiness. This trend will be highly critical to

achieving victory in future wars.”125

Shen Weiguang has also analyzed how IW affects mili -

tary doctrine. The following examination of his main points

indicates that Chinese military thinkers both grasp the

tenets of IW and appreciate its inherent power: “Informa -

tion power” gives a military unit its freedom of movement.

• IW targets focus on disrupting the enemy’s decisionmaking process.

• IW makes surgical strikes possible.

• IW is a “high tech people’s war”—to be waged from the

home or office.

• In IW “front and rear are reversed”; civilian techni -

cians may be the best soldiers.

• “Compared with nuclear weapons, information weapons are easier for small, weaker countries to obtain.”
potential threat and every computer a potential

weapon.”126

Analysts from the PLA Academy of Electronic Technology

summarized Chinese thinking in the field of information

warfare in six concepts:

• The primary goal of IW is to attack the enemy’s com -

mand and control systems.

• Information should be used to harass and confuse the

enemy.

• IW tactics are to attack enemy commanders and

headquarters at every level.

• The enemy’s “eyes and ears” should be destroyed,

while protecting one’s own ability to see and hear.

• Information deception and concealment procedures,

such as multi-node, multi-path, and multi-frequency

network systems, should be used to ensure surviv -

ability.

• Weapons with imbedded information technology (IT) will

become the “dominant factors on the battlefield. . . . IT

will be used to carry out electronic warfare, command

and control warfare, and warfare characterized by at -

tacks with computer viruses.”127

Chinese thinkers have highlighted the critical role of in -

formation in high-tech warfare and even assigned it the

preeminent role in war. In Information Warfare and Training of Skilled Commanders, Lei Zhoumin describes information as a force multiplier and “a strategic resource more

important than men, materials, and finances.” 128 Chang

Mengxiong, senior analyst in the Committee of Science,

Technology, and Industry (COSTIND) Institute of Systems

Engineering, predicts that in future high-tech wars, air

and sea superiority will still be required, but information

superiority will have to be won first. 129 He asserts that in

twenty-first-century warfare, information warfare “will decide who will win and who will lose the war.” 130 Other

analysts concur that “the struggle to wrest information

dominance will permeate everything and will be exceptionally fierce and intense.”131
applications. One military strategist maintains that a situation of “information offensive” would exist only for the

side with superior technology.132 For the side on the infor -

mation defensive, tactics available would include counter -

reconnaissance (either passive—e.g., deception and concealment, or active—such as blinding or destroying the

adversary’s reconnaissance systems), antijamming measures, virus protection, and information counterattack. 133

Chinese military literature reflects concern about defensive counters to virus attacks. In an essay entitled “Explo -

ration and Analysis of Military Computer Security and Virus

Protection,” Chou Hsi alleges the United States is developing

a “computer virus weapons plan” that would plant viruses

in computers and electrical equipment exported abroad—

the virus would presumably be activated during a conflict

to cause the equipment to malfunction. 134 His essay calls

for China to take preventive measures against future IW

attacks, including raising computer security awareness in the

armed forces, creating security filters for imported electronic

equipment, and conducting research on computer viruses.135

Chinese military thinkers are also addressing the offen -

sive use of computer viruses to destroy or degrade adver -

sary capabilities. In Information Warfare Poses Problems,

Zhou Li and Bai Lihong assert: “Computer viruses can be

used to track down the enemy’s target system and the

enemy’s guided missiles may end up attacking the side

which has launched them.”136 On this same issue, another

analyst highlights the superiority of IW over traditional

weapons of war: “Once a computer system is damaged so

that it cannot operate normally, cruise missiles and other

precision-guided weapons become arrows without targets;

and high-performance aircraft, tanks, warships, radar, and

activated command systems will be totally in the dark about

what to do.”

137

In short, information warfare is seen as a phenomenon

that is changing the nature of war from one focused on

seizing territory or destroying forces, to one seeking to

paralyze the adversary’s information systems and to de -

stroy his will to resist.138
Chinese Characteristics

Many of the principles of asymmetric warfare, including

the foundation for information warfare, have been a part of

Chinese thinking for over two millennia. Chinese strate -

gists draw parallels between ancient wisdom and future

warfare, relying on timeless prescriptions from such

sources as Sun Zi’s (Sun Tzu) The Art of War:

• Know your enemy and know yourself, and in a hun -

dred battles you will not be in peril. 139

• The supreme skill in war is to defeat the enemy with -

out fighting.140

• Attack the enemy’s strategy, then his alliances. 141

Cultural Foundations

Chinese military planners are well aware of the wide gap

that exists between the current state of their military tech -

nology and that of potential competitors such as the

United States. Even while their nation takes steps to im -

prove its relative position, Chinese strategists see in Sun Zi

a prescription for the defeat of the strong by the weak. As

the former director of the Strategy Department of China’s

Academy of Military Science recently noted: “In light of the

fact that the military lags behind its strong enemies in

information technology and information weapons, the mili -

tary must emphasize the study of ways to use inferior

equipment to achieve victory over enemies with superior

equipment. ‘Using the inferior to overcome the superior’ is

a tradition of China’s military.”142

These words capture the essence of the Chinese ap -

proach to asymmetric warfare. Sun Zi’s exhortations to

“stay clear of the enemy’s main force and strike at its weak

points,”143 and “the weak and the strong can shift their

position”144 are applicable to the Chinese military situation

today. While in a position of relative military inferiority, Bei -

jing may also draw on ancient Chinese wisdom to “hide one’s

capacities and bide one’s time” to strengthen its power. 145

The wisdom of Sun Zi also underpins China’s classic

deterrence strategy: “The national security deterrence per -
achieve the aim of subduing the enemy without fighting.

146

This concept is easily extended to the information realm; in

fact, information deterrence may be the strongest suit in

the Chinese inventory against an information-dependent

adversary like the United States. COSTIND’s Mengxiong

maintains that, given two unequal opponents, “if one side

can effectively weaken the information capability of the

other side, even if its capability in other ways is less , the

other side will dare not take any ill-considered action. ”

147

Chinese military strategists continue to study the trans -

formation of the US military in the wake of the Gulf War.

Since the United States is seen to be at the pinnacle of

advances in high-tech warfare, the Chinese are analyzing

the thinking of US futurists, revisions in US military doc -

trine, C3

I, and organizational restructuring, etc.148 The Chinese have a long tradition of adapting outside thinking to

fit their needs. Martin C. Libicki, a US information warfare

expert, notes that militaries prosper by adapting ideas to

their specific circumstances and strategies, saying, 149 “We

know the Chinese can copy our thoughts, but whether

they can innovate in pursuit of their own objectives is not

yet obvious.”150 Indian analyst M. Ehsan Ahrari responds

with this warning: “The Chinese have proven themselves

remarkable in indigenizing Marxism to suit their cultural

requirements and they are likely to develop informationbased warfare techniques to suit their special needs before

too long. The USA must remain especially sensitive to this

profound historical reality about the PRC.” 151

In a work entitled America, Russia and the Revolution in

Military Affairs, two young Chinese officers at the Academy

of Military Science have issued their own warning: “Those

who believe that the current revolution in military affairs

will be under the control of the United States or can de -

velop only according to the speed and directions set by the

United States are extremely wrong and quite danger -

ous.”152 Chinese attempts to “set the speed and directions”

for the development of a unique information warfare capa -

bility may be well under way. For example, some PRC

strategists have attempted to wed the traditional Maoist

idea of a “people’s war” with the special nature of informa -
with Chinese characteristics.

People’s Information War and the

Internet—Is There a Connection?

While evolving from a strategy of “fighting a people’s war

under modern conditions” to one of “fighting modern war -

fare under high-tech conditions,”153 the PLA has not lost its

appreciation for the force to be generated by mobilizing

China’s vast human resources, saying that “In the people’s

war, no great significance is attributed to the differentia -

tion between military and civilian realms, between military

personnel and civilians.”154 This approach is boosted by

access to information technology: “Thanks to the wide -

spread availability of computers, there are increasing opportunities for individuals as well to actively take part in

an information war. . . . We can drop into a café where a

computer provides us with a wide variety of news and mes -

sages; in precisely the same way, thanks to special soft -

ware and hardware, we are capable of destroying an en -

emy’s data banks and information networks.” 155 Other

statements by Chinese military thinkers echo this view:

• “[A]nybody who understands computers may become

a ‘fighter’ on the network.”156

• “The development of the Internet opens up new oppor -

tunities for the individual to participate directly in an

information war.”157

• “[A]ll preconditions are in place for information warfare

to be not simply a matter left up to armed forces, but

rather one in which the general public can take part. ”

158

In Exploring Ways to Defeat the Enemy Through Information, Cai Renzhao calls for the military and civilians to

cooperate in “tapping the military potential of the ‘informa -

tion superhighway.’ ”

159 His strategy is echoed by the pre -

viously cited analysts of the PLA Academy of Electronic

Technology: “Computer networks form the foundation for

IW. IW is warfare waged by all the people under high-tech

conditions. It is waged not only with military forces, but also

with the aid of networks throughout society as a whole.” 160
ogy on both the national economy and the national de -

fense, several analysts have called for the nation to “build

an information superhighway network with distinctively

Chinese characteristics.”161 These “high-speed, high-capacity,

broadband information” networks would serve both the “market” and the “battlefield.”162

China’s telecommunications infrastructure, currently second in size only to that of the United States, 163 has undergone significant expansion and modernization in recent

years. A small but growing portion of the Internet, China

has four major state-approved networks connected directly

to the net. The status of the networks as of December 1996

is depicted in figure 3. With the Internet now “linking 1.2

million of the 20 million computers in China,” 164 Beijing

appears to have made a conscious decision to loosen re -

strictions on access to global information. Since economic

modernization is China’s top priority, Beijing may be will -

ing to gamble with the political risks of broad Internet

access to reap the benefits of increased exposure to West -

ern information, especially in the scientific and technologi -

cal realms.

Loosening restraints on access to the Internet is also a

means to increase the technological sophistication of both

workers and soldiers. A growing population of skilled com -

puter users—with access to an unprecedented quality and

quantity of information on potential adversaries (across the

spectrum of economic, diplomatic, and military confrontation)—is the pool of China’s future military leaders and

information warriors.

Implications for the United States

The United States is the most advanced nation in the

world in cyberspace, but the dilemma for the Pentagon is

that it may also be the nation most vulnerable to attacks in

that arena.165

The autumn 1996 edition of Parameters outlines the basic features of strategic information warfare. These include

low cost for the aggressor, difficult warning and attack

assessment problems, complications in building and susability of the US homeland.

66 All four of these elements

appear to be favorable for Chinese use of IW.

First, an extraordinarily low investment can result in

tremendous capability. As the director of the National Se -

curity Agency (DIRNSA) recently stated in congressional

testimony, “Anyone with a computer, modem, and tele -

phone line can make use of a burgeoning array of network

sniffers, malicious software, and sophisticated information

attack tools to disrupt network operations.” 167 He also

maintained that “a moderately sophisticated adversary can

cause considerable damage with fewer than thirty people

and a nominal amount of money if the systems they are

attacking are not adequately protected and defended.” 168

Figure 3. Chinese Network Connectivity with the Internet

(December 1996)

Source: Xu Rongsheng, “Internet Development in China” (in Chinese), February 1998.
velopment, widely disseminated, and available in open fo -

rum.169 In the words of Chinese IW expert Shen Weiguang,

“the information to attack the net is available on the net.” 170

Second, attacks against US systems are widespread and

difficult to trace. A 1996 Department of Defense report

estimated that a quarter of a million network attacks

against US defense systems occurred during the previous

year.171 Even more disturbing is the fact that, according to

DIRNSA, “even when attacks are detected and reported, we

rarely know who the attacker was.” 172 In the words of a

Chinese author, “an information war is inexpensive, as the

enemy country can receive a paralyzing blow through the

Internet, and the party on the receiving end will not be able

to tell whether it is a child’s prank or an attack from its

enemy.”173 Such a situation would work to China’s advantage, should it choose to strike at US vulnerabilities

while taking advantage of ambiguity to avoid retaliation.

Third, IW is an ideal weapon to dissuade an adversary’s

ally from joining a hostile coalition. In a hypothetical sce -

nario, if China were to use a limited information attack to

demonstrate its capability to take down the Japanese fi -

nancial system, Tokyo might well think twice about sup -

porting US operations in a regional confrontation. Recall

Sun Zi’s emphasis on the importance of disrupting alliances.

Fourth, the US homeland itself is vulnerable to an IW

attack. The director of the Central Intelligence Agency

(CIA), George Tenet, recently predicted the Information Age

battlespace will include the US domestic infrastructure,

with electric power grids and telecommunications net -

works “targets of the first order.” 174 To illustrate his point,

Director Tenet quoted an article in the China’s People Liberation Daily that stated that “an adversary wishing to de -

stroy the United States only has to mess up the computer

systems of its banks by high-tech means. This would dis -

rupt and destroy the US economy.” 175 Tenet further noted

the following:

As I recently testified before the Senate Intelligence Committee in

January [1998], we have identified several countries that have

government-sponsored information warfare programs. Foreign nations

have begun to include information warfare in their military doctrine, as

well as their war college curricula, with respect to both defensive and
pggg yp

systems, both on the battlefield and in the civilian arena. The

magnitude of the threat from various forms of intrusion, tampering,

and delivery of malicious code, is extraordinary [emphasis in

original].176

The DIRNSA differentiated between two types of IW

threats: unstructured threats (random and limited) and

structured threats (methodical, well supported, extensively

funded, with long-term goals).177 Lt Gen Kenneth Minihan

believes that “the Chinese present a good example of the

structured threat. In 1995 the Chinese military openly ac -

knowledged that attacks against financial systems could

be a useful asymmetrical weapon. By 1997 the Chinese

military had incorporated computer warfare into an exer -

cise scenario.”178

The directors of both the CIA and NSA further concurred

in outlining the risk that an adversary would turn to IW as

a means of asymmetric warfare to level the playing field in

a military confrontation with the United States. 179 If China

chose to employ information attacks against US systems, it

could achieve success both by concealing the identity of

the attacker and by striking a blow against a US vulner -

ability.

Of course, the preferred Chinese strategy would be to

defeat the enemy without fighting. In this regard, it would

seem the Chinese would have their choice of stratagems to

employ: “hide one’s capabilities” or “overawe the enemy.”

Either lever of “information deterrence” could serve to de ter

a potential adversary such as the United States from engaging

it in war and may serve China well in the coming decades.

Conclusion

Hide one’s capacities and bide one’s time to strengthen one’s

power.

—Quoted in Yu Rubo and Qui Jianmin, “Philosophical 

Reflection on the Strategic Guideline of ‘The Weak Can 

Defeat the Strong’ in Ancient China,” in The 4th 

International Symposium on Sun Tzu’s Art of War, paper

 abstract (Beijing, 1988) 
China is inevitable. The question is not whether the two

nations will collide but when and how. Already, bilateral

relations have been strained and tested over such issues

as human rights, intellectual property, and weapons prolif -

eration. Will a more confident and militarily capable China

be more willing to take on the United States over what it

perceives as threats to its vital interests, such as the status

of Taiwan and PRC claims in the South China Sea? A

fundamental goal of the United States currently is to pre -

vent the rise of a single dominant power in northeast Asia.

It is not inevitable that the United States—in 15 years and

beyond—will be in the position to maintain this goal and back

it up with the credible threat of force in the region.

China has the potential to become a peer competitor of

the United States. China’s emergence as a great power

seems almost inevitable when one considers its diplomatic

strength, economic growth, natural resources—including

its immense population—and its military potential, including the nuclear “card.” To this, one must add China’s ad -

vances in its nuclear and space capabilities. The eventual -

ity and timing of such a scenario cannot be predicted with

certainty. Factors that would tend to favor China’s rise

include sustainment of its economic growth, internal politi -

cal stability, ability to address the domestic needs of a

developing country, regional stability, and avoidance of

military conflict in the near term with the United States.

US military advantages over China are narrowing in such

critical areas as nuclear weapons, space technology, and

information warfare. With its ongoing modernization program, China is developing nuclear weapons with increased

accuracy, mobility, and range. In addition to these qualita -

tive improvements, the Chinese arsenal will be in a better

relative position quantitatively due to ongoing US and Rus -

sian strategic arms reductions. Beijing’s growing prowess

in space—including a possible manned presence in space

within the decade—will also provide tremendous benefits

in the military realm. In these areas and in information

technology as a whole, China has been a beneficiary of the

so-called technology paradox: the further technology advances, the easier it is to catch up. 180 Through concerted
in several areas to leapfrog over some of the evolutionary

stages followed by advanced nations in developing its stra -

tegic capabilities. Beijing continues to leverage global advances in technology and communications to improve its

own systems and/or upgrade its inventories at a fraction of

the development costs incurred by other nations.

China’s rapid economic growth supports technological

modernization, and both go hand-in-hand with an improved

defense posture. This is the case both because an expand -

ing economy creates more money for direct investment in

the military (if the political leaders so choose) and because

of the opportunities to leverage dual-use (civilian and mili -

tary) technology and infrastructure, such as electronics

and space technology. An excellent example is Beijing’s

investment in the nation’s telecommunications infrastructure—the expanding and modernizing network advances

both commercial and military aims.

China does not (philosophically or militarily) have to ap -

proach US levels of capability or proficiency to pose a threat

to the United States. There is strong evidence the Chinese

are vigorously analyzing, pursuing, and acquiring the

means to wage asymmetric warfare against a more power -

ful adversary. Even in the near term, reliance on asymmet -

ric warfare could help Beijing level the playing field with

the United States. It would be dangerous to draw parallels

to “prove” Chinese military inadequacy far into the future.

“Warfighting with Chinese characteristics” could be unrecognizable to a Western foe expecting an alter ego adver -

sary. Asymmetric warfare can be cheap, low tech, readily

available, and devastatingly effective. US advantages in

military capabilities based on space and information sys -

tems have increased US reliance on these assets and corre -

spondingly increased its vulnerabilities to their degradation or destruction. Reported Chinese research in

antisatellite systems and China’s progress in information

warfare capabilities may allow it to stand up successfully

to a technologically advanced adversary.

Information warfare may be the weapon of choice for

China to use against a capable military adversary. There

would be little reason for a hostile China to confine IW
structure—the power grid, telecommunications infrastructure, financial systems, emergency systems, etc.—is vul -

nerable. So are the infrastructures of US allies in the region.

The shared knowledge of this fact may permit China to employ a strategy of information deterrence in a situation of

confrontation with the United States. This is in keeping

with two-millennia-old Chinese stratagems that advocate

defeating the enemy without fighting. Alternatively, it could

choose to wage IW, employing its traditional strategy of

using the inferior to overcome the superior. Consistent

with the principles of Sun Zi, an IW attack could be carried

out with complete surprise and with sufficient deception to

potentially avert a devastating counterattack.

It is not inevitable that China will become an adversary

of the United States; however, such a possibility could be -

come a self-fulfilling prophecy if the United States “mishan -

dles” its relationship with China. A US policy of constructive engagement appears to offer more prospects for

peaceful coexistence than attempts to contain China,

which seem destined to fail. Beijing has repeatedly demonstrated its ability to develop or acquire the technology it

needs to progress technologically. Attempts to isolate or

contain China are likely to backfire, since the United

States would lose both influence and leverage, and the

action would simply invite responses ranging from indige -

nous solutions to reliance on non-US suppliers for critical

technology and components. Although concerted efforts of

a powerful country like the United States could slow Chi -

nese progress in “sensitive” areas, the globalization of tech -

nology and profit motivations of other players effectively

conspire to remove the technology “veto” from any one ac -

tor’s hands. The United States holds some of the cards

with which to positively shape the future of Sino-US rela -

tions—the specter of a militarily capable and potentially

hostile China makes a compelling case for doing so. 

Notes

1. “China’s Nuclear Testing” (China database) (Monterey, Calif.: Cen -

ter for Nonproliferation Studies, November 1998), n.p.; and on-line,
p

2. Tracking Nuclear Proliferation, 1998: China (China database) (Washington, D. C.: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 1998), 10;

on-line, Internet, 11 November 1998, available from http://ceip.org/pro -

grams/npp/china/htm; “China’s Nuclear Stockpile and Deployments”

(China database) (Monterey, Calif.: Center for Nonproliferation Studies,

November 1998), n.p.; and on-line, Internet, 27 November 1998, available

from http://cns.miis.edu/db/china/ nforce.htm.

3. “China’s Nuclear Stockpile and Deployments.”

4. Proliferation: Threat and Response (Washington, D. C.: Government

Printing Office, November 1997), 10.

5. Alastair Iain Johnston, “China’s New ‘Old Thinking’: The Concept of

Limited Deterrence,” International Security 20, no. 3 (Winter 1995–96): 36.

6. John Caldwell and Alexander T. Lennon, “China’s Nuclear Modern -

ization Program,” Strategic Review 28, no. 4 (Fall 1995): 28.

7. Information Office of the State Council of the People’s Republic of

China, “China’s National Defense,” Beijing Review 41, no. 32 (10–16 August 1998): 16.

8. Ibid., 30.

9. “China’s Attitude Toward Nuclear Deterrence” (China database)

(Monterey, Calif.: Center for Nonproliferation Studies, November 1998),

n.p.; and on-line, Internet, 27 November 1998, available from

http://cns.miis.edu/db/china/npolicy.htm.

10. M. Ehsan Ahrari, “Sino-Indian Nuclear Perspectives: So Close, Yet

So Far Apart,” Jane’s Intelligence Review 10, no. 8 (August 1998): 31.

11. “China’s Nuclear Doctrine” (China database) (Monterey, Calif.:

Center for Nonproliferation Studies, November 1998), n.p.; and on-line,

Internet, 27 November 1998, available from http://cns.miis.edu/db/

china/npolicy.htm.

12. Ibid.

13. Johnston, 41.

14. Ibid., 5–6.

15. Ibid., 6, 38.

16. Caldwell and Lennon, 28.

17. Ibid.

18. Ibid.

19. Ibid.

20. Ibid., 29.

21. Ibid.

22. Ibid.

23. Jane’s Sentinel: China and Northeast Asia (Coulsdon, Surrey,

U.K.: Jane’s Information Group Limited, 1998), 1.10.5.

24. Banning N. Garrett and Bonnie S. Glaser, “Chinese Perspectives

on Nuclear Arms Control,” International Security 20, no. 3 (Winter

1995/96): 72.

25. Ibid., 55.

26. “Nuclear Warhead Modernization” (China database) (Monterey,

Calif.: Center for Nonproliferation Studies, November 1998), n.p.; on-line,
27. Caldwell and Lennon, 30.

28. Ibid.

29. Bill Gertz, “The Chinese Buildup Rolls On,” Air Force Magazine 80,

no. 9 (September 1997): 81.

30. “Nuclear Delivery System Modernization” (China database) (Monterey, Calif.: Center for Nonproliferation Studies, November 1998), n.p.;

and on-line, Internet, 27 November 1998, available from

http://cns.miis.edu/db/china/wnwmdat.htm.

31. Caldwell and Lennon, 30.

32. Ibid., 31.

33. Ibid., 30.

34. Madeleine K. Albright, “The Testing of American Foreign Policy,”

Foreign Affairs 77, no. 6 (November/December 1998): 57.

35. Garrett and Glaser, 47.

36. Ibid.

37. Ibid.

38. Tracking Nuclear Proliferation, 1998: China, 4.

39. Ibid., 5.

40. Proliferation: Threat and Response, 12.

41. Tracking Nuclear Proliferation, 1998: China, 3.

42. Proliferation: Threat and Response, 12.

43. Caldwell and Lennon, 34.

44. Tracking Nuclear Proliferation, 1998: China, 2.

45. “China’s National Defense,” 30.

46. Proliferation: Threat and Response, 11.

47. Ibid., 12.

48. Tracking Nuclear Proliferation, 1998: China, 7.

49. Mitchel B. Wallerstein, “China and Proliferation: A Path Not

Taken?” Survival 38, no. 3 (Autumn 1996): 64.

50. Tracking Nuclear Proliferation, 1998: China, 7.

51. “China’s National Defense,” 29.

52. “US-China Convergence and Friction on Arms Control/Nonprolif -

eration Issues” (China database) (Monterey, Calif.: Center for

Nonproliferation Studies, November 1998), n.p.; and on-line, Internet, 27

November 1998, available from http://cns.miis.edu/db/china/index

1fr.htm; and “China’s National Defense,” 30.

53. Ibid.

54. “China’s National Defense,” 26.

55. “US-China Convergence and Friction on Arms Control/Nonprolif -

eration Issues.”

56. Ibid.

57. Proliferation: Threat and Response, 12.

58. Garrett and Glaser, 73.

59. Hans Binnendijk and Ronald N. Montaperto, eds., Strategic Trends

in China (Washington, D. C.: National Defense University Press, 1998), 21.

60. Garrett and. Glaser, 43.

61. Caldwell and Lennon, 32.

62. Ibid., 33.
,

65. Caldwell and Lennon, 34.

66. Ibid.

67. “Overview of Chinese Satellite,” Dragon in Space, August 1998,

n.p.; and on-line, Internet, 10 September 1998, available from

http://www.geocities.com/CapeCanaveral/Launchpad/1921/satellite.htm.

68. Phillip Clark, ed., Jane’s Space Directory (Coulsdon, Surrey, U.K.:

Jane’s Information Group Limited, 1997), 210; and Space Warfare Center,

Space Reference Guide (Falcon AFB, Colo.: 1998), 10–19.

69. Ibid.

70. Clark, 211.

71. Ibid., 208.

72. Space Reference Guide, 10–20.

73. Clark, 212.

74. Space Reference Guide, 10–21.

75. Clark, 213.

76. Tamar A. Mehuron, “Space Almanac,” Air Force Magazine 81, no.

8 (August 1998): 39.

77. John Pike, “Chinese Space Launch Vehicles, World Space Guide,

September 1998, n.p.; and on-line, Internet, 1 September 1998, available

from http://www.fas.org/guide/china/launch.

78. Clark, 11.

79. Ibid.

80. Ibid.

81. “Launch History Search Results,” Mission and Spacecraft Library,

September 1998, n.p.; and on-line, Internet, 1 September 1998, available

from http://www.leonardo.jpl.nasa.gov/cgi.bin.

82. Clark, 12.

83. Ibid., 459.

84. Ibid., 11.

85. “Launch and Research Facilities,” Dragon in Space, July 1998,

n.p.; and on-line, Internet, 10 September 1998, available from

http://www.geocities.com/CapeCanaveral/Launchpad/1921/launch.htm.

86. Space Reference Guide, 10–18.

87. Clark, 12, 460.

88. Ibid.

89. Ibid., 454.

90. “Launch and Research Facilities.” 

91. John Pike, “Chinese Space Facilities,” World Space Guide, September 1998, n.p.; and on-line, Internet, 1 September 1998, available

from http://www.fas.org/guide/china/launch.

92. Clark, 10.

93. Ibid.

94. Ibid., 209.

95. Ibid.

96. Ibid.

97. Michael Hirsh, “The Great Technology Giveaway,” Foreign Affairs

77, no. 5 (September/October 1998): 4.
pgy, , 

99. Ibid., 24.

100. Hirsh, 2.

101. Anselmo, 24.

102. Chong-Pin Lin, China’s Nuclear Weapons Strategy (Lexington,

Mass.: Lexington Books, 1988), 55–56.

103. Ibid., 54.

104. Ibid.

105. Ibid., 55.

106. Phillip Clark, “Chinese Designs on the Race for Space,” Jane’s

Intelligence Review 9, no. 4 (April 1997): 178–79.

107. Chong-Pin Lin, 54.

108. Clark, “Chinese Designs on the Race for Space,” 179.

109. Ibid.

110. Ibid., 180.

111. Ibid.

112. Viacheslav A. Frolov, “China’s Armed Forces Prepare for HighTech Warfare,” Defense and Foreign Affairs Strategic Policy 26, no. 1

(January 1998): 7.

113. “China’s National Defense,” 31.

114. “China May Seek Satellite Laser, Pentagon Warns,” Los Angeles

Times, 28 November 1998, in Air Force Space Command Legislative Up -

date, 10 December 1998.

115. Frolov, 7.

116. Ibid.

117. Ibid.

118. Steve Berner, “Proliferation of Satellite Imaging Capabilities: De -

velopments and Implications,” in Fighting Proliferation: New Concerns for

the Nineties, edited by Henry Sokolski (Maxwell AFB, Ala.: Air University

Press, September 1996), 120.

119. M. Ehsan Ahrari, “Chinese Prove to Be Attentive Students of

Information Warfare,” Jane’s Intelligence Review 9, no. 10 (October 1997):

469.

120. Frolov, 7.

121. Ibid., 7–8.

122. “PRC Computer Security Concerns Grow,” 3.

123. Ibid.

124. Ibid.

125. Wang Pufeng, “The Challenge of Information Warfare,” in Chinese Views of Future Warfare, ed. Michael Pillsbury (Washington, D. C.:

National Defense University Press, March 1997), 318.

126. “PRC Computer Security Concerns Grow,” 3.

127. Wang Xusheng, Su Jinhai, and Zhang Hong, “China: Information

Revolution, Defense Security,” Beijing Jisuaji Shijie (China Computerworld), (11 August 1997):1–2; and on-line, Internet, 12 January 1997,

available from http://www.infowar.com/mil_c4I_121897a.html-ssi.

128. Ahrari, “Chinese Prove to Be Attentive Students of Information

Warfare,” 471.
, 

130. Ibid.

131. Wang Baocun and Li Fei, “Information Warfare,” in Chinese

Views of Future Warfare, 337.

132. Wang, “The Challenge of Information Warfare,” in Chinese Views

of Future Warfare, 322.

133. Ibid., 322–23.

134. Ahrari, “Chinese Prove to Be Attentive Students of Information

Warfare,” 473.

135. Ibid.

136. Ibid.

137. Ch’en, “The Third Military Revolution,” in Chinese Views of Future Warfare, 395.

138. Ibid., 393.

139. Sun Tzu, The Art of War, trans. Samuel B. Griffith (Oxford, U.K.:

Oxford University Press, 1963), 84.

140. Ibid., 77.

141. Ibid., 78.

142. Wang, “The Challenge of Information Warfare,” in Chinese Views

of Future Warfare, 319.

143. Quoted in Jiang Lei, “Influence of Sun Zi’s Concept of ‘Attacking

the Enemy’s Strategy and Disrupting its Alliance’ on the Current NonSymmetric Strategy,” in The 4th International Symposium on Sun Tzu’s Art

of War, paper abstract (Beijing: 1998), 94.

144. Quoted in Li Wenqing, “Carry Forward Sun Zi’s Concepts and

Seek Better Strategy to Subdue the Enemy in High-Tech Wars,” in The 4th

International Symposium on Sun Tzu’s Art of War, 100.

145. Quoted in Yu Rubo and Qui Jianmin, “Philosophical Reflection on

the Strategic Guideline of ‘The Weak Can Defeat the Strong’ in Ancient China,”

in The 4th International Symposium on Sun Tzu’s Art of War, 101.

146. Yu Shifu, Han Xiaoling, and Zhang Qinbin, “On the Outlook of

National Security Strategy in the Sun Zi and our National Security Strat -

egy,” in The 4th International Symposium on Sun Tzu’s Art of War, 82.

147. Ibid.

148. Ahrari, “Chinese Prove to Be Attentive Students of Information

Warfare,” 471–72.

149. Ibid., 473.

150. Ibid.

151. Ibid.

152. Zhu Xiaoli and Zhao Xiaozhu, quoted in Chinese Views of Future

Warfare, xxxiv.

153. Frolov, 7.

154. Wei Jincheng, “The People’s Information War,” in Infowar, eds.

Gerfried Stocker and Christine Schopf (New York: Springer, 1998), 87.

155. Ibid., 90.

156. Wei Jincheng, “Information War: A New Form of People’s War,” in

Chinese Views of Future Warfare, 409–10.

157. Wei Jincheng, “The People’s Information War,” 91.

158. Ibid., 92.
,

160. Wang Xusheng, Su Jinhai, and Zhang Hong, “China: Information

Revolution, Defense Security,” 2.

161. Ibid., 5.

162. Ibid.

163. “PRC Internet: Cheaper, More Popular and More Chinese,” US

Embassy Beijing Report, October 1998, n.p.; on-line, Internet, 10 Janu -

ary 1999, available from http://www.usembassy-china.org.cn/

english/sandt/Inetcawb.htm, 4.

164. Ibid.

165. “Information Warfare: A Two-Edged Sword,” Rand Report, Fall

1995, n.p.; on-line, Internet, 12 January 1999, available from

http://www.rand.org/publications/RRR/RRR.fall95.cyber/infor_war.html, 1.

166. Roger C. Molander, Andrew S. Riddile, and Peter A. Wilson,

“Strategic Information Warfare: A New Face of War,” Parameters 26, no. 3

(Autumn 1996): 86.

167. Lt Gen Kenneth Minihan, quoted in US Congress, Senate Gov -

ernmental Affairs Committee, “Vulnerabilities of the National Information

Infrastructure” (24 June 1998). Text from Federal Information Systems

Corporation Federal News Service, 24 June 1998, available from Congres -

sional Universe, on-line, Congressional Information Service, 2.

168. Ibid., 3.

169. Ibid., 2.

170. “PRC Computer Security Concerns Grow,” 4.

171. Sen. Fred Thompson (R-Tenn.), quoted from US Congress, Sen -

ate Governmental Affairs Committee, “Weak Computer Security in

Government.” Text from Federal Information Systems Corporation Federal

News Service, 24 June 1998, available from Congressional Universe, online, Congressional Information Service, 2.

172. Minihan, 4.

173. Wei, “Information War: A New Form of People’s War,” in Chinese

Views of Future Warfare, 411.

174. George Tenet, quoted in Senate Governmental Affairs Committee,

“Weak Computer Security in Government,” 24 June 1998. Text from Federal Information Systems Corporation Federal News Service, available from

Congressional Universe, on-line, Congressional Information Service, 5.

175. Ibid.

176. Ibid., 4.

177. Minihan, 3.

178. Ibid.

179. Tenet, 5; and Minihan, 2.

180. Ahrari, “Chinese Prove to Be Attentive Students of Information

Warfare,” 471.
C3I Command, Control, Communications, and

Intelligence

CALT China Academy of Launch Vehicle

Technology

CIA Central Intelligence Agency

COSTIND Committee of Science, Technology, and

Industry

CTBT Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty

CZ Chang Zheng (Long March)

DF Dongfeng

DIRNSA Director, National Security Agency

GEO Geosynchronous Earth Orbit

IAEA International Atomic Energy Agency

ICBM Intercontinental Ballistic Missile

IRBM Intermediate Range Ballistic Missile

IT Information Technology

IW Information Warfare

JL Julang

LANDSAT Land Satellite

LEO Low Earth Orbit

MIRV Multiple Independently Targeted Reentry

Vehicle

MRV Multiple Reentry Vehicle

MTCR Missile Technology Control Regime

NFU No First Use

NMD National Missile Defense

NPT Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty

NSA Negative Security Assurance

NSG Nuclear Suppliers Group

PLA People’s Liberation Army

PRC People’s Republic of China

SALT Strategic Arms Limitation Talks

SLBM Submarine Launched Ballistic Missile

SPOT Satellite Pour l’Observation de la Terre

SSBN Ballistic Missile Submarine

START Strategic Arms Reduction Talks

TMD Theater Missile Defense

TT&C Telemetry, Tracking, and Commanding

39