a

GAO

United States General Accounting Office

Report to the Ranking Minority Member, 

Subcommittee on Financial Management, 

the Budget, and International Security, 

Committee on Governmental Affairs,

U.S. Senate

August 2003 NUCLEAR SECURITY

Federal and State 

Action Needed to 

Improve Security of 

Sealed Radioactive 

Sources

GAO-03-804
The number of sealed sources in the United States is unknown because NRC 

and states track numbers of licensees instead of individual sealed sources. 

Users of certain devices containing sealed sources are not required to apply 

to NRC for a license. Accounting for these devices has been difficult. In 

addition, since 1998, more than 1,300 incidents have taken place in the 

United States where sealed sources have been lost, stolen, or abandoned. 

The majority of these lost devices were recovered. 

Security for sealed sources varied among the facilities GAO visited in 10 

states. Also, a potential security weakness exists in NRC’s licensing process 

to obtain sealed sources. Approved applicants may buy sealed sources as 

soon as a new license is issued by mail. Because the process assumes that 

the applicant is acting in good faith and it can take NRC as long as 12 months 

before conducting an inspection, it is possible that sealed sources can be 

obtained for malicious intent. In addition, NRC currently evaluates the 

effectiveness of state regulatory programs, but these evaluations do not 

assess the security of sealed sources. 

Since the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, NRC and states have 

notified licensees of the need for heightened awareness to security, but have 

not required any specific actions to improve security. NRC has been 

developing additional security measures since the attacks, and issued the 

first security order to large facilities that irradiate such items as medical 

supplies and food on June 5, 2003. Additional orders to licensees that 

possess high risk sealed sources are expected to follow. NRC and states 

disagree over the appropriate role of states in efforts to improve security. 

NRC intends to develop and implement all additional security measures on 

licensees with sealed sources, including those licensed by states. However, 

over 80 percent of states responding to our survey feel they should be given 

responsibility to inspect and enforce security measures. 

Number of Medical, Industrial, and Research Users of Sealed Sources (About 20,000 Total 

Nationwide) as of December 31, 2002 

Sealed radioactive sources, 

radioactive material encapsulated 

in stainless steel or other metal, are 

used worldwide in medicine, 

industry, and research. These 

sealed sources could be a threat to 

national security because terrorists 

could use them to make “dirty 

bombs.” GAO was asked to 

determine (1) the number of sealed 

sources in the United States, (2) 

the number of sealed sources lost, 

stolen, or abandoned, (3) the 

effectiveness of federal and state 

controls over sealed sources, and 

(4) the Nuclear Regulatory 

Commission (NRC) and state 

efforts since September 11, 2001, to 

strengthen security of sealed 

sources. 

GAO recommends that NRC (1) 

collaborate with states to 

determine availability of highest 

risk sealed sources, (2) determine 

if owners of certain devices should 

apply for licenses, (3) modify 

NRC’s licensing process so sealed 

sources cannot be purchased until 

NRC verifies their intended use, (4) 

ensure that NRC’s evaluation of 

federal and state programs assess 

security of sealed sources, and (5) 

determine how states can 

participate in implementing 

additional security measures. NRC 

stated that some of our 

recommendations would require 

statutory changes. We clarified our 

report language to address this 

concern. Agreement states and an 

organization of radiation experts 

agreed with our recommendations. 

www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-03-804.

To view the full report, including the scope 

and methodology, click on the link above. 

For more information, contact Gene Aloise at 

(202) 512-6870 or aloisee@gao.gov. 

Highlights of GAO-03-804, a report to 

Ranking Minority Member, Subcommittee 

on Financial Management, the Budget, 

and International Security, Committee on 

Governmental Affairs, U.S. Senate 

August 2003 

NUCLEAR SECURITY 

Federal and State Action Needed to 

Improve Security of Sealed Radioactive 

Sources 
Page i GAO-03-804 Nuclear Security

Contents

Letter 1

Results in Brief 4

Background 7

NRC and the Agreement States Lack Complete Information on 

Numbers of Sealed Sources 9

Over 1,300 Devices Containing Sealed Sources Have Been Reported 

Lost, Stolen, or Abandoned Since 1998 17

Weaknesses Exist in Federal and State Controls Over the Security of 

Sealed Sources 20

NRC Efforts to Improve Security over Sealed Sources Have Been 

Limited and Disagreement Exists over the Appropriate Role of the 

States 27

Conclusions 32

Recommendations for Executive Action 33

Agency Comments and Our Evaluation 34

Appendixes

Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology 40

Appendix II: Medical and Industrial Devices That Use Sealed Sources 45

Irradiators 45

Teletherapy 46

Industrial Radiography 47

Brachytheraphy 48

Well Logging Device 50

Fixed Industrial Gauge 52

Portable Gauge 53

Appendix III: Legislation Introduced in the 108th Congress Addressing 

Security of Sealed Sources 57

Appendix IV: Results of Survey of Agreement States 59

Appendix V: Results of Survey of Non-Agreement States 94

Appendix VI: Comments from the Nuclear Regulatory Commission 116

Appendix VII: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments 119

GAO Contact 119

Acknowledgments 119

Tables Table 1: Number of Specific Licenses Issued By Use in the United 

States as of December 31, 2002 13
Contents

Page ii GAO-03-804 Nuclear Security

Table 2: Type and Size of Sealed Sources Used in Medical and 

Industrial Practices 55

Figures Figure 1: NRC Regulated Specific Licenses in NRC Regulated 

States and on Federal Facilities in Agreement States as of 

December 31, 2002 11

Figure 2: Agreement State Regulated Specific Licenses as of 

December 31, 2002 12

Figure 3: Results of Integrated Materials Performance Evaluation 

Program Reviews 25

Figure 4: Product Conveyor System in a Panoramic Irradiator 46

Figure 5: Stereotactic Radiosurgery Device (Gamma Knife) 47

Figure 6: Industrial Radiography Camera and Storage Case 48

Figure 7: High Dose Rate Remote After Loader Used for 

Brachytherapy 50

Figure 8: Storage Container for Well Logging Sealed Source 52

Figure 9: Fixed Industrial Gauge 53

Figure 10: Portable Moisture/Density Gauge 54

Abbreviations

CFR Code of Federal Regulations

CRCPD Conference of Radiation Control Program Directors

DOE Department of Energy

DOT Department of Transportation

GAO General Accounting Office

NRC Nuclear Regulatory Commission

OAS Organization of Agreement States

This is a work of the U.S. government and is not subject to copyright protection in the 

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Page 1 GAO-03-804 Nuclear Security

United States General Accounting Office

Washington, D.C. 20548

A

August 6, 2003 Letr

The Honorable Daniel K. Akaka

Ranking Minority Member

Subcommittee on Financial Management,

 the Budget, and International Security

Committee on Governmental Affairs

United States Senate

Dear Senator Akaka:

Since the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks there has been concern that 

certain radioactive material, such as cobalt-60, strontium-90, iodine-131, 

cesium-137, iridium-192, and americium-241, could be used in the 

construction of a radiological dispersion device—commonly referred to as 

a “dirty bomb.” Such radioactive materials are used in devices that treat 

cancer, sterilize food and medical instruments, and detect flaws in 

pipelines and other types of metal welds. Much of the radioactive material 

used in these devices is encapsulated, or sealed, in metal such as stainless 

steel, titanium, or platinum to prevent its dispersal.1

 A dirty bomb could be 

produced by using explosives in combination with radioactive material 

upon detonation. Most experts agree that the dispersed radioactive 

material would have few short-term health effects on exposed individuals 

and that the explosives, not the radioactive material, would likely cause the 

greatest amount of immediate injuries, fatalities, and property damage. 

However, a dirty bomb—depending on the type, form, amount, and 

concentration of radioactive material used—could cause radiation 

exposure in individuals in close proximity to the material for an extended 

time and potentially increase the long-term risks of cancer for those 

contaminated. In addition, the evacuation and cleanup of contaminated 

areas after such an explosion could lead to panic and serious economic 

costs on the affected population.

Under the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, the Nuclear Regulatory Commission 

(NRC) regulates domestic medical, industrial, and research uses of sealed 

sources through a combination of regulatory requirements, licensing, 

1

Some loose material, such as iodine-131, used in thyroid cancer treatments, and 

technetium-99m, commonly used in medical imaging procedures is not in sealed source 

form. However, for simplicity this report uses the term “sealed source” to refer to all 

radioactive materials used for medical, industrial, and research purposes.

Letter
Page 2 GAO-03-804 Nuclear Security

inspection, and enforcement. Section 274 of the act authorizes NRC to give 

primary regulatory authority to states (called “agreement” states) under 

certain conditions.2

 To date, NRC has relinquished its licensing, inspection, 

and enforcement authority to 32 agreement states that administer the use 

of sealed sources within their jurisdictions;3

 while continuing to regulate 

the use of sealed sources in the remaining states. NRC periodically 

evaluates each agreement state’s regulatory program for compatibility with 

NRC regulations and its effectiveness in protecting public health and safety. 

Two types of licenses are associated with the use of radioactive materials—

general licenses and specific licenses. A generally licensed device usually 

contains a sealed source within a shielded device, such as gas 

chromatograph units, fixed gauges, luminous exit signs, or reference and 

check sources. Such devices are designed with inherent radiation safety 

features so that persons with little or no radiation training or experience 

can use it, and as such do not require NRC or agreement state approval to 

purchase and are widely commercially available. Specific licenses cover 

uses, such as cameras used for industrial radiography, medical devices 

used to treat cancer, and facilities that irradiate food or medical products 

for sterilization. These uses generally require larger amounts of radioactive 

material than can be obtained with a general license. Organizations or 

individuals wanting to obtain a specific license must submit an application 

and gain the approval of either NRC or an agreement state. In addition to 

NRC and agreement states, other federal agencies, such as the Department 

of Transportation, the Food and Drug Administration, and the 

Environmental Protection Agency, regulate the safe transportation, 

medical use, and cleanup of radioactive material. The Department of 

2

The purpose of section 274 of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended (42 U.S.C. § 2021) 

is to recognize the interest of the states in the peaceful uses of atomic energy and to 

establish programs for cooperation between the states and NRC to control the radiation 

hazards associated with the use of radioactive materials. While it details procedures for 

NRC to relinquish its regulatory authority to the states for medical, industrial, and research 

uses of radioactive materials, NRC retains sole regulatory authority over, among other 

things, nuclear power plants and the export and import of radioactive materials. In addition, 

NRC retains regulatory authority over federal facilities (such as Department of Defense 

bases or Veterans Administration hospitals)—see 10 C.F.R. § 30.6(b)(2).

3

At the time of our report, Alabama, Arizona, Arkansas, California, Colorado, Florida, 

Georgia, Illinois, Iowa, Kansas, Kentucky, Louisiana, Maine, Maryland, Massachusetts, 

Mississippi, Nebraska, Nevada, New Hampshire, New Mexico, New York, North Carolina, 

North Dakota, Ohio, Oklahoma, Oregon, Rhode Island, South Carolina, Tennessee, Texas, 

Utah, and Washington were agreement states. NRC expects Wisconsin will become an 

agreement state in the summer of 2003.
Page 3 GAO-03-804 Nuclear Security

Energy (DOE) regulates the use of radioactive material at its facilities and 

at the national laboratories.

This report—the third that we have prepared at your request to examine 

efforts to control sealed radioactive sources—examines efforts in the 

United States to regulate the use of sealed sources domestically and to 

prevent the use of this material by terrorists.4

 Specifically, you asked us to 

determine (1) the known number of sealed sources in the United States; (2) 

how many of these sealed sources have been lost, stolen, or abandoned; (3) 

the effectiveness of federal and state controls over sealed sources; and (4) 

NRC’s and agreement states’ efforts considered or implemented following 

September 11, 2001, to strengthen security of sealed sources. To address 

these objectives, we distributed a survey to radiation control agencies in 

the 32 agreement states, the 18 non-agreement states, the District of 

Columbia, and Puerto Rico to determine numbers and types of radioactive 

materials licenses in their jurisdictions and to solicit their views on the 

regulation of sealed sources. At the time of this report, all of the agreement 

states except Arizona, 11 non-agreement states, and Puerto Rico had 

responded to our survey. We did not receive responses from the following 

non-agreement states—Alaska, Connecticut, Minnesota, Missouri, 

Pennsylvania, South Dakota, Vermont, Wyoming, and the District of 

Columbia.5

 We also surveyed and interviewed officials in the four NRC 

regional offices; interviewed officials at NRC headquarters in Rockville, 

Maryland; and analyzed NRC license and incident databases. In addition, 

we observed NRC evaluations of the effectiveness of state regulatory 

programs in Rhode Island and Florida and a similar evaluation of NRC’s 

Region III radioactive materials regulatory program in Lisle, Illinois. We 

visited 10 states to meet with officials of state radiation control agencies 

4

Our report, U.S. General Accounting Office, Nuclear Nonproliferation: DOE Action Needed 

to Ensure Continued Recovery of Unwanted Sealed Radioactive Sources, GAO-03-483

(Washington, D.C.: Apr. 15, 2003) examined DOE’s efforts to recover and dispose of 

unwanted “greater-than-Class-C” sources—sources that typically contain greater 

concentrations of isotopes such as plutonium-238, plutonium-239, and americium-241, that 

cannot be disposed of at existing low-level radioactive waste facilities. Our report, U.S. 

General Accounting Office, Nuclear Nonproliferation: U.S. and International Assistance 

Efforts to Control Sealed Radioactive Sources Need Strengthening, GAO-03-638

(Washington, D.C.: May 16, 2003) examined international efforts conducted by the United 

States, the Russian Federation, the International Atomic Energy Agency, and others to 

control sealed sources.

5

Although we did not receive surveys from these states, we obtained data on incidents 

involving sealed sources and numbers and types of licensees from NRC.
Page 4 GAO-03-804 Nuclear Security

and selected licensees representing a variety of types and uses of sealed 

sources. Appendix I presents our scope and methodology in more detail.

Results in Brief The precise number of sealed sources in use today in the United States is 

unknown. NRC estimates that there are approximately 2 million sealed 

sources in the United States. This estimate is based on the number of 

specific and general licensees from NRC’s databases and agreement states 

combined with data from an NRC survey conducted in the early 1990s. NRC 

and agreement states do not track the actual numbers of sealed sources, 

but only track the number of specific licensees and have limited data on 

general licensees. NRC, in cooperation with DOE, has begun examining 

options for developing a national sealed source tracking system, but this 

effort is limited in scope; importantly, it has had only limited involvement 

of the agreement states. Our analysis of NRC’s specific license database 

and responses to our survey of agreement states indicate that about 20,000 

entities (companies, hospitals, organizations, and in some cases, 

individuals) have obtained specific licenses to possess and use radioactive 

material, including sealed sources. Agreement states regulate 80 percent of 

these entities, while NRC regulates the remaining 20 percent.

NRC has had difficulty accounting for generally licensed devices. Owners 

of these devices are not required to apply to NRC or agreement states for 

licenses. Mishandling and improper disposal of generally licensed devices 

has, in some cases, lead to expensive investigation and clean up. NRC 

began tracking generally licensed devices in April 2001, but has 

experienced problems locating device owners. To assist in this effort, NRC 

has contracted with a private investigation firm to help locate owners. In 

order to improve accountability over generally licensed devices, we are 

recommending that NRC determine the need to require owners of these 

devices to apply for specific licenses and whether the additional costs 

presented by applying for and approving specific licenses are 

commensurate with the risks these devices present.

Since 1998, there have been more than 1,300 reported incidents of lost, 

stolen, or abandoned devices containing sealed sources, an average of 

about 250 per year. The majority of these devices were subsequently 

recovered. Both NRC and DOE recognize the importance of determining 

how many sealed sources are present in the United States, and which 

sealed sources pose the greatest risk if they were to be used in a dirty 

bomb. NRC and DOE are working together to categorize sealed sources by 

their level of risk. However, NRC’s and DOE’s efforts are limited in scope 
Page 5 GAO-03-804 Nuclear Security

because they do not include an analysis of sealed sources in the agreement 

states, which regulate 80 percent of the nation’s radioactive materials 

licensees. This is because there is no single source of data on agreement 

state licensees; instead each state has its own database of the licensees it 

regulates. These databases are not linked to one another and NRC does not 

have access to them. Therefore, we are recommending that NRC as part of 

its continuing efforts to categorize the sealed sources that pose the greatest 

risk, consult with the agreement states to determine the types, amount, and 

availability of the highest risk sealed sources.

Weaknesses exist in federal and state controls over the security of sealed 

sources. Our visits to radiation control programs and licensees in 10 states 

found that security for devices containing sealed sources varied among 

facilities we visited. For example, a medical device manufacturer that we 

visited had extensive security measures, including electronic access 

control to areas containing sealed sources, perimeter fencing, and 

background checks on employees. On the other hand, a medical use 

licensee that we visited kept its sealed sources in an unlocked, unguarded 

space with the door propped open. In addition, we found a potential 

security weakness in NRC’s licensing process to obtain sealed sources. The 

process assumes an applicant is acting in good faith and allows applicants 

to acquire sealed sources as soon as a new license is issued by mail. It can 

then take NRC as long as 12 months to conduct its first inspection, leaving 

the possibility that materials will be obtained and used maliciously in the 

meantime. Certain agreement states have implemented measures to 

address this weakness, such as delivering licenses in person or conducting 

inspections before the delivery of sealed sources. In addition, NRC 

currently evaluates the effectiveness of state regulatory programs, but 

these evaluations do not assess the security of sealed sources. To address 

security weaknesses, we are recommending that NRC modify its licensing 

process to ensure that radioactive sources cannot be purchased before 

NRC verifies that the material will be used as intended. We are also 

recommending that NRC modify its evaluations of agreement state and 

NRC programs to include criteria and performance measures of program 

effectiveness in ensuring the security of sealed sources.

Since the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, NRC, along with the 

agreement states, has notified licensees of the need for heightened 

awareness to security and the need to take certain actions, but has not 

issued, until recently, legally binding orders to improve the security of 

sealed sources. NRC has been developing specific additional security 

measures since the attacks, and issued orders on June 5, 2003, to 
Page 6 GAO-03-804 Nuclear Security

strengthen security at large irradiator facilities. Although irradiator 

facilities contain large amounts of radioactive material, they are specially 

designed to include thick concrete and steel walls, security interlocks, and 

other protective equipment to protect against radiation exposure and 

secure the sealed sources. In light of such built-in security, agreement state 

officials and others have questioned NRC’s decision to select irradiators as 

the first recipient of additional security measures. Of agreement states 

responding to our survey, 93 percent identified sealed sources used in 

industrial radiography as of greater concern. Reasons for this may include 

that these devices are widely available and portable.

NRC and some agreement states disagree on the appropriate role of the 

states in the regulation of sealed source security. The Atomic Energy Act of 

1954 gives NRC the authority to issue rules, regulations, or orders to 

promote the common defense and security and to protect the health and 

minimize danger to life or property. Based on this authority, NRC intends to 

order licensees with sealed sources, including those licensed by agreement 

states, to implement additional security measures. NRC has already done 

so for large irradiator facilities. However, 82 percent of agreement states 

responding to our survey indicate that they want to have responsibility for 

inspection and enforcement of security measures for sealed sources. In 

addition, 74 percent of agreement states responding to our survey indicated 

that their state program could effectively respond to a radiological incident 

with its current resources. NRC officials argue that the agreement states 

lack the staff and funding to carry out the additional responsibility of 

securing sealed sources. However, according to NRC officials we 

contacted, NRC clearly faces similar staffing and funding problems. NRC 

has initiated a materials security working group, which includes the states, 

as a mechanism for discussing and identifying potential resolutions to 

these issues. We are recommending that NRC determine how agreement 

and non-agreement states can participate in the development and 

implementation of additional security measures over sealed sources.

We presented a draft of this report to NRC, the Conference of Radiation 

Control Program Directors (CRCPD), and the Organization of Agreement 

States (OAS) for comment. NRC stated that the draft report did not fully 

present either the current status of NRC’s efforts to improve the security of 

high-risk radioactive sources or the large effort that NRC has devoted to 

this issue over the past 18 months. NRC believed that several of our 

recommendations would require statutory changes at both federal and 

state levels. We clarified our recommendations regarding the participation 

of the states in the development and implementation of additional security 
Page 7 GAO-03-804 Nuclear Security

measures. CRCPD and OAS officials generally agreed with our conclusions 

and recommendations.

Background Radioactive material in sealed sources is used in equipment designed to 

diagnose and treat illnesses (particularly cancer), irradiate food and 

medical products for sterilization purposes, detect flaws and other failures 

in pipeline and other types of metal welds, and determine the moisture 

content of soil and other materials.6

 Until the 1950s, only naturally 

occurring radioactive materials, such as radium-226, were available to be 

used in sealed sources. Since then, sealed sources containing radioactive 

material produced artificially in nuclear reactors and particle accelerators 

have become widely available, including cobalt-60, strontium-90, 

technetium-99m, cesium-137, and iridium-192. Under the Atomic Energy 

Act of 1954, the states retain sole regulatory authority over most naturally 

occurring radioactive material as well as radioactive material produced in 

particle accelerators. Federal jurisdiction extends only to those materials 

used as a source of material for nuclear fuel or created as a result of 

irradiation in nuclear reactors.

Radioactive material can be found in various forms. For example, cobalt-60 

is a metal, while the cesium-137 in some sealed sources is in a powder form 

closely resembling talc. Radioactive materials never stop emitting 

radiation, but their intensity decays over time at various rates. The term 

“half-life” is used to indicate the period during which the radioactivity 

decreases by half as a result of decay. Radioactive materials are measured 

by their level of activity. The greater the activity level—measured in units 

called curies7

—the more radiation emitted, which increases the potential 

risk to the public if the radioactive materials are lost or stolen.

6

See appendix II for a discussion of medical and industrial devices that use radioactive 

sources.

7

The curie is the unit of measurement most commonly used in the United States. The 

corresponding international standard unit, the Bequerel (Bq) is the activity equal to one 

radioactive disintegration per second. One bequerel=2.7 x 10-11 curies. 
Page 8 GAO-03-804 Nuclear Security

Two types of licenses are associated with the use of radioactive materials—

general licenses and specific licenses. A generally licensed device usually 

consists of a sealed source within a shielded device, such as gas 

chromatograph units, fixed gauges, luminous exit signs, or reference and 

check sources. These devices are designed with inherent radiation safety 

features so that persons with little or no radiation training or experience 

can use it. General licensees are automatically licensed without having to 

apply to NRC or an agreement state for a license and are subject to a 

variety of requirements under NRC’s or agreement states’ regulations.8

Furthermore, manufacturers are required to report quarterly to NRC the 

names of customers who purchase generally licensed devices. Examples of 

requirements general licensees are subject to under NRC’s regulations 

include:

• general licensees shall not abandon the devices;

• complying with instructions and precautions listed on device labels;

• performing tests to ensure radioactivity is not leaking from the device at 

least every 6 months, and, if leakage is detected, suspend operation of 

the device and have it repaired or disposed of by the manufacturer or 

another entity authorized to perform such work; and

• reporting to NRC or an agreement state the transfer of a device to 

another licensee or the disposal of the device.

A company seeking radioactive material for uses that do not qualify for a 

general license must apply to NRC or, if it conducts business in an 

agreement state, to the appropriate state for a specific license. Its 

application must demonstrate how the use of the materials will meet the 

safety requirements in NRC’s or agreement states’ regulations.9

 Applicants 

must provide information on the type, form, and intended quantity of 

material, the facilities in which the material will be used, the qualifications 

of users of the materials, and radiation protection programs the applicant 

has in place to protect their workers and the public from receiving 

excessive doses of radiation.

8

NRC’s regulations are at 10 C.F.R. § 31.5.

9

NRC’s regulations are at 10 C.F.R. Parts 19-21, 30-39, 40, 61, 70, and 71.
Page 9 GAO-03-804 Nuclear Security

NRC and the 

Agreement States Lack 

Complete Information 

on Numbers of Sealed 

Sources

The number of sealed sources in use today in the United States is unknown 

primarily because no state or federal agency tracks individual sealed 

sources. Instead, NRC and the agreement states track numbers of specific 

licensees. NRC and DOE have begun to examine options for developing a 

national tracking system, but to date, this effort has had limited 

involvement by the agreement states. NRC had difficulty locating owners of 

certain generally licensed devices it began tracking in April 2001 and has 

hired a private investigation firm to help locate them. Twenty-five of the 31 

agreement states that responded to our survey indicated that they track 

some or all general licensees or generally licensed devices, and 17 were 

able to provide data on the number of generally licensed devices in their 

jurisdictions, totaling approximately 17,000 devices.

NRC and Agreement States 

Track Licensees Rather 

Than Individual Sealed 

Sources

NRC estimates that there are approximately 2 million licensed sealed 

sources in the United States. However, there is no single source of 

information in the United States to verify authorized users, locations, 

quantities, and movements of sealed sources. Separate systems are in place 

at NRC and in each agreement state to track the identities of specific 

licensees and the maximum quantity of radioactive material that they are 

authorized to possess. These systems do not, however, record the number 

of sealed sources actually possessed by specific licensees nor do the 

systems track movements (such as purchase, transfer, or disposal) of 

sealed sources by specific licensees. Licensees are required to maintain 

records for the acquisition and disposition of each sealed source it receives 

and inspections by NRC and/or an agreement state includes confirming 

inventory records.

The Secretary of Energy and the Chairman of NRC established a working 

group in June 2002 to address, among other things, the options for 

establishing a national source tracking system and the potential for the use 

of technological methods for tagging and monitoring sealed sources in use, 

storage, and transit. This working group reported in May 2003 that a 

national source tracking system should provide a “cradle to grave” account 

of the origins of each high-risk source, and record how, by whom, and 

where a source has been transported, used, and eventually disposed of or 

exported. According to the report, such a system would help NRC and DOE 

to:

• monitor the location and use of sealed sources,
Page 10 GAO-03-804 Nuclear Security

• detect and act on discrepancies,

• conduct inspections and investigations,

• communicate sealed source information to other government agencies,

• respond in the event of an emergency,

• verify legitimate ownership and use of sealed sources, and

• further analyze hazards attributable to the possession and use of sealed 

sources.

The working group did not determine how data on sealed source licensees 

in the agreement states would be integrated into a national level system.

While there are no complete data on the number of sealed sources in the 

United States, data are available on the number of specific licensees 

authorized to use sealed sources. Analysis of NRC’s specific license 

database and responses to our survey of the agreement states indicates that 

there are about 20,000 specific licensees in the United States (see figs. 1 

and 2). The majority (nearly 80 percent) are regulated by the 32 agreement 

states, the remaining 20 percent of specific licensees are regulated by NRC.
Page 11 GAO-03-804 Nuclear Security

Figure 1: NRC Regulated Specific Licenses in NRC Regulated States and on Federal Facilities in Agreement States as of 

December 31, 2002

Notes: NRC regulates specific licensees on federal facilities in agreement states.

NRC also regulates 5 specific licensees in Guam, 120 specific licensees in Puerto Rico, and 7 specific 

licensees in the U.S. Virgin Islands.
Page 12 GAO-03-804 Nuclear Security

Figure 2: Agreement State Regulated Specific Licenses as of December 31, 2002

Our analysis of NRC’s license tracking system and responses to our survey 

of agreement states indicates that sealed sources for medical uses 

comprise the largest portion of specific licenses issued (see table 1).
Page 13 GAO-03-804 Nuclear Security

Table 1: Number of Specific Licenses Issued By Use in the United States as of December 31, 2002

State Medical

Measuring 

systems

Industrial 

radiography

Well 

logging

IrradiatorslargeIrradiatorssmall Other Total

Alabama 153 185 26 3 0 2 63 432

Alaska 10 21 7 0 0 1 5 44

Arizona NA NA NA NA NA NA NA 318

Arkansas 118 128 10 6 1 4 29 296

California 655 799 40 18 9 26 640 2,187

Colorado 85 166 12 10 0 4 79 356

Connecticut 69 38 3 0 0 3 63 176

Delaware 19 16 1 1 0 2 15 54

District of Columbia 18 6 0 0 1 3 12 40

Florida 866 367 20 8 2 24 111 1,398

Georgia 267 175 13 1 2 5 66 529

Guam 2 3 0 0 0 0 0 5

Hawaii 21 25 3 1 0 1 5 56

Idaho 20 36 0 0 0 0 12 68

Illinois 273 338 18 7 4 8 125 773

Indiana 144 86 4 0 0 1 39 274

Iowa 67 136 6 0 0 5 27 241

Kansas 130 142 12 20 0 2 13 319

Kentucky 158 180 6 8 0 3 11 366

Louisiana NA NA NA NA NA NA NA 548

Maine 47 57 4 0 0 3 22 133

Maryland 226 140 2 0 7 19 169 563

Massachusetts 120 180 7 0 2 13 239 561

Michigan 250 168 7 4 1 7 64 501

Minnesota 56 49 5 0 1 5 38 154

Mississippi 118 157 21 5 1 6 21 329

Missouri 136 84 7 0 0 3 56 286

Montana 16 38 1 0 0 2 11 68

Nebraska 50 66 4 0 3 4 19 146

Nevada 86 130 5 1 0 3 13 238

New Hampshire 27 39 2 0 1 1 13 83

New Jersey 239 98 5 0 7 13 128 490

New Mexico 44 99 9 11 2 5 22 192

New York 512 268 25 2 2 4 38 851
Page 14 GAO-03-804 Nuclear Security

Sources: NRC license tracking system and GAO survey of agreement states.

Notes: NA=not available.

Does not include licenses issued for naturally occurring or accelerator-produced radioactive materials 

in NRC regulated states. Twenty-nine of the 31 agreement states responding to our survey do not 

distinguish between materials regulated under the Atomic Energy Act of 1954 and naturally occurring 

or accelerator-produced radioactive materials in their licensing actions.

Data for Arizona and Louisiana includes only the total number of licensees.

Fixed and portable gauges used in industry to measure density, moisture 

content, thickness, and so forth, are the next most prevalent use of sealed 

sources, with nearly 7,100 specific licenses issued nationwide. Over 570 

specific licenses have been issued for industrial radiographers. In addition, 

there are 70 large irradiators (containing high levels, between 10,000 and 15 

million curies, of cobalt-60) across the United States used for the 

sterilization of food and medical products, and 284 smaller irradiators 

(containing less than 10,000 curies of, in most cases, cesium-137 and 

cobalt-60) used in hospitals and other facilities for sterilization of smaller 

State Medical

Measuring 

systems

Industrial 

radiography

Well 

logging

IrradiatorslargeIrradiatorssmall Other Total

North Carolina 266 235 17 1 4 5 124 652

North Dakota 13 37 4 4 0 3 5 66

Ohio 341 274 22 4 2 5 128 776

Oklahoma 111 107 27 20 0 8 51 324

Oregon 88 262 8 0 0 4 97 459

Pennsylvania 296 215 11 4 1 24 145 696

Puerto Rico 65 35 3 0 2 3 12 120

Rhode Island 22 16 6 0 0 1 9 54

South Carolina 149 145 22 0 3 1 50 370

South Dakota 17 16 0 0 0 0 7 40

Tennessee 261 167 26 1 2 10 99 566

Texas 672 468 102 54 7 19 241 1,563

Utah 38 108 10 7 1 2 35 201

Vermont 13 10 0 0 0 2 7 32

U.S. Virgin Islands 2 4 0 0 0 0 1 7

Virginia 126 155 12 2 1 6 57 359

Washington 110 199 10 0 0 2 98 419

West Virginia 66 89 2 3 0 0 15 175

Wisconsin 106 88 9 0 1 7 52 263

Wyoming 17 40 2 3 0 0 10 72

Total 7,781 7,090 578 209 70 284 3,411 20,289

(Continued From Previous Page)
Page 15 GAO-03-804 Nuclear Security

products, such as units of blood. The remaining specific licenses in the 

United States are issued for a variety of purposes, including, among other 

things, manufacturing and distribution of smoke detectors (containing 

small amounts of americium-241), academic research, and disposal of 

radioactive waste.

NRC Has Had Difficulty 

Finding Owners of 

Generally Licensed Devices

While data exist on the numbers and locations of specific licenses in the 

United States, complete data are not available on the numbers of general 

licenses. In most cases general licensees are not required to apply to NRC 

or an agreement state for a license to possess and use a device. Therefore, 

in the past, data on general licensees have come from manufacturers of 

generally licensed devices that are required to report quarterly to NRC or 

the agreement states the names of customers purchasing generally licensed 

devices. According to NRC, approximately 40,000 general licensees possess 

an estimated 600,000 generally licensed devices in the United States. 

Although general licensees are required to follow NRC’s regulations, they 

traditionally have little contact with NRC. Mishandling and improper 

disposition of generally licensed devices has, on occasion, resulted in 

limited radiation exposure to the public and, in some cases, entailed 

expensive investigation, cleanup, and disposal activities. For example, two 

incidents occurred in New Jersey in 1997 involving luminous exit signs 

containing tritium. In May 1997, a 14-year old removed three tritium exit 

signs from a demolition site near his home and opened one sign exposing 

himself to radioactive material and contaminating his home. In October 

1997, a patient at a state-run psychiatric hospital broke a tritium exit sign. 

While no injuries resulted, the state spent more than $200,000 cleaning up 

the hospital and disposing of the more than sixty barrels of radioactive 

waste—primarily contaminated carpeting, furniture, bedding, and other 

debris—from the incident.
Page 16 GAO-03-804 Nuclear Security

NRC amended its regulations effective February of 2001, to, among other 

things, better enable NRC to verify and track the location, use, and 

disposition of generally licensed devices. NRC focused its efforts to 

improve accountability over generally licensed devices on a small subset of 

devices that were determined to be of higher risk. The amended regulations 

include a requirement for general licensees to register with NRC devices 

that contain certain levels of radioactive material.10 General licensees 

would be charged $450 to cover the costs of the registration program.

Beginning in April 2001, NRC mailed registration forms to about 2,800 of its 

general licensees.11 As of May 2003, approximately 61 percent of them had 

responded. Twenty-eight percent of the registration forms were returned as 

undeliverable and the remaining 11 percent were not returned by the 

general licensee, a response rate significantly lower than NRC expected. 

According to NRC, a significant amount of the submitted information is 

incomplete or inaccurate, requiring additional follow up that was not 

anticipated. To help increase the response rate, phone calls are being made 

in advance to locate general licensees before registration forms are sent to 

ensure the responsible individuals at the correct addresses receive them. In 

addition, NRC has contracted with a private investigation firm to help find 

general licensees whose addresses in the database are incorrect.

Twenty-five of the 31 agreement states that responded to our survey said 

that they require registration of some or all generally licensed devices. 

Seventeen of these states were able to provide us with data on the number 

of generally licensed devices they regulate. These 17 states estimate that 

approximately 17,000 generally licensed devices are used in their 

jurisdictions.

1010 C.F.R. § 31.5(c)(13). Registration is required for levels equal to or greater than 10 

millicuries of cesium-137, 0.1 millicuries of strontium-90, 1 millicurie of cobalt-60, or 1 

millicurie of any transuranic element (elements with atomic numbers higher than uranium). 

11This registration effort did not include the agreement states because the agreement states 

are not required to adopt compatible regulations requiring registration of generally licensed 

devices until February 2004. Once all agreement states have adopted rules compatible to 

NRC’s regulations, NRC says that it is considering coordinating with them to implement a 

national level database that will incorporate data from agreement states and NRC regulated 

states.
Page 17 GAO-03-804 Nuclear Security

Over 1,300 Devices 

Containing Sealed 

Sources Have Been 

Reported Lost, Stolen, 

or Abandoned Since 

1998

Since 1998, there have been more than 1,300 incidents where devices 

containing sealed sources have been reported lost, stolen, or abandoned in 

the United States, an average of about 250 per year. The majority of these 

lost devices were subsequently recovered. Both NRC and DOE recognize 

the importance of not only determining how many sealed sources are 

present in the United States, but also which sealed sources pose the 

greatest risk if used in a dirty bomb. NRC and DOE are working together to 

categorize sealed sources by their level of risk. However, NRC’s and DOE’s 

efforts have not, to date, addressed sealed sources in the agreement states.

Majority of Lost and Stolen 

Sealed Sources 

Subsequently Recovered 

and Represented Little Risk 

to the Public

Analysis of NRC’s Nuclear Materials Events Database indicates that, 

between 1998 and 2002, there were over 1,300 incidents of lost, stolen, and 

abandoned sealed sources. These losses averaged about 250 per year. Many 

of these incidents involved stolen portable gauges that are used to measure 

the moisture content and density of soils, concrete, or asphalt on 

construction sites. By themselves, these gauges contain low amounts of 

radioactive material and pose relatively little risk to the public. Portable 

gauges are most often stolen from construction sites or from vehicles such 

as pickup trucks. According to NRC and agreement state officials, 

individuals stealing gauges are usually unaware that they contain 

radioactive material, and they often abandon or return them once 

discovering their contents. Nevertheless, responding to these incidents 

takes time and resources. Well logging sources also account for a relatively 

large number of lost and abandoned sources. One major oil services 

company accounts for over 30 of the 132 total well logging sources 

abandoned since 1998. These sources contain several curies of americium241 and cesium-137. These losses usually consisted of a sealed source 

becoming lodged down a well and subsequently abandoned. The well is 

filled with concrete and a marker is attached warning of the presence of 

radioactive materials. In addition, sealed sources are occasionally 

abandoned when companies owning them go bankrupt.

According to NRC, most sealed sources that are lost, stolen, or abandoned 

are subsequently recovered. In the past 5 years, few incidents have 

occurred involving what NRC considers high-risk sealed sources. For 

example, in March 1999, an industrial radiography camera containing over 

88 curies of iridium-192 (a quantity NRC considers to be of concern) was 

stolen from a trailer at the radiographer’s home in Florida. The Florida 

radiation control program, local law enforcement, and the Federal Bureau 

of Investigation conducted an investigation, but never recovered the sealed 
Page 18 GAO-03-804 Nuclear Security

source. According to NRC, the iridium-192 in the sealed source has now 

decayed to the point where it is no longer a high risk to the public.

Another example of lost or stolen sealed sources took place in a North 

Carolina hospital in March 1998. During a quarterly inventory of a hospital’s 

sealed sources, it was discovered that 19 sealed sources were missing, 

containing an aggregate of over 600 millicuries of cesium-137—a highly 

dispersible radioactive material. These sources included 18 cesium-137 

sealed sources—which had been locked in a safe at the time of the 

disappearance—and a new cesium-137 sealed source still stored in its 

shipping container. The North Carolina radiation control program, NRC, 

DOE, and the Federal Bureau of Investigation conducted an extensive joint 

investigation. The investigation included air and ground searches using 

radiation detection equipment. However, the sealed sources were not 

recovered and a conclusion about the cause of the incident was not 

reached.

NRC’s and DOE’s Efforts to 

Categorize Sealed Sources 

of Greatest Concern Does 

Not Include Sealed Sources 

in Agreement States

The working group established by the Secretary of Energy and the 

Chairman of NRC in June 2002 was also tasked with determining which 

radioactive materials pose the greatest risk if used in a dirty bomb. Their 

analysis was to provide a relative ranking of the degree of risk posed by 

specific materials as a basis on which initial judgments can be made 

regarding specific protective measures to be developed for these materials.

Using experts from DOE’s Sandia National Laboratory, the task force 

developed a methodology to systematically evaluate radioactive materials 

for a dirty bomb. Researchers at Sandia considered the potential 

dispersability of radioactive materials, the number of locations possessing 

the material, the quantity of material possessed at each facility, and the 

protective measures already applied to the material. The combination of 

these factors yielded a “hazard index,” which serves as an expression of 

relative concern. Specific radioactive materials were rated high, medium, 

low, or very low, depending upon the degree of health risk posed for their 

use in a dirty bomb.12 The analysis focused on the potential health effects of 

12See U.S. Department of Energy and U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Radiological 

Dispersion Devices: An Initial Study to Identify Radioactive Materials of Greatest 

Concern and Approaches to Their Tracking, Tagging, and Disposition, (Washington, D.C., 

May 2003). The specific radioactive materials identified as highest priority for increased 

protection in the near term have not been listed in the report. This information is “For 

Official Use Only.”
Page 19 GAO-03-804 Nuclear Security

the use of radioactive materials in a dirty bomb and did not explicitly 

address the psychological and economic consequences. According to an 

NRC official, no specific data exists regarding how the public would react 

to a dirty bomb, which complicates efforts to analyze its psychological 

consequences.

The working group’s analysis included materials under an NRC license and 

DOE’s control in the United States, excluding nuclear weapons materials, 

radioactive materials in nuclear power plants, spent fuel, and other 

radioactive waste. DOE’s and NRC’s report, however, did not consider 

sealed sources held by the approximately 15,000 specific licensees in the 

agreement states. Although the agreement states and NRC have similar 

types of licensees, agreement states often have greater numbers of 

licensees with certain types of sealed sources than NRC-regulated states. 

For example, our survey of agreement states indicates that Texas has more 

well logging specific licensees than any other state.13 In addition, states 

exclusively regulate the use of naturally occurring and accelerator 

produced radioactive materials. Agreement state officials told us that any 

consideration of the risks presented by sealed sources needs to include all 

materials regulated by NRC and the agreement states because the 

psychological and economic consequences of a dirty bomb are likely to be 

similar whether the radioactive material is naturally or artificially 

produced. NRC plans to work with the states to implement follow-up 

actions based on the recommendations in the DOE/NRC report. 

Vulnerability studies have been initiated to identify security vulnerabilities 

and appropriate security enhancements. Scenarios involving the 

aggregation of sources in a single location will be considered. In addition, 

methods for improved tracking of the locations of sources will be 

developed.

13Well logging is a process that uses sealed sources and/or unsealed radioactive materials to 

determine whether a well, drilled deep into the ground, contains minerals, such as coal, oil, 

and natural gas.
Page 20 GAO-03-804 Nuclear Security

Weaknesses Exist in 

Federal and State 

Controls Over the 

Security of Sealed 

Sources

Weaknesses exist in federal and state controls over the security of sealed 

sources.14 Security for devices containing sealed sources varied among 

facilities we visited in 10 states. In addition, NRC’s licensing process to 

obtain sealed sources presents a potential security weakness, namely that 

approved applicants may purchase sealed sources as soon as a new license 

is issued by mail. Because the process assumes that the applicant is acting 

in good faith, it is possible that sealed sources can be obtained for 

malicious intent. It can take as long as 12 months before NRC conducts its 

first inspection of the sealed source holder, potentially allowing sealed 

sources to be obtained and used maliciously without NRC’s knowledge.

Security at Facilities Using 

Sealed Sources Varies

During visits to licensees, regulated by both NRC and agreement states, we 

found a varied level of security provided to sealed sources. A medical 

device manufacturer we visited in an agreement state had extensive 

security measures in place to protect sealed sources. For example, a heavy 

iron fence surrounds the building and guards are on duty to monitor the 

facility 24 hours per day, 7 days per week. For shielding and security, the 

concrete walls and ceiling containing the radioactive materials are more 

than 6 feet thick. All areas housing materials have electronic locks 

requiring a 4-digit code and card access. Visitors must be pre-arranged and 

escorted at all times. Background and drug checks are conducted on all 

personnel before hiring. Once hired, they are provided with varying degrees 

of building access, depending upon their duties. Eighteen staff members 

are fully trained in emergency response for hazardous materials and every 

employee is required to complete a 3-hour training course on radioactive 

materials and refresher training sessions are held frequently. Following the 

events of September 11, 2001, the company examined risks for the facility 

and established an in-house task force to develop scenarios of potential 

terrorist attacks. To test the company’s security and employees’ 

preparedness, the company’s chief executive officer had a helicopter land, 

unannounced, on the roof of one of the company’s buildings. Following this 

drill, emergency plans were developed that were integrated with the 

national Homeland Security Advisory System. For example, whenever the 

national threat level is raised to orange, the facility’s front gates are closed 

14As used in this report, security refers to measures to prevent unauthorized access to, loss, 

and/or theft of sealed sources. Safety refers to measures intended to minimize the likelihood 

of an accident with sealed sources and, should such an accident occur, to mitigate its 

consequences.
Page 21 GAO-03-804 Nuclear Security

and locked at all times. If the threat level were ever increased to red, no 

visitors would be allowed. Furthermore, the company has entered an 

agreement with the local police to hire armed off-duty police to provide 

additional security for the facility should the national threat level be raised 

to red.

Extensive security measures were also present at a facility we visited in an 

agreement state that manufactures portable moisture density gauges.15

Sealed sources, shipped to the manufacturer for installation in moisture 

density gauges, are immediately placed in a shielded basement storage 

room that is kept locked at all times. Only three staff members have keys to 

access the room. Entrances to the manufacturing facility are kept locked at 

all times, with an alarm system activated after closing time. Visitors must 

be escorted during visits. Finally, the company has initiated a computerized 

“cradle to grave” tracking system where all sealed sources installed in 

moisture density gauges are tracked from manufacture, use, and eventual 

disposal.

In the course of visits to a medical licensee, we observed poor security 

practices with sealed sources. For example, during a visit to a hospital in an 

agreement state, we were told that sealed sources, including strontium-90, 

cesium-137, and iridium-192, were securely stored in a room equipped with 

an electronic lock with limited access. Later, during a tour of the hospital, 

we found the room unlocked, unattended, and the door propped open. The 

hospital official explained that this practice was very unusual; he locked 

the room door after inspection and continued the tour. Shortly thereafter, 

we passed the room for a second time. Again, the room was unlocked, 

unattended, and the door propped open. The storage room was in close 

proximity to the hospital’s laundry and maintenance facility, which is 

accessible to any hospital employee. In addition, an entry to the hospital 

from the outside was also nearby, and this entrance was not guarded nor 

equipped with radiation detection equipment to notify security if any sealed 

sources were being removed or stolen.

We also saw potential vulnerabilities at industrial radiography licensees we 

visited in agreement states. Industrial radiographers use high radioactivity 

iridium-192 sources to produce an image on photographic film to inspect 

15Moisture density gauges are commonly used to measure density of asphalt and concrete 

surfaces and soil moisture content during road construction. See appendix II for a complete 

descriptions of radioactive devices.
Page 22 GAO-03-804 Nuclear Security

metal parts and welds for defects. These devices are very portable because 

they are often used at remote locations. The devices are also subject to 

limited security at the locations we visited—primarily a series of padlocks 

on storage cases for the device. Personnel are not required to have 

background checks and training was historically only on-the-job. Most 

agreement states now require classroom training and testing to enhance 

radiographers’ knowledge and skills. One industrial radiographer we 

visited added extra security measures consisting of a motion detector 

alarm system—monitored by the local police—and an extra lock to the gate 

of the storage room at its facility. However, this additional security would 

not prevent the theft of the sealed source when the device is being used in 

the field or at a customer’s facility. This industrial radiographer had taken 

additional steps to train his workers to be aware of security threats and 

required—even before it was required by NRC and agreement state 

regulations—for two people to be present whenever the sealed source was 

being used.

Current Licensing Process 

Leaves Sealed Sources 

Vulnerable

To qualify for a specific license to use sealed sources, an applicant must 

demonstrate that their use of sealed sources will meet safety requirements 

set forth in NRC regulations or in comparable agreement state regulations 

(if the license applicant is located in an agreement state). NRC requires 

license applications to include information on, among other things, types of 

sealed sources that will be used, details of the applicant’s radiation 

protection program for workers dealing with sealed sources, and 

qualifications of users of sealed sources. NRC reviews this information for 

adherence to procedures and criteria documented in NRC licensing 

guidance.16 If the application meets approval criteria, a license is issued.

NRC licensing procedures do not require inspection of licensee facilities 

before the issuance of a license. Instead, NRC performs initial inspections 

no later than 12 months after issuance of a license.17 However, as pointed 

out by an agreement state official, a licensee can purchase sealed sources 

as soon as a license has been acquired by mail. As a result, licensees may 

purchase sealed sources legally without first verifying that they will use the 

16NRC publishes guidance for specific license applicants that outlines procedures for 

licensing the use of sealed sources. See U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, NUREG1556—Consolidated Guidance about Materials Licenses, (Rockville, Maryland: Nov. 2001).

17Chapter 2800 of NRC’s Inspection Manual contains guidance for inspections of specific 

licensees with sealed sources.
Page 23 GAO-03-804 Nuclear Security

material as intended. Several agreement states have developed methods to 

verify the legitimacy of potential licensees. For example, one program we 

visited conducts prelicensing inspections. Another state program handdelivers licenses at the end of the application process. An agreement state 

official explained that pre-licensing inspections and hand delivery enabled 

regulators to establish authenticity of the prospective licensee and whether 

information provided in the application is indeed valid.

NRC and Agreement States 

Generally Ensure Safe Use 

and Handling of Sealed 

Sources

NRC conducts periodic evaluations of NRC regional materials programs 

and agreement state radiation control programs to ensure that public 

health and safety is adequately protected. Accidents and injuries resulting 

from the use of sealed sources are relatively few. For example, analysis of 

NRC’s Nuclear Materials Events Database and responses to our survey of 

the agreement states indicates that in fiscal year 2002, only 25 of the 

approximately 20,000 licensees in the United States reported radiation 

exposures in excess of regulatory limits. In addition, according to NRC, 

there were only 32 reported accidents in fiscal year 2002 involving medical 

use of sealed sources out of tens of thousands of medical procedures 

conducted.

To evaluate the performance of its and agreement states’ programs, NRC 

developed the Integrated Materials Performance Evaluation Program, 

which uses several performance indicators in assessment of program 

effectiveness, including timeliness and quality of licensee inspection, 

program staffing and training, licensing activity, and response to incidents 

and allegations. Officials from NRC and agreement states participate in 

these periodic evaluations. During these evaluations, NRC and agreement 

state officials review program documentation and interview officials with 

the state or regional program to assess the program’s performance. When 

the results of each performance indicator have been determined, a final 

report is issued.18 Agreement state or NRC regional programs can be 

evaluated as:

• adequate to protect the public health and safety,

• adequate but needs improvement, and

18The final determination of program adequacy is made by a management review board at 

NRC, which consists of NRC executives and a nonvoting representative of the agreement 

states.
Page 24 GAO-03-804 Nuclear Security

• inadequate to protect public health and safety.

Figure 3 outlines the results of the most recent reviews of agreement state 

and four NRC regional programs.
Page 25 GAO-03-804 Nuclear Security

Figure 3: Results of Integrated Materials Performance Evaluation Program Reviews
Page 26 GAO-03-804 Nuclear Security

NRC’s most recent reviews of the 32 agreement states and NRC regional 

programs, dating back to 1998, found that all programs are adequately 

protecting public health and safety. Of the last 35 program reviews, 31 

programs were found adequate to protect public health and safety—the 

highest evaluation. Four programs were found “adequate but needs 

improvement” and were placed on “heightened oversight.”19 A program 

placed on heightened oversight must follow a plan to improve performance 

or it will be placed on probation for failing to correct programmatic 

deficiencies. Furthermore, NRC reserves the right to suspend a state’s 

agreement if the state does not comply with one or more of the 

requirements of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954.

The Integrated Materials Performance Evaluation Program is intended to 

ensure that the NRC and the agreement states adequately protect the health 

and safety of the public in accordance with NRC standards. For example, in 

February 2003, the Rhode Island program was found “adequate but needs 

improvement.” As a result of its evaluation, the Rhode Island program was 

placed on heightened oversight and was instructed to follow a detailed plan 

to improve performance, which includes NRC monitoring of progress 

through bimonthly teleconferences. In addition, the Rhode Island program 

must periodically submit a progress report to NRC. The review team found 

that a deficiency in staffing and training had led to Rhode Island’s 

performance problems. Therefore, as part of the plan to improve 

performance, Rhode Island was instructed to address staffing and training 

concerns. In November 2003, a follow-up review will be conducted to 

establish whether the program has improved enough to remove it from 

heightened oversight status.

The review program also encourages states and NRC regions to learn good 

practices from one another. For example, an NRC official recommended 

that Florida be cited for a good practice for its in-house training efforts for 

the program’s staff, including the creation of a new “training coordinator” 

position. As a result of participation by an Ohio official during Florida’s last 

evaluation, Ohio’s program decided to hire a training coordinator. 

Furthermore, because review results are available to the public and a good 

practices report is periodically distributed to all agreement states and NRC 

regions, all programs have access to the good practices of other programs. 

19States under “heightened oversight” as of May 31, 2003, are Rhode Island, Nevada, and 

New Hampshire. Tennessee was removed from “heightened oversight” based on an October 

2001 follow-up review.
Page 27 GAO-03-804 Nuclear Security

The report not only shares the good practices, but also the reasons for poor 

performance. Agreement state and NRC regional programs can take action 

to improve performance by examining the strengths and weaknesses of 

other programs.

NRC Efforts to 

Improve Security over 

Sealed Sources Have 

Been Limited and 

Disagreement Exists 

over the Appropriate 

Role of the States

Efforts undertaken by NRC and agreement states to strengthen the security 

of sealed sources for medical, industrial, and research use have only, to 

date, required large irradiator facilities to take specific actions. Additional 

orders to licensees that possess high-risk sealed sources are expected to 

follow. NRC and agreement states disagree over the appropriate role of the 

states in efforts to improve security. NRC intends to develop and 

implement all additional security measures on licensees with sealed 

sources, including those licensed by agreement states. However, 82 percent 

of agreement states responding to our survey feel they should be 

responsible for inspecting and enforcing security measures for sealed 

sources in their states under their authority to ensure public health and 

safety.

NRC’s Security Efforts Have 

Not Focused on Sealed 

Sources

Since the events of September 11, 2001, NRC efforts have focused on 

issuing advisories and orders for nuclear reactor and nuclear fuel licensees 

and implementing changes within NRC to streamline its security 

responsibilities. Specifically, NRC has issued over 30 advisories and 20 

security orders requiring action to nuclear power plants, decommissioning 

power reactors, fuel cycle facilities, and spent fuel facilities.20 Between 

November and December 2001, NRC’s Office of Investigations visited 80 

nuclear facilities, law enforcement agencies, and first responders 

nationwide to interview officials and review records to identify potential 

terrorist risks. NRC forwarded potential leads to the Federal Bureau of 

Investigation. In addition, NRC has revised the “design basis threat” for 

nuclear power plants—the largest reasonable threat against which a 

regulated private guard force should be expected to defend under existing 

law—and issued a corresponding order in April 2003 requiring power 

20Advisories are non-public, rapid communications from NRC to its licensees that provide 

information obtained from the intelligence community or law enforcement agencies on 

changes to the threat environment, and guidance for licensees to take specific actions 

promptly to strengthen their capability against the threat. Security orders contain 

requirements for licensees to implement interim compensatory security measures beyond 

that currently required by NRC regulations and as conditions of licenses.
Page 28 GAO-03-804 Nuclear Security

plants to implement additional actions to protect against sabotage by 

terrorists and other adversaries. NRC also made a series of internal 

administrative changes, such as consolidating the agency’s security 

responsibilities in establishing an Office of Nuclear Security and Incident 

Response,21 which includes a Threat Assessment Team responsible for 

working directly with the Central Intelligence Agency and the Federal 

Bureau of Investigation on security issues. The Office of Nuclear Security 

and Incident Response also works with the Department of Homeland 

Security and other agencies concerned with terrorism to assess and 

respond to potential threats. In an effort to more effectively communicate 

and respond to threats, NRC developed a Threat Advisory and Protective 

Measures System22 based on the national Homeland Security Advisory 

System, and increased staffing at its 24-hour Emergency Operations Center. 

NRC also conducted a review of information available to the general public 

on the NRC Web site for potential security risks.

Efforts to strengthen the security of sealed sources for medical, industrial, 

and research use—by both NRC and agreement states—have been limited. 

Since September 11, 2001, NRC has issued a total of six advisories urging 

licensees to ensure security of sources and advising them to be more aware 

of the possibility of theft and sabotage.23 Licensees were also advised to 

double-check shipping documents and inform local police authorities of 

their possession of sealed sources. On June 5, 2003, NRC issued its first 

security order for large irradiator facilities—70 facilities nationwide that 

expose products, such as medical supplies, to radiation for sterilization—

that requires licensees to take action to strengthen security. The decision to 

select irradiators first has been questioned by agreement state officials and 

licensees, as they feel other uses of sealed sources pose a higher risk. For 

example, 93 percent of agreement states responding to our survey 

identified industrial radiographers as of greater concern. Reasons for this 

may include that the sealed sources in these devices are portable, have high 

21The Office of Nuclear Security and Incident Response was established in April 2002 and 

consists of two divisions – the Division of Nuclear Security and the Division of Incident 

Response Operations. It is responsible for the agency’s security, safeguards, and incident 

response efforts and to serve as a point of contact and counterpart to the Department of 

Homeland Security and other federal agencies. In this role, the Office of Nuclear Security 

and Incident Response participates in a number of interagency working groups and 

committees that address issues relating to terrorism, information sharing, and planning.

22NRC established this system in response to Homeland Security Presidential Directive 3.

23There were a total of seven advisories, one of which was a correction to a prior advisory.
Page 29 GAO-03-804 Nuclear Security

radioactivity, and are widely available (over 570 licensees in the United 

States). Although irradiator facilities contain larger amounts of radioactive 

material than industrial radiographers, they are specially designed to 

include thick concrete and steel walls, security interlocks, and other 

protective equipment to protect against radiation exposure. In addition, the 

irradiator facilities we visited had taken the initiative to implement 

supplementary security measures, such as installing motion detectors, 

more extensive security alarms and monitoring, and employee 

identification badges. Other uses identified by agreement states officials in 

our survey as requiring stricter regulation include portable gauges and welllogging devices—over 4,600 and over 200 licensees nationwide, 

respectively.

Transportation was also identified as needing additional security. Although 

most agreement states surveyed indicated that the Department of 

Transportation’s (DOT) regulations are adequate to ensure safe 

transportation of sealed sources, 81 percent of them identified weaknesses 

in current regulations and 77 percent indicated that communications and 

coordination needs to be improved between their state program and DOT. 

Some DOT officials we spoke with disagreed that sealed sources were 

particularly vulnerable during transportation. However, one DOT official 

noted that large quantities of iridium-192 are regularly shipped to the 

United States from Europe and South America using regular commercial 

freight services. Such sources are shipped in stainless steel transport kegs 

that require no special tools or equipment to open. Once loaded with up to 

10,000 curies of iridium-192, the transport keg weighs only 150 to 200 

pounds. While this official believed that, overall, security is sufficient 

during transport, he told us that at certain phases such shipments could be 

vulnerable to terrorist diversion.

NRC and the agreement states have formed a materials security working 

group to develop and issue new security orders by the end of the year for 

approximately 2,100 licensees—located throughout the United States—

that have been determined to be of the greatest risk based upon NRC’s and 

DOE’s work to categorize sealed sources. When these orders are issued, 

affected licensees will have a certain specified time period to comply with 

the order and implement required security measures. At the end of this 

period, licensees will be subject to inspections to ensure compliance and 

face enforcement actions if actions have not been taken.

Agreement states’ efforts to strengthen the security of sealed sources have 

focused primarily on facilitating NRC actions, such as forwarding NRC 
Page 30 GAO-03-804 Nuclear Security

advisories, increasing attention on security when conducting inspections 

and license reviews, and coordinating with local law enforcement and first 

responders to develop emergency response procedures. Eighty-six percent 

of agreement state officials responding to our survey indicated that they 

are adequately addressing post-September 11, 2001, heightened security 

concerns involving malicious use of radioactive material.

NRC and the Agreement 

States Disagree over 

Development and 

Enforcement of Additional 

Security Requirements

The Atomic Energy Act of 1954 authorizes NRC to issue rules, regulations, 

or orders to promote the common defense and security, while granting 

agreement states the authority to ensure public health and safety. 24

Following the events of September 11, 2001, NRC determined that securityrelated efforts for all medical, industrial, and research licensees—including 

those licensed by agreement states—should be the responsibility of NRC 

under its common defense and security authority. However, 82 percent of 

agreement states responding to our survey noted that they want to have 

responsibility for inspection and enforcement of security measures for 

sealed sources under their authority to ensure public health and safety. 

Agreement states already enforce NRC’s existing security regulations under 

this authority. In addition, 74 percent of agreement states responding to our 

survey indicated they could effectively respond to a radiological incident 

with their current resources.

Individual commissioners at NRC have expressed concern with budget 

shortfalls many states are currently experiencing. These commissioners 

said that states experiencing budgetary difficulties may not be able to 

assume additional responsibilities and that it may impact their program’s 

performance. When asked whether their state had sufficient resources to 

support new efforts, 60 percent of agreement states responding to our 

survey indicated they would need additional resources.25 However, officials 

from organizations representing agreement states and non-agreement 

states have met with NRC and advised NRC that, although many states are 

24NRC’s regulations require licensees to secure licensed materials that are stored in 

controlled or unrestricted areas from unauthorized removal or access and to control and 

maintain constant surveillance of licensed material that is not in storage and is in a 

controlled or unrestricted area. 10 C.F.R. §§ 20.1801, 20.1802.

25Approximately 20 percent of agreement state officials responding to our survey indicated 

that they are having difficulty retaining sufficient and/or qualified personnel to effectively 

regulate sealed sources. Nevertheless, NRC has determined that all agreement state 

programs are adequately protecting public health and safety.
Page 31 GAO-03-804 Nuclear Security

facing budget cuts, funding of the radioactive materials programs in these 

states have largely been stable and the programs have been able and will 

likely be able to adequately fulfill their responsibilities.

According to our discussions with NRC officials, NRC is also facing budget 

and staffing constraints, largely as a result of its dependence upon fees 

from the licensees it regulates—only 20 percent of the total sealed sources 

licensees nationwide—for funding of its sealed source licensing and 

inspection activities. As more states become agreement states, NRC has 

fewer licensees to support its licensing and inspection programs.26 To 

address the potential effect this reduction in funding may have on its 

licensing and inspection programs, NRC and the agreement states have 

entered into a partnership—called the National Materials Program—to 

better share the responsibility for protecting public health and safety. Since 

the agreement states regulate about 80 percent of the nation’s sealed 

source licensees, the National Materials Program allows them to 

participate more actively in the development of regulations and guidance, 

particularly in areas where they possess expertise. For example, Texas, an 

agreement state, regulates more well logging specific licensees than exist 

in all NRC-regulated states. Thus, according to NRC officials, Texas could 

take the lead in developing any new public health and safety regulations for 

well loggers. Both NRC and the agreement states are currently conducting 

pilot projects to determine how the National Materials Program can and 

will work. In addition, states remain solely responsible for regulating 

certain radioactive materials, such as naturally occurring radioactive 

material like radium and material produced in particle accelerators, 

increasing the importance of federal and state cooperation in developing 

and implementing additional safety and/or security measures. NRC and the 

agreement states are continuing to work cooperatively to develop 

information on how responsibilities can be shared under the National 

Materials Program.

NRC officials said that NRC lacks sufficient staff to conduct inspections of 

all licensees expected to receive security orders—large irradiator facilities 

and approximately 2,100 licensees that NRC has identified as presenting 

the greatest risk. To mitigate this staffing shortage, NRC intends to enter 

26NRC is required by the Energy and Water Development Appropriations Act, 2001 (P.L. 106-

377) to recover 94 percent of its budget through fee recovery. As the number of NRC 

licensees decreases with an increasing number of agreement states, fees paid by NRC’s 

licensees have increased in order to support NRC’s regulatory program.
Page 32 GAO-03-804 Nuclear Security

into contracts with agreement states or independent contractors to assist 

in carrying out these inspections. According to agreement state officials we 

spoke with, however, agreement states may be reluctant to participate in 

these efforts if they have had no role in developing the additional security 

requirements or are not provided additional funding. NRC would remain 

responsible for taking appropriate enforcement action for any security 

violation found during these inspections. According to NRC, although final 

details regarding funding have yet to be determined, NRC anticipates 

increasing its licensees’ fees and using funds NRC has received from 

emergency supplemental appropriations to cover costs associated with 

additional security.

Conclusions The terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, have changed the focus of 

radioactive sealed sources regulation. Where NRC and the agreement 

states previously concentrated on ensuring the safe and effective use of 

sealed sources, they must now increasingly consider how to prevent 

terrorists from obtaining and using the material. Efforts to improve 

controls over sealed sources face significant challenges, especially how to 

balance the need to secure these materials while not discouraging their 

beneficial use in academic, medical, and industrial applications. The first 

step to improve security is to conduct a threat assessment that would 

identify sealed sources most likely to be used in a terrorist attack and the 

consequences of such an attack. Defining the types of sealed sources that 

are of the greatest concern will allow federal and state efforts to be 

appropriately prioritized. NRC’s and DOE’s current efforts to categorize 

sealed sources by the greatest amount of risk and their efforts to establish a 

national-level tracking system for the highest risk sealed sources are 

commendable. However, these efforts could be strengthened by involving 

the agreement states, which regulate 80 percent of the nation’s radioactive 

materials licensees, in determining risk. In addition, these efforts could be 

further strengthened by determining the economic consequences of a dirty 

bomb and how to effectively mitigate any resulting psychological 

consequences. In addition, NRC’s current regulations leave sealed sources 

at risk of malicious use. Modifying its regulations to eliminate general 

licensing of devices containing sealed sources could improve 

accountability, potentially reducing the number of sources that are lost, 

stolen, or abandoned. Furthermore, modifying NRC’s licensing and/or 

inspection process to verify—before a licensee purchases radioactive 

material—that it will be used as intended may increase the security of 

sealed sources.
Page 33 GAO-03-804 Nuclear Security

The President’s National Strategy for Homeland Security recognizes the 

critical importance of integrating federal, state, local, and private sector 

efforts to prepare and respond to terrorist attacks, including those using 

sealed sources. The initial responsibility, however, falls upon state and 

local governments and their organizations—such as police, fire 

departments, emergency medical personnel, and public health agencies—

which will almost invariably be the first responders to any terrorist event 

involving sealed sources. Because of state and local governments’ role in 

responding to incidents—in addition to the fact that the federal 

government lacks authority over naturally occurring and accelerator 

produced radioactive material—it is critical to involve state and local 

governments in the development and implementation of additional security 

over sealed sources. State radiological protection agencies can provide 

valuable expertise on the licensees that they have been regulating, in many 

cases, for decades. Developing criteria and performance measures to gauge 

NRC’s and agreement states’ effectiveness at implementing additional 

security as part of NRC’s performance evaluation process would help 

ensure the consistent application of additional security measures across 

the United States. NRC and the agreement states have a proven record of 

cooperation in regulating the safe use of radioactive materials, including 

sealed sources. As increasing demands are placed on budgets at all levels 

of government, effectively leveraging the knowledge and resources of 

federal, state, and local agencies will be crucial to ensuring that sealed 

sources continue to be used safely and remain secure against terrorist use.

Recommendations for 

Executive Action

To determine the sealed sources of greatest concern, we recommend that 

the Chairman of NRC collaborate with the agreement states to identify the 

types, amount, and availability of the highest risk sealed sources and the 

associated health and economic consequences of their malicious use. In 

addition, we recommend that NRC and the agreement states determine 

how to effectively mitigate the psychological effects of their use in a 

terrorist attack.

In addition, accountability over generally licensed devices needs to be 

improved and gaps in the current licensing process need to be addressed. 

Because new efforts will involve additional licensing and inspection of 

potentially thousands of licensees and devices, we recommend that the 

Chairman of NRC:

• determine, in consultation with the agreement states, the costs and 

benefits of requiring owners of devices that are now generally licensed 
Page 34 GAO-03-804 Nuclear Security

to apply for specific licenses and whether the costs are commensurate 

with the risks these devices present and

• modify NRC’s process of issuing specific licenses to ensure that sealed 

sources cannot be purchased before NRC’s verification—through 

inspection or other means—that the materials will be used as intended.

Finally, to ensure that the federal and state governments’ efforts to provide 

additional security to sealed sources are adequately integrated and 

evaluated for their effectiveness, we recommend that the Chairman of 

NRC:

• determine how officials in agreement and non-agreement states can 

participate in the development and implementation of additional 

security measures and

• include criteria and performance measures of the NRC’s and the 

agreement states’ implementation of additional security measures in 

NRC’s periodic evaluations of its and agreement states’ effectiveness.

Agency Comments and 

Our Evaluation

We provided NRC, CRCPD, and OAS with draft copies of this report for 

their review and comment. NRC’s written comments are presented as 

appendix VI. NRC, CRCPD, and OAS also provided technical comments, 

which we incorporated into the report as appropriate.

NRC stated that the draft report does not fully present either the current 

status of NRC’s efforts to improve the security of high-risk radioactive 

sources or the large effort that it has devoted to this issue since September 

11, 2001. According to NRC, the draft report does not fully reflect its 

existing statutory framework and does not recognize that several of our 

recommendations would require statutory changes at both federal and 

state levels. Furthermore, NRC commented that our draft report should 

have focused on high-risk radioactive sources that are of greatest concern 

for malevolent use by a terrorist rather than radioactive sources of all 

types.

Regarding NRC’s comments that our draft report does not fully discuss its 

activities to increase the security of the highest-risk sealed sources, we 

note that our draft report detailed all advisories issued by NRC to sealed 

source licensees urging them to ensure security of sealed sources following 

September 11, 2001, as well as NRC’s efforts with DOE to define the 
Page 35 GAO-03-804 Nuclear Security

radioactive isotopes of concern. We have added information on the 

organization and goals of NRC’s new materials security working group. 

Furthermore, our report discusses that NRC’s security order to large 

irradiators was issued on June 5, 2003. This order was issued four days 

after our meeting with NRC officials to discuss our preliminary findings, 

conclusions, and recommendations. At the meeting, NRC officials told us 

that it could take until the end of 2003 for the order to be issued. It is 

important to note that this is the first and only security order related to 

sealed sources issued since the September 11, 2001, attacks and that it 

applies only to 70 large irradiator facilities in the United States. As 

discussed in our draft report, 93 percent of agreement states responding to 

our survey identified industrial radiographers, of which there are over 500 

nationwide, as of greater concern than large irradiator facilities. 

Regarding NRC’s comment that our draft report does not recognize that 

several of our recommendations would require statutory changes at both 

federal and state levels, we have clarified our report to recommend that 

NRC determine how officials in agreement and non-agreement states can 

participate in the development and implementation of additional security 

measures. We agree with NRC that its statutory framework reserves to 

NRC the authority to promote the common defense and security and our 

report discusses the distinction between federal and state authority. 

However, we continue to believe, as do state officials we spoke with, that 

involving the agreement and non-agreement states in the development and 

implementation of additional security measures would be beneficial. As 

our draft report stated, state and local governments will almost invariably 

be the first responders to any terrorist event involving sealed sources. 

States can also provide valuable expertise on licensees that they have been 

regulating for decades and which NRC has had no prior contact with. In its 

comments, NRC states that the possibility of state budget shortfalls played 

absolutely no role in its decision to develop and implement additional 

security measures under its common defense and security authority. 

However, numerous NRC officials told us during our review that budget 

difficulties could impact the performance of state radiation protection 

programs and NRC’s former Chairman discussed the issue at a January 

2003 meeting. NRC acknowledges in its comments that cooperation with 

agreement states is vital to the success of its efforts. We are encouraged 

that NRC stated in its comments that it will examine changes to its 

statutory framework in its new materials security working group and 

intends to work with the states to the maximum extent possible under 

existing statutes.
Page 36 GAO-03-804 Nuclear Security

Regarding NRC’s comment that the draft report should have focused only 

on high-risk sources rather than radioactive sources of all types, we note 

that the objectives of our review included determining the known number 

of all sealed sources in the United States and the number of sources lost, 

stolen, or abandoned. Our draft report noted that defining the types of 

sealed sources that are of the greatest concern would allow federal and 

state efforts to be appropriately prioritized. As we did when responding to 

a similar comment NRC made in our May 2003 report, we agree that the 

highest-risk sources present the greatest concern as desirable material for 

a dirty bomb. 27 However, other sealed radioactive sources could also be 

used as a terrorist weapon. No one can say with certainty what the 

psychological, social, or economic costs of a dirty bomb—regardless of the 

radioactive material used to construct it—would be. We are concerned that 

NRC’s and DOE’s identification of the highest-risk sealed sources focuses 

solely on the health risks of their use and does not address the 

psychological, social, or economic costs of a dirty bomb. It is also 

important to note that NRC is still working with the International Atomic 

Energy Agency to reconcile differences between their definitions of highrisk sealed sources. Furthermore, many of the radioactive isotopes 

identified by NRC and DOE as high-risk are used only at DOE facilities or 

by very few NRC licensees in the United States. NRC and DOE did not 

consider radioactive materials licensees in the agreement states, which 

constitute 80 percent of the nation’s licensees. Without addressing the total 

consequences of a dirty bomb and considering the availability of sealed 

sources nationwide, we believe NRC’s and DOE’s determination of risk is 

incomplete.

In general, both CRCPD and OAS agreed with the recommendations in the 

report. However, both organizations noted that our use of the term “sealed 

source” to refer to all radioactive materials used in medical, industrial, and 

research purposes may exclude many radioactive isotopes that could be 

used in a dirty bomb that are loose and not in sealed form, especially those 

used in medical and research facilities. We used the term “sealed source” 

for simplicity to distinguish medical, industrial, and research radioactive 

isotopes from material used in nuclear weapons and as fuel in nuclear 

reactors. We did not intend to exclude unsealed radioactive material from 

27See U.S. General Accounting Office, Nuclear Nonproliferation: U.S. and International 

Assistance Efforts to Control Sealed Radioactive Sources Need Strengthening, GAO-03-638

(Washington, D.C.: May 16, 2003).
Page 37 GAO-03-804 Nuclear Security

our discussion of radioactive materials of concern and have clarified our 

use of the term.

CRCPD stated that the report does not address four critical areas of 

potential risk. First, CRCPD believes that a major area of risk is at bankrupt 

facilities where sealed sources can be left unattended and/or unsecured for 

long periods of time, leaving the sources easy targets for theft. We 

acknowledge this risk and have revised our discussion of lost, stolen, and 

abandoned sources appropriately. Second, CRCPD noted that radioactive 

materials licensed for “storage only” tend to be neglected by the licensee 

and the regulatory agency. While we agree that this is a potential weakness 

in sealed source security, individual state practices on “storage only” 

licenses differ. We did not specifically examine these practices during our 

review. Third, CRCPD stated that the report does not adequately address 

the radioactive material under the control of DOE and naturally occurring 

and accelerator produced radioactive material. While DOE does control a 

large amount of radioactive material, discussion of the security provided to 

it was outside of the scope of our review. We believe our report adequately 

discusses the challenges of regulating naturally occurring and accelerator 

produced materials. Finally, CRCPD states that the report does not 

consider transportation hubs through which very large quantities of 

radioactive material pass each day. While we do not specifically discuss 

transportation hubs, our draft report noted that weaknesses have been 

identified in the transportation of sealed sources and, at certain phases of 

transport, these shipments could be vulnerable to terrorist diversion.

OAS agreed with our recommendation that NRC should include criteria and 

performance measures of the agreement states’ implementation of 

additional security measures in NRC’s periodic evaluations of agreement 

states’ effectiveness. OAS stated that such evaluation is not possible given 

the current intention of NRC to issue and implement security orders under 

its common defense and security authority. However, we believe that the 

recommendation in our draft report that NRC determine how states can 

participate in the development and implementation of additional security 

measures addresses this concern.

OAS also noted that our draft report stated that licensees are tracked 

instead of individual sealed sources and that the draft report lends support 

to the formation of a national tracking system for sealed sources. OAS 

commented that our discussion does not accurately describe the current 

system. Licensees are required to maintain records for the acquisition and 

disposition of each source it receives and maintain an accurate inventory of 
Page 38 GAO-03-804 Nuclear Security

sources in their possession. While we agree with this comment and have 

revised our discussion of license tracking, our draft report was accurate in 

that there is no single source of information in the United States to verify 

authorized users, locations, quantities, and movements of sealed sources. 

OAS goes on to state that there are serious concerns with the practicality 

and accuracy of a national tracking system and that the development of 

such a system should be further evaluated with input from the states and 

private industry. We agree with OAS’s comments, but believe that our 

recommendation to collaborate with the agreement states in order to 

determine the types, amount, and availability of the highest risk sealed 

sources and the health, psychological, and economic consequences of their 

use in a terrorist attack addresses OAS’s concerns.

Finally, OAS commented that the states have long requested that the 

federal government seriously consider placing the use and regulation of all 

radioactive materials in a single federal agency. According to OAS, the 

current approach results in a disjointed regulatory structure and different 

standards for the same public health issue. While we agree that consistency 

and avoiding duplication is important, addressing the overall regulation of 

radioactive material in the United States was outside the scope of our 

review on security of sealed sources.

We conducted our work from August 2002 through June 2003 in accordance 

with generally accepted government auditing standards. Appendix I 

presents our scope and methodology in detail.

As agreed with your office, unless you publicly announce the contents of 

this report earlier, we plan no further distribution of it until 30 days from 

the date of this letter. We will then send copies to the Chairman and 

Commissioners of NRC; the Secretary of Homeland Security; the Secretary 

of Energy; the Administrator, National Nuclear Security Administration; the 

Director, Office of Management and Budget; the Chairman of the 

Organization of Agreement States; the Chairman and Executive Director of 

the Conference of Radiation Control Program Directors; the directors of 

the radiation control programs in the 32 agreement states; interested 

congressional committees; and other interested parties. We will also make 

copies available to others who request them. In addition, the report will be 

available at no charge on the GAO Web site at http://www.gao.gov.
Page 39 GAO-03-804 Nuclear Security

If you or your staff have any questions about this report, I can be reached at 

(202) 512-3841. Key contributors to this report are listed in appendix VII.

Sincerely yours,

Robert A. Robinson

Managing Director, Natural

 Resources and Environment
Page 40 GAO-03-804 Nuclear Security

Appendix I

Objectives, Scope, and Methodology AAppenednxidexiIs

At the request of the Ranking Minority Member, Subcommittee on 

Financial Management, the Budget, and International Security, Committee 

on Governmental Affairs, U.S. Senate, we examined the following 

questions:

1. What is the known number of sealed sources in the United States?

2. How many of these sealed sources have been lost, stolen, or 

abandoned?

3. How effective are federal and state controls over sealed sources?

4. What efforts have been initiated or considered since September 11, 

2001, to better safeguard radiological sources?

To answer these questions, we distributed surveys to 32 agreement states, 

18 non-agreement states, Puerto Rico, the District of Columbia, and to 

NRC’s 4 regional offices. We focused the survey on information about each 

state’s radiation control program, specific and general licensing activities, 

enforcement actions, effectiveness of controls over sealed sources, 

program evaluation processes, transportation of sealed sources, and the 

impact of September 11, 2001, on regulatory programs. We acquired a list of 

the appropriate agreement and non-agreement state officials from NRC’s 

Office of State and Tribal Programs Web site and from the Conference of 

Radiation Control Program Directors. Because this was not a sample 

survey, but rather a census of all states, there are no sampling errors. 

However, the practical difficulties of conducting any survey may introduce 

errors, commonly referred to as nonsampling errors. For example, 

measurement errors are introduced if difficulties exist in how a particular 

question is interpreted or in the sources of information available to 

respondents in answering a question. In addition, coding errors may occur 

if mistakes are entered into a database. We took extensive steps in the 

development of the questionnaires, the collection of data, and the editing 

and analysis of data to minimize total survey error. To reduce measurement 

error, we conducted two rounds of pretesting to make sure questions and 

response categories were interpreted in a consistent manner with both 

agreement and non-agreement states. We also provided draft copies of the 

questionnaires to NRC, the Organization of Agreement States (OAS), and 

the Conference of Radiation Control Program Directors (CRCPD) for their 

review and comment. Based on both pretesting and comments received 

from NRC, OAS, and CRCPD, we made relevant changes to the questions 

based upon these pretests. Copies of the agreement and non-agreement 
Appendix I

Objectives, Scope, and Methodology

Page 41 GAO-03-804 Nuclear Security

state questionnaires, along with the results to each question, are in 

appendixes IV and V, respectively.

In addition, we edited all completed surveys for consistency and, if 

necessary, contacted respondents to clarify responses. All questionnaire 

responses were double key-entered into our database (that is, the entries 

were 100 percent verified), and a random sample of the questionnaires was 

further verified for completeness and accuracy. In addition, all computer 

syntax was peer reviewed and verified by separate programmers to ensure 

that the syntax was written and executed correctly.

We made extensive efforts to encourage respondents to complete and 

return the questionnaires, including sending up to four reminder electronic 

mail messages to non-respondents, calling state radiation control program 

directors directly, and collaborating with OAS to promote completion of 

this survey. Our efforts yielded responses from 31 of 32 (96.8 percent 

response rate) agreement states and 11 of 18 (61.1 percent response rate) 

non-agreement states. We also received responses from Puerto Rico and 

the four NRC regional offices. In total, we achieved an overall response rate 

of 80.4 percent, receiving 45 of the 56 surveys disseminated. We did not 

receive a response from one agreement state: Arizona. The non-agreement 

states of Alaska, Connecticut, Minnesota, Missouri, Pennsylvania, South 

Dakota, and Wyoming did not respond to our survey, nor did we receive a 

response from the District of Columbia. Although we did not receive 

surveys from these states, we obtained data on incidents involving sealed 

sources and numbers and types of licensees from NRC. Three states (New 

York, South Carolina, and Texas) have multiple agencies with jurisdiction 

over sealed sources. We sent and received surveys from the appropriate 

agencies in each of these states.

To determine the number and types of sealed source licenses in the United 

States and the number of sealed sources lost, stolen, or abandoned, we 

relied upon information provided by state radiation control programs in 

their responses to our survey. In addition, we obtained data from NRC’s 

license tracking system database on licensees NRC regulates—both in the 

non-agreement states and on federal facilities in the agreement states. To 

determine the number of sealed sources lost, stolen, or abandoned over the 

past 5 years, we obtained data on incidents from NRC’s Nuclear Materials 

Events Database. We chose to examine the past 5 years because 

information was readily available through this database. Because each 

state uses different systems to track its licensing activities, we did not 

attempt to independently assess the reliability of data provided by the 
Appendix I

Objectives, Scope, and Methodology

Page 42 GAO-03-804 Nuclear Security

states in their responses to our survey. However, we did ask states in what 

ways and how frequently information in their databases is validated. To 

assess the reliability of NRC’s databases, we interviewed officials at NRC in 

charge of maintaining its license tracking system database and the Nuclear 

Materials Events Database to determine if data in these systems are 

reasonably complete and accurate. As a result of these interviews, we did 

not find any reasons to question the reliability of these data. In addition, we 

also performed limited testing on NRC’s license tracking system database 

to find missing data or data outside expected ranges. We did not find 

significant errors or incompleteness as a result of these tests and 

concluded that the use of the data would not lead to incorrect or 

unintentional findings. These are the only data on NRC licensing activities 

in the United States and program managers at NRC regularly use the data.

In addition to data on state programs obtained through our survey, we 

obtained information through interviews with officials from state radiation 

control programs. We visited the following states during our review: 

Florida, Georgia, Illinois, Maryland, New Jersey, North Carolina, 

Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, South Carolina, and Utah. We also interviewed 

officials from the Massachusetts, Nevada, New York, and Ohio state 

radiation control programs.

We selected states to visit based upon the numbers of licensees regulated 

by the state and the different uses of sealed sources. We selected states 

with a low number of licensees (Rhode Island, South Carolina, and Utah), a 

medium number of licensees (Georgia, Maryland, New Jersey, North 

Carolina, and Pennsylvania), and a high number of licensees (Florida and 

Illinois). In addition, we considered the types of licensees in each state. For 

example, we visited South Carolina and Utah because they have two of the 

nation’s three low-level radioactive waste disposal facilities—the ChemNuclear Systems, L.L.C. facility in Barnwell, South Carolina and the 

Envirocare of Utah, Inc., facility in Clive, Utah. When visiting states, we met 

with officials from selected licensees that represented the major uses of 

sealed sources. We also visited manufacturers because they may possess 

larger quantities of radioactive material for installation in devices for sale. 

In summary, we visited three sites being decommissioned and 

decontaminated, two low-level radioactive waste disposal facilities, two 

moisture/density gauge manufacturers, two industrial radiographers, two 

medical licensees (hospitals), two large irradiator facilities, a well-logging 

licensee, a nuclear pharmacy, a research and development licensee, and an 

academic licensee to obtain their views on the effectiveness of NRC and 

state regulations, including the challenges associated with sealed source 
Appendix I

Objectives, Scope, and Methodology

Page 43 GAO-03-804 Nuclear Security

security. Additionally, we examined physical security measures during 

tours of these facilities.

We also visited Rhode Island, Florida, and the NRC Region III office in 

Lisle, Illinois, because they were undergoing NRC program performance 

evaluation reviews under the Integrated Materials Performance Evaluation 

Program. Visiting a program while it was being evaluated gave us the 

opportunity to witness review procedures for evaluating performance, 

consistency of application of NRC’s review criteria, transparency of the 

review process, and the level of cooperation and involvement between 

NRC officials and representatives from agreement states. To follow up our 

review of the program evaluation process, we attended a 2-day NRC 

training class on the Integrated Materials Performance Evaluation Program 

and observed two program evaluation Management Review Board 

meetings at NRC headquarters in Rockville, Maryland.

We attended two conferences related to sealed source regulation—the May 

2002 CRCPD annual meeting held in Madison, Wisconsin, and the annual 

OAS Conference held in October 2002, in Denver, Colorado. We also 

obtained a position paper from the Health Physics Society on the regulation 

of sealed sources. Furthermore, we met with the chairman of the Southeast 

Compact for low-level radioactive waste and the Advisory Committee on 

the Medical Uses of Isotopes to elicit views on the regulation and security 

of sealed sources.

At the federal level, we interviewed numerous NRC officials representing 

several different offices and programs. During these interviews, NRC 

provided us with information and documents about the regulation of sealed 

sources and the challenges it faces in the post September 11, 2001, security 

environment. We met with NRC’s Office of Enforcement, Office of 

Investigation, Office of Nuclear Materials Safety and Safeguards, Office of 

Nuclear Security and Incident Response, and Office of State and Tribal 

Programs. Additionally, we attended an August 2002 meeting between 

representatives of OAS and CRCPD and the Commissioners of NRC. 

Finally, to gain the perspective of federal regulators at the regional level, 

we visited three of the four NRC regional offices, including NRC Region I 

located in King of Prussia, Pennsylvania; Region II located in Atlanta, 

Georgia; and Region III located in Lisle, Illinois.

In addition to officials at NRC, we interviewed several other federal 

government agency officials. To learn about sealed source transportation 

regulations and issues, we interviewed officials from the Department of 
Appendix I

Objectives, Scope, and Methodology

Page 44 GAO-03-804 Nuclear Security

Transportation, including the Office of Hazardous Materials Safety. To 

establish the role of the Environmental Protection Agency in regulating 

sealed sources, we met with officials from the Office of Radiation and 

Indoor Air. We also met with officials from the Federal Emergency 

Management Agency (FEMA) and observed a FEMA evaluated exercise in 

March 2003 in Springfield and Morris, Illinois, that simulated a radiological 

release at a nuclear power plant. We also interviewed Department of 

Justice and Department of Energy officials.

We performed our review from August 2002 through June 2003 in 

accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards.
Page 45 GAO-03-804 Nuclear Security

Appendix II

Medical and Industrial Devices That Use 

Sealed Sources ApendxiI

Irradiators Irradiators are devices or facilities that expose products to radiation for 

sterilization, such as spices, milk containers, and hospital supplies. 

Irradiator facilities are relatively few in number and contain very high 

activity sources, which vary in physical size. Non-self shielded irradiators 

do not provide shielding from the radiation beam; therefore, the facilities 

that contain the irradiation must be specially designed, often including 

thickly shielded walls, interlocks, and other protective equipment. Selfshielded irradiators do not emit external radiation beams and are usually 

small cabinet type devices. These irradiators are commonly used in 

research applications or for blood irradiation. According to our survey and 

NRC specific license data, there are a total of approximately 350 irradiator 

specific licensees in the United States, about 70 of which are large 

irradiators.
Appendix II

Medical and Industrial Devices That Use 

Sealed Sources

Page 46 GAO-03-804 Nuclear Security

Figure 4: Product Conveyor System in a Panoramic Irradiator

Note: Cobalt-60 sealed sources are placed in racks and stored while not in use in a deep water-filled 

pool beneath the product conveyor system.

Teletherapy Teletherapy is commonly referred to as external beam radiation. Fixed 

multibeam teletheraphy units focus gamma radiation from an array of over 
Appendix II

Medical and Industrial Devices That Use 

Sealed Sources

Page 47 GAO-03-804 Nuclear Security

200 cobalt-60 sources on cancer lesions. The facilities within which the 

units are located are specifically designed to include thickly shielded walls 

and have other protective equipment, due to the high activity sources. 

According to our survey and NRC specific license data, there are 

approximately 60 teletherapy licensees and about 60 gamma knife 

licensees in the United States.

Figure 5: Stereotactic Radiosurgery Device (Gamma Knife)

Industrial Radiography Industrial radiography is the use of radiation to produce an image of 

internal features on photographic film to inspect metal parts and welds for 

defects. Industrial radiography sources and devices are generally small in 

terms of physical size, although the devices are usually heavy due to the 

internal shielding. The sources are attached to specially designed cables for 

their operation. The use of radiography sources and devices is very 

common—a total of over 570 licensees nationwide—and their portability 
Appendix II

Medical and Industrial Devices That Use 

Sealed Sources

Page 48 GAO-03-804 Nuclear Security

may make them susceptible to theft or loss. Further, the small size of the 

source allows for unauthorized removal by an individual, and such a source 

may be placed into a pocket of a garment. Industrial radiography cameras 

typically contain a high radioactivity iridium-192 source that is capable of 

inflicting extensive radiation burns if handled improperly.

Figure 6: Industrial Radiography Camera and Storage Case

Brachytheraphy Brachytherapy is an advanced cancer treatment in which radioactive seeds 

or sources are placed in or near the tumor itself, giving a high radiation 

dose to the tumor while reducing the radiation exposure in the surrounding 

healthy tissues. Brachytheraphy applications are of three slightly different 

varieties, generally referred to as low dose rate, medium dose rate, and 

high dose rate. These applications use sealed sources that are small 

physically (less than 1 centimeter in diameter and only a few centimeters 

long), and, thus, are susceptible to being lost or misplaced. High and 

medium dose rate sources, and some low dose rate sources, may be in the 
Appendix II

Medical and Industrial Devices That Use 

Sealed Sources

Page 49 GAO-03-804 Nuclear Security

form of a long wire attached to a device (a remote after loading device). 

The after loading device may be heavy, due to the shielding for the sources 

when not in use, and the device may be on wheels for transport within a 

facility. The remote after loading device may also contain electrical and 

electronic components for its operation. Brachytherapy sources and 

devices are located in hospitals, clinics, and similar medical institutions, 

and such facilities may have a large number of sources.
Appendix II

Medical and Industrial Devices That Use 

Sealed Sources

Page 50 GAO-03-804 Nuclear Security

Figure 7: High Dose Rate Remote After Loader Used for Brachytherapy

Well Logging Device Well logging is a process that uses sealed sources and/or unsealed 

radioactive materials to determine whether a well, drilled deep into the 

ground, contains minerals, such as coal, oil, and natural gas. The sources 
Appendix II

Medical and Industrial Devices That Use 

Sealed Sources

Page 51 GAO-03-804 Nuclear Security

are usually contained in long (1 to 2 meters, typically) and thin (less than 10 

centimeters in diameter) devices that also contain detectors and various 

electronic components. The actual size of the sources inside the devices is 

generally small, but the device is heavy, due to the ruggedness needed for 

the environments in which they are to be used. Our analysis of NRC’s 

license tracking system and responses to our survey of agreement states 

indicates that there are about 210 well logging licensees in the United 

States.
Appendix II

Medical and Industrial Devices That Use 

Sealed Sources

Page 52 GAO-03-804 Nuclear Security

Figure 8: Storage Container for Well Logging Sealed Source

Fixed Industrial Gauge Non-portable gauging devices are designed for measurement or control of 

material density, flow, level, thickness, weight, and so forth. The gauges—

possessed by over 1,600 specific licensees and an unknown number of 

general licensees—contain sealed sources that radiate through the 

substance being measured to a readout or controlling device. Depending 
Appendix II

Medical and Industrial Devices That Use 

Sealed Sources

Page 53 GAO-03-804 Nuclear Security

upon the specific application, industrial gauges may contain relatively 

small quantities of radioactive material, or may contain sources with 

activities approaching 30 curies. The devices generally are not large, but 

may be located some distance from the radiation detector, which may have 

electrical or electronic components located within the detector. A facility 

may have a large number of these gauges and the locations of such devices 

or sources within a facility may not be recognized, since the devices may be 

connected to process control equipment. This lack of recognition may 

result in a loss of control if the facility decides to modernize or terminate 

operations.

Figure 9: Fixed Industrial Gauge

Portable Gauge Portable gauging devices, such as moisture density gauges, are used at field 

locations and contain the sources, detectors, and electronic equipment 

necessary for the measurement. These gauges—over 4,600 licensees in the 

United States—contain a gamma emitting sealed source, usually cesium137, and a sealed neutron source, usually americium-241 and beryllium. 

The source is physically small in size, typically a few centimeters long by a 

few centimeters in diameter, and may be located either completely within 

the device or at the end of a rod/handle assembly. The portability of the 

device makes it susceptible to loss of control or theft.
Appendix II

Medical and Industrial Devices That Use 

Sealed Sources

Page 54 GAO-03-804 Nuclear Security

Figure 10: Portable Moisture/Density Gauge
Appendix II

Medical and Industrial Devices That Use 

Sealed Sources

Page 55 GAO-03-804 Nuclear Security

Table 2: Type and Size of Sealed Sources Used in Medical and Industrial Practices

Practice or Application Use Radioisotope

Range of radioactivity level 

(curies)

Irradiator (sterilization/food preservation) Industrial Cobalt-60 5,000-15,000,000

Cesium-137 5,000-5,000,000

Irradiator (self-shielded) Research Cesium-137 2,500-42,000

Cobalt-60 1,500-50,000

Irradiator (blood) Medical Cesium-137 1,000-12,000

Cobalt-60 1,500-3,000

Teletherapy Medical Cobalt-60 1,000-15,000

Cesium-137 500-1,500

Teletherapy (fixed, multibeam/gamma knife) Medical Cobalt-60 4,000-10,000

Industrial radiography Industrial Cobalt-60 11-200

Iridium-192 5-200

Selenium-75 80

Ytterbium-169 2.5-10

Thulium-170 20-200

Brachytherapy (high/medium dose rate) Medical Cobalt-60 5-20

Cesium-137 3-8

Iridium-192 3-12

Brachytherapy (low dose rate) Medical Cesium-137 .01-.7

Radium-226 .005-.05

Strontium-90 .02-.04

Palladium-103 .03

Iodine-125 .04

Iridium-192 .02-.75

Gold-198 .08

Californium-252 .083

Ruthenium/Rhodium106.00022-.0006

Well logging gauge Industrial Americium241/Beryllium.5-23

Cesium-137 1-2

Californium-252 .027-.11

Fixed industrial gauge (e.g. level/thickness gauge) Industrial Americium-241 .012-.12

Cesium-137 .05-.065

Portable gauge (e.g. moisture/density gauge) Industrial Americium241/Beryllium.01-.1
Appendix II

Medical and Industrial Devices That Use 

Sealed Sources

Page 56 GAO-03-804 Nuclear Security

Source: International Atomic Energy Agency, “Categorization of Radioactive Sources, Revision of IAEA-TECDOC-1191” Vienna, Austria, 2003.

Practice or Application Use Radioisotope

Range of radioactivity level 

(curies)

Cesium-137 .008-.011

Radium-226 .002-.004

Californium-252 .00003-.00007

(Continued From Previous Page)
Page 57 GAO-03-804 Nuclear Security

Appendix III

Legislation Introduced in the 108th Congress 

Addressing Security of Sealed Sources ApendxiI

Legislation Major Efforts Study Requested

S.6 Comprehensive Homeland 

Security Act of 2003

Sec. 3006 and Sec. 170.

Amends the Atomic Energy Act of 1954 to include the 

following major efforts: (1) based on a new classification 

system, develop a national system for recovery of sealed 

sources that are stolen or lost; (2) develop a national 

tracking system that takes into account the new 

classification system; and (3) establish procedures to 

improve the security of sealed sources in use, transport, 

and storage.

Establishes a task force to develop a 

classification system for sensitive sealed 

sources that is based on the potential for 

use by terrorists and the extent of the 

threat to public health and safety. 

S.350 A bill to amend the Atomic 

Energy Act of 1954 to strengthen 

the security of sensitive 

radioactive material.

Directs a task force to (1) determine which sealed 

sources should be classified as sensitive sealed sources, 

(2) develop a national system to recover sensitive sealed 

sources that are lost or stolen, (3) develop a national 

tracking system for sealed sources, and (4) establish 

procedures to improve the security of sensitive sealed 

sources. 

Establishes a multiagency task force to 

evaluate the security of sealed sources 

and recommends administrative and 

legislative actions to provide the maximum 

degree of security against radiological 

threats. 

H.R.891 A bill to establish a task 

force to evaluate and make 

recommendations with respect to 

the security of sealed sources of 

radioactive materials, and for 

other purposes.

Directs a task force to (1) establish or modify a 

classification system for sealed sources based on sealed 

source attractiveness to terrorists, (2) establish or modify 

a national tracking system, (3) establish a system to 

impose refundable fees for proper disposal, and (4) 

improve the security of sealed sources. 

Establishes a multiagency task force to, in 

consultation with state agencies, make 

recommendations for appropriate 

regulatory and legislative changes to 

strengthen controls over sealed sources. 

S. 1043 A bill to provide for the 

security of commercial nuclear 

power plants and facilities 

designated by the Nuclear 

Regulatory Commission

Sec. 6

Changes the definition of byproduct material to include 

naturally occurring and accelerator produced radioactive 

material and, within 4 years, transition regulatory 

authority over this material from non-agreement states to 

the Nuclear Regulatory Commission.

None.

S. 1005 The Energy Policy

Policy Act of 2003

Title IX Subtitle D—Nuclear 

Energy Sec. 946

Instructs the Secretary of Energy to establish a research 

and development program to develop alternatives to 

sealed sources that reduce safety, environmental, or 

proliferation risks to workers using the sources or the 

public.

Directs the Secretary of Energy to conduct 

a survey of industrial applications of large 

radioactive sources. Requires the survey 

to include information on the management 

and disposal of sealed sources.

S. 1045 Low-Level Radioactive 

Waste Act of 2003

Directs the Secretary of Energy to (1) identify options for 

disposal of low-level radioactive waste, (2) develop a 

report for Congress on a permanent disposal facility for 

greater-than-Class C waste, and (3) submit to Congress a 

plan to ensure continued recovery of greater-than-Class 

C waste until a permanent disposal facility is available.

None.
Appendix III

Legislation Introduced in the 108th Congress 

Addressing Security of Sealed Sources

Page 58 GAO-03-804 Nuclear Security

Source: GAO.

Legislation Major Efforts Study Requested

S. 1161 Foreign Assistance 

Authorization Act, fiscal year 

2004

Title III Sec. 301—308

Radiological Terrorism Threat 

Reduction Act of 2003

Authorizes the Secretary of Energy to engage in activities 

with the International Atomic Energy Agency to (1) 

propose and conclude agreements with up to 8 countries 

under which the countries would provide temporary 

secure storage for orphaned, unused, and surplus sealed 

sources, (2) promote the discovery, inventory, and 

recovery of sealed sources in member nations, and (3) 

authorizes the Secretary of Energy to make voluntary 

contributions to the International Atomic Energy Agency 

to achieve the aforementioned goals.

None.

(Continued From Previous Page)
Page 59 GAO-03-804 Nuclear Security

Appendix IV

Results of Survey of Agreement States ApendxiIV

1

United States General Accounting Office 

Agreement State Survey on Security of 

Radioactive Sources

Background

The U.S. General Accounting Office (GAO), the 

investigative arm of Congress, is reviewing the 

regulation of radioactive materials in the United 

States. Congress has asked the GAO to answer 

the following questions: 

1. What is the known universe of 

radiological sources in the United States 

and how many have been lost, stolen, or 

abandoned? 

2. How effective are federal and state 

controls over radiological sources? 

3. What efforts are underway since 

September 11, 2001, to improve the 

controls over radiological sources? 

As part of our review, we are conducting 

surveys of state radiation control agencies, 

including agreement and non-agreement states, 

Puerto Rico, Guam, and the District of 

Columbia. The principal aims of this survey are 

to obtain information from each state on the 

number and types of radiological sources being 

regulated by the state and obtain states’ views on 

the effectiveness of the current federal and state 

regulatory framework. 

Your cooperation in completing this survey is 

essential for an accurate and timely report to the 

Congress on the current state of regulatory 

control over radioactive materials. To be 

included in our report, your response within 3 

weeks of receipt is greatly appreciated. 

Directions for Completing this Questionnaire 

Please complete this questionnaire and return it 

via email (ColesR@gao.gov), fax (202-512-

6880), or FedEx within 3 weeks of receipt. 

GAO will take steps to safeguard the privacy of 

your responses. 

If you have any questions about the survey, 

please contact: 

Ryan T. Coles 

Office: 202-512-6888 

E-mail: ColesR@gao.gov

Peter Ruedel 

Office: 202-512-8753 

E-mail: RuedelP@gao.gov

Heather Von Behren 

Office: 202-512-6768 

E-mail: VonBehrenH@gao.gov

If you prefer to return the survey via FedEx, the 

return address is: 

U.S. General Accounting Office 

Attention: Ryan T. Coles 

Natural Resources and Environment 

441 G Street, NW Room 2T23 

Washington, DC 20548 

Due to increased security put in place following 

the anthrax incidents of October 2001, please do 

not use the U.S. Postal Service to return surveys 

to GAO. 

Although this questionnaire may require input 

from various individuals, we ask that one person 

assume responsibility for coordinating its 

completion. Please list that person’s name 

below in case we have questions or need followup. Thank you. 

Name: 

Title:

Telephone #: 

E-mail: 
Appendix IV

Results of Survey of Agreement States

Page 60 GAO-03-804 Nuclear Security

2

PROGRAM INFORMATION

1. First, we’d like to get some basic information about your state’s radiation control program.

Please provide the following information. 

Program name: 

State department/division/office (e.g. Department of Health): 

City the main office is located in: 

State: 

Current director of program: 

2. Please list your program’s total budget for the following calendar years: 

2000 (Actual) $51,463,128 (N=30)

2001 (Actual) $56,975,299 (N=31)

2002 (Actual) $59,712,939 (N=32)

2003 (Projected) $61,039,121 (N=31)

3. What are the sources of your program’s funding? (Mark all that apply 7) (N=35) 

94.3% Fees charged to licensees 

45.7% Appropriations from state general fund 

60.0% Other, please specify:

4. How many full-time equivalent (FTE) staff does your program currently employ? (N=35) 

754
Appendix IV

Results of Survey of Agreement States

Page 61 GAO-03-804 Nuclear Security

3

5. Of the total number of staff reported in question #3, how many FTEs do you have in the 

following categories? 

Category of Staff Number

Inspectors

License reviewers 

Other Technical Staff 

Other Non-Technical Staff 

6. How many of your technical staff (including inspectors and license reviewers) are 

professionally certified (e.g. certified health physicists, nuclear medicine technologists, etc.)? 

7. How many staff were employed in your state in the following categories on January 1, 

1998? (N=34) 

Category of Staff Number on January 1, 1998

Inspectors

License reviewers 

Other Technical Staff 

Other Non-Technical Staff 

TOTAL 750

8. Over the next five years, do you estimate your total full-time equivalent positions will 

increase or decrease for technical and non-technical staff? (Mark only one response 7 for 

each type of staff) (N=34) 

Technical Staff Non-Technical Staff

17.7% Increase 17.7% Increase 

11.8% Decrease 11.8% Decrease 

70.6% Stay about the same 70.6% Stay about the same 

9. In what year did your agreement with the NRC, or its predecessor, the Atomic Energy 

Commission, first enter into force? 

1 9 
Appendix IV

Results of Survey of Agreement States

Page 62 GAO-03-804 Nuclear Security

4

SPECIFIC LICENSING ACTIVITIES OF THE AGREEMENT STATES

10. Please complete the following table on the total number of active specific licenses for Atomic 

Energy Act materials issued by your state as of December 31, 2002: 

10 CFR part(s) or the applicable agreement 

state equivalent 

Active licenses as of 

December 31, 2002 

Part 32 380 (N=29)

Part 33 248 (N=29)

Part 34 417 (N=29)

Part 35 4,795 (N=29)

Part 36 134 (N=29)

Part 39 167 (N=29)

Part 40 137 (N=28)

Part 70 95 (N=27)

Total 10,611 (N=32)

Naturally occurring radioactive materials 153 (N=20)

Accelerator produced radioactive materials 324 (N=19)

11. Next, we’d like to obtain data on the number of active specific licenses issued by your state 

program as of December 31, 2002 and how often licensees are inspected. Enter number and 

mark only one response 7 in each row for most common inspection frequency within that 

particular code. If none, please enter “0” (zero). (N=35) 

29

Please check this box if the license information below includes non-Atomic Energy 

Act materials (i.e. naturally occurring or accelerator produced radioactive 

materials)

NRC license tracking system 

program code and license use 

Number of 

licensees 

Most Common Inspection 

Frequency Within This Code 

 More than once per year 

 Once a Year 

 Every 2-3 Years 

 Every 4-5 Years 

 Over 5 Years 

 Inspection Not Required 

03250 Introduction of byproduct material 

in exempt concentrations into 

products or materials, and transfer 

of ownership or possession 

8 (N=33)
Appendix IV

Results of Survey of Agreement States

Page 63 GAO-03-804 Nuclear Security

5

NRC license tracking system 

program code and license use 

Number of 

licensees 

Most Common Inspection 

Frequency Within This Code 

 More than once per year 

 Once a Year 

 Every 2-3 Years 

 Every 4-5 Years 

 Over 5 Years 

 Inspection Not Required 

03251 Application of byproduct material 

into devices exempt from regulation 

under §30.15 

0 (N=33)

 More than once per year 

 Once a Year 

 Every 2-3 Years 

 Every 4-5 Years 

 Over 5 Years 

 Inspection Not Required 

03252 Manufacture of resins containing 

scandium-46 designed for sandconsolidation in oil wells 

2 (N=33)

 More than once per year 

 Once a Year 

 Every 2-3 Years 

 Every 4-5 Years 

 Over 5 Years 

 Inspection Not Required 

03253 Manufacture, distribution, and 

transfer of exempt quantities of 

byproduct material 

15 (N=32)

 More than once per year 

 Once a Year 

 Every 2-3 Years 

 Every 4-5 Years 

 Over 5 Years 

 Inspection Not Required 

03256 Manufacture, preparation, or 

transfer of capsules containing 

carbon-14 urea for “in vivo” 

diagnostic use in humans 

14 (N=33)
Appendix IV

Results of Survey of Agreement States

Page 64 GAO-03-804 Nuclear Security

6

NRC license tracking system 

program code and license use 

Number of 

licensees 

Most Common Inspection 

Frequency Within This Code 

 More than once per year 

 Once a Year 

 Every 2-3 Years 

 Every 4-5 Years 

 Over 5 Years 

 Inspection Not Required 

03254 Manufacture, process, produce, or 

initially transfer self-luminous 

products containing tritium, 

krypton-85 or promethium-147 

6 (N=33)

 More than once per year 

 Once a Year 

 Every 2-3 Years 

 Every 4-5 Years 

 Over 5 Years 

 Inspection Not Required 

03255 Manufacture, process, produce, or 

initially transfer gas and aerosol 

detectors containing byproduct 

material 

1 (N=33)

 More than once per year 

 Once a Year 

 Every 2-3 Years 

 Every 4-5 Years 

 Over 5 Years 

 Inspection Not Required 

03240 Manufacture or initially transfer 

generally licensed devices under 

§31.5 

74 (N=33)

 More than once per year 

 Once a Year 

 Every 2-3 Years 

 Every 4-5 Years 

 Over 5 Years 

 Inspection Not Required 

03241 Manufacture, assemble, repair, or 

initially transfer luminous safety 

devices for use in aircraft 

1 (N=33)
Appendix IV

Results of Survey of Agreement States

Page 65 GAO-03-804 Nuclear Security

7

NRC license tracking system 

program code and license use 

Number of 

licensees 

Most Common Inspection 

Frequency Within This Code 

 More than once per year 

 Once a Year 

 Every 2-3 Years 

 Every 4-5 Years 

 Over 5 Years 

 Inspection Not Required 

03242 Manufacture or initially transfer 

calibration or reference sources 

containing americium-241 

5 (N=32)

 More than once per year 

 Once a Year 

 Every 2-3 Years 

 Every 4-5 Years 

 Over 5 Years 

 Inspection Not Required 

03243 Manufacture or initially transfer ice 

detection devices containing 

strontium-90 

1 (N=33)

 More than once per year 

 Once a Year 

 Every 2-3 Years 

 Every 4-5 Years 

 Over 5 Years 

 Inspection Not Required 

03244 Manufacture and distribution of 

byproduct material for in-vitro 

clinical or laboratory testing under 

general license 

25 (N=33)

 More than once per year 

 Once a Year 

 Every 2-3 Years 

 Every 4-5 Years 

 Over 5 Years 

 Inspection Not Required 

02511 Manufacture, preparation, or 

transfer for commercial distribution 

of radioactive drugs containing 

byproduct material for medical use 

under part 35. 

62 (N=33)
Appendix IV

Results of Survey of Agreement States

Page 66 GAO-03-804 Nuclear Security

8

NRC license tracking system 

program code and license use 

Number of 

licensees 

Most Common Inspection 

Frequency Within This Code 

 More than once per year 

 Once a Year 

 Every 2-3 Years 

 Every 4-5 Years 

 Over 5 Years 

 Inspection Not Required 

02513 Manufacture and distribution of 

sources or devices containing 

byproduct material for medical use 

20 (N=33)

 More than once per year 

 Once a Year 

 Every 2-3 Years 

 Every 4-5 Years 

 Over 5 Years 

 Inspection Not Required 

01100 Academic type A specific license of 

broad scope 

100 (N=33)

 More than once per year 

 Once a Year 

 Every 2-3 Years 

 Every 4-5 Years 

 Over 5 Years 

 Inspection Not Required 

03211 Manufacturing and distribution type 

A specific license of broad scope 

11 (N=33)

 More than once per year 

 Once a Year 

 Every 2-3 Years 

 Every 4-5 Years 

 Over 5 Years 

 Inspection Not Required 

03610 Research and development type A 

specific license of broad scope 

57 (N=33)
Appendix IV

Results of Survey of Agreement States

Page 67 GAO-03-804 Nuclear Security

9

NRC license tracking system 

program code and license use 

Number of 

licensees 

Most Common Inspection 

Frequency Within This Code 

 More than once per year 

 Once a Year 

 Every 2-3 Years 

 Every 4-5 Years 

 Over 5 Years 

 Inspection Not Required 

01110 Academic type B specific license of 

broad scope 

21 (N=33)

 More than once per year 

 Once a Year 

 Every 2-3 Years 

 Every 4-5 Years 

 Over 5 Years 

 Inspection Not Required 

03211 Manufacturing and distribution type 

B specific license of broad scope 

8 (N=33)

 More than once per year 

 Once a Year 

 Every 2-3 Years 

 Every 4-5 Years 

 Over 5 Years 

 Inspection Not Required 

03611 Research and development type B 

specific license of broad scope 

7 (N=33)

 More than once per year 

 Once a Year 

 Every 2-3 Years 

 Every 4-5 Years 

 Over 5 Years 

 Inspection Not Required 

01120 Academic type C specific license of 

broad scope 

31 (N=33)
Appendix IV

Results of Survey of Agreement States

Page 68 GAO-03-804 Nuclear Security

10

NRC license tracking system 

program code and license use 

Number of 

licensees 

Most Common Inspection 

Frequency Within This Code 

 More than once per year 

 Once a Year 

 Every 2-3 Years 

 Every 4-5 Years 

 Over 5 Years 

 Inspection Not Required 

03213 Manufacturing and distribution type 

C specific license of broad scope 

1 (N=33)

 More than once per year 

 Once a Year 

 Every 2-3 Years 

 Every 4-5 Years 

 Over 5 Years 

 Inspection Not Required 

03612 Research and development type C 

specific license of broad scope 

14 (N=33)

 More than once per year 

 Once a Year 

 Every 2-3 Years 

 Every 4-5 Years 

 Over 5 Years 

 Inspection Not Required 

03310 Industrial radiography fixed 

location

95 (N=33)

 More than once per year 

 Once a Year 

 Every 2-3 Years 

 Every 4-5 Years 

 Over 5 Years 

 Inspection Not Required 

03320 Industrial radiography temporary 

job sites 

379 (N=33)
Appendix IV

Results of Survey of Agreement States

Page 69 GAO-03-804 Nuclear Security

11

NRC license tracking system 

program code and license use 

Number of 

licensees 

Most Common Inspection 

Frequency Within This Code 

 More than once per year 

 Once a Year 

 Every 2-3 Years 

 Every 4-5 Years 

 Over 5 Years 

 Inspection Not Required 

02120 

02121 

Medical institution 2,519 (N=32)

 More than once per year 

 Once a Year 

 Every 2-3 Years 

 Every 4-5 Years 

 Over 5 Years 

 Inspection Not Required 

02200 

02201 

Medical private practice 1,805 (N=32)

 More than once per year 

 Once a Year 

 Every 2-3 Years 

 Every 4-5 Years 

 Over 5 Years 

 Inspection Not Required 

02220 

02231 

02240 

Mobile medical service 187 (N=32)

 More than once per year 

 Once a Year 

 Every 2-3 Years 

 Every 4-5 Years 

 Over 5 Years 

 Inspection Not Required 

02210 Eye applicators (strontium-90) 74 (N=33)
Appendix IV

Results of Survey of Agreement States

Page 70 GAO-03-804 Nuclear Security

12

NRC license tracking system 

program code and license use 

Number of 

licensees 

Most Common Inspection 

Frequency Within This Code 

 More than once per year 

 Once a Year 

 Every 2-3 Years 

 Every 4-5 Years 

 Over 5 Years 

 Inspection Not Required 

02300 Teletherapy 55 (N=33)

 More than once per year 

 Once a Year 

 Every 2-3 Years 

 Every 4-5 Years 

 Over 5 Years 

 Inspection Not Required 

02310 Stereotactic radiosurgery—gamma 

knife

45 (N=33)

 More than once per year 

 Once a Year 

 Every 2-3 Years 

 Every 4-5 Years 

 Over 5 Years 

 Inspection Not Required 

02400 Veterinary non-human 110 (N=33)

 More than once per year 

 Once a Year 

 Every 2-3 Years 

 Every 4-5 Years 

 Over 5 Years 

 Inspection Not Required 

02410 In-vitro testing laboratories 147 (N=33)
Appendix IV

Results of Survey of Agreement States

Page 71 GAO-03-804 Nuclear Security

13

NRC license tracking system 

program code and license use 

Number of 

licensees 

Most Common Inspection 

Frequency Within This Code 

 More than once per year 

 Once a Year 

 Every 2-3 Years 

 Every 4-5 Years 

 Over 5 Years 

 Inspection Not Required 

02500 Nuclear pharmacies 280 (N=33)

 More than once per year 

 Once a Year 

 Every 2-3 Years 

 Every 4-5 Years 

 Over 5 Years 

 Inspection Not Required 

03510 Irradiators self shielded less than 

10,000 curies 

176 (N=33)

 More than once per year 

 Once a Year 

 Every 2-3 Years 

 Every 4-5 Years 

 Over 5 Years 

 Inspection Not Required 

03511 Irradiators other less than 10,000 

curies

17 (N=33)

 More than once per year 

 Once a Year 

 Every 2-3 Years 

 Every 4-5 Years 

 Over 5 Years 

 Inspection Not Required 

03520 Irradiators self shielded greater than 

10,000 curies 

9 (N=33)
Appendix IV

Results of Survey of Agreement States

Page 72 GAO-03-804 Nuclear Security

14

NRC license tracking system 

program code and license use 

Number of 

licensees 

Most Common Inspection 

Frequency Within This Code 

 More than once per year 

 Once a Year 

 Every 2-3 Years 

 Every 4-5 Years 

 Over 5 Years 

 Inspection Not Required 

03521 All other irradiators greater than 

10,000 curies 

40 (N=33)

 More than once per year 

 Once a Year 

 Every 2-3 Years 

 Every 4-5 Years 

 Over 5 Years 

 Inspection Not Required 

03110 Well logging byproduct and/or 

special nuclear material tracer and 

sealed sources 

70 (N=33)

 More than once per year 

 Once a Year 

 Every 2-3 Years 

 Every 4-5 Years 

 Over 5 Years 

 Inspection Not Required 

03111 Well logging byproduct and/or 

special nuclear material sealed 

sources only 

40 (N=33)

 More than once per year 

 Once a Year 

 Every 2-3 Years 

 Every 4-5 Years 

 Over 5 Years 

 Inspection Not Required 

03112 Well logging byproduct only 64 (N=33)
Appendix IV

Results of Survey of Agreement States

Page 73 GAO-03-804 Nuclear Security

15

NRC license tracking system 

program code and license use 

Number of 

licensees 

Most Common Inspection 

Frequency Within This Code 

 More than once per year 

 Once a Year 

 Every 2-3 Years 

 Every 4-5 Years 

 Over 5 Years 

 Inspection Not Required 

03120 Fixed gauges 1,193 (N=33)

 More than once per year 

 Once a Year 

 Every 2-3 Years 

 Every 4-5 Years 

 Over 5 Years 

 Inspection Not Required 

03121 Portable gauges 3,715 (N=33)

 More than once per year 

 Once a Year 

 Every 2-3 Years 

 Every 4-5 Years 

 Over 5 Years 

 Inspection Not Required 

03122 Analytical instruments 369 (N=33)

 More than once per year 

 Once a Year 

 Every 2-3 Years 

 Every 4-5 Years 

 Over 5 Years 

 Inspection Not Required 

03123 Gas chromatographs 212 (N=33)

 More than once per year 

 Once a Year 

 Every 2-3 Years 

 Every 4-5 Years 

 Over 5 Years 

03124 Other measuring systems 146 (N=33)

 Inspection Not Required 
Appendix IV

Results of Survey of Agreement States

Page 74 GAO-03-804 Nuclear Security

16

NRC license tracking system 

program code and license use 

Number of 

licensees 

Most Common Inspection 

Frequency Within This Code 

 More than once per year 

 Once a Year 

 Every 2-3 Years 

 Every 4-5 Years 

 Over 5 Years 

 Inspection Not Required 

03221 Instrument calibration service 

only—source less than 100 curies 

104 (N=33)

 More than once per year 

 Once a Year 

 Every 2-3 Years 

 Every 4-5 Years 

 Over 5 Years 

 Inspection Not Required 

03222 Instrument calibration service 

only—source greater than 100 

curies

21 (N=33)
Appendix IV

Results of Survey of Agreement States

Page 75 GAO-03-804 Nuclear Security

17

12. Please complete the following table for radioactive materials licenses issued by your state 

program that are NOT LISTED IN YOUR RESPONSE TO QUESTION 11. Enter the 

license use, number of active licenses issued by your program, and mark only one response 7

in each row for most common inspection frequency within that particular use. 

License use Number of 

licensees 

Most Common Inspection 

Frequency Within This Code 

 More than once per year 

 Once a Year 

 Every 2-3 Years 

 Every 4-5 Years 

 Over 5 Years 

 Inspection Not Required 

 More than once per year 

 Once a Year 

 Every 2-3 Years 

 Every 4-5 Years 

 Over 5 Years 

 Inspection Not Required 

 More than once per year 

 Once a Year 

 Every 2-3 Years 

 Every 4-5 Years 

 Over 5 Years 

 Inspection Not Required 

 More than once per year 

 Once a Year 

 Every 2-3 Years 

 Every 4-5 Years 

 Over 5 Years 

 Inspection Not Required 
Appendix IV

Results of Survey of Agreement States

Page 76 GAO-03-804 Nuclear Security

18

License use Number of 

licensees 

Most Common Inspection 

Frequency Within This Code 

 More than once per year 

 Once a Year 

 Every 2-3 Years 

 Every 4-5 Years 

 Over 5 Years 

 Inspection Not Required 

 More than once per year 

 Once a Year 

 Every 2-3 Years 

 Every 4-5 Years 

 Over 5 Years 

 Inspection Not Required 

 More than once per year 

 Once a Year 

 Every 2-3 Years 

 Every 4-5 Years 

 Over 5 Years 

 Inspection Not Required 

 More than once per year 

 Once a Year 

 Every 2-3 Years 

 Every 4-5 Years 

 Over 5 Years 

 Inspection Not Required 

Please copy and paste above table for additional uses. 
Appendix IV

Results of Survey of Agreement States

Page 77 GAO-03-804 Nuclear Security

19

13. In your opinion, which 3 uses of radioactive materials, from the license uses listed in 

questions 11 and 12, require the strictest and least strict regulation to protect public health 

and safety?

 Strictest regulation Least strict regulation

1. 1.

2. 2.

3. 3.

14. In your opinion, which 3 uses of radioactive materials, from the license uses listed in 

questions 11 and 12, require the strictest and least strict regulation to ensure security? (i.e. 

to prevent the materials’ use by terrorists in a radiological weapon) 

 Strictest regulation Least strict regulation

1. 1.

2. 2.

3. 3.
Appendix IV

Results of Survey of Agreement States

Page 78 GAO-03-804 Nuclear Security

20

GENERAL LICENSE TRACKING

15. Does your state program require generally licensed devices to be registered? Mark only one 

response 7) (N=31) 

80.6% Yes, all generally licensed devices are required to be registered. (skip to question 17)

16.1% Yes, but only certain generally licensed devices are required to be registered. 

3.2% No, generally licensed devices are not required to be registered with the state. (skip to question 

19)

16. If only certain generally licensed devices are required to be registered, what criteria 

determine the devices required to be registered with the state program? 

17. If generally licensed devices are required to be registered with your state program, does the 

program maintain a database of registered generally licensed devices? Mark only one 

response 7)

Yes

No (skip to question 19)

18. If yes, how many generally licensed devices are currently registered in your state? 

19. If your state program does not require any generally licensed devices to be registered or 

your state program does not maintain a database of registered generally licensed devices, 

how many such devices would you estimate are present in your state? 
Appendix IV

Results of Survey of Agreement States

Page 79 GAO-03-804 Nuclear Security

21

SPECIFIC AND GENERAL LICENSE TRACKING OVERSIGHT

20. Briefly describe how your program maintains data on materials licenses and inspections. 

21. Please estimate the percentage of inspections of your licensees that are currently overdue. 

22. Are your databases (i.e. licensing records, computer files containing licensee information) 

periodically validated to ensure that licensees are still active (i.e. still conducting business)? 

Mark only one response 7) (N=35) 

97.1% Yes

2.9% No (skip to question 25)

23. How often do you validate your databases? Mark only one response 7) (N=32) 

46.9% More than once per year 

40.6% Once a year 

9.4% Every 2-3 years 

3.1% Every 4-5 years 

0.0% Over 5 years 

24. What steps are taken to validate information in your databases? 

25. Does your state have a program to identify and recover abandoned sources? Mark only one 

response 7) (N=35) 

94.3% Yes

5.7% No (skip to question 27)

26. Briefly describe your state’s program to identify and recover abandoned sources. 
Appendix IV

Results of Survey of Agreement States

Page 80 GAO-03-804 Nuclear Security

22

ENFORCEMENT ACTIONS

27. What enforcement actions are available to your state’s program to ensure laws and 

regulations are followed? (Mark all that apply 7) (N=35) 

0.0% No enforcement actions available (skip to question 31)

100% Notices of violation/citations 

77.1% Fines/civil penalties 

88.6% License suspension 

97.1% License termination 

57.1% Facility closure 

71.4% Imprisonment/criminal penalties 

45.7% Other, please specify:

28. Please complete the following table on your state program’s enforcement activities over the 

past five years. If none, please enter “0” (zero): 

Number of enforcement actions per year 

Enforcement action 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 

Notices of violation 

only (without other 

action)

2,135 

(N=24)

2,675 

(N=25)

3,056 

(N=27)

2,845 

(N=28)

2,568 

(N=28)

Fines/civil penalties 45 (N=23) 50 (N=24) 47 (N=24) 66 (N=26) 57 (N=25) 

License suspension 3 (N=25) 3 (N=26) 8 (N=26) 9 (N=27) 9 (N=27) 

License termination 24 (N=25) 25 (N=26) 26 (N=26) 27 (N=27) 53 (N=27) 

Facility closure 1 (N=24) 0 (N=25) 1 (N=25) 0 (N=25) 1 (N=25) 

Imprisonment/criminal 

penalties

0 (N=24) 0 (N=25) 2 (N=25) 0 (N=26) 2 (N=26) 

Other: 7 (N=15) 6 (N=16) 14 (N=16) 56 (N=19) 87 (N=19) 
Appendix IV

Results of Survey of Agreement States

Page 81 GAO-03-804 Nuclear Security

23

29. How are fines/civil penalties collected by your program utilized? (N=35) 

25.7% Available for use by the state radiation control program 

45.7% Deposited into state general fund 

11.4% Other, please specify:

20.0% Not applicable 

30. Please briefly describe any enforcement cases since January 1, 1998, that have been difficult 

to resolve, have generated above average public or press interest, have challenged your 

regulatory authority, or have or will result in high clean up costs financed by state or 

federal funds. 
Appendix IV

Results of Survey of Agreement States

Page 82 GAO-03-804 Nuclear Security

24

EFFECTIVENESS OF CONTROLS OVER RADIOACTIVE MATERIALS

31. To what extent, if at all, do you agree that communications and coordination needs to be 

improved between your state program and the following group? (Mark only one response 7

in each row)

Group Very great 

extent

Great 

extent

Moderate 

extent

Some 

Extent

Little or no 

extent

No Basis to 

Judge

a) the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory 

Commission (NRC) (N=35) 

8.6% 2.9% 28.6% 28.6% 31.4% 0.0% 

b) the U.S. Department of Energy 

(DOE) (N=35) 

11.4% 20.0% 25.7% 22.9% 5.7% 14.3% 

c) the Environmental Protection 

Agency (EPA) (N=35) 

11.4% 14.3% 25.7% 28.6% 17.1% 2.90% 

d) the Food and Drug 

Administration (FDA) (N=35) 

2.9% 5.7% 20.0% 25.7% 35.7% 8.6% 

e) the U.S. Department of Justice 

(DOJ) (N=35) 

8.6% 14.3% 14.3% 8.6% 8.6% 45.7% 

f) the U.S. Department of 

Transportation (DOT) (N=35) 

5.7% 14.3% 28.6% 28.6% 14.3% 8.6% 

g) other agreement states (N=35) 2.9% 0.0% 8.6% 20.0% 68.6% 0.0% 

h) non-agreement states (N=35) 2.9% 0.0% 11.4% 25.7% 57.1% 2.9% 

i) Organization of Agreement 

States (OAS) (N=34) 

0.0% 2.9% 5.9% 23.5% 67.6% 0.0% 

j) Conference of Radiation 

Control Program Directors 

(CRCPD) (N=34) 

0.0% 2.9% 5.9% 17.6% 73.5% 0.0% 
Appendix IV

Results of Survey of Agreement States

Page 83 GAO-03-804 Nuclear Security

25

32. To what extent, if at all, do you agree with the following statements? (Mark only one 

response 7 in each row) (N=35) 

Group Very great 

extent 

Great 

extent 

Moderate 

extent 

Some 

Extent

Little or no 

extent 

No Basis to 

Judge 

a) Communications and 

coordination needs to be 

improved between federal 

agencies with regulatory 

authority for radioactive 

materials 

34.3% 34.3% 17.1% 14.3% 0.0% 0.0% 

b) The current division of 

regulatory authority for 

radioactive materials between 

NRC, DOE, EPA, DOT and 

FDA is the most effective 

means of federal regulation 

0.0% 2.9% 5.7% 20.0% 71.4% 0.0% 

c) Consistent radiation protection 

standards need to be developed 

that would apply across all 

federal and state regulatory 

programs. 

48.6% 31.4% 5.7% 8.6% 5.7% 0.0% 

d) My state program currently has 

sufficient budgetary resources to 

effectively regulate radiological 

sources

8.6% 20.0% 25.7% 28.6% 17.1% 0.0% 

e) My state program currently has 

sufficient technology (e.g. 

radiation survey meters, 

laboratory resources) to 

effectively regulate radiological 

sources

11.4% 31.4% 34.3% 17.1% 5.7% 0.0% 

f) My state program currently has 

sufficient personnel to 

effectively regulate radiological 

sources

8.6% 31.4% 25.7% 25.7% 8.6% 0.0% 

g) My state program currently has 

qualified personnel to 

effectively regulate radiological 

sources

22.9% 42.9% 17.1% 11.4% 5.7% 0.0% 

h) NRC’s Nuclear Materials 

Events Database (NMED) 

accurately and completely 

reflects incidents involving 

radioactive materials in my state 

14.3% 25.7% 34.3% 17.1% 5.7% 2.9% 
Appendix IV

Results of Survey of Agreement States

Page 84 GAO-03-804 Nuclear Security

26

Group Very great 

extent 

Great 

extent 

Moderate 

extent 

Some 

Extent

Little or no 

extent 

No Basis to 

Judge 

i) DOT’s regulations adequately 

ensure safe and secure transport 

of radioactive materials 

0.0% 40.0% 48.6% 8.6% 2.9% 0.0% 

j) The federal government should 

have a greater role in regulating 

radioactive material in the 

United States 

0.0% 0.0% 2.9% 40.0% 57.1% 0.0% 

k) Additional federal training 

could improve regulation of 

radioactive material in my state 

31.4% 28.6% 20.0% 11.4% 8.6% 0.0% 

l) My state’s public safety/law 

enforcement agencies need 

additional training to respond to 

radiological incidents 

22.9% 31.4% 28.6% 8.6% 5.7% 2.9% 

m) My state program can 

effectively respond to a 

radiological incident with its 

current resources 

5.7% 22.9% 45.7% 20.0% 5.7% 0.0% 

n) In the event of a major 

radiological incident, adequate 

federal resources can be brought 

to bear in a timely manner 

5.7% 34.3% 20.0% 20.0% 5.7% 14.3% 

o) My state program is adequately 

addressing the post-September 

11th heightened security 

concerns involving malicious 

use of radioactive material (i.e. 

possible use as a “dirty bomb”) 

11.4% 42.9% 31.4% 11.4% 2.9% 0.0% 

p) Over the next five years, my 

state program will have 

sufficient budgetary resources to 

effectively regulate radiological 

sources

8.6% 20.0% 25.7% 20.0% 17.1% 8.6% 

q) Over the next five years, my 

state program will have 

sufficient technology (e.g. 

radiation survey meters, 

laboratory resources) to 

effectively regulate radiological 

sources

8.6% 25.7% 31.4% 22.9% 5.7% 5.7% 
Appendix IV

Results of Survey of Agreement States

Page 85 GAO-03-804 Nuclear Security

27

Group Very great 

extent 

Great 

extent 

Moderate 

extent 

Some 

Extent

Little or no 

extent 

No Basis to 

Judge 

r) Over the next five years, my 

state program will have 

sufficient personnel to 

effectively regulate radiological 

sources

8.6% 20.0% 34.3% 20.0% 11.4% 5.7% 

s) Over the next five years, my 

state program will have 

qualified personnel to 

effectively regulate radiological 

sources

8.6% 31.4% 22.9% 25.7% 5.7% 5.7% 

33. Please fill in the following table on the number of reportable incidents (under NRC or 

equivalent agreement state regulations) involving radiological materials that have occurred 

in your state from 1998 through 2002. If no incidents, please enter “0” (zero). 

Number of incidents per year 

Type of incident 

1998 1999 2000 2001 2002

Equipment malfunction 48 (N=24) 32 (N=26) 26 (N=25) 33 (N=25) 47 (N=26) 

Radiation overexposure 18 (N=26) 33 (N=26) 33 (N=28) 32 (N=28) 21 (N=28) 

Lost, stolen, or abandoned 

materials 

100 (N=28) 129 (N=27) 129 (N=27) 167 (N=28) 220 (N=28) 

Medical events 101 (N=24) 107 (N=24) 123 (N=27) 114 (N=27) 91 (N=26) 

Transportation events 30 (N=26) 37 (N=26) 47 (N=28) 38 (N=28) 34 (N=27) 

Leaking sealed sources 9 (N=25) 20 (N=27) 19 (N=27) 14 (N=27) 23 (N=28) 

TOTAL 341 (N=29) 388 (N=29) 408 (N=30) 454 (N=30) 540 (N=30) 

34. For those materials that have been reported lost, stolen, or abandoned from 1998 through 

2002, how many were subsequently recovered? (N=22) 

235
Appendix IV

Results of Survey of Agreement States

Page 86 GAO-03-804 Nuclear Security

28

INTEGRATED MATERIALS PERFORMANCE EVALUATION PROGRAM

35. Do you conduct periodic internal evaluations of your program’s effectiveness? (Mark only 

one response 7) (N=35) 

100% Yes

0.0% No

36. Apart from the Integrated Materials Performance Evaluation Program, does an outside 

party regularly evaluate your program? (Mark only one response 7) (N=35) 

91.4% Yes

8.6% No

37. In your opinion, how adequate or inadequate are the following Integrated Materials 

Performance Evaluation Program performance indicators in evaluating your state’s 

radiological protection programs? (Mark only one response 7 in each row)

Performance indicator Very

adequate 

Generally

adequate 

Generally

inadequate 

Very

inadequate

Not 

applicable 

a) Status of evaluation program 

(N=35)

42.9% 48.6% 2.9% 0.0% 5.7% 

b) Technical quality of inspections 

(N=35)

57.1% 37.1% 5.7% 0.0% 0.0% 

c) Quality of technical staffing and 

training (N=35) 

48.6% 40.0% 8.6% 2.9% 0.0% 

d) Technical quality of licensing 

actions (N=35) 

48.6% 48.6% 2.9% 0.0% 0.0% 

e) Quality of response to incidents 

and allegations (N=35) 

40.0% 51.4% 8.6% 0.0% 0.0% 

f) Sealed source and device 

evaluation program (N=34) 

8.8% 44.1% 5.9% 0.0% 41.2% 

g) Low-level radioactive waste 

disposal program (N=34) 

5.9% 17.6% 8.8% 0.0% 67.6% 

h) Legislation and program elements 

required for compatibility (N=35) 

42.9% 40.0% 14.3% 0.0% 2.9% 
Appendix IV

Results of Survey of Agreement States

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29

38. What are the strengths of the Integrated Materials Performance Evaluation Program? 

39. What are the weaknesses of the Integrated Materials Performance Evaluation Program? 

40. Briefly, what improvements, if any, should be made to the Integrated Materials 

Performance Evaluation Program process? 

41. Overall, is the Integrated Materials Performance Evaluation Program process an adequate 

means to assess the effectiveness of your state’s regulatory program? (Mark only one 

response 7) (N=35) 

100% Yes

0.0% No
Appendix IV

Results of Survey of Agreement States

Page 88 GAO-03-804 Nuclear Security

30

TRANSPORTATION OF RADIOACTIVE MATERIALS

42. Does your program regulate the transportation of radioactive material through your state? 

(N=35)

97.1% Yes

2.9% No

43. Do you require licensees to notify your program of shipments of radioactive material? 

(N=35)

97.1% Yes

2.9% No (skip to question 46) 

44. If yes, which types of cargo do you require that your program be notified of shipments of? 

45. Which of the following types of shipments does your state monitor? (N=35) 

60.0% Spent nuclear fuel 

57.1% DOE waste material (i.e. shipments to the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant) 

51.4% Byproduct material with high radioactivity 

37.1% Other, please specify:

2.9% No shipments monitored 

46. Please describe any coordination efforts undertaken by your state with other state and/or 

federal agencies regarding the transportation of radioactive material. 

47. What are the strengths of the current regulations on transporting radioactive materials? 

48. What are the weaknesses of the current regulations on transporting radioactive materials? 
Appendix IV

Results of Survey of Agreement States

Page 89 GAO-03-804 Nuclear Security

31

49. Under current regulations, to what extent is the transportation of radioactive materials 

vulnerable to terrorist sabotage or other malicious use? 
Appendix IV

Results of Survey of Agreement States

Page 90 GAO-03-804 Nuclear Security

32

IMPACT OF SEPTEMBER 11 TO YOUR STATE’S REGULATORY PROGRAM

50. What impact, if any, has the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks had on your state’s 

program in the following areas? (Mark only one response 7 in each row)

No Impact Minor 

Impact 

Moderate 

Impact 

Significant 

Impact 

No changes 

made since 

Sept 11, 2001

a) State radiological protection 

laws (N=33) 54.5% 15.2% 6.1% 3.0% 21.2% 

b) State radiological protection 

regulations (N=33) 39.4% 39.4% 9.1% 0.0% 12.1% 

c) License review procedures 

(N=34) 20.6% 44.1% 23.5% 5.9% 5.9% 

d) Inspection frequency (N=34) 55.9% 29.4% 8.8% 0.0% 5.9% 

e) Inspection procedures (N=34) 17.6% 38.2% 38.2% 2.9% 2.9% 

f) Number of enforcement actions 

(N=32) 71.9% 12.5% 12.5% 0.0% 3.1% 

g) Severity of enforcement actions 

taken (N=34) 60.6% 21.2% 15.2% 0.0% 3.0% 

h) Incident response procedures 

(N=34) 14.7% 35.3% 32.4% 14.7% 2.9% 

i) Incident investigation 

procedures (N=34) 20.6% 47.1% 20.6% 5.9% 5.9% 

j) Coordination with federal 

agencies (N=34) 2.9% 23.5% 44.1% 23.5% 5.9% 

k) Coordination with other states 

(N=34) 29.4% 35.3% 26.5% 2.9% 5.9% 

l) Coordination with state law 

enforcement/public safety 

agencies (N=34) 

2.9% 32.4% 38.2% 26.5% 0.0% 

m) Financial support from state 

legislature (N=33) 63.6% 9.1% 0.0% 6.1% 21.2% 

n) Monitoring of transportation of 

radioactive material through 

your state (N=33) 

45.5% 18.2% 27.3% 6.1% 3.0% 

o) Federal financial aid to your 

state program (N=33) 63.6% 9.1% 3.0% 3.0% 21.2% 

p) Federal training support to your 

state program (N=33) 60.6% 21.1% 9.1% 0.0% 18.2% 

q) Federal technology support to 

your state program (N=33) 57.6% 21.2% 3.0% 0.0% 18.2% 
Appendix IV

Results of Survey of Agreement States

Page 91 GAO-03-804 Nuclear Security

33

51. Please describe specific efforts that have been initiated or considered by your state since 

September 11, 2001, to better safeguard radiological sources. 

52. In your opinion, should post-September 11 security measures be developed and enforced by 

the NRC under the common defense and security authority given it by the Atomic Energy 

Act or by the agreement states under their health and safety authority? Why? (N=34) 

States = 82.4%; NRC = 5.9%; Both = 11.8% 

53. Does your state have sufficient resources to support these new efforts or are additional 

resources needed? (N=35) 

Yes = 34.3%; No = 65.7% 
Appendix IV

Results of Survey of Agreement States

Page 92 GAO-03-804 Nuclear Security

34

CHANGES NEEDED AT THE FEDERAL LEVEL

54. In your opinion, what are the 3 most significant changes (in rank order) that could be made 

at the federal level to improve the regulation of radioactive material to protect public health 

and safety?

#1. 

#2.

#3.

55. In your opinion, what are the 3 most significant changes (in rank order) that could be made 

at the federal level to improve the security of radioactive material? 

#1. 

#2.

#3.

56. In your opinion, what are the 3 most significant changes (in rank order) that could be made 

at the federal level to improve the transportation of radioactive material? 

#1. 

#2.

#3.
Appendix IV

Results of Survey of Agreement States

Page 93 GAO-03-804 Nuclear Security

35

57. Please use the space below to list any additional information about issues related to 

radioactive sources or concerns raised in this survey. 

Thank you for your assistance in our survey. 
Page 94 GAO-03-804 Nuclear Security

Appendix V

Results of Survey of Non-Agreement States ApendxiV

1

United States General Accounting Office 

Non-Agreement State Survey on Security of 

Radioactive Sources 

Background

The U.S. General Accounting Office (GAO), the 

investigative arm of Congress, is reviewing the 

regulation of radioactive materials in the United 

States. Congress has asked the GAO to answer 

the following questions: 

1. What is the known universe of 

radiological sources in the United States 

and how many have been lost, stolen, or 

abandoned? 

2. How effective are federal and state 

controls over radiological sources? 

3. What efforts are underway since 

September 11, 2001, to improve the 

controls over radiological sources? 

As part of our review, we are conducting 

surveys of state radiation control agencies, 

including agreement and non-agreement states, 

Puerto Rico, Guam, and the District of 

Columbia. The principal aims of this survey are 

to obtain information from each state on the 

number and types of radiological sources being 

regulated by the state and obtain states’ views on 

the effectiveness of the current federal and state 

regulatory framework. 

Your cooperation in completing this survey is 

essential for an accurate and timely report to the 

Congress on the current state of regulatory 

control over radioactive materials. To be 

included in our report, your response within 3 

weeks of receipt is greatly appreciated. 

Directions for Completing this Questionnaire 

Please complete this questionnaire and return it 

via email (ColesR@gao.gov), fax (202-512-

6880), or FedEx within 3 weeks of receipt. 

GAO will take steps to safeguard the privacy of 

your responses. 

If you have any questions about the survey, 

please contact: 

Ryan T. Coles 

Office: 202-512-6888 

E-mail: ColesR@gao.gov

Peter Ruedel 

Office: 202-512-8753 

E-mail: RuedelP@gao.gov

Heather Von Behren 

Office: 202-512-6768 

E-mail: VonBehrenH@gao.gov

If you prefer to return the survey via FedEx, the 

return address is: 

U.S. General Accounting Office 

Attention: Ryan T. Coles 

Natural Resources and Environment 

441 G Street, NW Room 2T23 

Washington, DC 20548 

Due to increased security put in place following 

the anthrax incidents of October 2001, please do 

not use the U.S. Postal Service to return surveys 

to GAO. 

Although this questionnaire may require input 

from various individuals, we ask that one person 

assume responsibility for coordinating its 

completion. Please list that person’s name 

below in case we have questions or need followup. Thank you. 

Name: 

Title:

Telephone #: 

E-mail: 
Appendix V

Results of Survey of Non-Agreement States

Page 95 GAO-03-804 Nuclear Security

2

PROGRAM INFORMATION

1. First, we’d like to get some basic information about your state’s radiation control program.

Please provide the following information. 

Program name: 

State department/division/office (e.g. Department of Health): 

City the main office is located in: 

State: 

Current director of program: 

2. Please list your program’s total budget for the following calendar years: 

2000 (Actual) $3,825,733 (N=10)

2001 (Actual) $4,340,987 (N=10)

2002 (Actual) $4,661,911 (N=10)

2003 (Projected) $5,331,768 (N=11)

3. What are the sources of your program’s funding? (Mark all that apply 7) (N=12) 

50.0% Fees charged to licensees 

83.3% Appropriations from state general fund 

50.0% Other, please specify:

4. How many full-time equivalent (FTE) staff does your program currently employ? (N=12) 

92
Appendix V

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3

5. Of the total number of staff reported in question #3, how many FTEs do you have in the 

following categories? 

Category of Staff Number

Inspectors

License reviewers 

Other Technical Staff 

Other Non-Technical Staff 

6. How many of your technical staff (including inspectors and license reviewers) are 

professionally certified (e.g. certified health physicists, nuclear medicine technologists, etc.)? 

7. How many staff were employed in your state in the following categories on January 1, 

1998? (N=12) 

Category of Staff Number on January 1, 1998

Inspectors

License reviewers 

Other Technical Staff 

Other Non-Technical Staff 

TOTAL* 90

8. Over the next five years, do you estimate your total full-time equivalent positions will 

increase or decrease for technical and non-technical staff? (Mark only one response 7 for 

each type of staff)

Technical Staff (N=12) Non-Technical Staff (N=11)

16.7% Increase 9.1% Increase 

8.3% Decrease 0.0% Decrease 

75.0% Stay about the same 90.9% Stay about the same 
Appendix V

Results of Survey of Non-Agreement States

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4

LICENSING ACTIVITIES OF THE NON-AGREEMENT STATES

9. As of December 31, 2002, how many active licenses are currently issued by your state 

program for the production and/or use of naturally occurring or accelerator produced 

radioactive materials (N=12) 

2751

10. Next, we would like to obtain information on licenses issued by your program for uses of 

naturally occurring radioactive material and accelerator produced radioactive material 

Enter the license use, mark whether it is for naturally occurring OR accelerator produced 

radioactive material, and enter the number of active licenses issued by your state program. 

Mark only one response 7 in the column for most common inspection frequency within each 

license use.

Use #1:

Type of Material Number of 

licenses 

Most Common Inspection 

Frequency Within This Code 

Naturally occurring More than once per year 

Accelerator produced Once a Year 

 Every 2-3 Years 

 Every 4-5 Years 

 Over 5 Years 

 Inspection Not Required 

Use #2: 

Type of Material Number of 

licenses 

Most Common Inspection 

Frequency Within This Code 

Naturally occurring More than once per year 

Accelerator produced Once a Year 

 Every 2-3 Years 

 Every 4-5 Years 

 Over 5 Years 

 Inspection Not Required 
Appendix V

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5

Use #3: 

Type of Material Number of 

licenses 

Most Common Inspection 

Frequency Within This Code 

Naturally occurring More than once per year 

Accelerator produced Once a Year 

 Every 2-3 Years 

 Every 4-5 Years 

 Over 5 Years 

 Inspection Not Required 

Use #4: 

Type of Material Number of 

licenses 

Most Common Inspection 

Frequency Within This Code 

Naturally occurring More than once per year 

Accelerator produced Once a Year 

 Every 2-3 Years 

 Every 4-5 Years 

 Over 5 Years 

 Inspection Not Required 

Use #5: 

Type of Material Number of 

licenses 

Most Common Inspection 

Frequency Within This Code 

Naturally occurring More than once per year 

Accelerator produced Once a Year 

 Every 2-3 Years 

 Every 4-5 Years 

 Over 5 Years 

 Inspection Not Required 
Appendix V

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6

Use #6: 

Type of Material Number of 

licensees 

Most Common Inspection 

Frequency Within This Code 

Naturally occurring More than once per year 

Accelerator produced Once a Year 

 Every 2-3 Years 

 Every 4-5 Years 

 Over 5 Years 

 Inspection Not Required 

Use #7: 

Type of Material Number of 

licensees 

Most Common Inspection 

Frequency Within This Code 

Naturally occurring More than once per year 

Accelerator produced Once a Year 

 Every 2-3 Years 

 Every 4-5 Years 

 Over 5 Years 

 Inspection Not Required 

Use #8: 

Type of Material Number of 

licensees 

Most Common Inspection 

Frequency Within This Code 

Naturally occurring More than once per year 

Accelerator produced Once a Year 

 Every 2-3 Years 

 Every 4-5 Years 

 Over 5 Years 

 Inspection Not Required 
Appendix V

Results of Survey of Non-Agreement States

Page 100 GAO-03-804 Nuclear Security

7

Use #9: 

Type of Material Number of 

licensees 

Most Common Inspection 

Frequency Within This Code 

Naturally occurring More than once per year 

Accelerator produced Once a Year 

 Every 2-3 Years 

 Every 4-5 Years 

 Over 5 Years 

 Inspection Not Required 

Use #10: 

Type of Material Number of 

licensees 

Most Common Inspection 

Frequency Within This Code 

Naturally occurring More than once per year 

Accelerator produced Once a Year 

 Every 2-3 Years 

 Every 4-5 Years 

 Over 5 Years 

 Inspection Not Required 

Use #11: 

Type of Material Number of 

licensees 

Most Common Inspection 

Frequency Within This Code 

Naturally occurring More than once per year 

Accelerator produced Once a Year 

 Every 2-3 Years 

 Every 4-5 Years 

 Over 5 Years 

 Inspection Not Required 

Please copy and paste above table for additional uses. 
Appendix V

Results of Survey of Non-Agreement States

Page 101 GAO-03-804 Nuclear Security

8

11. In your opinion, which 3 uses of radioactive materials—byproduct, naturally occurring, or 

accelerator produced—require the strictest and least strict regulation to protect public

health and safety?

 Strictest regulation Least strict regulation

1. 1.

2. 2.

3. 3.

12. In your opinion, which 3 uses of radioactive materials—byproduct, naturally occurring, or 

accelerator produced—require the strictest and least strict regulation to ensure security?

(i.e. to prevent the materials’ use by terrorists in a radiological weapon) 

 Strictest regulation Least strict regulation

1. 1.

2. 2.

3. 3.
Appendix V

Results of Survey of Non-Agreement States

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9

LICENSE TRACKING OVERSIGHT

13. Briefly describe how your program maintains data on materials licenses and inspections. 

14. Please estimate the percentage of inspections of your licensees that are currently overdue. 

15. Are your databases (i.e. licensing records, computer files containing licensee information) 

periodically validated to ensure that licensees are still active (i.e. still conducting business)? 

Mark only one response 7) (N=11) 

81.8% Yes

18.2% No (skip to question 18)

16. How often do you validate your databases? Mark only one response 7) (N=9) 

11.0% More than once per year 

33.3% Once a year 

44.4% Every 2-3 years 

11.1% Every 4-5 years 

0.0% Over 5 years 

17. What steps are taken to validate information in your databases? 

18. Does your state have a program to identify and recover abandoned sources? Mark only one 

response 7) (N=12) 

33.3% Yes

66.7% No (skip to question 20)
Appendix V

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10

19. Briefly describe your state’s program to identify and recover abandoned sources. 
Appendix V

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11

ENFORCEMENT ACTIONS

20. What enforcement actions are available to your state’s program to ensure laws and 

regulations are followed? (Mark all that apply 7) (N=12) 

16.7% No enforcement actions available (skip to question 24)

83.3% Notices of violation/citations 

58.3% Fines/civil penalties 

58.3% License suspension 

66.7% License termination 

58.3% Facility closure 

25.0% Imprisonment/criminal penalties 

0.0% Other, please specify:

21. Please complete the following table on your state program’s enforcement activities over the 

past five years. If none, please enter “0” (zero): 

Number of enforcement actions per year 

Enforcement action 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 

Notices of violation 

only (without other 

action)

302 (N=9) 340 (N=9) 265 (N=9) 303 (N=9) 519 (N=10) 

Fines/civil penalties 5 (N=6) 4 (N=6) 7 (N=6) 10 (N=6) 7 (N=6) 

License suspension 0 (N=7) 0 (N=7) 0 (N=7) 1 (N=7) 0 (N=7) 

License termination 0 (N=6) 0 (N=6) 0 (N=6) 1 (N=6) 2 (N=7) 

Facility closure 0 (N=6) 0 (N=6) 0 (N=6) 0 (N=6) 0 (N=6) 

Imprisonment/criminal 

penalties

0 (N=5) 0 (N=5) 0 (N=5) 0 (N=5) 0 (N=5) 

Other: 0 (N=1) 0 (N=1) 0 (N=1) 1 (N=1) 0 (N=1) 
Appendix V

Results of Survey of Non-Agreement States

Page 105 GAO-03-804 Nuclear Security

12

22. How are fines/civil penalties collected by your program utilized? (N=12) 

16.7% Available for use by the state radiation control program 

41.7% Deposited into state general fund 

16.7% Other, please specify:

33.3% Not applicable 

23. Please briefly describe any enforcement cases since January 1, 1998, that have been difficult 

to resolve, have generated above average public or press interest, have challenged your 

regulatory authority, or have or will result in high clean up costs financed by state or 

federal funds. 
Appendix V

Results of Survey of Non-Agreement States

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13

EFFECTIVENESS OF CONTROLS OVER RADIOACTIVE MATERIALS

24. To what extent, if at all, do you agree that communications and coordination needs to be 

improved between your state program and the following group(s)? (Mark only one response 

7 in each row) (N=12) 

Group Very great 

extent

Great 

extent

Moderate 

extent

Some 

Extent

Little or no 

extent

No Basis to 

Judge

a) the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory 

Commission (NRC) 

0.0% 8.3% 16.7% 8.3% 66.7% 0.0% 

b) the U.S. Department of Energy 

(DOE)

8.3% 16.7% 41.7% 25.0% 8.3% 0.0% 

c) the Environmental Protection 

Agency (EPA) 

8.3% 16.7% 8.3% 41.7% 25.0% 0.0% 

d) the Food and Drug 

Administration (FDA) 

0.0% 16.7% 0.0% 41.7% 41.7% 0.0% 

e) the U.S. Department of Justice 

(DOJ)

8.3% 25.0% 0.0% 25.0% 8.3% 33.3% 

f) the U.S. Department of 

Transportation (DOT) 

8.3% 16.7% 8.3% 41.7% 0.0% 25.0% 

g) agreement states 0.0% 8.3% 8.3% 33.3% 25.0% 25.0% 

h) other non-agreement states 0.0% 8.3% 16.7% 33.3% 16.7% 25.0% 

i) Organization of Agreement 

States (OAS) 

0.0% 8.3% 0.0% 16.7% 50.0% 25.0% 

j) Conference of Radiation 

Control Program Directors 

(CRCPD)

0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 25.0% 75.0% 0.0% 
Appendix V

Results of Survey of Non-Agreement States

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14

25. To what extent, if at all, do you agree with the following statement? (Mark only one 

response 7 in each row) (N=12) 

Group Very great 

extent 

Great 

extent 

Moderate 

extent 

Some 

Extent

Little or no 

extent 

No Basis to 

Judge 

a) Communications and 

coordination needs to be 

improved between federal 

agencies with regulatory 

authority for radioactive 

materials 

8.3% 33.3% 0.0% 50.0% 0.0% 8.3% 

b) The current division of 

regulatory authority for 

radioactive materials between 

NRC, DOE, EPA, DOT and 

FDA is the most effective 

means of federal regulation 

0.0% 8.3% 8.3% 25.0% 50.0% 8.3% 

c) Consistent radiation protection 

standards need to be developed 

that would apply across all 

federal and state regulatory 

programs. 

50.0% 8.3% 8.3% 83.3% 0.0% 0.0% 

d) My state program currently has 

sufficient budgetary resources to 

effectively regulate radiological 

sources

0.0% 8.3% 8.3% 0.0% 33.3% 0.0% 

e) My state program currently has 

sufficient technology (e.g. 

radiation survey meters, 

laboratory resources) to 

effectively regulate radiological 

sources

8.3% 16.7% 41.7% 0.0% 33.3% 0.0% 

f) My state program currently has 

sufficient personnel to 

effectively regulate radiological 

sources

0.0% 16.7% 0.0% 8.3% 75.0% 0.0% 

g) My state program currently has 

qualified personnel to 

effectively regulate radiological 

sources

8.3% 33.3% 16.7% 33.3% 8.3% 0.0% 

h) NRC’s Nuclear Materials 

Events Database (NMED) 

accurately and completely 

reflects incidents involving 

radioactive materials in my state 

8.3% 8.3% 16.7% 25.0% 0.0% 41.7% 
Appendix V

Results of Survey of Non-Agreement States

Page 108 GAO-03-804 Nuclear Security

15

Group Very great 

extent 

Great 

extent 

Moderate 

extent 

Some 

Extent

Little or no 

extent 

No Basis to 

Judge 

i) DOT’s regulations adequately 

ensure safe and secure transport 

of radioactive materials 

16.7% 33.3% 16.7% 16.7% 8.3% 8.3% 

j) The federal government should 

have a greater role in regulating 

radioactive material in the 

United States 

16.7% 0.0% 25.0% 16.7% 33.3% 8.3% 

k) Additional federal training 

could improve regulation of 

radioactive material in my state 

33.3% 25.0% 16.7% 25.0% 0.0% 0.0% 

l) My state’s public safety/law 

enforcement agencies need 

additional training to respond to 

radiological incidents 

50.0% 8.3% 33.3% 8.3% 0.0% 0.0% 

m) My state program can 

effectively respond to a 

radiological incident with its 

current resources 

0.0% 16.7% 41.7% 33.3% 8.3% 0.0% 

n) In the event of a major 

radiological incident, adequate 

federal resources can be brought 

to bear in a timely manner 

8.3% 0.0% 58.3% 8.3% 16.7% 8.3% 

o) My state program is adequately 

addressing the post-September 

11th heightened security 

concerns involving malicious 

use of radioactive material (i.e. 

possible use as a “dirty bomb”) 

0.0% 0.0% 25.0% 41.7% 33.3% 0.0% 

p) Over the next five years, my 

state program will have 

sufficient budgetary resources to 

effectively regulate radiological 

sources

0.0% 8.3% 16.7% 0.0% 66.7% 8.3% 

q) Over the next five years, my 

state program will have 

sufficient technology (e.g. 

radiation survey meters, 

laboratory resources) to 

effectively regulate radiological 

sources

0.0% 25.0% 25.0% 16.7% 25.0% 8.3% 
Appendix V

Results of Survey of Non-Agreement States

Page 109 GAO-03-804 Nuclear Security

16

Group Very great 

extent 

Great 

extent 

Moderate 

extent 

Some 

Extent

Little or no 

extent 

No Basis to 

Judge 

r) Over the next five years, my 

state program will have 

sufficient personnel to 

effectively regulate radiological 

sources

0.0% 8.3% 0.0% 8.3% 75.0% 8.3% 

s) Over the next five years, my 

state program will have 

qualified personnel to 

effectively regulate radiological 

sources

0.0% 8.3% 33.3% 25.0% 25.0% 8.3% 

26. Please fill in the following table on the number of reportable incidents (under your state 

regulations, if any) involving naturally occurring or accelerator produced radiological 

materials that have occurred in your state from 1998 through 2002. If no incidents, please 

enter “0” (zero). 

Number of incidents per year 

Type of incident 

1998 1999 2000 2001 2002

Equipment malfunction 0 (N=7) 0(N=7) 0(N=7) 0(N=7) 0(N=7) 

Radiation overexposure 0 (N=7) 0(N=7) 2 (N=8) 2(N=7) 1(N=7) 

Lost, stolen, or abandoned 

materials 

26 (N=9) 32(N=9) 13 (N=10) 18 (N=10) 19 (N=10)

Medical events 6 (N=7) 4 (N=7) 0 (N=8) 2 (N=8) 5 (N=8)

Transportation events 16 (N=8) 23 (N=8) 9 (N=8) 10 (N=9) 5 (N=8)

Leaking sealed sources 1 (N=7) 0 (N=7) 0 (N=7) 0 (N=7) 0 (N=7)

TOTAL 115 (N=11) 140 (N=11) 89 (N=11) 94 (N=11) 109 (N=12)

27. For those materials that have been reported lost, stolen, or abandoned from 1998 through 

2002, how many were subsequently recovered? (N=12) 

10
Appendix V

Results of Survey of Non-Agreement States

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17

NON-AGREEMENT STATE PERFORMANCE EVALUATION 

28. Do you conduct periodic internal evaluations of your program’s effectiveness? (Mark only 

one response 7) (N=12) 

66.7% Yes

33.3% No

29. Does an outside party (i.e. consultants or auditors) regularly evaluate your program? 

(Mark only one response 7) (N=12) 

8.3% Yes

91.7% No
Appendix V

Results of Survey of Non-Agreement States

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18

TRANSPORTATION OF RADIOACTIVE MATERIALS

30. Does your program regulate the transportation of radioactive material through your state? 

(N=12)

25.0% Yes

75.0% No

31. Do you require licensees to notify your program of shipments of radioactive material? 

(N=12)

16.7% Yes

83.3% No (skip to question 34) 

32. If yes, which types of cargo do you require that your program be notified of shipments of? 

33. Which of the following types of shipments does your state monitor? 

100% Spent nuclear fuel 

85.7% DOE waste material (i.e. shipments to the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant) 

100% Byproduct material with high radioactivity 

62.5% Other, please specify:

34. Please describe any coordination efforts undertaken by your state with other state and/or 

federal agencies regarding the transportation of radioactive material. 

35. What are the strengths of the current regulations on transporting radioactive materials? 

36. What are the weaknesses of the current regulations on transporting radioactive materials? 

37. Under current regulations, to what extent is the transportation of radioactive materials 

vulnerable to terrorist sabotage or other malicious use? 
Appendix V

Results of Survey of Non-Agreement States

Page 112 GAO-03-804 Nuclear Security

19

IMPACT OF SEPTEMBER 11 TO YOUR STATE’S REGULATORY PROGRAM

38. What impact, if any, has the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks had on your state’s 

program in the following areas? (Mark only one response 7 in each row) (N=12) 

No Impact Minor 

Impact 

Moderate 

Impact 

Significant 

Impact 

No changes 

made since 

Sept 11, 2001

a) State radiological protection 

laws 50.0% 8.3% 0.0% 0.0% 41.7% 

b) State radiological protection 

regulations 58.3% 8.3% 0.0% 0.0% 33.3% 

c) License review procedures 41.7% 8.3% 16.7% 0.0% 33.3% 

d) Inspection frequency 54.6% 9.1% 0.0% 9.1% 27.3% 

e) Inspection procedures 41.7% 8.3% 8.3% 0.0% 41.7% 

f) Number of enforcement actions 66.7% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 33.3% 

g) Severity of enforcement actions 

taken 66.7% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 33.3% 

h) Incident response procedures 16.7% 16.7% 8.3% 41.7% 16.7% 

i) Incident investigation 

procedures 16.7% 8.3% 33.3% 16.7% 25.0% 

j) Coordination with federal 

agencies 8.3% 41.7% 8.3% 25.0% 16.7% 

k) Coordination with other states 25.0% 25.0% 16.7% 8.3% 25.0% 

l) Coordination with state law 

enforcement/public safety 

agencies

16.7% 33.3% 8.3% 33.3% 8.3% 

m) Financial support from your 

state legislature 58.3% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 41.7% 

n) Monitoring of transportation of 

radioactive material through 

your state 

33.3% 25.0% 8.3% 0.0% 33.3% 

o) Federal financial aid to your 

state program 41.7% 8.3% 16.7% 0.0% 33.3% 

p) Federal training support to your 

state program 50.0% 16.7% 16.7% 0.0% 16.7% 

q) Federal technology support to 

your state program 58.3% 8.3% 8.3% 0.0% 25.0% 
Appendix V

Results of Survey of Non-Agreement States

Page 113 GAO-03-804 Nuclear Security

20

39. Please describe specific efforts that have been initiated or considered by your state since 

September 11, 2001, to better safeguard radiological sources. 

40. Does your state have sufficient resources to support these new efforts or are additional 

resources needed? (N=12) 

91.6% of states responding to the survey indicated they do not have sufficient resources to 

support new efforts. 

8.3% of states responding to the survey indicated they have sufficient resources to support new 

efforts.
Appendix V

Results of Survey of Non-Agreement States

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21

CHANGES NEEDED AT THE FEDERAL LEVEL

41. In your opinion, what are the 3 most significant changes (in rank order) that could be made 

at the federal level to improve the regulation of radioactive material to protect public health 

and safety?

#1. 

#2.

#3.

42. In your opinion, what are the 3 most significant changes (in rank order) that could be made 

at the federal level to improve the security of radioactive material? 

#1. 

#2.

#3.

43. In your opinion, what are the 3 most significant changes (in rank order) that could be made 

at the federal level to improve the transportation of radioactive material? 

#1. 

#2.

#3.
Appendix V

Results of Survey of Non-Agreement States

Page 115 GAO-03-804 Nuclear Security

22

44. Please use the space below to list any additional information about issues related to 

radioactive sources or concerns raised in this survey. 

Thank you for your assistance in our survey. 
Page 116 GAO-03-804 Nuclear Security

Appendix VI

Comments from the Nuclear Regulatory 

Commission ApendxiVI
Appendix VI

Comments from the Nuclear Regulatory 

Commission

Page 117 GAO-03-804 Nuclear Security
Appendix VI

Comments from the Nuclear Regulatory 

Commission

Page 118 GAO-03-804 Nuclear Security
Page 119 GAO-03-804 Nuclear Security

Appendix VII

GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments ApendxiVI

GAO Contact Gene Aloise (202) 512-6870

Acknowledgments In addition to the individual named above, Ryan T. Coles, Robert G. Crystal, 

Doreen S. Feldman, Judy K. Pagano, Terry L. Richardson, Peter E. Ruedel, 

Rebecca Shea, and Heather W. Von Behren also made key contributions to 

this report.

(360274)
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