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AIR WAR COLLEGE

AIR UNIVERSITY

The Air Expeditionary Force

A Strategy for an Uncertain Future?

MICHAEL J. NOWAK

Lieutenant Colonel, USAF

Air War College

Maxwell Paper No. 19

MAXWELL AIR FORCE BASE, ALABAMA

August 1999
Disclaimer

Opinions, conclusions, and recommendations expressed or implied within are s

those of the author and do not necessarily represent the views of Air University

United States Air Force, the Department of Defense, or any other US govern

agency. Cleared for public release: distribution unlimited.

ii
Foreword

Contrary to initial expectations, the end of the cold w

has not resulted in a spontaneous outbreak of inter

tional peace and stability. While the nuclear threat h

diminished, previously suppressed ethnic and nationali

rivalries have boiled over and become additive to exist

trouble spots in Korea and Southwest Asia. In spite 

these challenges, defense spending and military forw

presence have declined as the lack of a peer competitor h

deprived our national security strategy of a defina

threat.

The Air Expeditionary Force (AEF) attempts to deal w

the uncertainty of the current volatile world by provid

regional commanders in chief with effects-based packa

of airpower that can quickly respond to US national se

rity requirements. This employment strategy attempts 

balance international uncertainty with a decreased forw

presence and reduced force structure. Recently the 

Force has also touted the AEF as a tool to manage 

operational tempo and deployment rate problem that 

causing retention difficulties.

In his paper Colonel Nowak, USAF, argues that while 

AEF is a step in the right direction, the focus appears to 

too narrow. Current Air Force AEF planning is orien

toward a conventional force-on-force-style aggression 

those aggressions we have seen in Iraq and the form

republics of Yugoslavia. However, the most probable use 

an AEF will be in a noncombat role, supporting huma

tarian or peacekeeping operations. In these “nontra

tional” types of AEFs, personnel and leadership skills, 

well as the force composition, will be markedly differ

from a combat-style AEF. The study begins by review

the international and domestic context that has caused 

Air Force to focus on expeditionary operations. It continu

by discussing the historical roots of the AEF and its c

rent employment philosophy. The study concludes by id

tifying courses of action that should keep the AEF viable 

an uncertain international environment.

Regardless of one’s views on the AEF, this paper p

sents points for discussion as the Air Force comes to gr

iii
with both the changing nature of future conflict and 

Air Force’s ability to provide the National Comma

Authorities with a credible aerospace force. We encour

open debate on this critical topic.

LANCE L. SMITH

Major General, US

Commandant

Air War College

iv
About the Author

Lt Col Michael J. Nowak graduated from the Air Fo

Academy in 1979 and served in a variety of wing-level po

tions as a T-37 instructor pilot (IP) in Air Training Co

mand and an RF-4 IP in Tactical Air Command (TAC) a

Pacific Air Force (PACAF). Selected for a Daedalian Fello

ship in 1991, Colonel Nowak completed his master’s 

gree in engineering at the University of Texas in Aus

during the summer of 1992. Following a tour as a requi

ments staff officer at the Pentagon, he became the ch

Deliberate Plans, at the United States Central Comma

Air Forces headquarters. Here Colonel Nowak first beca

involved with the AEF concept. Prior to attending Air W

College at Maxwell Air Force Base (AFB), Alabama, he w

the 4404th Operations Support Squadron commander 

Prince Sultan Air Base, Saudi Arabia. After graduat

from Air War College in 1999, Colonel Nowak was assign

as deputy chief of staff, Plans Operations, 5th Allied Ta

cal Air Forces, Vicenza, Italy.

v
The Air Expeditionary Force

Contrary to predictions, the end of the cold war has 

produced a stable international order or a dramatic red

tion in the requirement for military forces. While the sp

ter of global nuclear war has greatly diminished, a hos

regional, ethnic, and nationalistic conflicts has replaced 

In former republics and satellite nations of the no 

defunct Soviet Union, the United States military play

key role in ensuring regional stability. Renewed ethnic v

lence between the republics of Serbia, Croatia, and Bos

in the former nation of Yugoslavia has resulted in a Uni

Nations (UN)-mandated peacekeeping force—with 

United States (US) military playing a principal role. Un

Project Sapphire, US military forces are directly involved 

removing fissile material from former Soviet republics 

preclude them from falling into the wrong hands. 1

 At 

same time, national leaders draw upon military expert

and equipment to provide relief for natural disasters a

humanitarian undertakings.

These impromptu deployments are additives to regio

tensions remaining from past conflicts in Korea and Sou

west Asia (SWA). Even though Korea has lost the econom

backing of its former patron and has been gripped by 

deadly famine, US forces maintain a watch on a No

Korean society about to implode. Almost eight years a

the end of the Gulf War, the United States continues to 

force UN sanctions against Iraq and Saddam Hussein. 

two examples of trouble spots, North Korea has produce

nuclear weapon, and Iraq is attempting to do the sam

Both nations can deliver chemical and biological weapon

While these contingencies continue, the United Sta

finds itself trying to grapple with the focus of a natio

security policy and the role of the military in this poli

Gone is the cold war clarity of George Kennan’s conta

ment policy and such geopolitical concepts as Presid

Richard M. Nixon’s Twin Pillars strategy. Without a p

competitor to threaten the security of the United Sta

directly, many question just how large a military we n

or can afford. As a consequence, defense spending a

percentage of the gross domestic product is at its low

point since the end of World War II. Despite the reductio

1
military forces are increasingly called upon to support 

erations short of outright war.

The Air Expeditionary Force (AEF) represents the 

Force’s strategy to adjust to the ambiguous post-cold-w

environment, declining defense budget, and reduced 

ward presence. The AEF capitalizes on the superior mo

ity, range, and lethality of airpower. It provides a regio

commander in chief (CINC) with tailored force packa

that can rapidly deploy to conduct operations ranging fr

presence to the employment of airpower against a hos

force. Toward this goal, AEF literature is heavily weigh

to responding to conventional state-to-state aggressi

Within this concept, the emphasis has been on the depl

ment of airpower to conduct a halt phase-style operat

against an aggressor nation.

However, the demise of the Soviet Union and the rec

performance of the United States in the Gulf War downp

the potential of this type of action. The United States d

not currently face a peer competitor and, according to e

mates, will most likely not face one until after 2010. 3

 F

ther, the overwhelming performance of US forces dur

Desert Storm will cause most adversaries to avoid ch

lenging the United States in a conventional land war. A

result, airpower may be used in those areas short of w

also known as military operations other than w

(MOOTW).

International Environment

The end of the cold war complicated world events to 

unexpected degree. Despite the terror of global nucl

war, the cold war era of 1946 to 1991 was actually one 

relative calm. During this period nations found themsel

divided into three basic camps: those countries align

with the free world ideals of the United States; th

aligned with the Soviet Union and its concept of wo

socialism; and those few nonaligned countries that 

tempted to walk the tightrope between the two superpo

ers. Within this framework of ideologies, nations conduc

international trade while the United States and Soviet U
ion jockeyed for hegemony over their respective spheres 

influence.

While relations between the free world and socia

camps oscillated at times between imminent hostility (i

the Cuban missile crisis of 1962) to fairly cordial relatio

(i.e., the period of détente during the Nixon administ

tion), the world as a whole was predominantly stable. P

ods of conflict normally involved only one superpower i

direct role while competing superpowers supported the 

posing side. Examples of this arrangement include (1) 

involvement in Korea and Vietnam while the Soviets a

Chinese provided materiel and manpower support to 

opposing side and (2) the Soviet Union’s conflict in 

ghanistan where the United States provided materiel s

port to Afghan rebels. Only during the missile crisis, wh

the United States felt its national survival threatened, did 

superpowers come close to direct confrontation and war.

The cold war also provided a focus to national secu

policy. The Twin Pillars strategy, the North Atlantic Tre

Organization (NATO), and Kennan’s containment po

helped to counter attempts by the former Soviet Union 

expand its sphere of influence. The American public ha

defined enemy and perceived a threat to its survival a

nation. Military spending, although hotly debated a

never at serious risk of being reduced, was more than a

quate to pursue robust research and development and 

quisition programs. National instruments of military, e

nomic, political, and psychological power concentrated 

preventing the expansion of communist ideology outs

the communist-controlled sphere. To implement this c

tainment strategy, the US military relied on both a forw

defense approach and a strong military force to dete

Soviet attack and, if necessary, to defeat them. At the p

nacle of US presence, the Air Force alone had nearly 

fighter wing equivalents and more than five hund

bombers.4

 Faced with a potential ground war in Euro

and the Pacific, the United States retained basing rights 

options at numerous overseas facilities. For example, 

1989 some 341,000 military personnel from all servi

were stationed solely in Europe.5
Two related events helped to change the cold war pa

digm of forward deployment and a large standing milit

force. The first and most significant was the disintegrat

of the Soviet empire. As the Soviet economic system c

lapsed under the weight of a bloated and inefficient b

reaucracy, it was replaced with a nascent market econom

President Mikhail Gorbachev’s more moderate tone— co

bined with the inability of the Soviet economy to field 

military force comparable to one the United States p

duced—yielded a significant reduction in tensions.

The second event that impacted the post-cold-war or

was Operation Desert Storm, which represented the f

time since the Korean War that the UN had used milit

force to contend with aggression. With the United States 

the lead nation of a multinational coalition, the world 

ceived a firsthand account of the capability and lethality 

US military power.

The end result of these two events is that the Uni

States stands as the sole remaining superpower in 

world both economically and militarily. As the Comm

wealth of Independent States (CIS) has limited econom

ability to intercede in regional upheavals and since 

United States retains the only credible force to han

large-scale, military-style operations, the responsibility 

assist in these endeavors will increasingly fall to the Uni

States. In addition, our Desert Storm performance h

most likely, placed a damper on any adversary’s dreams 

successfully challenging the United States on a conv

tional battlefield.

The implications of this superiority and lack of a p

competitor are that the nation has lost a common focus 

its defense strategy. Without this focus, the public qu

tions the size and cost of the current military force. Se

ing a “peace dividend,” and with the support of the Am

can public, Congress has initiated the largest dismantl

of American military capability since the end of World W

II. From a mid-1980s budget high, the Air Force bud

declined 40 percent in a 10-year period. 6

 The number 

active duty personnel has shrunk from 600,000 to a p

jected 370,000 by 2003. Meanwhile, the number of figh

wings has decreased to 13 active wings and seven 
National Guard/Reserve wings, while bomber assets n

have a total of 187 airframes. 7

 Similarly, military forw

presence has decreased in response to arguments by 

mestic critics that defense dollars should be spent 

home. As an example, in 1995 European-assigned for

had declined to 109,000 from the previously mention

1989 level of 341,000.8

 Overall, overseas forward bas

has been reduced by two-thirds—from 39 major milit

installations to 13.9

Ironically, despite these reductions, operations involv

United States forces have actually increased in num

since the end of the cold war. Eight years after the s

cessful allied effort to eject the Iraqis from Kuwait, Am

can forces find themselves still in Kuwait, Saudi Arab

and Turkey. The tide of nationalism and ethnic violence 

the former Yugoslavian republics has resulted in the U

imposition of peacekeeping forces. Although multinatio

in composition, the United States continues to provid

significant presence of air and ground assets in suppor

this operation. As opposed to previous cold war operatio

such as Grenada and Panama, these contingencies app

to have no near-term end.

Existing cold war tensions continue to demand enga

ment. North Korea continues to pour approximately 

percent of its gross domestic product into the militar

The continued economic problems of former Soviet rep

lics bring with them two concerns. One concern is t

financially strapped and unscrupulous military person

may attempt to sell one or more of these weapons to p

ties hostile to the United States or its allies. The seco

concern is one of proliferation of knowledge. Unemploy

scientists of the Soviet Union’s nuclear, biological, a

chemical (NBC) weapons design and production indus

are looking for work, and nations eager to develop th

own nuclear, biological, or ballistic missile capability 

willing to pay. In either case, the consequences o

weapon of mass destruction in the hands of a terrorist 

of considerable concern.

At the same time, the United States must remain p

pared to engage in regions of the world that are not nec

sarily a threat to the well-being of American citizens b
are still in our national interest. Many of these enga

ments fall under the heading of MOOTW.

According to Joint Publication (JP) 3-07, Military Ope

tions Other Than War, “MOOTW encompasses the use 

military capabilities across the range of military operatio

short of war. These operations can be applied to comp

ment any combination of the other instruments of natio

power.”11 MOOTW include both traditional military act

ties just short of such sustained, large-scale combat ope

tions as sanctions enforcement, exclusion zone enfor

ment, and strikes and raids. At the other end of 

spectrum, they include those types of operations traditi

ally viewed as humanitarian or show-the-flag-type act

ties. In the middle are some new types of activities to 

clude peacemaking, peacekeeping, and counterdrug a

antiterrorist operations, as well as noncombatant eva

ations and freedom of navigation demonstrations. 12

Since the end of Desert Storm, the predominant num

of military operations the United States has undertak

have been of an MOOTW variety. In Southwest Asia, 

example, US forces help to enforce UN sanctions agai

Iraq, while in Bosnia these forces strive to preserve 

fragile peace agreed to by warring factions from form

Yugoslavian republics. These activities—along with nat

building in Haiti, relief operations in Central Ameri

counterdrug operations in the Caribbean, and domes

support for hurricane and forest fire victims—continue 

displace the traditional view of the military as an organi

tion that “fights our nation’s wars.”

Internationally, humanitarian and MOOTW missions 

the beginning of a shift in security challenges. The 19

Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) attempts to provid

road map of where the defense establishment needs to 

in its strategy and modernization efforts to meet th

challenges. The QDR recognizes that while the cold w

has ended and the United States has no peer competit

the United States will face a variety of regional-dang

security challenges between 1999 and 2015. Despite th

challenges, the American public continues to remain a

thetic to the role of the military. The decline in defen

spending and the desire to reduce a fixed-forward presen
reflect an attitude that we “won” the cold war and t

there are no direct threats to our security any longer.

Within these challenges the AEF was born. The A

attempts to balance reductions in force structure and f

ward presence with the ambiguity of the post-cold-w

world by capitalizing on the attributes of airpower 

quickly and precisely provide airpower anywhere in 

world. However, the AEF concept is strongly rooted in c

war history.

Roots of the Air Expeditionary Force

I have heard the lament that, “The Air Force is not what it

used to be during the Cold War,” and I must tell you that it is

absolutely true; this “ain’t” our fathers’ Air Force. As the world

around us changes, so must all the services, including the Air

Force.

—Gen Michael E. Ryan, US Air Force Chief of Staff

Despite the chief of staff’s statement, the AEF is no

radically new concept and is one that many of our fath

would be familiar with. At its core, the AEF is a reincar

tion of the Composite Air Strike Force (CASF). TAC form

the CASF in response to the Air Force’s slow response 

the outbreak of the Korean War. At the end of the Kore

War, TAC began testing a quick-response force that co

deploy to bases with minimal facilities. The CASF wa

small tactical force composed of a command element a

fighter, reconnaissance, troop carrier (airlift), and comm

nications support units.13 To ensure a readily available 

refueling capability, TAC acquired KB-50J tanker aircraf

Like the current AEF concept, the CASF emphasi

rapid deployment of decisive airpower anywhere in 

world in minimal time. The CASF was as self-sufficient 

possible. Upon arrival in-theater, units were to sustain 

erations for 30 days on minimum logistics support w

the addition of required food, fuel, and munitions. T

ing was also stringent. CASF units destined for the M

dle East were tasked to arrive in place within 16 hours 

notification with the total force in-place and read y 

operations within 48 hours. CASF units deploying 

the Far East had to get lead elements in-place and be
combat operations within 36 hours and 72 hours, resp

tively.14

In light of the lack of air refueling capability and limi

range and speed of 1950s-era transport aircraft, th

numbers are remarkable.

Similarly, emphasis for personnel assigned to the CA

was light and rapid. TAC created Nineteenth Air For

nicknamed “The Suitcase Air Force,” as a headquart

command to provide the command element for CASF 

erations. With only 85 military and six civilian person

assigned, this small staff prepared contingency plans a

provided the command structure for a CASF deploym

anywhere in the world.

The CASF had its first serious test during the Leban

crisis of 1958. At the request of the Lebanese governme

President Dwight D. Eisenhower deployed Marines to B

rut to help stabilize the Lebanese regime in the face o

wave of discontent that had already toppled governme

in Iraq and Syria. To support the Marine deployment, 

national command authorities tasked the CASF to dep

to Adana, Turkey, “an underutilized” Turkish air force g

nery base. The deployment consisted of RF-101, F-100, K

50J, and RB-66 aircraft and 60 C-130s with equipm

and personnel. Thirteen hours after the alert, F-100s w

in-place at Adana, located approximately 15 minutes 

flying time from Beirut. Within two days the base at Ada

had a full-up operations center manned by Nineteenth 

Force personnel.15

Simultaneous with this crisis, Chinese Communists 

nounced their intentions to retake the Nationalist Chin

(Taiwan) islands of Quemoy and Matsu. In response to t

contingency, TAC stood up another CASF command e

ment under Ninth Air Force. Ordered to deploy on 29 A

gust 1958, F-100 aircraft deployed to Clark Air Base in 

Philippines en route to Taiwan. They arrived at Clark 

Base on 2 September after being delayed at Guam by 

typhoon. Follow-on aircraft arrived soon after. By 5 S

tember, seven days after the initial order, aircraft were a

Nationalist Chinese base under the control of a joint ope

tions center.16
Capitalizing on the responsiveness of the CASF, the D

partment of Defense activated US Strike Command (ST

COM) in 1961 as a unified command composed of e

Army Strategic Command and Air Force TAC units. Un

the command of Gen Paul D. Adams, Strike Command w

designed to “send a small package of forces immediately 

the area, subject, of course, to the political acceptability 

the existing Government of such a move.” 17 This force w

to be stationed in the continental United States (CONU

and trained in joint operations. It was to have a twof

mission of either augmenting in-place American forces 

operating as a task force in isolated areas. 18 In a 19

interview, General Adams colorfully described STRICOM a

flexible response option capable of conducting operati

throughout the spectrum of warfare, “from a silent attack 

[the] night with bayonets or knives, through the entire ra

of conventional warfare to the full play of nuclear weapons.” 

The beginning of the Vietnam conflict spelled the end 

the CASF. Most air assets not already involved in the n

clear deterrent mission were siphoned off to prosecute 

air war. As a result, the United States began to lose 

ability to intervene in other crisis areas. Ironically, the 

Force deactivated Nineteenth Air Force and CASF in J

1973, three months before the Yom Kippur War and Nic

Grass, the United States’s resupply mission to Israel. 20

The Modern Combat Allied

Expeditionary Force

Like the CASF, the AEF had its inception as a result 

conflict. The genesis of the modern AEF was a result 

continuing Southwest Asian operations in support of O

eration Southern Watch, and reductions in defense spe

ing and force structure placed strains on the defense 

tablishment. As Brig Gen William R. Looney III, form

commander of the 1st Fighter Wing, Langley AFB, Virgin

and AEF II, stated, “The United States does not poss

enough of any one particular type of airpower, land 

sea-based, to fulfill the many requirements placed on 

military. The AEF concept is just one more option in ad

tion to carriers to reinforce airpower capabilities, not 
attempt to replace one another.”21 Initial views of the A

leaned towards reducing forward presence while mainta

ing a means to rapidly project airpower in Southwest A

in the event of increased tensions.

The AEF gives the regional CINC an airpower pack

that can be tailored to the task at hand and, most imp

tantly, is rapid, responsive, and reliable. In the curr

incarnation of the AEF, tasked units are expected to p

pare (generate) aircraft and deploy and launch combat s

ties in-theater within 48 hours after an execute order 

given. Further, with resupply, the AEF must sustain co

bat operations for the duration of the conflict or crisis. 22

While there have been some AEF tests in PACAF, 

majority of AEF deployments to date have focused on 

Middle East and the mission of enforcing United Nation

sanctions against Iraq. Beginning with the first AEF depl

ment to Bahrain in October 1995, the US Air Force h

progressively increased the size and speed of subsequent 

ployments. From a Middle East perspective, Air Com

Command (ACC) units now have experience in deploying 

and operating from, bases in Bahrain, Jordan, and Qatar.

There are two reasons for this emphasis on Southw

Asia. First, the continuing requirement for forces in S

has produced an operations tempo problem for com

units in ACC that receive the bulk of these taskings. A

wants to improve the rapid-reaction capability of the A

with the goal of reducing our forward presence. Seco

deployments have helped bolster our presence in the 

gion during periods of increased tensions with Iraq. T

deployments have also demonstrated an increasing abi

to achieve the goal of “bombs on target” within 48 hours 

tasking.

As the AEF concept has evolved, it has grown to inclu

a scheduling aspect. To inculcate an AEF mind-set in 

Air Force and to address the operational pace (ops temp

the Air Force is organizing around 10 AEF wings. Two 

these wings will be placed on a modified alert status fo

three-month period. In the event of a contingency, th

“alert” units will be the first to deploy. 23

As mentioned previously, the size and composition of 

AEF is dictated by the assigned task. An AEF designed 
halt an armored advance would look remarkably differ

from one designed to support a humanitarian operati

Initial AEFs supporting Operation Southern Watch w

designed to provide precision-guided munitions (PGM) 

livery, air superiority, and suppression of enemy air 

fenses (SEAD) capabilities. Originally consisting of 30 

craft, these AEFs have been expanded to include tan

aircraft as well as B-52 and B-1 bombers. The more rec

evolution of the AEF now includes elements of such hi

demand, low-density assets as the E-3A Airborne Warn

and Control System, U-2, and E-8 Joint Surveillance T

get Attack Radar System.

Despite the mobile nature inherent in airpower, num

ous constraints must be resolved before deploying an A

Among these are access to the host country, airfield inf

structure, airlift availability, and munitions.24

Host-nation access is the most constraining requisite 

any AEF deployment. While most nations will accede to 

deployment of airpower to their country in a crisis si

ation, the host nation may not view the threat to Uni

States interests with the same sense of urgency in so

situations.

In a similar vein, overflight of and landing rights at 

route nations also play into the speed or ability of the A

to deploy. While the AEF is a rapid-reaction endeav

many countries require advanced notification to obt

“diplomatic clearances” for overflight. Further, some prin

pal mobility bases, like Royal Air Force Mildenhall [Uni

Kingdom], routinely observe quiet hours or reduced oper

ing periods.25 These restrictions decrease the speed and

throughput of the mobility effort.

Due to deployment timelines, a combat AEF require

modicum of existing support and infrastructure to supp

air operations. As a minimum, AEFs require access to 

adequate weight-bearing runway, ample ramp space 

park deployed aircraft, room for a tent city or billeting, a

access to fuel and water. The parking requirements 

fighter aircraft must be great enough to permit safe sepa

tion of weapons-loaded fighter aircraft to preclude “sym

thetic detonation” of munitions on adjacent aircraft i

weapons mishap occurs. Granted, distance requireme
may be waived or eased, but this can only be done with 

increased risk of a catastrophic accident. Further, strate

airlift aircraft must have sufficient space to off-load ma

riel and to preclude ramp closure if an airlifter breaks af

landing. The ramp space issue usually becomes one of 

main constraints in airfield selection. While there are ma

runways with adequate runway and weight-bearing cap

ity, most airports in third world regions do not have 

ramp space available to accommodate parking for an AE

sized force.

Aside from infrastructure concerns, deploying Air Fo

wings still relies on a heavy footprint of pre-positioned m

teriel, equipment, and facilities at the forward operat

location. Aircraft tugs (towing equipment), munitions tr

ers, and such aerospace ground equipment as power ca

fuel trucks, and cryogenic carts are all indispensable 

sustain combat operations. They are also bulky and hea

consuming valuable space on airlift assets. Other saf

items such as mobile aircraft arresting systems and cras

fire/rescue trucks can be delayed or dispensed with in em

gency situations but only at the cost of increased risk 

aircrews and aircraft.26

Perhaps the most challenging aspect of the AEF is 

logistics tail associated with sustained operations. A

units are expected to arrive at their forward operating b

prepared to conduct operations for three to seven day

Theater or strategic airlift assets that are already heav

tasked under competing contingency plans must cover 

time between deployment day 3 (D+3) and D+30. A

D+30, sea-lift assets should begin to arrive in-theater.

A quick calculation of munitions requirements for 

SWA AEF provides an illuminating example of the mag

tude of the munitions sustainment effort. The current S

AEF consists of 12 air-to-air aircraft (F-15C), 12 PG M- 

pable aircraft (F-16CG or F-15E), and six SEAD aircr

(F-16CJ). If one assumes a 2.5 sortie rate per aircraft 

each day, delivery of two PGM for each F-16CG sor

expenditure rate of two advanced medium-range air-to

missiles (AMRAAM) for each F-15C sortie, and employm

of two high-speed anti-radiation missiles (HARM) per 

16CJ sortie, the munitions requirements for three day
combat are 180 PGM, 180 AMRAAMs, and 90 HARM

Granted, the mere presence of F-15C aircraft may deter 

gressors from employing their air forces, thereby reduc

the AMRAAM requirement. Similarly, the employment 

HARM weaponry would be expected to drop after the first 

days as the enemy becomes sensitized to the HARM thre

and enemy radar threats are destroyed. However, unl

weather is a factor, PGM expenditure totals are reasona

and, for an equivalent size F-15E unit, slightly low.

In terms of lift, the Air Force Scientific Advisory Bo

estimates that up to 80 percent of available lift will 

consumed by bomb bodies. For example, 12 fighters dr

ping 8,000 pounds of PGM per day (equivalent to two s

ties per day per deployed F-16 CG aircraft) require 96 sh

tons of bomb bodies per day. This translates into 10 

130, five C-141, or two C-17 sorties each day. For a fu

armed B-52 or B-1, one sortie worth of munitions will 

quire either one C-5 or two C-17s to load it. 29 In sh

munitions support will be the long pole in any combat-ty

AEF.

For the present time, pre-positioning of munitions 

regional or theater stockpiles remains a feasible opti

There are adequate munitions pre-positioned to supp

current operations in Southwest Asia, Korea, and Bosn

To offset logistics problems, the Scientific Advisory Bo

has recommended that the Air Force establish regio

control centers (RCC) within fifteen hundred to two th

sand miles of potential trouble spots. In addition, they p

pose setting up two super RCC in Spain and Diego Garc

The idea is that RCC should be close enough to be su

ported by in-theater C-130 or C-17 assets. 30

Aside from munitions, the main challenge to the A

will remain the availability of tanker and airlift assets. A

lift assets, in particular, have not received the attent

they warrant. C-141 aircraft have decreased from an 

ventory of approximately four hundred to a current leve

161.31 By 2006 the last C-141 will exit the inventory. In 

place will be the highly capable C-17, of which the 

Force only intends to purchase 120. While the C-17 h

2.5 times the capacity of the C-141, the total available 

is still less than the original C-141 fleet.
Despite these issues, the combat-oriented AEF rep

sents a pragmatic response to conflicts in major theat 

for the foreseeable future. Lacking a peer competitor 

the immediate future, and with three mature theaters 

republics of the former Yugoslavia (Bosnia), Korea, a

Southwest Asia, the AEF provides theater CINCs with 

airpower capability that is timely and responsive. It is 

value in deploying to a theater where adequate provisio

have been made to rapidly beddown forces and wh

bulky items such as munitions are pre-positioned.

The AEF, however, is not as adaptable to an immatu

theater where necessary infrastructure is lacking if 

requisite 48-hour timeline is to be maintained. Abs

the ability to pre-position some assets near the depl

ment base, deploying units will be forced to bring 

materials with them at the expense of additional air

and time.

Fortunately, many of the deployability issues of the A

are being addressed. The development of small, “sma

bombs that retain the firepower effects of current mu

tions with a 60 percent reduction in weight will lessen 

requirements. A mini tent city for eleven hundred pers

nel that previously required 24 C-141 loads is moving 

eight loads, while electronic tags and scanners improve 

ability to precisely track the movement of cargo throu

the logistics pipeline.32

However, as theater ballistic missiles continue to p

liferate, forward-deployed forces like the AEF offer 

increasingly lucrative and attainable target. Lacking 

viable theater ballistic missile capability, the introd

tion of an AEF-type force may have to be coincident w

an attack on the enemy’s ability to threaten our forc

In this regard, long-range, heavy-payload bomber ass

on global strike-type missions might provide the ini

punch necessary to keep an adversary’s head down wh

an AEF arrives in-theater and begins to generate com

sorties.

As can be seen, the combat AEF provides a credi

response for a mature theater. While there are still un

solved issues, the Air Force is working hard to addr
them. Unfortunately, this emphasis seems to be lacking 

the humanitarian version of the AEF.

Humanitarian Air Expeditionary Forces

For the Armed Forces, troubled states and transnational

threats will probably occupy an increasing amount of their

time in the future, further complicating existing OPTEMPO

problems. The ethnic, tribal, and religious extremism revived

by the end of the Cold War gives no indication of abating.

Even if United States interests are limited, humanitarian

motivations fueled by media and public attention are likely to

encourage our participation in some of these tragedies.

—Hans Binnendijk 

“A Strategic Assessment of the

21st Century,” Joint Forces 

Quarterly, Autumn 1996 

Joint and service doctrinal publications recogniz

number of military operations short of war. While some 

these operations, including strikes, raids, and evacuat

of noncombatants, lend themselves to the previously 

scribed combat-oriented AEF concept, the majority of c

rent military operations require a unique set of skills an

differently tailored force structure, strategy, and traini

However, current AEF literature pays scant attention 

the AEF’s use in nontraditional military operations. Thi

unfortunate, as employment of military aerospace for

will be most likely in support of nontraditional milit

operations.

Differences between a combat and noncombat (or h

manitarian) AEF begin in the planning phase. In a comb

oriented AEF, the most probable threat can be discern

before hostilities begin and the force package can be 

lored appropriately. In addition, since the AEF must op

ate out of an established base in a host-country to m

the combat sortie timeline requirements, theater co

manders can identify deployment locations before they 

required.33

Humanitarian or noncombat AEFs are the antithesis 

this notion. Humanitarian AEFs usually strike with li

warning and run the gamut from famine to natural dis

ter. As such, the design of a humanitarian AEF may 

more of an ad hoc process based on the scale of the cont
gency and the ability of the affected region to absorb 

due to limited or damage infrastructure. Further, depl

ment locations can only be roughly guessed at. Even th

the infrastructure for airlift and operations may be 

graded or nonfunctioning. In addition, MOOTW norm

involve civil engineers and medical and airlift elements t

much larger scale than the ones we have seen in a conv

tional combat AEF. Finally, while combat-oriented AE

are quick-reaction events to preserve initiative and dem

strate resolve, humanitarian or peacekeeping AEFs do 

necessarily have the same timeline requirements.

After forces arrive in-theater, on-scene commanders f

different worlds. A combat AEF commander will norma

receive direction through traditional chains of comma

and interact with familiar allies and or military organi

tions. The combat AEF commander is also focused on 

mission that seems comfortable.

Conversely, the humanitarian AEF commander may 

working as part of a coalition of nations with which he h

never worked, or he may be operating under the aegis 

the United Nations. As a result, the leadership and ma

gerial skills of on-scene commanders require as much o

persuasive aptitude as command abilities.

A significant complicating effect may be the presence 

such nonmilitary entities as the private voluntary orga

zation (PVO) attempting to provide parallel relief servic

PVOs as defined by the US Agency for International Dev

opment are tax-exempt, nonprofit organizations working 

international development that receive some portion 

their annual revenue from the private sector and rece

voluntary contributions of money, staff time, or in-k

support from the general public. While the term PVO te

to be a United States usage, the term nongovernmen

organization (NGO) is used internationally and increasin

is a generic reference for the community as a whol

PVOs include such well-known organizations as CAR

World Vision International, OXFAM Federation, the M

(Medicin sans Frontieres) group, Save the Children Fo

dation, CIDSE (Cooperation Internationale pour le Devel

pement et la Solidarite), APDOVE (Association of Protest

Development Organizations in Europe), and EUROSTEP.3
The international political and economic power of th

organizations should not be underestimated. For examp

the UN General Assembly granted the International Co

mittee of the Red Cross (ICRC) observer status in 19

and the president of the UN Security Council and the N

York delegate of the ICRC confer on a weekly basis. 36 A

result, NGOs are now increasingly assuming state-ty

functions, such as the provision of public services, in ar

like health and education to an extent that was unimag

able a decade ago.37

The cultural characteristics of NGOs often clash with 

more traditional roles of intervening military organizatio

in a number of ways. In the first place, disaster relief se

ices are a significant industry and tend to solicit me

attention. Economically, eight disaster relief agencies c

trol one-half of the $8 billion disaster relief market, a

media attention is one of the primary means used to 

quest contributions from the public.38 Research has sho

that income increases significantly when purchased adv

tisements are combined with coverage of the PVO work 

national television and radio programs.39 The PVO’s de

for media coverage may conflict with security concerns 

on-scene commanders.

Secondly, NGOs are normally independent entities t

tend to develop their own plans and programs. They 

not accustomed to working with other organizations, 

are they arranged along hierarchical lines like a milit

organization. Instead, greater autonomy is given to in

viduals working in the field. Finally, NGOs are norma

committed to a long-term presence in the region. In ma

cases aid workers may have been in-place well before 

introduction of military personnel and tend to work tow

an end-state instead of an exit strategy.

Perhaps a unique aspect of PVOs is their apolitical stan

Most relief organizations gain access to nations because t

espouse no political affiliation and are viewed as a neu

form of assistance. Nevertheless, military forces repres

both the positive and negative perceptions of their par

country. As a result, some relief organizations may refuse 

work with deployed military forces out of concern of los

their neutrality in the eyes of the host-nation. 40
PVOs’ criticism of military relief operations extend 

yond the organizational differences cited above to inclu

cultural differences. The military’s concept of the final 

jective and the tools they have to reach that objective m

be inadequate for the task at hand. For example, milit

engineers concentrate on the speed of the construct

rather than permanence, since they do not need roads a

bridges to last for generations.41 Along the same lin

medical units are trained to perform surgery on battlefi

casualties. Nevertheless, what is usually required is a lo

health staff and provisions for food, clean water, and sa

tation.42 Similarly, PVOs tend to embrace the media t

much greater degree than their military counterparts. 

short, the humanitarian AEF is a unique leadership ch

lenge that the Air Force has yet to fully address.

The AEF represents a pragmatic attempt to balanc

CONUS-based, declining force structure with the unc

tainty of the post-cold-war world. Nonetheless, it continu

to use a conventional world model for the employment 

forces. Current AEF planning emphasizes the deploym

of combat forces in support of a major theater of war 

provide the theater CINC with a quick-reaction halt pha

style force. While the AEF concept discusses the flexibi

of an AEF to support the gamut of military operations, 

conventional SWA model has received most of the emp

sis. In reality, AEF employment in support of a major 

gional contingency may be the least likely scenario. 

mentioned previously, on the one hand, capabilities de

onstrated by United States forces during the Gulf War h

highlighted the fallacy of challenging the United States 

a conventional battlefield.

On the other hand, US involvement in humanitarian a

disaster relief operations is almost certain to increase. As 

sole remaining power with the military capability and e

nomic resources to influence world events, the United Sta

will be increasingly called upon to participate or lead inter

tional relief operations. It is probably safe to say that 

military’s focus has shifted from one of nuclear deterre

with a peripheral interest in regional conflicts to a curr

focus that requires equal proficiency in operations shor

war and major theater war.
Conclusion and Recommendations

With this background in mind, I offer the following r

ommendations for continued AEF development. Th

should result in significant improvements.

Increase Emphasis on Humanitarian

AEF Planning and Education

In forming the AEF, Air Force leaders are trying to ma

airpower more responsive to national security leaders. 

remain viable and useful in the future, the Air Force needs 

adapt to a world where the threat may not be a nation-st

in search of territory but a mass of people fleeing an epidem

or a tyrannical despot. In this environment proficiency 

rapid and global humanitarian and peacekeeping operati

will be as equally important as combat operations.

While the logistics demands of combat-style AEFs 

more challenging, humanitarian AEFs have their o

unique challenges that the military is not fully prepa

for. In these deployments, emphasis switches from bom

on target to providing fresh water, food, and medical ca

Deployment packages that support a combat unit may 

be adequate for these types of events.

Culturally, military commands need to learn how to 

teract with PVOs in a contingency operation that optimi

the contribution of both the PVO and the military aspe

Establishing liaison offices at unified commands and 

veloping a working relationship with PVOs during a per

of calm would reap dividends in cooperation when a c

tingency occurs.

Along the same lines, the Air Force needs to develo

broad cadre of area specialists knowledgeable in regions 

the world that are prone to disaster and least capable 

handling it. For fifty years US intelligence and cultu

focus has been on the European and Korean theaters 

the context of a Soviet incursion to the exclusion of ot

volatile areas of the world.

In the current era, commanders must be as cultura

adept at dealing with a humanitarian operation in Rwan

as they are with combat operations in Southwest Asia 

Korea. The emphasis on Europe and Korea has to be b
anced with our increasing involvement in other regions 

the world. Through NATO, experienced commanders m

be well versed on European cultural and political issu

but they are usually not as knowledgeable in Middle Ea

ern customs or on the history of developing African 

tions. An Air Force-sponsored degree plan might be o

means to improve the overall international sophisticat

of its officer corps.

Currently, the Air Force pays for its members to obtai

master’s degree in such topics such aeronautical scien

at Embry-Riddle Aeronautical University. In many cas

this degree is merely a “square filler,” has either limited 

no applicability to the Air Force mission, and is of qu

tionable repute as the culmination of graduate-level wo

At the same time, a major complaint of Air Force officers 

that, in many instances, course work towards a maste

degree is not universally transferable from one base (u

versity) to another.

One possible solution is for Air University (AU) to w

with other academic institutions to offer a master’s deg

in international relations through the base education 

fices. The program should be centered around political s

ence and provide an opportunity to specialize in a parti

lar region. It also needs to be 100 percent transferable fr

one duty location to another. Ideally, AU could develop 

curriculum in concert with other academic institutions 

allow base education offices and extension campuses 

administer the program. Since such schools as the Univ

sity of Southern California and Embry-Riddle and Troy St

Universities are virtually ubiquitous throughout the 

Force, they would be prime candidates to implement the p

gram.

The overall benefit of this suggestion is that Air Fo

members would obtain a degree in something that is of u

to the member in the field. The degree should also help 

promote the AEF culture.

Look for Alternatives to

Forward Presence-Style AEFs

While the current AEF strategy involves deploying a

power to a trouble spot rapidly, the proliferation of ballis
missile and nuclear, biological, and chemical technolog

to numerous third world and nonstate actors has create

new threat to this approach of forward deployment. By 

turn of the century, it is estimated that 20 countries w

have roughly 12,000 short- and medium-range ballis

missiles.43 Although nuclear technology is still a signific

stretch for many nonstate actors, crude chemical and b

logical weapons delivered by nontraditional means pos

danger to forward-deployed forces.

AEFs need to include theater ballistic-missile defens

systems in their planning. Pre-positioning Patriot units 

deploying the future airborne laser should provide a ne

term capability; however, a more prudent long-term 

proach would be to re-look at our current acquisition str

egy, which is heavily slanted toward expensive a

relatively short-range fighters.

Long-range bombers equipped with cruise missiles t

advantage of the global reach and precision of airpow

while offering the enemy a fleeting opportunity to retalia

In addition, they offer the option of conducting glo

strike missions from the United States or from in-thea

locations removed from the front. The acquisition of fut

deep strike-type platforms should emphasize long-ra

and endurance bomber assets over shorter-range fighter

Reinvest in Strategic Airlift

Every discussion of AEF employment assumes airlif

an available commodity. By its very nature, an AEF can

rely on slower surface transport for anything other th

those materials that are in proximity to the AEF locati

However, the current airlift-acquisition strategy places t

assumption in doubt for two reasons.

First, while the Air Force is in the process of acquir

120 C-17-type aircraft to replace the C-141 and augm

the aging and increasingly unreliable C-5, this acquisit

represents a decrease in overall airlift assets from Des

Storm. It creates a larger penalty on the airlift syst

when an aircraft breaks down. In addition, C-17s will 

come the preferred lift option as they are specifically 

signed to provide a small footprint and decrease c

straints as to the number of aircraft that can be handled 
any one time.44 As a result, demand will most likely 

outstrip supply.

Second, AEF discussions do not include the impact 

other services vying for airlift assets in a contingen

While some airpower advocates might view airpower as s

gle-handedly prevailing in a contingency, in all likeliho

Army and Marine assets would also be deployed, wh

naval assets would self-deploy.

Except for Korea, Air Force units are postured to fi

their cold war adversary, the Commonwealth of In

pendent States. Based upon recent history, some of 

more likely areas of involvement will include regions 

Central and South America, Africa, and the Middle E

that have limited existing basing options. In Central Am

ica the closure of Howard AFB in Panama will take awa

valuable staging base for air assets. Similarly, while 

forces will have some level of access to Saudi and Kuw

bases for the foreseeable future, long-term, unfettered 

cess to these bases is unlikely. Airpower will have to m

great distances, and it cannot assume the existence 

such luxuries as prepared fields with modern infrastr

ture and facilities, especially in MOOTW operations. Air

assets like the C-17 will become as critical as air su

riority in ensuring mission success.

Rediscover Our Expeditionary Roots

The Air Force needs to instill an expeditionary mind-

into its culture by rediscovering its history. During the c

war, Strategic Air Command (SAC), Tactical Air Comma

(TAC), and Military Air Command (MAC) displayed 

gamut of mind-sets from garrison to expeditionary. Of 

three commands, SAC was the most garrison-like in 

psychology and culture in that its units were stationed 

fixed bases and rarely deployed. At the opposite extrem

MAC deployed around the world. In fact, former C-1

MAC aircrews might find the newfound emphasis on ex

ditionary operations somewhat comical.

TAC had a somewhat mixed experience with expediti

ary operations. While combatant commands in Uni

States Air Force Europe and PACAF planned to fight fr

their home bases, CONUS-based TAC units were prepa
to deploy to augment combatant commands in the even

a contingency as part of the Composite Air Strike Force

short, the Air Force already has an expeditionary hist

that it should tap into.

Ironically, Air Force mid- and senior-level leaders w

assignments in these pre-cold-war institutions may be 

ones who require the most education. Nearly half an 

Force career has elapsed since the end of the Gulf War

growing majority of the Air Force populace has grown 

with the turmoil of frequent deployments. Those indivi

als with 10 or more years of experience can contrast 

current era of frequent deployments with the good old d

of the cold war.

Recent attempts at using the AEF to reduce ops tem

strains are laudable, but in the final analysis, ops tem

will be driven by the uncertainties of the changing wo

and the American public’s willingness to remain enga

in world events.

Notes

1. “Proliferation: Threat and Response,” November 1997, n.p.; 

on-line, Internet, available from

http://www.defenselink.mil/pubs/prolif97/slides.html.

2. Ibid.

3. Ronald P. Fuchs et al., Report on United States Air Force Expedi

ary Forces, SAB-TR-97-01, vol. 2 (Washington, D.C.: United States 

Force Scientific Advisory Board, 1997), E-6.

4. According to the ACC Internet web page, 744 B-52 bombers w

delivered to the Air Force. Existing B-52H models were the last ver

delivered in October 1962. See

http://www.af.mil/news/factsheet/_52_Stratofortress.html.

5. David S. Yost, “The Future of U.S. Overseas Presence,” Joint Fo

Quarterly, Summer 1995, 7.

6. Hon. Sheila F. Widnall, secretary of the Air Force, address to 

Young Presidents’ and World Presidents’ Organizations, Pentagon, W

ington, D.C., 2 May 1995.

7. Thomas S. Moorman Jr., US Air Force vice chief of staff, addres

the 75th Royal Australian Air Force Anniversary Air Power Confere

Canberra, Australia, 14 June 1996.

8. Yost, 72.

9. David A. Fulghum, “Tough Schedules Thin U.S. Ranks,” Avia

Week & Space Technology, 15 September 1997, 79.

10. “CIA Factbook: North Korea” on-line, Internet, n.d., n.p.; and a

able from

http://www.odci.gov/cia/publications/factbook/country-frame.html.
11. Joint Publication (JP) 3-07, Military Operations Other Than W

16 June 1995, I-1.

12. Air Force Doctrine Document (AFDD) 1, Air Force Basic Doct

September 1997, 8.

13. Richard G. Davis, Immediate Reach, Immediate Power: The 

Expeditionary Force and American Power Projection in the Post Cold 

Era (Maxwell AFB, Ala.: USAF History and Museums Program, 1998), 

14. Ibid.

15. Ibid., 15.

16. Ibid., 16.

17. Frank Harvey, Strike Command (New York: Meredith Press, 1962), 

18. Ibid.

19. “Can Strike Command Really Strike?” Airman, January 1965, 

20. Davis, 17.

21. First Lieutenant Tam T. Vo, “Exploratory Analysis of the Dep

ment Feasibility of United States Air Force Expeditionary For

(master’s thesis, Air Force Institute of Technology [AFIT] Graduate Sc

of Logistics and Acquisition Management, Wright-Patterson AFB, O

1997), 11.

22. Brig Gen William R. Looney III, “The Air Expeditionary Force: T

ing the Air Force into the Twenty-first Century,” Airpower Journal 10

4 (Winter 1996): 6.

23. “USAF Concept of Operations for Expeditionary Aerospace F

Implementation Draft,” 2 December 1998.

24. Ronald P. Fuchs et al., Report on United States Air Force Exp

tionary Forces, SAB-TR-97-01, vol. 1 (Washington, D.C.: United States 

Force Scientific Advisory Board), 12.

25. Robert S. Trip et al., Enhancing the Effectiveness of Air Expedi

ary Forces, RAND Report (Santa Monica, Calif.: RAND, May 1997), 20.

26. Fuchs, vol. 1, 13.

27. This figure comes from two sources. The first figure of three d

sustainment is based on the author’s work on the AEF while assigne

HQ CENTAF/DOXP. The seven-day figure is from a November 1997 Sc

tific Advisory Board study on USAF Expeditionary Forces.

28. According to unpublished notes from AEF 1, a sortie rate of 

sorties per day per aircraft was used for planning.

29. Fuchs, vol. 1, 41.

30. Ibid., 5–6.

31. Telecom with HQ AMC/XPPF, 16 December 1998. The num

161 reflects proposed inventory for fiscal year 99.

32. Tom Kuhn, “Ideas that Lift the Air Force,” Airman Magazin

(April 1998): 9.

33. Looney, 7.

34. Lisa W. Davidson et al., Humanitarian and Peace Operati

NGOs and the Military in the Interagency Process (Washington, D.C.

rectorate of Advanced Concepts, Technologies, and Information Strate

National Defense University, 1996), 10.

35. Thomas G. Weiss and Leon Gordenker, NGOs, The U.N. and Gl

Governance (Boulder, Colo.: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1996), 91.

36. Ibid., 86.
37. Ibid., 89.

38. Ibid., 91.

39. Andrew S. Nastios, “The International Humanitarian Respo

System,” Parameters 25, no. 1 (Spring 1995): 71.

40. Davidson, 14.

41. Peter Walker, “Foreign Military Resources for Disaster Relief

NGO Perspective,” Disasters: The Journal of Disaster Studies and Man

ment 16, no. 2 (June 1992): 155.

42. Ibid., 156.

43. Moorman.

44. Fuchs, vol. 1, 40.