area handbook series

Bulgaria

a country study



Bulgaria

a country study

Federal Research Division

Library of Congress

Edited by

Glenn E. Curtis

Research Completed

June 1 992
On the cover: Alexander Nevsky Cathedral, Sofia

Second Edition, First Printing, 1993.

Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data

Bulgaria : a country study / Federal Research Division, Library of

Congress ; edited by Glenn E. Curtis — 2d ed.

p. cm. — (Area handbook series, ISSN 1057-5294)

(DA pam ; 550-168)

"Research completed June 1992."

"Supersedes the 1974 edition of Area Handbook for Bulgaria,

edited by Eugene K. Keefe" —T.p. verso. Includes bibliographical references (pp. 287-295) and index.

ISBN 0-8444-0751-8

1. Bulgaria. I. Curtis, Glenn E. (Glenn Eldon), 1946- . II. Library of Congress. Federal Research Division. III. Series. IV. Series: DA pam ; 550-168.

DR55.B724 1993 93-10955

949.77—dc20 CIP

Headquarters, Department of the Army

DA Pam 550-168

For sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office Washington, D.C. 20402
Foreword

This volume is one in a continuing series of books prepared by

the Federal Research Division of the Library of Congress under

the Country Studies/Area Handbook Program sponsored by the

Department of the Army. The last page of this book lists the other

published studies.

Most books in the series deal with a particular foreign country,

describing and analyzing its political, economic, social, and national

security systems and institutions, and examining the interrelationships of those systems and the ways they are shaped by cultural

factors. Each study is written by a multidisciplinary team of social

scientists. The authors seek to provide a basic understanding of

the observed society, striving for a dynamic rather than a static portrayal. Particular attention is devoted to the people who make

up the society, their origins, dominant beliefs and values, their com- mon interests and the issues on which they are divided, the nature

and extent of their involvement with national institutions, and their

attitudes toward each other and toward their social system and

political order.

The books represent the analysis of the authors and should not

be construed as an expression of an official United States government position, policy, or decision. The authors have sought to adhere to accepted standards of scholarly objectivity. Corrections,

additions, and suggestions for changes from readers will be welcomed for use in future editions.

Louis R. Mortimer

Chief

Federal Research Division

Library of Congress

Washington, D.C. 20540

in

Acknowledgments

The authors are indebted to numerous individuals and organizations who gave their time, research materials, and expertise on

Bulgarian affairs to provide data, perspective, and material support for this volume.

The work of Violeta D. Baluyut and William Giloane, coauthors

of the previous edition of the Bulgaria area handbook, provided an important factual base from which to develop new chapters.

Thanks also go to the Bulgarian National Tourist Office in New

York, the United States Embassy in Sofia, the Embassy of the

Republic of Bulgaria in Washington, and Scott Thompson of the

United States Department of State for assistance in locating illus- tration material. The expert photography of Charles Sudetic and

Sam and Sarah Stulberg provided vivid new images of Bulgaria

for users of the handbook.

Thanks also go to Ralph K. Benesch, who oversees the Country Studies/Area Handbook Program for the Department of the

Army. In addition, the authors appreciate the advice and guidance

of Sandra W. Meditz, Federal Research Division coordinator of

the handbook series. Special thanks go to Marilyn L. Majeska, who

supervised editing and managed production, assisted by Andrea T.

Merrill; to Wayne Home, who designed the book cover and the

illustrations on the title page of each chapter; to David P. Cabitto,

who provided graphics support and, together with Harriett R. Blood

and the firm of Greenhorne and O'Mara, prepared maps; and to Tim Merrill, who compiled geographic data and adapted maps.

The following individuals are gratefully acknowledged as well: Sharon Costello, who edited the chapters; Barbara Edgerton and

Izella Watson, who did the word processing; Cissie Coy, who per- formed the final prepublication editorial review; Joan C. Cook,

who compiled the index; and Malinda B. Neale of the Printing

and Processing Section, Library of Congress, who prepared the

camera-ready copy under the supervision of Peggy Pixley.

Contents

Page Foreword iii Acknowledgments v Preface xiii Table A. Chronology of Important Events xv Country Profile xxi Introduction xxix

Chapter 1. Historical Setting 1 Glenn E. Curtis

EARLY SETTLEMENT AND EMPIRE 4 Pre-Bulgarian Civilizations 4

The Slavs and the Bulgars 5 The First Golden Age 6 The Second Golden Age 7 OTTOMAN RULE 7 Introduction of the Ottoman System 9 Bulgarian Society under the Turks 9 Early Decay and Upheaval in the Empire 10 NATIONAL REVIVAL, EARLY STAGES 11 The Written Word 11 Commerce and Western Influences 13 European and Russian Policies, 1800 14 THE BULGARIAN INDEPENDENCE MOVEMENT 14 Revolution in the Balkans 14 Cultural Expressions of Nationalism 15 Religious Independence 16 Early Insurrections 17 Balkan Politics of the Mid-Nineteenth Century 18 The First Independence Organizations 18 The Final Move to Independence 19 San Stefano, Berlin, and Independence 20

THE DECADES OF NATIONAL CONSOLIDATION 22 Forming the New State 22

The Stambolov Years 24

The Rule of Ferdinand 26

The Macedonian Issue 27

vii
Full Independence 28

THE BALKAN WARS AND WORLD WAR I 29

The First Balkan War 29

The Second Balkan War 30

World War I 30

THE INTERWAR PERIOD 33

Stamboliiski and Agrarian Reform 33

The Fall of Stamboliiski 35

The Tsankov and Liapchev Governments 36

The Crises of the 1930s 37

The Interwar Economy 39

Foreign Policy in the Late 1930s 40

WORLD WAR II 41 The Passive Alliance 41 Wartime Crisis 42

The Soviet Occupation 43

COMMUNIST CONSOLIDATION 44

Initial Maneuvering 44

The Dimitrov Constitution 45

Chervenkov and Stalinism in Bulgaria 46

Foreign and Economic Policies 47

After Stalin 47

THE ZHIVKOV ERA 50

Zhivkov Takes Control 50

Zhivkov's Political Methodology 50

The Constitution of 1971 51 Foreign Affairs in the 1960s and 1970s 51 Domestic Policy in the 1960s and 1970s 53

The Political Atmosphere in the 1970s 54

Bulgaria in the 1980s 55

Chapter 2. The Society and Its Environment 59

Pamela Mitova

NATURAL FEATURES 62

Boundaries 62

Topography 62

Drainage 67

Climate 67

Environment 68

POPULATION 70

Administrative Subdivisions 71 Settlement Patterns 71

Cities 72

Internal Migration 75

viii
Foreign Citizens in Bulgaria 76

Population Trends 77 ETHNOGRAPHIC CHARACTERISTICS 78

Government Minority Policy 78

Bulgarians 80

Turks 81

Pomaks 84

Macedonians 84

Gypsies 86

Other Minorities 87

RELIGION 87

Eastern Orthodoxy 88

Islam • 89

Roman Catholicism 90

Protestantism 92

Judaism 93

SOCIAL SYSTEM 94

Traditional Society 94

Family Life and Modern Society 98

Social Groups and Their Work 100

SOCIAL SERVICES 102

Health 104

Housing 108

Education 109

Chapter 3. The Economy 115

William Marsteller

RESOURCE BASE 118

Coal and Minerals 118

Agricultural Resources 121 Environmental Problems 121 LABOR FORCE 121 Factors of Availability 122

Labor and Economic Reform 123

ECONOMIC STRUCTURE AND CONTROL

MECHANISMS 123

The Centrally Planned Economy 124

The Planning System 125

ECONOMIC POLICY AND PERFORMANCE 127

Postwar Economic Policy 127

The First Five-Year Plans 128

The Era of Experimentation and Reform 130

ECONOMIC SECTORS 138

Fuels 138

ix
Energy Generation 138

Industry 141 Agriculture 144

Transportation 151 Communications 152

BANKING AND FINANCE 155

Currency and Exchange 155

Banking System 156 Investment Policy 157

Prices 158

FOREIGN TRADE 158

Postwar Trade Policy 158

Bulgaria in Comecon 160

Trade with the West and the Third World 162

New Trade Conditions, 1990 164

STANDARD OF LIVING 164

MARKET REFORM 166

Reform Mechanisms 166

The Economic Policy Commission 167

Domestic and International Economic Policies

in the 1990s 168

Chapter 4. Government and Politics 171 Glenn E. Curtis

THE PREWAR POLITICAL CONTEXT 175

THE EARLY COMMUNIST ERA 176

The State under Dimitrov 177

The Chervenkov Era 178

THE ZHIVKOV ERA 179

The Rise of Zhivkov 179

Zhivkov Takes Control 180

The Constitution of 1971 180

The Last Zhivkov Decade 182

Issues of Dissent 184

The Removal of Zhivkov 184

GOVERNANCE AFTER ZHIVKOV 185

The Mladenov Government 185

The 1990 Stalemate 186

GOVERNMENT STRUCTURE 188

The Role of Unofficial Organizations 188

The National Assembly 188

The State Council and the Presidency 190

The Council of Ministers 191 The Judiciary 192

x
Local Government 193

Electoral Procedures 194

NONGOVERNMENTAL POLITICAL INSTITUTIONS ... 197

The Bulgarian Communist (Socialist) Party 197

The Union of Democratic Forces 199

Trade Unions 202

Youth Organizations 205

The Movement for Rights and Freedoms 206

Other Political Organizations 207

The Monarchist Movement 208

THE PUBLIC AND POLITICAL DECISION MAKING ... 209

The Intelligentsia 209

Zhivkov and the Intelligentsia 210

The Ferment of 1988-90 210

The Media and Public Issues 212

The Turkish Problem 214

FOREIGN POLICY 215

The Foreign Policy Establishment 216

Relations with Balkan Neighbors 217

The Soviet Union 220

Western Europe and the United States 221

Chapter 5. National Security 225

Karl Wheeler Soper

DEVELOPMENT OF THE ARMED FORCES 228

Early Development 228

From the Struggle for National Independence

to World War I 229

The Interwar Years and World War II 231

Postwar Development 232

NATIONAL DEFENSE POSTURE 233

Threat Perception 234

Doctrine and Strategy 235

DEFENSE ORGANIZATION 237

The Military in the Political System 238

Government Organization for Defense 239

High Command 241

Armed Services 242

Logistics and Arms Procurement 250

Military Budget 251

MILITARY PERSONNEL 252

Recruitment and Service Obligations 252

Military Training 253

Officer Education 255

xi
Reserves and Mobilization 257

Ranks, Uniforms, and Insignia 257

FOREIGN MILITARY RELATIONS 258

The Warsaw Pact 258

Military Cooperation and Exchanges 259

Arms Sales 259

LAW AND ORDER . 262

Crime 263

The Judicial System 265

The Ministry of Internal Affairs 266

The Penal System 268

Security and Intelligence Services 270

Terrorist and Espionage Activities 271

Appendix. Tables 275

Bibliography 287

Glossary 297

Index 301

List of Figures

1 Administrative Divisions of Bulgaria, 1991 xxviii 2 The First Bulgarian Empire under Simeon, A.D. 893-927 . 8

3 The Second Bulgarian Empire under Ivan Asen II, 1218-41 10 4 Hajdutin Activity in the Ottoman Empire, 1600-1800 12

5 Territorial Changes in Bulgaria, 1878-85 24

6 Division of Macedonia at the Treaty of Bucharest, 1913 ... 32

7 Territorial Changes According to the Treaty of Neuillysur-Seine, 1919 34

8 Topography and Drainage 66

9 Population Centers, 1990 74

10 Energy and Mineral Resources 120

11 Principal Crops, 1990 146

12 Transportation System, 1988 154

13 Ranks and Insignia of Ground Forces, 1990 260

14 Ranks and Insignia of Naval Forces, 1990 261

15 Ranks and Insignia of Air Forces and Air Defense

Forces, 1990 264

xii
Preface

Beginning in 1989, Bulgaria passed through a time of political,

social, and economic transition that changed many of its basic in- stitutions and subjected society to stresses unknown in the fortyfive years of totalitarian communist rule. Events that occurred after the ouster of Todor Zhivkov in 1989 demanded a new and updated

version of Bulgaria: A Country Study. Although Bulgaria was one of

the most closed communist societies until 1989, subsequent relax- ation of tensions and restrictions has made available an increasing

amount of reliable information about both the communist and the

post-Zhivkov eras. Scholarly articles and periodical reports have

been especially helpful in compiling this new treatment of the country. The most useful of those sources, together with a smaller number of key monographs, are cited at the end of each chapter.

The authors of this edition have described the changes in Bulgaria occurring in the last twenty years, with special emphasis on

the last three. They have used the historical, political, and social fabric of the country as the background for these descriptions to en- sure understanding of the context of the important recent events

that have shaped the Bulgaria we see today. The authors' goal was

to provide a compact, accessible, and objective treatment of five main

topics: historical setting, society and its environment, the economy,

government and politics, and the military and national security.

In all cases, Bulgarian personal names have been transliterated

from Cyrillic according to a standard table; place-names are rendered in the form approved by the United States Board on Geographic Names; in the case of Sofia, the conventional international

variant is used instead of the transliterated form (Sofiya). Unlike

the previous edition of the Bulgaria study, this volume adds the

diacritic ( w

) to the letter "u" to distinguish the distinctive Bulgarian vowel from the conventional "u" also used in Bulgarian. On

maps, English-language generic designations such as river, plain,

and mountain are used. Organizations commonly known by their

acronyms (such as BCP, the Bulgarian Communist Party) are in- troduced first by their full English names. Measurements are given in the metric system; a conversion table

is provided in the Appendix. A historical chronology is provided

at the beginning of the book, and a glossary and bibliography appear at the end. To amplify points in the text of chapters 2 and

3, tables in the Appendix provide statistics on performance and

trends in the economy and various aspects of Bulgarian society.

Xlll
The body of the text reflects information available as of June

1992. Certain other portions of the text, however, have been updated. The Introduction discusses significant events that have oc- curred since the completion of research, and the Country Profile

includes updated information as available.

xiv
Table A. Chronology of Important Events

Period Description SEVENTH CENTURY

ca. 630 First federation of Bulgar tribes formed.

681 Byzantine Empire recognizes first Bulgarian

state. NINTH CENTURY

811 First Bulgarian Empire defeats Byzantine Empire, begins expanding. 870

893-927

Tsar Boris I accepts Christianity (Eastern Rite Orthodox) for Bulgaria.

Reign of Tsar Simeon, first golden age; maxi- mum size of First Bulgarian Empire.

TENTH CENTURY

924 ELEVENTH CENTURY

1014

Simeon defeated by Byzantines; first empire be- gins decline.

Byzantines inflict major military loss on Tsar

Samuil. 1018 Bulgaria becomes part of Byzantine Empire.

TWELFTH CENTURY

1185 Asen and Peter lead revolt against Byzantine

Empire, reestablishing Bulgarian state with

capital at Turnovo. THIRTEENTH CENTURY

1202

1204

Tsar Kaloian makes peace with Byzantine Empire, achieves full independence, and begins Second Bulgarian Empire.

Treaty with Rome recognizes pope and consoli- dates western border of Bulgarian Empire. 1218-1241 Reign of Ivan Asen II, second golden age of Bul- garia and period of territorial expansion.

1241

1277

Tatar raids and feudal factionalism begin, caus- ing social and political disorder. Peasant revolt; "swineherd tsar" Ivailo takes power.

ca. 1300 Tatar raids end. FOURTEENTH CENTURY

1323-1370 Under Mikhail Shishman and Ivan Aleksandur,

territorial and commercial expansion resumes.

XV
Table A. —Continued

Period Description

1385 1389

FIFTEENTH CENTURY

1453 SIXTEENTH CENTURY

ca. 1600

Sofia captured by Ottoman Empire. Turks defeat Serbs at Kosovo Polje, exposing

remaining Bulgarian territory to Ottoman oc- cupation.

Constantinople falls to Ottoman Empire, ending Byzantine Empire.

Ottoman Empire reaches peak of its power and

territorial control. SEVENTEENTH CENTURY

1688

EIGHTEENTH CENTURY

1741

762 NINETEENTH CENTURY

1804

1806

1815

1820

1835

1840

1844

1856 1860

Suppression of Bulgarian revolt against Otto- mans at Chiprovets ends Catholic influence

in Bulgaria.

Hristofor Zhefarovich completes his Stematografia, seminal work on Bulgarian cultural

history.

Paisi of Hilendar writes a history of the Bulgarian people, using vernacular Bulgarian.

Serbia is the first Slavic land to take arms against Ottoman Empire.

Sofronii Vrachanski publishes first book printed

in Bulgaria.

Bulgarian volunteers join Serbian independence

fighters. End of kurdzhaliistvo, anarchic period precipitated by breakdown of Ottoman authority in Bul- garian territory.

Neofit Rilski opens first school teaching in Bulgarian, using Petur Beron's secular education

system.

First girls' school teaching in Bulgarian opens.

First periodical printed in Bulgaria.

First chitalishte (public reading room) opens. Bishop Ilarion Makariopolski declares Bulgarian diocese of Constantinople independent of Greek Orthodox patriarchate.

XVI
Table A. —Continued

Period Description

1862 Georgi Rakovski forms first armed group for Bulgarian independence. 1870 Bulgarian Orthodox Church declared a separate exarchate by Ottoman Empire.

1875 September Uprising, first general Bulgarian

revolt against Ottoman rule, crushed. 1876 April Uprising spurs massacres of Bulgarians by Ottomans and European conference on au- tonomy for Christian subjects of Ottoman

Empire.

1878 Russo-Turkish War of 1877-78 ends in Treaty

of San Stefano, creating an autonomous Bulgaria stretching from Aegean Sea to Danube.

1878 In Treaty of Berlin, Western Europe forces re- vision of Treaty of San Stefano, returning area south of Balkan Mountains to Ottoman Empire; a smaller Bulgaria retains autonomy

within the empire. 1879 Turnovo constitution written as foundation of Bulgarian state; Alexander of Battenburg

elected prince of Bulgarian constitutional monarchy.

1886 Alexander deposed by army officers.

1887 Stefan Stambolov begins seven years as prime

minister, accelerating economic development; Ferdinand of Saxe-Coburg-Gotha accepts Bulgarian throne.

1891 Social Democratic Party, later Bulgarian Communist Party, founded.

1 899 Bulgarian Agrarian Union founded to represent peasant interests. TWENTIETH CENTURY

1903 Suppression of Ilinden-Preobrazhensko Uprising sends large numbers of Macedonian refu- gees into Bulgaria and inflames Macedonian

issue. 1908 Ferdinand declares Bulgaria fully independent

of Ottoman Empire and himself tsar. 1912 First Balkan War pushes Ottoman Empire completely out of Europe; Bulgaria regains Thrace.

XVII
Table A. —Continued

Period Description

1913 In Second Balkan War, Bulgaria loses territory

to Serbia and Greece; Bulgarian nationalism on the rise. 1915-18 Bulgaria fights in World War I on side of Central Powers; decisive defeat at Dobro Pole

(1918) forces Ferdinand to abdicate in favor of his son Boris III. 1919 Treaty of Neuilly-sur-Seine awards Thrace to Greece, Macedonian territory to Yugoslavia, Southern Dobruja to Romania, sets Bulgarian reparations, and limits Bulgarian army.

1919 Under Prime Minister Aleksandur Stamboliiski, agrarians become dominant political party; socialist parties also profit from postwar social unrest. 1923 After four years of drastic economic reform and

suppression of opposition, Stamboliiski assas- sinated by Macedonian extremists. 1923-1931 Coalition Tsankov and Liapchev governments

suppress extremists; social tensions rise with world economic crisis of 1929. 1934 In Balkan Entente, Greece, Romania, Turkey, and Yugoslavia reaffirm existing Balkan borders; Bulgaria refuses participation, is iso- lated. 1934 Right-wing coup by Zveno coalition begins dic- tatorship, abolishes political parties; Macedonian terrorism ends. 1935 Boris III deposes Zveno and declares royal dic- tatorship that remains in effect until 1943.

1941 Bulgaria signs Tripartite Pact, allying it with Nazi Germany in World War II; Bulgaria

refrains from action against Soviet Union for duration of war. 1943 Boris III dies, leaving three-man regency to rule

for his underage son Simeon II. 1943-44 Allied air raids damage Sofia heavily; activity of antiwar factions in Bulgaria increases. 1944 As Bulgarian government seeks peace with Allies, Red Army invades; temporary Bulgarian government overthrown by communistled coalition.

XV111
Table A. —Continued

Period Description 1946 Georgi Dimitrov of the Bulgarian Communist

Party (BCP) becomes prime minister of the new Republic of Bulgaria. 1947 Dimitrov constitution goes into effect; remaining opposition parties to BCP silenced; state confiscation of private industry completed. 1948-49 Muslim, Orthodox, Protestant, and Roman

Catholic religious organizations restrained or banned.

1949 Joseph V. Stalin chooses Vulko Chervenkov to succeed Dimitrov; period of Stalinist cult of

personality, purges of Bulgarian BCP, and

strict cultural and political orthodoxy begins. 1950 Large-scale collectivization of agriculture begins, continuing through 1958.

1 953 Death of Stalin begins loosening of Chervenkov's

control, easing of party discipline. 1956 Todor Zhivkov becomes first secretary of BCP.

1957-58 After Soviet invasion of Hungary, Bulgaria

cracks down on nonconformism to party line in culture and politics. 1962 Nikita S. Khrushchev annoints Todor Zhivkov

as successor to Chervenkov; Zhivkov becomes

prime minister and is unchallenged leader for the next twenty-seven years. 1968 Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia tightens government control in Bulgaria. 1971 New constitution specifies role of BCP in Bul- garian society and politics. 1978 Dissident Georgi Markov assassinated in London.

1981 Economic restructuring in New Economic

Model brings temporary economic upswing, no long-term improvement.

1 98 1 Under direction of Liudmila Zhivkova, Bulgaria

celebrates its 1,300th anniversary. 1984 First program of assimilation of ethnic Turkish

minority begins. 1987-88 Dissident groups begin to form around environ- mental and human rights issues.

XIX
Table A. —Continued

Period Description

1989 Summer

1989 Fall

1990

1990 June

1990 July

1990 August

1990 September

1990 November-December

1991 January

1991 Spring

1991 July

Second Turkish assimilation program brings massive Turkish emigration, increased dissi- dent activity, and international criticism. Massive antigovernment demonstrations trigger party dismissal of Zhivkov. Three BCP-dominated governments are formed and dissolved; round table discussions be- tween BCP and opposition parties begin to formulate reform legislation.

First multiparty national election since World

War II gives majority in National Assembly

to Bulgarian Socialist Party (BSP, formerly

BCP) with large opposition block to Union

of Democratic Forces (UDF), which has re- fused participation in government.

Tent-city demonstrations begin in Sofia, continue through summer. UDF leader Zheliu Zhelev chosen president. Zhelev meets with French and American leaders, receives pledges of economic support. General strike forces resignation of government

of Prime Minister Andrei Lukanov; interim

coalition government formed under Dimitur

Popov.

Initial phase of economic reform, including price decontrol on some commodities, goes into

effect. Arable Land Law begins redistribution of land

to private farmers. New constitution approved by National Assembly; national elections set for October.

XX
Country Profile

Country

Formal Name: Republic of Bulgaria.

Short Form: Bulgaria.

Term for Citizens: Bulgarian(s).

Capital: Sofia.

Geography

Size: Approximately 110,550 square kilometers.

NOTE—The Country Profile contains updated information as available. xxi
Topography: Mostly hills interspersed with plateaus, with major

flatlands in north (Danubian Plateau, extending across entire country) and center (Thracian Plain). Main mountain ranges Balkan

(extending across center of country from west to east, forming central watershed of country) and Rhodope (west to east across southern

section of country); Rhodope includes two major groups, Pirin (far

southwest) and Rila (west central).

Climate: Divided by mountains into continental (predominant in winter, especially in Danubian Plain) and Mediterranean (predominant in summer, especially south of Balkan Mountains). Rainfall

also variable, with largest amounts at higher elevations.

Society

Population: 1990 estimate 8,989,172; 1990 growth rate negative

0.35 percent; 1989 population density eighty-one per square kilo- meter.

Languages: Official state language Bulgarian; main national

minority language Turkish.

Ethnic Groups: In 1991, Bulgarians (85.3 percent), Turks (8.5

percent), Gypsies (2.6 percent), Macedonians (2.5 percent), Armenians (0.3 percent), Russians (0.2 percent).

Religion: In 1991 Bulgarian Orthodox (85 percent), Muslim (13

percent), Jewish (0.8 percent), Roman Catholic (0.5 percent). Significant increase in public worship and observance of religious holi- days beginning 1990.

Health: In post-World War II era, state health care facilities be- came available to large part of population through polyclinic sys- tem, with all medical services free. In 1990 state control removed

to promote diversity and specialization and reduce bureaucracy.

Serious shortages of medical supplies and treatment, early 1990s.

Education and Literacy: Education compulsory between ages seven and sixteen. Complete literacy claimed 1990. Extensive

growth in education system in post-World War II era, with rigidly

Marxist ideological curriculum; complete restructuring, modernization, and depoliticization program begun 1990.

Economy

Gross National Product (GNP): Estimated at US$47.3 billion, or US$5,300 per capita in 1990. Growth rate of gross domestic

product (GDP) 2.8 percent 1985-89, after continuous shrinkage xxu
through 1980s. Economic growth slowed in 1991 because of largescale restructuring of economy from centralized planning to privatized market system.

Energy: Critical shortage of conventional fuels beginning with in- terruption of supplies from Soviet Union in 1990; heavy reliance on nuclear power from Kozloduy Nuclear Power Plant. Some small

hydroelectric power plants. Main coal source Maritsa Basin (lowcalorie, high-pollutant lignite); little domestic natural gas, oil, or hard coal. Industry and Mining: Dramatic postwar growth in chemical, elec- tronics, ferrous metals, and machinery industries, at expense of

light industries such as food processing and textiles. Relatively nar- row industrial base concentrated in several industrial centers, with

inefficient use of fuels and raw materials. Major mining centers confined to lignite, iron ore, zinc, copper, and lead. Agriculture: Redistribution of land from large-scale state farms

to private ownership begun 1991 ; private plots, much more productive per hectare, vital to domestic food supply. Major crops: corn, tomatoes, tobacco (fourth largest exporter in world), attar of roses (world's largest exporter), grapes, wheat, barley, sugar beets, oil- seeds, soybeans, and potatoes. Most numerous livestock: pigs,

sheep, and chickens.

Exports: US$16 billion in 1989, of which 60.5 percent machinery

and equipment, 14.7 percent agricultural products; 10.6 percent

manufactured consumer goods; 8.5 percent raw materials, metals,

and fuels. Largest export markets in 1989 Soviet Union, German

Democratic Republic (East Germany), Czechoslovakia, Iraq,

Libya.

Imports: US$15 billion in 1989, of which raw materials and fuels 45.2 percent, machinery and equipment 39.8 percent, manufactured consumer goods 4.6 percent, agricultural products 3.8 percent. Largest import suppliers in 1989 Soviet Union, German

Democratic Republic (East Germany), Federal Republic of Germany (West Germany), Austria.

Balance of Payments: Hard currency trade surpluses maintained

through 1985, when hard currency shortage caused recurring major

trade deficits. Economic crisis of 1990-91 caused moratorium on

hard-currency interest payment on foreign debt (US$10 billion in

1990).

Exchange Rate: Floating exchange rate established 1990, ending

xxin
limitation of conversion to within Council for Mutual Economic

Assistance (Comecon). First conversion tables issued by Bulgarian

National Bank in 1991; official conversion value in 1991, 18 leva

to U.S. dollar. Inflation: Removal of price controls on selected categories of goods

in 1991 led to severe but uneven price rises. On average, housing

rose by 3.7 times, clothing three times, food six times in 1991 compared with 1989.

Fiscal Year: Calendar year. Fiscal Policy: Governmental economic planning system remained

centralized under noncommunist administration in 1991. Profit tax- es (50 percent on profits of nonagricultural enterprises in 1990)

most important state revenue source. Also turnover taxes on retail sales, excises on tobacco and alcohol, and individual income

tax (less than 10 percent of total state revenue). Extensive state subsidies remained on selected economic activities in 1991.

Transportation and Communications

Railroads: Total freight carried 83 million tons in 1987; total pas- sengers carried 110,000,000 in 1987. In 1987, 4,300 kilometers of

track, of which 4,055 kilometers standard gauge, 245 kilometers narrow gauge, 917 kilometers double track, 2,510 kilometers electrified. Civil Aviation: National line, Balkan Airline, carried 2,800,000

passengers and 24,213 tons of freight in 1987, using eighty-six major

transport aircraft. International flights to major European cities and Algiers, Damascus, Baghdad, Kuwait, and Tunis. Usable air- ports 380, of which 20 with runways longer than 2,400 meters, 120

with permanent-surface runways. Major airports at Burgas,

Khaskovo, Pleven, Plovdiv, Ruse, Silistra, Sofia, Stara Zagora,

Turgovishte, Varna, Vidin, and Yambol.

Highways: In 1987, 36,908 kilometers total, 33,535 kilometers hard

surface, of which 242 kilometers motorway (highway); 940,000,000

passengers and 917,000,000 tons of freight transported in 1987.

Inland Waterways: In 1987, 470 kilometers; Danube River, along

northern border, major commercial waterway.

Ports: Burgas and Varna on Black Sea; Lorn, Ruse, Svishtov, and

Vidin on Danube.

Pipelines: For crude oil, 193 kilometers; for refined petroleum

XXIV
products, 418 kilometers; for natural gas, 1,400 kilometers in 1986.

Conveyed 21,000,000 tons in 1987.

Telecommunications: In 1987, 4,053 postal and telecommunications offices, 2.23 million telephones, 80 radio and 43 television

transmitters; in 1990, 1,980,000 radio and 2.1 million television

receivers. Two television networks broadcast to nineteen stations

in 1991, with amplification to rural receivers. Three radio networks.

Membership in Intervision East European television network and

access to French satellite broadcasts.

Government and Politics

Government: Strong central government, with system of nine

provinces (consolidated in 1987 from 28 districts), run by people's

councils with limited autonomy and authority over local services,

publicly owned enterprises, and administration. After ouster of

Todor Zhivkov in 1989, communist party retained control of

government but titles of head of state and party chief were separated. First noncommunist government elected 1991. Since 1990,

president was head of state, prime minister was chief executive and

head of fourteen-member Council of Ministers (cabinet). Unicameral legislature (National Assembly, Narodno subranie) with

400 delegates; election law simplified in 1991 for direct representation by district. Legislative decision making slowed by distribution of seats between Union of Democratic Forces (UDF) and

Bulgarian Socialist Party (BSP; formerly Bulgarian Communist

Party, BCP).

Politics: Until 1989, BCP had complete control in one-party sys- tem with only nominal opposition. Opposition parties legalized after Zhivkov ouster in 1989. In 1990 BCP/BSP lost control of Council

of Ministers when internal splits and strong opposition forced resignation of its last government, replaced by caretaker coalition government representing major parties. UDF, coalition of over twenty

parties and movements, assumed leading role in 1991 ; with Movement for Rights and Freedoms, it formed working legislative majority after 1991 election and controlled Council of Ministers.

Numerous smaller parties, notably Bulgarian Agrarian National

Union and Bulgarian Social Democratic Party, remained active.

Foreign Relations: After collapse of Soviet-dominated Warsaw Pact and Comecon in 1991, sought acceptance into European community and improved relations with Balkan neighbors. In absence of

Warsaw Pact protection, national security sought through detente

with former enemy Turkey and Western support. International

image improved by major reform in diplomatic corps in 1991. xxv
International Agreements and Memberships: Member of United

Nations and most of its specialized agencies. Also member of In- ternational Monetary Fund (IMF), World Bank, and General

Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT).

National Security

Armed Forces: Included army, air force, and navy; until 1990

under complete control of BCP. Administered in three military districts with president as commander in chief, advised by National

Security Council, and chain of command through Ministry of National Defense to General Staff. Commission on National Security provided legislative oversight of national security decisions. In

1990 army had 97,000 active-duty personnel, including 65,000 conscripts; the air force 22,000, of which 16,000 were conscripts; the

navy 10,000 active-duty personnel, half of which were conscripts.

In 1991 total active-duty personnel reduced to 107,000, over 80

percent of which conscripts. Significant manpower reductions and

organizational streamlining continued in 1992.

Major Military Units: In 1990, army organized in eight motor

rifle divisions and five tank brigades. Major force structure change

in 1991-92, reducing tank and mechanized infantry in favor of

defensive systems (antitank, air defense). In 1991 navy, also being

downsized, had small diesel submarines, small frigates, corvettes,

missile craft, patrol vessels, coastal and inshore minesweepers, administered from Varna with bases at Atiya, Balchik, Burgas, and

Sozopol. Air force had three MiG interceptor regiments, two MiG

fighter regiments, limited numbers of fighter and other helicopters. Soviet SS-23 missile launchers remained in Bulgaria in 1992.

Military Budget: In 1990 defense expenditures estimated as equivalent of US$1.7 billion, about 3.6 percent of GNP.

Internal Security Forces: Drastic reform of State Security forces

undertaken after ouster of Todor Zhivkov in 1989, to end their

role as independent state enforcers of social discipline. In 1991 National Service for the Defense of the Constitution charged with identifying subversive or terrorist activities. Ministry of Internal Affairs

reorganized, and its domestic and foreign surveillance arms cut deeply and put under strict civilian control in 1991 . Power of militia

(national police force, formerly chief enforcer of totalitarian rule)

greatly reduced in 1990.

xxvi

MIKHAYLOVGRAD

° Mikhaylovgrad

N

LOVECH

Lovech

. / Sofia s' ~\grad ^

>SOFIYA/

SOFIYA

.J

r

v

/

I

PLOVDIV

Plovdiv

r

(

Fzgttr*? 7. Administrative Divisions of Bulgaria, 1991

xxvm
Introduction

FOR MOST OF ITS HISTORY, Bulgaria has been a small,

agricultural nation whose location at the nexus of the European

and Asian continents brought strong cultural and political influences

from both east and west. Because of its location in the Balkans, on the border of Asiatic Turkey, and just across the Black Sea from

the Russian and Soviet empires, Bulgaria received much attention

from the commercial, political, and military powers surrounding

it. Some of that attention was beneficial; much of it was harmful.

In spite of foreign influences, which included centuries of occupation by the Byzantine and Ottoman empires and absolute loyalty

to the Soviet Union in the twentieth century, Bulgarian cultural

and social institutions maintained a unique national identity that was again struggling to reemerge after the collapse of the Soviet

Empire in 1989.

When Bulgaria achieved autonomy within the Ottoman Empire

in 1878, it was completely without modern political and social in- stitutions with which to govern itself and deal with the outside world.

Over the next seventy years, the process of inventing those in- stitutions was rocky and uneven, both internally and in foreign

relations. In spite of a very progressive constitution, Bulgaria's constitutional monarchy was plagued by frequent changes of government and governmental philosophy until World War II. The

impact of a world depression and being on the losing side of both

world wars also hindered Bulgaria's development before another

expanding power, the Soviet Union, incorporated it into another

empire as a result of Soviet victory in World War II. Then, when

it emerged from the shadow of the Soviet Union in 1989, Bulgaria was faced again with inventing institutions that would enable its society, its economy, and its government to prosper in a world that

had been evolving apart from them for many years. The Byzantine and Ottoman occupations eclipsed the signifi- cant cultural developments of two golden ages (in the tenth and

thirteenth centuries) when independent Bulgarian kingdoms dominated their region. Despite the centuries of occupation, village cul- tural and church life retained basic elements of ethnic identity that

fostered a national revival as Ottoman power dwindled in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries.

After finally regaining its independence at the end of the nineteenth century, modern Bulgaria stood in the shadow of European

xxix
xxviii

power politics through the first nine decades of the twentieth century. In that period, three successive major geopolitical antagonisms

largely determined Bulgaria's place in the world: the Ottoman Empire versus Slavic Europe, the Axis powers versus the Allies, then

the Warsaw Pact (see Glossary) opposing the North Atlantic Treaty

Organization (NATO—see Glossary). In all three cases, Bulgaria

stood as a minor player placed at the critical frontier separating

the sides. Besides those conditions, Bulgaria's location amid the

constant turmoil of the Balkans also shaped domestic life and for- eign policy, even in the relatively uneventful postwar totalitarian years. For the first forty-five years of the post-World War II era, Bulgaria was the East European country most closely allied to the Soviet

Union, as well as the Warsaw Pact member most dependent eco- nomically on Soviet aid. During that time, all aspects of life that a totalitarian government could control were redrawn according

to the Soviet model—from overemphasis on heavy industry to the

content of works of literature. When the totalitarian era ended in

1989, it left behind many of the rigid structures and stereotypes

formed by such imitation. Although Bulgaria had strayed from the

prescribed Soviet path in noncontroversial areas such as glorification of the nation's 1,300-year history and token decentralization

of economic planning, the machinery of independent national policy

making was decidedly rusty when the post-Soviet era suddenly

dawned.

At that point, Bulgaria was seemingly more independent of the

power struggles of stronger neighbors than ever before in its his- tory. But this liberation also deprived the nation of the economic

and military security those neighbors had provided. The early 1990s saw a major reshaping of the economic power balance on the European continent. Because most of Eastern Europe emerged from

the economic and political dominance of the Soviet Union at the same time, competition among the former Soviet client states for

new economic and political positions was very keen. In this new

context, Bulgaria, a nation of about 9 million persons located at the periphery of Europe, required particular energy and leadership to establish itself as an integral part of Europe. At the same

time, energy and leadership were necessarily diverted to solving

internal ethnic and political problems—most notably the integration into society of a substantial and vocal Turkish minority and

the cultivation of an efficient government structure based on coalitions among Bulgaria's traditionally numerous political parties.

In the background of those issues was an economy impoverished

xxx
by decades of dependence on resources from the Soviet-led Comecon (Council for Mutual Economic Assistance—see Glossary) and

poorly balanced Soviet-style central economic planning.

Before World War II, Bulgarian society was overwhelmingly

agricultural, supported by rich farmland that grew a variety of

grains, vegetables, fruits, and tobacco for domestic use and export.

Well into the twentieth century, rural life remained steeped in vil- lage traditions that had not changed for many centuries, even under

Ottoman rule. Cities such as Sofia and Plovdiv were islands of commercial activity and points of contact with other cultures. The fast- paced industrialization and agricultural collectivization programs

of the postwar communist regimes brought four decades of intense

migration into urban areas; in 1990 two of every three Bulgarians

lived in a city or town. The migration process also reduced the

isolation of remaining rural populations, which maintained contact with friends and relatives in the cities. Despite this process, however, the traditional dichotomy between cities and villages was

still quite visible in the national elections of 1990 and 1991: Bulgaria's urban population largely supported economic and political

reform platforms, whereas the rural regions expressed skepticism

about reform by supporting the more conventional programs of

the Bulgarian Socialist Party (BSP, formerly the Bulgarian Communist Party (BCP)).

Besides speeding urbanization, postwar industrial policy put most means of production under central BCP control. The state also took over the Bulgarian financial system, and agriculture underwent a

series of collectivization phases between 1947 and 1958. Following the standard recipe for centralized economic planning, heavy

industry received a high proportion of state investment compared

with agriculture and consumer production. The ever-increasing

quotas of five-year plans for all those sectors, however, reflected

unrealistic expectations. Although later five-year plans aimed at more realistic goals, the centralized Bulgarian economic system

failed consistently to increase output, although it devoted huge

amounts of resources to the effort. Throughout the communist era, heavy industries lacked incentives because of state subsidies, and

state-run agriculture never matched the productivity of small pri- vate plots. The Zhivkov government trumpeted major economic

reform programs in the 1960s, 1970s, and 1980s, but they all re- mained within the restrictions of the centralized system, contributing

nothing to Bulgaria's economic advancement.

As in the other East European countries, central planning of the

economy produced severe environmental damage in Bulgaria.

Damage was more localized in Bulgaria because its designated role

xxxi
in Comecon required fewer "smokestack industries" than that of

Poland, Czechoslovakia, or the German Democratic Republic (East

Germany). Nevertheless, cities such as Ruse, Dimitrovgrad, and

Srednogorie suffered severe environmental deterioration from

manufacturing activities under the communist regimes, which dis- regarded pollution in the name of progress. In 1988 public concern over environmental quality spawned the first Bulgarian protest

groups, which played a central role in the overthrow of Zhivkov

and then evolved into permanent opposition parties with strong

public support.

In October 1991, the Grand National Assembly passed a Law

on Protection of the Environment, and the next cabinet included

a member of the Ekoglasnost environmental group as minister of

the environment. Despite these measures, however, the critical need

for economic growth in the postcommunist era hindered environmental recovery efforts. In 1992 auto emissions, heavy industry

emissions, and power plants remained beyond government control although they contributed heavily to air pollution; excessive use of chemicals in agriculture polluted many Bulgarian lakes and

streams; and reliance on nuclear power generated by unsafe equipment threatened a major radiation crisis. Besides industrialization and urbanization, other important

changes had occurred under the conventional communist totalitar- ian dictatorships that ruled Bulgaria under Georgi Dimitrov

(1947-49), Vulko Chervenkov (1949-56), and Todor Zhivkov

(1956-89). Centuries before, the Russian Empire had fought the

first in a long series of wars with the Turks. Those wars conferred on Russia the stature of protector of the Slavs in the Ottoman Empire. In 1944, as Axis power retreated in Europe, a strong Russophile element remained in Bulgarian society. Accordingly,

Bulgarians welcomed the arrival of the Red Army, whose presence

ended Bulgaria's participation as an Axis ally in World War II and

laid the foundation of the postwar political system. Interwar commercial and cultural relations with Western Europe (especially Germany and Italy) were curtailed when the postwar communist

regimes intensified Bulgaria's traditionally close ties with the Russian Empire/Soviet Union. In 1949 this policy shift was codified

by Bulgaria's membership in Comecon, which created a new net- work of East European trade relationships and subsidies dominated

by the Soviet Union.

Between 1947 and 1989, Bulgarian foreign and economic policy followed scrupulously the policies of the Soviet Union. Inter- mittent periods of rapprochement and hostility between the Soviet

Union and the West were mirrored in relations between Bulgaria xxxn
and the NATO countries of Europe. Thus, for example, Zhivkov

pulled back from newly invigorated relations with Western Europe

in order to lend vigorous support to the Soviet invasions of Czechoslovakia in 1968 and Afghanistan in 1979. Bulgaria also followed

the Soviet lead in assisting developing nations and supporting wars

of national liberation.

The Bulgarian constitutions of 1947 and 1971 borrowed heavily from Soviet constitutional models, and, especially in its early

stages, the Bulgarian centrally planned economy followed Soviet

guidelines. Periods of economic experimentation also coincided in

the two countries; Zhivkov's first large-scale restructuring of the

Bulgarian system occurred in the early 1960s, at the same time

that Nikita S. Khrushchev experimented with unorthodox economic

methodology in the Soviet Union. Zhivkov was able to experiment more freely because the Bulgarian system was much smaller and more homogeneous and because Bulgaria had earned a place as the most trusted and loyal of the Comecon member nations. By

the mid-1980s, economic imitation of the Soviet Union had turned

earlier skepticism into cynicism in large parts of the Bulgarian

public.

The communist regimes of the postwar era did accomplish significant improvement in national education and health care. Although the basic structure of prewar Bulgarian education re- mained intact after 1947, the primary goal of centralized education planning was to bring Marxist theory to as many Bulgarians

as possible; hence promotion of literacy and expansion of primary

and secondary education proceeded much more rapidly under the

communist regimes. On a basic level, those goals were reached

through a combination of rapid urbanization of the population and

mandatory training for children and adults. But the state education program was a carefully regimented, technology-oriented imitation of the Soviet Union's system. After Zhivkov, the public

education system and universities officially banned political indoctrination and activity in their institutions. Because many teachers

and textbooks remained from the era when only the party line was

acceptable, however, transition efforts encountered stubborn

resistance in some quarters.

The communist era had provided very basic health care in state regional clinics available to most Bulgarians. Under the socialist health system, indicators such as average life expectancy, infant

mortality rate, and physicians per capita improved steadily between

1947 and 1989. Nevertheless, post-Zhivkov governments embarked

on decentralization and modernization programs to improve specialized care and raise the incentives for health care personnel and

xxxni
entrepreneurs in private facilities. In the early 1990s, the new programs underwent a difficult transition period that yielded uneven

results. The overthrow of Zhivkov's orthodox communist regime in 1989

produced especially dramatic changes in Bulgarian political and

economic life. By the mid-1980s, the Zhivkov regime already had

wielded power for thirty years; by that time, the regime's inability

to deal with new political and economic realities was obvious to many Bulgarians, especially the educated classes. Zhivkov took

token political restructuring measures in the late 1980s, but by 1988

formidable opposition groups were forming around such issues as environmental standards and the chronic failure of the economic

system to raise the standard of living. In 1989 Zhivkov's heavyhanded campaign to assimilate or exile Bulgaria's large Turkish

minority depleted the labor force and evoked strong protest from

the international community and many groups within Bulgaria.

Shortly after an all-European environmental conference in Sofia

provided an international audience for protesting groups, the Bulgarian Communist Party (BCP) ousted Zhivkov to avoid losing

power entirely.

Although the BCP strategy succeeded in the short run, Zhivkov's communist successors were unable to meet the multitude of

demands that society unleashed upon them once the symbol of

monolithic state power had disappeared. Having lost the solid support of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union by 1990, the BCP

hesitated between full commitment to political and economic re- form and maintaining its still formidable grip on such sectors of

Bulgarian society as management of heavy industry and administration of provincial government. A few months after Zhivkov's

ouster, the party had changed its name to the Bulgarian Socialist

Party (BSP) and introduced a series of government reform programs. But opposition groups, combined in the Union of Democratic Forces (UDF), refused to form a coalition government with

the BSP or to support BSP reform proposals. Because the UDF

represented a growing majority of Bulgarian society, by the end

of 1990 the UDF strategy of non-participation had forced a politi- cal stalemate and resignation of the last communist-dominated cabinet, headed by Andrei Lukanov. This development negated the

broad 100-day economic reform plan that Lukanov had proposed

in the fall of 1990.

The old central planning system that remained in place in 1990

had included excessive emphasis on heavy industry, distorted pricing, declining agricultural productivity, and isolation from foreign

markets. By the end of 1990, those failures had brought the Bulgarian

xxxiv
economy to a severe crisis that included a drop of 11.5 percent in net material product (NMP—see Glossary), drastic increases in

unemployment, curtailment of all payments to foreign creditors,

and a drop in the standard of living.

The period following Lukanov's fall was one of extreme crisis; social unrest was very high, but political factions could not find an acceptable compromise course. Finally, Dimitur Popov, a judge

with no political affiliation, became prime minister of a coalition

cabinet that would run the government until the 1991 national elec- tions chose a new National Assembly. Resolution of this crisis was

due in large part to the negotiating skills of President Zheliu Zhelev.

In 1991 Bulgaria experimented with government coalitions to promote major reform programs. Important legislative packages

included depoliticization of the army, the police, courts, state prosecutors, and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs; amnesty for political

prisoners; restoration of property to political emigres and victims

of repression; and reform of the local government system that re- mained a stronghold of socialist bureaucrats. In 1991 such reform

legislation encouraged loans from the World Bank (see Glossary)

and other Western sources. In mid- 1991, all political factions agreed that economic reform was the government's top priority, but BSP members of parliament obstructed reform proposals that would bring temporary but

severe economic dislocation. Instead, they favored a more gradual approach that would not threaten party members still entrenched

in state industrial policy making. Although the National Assembly passed major legislation in 1991 on land redistribution, pri- vate commercial enterprises, and foreign investment, the key step

of enterprise privatization remained unresolved in early 1992, and

the land act required wholesale revision.

Privatization brought many difficult dilemmas for a system that

until recently had been centrally planned. The new government

had to distinguish state enterprises worth rehabilitation from those

that should be replaced by totally new private enterprises. Restitution was needed for Bulgarians whose capital property had been

seized by the communist state, but resolution of claims proved ex- tremely complex. And rapid privatization inevitably displaced large

numbers of workers from former state enterprises, damaging

productivity, national morale, and earning power. In February

1992, the World Bank cited the lack of privatization legislation in

delaying a loan of $US250 million. Both the Popov government

and the government of Filip Dimitrov that followed spent months

in fruitless debate of redistribution and regulation of large industries formerly operated by the state. xxxv
A vital economic support element, energy supply, became a crit- ical problem in late 1991 when the Soviet Union first ended coal

supply and later when Russia ended subsidized electric power supply

to Bulgaria following the dissolution of the Soviet Union. Because

Bulgaria's domestic energy base was quite inadequate to support an industrial system designed when outside energy supplies were

plentiful and cheap, economic recovery depended on the single

nuclear power plant at Kozloduy—a facility judged unsafe by both

domestic and international authorities in 1991. Lacking foreign cur- rency to import fuels, however, Bulgarian policy makers placed

their hopes on Kozloduy' s shaky technology to provide as much

as half the country's electricity throughout the 1990s.

Political developments in 1991 made accelerated economic re- form more likely. Remaining Zhivkov-era officials finally lost some

of their power to obstruct the transition away from authoritarian

government and a centrally planned economy. After considerable

delay, in July the Grand National Assembly, which had been elected

specifically to draft a new constitution, produced a document approved by a majority, but far from all, of its legislators. Some constituent groups in UDF refused to sign because they believed the

constitution defended interests of the BSP, which was still the

majority party at that point. Among vital innovations in the constitution were government by separation of powers, specification

of the principles of a market economy, and full protection of citizens' private property rights.

The constitution also set conditions for election of a new National Assembly under reformed election laws. The new laws simplified the extremely cumbersome system used in 1990 and reduced

the size of the National Assembly from 400 to 240. In the national

election of October 1991, Bulgarian politics followed its long tra- dition of fragmentation when forty-two parties and other groups

posted candidates. Of that number, thirty-five failed to receive

enough votes for representation in the legislature. UDF candidates,

running on three separate tickets, together won a plurality but not

a majority of seats. The BSP held the next largest block of seats, making the twenty-four-vote block of the Movement for Rights and

Freedoms (MRF) capable of swinging majority votes for the UDF

or obstructing reform legislation. Because the MRF represented

the substantial ethnic Turkish minority, many Bulgarians feared

that the UDF would be coerced into pro-Turkish positions. The

MRF blunted some criticism by announcing support of most of

the UDF reform platform, however, shortly after the election.

The fourteen-member cabinet formed by Prime Minister

Dimitrov, leader of the UDF, was young (average age forty-nine),

xxxvi
professional, and included no BSP or MRF members. Among

Dimitrov's structural reforms in the cabinet (reduced from seven- teen to fourteen members) was abolition of the Ministry of Foreign Economic Relations, formerly a stronghold of Zhivkovite

officials. For the first time, a civilian was named minister of defense.

Key cabinet figures were Minister of Defense Dimitur Ludzhev,

Minister of Foreign Affairs Stoian Ganev, and Minister of Inter- nal Affairs Iordan Sokolov. As in previous cabinets, economic policy was divided among several ministries. Dimitrov, who introduced no formal program when he was appointed, listed ending infla- tion, raising productivity, and stabilizing the economy as his chief

goals.

Despite the triumph of nonsocialist factions in the October elec- tions, however, the Bulgarian government remained unsettled in

the winter of 1991-92. Key constituent groups such as labor unions

and the Turkish population continued to be somewhat aloof from

the UDF coalition as 1992 began, and the coalition itself was constantly strained by the diversity of its membership. In 1992 the

former communists remained the country's largest party, and the

oversized government bureaucracy created by the communist re- gimes still controlled many parts of the national administration.

But, unlike his predecessor, Dimitrov had no opposition ministers

in his cabinet, and the UDF possessed a legislative majority if it could avoid internal fragmentation and keep the loyalty of the MRF.

With the environmental demonstrations of 1988, Bulgarian so- ciety renewed a long-dormant tradition of public protest, and such

activities continued during the crisis years of 1990-92. The volatile ethnic issue of Turkish minority rights evoked many boycotts

and protests by both Turks and Bulgarians between 1990 and 1992.

And industrial strikes, most organized by the Podkrepa labor union,

protested working conditions and unemployment throughout 1991

and early 1992.

Although Bulgarian society was ethnically relatively homogeneous, especially compared with neighboring Yugoslavia, the Turkish minority of about one million (estimates varied from 900,000

to 1.5 million in 1991) continued to present a delicate political

problem in 1992. Bulgarian-Turkish animosity was based on the

indelible Bulgarian memory of five centuries of occupation and cul- tural suppression by the Ottoman Empire. On the Turkish side,

hostility was based on more recent memories of forced assimilation and restriction of human rights by the Zhivkov regime. The

Zhivkov government had justified repression of the Turkish minority by appealing to ethnic Bulgarian fears that empowering Turks

within Bulgaria would once again threaten Bulgarian security. xxxvn
When Zhivkov fell, restoration of long-withheld civil rights became

a central issue in the newly open political atmosphere.

Minority rights found expression in the new political order; the

MRF was formed to advance those rights, and the UDF somewhat

cautiously advocated full use of the Turkish language in schools

and full civil rights for all Turkish citizens of Bulgaria. Especially

in eastern Bulgaria where the Turkish population was largest, a

strong undercurrent of hostility grew in 1991 and 1992 between

ultranationalist Bulgarians and their Turkish neighbors. Only a Supreme Court decision allowed the MRF to post candidates in

the 1991 election, and the issue of restoring the teaching of Turkish in Bulgarian schools remained quite sensitive in 1992. In late 1991, the BSP, shorn of its parliamentary majority, accelerated

its attacks on the MRF as a subversive organization working for Turkey—a desperate effort to build new support among Bulgari- ans fearful of new foreign domination.

In early 1992, the political situation left Turkish citizens with

only partially restorated civil rights, and school boycotts were called in some areas where the use of Turkish remained restricted. On

this issue, the Bulgarian court system, which had been a purely

political institution under the Zhivkov regime, was unable or unwilling to exercise fully the independence granted the judiciary in

the new constitution. This was partly because the new antidiscrimination language of that document had never before been tested and

partly because of the lingering tradition ofjudicial dependency on

political officials. Meanwhile, politicians generally treated the Turkish issue with great caution in 1991 and early 1992. Nationalist

factions attacked the governing UDF for its legislative "alliance"

with the MRF, suggesting that UDF compromises would jeopardize

national security. These conditions lessened the likelihood that the

National Assembly would finally attack and resolve the "national

question.

Bulgarian foreign policy also changed markedly in the years fol- lowing 1989. As in domestic affairs, a strong body of opinion fa- vored maintaining pre- 1989 policy, in this case continuing to cultivate the Soviet Union as protector and economic benefactor.

Actual policy sought a compromise that would not only change political relations but also ensure continued supply of raw materials,

especially fuels. Negotiations with the Soviet government yielded

promises of continued supply, but by 1991 the Soviet republics

responsible for delivery were able to ignore the commitment. This

situation deteriorated further when the Soviet Union dissolved into

constituent republics in the fall of 1991. By January 1992, Bulgaria had established relations with Belarus, Russia, Ukraine, and

xxxvm
the Baltic states in an effort to reestablish supply lines. In November 1991, Bulgaria joined a new economic association for East European cooperation and trade, formed by economic organizations in

most of the former East European Comecon member countries,

as well as in Russia, Kazakhstan, and Ukraine. The aim was to restore economic relations among those countries on a new basis.

A top foreign policy priority of the Dimitrov government was

dismantling the bureaucracy of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs,

which was still dominated by BSP functionaries under Prime

Minister Popov. Shortly after his appointment, Minister of Foreign Affairs Ganev secured the recall of several ineffectual senior

diplomats. In early 1992, he reviewed the performance of all ministry personnel in order to streamline the organization and purge

remaining members of Zhivkov's state security establishment, which

had been notorious for conducting espionage from diplomatic

outposts.

Beginning in 1990, President Zheliu Zhelev and other Bulgarian officials met with Western officials to stress Bulgaria's commitment to economic and political reform and cement relations with

the United States and the European Community (EC —see Glossary). The EC was the primary focus because Bulgarian policy makers saw acceptance into the European federation as the best way

to avoid isolation and hasten internal reform. With this goal in mind, top-level diplomatic attention was divided among many West

European countries, while overtures to Eastern Europe declined

noticeably. In late 1991, France, Germany, Greece, and Italy promised to support Bulgarian membership in the EC, although at that

point at least seven countries were ahead of Bulgaria on the list of prospective EC members. In 1991 Bulgaria did achieve associ- ate status in the EC, together with Czechoslovakia, Hungary, and

Poland. From the Western viewpoint, a stable Bulgaria offered a calming influence on the turbulent Balkans, where the disintegration of Yugoslavia in 1991 threatened to trigger wider conflict over

ethnic and economic issues.

Bulgaria viewed the Yugoslav crisis of the second half of 1991

as a serious threat to regional stability. President Zhelev reiter- ated Bulgaria's policy of nonintervention and the right of self- determination for all people in Yugoslavia. This declaration was

mainly to reduce accusations and fears in Serbia that Bulgaria would assume a direct role in weakening the Yugoslav Federation (now

reduced to Serbia and Montenegro) and renew century-old claims on Macedonian territory. Zhelev' s reassurances were also aimed

at Greece, which feared annexation of its part of Macedonia into

xxxix
a state of Greater Macedonia. Following its advocacy of self- determination for Balkan states, Bulgaria recognized the four former

Yugoslav secessionist republics, Bosnia and Hercegovina, Croatia,

Macedonia, and Slovenia, in the winter of 1991 . In late 1991 , Bulgaria strongly backed mediation of the conflict between Serbia and

Croatia by the EC and the United Nations, and Bulgaria embargoed military supplies and arms bound for Yugoslavia.

Meanwhile, relations with Turkey improved after the triumph

of the UDF in the fall 1991 election. The UDF-MRF coalition pursued a treaty of friendship, cooperation, and security to match the

treaty signed with Greece in October 1991. By early 1992, highlevel military talks had substantially eased tension with Turkey,

which maintained troops in eastern Thrace close to the Bulgarian

border. Meanwhile, Foreign Minister Ganev was seeking a trilateral summit meeting with Turkey and Greece to enhance regional security as well as a "mini-Helsinki" conference of Balkan states, to enhance regional security. Cultivation of Turkey had the strategic

role of counterbalancing Greece and Serbia, two regional powers

potentially allied against Bulgaria over the Macedonia issue in 1992.

The overthrow of Zhivkov revealed a deep fascination in Bulgarian society with the culture and ideals of the United States, and

a desire for closer relations. Although United States aid to Bulgaria remained quite small compared with aid given to Poland,

Hungary, and Czechoslovakia in the early 1990s, high-level offi- cial contacts in that period were more friendly and frequent than

ever before. President Zhelev stated Bulgaria's position very forcefully on two visits to Washington (1990 and 1991), and Prime

Minister Dimitrov had a productive stay in March 1992 that gained

a promise that the United States would accord Bulgaria the same

status as the three major East European aid recipients. In November

1991, the United States officially granted Bulgaria most-favorednation status. The demise of the Warsaw Pact in 1991 left Bulgaria without

the military protection of the Soviet Union and its allies. To bolster its security position, Bulgaria obtained NATO assurances about

Turkey's military ambitions and established a special relationship

with NATO headquarters in 1991 . Meanwhile, the Bulgarian mili- tary establishment underwent reforms comparable to those else- where in society. A central aim of the Dimitrov government was

to bring the military under civilian control, to end the separate,

elite status that followed the Soviet model, and to make the military an open institution integrated into society. An immediate

stimulus for this reform was the role of national military establishments in Yugoslavia's bloody internal conflict and in the failed coup

xl
in the Soviet Union in 1991. (The Bulgarian military had taken no part in any of the political turmoil of 1989-91 .) The depolitization of the military decreed by the Bulgarian government in 1990

reduced BSP influence in the ranks. As in other phases of Bulgarian life, positions of power remained for some time thereafter in

the hands of reactionaries from the Zhivkov era. By the end of 1991

however, about 85 percent of generals active in 1989 had retired

voluntarily or under pressure. The resignations resulted in a net reduction of ninety-three generals from a top-heavy officer corps. The military reform campaign also sought to lift the status of the

military as a profession and to foster positive relations between the

civilian and military communities. In 1992, however, a shortage

of army officers was partly attributed to the military's negative

image in society.

Arms and spare-part supply to the Bulgarian military suffered

greatly when the overthrow of Zhivkov caused the Soviet Union

to abandon long-term contracts. At the same time, the disproportionately large Bulgarian arms industry, a pillar of the centrally

planned economy, was hit hard by the loss of its Soviet market.

The new government limited the activities of Kintex, Bulgaria's

notorious arms export agency, by prohibiting sales to terrorists and

totalitarian regimes. A long-term conversion program begun in October 1991 gave new civilian production assignments to many arms

plants.

The Bulgarian military had a long history of cooperation with

its Soviet counterpart. Weapons systems, doctrine, and training were interchangeable throughout the postwar era, and the Bulgarian

military relied on Soviet fuel supplies even more heavily than the

civilian economy. The sudden end of the Soviet partnership in 1990,

followed shortly by removal of the communist symbols and dogma

that had supported military morale, caused considerable turbulence

and confusion.

New international responsibilities also affected the Bulgarian mili- tary establishment. To abide by the Treaty on Conventional Armed

Forces in Europe signed by the Warsaw Pact and NATO in 1990,

Bulgaria also faced reductions in military manpower and armaments beginning in 1991 . Bulgaria sought to retain the Soviet SS-23

missiles installed in the 1980s, however, on the grounds that they

predated the relevant nuclear disarmament treaty and were vital to national defense.

As the 1990s began, Bulgaria was in a completely new phase

of national existence. For this phase to succeed, Bulgaria needed

both a substantive new self-image and a believable new international posture. The postwar communist period had changed society

xli
by forcible industrialization and urbanization; those processes were

accompanied by regimentation that suppressed cultural and economic

individuality, and by isolation from influences and challenges outside the Soviet sphere. Then, in keeping with the wave of democratization that had swept most of Eastern Europe in 1989, Bulgaria made

an abrupt about-face and began experimenting with democratic in- stitutions in a manner unprecedented in the country's political his- tory. After nearly fifty years of totalitarianism, and having had

marginal success with democratic institutions prior to World War

II, Bulgaria's experimentation was quite cautious at first. By 1992,

however, a new generation of capable leaders had instilled impressive momentum in the transformation process. Although the slow

pace of economic restructuring promised continued hardship, a large

part of Bulgarian society was committed to reform, and hard-line

revisionism and social unrest had declined in early 1992.

Besides adapting Western-type political and economic institu- tions to unique domestic requirements, Bulgaria's most difficult task was to overcome its Cold-War image as an obscure and some- what sinister nation whose total loyalty to the Soviet Union had

led it to support terrorists and assassins. By 1992 progress in that

direction was significant; Western approval raised Bulgaria's sta- tus closer to that of Poland, Hungary, and Czechoslovakia, the

three former Soviet client states whose democratization had given

them a head start toward integration into the fabric of Europe. As

it strengthened its connections to the West in 1992, Bulgaria fi- nally had an opportunity to develop social and political institutions

appropriate to its needs under reduced pressure from large-power

European politics.

December 31, 1992

* * *

In the months following completion of this manuscript, Bulgaria

underwent serious political upheaval, and its economy failed to move toward reform nearly as fast as planners had hoped. The

Dimitrov government elected in late 1991 showed early promise

in promoting economic reform and democratization. By mid- 1992,

however, Dimitrov' s leverage was reduced by shifting factions in

his political coalition and by rising public skepticism that Bulgaria's

painful reform program would yield a better standard of living.

In 1992 Dimitrov 's UDF coalition dominated political dialogue

and enjoyed a narrow majority in the National Assembly. This position required that the coalition remain unified within itself and

allied with the much smaller MRF. But in the second half of 1992,

xlii
UDF policies increasingly alienated influential parts of Bulgarian

society such as the Orthodox Church, parts of the media, trade

unions, and private businessmen. An atmosphere of escalating confrontation was the result. Meanwhile, the MRF was taking increasingly independent stands on many issues, using the influence provided by the party's swingvote position in parliament. In October 1992, judging the UDF

response to its demands inadequate, the MRF finally joined the

Bulgarian Socialist Party and dissident UDF members in a parliamentary vote of no confidence in the Dimitrov government. By

destroying the Dimitrov coalition, the vote created another crisis period in which Bulgaria was unable to choose a government.

Nearly two months later, Liuben Berov, an unaffiliated economics professor, was approved as prime minister after both the UDF

and the BSP had failed to form governments.

The fate of the leading parties thus changed drastically at the

end of 1992. The BSP, which had remained aloof from political

struggle during the UDF's dominant period, found itself with the

political influence of a parliamentary plurality as the new government took office. This happened in spite of the continued split between BSP conservatives allied with former communist party chief

Aleksandur Lilov and the reformist branch of the party. Observers questioned whether the BSP would use its new influence to pro- mote reform or to preserve the remaining Zhivkov-era party

bastions in state industry and provincial government. In early 1993,

BSP support of the Berov government was decidedly pragmatic,

and experts saw a strong likelihood that support would be withdrawn (and the government automatically toppled) if policies dis- pleased the BSP or if a new election would be advantageous to the

BSP.

Meanwhile, the disparate membership of the UDF wrote another

chapter in the acrimonious history of the coalition. The group again

split formally when one faction of constituent parties formed a new

coalition, the New Union for Democracy. Although Berov had

pledged to continue the UDF reform program, UDF members of

parliament refused all support for the Berov government. Relations between the UDF and its former allies in the MRF remained

hostile. Several attempts at forming new coalitions and alliances

failed for various reasons in early 1993. The most notable coali- tion was the Bulgarian Democratic Center, whose loss of two key

member parties left a void in the center of the political spectrum.

Besides the confusion of a fragmented political base, the Dimitrov

government left unforeseen financial woes. According to one

xliii
estimate, Bulgaria's internal debt doubled in 1992. The reasons were inflation (which reached 6.6 percent per month in early 1993),

the Dimitrov government's concealing of budget deficits by withholding funds from certain industries, and government assumption of the debts of state companies. After the government had

borrowed heavily from the Bulgarian National Bank to pay its debts,

only an estimated 5 percent of domestic credit remained for pri- vate investment. Experts forecast the same figure for 1993, leaving no prospect of meaningful support for a larger private sector. In April 1993, Berov's coalition government was able to draft a budget bill containing the same deficit as in 1992, despite the

debt left by Dimitrov. To do this, spending on education, health

care, culture, and national defense were reduced significantly; the

Ministry of National Defense would receive only half the money

it requested. Nevertheless, the proposed deficit, 7.9 percent of the

gross national product (GNP—see Glossary), caused concern among international lenders.

Economic reform in 1992 had limited success. The amended land

redistribution law passed in March 1992 effectively abolished col- lective farms; nominally, nearly 80 percent of Bulgaria's total arable

land had been reclaimed by individual owners by midyear.

Although the legislative machinery was in place, however, by

mid- 1993 less than 20 percent of designated land had actually been

restored, and Zhelev criticized the Berov government for neglecting this aspect of economic policy. In April 1993, farmers demonstrated in Sofia against inequities they perceived in the land law.

The political crisis stopped vital privatization legislation in late 1992, delaying the pilot privatization of 100 companies. Berov had

called privatization the top priority of his government when he took

office, and adjustments were made in existing laws to make conversion easier. Nevertheless, almost no privatization activity took

place in the first four months of 1993. In early 1993, President

Zhelev recommended that privatization be delayed until a largescale national program, similar to those used in the Czech Republic, Hungary, and Poland, could be prepared. Meanwhile, ineffi- cient state industries went deep into recession, cancelling the effects of what had been a rather successful economic stabilization plan

in 1991.

International lenders, whose assistance was considered a vital ingredient in restructuring Bulgaria's economy, responded unevenly

to the events of 1992. Lenders demanded faster progress toward

a market system, but Bulgarian policy makers were wary of losing

public support by further cutting state subsidies for social programs.

In late 1992, Bulgaria agreed to repay part of the interest overdue

xliv
to its international commercial creditors, as a good-faith step toward

a 1993 debt settlement agreement. The additional expense, however, promised to exacerbate the budget deficit. Prospects for Bulgaria's commercial relations with Western Europe improved in late 1992 and early 1993. In March 1993, Bulgaria signed an agreement with the EC to establish a free-trade zone with that group over a ten-year transition period. A strong

incentive for the Europeans was bolstering Bulgaria as a stabiliz- ing influence in the chaotic Balkans. In an April resolution on its relations with Bulgaria, the European Parliament (the legislative

assembly of the EC) declared that no further guarantees of reform were needed because Bulgaria was on an irreversible line toward

a market economy—a judgment likely encouraged by Balkan geopolitics. The new EC-Bulgarian accords were to go into effect in

June 1993. In March 1993, Bulgaria also signed a free-trade agreement with

the European Free Trade Association (EFTA). Although at that

point only 3.5 percent of Bulgaria's exports went to EFTA member nations (Austria, Finland, Iceland, Liechtenstein, Norway,

Sweden, and Switzerland), the terms of the agreement made substantial expansion possible. Were the agreement ratified, 95 per- cent of Bulgarian industrial exports would have tariff-free access, while agricultural exports would be governed by bilateral arrangements.

Besides the drive for inclusion in West European economic groupings, the primary issue of Bulgarian foreign policy in early 1993 was preventing expansion of the Yugoslav crisis. In keeping with

its own consistent policy of nonintervention, Bulgaria warned the

other Balkan states to refrain from military involvement that might

return the entire region to the chaos that preceded World War I. Bulgaria opposed lifting the arms embargo on Bosnian Muslims,

predicting that such a move would expand the conflict between

Muslims and Serbs. Meanwhile, Bulgarian diplomats remained

in constant contact with Greece and Turkey while reiterating Bulgarian support for the independence of all four former Yugoslav

republics: Bosnia and Hercegovina, Croatia, Macedonia, and

Slovenia. Berov traveled to Moscow in March to discuss the Balkan

situation, trade, repayment of Russian debts to Bulgaria, and eco- nomic cooperation. No concrete decisions were made, although the

Bulgarian and Russian representatives noted their nations' harmony on the Balkan question. In early 1993, Bulgaria confirmed

its intention to rely on Russia and Ukraine as primary military

suppliers, choosing to maintain longstanding relations rather than

incur the greater expense of refitting Bulgarian forces with Western

xlv
equipment. According to official Bulgarian statements, no security threat was perceived from instability in any former Soviet

republic.

Ethnic minority issues remained without solution in 1992,

although no major open conflict resulted from continued tension

between minorities and Bulgarian nationalists. Although 1992

human rights legislation improved the legal status of minorities,

unemployment hit them especially hard, and as many as 40,000

Turks left Bulgaria in 1992. In the fall of 1992, the Roma (Gypsies) formed their first-ever national political organization in

response to their dire economic conditions. Prime Minister Berov,

whose government was nominally based on the ethnic-Turkish

MRF, openly discussed pressure tactics used by both Turks and

Bulgarian nationalists to influence ethnic self-identification in ethnically mixed regions. In 1993 those tactics still included campaigns

against restoration of Turkish names (following Zhivkov's mass renaming campaign) and campaigns against use of Turkish in

schools with Turkish populations, as well as forcible Turkicization

of Bulgarian Muslims preferring to live as Bulgarians. Berov

pledged to prevent human rights abuses on both sides, but little concrete change occurred in the first half of 1993.

Bulgaria began the fourth year of the post-Zhivkov era with

prospects less optimistic than in the previous years. The momentum of economic reform was slowed significantly by continued high

unemployment, rising inflation, low productivity, the resistance

of Zhivkov-era holdovers in large state industries, and, increasingly, the cynicism of the Bulgarian public toward the usefulness

of short-term sacrifice on the road to a market economy. The

ominously growing shadow of the former Bulgarian Communist

Party hung over the country, whose political system again collapsed

into chaos in late 1992. International prospects seemed somewhat

better, mainly because Bulgaria's designated role as a Balkan is- land of stability prompted increased Western support even when

internal political and economic conditions failed to match Western

expectations. But in 1993, the road from communism was proving much more rocky than most Bulgarians had anticipated; for

many Bulgarians, living standards were lower than under the Zhivkov regime, and patience was wearing thin.

May 15, 1993 Glenn E. Curtis

xlvi
Chapter 1. Historical Setting
Tsarevets Hill in Veliko Turnovo, capital of the Second Bulgarian Emp
THE HISTORY OF THE LAND now known as Bulgaria has

been determined by its location between Asia and Europe, by its proximity to powerful states competing for land and influence at the junction of trade routes and strategic military positions, and

by the strong national territorial drive of various Bulgarian states. Before the Christian era, Greece and Rome conquered the region

and left substantial imprints on the culture of the people they found

there. The Bulgar tribes, who arrived in the seventh century from

west of the Urals, have occupied the region continuously for thir- teen centuries. Over time Bulgarian culture merged with that of

the more numerous Slavs, who had preceded the Bulgars by one

century. After converting to Christianity and adopting a Slavic language in the ninth century, the Bulgarians consolidated a distinct

Slavic culture that subsequently passed through periods of both ex- pansionist independence and subordination to outside political

systems.

From the ninth until the fourteenth century, Bulgaria was a dominant force in the Balkans because of its aggressive military

tradition and strong sense of national identity. The chief rival and

neighbor, the Byzantine Empire, left a lasting political imprint on

two Bulgarian empires as it competed with them for regional domination. Marking the deterioration of both the Byzantine and the

Bulgarian political structures, the fall of Constantinople to the

Ottoman Turks in 1453 began four centuries of Turkish suppression of Bulgarian cultural and political institutions.

By the eighteenth century, however, weakening Ottoman control allowed a Bulgarian cultural revival. In the next century,

Western political ideas gradually combined with the reborn Bulgarian national consciousness to form an independence movement.

The movement was complicated by internal disagreement on aims

and methods, the increasing weakness of the Ottoman foothold in

Europe, and the conflicting attitudes of the major European powers toward Bulgaria. Russia gained distinction as Bulgaria's protector by driving out the Turks in 1877, but France and Britain

curbed Russian power in the Balkans by forcing establishment of a limited autonomous Bulgarian state under Turkish rule. The in- strument of that limitation, the Treaty of Berlin, revived longstanding Bulgarian territorial frustrations by placing the critical regions

of Macedonia and Thrace beyond Bulgarian control. Both of those

disputed regions had substantial Bulgarian populations. During

3
Bulgaria: A Country Study

the next sixty years, Bulgaria would fight unsuccessfully in four wars, in a variety of alliances, to redress the grievance. None of

the four wars brought substantial new territory to Bulgaria.

Beginning in 1878, Bulgaria was nominally ruled by members

of West European royal houses under a parliamentary form of

government. Prime Minister Stefan Stambolov unified the country during its first decade, but extremist political parties exerted

substantial influence from the beginning. Between 1878 and the

declaration of full independence in 1908, Bulgaria passed through

a period of peaceful modernization with expansion in industry,

science, education, and the arts. Modernization and industrialization sowed the seeds of class conflict, however, nurturing strong

socialist and agrarian opposition parties in the decades that followed

independence.

The period between 1912 and 1944 was full of irredentist wars and internal political turmoil. By 1900 Serbia and Greece were the

major territorial rivals, but a World War I alliance with Germany

gained Bulgaria litde advantage over them. After the war, the agrar- ian reform government of Aleksandur Stamboliiski had failed to unite the country by 1923. The series of unstable factions and forms

of government that followed Stamboliiski was broken only by Bulgaria' s participation as an Axis ally in World War II. Again no

territory was gained, but World War II brought Soviet occupation, the end of the monarchy, and forty-one years of unbroken

communist rule beginning in 1948. During that entire period, Bulgaria was the closest East European imitator of Soviet internal and

foreign policy. The years 1948 through 1989 were a time of collec- tivization, heavy industrialization, drastic restriction of human

rights, and close adherence to Soviet Cold-War policy.

Early Settlement and Empire

The land now known as Bulgaria attracted human settlement

as early as the Bronze Age. Almost from the first, however, exist- ing civilizations were challenged by powerful neighbors.

Pre-Bulgarian Civilizations

The first known civilization to dominate the territory of presentday Bulgaria was that of the Thracians, an Indo-European group.

Although politically fragmented, Thracian society is considered to have been comparable to that of Greece in the arts and economics; these achievements reached a peak in the sixth century B.C.

Because of political disunity, however, Thrace then was successively occupied and divided by the Greeks, the Persians, the

Macedonians, and the Romans. After the decline of the Macedonian Empire of Alexander the Great, a new Thracian kingdom

4
Thracian burial mound near Shipka Pass, central Bulgaria

Courtesy Sam and Sarah Stulberg

emerged in the third century B.C. Occupied by the Romans, it remained a kingdom within the Roman Empire until the emperor

Vespasian incorporated it as a district in the first century A.D.

Roman domination brought orderly administration and the establishment of Serditsa (on the site of modern Sofia) as a major trading center in the Balkans. In the fourth century A.D., when the

Roman Empire split between Rome and Constantinople, Thrace

became part of the Eastern, or Byzantine, Empire. Christianity was introduced to the region at this time. Both the Latin culture

of Rome and the Greek culture of Constantinople remained strong

influences on ensuing civilizations.

The Slavs and the Bulgars

Waves of Huns, Goths, Visigoths, and Ostrogoths invaded and

plundered the Balkans beginning in the third century A.D. None

of these invaders permanently occupied territory. Small Slavic

groups began settling outlying regions in the fifth century, and by

the seventh century the Slavs had overcome Byzantine resistance

and settled most of the Balkans. The Slavs brought a more stable

culture, retained their own language, and substantially slavicized

the existing Roman and Byzantine social system.

The immigration of the first Bulgars overlapped that of the Slavs

5
Bulgaria: A Country Study

in the seventh century. Of mixed Turkic stock (the word Bulgar

derives from an Old Turkic word meaning "one of mixed nationality"), the Bulgars were warriors who had migrated from a region

between the Urals and the Volga to the steppes north of the Caspian

Sea, then across the Danube into the Balkans. Besides a formidable reputation as military horsemen, the Bulgars had a strong political organization based on their khan (prince). In A.D. 630 a federation of Bulgar tribes already existed; in the next years the

Bulgars united with the Slavs to oppose Byzantine control. By 681

the khan Asparukh had forced Emperor Constantine V to recognize the first Bulgarian state. The state, whose capital was at Pliska, near modern Shumen, combined a Bulgarian political structure with Slavic linguistic and cultural institutions.

The First Golden Age

The First Bulgarian Empire was able to defeat the Byzantine

Empire in 81 1 and expand its territory eastward to the Black Sea,

south to include Macedonia, and northwest to present-day Belgrade

(see fig. 2). The kingdom reached its greatest size under Tsar

Simeon (893-927), who presided over a golden age of artistic and

commercial expansion. After moving deep into Byzantine terri- tory, Simeon was defeated in 924.

Meanwhile, Rome and Byzantium competed for political and

cultural influence in Bulgaria. The Eastern Empire won in 870,

when Bulgaria accepted Eastern Rite (Orthodox) Christianity and

an autocephalous Bulgarian Church was established. This decision

opened Bulgaria to Byzantine culture (and territorial ambitions)

through the literary language devised for the Slavs by the Orthodox monks Cyril and Methodius. Establishment of a common, offi- cial religion also permanently joined the Bulgarian and Slavic

cultures.

After reaching its peak under Simeon, the First Bulgarian Empire declined in the middle of the tenth century. Byzantine opposition and internal weakness led to a loss of territory to the Magyars

and the Russians. Bulgaria remained economically dependent on

the Byzantine Empire, and the widespread Bogomil heresy (see

Glossary) opposed the secular Bulgarian state and its political ambitions as work of the devil. Seeking to restore a balance of power

in the Balkans, the Byzantines allied with the Kievan Russians

under Yaroslav and invaded Bulgaria several times in the late tenth

century. Although the Bulgarians expanded their territory again

briefly under Tsar Samuil at the end of the tenth century, in 1014

the Byzantines under Basil II inflicted a major military loss. By

1018 all of Bulgaria was under Byzantine control. For nearly two

6
Historical Setting

centuries, the Byzantines ruled harshly, using taxes and the political power of the church to crush opposition. The first and second

Crusades passed through Bulgaria in this period, devastating the

land.

The Second Golden Age

By 1185 the power of the Byzantine Empire had again waned

because of external conflicts. The noble brothers Asen and Peter

led a revolt that forced Byzantine recognition of an autonomous Bulgarian state. Centered at Turnovo (present-day Veliko Turnovo),

this state became the Second Bulgarian Empire. Like the First Bulgarian Empire, the second expanded at the expense of a preoccupied

Byzantine Empire. In 1202 Tsar Kaloian (1197-1207) concluded

a final peace with Byzantium that gave Bulgaria full independence.

Kaloian also drove the Magyars from Bulgarian territory and in

1204 concluded a treaty with Rome that consolidated Bulgaria's

western border by recognizing the authority of the pope. By the

middle of the thirteenth century, Bulgaria again ruled from the

Black Sea to the Adriatic. Access to the sea greatly increased commerce, especially with the Italian Peninsula. Turnovo became the center of Bulgarian culture, which enjoyed a second golden age. The final phase of Bulgaria's second Balkan dominance was the

reign of Kaloian 's successor, Ivan Asen II (1218-41; see fig. 3). In this period, culture continued to flourish, but political instability again threatened. After the death of Ivan Asen II, internal and

external political strife intensified. Sensing weakness, the Tatars

began sixty years of raids in 1241, the Byzantines retook parts of

the Second Bulgarian Empire, and the Magyars again advanced.

From 1257 until 1277, aristocratic factions fought for control of

the Bulgarian throne. Heavy taxation by feudal landlords caused

their peasants to revolt in 1277 and enthrone the "swineherd tsar"

Ivailo. After 1300 Tatar control ended, and a new period of ex- pansion followed under Mikhail Shishman (1323-1330) and Ivan

Aleksandur (1331-1370). As before, however, military and commercial success paralleled internal disorder; the social chaos of the

previous century continued to erode the power of Bulgarian leaders. Meanwhile, Serbia had risen as a formidable rival in the

Balkans, and the Ottoman Turks had advanced to the Aegean coast. In the late fourteenth century, Bulgaria was weakened by the di- vision of its military defenses between the two perceived threats. Ottoman Rule

The Ottoman Empire was founded in the early fourteenth cen- tury by Osman I, a prince of Asia Minor (see Glossary) who began

7
Bulgaria: A Country Study

Figure 2. The First Bulgarian Empire under Simeon, A.D. 893-927

pushing the eastern border of the Byzantine Empire westward toward

Constantinople. Present-day European Turkey and the Balkans,

among the first territories conquered, were used as bases for ex- pansion far to the West during the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries. The capture of Constantinople in 1453 completed Ottoman

subjugation of major Bulgarian political and cultural institutions. Nevertheless, certain Bulgarian groups prospered in the highly or- dered Ottoman system, and Bulgarian national traditions continued

in rural areas. When the decline of the Ottoman Empire began about

1600, the order of local institutions gave way to arbitrary repression, which eventually generated armed opposition. Western ideas

that penetrated Bulgaria during the 1 700s stimulated a renewed concept of Bulgarian nationalism that eventually combined with decay

in the empire to loosen Ottoman control in the nineteenth century.

8
Historical Setting

Introduction of the Ottoman System

Ottoman forces captured the commercial center of Sofia in 1385.

Serbia, then the strongest Christian power in the Balkans, was decisively defeated by the Ottomans at the Battle of Kosovo Polje in

1389, leaving Bulgaria divided and exposed. Within ten years, the

last independent Bulgarian outpost was captured. Bulgarian re- sistance continued until 1453, when the capture of Constantinople gave the Ottomans a base from which to crush local uprisings.

In consolidating its Balkan territories, the new Ottoman political

order eliminated the entire Bulgarian state apparatus. The Ottomans also crushed the nobility as a landholding class and potential center of resistance. The new rulers reorganized the Bulgarian

church, which had existed as a separate patriarchate since 1235,

making it a diocese under complete control of the Byzantine Patriarchate at Constantinople. The sultan, in turn, totally controlled

the patriarchate.

The Ottomans ruled with a centralized system much different

from the scattered local power centers of the Second Bulgarian Empire. The single goal of Ottoman policy in Bulgarian territory was

to make all local resources available to extend the empire westward

toward Vienna and across northern Africa. Landed estates were

given in fiefdom to knights bound to serve the sultan. Peasants paid

multiple taxes to both their masters and the government. Territorial

control also meant cultural and religious assimilation of the populace

into the empire. Ottoman authorities forcibly converted the most

promising Christian youths to Islam and trained them for government service. Called pomaks, such converts often received special

privileges and rose to high administrative and military positions.

The Ottoman system also recognized the value of Bulgarian arti- sans, who were organized and given limited autonomy as a separate

class. Some prosperous Bulgarian peasants and merchants became

intermediaries between local Turkish authorities and the peasants.

In this capacity, these chorbadzhi (squires) were able to moderate

Ottoman policy. On the negative side, the Ottoman assimilation

policy also included resettlement of Balkan Slavs in Asia Minor

and immigration of Turkish peasants to farm Bulgarian land. Slavs

also were the victims of mass enslavement and forcible mass conversion to Islam in certain areas. Bulgarian Society under the Turks

Traditional Bulgarian culture survived only in the smaller vil- lages during the centuries of Ottoman rule. Because the administrative apparatus of the Ottoman Empire included officials of many

nationalities, commerce in the polyglot empire introduced Jews,

9
Bulgaria: A Country Study

Source: Based on information from Christ Atanasoff, The Bulgarians, Hicksville, New York,

1977, 37; and Hermann Kinder and Werner Hilgemann, The Anchor Atlas of World

History, 1, Garden City, New York, 1974, 204.

Figure 3. The Second Bulgarian Empire under Ivan Asen, 1218-41

Armenians, Dalmatians, and Greeks into the chief population

centers. Bulgarians in such centers were forcibly resettled as part

of a policy to scatter the potentially troublesome educated classes. The villages, however, were often ignored by the centralized Ottoman authorities, whose control over the Turkish landholders often

exerted a modifying influence that worked to the advantage of the

indigenous population. Village church life also felt relatively little impact from the centralized authority of the Greek Orthodox Church.

Therefore, between the fourteenth and seventeenth centuries, the

villages became isolated repositories of Bulgarian folk culture,

religion, social institutions, and language.

Early Decay and Upheaval in the Empire

Notable Bulgarian uprisings against the Ottomans occurred in

10
Historical Setting

the 1590s, the 1680s and the 1730s; all sought to take advantage

of external crises of the empire, and all were harshly suppressed.

Beginning in the 1600s, local bandits, called hajduti (sing. , hajdutin),

led small uprisings (see fig. 4). Some writers now describe these

uprisings as precursors of a Bulgarian nationalist movement. Most

scholars agree, however, that hajdutin activities responded only to

local misrule and their raids victimized both Christians and Muslims. Whatever their motivation, hajdutin exploits became a central theme of national folk culture.

By 1600 the Ottoman Empire had reached the peak of its power

and territorial control. In the seventeenth century, the empire began

to collapse; the wealth of conquest had spread corruption through

the political system, vitiating the ability of the central government

to impose order throughout the farflung empire. For the majority

of people in agricultural Bulgaria, centralized Ottoman control had

been far from intolerable while the empire was orderly and strong.

But the growing despotism of local authorities as the central government declined created a new class of victims. Increasingly, Bulgarians welcomed the progressive Western political ideas that

reached them through the Danube trade and travel routes. Already

in the 1600s, Catholic missionaries in western Bulgaria had stimulated creation of literature about Bulgaria's national past. Although

the Turks suppressed this Western influence after the Chiprovets

uprising of 1688, the next century brought an outpouring of historical writings reminding Bulgarian readers of a glorious national

heritage.

National Revival, Early Stages

For Bulgaria the eighteenth century brought transition from static subservience within a great Asian empire toward intellectual and

political modernization and reestablishment of cultural ties with

Western Europe. The monasteries of an increasingly independent

Bulgarian church fostered national thought and writing; Western

influences altered the nature of commerce and landholding in the

Balkans; and the forcible assimilation of Bulgarian culture into a cosmopolitan Asian society ended, allowing Bulgarian national consciousness to reawaken. At the same time, social anarchy inhibited the liberation process. These developments set the stage for a full national revival.

The Written Word

In the eighteenth century, all Slavic cultures moved away from

the formal Old Church Slavonic language that had dominated their

literatures for centuries. The literary language that emerged was

11
Bulgaria: A Country Study

• Populated place

j'

| Area of hajdutin activity lOO 200 Kilometers 100 200 Miles

Source: Based on information from Ilcho Dimitrov (ed.), Kratka istoriia na Bulgariia, Sofia, 1981, 153; and Hermann Kinder and Werner Hilgemann, The Anchor Atlas of World

History, 1, Garden City, New York, 1974, 208.

Figure 4. Hajdutin Activity in the Ottoman Empire, 1600-1800

much closer to the common vernacular, eventually making books

accessible to a much wider readership. In 1741 Hristofor Zhefarovich

published his Stematografia, a discussion of the cultural history of

the Serbs and the Bulgarians. The book displayed the Bulgarian

coat of arms and praised the glorious past of the Bulgarian people.

In 1762 Father Paisi of Hilendar wrote a history of the Bulgarian

peoples in a mixture of Old Church Slavonic and vernacular language. Circulated in manuscript form for nearly one hundred years, the book was a lively, readable celebration of the Bulgarian past

and a call for all Bulgarians to remember their heritage and culti- vate their native language. Paisi' s history inspired generations of

writings on Bulgarian patriotic themes. In part, its influence was

strong because Paisi wrote at a monastery on Mt. Athos, the largest spiritual center in the Balkans and an early receptacle of ideas

12
Historical Setting

of the European Enlightenment (see Glossary). Paisi's follower

Sofronii Vrachanski further developed the literature by using a much more vernacular language to advance secular ideas of the

Enlightenment in translations of Greek myths and his original Life

and Tribulations of the Sinner Sofronii. Sofronii also published the first printed book in Bulgaria in 1806.

Commerce and Western Influences

Under the Ottoman Empire, the Mediterranean and Asian trade routes met in Bulgaria. Fairs and regional markets eventually

brought tradesmen into contact with their foreign counterparts.

After centuries of exclusion from population centers by Turkish

policy, Bulgarians began migrating back to the towns, establishing an urban ethnic presence. By the eighteenth century, trade

guilds included many workers in cloth, metal, wood, and decorative braid. The estate holders of Macedonia also profited from growing European cotton markets. Some Bulgarian merchants assumed

positions as intermediaries between Turkish and European markets, grew rich from such connections, and established offices in

the major European capitals. As the Bulgarian cultural revival

spread from the monasteries into secular society, these newly

wealthy groups promoted secular art, architecture, literature, and

Western ideals of individual freedom and national consciousness.

Of particular impact were the ideals of the French Revolution, in- troduced through commercial connections at the start of the

nineteenth century.

The end of centralized Ottoman power over Bulgarian territory

brought several decades of anarchy, called the kurdzhaliistvo, at the

end of the eighteenth century. As at the end of the Second Bulgarian Empire four hundred years before, local freebooters controlled

small areas, tyrannized the population, and fought among themselves. Political order was not reestablished in Bulgaria until 1820.

Meanwhile, large population shifts occurred as Bulgarians fled the

taxation and violence inflicted by this anarchic condition; the new

communities they founded in Romania and southern Russia were

important sources of cultural and political ideas in the nineteenth

century.

The Bulgarian national revival took place in the larger context

of Christian resistance to Turkish occupation of Eastern and Central Europe—a cause whose momentum increased as the Ottoman

Empire crumbled from within. Russia fought a series of wars with

the Turks between 1676 and 1878, and was given the right to protect Christians living under Ottoman rule in treaties signed in 1774

and 1791 . Those treaties granted semiautonomy to the Romanian

13
Bulgaria: A Country Study

regions of Wallachia and Moldavia, which gave hope that Russia

might provide similar help to Bulgaria during the kurdzhaliistvo. Intellectual ties between Bulgaria and Russia promoted the adoption

of Russian revolutionary thought along with Western influences.

In 1804 Sofronii offered the help of the entire Bulgarian people

to Russian armies fighting the Turks and moving toward Bulgarian territory. By 1811 a special volunteer army of several thousand Bulgarians had been formed, in the hope that Russian success against the Turks would liberate Bulgaria. Although the Russians

did not aid the Bulgarians directly at that time, Russia remained

crucial to Bulgarian foreign relations from that time to the late twentieth century.

European and Russian Policies, 1800

By 1800 the Ottoman Empire was universally labeled ''The Sick

Man of Europe." The empire was precariously near total collapse

and ready to be dismantled by a powerful neighbor, just as the

Byzantine Empire had been dismantied by the Ottomans. In this case the logical successor was Russia, an expanding empire with

strong religious and cultural ties to the captive Slavic groups. Russia

also had a continuing desire to achieve access to the Mediterra- nean Sea. Russian military power reached its peak with the defeat

of Napoleon's invading army in 1812, but throughout the nineteenth century France and Britain used diplomatic and military means to counterbalance Russian influence in the Balkans and the

Bosporus. This implicit defense of the Ottoman Empire delayed

Bulgarian independence, but the intellectual basis of revolution grew

rapidly in the nineteenth century.

The Bulgarian Independence Movement

Revolution in the Balkans

In 1804 Serbia began a series of uprisings that won it autonomy

within the Ottoman Empire by 1830. Especially in the campaigns

of 1804 and 1815. many Bulgarians in areas adjacent to Serbia

fought beside the Serbs. When the Greeks revolted against Turkish rule in 1821, Bulgarian towns provided money and soldiers.

Several hundred Bulgarians fought in the six-year Greek uprising, some of them as commanders, and some became part of the government of independent Greece. Bulgarians also fought the Turks in

Crete: in addition, they fought with the Italian revolutionary

Giuseppe Garibaldi and with other nationalist uprisings against

the Habsburgs in 1848-49. In spite of Bulgarian sympathy for national liberation movements nearby, and although the ideals of those

14
Turkish mosque, Kyustendil

Courtesy Sam and Sarah Stulberg

movements permeated the Balkans from 1804 on, the anarchy of

the early 1800s confined expression of Bulgarian national feeling

primarily to the cultural realm until the 1860s.

Cultural Expressions of Nationalism

In 1824 Dr. Petur Beron, a member of the Bulgarian emigrant

community in Romania, published the first primer in colloquial Bulgarian. His book also explained a new system of secular education

to replace the outdated precepts of monastery pedagogy, and Beron'

suggestions strongly influenced the development of Bulgarian education in the nineteenth century. In 1835 a school was opened in Gabrovo according to Beron's design. Under direction of the monk

Neofit Rilski, it was the first school to teach in Bulgarian. Similar

schools opened in the ensuing years, and in 1840 the first school

for girls opened in Pleven. Education grew especially fast in trading towns such as Koprivshtitsa and Kalofer in the foothills of the

Balkans, where textiles and other trades created a wealthy merchant

class. In the 1840s, the first generation of Western-educated Bulgarians returned home. Forming a cosmopolitan intelligentsia, they

diversified and expanded Bulgarian schools in the following decades. In the first half of the 1800s, special educational and cultural ties developed with Russia and France. In 1840 the Russian government

15
Bulgaria: A Country Study

began awarding grants for Bulgarian students to study in Russia.

The total number of students in the Russian program was never

high, but several graduates were leaders in the independence drive

of the 1870s. Several notable Bulgarians of that generation also were educated in France and at Robert College, founded as a missionary institution in Constantinople.

Parallel with educational advancement, Bulgarian book printing advanced substantially after 1830. Before that date only seventeen original Bulgarian titles had been printed; but by mid-century,

printing had replaced manuscript copying as the predominant means of distributing the written word. The first periodical was

printed in Bulgarian in 1844, beginning an outpouring of mostly

ephemeral journals through the nineteenth century. Censorship before 1878 meant that the majority of such journals were printed

in the Romanian emigrant centers, outside the Ottoman Empire.

Most Bulgarian-language periodicals printed within the empire came from Constantinople, showing the cultural importance of that

city to the Bulgarian National Revival. After 1850 Bulgarian emigre

periodicals, supporting a wide variety of political views toward the

national independence movement, played a vital role in stimulating Bulgarian political consciousness.

In the mid- 1800s, a number of cultural and charitable organizations founded in Constantinople supported and directed Bulgarian

national institutions that resisted Ottoman and Greek influence.

The social institution of the chitalishte (literally "reading room")

played an important cultural role beginning in 1856. Established

in population centers by adult education societies, the chitalishte was

a center for social gatherings, lectures, performances, and debates.

Because it was available to the entire public, this institution spread

national cultural and political ideals beyond the intelligentsia to the larger society. By 1878 there were 131 such centers. The Bulgarian National Revival also stimulated the arts in the

nineteenth century. Dobri Chintulov wrote the first poetry in

modern Bulgarian in the 1840s, pioneering a national literary

revival that peaked in the 1870s. Translation of Western European

and Russian literature accelerated, providing new influences that

broke centuries of rigid formalism. Painting and architecture now

also broke from the prescribed forms of Byzantine church art to express secular and folk themes. Bulgarian wood-carving and church

singing assumed the forms that survive today.

Religious Independence

The Bulgarian church achieved new independence in the nineteenth century. The Ottoman Empire had left the Bulgarian church

16
Historical Setting

hierarchy under the Greek Patriarchate of Constantinople for four

centuries, disregarding the differences between the two Orthodox

churches. (The last separate Bulgarian church jurisdiction, the archbishopric of Ohrid, was absorbed in 1767.) Early in the 1800s, few

of the Bulgarian church leaders most closely connected with Enlightenment ideas sought separation from the Greek Orthodox

Church. But in 1839, a movement began against the Greek

Metropolitan of Turnovo, head of the largest Bulgarian diocese,

in favor of local control. In 1849 the active Bulgarian community

of Constantinople began pressing Turkish officials for church

sovereignty. Other large Bulgarian dioceses both inside and outside Bulgaria sought a return to liturgy in the vernacular and appointment of Bulgarian bishops. The first concession came in 1848,

when the Greek patriarch of Constantinople allowed one Bulgarian church in that city.

Because a decade of petitions, demonstrations, and Ottoman re- form suggestions had brought no major change, in 1860 Bishop

Ilarion Makariopolski of Constantinople declared his diocese in- dependent of the Greek patriarchate. This action began a move- ment for ecclesiastical independence that united rural and urban

Bulgarians and began a bitter Greek-Bulgarian dispute. The Turks

and the Russians began to mediate in 1866, seeking a compromise

that would ensure the security of each in the face of increasing

regional unrest. In 1870 the Ottoman sultan officially declared the

Bulgarian church a separate exarchate. The Greek patriarchate,

which never recognized the separation, excommunicated the entire Bulgarian church; but the symbolism of the Ottoman decree

had powerful political effect. The new exarchate became the leading force in Bulgarian cultural life; it officially represented the Bulgarians in dealing with the Turks, and it sponsored Bulgarian

schools. The novel administrative system of the exarchate called

for lay representation in governing bodies, thus introducing a note

of self-government into this most visible institution.

Early Insurrections

The social and cultural events of the National Revival moved

parallel to important political changes. Bulgarian aid to the Russians in the Russo-Turkish wars of 1806-12 and 1828-29 did nothing to loosen Ottoman control. Then the Ottoman Empire ruthlessly

quelled major Bulgarian uprisings in 1835 (in Turnovo), 1841 (in

Nis), and in 1850-51 (in Vidin). Those uprisings still bore the

disorganized qualities of the hajduti, but, together with smaller move- ments in intervening years, they established a tradition of insurrection for the next generation. Meanwhile, beset by European

17
Bulgaria: A Country Study

enemies and internal revolutions, the Turks entered a reform period

in 1826. They replaced the elite but increasingly untrustworthy

Janissary forces with a regular army and officially abolished the

feudal land system. These changes reduced oppression by the local Turkish rulers in Bulgaria. In the 1830s, Sultan Mahmud II recentralized and reorganized his government to gain control over his

corrupt officials and follow European administrative models.

Although these changes had little direct effect on Bulgaria, they

clearly signaled to the Slavic subjects of the empire that reform was now possible.

Balkan Politics of the Mid-Nineteenth Century

By 1850 the emerging Bulgarian nationalist movement had split

into two distinct branches. The moderates, concentrated in Constantinople, favored gradual improvement of conditions in Bulgaria

through negotiations with the Turkish government. This was the

approach that created a separate Bulgarian exarchate in 1870. The

moderates believed that the protection of the Ottoman Empire was

necessary because a free Bulgaria would be subject to Balkan politics and great-power manipulation. The radical faction, however, saw no hope of gradual reform. Following their understanding of

European liberal tradition and Russian revolutionary thought, the

leaders of this faction aimed first for liberation from all outside controls. Liberation, they believed, would automatically lead to complete modernization of Bulgarian society.

The crushing of the large-scale Vidin peasant revolt in 1851

brought intervention by Britain and France, who bolstered and protected the Ottoman Empire throughout the nineteenth century as a counterweight to Russian expansion. To prevent destabilizing

unrest, Britain and France forced the Turks to introduce land re- form in western Bulgaria in the early 1850s and a series of major

social reforms in 1856 and 1876. Nominally, those measures in- cluded equal treatment for non-Muslims in the empire and

parliamentary representation for Bulgarians and Serbs. These

changes, however, were the cosmetic product of Turkey's need for Western support in major wars with Russia. They did nothing to blunt the nationalist drive of the Bulgarian radicals.

The First Independence Organizations

In 1862 Georgi Rakovski assembled the first armed group of Bulgarians having the avowed goal of achieving independence from

the Ottoman Empire. Rakovski, well-educated and experienced

in the 1841 uprising and the drive for ecclesiastical independence,

envisioned a federal republic including all Balkan nations except

18
Historical Setting

Greece. His fighters were to stir a full-scale national uprising after crossing into Bulgaria from assembly points in Romania and Serbia.

But the Serbs, who had supported the Bulgarians while they were

useful in opposing the Turks, disbanded the Bulgarian legions in

Serbia when they no longer served that purpose. Although Rakovski

died in 1867 without achieving Bulgarian independence, he united

the emigre intelligentsia, and the presence of his army influenced

Turkish recognition of the Bulgarian church in 1870.

The Bulgarian Secret Central Committee, founded by emigre

Bulgarians in Bucharest in 1866, continued Rakovski 's mission

under the leadership of Vasil Levski and Liuben Karavelov. These

ideologues refined Rakovski' s idea of armed revolutionary groups,

creating a cadre of intellectuals who would prepare the people to

rise for independence. Beginning in 1868, Levski founded the first revolutionary committees in Bulgaria. Captured by the Turks, he

became a national hero when he was hanged in 1873. In 1870

Karavelov founded the Bulgarian Revolutionary Central Committee (BRCC) in Bucharest. The death of Levski temporarily shattered the group, but the committee resumed its activities when

Georgi Benkovski joined its leadership in 1875. By this time, the

political atmosphere of the Balkans was charged with revolution,

and the Ottoman Empire looked increasingly vulnerable. Britain,

Russia, and Austria-Hungary were growing concerned about the

implications of those trends for the European balance of power.

In 1875 Bosnia and Hercegovina revolted successfully against the

Turks, and the next year Serbia and Montenegro attacked the Ottoman Empire.

The Final Move to Independence

In the early 1870s, the BRCC had built an intricate revolutionary organization, recruiting thousands of ardent patriots for the

liberation struggle. Finally, in 1875 the committee believed that

external distractions had weakened the Ottoman Empire enough

to activate that struggle. Local revolutionary committees in Bulgaria attempted to coordinate the timing and strategy of a general

revolt. Armed groups were to enter Bulgaria from abroad to support local uprisings, and diversionary attacks on Ottoman military installations were planned. Despite these efforts at coordination,

the BRCC strategy failed. Although planned as a general revolt,

the September Uprising of 1875 occurred piecemeal in isolated lo- cations, and several local revolutionary leaders failed to mobilize

any forces. The Turks easily suppressed the uprising, but the harsh- ness of their response attracted the attention of Western Europe;

from that time, the fate of Bulgaria became an international issue.

19
Bulgaria: A Country Study

Following the failure of the September Uprising, Benkovski re- organized the BRCC and made plans for a new revolt. The April

Uprising of 1876 was more widespread, but it also suffered from

poor coordination. Poor security allowed the Turks to locate and

destroy many local groups before unified action was possible. Massacres at Batak and other towns further outraged international opinion by showing the insincerity of recent Turkish reform proposals.

The deaths of an estimated 30,000 Bulgarians in these massacres

spurred the Bulgarian national movement. An international conference in Constantinople produced proposals to curb the Muslim

fanaticism responsible for the Bulgarian massacres and give local self-government to the Christians on European territory in the empire. Two autonomous Bulgarian regions were proposed, one cen- tered at Sofia and the other at Turnovo. When the sultan rejected

the reforms, Russia declared war unilaterally in early 1877. This was Russia's golden opportunity to gain control of Western trade routes to its southwest and finally destroy the empire that had

blocked this ambition for centuries. Shocked by the Turkish massacres, Britain did not oppose Russian advances.

San Stefano, Berlin, and Independence

In eight months, Russian troops occupied all of Bulgaria and

reached Constantinople. At this high point of its influence on Balkan

affairs, Russia dictated the Treaty of San Stefano in March 1878.

This treaty provided for an autonomous Bulgarian state (under Russian protection) almost as extensive as the First Bulgarian Empire,

bordering the Black and Aegean seas. But Britain and AustriaHungary, believing that the new state would extend Russian in- fluence too far into the Balkans, exerted strong diplomatic pres- sure that reshaped the Treaty of San Stefano four months later into

the Treaty of Berlin. The new Bulgaria would be about one-third

the size of that prescribed by the Treaty of San Stefano; Macedonia and Thrace, south of the Balkans, would revert to complete

Ottoman control. The province of Eastern Rumelia would remain

under Turkish rule, but with a Christian governor (see fig. 5). Whereas the Treaty of San Stefano called for two years of Russian occupation of Bulgaria, the Treaty of Berlin reduced the time

to nine months. Both treaties provided for an assembly of Bulgarian notables to write a constitution for their new country. The as- sembly would also elect a prince who was not a member of a major

European ruling house and who would recognize the authority of

the Ottoman sultan. In cases of civil disruption, the sultan retained

the right to intervene with armed force. The final provisions for Bulgarian liberation fell far short of the

20
Statue of lane Sandanski, nineteenth-century revolutionary, Melnik

Courtesy Sam and Sarah Stulberg

21
Bulgaria: A Country Study

goals of the national liberation movement. Large populations of

Bulgarians remained outside the new nation in Macedonia, Eastern

Rumelia, and Thrace, causing resentment that endured well into

the next century. (Bulgarians still celebrate the signing of the Treaty

of San Stefano rather than the Treaty of Berlin as their national

independence day.) In late 1878, a provisional Bulgarian government and armed uprisings had already surfaced in the Kresna and

Razlog regions of Macedonia. These uprisings were quelled swiftly

by the Turks with British support. During the next twenty-five

years, large numbers of Bulgarians fled Macedonia into the new

Bulgaria, and secret liberation societies appeared in Macedonia

and Thrace. One such group, the Internal Macedonian Revolutionary Organization (IMRO), continued terrorist activities in the

Balkans into the 1930s.

The Decades of National Consolidation

Despite strong dissatisfaction with the frontiers imposed by the

European powers, a new Bulgarian state was born in 1878. And

despite early political uncertainty, the first thirty-four years of

modern Bulgaria were in many ways its most prosperous and

productive.

Forming the New State In 1879 a constituent assembly was duly convened in Turnovo.

Partly elected and partly appointed, the assembly of 230 split into

conservative and liberal factions similar to those that had existed

before independence. The liberals advocated continuing the alli- ance of peasants and intelligentsia that had formed the independence movement, to be symbolized in a single parliamentary

chamber; the conservatives argued that the Bulgarian peasant class was not ready for political responsibility, and therefore it should

be represented in a second chamber with limited powers. The framework for the Turnovo constitution was a draft submitted by the

Russian occupation authorities, based on the constitutions of Ser- bia and Romania. As the assembly revised that document, the lib- eral view prevailed; a one-chamber parliament or subranie would

be elected by universal male suffrage. Between the annual fall ses- sions of the subranie, the country would be run jointly by the

monarch and a council of ministers responsible to parliament. The

liberals who dominated the assembly incorporated many of their

revolutionary ideals into what became one of the most liberal constitutions of its time. The final act of the Turnovo assembly was

the election of Alexander of Battenburg, a young German nobleman

22
Historical Setting

who had joined the Russians in the war of 1877, to be the first prince of modern Bulgaria.

From the beginning of his reign, Alexander opposed the liberal

wing in Bulgaria and the Turnovo constitution. After two years

of conflict with the liberal council of ministers headed by Dragan

Tsankov, Alexander received Russian backing to replace Tsankov.

When the Russian Tsar Alexander II was assassinated, Russian

policy changed to allow a grand national assembly to consider the

constitutional changes desired by Prince Alexander. The assassination had spurred conservatism in Russia, and the Bulgarian liberals had alarmed the Russians by refusing foreign economic aid in

the early 1880s. To the dismay of the liberals, Russia intervened

in the election of the constitutional subranie, frightening voters into

electing a group that passed the entire package of amendments.

Liberal influence was sharply reduced by amendments limiting the

power of the subranie. But, because the conservative approach to governing Bulgaria had little popular support, Alexander made a

series of compromises with liberal positions between 1881 and 1885.

The Turnovo constitution was essentially restored by agreement

between Tsankov and the conservatives in 1883, and the constitutional issue was resolved. In only the first two years of Bulgaria's

existence, two parliaments and seven cabinets had been dissolved,

but more stable times lay ahead.

By 1884 the conservative faction had left the government, but

the liberals split over the high price of purchasing the Ruse-Varna

Railway from the British, as required by the Treaty of Berlin. As

on earlier issues, the more radical faction sought to reduce the in- fluence of the European powers who had imposed the Treaty of

Berlin. This group was led by Petko Karavelov, brother of revolutionary leader Liuben Karavelov and prime minister in the mid18808.

The most important issue of that period was Bulgaria's changing relationship with Russia. Bulgarian hostility towards the Russian army, refusal to build a strategic railway for the Russians

through Bulgaria, and poor relations between Prince Alexander

and Tsar Alexander III of Russia all contributed to increasing alie- nation. Because conservative Russia now feared unrest in the

Balkans, Karavelov tried to appease the tsar by quelling the uprisings that continued in Macedonia. Radical factions in Bulgaria were persuaded to lower their goals from annexation of Macedonia and

Thrace to a union between Bulgaria and Eastern Rumelia. When

a bloodless coup achieved this union in 1885, however, Russia

demanded the ouster of Prince Alexander and withdrew all Russian

23
Bulgaria: A Country Study

® Capital Boundary according to Treaty of San Stefano, • Populated place March 1878 100 200 Kilometers

I

'

1 1

1 Boundary according to 100 200 Miles Treaty of Berlin, July 1878

Source: Based on information from R.J. Crampton, A Short History of Bulgaria, Cambridge,

1987, frontispiece.

Figure 5. Territorial Changes in Bulgaria, 1878-85

officers from the Bulgarian army. Greece and Serbia saw their

interests threatened, and the latter declared war on Bulgaria.

The Bulgarian army won a brilliant victory over Serbia, with no Russian aid, at the Battle of Slivnitsa. Although the victory was

a source of great national pride for Bulgaria, Russia continued to withhold recognition of the union with Eastern Rumelia until Prince

Alexander abdicated. Finally, Russian-trained Bulgarian army

officers deposed the prince in August 1886.

The Stambolov Years

When Alexander left behind a three-man regency headed by

Stefan Stambolov, the Bulgarian government was as unstable as

it had been in its first year. A Russian-educated liberal, Stambolov

became prime minister in 1887 and ceased tailoring Bulgarian policy

to Russian requirements. The tsar's special representative in

24
Historical Setting

Bulgaria returned to Russia after failing to block a subranie called

to nominate a new prince. Russo-Bulgarian relations remained

chilly for the next ten years, and this break further destabilized

Bulgarian politics and society. Stambolov brutally suppressed an army uprising in 1887 and began seven years of iron control that

often bypassed the country's democratic institutions but brought

unprecedented stability to Bulgaria. Meanwhile, Ferdinand of SaxeCoburg-Gotha, a Catholic German prince, accepted the Bulgarian throne in August 1887.

Independence from the Ottoman Empire brought drastic eco- nomic and social changes to Bulgaria at the end of the nineteenth

century. Industrialization proceeded rapidly (thirty-six major fac- tories opened between 1878 and 1887), and a new class of industrial labor formed from displaced artisans and agricultural workers.

Harsh working conditions led the urban poor to the cause of so- cialism, and in 1891 the Social Democratic Party was formed. (Later

transformation of one of its factions into the Bulgarian Communist

Party made that organization the oldest communist party in the

world.) Town-centered trade and the guild structure were swept

away by an influx of West European commerce to which Bulgaria

had been opened by the terms of the Treaty of Berlin.

Despite industrialization, Bulgaria remained primarily an agricul- tural country. Liberation eliminated the Ottoman feudal landholding system. Bulgarian peasants were able to buy land cheaply or simply occupy it after Turkish landlords left, and a system of villagebased small landholding began. Agricultural production rose in spite

of heavy government land taxes. Many peasants were forced into

the urban work force by taxes or high interest on borrowings for land purchase. Until the end of the nineteenth century, the vast majority of the Bulgarian population were small landholders or in- dependent small tradesmen.

Russia and the other great powers did not recognize Ferdinand

as rightful prince of Bulgaria until 1896. Supporters of Prince Alexander who remained in power used this failure as a weapon against

the policies of Ferdinand and Stambolov. In 1890 a widespread

plot against the government was discovered. As before, the basis

of the plot was dissatisfaction with Stambolov 's refusal to intercede with the Turks on behalf of Macedonian independence. In

a masterful diplomatic stroke, Stambolov represented the insurrection to the Turks as an example of potential chaos that could

be avoided by minor concessions. Fearing the Balkan instability

that would follow an overthrow of Ferdinand, the Turks then ceded

three major Macedonian dioceses to the Bulgarian exarchate. Stambolov thus gained solid church support and an overwhelming victory

25
Bulgaria: A Country Study

in the 1890 election, which legitimized his government among all Bulgarian factions and reduced the threat of radical plots.

In the next years, Stambolov and the People's Liberal Party he

had founded in 1886 exerted virtually dictatorial power to suppress

extreme nationalism and opposing parties and create conditions

for economic growth. After the 1886 coup, the army was strictly

controlled. Voters were intimidated to ensure the reelection of in- cumbent officials, and political patronage grew rampant. Using

his own and Ferdinand's ties with Germany and Austria-Hungary,

Stambolov built a capitalist Bulgarian economic system on foreign

loans, protectionism, an expanded industrial and transport infrastructure, and a strict tax system for capital accumulation. Especially important to the Bulgarian economy was completion of the

Vienna-to-Constantinople Railway through Bulgaria in 1888 and

the Burgas-Yambol Railway in the early 1890s. Stambolov derived

strong political support from the entrepreneurs who benefited from

his industrial policy. The Stambolov era marked the victory of

executive over legislative power in the Bulgarian political system.

Legitimacy of the Bulgarian throne remained an important symbolic issue in the early 1890s, and the threat of assassination or overthrow of the prince remained after Stambolov consolidated his

power. Therefore, Stambolov found a Catholic wife for Ferdinand

and maneuvered past Orthodox Church objections in 1893 to en- sure Ferdinand an heir that would stabilize the throne. That heir,

Boris, was born the next year. Meanwhile, Stambolov' s autocratic

maneuvering and tough policies won him many enemies, especially

after the stabilization of the early 1890s appeared to make such

tactics unnecessary. In 1894 Ferdinand dismissed his prime minister

because the prince sought more power for himself and believed that

Stambolov had become a political liability. The next year, Macedonian radicals assassinated Stambolov.

The Rule of Ferdinand

The new administration was mainly conservative, and Ferdinand

became the dominant force in Bulgarian policy making. His position grew stronger when Russia finally recognized him in 1896. The

price for recognition was the conversion of Prince Boris to Orthodoxy from Catholicism. The Russian attitude had changed for two

reasons: Alexander III had died in 1894, and new Turkish massacres had signaled a collapse of the Ottoman Empire that would

threaten Russian and Bulgarian interests alike. In the next twenty

years, no strong politician like Stambolov emerged, and Ferdinand was able to accumulate power by manipulating factions. Several lib- eral and conservative parties, the descendants of the two preliberation

26
Historical Setting

groups, held power through 1912 in a parliamentary system that

seldom functioned according to the constitution. The Bulgarian

Social Democratic Party took its place in the new political order,

advocating class struggle, recruiting members from the working

class, and organizing strikes. After relations with Russia had been repaired, Bulgaria's in- ternational position stabilized, allowing the economy to continue

growing undisturbed until 1912. In this period, the government

continued active intervention in agriculture and industry; it promoted new agricultural methods that improved the yield from fertile lands still being reclaimed from the Turks in 1900. Bulgarian

economic growth continued because of a combination of factors: borrowing from West European industrial countries, a strong banking system, and a generally sound investment policy. Between 1887

and 1911, the number of industrial plants grew from 36 to 345.

But the government's financial policy greatly increased the national

debt, which by 1911 was three times the national budget and re- quired 20 percent of the budget for interest payment. New land

taxes and grain tithes were levied in the 1890s, leading to peasant

revolts. In 1899 the Bulgarian Agrarian Union was founded, the

result of a decade of growing rural discontent and resentment

against the intellectual and governing class. Within two years, the

union had evolved into an official party, the Bulgarian Agrarian

National Union (BANU), which was accepted by most Bulgarian

peasants as truly representing their interests. Soon, Bulgarian politicians viewed BANU as the most potent political group in the

country.

The Macedonian Issue Macedonian unrest continued into the twentieth century. Between 1894 and 1896, the government of Konstantin Stoilov

reversed Stambolov's policy of controlling Macedonian extremists.

When he sought to negotiate with the Turks for territorial concessions in Macedonia at the end of the century, Stoilov found that

he could not control IMRO. By 1900 that group, which advocated

Macedonian autonomy over the standard Bulgarian policy goal of

annexation, had gained control of the Macedonian liberation move- ment inside Bulgaria. Russia and the Western powers now held

Ferdinand responsible for all disruptions in Macedonia, causing

suspicion of all Bulgarian activity in the Balkans. Greece and Ser- bia also laid claim to parts of Macedonia, giving them vital interests in the activities of IMRO as well. In 1902 Russia and AustriaHungary forced Serbia and Bulgaria to cut all ties with IMRO.

27
Bulgaria: A Country Study

In 1903 Macedonian liberation forces staged a widespread revolt,

the Ilinden-Preobrazhensko Uprising. Despite strong public support for the Macedonian cause, Bulgaria sent no help, and the Turks

again suppressed opposition with great violence. Large numbers

of refugees now entered Bulgaria from Macedonia.

In the next four years, Austria-Hungary and Russia sought a formula by which to administer Macedonia in a way satisfactory

to Bulgarian, Serbian, and Greek interests and approved by Constantinople. Although nominal agreement was reached in 1905, Ser- bian, Greek, and Bulgarian sympathizers clashed in Macedonia

in 1906 and 1907. After the death of its leader Gotse Delchev in

the 1903 uprising, IMRO's influence decreased. Bulgarian public

sympathy for the Macedonian cause also diminished, and by 1905

the government's attention turned to internal matters. Inspired by the 1905 uprisings in Russia, a series of riots and

demonstrations between 1905 and 1908 were a reaction by workers, the poor, and some of the intelligentsia to several issues: domestic repression, government corruption, and the handling of the

Macedonian issue. In 1906 anti-Greek riots and destruction of

Greek property were ignited in some parts of Bulgaria by Greek

claims to Macedonia. In spite of heavy fines and prohibitions against

striking, a rail strike occurred in 1906, and in 1907 Prime Minister

Nikola Petkov was assassinated.

Full Independence

The strikes and demonstrations remained isolated and had little practical effect, so Ferdinand remained in firm control. In 1908

the Young Turks, an energetic new generation of reformers, gained

power in the Ottoman Empire. Their ascendancy temporarily re- stored the international self-confidence of the empire and threatened a renewed Turkish influence in the Balkans. To protect the

territory it occupied in Bosnia and Hercegovina, Austria-Hungary

annexed those regions. While the Turks were preoccupied with that

situation, Ferdinand nationalized the Bulgarian section of his main

international rail line and declared himself tsar of a fully independent Bulgaria. The Western powers, again seeing the threat

of Ottoman collapse, were appeased by Russian-arranged financial compromises that saved face for the Turks. But tension between Bulgaria and Turkey increased dramatically after Ferdinand's

declaration.

The arbitrary nature of Ferdinand's declaration also brought loud

criticism from democratic-minded Bulgarian factions. Nonetheless,

the grand national assembly held at Turnovo in 1911 to incorporate

28
Historical Setting

the terms of independence into the constitution, ratified Ferdinand's

title and expanded his power in conducting foreign affairs. By 1911 the BANU, led by Aleksandur Stamboliiski, had be- come the largest and most vocal opposition faction. Although the

BANU never gained more than 15 percent of a national vote before World War I, the party had a large, unified following in the

peasant class victimized by poor harvests, usurious interest rates, and high taxes. Stamboliiski 's political philosophy put the peasant

and rural life ahead of all other classes and lifestyles. Hating

bureaucrats and urban institutions, he proposed a government that

would provide representation by profession rather than party, to ensure a permanent peasant majority. His goal was to establish a peasant republic that would replace the conventional parliamentary apparatus established at Turnovo. The BANU was a controversial and powerful force in Bulgarian politics for the next two decades.

The Balkan Wars and World War I Full independence made Bulgaria a more aggressive party in the

complex of Balkan politics. The end of Ottoman occupation heightened territorial ambitions that involved Bulgaria and its neighbors

in three wars within four years. The First Balkan War

The period from 1908 to 1912 was one of colliding interests in

the Balkans and collapse of the system created by the Treaty of

Berlin. Beginning in 1908, the Young Turks attempted to consolidate Turkish influence in the Balkans while ensuring equality for

all nationalities in their empire. Rivals Italy and Austria threatened

to intervene on behalf of an Albanian revolt against the Turks in

1909. Russia then urged a Bulgarian-Serbian alliance to keep such

foreign powers at bay and ensure continued Slavic control in the

region. In 1912, after long negotiations, Serbia and Bulgaria

reached temporary agreement on the disposition of Macedonia,

the chief issue dividing them. Subsequent agreements by Greece

with Serbia, Bulgaria, and Montenegro completed the Balkan

League—an uneasy alliance designed by Russia to finally push the

Turks out of Europe and curtail great-power meddling in the

Balkans. The First Balkan War, which began in October 1912,

coincided with Italy's campaign to liberate Tripoli from the Turks.

Bulgarian forces moved quickly across Ottoman Europe, driving

the Turks out of Thrace. However, the Bulgarians then over- extended their position by a fruitless attack toward Constantinople. In the peace negotiations that followed, Bulgaria regained Thrace,

29
Bulgaria: A Country Study

but the fragile alliance against the Turks collapsed over the unresolved issue of Macedonia.

The Second Balkan War

The final removal of the Turks from Europe posed the problem

of dividing Ottoman territory and heightened the worries of the

European great powers about balancing influence in that strategic

region. Disagreement about the disposition of Macedonia quickly

rearranged the alliances of the First Balkan War and ignited a Sec- ond Balkan War in 1913. The Treaty of London that had ended

the first war stipulated only that the Balkan powers resolve exist- ing claims among themselves. The Bulgarians, having had the

greatest military success, demanded compensation on that basis;

the Serbs and Greeks demanded adjustment of the 1912 treaty of

alliance to ensure a balance of Balkan powers; and the Romanians demanded territorial reward for their neutral position in the

first war. Even before the First Balkan War ended, a strong fac- tion in Bulgaria had demanded war against Serbia to preserve Bulgaria' s claim to Macedonia. Ferdinand sided with that faction in

1913, and Bulgaria attacked Serbia. Turkey, Greece, and Romania then declared war on Bulgaria because they all feared Bulgarian domination of the Balkans if Macedonia were not partitioned.

Because most Bulgarian forces were on the Serbian frontier, Turkish and Romanian troops easily occupied Bulgarian territory by

mid- 1913, and Bulgaria was defeated. The Treaty of Bucharest

(1913) allowed Bulgaria to retain only very small parts of Macedonia

and Thrace; Greece and Serbia divided the rest, humiliating Bulgarian territorial claims and canceling the gains of the First Balkan

War (see fig. 6). This loss further inflamed Bulgarian nationalism,

especially when Bulgarians in Serbian and Greek Macedonia were

subjected to extreme hardship after the new partition. At this point,

Russia, whose warnings Bulgaria had defied by attacking Serbia,

shifted its support to the Serbs as its Balkan counterbalance against

Austro-Hungarian claims.

World War I The settlement of the Second Balkan War had also inflamed Bosnian nationalism. In 1914 that movement ignited an AustrianSerbian conflict that escalated into world war when the European

alliances of those countries went into effect. Prewar Bulgarian Politics

Supported by Ferdinand, the government of Prime Minister Vasil

Radoslavov declared neutrality to assess the possible outcome of

30
Historical Setting

the alliances and Bulgaria's position relative to the Entente (Russia, France, and Britain) and the Central Powers (Austria-Hungary

and Germany). From the beginning, both sides exerted strong pres- sure and made territorial offers to lure Bulgaria into an alliance.

Ferdinand and his diplomats hedged, waiting for a decisive military shift in one direction or the other. The Radoslavov government favored the German side, the major opposition parties favored

the Entente, and the agrarians and socialists opposed all involvement. By mid- 191 5 the Central Powers gained control on the Russian and Turkish fronts and were thus able to improve their

territorial offer to Bulgaria. Now victory would yield part of Turkish Thrace, substantial territory in Macedonia, and monetary compensation for war expenses. In October 1915, Bulgaria made a

secret treaty with the Central Powers and invaded Serbia and

Macedonia.

Early Successes Catching the Entente by surprise, Bulgarian forces pushed the

Serbs out of Macedonia and into Albania and occupied part of

Greek Macedonia by mid-1916. British, French, and Serbian troops

landed at Salonika and stopped the Bulgarian advance, but the

Entente's holding operation in Greece turned into a war of attri- tion lasting from late 1916 well into 1917. This stalemate diverted

500,000 Entente troops from other fronts. Meanwhile, Romania

had entered the war on the Entente side in 1916. Bulgarian and

German forces pushed the poorly prepared Romanians northward

and took Bucharest in December 1916. The Bulgarians then faced

Russia on a new front in Moldavia (the part of Romania bordering Russia), but little action took place there.

Stalemate and Demoralization

Once the Bulgarian advance into Romania and Greece halted,

conditions at the front deteriorated rapidly and political support

for the war eroded. By 1916 poor allocation of supplies created short- ages for both civilians and soldiers, and a series of government re- organizations provided no relief. By 1917 the military stalemate

and poor living conditions combined with news of revolution in

Russia to stir large-scale unrest in Bulgarian society. The agrari- ans and socialist workers intensified their antiwar campaigns, and

soldiers' committees formed in army units. Bolshevik antiwar

propaganda was widely distributed in Bulgaria, and Russian and

Bulgarian soldiers began fraternizing along the Moldavian front. In December 1917, Dimitur Blagoev, founder and head of the Social Democratic Party, led a meeting of 10,000 in Sofia, demanding

31
Bulgaria: A Country Study

\ MONTENEGRO

SERBIA

I

N I,

Skopji

(to Serbia

Ohrid

ALBANIA

GREECE

BULGARIA

Razlog

International boundary Boundary of Macedonia

Partition line • Populated place

Source: Based on information from Christ Atanasoff, The Bulgarians. Hicksville. New York,

1977. 214.

Figure 6. Division of Macedonia at the Treaty of Bucharest, 1913

an end to the war and overthrow of the Bulgarian government.

A wave of unrest and riots, including a "women's revolt" against

food and clothing shortages, swept through the country in 1918.

The government position weakened further when the Treaty of

Bucharest, which divided the territory of defeated Romania among

the central powers, left part of the disputed Romanian territory

of Dobruja outside Bulgarian control. Having failed to secure even

the least important territory promised by its war policy, the Radoslavov government resigned in June 1918. The newr prime minister,

Aleksandur Malinov, tried to unite the country by appointing the

agrarian Aleksandur Stambolhski to his cabinet. But Malinov had

vowed to fight, and the BANU leader refused the post as long as Bulgaria remained in the war. By September the Bulgarian army

was thoroughly demoralized by antiwar propaganda and harsh conditions. A batde with the British and French at Dobro Pole brought

32
Historical Setting

total retreat, and in ten days Entente forces entered Bulgaria. On

September 29, the Bulgarians signed an armistice and left the war.

Capitulation and Settlement

The retreat from Dobro Pole brought a soldier revolt that was

crushed by German troops near Sofia. But the parties in power

forced Ferdinand to abdicate at the end of September because they

feared full-scale revolution and blamed the tsar for the country's

chaotic state. Ferdinand's son Boris was named tsar, becoming Boris

III. The immediate cause of social upheaval ended with the armistice, but shortages and discontent with the Bulgarian government

continued. An ineffective coalition government ruled for the next

year, then a general election was called. Meanwhile, Bulgaria was

again left far short of the territorial goals for which it had declared war. In the Treaty of Neuilly-sur-Seine (November 1919), Thrace was awarded to Greece, depriving Bulgaria of access to the Aegean

Sea. The newly formed Kingdom of the Serbs, Croats, and Slo- venes took Macedonian territory adjoining its eastern border, and

Southern Dobruja went to Romania (see fig. 7). The treaty limited the postwar Bulgarian Army to a small volunteer force; Yugoslavia, Romania, and Greece were to receive reparations in industrial and agricultural goods; and the victorious Allies were to receive monetary reparations for the next thirty-seven years. On the other hand, the payment schedule was significantly improved in 1923, and Bulgaria's loss of 14,100 square kilometers was much less than the territorial losses of its wartime allies. Nationalist resentment and frustration grew even stronger because

of this outcome, however, and Bulgaria remained close to Germany

throughout the interwar period.

The Interwar Period

The period after World War I was one of uneasy political coali- tions, slow economic growth, and continued appearance of the

Macedonia problem. Although social unrest remained at a high

level, Boris kept firm control of his government as World War II approached.

Stambolirski and Agrarian Reform

The 1919 election reflected massive public dissatisfaction with

the war reparations, inflation, and rising taxes that prolonged the

chaotic living conditions of the war. The socialist and agrarian parties tightened their organizations and increased membership. The

left wing of the Bulgarian Workers' Socialist-Democratic Party

(BWSDP) numbered only 25,000 in 1919, and the BANU emerged

33
Bulgaria: A Country Study

Source: Based on information from RJ. Crampton, A Short History of Bulgaria, Cambridge,

1987, frontispiece.

Figure 7. Territorial Changes According to the Treaty of Neuilly-sur-Seine,

1919

as the largest party in the country. The BANU received 28 percent

of the 1919 vote, giving it a plurality but not a majority in the new

subranie. Stamboliiski sought to include the Bulgarian Communist

Party (BCP)—which had finished second in the election—and the

BWSDP in a coalition government. (The BCP and the BWSDP

were the two factions of the Bulgarian communist movement that

had sprung from the Social Democratic Party founded in 1891 ; they

would remain separate until the former was disbanded after World

War II.) Stamboliiski could not permit the two factions the control

they desired, however, so they refused participation.

The postwar governing coalition thus included only factions to Stamboliiski 's right. The first major test for the Stamboliiski government was a transport strike that lasted from December 1919 until

February 1920. Fomented by the communists and the social

democrats and joined by urban workers and middle-class Bulgarians, the striker protests were quelled harshly by the army and the

34
Historical Setting

Orange Guard, a quasi-military force that Stamboliiski formed to counter mass demonstrations by the parties of the left. Suppression of the strike, mobilization of the peasant vote, and

intimidation at the polls gave the BANU enough support to win

the parliamentary election of 1920 over the communists and form

a non-coalition government. Tsar Boris and much of the Bulgarian middle class preferred the agrarians to the communists and social democrats, whom they feared much more. Stamboliiski immediately began drastic economic reforms. He abolished the merchants'

trade monopoly on grain, replacing it with a government consor- tium; broke up large urban and rural landholdings and sold the

surplus to the poor; enacted an obligatory labor law to ease the

postwar labor shortage; introduced a progressive income tax; and

made secondary schooling compulsory. All aspects of the radical

reform policy aimed at ridding society of "harmful" classes of so- ciety such as lawyers, usurers, and merchants, distributing capital

and obligations more evenly through society, and raising the liv- ing standards of the landless and poor peasants.

In foreign policy, Stamboliiski officially abandoned Bulgaria's

territorial claims, which he associated with a standing army, monarchy, large government expenditures, and other prewar phenomena that the agrarians deemed anachronistic. After the war, no major

power was available to protect Bulgarian interests in the Balkans.

For this reason, the traditional approach to foreign policy was dis- carded in favor of rapprochement with all European powers and

the new government of Kemal Atatiirk in Turkey, membership

in the League of Nations (see Glossary), and friendship with the

new Kingdom of the Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes (later the Kingdom of Yugoslavia). Relations with Turkey were greatly improved

by Bulgarian support of Atatiirk' s revolutionary Turkish Republic in 1920.

Reconciliation with Yugoslavia was a necessary step toward

Stamboliiski 's ultimate goal of a multiethnic Balkan peasant fed- eration. Improved Yugoslav relations required a crackdown on the

powerful Macedonian extremist movement. Accordingly, Stamboliiski began a two-year program of harsh suppression of IMRO

in 1921; in 1923 Yugoslavia and Bulgaria agreed at the Nis Convention to cooperate in controlling extremists.

The Fall of Stamboliiski

Led by a large Macedonian group in Sofia, the strong nationalist elements remaining in Bulgaria found the new pacifist policy

alarming. The urban working class, unaided by agrarian reforms,

gravitated to the communists or the socialist workers. Inflation and

35
Bulgaria: A Country Study

industrial exploitation continued. Many of Stamboliiski's subordinates inflamed social tensions by taking very dogmatic positions

in favor of peasant rights. The Bulgarian right, silent since the war,

reorganized into a confederation called the National Alliance. Stamboliiski's Orange Guard jailed the leaders of that group in 1922,

temporarily stopping its momentum. Meanwhile, in late 1922 and

early 1923, Macedonian nationalists occupied Kiustendil along the

Yugoslav border and attacked government figures to protest rapprochement with Yugoslavia and Greece. Stamboliiski responded

with mass arrests, an accelerated campaign against IMRO ter- rorism, a purge of his own fragmented and notoriously corrupt

party, and a new parliamentary election. These dictatorial measures united the agrarians' various opponents (IMRO, the National

Alliance, army factions, and the social democrats) into a coalition

led by Aleksandur Tsankov. The communists remained outside

the group. Bulgaria's Western creditors would not protect a government that had rejected their reparations policy. In June 1923, Stamboliiski was brutally assassinated by IMRO agents, and the

conspirators shortly took control of the entire country with only

scattered and ineffectual agrarian resistance.

The Tsankov and Liapchev Governments

Tsankov formed a new government, which Boris III quickly

approved. An uprising by the communists, who had hoped the two

major coalition factions would destroy each other, was easily

suppressed in September 1923. Nonetheless, dominated by the

Macedonian freedom factions and the National Alliance, Tsankov'

s

government failed to restore order. When Tsankov outlawed the

Bulgarian Communist Party in 1924, the militant communists led

by exiles Georgi Dimitrov and Vasil Kolarov became dominant

in that organization. The first response to this change was the bombing of Sveta Nedelia Cathedral in Sofia while the tsar was present

in 1925, killing over 100. This attack brought a new government

reign of terror against the communists and the agrarians. Disunited

Macedonian factions also continued terrorist attacks from their vir- tually separate state at Petrich, causing alarm in Western Europe.

In 1926 Tsankov was replaced by Andrei Liapchev, a Macedonian

who remained prime minister for five years. Liapchev generally was more lenient toward political opposition

than Tsankov; the communists resurfaced in 1927 under cover of

the labor-based Bulgarian Workers' Party, and an Independent

Workers' Trade Union became the center of political activity by

labor. IMRO also had much more latitude under the Macedonian

prime minister; this meant that political assassinations and terrorism

36
Historical Setting

continued unabated. IMRO raids into Yugoslavia ended Bulgarian rapprochement with that country, and the Macedonians

demanded preferential economic treatment under Liapchev. But

compared with the years preceding, the late 1920s brought rela- tive political stability to Bulgaria. Liapchev led a conservative

majority in the subranie and had the confidence of Boris. The press was relatively free, and educational and judicial institutions functioned independently. Industrial and agricultural output finally ex- ceeded prewar levels, and foreign investment increased. But even

after substantial reduction, Bulgaria's reparations payments were

20 percent of her budget in 1928, and the return to the gold stan- dard that year weakened the economy one year before the onset of world depression. In foreign policy, Liapchev tried unsuccessfully to improve British

and French World War I reparation terms and bring Bulgaria out

of its postwar diplomatic isolation. The country had already improved its international image by participating enthusiastically in

the League of Nations, which reciprocated by forcing Greek invasion troops to leave southern Bulgaria in 1926. Boris made two

European tours in the late 1920s to strengthen diplomatic ties. In the late 1920s, the Macedonian independence movement split over the ultimate goal of its activity. The supremacist faction sought

incorporation of all Macedonian territory into Bulgaria, while the

federalist faction (including the IMRO terrorists) sought an au- tonomous Macedonia that could join Bulgaria or Yugoslavia in a protective alliance if necessary. Violence between the two groups

reinforced a growing public impression that the Liapchev government was unstable.

The Crises of the 1930s

Political Disorder and Diplomatic Isolation

The world economic crisis that began in 1929 devastated the Bulgarian economy. The social tensions of the 1920s were exacerbated

when 200,000 workers lost their jobs, prices fell by 50 percent,

dozens of companies went bankrupt, and per capita income among

peasants was halved between 1929 and 1933. A wave of strikes hit Bulgaria in 1930-31, and in 1931 the Liapchev government was

defeated in what would be the last open election with proportional

representation of parliamentary seats. Liapchev' s coalition fell apart, his defeat hastened by the rise of a supra-party organization, Zveno—a small coalition with connections to most of the major Bulgarian parties and to fascist Italy.

The main goal of Zveno was to consolidate and reform existing

37
Bulgaria: A Country Study

political institutions so that state power could be exerted directly

to promote economic growth. After 1931 Zveno used the economic

crisis to instill this idea in the Bulgarian political system. In 1931

the new government coalition, the People's Bloc, readmitted the

BANU in an attempt to reunite Bulgarian factions. But the BANU

had become factionalized and isolated; its representatives in the

coalition largely pursued political spoils rather than the interests

of their peasant constituency.

Meanwhile, the Macedonian situation in the early 1930s blocked

further attempts to heal Balkan disputes. Four Balkan conferences were held to address the Macedonian problem; but Bulgaria, fearing

IMRO reprisals, steadfastly refused to drop territorial demands

in Macedonia or quell Macedonian terrorist activities in the region.

Such activities had continued under all Bulgaria's postwar governments, but the People's Bloc was especially inept in controlling

them. The situation eventually led to the Balkan Entente of 1934,

by which Yugoslavia, Greece, Turkey, and Romania pledged to honor existing borders in the Balkans. For Bulgaria the isolation

inflicted by this pact was a serious diplomatic setback in southeastern

Europe.

In 1932 Aleksandur Tsankov founded Bulgaria's first serious fascist party, the National Socialist Movement, which imitated the

methods of Hitler's Nazi party. Although Tsankov' s party never

attracted a large following, its activities added to the chaotic fragmentation that forced the People's Bloc from power in May 1934.

Fragmentation of the People's Bloc coalition and the threat posed

by the Balkan Entente led Zveno and various military factions to stage a right-wing coup. Under the leadership of Colonel Damian

Velchev and Kimon Georgiev, the new prime minister, the new

government began taking dictatorial measures. The government

also took immediate steps to improve relations with Yugoslavia and

made overtures to Britain and France. Diplomatic relations resumed

with the Soviet Union in 1934, despite a marked increase in internal repression of communists and suspected communists. A concerted drive by the Bulgarian military against IMRO permanently

reduced the power of that organization, which by 1934 had ex- hausted most of its support in Bulgarian society. The fact that sponsorship of Balkan terrorism finally ceased to hinder Bulgarian

foreign policy was the single lasting contribution of the VelchevGeorgiev government.

The Zveno group abolished all political parties, citing the failure

of such institutions to provide national leadership. The press was

muzzled. Henceforward the state would be authoritarian and centralized; the subranie would represent not political parties but the

38
Historical Setting

classes of society: peasants, workers, artisans, merchants, the intelligentsia, bureaucrats, and professionals. Velchev also proposed

a wide-ranging program of social and technical modernization. In

1935, however, Tsar Boris III became an active political force in

Bulgaria for the first time. Disillusioned by the results of the 1934

coup, Boris took action to regain his power, which the new regime

had also curtailed. Boris used military and civilian factions alarmed

by the new authoritarianism to maneuver the Zveno group out of

power and declare a royal dictatorship.

The Royal Dictatorship

In the years following 1935, Boris relied on a series of uncharismatic politicians to run Bulgaria, weaken the political power of

Zveno and the military, and keep other factions such as the BANU,

the communists, and the national socialists from forming alliances

against him. Boris chose not to restore the traditional political

supremacy of the subranie and ignored demands by many public

figures to write a new Bulgarian constitution. In 1936 a broad coalition, the People's Constitutional Bloc, brought together nearly

all leftist and centrist factions in a nominal opposition that had the

blessing of the tsar. Boris delayed holding a national election until

1938. At that time, only individual candidates were allowed in a

carefully controlled election procedure that excluded party candidate lists. Boris claimed that domination of the new subranie by progovernment representatives justified his nonparty system, although

the People's Constitutional Bloc seated over sixty delegates. Elections in the next two years were strictly limited in order to maintain Boris's control over his parliament.

The Interwar Economy

In the years between the world wars, Bulgarian efforts to raise

agricultural and industrial standards closer to those of Western Europe yielded uneven results. Until the mid-1 930s, political unrest,

steep reparations payments, and the world financial crisis stymied

growth. Reparations payments were finally canceled in 1932,

however, and the stability of the royal dictatorship brought eco- nomic improvement in the late 1930s. Half the European average

in 1930, per-capita agricultural production improved markedly

when government control forced diversification, new methods, and

new markets into the system. In the 1930s, a 75 percent increase

in membership of agricultural cooperatives bolstered the financial

stability of the agricultural sector, particularly benefiting small landholders. The most notable agricultural trend between the wars was

39
Bulgaria: A Country Study

the switch to industrial crops, especially tobacco, which replaced

wheat as Bulgaria's top agricultural export. The predominance of

small agricultural plots increased, however; in 1944 only 1 per- cent of holdings were over twenty hectares and the number of landless families had decreased (see Agriculture, ch. 3). In the 1930s, Germany bought a huge percentage of Bulgaria's

agricultural exports (67.8 percent in 1939), reinforcing economic

dependency by selling finished industrial products for nonconvertible currency—a distinct advantage for the Bulgarian economy and

a boon to the Bulgarian standard of living. Boris tried to balance

German trade by expanding British and French markets, but he

found little interest in either country. Although industry remained

distinctly secondary to agriculture, contributing only 5.6 percent

of the Bulgarian gross national product (GNP—see Glossary) in

1938, between 1929 and 1939 Bulgarian industry grew at an aver- age rate of 4.8 percent, well ahead of the European average for

the period. The role of state-owned enterprises dwindled steadily

in the 1930s; by 1944, only coal mines, electrical power, railroads,

and banks remained predominantly in that category. While large

state-sponsored enterprise diminished, small private industries

flourished in the 1930s. At the same time, Bulgarian commerce

became largely state-controlled and centralized in Sofia, and the

social and political dichotomy between rural and urban Bulgaria was even sharper as World War II began.

Foreign Policy in the Late 1930s

By 1939 Bulgaria had moved inexorably into the fascist sphere

of Germany and Italy. The country was tied to the former for eco- nomic reasons and because Germany promised territorial revision

for Bulgaria, and to the latter because Boris was married to the

daughter of King Victor Emmanuel III of Italy. In the late 1930s,

Bulgaria continued to seek rapprochement with Yugoslavia; a

friendship treaty was signed in 1937 and a renunciation of armed

intervention in 1938. Germany's takeover of the Sudetenland from

Czechoslovakia in 1938 ended the anti-German Little Entente al- liance of Yugoslavia, Czechoslovakia, and Romania and pushed

Yugoslavia closer to Bulgaria. When World War II began in September 1939 with the German invasion of Poland, Bulgaria declared

neutrality, but this position was inevitably altered by big-power

relationships.

The Nazi-Soviet alliance of 1939 improved Bulgaria's relations

with the Soviet Union, which had remained cool, and yielded a Bulgarian-Soviet commercial treaty in 1940. The pro-Western

40
Historical Setting

Bulgarian Prime Minister Georgi Kioseivanov was deposed that

year in favor of pro-German Bogdan Filov, who reduced cultural

ties with the West and instituted a Nazi-type youth league. Meanwhile, Boris strove to maintain neutrality, rejecting Soviet treaty

offers in 1939 and 1940. Boris also rejected membership in the

Balkan Entente and in a proposed Turkish-Yugoslav-Bulgarian

defense pact because such moves would anger Italy, Germany, the

Soviet Union, or all three. Under pressure from Hitler, Romania

ceded southern Dobruja to Bulgaria by the Treaty of Craiova in

1940. Needing Bulgaria to anchor its Balkan flank, Germany in- creased diplomatic and military pressure that year. The massing

of German troops in Romania prior to Germany's invading Greece

removed all remaining flexibility; aware that German troops would

have to pass through Bulgaria to reach Greece, Bulgaria signed

the Tripartite Pact with Germany and Italy in March 1941.

World War II As in the case of World War I, Bulgaria fought on the losing

German side of World War II but avoided open conflict with the

Russian/Soviet state. Again the strains of war eroded public support and forced the wartime Bulgarian government out of office. But World War II heralded a drastic political change and a long

era of totalitarian governance.

The Passive Alliance

Having failed to remain neutral, Boris entered a passive alliance

with the Axis powers. The immediate result was Bulgarian occu- pation (but not accession) of Thrace and Macedonia, which Bulgarian troops took from Greece and Yugoslavia, respectively, in

April 1941. Although the territorial gains were initially very popular

in Bulgaria, complications soon arose in the occupied territories. Autocratic Bulgarian administration of Thrace and Macedonia was no improvement over the Greeks and the Serbs; expressions of

Macedonian national feeling grew, and uprisings occurred in

Thrace. Meanwhile, the Germans pressured Bulgaria to support

the eastern front they had opened by invading the Soviet Union

in June 1941. Boris resisted the pressure because he believed that

Bulgarian society was still sufficiently Russophile to overthrow him

if he declared war. After the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor ended

United States neutrality, Bulgaria declared war on Britain and the

United States, but continued diplomatic relations with the Soviet

Union throughout World War II. Acceleration of domestic war

protests by the BCP in 1941 led to an internal crackdown on

41
Bulgaria: A Country Study

dissident activities of both the right and left. In the next three years, thousands of Bulgarians went to concentration and labor camps.

The German eastern front received virtually no aid from Bulgaria, a policy justified by the argument that Bulgarian troops had

to remain at home to defend the Balkans against Turkish or Allied

attack. Hitler reluctantly accepted this logic. Boris's stubborn

resistance to committing troops was very popular at home, where

little war enthusiasm developed. Nazi pressure to enforce antiJewish policies also had little support in Bulgarian society. Early

in the war, laws were passed for restriction and deportation of the

50,000 Bulgarian Jews, but enforcement was postponed using var- ious rationales. No program of mass deportation or extermination was conducted in Bulgaria.

Wartime Crisis

In the summer of 1943, Boris died suddenly at age 49, leaving a three-man regency ruling for his six-year-old son, Simeon. Because two of the three regents were figureheads, Prime Minister

Bogdan Filov, the third regent, became de facto head of state in

this makeshift structure. The events of 1943 also reversed the military fortunes of the Axis,

causing the Bulgarian government to reassess its international position. Late in 1943, the Allies delivered the first of many disas- trous air raids on Sofia. The heavy damage sent a clear message

that Germany could not protect Bulgaria from Allied punishment.

Once the war had finally intruded into Bulgarian territory, the

winter of 1943-44 brought severe social and economic dislocation,

hunger, and political instability. The antiwar factions, especially

the communists, used urban guerrilla tactics and mass demonstrations to rebuild the organizational support lost during the government crackdown of 1941. Partisan activity, never as widespread

as elsewhere in the Balkans during the war, increased in 1944 as the Red Army moved westward against the retreating Germans.

To support antigovernment partisan groups, in 1942 the communists had established an umbrella Fatherland Front coalition

backing complete neutrality, withdrawal from occupied territory,

and full civil liberties. Early in 1944, Bulgarian officials tried to achieve peace with the

Allies and the Greek and Yugoslav governments-in-exile. Fearing

the German forces that remained in Bulgaria, Filov could not simply

surrender unconditionally; meanwhile, the Soviets threatened war

if Bulgaria did not declare itself neutral and remove all German

armaments from Bulgaria's Black Sea coast. Unable to gain the

protection of the Allies, who had now bypassed Bulgaria in their

42
Historical Setting

strategic planning, Bulgaria was caught between onrushing Soviet

forces and the last gambits of the retreating Nazis. At this point,

the top priority of Bulgarian leaders was clearing the country of

German occupiers while arranging a peace with the Allies that would

deprive Soviet forces of an excuse to occupy Bulgaria. But in September 1944, the Soviet Union unexpectedly declared war on Bulgaria, just as the latter was about to withdraw from the Axis and

declare war on Germany.

The Soviet Occupation

When Soviet troops arrived in Bulgaria, they were welcomed

by the populace as liberators from German occupation. On September 9, 1944, five days after the Soviet declaration of war, a Fatherland Front coalition deposed the temporary government in a bloodless coup. Headed by Kimon Georgiev of Zveno, the new

administration included four communists, five members of Zveno,

two social democrats, and four agrarians. Although in the minority, the communists had been the driving force in forming the coalition as an underground resistance organization in 1942. The

presence of the Red Army, which remained in Bulgaria until 1947,

strengthened immeasurably the communist position in dealing with

the Allies and rival factions in the coalition. At this point, many

noncommunist Bulgarians placed their hopes on renewed relations

with the Soviet Union; in their view, both Germany and the Allies had been discredited by the events of the previous fifteen years. In 1945 the Allies themselves expected that a benign Soviet Union

would continue the wartime alliance through the period of post- war East European realignment.

The armistice signed by Bulgaria with the Soviet Union in October 1944 surrendered all wartime territorial gains except Southern

Dobruja; this meant that Macedonia returned to Yugoslavia and

Thrace to Greece. The peace agreement also established a Sovietdominated Allied Control Commission to run Bulgaria until conclusion of a peace treaty. Overall war damage to Bulgaria was

moderate compared to that in other European countries, and the

Soviet Union demanded no reparations. On the other hand, Bulgaria held the earliest and most widespread war crimes trial in post- war Europe; almost 3,000 were executed as war criminals. Bulgaria

emerged from the war with no identifiable political structure; the

party system had dissolved in 1934, replaced by the pragmatic

balancing of political factions in Boris's royal dictatorship. This

condition and the duration of the war in Europe eight months after Bulgaria's surrender gave the communists ample opportunity to exploit their favorable strategic position in Bulgarian politics.

43
Bulgaria: A Country Study

Communist Consolidation

Initial Maneuvering

In the months after the surrender, the communist element of

the Fatherland Front gradually purged opposition figures, exiled

Tsar Simeon II, and rigged elections to confirm its power. In December 1945, a conference of foreign ministers of the United States,

Britain, and the Soviet Union theoretically allocated two seats to the newly consolidated opposition BANU in the Bulgarian Council of Ministers, but BANU leaders demanded an immediate national election and removal of communist ministers. Because the

BANU was now a unified party with substantial political backing,

these demands created a governmental stalemate with the Fatherland Front for one year. In a national referendum in September

1946, however, an overwhelming majority voted to abolish the

monarchy and proclaim Bulgaria a people's republic.

The next month, a national election chose a subranie to draft a new constitution. In a widely questioned process, Fatherland Front

candidates won 70 percent of the votes. At this point, however,

opposition to the front remained strong, as communist power grew

steadily. In early 1947, opposition to aggressive communist tactics of confiscation and collectivization generated a loose anticommunist coalition within and outside the Fatherland Front, under

BANU leader Nikola Petkov. The power struggle, which centered on the nature of the new constitution, reached its peak when the

Paris peace treaty of February 1947 required that Soviet forces and

the Allied Control Commission leave Bulgaria immediately. Once

the United States ratified its peace treaty with Bulgaria in June

1947, the communist-dominated Fatherland Front arrested and exe- cuted Petkov and declared Bulgaria a communist state. Petkov'

s

coalition was the last organized domestic opposition to communist

rule in Bulgaria until 1989.

After 1946 Fatherland Front governments maintained nominal

representation of noncommunist parties. But those parties increasingly bowed to the leadership of communist Prime Minister Georgi

Dimitrov, who had been appointed in 1946. After two years of post- war turmoil, Bulgarian political and economic life settled into the

patterns set out by the new communist constitution (referred to as the Dimitrov Constitution) ratified in December 1947. Dimitrov

argued that previous Bulgarian attempts at parliamentary democracy were disastrous and that only massive social and economic

restructuring could ensure stability. By the end of 1947, Bulgaria

had followed the other East European states in refusing reconstruction aid from the Marshall Plan (see Glossary) and joining the

44
Graffiti-covered tomb of Georgi Dimitrov, first president of communist

Bulgaria, Sofia, 1991

Courtesy Sam and Sarah Stulberg

Communist Information Bureau (Cominform—see Glossary). In

1948 the Fatherland Front was reorganized into an official workerpeasant alliance in accordance with Cominform policy. In December 1947, BANU leader Georgi Traikov had repudiated traditional

agrarian programs; after a thorough purge that year, his party re- tained only nominal independence to preserve the illusion of a twoparty system. All other opposition parties disbanded.

The Dimitrov Constitution

Dimitrov guided the framing of the 1947 constitution on the

model of the 1936 constitution of the Soviet Union. The Bulgarian document guaranteed citizens equality before the law; freedom

from discrimination; a universal welfare system; freedom of speech,

the press, and assembly; and inviolability of person, domicile, and

correspondence. But those rights were qualified by a clause prohibiting activity that would jeopardize the attainments of the national revolution of September 9, 1944. Citizens were guaranteed

employment but required to work in a socially useful capacity. The

constitution also prescribed a planned national economy. Private

property was allowed, if its possession was not "to the detriment

of the public good." By the end of 1947, all private industry had

45
Bulgaria: A Country Study

been confiscated and financial enterprises nationalized in the cul- mination of a gradual government takeover that began in 1944.

The first two-year plan for economic rehabilitation began in 1947

(see Postwar Economic Policy, ch. 3). Chervenkov and Stalinism in Bulgaria

In 1948 the newly formed Soviet empire in Eastern Europe was

threatened by a split between Yugoslav President Josip Broz Tito

and Soviet leader Joseph V. Stalin. After expelling Yugoslavia from

the Cominform, Stalin began exerting greater pressure on the other

East European states, including Bulgaria, to adhere rigidly to Soviet

foreign and domestic policy. He demanded that the communist parties of those countries become virtual extensions of the Communist

Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU) by purging all opposition figures.

The Bulgarian government curtailed religious freedom by forcing

Orthodox clergy into a Union of Bulgarian Priests in 1948, taking

control of Muslim religious institutions, and dissolving Bulgarian

branches of Roman Catholic and Protestant churches in 1949. The

most visible political victim of the new policy was Traicho Rostov,

who with Georgi Dimitrov and Vasil Kolarov had led the BCP to power in 1944. Accused by Dimitrov of treason, Rostov was shot

in December 1949. Dimitrov died before Rostov's execution,

Rolarov soon afterward. To fill the power vacuum left by those

events, Stalin chose Vulko Chervenkov, a trusted protege. Chervenkov would complete the conversion of the BCP into the type

of one-man dictatorship that Stalin had created in the Soviet Union. Chervenkov assumed all top government and party positions

and quickly developed a cult of personality like that of his Soviet

mentor. At Stalin's command, Chervenkov continued purging party

members from 1950 until 1953, to forestall in Bulgaria the sort of

Titoist separatism that Stalin greatly feared. Rigid party hierarchy replaced the traditional informal structures of Bulgarian governance, and the purges eliminated the faction of the BCP that

advocated putting Bulgarian national concerns ahead of blind subservience to the CPSU.

The Chervenkov period (1950-56) featured harsh repression of

all deviation from the party line, arbitrary suppression of culture

and the arts along the lines of Soviet-prescribed socialist realism,

and an isolationist foreign policy. By early 1951, Chervenkov had

expelled one in five party members, including many high officials, in his campaign for complete party discipline. In 1950 a new agricultural collectivization drive began. In spite of intense peasant

resistance, the collectivization drive continued intermittently until

the process was virtually complete in 1958.

46
Historical Setting

Foreign and Economic Policies

The independent course taken by Tito's Yugoslavia in 1948

caused Bulgaria to seal the Yugoslav border; a 1953 Balkan Pact

among Greece, Yugoslavia, and Turkey further isolated Bulgaria,

which by that time had cut all relations with Western countries.

The Soviet Union now was Bulgaria's only ally. It supplied military and economic advisers and provided the model for Bulgarian

social services, economic planning, and education in the early 1950s.

Over 90 percent of Bulgarian exports and imports involved Soviet

partnership, although the Soviets often paid less than world prices

for Bulgarian goods. Because the primitive, mainly agricultural Bulgarian economy closely resembled that of the Soviet Union, Sovietstyle centralized planning in five-year blocks had more immediate

benefits there than in the other European states, where it was first applied in the early 1950s.

After Stalin

The death ofJoseph Stalin in March 1953 had strong repercussions in Bulgaria. By that time, Chervenkov had already moved

slightly away from hard-line Stalinist domestic repression and in- ternational isolation, but the lack of clear ideological guidance from

post-Stalin Moscow left him in an insecure position. Official ap- proval in 1951 of Dimitur Dimov's mildly heretical novel Tiutiun

(Tobacco) had loosened somewhat the official constraints on liter- ature and other cultural activities. In 1953 Bulgaria resumed rela- tions with Greece and Yugoslavia, some political amnesties were

granted, and planners discussed increasing production of consumer

goods and reducing the prices of necessities. At the Sixth Party

Congress in 1954, Chervenkov gave up his party leadership but re- tained his position as prime minister. Todor Zhivkov, most prominent in the postwar generation of Bulgarian communist leaders,

assumed the newly created position of first secretary of the party

Central Committee. Several purged party leaders were released from

labor camps, and some resumed visible roles in the party hierarchy.

In spite of the 1954 party shifts, Chervenkov remained the unchallenged leader of Bulgaria for two more years. The economic

shift away from heavy industry toward consumer goods continued

in the mid-1950s, and direct Soviet intervention in Bulgarian eco- nomic and political life diminished. By 1955, some 10,000 politi- cal prisoners had been released. In an attempt to win political

support from the peasants, Chervenkov eased the pace of collec- tivization and increased national investment in agriculture.

However, events in the Soviet Union ended this brief period of calm.

47
Bulgaria: A Country Study

The Fall of Chervenkov

In 1955 the Belgrade Declaration restored Soviet-Yugoslav friendship and reinstated Tito to the fraternity of world communist leaders. Because Chervenkov had branded Tito and the Yugoslavs as

arch-villains during his rise to power, this agreement eroded his

position. Then, in February 1956, Nikita S. Khrushchev denounced

Chervenkov' s patron Stalin and Stalin's cult of personality at the

twentieth congress of the CPSU. Unwilling to stray from the Soviet

party line, the BCP also condemned the cult of personality (and,

implicitly, Chervenkov's authoritarianism), advocating instead col- lective leadership and inner-party democracy. In his 1956 report

to party leaders, Zhivkov expressed this condemnation and

promised that the party would make amends for past injustices

a clear reference to the fate of Kostov and Chervenkov's other purge

victims in the party. Having had his entire regime repudiated by

the party leader, Chervenkov resigned. Zhivkov, who had thus far remained below Chervenkov in actual party power, now assumed

the full powers of his party first secretary position. The 1956 April

Plenum became the official date of Bulgarian de-Stalinization in

party mythology; after that event, the atmosphere of BCP politics

changed significantly.

Intellectual Life

The thaw in Bulgarian intellectual life had continued from 1951

until the middle of the decade. Chervenkov's resignation and the

literary and cultural flowering in the Soviet Union encouraged the

view that the process would continue, but the Hungarian revolution of fall 1956 frightened the Bulgarian leadership away from en- couragement of dissident intellectual activity. In response to events

in Hungary, Chervenkov was appointed minister of education and

culture; in 1957 and 1958, he purged the leadership of the Bulgarian Writers' Union and dismissed liberal journalists and editors

from their positions. His crackdowns effectively ended the "Bulgarian thaw" of independent writers and artists inspired by Khrushchev's 1956 speech against Stalinism. Again mimicking the Soviet

party, which purged a group of high officials in 1957, the BCP

dismissed three party leaders on vague charges the same year. Among those removed was deputy prime minister Georgi Chankov,

an important rival of Zhivkov. The main motivation for this purge was to assure the Soviet Union that Bulgarian communists would

not fall into the same heretical behavior as had the Hungarian party

in 1956. Through the political maneuvers of the mid-1950s, Todor

Zhivkov enhanced his position by identifying with the "Bulgarian"

48
Historical Setting

rather than "Soviet" branch of the BCP at the same time as he

aligned himself with the new anti-Stalinist faction in the Soviet Union. He established especially close ties with Khrushchev at this time.

Domestic Policy and Its Results

Most aspects of life in Bulgaria continued to conform strongly

to the Soviet model in the mid-1950s. In 1949 the Bulgarian educational system had begun a restructuring process to resemble the

Soviet system, and the social welfare system followed suit. In the

mid-1950s, Soviet-style centralized planning produced economic

indicators showing that Bulgarians were returning to their prewar

lifestyle in some respects: real wages increased 75 percent, con- sumption of meat, fruit, and vegetables increased markedly, medical

facilities and doctors became available to more of the population,

and in 1957 collective farm workers benefited from the first agricul- tural pension and welfare system in Eastern Europe.

In 1959 the BCP borrowed from the Chinese the phrase "Great

Leap Forward" to symbolize a sudden burst of economic activity

to be injected into the Third Five-Year Plan (1958-1962). whose

original scope was quite conservative. According to the revised plan,

industrial production would double and agricultural production

would triple by 1962; a new agricultural collectivization and consolidation drive would achieve great economies of scale in that

branch; investment in light industry would double, and foreign

trade would expand (see The First Five-Year Plans, ch. 3). Following the Chinese model, all of Bulgarian society was to be

propagandized and mobilized to meet the planning goals. Two

purposes of the grandiose revised plan were to keep Bulgaria in step with the Soviet bloc, all of whose members were embarking

on plans for accelerated growth, and to quell internal party conflicts. Zhivkov, whose "theses" had defined the goals of the plan,

purged Politburo members and party rivals Boris Taskov (in 1959)

and Anton Yugov (in 1962). citing their criticism of his policy as economically obstructionist. Already by i960, however, Zhivkov

had been forced to redefine the impossible goals of his theses. Lack

of skilled labor and materials made completion of projects at the

prescribed pace impossible. Harvests were disastrously poor in the

early 1960s; peasant unrest forced the government to raise food

prices; and the urban dissatisfaction that resulted from higher prices

compounded a crisis that broke in the summer of 1962. Blame fell on Zhivkov 's experiments with decentralized planning, which was

totally abandoned by 1963.

49
Bulgaria: A Country Study

The Zhivkov Era

Beginning in 1961, Todor Zhivkov skillfully retained control of

the Bulgarian government and the BCP. His regime was a period

of unprecedented stability, slavish imitation of Soviet policies, and

modest economic experimentation.

Zhivkov Takes Control

Zhivkov was able to weather the social unrest of 1962 by finding scapegoats, juggling indicators of economic progress, and re- ceiving help from abroad. In 1961 Khrushchev had once again

denounced Stalin, requiring similar action in the loyal Soviet satellites. In October Chervenkov, who had retained considerable party

power, was ousted from the Politburo as an unrepentant Stalinist

and obstructor of Bulgarian economic progress (see The Chervenkov Era, ch. 4). When Khrushchev visited Bulgaria in 1962,

the Soviet leader made clear his preference for Zhivkov over other

Bulgarian party leaders. Within months Yugov had lost his party

position, and Chervenkov was expelled from the party. Thus, in

spite of disastrously unrealistic economic experimentation of the

sort that contributed to Khrushchev's ouster in 1964, Zhivkov had

greatly strengthened his position as party first secretary by the time

his Soviet patron had fallen. In the early 1960s, Zhivkov improved ties with the Bulgarian

intelligentsia by liberalizing censorship and curbing the state security

forces (see Zhivkov and the Intelligentsia, ch. 4). He also mended

relations with the agrarians by granting amnesties to BANU members and appointing the leader of the party as head of state. These

measures gave Zhivkov a political base broad enough to survive

the fall of Khrushchev, but they did not prevent an army plot against

him in 1965. Zhivkov used the plot as a reason to tighten control over the army and move security functions from the Ministry of

the Interior to a new Committee of State Security, under his per- sonal control. Several other plots were reported unofficially in the

late 1960s, but after 1962 Zhivkov's position as sole leader of Bulgaria went without serious challenge.

Zhivkov's Political Methodology

In the 1960s, Zhivkov moved slowly and carefully to replace the

deeply entrenched Old Guard in party positions. He believed that

only an energetic, professional party cadre could lead Bulgaria

effectively. Therefore, he gradually moved a younger group, in- cluding his daughter Liudmila Zhivkova and future party leader

Aleksandur Lilov, into positions of power. At the same time, he

50
Historical Setting

juggled party positions enough to prevent any individual from becoming a serious rival. Unlike Chervenkov, with his Stalinist personality cult, Zhivkov cultivated an egalitarian persona that kept

him in contact with the Bulgarian people. Unlike contemporaneous communist leaders in other countries, Zhivkov displayed a sense of humor even in formal state speeches. Because of the strong tra- dition of egalitarianism in Bulgarian political culture, the contrast of his approach with that of Chervenkov served Zhivkov very well. The Constitution of 1971

In 1968 the Prague Spring outbreak of heretical socialism in

Czechoslovakia caused the BCP to tighten control over all social

organizations, calling for democratic centrism and elimination of

unreliable elements from the party. This policy kept the BCP on

a unified path in complete support of Soviet interests; it also led

to a new Bulgarian constitution and BCP program in 1971. Approved by the Tenth Party Congress and a national referendum,

the 1971 constitution detailed for the first time the structure of the

BCP (highly centralized, in keeping with policy after 1968) and

its role in leading society and the state. BANU was specified as the partner of the BCP in the cooperative governing of the country. A new State Council was created to oversee the Council of

Ministers and exercise supreme executive authority (see The Constitution of 1971, ch. 4). In 1971 Zhivkov resigned as prime minister

to become chairman of the State Council, a position equivalent

to Bulgarian head of state. The new constitution also defined four

forms of property: state, cooperative, public organization, and pri- vate. Private property was limited to that needed for individual

and family upkeep.

Foreign Affairs in the 1960s and 1970s

In the first decade of the Zhivkov regime, Balkan affairs remained

central to Bulgarian foreign policy, and relations with the Soviet

Union remained without significant conflict. Because the Soviet

Union showed relatively little interest in the Balkans in the 1950s

and 1960s, Bulgaria was able to improve significantly its relations

with its neighbors. In 1964 an agreement with Greece ended the

long postwar freeze caused by Greek membership in the North

Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO—see Glossary). Bulgaria

paid partial wartime reparations to Greece, and relations were nor- malized in culture, trade, and communications after the initial agreement. Turkish-Bulgarian relations were hindered by irrita- tion over the Turkish minority issue: throughout the postwar period,

wavering Bulgarian policy on internal treatment and emigration

51
Bulgaria: A Country Study

of Bulgarian Turks was the chief obstacle to rapprochement,

although bilateral agreements on emigration and other issues were

reached in the 1960s and 1970s i see The Turkish Problem, ch. 4: Foreign Policv. ch. 4). Relations with Yugoslavia also were strained in the postwar years. The age-old Macedonian dispute was the principal reason that

Yugoslavia remained untouched by Zhivkov' s Balkan detente policy. In the mid-1960s. Tito and Zhivkov exchanged visits, but by

1967 official Bulgarian spokesmen were again stressing the Bulgarian majority in Yugoslav-ruled Macedonia, and a new decade

of mutually harsh propaganda began. Although the polemic over Macedonia continued through the 1980s, it served both countries

mainly as a rallying point for domestic political support, and Bulgaria avoided taking advantage of Yugoslav vulnerabilities such

as the unrest in the province of Kosovo. In the early 1980s, much

oi Bulgaria's anti-Yugoslav propaganda aimed at discrediting

heretical economic policv applications (feared by every orthodox

communist neighbor of Yugoslavia i in Yugoslav Macedonia. In 1981 Zhivkov called for establishment of a Balkan nuclear-free zone

that would include Romania. Greece. Turkey, and Yugoslavia.

The concept was notable not because of its practical implications

(Bulgaria was generally unsupportive of regional cooperation, and

the potential participants had strongly differing international positions i. but as a Soviet device to remove NATO nuclear weapons

from Greece and Turkev at a time of superpower tension over European weapons installations. In the 1970s. Zhivkov actively pursued better relations with the

West, overcoming conservative opposition and the tentative,

tourism-based approach to the West taken in the 1960s. Emulating Soviet detente policv of the 1970s. Bulgaria gained Western

technology, expanded cultural contacts, and attracted Western in- vestments with the most liberal foreign investment policy in Eastern

Europe. Between 1966 and 1975, Zhivkov visited Charles de Gaulle

and the pope and established full diplomatic relations with the Federal Republic of Germany (West Germany). As in 1956 and 1968,

however. Soviet actions altered Bulgaria's position. The Soviet in- vasion of Afghanistan in late 1979. which Bulgaria supported

vigorously, renewed tension between Bulgaria and the West. Bulgarian implication in the attempted assassination of Pope John Paul

II in 1981 exacerbated the problem and kept relations cool through

the earlv 1980s.

Bulgaria also followed the Soviet example in relations with ThirdWorld countries, maintaining the image of brotherly willingness

to aid struggling \dctims of Western imperialism. Student exchanges

52
Historical Setting

already were common in the 1960s, and many Bulgarian technicians and medical personnel went to African, Asian, and Latin

American countries in the 1970s and 1980s. Cultural exchange pro- grams targeted mainly the young in those countries. Between 1978

and 1983, Zhivkov visited seventeen Third-World countries and

hosted leaders from at least that many.

Throughout the 1960s and 1970s, Bulgaria gave official mili- tary support to many national liberation causes, most notably in

the Democratic Republic of Vietnam (North Vietnam), Indonesia, Libya, Angola, Afghanistan, the Horn of Africa, and the Middle East. In 1984 the 9,000 Bulgarian advisers stationed in Libya

for military and nonmilitary aid put that country in first place

among Bulgaria's Third-World clients. Through its Kintex arms

export enterprise, Bulgaria also engaged in covert military support activities, many of which were subsequently disclosed (see Arms

Sales, ch. 5). In the 1970s, diplomatic crises with Sudan and Egypt were triggered by Bulgarian involvement in coup plots. Repeated

discoveries of smuggled arms shipments from Bulgaria to ThirdWorld countries gave Bulgaria a reputation as a major player in international arms supply to terrorists and revolutionaries. Arms

smuggling into Turkey periodically caused diplomatic problems

with that country in the 1970s.

Domestic Policy in the 1960s and 1970s

Zhivkov's domestic policy in the late 1960s and 1970s emphasized increased production by Bulgaria's newly completed base of

heavy industry, plus increased consumer production. The industrial base and collectivization of Bulgarian agriculture had been

achieved largely by emulating Khrushchev's approaches in the early

1960s; but after Khrushchev fell, Zhivkov experimented rather

freely in industrial and agricultural policy. A 1965 economic re- form decentralized decision making and introduced the profit motive in some economic areas. The approach, a minor commitment

to "planning from below" in imitation of Yugoslavia's self- management program, was abandoned in 1969. Taking its place, a recentralization program gave government ministries full planning responsibility at the expense of individual enterprises (see The

Era of Experimentation and Reform, ch. 3). Meanwhile, a new program for integration and centralization

of agriculture was born in 1969. The agricultural-industrial complex (agropromishlen kompleks—APK) merged cooperative and

state farms and introduced industrial technology to Bulgarian

agriculture. In the 1970s, the APK became the main supporting

structure of Bulgarian agriculture (see Agriculture, ch. 3). The social

53
Bulgaria: A Country Study

and political goal of this program was to homogenize Bulgarian

society, ending the sharp dichotomy that had always existed between rural and town populations and weakening the ideological

force of the BAXU. If the traditional gulf between Bulgarian

agricultural and industrial workers were eliminated, the BCP could

represent both groups. Despite this large-scale reorganization ef- fort, the Bulgarian tradition of small peasant farming remained

strong into the 1980s. In keeping with the detente of the 1970s. Bulgaria sought in- dependent trade agreements with the West throughout that decade,

to furnish technology and credit not available within the Council

for Mutual Economic Assistance (Comecon—see Glossary). Economic cooperation and license agreements were signed with several

West European countries, most notably West Germany. .Although

the Western demand for Bulgarian goods remained generally low

and Western commodities proved unexpectedly expensive in the

late 1970s. Bulgaria's expansion of Western trade in that decade was unusually high for a Comecon member nation ^see Foreign

Trade, ch. 3). The Political Atmosphere in the 1970s

Through the mid-1970s. Zhivkov continued balancing the older

and younger generations and the reformist and conservative fac- tions in his party, with only occasional purges of key officials. But

in 1977. the purge of liberal Politburo member Boris Yelchev in- troduced a massive reorganization of provincial party organizations that ousted 38.500 party members. This move was designed

to limit the atmosphere of liberalization that had followed the 1975

Helsinki Accords (see Glossary). That mood and an economic crisis caused by oil shortages in the 1970s aroused discontent and

demonstrations in Bulgaria in the late 1970s.

At the end of the decade, two more crises confronted Zhivkov:

in 1978 the murder of exiled writer Georgi Markov was widely at- tributed to Bulgarian State Security, damaging the country's in- ternational image: and in 1980 the Polish Solidarity (see Glossary)

movement alarmed the entire Soviet Bloc by attracting an active

anticommunist following in a key Warsaw Pact (see Glossary) country. .Although the magnitude of Bulgarian social discontent was much less than that in Poland, the BCP ordered production of more

consumer goods, a reduction of party privileges, and limited media

coverage of Poland in the early 1980s as an antidote to the "Polish infection."

Meanwhile, in 1980 Zhivkov had improved his domestic position by appointing his daughter Liudmila Zhivkova as chair of the

54
Historical Setting

commission on science, culture, and art. In this powerful position,

Zhivkova became extremely popular by promoting Bulgaria's

separate national cultural heritage. She spent large sums of money

in a highly visible campaign to support scholars, collect Bulgarian

art, and sponsor cultural institutions. Among her policies was closer cultural contact with the West; her most visible project was the

spectacular national celebration of Bulgaria's 1 ,300th anniversary

in 1981 . When Zhivkova died in 1981 , relations with the West had

already been chilled by the Afghanistan issue, but her brief administration of Bulgaria's official cultural life was a successful phase

of her father's appeal to Bulgarian national tradition to bind the

country together.

Bulgaria in the 1980s

Despite the resumption of the Cold War, by 1981 several longstanding problems had eased in Bulgaria. Zhivkova had bolstered

national pride and improved Bulgaria's international cultural image; Zhivkov had eased oppression of Roman Catholics and

propaganda against the Bulgarian Orthodox Church in the 1970s,

and used the 1 ,300th anniversary of the Bulgarian state for formal

reconciliation with Orthodox church officials; the Bulgarian media

covered an expanded range of permissible subject matter; Bulgaria

contributed equipment to a Soviet space probe launched in 1981,

heralding a new era of technological advancement; and the New

Economic Model (NEM), instituted in 1981 as the latest economic

reform program, seemingly improved the supply of consumer goods

and generally upgraded the economy.

However, Zhivkova' s death and East-West tensions dealt seri- ous blows to cultural liberalization; by 1984 the Bulgarian Writers'

Conference was calling for greater ideological content and optimism in literature. Once fully implemented in 1982, NEM was

unable to improve the quality or quantity of Bulgarian goods and

produce. In 1983 Zhivkov harshly criticized all of Bulgarian in- dustry and agriculture in a major speech, but the reforms generated by his speech did nothing to improve the situation. A large

percentage of high-quality domestic goods were shipped abroad in

the early 1980s to shrink Bulgaria's hard-currency debt, and the

purchase of Western technology was sacrificed for the same reason, crippling technical advancement and disillusioning consumers. By 1984 Bulgaria was suffering a serious energy shortage because

its Soviet-made nuclear power plant was undependable and

droughts reduced the productivity of hydroelectric plants (see

Energy Generation, ch. 3). Like the cutback in technology imports,

this shortage affected all of Bulgarian industry. Finally, Bulgarian

55
Bulgaria: A Country Study

implication in the plot to assassinate Pope John Paul II in 1981

and in international drugs and weapons trading impaired the country's international image and complicated economic relations with

the West (see Security and Intelligence Services, ch. 5). The problem of the Turkish minority in Bulgaria continued into

the 1980s. Because birth rates among the Turks remained rela- tively high while Bulgarians approached a zero-growth birth rate m 1980. Bulgarian authorities sought to mitigate the impact of growing Turkish enclaves in certain regions. Hence. Bulgaria dis- continued its liberal 1969 emigration agreement with Turkey

(ostensibly to prevent a shortage of unskilled labor resulting from

free movement of Turkish workers back to their homeland), and

in 1984 began a massive campaign to erase the national identity

of Turkish citizens by forcing them to take Bulgarian names. Official propaganda justified forced assimilation with the assertion that the

only * 'Turks" in Bulgaria were descended from the Bulgarians who

had adopted Islam after the Ottoman occupation in the fourteenth

centurv. This campaign brought several negative results. Bulgaria's

international ima?e. already damaged by events in the early 1980s,

now included official discrimination against the country's largest

ethnic mmontv. The resumption of terrorist attacks on civilians,

absent for many years, coincided with the new policy. And Bulgaria's relations with Turkey, which had improved somewhat after a visit by Turkish President Kenan Evren to Bulgaria in 1982.

suffered another setback.

Bulgaria's close reliance on the Soviet Union continued into the

1980s, but differences began to appear. Much of Zhivkov' s success had come from the secure support of Xikita Khrushchev's successor. Leonid Brezhnev, with whom Zhivkov had a close personal

relationship. By contrast, relations between Zhivkov and Brezhnev's successor. Iuri! V. Andropov, were tense because Zhivkov

had supported Andropov's rival Konstantm Chernenko as successor

to Brezhnev. The advent of Mikhail S. Gorbachev as Soviet party

leader in 1985 defined a new generational difference between Soviet

and Bulgarian leadership. Gorbachev immediately declared that

Bulgaria must follow his example in party reform if traditional re- lations were to continue.

By this time, the image of the BCP had suffered for several years

from well-publicized careerism and corruption, and from the re- moteness and advancing age of the party leadership (Zhivkov was

seventy-four in 1985). The state bureaucracy, inordinately large

in Bulgaria since the first post-liberation government of 1878. constituted 13.5 percent of the total national work force in 1977. Periodic anticorruption campaigns had only temporary effects. The

56
Historical Setting

ideological credibility of the party also suffered from the apparent

failure of the NEM, whose goals were being restated by 1984.

Although the BCP faced no serious political opposition or internal

division in the early 1980s, the party launched campaigns to in- volve Bulgarian youth more fully in party activities. But these ef- forts had little impact on what party leaders perceived as serious

and widespread political apathy (see The Bulgarian Communist

(Socialist) Party, ch. 4). Thus, by 1985 many domestic and international signs indicated that the underpinning of the long, stable

Zhivkov era was in precarious condition.

* * * The most comprehensive English-language treatment of Bulgarian history is Richard J. Crampton's A Short History ofModern Bulgaria, which covers in detail the period from liberation (1878) to 1985. The Bulgarian Communist Partyfrom Blagoev to Zhivkov, by John

D. Bell, provides a political history from the viewpoint of the BCP,

beginning with the pre- 1900 origins of that party and concluding

in 1984. Modern Bulgaria: History, Policy, Economy, Culture, edited

by Georgi Bokov, contains a long historical section whose useful

detail can be separated from its bias as a state publication of the

Zhivkov era. Cyril Black's chapter "Bulgaria in Historical Per- spective" in Bulgaria (edited by L.A.D. Dellin) is a balanced over- view and perspective of all periods of Bulgarian history. And the

"History and Political Traditions" chapter of Robert J. Mclntyre's

Bulgaria: Politics, Economics, and Society describes the evolution of political institutions from the First Bulgarian Empire to the late 1980s.

(For further information and complete citations, see Bibliography.)

57

Chapter 2. The Society and Its Environment
Man in traditional costume, playing gaida, a folk instrument
IN THE PAST 150 YEARS, vast changes have completely trans- formed the political and economic situation in Bulgaria, as well

as the country's way of life. Poor peasants who served a foreign

ruler first became land-owning peasants, then industrial workers

who were mostly urbanized and disconnected from the land. Bulgarians who had traveled no farther than the next village began

to migrate, often to gain a better education or to get a job in a growing industry. As villages and towns became less isolated, both

internal migration and emigration became easier.

The decline in the agricultural way of life also made people sus- ceptible to changes on a national level rather than on a village or

regional level. People were less self-sufficient for their basic needs

and therefore more vulnerable to fluctuations in the national econ- omy. The traditional support systems of the extended family and

cooperative work in the village were replaced by a vast network

of national social welfare programs. Instead of receiving help from

family and neighbors, the poor, elderly, and disabled grew dependent on governmental programs. The sick no longer relied solely on traditional village healers once villagers and city people alike

fell under coverage of a national health system.

After 1944 much was written about the contrast between Bulgaria's traditional past and the modern way of life to which com- munism had accustomed Bulgarians. Indeed, during the postwar

era, Bulgaria made great progress in establishing the structure of a modern, urbanized way of life. Mortality decreased markedly,

life expectancy increased greatly, and the educational level of the

population improved significantly. However, the modern way of

life also generated much greater expectations for housing, education, health standards, work standards, and other aspects of life than the communist system could deliver. The centralization and

bureaucracy of traditional communist social policy established a

single, rather low standard for everyone, regardless of individual

needs. Also, massive industrialization brought pollution and other

environmental problems to a land that had been relatively unspoiled

before World War II. After democratization began in 1989, Bulgarians began looking westward and found that many aspects of their way of life were

sadly lacking by the standards of Western Europe and the United

States. The sense that Bulgaria needed to do fifty years' worth of

catching up made the transition to democracy even harder.

61
Bulgaria: A Country Study

Natural Features

The land area of Bulgaria is 110,550 square kilometers, slightly

larger than that of the state of Tennessee. The country is situated on the west coast of the Black Sea, with Romania to the north,

Greece and Turkey to the south, and Yugoslavia to the west. Considering its small size, Bulgaria has a great variety of topographical features. Even within small parts of the country, the land may

be divided into plains, plateaus, hills, mountains, basins, gorges,

and deep river valleys.

Boundaries

Although external historical events often changed Bulgaria's national boundaries in its first centuries of existence, natural terrain

features defined most boundaries after 1944, and no significant

group of people suffered serious economic hardship because of border delineation. Postwar Bulgaria contained a large percentage of

the ethnic Bulgarian people, although numerous migrations into

and out of Bulgaria occurred at various times. None of the country's borders was officially disputed in 1991, although nationalist

Bulgarians continued to claim that Bulgaria's share of Macedonia

which it shared with both Yugoslavia and Greece—was less than

just because of the ethnic connection between Macedonians and

Bulgarians (see Macedonians, this ch.).

In 1991 Bulgaria had a total border of about 2,264 kilometers.

Rivers accounted for about 680 kilometers and the Black Sea coast

for 400 kilometers; the southern and western borders were mainly

defined by ridges in high terrain. The western and northern boundaries were shared with Yugoslavia and Romania, respectively, and

the Black Sea coastline constituted the entire eastern border. The

Romanian border followed the Danube River for 464 kilometers

from the northwestern corner of the country to the city of Silistra and then cut to the east-southeast for 136 kilometers across the

northeastern province of Varna. The Danube, with steep bluffs on the Bulgarian side and a wide area of swamps and marshes on

the Romanian side, was one of the most effective river boundaries

in Europe. The line through Dobruja was arbitrary and was

redrawn several times according to international treaties (see The

Balkan Wars and World War I, ch. 1). In that process, most in- habitants with strong national preferences resettled in the country

of their choice. Borders to the south were with Greece and Turkey. The border with Greece was 491 kilometers long, and the Turkish border was 240 kilometers long.

Topography

The main characteristic of Bulgaria's topography is alternating

62
The Society and Its Environment

bands of high and low terrain that extend east to west across the

country (see fig. 8). From north to south, those bands are the Danubian Plateau, the Balkan Mountains (called Stara Planina, meaning old mountains in Bulgarian), the central Thracian Plain, and

the Rhodope Mountains. The easternmost sections near the Black

Sea are hilly, but they gradually gain height to the west until the

westernmost part of the country is entirely high ground.

More than two-thirds of the country is made up of plains,

plateaus, or hilly land at an altitude less than 600 meters. Plains

(below 200 meters) make up 31 percent of the land, plateaus and

hills (200 to 600 meters) 41 percent, low mountains (600 to 1,000

meters) 10 percent, medium-sized mountains (1,000 to 1,500

meters) 10 percent, and high mountains (over 1,500 meters) 3 percent. The average altitude in Bulgaria is 470 meters. The Danubian Plateau extends from the Yugoslav border to the

Black Sea. It encompasses the area between the Danube River,

which forms most of the country's northern border, and the Balkan

Mountains to the south. The plateau slopes gently from cliffs along

the river, then it abuts mountains of 750 to 950 meters. The plateau, a fertile area with undulating hills, is the granary of the country.

The southern edge of the Danubian Plateau blends into the

foothills of the Balkan Mountains, the Bulgarian part of the Carpathian Mountains. The Carpathians resemble a reversed S as they run eastward from Czechoslovakia across the northern portion of

Romania, swinging southward to the middle of Romania and then

running westward, where they are known as the Transylvanian

Alps. The mountains turn eastward again at the Iron Gate, a gorge

of the Danube River at the Romanian-Yugoslav border. At that

point, they become the Balkan Mountains of Bulgaria.

The Balkan Mountains originate at the Timok Valley in Yugoslavia and run southward towards the Sofia Basin in west central

Bulgaria. From there they run east to the Black Sea. The Balkans

are about 600 kilometers long and 30 to 50 kilometers wide. They

retain their height well into central Bulgaria, where Botev Peak,

the highest point in the Balkan Mountains, rises to about 2,376

meters. The range then continues at lower altitude to the cliffs of

the Black Sea. Through most of Bulgaria, the Balkan Mountains

form the watershed from which rivers drain north to the Danube

River or south to the Aegean Sea. Some smaller rivers in the east drain directly to the Black Sea. The Sredna Gora (central hills)

is a narrow ridge about 160 kilometers long and 1 ,600 meters high,

running east to west parallel to the Balkans. Just to the south is the Valley of Roses, famous for rose oil used in perfume and li- queurs.

63
Bulgaria: A Country Study

The southern slopes of the Balkan Mountains and the Sredna

Gora give way to the Thracian Plain. Roughly triangular in shape,

the plain originates at a point east of the mountains near Sofia and

broadens eastward to the Black Sea. It includes the Maritsa River

valley and the lowlands that extend from the river to the Black Sea. Like the Danubian Plateau, much of the Thracian Plain is some- what hilly and not a true plain. Most of its terrain is moderate

enough to cultivate.

The Rhodope Mountains occupy the area between the Thracian

Plain and the Greek border to the south. The western Rhodopes

consist of two ranges: the Rila Mountains south of Sofia and the

Pirin Mountains in the southwestern corner of the country. They

are the most outstanding topographic feature of Bulgaria and of

the entire Balkan Peninsula. The Rila range includes Mount

Musala, whose 2,975-meter peak is the highest in any Balkan country. About a dozen other peaks in the Rilas are over 2,600 meters.

The highest peaks are characterized by sparse bare rocks and re- mote lakes above the tree line. The lower peaks, however, are cov- ered with alpine meadows that give the range an overall impression

of green beauty. The Pirin range is characterized by rocky peaks

and stony slopes. Its highest peak is Mount Vikhren, at 2,915 meters

the second-highest peak in Bulgaria.

The largest basin in Bulgaria is the Sofia Basin. About twentyfour kilometers wide and ninety-six kilometers long, the basin contains the capital city and the area immediately surrounding it. The

route through basins and valleys from Belgrade to Istanbul (formerly Constantinople) via Sofia has been historically important

since Roman times, determining the strategic significance of the

Balkan Peninsula. Bulgaria's largest cities were founded on this route. Paradoxically, although the mountains made many Bulgarian

villages and towns relatively inaccessible, Bulgaria has always been

susceptible to invasion because no natural obstacle blocked the route through Sofia.

A significant part of Bulgaria's land is prone to earthquakes. Two

especially sensitive areas are the borders of the North Bulgarian

Swell (rounded elevation), the center of which is in the Gorna

Oryakhovitsa area in north-central Bulgaria, and the West

Rhodopes Vault, a wide area extending through the Rila and north- ern Pirin regions to Plovdiv in south-central Bulgaria. Especially

strong tremors also occur along diagonal lines running between

Skopje in the Republic of Macedonia and Razgrad in northeast

Bulgaria, and from Albania eastward across the southern third of

Bulgaria through Plovdiv. Sixteen major earthquakes struck Bulgaria between 1900 and 1986, the last two in Strazhitsa on the

64

Figure 8. Topography and Drainage

66
The Society and Its Environment

Skopje-Razgrad fault line. Together the two quakes damaged over 16,000 buildings, half of them severely. One village was almost

completely leveled, others badly damaged. Many inhabitants were

still living in temporary housing four years later. Drainage

The Balkan Mountains divide Bulgaria into two nearly equal

drainage systems. The larger system drains northward to the Black

Sea, mainly by way of the Danube River. This system includes

the entire Danubian Plateau and a stretch of land running fortyeight to eighty kilometers inland from the coastline. The second

system drains the Thracian Plain and most of the higher lands of

the south and southwest to the Aegean Sea. Although only the

Danube is navigable, many of the other rivers and streams in Bulgaria have a high potential for the production of hydroelectric power

and are sources of irrigation water. Of the Danube's Bulgarian tributaries, all but the Iskur rise in

the Balkan Mountains. The Iskur flows northward to the Danube

from its origin in the Rila Mountains, passing through Sofia's eastern suburbs and through a Balkan Mountain valley.

The Danube gets slightly more than 4 percent of its total volume

from its Bulgarian tributaries. As it flows along the northern border,

the Danube averages 1.6 to 2.4 kilometers in width. The river's

highest water levels usually occur during June floods; it is frozen over an average of forty days per year. Several major rivers flow directly to the Aegean Sea. Most of

these streams fall swiftly from the mountains and have cut deep,

scenic gorges. The Maritsa with its tributaries is by far the largest, draining all of the western Thracian Plain, all of the Sredna

Gora, the southern slopes of the Balkan Mountains, and the north- ern slopes of the eastern Rhodopes. After it leaves Bulgaria, the

Maritsa forms most of the Greek-Turkish border. The Struma and

the Mesta (which separate the Pirin Mountains from the main

Rhodopes ranges) are the next largest Bulgarian rivers flowing to the Aegean. The Struma and Mesta reach the sea through Greece.

Climate

Considering its small area, Bulgaria has an unusually variable

and complex climate. The country lies between the strongly contrasting continental and Mediterranean climatic zones. Bulgarian

mountains and valleys act as barriers or channels for air masses, causing sharp contrasts in weather over relatively short distances.

The continental zone is slightly larger because continental air masses

flow easily into the unobstructed Danubian Plain. The continental

67


Bulgaria: A Country Study

influence, stronger during the winter, produces abundant snowfall; the Mediterranean influence increases during the summer and

produces hot, dry weather. The barrier effect of the Balkan Mountains is felt throughout the country: on the average, northern Bulgaria is about one degree cooler and receives about 192 more

millimeters of rain than southern Bulgaria. Because the Black Sea

is too small to be a primary influence over much of the country's

weather, it only affects the immediate area along its coastline.

The Balkan Mountains are the southern boundary of the area

in which continental air masses circulate freely. The Rhodope

Mountains mark the northern limits of domination by Mediterra- nean weather systems. The area between, which includes the Thracian Plain, is influenced by a combination of the two systems, with

the continental predominating. This combination produces a plains

climate resembling that of the Corn Belt in the United States, with

long summers and high humidity. The climate in this region is generally more severe than that of other parts of Europe in the same

latitude. Because it is a transitional area, average temperatures and

precipitation are erratic and may vary widely from year to year. Average precipitation in Bulgaria is about 630 millimeters per

year. Dobruja in the northeast, the Black Sea coastal area, and

parts of the Thracian Plain usually receive less than 500 millimeters.

The remainder of the Thracian Plain and the Danubian Plateau

get less than the country average; the Thracian Plain is often subject to summer droughts. Higher elevations, which receive the most

rainfall in the country, may average over 2,540 millimeters per year. The many valley basins scattered through the uplands have temperature inversions resulting in stagnant air. Sofia is located in such

a basin, but its elevation (about 530 meters) tends to moderate sum- mer temperature and relieve oppressive high humidity. Sofia also

is sheltered from the northern European winds by the mountains

that surround its troughlike basin. Temperatures in Sofia average

-2°C in January and about 21°C in August. The city's rainfall

is near the country average, and the overall climate is pleasant.

The coastal climate is moderated by the Black Sea, but strong

winds and violent local storms are frequent during the winter.

Winters along the Danube River are bitterly cold; however,

sheltered valleys that open to the south along the Greek and Turkish borders may be as mild as areas along the Mediterranean or Aegean coasts. Environment

Like the other European members of the Council for Mutual

Economic Assistance (Comecon—see Glossary), Bulgaria saw

68
The Society and Its Environment

unimpeded industrial growth as a vital sign of social welfare and

progress toward the socialist ideal. Because this approach made

environmental issues a taboo subject in socialist Bulgaria, the degree

of damage by postwar industrial policy went unassessed until the

government of Todor Zhivkov (1962-89) was overthrown in late 1989. The Zhivkov government's commitment to heavy industry

and lack of money to spend on protective measures forced it to conceal major environmental hazards, especially when relations with

other countries were at stake. Factories that did not meet environmental standards paid symbolic fines and had no incentive to institute real environmental protection measures. Even as late as 1990,

socialist officials downplayed the effects on Bulgaria of radiation

from the 1986 nuclear power plant accident at Chernobyl'. Citizens were informed that they need not take iodine tablets or use any

other protective measures.

In 1991 Bulgarian environmentalists estimated that 60 percent

of the country's agricultural land had been damaged by excessive use of pesticides and fertilizers and by industrial fallout. By 1991

two-thirds of Bulgarian rivers were polluted, and the Yantra River was classified as the dirtiest river in Europe. Bulgaria's forests had

also been damaged. By 1991, about two-thirds of the primary forests had been cut. However, despite its recognition of the need for greater environmental protection, Bulgaria budgeted only 10.4 bil- lion leva (for value of the lev—see Glossary) to remedy ecological

problems in 1991

Perhaps the most serious environmental problem in Bulgaria was

in the Danube port city of Ruse. From 1981 to 1989, the chemical

pollution that spread from a chlorine and sodium plant across the

Danube in Giurgiu, Romania, was a forbidden subject in Bulgaria

because it posed a threat to good relations between two Warsaw

Pact (see Glossary) countries. Chemical plants in Ruse also contributed to the pollution. Citizen environmentalists opposing the

situation in Ruse organized the first demonstrations and the first independent political group to oppose the Zhivkov regime (see Other

Political Organizations, ch. 4). During the Giurgiu plant's first year

of operation, chlorine levels in Ruse almost doubled, reaching two

times the permissible maximum in the summer of 1990. Over 3,000

families left the city in the 1980s despite government restrictions

aimed at covering up the problem. Besides chlorine and its byproducts, the plant produced chemical agents for the rubber in- dustry, and in 1991 some sources reported that the plant was

processing industrial waste from Western countries—both activities likely to further damage Ruse's environment. International

experts claimed that half of Ruse's pollutants came from Giurgiu,

69
Bulgaria: A Country Study

and the others came from Bulgarian industries. In response to the

formidable Bulgarian environmental movement, some Bulgarian

plants have been closed or have added protective measures; the

Giurgiu plant, however, was planning to expand in 1991.

Pollution of agricultural land from a copper plant near the town

of Srednogorie provoked harsh public criticism. The plant emitted toxic clouds containing copper, lead, and arsenic. In 1988 it released toxic wastewater into nearby rivers used to irrigate land

in the Plovdiv-Pazardzhik Plain, which includes some of Bulgaria's

best agricultural land. The groundwater beneath the plain also was

poisoned. Work has begun on a plan to drain toxic wastewater from

the plant's reservoir into the Maritsa River. Environmental improvements for the copper plant and three other factories in the

Plovdiv area (a lead and zinc factory, a chemical factory, and a uranium factory) also were planned, but they would take years to implement.

None of Bulgaria's large cities escaped serious environmental

pollution. Statistics showed that 70 to 80 percent of Sofia's air pollution was caused by emissions from cars, trucks, and buses. Temperature inversions over the city aggravated the problem. Two other

major polluters, the Kremikovtsi Metallurgy Works and the Bukhovo uranium mine (both in southwestern Bulgaria), contaminated the region with lead, sulfur dioxide, hydrogen sulfide, ethanol,

and mercury. The city of Kurdzhali became heavily polluted with

lead from its lead and zinc complex. In 1973 the petroleum and

chemical plant near the Black Sea port of Burgas released large

amounts of chlorine in an incident similar to the one in Srednogorie.

Environmentalists estimated that the area within a thirty-kilometer

radius of the plant was rendered uninhabitable by that release. The

air in Burgas was also heavily polluted with carbon and sulfur di- oxide in 1990.

In 1990 environmental scientists claimed that two-thirds of Bulgaria's population suffered from the polluted environment to some

degree (see Health, this ch.). In 1991 Bulgaria began seeking in- ternational assistance in solving environmental problems. Besides

joining Romania, Turkey, and the Soviet Union in joint scientific studies of the critically polluted Black Sea, Bulgaria actively sought

environmental technology and expertise from Western Europe and

the United States. Population

Since ancient times, Bulgaria has been a crossroads for population movement. Early settlement occurred mainly in the most fertile agricultural lands. After World War II, however, Bulgarian

70
The Society and Its Environment

cities grew rapidly at the expense of rural population in concert with state industrialization policy.

Administrative Subdivisions

In 1991 Bulgaria was divided into nine provinces (oblasti; sing.

oblast). These administrative units included the city of Sofia (Grad

Sofiya) and eight provincial districts: Burgas, Khaskovo, Lovech,

Mikhaylovgrad, Plovdiv, Razgrad, Sofiya (the region outside the

city), and Varna (see fig. 1). Each province was named for the city

that was its administrative center. Excluding the city of Sofia, the

provinces encompassed territories ranging from 9.5 percent of the

country to 17.2 percent, and their population ranged from 7.5 per- cent to 14 percent of the national total (see table 2, Appendix).

The eight provinces were divided into a total of 273 communities

(obshtini; sing., obshtina)\ the city of Sofia was divided into districts (rawni; sing., raion). Because this system was established in 1987,

references to another type of district, the okrug (pi. okruzi), remained

common in the early 1990s. The new government that took office in 1991 announced that yet another change was needed in Bulgaria's political subdivisions because the 1987 system reflected the

discredited policies of the Zhivkov regime.

Settlement Patterns

The first settlements sprang up in Bulgaria very early in the area's history (see Early Settlement and Empire, ch. 1). The biggest and

most numerous villages appeared on fertile lands such as the Danubian Plateau, the Dobruja region, and the Maritsa and Tundzha

river valleys. Settlements also took hold at very high altitudes (up

to 1,500 meters in the Rhodope Mountains and up to 1,200 meters

in the Balkans), but only in areas where it was warm enough to grow grain or other crops. During the rule of the Ottoman Empire, many Bulgarians were forced to move into villages at higher

altitudes. After Bulgaria became independent in 1878, many people returned to the lower altitudes, but most of the upland villages

remained. The process of urbanization began at that point, but

it progressed slowly because of wars, lack of employment in population centers, and the emigration of the ethnic Turks who had supported the economies of some cities during the Ottoman era. The

massive industrialization of the communist era again stimulated

temporary settlement at high altitudes for mining or forestry. Generally, only the highest areas in the Rila, Pirin, and Rhodope mountains remained comparatively unsettled. These regions became

known for their national parks and seasonal resort areas.

71
Bulgaria: A Country Study

Cities

Bulgaria's cities grew much more rapidly after 1944. In 1946

only Sofia and Plovdiv had populations numbering over 100,000.

By 1990, there were ten cities having populations exceeding

250,000: Burgas, Dobrich (formerly Tolbukhin), Pleven, Plodiv,

Ruse, Shumen, Sliven, Sofia, Stara Zagora, and Varna (see fig. 9; table 3, Appendix). In 1990 nearly one-third of Bulgaria's population lived in the ten largest cities; two-thirds of the population was urban. Although the urban birth rate declined after the mid1970s, large-scale migration from rural areas to cities continued

through 1990 (see table 4, Appendix). At the same time, migration from cities to rural areas more than doubled from the 1960s

to the 1980s, mainly because more mechanical and service jobs became available in agriculture during that period. In cities such as Sofia and Plovdiv, where industrialization started earliest, the population stabilized, and the repercussions of rapid population growth were less obvious in the 1980s.

The population of the average Bulgarian city grew by three to four times between 1950 and 1990. The rapidity of this growth

caused some negative trends. The cities often lacked the resources

to serve the needs of their growing populations: in particular, housing and social services could not grow fast enough. The cities' great

need for social resources in turn diverted resources from smaller, more scattered population centers. The overall rural-to-urban

migration pattern caused shortages of agricultural labor, especially in the villages surrounding large cities. The government dis- couraged new industries from locating in outlying areas because

of the lack of workers.

Sofia was founded by the Thracians and has remained an important population center for 2,000 years. Its location in a basin

sheltered by the Vitosha Mountains was strategically and esthetically desirable. Long-established communication routes pass though

Sofia, most notably the route from Belgrade to Istanbul. Sofia's

climate and location caused the Roman Emperor Constantine to consider the city when he selected an eastern capital for his empire in the early fourth century. Hot springs, which still exist today, were an added attraction. After it became the Bulgarian capital

in 1879, Sofia became the administrative, educational, and cul- tural center of the country. Because of Sofia's rapid postwar growth

(it grew by 36 percent between 1965 and 1986), in 1986 its city

government closed the city to all internal immigrants except scholars and technical experts.

Plovdiv, the country's second most important city, was founded in the fourth century B.C. by Philip of Macedonia. Its exposed

72

Source: Based on information from Klaus-Detlev Grothusen (ed.), Bulgarien, Gottingen, Germar

Figure 9. Population Centers, 1990

74
The Society and Its Environment

location on the route from Belgrade to Istanbul gave the city a vio- lent history that included several instances of capture and

devastation—both by non-Christian invaders and by Christian

armies during the Crusades. At the end of the twentieth century,

Plovdiv remained an important commercial city. More rail lines

radiated from Plovdiv than from Sofia, and the city had a university, important museums and art treasures, and an old town center with a unique mid-nineteenth century architectural style. Part of

old Plovdiv was declared a national monument.

The three main port cities were Varna and Burgas on the Black

Sea and Ruse on the Danube River. A relatively young city, Burgas gained most of its size in the late 1800s. Until the 1950s, it was the most active Bulgarian port. Varna, which was founded

by Greeks in the sixth century B.C. , eclipsed Burgas by attracting

the naval academy and the chief naval base and acquiring most

of Bulgaria's shipbuilding industry. Ruse, founded by the Romans

in the first century B.C., grew into a major industrial center and

transportation hub after World War II. The first bridge across the

Danube between Bulgaria and Romania was built just north of

Ruse.

Internal Migration

The urbanization of Bulgaria began with independence from the

Ottoman Turks, but the process did not become widespread until

the massive industrialization of the communist era. In 1900 city

dwellers composed barely 20 percent of Bulgaria's population, and

in 1945 they made up only 24 percent. By the end of 1990, however, more than 6 million people lived in the cities while fewer than 3 million lived in the villages. Bulgarian demographers predicted that 75 percent of the population would live in cities by the year 2000.

During the 1950s and 1960s, when the industrialization process was most intense, most Bulgarians who moved were of working

age, had a basic education or less, and wished to obtain new jobs

in industry (see The Era of Experimentation and Reform, ch. 3). Fully 85 percent of internal migrants in the early 1960s went to work in an industry. The trend of moving to locations with industrial jobs continued at a reduced rate in the next decades, and

migrants in the 1980s tended to be younger and better educated

than those of earlier years. The migrant population generally in- cluded more women than men. The number reflected women who

moved to join the work force as well as women who married and

moved to join their husbands.

About two-thirds of migrant Bulgarians relocated within the same

province; hence no region showed a marked population decline.

75


Bulgaria: A Country Study

The decline in village population, however, concerned demographers, who feared that villages would be completely vacated and

the country's population distribution severely skewed. By 1990 this population shift had occurred most noticeably in the southeastern

and southern regions, but a similar trend was evident in the northwest. As workers continued to leave, village populations aged demographically. The share of villages with an average population age

above fifty increased from 23 percent in 1956 to 41 percent in 1985.

Natural growth in villages, negative after 1975, fell to negative 6

percent in 1985. Some villages recorded no births for an entire year. As the younger population decreased, schools and health facilities closed. The closures, in turn, drove more people to leave their

villages.

Meanwhile, demographers and sociologists encouraged younger Bulgarians to return to the villages. Generally, those who fol- lowed this advice because of housing shortages, transportation

problems, or pollution in the cities found hard, uncongenial work,

a lower standard of living, and scant public services and recreation. Many village workers were forced to raise animals to supplement their regular income. The beginning of democratization in

1990 sparked much debate about whether the rural standard of liv- ing would rise if the government's agricultural privatization program could stimulate agricultural activity (see Agricultural

Products, ch. 3). Foreign Citizens in Bulgaria

During the Zhivkov era, Bulgaria signed several friendship treaties with other Comecon nations to ease the exchange of workers. In

the 1980s, for example, a large number of Bulgarians worked in

the construction and timber industries of the Komi Autonomous

Soviet Socialist Republic (Komi ASSR) under an exchange agreement with the Soviet Union. Workers were expected to return to their own countries when their contracts ended, but they did not always do

so. For example, some Vietnamese construction workers sent to Bulgaria under a Comecon agreement in the 1980s remained, and in

1991 the Vietnamese population of Bulgaria was 11,000. Because

they arrived completely unprepared for life in Bulgaria and began

working after only one month of training and language courses, the

Vietnamese who remained in Bulgaria generally received the hardest

and lowest-paying jobs and often became involved in criminal activity. In 1991 several violent incidents involving Vietnamese provoked calls for their repatriation. In response, the government made

plans to expel all resident Vietnamese from Bulgaria in 1992.

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The Society and Its Environment

Population Trends

The 1985 census recorded Bulgaria's population at 8,948,649, an increase of 220,878 over the 1975 census figure. At the end of

1990, the Central Statistical Bureau had estimated an updated figure

of 8,989,172, including about 100,000 more women than men.

However, the estimates for 1989 and 1990 did not account for major

emigrations in those years: first the massive emigration of Turks

in 1989, then the emigration of ethnic Bulgarians in 1990. Adjusting for emigration figures, the population figure actually decreased

between 1985 and 1990. Bulgaria's 1989 population density figure

of eighty-one people per square kilometer made it one of the least densely populated countries in Europe.

Bulgaria's rate of population growth began a steady decrease

in the mid- 1920s, and the trend accelerated thereafter (see table 5, Appendix). Before World War II, a man's status in his community was determined by how many children (especially sons) he

had. Women who did not marry, or who married but had no chil- dren, were seen as failures. As the country became more urbanized,

however, such traditional views gradually disappeared. Large families were no longer the economic necessity they had been in agricultural society, and extra children became a burden rather than a boon. As women became more educated and less accepting of the

traditional patriarchal family norms, their attitude toward childbearing changed. In 1990 the majority of Bulgarian women believed two children ideal for a family, but because of economic and

social conditions, their personal preference was to raise only one. By the 1980s, this change in attitude had begun to prevail even

in villages and with less-educated women. In 1985, 75 percent of

Bulgarian women indicated that they would not like to have any more children. Families with three or more children became a rarity,

and women who opted for more than two children had a lower stan- dard of living and were generally less respected in society.

Although few social planners advocated a return to the large families of the past, Bulgarian policy makers were dismayed that the

population did not increase. During the Zhivkov era, the mass media and scholarly journals expressed concern that the nine millionth Bulgarian had not yet been born, and that families were unwilling to have two children instead of one. By 1985 population

experts were urging that 30 to 40 percent of families have three

children to make up for those which had none or only one. Meanwhile, although the 1973 Politburo had affirmed a family's right

to decide how many children to have and when they should be born,

in the 1970s and 1980s contraceptives were not available in sufficient

77
Bulgaria: A Country Study

quantity for family planning. The Zhivkov regime had placed strict restrictions on abortions; these restrictions were not repealed until

1990. Partly because contraceptives were in short supply, abortions had surpassed births by 1985 despite the restrictions. Until

1990 bachelors and unmarried women had to pay a 5 to 15 per- cent "bachelors' tax" depending on their age. In a more positive

step, laws provided family allowances for children under sixteen.

The age limit for the family allowance was raised to eighteen in

1990 for children still in school. In 1990 Bulgarian demographers recorded a negative growth rate (negative 35 births per 1 ,000 population) for the first time. At that

point, the number of live births per woman was 1.8. Demographers

reported that the figure must increase to 2.1 to maintain the country's natural rate of population replacement. Mortality figures in

Bulgaria were also much higher than those of the developed European countries (see Health, this ch.).

The most alarming demographic trend of the late 1980s, however, was substantially greater emigration totals. The 1989 Turkish exo- dus caused by the Zhivkov assimilation campaigns had a severe impact on the Bulgarian labor force (see Turks, this ch.). Then, in

1990, economic reform brought harsh living conditions that stimulated a wave of emigration by ethnic Bulgarians (see Standard of

Living, ch. 3.). As of March 1991, some 460,000 Bulgarians had

emigrated, bringing the total number of Bulgarians living abroad

to about 3 million. The majority of the emigre population remained

in nearby countries (1.2 million in Yugoslavia, 800,000 in other

Balkan countries, and 500,000 in the Soviet Union). Smaller numbers went as far as the United States (100,000 to 120,000), Canada

(100,000), Argentina (18,000), and Australia (15,000).

Ethnographic Characteristics

Throughout its past, Bulgaria, like the rest of the Balkan Peninsula, had been home to many diverse ethnic groups that were able

to preserve their national identities despite being shifted among

the jurisdictions of powerful empires. In modern Bulgaria, the opposite has been true: the largest minority ethnic group, the Turks,

remained in territory that their Ottoman ancestors had occupied.

After the fall of the Zhivkov government, Bulgaria was forced to moderate its minority policy in order to improve its delicate rela- tions with neighboring countries such as Turkey and Yugoslavia.

Government Minority Policy

The 1893 census listed the following nationalities and religious

groups in order of prevalence: Eastern Rite Orthodox Bulgarians,

78
Gypsy with trained bear, Varna

Courtesy Sam and Sarah Stulberg

Turks, Romanians, Greeks, Gypsies, Jews, Muslim Bulgarians,

Catholic Bulgarians, Tatars, Gagauz (a Turkish-speaking people

of the Eastern Orthodox faith), Armenians, Protestant Bulgarians,

Vlachs (a Romanian-speaking people in southwest Bulgaria), and

foreigners of various nationalities, mainly Russians and Germans.

Migrations and boundary changes after the two world wars

reduced the list somewhat; few Greeks and Romanians remained

in Bulgaria by 1990 (see table 6, Appendix). However, Bulgaria's

communist leaders often tried to deny the existence of minority

groups by manipulating or suppressing census data or by forcibly

assimilating "undesirable" groups. In 1985, at the height of the

last anti-Turkish assimilation campaign, a leading Bulgarian Communist Party official declared Bulgaria "a one-nation state" and

affirmed that "the Bulgarian nation has no parts of other peoples

and nations."

After the fall of Todor Zhivkov in 1989, all the minorities in Bulgaria progressed somewhat toward self-determination and freedom

of expression. New minority organizations and political parties

sprang up, and minority groups began publishing their own

newspapers and magazines. Non-Bulgarian nationalities regained

the right—curtailed in the Zhivkov era—to use their original names,

speak their language in public, and wear their national dress. In

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Bulgaria: A Country Study

1991 significant controversy remained, however, as to how far the

rights of minorities should extend. Legislators making policy on

such issues as approval of non-Bulgarian names and Turkishlanguage schools faced mass protests by nationalist Bulgarians, who

successfully delayed liberalization of government policy on those

issues (see The Turkish Problem, ch. 4). Bulgarians

Bulgarians have been recognized as a separate ethnic group on

the Balkan Peninsula since the time of Tsar Boris I (852-89), under

whom the Buigars were converted to Christianity. Early historians

began mentioning them as a group then; however, it is not clear

whether such references were to the earliest Bulgarians, who were

Asiatic and migrated to the Balkan Peninsula from the Ural Mountains of present-day Russia, or to the Slavs that preceded them in

what is now Bulgaria. By the end of the ninth century, the Slavs

and the Bulgarians shared a common language and a common

religion, and the two cultures essentially merged under the name

"Bulgarian" (see The Slavs and the Bulgars, ch. 1). Acceptance of the Eastern Orthodox church as the state religion

of the First Bulgarian Empire in A.D. 864 shaped the Bulgarian

national identity for many centuries thereafter. The Bulgarian language, which was the first written Slavic language, replaced Greek

as the official language of both church and state once the Cyrillic

alphabet (see Glossary) came into existence in the ninth century.

National literature flourished under the First Bulgarian Empire,

and the church remained the repository of language and national

feeling during subsequent centuries of occupation by the Byzantine and Ottoman empires.

Ottoman rule was the most formidable test of Bulgarian ethnic

identity. The Ottoman Turks forced many of their Christian subjects to convert to Islam, and the Turks differentiated their subjects only by religion, not by nationality. The latter policy meant

that the empire usually considered the Bulgarians as Greeks be- cause of their common Orthodox religion. Turkish recognition of

the Greek Orthodox Church gave the Greeks the power to replace

Bulgarian clergy and liturgy with Greek, further threatening Bulgarian national identity. Under the Ottomans, some Bulgarians

who had converted to Islam lost their national consciousness and

language entirely. Others (the Pomaks) converted but managed

to retain their old language and customs.

During the Ottoman occupation, the monasteries played an important role in preserving national consciousness among educated

Bulgarians. Later, during the National Revival period of the

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The Society and Its Environment

nineteenth century, primary schools and reading rooms (chitalishta) were established to foster Bulgarian culture and literacy in cities throughout Bulgaria. The vast majority of uneducated peasants,

however, preserved their customs in the less accessible regions in

the mountains. Traditional folk songs and legends flourished there

and became richer and more widely known than the literature

created by educated Bulgarians (see The Written Word, ch. 1). Bulgarian is classified as a South Slavic language, together with

Serbo-Croatian, Slovenian, and Macedonian. One of the oldest

written languages in Europe, Bulgarian influenced all the other

Slavic languages, especially Russian, in early medieval times. In

turn, the Bulgarian language was enriched by borrowings from

other civilizations with which it came into contact. Besides 2,000

words from the pre-Cyrillic Old Slavonic language, Bulgarians borrowed religious terms and words used in daily life from the Greeks;

vocabulary relating to political, economic, and day-to-day life from

Turkish; and many Russian words to replace their Turkish equivalents as Ottoman influence waned during the National Revival period. In the postwar era, many West European words began to appear in Bulgarian, especially in technological fields. Turks

Because of their status as former occupiers, the Turks have had

a stormy relationship with Bulgaria since the beginning of its in- dependence. In 1878 Turks outnumbered Bulgarians in Bulgaria,

but they began emigrating to Turkey immediately after independence was established. The movement continued, with some

interruptions, through the late 1980s. Between 1923 and 1949,

219,700 Turks left Bulgaria. Then a wave of 155,000 emigrants

either were "expelled" (according to Turkish sources) or were "allowed to leave" (according to Bulgarian sources) between 1949 and

1951. The number would have been far greater had Turkey not

closed its borders twice during those years. In 1968 an agreement

reopened the Bulgarian-Turkish border to close relatives of per- sons who had left from 1944 to 1951. The agreement remained

in effect from 1968 to 1978.

The biggest wave of Turkish emigration occurred in 1989,

however, when 310,000 Turks left Bulgaria as a result of the

Zhivkov regime's assimilation campaign. That program, which

began in 1984, forced all Turks and other Muslims in Bulgaria

to adopt Bulgarian (Christian or traditional Slavic) names and

renounce all Muslim customs. Bulgaria no longer recognized the

Turks as a national minority, explaining that all the Muslims in

Bulgaria were descended from Bulgarians who had been forced into

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Bulgaria: A Country Study

the Islamic faith by the Ottoman Turks. The Muslims would there- fore "voluntarily" take new names as part of the "rebirth process"

by which they would reclaim their Bulgarian identities. During the

height of the assimilation campaign, the Turkish government

claimed that 1.5 million Turks resided in Bulgaria, while the Bulgarians claimed there were none. (In 1986 Amnesty International

estimated that 900,000 ethnic Turks were living in Bulgaria.)

The motivation of the 1984 assimilation campaign was unclear;

however, many experts believed that the disproportion between

the birth rates of the Turks and the Bulgarians was a major factor. The birth rate for Turks was about 2 percent at the time of the

campaign, while the Bulgarian rate was barely above zero. The

upcoming 1985 census would have revealed this disparity, which

could have been construed as a failure of Zhivkov government policy. On the other hand, although most Turks worked in low-prestige

jobs such as agriculture and construction, they provided critical labor to many segments of the Bulgarian economy. The emigration affected the harvest season of 1989, when Bulgarians from all walks of life were recruited as agricultural laborers to replace the

missing Turks. The shortage was especially acute in tobacco, one

of Bulgaria's most profitable exports, and wheat.

During the name-changing phase of the campaign, which saw

Turkish towns and villages surrounded by army units, citizens were

issued new identity cards with Bulgarian names. Failure to present

a new card meant forfeiture of salary, pension payments, and bank

withdrawals. Birth or marriage certificates were issued only in Bulgarian names. Traditional Turkish costumes were banned; homes

were searched and all signs of Turkish identity removed. Mosques

were closed. According to estimates, 500 to 1,500 people were killed when they resisted assimilation measures, and thousands of others

went to labor camps or were forcibly resettled. Before Zhivkov 's assimilation campaign, official policy toward

use of the Turkish language had varied. Before 1958, instruction

in Turkish was available at all educational levels, and university

students were trained to teach courses in Turkish in the Turkish

schools. After 1958, Turkish-language majors were taught in Bulgarian only, and the Turkish schools were merged with Bulgarian

ones. By 1972, all Turkish-language courses were prohibited, even

at the elementary level. Assimilation meant that Turks could no

longer teach at all, and the Turkish language was forbidden, even

at home. Fines were levied for speaking Turkish in public.

After the fall of Zhivkov in 1989, the National Assembly at- tempted to restore cultural rights to the Turkish population. In 1991 a new law gave anyone affected by the name-changing campaign

82
Woman in folk costume, Koprivshtitsa

Courtesy Sam and Sarah Stulberg

three years to officially restore original names and the names of

children born after the name change. The Slavic endings -ov, -ova, -ev, or -eva could now be removed if they did not go with

one's original name, reversing the effect of a 1950s campaign to add Slavic endings to all non-Slavic names. The law was important not only for Turks, but also for the minority Gypsies and Pomaks who had been forced to change their names in 1965 and 1972

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Bulgaria: A Country Study

respectively. In January 1991, Turkish-language lessons were reintroduced for four hours per week in parts of the country with a substantial Turkish population, such as the former Kurdzhali and

Razgrad districts. Pomaks

Pomaks—a term that loosely translates as collaborators—were the

descendants of ethnic Bulgarians who accepted the Islamic faith

during Ottoman rule, mostly between the sixteenth and eighteenth

centuries. In 1990 about 150.000 Pomaks lived in mountain vil- lages in southern and southwestern Bulgaria. They were chiefly

employed in agriculture, forestry, and mining. Because of their

relative isolation in the mountains, the Pomaks did not become

ethnically mixed with their coreligionist Turks during the occupation, and they largely retained their Slavic physical features. Because the Ottoman Turks showed little interest in Pomak lands,

and because the Pomaks were converted rather late, most of their

traditional Bulgarian customs remained intact. Thus, for example, the Pomaks never learned to speak Turkish. The Bulgarian

government always considered the Pomaks as Bulgarians rather

than as a separate minority.

As a result of the 1972-73 assimilation campaign, about 550 Pomaks were arrested and imprisoned at Belene in north central Bulgaria and in Stara Zagora. Unrest flared in 1989 when Pomaks

from the Gotse Delchev area in southwest Bulgaria were refused

passports that would have enabled them to emigrate with the Turks.

Some Pomaks in southwest Bulgaria were subjected to a second

name change because the names they received the first time were

not definitely Bulgarian. Riots, work stoppages, and hunger strikes ensued. According to reports from the Plovdiv region, local offi- cials banned public gatherings of more than three Pomaks and for- bade residents to leave their villages.

Macedonians

Beginning with the withdrawal of the Ottoman occupation, the

region known as Macedonia was divided among two or more European states. The entire region was never included in a single political unit. In 1990 Macedonia included all of the Yugoslav republic

of Macedonia, the Pirin region of southwest Bulgaria, the part of

northern Greece bordering the Aegean Sea and including Thessaloniki. and a very small part of eastern .Albania. The Macedonian language, in which no written documents are known to have

existed before 1790. had three main dialects. One dialect was closest

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The Society and Its Environment

to Serbian, one most resembled Bulgarian, and a third, more

distinctive group became the basis for the official language.

The region's location in the middle of the Balkans and its lack

of defined ethnic character made the dispute over the existence and

location of a separate Macedonian nationality and control over its territory one of the most intractable Balkan issues of the late nineteenth and twentieth centuries. In general, Bulgaria and Greece

asserted that the Macedonians within their jurisdiction were ethnically indistinguishable from the majority population. Yugoslavia saw the Macedonians of all jurisdictions as a distinct ethnic group.

But, beginning with independence in 1878, Bulgarians also claimed

various segments of non-Bulgarian territory based on the ethnic

Slavic commonality of the Bulgarians and the Macedonians.

Residual claims on Macedonian territory were a primary reason

for Bulgaria's decision to side with Germany during both world

wars. In the division of territory after World War I, most of

Macedonia became part of the Kingdom of the Serbs, Croats, and

Slovenes (later the Kingdom of Yugoslavia), and was renamed

"South Serbia." After World War II, Yugoslavia strengthened its hold by making Macedonia a separate republic and recognizing

the Macedonians as a distinct nationality (see World War I and

Foreign Policy in the Late 1930s, ch. 1). The Bulgarian position maintained that leading patriots such as Gotse Delchev and lane Sandanski (who had fought for Macedonian independence from the Turks) and cultural figures such as the Miladinov brothers (who promoted education and the Slavic

vernacular during the National Revival period) were products of

Bulgarian culture and considered themselves Bulgarians, not

Macedonians. In 1990 many people in the Pirin region identified themselves as Bulgarian, but some opposition Macedonian

organizations such as Ilinden (named after the 1903 IlindenPreobrazhensko uprising for Macedonian independence on St. Elijah's Day) sought recognition by the Bulgarian government as a minority separate from the Bulgarians. This position was based on the assertion that Macedonians were a separate nationality with

a distinct language and history.

No reliable data showed how many people in Bulgaria, or in all of Macedonia, considered themselves Macedonian or spoke a Macedonian dialect in 1990. Those who considered the Slavs in

Macedonia as Bulgarians cited statistics for the whole region at the

time it was first divided after World War I. At that time, 1 ,239,903

Bulgarians, or 59 percent of the population, were listed. The Bulgarians were a majority in both Yugoslav (Vardar) Macedonia

(759,468 people) and in Bulgarian (Pirin) Macedonia (226,700

85
Bulgaria: A Country Study

people). Later Bulgarian censuses, however, showed sharply varying

numbers of Macedonians according to what political agenda was

to be supported by a given census. The 1946 census, for example,

identified over 250,000 Macedonians, reportedly to back President

Georgi Dimitrov's short-lived plan for federation with Yugoslavia.

Then, between the censuses of 1956 and 1965, the number of

Macedonians dropped from 187,789 to 9,632. After that time, the

Bulgarian census ceased identifying citizens by nationality.

Gypsies

Although Gypsies are known to have lived in Bulgaria since the

fourteenth century, most of the Gypsy population arrived in the

past few centuries. The last known group was forced to settle in

1958, having remained nomadic until that time. The Gypsy population was divided into three groups. According to the 1965 census, the last that enumerated Bulgarians by nationality, 42.5 percent were Orthodox and spoke Bulgarian; 34.2 percent were Orthodox

and spoke Romanian or Romany, the Gypsy language; and 22.8

percent were Muslim, spoke Turkish, and considered themselves

ethnic Turks. Estimates in 1990 put the Gypsy population at about

450,000, some 10 percent of whom lived in the southeastern city

of Sliven.

The Gypsies had a long history as one of Bulgaria's most dis- advantaged and maligned nationalities. They were the focus of offi- cial name-changing campaigns in every postwar decade between

1950 and 1990. Despite their numbers, Gypsies did not contrib- ute much to Bulgarian society because only about 40 percent of

them attained the educational and cultural level of the average Bulgarian. The other 60 percent lived in extremely disadvantaged conditions, isolated from the mainstream of society by the Gypsy

tradition of preserving ethnic customs and by Bulgarian government

policy. Government programs to improve the lot of the Gypsies

usually meant construction of new, separate Gypsy neighborhoods

rather than integration into Bulgarian society. Housing in Gypsy

neighborhoods was always poor and overcrowded. In 1959 when

a new neighborhood was built in Sofia, 800 people moved into 252

apartments. Each apartment had one and one-half rooms and no

kitchen or inside plumbing. By 1990 about 3,000 people lived in

these same apartments.

The education of Gypsies who spoke Romany was inhibited be- cause the language has no alphabet or written literature. Gypsy

children were exposed to Bulgarian only in school, hampering completion of studies for many. The illiteracy rate among Gypsies was

believed to be still quite high in 1990, although no statistics were

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The Society and Its Environment

available. According to the only known literacy figures for nationalities, given in the 1926 census, 8.2 percent of Gypsies were liter- ate compared with 54.4 percent of Bulgarians overall (see

Education, this ch.). The Gypsy community exerted littie pressure on students to finish school; many dropped out before reaching

legal working age, increasing the tendency to marry and begin having children early.

In 1990 about 70 percent of Gypsy workers were unskilled and

worked as general laborers, custodians, street cleaners, dishwashers, or in other minimum-wage occupations. About 20 percent of

Gypsies worked at skilled jobs. The small Gypsy intelligentsia,

which included musicians, scholars, professionals in various fields,

and political figures, tried to influence their countrymen to gain more education and job skills. Pressure also was exerted for elimination of separate Gypsy neighborhoods and official replacement

of the derogatory Bulgarian word tsiganin with rom, the Romany

word for Gypsy.

Other Minorities

Because of official suppression of nationality statistics, little in- formation was available on less numerous minorities in Bulgaria

between 1965 and 1990. Most of the Tatar population (6,430 in

1965) had migrated from the Crimea to the cities of the Dobruja

area in the nineteenth century. The Greek minority (8,241 in 1965)

comprised political emigres from Greece and the remainder of a population in southern Bulgaria that had been largely forced out

of Bulgaria by government oppression and violence between the

world wars. The Armenian population (20,282 in 1965) was mostly

added between 1896 and 1924 during the massive emigration of

Armenians from the Ottoman Empire. The Armenians were concentrated in the cities, especially Sofia and Plovdiv. In 1946 some

44,209 Jews remained in Bulgaria, which had conducted no largescale persecution despite its wartime alliance with Nazi Germany.

But massive emigration of Jews to Israel in the 1950's substantially reduced that number.

Religion

The Bulgarian Orthodox Church, which played a crucial role in preserving Bulgarian culture during the Ottoman occupation,

remained central to the sense of Bulgarian nationhood even under

the postwar communist regimes. In spite of the official status of

Orthodoxy, Bulgaria also had a tradition of tolerance toward other

Christian religions. Tolerance of Islam, however, remained problematic under all forms of government because of that religion's

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Bulgaria: A Country Study

historical identification with the occupation and subjugation of

Bulgaria.

Eastern Orthodoxy

In 1991 most Bulgarians were at least nominally members of

the Bulgarian Orthodox Church, an independent national church

like the Russian Orthodox Church and the other national branches

of Eastern Orthodoxy. Because of its national character and its status as the national church in every independent Bulgarian state until

the advent of communism, the church was considered an inseparable element of Bulgarian national consciousness (see Bulgarians,

this ch.). Baptism, before 1944 an indispensable rite establishing

individual identity, retained this vital role for many even after the

communists took power. The power of this tradition caused the

communist state to introduce a naming ritual called "civil baptism."

Although communist regimes could not eliminate all influence,

they did undermine church authority significantly. First, the communists ruled that the church only had authority on church matters and could not take part in political life. Second, although the

constitution made the church separate from the state, the clergy's

salaries and the fees needed to maintain the churches were paid

by the state. This meant that the clergy had to prove its loyalty

to the state. From 1949 until 1989, religion in Bulgaria was mainly

controlled by the Law on Religious Organizations, which enumerated the limitations on the constitution's basic separation of church

and state. The number of Orthodox priests declined from 3,312 in 1947

to 1,700 in 1985. Priests associated with the prewar regime were

accused of engaging in illegal or antisocialist activities, supporting

the opposition, and propagandizing against the state. Upon taking control of all church property, the state had the choice of maintaining churches or closing them down. Thus, for example, Rila

Monastery, the largest monastery in Bulgaria, became a national

museum in 1961.

In 1987 the Orthodox Church in Bulgaria had 3,720 churches

and chapels, 120 monasteries, 981 regular and 738 retired priests,

135 monks, and 170 nuns. The church was administered by a Holy

Synod. Under communist rule, the synod had the authority to publish limited quantities of religious material such as magazines,

newspapers, and church calendars. A new translation of the Bible was published in 1982, but in such small quantities that the size of the printing could not be determined. By 1988 the 1982 edition was being resold at ten times the original price.

88
Rila Monastery, for many centuries a cultural and religious center Courtesy Sam and Sarah Stulberg

After the fall of Zhivkov, the Orthodox Church and other

churches in Bulgaria experienced a revival. Church rituals such

as baptisms and church weddings attracted renewed interest, and

traditional church holidays were observed more widely. Christmas

1990, the first Christmas under the new regime, was widely cele- brated and greatly promoted in the mass media. During the post- war years, Christmas had received little public attention. The

government returned some church property, including the Rila

Monastery, and religious education and Bible study increased in

the early post-Zhivkov years. The Orthodox seminary in Sofia

returned to its original home in 1990 and attracted over 100 male

and female students in its first year of operation. The Konstantin

Preslavski Higher Pedagogical Institute added a new theology

department to train theology, art, and music teachers as well as

priests. The Holy Synod planned to publish 300,000 Orthodox

Bibles in 1992.

Islam

The Muslim population of Bulgaria, including Turks, Pomaks,

Gypsies, and Tatars, lived mainly in northeastern Bulgaria and

in the Rhodope Mountains. Most were Sunni Muslims (see Glossary) because Sunni Islam had been promoted by the Ottoman

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Bulgaria: A Country Study

Turks when they ruled Bulgaria. Shia sects (see Glossary) such as the Kuzulbashi and the Bektashi also were present, however. About

80,000 Shia Muslims lived in Bulgaria, mainly in the Razgrad,

Sliven, and Tutrakan (northeast of Ruse) regions. They were mainly descendants of Bulgarians who had converted to Islam to avoid

Ottoman persecution but chose a Shia sect because of its greater

tolerance toward different national and religious customs. For

example, Kuzulbashi Bulgarians could maintain the Orthodox cus- toms of communion, confession, and honoring saints. This integration of Orthodox customs into Islam gave rise to a type of syncretism

found only in Bulgaria.

As of 1987, Muslims in Bulgaria had 1,267 mosques served by

533 khodzhai, or religious community leaders. The Muslim hierarchy was headed by one chief mufti and eight regional muftis, in- terpreters of Muslim law, all of whom served five-year terms. The

largest mosque in Bulgaria was the Tumbul Mosque in Shumen,

built in 1744.

Bulgarian Muslims were subject to particular persecution in the

later years of the Zhivkov regime, partly because the Orthodox

Church traditionally considered them foreigners, even if they were

ethnically Bulgarian. In addition, the Bulgarian communist regimes

declared traditional Muslim beliefs to be diametrically opposed to communist and Bulgarian beliefs. This view justified repression

of Muslim beliefs and integration of Muslims into the larger soci- ety as part of the class and ideological struggle.

Like the practitioners of the other faiths, Muslims in Bulgaria

enjoyed greater religious freedom after the fall of the Zhivkov re- gime. New mosques were built in many cities and villages; one

village built a new church and a new mosque side by side. Some

villages organized Quran (also seen as Koran) study courses for young people (study of the Quran had been completely forbidden

under Zhivkov). Muslims also began publishing their own

newspaper, Miusiulmani, in both Bulgarian and Turkish.

Roman Catholicism

Roman Catholic missionaries first tried to convert the Bulgari- ans during the reign of Boris I. They were unsuccessful, and Boris

I led the Bulgarians in their conversion to Orthodoxy. In 1204 the

Bulgarian Tsar Kaloian (1197-1207) formed a short-lived union

between the Roman Catholic Church and the Bulgarian Orthodox Church as a political tactic to balance the religious power of

the Byzantine Empire. The union ended when Rome declared war

on Bulgaria, and the Bulgarian patriarchate was reestablished in

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The Society and Its Environment

1235. The Catholic Church had no influence in the Bulgarian

Empire after that date.

Catholic missionaries renewed their interest in Bulgaria during

the sixteenth century, when they were aided by merchants from

Dubrovnik on the Adriatic. In the next century, Vatican missionaries converted most of the Paulicians, the remainder of a once- numerous heretical Christian sect, to Catholicism. Many believed

that conversion would bring aid from Western Europe in liberating Bulgaria from the Ottoman Empire. By 1700, however, the

Ottomans began persecuting Catholics and preventing their Orthodox subjects from converting.

After Bulgaria became independent, the Catholic Church again

tried to increase its influence by opening schools, colleges, and hospitals throughout the country, and by offering scholarships to stu- dents who wished to study abroad. Prince Ferdinand of SaxeCoburg-Gotha, first ruler of independent Bulgaria, was himself

Catholic and supported the Vatican in these efforts. The papal

nuncio Angelo Roncalli, who later became Pope John XXIII,

played a leading role in establishing Catholic institutions in Bulgaria and in establishing diplomatic relations between Bulgaria and

the Vatican in 1925.

The communist era was a time of great persecution for Catholics, nominally because Catholicism was considered the religion of

fascism. Bulgarian communists also deemed Catholicism a foreign

influence because, unlike Orthodoxy, it had no ties to Russia. The

logic was that anything anti-Russian must also be anti-Bulgarian.

Under the communist regimes, Catholic priests were charged with

following Vatican orders to conduct antisocialist activities and help

opposition parties. In 1949 foreign priests were forbidden to preach

in Bulgaria, and the papal nuncio was forbidden to return to Bulgaria. Relations between the Vatican and Bulgaria were severed

at that time. During the "Catholic trials" of 1951-52, sixty priests were convicted of working for Western intelligence agencies and

collecting political, economic, and military intelligence for the West.

Four priests were executed on the basis of these charges. In the

early 1950s, the property of Catholic parishes was confiscated, all Catholic schools, colleges, and clubs were closed, and the Catholic Church was deprived of its legal status. Only nominal official toleration of Catholic worship remained.

In 1991 about 44,000 Roman Catholics remained in Bulgaria,

mostly in Ruse, Sofia, and Plovdiv. Another 18,000 Uniate Catholics were concentrated in Sofia. (Uniate Catholics recognize the

pope as their spiritual leader, but practice the Eastern Orthodox

rite.) Bulgaria reestablished relations with the Vatican in 1990, and

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Bulgaria: A Country Study

the Bulgarian government invited the pope to visit Bulgaria. Uniate

Catholics began assisting Western-rite Catholics in conducting masses in Bulgarian, making the Liturgy more accessible, and

prompting predictions that the two branches would unite. Relations had not been established between the Bulgarian Orthodox

Church and the Roman Catholic Church in 1991. however, and

Catholics blamed official Orthodox intolerance for the continued

rift. Protestantism

Protestantism was introduced in Bulgaria by missionaries from

the United States in 1857-58. amid the National Revival period.

The two main denominations, the Methodists and Congregationalists, divided their areas of influence. The former predominated

in northern Bulgaria and the latter in the south. In 1875 the Protestant denominations united in the Bulgarian Evangelical Philanthropic Society, which later became the Union of Evangelical

Churches in Bulgaria. Besides setting up churches, the Protestants

established schools, clinics, and youth clubs in Bulgaria, and dis- tributed copies of the Bible and their own religious publications.

The Union of Evangelical Churches produced the first translation

of the entire Bible into Bulgarian in 1871 and founded the non- denominational Robert College in Constantinople, where many

Bulgarian leaders of the post-independence era were educated. After

independence in 1878. the Protestants gained influence because

they used the vernacular in services and in religious literature.

The communist regimes subjected Protestants to even greater

persecution than they did the Catholics. In 1946 church funding was cut off by a law curbing foreign currency transactions. Because

many ministers had been educated in the West before World War

II. they were automatically suspected of supporting the opposition

parties. In 1949 thirty-one Protestant clergymen were charged with

working for American intelligence and running a spy ring in Bulgaria. All church property was confiscated, and the churches' legal status was revoked. Most of the mainstream Protestant denominations maintained the nominal right to worship, as guaranteed

by the constitution of 1947.

According to estimates in 1991. the 5.000 to 6.000 Pentecostals

in Bulgaria made that sect the largest Protestant group (see table

7. Appendix). The Pentecostal movement was brought to Bulgaria

in 1921 by Russian emigres. The movement later spread to Varna,

Sliven. Sofia, and Pleven. It gained popularity in Bulgaria after freedom of religion was declared in 1944. and the fall of Zhivkov

brought another surge of interest. In 1991 the Pentecostal Church

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The Society and Its Environment

had thirty-six clergy in forty-three parishes, with sufficient concentration in Ruse to petition the government to establish a Bible

institute there. In 1991 the Adventist Church had 3,500 Bulgarian members,

two-thirds of them young people. The Adventist movement began

in the Dobruja region of Bulgaria at the turn of the century and

then spread to Tutrakan, Ruse, Sofia, and Plovdiv. It gained mo- mentum in Bulgaria after 1944. Under the communist regimes,

mainstream Adventists maintained the right to worship. Some

twenty parishes with forty pastors remained active through that

era, although a breakaway reformed group was banned because

of its pacifist beliefs. Some Adventists were imprisoned for refusal

of military service.

Judaism

The Bulgarian communist regimes officially considered Jews a

nationality rather than a religious group. For that reason, and be- cause nearly 90 percent of the country's Jewish population emigrated to Israel after World War II, the Jewish society that remained

in Bulgaria was mainly secular. Under the Zhivkov regime, synagogues rarely were open in Sofia, Samokov, and Vidin. In 1990

the Jewish population was estimated at about 71,000. At that time,

only two rabbis were active, although several synagogues reportedly were reopened under the new regime. Most of the Jews in

Bulgaria were Sephardic, descended from Spanish Jews who spoke

Hebrew or Ladino (a Judeo-Spanish dialect). A much smaller number were Ashkenazi, with Yiddish-speaking ancestors. However,

very few Jews in postcommunist Bulgaria remembered their ancestral languages, and frequent mixed marriages further diluted

feelings of Jewish identity. The Jews of Bulgaria assimilated easily into Bulgarian society, partly because they traditionally lived

in cities and worked as tradesmen or financiers.

The fate of Bulgarian Jews during World War II was a source

of Bulgarian pride. The approximately 50,000 Jews then living in

Bulgaria had long been well integrated into the fabric of Bulgarian city life. Because of this integration, neither society in general nor Tsar Boris III was inclined to follow the anti-Jewish policies

of Bulgaria's Nazi ally. Boris tried to appease the Nazis by pass- ing comparatively benign anti-Jewish laws, which nevertheless were protested widely, especially by the Bulgarian Orthodox

Church. Twice in 1943, Boris personally blocked orders to deport

Bulgarian Jews, sending them instead to so-called labor camps in- side Bulgaria. Many Jews also received transit visas to Palestine

at this time.

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Bulgaria: A Country Study

Social System

Most manifestations of traditional Bulgarian familial and societal relations disappeared in the initial postwar wave of modernization. Some traditions, however, proved surprisingly persistent and

survived into the 1990s, especially in parts of western and southwestern Bulgaria. Although postwar communist regimes nominally

emphasized emancipation of women, strong elements of paternalism and emphasis on traditional female roles remained in Bulgarian society. By 1990 economic forces had eliminated traditional

extended families and limited the number of children, especially

in urban areas. Some evidence of resuming traditional relationships was seen in the immediate post-Zhivkov years. Traditional Society

Traditional Bulgarian society had three classes: the peasants

(almost everyone in the villages), the chorbadzhii (a small wealthy

class that owned large tracts of land and hired peasants to work

them), and the esnafi (skilled tradespeople in towns, who later be- came the bourgeoisie). Most references to traditional Bulgarian

society described village or peasant society because until the communist era the great majority of Bulgarians were peasants.

The most important institution of traditional Bulgarian society was the zadruga, an extended family composed of ten to twenty small

families, related by blood, who lived and worked together, owned

property jointly, and recognized the authority of a single patriarch.

The extended family most often included four generations of men,

the wives whom these men brought into the household through marriage, and the children produced through these marriages. Once

a girl married, she would leave the zadruga of her parents for that

of her husband. No member of the zadruga had any personal

property other than clothes or the women's dowries.

Traditional Bulgarian society was strongly patriarchal. The zadruga

leader, called the "old man" or the "lord of the house," had absolute power over his family and was treated with the utmost respect.

He was considered the wisest because he had lived the longest. His

duties included managing the purchase and sale of all household

property, division of labor among zadruga members, and settling

personal disputes. Older men within the household could offer advice, but the "old man" had the final word. Obligatory signs of

familial respect included rising whenever he appeared and eating

only after he had begun and before he had finished his meal. The

"old man's" wife (or the senior woman if he were widowed) had

similar authority over traditional women's activities such as tending

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The Society and Its Environment

the garden, observing holiday rituals, and sewing. The senior

woman commanded similar respect from zadruga members, but she was never allowed to interfere in functions designated for men. When a zadruga broke up (normally because it became too large

for easy management), property was divided equally among its members. Before the twentieth century, many villages were formed

as outgrowths of an enlarged zadruga. The largest of the extended

family organizations in Bulgaria began breaking up in the 1840s.

At that time, the Ottoman Empire instituted new inheritance laws

that did not take zadruga property patterns into account. A second

stage of fragmentation occurred as the expectation of automatic

integration into the extended family gradually weakened in younger generations: sons began leaving the zadruga at the death of the

"old man," and newly arrived wives failed to adjust to the traditional system. As a result of such pressures, smaller households

began to proliferate in the nineteenth century.

The zadruga breakup accelerated after Bulgaria gained its independence and began instituting Western-style laws that gave women

equal inheritance rights, although in many parts of Bulgaria women

did not begin demanding their legal inheritance until well into the

twentieth century. The disintegration of large family holdings

gradually led to the impoverishment of the peasants as land ownership became more fragmented and scattered with each generation.

The durability of the extended family was reflected in the 1934 census, however, which still listed a category of household size as "thirty-one and over." Furthermore, even after extended families broke up, many peasants continued to work cooperatively.

The familial system sometimes extended to include godparents

and adopted brothers and sisters —unrelated individuals enjoying

the same status as close relatives. Godparenthood included another

set of traditional relationships that knit village society together. Godparents kept close ties with their godchildren throughout their lives,

and the godparent/godchild relationship could be transferred from

generation to generation. Godparents were treated with the utmost

respect and had an important role in all important events in a godchild's life, beginning with baptism. The familial relationship was

so strong that a taboo developed against the marriage of children

related to the same family only through godparenthood.

After the decline of the zadruga, the patriarchal system continued

to flourish in the smaller families, where husbands gained ownership of family property and all the patriarchal status the old men

once had. The status of wives remained distinctly secondary. Upon

marriage a woman still severed all ties with her family if her husband's family lived in another village. Thus, couples always looked

95

Town of Melnik in Pirin Mountains

Courtesy Sam and Sarah Stulberg

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Bulgaria: A Country Study

forward to the birth of sons rather than daughters because sons would always remain family members. Men traditionally married

between the ages of twenty and twenty-two; women, between eigh- teen and twenty. In areas where daughters were needed as laborers

at home, marriage might be postponed until age twenty-five. Arranged marriages, common until the communist era, persisted in

the most traditional villages until the 1960s.

Only in the twentieth century did men begin to consult their wives

in family decisions. Until that time, wives were expected to give

blind obedience to their husbands. A woman who dared question

or interfere in a man's work was universally condemned. Women

waited for a man to pass rather than crossing his path, and wives

often walked with heavy loads while their husbands rode on horseback. The wife was responsible for all work inside the house and

for helping her husband in the field as well. Children typically began to share in household work at the age

of five or six. At that age, girls began to do household work, and

by age twelve they had usually mastered most of the traditional

household skills. By age twelve or thirteen, boys were expected to do the same field work as adults. Alternatively, boys might begin

learning a trade such as tailoring or blacksmithing at six or seven. As the size of farmland parcels diminished and field labor became

less critical, more families sent children away from home to learn

trades. Village boys apprenticed in cities sometimes became ac- customed to city life and did not return to the village.

Family Life and Modern Society

Throughout the era of postwar communist modernization, family life remained one of the most important values in Bulgarian

society. In a 1977 sociological survey, 95 percent of women re- sponded that "one can live a full life only if one has a family."

From the beginning of the twentieth century until the 1970s, the

marriage rate in Bulgaria was stable at close to 10 percent per year. The rate was slightly higher just after the two world wars. The rate

fell beginning in 1980, however, reaching 7 percent in 1989. Slightly more couples married in the cities than in the villages, a natural

development considering the aging of the village population. Most

women married between the ages of eighteen and twenty-five, most

men between twenty and twenty-five. Village men and less educated city men typically married before they were twenty. The first men to marry often were those who had completed their military

service, did not plan further education, and could support themselves financially (see Recruitment and Service Obligations, ch. 5; Education, this ch.). Those who continued their education often

98
The Society and Its Environment

delayed marriage until their late twenties. In choosing their spouses, the less educated and those from more traditional regions of Bulgaria sought qualities most highly valued in traditional society: love

of hard work, modesty, and good character. Among the educated

classes, values such as personal respect, commonality of interests,

and education were more often predominant in the choice of a spouse.

Until 1944 divorce was quite rare in Bulgaria, and great stigma was attached to all individuals who had divorced. After 1944 the

divorce rate rose steadily until 1983, when it reached 16.3 percent.

Between 1983 and 1986, however, the rate fell to 11.2 percent. In

the 1980s, the divorce rate in the cities was more than twice that

in the villages, in part because the village population was older.

The divorce rate was especially high for couples married five years

or less; that group accounted for 44 percent of all divorces. In 1991

the rate was increasing, however, for those married longer than

five years. Concerned about Bulgaria's low birth rate, the government is- sued new restrictions on divorce in its 1985 Family Code. The fee

to apply for a divorce was more than three months' average sal- ary, and every application for a divorce required an investigation.

The grounds most often listed in a divorce application were infi- delity, habitual drunkenness, and incompatibility. In 1991 the average Bulgarian family included four people. Families of two to five people were common, whereas families of six or more were rare. In the larger families, moreover, the additional

members usually included one or two of the couple's parents. In 1980 extended families spanning three or even four generations

made up 17 percent of all households, indicating the persistence

of the extended family tradition. Although the tradition was more

prevalent in the villages of western and southern Bulgaria than in

the cities, many urban newlyweds lived with their parents because

they could not afford or obtain separate apartments.

Socialist Bulgaria greatly emphasized the emancipation of

women. The 1971 constitution expressly stated that "all citizens

of the People's Republic of Bulgaria are equal before the law, and

no privileges or limitations of rights based on national, religious,

sex, race, or educational differences are permitted" and that

"women and men in the People's Republic of Bulgaria have the same rights." Bulgaria's Family Code also affirmed equal rights

for men and women.

In 1988 Bulgaria's work force included an almost equal number of men (50. 1 percent) and women (49.9 percent). By 1984 nearly

70 percent of working women surveyed said that they could not

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Bulgaria: A Country Study

imagine life without their professional work, even if they did not

need the pay. Only 9 percent of the women preferred being housewives. However, most men surveyed in 1988 cited economics as the reason for their wives to work, asserting that the wives should

give up their work if they were needed at home.

Household chores remained primarily the responsibility of

women, including most working wives. In 1990 the average working woman spent eight and one-half hours at her job and over four

and one-half hours doing housework: cooking, washing dishes,

washing clothes, ironing, mending, and tending the children. In

many households, such tasks were still considered "women's work,"

to which husbands contributed little. In their social planning, Bulgarian legislators usually viewed their

country's women mainly as mothers, not as workers. Besides the

laws passed in an effort to increase the country's birth rate, legis- lators passed laws giving certain privileges to women in the workplace, often keeping their reproductive capability in mind. Women

were prohibited by law from doing heavy work or work that would

adversely affect their health or their capacities as mothers. Women

sought such jobs because they generally offered better pay and

benefits. The list of prohibited jobs changed constantly. Depending on the type of work, women could retire after fifteen or twenty

years, or after reaching age forty-five, fifty, or fifty-five. Women

who had raised five or more children could retire after fifteen years

of work, regardless of their age or type of work. Men were generally offered retirement after working twenty-five years or reaching age fifty, fifty-five, or sixty. Some jobs were restricted to women

unless no women were available. Without exception these were lowskill, low-paying jobs such as archivist, elevator operator, ticket

seller, coat checker, and bookkeeper. Other jobs, such as secretary, stenographer, librarian, cashier, and cleaning person were

considered "appropriate for women. " Men in the workplace often

expressed resentment of women in positions of authority.

Social Groups and Their Work

Postwar Bulgarian society was divided into three social groups,

according to type of work: Workers, who held jobs in the "productive" manufacturing sector of the economy; Employees, who worked

in "non-productive" service and education jobs; and Agricultural

workers. The intelligentsia, usually considered a subsector of the

employee category, held professional or creative positions requiring specific qualifications. In 1987 nonagricultural workers made

up 63 percent of the population, employees made up 18 percent,

and agricultural workers made up 19 percent. The intelligentsia

100
Male dance ensemble at folk festival held every five years at Koprivshtitsa

Courtesy Sam and Sarah Stulberg

made up 13.5 percent of the total population in 1985. Both the

nonagricultural worker and the employee category grew about 1

percent between the censuses of 1975 and 1985, but the number

of agricultural workers dropped steadily through the 1970s and

1980s (see table 8, Appendix). Of all people in the work force in

1990, only 21.7 percent were rated as highly qualified. According

to sociologists, that figure would have to more than double if Bulgaria were to become economically competitive with the West.

Most of those registered as workers had jobs in industry. Between 1975 and 1985, the number of workers in the machinebuilding, spare-parts and metal-processing industries increased.

Other industries, such as the food industry, the lumber industry,

and the fuel industry, lost workers. Most workers were comparatively young, with little education and few work qualifications (see

table 9, Appendix). In 1990 some 66.8 percent of industrial workers had a basic education or less. However, young workers were

valued because they were considered most capable of adapting to new technology—a critical requirement for upgrading Bulgaria's

outdated industrial infrastructure (see Labor Force, ch. 3). In the 1980s, employment grew in the trade, supply, construction, and transportation sectors. Growing the fastest, however, were

the sectors requiring primarily intellectual work: research and

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Bulgaria: A Country Study

research services, education, and administration. After growing

by 90 percent between 1965 and 1985, administration included 26

percent of all employees and was the largest division of this category.

The housing sector was the only component of the employee

category that lost jobs between 1975 and 1990.

The number of agricultural workers decreased markedly from

50 percent of all workers in 1965 to 20 percent in 1985. As agricultural production intensified, many agricultural workers were trans- ferred to nonagricultural jobs. In the late 1980s, however, a shortage

of agricultural workers occurred because so many people had left the villages. For this reason, labor-intensive farm activities such

as harvesting required recruitment of brigades from schools and

nonagricultural enterprises. Many of the remaining farm workers

could not adapt to new technology. This lack of adaptation inhibited

the modernization and mechanization of agricultural processes.

The democratization that followed the Zhivkov regime raised the

problem of unemployment, unknown in Bulgaria after 1944 (see

Labor and Economic Reform, ch. 3). As of April 1991, some 124,000

Bulgarians were unemployed. With the country in the midst of eco- nomic restructuring, enterprise shutdowns, and scarcity of raw

materials, employment figures showed no sign of improvement. The

highest unemployment rates occurred in Plovdiv and Sofia. Most

unemployed persons were under age thirty, and over 60 percent were women. Job vacancies continued to decline in 1991; most re- maining opportunities were in low-skilled jobs or jobs requiring hard

physical labor. Persons with the highest level of education, such as engineers, economists, and teachers, were least likely to find suit- able positions. In 1990 the lack of skilled professional positions

spurred a "brain drain" emigration that further threatened Bulgaria's ability to compete on technologically oriented world markets. In the meantime, the country's economy had lost its protected

position as a member of the defunct Comecon, putting more pres- sure on the domestic labor force (see Bulgaria in Comecon, ch. 3). Because the national welfare system could only accommodate

those who lost their jobs because of enterprise shutdown, in 1990

the Bulgarian government began seeking ways to create more jobs.

It considered rewarding businesses that added shifts or offered parttime or seasonal work, and it encouraged development of small

business. One proposed solution, replacing working pensioners with

young unemployed workers, was unworkable because enterprises

found it less expensive to continue hiring pensioners.

Social Services

Between independence and the communist era, the Bulgarian

government had used its social welfare funds mainly for government

102
St. Paraskeva Orthodox Church, Nesebur

Courtesy Sam and Sarah Stulberg

workers, army officers, white-collar workers, craftsmen, and trades- men. The 1949 social welfare law founded a new social welfare sys- tem that endured into the 1990s. The new system greatly expanded

the categories of people eligible and the amounts they could receive.

The social welfare system in 1991 was largely based on the 1951

section of the Labor Code that regulated monetary compensation

and supplements, and the 1957 Law on Pensions. Both laws were

revised countless times and no longer agree with each other. The

National Assembly delayed creation of a new law until the new

constitution was ratified in the summer of 1991.

In 1991 two-thirds of Bulgaria's social welfare budget was spent on pensions; the rest went for monthly child-care allowances and

other programs. As of late 1990, the Bulgarian government provided over 4 billion leva per year to 2,300,000 pensioners—about one

fourth of the entire population. To keep pace with the rising cost of living in the transition to a Western economic system, the government had to index pensions several times in 1990. By the beginning of 1991, some 165 leva were being added monthly to every

pension, casting doubt on the long-term possibility of maintaining the program. The ratio of Bulgaria's pensioners to its total population was the largest in the world, almost twice that of most Western

countries. Because the society was aging, some experts declared

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Bulgaria: A Country Study

that workers should be encouraged to remain in the work force and

participate actively in society much longer than had been the practice under the communist regimes.

In early 1991, in a further effort to keep pace with the rising

cost of living, the Council of Ministers established a new minimum

wage and new subsidy levels for all social welfare programs. Anyone who had received the old monthly minimum wage of 165 leva

would now be compensated 270 leva to provide for a new minimum wage of 435 leva. This minimum wage was subsequently

changed three times in 1991, peaking at 518 leva. The 1991 program also gave 242 leva to pregnant or nursing women and to those on temporary workers' disability. Child-care compensation for

households with children under three years of age was raised to 90 leva, with a monthly supplement of 100 leva per child. In 1991

several cost-of-living increases were added to those categories as

well. In 1991 unemployment compensation was set at 270 leva per

month; students over eighteen received 130 leva per month; graduate students, 230 leva. Those payments were funded from the state budget and from enterprise salary budgets, neither of which seemed

adequate to keep pace with rapidly changing prices in 1991.

Under socialism all citizens who had been awarded the title "active fighter against fascism and capitalism" for military or civilian

contributions in World War II received a large pension and special privileges such as free public transportation, free medical

prescriptions, and free vacations at special resorts. After much controversy, those privileges were abolished in 1990.

Health

Until the 1920s, peasants relied on traditional medicine and went

to a doctor or hospital only as a last resort. Traditional healers believed that many illnesses were caused by evil spirits (baiane) and

could therefore be treated with magic, with chants against the spirits,

with prayers, or by using medicinal herbs. The knowledge of healing

herbs was highly valued in village society. For healing one could

also drink, wash, or bathe in water from mineral springs, some

of which were considered holy. Even in postcommunist Bulgaria, some resorted to herbal medicine or to persons with reputed extra- sensory healing powers. Herbalists and "extrasenses" regained popularity in Bulgaria after the overthrow of Zhivkov. Because of the

skepticism of conventional doctors, little research was done on the

validity of traditional herbal medicine, but in 1991 doctors began

to consider rating skilled herbalists as qualified specialists.

Beginning in 1944, Bulgaria made significant progress in increasing life expectancy and decreasing infant mortality rates. In 1986

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The Society and Its Environment

Bulgaria's life expectancy was 68.1 years for men and 74.4 years

for women. In 1939 the mortality rate for children under one year

had been 138.9 per 1,000; by 1986 it was 18.2 per 1,000, and in

1990 it was 14 per 1,000, the lowest rate in Eastern Europe. The

proportion of long-lived people in Bulgaria was quite large; a 1988

study cited a figure of 52 centenarians per 1 million inhabitants,

most of whom lived in the Smolyan, Kurdzhali, and Blagoevgrad

regions.

The steady demographic aging of the Bulgarian population was

a concern, however. In the 1980s, the number of children in the

population decreased by over 100,000. The prenatal mortality rate

for 1989 was 1 1 per 1 ,000, twice that in West European countries.

In 1989 the mortality rate for children of ages one to fourteen was

twice as great as in Western Europe. The mortality rate for vil- lage children was more than twice the rate for city children.

However, in 1990 some Bulgarian cities had mortality rates as low

as 8.9 per 1,000, which compared favorably with the rates in Western Europe.

Poor conditions in maternity wards and shortages of baby needs

worried new and prospective mothers. Hospital staff shortages

meant that doctors and nurses were overworked and babies received scant attention. Expensive neonatal equipment was not available

in every hospital, and transferral to better-equipped facilities was

rare. In 1990 the standard minimum weight to ensure survival at birth was 1 ,000 grams, compared with the World Health Organization standard of 500 grams.

The number of medical doctors, nurses, and dentists in Bulgaria

increased during the 1980s. Bulgaria had 27,750 doctors in 1988,

almost 6,000 more than in 1980. This meant one doctor for every

323 Bulgarians. Some 257 hospitals were operating in 1990, with

105 beds per 1,000 people.

Like other aspects of society, health services underwent significant reform after 1989. In 1990 health officials declared that the

socialist system of polyclinics in sectors serving 3,000 to 4,000 people

did not satisfy the public's need for more complex diagnostic ser- vices. They claimed the system was too centralized and bureaucratic, provided too few incentives for health personnel, and lacked

sufficient modern equipment and supplies. Thereafter, new emphasis was placed on allowing free choice of a family doctor and

providing more general practitioners to treat families on an on- going basis. Beginning in 1990, Bulgaria began accepting donations of money and medicine from Western countries. During the

reform period, even common medicines such as aspirin were sometimes in short supply. Prices for medicines skyrocketed. Shortages

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Bulgaria: A Country Study

of antibiotics, analgesics, dressings, sutures, and disinfectants were

chronic. In November 1989. the Council of Ministers decreed that doctors could be self-employed during their time off from their assigned

clinics. Doctors could work for pay either in health facilities or in

patients' homes, but with significant restrictions. When acting privately, they could not certify a patient's health or disability, issue

prescriptions for free medicine, perform outpatient surgery or abortions, conduct intensive diagnostic tests, use anesthetics, or serve

patients with infectious or venereal diseases. In 1990 the National

Assembly extended the right of private practice to all qualified medical specialists, and private health establishments and pharmacies were legalized. Church-sponsored facilities were included in this provision. The 1990 law did not provide for a health insurance sys- tem, however, and establishment of such a system was not a high

legislative priority for the early 1990s.

In 1991 the government created a National Health Council to be financed by 2.5 billion leva from the state budget plus funds

from donors and payments for medical services. The goal of the

new council was to create a more autonomous health system. Also

in 1991. the Ministry of Health set up a Supreme Medical Council and a Pharmaceuticals Council to advise on proposed private

health centers, pharmacies, and laboratories and to regulate the

supply and distribution of medicine.

In 1988 the top three causes of death in Bulgaria were cardiovascular illnesses, cancer, and respiratory illnesses. An expert esti- mated that 88 percent of all deaths were caused by "socially

significant diseases" that resulted from an unhealthy lifestyle and

were thus preventable. Strokes, the most prevalent cause of death,

killed a higher percentage of the population in Bulgaria than anywhere else in the world. In 1985 nearly 58.000 Bulgarians suffered

strokes, and nearly 24.000 of them died. The mortality rate for strokes was especially high in northern Bulgaria, where it sometimes exceeded 300 fatalities per 100.000 persons. In villages the

rate was three times as high as in the cities. Doctors cited unhealthy

eating habits, smoking, alcohol abuse, and stress as lifestyle causes

of the high stroke rate. In 1990 about 35 percent of Bulgarian women and 25 percent

of men were overweight. Sugar provided an average of 22 percent

of the calories in Bulgarian diets, twice as much as the standard

for balanced nutrition. Another 35 percent of average calories came

from animal fat. also twice as much as the recommended amount.

That percentage was likely much higher in the villages, where many

animal products were made at home. Modernization of the food

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The Society and Its Environment

supply generally led to increased consumption of carbohydrates and

fats. In contrast, the traditional Bulgarian diet emphasized dairy

products, beans, vegetables, and fruits. Large quantities of bread were always a key element of the Bulgarian diet. Average salt consumption was also very high. In 1990 the average Bulgarian

consumed 14.5 kilograms of bread, 4.4 kilograms of meat, 12.6

kilograms of milk and milk products, 15 eggs, and 15 kilograms

of fruits and vegetables per month.

In the 1980s, Bulgaria ranked tenth in the world in per capita

tobacco consumption. Tobacco consumption was growing, especially among young people. Each Bulgarian consumed 7.34 liters of alcohol per month, not including huge amounts of homemade

alcoholic beverages. Between 1962 and 1982, recorded alcohol con- sumption increased 1.6 times.

In 1990 an estimated 35 percent of the population risked seri- ous health problems because of environmental pollution (see Environment, this ch.). In the most polluted areas, the sickness rate increased by as much as twenty times in the 1980s. By 1990, pollution was rated the fastest-growing cause of "socially significant

diseases," particularly for respiratory and digestive disorders. Doctors in the smelting center of Srednogorie found that the incidence

of cancer, high blood pressure, and dental disorders had increased

significantly in the 1980s.

Pollution had an especially adverse effect on the immune sys- tems of children. In the first few years of the Giurgiu plant's operation, the number of deformed children born across the Danube

in Ruse increased 144 percent. From 1985 to 1990, this number

increased from 27.5 to 39.7 per 1,000. Miscarriages, stillbirths,

and premature, low-weight births doubled during that period. The

infant mortality rate in Srednogorie was three times the national

average in 1990. Excessive lead in the soil and water at Kurdzhali

had caused a great increase in skin and infectious diseases in chil- dren there. In 1990 environmental authorities named the village

of Dolno Ezerovo, near Burgas, the "sickest village in Bulgaria"

because over 60 percent of its children suffered from severe respiratory illnesses and allergies.

In 1987 Bulgarian health authorities instituted limited mandatory testing for human immunodeficiency virus (HIV), which causes acquired immune deficiency syndrome (AIDS). All prospective

marriage partners, all pregnant women, and all transportation

workers arriving from outside Bulgaria were required to be tested. Hemophiliacs, Bulgarian navy sailors who had traveled abroad after 1982, and students and workers visiting vacation resorts also fell under this rule. As of October 1989, some 2.5 million people in

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Bulgaria: A Country Study

Bulgaria, including about 66,000 foreigners, had been tested for HIV, and 81 Bulgarians were diagnosed as HIV-positive. According to government figures, six of that number had contracted AIDS.

Foreigners diagnosed as HIV-positive were ordered to leave the

country. Bulgaria estimated it would spend over US$4 million to treat AIDS and HIV-positive patients in 1991.

Housing

In the postwar era, housing in Bulgaria improved significantly

as more and better-quality homes were built. Expectations for housing availability also increased significantly in that time, however.

According to a 1990 survey, 51 percent of all Bulgarians were dissatisfied with their current housing, and 73 percent (especially young

families) did not believe that their current housing would be adequate for their future needs.

In 1990 the average home in Bulgaria had three rooms and an

area of 65 square meters. This small average size reflected the policy

of the command economy, which was to build many small oneor two-room apartments in large prefabricated housing complexes

in order to maximize the number of available housing units and

meet growing demand. In 1985 some 15.6 percent of all homes

had one room, 31.5 percent had two rooms, 29.6 percent had three

rooms, 14.4 percent had four rooms, and only 8.9 percent had five or more rooms. As a result, 65 percent of the population averaged

only half a room per family member. Only 36 percent of families

with children under eighteen had a separate children's room; 65

percent used the living room as a bedroom; and 57 percent used

the kitchen as a bedroom. By 1990 communal apartments were becoming rarer, however; at that time, 12 percent of families shared

a kitchen with another family.

The predominance of small housing units put larger families at a disadvantage. The situation was also difficult for young couples,

60 percent of whom were forced to stay in their parents' homes

after marriage. In 1990 over 40 percent of homes included two or more families or other relatives of one family. Members of three or even four generations often lived together. Traditional acceptance of the extended family contributed to this situation, but long

waits for separate housing also played a critical role. In 1979 the

government established a special Young Newlywed Families Fund

that ensured that new families would receive at least 25 percent

of new government housing. This program delivered more housing to young families in the 1980s, but waiting lists also grew longer

during that period.

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The Society and Its Environment

Living space was much more available in villages than in cities. One-room homes were unusual in villages, and villagers were much

more likely to live in separate homes than in apartment complexes.

Village houses usually had more rooms, but they lacked many of

the modern conveniences available in city apartments.

In 1985 hot running water, a shower or bathtub, and an indoor

toilet were available in only 42.4 percent of homes. Between the

1975 and 1985 censuses, the number of households with bathtubs

or showers almost doubled, from 34.0 percent to 63.7 percent. Still, only 39.3 percent of villagers had a bathtub or shower, and only

7.3 percent of them had an indoor toilet. In 1990 many villages

lacked a sewage system and relied on wells for water. At that time,

about 30 percent of Bulgarian homes had electric heating, and 34

percent were connected to a steam central heating system.

Housing planners often overlooked the need for convenient

schools, stores, and recreational facilities. (For Bulgarians, proximity generally meant fifteen minutes' walk.) On the average, 70

to 80 percent of construction funds went to constructing the housing complexes themselves, and only 20 to 30 percent went to building facilities to serve the residents of the complexes. This was

especially true in Sofia, where some of the newest neighborhoods were isolated from the rest of the city.

Housing was affected by the drastic reform-period price hikes

in Bulgaria. At the end of 1990, apartment owners in Sofia were

offering to sell two-room apartments at between 100,000 and

200,000 leva, or to rent them for 600 leva per month. Moreover,

the new economic system gave landlords the right to evict tenants

for nonpayment of rent. In 1990 prospective homebuyers frustrated

by the steeper housing prices established a tent city in Sofia to dramatize the threat of homelessness (see The Ferment of 1988-90,

ch. 4). Also at risk for homelessness were many Bulgarian Turks who

had emigrated in 1989 but returned after the overthrow of Zhivkov. By 1991 the state had bought many of the Turks' homes and

resold them; other homes were occupied illegally. In 1991 many

who lost their homes in this way went through the bureaucratic

process of reclaiming their property. In 1990 Sofia created a new

foundation to help the homeless, especially elderly and single people, and to aid in the building and financing of homes.

Education

Before the National Revival of the mid-nineteenth century, education usually took the form of memorization of the liturgy and other

religious material. Supporters of the National Revival movement

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Bulgaria: A Country Study

were instrumental in establishing and supporting Bulgarian schools

in the cities—first for boys, and later for girls as well. These activists also introduced the chitalishta. Often located next to a school,

the chitalishta served as community cultural centers as well as reading rooms. The first schools, which began opening in the early nineteenth century, often did not go beyond a basic education; students

wishing to continue their education had to go abroad.

The educational system established after Bulgaria gained its in- dependence retained the same basic structure through 1989. The

1878 Temporary Law on National Schools established free compulsory education in primary school for both sexes. The schools were designed to teach reading, writing, and basic arithmetic. In

practice, not everyone received that education, but the law gave

the villages an incentive to open new schools. By the turn of the

century, one-third of all Bulgarian villages had primary schools.

In the early days, the immediate demand for a large number of

teachers meant that many new teachers had little more education

than their students. Later reforms specified a seven-year standard

education with a curriculum based on a West European model.

Some peasants, especially uneducated ones, withdrew their chil- dren from school because they believed the classes were unrelated

to peasant life. This situation led to the offering of textbooks and

prizes as an incentive for students from poorer families to remain

in school.

Communist rule in Bulgaria brought forth a new approach to education as a means of indoctrinating Marxist theory and communist values. Literacy was promoted so that the communistcontrolled press could be disseminated throughout society. New

classes for both adults and children aimed at providing as many

as possible with a high-school education and abolishing illiteracy.

Schools switched their focus from liberal arts to technical training

and introduced a curriculum modeled on that of the Soviet Union.

Russian language study was introduced for all, from kindergart- ners to adults who had already completed their education. Copies

of Pravda, the primary newspaper of the Communist Party of the

Soviet Union, were distributed even in isolated villages. After the

overthrow of Zhivkov, however, English became the most studied

foreign language in Bulgaria, and the study of Russian declined

dramatically.

In 1979 Zhivkov introduced a sweeping educational reform,

claiming that Marxist teachings on educating youth were still not

being applied completely. Zhivkov therefore created Unified Secondary Polytechnical Schools (Edinna sredna politekhnicheska uchilishta,

ESPU), in which all students would receive the same general

110
The Society and Its Environment

education. The system united previously separate specialized middle

schools in a single, twelve- grade program heavily emphasizing tech- nical subjects. In 1981 a national program introduced computers

to most of the ESPUs. The change produced a chaotic situation

in which teaching plans and programs had to be completely over- hauled and new textbooks issued to reflect the new educational

emphasis. This project proved unworkable, and by 1985 new

specialized schools again were being established (see table 10, Appendix).

The fall of Zhivkov resulted in a complete restructuring of the

country's educational system. In retrospect Bulgarian educators

recognized that the socialist way of educating was not only

bureaucratic, boring, and impersonal, but also led to disregard for the rights of the individual, intolerance of the opinions of others,

and aggressive behavior. The centralized system with its regional

hierarchies was therefore scrapped in favor of a system of educational councils in which every 400 teachers could elect a delegate

to the National Council of Teachers. The first goal of the new or- ganization was to depoliticize the schools in cooperation with the

Ministry of Public Education.

In 1991 the Bulgarian educational system consisted of three types

of schools: state, municipal, and private (including religious). The

grade levels were primary (first to fourth grade), basic (fifth to seventh grade), and secondary (eighth to twelfth grade). Children

began first grade at age six or seven and were required to attended

school until age sixteen. Parents also had the option of enrolling

their children in kindergarten at age five. Secondary school stu- dents had the choice of studying for three years at professionalvocational schools or for four years at technical schools or general

high schools. Religious schools operated only on the high-school

level. Specialized high schools taught foreign languages, mathematics, and music; admittance to them was by special entrance exams.

Special programs for gifted and talented children began as early

as the fifth grade. Special schools also operated for handicapped

children. Children suffering from chronic illnesses could receive

their schooling in a hospital or sanatorium.

Prior to the postcommunist reform era, about 25,000 students

dropped out every year before reaching their sixteenth birthday;

another 25,000 failed to advance to the next grade. Under the new

system, parents could be fined 500 to 1,000 leva if their children

failed to attend school; fines also were levied for pupils retained

in grade for an extra year. Public opinion on the educational reform focused mainly on

depolitization. By the 1990-91 school year, new textbooks had been

111
Bulgaria: A Country Study

introduced in many subjects, but many of them were not completely

free of socialist rhetoric. A first-grade mathematics textbook published in 1990 contained the following exercise: "Count how many

words there are in this sentence: 'I am grateful to the Party, for

it leads my country to beautiful, radiant life and vigilantly protects us from war. '"A newly published music book contained songs

about the party, a communist youth organization, and Lenin. Many

teachers likewise continued to espouse the communist rhetoric in which their profession had been long and firmly indoctrinated. In

late 1990, about 50,000 Sofia University students demonstrated

against poor education and against continued requirements to at- tend courses in Marxism. Their protest caused the university to eliminate compulsory political indoctrination courses. The 1991

Law on Public Education declared that "no political activity is al- lowed in the system of public education."

Depolitization was expected to be a slow process because of the extent to which the schools had been politicized before 1990. At

the end of 1990, over 90 percent of all teachers were still members

of the Bulgarian Socialist (formerly Communist) Party. For this reason, the Law on Public Education prohibited teachers from becoming members of political parties for a period of three years, beginning in 1991 . Because the Zhivkov regime had tinkered often

with Bulgaria's educational system, longtime teachers had developed a cynicism toward reform of any type. This attitude hampered the removal of the old socialist structures from the educational

system.

Some students married and began families while they were still in school, and two- student families were not uncommon. Such families often depended on help from parents because of their low in- come and because of a shortage of student family housing. By 1990

most Bulgarian students worked in their free time, unlike their

predecessors in the 1970s and early 1980s.

Reform also reached higher education. In 1990 a new law on

academic freedom emphasized the concept of an intellectual market in which universities, teachers, and students must maintain high

performance levels to stay competitive. The law gave every insti- tution of higher learning the right to manage its teaching and

research activities without government interference. This right in- cluded control over curriculum, number of students, standards for student admissions and teacher hirings, training and organization

of faculty, and the level of contact with other institutions of higher

learning in Bulgaria and abroad. Students received the right to choose their own professors. The higher education law was criticized

112
The Society and Its Environment

for withholding students' rights and because the legislature had

failed to consult students in the law's formulation. In 1991 experts evaluated the state university system as weak

in critically needed technical fields of study. The availability of in- terested students was also questioned. In the 1990-91 school year, no graduate students with enterprise scholarships majored in subjects such as computer systems, artificial intelligence systems, or ecology and environmental protection. Graduate programs in cri- tical nontechnical fields such as management economics, marketing, production management, and finance also had no students.

After the overthrow of Zhivkov, France and Germany made early

commitments to help Bulgaria carry out educational reforms. In 1991 the United States began planning a new American college

in Blagoevgrad, where students would be taught in English using

American educational methods. The first 200 students were to in- clude 160 Bulgarians, 20 students from neighboring European countries, and 20 Americans majoring in Balkan studies. The University

of Maine was to supply the teachers. Plans called for business and

economics to be the major areas of concentration. Affordability was

a potential barrier to participation in this plan by Bulgarian stu- dents; the cost was low by American standards, but far above the

average Bulgarian's price range. And the tuition-free Bulgarian

university system was expected to lure many qualified students from

the new university. Nevertheless, Western education assistance was

an important symbolic step in moving the social institutions of Bulgaria into the European mainstream, from which they had been

isolated for forty-five years.

* * *

Because the societal change stimulated in Bulgaria by the process

of democratization is likely to continue through the 1990s, translations of the Bulgarian press are an invaluable source of current

information. A wide variety of articles and broadcasts on social

topics, as well as government documents and laws, is translated

in the Foreign Broadcast Information Service's Daily Report: East Europe and the Joint Publication Research Service's JPRS Report: East Europe. Amnesty International's Bulgaria: Imprisonment of Ethnic Turks is an impartial source of information on the Turks and

other minorities during the assimilation campaign of the 1980s.

Hugh Poulton's The Balkans: Minorities and States in Conflict includes

material on ethnic policy and regional issues after the overthrow

of Zhivkov. Kak Zhiveem (How We Live) is a new Bulgarianlanguage sociological magazine that includes Western-style surveys

113
Bulgaria: A Country Study

on topics such as housing and the standard of living. Bulgarien,

volume six in the German series of southeast European handbooks,

offers chapter-length treatment of most aspects of society, including education, minorities, population, and religion; some articles are in English, most are in German. (For further information and

complete citations, see Bibliography.)

114
Chapter 3. The Economy
A potter, one of many artisans practicing their trade in modern Bulgaria
FROM THE END OF WORLD WAR II until widespread revolution in Eastern Europe swept aside most communist governments

in 1989, the Bulgarian Communist Party (BCP) exerted complete

economic control in Bulgaria. The party's ascent to power in 1944

had marked the beginning of radical economic change for Bulgaria.

After World War II, Bulgaria followed the Soviet model of eco- nomic development more closely than any other East Bloc country. The new regime shifted much of the labor force from the

countryside to the city to provide workers for new large-scale in- dustrial complexes. At the same time, the focus of Bulgarian in- ternational trade shifted from Central Europe to Eastern Europe.

These new policies resulted in impressive initial rates of growth.

But this was partly because the country was starting from a low

level of economic development. Throughout the postwar period,

economic progress also was assisted substantially by a level of in- ternal and external political stability unseen in other East European countries during the same period and unprecedented in

modern Bulgarian history.

Nonetheless, beginning in the early 1960s low capital and labor

productivity and expensive material inputs plagued the Bulgarian

economy. With disappointing rates of growth came a high degree

of economic experimentation. This experimentation took place

within the socialist economic framework, however, and it never approached a market-based economy.

In the late 1980s, continuing poor economic performance brought

new economic hardship. By that time, the misdirection and irra- tionality of BCP economic policies had become quite clear. Fi- nally, on November 10, 1989, a popular movement toppled Todor

Zhivkov, long-time party leader and head of state, and orthodox

communist dictatorship ended. But unlike the communist parties

in most other East European states, the BCP retained majority

power after the transition in Bulgaria by winning the first free national elections in June 1990. By that time, however, changes in

party leadership and reduction of the BCP's power base permitted economic reorientation toward a market system. This difficult transition combined with political instability to seriously worsen

economic conditions during 1990.

Bulgaria's success in transforming its economy from central planning to a market-based system remained unmeasured in 1991. Undoubtedly, any form of Bulgarian government faced a daunting

117
Bulgaria: A Country Study

task at that point. Because its financial and productive resources had been allocated ineffectively for many years, the economy ur- gently needed major reforms. The manufacturing sector was uncompetitive in world markets, was technologically outmoded, and

consumed energy and materials at enormously wasteful rates. The

agricultural sector, once the most productive sector of the Bulgarian economy, had degenerated to the point that the country could

scarcely feed its own people. A new trade regime with traditional

partners would strain already low hard currency reserves, restricting access to raw materials and sophisticated technology. External and

internal debt was enormous when Zhivkov fell. Inflation was high,

environmental problems were severe, and skilled labor was in- sufficient. Several factors complicate the quantification of socialist econo- mies from a capitalist perspective. Prices in socialist economies serve primarily an accounting function; they do not reflect relative scarcities and demand for a product as they do in capitalist economies.

Hence, comparisons of value indicators are difficult. In addition, some socialist statistics simply are calculated differendy. For ex- ample, the socialist equivalent of national income, referred to as net material product (NMP—see Glossary), excludes the value of

most services, including government, that are unrelated to physical production.

Accurate assessment of Bulgarian economic policies and performance under communist regimes also is complicated by incomplete, inaccurate, or misleading statistics. Some Western economists

have attempted, however, to extrapolate data based on a combination of Bulgarian statistics, various economic assumptions, and

statistical techniques.

Resource Base

Bulgaria is relatively poor in both quantity and quality of natural

resources. This situation has been an important factor in planning

the national economy and foreign trade. The primary indigenous

mineral resources are coal, copper, lead. zinc, and iron ore. Coal and Minerals

Lignite, by far the most prevalent form of coal, is mined chiefly

in the Maritsa-zapad (West Maritsa) and Maritsa-iztok (East

Maritsa) sections of the Maritsa Basin (see fig. 10). The main source

of other grades of brown coal is the Bobov Dol deposit in the Rila

Mountains of southwest Bulgaria. There is little bituminous coal

in the country. Copper is mined chiefly in the Sredna Gora (central hills) in the western Balkans, and at Chelopets in south-central

Bulgaria. There are also large deposits of lead. zinc, and iron ore.

118

Source: Based on information from Klaus-Detlev Grothusen (ed.), Bulgarien, Gottingen, Gei

Figure 10. Energy and Mineral Resources

120
The Economy

the largest of which are at Kremikovtsi. Bulgaria became self- sufficient in the production of pig iron in 1987. Manganese, ura- nium, gold, salt, and chromium also are mined. Small amounts

of oil are extracted offshore in the Black Sea and inland near Pleven.

Agricultural Resources

In 1987 approximately 56 percent of Bulgaria's total land mass

of 11,055,000 hectares was used for agriculture. Of that total,

3,825,000 hectares, or 35 percent of the total land mass, was arable. Although natural conditions are very good for some crops, not all of the land is ideal for agricultural purposes. Large portions of the

western uplands are suitable only for tobacco and vegetable culti- vation. Grain fields on the rolling plain to the north of the Balkan

Mountains receive limited rainfall and experience periodic droughts.

Environmental Problems

Although Bulgaria has had serious environmental problems for some time, they were not openly discussed until the overthrow of

Zhivkov. Ecological groups were at the forefront of anti-Zhivkov

demonstrations in 1989, when an all-European ecology conference

focused world attention on Sofia. After acknowledging the problem,

post-Zhivkov policy makers rated degradation of the air, water, and

soil as one of the most serious problems facing Bulgaria. In April

1990, the Ministry of Public Health declared the cities of Asenovgrad, Dimitrovgrad, Kurdzhali, Panagyurishte, Plovdiv, Ruse, and

Vratsa ecologically endangered regions and announced that resi- dents of these regions would be given medical examinations. But

after forty years of touting heavy industry as the pathway to national advancement, Bulgaria could not easily remedy the intense

pollution emitted by chemical plants in Ruse and Dimitrovgrad or

the copper smelters at Srednogorie without further damaging its al- ready shaky economy. Likewise, the Kozloduy Nuclear Power Plant on the Maritsa River, provider of over 20 percent of the country's

electric power but a persistent emitter of radiation, could not be closed

without severe impact on the economy. Radiation from the 1986

Chernobyl' accident in the Soviet Union also remained an environmental hazard in 1991 (See Environment, ch. 2). Labor Force

Because of a low birth rate, labor shortages began to appear in

Bulgaria in the 1980s. Then in 1989, deportation of 310,000 ethnic Turks created critical shortages in certain economic sectors. The dislocation caused by the large-scale economic reform that

began in 1990 introduced high rates of unemployment and social

insecurity to a system that nominally had no unemployment under

121


Bulgaria: A Country Study

the central planning regime. A period of protracted readjustment

of labor to enterprise needs was expected to begin in 1991.

Factors of Availability

The total labor force in Bulgaria was 4.078 million in 1988. Of

that total, 35.9 percent were classified as industrial workers, 19

percent as agricultural workers, and 18.9 percent as service workers. In 1985 some 56 percent of the population was of working age

(16 to 59 years old for men and 16 to 54 for women); 22.9 percent were under working age, and 21.1 percent were over working age. These figures indicate that the population had aged demographically since 1946, when 30 percent of the population was under the

working age and only 12 percent was over. Small growth rates and

occasional declines of the Bulgarian labor force increasingly inhibited economic growth in the 1980s. The meager growth in the labor

force was caused primarily by a birthrate that began declining before World War II. Declining population growth did not affect Bulgarian economic

planning and performance for a number of years. In the 1950s and

1960s, the expanding labor requirements of industrial growth were accommodated by a steady influx of peasant labor from the countryside and by the nationalization of artisan shops in 1951 . This migration slowed, however, and complaints of an industrial labor shortage were common by the late 1960s. The situation was exacerbated in 1974 when the government reduced the work week from 48 to 42.5

hours (see Agriculture, this ch.). By the early 1980s, Bulgaria's urban

working-age population had begun to decline in absolute terms. Then

in May 1989, ethnic strife caused thousands of ethnic Turks to leave

Bulgaria for Turkey. In August Turkish authorities finally closed

the border, but only after 310,000 ethnic Turks had left the country,

taking with them a substantial chunk of the Bulgarian work force. In addition, a significant "brain drain" threatened in 1990 when

large numbers of young, highly educated Bulgarians applied to leave

the country. In the first four months of 1990, at a time when the

country desperately needed its professional class to restructure so- ciety and the economy, 550,000 such applications were received.

Labor statistics reflect a distinct change of economic priorities

from agriculture to industry under communist regimes. From 1948

to 1988, the shares of labor in industry and agriculture shifted dramatically. Industry's share rose from 7.9 to 38 percent, while

agriculture's share fell from 82.1 to 19.3 percent. Among other

sectors, in 1988 construction, transportation and communications,

and trade respectively accounted for 8.3, 6.7, and 8.7 percent of

employment.

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The Economy

Labor and Economic Reform

Under communist rule, unemployment officially was nonexistent. Like many other Soviet-style economies, however, the Bulgarian system included much underemployment and hoarding of

surplus workers, particularly in industry. While in power, the BCP

set wage and work norms. Average annual earnings rose from 2, 185

leva (for value of the lev, see Glossary) in 1980 to 2,953 leva in

1988. Earnings were highest in the research, state administration,

construction, transport, and finance sectors, in that order. Agriculture and forestry were among the lowest paid sectors. After the overthrow of Zhivkov, reasonable use of industrial capacity was expected to maintain a tight labor market for the foreseeable

future because the labor force had ceased to grow. Women already

accounted for approximately 50 percent of the labor force in 1988;

therefore, little additional growth was expected from that part of the

population. Similarly, little growth was expected from among voluntarily employed pensioners and invalids. However, the tight labor

supply was not the most pressing concern of the first post-Zhivkov

economic planners. The economic transformation from centralized

planning to a market economy meant increased influence by market factors on wage and unemployment rates in the future. This

transformation also made high unemployment likely as state enterprises closed and generation of goods and services shifted to an ex- panded private sector. But this intermediate dislocation was thought

necessary to achieve correlation between wages and productivity.

Unemployment, which stood at 72,000 at the beginning of 1991, was expected to jump to at least 250,000 by the end of that year

because of the planned transition to a market structure. In 1990

the interim government of Petur Mladenov created a national labor

exchange to assist in placing unemployed workers. Unemployment

assistance remained a state responsibility, but the state had very

little money for this purpose in 1991 . Plans called for eventual contribution by private employers to a designated unemployment fund.

Economic Structure and Control Mechanisms

Until late 1989, Bulgaria had a command economy based on centralized planning rather than on market forces. In such a system,

crucial economic decisions such as allocation of output, rates of ex- pansion of various sectors, values of goods and services, and the

exchange rate of the national currency were made administratively, not by the market. Bulgaria's faithful adherence to the Soviet model

of economic planning included rapid industrialization, large-scale

investments, and other resource allocation to heavy industry at the

expense of light industry and agriculture, higher rates of spending

123
Bulgaria: A Country Study

for capital investment than for consumption purchases, and forced

nationalization of industry and collectivization of agriculture.

The Centrally Planned Economy

Proponents of centrally planned economies (CPEs) maintained

that the advantages of such systems far outweighed the disadvantages. They believed that in many respects economic competition

wasted society's resources. In other words, what Marx called the

"anarchy of the market" led producers and consumers to expend

resources in activities that became unnecessary when they worked

in harmony rather than in competition. Planning could give priority to social goals over economic ones. Should the government

decide that the development of health professionals was important

to society, for example, it could earmark funds for that purpose.

Proponents of CPEs also claimed that they could insulate their econ- omies from the ups and downs of the business cycle, a phenome- non that Western economies never have been able to avoid.

Theoretically, CPEs were designed to be immune to economic (and

social) losses such as reduced output and unemployment associated with economic downturns. (As their national economies be- came more interrelated with international markets, however, CPE

proponents admitted the difficulty of isolating themselves from

swings in world economic conditions.) Another theoretical advantage was that economic decisions could be based on long-range goals

because the financial losses of any individual enterprise or industry could be offset by profits in other areas of the economy. And,

since the organization of the entire industrial and agricultural base was determined administratively, economies of scale could easily

be incorporated into the planning process. Western economists were generally critical of the CPE, however.

Their criticisms had two essential components. First, central eco- nomic planners often were unable to plan an economy efficiently;

and second, even when they could plan well, they were unable to achieve the goals they planned. These general assertions proved

true regarding specific aspects of Bulgaria's command economy,

and they had ramifications for efforts to reorganize that economy

in the 1990s.

The CPE induced enterprises to seek low production targets, concealing productive capacity and never overfulfilling the plan by too much, lest higher targets be set in the next plan. The result was

underutilized resources. Plans tended to stress quantity over quality. Simply requiring a particular level of output was insufficient

if that output were of such poor quality that no one bought it, or

if there were no need for such a product in the beginning. The

124
The Economy

consumer had no effective control over the producer when quality was low, and the artificial price structure prevented price signals

from alerting producers to consumer preferences. Also, because

enterprises were judged on their fulfillment of the plan, producers

geared production levels for satisfying the plan, not consumers. The CPE could induce technical progress from above, but it could

not stimulate it from below. The plan discouraged enterprise in- novation, because innovation meant interrupting current production, hence jeopardizing plan fulfillment. The system also encouraged waste and hoarding of fixed and working capital, and

the wage system failed to encourage workers to work harder or managers to economize on labor. Under Zhivkov, Bulgaria attempted

to deal with these problems by a series of reforms in both industry

and agriculture. These reforms included alternately centralizing

and decentralizing economic management; adding and deleting eco- nomic ministries and committees; revising the economic indicators for plan fulfillment; and encouraging or discouraging elements

of private enterprise. Despite such experimentation, however, Bulgaria remained faithful to the general Soviet model for over four

decades. In the years after the end of communist rule, the CPE

remained the predominant structural element in the Bulgarian econ- omy, especially in large enterprise management.

The Planning System

Prior to 1990, the planning hierarchy in Bulgaria included several

levels. The ultimate economic authority was the BCP. The party

determined general economic policies, identified economic reforms

and their structure, and monitored economic activity. Planning

and control were the responsibility of the Council of Ministers,

which was roughly equivalent to a Western cabinet. The most important planning committee within the Council of Ministers was

the State Planning Committee (SPC). Within the Council of

Ministers were specialized economic ministries, such as the Ministry

of Finance and the Ministry of Foreign Trade, and various governmental committees and commissions. The composition and authority of the ministries underwent frequent change. In 1986, for example, six ministries with economic powers were eliminated and

five cabinet-level "voluntary associations" were formed. The after- math of these changes, however, showed few new power relationships. In the later Zhivkov years, the prime responsibilities of

ministry-level agencies included forecasting development of their in- dustries, assessing development bottlenecks, and generally overseeing

state development policy. However, the ministries were not to participate actively in planning. That was a function of the associations.

125
Bulgaria: A Country Study

The associations, also known as trusts, were an intermediary

organization between the ministries and the lowest level of the planning hierarchy, the enterprise. The association integrated production, research and development, design, construction, and foreign

trade functions. Unlike associations in the Soviet Union, which

were merely an intermediary link in the chain of economic com- mand, Bulgarian associations retained several essential decisionmaking prerogatives and were in direct contact with centers of eco- nomic power such as the SPC, the Ministry of Finance, and the

Bulgarian National Bank (BNB). At the bottom of the economic

hierarchy, enterprises were distinct economic entities that operated

under an independent accounting system. They were expected to earn a planned amount of profit, a portion of which went to the

state as a profits tax. In the Bulgarian command economy, almost all economic activity was directed toward plan fulfillment. Economic directives were

outlined extensively in the plans, which were not merely guidelines but binding, legal documents. The best known of these was

the Five-Year Plan, although planning was done for longer and

shorter periods as well. Most important for the day-to-day operations of enterprises were the annual and monthly plans.

One of the most important tasks of central planning was what was referred to as material balances—planning for correspondence between supply and demand of goods. At the draft plan stage, this required that supply (planned output, available stocks, and planned

imports) equal demand (domestic demand and exports) for every

industry. When demand exceeded supply, planners could increase

planned output, increase imports, or reduce domestic demand. The

SPC usually favored the last alternative. This manipulation limited

the flow of inputs to low-priority industrial branches, which most

often made consumer items, resulting in shortages of those goods.

The party began the planning process by providing priorities

and output targets for critical commodities to the SPC, which reconciled them with required inputs. A draft plan then was created by

a process of negotiation and information exchange up and down

the planning hierarchy. After negotiating with the SPC on targets

and resources and formulating specific guidelines, the associations

then negotiated with their individual enterprises to establish final figures. The output targets then went back to the SPC for a final negotiation with the associations.

The final version of the plan was submitted to the Council of

Ministers for approval or modification, after which the approved

targets were sent down the hierarchy to the individual firms. Thus

enterprises were informed of their binding norms for a planning

period, including volume and mix of output, procurement limits,

126
The Economy

level of state investment, foreign currency earnings, foreign cur- rency limits for imports, and wage rates. An important element

of the plan fulfillment stage was manipulation of resources by ministries and the SPC to ensure fulfillment of priority targets and

minimize bottlenecks. Occasionally, reforms allowed enterprises

rather than higher echelons to make many of these decisions. For

most of the communist era, however, this was not the case. Economic Policy and Performance

Bulgarian postwar economic development can be divided into

four phases: the revolutionary period (1944 through 1948); the development of socialism (1949 through 1960); the age of intermittent reform (1961 through 1989); and the transformation to a market

economy (beginning in 1990).

Postwar Economic Policy

After the BCP came to power in 1944, the transition to social- ism began slowly. Before World War II, the Bulgarian economy

had been agrarian and decentralized; as a result, the industrial base was relatively undeveloped (see The Interwar Economy, ch. 1). Following the Soviet model, the BCP first sought control over as many facets of the economy as possible. Thus, restructuring in- cluded collectivizing agriculture, confiscating private enterprises,

nationalizing industry, and enacting various fiscal and monetary

measures.

In the 1940s, the BCP viewed the agricultural sector as a major

obstacle to the transformation of the economy. Although collec- tivization proceeded slowly at first, state power in the agricultural

markets was quickly established by nationalizing internal and for- eign commodity trade. To accomplish this, the BCP used the wartime organizations that had overseen distribution of major crops. Industry continued to decentralize from 1944 until 1947. In those

years, the majority of labor leaving the military and the farms entered small factories and unmechanized artisan shops. These small

enterprises were quite the opposite of the modern, large-scale in- dustry that the BCP was committed to creating. Small enterprises

also competed with state enterprises for scarce raw materials and

skilled labor. Labor discipline also was a major problem during

this phase; unexcused absences, sporadic strikes, and high labor

turnover plagued the new state enterprises. In September 1947,

a decision to accelerate the nationalization of industry was taken

at a meeting of the Communist Information Bureau (Cominform

see Glossary). As a result, in December 1947 trained groups of party

members entered all the approximately 6,100 remaining private

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Bulgaria: A Country Study

enterprises, seized their capital, and announced their immediate

nationalization. This act effectively erased Bulgaria's small class of private industrial entrepreneurs. Also in 1947, government monopolies were established over all items of retail trade. By the end

of 1948, 85 percent of the means of production were run by the state. Although Bulgaria had few private banks when the BCP came

to power, by December 1947 those few were merged with the BNB.

The BCP also enacted a series of fiscal and monetary measures

to gain control over Bulgaria's financial resources by the end of

1947. Monetary reform froze all bank accounts over 20,000 leva,

and a tax was imposed on the remaining accounts. These actions

reduced the money supply by two-thirds. The new policy also levied

high taxes on private income and high profits to absorb any potential

new deposits.

This first phase of postwar economic development included a

tentative Two-Year Plan (1947-48) that foreshadowed later policies. Aimed principally at speedy recovery from wartime stress, the program began large-scale industrialization and electrification;

it sought to raise industrial production by 67 percent and agricultural production by 34 percent over prewar levels. The first plan

disproportionately allocated funds away from agriculture and en- countered severe organizational and technical problems, mistakes

by inexperienced management, and shortages of energy and production equipment—problems that would continue in ensuing development phases.

The First Five-Year Plans

The next phase of Bulgarian postwar economic development in- cluded the First Five-Year Plan. This plan made an important contribution to the pattern of Bulgaria's socialist economic development

by creating the institutional apparatus for long-term industrial planning. Already in 1945, the wartime Directorate for Civilian Mobilization had been replaced by a Supreme Economic Council that

extended the previous organization's authority over resource

allocation. Now the state's existing economic ministries were subdivided into one ministry for each branch of production. By January 1948, a separate and politically powerful State Production

Committee (SPC) was established. By October 1948, representatives of the new SPC and the existing Main Directorate for Statistics had set out the criteria for calculating plan fulfillment.

The announced targets for the First Five-Year Plan (1949-53)

confirmed the economic priorities indicated by the previous TwoYear Plan. Agriculture was to receive 17 percent of new investment and industry 47 percent. Gross industrial output was to grow

by 119 percent, primarily because of a 220 percent increase in heavy

128
The Economy

industry. Light industry and agriculture were to raise output by

75 and 59 percent, respectively. The rapid collectivization and

mechanization of agriculture were expected to achieve the last tar- get while freeing labor for industry, construction, and transportation. Because about 25 percent of the country's national income was invested in the economic infrastructure, the standard of liv- ing remained low.

In 1952 the plan was declared fulfilled a year ahead of schedule,

but statistics on the period were too incomplete and contradictory

to evaluate its actual results. Substantial bottlenecks existed in

material inputs and outputs. Agriculture received less investment

than planned (only 13 percent) and showed no growth through the

period (see table 12, Appendix). The effect of low agricultural output

rippled through other sectors of the economy, hindering production in related industries. Substantial material and technical aid came from the Soviet Union, but with a steep price: Bulgaria was

expected to sell products to the Soviet market at below-market

prices, and the arrogance of Soviet economic advisers caused seri- ous resentment.

Continuing problems with excessive labor turnover forced the

regime to cut back the targets for heavy industry in the Second

Five-Year Plan (1953-57), and average annual industrial growth

fell from 20.7 to 12.7 percent during that period. This was the first of several dramatic swings that characterized Bulgarian economic

development throughout the postwar period. The average annual

growth rate of agriculture increased from negative 0.9 percent to 4.9 percent in the Second Five-Year Plan, but the same indicator

for the overall NMP dropped from 8.4 to 7.8 percent. The industrial share of the NMP exceeded that of agriculture for the first time in this period.

Two important economic events occurred at the Seventh Party

Congress of the BCP, which met in mid- 1958. The party declared

that Bulgaria was the first country besides the Soviet Union to achieve full collectivization of agriculture (estimates put the figure

at 92 percent at this time), and it announced the goals for the Third

Five-Year Plan. That plan, which began in 1958, set relatively

moderate initial quotas that included substantially more production of consumer goods. In 1959, however, a BCP decision to make

a "Great Leap Forward" (borrowed by the press from Mao

Zedong's concurrent program for the Chinese economy) drastically raised quotas: by 1965 industrial output was to be three to four times the 1957 level, and by 1961 agriculture was to produce

three times as much as it had in 1957. To achieve the latter goal,

agriculture was again reorganized. Amalgamation of collective

farms cut their number by 70 percent, after which average farm

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Bulgaria: A Country Study

acreage was second only to the Soviet Union among countries in

Eastern Europe. The grandiose Zhivkov Theses, as the quota program came to be known, were tempered noticeably by 1961, when

the economy's inability to achieve such growth was obvious to all. Meanwhile, throughout the late 1950s urban unemployment had

been a major problem. The new collectivization drive brought

another wave of peasant migration to urban centers. Compounding this problem was a cutback in Soviet imports of industrial in- puts, which created some excess capacity in heavy industry. Thus,

the intensified industrialization of the Third Five-Year Plan also aimed at absorbing surplus labor.

Trade relations with the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe also

played a large role in the investment priorities of the Third FiveYear Plan. Food processing and agriculture were earmarked for greatest growth because these sectors, together with chemical fertilizers and small electric equipment, were now areas of Bulgarian

responsibility in the plans of the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance (Comecon—see Glossary) for greater East European trade. After a reduction in 1955, Bulgaria faced greatly increased export

obligations to the USSR, Czechoslovakia, and the German Democratic Republic (East Germany) in the late 1950s. The latter two

could provide badly needed industrial machinery in return, and

the USSR provided vital raw materials and energy.

The party leadership initially resolved to fulfill the third plan,

like the first, within three or four years; although none of its goals were reached, the party declared fulfillment in 1960, and Zhivkov

survived the popular disillusionment and economic upheaval caused

by his totally unrealistic theses. At that point, the twelve years of

the second phase of Bulgarian postwar economic development had

wrought major structural changes in the Bulgarian economy. In- dustry's share of the NMP increased from 23 percent to 48 per- cent as agriculture's share fell from 59 percent to 27 percent. By

1960 the value produced by heavy industry matched that of light

industry, although food processing for export also grew rapidly.

Throughout the second phase, budget expenditures consisted

primarily of reinvestment in sectors given initial priority. Meanwhile, the completion of collectivization had shifted 678,000

peasants, about 20 percent of the active labor force, into industrial jobs. The average annual increase in industrial employment

peaked at 11.5 percent between 1955 and 1960.

The Era of Experimentation and Reform

The first full five-year plans proved the Bulgarian system's ca- pacity for extensive growth in selected branches of industry, based

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The Economy

on massive infusions of labor and capital. In the first postwar decades, that system was much more successful in reaching goals than were the command economies in the other East European countries, largely because Bulgaria had started with a much more primitive industrial infrastructure. By the early 1960s, however, changes

to the system were obviously needed to achieve sustained growth

in all branches of production, including agriculture. Specific incentives to reform were shortages of labor and energy and the growing

importance of foreign trade in the "thaw" years of the mid-1960s.

Consequently, in 1962 the Fourth Five-Year Plan began an era

of economic reform that brought a series of new approaches to the

old goal of intensive growth.

Industrial Decentralization In industry the "New System of Management" was introduced

in 1964 and lasted until 1968. This approach intended to streamline economic units and make enterprise managers more responsible

for performance. In June 1964, about fifty industrial enterprises,

mostly producers of textiles and other consumer goods, were placed

under the new system. Wages, bonuses, and investment funds were

tied to enterprise profits, up to 70 percent of which could be re- tained. Outside investment funds were to come primarily from bank

credit rather than the state budget. In 1965 state subsidies still ac- counted for 63 percent of enterprise investment funds, however,

while 30 percent came from retained enterprise earnings and only

7 percent from bank credits. By 1970 budget subsidies accounted

for only 27 percent of investment funds, while bank credits jumped

to 39 percent, and retained enterprise earnings reached 34 percent.

The number of compulsory targets for the Fourth Five-Year Plan was cut to four: physical output, investment funds, input utiliza- tion, and foreign trade targets. The pilot enterprises did very well,

earning profits that were double the norm. By 1967 two-thirds

of industrial production came from firms under the new system,

which by that time had embraced areas outside consumer production.

Another distinctive feature of the Bulgarian economy during the

1960s was the high level of net capital investment (total investment

minus depreciation). The average of 12 percent from 1960 to 1970 was the highest in all of Eastern Europe. As in the past, investment in heavy industry received the lion's share—over 80 percent

of total industrial investment. Capital accumulation (net investment plus net inventories) averaged 29 percent from 1960 to 1970,

also a very high level.

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Bulgaria: A Country Study

Industrial Recentralization

Before the end of the 1960s, however, Bulgarian economic planning moved back toward the conventional CPE approach. Many

Western analysts attributed the Bulgarian retreat from the reforms

of the 1960s to tension caused by the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia in 1968. International events may well have played a role,

but the timing of the retreat and the invasion suggest another component: dissatisfaction among the BCP elite with the results and

ideological implications of the reform. For example, in July 1968, one month before the invasion of Czechoslovakia, Bulgaria's unorthodox, three-tiered pricing system was eliminated. The party

leadership had never accepted the concept of free and flexible pricing

for some products, which was an important Bulgarian departure

from centralized planning in the 1960s. Resistance to reform was

further encouraged by a series of cases in which major enterprise

directors used newly decentralized financial resources to line their

own pockets.

Despite the general retreat from reform, two important measures remained intact, one each in agriculture and industry. The first involved new operating procedures introduced on the larger col- lective farms in the early 1960s. To better exploit the new equipment introduced during the consolidation of the late 1950s, farms were assigned more agronomists and labor was specialized by es- tablishing fixed brigades. Production target negotiations between

the Ministry of State Planning and the agricultural collectives also were simplified.

The industrial reform that survived retrenchment in 1968 gave

associations, not ministries, responsibility to supervise the new sys- tem of supply contracts between enterprises. This system continued

to grow, with prices determined on the basis of enterprise bargaining

rather than ministerial fiat. Interenterprise allocations clearly functioned more efficiently with this arrangement.

Larger Economic Units

Just as most reforms were being rescinded, the BCP began the

last phase of postwar agricultural restructuring. Prompted by the

labor shortage, the new streamlining of collective farms that began in 1969 introduced the so-called agricultural-industrial complex (agrompromishlen kompleks—APK). The new structure was to industrialize agricultural production, boost the value-added component in Bulgarian exports by processing more agricultural goods,

and raise the food supply to cities without diverting labor back from

industry. In the late 1960s, relatively poor agricultural performance

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133
Bulgaria: A Country Study

under the existing structure had prevented those goals from being

reached.

The idea of combining existing enterprises into a smaller,

presumably more manageable number of units spread quickly from

agriculture to industry. By the end of the 1970s, the number of

associations into which industrial enterprises were grouped was

reduced by half. The sixty-four new, larger associations were

granted the authority to make decisions for their enterprises about

new investments, bank credits, and budget subsidies. Within an

association, the larger enterprises (called subsidiaries) still could

sign their own supply contracts and maintain their own bank ac- counts, but they ceased to be legal entities. Smaller enterprises

(called subdivisions) became fully dependent on their association.

The main advantage of this streamlined organization was seen

as economy of scale through increased specialization and a simplified flow of information. Associations also were assumed to be better

able to make investment decisions and oversee material and labor

distribution than either a small number of ministries or a large number of enterprises. The new structure would link specific industrial enterprises with scientific institutes in the same way as the

agricultural complexes had linked them.

These reforms proved disappointing. Reformed planning techniques continued to leave unused industrial capacity, and quality

control failed to improve. Both Western and domestic customers

remained dissatisfied with the quality of many Bulgarian manufactures. New planning indicators that set norms for cost reduction

actually reduced quality in a number of cases. Individual members of institutes could not convey their ideas to associations or

ministries, where decisions to import or to invest in new technology were made. Thus the new framework only accentuated the

dangers of socialist monopoly. Party meetings and the press criti- cized monopolistic abuses resulting from irrational decisions at the

top and poor implementation of rational policies at the enterprise

level. By the end of the 1970s, a new set of reforms was prescribed.

The New Economic Model

Initiated in 1981, the next program of reforms was designated

the New Economic Model (NEM). This program involved both

agricultural complexes and industrial enterprises. Goals of the NEM

included updating the technical infrastructure of Bulgarian industry and improving the quality of Bulgarian exports to raise hardcurrency income. Centralized planning now was relegated to setting gross profits and overseeing the national scientific program. In

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The Economy

1982-83 the NEM's principal instruments were financial incentives and accounting regulations aimed at all levels of management,

but especially at the smallest unit of labor, the brigade. Brigades,

each containing thirty to fifty workers, now would set labor and

material input levels and dispose of finished products. In an effort to remedy the chronic distribution problems of the central econo- my, higher economic institutions became financially accountable

for damage inflicted by their decisions on subordinate levels. Several important initiatives were launched in 1978. The longstanding limits on enterprise investment were lifted. In their place, a new investment plan was based on the enterprises' contractual

obligations and credits with the BNB. The bank monitored the cash

balance of enterprise contracts with customers and suppliers, granting credits only when required. Three separate reinvestment funds

received first claim on the net income of the enterprise. Although

budgetary subsidies were not eliminated, the NEM directives as- signed responsibility for financial losses to all levels of enterprises.

Self-financing became the watchword for all economic

organizations.

Another major change eliminated the automatic first claim of

salaries and wages on gross enterprise income. This meant that

wages could rise only after an increase in labor productivity, and

then only by 50 percent of that increase. Moreover, management

salaries could be cut by as much as 20 percent if the complex or

enterprise failed to meet its norms for production and productivity.

The formula for sanctions against management salaries changed

several times. Finally, binding performance criteria were limited

to five financial indicators for agricultural complexes and industrial associations, and to four for individual enterprises. Profit cri- teria were set only for the complexes or associations. Complexes

and associations were given explicit freedom to sign their own contracts with suppliers and customers at home and abroad.

The BNB was granted some flexibility in restricting its terms

of lending and in charging interest rates above the nominal 2 percent. These measures were designed to bestow greater rewards for efficiency and to reduce the number of unfinished or unprofitable

new projects. The latter accounted for 57 percent of all Bulgarian

investment as late as 1976. A provision for joint ventures with for- eign firms met little enthusiasm from abroad.

The Last Round of Zhivkov Reforms

By 1982 economists and the party leadership admitted that the

NEM had not led to the anticipated upturn in overall productivity

and efficiency. Even upwardly skewed official statistics indicated

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Bulgaria: A Country Study

that aggregate economic growth had dropped to its lowest postwar

level. Under the NEM, enterprises could still get approval from

state pricing authorities for price increases with marginal or nonexistent quality improvement—an important factor in evaluating

official figures.

The differences between the Western concept of gross national

product (GNP—see Glossary) and NMP make performance comparisons problematic. However, a Western economist who cal- culated growth rates for the Bulgarian economy according to the

conventional GNP standard used in market economies determined

the official Bulgarian growth rates between 1961 and 1980. The

calculated rate for 1981-2 was 2.9 percent.

The Bulgarian response to declining growth rates under NEM

was to initiate a second set of NEM reforms. Measures in 1982

and 1983 concentrated almost exclusively on financial incentives

and prices. Net income was identified as the major basis forjudging plan fulfillment. The only other targets were tax payments,

domestic and imported input limits, and minimum export levels. The emphasis on self-supporting net income was extended downward to the brigade and upward to the associations. Guarantees

of a minimum wage were removed for workers and all levels of

management. Ministers themselves now were subject to salary

reductions if their industrial association failed to meet the streamlined list of targets. Ministry access to budgetary subsidies for new

investment was drastically cut and limited to a fixed term. Most

investment capital outside net income had to be procured from the

BNB. The bank's increasingly independent guidelines included the

authorization to hold regional competitions for investment funds.

Interest rates remained low however, ranging between 2.5 and 8

percent.

All these reforms did little to invigorate economic growth. In

the Eighth Five-Year Plan (1981-5), the NMP growth rate dropped

to 3.7 percent, its lowest postwar level. Officially, industry grew

at a rate of 7 percent and construction at 5.4 percent, but agricul- ture declined by 3.9 percent per year. In 1985 Mikhail S. Gorbachev visited Bulgaria and reportedly

pressured Zhivkov to make the country more competitive economically. This pressure led to a Bulgarian version of the Soviet perestroika program (see Glossary). New Regulations on Economic

Activity took effect in January 1987. These directives, intended

to stimulate "socialist competition," allowed enterprises to retain a much greater share of their profits and also required them to compete for investment capital from newly formed commercial banks.

In June 1987, in response to widespread dissatisfaction and

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The Economy

confusion over the measures, a decree on collective and individual

labor activities made it possible for state economic organizations

to lease small trading and catering facilities to private individuals

by offering contracts at public auctions. The auctions were an abject failure, however, because of high taxes, high rents, restricted access to capital, uncertain supplies, the short duration of the contracts, and legal insecurity. The idea was quietly abandoned.

Finally, in January 1989, the party issued Decree Number 56.

This decree established "firms" as the primary unit of economic

management. Theoretically, four types of firm could be created:

joint-stock firms, firms with limited responsibility, firms with unlimited responsibility, and citizens' firms. The differences among

the first three types of firms were small. But citizens' firms offered

the potential of individual, collective, and associative ownership

arrangements. In a fundamental departure from the socialist prohibition of private citizens hiring labor, as many as ten people could

now be hired permanently, and an unlimited number could be hired on temporary contracts. A wave of reorganizations produced new,

larger firms, depriving numerous enterprises of their self-management status. Nonetheless, hundreds of private and cooperative firms were authorized by Decree Number 56.

Other elements of the decree allowed firms to issue shares and

bonds and pay dividends, with a number of restrictions. Some

clauses sought to encourage foreign investment in the country. State- owned enterprises that were transformed into joint-stock firms now

could have foreign shareholders. Although tax incentives and legal

guarantees were provided for joint ventures, little foreign investment was stimulated. In 1989 and 1990, only 117 joint ventures were consummated, totaling US$10 million in Western capital. In

all probability, low labor costs were not enough to attract foreign

investment given remaining organizational disadvantages, poor in- frastructure, low political credibility, the nonconvertability of the

lev, and close economic ties to the Soviet Union.

This last round of reforms by the Zhivkov regime confused rather

than improved economic performance. Statistics on growth for 1986-88 indicated a 5.5 percent annual rate, up from the 3.7 per- cent rate achieved during the previous five-year plan. However,

these statistics were internally inconsistent and widely disputed in

the press. Expert observers speculated that they were the minimum

growth the regime could tolerate given the 6 percent target rate

in the five-year plan.

Ultimately, the reforms failed to radically change the economic

conditions in the country. Public discontent increased, and, finally,

emboldened by revolutions throughout Eastern Europe, the public

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Bulgaria: A Country Study

erupted in a popular revolt that ousted Todor Zhivkov in November 1989. By early 1990, the first attempts were being made to es- tablish a market-based economy.

Economic Sectors

Bulgaria's consistent emphasis on developing heavy industry at any cost created raw material demands well beyond the country's

domestic resources. This problem was compounded by the ineffi- cient industrial use of energy and raw materials: Bulgaria used more

energy per unit of NMP than any Western economy. For this rea- son, one of the most salient aspects of the Bulgarian postwar econ- omy was reliance on imported Soviet natural resources. Fuels

In 1989 Soviet imports supplied Bulgaria with 95 percent of its coal, 90 percent of its crude oil, and 100 percent of its natural gas

(see fig. 10). Although Bulgaria imported the majority of its raw

materials for energy and industrial requirements, some domestic

fuels and minerals were available. A small supply of hard coal was

depleted rapidly in the 1980s; in 1987 only 198,000 tons were mined.

More ample deposits of low-quality lignite yielded 31,400,000 tons

in 1987, but those fuels were relatively inefficient energy producers

and high polluters. In 1990 the Maritsa Basin in south-central Bulgaria was expected to remain the prime source of lignite for the fore- seeable future; yearly production at its Maritsa-iztok open-pit mines was projected to reach forty million tons after the year 2000.

Energy Generation

In 1988 Bulgaria produced approximately 43 billion kilowatt

hours of electricity (in contrast to 384 billion for France and 83.5

billion for Yugoslavia). At that point, planners expected power con- sumption to increase by about 3.5 percent per year through the

year 2000. The 1988 Program for Energy Development through

1995 and in Perspective until 2005 set general long-term goals for the Bulgarian power industry, including more effective integration

of machine building and construction industries into power projects,

improved balance between supply and demand of energy, and more

effective use of low-quality coal and local hydroelectric plants. In

1988 Bulgaria and the Soviet Union signed a bilateral agreement

for scientific and technical cooperation in thermoelectric, hydroelectric, and nuclear power generation. That year 59 percent of

Bulgaria's electricity came from thermoelectric plants (primarily

coal-powered); 35 percent came from nuclear reactors, the re- mainder from hydroelectric stations. Total generating capacity in

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The Economy

1988 was 11,300 megawatts (in contrast to 103,400 for France,

20,000 for Yugoslavia).

Conventional Power Generation

About 1 ,500 megawatts of Bulgaria's thermoelectric generation

capacity were idle in the late 1980s because of inefficient fuel delivery or equipment breakdown. About half the capacity of local heat and

power plants, relied upon to supplement major electrical plants and

provide heat for industries and homes, was unavailable for the same

reasons. In the early 1990s, Bulgarian energy planners faced serious dilem- mas. At the Maritsa-iztok- 1

, Maritsa-iztok-2 and Dimo Dichev ther- moelectric plants, located in the Maritsa-iztok coal fields, long-term

plans called for gradual replacement of old generating equipment

in existing stations. But most such projects were far behind schedule in 1990. The 1990 decision not to complete the Belene Nuclear

Power Plant meant increased reliance on Maritsa-iztok coal for heat

and power generation. In 1990 that source provided 70 percent

of the country's coal, and its three power stations contributed about

25 percent of total power generation.

The Maritsa-iztok Industrial-Power Complex (with its machine

building and repair enterprises one of the largest industrial centers

in Bulgaria, employing 22,000 people in 1991) had been in operation since 1951; by 1991 the quality of its coal and the reliability

of its infrastructure were steadily declining. But at that crisis point

in the national economy, funds were unavailable for capital investment, especially to buy expensive foreign technology (see Market

Reform, this ch.). At the same time, industry authorities acknowledged burning high-sulfur coal and strip mining at Maritsa-iztok

as a severe environmental problem whose amelioration would cost

at least a billion leva, mostly hard currency.

Hydroelectric power generation was concentrated in southwestern

Bulgaria, but few Bulgarian rivers offered large-scale hydroelectric

potential. The major hydroelectric project in the Ninth Five-Year

Plan (1986-90) was completion of the Chaira station, which would

add 864 megawatts of generating capacity. Development of local hydroelectric stations on small streams was a planning priority for the 1990s.

Nuclear Power

Nuclear power provided Bulgaria a way of easing its dependence on imported fuels, although the Soviet Union and Czechoslovakia

provided the expertise and equipment on which Bulgaria built its nuclear power industry. Lacking hard currency to buy enough oil,

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Bulgaria: A Country Study

and reaching the toleration limit for pollution by coal-burning

plants, Bulgaria increasingly made nuclear power the center of its energy policy in the 1980s. In 1974 the first nuclear power plant was opened at Kozloduy north of Sofia on the Danube River. After

completing the original four- reactor complex in 1982, Kozloduy

added a fifth unit in late 1987. This was the first 1 ,000-megawatt

reactor in Eastern Europe outside the Soviet Union. A sixth unit was installed in 1989. At that point, Bulgaria ranked third in the

world in per capita nuclear power generation, and the extent of

its reliance on a sole nuclear power plant was unsurpassed in the

world.

The Bulgarian nuclear power industry was beset with major

problems from the beginning. The Kozloduy station had a history

of technical difficulties and accidents, many of which were related

to the low quality or poor design of Soviet and Czechoslovak equipment. The fifth reactor, a constant source of trouble, was out of

commission for several months in 1991 because of extensive tur- bine damage. This setback put the entire country on a brownout

schedule that shut off electricity two out of every four hours.

The Chernobyl' disaster in 1986 made nuclear safety a sensitive political issue in Bulgaria, and by the late 1980s public opinion, now a much more significant factor for policy makers, had

turned strongly against the nuclear industry. A second nuclear

power complex was started at Belene, to add six 1 ,000-megawatt

reactors by the end of the Tenth Five-Year Plan. But construction was halted in 1989 by public opposition and disclosure that both

Kozloduy and Belene were located in earthquake-prone regions.

Long-term plans for nuclear heat generation also were shelved at that time. In 1991 the government's Commission on Nuclear Power

Supply reported that the supply system was poorly organized and

managed, and that managers relied on expensive foreign technical help instead of available domestic engineers. The commission

also reported that, once Soviet specialists left, a shortage of qualified personnel delayed activation of the sixth reactor at Kozloduy

(considered a top priority once Belene was rejected), and that most

monitoring instruments in the first four Kozloduy reactors were

out of operation.

In mid- 1991 the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA)

declared the Kozloduy reactors unsafe. Two reactors were shut

down. Meanwhile, also in 1991, the planned activation of the two

newest reactors at Kozloduy raised the problem of nuclear waste

disposal because the Soviet Union had begun charging hard cur- rency to reprocess waste from East European reactors, formerly one of its functions under Comecon. In 1991 Bulgaria requested

140
The Economy

European Economic Community (EEC—see Glossary) aid to build

its first permanent domestic repository for nuclear waste. The Bulgarian power transmission network was supplemented

in 1988 when a high-capacity transmission line from the South

Ukraine Nuclear Power Station in the Soviet Union reached the

northeastern port city of Varna. But like Soviet fuels, imported

Soviet electricity required hard currency in 1991, mitigating the

advantages of the old Comecon agreement.

Industry

From 1956 through 1988, industrial production rose an aver- age of 8.9 percent per year according to official figures, but the

actual rates declined steadily during the thirty-three-year period.

The annual average rate of industrial growth for the periods

1956-60, 1961-70, 1971-80, and 1981-88 was 15.5, 11.6, 7.5, and

4.4 percent, respectively. By the late 1980s, Bulgarian industry had

completely exhausted the advantages it had used in earlier decades

to post impressive growth statistics (see table 12, Appendix).

Industrial Policy

The cost of Bulgaria's industrial growth was substantial. Besides

environmental problems, the commitment to heavy industry came

at the expense of light industry—especially food processing and

textiles—and agriculture. These were sectors in which prewar Bulgaria had relatively high production potential. But de-emphasis held

the official annual NMP growth figures for light industry and

agriculture to 7.5 and 2.8 percent, respectively, between 1956 and

1988. In the postwar command economy, the chief beneficiaries of this emphasis were the chemical, electronics, and machinery industries.

Their respective share of total industrial production rose from 1.9,

0, and 2.4 percent in 1939 to 8.8, 14.4, and 15 percent in 1988.

Similar statistics indicate big drops in production shares for the

food processing and textiles industries—from 51.2 to 23.3 percent,

and from 19.8 to 5.1 percent, respectively, in the same period.

Besides the unchanging commitment to heavy industry, two other

major trends appeared in postwar industrial policy. The first was

steady and substantial support for a basic ferrous metals industry,

regardless of cost, in order to reduce dependence on imports. The

second was an effort to produce machinery competitive in international markets, with special emphasis on electrical equipment.

A result of the first policy was the Kremikovtsi Metallurgical

Complex. In 1954 Soviet-supported geological surveys indicated

major new deposits of higher quality iron ore that would support

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Bulgaria: A Country Study

a second complex to supplement the existing V.I. Lenin Ferrous

Metals Combine at Pernik. Although the deposits were actually

found to be inadequate, the extremely expensive Kremikovtsi plant

finally opened in 1963 and used Soviet iron ore to produce over

half of the national production of steel and iron through 1978.

The Kremikovtsi complex brought numerous problems. By the

mid-1970s, over 75 percent of its ore and coking coal was imported.

Costs were inflated by premium wages paid to maintain the labor

force and by delays in construction and delivery. Production at Kremikovtsi consistently failed to meet planned targets, and less than three-quarters of plant capacity was used. The enterprise never showed a profit; in 1989 it lost 99.5 million leva despite receiving

600 million leva in state subsidies. Using 15 percent of the country's total energy output, Kremikovtsi generated only 1 percent

of national income in the late 1980s.

The strategy of heavy equipment production for export fared

better than did metallurgy in the 1970s and 1980s. In fact, the most

competitive Bulgarian industries were those most committed to ex- port markets. The machine building and electronics industries aver- aged 16 percent growth between 1960 and 1980 while their

combined share of export value jumped from 13 to 55 percent from

1960 to 1982. The primary exports in these sectors were forklift trucks and electrical hoisting gear produced by the Balkancar

enterprise. Computer equipment and chemicals also showed improved export performance.

Bulgaria's postwar industrialization was clearly positive in some

sectors. Two notable examples were the construction of electric

power plants in the 1950s, which made possible the nationwide

spread of industry and the development of an electrical equipment

industry that produced exportable products. Nonetheless, as the

1980s drew to a close, it became increasingly clear that even the

most competitive sectors had serious problems that the BCP's half- way reforms could not solve. After the initial postwar climb, four

decades of socialist central planning had left the industrial sector

in a very poor state. Industrial Centers

Bulgarian heavy industries, mostly machine building, chemicals,

and electronics, were concentrated in relatively few production

centers. Important machine tool plants were the Bolshevik Tool

Plant at Gabrovo, the Nikola Vaptsarov Combine at Pleven, and

the Radomir Heavy Equipment Plant in southwest Bulgaria. The

Electronic Materials Processing and Equipment ScientificProduction Combine was a combined scientific and industrial center

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The Economy

at Sofia. Electronic instrument production centers were located at the Plovdiv Power Electronics Plant, the Shabla Electromechanical Plant on the northeast coast, the Stara Zagora Industrial Robot

Plant, the Pravets Instrument Plant in the southwest, and the

Petkov Instrument Plant at Turgovishte. Major chemical and petrochemical producers were the Industrial Petrochemical Plant at Pleven (specializing in vehicle lubricants and oils), the Burgas

Petrochemical Combine (plastics), the Vratsa Industrial Chemical Combine (chemical fertilizers), and four chemical plants at Dimitrovgrad (see fig. 10). Bulgaria also built large numbers of

ships, many for Soviet customers, at its Ruse and Varna shipyards on the Black Sea. The Shumen Vehicle Plant assembled LIAZMadara heavy trucks in a three-way arrangement with the Liberac

Auto Plant of Czechoslovakia and the Soviet Union.

Obstacles to Industrial Growth

In 1989 the domestic market still featured little or no competition. Over 80 percent of exports went to Comecon countries, and

75 percent of that total went to the Soviet Union. This situation

insulated the computers, industrial robots, microprocessors, and

other high-technology exports of Bulgarian industry from the market

competition that would require backing by substantial investment

in research and development. Bulgaria thus developed a practice

of expending a small proportion of its national income on applied

science, even compared with other East European states. Falling productivity was a major problem in a number of key

industries. Many of these industries were inherently uncompetitive, and attempts to raise productivity through large-scale production concentrated industrial and research facilities into enormous

enterprises that further reduced industrial flexibility. Unprofitability made Bulgarian industry dependent on a system of widespread

state subsidies. It was reported at the BCP Central Committee plenum in December 1989 that a quarter of all state companies had

received state support during the year, totaling 7 billion leva

almost a quarter of the national income. Machine building, one

of Bulgaria's key export industries, became a problem area for the

economy in the 1980s. Because it was the chief consumer of the

overpriced, low-quality output of the metallurgical industry, the

machine industry eventually became unprofitable as well. In 1990

Balkancar, the country's biggest company, one of its most successful exporters, and another major customer of the metallurgy enterprises, lost money for the first time.

A critical economic policy decision in the late 1980s was Zhivkov's

special emphasis on several energy-intensive industries, despite the

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Bulgaria: A Country Study

inadequacy of domestic energy supply. In the early 1990s, the new

regime faced a choice of dismantling many of those enterprises,

finding less expensive energy sources to keep them running, or acquiring enough hard currency to upgrade their technological level and make them less energy-intensive. To further complicate in- dustrial policy, beginning in 1991 the Soviet Union began charging market prices in hard currency for its oil and gas. Finally, emergence of a significant, fast-growing environmental movement cast the tradeoff of environmental quality for eco- nomic growth in starkly negative terms. Barring substantial

technical aid (most likely from the West) to reduce industrial waste,

public demand for environmentally sound economic policy stood

as a formidable obstacle to industrial expansion.

Agriculture

Prior to World War II, agriculture was the leading sector in the

Bulgarian economy. In 1939 agriculture contributed 65 percent

of NMP, and four out of every five Bulgarians were employed in agriculture (see fig. 11). The importance and organization of Bulgarian agriculture changed drastically after the war, however. By

1958 the BCP had collectivized a high percentage of Bulgarian

farms; in the next three decades, the state used various forms of

organization to improve productivity, but none succeeded. Meanwhile, private plots remained productive and often alleviated

agricultural shortages during the Zhivkov era. Early Collectivization Campaigns

When the BCP came to power, Bulgarian agriculture consisted

primarily of 1 . 1 million peasant smallholdings. The party saw consolidation of these holdings as its most immediate agricultural objective. It dismantled the agricultural bank that had been a primary

source of investment for the agriculture and food processing sec- tors before World War II. The first attempts at voluntary collectivization yielded modest

results, partly because open coercion was impossible until a peace

treaty was signed with the Allies. The labor-cooperative farm

(trudovo-kooperativno zemedelsko stopanstvo—TKZS) received official approval in 1945. It closely resembled Soviet cooperatives in or- ganization, although members were guaranteed a share of profits

and membership was (nominally) completely voluntary. By 1947

only 3.8 percent of arable land had been collectivized. After the

communists won the first postwar election and the peace was

concluded in 1947, pressure on private landholders increased.

Although most small farmers had joined collectives, by 1949 only

144


The Economy

12 percent of arable land was under state control—mainly because

the collectivization program alienated many peasants. But between

1950 and 1953, the Stalinist regime of Vulko Chervenkov used

threats, violence, and supply discrimination to produce the fastest pace of collectivization in Eastern Europe. Sixty-one percent of

arable land had been collectivized by 1952. The process was declared

complete in 1958 when 92 percent of arable land belonged to the

collective farms. This ended the first phase of Bulgarian postwar

agricultural restructuring.

Farm Consolidation in the 1960s

At this stage, Bulgarian collectives were much smaller than the

Soviet organizations on which they were modeled. To fulfill the

ambitious goals contained in the Zhivkov Theses (January 1959)

for the Third Five-Year Plan (1958-60), further consolidation was deemed necessary. This process reduced the number of collectives

from 3,450 to 932, and the average size of a collective grew from

1,000 to 4,500 hectares. In the late 1960s, an agricultural labor shortage combined with

fascination for China's agrarian amalgamation to prompt further

consolidation of collective farms into APKs. By the end of 1971,

all of Bulgaria's 744 collectives and 56 state farms had been merged

into 161 complexes, most of which were designated APKs. These

units averaged 24,000 hectares and 6,500 members. The consolidation continued until there were only 143 complexes in 1977.

Several complexes were larger than 100,000 hectares, and twentyfive were between 36,000 and 100,000 hectares. In the short term,

they were to achieve horizontal integration by specializing in three or fewer crops and one type of livestock. In the longer term, they

would be the basis for linking agriculture with manufacturing and

commerce. On the political level, this consolidation was to be a symbolic merger of the agricultural and urban workers, who had

remained quite distinct parts of the Bulgarian population since the

nineteenth century in defiance of the theory of the unified socialist society.

The new organizations never met the higher agricultural quotas

of the late 1970s, however. For some products, yield did not keep

pace with investment. Overall growth in agriculture continued to

fall after the creation of the APKs. And the goal of freeing farm

workers to take industrial jobs was not reached. On the contrary,

the annual reduction in agricultural employment dropped from 4

to 2 percent while farm labor productivity declined. As a result,

agriculture's share of gross investment in fixed capital fell to 18

percent by 1976, a level last seen in the mid-1950s. In 1978 this

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Bulgaria: A Country Study

failure triggered a new policy emphasizing smaller complexes.

Reduced agricultural quotas in the Eighth Five-Year Plan (1981-85) were an admission that too much had been expected from the constant tinkering process. Reform in the 1980s

By 1982 the total of old and new APKs reached 296, the aver- age size was halved to 16,000 hectares, and the management hierarchy was simplified. Most importantly, the number of annual

indicators of plan fulfillment was reduced from fourteen to four.

The new, simpler approach also allowed greater freedom for APKs

to negotiate prices on surplus production and to purchase their own

supplies. In the last Zhivkov years, the communist regime attempted other

agricultural reforms, including autonomy for the collectives. At that

point, the only funds the state received from agriculture were 60

percent of foreign currency from exports. Even then, government

delivery prices remained so low that state foodstuff monopolies

received only the absolute minimum supply. In 1989 the exodus

of 310,000 ethnic Turks, many of whom had cultivated personal

plots, also hurt agricultural output.

Despite these handicaps, the United States Department of

Agriculture estimated that within Eastern Europe Bulgaria was sec- ond only to Hungary in agricultural trade surpluses through 1987.

After that time, however, agricultural output dropped so far that

the country could no longer feed its own people. In 1990 the first rationing and shortages since World War II were the most obvi- ous indications of this situation. Because of domestic shortages,

export of several agricultural products was banned in 1990.

Agricultural Products

Two long-term policies strongly determined priorities in Bulgarian agricultural production after 1960. First, livestock was

promoted at the expense of crop cultivation, mainly to meet ex- port demand. Between 1970 and 1988, the share of livestock in

agricultural production rose from 35.3 to 55.6 percent. As a result,

less land was available for crops in that period. Pig and poultry

production increased the most, but large numbers of sheep also were raised. The second policy was a shift away from industrial

crops (primarily tobacco and cotton), toward production of fruit (most notably apples), vegetables (most notably tomatoes), and

grapes. Bulgaria remained an important exporter of tobacco,

however, averaging 65 percent of East European exports of that

crop in the 1980s. Grain production concentrated on wheat, corn,

148
Maize combine at work in Vratsa District Courtesy Sofia Press Agency

Coal dredger, used in opencast mining, receives final adjustments

at the Radomir plant.

149
Bulgaria: A Country Study

and barley, crops that are vulnerable to weather conditions. Poor

harvests in 1985 and 1986 led to grain imports of 1.8 and 1.5 million tons, respectively. Sugar beets, potatoes, sunflower seeds, and

soybeans also were important crops at the end of the 1980s. In 1990

Bulgaria was the world's largest exporter of attar of roses, used

in making perfume (see fig. 11).

The Role of Private Plots

After 1970 the only consistent contribution to agricultural production growth was family farming on private plots leased from the

agricultural complexes. These plots could not be bought or sold or worked by hired labor, but their yield belonged to the tenant. In 1971 special measures were instituted to increase the number

and the availability of personal plots. Beginning in 1974, peasant

households were permitted to lease additional plots and given free access to fertilizer, fodder seed, and equipment belonging to their

agricultural complexes. To encourage this practice, the government

extended loans and waived income taxes. More importantly, delivery prices increased for agricultural products. In the mid-1970s,

a reduced work week for urban workers and relaxed requirements

for plot leasing encouraged weekend cultivation of personal plots

by the nonagricultural population. Plot size limits were removed

in 1977.

By 1982 personal plots accounted for 25 percent of Bulgaria's

agricultural output and farm worker income. In 1988 personal plots

accounted for large shares of basic agricultural goods: corn, 43.5

percent; tomatoes, 36.8 percent; potatoes, 61.5 percent; apples,

24.8 percent; grapes, 43.2 percent; meat, 40.8 percent; milk, 25.2

percent; eggs, 49.4 percent; and honey, 86 percent. The sales from

plots to town markets meant that despite low overall agricultural

growth rates in the 1980s, the urban food supply actually improved

in many areas during the early and mid-1980s.

Post-Zhivkov Agricultural Reform

In 1991 privatization of agriculture was a top priority of the

government of Prime Minister Dimitur Popov. That spring the

National Assembly passed a new Arable Land Law, revising the

conditions for ownership and use of agricultural land. The law al- lowed every Bulgarian citizen to own as much as thirty hectares

of land, or twenty in areas of intensive cultivation. Use of this land was at the complete discretion of the owner. Conditions were stated

for voluntary formation of cooperatives by private landowners and

resale of their land. With some limitations, landowners whose

property had been incorporated into state farms were to receive

150
The Economy

"comparable" plots elsewhere or other appropriate compensation.

The state or municipality retained title to land not in private hands.

Another provision described redistribution of land seized by the

state from cooperatives and individuals during Zhivkov's several

agricultural consolidations. A National Land Council under the

Council of Ministers was to oversee land distribution and arbitrate

disputes, aided by a system of municipal land commissions.

As was true for reform elsewhere in the Bulgarian economy,

agricultural reform encountered stout resistance from entrenched

local Zhivkovite officials. Pre-collectivization land ownership records were destroyed, and farmers were threatened or bribed to remain

in collectives rather than seeking private farms. Although the Arable

Land Law was widely hailed as an equitable and useful economic

reform, its association with the Bulgarian Socialist Party (BSP,

formerly the BCP) majority brought criticism from the opposition

Union of Democratic Forces (UDF). Some farmers circumvented

the law simply by seizing land. The government, meanwhile, an- nounced that no state land would be redistributed before the 1991

harvest.

In early 1991, staples such as sugar and olive oil were unavailable in many areas; livestock feed rations had been cut by more

than half; a grain shortfall of 1.7 million tons was expected; meat,

withheld from markets until new government prices were an- nounced, was very scarce and expensive in cities; and fertilizers for the year's crops were in very short supply. Western firms ex- pressed interest in joint agricultural ventures in Bulgaria, but hesitated because of uncertainty about political and legal conditions

for such projects. A new round of government price-fixing in February 1991 substantially raised food prices but did restore supplies

of some items.

Transportation

The Bulgarian transportation system in 1987 was poorly developed compared with systems elsewhere in Europe. The rail system

totaled 4,300 kilometers of track, of which 4,055 were standard

gauge, 2,510 were electrified, and 917 were double track. In the

1980s, Bulgaria moved away from diesel engines toward electrical

rail haulage. By 1988 some 83 percent of freight was moved by this method, compared with 60 percent in 1980. In 1987 the rails car- ried 83 million tons of freight and 110,000,000 passengers. In 1987

Bulgaria had 36,908 kilometers of roads, 33,535 of which were hard

surfaced and 242 of which were classified as motorways (highways). In 1987 some 940 million passengers and 917 million tons of freight

151
Bulgaria: A Country Study

traveled by road. No major extension of the rail or the road sys- tem was built in the late 1980s.

In 1988 the freight system moved 103 billion ton kilometers (see

Glossary) of freight, the majority (62.9 percent) by seagoing trans- port (see fig. 12). Of the dozen Bulgarian ports on the Danube,

the most important was Ruse. The remaining freight was moved

by rail (17.1 percent), road (16.9 percent), inland waterway (2.1

percent), and pipeline (1 percent). In 1988 the national airline,

Balkan Airline, totalled 32 billion passenger kilometers (see Glossary). Rail provided 25.5 percent of passenger transport, roads 62.2

percent, and air 12.2 percent.

The Bulgarian transportation system suffered financial neglect

through most of the communist era. Investment in this sector was

never extremely high, but in 1988 overall investment fell almost

25 percent. The largest drops were in sea transport (96 percent),

river transport (63 percent), pipeline transport (62 percent), and

rail transport (18 percent). The Bulgarian State Railroad typified

the neglect and overuse of the transportation system. In 1990

authorities estimated that 27 million leva would be needed to re- store the railroads to satisfactory operating condition. Meanwhile,

rail revenues fell by 10 million leva during the first five months

of 1990 as a result of lower industrial production and equipment

breakdowns. At that point, about one-third of Bulgaria's passenger

railcars and two-thirds of railroad equipment were completely

depreciated, and 78 locomotives and 3,500 freight cars were idle due to breakdowns. Some 300 kilometers of track were classified as urgently needing repair.

Communications

Throughout the communist period, the state controlled all media.

In 1987 Bulgaria had eighty radio and forty-three television transmitters. Two television networks broadcast over nineteen stations

in 1991 , with 250 low-power repeaters extending coverage to rural

areas. The radio system featured three networks with twenty longand medium-wave stations. Foreign-language programming in Albanian, Arabic, English, French, German, Greek, Italian, Portuguese, Serbo-Croatian, Spanish, and Turkish was broadcast from

short- and medium-wave stations in Vidin, Stolnik, Kostinbrod,

and Plovdiv. Bulgaria was a member of the Intervision East European television network, but in 1991 it had not joined the International Telecommunications Satellite Organization (Intelsat). In 1990

approximately 2 million radio receivers and 2.1 million television

sets were in use. Some 2.23 million telephones were in operation

in 1987 (see table 14, Appendix).

152

Vidint

AN!

(Mikhaylovgrad Pleven

Lovech

Plovdiv

Khaskc

Smolyan

Aegean Sea

Figure 12. Transportation System, 1988

154
The Economy

In 1991 Bulgaria began privatizing its communications sector. The Commission on Communications and Information Science,

with the help of West European communications experts, developed

a plan for formation of ten independent companies to operate in

communications services, the equipment industry, construction,

and other related areas. The companies would operate under authority of a state regulatory organization similar to those in Western

Europe. This plan would mean gradually dismantling the national

communications monopoly while retaining the unified national tele- graph, postal, telephone, radio, and television services. Meanwhile,

private companies outside the existing networks were to be en- couraged to compete for new customers, and prices were to rise accordingly from the artificially low levels of the command econ- omy period.

Banking and Finance

Under the Zhivkov regime, Bulgaria followed the customary communist pattern of a single state-run bank performing all banking

and investment functions. Investment policy was the province of

state planning agencies, with substantial input from the BCP and

the national bank. Post-Zhivkov reform aimed at privatizing and

compartmentalizing the banking system, a goal that would likely

require years of gradual reform.

Currency and Exchange

The national currency of Bulgaria is the lev (plural, leva—see Glossary), which is divided into 100 stotinki (sing., stotinka).

Throughout the communist era, the lev could be used only in

domestic transactions because it was not convertible into foreign

currency. Bulgarian nationals were prohibited from owning for- eign currency, and the law prohibited citizens and foreigners from

entering or leaving the country with leva. As was true for domestic prices, the value of the lev was administratively determined.

This fact led to frequent overvaluing of the lev in terms of hard

currencies and black market rates well below official exchange rates. Besides official rates, which were based on a gold parity developed

after World War II, a commercial rate was used for business trans- actions and statistical purposes, and a tourist rate determined the

amount received by foreigners in Bulgaria for their domestic currencies. None of these arbitrary rates reflected the relationship of

domestic and foreign prices. Trade with Western countries was con- ducted in hard currency, while the transferable ruble, an accounting device with no convertible value, was primarily used to clear

commercial accounts within Comecon. In 1990 the lev was devalued

155


Bulgaria: A Country Study

several times, finally settling at rates of about 0.76 lev to the United

States dollar (official), 3 leva to the dollar (commercial), and 7 leva

to the dollar (tourist). The black market rate fluctuated considerably, but ended 1990 at approximately 11 leva to the dollar. In

mid- 1991 the Bulgarian National Bank (BNB) issued conversion

tables for the lev into major world currencies (see table 15, Appendix). The official value at that time was 18 leva to the United

States dollar. Banking System

As the chief financial instrument of economic policy making, the

BNB assumed virtually all of the financial functions in the country under the centrally planned economy. Only the granting of for- eign trade and consumer credits were separate functions, performed

respectively by the Bulgarian Foreign Trade Bank and the State Savings Bank—both of which were subordinate to the BNB. The

BNB worked with the Ministry of Finance to finance capital in- vestments in the economy. The BNB also monitored the economic

organizations that received investment funds to ensure their use

for accomplishing plan targets. As enterprises became more self- fmancing in the 1970s, a greater share of their investment capital was composed of bank credits granted by the BNB. Between 1965

and 1975, the BNB share of investment funds jumped from 7 per- cent to 54 percent; the trend then moderated as enterprises began

to rely more on retained earnings to finance investments.

Like industry and agriculture, banking under the BCP ex- perimented occasionally with decentralization but remained quite

centralized until shortly before the overthrow of Zhivkov. A 1987

reform nominally split Bulgarian banking into a two-tiered system.

The function of the BNB was restricted to money supply, although

it also retained significant supervisory power. The reform also

created several specialized banks including the Agricultural and

Cooperative Bank, the Biochemical Bank, the Construction Bank,

the Electronics Bank, the Transportation Bank, and the Transport,

Agricultural, and Building Equipment Bank—each responsible for an industrial sector. Post-Zhivkov banking reform began hesitantly but grew more

comprehensive in 1991. In a controversial policy decision, the

government first increased interest rates from 4.5 to 8 percent in

1990, then let them float freely beginning in 1991. Although the

first private commercial bank was established in May 1990, a new

National Bank Bill was not passed until June 1991. That law provided for a two-tier bank system independent of direct government

control but accountable to the National Assembly. The first tier

156
Overpass loop in Tsarigradsko Highway, Sofia Courtesy Sofia Press Agency

of the new system was to be the Central Bank, the second a separate

system of commercial banks and lending institutions serving pri- vate citizens and enterprises. Three-month bank credits would be

available to cabinet ministries. The BNB was to issue monthly

balance statements and report semiannually to the National Assembly.

Investment Policy In choosing among alternative investment projects, Bulgarian

planners in the Zhivkov era faced greater difficulties than investment decision makers in Western economies. True relative costs of labor and materials were masked by state assignment of prices,

meaning that funding allocations among projects often were ar- bitrary. In most cases, investments were not based on efficiency

criteria, but rather on plan goals. Artificially low interest rates also discouraged enterprises from efficient investment fund allocation.

The state budget also guided party economic policy under the

old regime. Until the reforms of the 1970s, the budget was the

primary source of funds for enterprise investment. Budget reve- nues were originally derived mainly from the turnover tax, a retail sales tax that was also used to regulate demand for various

products. Beginning in the mid-1960s, budget revenues were

157
Bulgaria: A Country Study

derived progressively less from the turnover tax and more from

taxes on net enterprise income.

Prices

Investments in inefficient operations and subsidies on consumer

items often led to budget deficits. Often the state simply printed more money to cover its obligations. Eventually this practice led

to circulation of excess currency compared with consumer goods

and services available at prevailing prices. Because prices were administratively set, shortages and long lines occurred more often

than inflation under the CPE. But party-directed general price in- creases such as the average 15 percent rise in 1979 usually were

quite steep.

In the post-Zhivkov era, economic planners saw marketdetermined prices for most goods and services as their long-term

goal. In 1990 the prices of 40 percent of goods and 60 percent of

services were freed from administrative control. In the second half

of 1990, price liberalization raised consumer prices an average of over 50 percent. In February 1991, price controls were removed

from all goods and services except fuels, heat, and electricity. Immediately after this step, average food prices were nearly six times

their 1989 level; housing was up 3.7 times, clothing three times more expensive. These levels, established by an independent trade

union study, were above the level triggering new talks on compensation payments. (For the second consecutive year, a government indexation program was established to reimburse a share

(estimated at an average 65 percent) of the higher cost of living

caused by the new price policy in the first half of 1991 .) In a twomonth period of early 1991 , consumption dropped by over 50 percent, but total consumer spending still increased by 11.5 percent.

Foreign Trade

Membership in Comecon tied Bulgarian trade policy closely to the Soviet economic sphere following World War II. By 1991,

however, trade policy was on the verge of significant diversification. With the trade protection of Comecon no longer available,

Bulgaria aggressively sought new markets in the West while seeking to retain the most advantageous commercial relations with its former Comecon partners.

Postwar Trade Policy

The adoption of the Soviet economic model had direct and in- direct impact on Bulgarian international trade after World War

II. Among direct results was the decision to reduce dependency

158
Roses cultivated in Valley of Roses

to produce attar of roses for

perfume industry

Courtesy Sam and Sarah Stulberg

Drying tobacco, one of Bulgaria's

major export crops, Melnik

Courtesy Sam and Sarah Stulberg
Bulgaria: A Country Study

on prewar Western trade partners. This decision meant strong promotion of import substitution policies to bolster domestic production of goods previously imported. In 1960 Bulgaria's total foreign

trade (exports plus imports) was 31 percent of NMP, quite low

for a country with a small internal market and few natural resources. By the 1980s, however, this figure had risen to over 90 percent.

Before World War II, Germany was well-established as Bulgaria's

top trading partner. Postwar economic policy diverted trade from

Central Europe to Eastern Europe, and primarily to the Soviet

Union. The new domestic economic priorities dictated a revised

foreign trade structure (see table 16; table 17, Appendix). The policy

of promoting heavy industry, for example, required huge imports

of machinery and raw materials (see table 18; table 19, Appendix). Beginning in the mid-1950s, imports of machinery accounted

for approximately half the value of total imports, while fuels, metals,

and minerals made up more than a quarter of this value. Lower

postwar investment in agriculture eventually lessened the share of

foodstuffs in total exports.

The state monopoly of foreign trade also changed the way decisions were reached on international allocation of goods. Trade decisions were reached administratively by planning authorities or

negotiated with other members of Comecon. Overall control of for- eign trade was shared among the Ministry of Foreign Trade, the

Ministry of Finance, and the Bulgarian Foreign Trade Bank.

Import and export operations were conducted by foreign trade

enterprises, most of which were affiliated with one or more associations but retained a legal identity outside the associations. Although

reform measures by the Zhivkov regime gave associations some

profit incentives in international trade, the producing enterprises

themselves were completely isolated from the foreign customer. This

situation meant that world quality standards had no influence on

Bulgarian producers.

Bulgaria in Comecon

The most important event in postwar Bulgarian international

economic relations occurred in 1949 when it became a founding

member of Comecon. Comecon was an attempt by the socialist economies to simplify the planning process by synchronizing the

five-year plans of member countries and, more importantly, by

achieving what Marxists called an international division of labor.

Countries within Comecon would specialize in the products they

made most efficiently and export the surplus. Products that a country could not produce efficiently would be available from one or more of its Comecon partners. This design was intended to

160
The Economy

eliminate some redundancies inherent in the Soviet economic model

where each country produced goods of all categories. Although the

concept achieved isolated successes such as Bulgarian forklift trucks,

broad growth was blocked by the uniform socialist preoccupation

with heavy industry and the lack of a single convertible currency.

The currency issue in particular made intra-Comecon trade a cumbersome process requiring negotiation of annual bilateral trade

agreements for all member nations.

In the 1980s, exports to the Soviet Union consisted primarily

of machinery, electronic components, and agricultural goods. These

included forklift trucks, electric engines, telephones, tobacco, fresh

fruits and vegetables, and wine. Imports from the Soviet Union

were mainly energy and raw materials, including oil, natural gas, iron ore, ferrous metals, and cotton. In 1988 Bulgaria still relied

almost entirely on Soviet oil and natural gas. East Germany and

Czechoslovakia were the next most important Comecon trading

partners, accounting for 5.2 and 4.6 percent of exports, respectively, and 5.9 and 5.4 percent of imports, respectively. Exchanges

of goods between Bulgaria and these countries emphasized both

exports and imports of machinery and the export of agricultural

products. In the initial years of Bulgaria's Comecon membership, the country benefited from energy prices below world levels, especially for

oil, in two ways. The cost of developing otherwise inefficient in- dustries was lower, and reexport of crude and refined oil for hard

currency bought Western technology to upgrade the industrial in- frastructure. Comecon members paid for their imports through

bilateral clearing agreements, with no exchange of hard currency. In the initial stages of Comecon, Bulgaria exported mainly food,

the price of which was lower in Comecon than on the world market. Later, however, Bulgaria paid for imported Soviet raw materials largely with machinery that was priced higher than on the world

market.

Beginning in 1974, Soviet energy exports were based on a float- ing five-year average of world prices that rarely matched market

prices at a given time. Even when Comecon prices were above the

world level, Bulgaria benefited from the lack of currency exchange

in the Comecon system. But dependence on Comecon trade, es- pecially Soviet energy exports, damaged Bulgaria tremendously

when economic reform swept through the Soviet sphere in 1989

and 1990. Of Bulgarian exports, 62.5 percent still went to the Soviet

Union in 1988, and 53.5 percent of imports came from that country. The new trade system, established after reforms, required trade

accounts to be cleared in hard currency at current world prices as

161
Bulgaria: A Country Study

ofJanuary 1, 1991. (Bilateral protocols for this procedure had not

been signed by that time, however; Bulgaria still owed Hungary

87 million transferable rubles in 1991.)

After the political reforms in Eastern Europe, the Soviet Union

announced cutbacks in energy exports to Eastern Europe. The cut- backs caused energy and raw materials shortages. In 1990 Bulgarian industry was forced to curtail production sharply; meanwhile, consumers endured severe shortages of gasoline as fuel prices doubled. A new set of export and import regulations adopted in

mid- 1991 removed import taxes from 200 types of raw materials

and consumer goods in critically short supply. The same regulations set export price minimums to eliminate pricing below world

market levels; export of crude oil, metals, grains, and textile raw

materials was banned.

Trade with the West and the Third World

After 1960 Bulgaria's trade with the West increased, partly be- cause Bulgaria needed Western machinery to supplement the out- dated, overpriced manufacturing equipment supplied by Comecon.

Between 1960 and 1975, the Western share of Bulgarian imports

went from 13.6 percent to 23.6 percent. In the same period,

however, exports dropped from 12.4 to 9.3 percent, creating an

external debt problem with the West. Increased exports to Third

World nations did little to help Bulgaria reduce this trade deficit because most Third World trade was not in convertible currencies.

Throughout the 1970s, Bulgarian trade balances alternated between solvency and high deficits. Although the trade deficit was

eliminated in 1975, many short-term debts to West European banks

remained. By 1976 Bulgarian debt was 13 percent of estimated

GNP—the highest ratio in Eastern Europe at the time. Bulgaria

greatly diminished this debt by reexporting Soviet oil to Western

buyers in the late 1970s.

From that point, Bulgaria maintained trade surpluses in hard

currency until 1985, when emergency imports of grain and coal

created a deficit of US$200 million. A series of poor harvests, high

machinery imports in the investment push of the Ninth Five-Year

Plan (1986-90), and sharply dropping oil prices deprived Bulgaria

of hard currency and created a major new trade deficit. Libya and

Iraq, the main Third World customers with which a surplus had

been accumulated, also reduced their purchase of Bulgarian goods

at this time.

The resulting trade deficits were financed by credits from Western

banks. After the overthrow of Zhivkov, the government announced

that the gross hard currency debt had reached US$10.6 billion by

162
The shipyards at Varna

Courtesy Sofia Press Agency

the end of 1989. Net indebtedness was somewhat lower at US$7.7

billion, but much of the hard currency export credits that Bulgaria

granted were to Libya and Iraq, who were likely to default on many

of their deals. Bulgaria had arranged for Iraq to repay these loans

with oil, but in 1991 the trade embargo and ensuing Persian Gulf

War negated that agreement. In March 1990, the incoming Bulgarian government announced unilateral suspension of principal

payments on outstanding debt, and later interest payments were

suspended as well. Western lines of credit immediately were frozen,

and Bulgarian hard currency holdings dropped to the minimal level of US$200 million in May 1990.

" Bulgaria's main Western trading partners were the Federal

Republic of Germany (West Germany) before German unification

in 1990, Switzerland, and Italy. Exports to these countries were

relatively minor, accounting for between 1 and 0.7 percent of total exports. Imports from West Germany were 4.9 percent of the total,

while Switzerland accounted for 1.4 percent of imports, and Italy

1.1 percent. Trade with the developed, Western economies re- sembled trade between an undeveloped country and an industrialized one. Bulgaria imported mostly machinery from those

countries and sold them raw and semifinished materials and agricultural products.

163
Bulgaria: A Country Study

The most important Third World trading partners, Iraq and

Libya, purchased 2.8 and 2.3 percent of Bulgarian exports, respectively. These exports consisted mainly of major construction projects

and agricultural goods. The overthrow of the Zhivkov regime re- vived talk of establishing a Black Sea Trading Zone that also would

include Turkey and Greece and perhaps Romania. In establishing its new trade policy in 1991 , Bulgaria faced a choice of expanding its traditional commercial ties with Germany and Germany's

partners in the EEC or cultivating new ties with closer markets

such as Turkey. In 1991 Turkey offered to invest US$13 billion

in Bulgaria's economy. An independent Union for Cooperation

between Bulgaria and Turkey was founded to foster direct cooperation between enterprises of the two countries, and transportation

links were solidified by ministerial agreements in 1991 . Talks with

the EEC early in 1991 yielded assurance of short-term EEC financial support through the PHARE (Polish and Hungarian Assistance

for the Reconstruction of Europe) program and closer future ties,

assuming that Bulgaria continued to make progress in its political

and economic reform programs.

New Trade Conditions, 1990

The end of central planning opened the Bulgarian economy to world competition and began a wrenching transition for which it was ill-equipped in finance, industrial diversity, agricultural in- frastructure, and available natural resources. The transition was made doubly difficult because the long years of privileged access

to energy had fostered inefficient energy use in the Bulgarian

economy.

Under the new economic conditions, imports would be purchased

only in hard currency. Although Western firms and governments

offered some credits and aid in 1991, Western investors preferred

Poland, Hungary, and Czechoslovakia to Bulgaria. Those countries were more familiar to Westerners, and they had had relatively advanced market economies before World Wr ar II. For these reasons, in the early 1990s they received the lion's share of a rather

meager Western investment in Eastern Europe.

Standard of Living

From the end of World War II until the 1960s, the Bulgarian

standard of living experienced no significant improvements. A net decline may have occurred during some of the collectivization

drives. The first improvements came when the government insti- tuted a minimum agricultural wage as part of its reconciliation with

the peasants after the Zhivkov Theses failed in 1960. Increases in

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The Economy

real incomes in agriculture rose by 6.7 percent per year during the

1960s. During this same period, industrial wages increased by 4.9

percent annually. Early in the 1960s, higher prices offset those wage

increases; but by 1970, increased urban food supplies made improved urban incomes meaningful. According to official data, from

the Fourth through the Eighth Five-Year Plans (1961-85), growth

in real wages ranged from 5.3 percent (1966-70) to 0.5 percent

(1976-80). The latter figure is low because a major price revision

in 1979 raised prices of foodstuffs by 25 percent and consumer goods

by 15 percent. Real growth in Bulgaria at that point was the lowest

in Europe. Bulgarian statistics indicating real income growth often were inaccurate, however. A major distortion resulted from the

failure of official figures to account for variations in availability

of commodities or services or for government subsidies for food,

housing, education, and health care—vital factors in evaluating

standard of living and purchasing power.

In 1990 a Bulgarian economist made an independent attempt

to construct a consumer price index for the period 1979 through

1989. Based on those findings, inflation during that period was 131

percent, or 8.7 percent per year. Official data showed a 9.0 per- cent increase in consumer prices between 1980 through 1988, or

1.1 percent annually. The same study compared the quantity of

various food items that could be purchased with the average monthly

salary in nine different countries, including four in the West (Austria, France, West Germany, and Britain). Of ten basic food

categories, the lowest amount that average monthly earnings could

purchase in the Western economies was 3.3 times the amount obtainable from average monthly earnings in Bulgaria. Even in comparison with the other socialist countries in the study, Bulgarian

purchasing power was the lowest by at least 25 percent. A mitigating factor in the latter set of comparisons is that official encouragement of private plots spurred substantially greater availability (albeit at greater cost) than in most other East European economies.

Some improvement was achieved in the Bulgarian diet in the

1970s and 1980s. Wary of popular discontent, Zhivkov made a major speech in December 1972 in which he promised a ten-year

program to raise living standards in general and to raise food con- sumption to the "scientific norms" set by the United Nations (UN).

Zhivkov never was entirely successful in this effort, however. Bread

and sugar were the only foods for which Bulgarian consumption

rates reached or exceeded UN norms in the later Zhivkov years. Availability of consumer durables significantly improved in the

1970s. According to official statistics, between 1965 and 1988 the

number of televisions per 100 households increased from 8 to 100;

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Bulgaria: A Country Study

radios increased from 59 to 95; refrigerators from 5 to 96; washing machines from 23 to 96; and automobiles from 2 to 40. Available automobiles were primarily Soviet Fiats, some of which were

manufactured in Bulgaria. Assembly of the Soviet Moskvich began

at the Lovech Vehicle Assembly Plant in 1988.

Housing was one of the most serious shortcomings in the Bulgarian standard of living. Residential construction targets in the

Five-Year Plans were regularly underfulfllled. Consequently, families often waited several years for apartments; in Sofia, where over- crowding was at its worst, the wait was as long as ten years (see

Housing, ch. 2). Market Reform

The first year of post-Zhivkov governance brought substantial

political confusion and paralysis, despite the country's desperate

need to concentrate on economic reform. The interim cabinet and

parliament of 1990 provided only stopgap measures, not the longterm planning that all factions believed necessary. The coalition

government of Dimitur Popov came to power at the beginning of

1991 with broad support but under the worst economic conditions

since World War II (see Governance after Zhivkov, ch. 4). The

Popov program planned first to use support from the International

Monetary Fund (IMF—see Glossary), the European Bank for

Reconstruction and Development (EBRD—see Glossary), and the

EEC to achieve financial stability. The second phase of the plan was privatization of the Bulgarian enterprise system. The hard

winter of 1990-91 began to break the policy stalemate between the

ruling BSP and its increasingly powerful opposition, the UDF (see

Nongovernmental Political Institutions, ch. 4). Reform Mechanisms

Although both the BSP and the UDF agreed on the need for market-oriented reforms, disagreements on methods and timing

continued in 1991. The BSP advocated slow transformation, to minimize economic dislocations and hardship (and also to preserve

privileged positions for party members whenever possible). The

UDF believed that a market economy could not be installed

piecemeal, but could be effective only as a form of "shock therapy." The UDF saw free market features such as market prices

and privatization as incompatible with socialist institutions such

as large state-owned enterprises. The huge operating losses of such

enterprises were largely responsible for a severe 1990 decline in

NMP. The model advocated by the UDF was the renaissance of

the Polish economy through private enterprise. This model justified severe, short-term social costs because only by inflicting them

166
Bulgarian Orthodox Church of St. George enclosed by courtyard of Balkan Sheraton Hotel, Sofia Courtesy Sam and Sarah Stulberg

could the economy be disentangled from the moribund apparatus

that remained from the central planning era. Progress was made on some fronts even before formation of the

first coalition government in early 1991. In September 1990, Bulgaria's admission to the IMF promised access to hard currency loans

and help in restructuring the economy. New agricultural banks

began providing credit to private farmers tilling the land provided

in the 1991 Arable Land Law; the first private bank was opened;

and Bulgaria applied for membership to the General Agreements

on Tariffs and Trade (GATT—see Glossary) and the World Bank

(see Glossary) (see Agriculture, this ch.).

The Economic Policy Commission

By 1991 the Economic Policy Commission was the most important advisory body on economic reform for its parent body, the

National Assembly. A number of economic proposals made in 1990

by the government of Prime Minister Andrei Lukanov were found

inadequate and redrawn in 1991. A particularly difficult obstacle

in establishing truly private enterprises was Decree Number 56,

the 1 989 formula that established semi-decentralized operating principles for firms and commercial organizations (see The Era of

167
Bulgaria: A Country Study

Experimentation and Reform, this ch.). In 1991 the National Assembly considered new laws addressing aspects of the transition

to a market economy: the Commercial Law was to replace Decree

Number 56 as the basic description of commercial enterprise operation: a complex of auditing and statistical laws were to put Bulgarian commerce on the same standards as potential Western

investors. The Privatization Law was the last and most problematic

item because, unlike the recipients of agricultural land under the

Arable Land Law. private recipients of former state commercial

enterprises had not been identified. The first goal of the Economic

Policy Commission was to use tight monetary policy to eliminate

unprofitable enterprises inherited from the CPE era: this would

finally stabilize productivity after the precipitous fall that began

in 1990 and accelerated in 1991 . Once stability was reached, a full- scale privatization process would begin: the 1991 timetable called

for the latter process to be well under way by early 1992.

Domestic and International Economic Policies in the 1990s

Whatever the pace of the Bulgarian economic transition. 1991

promised substantial dislocation before an upturn could be expected. In 1990 industrial production had fallen by 10.7 percent. Prime

Minister Popov warned that as much as 25 percent of the population would require social assistance in 1991. an increase from the

20 percent of 1990. Although the Popov government launched a consensus economic reform plan, pending national elections in

mid- 1991 it remained only a caretaker government. Popov's com- mitment to tough financial measures and the political calm that

prevailed during the crisis period encouraged foreign financial as- sistance. IMF loan requirements included liberalizing foreign trade

policy, lifting price and currency controls, compensating for social dislocation that resulted from reforms, maintaining a low national budget deficit, eliminating centralized production and

resource allocation, initiating privatization of small firms, and deemphasizing trade with Comecon countries. In January 1991. the United States extended most-favored-nation

status to Bulgaria: the United States Congress approved the move

in April. The recently chartered EBRD committed between 100

and 120 million European currency units (ECUs—see Glossary)

to Bulgaria in 1991 and 1992. Most of the money was to go through

the PHARE program. Of that amount. 40 percent was earmarked

for restructuring the economy, 25 percent for agriculture, 20 percent for health care, and 10 percent for the environment. In March

1991. the IMF approved USS500 million in loans, and the EEC

added a loan of L'SS377 million. A request to reschedule part of

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The Economy

Bulgaria's international debt was denied in early 1991, however.

Western aid was conditioned on visible evidence that the government remained in control of its reform program. The immediate

goal of the reform program was to reduce inflationary pressure by

removing the surplus money supply that had been caused by short- ages. Prices would remain subject to the Regulations on the Control of Prices issued in February 1991, to limit price fluctuations

and prevent monopolies from gaining huge profits. Meanwhile,

privatization remained a potential political quagmire because, unlike many of the measures in the first phase, differences in approach

and timing remained substantial among major political factions.

The National Assembly still included many politicians from the

Zhivkov years who would lose their power base if reform went too

far. For that reason, the National Assembly delayed deliberation on several vital economic bills in 1991 . For the same reason, many

remaining Zhivkovite industrial managers opposed application of

reforms to their enterprises. Advocates of reform hoped that the

1991 parliamentary elections would redistribute legislative power,

enabling reform to continue and shortening the traumatic transitional period. .

* * *

Several English-language monographs provide useful information on the Bulgarian economy. Unquestionably, the most comprehensive is John R. Lampe's The Bulgarian Economy in the Twentieth

Century, which covers economic structure, development, and per- formance and provides abundant statistics. Although somewhat

dated and less inclusive, Growth and Reforms in Centrally Planned Economies by George R. Feiwel covers the same general field. Robert J. Mclntyre's Bulgaria: Politics, Economics, and Society devotes a chapter to postwar economic development through the 1980s, and

John D. Bell's The Bulgarian Communist Partyfrom Blagoev to Zhivkov

analyzes the theory and practice of Bulgarian economic planning

from 1947 through 1985. The Statistical Yearbook of the People's Republic

of Bulgaria (the English-language version of which is an abridgement of the Bulgarian state publication) provides comprehensive

economic data. Periodicals such as the Radio Free Europe/Radio

Liberty Report on Eastern Europe and Business Eastern Europe cover

current economic issues. (For further information and complete

citations, see Bibliography.)

169

Chapter 4. Government and Politics
Official party banner combining Soviet and Bulgarian flags, hanging above

national party congress of Bulgarian Communist Party, Sofia, 1970
ON NOVEMBER 10, 1989, after thirty-five years as undisputed

leader, Todor Zhivkov resigned his positions as head of the Bulgarian Communist Party (BCP) and head of state of Bulgaria. This

act, forced by political opposition and turmoil, was the symbolic

watershed between two very different eras in Bulgarian governance.

One year after Zhivkov 's resignation, Bulgaria had at least some

of the primary building blocks for a democratic state: a freely elected parliament, a coalition cabinet, independent newspapers, and

vigorous, independent trade unions.

Beginning with Soviet occupation of Nazi-allied Bulgaria in September 1944, the political culture of that country had been totally

dominated by a monolithic communist party. In the following three

years, that party took advantage of the presence of Soviet troops,

decades-long disorder in the Bulgarian political system, and its own

high visibility as an anti-Nazi resistance force to complete a rapid

communization process. Postwar communist rule in Bulgaria can be divided into three

periods with varying political characteristics. The first period, 1944

through 1947, saw the consolidation of communist power. The

Fatherland Front, which began in 1942 as a small illegal antifascist coalition, led a coup that coincided with the 1944 Soviet invasion

and installed communists for the first time in crucial government

positions. In the next three years, the BCP gradually eliminated

disorganized blocks of political opposition, cut Bulgaria off from

foreign influences except that of the Soviet Bloc, and confiscated

most private economic resources. By the end of 1947, the last ef- fective political opposition had been eliminated and Soviet troops

had left Bulgaria. Longtime communist leader Georgi Dimitrov was prime minister of a Bulgarian government that ruled according to a new constitution modeled after that of the Soviet Union.

Although that constitution left the political institutions of prewar

Bulgaria nominally intact, the consolidation period set the pattern

for a very different set of political relationships. Actual political

power was concentrated entirely in the national BCP. From 1947

until 1989, nominations and elections to judicial, legislative, and

executive posts required party approval. During that time, a nominal second party existed, but party nominees were elected without

opposition at all levels of government. The National Assembly

(Narodno Subranie) met only to rubber-stamp proposals from the

party or the executive branch.

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Bulgaria: A Country Study

The second phase of the communist period, from 1948 through

1953, strengthened Bulgaria's traditionally close ties with the Soviet

Union and established a pattern of imitating the Soviet Union in

all major aspects of foreign and domestic policy. The first Bulgarian Five-Year Plan began in 1949, by which time most means of

production were in state hands. In 1949 Dimitrov was succeeded

by Vulko Chervenkov, a protege of Soviet leader Joseph V. Stalin. Chervenkov imitated his patron's cult of personality by assuming

total control of the BCP and the government and enforcing complete conformity to party policy through 1954. Chervenkov intensified the sovietization that began under Dimitrov; the only vestiges

of political diversity at this point were a few national party leaders

who survived Chervenkov' s purges. In 1953 the death of Stalin brought a strong reaction in Soviet

politics against the cult of personality and in favor of collective leadership. Accordingly, in 1954 Todor Zhivkov replaced Chervenkov as

first secretary of the BCP. In the next eight years, Zhivkov gradually consolidated his position as supreme leader. In doing so, he

maintained the totalitarian state machinery of his predecessors but

showed flexibility and resiliency—especially in maintaining power

at home while following the winding path of Soviet policy to which

Bulgaria remained scrupulously loyal. In spite of dramatic international changes and crises between 1954 and 1989, the Zhivkov

era was the longest period of stable rule by a single administration

in the history of the modern Bulgarian state. In the 1980s, however, the Zhivkov regime was overtaken by

the wave of political liberation that swept all of Eastern Europe,

and by the lethargy and corruption of an administration totally

without opposition for nearly thirty years. Immediately after Zhivkov 's fall, Bulgaria returned to its precommunist political cul- ture, a shifting mosaic of major and minor parties and coalitions.

The National Assembly was resurrected as the vehicle for democratic representation, and the first free parliamentary election was

held in 1990. Unlike the communist parties of other East European nations, the BCP (which changed its name in 1990 to the Bulgarian Socialist Party, BSP) was based on a domestic political

movement that predated the 1917 Russian Revolution. Partly for

this reason, the BSP was able to win the first free elections that

followed overthrow of the old regime. But internal fragmentation,

economic crisis, and the party's connection with the wrongs of the

Zhivkov era diminished the BSP's popular support as the 1990s

began.

Meanwhile, based on very brief experimentation with true parliamentary democracy before World War II, and imitating its

174
Government and Politics

East European neighbors, Bulgaria had decisively rejected repressive one-party rule and professed allegiance to democracy. But for- mation of democratic institutions on the ruins of the early 1900s

proved a formidable task in the early years of the postcommunist

era. Coalition government, the main device of political stability

in the precommunist era, functioned unevenly in solving the massive problems of the early 1990s, and the remaining power centers of the old regime hindered reform.

The Prewar Political Context

From its separation from the Ottoman Empire in 1878 until 1947,

Bulgaria was ruled as a constitutional monarchy, with a parliamentary system based on the Turnovo Constitution of 1879. Although

that document was one of the most progressive national constitutions in the world when it was written, actual governance of Bulgaria under it was a constant struggle for power among the tsar, the unicameral parliament, and the Council of Ministers. The many

political factions that proliferated in the twentieth century added

another dimension to this struggle. Parliaments were elected and

dissolved for purely political reasons; strong prime ministers such

as Stefan Stambolov (1886-94) and Aleksandur Stamboliiski

(1918-23) ignored parliament to advance their own programs (the

constitution had no provision for consultation among government

branches, although the Council of Ministers was nominally subordinate to parliament); a succession of weak prime ministers were

controlled by the tsar or by political factions such as the pro-fascist

Zveno coalition of the 1930s; the need to placate the forces of

Macedonian irredentism distorted both domestic and foreign politics throughout the post-independence period; and no prime

minister survived without stitching together tenuous coalitions of

parties, many of which had only narrow political agendas. Frequent

appeals were made to amend the Turnovo Constitution; in other

cases, the constitution simply was ignored.

The last arrangement of Bulgarian political forces before World

War II was the royal dictatorship of Boris III. Boris devised a sys- tem of "controlled democracy" after the short totalitarian regime

of Zveno had virtually abolished conventional political parties in 1934 (see The Crises of the 1930s, ch. 1). Boris's system was based on judicious appointments and the balancing of civilian politicians

against the army. His purpose was not authoritarian rule but to achieve a temporary centralization of power that would allow Bulgaria to return to stable constitutionality after the chaotic post-World

War I period. Boris believed that independent parties would hinder

this process, so such parties did not reemerge in Bulgaria under

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Bulgaria: A Country Study

his rule. National elections were not held between 1931 and 1938,

and subsequent prewar elections were held under strong government control. In spite of that control, an opposition bloc including the communists gained sixty parliament seats in the 1938

election, compared with ninety-five for Boris's nonpartisan government candidates. In the late 1930s, Boris struggled in vain to form

a lasting coalition that could provide solid middle ground between

the communist and pro-Nazi factions, both of which rapidly gained

support between 1935 and 1940. But when Bulgaria entered the war in 1940, the same "temporary" balance remained in place.

The Early Communist Era

During World War II, the BCP actively opposed Bulgaria's Axis

alliance by forming partisan terrorist and sabotage groups. In 1942

the broad Fatherland Front coalition was formed as the communists

attempted to involve legal opposition groups in exerting antiwar

pressure on the government. The coalition's activities brought se- vere government reprisals. By 1944 partisan units also were being

formed in the Bulgarian army.

The Red Army invasion of September 1944 found a temporary

Bulgarian government desperately trying to avoid accommodation

with the communist left or the pro-German right, but under in- tense diplomatic and military pressure from both Germany and

the Soviet Union. Boris had died in 1943, and by 1944 severe wartime shortages (partly caused by peasants hoarding food supplies)

had eroded support for the government.

When Soviet troops entered Bulgaria, the Fatherland Front en- gineered a bloodless coup displacing the government of Prime

Minister Konstantin Muraviev. In 1946 the first Fatherland Front

government divided ministries among the BCP, Zveno, the Bulgarian Agrarian National Union (BANU), and the Bulgarian Social Democratic Party (BSDP). Within a year, the BCP had used

that power base to purge the government of all key opposition

figures and dominate the Fatherland Front. In 1946 a national

referendum rejected the monarchy in favor of a people's republic,

leading to the immediate exile of Simeon II, nine-year-old son of

Boris III. The following month, the communists easily won a national election for representatives to a subranie to write a new constitution over the objections of BANU, which sought a return to the Turnovo Constitution. In early 1947, the conclusion of peace

between Bulgaria and the Allies eliminated the Allied Control Commission, through which Britain had maintained some influence on

domestic Bulgarian politics. By that time, the only remaining obstacle to total BCP domination was Nikola Petkov's BANU, in a

176
Government and Politics

coalition with other noncommunist parties. The power struggle

ended abruptly in mid- 1947, when the Fatherland Front arrested

and executed Petkov as a Western agent. This event paved the way

for unanimous adoption of a new constitution in December 1947.

The new document was closely modeled on the 1936 Soviet constitution. The parliamentary election of fall 1946 gave the BCP 275 of 465

seats and made Georgi Dimitrov prime minister. The communists

gained control of all significant ministries, beginning the last stage

of consolidating communist dictatorship. The ensuing regimes of

Dimitrov and Chervenkov defined Bulgaria as a highly conventional communist state and isolated it from nearly all noncommunist

commercial and cultural influences.

The State under Dimitrov

In the 1946 elections, noncommunist parties in the Fatherland

Front lost influence far out of proportion to the numerical election

results. The most salient new feature of the Dimitrov Constitution was that it rejected the separation of powers among government branches in favor of a "unity of state power," lodged in a presidium wielding legislative, judicial, and executive powers and

chosen by the National Assembly with party approval. As before,

the National Assembly was a unicameral legislature; elections were

to be held every four years, and members could be recalled at any

time. The assembly would meet in regular sessions twice a year, or by special order of the Presidium—making the full assembly little more than a rubber-stamp body. The Presidium met continuously

and exercised all constitutional powers of the National Assembly

when the assembly was not in session. The Presidium's powers

included controlling the selection of the Council of Ministers,

amending the constitution, approving the national economic plan,

declaring war, and making peace. The president of the nineteenmember Presidium thus became one of the two most powerful men

in Bulgaria.

The Council of Ministers retained a nominal executive authority as a cabinet, but it was overshadowed by the designation of the

National Assembly as "supreme organ of state power." In practice, the council chairman, who by office was prime minister of

the country, was always the first secretary of the BCP. This gave

the prime minister power equal to that of the Presidium president.

The judiciary, now also chosen by the legislative branch at all levels of government, lost all independence. Independent local political

power was eliminated when province and district jurisdictions were

restructured into people's councils. The councils elected executive

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Bulgaria: A Country Study

committees analogous to the national Presidium and overseen by

that body. As at the national level, local government bodies were

filled primarily with party officials. Thus, the Dimitrov Constitution achieved unprecedented centralization of political power in

Bulgaria.

Like its Soviet model, the 1947 constitution guaranteed broad

freedoms to all citizens (religion, conscience, assembly, speech, the

press, emancipation of women, and inviolability of person, domicile,

and correspondence). The Bulgarian document differed from the

Soviet by allowing private property, but only if the privilege were

not used "to the detriment of the public good." All means of

production shifted to state ownership. Universal suffrage was

guaranteed, as were welfare and employment. Guaranteed employment was restricted to socially useful occupations, however.

Government practice soon eroded the constitutional guarantee

of religious freedom. Between 1948 and 1952, several official acts repressed the Bulgarian religious community. In 1948 the exarch

of the Bulgarian Orthodox Church was forced into retirement for his refusal to defend the communist state and the Soviet Union.

In 1 949 the Law on Religious Organizations put all churches under

state control; over the next four years, Catholic and Protestant

clergy were harrassed and imprisoned as part of an overall policy

of preventing contact with the West. During this period, the

Dimitrov government continued purging party and nonparty officials, imitating the contemporaneous Stalinist practice of eliminating

all possible political rivals. The most notable victim was the hardline Stalinist and long-time party leader Traicho Kostov, convicted

and executed in 1949 as a collaborator with the fascists and Josip

Broz Tito, the heretical Yugoslav communist leader.

The Chervenkov Era

The Fifth Party Congress, held in December 1948, rightfully

celebrated the complete political dominance of socialism in Bulgaria. When Dimitrov died in 1949, his successor, Stalin protege

Vulko Chervenkov, began four years of intense party purges (disqualifying nearly 100,000 of 460,000 Bulgarian communists). Chervenkov 's cultivation of a cult of personality earned him the

nickname "Little Stalin." The breakaway of Tito's Yugoslavia from

the Cominform (Communist Information Bureau—see Glossary)

in 1948 caused Stalin and Chervenkov to put additional pressure on the BCP to conform with the Soviet line. Stalin's death in 1953

introduced new Soviet leaders who disapproved of Chervenkov'

s

methodology, but the Bulgarian leader remained prime minister

and dominated politics until 1956. Chervenkov announced a "new

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Government and Politics

course" in 1953, police terror abated, and some political prisoners were released. Meanwhile, the Bulgarian government under the

communists followed a postwar East European pattern by creat- ing large numbers of bureaucratic posts that were filled by partyapproved functionaries, the nomenklatura. A swollen bureaucracy

had been traditional in Bulgaria since the modern state was founded

in 1878; but previously appointments had depended on membership in the civil service elite, not on membership in a particular

party.

The Zhivkov Era

Todor Zhivkov was the dominant figure in Bulgarian government for about thirty-five years, during which time the political scene remained remarkably stable. In the context of post-Stalinist

communist statecraft, Zhivkov was a masterful politician. In the context of popular demands for meaningful reform, he was an

anachronism whose removal symbolized the beginning of a new

approach to governance.

The Rise of Zhivkov

The Chervenkov era firmly established Bulgarian reliance on

the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU) for policy leader- ship and resolution of domestic party rivalries. Just as Stalin's con- demnation had doomed Kostov, so condemnation of the cult of

personality by Stalin's successors doomed Chervenkov and pre- pared the way for his successor, Todor Zhivkov. Zhivkov, who

began his political career in the party youth organization and

worked his way to the party Central Committee in 1948, became

party chief when Chervenkov resigned that position in 1954. Both

the Moscow authorities who ultimately chose new Bulgarian leaders and the BCP leaders in Sofia approved Zhivkov' s flexibility,

youth (he was forty-two when selected), and lack of powerful friends

and enemies.

In 1956 Bulgarian politics again felt the influence of the Soviet

Union. When Nikita S. Khrushchev became leader of the CPSU,

he began a new phase of de-Stalinization and party reform that

echoed strongly in Bulgaria. This action left Chervenkov without

support outside Bulgaria. Then, in 1956 the April Plenum of the

BCP Central Committee began a broad party liberalization policy that caused Chervenkov to resign as prime minister. Rather

than break completely with the past, however, the party retained

Chervenkov as a member of a de facto ruling triumvirate that in- cluded Zhivkov and longtime party leader and purge participant Anton Yugov, who became prime minister. Although party

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Bulgaria: A Country Study

liberalization was stalled by 1956 uprisings in Hungary and Poland,

the April Plenum identified Zhivkov as the leader of the Politburo. In doing so, it also shifted power conclusively to the "home" branch

of the BCP, more attuned to Bulgarian issues and less to total obedience to the Soviet line. Zhivkov Takes Control

By the end of 1961, a new wave of Soviet anti-Stalinism gave

Zhivkov the support he needed to oust Chervenkov and Yugov.

Zhivkov' s political position had deteriorated because his grandiose, failed plans for industrialization and agricultural collectivization had evoked strong social protests between 1959 and 1961 , but

he succeeded Yugov as prime minister in 1962 (see The First FiveYear Plans, ch. 3). Khrushchev formally endorsed Zhivkov with

a state visit to Bulgaria in 1962. Although no additional changes

occurred in the party or the government until 1971 , Zhivkov began

introducing a new generation of leaders in the mid-1960s, and political repression eased noticeably. The old guard of officials re- maining from the 1944 revolution remained a powerful party

element with important Soviet connections; therefore, Zhivkov

provided that group enough Politburo positions to ensure its support. Meanwhile, Zhivkov selectively purged officials throughout

the early period to prevent development of alternative power centers

in the party. In 1964 Zhivkov earned peasant support by appointing Georgi Traikov, chief of the nominally independent BANU,

head of state and by pardoning comrades of the executed BANU

leader Petkov.

In 1966 a strong resurgence of the conservative wing of the BCP

at the Ninth Party Congress curtailed Bulgarian diplomatic and

economic overtures to the West and to its Balkan neighbors. The

new conservatism also tightened government control over the media

and the arts, and the government resumed anti-Western propaganda to protect Bulgarian society from bourgeois influences. As

was the case in the 1956 invasion of Hungary, Bulgarian support

for the 1968 Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia brought tighter party

control of all social organizations and reaffirmation of "democratic

centralism" within the party—all with the goal of reassuring the

Soviet Union that Bulgaria would not follow in the heretical foot- steps of Czechoslovakia.

The Constitution of 1971

A later echo of the events of 1968 was the drafting of a new constitution at the Tenth Party Congress in 1971 . Unlike the Dimitrov

Constitution, the new document specified the role of the BCP as

180
Todor Zhivkov one year after his ouster, in confinement

at his villa, November 1990

Courtesy Charles Sudetic

"the leading force in society and the state," and the role of the

BANU as its collaborator within the Fatherland Front. The 1971

constitution also defined Bulgaria as a socialist state with membership in the international socialist community. As before, broad

citizen rights were guaranteed but limited by the requirement that

they be exercised only in the interest of the state. Citizen obligations included working according to one's ability to build the foundation of the socialist state and defend the state, compulsory military

service, and paying taxes. Most of the governmental structure specified in the Dimitrov Constitution remained, but a new body, the

State Council, replaced the Presidium as supreme organ of state power. This council consisted of twenty-two members and a chairman who was de facto head of state. The State Council was more

powerful than the Presidium because it could initiate as well as ap- prove legislation, and because it exercised some of the non- governmental supervision normally delegated to ruling parties in East European communist states of that period. Council members,

nominally elected by the National Assembly, were members of the

BCP or other mass organizations (see Nongovernmental Political

Institutions, this ch.). In 1971 Zhivkov resigned as prime minister to become chairman

of the State Council. The National Assembly, traditional center of

political power in Bulgaria until the 1947 constitution stripped it of

power, received some new responsibilities. Permanent commissions

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Bulgaria: A Country Study

were to supervise the work of ministries, and legislation could now

be submitted by labor and youth groups (all of which were partycontrolled). In practice, however, the National Assembly still rubber-stamped legislation and nominations for the State Council, Supreme Court, and Council of Ministers. As a follow-up to the constitution's prescription of private property rights, the 1973

Law on Citizens' Property virtually abolished private ownership

of means of production, confining such ownership to "items for

personal use."

The Tenth Party Congress also devised a new BCP program

to coincide with the new constitutional description of party power.

The program specified an orthodox hierarchical party structure of

democratic centralism, each level responsible to the level above.

The lowest-level party organizations were to be based in workplaces;

all other levels would be determined by territorial divisions. Loyalty

to the CPSU was reiterated. The BCP goal was described as building an advanced socialist society lacking differentiation by property

and social standing—at that point, all of society was to be a single

working class. Science and technology were to receive special at- tention by the party, to improve production that would make possible the next jump from advanced socialism to the first stage of

communism (see The Bulgarian Communist (Socialist) Party, this ch.).

After a decade of political calm and only occasional purges of

party officials by Zhivkov, social unrest stirred in the mid-1970s

and alarmed the Zhivkov government. International events such

as the Helsinki Accords (see Glossary) of 1975, the growth of Eurocommunism in the 1970s, and the 1973 oil crisis stimulated hope

for liberalization and discontent with the domestic economy.

Zhivkov responded in 1977 by purging Politburo member Boris

Velchev and 38,500 party members—the largest such change since

the early 1960s. Provincial party organizations also were substantially reorganized. In May 1978, the Bulgarian government ac- knowledged for the first time that an antigovernment demonstration

had occurred—indicating that the 1977 measures had not quelled

domestic discontent.

The Last Zhivkov Decade

The period between 1978 and 1988 was one of political calm.

With minor exceptions, the structure and operations of the government and the BCP remained unchanged. But the avoidance of

meaningful change, despite cosmetic adjustments in the Zhivkov

government, assumed that Bulgarian governance was the same

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Government and Politics

uncomplicated procedure it had been in the 1970s and early

1980s—a major miscalculation.

Celebration of the 1,300th anniversary of the Bulgarian state in

1981 brought official liberalization and rehabilitation for some seg- ments of Bulgarian society. Bourgeois political factions that had

opposed the BCP before World War II were exonerated and

described as comrades in the fight for Bulgarian democracy.

Zhivkov also raised the official status of the Orthodox Church to codefender of the Bulgarian nationality, and restrictions on reli- gious observances were eased.

By the second half of the 1980s, substantial maneuvering and

speculation centered on identifying the successor to the seventyfour-year-old Zhivkov, who was increasingly isolated from everyday governance. Four younger politicians divided most of the key

responsibilities of government and party in 1986. Although speculation grew that Zhivkov had become a figurehead or was preparing to resign, in the late 1980s he was still able to divide the power

of his rivals and avoid naming a single successor. The BCP maintained complete control over all major programs

and policies in the Bulgarian government, although the role of the

party in specific instances was not clear. In 1987, facing a budding opposition movement and pressure from the Soviet Union,

the BCP began planning for multiple-candidate (not multiparty)

regional elections to end citizen apathy toward both government

and the party. Although some reforms were made in the nomination process, local electoral commissions retained control over final

lists of nominees.

By February 1989, at least nine independent political groups had

emerged. Spurred by the liberalized domestic policies of Mikhail

S. Gorbachev in the Soviet Union, such groups demanded similar

concessions from the Bulgarian government. Given Bulgaria's long

record of mimicking Soviet policy changes, this was a natural ex- pectation. In fact, the 1987 BCP Central Committee plenum had

officially endorsed perestroika (see Glossary) and glasnost (see Glossary), the cornerstones of the Gorbachev reform program. The plenum also substantially reduced official state ceremonies, rituals,

personal awards, and propaganda, explaining that such formalities alienated the people. In the three years following the 1987 plenum, however, the Bulgarian government and the BCP gave lip service to Soviet reforms,

while quietly taking a more hard-line approach to many issues. During this period, reform in the BCP and the government ap- paratus was confined to reshuffling ministries, departments, and

personnel as a gesture of solidarity With, perestroika. At the same time,

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Bulgaria: A Country Study

dissident groups were harrassed, put under surveillance, and ac- cused of unpatriotic activities. Issues of Dissent

In the late 1980s, official repression of the Turkish minority was

the most visible domestic issue in Bulgaria. By 1989 this policy had

brought harsh international condemnation and provided a human

rights issue for the domestic opposition. A total of 310,000 ethnic

Turks were expelled or emigrated voluntarily in 1989, and the Bulgarian economy suffered greatly from this depletion of its work force (see Labor Force, ch. 3, and The Turkish Problem, this ch.).

In July 1989, more than a hundred well-known Bulgarian in- tellectuals petitioned the National Assembly to restore rights to the

ethnic Turks suffering forced emigration. Bulgarian Turks formed

the Movement for Rights and Freedoms, advocating a wide range

of government reforms besides the Turkish issue. The regime

responded by accusing Turkish agents of fomenting ethnic strife,

denying the existence of a Turkish minority in Bulgaria, and fanning the racial animosity of Bulgarians toward Turks.

In addition to ethnic and political problems, in the late 1980s

Bulgaria faced the need for strenuous economic reforms to improve

efficiency, technology, and product quality. Between 1987 and 1989,

the Zhivkov regime promised expansion of trade and joint ventures with the West, banking reform, currency convertability, and

decentralized planning. In actuality, however, the thirty-five-yearold regime lacked the political will and energy to press drastic eco- nomic reform (see Era of Experimentation and Reform, ch. 3). The economic stagnation that began in the early 1980s, with which

Zhivkov had become identified, continued unchallenged and be- came another major cause of political discontent.

The Removal of Zhivkov

Despite the appearance of numerous opposition groups in the

preceding year, the Zhivkov regime was unprepared for the suc- cessive fall of communist regimes across Eastern Europe in late 1989. In October an all-European environmental conference, Ecoforum, was held in Sofia under the auspices of the Conference on

Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE—see Glossary). This

event focused world attention on Bulgaria's history of repressing

environmental activism and stimulated open demonstrations by

human rights advocates and the Bulgarian Ekoglasnost environmental group (see Other Political Organizations, this ch.). Although some demonstrators were beaten and detained, direct communication with the West inspired them to greater self-expression. This

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Government and Politics

activity culminated in a mass demonstration in Sofia on November 3. Meanwhile, in a speech to a plenum of the BCP in late October, Zhivkov admitted that his latest restructuring program,

begun in 1987 to achieve "fundamental renewal" of society, politics, and the economy, had been a failure. He unveiled a new,

detailed program to counteract "alienation of the people from the

government and the production process." Other party spokesmen

increasingly noted recent drastic reforms in other socialist states and pointed to Bulgaria's failure to keep pace. Then, at the regular plenary meeting of the BCP Central Committee in November,

Prime Minister Georgi Atanasov announced Zhivkov's resignation.

Although the resignation appeared voluntary, Western observers

agreed that top party figures, increasingly dissatisfied with Zhivkov'

refusal to recognize problems and deal with public protests, had

exerted substantial pressure on him. The leaders of the movement

to remove Zhivkov—Atanasov, Foreign Minister Petur Mladenov

(who became head of state), and Defense Minister Dobri Dzhurov

had received the advance blessing of Moscow and the majority of

the Bulgarian Politburo. Soviet leader Gorbachev apparently approved the change because Zhivkov had not heeded warnings that

cosmetic reform was insufficient given the drastic restructuring

sought by Gorbachev. Within a month of his resignation, Zhivkov was expelled from the BCP, accused of abuse of power, and ar- rested. Mladenov became chairman of the State Council and chief

of the BCP.

Governance after Zhivkov

The Zhivkov ouster brought rapid change in some political in- stitutions, little or no change in others. The official name of the

country, dropping the term "People's," became simply the Republic of Bulgaria. For two years, the BCP remained entrenched as the most powerful party, slowing reform and clinging tenaciously

to economic and political positions gained under Zhivkov. But a new constitution was ratified in mid- 1991 , laying the basis for ac- celerated reform on all fronts. The Mladenov Government

The first few months of the Mladenov regime brought few of the

dramatic changes seen in Czechoslovakia or the German Democratic

Republic (East Germany) in the same period. Mladenov, who came

to power without a personal following, left much of the old government in power and failed to separate state from party functions.

Although initial reforms came from the Politburo, Mladenov

achieved popularity by immediately legalizing political protest,

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Bulgaria: A Country Study

giving the media unprecedented freedom, abolishing privileges of

party officials, and scheduling free elections within six months. Article 1 of the 1971 constitution, which established the leading role

of the BCP in Bulgarian government and society, was abolished

in January 1990. Public repudiation of Zhivkov allowed his subordinates to treat him as a scapegoat, thus protecting themselves

from blame by the proliferating opposition groups.

The Bulgarian communists avoided the immediate political re- jection suffered by their East European comrades for several rea- sons. Because the BCP had begun as an indigenous Bulgarian

movement in 1891, Bulgarians did not resent it as an artificially

imposed foreign organization. In 1989 nearly one in nine Bulgari- ans belonged to the party, a very high ratio that included a large

part of the intelligentsia. Early opposition groups were concentrated

in Sofia and did not have the means to reach the more conservative hinterlands, reflecting a political dichotomy between town and

country that had existed since pre-Ottoman times (see Electoral

Procedures, this ch.). Visible reorganization and reform occurred

in the BCP shortly after Zhivkov left power; the Politburo was

abolished and some old-guard communists were purged. The BCP

invited opposition representation in the government and conducted

a series of round-table discussions with opposition leaders. In February 1990, Mladenov resigned as party chief, removing the stigma

of party interference in government; in April, the State Council was abolished and Mladenov was named president.

The 1990 Stalemate

The first free election of the postwar era, the national election

of June 1990, was anticipated as an indicator of Bulgaria's postZhivkov political mood and as an end to the extreme uncertainty

that followed the Zhivkov era. But the election results provided no decisive answers or conclusions. During the political maneuvering that preceded the election, the contest for control of the National Assembly narrowed to the BCP and the Union of Democratic

Forces (UDF), a coalition of several major and many minor parties and groups with diverse interests (see The Union of Democratic

Forces, this ch.). The BCP presented a reformist image, liberally

blaming Zhivkov for national problems and changing its name to the Bulgarian Socialist Party (BSP) to stress that a new era had

begun. In March an agreement with opposition groups had made

approval of legislative proposals by the round table necessary before the BCP-dominated National Assembly could consider pas- sage (see The Role of Unofficial Organizations, this ch.). The round

table also signed accords defining future legal changes in the political

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Government and Politics

system, including multiple parties, separation of powers, constitutional protection of media freedom, and legalization of private

property.

The parliamentary election was followed by three months of in- activity and drift in the summer of 1990. Although the Council

of Ministers had resigned immediately after the election, a new

government was not formed until late August. BSP party official Andrei Lukanov finally became prime minister in an all-socialist cabinet because UDF and other opposition parties refused to form

a coalition. At the same time, the National Assembly required several weeks to agree on compromise candidate Zheliu Zhelev to replace Mladenov as president. The most significant political sit- uation was outside government institutions. The two major parties became deadlocked over UDF demands that the BSP

acknowledge its responsibility for the economic ruin of Bulgaria,

and that the government adopt the UDF plan for radical economic

reform similar to that in Poland (see Market Reform, ch. 3). Although much of the Zhivkov old guard had been forced out in

favor of middle-of-the road socialists in 1990, the UDF demands

activated strong pockets of reaction. Zhelev, a dissident philosopher

and UDF leader, spent the rest of 1990 seeking compromises among

the factions.

The Lukanov government, tied to an aging, largely conservative constituency and full of little-known BSP figures, met few of

the reform demands. In October Lukanov presented a 100-day eco- nomic reform plan to serve as a transition to longer-term planning

in 1991 . The plan borrowed major parts of the program advocated

by the UDF. The National Assembly remained too divided on the

reform issue to give Lukanov the legislative support he needed.

Meanwhile, polls showed a definite drop in popular support for the BSP; under these circumstances, the UDF intensified efforts to turn out the government by refusing to support any of Lukanov'

proposals. In November Bulgaria was paralyzed by student demonstrations

and general strikes called to topple Lukanov (see Trade Unions,

this ch.). Lukanov' s resignation ended the opposition's refusal to form a coalition government. Zhelev, who then commanded more

political power than any other figure, proposed a compromise candidate, Dimitur Popov, as prime minister. Popov, a judge with no party allegiance, received a mandate to form a new cabinet and

proceed with reforms as soon as possible. After considerable deliberation, cabinet posts were distributed among major factions, and

reform legislation began slowly moving into the National Assembly in the first half of 1991.

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Bulgaria: A Country Study

Government Structure

In the years immediately following the Zhivkov regime, the nominal structure of the Bulgarian government remained essentially un- changed. Actual decision making, however, moved from the elite level of the communist leadership to a variety of political figures

and institutions.

The Role of Unofficial Organizations

An important quasigovernmental institution in the early stages

of this process was the national round table. Conceived by opposition groups shortly after Zhivkov' s fall, the round table format was

accepted by the Atanasov government under threat of general

strikes. In March 1990, a declaration on the role and status of the

national round table, formulated by all major political groups, gave

the round table approval rights to all major legislation proposed

by the government, prior to formal consideration by the National

Assembly. In 1990 round table discussions included key government figures and representatives of all constituent groups of the

UDS and other opposition parties and trade unions. This forum

was an effective bridge across the chaotic months preceding the

first free election. It reached key compromises on election law, major

provisions of the new constitution, and economic reforms. Compromise measures were then forwarded to the parliament for ratifi- cation. By mid- 1990 round table proposals were dominated by the

platform of the UDF, for which that forum had become the chief

input to government policy. The national round table thus replaced

the BCP as the de facto source of legislative initiatives, in the ab- sence of a coalition government representing the major Bulgarian

political factions.

In late 1990, President Zhelev convened a Political Consultative Council that was able to unite all major factions behind for- mation of a coalition government in December 1990. This step

ended the threat that chaos would follow the resignation of the

Lukanov government (see The Council of Ministers, this ch.). In January 1991, the parties represented in the National Assembly

signed a detailed agreement describing political rights, the legislative agenda for 1991, BCP (BSP) responsibility for the mistakes

of the Zhivkov regime, property rights, resolution of social conflicts, and ethnic questions. The stated purpose of this agreement was to ease national tensions and provide a proper working at- mosphere for the immense reform program envisioned for 1991.

The National Assembly

In the post-Zhivkov reforms, the National Assembly returned

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Government and Politics

to its prewar status as a forum for debate of legislation among

representatives of true political factions. This status had been lost completely from 1947 to 1989, when the assembly rubber-stamped

legislation originating in the BCP hierarchy.

The Assembly under Zhivkov

According to the 1971 constitution, the unicameral National Assembly was the supreme organ of state power, acting as the national legislature and electing all the other bodies of the national

government. In practice under the Zhivkov regime, the National

Assembly met for three short sessions each year, long enough to approve policies and legislation formulated by the Council of

Ministers and the State Council. The National Assembly had a chairman (until 1990 elected by the entire body at the recommendation of the BCP Central Committee) and four deputy chairs. In the intervals between sessions, the functions of the assembly were conducted by permanent commissions whose number and designation varied through the years. Not designated in the 1971 constitution, the duties of the commissions often overlapped those of

the ministerial departments. The National Assembly had the power

to dissolve itself or extend its term in emergency session.

During the Zhivkov years, new assemblies were elected every

five years to coincide with party congresses; the Central Committee of the BCP met immediately before the first session of each new

assembly to approve candidates who were then rubber-stamped by

the National Assembly for the leadership positions of the assembly, State Council, and Council of Ministers. The ninth National

Assembly (1986-90) was rarely even notified of policy decisions

of the Zhivkov-led State Council. Nevertheless, election of the National Assembly remained the most important political ritual in Bulgaria throughout the communist period, and the return to free assembly elections in 1990 recalled the direct popular representation prescribed in the Turnovo Constitution of 1879, still revered

as a model for Bulgarian governance.

The First Freely Elected Assembly, 1990

The first significant post-Zhivkov act of the holdover (ninth) National Assembly was passage of twenty-one measures of constitutional reform. These measures included abolition of the article of

the 1971 constitution giving the BCP sole right to govern. In April

1990, that National Assembly dissolved itself to make way for national election of a Grand National Assembly, charged with writing and ratifying a new constitution; this was the first voluntary

adjournment of that body since World War II.

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Bulgaria: A Country Study

In accordance with the provisions under which the 1990

parliamentary elections were held, after passing the new constitution in July 1991 the Grand National Assembly voted to dissolve

itself and continue working as a normal parliament until election

of the new body. Thus, in the second half of 1991 work would continue on critical legislation covering issues such as privatization,

election procedures, and local government reform.

After the 1990 national elections, the National Assembly re- mained a weak legislative body, but for a new reason. No longer

required to follow party orders precisely, representatives often were

split quite evenly on reform issues. The majority BSP included re- form and reactionary factions, and the 144 UDF members were

a formidable opposition group. Unlike the brief assemblies of the

Zhivkov era, the new body remained in session several days a week

throughout the remainder of 1990 and through mid- 1991, struggling for compromise on reform legislation.

The State Council and the Presidency

The State Council, technically an executive committee within

the National Assembly, was created by the 1971 constitution as the primary executive agency of the national government. Because

of that role, the chairman of the council was automatically president of the country and thus one of the two most powerful figures

in Bulgaria in the Zhivkov years. The State Council included

representatives from trade unions, the Communist Youth League

of Bulgaria (Komsomol), and other mass organizations. The council

supervised the Council of Ministers and had the right to repeal

ministry decisions—a function that clearly reduced the Council of

Ministers to secondary executive status. In addition to its executive functions, the State Council could issue direct decrees with

full legal authority when the National Assembly was not in ses- sion, with no provision for later approval by the full legislative body.

Under Zhivkov most members of the State Council were high offi- cials of the BCP. When Petur Mladenov replaced Zhivkov as chairman of the State Council, he did not automatically become head

of state. When the State Council was abolished in April 1990, the

round table named Mladenov president of the republic, a new title for the Bulgarian head of state. The appointment was made with

the understanding that the new constitution would set guidelines

for this office. Meanwhile, Mladenov and his successor Zheliu

Zhelev retained the power to form cabinets with the consent of the

National Assembly, to represent the country abroad, and to act as commander in chief of the armed forces.

190
President Zheliu Zhelev meets with United States president George

H. W. Bush, Washington, fall 1990

Courtesy White House Photo Office

The Council of Ministers

The constitution of 1971 substantially diminished the power of

the Council of Ministers, or cabinet, which had been an intermittent center of executive authority in Bulgarian governments since

1878. In the last two decades of the Zhivkov regime, the council

acted as an advisory board to the State Council and directed everyday operations of the government bureaucracies. All members of

the Council of Ministers belonged to the BCP or the BANU, and

many held top party posts and ministries simultaneously. Longtime Politburo member Stanko Todorov headed the executive committee of the council from its creation in 1971 until 1989. Within

their areas of responsibility, the ministries had authority to form

administrative organs and to overturn acts by local government

agencies. The exact makeup of the council was not prescribed in

the constitution; the National Assembly had authority to make

changes as necessary, and the council's shape and size changed

often in the last Zhivkov years. After the elections of 1986, the Council of Ministers was reor- ganized and reduced in size. In the last years of the Zhivkov re- gime, it included eleven ministers, a chairman (the prime minister),

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Bulgaria: A Country Study

a deputy prime minister, and the chairman of the Committee on

State and People's Control (see Security and Intelligence Services,

ch. 5). In early 1990, the new provisional council had fourteen

ministries: agriculture and forests; construction, architecture, and

public works; economy and planning; finance; foreign affairs; for- eign economic relations; industry and technology; internal affairs; internal trade; justice; national defense; national education; public health and social welfare; and transport. The ambassador to the Soviet Union also had full cabinet status, as did the heads of

the committees for protection of the environment and state and

people's control. Five deputy prime ministers also sat in that cabinet, which was headed by Zhivkov-era holdover Georgi Atanasov.

The second provisional cabinet, under Andrei Lukanov, included

ministers of the environment, culture, and science and higher education in its seventeen departments. The ambassador to the Soviet

Union was dropped, and a minister for economic reform added.

The new status of the Council of Ministers as the power center of Bulgarian government was signaled by the targeting of Prime

Minister Lukanov for opposition pressure in the fall of 1990. A

second signal was intense bargaining between the BSP and opposition parties for positions in the Popov cabinet. That bargaining

produced a compromise agreement that gave the key ministries of

foreign economic relations and finance to the BSP, with national

defense going to the UDF. The Ministry of the Interior, very sensitive because of its role under Zhivkov as the enforcer of state security, was largely reorganized and headed by a nonpolitical figure

whose two deputies represented the major parties. The splitting

of the deputy minister positions was a key compromise to gain approval of the Popov cabinet. In all, five of the seventeen ministers

in the new cabinet were politically unaffiliated; seven remained from

the last Lukanov cabinet to soften the transition; and the UDF filled only three posts. The multiparty conference that reached this agree- ment also allowed for further adjustments in the cabinet structure

for the Popov government. As an interim head of government,

Popov's main goal was to establish minimal political and economic

conditions favorable to long-term reforms.

The Judiciary

Members of the highest national judicial body, the Supreme

Court, were elected to five-year terms by the National Assembly.

Until 1990, however, National Assembly approval really meant

control by the State Council, hence by the BCP. The national court system was divided into criminal, civil, and military courts; the

Supreme Court had jurisdiction in both original and appellate cases,

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Government and Politics

and it controlled the activities of all lower courts. The 1971 constitution called the court system and state prosecutor's office "weapons

of the dictatorship of the proletariat." The chief prosecutor, chief

legal official of Bulgaria, was responsible for compliance with the

law by ordinary citizens, local and national political entities and

officials, and other public organizations. The powers of this office were extended by law in 1980 in an effort to forestall public dis- satisfaction with the crime prevention system. Like the justices of

the Supreme Court, the chief prosecutor served at the approval

of the State Council. Together with the chiefjustice of the Supreme

Court, the chief prosecutor provided absolute BCP control of the

Bulgarian judicial system until 1990. The election of all judicial

officials further guaranteed this control.

Lower courts functioned at the provincial and municipal levels; election was by people's councils at the provincial level and directly

by citizens at the municipal level, using party-approved lists. In 1990 each of Bulgaria's provinces (including Sofia) had a province

court. The 105 provincal courts tried minor offenses. Both professional judges and lay assessors sat in the lower courts. Specialized

disputes were heard outside the regular court system. For example, international trade cases went to the Foreign Trade Court of

Arbitration of the Bulgarian Chamber of Commerce and Industry, civil disputes among enterprises and public organizations were

heard by the State Court of Arbitration, and labor disputes were

settled by the conciliation committees of enterprises.

Criticized before and after the fall of Zhivkov, the Bulgarian

justice system changed little with the reform programs of 1990 and

1991. The round table resolutions of early 1990 alluded only to separation of the judicial, legislative, and executive branches to avoid concentration of power in any single branch. However, es- tablishment of an independent, authoritative judiciary would be

complicated by the universal view, instilled by forty-five years of

complete control by the BCP, that the Bulgarian court system was

only an extension of the state's executive power. In a 1991 poll,

only 1.7 percent of Bulgarians expressed trust in the courts and

the prosecutor's office. In 1990 the youngest judges were over forty

years old, and the most talented had left for other careers because

of the short term of office, poor pay, low professional status, and

party control. In late 1990, Judge Dimitur Lozanchev became the

first politically neutral chairman of the Supreme Court since World

War II. Local Government

In 1987 Bulgaria consolidated its local government structure by

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Bulgaria: A Country Study

combining its twenty-eight districts (okruzi; sing., okrug), into nine

provinces (oblasti; sing. , oblast), including the city of Sofia (see fig. 1). A tangible part of the Zhivkov regime's massive (and largely theoretical) plan for economic and political restructuring, the reor- ganization imitated restructuring plans in the Soviet Union. Local

government consolidation was to eliminate the complex and in- efficient okrug bureaucracies and improve the operation of "people's self-management," the system by which people's councils

nominally managed area enterprises. The latter improvement was

to result from narrowing the primary function of the new oblast government to the assistance of local workers' collectives. At the same time, municipalities and townships became somewhat more

autonomous because the restructuring gave them some of the administrative power removed from the higher level. Although the number of districts had remained stable from 1959

until the 1987 reform, the number and allocation of smaller urban

and rural political entities changed rapidly during that period as the population shifted (see Population, ch. 2). In 1990 there were

299 political divisions smaller than the oblast and twenty-nine

separate urban areas. Both oblasti and smaller constituencies were

ruled by people's councils, elected for thirty-month terms. The local multiple-candidate elections of February 1988 were another aspect

of the restructuring program. Although local election commissions

retained considerable influence over nominations, about 26 per- cent of successful candidates were nonparty in 1988. At that time,

51,161 councillors and 3,953 mayors were elected.

The people's councils at all levels were run by elected executive

committees that met continuously. These committees had full ex- ecutive power to act between sessions of the people's councils, in

the same way as the State Council acted for the National Assembly in the Zhivkov-era national government. Each council was

responsible to the council at the next higher level; financial planning was to conform to the goals of national economic programs.

Local councils had authority over the People's Militia, or police,

as well as over local services and administration. The Popov government scheduled new local elections for February 1991 , after which

time reforms were expected in the local government system. Meanwhile, most provincial governments remained under the control

of Zhivkovite officials, intensifying the schism between the urban

and provincial political climates.

Electoral Procedures

The round table reforms of 1 990 included a new election law rati- fied by the National Assembly. As in other aspects of governance,

194
A Bulgarian Orthodox priest

participating in the election demonstrations of 1990, Sofia Courtesy Charles Sudetic

prescribed election procedures did not change greatly under the

new regime, but the intent and practice of the law did. The right

to vote by direct secret ballot remained universal for all Bulgari- ans over eighteen, and the officials they elected remained theoretically responsible only to the voters. Prescriptions for eligibility for nomination and the nomination process changed little with the new

law. The main difference was that in practice the BCP (BSP) no

longer could indiscriminately remove elected representatives or members of people's councils, nor did it control the nomination

function nominally given to public organizations, trade unions,

youth groups, and cooperatives.

Under the election law of 1953, all candidate lists were approved

by the communist-controlled Fatherland Front. Under the 1990

law, all parties and registered nonparty organizations could submit candidates; individuals could be nominated for the assembly

with 500 signatures of voters from their district, and an unlimited

number of candidates might run from each district. The State Council formerly had the power to call elections; for the 1990 Grand

National Assembly election, the date was fixed by agreement of

the UDF and the BCP. The Central Election Commission, formerly a creature of the State Council, was to supervise the equitable

implementation of election laws, overseeing the operation of equivalent commissions at local levels. Election commissions at all levels included members from various parties; the Central Election

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Bulgaria: A Country Study

Commission was headed by a professor of law with no political connection.

The new law also revised the representational system of the National Assembly. The new assembly continued to have 400 seats, but it would sit for four instead of five years. A new electoral struc- ture also was introduced. Half the National Assembly members

were elected in multiple-seat districts, in proportion to total votes

cast for each party in the district. A 4 percent minimum was re- quired for a party to achieve representation. The law designated

twenty-eight multiple-seat voting districts, based on the pre- 1987

okruzi. The other 200 members were elected from 200 single-seat

voting districts. A runoff election was held in each district where no candidate received 50 percent of the initial vote (this occurred

in 81 of the 200 districts). All voters in the 1990 election had one

vote in each type of district (see The National Assembly, this ch.).

The election was supervised by the CSCE. According to impartial observers and the parties themselves, the election was reasonably

free of interference and coercion, considering that most of the elec- torate had never faced a true political choice and the registration

and voting systems were quite complex. Party strategies were dictated by timing and geography. The UDF, lacking time and re- sources to campaign in the provinces, confined its efforts to the more congenial constituency in Sofia and other large cities. The

BSP campaigned as a reform party in progressive Sofia, but it took

advantage of the substantial residue of Zhivkovite local officials in

the provinces (many of whom were accused of exerting pressure on their constituents to vote BSP) to gain 211 assembly seats to the UDF's 144. The UDF outpolled the BSP in Sofia, Plovdiv,

Varna, and most other Bulgarian cities. The timing of the next national election was the topic of heated

debate in the first half of 1991 as political factions maneuvered for

advantage. After the new constitution was ratified in July 1991 and

a new election law was scheduled for August, elections were tentatively set for October 1991. The new election law was to free the

system of the cumbersome procedure used in 1990. Controversial

elements of the law were a BSP-backed clause disallowing absentee ballots from emigres and the restriction of all campaign activities to the Bulgarian language. The 1991 law prescribed a Central

Electoral Commission of twenty-five, to be appointed by the president in consultation with major political factions. The central commission would then appoint and oversee like commissions at lower

jurisdictions and set policy for election administration. National

elections were to be held by the proportional system, eliminating

the two-part system of 1990. Recognized parties, coalitions of

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Government and Politics

parties, individual nominees, and combinations of individuals and

parties would be eligible to run. The country was divided into thirty- one electoral constituencies, three of which were in Sofia.

Nongovernmental Political Institutions

Until 1989 the BCP exerted firm control over such nongovernmental political institutions as trade unions, youth groups, women's groups, and the nominally oppositionist BANU. The ouster

of Zhivkov, however, brought a torrent of new and revived groups

into the political arena. In the new open political climate, the

groups' fragmented constituencies often spoke loudly for their own

special interests, greatly complicating the process of coalitionbuilding and compromise needed to accomplish national reform.

The Bulgarian Communist (Socialist) Party

The Bulgarian Communist Party (BCP), which renamed itself the Bulgarian Socialist Party (BSP) several months after the fall of Zhivkov, boasted one of the highest membership-to-population

ratios (one in nine Bulgarians) in any communist country in the

late 1980s. Between 1958 and 1987, membership grew by 442,000,

mainly by adding bureaucrats and blue-collar workers in younger

age groups. In 1986 women made up 32.7 percent of party membership, but few women held high positions. The proportion of

worker members had grown to 44.4 percent by 1986, and the

proportion of farm members had dropped to 16.3 percent, reflect- ing an even sharper drop in the overall farming population of Bulgaria (see table 20, Appendix). Party recruitment in the 1980s

targeted individuals already successful in public or economic life, and the proportion of white-collar members increased in that

decade.

In 1987 the BCP was organized into 2,900 local units. Until 1990

primary party organizations were based primarily in workplaces.

The next level in the hierarchy was municipal organizations, which

were overseen by city or province and ultimately national bodies.

At every level, party and government personnel were closely inter- woven, and the principle of democratic centralism kept the lower

levels strictly subordinate to the national party. The primary or- ganizations were charged with recruitment and mobilization. A

major concession by the post-Zhivkov party was removal of party

cells from all state offices, the judiciary, educational and health agencies, as well as all nongovernmental workplaces—a concession forced

by the UDF's threat to boycott the round table negotiations that

would set a national agenda for political reform early in 1 990 . That

change significantly altered the primary level of party organization.

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Bulgaria: A Country Study

Until 1990 the top level of party leadership was the Politburo,

of which Zhivkov was general secretary. That position had been

abolished in the 1950s in the BCP as part of de-Stalinization. It was restored in 1981, however, to recognize Zhivkov 's long ser- vice and conform to Soviet restoration under Leonid Brezhnev.

Politburo members usually were selected from the central committee

and nominally elected by party congresses, which normally met

every five years. In 1986 the Thirteenth Party Congress elected an eleven-member Politburo dominated by party loyalists of Zhivkov 's generation but supplemented by a few younger specialists

in politics and economics. Following tradition, the 1986 congress

made few changes in the previous Politburo. The party congresses were nominally the top policy-making body of the party, but, like the National Assembly, they rubber-stamped decisions handed them

by the party elite. The BCP hierarchy also included the Central Committee, whose

members the congress unanimously approved from candidates supplied by the party leadership. Through a number of specialized

departments, the Central Committee performed administrative

party work between sessions of congress. After considerable size variation, the last Central Committee included 190 members and

131 candidate members in early 1990. The third elite group was

the BCP Secretariat, a group somewhat smaller than the Politburo

(its number also varied during the Zhivkov years), entrusted with

implementing party policy.

Membership in the BCP required recommendation by three es- tablished members; if accepted at the primary and next-highest

level, a candidate received full membership with no probationary

period. Criminal or unethical behavior caused withdrawal of membership. Without benefit of explanation, a varying number of members also failed to receive the new party cards issued before each

party congress. Abrupt purging of cadre and membership elements

deemed potentially hostile to current programs was a procedure

that Zhivkov used with great skill to balance and weaken opposition forces throughout his tenure in office. The fall of Zhivkov brought immediate and dramatic changes

in the BCP, including removal of the word "communist" from

its name. The Extraordinary Fourteenth Party Congress of the BCP

was held in the winter of 1990, over a year sooner than scheduled.

That congress abolished the Central Committee and the Politburo

in favor of a Supreme Party Council headed by a presidency. To

streamline party activity, the new council had only 131 members,

59 fewer than the last Central Committee. The Secretariat was

abolished. The party emerged from the congress with significant

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Government and Politics

splits between reform and conservative factions and a new temporary program. Only about 10 percent of previous Central Committee members became members of the new Supreme Party

Council; several party stalwarts who had survived the Zhivkov over- throw, including Prime Minister Atanasov, were not elected. The

BCP's constitutional guarantee of the leading role in Bulgarian so- ciety already had been abolished. In a compromise with the UDF

shortly after the congress, party organizations were banned from

workplaces and the armed forces. The BSP had full control of the

government (the UDF refused to form a coalition both before and

after the 1990 elections), but BSP popularity and power ebbed

rapidly during 1990 and 1991 . By the first anniversary of Zhivkov'

resignation, party membership had decreased to an estimated

250,000. (Membership had been reported as 984,000 at the time

of the Fourteenth Party Congress.)

The Union of Democratic Forces

The Union of Democratic Forces (UDF; Bulgarian Sayuz na

Demokratichnite Sili—SDS), which emerged as the chief opposition faction to the BCP after 1989, was a motley coalition of several major and many minor parties and groups. Some of the parties,

such as the BANU, predated the communist era by several decades.

Others, such as the Green Party, were organized after the over- throw of Zhivkov. When the UDF was founded in December 1989,

it included ten organizations; by the following spring, six more parties and movements had joined.

The basis of the UDF was the dissident groups that formed under

the faltering Zhivkov regime in the late 1980s. The all-European

Ecoforum of October 1989 allowed many such groups to meet and

exchange ideas for the first time; once Zhivkov fell, the initial contacts spawned an organizational declaration that envisioned a loose

confederation. Within the confederation, constituent groups would

continue to work for their own specific interests. The coordinating council was to include three members from each organization.

Longtime dissident philosopher Zheliu Zhelev was elected chairman and Petur Beron, a well-known environmental scientist, was

chosen secretary.

The diversity of membership required substantial compromise

in the UDF program. At least one issue central to each member

group was included in the program, however. The general goals

of the program were a civil society, market economy, multiparty

system, and constitutional government. Sixteen specific steps were

outlined to achieve those goals. The main criterion for acceptance

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Bulgaria: A Country Study

of new member organizations was compatibility of their goals with

those in the UDF program.

Shortly after the UDF was founded, a vital policy decision confronted its leaders: the BCP-dominated government revoked the

Zhivkov program of Bulgarizing the names of all Turkish citizens. Alienating the extreme nationalist factions that opposed compromise

with the ethnic minority, the UDF supported the government decision in its first major policy statement. In the first half of 1990, the stature of the UDF was enhanced

by its participation as an equal in round table discussions with the

BCP (BSP) on a range of policy issues that would set future eco- nomic and political policy. By March 1990, the coalition's main

goal was clearly stated: to push the interim National Assembly to draft a democratic constitution and urgent reform legislation as quickly as possible, over the opposition of remaining BSP hardliners and noncommunist splinter groups. All factions recognized

that once this was completely accomplished, the coalition would

dissolve and members would act as independent political parties

with varying agendas.

In the parliamentary elections ofJune 1990, the UDF platform

advocated a wide range of drastic reforms in government structure, the media, foreign policy, and the economy. Detailed proposals were offered for education, the environment, and a two-phase

"shock therapy" reform leading to a free market economy. Finally,

the UDF blamed the previous communist regime for Bulgaria's

current crises. The UDF failed to gain a majority in the National

Assembly because many rural areas remained in control of Zhivkovite BSP politicians. Many peasants had felt relatively secure under the old collective system, and the timing of the election had

forced opposition parties to concentrate campaigns in the cities,

their strongest regions. The BSP won 211 of the 400 seats. In the year following parliamentary elections, BSP obstructionism

stymied legalization of the UDF's reform goals. On the other hand,

the UDF's refusal to participate in the Lukanov cabinet proved

its popular strength by stalemating Lukanov's economic reform

program. In the crisis-driven formation of the Popov government

in December 1990, the UDF gained strategic cabinet posts. In January 1991 , the UDF and the BSP agreed on a timetable for passage

of the new constitution and other urgent legislation, but early in

1991 parliamentary disagreements set back the schedule. In March

1991, the UDF sponsored a protest rally attended by more than

50,000 people in Sofia. In May legislators from several smaller parties walked out of the National Assembly to protest its inaction;

the BANU contingent promised to do the same if the parliament

200
A group of demonstrators for the Union of Democratic Forces

(identified by SDS on their banner) prior to the election ofJune 1990

Courtesy Charles Sudetic

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Bulgaria: A Country Study

had not passed a new constitution by the end ofJune. Meanwhile,

however, official UDF policy continued seeking to break the long

stalemate by convincing the socialists in the National Assembly to abandon their go-slow approach to reform.

By mid- 1991 a split developed between the largest member

groups (the reconstituted BSDP, the BANU, Ekoglasnost, and the

Green Party) and the smaller ones over using quotas and preferential lists in the next election—a practice that would contradict the

UDF's role as a single national movement and give larger parties

substantially more influence in policy making. Easily the largest

member organizations with about 100,000 members each, the

BANU and the BSDP would benefit most from such a shift. In

July 1991, voting in the National Assembly on the new constitution clarified the split between factions viewing the UDF as a sin- gle national movement and those seeking individual identity within a loose confederation. The main issue was the constitutional

prescription for legislative representation by party. By summer

1991, disagreements on ratification of the constitution had led

splinter groups to form a new Political Consultative Council to rival the UDF's existing National Coordinating Council as a controlling agency of the UDF. This action threatened to split the UDF

into two or three slates of candidates for the 1991 national elec- tions. Thus, by mid- 1991 the relative harmony of the UDF's first year had evolved into persistent divisiveness affecting tactics, or- ganizational structure, and the pace of reform. In spite of conciliatory efforts by the coordinating council, the effective united front

that had forced major concessions from the BSP in 1990 seemed

less potent in 1991.

Trade Unions

The Bulgarian trade union movement was rejuvenated in the

pluralist post-Zhivkov political atmosphere after being forced to adhere totally to BCP policy throughout the postwar period. By

1990 unions were a powerful policy-making force, using wellorganized strikes and walkouts to emphasize their positions.

Unions under Communist Regimes

In the decade before World War II, the benign dictatorship of

Tsar Boris III abolished independent trade unions in favor of a

single government-sponsored Bulgarian Workers' Union. As Bulgaria emerged from the war under Soviet occupation, communists

abolished that union and replaced it with a General Workers'

Professional Union that included both white- and blue-collar workers. Gradually, independent union organizations were forced to

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Government and Politics

disband or join the communist organization. By 1947 union leaders were an important instrument in consolidation of the party's

power. When capitalism was declared illegal in 1948, the Dimitrov

government united thirteen unions under the Central Council of

Trade Unions, which endured until 1989 as the single umbrella

organization representing Bulgarian workers.

During that entire period, all workers' and professional organizations followed faithfully the economic policies of the BCP. The

official goals of the Bulgarian trade unions were first to help management to fulfill state economic plans, then to defend workers' interests when they did not conflict with such fulfillment. As institutions

the unions had no policy input. In individual enterprises, union

leaders and managers developed informal advisory relationships.

The only official role of the unions was as transmitters of party

policies to the working masses. Although union and BCP membership were theoretically separate, officials at the national and local levels often overlapped to give the party direct control of workers.

For example, members of the district-level people's councils often were also union executives (see Local Government, this ch.).

General congresses of trade unions were held explicitly to carry

out BCP policy; congress delegate structure (2,997 attended the

ninth congress in 1982) and the holding of preliminary district congresses mimicked BCP procedures. The many industrial reorganization plans of the Zhivkov regime meant periodic restructuring,

if not new roles, for the unions. In the early 1980s, for example,

the decentralizing reforms of the New Economic Model (NEM)

changed the labor union structure from one divided by region to one divided by brigade, collective, and enterprise, matching the

NEM industrial structure of the time. Although this change was

controversial, it did little to improve the influence of the Bulgarian working class on enterprise policy. In the 1980s, union membership approached 4 million, encompassing an estimated 98 percent of Bulgarian workers. Almost a year before the fall of Zhivkov, the Independent Labor Federation, Podkrepa, organized as a white-collar opposition group in- spired by the Polish Solidarity (see Glossary) movement. In 1989

Podkrepa consistently was persecuted for its outspoken criticism

of Zhivkov's policies.

Independent Union Organizations

When the communist regime was overthrown, the central council began restructuring the trade union system, declaring the or- ganization independent of the BCP and renaming its umbrella

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Bulgaria: A Country Study

organization the Confederation of Independent Trade Unions

(CITU). In 1990 BCP organizations were banned from work places,

although the continuing overlap of party and union officials maintained substantial communist influence in the CITU at local levels. In the early reform years, the CITU and Podkrepa were the

two major trade union federations, although many independent

unions also emerged in this revival period for the movement. Early

in 1990, Podkrepa established its credibility by exacting an agreement with CITU guaranteeing its members all the rights (and the

substantial privileges) accorded official trade unions under the pre- vious system. From the beginning, Podkrepa sought maximum in- fluence on government policy, repeatedly demanding radical

economic reform.

Podkrepa grew rapidly in 1990 because of its roles as a charter

member of the UDF, as a participant in the policy round tables

with the BCP, and as the organizer of strikes and demonstrations

against the communist-dominated Lukanov government. In early

1990, an estimated 300 strikes helped convince the government that

talks with opposition groups were necessary. Although Podkrepa

ran no candidates in the national elections of 1990, it vigorously

supported candidates who espoused labor views. In late 1990,

another wave of strikes pushed the Lukanov government out and

led to the coalition Popov government. Although CITU and other

unions participitated, Podkrepa usually was the prime organizer

in such actions.

CITU, whose membership of 3 million dwarfed the 400,000 of

Podkrepa, remained politically passive in the early post-Zhivkov

period. In mid- 1990 CITU began issuing statements critical of

government inactivity, and it mobilized 500,000 workers to participate in the November 1990 strikes initiated by Podkrepa against

the Lukanov government.

The strikes that forced Lukanov' s resignation also raised criti- cism of the political role of both labor organizations late in 1990

(see Governance after Zhivkov, this ch.). CITU received criticism

for both its continued ties with the BSP and its aggressive refor- mist stance. The Supreme Party Council of the BSP declared a

policy of noninterference in CITU affairs. Meanwhile, Podkrepa,

led by controversial, outspokenly anticommunist Konstantin Trenchev, responded to internal and external criticism by changing from

active membership to observor status in the UDF.

The unions continued active participation in political decision

making in 1991, however. Because economic reforms brought substantial unemployment and workplace disruption, representing

worker interests was synonymous with such involvement in this

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Government and Politics

period. In January 1991, CITU and Podkrepa signed a "social peace

agreement" with the Popov government to refrain from striking during the first phase of economic reform in exchange for limitations on work-force cutbacks (see Market Reform, ch. 3). However, jurisdictional and policy disputes threatened to undermine the agreement. Although both organizations continued to support the Popov

government, in March 1991 Podkrepa proposed that UDF representatives boycott the National Assembly because it failed to pass re- form measures. As opposition to the communists declined as a uniting factor,

Bulgaria's trade unions maneuvered to shape new roles for themselves in 1991 . Representing 40 percent of the population in a wideopen political culture, they exerted tremendous influence on policy even in the first post-Zhivkov year. The radical economic reform

envisioned by Bulgarian leaders would include entirely new rela- tionships among the government, enterprise management, and

unions. Movement to a Western- style free-market economy would

mean conceding some worker rights taken for granted under the

command economy, but compromise with the Podkrepa-led union

movement promised to be a severe test for other political insti- tutions.

Youth Organizations

Following the model of the Soviet Union, the BCP put massive

resources into its party youth organization when it came to power.

Officially called the Communist Youth League of Bulgaria (later

the Dimitrov Communist Youth League of Bulgaria) and abbreviated to Komsomol, the league sought to ensure that proper socialist values would pass to the next generation and to supply new members for the party. With a peak membership of 1 .5 million in 1987,

the Komsomol had the same organizational structure as the BCP,

with a secretariat and executive bureau analogous to the Politburo

at the top and a pyramid of local and regional sub-organizations.

Besides instilling party dogma in Bulgarian youth, the organization was a vehicle for enforcing party directives, a source of reserve personnel, an organizer of social and recreational activities, and,

in the 1980s, an instrument for encouraging computer training in

the schools. Beginning in the mid-1970s, the Komsomol's lack of

self-confidence was revealed in a series of party meetings, speeches,

and programs aimed at explaining and combatting apathy and

materialism in Bulgarian youth. By the late 1980s, the Komsomol

was widely seen as a hollow facade; between 1987 and 1989, membership dropped by 30 percent after compulsory registration ended

in secondary schools.

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Bulgaria: A Country Study

Immediately after the overthrow of Zhivkov, alternative youth

groups began to form. One such group, the Federation of Independent Students' Unions (FISU), gained support by advocating complete separation of student groups from the BCP/BSP and its ideological constraints and by proclaiming itself a student voice on

questions of national policy. FISU gained stature by being a charter

member of the UDF.

Meanwhile, the Komsomol acknowledged past failures, changed

its name to the Bulgarian Democratic Youth (BDY), and began

issuing policy statements on student rights and broader social is- sues. The organization was decentralized by giving local affiliates substantial autonomy, and democratized by limiting the terms of

officials. Election of a political unknown, Rosen Karadimov, as

first secretary was another signal that the youth organization had

broken with conventional communist party practices.

The BDY was overwhelmed by a wave of student activism in

alternative groups. Student strikes in support of the anti-Lukanov

labor strikes in late 1990 shut down major universities. And, like the BSP, the BDY faced reminders and accusations of its misdeeds

in the prereform era. In late 1990, the BDY returned to the state much of the property the Komsomol had accumulated during decades of BCP funding. It also renounced socialism and recast it- self as an apolitical social organization.

The Movement for Rights and Freedoms

With 120,000 members, the Movement for Rights and Freedoms

(MRF) was the fourth largest political organization in Bulgaria in

1991, but it occupied a special place in the political process. The

leader of the movement, Ahmed Dogan, was imprisoned in 1986

for opposition to the Zhivkov policy of assimilating ethnic Turks

(see Bulgaria in the 1980s, ch. 1). Founded in 1990 to represent

the interests of the Turkish ethnic minority, the MRF gained

twenty-three seats in the first parliamentary election that year, giving it the fourth-largest parliamentary voting bloc. Its agenda

precluded mass media coverage or building coalitions with other

parties, because of the strong anti-Turkish element in Bulgaria's

political culture. By mid- 1991, the UDF had held only one joint

demonstration with the MRF; their failure to reconcile differences was considered a major weakness in the opposition to the majority

BSP. In early 1990, the MRF protested vigorously but unsuccessfully its exclusion from national round table discussions among the

major Bulgarian parties.

In 1991 the MRF broadened its platform to embrace all issues

of civil rights in Bulgaria, aiming "to contribute to the unity of

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Government and Politics

the Bulgarian people and to the full and unequivocal compliance

with the rights and freedoms of mankind and of all ethnic, reli- gious, and cultural communities in Bulgaria." The MRF took this step partly to avoid the constitutional prohibition of political parties based on ethnic or religious groups. The group's specific goals were ensuring that the new constitution protect ethnic minorities

adequately; introducing Turkish as an optional school subject; and

bringing to trial the leaders of the assimilation campaign in the

1980s. To calm Bulgarian nationalist resentment, the MRF cate- gorically renounced Islamic fundamentalism, terrorism, and ambitions for autonomy within Bulgaria. Political overtures were made

regularly to the UDF, and some local cooperation occurred in 1991

Although the MRF remained the fastest growing party in Bulgaria,

however, the sensitivity of the Turkish issue caused official UDF

policy to keep the MRF in isolation.

Other Political Organizations

Besides the BSP and the BANU, parties officially sanctioned

under Zhivkov, an unofficial list of political organizations in early

1990 contained fourteen political parties, seven unions and labor

federations, and sixteen forums, clubs, movements, committees,

and associations—diverging widely in scope, special interests, and

size. Ecological Organizations

Two ecological organizations, the Green Party in Bulgaria and

Ekoglasnost, were founding members of the UDF. The Greens,

which separated from Ekoglasnost shortly after Zhivkov 's fall, in- cluded mostly scientists and academics. Their platform stressed decentralized government and a strong role for the individual in

determining quality of life and preservation of the environment.

The government was to play a leading role, however, in providing social security, health care, and support for scientific reasearch.

Ekoglasnost, which described itself as nonpolitical despite its role in the UDF, was founded in early 1989 as an open association of

environmentally concerned citizens. Its purpose was to collect and

publicize ecological information about proposed projects, and to

assist decision makers in following environmentally sound policy.

Ekoglasnost had a membership of 35,000 at the end of 1990.

Revived Prewar Parties

The Bulgarian Social Democratic Party (BSDP) was an offshoot

of the movement that produced the BCP. The main socialist party

in Bulgaria between the world wars, the BSDP was disbanded by

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Bulgaria: A Country Study

the communists in 1948. It resurfaced in 1990, resuming its advocacy of government reform and elimination of social privilege.

The BSDP saw a freely elected National Assembly as the chief in- strument of popular democracy. The BSDP party platform also called for close economic ties with Europe, disarmament, and

respect for private property. The BSDP was a founding member

of the UDF and, under the controversial leadership of Petur

Dertliev, one of its most active participants.

The history of the BSDP followed closely that of the communists,

except that the latter had a larger following. The BSDP recovered

official status in 1990 after being disbanded in 1948. Representing the middle class, the party stood for private property rights, a multiparty parliamentary system of government, radical reduction of the military budget, and active participation in the European Community. Membership in 1991 was 25,000 to 30,000.

The Petkov branch of the Bulgarian Agrarian National Union

(BANU), the third of the prewar parties to emerge as an independent entity after Zhivkov, was the part of the agrarian movement

that had actively opposed the communists between 1944 and 1947

and thus did not survive the postwar communist consolidation. The

"official" BANU, showpiece opposition party to the BCP from

1947 until 1989, also was revitalized in 1990. In 1990 and 1991,

efforts were made to reunite the two factions. (Petkov himself was

officially rehabilitated by the National Assembly in 1990.) In its new incarnation, the Petkov branch advocated complete government decentralization, extensive support for agricultural privatization and investment, punishment of the communists and

"official" agrarians for crimes against the Petkov branch, and a

general return to the populist ideas of Stamboliiski (see Stamboliiski

and Agrarian Reform, ch. 1). Together with the BSDP, the Petkov

BANU was the largest (110,000 members in 1991) and most active constituent of the UDF.

The Monarchist Movement

Simeon II, exiled son of Tsar Boris III, was 54 years old in 1991

,

healthy, and popular with many Bulgarians. In the difficult reform

years, he was the center of a small but significant movement that saw restoration of the monarchy as a solution to the dilemmas of

governing society. Simeon encouraged the movement by agreeing to return if his people wished a restoration. Newly available

publications on the history of the Bulgarian monarchy, especially

Boris III, had evoked considerable public interest by 1991. A

referendum on monarchy-versus-republic was scheduled for July

1991, then cancelled by the National Assembly because of its

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Government and Politics

potentially divisive impact and because of strong opposition from

the BSP and most UDF factions. The new constitution's description of Bulgaria as a republic ended official consideration of resto- ration in 1991, but Simeon's personal popularity preserved

monarchism as a political option for many disillusioned Bulgari- ans in the early 1990s.

The Public and Political Decision Making

In the post-Zhivkov era, extreme diversification of political or- ganizations and activities paralleled a similar liberation in the media

and the arts. Under Zhivkov, Bulgaria had followed the totalitarian

formula for media control, allowing only official radio and tele- vision stations and newspapers that were conduits for the official party line on all subjects. Limited artistic freedom came in several

"thaw" periods (notably in the mid-1960s and the late 1970s) that

closely followed similar relaxation in the Soviet Union. The charisma of Liudmila Zhivkova, appointed by her father to oversee

cultural affairs in 1975, notably lightened the Bulgarian cultural scene from the late 1970s through 1981. The early 1980s was a time of unprecedented freedom for media discussion of controversial topics; the Law on Plebiscites (1983) was to have promoted discussion of preselected issues of public interest, but by 1984

party reactionaries had reasserted control. The 1984 Bulgarian

Writers' Conference called for more ideological content in litera- ture, signaling a change that lasted through the end of the Zhivkov regime.

The Intelligentsia

Intellectual groups developed no formal organizations comparable

to groups in other East European countries because the small in- tellectual community centered in one city (Sofia) required no such

measures. Furthermore, the Bulgarian Writers' Union already con- tained a large percentage of the intelligentsia. Especially during

the "thaw" periods, factions in the union showed substantial diversity in their approach to the role of art versus that of the state. A

much smaller Bulgarian Artist's Union and Bulgarian Journalists'

Union had similar status. A samizdat (underground publication)

network did circulate dissident writings from the Soviet Union and

elsewhere. Among official publications, Narodna kultura (People's

Culture) gained a singular reputation between 1984 and 1988 by

publishing provocative articles on politics, economics, education,

and the environment. In 1988 Zhivkov fired its editor Stefan Prodev

for helping found a dissident organization.

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Bulgaria: A Country Study

Zhivkov and the Intelligentsia

Until the late 1980s, Zhivkov successfully prevented unrest in

the Bulgarian intellectual community. Membership in the writers'

union brought enormous privilege and social stature, and that drew

many dissident writers such as Georgi Dzhagarov and Liubomir

Levchev into the circle of the officially approved intelligentsia. On

the other hand, entry required intellectual compromise, and refusal

to compromise led to dismissal from the union and loss of all privileges. The punishment of dissident writers sometimes went

far beyond loss of privileges. In 1978 emigre writer Georgi Markov

was murdered in London for his anticommunist broadcasts for the

British Broadcasting Corporation, and Blaga Dimitrova was harshly

denounced for her critical portrayal of party officials in her 1982

novel Litse. Zhivkov also softened organized opposition by restoring symbols of the Bulgarian cultural past that had been cast aside in the

postwar campaign to consolidate Soviet- style party control. Beginning in 1967, he appealed loudly to the people to remember "our

motherland Bulgaria." In the late 1970s, Zhivkov mended rela- tions with the Bulgarian Orthodox Church, and in 1981 Liudmila

Zhivkova's national celebration of Bulgaria's 1,300th anniversary

raised patriotic feeling. Zhivkov' s extensive campaign of cultural

restoration provided at least some common ground between him

and the Bulgarian intelligentsia.

The Ferment of 1988-90

In late 1987, dissatisfaction with government corruption, pollution, the Turkish issue, and repeated failure of economic reform

programs began to stimulate open political dissent. By that time, a younger generation had matured, unimpressed by communist

doctrine and disinclined to blind obedience. In November 1987,

the Federation of Clubs for Glasnost and Democracy (originally

the Discussion Club for Support of Glasnost and Perestroika) was

founded by communist intellectuals to promote openness in Bulgarian society. In early 1988, the appearance of the Independent

Association for Defense of Human Rights in Bulgaria publicized

the repression of the regime. Meanwhile, the fragmented intellec- tual community had been galvanized by a single issue: environmental degradation. In the winter of 1987-88, an ecological

exhibition in Ruse, one of the most seriously polluted industrial centers in Bulgaria, received national media attention. The communist regime's failure to protect its people from such dangers

became a symbol for the general aura of incompetence that

surrounded Zhivkov in the late 1980s.

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Government and Politics

In mid- 1988 Zhivkov responded to the new opposition by purging two high pro-glasnost party officials, signaling that the party

would permit glasnost only on its own terms. The BCP also tried

to preempt environmental opposition by forming the Movement

for Environmental Protection and Restoration amid promises for

stiffer environmental regulation.

In late 1988 and early 1989, many leaders of independent Bulgarian groups were deported or harrassed. Nevertheless, by

mid- 1989 at least thirteen independent associations and committees had been founded for the defense of human rights and the en- vironment. Then in 1989, communism was discredited by successful freedom movements in Hungary, Poland, East Germany, and

Czechoslovakia. By that time, glasnost had stimulated political di- alog in the Soviet Union, which was still the model for Bulgarian

political behavior. Under these new conditions, government in- timidation failed. Although Zhivkov sought reconciliation with the

intelligentsia by proclaiming a "new cultural revolution" in early

1989, the unions of writers, journalists, and artists leveled strong

criticism on the environment and other issues. When Ekoglasnost was formed that year, it made a formidable public appeal for an

accounting of economic policies that harmed the environment (see

Other Political Organizations, this ch.).

In 1989 the Federation of Clubs backed the National Assembly

petition against Turkish assimilation by characterizing the policy

as against the best traditions of the Bulgarian nation. According

to one theory, the Zhivkov policy toward the Turks was calculated

to alienate the intelligentsia from the ethnocentric Bulgarian majority by forcing the former to take sides with the Turks; whatever

its purpose, the policy failed amid the massive Turkish exodus of

1989. Leaders of the Movement for Rights and Freedoms, deported

for defending the Turks, were welcomed at a session of the CSCE,

severely damaging Zhivkov' s image in Europe. In the fall of 1989,

dissident groups received further validation at the CSCE Conference on the Environment in Sofia, where they held public meetings and

were received by Western delegates. The mass demonstrations that

followed convinced the BCP that the Zhivkov regime could not

survive

Dramatic expression of public discontent continued after the

Zhivkov ouster. In mid- 1990 tent-city demonstrations in Sofia con- tinued for several weeks, encountering no effective official resistance.

Patterned after peaceful antigovernment protests of the 1960s in

the West, the Sofia campsite of over 100 tents near the BSP headquarters building began as a protest against communist reten- tion of power in the national elections of June 1990. The protest

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Bulgaria: A Country Study

eventually included demonstrators of many political viewpoints.

Besides election fraud by the BSP, issues targeted were the Chernobyl' coverup, corruption among former and present BCP/BSP

officials, Bulgaria's role in the invasion of Czechoslovakia, and past

actions of present government officials such as Lukanov and Interior Minister Atanas Semerdzhiev. The tent city played an important role in publicizing reform issues as a new national government was being formed.

The Media and Public Issues In the wake of Zhivkov's overthrow, fast-spreading pluralism

in the media and intellectual circles brought a din of conflicting

opinion to the public. In 1987 Bulgaria had seventeen daily

newspapers, most of which were local. By 1991 eight national

newspapers were publishing, and an expanding variety of local and

weekly papers was available. Until 1990 the chief daily newspaper was Rabotnichesko delo, the official organ of the BCP. After the fall of Zhivkov, the daily was renamed Duma; in its new format, it began

to feature more balanced accounts of national problems, reflect- ing the moderate image now cultivated by its sponsoring organization. The fragmentation of politics in 1990 brought a newspaper

boom that included a full spectrum of political views. In 1991 the

leading papers by circulation were Duma, Demokratsiya (an independent), the trade union daily Trud, and Zemia, aimed primarily at rural readers. The most popular weeklies were Sturshel, featuring

folk humor, and the long- running Pogled. The weekly 168 Chasa

went furthest in rejecting traditional Bulgarian journalism in favor

of sophisticated parody and Western-style in-depth features.

Universities dropped their required study of Marxist-Leninist

ideology, and student organizations emerged immediately to assert positions on a wide variety of issues (see Youth Organizations,

this ch.). In numerous national polls, the public expressed dissatis- faction with government leaders, economic policies (as both too

radical and too conservative), and the BSP. Vestiges of the traditional gap between city and village remained, however: on the average, rural Bulgarians expressed less support for market reform and

noncommunist leaders, placed less blame on the communists for

current problems, and opposed complete rights for the Turkish

minority more strongly.

In 1990-91 the media featured major exposes on malfeasance

by the Zhivkov regime (acknowledged by the present BSP under

public pressure), coverups of radiation exposure from the Kozloduy

Nuclear Power Plant and the Chernobyl' disaster in the Soviet

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Demonstrators outside parliament building in Sofia demand

resignation of the Bulgarian Socialist Party government, November 1990.

Courtesy Charles Sudetic

Union, and the murder of Georgi Markov (a full-scale investigation of which opened in 1990). In mid- 1991 Bulgaria opened its archives to an international commission investigating the 1981 as- sassination attempt on Pope John Paul II. In spite of those developments, in 1991 government agencies and individuals still threatened

independent publications with court action for "treasonous" state- ments. In a 1991 poll by the independent 168 Chasa, 46 percent

of respondents expressed the belief that a campaign had been or- ganized to control the Bulgarian media (the BSP and party offi- cials were most often named responsible), and 37 percent said that

freedom of the press was not in danger in Bulgaria.

The Permanent Commission for Human Rights and the National

Problem was created in 1990 as an advisory and investigatory

agency of the National Assembly. Composed of thirty-nine members of parliament, the commission received the nominal assignment of investigating past and present human rights violations in Bulgaria, recommending appropriate compensation, and drafting

new human rights legislation. Among the issues addressed in the

commission's first year were restoration of government-confiscated

property to churches and Turkish citizens; verifying complaints

of unfair sentencing and inhumane prison conditions; proposing

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Bulgaria: A Country Study

laws to replace restrictive legislation such as the Law on Religious

Beliefs and the Law on Passports; and erecting legal barriers against

state persecution for political reasons (see Religion, ch. 2). In January 1991, commission chairman Svetoslav Shivarov reported that

all political prisoners in Bulgaria had been freed. The Turkish Problem

As in other parts of Eastern Europe, the repeal of single-party

rule in Bulgaria exposed the long-standing grievances of an ethnic

minority. Especially in the 1980s, the Zhivkov regime had systematically persecuted the Turkish population, which at one time

numbered 1.5 million and was estimated at 1.25 million in 1991.

Mosques were closed, Turks were forced to Slavicize their names,

education in the native language was denied, and police brutality was used to discourage resistance (see Turks, ch. 2). The urban

intelligentsia that partcipated in the 1990 reform movement pushed

the post-Zhivkov governments toward restoring constitutionally

guaranteed human rights to the Turks. But abrogation of Zhivkov 's assimilation program soon after his fall brought massive protests by ethnic Bulgarians, even in Sofia.

In January 1990, the Social Council of Citizens, a national body

representing all political and ethnic groups, reached a compromise

that guaranteed the Turks freedom of religion, choice of names,

and unimpeded practice of cultural traditions and use of Turkish

within the community. In turn, the Bulgarian nationalists were promised that Bulgarian would remain the official language and

that no movement for autonomy or separatism would be tolerated.

Especially in areas where Turks outnumbered Bulgarians, the lat- ter feared progressive "Islamification" or even invasion and an- nexation by Turkey—a fear that had been fed consciously by the

Zhivkov assimilation campaign and was revived by the BSP in 1991

.

Because radical elements of the Turkish population did advocate

separatism, however, the nonannexation provision of the compromise was vital. The Bulgarian governments that followed Zhivkov tried to realize the conditions of the compromise as quickly as possible. In the multiparty election of 1990, the Turks won representation in the National Assembly by twenty-three candidates of the predominantly

Turkish MRF (see The Movement for Rights and Freedoms, this ch.). At that point, ethnic Bulgarians, many remaining from the

Zhivkov regime, still held nearly all top jobs in government and

industry, even in predominantly Turkish Kurdzhali Province.

Nevertheless, parts of Bulgarian society felt threatened by the rise of the MRF. In 1990 that faction collided with a hard-line Bulgarian

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Government and Politics

group, the National Committee for Defense of National Interests

an organization containing many former communists instrumental in the Zhivkov assimilation program. In November 1990, Bulgarian nationalists established the Razgrad Bulgarian Republic in a heavily Turkish region to protest the government's program of

restoring rights to the Turks. In the first half of 1991, intermittent

violence and demonstrations were directed at both Turks and Bulgarians in Razgrad.

These conditions forced the government to find a balance between Turkish demands and demonstrations for full recognition

of their culture and language, and Bulgarian nationalist complaints

against preferential treatment for the ethnic minority. In 1991 the

most important issue of the controversy was restoring Turkishlanguage teaching in the schools of Turkish ethnic districts (see Education, ch. 2). In 1991 the Popov government took initial steps in

this direction, but long delays brought massive Turkish protests,

especially in Kurdzhali. In mid- 1991 continuing strikes and protests on both sides of the issue had brought no new discussions of

compromise. Frustration with unmet promises encouraged Turkish separatists in both Bulgaria and Turkey, which in turn fueled

the ethnocentric fears of the Bulgarian majority—and the entire

issue diverted valuable energy from the national reform effort. Although most political parties supported full minority rights, in

1991 the strength of Bulgarian nationalist sentiment, deeply rooted

in centuries of conflict with the Ottoman Empire and not inclined

to compromise, promised to make the Turkish question the most

pressing human rights issue in Bulgaria for the foreseeable future.

Foreign Policy

From World War II until 1989, Bulgarian foreign policy revolved

around the Soviet Union. Without exception Sofia imitated or sup- ported Soviet twists and turns such as Khrushchev's denunciation

of Stalin in 1956 and the invasion of Czechoslovakia in 1968. Substantial historical and economic ties supplemented the ideological

foundation of the relationship. In the 1970s and 1980s, Bulgaria

improved its diplomatic relations with nations outside the Soviet

sphere. But in 1989, domestic and international events jolted Bulgaria from forty years of uniformity and forced it to consider for the first time major diversification of its foreign policy, abandoning its paramount reliance on the Soviet Union. This meant a lengthy period of reevaluation, during which general goals were

agreed upon but specific policy was hotly debated.

In 1991 Foreign Affairs Minister Viktor Vulkov listed several

general goals of his ministry: the integration of Bulgaria as fully

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as possible into the unified European Community to facilitate development of a market economy and Western political institutions;

improving relations with all Bulgaria's Balkan neighbors and the

countries of the Black Sea region, with emphasis on mutual territorial integrity and sovereignty; active participation in the United

Nations and other international organizations able to guarantee

the security of small states; and maintaining as much as possible

of Bulgaria's unique relationship with the Soviet Union while drawing much closer to the United States. Once the economic advantages of membership in the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance

(Comecon—see Glossary) disappeared in 1990 and instability be- came chronic in the Soviet Union, other sources of economic and

geopolitical security became the primary quest in Bulgaria's pragmatic search for foreign partners (see Bulgaria in Comecon, ch. 3). In 1990 indications of the new pragmatism were recognition of the

Republic of Korea (South Korea) and Israel and an official invitation for the pope to visit Bulgaria.

The Foreign Policy Establishment

Major changes were made in the organizations conducting Bulgarian foreign affairs after the ouster of Zhivkov. Post-Zhivkov

governments ended the practice of selecting members of the Ministry of Internal Affairs for diplomatic positions in which they gathered

intelligence and carried out subversive activities abroad (see Security

and Intelligence Services, ch. 5). Admitting that the Bulgarian in- telligence presence abroad had been extensive under Zhivkov, the

Ministry of Foreign Affairs declared in mid- 1991 that henceforth

only a single, identified intelligence officer would remain in each

Western embassy. In a sharp streamlining of the diplomatic corps, 200 of Bulgaria's 544 foreign diplomats were called home in 1990

and 1991, and 20 of its 79 foreign missions were closed, mostly

in Third World countries (relations with those countries continued,

however).

Under the communist Lukanov government of 1990, President

Zheliu Zhelev assumed major responsibilities as head of state in

talks with foreign leaders; his nonpartisan political position at home

and his direct approach to foreign and economic issues gained

Zhelev respect as a spokesman in Bulgaria and abroad, as well as large-scale commitments of aid from several Western sources (see

Domestic and International Economic Policies in the 1990s, ch. 3). When Popov formed his government in 1991 , Vulkov (leader of the

BANU) replaced a former Zhivkovite intelligence official as minister

of foreign affairs, supplementing Zhelev' s efforts and improving

the world image of Bulgaria's official foreign policy agency.

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Government and Politics

Relations with Balkan Neighbors

Although the Zhivkov regime often advocated closer relations

and multilateral cooperation with Yugoslavia, Turkey, Greece,

Albania, and Romania, a number of traditional issues barred significant improvement until the late 1980s. Bulgarian proposals to make the Balkans a zone free of chemical and nuclear weapons,

or a "zone of peace and understanding" (advanced by Zhivkov

at the behest of the Soviet Union, to eliminate weapons of the North

Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO—see Glossary) from the

region) was vetoed on several occasions. But in 1990, Zhelev was

able to remove some of the suspicion that had barred rapprochement by the Zhivkov regime. Post-Zhivkov regimes sought closer

relations with both Greece and Turkey, partly in the hope that

NATO would grant Bulgaria membership to form a bridge between

its two mutually hostile members.

Yugoslavia

Bulgarian relations with Yugoslavia were conditioned by old

issues of Balkan politics and by strong domestic political forces at work in both countries. Throughout the 1980s, the Yugoslav media

complained loudly that Bulgaria mistreated its Macedonian citizens

by insisting that Macedonians were ethnically Bulgarians, making separate ethnic recognition inappropriate. The Zhivkov regime

(and its successors), fearing that inflamed nationalism in Yugoslavia would intensify demands for Macedonian autonomy across

the border in Bulgaria, largely ignored the Yugoslav propaganda

campaign on the Macedonian issue. The dispute over Macedonia

survived and prospered after communism lost its grip on both countries. Bulgarian nationalists, stronger after Zhivkov, held that the

Slavic population of the Republic of Macedonia was ethnically

Bulgarian, a claim leading naturally to assertion of a Greater Bulgaria. To defuse nationalist fervor on both sides, and in keeping

with the policy of improved relations with all neighbors, Zhelev

officially advocated nonintervention in the ethnic affairs of other

nations.

The nonintervention strategy assumed greater importance when

the Republic of Macedonia sought independence from the Yugoslav federation in 1991 in an effort to escape the increasing dominance of the Republic of Serbia in the federation. That effort reinforced the protective attitude of Macedonian nationalists in Bulgaria toward Yugoslav Macedonia, which had been part of Serbia

in the interwar period. Serbia's use of force to prevent the breakup

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Bulgaria: A Country Study

of the Yugoslav federation in 1991 triggered Bulgarian fears of wider

destabilization in the Balkans if Serbian expansionism were fully

revived.

In 1991 Bulgarian policy toward Yugoslavia was complicated

by the rejuvenation of Macedonian national groups in Bulgaria.

The largest of these was the Union of Macedonian Societies, a longstanding cultural and educational society that in 1990 took the prefix

IMRO (Internal Macedonian Revolutionary Organization), which was the name of the terrorist organization active in Bulgaria,

Greece, and Serbia between 1893 and 1935 (see The Macedonian

Issue, ch. 1). But the threat posed by such groups remained small

because the focus of Bulgarian nationalism was the Turkish issue

in 1991, and because economic reform was the major concern of

all factions. In spite of claims by the Serbian press that Bulgaria was aiding Croatia in the civil war of 1991 and that Bulgaria owed

Serbia reparations from World War II, Bulgaria followed Zhelev's

policy of nonintervention as the Yugoslav civil war continued.

Romania

In the early 1980s, Bulgarian relations with Romania featured

regular official visits by Zhivkov and Romanian President Nicolae Ceau§escu and diplomatic avoidance of differing approaches

to internal control (Romania being the more totalitarian) and the

Warsaw Pact (see Glossary) (Bulgaria being the more loyal member). At that point, both countries concentrated on more pressing

foreign issues, and both advocated creating a Balkan nuclear-free zone. But during the 1980s, relations were strained by the independent foreign policy of Romania, its opposition to perestroika in the

late 1980s, and mutual accusations of environmental pollution af- fecting the other country. Deteriorating personal relations between

Zhivkov and the maverick Ceau§escu also may have contributed

to the decline. But, in the name of Warsaw Pact solidarity, the

Zhivkov regime subdued criticism of chemical pollution from

Romanian plants across the Danube, and it remained neutral in

the Hungarian-Romanian dispute over Romanian treatment of eth- nic Hungarians in that country in the late 1980s. After the emergence of the environment as a political issue in 1989, however,

accusations became more harsh on both sides. In 1991 joint commissions attempted to reach a compromise on the environmental

issue and restore the pragmatic, relatively amicable relationship

of the postwar years. Greece

Bulgarian relations with Greece, a traditional enemy, were sta- ble throughout the 1970s and 1980s, in spite of major government

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Government and Politics

changes in both countries. Zhivkov made this stability a model for the overall Balkan cooperation that was a centerpiece of his for- eign policy in the 1980s. In 1986 the two countries signed a declaration of good-neighborliness, friendship, and cooperation that was

based on mutual enmity toward Turkey and toward Yugoslav demands for recognition of Macedonian minorities in Bulgaria and

Greece. An important motivation for friendship with Greece was

to exploit NATO's Greek-Turkish split, which was based on the

claims of the two countries in Cyprus. In early 1989, Bulgaria signed a ten-year bilateral economic agreement with Greece.

The main historical issue between Bulgaria and Greece, disposition of their Macedonian minorities, was settled during the 1970s;

after that time, the parties adopted mutual policies of strict noninterference in internal affairs. In mid- 1991 the possibility of in- dependence for Yugoslav Macedonia threatened to renew tension

in that area. Post-Zhivkov Bulgarian policy toward Greece remained

very conciliatory, however; in 1991 Zhelev stressed cooperation

with Greece as a foundation for Balkan stability and reassured the

Greeks that Bulgarian rapprochement with Turkey did not threaten

this relationship.

Turkey

In spite of intermittent rapprochement, Turkey was hostile to Bulgaria through most of the 1980s because of Zhivkov' s mistreatment of Bulgarian Turks and the economic hardship caused in Turkey by mass immigration of Turks from Bulgaria in 1989. The last rapprochement, a protocol of friendship in early 1988, was signed

by Bulgaria to defuse international criticism of its ethnic policy.

That agreement dissolved rapidly in 1988, when Turkey saw no

change in Bulgarian ethnic assimilation; by 1989 Turkey was vowing to defend the Turkish minority, while Bulgaria claimed that

its "Turks" were all Bulgarians converted to Islam under the

Ottoman Empire (see The Turkish Problem, this ch.).

The ouster of Zhivkov and subsequent Bulgarian commitment

to repatriate deported Turks and grant them full human rights

brought a marked change in Turkish policy. Despite delays and

complaints from the Bulgarian Turks, Turkey remained patient

and positive toward all signs of progress. The former dissident

Zhelev, long a vocal critic of assimilation, became president and

met with Turkish President Turgut Ozal in September 1990. That

meeting began a series of high-level economic talks in 1990-91 that

yielded Turkish loans and technical assistance to Bulgaria and

promised to bolster bilateral trade, which had shrunk by 80 to 90

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Bulgaria: A Country Study

percent in the mid-1980s. A new treaty of friendship and cooperation was prepared in the summer of 1991.

Despite the thaw, obstacles remained in Bulgarian-Turkish rap- prochement. The ill will caused by Zhivkov's shrill anti-Turkish

propaganda remained fresh in the early 1990s. Strident anti-Muslim

and anti-Turkish statements in the media by Bulgarian nationalist

factions kept tension high, and minor border incidents continued

in 1991. And Bulgarian friendship with Greece created a precari- ous balancing act that required caution toward such moves as the

Bulgarian-Turkish nonagression pact proposed by Turkey in late 1990.

The Soviet Union

In the post-Zhivkov era, the most controversial foreign policy

problem was defining Bulgaria's new relationship with its traditional

protector and best trading partner, the Soviet Union. Although

Zhivkov's relations with Gorbachev had not been as warm as those

with earlier Soviet leaders, Bulgaria remained strongly dependent on the Soviet Union economically even in the years immediately

following Zhivkov's ouster (permission for which Bulgarian Politburo members duly sought and received from Moscow). In mid1992 the 1967 Treaty for Cooperation, Security, and Friendship

with the Soviet Union was to expire.

Because the treaty called for notice of abrogation to be given a year in advance, by mid- 1991 Bulgarian national opinion was

divided over what terms should be included in the National Assembly's draft of a new treaty. Led by the BSP, one body of Bulgarian opinion advocated essentially renewing the existing treaty,

giving the Soviet Union top priority in the new foreign policy to ensure continued supply of fuels and other vital materials. A sec- ond body of opinion, led by the UDF and Podkrepa, conceded the

pragmatic necessity of continued economic relations but urged that a new treaty eliminate all subordination of Bulgarian to Soviet interests and provide complete flexibility for Bulgaria to establish commercial and diplomatic ties with the West. Amid heated public

debate, the Popov government reached agreement with the Soviet

Union on a short-term abrogation followed by accelerated joint development of a new treaty reflecting the changed positions of both

sides. The Bulgarian National Assembly was expected to pass a

bill to that effect in August 1991 (see Foreign Trade, ch. 3; see Foreign Military Relations, ch. 5). Because the two countries had no disputed territory and were on roughly parallel paths of political reform in 1991, major issues

between them were mostly economic. The primary Bulgarian

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Government and Politics

concern was to protect its newborn geopolitical independence from

any recurrence of the Warsaw Pact mentality in Moscow. Other

critical goals in 1991 were stabilizing the unpredictable supply of

Soviet oil, protecting large numbers of Bulgarian guest workers

threatened with layoff in the Komi Autonomous Soviet Socialist

Republic (Komi ASSR), and reestablishing Soviet markets for Bulgarian goods that had shrunk drastically in 1990. A new bilateral

defense agreement also was a priority in the wake of Warsaw Pact

disestablishment. In July 1991, Bulgaria set a precedent by signing a trade agreement with the Byelorussian Republic, the first inter- governmental pact made directly with one of the Soviet republics.

Western Europe and the United States

Under Zhivkov, Bulgaria's policy toward Western Europe and

the United States was determined largely by the position of the

Soviet Union. Events such as the invasions of Czechoslovakia and

Afghanistan automatically distanced Bulgaria from the West; then,

in the early 1980s Soviet efforts to split NATO by cultivating

Western Europe brought Bulgaria closer to France and the Federal Republic of Germany (West Germany)—a position that con- tinued through the 1980s. A 1988 application for membership in

the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT—see Glossary) was refused because of the Turkish assimilation program, after widespread expectations of success. Decades of complete isolation from the West left traces on Bulgarian policy even in the 1980s. In early 1989, President Francois

Mitterrand of France was the first Western head of state to visit Bulgaria since before World War II. Between 1945 and 1989, the

highest visiting United States official was an assistant secretary of

state. And in 1985 Sir Jeffrey Howe became the first British for- eign secretary to visit Bulgaria since the nineteenth century—an

indication that isolation began before the onset of communism.

The first post-Zhivkov regime recognized quite early, however,

that Cold War politics no longer could limit Bulgaria's choice of

economic or diplomatic partners. Within a few months of the Zhivkov ouster, the National Assembly Committee on Foreign Policy

had received the head of the Council of Europe and received a pledge of closer ties, and Bulgarian diplomats and businessmen

had described reform goals, priorities, and investment opportunities to a CSCE Conference on Economic Cooperation. Shortly

thereafter Prime Minister Lukanov visited the headquarters of the

European Economic Community (EEC —see Glossary) in Brussels. Lukanov signed a treaty on trade and economic cooperation

to remove all trade barriers by 1 995 and guarantee Bulgarian access

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Bulgaria: A Country Study

to EEC markets. Lukanov also gained substantial support for Bulgarian membership in the International Monetary Fund (IMF

see Glossary), the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, and GATT.

A critical stage in the new policy was Zhelev's meeting with

Western leaders in Europe and the United States in the fall of 1 990

.

Zhelev explained Bulgaria's nonaligned position and its needs to United States President George H.W. Bush and to Mitterrand,

receiving substantial pledges of aid from both leaders. Traditional

trading partner Austria also pledged substantial new investment

in the Bulgarian economy during Zhelev's tour of the West.

Bulgaria's new policy toward the West was reflected in a series

of decisions taken in 1990. Diplomatic relations were restored with

South Korea and Israel, Western allies in sensitive areas of Cold

War confrontation. An official invitation for Pope John Paul II to visit Bulgaria constituted a new level of recognition of that reli- gious leader's authority. And in early 1991, Bulgaria sent token

noncombat forces in support of the United States-led Persian Gulf

War effort. In 1991 Zhelev's cooperation with an international in- vestigation of the Markov murder was another significant gesture

to the Western world.

From the beginning, the success of Bulgaria's intense campaign

for closer relations with the West depended on continued progress

in economic and human rights reform and was measured in eco- nomic terms. As the stature of the Soviet Union dwindled steadily

in 1991, the hope of gaining full status in the European community was a powerful weapon for reformers within Bulgaria. Given

Bulgaria's strategic position and chronic instability elsewhere in

the Balkans, Western nations monitored Bulgaria carefully and re- warded its progressive steps. Nonetheless, in 1991 Bulgaria re- mained far behind Hungary, Czechoslovakia, and Poland in

receiving Western aid.

* * * Few monographs have been written on the Bulgarian government and politics of the late 1980s. Background to that period is provided by the politics sections of Robert J. Mclntyre's Bulgaria:

Politics, Economics and Society and John D. Bell's The Bulgarian Communist Partyfrom Blagoev to Zhivkov. More recent political events are reported authoritatively in numerous journal articles, including

"Long Memories and Short Fuses," by F. Stephen Larrabee; "Bulgaria: An Eastern European Revolution in Suspension," by Steven

Chiodini; "Bulgaria's Time Bind: The Search for Democracy and

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Government and Politics

a Viable Heritage" by Joel Martin Halpern and Barbara KerewskyHalpern; and "'Post-Communist' Bulgaria," by John D. Bell. Also

extremely valuable are the Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty Report on Eastern Europe, each covering a particular aspect of the current

political situation. (For further information and complete citations, see Bibliography.)

223

Chapter 5. National Security
Thracian warrior in Roman mural, Serditsa
IN 1991 BULGARIA GRAPPLED with political changes and eco- nomic difficulties that threatened its national security. The country's most intractable problems were internal crises rather than

external threats. The Warsaw Pact (see Glossary), which had guided

national security policy since 1955, became defunct as a military

organization on April 1, 1991. A concurrent shift from one-party

communist rule to multiparty politics made the future political

character and role of the Bulgarian People's Army (BPA) uncertain. Grave economic problems also portended that a smaller

proportion of national resources would be devoted to defense in

the future. The European strategic environment seemed less tense and threatening than at any time in the recent past, largely be- cause of the waning of the Cold War; however, the more immediate situation in the Balkans appeared less secure in 1991.

Neighboring countries Yugoslavia and Greece were apprehensive

that Bulgarians might renew their interest in the Greater Bulgaria

established briefly under the Treaty of San Stefano in 1878.

The Bulgarian military establishment was substantial and well

equipped considering the small size and population of the country. One expert observer described it aptly as a regional force of

significance. The data exchanged at the signing of the Treaty on

Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE—see Glossary) on November 19, 1990, revealed previously unknown details on the

command organization, structure, strength, and disposition of Bulgaria's ground and air forces. The BPA appeared to be a relatively

cohesive force without serious ethnic or other internal fragmentation. Despite the end of the Warsaw Pact, a continued military

relationship with the Soviet Union was expected, based on genuine

affinity and mutual interest between the two countries. In the late 1980s, Bulgaria imitated several major military reforms then being

introduced in the Soviet Armed Forces, which long had served as the model for developing Bulgaria's armed forces. The BPA in- stituted unilateral force reductions, restructuring, defense industry conversion, and a new openness in military affairs that imitated

Soviet glasnost (see Glossary).

In 1991 Bulgaria's uncertain internal security situation reflected

the unsettled state of politics and the economy. Increased political

freedom, economic hardship, and the inability or reluctance of the

governments that followed the regime of Todor Zhivkov (1962-89)

to use force or coercion against the population created the potential

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Bulgaria: A Country Study

for domestic unrest. These factors made possible increased reli- ance on the internal security apparatus, and ultimately the BPA,

to maintain order and even to carry out basic government functions. In the immediate post-Zhivkov years, the army was the pivotal institution protecting legitimate national security interests and

territorial integrity during the transition to democracy and the rule

of law.

Development of the Armed Forces

The ancestors of the modern Bulgarians established a respectable martial tradition during centuries of combat with the Byzantine and Ottoman empires. After Russian armies freed it from

Ottoman control in the late nineteenth century, Bulgaria became

an independent military force in the Balkans. Bulgaria's neighbors

viewed it as the major regional power with outstanding territorial ambitions; for that reason, they joined forces to offset Bulgarian

military power before 1914. Bulgaria participated actively in combat

operations as a German ally in World War I. Although again al- lied with Germany in World War II, Bulgaria did not join in German offensive operations. After World War II, Bulgaria came under

Soviet military influence and in 1955 joined the Soviet-led Warsaw Pact (see World War II, ch. 1). In that capacity, Bulgaria be- came an integral part of Soviet military and political policy toward

the southern flank of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization

(NATO—see Glossary). Although the end of superpower confrontation in Europe had loosened the bilateral military connection to the Soviet Union by 1991, extensive military ties remained.

Early Development

For several centuries after they migrated to the Balkans in the

middle of the seventh century A.D. , the Bulgars were the primary

rivals of the Byzantine Empire for control of the eastern Balkans.

In the seventh and eighth centuries, Bulgar kings established an

independent empire that inflicted several defeats on the Byzantines

in Macedonia and Thrace. King Terbelis defeated the Byzantine

army at the Battle of Anchialus in 708, drove through Thrace to the walls of Constantinople, and besieged the Byzantine capital in

712. In 717, however, Terbelis allied with the Byzantine Emperor

Leo III against the Arabs. Terbelis led the Bulgar army into Thrace,

won the Battle of Adrianople in 718, and defended Constantinople against a Muslim siege from across the Bosporus. Emperor

Constantine V reasserted Byzantine control over the Bulgars in the

mid- to late eighth century. King Kardan regained the initiative

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National Security

by the end of the century and forced Byzantium to pay tribute to the Bulgars.

The power of the First Bulgarian Empire waxed during the ninth

and early tenth centuries. The Bulgars continued their struggle with

Byzantium and encountered new foes as well. They fought the

Magyars and Pechenegs, who raided them from north of the

Danube River (see fig. 2). Beginning in 808, Tsar Krum fought

a successful war against the Byzantines, winning the Battle of

Versinikia in 813, capturing Adrianople, and advancing to the walls

of Constantinople. However, Krum's son was defeated at the Battle of Mesembria in 817. Tsar Simeon fought successful wars against

the Byzantines in the late ninth and early tenth centuries, capturing Thessaly, Macedonia, and Albania from the Byzantines, con- quering Serbia, and threatening Constantinople itself. Between 967 and 969, the Byzantines and Russians invaded and

annexed Bulgaria. Samuil, an expatriate noble, then regained control of eastern Bulgaria and Serbia by defeating the Byzantines near

Sofia in 981. Throughout the late tenth and early eleventh centuries, he fought the Byzantines in Macedonia and Thrace. In 1014,

however, the Byzantines crushed the Bulgarian army and re- occupied Bulgaria.

Bulgaria became a vassal state of the Byzantine Empire as well

as a march route and battleground for advancing Mongols, Turks,

Serbs, Magyars, and European crusaders beginning in the twelfth

century. The Bulgarians fought alongside the Serbs in the unsuccessful Battle of Kosovo Polje in 1389—a defeat that began nearly

five centuries of Ottoman domination during which tsarist Russia

represented the only hope for liberation.

From the Struggle for National Independence to World War I Uprisings against Ottoman control in 1875 and 1876 began mili- tary action that finally brought Bulgaria conditional independence

in 1878. Bulgaria was a major battleground in the Russo-Turkish

War of 1877-78. Russia fought the war as the champion of Slavs

living under the Ottoman Empire in the Balkans. Under the Treaty

of San Stefano, signed March 3, 1878, Bulgaria became an au- tonomous state under Russian protection. The same year, the European powers forced Bulgaria to sign the Treaty of Berlin,

returning substantial territory to the Ottoman Empire in the name

of regional balance. Bulgaria retained its autonomy, however.

Conflict with Balkan neighbors began when the new nation

sparked a brief war with Serbia in 1885 over control of the province

of Eastern Rumelia. Seeking compensation for Bulgaria's annexation, Serbia invaded the province and was defeated by Prince

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Bulgaria: A Country Study

Alexander, modern Bulgaria's first ruler. After inconclusive fighting, Bulgaria and Serbia agreed to the Treaty of Bucharest, which

restored prewar borders in 1886.

During the twentieth century, persistent territorial disputes and

dissatisfaction with borders determined Bulgaria's position in four wars. In 1912 Bulgaria entered the Balkan League, a military

alliance with Serbia and Greece, to eliminate the last vestiges of

Turkish rule in the Balkans and to expand its own territory in the

process. Fielding approximately 180,000 troops, Bulgaria provided

the bulk of the military personnel for operations against Turkish

forces in the First Balkan War. Bulgarian armies besieged Constantinople in November 1912, but they were driven back temporarily by the Turks. When the key city of Adrianople fell to Bulgarian and Serbian forces in March 1913, Turkey capitulated.

It surrendered its European possessions under the Treaty of London in May 1913.

A dispute over the spoils of the First Balkan War led directly

to the Second Balkan War. Bulgaria asserted that Serbia occupied more of Macedonia and Thessaloniki than it was allowed by the

prewar agreement. In June 1913, Bulgarian armies attacked Ser- bian forces in Macedonia and another army advanced into Thessaloniki. After checking this offensive, Serbian and Greek forces

pushed the Bulgarians back into Bulgaria in July. Romania then

declared war on Bulgaria and advanced unopposed toward Sofia,

while Turkey capitalized on the situation to retake Andrianople.

Bulgaria sued for peace and lost territory in Macedonia, Thrace,

and Southern Dobruja to Greece, Serbia, and Romania, respectively, in the Treaty of Bucharest (August 1913).

Bulgaria's rivalry with Serbia and Greece defined its participation in World War I . Bulgaria avoided involvement in the war until

1915 when it mobilized 1.2 million soldiers and joined the Central

Powers in attacking Serbia. Bulgaria took this action in the expectation that a victory by the Central Powers would restore Greater

Bulgaria. In October 1915, two of Bulgaria's armies drove west

into Serbia while allied Austro-Hungarian and German armies

drove south. Bulgarian forces blocked British and French troops

in Thessaloniki from linking with Serbian forces. In mid-1916 over 250,000 British, French, and Serbian troops

prepared for an offensive from Thessaloniki northwest along the

Vardar River. Although the Germans and Bulgarians preempted

the offensive and drove this force beyond the Struma River by late August, the war then settled into a long, costly stalemate along

the Vardar. Seriously weakened by a poor military supply system

and widespread unrest among the soldiers, Bulgaria collapsed and

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surrendered in 1918. The country suffered greatly during the war.

Mobilization disrupted food production, and German requisitioning

of grain and other foodstuffs taxed stored food supplies. About

100,000 Bulgarian soldiers were killed in combat, and 275,000 non- combatants died as a direct result of the war (see World War I, ch. 1). The Interwar Years and World War II The harsh terms of the Treaty of Neuilly-sur-Seine (November

1919) limited the postwar Bulgarian army to 20,000, and conscription was forbidden. Many embittered former officers became

politically active in the Military League, a formidable and well- organized opposition faction in the 1920s and 1930s. Irredentism

made Bulgaria a natural ally of Germany during the interwar years. After border skirmishes with Bulgaria in 1925 and 1931, Greece

joined Romania, Yugoslavia, and Turkey in forming the Balkan

Entente in 1934 to contain perceived Bulgarian expansionism. Bulgaria began to rearm in 1936 with German, British, and French

assistance. Meanwhile, the Military League had been influential

in staging coups in the early 1930s. In 1936, however, Tsar Boris

III (1918-43) dismantled the organization, stripping the military

of the political influence it had accumulated after World War I. After several years of hesitating between alignment with Germany or the Soviet Union, Bulgaria finally sought to satisfy ter- ritorial claims to the south and west by signing the Tripartite Pact

with the Axis powers in March 1941. But Bulgaria minimized its involvement in the war, managing to satisfy the terms of alliance

with Germany without a declaration of war on the Soviet Union.

In spite of its passive policy, Bulgaria was a vital pivot for German operations in the Balkans, North Africa, and on the eastern

front against the Soviet Union. Germany launched invasions of

Greece and Yugoslavia from Bulgaria in April 1941 , and Bulgaria

occupied parts of the territory it expected to retain after the war. German forces used the country as a rear area for transporting

troops and supplies and providing training, and as a rest and recre- ation point. Its railroads and ports were critical to the German war

effort. More than fifty German ships and submarines were berthed

in the harbor at Varna as late as the summer of 1944.

The Bulgarian Communist Party (BCP) dominated the antiGerman partisan movement that arose in 1941 . Although the move- ment had a central military commission to direct armed activities,

the partisans generally were poorly organized and armed. Their

total number never exceeded 18,000 and, unlike partisans else- where, they were more active in the cities than in the countryside.

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Bulgaria: A Country Study

The partisans received arms and supplies from the Soviet Union

and Britain. The most successful aspect of partisan activity was

pro-Soviet propaganda, demonstrations, terrorism, and sabotage

against installations in Bulgaria critical to the German war effort. Among assassination attempts against German officials and Bulgarian fascists, the assassination of Minister of War Khristo Lukov

in 1943 had the greatest impact. Harsh recriminations discouraged

such activities, however. In 1943 the partisans formed the first fighting units of the People's Revolutionary Army of Liberation

(PRAL), which eventually included brigade-sized units. Still, their

armed attacks on German forces generally ended in failure. As late as 1944, entire units were captured or killed in action.

The Soviet Union declared war on Bulgaria on September 5, 1944, as the Red Army forces of the Third Ukrainian Front under

General Fedor Tolbukhin crossed its northern border from Romania. Bulgaria changed sides on September 8 and declared war on Germany. Tolbukhin took command of the Bulgarian forces and

reorganized them. By September 17, a Bulgarian army of 200,000

troops was mobilized and attached to the Third Ukrainian Front

fighting German forces in Macedonia and Serbia. At the end of

World War II, Bulgaria again returned the Greek and Yugoslav

territory that it had occupied in 1941.

Postwar Development

The Red Army met little hostility during its occupation of Bulgaria from 1944 to 1947. At the time of invasion, the Soviet Union

did not regard Bulgaria as an enemy state, because Bulgaria had

not declared war or participated actively in the German eastern

front. According to the Yalta agreements of 1945, the Allied Control Commission for Bulgaria, assigned to administer the country

until a peace treaty was signed, was essentially an extension of the

Red Army military administration. Under pressure from Britain,

the preponderant interest of the Soviet Union in Bulgaria was recog- nized by giving it 75 percent control of the commission.

The Soviet Union immediately reorganized the Bulgarian Army

to ensure that the BCP would have a leading role. More than 40

generals and 800 officers discredited by their association with the

German Army were purged or resigned when Bulgaria switched

sides in the war. Although former Minister of War Damian Velchev returned to his post in the Fatherland Front coalition government, the BCP used the presence of Soviet occupation forces to push the old officer corps out of domestic politics. In July 1946,

control of the army shifted from the Ministry of War to the full cabinet, 2,000 allegedly reactionary officers were purged, and

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Velchev resigned in protest. The combination of events provided an opening for the BCP to establish full control over the military.

It conducted a decisive purge in October 1947. Accusing the re- maining noncommunist senior officers of plotting to overthrow the

Fatherland Front, the BCP dismissed one-third of the officer corps. After 1949 the BCP dominated the army, and party membership

was obligatory for officers on active duty.

In the first postwar years, Bulgaria closely followed the example of Soviet military development and served Soviet interests in

the Balkans. BCP leader Georgi Dimitrov exhorted Bulgarian

officers to learn from the experience, strategy, and military art of

the Soviet Union. He wanted the BPA to be exactly like the Soviet

armed forces, with common missions, organization, weapons and

equipment, and military science.

In 1946 Bulgaria participated in the initial conflict of the Cold

War by aiding communist forces in the Greek civil war. Bulgarian support, including operating bases on Bulgarian territory, made

possible communist victories near the border. As a result, Greece

charged Bulgaria with numerous violations of its northern border. In 1947 the United Nations (UN) confirmed the Greek charges

and later officially condemned Bulgaria for aiding communist guerrilla forces. In the late 1940s, the Bulgarian armed forces were composed

almost entirely of former partisans, peasants, and workers. Approximately 75 percent were members of the BCP or the Communist Youth League of Bulgaria (Komsomol). Many peasants and

workers were attracted to the military by upward mobility and pay

that was higher than in factories or farms. The armed forces were

officially named the Bulgarian People's Army (BPA) in 1952. Bulgaria joined the Warsaw Pact on May 14, 1955, and contributed

a token battalion to the Soviet-led invasion of Czechoslovakia on August 20, 1968. Bulgaria initiated a major military modernization program in the 1980s, adding its first T-72 tanks, MiG-23

fighters, Su-25 fighter-bombers, Mi-24 attack helicopters, and 130

surface-to-surface missiles to its inventory. During that period, the

education level and technical competence of the officer corps rose; by 1985 nearly 85 percent had received at least a secondary education (see Education, ch. 2). National Defense Posture

In 1991 the Warsaw Pact disbanded as a military alliance. Bulgarian commitment to the Soviet-led alliance accordingly ceased

to be the main direction of its national defense. The disintegration

of the Warsaw Pact presaged a major shift in threat perception,

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Bulgaria: A Country Study

military doctrine, and strategy. Historical, geographic, and eco- nomic factors promised to assume greater importance in shaping

Bulgaria's approach to national defense. Traditional allies and adversaries such as Germany and Turkey now exerted critical in- fluence on decisions about military requirements, doctrine, and

strategy. The country's geopolitical position in the volatile Balkans

at the crossroads of Europe and Asia was another important determinant. Economic considerations limited the development and

retention of military capabilities. In the early 1990s, Bulgarian offi- cials began to stress guaranteeing national security through politi- cal agreements with neighboring countries rather than military

force. Threat Perception

Bulgaria was the only Warsaw Pact country without a frontier

with the Soviet Union. Of the nearly 1 ,900 kilometers of land borders, 520 were with Romania, 500 with Yugoslavia, 480 with

Greece, and 380 with Turkey. With the general exception of Romania, Bulgaria had had serious past conflicts with each of these countries. Bulgaria and neighboring NATO members Greece and

Turkey had historical disputes that long predated the establishment

of their respective rival alliances after World War II. However,

unlike its former Warsaw Pact allies in Europe, Bulgaria's traditional enemies were NATO members or nonaligned nations. Relations with Greece had been friendly since 1980, based primarily on a shared antipathy toward Turkey. In 1986 Bulgaria and Greece

signed a joint declaration of friendship and cooperation.

The issue of Macedonia was a source of potential conflict between Bulgaria and its neighbors. In 1991 the prospect of civil war

in Yugoslavia raised concern that Bulgaria could reclaim Macedonia

as a step toward reestablishing the Greater Bulgaria prescribed in

the Treaty of San Stefano (see San Stefano, Berlin, and Independence, ch. 1). Bulgaria's Macedonian border had been tense since

the Second Balkan War; in 1989 the ouster of Zhivkov escalated

the risk that Macedonia would set off political or military conflict

with all of Yugoslavia or with its neighboring Republic of Serbia.

Bulgarian spokesmen denied having territorial ambitions against

Yugoslav Macedonia, but they added ambiguity by referring to

it as an open issue. Unlike the Yugoslavs, the Bulgarians did not

recognize Macedonians as an ethnic group distinct from Bulgarians.

Proximity to NATO members Greece and Turkey, both with

strong armed forces and significant military potential, was Bulgaria's primary strategic concern in the post-Warsaw Pact era. The

plan for the development of the BPA was measured against the

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military programs of those two neighbors. The BPA leadership

openly rated both their armies as superior to its own forces, stress- ing that Turkey boasted military manpower second only to the

United States among NATO countries and a population of over

100 million. In the view of the Bulgarian military establishment,

the size of the Turkish armed forces was the primary standard for determining appropriate reductions in BPA forces, as well as in strategic defense planning. Despite the relative lack of tension in

bilateral relations with Turkey and an apparent absence of hostile

intentions on its part in 1990, the treatment of ethnic Turks in Bulgaria remained an irritating and potentially explosive issue in bilateral relations. In 1987 veiled threats by Turkey to resolve the

issue by force had caused alarm in Bulgaria. The outburst of proTurkish and Bulgarian nationalist rhetoric that followed the fall of the BCP regime, which had been willing to suppress ethnic unrest by force, raised ethnic tensions in a period when central government control over society had substantially decreased (see The

Turkish Problem, ch. 4). Even in decline, the Warsaw Pact alliance remained a major fac- tor in Bulgarian threat perception and military planning. Bulgaria

continued to count on an ongoing close military relationship and

practical cooperation with the Soviet Union to balance perceived

security threats. In 1991 the Bulgarian government conducted

negotiations for a new bilateral treaty with the Soviet Union to guarantee it against external aggression. In return Bulgaria would

pledge not to join any organization, such as NATO, perceived

hostile to the Soviet Union. Whatever its relation to the Soviet

Union, by 1991 Bulgaria was entering a new, shifting local balance

of power similar to the balance that existed in the Balkans before

World War II. Doctrine and Strategy

The assigned mission of the BPA under the Warsaw Pact was

to defend the southwestern border of the alliance. In practice, this mission was considerably more oriented to offensive operations than

official pronouncements implied. Located within what the Soviet

General Staff called the Southwest Theater of Military Operations,

Bulgaria would have confronted Turkey in case of a Warsaw Pact

conflict with NATO. As indicated by several joint amphibious landing exercises undertaken with the Soviet Union, Bulgaria's principal objectives would have been to control Thrace and to help

Soviet forces seize and hold the critical straits at the Bosporus and

the Dardanelles.

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Bulgaria: A Country Study

In the new geopolitical climate of 1991, military spokespersons

emphasized different sources of military doctrine, including the constitution, resolutions passed by the National Assembly (Subranie),

the United Nations Charter, international law, and declarations

of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE

see Glossary). Military spokespersons cited active efforts to pursue mutual security and trust with Turkey and Greece as well as good relations with Yugoslavia, Romania, and other European nations. The military denied all territorial claims against neighboring countries and stressed that participation in the CSCE process

indicated its respect for the inviolability of European borders. It publicly rejected the threat or use of force against any country ex- cept in legitimate self-defense of territorial integrity, national in- dependence, and sovereignty. Arms control was an important

element of military doctrine before and after the overthrow of Zhivkov. Bulgaria had long advocated, without success, the establishment of a nuclear-free zone in the Balkans. In the mid-1980s, the

Zhivkov government arranged several unproductive meetings of

the Balkan countries on nuclear disarmament. The primary aim

of this effort was elimination of NATO nuclear weapons in Turkey. A signatory to the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty of 1968,

Bulgaria regularly pledged not to possess or produce nuclear

weapons or other weapons of mass destruction. In 1990 the country was embarrassed, however, by the revelation that it possessed

eight Soviet-made SS-23 missile launchers eliminated from the

Soviet inventory under the terms of the Treaty on the Elimination

of Intermediate- and Shorter-Range Nuclear Missiles in 1987.

Although acknowledging receipt of SS-23 missiles and launchers

in 1986, Bulgaria categorically denied having any nuclear capability associated with them. It offered to dismantle the systems in

accordance with the treaty. Similar allegations about the presence

of intermediate-range Soviet SS-20 missile launchers in Bulgaria

had appeared in the foreign press in 1984 but were never substantiated. Zhivkov called for a ban on chemical weapons in the Balkans

in 1985 at the same time as the United States accused Bulgaria

of storing chemical weapons on its territory.

The Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE)

was a contentious issue within the Warsaw Pact in 1990. The treaty

committed Bulgaria to limiting its ground and air forces to a per- centage of the Warsaw Pact's combined ceiling of 20,000 tanks,

30,000 armored combat vehicles, 20,000 artillery pieces, 6,800 combat aircraft, and 4,000 attack helicopters. However, the Warsaw

Pact divided its overall ceilings so that the Soviet Union received

most of the apportionment and the other former Warsaw Pact

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National Security

countries were limited to smaller quotas. Bulgaria's quotas were

1,475 tanks, 2,000 armored combat vehicles, 1,750 artillery pieces,

235 combat aircraft, and 67 attack helicopters. In 1990 the minister

of national defense disclosed that the Warsaw Pact debate over weapons allocation had been acrimonious because each member

had tried to maximize its quota, hence its security, before the alli- ance's military organization dissolved. In 1991 Bulgaria did not have a formal law on national defense,

and its military doctrine was still largely defined by Warsaw Pact

declarations and documents. The Warsaw Pact's Political Consultative Committee had formally adopted a defense doctrine and the

principle of reasonable sufficiency during its May 1987 meeting

in Berlin. Closely following this doctrine and the Soviet example,

Bulgaria then implemented a new national defensive doctrine calling for reasonable sufficiency. In the inexact and halting process of

quantifying this term, military leaders basically agreed on the need

to ensure national security at the lowest possible level of armaments.

But the levels required to deter potential enemies or defend the

country against them proved to be more debatable. By 1990 some

clear steps had been taken toward reducing offensive weapons

systems in favor of defensive ones (see Armed Services, this ch.).

Like professional military officers in other countries, the Bulgarian general staff viewed doctrine less from its political and diplomatic aspect than from its strictly technical military aspect. The

technical side of doctrine focused on planning for a number of likely

military contingencies and scenarios threatening national se- curity. Although Bulgaria's political stance was based on a lack of

enemies, the technical or worst-case military planning aspect of

doctrine was dictated by the country's geopolitical position, the

decline of the Warsaw Pact, and the possibility of instability in the

Balkans.

Defense Organization

Like most other national institutions, the defense establishment was in the midst of a major transition in 1991. The new political course brought changes to a military system long based on the Soviet

model. Democratic, multiparty politics brought the issue of depoliticization in the armed forces to the forefront. The state organization for national security and defense decision making, including

the high command, retained its former structure. Major changes,

including unilateral reductions and restructuring in accordance with

defensive doctrine, were carried out in the ground, air and air defense, and naval forces.

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Bulgaria: A Country Study

The Military in the Political System

In 1991 Bulgaria was in the midst of shifting from a highly politicized army to a depoliticized one. The military had always been

involved in domestic political struggles. The Military League ex- erted strong political influence through its support for the Zveno

coalition after World War I (see The Crises of the 1930s, ch. 1). In 1934 the Military League took a leading role in overthrowing

the government, and as recently as 1965 military officers were in- volved in political intrigue. The reported 1965 coup attempt led

by General Ivan Todorov-Gorunia was allegedly aimed at replacing Zhivkov and establishing a more nationalist, less pro-Soviet

leadership in the country. By 1990 communist Bulgaria had ap- parently made more progress in separating the military from politics than the Soviet Union, but perhaps less than other communist

countries of Eastern Europe.

After World War II, the BCP quickly established control over

the army. It purged old officers and made political loyalty to the

new regime a more important criterion than professional competence for the selection of new officers (see Postwar Development,

this ch.). Political officers in the ranks of the BPA ensured loyalty

by extending the party apparatus throughout the military establishment. As in the Soviet Union and other Soviet-allied countries,

party membership in the officer corps exceeded 80 percent.

Despite more than forty years of efforts to ensure communist

control of the armed forces, the BPA took no action when BCP

General Secretary Todor Zhivkov was ousted by party officials in

November 1989. According to many reports, the conspicuous lack

of military support for Zhivkov dissuaded his security forces from

intervening to prevent the overthrow. In the immediate postZhivkov era, the BPA and its leadership declared an intention to be an apolitical, stabilizing factor in the peaceful transition to democracy.

The shift to multiparty politics brought opposition pressure to depoliticize the armed forces, in part because all parties feared the

BPA could split into partisan armed factions or become the instrument of one party as it had been for the BCP. In the new climate

of open political discourse, national security and defense became

frequent topics of debate among political parties. The military

leadership, however, complained that some parties failed to show

a sufficiently responsible attitude toward these issues. In January 1990, at the direction of the reform wing of the BCP,

the State Council repealed the section of Article 1 of the constitution that had institutionalized the exclusive political role of the party

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National Security

in the armed forces. The decree replaced BCP political organs in

the army with educational work organs. The State Council followed

that action with a more specific decree ordering complete depoliticization of the armed forces. The Military Administration Department of the BCP Central Committee and the Main Political

Administration of the BPA were removed from the Ministry of National Defense and their functions curtailed. The decree effectively

eliminated control by the BCP (which in early 1990 renamed itself the Bulgarian Socialist Party, BSP) over the army by removing

cells of the party and the Komsomol from the army. In September

1990, the National Assembly approved a new law on political parties. The law depoliticized several government institutions, including the army, and required them to respond to the state rather than

the ruling party. By the end of the year, 98 percent of all soldiers

reportedly had relinquished their membership in political parties

in accordance with the law. If they refused to do so, they were dis- charged from the service. In 1991 the Ministry of National Defense

campaigned for exclusion of active-duty military personnel from

voting in elections.

Besides changing the legal framework for the relationship between the military and the political system, the new political course

in Bulgaria brought practical changes in everyday army life. The

content of military education shifted dramatically from emphasizing the defense of the communist system to the defense of the

homeland without regard to political considerations. Bulgarian

sources indicated that the adjective People's in Bulgarian People's

Army now was interpreted to mean "national' ' and not ' 'proletarian." Defense of national independence, sovereignty, and territorial integrity replaced the defense of socialism as the primary mission

of the military. Professional competence replaced political alle- giance and reliability as the most important measure of officer

qualifications. The military post of political officer was eliminated

officially, although plans called for retraining some political officers for new educational duties within the armed forces. The remainder

would have to qualify as regular line officers or leave the service.

Nevertheless, the Union of Democratic Forces (UDF) opposition

coalition accused the BSP of continued party recruitment among

cadets and newly enlisted personnel after the State Council decree on depoliticization.

Government Organization for Defense

Prior to November 1989, the chairman of the State Defense Committee was the commander in chief of the BPA, and as such made

every important decision about internal and external security. The

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Bulgaria: A Country Study

secretary general of the BCP and president of the State Council

automatically held the position of chairman of the State Defense

Committee as well. The consolidation of these three positions had

enabled a single person, Todor Zhivkov, to make political decisions on security issues and supervise their implementation within

the government apparatus, especially as they concerned the econ- omy and defense industries. In the post-Zhivkov order, the commander in chief of the armed

forces was the president of the republic, a position independent

of party affiliation. In 1990 the National Security Council was

formed as a consultative organ under the president after the State Defense Committee was abolished. The National Security Council advised the president in making decisions on a range of domestic and foreign policy issues related to national security, including

defense preparedness, organization, training, and deployment of

the armed forces, public order, and use of the internal security

forces. The National Security Council included the vice president;

the chairman of the Council of Ministers; the ministers of foreign

affairs, national defense, internal affairs, and economy and planning; and the chief of the General Staff. Decisions were implemented through the Council of Ministers, the Ministry of National

Defense, and the General Staff. The democratization of 1990 allowed the National Assembly to participate in making decisions on security issues rather than merely

rubber-stamping decisions made elsewhere. In 1990 the National

Assembly established a new legislative body, the Commission on

National Security, to provide oversight for government activities in internal and external security. The commission's role remained

largely undefined in 1991 , but its nominal function was to enforce

government compliance with the rule of law in security matters

and to protect the rights of citizens.

Despite these organizational changes, the constitutional provisions, most laws and statutes, and instructions and regulations per- taining to national security and defense adopted by the government

under the former BCP remained in effect. A complex of laws,

drafted for inclusion in the new constitution ratified by the National Assembly in 1991 , were designed to codify the many individual changes made in military practice and institutions after 1989.

During and after the ouster of Zhivkov, the prestige of the military among the people appeared to remain quite high. Despite its association with the former BCP regime, the military was credited for remaining in the barracks during the political transition.

Although some long-serving, high-ranking officers were removed

later, others remained and even advanced as a result of the ouster.

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National Security

Longtime Minister of National Defense and BCP Politburo member Army General Dobri Dzhurov was dismissed in 1990 in the

aftermath of the democratic opening. However, Colonel General

Atanas Semerdzhiev, first deputy minister of defense and chief of

the General Staff under Zhivkov, rose to the post of minister of

the interior in 1990. The retention and promotion of an officer like Semerdzhiev, formerly decorated and favored by Zhivkov himself,

indicated the value placed on the stabilizing role of the military

during this turbulent period.

High Command

The high command consisted of the Ministry of National Defense

and the General Staff. The minister of national defense was always

a professional officer bearing the rank of army general or colonel

general. In 1990, however, reformers called for a civilian defense

minister to ensure civilian control over the armed forces. The military flatly rejected such demands, insisting that the minister of national defense must be a professional officer because civilians lacked

the required expertise—despite evidence of able civilian administration of defense ministries in other countries.

The Ministry of National Defense was responsible for implementing the decisions of the National Security Council and the National

Assembly within the armed forces. The ministry recruited, equipped,

and administered the armed forces according to directives of the

executive and legislative branches of government. The ministry

linked the armed forces to the national economy for the purpose

of procuring weapons and military equipment. The Ministry of

National Defense was organized according to a Soviet model. The

first deputy minister of national defense was also the chief of the

General Staff, responsible for planning and directing the operational deployment of the armed forces and coordinating the actions

of the three armed services in peacetime and wartime. The deputy

minister's staff included a first deputy, several deputy chiefs, and

a disarmament inspectorate. All military commands reported to the General Staff. The country was divided into three military districts. Daily military administration, however, was performed at the level of military regions corresponding to the eight provinces

and the city of Sofia (see Local Government, ch. 4). Besides two

communications brigades and the usual service and support battalions, the General Staff controlled several other organizations,

including a military scientific research institute, military history

institute, military mapping and topography institutes, the Georgi

Rakovski Military Academy, the Military Medical Academy, and

the military medical infrastructure throughout the country.

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Bulgaria: A Country Study

The commanders of the ground, air, and naval forces were

deputy ministers of national defense controlling separate service

commands within the Ministry of National Defense. The service

commands were concerned primarily with training and maintaining combat readiness in their units. Other deputy ministers of national defense included the chief of weapons and military equipment,

the chief of the Material-Technical and Rear Support Command,

and the chief of civil defense. Other elements reporting to the

minister of national defense included the office of the inspector

general; the departments of personnel, military education, medical services, international relations, military counterintelligence,

military justice and procuracy, cultural institutions, and public in- formation; and the radiation and chemical detection command post.

The International Relations Department maintained contacts with

foreign military establishments and their attaches in Bulgaria. The

Cultural Institutions Department was responsible for several military museums, officers' clubs, theaters, cinema and art studios,

and the BPA performing ensemble. The Public Information Department managed the press center, military publishing house, nine

military newspapers and journals, and television and radio programs for the Ministry of National Defense.

In late 1990, the minister of national defense announced that

reductions in the armed services would affect the command ele- ments and administrative organizations within the Ministry of National Defense in proportion to reductions in operational forces. Some directorates with related functions reportedly were merged,

but the full extent of reductions in the Ministry of National Defense was not yet evident in 1991.

Armed Services

In 1991 the three armed services of the BPA were the ground,

air and air defense, and naval forces. The ground forces, or army,

clearly was the most important service. In addition, each service

had several combat arms and support branches. Some support ser- vices, such as the construction or civil defense troops, were not

subordinate to a particular armed service. In 1991 the BPA was

reducing, restructuring, and modernizing its forces. The Ministry of National Defense announced that, while the air and air

defense and naval forces would retain their basic structure, substantial changes in the ground forces were expected.

In 1991 the military had 107,000 personnel, a reduction of more

than 45,000 since 1988 (see Military Personnel, this ch.). More

than 80 percent were conscripts. In late 1990, the minister of national defense had announced plans for further reductions in 1991

,

242
Observation post in military exercises in Khaskovo District, 1985

Courtesy Sofia Press Agency

including elimination of one motorized rifle division, one tank

brigade, and one air force regiment—a total of 10,000 personnel,

200 T-62 tanks, 200 artillery pieces, and 20 MiG-21 aircraft. The

minister also announced that over 500 T-34 tanks held in storage were to be destroyed. The navy planned to decommission five older

combat ships in 1991.

At the same time, the minister of national defense stressed a need

to restructure the BPA into a more modern, professional, and better trained force. Such a force could be smaller because the new

defensive doctrine required fewer forces. Tank and mechanized in- fantry units were reduced in favor of more antitank, air defense,

and other defensive systems. The major problem for the BPA's fu- ture development was improving the quality of armaments while

reducing their quantity. However, the minister of national defense

publicly expressed concern that domestic industries could not produce

many types of modern weapons that used new technologies. In the area of personnel, the minister announced plans to modernize mili- tary training programs by updating curricula at military educational

establishments and making field training and exercises more realistic. Ground Forces Ground forces combat units included motorized rifle, tank,

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Bulgaria: A Country Study

artillery and missile, and antiaircraft troops, as well as several combat support branches. The ground forces numbered over 70,000

soldiers, the majority of whom were conscripts. As recently as 1990,

they had consisted mainly of eight motorized rifle divisions and

five tank brigades. In 1991 the active ground forces deployed four

motorized rifle divisions and two tank brigades, with four divisions

and one brigade in reserve status. In implementing the new defensive doctrine, the ground forces further reduced tanks in the re- maining motorized rifle divisions by 30 percent, converting their

tank regiments into motorized rifle regiments. Defensive weapons

in divisions were increased by adding more antitank, combat en- gineering, reconnaissance, and electronic warfare units. The at- tachment of several antiaircraft elements to the ground forces

command indicated that the command operated its own air defense

network to protect deployed ground units. The antiaircraft attachments included one air defense command post, one air defense

brigade, several antiaircraft maintenance brigades, one radiotechnical or radar battalion, and one antiaircraft artillery test range.

In all, the ground forces had over 2,400 tanks, including more

than 300 T-72, 1 ,300 T-55, and 600 older T-34 vehicles. The more

than 2,000 armored combat vehicles included nearly 150 modern

BMP armored fighting vehicles and over 600 BTR-60 and 1,100

MT-LB armored personnel carriers. The ground forces operated

2,500 large-caliber artillery systems. These included 450 85mm

D-44 and 100mm SU-100 and T-12 antitank guns; 200 122mm

BM-21 multiple rocket launchers; over 1,600 122mm and 152mm

howitzers and guns, including nearly 700 self-propelled 2S1, 500

M-30, and smaller numbers of D-20, M-1937, and M-46 towed

guns; and 350 mortars, including the self-propelled 120mm Tundzha produced in Bulgaria. The ground forces had 64 launchers

for surface-to-surface missiles. That number included modern SS-1

missiles and older, less accurate FROG-7 missiles with respective

ranges of 300 and 75 kilometers. Besides these battlefield missiles,

eight longer-range SS-23 launchers were available (see Doctrine and

Strategy, this ch.). The Soviet-made AT-3 was the main antitank

guided missile in the inventory. Air defense for the ground forces

consisted of 50 mobile SA-4, SA-6, and man-portable SA-13 tactical surface-to-air missiles and nearly 400 self-propelled and towed

100mm, 85mm, 57mm, and 23mm air defense guns.

The bulk of the ground forces were deployed along two primary

operational directions: the west-southwest, opposite Yugoslavia and

Greece, and the southeast, opposite Turkey. Stationed in Sofia,

Plovdiv, and southern Khaskovo provinces, the First Army faced

Yugoslavia and Greece with more than 600 tanks, 700 armored

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combat vehicles, and 800 large-caliber artillery weapons. The Third

Army was located primarily in Burgas and northern Khaskovo

provinces facing Turkey and had over 800 tanks, 900 armored combat vehicles, and 700 heavy artillery pieces. The active units of

the Second Army, a low-strength formation to be staffed by reserves

in wartime, were based in central Bulgaria, in Plovdiv, and northern

Khaskovo provinces. The Second Army was positioned to support

either the First Army in the west or the Third Army in the east when fully mobilized during wartime. Relatively few ground forces were deployed in the north opposite Romania or in the east along

the Black Sea coast. At nearly full strength, the First and Third Armies had two motorized rifle divisions each. Strategic reserves consisted of one independent tank brigade and one artillery, antitank, and antiaircraft

regiment each. In 1991 the Third Army opposite Turkey had a second independent tank brigade reinforced with two artillery battalions. The tank brigades each had four to six battalions and as many as 200 tanks. Support units included supply, maintenance,

and artillery-technical brigades; communications and combat en- gineering regiments; and radio relay cable, electronic warfare,

reconnaissance, artillery-reconnaissance, parachute-reconnaissance,

radio-technical, bridging, and chemical defense battalions. The ar- mies also controlled their own artillery, chemical, communications,

vehicle and armor, combat engineering, medical-sanitary, fuel, and

food depots, military hospitals, and maintenance and mobilization

bases to support their maneuver units. They had one or two territorial training centers that functioned as reserve divisions for their

respective armies. The centers were organized into reserve detachments for motorized rifle, tank, artillery, and antiaircraft troops,

and specialist training groups for artillery-technical, antitank, reconnaissance, communications, combat engineering, maintenance, and

rear support troops. Many reserve detachments were significant

forces in themselves, often as large as motorized rifle regiments

but lacking a full contingent of personnel. The low-strength Sec- ond Army itself was similar in organization and purpose to a ter- ritorial training center. It had one full-strength tank brigade, one

artillery regiment, several combat support regiments and battal- ions, several reserve detachments and groups, depots, one military hospital, and one maintenance base.

The typical motorized rifle division had four motorized rifle regiments, one artillery regiment, one antiaircraft artillery regiment, one independent tank battalion, one independent artillery battal- ion, one antitank battalion, and several machine gun-artillery battalions. Reconnaissance, communications, combat engineering,

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Bulgaria: A Country Study

maintenance, and supply battalions provided necessary combat sup- port to the division.

A typical motorized rifle regiment had three motorized rifle battalions with ninety armored combat vehicles and one tank battal- ion with thirty tanks. Its artillery battalion had two to four batteries

of nine artillery pieces. It had one antiaircraft artillery battalion, one antitank battery, and one or two machine gun-artillery batteries. Air and Air Defense Forces Air and air defense force units were rather evenly dispersed

throughout the country. They operated approximately 300 combat aircraft, including over 160 MiG-21, 70 MiG-23, 40 Su-25,

and 20 MiG-29 fighters and more than 100 L-29 and L-39 combat trainers. Two MiG fighter and three MiG interceptor regiments were operational. The air forces had two regiments of Mi-24 attack

helicopters, two regiments of Mi-17, Mi-8, and Mi-2 multipurpose

combat support helicopters, and one squadron of Mi-2 and Mi-8

transport helicopters. The air and air defense forces had over 22,000

personnel, about 75 percent of whom were conscripts.

The First Air Defense Division and Second Air Defense Division, deployed in Sofia and Burgas provinces, respectively, were composed of two interceptor regiments with eighteen aircraft each.

They operated Soviet-made MiG-21, MiG-23, and MiG-29 fighters. A third air defense division controlled the strategic air defense

network of approximately 280 Soviet-made SA-2, SA-3, SA-5,

and more modern SA-10 surface-to-air missile launchers dispersed

at about thirty sites throughout the country. In 1991 the division

probably had four regiments, each composed of several battalions.

Battalions provided central command and control for as many as ten launchers, with each launcher corresponding to a battery.

The Tenth Composite Air Corps in central Bulgaria was the largest air formation. It had more than 225 aircraft. Its principal mission was to provide air support, tactical reconnaissance, and mobility

for the ground forces. It had two fighter-bomber regiments, one

fighter regiment, one reconnaissance aircraft regiment, and four

helicopter regiments, as well as large numbers of radar, maintenance, and communications support units under its command. Its aircraft included MiG-21 and MiG- 17 fighters and MiG-23 and

Su-25 fighter-bombers, Su-22, MiG-21, and MiG-25 reconnais- sance variants, and over forty specialized Mi-24 attack helicopters

and forty Mi-2, Mi-8, and Mi-17 combat and transport helicopters.

The Higher Aviation School of the air and air defense forces com- mand also controlled two aviation training regiments and one aviation training squadron with over eighty L-29 and L-39 primary

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trainers and over eighty MiG-15, MiG-17, and MiG-21 armed

combat trainers in northern Bulgaria (see Officer Education, this

ch.). The Higher Aviation School also had a large number of logistics and other support units to train specialists for the service.

Naval Forces The navy defended approximately 350 kilometers of coastline

along the Black Sea. Its major bases were located at Varna (the

headquarters), Atiya, Sozopol, Balchik, and Burgas. Naval forces

included over twenty submarines and minor surface combatants

that could be deployed in coastal defense operations. As recently

as 1989, Bulgarian naval forces defended claims to their territorial waters in incidents with Turkish forces at sea. As in the case of

the ground forces, the Ministry of National Defense announced some unilateral naval reductions in 1990. In all, five vessels were

to be retired or sold abroad: two submarine chasers, two coastal

patrol boats, and one submarine. They were basically obsolete and

had little residual military value. This deletion was more than

balanced by the addition of three Soviet Poti-class corvettes to the

operational inventory. In 1990 the navy had about 10,000 personnel, half of them conscripts.

The navy had four components: the Black Sea Fleet, Danube

Flotilla, Coastal Defense, and a shore establishment. The Black

Sea Fleet was organized into submarine, escort ship, missile and

torpedo boat, amphibious craft, and minesweeping squadrons and

brigades. The Danube Flotilla operated patrol craft along the river- ine border with Romania. Coastal Defense included amphibious

landing and mine countermeasures forces. The shore establishment

controlled naval bases, training facilities, and naval aviation, coastal

artillery, and naval infantry units.

Bulgaria obtained its minor surface combatant crafts from the

Soviet Union. Its main forces consisted of four Pobeda-class submarines, two Druzki-class frigates, five Poti-class corvettes, six Osaclass missile patrol boats, six Shershen-class torpedo boats, and three

SO- 1 -class and seven Zhuk-class patrol craft. The navy received

its Pobeda- (formerly Romeo-) class submarines from the Soviet

Union beginning in 1972. Originally built in the 1950s, they were armed with eight 533mm torpedo tubes. The Druzki- (formerly

Riga-) class frigates were built in 1957 and 1958. They were modernized extensively during the early 1980s. They had three 100mm

guns, three 533mm torpedo tubes, and four five-tube antisubmarine

rocket launchers. The navy acquired its first three Poti-class cor- vettes from the Soviet Union in 1975 and another three in 1990.

These were lightly armed antisubmarine warfare platforms carrying

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Bulgaria: A Country Study

four 406mm torpedo tubes and two antisubmarine rocket launchers. The Osa-class missile patrol boats carried four SS-N-2 surfaceto-surface missile launchers. The Soviet Union built them in the

1960s and first transferred them to Bulgaria in the early 1970s.

The Shershen-class torpedo boats had four 533mm torpedo tubes

and were built and acquired at approximately the same time as the Osa-class boats.

The navy operated more than thirty mine-warfare counter- measures ships, including four modern Soviet-built Sonya-class

oceangoing minesweepers acquired in the early 1980s. The other

minesweepers, including the Vanya-class, Yevgenya-class, and

several miscellaneous ships, were restricted to coastal or inshore

operations. The inventory also included two Polish-built Polnocnyclass medium landing ships. These amphibious ships each could

transport and land six tanks and 150 troops. The navy had nineteen

additional Vydra-class medium landing craft, each of which could

carry 100 troops and 250 tons of equipment on their open tank

decks.

Naval aviation, coastal artillery, and naval infantry were small

support arms of the navy. Naval aviation consisted of one squadron of three armed and nine unarmed search-and-rescue and antisubmarine warfare helicopters. These Mi- 14, Mi-8, Mi-4, and Mi2

naval helicopters were obtained from the Soviet Union. Coastal

artillery had two regiments with about 150 guns of 100mm or 130mm caliber. They were organized into several battalions with

five batteries each. Coastal artillery units also operated an unknown

number of Soviet SS-C-1 and more modern SSC-3 antiship missile launchers. Their mission was to direct fire against combatants

offshore, supporting amphibious assaults on the Bulgarian coastline. The naval infantry force consisted of three companies of 100

troops each. Their small size limited them to guard duty and ground

defense of important coastal installations against commando raids

and other assault forces. Border Troops

The Border Troops were part of the BPA. Composed of 13,000

troops in sixteen light infantry regiments, they resembled military

units more than a police force. The mission was to defend the country's frontiers against illegal crossings. The Border Troops regulated the movement of people within a strip twelve kilometers wide

along the border. They cooperated with other authorities to pre- vent smuggling, although contraband control was not primarily

their responsibility (see Crime, this ch.). During wartime the Border

Troops were to coordinate their actions with the ground forces as

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a first line of national defense. The majority of the Border Troops

were deployed to guard frontiers with Greece, Turkey, and Yugoslavia, but they also defended the Romanian border. Several light

patrol boats operated along the Danube River where it separated

Bulgaria from Romania and along the Black Sea coast. Construction Troops

Between 12,000 and 15,000 conscripts traditionally served as construction troops. They had their origin in the compulsory labor

service established by the Bulgarian Agrarian National Union

(BANU) government in 1920 (see Stamboliiski and Agrarian Reform, ch. 1). Commanded by a general and organized into military units, this labor service built roads, railroads, and entire

industrial enterprises. Although service in the Construction Troops

satisfied military service requirements, these units were controlled

by the Ministry of Construction, Architecture, and Public Services,

and they received little or no military training. According to the

chairman of the Movement for Rights and Freedoms, these units

typically drafted Turks and other ethnic minorities considered unsuitable for service in combat units because of linguistic barriers or perceived political unreliability (see Turks, ch. 2; The Movement for Rights and Freedoms, ch. 4). After the fall of Zhivkov, the Construction Troops received considerable attention. It was alleged that the Construction Troops

had built over 20,000 apartments and houses for members of the

BCP elite during the last ten years of the Zhivkov regime. Highranking officers reportedly could requisition labor crews from the

Construction Troops to work on their apartments or country homes.

The Construction Troops often were reported as working in uran- ium mines, metallurgical industries, and other unsafe environments

that did not attract enough civilian workers.

In 1991 the future of the Construction Troops depended on the

status of professionalization in the armed forces. Opponents ar- gued that these units were not a necessary component of professional armed forces, and that their functions should devolve to the

civilian economy. Proponents insisted that the Construction Troops

provided a low-cost labor force for important national projects, in- cluding factories, power plants, and other capital investment

projects, as well as useful occupational training in the building trades

for a large number of conscripts. In the first half of the 1980s, a reported 1.2 billion leva (for value of the lev, see Glossary) worth

of labor came from this source for more than 700 projects. Similar

debates surrounded specially designated railroad troops and trans- portation troops.

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Bulgaria: A Country Study

Civil Defense Troops

A strong emphasis on civil defense resulted from Bulgaria's participation in the Warsaw Pact and the BCP's efforts to mobilize

the population. The civil defense program developed in the 1960s

from the recognition that nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons

delivered by long-range missiles and artillery ended the clear dis- tinction between the front lines and civilian areas. Planning for

civil defense was intended to meliorate the worst effects of weapons

of mass destruction and to ensure continuity in communications,

transportation, supply, and power generation during wartime.

The Ministry of National Defense operated the National Radiation and Chemical Defense Warning System and planned the overall direction and financing of civil defense activities. Civil defense

committees attached to people's councils at the province or municipality level implemented civil defense plans for those jurisdictions.

Civil defense organizations in manufacturing plants, enterprises,

schools, and other collectives had similar responsibilities. Staffed

with conscripts and organized into battalions, the civil defense troops

trained the civilian population in individual and collective defensive measures, including dispersal and evacuation. They maintained

firefighting, decontamination, civil engineering, salvage, rescue, and medical assistance programs and skills needed for the civil defense program. Despite these preparations for civil defense, construction of protective shelters for the population was a relatively

low priority, primarily because of economic constraints. A network

of hardened command posts for the military and civilian leadership was believed to exist. Logistics and Arms Procurement

The Material-Technical and Rear Support Command had wide

responsibility for logistical support to the BPA, ranging from routine supply operations to maintenance and arms procurement. Its base and depot network included petroleum-oil-lubricant (POL)

depots, special fuel bases, POL and special fuel equipment maintenance battalions, central supply bases, food and general supply

depots, central maintenance bases, central vehicle and armor-tank

depots, vehicle and armor-tank maintenance bases, artillery depots,

central artillery ammunition bases, and central missile maintenance

bases.

One major directorate of the Material-Technical and Rear Support Command was responsible for military repair bases and

factories. This directorate controlled general equipment repair

factories, electro-mechanical factories, vehicle repair factories, and

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an institute for research and development in maintenance of

weapons and equipment. In addition to this directorate, the com- mand ran a military technology research institute, a laser technology laboratory, an electro-mechanical training equipment factory, a central artillery-technical test range, and a billeting service. It also operated several schools for maintenance specialist training

(see Military Training, this ch.).

Despite the range of these activities, Bulgaria produced relatively

few of its own armaments and other combat equipment. Defense

production plants were located in Gabrovo, Karlovo, Kazanluk,

Plovdiv, Sofia, and Varna, but the vast majority of arms and equipment came from the Soviet Union, with smaller amounts from

Poland and Czechoslovakia. The Zhivkov regime also occasionally

purchased military equipment from at least three NATO members, including the Federal Republic of Germany (West Germany).

The exact nature and amount of weapons systems produced for domestic use remained largely unknown during that period,

however. The Tundzha mortar and a few types of armored combat vehicles were produced domestically. Bulgarian shipyards did

not produce surface combat ships or submarines.

Following the lead of the Soviet Union, Bulgaria announced a major program of defense industry conversion in 1990. The sec- tion of the Ministry of Industry, Trade, and Services responsible

for arms production was renamed the Special Production and Conversion Department to reflect conversion to civilian manufacture.

Bulgaria planned to convert an unspecified number of military

plants and to require firms producing both military and civilian

goods to double their output of the latter. By the end of 1990,

defense plants were required to produce a total of 246 million leva

worth of nonmilitary goods, increasing to 394 million leva in 19,91

and to 1,130 million leva by 1995. In this period, their production

mix was to change to 60 percent civilian and 40 percent military

goods. Fully and partially converted military enterprises would

manufacture textiles, capital equipment and machine tools, trac- tors and cultivators, durable consumer appliances, industrial and

medical lasers, and canned food. The encouragement ofjoint ventures between Bulgarian and foreign firms was another element

of the conversion program. Despite these changes in the defense

industries, the government planned to retain complete authority over military production.

Military Budget

Bulgaria traditionally spent less on defense than other Warsaw

Pact countries, but military spending was a greater burden on its

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Bulgaria: A Country Study

economy than on those of its allies. During the late 1980s, the mili- tary budget amounted to more than 10 percent of the gross national product (GNP—see Glossary) because Bulgaria had the

lowest GNP in the Warsaw Pact. Measured in terms of total government spending, the military budget typically accounted for more

than 20 percent of the national budget. In contrast, BPA leaders

complained that by 1990 defense spending had dropped to about

6 percent of state expenditures, a smaller proportion than that spent

by the governments of Greece or Turkey.

Between 1986 and 1989, the military budget increased gradually

from 1.67 to 1.8 billion leva. In January 1989, however, the State Council and the Council of Ministers reduced the appropriated

defense budget for 1989 by 12 percent to 1.6 billion leva. The an- nouncement cited restructuring in the armed forces and economic

considerations as reasons for the reduction. The Ministry of National Defense stated its intention to absorb the cut by reducing

expenditures on operations, maintenance, and procurement, which were the largest components of the military budget.

Military Personnel

Bulgaria traditionally had more troops in uniform per capita than

the other Warsaw Pact countries. At one time, it had almost as many soldiers as Romania, a country with a population three times

larger than Bulgaria's. Total personnel in the BPA were drastically

reduced from 152,000 to 107,000 between 1988 and 1991, however.

The Ministry of National Defense cut the officer corps by over 1 , 700

and general officers by 78. The military strongly opposed additional reductions on the grounds that they would seriously jeopardize

national security. Military spokesmen pointed to the 300,000- to 350,000-soldier Turkish force in eastern Thrace and western Anatolia as the key factor in determining the appropriate personnel level for the BPA. The unilateral reduction between 1988 and 1991 oc- curred against a backdrop of sharp domestic political debate over reducing the basic two-year military conscription term to eighteen

months.

Recruitment and Service Obligations

The standard two-year term of military service for most conscripts was reduced to eighteen months by the National Assembly

in 1990. At the same time, the three-year term for sailors and other

specialists was changed to two years. Bulgarian males entered the

armed forces at the age of nineteen. Although the BPA was smaller

than before, the new eighteen-month service term caused a turn- over of one-third of all conscripts every six months, making universal

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conscription of nineteen-year-old males a necessity to maintain force

levels. A population growth rate barely above zero exacerbated the

manpower problem. In 1991 the minister of national defense noted an increased incidence of potential conscripts avoiding military ser- vice. He stated that 6,000 young men over seventeen years of age were known to have departed the country illegally for this reason, and another 3,500 failed to appear before the conscription commission and were presumed to be living abroad. The existing law on the armed forces prohibited men in this age category from leaving

Bulgaria before performing their compulsory service. Although

young men enrolled in a higher school or university could defer

fulfillment of their military obligation until they had completed their

education, draft deferments for other reasons were granted infre- quently and reluctantly. In 1991 political parties debated additional adjustments in the

conscription system. The UDF and the BANU argued for a fur- ther reduction to a one-year term for most conscripts and six months

for university graduates. They also called for extending contracts

to some soldiers and noncommissioned officers (NCOs) to shift the

BPA to a more professional force. Other aspects of military ser- vice discussed by the Commission on National Security of the National Assembly in 1990 were possible voluntary service by women

and service in the national police force as an alternative to military conscription.

Supported by the BSP, the military argued that one year of mili- tary service was insufficient to provide required training for conscripts. It maintained that at any given time only 50 percent of

the army would have completed basic training and be in a state of minimum combat readiness. Furthermore, shorter service would

make the training of Bulgarian troops inferior to that of other armies

in the region. Military spokesmen argued that the country could

not afford the wages or the benefits required in a professional army, nor could it attract enough volunteers under the austere conditions

of military service throughout the country. The army viewed the

draft and mobilization as essential to ensure an adequate force in

wartime. Some military leaders charged that the UDF and the

BANU sought to reduce service terms in order to gain votes from

servicemen who would gain early release. The military opposed

alternative service on the grounds that the Construction Troops

were the existing alternative to combat service.

Military Training

Military training began with mandatory premilitary training

through the Organization for Cooperation in Defense, a mass

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Bulgaria: A Country Study

organization with more than 10,000 affiliates in schools, cooperative farms, and enterprises throughout the country. Under its auspices, reserve officers and active-duty junior officers trained

thousands of young men and women between the ages of sixteen

and eighteen in a year-round program. In classroom and field exercises, trainees learned marksmanship, radio communications,

scuba diving, and technical military specialties such as aircraft and

vehicle operations and maintenance. For the last, the Organization for Cooperation in Defense had an inventory of more than

seventy BTR-60 and MT-LB armored personnel carriers. Although the organization also sponsored sports competitions and

summer camps less directly related to military service, the main

goal of premilitary training was to reduce the time required to adapt

young inductees to military life. Military training followed the Soviet model because the Sovietmade weapons and equipment in the inventory required specialized training in operation and maintenance. Training, which also

followed Soviet tactical concepts, moved in an annual cycle under

the two-year service term. Adjustments in the training cycle were

expected to compensate for the shorter eighteen-month service term. On the other hand, in 1990 elimination of political indoctrination

requirements freed as much as 25 percent of conscript training time

for military and physical training. Immediately after induction,

conscripts began basic physical conditioning, training in handling

and maintenance of small arms, drill, and general military indoctrination. They learned a range of individual skills required in small

unit combat situations, including first aid, radiation and chemical

decontamination, and camouflage techniques. After basic training, soldiers formed crews for training on larger weapons and equipment. They participated in exercises of increasing scale until the

training cycle culminated in a large-scale combined arms maneuver held each year. In 1990 the minister of national defense called

for more realistic training, especially for combat at night and in

poor visibility conditions. Conscripts received specialist training

in a variety of fields. Separate schools trained junior specialists in

transport and rear services, tank and vehicle maintenance, POL

handling, and military music.

The majority of NCOs were new inductees selected at induction for special training at service schools. NCOs served longer than

the usual conscription period. In the early 1970s, special secondary schools were also established for NCO training. These schools were available to acceptable applicants who had completed the

eighth grade. The course of study lasted three years and graduates were obligated to serve in the armed forces for ten years.

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Military life was generally austere but not significantly differ- ent from conditions throughout the country. The greatest hardship was the requirement that conscripts serve outside their home

provinces. In 1991 increasing criticism was leveled at the negative

aspects of military service, especially the hazing of new conscripts.

The press widely reported complaints from conscripts and parents

that hazing often included intimidation and violence against young

recruits by senior soldiers. In response, junior officers were assigned

barracks duty to prevent such excesses. A general decline in military discipline also had become a problem in 1991. The press re- ported widespread cases of soldiers failing to wear proper uniforms

or to carry proper identity papers, increased rates of absence without

leave, and black market activities by soldiers. Misappropriation

of money and property, theft of weapons and ammunition, and

violent assault and murder were cited as increasingly common oc- currences. The Plovdiv garrison alone reported 600 violations of

military conduct rules during the last six months of 1990. Burgas,

Stara Zagora, and other garrisons in southeastern Bulgaria were

cited as particular problem areas. A spokesperson for the Ministry of National Defense voiced concern that the process of democratization had the unintended side effect of undermining order

in the ranks of the BPA. The spokesperson accused the media and

political parties of encouraging disciplinary violations and disobedience among conscripts without regard to the need to maintain

the integrity and capabilities of the BPA. On the other hand, the

military leadership tended to label all agitation for better living conditions as simply a failure of discipline.

Officer Education

The level of education of Bulgarian officers rose in the 1970s

and 1980s. In the early 1970s, only 40 percent had degrees from

higher military or civilian schools, but this figure rose to nearly

two-thirds of the entire officer corps by 1980. Cadet programs in several higher military schools provided officers for the armed forces. These programs were equivalent to a civilian university curriculum. Applicants were required to have a secondary school education and to be single, in excellent physical condition, and under

twenty-four years of age. Many applicants had completed their compulsory military service as conscripts and had decided to pursue

a professional military career. The ground forces had three higher

military schools for training combined arms officers, artillery

officers, and reserve officers. The air and air defense forces had

one Higher Aviation School that provided firsthand experience with

aircraft besides its classroom training. The Higher Aviation School

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Bulgaria: A Country Study

had three flight training regiments with supporting aviation engineering, communications, and radio-technical (radar) support battalions

(see Armed Services, this ch.). The naval forces had a Higher Naval

School to train officers for the service. Cadets in training to be line

officers had four-year courses of study; those preparing for technical specialties such as artillery, aviation, and communications had

five-year courses of study. Cadets received their commissions immediately after they graduated.

Selected officers could obtain advanced academic training. Midgrade officers could apply for acceptance in the Georgi Rakovski

Military Academy in Sofia. Graduation from the academy, which was similar to a Western war college or command and staff course, was a prerequisite for advancement into the senior officer ranks.

Approximately one-third of all career officers completed that course. Most active-duty officers studied in one of several Soviet military

academies. Completion of a two-year program in the Soviet Union

and fluency in Russian were requirements for field-grade officers. In 1991 the minister of national defense raised the possibility of

sending officers to study in Western military academies, but he

cited the language barrier and the country's financial difficulties as obstacles. The General Staff had several other specialized aca- demic institutes for the study of military science and history (see

High Command, this ch.). It also operated the Military Medical

Academy, which was established as a training and research center

in the military aspects of the medical sciences, to upgrade training

of military physicians and to provide medical services for the armed

forces. A professional military career was considered relatively prestigious in Bulgaria, although prestige began to wane in the postZhivkov era. Depending on whether nonmonetary benefits like housing and food were considered, an officer's pay was generally

25 to 50 percent higher than that offered in civilian positions with

comparable responsibilities. Only in 1990 did the defense establishment begin to address problems familiar to military officers in

all countries, however. For example, spouses frequently were unable to find work in the vicinity of military posts. In 1991 a special

cash allowance to military families was being considered to cover

these instances. Day-care and school accommodations often were

scarce, and adequate housing unavailable. The quasi-official Georgi

Rakovski Officer Legion was established in 1990 to promote a broad

range of professional interests and address issues such as living stan- dards within the Ministry of National Defense.

In the early 1990s, tenure became a vital concern to officers. In 1991 the minister of national defense announced that reductions

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in the armed forces would reduce the officer corps by nearly 15

percent. A military affiliate of the Podkrepa labor federation was

founded in 1991 by a group ofjunior officers and NCOs (see Trade

Unions, ch. 4). As an independent organization, it was seen as a more formidable adversary to the Ministry of National Defense

than the Georgi Rakovski Officer Legion. Some of the Podkrepa

affiliate's founders were dismissed from the service, apparently in

retaliation for their activities. Reserves and Mobilization

In 1991 Bulgaria had a force of approximately 500,000 in reserve

for service in the event of mobilization. This figure included over 400,000 in the ground forces, nearly 50,000 in the air and air

defense forces, and smaller numbers in the naval forces. Individuals were counted in the active reserves for the first five years after their release from military service. Their reserve obligation con- tinued until age fifty for former conscripts and until age sixty for

officers. The demand for labor in the civilian economy and a lack

of training put a practical limit on the effectiveness of the reserves. Soldiers discharged in the latest five-year period represented the

largest contingent in the reserves, and they could be mobilized after a short period of refresher training and physical conditioning. The

deactivation of four motorized rifle divisions and increased emphasis on territorial training centers indicated that reserves could become

a more important part of the force structure. Ranks, Uniforms, and Insignia

The ground forces and air and air defense forces used the same

system of ranks. The air and air defense forces and naval forces

lacked an equivalent to the four-star army general rank in the

ground forces. Below army general, there were three general- grade,

three field- grade, and four company-grade officer ranks. In descending order, the ranks were colonel general, lieutenant general, major

general, colonel, lieutenant colonel, major, captain, senior lieu- tenant, lieutenant, and junior lieutenant. Naval officer ranks in- cluded three admiral, four captain, and three lieutenant ranks. The

ground forces and air and air defense forces had six enlisted grades,

four sergeant and two private. The naval forces had equivalent petty

officer and seaman grades.

Officers wore a service uniform consisting of a tailored blouse

with patch pockets and trousers that tucked into high boots. A Sam

Browne belt and sidearms were optional. The ground forces wore

stripes and piping on caps and rank insignia that varied in color

according to the branch of service (motorized rifle, tank, artillery,

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Bulgaria: A Country Study

and others). Enlisted uniforms were similar in design but had less ornate trim. The air and air defense forces and naval forces had

the same uniforms but could be distinguished by blue stripes and

piping for the former and traditional naval blues and whites for the latter. Rank insignia on uniforms consisted of stars or stripes on shoulder

boards. Officer ranks were identified by varying numbers of stars and increasingly ornate shoulder boards with higher ranks. Those

of company-grade officers were relatively plain: those of general

officers were very ornate. Enlisted grades were denoted by increasing numbers of stripes. Privates and seamen wore no stripes and

plain shoulder boards. The number and width of stripes increased

with promotion to higher grades (see fig. 13: fig. 14: fig. 15).

Foreign Military Relations

For most of the postwar era. Bulgaria's strictly defined relations

with the Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pact limited its relations

with the military establishments of other countries. In the 1970s

and 1980s. Bulgaria established military contacts with a few developing countries in the Middle East and Africa because of their

relations with the Soviet Union. The collapse of the Warsaw Pact

raised a question about Bulgaria's future external military ties. Options included continuing a bilateral relationship with the Soviet

Union, establishing a multilateral security arrangement with neighboring Balkan countries or former Warsaw Pact allies in Eastern

Europe, mounting an effort to join NATO, or withholding military commitments to other countries.

The Warsaw Pact

Geographically isolated from the strategically more important

northern-tier countries of the alliance. Bulgaria participated in a few joint exercises of the Warsaw Pact along the central front opposite NATO in the German Democratic Republic (East Germanv) and Czechoslovakia. Participation in that front usually was

limited to small contingents. Small-scale maneuvers or command

and staff exercises were held in Bulgaria in 1964 and 1972. Shield-82 was the first major Warsaw Pact exercise m Bulgaria. That exercise involved 60.000 allied troops and included units from the

northern-tier Warsaw Pact countries for the first time. The majority of participants were Soviet soldiers, however. The use of air or

sea transportation instead of ground transportation across Romama. which allowed no foreign troops on its territory, restricted participation by the northern-tier Warsaw Pact countries. Part of the

rationale for the Yarna-Odessa ferry completed in the late 1970s

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was to bypass this obstacle and provide direct Soviet-Bulgarian

transport of equipment and troops. The Warsaw Pact conducted

a major command and staff exercise for its Southwestern Theater

of Military Operations in Bulgaria in March 1984. Union-84 in- cluded general staff elements from the Soviet Union, Hungary,

Romania, and Bulgaria in simulated coordination of their respective ground and naval forces. Military Cooperation and Exchanges

Bulgaria had fewer military contacts with developing countries

than did its Warsaw Pact allies, instead stressing economic, agricultural, and technological exchanges. Military cooperation with developing countries occurred primarily as part of assistance programs

to Soviet allies rather than as an independent policy.

Beginning in the late 1970s, Bulgaria developed military rela- tions with several key countries in the Middle East and Africa. By

the mid-1980s, friendship treaties were in effect with Angola, Ethiopia, Libya, Mozambique, and Syria—all of which were receiving

substantial military aid from the Soviet Union. These treaties mentioned unspecified military cooperation between the two signatories. In the 1980s, the Bulgarian minister of national defense paid

official visits and received military delegations of developing countries without further elaboration of those terms. During this period, Bulgaria also had limited military relations with several

developing countries that were not Soviet client states, including

India, Nigeria, and Zambia.

More recently, Bulgaria extended its policy of military cooperation to immediate neighbors. In 1987 and 1988, Bulgaria and

Greece exchanged visits by the chiefs of their respective general

staffs. In 1990 the National Assembly ordered several units of special

troops deployed to the Persian Gulf. Over 270 troops, consisting

of a medical team, chemical defense company, and rear services

unit, supported the United States-led coalition that forced the Iraqi

army to withdraw from Kuwait in February 1991. In November

1990, the Bulgarian General Staff sent a delegation to Turkey, signaling a decisive warming of relations with that traditional enemy.

In 1991 a Bulgarian-Turkish nonaggression pact was discussed,

but Bulgaria feared that a bilateral treaty would damage its close relations with Greece.

Arms Sales

During the 1980s, Bulgaria annually exported an estimated

US$250 to US$500 million worth of arms and military equipment.

On one occasion, Zhivkov personally boasted of having arms supply

259
Bulgaria: A Country Study
National Security
Bulgaria: A Country Study

relationships with thirty-six different countries. The Kintex for- eign trade organization had responsibility for managing arms sales abroad. Beginning in the early 1960s, Bulgaria reportedly used its merchant ship fleet to deliver arms to socialist-oriented forces fighting civil wars in Algeria, Angola, Guinea-Bissau, and Mozambique

and to leftist terrorist groups in Italy, Turkey, and the Middle East. Kintex allegedly was willing to accept narcotics from Turkish ter- rorists and other insurgent groups as payment for arms, a charge

Bulgarian officials denied. A captured leader of the Italian Red

Brigades asserted that Bulgaria was willing to provide weapons to

his group during the early 1980s. One of Bulgaria's more infamous

sales transferred sixty Soviet tanks to Nicaragua and trained seventy

Nicaraguan pilots in 1983 and 1984, at the height of the Sandinista

government's war against anticommunist rebels in that country.

Political change removed Kintex and its activities from the

category of state secrets. In 1990 the trade organization revealed

that it maintained contacts in fifty countries and sold them mainly

small arms, ammunition, and tanks and combat aircraft retired

from service with the BPA. The democratization of post-Zhivkov

Bulgaria reportedly had the same downsizing effect on Kintex as

it had on other defense-related enterprises (see Logistics and Arms

Procurement, this ch.). According to one source, arms exports to the Soviet Union declined from billions to several hundred million leva between the late 1980s and the early 1990s. Plans were announced to continue Bulgaria's arms sales under stricter legislative scrutiny and government control in the 1990s.

Law and Order

The BCP gained control of the Ministry of Justice and Ministry of Internal Affairs in the Fatherland Front coalition after the

overthrow of the wartime government on September 9, 1944. The

party used these posts to increase its political power and ultimately

to push all noncommunists out of the cabinet. In the subsequent

reorganization of the national police force, party loyalists replaced

officers suspected of having cooperated with the Gestapo. BCP

cadres held every important national, regional, and municipal position in the new People's Militia that replaced the prewar local police force. The BCP also replaced the prewar court system with

People's Courts, in which party members served as judges and

jurors. With some modifications, the internal security and justice

systems established in the mid- 1940s remained in place for the next

forty years, bolstering one-party rule. The fall of Zhivkov in November 1989 and the end of the communist monopoly on political power brought overt pressure for

262
National Security

democratic reform of the justice system. In 1991 some improvements were evident, but other problems persisted. The Ministry

of Internal Affairs retained its broad responsibility for maintaining law and order, law enforcement, internal security, and foreign

intelligence activities. Before 1989 it had been more powerful and

important than the judicial system it was supposed to serve; in 1991

many still considered the ministry a reactionary and sinister force

because of past involvement in repressive activities and indications

of continued party influence within its ranks. However, a new union

of its employees called for significant reforms, including the

depoliticization and professionalization of its work force. Immediately after the Zhivkov ouster, substantial public pressure called

for depoliticizing the ministry, which one high official described

as the "armed detachment of the party." Early in 1990, a reor- ganization plan proposed drastic cuts in budgeting and personnel

and a complete revision of the ministry's functions.

Bulgaria lost social stability between 1989 and 1991. Increased

social tension, crime, violence, and civil disorder were the unintended

consequences of greater freedom. A crisis of law enforcement fol- lowed in the wake of political relaxation and democratization. The

police seemed unsure whether to enforce the laws of the legal sys- tem of the discredited Zhivkov regime. This uncertainty was reflected when the People's Militia, formerly an efficient and feared instrument of the communist regime, took no action to stop vandals and

arsonists who attacked and burned the BSP headquarters in August 1990.

Crime

More than 700,000 crimes were reported in Bulgaria between 1970

and 1990. The People's Militia reported an annual rate of 570 crimes

per 100,000 people in 1989. By 1989, homicides had increased by

30 percent, burglaries by nearly 40 percent, and rapes by 45 per- cent over the rates in the mid-1980s. In 1990, the incidence of crime

again increased sharply. Compared with the 15,000 crimes committed during 1989, the People's Militia received reports of more

than 4,600 crimes in Sofia alone during the first six months of 1990.

Approximately 70 percent of these crimes were committed by repeat

offenders, and a very high percentage were petty crimes against

property. Organized crime was increasingly evident; more than ten criminal organizations reportedly operated in Sofia. They were in- volved in black-market activities and were reputed to have connections to organized crime in other countries. In an effort to curb another aspect of the crime problem, the National Assembly appealed in 1990 for citizens to surrender their

263
Bulgaria: A Country Study

264
National Security

unregistered firearms and ammunition. The People's Militia re- ported that 145 crimes were committed with firearms between 1985

and 1989 and that in that period 60 people were killed and more

than 120 people were wounded by illegal firearms. In 1989 authorities seized nearly 800 illegal firearms, and 2,500 firearms were sur- rendered voluntarily. That year approximately 85,000 firearms had

been registered in the country. In 1990 the government revoked

a law allowing party members and government officials to carry

weapons.

Smuggling of drugs, arms, and other contraband was a persis- tent problem during and after the Zhivkov regime. Allegations of

official involvement in smuggling appeared frequently in the for- eign press (see Arms Sales, this ch.). Government spokespersons

denied these charges and routinely asserted that the geographical

situation of Bulgaria at the crossroads of Europe and Asia made

it a natural route for illegal trade. They pointed out instances in

which customs officials arrested foreigners, particularly Turks and

Yugoslavs, passing through Bulgaria with illegal narcotics bound

for Europe. The press noted cooperation between customs authorities and the UN Commission for Narcotics Control in efforts to curtail international drug trafficking. The UN supported these ef- forts by funding construction of modern border checkpoints in Bulgaria. The International Criminal Police Organization (Interpol)

also certified that Bulgaria had a good record in international law

enforcement. In Bulgaria the Directorate of Customs and Customs

Control of the Ministry of Finance was responsible for preventing

drug trafficking; however, the People's Militia and Border Troops

also were active in the counternarcotics effort. The Judicial System

In 1991 the court system operated basically as it had before 1989.

The administration ofjustice was based on the penal code of 1968

and several subsequent amendments to it, and on the constitution

of 1971. In general, the courts had little independence and the

Ministry of Justice had few powers under the former regime. In 1991 , however, the National Assembly was considering draft laws on penal procedure, punishment, courts, amnesty, state secrets,

and travel abroad. It sought to guarantee accused persons access

to defense counsel during each phase of the legal process, to eliminate detention on suspicion, and to ensure that three judges and

four lay jurors, called assessors, would preside over trials involving particularly grievous crimes in which the death penalty would

be a possible sentence.

265
Bulgaria: A Country Study

The court system consisted of municipal, provincial, and military courts; the Supreme Court; and public prosecutors at cor- responding levels. The National Assembly elected the judges of the

Supreme Court, its president, and the chief prosecutor to five-year terms. The chief prosecutor selected and supervised prosecutors

to serve at the municipal and province levels and enforced compli- ance with legal standards by the government, its officials, and all citizens, prosecuting cases involving major crimes detrimental to the national interests or economy of Bulgaria. Judges at lower levels were elected to five-year terms by their respective constituencies. Conciliation committees in enterprises or municipal courts

ruled on labor disputes. The arbitration court adjudicated civil cases and disputes between enterprises.

Under the penal code inherited from the Zhivkov era, crimes

against the socialist economy or socialist property generally were

punished more severely than crimes against persons. Major economic

crimes, misappropriation, and serious malfeasance were punished

rigorously. Directors and managers could be held criminally liable for the shortcomings of their enterprises. Six-year prison terms were

levied for crimes such as conducting private economic activity while

representing a state enterprise and receiving economic benefits for work or services not rendered. Illegally crossing national borders was punishable by a fine of 3,000 leva and a five-year prison term,

with heavier penalties for recidivists. In the reform period, an in- creasing number of minor offenses were changed to receive administrative punishments such as fines up to 300 leva. These administrative

proceedings represented rather arbitrary justice because the accused

did not have the right to trial or legal counsel. The administrative

proceedings were an expedient designed to alleviate a tremendous

backlog of minor cases. Beginning in 1990, the dismantling of the

state enterprise system called for shifting the emphasis of the criminal code from protection of state property to protection of the in- dividual. This shift was attempted in the new constitution ratified by the National Assembly in July 1991. Independence of the judicial system, needed to standardize and clarify the administration

ofjustice, received little attention in initial rounds of reform, however

(see The Judiciary, ch. 4). The Ministry of Internal Affairs

Under Zhivkov the Ministry of Internal Affairs had been charged

with all aspects of internal and external security in peacetime. Given

this assignment, the forces under the ministry had vast jurisdiction over society and were a feared and hated part of the communist

government. For that reason, reorganization of internal security and

intelligence operations was one of the first goals of the post-Zhivkov

266
Troops disembarking from armored personnel carrier during military

exercises in Khaskovo District, 1985

Courtesy Sofia Press Agency

regimes. The overthrow of Zhivkov revealed the activities of Department Six, the "thought police" division of State Security that had

been in charge of monitoring the activity of dissidents. Liquidation of that department was announced within a month of Zhivkov' s ouster; it also was blamed for the assaults on demonstrators

that had received world publicity at the time of the 1989 ecological

conference in Sofia (see The Ferment of 1988-90, ch. 4). The UDF

and other political organizations called for a complete review of

past investigations to identify violations of civil rights by the ministry, review accusations of physical abuse during detention, improve

prison conditions, and overturn sentences applied after improper

investigation. The remaining prestige of the ministry was demonstrated in December 1990, however, when it and the defense ministry were the posts most hotly contested between the BSP and the

UDF in formation of the first multiparty cabinet. At that time, a civilian became head of the Ministry of Internal Affairs for the

first time since 1944.

The Ministry of Internal Affairs controlled the People's Militia

(police) and the special militarized Internal Security Troops known

as the Red Berets. In response to public demands for reform, a new Independent Trade Union Organization of Militia Employees

267
Bulgaria: A Country Study

set forth reforms to improve the organization's public relations,

which remained very poor in 1990. Declaring that membership in a party was incompatible with nonpartisan law enforcement, the

union called for the depoliticization and professionalization of the

militia through training programs, legal definition of its authority, and visible separation from influence by the BSP, with which

the public still linked the militia. The force also sought to change

its name from "militia" to "police." The Commission on National

Security of the National Assembly supported this proposal, and

the Ministry of Internal Affairs itself drafted a new law on the People's Militia for consideration by the National Assembly.

The People's Militia controlled several subordinate organizations,

including the Territorial Militia, Road Militia, Commercial Militia,

Central Investigations Department, Training Department, and Administration Department. The Territorial Militia provided law en- forcement at the local level. Directorates for the Territorial Militia

in each province of the country reported to the People's Militia

at the national level. The Road Militia acted as a traffic enforcement authority similar to a highway patrol or state police force. The Commercial Militia investigated economic crimes, fraud, and

thefts. The Training Department supervised the training of per- sonnel for the People's Militia. It operated a special secondary school

to train sergeants and a national academy to train officers. Candidates studied law codes, criminology, criminal procedure, and for- eign languages.

The Red Berets were also part of the Ministry for Internal Security. They were a militarized, light infantry force responsible for

preventing riots and other civil disturbances. Their 15,000 personnel were organized into fifteen regiments; they operated over

100 BTR-60 armored personnel carriers equipped for riot control.

Together with the People's Militia and the secret police, the Red

Berets were involved in the infamous Bulgarization campaign during 1984 and 1985 (see Bulgaria in the 1980s, ch. 1; The Turkish

Problem, ch. 4). They were deployed in November 1990 to maintain order in Sofia during the general strike that toppled the BSP

government.

The Penal System

Until 1990 the Ministry of Internal Affairs operated the penal

system through its Central Prison Institutions Department and its Prison Service. The latter organization trained and administered

prison guards. In 1990 the system included thirteen prisons and

twenty-six minimum-security facilities housing 6,600 prisoners.

268
Military personnel used in crowd control during Union of

Democratic Forces rally, Sofia 1990

Courtesy Charles Sudetic

Major prisons were located in Bobov Dol, Pazardzhik, Plovdiv,

Sofia, Stara Zagora, Varna, and Vratsa. In 1990 authorities re- ported that the total prison population had declined by 10,000 as a result of amnesties granted to political prisoners during the previ- ous three years. The remaining prison population included a high

percentage of repeat offenders and prisoners convicted of serious

crimes. The institution at Pazardzhik reported more than 560 in- mates, including more than 50 imprisoned for murder, 60 for rape, 140 for other crimes against persons, and the balance for crimes

against property. Offenders guilty of less serious crimes served time

in minimum-security facilities, including open and semi-open labor

camps. Prison strikes and demonstrations began with the Zhivkov

ouster, continuing and escalating through the first half of 1990.

Sparked by the release of large numbers of political prisoners, massive strikes elsewhere, and the suddenly volatile sociopolitical cli- mate, the strikes became violent, and several inmates reportedly

immolated themselves to protest prison conditions. Red Berets were

called upon to reinforce Prison Service guards. By 1991 Bulgaria

had already implemented one stage of prison reform to improve

its international human rights image: prisons were put under the

Ministry of Justice instead of the Ministry of Internal Security.

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Bulgaria: A Country Study

Security and Intelligence Services

In 1990 the Bulgarian state security system was substantially

revamped in response to opposition pressure to improve the sinister,

oppressive reputation gained by agencies of the Ministry of Inter- nal Affairs during the Zhivkov era. After encountering strong

resistance from party functionaries accustomed to using their positions for personal gain, the realignment used the American security

system as a model to create three services under a streamlined

Ministry of Internal Affairs. The National Security Service (before mid- 1991 called the National Service for Defense of the Constitution) was given responsibility for identifying and countering

foreign intelligence, subversive, or terrorist activities affecting the

security, territorial integrity, or sovereignty of the country. It had

authority for domestic law enforcement in cases involving international criminal activity, organized crime, smuggling, political

corruption, and illegal fascist or nationalist organizations. The new

philosophy announced for conduct of these activities included independence from all political parties, oversight by the Commission

on National Security of the National Assembly, and recruitment

according to professional rather than political qualification. In 1990

the service was given the important new role of preventing violence during elections.

Unlike the catchall National Security Service, the other two in- telligence agencies had very specific roles. The National Protection Service was formed from the Department of Security and

Protection, which Zhivkov had turned into a massive organization

with unspecified functions ranging from personal protection to sup- plying imported cars to high party officials. The new protection

service was much smaller and was confined to physical protection

of government officials and foreign dignitaries.

The third security agency, the National Intelligence Service, was

responsible for counterespionage and monitoring activities in neighboring countries, roles filled by the State Security (Durzhavna

sigurnost, DS) prior to 1990. The National Intelligence Service

announced a personnel cut of 20 percent in 1991, but even in the

new atmosphere of disclosure little else was reported about its activity or staffing. After the collapse of the Warsaw Pact, the Bulgarian counterintelligence effort continued to be directed against

the NATO countries adjacent to Bulgaria; counterintelligence

against former Warsaw Pact allies remained forbidden under a mutual cooperation agreement. The work of the National Intelligence

Service was supplemented by the Military Counterintelligence

Service, which was moved from DS jurisdiction to the Ministry

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National Security

of National Defense in 1990. The military service reported to the

General Staff. According to its chief, military intelligence was

responsible for identifying and countering subversive actions, in- cluding terrorism, sabotage, and espionage. Besides foreign intel- ligence services, the activities of military intelligence were directed

against domestic political extremism and crime.

After reorganization of the DS agencies, substantial public skepticism remained about the role of the secret services in monitoring

Bulgarian society. Some Department Six agents remained active,

and in 1991 the existence of still undisclosed Department Six files fueled much media speculation. Revelations that the KGB had over- seen DS activity under Zhivkov brought speculation that KGB

agents might still be active in Bulgaria after the Warsaw Pact ended.

The Ministry of Internal Affairs claimed that only two agents re- mained in 1991, attached to the Soviet Embassy.

Terrorist and Espionage Activities

Bulgaria's involvement in international terrorism began in the

early twentieth century when it provided sanctuary and a base of

operations to the Internal Macedonian Revolutionary Organization (IMRO) for terrorist activities against Yugoslavia and Greece.

In the 1920s and 1930s, IMRO became a virtual state within a

state in southwestern Bulgaria, also known as Pirin Macedonia.

From the beginning of the first communist regime, the State Security service was involved in conventional intelligence collection, ille- gal technology transfer, and covert actions abroad. The more recent notoriety of the State Security began in 1978 when it was accused

of murdering prominent emigre Georgi Markov in London. Once

a protege of Zhivkov, Markov had fled Bulgaria in 1969 and was

frequently critical of his former mentor in Bulgarian language

broadcasts for the British Broadcasting Corporation. He was

stabbed with a poison-tipped umbrella in London, assumedly by

a Bulgarian agent. During the same period, at least two similar

assassination attempts were made on emigres, and a number of

Bulgarian dissidents received threatening letters. In 1991 President

Zheliu Zhelev agreed to open a full investigation of the Markov

murder, using State Security files. Other incidents of State Security activity abroad received international attention. The Bulgarian Embassy in Egypt was closed

in 1978 after authorities found evidence of a plot to incite the Egyptian population to overthrow President Anwar al Sadat. In the

1980s, Bulgaria engaged in retaliatory expulsions of Italian and

Turkish diplomats on charges of espionage at a time when rela- tions with both countries were strained. The most infamous incident

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Bulgaria: A Country Study

was the State Security's alleged involvement in the attempted as- sassination of Pope John Paul II in 1981 . In that case, the attacker, a Turkish radical, claimed that the Bulgarian and Soviet intelligence

agencies had masterminded his plan in order to eliminate the Polish pope's political influence in Eastern Europe. Three Bulgarians

identified as coconspirators were acquitted in 1986, but the inci- dent caused the United States Department of State to place Bulgaria on its list of countries sponsoring terrorism.

A leader of the Red Brigades, an Italian terrorist group that kidnapped a U.S. Army general in 1981, later implicated Bulgaria in the kidnap plot. The terrorist asserted that the aim of Bulgarian in- telligence was to destabilize Italy and gain information about NATO.

The terrorists were ostensibly offered training, arms, and logistical

assistance in this operation. A Bulgarian diplomat was expelled from

Japan for spying on the Japanese biotechnology and genetic engineering industry in 1983. In 1990 the UDF asserted that it possessed

documents detailing the connections between the ousted Zhivkov

regime and international terrorists as well as the operation of ter- rorist training centers in Bulgaria. In 1991 the government of Prime

Minister Dimitur Popov pledged to disclose additional information on intelligence activities under Zhivkov.

During the Turkish assimilation campaign of 1984-85, the DS,

People's Militia, Red Berets, and the army were reported as using

violence against ethnic Turks who resisted adopting Bulgarian names

in place of their Turkish ones. As many as several hundred ethnic

Turks may have been killed by secret police during this campaign.

Additional hundreds of Turks were forcibly resettled, arrested, or imprisoned for refusing to cooperate with the assimilation measures. Bulgarian authorities blamed ethnic Turks for a bombing campaign

in which thirty Bulgarians were killed in public places in 1984 and

1985. Although guilt was never established, the terrorist acts aroused

ethnic feeling that supported the Bulgarization campaign. As the

1990s began, the Bulgarian civilian government had asserted control over all internal security agencies, inspiring the hope that a more

open society would result.

* * *

English-language sources on Bulgarian national security, the

armed forces, and law and order are relatively few. Stephen Ashley's

1 989 article in The Warsaw Pact and the Balkans, edited by Jonathan

Eyal, is the best treatment of the BPA and Bulgarian security. F. Stephen Larrabee's article "Long Memories and Short Fuses" sets a context for understanding the security environment in which the

272
National Security

country found itself as the Warsaw Pact disbanded and traditional

conflicts reemerged in the Balkans. A 1982 book by Ivan Volgyes,

The Political Reliability of the Warsaw Pact Armies, remains a good over- view of BPA force structure and personnel. Michael M. Boll's The

Soviet-Bulgarian Alliance on Bulgarian security policies is useful but

dated. Official Bulgarian data supplied for the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe and The Military Balance provide

detail on the organization, structure, strength, and disposition of

ground forces and air and air defense forces. Milan Vego covers

the naval forces in "Special Focus: The Bulgarian Navy" in the

U. S. Naval Institute Proceedings. Given increasingly open coverage

of national security issues in primary sources, translations of the

Bulgarian press by the Foreign Broadcast Information Service and

Joint Publications Research Service provide information on current developments. (For further information and complete citations, see Bibliography.)

273

Appendix

Table

1 Metric Conversion Coefficients and Factors

2 Area and Estimated Population of Provinces, 1987

3 Population of the Largest Cities, 1987

4 Urban Growth, Selected Years, 1946-87

5 Birth Rates and Death Rates, Selected Years, 1946-87

6 Major Ethnic Groups, 1956 and 1965

7 Protestant Denominations, 1975

8 Employees in the State Economy by Sector, 1985, 1986, and

1987

9 Population Distribution as Related to Working Age, Selected

Years, 1956-87

10 Number of Schools, Teachers, and Students by Kind of School,

Selected Years, 1951-88

1 1 Investment Apportionment in the State Economy, Selected

Years, 1949-88

12 Average Annual Growth Rate of Net Material Product by

Five-Year Plan, 1949-88

13 Government Budget, Selected Years, 1980-90

14 Ownership of Selected Consumer Products, 1980, 1983, and

1987

15 Conversion Values of the Lev to Major World Currencies,

1991

16 Distribution of Imports by Country, Selected Years, 1950-88

17 Distribution of Exports by Country, Selected Years, 1950-88

18 Distribution of Major Imports by Commodity, Selected Years,

1980-88

19 Distribution of Major Exports by Commodity, Selected Years,

1980-88

20 Social Categories in Bulgarian Communist Party Membership, Selected Years, 1944-86

275

Appendix

Table 1. Metric Conversion Coefficients and Factors When you know Multiply by To find

Millimeters 0.04 inches Centimeters 0.39 inches Meters 3.3 feet Kilometers 0.62 miles Hectares (10,000 m2 ) 2.47 acres Square kilometers 0.39 square miles Cubic meters 35.3 cubic feet Liters 0.26 gallons Kilograms 2.2 pounds

Metric tons 0.98 long tons

1.1 short tons 2,204 pounds

Degrees Celsius 1.8 degrees Fahrenheit

(Centigrade) and add 32

Table 2. Area and Estimated Population of Provinces, 1987

Province Area * Population Burgas 14,657 872,700 Khaskovo 13,892 1,044,400 Lovech 15,150 1,072,100 Mikhaylovgrad 10,607 668,200

Plovdiv 13,628 1,258,000 Razgrad 10,842 850,000

Sofia (city) 1,331 1,208,200

Sofiya 18,979 1,017,000 Varna 11,929 980,100

TOTAL 111,015 8,970,700

* In square kilometers. Source: Based on information from The Statesman's Year-Book, 1990-1 991, Ed., John Paxton, New York, 1990, 243.

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Bulgaria: A Country Study

Table 3. Population of the Largest Cities, 1987

City Population City Population

Sofia 1,128,859 Sliven Plovdiv 356,596 Shumen

Varna 305,891 Pernik Burgas 197,555 Yambol

Ruse 190,450 Khaskovo

Stara Zagora 156,441 Gabrovo

Pleven 133,747 Pazardzhik Dobrich (Tolbukhin) 111,037

Source: Based on information from The Stateman's Year-Book, 1990-1991, Ed., John Paxton, New York, 1990, 243.

106,610

106,496 97,225

94,951 91,409

81,554

81,513

Table 4. Urban Growth, Selected Years, 1946-87

Natural Urban Urban Percentage of Population Year Population Total Population Increase

1946 1,735,200 24.7 19,800 1956 2,556,100 33.6 25,500

1965 3,828,400 46.5 31,800

1975 5,067,000 58.0 58,100

1985 5,807,500 64.9 30,200

1987 5,959,400 66.4 29,000

Source: Based on information from Klaus-Detlev Grothusen (ed.), Bulgarien, Gottingen,

Germany, 1990, 445, 447.

Table 5. Birth Rates and Death Rates, Selected Years, 1946-87

Births Deaths Year Number Birth Rate * Number Death Rate

1946 179,200 26.5 95,800 13.7 1956 147,900 19.5 71,200 9.4 1965 125,800 15.3 67,000 8.1 1975 144,700 16.6 90,000 10.3 1985 119,000 13.3 107,500 12.0 1987 116,700 13.0 107,200 12.09

* Per 1,000 population. Source: Based on information from Klaus-Detlev Grothusen (ed.), Bulgarien, Gottingen,

Germany, 1990, 437, 440.

278
Appendix

Table 6. Major Ethnic Groups, 1956 and 1965

1956 1_965 Ethnic Group Population Percentage Population Percentage

Bulgarian 6,506,541 85.5 7,231,243 87.9 Turkish 656,025 8.6 780,928 9.5 Gypsy 197,865 2.6 148,874 1.8 Macedonian * 187,789 2.5 9,632 0.1 Armenian 21,954 0.3 20,282 0.3 Greek 7,437 0.1 8,241 0.1 Tatar 5,993 0.1 6,430 0.1

* Official census category. Figures do not represent actual size of this group. Source: Based on information from Klaus-Detlev Grothusen (ed.), Bulgarien, Gottingen,

Germany, 1990, 475.

Table 7. Protestant Denominations, 1975

Denominations Membership Clergy Parishes

Pentecostal 5,000-6,000 36 43 Adventist 3,500 40 20

Congregationalist 2,600 24 26 Methodist 1,000 15 13 Baptist 700 7 10 Source: Based on information from Klaus-Detlev Grothusen (ed.), Bulgarien, Gottingen,

Germany, 1990, 564.

Table 8. Employees in the State Economy by Sector, 1985, 1986, and 1987

(in thousands)

Sector 1985 1986 1987

Agriculture 878.8 848.1 821.5

1,411.1 1,403.0 1,422.3 Construction 360.6 359.2 359.1 Commerce 355.2 360.7 361.4

299.5 306.3 303.3 Education and culture 311.7 317.2 317.6

201.1 201.8 207.7 Administration 54.1 54.3 57.2 Science and research 82.1 83.0 85.8 Housing and community services 54.4 56.7 58.7 Other 86.2 86.2 89.0 TOTAL 4,094.8 4,076.5 4,083.6

Source: Based on information from The Europa World Year Book, 1989, 1, London, 1989, 567.

279
Bulgaria: A Country Study

Table 9. Population Distribution as Related to Working Age,

Selected Years, 1956-87

Year Under Working Age Working Atre

* Over Working Age Number Percentage Number Percentage Number Percentage 1956 . . . 2,136,700 28.1 4,486,800 58.9 980,200 13.0 1965 . .. 2,112,400 25.7 4,789,000 58.2 1,326,500 16.1 1975 . .. 2,061,400 23.6 5,058,100 58.0 1,608,100 18.4 1985 . . . 2,046,700 22.9 5,013,200 56.0 1,888,800 21.1 1987 . . . 2,029,300 22.6 5,004,500 55.8 1,942,400 21.6

* 16 to 54 for women; 16 to 59 for men.

Source: Based on information from Klaus-Detlev Grothusen (ed.), Bulgarien, Gottingen,

Germany, 1990, 456.

Table 10. Number of Schools, Teachers, and Students by Kind of School,

Selected Years, 1951-88

School 1951 1961 1971 1981 1988 Trade schools Number 187 236 328 300 264

1,564 2,835 8,454 9,435 7,457 35,724 42,123 130,292 151,200 107,967

Schools for the handicapped * Number 11 20 116 129 128 Teachers 115 987 2,155 2,373 2,364

Students 976 8,090 16,870 17,420 16,764

Professional schools Number 175 231 246 234 248

2,690 5,307 9,045 9,415 10,619

Students 61,591 93,944 152,919 97,575 115,036 General middle schools Number 129 144 134 112 74 Teachers 4,627 8,021 6,270 7,419 9,637 113,259 158,004 100,949 97,089 167,845

* Includes schools for mentally handicapped, maladjusted, deaf-mute, blind, and speech-impaired

individuals. Source: Based on information from Klaus-Detlev Grothusen (ed.), Bulgarien, Gottingen,

Germany, 1990, 502, 506, 508, 510.

280
Appendix

Table 11. Investment Apportionment in the State Economy,

Selected Years, 1949-88

(in percentages)

Category 1949 1960 1965 1970 1980 1985 1988

Industry 31.4 34.2 44.8 45.2 41.9 46.8 51.0 Agriculture 12.4 29.7 19.7 15.8 12.4 8.2 7.0 Construction 2.2 1.6 2.7 2.9 2.5 3.8 3.4 Transportation 16.5 5.4 6.1 7.8 9.7 8.5 9.7 Housing 22.9 19.2 16.9 15.8 20.2 19.5 17.3 Other 14.6 9.9 9.8 12.5 13.3 13.2 11.6

Source: Based on information from Bulgaria, Tsentralno statistichesko upravlenie. Statisticheski godishnik na Narodna Republika Bulgaria, 1989, Sofia, 1989, 38; and John R. Lampe,

The Bulgarian Economy in the Twentieth Century, New York, 1986, 165.

Table 12. Average Annual Growth Rate of Net Material Product

by Five- Year Plan, 1949-88 *

Five-Year Plan Total Economy Industry Agriculture

First (1949-52) 8.4 20.7 -0.9 Second (1953-57) 7.8 12.7 4.9 Third (1958-60) 11.6 16.2 6.6 Fourth (1961-65) 6.7 11.7 3.2

Fifth (1966-70) 8.7 10.9 3.5 Sixth (1971-75) 7.8 9.1 2.9 Seventh (1976-80) 6.1 6.0 0.9 Eighth (1981-85) 3.7 7.0 -3.9 Ninth (1986-88) 5.5 5.6 1.2

* Official government figures. First, third, and ninth plans were abandoned or declared fulfilled before

the full five years had elapsed. For definition of net material product —see Glossary. Source: Based on information from Bulgaria, Tsentralno statistichesko upravlenie. Statisticheski godishnik na Narodna Republika Bulgariia, 1989, Sofia, 1989, 42, 43, 46; and John R. Lampe, The Bulgarian Economy in the Twentieth Century, New York, 1986, 144, 162.

281
Bulgaria: A Country Study

Table 13. Government Budget, Selected Years, 1980-90 1 (in millions of leva) 2

1980 1986 1988 1990 Expenditures Current expenditures

Wages and salaries 1,162 1,729 1,778 2,316

. . . . 3,403 4,756 5,167 5,904 Defense and security 1,139 1,914 1,929 2,114

State subsidies 3,128 5,301 6,767 6,050 422 369 795 2,125

Social security 2,392 3,627 3,895 4,446

Total current expenditures 11,646 17,696 20,331 22,955

Capital investments 1,237 3,447 2,062 1,488 Total expenditures 12,883 21,143 22,393 24,443

.evenues Tax revenues Taxes on profits 2,302 6,440 8,110 9,734 Income taxes 945 1,372 1,538 1,721 3,431 5,672 4,442 4,565 Customs duties 159 310 355

Social security contributions 2,753 3,325 3,628 4,027 Other 36 56 133 126

Total tax revenues 9,467 17,024 18,161 20,528 Nontax revenues

Trade-related revenues 1,975 920 1,551 1,510 Other 1,574 2,197 2,092 2,010

Total nontax revenues 3,549 3,117 3,643 3,520

Total revenues 13,016 20,141 21,804 24,048

1 Figures may not add to total because of rounding.

2 For value of the lev—see Glossary. Source: Based on information from World Bank, Bulgaria: Crisis and Transition to a Market

Economy, 1, Washington: 1991, 28.

Table 14. Ownership of Selected Consumer Products,

1980, 1983, and 1987

(in percentages of households)

Item 1980 1983 1987

88 92 94

Refrigerator 76 88 94

75 87 97 Washing machine 71 81 91 Automobile 29 34 39 Telephone 24 34 47

Source: Based on information from Klaus-Detlev Grothusen (ed.), Bulgarien, Gottingen,

Germany, 1990, 470.

282
Appendix

Table 15. Conversion Values of the Lev to Major World

Currencies, 1991

C^. 1 1 rr<=» nrv Symbol Per Lev \^3.1ue ATS 1 1.5146 BEF 100 51.719 GBP 1 31.417 NLG 1 9.4505 FRF 100 313.86 DEM 1 10.642 GRD 100 9.718 Japanese yen JPY 100 13.307

Swiss franc CHF 1 12.489 USD 1 18.367

Source: Based on information from Bulgarian National Bank notification to domestic foreign- exchange bankers, June 3, 1991.

Table 16. Distribution of Imports by Country, Selected Years, 1950-88

(in percentages)

Country 1950 1960 1970 1980 1988 Comecon countries * Soviet Union 50.2 52.6 52.2 57.3 53.5

3.8 11.1 8.6 6.6 5.9 Other 31.6 20.3 15.3 18.8 17.3 Western countries 3.4 5.9 2.7 4.8 4.9 Other 1.3 7.7 16.5 8.6 10.6 Third World countries n.a. 2.4 4.7 3.9 7.8

n.a. —not available.

* Comecon—Council for Mutual Economic Assistance (see Glossary). Source: Based on information from Bulgaria, Tsentralno statistichesko upravlenie. Statisticheski godishnik na Narodna Republika Bulgariia, 1989, Sofia, 1989, 84-85; and John R. Lampe, The Bulgarian Economy in the Twentieth Century, New York, 1986, 152, 188.

283
Bulgaria: A Country Study

Table 17. Distribution of Exports by Country, Selected Years, 1950-88

(in percentages)

Country 1950 1960 1970 1980 1988 Comecon countries * Soviet Union 54.4 53.8 53.8 49.9 62.5

5.5 10.2 8.7 5.5 5.2 Other 32.0 20.2 17.2 15.4 16.9 Western countries

0.7 3.3 2.6 2.5 1.0 Other 7.2 9.1 11.6 13.3 5.3

0.2 3.4 6.1 13.4 9.1

* Comecon—Council for Mutual Economic Assistance (see Glossary). Source: Based on information from Bulgaria, Tsentralno statistichesko upravlenie. Statisticheski godishnik na Narodna Republika Bulgaria, 1989, Sofia, 1989, 84-85; and John R. Lampe, The Bulgarian Economy in the Twentieth Century, New York, 1986, 152, 188.

Table 18. Distribution of Major Imports by Commodity,

Selected Years, 1980-88

(in percentages at constant prices)

Commodity 1980 1985 1987 1988 Machinery and equipment 45.4 47.2 43.5 43.5

Fuels, metals, and minerals 28.3 24.0 32.4 32.2

7.2 6.8 5.4 5.7 Chemicals 6.7 6.6 6.4 5.6 Raw materials 5.9 6.2 5.4 5.6 Foodstuffs 2.9 5.0 4.1 4.3 Other 3.6 4.2 2.8 3.1 Source: Based on information from Bulgaria, Tsentralno statistichesko upravlenie. Statisticheski godishnik na Narodna Republika Bulgania, 1989, Sofia, 1989, 83.

Table 19. Distribution of Major Exports by Commodity,

Selected Years, 1980-88

(in percentages at constant prices)

Commodity 1980 1985 1987 1988 Machinery and equipment 50.7 54.1 58.8 58.7 Processed foods 15.6 12.7 11.4 11.2

Fuels, metals, and minerals 12.7 10.4 8.8 8.2 Consumer goods 9.4 9.4 10.2 11.0 Foodstuffs 3.6 3.2 2.8 2.8 .... 2.8 3.9 3.7 4.0 Construction materials 2.2 1.9 1.9 1.7 Other 3.0 4.4 2.4 2.4 Source: Based on information from Bulgaria, Tsentralno statistichesko upravlenie. Statisticheski godishnik na Narodna Republika Bulgania, 1989, Sofia, 1989, 83.

284
Appendix

Table 20. Social Categories in Bulgarian Communist Party

Membership, Selected Years, 1944-86

(in percentages)

Professionals and Year Workers Farmers Intelligentsia Women Under 30 1944 26.5 51.9 8.0 n.a. n.a. 1948 26.5 44.7 16.3 13.0 26.0 1954 34.1 39.8 17.9 1.3 n.a. 1962 37.2 32.1 23.6 21.3 15.6 1971 40.1 26.1 28.2 25.2 16.1 1976 41.4 23.0 30.2 27.5 15.0 1986 44.4 16.3 n.a. 32.7 11.9

n.a. —not available. Source: Based on information from Klaus-Detlev Grothusen (ed.), Bulgarien, Gottingen,

Germany, 1990, 183, 185.

285

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Mclntyre, Robert J. Bulgaria: Politics, Economics, and Society. London: Pinter, 1988.

The Military Balance, 1990-1991 . London: Brassey's for International Institute for Strategic Studies, 1990.

Miller, Marshall Lee. Bulgaria During the Second World War. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1975.

Nelson, Daniel N. Balkan Imbroglio: Politics and Security in Southeastern Europe. Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 1991.

"Political Dynamics and the Bulgarian Military," Berichte des Bundesinstituts fur ostwissenschaftliche und Internationale Studien

[Cologne], 1990, No. 43, July 1990.

Sharpe, Richard (ed.). Jane's Fighting Ships, 1990-91. Surrey, United

Kingdom: Jane's, 1990.

United States. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency. World Military Expenditures and Arms Transfer, 1989. Washington: GPO, 1990.

Vego, Milan. "Special Focus: The Bulgarian Navy," U.S. Naval

Institute Proceedings. (No. 114/3/1021.) March 1988, 52-54.

Volgyes, Ivan. The Political Reliability of the Warsaw Pact Armies: The

Southern Tier. Durham, North Carolina: Duke University Press,

1982.

(Various issues of the following publications were also used in

the preparation of this chapter: Foreign Broadcast Information Service, Daily Report: East Europe and Joint Publications Research Service, JPRS Report: East Europe.)

295

Glossary

Asia Minor—The Asian portion of what is now Turkey.

Bogomilism—A religious sect founded in Bulgaria and flourishing in the Balkans between the tenth and fifteenth centuries.

It combined beliefs from several contemporaneous religions,

most notably the Paulicians from Asia Minor (q.v.). The central belief was that the material world was created by the devil. Cominform (Communist Information Bureau)—An international

communist organization (1947-56) including communist

parties of the Soviet Union, Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, France,

Hungary, Italy, Poland, Romania, and Yugoslavia (expelled

in 1948). Formed as a tool of Soviet foreign policy, it issued

propaganda advocating international communist solidarity.

Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE)

Originating at the Helsinki meeting that produced the Helsinki

Accords (q.v.) in 1975, a grouping of all European nations (the

lone exception, Albania, joined in 1991) that subsequently sponsored joint sessions and consultations on political issues vital to European security.

Conventional Armed Forces in Europe Treaty (CFE)—An agreement signed in 1990 by the members of the Warsaw Pact (q. v. ) and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (q. v.) to establish

parity in conventional weapons between the two organizations

from the Atlantic to the Urals. Included a strict system of in- spections and information exchange.

Council for Mutual Economic Assistance (Comecon)—A multilateral economic alliance headquartered in Moscow until it disbanded in 1991. Members in 1991: Bulgaria, Cuba, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Mongolia, Poland, Romania, the Soviet

Union, and Vietnam. Also known as CMEA and CEMA.

Cyrillic—Alphabet ascribed to the missionary Cyril (ninth century), developed from Greek for recording church literature

in Old Church Slavonic. Now the alphabet of Belarus, Bulgaria, Montenegro, Russia, Serbia, Ukraine, and several

former Soviet republics in Central Asia, it is considered one

of the three principal alphabets of the world.

Enlightenment—Intellectual and spiritual movement in Europe in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, concerned with the

relationship of God, nature, reason, and man, often challenging the tenets of Christianity.

297
Bulgaria: A Country Study

European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD)

A bank founded under sponsorship of the European Community (EC) in 1990, to provide loans to East European countries (Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Poland, Romania,

the Soviet Union, and Yugoslavia) to establish independent,

market-type economies and democratic political institutions.

Some forty-one countries were shareholders in 1991.

European currency unit (ECU)—The unit of account of the European Economic Community (q.v.), value of which is determined

by the value of the currencies of the member states, apportioned

by relative strength and importance of the member's economy.

In 1988 one ECU equalled about one United States dollar. European Economic Community (EEC)—The "Common Market" of primarily West European countries, organized to promote coordinated development of economic activities, ex- pansion, stability, and closer relations among member states. Methods included elimination of customs duties and import

regulations among member states, a common tariff and commercial policy toward outside countries, and a common agricultural and transport policy. A significant further reduction of

intraorganizational barriers was planned in 1992.

General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT)—An integrated

set of bilateral trade agreements among nations, formed in 1947

to abolish quotas and reduce tariffs. Bulgaria applied for membership in 1991.

glasnost—Russian term, literally meaning "openness," applied beginning in the mid-1980s in the Soviet Union to official per- mission for public discussion of issues and access to information.

Identified with the tenure of Mikhail S. Gorbachev as leader

of the Soviet Union (1985-91).

gross national product (GNP)—The sum of the value of goods and

services produced within a country's borders and the income

received from abroad by residents, minus payments remitted

abroad by nonresidents. Normally computed over one year. Helskinki Accords—Signed in 1975 by all countries of Europe ex- cept Albania (which signed in 1991) plus Canada and the

United States at the Conference on Security and Cooperation

in Europe (q.v.), a pact outlining general principles of international behavior and security and addressing some economic,

environmental, and humanitarian issues.

International Monetary Fund (IMF)—Established with the World

Bank (q.v.) in 1945, a specialized agency affiliated with the

United Nations and responsible for stabilizing international ex- change rates and payments. Its main business was providing

298
Glossary

loans to its members when they experienced balance of payments difficulties. Bulgaria became a member in 1991.

League of Nations—An organization for international cooperation

established by the Allied powers after World War I . Discredited

by failure to oppose aggression in the 1930s, it became inactive at the beginning of World War II and was replaced in 1946

by the United Nations.

lev (pi., leva)—The national currency unit of Bulgaria, consisting

of 100 stotinki. Exchange rate to the U.S. dollar in 1991 was

18 leva. Marshall Plan—In full, the European Recovery Program, a United

States-sponsored program to rehabilitate European nations after World War II and prevent communist subversion of countries

weakened by war.

net material product (NMP)—The total economic value of production in the productive sectors of a national economy (not count- ing administration, defense, finance, education, health, and

housing) after depreciation has been deducted.

North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO)—An organization

founded in 1949 by the United States, Canada, and their post- war European allies to oppose the Soviet military presence in

Europe. Until the dissolution of the Soviet-led Warsaw Pact

(q.v.) in 1991, it was the primary collective defense agreement

of the Western powers. Its military and administrative struc- ture remained intact after the threat of Soviet expansionism

had subsided.

passenger kilometers—The total number of kilometers traveled by

passengers by a given mode of transportation in a specified period of time.

perestroika—Russian word meaning "restructuring," applied in the

late 1980s to official Soviet program of revitalization of the communist party, economy, and society by adjusting economic,

social, and political mechanisms. Identified with the tenure of

Mikhail S. Gorbachev as leader of the Soviet Union (1985-91).

Shia—A member of the smaller of the two divisions of Islam, supporting the claims of Ali to leadership of the Muslim community, in opposition to the Sunni (q.v.) view of succession to Muslim leadership—the issue causing the central schism within

Islam.

Solidarity—An independent trade union founded in 1980 in communist Poland. For its defiance of the communist system, the

union attained great political power through the loyalty of a

large part of the Polish population. Under the leadership of

Lech Walesa, it eventually formed the basis of the first post- war noncommunist Polish government.

299
Bulgaria: A Country Study

Sunni—A member of the larger of the two fundamental divisions

of Islam, opposed to the Shia (q. v.) on the issue of succession

to Muslim leadership.

ton kilometers—The total number of tons of cargo conveyed via a given mode of transportation in a specified period of time.

Warsaw Pact—In full, Warsaw Treaty Organization, a mutual

defense organization including the Soviet Union, Albania

(which withdrew in 1961), Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, the German Democratic Republic (East Germany), Hungary, Poland,

and Romania. Founded in 1955, it enabled the Soviet Union

to station troops in most of the other countries to oppose the

forces of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO, q. v.

)

and was the basis of invasions of Hungary (1956) and Czechoslovakia (1968). Disbanded in 1991.

World Bank—Informal name used to designate a group of four

affiliated international institutions: the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD), the International

Development Association (IDA), the International Finance Corporation (IFC), and the Multilateral Investment Guarantee

Agency (MIGA). The IBRD, established in 1945, has as its primary purpose the provision of loans to developing countries

for productive projects. The IDA, a legally separate loan fund

but administered by the staff of the IBRD, was set up in 1960

to furnish credits to the poorest developing countries on much

easier terms than those of conventional IBRD loans. The IFC,

founded in 1956, supplements the activities of the IBRD

through loans and assistance designed specifically to encourage

the growth of productive private enterprises in the less- developed countries. The MIGA, founded in 1988, insures pri- vate foreign investment in developing countries against vari- ous non-commercial risks. The president and certain senior

officers of the IBRD hold the same positions in the IFC. The

four institutions are owned by the governments of the countries that subscribe their capital. To participate in the World

Bank group, member states must first belong to the International Monetary Fund (IMF

q.v.).

300
Index

abortion: restrictions on, 78 Academic Freedom, Law on (1990), 112-13

acquired immune deficiency syndrome

(AIDS), 107-8

Administration Department, 268

administrative subdivisions, 71, 194, 197 Adrianople, Battle of (718), 228

Adventist Church, 93

Afghanistan: military support to, 53; Soviet invasion of, xxxiii, 52, 55, 221

agrarians. See Bulgarian Agrarian National Union (BANU)

Agricultural and Cooperative Bank, 156

agricultural collectivization, xxxi, 46, 53, 53-54, 127, 129, 144-47; benefits of, 49; campaigns, 144-47; compensation

for, 150-51; opposition to, 44; pace of, 47, 127, 129; peasant resistance to, 46, 147, 180; problems with, 180; reforms

in, 132

agricultural cooperatives: increase in membership of, 39; voluntary formation of, 150

agricultural-industrial complex (agropromishlen kompleks—XPK), 53-54, 132, 134, 147, 148

agricultural labor: percentage of, in labor

force, 122; shortages of, xxxiv, 72, 82, 121, 147, 184

agricultural land: chemical damage to, 69, 70; as percent of total, 121

agricultural plots: private, 150; consoli- dation of, 147-48; size of, 40, 129-30

agricultural production, 150; attempts to increase, 128; attempts to industrialize, 132; decline in, 147; diversification of, 39; under five-year plans, 129; govern- ment control of, 39; growth of, 25, 27,

39, 129, 136, 147, 148; under Liapchev,

37; quotas in, 147, 148; under Stambolov, 25; target negotiation, 132; under Third Five-Year Plan, 49

agricultural products (see also under in- dividual crops), 148-51; export of, 40, 148, 164; food, 150; grain, 121; industrial crops, 40; tobacco, 121, 148; vegetables, 121

agricultural reform, 33-35, 148; resis- tance to, 151; retreat from, 132; under

Zhivkov, 55, 125

agricultural workers, 100; income of, 150; minimum wage for, 164; number of, 102; as party members, 197; as percent- age of population, 101; shortage of, xxxiv, 102, 148

agriculture, xxx, 144-48; aid for restruc- turing, 168; under democratization,

118; under five-year plans, 128, 129; government intervention in, 27; income

in, 123, 165; investment in, 47, 160; modernization of, 129; net material product growth of, 141; as percentage

of net material product, 130, 144; policy, experiments with, 53; privatization

in, 76, 129, 150; resources, 121

agropromishlen kompleks. See agricultural- industrial complex AIDS. See acquired immune deficiency

syndrome

air and air defense forces, 242, 246-47; air- craft of, 246; combat units of, 246; com- manders of, 242; conscripts in, 246; deployment of, 246; number of personnel,

246; uniforms, ranks, and insignia, 257-58

air pollution, 70

Albania: Bulgarian occupation of, 229; in World War I, 31 Albanians: revolt against Ottoman Turks, 29

alcohol consumption, 107

Algeria: arms sales to, 262

Aleksandur, Ivan, 7 Alexander II: assassinated, 23 Alexander III: death of, 26; relations of, with Alexander of Battenburg, 23 Alexander of Battenburg, 230; deposed,

24; elected prince, 22-23; opposition of, to liberal faction, 23; opposition of, to Turnovo constitution, 23; relations of, with Alexander III, 23 Alexander the Great, 4

Allied Control Commission, 43, 232; dis- mantled, 44, 176

Allied powers, xxx; attempts to achieve peace with, 42 301
Bulgaria: A Country Study

Amnesty International, 82 Anchialus, Battle of (708), 228 Andropov, Iurii V.: relations of, with Zhivkov, 56 Angola: arms sales to, 262; military support to, 53, 259

antiwar campaigns, 31-32, 41, 42, 176, 231-32 APK. See agricultural-industrial complex

April Plenum of 1956, 48

April Uprising of 1876, 20 Arable Land Law (1991), 150, 167 Argentina: emigre population in, 78 armed forces, 227-33, 237-39, 242-50, 252-57; allowances, 256; benefits in, 256; budget, 251-52; depoliticized, xxxv, xli, 199, 237, 238, 239; dis- cipline, 255; high command, 241-42;

Internal Macedonian Revolutionary

Organization, drive against, 38; living standards in, 256; modernization of, 233, 242, 243; party membership in, 233; political role of, 238-39; prestige

of, 240, 256; professionalization of, 249; post-World War II, 232-33; purge

of, 233; quotas of, in Warsaw Pact, 237; reduced, 237, 242; reserves, 245,

257; resignations, xli; restructuring of, 237, 242, 243; uniforms, ranks, and in- signia, 257-58; in World War I, 230-31; in World War II, 231 Armenians: in Ottoman Empire, 10; in population, 79, 87

armistice of 1944, 43 arms: control, 236; private, surrendered,

265; trafficking, 56 army, 242, 243-46; combat units of, 243-44, 245-46; commanders of, 242;

conscripts in, 244; control of, 26, 232,

238; coup by, 26; deployment of, 244;

internal security by, 34; materiel of, 244; number of troops in, 244; plot against Zhivkov, 50; purged, 232, 238; reorganized by Soviets, 232; reserves, 245, 257; support units of, 245; training, 245, 255; uniforms, ranks, and in- signia, 257-58; vehicles of, 244

art: repression of, 46 Asen, 7 Asenovgrad: declared ecologically endangered, 121 Asparukh (khan), 6 assimilation program, revoked, 200

associations, 126; responsibilities of, 132, 134; target negotiation by, 132 Atanasov, Georgi: as prime minister, 185, 192, 199 Atanasov government, 188

Atatiirk, Kemal: support for, 35

Atiya: armed forces stationed at, 247

attar of roses, 63, 150

auctions, 137

Australia: emigre population in, 78

Austria: aid from, 222 Austria-Hungary: Bosnia and Hercegovina annexed by, 28; conflict of, with

Serbia, 30; intervention of, in Balkan

uprisings, 29; reaction of, to Internal Macedonian Revolutionary Organization, 27; ties with, 26

automobiles, 166; manufacture of, 142, 143 Axis powers, xxx; passive alliance with, 41-42, 85, 231

Balchik: armed forces stationed at, 247 Balkan Airlines, 152 Balkancar enterprise, 142, 143 Balkan Entente (1934), 38, 41, 231 Balkan League, 29, 30, 230 Balkan Mountains, 63, 68 Balkan nations: conferences on Macedonia issue, 38; emigre population in, 78; mini- Helsinki conference of, xl; politics

of, 18; relations with, 51, 52, 216, 217-

20, 258 Balkan nuclear-free zone, 52, 217, 218, 236 Balkan Pact (1953), 47 Balkan War, First, 29-30, 230; beginning

of, 29 Balkan War, Second, 30, 230

Baltic states: relations with, xxxix banking system, 155-58; credits in, 156; experimented with decentralization, 156; reform of, 156-57

bankruptcy: in Great Depression, 37

banks: accounts in, 128; agricultural, 167; commercial, 136; private, 128 BANU. See Bulgarian Agrarian National Union

Basil II, 67 Batak: massacre at, 20 BCP. See Bulgarian Communist Party

BDY. See Bulgarian Democratic Youth

302
Index

Belarus: relations with, xxxviii Belene Nuclear Power Plant, 139, 140; public opposition to, 140 Belgrade Declaration (1955), 48

Benkovski, Georgi, 19, 20

Berlin, Treaty of (1878), 3, 20, 229; ef- fect on commerce, 25; opposition to, 23; provisions of, 20, 23 Beron, Petur, 15, 199

Berov, Liuben, xliii, xlv Berov government, xliii, xlvi; budget of, xliv birth rate, 56, 82

Black Sea, 63, 68; oil drilling in, 121; pol- lution in, 70 Black Sea Fleet, 247

Black Sea Trading Zone, 164

Blagoev, Dimitur, 31 Blagoevgrad: American college in, 113; centenarians in, 105 Biochemical Bank, 156

birth control: availability of, 77-78 BNB. See Bulgarian National Bank

Bobov Dol, 118; prison in, 269 Bogomil heresy, 6 Bolsheviks: antiwar campaigns of, 31-32

Bolshevik Tool Plant, 142 book printing, 165 Border Troops, 248-49; deployment of, 249; mission of, 248-49, 265; number

of, 248

Boris I, 80, 90

Boris III, 35, 36, 37; birth of, 26; death

of, 42, 176; relations with Germany

under, 41; royal dictatorship of, 39, 175-76, 202, 231; named tsar, 33 Bosnia and Hercegovina: annexed by

Austria-Hungary, 28; nationalist move- ment in, 30; recognition of, xl, xlv; revolt of, against Ottoman Turks, 19 Botev Peak, 63 BRCC. See Bulgarian Revolutionary Central Committee

Brezhnev, Leonid: relationship of, with Zhivkov, 56

Britain: attempts to limit Russian in- fluence, 3, 14; attempts at trade with,

40; intervention of, in peasant uprisings, 18; materiel from, 231; purchase

of Ruse-Varna Railway from, 23

relations with, 38; war declared on, 41

British Broadcasting Corporation, 210, 271

BSDP. See Bulgarian Social Democratic

Party BSP. See Bulgarian Socialist Party

Bucharest, Treaty of (1913), 30, 32, 230 budget deficit, 158 budget revenue: sources of, 157-58

budget, military, 251-52 Bukhovo uranium mine, 70

Bulgar: etymology of word, 6 Bulgarian Agrarian National Union

(BANU), 27, 29, 33-34, 202, 216, 253; amnesties for, 50; under communism,

44, 176; corruption in, 36; in Council

of Ministers, 44; under democratization, 200-202; in elections of 1919, 34;

in elections of 1920, 35; factions in, 38;

in Fatherland Front, 181; government

relations with, 50; as obstacle to communist rule, 176; Petkov branch of, 208; purges of, 36; rehabilitated, 38, 208; reign of terror against, 36; under

royal dictatorship, 39; in Union of Democratic Forces, 199; under Zhivkov, 51, 180 Bulgarian Agrarian Union, 27 Bulgarian Artists' Union, 209, 211

Bulgarian Chamber of Commerce and In- dustry, 193 Bulgarian Communist Party (BCP) {see also Bulgarian Socialist Party; communists), xxxiv, 197-99; acceptance of, 186; antiwar protests by, 41, 176, 231-

32; conservative resurgence in, 180; consolidation of power by, 173; under

constitution of 1971, 180-81, 189; control of army by, 233, 238; control of

ministries by, 262; corruption in, 56, 186, 212; cult of personality denounced

by, 48; cultural foundation for, 174; under democratization, 117; economic

control by, 117, 125, 127; in elections of 1990, 186; factions in, 199; farm members, 197; goals of, 182; liberali- zation under, 179-80; membership in, 197, 198, 233; Mladenov as head of, 185; and multiparty elections, 183; opposition to, 183; origins of, 25, 34; out- lawed, 36; purges of, 46, 182, 186, 198; recruitment, 197; reform in, 186; replaced by national round table, 188; reprieve of purged leaders, 47; restruc- tured, 50-51, 183; role of: defined in 1971 constitution, 51, 183; secretary 303
Bulgaria: A Country Study

general of, 240; Supreme Party Council, 198, 199, 204; teachers in, 112; women in, 197; workers in, 35, 197; Zhivkov as head of, 173; Zhivkov ex- pelled from, 185

Bulgarian Communist Party Central Committee, 143; abolished, 198; members

of, 198; 1987 plenum, 183; size of, 198 Bulgarian Communist Party Secretariat, 198 Bulgarian Democratic Center, xliii Bulgarian Democratic Youth (BDY), 206

Bulgarian Empire, First, 6-7, 229; litera- ture under, 80; religion in, 80; territory

of, 6 Bulgarian Empire, Second, 7-8

Bulgarian Evangelical Philanthropic Society, 92 Bulgarian Foreign Trade Bank, 156

Bulgarian Journalists' Union, 209, 211 Bulgarian language, 86; influences, 81; origins of, 80; primer for, 15 Bulgarian National Bank (BNB), 126, 135, 136, 156; government borrowing

from, xliv; private banks merged with, 128

Bulgarian Orthodox Church, xliii, 6, 87, 92; administrative system of, 17; de- clared independent, 17; education by,

89; established, 6; excommunicated,

17; holidays of, 89; independence, 46,

178; Macedonian dioceses ceded to, 25-

26; members of, in population, 79, 86; monks in, 88; number of churches in, 88; number of monasteries in, 88; nuns

in, 88; oppression of, 55, 178, 210; Otto- man recognition of, 19; priests in, 88; property restored to, 213; reorganized,

9; revival of, 89, 183; rituals of, 89; union of, with Roman Catholic Church,

90

Bulgarian People's Army (BPA) (see also under individual branches; see also armed

forces): commander in chief of, 239,

240; force reductions, 227; future of, 227; mission of, 235; named, 233; political activities of, 227; political officers

in, 238; restructuring, 227; role of, 227; Soviet army imitated by, 233

Bulgarian Revolutionary Central Committee (BRCC), 19; reorganized, 20 Bulgarian Secret Central Committee, 19

Bulgarian Social Democratic Party

(BSDP), 27, 176, 202; disbanded, 207;

history of, 208; membership of, 208; platform of, 208; reformed, 208; in the Union of Democratic Forces, 208

Bulgarian Socialist Party (BSP) (see also Bulgarian Communist Party), xxxi, xliii, 151, 174, 186; in elections, xxxvi, 200;

foreign relations under, 220; headquarters burned, 263; membership in, 199; stalemate of, with Union of Democratic Forces, xxxiv, 166, 186, 187, 200; support for, 187, 199 Bulgarian State Railroad, 152 Bulgarian Workers' Party, 36

Bulgarian Workers' Socialist-Democratic Party (BWSDP), 33; origins of, 34; workers in, 35 Bulgarian Workers' Union, 202

Bulgarian Writers' Conference, 55, 209

Bulgarian Writers' Union, 209, 211; purged, 48

Bulgarians as ethnic group, 78, 79

Bulgars, 3, 228; converted to Christianity, 3, 80; immigration of, to the Bal- kans, 5-6

bureaucracy: as percentage of work force, 56; size of, 56, 179 Burgas (city): percentage of population in, 71; population in, 72; as port, 75 Burgas (province): armed forces stationed

in, 245, 246, 247 Burgas Petrochemical Combine, 143 Burgas-Yambol Railway, 26 Bush, George H.W., 222 BWSDP. See Bulgarian Workers' So- cialist-Democratic Party

Byelorussian Republic: trade agreement

with, 221

Byzantine Empire, 118; allied with Kievan

Rus', 6; fall of, 3; incorporation of Thrace into, 5; invasion of Bulgaria by,

6, 7, 229; legacy of, 3; rule of Bulgaria

by, xxix, 6-7, 80, 229

Byzantine Patriarchate: control of Bulgarian church by, 9

cabinet, xxxvi-xxxvii, 232 Canada: emigre population in, 78

capital: accumulation, 131; investment,

131, 136

capitalism: declared illegal, 203 304
Index

Carpathian Mountains, 63 Ceau§escu, Nicolae, 218

censorship: liberalized, 50

Central Bank, 157 Central Committee. See Bulgarian Communist Party Central Committee

Central Council of Trade Unions, 203

Central Election Commission, 195-96

Central Investigations Department, 268

Central Powers: members of, 31, 230; ter- ritorial offers by, to Bulgaria, 31 Central Prison Institutions Department,

268 CFE. See Conventional Armed Forces in Europe, Treaty on

Chaira station, 139 Chankov, Georgi, 48

Chelopets: mining in, 118 Chernenko, Konstantin: relations of, with Zhivkov, 56 Chernobyl' disaster: coverup of, 212; en- vironmental effects of, 69; political implications of, 140; radiation from, 121 Chervenkov, Vulko, xxxii, 46, 179; cult of personality of, 46, 174, 178; disapproval of, 178, 179; economic policy of, 47; fall of, 48; foreign policy of, 47; as minister of education and culture, 48; ousted from Politburo, 50; purged, 50, 180; purges by, 48, 178 Chervenkov government (1949-56), 46, 174, 178-79; collectivization under,

147; repression under, 46, 147

chief prosecutor, 193

children: compensation for, 104; as de- terminer of status, 77; health problems

of, from environmental pollution, 107;

ideal number of, 77, 94; work by, 98

Chintulov, Dobri, 16 Chiprovets uprising (1688), 11

chitalishte (reading room), 16, 110

chorbadzhi, 9, 94

Christianity (see also under individual denominations): conversion of Bulgar tribes to, 3, 80; introduction of, 5

cities {see also urban areas): growth of, 72; historical development of, 71, 72

Citizens' Property, Law on (1973), 182 CITU. See Confederation of Independent

Trade Unions

civil baptism, 88

Civil Defense Troops, 250; organization

of, 250; training of, 250

class (see also social groups): government

representation by, 29, 38-39

class conflict: origins of, 4

clergy: accused of spying, 91, 92; number of, in Orthodox church, 88; repres- sion of, 46, 178

climate, 67-68; continental zone, 67, 68; Mediterranean zone, 67-68; rainfall, 68; seasons, 68; temperature, 68

coal, xxxvi, 118-21; imported, 142; mining of, 118, 138

Coastal Defense, 247 Cold War: initial conflict of, 233

collective farms, 127, 129-30, 132, 144-

48 Comecon. See Council for Mutual Eco- nomic Assistance Comecon countries: economic synchronization with, 160-61; exports to, 143; use of ruble in, 155; trade with, 158 Cominform. See Communist Information Bureau commerce: with Europe, xlv, 25; in national revival, 13-14; state control of, 40 Commercial Law (1991), 168 Commercial Militia, 268 communications, 152-55; foreign lan- guage programming in, 152; percent- age of labor force in, 122; privatization

in, 155 Communications and Informaton Sci- ence, Commission on, 155 Communist Information Bureau (Cominform), 127; joined, 44-45; Yugoslavia

expelled from, 46, 178 Communist Party of the Soviet Union

(CPSU), 179; loyalty to, 182 communist rule, 4; consolidation period,

44-49, 173, 176-79; declaration of, 44; democratic period, 174-75; education under, 110; employment under, 123; opposition to, 44; religion under, 88,

91, 92, 93; Soviet period, 174 communists (see also Bulgarian Communist Party): under democratization,

186; reign of terror against, 36; under

royal dictatorship, 39; uprisings by, 36; workers as, 35 Communist Youth League of Bulgaria

(Komsomol), 190, 205-6, 239; functions of, 205; membership of, 205, 233;

structure of, 205 305
Bulgaria: A Country Study

communities (obshtini), 71 concentration camps, 42 Confederation of Independent Trade Unions (CITU), 204

Conference on Security and Cooperation

in Europe (CSCE), 184, 196, 236; Conference on Economic Cooperation, 221 Conference on the Environment, 211

Congregationalists, 92

conscription: adjustments in, 253; avoid- ance of, 253; deferments from, 253; term of, 252

conscripts, 253; in air and air defense

forces, 246; in army, 244; hazing of, 255

Constantine (Roman emperor), 72 Constantine V (Byzantine emperor), 6, 228

Constantinople: cultural importance of, 16; Ottoman capture of, 9 constituent assembly (1879), 22

constitution of 1879 (Turnovo Constitution), 22, 176; Alexander's opposition

to, 23; amendments to, 23, 175; bal- ance of power under, 175; desire to re- turn to, 189; framework for, 22; subranie under, 22, 189; suffrage under, 22

constitution of 1947, 45-46; adopted, 177;

citizens rights under, 45, 178; drafted,

44, 176; economy under, 45-46; model

for, xxxiii, 45, 173; nationalization under, 45-46; press under, 178; private

property under, 45, 178; ratified, 44;

religion under, 178; state power under,

177, 178; women under, 178

constitution of 1971, xxxiii, 51, 180-82;

Article I of, abolished, 180-81, 186,

189, 238-39; Bulgarian Communist

Party under, 186, 189; Council of Ministers under, 191; government structure under, 181 ; judiciary under, 193, 265;

obligations under, 181; private property under, 51; reform of, 189, 190;

rights under, 181; women under, 99

constitution of 1991, xxxvi; military doctrine under, 236; ratified, 196

construction: employment in, 101; ex- ports by, 164; growth rate, 136; guest- workers in, 76; income in, 123; under

net material product, 136; percentage

of labor force in, 122

Construction, Architecture, and Public

Services, Ministry of, 279

Construction Bank, 156

Construction Troops, 249; conscripts in, 249, 253; future of, 249; number of, 249; organization of, 249; origins of, 249 consumer control, 125; credits, 156 consumer goods, 251; availability of, 165-66; emphasis on production of, 47; shortages of, 126, 158; state monopolies of, 128 consumer price index, 165 consumption, 158 Control mechanisms, economic, 123-27

Conventional Armed Forces in Europe

(CFE), Treaty on (1990), xli, 227, 236

conversion to Christianity, 80

Cooperation, Security, and Friendship,

Treaty of (with Soviet Union, 1967), 220

copper, 118

corruption: in Bulgarian Agrarian National Union, 36; in Bulgarian Communist Party, 56; demonstrations

against, 28; in government, 28

cotton: imports of, 161 Council for Mutual Economic Assistance (Comecon), xxxi, xxxii, xxxiii, 54, 68;

benefits of, 161, 216; relationship with, 130, 160-62

Council of Europe, 221 Council of Ministers, 104, 182, 191-92,

240; armed forces under, 252; economic planning by, 125; members of, 191-

92; ministries under, 192; powers of, 177, 189, 191, 192; provisional, 192; reorganized, 191; selection of, 177; struggle for power by, 175 coups d'etat: of 1885, 23; of 1934, 38, 231, 238; of 1944, 43, 173, 176 coups d'etat, attempted: 233; in Egypt,

53; of 1965, 50, 238; in Sudan, 53

courts, 265-66; backlog in, 266; lower,

193, 266; military, 266; municipal,

266; provincial, 266; public distrust of, 193 CPSU. See Communist Party of the Soviet Union

Craiova, Treaty of (1940), 41

Crete, 14

crime, 263-65, 266; annual rate of, 263; organized, 263; punishment for, 266

Croatia, 218; recognition of, xl, xlv Crusades, 7, 75 306
Index

CSCE. See Conference on Security and

Cooperation in Europe

cult of personality: of Chervenkov, 46,

178; officially denounced, 48, 174, 179; of Stalin 174

cultural exchange programs, 53

cultural revival {see also National Revival),

13; under Zhivkova, 55

culture: influences on, 15; liberalized constraints on, 47, 50; under Ottoman

rule, 9; preservation of, 80, 81; repres- sion of, 46; Western influence on, 52

currency, 155-56; in Comecon trade, 161; devaluations of, 155; exchange

rate, 155-56

currency, hard: debt in, 55, 162-63; from

exports, 148; need for, 118; reserves of, 118, 162; trade conducted in, 144, 155, 161, 164

Cyril, 6 Czechoslovakia, xxxii, xl, 164; exports to, 130; industrial arrangements with, 143; joint military exercises with, 258; in

Little Entente, 40; materiel from, 251; membership in European Community,

xxxix; revolution in, 211; Soviet invasion of, xxxiii, 132, 180, 212, 215, 221,

233; technical assistance from, 139, 140

Dalmatians: in Ottoman Empire, 10 Danube Flotilla, 247 Danube River, 63, 67; as border, 62, 63; Border Troops patrol of, 249 Danubian Plateau, 63, 67, 68; early set- tlements on, 71 death: causes of, 106; rate, 61

debt: under Ferdinand, 27; internal, xliii- xliv, 118; rescheduling, 169

debt, external, 118; of hard currency, 55, 162-63; payments suspended, xxxv,

163; as percentage of GNP, 162; to West, 162

decentralization, industrial, 131 Decree Number 56: 137, 167-68

defendants: rights of, 265

defense industry, domestic, xli, 243; con- version of, 227, 251; plants, 251

defense organization, 237-51; govern- ment, 239-41; Soviet model for, 237;

transition in, 237

defense posture, 233-37

deGaulle, Charles: Zhivkov's visit to, 52

Delchev, Gotse, 28, 85 democratic centralism, 182, 197

democratization, xlii, 61, 262; Bulgarian

Communist Party in, 117; effect of, on armed forces, 255; justice system

under, 263; transition agreement in, 188; unemployment under, 102

Demokratsiya, 212

demonstrations. See political protest

dentists, 105 Department of Security and Protection, 270

depoliticization, xxxv, 111, 197, 263

de-Stalinization, 179

diet, 106-7; improvements in, 49, 165;

in 1950s, 49; traditional, 107 Dimitrov, Filip, xxxv, xxxvi-xxxvii, xl Dimitrov, Georgi, xxxii, 36, 233; death

of, 46, 178 Dimitrova, Blaga, 210 Dimitrov Communist Youth League

of Bulgaria. See Communist Youth

League of Bulgaria Dimitrov Constitution. See constitution of 1947 Dimitrov government (1947-49), 44, 86, 173, 177-78; unions under, 203 Dimitrov government (1992): problems

in, xlii; vote of no confidence in, xliii Dimitrovgrad: chemical plants at, 143; declared ecologically endangered, xxxii, 121 Dimo Dichev Thermoelectric Plant, 139 Dimov, Dimitur, 47

Directorate for Civilian Mobilization, 128

Directorate of Customs and Customs

Control, 265

Discussion Club for Support of Glasnost and Perestroika, 210

dissident groups, 186; formed, 183; harassed, 184

divorce: rate, 99; restrictions on, 99; stigma of, 99

Dobrich: population in, 72 Dobro Pole: retreat from, 32-33

Dobruja, 62, 68; Adventists in, 93; ceded

to Bulgaria, 41 ; early settlements in, 71

given to Romania, 230 Dogan, Ahmed, 206 Dolno Ezerovo, 107 domestic policy, 49, 53-54

drainage, 67 drought, 55, 68 drug trafficking, 56, 265 307
Bulgaria: A Country Study

DS. See State Security

Dubrovnik, 91 Duma, 212 Durzhavna sigurnost (DS). See State Security

Dzhagarov, Georgi, 210 Dzhurov, Dobri, 185, 241

earthquakes, 64-67

Eastern Europe: trade with, 117, 160

Eastern Orthodox Church (see also Bulgarian Orthodox Church), 88-89; in First Bulgarian Empire, 80, 90

Eastern Rite Church. See Eastern Ortho- dox Church

Eastern Rumelia: union with, 23; war

over, 229 EBRD. See European Bank for Reconstruction and Development

Ecoforum conference, xxxiv, 121, 184, 199, 267 economic association, xxxix economic growth: under communist rule, 136; decline of, 135-36; under Ferdi- nand, 27; under New Economic Model,

136; under Stambolov, 26 economic planning (see also five-year

plans), xxxi, xxxiii, 128; failures of, xxxiv-xxxv; hierarchy, 125; ineffici- ency under, 125; innovation dis- couraged under, 125; material balances

in, 126; process, 126-27; Soviet model

for, 47, 49, 125, 126; system, 125-27 economic policy, 127-38; assessment of, 118; of Chervenkov, 47; under communist rule, 118, 127-28 Economic Policy Commission, 167-68 economic reform, xxxi, 47, 123, 130-38, 166-69; under democratization, xxxv,

xliv, 121, 187; goals of, 169; incentive

for, 131, 184; mechanisms, 166-67; methods, 166; of 1965, 53; Poland as model for, 166-67; timing, 166; trade unions under, 204-5 economy: aid for restructuring, 168; crisis in, 54; effect of reparations payments

on, 37; experimentation in, xxxiii, 117, 125, 130-38; indicators, 49; interwar, 39-40; market, 117; performance,

127-38; rehabilitation, postwar, 46; restructuring of, 127; role of Bulgarian

Communist Party in, 117; Soviet intervention in, 47; statistics, 118; structure, 123-27; units, larger, 132-34 economy, centrally planned, 124-25; ad- vantages of, 124; criticisms of, 124-25;

distribution problems under, 135; transition from, 164; under constitution of 1947, 45-46

Edinna sredna politekhnicheska uchilishta. See Unified Secondary Polytechnical Schools

education (see also schools), xxxiii, 109-13; communist indoctrination in, 110, 112; compulsory, 35, 110; curriculum, 110; employment in, 101; foreign aid for reforming, 113; for girls, 15; of Gypsies, 86; independence of, 37; level of, 61; under Liapchev, 37; and marriage, 98-99; political activity in, 112; post- secondary, 112; problems in, 111; re- form of, 110, 112; religious, 89; restructuring of, 111; secular, 15; socialist, 111; Soviet model for, 47, 49; subsidies for, 165; of workers, 101 educational councils, 111 EEC. See European Economic Community

EFTA. See European Free Trade Association Egypt: attempted coup in, 53, 271

Ekoglasnost, xxxii, 184-85, 202, 207,

211; demonstrations by, 184; founded,

207; membership of, 207; platform of, 207

election commissions, 195

election laws, 194, 195, 196

elections: campaigns for, 196; candidates

for, 195; under communist rule, 177; communists in, 174; constituencies of, 197;

eligibility for, 195; free, 186, 196; intimi- dations in, 35; multicandidate, 183; of 1919, 34; of 1931, 37; of 1938, 39; of

1944, 44; of 1946, 44; of 1990, 174, 186, 196, 100; of- 1991, xxxvi, xxxviii, 194; nomination process for, 195; rigged, 44; Russian intervention in, 23

electoral procedures, 194-97

electric power: brownout schedule for, 140; generation of, 55-56, 121; short- ages of, 55, 140; state ownership of, 40

electrification, 128

Electronic Materials Processing and

Equipment Scientific-Production Combine, 142 308
Index

Electronics Bank, 156

Elimination of Intermediate- and Shorter- Range Nuclear Missiles, Treaty on

(1987), 236

embassies: intelligence officers in, 216

emigration, 61 ; brain drain, 102, 122; of Bulgarians, 77, 78; of Jews, 87; of Turks, 56, 77, 78, 81, 82 employees, 100; as percentage of population, 101 employment: in administration, 102; in construction, 101; in education, 102; guaranteed, 178; in housing, 102; in research, 101-2; in trade, 101; in trans- portation, 101 energy (see also fuels): imports of, 161,

162; industry goals, 138; inefficient use

of, 138; shortages, 131 energy generation, xxxvi, 138-41; conventional, 139; development of, 139;

hydroelectric, 138-39; nuclear, xxxii, 138, 139-41; thermoelectric, 138, 139

English language, 110 Enlightenment: influence of, 13 Entente: members of, 31; territorial offers by, to Bulgaria, 31

enterprises, private. See private enterprises

enterprises, state. See state-owned enterprises environment, 68-70; aid for restoring, 168 Environment, Ministry of, xxxiii environmental movement, xxxiv, xxxvii, 69, 121, 144, 207; environmental problems, xxxi-xxxii, 118, 121, 210, 218;

attempts to get international aid for, 70; caused by burning coal, 139; caused by

industrial growth, 69, 141; caused by

strip mining, 139; health problems

caused by, 107; protests against, xxxii, 69, 121, 210; taboo on discussion of, 69

esnafi, 94

espionage, 271-72 ESPU. See Unified Secondary Polytechnical Schools

Ethiopia: military support to, 53, 259

ethnographic characteristics, 78-87

Europe: commerce with, xlv, 25; eco- nomic cooperation agreements with,

54; influences of, in national revival, 13-14; license agreements with, 54; re- lations with, 52, 55, 221-22; trade agreements with, 54

Europe, Central: trade with, 117, 160 Europe, Eastern: relations with, xxxii, 130 European Bank for Reconstruction and

Development (EBRD), 166 European Community (EC), xxxix, xlv, 216; membership in, xxxix European Economic Community (EEC),

221; assistance from, 141, 168; trade

with, 164, 221-22

European Free Trade Association (EFTA),

xlv European Parliament, xlv Evren, Kenan, 56

exercises, military, 235; with Hungary,

259

exports (see also under individual products): to Comecon countries, 143; of crops, 148; to Czechoslovakia, 130; to East Germany, 130; of food, 132, 148, 161; hard currency from, 148; to Italy, 163; of Soviet oil, 162; to Soviet Union, 47, 130, 143, 161; to Switzerland, 163; to West Germany, 163

families: allowances to, for children, 78; average size of, 99; duties in, 100; in modern society, 98-100; status in, 95; of students, 112; value of, 98

family, extended (zadruga): decline of, 61, 94; fragmentation of, 95; inheritance

in, 95; members of, 94; "old man" in, 94-95; as origins of villages, 95; as per- centage of all households, 99; senior woman, 94-95

Family Code (1985), 99; emancipation of women in, 99

Fatherland Front coalition, 232, 262; Bul- garian Agrarian National Union in, 181; communists in, 44; coup by, 43, 173; elections under, 195; origins of, 173, 176; Petkov executed by, 44, 177; purges by, 44; reorganized, 45

Federation of Clubs for Glasnost and Democracy, 210, 211 Federation of Independent Students' Unions (FISU), 206 Ferdinand of Saxe-Coburg-Gotha: declares himself tsar, 28-29; elected prince, 25; European refusal to recognize, 25; intervention in agriculture,

309
Bulgaria: A Country Study

27; intervention in industry, 27; power

accumulated by, 26; rail lines nationalized by, 28; recognition of, 25, 26;

religion under, 91; rule by, 26-29; Stambolov dismissed by, 26; wife for, 26

Filov, Bogdan, 41, 42

Finance, Ministry of, 125, 126, 192, 265

financial enterprises: income in, 123; nationalization of, 46

financial system, national, 155-58

First Air Defense Division, 246

First Army, 244-45 FISU. See Federation of Independent Stu- dents' Unions

five-year plans, xxxi, 126, 128-30; basis forjudging fulfillment of, 136; goals for, 157; Eighth (1981-85), 136, 148; First (1949-53), 128-29, 174; Fourth (1963-

67), 131; Second (1953-57), 129

Five-Year Plan, Third (1958-62): agricul- tural collectivization in, 147; agricultural production in, 49; Great Leap

Forward in, 49, 129; industrial production in, 49; targets for, 129

floods, 67

food: export of, 148-50, 161; prices, 165; production, 251; subsidies for, 165; supply, 151, 176; supply to cities, 132

foreign affairs: in 1960s, 51-52, 53; in 1970s, 52-53

Foreign Affairs, Ministry of, xxxix, 215-

16

foreign assistance, xliv, 166-69, 216; from European Economic Community, 141;

refusal of, xliv-xlv, 44

Foreign Economic Relations, Ministry of, 192; abolished, xxxvii

foreign influences, xxix

foreign investment: encouraged, xxxv,

137; under Liapchev, 37; Western, 52

foreign policy, xxx, xlv, 215-22; under

Chervenkov, 47; imitation of Soviet Union in, xxxviii, 215; in late 1930s, 40-41; under Liapchev, 37 Foreign Trade, Ministry of, 125 Foreign Trade Court of Arbitration, 193

forests: environmental damage to, 69

forestry: earnings from, 123; guest- workers in, 76; settlements for, 71 France: aid from, 113, 222; attempts to trade with, 40; attempts to limit Russian influence, 3,14; cultural ties with,

15-16; educational ties with, 15-16; in- tervention of, in peasant uprisings, 18; materiel from, 231; relations with, xxxix, 38, 221 French Revolution: influence of, on national revival, 13

fuels {see also energy), 138; imports of, 138

Gabrovo, 142; defense production plant

in, 251 Gagauz: in population, 79 Ganev, Stoyan, xxxvii, xxxix, xl Garibaldi, Giuseppe, 14

gasoline: shortages of, 162 GATT. General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade

General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade

(GATT): application for membership

in, 167, 221, 222 General Staff, 240, 241, 256, 271; duties

of, 241 General Workers' Professional Union,

202

Georgiev, Kimon, 43; as prime minister, 38 Georgi Rakovski Military Academy, 241, 256

Georgi Rakovski Officer Legion, 256, 257 German Democratic Republic (East Ger- many), xxxii; exports to, 130; joint

military exercises with, 258; revolution

in, 211 Germans: in population, 79 Germany: aid from, for reforming education, 113; agricultural exports to, 40; invasion of Poland by, 40; materiel from, 231; relations with, xxxix, 221; takeover of Sudetenland by, 40; ties with, 26, 33, 40; trade with, 160, 164;

in World War I, 3 1; in World War II, 85, 231, 232 Germany, Federal Republic of (West

Germany): diplomatic relations with,

52; economic cooperation agreements

with, 54; license agreements with, 54; materiel from, 251; trade with, 163 Giurgiu plant: health problems attributed

to, 107

glasnost, 183, 211 GNP. See gross national product

godparents, 95

golden ages, xxix; first, 6-7; second, 7-8 310
Index

Gorbachev, Mikhail S., 183, 185; rela- tions of, with Zhivkov, 56, 220; visit by, 136 Gorna Oryakhovitsa, 64 government (see also government, local): budget, 252; intervention of, in agriculture, 27, 39; intervention of, in industry, 27; job creation by, 102; representation

by class in, 29; spending on environ- mental protection, 69 government, local, 177-79, 193-94; consolidation of, 193-94

grand national assembly: of 191 1 , 28-29;

of 1990, xxxvi, 189, 195 Great Depression, xxix, 37 Greater Bulgaria, 227, 230, 234

Greater Macedonia, xl Great Leap Forward, 49

Greece, 24; agreement on disposition of Macedonia, 29; attempts to achieve peace with, 42; in Balkan Entente, 38, 231; in Balkan Pact, 47; in Balkan Wars, 29-30, 230; in Black Sea Trading Zone, 164; border with, 234, 249; claims to Macedonia, 27, 29, 30; eco- nomic agreement with, 219; forced to leave southern Bulgaria, 37; Macedonians in, xxxix, 85; military programs

of, 235; in proposed nuclear-free zone,

52; relations with, xxxix, xl, 47, 51, 217, 218-19, 234, 236; riots against

(1906), 28; strategic considerations of, 234; territory returned to, 232; Thrace awarded to, 33, 43; uprisings in, 14;

in World War I, 31 Greek civil war, 233 Greek language: in First Bulgarian Empire, 80 Greek Orthodox Church, 80

Greeks: in Ottoman Empire, 10; population in Bulgaria, 79, 87 Green Party, 199, 207; platform of, 207

gross national product (GNP): compared

to net material product, 136; debt as percentage of, 162; industry as percent- age of, 40; military budget as percent- age of, xliv, 252

groundwater: pollution of, 70 guestworkers: Bulgarians as, 76, 221; in Bulgaria, 76 Guinea-Bissau: arms sales to, 262

Gypsies, 86-87; education of, 86-87;

forced settlement of, 86; illiteracy

among, 86-87; in intelligentsia, 87; lan- guages of, 86; and name-change policy, 83-84, 86; neighborhoods of, 86; occupations of, 87; political participa- tion of, xlvi; in population, 79, 86;

religion of, 89

hajdutin exploits, 11, 17 Health, Ministry of, 106

health (see also medicine), 104

health care, xxxiii-xxxiv; aid for restruc- turing, 168; foreign aid for, 105; im- provements in, xxxiii, 49; nationalized, 61; in 1950s, 49; personnel, 105; services, reform of, 105; subsidies for, 165;

traditional, 104

health facilities, 49, 105, 106; church-run,

91, 92, 106; maternity, 105; military, 241; private, 106; in villages, 76

health problems, 104-8; caused by en- vironmental pollution, 107

Helsinki Accords (1975), 54, 182 Higher Aviation School, 246-47, 255 Higher Naval School, 356

history, recorded, 11, 12

Hitler, Adolf, 38, 41 HIV. See human immunodeficiency virus Holy Synod, 88; publishing by, 88, 89

homelessness, 109

housing, 108-9; availability of, 108, 166; communal, 108; under democratization, 109; employment in, 102; family, 108; of Gypsies, 86; indoor plumbing,

109; for newlyweds, 99, 108; in rural

areas, 109; size of, 108; in Sofia, 109; subsidies for, 165 Howe, Jeffrey, 221 human immunodeficiency virus (HIV),

107-8 human rights, 269 Hungarian revolution (1956), 48 Hungary, xl, 164; freedom movement of 1989 in, 211; joint military exercises with, 259; membership in European

Community, xxxix

hydroelectric power plants: potential for production, 67; problems with, 55

IAEA. See International Atomic Energy

Agency

311
Bulgaria: A Country Study

Ilinden independence group, 85

Ilinden-Preobrazhensko Uprising (1903),

28, 85 IMRO. See Internal Macedonian Revolutionary Organization IMF. See International Monetary Fund

imports: of fuel, 138; hard currency for, 164; from Italy, 163; of manufacturing

inputs, 160; from Soviet Union, 47, 138, 161; from Switzerland, 163; from West Germany, 163 import substitution, 160

income: of agricultural workers, 150, 165; average, 123; under communist rule, 123; in Great Depression, 37; in industry, 165; of peasants, 37; per capita, 37;

taxes, 128 independence, xxix-xxx, 20-22, 28-29, 229

independence movement, 14-22; complications of, 3; organizations for, 18-19;

for religion, 16-17 Independent Association for Defense of Human Rights in Bulgaria, 210 Independent Labor Federation. See Podkrepa

Independent Trade Union Organization

of Militia Employees, 268 Independent Workers' Trade Union, 36

India: military relations with, 259

Indonesia: military support to, 53

industrial growth: under communist rule, 141; environmental problems caused

by, 69, 141; obstacles to, 143-44; rates, 141; under Second Five-Year Plan, 129

industrialization, xxxi, 4, 128; growth of, 25; problems with, 180

industrial laborers: conditions for, 25; as percentage of labor force, 122; sources

of, 25

Industrial Petrochemical Plant, 143

industrial policy, 53, 141-42

industrial production, 141; attempts to in- crease, 128; under communist rule, 141; under Ferdinand, 27; under five- year plans, 129; growth in, 27; under

Liapchev, 37; rates of, 141; target negotiation, 132; under Third Five- Year Plan, 49

industrial reform: outcomes of, 132;

retreat from, 132; under Zhivkov, 55, 125

industry, 141-44; civil defense organizations in, 250; electronics, 142; employ- ment in, 101, 130; under five-year

plans, 128-29; government intervention in, 27; growth of, 40, 136; invest- ment in, 49; labor discipline in, 127;

lack of competition in, 143; light, 141

,

142; machine-building, 143; metallurgical, 143; nationalization of, 45-46,

127-28; under net material product,

136; as percentage of gross national product, 40; as percentage of net material product, 130; surplus workers

in, 123; under Third Five-Year Plan, 49

industry, heavy: centers of, 142; demands

of, 138; emphasis on, 47, 138, 160; ex- ports by, 142; inefficiency in, 138; in- vestment in, xxxi

inflation, 118, 158

Industry, Trade, and Services, Ministry

of, 251; under democratization, 165; under economic planning, 158; after World War I, 33, 35

intellectual life, 48-49; thaw in, 48

intelligence: gathering of, xxxix, 216;

military, 271; services, 270-71

intelligentsia, 100, 209-10, 211; demonstrations by, 28; government relations with, 50; Gypsies in, 87; party membership of, 186; as percentage of population, 100, 101; under Zhivkov, 210

Intelsat. See International Telecommunications Satellite Corporation

interest rates, 156, 157

Interior, Ministry of, 50, 192

Internal Affairs, Ministry of, 216, 262,

263, 266-69

Internal Macedonian Revolutionary Organization (IMRO), 22, 218; crack- down on, 35, 38; decrease in influence

of, 28; Stamboliiski's handling of, 35, 36; terrorism by, 27, 37, 271; under

Liapchev, 36-37

Internal Security Troops, 267, 268, 269,

272; number of personnel in, 268

International Atomic Energy Agency

(IAEA): Kozloduy evaluation by, 140

International Bank for Reconstruction and

Development: application for membership in, 222

International Criminal Police Organization (Interpol), 265 312
Index

International Monetary Fund (IMF): application for membership in, 222; loans from, 167, 168; support from, 166

International Telecommunications Satellite Corporation (Intelsat), 152

Interpol. See International Criminal Police Organization

Intervision East European television net- work, 152

investment: in agriculture, 47; from Austria, 222; by enterprises, 135; net capital, 131, 136; policy, 157-58; Western,

52

Iraq: trade with, 162, 163, 164

iron, 118, 121, 141; imported, 142, 161 Iron Gate, 63

irrigation: sources of water for, 67

Iskur River, 67

Islam, 89-90; followers of, 89; forced conversion to, 9, 80, 84; Orthodox customs

in, 90; Shia, 90; Sunni, 89-90; syn- cretism in, 90; tolerance of, 87-88

isolation: under Chervenko, 47

Israel: emigration of Jews to, 87; recognition of, 216, 222

Italy: arms sales to, 262; diplomats of, expelled, 271; intervention of, in Balkan

uprisings, 29; ties to, 40; trade with, 163

Ivailo, 7 Ivan Asen II, 7

Jews: assimilation of, 93; under communist rule, 93; emigration of, 87; in Ottoman Empire, 9; in population, 79; protection of, in World War II, 42, 93

jobs: government creation of, 102; of Gypsies, 87; in villages, 76 John XXIII (pope), 91 John Paul II (pope): attempted assassina- tion of, 52, 56, 213, 272; invitation to

visit, 216, 222

journalists: purged, 48 Judaism, 93

judges: election of, 193, 266; terms of, 192-93

judiciary, 192-93; independence of, 37, 177, 266; under Liapchev, 37; public

distrust of, 193; reform of, 266

Justice, Ministry of, 262, 265

Kaloian, 7

Karadimov, Rosen, 206

Karavelov, Liuben, 19, 23 Karavelov, Petko: as prime minister, 23;

as revolutionary, 23 Kardan (king), 228-29

Karlovo: defense production plant in, 251 Kazakhstan, xxxix Kazanluk: defense production plant in, 251 KGB. See State Security, Committee for Khaskovo Province: armed forces sta- tioned in, 244-45; percentage of population in, 71 Khrushchev, Nikita S.: emulation of, xxxiii, 53, 179; relations of, with Zhivkov, 49; Stalin denounced by, 48, 50, 215; visit to Bulgaria by, 50; Zhivkov

endorsed by, 50, 180 Kievan Rus', 6 Kingdom of the Serbs, Croats, and Slo- venes: formed, 33; Macedonia in, 85;

relations with, 35 Kingdom of Yugoslavia: Macedonia in, 85 Kintex arms-export enterprise, 53, 262;

effect of democratization on, 262

Kioseivanov, Georgi, 41 Kiustendil, 36

Kolarov, Vasil, 36; executed, 46 Komi Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic: guestworkers in, 76, 221 Komsomol. See Communist Youth

League of Bulgaria Konstantin Preslavski Higher Pedagogical Institute, 89 Korea, Republic of, 216, 222 Kosovo Polje, Battle of, 9, 229

Kostinbrod: radio broadcasts in, 152 Kostov, TraTcho, 179; executed, 46, 178 Kozloduy Nuclear Power Plant, xxxvi,

140; accidents at, 140; declared unsafe, 140; problems with, 55, 140; radiation from, 121, 212 Kremikovtsi: mineral resources at, 118-21

Kremikovtsi Metallurgical Complex, 141; problems with, 142; production at, 142 Kremikovtsi Metallurgy Works: pollution

by, 70 Krum (tsar), 229

Kurdzhali: centenarians in, 105; declared

ecologically endangered, 121; pollution

313
Bulgaria: A Country Study

in, 70, 107, 121; Turkish population

in, 84

kurdzhaliistvo (anarchy), 14, 15

laboratories, 106

labor: brigades, 135; laws, 35; reform,

123; shortages, xxxiv, 72, 118, 122 Labor Code (1951), 103

labor-cooperative farm (trudovo-kooperativno zemedelsko stopanstvo —TKZS), 144

labor force, 121-23; availability factors, 122; benefits of, 122; categories of, 122; discipline of, under nationalization,

127; distribution of, 122; peasants in, 122; shortages in, xxxiv, 121, 131, 147, 184; size of, 122; skilled, 118, 122; turnover, 129; urbanization of, 117; women in, 123

land: area, 62; redistribution, xxxv, xliv; reform, 18 landholding: by peasants, 25, 54, 61, 95, 144; redistribution of, 35 law and order, 262-72

lead, 118 League of Nations: membership in, 35, 37 Leo III (emperor), 228

Levchev, Liubomir, 210

Levski, Vasil, 19 Liapchev, Andrei, 36 Liapchev government, 36-37 LIAZ-Madera trucks, 143 Liberac Auto Plant, 143

liberals, 22, 23; Alexander's opposition

to, 23

Libya: military support to, 53, 259; trade

with, 162, 163, 164

Life and Tribulations of the Sinner Sofronii (Vrachanski), 13

life expectancy, 61, 104

Lilov, Aleksandur, xliii, 50

literacy, 81; of Bulgarians, 87; under communist rule, xxxiii, 110; of Gypsies, 86-87

literature, 11-13; historical, 11; national, 80; translation of western, 16

Litse (Dimitrova), 210

Little Entente, 40

livestock, 148

living conditions, 78

living standards, xxxv, 40, 164-66;

decline in, 61; under First Five-Year

Plan, 128; improvements in, 164; in

military, 256; in villages, 76; under

Zhivkov, 49

loans, foreign, 166-69

logistics, 250-51 London, Treaty of (1913), 30, 230

Lovech: percentage of population in, 71 Lovech Vehicle Assembly Plant, 166 Lozanchev, Dimitur, 193 Ludzhev, Dimitur, xxxvii Lukanov, Andrei; as prime minister, 187, 192, 221 Lukanov government, xxxiv, 167, 187, 212 Lukov, Khristo: assassination of, 232

Macedonia: attempts to administer, 28; Bulgarian occupation of, 41, 228, 229; Bulgarian population in, 3; conferences

to address problems of, 38; desire to annex, 23, 62, 84, 85, 234; dioceses of, ceded to Bulgarian church, 25-26; dis- putes over, 52, 84; foreign claims to, 27, 29, 30; given to Greece, 230; invasion of, 31; recognition of, xl, xlv; refu- gees from, 28; as target for conquest,

3; in World War I, 31; in World War

II, 41 ; under Yugoslav rule, xxxix, 43, 85 Macedonian Empire, 4 Macedonian independence movement (see also International Macedonian Revolutionary Organization), 25, 27-28, 36, 85, 217; Bulgarian sympathy for, 28, 219; demonstrations against handling of, 28; factions in, 37; under Liapchev, 37; StamboliTski's handling of, 35, 36; Stambolov's handling of, 25, 26;

Stoilov's handling of, 27; terrorism by, 38 Macedonian language: dialects of, 84-85

Macedonians, 84-86, 234; dispositions of, 84, 85; in Greece, 85; population of, 85-86; in Yugoslavia, 85-86, 217 Magyars, 7, 229 Mahmud II (sultan), 18 Main Directorate for Statistics, 128 Main Political Administration, 239

Makariopolski, Ilarion, 17 Malinov, Aleksandur, 32 manufacturing: under democratization, 118 Mao Zedong, 129 Maritsa Basin, 118, 138 314
Index

Maritsa-iztok (East Maritsa): coal mining at, 118, 138, 139; environmental problems caused by, 139

Maritsa-iztok Industrial-Power Complex,

139; reliability of, 139

Maritsa-iztok- 1 Thermoelectric Plant, 139

Maritsa-iztok-2 Thermoelectric Plant, 139 Maritsa River, 67; pollution in, 121 Maritsa River valley, 64; early settle- ments in, 71 Maritsa-zapad (West Maritsa), 118 Markov, Georgi: murder of, 54, 210, 213, 271; state investigation of murder of, 222, 271 marriage: age for, 98; arranged, 98; and

extended family, 94; qualities of spouse,

99; rate, 98; women in, 95 Marshall Plan: refusal of aid from, 44 Marx, Karl, 124 Marxism: indoctrination in, xxxiii, 110,

112, 212

Material-Technical and Rear Support

Command, 250; responsibility of, 250

media, xliii, 212-14; censorship of, eased,

55; control of, 209, 213; freedom for, 186; under Zhivkov, 209

medicine: availability of, 106; prices of, 105; shortages of, 105-6

merchants, 13 Mesembria, Battle of (817), 229 Mesta River, 67

Methodists, 92 Methodius, 6 Middle East: arms sales to, 262; military

support to, 53 migration (see also emigration): internal, 61, 72, 75-76; urban, 117, 122, 130 Mikhaylovgrad: percentage of population

in, 71 Miladinov brothers, 85

Military Administration Department, 239

Military Counterintelligence Service, 270-

71 military doctrine, 235-37

Military League, 231; coups d'etat by, 231, 238; political influence of, 238

Military Medical Academy, 241, 256

military officers, 231 ; criteria for selection

of, 238, 239; cuts in, 252; doctrine of, 237; education of, 233, 255-57; party membership of, 233, 238; political, 238,

239; technical competence of, 233; ten- ure of, 256-57; training for, 268

military officers, noncommissioned, 254;

service obligation of, 254; training of, 254

military personnel, 252-58; cuts in, 252; number of, 252; recruitment of, 252-

53; service obligations of, 252-53

military relations, 258-62; with Greece,

259; with India, 259; with Nigeria, 259; with the Soviet Union, 227, 228, 235, 258

military sales: from Czechoslovakia, 251;

as exports, 259-62; from Germany,

251; from Poland, 248, 251; procure- ment, xli, xlv, 241, 250-51; from Russia, xlv; from the Soviet Union, 247,

248, 251; from Ukraine, xlv military schools: applicants for, 255; cadet programs in, 255

military service, and marriage, 98

military tradition, 3 military training, 243, 251, 253-55, 268;

level of, 255; based on Soviet model,

254; basic, 254; centers, 245; cycle of, 254; specialist, 254

minerals, 118-21

mines: state-owned, 40

mining, 118-21; settlements, 71

ministries: authority of, 191 minority policy, xlvi, 78-80

Mitterrand, Francois, 221, 222

Miusiulmani, 90 Mladenov, Petur, 185; government of, 123, 185-86; as head of Bulgarian

Communist Party, 185; as head of State Council, 185; as president, 186, 190

modernization, 4; of agriculture, 129; under Zveno coalition, 39 monarchy: abolished, 4, 44; legitimacy of, 26; movement to restore, 208-9; refer- endum on, 208-9; struggle for power

by, 175

monasteries: number of, 88; role of, in preserving culture, 80 money supply: frozen, 128; reduced, 128 Montenegro: agreement on disposition of Macedonia, 29; revolt of, against Otto- man Turks, 19 mosques: built, 90; closed, 82; number

of, 90 Mt. Athos, monastery on, 12-13 Mount Musala, 64 315
Bulgaria: A Country Study

Mount Vikhren, 64 Movement for Environmental Protection and Restoration, 211 Movement for Rights and Freedoms

(MRF), xxxviii, 184, 206-7, 249; co- operation of, with Union of Democratic

Forces, 207; excluded from national round table, 206; founded, 206; in- dependence of, xliii; leaders of, de- ported, 211; platform of, 206-7;

political participation by, xxxvi,

xxxviii, 214 Mozambique: arms sales to, 262; military

support to, 259 MRF. See Movement for Rights and

Freedoms

Muraviev, Konstantin, 176 Muslims (see also Islam): ethnic distribu- tion of, 89; in population, 79, 86; publishing by, 90; repression of, 46, 90

Narodna kultura (People's Culture), 209

National Alliance, 36

national anniversary, 1,300th, xxx, 55, 183, 210

National Assembly, 188-91, 194-96; under communist rule, 173, 177; under

democratization, 174, 186; economic

reform under, 169; elections for, 189,

196; factions in, 190; functions of, 189, 241; military doctrine under, 236; in 1947 constitution, 181; in 1971 consti- tution, 181-82; organization of, 189; powers of, 177, 181, 192; representation in, 196; security issues under, 240;

size of, xxxvi; struggle for power by,

175; Turks in, 214; under Zhivkov, 189 National Assembly Committee on Foreign Policy, 221 National Bank Bill (1991), 156 National Committee for Defense of National Interests, 215

National Council of Teachers, 111 National Defense, Ministry of, 239, 240,

250, 256, 270-71; calls for civilian head

of, 241; commands within, 242; Cultural Institutions Department, 242; In- ternational Relations Department, 242;

military budget under, xliv, 252; organi- zation of, 241; Podkrepa as adversary

of, 257; Public Information Department,

242; responsibilities of, 241

National Health Council, 106 National Intelligence Service, 270

national labor exchange, 123 National Security, Commission on, 240,

253, 268, 270

nationalism, xxix, 8; after Balkan Wars,

30; cultural expressions of, 15-16; sup- pression of, 26

nationalist movement: branches of, 18; precursors of, 11 nationalization, 127; of industry, 127-28;

of rail line by Ferdinand, 28

National Land Council, 151

national police, 253; purged, 262; reor- ganization of, 262

National Protection Service, 270

National Radiation and Chemical Defense Warning System, 250

National Revival (see also cultural revival), 109-10; commerce and, 13; early

stages, 11-14; literature in, 11-13, 81; missionaries in, 92; role of religion in, 88; schools in, 81; Western influence on, 13 national round table, 186-87, 188; elec- tion laws under, 194; influence of, 186; Mladenov named president by, 190; Movement for Rights and Freedoms

excluded from, 206; Podkrepa in, 204; reduces role of Bulgarian Communist

Party, 188; role of, 188; threats to boycott, 197; Union of Democratic Forces

in, 200

National Security Council, 240, 241; members of, 240

National Security Service, 270

National Service for Defense of the Constitution, 270

National Socialist Movement: founded,

38; under royal dictatorship, 39

National Socialist Party (Nazi Party), 38 NATO. See North Atlantic Treaty Organization

natural gas: hard currency for, 144; imports of, 138, 144, 161 naval forces, 242, 247-48; aviation, 248;

bases, 247; coastal artillery, 248; com- manders of, 242; fleet, 247; infantry, 248; mission of, 248; modernization of, 247; reductions in, 247; reserves, 257;

ships, 243, 247; uniforms, ranks, and

insignia, 257-58 316
Index

Nazi Party. See National Socialist Party

Nazi-Soviet alliance, 40 NEM. See New Economic Model

net material product (NMP), 118; agri- culture as percentage of, 130, 144; compared with GNP, 136; growth rate, xxxv, 136, 141; industry as percentage

of, 130, 141; under Second Five-Year

Plan, 129; second round of, 136; trade

as percentage of, 160 New Economic Model (NEM), 55, 134-35; accounting under, 135; eco- nomic growth under, 136; failure of, 57; financial incentives under, 135; goals of, 134

Neuilly-sur-Seine, Treaty of (1919), 33, 231 New Regulations on Economic Activity

(1987), 136 New System of Management (1964-68),

131 newspapers (see also journalists; media), 212 New Union for Democracy, xliii Nicaragua: arms sales to, 262

Nigeria: military relations with, 259

Nikola Vaptsarov Combine, 142 Nis Convention, 35 NMP. See net material product

nomenklatura, 179 North Atlantic Treaty Organization

(NATO), xxx, xxxiii, 51, 217, 234;

counterintelligence against, 270; policy

toward, 228; relations with, xl, 258 North Bulgarian Swell, 64 Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (1968), 236

Nuclear Power Supply, Commission on, 140

nuclear waste disposal, 140

nurses, 105

oil: crisis, 182; extraction, 121; hard cur- rency for, 144; imports of, 138, 144, 161; shortages, 54 Old Church Slavonic, 11-12 Old Slavonic, 81 Orange Guard, 35, 36

Organization for Cooperation in Defense, 253-54 Orthodox seminary in Sofia, 89

Osman I, 7-8 Ottoman Empire, xxx, xxxii, 7; decline

of, 8, 10-11, 14, 26, 28; expansion of, 8; fall of, 31; forced relocation in, 71; founded, 7; Macedonian dioceses ceded

to Bulgarian church, 25-26; reform in, 18, 28; uprisings against, 10-11, 19-20,

29, 229 Ottoman rule, xxix, 3, 7-11, 80; Bulgarian culture under, 9-11; Christian

resistance to, 13; forced conversion under, 9, 80; peasants under, 9 Ottoman system: assimilation policy of, 9, 80; goal of, 9; introduction of, 9 Ozal, Turgut, 219

Paisi of Hilendar, 12

Palestine: emigration to, 93 Panagyurishte: declared ecologically en- dangered, 121 parliament. See subranie Party Congresses: Extraordinary Fourteenth, 198; Second, 129; Sixth, 47; Ninth, 180; Tenth, 51, 180-82, 182

Passports, Law on, 214

paternalism in society: decline of, 94

patriarchy, 94-98; in extended family, 94

Paul VI (pope): Zhivkov's visit to, 52

Paulicians, 91 Pazardzhik: prison in, 269

peasant revolts: intervention in, 18; of 1277, 7; of 1835, 17; of 1841, 17; of 1850-51, 17, 18; of 1960s, 49; against

taxes, 27

peasants, 47; antiwar campaigns of, 31-32; attitudes toward postcommunist

reform, 200; education of, 110; forced

into urban work force, 25, 61, 122, 130;

in Great Depression, 37; impoverish- ment of, 95; income of, 37; landholdingsof, 25, 54, 61, 95, 144; opposition

of, to collectivization, 44, 46, 147; under Ottoman rule, 9; political organi- zation of, 29; taxes on, 9, 25, 27, 29;

in traditional society, 94; voting by, 35; under Zhivkov, 180 Pechenegs, 229

penal code of 1968, 265

penal system, 268-69; under democratization, 263 317
Bulgaria: A Country Study

pensioners: as percentage of population, 103

Pensions, Law on (1957), 103

Pentecostals, 92-93

People's Bloc coalition, 38; fragmentation

of, 38; overthrown, 38

People's Constitutional bloc, 39

people's councils, 177-78; organization

of, 194

People's Courts, 262

People's Liberal Party, 26

People's Militia, 194, 262, 265, 267, 272; subordinate organizations of, 268

People's Revolutionary Army of Liberation (PRAL), 232

perestroika: pressure to implement, 136,

183; Romanian opposition to, 218

periodicals, 16, 212 Permanent Commission for Human

Rights and the National Problem, 213

Pernik, 142 Persian Gulf War, 163, 222, 259

Peter, 7 Petkov, Nikola, 44, 176; executed, 28, 44, 177; pardoned, 180 Petkov Instrument Plant, 143 PHARE program (Polish and Hungarian

Assistance for the Reconstruction of Europe), 164, 168

Pharmaceuticals Council, 106

pharmacies, 106

Philip of Macedonia: Plovdiv founded by, 72

physicians, 105; military, 256; in 1950s,

49; per capita, xxxiii; in private practice, 106

Pirin Macedonia, 271

Pirin Mountains, 64, 67

Pirin region: Macedonians in, 85-86

planning, military, 235

Plebiscites, Law on (1983), 109

Pleven, 142; oil drilling in, 121; Pentecostals in, 92; population of, 72

Pliska, 6 Plovdiv, xxxi; Adventists in, 93; armed

forces stationed in, 244, 245; Armenians in, 87; Catholics in, 91; declared

ecologically endangered, 121; defense production plant in, 251; founded, 72; history of, 75; 1990 elections in, 196; percentage of population in, 71; Pomaks in, 84; population of, 72; prison in, 269; radio broadcasts in, 152; rail lines in, 75; unemployment in, 102 Plovdiv-Pazardzhik Plain: pollution in, 70 Plovdiv Power Electronics Plant, 143 Podkrepa (Independent Labor Federation), xxxvii, 203; foreign relations under, 220; membership of, 204; mili- tary affiliate of, 257; participation of, in national round table, 304; perse- cuted, 203; political protest by, 204;

rights sought by, 204; in Union of Democratic Forces, 204

poetry, 16

Pogled, 212

Poland, xxxii, xl, 164; German invasion

of, 40; military purchases from, 248, 251; membership in European Community, xxxix; as model for economic

reform, 166; revolution in, 211

police organizations, 267-68

Polish and Hungarian Assistance for the Reconstruction of Europe. See PHARE

program

Politburo: abolished, 198; Chervenkov

ousted from, 50; members of, 198; purges, 49; reform under, 185; Zhiv- kov as head of, 180, 198

political activity: of armed forces, 238-39;

in education system, 112

political apathy, 57

political atmosphere, 54-55

Political Consultative Council, 188, 202

political prisoners, xxxv, 47, 214, 269

political parties (see also under individual parties), 4; abolished, 38; concern of, with

defense, 238; law on, 239

political protest, 182; against collectiviza- tion, 180; for democratization, 211; by

environmentalists, xxxii, xxxvii, 69, 121, 184-85, 211; factors provoking, 227-28; legalized, 185; against Lukanov, 187; of 1905, 28; of 1941, 42; of 1970s, 54; of 1980, 28; by peasants,

xliv; by Podkrepa, 204; against repression, 28; by Turks, 215; by Union of Democratic Forces, 200 Pomaks, 9, 80, 84; features of, 84; forced

assimilation of, 84; and name-change

policy, 83-84; religion of, 89; uprising

by, 84 Popov, Dimitur, 150; as prime minister, xxxv, 187, 192 318
Index

Popov government, xxxv, 166, 216; elec- tions under, 194; formation of, 200; openness under, 272; Turks under, 215

population, xxx, 70-78; age distribution

in, 76, 105, 122; aging of, 105, 122; in

cities, 72; density, 77; distribution of, 72; government attempts to increase,

77; of Gypsies, 86; increase in, 77; of Macedonians, 85-86; in 1985, 77; in 1990, 77; percentage suffering from

pollution, 70; percentage of pensioners

in, 103; of Plovdiv, 72; trends, 77-78;

rural, 76; settlement patterns of, 71; of

Sofia, 72; of Turks, 82; urban, 75; of working age, 122 population statistics: birth rate, 56, 72, 82, 99, 100, 121, 122; fertility rate, 78; growth rate, 77, 78, 253; infant mortality rate, xxxiii, 104, 105; life expectancy, xxxiii, 104, 105; mortality rate, 78, 105; natural growth, 76; prenatal

mortality rate, 105

ports, 75, 152

postal service, 155 Prague Spring (1968), 51; reaction to, 51 PRAL. See People's Revolutionary Army

of Liberation

Pravda, 110

Pravets Instrument Plant, 143

precipitation, 68

Presidency, 190, 240

Presidium, 177

press {see also media; newspapers): censor- ship of, 38; freedom of, 37, 178; under

Liapchev, 37

prices, 158; under communist rule, 118; decline of, 37; under democratization,

168; of food, 165; in Great Depression,

37; increases, 158, 165; liberalized, 158 prime minister, 191-92; Atanasov as, 185, 192, 199; Georgiev as, 38; Karavelov as, 23; Lukanov as, 187, 192, 221; Popov as, 187, 192; powers of, 177; Yugov as, 179; Zhivkov as, 179, 180

Prison Service, 268

prisons, 269; conditions in, 213; inmates

in, 269; reform of, 269; violence in, 269

private enterprises, 167-68

private sector, xxxv; nationalized, 127; in 1930s, 40

privatization: of agriculture, 76, 129, 150; of communications, 155; under democratization, xxxv, xliv, 166 Prodev, Stefan, 209

productivity: under central planning, 124; decline in, 143 Program for Energy Development through 1995 and in Perspective until 2005

(1988), 138

property, private: under constitution of 1947, 45, 178; under constitution of

1971, 51, 182; in extended family, 94; restoration of, xxxv

Protection of the Environment, Law on

(1991), xxxii Protestant Churches: dissolved, 46; health

services of, 92; members of, in population, 79; persecution of, 92, 178; schools of, 92; youth clubs of, 92

Protestantism {see also under individual de- nominations), 92-93; missionaries, 92

provinces (oblasti), 71, 194; percentage of population in, 71 Public Education, Law on (1991), 112

Public Health, Ministry of, 121

purges: of army, 232; by Chervenkov, 48, 174; under democratization, xxxix,

186; by Dimitrov, 178; by Fatherland

Front, 44; by Stamboliiski, 36; by Zhivkov, 49, 54, 182, 211

Rabotnichesko delo, 212

radio, 152, 155, 165 Radomir Heavy Equipment Plant, 142 Radoslavov, Vasil, 30; resignation of, 32

rail lines: in Plovdiv, 75

railroads, 151; nationalized by Ferdinand,

28; state ownership of, 40

Rakovski, Georgi, 18-19 raw materials: imports of, 160; inefficient use of, 138 Razgrad: Muslims in, 90; percentage of population in, 71; Turkish population

in, 84 Razgrad Bulgarian Republic, 215

recentralization, industrial, 132 Red Berets. See Internal Security Troops

Red Brigades, 272; arms sales to, 262

reform, military, xl-xli, 227

refugees: from Macedonia, 28

religion {see also under individual religions), 80, 87-93; under communism, 88, 178; tolerance of, 87-88, 90

religious freedom, 46, 178; persecution, 82 319
Bulgaria: A Country Study

Regulations on the Control of Prices (1991), 169

Religious Beliefs, Law on, 214

Religious Organizations, Law on (1949),

88, 178

reparations, World War I, 33; canceled,

39; effect of, on economy, 37

research: employment in, 101; income in, 123

research and development, 143

reserves, armed forces, 257; number of, 257

resource base, 118-21

retirement: age, 100; eligibility for, 100

revolution of 1989, 117, 138 Rhodope Mountains, 63, 64, 67, 68; early settlements in, 71; Muslim settlements

in, 89 Rhodopes Vault, 64

Rila Monastery, 88, 89

Rila Mountains, 64, 67; mining in, 118

Rilski, Neofit, 15

riots: anti-Greek (1905-8), 28

rivers, 67; pollution of, 69 Road Militia, 268

roads, 151 Robert College, 16, 92 Roma. See Gypsies

Roman Catholic Church, 90-92; hospitals of, 91; membership in, 91; missionaries, 11, 90, 91; oppression of, 91, 178; oppression of, eased, 55; schools

of, 91; union of, with Bulgarian Ortho- dox Church, 90 Roman Empire, 4, 5 Romania: in Balkan Entente, 38, 231; in Black Sea Trading Zone, 164; border

with, 62, 234, 249; chemical pollution

from, 69; claims to Macedonia, 30; en- vironmentalists' protests against, 69; German army in, 41 ; joint military exercises with, 259; in Little Entente, 40;

in proposed nuclear-free zone, 52; re- lations with, 218, 236; in Second

Balkan War, 30, 230; in World War I, 31 Romanian language, 86 Romanians: in Bulgarian population, 79 Romany language, 86

Roncalli, Angelo, 91

rural areas: infant mortality in, 105; labor

shift to cities, 117, 122, 130; migration

to, 72; politics in, 186

rural-urban dichotomy, xxxi, 54, 212; in- crease in, 40; in politics, 186 Ruse: Adventists in, 93; Catholics in, 91; chemical pollution in, 69; declared ecologically endangered, xxxii, 121; ecological exhibition in, 210; population

of, 72; port of, 75, 152; shipyard, 143 Ruse-Varna Railway: purchase of, 23 Russia {see also Soviet Union): borders

with, xxix; cultural ties with, xxxix, 15-16; educational ties with, 15-16;

grants for study in, 16; intervention of, in Bulgarian elections, 23; invasion by, 229; as protector of Bulgaria, xxxii, 3, 14, 229; Ottoman Turks driven out by,

3; reaction of, to Internal Macedonian

Revolutionary Organization, 27; rela- tions with, xxxviii, xlv, 25 Russian army: hostility toward, 23 Russian language, 110, 256

Russians: in Bulgarian population, 79; religion of, 92 Russo-Turkish wars (1877-78), 229; Bul- garian aid to, 17

Sadat, Anwar al, 271

samizdat, 209 Samokov: synagogues in, 93 Samuil, 6, 229

Sandanski, lane, 85

Sayuz na Demokratichnite Sili (SDS). See Union of Democratic Forces

schools, 111; church-run, 91, 92; depoliticization of, 111; dropouts from, 111;

failures in, 111; fines in, 111; general,

111; girls', 15; municipal, 111; primary,

110; private, 111; professional, 111; secondary, 111; secular, 15; specialized, 111; state, 111; technical, 111; Turkish

language in, 82; in villages, 76

science, culture, and art, commission on

(Zhivkova), 54-55, 209, 210 SDS. See Union of Democratic Forces Second Air Defense Division, 246 Second Army, 245

security services, 270-71

Semerdzhiev, Atanas, 212, 241 September Uprising of 1875, 19

Serbia, 7, 24, 234; agreement on disposi- tion of Macedonia, 29; in Balkan Wars,

29-30, 230; Bulgarian occupation of, 320
Index

229; claims to Macedonia, 27, 29, 30;

conflict of, with Austria-Hungary, 30; connections to Internal Macedonian

Revolutionary Organization, 27; invasion of, 31; Ottoman defeat of, 9; revolt

of, against Ottoman Turks, 19; uprisings in, 14; wars with Bulgaria, 24, 30, 229; in World War I, 230; in Yugoslavia, 217-18

Serditsa, 5 settlements: early, 71; at high altitudes, 71; patterns of, 71 Shabla Electromechanical Plant, 143

Shield-82 exercises, 258

shipbuilding, 143, 251

shipping, 152 Shishman, Mikhail, 7 Shivarov, Svetoslav, 214 Shumen: population of, 72; Tumbul

Mosque in, 90 Shumen Vehicle Plant, 143

Silistra, 62 Simeon (tsar), 6, 229 Simeon II, 42; exiled, 44, 176; movement

to restore, 208

Skopje- Razgrad fault line, 67

Slavic language, 3 Slavs: converted to Christianity, 80; en- slavement of, by Ottomans, 9; forced resettlement of, 9, 10; settlement in Balkans, 5 Sliven: Muslims in, 90; Pentecostals in, 92; population of, 72

Slivnitsa, Battle of, 24

Slovenia, xl, xlv Smolyan: centenarians in, 105 smuggling: allegations of official involve- ment in, 265; of arms, 53

Social Council of Citizens, 214

Social Democratic Party, 31; formed, 25, 34; as original communist party, 25

social groups (see also class), 100-102

socialism: inspiration for, 25

socialists: antiwar campaigns of, 31-32; workers as, 35

social reforms: of 1856, 18; of 1876, 18

social services, 102-13; Soviet model for, 47, 49; in villages, 76

social system, 94-102; classes in, 94;

traditional, xxxi, 94-98

social welfare law (1949), 103

social welfare system, 103; child-care al- lowance in, 103; guarantees in, 178;

pensions, 103

Sofia (city), xxxi; administrative subdivisions in, 71; Adventists in, 93; air pollution in, 70; air raids on, 42; armed

forces stationed in, 244, 246; Armenians in, 87; Catholics in, 91; climatic conditions, 68, 70; defense production

plant in, 251; Ecoforum conference in, xxxiv, 121, 184, 267; election campaigns in, 196; founded, 72; housing

in, 109; industry in, 142; Jews in, 93; 1990 elections in, 196; opposition groups in, 186; Pentecostals in, 92; prison in, 269; unemployment in, 102

Sofia Basin, 63, 64

Sofia University, 112

Sofiya Province: percentage of population

in, 71 SofroniT Vrachanski, 13, 14 Sokolov, Iordan, xxxvii

Solidarity, 203; influence of, 54

Somalia: military support to, 53 South Ukraine Nuclear Power Station, 141 South-Western Theater of Military Operations, 259

Soviet Union (see also Russia): advisers from, 47, 129; agreements signed by,

138; aid from, 129; armistice with, 43; arms exports to, 262; borders with,

xxix; Bulgarian army reorganized by,

232; commercial treaty with (1940), 40; defense agreement with, 221; economic

ties with, 215, 220-21; embassy of, 271; emigre population in, 78; energy trans- missions from, xxxvi, 141, 161, 162; exports to, 47, 130, 143, 161, 162; glas- nost in, 211; imitation of, xxx, xxxiixxxiii, xxxviii, 53, 179, 215, 233, 251; imports from, 161; industrial arrange- ments with, 143; invasion of Af- ghanistan by, xxxiii, 52, 221; invasion

of Czechoslovakia by, xxxiii, 132, 180, 212, 215, 221, 233; military purchases

from, 247, 251; military advisers, 47; military exercises with, 258-59; mili- tary relations with, xli, 227, 228, 235, 258; military training in, 256; occupation by, xxix, xxxii, 4, 43, 173, 176, 232; propaganda for, 232; as protector,

xxxviii, 235; reexport of oil from, 162;

relations with, xxxii, 38, 40, 41, 51, 216, 220-21; relations with Yugoslavia,

321
Bulgaria: A Country Study

47, 48; technical assistance from, 139,

140; trade relations with, 130; trade

with, 47, 129, 144, 160; war declared

by, 42-43

Sozopol: armed forces stationed at, 247 SPC. See State Planning Committee SPC. See State Production Committee

Special Production and Conversion

Department, 251 spending, consumer, 158 Sredna Gora, 63, 67; mining in, 118

Srednogorie: pollution in, xxxii, 70, 107, 121

Stalin, Joseph V., 174; death of, 47, 178; demands of, on Eastern Bloc, 46; denounced by Khrushchev, 48, 50, 215; split, with Tito, 46

Stamboliiski, Aleksandur, 4, 208; assas- sinated, 36, 175; fall of, 35-36; as head

of Bulgarian Agrarian National Union,

29; in Malinov government, 32

Stamboliiski government, 33-35; coali- tion in, 34; economy under, 35-36; for- eign policy under, 35; Macedonian

independence movement under, 35, 36; purges under, 36 Stambolov, Stefan, 4, 24, 175; assassi- nated, 26; dismissed by Ferdinand, 26; involvement of, with monarchy, 26; People's Liberal Party founded by, 26 Stambolov government, 24-26; handling

of Macedonian issue, 25, 26; oppression under, 25, 26

Stara Planina, 63

Stara Zagora: population of, 72; prison

in, 269

Stara Zagora Industrial Robot Plant, 143

state administration, 101, 113

State and People's Control, Committee

on, 192

State Council, 51, 190; abolished, 186; armed forces under, 239, 252; created,

51, 181; functions of, 190; judiciary

under, 193; Mladenov as head of, 185, 190; powers of, 181, 182, 189; presi- dent of, 240; Zhivkov as chairman of, 51, 181

State Court of Arbitration, 193

State Defense Committee: chairman of, 239, 240

state-owned enterprises: abuses of, 134; under central planning, 124, 126; civil defense organization in, 250; corruption in, 132, 266; industrial, 134; in- efficiency in, 124; investment under,

135; labor problems in, 127; monopolies of, 128, 134; operating losses of, 166; poor quality of output from, 124, 134; privatized, xxxv; role of, 40; self- financing by, 135, 156; types of, 40

State Planning, Ministry of, 132

State Planning Committee (SPC): eco- nomic planning by, 125, 126

State Production Committee (SPC), 128

State Savings Bank, 156

State Security (Durzhavna sigurnost),

270-71, 272; control of, 50; curbed, 50; Department Six, 267, 271; intelligence

in, 271; model for, 270; reorganized,

270, 271

State Security, Committee for (KGB),

271

Stematografia (Zhefarovich), 12 168 Chasa, 212, 213

Stoilov,Konstantin, 27

Stoilov government: handling of Macedonian issue, 27

Stolnik: radio broadcasts in, 152

strategic location, 3, 64, 234, 237

strategy, military, 235-37

strikes, xxxvii; general, 187; in Great Depression, 37; by railway workers

(1906), 28'; student support for, 206; suppression of, 35; by transportation

workers, 34-35

strokes, mortality from, 106 Struma River, 67

student demonstrations: against Lukanov,

187, 206; against political indoctrination courses, 112, 212

student exchanges, 53

students: allowance for, 104; availability

of, 113; married, 112

Sturshel, 212

subranie, 22-23, 38-39; conservatives in, 37; constitution of 1947 drafted by, 44;

in 1879 constitution, 22; elections for, 23, 34; factions in, 25-27; Russian inter- vention in elections for, 23; Zveno in, 76

subsidies, xxxi, 131, 143, 165 Sudan: attempted coup in, 53 Sudetenland: German takeover of, 40

suffrage: under 1879 constitution, 22; under 1947 constitution, 178 Supreme Court, 182, 193, 266; jurisdic- tion of, 192-93; members of, 192 322
Index

Supreme Economic Council, 128 Supreme Medical Council, 106

Sveta Nedelia Cathedral: bombing of, 36 Swineherd tsar. See Ivailo Switzerland: trade with, 163 synagogues, 93

Syria: military support to, 259

Taskov, Boris, 49

Tatars, 7; distribution of, 87; in population, 79, 87; religion of, 89

taxes, 27, 136; on bachelors, 78; income,

128; on peasants, 9, 25, 27; progressive income, 35; turnover, 157; after World War I, 33

teachers, 110; in Bulgarian Communist

Party, 112 technology, Western, 52

telegraph, 155

telephones, 152, 155

television, 152, 155, 165 temperature, 68; inversion, 68 Temporary Law on National Schools

(1878), 110

tent city, in Sofia, 109, 211-12 Tenth Composite Air Corps, 246

Terbelis (king), 228

Territorial Militia, 268

terrorism, 36-37, 271, 272; by Internal Macedonian Revolutionary Organization, 27, 271; by Macedonians, 38

Thessaly: Bulgarian occupation of, 229 Third Army, 245 Third World countries: arms smuggling

to, 53; military assistance to, 53; missions to, closed, 216; relations with,

xxxiii, 52-53; trade with, 162-64

Thrace: Bulgarian occupation of, 41, 228; Bulgarian population in, 3; desire to annex, 23; in First Balkan War, 29; given to Serbia, 33, 43, 230; occupation of, 4-5; as target for occupation,

3; uprisings in, 41 Thracian Plain, 63, 64, 67, 68

Thracians, 4; Sofia founded by, 72

threat perception, 234-35 Timok Valley, 63

Tito, Josip Broz, 178; friendship with Khrushchev, 48; split of, with Stalin, 46

Tiutiun (Dimov), 47 TKZS. See labor-cooperative farm

tobacco: consumption, 107; cultivation,

121; export of, 148, 161 Todorov, Stanko, 191 Todorov-Gorunia, Ivan, 238 Tolbukhin. See Dobrich

Tolbukhin, Fedor, 232 topography, 62-67; altitude, 63-64; mountains, 63-64; plains, 63-64;

plateaus, 63; valleys, 63-64

trade {see also exports; imports), 158-64; agreement with Byelorussian Republic,

221; under central planning, 156; with Comecon countries, 158; deficit, 162; employment in, 101; guilds, 13; hard

currency for, 155, 164; importance of, 131; nationalized, 127; in 1990, 164;

as percentage of net material product,

160; policy, 158-60; shift to Eastern Europe, 117; under Third Five-Year

Plan, 49; with Third World, 162-64; with West, 160, 162-64

trade unions, xliii, 202; abolished, 202; under communist rule, 202-3; criti- cisms of, 204; under economic reform,

205; general congresses of, 203; goals

of, 203; membership in, 203, 205; re- structured, 203-4

Traikov, Georgi, 45, 180 Training Department, 268

Transport, Agricultural, and Building

Equipment Bank, 156

transportation, 151-52; employment in, 101; income in, 123; neglect of, 152; percentage of workers in labor force, 122; ports, 152; railroads, 151; roads,

151; shipping, 152; strike, 1919-20, 34-35

Transportation Bank, 156 Transylvanian Alps, 63 Trenchev, Konstantin, 204

Tripartite Pact, 41, 231

Trud, 212

trudovo-kooperativno zemedelsko stopanstvo. See labor-cooperative farm

trusts. See associations Tsankov, Aleksandur, 36; National Socialist Movement founded by, 38 Tsankov government, 36; reign of terror by, 36 Tsankov, Dragan, 23 Tumbul Mosque, 90 Tundzha River valley, 71; early settle- ments in, 71 Turgovishte, 143 323
Bulgaria: A Country Study

Turkey: aid from, 219; arms sales to, 262; arms smuggling to, 53; in Balkan Entente, 231; in Balkan Pact, 47; in Black Sea Trading Zone, 164; border with,

xxix, 62, 122, 234, 249; diplomats of, expelled, 271; in First Balkan War,

230; investment by, 164; military pro- grams of, 235; population of, 235; in proposed nuclear-free zone, 52; rela- tions with, xl, 51, 56, 217, 219-20, 234, 236, 259; in Second Balkan War, 30;

strategic considerations of, 234; trade

with, 219-20

Turkish language, 86; restrictions on use

of, 80, 82; in schools, xxxviii, 80, 82,

84, 207, 215 Turkish minority, xxx, 81-84, 214-15;

birth rates of, 56, 82; cultural rights re- stored to, 82-83; emigration of, xlvi, 56, 77, 78, 81, 82, 121, 122, 148, 184, 211, 219; homelessness among, 109; persecution of, xxxviii, 214, 219, 235,

249; political protest by, 215; popular

prejudice against, xxxvii, 215; in population, xxxvii, 79, 82, 214; property re- stored to, 213; religion of, 89; Zhivkov's policy on, 51-52

Turkish Republic, 35 Turks, forced assimilation of, xxxiv,

xxxvii, xlvi, 56, 79-80, 81, 184, 206,

214, 221, 268, 272; international reaction to, 56; opposition to, 211; reasons

for, 82; revoked, 200; techniques, xlvi, 79-80, 81, 82, 83 Turnovo, 7; grand national assembly at, 28-29 Turnovo constitution, ^constitution of 1879 Tutrakan region: Adventists in, 93; Muslims in, 90 Two-Year Plan (1947-48), 128

UDF. See Union of Democratic Forces UDF-MRF coalition, xl, xlii-xliii underemployment, 123 unemployment: under communist rule, xxxv, 123; compensation, 104, 123; under democratization, 102, 121, 123;

in Great Depression, 37; of minorities,

xlvi; in Plovdiv, 102; rate, 123; in Sofia, 102; urban, 130

Ukraine, xxxix; relations with, xxxviii, xlv

Uniate Catholic Church, 91-92

Unified Secondary Polytechnical Schools

(Edinna sredna politekhnicheska uchilishta—

ESPU), 110 Union-84 exercises, 259 Union for Cooperation, 164 Union of Bulgarian Priests, 46 Union of Democratic Forces (UDF),

xxxvii, xliii, 151, 199-202, 239, 253, 272; basis for, 199; Bulgarian Social Democratic Party in, 208; compromise

in, 199; constitutional reform under,

190; cooperation with Movement for Rights and Freedoms, 207; economic

reform under, 166; in elections, xxxvi,

186, 196, 200; factions in, xliii, 202;

foreign relations under, 220; founded,

199; membership, 199; organization of, 199; Podkrepa in, 204; program of, 199-200; protest rally by, 200; stale- mate with Bulgarian Socialist Party, xxxiv, 166, 186, 187, 200; support of Bulgarian Communist Party, 200;

threat to boycott national round table, 197 Union of Democratic Forces National Coordinating Council, 202 Union of Evangelical Churches in Bulgaria, 92 Union of Macedonian Societies, 218 United Nations, 233, 236; participation

in, 216

United Nations Commission for Narcotics Control, 265

United States: aid from, xl, 113, 168, 222; emigre population in, 78; missionaries from, 92; relations with, xxxix, 216; war declared on, 41 United States Department of Agriculture,

148, 272

universities: political indoctrination in, 112, 212; weaknesses in, 113 University of Maine, 113

uprisings: April, 20; by the army in 1887,

25; by communists, 36; in Hungary,

180; in Macedonia, 22, 28; in Nis, 17; against Ottoman Empire, 229; in Poland, 180; by Pomaks, 84; September, 19; in Thrace, 41; in Turnovo, 17; in Vidin, 17, 18 urban areas {see also cities): birth rate in, 72; food supply to, 132; infant mortality in, 105; percentage of population in, 324
Index

75; politics in, 186; rural labor shifted

to, 117, 122, 130; unemployment in, 130

urbanization, 71, 75 urban migration, xxxi, 13, 72; during national revival, 13; reasons for, 75; by women, 75 urban work force: characteristics of, 75; peasants forced into, 25,61, 117, 122, 130; political orientation of, 35

Valley of the Roses, 63 Varna (city), 62; defense production plant

in, 251; 1990 elections in, 196; Pentecostals in, 92; population of, 72; port

of, 75, 231; prison in, 269; shipyard, 143 Varna-Odessa ferry, 258-59 Varna Province: percentage of population

in, 71 Vatican: diplomatic relations with, 91

vehicles, pollution by, 70 Velchev, Boris: purged, 54, 182 Velchev, Damian, 38, 232, 233 Velchev-Georgiev government, 38

Versinikia, Battle of (813), 229

veterans, 104

Victor Emmanuel III, 40

Vidin: Jews in, 93; radio broadcasts from

152 Vienna-to-Constantinople Railway, 26 Vietnam, Democratic Republic of (North

Vietnam): assistance to, 53; guestworkers from, 76

V.I. Lenin Ferrous Metals Combine, 142

villages: aging of population in, 76; decline of population in, 76; formed

from extended families, 95; housing in, 109; natural growth in, 76; as repositories of folk culture, 10, 81 Vitosha Mountains, 72

Vratsa: declared ecologically endangered,

121; prison in, 269

Vratsa Industrial Chemical Combine, 143 Vulkov, Viktor, 215, 216

wages, 125, 135; agricultural, 165; guarantees of, removed, 136; industrial, 165; minimum, 104, 136, 164; in 1950s, 49 war crimes trials, 43

Warsaw Pact, xxx, 218, 258-59; attrac- tion of, to Solidarity movement, 54; demise of, xl, 227, 233, 237, 258; duties under, 235; forces, 236-37; membership in, 228, 233; military exercises in, 258-59; and threat perception, 235 Warsaw Pact Political Consultative Committee, 237

water pollution, 69, 70 West: debt to, 162; trade with, 162-64 West Germany. See Germany, Federal Republic of women: in armed forces, 253; attitudes

of, toward childbearing, 77; child-care compensation for, 104; emancipation

of, 99, 178; employment of, 123; in- heritance rights of, 95; marriage of, 98;

as party members, 197; roles of, 94, 95, 98, 100; status of, 95; urban, 75; in work force, 99-100 women's revolt (1918), 32 work force: bureaucracy as percentage of, 56; peasants forced into urban, 25; women in, 99-100

workers, 100; antiwar campaigns of, 31-32; demonstrations by, 28; depoliti- cized, xxxv, 199; education of, 101; jobs of, 101; as party members, 197;

political orientation of, 35; service, 122; surplus, 123; wages of, 125 World Bank: loans from, xxxv; membership in, 167 World War I, xxix, 4, 30-33, 228, 230; antiwar campaigns, 31-32; capitulation, 33, 231; combatants in, 31; divi- sion of territory after, 85; early action

in, 31; number of soldiers in, 230; repa- rations following, 33; settlement of, 33 World War II, xxix, 4, 41-43, 228; divi- sion of territory after, 85; fate of Jews

in, 42, 93

Yalta agreements (1945), 232 Yantra River: pollution of, 69

Yaroslav, 6 Young Newlywed Families Fund (1979), 108 Young Turks, 28, 29

youth: apathy of, 57; clubs, 92, 205-6

Yugoslavia: attempts to achieve peace

with, 42; in Balkan Entente, 38, 231;

in Balkan Pact, 47; border with, 62, 325
Bulgaria: A Country Study

234, 249; border with, sealed, 47; dis- integration of, xxxix-xl, xlv; emigre

population in, 78; expelled from

Cominform, 46; imitation of, 53; In- ternal Macedonian Revolutionary Organization raids into, 37; in Little Entente, 40; Macedonia given to, 32; Macedonians in, xxxix, 85, 217; in pro- posed nuclear-free zone, 52; relations with, 35, 38, 40, 47, 52, 217-18, 236;

relations with Soviet Union, 47, 48,

178; territory returned to, 232 Yugov, Anton: as prime minister, 179; purged, 49, 50, 180

zadruga. See family, extended Zambia: military relations with, 259

Zemia, 212

Zhefarovich, Hristofor, 12 Zhelev, Zheliu, 219; as chairman of Union of Democratic Forces, 199; as president, xxxv, xxxix, xl, xliv, 187,

190, 216, 222, 271; and Turkish

minority, 219

Zhivkov, Todor, xxxii; assumption of power by, 47, 48-49; career of, 179; as chairman of State Council, 51, 240;

consolidation of power by, 174, 180; demonstrations against, 121; egalitar- ian persona of, 51; endorsed by

Khrushchev, 50, 180; expelled from

Bulgarian Communist Party, 185; as head of Bulgarian Communist Party,

174, 240; as head of Committee of State Security, 50; as head of Politburo, 180,

198; intelligentsia under, 210; over- thrown, xxxii, xxxiv, 117, 138, 173,

174, 185, 198, 238; as prime minister,

179, 180; purges by, 49, 180, 182, 211;

relations with Andropov, 56; relations with Brezhnev, 56; relations with Ceau§escu, 218; relations with Chernenko, 56; relations with Gorbachev,

56, 220; relations with Khrushchev, 49; as scapegoat, 186; successor for, 183 Zhivkova, Liudmila, 50; anniversary

celebration under, 183, 210; as chair of commission on science, culture, and

art, 54-55, 209, 210; death of, 55 Zhivkov government (1956-89), 50-57,

179-85; Balkan detente policy, 52; cor- ruption in, 212; diet under, 165; domestic policy of, 53; economic ex- perimentation under, 117; education under, 110; environmental problems

under, 69; foreign policy of, 51-53; in- dustrial growth under, 69, 143; National Assembly under (1971), 189;

political methodology, 50-51 ; policy ex- periments of, 53; relations with agrarians, 50; relations with intelligentsia, 50; religion under, 93; thaw under, 55, 209 Zhivkov Theses, 129-30; agriculture

under, 17; failure of, 49

zinc, 118 Zveno coalition, 37, 175; censorship under, 38; class representation under, 38; coups by, 38, 43; goals of, 37-38; mili- tary influence on, 238; political parties abolished by, 38; in subranie, 176

326
Published Country Studies

(Area Handbook Series)

550-65 Afghanistan 550-87 Greece 550-98 Albania 550-78 Guatemala

550-44 Algeria 550-174 Guinea

550-59 Angola 550-82 Guyana and Belize 550-73 Argentina 550-151 Honduras

550-169 Australia 550-165 Hungary

550-176 Austria 550-21 India 550-175 Bangladesh 550-154 Indian Ocean

550-170 Belgium 550-39 Indonesia 550-66 Bolivia 550-68 Iran 550-20 Brazil 550-31 Iraq 550-168 Bulgaria 550-25 Israel 550-61 Burma 550-182 Italy 550-50 Cambodia 550-30 laDan 550-166 Cameroon 550-34 Jordan

550-159 Chad 550-56 Kenya

550-77 Chile 550-81 Korea, North

550-60 China 550-41 Korea, South 550-26 Colombia 550-58 Laos 550-33 Commonwealth Caribbean, 550-24 Lebanon

Islands of the 550-91 Congo 550-38 Liberia 550-90 Costa Rica 550-85 Libya 550-69 Cote d'lvoire (Ivory Coast) 550-172 Malawi

550-152 Cuba 550-45 Malaysia 550-22 Cvorus 550-161 Mauritania 550-158 Czechoslovakia 550-79 Nlexico 550-36 Dominican Republic and 550-76 Mongolia

Haiti 550-52 Ecuador 550-49 Morocco

550-43 Egypt 550-64 Mozambique

550-150 El Salvador 550-35 Nepal and Bhutan

550-28 Ethiopia 550-88 Nicaragua 550-167 Finland 550-157 Nigeria 550-155 Germany, East 550-94 Oceania

550-173 Germany, Fed. Rep. of 550-48 Pakistan 550-153 Ghana 550-46 Panama

327
550-156 Paraguay 550--53 Thailand

JvJU S'SO-I1 85OvJ JTCll5la.il V-TU.11 OlalCo 'i'SO--89 x miiMd. JJu i ui Key

x iiiiippiiica -74 T T era n n q 550-162 Poland 550--97 Uruguay

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550-37 Rwanda and Burundi 550--183 Yemens The

550-51 OaUUl i\x aula 550--99 YiX LIi (To fci WolCt q1 avia V Id 550-70 Senegal 550--67 Zaire 550-180 Sierra Leone 550--75 Zambia

^0-1 84 kJlllcicllJvJl C 550--171 /lmnanwp

550-86 Snm O ?» 1 1 c\ iJ 1 1 1 dl 1 cL 550-93 South Africa

j ju zj -J OUV1CL I11U11 550-179 Spain 550-96 Sri Lanka

550-27 Sudan

550-47 Syria 550-62 Tanzania

328



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