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Air War College

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AIR WAR COLLEGE

AIR UNIVERSITY

The Command or

Control Dilemma

When Technology and Organizationa

Orientation Collide

GREGORY A. ROMAN

Lieutenant Colonel, USAF

Air War College

Maxwell Paper No. 8

MAXWELL AIR FORCE BASE, ALABAMA

March 1997
Disclaimer

This publication was produced in the Department of Defense school environme

the interest of academic freedom and the advancement of national defense re

concepts. The views expressed in this publication are those of the author an

not reflect the official policy or position of the Department of Defense or the U

States government.

This publication has been reviewed by security and policy review authorities a

cleared for public release.

ii
Foreword

In this well-researched and insightful study, Lt Col G

gory A. Roman examines the relationships between m

tary organizational hierarchies and the impact of bat

space information. Drawing on a sophisticated range 

studies and data and using numerous illustrations, 

author contends that the outmoded effects of traditiona

centralized (and technologically proliferating) comma

and control orientations preclude the US military (and p

ticularly the Air Force) from effectively applying and act

upon the benefits of information-age technologies in an 

of information warfare. The author sees future warf

characterized by faster decision making, faster operatio

tempos, and a torrent of tactical battlefield informati

These new realities necessitate greater decentralization 

control, more flexible information gathering, and creat

nontraditional military organizational arrangements.

Of particular relevance to the Air Force is the joint fo

air component commander (JFACC) structure and air ta

ing order (ATO) process. Colonel Roman argues that th

products of traditional hierarchical organizations a

mindsets significantly impede flexibility in responding 

ongoing battlefield developments. As currently compos

the JFACC and ATO reflect inflexible, traditional ind

trial-age warfare doctrine arrangements. Moreover, US

doctrine (unlike Army, Navy, and Marine doctrine) does 

permit decentralization of control. Some Air Force pro

nents have even advocated increasingly centralized exe

tion, the basis of a new micromanagement. The aut

recommends that the Air Force move to decentralized c

trol and execution in which shared information gather

by “networked” organizations—with decentralized a

more autonomous decision making operating within f

tened hierarchies—would bypass unnecessary comma

layers. Such arrangements would allow much more ra

responses to mobile, agile targets presented by adapt

and flexible adversaries. The author also contends that 

commanders could increase their operations tempos a

initiatives without sacrificing the ability to concentrate 

fort. Given a 5,000-page, 72-hour ATO in Operation Des

iii
Storm, it is little wonder that Gen Merrill A. McPeak 

marked, “It is a disgrace that modern air forces are s

shackled to a planning and execution process that la

three days. We have hitched our jets to a hot air balloo

Colonel Roman’s analysis and recommendations need 

be read by a wide community of operators and planners.

D. BRUCE SMITH

Major General, US

Commandant

Air War College

iv
About the Author

Lt Col Gregory A. Roman is a career intelligence offi

who has been stationed in Greece, Korea, Germany, P

ama, and Japan. He is a graduate of the US Air Fo

Academy and holds a master of science degree from T

State University. His duty assignments include tours as 

operations officer and squadron commander for EC-

and RC-135 operations. While assigned to the Pentag

he served as the tactical cryptologic program elem

monitor, executive officer to the assistant chief of the 

Force/Intelligence, and on the Secretary of the Air Fo

Legislative Liaison staff. Colonel Roman is a distinguish

graduate of Squadron Officer School and a graduate of 

Command and Staff College. He is a 1996 graduate of 

War College.

v
The Command or Control Dilemma

When Technology and Organizational

Orientation Collide

 The functions of command are eternal.

—Martin L. van Creveld, 1985

Once upon a time, everybody understood what com

manders did. They commanded. This was simple enough

and sufficient for a thousand years or more . . . now

commanders would exercise command and control.

—Greg Todd, 198

One of the least controversial things that can be said

about command and control is that it is controversial

poorly understood, and subject to wildly different inter 

pretation. The term can mean almost everything from

military computers to the art of generalship: whateve

the user wishes it to mean.

—Kenneth Moll, 197

Command and control (C2

), a term very familiar to 

military, is subject to much confusion and misinterpre

tion. What does command and control really mean, and 

the current C2

 orientation the proper one for an inform

tion-age military?1

 These are important questions as 

US military grapples with the potentially revolution

changes brought on by modern information technology

information-age technology is indeed contributing t

revolution of military affairs (RMA), then organizatio

structures and associated C2 orientation must change

1995, Secretary of Defense William J. Perry stated, “ H

torically, an RMA occurs when the incorporation of new te

nologies into military systems combines with the innova

operational concepts and organizational adaptations to f

damentally alter the character and conduct of military ope

tions.”2

These organizational changes are occurring in the bu

ness world, but can the same be said for the military? T

USAF Scientific Advisory Board’s New World Vistas (Co
munications Volume, 1995) draft report notes that “e

the most casual glance at business history makes it cl

that each time a new information infrastructure becom

available (e.g., railroad, telegraph, telephone) the entit

which are ultimately most successful are also the first 

reshape their structures in order to gain maximum 

vantage of the new information conduits. The new n

works emerging today are ‘geodesic,’ that is global, n

hierarchical, and without any central node.” 3

The board concludes with the optimistic view that, “I

a safe bet that our [military] organizations will follow sui

However, this may be easier said than done given the h

torical resistance of military organizations in adapting 

new organizational orientations.

Thus far the US military services have failed to create 

innovative operational concepts and make the organizatio

adaptations needed for the information age. The US milit

remains rooted in an industrial-age C2

 paradigm, where c

trol is emphasized over command. As pointed out in the dr

Warfighting Vision 2010, “technological enhancements m

have made ‘control’ an anathema to ‘command.’” 5

 This 

certainly true of the modern US military. The dilemma is t

for an information-age military the correct organizational 

entation may no longer be one of command and control 

one of command or control. Centralized control exercised 

hierarchical organizations may no longer be possible or de

able in a fast tempo war.

Failure to address this dilemma could result in a m

tary not being prepared for the operations tempo of inf

mation-age warfare. As Maj Gen J. F. C. Fuller points o

“The highest inventive genius must be sought not so mu

amongst those who invent new weapons as among th

who devise new fighting organizations.”6

 However, creat

new organizational orientations has never been easy. B

J. P. Kiszely expands Fuller’s view by stating, “With

originality, let alone genius, the new technologies w

merely be grafted on to existing organizations a

doctrines in a way designed to cause the least inconvenie

and least unpleasantness in peacetime. The risks 

having operated on this principle in the past are as no

ing to the dangers of doing so in the future.” 7

2 THE COMMAND OR CONTROL DILEMMA
Unfortunately, by viewing the benefits of informat

technology within the current military C2

 orientation, te

nology may be used in a manner that is the exact oppos

of what is most desired.

The seductiveness of information technology stimula

military organizational orientation towards greater cent

ized control and more rigid hierarchical organizations inst

of the desired orientation of decentralized control and m

flexible organizations. Unless the US military recognizes 

danger of succumbing to technological temptation, con

functions may take priority over command functions, res

ing in both a less efficient and less effective military. Wh

this applies to all US military services, the command or c

trol dilemma particularly impacts those organizations wh

centralized control is part of doctrine.

This paper argues that the corrosive effect of an o

dated C2

 orientation prevents the US military from fu

applying the benefits of information technology. Fut

warfare, characterized by faster operations tempo, requi

a new orientation based not on “centralized control” but 

greater decentralized control and more flexible organi

tional orientation. To better understand this, the def

tions of command and control are examined to explain w

there is so much confusion and misunderstanding. Ne

organizational orientation theory is discussed to show h

the military traditionally responds to new informat

technology by emphasizing greater centralized control a

rigid hierarchical organizational structures. Then, throu

the use of an information-gathering and decision-mak

model, it can be determined why current US military ori

tation of centralized control and hierarchical organizatio

structures is not suited for the high-tempo operations 

pected in the information age. Finally, from theoretical a

model analyses, some recommendations are given on w

the correct military organizational orientation for the 

ture must be.

Frame of Reference

Our familiarity with the words command and control m

lead one to believe that a problem does not exist. After 

ROMAN 
these two words sound like they were meant for ea

other, causing few to fully appreciate their separate me

ings. This cozy word association also gives the impress

of equal weighting, value, and importance. While few wo

challenge this observation, the truth is that there is 

agreement on what command and control really means.

In Command and Control for War and Peace , Thom

Coakley addresses some of the origins behind these t

words. He notes that there is little mention of control 

the early biographers of the great captains of battle. C

trol was viewed as an organic function of command. Ho

ever, the word control appears in literature during Wo

War I and more frequently in World War II literature, pos

bly from the increased automation and sophistication 

weapon systems.8

 This led to a belief that one comman

people but controls things.9

 For example, a distinction 

be made that one commands the aircrew who, in tu

controls nuclear weapons. Others make the distinct

that command is strategic and operational, while contro

tactical. Analogies have been made with the human ne

ous system with the command brain controlling the res

the body.10 Another view is that command is an art wh

control is more a science. John R. Boyd wrestles with 

differences in describing the epitome of command, which 

to direct, order, or compel, while control means to regula

restrain, or hold to a certain standard. 11 Boyd further s

gests that “leadership and monitoring” are more accur

and descriptive than are “command and control.” 12

Attempts to clarify the command and control muddle h

light the difficulty in associating these words. Is this w

association healthy, and what happens when certain words 

out of favor? One solution is to invent new word association

For example, C2 has expanded to C3 (communications), 

(computers), C4I (intelligence), and C4I

2

 (interoperability). 

US Marine Corps is advocating an orientation of “comma

and coordination” as part of their future war-fighting conc

called Sea Dragon, while the Air Force is championing 

orientation called C4

ISR (surveillance and reconnaissanc

One wonders which word will be added next? Perhaps C 

(coordination), or C6I

2

 (cooperation)? Unfortunately, each n

word association that tries to describe new thinking or n

4 THE COMMAND OR CONTROL DILEMMA
technology does so at the expense of the most import

word command, or what Greg Todd calls “C1.”15

The Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) provide little help in clar

ing the confusion over the term command and control. J

Pub 1-02, Department of Defense Dictionary of Military a

Associated Terms, defines command as “the authority tha

commander in the Military Service lawfully exercises o

subordinates by virtue of rank or assignment. Command 

cludes the authority and responsibility for effectively us

available resources and for planning the employment of, 

ganizing, directing, coordinating, and controlling milit

forces for the accomplishment of assigned missions.” 16

By definition then, control is a component of comma

Why then is a distinction made between the word comm

and the word control, and why give preferential treatmen

the notion of control but not to those of organizing, directi

or coordinating? Perhaps it is because the US military fails 

see the difference. There are many obvious similarities wh

comparing Joint Pub 1-02’s definition of command with 

definition of command and control, “The exercise of autho

and direction by a properly designated commander o

assigned forces in the accomplishment of the missi

Command and control functions are performed through 

arrangement of personnel, equipment, communications, 

cilities, and procedures employed by a commander in pl

ning, directing, coordinating, and controlling forces a

operations in the accomplishment of the mission.” 17

The differences between these two definitions are it

cized. The latter describes the orientation, which will 

discussed later, through which a commander exerci

command and control. For now, let us focus on the it

cized word direction. Does this imply control? If so, th

one would logically expect that the JCS definition of c

trol to be the exercise of direction by a properly designa

commander over assigned and attached forces in the 

complishment of the mission.

This would make sense in explaining that command 

the exercise of authority while control is the exercise 

direction. However, things are not this easy. Control is a

exercised by civilian leadership, such as President John 

Kennedy’s handling of the Cuban missile crisis; or milit

ROMAN 
personnel, like air traffic or weapons controllers, as par

their official duties. Thus, control also applies to people 

noncommand functions.

Unfortunately, the JCS Joint Pub 1-02 definition of c

trol does little to clear up the confusion by describing it 

an authority which may be less than full command ex

cised by a commander over part of the activities of subor

nate or other organizations.18 These definitions, unfor

nately, do little to clarify the command or control definit

dilemma. Is command defined by “authority for full co

mand exercised by a commander,” while control is defin

as “authority of less than full command exercised by 

commander?” And, if so, what exactly does that mean? 

would appear that more accurate, unambiguous, and 

scriptive definitions are the first step in resolving the co

mand or control dilemma.

Perhaps what is needed is a fresher and simpler p

spective. The JCS definition of command is a good one a

already contains all the essential ingredients necessary 

accomplishing the assigned mission. Associating comma

with control is, at the least, redundant, and at worst, c

ates an incorrect paradigm that impacts how we organ

for future warfare. As Todd points out, “If atoms could 

split, so could the act of command. Now, command

would exercise command and control. Eureka! Never m

that command already implied control. Never mind t

without control one could not command.” 19 By recal

Martin L. van Creveld’s statement about “the eternal 

ture of command,” then the US military must assume 

sponsibility for the confusion. JCS Joint Pub 1, Joint W

fare of the US Armed Forces, reminds us that “the prim

emphasis in command relations should be to keep 

chain of command short and simple so that it is clear w

is in charge of what.”20 Command, by its very eternal 

ture, provides that simple orientation that stands the t

of time and introduction of new technology.

An Organizational Orientation Model

While van Creveld points out that the functions of co

mand do not change over time, the means to carry out t

6 THE COMMAND OR CONTROL DILEMMA
command change quite often.21 He divides the means 

command into three categories: organizations, procedur

and the technical means which help determine the deg

of control exercised by that commander. 22 For exam

sensor and communications technologies have changed 

a more rapid rate than have organizational structures a

operating procedures for employing them. Today’s milit

services have progressed from the telegraph to modern 

microburst transmitters but still operate under the sa

centralized control and hierarchical organizational orien

tion employed by Frederick the Great and Napoléon. T

danger is that this industrial-age C2

 orientation corro

the benefits offered by this new information technolo

The primary impact will be felt if a commander’s inform

tion-gathering and decision-making processes do not k

up with the increased operations tempo of future warfar

A key characteristic of future warfare is increased ope

tions tempo which stresses a commander’s ability to 

serve and react to changes in the battlespace. JCS Pub 

Doctrine for Joint Operations, acknowledges that “

tempo of warfare has increased over time as technologi

advancements and innovative doctrines have been appl

to military requirements.”23 Thus, the commander oper

ing at a slower tempo than the opposing commander is a

greater disadvantage because there is a greater degree 

uncertainty. This happens because the commander oper

ing at a faster tempo will always be one step ahead of 

adversary and is actually setting the tempo. Boyd 

dresses the commander’s decision-making process a

continuous four-step mental process—observation, ori

tation, decision, and action (OODA).24 Using the B

model, successful commanders are those with the capa

ity to operate within their adversaries’ OODA loop.

The ability to observe, orient, decide, and act faster th

your opponent is necessary for future warfare. In Wa

the Information Age, Gen Gordon R. Sullivan, a former 

Army chief of staff, observes that throughout history 

tempo of operations caused by the impact of technology 

warfare has accelerated (table 1).25 Information technol

has decreased the time available for commanders to gat

information and make decisions. Notice that the time 

ROMAN 
ferential between orienting (finding out “What is actua

happening?”) and deciding (“What can I or should I 

about it?”) has compressed to the point that in informati

age warfare, orienting and deciding can no longer be 

quential actions but must be simultaneous and contin

ous ones. Thus, organizational orientation and procedu

are critical components in determining the tempo of a co

mander’s OODA loop.

To better understand this process, it is worth consid

ing the OODA loop in a different paradigm; as really t

separate cycles, or processes, operating at the same ti

(fig. 1). The first cycle is the information-gathering cy

which addresses the commander’s need to find out “W

is actually happening?” The second cycle is the decisi

making cycle, which addresses the commander’s need 

decide “What can I or should I do about it?” In this mod

the information cycle loosely incorporates Boyd’s obser

Revolutionary

War

Civil

War

World

War II Gulf War War o

Tomorr

Observe Telescope Telegraph Radio/

Wire

Near Real

Time Real Tim

Orient Weeks Days Hours Minutes Continuo

Decide Months Weeks Days Hours Immedia

Act A Season A Month A Week A Day < An Ho

Figure 1. C2 Dynamics

Table 1

Tempo and Command

8 THE COMMAND OR CONTROL DILEMMA
tion and orient functions while the decision-making cy

incorporates the decision and action functions. 26 With 

use of this model, one can examine the impact of tem

and technology on organizational orientation.

First, consider the commander with a very effective 

formation-gathering capability who defers a decision, 

fuses to make decision, or makes a wrong decision. Wh

his ability to observe and orient is high, the comman

may not have the temperament or capability to decide a

act on that information. The model suggests that his inf

mation-gathering cycle is operating faster than his de

sion-making cycle, creating an imbalance. While his unc

tainty level may be relatively low, it ill behooves the troo

commanded because he is incapable of using his cont

process to command appropriate action.

Second, consider the commander with poor informati

gathering capability, yet who decides and acts correctly 

the right time based on whatever information was av

able. While the commander’s information gathering w

poor or incomplete, by temperament, training, doctri

and faith, such commanders overcome uncertainty and 

cide the best course of action. In this case, the co

mander’s decision-making cycle is operating relativ

faster than his information-gathering cycle, again creat

an imbalance. Even the most decisive of commanders w

eventually make poor decisions given poor information.

The balance between the information-gathering cy

and decision-making cycle is critical because it define

commander’s operating tempo. As Boyd points out, fr

an external viewpoint it is critical for a commander to op

ate faster than an adversary or within an adversar

OODA loop. The means to do so, however, require inter

balance between a commander’s information-gather

and decision-making cycles. Faster decisions can be pos

ble because of faster information technology. Of cour

faster does not imply better information, or even bet

decisions. Even under ideal conditions, it is difficult 

always have perfect information and to always make p

fect decisions, a state where the information-gathering a

decision-making cycles are working in harmony. While f

tion will always be a factor, it is technology, organization, a

ROMAN 
procedures that either act as a lubricant or throw a wren

into the balancing of the information-gathering and d

sion-making cycles (fig. 2). It is the balance between inf

mation gathering and decision making that also det

mines the amount of uncertainty in the system.

Organizational orientation determines the degree of u

certainty a commander is willing to tolerate. Van Crev

declares that the history of warfare is an endless quest 

decreasing the “realm of uncertainty, resulting in a r

between more information and the ability of technology 

keep up with it.”27 Thus, the choice between centralized 

decentralized control involves the distribution of unc

tainty. Van Creveld believes that while centralized con

reduces uncertainty at the top, it increases uncertainty 

the bottom. Decentralized control has the opposite effec

Thus, it is human nature for higher level commanders 

reduce their uncertainty, driving organizational orientat

to greater centralized control. However, the cost for l

uncertainty at the top is more uncertainty at the botto

The cost for greater control by commanders is less aut

omy in the field.

Unfortunately, the greater the level of control, the l

opportunities for initiative and flexibility where it is need

most to cope with the dynamics of warfare: at the low

levels of command. Frank M. Snyder points out that pr

Figure 2. Technology/Organization Procedures Impact

10 THE COMMAND OR CONTROL DILEMMA
to reliable long-distance communications, command

wrote orders with objectives at a level high enough to g

lower level commanders the flexibility to adjust their 

tions according to current events.29 Commanders expec

that communications would be unreliable and planned 

cordingly. This is no longer true today because informat

technology is making communications more available a

more reliable. For example, the number of radio sets r

from one for every 38.6 soldiers in World War II to one 

every 4.5 soldiers in Vietnam, an 857 percent increas

Moreover, communications are more reliable. During O

eration Desert Storm, the US military had a 98 perc

communications reliability rate in handling 700,000 t

phone calls, 700,000 messages per day, and more th

30,000 radio frequencies.31 Better information technol

decreases the need for flexibility and initiative.

Modern technological advances, particularly in the a

of computers and communications systems, increase 

likelihood that the information-gathering and decisi

making cycles will be imbalanced. In fact, technology is 

contributing factor for having two separate cycles. In pre

dustrial warfare, Alexander the Great’s personal comma

style was such that his information-gathering process a

decision-making cycles were in harmony. He saw what w

happening on the battlefield, made decisions, and took 

tions based on his personal observations. This is the cl

sic OODA loop, a very sequential process. In preindustr

age warfare, technology, organization, and procedures w

relatively simple.

One of the major characteristics of industrial-age w

fare is movement made possible by the internal comb

tion engine. Vehicles, and the things they transport, m

at high speeds. Armies are mechanized and mount

There are relevant objects in space and beneath the s

All of these fast-moving objects must be observed for one 

properly orient. Thus, faster operations tempo contribu

to greater uncertainty. Faster information-gathering ca

bilities increase the potential for dealing with panoram

multimedia changes, suspicious, contradictory or inco

plete information, making the decision-making proc

more difficult. This increase in information-gathering ca

ROMAN 
bilities is a result of technological advances in the inform

tion, intelligence, computer, and communications fiel

The volume of data processing is growing exponentia

with capacities doubling approximately every 18 mont

The maximum communications throughput of two me

bits per second in Operation Desert Storm will seem s

when compared to the impending capacity of 30 megab

per second.32 The result is a technologically driven fas

information-gathering cycle, but a decision-making cy

that has not gotten appreciably faster since the days 

Alexander the Great. Decision making is still very muc

human chore.

Unfortunately, advances in decision-making technolo

such as computer-assisted logic tools and artificial inte

gence, have not progressed as rapidly as informati

gathering technology. Technology is making more a

more information available, but the commander’s ability 

process and act on that information is still limited to h

much the commander’s brain can comprehend. As v

Creveld states, “The paradox is that, though nothing 

more important in war than unity of command, it is imp

sible for one man to know everything. The larger and m

complex the forces that he commands, the more true t

becomes.”33

It is the organization and procedures that try and re

tablish the balance between the process of informat

gathering and the process of decision making. Technol

and operating procedures can either add friction or m

gate it. Both technology and operating procedures 

strongly affected by organizational structure and organi

tional orientation.

As mentioned earlier, information gathering is critica

addressing the problem of uncertainty. As John F. Schm

explains, there are two possible responses. One is to p

sue certainty as the basis for command and control. T

second is to accept uncertainty as a fact of war and fu

tion with it.34 The first response is to eliminate uncertai

by creating a highly efficient C2

 structure based on 

quest for close control, “In such a system, the comman

controls with a ‘tight rein.’ Command and control 

centralized, formal, and inflexible . . . detailed control 

12 THE COMMAND OR CONTROL DILEMMA
quires strict obedience and minimizes subordinate d

sion making and initiative.”35 Thus, there may be grea

certainty at the top but decreased certainty at the botto

As Schmitt points out, if war is inherently uncertain, th

this kind of orientation attempts to overcome a fundam

tal nature of war; there will always be some level of unc

tainty that one cannot overcome.36

This makes the second approach, that of operating w

a certain amount of uncertainty, a more pragmatic C 2

 

entation. Schmitt states that “rather than increasing 

degree of certainty we achieve, we reduce the degree 

certainty that we need.”37 The result is a C2

 orientat

that is decentralized. “In such a system, the comman

controls with a loose rein, allowing subordinates sign

cant freedom of action and requiring them to act with 

itiative . . . command and control is decentralized, inf

mal, and flexible . . . [which] seeks to increase tempo a

improve the ability to deal with fluid and disorderly si

ation.”38

Decentralized control allows for some uncertainty at 

top to facilitate greater certainty and decision making 

the bottom. The greater the degree of control, the less 

number of alternatives available to solving a problem. 39 

example, numerous laboratory tests indicate that tea

placed under increased stress operate more efficiently a

correctly when there is less shared uncertainty coup

with decentralized decision making.40 Thus, the ability 

gather vital information and make appropriate decisio

rapidly is very dependent on the C2

 orientation.

The two most common types of C2

 organizational ori

tations, and hence structures, are hierarchical and n

worked. The traditional military C2

 orientation is hierarc

cal, because traditionally hierarchical organizatio

required less communications and substantially simplif

the planning and control process.41 Maj George E. Orr 

scribes a hierarchical organization as one that “attempts 

turn the entire military force into an extension of the co

mander. Subordinate levels respond in precise and sta

ardized ways to his orders and provide him with the d

necessary to control the entire military apparatus. The e

phasis is upon connectivity hierarchy, upon global inf

ROMAN 
mation gathering or upon passing locally obtained inf

mation to higher levels, and upon centralized managem

of the global battle.”42 The key is that both informat

gathering and decision making are under the personal c

trol of the commander. Power at each level of comma

within the hierarchical organization is a function of b

how much information and the kind of information c

trolled.

However, the first problem is that the very nature 

controlling information defeats the optimum use of t

information. Information gathering and decision mak

must be made at each level of command before that inf

mation is moved on. At each level of command, the inf

mation is filtered, added, deleted, and modified, which 

time consuming and often resulting in information 

reaching the right people or getting there too late to be 

any use. This process creates a cascading effect, such t

controlled information becomes slow information. This l

point is often cited as a failure of intelligence not getting 

the right people on time. Perhaps the problem is not w

the intelligence process but rather the hierarchical orga

zation it is supporting. Information must move with a 

gree of freedom at all levels of command to better balan

decision making at all levels of command.

A second problem with hierarchical organizations i

tendency to control decision making at the highest levels 

the organization. Again, technological advances dr

higher levels of centralized control, threatening to st

ingenuity and initiative at the lower levels. Combating t

temptation requires trust in subordinates. During the C

War, Gen Ulysses S. Grant, though he had the techni

capacity to centrally manage the war, was successful 

cause he “trusted subordinates thoroughly, giving o

general directions, not hampering them with petty instr

tions.”43 Gen Dwight D. Eisenhower seemed to support t

approach on the art of high command: “He can and sho

delegate tactical responsibility and avoid interference 

the authority of his selected subordinates.” 44 Gen H. N

man Schwarzkopf applied this lesson into joint war fig

ing by attesting, “I built trust among my components 

cause I trusted them. . . . If you want true jointness

14 THE COMMAND OR CONTROL DILEMMA
CINC should not dabble in the details of component bu

ness.”45 This freedom from interference is extremely imp

tant, as Sir William Slim explains, “Commanders at 

levels had to act more on their own; they were given grea

latitude to work out their own plans to achieve what th

knew was the Army Commander’s intention. In time th

developed to a marked degree a flexibility of mind and 

firmness of decision that enabled them to act swiftly 

take advantage of sudden information or changing circu

stances without reference to their superiors.” 46 Thus, fas

decision making in response to the faster tempo of w

requires an orientation of decentralized control.

Unlike hierarchical organizations, networked organi

tions offer a decentralized control orientation that ma

better use of information technology. RAND Corporatio

John Arquilla and David Ronfeldt point out that the 

vances in computers and information technologies in

ence related innovations in organization and managem

theory.47 This is reinforced by John Naisbitt’s book Me

trends and the USAF’s Scientific Advisory Board, wh

predicts that organizational changes will result as ind

trial-based society transitions to an information-based 

ciety.48 This trend will drive hierarchical organizations 

becoming more networked and centralized control yield

to decentralized control. Orr defines a networked organi

tion as one that “views the commander as controlling o

in the sense of directing a cooperative problem-solving 

fort. The emphasis in this style is on autonomous ope

tion at all levels, upon the development of distributed s

tems and architectures, upon networking to share 

elements needed to detect and resolve possible conflic

and upon distributed decision making processes.” 49 I

networked organization, the information-gathering proc

will be more equally distributed and more information w

be available more rapidly to all levels of command. Co

manders will share rather than control information, resu

ing in faster decision making at all levels of command.

A networked sharing of information is much differ

than that of the hierarchical control of information

faster decision-making cycle is possible with shared inf

mation because all levels of command have the same le

ROMAN 
of certainty. It also eliminates irritants. For example, R

Adm Joseph Metcalf III, Task Force 120 commander dur

Operation Urgent Fury, remembered his experiences fr

Vietnam with the “long distance screwdriver.” 50 To prev

recurrence, he worked hard at increasing the confide

and certainty of his superiors by providing them w

masses of information during the operation to liberate G

nada.51 This accomplished the desired effect in allow

Admiral Metcalf to accomplish the mission with minim

interference.

More important than the elimination of irritants, ho

ever, is another advantage: troops engaged will have a

generate more information than the headquarters. If w

fare is chaotic, the chaos arises from adding information 

energy to a system. Since troops in contact will be the fi

to observe that information, they must be empowered 

use it for their decision making. What appears to be c

otic and uncertain to the headquarters may be much l

chaotic and much more certain to troops empowered 

respond to local conditions. Headquarters, then, can u

information technology, as Boyd suggests, to monitor.

The need to balance legitimate requests for informat

while allowing subordinate commanders the freedom of 

tion is a difficult one. Prussian leader Helmuth von Mol

“the Elder” was one of the first to appreciate the value 

the telegraph, but he also recognized the increased t

dency in using it to find out what was happening at 

front.52 In his Thoughts on Command, von Moltke wr

that “the most unfortunate of all supreme commanders 

the one who is under close supervision, who has to give 

account of his plans and intentions every hour of ev

day. This supervision may be exercised through a de

gate of the highest authority at his headquarters o

telegraph wire attached to his back. In such a case 

independence, rapid decision, and audacious risk, w

out which no war can be conducted, ceases.”53 Gen Geo

S. Patton, reflecting in his Diaries about World War 

complained frequently about being tied to the radio a

telephone, noting, “The hardest thing I have to do is to 

nothing. There is a terrible temptation to interfere.” 54 A

16 THE COMMAND OR CONTROL DILEMMA
frequently, this temptation became too great to ignore, 

General Fuller explains from his World War I experience

As the general became more and more bound to his office, and

consequently, divorced from his men, he relied for contact not upon

the personal factor, but upon the mechanical telegraph an

telephone. They could establish contact, but they could accomplish

this only by dragging subordinate commanders out of the firin

line, or more often persuading them not to go into it, so that they

might be at the beck and call of their superiors. In the World Wa

nothing was more dreadful to witness than a chain of men startin

with a battalion commander and ending with an army commander

sitting in telephone boxes, improvised or actual, talking, talking, in

place of leading, leading.55

The key to less interference and greater flexibility and 

itiative lies in an organizational orientation that promo

sharing of information at all levels.

While the principle of sharing information at all levels 

command is important, it is modern information techn

ogy that makes it possible. With better communicatio

and computer technology, US Central Command for

shared information during Operation Earnest Will in 

Persian Gulf with great success. Vice Adm Jerry O. Tut

then director of the Command, Control, and Communi

tions Directorate of the Joint Staff (J-6), provided comm

nications equipment for sharing information with nation

and theater-level commanders.56 “With the on-sce

commander, Rear Admiral Less, the CINC (Admiral Cris

Tampa, Florida), and the Secretary [of Defense] and 

Chairman [of the JCS] all having the same picture a

same databases, the requirement to communicate 

minished markedly. By having red and blue forces 

picted in one composite picture, the relative urgency 

decision making could be readily determined and priorit

set more intelligently.”57 While shared information 

creases uncertainty, it has the added benefit of foster

decision making at lower levels of command. Admiral C

discovered that because the national command autho

received the same shared information, they did not 

compelled to monitor or control the operation by “s

echelon.”58 As Paul Strassmann writes, “The more peo

share information, the more its importance will increase

Shared information provides the means to faster and 

centralized decision making. To achieve faster decis

ROMAN 
making, it is critical that all levels of command are oper

ing from a shared vision or commander’s intent. “The co

mander’s intent describes the desired end state. It i

concise expression of the purpose of the operation a

must be understood two echelons below the issuing co

mander. It must clearly state the purpose of the mission

is the single unifying focus for all subordinate elements

. Its purpose is to focus subordinates on the desired e

state.”60 Through a unifying commander’s intent, initiat

is generated. Boyd supports this assertion when discu

ing the ability to act faster than an opponent, “This is b

accomplished by the exercise of initiative at the lower lev

within a chain-of-command. However, this decentrali

control of how things are done must be guided by a c

tralized command of what and why things are done.” 61 

Marine Corps Fleet Marine Force Manual (FMFM) 1

Campaigning, echoes this by stating, “We generate tem

by creating a command system based on decentralized 

cision making within the framework of a unifying intent

Therefore, the commander’s role establishes the boun

ries within which subordinate commanders can make de

sions and increase operating tempo.

However, while a networked organization is better 

sharing information, it may prove unsuitable for milit

commanders dealing with tough decisions in combat. U

like their business counterparts, military command

must really make life and death decisions and put subor

nates at risk. In a networked organization, who among 

collaborators will make those decisions? War requires co

manders, not collaborators. Thus, decision making m

require a more hierarchical process. Decisions need 

always be shared. For example, the success of a decept

plan usually requires fooling your own troops. During O

eration Desert Storm, the US marines afloat off the coas

Kuwait may have conducted their daily preparations a

routines differently, even subconsciously, had they b

aware that their amphibious landing preparations w

only a ruse. Their subtle changes in behavior or an in

vertent communications transmission might have been 

tected by the Iraqis, thus compromising the decept

plan. Thus, some type of hierarchical organization 

18 THE COMMAND OR CONTROL DILEMMA
needed to support the decision-making process, though 

can be made more effective.

The answer is a flattened hierarchical organization t

greatly facilitates a commander’s decision-making proce

Eliminating layers of command between the comman

and operational forces facilitates the execution of th

decisions. The goal is combining a clearly defined co

mander’s intent with decentralized control at all levels 

command allowing for greater flexibility, ingenuity, and 

itiative. The German concept of Auftragstaktik during 

Second World War demonstrates how this works. Germ

commanders at each echelon, when out of contact w

higher echelons, were free to operate in meeting objecti

at two levels higher than their command without perm

sion. Each level of command understood the command

intent and what other commanders were expected to d

This German decentralized decision-making cycle was a

to operate at a faster tempo than that of their opponen

For example, German counterattacks were often conduc

within 30 minutes after losing a position, while Americ

British, Russian, and French counterattacks usually to

hours.64 The German decision-making process, facilita

by decentralized control, allowed them to operate wit

the OODA loop of their adversary.

Thus, the ideal C2

 organization combines the shared 

formation-gathering advantages of the networked organi

tion with the decision-making advantages of a decentr

ized, flattened hierarchical organization (fig. 3). 65 Col Jo

Warden III’s experiences from the Gulf War support t

orientation by noting:

The coalition managed its own information requirement

acceptably, even though it was organized in the same way Frederick

the Great had organized himself. Clear for the future is th

requirement to redesign our organizations so they are built t

exploit modern information-handling equipment. This also mean

flattening organizations, eliminating most middle management

pushing decision making to very low levels, and forming worldwid

neural networks to capitalize on the ability of units in and out o

the direct conflict area.66

Thus, to maximize the advantages from information te

nology, one must redesign the military organizatio

orientation where the emphasis is on command not contro

ROMAN 
Modern technology can help redesign a military organi

tion based on a theory of “centralized command—decent

ized control and execution” which mirrors the “massiv

parallel” designs of modern computers.67 To support inform

tion gathering, “Each [basic action unit] BAU has direct 

cess to the situation model. This is achieved by linking all 

units together in a single data net. . . . The BAU command

can then access the battlefield model and pull out the inf

mation they need to accomplish their objectives.” 68 To s

port decision making, “The command unit does not is

explicit orders but instead identifies mission objectives an

focus of main effort. . . . The BAUs are given wide latitude 

conducting their mission. Coherence is achieved because 

the units share a common doctrine, a common goal, an

common view of the situation. . . . Instead of waiting for ex

orders to funnel through intermediate units, each BAU 

access its mission order against the common model and 

accordingly.”69 This concept of a shared information-gath

ing cycle and a decentralized decision-making cycle is be

discussed among the military services, but there is no c

sensus on what organizational orientation is best suited 

take advantage of information technology. The only agr

ment is that organizational change eventually will happen.

Organizational Orientation Reality

The US military services’ organizational orientation 

information-age warfare is striking in their contrast. Y

Figure 3. Shared Information/Decision Process

20 THE COMMAND OR CONTROL DILEMMA
each service must respond to the certainty of high-tem

operations in the future, because there is little argum

that the operations tempo of Operation Desert Storm w

seem slow compared to that of future wars. Military serv

doctrine defines tempo as follows.

US Army

Tempo is the rate of speed of military action; controlling or alterin

that rate is essential for maintaining the initiative. . . . A quick

tempo demands an ability to make tactical decisions quickly, t

execute operations that deny the enemy a pause, and to exploi

opportunities according to commander’s intent.70

US Marines

Tempo is a rate or rhythm of activity. Tempo is a significant weapon

because it is through a faster tempo that we seize the initiative and

dictate the terms of war.71

US Navy

Tempo is the pace of action—the rate at which we drive events. On

way of doing this is to exploit the dynamics of warfighting by

maintaining a high tempo.72

US Air Force

No mention of tempo in current or proposed Air Force doctrine

However, “speed” is mentioned as a characteristic of airpower. 73

Why does the Air Force emphasize speed over temp

Tempo is speed over time—the consistent ability to oper

fast.74 One might argue that a more accurate description 

a desired characteristic of airpower is tempo, not spe

For example, a characteristic of airpower technology 

speed, that is the speed of the aircraft, or how long it tak

to hit the target, but a more accurate characteristic of 

orientation is tempo. In a 1995 speech, the Air Force ch

of staff stated that “not too far in the next century, we m

be able to engage 1,500 targets within the first hour, if 

the first minutes, of a conflict.” 75 This describes speed, 

tempo. The question is, What happens after the fi

strike? Does the USAF have a C2

 orientation that ma

tains and even increases the tempo of operations to k

those 1,500 targets at risk? If Air Force doctrine rema

one of “centralized control, decentralized execution,” th

the answer is no. Much worse is the risk of unsynchr

ized joint high-tempo operations.

ROMAN 
With the exception of the Air Force, every US milit

service recognizes that increased operations tempo 

quires decentralized control and decision making to 

lowest level. These service observations are fairly clear.

US Army

Initiative requires the decentralization of decision authority to th

lowest practical level.76

US Marines

In order to generate the tempo of operations we desire and to bes

cope with the uncertainty, disorder, and fluidity of combat

command must be decentralized.77

US Navy

A rapid tempo requires that commanders be provided . . . enough

decentralization to allow subordinate commanders to exploi

opportunities.78

US Air Force

To exploit speed, range, flexibility, precision, and lethality tha

makes air and space so versatile, their organization must make i

possible for missions to be centrally controlled.

The need to respond to and exploit unforeseeable events require

that these same forces are capable of decentralized execution. 79

In the aftermath of Operation Desert Storm, the Ar

Force XXI concept and Marine Corps Sea Dragon conc

are the respective services’ thinking about future warf

which emphasizes decentralized control and decision m

ing. The Air Force has no such new paradigm. The 

Force is taking a much different direction because it 

mains rooted to an orientation of “centralized control—

centralized execution,” which Eliot Cohen describes as 

catchphrase of Air Force doctrine, much as ‘don’t div

the fleet’ preoccupied American naval strategists in ear

times.”80 Although Air Force doctrine has changed 

times, based on 50 years of experience (another change 

in draft), doctrine is now the basis for increased centrali

control through the joint force air component comman

(JFACC) concept and the air tasking order (ATO) process

The seductive effect of information technology is seen 

those proponents advocating stronger centralized cont

For example, some have advocated that future aerosp

operations not only require greater centralized control 

22 THE COMMAND OR CONTROL DILEMMA
increasingly centralized execution. Jeffery R. Barnett, in 

book Future War, argues that “only a centralized C2

 syst

has the potential to deconflict these factors in the chaos 

war . . . decentralized execution, effective in past wa

won’t answer this challenge.”82 He suggests that 

JFACC has the technology and should conduct future w

fare from the continental United States. Unfortunately, t

thinking increases the danger of military micromana

ment at a time when just the opposite is desired. As Coh

argues, “A general in Washington, an admiral in a co

mand ship or a theater commander in rear head-quart

may have access to almost the same information as a f

ward commander, and in some cases more. Those dist

commanders will often succumb to the temptation to m

nipulate individual units in combat accordingly.” 83 In m

ways, the ATO reflects JFACC micromanagement of 

power through centralized control.

Highly centralized, the ATO is the tool of inflexibil

The Gulf War Air Power Survey (GWAPS) Summary Rep

notes that “the ATO process used by the air planners a

commanders in Riyadh merely modified an approach lo

used within NATO; it also bore a striking family rese

blance to the way American planners had constructed a

executed air campaigns as far back as WWII.” 84 A comm

understanding was that “an airplane didn’t fly unless 

was in the ATO.”85 The reaction of one squadron co

mander to the ATO was typical: “By day three, the ATO w

basically a historical document that described what 

were supposed to do after we have already done it. Vir

ally all our tasking was received by phone and chan

were the rule.”86 Twenty percent of all air missions w

changed during the few hours between the printing of 

ATO and the time the aircrew launched. Still more chan

were made before the ATO was officially released or af

the aircraft had left their bases. 87 Much as our model p

dicts and as Cohen points out, “Sometimes these decisio

made sense; other times they did not. In all cases th

created great uncertainty among the pilots flying the m

sions.”88

The reaction of other services to the slow ATO proc

was equally harsh. One US marine described the A

ROMAN 
process as “an attempt to run a minute-by-minute air w

at a 72 hour pace.”89 US Marine Corps General Moore co

ments, “It [ATO] does not respond well to a quick-act

battlefield. If you’re trying to build a war for the next 72 

96 hours, you can probably build a pretty good war. Bu

you’re trying to fight a fluid battlefield like we were 

then you need a system that can react.” 90 There was e

criticism from a US Navy admiral claiming that the Ira

had figured out the 72-hour nature of the ATO and w

moving aircraft around within that window. 91 That Sadd

Hussein was able to operate within the OODA loop of 

Air Force gives him more credit than he deserves and 

probably more reflective of service parochialism about 

JFACC and ATO process than an accurate characteristic 

one of the world’s worst generals. However, the admira

correct about the ATO process being a dinosaur of ind

trial-age warfare, because the timeliness of the ATO ca

into question its value in a high-tempo war.

Perhaps the concept of “centralized command—dec

tralized control and execution” is an idea whose time h

come. Fast tempo warfare, with the need for balanced 

formation sharing and decision making, requires a n

command and control orientation. Cohen describes “a n

concept of high command, one that acknowledges t

technology inevitably diffuses authority will have to ta

root.”92 Certainly, if technology provides the means 

transmitting a 300-page ATO, that same technology co

be applied in making airpower more responsive. T

GWAPS Summary Report points out that “coalition co

manders relied on an air-tasking system whose cycle tim

. . . had not changed appreciably from the Vietnam era

It is little wonder then that the US Air Force had mu

greater success against stationary targets than against 

mobile Scud launchers; and this was against a relativ

benign enemy with a snail-like operations tempo. As 

Navy Capt Lyle G. Bien observes, “The 48-hour ATO cy

did not permit rapid response to mobile targets.” 94 T

becomes critical in the future if the number of mobile t

gets increase, or if enemies become more agile.

An organizational orientation is required that will ta

advantage of this information technology for faster inf

24 THE COMMAND OR CONTROL DILEMMA
mation-gathering and faster decision-making cycles. 

General Sullivan points out, “The present, regular, ‘c

veyor-belt’ pace of the machine age is over. Only fa

paced, adaptive organizations will succeed. . . .” 95 This 

quires greater emphasis on decentralized decision mak

at all levels of command. As Lt Col Michael Straight poi

out, “Decentralized decision making, guided by comman

intent, can help keep decentralized execution focused 

the JFACC’s centralized priorities as the information re

lution increases the number of decision-action cycles t

occur inside the ATO’s two-to-three-day limits.” 96

Are there disadvantages to an organizational orientat

that emphasizes less control and decentralized decis

making? Of course, there are those who argue that a

power is different from land and sea forces, justifying 

need for greater, not lesser, centralized control. Colo

Straight emphasizes that the Air Force works with a mu

narrower span of control with less emphasis on a doctri

concept meant to guard tempo, flexibility, and initiativ

However, he also points out that without an Air Force co

mander’s intent, higher operations tempo is difficult 

cause subordinate initiative is limited.

Any discussion of decentralized control immediat

brings forth historical failures of airpower, such as “pen

packets” during the North African campaign of World W

II and “route packaging” of Vietnam. 98 Less control a

greater decentralized decision making increases the dan

of fratricide, air space coordination problems, and mis

opportunities. However, these tactical-level proble

which the ATO addresses need to be balanced with 

operational-level benefits. Information technology h

come a long way in 25 years, calling into question a 

year-old process. A fresh organizational orientation 

needed that will increase operations tempo and initiat

without sacrificing the ability to concentrate effect.

The advantages of decentralized control in the fa

paced tempo of future wars makes it essential for the 

Force to relook the ATO process. Former Air Force chie

staff general Larry Welch said, “I believe we overcontrol

in Desert Storm. We did focus on the CINC’s intent . . . b

it took us 5000 pages and 72 hours to produce an ATO

ROMAN 
Gen Merrill A. McPeak, the Air Force chief of staff dur

Operation Desert Storm, expressed interest in explor

mission-type orders to try and shorten the ATO cycle, “I

a disgrace that modern air forces are still shackled t

planning and execution cycle that lasts three days. 

have hitched our jets to a hot air balloon. Even when t

lackluster C2

 system works properly, we are bound to f

feit much of the combat edge we know accrues to airpow

because of its flexibility and speed of response.” 100 As 

Air Force officer notes, “Mission-type orders are the la

tive for constipated communications.”101 However, inst

tional orientation continues to be that the ATO must 

centralized at the top. Thus, the only improvements sou

will be in shortening the ATO cycle, rather than looking 

alternatives. In any case, there appears to be little inter

in the Air Force joining the other services in advocatin

new command and control orientation. The high ope

tions tempo of future wars demands the Air Force to tak

fresh orientational perspective.

Recommendations and Conclusion

Technology is a tool, and humans decide how they w

organize and how they will use the tools available. A scre

driver can be used as an icepick, and one can pound na

with a laptop computer. Information technology— co

puter machines and communications devices—can ena

us to fight more effectively. If fighting more effectively is 

goal, the correct organizational orientation—one of m

command, less control—is needed. The following actio

must be taken.

$ Establish useful definitions clarifying the distinct

between command and control. By reinforcing the imp

tance of command, and decreasing the need for cont

the US military will go a long way in eliminating the con

sion and misunderstanding. In its present context, co

mand embraces planning, organizing, directing, coordin

ing, and controlling. Command is also a timeless conc

in spite of organizational changes and technological 

vances. The US military must resist efforts to hang ad

26 THE COMMAND OR CONTROL DILEMMA
tional attributes on the function of command because 

dilutes the most critical component of war: Command.

$ Recognize that information, by its very nature, is m

useful when not controlled. A characteristic of military 

erarchies is control of information. The US military m

take advantage of networked organizational orientation 

providing access to shared information at all levels of co

mand. Shared information reduces uncertainty and 

proves a commander’s decision-making cycle. Given 

danger of information overload, new technological inno

tions such as computer smart agents and data mining w

allow commanders to tailor their information-gathering 

pabilities to meet their specific needs. Shared informat

gathering allows for increased operations tempo.

$ Create flattened hierarchical organizations that p

mote decentralized decision making. Eliminating layers 

command provides the means for operating at higher te

pos. Decentralized control, with the unifying vision of co

mander’s intent, also encourages innovation and initiat

at the lowest levels of command.

$ Reexamine the doctrine of “centralized control, dec

tralized execution” against an information-age adversa

The JFACC and ATO concepts are a product of hierarchi

organizations and centralized control, perhaps the last v

tiges of excessive concern over “independence.” While eff

tive in industrial-age warfare, the limitations centrali

control places on timeliness, flexibility, and tempo cre

potentially serious problems should the US military face 

adversary operating at a faster operations tempo. The sa

technology that promotes greater centralized control c

also apply to decentralized control. At the operational lev

Boyd points out that the JFACC’s primary role is that 

“monitoring” and not “controlling.” Future enemies will 

smarter than Saddam Hussein.102 Defeating them requi

synchronized joint operations that promote decentrali

decision making and initiative.

In conclusion, van Creveld points out the relations

between technology, organizational orientation, and pro

dures. Too often, the US military has failed to exploit 

benefits of new technology because it is difficult to embr

a new organizational paradigm. Basil H. Liddell Hart sta

ROMAN 
that this is not an easy challenge. Yet, in order to fight 

high-tempo wars of the future where information techn

ogy will be critical, it is essential that the US military ta

on this challenge.

Centralized control exercised through hierarchical 

ganizations reflects old and dangerous thinking against 

ture enemies operating at a faster decision-making cy

As Carl H. Builder reminds us, “Each age of warfare 

quired different treasured capabilities. In agrarian-

warfare, strength and cunning were valued. In industr

age warfare, organization and discipline were valued. 

information-age warfare, the treasured capabilities 

knowledge and creativity.”103 Greater access to shared 

formation and decentralized decision making are key 

operating at the high tempos required in information-

warfare. The US military must have the organizational 

entation to take advantage of these capabilities. This 

quires more emphasis on command and less on cont

Failure to do so may result in a US military ill prepared 

information-age warfare.

Notes

1. Alvin and Heidi Toffler, War and Anti-War: Survival at the Daw

the 21st Century (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1993). Th

authors describe the differences between agrarian, industrial, and in

mation-age societies and militaries. While some have criticized 

categorization as oversimplified, the Tofflers’ writings are influen

within the US military.

2. Department of Defense, Annual Report to the President and 

Congress (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1995), 107.

3. USAF Scientific Advisory Board, New World Vistas: Air and Sp

Power for the 21st Century, Communications Volume draft (Washing

D.C.: Department of the Air Force, 1996), 17.

4. Ibid.

5. Joint Warfighting Center, draft, Warfighting Vision 2010 (Fort M

roe, Va.: Joint Chiefs of Staff, 1 August 1995), 19.

6. Maj Gen J. F. C. Fuller, Armament and History: A Study of 

Influence of Armament on History from the Dawn of Classical Warfar

the Second World War (New York: C. Scribner’s Sons, 1945), 158. Of n

on page 146, Fuller gives a scathing critique of Giulio Douhet’s motive

stating, “The secret which Douhet could not grasp was that inven

genius when stirred by the instinct of self-preservation knows no boun

He was a wonderful salesman, and like many people—a prophet of 

ridiculous.”

28 THE COMMAND OR CONTROL DILEMMA
7. Brig J. P. Kiszely, MC, “The Contribution of Originality to Mili

Success,” in The Science of War, ed. Brian H. Reid (London: Routle

1993), 44–45.

8. Thomas P. Coakley, Command and Control for War and Pe

(Washington, D.C.: National Defense University Press, 1992), 36.

9. Ibid.

10. Ibid., 41–42; and Martin van Creveld, Command in War (C

bridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1985), 263.

11. John R. Boyd, “Organic Design for Command and Control,” 

excerpt from A Discourse on Winning and Losing, a selection of unp

lished notes and visual aids, compiled from 1976 to 1992, 32.

12. Ibid.

13. This word association may be more psychological than pract

My thanks to Lt Col Chancel T. French, Retired, for educating me o

possibility of our habit of word association having historical origins da

to the Battle of Hastings in 1066. One outcome was the minglin

English, French, and Latin words on legal documents and in every 

usage. As a result, word associations like cease and desist, have 

hold, search and destroy, and command and control are now com

jargon. My thanks also to Col Richard Szafranski for explaining the R

sian usage of “duty terms” when talking about certain military subje

Command and control is a duty term.

14. Provided by US Marine Corps and US Air Force briefers during 

Air War College academic year 1995–1996. Used with permission.

15. Greg Todd, “C1 Catharsis,” Army, February 1986, 14.

16. JCS Pub 1-02, Department of Defense Dictionary of Military 

Associated Terms, 23 March 1994, 78. Emphasis added.

17. Ibid. Emphasis added.

18. Joint Pub 6-0, Doctrine for Command, Control, Communicati

and Computer (C4

) Systems Support (Washington, D.C.: Joint Chief

Staff, 30 May 1995), GL-6.

19. Todd, 14.

20. Joint Pub 1, Joint Warfare of the United States Armed Fo

(Washington, D.C.: National Defense University Press, 10 January 19

III-9.

21. Van Creveld, 9.

22. Ibid., 10.

23. JCS Pub 3, Doctrine for Joint Operations (Washington, D.C.: J

Chiefs of Staff, 1 February 1995), III-15.

24. Boyd, 5–12.

25. Gen Gordon R. Sullivan and Col James M. Dubik, War in 

Information Age (Carlisle Barracks, Pa.: US Army War College, 4 J

1994), 5.

26. Although Colonel Boyd cautioned against separating these fu

tions in a telephone interview on 20 March 1996, it is just this kin

“analysis” (or destructive deduction) he argues for in his 3 Septem

1976 “Creation and Destruction” notes, 5–17.

27. Frank M. Snyder, Command and Control: The Literature and C

mentaries (Washington, D.C.: National Defense University Press, 19

148.

ROMAN 
28. Ibid.

29. Ibid., 61.

30. Van Creveld, 238.

31. Alan D. Campen, ed., The First Information War (Fairfax, Va.: 

CEA International Press, 1992), 1.

32. US Space Command briefing given to the Air War College du

academic year 1995–1996. Used with permission.

33. Martin van Creveld, The Transformation of War (New York: 

Free Press, 1991), 109.

34. John F. Schmitt, “A Concept for Marine Corps Command 

Control,” in Science of Command and Control: Part III, eds. Alexande

Levis and Ilze S. Levis (Fairfax, Va.: AFCEA International Press, 1994), 

35. Ibid.

36. Ibid.

37. Ibid.

38. Ibid.

39. John P. Crecine and Michael D. Salomone, “Organization Th

and C3

,” in Science of Command and Control: Part II, eds. Stuar

Johnson and Alexander H. Levis (Fairfax, Va.: AFCEA International Pr

1989), 50.

40. Proceedings of the 1992 Symposium on Command and Con

Research, held at the Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, Calif., 12

June 1992, and compiled by Science Applications International Co

McLean, Va. Some of the better studies include “A C 3 Workstation U

ing Value-Based Message Scheduling” by J. E. Bake, L. P. Clare, J

Agree, and W. Heyman; “Horizontal and Vertical Structures in Sm

Teams: Team Performance and Communication Patterns” by Clint A. B

ers, Paul B. Kline, and Ben B. Morgan Jr.; “The Application of a Mode

Adaptive Decision Making to the Collection and Analysis of Domain 

pertise” by Peter D. Morgan; and “Examining Cognitive Processin

Command Crises: New HEAT Experiments on Shared Battle Graphics 

Time Tagging” by Dr. Paul J. Hiniker and Dr. Elliot E. Entin.

41. Crecine and Salomone, 50.

42. Maj George E. Orr, Combat Operations C3

I: Fundamentals 

Interactions (Maxwell AFB, Ala.: Air University Press, 1983), 87–88.

43. Maj John M. Vermillion, “The Pillars of Generalship,” Parame

Summer 1987, 11.

44. Edgar F. Puryear Jr., Nineteen Stars: A Study in Military Chara

and Leadership (Novato, Calif.: Presidio Press, 1981), 229.

45. Joint Pub 1, II-6.

46. Sir William Slim, Defeat into Victory (London: Cassell and C

pany, 1956), 292.

47. John Arquilla and David Ronfeldt, “Cyberwar Is Coming” (RA

Study P-7791, Air University Library, Document No. M-U 30352-16, 

7791), 2.

48. John Naisbitt, Megatrends (New York: Warner Books, 1982), 1–

49. Orr, 88.

50. Raymond C. Bjorklund, The Dollars and Sense of Command 

Control (Washington, D.C.: National Defense University Press, 1995), 7

51. Ibid.

30 THE COMMAND OR CONTROL DILEMMA
52. Van Creveld, Command in War, 108.

53. Daniel J. Hughes, ed., Moltke and the Art of War: Selected Writ

(Novato, Calif.: Presidio Press, 1993), 77. Italics added to highlight 

relationship between technology (i.e., the telegraph) and rapid deci

making.

54. Roger Beaumont, The Nerves of War (Fairfax, Va.: AFCEA Inte

tional Press, 1986), 28.

55. Maj Gen J. F. C. Fuller, Generalship: Its Diseases and Their C

(Harrisburg, Pa.: Military Service Publishing Co., 1936), 61.

56. Ibid., 83.

57. Vice Adm Jerry O. Tuttle, “C3

, An Operational Perspective

Science of Command and Control: Part II, eds. Stuart E. Johnson 

Alexander H. Levis (Fairfax, Va.: AFCEA International Press, 1989), 4.

58. Bjorklund, 83.

59. Ibid., 85.

60. FM 100-5, Operations, 14 June 1993, 6-6.

61. Maj David S. Fadok, John Boyd and John Warden: Airpow

Quest for Strategic Paralysis (Maxwell AFB, Ala.: Air University Pr

February 1995), 15.

62. FMFM 1-1, Campaigning, 25 January 1990, 73.

63. James G. Hunt and John D. Blair, eds., Leadership on the Fu

Battlefield (London: Pergamon-Brassey’s, 1985), 183.

64. Ibid.

65. I am deeply indebted to Maj Patrick Pope, a 2025 collea

whose wise counsel, shared interest, energy, and computer wiza

helped channel many of my random thoughts into a coherent pattern.

66. Barry R. Schneider, “Principles of War for the Battlefield of 

Future,” in Battlefield of the Future, eds. Schneider and Lawrenc

Grinter (Maxwell AFB, Ala.: Air University Press, September 1995), 36–

67. 1st Lt Gary A. Vincent, “A New Approach to Command and C

trol: The Cybernetic Design,” Airpower Journal, Summer 1993, 29 and 

68. Ibid., 30–31.

69. Ibid.

70. FM 100-5, 7-2 and 7-3.

71. FMFM 1-1, 72–73.

72. Naval Doctrine Publication (NDP) 1, Naval Warfare, 28 M

1994, 40–41.

73. Speed is referenced in both the draft Air Force Doctrine Docum

(AFDD)1, 15 August 1995, 24, and AFM 1-1, Basic Aerospace Doctrin

the United States Air Force, Vol. I, March 1992, 18. Of interest, the 1

version of AFM 1-1 reflects the Air Force thinking about timing and te

as a possible new principle of war, but any discussion of timing 

tempos was dropped in later versions of AFM 1-1.

74. FMFM 1-1, 32.

75. Gen Ronald R. Fogleman, “Getting the Air Force into the 2

Century,” speech to the Air Force Association’s Air Warfare Symposi

Orlando, Fla., 24 February 1995.

76. FM 100-5, 2-6.

77. FMFM 1-1, 61–62.

78. NDP 1, 40.

ROMAN 
79. AFDD 1 draft, 24. Italics added.

80. Eliot A. Cohen, “The Mystique of US Air Power,” Foreign Aff

January/February 1994, 389.

81. It is interesting that during Operation Desert Storm, the Air F

correctly identified Saddam Hussein’s hierarchical organizational orie

tion with its highly centralized control as a vulnerability. Destroyin

disrupting key control facilities and communications paths was ke

inducing strategic paralysis at all levels of Iraqi command. Yet, ironic

American-led airpower had a similar organizational orientation and, l

wise, similar vulnerabilities.

82. Jeffery R. Barnett, Future War: An Assessment of Aerospace C

paigns in 2010 (Maxwell AFB, Ala.: Air University Press, 1996), 33.

83. Cohen, 388.

84. Thomas A. Keaney and Eliot A. Cohen, Gulf War Air Power Su

Summary Report (Washington, D.C.: Department of the Air Force, 19

247.

85. John P. Hyde, Johann W. Pfeiffer, and Toby C. Logan, “CAF

Goes to War,” in The First Information War, ed. Alan D. Campen (Fair

Va.: AFCEA International Press, October 1992), 44.

86. Maj J. Scott Norwood, Thunderbolts and Eggshells: Composite 

Operations during Desert Storm and Implications for USAF Doctrine 

Force Structure (Maxwell AFB, Ala.: Air University Press, 1994), 24.

87. Cohen, 386.

88. Ibid.

89. Keaney and Cohen, 150.

90. Col Stephen J. McNamara, Air Power’s Gordian Knot: Central

versus Organic Control (Maxwell AFB, Ala.: Air University Press, 19

131.

91. Michael R. Gordon and Gen Bernard E. Trainor, The Gene

War: The Inside Story of the Conflict in the Gulf (Boston: Little, Brown 

Company, 1995), 320. Vice Adm Stanley Arthur, senior Navy officer in 

Persian Gulf, said that his intelligence officers were telling him that 

Iraqis were moving what combat planes remained in Iraq every day or 

having discovered that it took three days to get all but the most crit

targets on the allies’ target list.

92. Cohen, 118.

93. Keaney and Cohen, 237.

94. McNamara, 131.

95. Gordon and Dubik, 9.

96. Lt Col Michael Straight, “Commander’s Intent: An Aerospace 

for Command and Control?” Airpower Journal, Spring 1996, 48.

97. Ibid., 44.

98. One of my fondest memories of the Air War College experience 

be spirited arguments in the seminar room. None were more heated t

over the Air Force doctrinal (or to some, “dogmatic”) issue of “central

control.” I am deeply indebted to Lt Col Pivo Pivarsky, Lt Col Joe So

and Lt Col Gary Coleman—scholars and warriors all. Their intellig

and usually emotional, debate helped keep me focused.

32 THE COMMAND OR CONTROL DILEMMA
99. Maj Michael E. Fischer, Mission-Type Orders in Joint Air Op

tions: The Empowerment of Air Leadership (Maxwell AFB, Ala.: 

University Press, 1995), 55.

100. Maj James P. Marshall, Near-Real-Time Intelligence on the T

cal Battlefield (Maxwell AFB, Ala.: Air University Press, 1994), 66.

101. Lt Col J. Taylor Sink, Rethinking the Air Operations Center

Force Command and Control in Conventional War (Maxwell AFB, Ala.

University Press, 1994), 42.

102. The only officers more stupid than Saddam Hussein were 

sons-in-laws. They were killed “by angry relatives” shortly after return

from self-imposed exile for denouncing their father-in-law.

103. Mentioned during one of Carl Builder’s, a RAND analyst, m

visits to Air University in support of the Air Force 2025 study.

ROMAN