door, but she did not answer. Walker sent Butler a text message asking 

her why Pacheco was there and why she did not answer her door, but 

again, she did not respond. Later that evening, Walker called Butler and 

asked if he could pick up his dog; she responded that he could so long as he 

was "in and out." 

Walker and Johnson returned to the apartment while Pacheco 

was upstairs in Butler's bedroom. When Butler opened the door, Walker 

and Johnson immediately proceeded upstairs and began "talking trash" to 

Pacheco. Butler protested, and Walker came down, telling Johnson that 

they should not fight Pacheco and should just get the dog and leave. 

Johnson remained upstairs and continued "talking trash." Walker opened 

the back door to retrieve his dog and it immediately ran upstairs. Johnson 

shouted either "don't throw [Walker's] dog" or "don't touch [Walker's] dog," 

and Walker ran upstairs. Walker entered the bedroom with Butler close 

behind and Butler observed him punch Pacheco several times in the head. 

Butler intervened, but as Walker exited the room Johnson moved in and 

punched Pacheco several times before making a stomping motion on his 

head. Pacheco died the next morning as a result of multiple blunt force 

trauma injuries of the head, caused by one blow, which propelled the brain 

into the cranium, or multiple blows. 

We conclude that the jury could reasonably infer from the 

evidence presented that Walker was guilty of first-degree murder because 

he and Johnson committed burglary and Pacheco died as a result of 

injuries sustained in the perpetration of that burglary. See NRS 195.020 

(defining principals); NRS 200.030(1)(b) (murder committed in the 

perpetration of burglary is first-degree murder); NRS 200.481(1)(a) 

("Battery' means any willful and unlawful use of force or violence upon 

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the person of another."); NRS 205.060(1) (a person who enters a house 

with the intent to commit battery is guilty of burglary); see also SanchezDominguez v. State, 130 Nev. , P.3d (Adv. Op. No. 10, February 

27, 2014) (analyzing the meaning of "in the perpetration or); see also 

Anderson v. State, 121 Nev. 511, 515, 118 P.3d 184, 186 (2005) (Where 

alternate theories of culpability are presented, "[a] unanimous general 

verdict of guilt will support a conviction so long as there is substantial 

evidence in support of one of the alternate theories of culpability."). 

Whether Walker broke the chain of events flowing from the initial 

burglary and withdrew from any conspiracy by announcing his intent to 

leave and going downstairs was a factual determination for the jury to 

decide, Payne v. State, 81 Nev. 503, 507, 406 P.2d 922, 924 (1965), and a 

jury's verdict will not be disturbed where, as here, it is supported by 

sufficient evidence, see Bolden v. State, 97 Nev. 71, 73, 624 P.2d 20, 20 

(1981). 

Second, Walker contends that the district court abused its 

discretion by denying his motion for a severance because Johnson sent 

postcards stating that he believed it was his actions which caused 

Pacheco's death, and the joinder of their cases prevented him from 

confronting Johnson with the postcards. See Marshall v. State, 118 Nev. 

642, 647, 56 P.3d 376, 379 (2002) (severance is warranted where 'there is 

a serious risk that a joint trial would compromise a specific trial right of 

one of the defendants, or prevent the jury from making a reliable 

judgment about guilt or innocence" (quoting Zafiro v. United States, 506 

U.S. 534, 539 (1993))). The district court denied the motion because there 

was no indication that Johnson would testify on Walker's behalf if the 

trials were severed and their defenses were not antagonistic, but allowed 

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Walker to admit the postcards into evidence. See NRS 174.165(1) (if it 

appears a defendant will be prejudiced by joinder, the district court may 

grant a severance "or provide whatever other relief justice requires" 

(emphasis added)). We conclude that the district court did not abuse its 

discretion. See Marshall, 118 Nev. at 646-47, 56 P.3d at 379 (reviewing a 

district court's determination as to whether severance is warranted for an 

abuse of discretion). 

Third, Walker contends that the district court erred by 

denying his motion to set aside the verdict or for a new trial. Because 

sufficient evidence supports the verdict, we conclude that the district court 

did not err by denying Walker's motion to set aside the verdict. See State 

v. Purcell, 110 Nev. 1389, 1394, 887 P.2d 276, 278-79 (1994) (a court must 

set aside the verdict if "the prosecution has not produced a minimum 

threshold of evidence upon which a conviction may be based"). And 

because the record supports the district court's determination that there 

was no conflicting evidence which undermined the jury's verdict, we 

conclude that the district court did not abuse its discretion by denying 

Walker's motion for a new trial. See id. 

Fourth, Walker contends that the application of the felonymurder rule in this case constituted impermissible bootstrapping and 

produced an absurd result; therefore, he urges this court to revisit its 

holding in State v. Contreras, 118 Nev. 332, 337, 46 P.3d 661, 664 (2002) 

(rejecting defendant's argument regarding felony murder where the 

underlying felony is burglary with the intent to commit battery). We 

decline to do so. NRS 200.030(1)(b) states that first-degree murder 

encompasses murders committed in the perpetration of burglary, and NRS 

205.060(1) states that a person who enters an apartment with the intent 

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Pickering 

J. 

to commit battery is guilty of burglary; "[t]he legislative language is clear, 

and we are not persuaded that any policy considerations should override 

the legislature's determination that burglary should be one of the 

enumerated felonies appropriate to elevate a homicide to felony murder." 

Contreras, 118 Nev. at 337, 46 P.3d at 664; see also Sanchez-Dominguez, 

130 Nev. at , P.3d at (Adv. Op. No. 10 at 13) (the felony-murder 

rule holds felons "strictly accountable for the consequences of perpetrating 

a felony, and it is immaterial whether [the] killing is intentional or 

accidental"). 

Having considered Walker's contentions and concluded that 

they lack merit, we 

ORDER the judgment of conviction AFFIRMED. 

cc: Hon. Jerome Polaha, District Judge 

Law Office of Thomas L. Qualls, Ltd. 

Attorney General/Carson City 

Washoe County District Attorney 

Washoe District Court Clerk 

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