area handbook series

Spain

country study



Spain

country study

Federal Research Division

Library of Congress

Edited by

Eric Solsten

and Sandra W. Meditz

Research Completed

December 1988
On the cover: Windmills at Consuegra in Toledo Province

Second Edition, First Printing, 1990.

Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data

Spain: A Country Study.

Area Handbook Series, DA Pam 550-179

Research completed December 1988. Bibliography: pp. 355-384.

Includes index.

1. Spain. I. Solsten, Eric D., 1943- . II. Meditz, Sandra W.,

1950- . III. Library of Congress. Federal Research Division. IV. Area Handbook for Spain. V. Series. VI. Series: DA Pam 550-179.

DP17.S67 1990 946—dc20 90-6127 CIP

Headquarters, Department of the Army

DA Pam 550-179

For sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office Washington, D.C. 20402
Foreword

This volume is one in a continuing series of books now being

prepared by the Federal Research Division of the Library of Congress under the Country Studies—Area Handbook Program. The

last page of this book lists the other published studies.

Most books in the series deal with a particular foreign country,

describing and analyzing its political, economic, social, and national

security systems and institutions, and examining the interrelationships of those systems and the ways they are shaped by cultural

factors. Each study is written by a multidisciplinary team of social

scientists. The authors seek to provide a basic understanding of

the observed society, striving for a dynamic rather than a static portrayal. Particular attention is devoted to the people who make

up the society, their origins, dominant beliefs and values, their com- mon interests and the issues on which they are divided, the nature

and extent of their involvement with national institutions, and their

attitudes toward each other and toward their social system and

political order.

The books represent the analysis of the authors and should not

be construed as an expression of an official United States government position, policy, or decision. The authors have sought to adhere to accepted standards of scholarly objectivity. Corrections,

additions, and suggestions for changes from readers will be welcomed for use in future editions.

Louis R. Mortimer

Acting Chief

Federal Research Division

Library of Congress

Washington, D.C. 20540

iii

Acknowledgments

The authors wish to acknowledge the contributions of the fol- lowing individuals who wrote the 1976 edition of Spain: A Country

Study: David P. Coffin, Eugene K. Keefe, James M. Moore, Jr.,

Robert Rinehart, and Susan H. Scurlock. Their work provided some portions of the text. The authors are grateful to individuals in various agencies of

the United States government and in international and private

institutions who gave of their time, research materials, and special knowledge, providing both information and perspective. Officials at the World Bank and the United States Department of State were especially helpful in providing economic data. Similarly, offi- cials of the United States Department of Defense supplied up-todate information about Spain's defense forces. The staff of the

Embassy of Spain in Washington also provided valuable assistance

and material. Patrick Buckley made insightful comments on drafts of some of the text. The authors also wish to thank those who contributed directly

to the preparation of the manuscript. These include Richard F. Nyrop, who reviewed all drafts and served as liaison with the sponsoring agency; Richard Kollodge, Noel Beatty, Evan Raynes, and

Gage Ricard, who edited the chapters; Martha E. Hopkins, who

managed editing; Marilyn Majeska, who managed book production; and Barbara Edgerton, Janie L. Gilchrist, and Izella Watson,

who did the word processing. Carolyn Hinton performed the final prepublication editorial review, and Shirley Kessel, of Communicators Connections, compiled the index. Diann J. Johnson and

Malinda B. Neale of the Library of Congress Printing and Process- ing Section performed phototypesetting, under the supervision of

Peggy Pixley.

David P. Cabitto, who was assisted by Sandra K. Cotugno and

Kimberly A. Lord, provided invaluable graphics support. Susan

M. Lender reviewed the map drafts, which were prepared by

Kimberly A. Lord and Greenhorne and O'Mara. Kimberly A.

Lord also deserves special thanks for designing the illustrations for the book's cover and the title page of each chapter. Many photographs were graciously supplied by the National Tourist Office of

Spain in New York and the Embassy of Spain in Washington.

The authors also would like to thank several individuals who

provided research support. Arvies J. Staton supplied information on ranks and insignia, and Karen M. Sturges-Vera authored the

section on geography in chapter 2.

Contents

Page Foreword m

Acknowledgments v Preface xiii Country Profile XV Introduction xxvii Chapter 1. Historical Setting 1 Robert Rinehart and Jo Ann Browning Seeley

IBERIA 4 HISPANIA 5 AL ANDALUS 8 CASTILE AND ARAGON 10 THE GOLDEN AGE . 15 Ferdinand and Isabella 15 Charles V and Philip II 17 Spain in Decline 20

BOURBON SPAIN 20

War of the Spanish Succession 21 The Enlightenment 22 The Napoleonic Era 22 THE LIBERAL ASCENDANCY 24

The Cadiz Cortes 24

Rule by Pronunciamiento 25

Liberal Rule 26

THE CONSTITUTIONAL MONARCHY 29

The Cuban Disaster and the ' 'Generation of 1898" . 30

The African War and the Authoritarian Regime of Miguel Primo de Rivera 31 REPUBLICAN SPAIN 32

THE SPANISH CIVIL WAR 36

THE FRANCO YEARS 40

Franco's Political System 40

Policies, Programs, and Growing Popular Unrest ... 45

Foreign Policy under Franco 50

THE POST-FRANCO ERA 54

Transition to Democracy 54

Disenchantment with UCD Leadership 60

vii
Growth of the PSOE and the 1982 Elections 61 Spanish Foreign Policy in the Post-Franco Period .... 62

Chapter 2. The Society and Its Environment . 65

Robert P. Clark

GEOGRAPHY 69

External Boundaries and Landform Regions 69

Drainage 74

Climate 76

POPULATION 77

Size and Growth 77 Regional Disparities 79

Migration 82

ETHNICITY AND LANGUAGE 87

Government Policies 87

The Catalans 89

The Galicians 92

The Basques 93

The Andalusians 97

The Gypsies 99

SOCIAL STRATIFICATION 102

SOCIAL VALUES AND ATTITUDES 106

RELIGION 110

EDUCATION 116

Primary and Secondary Education 118

Higher Education 121 HEALTH AND WELFARE 123

Health Conditions and Mortality 124

Public Safety and Environmental Problems 126

Housing 128

Government Health and Welfare Programs 129

Chapter 3. The Economy 135

Benjamin Martin

CHARACTER AND DEVELOPMENT OF THE

ECONOMY 138

The Franco Era, 1939-75 139

The Post-Franco Period, 1975-1980s 143

ROLE OF GOVERNMENT 146

Economic Ministries 147

Budget and Fiscal Policy 147

HUMAN RESOURCES 148

The Unemployment Problem 150

The Underground Economy 151

viii
Labor Relations in the Franco Era 152

Labor Relations in the Post-Franco Period 153

AGRICULTURE 156

Agricultural Development 158

Regional Variation 161 Crops 162

Livestock 166

Forestry 167

Fisheries 168

Food Processing , 169

INDUSTRY 169

Industrial Development 169

Regional Concentration 172 National Industrial Institute 173

Manufacturing and Construction 176

Mining 181 ENERGY 182

Petroleum 182

Coal 184

Natural Gas 185

Electricity 185

SERVICES 186

Banking , 186

Stock Market Exchanges 190

Transportation and Communications 190

Tourism 195

FOREIGN ECONOMIC RELATIONS 198

Trading Partners 199

Foreign Investment 200

Spain and the European Community 201

Chapter 4. Government and Politics 205

Jo Ann Browning Seeley

CONSTITUTIONAL SYSTEM 208

The 1978 Constitution 210

Electoral System 212

GOVERNMENT 213

The Cortes 213

The King, the Prime Minister, and the Council of Ministers 216

The Judiciary 220

Regional Government 222

Local Government 226

Civil Service 228
POLITICS 229

Political Developments, 1982-88 231

Political Parties 237

Political Interest Groups 246

Mass Communications 257

FOREIGN RELATIONS 261

Spain and the European Community 261

Spain and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization . . . 263

Spain and the United States 265

Spain and Latin America 267

Gibraltar, Ceuta, and Melilla 269

Spain and the Middle East 272

Spain and the Soviet Union 272

Spain and France 273

Chapter 5. National Security 277

Jean R. Tartter THE MILITARY IN NATIONAL LIFE 280

Historical Role of the Armed Forces 281

The Civil War and Its Aftermath 283

The Military in Political Life 285

The Military in Society 288

EXTERNAL SECURITY PERCEPTIONS AND

POLICIES 290

JURISDICTION OVER NATIONAL DEFENSE 292

MILITARY COMMANDS AND ORGANIZATION 295

Army , 296

Navy 300

Air Force 302

Uniforms, Ranks, and Insignia 304

SOURCES AND QUALITY OF MANPOWER 305

TRAINING AND EDUCATION 309

MILITARY JUSTICE 311

THE DEFENSE BUDGET 312

DEFENSE PRODUCTION 313

PARTICIPATION IN NATO 316

MILITARY COOPERATION WITH THE UNITED

STATES 320

PUBLIC ORDER AND INTERNAL SECURITY 323

The Police System 324

Criminal Justice and the Penal System 331

Threats to Internal Security 334

Appendix. Tables 339

X
Bibliography 355

Glossary 385

Index 389

List of Figures

1 Spain, 1988 xxiv

2 The Reconquest: Reconquering Spain from the Moors .... 12

3 Europe in the Sixteenth Century , 18 4 Territorial Control During the Spanish Civil War,

1936-37 38

5 Topography and Drainage

, , 72

6 Population by Age and Sex, 1981 , 80

7 Administrative Divisions of Spain, 1988 82

8 Population Density by Province, 1986 86

9 Spain's Education System in the 1980s 120

10 Structure of Gross Domestic Product, 1988 ...... 160

11 Transportation System, mid-1980s 192

12 System of Government, 1988 214

13 Distribution of Seats in the Congress of Deputies

Following Selected Elections 230

14 Organization of National Defense, 1988 294

15 Major Military Installations, 1988 298

16 Officer Ranks and Insignia, 1988 , , . . 306

17 Enlisted Ranks and Insignia, 1988 307

18 Organization of Police Services, 1988 , 326

xi

Preface

Like its predecessor, this study is an attempt to treat in a compact and objective manner the dominant historical, social, eco- nomic, political, and military aspects of contemporary Spain.

Sources of information included scholarly books, journals, and

monographs, official reports of governments and international

organizations, numerous periodicals, and interviews with individuals having special competence in Spanish affairs. Chapter bibliographies appear at the end of the book; brief comments on sources recommended for further reading appear at the end of each chapter. Measurements are given in the metric system; a conversion

table is provided to assist readers unfamiliar with metric measure- ments (see table 1, Appendix ). A glossary is also included.

Although there are numerous variations, Spanish surnames

generally consist of two parts: the patrilineal name followed by the

matrilineal. In the instance of Felipe Gonzalez Marquez, for ex- ample, Gonzalez is his father's surname, and Marquez, his mother's

maiden name. In non-formal use, the matrilineal name is often

dropped. Thus, after the first mention, we have usually referred

simply to Gonzalez. A minority of individuals use only the

patrilineal name.

Xlll

Country Profile

Country

Formal Name: Spanish State. Short Form: Spain.

Term for Citizens: Spaniard(s).

Capital: Madrid.

Geography

Size: Peninsular Spain covers 492,503 square kilometers. Spanish

xv
territory also encompasses the Balearic Islands (Spanish, Islas Baleares) in the Mediterranean Sea and the Canary Islands (Spanish, Canarias) in the Atlantic Ocean, as well as the city enclaves

of Ceuta and Melilla in North Africa.

Topography: Peninsular landmass predominantly a vast highland

plateau—the Meseta Central—surrounded and dissected by mountain ranges. Major lowland areas include narrow coastal plains,

Andalusian Plain in southwest, and Ebro Basin in northeast.

Islands, especially Canary Islands, mountainous.

Climate: Predominantly continental climate with hot, dry sum- mers and rather harsh, cold winters. Wide diurnal and seasonal

variations in temperature and low, irregular rainfall. Maritime cli- mate prevails in northern part of country, characterized by rela- tively mild winters, warm but not hot summers, and generally

abundant rainfall spread throughout year. Slight diurnal and

seasonal variations in temperature. Mediterranean climate ex- perienced from Andalusian Plain along south and east coasts,

characterized by irregular, inadequate rainfall, mostly in autumn

and winter.

Society

Population: 38.8 million in 1986. Projected 40 million by 1990,

42 million by 2000. Rate of annual growth from 0.8 percent to 1.2 percent from 1930s to 1980s. Growth rates expected to level off or to decline slightly for remainder of twentieth century.

Education and Literacy: Primary education (age six to fourteen)

free and compulsory. Insufficient number of state schools and

teachers to meet this goal and rising enrollment. Gap filled by pri- vate schools subsidized by state. By early 1980s, 40 percent of all schools private. By 1965 country had achieved nearly universal

enrollment in primary grades. Secondary school attendance optional, but students deciding not to attend secondary school had

to attend vocational training until age sixteen. In 1985 estimated

89 percent of students did attend secondary school, and 26 per- cent attended university. Adult population 94-97 percent literate in late 1980s.

Health: Uneven provision of health care. Maldistribution of health care resources of state's welfare system resulted in poor service in many areas, especially working-class neighborhoods of large cities. High ratio of doctors to inhabitants, but low ratio of nurses to in- habitants and relatively low public expenditures on health care

xvi
compared with other West European countries. Tuberculosis,

typhoid, and leprosy not eradicated. Infant mortality rate 10 per

1,000 in 1985. Life expectancy seventy-four years for males and

eighty for females in late 1980s.

Languages: Castilian Spanish official language and dominant in usage, especially in formal settings, but estimated one of four Spanish citizens had a different mother tongue. New 1978 Constitution allows for other languages to be "co-official" within respective

autonomous communities. Catalan, Galician, Euskera (the Basque

language), Valencian, and Majorcan had such status by 1988.

Ethnic Groups: Spanish state encompassed numerous distinct eth- nic and cultural minorities. New 1978 Constitution recognizes and

guarantees autonomy of nationalities and regions making up Spanish

state, and seventeen autonomous communities existed in late 1980s.

Major ethnic groups: Basques, Catalans, Galicians, Andalusians,

Valencians, Asturians, Navarrese, and Aragonese. Also small number of Gypsies. Ethno-nationalistic sentiment and commitment to the ethnic homeland varied among and within ethnic communities.

Nationalist and separatist sentiment ran deepest among Basques.

Religion: 99 percent nominally Roman Catholic. Other 1 percent

mostly other Christian faiths. Small Jewish community. Society

generally becoming more secular as society and economy became more modern and developed. Religious freedom guaranteed by

1978 Constitution, which formally disestablishes Roman Catholicism as official religion. But church still enjoyed somewhat

privileged status. Continuing government financial aid to church was contentious issue in late 1980s.

Economy

Gross Domestic Product (GDP): US$340.1 billion in 1988

(US$8,702 per capita). Economy stagnant during late 1970s and

first half of 1980s, but real gross domestic product (GDP—see Glossary) growth averaged 3.3 percent in 1986 and 5.5 percent in 1987,

roughly double the West European rate. Agriculture: Made up about 5 percent of GDP in 1988 and employed about 15 percent of population. Very important producer

of citrus fruits, olive oil, vegetables, and wine. Agricultural products

made up more than 15 percent of country's exports. Productive

and modern farming along southern and eastern coasts able to meet

foreign competition. Small antiquated farms of northwestern region

threatened by Spain's membership in European Community

(EC—see Glossary). xvn
Industry: Made up about 30 percent of GDP and employed about

one-third of work force in late 1980s. Consisted of unprofitable

heavy industry segment, mainly government-owned, and profitable chemical and manufacturing components that accounted for most of Spain's exports.

Services: Accounted for about half of GDP in 1988. Tourism vital to the economy, and it alone made up about a tenth of GDP. In

1987 more than 50 million foreign tourists visited Spain.

Imports: US$49.1 billion in 1987. Because of a surging economy,

approximately one-fourth of this amount consisted of capital goods

and about one-fifth of consumer goods. Fuels made up approximately one- sixth. Exports: US$34.2 billion in 1987. Raw materials, chemicals, and

unfinished goods made up about one-third of this amount, as did

non-food consumer goods, most notably cars and trucks. Agricultural products and wine supplied about one-sixth of total exports.

Major Trade Partners: In 1987 63.8 percent of Spain's exports

went to the EC, which supplied Spain with 54.6 of its imports.

France was single biggest buyer of Spanish exports, taking 18.9

percent in 1987. Federal Republic of Germany (West Germany)

most important exporter to Spain, supplying 16.1 percent that year. United States accounted, respectively, for 8.3 and 8.1 of Spain's

imports and exports.

Balance of Payments: Spain without a positive merchandise

balance since 1960. However, large earnings from tourism and

remittances from Spaniards working abroad guaranteed a positive current account balance up through 1987.

General Economic Conditions: Strong growth since mid-1980s

and controlled inflation made Spain's economy one of Western

Europe's healthiest. Full membership in EC posed a threat for weaker sectors of the economy, both industrial and agricultural.

Spain had long had Western Europe's highest unemployment rate, more than 20 percent.

Exchange Rate: In March 1988, 113.49 pesetas (see Glossary) to US$1.

Fiscal year: Calendar year. Transportation and Communications

Railroads: State railroad system in late 1980s covered about 13,000

kilometers, half of which electrified. This national system used a xvm
broad gauge. A smaller state-owned system, operating mainly in

suburban areas of some northern cities, had over 1 ,000 kilometers

of narrow-gauge track in operation. In addition, there were some

small private railroads. Major modernization program for main

state system began in late 1980s.

Roads: Total road network amounted to about 320,000 kilometers

in 1986, of which 2,000 kilometers were super highways and about

20,000 were main roads. In 1980s roads were most important means

of moving people and goods.

Ports: About 200, of which 10 largest—Cartagena, Santa Cruz

de Tenerife, Bilbao, Barcelona, Gijon, Aviles, Puerto de la Luz,

Huelva, Valencia, and Seville (Spanish, Sevilla)—accounted for 75 percent of shipping.

Civil Airports: About forty. Half of these could receive international flights.

Telecommunications: Generally adequate facilities. Telephone sys- tem operated by government company that was in process of modernizing the network. Countrywide radio and television reception.

International communication provided by numerous coaxial submarine cables and two satellite ground stations.

Government and Politics

National Government: Parliamentary monarchy with hereditary

constitutional monarch as head of state. Under 1978 Constitution,

power centered in bicameral legislature—the Cortes (comprising

lower house, Congress of Deputies, and upper house, Senate). Both

houses elected by universal suffrage every four years (unless parliament dissolved earlier by head of state), but 350-member Congress

of Deputies uses proportional representation system, whereas Senate

contains 208 members elected directly as well as 49 regional

representatives. Congress of Deputies wields greater legislative

power. Leader of dominant political party in Cortes designated

prime minister and serves as head of government. Prime minister,

deputy prime minister, and cabinet ministers together make up

Council of Ministers, highest national executive institution with

both policy-making and administrative functions. Constitution also establishes independent judiciary. Judicial system headed by

Supreme Court. Also includes territorial courts, regional courts,

provincial courts, courts of first instance, and municipal courts. Constitutional Court resolves constitutional questions. Twentymember General Council of the Judiciary appoints judges and

maintains ethical standards within legal profession. Constitution

xix
also provides for public prosecutor and public defender to protect

both rule of law and rights of citizens. In 1980s legal system plagued

by severe shortage of funds, which resulted in persistent delays in

bringing cases to trial. Major revision of Penal Code under way

in late 1980s. Government staffed by professional civil service, tradi- tionally inefficient and cumbersome. Attempts to reform and to streamline it under way since 1982 but not fully successful. Regional Government: Traditionally rigidly centralized, unitary

state; however, 1978 Constitution recognizes and guarantees right

to autonomy of nationalities and regions of which state is composed.

In late 1980s, national territory divided among seventeen autonomous communities, each encompassing one or more previously existing provinces. Each autonomous community governed by statute of autonomy providing for unicameral legislative assembly elected

by universal suffrage. Assembly members select president from their ranks. Executive and administrative power exercised by Council

of Government, headed by president and responsible to assembly.

Division of powers between central government and autonomous

communities imprecise and ambiguous in late 1980s, but state had

ultimate responsibility for financial matters and so could exercise a significant degree of control over autonomous community activities. Another means of control provided by presence in each

region of central government delegate appointed by Council of

Ministers to monitor regional activities. Provincial government re- mained centralized in late 1980s. Headed by civil governors ap- pointed by prime minister, usually political appointees. Provincial

government administered by provincial council elected from among

subordinate municipal council members and headed by president.

Special provisions for Basque provinces, single-province autonomous communities, and Balearic and Canary Islands, as well as North African enclaves.

National Politics: Following death of Francisco Franco y Bahamonde in November 1975, King Juan Carlos de Borbon engineered

transition to democracy that resulted in transformation of dictatorial regime into pluralistic, parliamentary democracy. Prior to advent

of participatory democracy, little political involvement by citi- zens. Under Franco, Spanish society essentially depoliticized. But

after forty years without elections, parties revived and proliferated in months following Franco's death. In elections ofJune 1977,

party receiving largest number of votes was Union of the Democratic Center (Union de Centro Democratico—UCD), a centrist

coalition led by Adolfo Suarez Gonzalez. Leading opposition

party Spanish Socialist Workers' Party (Partido Socialista Obrero

xx
Espanol—PSOE) led by Felipe Gonzalez Marquez. Country in- creasingly disillusioned, however, by UCD government. UCD,

essentially a pragmatic electoral coalition, never developed coherent political program. Its brief success due almost entirely to charisma of Suarez. In October 1982 elections, PSOE registered a sweeping victory. Role of opposition party went to conservative

Popular Alliance (Alianza Popular—AP). PSOE able to form first majority one-party government since Civil War. Popularity of

Socialist government confirmed in May 1983 municipal and re- gional elections. PSOE adopted generally pragmatic rather than

ideological approach to pressing economic problems. Also undertook military and educational reforms, attempted to resolve problem

of Basque terrorism, and sought to develop more active international role for Spain. Gonzalez called for early elections in June

1986, and, although losing some seats, PSOE retained control of

Cortes. Official opposition embodied in Popular Coalition (Coalicion Popular—CP), which included AP, Popular Democratic Party

(Partido Democrata Popular—PDP), and Liberal Party (Partido

Liberal—PL). But 1986 elections also saw significant support for Democratic and Social Center (Centro Democratico y Social

CDS) under Suarez. Many observers believed CDS had potential

to develop into major opposition party, given disarray at ends of

political spectrum and growing move of party politics to center. After 1986 elections, Socialists faced increasing popular discontent,

and polls indicated decline in confidence in Gonzalez.

Regional Politics: In addition to major national parties and their

regional affiliates, political party system included numerous regional

parties that participated in regional elections and, in the case of

the larger parties, also in national elections. Most prominent mainstream parties were Basque Nationalist Party (Partido Nacionalista

Vasco—PNV) and Convergence and Union (Convergencia i Unio—CiU), a Catalan party. Catalan parties generally pragmatic

and moderate, but some Basque parties regarded as extremist and

leftist with ties to terrorist organizations.

Foreign Relations: Traditionally isolated from mainstream European affairs. Neutral in both world wars and ostracized during early

rule of Franco because of Franco's Fascist ties and dictatorial re- gime. But because of strategic location at western entrance to Mediterranean, drawn into United States orbit during Cold War.

Signed defense agreement with United States in 1953, subsequently

renewed at regular intervals. Nevertheless, latent anti-Americanism

persisted. Also permitted to join United Nations (UN). Following

Franco's death in 1975, main diplomatic goal to establish closer

xxi
ties with Western Europe and to be recognized as a West Europe- an democratic society. Became member of Council of Europe (see

Glossary) in 1977, EC in 1986, and Western European Union

(WEU) in 1988. Had already joined North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) in 1982, but membership controversial within

Spain. Socialists initially opposed membership, but ultimately came

to support limited membership, and public referendum in March

1986 confirmed Spain's membership. Other major foreign policy

objectives to increase Spanish influence in Latin America, to achieve return of sovereignty over Gibraltar to Spain, and to serve as bridge

between Western Europe and Arab world, in which Spain had

adopted generally pro-Arab stance. Latter goal complicated some- what by Spain's involvement with Morocco in dispute over

sovereignty of Spanish enclaves of Ceuta and Melilla.

International Agreements and Memberships: Member of UN

and its specialized agencies, International Monetary Fund (IMF

see Glossary), World Bank, General Agreement on Tariffs and

Trade (GAIT), and Organisation for Economic Co-operation and

Development (OECD—see Glossary). Within Europe, member of

Council of Europe, EC, WEU, and NATO. Also member of Inter- American Development Bank (IDB) and had observer status in

Andean Pact and Organization of American States (OAS). Bilateral

military agreements with United States begun in 1953 and subsequently renewed.

National Security

Armed Forces (1987): Total personnel on active duty, 320,300,

of which about 200,000 conscripts serving for twelve months.

Reserves totaled 1,085,000. Component services were army of

240,000 troops, navy of 47,300 (including 11,500 marines), and

air force of 33,000.

Major Tactical Military Units: Army had five divisions comprising eleven brigades: one armored division with two brigades, one

motorized division with three brigades, one mechanized division

with two brigades, and two mountain divisions each consisting of

two brigades. Other units included four independent brigades, two

armored cavalry brigades, one airborne brigade, and one paratroop

brigade—and Spanish Legion of 8,500 troops. All stationed in

peninsular Spain except 19,000 troops in North African enclaves,

10,000 in Canary Islands, and 5,800 in Balearic Islands. Navy combat forces included small carrier group, submarines, and missilearmed fast attack craft. Protective forces included destroyers, xxn
frigates, corvettes, and minesweepers. Air force had seven squadrons of fighter-bomber-interceptors in Combat Air Command

(Mando Aereo de Combate—MACOM), ten squadrons of ground

support aircraft in Tactical Air Command (Mando Aereo

Tactico—NATAC), moderate airlift and refueling capacity in Air

Transport Command (Mando Aereo de Transporte—MATRA),

and mixed capabilities in Canary Islands Air Command (Mando

Aereo de Canarias—MACAN).

Military Equipment (1987): Army had about 1,000 tanks, 1,200

armored personnel carriers, 650 other armored vehicles, 1,300

towed and self-propelled artillery pieces, 28 multiple rocket launchers, 1,200 mortars, 1,000 antitank and antiaircraft weapons, and

180 helicopters. Main operational units of navy were one small air- craft carrier, eight submarines, eight frigates, nine destroyers, ten

corvettes, and twelve fast-attack craft. Air force had more than 200

fighter aircraft, mostly of 1960s vintage, but was in process of ac- quiring 72 advanced F-18 Hornets from United States. Military Budget (1988): Defense budget of US$6.93 billion was

2 percent of GDP. Military expenditures among lowest in NATO

on per capita basis and as ratio of GDP.

Foreign Military Treaties: Bilateral military agreement with

United States, signed in 1953 and periodically renewed, covers United States use of four bases and several communications sites in Spain. Spain joined NATO in 1982 but rejected military in- tegration, storage of nuclear weapons on Spanish territory, and

use of Spanish forces abroad.

Internal Security Forces: Principal security agencies were Civil

Guard (force of 65,000 plus 9,000 auxiliaries) policing rural areas and National Police Corps (Cuerpo Nacional de Policia) of about

50,000 uniformed and 9,000 plainclothes officers in communities

of more than 20,000 inhabitants. Special Civil Guard and National

Police Corps units engaged against Basque extremists and other

terrorists. These national forces controlled by Ministry of Interior

supplemented by locally controlled municipal police and regional

police forces of three autonomous communities.

xxm
ftttantic

Ocean

Lisboi

Bay of 'Biscay

Guadalajara Madrid @

Badajoz

Toledo

Ciudad

Real •

Cordoba

Sevilla

Qolfo C&diz

International

boundary

® National capital

• Populated place

Malaga

50 100 Kilometers

1

1 l''

l

'

I 1

Granada

'Gibraltar {Br,}

i^yStrait of QiSraCtar

Ceuta ' s' a de

(So.) Atboran

(Sp.)

Figure 1. Spain, 1988

XXIV
XXV

Introduction

SINCE THE LATE 1950s, Spain has been transformed. A stagnant, inefficient economy, with a large and backward agricultural

sector, has become one of the most dynamic in Western Europe

and often produces the continent's highest growth rates. This trans- formation brought with it tremendous changes in where Spaniards

lived, in how they earned their livelihoods, and in their standard

of living. It also came to mean that Spain, long sealed off from

the social changes of Western Europe by a reactionary authoritarian

regime, gradually opened up and, in the course of a single generation, adopted the living habits and the attitudes of its more advanced neighbors. Most striking of all were two political events. The first, the fashioning of a working democracy that most Spaniards supported, was unique in the country's history. Perhaps

equally pathbreaking was the attainment of varying degrees of au- tonomy by the country's regions, in a radical departure from a

centuries-old tradition of centralized control from Madrid.

Only since the early 1960s have the doctrines of economic liber- alism been widely practiced in Spain. Traditional policy was based on high tariffs, protectionism, and a striving for economic self- sufficiency, practices which resulted in a backward Spanish econ- omy in 1960. At that time, agriculture was still very important be- cause slighdy under half of the population earned its living working on farms. The manufacturing sector consisted mainly of small, privately owned firms, using outmoded methods of production, or

of large, inefficient, state-run enterprises, specializing in heavy in- dustry. Only the Basque Country (Spanish, Pais Vasco; Basque,

Euskadi) and Catalonia (Spanish, Catalufia; Catalan, Catalunya)

had experienced an industrial revolution, but both the former's

heavy industry and the latter' s textile production were dependent on the domestic market for sales and on protection from foreign

competition.

Spanish industry had profited hugely from World War I, but, once peace returned, it was unable to meet the demands of free trade. Therefore, the government resorted to traditional protectionism to keep the country's businesses running. The Civil War

of 1936-39 so devastated the economy that the living standards

of the mid- 1930s were not matched again until the early 1950s.

The political regime established by the war's victor, Francisco

Franco y Bahamonde, showed its essentially traditional character

by embracing the principle of national economic self-sufficiency xxvn
and by codifying it into the doctrine of autarchy. Stringent import

controls and extensive state participation in the industrial sector,

through large state-owned and state-operated enterprises, became

characteristic features of the economy. Protectionism preserved in- efficient businesses, and state controls prevented agricultural in- novation or made it pointless. Labor was rigidly controlled, but

job security was provided in return. While Western Europe's economies experienced a miraculous

rebirth in the 1950s, Spain's economy remained dormant. Lack

of growth eventually forced the Franco regime to countenance

introduction of liberal economic policies in the late 1950s. The so- called Stabilization Plan of 1959 did away with many import restrictions; imposed temporary wage freezes; devalued the nation's

currency, the peseta (for value of the peseta—-see Glossary); tied

Spain's financial and banking operations more closely to those of

the rest of Europe; and encouraged foreign investment. After a

painful start, the economy took off in the early 1960s, and, during

the next decade, it grew at an astonishing pace. The Spanish gross national product (GNP—see Glossary) expanded at a rate twice

that of the rest of Western Europe. Production per worker doubled, while wages tripled. Exports grew by 12 percent a year, and

imports increased by 17 percent annually. Between 1960 and 1975,

agriculture's share of the economically active population fell by

almost half, while the manufacturing and service sectors' shares

each rose by nearly a third. Some of this growth was caused by

tourism, which brought tens of millions of Europeans to Spain each

year, and by the remittances of Spaniards working abroad. Without

the liberalization of the economy, however, the overall gains would

not have been possible. Liberalization forced the economy to be more market-oriented, and it exposed Spanish businesses to for- eign competition.

The first and the second oil crises of the 1970s ended this ex- traordinary boom. An excessive dependence on foreign oil, insuffi- cient long-term investments, structural defects, and spiraling wage

costs made Spain unusually susceptible to the effects of the worldwide economic slump of the late 1970s and the early 1980s. Spain's

economy languished until the second half of the 1980s, and during this time the country was afflicted by an unemployment rate

that often exceeded 20 percent, higher than that of any other major

West European country.

The sensational victory of the Spanish Socialist Workers' Party

(Partido Socialista Obrero Espariol—PSOE) in the national elec- tion of 1982 gave it an absolute majority in Spain's Parliament,

the Cortes, and allowed it to introduce further liberal economic

xxvin
measures that previous weak governments could not consider. The

Socialist government, headed by the party leader and prime

minister, Felipe Gonzalez Marquez, opted for orthodox monetary

and fiscal policies, for wage austerity, and for the scaling down

of wasteful state enterprises. The government's policies began to bear fruit in the second half of the decade, when the economy once

again had the fastest growth rates in Western Europe. Many large

manufacturing companies and financial institutions had recordbreaking profits, and inflation was kept under control. One reason for the government's interest in reforming the econ- omy was Spain's admission to the European Community (EC) in 1986. If the country were to benefit from EC membership, it would

have to be able to meet unrestricted foreign competition. At the

end of 1992, when a single EC market was to come into being,

virtually all restrictions shielding Spain's economy against competition from other members of the organization would end. This

change meant that Spanish firms had to be strong enough to thrive

in a more rigorous commercial climate. In mid- 1989 the peseta was believed to be sufficiently healthy for the country to join the

European Monetary System (EMS), which tied the peseta to the

other EC currencies. The country's financial institutions were

undergoing a long strengthening process of reorganization and consolidation. Portions of the agricultural sector had also been modernized, and, given the advantage of Spain's Mediterranean climate,

they were well poised to hold their own with the commercialized

farming of other EC countries. In short, in thirty years Spain's

economy had undergone a profound transformation and had joined

the European mainstream.

The economic boom of the 1960s and the early 1970s had social

effects that transformed Spain in a single generation. First, there was a great movement of population from the countryside to those

urban areas that offered employment, mainly Madrid, Barcelona,

and centers in the Basque Country. A rapid mechanization of

agriculture (the number of tractors in Spain increased sixfold during the boom) made many agricultural workers redundant. The

need for work and the desire for the better living standards offered

in urban centers, spurred about five million Spaniards to leave the

countryside during the 1960s and the early 1970s. More than one

million went to other countries of Western Europe. The extent of

migration was such that some areas in Extremadura and in the

high Castilian plateau appeared nearly depopulated by the mid1970s.

Urbanization in the 1960s and the 1970s caused cities to grow

at an annual rate of 2.4 percent, and as early as 1970 migrants

xxix
accounted for about 26 percent of the population of Madrid and

for 23 percent of that of Barcelona. After the mid-1970s, however,

this mass migration slowed down appreciably, and some of the

largest urban areas even registered a slight decrease in population

in the 1980s.

Another result of the economic transformation was a dramatic

rise in living standards. In the 1940s and the 1950s, many Spaniards were extremely poor, so much so that, for example, cigarettes could

be bought singly. By the late 1980s, the country's per capita in- come amounted to more than US$8,000 annually, somewhat lower

than the West European average, but high enough for Spanish con- sumption patterns to resemble those of other EC countries. In 1960

there were 5 passenger cars per 1,000 inhabitants; in 1985, there were 240. In the same period, the number of television sets showed

a similar increase, and the number of telephones per capita in- creased sixfold. Access to medical care was much better, and the

infant mortality rate had decreased so greatly that it was lower than

the EC average. In addition, many more Spaniards received higher

education.

However, the economic boom was not an unmixed blessing.

Housing in many urban regions was often scarce, expensive, and

of poor quality. Although many new dwellings were built, the results were frequently unappealing, and there were unhealthy tracts of

cramped apartment buildings with few amenities. City transportation systems never caught up with the influx of people, and the

road network could not accommodate the explosion in car ownership made possible by increased incomes. An already inadequate

social welfare system was also swamped by the waves of rural immigrants, often ill-prepared for life in an urban environment.

Widespread unemployment among the young, usually estimated

at about 40 percent in the late 1980s, caused hardship. Material

need, coupled with a way of life remote from the habits and the

restrictions of the rural villages from which most migrants came,

often resulted in an upsurge of urban crime. The boom also had

not touched all sections of the country. Some areas, for example,

had twice the per capita income of others.

The material transformation of Spain was accompanied by a social transformation. The Roman Catholic Church lost, in a single

generation, its role of social arbiter and monitor. Traditionally one

of the most rigid and doctrinaire churches in Western Europe, the

Spanish church had enjoyed a privileged role under the Franco re- gime. Although significant elements of the church had fought

against oppressive aspects of the regime and for democracy, especially after the Second Vatican Council (1962-65), the church as

xxx
a whole had been comfortable with the regime. The church supervised the education system, supported the bans on divorce and abortion, and in general counseled submission to political authorities.

This close relationship ended after the death of Franco in 1975.

The 1978 Constitution separates church and state, and it deprives

Roman Catholicism of the status of official religion. Subsequent

legislation brought education under secular control, liberalized press laws, permitted pornography; and, in the first half of the 1980s,

both divorce and abortion became legal. More significant than these

formal changes was the secularization of the Spanish people. Church

attendance dropped significantly, and by the early 1980s only about

30 percent of Spaniards viewed themselves as practicing Roman

Catholics, compared with 80 percent in the mid-1960s. Moreover,

about 45 percent of Spaniards declared themselves indifferent, or even hostile, to religion. This attitude was reflected in the precipi- tous drop in the number of Spaniards choosing religious vocations,

and it was evidence of the loss of religion's central place in many

people's lives. Another indication of the lessening importance of religion was

the absence of any successful nationwide religious political party.

Although there were impassioned debates about the legalization

of divorce and about the proper role of the Roman Catholic Church

in the national education system in the early 1980s, religion was

no longer the highly divisive element it had so often been in Spanish politics, and the Roman Catholic Church refrained from en- dorsing political parties before elections. In contrast to the Second

Republic (1931-36), when anticlericalism was a powerful force,

many church-going members of leftist parties in the post-Franco

era saw no contradiction between their political affiliations and regular church attendance.

Some secular creeds also lost the place they had once filled in

public life. The anarchist movement that had been so important

for most of the century up to the end of the Civil War was nearly

extinct by the end of Franco's rule. Other left-wing movements

that survived the years of Francoist oppression either adapted to the new economic and social circumstances or were marginalized.

Old sets of political beliefs faded away in new economic and social

conditions.

Social attitudes changed, too. Migration separated many people

from old ways of thought. Moreover, the enormous influx of for- eign tourists brought in new social and political attitudes, as did

the movement of large numbers of Spanish workers back and forth

between their country and the rest of Western Europe. Migration

broke down the patron-client relationship that had been characteristic

xxxi
of Spaniards' relationships with the government. Using informal

personal networks and petitioning the well-placed to obtain desired

government services became, within the space of a few decades,

much less common. Persistent, but not wholly effective, reforms

of the civil service also aimed at increasing the impartiality of public

institutions.

Personal relations changed as well. The position of women improved as the legalization of divorce and birth control gave women

more freedom than they had traditionally enjoyed. Although divorce was still not common in Spain in the 1980s, families had become

smaller. The extended family continued to be more important in

Spain than it was in Northern Europe, but it had lost much of its earlier significance. Legal reforms made women more equal before the law. The expanding economy of the 1960s and the late 1980s employed ever more women, although at a rate considerably below that in Northern Europe.

The social and the economic changes that occurred during the

1960s and the early 1970s convinced segments of the Franco re- gime that autocratic rule was no longer suitable for Spain and that a growing opposition could no longer be contained by traditional means. The death of Franco made change both imperative and possible. There was no one who could replace him. (His most likely successor had been assassinated in 1973.) Franco's absence allowed

long- submerged forces to engage in open political activity. Over

the course of the next three years, a new political order was put

in place. A system of parliamentary democracy, rooted in a widely

accepted modern constitution, was established. For the first time

in Spanish history, a constitution was framed not by segments of

society able to impose their will but by representatives of all significant groups, and it was approved in a referendum by the people as a whole.

Given the difficulties this process entailed, Spain was fortunate

in several regards. In addition to a population ready for peaceful

change, there was political leadership able to bring it about. A skilled Francoist bureaucrat, Adolfo Suarez Gonzalez, guided the governmental apparatus of the Franco regime in disassembling itself and

in participating peacefully in its own extinction. Another favorable circumstance was that the king, Juan Carlos de Borbon, chosen and educated by Franco to maintain the regime, worked instead

for a constitutional monarchy in a democratic state. The king's

role as commander in chief of the armed forces and his good per- sonal relations with the military served to keep the military on the

sidelines during the several years of intense political debate about

how Spain was to be governed. Yet another stroke of good fortune xxxn
was that Spain's political leadership had learned from the terrible

bloodletting of the Civil War that ideological intransigence pre- cluded meaningful political discourse among opposing groups. The

poisonous rancors of the Second Republic, Spain's last attempt at democratic government, were avoided, and the political elite that

emerged during the 1970s permitted each significant sector of so- ciety a share in the final political solution. Suarez's legalization

in April 1977 of the Communist Party of Spain (Partido Comunista

de Espana—PCE), despite much conservative opposition, was the

most striking example of this openness.

The first free elections in more than forty years took place in June 1977, and they put Suarez's party, the Union of the Democratic Center (Union de Centro Democratico—UCD) in power.

The UCD also won the next elections in 1979, but it disintegrated

almost completely in the elections of 1982. The UCD, a coalition

of moderates of varying stripes, had never coalesced into a genuine

party. It had, however, been cohesive enough to be the governing

party during much of an extraordinary transition from autocratic

rule to democracy, and it had withstood serious threats from a violent right and left. The UCD's successor as a governing party was Spain's socialist party, the PSOE, under the leadership of Felipe Gonzalez Marquez,

a charismatic young politician. Gonzalez had successfully wrested

control of the party away from the aging leadership that had di- rected it from exile during the dictatorship, and he was able to modernize it, stripping away an encrustation of Marxist doctrine.

Gonzalez and his followers had close ties to the West German Social Democrats and they had learned from their example how to form and to direct a dynamic and pragmatic political organization. The PSOE's victory at the polls in 1982 proved the strength

of Spain's new democracy in that political power passed peacefully to a party that had been in illegal opposition during all of Franco's

rule. Once in office, Gonzalez and the PSOE surprised many by in- itiating an economic program that many regarded as free-market

and that seemed to benefit the prosperous rather than working people. The government argued that only prosperity—not poverty

could be shared, and it aimed at an expansion of the economy rather

than at the creation of government social welfare agencies, however

much they were needed. Many of the large and unprofitable state firms were scaled down. The Socialist government also reversed

its stand on North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) membership, and it successfully urged that the voters support Spain's

remaining in the alliance in a referendum in early 1986. One reason

xxxin
the PSOE reversed its position was that it came to see that NATO

membership could contribute to the democratization of Spain's

armed forces. The government also worked toward this goal by

modernizing the military, by reducing its size, by reforming its promotion procedures, and by retiring many of its older officers. Nevertheless, the government retained part of its early position on

defense by insisting that the United States close some of its military bases in Spain and by placing some limits on Spain's participation in the alliance. The governing PSOE was faithful to its origins, in that it some- what reformed the education system, and it increased access to schooling for all. There were improvements in the country's backward social welfare system as well. Critics charged, however, that

the Socialist government paid insufficient attention to the more immediate needs of ordinary Spaniards. In the second half of the

1980s, even the PSOE's own labor union, the General Union of

Workers (Union General de Trabaj adores—UGT), bitterly contested the government's economic policies. In December 1988, the

UGT and the communist-controlled union, the Workers' Commissions (Comisiones Obreras—CCOO), mounted a highly successful, nationwide general strike to emphasize their common

contention that the government's economic and social policies hurt

wage-earners. Critics within the labor movement were also incensed

at the tight control Gonzalez and his followers had over the PSOE,

which effectively eliminated any chance of deposing them.

As the 1980s drew to an end, the PSOE, despite a steady ero- sion of electoral support in national elections, continued to be

Spain's most powerful political party, by far. This continuing pre- eminence was confirmed by the national elections held on October

29, 1989. Gonzalez had called for the elections before their originally scheduled date of June 1990, because the party leadership

believed that the belt-tightening measures needed to dampen in- flation and to cool an over-heated economy could only hurt the

party's election chances. They thought it opportune to hold the

elections before painful policies were imposed. In addition, the

PSOE was encouraged by its success in the elections for the European Parliament in June 1989. The Socialists based their campaign on the premise that Spain needed the continuity of another four

years of their rule in order to meet the challenges posed by the country 's projected full participation in the EC's single market at the

end of 1992.

In what was generally regarded as a lackluster contest, the opposition countered by pointing to the poor state of public services

and to the poor living conditions of many working people; by

xxxiv
suggesting possible reforms of the terms of service for military conscripts; and by decrying the Socialists' arrogance, abuse of power,

and cronyism after seven years in office. An important bone of contention was the government's alleged manipulation of television news to benefit the PSOE's cause, a serious issue in a country where

newspaper readership was low, compared with the rest of Western

Europe, and where most people got their news from television.

The PSOE was expected to suffer some losses, but probably to retain its absolute majority in the Congress of Deputies (the lower

chamber of the Cortes). At first it appeared to have held its majority,

but a rerun in late March 1990 in one voting district because of

irregularities reduced the number of its members in the Congress

of Deputies to 175, constituting exacdy half that body, an appreciable drop from the 184 seats the PSOE had controlled after the 1986

national election. The most striking gains were made by the PCEdominated coalition of leftist parties, the United Left (Izquierda

Unida—IU), which, under the leadership of Julio Anguita, in- creased the number of its seats in the Congress of Deputies from

seven to seventeen. The moderately right-wing People's Party

(Partido Popular—PP), which until January 1989 bore the name

Popular Alliance (Alianza Popular—AP), gained 2 seats for a total of 107 —an excellent showing, considering that the group had a new leader, Jose Maria Aznar, because its long-time head, Manuel

Fraga Iribarne, had stepped down just weeks before the election.

One reason there was still no effective party on the right, a decade

after the promulgation of the Constitution, was that Fraga had never been able to shake off his Francoist past in the eyes of many voters. A new, young, and effective leader of the PP could conceivably

change this situation in the 1990s.

Another obstacle to the PP's political dominance was the exis- tence of several moderately conservative regional parties that

received support that the PP otherwise might have claimed. The

largest of these parties, Convergence and Union (Convergencia

i Unio—CiU), was the ruling political force in Catalonia and won

eighteen seats in the Chamber of Deputies, a result identical to that of 1986. Second in importance was the venerable Basque

Nationalist Party (Partido Nacionalista Vasco—PNV), which won

five seats, one less than in 1986. As of early 1990, the PP had been

unable to come to an accommodation with the conservative nationalist movements these parties represented.

Suarez's new party, the Democratic and Social Center (Centro

Democratico y Social—CDS), stumbled badly, losing a quarter

of its seats for a total of fourteen. His party was believed to have

been hurt by its collaboration with the PP in the previous June's xxxv
European Parliament elections, a move seen by voters as yet another

indication that Suarez still had not formed a party with a distinct

program.

In addition to the establishment of a democratic system of government, the other historic achievement of post-Franco Spain was a

partial devolution of political power to the regional level through

the formation of seventeen autonomous communities. This development was nearly as significant as the first, for it broke with the

tradition of a highly centralized government in Madrid that had

been a constant in Spanish history since the late Middle Ages.

Despite the weight of this tradition, centrifugal forces had persisted.

Various peoples within Spain remembered their former freedoms,

kept their languages and traditions alive, and maintained some

historical rights that distinguished them from the Castilian central

government. Most notably conscious of their separate pasts were

the Basques and the Catalans, both of which groups had also been

affected by nationalist movements elsewhere in nineteenth-century

Europe. During the Second Republic, both peoples had made some

progress toward self-government, but their gains were extinguished

after Franco's victory, and they were persecuted during his rule. Use of their languages in public was prohibited, leading nationalist figures were jailed or were forced into exile, and a watchful

campaign to root out any signs of regional nationalism was put

in place.

During the period of political transition after Franco's death,

regional nationalism came into the open, most strongly in the

Basque Country and in Catalonia, but also in Galicia, Navarre

(Spanish, Navarra), Valencia, and other regions. Regional politicians, aware that their support was needed, were able to drive hard

bargains with politicians in Madrid and realized some of their aims.

The 1978 Constitution extends the right of autonomy to the regions

of Spain. Within several years of its adoption, the Basques, the

Catalans, the Galicians, the Andalusians, and the Navarrese had

attained a degree of regional autonomy. Publications in Catalan,

Galician, Basque, and other languages became commonplace; these

languages were taught in schools at government expense, and they were also used in radio and television broadcasts. Dozens of regional

political parties of varied leanings sprang up to participate in elec- tions for seats in the parliaments of the newly established autonomous communities.

Many conservatives regarded this blossoming of regionalism as an insidious attack on the Spanish state. Portions of the military

resolved to fight decentralization at all costs, using force if necessary. Elements of the Basque nationalist movement were also

xxxv1
dissatisfied with the constitutional provisions for regional autonomy. In contrast to the ultraright, however, they regarded the provisions as too restrictive. They therefore decided to continue the

armed struggle for an independent Basque state that they had begun

in the last years of the Franco regime. They reasoned that a campaign of systematic attacks on the security forces would cause the

military to retaliate against the new democratic order and, perhaps,

to destroy it. The strategy of the Basque terrorist organization, Basque Fatherland and Freedom (Euskadi Ta Askatasuna—ETA), nearly suc- ceeded. During the late 1970s and the 1980s, the ETA assassinated

hundreds, many of whom were policemen or military men. These

killings were a key factor behind a number of planned military

coups, nearly all of which were aborted. A large-scale coup did occur in February 1981, during which the Cortes was briefly oc- cupied by some military men; however, the courageous and expeditious intervention of King Juan Carlos, the commander in chief

of Spain's military forces, on the side of the new democratic order,

ended the dangerous incident.

Many observers contend, however, that the February 1981 coup

did cause a slowing of the movement toward regional autonomy.

In the next two years, the remainder of Spain's regions became

autonomous communities, but with a less extensive degree of in- dependence than that argued for by many regional politicians during

constitutional negotiations. The Organic Law on the Harmonization of the Autonomy Process (Ley Organica de Armonizacion del

Proceso Autonomico—LOAPA), passed in the summer of 1981,

brought the process of devolution under tighter control. In subsequent years, there were gains in political power at the regional level,

but the goals of self-government set in the late 1970s were only

slowly being realized.

Separatist terrorism was still a problem in Spain at the end of

the 1980s, but it was no longer the potentially lethal issue for Spanish

democracy that it had been in the late 1970s. The ETA continued

to kill, but at a greatly reduced rate. Increased Basque political

independence and the establishment of an indigenous police force

in the Basque Country undercut much of the popular support the

ETA had enjoyed in the last years of the Franco era and in the

first years of the democratic transition. Occasional terrorist outrages

that claimed the lives of ordinary citizens also eroded local support. Moreover, police successes in capturing or killing many

ETA leaders took their toll on the organization, as did belated

international support in fighting terrorism, particularly that provided by French authorities. A policy of granting pardons to xxxvn
members of the ETA not linked to acts of violence was also effective.Violence from the right also declined. Ultrarightist elements in

the armed forces were dismissed, or they retired, and the military

as a whole had come to accept the new democracy. The Spanish

people's overwhelming support for democracy and the election suc- cesses of the PSOE also undercut any tendency of the military to stage a coup. Military interventions in politics had traditionally

been based on the notion that the armed forces were acting on the

behalf of, or at the behest of, the Spanish people, and that the mili- tary were therefore realizing the true will of Spain. The legitimacy

conferred on the new political system by nearly all segments of so- ciety made such reasoning impossible.

However reduced violence had become, it was still troubling. In November 1989, two Basques elected to the Chamber of Deputies were shot in a restaurant in Madrid. One of the deputies died; the

other was seriously wounded. Police believed that ultrarightist killers had attacked the two men, both of whom had ties to the ETA. The

action provoked extensive public demonstrations and some street violence.

Whether or not this dark side of regional politics would continue

to be significant through the 1990s was uncertain. It appeared likely,

however, that regionalism would play an even greater role in the

1990s than it had since the transition to democracy. Much politi- cal energy would be needed to arrange a mutually satisfactory rela- tionship between the Spanish state and its constituent nationalities. The degree to which the autonomous communities should gain full autonomy, or even independence, was likely to be much debated;

however, the wrangling, fruitful or futile, could be done peacefully, within the context of Spain's new democracy.

April 9, 1990 Eric Solsten

XXXVlll
Chapter 1. Historical Setting
El Escorial, northwest of Madrid, built by Philip II in the second half of

the sixteenth century
THE NATIONAL HISTORY of Spain dates back to the fifth century A.D., when the Visigoths established a Germanic successor state in the former Roman diocese of Hispania. Despite a period

of internal political disunity during the Middle Ages, Spain

nevertheless is one of the oldest nation-states in Europe. In the late fifteenth century, Spain acquired its current borders and was united

under a personal union of crowns by Ferdinand of Aragon (Spanish, Aragon) and Isabella of Castile (Spanish, Castilla). For a period

in the sixteenth and the seventeenth centuries, Portugal was part

of that Iberian federation. In the sixteenth century, Spain was the foremost European

power, and it was deeply involved in European affairs from that

period to the eighteenth century. Spain's kings ruled provinces scat- tered across Europe. The Spanish Empire was global, and the

influence of Spanish culture was so pervasive, especially in the

Americas, that Spanish is still the native tongue of more than 200

million people outside Spain.

Recurrent political instability, military intervention in politics,

frequent breakdowns of civil order, and periods of repressive

government have characterized modern Spanish history. In the

nineteenth century, Spain had a constitutional framework for parliamentary government, not unlike those of Britain and France,

but it was unable to develop institutions capable of surviving the

social, economic, and ideological stresses of Spanish society.

The Spanish Civil War (1936-39), which claimed more than

500,000 lives, recapitulated on a larger scale and more brutally

conflicts that had erupted periodically for generations. These conflicts, which centered around social and political roles of the Roman

Catholic Church, class differences, and struggles for regional auton- omy on the part of Basque and Catalan nationalists, were repressed

but were not eliminated under the authoritarian rule of Nationalist leader Generalissimo Francisco Franco y Bahamonde (in

power, 1939-75). In the closing years of the Franco regime, these

conflicts flared, however, as militant demands for reform increased

and mounting terrorist violence threatened the country's stability.

When Prince Juan Carlos de Borbon became king of Spain fol- lowing Franco's death in November 1975, there was little indication that he would be the instrument for the democratization of

Spain. Nevertheless, within three years he and his prime minister,

AJdolfo Suarez Gonzalez (in office, 1976-81), had accomplished the

3
Spain: A Country Study

historically unprecedented feat of transforming a dictatorial regime

into a pluralistic, parliamentary democracy through nonviolent means. This accomplishment made it possible to begin the process

of healing Spain's historical schisms.

The success of this peaceful transition to democracy can be attrib- uted to the young king's commitment to democratic institutions

and to his prime minister's ability to maneuver within the exist- ing political establishment in order to bring about the necessary

reforms. The failure of a coup attempt in February 1981 and the

peaceful transfer of power from one party to another in October

1 982 revealed the extent to which democratic principles had taken

root in Spanish society.

West European governments refused to cooperate with an

authoritarian regime in the immediate aftermath of World War

II, and, in effect, they ostracized the country from the region's

political, economic, and defense organizations. With the onset of

the Cold War, however, Spain's strategic importance for the defense

of Western Europe outweighed other political considerations, and

isolation of the Franco regime came to an end. Bilateral agreements,

first negotiated in 1953, permitted the United States to maintain

a chain of air and naval bases in Spain in support of the overall

defense of Western Europe. Spain became a member of the United

Nations in 1955 and joined the North Atlantic Treaty Organization in 1982.

Iberia

The people who were later named Iberians (or dwellers along

the Rio Ebro) by the Greeks, migrated to Spain in the third millennium B.C. The origin of the Iberians is not certain, but archaeological evidence of their metallurgical and agricultural skills supports a theory that they came from the eastern shores of the Mediterra- nean Sea. The Iberians lived in small, tightly knit, sedentary tribal groups that were geographically isolated from one another. Each

group developed distinct regional and political identities, and intertribal warfare was endemic. Other peoples of Mediterranean origin

also settled in the peninsula during the same period and, together

with the Iberians, mixed with the diverse inhabitants.

Celts crossed the Pyrenees into Spain in two major migrations

in the ninth and the seventh centuries B.C. The Celts settled for the most part north of the Rio Duero and the Rio Ebro, where they

mixed with the Iberians to form groups called Celtiberians. The

Celtiberians were farmers and herders who also excelled in metalworking crafts, which the Celts had brought from their Danubian

homeland by way of Italy and southern France. Celtic influence

4
Historical Setting

dominated Celtiberian culture. The Celtiberians appear to have

had no social or political organization larger than their matriarchal, collective, and independent clans. Another distinct ethnic group in the western Pyrenees, the

Basques, predate the arrival of the Iberians. Their pre- IndoEuropean language has no links with any other language, and

attempts to identify it with pre-Latin Iberian have not been convincing. The Romans called them Vascones, from which Basque

is derived.

The Iberians shared in the Bronze Age revival (1900 to 1600

B.C.) common throughout the Mediterranean basin. In the east and the south of the Iberian Peninsula, a system of city-states was

established, possibly through the amalgamation of tribal units into

urban setdements. Their governments followed the older tribal pattern, and they were despotically governed by warrior and priestly

castes. A sophisticated urban society emerged with an economy

based on gold and silver exports and on trade in tin and copper

(which were plentiful in Spain) for bronze.

Phoenicians, Greeks, and Carthaginians competed with the Iberi- ans for control of Spain's coastline and the resources of the interior. Merchants from Tyre may have established an outpost at Cadiz,

"the walled enclosure," as early as 1 100 B.C. as the westernmost

link in what became a chain of settlements lining the peninsula's

southern coast. If the accepted date of its founding is accurate, Cadiz

is the oldest city in Western Europe, and it is even older than

Carthage in North Africa. It was the most significant of the Phoenician colonies. From Cadiz, Phoenician seamen explored the west

coast of Africa as far as Senegal, and they reputedly ventured far out on the Atlantic.

Greek pioneers from the island of Rhodes landed in Spain in

the eighth century B.C. The Greek colony at Massilia (later Marseilles) maintained commercial ties with the Celtiberians in what

is now Catalonia (Spanish, Cataluna; Catalan, Catalunya). In the

sixth century B.C., Massilians founded a polis at Ampurias, the

first of several established on the Mediterranean coast of the

peninsula.

Hispania

After its defeat by the Romans in the First Punic War (264-

41 B.C.), Carthage compensated for its loss of Sicily by rebuilding a commercial empire in Spain. The country became the staging ground for Hannibal's epic invasion of Italy during the Second

Punic War (218-201 B.C.). Roman armies also invaded Spain and

used it as a training ground for officers and as a proving ground

5
Spain: A Country Study

for tactics during campaigns against the Carthaginians and the

Iberians. Iberian resistance was fierce and prolonged, however,

and it was not until 19 B.C. that the Roman emperor Augustus

(r. 27 B.C.-A.D. 14) was able to complete the conquest of Spain.

Romanization of the Iberians proceeded quickly after their conquest. Called Hispania by the Romans, Spain was not one politi- cal entity but was divided into three separately governed provinces

(nine provinces by the fourth century A.D.). More important, Spain was for more than 400 years part of a cosmopolitan world empire

bound together by law, language, and the Roman road.

Iberian tribal leaders and urban oligarchs were admitted into

the Roman aristocratic class, and they participated in governing

Spain and the empire. The latifundios (sing., latifundio), large

estates controlled by the aristocracy, were superimposed on the exist- ing Iberian landholding system.

The Romans improved existing cities, established Zaragoza,

Merida, and Valencia, and provided amenities throughout the

empire. Spain's economy expanded under Roman tutelage. Spain,

along with North Africa, served as a granary for the Roman market,

and its harbors exported gold, wool, olive oil, and wine. Agricultural production increased with the introduction of irrigation

projects, some of which remain in use. The Hispano-Romans

the romanized Iberians and the Iberian-born descendants of Roman

soldiers and colonists—had all achieved the status of full Roman

citizenship by the end of the first century A.D. The emperors Trajan

(r. 98-117), Hadrian (r. 117-38), and Marcus Aurelius (r. 161-80) were born in Spain.

Christianity was introduced into Spain in the first century, and

it became popular in the cities in the second century. Little headway was made in the countryside, however, until the late fourth

century, by which time Christianity was the official religion of the

Roman Empire. Some heretical sects emerged in Spain, but the

Spanish church remained subordinate to the Bishop of Rome.

Bishops who had official civil, as well as ecclesiastical, status in the

late empire continued to exercise their authority to maintain order

when civil governments broke down in Spain in the fifth century.

The Council of Bishops became an important instrument of sta- bility during the ascendancy of the Visigoths, a Germanic tribe. In 405 two Germanic tribes, the Vandals and the Suevi, crossed

the Rhine and ravaged Gaul until the Visigoths drove them into

Spain. The Suevi established a kingdom in the remote northwestern

corner of the Iberian Peninsula. The hardier Vandals, never exceeding 80,000, occupied the region that bears their name—Andalusia

(Spanish, Andalucia).

6
Roman aqueduct, Segovia

Courtesy Prints and Photographs Division, Library of Congress

Because large parts of Spain were outside his control, the western

Roman emperor, Honorius (r. 395-423), commissioned his sister,

Galla Placidia, and her husband Ataulf, the Visigoth king, to restore order in the Iberian Peninsula, and he gave them the rights to settle in and to govern the area in return for defending it. The highly

romanized Visigoths managed to subdue the Suevi and to compel

the Vandals to sail for North Africa. In 484 they established Toledo

as the capital of their Spanish monarchy. The Visigothic occupation was in no sense a barbarian invasion, however. Successive

Visigothic kings ruled Spain as patricians who held imperial commissions to govern in the name of the Roman emperor.

There were no more than 300,000 Germanic people in Spain,

which had a population of 4 million, and their overall influence on Spanish history is generally seen as minimal. They were a

privileged warrior elite, though many of them lived as herders and

farmers in the valley of the Tagus and on the central plateau.

Hispano-Romans continued to run the civil administration, and

Latin continued to be the language of government and of commerce. Under the Visigoths, lay culture was not so highly developed

as it had been under the Romans, and the task of maintaining for- mal education and government shifted decisively to the church

because its Hispano-Roman clergy alone were qualified to manage

higher administration. As elsewhere in early medieval Europe, the

7
Spain: A Country Study

church in Spain stood as society's most cohesive institution, and

it embodied the continuity of Roman order.

Religion was the most persistent source of friction between the

Roman Catholic Hispano-Romans and their Arian Visigoth overlords, whom they considered heretical. At times this tension invited

open rebellion, and restive factions within the Visigothic aristocracy

exploited it to weaken the monarchy. In 589 Recared, a Visigoth

ruler, renounced his Arianism before the Council of Bishops at Toledo and accepted Catholicism, thus assuring an alliance between

the Visigothic monarchy and the Hispano-Romans. This alliance

would not mark the last time in Spanish history that political unity

would be sought through religious unity.

Court ceremonials—from Constantinople—that proclaimed the

imperial sovereignty and unity of the Visigothic state were introduced at Toledo. Still, civil war, royal assassinations, and usurpation were commonplace, and warlords and great landholders

assumed wide discretionary powers. Bloody family feuds went

unchecked. The Visigoths had acquired and cultivated the apparatus

of the Roman state, but not the ability to make it operate to their

advantage. In the absence of a well-defined hereditary system of

succession to the throne, rival factions encouraged foreign inter- vention by the Greeks, the Franks, and, finally, the Muslims in

internal disputes and in royal elections.

Al Andalus

Early in the eighth century, armies from North Africa began

probing the Visigothic defenses of Spain, and ultimately they initi- ated the Moorish epoch that would last for centuries. The people

who became known to West Europeans as Moors were the Arabs,

who had swept across North Africa from their Middle Eastern

homeland, and the Berbers, inhabitants of Morocco who had been

conquered by the Arabs and converted to Islam.

In 711 Tariq ibn Ziyad, a Berber governor of Tangier, crossed

into Spain with an army of 12,000 (landing at a promontory that was later named, in his honor, Jabal Tariq, or Mount Tariq, from

which the name, Gibraltar, is derived). They came at the invitation of a Visigothic clan to assist it in rising against King Roderic.

Roderic died in battle, and Spain was left without a leader. Tariq

returned to Morocco, but the next year (712) Musa ibn Nusair,

the Muslim governor in North Africa, led the best of his Arab troops

to Spain with the intention of staying. In three years he had subdued all but the mountainous region in the extreme north and had

initiated forays into France, which were stemmed at Poitiers in 732.

8
Historical Setting

Al Andalus, as Islamic Spain was called, was organized under

the civil and religious leadership of the caliph of Damascus. Governors in Spain were generally Syrians, whose political frame of refer- ence was deeply influenced by Byzantine practices.

Nevertheless, the largest contingent of Moors in Spain consisted

of the North African Berbers, recent converts to Islam, who were

hostile to the sophisticated Arab governors and bureaucrats and

were given to a religious enthusiasm and fundamentalism that were

to set the standard for the Islamic community in Spain. Berber

settlers fanned out through the country and made up as much as 20 percent of the population of the occupied territory. The Arabs

constituted an aristocracy in the revived cities and on the latifundios that they had inherited from the Romans and the Visigoths.

Most members of the Visigothic nobility converted to Islam, and

they retained their privileged position in the new society. The countryside, only nominally Christian, was also successfully Islamized.

Nevertheless, an Hispano-Roman Christian community survived

in the cities. Moreover, Jews, who constituted more than 5 per- cent of the population, continued to play an important role in commerce, scholarship, and the professions.

The Arab-dominated Umayyad dynasty at Damascus was over- thrown in 756 by the Abbasids, who moved the caliphate to Baghdad. One Umayyad prince fled to Spain and, under the name of

Abd al Rahman (r. 756-88), founded a politically independent

amirate, which was then the farthest extremity of the Islamic world.

His dynasty flourished for 250 years. Nothing in Europe compared

with the wealth, the power, and the sheer brilliance of Al Andalus

during this period. In 929 Abd al Rahman III (r. 912-61), who was half European—

as were many of the ruling caste, elevated the amirate to the status of a caliphate (the Caliphate of Cordoba). This action cut Spain's

last ties with Baghdad and established that thereafter Al Andalus 's rulers would enjoy complete religious and political sovereignty.

When Hisham II, grandson of Abd al Rahman, inherited the

throne in 976 at age twelve, the royal vizier, Ibn Abi Amir (known

as Al Mansur), became regent (981-1002) and established himself

as virtual dictator. For the next twenty-six years, the caliph was

no more than a figurehead, and Al Mansur was the actual ruler. Al Mansur wanted the caliphate to symbolize the ideal of religious

and political unity as insurance against any renewal of civil strife. Notwithstanding his employment of Christian mercenaries, Al

Mansur preached jihad, or holy war, against the Christian states on the frontier, undertaking annual summer campaigns against

9
Spain: A Country Study

them, which served not only to unite Spanish Muslims in a common

cause but also to extend temporary Muslim control in the north.

The Caliphate of Cordoba did not long survive Al Mansur's dic- tatorship. Rival claimants to the throne, local aristocrats, and army

commanders who staked out taifas (sing., taifa), or independent

regional city-states, tore the caliphate apart. Some taifas, such as

Seville (Spanish, Sevilla), Granada, Valencia, and Zaragoza, be- came strong amirates, but all faced frequent political upheavals, war among themselves, and long-term accommodations to emerging

Christian states. Peaceful relations among Arabs, Berbers, and Spanish converts

to Islam were not easily maintained. To hold together such a heterogeneous population, Spanish Islam stressed ethics and legalism.

Pressure from the puritanical Berbers also led to crackdowns on Mozarabs (name for Christians in Al Andalus: literally, Arab-like)

and Jews.

Mozarabs were considered a separate caste even though there were no real differences between them and the converts to Islam

except for religion and liability to taxation, which fell heavily on

the Christian community. They were essentially urban merchants

and artisans. Their church was permitted to exist with few restric- tions, but it was prohibited from flourishing. The episcopal and

monastic structure remained intact, but teaching was curbed and

intellectual initiative was lost. In the ninth century, Mozarabs in Cordoba, led by their bishop,

invited martyrdom by publicly denouncing the Prophet Muhammad. Nevertheless, violence against the Mozarabs was rare until

the eleventh century, when the Christian states became a serious

threat to the security of Al Andalus. Many Mozarabs fled to the

Christian north.

Castile and Aragon

Resistance to the Muslim invasion in the eighth century had been

limited to small groups of Visigoth warriors who took refuge in

the mountains of Asturias in the old Suevian kingdom, the least romanized and least Christianized region in Spain. According to

tradition, Pelayo (718-37), a king of Oviedo, first rallied the natives

to defend themselves, then urged them to take the offensive, beginning the 700-year Reconquest (Spanish, Reconquista), which

became the dominant theme in medieval Spanish history (see fig. 2). What began as a matter of survival in Asturias became a crusade

to rid Spain of the Muslims and an imperial mission to reconstruct a united monarchy in Spain.

10
Historical Setting

Pelayo's successors, known as the kings of Leon, extended Christian control southward from Asturias, tore away bits of territory,

depopulated and fortified them against the Muslims, and then reset- tled these areas as the frontier was pushed forward. The kingdom's

political center moved in the direction of the military frontier. In the tenth century, strongholds were built as a buffer for the

kingdom of Leon along the upper Rio Ebro, in the area that became

known as Castile, the "land of castles." The region was populated

by men—border warriors and free peasants—who were willing to defend it, and were granted Jueros (special privileges and immunities) by the kings of Leon that made them virtually autonomous.

Castile developed a distinct society with its own dialect, values, and

customs shaped by the hard conditions of the frontier. Castile also produced a caste of hereditary warriors whom the frontier "democratized"; all warriors were equals, and all men were warriors. In 981 Castile became an independent county, and in 1004 it was raised to the dignity of a kingdom. Castile and Leon were

reunited periodically through royal marriages, but their kings had

no better plan than to divide their lands again among their heirs. The two kingdoms were, however, permanently joined as a single

state in 1230 by Ferdinand III of Castile (d. 1252).

Under the tutelage of the neighboring Franks, a barrier of pocket

states formed along the range of the Pyrenees and on the coast of

Catalonia to hold the frontier of France against Islamic Spain. Out

of this region, called the Spanish March, emerged the kingdom

of Aragon and the counties of Catalonia, all of which expanded,

as did Leon-Castile, at the expense of the Muslims. (Andorra is the last independent survivor of the March states.)

The most significant of the counties in Catalonia was that held

by the counts of Barcelona. They were descendants of Wilfrid the

Hairy (874-98), who at the end of the ninth century declared his

fief free of the French crown, monopolized lay and ecclesiastical

offices on both sides of the Pyrenees, and divided them—according

to Frankish custom—among members of the family. By 1 100 Barce- lona had dominion over all of Catalonia and the Balearic Islands

(Spanish, Islas Baleares). Aragon and the Catalan counties were

federated in 1137 through the marriage of Ramon Berenguer IV,

count of Barcelona, and Petronilla, heiress to the Aragonese throne.

Berenguer assumed the title of king of Aragon, but he continued

to rule as count in Catalonia. Berenguer and his successors thus

ruled over two realms, each with its own government, legal code,

currency, and political orientation.

Valencia, seized from its Muslim amir, became federated with

Aragon and Catalonia in 1238. With the union of the three crowns,

11
Spain: A Country Study

Area

boundary

City

Major battle

Aragon

Castile

Leon

Navarre

Portugal

Source: Based on information from Pierre Vidal-Naquet (ed.), The Harper Atlas of World

History, New York, 1987, 93.

Figure 2. The Reconquest: Reconquering Spain from the Moors

Aragon (the term most commonly used to describe the federation)

rivaled Venice and Genoa for control of Mediterranean trade.

Aragonese commercial interests extended to the Black Sea, and the

ports of Barcelona and Valencia prospered from traffic in textiles,

drugs, spices, and slaves. Weakened by their disunity, the eleventh-century taifas fell piecemeal to the Castilians, who had reason to anticipate the completion of the Reconquest. When Toledo was lost in 1085, the alarmed

amirs appealed for aid to the Almoravids, a militant Berber party

of strict Muslims, who in a few years had won control of the

12
Historical Setting

Maghreb (northwest Africa). The Almoravids incorporated all of

Al Andalus, except Zaragoza, into their North African empire.

They attempted to stimulate a religious revival based on their own

evangelical brand of Islam. In Spain, however, their movement

soon lost its missionary fervor. The Almoravid state fell apart by

the mid-twelfth century under pressure from another religious

group, the Almohads, who extended their control from Morocco

to Spain and made Seville their capital. The Almohads shared the

crusading instincts of the Almoravids and posed an even greater

military threat to the Christian states, but their expansion was

stopped decisively in the epic battle of Las Navas de Tolosa (1212), a watershed in the history of the Reconquest. Muslim strength

ebbed thereafter. Ferdinand III took Seville in 1248, reducing Al

Andalus to the amirate of Granada, which had bought its safety

by betraying the Almohads' Spanish capital. Granada remained

a Muslim state, but as a dependency of Castile.

Aragon fulfilled its territorial aims in the thirteenth century when

it annexed Valencia. The Catalans, however, looked for further

expansion abroad, and their economic views prevailed over those

of the parochial Aragonese nobility, who were not enthusiastic about

foreign entanglements. Peter III, king of Aragon from 1276 until

1285, had been elected to the throne of Sicily when the French

Angevins (House of Anjou) were expelled from the island kingdom during an uprising in 1282. Sicily, and later Naples, became

part of the federation of Spanish crowns, and Aragon became

embroiled in Italian politics, which continued to affect Spain into

the eighteenth century.

Castile, which had traditionally turned away from intervention

in European affairs, developed a merchant marine in the Atlantic

that successfully challenged the Hanseatic League (a peaceful league

of merchants of various free German cities) for dominance in the

coastal trade with France, England, and the Netherlands. The eco- nomic climate necessary for sustained economic development was

notably lacking, however, in Castile. The reasons for this situa- tion appear to have been rooted both in the structure of the economy

and in the attitude of the Castilians. Restrictive corporations closely

regulated all aspects of the economy—production, trade, and even

transport. The most powerful of these corporations, the Mesta, controlled the production of wool, Castile's chief export. Perhaps a

greater obstacle for economic development was that commercial

activity enjoyed little social esteem. Noblemen saw business as beneath their station and derived their incomes and prestige from

landownership . Successful bourgeois entrepreneurs, who aspired

13
Spain: A Country Study

to the petty nobility, invested in land rather than in other sectors of the economy because of the social status attached to owning land.

This attitude deprived the economy of needed investments and

engendered stagnation rather than growth.

Feudalism, which bound nobles to the king-counts both economically and socially, as tenants to landlords, had been introduced into

Aragon and Catalonia from France. It produced a more clearly

stratified social structure than that found in Castile, and conse- quently it generated greater tension among classes. Castilian society was less competitive, more cohesive, and more egalitarian. Castile

attempted to compensate through political means, however, for the

binding feudal arrangements between crown and nobility that it lacked. The guiding theory behind the Castilian monarchy was that

political centralism could be won at the expense of localfueros, but

the kings of Castile never succeeded in creating a unitary state. Aragon-Catalonia accepted and developed—not without conflict

the federal principle, and it made no concerted attempt to establish a political union of the Spanish and Italian principalities outside of their personal union under the Aragonese crown. The

principal regions of Spain were divided not only by conflicting local

loyalties, but also by their political, economic, and social orientations. Catalonia particularly stood apart from the rest of the

country.

Both Castile and Aragon suffered from political instability in the

fourteenth and the fifteenth centuries. The House of Trastamara

acquired the Castilian throne in 1369 and created a new aristocracy

to which it granted significant authority. Court favorites, or validos (sing., valido), often dominated their Castilian kings, and, because

the kings were weak, nobles competed for control of the government. Important government offices, formerly held by members

of the professional class of civil servants who had urban, and fre- quently Jewish, backgrounds, came into the possession of aristo- cratic families who eventually held them by hereditary right. The

social disruption and the decay of institutions common to much

of Europe in the late Middle Ages also affected Aragon, where

another branch of the Trastamaras succeeded to the throne in 1416.

For long periods, the overextended Aragonese kings resided in

Naples, leaving their Spanish realms with weak, vulnerable governments. Economic dislocation, caused by recurring plagues and by

the commercial decline of Catalonia, was the occasion for repeated

revolts by regional nobility, town corporations, peasants, and, in

Barcelona, by the urban proletariat.

14
Historical Setting

The Golden Age

Ferdinand and Isabella

The marriage in 1469 of royal cousins, Ferdinand of Aragon

(1452-1516) and Isabella of Castile (1451-1504), eventually brought

stability to both kingdoms. Isabella's niece, Juana, had bloodily

disputed her succession to the throne in a conflict in which the rival claimants were given assistance by outside powers—Isabella by

Aragon and Juana by her suitor, the king of Portugal. The Treaty

of Alcacovas ended the war in September 1479, and as Ferdinand

had succeeded his father in Aragon earlier in the same year, it was

possible to link Castile with Aragon. Both Isabella and Ferdinand

understood the importance of unity; together they effected institu- tional reform in Castile and left Spain one of the best administered

countries in Europe.

Even with the personal union of the Castilian and the Aragonese

crowns, Castile, Aragon, Catalonia, and Valencia remained constitutionally distinct political entities, and they retained separate

councils of state and parliaments. Ferdinand, who had received

his political education in federalist Aragon, brought a new emphasis on constitutionalism and a respect for localfueros to Castile, where

he was king consort (1479-1504) and continued as regent after

Isabella's death in 1504. Greatiy admired by Italian political theorist Niccolo Machiavelli (1469-1527), Ferdinand was one of the most

skillful diplomats in an age of great diplomats, and he assigned

to Castile its predominant role in the dual monarchy.

Ferdinand and Isabella resumed the Reconquest, dormant for more than 200 years, and in 1492 they captured Granada, earn- ing for themselves the title of Catholic Kings. Once Islamic Spain

had ceased to exist, attention turned to the internal threat posed

by hundreds of thousands of Muslims living in the recently incorporated Granada. "Spanish society drove itself," historian J. H.

Elliot writes, "on a ruthless, ultimately self-defeating quest for an

unattainable purity."

Everywhere in sixteenth-century Europe, it was assumed that

religious unity was necessary for political unity, but only in Spain was there such a sense of urgency in enforcing religious conformity.

Spain's population was more heterogeneous than that of any other

European nation, and it contained significant non-Christian communities. Several of these communities, including in particular some

in Granada, harbored a significant element of doubtful loyalty.

Moriscos (Granadan Muslims) were given the choice of voluntary

exile or conversion to Christianity. Many Jews converted to Christianity, and some of these conversos filled important government

15
Spain: A Country Study

and ecclesiastical posts in Castile and in Aragon for more than 100

years. Many married or purchased their way into the nobility. Muslims in reconquered territory, called Mudejars, also lived quietly

for generations as peasant farmers and skilled craftsmen.

After 1525 all residents of Spain were officially Christian, but

forced conversion and nominal orthodoxy were not sufficient for complete integration into Spanish society. Purity of blood (limpieza

de sangre) regulations were imposed on candidates for positions in

the government and the church, to prevent Moriscos from becoming

a force again in Spain and to eliminate participation by conversos whose families might have been Christian for generations. Many

of Spain's oldest and finest families scrambled to reconstruct family

trees. The Inquisition, a state-controlled Castilian tribunal, authorized

by papal bull in 1478, that soon extended throughout Spain, had

the task of enforcing uniformity of religious practice. It was originally intended to investigate the sincerity of conversos, especially those

in the clergy, who had been accused of being crypto-Jews. Tomas

de Torquemada, a descendant of conversos, was the most effective

and notorious of the Inquisition's prosecutors.

For years religious laws were laxly enforced, particularly in Aragon, and converted Jews and Moriscos continued to observe their

previous religions in private. In 1568, however, a serious rebel- lion broke out among the Moriscos of Andalusia, who sealed their

fate by appealing to the Ottoman Empire for aid. The incident led

to mass expulsions throughout Spain and to the eventual exodus

of hundreds of thousands of conversos and Moriscos, even those who

had apparently become devout Christians. In the exploration and exploitation of the New World, Spain

found an outlet for the crusading energies that the war against the

Muslims had stimulated. In the fifteenth century, Portuguese

mariners were opening a route around Africa to the East. At the same time as the Castilians, they had planted colonies in the Azores

and in the Canary Islands (also Canaries; Spanish, Canarias), the

latter of which had been assigned to Spain by papal decree. The

conquest of Granada allowed the Catholic Kings to divert their

attention to exploration, although Christopher Columbus's first voyage in 1492 was financed by foreign bankers. In 1493 Pope

Alexander VI (Rodrigo Borgia, a Catalan) formally approved the

division of the unexplored world between Spain and Portugal. The

Treaty of Tordesillas, which Spain and Portugal signed one year

later, moved the line of division westward and allowed Portugal

to claim Brazil.

16
Historical Setting

New discoveries and conquests came in quick succession. Vasco

Nunez de Balboa reached the Pacific in 1513, and the survivors

of Ferdinand Magellan's expedition completed the circumnavigation of the globe in 1522. In 1519 the conquistador Hernando Cortes

subdued the Aztecs in Mexico with a handful of followers, and

between 1531 and 1533 Francisco Pizzaro overthrew the empire

of the Incas and established Spanish dominion over Peru.

In 1493, when Columbus brought 1,500 colonists with him on

his second voyage, a royal administrator had already been appointed

for the Indies. The Council of the Indies (Consejo de Indias), estab- lished in 1524, acted as an advisory board to the crown on colonial

affairs, and the House of Trade (Casa de Contratacion) regulated

trade with the colonies. The newly established colonies were not

Spanish but Castilian. They were administered as appendages of

Castile, and the Aragonese were prohibited from trading or settling there. Charles V and Philip II Ferdinand and Isabella were the last of the Trastamaras, and

a native dynasty would never again rule Spain. When their sole male heir, John, who was to have inherited all his parents' crowns,

died in 1497, the succession to the throne passed to Juana, John's

sister. But Juana had become the wife of Philip the Handsome,

heir through his father, Emperor Maximilian I, to the Habsburg

patrimony. On Ferdinand's death in 1516, Charles of Ghent, the son ofJuana and Philip, inherited Spain (which he ruled as Charles

I, r. 1516-56), its colonies, and Naples. (Juana, called Juana la Loca or Joanna the Mad, lived until 1555 but was judged incompetent to rule.) When Maximilian I died in 1519, Charles also in- herited the Habsburg domains in Germany. Shortly afterward he was selected Holy Roman emperor, a title that he held as Charles

V (r. 1519-56), to succeed his grandfather. Charles, in only a few

years, was able to bring together the world's most diverse empire

since Rome (see fig. 3). Charles's closest attachment was to his birthplace, Flanders; he

surrounded himself with Flemish advisers who were not appreciated

in Spain. His duties as both Holy Roman emperor and king of

Spain, moreover, never allowed him to tarry in one place. As the

years of his long reign passed, however, Charles moved closer to Spain and called upon its manpower and colonial wealth to maintain the Hapsburg empire.

When he abdicated in 1556 to retire to a Spanish monastery,

Charles divided his empire. His son, Philip II (r. 1556-98), inherited

Spain, the Italian possessions, and the Netherlands (the industrial

17
Spain: A Country Study

Spanish Habsburgs after 1556 • Populated place

Figure 3. Europe in the Sixteenth Century

heartland of Europe in the mid-sixteenth century). For a brief period

(1554-58), Philip was also king of England as the husband of Mary

Tudor (Mary I). In 1580 Philip inherited the throne of Portugal

through his mother, and the Iberian Peninsula had a single monarch

for the next sixty years.

Philip II was a Castilian by education and temperament. He was

seldom out of Spain, and he spoke only Spanish. He governed his scattered dominions through a system of councils, such as the Council

of the Indies, which were staffed by professional civil servants whose

activities were coordinated by the Council of State, which was responsible to Philip. The Council of State's function was only advisory.

Every decision was Philip's; every question required his answer;

every document needed his signature. His father had been a peripatetic emperor, but Philip, a royal bureaucrat, administered every

detail of his empire from El Escorial, the forbidding palacemonastery-mausoleum on the barren plain outside Madrid.

18
Historical Setting

By marrying Ferdinand, Isabella had united Spain; however,

she had also inevitably involved Castile in Aragon's wars in Italy

against France, which had formerly been Castile's ally. The motivation in each of their children's marriages had been to circle France

with Spanish allies—Habsburg, Burgundian, and English. The suc- cession to the Spanish crown of the Habsburg dynasty, which had

broader continental interests and commitments, drew Spain onto

the center stage of European dynastic wars for 200 years. Well into the seventeenth century, music, art, literature, theater,

dress, and manners from Spain's Golden Age were admired and

imitated; they set a standard by which the rest of Europe measured

its culture. Spain was also Europe's preeminent military power,

with occasion to exercise its strength on many fronts—on land in

Italy, Germany, North Africa, and the Netherlands, and at sea

against the Dutch, French, Turks, and English. Spain was the mili- tary and diplomatic standard-bearer of the Counter-Reformation.

Spanish fleets defeated the Turks at Malta (1565) and at Lepanto

(1572)—events celebrated even in hostile England. These victories prevented the Mediterranean from becoming an Ottoman lake. The defeat of the Grand Armada in 1588 averted the planned

invasion of England but was not a permanent setback for the Spanish fleet, which recovered and continued to be an effective naval

force in European waters. Sixteenth-century Spain was ultimately the victim of its own

wealth. Military expenditure did not stimulate domestic production. Bullion from American mines passed through Spain like water

through a sieve to pay for troops in the Netherlands and Italy, to maintain the emperor's forces in Germany and ships at sea, and

to satisfy conspicuous consumption at home. The glut of precious

metal brought from America and spent on Spain's military establishment quickened inflation throughout Europe, left Spaniards

without sufficient specie to pay debts, and caused Spanish goods

to become too overpriced to compete in international markets.

American bullion alone could not satisfy the demands of military expenditure. Domestic production was heavily taxed, driving up prices for Spanish-made goods. The sale of titles to entrepreneurs who bought their way up the social ladder, removing themselves from the productive sector of the economy and padding an increasingly parasitic aristocracy, provided additional funds.

Potential profit from the sale of property served as an incentive

for further confiscations from conversos and Moriscos.

Spain's apparent prosperity in the sixteenth century was not

based on actual economic growth. As its bullion supply decreased

in the seventeenth century, Spain was neither able to meet the cost

19
Spain: A Country Study

of its military commitments nor to pay for imports of manufactured goods that could not be produced efficiently at home. The

overall effect of plague and emigration reduced Spain's population from 8 million in the early sixteenth century to 7 million by

the mid-seventeenth century. Land was taken out of production

for lack of labor and the incentive to develop it, and Spain, although

predominantly agrarian, depended on imports of foodstuffs. Spain in Decline

The seventeenth century was a period of unremitting political,

military, economic, and social decline. Neither Philip III (r. 1598-

1621) nor Philip IV (r. 1621-65) was competent to give the kind

of clear direction that Philip II had provided. Responsibility passed

to aristocratic advisers. Gaspar de Guzman, count-duke of Olivares,

attempted and failed to establish the centralized administration that

his famous contemporary, Cardinal Richelieu, had introduced in France. In reaction to Guzman's bureaucratic absolutism, Catalonia

revolted and was virtually annexed by France. Portugal, with

English aid, reasserted its independence in 1640, and an attempt was made to separate Andalusia from Spain. In 1648, at the Peace

of Westphalia, Spain assented to the emperor's accommodation

with the German Protestants, and in 1654 it recognized the independence of the northern Netherlands.

During the long regency for Charles II (1665-1700), the last of

the Spanish Habsburgs, validos milked Spain's treasury, and Spain's

government operated principally as a dispenser of patronage.

Plague, famine, floods, drought, and renewed war with France

wasted the country. The Peace of the Pyrenees (1659) ended fifty

years of warfare with France, whose king, Louis XIV, found the

temptation to exploit weakened Spain too great. As part of the peace

settlement, the Spanish infanta Maria Teresa, had become the wife

of Louis XIV. Using Spain's failure to pay her dowry as a pretext,

Louis instigated the War of Devolution (1667-68) to acquire the

Spanish Netherlands in lieu of the dowry. Most of the European

powers were ultimately involved in the wars that Louis fought in

the Netherlands.

Bourbon Spain

Charles II, the product of generations of inbreeding, was unable

to rule and remained childless. The line of Spanish Habsburgs came

to an end at his death. Habsburg partisans argued for allocating

succession to the Austrian branch of the Habsburg dynasty, but

Charles II, in one of his last official acts, left Spain to his nephew,

Philip of Anjou, a Bourbon and the grandson of Louis XIV. This

20
Historical Setting

solution appealed to Castilian legitimists because it complied with

the principle of succession to the next in the bloodline. Spanish

officials had been concerned with providing for the succession in

such a way as to guarantee an integral, independent Spanish state

that, along with its possessions in the Netherlands and in Italy,

would not become part of either a pan-Bourbon or a pan-Habsburg

empire. ''The Pyrenees are no more," Louis XIV rejoiced at his

grandson's accession as Philip V (r. 1700-46). The prospect of the

Spanish Netherlands falling into French hands, however, alarmed

the British and the Dutch.

War of the Spanish Succession

The acceptance of the Spanish crown by Philip V in the face

of counterclaims by Archduke Charles of Austria, who was supported by Britain and the Netherlands, was the proximate cause

of the War of the Spanish Succession (1702-14), the first "world

war" fought by European powers. In 1705 an Anglo-Austrian force

landed in Spain. A Franco-Castilian army halted its advance on

Madrid, but the invaders occupied Catalonia. Castile enthusiastically received the Bourbon dynasty, but the Catalans opposed it, not so much out of loyalty to the Habsburgs as in defense of their

fueros against the feared imposition of French-style centralization

by a Castilian regime.

The War of the Spanish Succession was also a Spanish civil war.

Britain agreed to a separate peace with France, and the allies withdrew from Catalonia, but the Catalans continued their resistance

under the banner "Privilegis o Mort" (Liberty or Death). Catalonia was devastated, and Barcelona fell to Philip V after a prolonged

siege (1713-14).

The Treaty of Utrecht (1713) brought the war to a close and

recognized the Bourbon succession in Spain on the condition that

Spain and France would never be united under the same crown. The Spanish Netherlands (which become known as the Austrian

Netherlands and later as Belgium) and Spain's Italian possessions,

however, reverted to the Austrian Habsburgs. Britain retained

Gibraltar and Minorca, seized during the war, and received trade

concessions in Spanish America. Spain emerged from the war with

its internal unity and colonial empire intact, but with its political

position in Europe weakened.

Philip V undertook to modernize Spanish government through

his French and Italian advisers. Centralized government was insti- tutionalized, localfueros were abrogated, regional parliaments were

abolished, and the aristocracy's independent influence on the councils of state was destroyed.

21
Spain: A Country Study

The Enlightenment

Charles III (r. 1759-88), Spain's enlightened despot par excel- lence, served his royal apprenticeship as king of Naples. He was

one of Europe's most active patrons of the Enlightenment, a period

during which attempts were made to reform society through the

application of reason to political, social, and economic problems.

Despite Charles's attempt to reform the economy, the impact of

the Enlightenment was essentially negative. Anticlericalism was an

integral part of Enlightenment ideology, but it was carried to greater

lengths in Spain than elsewhere in Europe because of government

sponsorship. Public charities financed by the church were considered antisocial because they were thought to discourage initiative,

and they were therefore abolished. The state suppressed monasteries

and confiscated their property. The Jesuits, outspoken opponents

of regalism, were expelled. Their expulsion virtually crippled higher

education in Spain. The state also banned the teachings of medieval

philosophers and of the sixteenth-century Jesuit political theorists

who had argued for the ' 'divine right of the people' ' over their kings.

The government employed the Inquisition to discipline antiregalist

clerics. Economic recovery was noticeable, and government efficiency was greatiy improved at the higher levels during Charles Ill's reign.

The Bourbon reforms, however, resulted in no basic changes in

the pattern of property holding. Neither land reform nor increased

land use occurred. The rudimentary nature of bourgeois class consciousness in Spain hindered the creation of a middle-class movement. Despite the development of a national bureaucracy in

Madrid, government programs foundered because of the lethargy

of administrators at lower levels and because of a backward rural

population. The reform movement could not be sustained without

the patronage of Charles III, and it did not survive him.

The Napoleonic Era

Charles IV (r. 1788-1807) retained the trappings of his father's enlightened despotism, but he was dominated by his wife's favorite, a guards officer, Manuel de Godoy, who at the age of twenty-five was chief minister and virtual dictator of Spain. When the French

National Assembly declared war in 1793, Godoy rode the popular wave of reaction building in Spain against the French Revolution

and joined the coalition against France. Spanish arms suffered

repeated setbacks, and in 1796 Godoy shifted allies and joined the

French against Britain. Godoy, having been promised half of Portugal as his personal reward, became Napoleon Bonaparte's willing

22
The Giralda,

symbol of the city of Sevilla, in the

late nineteenth century

Courtesy Prints and

Photographs Division,

Library of Congress

puppet. Louisiana, Spanish since 1763, was restored to France.

A regular subsidy was paid to France from the Spanish treasury,

and 15,000 Spanish troops were assigned to garrisons in northern

Europe.

Military reverses and economic misery caused a popular uprising in March 1808 that forced the dismissal of Godoy and the abdiction of Charles IV. The king was succeeded by his son, Ferdinand

VII (r. 1808; 1814-33). The French forced Ferdinand to abdicate

almost immediately, however, and Joseph Bonaparte, Napoleon's

brother, was named king of Spain. A large French army was moved

in to support the new government and to invade Britain's ally, Portugal, from Spanish soil. The afrancesados, a small but influential

group of Spaniards who favored reconstructing their country on

the French model, welcomed the Bonapartist regime.

To ingratiate himself with the afrancesados, Joseph Bonaparte

proclaimed the dissolution of religious houses. The defense of the

Roman Catholic Church, which had long been attacked by successive Spanish governments, now became the test of Spanish patriotism and the cause around which resistance to the French rallied. The citizens of Zaragoza held out against superior French forces

for more than a year. In Asturias, local forces took back control

of their province, and an army of Valencians temporarily forced

the French out of Madrid. The War of Independence (1808-14),

as the Iberian phase of the Napoleonic wars is known in Spanish

23
Spain: A Country Study

historiography, attained the status of a popular crusade that united

all classes, parties, and regions in a common struggle. It was a war

fought without rules or regular battlelines. The Spanish painter,

Goya, depicted the brutality practiced on both sides. The British dispatched an expeditionary force, originally intended

to occupy part of Spanish America, to the Iberian Peninsula in

1808. In the next year, a larger contingent under Arthur Wellesley,

later duke of Wellington, followed. Elements of the Spanish army

held Cadiz, the only major city not taken by the French, but the

countryside belonged to the guerrillas, who held down 250,000 of

Napoleon's best troops under Marshal Nicholas Soult, while Wellington waited to launch the offensive that was to cause the defeat

of the French at Vitoria (1813).

The Liberal Ascendancy

The Cadiz Cortes

From the first days of the War of Independence, juntas, established by army commanders, guerrilla leaders, or local civilian

groups, appeared in areas outside French control. They also existed

underground as alternatives to the French-imposed government.

Unity extended only to fighting the French, however. Coups were

frequent, and there was sometimes bloody competition among mili- tary, partisan, and civilian groups for control of the juntas. A central junta sat in Cadiz. It had litde authority, except as surrogate

for the absent royal government. It succeeded, however, in call- ing together representatives from local juntas in 1810, with the

vague notion of creating the Cortes of All the Spains, so called

because it would be the single legislative body for the empire and

its colonies. Many of the overseas provinces had by that time already

declared their independence. Some saw the Cortes at Cadiz as an

interim government until the Desired One, as Ferdinand VII was

called by his supporters, could return to the throne. Many regalists

could not admit that a parliamentary body could legislate in the

absence of a king.

The delegates at the Cortes at Cadiz formed into two main currents, liberal and conservative. The liberals carried on the reformist

philisophy of Charles III and added to it many of the new ideals

of the French Revolution. They wanted equality before the law, a centralized government, an efficient modern civil service, a reform

of the tax system, the replacement of feudal privileges by freedom

of contract, and the recognition of the property owner's right to use his property as he saw fit. As the liberals were the majority,

they were able to transform the assembly from interim government

24
Historical Setting

to constitutional convention. The product of the Cortes' s deliberations reflected the liberals' dominance, for the constitution of 1812 came to be the "sacred codex" of liberalism, and during the nineteenth century it served as a model for liberal constitutions of Latin

nations.

As the principal aim of the new constitution was the prevention

of arbitrary and corrupt royal rule, it provided for a limited monarchy which governed through ministers subject to parliamentary control. Suffrage, determined by property qualifications, favored the

position of the commercial class in the new parliament, in which

there was no special provision for the church or the nobility. The

constitution set up a rational and efficient centralized administrative system based on newly formed provinces and municipalties

rather than on the historic provinces. Repeal of traditional property

restrictions gave the liberals the freer economy they wanted.

The 1812 Constitution marked the initiation of the Spanish tra- dition of liberalism; by the country's standards, however, it was

a revolutionary document, and when Ferdinand VII was restored

to the throne in 1814 he refused to recognize it. He dismissed the

Cadiz Cortes and was determined to rule as an absolute monarch.

Spain's American colonies took advantage of the postwar chaos

to proclaim their independence, and most established republican

governments. By 1825 only Cuba and Puerto Rico remained under

the Spanish flag in the New World. When Ferdinand was restored

to the throne in Madrid, he expended wealth and manpower in a vain effort to reassert control over the colonies. The move was

unpopular among liberal officers assigned to the American wars. Rule by Pronunciamiento

In 1820 Major Rafael de Riego led a revolt among troops quartered in Cadiz while awaiting embarkation to America. Garrison

mutinies were not unusual, but Riego issued a pronunciamiento , or

declaration of principles, to the troops, which was directed against

the government and which called for the army to support adoption of the 1812 constitution. Support for Riego spread from gar- rison to garrison, toppling the regalist government and forcing

Ferdinand to accept the liberal constitution. The pronunciamiento,

distributed by barracks politicians among underpaid members of an overstaffed officer corps, became a regular feature of Spanish

politics. An officer or group of officers would seek a consensus among fellow officers in opposing or supporting a particular policy or in calling for a change in government. If any government were

to survive, it needed the support of the army. If a pronunciamiento

received sufficient backing, the government was well advised to

25
Spain: A Country Study

defer to it. This "referendum in blood" was considered within the

army to be the purest form of election because the soldiers supporting a pronunciamiento—at least in theory—were expressing their

willingness to shed blood to make their point. A pronunciamiento was

judged to have succeeded only if the government gave in to it without a fight. If it did not represent a consensus within the army

and there was resistance to it, the pronunciamiento was considered

a failure, and the officers who had proposed it dutifully went into

exile. French intervention, ordered by Louis XVIII on an appeal from

Ferdinand and with the assent of his conservative officers, brought

the three years of liberal government under the 1812 constitution

called the Constitutional Triennium (1820-23)—to an abrupt close. The arrival of the French was welcomed in many sectors. Ferdinand, restored as absolute monarch, chose his ministers from the

ranks of the old qfrancesados.

Ferdinand VII, a widower, was childless, and Don Carlos, his

popular, traditionalist brother, was heir presumptive. In 1829,

however, Ferdinand married his Neapolitan cousin, Maria Cristina,

who gave birth to a daughter, an event followed closely by the revo- cation of provisions prohibiting female succession. Ferdinand died

in 1833, leaving Maria Cristina as regent for their daughter, Isabella

II (r. 1833-68).

Don Carlos contested his niece's succession, and he won the

fanatical support of the traditionalists of Aragon and of Basque

Navarre (Spanish, Navarra). The Carlists (supporters of Don

Carlos) held that legitimate succession was possible only through

the male line. Comprising agrarians, regionalists, and Catholics,

the Carlists also opposed the middle class—centralist, anticlerical

liberals who flocked to support the regency. The Carlists fielded an army that held off government attempts to suppress them for

six years (1833-39), during which time Maria Cristina received

British aid in arms and volunteers. A Carlist offensive against

Madrid in 1837 failed, but in the mountains, the Basques continued

to resist until a compromise peace in 1839 recognized their ancient

fueros. Sentiment for Don Carlos and for his successor remained

strong in Navarre, and the Carlists continued as a serious political force. Carlist uprisings occurred in 1847 and again from 1872 to 1876.

Liberal Rule

The regency had come to depend on liberal support within the

army during the first Carlist war, but after the end of the war against

the traditionalists, both the liberals and the army tired of Maria

26
Historical Setting

Cristina. They forced her to resign in 1840, and a liberal government assumed responsibility for the regency.

The liberals were a narrowly based elite. Their abstract idealism and concern for individual liberties contrasted sharply with the

paternalistic attitudes of Spain's rural society. There was no

monolithic liberal movement in Spain, but anticlericalism, the

touchstone of liberalism, unified the factions. They theorized that

the state was the sum of the individuals living within it and that

it could recognize and protect only the rights of individuals, not

the rights of corporate institutions, such as the church or universities, or the rights of the regions as separate entities with distinct

customs and interests. Because only individuals were subject to the

law, only individuals could hold title to land. As nothing should

impede the development of the individual, so nothing should impede

the state in guaranteeing the rights of the individual.

Liberals also agreed on the necessity of a written constitution, a parliamentary government, and a centralized administration, as well as the need for laissez-faire economics. All factions found a

voice in the army and drew leadership from its ranks. All had confidence that progress would follow naturally from the application

of liberal principles. They differed, however, on the methods to be used in applying these principles.

The Moderates saw economic development within a free market

as the cure for political revolution. They argued for a strong constitution that would spell out guaranteed liberties. The Progressives, like the Moderates, were members of the upper and the

middle classes, but they drew support from the urban masses and

favored creation of a more broadly based electorate. They argued

that greater participation in the political process would ensure eco- nomic development and an equitable distribution of its fruits. Both

factions favored constitutional monarchy. The more radical

Democrats, however, believed that political freedom and economic

liberalism could only be achieved in a republic.

The army backed the Moderates, who dominated the new

regency in coalition with supporters of Isabella's succession. Local

political leaders, called caciques, regularly delivered the vote for government candidates in return for patronage and assured the

Moderates of parliamentary majorities. The Progressives courted

the Democrats enough to be certain of regular inclusion in the

government. State relations with the church continued to be the

most sensitive issue confronting the government and the most divi- sive issue throughout the country. Despite their anticlericalism, the

Moderates concluded a rapprochement with the church, which

agreed to surrender its claim to confiscated property in return for

27
Spain: A Country Study

official recognition by the state and a role in education. Reconciliation with the church did not, however, win the Moderates conservative rural support.

Modest economic gains were made during the administration

of General Leopoldo O'Donnell, an advocate of laissez-faire policies, who came to power in 1856 through a pronunciamiento. O'Donnell had encouraged foreign investors to provide Spain with a

railroad system, and he had also sponsored Spain's overseas expansion, particularly in Africa. Little economic growth was stimulated,

however, except in Catalonia and the Basque region, both of which

had already possessed an industrial base. Promises for land reform were broken.

O'Donnell was one of a number of political and military figures

around whom personalist political parties formed in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. Most of these parties failed to survive their leaders' active political careers. O'Donnell, for example, formed the Liberal Union as a fusion party broad enough

to hold most liberals and to counter the drift of left-wing Progressives to the Democrats. After several years of cooperating with the

one-party parliamentary regime, the Progressives withdrew their

support, and in 1866 a military coup toppled O'Donnell.

In 1868 an army revolt, led by exiled officers determined to force

Isabella from the throne, brought General Juan Prim, an army

hero and popular Progressive leader, to power. Isabella's abdication inaugurated a period of experimentation with a liberal monarchy, a federal republic, and finally a military dictatorship.

As prime minister, Prim canvased Europe for a ruler to replace

Isabella. A tentative offer made to a Hohenzollern prince was suffi- cient spark to set off the Franco-Prussian War (1870-71). Prim

found a likely royal candidate in Amadeo of Savoy, son of the Italian king, Victor Emmanuel II. Shortly after Amadeo' s arrival in Spain,

Prim was assassinated, leaving the new king, without a mentor,

at the mercy of hostile politicians. The constitution bequeathed to the new monarchy did not leave Amadeo sufficient power to supervise the formation of a stable government. Mistrustful of Prim's

foreign prince, factional leaders refused to cooperate with, or to advise, Amadeo. Deserted finally by the army, Amadeo abdicated,

leaving a rump parliament to proclaim Spain a federal republic.

The constitution of the First Republic (1873-74) provided for internally self-governing provinces that were bound to the federal

government by voluntary agreement. Jurisdiction over foreign

and colonial affairs and defense was reserved for Madrid. In its eight-month life, the federal republic had four presidents, none of

whom could find a prime minister to form a stable cabinet. The

28
Early-twentieth-century stereoscope card showing Madrid's Puerta del Sol Courtesy Prints and Photographs Division, Library of Congress

government could not decentralize quickly enough to satisfy local radicals. Cities and provinces made unilateral declarations of

autonomy. Madrid lost control of the country, and once again the

army stepped in to rescue the "national honor." A national government in the form of a unitary republic served briefly as the trans- parent disguise for an interim military dictatorship.

The Constitutional Monarchy

A brigadier''s pronunciamiento that called Isabella's son, the able,

British-educated Alfonso XII (r. 1875-85), to the throne was suffi- cient to restore the Bourbon monarchy. Alfonso identified himself

as "Spaniard, Catholic, and Liberal," and his succession was

greeted with a degree of relief, even by supporters of the republic.

He cultivated good relations with the army (Alfonso was a cadet

at Sandhurst, the British military academy, when summoned to Spain), which had removed itself from politics because it was content with the stable, popular civilian government. Alfonso insisted

that the official status of the church be confirmed constitutionally,

thus assuring the restored monarchy of conservative support.

British practices served as the model for the new constitution's

political provisions. The new government used electoral manipulation to construct and to maintain a two-party system in par- liament, but the result was more a parody than an imitation.

Conservatives and liberals, who differed in very little except name,

exchanged control of the government at regular intervals after

29
Spain: A Country Study

general elections. Once again, caciques delivered the vote to one party or the other as directed—in return for the assurance of patronage

from whichever was scheduled to win, thus controlling the elec- tions at the constituency level. The tendency toward party frac- turing and personalism remained a threat to the system, but the

restoration monarchy's artificial two-party system gave Spain a generation of relative quiet.

Alfonso XIII (r. 1886-1931) was the posthumous son of Alfonso

XII. The mother of Alfonso XIII, another Maria Cristina, acted

as regent until her son came of age officially in 1902. Alfonso XIII

abdicated in 1931.

The Cuban Disaster and the "Generation of 1898"

Emigration to Cuba from Spain was heavy in the nineteenth century, and the Cuban middle class, which had close ties to the mother

country, favored keeping Cuba Spanish. Cuba had experienced

periodic uprisings by independence movements since 1868. Successive governments in Madrid were committed to maintaining

whatever armed forces were necessary to combat insurgency. Hostilities broke out again in 1895. The United States clandestinely

supported these hostilities, which required Spain to send substantial

reinforcements under General Valerio Weyler. Reports of Weyler's

suppression of the independence movement, and the mysterious

explosion of the battleship U.S.S. Maine in Havana harbor, stirred

public opinion in the United States and led to a declaration of war

by the United States in April 1898. The United States destroyed

antiquated Spanish naval units at Santiago de Cuba and in Manila

Bay. Despite a pledge by Madrid to defend Cuba "to the last peseta," the Spanish army surrendered after a few weeks of hostilities against an American expeditionary force. In Paris that September, Spain gave up Cuba, Puerto Rico, and the Philippines.

The suddenness and the totality of Spain's defeat as well as the

country's realization of its lack of European support during the war with the United States (only Germany had offered diplomatic

backing) threw Spain into despair. The disaster called forth an intel- lectual reevaluation of Spain's position in the world by the so-called "Generation of 1898," who confronted Spaniards with the propositions that Spain had long since ceased to be a country of conse- quence, that its society was archaic, and that its institutions were

outworn and incapable of moving into the twentieth century. These

words were painful for the proud nation.

The traumatic events of 1898 and the inability of the government to deal with them prompted political reevaluation. A plethora

of new, often short-lived, personalist parties and regional groups

30
Historical Setting

on both the left and the right (that broke the hegemony of the twoparty system and ultimately left the parliamentary structure in dis- array) sought solutions to the country's problems. By 1915 it was

virtually impossible to form a coalition government that could com- mand the support of a parliamentary majority.

Some politicians on the right, like the conservative, Antonio

Maura, argued for a return to traditional authoritarianism, and

they blamed the parliamentary regimes (kept in power by caciques) for corrupting the country. Maura failed in his attempt to form

a national Catholic party, but he inspired a number of right-wing

groups with his political philosophy.

Regionalist movements were organized to free progressive Catalonia, the Basque areas, and Galicia from the "Castilian corpse."

Whether on the left or on the right, residents of these regions stressed

their distinct character and history. An electoral coalition of Catalan

parties regularly sent strong parliamentary contingents to Madrid

to barter their votes for concessions to Catalonian regionalism.

Alejandro Lerroux was an effective, but demagogical, political

organizer who took his liberal splinter group into the antimonarchist camp. He formed the Radical Republicans on a national,

middle-class base that frequently allied itself with the Catalans.

The democratic, Marxist-oriented Spanish Socialist Workers'

Party (Partido Socialista Obrero Espanol—PSOE), founded in

1879, grew rapidly in the north, especially in Asturias, where a

trade union, the General Union of Workers (Union General de

Trabajadores—UGT), had most effectively organized the working class. The Federation of Iberian Anarchists (Federacion Anarquista

Iberica) was well organized in Catalonia and Andalusia and had

many members, but in keeping with anarchist philosophy, they

remained aloof from participation in the electoral process. Their

abstention, however, had a telling effect. They practiced terrorism,

and the anarchist trade union, the National Confederation of Labor

(Confederation Nacional del Trabajo—CNT), was able on several

occasions to shut down Barcelona. The aim of the anarchists was

not to take control of the government, but to make government

impossible.

The African War and the Authoritarian Regime of

Miguel Primo de Rivera

Spain was neutral in World War I, but the Spanish army was

constantly engaged from 1909 to 1926 against Abd al Krim's Riff

Berbers in Morocco, where Spain had joined France in proclaiming

31
Spain: A Country Study

a protectorate. Successive civilian governments in Spain allowed

the war to continue, but they refused to supply the army with the means to win it. Spanish losses were heavy to their fierce and skillful enemy, who was equipped with superior weapons. Riots against

conscription for the African war spread disorder throughout the

country, and opposition to the war was often expressed in church

burnings. Officers, who often had served in Morocco, formed juntas

to register complaints that were just short ofpronunciamientos against

wartime inflation, low fixed salaries for the military, alleged civilian corruption, and inadequate and scarce equipment.

Conditions in Morocco, increased anarchist and communist ter- rorism, industrial unrest, and the effects of the postwar economic

slump prompted the pronunciamiento that brought a general officer,

Miguel Primo de Rivera (in power, 1923-30), into office. His authoritarian regime originally enjoyed wide support in much of the

country and had the confidence of the king and the loyalty of the

army. The government lacked an ideological foundation, however;

its mandate was based on general disillusionment with both the

parliamentary government and the extreme partisan politics of the

previous period.

Once in power, Primo de Rivera dissolved parliament and ruled

through directorates and the aid of the military until 1930. His

regime sponsored public works to curb unemployment. Protec- tionism and state control of the economy led to a temporary eco- nomic recovery. A better led and better supplied army brought

the African war to a successful conclusion in 1926.

The precipitous economic decline in 1930 undercut support for the government from special-interest groups. For seven years, Primo

de Rivera remained a man on horseback. He established no new

system to replace parliamentary government. Criticism from aca- demics mounted. Bankers expressed disappointment at the state loans that his government had tried to float. An attempt to reform

the promotion system cost him the support of the army. This loss of army support caused him to lose the support of the king. Primo

de Rivera resigned and died shortly afterward in exile. Republican Spain

Antimonarchist parties won a substantial vote in the 1931 municipal elections. Alfonso XIII interpreted the outcome of the elections

and the riots that followed as an indication of imminent civil war. He left the country with his family and appealed to the army for support in upholding the monarchy. When General Jose Sanjurjo,

army chief of staff, replied that the armed forces would not support

the king against the will of the people, Alfonso abdicated.

32
Historical Setting

A multiparty coalition in which regional parties held the balance

met at a constitutional convention at San Sebastian, the summer

capital, to proclaim the Second Republic. The goals of the new

republic, set forth at the convention, included reform of the army,

the granting of regional autonomy, social reform and economic

redistribution, the separation of church and state, and depriving

the church of a role in education. Niceto Alcala Zamora, a nonparty conservative, became president and called elections for June.

The first general election of the Second Republic gave a majority

to a coalition of the Republican Left (Izquierda Republicana

IR)—a middle-class radical party led by Manuel Azafia, who

became prime minister—and labor leader Francisco Largo Cabal- lero's PSOE, backed by the UGT. Azafia pledged that his government would gradually introduce socialism through the democratic

process. His gradualism alienated the political left; his socialism,

the right.

Azafia' s republicanism, like nineteenth-century liberalism and

Bourbon regalism before it, was inevitably associated with anticleri- calism. His government proposed to carry out the constitutional

convention's recommendations for complete state control of education. In 1932 the Catalan Generalitat gained recognition as the autono- mous regional government for Catalonia. The region remained part

of the Spanish republic and was tied more closely to it because of

Madrid's grant of autonomy. Representatives from Catalonia to the Madrid parliament played an active role in national affairs. Efforts to reform the army and to eliminate its political power pro- voked a pronunciamiento against the government by Sanjurjo. The

pronunciamiento, though unsuccessful, forced Azafia to back down

from dealing with the military establishment for the time being.

Azafia' s greatest difficulties derived from doctrinal differences

within the government between his non-Marxist, bourgeois IR and

the PSOE, which, after an initial period of cooperation, obstructed

Azafia at every step. Opposition from the UGT blocked attempts

at labor legislation. The PSOE complained that Azafia' s reforms were inadequate to produce meaningful social change, though there was no parliamentary majority that would have approved Largo

Caballero's far-reaching proposals to improve conditions for working people. Azafia' s legislative program may not have satisfied his

ally, but it did rally moderate and conservative opinion against the

coalition on the eve of the second general election in November

1932.

Azafia' s principal parliamentary opposition came from the two

largest parties that could claim a national constituency, Lerroux's

33
Spain: A Country Study

moderate, middle-class Radical Republicans and a right-wing

Catholic organization, the Spanish Confederation of the Autonomous Right (Confederation Espanola de Derechas Autonomas

CEDA). Lerroux, who had grown more conservative and tolerant

since his days as an antimonarchist firebrand, capitalized on the

left's failures to reach a compromise with the church and to deal

with industrial unrest and with the extragovernmental power of

the UGT and the CNT. He appealed for conservative support by

showing that Azana was at the mercy of the unions—as he was when in coalition with Largo Caballero.

CEDA was a coalition of groups under the leadership of Jose

Maria Gil Robles, a law professor from Salamanca who had headed

Popular Action (Action Popular), an influential Catholic political

youth movement. As a broadly based fusion party, CEDA could

not afford a doctrinaire political stance, and its flexibility was part

of its strength. Some elements in the party, however, favored a

Christian social democracy, and they took the encyclicals of Pope

Leo XIII as their guide. CEDA never succeeded in establishing a working-class base. Its electoral strength lay in the Catholic middle

class and in the rural population. Gil Robles was primarily interested in 1932 in working for a settlement favorable to the church

within the constitutional structure of the republic.

In the November election, the IR and the PSOE ran separately

rather than placing candidates on a common slate. Combined elec- toral lists, permitted under the constitution, encouraged coalitions;

they were intended to prevent parliamentary fragmentation in the

multiparty system.

The government parties lost seats, and CEDA emerged as the

largest single party in parliament. CEDA's showing at the polls was taken as a sign of conservative Spain's disenchantment with

the Republic and its anticlericalism. But there was no question that

the Catholic right was being called on to form a government. President Zamora was hostile to CEDA, and he urged Lerroux to head

a minority government. Lerroux agreed, but he entered into a parliamentary alliance with CEDA a little more than a year later. Lerroux did not welcome the center-right coalition; however, he

knew the coalition presented the only means by which a parliamentary majority that included his party could be obtained. Gil Robles was appointed minister for war, with a role in maintaining public

order, in the new government.

Unions used strikes as political weapons, much as the army had

used the pronunciamiento. Industrial disorder climaxed in a miners'

strike in Asturias, which Azafia openly and actively supported. The

police and the army commanded by Franco crushed the miners.

34
Historical Setting

The strike confirmed to the right that the left could not be trusted

to abide by constitutional processes, and the suppression of the strike proved to the left that the right was "fascist." Azafia accused Gil

Robles of using republican institutions to destroy the republic.

The Lerroux-Gil Robles government had as its first priority the

restoration of order, although the government's existence was the

chief cause of the disorder. Action on labor's legitimate grievances was postponed until order was restored. The most controversial

of Gil Robles 's programs, however, was finding the means to effect a reconciliation with the church. In the context of the coalition with

Lerroux, he also attempted to expand his political base by court- ing the support of antirepublican elements. The government

resigned in November 1935 over a minor issue. Zamora refused

to sanction the formation of a new government by CEDA, without

the cooperation of which no moderate government could be put

together. On the advice of the left, Zamora called a new general

election for February 1936.

The Asturian miners' strike had polarized public opinion and

had led to the consolidation of parties on the left from Azafia' s IR

to the Communist Party of Spain (Partido Comunista de Espafia

PCE). The PSOE had been increasingly "bolshevized," and it was

difficult for a social democrat, such as Largo Caballero, to control his party, which drifted leftward. In 1935 Soviet leader Joseph

Stalin had sanctioned communist participation in popular front

governments with bourgeois and democratic socialist parties. The

Left Republicans, the PSOE, the Republican Left of Catalonia

(Esquerra Republicana de Catalunya), the communists, a number of smaller regional and left-wing parties, and the anarchists,

who had boycotted previous elections as a matter of principle, joined

to present a single leftist slate to the electorate. The Spanish Popular Front was to be only an electoral coalition. Its goal was not to form a government but to defeat the right.

Largo Caballero made it clear that the Socialists would not cooperate

in any government that did not adopt their program for nationalization, a policy as much guaranteed to break Spain in two and

to provoke a civil war as the appointment of the CEDA-dominated

government that Zamora had worked to prevent.

The general election produced a number of irregularities that

led the left, the right, and the center to claim massive voting fraud.

Two subsequent runoff votes, recounts, and an electoral commission controlled by the left provided the Popular Front with an

impressive number of parliamentary seats. Azafia formed his

minority government, but the front's victory was taken as the

signal for the start of the left's long-awaited revolution, already

35
Spain: A Country Study

anticipated by street riots, church burnings, and strikes. Workers'

councils, which undertook to circumvent the slow- grinding wheels

of the constitutional process, set up governments parallel to the

traditional bodies. Zamora was removed from office on the grounds

that he had gone beyond his constitutional authority in calling the

general election. Azafia was named to replace him, depriving the

IR of his strong leadership.

The Spanish Civil War

Gil Robles's influence, as a spokesman for the right in the new

parliament, waned. The National Block, a smaller coalition of

monarchists and fascists led by Jose Calvo Sotelo, who had sought

the army's cooperation in restoring Alfonso XIII, assumed CEDA's

role. Calvo Sotelo was murdered in July 1936, supposedly in retalia- tion for the killing of a police officer by fascists. Calvo Sotelo 's death was a signal to the army to act on the pretext that the civilian government had allowed the country to fall into disorder. The army issued a pronunciamiento. A coup was expected, however, and the urban

police and the workers' militia loyal to the government put down

revolts by army garrisons in Madrid and Barcelona. Navy crews

spontaneously purged their ships of officers. The army and the left rejected the eleventh-hour efforts of Indalecio Prieto (who had suc- ceeded Azana as prime minister) to arrive at a compromise.

The army was most successful in the north, where General Emilio

Mola had established his headquarters at Burgos (see fig. 4). Northcentral Spain and the Carlist strongholds in Navarre and Aragon

rallied to the army. In Morocco, elite units seized control under

Franco, Spain's youngest general and hero. Transport supplied

by Germany and Italy ferried Franco's African army, including

Moorish auxiliaries, to Andalusia. Franco occupied the major cities in the south before turning toward Madrid to link up with Mola,

who was advancing from Burgos. The relief of the army garrison

besieged at Toledo, however, delayed the attack on Madrid and

allowed time for preparation of the capital's defense. Army units

penetrated the city limits, but they were driven back, and the

Nationalists were able to retain the city.

A junta of generals, including Franco, formed a government at Burgos, which Germany and Italy immediately recognized. Sanjurjo, who had been expected to lead the army movement, was killed in a plane crash during the first days of the uprising. In October

1936, Franco was named head of state, with the rank of generalissimo and the title el caudillo (the leader).

When he assumed leadership of the Nationalist forces, Franco

had a reputation as a highly professional, career-oriented, combat

36
Historical Setting

soldier, who had developed into a first-rate officer. Commissioned

in the army at the age of eighteen, he had volunteered for service

in Morocco, where he had distinguished himself as a courageous

leader. Serious, studious, humorless, withdrawn, and abstemious,

he had won the respect and the confidence of his subordinates more

readily than he had won the comradeship of his brother officers. At the age of thirty-three, he had become the youngest general in Europe since Napoleon Bonaparte.

Franco opposed Sanjurjo in 1932; still, Azaria considered Franco

unreliable and made him captain general of the Canaries, a virtual

exile for an ambitious officer. Though by nature a conservative,

Franco did not wed himself to any particular political creed. On

taking power, he set about to reconcile all right-wing, antirepubli- can groups in one Nationalist organization. The Falange, a fascist party founded by Jose Antonio Primo de Rivera (the dictator's son),

provided the catalyst. The Carlists, revived after 1931, merged with

the Falange in 1937, but the association was never harmonious.

Jose Antonio's execution by the Republicans provided the Falange

with a martyr. The more radical of the early Falange programs

were pushed aside by more moderate elements, and the Nationalists' trade unionism was only a shadow of what Jose Antonio had

intended. The Nationalist organization did keep its fascist facade,

but Franco's strength lay in the army.

Nationalist strategy called for separating Madrid from Catalonia

(which was firmly Republican), Valencia, and Murcia (which the

republic also controlled). The Republicans stabilized the front

around Madrid, defending it against the Nationalists for three years. Isolated Asturias and Vizcaya, where the newly organized Basque

Republic fought to defend its autonomy without assistance from

Madrid, fell to Franco in October 1937. Otherwise the battlelines were static until July 1938, when Nationalist forces broke through

to the Mediterranean Sea south of Barcelona. Throughout the Civil

War, the industrial areas—except Asturias and the Basque provinces—remained in Republican hands, while the chief foodproducing areas were under Nationalist control.

The republic lacked a regular trained army, though a number

of armed forces cadres had remained loyal, especially in the air force and the navy. Many of the loyal officers were either purged

or were not trusted to hold command positions. The workers' militia and independently organized armed political units like those of the

Trotskyite Workers' Party of Marxist Unification (Partido Obrero

de Unification Marxista—POUM) bore the brunt of the fighting

in the early months of the Civil War. For example, the anarchist

37
Spain: A Country Study

Source: Based on information from Raymond Carr, Spain 1908-1975, Oxford, 1982, 777.

Figure 4. Territorial Control During the Spanish Civil War, 1936-37

UGT militia and the Assault Guards (the urban police corps established by the Republic to counterbalance the Civil Guard—Guardia

Civil—the paramilitary rural police who were generally considered

reactionary) crushed the army garrison in Barcelona. Moscow

provided advisers, logistics experts, and some field- grade officers. Foreign volunteers, including more than 2,000 from the United

States, formed the International Brigade. The communists pressed

for, and won, approval for the creation of a national, conscript

Republican army.

The Soviet Union supplied arms and munitions to the republic

from the opening days of the Civil War. France provided some

aircraft and artillery. The republic's only other conduit for arms

supply was through Mexico. The so-called spontaneous revolutions

38
Historical Setting

that plagued the industrial centers hampered arms production

within Spain.

Nationalist strength was based on the regular army, which in- cluded large contingents of Moroccan troops and battalions of the

Foreign Legion, which Franco had commanded in Africa. The

Carlists, who had always maintained a clandestine militia (requetes), were among Franco's most effective troops, and they were employed, together with the Moroccans, as a shock corps. Italian dic- tator Benito Mussolini (fascist premier, 1922-45) dispatched more

than 50,000 Italian "volunteers" (most of them army conscripts)

to Spain, along with air and naval units. The German Condor

Legion, made infamous by the bombing of Guernica, provided air support for the Nationalists and tested the tactics and the equipment used a few years later by the Luftwaffe (German air force).

Germany and Italy also supplied large quantities of artillery and

armor, as well as the personnel to use this weaponry.

A nonintervention commission, including representatives from

France, Britain, Germany, and Italy, was established at the Lyon

Conference in 1936 to stem the flow of supplies to both sides. France

and Britain were concerned that escalating foreign intervention

could turn Spain's Civil War into a European war. The commission and coastal patrols supplied by the signatory powers were to enforce an embargo. The net effect of the nonintervention agreement was to cut off French and British aid to the republic. Germany and Italy did not observe the agreement. The Soviet Union

was not a signatory. By 1938, however, Stalin had lost interest in Spain.

While the Republicans resisted the Nationalists by all available

means, another struggle was going on within their own ranks. A

majority fought essentially to protect Republican institutions. Others,

including the communists, were committed to finishing the Civil

War before beginning their anticipated revolution. They were, however, resisted by comrades-in-arms—the Trotskyites and anarchists—who were intent on completing the social and political revolution while waging war against the Nationalists.

Largo Caballero, who became prime minister in September 1936,

had the support of the socialists and of the communists, who were becoming the most important political factor in the Republican

government. The communists, after successfully arguing for a

national conscript army that could be directed by the government,

pressed for elimination of the militia units. They also argued for postponing the revolution until the fascists had been defeated and

encouraged greater participation by the bourgeois parties in the

Popular Front. The UGT, increasingly under communist influence,

39
Spain: A Country Study

entered into the government, and the more militant elements within

it were purged. POUM, which had resisted disbanding its independent military units and merging with the communist-controlled

national army, was ruthlessly suppressed as the communists undertook to eliminate competing leftist organizations. Anarchists were

dealt with in similar fashion, and in Catalonia a civil war raged

within a civil war. Fearing the growth of Soviet influence in Spain, Largo Caballero

attempted to negotiate a compromise that would end the Civil War.

He was removed from office and replaced by Juan Negnn, a procommunist socialist with little previous political experience.

The Republican army, its attention diverted by internal politi- cal battles, was never able to mount a sustained counteroffensive or to exploit a breakthrough such as that on the Rio Ebro in 1938.

Negnn realized that Spaniards in Spain could not win the war, but he hoped to prolong the fighting until the outbreak of a European war, which he thought was imminent.

Barcelona fell to the Nationalists in January 1939, and Valencia,

the temporary capital, fell in March. When factional fighting broke

out in Madrid among the city's defenders, the Republican army

commander seized control of what remained of the government

and surrendered to the Nationalists on the last day of March, thus

ending the Civil War.

There is as much controversy over the number of casualties of

the Spanish Civil War as there is about the results of the 1936 elec- tion, but even conservative estimates are high. The most consis- tent estimate is 600,000 dead from all causes, including combat,

bombing, and executions. In the Republican sector, tens of thousands died of starvation, and several hundred thousand more fled from Spain.

The Franco Years

Franco's Political System

The leader of the Nationalist forces, General Franco, headed the

authoritarian regime that came to power in the aftermath of the Civil

War. Until his death in November 1975, Franco ruled Spain as "Caudillo by the grace of God," as his coins proclaimed. In addition to being generalissimo of the armed forces, he was both chief

of state and head of government, the ultimate source of legitimate

authority. He retained the power to appoint and to dismiss ministers

and other decision makers. Even after he grew older, began to lose

his health, and became less actively involved in policy making,

Franco still had the final word on every major political decision.

40
Civilians observing an aerial dogfight during the Civil War

Courtesy Prints and Photographs Division, Library of Congress

Ideology or political theories were not the primary motivators

in Franco's developing of the institutions that came to be identified with his name. Franco had spent his life as a professional soldier,

and his conception of society was along military lines. Known for

his iron political nerve, Franco saw himself as the one designated

to save Spain from the chaos and instability visited upon the country

by the evils of parliamentary democracy and political parties, which

he blamed for destroying the unity of Spain. His pragmatic goal was to maintain power in order to keep what he termed the ' ' antiSpain" forces from gaining ascendancy.

The political structures established under Franco's rule repre- sented this pragmatic approach. Because he never formulated a

true, comprehensive, constitutional system, Franco had great flexibility in dealing with changing domestic and international situations. Seven fundamental laws decreed during his rule provided

the regime with a semblance of constitutionalism, but they were

developed after the fact, usually to legitimize an existing situation or distribution of power.

The first of these fundamental laws was the Labor Charter,

promulgated on March 9, 1938. It set forth the social policy of the

regime, and it stressed the mutual obligations of the state and its citizens: all Spaniards had the duty to work, and the state was to assure them the right to work. Although the decree called for

41
Spain: A Country Study

adequate wages, paid vacations, and a limit to working hours, it ensured labor's compliance with the new regime by labeling strikes as treason. Later legislation required Spanish workers to join vertical syndicates in which both owners and employees were supposed

to cooperate for the good of the nation.

Another fundamental law, the Constituent Law of the Cortes

(1942), provided the trappings of constitutionalism. This Cortes

(Spanish Parliament), was purely an advisory body, and it had little in common with democratic legislatures. Most of its members were

indirectly elected or appointed, and many were already part of the

administration. The Cortes did not have the right to initiate legislation or to vote against the government; it could only approve laws

presented by the executive. There was no vestige of power attached

to this function because the law permitted Franco to legislate by

decree without consulting the Cortes. The Council of Ministers,

the members of which were appointed by, and presided over, by

Franco, exercised executive authority. Franco had the right to dis- miss these ministers.

Following the Allied victories in 1945, Franco sought to impress

the world's democratic powers with Spain's ''liberal" credentials

by issuing a fundamental law that was ostensibly a bill of rights

the Charter of Rights. The rights granted by this charter were more

cosmetic than democratic, because the government bestowed them

and could suspend them without justification; furthermore, the

charter placed more emphasis on the duty of all Spaniards to serve

their country and to obey its laws than on their basic rights as

citizens. Thus, for example, the charter guaranteed all Spaniards

the right to express their opinions freely, but they were not to attack

the fundamental principles of the state. The Law on Referenda, also issued in 1945, was a further attempt

by Franco to make his regime appear less arbitrary. It provided

that issues of national concern would be submitted for the consideration of Spanish citizens by means of popular referenda. Franco

decreed this law without having consulted the Cortes, however,

and he retained the sole right to determine whether a referendum

would be called. The law stipulated that after 1947, a referendum

would have to be called in order to alter any fundamental law;

Franco retained the right to decree such laws, however—a right

which he exercised in 1958.

Additional measures that were taken in the immediate postwar

years to provide the Franco regime with a facade of democracy

included pardons and reduced terms for prisoners convicted of Civil

War crimes and a guarantee that refugees who returned would not be prosecuted if they did not engage in political activities. The

42
Historical Setting

regime announced new elections for municipal councils; council

members were to be selected indirectly by syndicates and heads

of "families." The government retained the right to appoint all mayors directly.

The Law of Succession (1947) was the first of the fundamental

laws to be submitted to popular referendum. It proclaimed that

Spain would be a "Catholic, social, and representative monarchy"

and that Franco would be regent for life (unless incapacitated).

Franco had the authority to name the next king when he thought

the time was appropriate and also to revoke his choice at a later date if he so desired. The law also provided for a Council of the

Realm to assist Franco in the exercise of executive power and for a three-member Regency Council to be in charge of the government during the period of transition to the Caudillo's successor. When the plebiscite was held, over 90 percent of the 15 million

voters approved the measures. Although the Law of Succession

ostensibly reestablished the monarchy, it actually solidified Franco's

rule and legitimized his position as head of state by popular suffrage.

The sixth fundamental law, the Law on the Principles of the

National Movement—which Franco decreed unilaterally in 1958

further defined the institutions of Franco's government. The

National Movement—a coalition of right-wing groups referred to as political "families" —termed a "communion" rather than a

party, was designated as the sole forum for political participation.

The law reaffirmed the nature of Spain as a traditional, Catholic

monarchy. All top government officials, as well as all possible future successors to Franco, were required to pledge their loyalty to the

principles embodied in this law (which was presented as a synthesis of all previous fundamental laws).

The final fundamental law, the Organic Law of the State, was

presented in 1966. It incorporated no major changes, but was

designed to codify and to clarify existing practices, while allowing

for some degree of reform. It established a separation between the

functions of the president of government (prime minister) and the

head of state, and it outlined the procedures for the selection of

top government officials. It included other measures designed to modernize the Spanish system and to eliminate vestiges of fascist terminology. Although presented as a move toward democratization, it nevertheless retained the basic structure of an authoritarian

system.

Franco initially derived his authority from his victory in the Civil

War. The armed forces gave his regime security; the Roman Catholic Church and the National Movement gave it legitimacy. The

National Movement was the only recognized political organization

43
Spain: A Country Study

in Franco's Spain. It was not a political party, and it did not have an overt ideological basis. Its membership included monarchists,

Falangists, conservative Catholics, members of the armed forces, as well as business groups (with vested interests in continuity),

technocrats, and civil servants. Although there was some overlap

among these groups, they had distinct, and often contradictory,

interests. The force that fused them together was their common

loyalty to Franco. Franco was particularly skillful in manipulating

each of these "families," giving each a taste of power, but not allowing any group or individual to create an independent base from

which to challenge his authority.

Franco's political system was virtually the antithesis of the final government of the Republican era—the Popular Front government.

In contrast to the anticlericalism of the Popular Front, the Francoist regime established policies that were highly favorable to the

Catholic Church, which was restored to its previous status as the

official religion of Spain. In addition to receiving government subsidies, the church regained its dominant position in the education

system, and laws conformed to Catholic dogma. Gains in regional

autonomy were reversed under Franco, and Spain reverted to being

a highly centralized state. The regime abolished regional governmental bodies and enacted measures against the use of the Basque

and the Catalan languages. Further contrast between the Popular

Front government and the Franco regime was apparent in their

bases of support. Whereas the liberal leftists and the working-class

elements of society had supported the Popular Front, the conservative upper classes were the mainstay of Franco's government.

Above all, Franco endeavored to remove all vestiges of parliamentary democracy, which he perceived to be alien to Spanish politi- cal traditions. He oudawed political parties, blaming them for the

chaotic conditions that had preceded the Civil War. He eliminated

universal suffrage and severely limited the freedoms of expression

and association; he viewed criticism of the regime as treason. In spite of the regime's strong degree of control, Franco did not

pursue totalitarian domination of all social, cultural, and religious

institutions, or of the economy as a whole. The Franco regime also lacked the ideological impetus characteristic of totalitarian governments. Furthermore, for those willing to work within the system,

there was a limited form of pluralism. Thus, Franco's rule has been

characterized as authoritarian rather than totalitarian. Whereas there is generally consensus among analysts in designating the regime as authoritarian, there is less agreement con- cerning the fascist component of Franco's Spain. In its early period,

the Francoist state was considered, outside Spain, to be fascist. The

44
Historical Setting

Falangist program of national syndicalism reflected the pattern of

fascism prevalent in Europe during those years; nevertheless, core

Falangists never played a major role in the new state. Most of the

key leaders of the Falange did not survive the Civil War, and Franco

moved quickly to subordinate the fascist party, merging it as well

as more conservative and traditional political forces into the broader

and vaguer National Movement under his direct control. The links

between Franco's regime and the Roman Catholic Church, as well

as the course of international developments, further mitigated the

fascist component. Thus, while there was a definite fascist element

during the first decade of Franco's rule, most analysts have con- cluded that early Francoism can more accurately be described as semifascist.

Policies, Programs, and Growing Popular Unrest

Severe repression marked the early years of the regime, as Franco

sought to impose absolute political control and to institutionalize

the Nationalist victory in the Civil War. The schisms that had pre- ceded and precipitated the war were maintained as the vanquished were excluded from political participation. Franco restricted individual liberties and suppressed challenges to his authority. The

regime imposed prison terms for "revolutionary activity," and

executions were carried out through 1944, albeit at a decreasing

rate. These repressive measures engendered an atmosphere of fear. In addition, the traumatic effect of years of internecine violence,

widespread deprivations, suffering, and disillusionment had left most of the Spanish population acquiescent, willing to accept any

system that could restore peace and stability.

During the first phase of the regime, the military played a major

role. The state of martial law that was declared in July 1936

remained in effect until 1948. With the backing of the armed forces,

Franco used his extensive powers to invalidate all laws of the Sec- ond Republic that offended his political and ethical beliefs. He

banned civil marriage, made divorce illegal, and made religious

education compulsory in the schools. Publications were subject to prior censorship, and public meetings required official permission.

He returned most of the land nationalized under the republic's

agrarian program to its original owners. The state destroyed trade

unions, confiscating their funds and property. Vertical syndicates

replaced the unions.

In 1939 Franco initiated a program of reconstruction based on

the concept of economic self-sufficiency or autarchy (see The Franco

Era, 1939-75, ch. 3). The program, aimed at increasing national

economic production, favored the established industrial and

45
Spain: A Country Study

financial interests at the expense of the lower classes and the agricultural regions. Acute shortages and starvation wages were widespread

in the early 1940s, a period which saw the worst inflation in Spain's

history. By the end of the decade, Spain's level of economic development was among the lowest in southern Europe. Furthermore,

the ostracism that Spain experienced because of Franco's collaboration with the Axis powers during World War II and because of

the dictatorial nature of his regime deprived the country of the

benefits of the Marshall Plan, which was a major factor in the

rebuilding of Europe's postwar economy (see Foreign Policy under

Franco, this ch.).

As the 1940s drew to a close, agricultural imbalances, labor

unrest, and a growing pressure for industrial development forced

the regime to begin to modify its autarchic policies. Spain's need

for food, raw materials, energy, and credit made it necessary for the country to establish some link to the international economy.

Spain achieved this goal when the United States decided to seek

the political and strategic advantages of Spanish friendship in the

face of an increasingly aggressive Soviet Union. With the infusion

of American capital, Spain's economy revived, and living standards

began to improve. There was a degree of economic liberalization,

and industrial production increased significandy in the 1950s. Economic liberalization did not result in a relaxation of authoritarian

control, however. The regime swiftly repressed workers' demonstrations in the spring of 1951 and student protests in 1956.

The regime's "families" did not agree unanimously on the new

economic policies, and there were clashes between the progressive

and the reactionary forces. The Falange resisted the opening of

the regime to capitalistic influences, while the technocrats of the

powerful Catholic pressure group, Opus Dei, de-emphasized the

role of the syndicates and favored increased competition as a means

of achieving rapid economic growth. The technocrats prevailed,

and members of Opus Dei assumed significant posts in Franco's

1957 cabinet (see Political Interest Groups, ch. 4). Although Opus

Dei did not explicitly support political liberalization, it aspired to economic integration with Europe, which meant that Spain would

be exposed to democratic influences.

Measures proposed by these technocrats to curb inflation, to reduce government economic controls, and to bring Spanish eco- nomic policies and procedures in line with European standards were

incorporated in the Stabilization Plan of 1959. The plan laid the

basis for Spain's remarkable economic transformation in the 1960s.

During that decade, Spain's industrial production and standard

of living increased dramatically.

46
Medieval walls of Avila

Courtesy National

Tourist Office of Spain

Rapid economic development had political and social conse- quences, however. Economic expansion resulted in a larger and

better educated middle class than had ever existed in Spain, as well

as in a new urban working class. Furthermore, the unprecedented

degree of foreign cultural influence had a marked impact on Spanish

society (see Social Values and Attitudes, ch. 2). All of these fac- tors contributed to an increasing level of dissatisfaction with the

restrictions that Franco had imposed. These restrictions were seen

as impediments to further growth and modernization.

The technocrats had hoped that greater economic prosperity

would eliminate hostility toward Francoism, but tension between

an increasingly dynamic Spanish society and the oppressive regime

that governed it resulted in growing domestic opposition throughout the 1960s. The expanding industrial labor force became increasingly militant. Workers organized clandestine commissions, and

recurrent strikes and bombings were indications that Franco would

not be able to maintain his repressive grip on the labor force indefinitely.

In addition, regional discontent was giving rise to escalating

violent protests in the Basque region and in Catalonia. Agitation was also growing among university students who resented the stric- tures of Franco's regime. There was even opposition among the

members of one of Franco's former bastions of support, the clergy.

The younger liberal priests in the Catholic Church in Spain had

47
Spain: A Country Study

responded with enthusiasm to the Second Vatican Council, which

emphasized individual liberties and progressive social policies. The

priests were also increasingly vocal in their attacks on the oppressive aspects of Francoism.

The unrest of the mid-1960s did not seriously threaten Spain's

stability, however, and Franco—after twenty-five years in power

felt the regime was sufficiently secure and economically booming

for a slight loosening of his authoritarian control. The Organic Law

of the State, which had been approved by referendum in 1966,

provided this modicum of liberalization while it solidified Franco's

political system (see Franco's Political System, this ch.). The Law

on Religious Freedom, approved in June 1967, eased restrictions on non-Catholics. In the same year, the regime modified censorship laws, and a considerably wider expression of opinion followed.

In July 1969, Franco provided his regime with a greater degree

of legitimacy and continuity by naming as his successor a legitimate heir to the throne, Prince Juan Carlos de Borbon.

The closing years of Franco's regime were marked by increasing violence and unrest. The anticipation of the dictator's demise

and his increasing incapacity destabilized the country, and there was ongoing conflict between those who sought to liberalize the

regime in order to secure its survival and those of the bunker mentality who resisted reforms. As a recession in the late 1960s over- took rapid economic expansion, labor agitation heightened. An

unprecedented wave of strikes and increasing rebellion in the universities moved Franco to proclaim a state of exception throughout

Spain in the early months of 1969. Freedom of expression and

assembly were among the constitutional rights that were suspended,

and Spain appeared to be returning to the repressive conditions

of the 1940s. The revival of dictatorial policies had international

repercussions and threatened negotiations with the United States

for renewal of an agreement on United States military bases. Franco

lifted the state of exception in March 1969, but the government's

efforts to achieve legitimacy had been seriously undermined. The

remaining years of Franco's rule saw periods of intensified opposition to which the government responded with harshly repressive measures that merely served to broaden and to inflame the resis- tance, leaving the regime in a state of constant turmoil.

The most virulent opposition to the Franco regime in the late 1960s and the early 1970s came from the revolutionary Basque

nationalist group, Basque Fatherland and Freedom (Euskadi Ta

Askatasuna—ETA; see Threats to Internal Security, ch. 5). This

extremist group used terror tactics and assassinations to gain recognition of its demands for regional autonomy. The ETA's most

48
Historical Setting

daring act was the assassination in December 1973 of Luis Carrero Blanco, whom Franco had appointed as his first prime minister.

Carrero Blanco had embodied hard-line Francoism, and he was

seen as the one who would carry on the Caudillo's policies. His

assassination precipitated the regime's most serious governmental

crisis and interrupted the continuity that Franco had planned.

The tensions that had been mounting within the regime since

the late 1960s would have made a continuation of Franco's system

untenable even without Carrero Blanco's death. Conflicts between

the reactionary elements of the regime and those who were willing

to open the door to reform had plagued Carrero Blanco. These

conflicts continued under his successor, Carlos Arias Navarro. In

his first speech to the Cortes on February 12, 1974, the new prime

minister promised liberalizing reforms, including the right to form

political associations; however, diehard Francoists on the right, who

equated any change with chaos, and radical reformers on the left, who were not content with anything less than a total break with

the past, condemned Arias Navarro.

Both camps were dissatisfied with the political associations bill that eventually became law in December 1974. The law required

that political participation be in accord with the principles of the

National Movement and placed associations under its jurisdiction.

The law offered no significant departure from Francoism. Wouldbe reformers saw it as a sham; reactionaries criticized it as the beginning of a limited political party system.

Opposition to the regime mounted on all sides in 1974 and 1975.

Labor strikes, in which even actors participated, spread across the

country. Universities were in a state of turmoil, as the popular

clamor for democracy grew more strident. Terrorist activity reached

such a level that the government placed the Basque region under

martial law in April 1975. By the time of Franco's death on November 20, 1975, Spain was in a chronic state of crisis. Franco's legacy had been an unprecedented era of peace and

order, undergirded by his authoritarian grip on the country. While

forced political stability enabled Spain to share in the remarkable

period of economic development experienced by Europe in the

1960s, it suppressed, but did not eliminate, longstanding sources

of conflict in Spanish society. The economic and social transformation that Spain experienced in the last decades of Francoist rule

complicated these tensions, which were exacerbated as the regime

drew to a close. At the time of Franco's death, change appeared

inevitable. The form that the change would take and the extent

to which it could be controlled were less certain.

49
Spain: A Country Study

Foreign Policy under Franco

The overriding need to strengthen the regime determined for- eign policy in the first phase of Franco's rule. Weakened by the

devastation of civil war, the country could not afford to become

involved in a protracted European conflict. Although Franco was

deeply indebted to Germany and to Italy for their decisive contribution to his victory over the Republicans, he declared Spain's neutrality in the opening days of World War II. His sympathies,

nevertheless, were openly with the Axis powers; he had, in fact,

already joined the Anti-Comintern Pact and had signed a secret treaty of friendship with Germany in March 1939. There was

genuine enthusiasm for the fascist cause among important elements

of the Franco regime, especially the Falange.

Spain altered its policy of neutrality following the lightning success of Germany's 1940 spring offensive. The German armies

appeared invincible, and Franco was eager to assure Spain a voice

in the postwar settlement. In June 1940, the Spanish government

adopted a policy of nonbelligerency, which permitted German submarines to be provisioned in Spanish ports and German airplanes

to use Spanish landing strips. This stance was widely interpreted

as foreshadowing Spain's entry on the side of the Axis powers; the

German Nazi leader, Adolf Hitler, and Franco discussed this move

on more than one occasion. The two dictators could never come

to terms, however. The German invasion of the Soviet Union in

1941 presented Franco with a unique opportunity to participate

in the conflict without a declaration of war and to get revenge for the Soviet Union's aid to the Republicans. Franco agreed to a

Falangist request for the official formation of a Blue Division of

volunteers—which reached a maximum strength of 18,000 men—to

fight on the eastern front. Franco still believed that the Axis powers

would win the war, and he considered the intervention of Spanish

volunteers to be an inexpensive way of assuring recognition of

Spain's colonial claims after the war was over. The war turned in favor of the Allies with the entry of the United

States in December 1941 and the Allied landing in Casablanca in

November 1942. At that time, Spain replaced its pro-Axis policy

with a genuinely neutral stance. Spain withdrew the Blue Division

from the eastern front in November 1943, thus ending Franco's

major collaboration with Nazi Germany. In May 1944, Spain and

the Allies concluded an agreement. The Spanish government agreed

to end wolfram shipments to Germany, to close the German consulate in Tangier, and to expel German espionage agents. In

50
Historical Setting

exchange for these actions, the Allies were to ship petroleum and

other necessary supplies to Spain.

By the end of 1944, Spain had entered into a period of "benevolent neutrality" toward the Allies. Spain allowed Allied aircraft

to land inside its borders and permitted Allied intelligence agents

to operate in Madrid. In spite of this opportunistic policy shift,

Spain was ostracized at the end of the war by the victorious powers. Although the United States president, Harry S Truman, and

the British prime minister, Winston Churchill, successfully resisted

Stalin's proposals at the Potsdam Conference in July 1945 for Allied

intervention against Franco, Spain was denied membership in the

United Nations (UN) because its government had come to power

with the assistance of the Axis powers and had collaborated with

them during the war. A resolution adopted by the second meeting of the UN General

Assembly in December 1946 expressed the most severe postwar

censure of the Franco regime. According to this resolution, Spain

would be banned from the UN and would not be allowed to participate in any of its specialized agencies, as long as Franco remained

in power. Franco did not appear seriously concerned by this censure, nor by the subsequent exclusion of Spain from the Marshall

Plan. In fact, he used the international ostracism to strengthen his

hold over the Spanish government. During this period of isolation,

the Argentine government of Juan Peron (president, 1946-55)

provided Spain with crucial economic support.

Franco was convinced that attacks on his regime were the work

of communist forces, and he felt certain that the Western powers

would someday recognize Spain's contribution in maintaining its solitary vigil against bolshevism. As events evolved, Spain's anticommunist stance proved to be a significant factor in the United

States decision to revise its policy toward Spain in view of the Cold

War.

As the United States became increasingly concerned with the

Soviet threat following the fall of Czechoslovakia, the Berlin blockade in 1948, and the outbreak of the Korean War in 1950, United

States policy makers also began to recognize the strategic importance of the Iberian Peninsula; furthermore, they realized that

ostracism had failed and that the Franco regime was stronger than

ever. The United States government took steps to normalize its political and economic relations with Spain in the years 1948-50.

In September 1950, President Truman signed a bill that appropriated US$62.5 million for aid to Spain. In the same year, the United

States supported a UN resolution lifting the boycott on Franco's

regime and resumed full diplomatic relations with Spain in 1951.

51
Spain: A Country Study

As Spain became an increasingly important link in the overall

defense system of the United States against the Soviet Union, the

period of isolation came to an end.

Two major agreements signed in 1953 strengthened the Franco

regime: the Concordat with the Vatican and the Pact of Madrid.

The Concordat, signed in August 1953, was to replace the 1851

document that the republic had abrogated. The new agreement

provided full church recognition of Franco's government. At the same time, it reaffirmed the confessional nature of the Spanish state; the public practice of other religions was not permitted. The agree- ment was more favorable to the Vatican than to Franco; it included measures that significantly increased the independence of the church

within the Spanish system. The Concordat served, nevertheless,

to legitimize the regime in the eyes of many Spaniards, and it was

instrumental in strengthening Franco's hold over the country.

The Pact of Madrid, signed shortly after the Concordat, fur- ther symbolized the Spanish regime's rehabilitation. It also marked

the end of Spanish neutrality. The Pact consisted of three separate,

but interdependent, agreements between Spain and the United

States. It provided for mutual defense, for military aid to Spain,

and for the construction of bases there. The United States was to use these bases for a renewable ten-year period, but the bases

remained under Spanish sovereignty. Although the pact did not

constitute a full-fledged military alliance, it did commit the United

States to support Spain's defense efforts; furthermore, it provided

Spain with much-needed economic assistance. During the first ten years of the Pact of Madrid, the United States sent approximately

US$1.5 billion in all kinds of aid to Spain.

Two years later, in 1955, the UN approved Spain's membership. In a visit by the United States president, Dwight D. Eisenhower, to the Spanish capital in 1959, the two generals received

warm public welcomes as they toured the city together. The visit further emphasized Franco's acceptance and the end of Spain's

ostracism. Franco placed a high value on Spain's relationship with

the United States, for the prestige it conferred as well as for stra- tegic reasons. This relationship continued to be a dominant factor

in the development of the country's foreign policy.

Spain's European neighbors were less willing than the United

States to modify their aversion to Franco's authoritarian rule. The

West European members of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) vetoed efforts to include Spain. Spain's applications

for association with the European Community (EC —see Glossary) were also repeatedly rejected. Although a Trade Preference Treaty

between Spain and the EC signed in 1970 seemed to herald a thaw

52
in relations, Spain's entry into the EC continued to be a political

issue throughout Franco's lifetime. Spanish membership in the

Community, considered by Spanish economists and businessmen

as crucial for Spain's economic development, had to await the

democratization of the regime (see Spain and the European Community, ch. 4). A more intractable problem than Spain's entry into the EC was

the fate of Gibraltar, a sore point in Anglo-Spanish relations since

1713, when Spain ceded the area to Britain under the terms of the

Treaty of Utrecht (see War of the Spanish Succession, this ch.).

The question of sovereignty, which had been dormant during the

years of the Second Republic, revived in the 1960s and jeopardized

otherwise friendly relations between Britain and Spain. Spain has never relinquished its claim to Gibraltar, while the British have

maintained that the inhabitants of the area should determine Gibraltar' s fate. The heterogeneous population of Gibraltar enjoyed local democratic self-government and an increasingly higher standard

of living than that prevailing in Spain; therefore, it was not a sur- prise when they voted almost unanimously in a referendum held

in 1967 to remain under British rule. The UN repeatedly con- demned the "colonial situation" and demanded—to no avail—its termination. In 1969 Spain took steps to seal off Gibraltar from

the mainland and to accelerate the economic development program

for the area surrounding it, known as Campo de Gibraltar. The

53
Spain: A Country Study

situation continued in stalemate throughout the remainder of the

Franco regime.

Franco may have been frustrated with the problem of Gibraltar, but he was optimistic about his potential for maintaining a powerful position for Spain in North Africa. As a former commanding officer of Spanish colonial garrisons in Morocco, Franco had

developed close ties to the area, and during the postwar period,

he placed great emphasis on maintaining Spain's position in the

Arab world. Appealing to historical, cultural, and political ties, Franco endeavored to act as self-appointed protector of Arab interests and to portray Spain as an essential bridge, or mediator,

between Europe and the Arab countries.

Despite the regime's position as a colonial power in northwest

Africa, relations between Spain and the Arab countries became

closer in the late 1940s, in part because of Spain's nonrecognition

of Israel. A visit by Spain's foreign minister to the Middle East

resulted in a variety of economic and cultural agreements, and the

Arab states assumed a benevolent attitude toward Spain's position

in Morocco. Nevertheless, France's decision to withdraw from

Morocco in early 1956, following the successful struggle waged by

Moroccan nationalists against French control, left little prospect

of Spain's retaining its zone. (In the spring of the same year, France

relinquishied the protectorate.) In the following decades, Spain's position in North Africa eroded

further. A long series of conflicts with Morocco resulted in the

abandonment of much of Spain's colonial territory in the 1960s.

When Morocco's Mohammed V made it clear in 1958 that he had

designs on the Spanish Sahara, Spain opposed any change of status for the area. In 1975, however, Spain reversed its policy and

declared its readiness to grant full independence to the Spanish

Sahara under UN supervision. Following the march of 300,000

unarmed Moroccans into the territory in November 1975, Spain

agreed to cede the Spanish Sahara to Morocco and Mauritania.

At the time of Franco's death, Spain's only remaining presence

in North Africa consisted of the Spanish-inhabited enclave cities of Ceuta and Melilla and the small garrison spot called Pefion de

Velez de la Gomera, all on Morocco's Mediterranean coast (see

Gibraltar, Ceuta, and Melilla, ch. 4). The Post-Franco Era

Transition to Democracy

The democratization that Franco's chosen heir, Juan Carlos, and

his collaborators peacefully and legally brought to Spain over a

54
Historical Setting

three-year period was unprecedented. Never before had a dictatorial regime been transformed into a pluralistic, parliamentary democracy without civil war, revolutionary overthrow, or defeat by a

foreign power. The transition is all the more remarkable because

the institutional mechanisms designed to maintain Franco's

authoritarian system made it possible to legislate a democratic constitutional monarchy into existence.

When Prince Juan Carlos took the oath as king of Spain on November 22, 1975, there was little reason to foresee that he would

be the architect of such a dramatic transformation. Franco had

hand-picked Juan Carlos and had overseen his education. He was

considered an enigma, having publicly sworn loyalty to the principles of Franco's National Movement while privately giving vague

indications of sympathy for democratic institutions. More was known of his athletic skills than of his political opinions, and

observers predicted that he would be known as ' 'Juan the Brief.

'

Juan Carlos confirmed Arias Navarro's continuation in office as prime minister, disappointing those who were hoping for liberal reforms. Arias Navarro had served as minister of interior under

Carrero Blanco, and he was a loyal Francoist. His policy speech

of January 28, 1976, was vague—devoid of concrete plans for

political reform. The hopes and expectations aroused by the longawaited demise of Franco were frustrated in the initial months of

the monarchy, and a wave of demonstrations, industrial strikes,

and terrorist activity challenged the country's stability. The government responded with repressive measures to restore law and order.

These measures inflamed and united the liberal opposition. At the same time, the cautious reforms that the Arias Navarro government proposed met with hostile reaction from orthodox Francoists,

who pledged resistance to any form of change.

It was in this volatile atmosphere that Juan Carlos, increasingly

dissatisfied with the prime minister's ability (or willingness) to handle the immobilists as well as with his skill in dealing with the opposition, asked for Arias Navarro's resignation. Arias Navarro

submitted his resignation on July 1, 1976. Proponents of reform were both surprised and disappointed when the king chose, as Arias

Navarro's successor, Adolfo Suarez Gonzalez, who had served

under Franco and who had been designated secretary general of

the National Movement in the first government of the monarchy.

The new prime minister's Francoist links made it appear unlikely

that he would promote major evolutionary change in Spain, but

it was these links with the political establishment that made it possible for him to maneuver with the existing institutions to bring

about the reforms that Juan Carlos desired.

55
Spain: A Country Study

Throughout the rapid democratization that followed the appointment of Suarez, the collaboration between the king and his prime

minister was crucial in assuaging opposition from both the immobilists of the old regime and those who agitated for a more radical

break with the past. Whereas Suarez 's political expertise and pragmatic approach enabled him to manipulate the bureaucratic

machinery, Juan Carlos 's ability to maintain the allegiance of the

armed forces made a peaceful transition to democracy possible during these precarious months.

In July 1976, the government declared a partial amnesty that

freed approximately 400 political prisoners. On September 10,

Suarez announced a program of political reform, calling for a bicameral legislature based on universal suffrage. With skillful maneuvering, he was able to persuade members of the Cortes to approve the law, thereby voting their own corporatist institution

out of existence, in November. The reforms were then submitted

to a national referendum in December 1976, in accordance with

Franco's 1945 Law on Referenda. The Spanish people voted over- whelmingly in favor of reform: about 94 percent of the voters

(78 percent of the electorate took part in the referendum) gave their

approval. The results of the referendum strengthened the position

of the Suarez government and of the king and represented a vindication for those who favored reform from above rather than revolution.

In the first six months of 1977, significant reforms were enacted

in rapid succession. There were further pardons for political

prisoners in March; independent trade unions replaced vertical and

labor syndicates; and the right to strike was restored. In April the

National Movement was disbanded.

Suarez and the king began to prepare the Spanish people for the first free elections—to be held on June 15, 1977—since the Civil

War. The legalization of political parties began in February, and

an electoral law outlining the rules for electoral competition was

negotiated with opposition political forces and went into effect in

March. The government adopted the d'Hondt system of proportional representation, which favored the formation of large parties or coalitions (see Electoral System, ch. 4). A major crisis appeared to be in the offing over the issue of legalizing the Communist Party of Spain (Partido Comunista de

Espafia—PCE). Parties of the left and the center-left demanded

legal recognition, refusing to participate in the elections otherwise.

Suarez feared a strong reaction from military leaders, however,

if such a step were taken. Members of the armed forces had been

dedicated to the suppression of Marxism since the time of the Civil

56
Historical Setting

War; moreover, Suarez had assured them the previous September that the PCE would never be legalized.

In a bold but necessary move, Suarez legalized the PCE on

April 9, 1977. Military leaders were upset by the decision and publicly expressed their dissatisfaction with the measure, but they

grudgingly accepted it out of patriotism. Juan Carlos 's close rela- tions with senior military officers were a factor in defusing a potentially explosive state of affairs. His earlier efforts to replace

ultraconservative commanders of the armed forces with more liberal ones also benefited him when he took this controversial step. The

moderation that the communists exercised in accepting the monarchy in spite of their avowed republicanism also helped to normalize the political situation.

As the country prepared for elections, a large number of diverse

political parties began to form. Only a few of these parties gained

parliamentary representation following the June 15, 1977, elections,

however, and none achieved an absolute majority. The Union of

the Democratic Center (Union de Centro Democratico—UCD),

a centrist coalition of several groups, including Francoist reformists

and moderate opposition democrats, led by Suarez, emerged from

the election as the largest party, winning 34.6 percent of the vote

(see table 2, Appendix).

The leading opposition party was the Spanish Socialist Workers'

Party (Partido Socialista Obrero Espafiol—PSOE), which received

29.3 percent of the vote. Having been in existence since 1879, the

PSOE was Spain's oldest political party. A group of dynamic young

activists, led by a Seville lawyer, Felipe Gonzalez Marquez, had

taken control of the party from the exiles in 1972, and their revolutionary idealism, combined with pragmatic policies, enabled the

PSOE to appeal to a broader spectrum of the electorate. Both the

neo-Francoist right, embodied in the Popular Alliance (Alianza

Popular—AP), and the PCE were disappointed with the election

results, which gave them each less than 10 percent of the popular

vote (see Political Parties, ch. 4). Catalan and Basque regional parties accounted for most of the remaining votes. The election results were a victory for both moderation and the

desire for change. They boded well for the development of democracy in Spain. The domination of Spain's party system by two rela- tively moderate political groups marked an end to the polarization

that had plagued the country since the days of the Second Republic. The political skill of Suarez, the courage and determination

ofJuan Carlos, and the willingness of opposition leaders to sacrifice their hopes for more radical social change to the more immediate

goal of securing political democracy helped to end the polarization.

57
Spain: A Country Study

The deferral of these hopes led to eventual disenchantment with

the Suarez government, but in 1977 it was a key factor in the peaceful transition to democracy.

A formidable array of problems, including a growing economic

crisis, Basque terrorism, and the threat of military subversion, con- fronted the new Suarez government. Long-range solutions could

not be devised until after the new constitution had been approved,

but in the interim, the socioeconomic difficulties had to be faced.

It was apparent that austerity measures would have to be taken,

and Suarez knew he needed to gain support for a national economic

recovery program. This was achieved in October 1977 in the

Moncloa Pacts, named for the prime minister's official residence

where leaders of Spain's major political parties met and agreed to share the costs of, and the responsibility for, economic reforms.

The parties of the left were promised an increase in unemployment

benefits, the creation of new jobs, and other reforms; in return they

agreed to further tax increases, credit restrictions, reductions in

public expenditures, and a 20 percent ceiling on wage increases.

The new government set forth a provisional solution to demands

for regional autonomy. Preautonomy decrees were issued for Catalonia in September and for three of the Basque provinces in

December, 1977. The significance of these decrees was primarily

symbolic, but the decrees helped to avoid potentially disruptive conflict for the time being by recognizing the distinctive political character of the regions and by promising autonomy when the constitution was ratified. The regional issue nevertheless continued to be the

government's most intractable problem, and it became even more

complicated as autonomist demands proliferated throughout the

country. During the early months of the Suarez government, there were disturbing indications that the army's toleration of political

pluralism was limited. Military unrest also boded ill for the regime's

future stability.

The major task facing the government during this transitional

period was the drafting of a new constitution. Since previous constitutions had failed in Spain because they had usually been imposed

by one particular group and were not the expression of the popular will, it was imperative that the new constitution be based on

consensus. To this end, the Constitutional Committee of the Cortes

in August 1977 elected a parliamentary commission representing

all the major national parties and the more important regional ones. This group began its deliberations in an atmosphere of compromise

and cooperation. Although members of the group disagreed over

issues of education, abortion, lock-outs, and regionalism, they made

58

Spain: A Country Study

steady progress. The Cortes passed the document they produced

with amendments—in October 1978.

The new 1978 Constitution is long and detailed, because of its framers' desire to gain acceptance for the document by including

something for everyone. It proclaims Spain to be a parliamentary

monarchy and guarantees its citizens equality before the law and

a full range of individual liberties, including religious freedom.

While recognizing the autonomy of the regions, it stresses the

indivisibility of the Spanish state. The Constitution was submitted to popular referendum on December 6, 1978, and it was

approved by 87.8 of the 67.7 percent of the eligible voters who went

to the polls (see The 1978 Constitution, ch. 4). After the king had signed the new Constitution, Suarez dissolved

the Cortes and called another general election for March. It was

widely predicted that the results would show an erosion of support

for Suarez and the UCD (which had begun to show signs of fragmentation) and a gain for the PSOE. The PSOE was experiencing its own internal crisis, however. The party's official definition

of itself as Marxist hampered Gonzalez's efforts to project an image

of moderation and statesmanship. At the same time, the party's more radical members were increasingly resentful of Gonzalez's

ideological moderation. Contrary to expectations, the PSOE did

not improve its position when Spaniards went to the polls on March

1, 1979. The election results were not significantly different from

those of 1977, and they were seen as a reaffirmation and a consolidation of the basic power structure. Disenchantment with UCD Leadership

Political change was under way. The UCD was a coalition that

encompassed a wide range of frequently incompatible political

aspirations. Internal conflict had been muted in the interest of maintaining party unity in order to protect the transition to democracy.

When the 1979 elections appeared to affirm this transition, the centrifugal tendencies broke loose. In the succeeding months, the

center-right UCD moved farther to the right, and its more conservative members were increasingly critical of Suarez 's compromises with the PSOE opposition on political and economic

issues. At the same time, large segments of the population were

frustrated that Suarez did not produce a more thorough reform

program to eliminate the vestiges of authoritarian institutions and

practices.

Suarez' s failure to deal decisively with the regional problem fur- ther eroded his popularity. Repressive police measures met increasingly virulent outbreaks of Basque terrorism, and the ongoing spiral

60
Historical Setting

of repression and terror contributed to a growing impression that

the government was incompetent. The mounting violence further

exacerbated Suarez's relations with the military, which were already

strained because of his legalization of the PCE. Army leaders, who

had only grudgingly accepted political reforms out of loyalty to Juan

Carlos, grew increasingly hostile to the democratic regime as ETA

terrorism intensified. A coup plot had been uncovered in the fall of 1978, and the possibility of military subversion continued to be

a threat. As discontent with his leadership grew, Suarez realized that he

had lost his effectiveness, and on January 29, 1981 , he announced

his resignation as prime minister. The king appointed conservative centrist Leopoldo Calvo Sotelo to replace him. Before the new

prime minister could be confirmed, a group of Civil Guards, led

by Lieutenant Colonel Antonio Tejero Molina, marched onto the

floor of the Cortes and held the representatives hostage in an

attempted coup. The plan of the rebellious military leaders was

to set up an authoritarian monarchy under the protection of the

armed forces. That the coup failed was primarily due to the decisive action ofJuan Carlos, who ordered the conspirators to desist

and persuaded other military officers to back him in defending the

Constitution. Juan Carlos then appeared on television and reas- sured the Spanish people of his commitment to democracy. The

foiled coup was over by the next day, but it demonstrated the

fragility of Spain's democracy and the importance ofJuan Carlos

to its continued survival. On February 27, more than 3 million

people demonstrated in favor of democracy in the capital and else- where throughout Spain, showing the extent of popular support

for democratic government.

Growth of the PSOE and the 1982 Elections

In the immediate aftermath of the coup, the various sectors within

the UCD closed ranks briefly around their new prime minister,

Calvo Sotelo, but internal cleavages prevented the formation of a coherent centrist party. Clashes between the moderate and the

rightist elements within the UCD, particularly over the divorce bill, resulted in resignations of dissenting groups and the formation of

new splinter parties and coalitions. These developments in turn

led to a series of election defeats in 1981 and 1982, and by the time

a general election was called in August for October 1982, the UCD's

representation in the Cortes was down by one-third.

As the UCD continued to disintegrate, the PSOE gained

strength; it was considered more likely than the increasingly conservative UCD to bring about the sweeping social and economic

61
Spain: A Country Study

reforms that the Spanish people desired. Moreover, party leader

Gonzalez had been successful in his efforts to direct the PSOE

toward a more centrist-left position, as seen in his successful per- suasion of PSOE delegates in 1979 to drop the term "Marxist"

from the party's definition of itself. The PSOE was thereby able

to project an image of greater moderation and reliability, and it became a viable governmental alternative. The PSOE also benefited

from the decline of the PCE. The heavy-handed management style

of PCE leader Santiago Carrillo had aggravated the dissension in

the party over whether to follow a more revolutionary line or to adopt more moderate policies. As was the case with the UCD, inter- necine disputes within the PCE resulted in defections from the party.

With the PCE apparently on the point of collapse, the PSOE became

the only feasible option for left-wing voters. When Spaniards went to the polls in record numbers in October

1982, they gave a sweeping victory to the PSOE, which received

the largest plurality (48.4 percent) in the post- 1977 period. The

party enlarged its share of the 350 seats in the Chamber of Deputies

to 202, while the UCD, with only 6.8 percent of the vote, won only

1 1 seats. The conservative AP took on the role of opposition party

(see Political Developments, 1982-88, ch. 4). The most significant

implication of the October elections for the future of democracy

in Spain was the transfer of power from one party to another without

military intervention or bloodshed. The transition to democracy

appeared to be complete.

Spanish Foreign Policy in the Post-Franco Period

Spain's political system underwent dramatic transformations after the death of Franco, but there was nevertheless some degree of continuity in Spanish foreign policy. The return of Gibraltar to Spanish sovereignty continued to be a foreign policy goal, as did greater

integration of Spain into Western Europe. In spite of frequent

ongoing negotiations, neither of these goals had been accomplished

by the time Gonzalez came to power in 1982. Foreign policy makers also endeavored to maintain an influential role for Spain in its relations with Latin American nations.

Spanish opinion was more ambivalent with regard to membership in NATO and relations with the United States, although

defense agreements, allowing the United States to continue using

its naval and air bases in Spain, were signed periodically. When

Spain joined NATO in May 1982, under Calvo Sotelo's government, the PSOE leadership strongly opposed such a commitment

and called for withdrawal from the Alliance. One of Gonzalez's

campaign promises was a national referendum on Spain's NATO

62
Historical Setting

membership. In 1982 the role the new Socialist government envisioned for Spain in the West's economic, political, and security

arrangements remained to be seen.

Stanley G. Payne presents a comprehensive general introduction to the history of the Iberian Peninsula in his two-volume study,

A History of Spain and Portugal. Henry Kamen's clearly written and

amply illustrated Concise History of Spain provides a briefer treat- ment. The late Spanish historian Jaime Vicens Vives dealt with

the dominant questions of Spanish historiography and analyzed

the major interpretations in Approaches to the History ofSpain. Whereas

Vicens Vives emphasized the pre- 1500 period in his work, Richard

Herr's Historical Essay on Modern Spain gives more attention to the

country's evolution in recent centuries.

An excellent introduction to the Spanish Middle Ages can be

found in Gabriel Jackson's The Making of Medieval Spain. Angus

MacKay's Spain in the Middle Ages emphasizes the continuity between

medieval and early modern Spain. J. H. Elliott's Imperial Spain,

1469-1716 is an insightful account of Spain at the apogee of its empire as well as of the transition into the modern period. For a balanced study of eighteenth-century Spanish reformism and the

impact of the French Revolution on Spain, see Richard Herr's The

Eighteenth- Century Revolution in Spain. Raymond Carr's Spain,

1808-1975 contains a definitive treatment of nineteenth-century

Spain.

There is an extensive, if not always balanced, literature on the

Spanish Civil War. An excellent introduction to the subject is Gerald

Brenan's The Spanish Labyrinth, which offers a lucid account of the

social and political conflicts that divided the country. Hugh

Thomas's comprehensive and thoroughly researched study, The

Spanish Civil War, is considered the standard work on the subject.

The evolution of the Nationalist side receives thorough treatment

in Stanley G. Payne's Falange: A History of Spanish Fascism.

J. W. D. Trythall's biography of Franco, El Caudillo, provides an illuminating description of the regime's politics, while Brian

Crozier's Franco deals more extensively with its wartime diplomacy.

A more recent biography by Juan Pablo Fusi, Franco, presents the

most balanced portrayal of Francoism to date. Another recent publication, Stanley G. Payne's authoritative and detailed analysis

entitled The Franco Regime: 1936-1975, is likely to remain the major

treatise on the political history of Francoist Spain.

63
Spain: A Country Study

A concise, clearly written account of the transformation of Francoist structures into a democratic regime, with an emphasis on social and economic developments, appears in Spain: Dictatorship to Democracy by Raymond Carr and Juan Pablo Fusi. Paul Preston's The

Triumph ofDemocracy in Spain and E. Ramon Arango's Spain: From

Repression to Renewal also provide penetrating accounts of the transition period. (For further information and complete citations, see Bibliography.)

64
Chapter 2. The Society and Its Environment
The town of Casares in Malaga Province
IN THE DECADE after the death of Francisco Franco y

Bahamonde (in power, 1939-75) in 1975, Spain experienced several powerful transformations. The political transition from a rigid dic- tatorship to an active parliamentary democracy was widely acknowledged as a highly significant event in West European history. Much

more subtle, but equally significant in the long run, was Spain's

social and economic transition, described as Spain's "economic

miracle," which brought a relatively isolated, conservative social order to the threshold of an advanced industrial democracy. In the

decades after the 1930s' Civil War, Spain still possessed the social structures and values of a traditional, less developed country. By

the late 1980s, Spanish society had already taken on most of the

principal characteristics of postindustrial Europe, including a declining rate of births and of population growth generally, an erosion

of the nuclear family, a drop in the proportion of the work force

in agriculture, and changes in the role of women in society.

Changes in Spain's population reflected this transition quite

clearly. Falling birth rates and increased life expectancy combined

to produce a rapidly aging population that grew at an extremely

slow pace. Spain also experienced massive shifts in the location of

its people. Between 1951 and 1981, more than 5 million individuals

left the poverty of rural and small-town Spain. Many headed for the more prosperous countries of Western Europe, but the more

significant flow was from farm and village to Spain's exploding

cities, especially Madrid, Barcelona, and Bilbao (see fig. 1, frontispiece).

Spain's diverse ethnic and linguistic groups have existed for centuries, and they have presented Spanish governments with severe challenges since the nineteenth century. In the late 1980s, about

one citizen in four spoke a mother tongue other than Castilian Spanish (primarily Catalan or one of its variants; the Basque language,

Euskera; or Galician), but Castilian continued to be the dominant

language throughout the country. Indeed, after nearly 150 years

of industrial development and the migration of millions of nonethnic

Spaniards to the ethnic homelands, particularly Barcelona and

Bilbao, the non-Castilian languages were in danger of disappearing. Although the Franco regime began to liberalize its approach

to the minority languages late in the 1960s, the overall effect of

the dictatorship on these languages was very nearly disastrous. The

1978 Constitution made possible the establishment of regional

67
Spain: A Country Study

autonomous governments with the requisite powers and resources

to salvage their respective cultures and to make their languages

co-official with Castilian in their own regions. Whether this experiment in regional bilingualism would succeed, however, remained

to be seen. In social values, Spain began to resemble its West European

neighbors to the north. The status of women, for example, was

one of the most notable of these changes, as women began to figure more prominently in education, politics, and the work force generally. Closely associated with these changes were a number of other

social characteristics including a more liberal stance on abortion,

contraception, divorce, and the role of the large and extended

family. The Roman Catholic Church, long a dominant power in Spanish life, opposed these developments, but as Spain became

a more materialistic and more secular society, the church's ability to determine social mores and policies was strikingly eroded.

Spain also underwent major changes in its educational system. In 1970 Spanish law made education free and compulsory through

the age of fourteen; the challenge in the 1980s was to provide the resources necessary to fulfill this obligation. Although the schools

enrolled essentially all the school-age population and the country's

illiteracy rate was a nominal 3 percent, the school system was

plagued by serious problems, including a rigid tracking system,

a high failure rate, and poorly paid instructors. In 1984 the Socialist government passed the Organic Law on the Right to Education (Ley Organica del Derecho a la Educacion—LODE) in an

attempt to integrate into a single system the three school systems:

public, private secular, and Roman Catholic. Changes reached the

university level as well, as the Law on University Reform (Ley

de Reforma Universitaria—LRU) made each public university

autonomous, subject only to general rules set down in Madrid.

In the late 1980s, Spain continued to rank at the low end of the

list of advanced industrial democracies in terms of social welfare.

Its citizens enjoyed the usual range of social welfare benefits, including health coverage, retirement benefits, and unemployment in- surance, but coverage was less comprehensive than that in most

other West European countries. The retirement system was under

increasing pressure because of the aging population. Housing construction just barely managed to keep pace with rapid urbanization in the 1970s, and by the late 1980s the country had to begin

to address some of the "quality of life" issues connected with housing. The society ranked high on some indicators of health care, such as physician availability, but there were still residual health

problems more reminiscent of the Third World, particularly a high

68
The Society and Its Environment

incidence of communicable diseases. There were dramatic gains

in reducing the infant mortality rate, but severe problems in the

areas of public health, safety, and environmental concerns—industrial accidents and air, water, and noise pollution—were a direct

outgrowth of uncontrolled, rapid industrialization.

Geography

Spanish territory comprises nearly five-sixths of the Iberian

Peninsula, which the nation shares with Portugal, the micro-state

of Andorra, and the British possession of Gibraltar. Spanish terri- tory also includes two sets of islands—the Balearic Islands (Spanish, Islas Baleares) in the Mediterranean Sea and the Canary Islands

(Spanish, Canarias) in the Atlantic Ocean—and two city enclaves

in North Africa, Ceuta and Melilla (see fig. 1). Peninsular Spain,

covering an area of 492,503 square kilometers, consists of a central plateau known as the Meseta Central, which is enclosed by

high mountains on its north, south, east, and part of its western

sides. The area that is predominantly plateau also encompasses

several mountain systems that are lower than the peripheral mountains. Although Spain thus has physical characteristics that make

it, to some extent, a natural geographic unit, there are also inter- nal geographic features that tend to compartmentalize the country.

The topographical characteristics also generate a variety of cli- matic regimes throughout the country. By far the greatest part of

the country, however, experiences a continental climate of hot, dry summers and rather harsh, cold winters. Where these conditions

prevail, the soils have eroded, vegetation is sparse, and agricul- ture is difficult. Irrigation is practiced where possible, but it is difficult because the flow in most streams is seasonally irregular,

and the stream beds of larger rivers are frequentiy much lower than

the adjacent terrain.

External Boundaries and Landform Regions

Most of Spain's boundary is water: the Mediterranean Sea on

the south and east from Gibraltar to the French border; and the

Atlantic Ocean on the northwest and southwest—in the south as the Golfo de Cadiz and in the north as the Bay of Biscay. Spain

also shares land boundaries with France and Andorra along the

Pyrenees in the northeast, with Portugal on the west, and with the

small British possession of Gibraltar at the southern tip. Although

the affiliation of Gibraltar continued to be a contentious issue

between Spain and Britain in the late 1980s, there were no other

disputes over land boundaries, and no other country claimed the

69
Spain: A Country Study

insular provinces of the Balearic Islands and the Canary Islands

(see Gilbraltar, Ceuta, and Melilla, ch. 4). The majority of Spain's peninsular landmass consists of the

Meseta Central, a highland plateau rimmed and dissected by mountain ranges (see fig. 5). Other landforms include narrow coastal

plains and some lowland river valleys, the most prominent of which

is the Andalusian Plain in the southwest. The country can be divided

into ten natural regions or subregions: the dominant Meseta Central, the Cordillera Cantabrica and the northwest region, the Iberico

region, the Pyrenees, the Penibetico region in the southeast, the

Andalusian Plain, the Ebro Basin, the coastal plains, the Balearic

Islands, and the Canary Islands. These are commonly grouped into

four types: the Meseta Central and associated mountains, other

mountainous regions, lowland regions, and islands.

The Meseta Central and Associated Mountains

The Meseta Central, a vast plateau in the heart of peninsular

Spain, has elevations that range from 610 to 760 meters. Rimmed

by mountains, the Meseta Central slopes gently to the west and

to the series of rivers that form some of the border with Portugal.

The Sistema Central, described as the "dorsal spine" of the Meseta

Central, divides the Meseta into northern and southern subregions,

the former higher in elevation and smaller in area than the latter. The Sistema Central rims the capital city of Madrid with peaks

that rise to 2,400 meters north of the city and to lower elevations

south of it. West of Madrid, the Sistema Central shows its highest

peak of almost 2,600 meters. The mountains of the Sistema Central, which continue westward into Portugal, display some glacial

features; the highest of the peaks are snow-capped for most of the

year. Despite their height, however, the mountain system does not

create a major barrier between the northern and the southern portions of the Meseta Central because several passes permit road and

railroad transportation to the northwest and the northeast.

The southern portion of the Meseta is further divided by twin

mountain ranges, the Montes de Toledo running to the east and

the Sierra de Guadalupe, to the west. Their peaks do not rise much

higher than 1,500 meters. With many easy passes, including those

that connect the Meseta with the Andalusian Plain, the Montes

de Toledo and the Sierra de Guadalupe do not present an obstacle

to transportation and communication. The two mountain ranges

are separated from the Sistema Central to the north by the Tagus

River (Spanish, Rio Tajo).

The mountain regions that rim the Meseta Central and are

associated with it are the Sierra Morena, the Cordillera Cantabrica,

70


The Society and Its Environment

and the Sistema Iberico. Forming the southern edge of the Meseta

Central, the Sierra Morena merges in the east with the southern

extension of the Sistema Iberico and reaches westward along the

northern edge of the Rio Guadalquivir valley to join the mountains in southern Portugal. The massif of the Sierra Morena extends

northward to the Rio Guadiana, which separates it from the Sistema

Central. Despite their relatively low elevations, seldom surpass- ing 1,300 meters, the mountains of the Sierra Morena are rugged.

The Cordillera Cantabrica, a limestone formation, runs parallel

to, and close to, the northern coast near the Bay of Biscay. Its highest points are the Picos de Europa, surpassing 2,500 meters. The Cordillera Cantabrica extends 182 kilometers and abruptly

drops 1 ,500 meters some 30 kilometers from the coast. To the west

lie the hills of the northwest region.

The Sistema Iberico extends from the Cordillera Cantabrica

southeastward and, close to th£ Mediterranean, spreads out from

the Rio Ebro to the Rio Jucar. The barren, rugged slopes of this mountain range cover an area of close to 21 ,000 square kilometers.

The mountains exceed 2,000 meters in their northern region and

reach a maximum height of over 2,300 meters east of the headwaters of the Rio Duero. The extremely steep mountain slopes in

this range are often cut by deep, narrow gorges. Other Mountainous Regions

External to the Meseta Central lie the Pyrenees in the northeast

and the Sistema Penibetico in the southeast. The Pyrenees, extending from the eastern edge of the Cordillera Cantabrica to the

Mediterranean Sea, form a solid barrier and a natural border

between Spain and both France and Andorra that, throughout his- tory, has effectively isolated the countries from each other. Passage is easy in the relatively low terrain at the eastern and western

extremes of the mountain range; it is here that international rail- roads and roadways cross the border. In the central section of the

Pyrenees, however, passage is difficult. In several places, peaks

rise above 3,000 meters; the highest, Pico de Aneto, surpasses 3,400

meters. The Sistema Penibetico extends northeast from the southern tip

of Spain, running parallel to the coast until it merges with the

southern extension of the Sistema Iberico near the Rio Jucar and

with the eastern extension of the Sierra Morena. The Sierra

Nevada, part of the Sistema Penibetico south of Granada, includes

the highest mountain on the peninsula, Mulhacen, which rises to 3,430 meters. Other peaks in the range also surpass 3,000 meters.

73


Spain: A Country Study

Lowland Regions

The major lowland regions are the Andalusian Plain in the southwest, the Ebro Basin in the northeast, and the coastal plains. The

Andalusian Plain is essentially a wide river valley through which

the Rio Guadalquivir flows. The river broadens out along its course, reaching its widest point at the Golfo de Cadiz. The Andalusian

Plain is bounded on the north by the Sierra Morena and on the

south by the Sistema Penibetico; it narrows to an apex in the east where these two mountain chains meet. The Ebro Basin is formed

by the Rio Ebro valley, contained by mountains on three sides

the Sistema Iberico to the south and west, the Pyrenees to the north

and east, and their coastal extensions paralleling the shore to the

east. Minor low-lying river valleys close to the Portuguese border

are located on the Tagus and the Rio Guadiana.

The coastal plains regions are narrow strips between the coastal

mountains and the seas. They are broadest along the Golfo de

Cadiz, where the coastal plain adjoins the Andalusian Plain, and

along the southern and central eastern coasts. The narrowest coastal plain runs along the Bay of Biscay, where the Cordillera Cantabrica

ends close to shore.

The Islands

The remaining regions of Spain are the Balearic and the Canary

Islands, the former located in the Mediterranean Sea and the latter in the Atlantic Ocean. The Balearic Islands, encompassing a total area of 5,000 square kilometers, lie 80 kilometers off Spain's central eastern coast. The mountains that rise up above the Mediter- ranean Sea to form these islands are an extension of the Sistema

Penibetico. The archipelago's highest points, which reach 1,400

meters, are in northwestern Majorca, close to the coast. The central portion of Majorca is a plain, bounded on the east and the

southeast by broken hills. The Canary Islands, ninety kilometers off the west coast of Africa, are of volcanic origin. The large central islands, Gran Canaria and

Tenerife, have the highest peaks; on Gran Canaria they rise to 1 ,950

meters and on Tenerife, to 3,700 meters. Drainage

Of the roughly 1 ,800 rivers and streams in Spain, only the Tagus

is more than 960 kilometers long; all but 90 extend less than

96 kilometers. These shorter rivers carry small volumes of water on an irregular basis, and they have seasonally dry river beds;

however, when they do flow, they often are swift and torrential.

74
View of Montefrio, Granada Province

Courtesy National Tourist Office of Spain

Panoramic view ofJaen

Courtesy National Tourist Office of Spain

75
Spain: A Country Study

Most major rivers rise in the mountains rimming or dissecting the

Meseta Central and flow westward across the plateau through Portugal to empty into the Atlantic Ocean. One significant exception

is the Rio Ebro, which flows eastward to the Mediterranean. Rivers

in the extreme northwest and in the narrow northern coastal plain

drain directly into the Atlantic Ocean. The northwestern coastline is also truncated by Has, waterbodies similar to fjords.

The major rivers flowing westward through the Meseta Central

include the Rio Duero, the Tagus, the Rio Guadiana, and the Rio

Guadalquivir. The Rio Guadalquivir is one of the most significant riv- ers in Spain because it irrigates a fertile valley, thus creating a rich

agricultural area, and because it is navigable inland, making Seville (Spanish, Sevilla) the only inland river port for ocean-going traffic in Spain. The major river in the northwest region is the Rio Mino.

Climate

Peninsular Spain experiences three climatic types: continental,

maritime, and Mediterranean. The locally generated continental

climate covers the majority of peninsular Spain, influencing the

Meseta Central, the adjoining mountains to the east and the south,

and the Ebro Basin. A continental climate is characterized by wide

diurnal and seasonal variations in temperature and by low, irregular

rainfall with high rates of evaporation that leave the land arid. Annual

rainfall generally is thirty to sixty-four centimeters; most of the

Meseta region receives about fifty centimeters. The northern Meseta,

the Sistema Central, and the Ebro Basin have two rainy seasons, one in spring (April-June) and the other in autumn (OctoberNovember), with late spring being the wettest time of the year. In

the southern Meseta, also, the wet seasons are spring and autumn,

but the spring one is earlier (March), and autumn is the wetter sea- son. Even during the wet seasons, rain is irregular and unreliable.

Continental winters are cold, with strong winds and high humidity,

despite the low precipitation. Except for mountain areas, the northern

foothills of the Sistema Iberico are the coldest area, and frost is com- mon. Summers are hot and cloudless, producing average daytime

temperatures that reach the mid- or upper 30sC in the northern

Meseta and the upper 30sC in the southern Meseta; nighttime temperatures, however, drop to the upper teens. The Ebro Basin, at a lower altitude, is extremely hot during the summer, and temperatures can exceed 43 °C. Summer humidities are low in the Meseta

Central and in the Ebro Basin, except right along the shores of in the Rio Ebro, where humidity is high.

A maritime climate prevails in the northern part of the country, from the Pyrenees to the northwest region, characterized by

76
The Society and Its Environment

relatively mild winters, warm but not hot summers, and generally

abundant rainfall spread out over the year. Temperatures vary only

slightly, both on a diurnal and a seasonal basis. The moderating

effects of the sea, however, abate in the inland areas, where temperatures are 9° to 18°C more extreme than temperatures on the

coast. Distance from the Atlantic Ocean also affects precipitation,

and there is less rainfall in the east than in the west. Autumn

(October through December) is the wettest season, while July is the driest month. The high humidity and the prevailing off-shore

winds make fog and mist common along the northwest coast; this phenomenon is less frequent a short distance inland, however,

because the mountains form a barrier keeping out the sea moisture.

The Mediterranean climatic region extends from the Andalusian

Plain along the southern and eastern coasts up to the Pyrenees, on the seaward side of the mountain ranges that parallel the coast. Total rainfall in this region is lower than in the rest of Spain, and

it is concentrated in the late autumn-winter period. Generally, rainfall is slight, often insufficient, irregular, and unreliable. Temperatures in the Mediterranean region usually are more moderate in

both summer and winter, and diurnal temperature changes are more limited than those of the continental region. Temperatures

in January normally average 10° to 13°C in most of the Mediter- ranean region, and they are 9°C colder in the northeastern coastal area near Barcelona. In winter, temperatures inland in the Andalusian Plain are slightly lower than those on the coasts. Temperatures in July and August average 22° to 27°C on the coast and

29° to 31°C farther inland, with low humidity. The Mediterranean

region is marked by Leveche winds—hot, dry, easterly or southeasterly air currents that originate over North Africa. These winds,

which sometimes carry fine dust, are most common in spring. A

cooler easterly wind, the Levante, funnels between the Sistema

Penibetico and the Atlas Mountains of North Africa.

Population

Size and Growth

In mid- 1985, Spain's population reached 38.8 million, making

it Western Europe's fifth most populous nation. The country's

population grew very slowly throughout the latter half of the

nineteenth century and most of the twentieth. In the 1860s, the

population increased by only about one-third of one percent annually; by the first decades of the twentieth century, this rate of increase

had grown to about 0.7 percent per year. Between the 1930s

and the 1980s, population growth rates hovered between 0.8 and

77
Spain: A Country Study

1.2 percent annually (see table 3, Appendix). In the postwar years, Spain began to exhibit population growth patterns very similar to those of most other advanced industrial societies. Growth rates were

projected to level off, or to decline slightly, through the remainder

of the twentieth century; Spain was expected to reach a population

of 40 million by 1990 and 42 million by the year 2000. Observers

estimated that the country's population would stabilize in the year

2020 at about 46 million.

One significant factor in Spain's population growth has been a

declining rate of births. Between 1965 and 1985, Spain experienced a dramatic reduction in its birth rate, from 21 to 13 per 1,000, a drop of approximately 38 percent. In 1975, with an estimated

base population of about 35.5 million, the country recorded about

675,000 live births; in 1985, with an estimated base population of more than 38 million, Spain had only about 475,000 live births.

In other words, ten years after the death of Franco, despite an

increase of nearly 3 million in the base population, the country

registered more than one-third fewer births.

Part of this change can be attributed to the increase in the per- centage of women using contraceptives. Whereas in the 1960s such

data were not even reported, by 1984 the World Bank (see Glossary) estimated that over half of Spanish women of child-bearing

age practiced birth control. Demographers have observed, however,

that this increased use of contraceptive devices was only the sur- face reflection of other more significant changes in Spanish society

during the period from 1960 to 1985. The economic causes included an economic slump, unemployment, insufficient housing, and the

arrival of the consumer society. Also, changes in cultural patterns

reflected women's increased access to employment, expanded women's rights, a decline in the number of marriages (between 1974

and 1984, the marriage rate dropped from 7.6 to 5.0 per 1,000), an improved image of couples without children, a decline in the

belief that children were the center of the family, increased access

to abortion and divorce, and in general a break in the linkage

between woman and mother as social roles. At the same time that the birth rate was dropping sharply, Spain's

low death rate also declined slightly, from 8 to 7 per 1,000. By the

mid-1980s, life expectancy at birth had reached seventy-seven years, a level equal to or better than that of every other country in Europe

except France, and superior to the average of all the world's

advanced industrial countries. Male life expectancy increased

between 1965 and 1985 from sixty-eight to seventy-four years, while

female life expectancy rose from seventy-three to eighty years.

78
The Society and Its Environment

By the early 1980s, Spain, like all advanced industrial countries,

had begun to experience the aging of its population (see fig. 6). In 1980 a reported 10.6 percent of its population was over sixtyfive years of age, a figure that was only a bare point or two behind

the percentages in the United States and the Netherlands. By 1986

the percentage over sixty-five had climbed to 12.2; officials estimated

that by 2001, the percentage over sixty-five would exceed 15. In 1985 children under the age of fourteen constituted 25 percent of

the population; specialists anticipated that, by the year 2001, this proportion would decline to 18 percent.

Regional Disparities

Spain is more a subcontinent than a country, and its climate,

geography, and history produced a state that was little more than

a federation of regions until Philip V, a grandson of Louis XIV,

brought the centralization of the Bourbon monarchy to the country in the eighteenth century (see Bourbon Spain, ch. 1). Modernday Spain contains a number of identifiable regions, each with its own set of cultural, economic, and political characteristics. In many

instances, the loyalty of a population is still primarily to its town

or region, and only secondarily to the abstract concept of "Spain."

Administratively, Spain is organized into seventeen autonomous

communities comprising fifty provinces (see fig. 7). However, when

an autonomous community is made up of only one province,

provincial institutions have been transferred to the autonomous

community.

On the map, the Iberian Peninsula resembles a slightly distort- ed square with the top bent toward the east and spread wide where

it joins the rest of Europe. In the center lies the densely populated

Spanish capital, Madrid, surrounded by the harsh, sparsely populated Meseta Central. King Philip II made Madrid the capital of

Castile (Spanish, Castilla) in the sixteenth century, partly because

its remoteness made it an uncontroversial choice (see Charles V

and Philip II, ch. 1). The city, surrounded by a demographic desert,

in the late 1980s was still regarded by many Spaniards as an

"artificial" capital even though it had long been established as the

political center of the country.

Around the periphery of the peninsula are the peoples that have

competed with Castilians for centuries over control of Iberia: in

the west, the Portuguese (the only group successful in establishing

its own state in 1640); in the northwest, the Galicians; along the

northern coast of the Bay of Biscay, the Asturians, and, as the coast nears France, the Basques; along the Pyrenees, the Navarrese and

the Aragonese; in the northeast, the Catalans; in the east, the

79
Spain: A Country Study

AGE-GROUPS

3,200 2,400 1.600 800 800 1,600 2,400 3,200 POPULATION IN THOUSANDS

Source: Based on information from Spain, Institute Nacional de Estadfstica, Anuario estadistica de Espana, Madrid, 1986, 36-37.

Figure 6. Population by Age and Sex, 1981

Valencians; and in the south, the Andalusians. Although most of

these peoples would decline to identify themselves first, foremost,

and solely as "Spanish," few of them would choose to secede from

Spain. Even among Basques, whose separatist sentiment ran deepest

in the late 1980s, those advocating total independence from Spain

probably comprised only one-fifth of the ethnic Basque population.

Whereas culture provided the centrifugal force, economic ties linked

the regions together more closely than an outsider might conclude

from their rhetoric.

Spain's seventeen regions, defined by the 1978 Constitution as autonomous communities, vary greatly in size and population, as well as in economic and political weight (see table 4, Appendix).

For example, Andalusia (Spanish, Andalucia), nearly the size of

Portugal, encompasses 17 percent of Spain's land area. The two

regions carved out of sparsely populated Castile—Castilla-La

Mancha (larger than Ireland) and Castilla y Leon (larger than Austria)—account for 15.6 and 18.7 percent, respectively, of Spain's

total area. These three large regions combined account for about

52 percent of the country's total territory. No other autonomous

region contains more than 10 percent of the total. The three richest,

most densely populated, and most heavily industrialized regions

Madrid, Catalonia (Spanish, Cataluna; Catalan, Catalunya), and

80
The Society and Its Environment

the Basque, Country (Spanish, Pais Vasco; Basque, Euskadi)

together account for 9.3 percent of the total. The remaining 40 per- cent is made up of two medium-sized regions—Aragon (Spanish,

Aragon) and Extremadura—each of which holds 8 to 9 percent,

and seven much smaller regions that together account for about

20 percent of the national territory.

Regional economic disparities between "Rich Spain" and "Poor

Spain" were also highly significant, and they continued to shape

the country's political debate despite a century of efforts to redistribute the wealth of the country. Imagine a line drawn from about

the middle of the north coast, in Asturias, southeastward to Madrid,

and then to Valencia. To the north and east of the line lived the

people of Rich Spain, sometimes referred to as "Bourgeois Spain," an area already substantially modernized, industrialized, and

urbanized, where the transition to an information and services econ- omy was already well under way in the 1980s. To the south and

west of the line lay Poor Spain, or "Traditional Spain," where

agriculture continued to dominate and where semi-feudal social

conditions could still be found. To aggravate this cleavage still fur- ther, Rich Spain, with the exception of Madrid, tended to be made

up disproportionately of people who felt culturally different from

the Castilians and not really "Spanish" at all. Indicators of economic disparity are stark reminders that not all Spaniards shared in the country's economic miracle. The autonomous communities of Catalonia, the Basque Country, and Madrid

accounted for half of Spain's gross national product (GNP—see Glossary) in the late 1980s. Income per capita was only 55 percent

of the Catalan level in Extremadura, 64 percent in Andalusia, and

70 percent in Galicia. In Galicia, 46 percent of the population still worked on the land; in Extremadura and the two Castilian regions,

30 to 34 percent did so; but in Catalonia and the Basque Country,

only 6 percent depended on the land for their livelihood. In Andalusia, unemployment exceeded 30 percent; in Aragon and in

Navarre (Spanish, Navarra) it ran between 15 and 20 percent. A

1987 report by Spain's National Statistics Institute revealed that

the country's richest autonomous community, Madrid, exceeded

its poorest, Extremadura, by wide margins in every economic

category. With the national average equal to zero, Madrid's stan- dard of living measured 1.7 while Extremadura scored -2.0; in

family income, the values were Madrid 1.0, Extremadura, -2.1;

in economic development, Madrid, 1.7, Extremadura, -2.0; and

in endowment in physical and human resources, Madrid, 1.4,

Extremadura, -1.7.

81
Spain: A Country Study

Autonomous community

boundary

Provincial boundary

within autonomous community

® National capital

• Autonomous community

capital

Figure 7. Administrative Divisions of Spain, 1988

Migration

The poverty of rural Spain led to a marked shift in population

as hundreds of thousands of Spaniards moved out of the poor south

and west in search of jobs and a better way of life. Between 1951

and 1981, more than 5 million Spaniards left Poor Spain, first for the prosperous economies of France and the Federal Republic of

Germany (West Germany), then for the expanding industrial

regions of Spain itself. Nearly 40 percent, or 1.7 million, left Andalusia alone; another million left Castilla y Leon; and slightly fewer

than 1 million left Castilla-La Mancha.

By 1970 migrants accounted for about 26 percent of the population in Madrid, 23 percent in Barcelona, and more than 30 percent

82
The Society and Its Environment

Administrative Divisions of Spain

Alava (7) Albacete (30)

Alicante (33)

Almerfa (41)

Avila (23)

Badajoz (25)

Barcelona (12)

Burgos (17)

Caceres (24)

Cadiz (38)

Castellon (31)

Ciudad Real (29)

Cordoba (36)

La Coruha (1) Cuenca (28)

PROVINCES " Gerona (13)

Granada (40)

Guadalajara (27)

Guipuzcoa (6) Huelva (34)

Huesca (9) Jaen (37)

Leon (15)

Lerida (11)

Lugo (2) Malaga (39)

Orense (4) Palencia (16)

Las Palmas (43)

Puntavedra (3)

Salamanca (22)

Santa Cruz de

Tenerife (42)

Segovia (20)

Sevilla (35)

Soria (21)

Tarragona (14)

Teruel (10)

Toledo (26)

Valencia (32) Valladolid (19)

Vizcaya (5) Zamora (18)

Zaragoza (8) AUTONOMOUS COMMUNITIES

Andalusia (XIV) Cantabria (III)* Madrid (X)*

Aragon (VI) Castilla-La Mancha (XII) Murcia (XV)*

Asturias (II)* Castilla y Leon (VIII) Navarre (V)*

Balearic Islands (XVI)* Catalonia (VII) La Rioja (IX)* Basque Country (IV) Extremadura (XI) Valencia (XIII) Canary Islands (XVII) Galicia (I) *Both an autonomous community and a province.

in the booming Basque province of Alava. In the years after Franco's death, when the economies of some of the industrial areas, especially the Basque region, began to sour, some tens of thousands of these people returned to their provinces of origin. The

majority of the migrants of the 1960s and the 1970s, however, were husbands and wives who had moved their families with the idea

of staying for a long period, if not permanently. Thus, the great

bulk of the migrants stayed on to shape the culture and the politics

of their adopted regions. In the long run, this may turn out to be

the most significant impact of the Spanish economic miracle on

the country's intractable regional disparities.

During the last decade of the Franco era and the first decade

of democracy, the population became steadily more urbanized,

83
Spain: A Country Study

although Spain was already a fairly urban country even in the 1960s.

Between 1965 and 1985, the population living in urban areas rose from 61 to 77 percent of the total, a level slightly higher than the

average for the advanced industrial countries. Urbanization intensified during the 1960s and the 1970s, when cities grew at the rate of 2.4 percent annually, but the rate slowed to 1.6 percent during

the first half of the 1980s. The mid-decennial census of April 1, 1986, showed that the Madrid area, accounting for 12.5 percent

of the total population, continued to dominate the country. The

six cities of over half a million—Barcelona, Madrid, Malaga,

Seville, Valencia, Zaragoza—together accounted for approximately

19 percent (see table 5). A comparison of population densities among the provinces illus- trates dramatically the drain of the rural population toward the

major cities (see fig. 8). In 1986 Spain's overall population density was 77 persons per square kilometer, about the same as that of

Greece or Turkey and far below the average of such heavily urbanized countries as West Germany. Population densities ranged,

however, from the practically deserted interior Castilian provinces,

like Soria (9 per square kilometer) and Guadalajara (12), to some

of the most densely populated territory in Europe, such as Madrid

(607 per square kilometer), Barcelona (592 per square kilometer),

and Vizcaya (527 per square kilometer). In terms of the autonomous community system, four regions—Madrid (4.9 million people), Catalonia (6.0 million), Valencia (3.8 million), and Andalusia

(6.9 million)—held 50 percent of the country's population in 1986.

None of the remaining 13 autonomous regions had more than 2.8

million people.

A comparison of regional population distribution changes from

1962 to 1982 shows clearly the effects of urbanization and the trans- formation of the work force. In this 20-year period, three regions

increased their share of the country's population by three percentage points or more: Catalonia (from 13.1 to 16.6), Madrid (from

8.7 to 12.5), and Valencia (from 7.0 to 10.0). Several other regions,

notably the Canary Islands and the Basque Country, registered

moderate gains of about one percentage point. In contrast, the big

losers (declines of three percentage points or more) were Andalusia (19.3 to 16.2) and Castilla y Leon (9.1 to 6.1). Other regions

also losing their historical share of the country's population were

Castilla-La Mancha, Galicia, and Extremadura. It is clear that during these two decades Spain's population balance shifted dramatically from the poor and rural provinces and regions to the much

richer and more urbanized ones. Since the birth rates in the more

modernized and more urbanized parts of the country tended to

84
The Society and Its Environment

be even lower than the national average (the Spanish birth rate averaged between 14 and 15 per 1,000 in 1980-85, whereas the

Basque Country rate averaged only 12), it is equally clear that this

shift in the population balance was due principally to internal migration rather than to changes in birth rates. Internal migration concentrated primarily on the huge cities of

Madrid and Barcelona in the 1960s and the 1970s, but by the 1980s

a significant change began to appear in the migration data. An

examination of the data for 1983 and 1984—years in which, respectively, 363,000 and 387,000 persons changed residence in Spain

revealed several trends. First, the major losers of population were

small towns (of fewer than 2,000 inhabitants each), which sustained a combined net loss of about 10,000 people each year, and large

cities (of more than 500,000), which together had a net annual loss of more than 20,000. Second, the major net gains in population were made by cities of between 100,000 and 500,000, which had

a net annual increase of more than 20,000. Third, all the other

town or city size categories either had stable populations or experienced only small losses or gains. Thus, while provinces like Barcelona, dominated by a single huge city, actually lost population (more

than 15,000 people in each of the years 1983 and 1984), provinces

like Seville or Las Palmas, with large cities that had not yet reached

the bursting point, experienced significant net in-migration. This

reflected a more mature form of population relocation than the simple frantic movement from the farm to Madrid or Barcelona that

had characterized the earlier decades of the Spanish economic boom.

Migration was significant not only among regions within the

country but abroad as well. The movement of the Spanish population abroad resembled that of many Third World countries that

sent large waves of migrants to Western Europe and to North

America in the late 1960s and the early 1970s in search of better

jobs and living standards and in response to labor shortages in the more advanced industrial countries. Between 1960 and 1985, nearly

1.3 million Spaniards emigrated to other West European countries.

More than 500,000 went to Switzerland; more than 400,000, to West Germany; and about 277,000, to France. This flow of migrant

workers reached its peak in the 1969 to 1973 period, when 512,000

Spanish citizens—some 40 percent of the entire 25-year total, an

average of more than 102,000 each year—migrated. Following the

economic downturn in Europe in the mid-1970s, Spanish migration dwindled to between 10,000 and 20,000 each year, although

there was a slight increase in the early 1980s in response to worsening economic conditions in Spain itself. In contrast, the late 1970s saw the return of many Spaniards from abroad, especially from

85
Spain: A Country Study

Source: Based on information from John Paxton (ed.), The Statesman 's Year-Book, 1989-1990, New York, 1989, 1114-1115.

Figure 8. Population Density by Province, 1986

Europe, as economic opportunities for Spaniards declined in Europe

and as democracy returned to Spain. In the peak return year, 1975, some 110,000 Spaniards returned from Europe, and Spain's net emigration balance was minus 89,000. In 1987, according to the government's Institute on Emigration, more than 1 . 7 million Spanish citizens resided outside the country. About 947,000 lived in the Western Hemisphere, principally

in Argentina (374,000), Brazil (1 18,000), Venezuela (144,000), and

the United States (74,000). More than 750,000 Spanish citizens

lived in other West European countries, primarily France (321,000),

West Germany (154,000), and Switzerland (108,000). Aside from

these two heavy concentrations, the only other significant Spanish

86
The Society and Its Environment

populations abroad were in Morocco (10,000) and in Australia

(22,500).

Ethnicity and Language

One of the clearest indicators of Spain's cultural diversity is lan- guage. Ethnic group boundaries do not coincide with administrative jurisdictions, so exact figures are impossible to confirm, but

observers generally agreed that about one Spanish citizen in four

spoke a mother tongue other than Castilian in the late 1980s.

Nevertheless, Castilian Spanish was the dominant language

throughout the country. Even in the homelands of the other Iberian

languages, the native tongue was used primarily for informal communication, and Castilian continued to dominate in most formal

settings.

Spain has, besides its Castilian ethnic core, three major peripheral

ethnic groups with some claim to an historical existence preceding

that of the Spanish state itself. In descending order of size, they

are the Catalans, the Galicians, and the Basques. In descending

order of the intensity of the pressure they brought to bear on Spanish

society and politics in the late 1980s, the Basques came first, fol- lowed by the less intransigent and less violent Catalans, and, at a great distance, by the much more conservative and less volatile

Galicians. In addition, heavily populated Andalusia had become

the center of fragmenting regionalism in the south; and the Gypsies,

although few in number, continuing to be a troublesome and

depressed cultural minority.

Government Policies

Franco's policies toward cultural, ethnic, and linguistic minorities were directed at the suppression of all non-Spanish diversity

and at the unification, integration, and homogenization of the country (see Policies, Programs, and Growing Popular Unrest, ch. 1). Until 1975 Spain's policy toward its ethnic minorities was more

highly centralized and unifying than that of its neighbor, France,

where a liberal democratic framework allowed private-sector initia- tives to keep regional cultures and languages alive. With the restoration of democracy, Spanish elites (many of whom

come from one of the peripheral ethnic homelands, especially

Catalonia) were much more tolerant of cultural, ethnic, and lin- guistic differences. Article 2 of the 1978 Constitution includes this wording: "The Constitution is based on the indissoluble unity of

the Spanish Nation, the common and indivisible fatherland of all Spaniards, and it recognizes and guarantees the autonomy of the

nationalities and regions that comprise it [the Spanish Nation] , and

87
Spain: A Country Study

the solidarity among them." It should be pointed out, however,

that the word "autonomy" is never defined in the Constitution,

leaving a serious ambiguity in Spain's treatment of its ethnic minorities (see Regional Government, ch. 4). While requiring that Castilian be the official language throughout the country, the

Constitution also recognizes the possibility that other languages

may be "co-official" (an ambiguous term that is taken to mean

"having co-equal status with Castilian for governmental purposes")

in their respective autonomous communities. By 1988 five languages

had been accorded such treatment: Catalan, Galician, Euskera (the

Basque language), Valencian, and Majorcan.

From the vantage point of the state, the Basque, the Catalan,

and the Galician peoples were "nationalities" within the larger and more inclusive Spanish nation. There was only one nation, and

its capital was Madrid; ethnic minorities were prohibited from using

the term "nation" in reference to themselves. For the Basque or

the Catalan nationalist, however, there was no Spanish nation, only

a Spanish state made up of a number of ethnic nations, of which

theirs was one.

It should be noted that ethno-nationalist sentiment varied greatly

within and among Spain's important ethnic minorities, throughout the years. In other words, not all Basques or Catalans felt themselves to be solely Basque or Catalan, and even those who did

possessed varying levels of identification with, and commitment

to, their ethnic homeland, depending upon the circumstances of

the moment. For example, a 1979 study by Goldie Shabad and

Richard Gunther revealed that, in the Basque provinces of Alava,

Guipuzcoa, and Vizcaya, 28 percent of their respondents identified themselves as "Spanish only" or "more Spanish than Basque,"

24 percent said they were "equally Spanish and Basque," 11 per- cent said they were "more Basque than Spanish," and 37 percent

identified themselves as "solely Basque." In the Basque province

of Navarre, in contrast, 26 percent said they were "Spanish only";

52 percent, "Navarrese only"; and 15 percent, "Basque only."

In Catalonia, the figures were as follows: "Spanish or more Spanish than Catalan," 38 percent; "equally Catalan and Spanish,"

36 percent; "more Catalan than Spanish," 12 percent; and "Catalan only," 15 percent.

Such variation in ethnic identity was related to two factors: the

migration of non-ethnics into the ethnic homelands from other parts

of Spain, especially in the economic boom years of the 1950s and

the 1960s; and the impact of industrialization, modernization, and

urbanization on the usage of non-Castilian languages. After several

decades of migration of non-ethnics into the Basque and Catalan

88
The Society and Its Environment

regions, the native-born population represented between one-half

and two-thirds of the total; and in many working-class neighborhoods and large cities, the non-ethnics were actually in the majority.

Whereas many migrants were able to learn Catalan because of its close similarity to Castilian Spanish, the number of migrants who

learned the Basque language was insignificant because Euskera is not an Indo-European language. Moreover, the impact of mass

media, urbanization, and other modernizing mass cultural influ- ences gradually weakened the place of the non-Castilian languages.

This was especially true in the Basque region, where non-Basque

speakers found it pointless to learn a minority language that apparently had little utility in the modern world.

For these reasons, the Basque, the Catalan, and the Galician

autonomous community governments placed the highest emphasis on policies to save their respective languages. In each of these

regions, the local language was declared co-official along with

Castilian Spanish; residents of the regions came to expect that they

could communicate with their government in their native tongues

when dealing with the courts and the police, and in a wide variety

of other contexts in which citizens interacted directly with the state. Trials were conducted in both languages. The regional parliaments

and governments, as well as most other institutions of government, were bilingual in theory if not in practice. Each government subsidized native-language schools through the high-school years and

supported a television system that broadcast largely, or, in the

Basque case, entirely, in the native language. The Basque autonomous government placed great emphasis on recruiting a native

police force made up of bilingual officers able to interact with the

local population in the language of their choice (see The Police System, ch. 5). At the end of the 1980s, it was still too early to assess whether

or not such policies could salvage these minority languages. Catalan seemed assured of survival, even if as a subordinate language

to Castilian, but Euskera and Galician were spoken by such a small

portion of the modern, urbanized population that their fate would

probably not be known for another generation. Under the best of

circumstances, the representation of such complexity in Spanish

society and politics will present a major challenge to the country's

political elites and opinion leaders through the 1990s.

The Catalans

The four Spanish provinces in the northeast corner of the Iberian

Peninsula constitute the principal homeland of the Catalans. The

Catalan autonomous community covers about 6.5 percent of Spain's

89
Spain: A Country Study

total peninsular land area. The region consists of the provinces of

Barcelona, Gerona, Lerida, and Tarragona. Elsewhere in Spain,

there were also significant Catalan-speaking populations in the

Balearic Islands, along the east coast to the south of Valencia, and

as far west as the eastern part of the Aragonese province of Huesca.

Outside Spain, the principal Catalan populations were found in

France, at the eastern end of the Pyrenees, and in Andorra.

The population of the Catalan region in 1986 was approximately

6.0 million, of which 4.6 million lived in densely populated Barcelona Province. The other three provinces were more sparsely populated. As one of the richest areas of Spain and the first to

industrialize, Catalonia attracted hundreds of thousands of

migrants, primarily from Andalusia and other poor parts of the

country. From 1900 to 1981, the net in-migration into Catalonia was about 2.4 million. In the 1980s, over half of Catalonia's working

class, and the vast majority of its unskilled or semi-skilled workers, were cultural outsiders.

Catalan was one of five distinct Romance languages that emerged

as the Islamic invasion of the Iberian Peninsula began to ebb (see

Al Andalus, ch. 1). The others were Aragonese, Castilian, Leonese,

and Galician. By the late Middle Ages, the kingdoms of Catalonia, Aragon, and Valencia had joined together in a federation, forging one of the most advanced constitutional systems of the time

in Europe (see Castile and Aragon, ch. 1). After the union of the kingdoms of Aragon and Castile in 1479,

the Spanish crown maintained a loose administrative hold over its component realms. Although it occasionally tried to assert more

centralized control, in the case of Catalonia its efforts generally

resulted in failure. Nonetheless, attempts by Catalans in the seven- teenth century to declare their independence were likewise unsuccessful (see Spain in Decline, ch. 1). In the War of the Spanish

Succession, Catalonia sided with the English against the Spanish

crown, and the signing of the Treaty of Utrecht in 1713 opened

the way for the conquest of Catalonia by Spanish troops (see War

of the Spanish Succession, ch. 1). In September 1714, after a long

siege, Barcelona fell, and Catalonia's formal constitutional independence came to an end.

During the latter half of the nineteenth century, Catalonia experienced a dramatic resurgence as the focal point of Spain's industrial revolution (see The Cuban Disaster and the "Generation of

1898," ch. 1). There were also a cultural renaissance and a renewed

emphasis on the Catalan language as the key to Catalan cultural

distinctiveness. Catalan nationalism was put forward by the nascent Catalan bourgeoisie as a solution that coupled political and cultural

90
Romanesque church in Lerida Province

Courtesy National Tourist Office of Spain

91
Spain: A Country Study

autonomy with economic integration in the Spanish market. For

a brief period during the 1930s, the freedom of the Second Republic

gave the Catalans a taste of political autonomy, but the door was

shut for forty years by the Franco dictatorship (see Republican

Spain, ch. 1). There were, in principle, several different criteria that were used

to determine who was, or was not, Catalan. One's place of birth, or the place of birth of one's parents, was often used by secondgeneration migrants to claim Catalan status, but relatively few

whose families had been Catalan for generations agreed with these

claims. Biological descent was seldom used among either natives or migrants, because Catalans, unlike Basques, did not usually

define their ethnic identity in such terms. Sentimental allegiance

to Catalonia was important in separating out from the category

those native Catalans who no longer felt any identification with

their homeland, but preferred to identify themselves as Spanish.

Thus, the most significant and powerful indicator of Catalan identity, for both Catalans and migrants alike, was the ability to speak

the Catalan language.

According to one estimate, the population (including those outside Spain) speaking Catalan or one of its variants (Valencian or Majorcan) numbered about 6.5 million in the late 1980s. Within

the Catalan autonomous community, about 50 percent of the people

spoke Catalan as a mother tongue, and another 30 percent could

at least understand the language. In Valencia and the Balearic

Islands, perhaps as many as 50 to 70 percent of the population spoke one of the variants of Catalan as a mother tongue, although a great

majority used the language only in the home.

The Galicians

Galicians live in the four Spanish provinces located along the

far northwest coast of the Iberian Peninsula, but their language

zone shades into northern Portugal as well. The autonomous region

of Galicia covers about 6 percent of the total peninsular territory

of Spain. The four provinces that make up the region are La

Coruna, Lugo, Orense, and Pontevedra. The total population of

these provinces in 1986 was about 2.8 million. None of the provinces was densely populated. Unlike the Basque and the Catalan regions,

which were rich, urbanized, and industrialized, Galicia remained

relatively poor, agricultural and dominated by rural and village

society, as industry had yet to make its appearance there on a large

scale. Moreover, its agricultural sector continued to be among the

most backward in Spain, and farm productivity was severely hampered by the tiny size of the individual plots, known as minifundios.

92
Galician bagpipe players

in regional dress Courtesy National

Tourist Office of Spain

Canary Islanders

in regional dress Courtesy National

Tourist Office of Spain

remainder refraining, at least partly, out of a sense of inferiority.

In any case, only an insignificant percentage would be unable to understand the language, given its similarities to Castilian Spanish. Nevertheless, like Catalan, Galician seemed condemned to second-class status while Castilian continued to enjoy the role of

the dominant language in official and formal contexts. Galician

nationalists were sharply critical of what they termed the '' so-called bilingualism policy," because they believed that Galician, unless

it were given privileged status vis-a-vis Castilian, would eventually

be overwhelmed by the more popular and more dominant official language.

The Basques

The homeland of the Basques, known by Basque nationalists as Euzkadi, occupies the littoral of the Bay of Biscay as it curves north

into France. The region extends inland some 150 kilometers,

through the juncture of the Pyrenees and the Cordillera Cantabrica,

and thence south to the Rio Ebro. The region covers nearly 21 ,000

93
Spain: A Country Study

The minifundio was the product of an attempt to distribute land parcels in a closed rural system to a growing population by requiring

that equal shares be left to each heir. After just a few generations,

the land had been subdivided so much that most of the parcels were

too small to support a family or to be economically viable. For these reasons, Galicia was a net exporter of population to the rest of Spain.

Between 1900 and 1981, the net outflow of people from Galicia was more than 825,000.

Galician nationalism, which appeared as early as the 1840s,

recalled a mythical "Golden Age" when the medieval kingdom

of Galicia had existed. There had indeed been a king of Galicia

who was crowned in 1111; the kingdom was partitioned some years

later, however, leaving the northern half hemmed in and isolated

while the southern portion expanded southward in the wake of the

Moors' withdrawal. This southern part of the realm eventually

became Portugal; the northern part fell into disorder. Finally, in

1483 Castilian forces restored order in Galicia, and the kingdom

of Castile incorporated the region into its realm. Castilian rule also brought on economic and cultural stagnation that lasted into the

nineteenth century.

The emergence of Galician nationalism in the 1840s was principally a literary and cultural phenomenon; its economic and politi- cal strength had been sapped by the continuation of its traditional,

rural, even anti-industrial social structure. The peasantry was conservative; the bourgeoisie was tiny and was largely non-Galician;

the church opposed modernization. The Galician language survived

principally as a rural vernacular, but it had no official standing.

Despite Galicia' s contemporary nationalist movement, which dates

from 1931, and the activities of the region's autonomous government, in power since 1981, Galician nationalism continued to be

almost silent in comparison with the louder demands of Basques

and Catalans in the late 1980s. The use of Galician in political and

official forums remained principally a strategy of parties on the left of the political spectrum; more conservative political figures con- tinued to use Castilian either predominantly or exclusively.

About 60 percent of the population of the autonomous community can be identified as ethnic Galician, the great majority of whom

retained some use of their language, if not in formal settings, at least in the home. According to one source, some 80 percent of

the population could at least understand the language, although

it remained primarily a language for the rural and village poor of

Galicia and was not much heard in the larger cities. Another source argues that at least 80 percent could speak the language but probably

only about 60 percent actually did so on a regular basis, the

94
Typical regional dress

in Cdceres Province

Courtesy National

Tourist Office of Spain

square kilometers, of which about 3,000 lie on the French side of

the international frontier. The 18,000 square kilometers on the

Spanish side constitute about 3.6 percent of Spain's total land area. About 3 million people lived in this area in the late 1980s.

Approximately 300,000 people were on the French side of the

border, while the remaining 2.7 million people were concentrated

primarily in the two Spanish coastal provinces of Guipuzcoa and

Vizcaya and, less densely, in the two inland provinces of Alava

and Navarre. This population lived under two distinct autonomous

communities: the Basque Country, which incorporated the three

smaller provinces, and Navarre, which by itself constituted a "uniprovincial" regional government.

The Basques are among the oldest peoples of Europe. Despite

their having been visited by numerous waves of invaders, the

Basques reached the tenth century still fairly isolated from the flow

of West European history. In the tenth and the eleventh centuries, the rising kingdom of Navarre absorbed most of the rest of

the Basque peoples, and it created for the first time a more or less

95
Spain: A Country Study

unified Basque political entity. With the kingdom's decline, however, the region fell into disorder, and by the sixteenth century,

the Basque provinces had been integrated into the kingdom of

Castile. From this time until the nineteenth century, relations

between Castile and the Basque provinces were governed by the

fueros, local privileges and exemptions by which the Spanish king

recognized the special nature of the Basque provinces and even

a number of Basque towns (see Rule by Pronunciamiento; Liberal

Rule, ch. 1). As a result of the centralization of the Spanish state and the Carlist Wars, the fueros had been abolished by the end of

the nineteenth century. The Second Republic in the 1930s offered

the chance to create a new autonomous Basque regime, but all such

efforts were doomed by the Spanish Civil War. After the war, the

Franco dictatorship sought—unsuccessfully—to suppress all signs

of Basque distinctiveness, especially the use of the language.

Through most of the twentieth century, the thriving Basque econ- omy, centered on the steel and the shipbuilding industries of Vizcaya

and the metal-processing shops in Guipuzcoa, attracted thousands

of Spaniards who migrated there in search ofjobs and a better way

of life. Between 1900 and 1980, the number of people moving into

the region exceeded those who left by nearly 450,000, the heaviest

flow occurring during the decade of the 1960s. In the 1970s, the

flow began to reverse itself because of political upheaval and eco- nomic decline. Between 1977 and 1984, the net outflow was nearly

51,000. The consequence of this heavy in-migration was a population in the late 1980s that was only marginally ethnic Basque and

that in many urban areas was clearly non-Basque in both language

and identity. One authoritative study found that only 52 percent

of the population had been born in the Basque region of parents

also born there, 1 1 percent had been born in the region of parents

born elsewhere, and 35.5 percent had been born outside the region.

The Basque region has been for decades the arena for a clash

between an encroaching modern culture and its values (speaking

Spanish, identifying with Spain, working in industry, living in a

large city) and a native, traditional culture and its values (speaking Euskera, identifying with one's village or province, working on a small farm or in the fishing sector, living on a farm or in a

small village). The former population was found concentrated in the larger cities such as Bilbao, while the latter lived in the small

fishing villages along the Bay of Biscay or in mountain farmsteads,

called caserios, located in the mountains of Guipuzcoa, Vizcaya,

and Navarre. These centers of Basque traditional culture have been

in constant decline since the introduction of heavy industry to the

96
The Society and Its Environment

region in the last quarter of the nineteenth century, and they could

well disappear by the end of the twentieth century.

The use of the Basque language has also been in steady decline

for centuries, but the erosion has accelerated since the 1950s with

the rise in non-Basque migration to the region. A 1984 language census confirmed what unofficial estimates had already observed: that

Basque was a weakened minority language, although not yet moribund. Of the 2.1 million people in the Basque Country autonomous

region, 23 percent could understand Euskera, 21 percent could speak

it, but only 13 percent could read the language and only 10 percent

could write it. These data indicate that the Basque language has

survived principally as an oral language without much of a written

tradition, and that it is conserved not by formal teaching in schools

but by informal teaching in the home, Officials in the Basque Country launched a number of important programs, especially in tele- vision and education, to restore the language to a level of parity

with Castilian Spanish, but the success of these efforts will not be

confirmed for at least a generation. Officially, the objective was to make the Basque population bilingual in Spanish and in Basque;

but that goal seemed quite remote in the late 1980s.

The Andalusians

The Andalusians cannot be considered an ethnically distinct people because they lack two of the most important markers of dis- tinctiveness: an awareness of a common, distant mythological

origin, and their own language. Nevertheless, it is clear that they

do constitute a culturally distinct people, or region, that has become

increasingly important in an industrial and democratic society.

The Andalusians live in Spain's eight southernmost provinces:

Almeria, Cadiz, Cordoba, Granada, Huelva, Jaen, Malaga, and

Seville. In 1986 their total population stood at 6.9 million. In

general, it had grown more slowly than had the country's total population, and the region continued to be sparsely populated. Since

1960, the region's share of total population had declined, despite

birth rates ranging from 20 to 25 per 1 ,000, about 40 percent higher

than the Spanish average. The causes of the depopulation of the

region can be found in the distinctive characteristics of its culture

and economy: the large, poorly utilized estates and the agro-towns;

rural poverty and landlessness; a rigid class structure and sharp

class conflict; and emigration to Spain's industrial cities and to other

parts of Europe.

Most descriptions of Andalusia begin with the landownership system, for the most powerful forces in the region have for centuries been the owners of the large, economically backward

97
Spain: A Country Study

estates, called latifundios (see Hispania, ch. 1). These wide expanses

of land held by relatively few owners had their origins in landowning

patterns that stretch back to Roman times; in grants of land made

to the nobility, to the military orders, and to the church during

the Reconquest (Reconquista); and in laws of the nineteenth cen- tury by which church and common lands were sold in large tracts to the urban middle class. The latifundio system is noted for two

regressive characteristics: unproductive use of the land (agricultural production per capita in Andalusia was only 70 percent of

that in Spain as a whole during the late 1980s) and unequal and

absentee landownership patterns (1 percent of the agricultural population owned more than half of the land; the landed aristocracy

made up no more than . 3 percent of the population) . The workers of this land, calledjornaleros, were themselves landless; they did

not even live on the land. Instead, they resided in what Spaniards

refer to as pueblos, but with populations ranging as high as 30,000,

these population centers were far too large to be considered "villages" or "towns." Anthropologists have coined the term "agrotowns" to describe such urban areas, because they served almost

solely as a habitat for agricultural day-workers and had themselves

declined in economic, cultural, and political significance.

This economic and cultural system produced a distinctive outlook, or perspective, that involved class consciousness and class conflicts as well as significant out-migration. In contrast to the much

smaller farm towns and villages of northern Spain, where the land was worked by its owners, where parcels were of more nearly equal

size, and where class differentiations were softened, class distinctions in the agro-towns of Andalusia stood out with glaring clarity.

Devices used in other parts of rural Spain to diffuse class conflict,

such as kinship and religious rituals, were of little value here (see

Social Stratification, this ch.). The families of the landless farmers

lived at, or near, the poverty level, and their relations with the

landed gentry were marked by conflict, aggression, and hostility.

The two main forces that kept Andalusia's rural society from flying apart were external to the region. The first was the coercive

power of the state, the political power emanating from Madrid,

as exemplified by Spain's rural constabulary, the Civil Guard

(Guardia Civil—see The Police System, ch. 5). The second was

the safety valve offered by the opportunities to migrate to other

parts of Spain, or to other countries in Western Europe. This free- dom resulted in the remaining facet of Andalusian culture: the will to leave the region behind. Much of this migration was seasonal;

in 1982, for example, 80,000 Spaniards, mostly Andalusians,

migrated to France for the wine harvest. Much of the migration,

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The Society and Its Environment

however, consisted of entire families who intended to remain in

their new home for long periods, or perhaps forever. This is why

Andalusia during the 1960s lost some 14 percent of its population,

perhaps the greatest European exodus in peacetime in this century.

The Gypsies

The term "Gypsies" is used by outsiders to label an ethnic group

the members of which refer to themselves as Rom and speak a lan- guage known as Romany. No one knows exactly how many Gypsies there are, either in general or in Spain in particular. Estimates

of the Spanish Gypsy population range as low as 50,000 and as high as 450,000, and other estimates place the world Gypsy population at between 3 and 6 million. Correct estimates are made

difficult by the nomadic life- style followed by a portion of the group,

by their cultural isolation, by the sense of mystery surrounding them

and their origins, and by the division of the population into a number of distinctive subgroups.

It is generally accepted that Gypsies migrated out of India into

Europe as early as the eleventh century. There are records of their

having arrived in Spain as early as 1425 and in Barcelona, in particular, by 1447. At first they were well received and were even

accorded official protection by many local authorities. In 1492,

however, when official persecution began against Moors and Jews

to cleanse the peninsula of non-Christian groups, the Gypsies were

included in the list of peoples to be assimilated or driven out. For

about 300 years, Gypsies were subject to a number of laws and

policies designed to eliminate them from Spain as an identifiable

group: Gypsy settlements were broken up and the residents dis- persed; Gypsies were required to marry non-Gypsies; they were

denied their language and rituals as well as being excluded from

public office and from guild membership. By the time this period

had drawn to a close, Gypsies had been driven into a permanently

submerged underclass from which they had not escaped in the late 1980s.

" Spanish Gypsies are usually divided into two main groups: gitanos

and hungaros (for Hungarians). The former, in turn, are divided

into subgroups classified by both social class and cultural differ- ences. In the late 1980s, the gitanos lived predominantly in southern

and central Spain. Many of them took up a sedentary form of life, working as street vendors or entertainers. Although poor and largely

illiterate, they were usually well integrated into Spanish society.

The hungaros, however, are Kalderash, one of the divisions of the

group from Central Europe (hence the name). They were much

poorer than the gitanos and lived an entirely nomadic lifestyle,

99

View of Grazalema, Cadiz Province

Courtesy National Tourist Office of Spain

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Spain: A Country Study

usually in tents or shacks around the larger cities. They made their

living by begging or stealing, and they were much more of a problem for Spanish authorities. Many gitanos denied the hungaros

the status of being in their same ethnic group, but outsiders tend

to regard them all as basically Gypsies. In any case, whatever com- mon ethnic consciousness they possessed was not sufficient to make

them a significant political force. Under Franco, Gypsies were persecuted and harassed, as indeed

they were throughout the areas of Europe controlled by Nazi Germany. In the post-Franco era, however, Spanish government policy

has been much more sympathetic toward them, especially in the area of social welfare and social services. Since 1983, for example,

the government has operated a special program of compensatory

education to promote educational rights for the disadvantaged,

including those in Gypsy communities. The challenge will be to devise programs that bring the Gypsy population into the mainstream of the country's economic and political life without eroding the group's distinctive cultural and linguistic heritage.

Social Stratification

Spain in the 1980s possessed a socioeconomic class structure typi- cal of countries entering the advanced stage of industrialization.

In general terms, society was becoming more differentiated along

class, occupational, and professional lines, with an expanding middle class and a decreasing proportion of rural poor. Although Spain

had not yet reached the degree of social differentiation seen in other

advanced industrial democracies in Western Europe, it was clearly

moving in the same direction. As in other areas, however, Spain was modernizing in a distinctiy Iberian style, retaining some important social characteristics from an earlier era. By the mid-1980s, the structure of Spain's economy had come

increasingly to resemble that of most other West European countries, as evidenced by changes in the distribution of its work force. Throughout the twentieth century there was a steady decline in the

proportion of workers employed in agriculture and other primary

sectors (from 60.4 percent of the work force in 1900 to 14.4 percent

in 1981); a gradual increase in the proportion employed in the ser- vices sector (from 15.1 percent to 40.4); and an increase in the proportion employed in industry and construction, until the 1970s when

the percentage leveled off and even declined slightly (13.6 percent

in 1900, to 37.4 percent in 1970, then 35.3 percent in 1981). (The

residual percentages are accounted for by "other" and "unclassified" economic activities.) Changes were especially dramatic during the fifteen-year period from 1965 to 1980. According to a 1983

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The Society and Its Environment

study, the Spanish work force consisted of 15 percent in agriculture, 33 percent in industry, 25 percent in non-information-related

services, and 27 percent in the information sector (compared with

40 percent in the United States and 30 percent or more in West

Germany, in France, and in Britain).

There were, however, worrisome signs that certain key sectors of the work force had not kept pace with the country's transition

to advanced industrial status. In 1980 administrative and managerial

workers, the key to guiding a complex industrial economy, constituted a tiny portion—only 1.3 percent—of Spain's work force, which

put Spain on a par with Uruguay and Brazil. Professional and technical workers, the sector relied upon to provide basic and applied

research for a country's industrial base, constituted only 5.9 per- cent of the work force, which placed Spain on about the same level as Mexico and the Philippines. In both cases, among West European nations, Spain was close to only Greece and Portugal. The

rest of Western Europe was still far ahead in these crucial areas. Changes in Spain's economic structure have been reflected in class structure changes as well. By 1970 Spanish sociologist Amando de

Miguel had reported that the country's occupation structure was

dominated by a growing middle (including upper-middle) class of

administrators, service personnel, and clerical workers. On the basis

of the 1970 census, de Miguel found that fully 40 percent of Spain's

working population was employed in the category of "nonmanual

and service workers"; the country's industrial labor force, or blue

collar-workers, constituted 35 percent of the work force; the rural

workers (including employed farm workers, day workers, and farm

owners) accounted for 25 percent (still high by West European stan- dards). The occupational structure differed markedly among Spain's

various regions. In the more industrial, urbanized north and northeast (the Basque Country and Catalonia), white-collar service and

administrative workers made up about 45 percent of the work force; industrial blue collar workers, about 47 percent; and rural workers,

about 8 percent. In the more traditional, rural and agrarian south

and west of the country (Andalusia and Extremadura), the relative percentages were 35 percent white-collar, 30 percent blue-collar, and

35 percent rural. A decade later, American political scientists Richard

Gunther, Giacomo Sani, and Goldie Shabad studied the class implications of the 1979 Spanish elections and discovered, first, that the

country's class structure had become more differentiated in the

preceding decade, and second, that the upper and middle classes had grown in size, while the urban and rural working classes had

contracted. Gunther and his associates found that 12.6 percent of

their respondents classified themselves in the highest status group

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Spain: A Country Study

(entrepreneurs, professionals, large landowners, etc.), an increase

from 5.2 percent in the de Miguel study. Another 36.3 percent

could be classified as upper-middle class (these in technical professions, small businessmen, mid-level public and private employees),

up from 15.4 percent in 1970; and 16.3 percent fell within the lowermiddle class category (sales and supervisory personnel and small

farmers), down from 21.8 percent a decade earlier. Thus, the number included in the general category of middle class rose from about

one-third of the work force to about one-half in a decade. As a per- centage of the total, blue-collar workers and rural farm workers

fell from about 60 percent in 1970 to only 33.3 percent in Gunther's 1979 study.

Later studies, using less precisely differentiated categories, found

that many Spaniards continued to classify themselves as workingclass people regardless of the color of their collar. In one 1979 study,

done by American political scientists Peter McDonough and Samuel

Barnes and their Spanish colleague Antonio Lopez Pina, 48 per- cent of their respondents classified themselves as "working class";

36 percent, as "low-middle"; and 16 percent, as "middle-high."

In a 1984 study, these same three researchers reported that self- classified working-class respondents were 55.9 percent of the sample, middle-class people were 33 percent, and upper-class subject were 11.1 percent. Allowing for a considerable degree of overlap

and ambiguity in answers across surveys, particularly in aggregating

the responses for working class and lower-middle class into a sin- gle statistic, it still seems clear that Spanish society had become

more middle class and less poor over the decade and a half between

1970 and 1985.

Data on class structure from 1984 have been analyzed in a study

by Spanish sociologists Salustiano del Campo and Manuel Navarro,

who divided the Spanish work force into two broad groups: salaried

employees, constituting approximately 68 percent of the work force,

and owners, managers, and professionals, making up about 31 percent. The first group was further divided into nonmanual and

service workers, who accounted for about 34 percent of the work

force, and blue-collar workers, who also constituted approximately

34 percent. The second group had the categories of capitalist busi- ness class, with about 5 percent of the work force; and the liberal professional class (e.g., attorneys) and self-employed small busi- ness owners, merchants, and small farmers, who accounted for approximately 27 percent.

Although Spaniards experienced many of the same social and

class cleavages that occurred in other advanced industrial societies, they retained a distinctive commitment to greater income

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The Society and Its Environment

equality, an egalitarian value that stands out in comparison with

their wealthier and more industrialized neighbors. In a 1985 study,

McDonough, Barnes, and Lopez Pina asked their respondents, "Do

you think there should be a great deal of difference, some difference, or almost no difference in how much people in different occupations

earn?" The proportions of respondents answering "a great differ- ence" were 3 percent from the working class, 4 percent from the

middle class, and 7 percent from the upper class, compared with

26 percent, 32 percent, and 49 percent from comparable classes in the United States. Thus, McDonough and his colleagues call our

attention to "the salient fact [of] the high level of egalitarian/populist

expectations in Spain. The pattern is understandable in light of the

poverty which for many Spaniards is not a vicarious memory and

in view, as well, of the paternalistic legacy of Latin Catholicism.

On the one hand, then, economic and social issues are probably

not as conflict-ridden as caricatures of Spanish politics imply—relative to the symbolic-moral issues, for example. On the other hand, the

public seems to entertain high expectations about the benefits and

social equity to be delivered by the government."

According to data from 1980 and 1981 , Spain's household income was distributed in the following pattern: the poorest quintile of the

population received 6.9 percent; the second poorest, 12.5; the middle quintile, 17.3; the fourth quintile, 23.2; the richest quintile,

40.0; and the richest decile, 24.5. The ratio between the richest

and the poorest quintiles was 5.8:1, a fairly equitable distribution

pattern compared with other advanced industrial West European

democracies. The Spanish pattern of income distribution did not

differ dramatically from that of advanced welfare states like Sweden

or Denmark. The crucial difference was, of course, that in those

countries there was much more income to distribute. Outside

Spain's urban areas, in the small and mid-sized towns where more

than a quarter of the country's population still lived, there were two distinctive models of class structure and conflict. In the small

villages of Castile and the north, where land was more evenly dis- tributed, and where the land was worked by its owners, social

cleavages were much less acute, and class conflict was much less strident. There, the sense of community was reinforced by the still- powerful forces of kinship and religion. Moreover, modernization,

principally by raising the salaries of laborers and by diminishing

the gap in material possessions between rich and poor, had erased

the few class or status differences that had existed previously. As

the ownership of automobiles, refrigerators, and television sets spread to practically the entire population, upper-class status became

largely meaningless in these small villages.

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Spain: A Country Study

In the larger agro-towns of the south, however, a totally differ- ent picture was found. In Andalusia, land was distributed in a highly

unequal way and the land was worked principally by day laborers

who owned no land and who seldom even lived on it. In these towns,

class structure was very sharply delineated and class conflict was

aggressive and often violent. Traditional values of kinship and

religion failed to diffuse these conflicts, and the towns and villages were held together by what anthropologist David Gilmore calls the

''coercive integration" imposed by external forces, primarily the

government in Madrid.

Social Values and Attitudes

After the restoration of democracy, the changes in everyday Spanish life were as radical as the political transformation. These changes were even more striking when contrasted with the values and social practices that had prevailed in Spanish society during the Franco

years, especially during the 1940s and the early 1950s. In essence, Spanish social values and attitudes were modernized at the same

pace, and to the same degree, as the country's class structure, eco- nomic institutions, and political framework.

To say that Spanish social values under Franco were conservative would be a great understatement. Both public laws and church

regulations enforced a set of social strictures aimed at preserving

the traditional role of the family, distant and formal relations

between the sexes, and controls over expression in the press, film,

and the mass media, as well as over many other important social institutions. By the 1960s, however, social values were changing

faster than the law, inevitably creating tension between legal codes

and reality. Even the church had begun to move away from its more conservative positions by the latter part of the decade. The

government responded haltingly to these changes with some new

cabinet appointments and with somewhat softer restrictions on the

media. Yet underneath these superficial changes, Spanish society was experiencing wrenching changes as its people came increasingly into contact with the outside world. To some extent, these

changes were due to the rural exodus that had uprooted hundreds

of thousands of Spaniards and had brought them into new urban

social settings. In the 1960s and the early 1970s, however, two other contacts were also important: the flow of European tourists to "sunny Spain" and the migration of Spain's workers to jobs in

France, Switzerland, and West Germany.

One of the most powerful influences on Spanish social values

has been the country's famous "industry without smokestacks" —

tourism. In the years before the Civil War, tourists numbered only

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The Society and Its Environment

about one quarter of a million, and it took more than a decade

after World War II for them to discover Spain's climate and low

prices. When they finally did, the trickle of tourists became a flood

(see table 6, Appendix). The leading countries sending tourists to Spain were France, Portugal, Britain, and West Germany. Of

course tourists brought much more than British pounds or German deutsche marks; they also brought the democratic political

and social values of northern Europe.

The other population flow that affected Spanish cultural values

involved Spanish workers who returned from having worked in the more industrialized and more liberal countries of Western Europe.

The exact number of returning migrants fluctuated greatly from

year to year, depending on economic conditions in Spain and in

the rest of Europe. The peak period was 1965 to 1969, when more

than 550,000 returned; but nearly 750,000 returned during the

decade of the 1970s. The return flow ebbed somewhat during the

1980s, when only about 20,000 came back per year. The principal

problems encountered by these returning Spaniards were both eco- nomic (finding another job) and cultural (what the Spanish refer

to as "social reinsertion," or becoming accustomed again to the

Spanish ways of doing things). Many of the returnees came back

with a small sum of money that they invested in a small business or shop, from which they hoped to advance up the economic ladder. Above all, they brought back with them the cultural habits

and tastes of France, West Germany, and Switzerland, contributing thereby to the cultural transformation of post-Franco Spain.

Outsiders who still thought of Spain as socially restrained and

conservative were surprised to note the public changes in sexual

attitudes in the country since the late 1970s. Once state censorship was relaxed on magazines and films in 1976 and in 1978, the

market for pornography flourished. In a country where Playboy was

outlawed until 1976, ten years later this and other foreign "adult"

magazines were already considered tame and were outsold by

domestic magazines. Throughout Spain's large cities, uncensored

sex films were readily available in government-licensed theaters,

and prostitutes and brothels freely advertised their services in even

the most serious press. Despite these attention-getting changes in

public attitudes, however, Spanish government policy for some

years remained quite distant from social practice in two important

areas related to private sexual behavior, contraception and abortion.

During the Franco years, the ban on the sale of contraceptives was complete, at least in theory, even though the introduction of

the pill had brought artificial contraception to at least half a million Spanish women by 1975. The ban on the sale of contraceptives

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Spain: A Country Study

was lifted in 1978, but no steps were taken to ensure that they were

used safely or effectively. Schools offered no sex education courses, and family planning centers existed only where local authorities were willing to pay for them. The consequence of a loosening of

sexual restraints, combined with a high level of ignorance about

the technology that could be substituted in their place, was a rise in the number of unwanted pregnancies, which led to the second

policy problem—abortion.

Illegal abortions were fairly commonplace in Spain even under

the dictatorship. A 1974 government report estimated that there were about 300,000 such abortions each year. Subsequently, the

number rose to about 350,000 annually, which gave Spain one of

the highest ratios of abortions to live births among advanced industrial countries. Abortion continued to be illegal in Spain until 1985,

three years after the Spanish Socialist Workers' Party (Partido

Socialista Obrero Espafiol—PSOE) came to power on an electoral platform that promised a change. Even so, the law legalized abortions only in certain cases: pregnancy resulting from rape, which

must be reported to the authorities prior to the abortion; reasonable probability of a malformed fetus, attested to by two doctors; or to save the mother's life, again in the opinion of two physicians.

In the 1980s, this was as far as public opinion would permit the

state to go; surveys showed that a clear majority of the electorate

remained opposed to abortion on demand.

Perhaps the most significant change in Spanish social values,

however, involved the role of women in society, which, in turn, was related to the nature of the family. Spanish society, for centuries, had embraced a code of moral values that established strin- gent standards of sexual conduct for women (but not for men);

restricted the opportunities for professional careers for women, but

honored their role as wives and (most important) mothers; and prohibited divorce, contraception, and abortion, but permitted prostitution. After the return of democracy, the change in the status of

women was dramatic. One significant indicator was the changing

place of women in the work force. In the traditional Spanish world,

women rarely entered the job market. By the late 1970s, however,

22 percent of the country's adult women, still somewhat fewer than

in Italy and in Ireland, had entered the work force. By 1984 this figure had increased to 33 percent, a level not significantly differ- ent from Italy or the Netherlands. Women still made up less than

one-third of the total labor force, however, and in some important

sectors, such as banking, the figure was closer to one-tenth. A 1977

opinion poll revealed that when asked whether a woman's place was in the home only 22 percent of young people in Spain agreed,

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The Society and Its Environment

compared with 26 percent in Britain, 30 percent in Italy, and

37 percent in France. The principal barrier to women in the work

place, however, was not public opinion, but rather such factors as a high unemployment rate and a lack of part-time jobs. In education, women were rapidly achieving parity with men, at least

statistically. In 1983, approximately 46 percent of Spain's university enrollment was female, the thirty-first highest percentage in

the world, and comparable to most other European countries.

During Franco's years, Spanish law discriminated strongly

against married women. Without her husband's approval, referred

to as the permiso marital, a- wife was prohibited from almost all eco- nomic activities, including employment, ownership of property,

or even travel away from home. The law also provided for less strin- gent definitions of such crimes as adultery and desertion for husbands than it did for wives. Significant reforms of this system were begun shordy before Franco's death, and they have continued at a rapid pace since then. The permiso marital was abolished in 1975;

laws against adultery were cancelled in 1978; and divorce was legalized in 1981 . During the same year, the parts of the civil code that

dealt with family finances were also reformed.

During the Franco years, marriages had to be canonical (that

is, performed under Roman Catholic law and regulations) if even one of the partners was Catholic, which meant effectively that all marriages in Spain had to be sanctioned by the church. Since the

church prohibited divorce, a marriage could be dissolved only

through the arduous procedure of annulment, which was available

only after a lengthy series of administrative steps and was thus

accessible only to the relatively wealthy. These restrictions were

probably one of the major reasons for a 1975 survey result showing that 71 percent of Spaniards favored legalizing divorce; however,

because the government remained in the hands of conservatives

until 1982, progress toward a divorce law was slow and full of conflict. In the summer of 1981 , the Congress of Deputies (lower chamber of the Cortes, or Spanish Parliament) finally approved a divorce

law with the votes of about thirty Union of the Democratic Center

(Union de Centro Democratico—UCD) deputies who defied the

instructions of party conservatives. As a consequence, Spain had

a divorce law that permitted the termination of a marriage in as

little as two years following the legal separation of the partners.

Still, it would be an exaggeration to say that the new divorce law

opened a floodgate for the termination of marriages. Between the

time the law went into effect at the beginning of September 1981

,

and the end of 1984, only slighdy more than 69,000 couples had

availed themselves of the option of ending their marriages, and the

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Spain: A Country Study

number declined in both 1983 and 1984. There were already more

divorced people than this in Spain in 1981 before the law took effect. Despite these important gains, observers expected that the gaining

of equal rights for women would be a lengthy struggle, waged on many different fronts. It was not until deciding a 1987 case, for example, that Spain's Supreme Court held that a rape victim need

not prove that she had fought to defend herself in order to verify

the truth of her allegation. Until that important court case, it was

generally accepted that a female rape victim, unlike the victims

of other crimes, had to show that she had put up * 'heroic resistance"

in order to prove that she had not enticed the rapist or otherwise

encouraged him to attack her.

Another important sign of cultural change involved the size and

the composition of the family. To begin with, the marriage rate (the number of marriages in proportion to the adult population)

has declined steadily since the mid-1970s. After holding steady at

7 per 1 ,000 or more for over 100 years, the marriage rate declined

to about 5 per 1,000 in 1982, a level observed in West Germany

and in Italy only a few years earlier. Fewer people were marrying

in Spain, and the family structure was changing dramatically as

well. In 1970, of the 8.8 million households recorded in the census, 59 percent consisted of small nuclear families of two to five persons, 15 percent were somewhat larger nuclear families that

included other relatives as well as guests, and 10.6 percent were

households of unrelated individuals who had no nuclear family.

Large families of more than three children were only 9 percent of

the total. In a 1975 municipal survey that dealt only with families,

the following results were registered: couples without children constituted 16 percent of all families; and two-children families made

up 34 percent of the total. Although the number of family units

increased more than 20 percent between 1970 and 1981, the aver- age size of the family decreased by about 10 percent, from 3.8 per- sons to 3.5. The typical extended family of traditional societies (three

generations of related persons living in the same household) hardly

appeared at all in the census data. Clearly, that characteristic of

Spanish cultural values was a thing of the past.

Religion

Spain, it has been observed, is a nation-state born out of reli- gious struggle between Catholicism and, in turn, Islam, Judaism,

and Protestantism. After centuries of the Reconquest, in which

Christian Spaniards fought to drive Muslims from Europe, the

Inquisition sought to complete the religious purification of the

Iberian Peninsula by driving out Jews, Protestants, and other

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The Society and Its Environment

nonbelievers (see Ferdinand and Isabella, ch. 1). The Inquisition was finally abolished only in the 1830s, and even after that religious

freedom was denied in practice, if not in theory. Catholicism became

the state religion in 1851, when the Spanish government signed

a Concordat with the Vatican that committed Madrid to pay the

salaries of the clergy and to subsidize other expenses of the Roman

Catholic Church. This pact was renounced in 1931, when the secular constitution of the Second Republic imposed a series of anticleri- cal measures that threatened the church's very existence in Spain

and provoked its support for the Franco uprising five years later (see Republican Spain, ch. 1). The advent of the Franco regime saw the restoration of the

church's privileges. During the Franco years, Roman Catholicism was the only religion to have legal status; other worship services

could not be advertised, and only the Roman Catholic Church could

own property or publish books. The government not only continued

to pay priests' salaries and to subsidize the church, but it also assisted in the reconstruction of church buildings damaged by the war. Laws were passed abolishing divorce and banning the sale of contraceptives. Catholic religious instruction was mandatory,

even in public schools. Franco secured in return the right to name

Roman Catholic bishops in Spain, as well as veto power over appointments of clergy down to the parish priest level. In 1953 this close cooperation was formalized in a new Concordat with the

Vatican that granted the church an extraordinary set of privileges:

mandatory canonical marriages for all Catholics; exemption from

government taxation; subsidies for new building construction; censorship of materials the church deemed offensive; the right to establish universities, to operate radio stations, and to publish newspapers

and magazines; protection from police intrusion into church properties; and exemption of clergy from military service (see Foreign

Policy under Franco, ch. 1). The proclamation of the Second Vatican Council in favor of the

separation of church and state in 1965 forced the reassessment of

this special relationship. In the late 1960s, the Vatican attempted

to reform the church in Spain by appointing liberals as interim, or acting, bishops, thereby circumventing Franco's stranglehold on the country's clergy. In 1966 the Franco regime passed a law

that freed other religions from many of the earlier restrictions,

although it also reaffirmed the privileges of the Catholic Church.

Any attempt to revise the 1953 Concordat met the dictator's rigid

resistance. In 1976, however, King Juan Carlos de Borbon unilaterally

renounced the right to name the bishops; later that same year,

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Spain: A Country Study

Madrid and the Vatican signed a new accord that restored to the

church its right to name bishops, and the church agreed to a revised

Concordat that entailed a gradual financial separation of church

and state. Church property not used for religious purposes was

henceforth to be subject to taxation, and gradually, over a period

of years, the church's reliance on state subsidies was to be reduced.

The timetable for this reduction was not adhered to, however, and

the church continued to receive the public subsidy through 1987

(US$110 million in that year alone). Indeed, by the end of 1987

issues such as financing and education had not been definitively

resolved, and the revised Concordat still had not been agreed to in final form, even though the 1953 Concordat had expired in 1980.

It took the new 1978 Constitution to confirm the right of

Spaniards to religious freedom and to begin the process of disestablishing Catholicism as the state religion (see The 1978 Constitution, ch. 4). The drafters of the Constitution tried to deal with the

intense controversy surrounding state support of the church, but

they were not entirely successful. The initial draft of the Constitution did not even mention the church, which was included almost

as an afterthought and only after intense pressure from the church's

leadership. Article 16 disestablishes Roman Catholicism as the offi- cial religion and provides that religious liberty for non-Catholics

is a state-protected legal right, thereby replacing the policy of limited

toleration of non-Catholic religious practices. The article further

states, however, that "The public authorities shall take the reli- gious beliefs of Spanish society into account and shall maintain the

consequent relations of cooperation with the Catholic Church and

the other confessions." In addition, Article 27 also aroused controversy by appearing to pledge continuing government subsidies

for private, church-affiliated schools. These schools were sharply

criticized by Spanish Socialists for having created and perpetuated

a class-based, separate, and unequal school system. The Constitution, however, includes no affirmation that the majority of Spaniards are Catholics or that the state should take into account the

teachings of Catholicism.

Government financial aid to the church was a difficult and contentious issue. The church argued that, in return for the subsidy,

the state had received the social, health, and educational services

of tens of thousands of priests and nuns who fulfilled vital functions that the state itself could not have performed. Nevertheless,

the revised Concordat was supposed to replace direct state aid to the church with a scheme that would allow taxpayers to designate

a certain portion of their taxes to be diverted directly to the church.

Through 1985, taxpayers were allowed to deduct up to 10 percent

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The Society and Its Environment

from their taxable income for donations to the Catholic Church.

Partly because of the protests against this arrangement from

representatives of Spain's other religious groups, the tax laws were changed in 1987 so that taxpayers could choose between giving

0.52 percent of their income tax to the church and allocating it to the government's welfare and culture budgets. For three years, the

government would continue to give the church a gradually reduced

subsidy, but after that the church would have to subsist on its own

resources. The government would continue, however, its program

of subsidizing Catholic schools, which in 1987 cost the Spanish tax- payers about US$300 million, exclusive of the salaries of teachers,

which were paid directly by the Ministry of Education and Science

(see Education, this ch.).

Anyone visiting Spain must be constantly aware of the church's

physical presence in buildings, museums, and religious celebrations. In a population of about 39 million, the number of nonCatholics was probably no more than 300,000. About 250,000 of

these were of other Christian faiths, including several Protestant denominations, Jehovah's Witnesses, and Mormons. The number of Jews in Spain was estimated at about 13,000. More than

19 out of every 20 Spaniards were baptized Catholics; about 60 per- cent of them attended Mass; about 30 percent of the baptized

Catholics did so regularly, although this figure declined to about

20 percent in the larger cities. As of 1979, about 97 percent of all marriages were performed according to the Catholic religion. A

1982 report by the church claimed that 83 percent of all children

born the preceding year had been baptized in the church.

Nevertheless, there were forces at work bringing about fundamental changes in the place of the church in society. One such

force was the improvement in the economic fortunes of the great

majority of Spaniards, making society more materialistic and less religious. Another force was the massive shift in population from

farm and village to the growing urban centers, where the church

had less influence over the values of its members. These changes were transforming the way Spaniards defined their religious

identity.

Being a Catholic in Spain had less and less to do with regular

attendance at Mass and more to do with the routine observance

of important rituals such as baptism, marriage, and burial of the

dead. A 1980 survey revealed that, although 82 percent of Spaniards were believers in Catholicism, very few considered themselves to be very good practitioners of the faith. In the case of the youth

of the country, even smaller percentages believed themselves to be

"very good" or "practicing" Catholics.

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Spain: A Country Study

In contrast to an earlier era, when rejection of the church went

along with education, in the late 1980s studies showed that the more

educated a person was, the more likely he or she was to be a practicing Catholic. This new acceptance of the church was due partly

to the church's new self-restraint in politics. In a significant change

from the pre-Civil War era, the church had accepted the need for the separation of religion and the state, and it had even discouraged

the creation of a Christian Democratic party in the country.

The traditional links between the political right and the church no longer dictated political preferences; in the 1982 general election, more than half of the country's practicing Catholics voted for the

PSOE. Although the Socialist leadership professed agnosticism,

according to surveys between 40 and 45 percent of the party's rankand-file members held religious beliefs, and more than 70 percent

of these professed to be Catholics. Among those entering the party

after Franco's death, about half considered themselves Catholic.

One important indicator of the changes taking place in the role of the church was the reduction in the number of Spaniards in Holy

Orders. In 1984 the country had more than 22,000 parish priests,

nearly 10,000 ordained monks, and nearly 75,000 nuns. These

numbers concealed a troubling reality, however. More than 70 per- cent of the diocesan clergy was between the ages of 35 and 65; the

average age of the clergy in 1982 was 49 years. At the upper end

of the age range, the low numbers reflected the impact of the Civil

War, in which more than 4,000 parish priests died. At the lower

end, the scarcity of younger priests reflected the general crisis in

vocations throughout the world, which began to be felt in the 1960s.

Its effects were felt especially acutely in Spain. The crisis was seen

in the decline in the number of young men joining the priesthood

and in the increase in the number of priests leaving Holy Orders.

The number of seminarists in Spain fell from more than 9,000 in

the 1950s to only 1 ,500 in 1979, even though it rose slightly in 1982

to about 1,700.

Changes in the social meaning of religious vocations were perhaps

part of the problem; having a priest in the family no longer seemed

to spark the kind of pride that family members would have felt in

the past. The principal reason in most cases, though, was the

church's continued ban on marriage for priests. Previously, the

crisis was not particularly serious because of the age distribution

of the clergy. As the twentieth century nears an end, however, a

serious imbalance will appear between those entering the priesthood and those leaving it. The effects of this crisis were already

visible in the decline in the number of parish priests in Spain

from 23,620 in 1979 to just over 22,000 by 1983.

114
Salamanca Cathedral

Courtesy James Scofield

Another sign of the church's declining role in Spanish life was

the diminishing importance of the controversial secular religious

institute, Opus Dei (Work of God). Opus Dei was a worldwide

lay religious body that did not adhere to any particular political

philosophy and was allegedly nonpolitical. The organization was

founded in 1928 by a Spanish priest, Jose Maria Escriva de Balaguer

y Albas, as a reaction to the increasing secularization of Spain's

universities, and higher education continued to be one of the insti- tute's foremost priorities. Despite its public commitment to a nonpolitical stance, Opus Dei members rose to occupy key positions

in the Franco regime, especially in the field of economic policymaking in the late 1950s and the early 1960s. Opus Dei members

dominated the group of liberal technocrats who engineered the opening of Spain's autarchic economy after 1957. After the 1973 assas- sination of Prime Minister Luis Carrero Blanco (often rumored

to be an Opus Dei member), however, the influence of the insti- tute declined sharply. The secrecy of the order and its activities and the power of its myth helped it maintain its strong position

of influence in Spain; but there was little doubt that, compared

with the 1950s and the 1960s, Opus Dei had fallen from being one

of the country's chief political organizations to being simply one among many such groups competing for power in an open and

pluralist society (see Political Interest Groups, ch. 4). In the late 1980s, however, the church showed signs of becoming

115
Spain: A Country Study more conservative than liberal. After years of being the minority

in the church hierarchy, conservative Catholic leaders had reas- serted their power and influence, and they were beginning to wrest power from the liberals. One telling indicator of the return of conservatives to control within the church was the battle in late 1987

over the editorial policy of the leading Spanish Catholic weekly

magazine, Vida Nueva, which ended with the liberal editor's being

forced out of office and his being replaced with a conservative.

Education

In the 1980s, Spain spent about 8 percent of its national budget on education. In 1983 education expenditures amounted to only

about US$120 per capita, which placed Spain forty-fifth in the world

in per capita spending on education, far behind most other countries in Western Europe. In the government's 1988 budget, expenditures on education were scheduled to increase by 18 to 20 percent over 1987, to about US$170 per person. Nevertheless, rapid

increases in other areas meant that spending on education declined

as a proportion of the total budget, to about 6.7 percent. This level of expenditure was not only too little in an advanced industrial

society, but it was also distributed in a way that was skewed toward

the expensive private-sector schools.

In the 1970s, the Ministry of Education and Science began to confront the paradox that, although the General Law on Education (Ley General de Educacion—LGE) made primary education

free and obligatory, the reality was that the state could not build

schools or hire teachers fast enough to keep up with the demand.

The consequence was a widening gap between the rising student

population and the number of places available for them. The

solution lay in the short run in state subsidies to private schools

that enabled them to offer basic primary education free or for a reduced fee. Thus, although the government could claim that by

1977 there were enough places in school to go around, in some

major cities, such as Madrid, more than half were provided by pri- vate schools.

By the early 1980s, about 40 percent of all schools were private.

Of these, just over half were run by the Roman Catholic Church

and enrolled some 1 .2 million pupils in primary schools and 230,000

in secondary schools. The remainder of the private schools were

operated as profit-making enterprises by secular owners. The reli- gious schools often were highly regarded, and the instruction they

offered probably was superior to that provided by the state-run

institutions. The other private-sector schools varied greatly in

quality. Although a few were excellent, many others were seriously

116
The Society and Its Environment

underfunded and poorly staffed, so that private secular education was not automatically associated with elite education as was the case in some other West European countries.

Between 1977 and 1982, the government's annual subsidy to private education nearly tripled. As a result, by the time the centerright coalition UCD government left office in late 1982, most

primary schools were free. Unfortunately, this policy had to be paid

for by drawing on funds available for state schools, with a conse- quent loss of teachers and instructional quality in the public system.

The Socialist government that came to power in 1982 sought

to soften the conflict between private (largely Catholic) schools and

public schools by integrating the private schools into the country's

overall education system. To accomplish this goal, in 1984 the

government passed the Organic Law on the Right to Education

(Ley Organica del Derecho a la Educacion—LODE), which established three categories of schools. Free public schools were accountable to either the Ministry of Education and Science or to the

governments of the autonomous communities. Instruction was subject to the principles of the Constitution, in that it had to be ideologically neutral and it had to respect diverse religious beliefs. The

second category, private schools, usually secular, could be organized

by any person or group as long as constitutional limits were

observed. These schools were to receive no state assistance so that

all costs were borne by the students' families. The third category,

mixed schools, usually religious, were financed by the state. Nevertheless, the director and the faculty were chosen by a school

council, or consejo escolar (pi. , consejos escolares), made up of representatives of the school's diverse constituencies, including parents and

faculty. Although the state did not try to control this subsidized

sector, the consejos were a clear signal that it intended increased

democratization in this all important realm of society. In all three

models, students enjoyed the right not to receive instruction that

violated their religious beliefs. As a result of these educational reforms, during the two decades

after 1965 Spain had made great strides, enrolling essentially the

entire population in the age-group of the primary grades and reducing the country's illiteracy to a nominal 3 to 6 percent. The really

impressive gains, however, were in the secondary grades and in

higher education, especially for women. In 1965 only 38 percent

of Spain's youth were enrolled in secondary schools, one of the

lowest percentages in Western Europe and only about 60 percent

of the average of all advanced industrial countries. Only 29 per- cent of the country's females, less than half the industrial countries' average, were enrolled in the secondary grades. By 1985, an

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Spain: A Country Study

estimated 89 percent of all students and 9 1 percent of females were

attending secondary schools. These figures conformed to the aver- age of the industrial democracies and were noticeably higher than

those in Italy, Britain, or Sweden. At the university level, enroll- ment more than quadrupled in percentage terms, from 6 percent

in 1965 to 26 percent in 1985, a level about 30 percent lower than

the industrial countries' average, but still higher than that of Britain or Switzerland. In 1980 women constituted 40 percent of university

enrollment (48 percent in 1984), a level only four to six percentage

points behind France, Belgium, and Italy.

Nevertheless, in terms of the school-age population per teacher,

Spain still ranked forty- seventh in the world, and in terms of the

percentage of school-age population in school, it ranked twentysecond. In this area, demographics were working in favor of Spain's

educational planners, however. Spain's "baby boom" lasted about

a decade longer—until the mid-1970s—than similar phenomena did

in the rest of Europe, but after 1977 the birth rate fell at a faster rate than it did in any other country in Western Europe. As a result,

planners expected that the school population pressures of the 1960s

and the 1970s would soon abate, giving the country's educational

system some much-needed breathing space. The minister of education and science through most of the 1980s,

Jose Maria Maravall Herrero, has written that the country's educational system must fulfill four important functions: to promote the

cohesion of the nation (i.e., cultural integration); to contribute to the integration of society (i.e., social integration); to foster equality

of opportunity (i.e., economic integration); and to socialize citizens to hold democratic values (i.e., political integration). Spanish politi- cal elites recognized that, despite the remarkable political and eco- nomic transformation of their country, they were still presiding over a society split by cultural, social, economic, and political differences

that had endured for generations. The country's educational sys- tem did little to overcome these divisions until the restoration of

democracy; since then, education has become one of the principal

instruments in national integration.

Primary and Secondary Education

From 1970 until 1984, Spain's education system was based entirely on the LGE, often referred to as the Villar Palasi Law after the

minister of education and science at the time, Jose Luis Villar Palasi. This law was the Franco government's attempt to modernize Spain's

public education system. Although it has been added to, and modified by, the LODE since the return of democracy, the structure it established was still nearly completely intact in the

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The Society and Its Environment

late 1980s (see fig. 9). The law provided that primary education

(Educacion General Basica—EGB) would be free and compulsory

from the ages of six to fourteen. In the 1986-87 school year, there were about 185,000 primary institutions that provided instruction

to about 6.6 million students, 70 percent of whom were in state schools. Secondary education (Bachillerato Unificado Polivalente

BUP) lasted from age fourteen to sixteen and terminated in the

state graduation examination, the bachillerato. Those who completed

the bachillerato could then enroll in an additional one-year program

(Curso de Orientacion Universitaria—COU) to prepare themselves

for the university entrance exams. In the 1986-87 school year, more

than 2,600 secondary schools enrolled about 1 .2 million students.

Studies at all institutions were organized around an academic year

that ran from about mid-September to the middle or latter part

of June.

Secondary school attendance was optional, but if students did not go on to secondary school, they had to enroll in vocational training

for the period when they were fifteen to sixteen years of age. Students in the vocational program (Formacion Professional—FP) generally completed their studies with an equivalent exam, the labor

bachillerato. In the 1986-87 school year, about 2,200 vocational centers provided instruction to more than 700,000 students. The FP was

divided into two two-year phases. The first, which was obligatory

for everyone who did not enter the BUP, provided a general introduction to applied vocations, such as clerical work or electronics,

while the second phase offered more specialized vocational training. Special education for the physically and the mentally impaired was provided in schools run by both state and private organizations.

Perhaps sensing that this model of education imposed a choice

between academic and vocational studies on children at too young

an age, the government began to experiment in the 1980s with an

alternate model that kept students on a single, unified track until

the age of sixteen. An equally troublesome aspect of the system,

however, was the irreversibility of the choice between BUP and

FP. Once a student had chosen the FP program, it was impossible

to go on to the university, so many youngsters chose the BUP even

if, at the time, they were more suited for vocational training or were better able to use the more practical skills taught in the FP.

This dimension of the educational system, plus the traditional dis- dain of many Spaniards toward manual labor, caused the BUP to enroll nearly twice as many students as the FP. Observers believed,

however, that if the economic cramp of the 1980s continued to shrink the job market, the balance might shift toward the FP

because the acquisition of a marketable skill might look more

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Spain: A Country Study

GRADUATE

STUDY

School Year

18

17 UNIVERSITY

UNIVERSITY

SCHOOLS

COLLEGE PREPARATORY

ACADEMIC

HIGH SCHOOL

SPECIALIZED

VOCATIONAL SCHOOL

FIRST-LEVEL

VOCATIONAL SCHOOL

BASIC

GENERAL EDUCATION

PRESCHOOL

Figure 9. Spain's Education System in the 1980s

important than the gaining of academic qualifications. Indeed,

between the 1979-80 and 1986-87 academic years, enrollment in the vocational programs increased nearly 35 percent (from 515,000

to 695,000), while enrollment in the academic program grew by

only about 8 percent (from 1.055 million to 1.142 million).

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The Society and Its Environment

Another major problem with Spanish education was the continued high failure rate. The standards set for graduation from the

EGB were not especially demanding, yet between one-fifth and onethird of all students failed to complete the course of study. Failure

rates ran much higher in state schools than in private institutions.

Critics blamed principally the poor quality of instruction and thus,

indirectly, teacher training. In 1981 the government published a

revised EGB curriculum that set forth goals for both teachers and

students. This revised curriculum was not adopted easily or without

resistance, and there were those who argued that it was too rigid

and centralized and that it placed too much emphasis on rote memory.

The uneven spread of nursery schools contributed to the high

failure rate in later years. In the 1960s and the 1970s, pre-school

education began to gain in popularity to such an extent that, in

the mid-1980s, some 80 percent of Spain's children between the

ages of four and six went to nursery schools (1.3 million in 1986-87).

Many primary teachers thus assumed that their students had completed a year or two of pre-school education. About one-third of

the 39,000 nursery schools in operation in the 1986-87 school year were still in the private sector, however, and the public nurseries were little more than day-care centers. The effect was to create a disadvantaged student population right from the beginning—one

that was likely to persist for many years and to continue to contribute to the high failure rate within the system. The solution

universal, public- supported pre-schools—was not a likely prospect

as of the late 1980s.

Another source of deficiencies in the public educational system was the low pay teachers received. Even though teachers' salaries were raised by more than 40 percent between 1983 and 1985, in

1988 the average salary for teachers in the public schools at both

the elementary and the secondary levels was still only about

US$15,000 per year. In 1988 more than 200,000 teachers went

out on strike to gain a 14 percent pay increase that would have

raised their monthly salary by about US$175. The government put

down the strike after street demonstrations led to extensive violence.

Higher Education

In the late 1980s, Spain had thirty-four universities, four of which

were run by the Catholic Church (three by Jesuits and one by Opus

Dei). Although the Catholic universities enrolled only 30,000 of

the country's 900,000 students, they were highly regarded, especially by conservative, middle-class Spaniards, and therefore they

exerted an influence in higher education far out of proportion to

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Spain: A Country Study

their size. The two largest and most respected state universities,

the Complutense in Madrid, which by the late 1980s enrolled about

100,000 undergraduates, and the Central in Barcelona, which had

about 80,000, together accounted for almost 20 percent of all university students.

Until the 1980s, the universities were under the direct control

of the central government's Ministry of Education and Science.

In 1983 the Socialist government passed the Law on University

Reform (Ley de Reforma Universitaria-—LRU), which weakened

central government control over universities and gave increased

autonomy to each public university. Universities were relatively

free to offer new programs and to restructure themselves internally

so long as they met the qualifications imposed on all state universities. The law also weakened (at least on paper) the control of the

universities that had been exercised by the catedrdticos, the senior

professors who held the highly prestigious chairs in each department. The new law provided that control of the universities would

shift to the claustro constituyente or university council made up of

professors of all ranks, as well as administrators, staff, and occasionally, for certain purposes, students.

The university system offered two distinct tracks that emphasized either academic or vocational subjects. Students could pursue a five-year or a six-year course of study in the liberal and

professional programs offered by the conventional facultades (pi.;

sing. ,facultad) or departments, or a three-year program at the escuelas

universitarias, which offered training in nursing, teaching, and other

less elite professions. Not surprisingly, the degrees offered by the

escuelas usually had a lower status than those given in the more tradi- tional academic programs.

Spain's universities grew even more rapidly during the 1960s

than the elementary and secondary schools; enrollments increased

from 77,000 to 241,000 between 1960 and 1972. The 1970 General

Law on Education prescribed that each student completing the

bachillerato course should have a university place available to him

or to her, but by the mid-1970s the government reintroduced

entrance exams to slow the explosive growth of the university sys- tem. Growth continued nevertheless, and by the 1986-87 academic

year, the universities enrolled about 900,000 students. Of these,

about two-thirds were studying in the traditionalfacultades and the

rest, in the more applied programs in the escuelas. In the late 1980s, Spain had the second highest ratio of university students to population in Western Europe, yet spending per

student was only one-third of the West European average, leading to poorly paid faculty (the average university professor earned

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The Society and Its Environment

only slightly more than US$21,000 per year) and inadequate

facilities, such as laboratories and libraries. Only a few of the more

modern universities had student residences or dormitories; students

at the older, urban universities lived at home or in apartments with

other students. Instruction emphasized rote memory rather than

independent analysis, and university faculties rarely combined

research and teaching. In addition, the university system seemed

poorly attuned to the needs of the rest of the country because it was preparing far too many young people for career fields already

filled to overflowing (medicine, for example) and far too few for the jobs needed in an advanced industrial society, such as those

involving computers and information science.

To a much greater degree than was true for elementary and

secondary education, higher education tended to perpetuate longstanding social cleavages. Writing in 1985, Minister of Education

and Science Maravall observed that 10 years earlier, 66 percent

of the children of university-educated parents were able to attend

university, while only 3 percent of the children of parents with just a primary education had had this opportunity. In 1980 children

of parents in the upper education levels were twenty-eight times more likely to enter a university than were children of unskilled

workers. Even after a decade of education reform, most university

students depended completely on their parents for support through

the end of their studies. The country's high unemployment rate, as well as the tradition that university students did not work while

completing their studies, meant that few students could pay their

own education costs. The country still lacked programs of scholarships and student subsidies that would enable education expenses

to be borne by society as a whole. The result was that a university

education was largely the privilege of the middle and the upper

classes. To some degree, the same was true of the place of women

in higher education. Although in 1984 about 47 percent of the country's university enrollment was female (a figure higher than that

in most other countries in Western Europe), relatively few women

went on to become university professors. The majority of universityeducated women continued to pursue the professions traditionally

open to them, especially pharmacy, journalism, and teaching at the elementary and the secondary levels. Health and Welfare

According to several summary measures of social welfare, Spain

could best be described as being at the low end of the list of advanced

industrial countries. One such measure is the Physical Quality of

Life Index (PQLI) developed by the Overseas Development Council,

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Spain: A Country Study

an average of three indices—life expectancy, infant mortality, and

literacy. In 1980, on a scale of from 1 to 100, Iceland, Japan, the

Netherlands, and Sweden all ranked at the top with scores of 98;

Spain was twenty-eighth out of 1 64 countries—between Puerto Rico

and Bulgaria—with a score of 92. Another measure, the Index of

Net Social Progress (INSP), developed by Dr. Richard Estes of

the University of Pennsylvania, uses data from eleven subindices,

including education, health, the status of women, and welfare. On

this scale, Spain, with a score of 122 for the 1979-80 period, ranked

thirty- seventh out of 107 countries, quite far behind most other

West European countries and comparable to several advanced Third

World states, such as Mexico and Argentina. This lower rating

stemmed from Spain's poor score in the Cultural Diversity Subindex, where ethnic and linguistic fragmentation caused Spain to

fall in the ratings.

Health Conditions and Mortality

On a number of indicators of health care, Spain ranked fairly

high among the advanced industrial countries. In both 1965 and

1981, the country had a better population-to-physician ratio than

the average of the industrial democracies (800 to 1 versus 860 to

1, respectively, in 1965 and 360 to 1 versus 530 to 1, respectively,

in 1981). In 1983, with more than 115,000 physicians, Spain ranked

sixth in the world in its ratio of inhabitants to physicians. Despite

dramatic strides in adding nursing personnel (causing a decline in

the population-to-nurse ratio of from 1,220 to 1 to 280 to 1 in less than 20 years), the country remained near the bottom of the list of advanced industrial countries on this scale. Spain also ranked

below most other West European countries in per capita public

expenditures on health care—only US$220 per person in 1983. In

1981 there were in Spain slightly more than 1,000 hospitals and

about 194,000 beds, or about 5.4 beds per 1,000 population.

As these figures suggest, the provision of health care in Spain was highly uneven. Even with a high ratio of doctors to inhabitants, the country had still not managed to eradicate such diseases

as tuberculosis (more than 9,000 cases in 1983) and typhoid (5,500

cases); and there were still even a few new cases of leprosy reported

each year. The root of this problem seems to be the maldistribution

of the health care resources of the state's welfare system. Hospitals

in one area of the country might be seriously understaffed, while

those in other regions lay virtually empty. By and large, the worst- served areas were the workers' suburbs near large cities. One press report cited the neighborhood of Vallecas, near Madrid, where

a population of 700,000 had no hospital at all and had only

124
3 doctors in residence, who were reduced to seeing patients at the

rate of 1 per minute. A principal reason for understaffing was the

system of multiple hospital assignments arranged by physicians to augment their salaries. Although regulations prohibited this practice, many doctors arranged to be on duty at more than one hospital

at a time, thereby reducing their effectiveness in meeting patient

needs.

In terms of the causes of death, Spain fairly closely resembled

other advanced industrial societies, although cancer and heart

disease appeared less frequently in Spain than in more industrialized countries. Of the nearly 290,000 deaths registered in 1980,

almost half (45 . 8 percent) were due to a variety of circulatory sys- tem problems, principally heart attacks and strokes. The single most

prevalent cause of death was malignant neoplasms; about one-fifth

(20.2 percent) of all deaths were caused by cancer of one sort or

another. About one-tenth (9.2 percent) of all deaths were occasioned

by respiratory ailments. (Spaniards were the second heaviest smokers in the European Community—EC, after Greeks. About 40 per- cent of adults smoked, as did 50 percent of teenagers; the average

14-year-old reportedly smoked 2,700 cigarettes a year.) About

2 percent of deaths were caused by automobile accidents, and about

0.5 percent, by suicides.

In the third quarter of 1987, there were 112 cases of acquired

immune deficiency syndrome (AIDS) reported in Spain, bringing

125
Spain: A Country Study

to 620 the total number of Spaniards afflicted by this disease.

Although high, the Spanish figure was still less than half that of

France, and it was far behind the more than 40,000 cases in the

United States. Slightly more than half the AIDS victims contracted

the disease through narcotics-related practices; about one-fifth, from

homosexual contact; and about one-tenth were hemophiliacs.

During the 1960s and the 1970s, Spain achieved dramatic gains

in reducing infant mortality. Between 1965 and 1985, the infant

mortality rate dropped from being the highest among the industrial market economies, 38 per 1,000, to only 10 per 1,000 in 1985,

which placed it ninth lowest in the world, on a par with other

advanced industrial societies. The death rate for children less than

1 year old declined from slightly fewer than 13 per 1,000 in 1975

to fewer than 9 per 1 ,000 in 1979, and for children less than 5 years

of age, it declined from 15 per 1,000 to fewer than 10 per 1,000

in the same period.

Spain also registered some improvement in food consumption

during the 1960s and the 1970s, with per capita caloric supply growing by about 1 percent per year (from 2,844 in 1965 to 3,358 in 1985). In 1983 Spain ranked twenty-ninth in the world in calorie

supply per capita. Spaniards daily consumed more calories than, or about the same number of calories as, the residents of Britain,

France, Finland, Japan, Sweden, or Norway.

Public Safety and Environmental Problems

The reform and improvement of the country's food regulations

and inspection procedures were long overdue. In 1981 Spain experienced a major public health disaster, a

1 'toxic syndrome" still unexplained, but believed to be connected with the consumption

of rapeseed oil intended for industrial use, but marketed by doorto-door salesmen as olive oil. More than 300 people died from this substance, and hundreds more were permanently disabled.

The rapeseed tragedy was only one of a number of man-made

or man-aggravated disasters that Spain has experienced since it crossed the threshold into industrial society. Airplane crashes, train

derailments, bus collisions, hotel fires, gas explosions—these and

other tragedies were nearly commonplace in Spain. Far more people

died in train accidents in Spain, for example, than in any other

country in Europe. Spain suffered these disasters largely because

of a combination of the advanced technology of an industrializing

and urbanizing society, low standards of professional competence

and private sector morality (themselves the product of rapid

growth), and the state's unwillingness or inability to step in to regulate this increasingly sophisticated and complex society. Two

126
The Society and Its Environment

problems of special importance can be cited here: public health and

environmental contamination.

As the rapeseed tragedy illustrates, one of the chief problems

in the public health field had to do with food and drink inspection

and regulation. Although food containers and additives were analyzed by government chemists, the food and drink themselves were

not tested before being put on sale. One report on the subject in

the mid-1980s estimated that, in the whole of Spain, there were

fewer than 1,000 people working full-time to check the quality of

the food and drink in the 225,000 places where they were manufactured, distributed, sold, and consumed. Another check of the 3,000

restaurants, bars, and hotels in Madrid found that 35 percent of

the wine, 41 percent of the spirits, and 75 percent of the milk and

ice were unfit for human consumption.

Rapid and uncontrolled industrialization and urbanization had

left a legacy of air, water, and noise pollution that would take a major

government effort many years to correct. The rivers flowing through

Spain's major cities, such as Madrid or Bilbao, were little more than

open sewers. One survey of Bilbao's Rio Nervion showed that 385

factories dumped their untreated effluents into it, and that the oxygen

content was only 5 percent compared with the 60 percent needed

to sustain fish. In Madrid, air pollution was a major problem during the late 1970s and the early 1980s, when the suspended particle

count reached an average of more than 200 micrograms per cubic

meter of air, compared with the government's recommended maximum level of 80. Bilbao's atmospheric carbon dioxide level was the

highest of all the cities in Western Europe. Air pollution was a problem, because of the heavy automobile traffic (in the late 1970s

only seven countries in the world had more registered passenger cars than Spain), oil-fired space heating, and heavy industry.

Although there had been significant improvement in environmental protection in such large cities as Bilbao and Madrid in the

late 1980s, the mid-sized industrial cities around the country were

still experiencing rising populations and pollution at alarming rates. According to a 1987 study by the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), Spain was one of Europe's

noisiest countries, principally because there were no regulations

covering industrial or automobile noise levels. In late 1987, the

Ministry of Public Works and City Planning finally drafted several

government decrees that, for the first time, set maximum noise

levels for industrial and construction machinery, motorcycles, and

automobiles, and established new regulations in building codes that would require soundproofing for residences, hospitals, schools, and

cultural centers. A survey of 226 firms in Madrid showed that

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Spain: A Country Study

60 percent of their 165,000 employees were working in noise higher

than government-approved limits. In 1988 a government report

revealed that Spanish industry was producing 1,700,000 tons of

toxic waste material each year, of which only 240,000 tons could

be disposed of by burning. When the international agency, the Oslo

Convention, denied Spain the right to dump some of these wastes

in the North Sea, the government had to store thousands of tons

of highly toxic chemicals in warehouses along the coast of the Bay

of Biscay because there was no way that they could be released into

the environment safely.

Housing

Housing was another area in which Spaniards had to respond

to the challenges of dramatic change. During the late 1950s and

the 1960s, about 14 percent of the total population changed resi- dence permanently from one part of the country to another, and

most of these people lacked suitable housing. One of the most press- ing challenges of the government and of the private sector was to find or to build housing for these millions of uprooted people. The

government became involved in housing policy relatively late and

then only as a source of subsidy for the private sector. The government's 1961 National Housing Plan called for the construction of

4 million new dwellings by 1976. In the hope that home ownership would help dilute the working-class radicalism that had fueled

the economic crises of the 1930s, most of these dwellings were to be for sale, not for rent. About half of these residences were built

and were financed through the unsubsidized private sector; for most

of the remainder, the government subsidized only the lending insti- tution. Thus, government-owned housing accounted for only a very

small percentage of the total number of dwellings.

The private construction sector surpassed the target of 4 million new dwellings. In every major city of Spain, slums were

replaced by high-rise apartment buildings that ringed the older town

centers. Despite this building boom, however, by the time the wave

of urban migration had subsided in the 1970s, there were still about

1.5 million people without homes, and the figure was about 230,000

as of the 1981 census. The government's housing policy had

produced millions of new homes, but, by relying entirely on the

private sector to produce them, the government ensured that new

construction would be directed principally toward the growing middle class because there were greater profits to be made on large,

expensive dwellings than there were on small, modest ones. The

government attempted to offset these market forces by placing ceil- ings on sale prices and on the size of units to be subsidized, but

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The Society and Its Environment

the limits they imposed were so high that they did little to enlarge

the market for cheap working-class housing. Not only was housing scarce, but much of it was in poor condition. According to the

1980 housing census, of the 6.5 million buildings tallied, one-fifth

(1.3 million) had been built before 1900 and another one-fifth,

between 1900 and 1940. Only 37 percent could be considered to be relatively modern, having been constructed since 1961. About

70 percent of the available buildings were classified as being in good

condition, but nearly 10 percent were categorized as being seri- ously run down and in need of repair. Some 90 percent of the buildings had running water and indoor toilets, and 94 percent had

electricity; but only 20 percent had central hot water service, and

only 4 percent had central heating.

The Socialist government elected in 1982 estimated that the country's housing stock must be increased by between 250,000 and

310,000 units each year, if all citizens were to have their own homes

by the early 1990s. Still, only about 10 percent of the new dwellings were to be government-built; 200,000 units would continue

to be built, financed, and sold, annually, through the private sector. Nevertheless, by the late 1980s many believed that the housing crisis was substantially over, and that Spaniards were within a decade of achieving their goal of minimally acceptable dwellings

for all. In terms of quality, however, the people had to continue

to live with the legacy of the 1960s construction boom—huge,

impersonal apartment complexes; shoddy construction and high

maintenance costs; and high purchase costs—for the foreseeable

future.

Government Health and Welfare Programs

Following the reform of the government's social services in 1978,

all social security benefits were under the supervision of the Ministry

of Labor and Social Security. In addition, the Ministry of Health

and Consumer Affairs was responsible for public health and health

education programs. In the government's 1988 budget, these programs were allocated about US$22.5 billion, a 9 percent increase over 1987 and about 23.3 percent of the total budget.

Except for unemployment benefits, most social security programs were administered under a single set of institutions created by the

1978 reform to replace the patchwork system of unions, insurance

companies, mutual aid associations, and state-run programs that

had evolved in haphazard fashion throughout the century. These

institutions were not the only weFare system, but they did cover about 80 percent of the population, and they offered a complete

range of welfare benefits, including cash payments, medical care,

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Spain: A Country Study

and social services. The programs were administered by three

government agencies, together with the General Social Security

Treasury, which was responsible for financial control. Cash payments were administered by the National Social Security Institute

(Instituto Nacional de Seguridad Social—INSS); medical care, by

the National Health Institute (Instituto Nacional de Salud

INSALUD); and social services, by the National Institute for Social

Services (Instituto Nacional de Servicios Sociales—INSERSO).

After the advent of the autonomous community system, several

autonomous governments sought to have responsibility for social security transferred to their jurisdictions. The health care responsibilities of INSALUD were transferred to the regional government

of Catalonia in 1982 and to that of Andalusia in 1983. The Basque

Country and Valencia were scheduled to receive their authority

in the health field in 1988.

As of 1984, residents had access to a fairly comprehensive program of health insurance coverage, paid for by joint contributions

from workers and employers; the state added a subsidy to cover

deficits. Sickness benefits ranged between 60 and 75 percent of

covered earnings, and maternity benefits amounted to 75 percent

of covered earnings, paid both 6 weeks before, and 8 weeks after,

childbirth. Medical services of all kinds were provided to patients

directly through state-run hospitals and clinics, or through insti- tutions under contract to the state. Pension insurance or retire- ment coverage was available to all employees in industry, including

the service industry, and to their dependents. Benefits were financed

by workers, employers, and the state under the same general scheme

as that used for health insurance. There were separate systems in

effect for sectors that were difficult to cover in this way, including

farm workers, domestic servants, seamen, public employees,

miners, and so forth. Old-age pensions were payable in most cases

at age sixty-five, and they constituted 50 percent of covered earnings (the average of the highest-paid two of the last seven years)

plus 2 percent per year of contributions made from eleven to thirty- five years, up to a maximum of 100 percent. Pensions—usually

reduced to a certain percentage of the original pension, but equalling

100 percent under certain conditions—were also payable to sur- vivors of the covered worker.

Unemployment insurance has been available in Spain since 1919,

but the state has provided benefits to those out of work only since

1961. Insured workers contributed between 1.1 and 6.3 percent

of covered earnings according to twelve occupational classes, while

employers contributed between 5.2 and 6.3 percent of payroll, and

the state added a variable subsidy. Benefits covered the insured

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The Society and Its Environment

for up to twenty-four months under normal circumstances, and

they could range between 60 and 80 percent of covered earnings.

Only about 60 percent of the registered unemployed received

benefits, however, because the law excluded short-term and casual

employees as well as those seeking their first jobs and because

agricultural workers were covered under a special program.

During the 1980s, the state's share of funding for social security

programs expanded rapidly, while the proportion contributed by

employers and employees declined correspondingly. In the 1970s,

the state was contributing only 5 percent; however, by the 1980s

the figure had risen to more than 20 percent, still quite low by West

European standards. Many employers complained because of the

relatively high proportion (85 percent) that they had to contribute

to the non-state portion of social security funding; some even fal- sified records or refused to make the payments, leaving their

employees without benefits. Slightly less than two-thirds of social security expenditures were paid out in cash benefits, principally

in the form of pensions to the aged, widows, orphans, and the dis- abled. The remaining third was spent on health, on social services,

and, in small part, on administration.

As in many other advanced industrial countries, Spain's welfare system was under increasing financial pressure throughout the

1980s. This was due in part to the country's economic distress,

which created the dual pressures of declining contributions and tax

receipts on the one hand, and increased claims for unemployment

assistance on the other. Another important reason was the decline

of the extended family, which in earlier times had absorbed part

of the cost of helping unemployed or distressed family members.

However, the main reason was that, like those in other Western

countries, Spain's population was aging rapidly and therefore the

state had to pay more and more in old-age pensions. These pensions tended to be quite generous, the highest, in fact, after Sweden's, in Western Europe. Between 1972 and 1982, the number of pensioners rose by an average of 184,000 each year. By 1983,

when there were 4.7 million pensioners, for every beneficiary of

the pension program there were only 2.3 contributors, compared

with an average of 5 in the rest of Western Europe. Thus, in the

1980s, officials began to talk seriously about the possibility of the

bankruptcy of the old-age pension system. The private sector needed

to become more heavily involved through private pension plans,

but in the late 1980s, legislation that would make these plans possible had failed to win government approval. In a country where

the elderly have traditionally been held in high esteem and have

generally been well treated, the dramatic aging of the population

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Spain: A Country Study

was still a relatively new experience that would greatly affect public policies as well as the country's social values. In 1982 there were

only 62 homes for the elderly, and these cared for some 12,500

persons; by 1986 the number of centers had increased by approximately 16 percent, to 72, and the number of elderly residents had

increased by 25 percent, to about 15,700. Also in 1982, some 385

day-care centers provided services to about 1.1 million elderly; by

1986, just four years later, the number of these centers had increased

by 13 percent to 435, and the number of elderly served by them

had increased by 55 percent, to about 1.7 million. In this same four- year period, government expenditures on social services for the

elderly rose by 87 percent, direct payments to the elderly rose by more than 170 percent, and investments in facilities for the aged

increased by 160 percent. It was clear that these figures would continue to increase well into the twenty-first century, raising the highly

controversial political question of who would bear this fiscal burden.

* * *

Spain's transition to an advanced industrial democracy has been

amply documented in a number of excellent books, most of which

deal with the politics of the transition. Two recent works, however,

stand out as readable accounts of the social transformation as well. Both are by British journalists who lived in Spain for a number

of years during the transition. John Hooper's book, The Spaniards:

A Portrait of the New Spain, contains a lengthy section on the regional

and the ethnic problems of contemporary Spain, while Robert Graham's book, Spain: A Nation Comes ofAge, focuses primarily on the

rise of the country's middle class and on important institutions.

Also helpful are: Spain: The Root and the Flower by John Crow and

Spain: A Guide to Political and Economic Institutions by Peter Donaghy

and Michael Newton.

Several American cultural anthropologists have written books on Spanish culture in recent years, thereby increasing greatly our

understanding of life in rural and small-town Spain. The principal

of these works are William Douglass's Echalar and Murelaga: Opportunity and Rural Exodus in Two Spanish Basque Villages, Susan Free- man's The Pasiegos: Spaniards in No Man 's Land, and David Gilmore's

Aggression and Community: Paradoxes ofAndalusian Culture. The politics

and culture of Spain's ethnic groups have been dealt with by several

American political scientists, including these: Robert Clark, The

Basques: The Franco Years and Beyond; Oriol Pi-Sunyer, Nationalism

and Societal Integration: A Focus on Catalonia; and Kathryn Woolard,

The Politics of Language and Ethnicity in Barcelona.

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The Society and Its Environment

Several Spanish sociologists have produced significant studies

of key elements of the Spanish transformation, of which the most

readable and important are: Salustiano del Campo and Manuel

Navarro, Nuevo andlisis de la poblacion espanola; Salustiano del Campo,

Manuel Navarro, and J. Felix Tezanos, La cuestion regional espanola; Amando de Miguel, Manual de estructura social de Espana; and

Amando de Miguel, Recursos humanos, closes, y regiones en Espana.

The standard work on Spanish geography, now in its fifth edition,

is by Manuel de Teran, L. Sole Sabaris, and J. Vila Valenti,

Geografia regional de Espana.

Finally, for those who wish to remain abreast of current affairs in Spain, an accessible and readable periodical that covers Spain

fairly regularly is The Economist, published in London. For those

able to read Spanish, the best source is the international edition

of El Pais, published weekly in Madrid. (For further information

and complete citations, see Bibliography.)

133

Chapter 3. The Economy
Workers in an olive orchard
IN THE MID-1980S, Spain's per capita gross domestic product

ranked low among the industrial countries represented in the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, though well ahead of such nations as Greece, Yugoslavia, and Portugal. In the

latter half of the decade, however, the Spanish economy entered

a phase of strong expansion and employment.

Spain was a latecomer to economic and industrial modernization. Early in the twentieth century, economic progress was made

in fitful starts, but in the 1960s the process of renewal began in earnest. Before then, the Spanish economy was one of the most

underdeveloped in Western Europe, and it was sometimes characterized as a Third World economy. A spectacular period of growth

and modernization during the 1960s and the early 1970s profoundly

transformed the Spanish economy, bringing it much closer to the

West European consumer society prototype. However, in late 1975,

when the authoritarian rule of Francisco Franco y Bahamonde (in

power, 1939-75) came to an end, and democratic processes were

restored, there were huge increases in the price of imported oil upon

which Spain was heavily dependent for its energy needs. Vigorous

economic expansion was replaced by recession, stagnation, and a dizzying increase in the number of unemployed wage earners. The Socialist government, headed by Felipe Gonzalez Marquez,

that came to power in late 1982 —the first post-Franco government

with an absolute parliamentary majority—was committed to a pro- gram of industrial renewal and economic modernization and, at the same time, to lowering the rate of inflation. Under its guidance,

in the second half of the 1980s the economy experienced a growth

rate and a level of foreign capital investment that were the highest

in Europe. Budget deficits were reduced, inflation was lowered,

foreign currency reserves were greatly increased, private enterprise

enjoyed record profits, and consumer spending grew. A major

accomplishment during this period was the liquidation of excess personnel and overcapacity in key industries, such as steel and shipbuilding, and the redirection of substantial capital resources to more

promising high-technology industries.

Despite the excellent economic performance of the late 1980s,

the Gonzalez government was unable to reduce an unemployment

rate that was then the highest among the members of the European

Community (EC—see Glossary). The number of workers employed

as a result of the economic boom was equivalent to the number

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Spain: A Country Study

of new entrants into the labor market, so that the boom only marginally reduced the number of job seekers. A mitigating circumstance, however, was that although the official unemployment rate was 20 percent, perhaps as many as one-third of those registered

as unemployed were working in the "underground economy."

Spain's accession to the EC on January 1, 1986, was a driving

force behind the country's accelerated modernization effort. Under

the terms of its entry into the EC, Spain was required to adapt

to EC norms and regulations, over a period of seven years. The

EC plan to eliminate existing barriers to trade, employment, and

the flow of capital throughout the EC by the end of 1992 was still another impetus. Observers believed that, barring unforeseeable

adverse developments in the international economic situation, by

the year 2000 Spain would at last closely resemble its neighbors,

who, for most of the twentieth century, had been socially and eco- nomically more advanced.

Character and Development of the Economy

Economic historians generally agree that during the nineteenth

century and well into the twentieth, at a time when Western Europe was engaged in its great economic transformation, Spain "missed

the train of the industrial revolution." Much of the chronic social

and political turmoil that took place in Spain during this period can in large measure be attributed to the great difficulties the country encountered in striving for economic modernization. Throughout this period, Spanish social and economic development lagged

far behind the levels attained by the industrializing countries of

Western Europe. Spain's economic "take-off" began belatedly during the 1950s and reached its height during the 1960s and the early

1970s. A second cycle of economic expansion began in the mid1980s, and if this one continues, it might catapult Spain into the

company of Western Europe's more advanced industrial societies. At the beginning of the twentieth century, Spain was still mostly

rural; modern industry existed only in the textile mills of Catalonia

(Spanish, Catalufia; Catalan, Catalunya) and in the metallurgical

plants of the Basque provinces (see fig. 1). Even with the stimulus

of World War I, only in Catalonia and in the two principal Basque

provinces, Vizcaya and Guipuzcoa, did the value of manufacturing output in 1920 exceed that of agricultural production. Agricultural productivity was low compared with that of other West

European countries because of a number of deficiencies—backward

technology, lack of large irrigation projects, inadequate rural credit

facilities, and outmoded land-tenure practices. Financial institu- tions were relatively undeveloped. The Bank of Spain (Banco de

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The Economy

Espana) was still privately owned, and its public functions were

restricted to currency issuance and the provision of funds for state

activities. The state largely limited itself to such traditional activities as defense and the maintenance of order and justice. Road building, education, and a few welfare activities were the only public

services that had any appreciable impact on the economy.

Considerable economic progress was made during World War

I and in the 1920s, particularly during the regime of Miguel Primo

de Rivera (1923-30). The Primo de Rivera government initiated

important public works projects, including construction of new highways, irrigation facilities, and modernization of the railroad sys- tem. It also made a start on reforestation programs. Industry and

mining were growing, and there was an average annual increase

in the industrial and mining index of 6.4 percent between 1922

and 1931. An income tax, however ineffectively collected, was intro- duced in 1926, and a number of new banks were started with state backing, to invest in projects considered to have national interest. Certain economic functions were turned over to private monopolistic operations—of which the most important was the petroleum dis- tribution company, Compama Arrendataria del Monopolio de

Petroleos (CAMPSA); others, such as transportation, were put

under state control.

These steps toward a modern economic structure were slowed

drastically by the political turmoil of the period, which culminated

in the Spanish Civil War, and they were further exacerbated by

the worldwide depression of the early 1930s. When the Civil War

broke out in 1936, it eliminated what litde chance Spain might have

had to recover from the economic malaise of the period (see The

Spanish Civil War, ch. 1). The Franco Era, 1939-75

Spain emerged from the Civil War with formidable economic

problems. Gold and foreign exchange reserves had been virtually

wiped out, and the neglect and devastation of war had reduced

the productive capacity of both industry and agriculture. To com- pound the difficulties, even if the wherewithal had existed to purchase imports, the outbreak of World War II rendered many needed

supplies unavailable. The end of the war did not improve Spain's

plight because of subsequent global shortages of foodstuffs, raw

materials, and peacetime industrial products. Spain's European

neighbors faced formidable reconstruction problems of their own,

and, because of their awareness that the Nationalist victory in the

Spanish Civil War had been achieved with the help of Adolf Hitler

and Benito Mussolini, they had little inclination to include Spain

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Spain: A Country Study

in any multilateral recovery program. For a decade following the

Civil War's end in 1939, the economy remained in a state of severe depression.

Branded an international outcast for its pro-Axis bias during

World War II, Franco's regime sought to provide for Spain's well- being by adopting a policy of economic self-sufficiency. Autarchy was not merely a reaction to international isolation; it was also rooted for more than half a century in the advocacy of important

economic pressure groups. Furthermore, from 1939 to 1945, Spain's

military chiefs genuinely feared an Allied invasion of the peninsula

and, therefore, sought to avert excessive reliance on foreign armaments.

Spain was even more economically retarded in the 1940s than

it had been ten years earlier, for the residual adverse effects of the

Civil War and the consequences of autarchy and import substitution were generally disastrous. Inflation soared, economic recov- ery faltered, and, in some years, Spain registered negative growth

rates. By the early 1950s, per capita gross domestic product (GDP

see Glossary) was barely 40 percent of the average for West European countries. Then, after a decade of economic stagnation, a

tripling of prices, the growth of a black market, food rationing,

and widespread deprivation, gradual improvement began to take

place. The regime took its first faltering steps toward abandoning

its pretensions of self-sufficiency and toward inaugurating a far- reaching transformation of Spain's retarded economic system. PreCivil War industrial production levels were regained in the early

1950s, though agricultural output remained below that level until

1958.

A further impetus to economic liberalization came from the September 1953 signing of a mutual defense agreement, the Pact of

Madrid, between the United States and Spain (see Military Cooperation with the United States, ch. 5). In return for permitting the

establishment of United States military bases on Spanish soil, the

Eisenhower administration provided substantial economic aid to the Franco regime. More than 1 billion dollars in economic assis- tance flowed into Spain during the remainder of the decade as a

result of the agreement. Between 1953 and 1958, Spain's gross national product (GNP—see Glossary) rose by about 5 percent per annum. The years from 1951 to 1956 were marked by substantial eco- nomic progress, but the reforms of the period were only spasmodically implemented, and they were poorly coordinated. One large

obstacle to the reform process was the corrupt, inefficient, and

bloated bureaucracy. A former correspondent of London's Financial

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The Economy

Times, Robert Graham, described the Franco era as "the triumph

of paleocapitalism—primitive market skills operating in a jungle

of bureaucratic regulations, protectionism, and peddled influence."

By the mid-1950s, the inflationary spiral had resumed its upward

climb, and foreign currency reserves that had stood at US$58 million in 1958 plummeted to US$6 million by mid- 1959. The stan- dard of living remained one of the lowest in Western Europe, and

the backwardness of agriculture and of the land-tenure system,

despite lip service to agrarian reform, kept farm productivity low.

The growing demands of the emerging middle class—and of the ever greater number of tourists—for the amenities of life, particularly for higher nutritional standards, placed heavy demands on

imported foodstuffs and luxury items. At the same time, exports

lagged, largely because of high domestic demand and institutional

restraints on foreign trade. The peseta (for value of the peseta

see Glossary) fell to an all-time low on the black market, and Spain's

foreign currency obligations grew to almost US$60 million.

A debate took place within the regime over strategies for extricat- ing the country from its economic impasse, and Franco finally opted

in favor of a group of neoliberals. The group included bankers,

industrial executives, some academic economists, and members of

the semi- secret Roman Catholic lay organization, Opus Dei (Work

of God—see Religion, ch. 2; Political Interest Groups, ch. 4). During the 1957-59 period, known as the pre-stabilization years, economic planners contented themselves with piecemeal measures

such as moderate anti-inflationary stopgaps and increases in Spain's

links with the world economy. A combination of external developments and an increasingly aggravated domestic economic crisis,

however, forced them to engage in more far-reaching changes.

As the need for a change in economic policy became manifest

in the late 1950s, an overhaul of the Council of Ministers in February 1957 brought to the key ministries a group of younger men,

most of whom possessed economics training and experience. This

reorganization was quickly followed by the establishment of a committee on economic affairs and the Office of Economic Coordination and Planning under the prime minister.

Such administrative changes were important steps in eliminating the chronic rivalries that existed among economic ministries.

Other reforms followed, the principal one being the adoption of a corporate tax system that required the confederation of each industrial sector to allocate an appropriate share of the entire industry's tax assessment to each member firm. Chronic tax evasion was

consequently made more difficult, and tax collection receipts rose

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Spain: A Country Study

sharply. Together with curbs on government spending, in 1958

this reform created the first government surplus in many years. More drastic remedies were required as Spain's isolation from

the rest of Western Europe became exacerbated. Neighboring states were in the process of establishing the EC and the European Free

Trade Association (EFTA—see Glossary). In the process of liber- alizing trade among their members, these organizations found it difficult to establish economic relations with countries wedded to trade quotas and bilateral agreements, such as Spain.

Spanish membership in these groups was not politically possible, but Spain was invited to join a number of other international

institutions. In January 1958, Spain became an associate member

of the Organisation for European Economic Co-operation (OEEC),

which became the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and

Development (OECD—see Glossary) in September 1961, and

which included among its members virtually every developed country in the noncommunist world. In 1959 Spain joined the International Monetary Fund (IMF—see Glossary) and the World Bank

(see Glossary). These bodies immediately became involved in helping Spain to abandon the autarchical trade practices that had

brought its reserves to such low levels and that were isolating its economy from the rest of Europe.

Spain traditionally paid close attention to events in France and

was often influenced by them. In December 1958, the French

government adopted a stabilization program in order to overcome

a severe economic slump; this program included devaluation of the

franc, tax increases, and the removal of restrictions on most of

France's trade with OECD countries. The French action removed

whatever doubts the Spanish authorities had harbored about

embarking on a wholesale economic transformation. After seven months of preparation and drafting, aided by IMF and French

economists, Spain unveiled its Stabilization Plan on June 30, 1959.

The plan's objectives were twofold: to take the necessary fiscal and

monetary measures required to restrict demand and to contain infla- tion, while, at the same time, liberalizing foreign trade and encour- aging foreign investment.

The plan's initial effect was deflationary and recessionary, leading

to a drop in real income and to a rise in unemployment during

its first year. The resultant economic slump and reduced wages

led approximately 500,000 Spanish workers to emigrate in search

of better job opportunities in other West European countries.

Nonetheless, its main goals were achieved. The plan enabled Spain

to avert a possible suspension of payments abroad to foreign banks

holding Spanish currency, and by the close of 1959 Spain's foreign

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The Economy

exchange account showed a US$100 million surplus. Foreign capital investment grew sevenfold between 1958 and 1960, and the

annual influx of tourists began to rise rapidly.

As these developments steadily converted Spain's economic struc- ture into one more closely resembling a free-market economy, the

country entered the greatest cycle of industrialization and prosperity

it had ever known. Foreign aid played a significant role. Such aid

took the form of US$75 million in drawing rights from the IMF,

US$100 million in OEEC credits, US$70 million in commercial

credits from the Chase Manhattan Bank and the First National

City Bank, US$30 million from the United States Export-Import

Bank, and funds from United States aid programs. Total foreign

backing amounted to US$420 million. The principal lubricants of

the economic expansion, however, were the hard currency remit- tances of 1 million Spanish workers abroad, which are estimated

to have offset 17.9 percent of the total trade deficit from 1962 to 1971 ; the gigantic increase in tourism that drew more than 20 million visitors per year by the end of the 1960s and that accounted

for at least 9 percent of the GNP; and direct foreign investment,

which between 1960 and 1974 amounted to an impressive US$7.6

billion. More than 40 percent of this investment came from the

United States, almost 17 percent came from Switzerland, and the

Federal Republic of Germany (West Germany) and France each

accounted for slightly more than 10 percent. By 1975 foreign capital represented 12.4 percent of all that invested in Spain's 500 largest

industrial firms. An additional billion dollars came from foreign sources through a variety of loans and credit devices.

The success of the stabilization program was attributable to both

good luck and good management. It took place at a time of eco- nomic growth and optimism in Western Europe, which as a result was ready to accept increased Spanish exports, to absorb Spain's

surplus labor, and to spend significant sums of money on vacations in Spain and on investments in Spanish industry.

The Post-Franco Period, 1975-1 980s

Franco's death in 1975 and the ensuing transition to democratic

rule diverted Spaniards' attention from urgent economic problems.

The return to democracy coincided with an explosive quadrupling

of oil prices, which had an extremely serious effect on the economy

because Spain imported 70 percent of its energy, mostly in the form

of Middle Eastern oil. Nonetheless, the centrist government of

Adolfo Suarez Gonzalez, which had been named to succeed the

Franco regime by King Juan Carlos de Borbon, did little to shore

up the economy or even to reduce Spain's heavy dependence on

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Spain: A Country Study

imported oil. A virtually exclusive preoccupation with the politics

of democratization and the drafting of a new political system

prevailed.

Because of the failure to adjust to the drastically changed eco- nomic environment brought on by the two oil price shocks of the

1970s, Spain quickly confronted plummeting productivity, an

explosive increase in wages from 1974 to 1976, a reversal of migration trends as a result of the economic slump throughout Western

Europe, and the steady outflow of labor from agricultural areas

despite declining job prospects in the cities. All these factors joined

in producing a sharp rise in unemployment. Government budgetary deficits swelled, as did large social security cost overruns and

the huge operating losses incurred by a number of public-sector

industries. Energy consumption, meanwhile, remained excessive.

The years of economic recession, beginning in 1975, were not solely

attributable to the oil crisis, but they revealed, in the words of one

Spanish economist, Eduardo Merigo, "an institutional structure

that was creaking at the seams, unable to function in a country

in which output had increased nearly five times in thirty years."

These structural deficiencies made Spain more vulnerable than most

other modern economies to the oil crises of the 1970s.

When the Socialist government headed by Felipe Gonzalez took

office in late 1982, the economy was in dire straits. Inflation was

running at an annual rate of 16 percent, the external current account was US$4 billion in arrears, public spending had gotten out of hand,

and foreign exchange reserves had become dangerously depleted.

In coping with the situation, however, the Gonzalez government

had one asset that no previous post-Franco government had

enjoyed, namely, a solid parliamentary majority in both houses

of the Cortes (Spanish Parliament). With this majority, it was able

to undertake unpopular austerity measures that earlier weak and

unstable governments had been unable even to consider.

The Socialist government opted for pragmatic, orthodox monetary and fiscal policies, together with a series of vigorous retrenchment measures. In 1983 it unveiled a program that provided a more

coherent and long-term approach to the country's economic ills. Renovative structural policies—such as the closing of large, unprofitable state enterprises—helped to correct the more serious imbal- ances underlying the relatively poor performance of the economy.

The government launched an industrial reconversion program,

brought the problem-ridden social security system into better

balance, and introduced a more efficient energy-use policy. Labor

market flexibility was improved, and private capital investment was

encouraged with incentives.

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The Economy

By 1985 the budgetary deficit was brought down to 5 percent

of GNP, and it dropped to 4.5 percent in 1986. Real wage growth was contained, and it was generally kept below the rate of infla- tion. Inflation was reduced to 4.5 percent in 1987, and analysts

believed it might decrease to the government's goal of 3 percent

in 1988.

Efforts to modernize and to expand the economy were greatly

aided by a number of factors that fostered the remarkable economic

boom of the 1980s: the continuing fall in oil prices, increased

tourism, a sharp reduction in the exchange value of the United

States dollar, and a massive upsurge in the inflow of foreign investment. These exogenous factors allowed the economy to undergo

rapid expansion without experiencing balance of payments constraints, despite the fact that the economy was being exposed to foreign competition in accordance with EC requirements. Were

it not for these factors, the process of integration with the EC would

have been a good deal more painful, and inflation would have been

much higher. In the words of the OECD's 1987-88 survey of the Spanish econ- omy, "following a protracted period of sluggish growth with slow

progress in winding down inflation during the late 1970s and the

first half of the 1980s, the Spanish economy has entered a phase

of vigorous expansion of output and employment accompanied by

a marked slowdown of inflation." In 1981 Spain's GDP growth

rate had reached a nadir by registering a rate of negative 0.2 percent; it then gradually resumed its slow upward ascent with increases

of 1.2 percent in 1982, 1.8 percent in 1983, 1.9 percent in 1984,

and 2.1 percent in 1985. The following year, however, Spain's real GDP began to grow by leaps and bounds, registering a growth rate of 3.3 percent in 1986 and 5.5 percent in 1987. The 1987 figure was the highest since 1974, and it was the strongest rate of expansion among OECD countries that year. Analysts projected a rise of 3.8 percent in 1988 and of 3.5 percent in 1989, a slight decline

but still roughly double the EC average. They expected that declining interest rates and the government's stimulative budget would

help sustain economic expansion. Industrial output, which rose by

3.1 percent in 1986 and by 5.2 percent in 1987, was also expected

to maintain its expansive rate, growing by 3.8 percent in 1988 and

by 3.7 percent in 1989.

A prime force generating rapid economic growth was increased

domestic demand, which grew by a steep 6 percent in 1986 and

by 4.8 percent in 1987, in both years exceeding official projections.

During 1988 and 1989, analysts expected demand to remain strong,

though at slightly lower levels. Much of the large increase in

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Spain: A Country Study

demand was met in 1987 by an estimated 20 percent jump in real terms in imports of goods and services.

In the mid-1980s, Spain achieved a strong level of economic per- formance while simultaneously lowering its rate of inflation to within

two points of the EC average. However, its export performance,

though increasing by a creditable 5.5 percent, raised concerns over

the existing imbalance between import and export growth.

Role of Government

The public sector of the postwar Spanish economy was not conspicuously large, compared with the corresponding sectors of most

other West European countries. Much of it came into existence

under the Franco regime. Spain's communication and transportation facilities were publicly operated, as was the case on most

of the rest of the continent . State trading monopolies were maintained for petroleum products, tobacco, and some agricultural

products, but most industry other than coal mining, iron and steel making, shipbuilding, and aircraft assembly, was privately owned.

Most of the major financial institutions were also privately owned.

Yet agriculture, which was largely in private hands, was affected

by a panoply of subsidies and marketing controls. Irrigation projects

and reforestation and land reform programs were also important

official concerns. The single largest component of the public sector was the National

Industrial Institute (Instituto Nacional de Industria—INI), a government holding company that was primarily, though not exclusively, involved in industry (see National Industrial Institute, this ch.). In addition to INI, the public sector included the Grupo

Patrimonio, founded in the late nineteenth century. Formally

referred to as the Directorate General for State Assets (Direccion

General del Patrimonio del Estado—DGPE), it functioned under

the auspices of the Ministry of Economy, Finance, and Commerce.

In the mid-1980s, there were about two dozen companies in the

DGPE, operating in a variety of sectors, such as communications,

finance, transportation, agriculture, and textiles. Three companies

dominated the group: the National Telephone Company of Spain

(Compama Telefonica Nacional de Espana—CTNE), the tobacco

distributor (Tabacalera), and the Overseas Trade Bank (Banco

Exterior de Espana). Together they accounted for the bulk of the

employment and the financial holdings of the group's members.

The shares of these companies were held directiy by the state, rather

than indirectly through a holding company, as was the case with

INI. One of the main purposes of the DGPE was to channel to the government the revenues from the sale of certain commodities

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The Economy

placed in the hands of monopoly distributors, though such monopolies were coming to an end as a result of Spain's entry into the

EC . The DGPE had also taken an active role in restructuring the

textile industry.

Economic Ministries

Under the Felipe Gonzalez government, the minister of economy,

finance, and commerce served as ''superminister" and chief government spokesman with the responsibility of advising the prime

minister on economic and financial policies. The Ministry of Economy, Finance, and Commerce formulated general economic policies; prepared the budget; audited the state's accounts; supervised

expenditures; managed the public debt; supervised the banks, insur- nce companies, and stock exchanges; and collected taxes. It therefore had a major role in the conduct of both fiscal and monetary

policy. It was also responsible for all matters concerned with publicly owned properties involved in industrial, agricultural, and

commercial ventures, including supervision of those under the dayto-day management of other ministries.

Other ministries having primarily economic functions included

the Ministry of Agriculture, Fisheries, and Food; the Ministry of

Transportation, Tourism, and Communications; the Ministry of

Industry and Energy; the Ministry of Labor and Social Security;

and the Ministry of Public Works and City Planning. There was

also an interministerial Economic Affairs Committee (Comision

de Asuntos Economicos), which consisted of the heads of economically important ministries and the undersecretary of state for the

economy.

Budget and Fiscal Policy

The budget of the central government reflected only a part of

the financial resources involved in the execution of fiscal policy.

Other official receipts and expenditures, including social security revenues and payments, local and regional government taxation

and spending, and the operations of autonomous organizations

associated with defense, education, and agrarian development,

brought the total amount of government outiays in 1987 to 13,200

billion pesetas, or 41 percent of GDP. Thus, despite the sharp rise in revenues recorded in 1987, the central government deficit nar- rowed only from 1,659 billion pesetas to 1,623 billion pesetas on

a national accounts basis. Government spending tended to be expansionary. Even in 1987,

when government receipts were unusually high because of strong

economic growth, a crackdown on tax fraud, and the introduction

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Spain: A Country Study

of a value-added tax in 1986, state expenditures outstripped state income and the government's deficit amounted to about 3.8 per- cent of 1987's GDP. When regional and local government expenditures were figured in, the total deficit amounted to approximately

5 percent. Budgetary estimates for 1988 indicated that the central

government deficit could be held to approximately 3 percent of

GDP. Initial budgets, however, have usually underestimated ulti- mate spending.

Human Resources

Throughout much of the twentieth century, there has been a dramatic shift in the makeup of the Spanish population and in the nature of its employment. As late as the 1920s, 57 percent of Spain's

active population was concentrated in agriculture. During the next 30 years, the number of people employed in this sector fell by only

10 percent. Starting in 1950, however, the sector's share of the work

force fell by close to 10 percent each decade, so that by the early

1980s its share had shrunk to about 15 percent. Even after the eco- nomic transformation in the 1960s and the first half of the 1970s,

agricultural employment continued to fall steadily—by an estimated

4 percent per year between 1976 and 1985. Migration from rural

regions to areas where employment was available led to the virtual

depopulation of a number of rural towns and provinces, especially

those in the middle of the country (see Migration, ch. 2.)

The evolution in the size and the composition of the working

population offered an index to the country's modernization process. Since the 1920s, the number of workers employed in industry and

services had virtually doubled. Industry's share of the work force

had gone from about 20 percent in 1920 to a high point of 38 per- cent in 1975, after which it had begun to decline, dropping to 32 percent by 1985. The service sector had grown steadily, from

20 percent of the work force in 1920 to 52 percent in 1985, declining only during the bleak 1940s. It had surpassed the industrial sector at the end of the boom years in the mid-1970s, when it accounted for about 40 percent of the work force. Despite the eco- nomic slump of the 1975-85 period, the service sector grew

strongly—an indication of Spain's development toward a postindustrial society and its increasing resemblance to the economic struc- tures of other West European countries.

Spain has been fairly constant in the portion of its population

actively involved in the economy. For all of the twentieth century,

just over one-third of the population has either had a job or has

been looking for one. A high point was reached in 1965, when

148
Plowed fields in Valencia Province

Courtesy National Tourist Office of Spain

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Spain: A Country Study

38.5 percent of all Spaniards were in the work force. During the

1980s, the figure hovered at about 33 to 34 percent.

Compared with other West European countries, however, Spain

has been distinguished by the low participation of women in the

work force. In 1970 only 18 percent of the country's women were

employed, compared with 26 percent in Italy and 30 to 40 percent

in northern Europe. During the 1980s, female employment in- creased, but women still made up less than 30 percent of the eco- nomically active population, considerably less than they did in

Finland, for example, where nearly half of all those employed were

female and where three-quarters of all women worked outside the

home. Female participation in the labor market was increasing in

the second half of the 1980s, and it had jumped 2 percent between

1985 and 1987, when, according to an OECD report, it reached

29.9 percent in mid-1987. El Pais, a respected daily, reported that

there were 3.5 million women in the work force of 15 million at the end of 1987, which gave them a share of about 32 percent of

the total. The Unemployment Problem

Spain's most nagging and seemingly intractable economic

problem has been the persistence of high unemployment. The industry shakeout of the 1975-85 period, declining job opportunities in

agriculture, and the virtual drying up of the need for Spanish workers in Western Europe led to an unemployment rate that, throughout the 1980s, rarely went below 20 percent, the highest rate in

Europe. Overall employment between 1976 and 1985 declined by

almost 25 percent. The sharp slowdown in labor demand, following the first oil shock, coincided with the growing exodus from rural areas. The decline in industrial employment was due not only to production cutbacks in a number of key sectors, but also to prior

widespread overmanning and to the abrupdy urgent need to address

deteriorating economic conditions by stressing higher productivity

and lower unit labor costs. The ensuing slowdown in real wage

growth did not moderate before 1980. As a result, real wages sur- passed productivity between 1976 and 1979 by 22 percent.

Though government programs, such as the strengthened Employment Promotion Programs, led to the hiring of more than 1 million people in 1987—more than double the average of about 450,000

per year between 1979 and 1984—they did not appreciably alter the level ofjoblessness. With almost 3 million people unemployed

in 1988, the official unemployment level of 20.5 percent was almost

double the OECD average. Record numbers of new job openings were created in the buoyant economy of 1987, and total employment

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The Economy

increased by 3 percent, but the new jobs barely kept pace with the

growth of the labor force. Undoubtedly, the unemployment rate would have been much higher were it not for the relatively low

level of participation of women in the labor force. The unemployment rate for women in the labor force was about one-third higher

than that for men. Youth unemployment was particularly high. The under-25 age- group accounted for nearly 55 percent of all unemployment, a factor that contributed to juvenile delinquency and street crime. Thus,

the increasing participation of young people and women in the work

force contributed to a persistence of high unemployment in the

booming economy of the late 1980s because of the relatively low

rates of employment among both groups. Another reason was that,

although the economy was growing, part of the expansion was due

to improved equipment, and not to increased employment. Industrial production, for example, rose by 4.7 percent in 1987, but

industrial employment grew only by 2.5 percent. Nonetheless, these

official unemployment rates were believed to be too high, for they

did not take account of those persons believed to be working in

the underground economy.

The Underground Economy

With the growth in unemployment, rising labor costs, rigid legal

regulations, increasing numbers of layoffs and discharges, and high

employer social security taxes, since the 1970s Spain has experienced

the growth of an increasingly important underground economy

(economia sumergida). Its rise has been of growing concern to government policymakers. Observers estimated that it accounted for 10 percent to 15 percent of the GNP, and a 1985 government study

suggested that the number of those employed in the underground

economy amounted to 18 percent of the entire active labor force. Other analysts believed that as many as 33 percent of those offi- cially listed as unemployed—about 20 percent of the working

population—were actually working in the shadow economy. Workers in this sector were particularly numerous in labor-intensive

industries and services. According to official estimates, agriculture

accounted for the largest share, estimated at perhaps 30 percent;

services claimed up to 25 percent; construction, 20 percent; and

industry, a little less than 20 percent. Most of those involved in

the service sector worked as domestics.

Typically, workers in the underground economy were young people with minimal educational and professional qualifications. Many

were single women, more often than not, those without family

responsibilities. This sector of the economy was marked by high

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Spain: A Country Study

labor turnover; its employees earned substandard wages, and they

often toiled in unhealthy surroundings, frequently at home. Though

wages were low, those who worked in the underground economy

could avoid paying taxes and social security contributions—an

aspect of the sector that made it attractive to employers as well as

to laborers.

Labor Relations in the Franco Era Labor relations until the late 1950s were generally of a fascist,

authoritarian type. Wages and working conditions were set by

decrees issued by the government, and all wage earners were

required to be members of the government body, the Spanish

Syndical Organization (Organizacion Sindical Espanola—OSE).

Collective bargaining, independent labor organizations, and strikes were prohibited. In conjunction with the general economic liberal- ization of the late 1950s, the 1958 Collective Bargaining Law (Ley

de Convenios Colectivos) for the first time permitted limited local

collective bargaining between employers and labor within the framework of the OSE.

Despite police repression and the heavy penalties that were given

to striking workers—striking was considered the equivalent of a treasonable offense—there were a number of labor conflicts during the 1950s, especially in Barcelona and in the Basque region,

both pre-Civil War trade-union strongholds. Through harsh police measures and the imprisonment of workers, these conflicts were

readily brought under control. They were, however, harbingers

of a tidal wave of labor unrest that was to inundate the country

during the late 1960s and the early 1970s.

As workers and their clandestine labor organizations grew more

assertive during the mid-1960s, they sought a larger share of the

country's growing prosperity. An oppositional grass-roots labor

movement, which became known as the Workers' Commissions

(Comisiones Obreras—CCOO), arose within the official labor organization. During the 1960s and 1970s, the CCOO became the principal opposition to government-controlled labor organizations. The

CCOO had links to the Roman Catholic Church, which during

the same period was undergoing a growing liberalization with the

encouragement of Pope John XXIII and Pope Paul VI. The church

dissociated itself from the Franco regime, and it championed

Spanish trade union freedoms and collective bargaining rights.

Some church-sponsored labor groups were permitted to operate

openly, most notably the Catholic Action Workers' Brotherhood

(Hermandad Obrera de Accion Catolica—HOAC). On July 24,

1968, the Bishops' Conference condemned Spain's government

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The Economy

labor organizations and issued a call for free trade unions. Churches

provided a sanctuary for striking workers and served as a refuge

from the police.

Oppositional union groups became more active in elections for shop-level representatives. As slates of candidates sponsored by the

CCOO and others increasingly won elections for factory shop

stewards (jurados de empresa), the OSE became more and more

dysfunctional. Meanwhile, the influence of the Catholic leadership

of the CCOO lessened, as communists became increasingly dominant and as the movement became more active. Labor unrest underwent an explosive expansion. There were 777 strikes in 1963,

484 in 1965, and the number mushroomed in 1970 to 1,595. The

strikes resulted in major wage gains, frequently exceeding official guidelines.

Semiclandestine independent trade unions began to emerge during the final decade of the Franco regime. In addition to the CCOO,

other groups began to make their presence felt. The socialist General

Union of Workers (Union General de Trabajadores—UGT), historically, the labor arm of the Spanish Socialist Workers' Party

(Partido Socialista Obrero Espafiol—PSOE), belatedly emerged

as a leading contender for worker leadership. In the Basque region,

the Basque Workers' Solidarity (Eusko Langilleen AlkartasunaSolidaridad de Trabajadores Vascos—ELA-STV), the labor

adjunct of the Basque Nationalist Party (Partido Nacionalista

Vasco—PNV), also made a reappearance. In addition, various

organizations spawned by the church's active defense of workers'

rights, the most notable being the Workers' Syndical Union (Union

Sindical Obrera—USO), vied for workers' support. The anarchosyndicalist National Confederation of Labor (Confederacion

Nacional del Trabajo—CNT), which had been one of the two

dominant trade union centers before 1939, reappeared sporadically

in post-Franco Spain as a tiny, marginal force. Labor Relations in the Post-Franco Period

The Franco regime ended amidst a wave of worker ferment and

considerable strike activity. By 1975, brutal repression no longer

sufficed to snuff out social discontent, as worker militancy over- whelmed an increasingly dysfunctional OSE and forced employers to negotiate directly with representatives of the semilegal

independent unions. The strike waves that crested between 1974

and 1976 coincided with the huge oil price increases that began

in 1973. The country's political elite, because it was engrossed with

the transition to parliamentary democracy, gave only passing atten- tion to labor unrest and to the increasing deterioration of the

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Spain: A Country Study

economy. The institutional changes of this period had not yet

established channels for collective bargaining, nor did consultative

machinery exist to negotiate general wage guidelines.

Industrial workers, having inadequately partaken of the growing prosperity of earlier years, resented rising inflation and sought

to make up for lost time despite mounting economic difficulties. A virtual wage explosion took place as workers and their semilegal

spokesmen extracted large pay increases from their employers. From

1974 to 1976, wages rose much more rapidly than did the cost of

living. Analysts estimated that wage increases in those years aver- aged 20 to 30 percent per annum. Price controls managed to keep

inflation well below these levels, at least for a time. Profits declined

sharply, while the wage component of Spain's national income rose

steeply—by four percentage points between 1974 and 1975. Output was maintained at fairly normal levels, as increased wage levels led to rapid growth in consumption, but depressive factors soon had an adverse effect on the economy. Unemployment rose from

an insignificant 2.5 percent in 1973 to 8.5 percent in 1979, and

thereafter it continued to rise steadily.

Free trade unions were formally legalized on April 28, 1977, and

the first post-Franco parliamentary elections, which were held the

following June, saw Suarez and his center-right Union of the

Democratic Center (Union de Centro Democratico—UCD) emerge

victorious, but with only a plurality of the parliamentary seats. In October 1977, government and opposition parties agreed on an economic package, the Moncloa Pacts. The pacts were designed

to prevent further economic deterioration and to buy time while

the country awaited the October referendum on the new 1978 Constitution. The pacts called for a 2

2 -percent wage increase ceiling.

This figure was below the rate of inflation, and it signified a reduction in popular purchasing power. In 1979, however, the

government-labor consensus came to an end; partisan politics

resumed, as unions sought wage adjustments that were at least equal

to increases in the cost of living.

The Workers' Statute, adopted in March 1980, articulated trade

union rights as guaranteed by the Constitution. The statute eliminated direct government intervention in labor relations. It also included provisions for minimum wage standards, for access to

social security funds, and for a delineation of the contractual nature

of wage accords. Democratically elected works councils (comites de empresa) were established as spokesmen for employees, and unions were given responsibility for arriving at industry-wide and at local wage agreements.

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The Economy

During the 1970s, Spain's economic recession and the critical situation confronting many firms led to the establishment of implicit or explicit social contracts in which government, employers, and

unions participated. Unions tended to accept wage restraint, and

they increased productivity in exchange for improved job security

and for promises to create more job opportunities. In 1980 the UGT

and the Spanish Confederation of Employers' Organizations (Confederacion Espanola de Organizaciones Empresariales—CEOE)

negotiated a pact called the Inter-Confederation Framework Agreement (Acuerdo Marco Interconfederal—AMI), embodying these

features. The agreement set the pattern for 800,000 companies.

These companies had an aggregate work force of 6 million persons, or half of the country's economically active population.

Since the death of Franco, the UGT and the CCOO have been

engaged in a fierce rivalry for hegemony in the labor movement.

The struggle has had strong political ramifications because the UGT

served as the trade union arm of the governing PSOE, and the

CCOO was controlled by the Communist Party of Spain (Partido

Comunista de Espana—PCE) and by other communist splinter

groups. In the 1978 elections for members of the works councils,

the CCOO elected 34 percent of their candidates, compared with

the UGT's 20 percent. By 1980, however, the tide began to turn,

and the UGT succeeded in electing close to 30 percent of its supporters, having made inroads into CCOO voting strongholds. The

decision of a large number of USO affiliates to merge with the UGT

also enhanced its strength. In 1982 the UGT managed to edge out

the CCOO by a 36 percent to 33 percent margin, and in the suc- ceeding election, held in October-December 1986, it gained a fur- ther 4 percentage points, garnering a total of 41 percent, while the

CCOO advanced only slightly to 34 percent. The UGT's strength was concentrated in smaller enterprises, whereas the CCOO's

popularity advanced in public- sector companies and in the banking sector. In the late 1980s, the CCOO dominated the works councils in all the leading companies of INI, except for the tobacco

monopoly. The ELA-STV continued to maintain its position as the single largest labor organization in the Basque region, but it was closely followed by the UGT.

Not long after coming to power in late 1982, the Socialist government became increasingly embroiled in an acrimonious relationship with the equally socialist UGT. To advance its program for industrial restructuring and for the revitalization of the economy,

in order to prepare for integration into the EC, the government

considered it necessary to enforce wage restraint, to carry out largescale personnel cutbacks in a number of public-sector companies,

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Spain: A Country Study

to limit social spending, and to permit employers greater latitude

in hiring, firing, and laying off workers. In exchange for docility

and low wages, workers during the Franco era received virtual life- time job security, making it practically impossible for employers

to engage in personnel retrenchment; however, a free-market econ- omy, especially one linked to the EC, required the elimination of

this rigid employment status—a goal toward which the Gonzalez

government was gradually moving. Though such measures contributed to the economic boom of the late 1980s, they seriously

undercut the standing of trade unions. Furthermore, labor mili- tants were incensed to find that in 1987 company profits greatly

increased—an average of 40 percent—while the government con- tinued to insist on wage restraint. The two-year Economic and

Social Agreement, which covered wages and related matters and

was signed by the government, employers, and workers, expired

at the end of 1986. Thereafter, government efforts to persuade

unions to accept a social compact failed because of union insistence on wage increases appreciably higher than those proposed by the

government and because of union opposition to further personnel

reductions in state enterprises that operated at a loss. The result was that union contract renewals in early 1987 led to a resurgence

of labor disputes and to an increase in the number of work

stoppages.

Trade unions entered the post-Franco era with great prestige

and large memberships. According to the unions, their combined

membership totalled 3 million workers. Since then, however, orga- nized labor has steadily lost strength because of rising unemployment and limitations on wage increases. As a consequence, most

workers professed sympathy and regard for the unions, but few

bothered to pay dues. In the late 1980s, probably fewer than 15

percent of all workers possessed union cards. Nonetheless, a much

larger proportion heeded union calls during negotiations for eco- nomic agreements and participated in strikes and other job-related

actions.

Agriculture

Viewed in terms of land mass, Spain is one of the largest countries of Western Europe, and it ranks second in terms of its elevation, after Switzerland. A large part of the country is semiarid,

with temperatures that range from extremely cold in the winter

to scorching in the summer. Rainfall, which is often inadequate,

tends to be concentrated in two generally brief periods during the

year. Summer droughts occur frequently. Of Spain's 50.5 million

hectares of land, 20.6 million, or about 40 percent, are suitable

156
The Economy

for cultivation; however, the soil is generally of poor quality, and

only about 10 percent of the land can be considered excellent. In

addition, the roughness of the terrain has been an obstacle to agricul- tural mechanization and to other technological improvements. Fur- thermore, years of neglect have created a serious land erosion

problem, most notably in the dry plains of Castilla-La Mancha.

Compared with other West European countries, the proportion

of land devoted to agricultural purposes is low. In the 1980s, about

5 million hectares were devoted to permanent crops: orchards, olive groves, and vineyards. Another 5 million lay fallow each year

because of inadequate rainfall. Permanent meadows and pastureland occupied 13.9 million hectares. Forests and scrub woodland

accounted for 11.9 million hectares, and the balance was wasteland

or was taken up by populated and industrial areas. The primary forms of property holding in Spain have been large

estates (latifundios) and tiny land plots (minifundios) . In large measure, this was still true in the 1980s. The agrarian census of 1982

found that 50.9 percent of the country's farmland was held in

properties of 200 or more hectares, although farms of this size made

up only 1 . 1 percent of the country's 2.3 million farms. At the other

end of the scale, the census showed that 61.8 percent of Spain's

farms had fewer than 5 hectares of land. These farms accounted

for 5.2 percent of the country's farmland. Furthermore, just under

25 percent of all farms consisted of less than 1 hectare of land, and

they accounted for 0.5 percent of all farmland. Minifundios were

particularly numerous in the north and the northwest. Latifundios were mainly concentrated in the south, in Castilla-La Mancha,

Extremadura, Valencia, and Andalusia (Spanish, Andalucia).

Crop areas were farmed in two highly diverse manners. Areas

relying on nonirrigated cultivation (secano), which made up 85 per- cent of the entire crop area, depended solely on rainfall as a source

of water. They included the humid regions of the north and the

northwest, as well as vast arid zones that had not been irrigated.

The much more productive regions devoted to irrigated cultivation (regadio) accounted for 3 million hectares in 1986, and the

government hoped that this area would eventually double, as it already had doubled since 1950. Particularly noteworthy was the

development in Almeria—one of the most arid and desolate

provinces of Spain—of winter crops of various fruits and vegetables for export to Europe.

Though only about 17 percent of Spain's cultivated land was

irrigated, it was estimated to be the source of between 40 and

45 percent of the gross value of crop production and of 50 percent

of the value of agricultural exports. More than half of the irrigated

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Spain: A Country Study

area was planted in corn, fruit trees, and vegetables. Other agricultural products that benefited from irrigation included grapes, cot- ton, sugar beets, potatoes, legumes, olive trees, strawberries,

tomatoes, and fodder grasses. Depending on the nature of the crop,

it was possible to harvest two successive crops in the same year on about 10 percent of the country's irrigated land.

Citrus fruits, vegetables, cereal grains, olive oil, and wine^

Spain's traditional agricultural products—continued to be important in the 1980s. In 1983 they represented 12 percent, 12 percent,

8 percent, 6 percent, and 4 percent, respectively, of the country's

agricultural production. Because of the changed diet of an increasingly affluent population, there was a notable increase in the con- sumption of livestock, poultry, and dairy products. Meat production

for domestic consumption became the single most important agricul- tural activity, accounting for 30 percent of all farm-related production in 1983. Increased attention to livestock was the reason that

Spain became a net importer of grains. Ideal growing conditions,

combined with proximity to important north European markets,

made citrus fruits Spain's leading export. Fresh vegetables and fruits produced through intensive irrigation farming also became important export commodities, as did sunflower seed oil that was produced

to compete with the more expensive olive oils in oversupply throughout the Mediterranean countries of the EC.

Agricultural Development

Farming was only marginally affected by the Civil War, yet

agricultural output during the 1940s remained below the 1933 level. This low agricultural productivity led to food rationing, substantially contributing to the great hardships endured by people residing in the cities. One of the main reasons for this dilemma was

the government preoccupation with industrial self-sufficiency, which

resulted in neglect for the modernization of agriculture. The government did encourage grain cultivation with the aim of achieving

agricultural self-sufficiency, but heavy-handed efforts to control food

prices led to the massive channeling of agricultural products into

the black market.

The traditional shortcomings of Spanish agriculture—excessive

land fragmentation (minifundismo) and extremely large land tracts in the hands of a few (latifundismo)—were, for all practical purposes,

ignored. As in the past, latifundio areas with low yields and little irrigation were primarily devoted to the production of such traditional commodities as olive oil, grains, and wine. They were, moreover, the areas where casual rural laborers (braceros) were

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The Economy

concentrated, where wage levels were lowest, and where illiteracy rates were highest.

A gradual change in Spanish agriculture began in the 1950s,

when prices rapidly increased, and the surplus labor pool began

to shrink, as a half million rural field hands migrated to the cities or went abroad in search of a better life (see Migration, ch. 2). Nonetheless, more substantial changes did not take place prior to the 1960s. The Stabilization Plan of 1959 encouraged emigration

from rural areas, and the economic boom in both Spain and

Western Europe provided increased opportunities for employment.

The subsequent loss of rural manpower had a far-reaching effect on both agricultural prices and wage levels and, as a consequence, on the composition of Spanish agriculture.

Spain's economic transformation in the 1960s and in the first half of the 1970s caused tremendous outmigration from rural areas. Between 1960 and 1973, 1 .8 million people migrated to urban areas. Even later, between 1976 and 1985, when the economy was experiencing serious difficulties, the fall in farm employment averaged

4 percent per annum. The results of these migrations were reflected in the changing percentage of the population involved in farming.

In 1960, 42 percent of the population was engaged in agricultural

work; by 1986 only about 15 percent was so employed—a marked

reduction, though still twice as high as the EC average. As Spain

became more industrialized, the declining share of agriculture in

the economy was evidenced by its declining share of the GDP.

Agriculture accounted for 23 percent of GDP in 1960; for 15 percent, in 1970; and for 5 percent, by 1986 (see fig. 10). In addition, the character of Spanish agriculture in the 1980s had changed.

It had become less a way of life and more a way of making a liv- ing. Even subsistence agriculture, already in steady decline, had

become increasingly market oriented.

The magnitude of the rural exodus permitted the government

to undertake a program of parcel consolidation, that is, to bring

together into single plots many tiny, scattered pieces of land that

characterized the minifundio sector. The government managed to surpass its goal of consolidating 1 million hectares of small land

holdings between 1964 and 1967; by 1981 it had brought together

a total of 5 million hectares.

The decreased size of the rural work force affected Spanish

agriculture because its traditionally labor-intensive practices re- quired a large pool of cheap labor. The workers who remained in

the countryside saw their wages advanced by 83.8 percent between

1960 and 1970—a rate that roughly followed the wage increases

in industry. At the same time, however, increased agricultural

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Spain: A Country Study

GDP FY 1988 - US$340.1 billion

Construction

Energy

Industry

Services

Figure 10. Structure of Gross Domestic Product, 1988

labor costs led to the end of countless minifundios. The 1982 agrarian census recorded the disappearance of about one-half million small

farms between 1962 and 1982. The resulting lack of a ready labor

supply was an incentive, particularly for large landed estates, to mechanize. The number of farm tractors expanded more than tenfold between 1960 and 1983, from 52,000 to 593,000. The number of combine harvester-threshers increased almost tenfold over

the same period, from 4,600 to 44,000. The process of mechanization caused agricultural productivity to grow by 3.5 percent per

year between 1960 and 1978, and the productivity of farm workers grew even faster. Nonetheless, Spain's output per agricultural

worker remained low. It was about half the EC average in 1985,

and it surpassed only those of Greece and Portugal.

During the mid-1980s, Spanish agriculture was roughly self- sufficient in years when there were good harvests, and in nearly

every year there were sizable surpluses of olive oil, citrus fruits,

and wine that could be exported in quantities large enough to make

it the EC's third-largest food supplier. In years of poor or average

harvests, the country was obliged to import grains for use as animal

fodder, but on the whole Spain was a net exporter of foodstuffs. Spanish agriculture varied considerably with regard to regional

differences in output. Some regions were distinguished by a highly

160
The Economy

inefficient variety of farming. Specialists estimated that areas dominated by minifundios would have to lose an estimated three-fourths

of their farming population if they were to compete effectively with

foreign producers. The variety of agriculture practiced along the

Mediterranean coast or in the Rio Ebro Valley was, however, highly

efficient and capable of keeping up with foreign competition.

Opinion was not united as to what EC membership would eventually mean for Spanish farmers. The EC's Common Agricultural

Policy (CAP), which aimed at supporting most of each member

state's farming sector, was expensive, and by the 1980s it was con- suming well over half of the organization's revenues. If the CAP

were continued, it would not be likely to have a considerable effect on Spanish agriculture, for a system of domestic price supports had

long protected the weaker parts of the nation's farm sector. A change

of EC policy that encouraged a single community-wide agricultural system might allow those parts of the Spanish agricultural

sector that outperformed their rivals in the EC to prosper, while

backward branches would probably disappear.

Regional Variation

Because the interior of Spain is dominated by semiarid plateaus

and mountains subject to temperature extremes, the most productive agricultural areas in the late 1980s tended to be the coastal

regions. Thus, the north and the northwest, where there is a rela- tively mild, humid climate, were the principal corn-producing and

cattle-raising areas. Apples and pears were the main orchard crops

in this area, and potatoes were another of its leading products.

Galicia, which consists of Spain's four westernmost provinces

directly north of Portugal, had a concentrated farm population living on intensely fragmented plots. Accordingly, per capita farm income was low, compared with that of the northern provinces lying to the east, where there were fewer people and higher per capita in- come levels because of a more diversified economy that included

industry, mining, and tourism.

Catalonia, on the northeast coast, also has a climate that per- mits diversified agriculture. At the end of the 1980s, livestock, particularly the expanding poultry industry, was important in the area. Modern farming methods, including the use of tractors, were more

advanced here than they were in the rest of the country. South of

Catalonia, along the narrow Mediterranean coast, or Levante, was

Spain's principal area of intensive, irrigated horticulture. Orange

trees, orchard fruits, rice, and vegetables were produced in this region, and farther to the south, fig trees and nut trees were grown.

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Spain: A Country Study

Andalusia, which includes all of tillable southern Spain, was

another major agricultural area in the late 1980s. It was also the

target of several agricultural planning programs. Although olive

trees grow throughout the Mediterranean coastal region, as well

as in parts of the Meseta Central (Central Plateau), they constituted

the most important crop in Andalusia, particularly in the province

ofJaen. Other warm-weather crops, such as cotton, tobacco, and

sugarcane, were also produced in Andalusia, as were wine and table grapes. The vast dry plateau region of central Spain contrasts sharply

with the country's relatively productive areas. The production of

agricultural commodities is particularly difficult in central Spain

because of a lack of rainfall, a scarcity of trees and other vegetation, extremes of temperature, and harsh, rocky soil. Nevertheless, the farmers of the region grew wheat and other grains, raised

sheep and goats, maintained vineyards, and carried on other

agricultural activities. An important irrigation system lies just northwest of the north- ern Meseta and south of the Pyrenees in the Ebro Basin, where

Spain's best known vineyard district is located in the autonomous

community of La Rioja. Because of its irrigation, corn, sugar beets,

and orchard fruits were grown in this area, and the Ebro Delta was one of Spain's principal rice- growing regions.

In the Balearic Islands (Spanish, Islas Baleares), the uncertain,

sparse rainfall and the lack of permanent fresh water streams are somewhat compensated for by good supplies of underground water.

Irrigation permitted the production of a wide range of temperate

and semitropical tree corps for export, as well as enough cereals,

legumes, wines, and vegetables for local consumption. Sheep, goats,

pigs, and poultry were also raised on the islands.

Agriculture in the Canary Islands (Spanish, Canarias) was limited

by water shortages and mountainous terrain. Nevertheless, a variety

of vegetable and fruit crops were produced for local consumption,

and there was a significant and exportable surplus of tomatoes and

bananas.

Crops

Spain has long been Western Europe's leading producer, and

the world's foremost exporter, of oranges and mandarins. In the

early 1960s, the production of these commodities averaged 1 .8 million tons a year, and by the 1980s the annual yield averaged about

3 million tons (see table 7, Appendix). Grapefruit, lemons, and

limes were also grown in quantity, but Spain was second to Italy

among West European producers of these fruits. Spain's citrus

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The Economy

groves, all under irrigation, were concentrated in Mediterranean

coastal provinces, the Levante, primarily in a narrow coastal strip

500 kilometers in length extending from the province of Castellon

to the province of Almena. Some citrus fruit production also was

found in Andalusia.

Spain's other significant orchard crops were apples, bananas,

pears, peaches, apricots, plums, cherries, figs, and nuts. Except

for bananas, which were grown only in the Canary Islands, and

figs, which were grown mosdy in the Balearic Islands, orchard crops were produced primarily in the Levante and in Catalonia. The

Catalan province of Lerida was the leading producer of apples and

pears, and it ranked second to Murcia in the production of peaches.

Almonds, grown along the southern and the eastern coasts, emerged

as another important Spanish cash crop. Almost half of the 1985

crop was exported, approximately 70 to 75 percent of it to EC countries. The principal vegetable crops were potatoes, tomatoes, onions,

cabbages, peppers, and string beans. Spain was the leading producer of onions in Western Europe, and it was second only to Italy

in the production of tomatoes. These crops were concentrated in

Andalusia and in the intensively cultivated and largely irrigated

Mediterranean coastal areas, where small garden plots known as

huertas were common. The Canary Islands also produced a signifi- cant proportion of Spain's tomatoes. Potatoes were a prominent

garden crop in the northwest.

Spain was the world's leading producer and exporter of olives

and olive oil, although in some years Italy showed higher production levels because Spanish harvests were notably vulnerable to

insects, frost, and storm damage. Andalusia, where about one-half

of the olive groves were found, is generally free of these hazards,

but olives were grown in virtually every province except the humid

north and the northwest. In the 1980s, olive production fluctuated

wildly, ranging from 1.2 million to 3.3 million tons per year. Olive

oil production was also volatile. Spain's olive production is affected

by EC quotas, and past efforts to control overproduction have

included the destruction of olive groves. Though Spain boasted the world's largest area of land devoted

to vineyards, much of the wine it produced was of mediocre quality.

Vineyards were usually located on poor land, and good winemaking technology was often lacking. In the past, governmentguaranteed prices for wine tended to encourage quantity rather than

quality and alcoholic content, but programs were instituted in the

1980s to upgrade production, and surpluses of poor quality white

wine were more regularly distilled into industrial alcohol. Supported

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Spain: A Country Study

by the restructuring and reconversion program initiated by the

government in 1984 and by an EC assistance program, Spain's

vineyard acreage continued to decline, and it was expected to fall to 100,000 hectares by 1990. Spain's 1986 wine production was

estimated at 36.7 million hectoliters.

Grains covered about 10 percent of Spain's cultivated lands, and

about 10 percent of that area was irrigated. Wheat and barley were

generally grown in the dry areas because corn tends to crowd such

crops out of areas with more abundant rainfall or irrigation.

Although most of the wheat was grown in dry upland areas, some

of it also was grown on valuable irrigated land. Rice was dependent on plentiful water supplies and, accordingly, was produced

in the irrigated areas of the Levante, in Andalusia, and at the mouth

of the Rio Ebro. Spanish farmers also grew rye, oats, and sorghum.

During the mid-1980s, the grain crop usually hit record highs

of about 20 million tons, compared to 13 million tons in 1983. This

meant that Spain, long a grain-importing nation, now produced

a surplus of cereals. Barley had come to account for about onehalf of the grain harvest and corn for about one-sixth of it, as the

government encouraged production of these crops in order to reduce

imports of animal feed grains. Although the wheat crop was subject to wide fluctuations because of variable weather conditions,

it generally provided about one-fourth of Spain's total grain production, which exceeded the country's needs. Rice and oats constituted

the rest of the national total. Some rice and wheat were exported

with the help of subsidies, and analysts expected the surplus of wheat

and the deficit of corn to continue into the 1990s.

To make up for the shortage of domestic feed grains, Spain

became one of the world's largest importers of soybeans, and it developed a modern oilseed-crushing industry of such high productivity that surplus soybean oil became one of Spain's most important agricultural export commodities. The government encouraged

domestic production of soybeans to lessen the heavy dependence on soybean imports. To limit the impact of this production on the

important, labor-intensive, olive oil industry, which provided work

for many field hands in southern Spain, a domestic tax system was

established that maintained a two-to-one olive oil-soybean oil price

ratio. The revenues derived from this system subsidized large

exports of surplus soybean oil. The United States, once the main

source of soybean imports, lodged protests against this policy, both

bilaterally and internationally, but with little effect as of 1988.

As a further step in reducing Spanish dependence on imported

soybeans, the government encouraged sunflower production.

Especially favorable growing conditions, coupled with generous

164
Rice fields in Navarre

Courtesy National Tourist Office of Spain

government support, caused sunflower seed output to expand spectacularly, and the amount of land used for its cultivation went from

virtually nothing in 1960 to approximately 1 million hectares in

the 1980s. Sunflower-seed meal was not the most desirable livestock

feed, and therefore was not used in this way, but by the 1980s most

Spanish households used the cooking oil it provided because it was

less expensive than olive oil. About 8 percent of the cultivated land in Spain was devoted to legumes and to industrial crops. Edible legumes were grown in vir- tually every province; French beans and kidney beans predominated in the wetter regions; and chick peas (garbanzos) and lentils, in the arid regions. However, Spain was a net importer of legumes.

Although consumption of these crops declined as the standard of

living improved, domestic production also fell. Sugar beets were Spain's most important industrial crop. Annual

production in the mid-1980s averaged about 7 million tons. Cultivation was widely scattered, but the heaviest production was found

in the Guadalquivir Basin, in the province of Leon, and around

Valladolid. A small amount of sugarcane was grown in the Guadalquivir Basin. Sugar production, controlled to meet EC quotas, was

usually sufficient to meet domestic needs.

Although small quantities of tobacco, cotton, flax, and hemp were

also cultivated, they were not adequate to fulfill Spain's needs. But

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Spain: A Country Study

esparto grass, a native Mediterranean fiber used in making paper,

rope, and basketry, grew abundantly in the southeastern part of

the country.

Livestock

Spanish meat production in 1986 totalled 2,497,000 tons. The

country's farmers produced 137,000 tons of lamb and mutton,

435,000 tons of beef and veal, 765,000 tons of poultry, and

1,160,000 tons of pork. With some fluctuations, these figures were

representative of Spain's meat production during the 1980s. Spanish

livestock industries had experienced significant growth and modernization since the 1950s, but their output remained well behind the

levels of efficiency and productivity of EC countries. The EC states' generous subsidies and their experience in the use of expensive feed

grains gave their livestock industries a decided competitive advantage. As the Spanish livestock sector was increasingly concentrated

in northern Spain, where minifundio agriculture predominated,

many Spanish cattle-raising farms were too small to exploit fully

the efficiencies of modern technology. Domestic meat production

failed to meet demand, making Spain a net importer of farm animals

and meat products.

Pork was Spain's most important meat product, and the number of pigs grew from 7.6 million in 1970 to 11.4 million in 1985.

Pigs were raised unpenned in the central uplands, but they were

generally pen-fed in the northern regions. At times African Swine

Fever was a serious impediment to pork exports.

Poultry raising had also expanded rapidly, and the number of

chickens had doubled between 1970 and 1985, when it reached 54

million. The emphasis was on poultry production for meat rather

than for eggs, because poultry, previously a minor item in the Spanish diet, had become much more popular. The most important areas

for poultry raising were in the corn- growing provinces of the north

and the northwest, but Catalonia, Valencia, and Andalusia were

also important.

The principal cattle areas were in the north, the northwest, and,

to a lesser degree, in Extremadura, Andalusia, the Rio Duero Basin,

and the Murcia-Valencia lowlands. These regions provided the

suitable pastures that were available only in areas with humid

climates or with irrigated land. In 1986 Spain had 5 million cattle,

including 1.9 million dairy cows. About 25 percent of the cattle were raised as oxen for draft purposes, and about 2 percent were

bred for the bullring. The ranches of Extremadura and Andalusia

specialized in raising animals of bullring quality.

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The Economy

The dairy industry had grown rapidly. Milk production from

cows, sheep, and goats, which had stood at 5.4 million tons in 1974,

reached 6.4 million tons in 1986—well over double the production level of the early 1960s. The bulk of milk products came from

Galicia, Asturias, and Santander. In 1982 the government launched

a program designed to modernize milk production, to improve its quality, and to concentrate it in the northern provinces. The dairyindustry was not seriously hurt by Spain's entry into the EC,

although the 3 percent quota reduction for each of the years 1987

and 1988 and the 5.5 percent voluntary cutback hampered development.

Spain's sheep population remained almost unchanged at about

17 million between 1970 and 1985. Sheep rearing predominated

in central Spain and the Ebro Basin. Goats were kept in much the same area, but they were more prevalent in the higher, less grassy

elevations because they can survive on poorer pasture. Merino

sheep, the best known breed, were probably imported from North

Africa, and they were well adapted to semiarid conditions. Merino

sheep, noted for their fine wool, were widely used as stock for new

breeds. Other prominent breeds were the Churro and the Mancha.

Although raised primarily for wool, milk, and cheese, Spanish farm

animals, particularly sheep, were increasingly used to satisfy the

country's meat consumption needs.

Forestry

Most of the natural forests of the Iberian Peninsula had long

since disappeared because of erosion and uncontrolled harvesting

for firewood, timber, or the creation of pastureland. In the 1980s,

about 7 million hectares, or 14 percent of the land in Spain, could

be considered usable forest, although another 3.5 million hectares

of scrub growth were often included in forestland statistics. A reforestation program had been under way in Spain since 1940.

The aims of the program included meeting market demand for

forest products, controlling erosion, and providing seasonal employment in rural areas. Eucalyptus trees, Lombardy poplars, and a

variety of conifers were emphasized because of their fast growth.

Lumber output was approximately 12.3 million cubic meters in 1986, compared with 11.8 million cubic meters in 1985. Output

could conceivably triple if 5.8 million hectares of the best forestland,

which accounted for 50 percent of the total woodlands area, were

properly developed and managed. Existing forestation programs

were inadequate, however. For example, in the 1975-84 period,

the balance between reforestation and the loss of forestland as a

result of fires favored the latter by about 148,000 hectares. A report

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Spain: A Country Study

issued by the Forest Progress Association reported that, by the year

2000, Spain's wood deficit could reach between 8.5 and 16.9 million cubic meters. The value of Spain's forest products in 1985 was US$302 million. Pine trees grown in the north and the northwest as well as oak and beech trees grown in the Pyrenees accounted for most of

the total. Commercial forestry products produced in Spain included

cork, turpentine, and resins.

Spain was the world's second largest producer of cork after Portugal. The best quality of cork, used for bottle stoppers, was grown

in Catalonia. More plentiful lower grades, which went into lino- leum, insulating materials, and other industrial products, came

primarily from Andalusia and Extremadura. Cork production was

declining, after reaching a high in the 1970s of 97,000 tons per

year; only 46,000 tons were produced in 1985, as the widening

use of plastics and other cork substitutes reduced demand.

Fisheries

Spain was Western Europe's leading fishing nation, and it had

the world's fourth largest fishing fleet. Spaniards ate more fish per

capita than any other European people, except the Scandinavians. In the mid-1980s, Spain's fishing catch averaged about 1.3 million tons a year, and the fishing industry accounted for about

1 percent of GDP. Sardines, mussels, cephalopods, cod, mackerel,

and tuna, most of which came from the Atlantic Ocean, were the

principal components of the catch (see table 8, Appendix). Fishing was particularly important in the economic life of Galicia, the

principal fishing ports of which were Vigo and La Coruna on the

northwest coast. Also important were Huelva, Cadiz, and Algeciras

in the south, and Las Palmas de Gran Canaria and Santa Cruz

de Tenerife in the Canary Islands.

In the mid-1980s, the fishing fleet numbered between 13,800

and 17,500 vessels, most of which were old and small. Deep-sea

vessels numbered about 2,000. Spain's 100,000 fishermen made

up one-third of all EC manpower in the fishing sector, and a fur- ther 700,000 Spanish jobs depended on fishing. Prior to its admission into the EC , the undisciplined behavior of Spanish fishermen was a constant problem for the government and for other Europe- an countries. Spanish vessels were frequently charged with fishing

violations in the Atlantic and the North Sea. Entry into the EC

brought access to most of its waters, but it also meant catches would

be sharply restricted until 1995.

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The Economy

Food Processing

Food processing had become a major industry in Spain, and by

1985 this activity employed 450,000 workers in about 70,000 firms.

These enterprises were dominated by about 150 large companies,

many of which belonged to foreign multinational corporations.

Capital expenditures by all food processing companies amounted

to US$580 million in 1985, and the sector's productive value was

about US$20 billion in the same year. Changes in the nation's food

consumption patterns and increased tourism substantially contributed to the expansion of the food processing industry.

Industry

Industrial Development

Spain's rapid industrial development dates from about 1960, but

the underlying structure that made it possible resulted from a concerted effort by the government to reconstruct and to modernize

the economy after the destruction caused by the Civil War. In the

initial post-Civil War period of the early 1940s, the immediate need was for economic self- sufficiency because World War II had dis- rupted international trade patterns. After the war, most of the rest of Western Europe faced reconstruction problems, which left little surplus foreign capital for Spain. In addition, a political and eco- nomic boycott by the victorious Allies, the result of Franco's proAxis leanings, left Spain dependent on its own resources. The result was the slow, forced development of a diversified industrial sector, which would not have been economically justified if Spain had

been able to trade freely with its neighbors. The high operating

costs, the low rate of exports, and the inflation that consequently

befell the Spanish economy made the 1940s a difficult period for the country. In the 1950s, Spain, which had not been an original participant

in the Marshall Plan, received considerable aid from the United

States as part of a military basing agreement signed in 1953.

Industrial development subsequently became more rapid, but it was still hampered by the country's continued isolation from the more quickly recovering economies of Western Europe. Inflation,

fairly well under control in the rest of Europe, was rampant in the

1950s, and foreign exchange reserves declined because of Spain's

continuing inability to export its products.

The turning point for the economy, particularly for its industrial

sector, occurred in 1959, when a stabilization program went into

effect. This program marked the end of Spain's economic isolation.

Its outmoded system of multiple exchange rates was abandoned,

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Spain: A Country Study

and the peseta was devalued by 42.9 percent. Import duties and

quotas were progressively lowered or removed, and exports were

encouraged by subsidies, export credits, and other promotional

efforts. The result of these initiatives was the structural transformation of Spanish industry during the 1960s. The manufacturing

sector grew in real terms at an annual rate of 10.3 percent between

1958 and 1969. This growth was led by the motor vehicle and the

chemical industries, both of which were stimulated by foreign capital

and technology. The annual growth rates of these two key sectors were 24 and 14 percent, respectively. In the same period, labor

productivity grew by nearly 8 percent per year. Both domestic and export demand significantly contributed to the industrial growth of the 1960s and the early 1970s. The export

of manufactures rose from 43.5 billion pesetas in 1960 to 191 bil- lion pesetas in 1973, or from about 30 to 63 percent of the country's total manufacturing output.

The slowdown of the world economy caused by the increase in

oil prices in the 1970s began to affect Spain in the second half of

1974. Unique among Spain's major industrial sectors, mining had

been in trouble even before the price hike. It had continually experienced the slowest rate of growth during the period of expansion,

and it reached its high point relatively early, in 1972. Construction was affected by the oil crises because of its relation to the booming tourist trade, which also suffered reverses in 1974. Within the

manufacturing sector, textiles were particularly hard hit, and both

the automobile and the shipbuilding industries faced reduced sales and cancellations. Rapidly rising unemployment and continuing

inflation also indicated that the boom in Spain's industrial growth

had stagnated.

The economic boom of the 1960s and the 1970s had left Spain

with a large steel-producing capacity and had made it into one of

the world's largest shipbuilding nations. By the mid-1970s, both

of these industries experienced a production capacity glut as a result of sharply reduced global and domestic demand. Industrial retrenchment, however, was postponed during the 1970s. Sheltered to some

degree from the first oil price shock by a cut in taxes on oil products—and cushioned by a high inflation rate, the persistence

of negative interest rates, and protectionist tariff barriers—steel, shipbuilding, and other heavy industries continued their heavy

investment in new capacity despite the downturn in world demand

and the increasingly competitive international environment. Excess

capacity in these industries coincided with rapidly rising labor costs and, as a consequence, with reduced competitiveness and profit

margins.

170
Inspecting the nets in La Coruna Province

Courtesy National Tourist Office of Spain

One of the by-products of the country's economic difficulties was

a sharp reduction in industrial employment. In addition, the 1980

recession finally forced the government to permit Spanish oil prices

to rise toward world levels, while interest rates declined.

The first attempt at industrial restructuring was embodied in a 1981 law dealing with industrial reconversion. It proved difficult to implement, and a large part of the funds allocated for reconversion was siphoned off to cover losses among public-sector industrial companies. A more concerted attack was launched in 1983.

The following year, a white paper on reindustrialization was issued,

followed by a new law, the aims of which were to raise productivity

and to restore industrial profitability by downsizing in order to restructure financial liabilities and to eliminate excess capacity and

overmanning. To counterbalance these cutbacks, investment was

directed toward new technologies for use in sectors that showed

promise for greater growth and profit potential.

Development and expansion were encouraged in such industries

as food processing, consumer electronics, defense systems, and other

"growth" sectors. The industrial reconversion program was accompanied, however, by considerable worker discontent and by violent

incidents. The initial financial costs of the program were high, but

over time they were expected to yield considerable benefits.

By the mid-1980s, the economy had begun to emerge from a

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Spain: A Country Study

prolonged period of stagnation and crisis. The GDP commenced

its expansionary growth, rising by 2.3 percent in 1984 and by a high of 4.7 percent in 1987. Meanwhile, industrial output had suc- ceeded in shedding its sluggishness and had embarked on a vigorous

cycle of growth. Industrial production grew by 0.9 percent in 1984,

by 2.2 percent in 1985, by 3.5 percent in 1986, and by 4.7 percent

in 1987. Observers projected that output would somewhat decrease

in 1988 and in 1989, but that it would reach growth levels of 3.8

and 3.7 percent, respectively, in these years. Despite a modest

decline in the mid-1980s, Spanish economic and industrial growth

continued to be the strongest in Western Europe. Indicating an expanding economy, capital goods production increased by 9 per- cent in 1985, despite a previous decline in 1984. In the manufacturing sector, metal fabrication and the production of precision

instruments increased from 1.8 percent in 1984 to 4.1 percent in

1985. Nevertheless, production increases in minerals and in chemicals were a minimal 0.2 percent in 1985, compared with 3.3 per- cent in 1984. Auto assembly output soared, but iron and steel production and shipbuilding experienced sharp declines. Traditional

export-oriented activities, such as petroleum refining, and textile,

shoe, and leather production were suffering from reduced competitiveness.

In what probably would turn out to be the peak of the economic

boom, all major economic sectors posted healthy production gains

in 1987. In the wake of renewed investment demand, construction grew by an estimated 10 percent, and overall industrial growth was 4.7 percent.

Regional Concentration

Spanish industry has long been concentrated in a few areas. Traditionally, the major industrial areas were in Barcelona and

surrounding Catalonia, the northern region of Asturias and the

Basque provinces, Madrid, and to a lesser extent the mineral-rich

southwest.

Catalonia had a concentration of processing and engineering

industries, rather than basic industries. It was the dominant area

for food and textile industries, and it was a center for the production of electronics. Tarragona's industrial capacity, based on a large

oil refinery and a petrochemical complex, was growing rapidly.

Catalonia also had a highly developed machinery industry, including the country's largest automobile plant and extensive railroad

foundries and workshops, as well as diesel, electrical engineering,

and various industrial equipment plants.

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The Economy

The northern coast and the Basque region were centers of basic

industry because of their coal and iron ore deposits and their port

facilities, used for raw material imports. Spain's major iron and

steel works were located in the northern region, as were a number

of engineering industries, shipbuilding facilities, and chemical

plants.

Madrid was a major manufacturing center, producing, among

other items, automobiles, electrical equipment, and aircraft. Its location in the center of both Spain and the poorly endowed Meseta

Central would seem to make it a poor prospect for industrial development; however, its large population, transportation facilities, and

governmental role stimulated its evolution as an industrial center. By contrast, some of the country's industrially and agriculturally

poorer provinces lay in a vast arc separating Madrid from the north- ern coast and the Catalan areas. National Industrial Institute

Spain's industrial sector was marked by the presence of a major

subsector controlled by the government. Some of this subsector was

under the control of the Directorate General for State Assets (Direccion General del Patrimonio del Estado—DGPE—see Role of

Government, this ch.). By far the largest component of the public

sector, however, was contained within the National Industrial Insti- tute (Instituto Nacional de Industria—INI), which, since 1968, had

been under the supervision of the Ministry of Industry and Energy.

The Franco regime adopted extremely protectionist policies early,

and it opted for a high level of direct state intervention in the econ- omy. When INI was founded in 1941, it was intended to create or to subsidize industries in key sectors of the economy where pri- vate enterprise alone was insufficient to achieve self- sufficiency.

INI, which used both direct investments and collaboration with

sources of private capital, studiously avoided any involvement in

the banking sector; it especially favored industries related to national

defense. INI was granted powers to take over existing enterprises

and to create new ones when necessary.

Few of INI' s original purposes were realized. With the signing

of base agreements with the United States, the armed forces, beginning in 1953, became dependent on the United States for arms

equipment. INI's efforts to fill gaps in the economy were not very

effective. Instead of creating efficient new industries, it tended to establish inefficient ones and to hamper the activities of private

enterprise. Political favorites of the regime were permitted to unload

badly run, deficit-producing firms on INI, and many of its top positions were political sinecures.

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Spain: A Country Study

Efforts were periodically undertaken to bring INI more into line with the rest of Spanish industry, and, as a result, a more realistic approach toward the financing of industrial companies was

instituted. Government subsidies were permitted to cover the deficits of those INI firms that were considered to have incurred losses unavoidably. For example, the coal-mining conglomerate, Empresa

Nacional Hulleras del Norte (HUNOSA), which was set up by INI

in 1967 to reorganize the coal industry, was still losing money in

the late 1980s. In general, however, firms were expected to become

economically viable, although many did not. A policy change took place in 1974, however. It was decided that

INI, rather than remaining in the background of the industrial sector, was to serve as the linchpin of basic industries, such as ironmaking, steelmaking, and petrochemical production, and that it was

to become the prime promoter of development in high-technology

areas, such as electronics and aircraft manufacture.

By the mid-1980s, the companies directly controlled by INI

formed the single largest industrial group in the country, responsible

for 10 percent of Spain's GDP and for the employment of 200,000

workers. INI directed more than 60 firms—sometimes having 100

percent ownership in them—as well as more than 100 of their subsidiaries. INI firms produced all of the country's aluminum; most

of its ships; much of its steel, other metals, paper and pulp, and

transportation equipment; and many of its commercial vehicles.

It also controlled most of the country's two largest airlines: Iberia,

Lineas Aereas de Espafia; and Aviacion y Comercio (AVIACO).

A restructuring and investment program was launched in 1984

and 1985 to reduce INI's huge losses and to refocus industrial invest- ment and expansion. The overhaul was prompted in part by a need

to end INI's reliance on payments from the central government,

which would no longer be permitted when Spain completed its transition into the EC. The program had some successes. In 1983 INI

posted a record loss of 204 billion pesetas, but by the late 1980s

the restructuring program had steadily reduced the shortfall. In

its best performance since the late 1970s, the loss was cut to 45 bil- lion pesetas (US$421 million) in 1987. INI's improved performance was partly the result of the 1985 sale of the auto assembly company,

Sociedad Espanola de Automoviles de Turismo (SEAT), which had

lost 37 billion pesetas that year. The INI concerns that registered

profits were the national airline, Iberia, the electric power utilities, food processing plants, and enterprises producing electronics, alu- minum, paper, and fertilizers. Among the leading contributors to the deficit were Construcciones Aeronauticas (CASA), Empresa

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The Economy

National de Santa Barbara de Industrias Militares (Santa Barbara),

and the coal company, HUNOSA.

INI's losses had traditionally been the largest in the "rust belt"

industries—steelmaking, shipbuilding, and mining. In each of these

areas, the restructuring program downgraded INI's large holdings

through personnel cutbacks and the closing down of some old, ineffi- cient plants, production yards, and mines. Investments were undertaken to upgrade industrial facilities, such as those used in a new

continuous casting plant scheduled to begin operations by mid1989. The large steel company, Empresa Nacional Siderurgica

(ENSIDESA), was expected to reach the financial break-even point

by the end of 1988. In addition, the shipbuilding industry gradually was beginning to reemerge from its protracted slump.

Although INI intended to liberate itself from much of its customary

heavy reliance on government subsidies, massive government support would continue to sustain the ailing shipyard and coal-mining

industries. Government allocations in 1987 amounted to 150 billion pesetas (US$1.4 billion). Aid to government-supported firms was

designed to keep them operating in order to maintain employment.

Of particular note in INI's renovation was its partial privatization. In the mid-1980s, INI sold a 51 percent interest in SEAT

to Volkswagen (SEAT lost US$231 million in 1984). Minority interests, ranging from 25 to 45 percent, were being sold in the more

profitable public-sector companies through public stock offerings.

Shares in two electric power companies and a pulp-paper firm were

offered, and observers expected that shares in Iberia and in two

electric power companies would be offered in 1989. INI spokesmen, however, were quick to point out that such developments

should not be interpreted as an ideological or policy-oriented commitment to privatization. They were conceived of as part of an effort to improve management of public-sector companies and to use

private-sector resources to invest in modernization and expansion.

The funds gained from the sale of stock in INI companies were

to be used for strengthening them financially, for expanding exist- ing programs, and for embarking on new investment strategies.

Another part of INI's restructuring strategy called for a major

expansion of research and development. In the late 1980s, 1.6 per- cent of INI's revenues went to research and development, which was well above the overall Spanish corporate average of 0.5 percent,

but far below that of foreign technologically oriented companies.

The goal was to bring research and development expenditures up

to 3 percent of INI's income by 1992. The plan also emphasized

training and retraining for both white-collar and blue-collar workers.

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Spain: A Country Study

Manufacturing and Construction

Iron and Steel Spain's steel industry was located in the north at Vizcaya,

Cantabria, and Asturias, and in the south at Sagunto, near Valencia. Though the steel industry had had an important presence in

Spain since the second half of the nineteenth century, it had

expanded greatly during the boom years of the 1960s and the early

1970s. Production had gone from 1.9 million tons in 1960 to 11.1 million tons in 1975, making the country the fifth largest steel producer in Europe and the thirteenth largest in the world. By the

late 1970s, however, a worldwide glut in steelmaking capacity and

the domestic economic slump had led to a severe crisis in the industry. Thereafter, the Spanish steel industry experienced an extensive contraction, not only in production capacity, but also in the

size of its labor force. Despite a 50 percent drop in domestic steel consumption, production remained at about 13 million tons per year during the early

1980s, and it reached a high of 14 million tons in 1985. High

production levels were maintained through extensive exports; the

two largest steel producers, the state firm ENSIDESA, and the

Basque company, Altos Hornos de Vizcaya, were among the

nation's most important exporters after the large automobile companies. Both of these companies and most other steel companies

operated with heavy losses, however.

Membership in the EC and in the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) committed Spain to cutting back its iron and steel output and to reducing its overall capacity. Steel output declined

almost 16 percent in 1986, to 11.8 million tons, and it fell to a

slightly lower level in 1987. The government's efforts at restruc- turing the steel industry continued during the later 1980s with the

creation of Acenor, which consolidated the producers of special

grades of steel and became Western Europe's sixth largest firm of

this kind. The large blast furnaces at Sagunta were shut down, and

the government, which already controlled ENSIDESA and Altos

Hornos del Mediterraneo, both INI firms, took a 40 percent interest in Altos Hornos de Vizcaya.

Automobile Assembly

The greatest success story of Spain's economic expansion was

the rise of its large motor vehicle assembly industry. Although it started up only in 1950, by the early 1970s it had become the country's second most important industry in the manufacturing sector,

176
Steel mill at Aviles in Asturias

Courtesy Embassy of Spain, Washington

and in the mid-1980s it was the most important producer of exports.

Automobile production reached 38,000 units in 1960 and increased

sixfold between 1965 and 1976. By the 1980s, Spain manufactured an average of well over a million cars per year, and in 1987 it produced 1.4 million vehicles. A good part of this production was

exported. In 1985, for example, about 800,000 vehicles, out of a

total of 1.2 million, went abroad. By 1986 Spain's three largest

exporters were Ford Espana, General Motors Espana, and SEAT.

In addition to the manufacture of personal automobiles, Spain

produced substantial numbers of commercial vehicles. In the

mid-1980s, commercial vehicle production ranged from 130,000

to 300,000 units per year, and annual tractor production levels stood

at about 16,000 units.

Spain's motor vehicle industry was located in many parts of the

country. SEAT began its operations in Barcelona, while General

Motors Espana was located in the Zaragoza and Cadiz areas, Ford

Espana was near Valencia, and a number of companies were placed

around Madrid.

Subsidiaries of foreign firms dominated the automobile industry. In 1986 Fabricacion de Automoviles, SA (FASA Renault), with

about 20,000 employees, was Spain's largest automotive company, as measured by revenues. SEAT—at one time a Spanish

firm, but, since the mid-1980s, owned by Volkswagen—ranked

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Spain: A Country Study

second, followed by Ford Espana, General Motors Espana, and

Citroen Hispania. During the late 1970s and the early 1980s, both

Ford and General Motors became major domestic automobile

manufacturers. Other foreign firms involved in the motor vehicle

industry included Peugeot, Mercedes Benz, Land Rover, and

Japanese firms such as Nissan, Suzuki, and Yamaha.

In the late 1980s, Japanese investors sought to use Spain as a bridgehead to penetrate the West European market and to follow

the example of Ford Espana and General Motors Espana, which

exported about 75 percent of their output. Not all firms worked

from this premise, however. Renault and Peugeot-Talbot began

operations with the intention of catering to a highly protected Spanish home market.

The reviving economy of the second half of the 1980s was reflect- ed by a strong growth in domestic demand, including that for con- sumer durables. Sales of new cars rose from 629,000 units in 1985

to 860,875 in 1987, an increase of about 37 percent. In accordance

with the EC accession agreement, automobile imports were enter- ing Spain in increasing numbers, and they were securing a large

share of the market. In 1987 approximately 211,000 foreign-made

cars were sold in Spain, an increase of 101 percent over 1986;

imported automobiles increased their market share from 16 per- cent in 1986 to 25 percent in 1987.

Despite this increase in the sale of foreign cars, Spain's motor

vehicle industry remained strong. Investments had been made in industrial robots in order to enhance productivity, and in the late 1980s labor costs were highly competitive with those of foreign

producers. In late 1988, the Economist reported that a Spanish auto

worker earned about half as much as his West German counterpart. Observers regarded Spain as well positioned to emerge as the EC's market leader in small car production.

Shipbuilding

During the economic expansion of the 1960s and the early 1970s,

Spain became one of the world's leaders in shipbuilding, ranking

third in 1974. Its shipbuilding industry was one of the few major

industries in the country that made no use of foreign capital. Shipbuilding, both in Spain and among other shipbuilding nations, was

however, one of the main casualties of the post- 1974 energy crisis; following a sharp drop in orders in the late 1970s, the shipbuilding sector was in serious difficulty. Among Spain's leading industries, it was one of those most affected by production cutbacks,

closings, and reductions in personnel. The number of shipbuilding

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The Economy

yards able to build steel-hulled vessels declined from forty-three

in 1975 to thirty, ten years later. In the mid-1980s, more than half Spain's shipbuilding capacity was located in Cadiz; other major shipyards in the south were at Seville (Spanish, Sevilla) and Cartagena. In the north, important

shipyards were located at El Ferrol del Caudillo and in the province

of Vizcaya. The shipbuilding industry was dominated by two state- owned firms, both belonging to the INI group, and in 1986 each

had about 12,000 employees. One company, Empresa Nacional

Bazan de Construcciones Navales Militares (generally referred to as Bazan), constructed military vessels. The other, Astilleros Espanoles, SA (AESA), constructed civilian ships. The next three largest

firms employed a total of 4,000 persons.

After years of decline and heavy losses, in 1987 the Spanish shipbuilding industry turned the corner, showing strong gains in the

construction of vessels from small- to medium-size. In 1987 deliveries totaled 340,000 compensated gross registered tons, 90,000 tons more than in 1985 or 1986. Solid increases in foreign orders were

exceeded by domestic demand. Rigorous restructuring measures

undertaken in the 1980s were believed to have prepared the industry for the upsurge in orders on the world market that was expected

in the early 1990s.

Chemical Industry

Since the 1970s, the chemical industry had been one of Spain's

largest, and it continued to grow in the 1980s. By the mid-1980s,

it accounted for about 7 percent of the Spanish work force and

8 percent of the country's total industrial production. With its share

of exports at about 10 percent of the national total, it was the thirdlargest export industry. In 1985 chemical exports stood at US$1 .8 billion, increasing by a further 16 percent in 1986. The Spanish

chemical industry had received a substantial amount of foreign

investment capital and new technology, and in 1987 about 30 per- cent of its output came from foreign-owned companies. Although

many of its raw materials, including those for petrochemical production, had to be imported, the industry benefited from Spain's

deposits of pyrites, potash, and mercury. The largest components

of the chemical industry were those producing plastics, petrochemicals, pharmaceuticals, rubber manufactures, fertilizers, paints, and

dyes. All of these areas registered substantial gains in the 1980s.

As part of its policy of merging Spanish firms into larger entities better able to compete with foreign companies, the government

prodded the country's largest chemical firm, Rio Tinto Explosives,

to merge with the second-largest such enterprise, Cros, in 1988.

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Spain: A Country Study

By the time the merger occurred, sizable portions of both companies were controlled by the Kuwait Investment Office (KIO), which

managed both public and private Kuwaiti funds. The fertilizer inter- ests of the two companies were combined to form a new company,

Fosforico Espanol, and Rio Tinto ceded its considerable defense

interests. Textiles and Footwear

Since the early nineteenth century, the Spanish textile industry

has been concentrated in Catalonia. Though an established industry, it lacked the dynamism of many of the newer industries and

had the least impressive growth rate among Spain's manufacturing industries. It was an industry that suffered from excessive fragmentation, and, although, its operations were export-based, it depended on a protected domestic market. Spain's entry into the

EC removed tariff barriers to textile imports, and the industry

generally found itself in difficulty. Foreign investors showed little interest in the Spanish textile industry, and in the late 1980s it was

being subjected to extensive industrial modernization for greater

efficiency.

The Spanish shoe-manufacturing industry was concentrated

chiefly in the Valencia area and in the Balearic Islands. According to a Spanish government study, 90 percent of the country's

2, 100 shoe factories had fewer than 50 employees, and a large part

of the industry operated in the underground economy.

Construction

The rise and fall of Spanish construction activity tended to parallel

the ebb and flow of the general economy. During the 1960s and

the 1970s, a genuine boom occurred in construction, but it was more a reflection of the strong increase in tourism than a response

to housing needs that had been created by industrial and urban

growth. Extensive demand for hotels, apartment buildings, vacation housing, and amenities in tourist centers absorbed the atten- tion of much of the construction industry.

During the 1974 to 1984 period, the construction industry, like the rest of the economy, was in the doldrums. The year 1985 was

an especially poor one for construction, but, as the pace of economic

activity increased in 1986, there was also a notable acceleration

in construction. Cement consumption increased by 10.2 percent,

compared with 1985; new private-sector housing starts increased

by 10 percent; and construction expenditures rose by 5 percent.

The construction boom was even stronger in 1987, when the industry registered an increase of 10 percent, the highest rate of growth

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The Economy

in all Spanish industries. In the same year, the construction sector came to represent 7 percent of the country's GDP. Strong industrial expansion continued throughout 1988, and much of Spain's new construction was concentrated on urban offices, private housing, and tourist facilities. Employment has increased in all of Spain's nonagricultural sectors, but the construction industry showed the greatest relative

increase—11.2 percent—as a result of the 88,100 new jobs it created

in 1986. By comparison, there had been only 7,300 new construction jobs in 1985, and there had been a decrease of 110,400 jobs

in 1984. In the late 1980s, overall construction employment ac- counted for approximately one-third of the industrial work force. Despite the boom, however, the sector still operated at a level considerably below its capacity in the late 1980s, and the unemployment rate among Spanish construction workers was as high as 30 percent.

Mining

Though Spain's mining sector, including the coal-mining industry, employed only 80,000 persons and was responsible for only

about 1 percent of the country's GDP in the late 1980s, Spain was

an important producer of minerals. It was one of the world's leading producers of slate and strontium. It ranked second in the production of granite and marble; third, in pyrites and natural sodium

sulfate; sixth, in fluorspar; seventh, in kyanite and other refractory

minerals; eighth, in magnesite and potash; ninth, in tantalite; and

tenth, in anthracite, asphalt, and bentonite.

Spanish mineral production was of particular significance to the

EC because Spain was its sole producer of mercury, natural sodium

sulfate, and tantalite. Moreover, Spain mined approximately 9 per- cent of all EC copper, 86 percent of its antimony, 65 percent of

its gold and pyrite, 47 percent of its silver, 41 percent of its lead

and magnesite, 38 percent of its iron ore and tungsten, and 28 per- cent of its fluorspar and zinc. In addition to mining, Spain was

an important processor of raw minerals, both those produced

domestically and those imported from abroad. Although Spain was

the most self-sufficient member of the EC with regard to minerals,

imports were needed to meet about 30 percent of its needs. In the mid-1980s, Spain's mining industry suffered from the

depressed state of the world minerals market, and the production

of most substances had declined. The drop in the value of the dollar, the dominant currency in the mineral trade, further reduced

the sector's profits, which had already been damaged by declining

sales. Spanish production of copper, tin, and wolfram all declined

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Spain: A Country Study

by more than 75 percent in 1987 (see table 9, Appendix). The

production of iron, pyrites, and fluorspar also dropped significantly

in the same year. Zinc, potassium salts, uranium, and lead production remained steady during this period, however.

Energy

Spain is poor in energy resources, with the exception of coal. Rapid industrial growth has intensified the problems caused by

insufficient oil reserves, dwindling supplies of easily accessible highquality coal, and inadequate water for power generation. Until the

early 1980s, Spain increasingly depended upon imported petroleum,

and overall energy consumption continued to grow in the 1973-79

period. Following adjustment to a slower rate of economic growth

and to the changed energy market of the 1970s, Spanish energy

consumption declined in the early 1980s.

The National Energy Plan (Plan Energetico Nacional—PEN),

the basic statement of official energy policy, was first formulated

in 1978. Revised in 1983 to cover the 1984-93 period, the new

PEN aimed at a rationalization of energy consumption and a reduction in Spain's dependence on imported energy. It pressed, in addition, for a reorganization of the oil industry and for a financial

reorganization of the electricity industry. In contrast to the 1978-87

plan, it reduced the role of nuclear energy.

Petroleum

Although oil continued to be Spain's major source of energy,

it had diminished in importance significantly since 1973. Oil con- sumption grew steadily between 1973 and 1979, reaching 50 million tons in that last year, but by 1985 it had declined to 39 million

tons. Oil accounted for two-thirds of the country's primary energy

requirements throughout the 1970s, but by the mid-1980s the figure

had dropped to just over half. In 1985 alone, Spanish industry saved

40 billion pesetas (US$260 million) by replacing 500,000 tons of

oil consumption with coal and natural gas. In 1985 Mexico, responsible for 19.7 percent of Spain's petroleum

imports, was the largest single supplier of Spain's energy needs,

and in the mid-1980s Latin American countries provided Spain

with about one-quarter of its imported oil. Africa's share—Nigeria

being the most important supplier—dropped from 36.5 percent in 1985 to 29.3 percent in 1987. Middle Eastern countries provided

27.4 percent in 1985 and 29.6 percent in 1987. Western Europe's

share rose from 10.6 percent in 1985 to 16.5 percent in 1987. Efforts were under way to lessen Spain's dependence on Middle Eastern

oil and to increase imports from Mexico.

182
Vandellos nuclear power plant in Tarragona Province

Courtesy Embassy of Spain, Washington

In the 1980s, imported petroleum entered Spain via eight ports.

The three largest, in terms of vessel capacity, were Algeciras

(330,000 deadweight tons), Malaga (330,000 tons), and Cartagena

(260,000 tons).

Spain possessed a small domestic oil production capability that

yielded only 1.6 million tons in 1987. Despite a sizable exploration effort, only a few small fields and two medium-sized ones were

discovered. The Casablanca oil field, discovered in 1983, yielded

90 percent of Spain's domestic oil production in 1987, but it was

not large enough to offset an overall decline in Spanish production. The fall in oil prices in the 1980s further reduced the country's exploration efforts. The Spanish oil industry imported and refined foreign crude

petroleum; it distributed petrochemical products within Spain; and,

in the mid-1980s, it exported about 10 million tons of finished

petroleum products per year. As with some other sectors of the Spanish economy, the domestic oil industry had been brought under state control. Distribution

of petroleum products had been in the hands of the state monopoly,

Compama Arrendataria del Monopolio de Petroleos (CAMPSA),

since 1927, and large portions of the shipping and refining system were state owned. To rationalize the petroleum industry and to make it able to withstand foreign competition, the National Institute

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Spain: A Country Study

for Hydrocarbons (Instituto Nacional de Hidrocarburos—INH)

was formed in 1981 in order to direct CAMPSA and those parts

of the oil, gas, and petrochemical industry supervised by INI. By

the mid-1980s, INH was responsible for more than 1 percent of

the Spanish GDP, and it claimed 20,000 employees. To prepare

for Spain's entry into the EC, after which state monopolies were

required to be phased out, all of INH's holdings, with the exception of the state gas company, Empresa Nacional del Gas

(ENAGAS), were placed under a new holding company in the late 1980s. The company, Repsol, which had a stock market listing, was gradually to allow a greater role for private capital in the petroleum industry. By 1988 Repsol had become Western Europe's

seventh largest petroleum company, and its management planned

to continue to control about half of the Spanish market once that

market was fully opened to foreign firms in 1992. EC membership rendered CAMPSA's future uncertain, for it would no longer

be allowed its distribution monopoly. The Treaty of Accession that

brought Spain into the EC stipulated that specific amounts of nine

groups of petroleum products from foreign suppliers would have

access to the Spanish market. In 1986 these products were to have

a 5 percent share of the domestic market—a share that was to increase by 20 percent (of this 5 percent) each year thereafter. Coal

Spain's coal reserves are found primarily in Asturias, with smaller

deposits located near southwestern Seville (Spanish, Sevilla),

Cordoba, and Badajoz, and in northeastern Catalonia and Aragon

(Spanish, Aragon). Most of the country's lignite is located in

Galicia. Domestic coal is generally of poor quality, and, because

of the structure of Spanish deposits, it is more expensive than

imported coal. In 1967 HUNOSA, a state holding company under

the control of INI, was founded to direct most of Spain's coal mining, and it gradually took over the larger coal companies.

Higher oil prices have spurred domestic coal production. Annual

production in the early 1970s amounted to about 10 million tons of coal and 3 million tons of lignite. By the mid-1980s, the industry produced 15 million tons of coal and 23 million tons of lignite

annually. This higher rate of production was insufficient to meet

domestic needs because coal had come to supply about 25 percent

of Spain's needed energy, compared with about 16 percent in the

early 1970s. About 5 million tons of foreign coal were imported

per annum.

Over the years, there had been little change in patterns of coal

consumption. Hard coal, used mainly for the generation of electricity,

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The Economy

accounted for 65 percent of total demand. The steel and cement

industries were the two next-largest consumers.

In line with the energy rationalization policies set by PEN, the

government sought to increase the efficiency of the coal-mining

sector by closing down high-cost mines and by providing financial

aid for the industry's modernization. To encourage the cement and

other industries to convert from oil to coal, the government allowed

them to import duty-free coal. The government also made efforts to substitute the use of oil for coal in urban areas. Natural Gas

In order to reduce Spain's dependence on imported oil, PEN

encouraged natural gas consumption. Efforts to redirect the use

of fuels were successful, and in the 1980s the consumption of natural

gas increased faster than that of any other fuel. Total natural gas

demand doubled between 1973 and 1984, and in 1987 it accounted

for 3.85 percent of all energy consumption. Energy planners hoped

to increase this share to 7 percent by 1992.

Domestic production of natural gas began in 1984 with the

development of the Serrablo field; two years later, the Gaviota field went into operation. In 1987 domestic production supplied about

one-sixth of Spain's natural gas consumption, and observers antici- pated that its share might rise to as much as one-third by 1990.

Domestic production shortfalls were taken up by imports from

Algeria and Libya under long-term contracts. In 1988 it was agreed

that Spain's gradually expanding gas pipeline network would be

connected to the European network, and Norwegian gas was scheduled to begin arriving in Spain in 1992.

Electricity

Although Spain's mountainous terrain would appear to be well- suited to hydroelectric power production, the scarcity of water

limited such potential and was the principal reason for Spain's heavy

dependence on thermal power. In 1986 only 27.2 percent of the

country's electricity came from hydroelectric plants, while 50.6 per- cent came from conventional thermal plants, and 22.2 percent came

from nuclear plants. The most important fuel for the production

of electricity was coal, which generated about 40 percent of the total. In 1987 the production of electricity amounted to 132,000 million

kilowatt hours—about six times the amount produced in 1960 and

twice the production level of 1970. The total installed capacity of

the predominantly privately owned electrical system was about

185
Spain: A Country Study

40 gigawatts—an amount large enough to meet the country's needs

and to allow some exports. In the second half of the 1980s, the

growth of the demand for electric power was less than anticipated,

and Spain had a supply adequate to last until the mid-1990s. The

Spanish level of per capita electric power consumption was among

the lowest in Western Europe, surpassing only those of Greece and

Portugal.

A key element in the future of Spain's electric power industry was the role to be assigned to nuclear power. Nuclear power was

an important factor because of scarce petroleum reserves, the limited

potential for hydroelectric power production, and the presence of

significant uranium deposits. The first PEN, drawn up in 1978,

emphasized the role that nuclear power would play in meeting the

nation's ever- increasing need for electricity. The revised PEN of

1984 postponed the opening of the Lemoniz Nuclear Power Plant

for political reasons, and it continued the mothballing of three other

nuclear plants. The government decided, nonetheless, that if the

demand for electricity increased by more than 3 percent, work on

one of the plants might be restarted. The new PEN also emphasized the benefits of increased natural gas consumption.

Services

Banking

By the late 1980s, the Spanish banking system had been undergoing sweeping changes for some time. Its structure was largely a throwback to the post-Civil War period of the Franco era, when

Spanish private banks played a leading role in financing the development of industry. As financial backers of the Nationalist cause, they

had won Franco's confidence and gratitude, and they were given

a relatively free hand during the reconstruction period. With the

adoption of an economic policy that emphasized self-sufficiency and

barred foreign investment capital and banking competition, their role was strengthened. It has been estimated that, by 1965, the

five leading private banks controlled over 50 percent of Spain's

capital. Their influence extended not only to the private sector,

but also to such autonomous institutions as INI and the state rail- roads. Subsequently, as industry grew stronger, many of the banks'

equity holdings were sold to the public through stock exchanges.

The banks, however, continued to play a vital role in providing

new funds for industry.

Supervision of all Spanish financial institutions rested with the

Ministry of Economy, Finance, and Commerce. Subordinate to

this ministry, and responsible for overseeing the country's banking

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The Economy

system, was the country's central bank, the Bank of Spain. Formed

in 1847, and granted the sole right to issue currency in 1874, the

bank was nationalized by the Bank Reform Law of 1962. In addition to supervising the rest of the banking system and setting reserve requirements, it carried out the government's monetary policy

through open market operations, and it oversaw foreign exchange

along with the Directorate General for Foreign Transactions. In

1977 the Bank of Spain had helped set up the Deposit Guarantee

Fund, which protected deposits in troubled banking institutions.

Of the three main groups of banks in the Spanish banking

system—private banks, savings banks, and official credit institu- tions—private banks were the most important. In 1962 private

banks were divided into commercial banks and industrial banks.

The latter had the right to invest a higher proportion of their resources in equity holdings than the former, and they specialized

in industrial investments. Commercial banks, which were larger

and more numerous, served the general public; they were the principal source of short-term credit for the private sector, though they

also competed for long-term loans. By the late 1980s, the distinction between the two kinds of banks had lost much of its meaning,

for each had gradually been allowed to operate in the other's area

of specialization.

Although in the second half of the 1980s Spain had about 100

private banks—a quarter of which were industrial banks—the field had long been dominated the Big Seven, seven large commercial

institutions: Banco Espanol de Credito, or, as it was more com- monly known, Banesto; Banco Central; Banco de Bilbao; Banco

Popular Espanol; Banco de Santander; Banco de Vizcaya; and

Banco Hispano Americano. By the 1980s, these banks had direct or indirect control of approximately 80 percent of the country's

banking resources. The leading banks controlled huge industrial portfolios, by far the largest in Spain. The market value of these holdings was not

known, but analysts estimated that Banesto possessed about

US$3 billion, and Banco Central, about US$1 billion. These large

Spanish banks were present in virtually every area of finance.

Beyond their industrial holdings, they also possessed extensive retail networks. Because Spain did not have an adequate pension fund

system, many Spaniards invested their savings in order to provide

for their retirement. Consequently, there were 5 million retail investors among Spain's 39 million people, the highest proportion

in Europe.

Banking can be said to be the last redoubt of Francoist economic

autarchy. Banks had grown during the Franco period by borrowing

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Spain: A Country Study

cheaply from their customers and then selling their services at huge

margins. During the late 1970s and the early 1980s, when a number of banks found themselves in serious difficulties, the government, for the first time, permitted their purchase by foreign banks.

When it became clear that the more sophisticated foreign banks were rapidly making inroads into the traditional preserves of the

large Spanish banks, however, the government closed the door to their further influx. Foreign banks were no longer to be allowed

entry into Spain before the 1992 deadline set by the EC integration agreement, so that the Spanish banking system would have

the maximum amount of time to modernize.

By the second half of the 1980s, Spanish banks were still not inter- nationally competitive. The banks tended to be greatly overstaffed,

and they possessed far too many branches, compared with their

West European counterparts. Only in Belgium were there more

branches per capita. In addition, the inadequate investments of

Spanish banks were compensated for financially by the overpricing of services for bank clienteles. An EC report of the late 1980s

indicated that, in order for the costs of financial services in member states to be harmonized, those of the Spanish banking system

would have to be cut by 34 percent. In comparison, those of French

banks would have to be reduced by 24 percent, and those of British banks, by 13 percent.

The pressure to revamp Spain's banking industry was, therefore, very great. Mergers were undertaken with the government's

encouragement in order to create large Spanish financial holdings

that could adequately compete with their European rivals. Although an attempted merger of the Banco de Bilbao and Banesto fell through in 1987, in early 1988 a successful union took place between

the Banco de Bilbao and the Banco de Vizcaya. This merger

resulted in the creation of Western Europe's thirty-second largest

financial institution, the Banco Bilbao-Vizcaya. In 1988 the planned

merger of the two largest private banks, Banco Central and Banesto,

fell through, but analysts expected that, before 1992, the Big Six

of the Spanish banking industry might, through various mergers,

become the Big Three or the Big Four.

The second major group in the banking system consisted of

savings banks, which predominated in rural areas that could not

attract branches of the leading private banks. These banks did not come under the control of the Bank of Spain until 1971, having

previously had their own official governing body, the Credit Insti- tute for Savings Banks. Heretofore, they had generally accounted

for about one-quarter of total lending in the private sector. Since

the late 1970s, savings banks have raised their share of total

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The Economy

national deposits from 34 percent to 45 percent—a feat that was

accomplished despite severe restrictions. In the mid-1980s, these

restrictions were gradually being relaxed. For example, barriers

that limited their operations to specific areas or regions were lifted in June 1988, and by 1992 they were to be free to open up branches

anywhere in the country. In terms of deposits, the Barcelona-based

Caja de Pensiones para la Vejez y de Ahorros de Catalufia y

Baleares, popularly known as La Caixa, was the country's largest

savings bank. Another large savings bank was La Caja de Madrid.

After the relevant restrictions were lifted, a large-scale merger

process commenced among savings banks. This trend appeared

likely to become a substantial factor in the country's savings banks'

operations.

Legally, savings banks were nonprofit institutions, but in reality

they were quite profitable; in 1987, for example, they were more

profitable than rival commercial banks. One reason for this was

that savings banks were self-financed foundations without stockholders. The seventy-seven savings banks operating in the late 1980s

lent mostly to families and to small and medium-sized businesses.

The third leg of the Spanish banking industry consisted of offi- cial credit institutions, each with a specialized sphere of influence.

These credit institutions were under the control of the Directorate

General for State Assets (Direccion General del Patrimonio del

Estado—DGPE), and they were supervised by the Official Credit

Institute (Instituto de Credito Oficial—ICO), which received funds

from the state that were then lent to the credit institutions. The

largest of these was the Industrial Credit Bank (Banco de Credito

Industrial), which specialized in general industrial loans. The Mortgage Bank of Spain (Banco Hipotecario de Espana) provided mortgage loans for urban and rural properties. The Agricultural Credit

Bank (Banco de Credito Agricola) provided credit for agriculture

and related sectors. Provincial and municipal administrative bodies were served by the Local Credit Bank (Banco de Credito Local).

Also under the ICO, but only partially so, was the Overseas

Trade Bank (Banco Exterior de Espana), which had been founded

in 1923 to promote exports. More than half the bank's capital was

in private hands. In addition to its participation in foreign trade,

it competed with domestic commercial banks and ranked just below

the former Big Seven in terms of its size. Like the official credit

institutes, the Overseas Trade Bank was among those bodies

belonging to the DGPE.

Analysts expected the increasing financial liberalization of the

Spanish banking system to affect the status and the functions

of the country's public banks. The freeing of funds tied up in

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Spain: A Country Study

government-required investments would eliminate the "privileged

circuits" through which funds at low interest rates were normally

channeled into such investments. In mid- 1988 legislation was being

prepared that would redefine the role of publicly owned banks by

converting them into subsidiaries of the ICO and by forcing them

to finance themselves at market rates. To assist them in adapting

to these new circumstances, a period of gradual adjustment last- ing as long as fifteen years was being considered, during which

they could continue to depend on financing from the Ministry of

Economy, Finance, and Commerce.

Stock Market Exchanges

Spain's four stock market exchanges, located in Madrid, Barcelona, Bilbao, and Valencia, were also undergoing accelerated

modernization in the late 1980s. Nevertheless, the country's nearly

200 powerful exchange and stock market agents (agentes de cambio

y bolsa) exercised a monopoly on all equity transactions, as they

had for over a century and a half. These agents, who were required

to take civil service examinations and to perform bureaucratic functions, were government employees for all practical purposes, but

many of them earned as much as US$1 million a year. Under the Securities and Market Reform Act of 1988 (Ley de

Reforma de Mercado de Valores), stock market operators were to be attached to brokerage houses, several dozen of which were

established in 1987 and 1988. These houses either dealt in shares,

and were known as sociedades de valores (SVs), or they functioned as brokers to third parties and were called agendas de valores (AVs). Other

planned changes in the stock market system included eliminating

fixed commissions, establishing a strict regulatory body, and creat- ing continuous trading and electronic bookkeeping systems.

Spanish stock markets had traditionally been notoriously undercapitalized, and both domestic banks and foreign interests had been

excluded from their operations. The government's intention was

to make Spain's stock markets more competitive and to allow them

a greater role in the country's capital market. Most major trans- actions had previously taken place outside the stock exchange, but

now Spanish banks were to be granted entry to the domestic securities market, and foreigners were to be allowed access to it on equal

terms by 1992. In the interim, the country's stock markets were

being given several years of breathing space in order to prepare

for this challenge.

Transportation and Communications

Spain's road network covered 320,000 kilometers in 1986. Of

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The Economy

the total, 2,000 kilometers were superhighways and 20,000 kilometers were main roads (see fig. 11). Fewer than 2,000 kilometers

of the network consisted of toll roads. In the 1980s, road transport was by far the most important method of moving people and goods. In 1983 roads accounted for 90 percent of all interurban passenger

travel. Railroads accounted for 7 percent, and aviation, for 3 per- cent of the total. Internal freight traffic figures were similarly

weighted toward road transport; the shares of mileage in this cate- gory were road, 73 percent; marine, 18 percent; railroad, 7 percent; and aviation, 2 percent. About 75 percent of the people

entering or leaving Spain travelled by road, but nearly 90 percent

of imported or exported goods were transported by sea. By the late 1980s, Spain's road system was in need of upgrading. The local road network was so extensive, however, that improving it was fraught with difficulties. The network of major roads,

accounting for 80 percent of the country's traffic, was gradually

being upgraded under a sucession of long-term plans, none of which was very successful. The 1984-91 General Highways Plan, directed

by the Ministry of Public Works and City Planning, envisioned

the construction of 5,000 kilometers of highways.

Railroad construction began in the middle of the nineteenth cen- tury with the aid of foreign capital. In 1941 the many poorly run

railroad companies were nationalized and then united through the

creation of the Spanish National Railroad Network (Red Nacional

de los Ferrocarriles Espanoles—RENFE). RENFE had its own

statute. It was not operated by any of the state holding companies, but instead was supervised by a board nominated by the

minister of transportation, tourism, and communications. After

nationalization, the system continued to experience difficulties, los- ing much of its freight and passenger traffic to road transportation. An impediment to its use for international traffic was that

the track gauge of most of the RENFE system differed from that

of neighboring countries. Traffic in parts of the system was so light

that in 1984 the government decided to reduce the system by 3,500

kilometers, and in 1985 it removed 1,000 kilometers from operation. As of the mid-1980s, the Spanish state railroad system totalled about 13,000 kilometers, half of which were electrified. A major

thirteen-year renovation program was announced in 1986.

Spain made little use of inland shipping, but nearly 90 percent

of all transport in and out of the country was accomplished by sea

in the early 1980s. At the end of 1987, the Spanish merchant fleet consisted of 957 ships of at least 100 gross tons, and it had a total gross tonnage of 4.6 million tons. There were, however, an excessive number of companies engaged in shipping, some of them

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Spain: A Country Study

Bay of Biscay

in Santander

Atlantic

Ocean

Lisbon

H—

h

International

boundary

National capital

Populated place

Road

Railroad

Airport

J, Port

50 100 Kilometers

1

' l' 'l ' I

1 50 100

Gibraltar (Br.) \Ceuta

\(Sp.) MOROCCO

Isla de & Alboran

(Sp.)

Melilfa

Figure 11. Transportation System, Mid-1980s

192
The Economy

193
Spain: A Country Study

owning but a single vessel. In addition, many companies did not

have the resources to upgrade their ships, and the fleet suffered

from obsolescence. An indication of the troubles of the Spanish shipping industry was that the largest shipowner in the country, the

Industrial Credit Bank, had to attach liens to many of its ships.

Spain had some 200 ports in the 1980s. The ten largest ports

Cartagena, Santa Cruz de Tenerife, Bilbao, Barcelona, Gijon,

Aviles, Puerto de la Luz, Huelva, Valencia, and Seville—accounted

for 75 percent of all maritime traffic. Since the 1960s, there had

been a good deal of investment in port facilities, and Spanish ports were able to handle all types of shipping.

In the mid-1980s, Spain had approximately forty airports that were open to civil aviation, about half of which could receive inter- national flights. Two airlines dominated Spanish commercial

aviation—Iberia, Lmeas Aereas de Espana (generally known simply as Iberia) and Aviacion y Comercio (AVIACO). In addition,

there were four airlines that offered charter services. During the

1980s, air transport attracted an increasing share of the traffic previously carried by RENFE and by the country's shipping companies. Spain's size encouraged the use of aircraft for domestic travel,

and Iberia and AVIACO had exclusive rights in this area. Demand

was at times too heavy to be met adequately, and fares were so low that domestic operations were not particularly profitable. Iberia

had experienced grave economic difficulties in its overseas operations in the late 1970s and the early 1980s, but business improved

in the second half of the decade (see National Industrial Institute,

this ch.).

The National Telephone Company of Spain (Compama Telefonica Nacional de Espana—CTNE), popularly known as La

Telefonica, was established in 1924 as a subsidiary of the Americanowned International Telephone and Telegraph Company (ITT).

The company was granted exclusive monopoly rights for the instal- lation of telephone service in 1945, when it was nationalized.

CTNE's operations were supervised by DGPE, and as of 1984 the

government had a 31 .5 percent interest in the company. In an effort to modernize its telecommunications network, CTNE entered into

technology agreements with a number of West European, Japanese,

and United States companies, and it also obtained stock market

listings in Frankfurt, London, Paris, Tokyo, and New York. In

addition, CTNE planned to invest 260 billion pesetas—a tremendous increase over earlier years—with the aim of becoming a guiding force in Spanish high technology. An indication that there was room for the company to grow was that Spain had a mere 369

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The Economy

telephones per 1 ,000 inhabitants in 1985, a figure that lagged well

behind most other EC countries.

The Postal Service, which included the national telegraph sys- tem, was operated by the Ministry of Transportation, Tourism,

and Communications. Its headquarters was in the Palace of Communications in Madrid. One of the services offered by the Postal

Service was a network of postal savings banks, which had been

established in 1916.

Tourism

Although historical sites and unique cultural features had always

made Spain attractive to foreign visitors, the tourist boom that

began in the mid-1950s was based primarily on the recreational

assets of the Mediterranean seashore areas. The country had fewer

than 1 million tourists in 1950, but the number rose steadily, reaching more than 34 million in 1973 and 50.5 million in 1987 (see

table 6, Appendix).

The tourist boom had a significant, and not wholly beneficial,

impact on the Spanish economy. Though it was a welcome source

of foreign exchange and created new employment opportunities, it also diverted capital investment and construction efforts away from more stable economic activities to a sector subject to seasonal fluc- tuations, the whims of fashion, and worldwide economic conditions.

Nonetheless, the importance of tourism to the Spanish economy

was substantial. Net tourist receipts averaged about 5 percent of

GDP in the early 1970s, but in 1987 that figure rose to almost

10 percent, as receipts rose to US$14.7 billion—more than enough

to cover the country's merchandise trade deficit. On a net basis,

Spain's tourist revenues were the highest in the world. The United

States had higher gross revenues, but its tourist expenditures ex- ceeded revenues by a considerable margin.

Spain's 50.5 million foreign visitors in 1987 constituted 12 per- cent more than had come in 1986. Most of them came from the

EC, with France, Portugal, Britain, and West Germany leading

the way. American tourists accounted for less than 2 percent of

the total, but they spent more per person than their European counterparts, making the United States the second source of tourist

receipts after Britain. Tourism was projected to remain strong in

1988, with a 5 percent increase in visitors. Tourist sector spokespersons were more concerned about raising tourist spending, however,

than with increasing the number of visitors. The average expenditure per foreign visitor increased only 2.4 percent in 1987.

The most popular resort areas were the Balearic Islands and

the Mediterranean coastal areas. The Balearic Islands generally

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Spain: A Country Study

accounted for about 34 percent of the number of nights foreign

tourists spent in Spain; the Costa Brava and the Costa Dorada,

stretching from the French border through Barcelona to Tarragona,

accounted for 22 percent; and the Costa del Sol and Costa de la Luz, extending from Almerfa on the southern—or Mediter- ranean—coast to Ayamonte on the Atlantic coast at the Portuguese

border, accounted for 12 percent. The distant Canary Islands

attracted 13 percent of Spain's foreign guests, and land-locked

Madrid was host to 8 percent. Cultural festivals were instituted

in Santander and Madrid in an effort to increase the attractive- ness of these cities. The seaside resorts continued to dominate the

tourist industry, however, despite considerable government effort to stimulate interest in visiting historical and cultural sites. Although areas on the northern coast facing the Bay of Biscay were accessible to the rest of Europe and had good weather in the

summer, when most Europeans and Americans took their vacations, their share of the tourist trade was only about 3 percent. San

Sebastian was the center of the tourist industry on the Bay of Bis- cay, and nearby towns were also popular, but their allure was

limited by tourist apprehensions over continuing political turbulence and violence in the Basque region.

Tourist centers farther to the west, on the Cantabrian coast and

in Galicia, were not so commercially developed as the better known

Basque or Mediterranean resorts. Accordingly, their appeal to tourists was their traditional Spanish flavor. They also provided

visitors with less elaborate, but also less expensive, accommodations.

Like most nations dependent on tourist trade, Spain was con- cerned about the underutilization, and sometimes overutilization,

of facilities that was caused by seasonal variation in weather. These

variations caused marked differentials in monthly tourist revenues and international trade receipts. July and August were the most

active months; February was the least active. Efforts were made

to develop winter sports facilities in order to increase the number

of tourists visiting Spain during the colder months; however, competition from France, Switzerland, and Austria, where snow conditions were more reliable, constituted a formidable obstacle to success in this area. Tourism was recognized, even before World War II, as an important economic activity worthy of government support. A chain of

official hotels, known as tourist inns (paradores) , was initiated at historical sites in the 1920s during the Primo de Rivera regime,

and it was extended during the postwar years. Tourist promotion was a function of the Ministry of Interior until 1951, when the

Ministry of Information and Tourism was created. In the late 1980s,

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197
Spain: A Country Study

the Ministry of Transportation, Tourism, and Communications

took on this responsibility. The National Tourist Company, a state- owned enterprise, was engaged in the construction of hotels and

tourist complexes.

Tourist promotion encompassed such routine activities as advertising and distributing maps, information folders, and lists of accom- modations and shops. In addition, tourist offices were maintained

in major foreign cities in order to encourage, to advise, and to assist people planning visits to Spain. Within the country, tourist assis- tance was provided by a network of more than seventy local tourist

information offices found in all major cities and sites of interest. Although most tourist accommodations were privately owned

and operated, there was considerable government supervision of

the industry. All restaurants and hotels were inspected, classified,

and controlled by the Ministry of Transportation, Tourism, and

Communications. Prices for meals and accommodations were controlled, and establishments catering to tourists were required to maintain complaint books which were intended to help the ministry's inspectors identify any shortcomings. In addition, the government operated a number of accommodations. These establishments

included the above-mentioned paradores, many of which were con- verted castles, palaces, or other buildings of historical or cultural

interest. Government-operated inns (albergues) were maintained on

highways away from larger cities and towns, and many areas had

hostels (hosterias), which were government-operated restaurants

featuring traditional regional dishes. The ministry also maintained

a number of mountain lodges (refugios).

Foreign Economic Relations

Spain has had a long legacy of tariff protectionism and economic

isolationism, and until the 1960s it remained outside the West

European and international economic mainstreams. Spain's effort in the late 1980s to accelerate its integration into the EC customs

and economic structures resulted in a drastic accommodation to international and West European trading standards.

When Spain embarked on a period of economic modernization

in the 1960s, its foreign trade, as a percentage of overall economic

activity, was below the average for other major West European

countries. Exports and imports amounted to about 16.5 percent

of the Spanish GDP in 1960. During the 1960s, Spain's foreign

trade increased at an annual rate of about 15 percent; in the 1970s,

it grew at an even higher rate. After the oil price increases of the

1970s slowed the world economy, Spanish trade expanded less rapidly. By 1984, after a period of sluggish growth, foreign trade

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The Economy

made up about 25 percent of the country's GDP. According to the

Economist, in 1987 Spanish imports and exports, respectively,

accounted for 16.8 and 11.7 percent of the nation's GDP. These

figures indicated an increasing linkage with the world economy,

but even in the 1980s foreign trade played a smaller role in Spain's

economy than it did in most other European countries.

Spain has not had a positive trade balance since 1960, when

exports of US$725 million exceeded imports by US$4 million. In

1961 imports were about one-third larger than exports—a quantitative relationship that, for the most part, has held steady ever

since then, despite enormous increases in Spanish exports. In the

mid-1980s, Spain's trade deficits ranged from just over US$4 bil- lion in 1984 and in 1985 to US$13 billion in 1987, when merchandise imports amounted to US$49.1 billion, and exports, to US$34.2

billion. A booming economy with strong domestic demand was

responsible for a surge of imports in 1987 —an increase of 25 percent, compared to 1986.

Spain's chronic trade deficits were often offset by large earnings

from the tourist industry and by remittances from Spaniards working abroad. The revenue from these two sources often allowed

invisible receipts to exceed the trade deficit, the result being a sur- plus in the nation's current account balance. In 1983 Spain's cur- rent account balance registered a deficit of US$2.7 billion, but this was followed by surpluses during the next four years. In 1985 the

surplus amounted to US$2.8 billion, and in 1986 it was US$4.2

billion. The surplus for 1987 was only US$184 million but, as capital

goods made up much of that year's imports, economists were not alarmed.

Although famous for its production of citrus fruits, olives, and

wine, about three-quarters of Spain's exports consisted of manufactured products in the mid-1980s (see table 10, Appendix). In 1986

and in 1987, manufactured goods made up 74.4 and 72.4 percent

of the country's exports, respectively, while foodstuffs accounted

for 16.1 and 17.6 percent, respectively. In these two years, raw

materials made up about 4 percent of Spain's exports, and fuel products, about 6 percent. Merchandise imports generally exceeded

merchandise exports by about one-third. In the 1980s, manufactured goods constituted about two-thirds of all imports, fuels as much as one-fifth, and other raw materials and foods about onetenth each.

Trading Partners

Ever since steps were taken in the 1960s to liberalize Spain's econ- omy, its trade with West European countries had steadily expanded.

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Spain: A Country Study

In 1973 EC countries accounted for 47.8 percent of Spain's exports,

and they provided 37 percent of its imports. In the early 1980s,

this ratio had not changed significantly; in 1982 the respective fig- ures were 48.6 and 31.8 percent. After Spain's accession to the

EC, however, the balance shifted radically; in 1987 some 63.8 per- cent of Spain's exports went to the EC, while the EC supplied Spain

with 54.6 percent of its imports (see table 11, Appendix). In 1987

France was Spain's most important trading customer, taking 18.9

percent of its merchandise exports; West Germany was the largest source of imports, supplying 16.1 percent of the total. The United

States, which was Spain's single most important trading partner

in the 1970s, accounted for just over 8 percent of both imports and

exports in 1987. Increased trade with the EC caused Spain's eco- nomic interaction with most of the rest of the world to decline on

a relative basis. This decline was most marked with regard to the

Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC), which

supplied Spain with 26.8 percent of its imports and received

5.3 percent of its exports in 1982, compared with 9.5 and 6.5 per- cent in 1987.

Foreign Investment

Since the late 1950s, foreign investment has played an increasingly crucial role in Spain's economic modernization. One of the

first and most significant steps included in the Stabilization Plan

of 1959 was granting foreigners permission to buy Spanish securities. In 1963 this measure was supplemented by allowing foreigners the right to secure majority interest in Spanish companies, except

those engaged in fields deemed to have strategic importance. As

a result of these actions, there was a large influx of foreign capital

into Spain.

Spain was attractive to foreign investors not merely because it offered opportunities for participating in a rapidly expanding domestic market, but also because it served as a base for further export

and trade with EC countries. This was a leading factor in Ford

Motor Company's 1974 decision to build an assembly plant near

Valencia, and in General Motors' entry into the Spanish market.

Japanese companies also intensified their investments and presence

in Spain with similar goals in mind. Low-cost labor was another

attraction for foreign investors, though not to the same extent as

in the 1960s and the 1970s. In compliance with the EC accession agreement, rules governing foreign investment in Spain were adapted to EC standards in 1986. The new measures streamlined administrative procedures

and reduced the number of sectors in which foreign ownership was

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The Economy

restricted. The requirement for prior authorization of investments was replaced by one calling merely for prior notification. Notification had to be given when the investment was for more than 50 per- cent of a Spanish enterprise, when it constituted a re-investment

by foreigners, or when its goal was the establishment of branches

of foreign companies on Spanish soil. The influx of foreign investment was extremely large during the

1980s, almost tripling between 1982 and 1987. Some of it took the

form of speculative investment, attracted by high Spanish interest

rates. More than half of all new foreign investments in Spain

represented an expansion of previously existing investments; nearly

one-third were in the chemical industry and in the nonfuel mineral

processing sector. EC countries became the most important source

of investment (see table 12, Appendix). The United States, nonetheless, still accounted for about 20 percent of the cumulative foreign

investment total. It was expected that, if negotiations being con- ducted in 1988 for a United States-Spain treaty to avoid double

taxation were successful, United States investment might increase.

Spanish direct investment abroad, for which regulatory restric- tions were liberalized in 1986, doubled to 101 billion pesetas in

1987. EC countries accounted for 64 percent of the total, with the

Netherlands, West Germany, and Portugal being the largest

recipients. Investments in the United States fell to 8 percent of the

total. Spanish investments in Latin America, especially in Mexico

and in Argentina, declined sharply because of heavy debt burdens

in that region. By the late 1980s, analysts estimated that Latin

America accounted for only 4 percent of Spain's foreign investments.

Spain and the European Community

The year 1992 promised to be one of the most momentous for Spain in the twentieth century. The Summer Games of the XXVth

Olympiad were to be held in Barcelona; the five hundredth anniversary of the discovery of the New World was to be celebrated

in Seville, with an ambitious international exposition known as Expo

92; and Madrid had been designated as Europe's cultural capital

for that year. Moreover, 1992 would mark the culmination of a

forced march to modernize the country's economic, social, and

financial institutions, because Spain would be fully exposed to the

bracing winds of unfettered economic competition from the members of the EC. By the end of 1992, the EC's plan to eliminate

barriers to trade, employment, and the flow of capital across the

twelve member states' borders was to take effect.

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Spain: A Country Study

Spain's long adherence to protectionism had been a major fac- tor in its technological and economic backwardness. The Socialist

government's commitment to economic modernization and to Spain's integration into the European economic mainstream thus

represented a historic landmark. The end of authoritarian rule in

1975 led Spain to embrace a system of political democracy, but

changes in the economic sphere proved more difficult. In the 1980s, true economic modernization was only beginning, as the Gonzalez

government cast Spain's national goals in terms of increasing its competitiveness, both within Europe and around the world.

The Spanish economy had long functioned on a two-tiered basis. One part—including most notably the automobile manufacturing

and chemical industries—was technologically advanced. An even

larger part was accustomed to operating inefficiendy, protected from

outside competition and highly fragmented into a host of small and

medium-sized enterprises that accounted for as much as 90 percent

of Spain's commerce and industry. It was in this second economic

area that the brunt of accelerated change was being felt in the second

half of the 1980s, as many small, inefficient concerns faced the effects of free market competition.

Spain had been trying to join, or to align itself with, the EC since

1962. The barriers to Spanish membership were primarily political, and they reflected varying degrees of European hostility to the

Franco government rather than fear of economic competition.

Among the members of the EC, only Italy and France, with similar agricultural export commodities, had substantial economic

motives for opposing Spain's entry into the EC.

After long negotiations, which began in 1962, Spain and the EC

signed a preferential trade agreement in June 1970. The agreement called for mutual tariff reductions, ranging from 25 to 60 percent, to be applied gradually over a six-year period. Quantitative

restrictions for a number of items were eased under a special quota

system.

At the end of the Franco era, little attention was given to Spain's

urgent economic problems. Spaniards and their post-Francoist

governments tended to regard membership in the EC as a symbolic political act that obtained recognition for Spain's return to democracy, rather than as a portentous economic policy decision

irretrievably linking Spain's economic future with that of Europe.

The result was that, although Spain had applied for membership

nearly a quarter of a century earlier, little national debate took place

prior to the signing of the 1985 accession agreement, which was

concluded only after arduous negotiations.

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The Economy

The accession agreement called for gradual integration to be car- ried out over a seven-year period, beginning on January 1, 1986.

This adjustment transition involved a number of significant fea- tures. Customs duties were to be phased out as of March 1, 1988,

and industrial tariffs on EC goods were to be phased out on a

reciprocal basis until January 1, 1993. Additional import levies,

most notably Spain's tax rebate on exports, were to disappear upon

its entry into the EC. With some exceptions, import quotas were

to be removed immediately. Quotas on color television sets and

tractors were to be eliminated by the end of 1988, and those for chemicals and textiles, by the close of 1989.

In principle, EC-based companies were free to invest in Spain.

National assistance programs for industrial projects were subject

to strict EC regulations, but special allowances were made for the

steel industry, and Spain was allowed to keep its 60 percent local content rule for automobile manufacturing until the end of 1989.

Spain became subject to EC antitrust rules immediately, however.

Spain was obliged to adhere to EC product and consumer protection standards at once. Like other EC members, Spain was

required to levy a value-added tax (VAT—see Glossary), which was the EC's principal source of revenue. Spanish workers were

to be able to circulate freely and seek employment in the EC by

1993.

Phased alignment with the EC's Common Agricultural Policy

(CAP) was to be completed only in 1996. The Spanish widely

regarded this as a discriminatory action taken by EC countries to prevent imports of Spanish tomatoes, olive oil, and wines until as

late a date as possible. Spain's fishing industry, the largest in

Western Europe, received the right to fish in most EC waters, but

its catch was sharply restricted until 1995.

Despite a favorable attitude toward the establishment of an eventual EC-wide monetary union in the late 1980s, the government was reluctant to commit the peseta to stabilization within the European Monetary System (EMS) because of its over-valued exchange

rate. In mid- 1988 the Bank of Spain took what was regarded as a symbolic step toward full membership in the EMS by formally

accepting the 1979 Basel agreement. By the terms of the agreement,

EC central banks made 20 percent of their gold and foreign cur- rency reserves available to the European Monetary Cooperation

Fund, against the equivalent in European Currency Units (ECUs

see Glossary). The subject of the peseta's inclusion in the ECUs,

in all likelihood a prerequisite of Spain's full participation in the

EMS's exchange-rate system, was to be taken up in September 1989,

when the composition of the next ECU would be determined.

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Spain: A Country Study

The Spanish government sought special treatment for the peseta,

the exchange rate of which was considered inflated. Such an

arrangement would permit relatively wide margins of fluctuation

similar to those enjoyed by the Italian lira. The International Monetary Fund (IMF—see Glossary) urged Spain's early membership

in the EMS, and the pressure to reach a decision on this EMS question was bound to increase when Spain assumed the EC presidency

during the first half of 1989. In the late 1980s, some of the more painful aspects of Spain's

integration into the EC were cushioned by the country's expansionary economic boom, the continuing fall in oil prices, a sharp reduction in the exchange value of the United States dollar, and the

massive inflow of foreign investment, as numerous foreign multinational companies endeavored to participate in Spain's expanding consumer market. Observers expected that Spain's industrial enterprises, especially the more inefficient and backward ones, would be

absorbed by more modern domestic and foreign entrepreneurs or would cease operations. Over the long term, however, the Spanish

economy was expected to resemble that of its more advanced EC

counterparts much more closely by the year 2000 than it had in the

past.

* * * Although there is a growing literature in Spanish and in English on the Spanish economy during the Franco regime (1939-75), there

is littie available in English on the post-Franco period, with the notable exception of Ramon Tamames's classic and encyclopedic The

Spanish Economy. Among the more useful books on the Franco period,

in English, are Joseph Harrison's The Spanish Economy in the Twentieth Century and Stanley Payne's The Franco Regime, 1936-1975. For

information and analysis of industrial, financial, and economic devel- opments in more recent years, readers should consult the annual

country surveys of the OECD and the quarterly Country Report: Spain

and the annual Country Profile: Spain, both published by the Economist

Intelligence Unit. The annual reports of the Bank of Spain also are

particularly useful. Current statistical data can be found in the Anuario

Estadistica, a yearbook issued by the Spanish government's statistics bureau, the Instituto Nacional de Estadistica. For up-to-date information on government and private-sector economic activities, London's

Financial Times and the Economist provide some of the most comprehensive coverage and also publish survey supplements on various

aspects of Spanish economic and financial activities. (For further

information and complete citations, see Bibliography.)

204
Chapter 4. Government and Politics

^4§>.fAt»f-- ' . _____
Political discussion
SPAIN'S TRANSFORMATION from a rigid, authoritarian,

highly centralized regime into a pluralistic, liberal parliamentary

democracy with considerable regional autonomy stands as one of

the more remarkable political developments of the twentieth

century. That this was accomplished without civil war or revolutionary upheaval and in the midst of unfavorable economic circumstances is all the more extraordinary. Despite decades of living under

a repressive dictatorship, most Spanish citizens adapted readily to the new democratic system, and they turned out in large numbers

for referenda and elections.

The institutions established under the new democratic regime were based on the principles of modernization and decentralization. The 1978 Constitution, which enjoyed massive popular support, established Spain as a democratic state ruled by law. Spain's

form of government is that of a parliamentary monarchy, with

political power centered in the bicameral Cortes (Spanish Parliament).

One of the most striking features of Spain's new governmental

system is the devolution of power and responsibility to the regions.

Regional differences had been the source of long-standing tensions

between the center and the periphery in Spain. The 1978 Constitution addresses these conflicts by providing for an unprecedented

degree of regional autonomy, although not all Spaniards have been

satisfied with the pace of the devolution process. At the same time,

the relationships between the more powerful autonomous regions

and the central government remain complicated by the deliberately

ambiguous terms of the Constitution.

The dismantling of the dictatorship of Francisco Franco y Bahamonde (dictator of Spain, 1939-75) and the establishment of

democratic political institutions did not immediately permeate all levels of society. Reactionary elements within the army remained

opposed to democracy, and rumors of coup plots were a persistent

feature of the early years of democratic rule, although they subsequently subsided as the government stabilized. The civil service

also resisted transformation, remaining almost as inefficient and

cumbersome as it was under Franco.

Although Spanish citizens had minimal experience with politi- cal involvement prior to the advent of participatory democracy,

they took to it enthusiastically, and, after a shaky beginning, a viable

party system developed. The stability of this party system was

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Spain: A Country Study

evidenced by the declining support for extremist parties and by

the peaceful transfer of power from a conservative coalition to the

long-outlawed Socialists in the 1982 elections. In the late 1980s,

the major challenge to the governing Spanish Socialist Workers'

Party (Partido Socialista Obrero Espanol—PSOE) came from within its own ranks, as labor leaders complained that Prime Minister

Felipe Gonzalez Marquez had forsaken his socialist roots in favor

of market-oriented policies.

Spain continued to seek an independent role in the international arena, while maintaining a European focus through membership

in the European Community (EC—see Glossary) and, through

association, on its own terms, with the North Atlantic Treaty

Organization (NATO). Other major foreign policy goals continued

to be the re-establishment of Spanish sovereignty in Gibraltar, the

retention of the North African enclaves of Ceuta and Melilla, and

an influential role for Spain in Latin America. In 1987 Spain

expressed a latent anti-Americanism, prevalent in the country since

the 1898 Spanish-American War, when the government delayed

renewal of the long-standing agreement for United States use of

military bases in Spain in exchange for military and economic

assistance.

One difficult problem facing the government in the 1980s was

the ongoing menace of Basque terrorism, as militant separatists

continued to perpetrate assassinations and bombings in spite of

vigorous antiterrorist measures. A more far-reaching challenge lay

in the economic realm. Workers were becoming increasingly dis- satisfied with their diminished earnings and with the government's

failure to deal with the unemployment problem.

The political changes since 1975 have been dramatic and profound. Spain has benefited from the shrewd leadership of its king

and its prime ministers, who successfully presided over the transition to democracy and its consolidation. Nevertheless, Spanish

leadership confronted the challenge of sustaining social stability in

the face of economic and regional pressures. Constitutional System

The 1978 Constitution dismantled the political system of the

Franco regime and established Spain as a democratic state ruled

by law. The writing of the Constitution was a long and arduous

task, involving extensive negotiations and compromise. Spain has

a history of failed constitutions, and the framers of the 1978 Constitution endeavored to devise a document that would be acceptable to all the major political forces.

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Government and Politics

In July 1977, the Committee on Constitutional Affairs was

formed, made up of thirty-six deputies from the newly elected Cortes. These deputies in turn appointed a seven-member subcommittee that included members of the major national parties and

one representative, a Catalan, of the regional parties. This group was to produce a draft constitution, which it completed in December and presented to the full committee. Vigorous debate ensued,

and by the time the draft was returned to the subcommittee for

final revision in January 1978, individual Cortes deputies and party caucuses had proposed more than 1,000 amendments.

As the seven subcommittee members attempted to address the

issues raised by these amendments, consensus began to break down

over provisions concerning the Roman Catholic Church, education, labor lockouts, and the regional issue. The PSOE delegate

withdrew from the subcommittee in protest on two occasions, and

it required delicate diplomatic maneuvering on the part of Prime

Minister Adolfo Suarez Gonzalez to surmount the stalemate in the

constituent process. Compromise agreements were reached by the

end of May, when the text went back to the full committee. By

June 20, this committee had completed revisions of the draft document, which was presented for debate in the Congress of Deputies

(lower chamber of the Cortes) in July, a year after the formation

of the constitutional committee.

The text was passed with negligible opposition, although deputies

of the Basque Nationalist Party (Partido Nacionalista Vasco—PNV)

abstained because of what they termed the inadequate provisions

for regional autonomy (see Regional Government, this ch.). The

draft constitution then went to the Senate (upper chamber of the

Cortes), where it again received more than 1,000 amendments and

was revised by another constitutional committee. At the end of September, the full Senate discussed the text and approved it. Because

there were differences between the version passed by the Senate

and the one approved by the Congress of Deputies, another committee, including both senators and deputies, was required to resolve

the discrepancies. This group also added the stipulation that the

prime minister must either call for new elections or seek a vote of

confidence within thirty days of the promulgation of the new constitution. On October 31 , 1978, both chambers overwhelmingly approved

the text of the new Constitution, which was presented to the people in a referendum on December 6, 1978. Of the 67.7 percent

of eligible voters who went to the polls, 87.8 percent accepted the

new Constitution, which was signed by the king on December 27.

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Spain: A Country Study

The Constitution that the Spaniards ratified in 1978 is long and

complicated. In their efforts to avoid dogmatism and to gain

widespread support, the framers had produced a document that was hailed as a triumph for consensus politics, but at the same time

the new Constitution included ambiguous language and contradictory provisions, which gave rise to problems of interpretation in

subsequent months and years. The 1978 Constitution

The Constitution proclaims Spain to be a social and democratic

state governed by law and declares liberty, justice, equality, and

political pluralism to be the country's foremost values. National

sovereignty resides in the people, from whom all powers of the state emanate. The new Constitution defines Spain as a parliamentary

monarchy, with the king as head of state and symbol of its unity

and permanence. It establishes a bicameral legislature, the Cortes,

and an independent judicial system (see Government, this ch.).

The Constitution delineates the role of political parties and

requires that they adhere to democratic structures and procedures.

It provides for universal suffrage at the age of eighteen and abolishes the death penalty, except under military law in time of war. The longest section of the Constitution sets forth the basic civil, political, and socioeconomic rights of citizens, all of whom are equal

before the law, regardless of birth, race, sex, or religion. They are protected against unlawful arrests, searches, seizures, and other

invasions of privacy. If accused of a crime, they are presumed inno- cent until proven guilty, and they have the right to a legally

appointed judge, a solicitor, and a public trial without delay. The

Constitution guarantees the freedoms of religion, assembly, and

association, and it stipulates that citizens may make individual or

collective petitions in writing to the government.

Individual liberties are further strengthened by constitutional provisions recognizing the right to organize trade unions, to join them

or to refrain from joining them, and to strike. The Constitution

links the right to work with the duty to work, and it calls for suffi- cient remuneration to meet individual and family needs, without

discrimination as to sex. It also guarantees adequate pensions for the elderly, protection of the handicapped, and decent housing,

and it ascribes to the state a fundamental role with regard to the

organization and protection of health care and welfare.

The Constitution declares that the rights and the liberties described therein are binding on all public authorities. A provision exists (Article 55) for the suspension of these rights and liberties, but this can be used only under strictly regulated circumstances.

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Congress of Deputies, Madrid

Courtesy National Tourist Office of Spain

The Constitution includes significant provisions pertaining to the armed forces and to the Roman Catholic Church, two institu- tions that have played dominant roles in Spain's political history.

The framers of the new document sought to reduce the influence

of these historically powerful institutions, and, at the same time,

tried not to alienate them to the point that they might become

sources of opposition. The role of each of these traditional institu- tions is clearly defined and is strictly limited in the new Constitution. While assigning to the army the role of safeguarding the

sovereignty and independence of Spain and of defending its territorial integrity and constitutional order, the Constitution emphasizes that ultimate responsibility for Spain's defense rests with its popularly elected government, not with the armed forces (see Jurisdiction Over National Defense, ch. 5). The role of the Roman Catholic Church also is reduced in the

1978 Constitution, which denies Catholicism the status of state religion. The provisions of the new Constitution with regard to the church are, however, not as stridently secular as those of the

1931 constitution, which so antagonized the conservative elements

of Spanish society. The 1978 document guarantees complete reli- gious freedom and declares that there will be no state religion, but

it also affirms that public authorities are to take into account the

religious beliefs of Spanish society and that they are to maintain

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Spain: A Country Study

cooperative relations with the Roman Catholic Church and with

other religions (see Religion, ch. 2). Religion was also a factor in the formulation of constitutional

provisions concerning education. There was considerable controversy over the issue of providing private schools with public

funds, because in Spain most private schools are run by the church

or by the religious orders. The Constitution guarantees freedom

of education and calls for the government to provide some financial assistance to private schools. It further stipulates that children

in state schools may receive religious teaching, if their parents so

desire. At the same time, the Constitution gives the government

the authority to inspect and to license the schools, thus granting

it some control over the institutions it subsidizes. Conflicts over

this issue of state control led to the passage in 1984 of the Organic

Law on the Right to Education (Ley Organica del Derecho a la Educacion—LODE), which established three categories of schools

and set forth conditions to be met by private institutions receiving

financial aid from the government (see Education, ch. 2). Along with constitutional provisions pertaining to education and

to the church, those dealing with regional issues were sources of

bitter controversy. Historical tensions between the center and the

periphery in Spain made it difficult for the framers of the Constitution to reach agreement on matters of regional autonomy. The

compromise that they eventually reached was unsatisfactory to extremist elements on both sides of the issue, and the terrorist move- ment that grew out of this controversy continues to be the major

threat to Spain's stability (see Political Developments, 1982-88,

this ch.).

The new Constitution seeks to recognize, and to respond to, deepseated cultural differences among the existing nationalities by allowing for substantial regional autonomy, in contrast to the stifling

centralism imposed by Franco. Although it affirms the indissoluble unity of the nation, it also grants a greater degree of autonomy

to Spain's nationalities and regions, which are allowed to use their

own languages and flags without interference (see Regional Government, this ch.).

Electoral System

The electoral system—with the exception of the Senate, which

uses a majority system—is set forth in the electoral law of 1977,

updated in 1985, which is based on the d'Hondt system of proportional representation. A party must obtain a minimum of 3 per- cent of the vote in order to qualify for parliamentary representation.

Each province is to have a minimum of two seats in the Congress

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Government and Politics

of Deputies, plus one additional seat for every 144,500 inhabitants or fraction over 70,000 inhabitants. Each province is allotted four

seats in the Senate, regardless of population.

This system tends to overrepresent the more traditional, rural,

and thinly populated parts of Spain and to favor the larger parties, which also benefit from the system of postelectoral subsidies.

Under this arrangement, the state allocates funds to the party of

each elected candidate. Parties are also given smaller sums for each

vote received by their candidates, provided that at least one candidate is elected. One of the effects of this system is that parties

able to demonstrate probable electoral success are able to obtain

loans to finance their campaigns based on their expected subsidies.

The electoral law guarantees universal, free, and direct suffrage

and stipulates that voting shall be by secret ballot. It permits postal

balloting for those away from their areas of registration. Voting

is done by party list. Only the names of an individual party and

its leader appear on ballots, with the exception of those of the Senate,

for which a multiparty list is used, and voters choose any three

candidates. Elections are held every four years, although an early

dissolution of the Cortes will mean early elections for this body.

Elections in the autonomous communities—except those in the

"historic regions" of Galicia, Catalonia (Spanish, Catalufia; Catalan, Catalunya), the Basque Country (Spanish, Pais Vasco; Basque,

Euskadi), and Andalusia (Spanish, Andalucia), which received their autonomy earlier than the other thirteen communities—are held

simultaneously.

Government

According to the 1978 Constitution, political power is centered

in the bicameral Cortes, and the king exercises largely honorific

functions as head of state (see fig. 12). Judicial power is vested in

independent courts. The governmental system outlined in the new

Constitution, in its emphasis on democratic principles and its provisions for decentralization, represents a radical transformation in

the nature of the Spanish state. The Cortes

The Cortes is the most powerful governmental institution of the

state. It is made up of a lower house, the Congress of Deputies,

and an upper chamber, the Senate. The Congress of Deputies, the

stronger of the two bodies, may consist of between 300 and 400

members—although electoral laws have set the norm at 350

deputies—elected by proportional representation every four years, unless parliament is dissolved earlier by the head of state. The

213
Spain: A Country Study

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214
Government and Politics

Senate is composed of 208 directly elected members and 49 regional

representatives, also chosen every four years. The preponderance of legislative authority lies with the Congress

of Deputies. Either house may initiate legislation, but the lower

house can override a Senate veto by a vote of a simple majority

of its members. Thus, if a political party has a solid majority in

the Congress of Deputies, a Senate veto has little effect. The

predominance of the lower house is also evidenced by the fact that

the president of the Congress presides when the two chambers are meeting jointly.

The Congress of Deputies also has the power to ratify or to reject

decree laws adopted by the government, and its authorization is required for a declaration of a state of exception and for the extension of a state of alarm. It is also the body that is responsible, if necessary, for accusing the prime minister or his ministers of trea- son or of crimes against the state. The prime minister must receive a vote of investiture from the Congress of Deputies before being

formally sworn into office by the king. A prime minister may request a vote of confidence from the Congress of Deputies at any time.

If he fails to achieve this, both houses of parliament are dissolved,

and new elections are called. Furthermore, the Congress of Deputies

has potentially significant power over the executive because it may

vote the prime minister out of office by adopting a motion of censure by absolute majority.

The primary function of the Senate is territorial representation.

Its only exclusive power concerns the autonomous communities.

If a community fails to fulfill its legal and its constitutional obligations, or acts contrary to the general interests of Spain, the government, with the approval of an overall majority of the Senate, may

adopt measures to enforce the community's compliance with its obligations.

Although each chamber of the Cortes carries out certain duties

separately, many important functions are exercised by both houses,

in which case they meet as the General Cortes (Cortes Generales).

In this capacity, they elaborate laws proposed by the government,

by the Congress of Deputies, by the Senate, by any autonomous

community, or through popular initiative. They also approve, and

they may amend, state budgets proposed by the executive. They

furthermore may direct interpellations and questions to the government and to individual ministers.

Each chamber of the Cortes meets in separate premises in Madrid, and each holds two regular annual sessions—from September to December and from February to June. They may meet

in extraordinary session to attend to a specific matter at the request

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Spain: A Country Study

of the government, or at the request of the absolute majority of

the members of either chamber.

All Spaniards "having full use of their political rights" may be

candidates for election to the Cortes, except for the following: members of the Constitutional Court, high-ranking civil servants, practicing judges and public prosecutors, the ombudsman, professional

military personnel, members of the police and security forces who

are in active service, and members of electoral commissions. Members of the Cortes may not be members of both chambers at the same time, nor may members of the Congress of Deputies have

a seat in both the Congress and a regional assembly. Senators are not barred from occupying a seat in a regional assembly. Members of the Cortes are required to disclose their income and their

assets following election. They are expected to attend plenary ses- sions of the chamber and of the committees on which they serve. Senators who consistently fail to attend such meetings are liable to incur a financial penalty.

Along with these obligations, parliamentarians enjoy certain

rights and privileges. They may not be prosecuted for verbal opinions expressed in the exercise of their duties. While in office, they

may be arrested only if caught in the actual act of committing a

crime. Even in this case, they cannot be charged or prosecuted

without prior consent of the Cortes. They are guaranteed a fixed

salary and social security payments, along with allowances for extra expenses incurred in the line of duty. Members of the Cortes

exercise their functions independently, and they are not obliged

to follow the dictates of their parties' leaderships in casting their votes. The King, the Prime Minister, and the Council of Ministers

By defining the state as a parliamentary monarchy, the Constitution makes it clear that the king is not sovereign and that

sovereignty resides with the people as expressed in their democratically elected parliament. The king is a hereditary and constitutional

monarch, who serves as head of state. The decision to retain the monarchy, which had been restored

under the Franco regime, represents a historically significant compromise. As the Constitution was being formulated, parties of the

left were strongly opposed to a monarchy, which they saw as a Francoist legacy; they favored establishing a republican form of government. At the same time, reactionary elements wanted to preserve

the monarchy in order to use it as a means to perpetuate Francoism. In between these two extremes were the reformers, who

216
The Royal Palace, Madrid

Courtesy Prints and Photographs Division, Library of Congress

thought that the monarchy could serve as an element of stabiliza- tion during the transition to democracy.

A compromise eventually was reached whereby the left-wing parties accepted the institution of a parliamentary monarchy as reflect- ing the will of the majority. Constitutional provisions dealing with

the king's role were worded in such a way as to make clear the

neutral and apolitical nature of his duties. The success of this arrangement has been largely attributable to King Juan Carlos de

Borbon's willingness to relinquish the powers that Franco had conferred upon him and to rule as a constitutional monarch within

a democratic system of government (see Transition to Democracy,

ch. 1). The crown is hereditary, and the king's eldest son is first in the

line of succession. (In the case of Juan Carlos, there is only one

son, Prince Felipe, and there are two daughters.) Whereas Franco's

fundamental laws forbade a female monarch, the 1978 Constitution allows a female to inherit the throne, but only if there are no

males of the same generation. If all hereditary lines entitled to the crown by law become extinct, the succession to the throne is to be determined by the General Cortes.

The king sanctions and promulgates laws that have been worked

out by the other branches of government. He formally convenes and dissolves the Cortes and calls for elections and for referenda.

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Spain: A Country Study

He appoints the prime minister after consultation with the Cortes

and names the other ministers, upon the recommendation of the

prime minister. He also signs decrees made in the Council of

Ministers and ratifies civil and military appointments.

Although the king does not have the power to direct foreign

affairs, he has a vital role as the chief representative of Spain in

international relations. The potential significance of this role has

been demonstrated during the reign of Juan Carlos, whose many

trips abroad and contacts with foreign leaders have enabled the

Spanish government to establish important political and commercial ties with other nations. The king also has the duty to indicate

the state's consent to international treaties and, with the prior

authorization of the Cortes, to declare war and peace.

The Constitution confers upon the king the title of supreme com- mander of the armed forces, although he has no actual authority over them. Nevertheless, Juan Carlos has maintained close rela- tions with the military, and he has used his considerable influence

with them to counteract potential threats to the stability of the

democratic regime (see Disenchantment with UCD Leadership,

ch. 1). The influence of the king depends largely upon the individual

who holds the title, because he is granted no independent executive powers by the Constitution. Every one of his acts must be countersigned by the prime minister or by one of his ministers. In spite

of these restrictions, the monarchy under Juan Carlos has achieved

a significant degree of moral authority, largely because of his coura- geous and steadfast adherence to democratic procedures.

If the king has the symbolic role of representing the state, the

prime minister has the more powerful role of chief of government.

As the leader of the dominant political party in the Cortes, he bears

the responsibility and the accountability for his own actions and

for those of the government. He directs the preparation, promotion, and execution of the government's program and coordinates

the functions of the various ministries. The prime minister nominates candidates for the king to appoint as his ministers. He also has the right to name candidates for civil service positions and to

select the civil governors in each province as well as the government delegates to the autonomous communities. A reform law

approved late in 1983 placed the armed forces under the control

of the prime minister, although the king remained supreme commander.

The prime minister may ask for a vote of confidence from the

Congress of Deputies with regard to his program or policies. He

may propose the dissolution of the Congress of Deputies, the Senate,

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Government and Politics

or the Cortes, unless a motion of censure is under consideration.

The position of his government in the event of such a motion of censure is strengthened significantly by the requirement that such

a motion must contain the name of a candidate to succeed the prime

minister if the motion is approved. This provision makes it more

difficult to overthrow the government, because minority parties

may find it more difficult to agree upon a candidate than to con- cur in their opposition to the incumbent.

When the prime minister is appointed following elections, he

must present his program to the Congress of Deputies and receive a vote of investiture by absolute majority before he can be sworn

in by the king. If he cannot obtain a vote of confidence for investiture, a new vote is taken forty-eight hours later, requiring only

a simple majority. If this procedure fails, the king is to propose

other candidates until one gains a vote of confidence. Should no

candidate succeed within two months of the first vote, the king dis- solves the Cortes and calls for new elections.

The prime minister remains in office until such time as he and

his government lose the support of the Congress of Deputies in a vote of confidence, or the Congress of Deputies approves a motion

of censure. A prime minister also must resign if he and his party

are defeated in the general elections, in which case he remains in

office until the new prime minister has been sworn in. When a prime

minister leaves office for whatever reason, even if it is his own

choice, his cabinet must resign with him. They nonetheless retain

their functions in a caretaker capacity until a new government has

been installed. A deputy prime minister assumes the functions of the head of

government if the prime minister dies, or if he is ill or out of the

country. The deputy also plays a coordinating role, working closely

with the prime minister, senior ministers, and high-ranking party

members. The deputy prime minister may assume other functions,

at the discretion of the prime minister.

The prime minister, the deputy prime minister, and the other

ministers together comprise the Council of Ministers, which functions as a cabinet, and which is the highest executive institution

of the state. The Council of Ministers has both policy-making and

administrative functions, and it is responsible for the implementation of government policy. In addition to overseeing the administration of the various ministries, it controls military affairs and is responsible for national security and defense. In the exercise of all of its functions, it is ultimately accountable to the Cortes.

Cabinet ministers are each charged with the responsibility of

administering their individual departments. Although they may

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Spain: A Country Study

exercise a great deal of discretion and autonomy within their ministries, they are ultimately responsible to the prime minister. They

present to the Council of Ministers draft laws that have been pre- pared within their departments, and they establish rules to implement government policy. They have the power to issue ministerial

orders without the approval of the Council of Ministers and to sign

state contracts in matters concerning their ministries. They also may resolve administrative conflicts within their departments.

Ministers are responsible to the Council of Ministers as well as to the prime minister for their actions, and they can be called to explain

their policies before one or both houses of the Cortes, or before one of the parliamentary committees.

The Constitution declares that government ministers may not

hold any additional public posts not related to their governmental

office, and it also prohibits them from engaging in professional or commercial activity. This provision is aimed at avoiding the cor- ruption that prevailed in the Franco era, when senior government

ministers frequently occupied important positions in the business

community and sometimes held more than one post within the public administration.

Various advisory bodies serve the administration. The most

important of these is the Council of State, which the Constitution

refers to as the highest consultative organ of the government. It has no executive functions or powers and performs in a purely

advisory capacity. The Council of Ministers appoints its president,

who is usually an experienced jurist. The other members

approximately twenty-three in number—are eminent representatives of the autonomous regions, the armed forces, civil service,

and the legal and academic communities. Permanent members are appointed by government decree for an indefinite period, whereas

members termed elected are those who are also appointed by decree

but who are chosen from among citizens who have held various

specific jobs; the elected members serve on the council for a period

of four years. The Judiciary

The Constitution declares that justice emanates from the people and that it is administered in the name of the king by independent judges and magistrates, who are irremovable and who are responsible and subject only to the rule of law. The judicial sys- tem is headed by the Supreme Court, which is the country's highest

tribunal except for constitutional questions. The supreme governing and administrative body is the General Council of the Judiciary.

Its primary functions are to appoint judges and to maintain ethical

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Government and Politics

standards within the legal profession. The 1978 Constitution provides that twelve of this council's twenty members are to be selected for five-year terms by judges, lawyers, and magistrates, with the

remaining eight to be chosen by the Cortes. A judicial reform law

that entered into force in July 1985 called for all twenty members

to be chosen by the Cortes; ten by the Congress of Deputies and

ten by the Senate. The General Council of the Judiciary elects the

president of the Supreme Court, who also serves on this council. In addition, there are territorial courts, regional courts, provincial courts, courts of the first instance, and municipal courts. Constitutional questions are to be resolved by a special Constitutional Court, outlined in the 1978 Constitution and in the Organic

Law on the Constitutional Court that was signed into law in October

1979. This court consists of twelve judges who serve for nine-year

terms. Four of these are nominated by the Congress of Deputies,

four by the Senate, two by the executive branch of the government,

and two by the General Council of the Judiciary. They are chosen

from amongjurists of recognized standing with at least fifteen years'

experience. Once appointed, they are prohibited by the Constitution from engaging in other forms of political, administrative,

professional, or commercial activity. The Organic Law on the Constitutional Court contains provisions whereby the court can expel

its own members, a circumstance which appears to contradict the

constitutional declaration that magistrates are irremovable.

The Constitutional Court is authorized to rule on the constitutionality of laws, acts, or regulations set forth by the national or

the regional parliaments. It also may rule on the constitutionality

of international treaties before they are ratified, if requested to do

so by the government, the Congress of Deputies, or the Senate.

The Constitution further declares that individual citizens may

appeal to the Constitutional Court for protection against governmental acts that violate their civil rights. Only individuals directly

affected can make this appeal, called an amparo, and they can do

this only after exhausting other judicial appeals.

In addition, this court has the power to preview the constitutionality of texts delineating statutes of autonomy and to settle conflicts of jurisdiction between the central and the autonomous

community governments, or between the governments of two or more autonomous communities. Because many of the constitutional

provisions pertaining to autonomy questions are ambiguous and

sometimes contradictory, this court could play a critical role in

Spain's political and social development.

The Constitution prohibits special courts and limits the jurisdiction of military courts to members of the armed services, except

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Spain: A Country Study

during a state of siege (see Military Justice, ch. 5). It provides for a public prosecutor as well as for a public defender, to protect both

the rule of law and the rights of citizens. A significant innovation

is the provision allowing for trial by jury in criminal cases. A major problem that continued to plague the legal system in

the 1980s was a severe shortage of funds, which made it impossible to keep up with an increasingly heavy case load. This resulted

in inordinate delays, which led to corrupt practices such as the bribing of court administrators by lawyers attempting to expedite their

clients' cases (see Criminal Justice and the Penal System, ch. 5). Regional Government

The framers of the 1978 Constitution had to deal with many controversial issues arising from the advent of democracy to a nation

that had been under dictatorial control for decades. Among these,

the most divisive was the historically sensitive question of regional

autonomy. The Spanish state is unusual in the extent and the depth

of its regional differences, and the society includes ethnic groups

notably the Basques, Catalans, and Galicians—that are each cul- turally and linguistically distinct from the rest of the country (see

Ethnicity and Language, ch. 2). The strength of regional feeling

is such that, in many areas, Spaniards identify more closely with

their region than they do with the nation.

Long-standing tensions between the center and the periphery were repressed, but not extinguished, by Franco's rigid centralism. After his death, there was considerable popular and official support for some degree of decentralization; a key feature of the

democratic reforms was the devolution of increased power and

responsibility to the regions. This applied not only to those regions

that historically had enjoyed a degree of autonomy—Galicia, the

Basque region, and Catalonia—but to the rest of Spain as well. This transformation from a unitary state into a more decentralized structure was not accomplished without bitter conflict. Reactionary elements objected to any reference to regional autonomy

in the Constitution as a threat to national unity, while, at the other

extreme, militant Basques demanded the right of self-determination

for the regions. After prolonged and acrimonious debate, a compromise was agreed upon by all the major parties except the Basque

nationalists. Discontent in this region has been a major disruptive

element in the post-Franco years (see Political Developments,

1982-88, this ch.).

The Constitution proclaims the indissoluble unity of the nation,

but it recognizes and guarantees the right to autonomy of the

nationalities and the regions of which the state is composed.

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Government and Politics

Adjoining provinces with common historical, cultural, and eco- nomic characteristics, as well as the Balearic Islands (Spanish, Islas Baleares) and the Canary Islands (Spanish, Canarias), are granted

the right to form autonomous communities. These communities

are, however, expressly prohibited from forming federations.

Castilian Spanish is declared to be the official language of Spain,

but other languages are recognized as co-official in their respective autonomous communities. In addition, flags and emblems of

these communities may be displayed alongside the Spanish flag on

their public buildings and on public occasions.

The Constitution provides two procedures for achieving regional

autonomy. The rapid procedure was for those regions that had

sought autonomy in the 1930s. After approval by the Constitutional Committee of the Congress of Deputies, the proposal for autonomy was voted on in a regional referendum. The "historic

nationalities" of Galicia, the Basque Country, and Catalonia

acquired regional autonomy in this way. The slow procedure

required initiative on the part of municipal and provincial governments as well as final approval by the Cortes, for a degree of regional

autonomy less than that enjoyed by the "historic nationalities."

A compromise procedure was devised for Andalusia because,

although it had not sought regional autonomy earlier, there was

widespread support for such autonomy among its inhabitants.

Although the communities employing the rapid procedure gained

a greater degree of autonomy than the other communities for the

time being, ultimately—although probably not until sometime in

the 1990s—all were to have an equal degree of autonomy.

Following the attempted coup of February 1981 , those who had

urged a more cautious approach to regional autonomy prevailed,

and the process was brought under stricter control by the controversial Organic Law on the Harmonization of the Autonomy Process

(Ley Organica de Armonizacion del Proceso Autonomico

LOAPA), approved in July 1981. Among the law's stipulations was that—with the exception of Andalusia, which was already near- ing autonomous status—the remaining regions would have to pro- ceed according to the more protracted and complicated method (see

table 13, Appendix).

The regional reorganization of Spain into autonomous communities was completed in May 1983, when elections were held in the thirteen new autonomous communities, although the actual

process of transferring powers was far from complete. The state consists of seventeen autonomous communities, each of which

includes one or more previously existing provinces (see fig. 7). These

communities vary widely in size, in population, and in economic

223
Spain: A Country Study

development; moreover, the political weight of an autonomous com- munity is not necessarily related to its land area or population (see

Regional Disparities, ch. 2). Each regional entity is governed by its own statute of autonomy.

It has its own capital and a political structure based on a unicameral

Legislative Assembly, elected by universal suffrage. This assembly chooses from among its members a president who is the highest

representative of the community. Executive and administrative

powers are exercised by the Council of Government, headed by

the president and responsible to the assembly. There are also regional supreme courts, which are somewhat less autonomous than

the legislative and the executive organs because they are subject

to the ultimate authority of the Supreme Court in Madrid.

The division of powers between the autonomous regions and the

central government is outlined in Article 148 and Article 149 of

the Constitution. The language used to differentiate between the

authority of the central government and that of the regions is, however, imprecise and ambiguous, resulting in varying, and sometimes contradictory, interpretations. Further confusion arises from

the constitutional provision enabling the autonomous communities to extend their powers gradually, although it does not indicate

specifically what these new powers are to be.

The areas enumerated as belonging under the exclusive jurisdiction of the national government include international affairs; defense; justice; criminal, commercial, and labor legislation; merchant shipping; civil aviation; foreign trade and tariffs; economic

planning; finances; and public safety. Whereas the central government clearly is granted exclusive jurisdiction in these and in other

matters, the provision that sets forth the rights of the autonomous

communities is stated in less precise language. It declares that these

communities may assume authority—a more equivocal mandateover certain areas. These include the organization of their own

institutions of self-government, municipal boundaries, town planning, housing, public works, forestry, environmental protection,

cultural affairs and organizations, tourism, sports and leisure events,

social welfare, health and hygiene, and noncommercial ports and

airports. In addition, the state may delegate to the communities

part of its authority in areas reserved to its jurisdiction. Therefore,

although the regions have very limited primary authority, the Constitution permits the extension of this authority by subsequent dele- gation.

The Constitution recognizes the right of the autonomous communities to have financial autonomy "for the development and

enforcement of their authority." These communities receive

224
Government and Politics

revenue directly and indirectly from central government sources

as well as from their own local taxes and special levies. They also may borrow money. The Constitution declares that the financial

autonomy of the communities must be exercised in coordination

with the policies of the central government, which is ultimately

responsible for taxation and for guaranteeing equal opportunities

for all citizens. The mechanism for this arrangement was established by the 1980

Organic Law on the Financing of the Autonomous Communities,

which provides for a Council for Fiscal and Financial Policy, to be composed of the finance ministers from the autonomous communities, the state fmance minister, and the minister for public

administration. This council is to function in a consultative capacity

in order to coordinate policies concerning public investment and

debt, cost of services, and the distribution of resources to the regions.

The state's ultimate responsibility for financial matters enables

it to exercise a significant degree of control over the activities of

the autonomous communities. A further element of control is the

presence in each region of a central government delegate, appointed

by the Council of Ministers at the recommendation of the prime

minister, who monitors the activities of the regional government.

Moreover, the state may challenge any measures adopted by the

autonomous communities.

The Constitutional Court makes the final decision in any question pertaining to the constitutionality of regional legislation. In 1983 this court made a ruling that had the effect of increasing the

powers of the autonomous communities. It invalidated portions

of the controversial LOAPA and declared that this law did not harmonize the autonomy process. Significant provisions that were

struck down included those stipulating that the state's legal norms

should have automatic precedence over those of the autonomous

regions and that regional civil servants should be seconded from

Madrid rather than recruited locally.

The Constitution permits the government to intervene if an autonomous community fails to carry out its constitutional obli- gations or acts against the general interests of the nation. In such

a case, the state is to ask the president of the autonomous community to correct the matter; if he or she fails to do so, the government, with majority approval from the Senate, may adopt measures

necessary to enforce the community's compliance. As of mid- 1988,

this provision had never been invoked, and it remained unclear

what such measures might entail. In spite of these limitations on the jurisdiction of the communities, regions have enjoyed an unprecedented degree of autonomy

225
Spain: A Country Study

since the death of Franco. Because rigid centralism was so closely

identified with Francoism, Spaniards have come to associate democracy with greater regional independence. Although difficulties in

the devolution process remain to be resolved, the development of

such an extensive system of regional autonomy, by what had been one of the world's most centralized nations, is an indication of its peoples' commitment to democracy.

Local Government

Institutions of local government have undergone marked trans- formations since the Franco era, when they functioned primarily

as instruments of the central government. The overhauling of

administration at the local level had to wait, however, until a degree

of political reform had been achieved at the national level. The

first fully democratic local elections following Franco's demise were

held in 1979, and limited reforms were introduced at the local level in 1981, but it was not until 1985 that the fundamental reorganization and democratization of local administration was completed

with the passage of the Basic Law on Local Government (Ley

Reguladora de las Bases de Regimen Local—LRBRL).

This law outlines the basic institutions at the municipal and the

provincial levels, establishes guidelines for the sharing of responsibilities among the different tiers of administration, and lists the

services that local authorities are to provide. The responsibilities

of municipalities vary in proportion to the size of their populations.

Municipal governments share responsibility with the regional government in matters of health and education. Both the central and

the regional governments may delegate additional powers to municipalities. Because of the degree of authority that has been devolved

to the autonomous communities from the central government, local institutions are politically dependent on these communities; however, they remain to a large extent financially dependent on Madrid.

Government at the municipal level is administered by a Municipal Council, the members of which are directly elected by

universal suffrage and according to proportional representation.

The number of council members is determined by the population

of the municipality; a minimum of five is required by law. There

is no limit to the number of times councillors may be re-elected.

If they die, resign, or are dismissed, they are replaced by the next

person on the electoral list of their political party; therefore, there are no by-elections.

The council is elected every four years, and it cannot be dis- solved. The law requires it to meet in full session at least every

three months; extraordinary sessions can be called by either the

226
Government and Politics mayor or one-fourth of the council membership. The council does

not formulate major laws, but drafts regulations related to legislation from the Cortes or the regional parliament. It oversees the

budget, and it may raise taxes to supplement grants from the central and the regional governments.

Each Municipal Council is headed by a mayor, who is elected

following local elections, from among the council members, and

who, in most instances, serves as the leader of the majority party

in the council. In addition to being chairman of the council, directing municipal administration, heading the municipal police force,

and exercising extensive powers of appointment, the mayor plays a major public relations role and enjoys a great deal of prestige.

Municipalities of more than 5,000 inhabitants have a Municipal

Commission to assist the mayor in the exercise of his duties.

Municipal administration in such towns is divided into departments

and districts, the leaders of which are ultimately responsible to the

mayor.

Government at the provincial level has retained an element of

its Francoist function as an outpost of the state. The Constitution

defines the provinces as territorial divisions " designed to carry out

the activities of the central government." The civil governor, who

is the highest executive of the state administration at the provincial level, is appointed by the prime minister on the recommendation of the minister of interior. Thus, the governors are usually

political appointees, as was the case during the Franco regime,

although they have less power than they did formerly. They continue to be responsible for the state police and the security forces

that operate at the provincial level (see The Police System, ch. 5). In addition to ensuring the implementation of state policies in the

provinces, they function as a liaison between local authorities and

the central government.

Provincial government is administered by a Provincial Council, which consists of deputies elected by the municipal councillors

from among themselves. They remain on the Provincial Council

for four years and may be re-elected for as many terms as they

remain municipal councillors. As is the case with the municipal

councils, the Provincial Council does not have the power to draft

major laws, but it may establish regulations based on legislation

from the Cortes or the regional parliament.

Each Provincial Council is headed by a president, who is elected

by all the members of the full council. Although the civil governor

is the highest representative of the central government in the

province, the president of the Provincial Council has the responsibility for the government and administration of the province. The

227
Spain: A Country Study

office of president of the Provincial Council was established during the Franco years, but it was largely overshadowed by that of

the civil governor. Since the advent of democracy to Spain, the

council president has acquired more prestige, and the role of the

governor has been reduced.

Provincial government is administered differently in the Basque

provinces, the single-province autonomous communities, the

Balearic Islands, and the Canary Islands. The Basque provinces

have more extensive privileges because of their status as "historic

territories," which makes their provincial councils more powerful

than those of other provinces. The autonomous communities that are made up of a single province assume all provincial powers and

responsibilities, thereby obviating the need for provincial institu- tions. Because of the geographical separation that exists within the

island chains, government and administration have been entrusted

to island councils, which enjoy greater powers than their provincial counterparts. The small North African enclaves of Ceuta and

Melilla have a special status: they are organized as municipalities

of the provinces of Cadiz and Malaga, respectively. In both towns,

civil authority is vested in an official, called the delegado del gobierno,

who is directly responsible to the Ministry of Interior in Madrid.

In 1986 the enclaves received municipal autonomy under the provisions of Spain's devolution of authority to regions, but, unlike

Spain's other regional assemblies, they were not granted legisla- tive powers. In March 1986, a large crowd of demonstrators in

Ceuta protested this denial of full autonomy.

Civil Service

Part of the Francoist legacy to Spain was a highly inefficient and

cumbersome civil service apparatus. Attempts to reform and to streamline the system of public administration have been hampered

by the bureaucracy's traditional resistance to change.

Under Franco, the civil service system was dominated by cuerpos, professional associations of engineers, lawyers, economists, etc., within the civil service, which also performed functions similar to those of trade unions and fraternal organizations. Admission to a cuerpo was on the basis of a competitive examination that was

judged by the current members. The cuerpo served as a channel

for civil servants to make their demands to the appropriate minister.

In addition, the cuerpos were able to exercise considerable influence over hiring and firing of persons for key administrative positions,

thereby enabling them to protect their own economic interests. Loyalty to the cuerpo came to take precedence over administrative

228
Government and Politics

interests, and rivalry among these bodies added to the inefficiency

of the system by hampering coordination among departments.

This bloated bureaucracy extended to the provincial level, where

it became increasingly difficult to control. As civil servants increased

in number, administrative efficiency declined and corruption flour- ished. Because of the low salaries traditionally paid to civil servants,

the practice of holding more than one job was common. This in

turn resulted in fewer hours devoted to administrative functions

and a further reduction in efficiency. In spite of intermittent efforts to reorganize this unwieldy structure, the civil service did not undergo significant change in the

immediate post-Franco years. The cuerpos retained their influence,

and the bureaucracy proliferated. In 1981 the number of civil ser- vants had reached 1.2 million. Moreover, multiple job-holding had

not been eliminated, despite constitutional restrictions against this practice.

When the PSOE came to power in 1982, its leaders took steps

to reduce the number of civil servants and to require that they put

in a full workday. The government introduced more stringent legislation against multiple job-holding, and it also endeavored to reduce

ministerial rivalry. A departmental reorganization was carried out

in July 1986, at which time the coordination and the overall control of the civil service became the responsibility of the Ministry

of Public Administration.

Nevertheless, the bureaucratic behemoth had not suffered a mortal blow, and most of the abuses were not effectively eliminated.

An indication of the resistance to change that prevailed in the civil service was the continued existence of very slow service and therefore of gestorias administrativas, i.e., private firms, the employees of

which filled out forms and stood in line for customers, who considered the time saved well worth the price charged. Meaningful reform

of the civil service remained on the government's wish list in the

late 1980s.

Politics

The politicians who had played key roles in Spain's transition

to democracy found that consolidating and administering this democracy was more difficult and less exhilarating than bringing

it into being. Suarez, who had been pivotal in the reform process, found his leadership undermined by internal factionalism within

his party coalition, the Union of the Democratic Center (Union

de Centro Democratico—UCD), as well as by his ineffectiveness

in dealing with the country's growing economic difficulties and

regional tensions.

229
Spain: A Country Study

1977

PNV OTHERS

CiU 8 / 10

11

PSOE R^PCE

UCD ^AP

CiU ] I OTHERS

PNV

1979

PNV OTHERS

PSOE [S3 PCE UCD | | CD

CiU I I OTHERS

PNV 1982

rill PNV OTHERS TM 8 / 6 1986

PSOE [^PCE

UCD BBpDP

CiU I | OTHERS

PNV HPSOE E53iu

CP HQ PNV OTHERS

CiU [Cy^CDS PARTIES PSOE- Spanish Socialist Workers' Party m

Ml

UCD - Union of the Democratic Center PCE - Communist Party of Spain

IU - United Left (leftist alliance dominated by PCE) AP - Popular Alliance CD - Democratic Coalition (led by AP) PDP - Popular Democratic Party (allied with the AP in 1982 and 1986)

CP - Popular Coalition (led by AP)

CiU - Convergence and Union PNV - Basque Nationalist Party CDS - Democratic and Social Center

Figure 13. Distribution ofSeats in the Congress ofDeputies Following Selected Elections

230
Government and Politics The Socialists had not been part of the government during the

transition process, although they participated through pacts and

agreements, and thus they did not share responsibility for the inevi- table mistakes made in the early period. When they came to power

in 1982, however, they too were faced with the age-old problem

of center-periphery tension (see fig. 13; table 2, Appendix). In deal- ing with the regional issue as well as with the economic crisis, the

Socialists found it necessary to moderate their ideological principles. Although compromise was essential, it resulted in the contradiction of earlier pronouncements and in the alienation of some

elements of the political elites. Nevertheless, such pragmatism and

moderation remained crucial to consolidating the rule of democracy

in Spain.

Political Developments, 1982-88

Following its triumph at the polls in October 1982, the Spanish

Socialist Workers' Party (Partido Socialista Obrero Espanol

PSOE), under the leadership of Felipe Gonzalez, formed the first majority one-party government since the Civil War (see Growth

of the PSOE and the 1982 Elections, ch. 1). The increase in voter

participation, which rose from less than 68 percent in 1979 to 80

percent in 1982, seemed a significant indication of citizen affirmation of the democratic process. Municipal and regional elections,

held in May 1983, confirmed the popularity of the Socialist government, which obtained 43 percent of the vote. A significant factor in the Socialist victory in 1982 was the popular

perception that profound economic and social reforms were long

overdue. Previous governments had not been able to deal effectively with these issues, in part because of the need to focus on politi- cal and constitutional questions. Whereas most Spaniards had been

willing to defer their hopes for economic improvement and for liber- alized social policies in the interest of stabilizing the fledgling

democracy, they became increasingly impatient for the reform

process to reach their daily lives. The economic reform policies implemented under the POSE

government were pragmatic rather than ideological. Although

stressing the need for reform, the government did not call for tradi- tional socialist measures, such as the nationalization of industry, a significant redistribution of income, or massive state intervention in the economy. Instead, it pursued a program of economic

austerity in order to lower inflation and raise productivity (see the

Post-Franco Period, 1975-1980s, ch. 3). As part of an attempt to achieve greater efficiency in the industrial sector as well as in the civil service, the government eliminated

231
Spain: A Country Study

many jobs. This had the short-term effect of adding to the nation's

unemployment problem, and it met with strong opposition from

the trade unions, although it gained support for the PSOE from

the commercial and the financial sectors. The government's eco- nomic policies resulted in a moderate reduction in inflation and

an increase in the rate of economic growth, but unemployment

worsened, and strike activity increased 30 percent in 1984. In June

1985, there were massive protests against the proposed reforms in

the social security system and the reductions in pension benefits.

Nevertheless, the idea of streamlining the economy was viewed by

most Spaniards as a positive step toward economic recovery, in

spite of the fact that its costs were borne largely by the working class. Although the Socialists' moderate approach to economic issues

entailed a relatively slow rate of change, significant progress was

achieved in other important areas, most notably that of military

reorganization. In October 1983, Minister of Defense Narcis Serra

i Serra announced plans for large-scale reductions in the size of

the military, which was to be reoriented, toward national defense

rather than internal security. Legislation passed in early 1984 placed

the armed forces under the direct control of the prime minister and

the civilian minister of defense. Increased subordination of the mili- tary to the civilian government was made more palatable to the

military hierarchy by a major increase in military spending to modernize the army's equipment and weaponry (see The Defense

Budget, ch. 5). The Socialist government also brought about significant reforms

in the educational system. Education and Science Minister Jose

Maria Maravall Herrero introduced legislation, passed in the spring

of 1984, providing for increased state control over private schools

that received government subsidies. The law also gave parents a

greater role in the appointment of teachers and in establishing the

curricula at these schools (see Education, ch. 2). This had a major

impact on society, because in the late 1980s approximately onethird of students attended such schools, which usually had a reli- gious affiliation. The Roman Catholic Church joined forces with

the right-wing Popular Alliance (Alianza Popular—AP) to mobilize a large antigovernment rally, protesting the new educational

policies, in November 1984.

A difficult problem facing the Socialist government was the continuing menace of Basque terrorism. Although democratization had

brought an unprecedented degree of autonomy to the country's

communities, there was increasing frustration in the Basque and

the Catalan regions with the protracted process of transferring powers to the regional governments. The PSOE's concurrence with

232
Government and Politics

the implementation of the controversial LOAPA, passed by the

UCD government in 1981, led the Basques and the Catalans to consider the Socialists as proponents of centralization (see Regional

Government, this ch.). Terrorist activity by the militant Basque

Fatherland and Freedom (Euskadi Ta Askatasuna—ETA), the

Basque separatist organization founded in 1959 by a splinter group

of the Basque Nationalist Party (Partido Nacionalista Vasco

PNV), continued unabated in Spain in the year following the elec- tion that brought the PSOE to power (see Threats to Internal Security, ch. 5). This increased violence, in itself a destabilizing factor, also threatened Spain's hold on democracy by tempting right-wing

forces to contemplate a coup in order to restore order. In an effort to control terrorist activity and to calm the military,

the Socialist government introduced strong antiterrorist legislation,

which received widespread popular support. Nevertheless, the violence continued. Moreover, the central government received a set- back in its antiterrorist campaign in 1984, when the Supreme Court

overruled a decision by the Ministry of Interior to ban the politi- cal party Popular Unity (Herri Batasuna—HB), with which the

ETA Military Front (ETA Militar—ETA-M) was associated, from

representation in either the regional or the national parliament.

Prospects for a lessening of tension between the Basque Country and the Socialist government appeared to brighten when a legis- lative pact was signed in January 1985 between the president of

the Basque Country and the Basque affiliate of the PSOE. This

agreement included provisions to expedite the transfer of powers

to the autonomous institutions and called for a joint offensive against

terrorism. In spite of vigorous antiterrorist measures taken by the

central government, however, bombings and assassinations continued.

While dealing with such demanding domestic concerns as ter- rorism and the need for economic and social reform, the Socialist

government was also taking steps to develop a more active inter- national role for Spain. The country had experienced ostracism

under Franco because of the highly undemocratic nature of his

regime (see Foreign Policy under Franco, ch. 1). After taking office in 1982, the Socialists made vigorous efforts to gain entry into the

European Community (EC—see Glossary). The government hoped

that membership in the EC would bring not only economic advantages but also international recognition of the country's successful

transition to democracy.

The question of Spain's entry into the EC met with repeated

delays in 1983 and in 1984, largely because of the opposition of

France. After protracted negotiations, a Treaty of Accession was

233
Spain: A Country Study

signed in the summer of 1985, and Spain formally joined the EC

on January 1, 1986 (see Spain and the European Community, this ch.).

Although the PSOE government had pursued the goal of EC

membership with single-minded zeal, it was ambivalent with regard

to participation in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO).

The Socialists had long advocated neutralism as part of their ideology; moreover, latent anti-Americanism was widespread in the

population.

The Socialists had opposed Spain's decision to join NATO in

May 1982, and part of their election platform in October of that

year was the promise of a referendum on the question of remaining in the alliance. After coming to power, they soon changed their

minds and concluded that some form of membership in NATO

was in Spain's interest. This left Gonzalez with the ticklish task

of campaigning for a favorable vote on an issue he had previously

attacked.

In order to gain approval for his new pro-NATO position,

Gonazlez attached conditions to membership. Spain would be part

of NATO in a political sense but without military integration; fur- thermore, nuclear weapons were to be banned in Spain. In an effort to appease the left wing of his party, the prime minister promised

that the number of United States troops in Spain, whose presence

reminded many Spaniards of previous United States ties with the

Franco regime, would be reduced. The promised referendum was

held on March 12, 1986, and in spite of public opinion polls indicating strong anti-NATO sentiment, the people voted to continue

membership in the alliance (see Participation in NATO, ch. 5). Gonzalez moved to consolidate the gains his government had

made through EC membership and the successful NATO referendum by calling for national parliamentary elections in June 1986,

four months ahead of schedule. The PSOE benefited from the fragmentation of both its right-wing opposition and the communists,

and it retained an absolute majority in the general elections, winning 184 of the 350 seats in the Congress of Deputies—18 fewer

than it had obtained in the 1982 elections, but still enough to retain

control.

The official opposition was embodied in the conservative Popular Coalition (Coalicion Popular—CP), which included Manuel

Fraga Iribarne's AP, the Popular Democratic Party (Partido

Democrata Popular—PDP), and the Liberal Party (Partido

Liberal—PL). The CP failed in its attempt to attract the moderate vote by moving to the center. Fraga' s abrasive personality and

Francoist past contributed to the defeat of the coalition, which began

234
Felipe Gonzalez Mdrquez,

prime minister, 1982-

Courtesy National

Tourist Office of Spain

to disintegrate soon after the election. Several leftist groups and

communist splinter parties formed an electoral coalition, the United

Left (Izquierda Unida—IU), to participate in the election, which

obtained slightly better results than the left did in 1982.

The surprise feature of the 1986 elections was the resurgence

of the center vote, indicated by the tripling of the ballots cast for the Democratic and Social Center (Centro Democratico y Social

CDS). Its leader, Suarez, continued to be a popular figure on the

Spanish political scene (see Transition to Democracy, ch. 1). Given

the disarray at both ends of the political spectrum, the CDS had

a chance to develop into the major opposition party (see Political

Parties, this ch.).

In spite of the PSOE's electoral victory in June 1986, dissatis- faction with the policies and the actions of the Socialist government had been mounting, and it increased even more as the year

drew to a close. The early months of 1987 saw the strongest out- break of social unrest in Spain since the 1930s. Demonstrations

by university and secondary school students were followed by

increasingly violent labor strikes. Doctors and teachers joined rail- road workers and farm laborers in protesting the low wages and

the high unemployment that had come in the wake of the government's economic austerity policies. Contributing to the growing

unrest was an escalation in Basque terrorism and popular revulsion over a bomb that caused the deaths of many innocent civilians.

235
Spain: A Country Study

Polls indicated a decline in confidence in Gonzalez, whose immense

popularity had heretofore been unaffected by such vicissitudes.

Elections held in June 1987 at the municipal and the regional

levels, as well as those for the European Parliament, confirmed the

declining support for the Socialist government. Although the PSOE

remained the largest single party, it obtained only 37 percent of

the municipal vote, down from 43 percent in 1983. TheJune elec- tions resulted in a further erosion of the AP, which was under the new leadership of Antonio Hernandez Mancha. The CDS emerged,

strengthened, as the fulcrum of the center, although it was not yet

in a position to present a challenge to Socialist dominance.

Dissatisfaction with the PSOE government was also evidenced

within the Socialist party itself. In October 1987, Nicolas Redondo,

leader of the Socialist-controlled General Union of Workers (Union

General de Trabaj adores—UGT), resigned his seat in parliament

in protest against the government's 1988 budget. He criticized the

government for favoring employers' interests over those of the working class. Most businessmen approved of the market-oriented economic

policies of Gonzalez, which had succeeded in reducing the annual

inflation rate, from 15 percent in 1982 to below 5 percent in 1987,

and in raising annual economic growth rate to 4.5 percent. The

price paid for these accomplishments, however, was an unemployment rate of 21 percent, the highest in Europe, and an increasingly

alienated labor force. The UGTjoined with its communist counterpart, the Workers' Commissions (Comisiones Obreras—CCOO),

in staging joint protests in October and in November 1987 and

a general strike in December 1988 (see Political Interest Groups,

this ch.).

At the Socialist party congress held in January 1988, Redondo

and other left-wing socialists accused Gonzalez of betraying the

workers and of forsaking the socialist cause. They urged a relaxation of anti-inflation measures in order to allow for an increase in

wages and in pensions. They also called for greater investment in

public works and for a concerted effort to deal with the unemployment problem.

In contrast to the growing dissatisfaction with the government's

economic policies, there was widespread approval when Gonzalez

decided to demand a reduction of the United States military

presence in Spain, in keeping with the pledge he had made at the

time of the NATO referendum. In December 1987, the government notified the United States that it would have to remove its seventy-two F-16 fighter bombers from Spain by mid- 1991. The

two countries reached agreement in principle in January 1988 on

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a new, more limited base agreement to last eight years (see Spain

and the United States, this ch.; Military Cooperation with the

United States, ch. 5). Spanish popular opinion also responded favorably to indications

that there might be hope for an end to the terrorist violence that

had claimed more than 750 lives in a 20-year period. In November 1987, the major political parties signed an antiterrorist pact

in which they pledged to work peacefully for the resolution of conflicts in the Basque Country, they condemned all forms of violence,

and they called on the ETA to lay down its arms and to work

through democratic channels. In February 1988, the government

accepted an ETA proposal for a sixty-day truce and for the opening of formal peace negotiations. A major factor in bringing the

ETA to hold talks was French cooperation, beginning in mid- 1986,

in hunting down the movement's leaders and in extraditing those

who had sought asylum in France. The negotiators faced formidable obstacles, most notably the conflict between Basque demands

for self-determination and constitutional provisions for the armed

forces to uphold Spain's territorial integrity. Nevertheless, by

mid- 1988 prospects for an end to violence were brighter than they

had been in many years. After five and one-half years in office, the PSOE could take credit for significant accomplishments, in spite of rumblings on the left. Observers generally conceded that the austerity measures carried

out by the government, while far removed from socialist concepts, were necessary in order to revive the economy, and they hoped

that a healthier economy would ultimately resolve the unemployment problem. More in line with socialist policies were the government's measures to lessen the Roman Catholic Church's control

of Spain's schools, to ease censorship laws, and to legalize divorce

(see Social Values and Attitudes, ch. 2). The PSOE's foreign policy

initiatives, gaining EC membership and reducing dependence on

the United States, also received popular approval. The democratic

process appeared to have taken root. Political Parties

Prior to the arrival of participatory democracy in Spain in the

late 1970s, Spanish citizens had scant experience with political

involvement. Suffrage was extremely limited, electoral mechanisms

were controlled and corrupt, and political parties were elitist. Under

the Francoist regime, Spanish society was depoliticized; the only

political formation officially sanctioned was the National Movement.

Remnants of the socialist and the communist parties functioned

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Spain: A Country Study

underground, and they were subject to severely repressive measures

(see The Franco Years, ch. 1). After forty years without parliamentary elections, political parties were revived, and they proliferated in the months following

Franco's death. Leftist parties that had been exiled or had functioned clandestinely, such as the communists and the Socialists,

had existing organizations and ideological traditions to form the

bases of renewed political activity. The center and the right,

however, had no such structures in place, and they lacked experi- ence in political involvement. The coalition party that was victori- ous in the first elections of the new democratic regime in June 1977,

the center-right UCD, failed to develop a coherent political vision.

Its brief period of success was due largely to the charisma of its leader, Suarez, and the party ultimately succumbed to its internal

conflicts. With the victory of the PSOE in 1982, Spain's political system

moved from a moderate right-left division to a predominance of

the center-left. Support for the PSOE had become less class-based

and more widespread as Spain underwent economic transformation and as the party became less dogmatic. In general, the tendency

of Spain's party politics has been toward the center, and support

for extremist parties has declined markedly, which bodes well for the country's future stability.

Spanish Socialist Workers' Party

The Spanish Socialist Workers' Party (Partido Socialista Obrero

Espanol—PSOE) is the oldest political party in Spain. Founded

by Pablo Iglesias in 1879 as a Marxist proletarian party, it evolved

alongside the trade union UGT, which was the basis of its support. The goal of both organizations was to obtain a voice for the

working class in the political arena. As the party began to win

parliamentary seats in the 1920s and the early 1930s, its membership began to broaden to include intellectuals, writers, and teachers. The PSOE's first experience as a governing party was during the

turbulent Second Republic, but its time of leadership was shortlived. The party experienced severe repression under Franco, and

its leaders went into exile, primarily in France.

In the early years of the Franco dictatorship, the PSOE within

Spain was almost obliterated. In succeeding years, the party's

leadership in exile gradually lost touch with what was evolving inside

the country. In the mid-1950s, socialist groups began to organize

within Spain; and, in the 1960s a small group of activists, led by

two young labor lawyers from Seville (Spanish, Sevilla), Alfonso

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Government and Politics

Guerra and Felipe Gonzalez, revived the PSOE and began to agitate for changes within the party.

The leaders in exile had fought in the Civil War, and they had

strong feelings against compromising the ideological purity of their cause by collaborating with other forces opposing Franco. Conversely, the younger activists, with no personal memories of the

Civil War, were willing to work with other anti-Franco groups to the left as well as to the right of the PSOE. These young Socialists,

who had been strongly influenced by Social Democrats in the Federal Republic of Germany (West Germany), also favored a more

moderate ideology than the rigid Marxism of the old guard. By

1972 the struggle for power between these two groups had been

won by the younger generation, and Gonzalez was elected secre- tary general of the PSOE at its Twelfth Congress in 1974.

During the transition to democracy, the PSOE essentially cooperated with the reform plans set forth by Suarez, as did the other

major leftist groups. When the country's first free elections since

the Civil War were held in June 1977, the PSOE became Spain's

leading opposition party. While growing in popularity, however,

the party was beset from within by profound ideological tensions.

Although the Socialists had gained support by presenting an image

of moderation to the electorate, this stance was vehemently attacked

by the more radical members of the party, who criticized Gonzalez

and his supporters for placing more emphasis on gaining votes than

they did on advancing the interests of the workers.

This rift came to a head at the party's Twenty-Eighth Congress

in May 1979. When Gonzalez failed in his effort to remove the

term Marxist from the party's constitution, he resigned. Gonzalez was successful in his gamble that most PSOE members considered

his leadership invaluable, and at an extraordinary congress held

in September 1979, he was re-elected on his own terms. The party no longer defined itself as Marxist, and policies of moderation and

pragmatism prevailed, thereby enabling the PSOE to appeal to a wider spectrum of society. This broader electoral base was a key

factor in the Socialists' victory in 1982, when they increased their

popular vote from 5.5 million in 1979 to 10 million.

Nevertheless, Gonzalez continued to emphasize economic modernization rather than traditional socialist policies, which resulted in

increasingly vociferous opposition from his historical base of support, the labor unions (see Political Developments, 1982-88, this ch.). A poll taken at the end of 1987 revealed a steady, albeit not

dramatic, decrease in popular support for the Socialists. Even so, in mid- 1988 the PSOE, as governing party, had no serious rival.

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Spain: A Country Study

Communist Party of Spain

The Communist Party of Spain (Partido Comunista de Espana

PCE) had its beginnings in Spain during the revolutionary upsurge

that followed World War I and the Bolshevik Revolution in Russia. The Spanish communists did not become as strong a force as their counterparts in other European countries, however, largely

because of the existence in Spain of strong socialist and anarchist

movements that already occupied the left end of the political spec- trum. PCE membership, never very large in the party's early years

of activity, declined dramatically under the repression carried out

by the dictatorship of Miguel Primo de Rivera in the 1920s (see

The Africa War and the Authoritarian Regime of Miguel Primo

de Rivera, ch. 1). Communist influence on the left increased when

the PCE ceased attacking the Socialists and other leftist organizations and shifted toward a popular front strategy in 1934.

During the Civil War, the leftist forces were again divided. The

communists were intent on finishing the war against the fascist forces before beginning their social and political revolution, whereas other

leftist organizations were not willing to postpone the restructuring

of Spanish society. The communists were brutal in their suppression of competing leftist organizations, which led to the party's

ostracism by the other anti-Franco forces in the post-Civil War

period.

In the mid-1950s, the PCE began vigorous efforts to break out

of its isolation and adapted policies designed to bring together a broad coalition of parties, under PCE leadership, to oppose the

Franco dictatorship. Ironically, it was the Franco regime itself, by

focusing its attacks on the PCE, that enabled the party to become

a rallying point for dissident students and workers. The party built a political base around the trade union movement known as the

CCOO, and by the end of the Franco era the PCE, under the

leadership of Santiago Carrillo, was the most effective political

organization in Spain.

The PCE failed to take the initiative as this authoritarian regime

drew to a close, however, and expectations of a hegemonic role

for the PCE on the Spanish left were not realized. Although PCE

membership multiplied following the party's legalization in 1977,

the PCE received only 9 percent of the popular vote in the elec- tions held that year; dominance on the left went to the rival PSOE

(see Transition to Democracy, ch. 1). After the PCE's share of

the vote fell to 3.8 percent in the 1982 elections, internal tensions

within the party reached crisis proportions, and Carrillo 's leadership began to be questioned.

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Government and Politics

As had been the case for the PSOE, the PCE found that the burden of dogmatic Marxism reduced its appeal for the electorate. Carrillo had succeeded in eliminating the word "Leninism" from the

PCE statutes at a party congress in 1978, over substantial opposition. He continued to be criticized by the pro-Soviet militants within

the party, who urged him to take a more revolutionary approach.

At the same time, a more European-oriented group, known as the

renovators, agitated for modernization and for more internal debate

within the party. In addition to ideologically based dissension, there was also general dissatisfaction with Carrillo's increasingly inflexible leadership.

His repeated purges of those members who opposed him further

decimated and demoralized the party. Following the PCE's decisive defeat in the October 1982 elections, Carrillo resigned as secre- tary general of the party; he was replaced by Gerardo Iglesias. In succeeding months, splinter groups broke away from the PCE,

further depleting its support to form pro-Soviet or Marxist-Leninist

parties. Among these were the pro-Soviet Communist Party of the

Peoples of Spain (Partido Comunista de los Pueblos de Espaha

PCPE) and the Communist Party of Spain—Marxist-Leninist

(Partido Comunista de Espana—Marxista-Leninista—PCE-ML).

Within the PCE, Carrillo strongly opposed Iglesias' s policies. He

was particularly critical of the latter' s proposal to form a coalition

of all progressive forces that were to the left of the PSOE. This

conflict led to Carrillo's expulsion from the central committee of

the party, in April 1985. He subsequently organized and led the

Committee for Communist Unity (Mesa para Unidad de los Comunistas—MUC), which in December 1986 formed a new pro-Soviet

party named the Spanish Workers' Party-Communist Unity (Partido de los Trabajadores de Espana-Unidad Comunista—PTEUC). By the end of 1987, there were indications of efforts on the

part of the PCE, PCPE, and the PTE-UC to unify the three communist parties in time for the next general elections. The PCE and

the PCPE, together with several other small leftist parties, formed

an electoral coalition, the IU, to contest the national elections in

1986 as well as the regional and municipal elections in 1987.

The PCE convened its Twelfth Party Congress in February 1988

amid mounting agitation for a major revitalization of the party,

which was plagued by financial problems and by a lack of unity.

Although Iglesias had initiated the policy of a united left and had

ended the decimating party purges, critics felt that stronger measures as well as more effective leadership were necessary to mobilize the left and to improve the PCE's showing at the polls. At the

party congress, Julio Anguita was chosen to succeed Iglesias. Party

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Spain: A Country Study

members reaffirmed their commitment to workers' interests, and

they adopted policies aimed at attracting environmentalists and

pacifists to their ranks.

Popular Alliance

The Popular Alliance (Alianza Popular—AP) was a conservative right-wing party founded in 1976 by former Franco ministers

under the leadership of Fraga, who had helped to prepare the way

for reform during the Franco era and who had expected to play a key role in post-Franco governments. He underestimated the

popular desire for change and distaste for Francoism, and he advocated an extremely gradual transition to democracy. Although Fraga

had originally intended to convey a reformist image, his party was

perceived by the electorate as both reactionary and authoritarian.

Fraga' s own outbursts of temper and the close ties of many of the

AP candidates to the previous regime contributed to this perception. When elections were held in June 1977, the AP garnered only

8.3 percent of the vote. In the months following the 1977 elections, dissension erupted

within the AP over constitutional issues that arose as the draft document was being formulated. The more reactionary members voted

against the draft constitution, and they advocated a shift to the right.

Fraga, however, wanted to move the AP toward the political center

in order to form a larger center-right party. Most of the disenchanted reactionaries left the AP, and Fraga and the remaining

AP members joined other more moderately conservative party leaders to form the Democratic Coalition (Coalicion Democratica

CD). It was hoped that this new coalition would capture the support of those who had voted for the UCD in 1977, but who had

become disenchanted with the Suarez government. When elections were held in March 1979, however, the CD received only 6. 1 per- cent of the vote. Deeply disappointed, Fraga resigned as head of

his party.

By the time of the AP's Third Party Congress in December 1979,

party leaders were reassessing their involvement in the CD. Many

felt that the creation of the coalition had merely confused the voters,

and they sought to emphasize the AP's independent identity. Fraga

resumed control of the party, and the political resolutions adopted

by the party congress reaffirmed the conservative orientation of

the AP.

In the early 1980s, Fraga succeeded in rallying the various components of the right around his leadership. He was aided in his

efforts to revive the AP by the increasing disintegration of the UCD.

In the general elections held in October 1982, the AP gained votes

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Government and Politics

both from previous UCD supporters and from the far right, and

it became the major opposition party, securing 25.4 percent of the

popular vote. Whereas the AP's parliamentary representation had

dropped to 9 seats in 1979, the party allied itself with the small

right-wing PDP and won 106 seats in 1982. The increased strength

of the AP was further evidenced in the municipal and regional elec- tions held in May 1983, when the party drew 26 percent of the

vote. A significant portion of the electorate appeared to support

the AP's emphasis on law and order as well as its probusiness

policies.

Subsequent political developments belied the party's aspirations

to continue increasing its base of support. Prior to the June 1986

elections, the AP once again joined forces with the PDP, and along

with the PL, formed the CP, in another attempt to expand its constituency to include the center of the political spectrum. The coalition called for stronger measures against terrorism, for more

privatization, and for a reduction in spending and in taxes. The

CP failed to increase its share of the vote in the 1986 elections,

however, and it soon began to disintegrate.

When regional elections in late 1986 resulted in further losses for the coalition, Fraga resigned as AP president, although he

retained his parliamentary seat. At the party congress in February 1987, Hernandez was chosen to head the AP, declaring that

under his leadership the AP would become a "modern right-wing

European party." But Hernandez lacked political experience at the national level, and the party continued to decline. When support for the AP plummeted in the municipal and regional elections

held in June 1987, there was increased likelihood that it would be

overtaken as major opposition party by Suarez' s CDS.

Democratic and Social Center

The Democratic and Social Center (Centro Democratico y

Social—CDS) was organized shortly before the October 1982 elec- tions by Suarez, who had been the principal architect of the transition to a democratic system after the death of Franco. After he

resigned as both prime minister of Spain and president of the UCD

in January 1981, Suarez continued to struggle for control of the

party machine. When he failed in his bid to regain party leadership in July 1982, he abandoned the party he had created and

formed the CDS. The new centrist party fared poorly in the October

general elections, gaining only two parliamentary seats. By 1986 the party's fortunes had improved dramatically under

the leadership of the former prime minister. In the June elec- tions, the CDS more than tripled its share of the vote, which was

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Spain: A Country Study

9.2 percent in 1986, compared with 2.9 percent in 1982, indicating that many who had previously voted for the UCD had trans- ferred their support to the CDS. In the electoral campaign, Suarez

had focused on his own experience as head of the government; he

had criticized the PSOE for not fulfilling its 1982 election promises,

had advocated a more independent foreign policy, and had called

for economic measures that would improve the lot of the poor. This

strategy enabled him to draw some votes from those who had

become disillusioned with the PSOE.

In the municipal and the regional elections held in June 1987,

the largest gains were made by the CDS. A poll taken at the end

of 1987 revealed even stronger support for the party, and it gave

Suarez a popularity rating equal to that of Gonzalez. Suarez 's call for less dependence on the United States appealed to the latent anti- Americanism in the populace, and his advocacy of a greater role for the state in providing social services and in ensuring a more

equitable distribution of income struck a responsive chord among

the workers, who were growing increasingly impatient with Gonzalez's conservative economic policies. Nevertheless, it remained

to be seen how far Suarez 's populist rhetoric would take him in

his quest to challenge the PSOE.

Other National Parties

Smaller parties emerged during the 1970s and the 1980s, and

they frequently became part of various coalitions. The PDP had

been a component of the UCD, but it re-established its separate

identity in 1982, joining with the AP for the October 1982 electoral campaign and forming part of the CP during the June 1986 elec- tions. The PL, founded in 1977, also allied with the CP in 1986.

The centrist Democratic Reformist Party (Partido Reformista

Democratico—PRD), established in 1984, stressed decentralization and greater independence for local party leaders. A new radical right-wing party also emerged in 1984, the Spanish Integration

Committees (Juntas Espanolas de Integration). Founded by former

Franco ministers, the party presented an updated version of the

Falangism of the Franco regime. Another extreme right-wing party,

the National Front (Frente Nacional—FN), was formed in October

1986. On the left, the radical Progressive Federation (Federation

Progresista—FP) called for greater decentralization and for a neutralist foreign policy.

Special interest groups also established political organizations.

The Spanish Green Party (Partido Verde Espanol—PVE) convened

its first party congress in February 1985. The group focused on

wide-ranging environmentalist concerns, and it opposed NATO

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Government and Politics

membership for Spain. There was also a Feminist Party (Partido

Feminista—PF) that focused primarily on education.

Regional Parties

Spain's system of political parties was complicated by the exis- tence of regional parties that were active both at the regional level,

and, when they had seats in the Cortes, at the national level (see

table 14, Appendix). In most autonomous communities, politics was dominated by regional affiliates of one of the two national parties, the PSOE and the AP, with the PSOE controlling the greater

number of regions. In some of the autonomous communities,

however, these regional offshoots had to form coalitions with truly

local parties if they wished to govern. Only the Basque Country

and Catalonia had regional parties that were strong enough to set the political agenda; the most important were the PNV and the

Catalan electoral coalition, Convergence and Union (Convergencia

i Unio—CiU). These two moderately right-wing parties routinely

won seats in the Cortes, and the CiU did well enough in regional

elections to govern Catalonia, if it chose, without the aid of coali- tion partners. It was also the only regional party that had a decisive role in politics on the national level. This foremost exponent

of Catalan nationalism occasionally supplied important parliamentary support to the UCD in the late 1970s. By far the second most

important party in Catalonia was the regional offshoot of the PSOE,

the Socialists' Party of Catalonia (Partit dels Socialistes de Catalunya—PSC).

The Catalan party system in general was characterized by pragmatism and by moderation. By contrast, the Basque national parties were beset by polarization, fragmentation, and political

violence. In 1986 a group of PNV dissidents, unhappy with both

the party's economic conservatism and its willingness to cooperate with the PSOE's stern antiterrorist measures, split from the

party to form the more radical organization named Basque Soli- darity (Eusko Alkartasuna—EA). In addition, there were two more

extreme Basque nationalist groups, the Basque Left (Euskadiko

Ezkerra—EE) and the HB. The more radical of these was the HB,

which included Marxist-Leninist revolutionary and ultranationalist

groups and which was closely linked to the ETA-M. The party

emphasized social revolution and armed struggle for Basque independence. The EE party was believed to be tied to the less violent

ETA Political-Military Front (ETA Politico-Militar—ETA-PM)

(see Threats to Internal Security, ch. 5). These nationalist parties

almost invariably won seats in the Cortes.

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Spain: A Country Study

Political Interest Groups

The revitalized pluralism that accompanied liberalization in Spain

after Franco gave rise to new forms of popular participation in the

country's political process. At the same time, it redefined the exist- ing political forces, such as the army and the Roman Catholic

Church (see Constitutional System, this ch.). Article 9 of the 1978

Constitution calls on public authorities to facilitate the participation of all citizens in the political, the economic, the cultural, and

the social life of the country. After forty years of depoliticization,

Spanish citizens began to play an increasingly active role in the

nation's development, through involvement in the various interest

groups that were established or reactivated along with the political

parties.

Labor

The labor movement, which had been a major component of

support for the Republican forces in the Civil War, was brutally

suppressed after the Nationalists came to power. Vertical syndicates replaced trade unions, and strikes were outlawed (see The

Franco Years, ch. 1). Nevertheless, mounting strike activity in the

1960s and the 1970s, which persisted in spite of severe reprisals,

testified to the strength of the labor movement, which was a key

factor in propelling Spain toward a democratic form of government.

The political changes that swept through Spain in the wake of

liberalization were not accompanied by commensurate changes in

social and economic conditions. One of the reasons for this was

the labor movement's reluctance to voice strong criticisms of the

governing UCD for fear of provoking a military coup. Because of

the army's apparent ambivalence toward the nascent democratic

system, the parties on the left and the labor movement, which

normally would have been expected to agitate for a significant

restructuring of the economy and of society, adopted an attitude

of cooperation and consensus with the government (see Transition

to Democracy, ch. 1). Although this stance contributed to the success of the transition process, it nevertheless had the effect of postponing necessary societal reforms. The consequences of this delay were a salient factor in the labor unrest that reached crisis proportions in the late 1980s.

Decree laws in March and in April 1977 legalized trade unions

and introduced the rights to strike and to engage in collective bargaining. The 1978 Constitution delineates the rights of unions to defend their interests. It grants to all citizens, except members of

the armed forces and the judiciary, the right to join a union. It

246
The Benedictine Monastery of Montserrat,

located to the northwest of Barcelona, is a bastion of Catalan culture. Courtesy James Scofield

also guarantees them the right not to join one. The first major labor

legislation enacted under the 1978 Constitution, the Workers'

Statute that came into force in 1980, further elaborated the rights

of workers. It included guarantees pertaining to a minimum wage

and to social security, and it stipulated that labor relations were

to be worked out between unions and management, with no direct

government involvement. The statute outlined the format for col- lective bargaining, recognizing the right of the elected representatives of the workers to negotiate on their behalf.

The basic freedoms and rights of unions were given more detailed

treatment in the Organic Law on Trade Union Freedom, which

went into effect in August 1985. This law spelled out the negotiating role to which larger unions were entitled, and it prohibited any

form of discrimination on the part of employers. An earlier government labor statute called for syndical elections to be held every two

years, and these provided an indication of the national strength

of the labor unions.

The two principal unions were the UGT and the CCOO. The

UGT, which was founded in 1888 and which had a long tradition

of close ties with the PSOE, was a composite of autonomous local unions, each of which consisted of workers engaged in the same

type of activity, who were organized on a provincial or regional

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Spain: A Country Study

basis. The UGT favored the idea of increased power at the local

level, and allowed local unions to call work stoppages independendy.

In the 1982 union elections, the UGT gained a greater share of

the vote than the CCOO, which had dominated previous syndical

elections.

The CCOO has a shorter history than the UGT, having developed out of locally organized groups of workers that functioned

both legally and clandestinely during the Franco dictatorship.

Reforms enacted in the late 1950s allowed for the election of factory

committees that rapidly evolved into permanent bodies representing the interests of the workers. Although the founding members

of this new labor movement were independent socialists and leftist Roman Catholics as well as communists, it was the PCE that

emerged as the dominant force within the movement; the majority

of leadership positions were held by PCE members.

As these workers' organizations, called commissions, grew in

strength and began to proliferate, the Francoist authorities cracked

down, outlawing them in 1967. This did not stop their activities. By the time of Franco's death, the CCOO was the dominant force

in the labor movement. It subsequently declined in strength, in

part because of the PCE's decreased electoral support and the con- comitant ascendancy of the PSOE.

Like the UGT, the CCOO was organized into federations of

workers, based on the type of work they performed. These groups were in turn linked together as confederations in territorial congresses. A national congress met every other year. The structure of the CCOO was more centralized than that of the UGT; decisions made at the top were expected to be carried out throughout

the lower echelons of the union.

The CCOO claimed to be politically independent, but the union

had strong historical links with the PCE, and its important leaders were also prominent communists. Communist ideology prevailed, although the union began assuming a tactical distance from

the PCE in the 1980s, as the party became weakened by internal

divisions and lost support at the polls.

The UGT made no effort to de-emphasize its links with the

PSOE. Both union and party frequently reiterated their common

aspirations, although there were disagreements between them as well as within their respective organizations. The political ties of

both the UGT and the CCOO were salient factors in the rivalry

that existed between the two unions. In addition to these two major unions, other labor organizations

remained active and influential in Spaih in the late 1980s. The

Workers' Syndical Union (Union Sindical Obrera—USO) was

248
Government and Politics among those that developed in opposition to the Franco regime.

Many of its founding members had been involved in the Catholic

workers' organizations, and they were strongly anticommunist. At

the same time, they sought to replace capitalism with control of

production by the workers. Militant in its early days, the USO had

evolved into the most politically conservative of the major federations by the 1980s.

A more radical trade union, the anarcho-syndicalist National

Confederation of Labor (Confederacion Nacional del Trabajo

CNT), was the second oldest labor organization in Spain; it had

been a major political force during the Second Republic. Failing

to re-establish its working-class base after the Franco period, it found

its principal support among white-collar workers. It boycotted syndical elections as elements of bourgeois democracy and preferred

direct action strategies.

Two smaller unions that developed as splinter groups from the

CCOO were the extreme left Confederation of United Workers'

Unions (Confederacion de Sindicatos Unitarios de Trabajadores

CSUT) and the United Syndicate (Sindicato Unitario—SU). Both

were linked to Maoist political parties; their aim was to present

a distinctly radical alternative to the moderation of the major fed- erations. Although they gained some support in the 1978 union

elections, their influence has steadily declined.

In addition, there were regional unions, two of which gained

sufficient support to qualify for a formal place in negotiating

procedures. These were the Basque Workers' Solidarity (Eusko

Langilleen Alkartasuna-Solidaridad de Trabajadores Vascos

ELA-STV), which was closely linked to the PNV, and the National

Galician Workers' Union (Intersindical Nacional de Trabajadores

Gallegos—INTG).

Although trade unions were highly visible and influential in the

political process, they all, with the exception of the ELA-STV,

suffered from small memberships. While studies indicated that less than 20 percent of the wage-earning population was affiliated with

a union, even fewer of these workers maintained their dues payments, leaving the trade unions in a financially weak position (see

Labor Relations in the Post-Franco Period, ch. 3). Nevertheless, labor unions continued to maintain a high profile

in the political arena. Throughout 1987 and 1988, periodic strikes plagued the PSOE government and disrupted the day-to-day functioning of the country. These strikes had the backing of the UGT.

Discontent within the labor movement was dramatized when the

UGT leader, Redondo, formerly close to Gonzalez, resigned his seat in parliament in protest against government policies. He gave

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Spain: A Country Study

voice to the widespread feeling that the PSOE's economic policies were benefiting business at the expense of the working class. In

October 1987, the UGT and the CCOO agreed to stage joint

demonstrations against the government's pay and pension policies,

and in December 1988 they staged a general strike (see Political

Developments, 1982-88, this ch.).

Business

Throughout the Franco years, a relatively small financial elite of businessmen and bankers exercised a considerable amount of

power through personal influence and connections rather than

through support from organized interest groups. Moreover, the

interests of the business community were generally compatible with

those of the Franco dictatorship: both wanted stability and eco- nomic prosperity. In the later years of the regime, business leaders, influenced by their contacts with Western Europe, came to favor more economically liberal policies; many of these leaders

became vigorous proponents of economic and political modernization.

Many members of the financial elite under Franco continued

to hold positions of authority after his death. Constitutional and

statutory provisions enacted under the new democratic regime

provided more formalized structures to represent their interests and

those of the wider business community. In the early days of

democratic government, a large number of employers' organizations came into being. Some of these were based on regions; a larger

number were organized according to the type of business activity

involved. In 1977 these diverse organizations were brought together

in the Spanish Confederation of Employers' Organizations (Confederation Espanola de Organizaciones Empresariales—CEOE).

This group subsequently became one of the strongest supporters

of the AP. A separate confederation, the Spanish Confederation

of Small and Medium-Sized Firms (Confederacion Espanola de

Pequenas y Medianas Empresas—CEPYME), was incorporated

into the CEOE in 1980. It maintained a special status within the

larger confederation, and when agreements were reached with the

government and the unions, the CEPYME was a separate signatory.

The CEOE was a highly consolidated organization, representing almost all of Spain's companies, other than those that were owned or controlled by the government. Two other national associations endeavored, with little success, to become the representatives

of smaller-scale businesses: the General Confederation of Small and

Medium-Sized Firms of Spain (Confederacion General de las

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Government and Politics

Pequenas y Medianas Empresas del Estado Espanol—COPYME)

and the Union of Small and Medium-Sized Firms (Union de la Pequefia y Mediana Empresa—UNIPYME).

In addition to employers' organizations, chambers of commerce

endeavored to further the economic interests of their members by

providing a variety of services to the firms and the individuals they

represented. They had an international role as well, and they

assisted in export promotion and trade missions.

The greatest degree of political influence within Spain's busi- ness community was exercised by the country's large private banks.

During the Franco regime, the banking sector provided crucial

financial support for Franco, and he in turn enacted measures that were to its benefit. For example, he prohibited the founding of new

banks from 1936 to 1962, thereby further concentrating the power

of the larger banks. These banks controlled large sectors of industry, directly and indirectly, and they collaborated with government

institutions in directing Spain's economic expansion (see Banking,

ch. 3). The traditionally powerful position of the banks was eroded some- what during the economic recession of the 1970s and by increased

government intervention in banking under the democratic regime.

The inability of the leaders of the largest banks to transcend their

mutual rivalries also attenuated the influence of this potentially for- midable interest group. Nevertheless, they remained the single largest grouping of economic and financial interests in Spain, with close links to the government. Banks gained additional leverage by

providing financial assistance to the frequentiy short-funded politi- cal parties.

Roman Catholic Church

Church and state have been closely linked in Spain for centuries. With the reinstitution of the Inquisition in Spain in the fifteenth century, the state employed draconian measures to enforce reli- gious unity in an effort to ensure political unity. Strong measures

to separate church and state were enacted under the short-lived

Second Republic, but they were nullified by the victorious Nationalists. In the early years of the Franco regime, church and state had a close and mutually beneficial association. The loyalty of the

Roman Catholic Church to the Francoist state lent legitimacy to the dictatorship, which in turn restored and enhanced the church's

traditional privileges (see The Franco Years, ch. 1). After the Second Vatican Council in 1965 set forth the church's

stand on human rights, the church in Spain moved from a position of unswerving support for Franco's rule to one of guarded

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Spain: A Country Study

criticism. During the final years of the dictatorship, the church withdrew its support from the regime and became one of its harshest

critics. This evolution in the church's position divided Spanish

Catholics. Within the institution, right-wing sentiment, opposed

to any form of democratic change, was typified by the Brotherhood of Spanish Priests, the members of which published vitriolic attacks on church reformers. Opposition took a more violent form

in such groups as the rightist Catholic terrorist organization known

as the Warriors of Christ the King, which assaulted progressive

priests and their churches.

Whereas this reactionary faction was vociferous in its resistance

to any change within the church, other Spanish Catholics were frus- trated at the slow pace of reform in the church and in society, and

they became involved in various leftist organizations. In between

these extreme positions, a small, but influential, group of Catholics—who had been involved in lay Catholic organizations such as Catholic Action—favored liberalization in both the church and the

regime, but they did not enter the opposition forces. They formed

a study group called Tacito, which urged a gradual transition to a democratic monarchy. The group's members published articles advocating a Christian democratic Spain.

The church continued to be in opposition to the Franco regime

throughout the dictatorship's final years. The Joint Assembly of

Bishops and Priests held in 1971 marked a significant phase in the

distancing of the church from the Spanish state. This group affirmed

the progressive spirit of the Second Vatican Council and adopted

a resolution asking the pardon of the Spanish people for the hierarchy's partisanship in the Civil War.

At the Episcopal Conference convened in 1973, the bishops

demanded the separation of church and state, and they called for a revision of the 1953 Concordat. Subsequent negotiations for such

a revision broke down because Franco refused to relinquish the power

to veto Vatican appointments. Until his death, Franco never understood the opposition of the church. No other Spanish ruler had

enacted measures so favorable to the church as Franco, and he complained bitterly about what he considered to be its ingratitude.

Because the church had already begun its transformation into a modern institution a decade before the advent of democracy to Spain, it was able to assume an influential role during the transition period that followed Franco's death. Furthermore, although

disagreements over church-state relations and over political issues

of particular interest to the Roman Catholic Church remained, these

questions could be dealt with in a less adversarial manner under

the more liberal atmosphere of the constitutional monarchy.

252
Government and Politics A revision of the Concordat was approved in July 1976 by the

newly formed Suarez government. Negotiations soon followed that

resulted in bilateral agreements, delineating the relationship between

the Vatican and the new democratic state (see Religion, ch. 2). The 1978 Constitution confirms the separation of church and state while recognizing the role of the Roman Catholic faith in Spanish

society (see The 1978 Constitution, this ch.).

Within this basic framework for the new relationship between

the church and the government, divisive issues remained to be

resolved in the late 1980s. The church traditionally had exercised

considerable influence in the area of education, and it joined conservative opposition parties in mounting a vigorous protest against

the education reforms that impinged on its control of the schools

(see Political Developments, 1982-88, this ch.). Even more acri- monious debate ensued over the emotionally charged issues of

divorce and abortion. The church mobilized its considerable influ- ence in support of a powerful lobbying effort against proposed legislation that was contrary to Roman Catholic doctrine governing these

subjects. The passage of a law in 1981 legalizing civil divorce struck a telling blow against the influence of the church in Spanish society.

A law legalizing abortion under certain circumstances was passed

in August 1985 and further liberalized in November 1986, over

the fierce opposition of the church.

Another manifestation of the redefined role of the church was

contained in measures aimed at reducing, and ultimately eliminating, direct government subsidies to the church. As part of the agree- ments reached in 1979, the church concurred with plans for its financial independence, to be achieved during a rather lengthy transitional period. At the end of 1987, the government announced

that, after a three-year trial period, the church would receive no

further direct state aid but would be dependent on what citizens

chose to provide, either through donations or by designating a portion of their income tax for the church. Although the church's tax- exempt status constituted an indirect subsidy, the effect of this new

financial status on the church's ability to wield political influence

remained to be seen. Although church-state relations involved potentially polarizing

issues, the church played a basically cooperative and supportive

role in the emergence of plural democracy in Spain. Although it no longer had a privileged position in society, its very independence from politics and its visibility made it an influential force. Opus Dei

The most influential Catholic lay group during the Franco period

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Spain: A Country Study

was the controversial Opus Dei (Work of God). This group did

not fit conveniently into any political category. Although it denied

any political aims, its members played pivotal roles in the modernization of the economy under Franco and in the subsequent liberali- zation of politics and government. At the same time, they were

theologically conservative, and their desire for modernization was

far from radical. They believed that economic reforms would

improve society to the extent that thoroughgoing political reforms

would be unnecessary.

Opus Dei was founded in 1928 by an Aragonese priest, Jose

Maria Escriva de Balaguer y Albas, and it was subsequently recog- nized by the Roman Catholic Church as its first secular religious

institution. Although attention has been drawn primarily to its activities in Spain, it is an international body with members and

associates throughout the world. Members take a vow to dedicate

their professional talents to the service of God and to seek to win

converts through their missionary zeal. The organization in Spain

has emphasized professional excellence, and it has expected its members to serve in important government positions.

During the late 1950s and the 1960s, Opus Dei members came

to control the economic ministries, and they occupied other important cabinet posts as well. This was in keeping with the organization's aim of influencing the development of society indirecdy. Opus

Dei recruited its members from among the brightest students, which

encouraged a sense of elitism and clannishness. Because of this clan- nishness and the secrecy that surrounded the organization, some

critics termed it the "Holy Mafia."

The Opus Dei technocrats were largely responsible for devising,

introducing, and later administering the economic stabilization pro- gram that formed the basis of Spain's economic development. They

encouraged competition as a means of achieving rapid economic

growth, and they favored economic integration with Europe.

Although these policies implied eventual political as well as eco- nomic liberalization, this was not Opus Dei's avowed goal; the

group remained socially conservative, stressing personal piety and

orthodox theology.

With the advent of democracy, Opus Dei lost much of its influ- ence, and it was condemned by the more progressive forces in both

the Catholic hierarchy and Spanish society for having propped up

a repressive regime. Its stature was somewhat restored under Pope

John Paul II, who viewed the orthodox Catholicism of the organization with favor. Opus Dei remained influential in the area of

education as well as in certain sectors of the financial community.

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Government and Politics

Military

Military intervention in politics has been a recurring theme in

Spain since the end of the Napoleonic wars. From 1814 to 1936,

Spain experienced no fewer than fifty-four attempts by the army

or by groups of officers to intervene against the civilian authority.

Twelve of these succeeded in overthrowing the existing regime or

in abrogating its constitution. The form each of these interventions

took was that of a pronunciamiento (pi., pronunciamientos) , whereby

a group of rebelling officers would "pronounce" what it wanted

the civilian leaders to do (see Rule by Pronunciamiento, ch. 1; Historical Role of the Armed Forces, ch. 5). The support of the armed forces was an essential factor in maintaining Franco's forty-year dictatorship. Franco was always aware

of the importance of this support, and he managed to foster the

belief that the army's interests would be served best by the continuation of his rule. Franco restored to the army its role of guarantor of the nation's values. At the same time, Franco was aware

of the dangers of a politicized army. He retained firm control of

the military establishment and prevented any individual officer from

gaining a power base. If a military leader became too popular or began to question Franco's policies, he was quickly removed from

any position of influence.

Following the death of Franco, King Juan Carlos and Prime

Minister Suarez were able to achieve a peaceful transition to democracy by proceeding with extreme caution and consulting with

the military leadership throughout the process. Thus, the military

leaders retained the belief that they had the right to be consulted on matters of national importance. The democratic leftists were

also aware of the ever-present possibility that reformist measures

could alienate the military and could provoke a coup attempt, which

led them to accept many compromises throughout the transition

period.

The role of King Juan Carlos was vital in gaining the army's

acceptance of the new democratic regime. He had been trained

in military academies, and he understood the viewpoint of the officer corps. He made a point of establishing close ties with the armed

forces after Franco's death in order to gain their loyalty to him

as Franco's chosen successor. At the same time, he was able to keep

the government informed as to how far it could go in the reform

process without provoking a military reaction.

Although many officers did not care for the political reform pro- gram set forth by Suarez, the military leaders did not express open

opposition to the democratization process until the legalization of

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Spain: A Country Study

the PCE in the spring of 1977 (see Transition to Democracy, ch. 1). They felt betrayed by Suarez, who had promised not to take such

a step, and although there was no coup, they protested vehemently.

The independence with which the army leaders had expressed

their revulsion at the government's decision highlighted the possibility that a powerful military organization could limit popular

sovereignty. Subsequently, measures were taken to affirm the

supremacy of civilian control. At the same time, the government

took steps to assuage military opinion by allocating funds for the

modernization of military equipment and for raising military

salaries. Efforts also were made to rationalize the military career

structure and to eliminate bottlenecks in the promotion process. In succeeding months, the armed forces and the civilian government coexisted uneasily. Intermittent rumblings were heard from

reactionary army leaders, who retained an antidemocratic mentality and who could not come to terms with their new position

in society. The armed forces seethed with plots for military take- overs, and the government's leniency toward conspirators, rather

than mollifying the military leaders, encouraged the plotters to more

daring acts. This unstable situation was exacerbated by the esca- lation of terrorist violence. Army dissidents perceived the government as allowing the country to descend into anarchy, and military unrest culminated in the dramatic coup attempt of February 23,

1981 . This attempted takeover was thwarted by the decisive inter- vention of King Juan Carlos, but conspiracies continued to be

uncovered.

When the Socialists came to power in 1982, the deterrent power

of the armed forces was still a factor to be considered. The PSOE

government continued to be cautious in dealing with issues affect- ing the military, although it took a firmer stance than did its predecessors. As rumors of impending coups quieted, and as extreme right-wing parties failed to gain popular support, the

government undertook stronger legal measures to bring the armed

forces under the political control of the prime minister as well as

to modernize and to streamline the military organization (see The

Military in National Life and Jurisdiction Over National Defense,

ch. 5). A significant aspect of the military reorganization was the emphasis on the armed forces' role in defending the state from external, not internal, enemies. This was reinforced by Spain's entrance into

NATO (see Spain and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization,

this ch.). This new outward focus, combined with the general sta- bility and conservatism of the government, helped to make mili- tary intervention in the political realm both impractical and unlikely.

256
King Juan Carlos and Queen Sofia Courtesy National

Tourist Office of Spain

Mass Communications

Newspapers and Periodicals

Under the rigorous censorship that prevailed during the Franco

regime, only news favorable to the government could appear in

the press, and there was little concern for the veracity of such

reports. With no reliable coverage of political events, reportage

diminished to a few items pertaining to society news, sports, or

business.

A new press law, approved in 1966, provided a degree of liberali- zation for publications and eliminated prior censorship, although

newspapers were expected to exercise self-censorship. The 1966 law

did not usher in freedom of the press, but it did expand the scope

of news that could be published; newspapers even began debating

what forms of government might evolve after Franco's death.

Although the 1978 Constitution guarantees the right to dis- seminate information, as of mid-1988 the 1966 press law had not

been replaced, and regulations dating from the Franco years had

been used in attempts to control journalists who published articles offensive to the government. In addition, some observers believed

that government subsidies to the press, beginning in 1979, threatened to compromise true freedom of the press. The early post-Franco years witnessed a proliferation of newspapers and magazines, although many of these were short lived.

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Spain: A Country Study

The enthusiasm for publishing was not matched by a commensurate

eagerness for reading on the part of the populace. In part because

of the prolonged repression of the dictatorship, Spaniards had lost the habit of reading newspapers. Whereas about 2,000 newspapers

had appeared daily during the Second Republic, in the 1980s there were only 130 (see table 15, Appendix). This drastically reduced

figure was an indication of the population's distrust of the press, although the growth of radio and television newscasts was also a

factor. Spain's per capita newspaper circulation was far below that

of most West European countries, and in the late 1980s less than

10 percent of the population regularly bought a daily newspaper.

By all accounts, the most influential newspaper was El Pais,

founded in 1976. It played a critical role in guiding the formation

of opinion in the early days of Spanish democracy. The paper maintained a liberal, factually objective viewpoint, and it appealed

primarily to well-educated citizens. In the mid-1980s, it was the

country's largest daily newspaper, with a circulation of 350,000

daily and 590,000 on Sundays.

The much older ABC was a conservative-monarchist newspaper.

Founded in 1905, it enjoyed wide popularity during the Franco

years, but its circulation declined after 1975. El Alcazar represented

ultra-right wing opposition to democratic policies. Many of its arti- cles pertained to the armed forces, because it appealed to a sector of society still nostalgic for Francoism. The oldest continuously published newspaper in Spain was La Vanguardia, founded in 1881 and

published in Barcelona. Until the early 1980s, this conservative

paper had the largest circulation in the country.

Other major daily newspapers included the Catholic rightist Ya, which strongly defended the church's position on such issues as divorce and abortion, and Diario 16, which began publication in 1975 as a spinoff of the respected weekly, Cambio 16. Marca was

a popular daily newspaper, devoted exclusively to sports news. Founded in the early days of the Franco regime, it enjoyed immense

popularity between 1940 and 1970, primarily because sports cover- age was the only uncensored news permitted by the government.

There were also a number of important regional newspapers in

Catalonia (Avui) and in the Basque Country (Deia in Bilbao and

Egin in San Sebastian) that published, at least partly, in the respective regional language; the circulation of each usually ran between

40,000 and 50,000 daily.

One large news agency, EFE, dominated the distribution of news. This national agency, which the government owned and subsidized, was controlled by the Ministry of Transportation, Tourism,

and Communications. The government frequently exercised its

258
Government and Politics

prerogative of appointing EFE directors. At the same time, financial aid from the state contributed to the significant growth of the

agency. Observers questioned the appropriateness of newspapers'

receiving their information from an agency so closely linked with

the government.

In addition to newspapers, Spain had a large number of weekly

and monthly periodicals that filled in the gaps in newspaper

coverage. Two leading weeklies specialized in political reporting:

Cambio 16, founded in 1972; and its more recent, somewhat sensationalist rival, Tiempo. Other periodicals for the most part concentrated on entertainment, social events, sports, and television.

One of the most popular magazines in Spain, Interviu, combined

unrestrained political reporting with equally uninhibited photography. This blending of political and sexual liberation proved

highly attractive to Spanish readers, after Franco's repressive poli- cies in both these areas. The best- selling magazine in Spain was

the weekly television review Tele-Indiscreta, the large circulation of

which indicated the immense popularity of television throughout

the country.

Radio and Television

Spain was served by four major radio networks in the late 1980s:

Radio Nacional Espanola (RNE), controlled by the government;

Radio Cadena Espanola (RCE), which consisted of stations for- merly owned by Francoist groups; Cadena de Ondas Populares

Espanolas (COPE), a network supported by the Roman Catholic

Church; and Sociedad Espanola de Radiodifiision (SER), the largest and most popular of the commercial networks.

The 1975 Geneva Conference restricted the number of networks

that might operate on the medium wave in each country. In Spain,

the four major networks plus one Catalan station broadcast on the

medium wave as well as on frequency modulation (FM). A number of new stations and networks began broadcasting on FM after the government redistributed the franchises in 1982. The quality

and the popularity of this FM programming had increased to such an extent, that in the mid-1980s, more Spaniards were listening

to FM than to medium wave. In 1986 there were approximately

10.8 million radio receivers in the country.

Radio broadcasting was regulated by the General Bureau for Radio Broadcasting and Television (Direccion General de Radiodifusion y Television). In October 1977, the government relin- quished its monopoly on radio news dissemination and declared

that it would no longer require the country's nonstate radio sta- tions to broadcast government news bulletins. News coverage

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Spain: A Country Study

became both faster and better after the end of RNE's monopoly,

as was evidenced dramatically during the February 1981 coup

attempt, when radio correspondents provided vivid and timely

descriptions of the night's events to a worried population, in a manner that neither the slower print media nor state-run television could

match.

Of the various forms of communications media, television occu- pied a unique position in the shaping of Spanish social values and

institutions. Spaniards received a relatively small proportion of their news and information from the print media, and they spent more

time watching television than the people of any other country in

Western Europe except Britain. Even most of the poorest homes

had television sets, which numbered approximately 10 million in

1986.

Television was controlled by a state monopoly, Radio-Television

Espafiola (RTVE), the responsibility for which was shuffled from

one ministry to another in the 1970s and the 1980s. Television as

well as radio continued to be subject to intense government scrutiny

and censorship through the early years of the post-Franco era, and

the Francoist notion of television as an arm of government did not

end with Franco's death. As part of agreements stemming from

the Moncloa Pacts, a governing body was established to guarantee RTVE's objectivity (see Transition to Democracy, ch. 1). This

body, called the Administrative Council, was to consist of six members elected by the Congress of Deputies in order to ensure that

it would reflect the political composition of the Cortes. This council was less than vigilant in its watchdog role, however, and during the late 1970s and the 1980s there were many cases of political

and financial corruption as well as mismanagement on the part

of RTVE.

Spain had two national television programs: one ultrahigh fre- quency (UHF) and the other, very high frequency (VHF). They

operated under the country's only television network, Television

Espanola (TVE), which in turn was under the jurisdiction of the

RTVE. In the 1980s, several autonomous governments obtained

permission to build television transmission facilities for broadcasting in their regional languages.

The most noteworthy development regarding television in the

late 1980s was the passage of a bill in April 1986, which, when

carried out, will end the state monopoly on television by allowing

three new private television networks to operate under the supervision of an independent broadcasting authority. The bill included

restrictions to prevent private investors from gaining a monopoly

control of a station, and it also established requirements about

260
Government and Politics

programming. The bill became law on April 4, 1987, and observers

noted that the introduction of commercial television might lead to an improvement in the rather erratic programming of Spanish tele- vision.

Foreign Relations

Spain's remote position on the southwest periphery of Western

Europe has affected much of its history, even when it belonged to the Roman, the Habsburg, and the Napoleonic empires. The

Pyrenees have presented a formidable land barrier against both

invasions and influences from the north. At the same time, Spain's

location at the western entrance of the Mediterranean has impelled

the country to play the role of an important maritime power and

has enabled it to act as a bridge among Europe, Africa, and the

Americas.

In the nineteenth century, Spain, beset by political instability

deriving from the cataclysm of the French Revolution as well as from its own later failure to participate in the Industrial Revolution, withdrew behind its borders. After suffering a humiliating

defeat by the United States in the Spanish-American War and los- ing its last colonies in the Philippines and the New World, Spain's

focus turned even further inward. Neutral in both world wars, Spain

found that its isolation deepened during the Franco years, intensified by the ostracism the country experienced because of its associations with Nazi Germany and fascist Italy.

After the Nationalist victory in the Civil War, the Franco regime

devoted itself primarily to domestic affairs, relegating foreign considerations to a secondary position. The primary concerns were

to establish political stability and to ensure economic reconstruction and development. Spanish diplomacy was an instrument with

which the government tried to obtain political legitimacy and to gain Spain's acceptance by the international community. Franco

played the leading role in pursuing these foreign policy goals, as he did in every other aspect of his government.

Spain's pariah status following World War II strengthened

Franco's internal position, solidifying the support of the Spanish

people behind their beleaguered leader. Nevertheless, as Spain

began to benefit from mounting Cold War tensions, from signing an agreement with the United States, and from achieving United

Nations (UN) membership, the siege mentality of the Spanish people lessened (see Foreign Policy under Franco, ch. 1). Spain and the European Community

As Spain began to emerge from its postwar isolation, successive

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Spain: A Country Study

Franco cabinets sought to establish closer ties with Europe. After

Franco's death, this became Spain's major diplomatic goal. The

desire to be recognized as a member of the West European

democratic societies was a primary motivating factor in Spain's

attempts to gain membership in the European Community (EC).

Spain had become an associate member of the Organisation for European Economic Co-operation (OEEC) in 1958 and a full member of that organization's successor, the Organisation for Economic

Co-operation and Development (OECD—see Glossary), in 1959.

It also had gained membership in the World Bank (see Glossary).

The EC, however, was much more reluctant to have Spain join

its ranks. Agreement for a preferential commercial trade pact was

reached in March 1970, after six years of negotiations, but it was

a strictiy economic accord. The continued existence of undemocratic

governmental institutions in Spain was strongly resented by member

countries of the EC, and it continued to be a barrier to Spanish

accession.

Shortly after Spain's first democratically elected government in more than forty years came to power in June 1977, Prime Minister

Suarez dispatched his foreign minister to Brussels to present Spain's

formal application to join the EC. The major political parties in

Spain, divided over other issues, all firmly supported this attempt

to advance Spain's modernization as well as its international legitimation. Prospects for the approval of this application were enhanced

by the implementation of democratic policies by the post-Franco

governments. European attitudes toward Spain began to improve,

and Spain was admitted to membership in the Council of Europe

(see Glossary), in November 1977. The Spanish government's

determination to continue moving in the direction of closer rela- tions with Europe was manifested in the creation in February 1978

of a new cabinet-level position, that of minister in charge of rela- tions with Europe.

Nevertheless, negotiations for Spain's accession to the EC were

complicated and protracted. After Spain had acquired the neces- sary democratic credentials, the economic implications of the prospective Spanish accession caused misgivings among EC members.

Spain's level of economic development was significantiy lower than

that of other member nations, and its industrial sector was in need

of profound structural reform. There were also difficulties concerning Spain's fishing fleets. It was in the area of agriculture, however,

that the potential consequences of Spanish membership created the

greatest concern among EC members, particularly France. These

and other factors would necessitate substantial increases in budget

262
Government and Politics

expenditures on the part of the EC , which was already experiencing a financial crisis (see Spain and the European Community,

ch. 3). After lengthy bargaining, agreements were reached on these

issues, and a Treaty of Accession was signed in the summer of 1985.

OnJanuary 1 , 1986, Spain finally entered the EC, along with Portugal. The terms of the Treaty of Accession were less than favorable to Spain, making the country a net contributor to the EC

budget for several years, but there was no popular or governmental protest. A major nonpartisan foreign policy objective had been

achieved, and most Spaniards savored the long-awaited feeling of

formal inclusion in the West European society of nations.

Their enthusiasm was tempered in subsequent months, as issues,

such as the barring of Spanish fishermen from Moroccan waters

because of an EC dispute with Morocco, made clear that not all aspects of EC membership would be beneficial to Spain. A poll

taken in the spring of 1987 revealed that a large majority of

Spaniards believed that entry into the EC had not helped Spain.

Farmers were particularly dissatisfied with the consequences of the

EC's Common Agricultural Policy. Nevertheless, the same poll

indicated that a majority of Spaniards favored EC membership and

that their sense of being "citizens of Europe" was increasing.

Spain and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization

Even though popular and official opinion had been virtually

unanimous in favoring Spain's accession to the EC, considerable

doubts were expressed with regard to Spanish membership in the

North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). Spain's significant

geographical position, astride some of the world's major sea, air,

and land communication routes, made it a valuable potential part- ner for the alliance. Spanish proponents of NATO membership

argued that these same geopolitical considerations made such membership equally advantageous to Spain, because the country's stra- tegic location could make it an obvious target in any major conflict unless it had allied support. They also maintained that integration into NATO would ensure sorely needed modernization of

Spain's armed services in addition to the securing of adequate

national defense. A corollary hope was that NATO membership

would reorient the focus of army leaders away from reactionary

preoccupations and toward defense of the West.

Many political forces in Spain, particularly the socialists and the

communists, did not agree that full membership would benefit the

country's defense and foreign policy aims. On the contrary, they

felt it would raise the level of tension between the rival power blocs

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Spain: A Country Study

and would make Spain a more likely target in any future conflict

with the Soviet Union. Moreover, opponents of NATO membership pointed out that NATO would be of no assistance in an area

of primary concern to Spain: the two Spanish enclaves of Ceuta

and Melilla, which are located in Morocco and which are outside

the geographic zone of application of the North Atlantic Treaty.

They also maintained that NATO would be of no benefit to Spain

in the country's long-standing effort to recover Gibraltar, because

it could be assumed that other NATO members would support

Britain on this issue (see Gibraltar, Ceuta, and Melilla, this ch.).

Resentment of the United States as the principal supporter of the

Franco regime was another factor influencing those who opposed

Spain's entry into NATO.

Although Suarez had announced Spain's intention of applying

for NATO membership, his Union of the Democratic Center

(Union de Centro Democratico—UCD) government remained

somewhat divided over the question. After Suarez resigned in 1981

,

his successor, Leopoldo Calvo Sotelo, gave high priority to this

issue, arguing that Spain's entry into NATO would expedite negotiations for integration into the EC. In December 1981, the Cortes

approved membership in NATO by majority vote, over the vigor- ous opposition of a large leftist minority. Spain officially joined

NATO in May 1982.

Leaders on the left protested bitterly that NATO membership

had been pushed through parliament in violation of the consensus

that had been the basis of all major political decisions since 1977.

The Socialists organized a protest campaign, and the PSOE leader,

Gonzalez, made the NATO issue a major feature of his electoral platform in 1982, promising a popular referendum on withdrawal

from NATO in the event of a Socialist victory.

No immediate steps were taken to fulfill this promise, following

the overwhelming Socialist victory in October 1982, although the

PSOE confirmed in June 1983 that it would campaign in favor

of withdrawal when the referendum was held. Many Socialists took

part in a large anti-NATO demonstration organized by the PCE

in June 1984, but Gonzalez was having second thoughts, and he

found reasons to delay the referendum. Although neutralist opinion

remained strong in Spain, the government evolved toward a position favoring continued membership in NATO, which it perceived

as the principal guarantor of European security. A significant fac- tor in this change of position was the fear that withdrawal from

NATO might become an insuperable obstacle to entry into the EC

.

When the referendum eventually was set for March 2, 1986,

Gonzalez engaged in a vigorous campaign for continued, but limited,

264
Government and Politics NATO membership. The government presented NATO membership as a corollary to EC membership, and it warned of the seri- ous economic consequences of a vote to withdraw. In spite of

opinion polls indicating the probability of a negative outcome, the

government secured a clear margin of victory for its position. With

almost 60 percent of the electorate participating, 52.6 percent of

the voters supported Spain's continued membership in NATO,

while 39.8 percent opposed it. Spain remained the sixteenth member

of NATO (see Participation in NATO, ch. 5). The following year, in a move seen as emphasizing the European

aspect of the defense system, Gonzalez made a bid for Spanish membership in the Western European Union (WEU), a seven-nation

European defense grouping, originally formed in 1948, that experienced revitalization in the 1980s. On April 19, 1988, Spain and

Portugal were formally invited to join the organization.

Spain and the United States

The anti-American sentiment that figured significantly in Spain's

relations with NATO had its roots in the historical rivalry between

the two countries for control of the territories of the New World.

The Spanish-American War ended this rivalry, stripping Spain of

its remaining colonies and leaving a residue of bitterness toward

the United States. In the years following the Spanish-American War, economic

issues dominated relations between Spain and the United States, as Spain sought to enhance its trading position by developing closer commercial ties with the United States as well as with Latin

America. A series of trade agreements signed between Spain and

the United States in 1902, 1906, and 1910 led to an increased

exchange of manufactured goods and agricultural products that

benefited Spain's domestic economy. Cultural contacts and tourism

also increased.

The emotions of the American public were stirred profoundly

by the outbreak of the Civil War in Spain, and approximately 3,000

United States citizens volunteered to serve in the Spanish Republican Army, although the United States government remained

adamantly neutral. Following the Nationalist victory, much of public opinion in the United States condemned Franco's regime as a

fascist dictatorship, but the United States government participated

in various Allied agreements with Spain, aimed at ensuring that

Franco would not permit the Iberian Peninsula to be used by Adolf

Hider against Allied forces (see Foreign Policy under Franco, ch. 1). The 1953 Pact of Madrid between Spain and the United States provided for mutual defense as well as for United States military

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Spain: A Country Study

aid, and it brought to an end Spain's postwar isolation. It did not

end anti-Americanism in Spain, however. Francoist leaders resented

having to accept what they considered to be insufficient military

supplies in return for basing rights. They also chafed at United

States restrictions against the use of American equipment in defending Spain's North African territories in 1957. This anti-American

sentiment was bipartisan in Spain. Whereas Francoists resented

the United States for its democratic form of government, the opposition parties in Spain perceived the United States as the primary

supporter of the Franco regime and therefore as a major obstacle

to the democratization of Spain.

Following the death of Franco in 1975, the United States welcomed the liberalization of the Spanish regime under King Juan

Carlos and sought to bring Spain further into Western military

arrangements. In 1976 the bilateral agreement between Spain and

the United States was transformed into a Treaty of Friendship and

Cooperation. In addition to renewing United States basing rights

in return for United States military and economic aid, this treaty

provided for a United States-Spanish Council intended to serve

as a bridge to eventual Spanish membership in NATO.

During the early years of democratic rule, the government's focus was on consolidating the parliamentary system, and foreign policy

issues received less attention. However, a point of contention persisted between the governing UCD and the Socialist opposition over

Spain's relations with NATO and with the United States (see Spain

and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, this ch.).

When Calvo Sotelo replaced Suarez as prime minister in 1981,

he made vigorous efforts to gain approval for Spanish membership in NATO, and shortly after this was accomplished a new executive agreement on the use of bases in Spain was signed with the

United States in July 1982. This agreement was one of a series of renewals of the basic 1953 arrangement, providing for United

States use of strategic naval and air bases on Spanish soil in ex- change for United States military and economic assistance (see Military Cooperation with the United States, ch. 5). Many Spaniards resented the presence of these bases in Spain,

recalling the widely publicized photograph of United States president Dwight D. Eisenhower, throwing his arms around Franco

when the first agreement on bases was signed. There were occasional popular protests against these reminders of United States support for the dictatorship, including a demonstration during

United States president Ronald Reagan's 1985 visit to Spain.

The Socialists had consistently advocated a more neutralist, independent stance for Spain, and when they came to power in

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Government and Politics

October 1982, Gonzalez pledged a close examination of the defense

and cooperation agreements with the United States. A reduction

in the United States military presence in Spain was one of the stipulations contained in the referendum, held in 1986, on continued

NATO membership. In keeping with this, the prime minister

announced in December 1987 that the United States would have

to remove its seventy-two F-16 fighter-bombers from Spanish bases

by mid- 1991 . Spain also had informed the United States in November that the bilateral defense agreement, which opinion polls indicated was rejected overwhelmingly by the Spanish population,

would not be renewed. Nevertheless, in January 1988 Spain and

the United States did reach agreement in principle on a new base

agreement to last eight years. The new military arrangements called for a marked reduction of the United States presence in Spain and

terminated the United States military and economic aid that had

been tied to the defense treaty.

Spain and Latin America

One of Spain's major foreign policy objectives since the advent

of democracy has been to increase its influence in Latin America.

Spain has a special interest in this area because of historical ties and a common linguistic, cultural, and religious heritage. In the

post-Franco years, economic investments and diplomatic initiatives were added to the more nostalgic links between Spain and its former

colonies.

Relations between Spain and Latin America have undergone

profound transformation since Spain's imperial days. Resentment

of Spain as the imperial power continued long after the colonial

period, because many Latin Americans blamed Spain for their lack

of progress and for their problems with democratization. In the

early years of independence, the attitude of most Latin Americans was one of disdain for Spain. This changed, following the SpanishAmerican War in 1898. The devastating defeat inflicted upon Spain

by the United States combined with increased United States inter- ference in Latin America led the two Hispanic areas to draw closer

together in the face of a common enemy. Both Spain and Latin

America began to re-emphasize their common ties of culture, language, and religion, although trade, diplomatic, and political rela- tions between the two areas remained minimal.

During the 1950s, modernized methods of communications and

transportation facilitated closer contacts between Spain and Latin

America. Trade increased, and Spain's rapid economic growth in

the 1960s and the 1970s enabled the country to approach its rela- tions with Latin America from a position of greater economic

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Spain: A Country Study

strength. A paradoxical foreign policy phenomenon during this period was the refusal of the fiercely anticommunist Franco to break

off relations with Fidel Castro Ruz's Marxist Cuba. In this instance,

historical ties appeared to take precedence over ideology.

After Franco's death, Spain's transition to a democratic form

of government was paralleled by the establishment of various forms

of democratic rule in some Latin American countries. The timing

of these governmental changes was largely coincidental, although

Spain offered its transition process as an example for Latin America

to follow.

The democratization process in Spain caused a reorientation of

Spanish foreign policy. Under Suarez, Spain pursued a more

aggressive foreign policy, which included giving increased atten- tion to Latin America. Both Suarez and King Juan Carlos made

official visits to most of the Latin American countries, and Spanish investment in the area increased markedly. When war broke

out between Britain and Argentina over the Falkland Islands

(Malvinas) in the spring of 1982, Spain supported Argentina's claim

to the islands, even though the Spanish government opposed the

military junta that ruled Argentina at the time.

When the Socialists came to power in 1982, Foreign Minister

Fernando Moran asserted that the amount of influence Spain could

exert in Europe and on the United States would depend on Spain's

maintaining special relationships outside these areas, particularly

with Latin America. In keeping with this policy, the Socialist

government created a special assistance program for Latin America

that had a budget of tens of millions of dollars in 1985.

A particular area of concern for Gonzalez was the intensifying

conflict in Central America. Under his leadership, Spain took an

active part in the Contadora Group, an association of Latin American republics seeking peaceful solutions to the bloody struggles in

El Salvador, Guatemala, and Nicaragua.

Before becoming prime minister, Gonzalez had been involved

in the articulation of the Socialist International's policies toward

Latin America and had served as the president of that organization's committee for the support of the Nicaraguan Revolution,

which was formed in 1980. Although Gonzalez was sympathetic

to the early goals of the Sandinistas, who had seized power in 1979,

he later became highly critical of their radical Marxist policies. He

favored the more pragmatic approach of Latin America's social democrats.

It became increasingly apparent that the prime minister's moderate views were in marked contrast to the Marxist orientation of

his foreign minister. Gonzalez was also less stridentiy anti-American

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Government and Politics

than Moran. Although critical of United States actions in both

Nicaragua and El Salvador, the prime minister recognized that the

United States had legitimate interests in the area and that it could

not be excluded from the negotiating process. These increasingly

divergent views between Gonzalez and his foreign minister led to the latter' s removal in the summer of 1985.

Moran's successor, Francisco Fernandez Ordonez, followed a more restrained approach—calling for Spain to be the IberianAmerican conscience of Europe—in furthering Spain's active role in Latin America. Spain continued to support efforts for a peaceful resolution to the strife in Central America. In January 1988,

Nicaraguan president Daniel Ortega requested that Spain take part

in the verification of the peace process in Central America. Gonzalez

accepted the proposal, provided that the other Central American

governments were in agreement and that a cease-fire were in effect. The prime minister reiterated his support of the Contadora Group

and emphasized that the countries involved had the ultimate responsibility for finding a solution to the conflict. He also called for an end to United States aid for the armed forces fighting against the

Sandinista government (Contras) so that the peace plan could be

implemented.

Although Spain had again become a significant presence in Latin

America in the 1980s, there was no indication that it was on the

way to supplanting the United States in the region, or, indeed,

that it wanted to assume that role. At the same time, a vital sense of Hispanic commonality between Spain and Latin America

appeared likely to continue.

Gibraltar, Ceuta, and Melilla

The return of Gibraltar to Spain has remained a foreign policy

goal for all Spanish rulers since the area was lost to Britain under

the terms of the Treaty of Utrecht in 1713 (see War of the Spanish

Succession; Foreign Policy under Franco, ch. 1). Franco's fierce determination to regain Gibraltar culminated in his closing the

frontier between Spain and Gibraltar in 1969. Governments that came to power after the regime was democratized engaged in calmer

but equally persistent negotiations with the British and with the

residents of Gibraltar over the future of the area. These discussions ultimately resulted in the April 1980 Lisbon Agreement, which was more symbolic than substantive, but which served as a framework for subsequent Anglo-Spanish negotiations.

The Spanish government had intended to reopen the frontier

between Spain and Gibraltar shortly after the signing of the Lisbon

Agreement, but it postponed this step in anger at a series of British

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Spain: A Country Study

actions, including the use of Gibraltar as a military depot and refuel- ing base during the Falklands War in 1982. The frontier was finally

reopened in the early days of the Socialist government that was

elected later in the year. Spain's entry into NATO added new complications to the Gibraltar question, including Spain's insistence that Gibraltar was a NATO naval base as well as a British one, a contention that the

British government denied. The Spanish navy refused to participate in joint military exercises with the British while Britain maintained a military base on Gibraltar. At the same time, Spanish

membership in NATO provided a vehicle for negotiations on the

Gibraltar question in a less competitive atmosphere. It also put

Spain in a better bargaining position.

The ultimate issue underlying the various twists and turns of

the Gibraltar problem was sovereignty. The approximately 30,000

residents of Gibraltar remained adamantly opposed to becoming

Spanish citizens, although the UN continued to pass resolutions

condemning British rule in Gibraltar as a colonial situation. As

a more flexible and democratic government took root in Spain,

however, and as the country achieved greater integration into

Europe through its EC and NATO memberships, the possibility

of a resolution of the sovereignty issue became less remote. The

Socialist government, unlike its predecessors, emphasized that any

solution to this problem must be in keeping with the interests of

Gibraltar's inhabitants. This led observers to conjecture that

through some type of regional autonomy structure, provided for in the 1978 Constitution—a long-term plan for a form of autonomous government for Gibraltar acceptable to all concerned, might

be possible.

In much the same way that Spain laid claim to Gibraltar as part

of its territory, Morocco maintained that the Spanish enclaves of

Ceuta and Melilla were integral parts of Morocco's sovereign ter- ritory. The two North African towns and their tiny offshore islands,

the last vestiges of Spain's far-flung empire, had belonged to the

Spanish crown for centuries. Both were administered as integral

parts of Spain and had predominantly Spanish populations; Spain

insisted that they remain Spanish.

Ceuta, which had become a Spanish possession following the

union with Portugal in 1580, was historically a focal point for trade

between Europe and Africa. Located only thirty kilometers from

metropolitan Spain, it could reasonably be regarded as a natural

prolongation of the Iberian Peninsula. Although Ceuta was used

for military purposes, it also functioned as a fishing port, and it had close economic links with Andalusia.

270
View of Ceuta

Courtesy National Tourist Office of Spain

There were almost no direct links between Ceuta and the other

Spanish enclave of Melilla, which had come under Spanish rule

in the late fifteenth century. Melilla was situated more than 500

kilometers away from the Iberian Peninsula, and it did not benefit

from the lively tourist traffic that Ceuta enjoyed. Because of its geographical location, Melilla also was subject to greater influence

from its Moroccan hinterland than was Ceuta. In addition, more

Moroccans actually lived in Melilla than in Ceuta, where the

atmosphere was far more European.

There were protests on the part of the Muslim communities in

both enclaves over the passage, in July 1985, of an aliens law, which

required all foreigners in Spain to register with the authorities or be expelled. Tensions were especially high in Melilla, where less than one-third of the Muslim community held Spanish nationality.

Promises from Madrid to assist in integrating the Muslims of both

enclaves into Spanish society angered portions of the local Spanish communities, who in turn demonstrated in support of the aliens

law.

The outlook for continued Spanish sovereignty in the two enclaves

appeared uncertain. When Spain joined the EC in 1986, Ceuta

and Melilla were considered Spanish cities and European territory.

They joined the EC as part of Spain, and they hoped to receive

financial assistance from the EC's Regional Development Fund.

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Spain: A Country Study

Spain also hoped that membership in NATO, while providing no

security guarantee to Ceuta and Melilla, might make Morocco's

King Hassan II less likely to move against territory belonging to a NATO member; however, Spanish demands for the return of

Gibraltar could fuel Moroccan claims to the North African enclaves.

Mounting tensions between the Spanish and the Muslim populations in Ceuta and in Melilla added to the precariousness of the

Spanish position. In addition, a few leaders in both the socialist and the communist parties expressed sympathy for Morocco's

claim, contributing to a growing fear of abandonment on the part

of the enclaves' inhabitants. A resolution of this tenuous situation

did not appear imminent in mid- 1988.

Spain and the Middle East In spite of tensions with Morocco over control of Ceuta and

Melilla, Spain continued to consider itself as a bridge between the

Arab world and Western Europe. In an effort to maintain good

relations with Islamic states, the Spanish government adopted a

pro-Arab stance in most Middle East conflicts. For years, Spain was the only West European country that did not recognize Israel. The Spanish government finally established diplomatic relations

with the Israeli state in January 1986. When that step resulted in

widespread criticism from the Arab states, Spain hastened to compensate by according diplomatic status to the Palestine Liberation

Organization (PLO) mission in Madrid in August 1986. More

generalized efforts to increase Spain's role throughout the Middle

East and Africa in the 1980s included expanded trade and cultural

relations.

Spain and the Soviet Union

Diplomatic relations between Spain and the Soviet Union were

not formally reestablished until February 1977, although there had

been extensive trade and cultural contacts between the two nations

for decades, and Spain had already established diplomatic relations

with the other Warsaw Pact states. This long delay was due in part

to Franco's strong anticommunist feelings, but more particularly

to his bitterness toward the Soviet Union for its support of the

Republican forces during the Spanish Civil War. Anti-Soviet senti- ment was not limited to the Francoists in the years following that

devastating upheaval. Because of the attempts of the Soviet dictator, Joseph Stalin, to destroy leftist elements within Spain that were

independent of Moscow, anti-Francoists as well as Franco's supporters were deeply distrustful of Moscow (see The Spanish Civil

War, ch. 1).

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Government and Politics

Spain's relations with the Soviet Union were also significantly

affected by its relations with the United States. From the point of

view of the Soviet Union, it was vital to maintain a strong position in the Mediterranean in order to guard the gateway to the

Black Sea and to assure access to the Atlantic Ocean through the

Strait of Gibraltar. At the same time, the United States, wary of

Soviet expansionist aims, had sought to protect this vital region

by the establishment of United States bases on Spanish soil. The

opposition that subsequently developed within Spain to the con- tinued presence of United States forces there received encouragement from the Soviet Union. Nevertheless, when Moscow delivered a warning to Madrid, referring to the "negative consequences"

that could ensue if Spain joined NATO, Spain's foreign minister

curtly remonstrated with the Soviet Union for attempting to inter- fere in Spain's internal affairs. Spanish public opinion has generally not shared United States

fears of a serious Soviet military threat. Spaniards have favored

increasing trade with the Soviet Union, and they have welcomed

Moscow's support of Spain's demand for the "decolonization" of

Gibraltar. In the late 1970s and the 1980s, however, Spain moved

toward an increasingly independent stance, and this applied to its relations with the Soviet Union as well as with the United States. Such independence also was reflected in the efforts of the PCE to reduce its ties to Moscow (see Political Parties, this ch.). In the

mid-1980s, Spain's major difficulty with regard to the Soviet Union

concerned the extensive espionage activities that had been mounted

from the large Soviet embassy installed after Franco's death and

that had led to the expulsion of several Soviet diplomats.

Spain and France

While the Soviet Union appeared to most Spaniards to be too

far away to pose any immediate threat, Spain's most difficult rela- tions in the postwar years were with its European neighbor to the

north, France. Spain's relations with France had been troublesome

since 1945, when France called for an Allied invasion of Spain to remove the last fascist dictator. When the United States and Britain

refused to agree to such a course of action, France permitted antiFranco forces to use France as a base for organizing raids into Spain.

When some of these infiltrators were apprehended and executed

in Spain in 1946, the Allies declared that Spain would be forbidden

to join the UN while under the control of Franco. France was also the major obstacle to Spain's entry into the EC. Responding to the pressures of a strong agricultural lobby, the French government

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Spain: A Country Study

succeeded in delaying Spanish membership in the EC (see Spain

and the European Community, this ch.).

French policies also exacerbated Spain's most volatile domestic

political problem, that of Basque terrorism. For years, France maintained a policy of providing sanctuary to terrorists, who were seen

as "resistance fighters." This policy became less tenable, however,

after the democratization of Spain. Following the appearance of

terrorist activity within France itself, the policy of sanctuary was

markedly restricted, and by 1986 France was cooperating with Spain

in efforts to combat terrorist activity (see Threats to Internal Security, ch. 5).

Two highly readable works dealing with political and social

developments in the new democratic Spain are John Hooper's The

Spaniards: A Portrait of the New Spain and Robert Graham's Spain:

A Nation Comes ofAge. A selection of papers delivered at a confer- ence conducted by the West European Program of the Woodrow

Wilson International Center for Scholars deals with the dominant

issues facing Spain as the country consolidates its democratic system.

Titled Spain in the 1980s (edited by Robert P. Clark and Michael

H. Haltzel), it includes insightful articles by leading Spanish politi- cal figures as well as papers prepared by American and British

experts on Spain.

A thorough and lucidly written examination of the provisions

contained in the Spanish Constitution can be found in the Hastings Constitutional Law Quarterly in an article by George E. Glos.

Updates and elaborations of laws pertaining to the Spanish governmental system are available in Spain: A Guide to Political and Eco- nomic Institutions, by Peter J. Donaghy and Michael T. Newton.

This book provides the most comprehensive treatment of Spain's

major political and economic institutions and the first in-depth study

of local and regional institutions to be published in English.

The rapid evolution of Spanish politics after Franco is depicted

in Democratic Politics in Spain, edited by David S. Bell. Richard Gunther, Giacomo Sani, and Goldie Shabad provide a comprehensive

description of the development of political parties and the political

orientations of the electorate in Spain After Franco: The Making of a Competitive Party System. How these parties fared is the topic of

the insightful Spain at the Polls, 1977, 1979, and 1982: A Study of

the National Elections, edited by Howard R. Penniman and Eusebio

M. Mujal-Leon. Group political participation, as manifested in

the interest groups that influenced Spain's political development,

274
Government and Politics

is emphasized in Politics and Change in Spain, edited by Thomas D

.

Lancaster and Gary Prevost. An excellent background for the study of Spanish foreign rela- tions may be found in James W. Cortada's Spain in the TwentiethCentury World. Although somewhat dated, it covers the major thrust

of Spain's foreign policy both before and after Franco. Spain: Studies

in Political Security, edited by Joyce Lasky Shub and Raymond Carr,

also provides a useful analysis of Spain's foreign policy goals. For

a study of Spain's relations with the Latin American countries, see Howard J. Wiarda's The Iberian-Latin American Connection: Implicationsfor U.S. Foreign Policy. (For further information and complete

citations, see Bibliography.)

275

Chapter 5. National Security
Spanish soldiers
DURING THE SIXTEENTH CENTURY, when Spain was the

most powerful nation in Europe, the Spanish armed forces enjoyed

a formidable reputation. The military decline that set in during

the Thirty Years' War (1618-48) brought an end to Spain's ascen- dancy. During the nineteenth century, the ineffectiveness of the

Spanish armed forces was demonstrated repeatedly by humiliating defeats abroad. A decadent monarchy and the weak and corrupt

civil governments of the time cemented the military's involvement

in domestic politics; interventions by an inflated and underemployed

officer corps became a recurrent feature of Spanish political life. At the conclusion of the 1936-39 Civil War, the victorious

Nationalist army of General Francisco Franco y Bahamonde (dic- tator of Spain, 1939-75) was a large and hardened fighting force. Franco maintained direct command over the army, which he employed as an instrument for suppressing opposition to his regime.

The country, however, exhausted economically after the Civil War,

could not afford a large military establishment. Its size was steadily

reduced, and it lacked the means to fight a modern conflict. Beginning in 1953, military assistance furnished by the United States

in conjunction with the base agreement between the two countries

helped to reverse the deterioration of the armed forces. The constitutional monarchy that emerged on Franco's death

in 1975 was threatened by the rebelliousness of many senior officers who had failed to come to terms with the new democratic climate.

Nevertheless, under the 1978 Constitution and subsequent enact- ments, the mission and the structure of the armed forces were gradually transformed. Funds were allotted for new equipment and for improved training. The career system was rationalized, and pay

increases were granted. The three individual service ministries were

replaced by a single Ministry of Defense with a civilian at its head.

The Chief of the Defense Staff (Jefe del Estado Mayor de la Defensa—JEMAD), the highest military officer, acted in a supportive role to the minister of defense in carrying out military

policies.

Further reforms were introduced by the Socialist government

of Felipe Gonzalez Marquez, who came to power in 1982. The

army was reconstituted as five divisions comprising eleven brigades,

plus four independent brigades. The distinction between forces,

earmarked to protect against external threats, and regional defense

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Spain: A Country Study

units, organized to maintain internal order, was abandoned. From

a manpower strength of 280,000, when the Socialists took office,

the army was scheduled to be reduced by nearly one-third to 195,000

effectives by 1991.

The navy and the air force, less burdened by personnel costs, were farther along in their modernization programs than the army.

In 1987 the navy had a personnel strength of about 47,300, including 11,500 marines; its fleet of warships in 1988 included a new

aircraft carrier. The air force, with a manpower level of 33,000,

had an aging inventory of 1 8 squadrons of interceptor and ground

attack aircraft. More advanced F-18 Hornets, seventy-two of them

purchased from the United States, were scheduled for delivery in

the 1986 to 1990 period.

Spain's long-established policy of neutrality ended with its conditional accession to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization

(NATO) in 1982. Spain's membership, subject to conditions that

circumscribed the Spanish role, remained in doubt, however, until

it was ratified by a public referendum in 1986. Spain abstained

from participating in the NATO integrated command structure,

continued to ban nuclear weapons from Spanish soil, and excluded

the use of Spanish forces outside its own territory. The Spanish

government also insisted on the removal of a wing of United States

fighter planes based near Madrid, which had formed a part of

NATO's South European defenses. In spite of the modernization program, the Spanish armed forces,

especially the army, were still deficient in relation to other NATO

nations. Defense spending remained well below the average for the

alliance. Nevertheless, Spain was potentially capable of making a

significant contribution to NATO's defenses. Moreover, its acces- sion to the treaty was expected to invigorate the Spanish military

establishment and to contribute to its emergence as a modern force

with a well-defined mission as part of Europe's collective security.

The Military in National Life

Since the early nineteenth century, the Spanish armed forces had

been burdened by an inflated officer corps and had had infrequent

military challenges. The professional military was preoccupied with

its status and its privileges. Promotions were slow, and they were

based on seniority rather than on merit. Fighting units were starved

of modern equipment because of heavy personnel costs. The mili- tary had established a tradition of frequent interventions to alter the course of internal politics in what it perceived to be the higher

interests of the nation. Nevertheless, until the authoritarian regime

of Miguel Primo de Rivera (1923-30), the military was more

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National Security

inclined to induce changes in civilian governments than it was to impose direct rule (see The African War and the Authoritarian

Regime of Miguel Primo de Rivera, ch. 1). Although left with a large and powerful army at the close of the

Civil War in 1939, Franco allowed the armed forces to deteriorate.

The majority of his officers were identified with the most reactionary elements in the government and with the repressive aspects

of the regime. They were thrust into an uneasy relationship with

the civilian politicians of the democratic government installed after Franco's death in 1975. Aggrieved over the course of events, a small

group of army and Civil Guard (Guardia Civil) officers attempted

a coup on February 23, 1981, by holding the entire government

hostage in the Cortes (Spanish Parliament). The coup failed because

of the lack of support and the intervention of the king on the side

of democratic rule (see Disenchantment with UCD Leadership,

ch. 1). The Socialist government that assumed office in 1982 introduced

a radical program to reform the status of the armed forces. It set out to improve the material conditions of military life, but it also imposed layers of civilian control and a sharp cutback in the size of the army and the number of active-duty officers. Smaller, but more rationally configured and embarked on a modernization pro- gram, the armed forces were faced with the task of coordinating

Spain's fighting strength with the overall NATO defense effort. Although the officer corps continued to be treated cautiously as a potentially intrusive factor if the civilian government faltered,

its traditional political role seemed increasingly anachronistic.

Historical Role of the Armed Forces

Permanently organized armed forces were first created during

the reign of Ferdinand of Aragon (Spanish, Aragon) and Isabella

of Castile (Spanish, Castilla) in the fifteenth century (see Ferdinand and Isabella, ch. 1). Throughout the sixteenth and the seven- teenth centuries, the army was well organized and disciplined,

employing the most technologically advanced weapons of all the

forces in Europe; in that period it suffered no decisive defeat. The

army was colorful, feared, and respected. Military careers had sta- tus, and they were sought by the aristocracy and by the most ambitious of the commoners. The navy was also formidable throughout much of the same

period. The humiliation of the Armada, as the navy is known in

Spain, in its battle against England in 1588 was a result of inadequate strategy and tactics, complicated by weather, not inferior

fleet size. Its defeat did not end Spain's days as a sea power, but

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Spain: A Country Study

Spain was never again mistress of the seas. The appeal of military careers gradually declined, and the lower ranks became a haven

for social misfits. Foreign mercenaries outnumbered Spaniards in

twenty- six of the thirty-one brigades formed during the reign of

Philip III (1598-1621). The Thirty Years' War began the eclipse

of Spain's international prestige as a military power. The occupation of Spain by Napoleon Bonaparte in the first decade of the

nineteenth century was the last occasion on which Spanish forces

participated in a major conflict with those of other European powers (see The Napoleonic Era, ch. 1). The War of Independence (1808-14) marked the armed forces' departure from unquestioning obedience to the government.

Although the government had acquiesced in the French occupation, and many of the army's leaders had concurred in this, a number of regular army units rebelled against the occupation and

responded to the patriotic cause. After the defeat by the French,

guerrilla units continued to resist. Composed largely of former army

personnel, these units were, in effect, fighting a people's war in

opposition to the so-called legal government.

When the War of Independence ended, officers from the old army

were joined by those of the resistance groups. Most retained their

military status rather than resign or retire, because there were few

employment opportunities in the sluggish civilian economy of the

time. The glut of officers persisted, and it was one of the factors contributing to the military's continued dabbling in the political arena. The Carlist civil wars that occurred intermittently between 1833

and 1876, the decadent monarchy, and the weak governments of

the nineteenth century cemented the military's involvement in

politics (see Rule by Pronunciamiento; Liberal Rule, ch. 1). Civilian

politicians were rarely willing to turn over power, but they often

encouraged actions by the military when conditions under the group

in control could no longer be tolerated. Although not all its members shared a common ideology, the military was generally among

the more liberal forces in society.

The armed forces were either the instigators of, or the major

participants in, most of the governmental changes between 1814

and the Civil War of the 1930s. There were so many military inter- ventions that the procedure followed a stylized scenario, known

as the pronunciamiento (pi., pronunciamientos) . A group of officers

usually led by a general—would, after exploring the ' 1 will of the

people," seek a commitment to rebellion from other officers, who

would pledge their troops and agree to act upon a proper signal.

Convinced of adequate support, the leader would then issue a

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National Security

pronunciamiento, which typically would consist of an address to the

troops or to a street gathering, taking the form of direct or oblique

threats against the government. Both the military leaders and the

government would then watch the public reaction to determine

whether there had been an impressive rallying to the rebel cause,

in which case the government would resign. If the pronunciamiento were not greeted with revolutionary enthusiasm and if those who

had agreed to stage simultaneous demonstrations failed to do so, the effort was quickly abandoned.

Pronunciamientos were made almost annually between 1814 and

1868, and occasionally thereafter until the 1930s. The last successful one brought Primo de Rivera to power in 1923.

Depite the position of the armed forces as a highly important

factor in Spanish politics, they demonstrated deplorable incompetence in batde. Spain's Latin American colonies successfully broke

away early in the nineteenth century. Spain's last colonies, Puerto

Rico, Cuba, and the Philippines, were lost during the SpanishAmerican War of 1898. The navy shared the army's disgrace; its crushing losses during the Spanish-American War left it with only

two major combat vessels. Spain emerged successfully from a frus- trating campaign against Morocco (1907-27) only after painful and

humiliating defeats. Symptomatic of the defense establishment's

failure to adapt to modern needs was the existence of nearly 150

admirals in the navy of the time.

The Civil War and Its Aftermath

After the Spanish Civil War broke out in 1936, a majority of

the officers remained to fight in the Republican forces, as much

from a sense of obligation to the legitimate government as on ideological grounds. Their units usually stayed intact and followed them.

Many remained with the forces controlling the areas in which they

found themselves. More conservative officers tended to join the

Nationalist forces of the rebellion.

The Republican forces controlled the larger share of the land,

including the cities of Madrid and Barcelona, at the beginning of

the war. Their troops often fought superbly; however, their leaders were less effective than those of the Nationalist army, which

also had the better disciplined of the army's fighting units (those

that were based in Morocco) and better organized international

support, primarily from Germany and Italy. Moreover, in Franco

they had by far the most gifted combat leader (see The Spanish

Civil War, ch. 1). At the outset of the war, the Nationalists controlled most of the

highlands of the north, much of the western part of the country,

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Spain: A Country Study

and a part of Andalusia (Spanish, Andalucfa) in the south (see

fig. 4). The Republicans controlled the northern coast and most

of the country east of Madrid, including all of Catalonia (Spanish, Cataluna; Catalan, Catalunya). It became apparent that the war was to be a long struggle, when Franco's forces from Andalusia advanced to the Madrid area in the early months of the war

but failed to take the city.

In subsequent campaigns, the Nationalist forces expanded the areas they held to include most of the northern, the southern, and

the western portions of the country. During the last year, they drove

a wedge between the Republican forces in Madrid and Catalonia,

decisively defeated those in Catalonia, and seized Barcelona. Forces

in Madrid could no longer be supplied. The city and the Republi- can cause were surrendered in March 1939. Franco's victorious troops had by then been molded into a powerful and well-equipped army, organized into sixty-one divisions. Its strength compared favorably with other European armies on the eve of World War II. The country's energies, however, were spent.

It soon became apparent that a force of that size was not needed

to maintain order and that it could not be supported under the

prevailing economic conditions. By 1941 demobilization had

brought the army down to twenty-four divisions in peninsular

Spain. Its offensive capability was already depleted; with only one

motorized division, it was rapidly becoming out of date.

Franco avoided being drawn into World War II, although a

volunteer Spanish unit known as the Blue Division served with German forces on the Soviet front between August 1941 and October

1943. Fully outfitted and financed by Germany, it fought almost

entirely in the Leningrad sector. The 40,000 volunteers who served

in the Blue Division swore allegiance to the German dictator, Adolf

Hitler, rather than to Franco or to Spain (see Foreign Policy under

Franco, ch. 1). Although the economy had recovered to pre-Civil War levels by

1951 , the army was ill-trained and poorly equipped, lacking modern

armaments and transport. Substantial United States assistance after the signing of the Pact of Madrid in 1953 helped to reverse the

deterioration and contributed to a slow improvement in quality.

World War II-vintage tanks and artillery were introduced into the

army, new and refurbished ships were supplied to the navy, and

the air force was equipped with modern jet aircraft (see Military

Cooperation with the United States, this ch.).

An important reorganization of the army in 1965 grouped it into

two distinct categories: an intervention force organized to protect

against external threats, and a territorial defense army divided into

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National Security

nine regional garrisons. Both forces were deployed in such a way

that they were available to protect against internal disorder rather

than to defend the country's borders. The strongest units of the

intervention force were concentrated around Madrid, in the center of the country; others were assigned to the nine military regions

under captains general into which the country was divided, in such

a manner as to maximize security against regional dissidents.

The Military in Political Life

The armed forces have constituted a highly important and often

decisive factor in Spanish politics throughout the modern history

of the country as a constitutional monarchy and republic. During

most of the nineteenth century, the military was considered to be

a liberal influence, intervening to enforce necessary correctives

against the failings of weak civilian governments, but not seeking

to replace civilian institutions permanently. After about 1875, the

army was less involved politically, and it often found itself on the

side of maintaining public order against popular movements of

peasants and the industrial working class. Although their outlook was little changed, the officers then occupied what had become the

right side of the political spectrum in a period of rapidly evolving

political ideas.

Until the Spanish Civil War, the range of acceptable political beliefs among army officers remained quite broad. One result of

the conflict was that the most conservative officers tended to join

the Nationalist forces. More than 10,000 Nationalist officers who

had survived the war, or who had been commissioned during its course, decided to stay on as regulars. The officer corps was completely purged of those who had fought on the losing side. The army

leadership during the next three decades thus was drawn from the

group that had been the most conservative and the most closely

identified with Franco's political ideology.

High-ranking soldiers were appointed by Franco to important

state bodies and served in the Cortes. (Under the 1978 Constitution, officers are required to resign their commissions to run for parliamentary office.) Over one-third of the ministers in post- 1939

cabinets had backgrounds as career officers. The ministers of the

army, the navy, and the air force were invariably professional mili- tary, as was the minister of interior, who was responsible for inter- nal security. Many officers also served in civilian ministries and

in other agencies, in companies owned by the government, and

on the boards of directors of leading private companies. Nevertheless, as modernization of the economy proceeded, the main functions of government fell increasingly under the control of civilian

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Spain: A Country Study

technocrats. The influence of the military in the final stages of the

Franco regime was limited primarily to the prime minister and to the armed forces ministerial portfolios. In spite of its prominent

representation in the ministries and in the industries connected with

defense, the military establishment had little success in persuading Franco to earmark for it the resources needed to overcome the

obsolescence of the armed forces. The more senior officers remained extremely conservative, violently opposed to the left, and suspicious of any broadening of politi- cal expression. Certain military reforms were advanced by Diego

Alegna, the army commander who took office in 1970. He aimed

at more selective enlistments, at rationalization of troop deployments, and at promotion by merit rather than by seniority. Alegna'

s

program was undermined, however, by right-wing commanders,

who secured his removal in 1974. In 1972 a secret society of younger army officers, the Democratic

Military Union (Union Militar Democratica—UMD) grew quickly,

numbering 300 in 1975 when many of its members were arrested

and court-martialed. Most of the reforms they proposed—the unifi- cation of the three service ministries, a restriction in the scope of

the military justice system, reductions in the length of obligatory

military service, curbs on the military intelligence system, and a

less prominent role for the captains general of the nine military

regions—were adopted after Franco's death.

During the transition period after Franco's death, the civil government adopted a deferential attitude toward the military

leadership, which, as the national institution most loyal to the former

regime and most able to intervene decisively, presented the greatest

danger to the program of the new democratic leaders. The civilian authorities prudently consulted the military before adopting new

proposals, seeking their implied consent. Many members of the

officer corps willingly accepted the new constitutional order, but

others—mainly in the army—who still identified with the Franco

era, regarded it as a betrayal of the Civil War victory in 1939. In spite of objections by the most vocal elements, the senior mili- tary acquiesced in the important changes to the military command

structure needed to bring it unambiguously under civilian direction (see Jurisdiction over National Defense, this ch.). The military was dangerously antagonized by other actions, however,

particularly by the legalization of the Communist Party of Spain

(Partido Comunista de Espafia—PCE) in 1977 after the military

had received what it had interpreted as a firm pledge against such

a step.

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National Security

The accumulating discontent of certain officers was made evi- dent by a number of provocative incidents. The first of a series of plots against the government was uncovered in November 1978.

The extremely light sentences imposed on the officers involved may

have encouraged conspiracies. In late 1980 and early 1981, at least three further schemes appeared to be afoot. The conspiracy that came closest to success was the invasion of the Congress of Deputies

(lower house of the Cortes) on February 23, 1981 , by Civil Guardsmen and soldiers who took as hostages the entire body as well as the cabinet, which was present for a debate on a new government.

The three principal plotters were Lieutenant Colonel Antonio

Tejero Molina, an officer of the Civil Guard; Lieutenant General

Jaime Milans del Bosch, captain general of Valencia; and Lieutenant

General Alfonso Armada Comyn, a confidant of the king. Milans

del Bosch had previously been commander of the elite Brunete

Armored Division near Madrid, but he had been transferred, as a result of his well-known antipathy to the new political order, under

suspicion of earlier plotting. Armada had been forced from a post

in the royal household because of his political activities. The failure of other units to join the mutineers, the vacillation of a number

of officers who had been counted on to join the revolt, and, most

particularly, the denunciation of the attempt by KingJuan Carlos

de Borbon, who appeared in uniform on national television, brought

the release of the civilian politicians, after twenty-two hours, and

the surrender of the forces under the control of the conspirators.

At least one further plot was foiled when a group of colonels was

discovered planning to seize power on the eve of the October 1982

general election. The subsequent accommodation of the military

to the Socialist government of Gonzalez and the military's grudging acceptance of the major reforms of the armed forces, introduced

in 1983, and of Spain's membership in NATO and in the European

Community (EC—see Glossary) appeared to have moderated the

danger of new attempts by right-wing officers to challenge civilian

authority.

In spite of the government's success in establishing unequivocal authority over the principal issues of national security, certain matters continued to be sensitive for the military. Attacks by Basque

terrorists on high-ranking officers and security personnel have been

a source of bitterness. Government plans to devolve greater autonomy on regional governments were delayed; and, these plans were

less extensive than originally foreseen, in deference to military

objections to the decentralization process, especially as it applied

to the Basque region. The inflexibly nationalistic stance of the mili- tary commanders was the primary factor determining government

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Spain: A Country Study

policy regarding the status of the enclaves of Ceuta and Melilla on the North African coast as well as on negotiations with Britain over the status of Gibraltar (see Gibraltar, Ceuta, and Melilla,

ch. 4). By 1986 the authority of the defense minister was great enough

to enable him to replace the JEMAD and the three service chiefs

of staff, reportedly because they had failed to support the military

reform program. Nevertheless, the military leaders continued to be treated with prudence. The government made a considerable

effort to demonstrate sympathy and respect for the military in

ceremonies and in official statements. The king, who had received

training in the three military academies, had carefully forged links

with the military. As supreme commander, he could in theory

supersede the political authority of the country. His public addresses

recognized the contribution of the military and were sensitive to the need to sustain its morale in the face of the fundamental changes

that it had been obliged to accept. At the same time, the king

stressed that, in a democracy, the armed forces must comport themselves with discipline and restraint (see Political Interest Groups,

ch. 4). The Military in Society

Officers of the Spanish armed forces have tended to regard themselves as highly patriotic, self-denying, and devoted to service. They

attach importance to the symbols of Spanish unity and historical

continuity. Sensitive to criticism and extremely conscious of per- ceived slights to honor, they have constantly sought reassurance

that their role was appreciated by the government and by the public.

The military careerists' sense of forming a community set at a

distance from civilian society has been heightened by their style

of living. They usually have been housed on military compounds;

they have shopped in military outlets, have obtained free education for their children at military schools, have used military hospitals, and have taken holidays at special facilities made available

only to the armed forces. This isolated life has not been entirely a matter of choice, but has been necessitated by low wage scales. Until 1978 the majority of officers could maintain themselves only

by holding second jobs, after finishing their military duties at midday.

Rates of intermarriage within the armed services community have

always been high, as has been the ratio of sons of military personnel choosing military careers. As of 1979, about 67 percent of

those entering the army military academy were following their

fathers into the service. The corresponding ratio for the navy was

288
King Juan Carlos in military uniform

Courtesy National Tourist Office of Spain

289
Spain: A Country Study

81 percent, and for the air force it was 54 percent. The future of

the officers' group, as a distinctive social class, appeared to be in

jeopardy by the mid-1980s. Uncompetitive salaries, greater career opportunities in the modern civilian economy, and reduced prospects in an officer corps that was faced with dramatic staff reductions presented a discouraging prospect to the sons of officers. A

newer source of entrants to the military academies was developing

among the sons of noncommissioned officers (NCOs), however,

for whom the free education and the potential for social advancement were important inducements.

In terms of its status as a profession, military service has traditionally ranked high, below that of doctors and of engineers, but

higher than that of lawyers, of deputies of the Cortes, and of members of the priesthood. In an opinion poll taken in late 1986, con- cerning the prestige of nineteen of the leading institutions of the

nation, the armed services ranked seventh, below that of the monarchy, the Roman Catholic Church, the press, and the internal security forces, but above the Cortes, the central government, the courts,

unions, universities, and the business community.

External Security Perceptions and Policies

Not having faced any serious threat to its territorial integrity for more than 150 years, Spain has tended to regard itself as safely

removed from conflicts that could arise on the continent of Europe.

Spain's remoteness and the physical barriers to mounting a successful attack on its soil appear to justify this view. To the north,

the Cordillera Cantabrica and the Pyrenees form natural defenses

against invasion (see fig. 5). Attacks from the sea, whether from

the Atlantic or the Mediterranean coasts, also would confront

rugged terrain. Only by invading from the west, through Portugal, could a hostile army find relatively level terrain, permitting maneuver. The distance between central Spain and the nearest Warsaw Pact airfields is nearly 2,000 kilometers. Hostile aircraft

with the necessary range would need to survive NATO air defenses over Italy and the Federal Republic of Germany (West Germany)

in order to attack Spanish targets.

Spain's success in maintaining a status of nonbelligerency in both

World War I and World War II has helped to contribute to its sense of invulnerability. In spite of the strongly anticommunist and

anti-Soviet attitude among the Spanish military, there has been

little sense of an immediate security threat from the Soviet Union.

The reinforcement of the Soviet naval squadron in the Mediterra- nean Sea, with an aircraft carrier in 1979, and the increased number of Soviet submarines passing through the Strait of Gibraltar

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National Security

have modified this perception to some degree, however, in the late 1980s. Spanish naval planners have been obliged to take account

of this new potential risk to the strait and to the Spanish Mediterra- nean islands and coast. The conclusion of the 1953 Pact of Madrid with the United States altered Spain's traditional neutrality, making its territory a factor

in the defense of the West. The Spanish military leadership began

to recognize that Spain had acquired strategic importance as a result of the presence of United States bases and that it had become a

potential target in the event of conflict between NATO and the

Warsaw Pact. If the West suffered a military setback, particularly on NATO's vulnerable southern flank, Spain's security and territorial integrity would be directly threatened.

Spain's adherence to NATO in 1982 necessitated the recasting

of Spain's traditional strategic doctrine to accept the concept of

collective security in partnership with other nations of the West.

The public's endorsement of Spanish membership in NATO, in a 1986 referendum, demonstrated recognition that, under the conditions of modern warfare, a threat to Central Europe represented a threat to Spain as well. Nevertheless, in the debate over the advantages of Spanish membership, opponents pointed out that Spain

would face a higher level of risk, including exposure to bombardment from the air and nuclear attack. Prior to accepting NATO commitments, much of Spain's stra- tegic planning had been dominated by the potential threat from

North Africa. The immediate objects of any belligerency had been

expected to be the port enclaves of Ceuta and Melilla. Surrounded on the landward side by Moroccan territory and claimed by

Morocco, these remnants of Spain's once-vast empire were vulnerable both economically and militarily. Both were fortified towns

defended by relatively strong garrisons. Since the fifteenth century,

they had formed a line of defense against the Islamic threat to the

Iberian Peninsula. In modern times, however, their strategic importance was that, together with Gibraltar, they ensured that control

of the strait linking the western Mediterranean with the Atlantic was in Western hands.

If it had chosen to do so, Morocco probably could have imposed

a damaging economic blockade on the two cities. Observers

regarded the likelihood of such an action as small, however, because

of the losses that would be inflicted on people living in adjacent

Moroccan areas dependent on sales of their products and on smuggling operations in the enclaves. Militarily, Morocco probably

would not have been strong enough to drive the Spanish out, and

it had generally avoided actions that would inflame the issue. The

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Spain: A Country Study

success of the Spanish military in cultivating their Moroccan counterparts had also helped to keep tensions at a minimum. Nevertheless, for a time the short-lived 1984 treaty of union between Libya

and Morocco created anxiety in Spain because the military potential of the two countries combined with the belligerency of the

Libyan ruler, Muammar al Qadhafi, accentuated its sense of vulnerability.

A number of Spanish observers criticized the failure of the Spanish government to secure recognition from NATO of Ceuta and

Melilla as falling within the geographical sphere of the treaty, there- by requiring a response from the alliance if they were attacked.

Others concluded that Spain's NATO ties would, at a minimum,

act as a brake against action by Morocco because Spain could avail

itself of the consultative provisions of the treaty if it regarded its territorial integrity, political independence, or security as coming

under threat. Realistically, however, other NATO countries viewed

the enclaves as remnants of the European colonial past in Africa,

and they could not be counted on for assistance.

Jurisdiction over National Defense

In Francoist Spain, the head of state occupied the position of

commander in chief of the armed forces. He was, in an active sense,

at the top of the military hierarchy, linked directly to the three ser- vices. The ministers of the army, the air force, and the navy

customarily officers of three-star rank—directed the operations, the

training, and the administration of their respective services to the extent of the authority delegated to them by Franco as commander

in chief. Under Franco the National Defense Council and the

Supreme Staff had planning and coordinating functions without

real authority over the three services.

After Adolpho Suarez Gonzalez took office in 1976, replacing

Franco's last prime minister, he set into motion a series of measures to convert the command structure into one resembling that

of other democratic Western nations and to place the armed forces

unequivocally under the authority of the elected civilian government. The chairman of the Supreme Staff, Lieutenant General

Manuel Gutierrez Mellado, was entrusted with this task, for which

he was appointed deputy prime minister responsible for defense.

Gutierrez Mellado acted vigorously to introduce a host of reforms,

the first of which was to replace the chairman of the Supreme Staff

by transferring his powers to a newly created Joint Chiefs of Staff

(Junta de Jefes de Estado Mayor—JUJEM), comprising of the three

service chiefs and a chairman. By a royal decree in June 1977, the

three service ministries were replaced by a single Ministry of

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National Security

Defense. Gutierrez Mellado became the first minister of defense;

when he retired two years later, a civilian assumed the portfolio.

The new ministry was given the task of preparing organizational

alternatives for the government to consider in the areas of national

defense and the execution of military policy. A further stage in the

transition was reached with the promulgation of the new 1978 Constitution, which, in Article 8, states that:

1. "The Armed Forces, consisting of the army, the navy, and

the air force, have as their mission the guarantee of the sovereignty

and independence of Spain, the defense of its territorial integrity,

and the constitutional order.

2. "An organic law will regulate the bases of the military organization, in conformity with the principles of the present Constitution."

Article 97 establishes that "The government directs domestic

and external policy, the civil and military administration, and the

defense of the state. Exercise of the executive function and jurisdiction will be by regulation in accordance with the Constitution

and the laws."

The language of the new Constitution affirms that responsibility

for defense and for military policy is to be under the authority of

the civilian government. The new definition of the armed forces

clearly distinguishes them from the forces of public order, i.e., the

Civil Guard and the police, which had been treated as part of the

armed forces under the applicable organic law of the previous

regime. Allocation to the armed forces of the responsibility to defend

the constitutional order was intended to reassert the role of the mili- tary in internal security and to underscore the illegality of actions

contrary to the democratic system. In conformity with Article 8.2 of the Constitution, Organic Law 6 was promulgated on July 1 , 1980. It allocates authority in matters

concerning national defense and the military establishment, declaring that the king is the supreme commander of the armed forces

and the presiding officer of the National Defense Council at ses- sions that he attends, and that the government, headed by the prime

minister, is to determine defense policy. It names the National

Defense Council, to include both civilian and military officials, as the senior advisory and consultative body of the government, with

the task of formulating and proposing military policy. The JUJEM

would continue to serve as the senior joint military advisory board

(see fig. 14).

The division of responsibilities set out in the 1980 law failed to resolve all of the issues involved in the distribution of functions;

notably, it failed to assure that the planning of military requirements took full account of available resources. In addition, the

293
Spain: A Country Study

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National Security

powers of the prime minister and the minister of defense to supervise the conduct of military operations were not clearly defined.

Some politicians felt that the military still dominated the chain of

command.

To deal with these problems, Organic Law 1 ofJanuary 5, 1984,

introduced certain modifications. It specifically assigns to the prime

minister the responsibility for defining the outlines of strategic and

military policy, and it authorizes him to order, to coordinate, and

to direct the implementation of military policy by the armed forces.

It establishes that the minister of defense could exercise various

of these functions as delegated to him by the prime minister. It modifies the role of the JUJEM, confining it to that of a military advisory body to both the prime minister and the minister of defense.

An important innovation is the creation of the post of Chief of the

Defense Staff (Jefe del Estado Mayor de la Defensa—JEMAD).

As the highest figure in the military hierarchy, the JEMAD is in- structed to act as principal collaborator to the minister of defense

in the planning and the execution of the operational aspects of mili- tary policy. In wartime, the JEMAD would be commander in chief

of the armed forces, directly responsible for conducting military

operations.

As explained by the government, the 1984 law formalizes the

procedure whereby the prime minister and the minister of defense

are given a preponderant role in carrying out defense policy and

in integrating the contributions of the individual branches of the

armed forces. All three service chiefs of staff must exercise their

commands under the authority of the civilian leaders; the law allows

for no separate military command whereby the armed forces could

operate autonomously.

Military Commands and Organization

As a result of the organizational reforms since 1977, culminating in the 1984 law that reaffirmed civil authority over the military establishment, command responsibility for the three armed

services, was vested in the JEMAD, who reported directly to the

minister of defense. The post was held by a senior officer of each

of the three services on an alternating basis, with no specified term. The JEMAD was responsible for proposing major strategic objectives that formed the basis for the Joint Strategic Plan, prepared

by the Ministry of Defense for the prime minister's approval. The

JEMAD also prepared operational directives and plans derived from

the Joint Strategic Plan, determined requirements for the conduct

of military operations in case of war, coordinated logistics among

the three services, and supervised the training and effectiveness

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Spain: A Country Study

of the services. To carry out these functions, the JEMAD had at his disposal a staff of five sections: plans and organization, intelli- gence, strategy, logistics, and telecommunications and electronic

warfare.

At a senior level in the Ministry of Defense, the office of the

secretary of state for defense was responsible for material and eco- nomic resources. The office was divided into three directorates

general, concerned, respectively, with economic affairs, armaments

and materiel, and infrastructure. At a parallel level, the under secre- tary of defense and his staff supervised technical services, personnel training, administrative services, and the general counsel.

The first JEMAD was Admiral Angel Liberal Lucini. In October

1986, Lucini was succeeded by Lieutenant General Gonzalo Puigserver Roma, an air force officer; the chiefs of staff of the three

service branches were replaced at the same time. The wholesale

removal of the top military leadership reportedly was carried out

by Minister of Defense Narcis Serra i Serra in reaction to their

opposition to several of the Socialist government's reform measures,

including the reduction of compulsory military service to twelve

months and changes in the military justice system that expanded

the rights of individual soldiers (see Sources and Quality of Manpower; Military Justice, this ch.).

Army

The army (Ejercito de Tierra) has existed continuously since the

reign of Ferdinand and Isabella. The oldest and largest of the three

services, its mission was the defense of peninsular Spain, the Balearic

Islands (Spanish, Islas Baleares), the Canary Islands (Spanish,

Canarias), Melilla, Ceuta, and the smaller islands and rocks off the northern coast of Africa. The army was, as of 1988, completing a major reorganization that had been initiated in 1982. It had

previously been organized into nine regional operational commands. These were reduced to six commands in conjunction with

a revised deployment of forces: Central Command, Southern Command, Levante Command, Eastern Pyrenees Command, Northwestern Command, and Western Pyrenees Command. In addition,

there were the two military zones of the Canary Islands and the

Balearic Islands. Ceuta and Melilla fell within the Southern Command (see fig. 15). At the head of each regional and zonal com- mand was an officer of two-star rank. Although his authority had

been reduced, the regional commander, who held the title of captain general, was still among the most senior officers of the army.

Under its earlier organization, the army was grouped into

two basic categories: the Immediate Intervention Forces and the

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National Security

Territorial Operational Defense Forces. In theory, the former, consisting of three divisions and ten brigades, had the missions of

defending the Pyrenean and the Gibraltar frontiers and of fulfill- ing Spain's security commitments abroad. The latter force, consisting of two mountain divisions and fourteen brigades, had the

missions of maintaining security in the regional commands and

of reinforcing the Civil Guard and the police against subversion

and terrorism. In reality, most of the Immediate Intervention Forces were not positioned to carry out their ostensible mission of protecting the nation's borders. Many units were stationed near major

cities—as a matter of convenience for officers who held part-time

jobs—from which they also could be called upon to curb disturbances or unrest. In a gradual process that had not been fully completed as of

mid- 1988, the division of the army into the Immediate Intervention Forces and the Territorial Operational Defense Forces was

being abolished. The brigade had become the fundamental tacti- cal unit. The total number of brigades had been reduced from

twenty-four to fifteen by the dismantling of nine territorial defense

brigades. Eleven of the brigades had been organized within the

existing five divisions; three brigades were to be independent, and

one was to be in general reserve. The best equipped of the five was the First Division, the Brunete

Armored Division, with its armored brigade in the Madrid area and its mechanized brigade farther to the southwest near Badajoz.

The motorized Second Division, Guzman el Bueno Division, which

had acquired a third brigade as a result of the reorganization, was

the major defensive force in the south, with full capability for rapid maneuver. The mechanized Third Division, the Maestrazgo Division, under the Levante Command, consisted of two brigades considered to have a medium degree of mobility. The two mountain

divisions, the Fourth Division—or Urgel Division and the Fifth

Division—or Navarra Division, each consisting of two mountain

brigades, remained in the Pyrenean border area of the north. Two

of the four independent brigades were armored cavalry, one was

an airborne brigade, and one was a paratroop brigade (in general

reserve).

Numerous other changes were introduced as well, including the

reorganization of artillery forces not included in the major combat

units. This involved the creation of a field artillery command that

consisted of a restructured and consolidated former artillery brigade,

the creation of a single straits coastal artillery command that

replaced two former coastal artillery regiments, and the introduction

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Spain: A Country Study

_,£2C3L layoff

Strait

SO 100 Kilometers 100 Miles / MOROCCO

CANARY

ISLANDS $

(jLasPalmasde

Gran Canaria — — International boundary Air base

Military regional boundary Naval base ® National capital Regional Army headquarters

• Populated place United States Installation

Figure 15. Major Military Installations, 1988

of an antiaircraft artillery command that was expected to benefit

from significant modernizing of its weapons inventory.

The personnel strength of the army, which previously had been

maintained at about 280,000, including 170,000 conscripts, had

been trimmed to 240,000 by 1987. This was achieved through lower

intakes of conscripts and volunteers and through cuts in the table

of organization for officers and NCOs. The government's goal was

a smaller but more capable army of 195,000 effectives by 1991.

Outside peninsular Spain, about 19,000 troops were stationed in

Ceuta and Melilla. These included, in addition to the Spanish

Legion and other specialized units, four Regulares regiments of

North Africans. An additional 5,800 troops were assigned to the

Balearic Islands, and 10,000 were in the Canary Islands.

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Spanish Legion

The Spanish Legion, founded in Morocco in 1920, has always

been under the direct command of the chief of the army staff. It has had a reputation as the toughest combat unit in the service.

Although modeled after the French Foreign Legion, it never

acquired the international flavor of its French counterpart. Reduced

in size to 8,500 in 1987, as a result of successive reorganizations,

the legion was scheduled to undergo further cuts to an overall

strength of 6,500. It had a higher number of career soldiers than

other units, but it was manned mosdy by conscripts who had volunteered for the legion. Recruitment of non-Spanish personnel, who

had never exceeded 10 percent of the group's manpower, ended

in 1986. Foreign legionnaires already in the service were not

affected. As of 1987, the Spanish Legion was grouped into four tercios (sing., tercio), a unit intermediate between a regiment and a brigade,

each commanded by a colonel. The first and the second tercios constituted the core of the military garrisons at Melilla and Ceuta.

Each had been reduced by a motorized battalion, leaving it with

a single motorized battalion, a mechanized battalion, an antitank

company, and a headquarters company. They were equipped with

BMR armored personnel carriers. The third tercio, stationed in the

Canary Islands, consisted of two motorized battalions and a headquarters company. The fourth tercio was being converted from a support role to a combat unit at the legion headquarters in Ronda

near Malaga.

In 1987 the Ministry of Defense was planning the creation of a rapid deployment force composed entirely of volunteers. This

force, which would include the Spanish Legion, the paratroop

brigade, the airborne brigade, and Marine units, would be available for use in trouble spots on twelve hours' notice. Lack of adequate air and naval transport would, however, be a limiting factor. Equipment

In spite of new procurement programs, introduced in the mid1980s, arms and equipment were not in sufficient supply, and they were not up to the standards of other NATO armies. The inventory of medium tanks was made up of nearly 700 United States models dating back to the Korean War, as well as about 300

AMX-30s of French design but manufactured mostly in Spain

between 1974 and 1983. Although the military felt that it was

essential to adopt a new main battle tank for the 1990s, economic

considerations led to a postponement of the decision and the

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Spain: A Country Study

upgrading of the AMX-30s with new West German-designed diesel engines and transmissions, reactive armor panels, and laser fire- control systems.

Armored troop carriers included about 1,200 American-made

M-l 13s as well as AML-60s and AML-90s of French design. The

Spanish army was in the process of being equipped with more than

1,200 BMRs, a six-wheeled armored vehicle manufactured in Spain

under French license. A variety of towed and self-propelled artillery was available, ranging from 105mm to 203mm guns and howitzers. The main antitank weapons were recoilless rifles; 88.9mm

rocket launchers; Milan, Cobra, and Dragon missiles; and a small

number of TOW (tube-launched, optically tracked, wire-guided)

and HOT (high subsonic, optically guided, tube-launched) antitank missile systems. A considerable quantity of additional antitank missiles and rocket launchers was on order. The army aircraft inventory included about 180 helicopters, about 40 of which were armed with 20mm guns or HOT antitank missiles (see table 16,

Appendix).

The air defense of ground forces depended largely on outdated

Bofors guns and on aging Hawk and Nike missiles. As of 1987, a start had been made on overcoming deficiencies in this area by

acquiring French Roland missiles, to be mounted on AMX-30

chassis, and Italian Aspide missiles for fixed defense.

Navy

The Spanish navy (Armada) was relatively large, ranking second

in total tonnage, after the British navy, among European NATO

nations. Its ship inventory, although aging, was being upgraded

through a construction and modernization program. As part of its personnel reorganization, its strength had been reduced by 10,000

to 47,300 personnel, including marines, as of 1987. Of this number, about 34,000 were conscripts.

Subordinate to the commander in chief of the fleet, with his headquarters in Madrid, were four zonal commands: the Cantabrian

Maritime Zone with its headquarters at El Ferrol del Caudillo

(Ferrol) on the Atlantic coast; the Straits Maritime Zone with its headquarters at San Fernando near Cadiz; the Mediterranean

Maritime Zone with its headquarters at Cartagena; and the Canary

Islands Maritime Zone with its headquarters at Las Palmas de Gran

Canada.

Operational naval units were classified by mission, and they were

assigned to the combat forces, the protective forces, or the auxiliary forces. The combat forces were given the tasks of conducting

offensive and defensive operations against potential enemies and

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of assuring maritime communications. Their principal vessels included a carrier group, naval aircraft, transports and landing vessels, submarines, and missile-armed fast attack craft. The protective forces had the mission of protecting maritime communications

over both ocean and coastal routes and the approaches to ports and

to maritime terminals. Their principal components were destroyers or frigates, corvettes, and minesweepers as well as marine units

for the defense of naval installations. The auxiliary forces, responsible for transport and for provisioning at sea, also had such diverse

tasks as coast guard operations, scientific work, and maintenance

of training vessels. In addition to supply ships and a tanker, the

force included older destroyers and a considerable number of patrol

craft. The largest vessel of the navy was the 15,000-ton aircraft carrier,

Principe de Asturias, which had entered service in 1988 after completing sea trials. Built in Spain with extensive United States engineering assistance and financing, it was designed with a "skijump" takeoff deck. Its complement would be six to eight Harrier

vertical (or short) takeoff and landing (V/STOL) aircraft and as many as sixteen helicopters designed for antisubmarine warfare

and support of marine landings.

The new carrier was to have as its escort group four frigates of

the United States FFG-7 class, built in Spain and armed with

Harpoon and Standard missiles. The first three were commissioned

between 1986 and 1988; construction on the fourth was begun in

1987. Also in the inventory were five frigates, commissioned

between 1973 and 1976 and built in Spain with United States assis- tance. Six slightly smaller vessels of Portuguese design, classified as corvettes, were constructed in Spain between 1978 and 1982 (see

table 17, Appendix).

The fleet of eight submarines was built, based on French designs,

with extensive French assistance. Four submarines of the Agosta

class were constructed in Spain between 1983 and 1985. They were equipped with the submarine-launched version of the Exocet antiship missile. Four submarines of the Daphne class had been completed between 1973 and 1975. A number of United States destroyers of the Gearing and the Fletcher classes, constructed at the close of World War II, were also in the 1988 inventory, although

the three remaining Fletcher class vessels were scheduled to be

retired by 1990.

The marines, numbering 11,500 troops, were divided into base

defense forces and landing forces. One of the three base defense battalions was stationed at each of the headquarters at Ferrol, Cartagena,

and San Fernando. "Groups" (midway between battalions and

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Spain: A Country Study

regiments) were stationed at Madrid and at Las Palmas de Gran

Canaria. The fleet tercio (equal to a regiment), available for immediate embarkation, was based at San Fernando. Its principal arms

included light tanks, armored personnel vehicles, self-propelled artil- lery, and TOW and Dragon antitank missiles.

Air Force

The air force (Ejercito del Aire), with a personnel strength of

33,000 as of 1987, of whom about 18,000 were conscripts, was orga- nized into four operational commands—combat, tactical, trans- port, and Canary Islands. The Combat Air Command (Mando

Aereo de Combate—MACOM) had as its mission control over

national airspace through the use of offensive and defensive inter- ceptor operations. As of 1987, MACOM consisted of seven squadrons equipped with F-18 Hornets, F-4 Phantoms, Mirage F-ls,

and Mirage Ills (see table 18, Appendix).

The F-18s, introducted in 1986, were among the world's most

up-to-date multipurpose fighter aircraft, with advanced navigational

and target acquisition systems. Associated weaponry included Spar- row and Sidewinder antiaircraft missiles, HARM antiradar missiles, and Harpoon antiship missiles. The F-18s would permit

replacement of the F-4 Phantoms, high-performance fighters of

the 1960s generation. The version of Mirage III in the Spanish

inventory, first introduced in 1964, was designed as a long-range

fighter-bomber intruder. A more recent Mirage model, the F-l, was purchased in the 1974-75 period by the air force. The Mirage

Ills were scheduled to have new electronic attack and navigation

systems installed, so that they could be kept in service through the

1990s.

The Tactical Air Command (Mando Aereo Tactico—MATAC)

had as its mission the support of ground forces. It was equipped

with ten squadrons of SF-5 aircraft, one squadron of six Orion

P-3A maritime reconnaissance aircraft, and one squadron of

DO-27 type liaison aircraft. The SF-5s, modeled after the Northrop-designed American F-5, were assembled in Spain in three versions: attack-fighters, reconnaissance aircraft, and two-seat trainers. Modifications being carried out in 1987, involving installation of

new communications, a plane identification system, and updated

navigation and landing aids, were intended to keep the SF-5 operational until a replacement was available in the late 1990s. This was

expected to be either one designed and manufactured in Spain or a more advanced model available through Spain's participation in

the European fighter program (see Defense Production, this ch.).

302
Spanish-made CASA aircraft Courtesy Embassy of Spain, Washington

The Air Transport Command (Mando Aereo de Transporte

MATRA) provided airlift capacity for the three services, as well

as air evacuation, disaster relief, and paratroop carriers. The com- mand possessed sixty aircraft, and it could conduct heavy logisti- cal operations, using five C-130 Hercules transports and six KC-130s (for aerial refueling). The Spanish-built CASA C-212

Aviocar was the mainstay of the light transport fleet. The Canary Islands Air Command (Mando Aereo de Canarias—MACAN) was a mixed unit equipped to carry out multiple

missions—interceptor, ground attack, transport, surveillance, and

antisubmarine—at a distance of 1,500 kilometers from the mainland. Its air fleet included a squadron of Mirage F-ls armed for both interceptor and ground attack operations, a unit of ten CASA

C-212 Aviocar light transports, and a squadron equipped for anti- submarine warfare with Fokker F-27 patrol aircraft and Aerospatiale AS-332B Super Puma helicopters.

The modernization efforts of the air force centered on the acquisition of seventy-two F-18s, produced by McDonnell Douglas in the

United States. The first such planes—known as the EF-18A in

Spain—arrived in 1986, and the final deliveries were scheduled

for 1990. The cost of this program, which amounted to US$1.8

billion for the aircraft alone, was to be offset in full by expenditures in Spain. These were to include support and overhaul for

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Spain: A Country Study

CF-18s of the Canadian Air Force in Europe and for F-18s of the

United States Sixth Fleet in the Mediterranean.

The principal MACOM bases were at Zaragoza, at Torrejon

near Madrid, at Albacete, and at Manises near Valencia. The initial F-18 deliveries were assigned to two operational MACOM squadrons based at Zaragoza. Subsequent deliveries would replace the

F-4s of two squadrons at Torrejon and two Mirage III squadrons

at Manises. The SF-5s of MATAC were based at Moron de la Frontera (Moron), and the Orion P-3As were at Jerez de la Frontera near Cadiz.

Uniforms, Ranks, and Insignia

Service uniforms for officers of all military services consisted of a blouse, shirt, tie, pants, black socks, and black shoes. Service

uniforms for army and air force officers were similar in style, in

that both were single-breasted and had four patch pockets, but

different in color—olive green for the army and blue for the air force. The navy had a white and navy blue service uniform. Uniforms for enlisted personnel were more simply tailored, and they were made from heavier, longer wearing fabric. The army's enlisted

personnel uniform jacket was similar to that worn by officers, but

it lacked the lower patch pockets. Air force enlisted personnel wore

waist-length jackets similar to those worn by officers. Navy enlisted

personnel wore the conventional blues and whites. The military's

field uniform consisted of an olive green fatigue jacket, a shirt, trousers, a belt with vertical shoulder suspenders, a field cap and/or

a helmet, and combat boots. Additional field uniforms for special

forces included winter and summer camouflage uniforms.

Ranks in all three military services generally corresponded to those in the armed forces of the United States. Each of the three

services had ten officer ranks, ranging from the equivalent of second

lieutenant in the army and the air force and ensign in the navy

to general of the army, general of the air force, and fleet admiral.

The only difference between the two countries' officer rank struc- tures was that Spain had only four, rather than five, general officer ranks. The highest actual rank held by a general officer was that

of three stars. Only the king, as supreme commander, held the fourstar rank of captain general. Spain had eight enlisted grades for the army and the air force (as opposed to nine in the United States),

ranging from basic private and airman basic to command sergeant

major and chief master sergeant, respectively. Spain lacked an

equivalent for the United States army grade of sergeant first class/master sergeant or its air force grade of master sergeant. The

Spanish navy had only seven enlisted grades, ranging from seaman

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apprentice to master chief petty officer. It lacked an equivalent for the United States grades of seaman recruit and chief petty officer. Insignia of rank for Spanish military personnel were displayed on sleeves or shoulder boards and, in some cases, on headgear.

Officer rank insignia were the same for the army and air force (a

varying number and type of symbols in gold). Naval officer ranks were usually distinguishable by gold stripes worn on sleeves or shoulder boards (see fig. 16). Enlisted personnel ranks were designated

by stripes: red for army private and private first class as well as

for navy seaman and seaman apprentice; green (on shoulder boards)

for air force airman first class; and gold for all other enlisted ranks

including warrant officers, but on different colored backgrounds

depending on the service (red background for army, blue for navy,

and green for air force). In addition, army and air force warrant

officers wore a single five-pointed star on service background; the

naval warrant officer was identified by a single short horizontal

stripe (see fig. 17).

Sources and Quality of Manpower

Beginning in 1982, major changes in the military personnel sys- tem were introduced in an effort to deal with the chronic problem

of overstaffing, to modernize recruitment procedures, and to improve the quality of education and training. The existing officer complement was far in excess of the number required by the new

tables of organization adopted in the extensive reorganization of

the army. A total of 41,328 soldiers were in the ranks of sergeant

through lieutenant general in 1986; these were scheduled to be

reduced to 35,213 by 1991. In 1986 a further 4,200 officers were

in the active reserves, and 2,000 were in a special status called transitional active reserve, a voluntary category that had been created

to induce officers to forego their final two years of active duty while

retaining full pay.

The total number of trained reserves was reported to be

1,085,000, as of 1987. These personnel, who were considered

reservists until the age of thirty-eight, theoretically would be avail- able to form brigades needed to fill out incomplete divisions in an

emergency. Reservists did not, however, attend periodic refresher courses or undergo retraining.

The mandatory retirement age for general officers, which had been

between sixty- six and seventy prior to 1981, had been reduced to

sixty-five—after conversion to active reserve status on full pay at age sixty-two to sixty-four—as of 1986. Active duty for majors, lieu- tenant colonels, colonels, and their naval equivalents was to end about

five years earlier than it had previously, at age fifty- seven to sixty.

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Spain: A Country Study

In spite of these changes, it was evident that the number of army

generals still would be excessive (143 in 1991) in relation to the

small number of units at the level of division and brigade.

Military promotions historically had been based almost exclusively on seniority; with few exceptions, years in grade and age were the determining factors. Military officers knew with considerable certainty when they would advance in rank and whether or not vacancies existed for them at the new grade. Reforms in the

promotion system, giving far greater weight to professional merit,

to previous assignments, and to special training, were proposed

as early as 1984, but only in 1987 was specific legislation introduced

to modify the procedure.

Reforms of the salary system also were introduced to raise and

to simplify military wage scales, making them consistent with the

civil service wage structure. When the new system was introduced

in 1985, it resulted in pay increases of between 15 percent (for ser- geants) and 33 percent (for lieutenant generals). Total pay and

allowances at the rate of exchange prevailing in 1 988 would be the

equivalent of US$19,300 annually for a colonel, US$14,800 for a captain, and US$10,000 for a sergeant. No changes were proposed in the policy of paying conscripts only nominal wages, which

amounted to only US$5 a month in 1988.

Also included in the reform legislation of 1984 were a number

of important changes affecting recruitment and conscription. For

the first time, conscientious objectors were recognized officially and

offered the possibility of alternate social service of eighteen to twentyfour months. Obligatory military service, previously set at fifteen months for the army and the air force, and at eighteen months for the navy, was to be reduced over a three-year period to twelve

months for all services. A gradual shift in the call-up age, from

twenty-one years to nineteen years, also was initiated. Voluntary

recruits to all services would in the future serve for sixteen months

rather than eighteen months (twenty-four months for the navy).

In categories requiring specialized training, enlistments of two to three years would be required. The reason for these changes was

the attempt to achieve an annual intake of 200,000 conscripts and

36,600 enlistees in 1986. The total number of young men qualified for military service would exceed these totals combined by an

estimated 71 ,000. The conscripts would be concentrated in the army

and the navy. Only 4,700 would be assigned to the air force, which

expected to attract 16,000 volunteers each year. The military conscription system was relatively unpopular; but

the government vowed that it would be maintained. In a 1987 public

opinion poll, 76 percent of those queried believed that some form

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of service should be rendered to the state; however, only 17 per- cent felt that the service should be in the armed forces. The government's position was believed to be influenced by the high rate of

unemployment among young men and the added cost of depending on voluntary enlistments. Moreover, the government was apprehensive that an all-professional army might be less accountable to

civil authority.

Although the 1978 Constitution gives each citizen the right to serve in the armed forces, regardless of sex, the full integration

of women had been met by strong resistance. About 8,000 women

were included in a uniformed army auxiliary health corps, but they

retained civilian status. A small number of women auxiliaries in

the air force and the navy served in certain administrative jobs.

As of early 1988, this situation was on the brink of change as the

result of a royal decree providing for the progressive incorporation of women under equal conditions with males. Initially, women

were to be permitted to apply for enlistment in the legal, the

auditing, the engineering, the health, and the veterinary corps of

the three services. Access to additional corps would be allowed as necessary organizational adaptations were completed. No action

had been taken to open the service academies to women, although

individual legal suits had been instituted by women seeking

admission.

Training and Education

Three service academies prepared young men as career officers. The General Military Academy at Zaragoza provided a four-year

program leading to a commisssion as lieutenant in the army. The

first two years and the fourth year consisted ofjoint studies at the

academy; the third year was devoted to training specific to the

branch of service selected. The five-year curriculum of the Naval

Military School at Marin on the Atlantic coast included years one, two, and four based at the academy, a six-month to eight-month

cruise on a school sailing ship during the third year, and a fifth year spent primarily aboard fleet units. At the General Air Academy

at San Javier, the first three years consisted of basic studies and

introductory flight training. The fourth year was devoted to the

specialization chosen. Beginning with the entering class of 1987, a fifth year was to be added with further concentration on a specialization.

As part of the reforms announced in 1985, all of the academies were expected to provide similar levels of the general education

needed to undertake future advanced studies; in particular, they were to strengthen the areas of the humanities and the social

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Spain: A Country Study

sciences, including the courses on the constitutional and the justice

systems. The curricula were to devote 20 percent of courses to the

humanities and the social sciences, 20 percent to scientific and technical subjects, 10 percent to physical education and recreation, and

50 percent to military and professional training.

Competition for entry into the academies was keen. In 1986 only

194 out of 3,000 candidates were selected for the army academy,

only 60 of 800 applicants were chosen for the naval academy, and

only 78 out of 2,500 were accepted for the air academy. The entering

classes were decidedly smaller than they had been in the past, in

order to conform to the new tables of organization. In 1980, for example, 275 cadets had entered the army academy, 72 had been

accepted in the naval academy, and 126, in the air academy.

Army noncommissioned officer (NCO) training was conducted

at the Basic General Academy of Noncommissioned Officers

(Academia General Basica de Suboficiales—AGBS), in an intensive three-year program. The first year consisted of basic military

studies, the second year was spent in study in a technical training

institute, and the third year consisted of further specialized technical training or additional leadership training at AGBS. Soldiers

completing the course were promoted to the rank of sergeant. In

spite of a large number of applicants—more than 10,000 in 1985

the number of candidates accepted was reduced from more than

1,100 in 1980 to 610 in 1986.

Each branch of the armed forces had a range of technical schools

and preparatory courses for successive levels of command. The

Ministry of Defense directly administered schools in such specialties as military justice, accounting, administration, and intelligence.

Army colonels and lieutenant colonels with demonstrated aptitudes

and qualifications could be assigned to the Higher Army School

for command and staff studies. The Naval Warfare School pre- pared naval captains and marine colonels for higher commands.

The Higher Air School provided corresponding command training to those air force officers demonstrating qualities expected to lead to general officer rank.

Training for ground force conscripts consisted of an initial fourmonth period of basic instruction and tactical exercises at the squad

and the platoon levels. This was followed by two four-month training cycles providing collective larger-unit instruction and tactical exercises. Spanish observers asserted that insufficient time was

devoted to training and that its quality was lax. Recruits complained

that they were often inefficiently occupied, doing minor chores,

sitting around barracks, or assigned to duties in commissaries and

clubs. In addition to efforts to introduce more meaningful training

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and to increase the amount of time devoted to training, the government hoped to meet other objections to the conscription system

by instituting a new regionalization policy. To the extent permitted by national defense needs, servicemen were to be assigned to posts near their homes. The previous policy, introduced under

Franco when the principal mission of the armed forces was internal security, was to send soldiers to regions where they had no per- sonal ties. The army continued to rely, to a considerable extent, on university students, who were fulfilling their twelve-month service obli- gation as second lieutenants, to serve as platoon commanders or

as sergeants after only six months of basic training. Observers questioned the continued dependence on this recruiting source, which

affected the caliber of training provided to conscripts and reduced

the professional prospects of career NCOs. One reason for its reten- tion was that limiting the number of career officers left the avenues

for advancement to higher rank less cluttered. Military Justice

During the Franco regime, military courts were competent to try a wide array of political crimes by civilians, including terrorist acts and offenses against military honor by the press. Martial law was invoked frequently, enabling military courts to prosecute

civilians charged with participating in strikes, demonstrations, and

subversive meetings. In accordance with the requirements of the

new 1978 Constitution, an organic law passed in 1980 abolished

the jurisdiction of military courts over civilians. In addition, com- mon crimes committed by military personnel were to be tried in

civil courts, and sentences imposed by military courts were subject to review by the Supreme Council of Military Justice and by

the civil Supreme Court as the final court of appeal.

A completely new Military Penal Code was adopted in late 1985.

The new code introduced safeguards comparable to those of the

civil criminal system, including the appointment of defense counsel and a ban against degrading punishment. It distinguished

between conduct of a criminal character that was subject to criminal justice and disciplinary infractions that were to be handled by

the military commands. The new code reduced the jurisdiction of

military courts in the area of political crimes, such as rebellion,

and it placed limits on the defense of obedience to legal authority

in connection with illegal or unconstitutional acts. The death penalty was abolished for all but certain crimes committed in wartime, and

even in such cases the death penalty was not to be mandatory.

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Spain: A Country Study

The Defense Budget

The defense budget for 1988 was set at 762 billion pesetas (for

value of the peseta—see Glossary), or US$6.74 billion based on

1988 rates of exchange. It was apportioned on the basis of 37 per- cent to the army, 24 percent to the navy, 19 percent to the air force,

and 20 percent to centralized functions (the Ministry of Defense).

The army budget, which had constituted 46 percent of the total in 1982, had begun to diminish as a result of reductions in army

force levels. The shift also reflected major weapons acquisitions pro- grams by the navy and the air force. The cost of centralized functions had risen as a result of the development of the new command

structure, the consolidation of many operations that had previously

been administered by individual services, and the decision of the

minister of defense to control major equipment acquisitions more

directly.

The 1988 defense budget was somewhat higher than the

corresponding figures for 1987 (703 billion pesetas) and for 1986

(630 billion pesetas). In real terms, however, the rise in defense

allocations had been lower than the annual rate of 4.432 percent

planned for the eight-year period 1982-90. Moreover, the military budget had declined as a percentage of the total government

budget, from 13.2 percent in 1978 to 8.81 percent in 1986. Military expenditures also declined slightly, during the same period,

as a percentage of gross domestic product (GDP—see Glossary),

from 2.06 percent to 1.97 percent.

Although personnel costs remained high in proportion to total defense expenditures, a distinct reduction was recorded between

1982 and 1986, from 49.9 percent to 44.5 percent. Expenditures

for construction and materiel expanded from 34.8 percent of the

total in 1982 to 42.3 percent in 1986. Operating costs (of 15.3 per- cent in 1982 and 13.2 percent in 1986) were proportionately some- what lower. Although the army was gradually bringing its personnel

outlays under control, they continued to be much higher than those

in the other services—58.8 percent of its total expenditures in 1988,

compared with 31.3 percent in the navy and 33.5 percent in the

air force. Moreover, because of their earlier starts on modernization programs, much higher shares of the navy and the air force

budgets (over 50 percent for each in 1986) were being invested in

equipment and in construction than was true in the army (22 per- cent in 1986).

According to a study prepared by the United States Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, Spain ranked thirteenth among

NATO's sixteen nations in military expenditures per capita,

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calculated on the basis of 1985 defense budgets. With the exception of Luxembourg and Iceland, it ranked last in military expenditures as a percentage of GDP. Spain's defense outlays were well

below the average of 3.4 percent of GDP attained by other European NATO countries.

Defense Production

Spanish industry manufactured a significant share of the material

requirements of the armed forces, notably light arms, vehicles,

ships, and light transport aircraft. As a member of NATO, Spain

had joined in the planning of several coproduction projects with

other West European countries. Nearly 150 firms were engaged

principally in defense production, and about 4,000 Spanish firms were linked in some way with the industry. Four large munitions

manufacturers were directly controlled by the Ministry of Defense.

A number of other major firms were part of the state holding company, the National Industrial Institute (Instituto Nacional de Industria—INI). A large group of purely private companies formed a

third category. The ultimate intention of the Ministry of Defense was to transfer the four arms factories to the INI.

According to a 1986 survey of firms doing business with the

Ministry of Defense, the manufacture of electronics accounted for about 20 percent of Spanish defense production; military vehicles

for about 14 percent, supply of arms for approximately 13 percent,

naval construction for about 8 percent, and aircraft construction

for approximately 6 percent. Production of components and ancil- lary equipment made up the remaining approximately 39 percent.

Among the leading producers of army equipment was Empresa

Nacional de Autocamiones S.A. (ENASA), generally known by

the trade name of Pegaso, which manufactured a range of trucks

and armored vehicles. Its basic BLR four-wheeled armored car was

used primarily by the Spanish army; the six-wheeled BMR also was exported to Saudi Arabia and to Egypt. Most of the army's

ordnance was produced by Empresa Nacional de Santa Barbara

de Industrias Militares (Santa Barbara), including the CETME

5.56mm rifle, in general use by the Spanish army, and the

AMX-30E tank, based on French technology. Santa Barbara also manufactured the truck-mounted 140mm Teruel multiple rocket

launcher. Larger naval vessels, including Spain's new aircraft carrier, French-designed submarines of the Daphne and the Agosta

classes, and FFG-7 frigates of United States design, were constructed by Empresa Nacional Bazan de Construcciones Navales

Militares (Bazan) at San Fernando near Cadiz.

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Spain: A Country Study

The predominant aircraft manufacturer, Construcciones Aeronauticas S.A. (CASA), was best known for the C-212, a short

takeoff and landing utility plane with a three-ton payload. The com- pany also produced the C-101, a trainer and light fighter, with

assistance from West German and American aircraft companies

that owned minority interests in CASA. The CN-235 turboprop,

a forty- seat airliner with a military version, was being built in

cooperation with an Indonesian firm. CASA also was reported in

1987 to be at the design stage of a plane—the Avion Experimental

(AX)—that might be selected to replace the F-5 tactical fighters

obtained from the United States. This would be an advanced ver- sion of the C-101, with an engine of much greater horsepower.

CASA also assembled French-supplied kits for Aerospatiale Super

Puma helicopters. It was the principal Spanish firm involved with

British, West German, and Italian firms in the Eurofighter con- sortium planning an entirely new fighter aircraft for the latter half

of the 1990s that was expected to replace the Mirages in the exist- ing Spanish inventory.

Among other more advanced systems either being produced or

in the planning phase were the French-designed Roland and the

Italian Aspide air defense missile systems and the European attack

helicopter AB-129. The latter was being developed in collaboration with Britain, Italy, and the Netherlands, with production fore- seen for the 1990s.

The relatively small scale of Spain's own military orders spurred

the Spanish armaments industry to develop its export potential and

to increase its share of the international arms market. By 1987 it had risen to eighth rank as a world exporter, with a number of

clients in the Middle East and in Latin America. In an analysis

of 1985 results by an industry group, the Spanish Arms Manufacturers Association, export sales by member firms (125 billion

pesetas) exceeded sales to the Ministry of Defense (90 billion

pesetas).

As of 1988, Spain enforced sales embargoes against countries

accused of human rights violations (e.g., South Africa, Chile, and

Paraguay), Warsaw Pact and other communist countries, and active

belligerents (e.g., Iran and Iraq). The Spanish press has, however,

reported widespread violations of these controls, especially in the

form of munitions shipments to Iran and to Iraq. Spain also had

joined with other North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO)

countries and Japan in controlling the export of militarily sensitive goods to communist destinations through the Paris-based Coordinating Committee for Multilateral Export Controls (COCOM).

314
Spanish-made military equipment on display during

annual Spanish Armed Forces Day parade, Valladolid, May 29, 1984

Courtesy United States Department of Defense

315
Spain: A Country Study

Participation in NATO

Membership in NATO had not been a practical alternative during Franco's lifetime because of the opprobrium with which the

dictatorship was viewed by other West European states. Moreover,

Franco displayed little interest in a Spanish contribution to West

European security, regarding the Spanish military primarily as an

instrument to protect the internal stability of the country. Only

after his death was Spain able to contemplate the possibility of participation in the alliance. With the support of the political parties

of the right and of the then-dominant Union of the Democratic

Center (Union de Centro Democratico—UCD), membership terms were successfully negotiated and approved by the Cortes in October 1981, in spite of opposition by the Spanish Socialist Workers'

Party (Partido Socialista Obrero Espanol—PSOE) and the Communist Party of Spain (Partido Comunista de Espana—PCE).

Although most European members were less enthusiastic over

Spain's membership than was the United States, the agreement was quickly ratified, and Spain's formal entry as the sixteenth

member—the first new member since West Germany, twenty-seven

years earlier—took place in May 1982.

Spanish participation was to be accomplished in stages: first by

membership in the political committees and eventually by integration into alliance military activities. A few months after entry,

however, in October 1982, a new PSOE government took office under Prime Minister Felipe Gonzalez Marquez, who had campaigned against Spanish adherence to the pact. Gonzalez suspended

further Spanish involvement in NATO military operations, pending

a national referendum on Spain's continued membership. A strong

anti-NATO movement had been growing among the Spanish people. In the eyes of many, NATO membership was linked to the

issue of United States bases and to the likelihood of an increased

military budget. Spanish opposition became part of the movement

then gaining ground elsewhere in Europe to resist the deployment

of intermediate-range nuclear missiles on the continent. Nevertheless, a delay in calling the referendum until March 1986 was accompanied by a reevaluation in the PSOE attitude. By this time,

Gonzalez was openly supporting Spain's continued adherence,

arguing that if Spain wished to benefit from membership in the

European Community (EC), it would have to accept the responsibilities of membership in NATO as well (see Spain and the European

Community; Spain and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization,

ch. 4). The referendum took the form of asking the electorate to agree

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National Security

that it was in the national interest for Spain to remain in the alli- ance subject to three principles affirmed by the Gonzalez government: that Spain would not be incorporated into the integrated

military structure; that the ban on the installation, the storage, and

the introduction of nuclear weapons on Spanish territory would

be maintained; and that there would be an effort toward a progressive reduction in the United States military presence in Spain. Contrary to opinion polls predicting continued heavy opposition to Spanish membership, the government's proposal was approved by

52.6 percent to 39.8 percent.

The actual conditions of Spain's participation—as subsequently

negotiated—were that Spain would remain a full member of the

North Adantic Council and its subordinate organs, that Spain would

be present as an observer on the Nuclear Planning Group, that

it would continue to be a member of the Defense Planning Committee and the Military Committee, and that it would appoint mili- tary representatives for liaison with the NATO military commands.

Spain would continue to participate in logistical coordination,

development of common equipment and materiel, and civil protection measures, reserving its position on participation in the inte- grated communication system. Spain would be permitted to nominate candidates for the NATO Secretariat and the International Military Staff. Observers later reported that Spain had offered

to coordinate its national military missions with those of NATO,

especially control of the sea between the Balearic Islands and the

Canaries. Spanish forces were to be commanded only by Spanish

officers, however, and no troops were to be deployed outside of

Spain on a sustained basis. The Spanish air defense system, which was compatible with the NATO system, was to be linked also to the French and the Italian air defense systems. In spite of the formal limitations on Spain's participation in

NATO, the coordinated strategic planning envisaged by Spain was

intended to make it possible for Spanish forces to operate in con- junction with NATO in an emergency. NATO planners viewed

Spain's relatively secure landmass as a potentially major strategic

asset, forming a marshaling area and a redoubt from which air and

sea attacks could be launched against Warsaw Pact forces. In a

crisis, it would be highly valuable as a transit center and a supply

depot for reinforcement from the United States. The Spanish navy

and air force, operating from bases located in the Balearic Islands

and southern Spain, afforded NATO a stronger position in the

western Mediterranean. The Canary Islands bases would be important for safeguarding shipping lanes, particularly for oil tankers

bound for the North Atlantic and the North Sea. Moreover, the

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Spain: A Country Study

addition of a new and important West European country imparted

a useful psychological boost to NATO, helping to demonstrate the

restored vitality of the alliance.

Politically, the United States and other NATO countries believed

that, by establishing a closer association through NATO, Spain's

new democratic course would be strengthened. They hoped that

membership would offer the Spanish armed services a well-defined

military mission and would distract them from involvement in

domestic politics. A greater professionalism of the Spanish military was expected to result, as well as efforts to modernize and to improve the armed forces through collaboration with NATO,

perhaps at a lower cost than would otherwise be the case. The conditions limiting Spain's membership restricted the participation of Spanish ground forces in NATO exercises, although

Spain conducted exercises with other NATO countries on a bilateral basis. In 1987 Spanish ships engaged in NATO air-naval maneuvers between the Bay of Biscay and the Canary Islands, an area

of the Atlantic Ocean that Spain regarded as of strategic importance. Spanish officers were not eligible to hold allied command

and staff positions, thereby denying them valuable broadening

experience and exposure to modern doctrinal and tactical concepts.

NATO funds were not available for infrastructure projects in Spain.

Particularly in light of the deficiencies and the obsolescence of much

of the army's equipment, Spain needed to increase its military

budget considerably to bring its forces within reach of minimum

NATO standards. Some Spanish critics argued that Spain had

gained little advantage from its membership because it had failed

to secure any commitment regarding the eventual cession of Gibraltar, and it had failed to obtain security guarantees covering Ceuta

and Melilla, which remained outside NATO's area of collective

defense.

Prime Minister Gonzalez justified in part Spain's failure to accept

the integrated military structure by pointing out that Spain had

joined the alliance many years after its formation, when the com- mand structure was already well established. A complex readjustment of existing commands would have been necessary, said

Gonzalez, which would have created conflict with other members.

For example, Spain's maritime role in the Atlantic would appropriately fall under the Supreme Allied Commander, Atlantic

(SACLANT). Under the system prevailing when Spain entered

NATO, a command subordinate to SACLANT, the Iberian Atiantic Command (IBERLANT), headquartered at Lisbon under a Por- tuguese admiral, was responsible for surveillance and control of

large ocean areas west of Portugal and south to the Tropic of

318
Armored vehicles at military garrison near Seville Courtesy United States Department of Defense

319
Spain: A Country Study

Cancer. Spain would appropriately have an important role in

IBERLANT, but Portugal made it plain that it would be unwilling to cede command responsibilities to Spain, even on an alter- nating basis. Similarly, for fully effective defense of the strait,

Spanish cooperation with British forces on Gibraltar would be indis- pensable. Spanish sensitivities on this issue, however, made it hardly

imaginable for Spanish officers to be part of a combined NATO

command, or to engage in area cooperation with British officers on Gibraltar, so long as Britain refused to negotiate seriously on

the future of the stronghold.

In 1987 Spain changed its status from observer to full member

on NATO's Nuclear Planning Group. It continued, however, to adhere to the policy, approved virtually unanimously during the

parliamentary debate on NATO, that it would remain a nonnuclear

power and that it would not agree to stockpile or to install nuclear

weapons of NATO forces on its territory. In this respect, its position was similar to two other NATO members, Norway and Denmark. Spain had initially rejected adherence to the 1968 Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), asserting that

the treaty was unbalanced in favor of the nuclear signatories. But

in 1987, after finding that its nonadherence was complicating its nuclear fuel supply relationships in the EC and with other countries as well, Spain reversed its position and acceded to the treaty.

The issue of nuclear weapons had been politically charged since

three thermonuclear bombs were spilled over Spanish territory and

one dropped into Spanish coastal waters in 1966, following an air collision between a United States B-52 bomber and a KC-135

refueling plane. Although all the bombs eventually were recovered,

subsequent agreements expressly committed the United States to refrain from storing nuclear devices or components on Spanish soil. The last American units with nuclear armaments were submarines

equipped with Poseidon missiles that were based at the Rota naval

complex until they were shifted to Holy Loch, Scotland.

Military Cooperation with the United States

The Pact of Madrid, signed in 1953 by Spain and the United

States, ended a period of virtual isolation for Spain, although the

other victorious allies of World War II and much of the rest of the

world remained hostile to what they regarded as a fascist regime

sympathetic to the Nazi cause and established with Axis assistance.

The 1953 accord took the form of three separate executive agreements that pledged the United States to furnish economic and mili- tary aid to Spain. The United States, in turn, was to be permitted

to construct and to utilize air and naval bases on Spanish territory.

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National Security

Although not a full-fledged military alliance, the pact did result in a substantial United States contribution to the improvement of

Spain's defense capabilities. During the initial United States fis- cal year (FY—see Glossary) 1954 to FY1961 phase, military aid

amounted to US$500 million, in grant form. Between FY1962 and

FY1982, a further US$1,238 billion of aid in the form of loans

(US$727 million) and grants (US$511 million) was provided. During the period FY1983 to FY1986, United States military aid,

entirely in the form of sales under concessional credit terms, aver- aged US$400 million annually, but it declined to slightiy more than

US$100 million annually in FY1987 and in FY1988. The military

credits were scheduled to be phased out in FY1989, in keeping with

Spain's growing self-sufficiency in national defense. More than 200

Spanish officers and NCOs received specialized training in the

United States each year under a parallel program.

Although Spain had purchased some military equipment from

countries other than the United States, and although some officers had received training in other countries, the only major foreign

influence on the Spanish military between the end of World War

II and Franco's death in 1975 had been the United States. After

the democratic regime was installed in 1976, the United States con- tinued to be Spain's predominant partner in military cooperation,

in spite of that country's growing involvement with France and

with other West European countries. Between 1982 and 1986, the

value of arms shipments to Spain from the United States totaled

US$725 million. France was the second ranking supplier (US$310

million), and West Germany was third (US$50 million).

As of 1988, there were 12,000 United States military personnel

in Spain, at four major bases and at several smaller communications and navigation facilities. The legal status of the American

military personnel and their dependents was governed by status of forces accords that were similar to the standard NATO status of forces agreements. One of the major bases was the naval complex at Rota near Cadiz, northwest of the Strait of Gibraltar, which

provided fuel and ammunition storage facilities for American forces.

It was also a naval air base supporting antisubmarine warfare and

ocean surveillance operations. Rota was the site of a United States Defense Communications System (DCS) terminal tied to a number of radar and microwave stations throughout Spain, with fur- ther linkage to DCS sites elsewhere in the Mediterranean, that

remained in continuous contact with the United States Sixth Fleet. The United States shared with Spain the use of three airbases:

Torrejon, just east of Madrid; Zaragoza, in northeast Spain; and

Moron, near Seville (Spanish, Sevilla) in southwest Spain. Torrejon

321
Spain: A Country Study

was the headquarters of the Sixteenth Air Force of United States Air Forces, Europe (USAFE). A tactical fighter wing of seventytwo F-16 aircraft at Torrejon was rotated to other USAFE airbases

at Aviano, Italy, and at Incirlik, Turkey. Torrejon was, in addition, a staging, reinforcement, and logistical airlift base.

Zaragoza was the base for a detachment of five United States

aerial refueling aircraft, and it also was used by USAFE as a tacti- cal fighter training base. It was located near Spain's Bardenas

Reales firing range, where gunnery and bombing techniques could

be practiced. Moron served as a support base for units of USAFE,

including a detachment of fifteen aerial refueling aircraft. Torrejon, Zaragoza, and Moron were built initially as bases for Strategic Air Command (SAC) B-47 bombers, which had a rela- tively limited range. After the B-47s were phased out, SAC no

longer needed the bases, but they continued to serve useful functions for airlift, communications, resupply, rear basing, and fighter

training in conjunction with the NATO obligations of the United

States. As the time approached in 1987 for the renegotiation of the

existing base agreement, which had entered into force in 1983 for a five-year period, pressures mounted for a reduction of the United

States military presence in Spain. Communist political groups and

elements of the PSOE had campaigned against the bases. Moreover,

the base agreement had become a symbol of United States cooperation with the former Franco regime. It was important to many

Spaniards to eliminate vestiges of this history by converting Spain's

long-standing bilateral relations with the United States into a multilateral undertaking through NATO. According to a poll taken

in early 1987, 53 percent of Spanish citizens regarded the bases

as prejudicial to the security and the defense of Spain, and 47 per- cent thought they should be removed.

The outcome of the 1986 referendum on membership in NATO

committed Gonzalez to negotiate the reduction of the United States military presence in Spain. Gonzalez insisted that the wing of

seventy-two F-16 aircraft be removed from Torrejon as a condition for renewal of the base agreement, and he threatened to expel

all United States forces in Spain if this demand were not accepted.

His stand was considered unduly inflexible by the United States and inconsistent with an earlier Spanish commitment that the level of security would be left intact. The United States felt that Spain,

the military contribution of which was minimal, was permitting

domestic factors to dictate a weakening of NATO defenses. Even

though Italy subsequently agreed to station the F-16 wing on its

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territory, the cost of transfer would be high, and the unit would

be in a more exposed position. In January 1988, Spain and the United States announced jointly

that agreement had been reached in principle on a new base agree- ment with an initial term of eight years, essentially meeting the

conditions demanded by Spain. The F-16 fighter wing was to be

removed from Torrejon within three years, by mid- 1991. It was

expected that this step would reduce the number of United States personnel in Spain by nearly one-half.

Use by the United States of the bases in Spain for non-NATO

purposes was a matter requiring Spanish approval, which was not

likely to be forthcoming unless the mission had Spain's endorsement. In keeping with its policy of avoiding involvement in the

Arab-Israeli dispute, Spain withheld diplomatic clearance for the

United States to use the bases to resupply Israel during the October 1973 Arab-Israeli War. Gonzalez reportedly was approached

indirectly regarding the possible use of the Spanish bases and overflights of Spain in connection with the United States raid on Libya

in April 1986. His negative response necessitated a long detour

over international waters by the aircraft flying from British bases.

One of the American fighter-bombers was forced to make an emer- gency landing at Rota, however. Gonzalez defended the landing

as consistent with the provisions of the base agreement, in spite

of the criticism that it evoked in Spain.

Public Order and Internal Security

The transition from Franco's dictatorship to a system of parliamentary democracy was accompanied by a major effort to bring

the forces of law and order and the justice system into harmony

with the new political era. The police were stripped of most of their

military characteristics. The Civil Guard, which maintained order

in rural areas and in smaller communities, retained many of its military features, but both the Civil Guard and the police were

placed under civilian leadership. Once dedicated to repressing all evidence of opposition to the Franco regime, the police and the

Civil Guard were expected to tolerate forms of conduct previously

banned and to protect individual rights conferred by the 1978 Constitution and by subsequent legislation. Members of the Civil Guard

continued to be implicated in cases of mistreatment and brutality

in the campaign against Basque terrorism. The authorities had,

however, prosecuted many guardsmen for such infractions, with

the result that by 1988 fewer violations of legal norms were being

recorded.

323
Spain: A Country Study

Reforms of the judicial system included appointments ofjudges

by a body insulated from political pressures and increased budgets to enable courts to deal with a chronic backlog of criminal hearings. The penal code was being modernized to bring it into

conformity with the new Constitution. Some progress had been

made in ensuring that defendants had effective legal representation and that they received speedier trials. Nevertheless, antiquated

procedures and the escalation of crime continued to generate huge

delays in the administration ofjustice, with the result that as much

as half of the prison population in 1986 consisted of accused per- sons still awaiting trial. The Police System

The principal forces of public order and security as of 1988 were

the Civil Guard and the National Police Corps (Cuerpo Nacional

de Policia). The Civil Guard, fortified by nearly a century and a

half of tradition, was a highly disciplined paramilitary body with

close links to the army. As it evolved, it served mainly as a rural

police to protect property and order and to reinforce the authority

of the central government. Under Franco, a tripartite system of

police was formalized: the Civil Guard in rural areas; the Armed

and Traffic Police (renamed the National Police in 1979), which

fulfilled normal police functions in communities with a population

of more than 20,000; and the Higher Police Corps of plainclothes

police with responsibility for investigating crimes and political offenses. Separate municipal police forces under the control of local mayors were concerned mainly with traffic control and with en- forcement of local ordinances.

During the Franco era, the police had been regarded as a reac- tionary element, associated in the public mind with internal sur- veillance and political repression. The Civil Guard and the Armed

and Traffic Police were legally part of the armed forces, and their

senior officers were drawn from the army. The 1978 Constitution

effects the separation of the police from the military, and it emphasizes that one of the functions of the police is to safeguard personal

liberties. Article 104 of the 1978 Constitution states that,

' 'The

Security Corps and Forces, responsible to the Government, shall have as their mission the protection of the free exercise of rights

and liberties and the guaranteeing of the safety of citizens."

Although considerably delayed, a subsequent statute, the Organic

Law on the Security Corps and Forces, was enacted in March 1986

to incorporate the mandate of the Constitution to redefine the functions and the operating principles of the police forces. With its passage, the final legal steps had been taken to make the police system

324
National Security

conform to the requirements of the democratic regime, although

most observers concluded that it would be years before the reforms were fully in effect. The new organic law provided a common ethical code for police

practices, affirmed trade union rights, recast the role of the judicial police serving under the courts and the public prosecutors, combined the uniformed and the nonuniformed police into the single

National Police Corps, and redefined the missions and the chains

of command of the various police elements. The Civil Guard

remained a separate paramilitary force, although in operational matters it was under the direction of the Ministry of Interior rather

than the Ministry of Defense. In time of war or emergency, it would

revert to the authority of the minister of defense. In 1986 a new

post of secretary of state for security was created in the Ministry

of Interior to coordinate the activities of the National Police Corps

and the Civil Guard. The National Police Corps functioned under

the directives of the director general of the National Police Corps,

but local supervision was exercised by civil governors of the

provinces where police forces served (see fig. 18).

The Civil Guard

Patterned after the French rural gendarmerie when it was formed

in 1844, the Civil Guard has long maintained its own traditions

and style of operation. Until the first civilian director general of

the Civil Guard was installed in 1986, its head had been an army

lieutenant general. The total complement of the Civil Guard as of 1986 was 65,000; in addition, about 9,000 auxiliary guardsmen

performed their military service obligation in the Civil Guard.

The Civil Guard was grouped into six zones, matching the six army regions, each commanded by an army brigadier general.

These were divided, in turn, into commands coinciding with provincial boundaries and further subdivided into about 300 companies,

800 lines {lineas) corresponding to platoons, and about 3,200 posts.

A post typically consisted of six to ten guardsmen, headed by a

corporal or a sergeant. Posts were responsible for organizing twomember patrols to police their areas, generally by automobile. To

deploy forces more flexibly, this traditional system had been augmented by radio-controlled mobile patrols of three or more members. A separate traffic group patrolled the main roads to assist in cases of breakdown or accident. A Rural Antiterrorist Group

of four companies, stationed in the Basque Country (Spanish, Pais

Vasco; Basque, Euskadi) and Navarre (Spanish, Navarra), concentrated its efforts against Basque extremists. This force could be

supplemented by a helicopter unit and by a Special Intervention

325
Spain: A Country Study

MINISTER OF

INTERIOR

SECRETARY OF

STATE FOR SECURIP

DIRECTOR GENERAL

OF THE NATIONAL

POLICE CORPS

INTELLIGE

CRIMINAL

INVESTIGATION r

PERS(

DOCUMENTS 1

FINANCIAL MAN- AGEMENT AND

INFRASTRUCTURE RECRUITMENT AND TRAINING

CIVIL SECURI

SPECIAL OPERATIONS GROUP

(GEO)* REGIONAL HEADQUARTERS (13)

PROVINCIAL HEADQUARTERS (50)

MUNICIPAL HEADQUARTERS (190)

DISTRICT HEADQUARTER!

IUNICI

POLI'

PROMOTIONS,

ASSIGNMENTS,

Mil ITARY MINISTER OF DEFENSE

DIRECTOR GENERAL

OF THE CIVIL GUARD

DEPUTY

DIRECTOR GENERAL

(ADMINIS- TRATION, PERSONNEL,

SOCIAL

ACTION)

DIRECTOR,

TRAINING

DIRECTOR,

LOGISTICS

CHIEF OF

STAFF

DIRECTOR,

CIVIL PROTECTION

RURAL ANTI- TERRORIST GROUP

TRAFFIC GROUP

FISCAL SERVICE

MARITIME SERVICE

SPECIAL INTERVENTION

UNIT HELICOPTER

UNIT

MOUNTAIN

UNITS

SECURITY

POLICY COUNCIL

ZONES (6) 1

IEGIONAI POLICE

COMMANDS (50)

\

*GEO

LINES OF COMMAND

LINES OF COORDINATION GRUPO ESPECIAL OPERACIONES

COMPANIES (300)

I LINES (800) POSTS (3,200)

I .

Source: Based on information from Ian R. MacDonald, "The Police System of Spain,"

in Police and Public Order in Europe, John Roach and Juergen Thomaneck (eds.), London, 1985, 215-54.

Figure 18. Organization of Police Services, 1988

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National Security

Unit as needed. Mountain Units guarded the Pyrenees frontier

against terrorists and smugglers, in addition to providing general

police and rescue services.

The Civil Guard generally enjoyed greater popularity than other

police elements, in part because of its reputation for courtesy and

helpfulness to motorists. Nevertheless, it had not completely shed

its earlier reputation as the primary instrument of the Franco

regime's efforts to root out and crush any evidence of opposition.

Numerous cases of torture and ill treatment were attributed to members of the Civil Guard, especially in the handling of suspected

Basque dissidents (see Criminal Justice and the Penal System, this ch.). The persistence of reactionary tendencies was underscored

by the participation of a senior officer of the Civil Guard, Lieutenant Colonel Antonio Tejero Molina, in the dramatic coup

attempt of 1981, backed by nearly 300 guardsmen who made

prisoners of cabinet ministers and deputies of the Cortes (see The

Military in Political Life, this ch.).

Most members of the Civil Guard were housed with their families on compounds that formed part of the stations from which they

operated. A high proportion of recruits were the sons of guards- men. Entrance was at the age of sixteen years or seventeen years, when recruits began a two-year course at one of two "colleges"

or, alternatively, at ages nineteen to twenty-four at the other col- lege where the course was of eleven months duration. Promotion

to officer rank was possible after fourteen years of service. A

minority of officers gained direct commissions by attending the

General Military Academy at Zaragoza for two years, where they

followed the regular military cadet curriculum. After an additional

three years at the Special Academy of the Civil Guard at Aranjuez,

these cadets entered the service as lieutenants.

Under the 1986 organic law, the Ministry of Interior was assigned

responsibility for operational matters, pay, assignments, accommodations, and equipment. The Ministry of Defense was responsible for promotions, military missions, and wartime mobilization.

Recruitment, training, weapons, deployment, and conduct of the

system whereby compulsory service could be performed in the Civil

Guard were matters ofjoint responsibility. The regulations introduced in early 1988 enabling women to serve in certain categories

of the armed forces also cleared the way for eventual recruitment

of women into the Civil Guard.

The 1986 law set out a new functional division of responsibilities between the Civil Guard and the National Police Corps. In

addition to its rural police functions, the Civil Guard was to be

responsible for firearms and explosives control; traffic policing on

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Spain: A Country Study

interurban roads; protection of communication routes, coasts, frontiers, ports, and airports; enforcement of environmental and conservation laws, including those governing hunting and fishing; and

interurban transport of prisoners.

The National Police Corps

The 1986 organic law unifying the separate uniformed and plainclothes branches of the national police was a major reform that

required a considerable period of time to be brought into full effect. The former plainclothes service, known as the Higher Police Corps,

but often referred to as the '' secret police," consisted of some 9,000

officers. Prior to 1986, it had a supervisory and coordinating role in police operations, conducted domestic surveillance, collected

intelligence, investigated major crimes, issued identity documents,

and carried out liaison with foreign police forces. The uniformed service was a completely separate organization

with a complement of about 50,000 officers, including a small number of female recruits who were first accepted for training in 1984.

The Director General of the National Police Corps, a senior offi- cial of the Ministry of Interior, commanded 13 regional headquarters, 50 provincial offices, and about 190 municipal police stations. In the nine largest cities, several district police stations served

separate sections of the city. The chief of police of each station was

in command of both the uniformed and the plainclothes officers attached to the station. A centrally controlled Special Operations

Group (Grupo Especial de Operaciones—GEO) was an elite fighting unit trained to deal with terrorist and hostage situations.

The principal weapons regularly used by the uniformed police were 9mm pistols, 9mm submachine guns, CETME and NATO

7.62mm rifles, and various forms of riot equipment. The uniform

consisted of light brown trousers and dark brown jackets.

The initial training phase for recruits to the National Police Corps was nine months, followed by a year of practical training. Promotions to corporal, sergeant, and sergeant major were based on

seniority, additional training, and performance. In the Franco era, most police officers were seconded from the army. Under a 1978

law, future police officers were to receive separate training, and army

officers detailed to the police were to be permanently transferred.

By 1986 only 170 army officers remained in the National Police

Corps. Under the 1986 organic law, military-type training for police was to be terminated , and all candidate officers were to attend the

Higher Police School at Avila, which previously had served as the

three-year training center for the Higher Police Corps. The ranks

of the plainclothes corps—commissioners, subcommissioners, and

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National Security

inspectors of first, second, and third class —were to be assimilated

into the ranking system of the uniformed police—colonel, lieutenant

colonel, major, captain, and lieutenant. Two lower categories

subinspection and basic—would include all nonofficer uniformed

personnel. The newly unified National Police Corps was to be

responsible for issuing identity cards and passports, as well as for immigration and deportation controls, refugees, extradition, deportation, gambling controls, drugs, and supervision of private security forces. Franco's Armed and Traffic Police had once been dreaded as one of the most familiar symbols of the regime's oppressiveness.

During the 1980s, however, the police effected an internal trans- formation, adopting wholeheartedly the new democratic spirit of

the times. The police unwaveringly supported the legally constituted

government during the 1981 coup attempt. Led by the new police

trade union, the police demonstrated in 1985 against right-wing

militants in their ranks and cooperated in efforts to punish misconduct and abuses of civil rights by individual officers. Other Police Forces Although their powers were, in most cases, quite limited, the

local police services of individual towns and cities supplemented

the work of the National Police Corps, dealing with such matters

as traffic, parking, monitoring public demonstrations, guarding

municipal buildings, and enforcing local ordinances. They also col- laborated with the National Police Corps by providing personnel

to assist in crowd control. Numbering about 37,000 individuals

in 1986, the local police were generally armed only with pistols.

Under the Statutes of Autonomy of 1979, the Basque Country

and Catalonia were granted authority to form their own regional

police forces. Subsequently, ten of the seventeen autonomous

regions were extended the right to create their own forces, but,

as of 1988, only three areas—the Basque Country, Catalonia, and

Navarre—had developed regional police units. The 1986 organic

law defined the limits of competence for regional police forces,

although the restrictions imposed did not apply to the existing forces in the Basque Country and Navarre and applied only in part to those in Catalonia. Under the law, regional police could enforce

regional legislation, protect regional offices, and, in cooperation

with national forces, could police public places, control demonstrations and crowds, and perform duties in support of the judiciary.

A Security Policy Council was established at the national level to ensure proper coordination with the new regional forces, which,

as of 1986, numbered about 4,500 officers.

329
Spain: A Country Study

Intelligence Services

The principal intelligence agency was the Higher Defense Intel- ligence Center (Centro Superior de Informacion de la Defensa

CESID), created in 1977 to replace the intelligence organizations

of the Francoist period. These included the Political- Social

Brigade—a special branch of the plainclothes corps—and th£ Intel- ligence Service of the Civil Guard. With their files on every part

of the rural and urban population, these bodies carried on close surveillance and political intimidation on behalf of the Franco

regime.

By a royal decree ofJanuary 1984, CESID was defined legally as the intelligence agency of the prime minister. Nevertheless, it was fundamentally military in nature, and its head in 1988 was

an army lieutenant general, Emilio Alanso Manglano. Observers

speculated, however, that Manglano, who had held the post since

1981, eventually would be succeeded by a civilian. Employing about 2,000 individuals as of 1988, CESID was staffed primarily by the military, supplemented by 500 members of the

Civil Guard and by 80 plainclothes police. About 30 percent of

the members of the staff were civilians, said to be selected usually

from among close relatives of military officers. Women had been

confined largely to administrative tasks, but they were increasingly

being entrusted with operational assignments.

The principal operating units were domestic intelligence; for- eign intelligence; counterintelligence; economics and technology

(primarily industrial espionage); and operational support (principally application of devices for surveillance and eavesdropping).

Considerable emphasis in external intelligence was allotted to North

Africa and to the security of Ceuta and Melilla. Liaison was maintained with a number of intelligence services of North African and

Middle Eastern nations, as well as with the Israeli agency, Mossad.

Interception of ship transmissions in the strait area was another

focus of activity. Domestic intelligence centered on exposure of plots

against the government, monitoring activities of unrecognized politi- cal parties, and counterterrorism.

Although CESID was the senior agency, it did not have a firmly

established coordinating function over other intelligence bodies,

which included the General Headquarters of Information of the

Ministry of Defense; the second sections of the army, the air force,

and the navy staffs; and the Civil Guard Information Service, dedicated to criminal and terrorist intelligence. In addition, the National

Police Corps had a General Commissariat of Intelligence, with an

antiterrorist mission that included a Foreign Intelligence Brigade

330
National Security

to investigate international terrorism aimed against Spain. Considerable rivalry and overlapping of missions characterized the entire

intelligence system. CESID, in particular, was reported to be seeking to gain exclusive jurisdiction over police foreign intelligence

activities. Criminal Justice and the Penal System

Spain's criminal justice system, which is based on Roman law,

extends customary procedural safeguards to accused persons. Article 17 of the 1978 Constitution prohibits arbitrary arrest and imprisonment. It also provides that there be a maximum period of

preventive detention (set by law at seventy-two hours), and that

the arrested person be informed of his or her rights, including the

right to an attorney, the right to an explanation of the reason for the arrest, and the right to be present at the trial. The Constitution abolishes the death penalty, except for certain military crimes

in wartime. Under the Socialist government that took office in 1982,

laws were passed providing for a limited right of habeas corpus

for suspects to appeal against illegal detention or mistreatment.

Defendants unable to afford counsel were assured of free legal assis- tance. A Public Defender's Office was formed that had authority

to look into complaints by citizens and to initiate investigations.

Trial by jury, which had been abolished by Franco, was part of

the Socialist electoral program, but its introduction was delayed

by differences with the judiciary as to the precise role the jury would

play.

A full-scale revision of the Penal Code was being prepared in

the late 1980s, but a number of significant changes had already

taken effect. The principle of suspended sentences was introduced.

Pollution of the environment was made a crime, and distinctions were introduced between hard and soft narcotics in sentencing illicit producers and dealers. Earlier provisions of law that had legalized

the possession of small quantities of soft drugs were reaffirmed.

After the Civil War, crimes involving the security of the state were handled outside the regular court system. From 1941 until

1963, military courts had sole charge of all crimes against national

security, in many cases through summary courts martial. Offenses

ranging from treason and sabotage to the fostering of strikes and

membership in illegal associations came under the jurisdiction of

military courts. In 1963 Franco created the three-judge civilian

Court for Public Order to deal with all nonterrorist internal security offenses, such as belonging to illegal parties and distributing

antigovernment propaganda. In 1968, however, and again in 1975,

after intensified terrorist action, various crimes were added to the

331
Spain: A Country Study

state security category, restoring them to military jurisdiction. In

1980 the charging or the trying of civilians by military courts was

prohibited.

Antiterrorist laws adopted in 1980 and in 1981, in response to a wave of killings by Basque terrorists, had the effect of suspending certain constitutional guarantees. Anyone charged with supporting terrorism could be held virtually incommunicado for up

to ten days (later reduced to three days). A suspect's home could

be searched, his mail opened, and his telephone tapped. A detainee

in a terrorism case had the right to an appointed attorney who could

formally advise him of his rights, and who might be present during his interrogation, but who could not consult with the detainee

until the interrogation was completed.

The international human rights group, Amnesty International,

Spanish civil rights organizations, and the Spanish press have drawn

attention to abuses of these exceptional powers given to police under

the antiterrorism laws. In several of its annual reports, Amnesty

International has said that detainees were not accorded access to counsel while in custody, that few were actually charged with crimes,

that habeas corpus rights were not respected, and that insufficient

judicial and medical supervision was exercised. The organization's

claims of widespread mistreatment and torture, mainly of alleged

members of Basque terrorist organizations, were supported by the

annual reports on human rights of the United States Department

of State. The Spanish government asserted, for its part, that

detainees under the antiterrorist laws routinely lodged complaints

of police brutality or torture, whether or not there was cause. Nevertheless, in 1986 the courts sentenced thirty-nine members

of security forces for mistreatment of prisoners, and an estimated

150 additional cases were pending.

One of the most persistent problems of the judicial system was

the delay in bringing cases to trial. As of 1986, these delays aver- aged eighteen months for minor offenses and between two and four

years for serious crimes. In 1980, in an effort to curb the growing

incidence of crime, bail was made available only for those accused

of crimes for which the penalty was six months or less. By 1983

the large number of prisoners awaiting trial obliged the government to introduce a law raising to two years the maximum time

that an accused could be held pending trial on a minor charge and

to four years, on a serious charge.

Spanish statistics reflected increases of 5 to 10 percent annually

in the incidence of crime during the late 1970s and the 1980s. For- eign tourists in particular were frequent victims of armed and violent robberies. The rise was attributed largely to the economic and

332
National Security

social problems of urban areas where recent high-school and col- lege graduates faced unemployment rates often in excess of 20 per- cent (see The Unemployment Problem, ch. 3). The growing

problem of drug addiction also contributed to the number of robberies in cities and in resort areas. Over 90 percent of all crimes reported in 1986 were offenses

against property. The next most significant crimes—against per- sons and internal security as well as the abandonment of family

and personal injury—each contributed only between 1 and 2 per- cent to the total. Despite liberal laws in this area, the number of

persons arrested on narcotics charges rose from about 9,000 in 1980

to nearly 22,000 in 1987. Nevertheless, in Spain as a whole, the

official crime rate continued to be lower than it was in most other

countries of Western Europe.

The prison population as of 1987 consisted of 17,643 individuals, of whom 1,486 were women. Of the total, about 7,700 were

serving sentences, and nearly 9,000 were detained pending trial. An additional 7,200 were inmates of other correctional institutions

and halfway houses. Many complaints of overcrowding and inadequate medical attention had in the past been leveled against prison

conditions. A series of riots between 1976 and 1978 had been provoked in major part by the crowding and by delays in sentencing.

Under the Franco government, periodic amnesties had helped to reduce pressures from the expanding prison population. The ban

in the 1978 Constitution against such amnesties had led to a buildup

that necessitated an ambitious construction and renovation program. As a result, by 1984, one-third of existing prisons had been

built in the previous five years, and many others had been modernized. Prisons, which numbered forty-seven in 1987, were located

in most of the main population centers. The largest prisons by far were in Madrid and in Barcelona, each of which had inmate populations of more than 2,000. None of the others housed more than

800 prisoners.

Although in a 1978 report a committee of the Spanish Senate

(upper chamber of the Cortes) had severely criticized the treatment

of inmates, subsequent evidence indicated considerable improvement. The International Red Cross was permitted to inspect prison

conditions whenever it desired. It reported that facilities were satis- factory in the majority of cases, and it described Yeserias Women's

Prison in Madrid, where female militants of the Basque movement

were held, as a model for the rest of the world. There were several

open prisons from which inmates were allowed to return to the

community for specified periods. Conjugal visits were allowed

333
Spain: A Country Study

on a limited basis. Rehabilitation facilities were said to be almost

nonexistent, however.

Threats to Internal Security

During the Franco regime, a wide spectrum of opposition groups

carried on antigovernment and, in some cases, terrorist activities. Nevertheless, these movements were successfully contained by the

authorities, who were determined to crush all forms of independent political expression. Most of the dissident activity abated with

the introduction of a democratic system that extended legal recognition to hitherto banned political groups, including the Communist

Party of Spain (Partido Comunista de Espafia—PCE). The legitimacy of separatist movements was recognized by granting partial

regional autonomy, which included legislatures with powers of taxation, policing, and education (see Regional Government, ch. 4). As a consequence of these policies, political opposition groups

presented no imminent threat to Spain's stability as of 1988,

although the activities of Basque extremists continued to present a danger to the forces of internal security. The Basque terrorist movement did not, however, enjoy the active support of the majority

of the Basque population, and it appeared to be in decline as a

result of an increasingly effective police campaign.

The radical movement of Basque separatists was organized in

1959 when the group known as Basque Fatherland and Freedom

(Euskadi Ta Askatasuna—ETA) broke away from the much larger

Basque Nationalist Party (Partido Nacionalista Vasco—PNV). The

ETA adopted a policy of armed struggle in 1968; in practice, much

of the violence was attributed to an extremist faction, the ETA Military Front (ETA Militar—ETA-M). A less violent faction, the ETA

Political-Military Front (ETA Politico-Militar—ETA-PM), pursued a strategy of mixing political activities with terrorist actions.

The ETA-M was largely responsible for the mounting savagery

of the attacks during the 1970s, which included the assassination

of the prime minister, Admiral Luis Carrero Blanco, in 1973.

The election of a democratic national parliament in 1977 and

a Basque parliament in 1980 brought little relief from ETA violence. Although avowedly socialist in orientation, ETA continued

to justify its terrorist policies after the Socialist government came

to power in 1982. It insisted that the PSOE was only a pawn of

the capitalist and clerical forces that dominated Spain and that it had failed to offer real autonomy to the Basque people.

The ETA-M was considered to be the militant wing of Popular

Unity (Herri Batasuna—HB), the most radical of three Basque

334
National Security

parties represented in the Cortes (see Political Parties, ch. 4). Although the HB increased its representation in the Cortes to five seats in 1986, it still received only 17 percent of the Basque vote. The party's platform included the compulsory teaching of the

Basque language, Euskera, in the schools; the withdrawal of Spanish

security forces from Basque territory; measures to restrict private

capital; and the addition of Navarre to the three provinces of the

north that constituted the existing autonomous community of the

Basque Country. As its ultimate objective, the party favored complete independence from Spain.

ETA-M's strategy had been to carry out a series of carefully

selected assassinations and bombings, each having important psychological or symbolic impact. The terrorists thus hoped to inspire a spiral of violence and counterviolence that would arouse feeling

against "repression" by the security forces and that would perhaps

provoke a right-wing coup by the armed services. A total of more

than 700 deaths had been attributed to the movement by the close

of 1987. The violence had reached its peak in 1980 when the death

toll was eighty-five. Nearly two-thirds of those killed were members of the Civil Guard or the National Police Corps. Most of the

remainder were civilians killed in bombings or caught in crossfire. The military represented only 7 percent of the deaths, but those

selected for assassination were often senior officers holding prominent positions.

The activists of ETA-M, believed to number no more than 200

to 500 in 1986, were organized into cells of as few as 5 individuals.

Most members were under thirty years of age, and they had served

for an average of three years in this sideline to their ordinary jobs.

Perhaps no more than 100 were actual gunmen, the others acting

as messengers, transporting weapons and explosives, and providing support. A number of young women also served in ETA-M;

they were said to be among the most uncompromising militants,

willing to take risks that young men increasingly shunned.

By the mid-1980s, ETA-M appeared to be under growing pres- sure from the security forces, with the result that the incidence of

terrorist acts had tapered off. Better use of informants, ambushes,

raids, and tighter control of the border with France contributed

to the success of the police efforts. In 1984 the Spanish government had announced a policy of "social integration," a form of

amnesty offered to ETA members in exile or in Spanish jails if they

renounced future acts of terrorism. Improved international cooperation was also important. In 1986 about 200 active terrorists were

believed to be living among the large Basque population in the adja- cent provinces of France, using French territory as sanctuary and

335
Spain: A Country Study

as a base for terrorist missions. Two years later, their numbers had

been reduced to a few dozen as a result of intensified cooperation

between Spanish and French security authorities. Until 1983

France, citing its tradition of granting political asylum, had been

unwilling to extradite ETA members to Spain, France shifted to a more accommodating policy, after the new Socialist government

took office in Spain, and permited the extradition of a few ETA

members, accused of specific crimes of violence, while resettling

others in northern France or deporting them. In late 1987, the police

claimed a crippling blow had been administered to the terrorists by the arrest of many senior members of ETA-M in both Spain

and France and the discovery of caches of arms and explosives.

Sympathy among Basques for the extremists, which was already

limited, diminished further following the bombing in 1987 of a supermarket garage in Barcelona, in which twenty-four innocent

people were killed. Later in the same year, there was popular revul- sion over the deaths of five children among eleven people killed

in a bombing of family quarters of the Civil Guard at Zaragoza.

Beginning in late 1983, a right-wing force, the Antiterrorist

Liberation Group (Grupo Antiterrorista de Liberacion—GAL),

began a campaign of revenge killings and bombings among sus- pected ETA terrorists, chiefly in France, where GAL was widely

believed to be linked to the Civil Guard. At the same time, an off- shoot of ETA-M, Spain Commando, targeted members of the Civil

Guard and the armed forces in Madrid, where such attacks, which

gained maximum publicity for the movement, had been on the rise. ETA-M was at one time well financed by kidnappings, robberies, and the so-called " revolutionary tax" on Basque businessmen.

Reportedly, however, after the reverses suffered by the terrorists in 1987, receipts from the tax had declined almost to zero. The regional Basque police force, Ertzaintza, formed in 1981,

originally was assigned to traffic and other nonsecurity duties, but

in late 1986 it conducted its first engagement against ETA-M. A

plan had been adopted for Ertzaintza gradually to take a larger

role, but it was reported that Civil Guard officers were reluctant

to turn over intelligence out of conviction that the autonomous police were infiltrated by ETA activists. Other regional opposition groups—in the Canary Islands,

Galicia, and Catalonia—did not present a threat to internal security forces that was comparable to ETA. The Catalan separatist

organization Terra Lliure (Free Land), formed in 1980, was responsible for a series of bomb explosions, some of which had resulted

in fatalities. In late 1987, a United States servicemen's club in Barcelona was attacked with grenades, and the United States

336
National Security

consulate was bombed. Terra Lliure and a newer group, the Catalan Red Liberation Army, both claimed responsibility. During the

first part of 1987, a group dedicated to a separate Galician nation,

the Free Galician Guerrilla People's Army, carried out bomb attacks against banks in a number of towns in Galicia.

* * * An official Spanish publication, Ministerio de Defensa: Memoria

Legislatura, 1982-86, provides an authoritative explanation of the

sweeping changes undertaken during the 1980s in the structure of

national defense, defense policy, organization of the armed ser- vices, personnel and training policies, and modernization of equipment. The role of the armed forces under Franco, the strained

relations between military and civil authorities during the transition to democracy, and the government's successful efforts to intro- duce its reform measures are reviewed in a study by Carolyn P. Boyd and James M. Boyden included in Politics and Change in Spain,

edited by Thomas D. Lancaster and Gary Prevost. Briefer accounts covering the same topics can be found in John Hooper's The

Spaniards: A Portrait of the New Spain and Robert Graham's Spain:

A Nation Comes ofAge. Analyses by several scholars of Spanish security concerns, relating to the North African enclaves, Gibraltar,

and the implications of Spain's membership in NATO, can be

found in Spain: Studies in Political Security edited by Joyce Lasky Shub

and Raymond Carr. An article by Victor Alba also addresses the

domestic political and military factors bearing on Spanish entry

into NATO. Strategic considerations of Spanish participation in the defense of Europe are weighed in a study by Stewart Menaul,

The Geostrategic Importance of the Iberian Peninsula. The uncertainties

arising from the special conditions of Spain's adherence to NATO

are emphasized in "Spain in NATO: An Unusual Kind of Participation," by Carlos Robles Piquer. The changes in the character of the Spanish police services and the Civil Guard are detailed

in two articles by Ian R. MacDonald. In Spain and the ETA: The

Bid for Basque Autonomy, Edward Moxon-Browne provides background on an internal security problem that has troubled Spain

for many years. (For further information and complete citations, see Bibliography.)

337

Appendix

Table

1 Metric Conversion Coefficients and Factors

2 Selected Election Results for the Congress of Deputies, 1977-86

3 Total Population and Annual Growth Rates, Census Years,

1860-1981

4 Area, Population, and Density of the Autonomous Communities and Provinces in the Mid-decennial Census of April 1

,

1986

5 Population of Principal Cities in the Mid-decennial Census

of April 1, 1986

6 Number of Foreign Tourists and Earnings from Tourism,

Selected Years, 1960-87

7 Selected Crops, 1985-87

8 Fishing Industry Catches, 1984-86

9 Selected Mineral Production, 1986-87

10 Composition of Foreign Trade, 1981 and 1987

1 1 Total Spanish Foreign Trade and Trade with Selected Partners, 1982-86

12 Foreign Investment in Spain by Country, 1982-87

13 Autonomous Communities and Dates of Approval of Statutes of Autonomy

14 Selected Regional Parties

15 The Thirty Daily Newspapers with the Largest Circulations

in 1987

16 Major Army Equipment, 1987

17 Major Naval Equipment, 1988

18 Major Air Force Equipment, 1987

339

Appendix

Table 1. Metric Conversion Coefficients and Factors When you know Multiply by To find

Millimeters > 0.04 inches Centimeters 0.39 inches Meters 3.3 feet Kilometers 0.62 miles Hectares (10,000 m2 ) 2.47 acres Square kilometers 0.39 square miles Cubic meters 35.3 cubic feet Liters 0.26 gallons Kilograms 2.2 pounds

Metric tons 0.98 long tons

1.1 short tons 2,204 pounds

Degrees Celsius 9 degrees Fahrenheit

(Centigrade) divide by 5 and add 32

341
Spain: A Country Study

Table 2. Selected Election Results for the Congress of Deputies, 1977-86

1977 1979

Party Valid Votes Percentage Party Valid Votes Percentage UCD . 6,337,288 34.61 UCD 6,292,102 35.02 PSOE . 5,358,781 29.27 PSOE 5,477,037 30.49 PCE . 1,718,026 9.38 PCE . . . 1,940,236 10.80 AP . 1,525,028 8.33 CD . . . 1,070,721 5.96 CiU 514,647 2.81 CiU 483,446 2.69 PNV 314,409 1.72 PNV . . . 275,292 1.53 EE 60,312 0.33 HB 172,110 0.96 EE 85,677 0.48

Party \ 7_i: J \ Valla Votes Percentage Party Valla Votes Percentage PSOE .... . 10, 127, 392 48.4 roUr- . . . O OOT 1 A K

. . . O,oo/,J40 44.3 AP 5,409,229 25.9 CP . . . 3, 245,396 26.2 UCD 1,425,248 6.8 CDS ... 1,862,856 9.3 AP/UCD * 139,148 0.6 CiU ... 1,012,054 5.0 PCE 846,440 4.0 IU . . . 930,223 4.6 CiU 772,726 3.7 PNV . . . 308,991 1.5 CDS 604,293 2.9 HB ... 231,558 1.2 PNV 395,656 1.9 EE 106,937 0.5 HB 210,601 1.0 EE 100,326 0.5 AP—Popular Alliance. CD—Democratic Coalition (led by AP). CDS—Democratic and Social Center. CiU—Convergence and Union Party. CP—Popular Coalition (led by AP). EE—Basque Left. HB—Popular Unity.

IU—United Left (leftist alliance dominated by PCE).

PCE—Communist Party of Spain.

PNV—Basque Nationalist Party. PSOE—Spanish Socialist Workers' Party. UCD—Union of the Democratic Center.

* These parties formed an alliance in three Basque provinces for the 1982 elections.

Table 3. Total Population and Annual Growth Rates, Census Years, 1860-1981

Annual Annual

Census Growth Census Growth

Year Population Rate Year Population Rate 1860 15,655.467 0.34 1950 27,976,755 0.81 1910 19,927,150 0.72 1960 30,903,137 0.88 1920 21,303,162 0.69 1970 33,823,918 0.94 1930 23,563,867 1.06 1981 37,746,260 1.15 1940 25,877,971 0.98

Source: Based on information from John Paxton (ed.), The Statesman's Year-Book, 1989-1990, New York, 1989, 1114.

342
Appendix

Table 4. Area, Population, and Density of the Autonomous

Communities and Provinces in the Mid-decennial Census of April 1, 1986

Autonomous Area Inhabitants Community (in square Per Square

Province kilometers) Population Kilometer Andalusia 87,268 6,875,628 79 Almeria 8,774 448,592 51 Cadiz 7,385 1,054,503 143 Cordoba 13,718 745,175 54 Granada 12,531 796,857 64 Huelva 10,085 430,918 43 Jaen 13,498 633,612 47 Malaga 7,276 1,215,479 167

Seville 14,001 1,550,492 111 Aragon 47,669 1,214,729 25 Huesca 15,671 220,824 14 Teruel 14,804 148,073 10 Zaragoza 17,194 845,832 49

Asturias 10,565 1,114,115 105

Balearic Islands 5,014 754,777 151 Basque Country 7,261 2,133,002 294 Alava 3,047 275,703 90 Guipuzcoa 1,997 688,894 345 Vizcaya 2,217 1,168,405 527 Canary Islands 7,273 1,614,882 222 Las Palmas 4,065 855,494 210

Santa Cruz de Tenerife 3,208 759,388 237 Cantabria 5,289 524,670 99

Castilla La Mancha 79,226 1,665,029 21 Albacete 14,858 342,278 23 Ciudad Real 19,749 477,967 24 Cuenca 17,061 210,932 12 Guadalajara 12,190 146,008 12 Toledo 15,368 487,844 32

Castilla y Leon 94,147 2,600,330 28

Avila 8,048 179,207 22 Burgos 14,269 363,530 25 Leon 15,468 528,502 34

Palencia 8,029 188,472 23 Salamanca 12,336 366,668 30

Segovia 6,949 151,520 22

Soria 10,287 97,565 9 Valladolid 8,202 503,306 61 Zamora 10,559 221,560 21 Catalonia 31,970 5,977,008 187 Barcelona 7,773 4,598,249 592 Gerona 5,886 490,667 83 Lerida , . 12,028 356,811 30 Tarragona 6,283 531,281 85 Extremadura 41,602 1,088,543 26 Badajoz 21,657 664,516 31 Caceres 19,945 424,027 21 Galicia 29,434 2,785,394 95 LaCorufia 7,876 1,102,376 140

343
Spain: A Country Study

Table 4. —Continued

Autonomous Area Inhabitants Community (in square Per Square

Province kilometers) Population Kilometer Lugo 9,803 399,232 41 Orense 7,278 399,378 55 Pontevedra 4,477 884,408 198 Madrid 7,995 4,854,616 607 Murcia 11,317 1,014,285 90 Navarre 10,421 512,676 49 La Rioja 5,034 262,611 52 Valencia 23,305 3,772,002 162

Alicante 5,863 1,254,920 214

Castellon 6,679 437,320 65 Valencia 10,763 2,079,762 193

Source: Based on information from John Paxton (ed.), The Statesman 's Year-Book, 1989-1990, New York, 1989, 1114-1115.

344
Appendix

Table 5. Population of Principal Cities in the Mid-decennial Census of April 1, 1986

City Population City Population

Albacete 127,169

Alicante 265,543 Almeria 156,838 Badajoz 126,340

Barcelona 1,694,064

Bilbao 378,221 Burgos 163,910 Caceres 79,342 Cadiz 154,051 Cartagena 168,809

Castellon 129,813 Cordoba 304,826 La Coruna 241,808 Gerona 67,578 Granada 280,592 Huelva 135,427

Jerez de la Frontera 180,444 Jaen 102,826 Leon 137,414 Lerida 111,507 Logrono 118,770 Lugo 77,728 Madrid 3,123,713 Malaga 595,264 Murcia 309,504

Orense 102,455 Oviedo 190,651

Palencia 76,707 Palma de Mallorca 321,112 Las Palmas de Gran

Canaria 372,270 Pamplona 183,703 Salamanca 166,615 San Sebastian Santa Cruz de Tenerife Santander

Santiago de Compostela

Seville Tarragona

Valencia

Vailadolid

Vitoria

180,043 211,389

188,539

104,045 668,356

109,557 738,575 341,194

207,501 Zaragoza 596,080

Source: Based on information from John Paxton (ed.), The Statesman's Year-Book, 1989-1990, New York, 1989, 1115-1116.

Table 6. Number of Foreign Tourists and Earnings

from Tourism, Selected Years, 1960-87

Earnings Number of Tourists (in millions of Year (in millions) United States dollars) 1960 6.1 350

1965

.

14.3 1,105 1970 24.1 1,681 1975 30.1 3,404 1980 38.0 6,968 1982 42.0 7,126 1984 43.0 7,717 1986 47.4 12,058 1987 50.5 14,760

Source: Based on information from Spain, Ministerio del Portavoz del Gobierno, Spain, 1989, Madrid, 1989, 141.

345
Spain: A Country Study

Table 7. Selected Crops, 1985-87

(in thousands of tons)

Crop 1985 1986 1987 Almonds 287 221 250 Bananas 402 471 410

Barley 10,698 7,431 9,602 Cabbages 546 465 421 Corn 3,414 3,423 3,555 Grapes 5,450 5,788 6,181 Lemons 482 619 584 Mandarins 1,051 1,164 1,133 Oats 680 433 503

Olive oil 429 533 710 Onions 1,249 1,166 1,104 Oranges 1,968 2,135 2,359

Potatoes 5,927 5,125 5,379 Rice 463 496 490 Rye 273 220 320 Sugar beets 6,619 7,746 7,908 Tomatoes 2,429 2,400 2,347 Wheat 5,329 4,392 5,768

Source: Based on information from Europa World Year Book, 1989, 2, London, 1989, 2336.

Table 8. Fishing Industry Catches, 1984-86

(in thousands of tons)

Type of Catch 1984 1985 1986

116.8 103.3 118.3 Cephalopods

54.1 51.5 45.9

26.1 23.6 66.6 Cod varieties 35.5 38.3 54.6 Cape hake . , 119.0 136.4 147.9 European hake 55.1 46.3 42.3 Blue whiting 25.2 26.6 35.7 Mackerel varieties Atlantic horse mackerel 34.0 34.1 44.7

19.4 16.1 23.4

20.9 '19.4 15.8 257.1 229.0 173.2 Tuna varieties 17.5 21.4 22.1 57.2 58.5 65.5 57.9 83.3 79.6 TOTAL (incl. others) 1,337.7 1,337.7 1,303.5

* Estimates of the Food and Agriculture Organization. Source: Based on information from Europa World Year Book, 1989, 2, London, 1989, 2337.

346
Appendix

Table 9. Selected Mineral Production, 1986-87

(in thousands of tons, net metal content)

1986 1987

4.7 1

1

1

1

278 196

2,778 2,042 80 78

1,491 1,612 1,195 992 Tin * 281 71 373 380 Wolfram * 564 64

223 225

* in tons. Source: Based on information from John Paxton, (ed.), Statesman's Year-Book, 1989-1990, New York, 1989, 1120.

Table 10. Composition of Foreign Trade, 1981 and 1987

(in billions of pesetas)

Trade Items 1981 1987 Imports

Capital goods 419.0 1,432.8 Consumer goods 278.1 1,193.6 Food 258.1 606.5

Fuels 1,259.6 986.5 Raw materials 334.2 508.8

Semi-finished products 421 .5 1,301.6 Total imports 2,970.5 6,029.8 Exports

Capital goods 296.3 617.3 Consumer goods 476.4 1,324.0 Food 347.0 739.8

Fuels 99.1 260.7 Raw materials 61.9 156.1 Semi-finished products 607.6 1,097.8 Total exports 1,888.3 4,195.7

Source: Based on information from Spain, Ministerio del Portavoz del Gobierno, Spain, 1989, Madrid, 1989, 150.

347
Spain: A Country Study

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348
Appendix

Table 12. Foreign Investment in Spain by Country, 1982-87

(in billions of pesetas)

Percentage of Total Foreign

Investment, Country 1982 1984 1986 1987 1982-87

1.0 3.4 11.5 33.5 3 10.3 20.7 28.0 45.4 8

8.0 15.6 25.1 50.1 10

Italy 2.0 4.3 25.3 67.1 7 Japan 3.5 15.6 9.9 33.3 5 16.3 18.4 30.5 122.5 13 Switzerland 35.4 22.5 21.1 61.0 11 United States 42.3 35.0 32.1 40.1 14 West Germany 18.9 26.9 104.5 26.8 14 Others 24.7 75.4 52.0 60.5 17 TOTAL 162.4 237.8 340.0 540.3 100 *

* Figure does not add to total because of rounding. Source: Based on information from Mark Hudson and Stan Rudcenko, Spain to 1992: Joining Europe's Mainstream, Special Report No. 118, Economist Intelligence Unit, London, 1988, 112.

Table 13. Autonomous Communities and Date of Approval of

Statutes of Autonomy

Autonomous Community Approval Date Basque Country December 18, 1979

Catalonia December 18, 1979

Galicia April 6, 1981 Andalusia December 30, 1981

Asturias December 30, 1981 Cantabria December 30, 1981 La Rioja June 9, 1982 Murcia June 9, 1982 Valencia July 1, 1982 Aragon August 10, 1982

Castilla La Mancha August 10, 1982 Canary Islands August 10, 1982 Navarre August 10, 1982 Extremadura February 25, 1983

Balearic Islands February 25, 1983 Madrid February 25, 1983

Castilla y Leon February 25, 1983

349
Spain: A Country Study

Table 14. Selected Regional Parties Name of Party Ideology Year Founded Basque Left (Euskadiko Ezkerra—EE) leftist 1976 Basque Nationalist Party (Partido Nacionalista Vasco—PNV) center-right 1894 Basque Solidarity (Eusko Alkartasuna—EA) . . radical independentist 1986 Canary Independence Association (Agrupacion

Independiente Canaria—AIC) independentist 1986 Republican Left of Catalonia (Esquerra moderate left 1931 Convergence and Union (Convergencia i Unio—CiU) center-right 1979

Galician Coalition (Coalicion Galega—CG) . . reformist 1985

leftist 1978

Regionalist Aragonese Party (Partido Aragones

Regionalista—PAR) center- right 1977 Union of the Navarrese People (Union del Pueblo Navarro—UPN) social Christian 1979

350
Appendix

Table 15. The Thirty Daily Newspapers with the Largest Circulations in 1987

Newspaper Place of Publication Average Circulationin 1987 El Pais . . Madrid and Barcelona 373,000

ABC . . Madrid and Seville 247,000

. Barcelona 201,000 As . . Madrid 157,000 El Periodico . Barcelona 154,000 Marca . Madrid and Seville 144,000

Diario 16 . Madrid and Seville 136,000 El Correo Espanol-El Pueblo Vasco . . Bilbao 123,000 La Voz de Galicia . La Corufia 82,000

El Diario Vasco . San Sebastian 81,000

Ya . Madrid 75,000

. Valencia 56,000 El Mundo Deportivo . Barcelona 55,000

Sport . Barcelona 50,000

Deia . Bilbao 50,000

Heraldo de Aragon . Zaragoza 49,000

Diario de Navarra . Pamplona 43,000

. Hernani 41,000

. Murcia 40,000

Avui . Barcelona 39,000 La Nueva Espana . Oviedo 36,000 El Faro de Vigo • Vigo 32,000

Sur . Malaga 32,000 La Provincia -

. Las Palmas de Gran Canaria 32,000

. Alicante 31,000

. Cadiz 28,000

. Valencia 27,000

. Palma de Mallorca 26,000 El Diario Montanes . Santander 26,000

Ideal . Granada 26,000

Source: Based on information from Ramon Tamames (ed.), El Pais Anuario, 1989, Madrid,

1989, 200.

351
Spain: A Country Study

Table 16. Major Army Equipment, 1987

Country of Number in Type and Description Manufacture Inventory Tanks AMX-30E France/Spain 300 M-47E United States 380 M-48A5E -do- 164 M-41 -do- 127 Armored vehicles M-113 armored personnel carriers -do- 1,196 BMR-600 six-v/heeled infantry combat vehicles Spain 510 AML-60 reconnaissance vehicles France 60 AML-90 light armored cars -do- 80

Self-propelled guns and howitzers 105mm M-108 howitzers United States 48 155mm M-109A howitzers -do- 96 175mm M-107 -do- 12 203mm M-55 howitzers -do- 4 Towed Artillery 105mm M-26 and M-56 pack United States 810 122mm 122/46 Spain 188 155mm M-114 United States 84 155mm M-44 -do- 12 203mm M- 115 -do- 24

Multiple Rocket Launchers

Teruel 140mm Spain 12 L-21 216mm -do- 16 Mortars: 81mm, 107mm, 120mm various 1,200 Antitank weapons 106mm recoilless rifles United States 500 M-65 88.9mm rocket launchers -do- 42 Milan, Cobra, Dragon, HOT, and TOW missiles .... France and

United States 130 Air defense weapons 20mm, 35mm, 40mm, and 90mm guns various 364

Nike, Hercules missiles United States 9 Improved Hawk -do- 24 Roland France n.a. Aspide Italy n.a. Helicopters

Bell UH-1 B/H (utility) United States 69 CASA-MBB HA-15 (attack; reconnaissance) Spain/West

Germany 70 AB-206A; AB-212 (training; utility) Italy 9 OH-58B (transport) United States 12 CH-47 Chinook (transport) -do- 18

n.a. —not available. Source: Based on information from the International Institute for Strategic Studies, The

Military Balance, 1987-88, London, 1987, 75.

352
Table 17. Major Naval Equipment, 1988

Appendix

Type and Description Origin Number

Date Commissioned

Aircraft carriers Dedalo (eight Harriers; eight helicopters) . United States 1 1967 (to be

Principe de Asturias (six-eight Harriers retired) (V/STOL); eight helicopters) Spain 1 1988 Submarines

Agosta class Spain/France 4 1983-86 Daphne class

v -do- 4 1973-75

Destroyers Gearing class United States 5 1945

Fletcher class -do- 3 1943-44

Roger de Lauria Spain 1 1959

Frigates FFG-7 class -do- 3 1986-88 F-70 Baleares -do- 5 1973-76

Corvettes Atrevida class -do- 4 1954-60

Descubierta class -do- 6 1978-82

Fast attack craft, missile armed -do- 12 1975-78

Patrol craft, various types -do- 79 various Minesweepers

Aggressive class (ocean) United States 4 1953-54

Adjutant class (coastal) -do- 8 1956-59 Amphibious

Paul Revere class LPA 1 -do- 2 1958-61 Cabildo class LSD 2 -do- 1 1945 Landing craft, various types Spain and

United States 35 various

Helicopters AB-212 (command; reconnaissance) .... Italy 12 n.a. Sea King (antisubmarine) United States 13 n.a. Hughes 500M (antisubmarine) -do- 11 n.a.

n.a. —not available.

1 Amphibious Personnel Transport.

2 Landing Ship, Dock. Source: Based on information from the International Institute for Strategic Studies, The

Military Balance, 1987-88, London, 1987, 76; and Jane's Fighting Ships, 1987-88, London, 1987, 461-75.

353
Spain: A Country Study

Table 18. Major Air Force Equipment, 1987

Country of Number in Type and Description Origin Inventory

Fighter-bomber-interceptors

F-4C and RF-4C Phantoms United States 36 Mirage HIE and HID (trainer) France 30 Mirage Fl -do- 63 F-18 Hornets United States 24

(on order) 48 Ground attack SF-5 Spain (assembly) 52 Maritime reconnaissance Orion P-3A United States 6 Fokker F-27 Netherlands 3 Transport C-130 Hercules United States 5 KC-130 (aerial refueling) -do- 6 CASA C-212 Aviocar Spain 82 DHC-4 Caribou United States 12

Utility Do-27 West Germany 49 Training Beech T-34A Mentor United States 24 Beech F-33A Bonanza -do- 8 CASA C-101 Spain 40

Helicopters

Aerospatiale SA-319A Alouette III France 6 Aerospatiale SA-330 Puma -do- 6 Aerospatiale AS-332B Super Puma Spain (assembly) 12 Agusta/Bell 205, 206 Italy 17 Hughes 269A United States 17

Bell CH-47 Chinook -do- 25

Source: Based on information from the International Institute for Strategic Studies, The

Military Balance, 1987-88, London, 1987, 76-77.

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384
Glossary

Council of Europe—Founded in 1949 to foster parliamentary

democracy, social and economic progress, and unity among

its member states. Membership is limited to those European

countries that respect the rule of law and the fundamental

human rights and freedoms of all those living within their

boundaries. As of 1988, its membership consisted of twenty- one West European countries.

European Community (EC—also commonly called the Community)—The EC comprises three communities: the European

Coal and Steel Community (ECSC), the European Economic

Community (EEC, also known as the Common Market), and

the European Atomic Energy Community (EURATOM). Each

community is a legally distinct body, but since 1967 they have

shared common governing institutions. The EC forms more

than a framework for free trade and economic cooperation: the

signatories to the treaties governing the communities have

agreed in principle to integrate their economies and ultimately

to form a political union. Belgium, France, Italy, Luxembourg,

the Netherlands, and the Federal Republic of Germany (West

Germany) are charter members of the EC. Britain, Denmark,

and Ireland joined on January 1, 1973; Greece became a member on January 1, 1981; and Portugal and Spain entered on

January 1, 1986.

European Currency Unit (ECU)—Instituted in 1979, the ECU is the unit of account of the EC (q.v.). The value of the ECU

is determined by the value of a basket that includes the currencies of all EC member states. In establishing the value of

the basket, each member's currency receives a share that reflects the relative strength and importance of the member's economy.

In 1988 one ECU was equivalent to about one United States

dollar. European Economic Community (EEC)—See EC.

European Free Trade Association (EFTA)—Founded in 1961,

EFTA aims at supporting free trade among its members and

increasing the liberalization of trade on a global basis, but particularly within Western Europe. In 1988 the organization's

member states were Austria, Finland, Iceland, Norway,

Sweden, and Switzerland.

Gross domestic product (GDP)—The total value of goods and ser- vices produced by the domestic economy during a given period,

385
Spain: A Country Study

usually one year. Obtained by adding the value contributed

by each sector of the economy in the form of profits, compensation to employees, and depreciation (consumption of capital). Most GDP usage in this book was based on GDP at factor

cost. Real GDP is the value of GDP when inflation has been

taken into account. Gross national product (GNP)—Obtained by adding GDP (q. v. ) and the income received from abroad by residents less payments remitted abroad to nonresidents. GNP valued at market prices was used in this book. Real GNP is the value of GNP

when inflation has been taken into account.

International Monetary Fund (IMF)—Established along with the

World Bank (q. v.) in 1945, the IMF is a specialized agency

affiliated with the United Nations that takes responsibility for stabilizing international exchange rates and payments. The

main business of the IMF is the provision of loans to its members when they experience balance-of-payment difficulties. These loans often carry conditions that require substantial in- ternal economic adjustments by the recipients.

Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development

(OECD)—Established in 1961 to replace the Organisation for European Economic Co-operation, the OECD is an international organization composed of the industrialized market econ- omy countries (twenty-four full members as of 1988). It seeks

to promote economic and social welfare in member countries

as well as in developing countries by providing a forum in which

to formulate and to coordinate policies.

peseta—Basic Spanish currency unit. Consists of 100 centimos, but

these are no longer in legal use. In terms of the United States

dollar, the exchange rate averaged 60 pesetas in 1965, 56 pesetas

in 1975, 79 pesetas in 1980, 126 pesetas in 1982, 173 pesetas

in 1984, 154 pesetas in 1985, 134 pesetas in 1986, 107 pesetas

in 1987, and 113 pesetas in 1988.

VAT—Value-added tax. A tax applied to the additional value

created at a given stage of production and calculated as a per- centage of the difference between the product value at that stage

and the cost of all materials and services purchased as inputs.

The VAT is the primary form of indirect taxation applied in

the EEC (q.v.), and it is the basis of each country's contribution to the community budget.

World Bank—Informal name used to designate a group of three

affiliated international institutions: the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD), the International

Development Association (IDA), and the International Finance

386
Glossary

Corporation (IFC). The IBRD, established in 1945, has the

primary purpose of providing loans to developing countries for productive projects. The IDA, a legally separate loan fund administered by the staff of the IBRD, was set up in 1960 to fur- nish credits to the poorest developing countries on much easier

terms than those of conventional IBRD loans. The IFC, founded in 1956, supplements the activities of the IBRD through

loans and assistance designed specifically to encourage the

growth of productive private enterprises in less developed countries. The president and certain senior officers of the IBRD

hold the same positions in the IFC . The three institutions are owned by the governments of the countries that subscribe their

capital. To participate in the World Bank group, member states must first belong to the IMF (q.v.).

387

Index

Abbasids, 9 Abd al Krim, 31 Abd al Rahman, 9 Abd al Rahman III, 9

abortion, xxxi, 68, 78, 108, 253 Acenor (steel company), 176

Africa, North (see also Maghreb), 6, 12-13; potential threat of, 291;

presence of Spain in, 54, 270-72

agreements: with Allies in WW II, 50-51

;

Basel agreement on EC currency, 203; Concordat with Vatican, 52, 111-12, 252-53; Economic and Social Agree- ment, 156; for limited U. S. military presence, 236-37; Lisbon Agreement

(1980), 269; nonintervention in Civil War, 39; Pact of Madrid (U. S. mili- tary bases), 52, 140, 169, 173, 265-66,

284, 291; preferential trade agreement

(1970) with EC, 52-53, 202, 262

agricultural sector (see also land ownership;

latifundio system; minifundios): along Rio

Guadalquivir, 76; arable land of, 156-

57; economic performance of, xxviii, 141, 158-60; employment in, 148; migration from, xxix-xxx; regional vari- ation in, 161-62

airbases, xxxiv, 237, 266-67, 298, 304,

317, 321-22

aircraft industry, 313-14

air force (Ejercito del Aire), 280, 302-4, 317

airline companies, 174, 194

airports, 194 Air Transport Command (Mando Aereo

de Transporter MATRA), 303 Al Andalus (Islamic Spain), 9-10, 13 Alava Province, 83

Alegria, Diego, 286 Alexander IV (pope), 16 Alfonso XII (king of Spain), 29

Alfonso XIII (king of Spain), 30, 32

Algeciras (port), 168 Al Mansur (Ibn Abi Amir), 9-10 Almeria Province, 97, 163 Almohads, 13 Almoravids, 12-13

Altos Homos del Mediterraneo, 176

Altos Homos de Vizcaya, 176 Amadeo of Savoy, 28 Amnesty International, 332 Ampurias, 5 Andalusia, 6, 20; agriculture of, 162; as autonomous region, 80-82, 97-99, 223; health care responsibility of, 130 Andalusian Plain, 70, 74, 77 Andalusians, 80, 87, 97-99

Andorra, 11, 69, 73 Anguita, Julio, xxxv, 241

anticlericalism, xxxi, 27, 47-48

Anti-Comintern Pact, 50

antiterrorist activity, xxxvii-viii, 233,

328, 320-32, 335-36

Antiterrorist Liberation Group (Grupo

Antiterrorista de Liberation: GAL),

336 AP. See Popular Alliance (Alianza Popular: AP)

Arab-Israeli War (October 1973), 323

Arabs, 8-13, 15, 272

Aragonese, 79 Aragon, 11-15, 81 Argentina, 86, 201, 268

Arias Navarro, Carlos, 49, 55

the Armada, 19, 281 Armada Comyn, Alfonso, 287 Armed and Traffic Police (see also National

Police), 324, 329 armed forces (see also Joint Chiefs of Staff (Junta de Jefes de Estado Mayor:

JUJEM); military sector): Blue Division in WW II, 50, 284; constitutional provisions for, 211; first organization

of, 281; Organic Laws pertaining to, 293, 295; reorganization and reform of, xxxiv, 256, 281; support by Franco

regime of, 255; women in, 309 arms industry, 313-14 army (see also officer corps): at end of Civil War, 279, 281, 286; equipment of, 299-300; organization of, 296-98; reac- tionary faction of, 207; reorganization

of, 284-85, 296; Spanish Legion in, 299; troop strength of, 298

artillery forces, 297-98 389
Spain: A Country Study

assassinations, xxxii, 49, 115, 208, 233, 334-36

Assault Guards, 38

Astilleros Espafioles, SA (AESA), 179

Asturians, 79

Asturias, 10-11, 81, 172 Ataulf (Visigoth king), 7 Atlantic Ocean: as boundary, 69; Canary

Islands in, 74; coastal trade of, 13; fish- ing in, 168

Atlas Mountains, 77 Augustus (Roman emperor), 6

autarchy, xxviii, 140, 173 automobile industry. See motor vehicle assembly industry autonomous communities, xxxvi, 60, 79-80, 130; administration and powers of, 224-26; court system of, 224;

elections in, 213, 223, 245; elements of

central control of, 223-25; political parties in, 245 Aviation y Comercio (AVIACO), 174, 194

Aviles (port), 194 Avion Experimental: AX, 314 Azana, Manuel, 33-36, 37 Aznar, Jose Maria, xxxv

Azores, 16

Aztecs, 17

balance of payments, 199

Balboa, Vasco Nunez de, 17 Balearic Islands, 11, 69-70, 74, 90, 92;

agriculture in, 162, 163; military role

of, 296, 298, 317; as tourist area, 195-96 bank credit, 143 banking industry (see also credit institu- tions), 186; private banks of, 187; sav- ings banks of, 188-89; as special

interest group, 251 Bank of Spain, 187, 203 Bank Reform Law (1962), 187 Barcelona, 11-12, 21; during Civil War,

36, 37, 283-84; as industrial region,

172; migration to, 82-84; Olympic

Games (1992), 201; as port, 194; in War of Spanish Succession, 21 Barcelona Province, 90 Bardenas Reales, 322

Barnes, Samuel, 104-5

Basel agreement (on EC currency), 203

Basic General Academy of Noncommissioned Officers (Academia General Basica de Suboficiales: AGBS), 310

Basic Law on Local Government (Ley

Reguladora de las Bases de Regimen

Local: LRBRL), 226 Basque Country: as autonomous region,

80-81, 89, 94-97, 223, 228, 334; as

industrial region, xxvii, 173; police

force of, xxxvii, 329; political parties in, 245 Basque Fatherland and Freedom (Euskadi

Ta Askatasuna: ETA), xxxvii, 48-49,

233, 237, 334; ETA Political-Military Front, 245, 334; Military Front (ETA

Militar: ETA-M), 233, 245, 334-36 Basque (Euskera) language, xxxv, 67, 88-89, 97, 335 Basque Left (Euskadiko Ezkerra: EE), 245 Basque Nationalist Party (Partido Nacionalista Vasco: PNV), xxxv, 153, 209, 233, 245, 249, 334 Basque Republic, 37

Basques, xxxvi, 5, 79-80, 87, 95, 222; ter- rorism of, xxxvi-xxxviii, 58, 60, 208, 232-33, 235, 237, 287, 332, 334-36 Basque Solidarity (Eusko Alkartasuna: EA), 245

Basque Workers' Solidarity (Eusko Langil- leen Alkartasuna-Solidaridad de

Trabajadores Vascos: ELA-STV), 153, 155, 249 Bay of Biscay, 69, 73, 74, 79, 94, 96, 128

Berbers, 8-10, 12, 31-32

Berenguer, Ramon, 11 Bilbao (port), 194

birth control, 78

birth rate, 78 Black Sea, 12 Bonaparte, Joseph (king of Spain), 23 Bonaparte, Napoleon, 22-23, 282

boundaries, 69-70, 73

Brazil, 16

Britain, 39 Brotherhood of Spanish Priests, 252 budget deficits, 144

business interest groups, 250-51

cabinet. See Council of Ministers Cadena de Ondas Populares Espanolas:

COPE, 259 390
Index

Cadiz, 5, 24-25, 168 Cadiz Province, 97, 228

Caliphate of Cordoba, 9-10 Calvo Sotelo, Jose, 36 Calvo Sotelo, Leopoldo, 61, 264, 266 Canary Islands, 16, 69-70, 74, 168, 223;

agriculture in, 162, 163; military role

of, 296, 298, 299, 300, 302, 303, 316,

318; as tourist area, 196 Canary Islands Air Command (Mando

Aereo de Canarias: MACAN), 303

capital, foreign. See investment, direct foreign

Carlists, 26, 36; civil wars of, 282; militia

of, 39 Carrero Blanco, Luis, 49, 115, 334

Carrillo, Santiago, 62, 240-41 Cartagena (port), 194

Carthage, 5-6

Castellon Province, 163

Castile, 11, 15; economic and social struc- ture of, 13-14; exploration and settle- ment by, 16-17

Castilians, 79

Castilian Spanish, 67, 87-89, 223

Castilla-La Mancha: as autonomous

region, 80-82; land erosion in, 157

Castilla y Leon (autonomous region), 80-82

Castro Ruz, Fidel, 268

Catalan language, 67, 88-90, 92

Catalans, xxxvi, 79, 87, 222

Catalonia, 5, 11, 13-14, 20, 21, 90; agriculture of, 161; as autonomous

region, 80-81, 89-90, 92, 223; civil war

in, 40; health care responsibility of, 130; as industrial region, xxvii, 172;

police force of, 329; political parties in, 245; in War of Spanish Succession, 21 Catholic Action, 252

Catholic Action Workers' Brotherhood (Hermandad Obrera de Accion Catolica: HOAC), 152

Catholics. See Roman Catholic Church

CCOO. See Workers' Commissions (Comisiones Obreras: CCOO)

CDS. See Democratic and Social Center

(Centro Democratico y Social: CDS)

CEDA. See Spanish Confederation of the Autonomous Right (Confederacion Es- panola de Derechas Autonomas: CEDA)

Celtiberians, 4-5

Celts, 4

censorship, 257

Central America, 268-69

central bank (Bank of Spain), 138, 187, 203

Central University, 122 Ceuta (city enclave), 54, 69, 208, 228,

264, 270-72, 288, 291, 296, 299

Charles I (king of Spain), 1

7

Charles II (king of Spain), 20 Charles III (king of Spain), 22 Charles IV (king of Spain), 22-23

Charles V (Holy Roman emperor), 17 Charter of Rights (1945) (fundamental

law), 42 chemical industry, 179-80

Chief of the Defense Staff Qefe del Estado Mayor de la Defensa: JEMAD), 279,

288, 295-96

Christianity (see also Inquisition; Reconquest; Roman Catholic Church): efforts to regain control, 10-11; in Islamic Spain, 9-10, 13; in Roman Empire, 6, 7-8; in Spain, 15 Churchill, Winston, 51 Citroen Hispania, 178

citrus crops, 158, 161, 162-63

Civil Guard (Guardia Civil), 38, 61, 98, 281, 287, 323-25; Intelligence Service

of, 330; organization and functions of, 325, 327-28

civil service: reforms in, xxxii; resistance

to change of, 207, 228-29

civil unrest, 36, 47-49, 222, 232-33, 235

Civil War (1936-39), 3, 36-40; communists in, 240; effect of, xxvii, 139-40, 158, 169; Nationalist and

Republican forces in, 283-85; nonintervention agreement concerning, 39

class structure, 103-5

climate, 69, 76-77 CNT. See National Confederation of Labor (Confederacion Nacional del Trabajo: CNT)

coal industry, 174-75, 181, 184-85

coastal regions, 74, 161, 163

Collective Bargaining Law (Ley de Con- venes Colectivos) (1958), 152 Columbus, Christopher, 16-17 Committee for Communist Unity (Mesa

para Unidad de los Comunistas:

MUC), 241 Committee on Constitutional Affairs, 209 391
Spain: A Country Study

communications (telephone and tele- graph), 194-95 Communist Party of Spain (Partido

Comunista de Espafia: PCE), 35, 56-57, 155; decline of, 62; development

and role of, 240-42; as force in labor movement, xxxiv, 153, 155, 248; legali- zation of, xxxiii, 255-56, 286, 334; opposition to NATO membership by, 316; splinter groups of, 241 Communist Party of Spain: MarxistLeninist (Partido Comunista de Espafia: Marxista-Leninista: PCE-ML),

241 Communist Party of the Peoples of Spain

(Partido Comunista de los Pueblos de

Espafia: PCPE), 241 Compama Arrendataria del Monopolio

de Petroleos (CAMPSA), 139, 183-84 Complutense University, 122 Concordat with Vatican, 52, 111-12, 252-53 Condor Legion, 39

Confederation of United Workers' Unions

(Confederation de Sindicatos Unitarios de Trabajadores: CSUT), 249 Congress of Deputies. See Cortes

conscription, 308-9

Constituent Law of the Cortes (1942) (fundamental law), 42

constitution (see also laws, fundamental): under Alfonso XII, 29-30; of First Republic, 28

Constitution (1978), 60; dissemination of information under, 257; drafting of, 58, 60, 208-10; establishes regional autono- mous governments, xxxvi, 67-68, 80, 207, 212, 222-23; prohibition of ar- bitrary arrest, 331; provisions for armed forces in, 293; provisions for Council of State in, 220; provisions for General Council of the Judiciary, 221;

provisions for king in, 216-19; provisions of, xxxii, 210-12; religious free- dom under, 112; rights of unions in, 246-47; rule of law in, 207, 208; separation of church and state under, xxxi, 253, 279; separation of military and

police under, 324; tolerance for ethnic

differences in, 87-88, 223

Constitutional Committee of the Cortes,

58, 223

Constitutional Court, 221, 225

Construcciones Aeronauticas (CASA),

174,314

construction industry, 180 Contadora Group, 268-69

contraception, 68, 78, 107-8, 111 Convergence and Union (Convergencia

i Unio: CiU), xxxv, 245

conversos, 15-16, 19 Coordinating Committee for Multilateral Export Controls (COCOM), 314

Cordillera Cantabrica, 70, 73, 74, 290 Cordoba Province, 97

Cortes: composition and functions of, 213-16; elements and effect of, 24-25

Cortes, Hernando, 17 Council of Europe, 262 Council of Ministers, 219-20

Council of State, 220

Council of the Indies, 17, 18 coup d'etat: attempted (1981), xxxvii, 61, 223, 256, 281, 287; by military (1936), 36

court system, 220-22, 224, 311, 331-32 CP. See Popular Coalition (Coalition

Popular: CP)

credit institutions, 186 crime rate, 332-33

criminal justice (see also military justice), 331-34

crops, 162-66; citrus, 162-63; diverse areas of, 157-58, 160-61; permanent,

157 Cros, 179 Cuba, 25, 30, 268, 283

cuerpos (civil service), 228-29

currency: depreciation of, 141; devaluation of, xxviii, 170; participation in EMS of, xxix, 203-4

current account receipts, 199

dairy industry, 167

decentralization (see also autonomous communities), xxxvi, xxxviii, 58, 207, 222;

military's objection to, xxxvi, 287

defense budget. See spending, defense Defense Communications System (DCS),

U.S., 321

defense industrial base, 313-14

defense production. See defense industrial base

del Campo, Salustiano, 104 392
Index

Democratic and Social Center (Centro

Democratico y Social: CDS), xxxvxxxvi, 235, 236, 243-44

Democratic Coalition (Coalition Democratica: CD), 242 Democratic Military Union (Union Militar Democratica: UMD), 286

democratic transition, xxvii, xxxii-xxxiii, 54-62, 255-56

Democratic Reformist Party (Partido Reformista Democratico: PRD), 244

Democrats, 27, 28

Deposit Guarantee Fund, 187 d'Hondt system of proportional representation, 212-13

Directorate General for State Assets (Di- rection General del Patrimonio del Estado: DGPE), 146-47, 173, 189

disease, 68-69, 124-26

divorce, xxxi, 68, 78, 108-10, 111, 253 Don Carlos {see also Carlists), 26 DPGE. See Directorate General for State Assets (Direction General del Patrimonio del Estado: DGPE)

drought, 77, 156

Ebro Basin, 70, 74; agriculture in, 162;

precipitation in, 76 EC. See European Community (EC)

Economic and Social Agreement, 156 economic assistance {see also Pact of Madrid), 143; exclusion from Marshall

Plan, 46, 51, 169; from United States, 46, 51-52, 140 economic performance, xxvii-xxviii, 46-47, 137; after Civil War and World

War II, 139-40; of Basque region, 96;

crisis in, 58; effect of link to EC on,

xxix; as outcome of Stabilization Plan,

46, 142-43, 159, 169-70; post-Franco,

xxix, 143-46, 170; recession in, 155, 171-72 economic policy {see also Moncloa Pacts):

to develop high-technology industries, 174; government intervention in, 173; reform measures of, xxix, 140; of socialist government, xxix, xxxiii, 144, 231-32; Stabilization Plan (1959),

xxviii, 46, 142-43, 159, 169, 200 economic system: disparities in, xxx, 81;

feudal, 13-14; transformation of, xxvii, 67, 141-43

education: constitutional provisions for, 212; higher, xxx, 121-23; of military

personnel, 309-11; one-year program

(Curso de Orientation Universitaria: COU), 119-20; primary (Education General Basica: EGB), 119, 121; role of Opus Dei in, 254; secondary (Bachil- lerato Unificado Polivalente: BUP),

119; vocational (Formation Professional: FP), 119-20

educational system {see also General Law

on Education (Ley General de Education: LGE)): achievements of, 117-18;

expenditures for, 116; primary and

secondary schools in, 118-21; ratio of

public to private schools in, 116-17; reforms in, xxxi, xxxiv, 68, 117, 232;

role of Roman Catholic Church in, xxxi, 116, 121, 237, 253; structure of, 118-23; university system of, 121-23 EFE news agency, 258-59 EFTA. See European Free Trade Association (EFTA)

Eisenhower, Dwight D., 52

electoral system, 56, 212-13

electricity {see also coal industry; hydroelectric power; nuclear power; thermal

power), 184-86

electronics industry, 313

El Escorial, 18

Elliot, J. H., 15

El Salvador, 268

emigration, xxix, 67, 82, 85-87, 106, 142, 159; to Cuba, 30 Employment Promotion Programs, 150 Empresa National Bazan de Construcciones Navales Militares (Bazan), 179, 313 Empresa National de Autocamiones S.A.: ENASA (Pegaso), 313 Empresa National del Gas (ENAGAS),

184 Empresa Nacional de Santa Barbara de

Industrias Militares (Santa Barbara),

175, 313 Empresa Nacional Hulleras del Norte (HUNOSA), 174-75, 184 Empresa Nacional Siderurgica (ENSIDESA), 175, 176 energy resources, 182-86

Enlightenment, 22 environmental issues, 126-28

Episcopal Conference, 252 393
Spain: A Country Study

Escriva de Balaguer y Albas, Jose Maria,

115, 254

Estes, Richard, 124 ETA. See Basque Fatherland and Free- dom (Euskadi Ta Askatasuna: ETA)

ETA-M. See Basque Fatherland and Free- dom (Euskadi Ta Askasuna: ETA)

ETA-PM. See Basque Fatherland and Free- dom (Euskadi Ta Askasuna: ETA)

ETA Military Front (ETA Militar: ETAM). See Basque Fatherland and Freedom

(Euskadi Ta Askasuna: ETA)

ETA Political-Military Front (ETA Polfti- co-Militar: ETA-PM). See Basque

Fatherland and Freedom (Euskadi Ta

Askasuna: ETA)

ethnic groups, 67, 87-88, 222; constitutional provisions for, 212 European Coal and Steel Community

(ECSC), 176 European Community (EC): Ceuta and

Melilla as part of Spain in, 271-72; Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) of, 161, 203, 263; exclusion of Spain from,

52-53, 262; final integration into (1992), 201; integration process into, 198, 201-

4, 262-63; membership of Spain in, xxix, 138, 176, 202-3, 208, 233-34;

preferential trade agreement with

(1970), 52-53, 202, 262; requirement to abandon state-owned enterprises by,

184; standards for foreign investment, 200-201; trade with, 199-200 European Currency Units (ECUs), 203 European Free Trade Association (EFTA),

142 European Monetary Cooperation Fund,

203 European Monetary System (EMS), xxix, 203 Euskera (Basque) language, xxxvi, 67, 88-89, 96-97, 335 exchange rate system, 169

exports, xxviii, 198-99; of arms, 314; of

automobiles, 176-77; of foodstuffs, 158, 160, 162, 164, 199; of manufactured

products, 199; of raw materials, 199 Extremadura, xxix, 81, 166, 168

Fabrication de Automoviles, SA (FASA,

Renault), 177 Falange party, 37, 44, 45, 46, 50

Falkland Islands (Malvinas), 268

family structure, 67, 68, 108-10

Federation of Iberian Anarchists (Federation Anarquista Iberica), 31 Feminist Party (Partido Feminista: PF), 245 Ferdinand III of Castile, 11, 13, 281 Ferdinand VII (king of Spain), 23-26

Ferdinand of Aragon, 3, 15, 19 Fernandez Ordonez, Francisco, 269

fiscal policy, 147; adoption of corporate tax system, 141; deduction for donations to Catholic Church, 112-13

fishing industry, 168, 203

Flanders, 17 food processsing industry, 169

footwear industry, 180 Ford Espafia, 177-78, 200

Foreign Legion, 39

foreign relations: with European, Community (EC) 261-63; with France, 273-74;

after Franco, 62-63; of Franco regime, 50-54, with Latin America, 267; with Middle East, 272; with Morocco, 270-

72; with North Adantic Treaty Organization (NATO), 263-65, 270; with

Soviet Union, 272-73; with United

States, 265-67

forestry, 167

Fosforico Espanol, 180 Fraga Iribarne, Manuel, xxxv, 234, 242-

43

France: assistance in Civil War by, 38;

assistance in antiterrorism, xxxvii, 335-

36; assistance with Stabilization Plan,

142; boundary with, 69, 73; intervention in Spain by, 26; relations with, 273; trade with, 200

Franco-Prussian War (1870-71), 28 Franco y Bahamonde, Francisco, 3, 36; administration of (1939-75), xxviixxviii, 40-54; armed forces in regime of, 292; as head of state, 36-37; as leader

in Civil War, 36-39; as leader of Nationalist forces, 283-84; opposition to regime of, 48; policy for social homogeneity of, 87; repression of PSOE by, 238

Franks, 11 freedom of religion, 112, 210, 211-12

freedom of the press, 257

Free Galician Guerrilla People's Army,

337 394
Index

French Revolution, 22

fruit crops, 163

Galicia: agriculture of, 161; as autono- mous region, 81, 92, 223; fishing industry in, 168; nationalism of, 93; terrorism in, 337; tourism in, 196

Galicians, 79, 87, 222 General Air Academy, 309 General Bureau for Radio Broadcasting

and Television, 259

General Confederation of Small and

Medium-Sized Firms of Spain (Confederation General de las Pequenas y Medianas Empresas del Estado Espanol: COPYME), 250-51 General Council of the Judiciary, 220

General Highways Plan, 191 General Law on Education (Ley General

de Education: LGE), 116, 118, 122 General Military Academy, 309

General Motors Espana, 177-78, 200

General Social Security Treasury, 130 General Union of Workers (Union General de Trabajadores: UGT), xxxiv, 31

,

33-34, 39-40, 153, 155, 236, 238, 247-50; militia of, 38 Geneva Conference (1975), 259

geography, 69-77 Germanic people, 7 Germany: assistance from Spain in WW

II, 50, 284; assistance in Civil War by,

39, 50 Germany, West: Spanish investment in, 201; trade with, 200 Gerona province, 90

Gibraltar, 8; boundary with, 69-70; Brit- ish possession of, 21, 53-54, 62, 69;

effect on military, 290-91, 318, 320;

goal for Spanish possession of, 208,

264, 269-70, 288; Soviet Union support of Spain for, 273 Gijon (port), 194 Gilmore, David, 106

Gil Robles, Jose Maria, 34-36 Godoy, Manuel de, 22-23

Golfo de Cadiz, 69, 74 Gonzalez Marquez, Felipe, 57, 60, 62, 137, 144, 147, 156, 208; armed forces reforms of, 279-80; one-party govern- ment of, xxviii-xxix, xxxiii, 231, 234;

position on NATO membership of, 234, 236, 316; revives PSOE, 239 government, central. See Constitution

(1978); Cortes; king; legislative branch; monarchy; provinces

government, local, 226-28

government, regional. See autonomous

communities; regions

government intervention: in economy,

xxviii-xxix, 137-44, 146-48, 154-56,

169-71, 173-75, 182-87, 189-90, 201-

04, 261-63, 313; in information dis- semination, 257-61 Graham, Robert, 140-41

grain crops, 164 Granada, 10, 13, 15 Granada Province, 97 Gran Canaria (island), 74

Greeks, 5 Grupo Patrimonio. See Directorate General for State Assets (Direction General

del Patrimonio del Estado: DGPE)

Guatemala, 268 Guerra, Alfonso, 238-39

Gunther, Richard, 88, 103-4

Gutierrez Mellado, Manuel, 292, 293 Guzman, Gaspar de, 20

Gypsies, 87; gitanos and hungaros, 99, 102; persecution of, 99, 102

Habsburg dynasty, 17-21 Hadrian (Roman emperor), 6 Hannibal, 5 Hanseatic League, 13 HB. See Popular Unity (Herri Batasuna: HB)

health care {see also public health), 68-69,

124-25, 130 Hernandez Mancha, Antonio, 236, 243 Higher Air School, 310 Higher Army School, 310 Higher Defense Intelligence Center (Centro Superior de Information de la Defensa: CESID), 330 Higher Police Corps, 324

high-technology industries, 174 Hisham II, 9 Hispania, 6

Hitler, Adolf, 50, 139, 284 Holy Roman Empire, 17 Honorius (Roman emperor), 7 hospital facilities, 124-25 395
Spain: A Country Study

housing, xxx, 128-29 Huelva (port), 168, 194 Huelva Province, 97 Huesca Province, 90 human rights violations, 332

hydroelectric power, 185

Iberia Airlines, 174, 194

Iberian Atlantic Command (IBERLANT), 318, 320

Iberian Peninsula, 5, 7, 23-24, 79

Iberians, 4-6

Iberico region, 70

Iglesias, Gerardo, 241

Iglesias, Pablo, 238 IMF. See International Monetary Fund

(IMF)

imports, xxviii, 198-99; of agricultural products, 164-65; of fuels, 182-85, 199; of manufactured goods, 199 import substitution, 140, 157

Incas, 17 income distribution, xxx, 81, 105 Index of Net Social Progress (INSP), 124

industrial sector {see also defense industrial base; manufacturing sector): develop- ment of, xxvii, 169-72; employment in, 148, 170-71; regional concentration of, 172-73; regional economic performance

of, xxvii; self-sufficiency concept for, xxvii-xxviii, 140, 173

inflation, xxix, 140-41, 145, 154, 169

information dissemination, 257-61

infrastructure, 190-91

INI. See National Industrial Institute (Insti- tuto Nacional de Industria: INI)

Inquisition, 16, 110-11

insurance: health, 130; pension, 130; un- employment, 130-31

intelligence services, 330

International Brigade, 38

International Monetary Fund (IMF):

advice of, 204; economic assistance from, 143; member of, 142

investment, direct foreign, xxviii, 143,

144, 179, 200-201; of Spain, 201

investment, domestic, 171, 174

IR. See Republican Left (Izquierda Republicana: IR)

irrigation, 69, 157-58, 162

Isabella II (queen of Spain), 26-28, 281

Isabella of Castile, 3, 15, 19

Islam, 12-13

Islam, Spanish, 8-15

island territory, 11, 16, 69-70, 74

Israel, 54, 272

Italy, 13, 17-18, 39, 50, 322

Jaen Province, 97, 162 Japan, 200

Jehovah's Witnesses, 113 JEMAD. See Chief of the Defense Staff Qefe del Estado Mayor de la Defensa: JEMAD)

Jesuits, 22 Jews, 9; conversion to Christianity by, 15-16; persecution of, 99

jihad (holy war), 9-10 John Paul II (pope), 254

Joint Assembly of Bishops and Priests, 252

Joint Chiefs of Staff (Junta de Jefes de Es- tado Mayor: JUJEM), 292, 293, 295 Juan Carlos de Borbon (king), xxxii, xxxvii, 3-4, 48, 54-61, 111, 143, 217, 255-56, 287

judicial system, 220-22, 311, 324, 331-34

king (constitutional definition), 216-19 Kuwait Investment Office (KIO), 180

Labor Charter (1938) (fundamental law), 41-42

labor force: contracts with employers of, 155; distribution of, 102-3; employment

in, 159; expansion of, 47, 148, 150; remittances of workers abroad, xxviii, 143, 199; unemployment in, xxviii, xxx, 137-38, 150-51, 154

labor movement, 152-56, 246-50

labor unions, xxxiv, 31, 34-35, 39-40,

152-56, 236, 238, 246-50 La Coruna (port), 168 La Coruna Province, 92 land erosion, 157 land ownership, 106, 158-60

languages, 67; Basque (Euskera), xxxvi,

67, 88-89, 97, 335; Castilian Spanish,

67, 87-88; Catalan, xxxvi, 88-90, 92;

co-official status with Castilian Spanish

of, 68, 88-89, 223; Galician, xxxvi, 67, 88-89, 93-94; Majorcan, 88; Romany,

99; Valencian, 88 396
Index

Largo Caballero, Francisco, 33-35, 39-40 La Rioja autonomous region, 162

latifundio system, 6, 97-98, 157, 158

Latin America: colonies in, 16-17, 25, 283; investment in, 201; relations with, 267-69 Law of Succession (1947) (fundamental

law), 43 Law on Referenda (1945) (fundamental

law), 42, 56 Law on Religious Freedom (1967) (fun- damental law), 48 Law on the Principles of the National Movement (1958) (fundamental law), 43 Law on University Reform (Ley de Reforma Universitaria: LRU), 68, 122

laws, fundamental, 41-43

legislative branch, 213-16 Lemoniz Nuclear Power Plant, 186 Leon (kingdom), 11 Leo XIII (pope), 34

Lerida province, 90

Lerroux, Alejandro, 31, 33-35 LGE. See General Law on Education (Ley General de Educacion: LGE)

liberalism {see also anticlericalism), 24-25,

27

Liberal Party (Partido Liberal: PL),

26-27, 31, 234, 243-44

Liberal Union Party, 28

Libya, 292

lignite deposits, 184

linguistic groups. See languages Lisbon Agreement (1980), 269

literacy rate, 117

livestock industry, 166-67 LOAPA. See Organic Law on the Harmonization of the Autonomy Process (Ley Organica de Armonizacion del Proceso Autonomico: LOAPA)

LODE. See Organic Law on the Right to Education (Ley Organica del Derecho

a la Educacion: LODE)

Lopez Pina, Antonio, 104-5

Louisiana, 23 Louis XIV (king of France), 20-21

Louis XVIII (king of France), 26 lowland regions, 74

Lucini, Angel Liberal, 296 Lugo Province, 92 Lyon Conference (1936), 39

McDonough, Peter, 104-5

Machiavelli, Niccolo, 15 Madrid, 18; as autonomous region, 80-

81; in Civil War, 36, 37, 40, 283-84,

285; as industrial region, 172-73, 177; location of, 79; migration from, 85; migration to, 82-84; Sistema Central

in vicinity of, 70 Magellan, Ferdinand, 17 Maghreb, 13 Majorca, 74 Malaga Province, 97, 228 Malvinas (Falkland Islands), 268 Manglano, Emilio Alanso, 330 manufacturing sector (see also defense in- dustrial base): performance of, xxviii, 170, 176-80

Maravall Herrero,Jose Maria, 118, 123, 232 Marcus Aurelius (Roman emperor), 6 Man'a Cristina (regent), 26-27

marines, 301-2

marriage, 78, 109-10, 111 martial law (1936-48), 45 Marxism, xxxiii, 56-57, 239 mass media, 257-61

Massilia (Marseilles), 5 Maura, Antonio, 31 Mauritania, 54 Maximilian I (Habsburg emperor), 17 Mediterranean coastal regions, 77, 161,

163, 195-96 Mediterranean Sea, 4, 12, 69, 73, 74, 290-91, 300, 317, 321

Melilla (city enclave), 54, 69, 208, 228,

264, 270-72, 288, 291 Merida, 6 Merigo, Eduardo, 144 Meseta Central (plateau), 69-70; agricul- ture in, 162; mountains in and around,

70, 73; precipitation in, 76; Sistema

Central of, 70 Mexico, 17, 38 Middle East, 272

migration, 67, 82-87, 128; from Andalusia, 97, 98-99; effect of, xxxi-xxxii; from Galicia, 93; from rural regions,

xxix-xxx, 148, 159 Miguel, Amando de, 103 Milans del Bosch, Jaime, 287

military assistance, U. S., 52, 173, 279,

284, 321 397
Spain: A Country Study

military bases, U. S., 52, 140, 169, 173, 321 ; demand for reduction of forces in, xxxiv, 236, 322

military courts, 221-22

military equipment, 299-300; industry of, 313

military justice, 311

Military Penal Code, 311

military sector {see also air force; armed

forces; army; conscription; navy; officer corps; pronunciamiento rule): decline of importance of, 281-82; intervention in

politics of, xxxviii, 255-56, 280, 282, 285-88; modernization of, xxxiv; re- forms in personnel system of, 305, 308;

role in Franco regime of, 45, 285-86;

role in society of, 288, 290; unrest in, 58, 61

military vehicle industry, 313

mineral resources, 181-82

minifundios, 92-93, 157, 158, 159, 161, 166 mining industry {see also coal industry), 181-82

Ministry of Defense, 279, 292-93,

295-96, 299, 310

Ministry of Economy, Finance, and Commerce, 146, 147, 186, 190 Ministry of Education and Science, 113,

116, 122

Ministry of Health and Consumer Affairs, 129 Ministry of Industry and Energy, 173 Ministry of Interior, 228, 233, 325

Ministry of Labor and Social Security, 129 Ministry of Public Works and City Planning, 191 Ministry of Transportation, Tourism,

and Communications, 147, 195, 198, 258

Minorca, 21 Moderates, 27-28 Mola, Emilio, 36 monarchy, 216-19 Moncloa Pacts, 58, 154, 260 Montes de Toledo, 70 Moors, 8-9, 99 Moran, Fernando, 268-69

Moriscos, 15-16, 19 Mormons, 113 Morocco, 31-32, 263; campaign against

(1907-27), 283; claim to Ceuta and

Melilla by, 54, 270-72, 291-92

mortality rate, 69, 78, 126 Mossad, 330 motor vehicle assembly industry, 172,

174, 175, 176-78, 200, 203 mountains, 69-70, 73-74, 76 Mozarabs, 10 Mudejars, 16 Muhammad (prophet), 10 Mulhacen mountain, 73 Municipal Commission, 227 Municipal Council, 226-27

municipalities, 226-27 Musa ibn Nusair, 8 Muslims, 15-16

Mussolini, Benito, 39, 139

Naples, 13-14

National Block, 36

National Confederation of Labor (Confederacion Nacional del Trabajo:

CNT), 31, 34, 153, 249

National Defense Council, 292, 293

National Energy Plan (Plan Energetico

Nacional: PEN), 182, 185, 186

National Front (Frente Nacional: FN), 244

National Galician Workers Union (Inter- sindical Nacional de Trabaj adores

Gallegos: INTG), 249

National Health Institute (Instituto National de Salud: INSALUD), 130

National Housing Plan, 128

National Industrial Institute (Instituto Nacional de Industria: INI), 146, 173-75, 179, 184, 313; financial losses and restructuring of, 174-75

National Institute for Hydrocarbons (Instituto Nacional de Hidrocarburos: INH), 183-84

National Institute for Social Services (Instituto Nacional de Servicios Sociales: INSERSO), 130

nationalism, xxxvi, 222

Nationalist organization, 36-37

nationalization: of central bank, 187; of

industry, 173; of railroads, 191; of tele- phone system, 194

National Movement, 43-45, 55-56, 237

National Police, 324 398
Index

National Police Corps (Cuerpo Nacional

de Poliria), 324, 325; General Commissariat of Intelligence, 330-31; organization and functions of, 328-29; Special

Operations Group (Grupo Especial de

Operaciones: GEO), 328

National Social Security Institute (Insti- tuto Nacional de Seguridad Social: INSS), 130 National Telephone Company of Spain

(Compama Telefonica Nacional de Espana: CTNE), 146, 194

National Tourist Company, 198

natural gas industry, 185

natural resources, 179, 181 naval air base, U.S., 321

naval base, U.S., 321 Naval Military School, 309 Naval Warfare School, 310

Navarre: as autonomous region, 81;

police force of, 329

Navarrese, 79 Navarro, Manuel, 104 navy (Armada) (see also marines), 280;

historical importance of, 281-82; vessels

of, 300-301; zonal commands of, 300 Negrm, Juan, 40

the Netherlands, 17-18, 20, 21; Spainish investment in, 201 news agency (EFE), 258-59

newspapers, 257-58

Nicaragua, 268-69

noise pollution, 127-28 North Atlantic Treaty Organization

(NATO), 208, 234; coordination of

fighting forces with, 281; effect of Brit- ish possession of Gibraltar on, 320;

effect of Spanish possession of Ceuta and Melilla on, 292, 318; excludes

Spain, 52, 263-64; Gibraltar as naval

base of, 270; Nuclear Planning Group

of, 320; participation in, 316-320;

question of membership in, xxxiii- xxxiv, 316; requirement for U. S. mili- tary reduction, 322-23; Spain joins (1982), 62, 256, 264-65, 280, 316

nuclear power, 186

O'Donnell, Leopoldo, 28 OECD. See Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD)

OEEC. See Organisation for European

Economic Co-operation (OEEC)

officer corps, 280-81; discontent after Civil War of, 285-87; reform proposals

of, 286; in society, 288

Official Credit Institute (Instituto de

Credito Oficial: ICO), 189-90

oil industry, 139, 182-83

oil price shock, xxviii, 137, 143-44, 150,

170, 198 Opus Dei (Work of God), 46, 115, 141;

as special interest group, 253-54 Orense Province, 92 Organic Law 1: 1984 (related to armed

forces), 295 Organic Law 6: 1980 (related to armed

forces), 293, 295 Organic Law of the State (1966) (funda- mental law), 43, 48 Organic Law on the Constitutional Court

(1979), 221 Organic Law on the Financing of the Autonomous Communities, 225 Organic Law on the Harmonization of the Autonomy Process (Ley Organica de Armonizacion del Proceso Autonomico: LOAPA), xxxvii, 223 Organic Law on the Right to Education (Ley Organica del Derecho a la Education: LODE), 68, 117, 118-19, 212 Organic Law on the Security Corps and

Forces (1986), 324-25 Organic Law on Trade Union Freedom

(1985), 247

Organisation for Economic Co-operation

and Development (OECD), 142, 262

Organisation for European Economic Cooperation (OEEC), 142, 143, 262 Organization of Petroleum Exporting

Countries (OPEC), 200

Ortega, Daniel, 269 OSE. See Spanish Syndical Organization

(Organization Sindical Espanola: OSE)

Oslo Convention, 128 Overseas Trade Bank (Banco Exterior de

Espana), 146, 189

Pacific Ocean, 17 Pact of Madrid (1953), 52, 140, 169, 173, 265-66, 284, 291, 320-21

Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO),

272 399
Spain: A Country Study

PCE. See Communist Party of Spain (Partido Comunista de Espafia: PCE)

PDP. See Popular Democratic Party (Partido Democrata Popular: PDP)

Peace of the Pyrenees, 20 Peace of Westphalia, 20

Pelayo (king of Oviedo), 10 Penal Code, 324, 331

Penibetico region, 70 Penon de Velez de la Gomera, 54

pensions, 130

People's Party (Partido Popular: PP), XXXV

periodicals, 259

Peron, Juan, 51 Peru, 17 Peter III (king of Aragon), 13

Philip II (king of Spain), 17-18, 79

Philip III (king of Spain), 20, 282

Philip IV (king of Spain), 20

Philip V (king of Spain), 20-21; centrali- zation by, 79

the Philippines, 30, 261, 283

Phoenicians, 5 Physical Quality of Life Index (PQLI),

123

Pico de Aneto, 73

Picos de Europa, 73

pipeline (gas), 185

Pizzaro, Francisco, 17 PL. See Liberal Party (Partido Liberal: PL)

plains, coastal, 70, 74

plateau region (see also Meseta Central), 69-70, 162 PNV. See Basque Nationalist Party (Partido Nacional Vasco: PNV)

police system: human rights violations of, 332; national, 324-29; regional, 329

political parties: changing goals of, xxxi; formation of, 57, 238; legalization of, 56; regional, 245; small parties, 244-

45; stabilization of, 207-8; support and

opposition to NATO membership of, 62-63, 234, 316

Political-Social Brigade, 330

political system, Franco regime, 40-45, 207 Pontevedra Province, 92 Poor Spain, 81, 82 Popular Action (Accion Popular), 34 Popular Alliance (Alianza Popular: AP)

(see also People's Party (Partido Popular: PP)), xxxv, 57, 62, 232, 234, 236,

244; development and role of, 242-43

Popular Coalition (Coalition Popular:

CP), 234, 244 Popular Democratic Party (Partido Democrata Popular: PDP), 234, 244

Popular Unity (Herri Batasuna: HB),

233, 245, 334-35

population (see also birth rate; migration;

mortality rate; urbanization): aging of, 131-32; densities of regions and cities, 84; growth of, 77-78; migration of, 67; urbanization of, 83-84, 113

ports, 76, 168, 194

Portugal: boundary with, 69, 74; exploration and settlement by, 16; in Iberian

federation, 3; investment in, 201; Sis- tema Central in, 70

Postal Service, 195 Potsdam Conference, 51 POUM. See Trotskyite Workers' Party of Marxist Unification (Partido Obrero de

Unification Marxista: POUM)

poverty, 82

press law (see also newspapers; freedom of

the press), 256

price controls, 154

Prieto, Indalecio, 36

Prim, Juan, 28 prime minister (office), 218-20 Primo de Rivera, Jose Antonio, 37 Primo de Rivera, Miguel, 32, 139, 240, 280-81, 283

prisons, 333-34

Progressive Federation (Federation Progresista: FP), 244

Progressives, 27, 28

pronunciamiento rule, 25-26, 36, 255, 282-

83

protectionism. See trade policy Protestant denominations, 113

provinces, government of, 227-28

Provincial Council, 227-28 PSOE. See Spanish Socialist Workers'

Party (Partido Socialista Obrero Espanol: PSOE)

public health, 124-28, 129-30

Puerto de la Luz (port), 194 Puerto Rico, 25, 30, 283

Puigserver Roma, Gonzalo, 296

Punic Wars: First (264-41 B.C.), 5; Sec- ond (218-201 B. C), 5 Pyrenees mountains, 4, 5, 69-70, 73-74,

261, 290 400
Index

Qadhafi, Muammar al, 292

Radical Republicans, 31, 34 Radio Cadena Espaiiola: RCE, 259 Radio Nacional Espaiiola: RNE, 259, 260

radio networks, 259

Radio-Television Espaiiola: RTVE, 260

railroads, 186, 191

rainfall, 76-77, 156 Reagan, Ronald, 266

Reconquest, 10-15, 110 Redondo, Nicolas, 236, 249

reforestation, 167

regions: differences among, 222; police

forces of, 329; Rich Spain and Poor

Spain, 81

regions, autonomous. See autonomous communities; decentralization regions, natural, 70

religion, 110-16; changing role of, xxxi;

constitutional provisions for, xxx-xxxi,

112, 210-12 RENFE. See Spanish National Railroad Network (Red Nacional de los Ferrocarriles Espanoles: RENFE)

Repsol (oil company), 184

Republic, First (1873-74), 28

Republic, Second, xxxi, 33, 45 Republican Left (Izquierda Republicana:

IR), 33-36

Republican Left of Catalonia (Esquerra

Republicana de Catalunya), 35

rias, 76 Rich Spain, 81 Riego, Rafael de, 25 Rio Duero, 4, 73, 76, 166 Rio Ebro, 4, 11, 40, 73-74, 76, 161, 162 Rio Guadalquivir, 73, 76, 165 Rio Guadiana, 73, 74, 76 Rio Jucar, 73 Rio Miiio, 76

Ri'o Tajo (Tagus River), 7, 70, 74, 76 Rio Tinto Explosives, 179-80

rivers, 69, 70, 73, 74, 76, 191 RNE. See Radio Nacional Espaiiola: RNE

roads, 190-91

robots, industrial, 178 Roderic (king), 8 Roman Catholic Church (see also Jesuits; Opus Dei): changes in role of, xxx, 114-16; constitutional provisions for, 211-12; educational program of, xxxi,

116; government contributions to, 112-13; links to labor movement of, 152; named official religion, 43, 111; opposition to social change by, 68; political activity of, 34, 43-45, 114; ra- dio network of, 259; recognition of Franco government by, 52, 111; role

in Franco regime of, xxx-xxxi, 111;

role in Reconquest, 3, 15-16; as special interest group, 251-53; university

system of, 121 Roman Empire, 5-7

safety, public, 126-28

Sahara, Spanish: ceded to Morocco and

Mauritania, 54

Sani, Giacomo, 103

Sanjurjo, Jose, 32, 33, 36-37

Santa Cruz de Tenerife (port), 194 SEAT. See Sociedad Espaiiola de Automoviles de Turismo (SEAT)

Securities and Market Reform Act (1988), 190

Security Police Council, 329

self-sufficiency concept. See autarchy

Senate. See Cortes

Serra i Serra, Narcis, 296

service sector, 186-98; employment in, 148; performance of, xxviii

Seville, 10; Expo 92 in, 201; migration

to, 85; as port, 76, 194

Seville Province, 97 Shabad, Goldie, 88, 103

shipbuilding industry, 170, 175, 178-79, 313

shipping, 191, 194

Sicily, 13 Sierra de Guadalupe, 70

Sierra Morena, 70, 73-74

Sierra Nevada, 73 Sistema Central, 70, 73, 76 Sistema Iberico, 73-74, 76 Sistema Penibetico, 73-74, 77

Socialists' Party of Catalonia (Partit dels

Socialistes de Catalunya: PSC), 245

social security system, 129, 131-32, 144; proposed reform for, 232

social structure (see also class structure), 102-6; feudal, 13-14; transformation

of, xxx, 67-68

social values, xxx-xxxvii, 106-10 401
Spain: A Country Study

Sociedad Espanola de Automoviles de Turismo (SEAT), 174, 175, 177 Sociedad Espanola de Radiodifusion: SER, 259

Soult, Nicholas, 24

Soviet Union: advisers and arms in Civil War, 36-38; German invasion of, 50;

relations with, 272-73

Spain Commando, 336 Spanish-American War (1898), 30, 261, 265, 267, 283 Spanish Arms Manufacturers Association, 314

Spanish Confederation of Employers' Organizations (Confederacion Espanola de Organizaciones Empresariales:

CEOE), 155, 250

Spanish Confederation of Small and

Medium-Sized Firms (Confederacion

Espanola de Pequenas y Medianas

Empresas: CEPYME), 250

Spanish Confederation of the Autono- mous Right (Confederacion Espanola

de Derechas Autonomas: CEDA),

34-35

Spanish Green Party (Partido Verde Espafiol: PVE), 244 Spanish Integration Committees (Juntas Espanolas de Integration), 244

Spanish language (Castilian). See Castilian Spanish

Spanish Legion, 299

Spanish March, 11 Spanish National Railroad Network (Red

Nacional de los Ferrocarriles Espafioles: RENFE), 191 Spanish Popular Front, 35-36

Spanish Socialist Workers' Party (Partido

Socialista Obrero Espaiiol: PSOE), 31, 33-35, 57, 60, 108, 114, 153, 208; civil service reform by, 229; economic and

social reform of, xxxiii, 231-32,

236-37; foreign policy of, 233, 237;

gains strength, 61-62, 238-39; labor union of, xxxiv, 31, 33-34, 39-40, 153, 236, 238, 247-50; majority in Cortes

of, xxviii-xxix, xxxiii; opposition to, xxxiv-xxxv, 234-36; oppostion to NATO membership of, xxxiii, 234, 316; as rival to PCE, 240

Spanish Syndical Organization (Organization Sindical Espanola: OSE), 152, 153

Spanish Workers' Party-Communist Unity

(Partido de los Trabajadores de EspanaUnidad Comunista: PTE-UC), 241

special interest groups, 246-56

Special Operations Group (Grupo Especial de Operaciones: GEO), 328

spending, defense, 280, 312-13

spending, government: aid to Catholic Church as, 112-13; for health care, 124; levels of, 147-48; limitations on,

142; for private and public schools, 116-17; on university education, 122-

23

Stabilization Plan (1959), xxviii, 46, 142-43, 159, 169, 200

Stalin, Joseph, 35, 39, 272

standard of living (see also Index of Net

Social Progress (INSP)), xxvii, xxx, 123-32, 141 state-owned enterprises, xxviii, 146-47,

174-75, 176, 179, 183-84, 191, 194,

198, 258-59, 313

Statutes of Autonomy (1979), 329

steel industry, 170, 175, 176

stock exchanges, 190

Strait of Gibraltar, 290-91, 320, 321

Strategic Air Command (SAC) bombers,

U.S., 322

strikes, xxxiv, 34-36, 47-49, 153, 232,

236, 249-50

Suarez Gonzalez, Adolfo, 3-4, 55-61,

143, 154, 209, 229, 235, 255; foreign

policy of, 268; as leader of UCD, xxxvxxxvi, 238, 242-43; reforms of armed

forces by, 292; succeeds Franco, xxxiixxxiii

subsidies, government, 128, 175; to Catholic Church, 253; to the press, 257

Suevi, 6, 7 summer, 76-77 Supreme Allied Commander (SACLANT),

318 Supreme Council of Military Justice, 311 Supreme Court, 220-21, 224, 311 Supreme Staff, 292

Tabacalera, 146

Tacito, 252

Tactical Air Command (Mando Aereo

Tactico: MATAC), 302 Tagus River. See Rio Tajo

taifas, 10, 12 402
Index

Tariq ibn Ziyad, 8 Tarragona Province, 90, 172

tax system, 141-42

Tejero Molina, Antonio, 61, 287

telegraph system, 195

telephone system, 194-95

Television Espanola: TVE, 260

television networks, 259-61

Tenerife (island), 74 Terra Lliure (Free land), 336-37

terrorism: of antigovernment groups,

334; of Basque groups, xxxvi-xxxviii,

58, 60, 208, 232-33, 235, 237, 287, 335-36; of Catalan group, 336-37; of Galician group, 337; support of France

against, xxxvii, 274, 335-36

textile industry, xxvii, 180 thermal power, 185 Thirty Years' War, 282

Toledo, 7, 12 topography, 69 Torquemada, Tomas de, 16 tourism industry, xxviii, 106-7, 143, 144, 180-81, 195-98, 199; effect of, xxxi

toxic waste, 128

trade, international, 198-99

trade policy: liberalization of, xxviii, 169-

70; protectionist elements of, xxviixxviii, 173, 198, 202 Trade Preference Treaty (1970), 52-53 Trajan (Roman emperor), 6

transportation: airlines, 194; nationalization of (1926), 139; roads and railroads

in system of, 190-91; shipping, 191, 194

transportation system, xxx

Trastamara, House of, 14, 17 Trade Preference Treaty (1970), 52-53

Treaty of Accession (1985) (into EC),

184, 233-34, 263 Treaty of Alcagovas (1479), 15 Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation

(1976), 266 Treaty of Tordesillas (1494), 16 Treaty of Utrecht (1713), 21, 53, 90, 269

Treaty of Westphalia (1648), 20 Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), 1968, 320

Trotskyite Workers' Party of Marxist

Unification (Partido Obrero de Unifi- cacion Marxista: POUM), 37, 40 Truman, Harry S, 51

UCD. See Union of the Democratic

Center (Union de Centro Democratico: UCD)

UGT. See General Union of Workers

(Union General de Trabaj adores: UGT)

Umayyad dynasty, 9 underground economy (economia sumergida), 151-52

uniforms, ranks, and insignias, 304-5 Union of Small and Medium-Sized Firms (Union de la Pequena y Mediana

Empresa: UNIPYME), 251 Union of the Democratic Center (Union

de Centro Democratico: UCD), 57, 60, 109, 154-55, 238, 242, 244; as coali- tion, 229; decline in Cortes representation of, 61-62; fragmentation of, xxxiii, 60-61; support for NATO membership of, 316

United Left (Izquierda Unida: IU), xxxv, 235 United Nations (UN): approves membership for Spain (1955), 52, 261; denial of membership in, 51; membership in, 4 United States: air and naval bases of, 4; economic assistance by, 46, 51, 143; Export-Import Bank assistance, 143; investment of, 201; military personnel

of, 321; mutual defense agreement of (Pact of Madrid), 52, 140, 169, 173, 261, 265-66, 279, 284, 291; recognition of Spain's strategic importance by,

4, 51-52; in Spanish American War,

30; support in Cuba (1895), 30; trade

with, 200; Treaty of Friendship and

Cooperation with, 266 United Syndicate (Sindicato Unitario: SU), 249

universities, 121-23

urbanization, xxix-xxx, 83-84 USO. See Workers' Syndical Union (Union

Sindical Obrera: USO)

Valencia, 6, 10, 11-13, 40, 92, 157, 177, 194, 304

Valencians, 79-80

value-added tax (VAT), 203 Vandals, 6, 7 Vascones. See Basques

Vatican Council, Second, xxx, 111, 252 403
Spain: A Country Study

Vigo, 168

Villar Palasi, Jose Luis, 118

vineyards, 163-64

Visigoths, 6-10 Volkswagen, 177

War of Devolution (1667-68), 20 War of Independence (1808-14), 23-24, 282 War of the Spanish Succession (1702-14),

21 Warriors of Christ the King, 252 Warsaw Pact countries, 272

welfare programs, 129-32

Wellesley, Arthur (Duke of Wellington), 24 Western European Union (WEU), 265 Weyler, Valerio, 30

Wilfred the Hairy, 1

1

winds (Leveche and Levante), 77

winter, 76-77 women: in armed services, 309; discrimi- nation against married, 109; educational attainment of, 118, 123; status of, xxxii, 67-68, 78, 110; in workplace, 108-9, 150 Workers' Commissions (Comisiones Obreras: CCOO), xxxiv, 152-53, 155, 236, 240, 247-50 Workers' Statute (1980), 154, 247 Workers' Syndical Union (Union Sindical Obrera: USO), 153, 155, 248-49 World Bank, 78; member of, 142, 262 World War I, xxvii, 31, 138-39 World War II, 139-40; Spanish collaboration with Axis powers during, 46, 50, 139-40, 169, 261, 284; Spanish neutrality in, 50-51

Zamora, Niceto Alcala, 33-36

Zaragoza, 6, 10, 13, 177

404
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