14-3912 Mazur v. New York City Department of Education et al.



### UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS **FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT**



## SUMMARY ORDER

**R ULINGS BY SUMMARY ORDER DO NOT HAVE PRECEDENTIAL EFFECT**  **. C**  **ITATION TO A SUMMARY ORDER FILED**
**ON OR AFTER J** **ANUARY 1,**  **2007, IS PERMITTED AND IS GOVERNED BY**  **F EDERAL**  **R ULE OF**  **A PPELLATE**  **P ROCEDURE**  **32.1 AND THIS COURT**  **’ S**  **L OCAL**  **R ULE**  **32.1.1. W**  **HEN CITING A SUMMARY ORDER IN A**
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**At a stated term of the United States Court of Appeals** 1 **for the Second Circuit, held at the Thurgood Marshall United** 2 **States Courthouse, 40 Foley Square, in the City of New York,** 3 **on the 6 th** **day of November, two thousand fifteen.** 4 5 **PRESENT: DENNIS JACOBS,** 6 **PIERRE N. LEVAL,** 7 **Circuit Judges**

**.** 8 **GEOFFREY W. CRAWFORD,** ***** 9 **District Judge**

**.** 10 11 - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -X 12 **JOAN MAZUR,** 13 **Plaintiff-Appellant ,**  14 15 **-v.- 14-3912** 16 17 **NEW YORK CITY DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION** 18 **et al.,** 19 **Defendants-Appellees**

**.** 20
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -X 21 22

*The Honorable Geoffrey W. Crawford, United States District Judge for the District of Vermont, sitting by designation.

1**FOR APPELLANT:** STEVEN A. MORELLI, LAW OFFICE OF 1 STEVEN A. MORELLI, Garden City, 2 New York. 3 4 **FOR APPELLEES:** MICHAEL J. PASTOR (with Richard 5 Dearing on the brief ) for 6 Zachary W. Carter, Corporation 7 Counsel of the City of New York, 8 New York, New York. 9 10 Appeal from a judgment of the United States District 11 Court for the Southern District of New York (Torres, J. ). 12 13 **UPON DUE CONSIDERATION, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED** 14 **AND DECREED**that the judgment of the district court be 15
**AFFIRMED**

. 16 17 Joan Mazur appeals from the judgment of the United 18 States District Court for the Southern District of New York 19 (Torres, J. ) dismissing her discrimination complaint on 20 summary judgment

. We assume the parties’ familiarity with 21 the underlying facts, the procedural history, and the issues 22 presented for review. 23 24 “We review a district court’s grant of summary judgment 25 de novo , construing the evidence in the light most favorable 26 to the non-moving party and drawing all reasonable 27 inferences in its favor.” Allianz Ins. Co. v. Lerner , 416 28 F.3d 109, 113 (2d Cir. 2005). 29 30 **1.** A number of Mazur’s claims, including claims 31 asserted under § 1983, the New York State Human Rights Law 32 (“NYSHRL”), and the New York City Human Rights Law 33 (“NYCHRL”) were dismissed on the ground of collateral 34 estoppel because these claims were litigated during Mazur’s 35 hearing pursuant to N.Y. EDUC. § 3020-a (hereinafter “§ 36 3020-a”) . Because such a hearing is “an administrative 37 adjudication, we must give its findings preclusive effect.” 38 Burkybile v. Bd. of Educ. of Hastings-On-Hudson Union Free 39 Sch. Dist. , 411 F.3d 306, 311 (2d. Cir. 2005). This accords 40 with the general principle that “New York courts will give 41 administrative determinations preclusive effect if made in a 42 quasi-judicial capacity and with a full and fair opportunity 43 to litigate the issue.” Id. at 312. 44 45 During the hearing, Mazur presented both of her 46 discrimination theories, arguing that her supervisors’ 47

2criticisms and charges were mere pretexts for 1 discrimination. A. 140-41, 163-64. The hearing officer, 2 after a full and fair litigation, determined that Mazur was 3 subject to discipline because of, inter alia, her excessive 4 absenteeism, poor teaching, and failure to improve in 5 response to the recommendations of her supervisors. A. 130- 6 31, 182-89. Defendants advance these findings as 7 legitimate, non-discriminatory reasons for their actions. 8 Absent evidence sufficient to support a reasonable finding 9 of discriminatory motivation--which, as we conclude below, 10 is lacking–-we must accept the hearing officer’s 11 determination that Mazur was guilty of the charged conduct 12 and disciplined for these legitimate reasons. 13 14 Mazur argues against this preclusive effect on the 15 ground that there is an insufficient opportunity for 16 discovery in a § 3020-a proceeding. We reject her argument, 17 as did the district court, because she neither identifies 18 any discovery demand she made in the § 3020-a proceeding 19 that was rejected nor points to any subsequently available 20 evidence that could have changed the result. SeeSpecial 21 Appendix (“SPA”) 15 (“Here, [p]laintiff does not point to 22 any deficiencies in the discovery in connection with the 23 3020-a hearing, and tellingly, [p]laintiff does not provide 24 any additional evidence in her moving papers that post-dates 25 the 3020-a hearing or demonstrates that the discovery in the 26 3020-a hearing was somehow deficient.”). 27 28 **2.** Mazur challenges the grant of summary judgment on 29 her claims under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act 30 (“ADEA”) and Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”). 31 Because her employer provided non-discriminatory reasons for 32 the disciplinary action taken towards Mazur, the presumption 33 in Mazur’s favor established by McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. 34 Green , 411 U.S. 792 (1973) “completely drops out of the 35 picture.” James v. N.Y. Racing Ass’n , 233 F.3d 149, 154 (2d 36 Cir. 2000) (internal quotation marks omitted). 37 38 We agree with the district court that Mazur failed to 39 make out a sufficient case under the ADEA because Mazur does 40 not point to evidence from which a jury could draw a 41 reasonable inference of age discrimination. The district 42 court concluded that Mazur had failed to rebut defendants’ 43 reasons, and Mazur has not specifically addressed this 44 finding on appeal. SPA 21. And assuming her sprained ankle 45 is a disability under the ADA, Mazur failed to adduce 46 evidence of discrimination to rebut her employer’s 47

3identification of legitimate nondiscriminatory reasons for 1 her discipline. 2 3 **3.** Mazur argues that summary judgment should not have 4 been granted on her ADEA and ADA hostile work environment 5 claims. An “actionable discrimination claim based on 6 hostile work environment . . . is one for which the 7 workplace is permeated with discriminatory intimidation, 8 ridicule, and insult that is sufficiently pervasive to alter 9 the conditions of the victim’s employment . . . . .” 10 Kassner v. 2nd Ave. Delicatessen Inc. , 496 F.3d 229, 240 (2d 11 Cir. 2007) (internal quotation marks omitted). In view of 12 the stringent standard governing hostile work environment 13 claims and the fact that summary judgment was properly 14 granted on Mazur’s ADEA and ADA discrimination claims, the 15 district court correctly determined that Mazur’s hostile 16 work environment claims were unsupported by the record. 17 18 **4.** As to Mazur’s First Amendment retaliation claim, 19 the district court properly found that summary judgment was 20 warranted because Mazur’s complaints did not address a 21 matter of public concern. SeeRuotolo v. City of New York
, 22 514 F.3d 184, 188 (2d Cir. 2008). As to Mazur’s Equal 23 Protection, ADA, ADEA, and NYSHRL retaliation claims, 24 summary judgment was proper because Mazur “has offered 25 insufficient evidence of causation linking [her] 26 [suspension] to motives of retaliation or discrimination to 27 overcome the cumulative probative weight of the evidence of 28 a legitimate reason for [her] discharge and of the final 29 termination decision” rendered during the § 3020-a hearing. 30 Collins v. New York City Transit Authority , 305 F.3d 113, 31 119 (2d Cir. 2002). As to the NYCHRL retaliation claim: 32 even construed broadly in Mazur’s favor, these claims fail 33 for a lack of the requisite causal link between Mazur’s 34 complaints and any alleged retaliatory action. Moreover, 35 the record contains numerous non-retaliatory reasons for any 36 action taken against Mazur. SeeMihalik v. Credit Agricole 37 Cheuvreux North America Inc. , 715 F.3d 102, 110 n.8 (2d Cir. 38 2013) (noting that summary judgment is appropriate if “the 39 record establishes as a matter of law that discrimination 40 play[ed] norole” in employer’s actions) (internal quotation 41 marks omitted). 42 43 44 45 46

4For the foregoing reasons, and finding no merit in 1 Mazur’s other arguments, we hereby **AFFIRM** the judgment of 2 the district court. 3 4 FOR THE COURT: 5 CATHERINE O’HAGAN WOLFE, CLERK 6 7 8 9 10 11

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