IN THE COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS OF TENNESSEE

AT NASHVILLE

August 9, 2016 Session

DENNIS CEDRIC WOODARD, JR. v. STATE OF TENNESSEE

Appeal from the Circuit Court for Bedford County

No. 10392 Forrest Durard, Jr. Judge

No. M2015-02002-CCA-R3-ECN – Filed November 8, 2016

The Petitioner, Dennis Cedric Woodard, Jr., appeals the Bedford County Circuit Court‟s 

denial of his petitions for post-conviction relief and for a writ of error coram nobis from 

his first degree premeditated murder conviction and his resulting life sentence. The 

Petitioner contends that the court erred by denying (1) post-conviction relief and (2) 

coram nobis relief. We affirm the judgments of the post-conviction and coram nobis 

court. 

Tenn. R. App. P. 3 Appeal as of Right; Judgments of the Circuit Court Affirmed

ROBERT H. MONTGOMERY, JR., J., delivered the opinion of the court, in which THOMAS 

T. WOODALL, P.J., and J. ROSS DYER, J., joined.

Andrew Love, Nashville, Tennessee, for the appellant, Dennis Cedric Woodard, Jr.

Herbert H. Slatery III, Attorney General and Reporter; Brent C. Cherry, Senior Counsel; 

Robert J. Carter, District Attorney General; Michael D. Randles, Assistant District 

Attorney General, for the appellee, State of Tennessee.

OPINION

This case relates to the shooting death of Scott Shafter. On the night of April 12, 

2001, the Petitioner confronted and fatally shot the victim after a physical altercation 

between them occurred earlier that day. See State v. Dennis Cedric Woodard, Jr., No. 

M2002-00122-CCA-R3-CD, 2003 WL 169082, at *1 (Tenn. Crim. App. Jan. 24, 2003), 

perm. app. denied (Tenn. May 12, 2003). The Petitioner appealed, and in its opinion 

affirming the conviction, this court summarized the facts as follows:
-2-

The proof offered by the State demonstrated that on the night of 

April 13, 2001, the homicide victim, Scott Shafer, was shot near Derry 

Street in Shelbyville. Earlier that day, at around four o‟clock, the victim 

had been visiting the home of LaShawn Nunnally. Ms. Nunnally testified 

that sometime later the [Petitioner] arrived at her house carrying a gun. The 

[Petitioner] pointed the gun at the victim and said, “Nigga, are you real or 

are you fake?” The victim responded to the [Petitioner], who was 

commonly referred to as “Junior,” by saying, “Junior, man, quit playing. 

I‟m fucked up.” The [Petitioner], still pointing the gun at the victim, then 

repeated his question. At that point, Ms. Nunnally requested that the two 

men leave the front of her house. The [Petitioner] and the victim went to 

the rear of the house, and Ms. Nunnally followed. She asked the 

[Petitioner] for the gun, and he gave it to her. Immediately thereafter, 

Jarmaine Hill, Ms. Nunnally‟s boyfriend, and Mike Jones arrived. Mr. Hill 

inquired what Ms. Nunnally was doing with the [Petitioner]‟s gun. She 

responded that she was trying to “prevent trouble.” Mr. Hill then 

demanded that she return the [Petitioner]‟s gun, which she did, but she kept 

the clip that contained the bullets and went back around to the front porch 

of her house. A few minutes later, the four men came to the front of the 

house, and the [Petitioner]‟s mouth was bleeding. When Ms. Nunnally

asked what had happened, the victim replied, “I dunked him on his head.” 

The [Petitioner] then said to the victim, “Man, you fucked up my grill.” 

Then the [Petitioner] smiled at the victim and added, “You are going to 

remember this tonight.” However, Ms. Nunnally testified that the 

[Petitioner] and the victim then hugged, made up, and left together in the 

victim‟s car. After all the men left, Ms. Nunnally wrapped the pistol clip in 

toilet paper and tossed it into a creek.

About two hours later, Ms. Nunnally had gone to another house to 

visit with friends. Jarmaine Hill and Mike Jones arrived; then a few 

minutes later, the [Petitioner] and the victim drove up. As the day got later, 

Ms. Nunnally, her two daughters, and the victim decided to walk back to 

Ms. Nunnally‟s house to get their jackets. As they returned from getting 

their coats, the [Petitioner] walked up, pointed the gun at the victim, and 

said, “Nigga, are you ready to die?” The [Petitioner] then shot the victim, 

who fell down. He pulled the trigger several more times, but the gun would 

not fire because the clip had been removed. The [Petitioner], who then ran 

away, was wearing a yellow shirt, black denim shorts, black Nike shoes, 

and black socks. Ms. Nunnally ran to a pay telephone and called 911. She 

then located the victim, who had run a short distance and fallen down, and 

she applied a blanket to his wound.
-3-

On cross-examination, Ms. Nunnally said that the [Petitioner]

appeared intoxicated while he was at her house. She said that his speech 

was slurred and he was staggering. He also appeared to be intoxicated 

when she left her friend‟s house to get the jackets from her house. She said 

that when the police arrived, she was beside the victim, rendering aid.

Thomas Thompson testified that on the evening of April 13, 2001, 

he was in his house at 101 Byrd Street. At around 7:40 that night, he heard 

what sounded like a gunshot. He then looked out his window and saw a 

white man run between 714 and 716 Derry Street, fall down on the ground, 

and yell that he had been shot. Then Mr. Thompson looked behind Smith‟s 

Food Town on Derry Street and saw a black man in a yellow shirt run 

behind the store.

James Wheeler testified that at around nine o‟clock on the night of

April 13, 2001, a young black man, whom he identified as the [Petitioner],

knocked on his door. Mr. Wheeler testified that the [Petitioner] was 

bleeding from his mouth, and he initially thought that the [Petitioner] had 

been in a car accident. However, the [Petitioner] said that he had been 

beaten up, and he asked to use the telephone. While Mr. Wheeler was 

inside his house retrieving a cordless phone for the [Petitioner], he decided 

to call 911 to have an ambulance come render aid to the [Petitioner]. When 

Mr. Wheeler went outside to give the [Petitioner] the telephone, he 

observed a car drive up with a young man and woman inside. Mr. Wheeler 

recognized the driver of the car as a man named Matt Kelly. The 

[Petitioner], who Mr. Wheeler said was “fidgety” and “obviously wanting 

to leave,” got in the car with Mr. Kelly and drove away. On crossexamination, Mr. Wheeler testified that the [Petitioner] was having 

difficulty breathing and speaking because of the condition of his mouth.

David Williams, an officer with the Bedford County Sheriff‟s

Department, testified that he accompanied the ambulance to Mr. Wheeler‟s

residence in response to Mr. Wheeler‟s 911 call. As he was driving, he 

passed a white Honda Accord. Upon speaking with Mr. Wheeler, he 

learned that the subject had left in that car. Officer Williams then followed 

the Accord to the emergency room parking lot, where he stopped the 

vehicle. The [Petitioner] was in the back seat, and Officer Williams noticed 

that he had injuries to his face, he had blood down the front of his body, 

and he was not wearing a shirt. When the officer asked for his name, the 

[Petitioner] replied that his name was Simms. However, the driver of the 

car, Matt Kelly, told the [Petitioner] to tell the truth, and the [Petitioner]

then told the officer that his name was Junior Woodard. Officer Williams 
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asked another officer, D‟Angelo Inman of the Tennessee Highway Patrol, 

to pat down the [Petitioner] for weapons. Officer Inman located a Taurus 

.40 caliber semi-automatic pistol in the [Petitioner]‟s pocket. The weapon 

had no clip in the grip. Officer Williams then placed the [Petitioner] in his 

patrol car and called for the city police. Officer Williams testified that he 

smelled alcohol on the [Petitioner], but that the [Petitioner] was coherent 

and had no trouble walking. Officer Inman, on the other hand, testified that 

he did not notice an odor of alcohol about the [Petitioner].

Back at the scene of the shooting, Rod Stacey was the patrolman 

with the Shelbyville Police Department who first arrived. He testified that 

he located a white male, whom he recognized as the victim, Scott Shafer, 

lying on the ground in between 714 and 716 Derry Street. Officer Stacey 

observed an entrance wound and an exit wound in the victim‟s left arm and 

an entrance wound in the victim‟s abdomen. Officer Stacey testified that 

the victim did not tell him who shot him or the circumstances surrounding 

the shooting.

Detective Eric Ely of the Shelbyville Police Department arrived on 

the scene after other officers had already secured the area and begun 

searching for evidence. He was directed to an area where David Williams 

of the Bedford County Sheriff‟s Department had located a shell casing 

earlier that evening. Detective Ely photographed the cartridge and took it 

into evidence. He testified that it was the casing of a .40 caliber bullet. At 

around 10:25 that evening, Detective Ely went to the hospital where other 

officers had the [Petitioner] in custody. There he received the Taurus pistol 

that Trooper Inman had found in the [Petitioner]‟s pocket. Detective Ely 

stated that he read the [Petitioner] his rights. Noticing that the [Petitioner]

had blood on his lip and some of his teeth were dislodged, he asked him, 

“What happened to your mouth?” The [Petitioner] replied, “I didn‟t shoot 

anybody.” The detective testified that he did not smell alcohol on the 

[Petitioner] during this conversation. Later in his investigation, Detective 

Ely went to the office of the state medical examiner, where he received the 

bullet that had been removed from the body of the victim.

Teri Arney is a forensic scientist with the Tennessee Bureau of

Investigation. She examined the shell casing found at the scene of the

shooting, the bullet extracted from the victim‟s body, and the handgun 

found in the [Petitioner]‟s pocket. She testified that the gun was a Taurus 

model PT140 .40 caliber semi-automatic pistol. She determined that the 

bullet and shell casing had been fired and ejected from the [Petitioner]‟s 

gun.
-5-

Jeff Long is the EMT worker who administered medical aid to the

victim. Mr. Long testified that when he encountered the victim, he was 

pale and sweating. The victim‟s lack of color indicated blood loss, and the

perspiration indicated that he was beginning to go into shock. These signs

suggested that the victim was bleeding internally and needed to be flown 

via helicopter to Nashville for surgery.

Jeffery Guy is a surgeon at Vanderbilt Hospital who treated the 

victim. He testified that the victim had extremely low blood pressure when 

he arrived at Vanderbilt. Despite the efforts of the surgical team, Scott 

Shafer died from blood loss as a result of gunshot wounds to the spleen, 

pancreas, and intestines.

Feng Li of the state medical examiner‟s office performed an autopsy 

on the victim‟s body on April 14, 2001. He testified that the victim died of

gunshot wounds to different internal organs, and that all of the wounds had

been caused by a single bullet. He also testified that no alcohol or drugs 

were detected in the victim‟s blood.

Rhonda Hill testified that her son Chris received a letter in May of

2001. She recognized the return address on the envelope as being the 

Bedford County Jail; so she decided to read the letter. The letter was dated 

May 23, 2001, the day after the [Petitioner]‟s preliminary hearing. The 

letter was from the [Petitioner], who referred to himself as “Juvy.” In the 

letter, the [Petitioner] stated that a girl named Shawn is “running her 

mouth.”1The [Petitioner]‟s letter asked Chris to prevent Ms. Nunnally 

from making the June 18 court date, which is the date on which the 

[Petitioner]‟s case was presented to the grand jury. Finally, the [Petitioner]

requested Chris to “hook up with Mickey and burn this [b----] house 

down.” After reading the letter, Ms. Hill went to the police station and gave 

the police the letter. Henry Young, who was in jail with the [Petitioner], 

testified that he observed the [Petitioner] writing the letter. Mr. Young 

testified that after his preliminary hearing on May 22, 2001, the [Petitioner]

mentioned LaShawn Nunnally‟s testimony and that it “needed to be taken 

care of.”

After the State rested its case, the [Petitioner] testified on his own

behalf. He stated that, on the afternoon of April 13, 2001, he had been out

riding with the victim, Scott Shafer. The [Petitioner] had drunk three quarts

of Budweiser beer in thirty minutes when he first joined the victim. After 

 

1

 “Shawn” refers to LaShawn Nunnally. 
-6-

the [Petitioner] left the victim‟s car, the [Petitioner] decided to walk to 

LaShawn Nunnally‟s house. When he arrived, the victim was already 

there. The two men exchanged words regarding whether the victim had 

tried to “holler” at the [Petitioner]‟s girlfriend. At this point, the 

[Petitioner] testified that his gun was in his pocket. He handed the gun to 

Ms. Nunnally, and the argument between the [Petitioner] and the victim 

escalated into a fight. The victim punched the [Petitioner] in the mouth, 

and the two wrestled on the ground. During the fight, the [Petitioner]

suffered a busted lip and lost a tooth. After the fight, the two men 

apologized to each other, hugged, and left in the victim‟s car. The

[Petitioner] stated that when they left, Ms. Nunnally still had the gun.

The [Petitioner] and the victim then went to a store, where the

[Petitioner] bought another quart of beer. After riding around for awhile, 

the two men returned to Ms. Nunnally‟s house. When they arrived, Ms. 

Nunnally and Mike Jones were there. The group was sitting on the front 

porch talking, when Jarmaine Hill showed up. Mr. Hill and Ms. Nunnally 

went inside the house for fifteen to thirty minutes. When Mr. Hill came 

back onto the front porch, he told the [Petitioner] that he wanted to speak 

with him. The two men walked down the street and talked. The [Petitioner]

testified that when they returned, he sat back down on Ms. Nunnally‟s front 

porch. Then the [Petitioner] looked up and observed Mr. Hill pointing a 

gun at the victim. The [Petitioner] stated that Mr. Hill shot the victim. Mr. 

Hill ran away, but the [Petitioner] remained on the porch. At that time, Ms. 

Nunnally approached the [Petitioner], said “Here,” and handed him the 

pistol. The [Petitioner] took the gun and ran. The [Petitioner] said that he 

ran past Smith‟s Food Town, and he stopped and knocked on the door of 

James Wheeler because he did not know how to get to his friend Matt 

Kelly‟s house. While he was at Mr. Wheeler‟s house, Matt Kelly drove up, 

and the [Petitioner] got in his car. The [Petitioner] testified that they drove 

to the hospital because he was concerned about the victim. Later on in his 

testimony, the [Petitioner] admitted writing the letter to Chris Hodge asking 

him to burn down the house of LaShawn Nunnally “to make her stop lying 

on [him].”

The defense called Jarmaine Hill as a witness, but he asserted his 

Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination. Therefore, the trial 

court declared Mr. Hill unavailable, and the defense called Randall Lottie. 

Mr. Lottie testified that, while he was incarcerated with Mr. Hill, he heard 

Mr. Hill say that he killed Scott Shafer. Mr. Hill said that Mr. Shafer owed 

him money for drugs, and that another person was in jail for his crime.
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Dennis Cedric Woodard, Jr., 2003 WL 169082, at *1-5. 

On April 19, 2005, the Petitioner filed a pro se petition for post-conviction relief, 

alleging that he received the ineffective assistance of counsel. The Petitioner argued in 

his petition that the post-conviction court should toll the one-year statute of limitations 

because he did not learn the supreme court denied his application for permission to 

appeal until after the statute of limitations in which to file his petition for post-conviction 

relief expired. The post-conviction court determined that the petition was untimely and 

that tolling of the statute of limitations was not warranted. The Petitioner did not appeal 

the dismissal of the petition, but he filed a second petition on May 10, 2013, requesting

post-conviction relief and a writ of error coram nobis. See Dennis Cedric Woodard, Jr. v. 

State, No. M2013-01857-CCA-R3-PC, 2014 WL 4536641, at *5 (Tenn. Crim. App. Sept. 

15, 2014), no perm. app. field. Although the Petitioner conceded his second petition was 

untimely, he requested tolling of the statute of limitations period in the interests of justice 

based upon his allegation that trial counsel deliberately deceived him by failing to 

disclose that counsel previously represented one of the State‟s witnesses. Id. at *6. The 

Petitioner, likewise, alleged multiple grounds of the ineffective assistance of counsel. 

The post-conviction court dismissed the petition as untimely and did not render findings 

of fact or conclusions of law relative to the request for a writ of error coram nobis. Id. 

This court reversed the summary dismissal based upon the Petitioner‟s diligent pursuit of 

appellate relief and remanded the case for an evidentiary hearing on the post-conviction 

and coram nobis claims. Id. at *11.

At the evidentiary hearing, trial counsel testified that he had practiced law for 

twenty-five years and that he had been an assistant public defender for sixteen years. 

Counsel said that he had worked in the public defender‟s office for two years at the time

he represented the Petitioner. Counsel said that he investigated the Petitioner‟s case by 

interviewing witnesses, talking to the Petitioner, following up on discovery, and 

reviewing the autopsy and laboratory reports. He said he interviewed the police officers 

involved, although he did not have any records relative to their conversations. He said 

the physicians were interviewed before the trial, although he could not recall whether he 

or the investigator interviewed them. 

Trial counsel testified that he previously represented Brooke Whitaker but not 

when he represented the Petitioner. Counsel said that relative to the Petitioner‟s case, he 

first heard Ms. Whitaker‟s name when he read the post-conviction petition. Counsel was 

unsure whether he knew the offense occurred near Ms. Whitaker‟s home and said that he 

did not know where she lived at the time of the offense and that nobody mentioned Ms. 

Whitaker‟s name in connection with the Petitioner‟s case. 
-8-

Trial counsel testified that the Petitioner claimed he was innocent and that counsel 

determined a mental health expert was unnecessary relative to the Petitioner‟s intent at 

the time of the offense. Counsel knew about the Petitioner‟s juvenile psychiatric records 

and said that had an expert testified, the jury would have heard evidence the Petitioner 

had been previously diagnosed with “intermittent explosive disorder,” which counsel 

described as “flying off the handle” and committing violent acts. Counsel said that he 

recalled the Petitioner had been previously evaluated for mental health reasons but did 

not recall the Petitioner‟s being hospitalized in a mental health facility. Counsel recalled 

that the Petitioner‟s diagnosis was depression caused by legal difficulties. Counsel said 

that based upon the diagnosis, requesting an expert was pointless. Counsel was unsure 

whether the trial court would have granted a request for expert funding. 

Trial counsel testified that he did not obtain an expert to testify about the 

Petitioner‟s intoxication because the evidence showed the Petitioner had been drinking on 

the day of the offense. Counsel said that after reviewing the records and the witness 

statements and speaking with the Petitioner, counsel determined an intoxication expert 

was unnecessary. 

Trial counsel testified that he was familiar with Henry Young, that he had 

represented Mr. Young, and that Mr. Young had been a long-time client of the public 

defender‟s office. Counsel denied, though, that he represented the Petitioner and Mr. 

Young simultaneously. Counsel said that the public defender‟s office represented Mr. 

Young before the homicide in the Petitioner‟s case, that Mr. Young pleaded guilty, and 

that Mr. Young, ultimately, violated the conditions of his community corrections 

sentence. Counsel said that at some point, Mr. Young incurred additional charges, that 

the public defender‟s office represented Mr. Young, that Mr. Young pleaded guilty, and 

that this charge occurred when the Petitioner‟s case was pending. Counsel said that after 

Mr. Young pleaded guilty in the subsequent case, counsel received the State‟s 

supplemental witness list in the Petitioner‟s case, which included Mr. Young. Counsel 

said that at that point, the public defender‟s office had ended its representation of Mr. 

Young. 

Trial counsel testified that the Petitioner reported counsel to the Board of 

Professional Responsibility, alleging that counsel represented the Petitioner and Mr. 

Young simultaneously and that counsel advised Mr. Young to testify against the 

Petitioner. Counsel denied the allegations and said that the Board of Professional 

Responsibility opened an investigation and, ultimately, dismissed the complaint. Counsel 

admitted he represented Mr. Young while the Petitioner‟s case was pending but said he 

did not represent Mr. Young at the time of the Petitioner‟s trial. Counsel agreed he 

represented the Petitioner when counsel represented Mr. Young at an August 2, 2001 

guilty plea hearing but said that he and the public defender‟s office had no information or 

knowledge that Mr. Young was involved with or connected to the Petitioner‟s case. 
-9-

Counsel agreed the supplemental witness list relative to the Petitioner‟s case was received 

on October 5, 2001. Counsel said he did not file a motion to withdraw as the Petitioner‟s 

counsel because neither counsel nor the public defender‟s office represented Mr. Young 

when counsel learned Mr. Young was a State‟s witness at the Petitioner‟s trial. Counsel 

said he probably considered whether a motion to withdraw was necessary but said his 

office no longer represented Mr. Young. Counsel recalled that he received the 

supplemental witness list sixty days after his office ended its representation of Mr. Young 

and that no conflict of interests existed at that point. Counsel said that the Petitioner 

knew counsel represented Mr. Young because the Petitioner mentioned it to counsel. 

Trial counsel testified that Mr. Young‟s testifying at the Petitioner‟s trial was not 

“as big a deal” as the woman who testified that she saw the Petitioner shoot the victim 

and that the woman was identified as a State‟s witness in the initial witness list. He said 

that although Mr. Young was not his client when counsel received the supplemental 

witness list, counsel spoke to Mr. Young, who said that he saw the Petitioner write a 

letter while Mr. Young and the Petitioner were confined in the jail. Counsel said cocounsel cross-examined Mr. Young at the trial. Counsel said that his office did not work 

on the Petitioner‟s appeal and that a private attorney was appointed for the appeal. 

Trial counsel testified that the State obtained permission from the trial court to 

introduce a letter written by the Petitioner in which the Petitioner attempted to solicit the 

killing of Ms. Nunnally and that the defense did not object to the letter because the 

Petitioner admitted writing it. Counsel said that he received a notice of intent to 

introduce the letter and that a pretrial hearing was probably held, although he had no 

recollection of it. He agreed the transcript reflected that the parties discussed Mr. 

Young‟s testifying relative to the letter and that counsel told the trial court the defense 

had interviewed Mr. Young before the trial. Counsel said he told the trial court that he 

would object on the basis of relevance to questions about who represented Mr. Young 

when Mr. Young obtained his convictions. Counsel said the Petitioner was told that Mr. 

Young saw the Petitioner write the letter and would testify against the Petitioner. 

Counsel said that he last represented Mr. Young at a guilty plea hearing on August 2, 

2001, and that during the plea negotiations, no discussion occurred about Mr. Young‟s 

receiving any benefit for testifying against the Petitioner. 

Trial counsel testified that although he did not maintain records about how much 

time he spent on trial preparation, he estimated he spent at least forty hours preparing for 

the Petitioner‟s trial. Counsel said that he and the Petitioner discussed the possibility of 

an intoxication defense in conjunction with the Petitioner‟s mental health issues, although 

counsel did not specifically recall the conversation. Counsel initially believed the State 

extended a plea offer for second degree murder but said after reviewing his file and 

speaking to the prosecutor, that no offer was made to the Petitioner. Counsel recalled 

attempting to solicit an offer and focusing on the Petitioner‟s youth and psychiatric 
-10-

problems as a basis for a guilty plea to a lesser included offense. Counsel said that the 

State believed it had adequate proof for a first degree murder conviction and that the 

Petitioner‟s only options were to plead guilty to first degree murder or to go to trial. 

Counsel said he spoke to the prosecutor and did not write correspondence during 

negotiations. Counsel agreed that his goal was to negotiate a plea agreement for anything 

less than first degree murder but that the prosecutor was unwilling to negotiate. 

Trial counsel testified that he did not know when the defense received the letter 

the Petitioner wrote while in jail. Counsel did not recall what questions were asked of 

Mr. Young during co-counsel‟s cross-examination. Counsel also did not recall opening 

statements or closing arguments. Counsel was familiar with the name Jermaine Hill, 

although counsel did not know Mr. Hill personally. Counsel did not recall whether Mr. 

Hill was the person the defense identified as the perpetrator. 

On cross-examination, trial counsel testified that before the Petitioner‟s trial, 

counsel did not know Ms. Whitaker but that counsel represented Ms. Whitaker multiple 

times after the Petitioner‟s trial. Counsel said that the Petitioner never mentioned Ms. 

Whitaker. Counsel agreed that the trial evidence showed that the Petitioner drank several 

“quarts” of beer on the day of the shooting and that the jury knew of the Petitioner‟s 

intoxication. Counsel said he did not want the jury to hear evidence of the Petitioner‟s 

intermittent explosive disorder diagnosis because counsel knew the trial evidence would 

show the Petitioner and the victim had an altercation hours before the shooting. 

Trial counsel testified that he learned of Mr. Young‟s involvement in the 

Petitioner‟s case when the State filed its supplemental witness list and that generally, the 

State provided the defense with information about additional witnesses and how the 

witnesses related to a case. Counsel said that even if he had learned confidential 

information during his representation of Mr. Young, any confidential information learned 

would not have been to the Petitioner‟s detriment. Counsel agreed his and the public 

defender‟s office‟s practices were to contact the Board of Professional Responsibility to 

determine whether a conflict might prevent counsel or his office from representing a 

defendant. Counsel agreed that no discussions were held with Mr. Young about the 

Petitioner‟s case until the State filed its supplemental witness list. Counsel said the trial 

judge was told about counsel‟s previously representing Mr. Young. 

Trial counsel testified that the letter written by the Petitioner while in jail was 

discovered by the State after the preliminary hearing and that the letter was postmarked 

May 24, two days after the preliminary hearing. Counsel said the Petitioner admitted 

writing the letter to Chris Hodge and requesting that Mr. Hodge kill Ms. Nunnally by 

burning her home. Counsel agreed that the extent of Mr. Young‟s trial testimony was 

that Mr. Young witnessed the Petitioner write the letter and that the Petitioner asked Mr. 

Young for assistance spelling a couple of words. 
-11-

Trial counsel testified that had he sought to admit the Petitioner‟s mental health 

records, the jury would have heard evidence of the Petitioner‟s owning a firearm and 

firing the gun during a struggle with his father. Counsel agreed the evaluating 

psychiatrist would have been subject to cross-examination. Counsel said he was 

concerned about the psychiatrist‟s testifying about the Petitioner‟s disruptive, aggressive, 

and violent behaviors and about the psychiatrist‟s conclusion that the Petitioner did not 

have any mental health illness requiring inpatient treatment. 

On redirect examination, trial counsel testified that he did not know Dana Brown 

and that he did not recall the name associated with the return address on the envelope of 

the Petitioner‟s letter to Mr. Hodge. 

Upon questioning by the post-conviction court, trial counsel testified that Mr. 

Young did not disclose any impeachable conduct or prior bad acts during counsel‟s 

representation of Mr. Young. Relative to the Petitioner‟s letter, counsel said the 

Petitioner admitted writing the letter to counsel privately, and counsel thought the 

Petitioner was questioned about the letter at the trial. 

Co-counsel testified that he had been a licensed attorney since 1999 and that his 

career had been devoted to criminal defense work. He recalled working on the 

preliminary hearing in the Petitioner‟s case but said trial counsel was the primary 

attorney. Co-counsel said that at the time of the Petitioner‟s case, co-counsel was 

relatively inexperienced, handled general sessions court, and assisted trial counsel in 

criminal court. Co-counsel recalled the Petitioner insisted on attempting to obtain a not 

guilty verdict and did not want to pursue an intoxication defense. 

Co-counsel testified that Mr. Young was a witness for the State and that although 

the public defender‟s office represented Mr. Young before the Petitioner‟s case, the 

public defender‟s office did not represent the Petitioner and Mr. Young simultaneously. 

Co-counsel said that a conflict of interests existed if the public defender‟s office 

represented a defendant and a State‟s witness simultaneously. Co-counsel said that he 

cross-examined Mr. Young at the trial and that co-counsel asked Mr. Young if the 

Petitioner told him that Ms. Nunnally was lying and whether Mr. Young read the 

Petitioner‟s letter. Co-counsel agreed he did not ask Mr. Young about his burglaryrelated convictions and said the evidence about Mr. Young‟s previous convictions was 

elicited by the prosecutor on direct examination. Co-counsel said he cross-examined Mr. 

Young in an effort to gain experience, not because trial counsel might have had a conflict 

of interests. 

Henry Young testified that the Petitioner was a friend and that they were confined 

at the same jail. Mr. Young said that just before the Petitioner‟s trial, trial counsel came 

to the jail to talk to Mr. Young. Mr. Young said that counsel had represented him a few 
-12-

times. He said that at the time of the Petitioner‟s trial, he had a previous conviction for 

burglary and that counsel was his attorney. He said he received a two-year sentence, 

served one year in jail before being released, and returned to jail after being arrested for 

driving with a suspended license. He said that after his release was revoked, counsel 

came to the jail to talk to him. Mr. Young considered counsel his attorney at that time 

and said counsel asked what Mr. Young knew about the Petitioner‟s case. Mr. Young 

said he told counsel, “Nothing.” Mr. Young said he told counsel that Mr. Young 

frequently assisted the Petitioner with writing letters. Mr. Young said he and counsel

spoke about other topics, but he could not recall what they discussed. Mr. Young said 

that he did not know counsel represented the Petitioner at the time of their conversation. 

Mr. Young did not recall talking to the police or to the prosecutor about the Petitioner‟s 

letter.

On cross-examination, Mr. Young testified that he received a community 

corrections sentence upon being convicted of burglary in 1999, that he served one year in 

jail before being released to community corrections, that he violated the terms of his 

release, and that he was ordered to serve his sentence, which was enhanced to three years. 

Mr. Young said trial counsel represented him for the burglary charge and the community 

corrections violation. Mr. Young stated that he pleaded guilty to two counts of 

aggravated burglary on August 2, 2001, that he received an effective four-year sentence, 

and that counsel was his attorney. Mr. Young denied telling counsel that he committed 

crimes for which he was not charged while counsel represented him. 

Mr. Young testified that trial counsel came to speak with him about the 

Petitioner‟s case, that counsel discussed the prosecutor‟s adding Mr. Young‟s name to the 

witness list relative to the Petitioner‟s trial, that counsel said the reason was based upon a 

letter, and that counsel asked what he knew about the letter. Mr. Young said that he did 

not regard the conversation as important or confidential at the time. Mr. Young agreed 

that the aggravated burglary cases had been resolved by plea agreement at the time 

counsel came to talk to him about the Petitioner‟s case but that he was unsure whether he

had been sentenced. Mr. Young agreed the aggravated burglary judgments were entered 

on August 2, 2001, and that his case had ended when the Petitioner‟s trial began in 

October 2001. Mr. Young agreed that he did not return to court after he pleaded guilty to 

aggravated burglary. Mr. Young stated that at the time of the post-conviction hearing, he 

was on probation and that counsel was not his attorney for this matter. 

The Petitioner testified that trial counsel and co-counsel visited him at the jail 

three times before the trial. The Petitioner said that as a juvenile, he used drugs, had a 

history with the police, and had obtained mental health counseling and treatment at two 

hospitals. The Petitioner agreed that he had been drinking on the night of the shooting 

and said that no physicians evaluated him before the trial. He agreed he testified at the 

trial and said had he known trial counsel had represented Mr. Young, the Petitioner
-13-

would not have testified. The Petitioner said information related to counsel‟s 

representing Mr. Young was “kept from” him. He said he learned counsel had previously 

represented Mr. Young about two years before the post-conviction hearing. 

The Petitioner testified that he told trial counsel and co-counsel that he was not 

guilty but that the Petitioner did not discuss the details of the day of the shooting with 

counsel. The Petitioner said, though, he provided detailed information to defense 

investigators. He said he filed the instant post-conviction petition after learning that 

counsel previously represented Mr. Young and that a conflict of interests existed. 

The Petitioner testified that the prosecutor engaged in misconduct at the trial by 

introducing the pending solicitation to commit murder charge stemming from the letter 

discussed during Mr. Young‟s trial testimony and that trial counsel and co-counsel did 

not object to the evidence because counsel had previously represented Mr. Young. Upon 

examination of the trial transcript, the parties agreed that a jury-out hearing was held and 

that the jury never heard evidence of the pending solicitation to commit murder charge. 

The Petitioner stated, though, his issue stemmed from counsel‟s failure to object to the 

admission of the letter in which Mr. Young assisted. The Petitioner said that he would 

not have testified at the trial had he known of the conflict of interests.

The Petitioner testified that during the trial, the attorneys and the judge had 

conferences in an office adjoining the courtroom and that he did not know what 

transpired. The Petitioner said the State extended a plea offer for second degree murder 

in exchange for twenty-five years at 85% service. He said that had he known of the 

conflict of interests he would have not gone to trial. 

The Petitioner testified that trial counsel told the jury during opening statements 

that the Petitioner was innocent but that counsel presented evidence of intoxication. The 

Petitioner said that counsel did not retain an expert to establish his intoxication but rather 

attempted to introduce a toxicology report reflecting the Petitioner‟s intoxication level 

through the medical examiner. The Petitioner said that the report was not admitted in 

evidence because counsel could not establish the chain of custody and that the trial court 

would not permit counsel to present the witness who performed the analysis because 

counsel failed to provide notice of the witness‟s testimony. The Petitioner agreed, 

though, counsel cross-examined the medical examiner about the effects of the Petitioner‟s 

blood alcohol concentration of .235. 

The Petitioner testified that he only received Randall Lotti‟s police statement 

before the trial. The Petitioner said that Brooke Whitaker and Evette McGee could have 

testified at the trial about his state of mind on the night of the shooting. The Petitioner 

said he told trial counsel about Ms. Whitaker because the shooting occurred at her home. 

The Petitioner said counsel also did not investigate the second bullet hole in the victim‟s 
-14-

car. The Petitioner said that counsel did not prepare a closing argument. The Petitioner 

said counsel told the jury that his closing argument was based upon counsel‟s memory of 

the testimony and that if counsel said something incorrect, the jurors should rely upon 

their memories. 

On cross-examination, the Petitioner testified that his defense was he did not shoot 

the victim and that he knew who shot the victim. The Petitioner agreed that he wanted 

the jury to believe his testimony that he did not kill the victim and that he had a clear 

mind at the time of the shooting. The Petitioner said, though, that counsel should have 

presented evidence of his intoxication at the time of the shooting because the “mitigating 

evidence” could have resulted in a “dismissal” of the murder charge. He agreed the jury 

heard evidence that the Petitioner had consumed four quarts of beer and that he was 

intoxicated.

The Petitioner testified that had he “may have” pleaded guilty in exchange for 

twenty-five years at 85% had he known trial counsel represented Mr. Young. The 

Petitioner agreed that counsel learned Mr. Young would testify about five days before the 

trial and said that he would not have proceeded to the trial with counsel regardless of 

whether the plea offer was still available had he known of the conflict of interests. The 

Petitioner said he would have requested a new attorney because he would not have been 

able to trust counsel. The Petitioner agreed that Mr. Young testified that the Petitioner 

wrote a letter and that the Petitioner testified he wrote the letter. The Petitioner said the 

letter should not have been admitted at the trial because the trial was about LaShawn 

Nunnally‟s seeing the Petitioner shoot the victim and about the police officer‟s finding 

the murder weapon in the Petitioner‟s pants pocket. The Petitioner said that he was not 

on trial for the solicitation charge and that the letter was irrelevant to the murder charge. 

The Petitioner said that he would not have testified at the trial had he known counsel 

previously represented Mr. Young. The Petitioner agreed that his defense of innocence 

would have been the same with another attorney. 

The Petitioner testified that after the trial, he pleaded guilty to the solicitation 

charge related to the letter and that trial counsel represented him at the guilty plea 

hearing. The Petitioner acknowledged he testified at the homicide trial that he wrote the 

letter and that he would have been convicted of solicitation had he gone to trial. 

The post-conviction court denied relief. Relative to the Petitioner‟s claim that trial 

counsel failed to investigate the circumstances of the Petitioner‟s case adequately and 

failed to gather exculpatory and mitigating evidence, the court found that the allegations

were “mere conclusion[s]” without supporting evidence. The court credited counsel‟s 

testimony and found that counsel reviewed the preliminary hearing testimony with cocounsel, who conducted the hearing, spoke with the investigating police officers and 
-15-

witnesses, and reviewed the Petitioner‟s medical and psychological records. The court 

found that the Petitioner had failed to show any deficient performance or prejudice. 

Relative to the Petitioner‟s claim that trial counsel and co-counsel failed to 

interview witnesses to the shooting and that counsel failed to interview and obtain 

exculpatory evidence from Evetta McGee, the post-conviction court found that Ms. 

McGee did not testify at the evidentiary hearing and that as a result, the Petitioner had 

failed to establish any deficient performance or prejudice. The court noted that Ms. 

McGee was incarcerated at the time of the post-conviction hearing. 

Relative to the Petitioner‟s claim that trial counsel failed to present as a defense 

witness Brooke Whitaker, who would have provided exculpatory testimony, the postconviction court found that counsel was unaware until the post-conviction hearing that

Ms. Whitaker was a potential trial witness. The court found that Ms. Whitaker was not 

presented at the evidentiary hearing and that counsel did not provide deficient 

performance because Ms. Whitaker‟s name was not provided to trial counsel, although 

Ms. Whitaker was known to the Petitioner. The court found that the Petitioner presented 

no evidence that the outcome of the trial would have been different had Ms. Whitaker‟s 

testimony been offered. The court noted that Ms. Whitaker was incarcerated, along with 

Ms. McGee, for a rape committed at the Bedford County Jail. 

Relative to the Petitioner‟s claim that trial counsel failed to investigate and employ 

the use of experts relative to the scientific evidence, the post-conviction court found that 

little evidence was presented at the evidentiary hearing that the use of experts would have 

had a reasonable probability of affecting the jury‟s verdict. The court found that the jury 

was presented with evidence relative to the Petitioner‟s consuming four quarts of beer 

shortly before the shooting and that counsel cross-examined the medical examiner about 

the effects of alcohol. The court stated that the Petitioner‟s claim that counsel was 

deficient by failing to obtain experts on the issue of intoxication to rebut proof of 

premeditation was “curious” based upon the claim counsel was deficient by changing the 

defense theory during the trial. 

Relative to the Petitioner‟s claim that trial counsel was representing Mr. Young at 

the time of the Petitioner‟s trial, the post-conviction court found that counsel had 

previously represented Mr. Young but that the representation had ended before the 

Petitioner‟s trial. The court found that Mr. Young was not identified as a State‟s witness 

on the original witness list and that Mr. Young‟s name was provided to counsel days 

before the trial. The court noted that counsel‟s representation of Mr. Young ended on 

August 2, 2001, and found that counsel did not speak to Mr. Young regarding the 

Petitioner‟s case before the supplemental witness list was received by counsel. The court 

found that Mr. Young could not and did not receive any consideration for his testimony 

in the Petitioner‟s case because Mr. Young‟s case had been resolved by August 2.
-16-

Relative to the Petitioner‟s claim that trial counsel failed to disclose a conflict of 

interests regarding Mr. Young, the post-conviction court found that no conflict existed. 

The court found that counsel learned nothing from his representing Mr. Young that would 

have impaired counsel‟s ability to represent the Petitioner and that the issue was 

disclosed to the trial court when it arose. The court noted that the Board of Professional 

Responsibility dismissed the Petitioner‟s complaint. The court found that although 

counsel met with Mr. Young after the supplemental witness list was provided to the 

defense in October 2001, counsel did not advise Mr. Young to testify against the 

Petitioner. The court noted that counsel would have been negligent by not attempting to 

ascertain what Mr. Young knew about the Petitioner‟s case. 

Relative to the Petitioner‟s claim that trial counsel failed to impeach Mr. Young‟s 

credibility with his previous felony convictions, other specific instances of conduct, and 

his benefiting from his testimony, the post-conviction court found that the prosecutor 

elicited testimony on direct examination about Mr. Young‟s convictions. The court 

found that counsel did not receive information about any specific instances of conduct 

that could have impeached Mr. Young‟s credibility and that no instances of conduct were

presented at the post-conviction hearing. The court noted that Mr. Young testified at the 

hearing that he never disclosed to counsel any conduct that could have provided a basis 

for impeachment. The court found that Mr. Young‟s conversations with counsel were 

confined to Mr. Young‟s pending charges and that no evidence showed Mr. Young 

received any benefit for testifying at the Petitioner‟s trial. 

Relative to the Petitioner‟s claim that trial counsel failed to impeach Ms. Nunnally 

with her prior inconsistent statements regarding the night of the shooting, the postconviction court found that no evidence was presented regarding the allegation. The 

court found that the Petitioner did not present proof at the post-conviction hearing about 

what evidence counsel should have used to impeach Ms. Nunnally and whether the 

evidence would have had a reasonable probability of affecting the jury‟s verdict. 

Relative to the Petitioner‟s claim that trial counsel failed to review laboratory 

reports and medical records and failed to obtain an expert to review these documents, the 

post-conviction court found that counsel reviewed these records and knew the Petitioner 

had been diagnosed with intermittent explosive disorder. The court determined that, 

given the nature of the first degree murder charge, presenting the records at the trial 

would have caused harm because the records discussed the Petitioner‟s violent 

tendencies. The court found that no evidence offered at the post-conviction hearing 

would have affected the jury‟s verdict if it had been presented at the trial. The court 

noted that the Petitioner adamantly claimed he was innocent and found that the chosen 

defense strategy resulted in the records having little evidentiary value. 
-17-

Relative to the Petitioner‟s claim that trial counsel failed to procure funding for 

expert witnesses relative to the Petitioner‟s intoxication and mental state at the time of the 

offense, the post-conviction court found that counsel cross-examined the medical 

examiner on the effects of consuming alcohol. The court found that the jury heard 

evidence of the Petitioner‟s intoxication at the time of the shooting and that as a result, 

the evidence was presented to the jury. The court noted that the evidence of the 

Petitioner‟s intoxication and the effects of alcohol was immaterial because the Petitioner 

claimed he was innocent. 

Relative to the Petitioner‟s claim that trial counsel failed to obtain an expert 

witness to challenge the medical examiner‟s conclusions in relation to other witness 

testimony, the post-conviction court found that no evidence regarding this allegation was 

presented at the evidentiary hearing. The court noted that the Petitioner did not identify 

the witnesses to which he referred in his petition. 

Relative to the Petitioner‟s claim that trial counsel failed to choose a trial strategy 

based upon adequate investigation, the post-conviction court found that the Petitioner 

claimed he did not shoot the victim, rendering his mental health problems and 

intoxication at the time of the shooting immaterial. The court concluded that the 

Petitioner‟s guilt was established with “considerable proof” at the trial and found that the 

Petitioner forced counsel to defend the case based upon the Petitioner‟s innocence rather 

than by offering mitigating evidence that “might or might not have” resulted in a 

conviction for a lesser included offense. The court found that the Petitioner testified at 

the trial and at the post-conviction hearing that he was not guilty and identified Jermaine 

Hill as the perpetrator. The court found that Mr. Hill invoked his privilege against selfincrimination and that Randall Lottie testified about Mr. Hill‟s involvement in the 

shooting. The court found that the jury heard evidence that the Petitioner was not the 

shooter and that the jury‟s verdict reflects it rejected this theory. 

The post-conviction court found that no evidence was presented to support the 

Petitioner‟s claim that trial counsel failed to prepare the Petitioner to testify at the trial. 

The court found that the Petitioner had failed to establish prejudice.

Relative to the Petitioner‟s claim that trial counsel abandoned the initial defense 

that the Petitioner was not the shooter and presented evidence at the trial of the 

Petitioner‟s intoxication as a means to negate the element of premeditation, the postconviction court found after reviewing the trial transcript that counsel did not change 

defense strategy mid-trial. The court found that counsel‟s focus during the opening 

statement, the proof, and the closing argument was that Mr. Hill was the shooter. The 

court found that questioning the medical examiner about the effects of intoxication was 

not inconsistent with the chosen defense. 
-18-

The coram nobis court also denied the petition for a writ of error coram nobis. 

Relative to the Petitioner‟s claim that trial counsel failed to disclose and intentionally 

concealed a conflict of interests, the court found that no new evidence was presented. 

The court found that although the record reflected a side-bar discussion was held with the 

trial judge, counsel, and the prosecutor, no evidence showed the Petitioner was present

for the discussion. The court found that it was likely the Petitioner was unaware of the 

former representation and that the Petitioner would not have been at fault for not 

discovering the previous representation earlier. The court found, though, that the 

previous representation did not have an impact on the outcome of the trial. The court 

found that the previous representation had ended before the State supplemented its 

witness list to include Mr. Young and that Mr. Young and counsel did not discuss any 

conduct that could have been used to impeach Mr. Young. This appeal followed.

As a preliminary matter, the State argues the Petitioner is barred from receiving 

post-conviction relief. The State initially asserts that this court‟s previous opinion 

ordered an evidentiary hearing not on the merits of the Petitioner‟s allegations contained

in the petitions but, rather, for the purpose of providing the Petitioner an opportunity to 

present proof of whether appellate counsel informed the Petitioner that the supreme court 

denied his application for permission to appeal because “[i]t appears that the petitioner‟s 

timely pursuit of relief was hindered by, if true, his appellate counsel not informing him 

of the denial of his application for permission to appeal to the supreme court in 2003.” 

Dennis Cedric Woodard, Jr., 2014 WL 4536641, at *11. We disagree with the State‟s 

interpretation of this court‟s instructions. This court concluded that “[c]onsidering the 

procedural situation and cumulative claims in this case, the record suggests that the 

petitioner has been „pursuing his rights diligently‟ upon learning of such rights . . . and 

that due process at least requires that the petitioner be afforded the opportunity to present 

proof as to his claims.” Dennis Cedric Woodard, Jr., 2014 WL 4536641, at *11. This 

court determined that the statute of limitations was tolled and ordered an evidentiary 

hearing on the merits of the Petitioner‟s post-conviction and coram nobis allegations. We 

note the State did not file an application for permission to appeal to our supreme court. 

Likewise, the State asserts that the post-conviction petition court‟s 2005 summary 

dismissal of the original petition as untimely prevents the Petitioner from obtaining postconviction relief from the present petition. See T.C.A. § 40-30-102(c) (2014) (stating the 

Post-Conviction Act “contemplates the filing of only one (1) petition for post-conviction 

relief be filed attacking a single judgment”). However, Code section 40-30-102(c) also 

states, “If a prior petition has been filed which was resolved on the merits by a court of 

competent jurisdiction, any second or subsequent petition shall be summarily dismissed.” 

(emphasis added). The record reflects that the Petitioner‟s petition was not resolved on 

the merits, and this court concluded in the previous appeal that the Petitioner was entitled 

to an evidentiary hearing on the petitions for post-conviction relief and for a writ of error 
-19-

coram nobis. See Dennis Cedric Woodard, Jr., 2014 WL 4536641, at *11. We will 

consider the Petitioner‟s allegations on their merits. 

I. Petition for Post-Conviction Relief

Post-conviction relief is available “when the conviction or sentence is void or 

voidable because of the abridgement of any right guaranteed by the Constitution of 

Tennessee or the Constitution of the United States.” T.C.A. § 40-30-103 (2012). A 

petitioner has the burden of proving his factual allegations by clear and convincing 

evidence. Id. § 40-30-110(f) (2012). A post-conviction court‟s findings of fact are 

binding on appeal, and this court must defer to them “unless the evidence in the record 

preponderates against those findings.” Henley v. State, 960 S.W.2d 572, 578 (Tenn. 

1997); see Fields v. State, 40 S.W.3d 450, 456-57 (Tenn. 2001). A post-conviction 

court‟s application of law to its factual findings is subject to a de novo standard of review 

without a presumption of correctness. Fields, 40 S.W.3d at 457-58. 

A. Ineffective Assistance of Counsel

To establish a post-conviction claim of the ineffective assistance of counsel in 

violation of the Sixth Amendment, a petitioner has the burden of proving that (1) 

counsel‟s performance was deficient and (2) the deficient performance prejudiced the 

defense. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984); see Lockhart v. Fretwell, 

506 U.S. 364, 368-72 (1993). The Tennessee Supreme Court has applied the Strickland

standard to an accused‟s right to counsel under article I, section 9 of the Tennessee 

Constitution. See State v. Melson, 772 S.W.2d 417, 419 n.2 (Tenn. 1989).

A petitioner must satisfy both prongs of the Strickland test in order to prevail in an 

ineffective assistance of counsel claim. Henley, 960 S.W.2d at 580. “[F]ailure to prove 

either deficiency or prejudice provides a sufficient basis to deny relief on the ineffective 

assistance claim.” Goad v. State, 938 S.W.2d 363, 370 (Tenn. 1996). To establish the 

performance prong, a petitioner must show that “the advice given, or the services 

rendered . . . , are [not] within the range of competence demanded of attorneys in criminal 

cases.” Baxter v. Rose, 523 S.W.2d 930, 936 (Tenn. 1975); see Strickland, 466 U.S. at 

690. The post-conviction court must determine if these acts or omissions, viewed in light 

of all of the circumstances, fell “outside the wide range of professionally competent 

assistance.” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 690. A petitioner “is not entitled to the benefit of 

hindsight, may not second-guess a reasonably based trial strategy by his counsel, and 

cannot criticize a sound, but unsuccessful, tactical decision.” Adkins v. State, 911 S.W.2d 

334, 347 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1994); see Pylant v. State, 263 S.W.3d 854, 874 (Tenn. 

2008). This deference, however, only applies “if the choices are informed . . . based upon 

adequate preparation.” Cooper v. State, 847 S.W.2d 521, 528 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1992). 

To establish the prejudice prong, a petitioner must show that “there is a reasonable 
-20-

probability that, but for counsel‟s unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding 

would have been different.” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694. “A reasonable probability is a 

probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome.” Id.

1. Failure to Investigate Possible Defenses

The Petitioner argues that trial counsel failed to investigate adequately the 

viability of possible defenses associated with the Petitioner‟s mental health and 

intoxication. The State responds that the post-conviction court properly denied relief. 

Trial counsel‟s credited testimony reflects that his investigation efforts included 

interviewing witnesses, talking to the Petitioner, reviewing the discovery materials, 

reviewing the autopsy and laboratory reports, and interviewing police officers and 

physicians. Counsel estimated spending forty hours preparing for the Petitioner‟s trial. 

Counsel testified that the Petitioner claimed he was innocent but knew who killed the 

victim. Although counsel reviewed the Petitioner‟s mental health records and was aware 

of the intermittent explosive disorder diagnosis, counsel concluded that a mental health 

expert was unnecessary because the defense strategy was that the Petitioner did not shoot 

the victim. Counsel concluded that evidence of the Petitioner‟s mental health was not 

relevant to the chosen defense and that presenting an expert to testify about the 

Petitioner‟s violent tendencies would have been detrimental to the Petitioner. The proof 

at the trial established that the Petitioner and the victim were involved in a physical 

altercation hours before the shooting, and counsel did not want the jury to learn of the 

Petitioner‟s violent behaviors. We note that the Petitioner did not present an expert 

witness at the post-conviction hearing to show how the use of his mental health history 

would have impacted the outcome of the trial notwithstanding his claim he was not the 

shooter. See Black v. State, 794 S.W.2d 752, 757 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1990). 

Likewise, trial counsel considered the evidence of the Petitioner‟s intoxication and 

concluded that the Petitioner‟s intoxication on the night of the shooting was also 

irrelevant to the Petitioner‟s innocence defense. In any event, the record reflects that 

counsel presented evidence to the jury of the Petitioner‟s consuming four quarts of beer 

shortly before the shooting and that counsel questioned the medical examiner about the 

effects of alcohol, while maintaining the Petitioner did not shoot the victim. We note the 

Petitioner testified at the trial that he was innocent, that he saw Jermaine Hill shoot the 

victim, and that he had drank alcohol on the night of the shooting. The effects of the

Petitioner‟s intoxication were minimally relevant to the chosen defense but nonetheless

were before the jury for its consideration. Again, the Petitioner did not present an expert 

witness at the post-conviction hearing to show how the use of the Petitioner‟s 

intoxication would have changed the outcome of the trial notwithstanding his claim he 

was not the shooter, preventing him from establishing prejudice. See Black, 794 S.W.2d 

at 757. 
-21-

The record supports the post-conviction court‟s findings that the Petitioner‟s claim 

of innocence rendered immaterial the Petitioner‟s mental health and intoxication and that 

the Petitioner‟s denial of involvement in the shooting prevented a defense of mitigating 

evidence in an effort to obtain a conviction for a lesser included offense of first degree 

murder. The record does not preponderate against the court‟s findings that counsel did 

not provide deficient performance and that the Petitioner failed to establish prejudice. 

The Petitioner is not entitled to relief on this basis. 

2. Admission of the Petitioner’s Handwritten Letter

The Petitioner argues that trial counsel failed to challenge the admission of the 

letter the Petitioner wrote while in the jail. He asserts that no trial witnesses identified 

the handwriting as the Petitioner‟s and that “it is possible that the State might not have 

been able to introduce the letter if counsel would have objected to its admission.” The 

State responds that the post-conviction court properly denied relief. 

The record reflects that the letter was read to jury by State‟s witness Rhonda Hill. 

She testified that she received the letter in the mail, although it was addressed to her son, 

Chris Hodge. She said that the return address was the jail and that the name associated 

with the return address was Dana Brown, Ms. Hill‟s former neighbor. Ms. Hill noted Mr. 

Brown‟s name was misspelled and said she opened the letter. The letter stated the 

following: 

Chris, . . . [t]his s--- is real. I need you to do something cause this stupid . . 

. b---- named Shawn is running her mouth, tell s---. Hey, I need you to stop 

this ho from making this court date, June 18th. Hook up with Micky and 

burn this b---- house down. Micky will tell you where the ho lives at. You 

dig. This is the ho that is making the charge, me with first-degree murder 

and this 51 top off. That‟s life. Stay on your feet. Much love, Juvy. 

Mr. Young testified at the trial that he and the Petitioner were housed in the same 

cell block at the jail and that after the Petitioner‟s preliminary hearing, the Petitioner 

began writing a letter. Mr. Young stated that he knew “a little” about the letter‟s content 

and that the Petitioner was attempting to “get something taken care of with Shawn” 

Nunnally. Mr. Young said he saw the Petitioner writing the letter and that the Petitioner 

asked him how to spell a couple of words. Mr. Young identified the letter read by Ms. 

Hill as the letter the Petitioner wrote. Mr. Young said the Petitioner‟s nickname was 

“Juvy.” On cross-examination, Mr. Young testified that he did not read the Petitioner‟s 

letter and that the Petitioner claimed Ms. Nunnally was lying to the police. 
-22-

The Petitioner testified at the trial that he wrote the letter and admitted he asked 

Mr. Hodge to burn Ms. Nunnally‟s house because Ms. Nunnally was lying and because 

he was scared. The Petitioner said he did not know what else to do to make Ms. 

Nunnally stop lying about whether he shot the victim. 

The record reflects that counsel did not object to the admission of the letter 

because the Petitioner admitted to counsel that he wrote the letter. The Petitioner 

testified at the trial that he wrote the letter, rendering a handwriting expert unnecessary. 

Likewise, the Petitioner did not deny writing the letter at the post-conviction hearing. In 

any event, the Petitioner did not present a handwriting expert at the post-conviction 

hearing, nor did he offer any evidence to show that he did not write the letter or that the 

letter was inadmissible. See Black, 794 S.W.2d at 757. Therefore, we conclude that the

record does not preponderate against the post-conviction court‟s conclusion that counsel 

did not provide ineffective assistance of counsel. The Petitioner is not entitled to relief 

on this basis. 

B. Sixth Amendment Right to Counsel

The Petitioner contends that his Sixth Amendment right to counsel was violated 

because trial counsel simultaneously represented the Petitioner and Mr. Young, creating a 

conflict of interests. The State responds that the post-conviction court properly denied 

relief. 

A criminal defendant is “entitled to zealous representation by an attorney 

unfettered by a conflicting interest.” State v. Thompson, 768 S.W.2d 239, 245 (Tenn. 

1989). “In order to demonstrate a violation of his Sixth Amendment rights, a defendant 

must establish that an actual conflict of interest adversely affected his lawyer‟s 

performance.” Cuyler v. Sullivan, 446 U.S. 335, 350 (1980); see Thompson, 768 S.W.2d 

at 245. A possible conflict of interests is insufficient to establish the constitutional 

violation. Cuyler, 446 U.S. at 350. “If an attorney actively represents conflicting 

interests, no analysis of prejudice is necessary; it is presumed that his divided interests 

adversely affected his representation.” Thompson, 768 S.W.2d at 245.

No conflict of interests existed. The offense date in the Petitioner‟s case was April 

13, 2001, and the trial occurred in October 2001. Trial counsel admitted previously 

representing Mr. Young and said his representation ended on August 2, 2001. Counsel 

was unaware of Mr. Young‟s connection to the Petitioner‟s case during counsel‟s 

representation of Mr. Young, and counsel and Mr. Young confirmed they never discussed 

the Petitioner‟s case during counsel‟s representation of Mr. Young. On October 5, 2001, 

more than two months after counsel ended his representation of Mr. Young, counsel 

received the State‟s supplemental witness list in the Petitioner‟s case, which indicated 

Mr. Young would testify at the Petitioner‟s trial. At that time, counsel did not represent 
-23-

Mr. Young, and it had been two months since counsel had spoken with Mr. Young. 

Upon learning Mr. Young would testify at the Petitioner‟s trial, counsel spoke with Mr. 

Young, who provided limited information to counsel consistent with his trial testimony

regarding the Petitioner‟s letter. Mr. Young testified at the post-conviction hearing that 

he did not regard this conversation with counsel as important or confidential. The record 

reflects that Mr. Young did not receive any benefit from the State in exchange for his 

testimony because his criminal cases had been resolved by August 2, 2001. We note the 

Petitioner did not present evidence that Mr. Young received any benefit from testifying at 

the Petitioner‟s trial. 

Likewise, trial counsel and Mr. Young both testified at the post-conviction hearing 

that counsel did not advise him to testify against the Petitioner. Counsel‟s credited 

testimony reflects that counsel did not obtain confidential information relevant to the 

Petitioner‟s case during counsel‟s representation of Mr. Young and that counsel and Mr. 

Young did not discuss any prior bad acts, criminal conduct, or specific instances of 

conduct that could have been used to impeach Mr. Young at the Petitioner‟s trial. 

Nothing about counsel‟s representation of Mr. Young would have impaired counsel‟s 

ability to represent the Petitioner. We note that the Petitioner did not present any 

impeaching evidence at the post-conviction hearing and that the record reflects the 

prosecutor questioned Mr. Young on direct examination about Mr. Young‟s previous 

criminal convictions and criminal behavior. 

As a result, the record does not preponderate against the post-conviction court‟s 

finding that no conflict of interests existed and that counsel did not fail to impeach Mr. 

Young properly. The Defendant has failed to show an actual conflict of interests existed, 

and he is not entitled to relief on this basis. 

II. Petition for a Writ of Error Coram Nobis

The Petitioner asserts that trial counsel did not disclose the conflict of interests 

created by counsel‟s representing Mr. Young, that information related to the conflict of 

interests was intentionally concealed from the Petitioner, and that the Petitioner would 

not have proceeded to the trial with counsel as his attorney had he known of the 

representation. 

Tennessee Code Annotated section 40-26-105(b) (2012) provides that coram nobis 

relief is available in criminal cases as follows:

The relief obtainable by this proceeding shall be confined to errors dehors 

the record and to matters that were not or could not have been litigated on 

the trial of the case, on a motion for a new trial, on appeal in the nature of a 

writ of error, on writ of error, or in a habeas corpus proceeding. Upon a 
-24-

showing by the defendant that the defendant was without fault in failing to 

present certain evidence at the proper time, a writ of error coram nobis will 

lie for subsequently or newly discovered evidence relating to matters which 

were litigated at the trial if the judge determines that such evidence may 

have resulted in a different judgment, had it been presented at the trial.

Unlike the grounds for reopening a post-conviction petition, the grounds for 

seeking a writ of error coram nobis are not limited to specific categories. Harris v. State, 

102 S.W.3d 587, 592 (Tenn. 2003). Coram nobis claims may be based upon any “newly 

discovered evidence relating to matters litigated at trial” so long as the petitioner 

establishes that he or she was “without fault in failing to present the evidence at the 

proper time.” Id. at 592-93. In a coram nobis proceeding, the trial court first must 

consider the newly discovered evidence and be “reasonably well satisfied with its 

veracity.” State v. Vasques, 221 S.W.3d 514, 527 (Tenn. 2007). If the defendant is 

without fault because the exercise of reasonable diligence would not have led to a timely 

discovery of the new information, the trial court must examine both the evidence 

presented at the trial and during the coram nobis proceedings to determine whether the 

new evidence may have led to a different result. Id. The decision to grant or deny coram 

nobis relief rests within the sound discretion of the trial court. Id. at 527-28.

The record reflects, as we have concluded above, that no conflict of interests 

existed because trial counsel‟s representation of Mr. Young ended on August 2, 2001, 

and because counsel did not obtain any information during his representation of Mr. 

Young that could have been used to impeach Mr. Young at the Petitioner‟s trial. 

Likewise, no evidence was presented at the evidentiary hearing reflecting that counsel 

concealed any conflict of interests from the Petitioner. The record shows that at the trial, 

a side-bar discussion was held between the trial judge, the prosecutor, and counsel 

relative to any potential conflict of interests and that the Petitioner was not present during 

the discussion. The trial court was informed of counsel‟s previously representing Mr. 

Young. Likewise, counsel testified at the post-conviction hearing that the Petitioner 

knew counsel had represented Mr. Young because the Petitioner mentioned it to counsel. 

In any event, coram nobis relief is limited to matters involving “subsequently or 

newly discovered evidence relating to matters which were litigated at the trial if the judge 

determines that such evidence may have resulted in a different judgment, had it been 

presented at the trial.” T.C.A. § 40-26-105(b). Evidence of a conflict of interests does 

not qualify as newly discovered evidence as contemplated by our statutes. Trial 

counsel‟s previous representation had no impact on the outcome of the Petitioner‟s trial 

because it had no relevance to whether the Petitioner shot and killed the victim. As a 

result, the Petitioner is not entitled to relief on this basis. 
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In consideration of the foregoing and the record as a whole, the judgments of the 

post-conviction and coram nobis court are affirmed.

 _____________________________________

 ROBERT H. MONTGOMERY, JR., JUDGE