NOT FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

MARIA TERESA RIOS MARTINEZ,

Petitioner,

v.

MERRICK B. GARLAND, Attorney 

General,

Respondent.

No. 22-1901

Agency No.

A208-067-255

MEMORANDUM*

On Petition for Review of an Order of the

Board of Immigration Appeals

Submitted March 25, 2024**

Pasadena, California

Before: RAWLINSON, LEE, and BRESS, Circuit Judges.

Maria Teresa Rios Martinez (Rios), a native and citizen of Mexico, petitions 

for review of a Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) decision dismissing her appeal 

of an Immigration Judge (IJ) order denying her application for withholding of 

* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent 

except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.

** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision 

without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).

FILED

APR 1 2024

MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK

U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
2 22-1901

removal and protection under the Convention Against Torture (CAT). We review 

the denial of withholding of removal and CAT relief for substantial 

evidence. Sharma v. Garland, 9 F.4th 1052, 1060, 1066 (9th Cir. 2021). “Under 

this standard, we must uphold the agency determination unless the evidence compels 

a contrary conclusion.” Duran-Rodriguez v. Barr, 918 F.3d 1025, 1028 (9th Cir. 

2019). We have jurisdiction under 8 U.S.C. § 1252, and we deny the petition.1

1. Substantial evidence supports the denial of withholding of removal. A 

petitioner is eligible for withholding of removal if “it is more likely than not,”

Barajas-Romero v. Lynch, 846 F.3d 351, 360 (9th Cir. 2017), that her “life or 

freedom would be threatened in [the country of removal] because of [her] race, 

religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group, or political opinion.” 

8 U.S.C. § 1231(b)(3)(A). To meet her burden, the petitioner must “demonstrate a 

nexus between the harm [s]he allegedly faces upon return to [Mexico] and a 

protected ground.” Zetino v. Holder, 622 F.3d 1007, 1011 (9th Cir. 2010). For

withholding of removal, the petitioner establishes this nexus by showing that a 

protected ground was “a reason” for the past or feared harm. Barajas-Romero, 846 

F.3d at 360.

Rios testified that she had not previously been harmed or threatened in 

1 We reject as unsupported the government’s contention that Rios has forfeited her 

challenges to the BIA’s decision by failing meaningfully to advance them in her 

opening brief.
3 22-1901

Mexico. But she alleges that, if returned to Mexico, she will be persecuted because 

of her membership in proposed social groups consisting of “Mexican females with 

higher education,” “an individual perceived as wealthy,” and “a Mexican child 

brought to the United States as a minor.” The BIA correctly determined that these 

social groups lack particularity and social distinction. See, e.g., Ramirez-Munoz v. 

Lynch, 816 F.3d 1226, 1229 (9th Cir. 2016) (holding that the proposed group of 

“imputed wealthy Americans” is not cognizable); Barbosa v. Barr, 926 F.3d 1053, 

1059 (9th Cir. 2019) (holding that the proposed group of persons “returning to 

Mexico from the United States who are believed to be wealthy” is not cognizable)

(brackets omitted).

2

In addition, even assuming Rios put forward a cognizable particular social 

group, substantial evidence supports the BIA’s further determination that Rios has 

not established the required nexus between her feared persecution and membership 

in a proposed social group. As the BIA recognized, Rios’s fears stem from 

generalized crime and violence in Mexico, which does not establish a nexus to a 

protected ground. See, e.g., Zetino, 622 F.3d at 1016 (holding that a “desire to be 

2

In her opening brief, Rios also claims she will face persecution based on her 

membership in the proposed social group of “Mexican females returning with family 

who still reside in the United States.” Because Rios did not raise this argument 

before the BIA and because the government has raised the exhaustion issue, we may 

not grant relief on this basis. See 8 U.S.C. § 1252(d)(1); Santos-Zacaria v. Garland, 

598 U.S. 411, 413 (2023). Regardless, Rios has not explained how this additional 

proposed social group would be cognizable.
4 22-1901

free from harassment by criminals motivated by theft or random violence by gang 

members bears no nexus to a protected ground”); Gormley v. Ashcroft, 364 F.3d 

1172, 1177 (9th Cir. 2004) (holding that random criminal acts bear no nexus to a 

protected ground). Substantial evidence thus supports the BIA’s determination that 

Rios’s fears of general gang violence in Mexico are insufficient to establish 

eligibility for withholding of removal.

Lastly, substantial evidence supports the BIA’s determination that Rios failed 

to establish a nexus between her feared persecution and her political opinions

concerning extortion and criminal organizations. As the BIA explained, Rios 

provided insufficient evidence that she held these political opinions, would continue 

to hold these opinions upon returning to Mexico, or was known to hold these 

opinions. The record does not compel a contrary conclusion.

2. Substantial evidence supports the agency’s denial of CAT relief. An 

applicant for CAT relief bears the burden of establishing that she “will more likely 

than not be tortured with the consent or acquiescence of a public official if removed 

to her native country.” Xochihua-Jaimes v. Barr, 962 F.3d 1175, 1183 (9th Cir. 

2020). Rios testified that she had not been harmed or threatened in Mexico. The 

BIA also concluded that Rios’s claims of torture were speculative and lacked indicia 

of government consent or acquiescence. The record does not compel a conclusion 

contrary to that of the agency.
5 22-1901

PETITION DENIED.3

3 The temporary stay of removal remains in place until issuance of the mandate. The 

motion for a stay of removal is otherwise denied.