In the

United States Court of Appeals

For the Seventh Circuit ____________________ 

No. 21-2001 

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 

Plaintiff-Appellee, 

v.

DAMON RUCKER, 

Defendant-Appellant. 

____________________ 

Appeal from the United States District Court for the

Northern District of Illinois, Western Division.

No. 13CR-50005-1 — John Robert Blakey, Judge. 

____________________ 

ARGUED JANUARY 25, 2022 — DECIDED MARCH 2, 2022 

____________________ 

Before RIPPLE, WOOD, and JACKSON-AKIWUMI, Circuit 

Judges. 

PER CURIAM. Damon Rucker, a federal inmate who is obese 

and has hypertension, appeals the denial of his motion for 

compassionate release based on his heightened risk of

COVID-19. See 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A)(i). The district court 

concluded that Rucker had not shown that his medical circumstances were extraordinary and compelling, and the sentencing factors of 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) weighed against early 
2 No. 21-2001 

release. Because the district court did not abuse its discretion 

in applying the factors under § 3553(a), we affirm.

Rucker is serving a 240-month sentence for witness retaliation. See 18 U.S.C. § 1513(b)(1). While awaiting a jail transfer 

in 2012, Rucker attacked a fellow prisoner who had testified 

against him at sentencing. Rucker slammed the man’s head 

against a concrete wall, causing the man to collapse to the 

floor and convulse. United States v. Rucker, 766 F.3d 638, 642 

(7th Cir. 2014) (affirming sentence). 

In October 2020, Rucker moved for a sentence reduction 

under § 3582(c)(1)(A)(i). He argued that he had an extraordinary and compelling reason for release—his medical conditions (obesity, hypertension, pre-diabetes, poor eyesight, possible sickle cell trait, and his then-current COVID-19 infection) combined with the spread of COVID-19 throughout the 

prison. He also argued that early release was supported by 

the § 3553(a) sentencing factors, specifically his history and 

characteristics (including a traumatic childhood during 

which his mother died and his father abused drugs, and his 

successful completion of anger management and drug abuse 

courses while in prison). And he argued that potential errors 

in his original sentence supported his request for early release.

The government responded that early release would not 

be consistent with the factors under § 3553(a) because of the 

serious and violent nature of the offense, Rucker’s criminal 

history (which included prior convictions for damage to 

property, battery, home invasion, and drug trafficking), and 

the need to protect the public because of his risk of recidivism. 

The government noted that Rucker’s medical records reflect 

that the prison had been treating his hypertension 
No. 21-2001 3

appropriately, as well as his COVID-19 infection, during 

which he had remained asymptomatic. (Rucker, however, asserted in an affidavit that he did experience symptoms during 

his COVID-19 infection.) 

In May 2021, the district court denied the motion for compassionate release. Because the court’s explanation was terse, 

we reproduce it here in its entirety: 

Although there has been no “applicable” statement since the First Step Act expanded the compassionate-release statute, the formerly controlling statement, U.S.S.G. § 1B1.13, may continue 

to inform the district court’s discretion. United 

States v. Gunn, 980 F.3d 1178, 1180 (7th Cir. 

2020). Here, Defendant has exhausted administrative remedies, but this Court finds that the 

record fails to warrant a reduction in sentence 

under 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A), after full consideration of the factors provided in 18 U.S.C. 

§ 3553 and the applicable policy statements issued by the Sentencing Commission. Among 

other factors, the record confirms that, even 

though the coronavirus outbreak is serious, the 

facts do not support defendant’s claim that his 

medical conditions, combined with the COVID19 conditions and in-custody procedures and 

medical care, warrant a reduction in his sentence due to extraordinary and compelling reasons. Even though Defendant tested positive for 

the virus, he remained asymptomatic and recovered. Based upon the entire record, the defendant fails to meet the criteria of U.S.S.G. 
4 No. 21-2001 

§ 1B1.13. The record also confirms that he constitutes a risk of recidivism and a danger to the 

safety of other persons and the community (evidenced, among other things, by his prior criminal conduct consisting of numerous convictions including a violent attack on a cooperating 

witness), and that a sentence reduction otherwise remains inconsistent with the need under 

18 U.S.C. § 3553 for the sentence to reflect the seriousness of, and to provide just punishment 

for, defendant’s underlying offense.

We review the denial of a motion for compassionate release for abuse of discretion. United States v. Gunn, 980 F.3d 

1178, 1180 (7th Cir. 2020). A court may grant a motion for compassionate release if, after considering the factors under 

§ 3553(a), it determines that extraordinary and compelling 

reasons warrant release. § 3582(c)(1)(A)(i). 

Rucker first argues that the district court erred by relying 

on the outdated policy statement set forth in U.S.S.G. § 1B1.13. 

That policy statement, which implements the compassionaterelease statute, has not been updated since the statute was 

amended to allow prisoners to file motions for compassionate 

release. First Step Act of 2018, Pub. L. 115-391, 132 Stat. 5194. 

Because it has not been updated, U.S.S.G. § 1B1.13 is not binding on a district court when a prisoner moves for compassionate release. See Gunn, 980 F.3d at 1180. But Rucker’s argument 

fails because the district court recognized the non-binding nature of U.S.S.G. § 1B1.13 and permissibly used it as a guide. 

See United States v. Kurzynowski, 17 F.4th 756, 760 (7th Cir. 

2021). 
No. 21-2001 5

Rucker next argues that the district court erred by failing 

to consider the medical conditions at the prison (which led to 

over half the prisoners being infected with COVID-19) as well 

as his specific health conditions (including obesity, hypertension, and his COVID-19 infection). He also argues that the district court erred when it considered his COVID-19 infection to 

be asymptomatic, despite his affidavit that he experienced 

symptoms. Rucker relatedly contends that the district court 

should have conducted an evidentiary hearing, but no hearing was required by statute. See § 3582(c)(1)(A)(i).

The district court’s assessment of Rucker’s COVID-19 risk 

was cursory. The court made only generalized references to 

his “medical conditions, combined with the COVID-19 conditions and in-custody procedures and medical care,” and 

found that these did not present extraordinary and compelling reasons for release. The court also suggested, without 

supporting medical evidence, that Rucker’s prior infection—

asymptomatic or otherwise—affected his future risk of infection and future health. In United States v. Newton, 996 F.3d 485, 

489 (7th Cir. 2021), another compassionate-release case, we 

emphasized that a district court’s analysis, at a minimum, 

must reasonably assure us that it at least considered the prisoner’s principal arguments. We also cautioned district courts 

to avoid drawing “medical conclusions about the ramifications of a future infection without any supporting medical evidence in the record.” Id. at 490. 

But any error here is harmless because the court acted 

within its broad discretion in finding that the § 3553(a) factors

did not favor release. See United States v. Saunders, 986 F.3d 

1076, 1078 (7th Cir. 2021). Rucker disputes the manner in 

which the court weighed the § 3553(a) factors. But the court 
6 No. 21-2001 

highlighted the need to protect the public from further crimes 

(noting Rucker’s numerous prior convictions and risk of recidivism) and the need to reflect the seriousness of the offense 

and provide just punishment for the offense (“a violent attack 

on a cooperating witness”), and just one good reason for 

denying a compassionate-release motion suffices. 

See United States v. Ugbah, 4 F.4th 595, 598 (7th Cir. 2021). 

Rucker also invoked potential errors that, he believes, 

tainted his original sentence. But Rucker did not raise an argument about potential sentencing errors in his direct appeal 

and “a claim of errors in the original sentencing is not itself an 

extraordinary and compelling reason for release.” United 

States v. Martin, 21 F.4th 944, 946 (7th Cir. 2021). 

We close with an observation about COVID-19 vaccines in 

the context of requests for compassionate release. The government points to our language in United States v. Broadfield, 

5 F.4th 801, 803 (7th Cir. 2021), in which we said that the availability of vaccines had effectively eliminated the risks of 

COVID-19 to most federal prisoners. But that opinion was 

handed down before Omicron became the dominant variant 

in this country (with an increase in breakthrough infections 

among the fully vaccinated). And it included a safety valve for 

prisoners to show that they are unable to receive or benefit

from a vaccine, or that they remain vulnerable to severe infection, notwithstanding the vaccine. Id. Recent events underscore the need for a district court’s opinion to leave us assured 

that it considered the applicant’s individualized arguments 

and evidence. See Newton, 996 F.3d at 491. 

AFFIRMED