Federal Register / Vol. 72, No. 37 / Monday, February 26, 2007 / Proposed Rules 8309 

the Administrator finds necessary for 

safety in air commerce. This regulation 

is within the scope of that authority 

because it addresses an unsafe condition 

that is likely to exist or develop on 

products identified in this rulemaking 

action. 

Regulatory Findings 

We have determined that this 

proposed AD would not have federalism 

implications under Executive Order 

13132. This proposed AD would not 

have a substantial direct effect on the 

States, on the relationship between the 

National Government and the States, or 

on the distribution of power and 

responsibilities among the various 

levels of government. 

For the reasons discussed above, I 

certify that the proposed regulation: 

1. Is not a ‘‘significant regulatory 

action’’ under Executive Order 12866; 

2. Is not a ‘‘significant rule’’ under the 

DOT Regulatory Policies and Procedures 

(44 FR 11034, February 26, 1979); and 

3. Will not have a significant 

economic impact, positive or negative, 

on a substantial number of small entities 

under the criteria of the Regulatory 

Flexibility Act. 

We prepared a regulatory evaluation 

of the estimated costs to comply with 

this proposed AD and placed it in the 

AD docket. See the ADDRESSES section 

for a location to examine the regulatory 

evaluation. 

List of Subjects in 14 CFR Part 39 

Air transportation, Aircraft, Aviation 

safety, Safety. 

The Proposed Amendment 

Accordingly, under the authority 

delegated to me by the Administrator, 

the FAA proposes to amend 14 CFR part 

39 as follows: 

PART 39—AIRWORTHINESS 

DIRECTIVES 

1. The authority citation for part 39 

continues to read as follows: 

Authority: 49 U.S.C. 106(g), 40113, 44701. 

§ 39.13 [Amended] 

2. The Federal Aviation 

Administration (FAA) amends § 39.13 

by adding the following new 

airworthiness directive (AD): 

McDonnell Douglas: Docket No. FAA–2007–

27339; Directorate Identifier 2006–NM–

280–AD. 

Comments Due Date 

(a) The FAA must receive comments on 

this AD action by April 12, 2007. 

Affected ADs 

(b) None. 

Applicability 

(c) This AD applies to the airplanes 

identified in paragraphs (c)(1) and (c)(2) of 

this AD, certificated in any category. 

(1) McDonnell Douglas Model DC–10–10 

and DC–10–10F airplanes, Model DC–10–15 

airplanes, Model DC–10–30 and DC–10–30F 

(KC–10A and KDC–10) airplanes, Model DC–

10–40 and DC–10–40F airplanes, and Model 

MD–10–10F and MD–10–30F airplanes; as 

identified in Boeing Alert Service Bulletin 

DC10–28A254, dated September 8, 2006. 

(2) McDonnell Douglas Model MD–11 and 

MD–11F airplanes, as identified in Boeing 

Alert Service Bulletin MD11–28A134, dated 

September 8, 2006. 

Unsafe Condition 

(d) This AD results from a fuel boost pump 

found with blown thermal fuses and a 

fractured thrust washer. We are issuing this 

AD to prevent failure of the fuel boost 

pumps, which could lead to the potential of 

ignition sources inside fuel tanks. This 

condition, in combination with flammable 

fuel vapors, could result in fuel tank 

explosions and consequent loss of the 

airplane. 

Compliance 

(e) You are responsible for having the 

actions required by this AD performed within 

the compliance times specified, unless the 

actions have already been done. 

Service Bulletin Reference Paragraph 

(f) The term ‘‘service bulletin,’’ as used in 

this AD, means the following service 

bulletins, as applicable: 

(1) For the airplanes identified in 

paragraph (c)(1) of this AD, Boeing Alert 

Service Bulletin DC10–28A254, dated 

September 8, 2006. 

(2) For the airplanes identified in 

paragraph (c)(2) of this AD, Boeing Alert 

Service Bulletin MD11–28A134, dated 

September 8, 2006. 

Note 1: Boeing Alert Service Bulletin 

DC10–28A254, dated September 8, 2006; and 

Boeing Alert Service Bulletin MD11–28A134, 

dated September 8, 2006; refer to Crane 

Hydro-Aire Service Bulletin 60–847–28–3, 

dated May 1, 2006, as an additional source 

of service information for accomplishing the 

modification in paragraph (g) of this AD. 

Modification 

(g) At the applicable compliance time 

specified in paragraph (g)(1) or (g)(2) of this 

AD, modify the fuel boost pumps having part 

numbers 60–847–1A, –2, and –3, in 

accordance with the Accomplishment 

Instructions of the applicable service 

bulletin. 

(1) For fuel boost pumps identified as 

Configuration 1 or 2 in Table 1 of paragraph 

1.E. of the applicable service bulletin, do the 

modification within 120 months after the 

effective date of this AD. 

(2) For fuel boost pumps identified as 

Configuration 3 in Table 1 of paragraph 1.E. 

of the applicable service bulletin, do the 

modification within 72 months after the 

effective date of this AD. 

Alternative Methods of Compliance 

(AMOCs) 

(h)(1) The Manager, Los Angeles Aircraft 

Certification Office, FAA, has the authority to 

approve AMOCs for this AD, if requested in 

accordance with the procedures found in 14 

CFR 39.19. 

(2) Before using any AMOC approved in 

accordance with § 39.19 on any airplane to 

which the AMOC applies, notify the 

appropriate principal inspector in the FAA 

Flight Standards Certificate Holding District 

Office. 

Issued in Renton, Washington, on February 

16, 2007. 

Ali Bahrami, 

Manager, Transport Airplane Directorate, 

Aircraft Certification Service. 

[FR Doc. E7–3166 Filed 2–23–07; 8:45 am] 

BILLING CODE 4910–13–P 

DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION 

Federal Aviation Administration 

14 CFR Part 39 

[Docket No. FAA–2007–27334; Directorate 

Identifier 2006–NM–279–AD] 

RIN 2120–AA64 

Airworthiness Directives; McDonnell 

Douglas Model DC–8–33, –42, and –43 

Airplanes; Model DC–8–50 Series 

Airplanes; Model DC–8F–54 and –55 

Airplanes; Model DC–8–60 Series 

Airplanes; Model DC–8–60F Series 

Airplanes; Model DC–8–72 Airplanes; 

and Model DC–8–70F Series Airplanes 

AGENCY: Federal Aviation 

Administration (FAA), Department of 

Transportation (DOT). 

ACTION: Notice of proposed rulemaking 

(NPRM). 

SUMMARY: The FAA proposes to adopt a 

new airworthiness directive (AD) for 

certain McDonnell Douglas airplanes 

described previously. This proposed AD 

would require installing bonding 

jumpers to the airplane wing structure 

from the fuel system in-line electrical 

solenoid valves along the left and right 

wing front spar. This proposed AD 

results from fuel system reviews 

conducted by the manufacturer. We are 

proposing this AD to prevent point-ofcontact arcing or filament heating 

damage in the fuel lines that could 

create a potential ignition source, 

which, in combination with flammable 

fuel vapors, could cause a fuel tank 

explosion and consequent loss of the 

airplane. 

DATES: We must receive comments on 

this proposed AD by April 12, 2007. 


hsrobinson on PROD1PC76 with PROPOSALS
8310 Federal Register / Vol. 72, No. 37 / Monday, February 26, 2007 / Proposed Rules 

ADDRESSES: Use one of the following 

addresses to submit comments on this 

proposed AD. 

• DOT Docket Web site: Go to 

http://dms.dot.gov and follow the 

instructions for sending your comments 

electronically. 

• Government-wide rulemaking Web 

site: Go to http://www.regulations.gov 

and follow the instructions for sending 

your comments electronically. 

• Mail: Docket Management Facility, 

U.S. Department of Transportation, 400 

Seventh Street, SW., Nassif Building, 

Room PL–401, Washington, DC 20590. 

• Fax: (202) 493–2251. 

• Hand Delivery: Room PL–401 on 

the plaza level of the Nassif Building, 

400 Seventh Street, SW., Washington, 

DC, between 9 a.m. and 5 p.m., Monday 

through Friday, except Federal holidays. 

Contact Boeing Commercial 

Airplanes, Long Beach Division, 3855 

Lakewood Boulevard, Long Beach, 

California 90846, Attention: Data and 

Service Management, Dept. C1–L5A 

(D800–0024), for the service information 

identified in this proposed AD. 

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: 

Samuel Lee, Aerospace Engineer, 

Propulsion Branch, ANM–140L, FAA, 

Los Angeles Aircraft Certification 

Office, 3960 Paramount Boulevard, 

Lakewood, California 90712–4137; 

telephone (562) 627–5262; fax (562) 

627–5210. 

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: 

Comments Invited 

We invite you to submit any relevant 

written data, views, or arguments 

regarding this proposed AD. Send your 

comments to an address listed in the 

ADDRESSES section. Include the docket 

number ‘‘FAA–2007–27334; Directorate 

Identifier 2006–NM–279–AD’’ at the 

beginning of your comments. We 

specifically invite comments on the 

overall regulatory, economic, 

environmental, and energy aspects of 

the proposed AD. We will consider all 

comments received by the closing date 

and may amend the proposed AD in 

light of those comments. 

We will post all comments we 

receive, without change, to http:// 

dms.dot.gov, including any personal 

information you provide. We will also 

post a report summarizing each 

substantive verbal contact with FAA 

personnel concerning this proposed AD. 

Using the search function of that Web 

site, anyone can find and read the 

comments in any of our dockets, 

including the name of the individual 

who sent the comment (or signed the 

comment on behalf of an association, 

business, labor union, etc.). You may 

review DOT’s complete Privacy Act 

Statement in the Federal Register 

published on April 11, 2000 (65 FR 

19477–78), or you may visit http:// 

dms.dot.gov. 

Examining the Docket 

You may examine the AD docket on 

the Internet at http://dms.dot.gov, or in 

person at the Docket Management 

Facility office between 9 a.m. and 5 

p.m., Monday through Friday, except 

Federal holidays. The Docket 

Management Facility office (telephone 

(800) 647–5227) is located on the plaza 

level of the Nassif Building at the DOT 

street address stated in the ADDRESSES

section. Comments will be available in 

the AD docket shortly after the Docket 

Management System receives them. 

Discussion 

The FAA has examined the 

underlying safety issues involved in fuel 

tank explosions on several large 

transport airplanes, including the 

adequacy of existing regulations, the 

service history of airplanes subject to 

those regulations, and existing 

maintenance practices for fuel tank 

systems. As a result of those findings, 

we issued a regulation titled ‘‘Transport 

Airplane Fuel Tank System Design 

Review, Flammability Reduction and 

Maintenance and Inspection 

Requirements’’ (66 FR 23086, May 7, 

2001). In addition to new airworthiness 

standards for transport airplanes and 

new maintenance requirements, this 

rule included Special Federal Aviation 

Regulation No. 88 (‘‘SFAR 88,’’

Amendment 21–78, and subsequent 

Amendments 21–82 and 21–83). 

Among other actions, SFAR 88 

requires certain type design (i.e., type 

certificate (TC) and supplemental type 

certificate (STC)) holders to substantiate 

that their fuel tank systems can prevent 

ignition sources in the fuel tanks. This 

requirement applies to type design 

holders for large turbine-powered 

transport airplanes and for subsequent 

modifications to those airplanes. It 

requires them to perform design reviews 

and to develop design changes and 

maintenance procedures if their designs 

do not meet the new fuel tank safety 

standards. As explained in the preamble 

to the rule, we intended to adopt 

airworthiness directives to mandate any 

changes found necessary to address 

unsafe conditions identified as a result 

of these reviews. 

In evaluating these design reviews, we 

have established four criteria intended 

to define the unsafe conditions 

associated with fuel tank systems that 

require corrective actions. The 

percentage of operating time during 

which fuel tanks are exposed to 

flammable conditions is one of these 

criteria. The other three criteria address 

the failure types under evaluation: 

single failures, single failures in 

combination with a latent condition(s), 

and in-service failure experience. For all 

four criteria, the evaluations included 

consideration of previous actions taken 

that may mitigate the need for further 

action. 

We have determined that the actions 

identified in this AD are necessary to 

reduce the potential of ignition sources 

inside fuel tanks, which, in combination 

with flammable fuel vapors, could result 

in fuel tank explosions and consequent 

loss of the airplane. 

We have received a report indicating 

that fuel system in-line solenoid valve 

installations located in fuel vapor zones 

along the front spar of the left and right 

wings might not have adequate ground 

paths to dissipate the overcurrent from 

a lightning-induced high voltage 

transient. This condition, if not 

corrected, could result in point-ofcontact arcing or filament heating 

damage in the fuel lines that could 

create a potential ignition source, 

which, in combination with flammable 

fuel vapors, could cause a fuel tank 

explosion and consequent loss of the 

airplane. 

Relevant Service Information 

We have reviewed Boeing Service 

Bulletin DC8–28–091, dated November 

7, 2006. The service bulletin describes 

procedures for installing bonding 

jumpers to the airplane wing structure 

from the fuel system in-line electrical 

solenoid valves along the left and right 

wing front spar. Accomplishing the 

actions specified in the service 

information is intended to adequately 

address the unsafe condition. 

FAA’s Determination and Requirements 

of the Proposed AD 

We have evaluated all pertinent 

information and identified an unsafe 

condition that is likely to exist or 

develop on other airplanes of this same 

type design. For this reason, we are 

proposing this AD, which would require 

accomplishing the actions specified in 

the service information described 

previously. 

Costs of Compliance 

There are about 216 airplanes of the 

affected design in the worldwide fleet. 

This proposed AD would affect about 

145 airplanes of U.S. registry. The 

following table provides the estimated 

costs for U.S. operators to comply with 

this proposed AD, at an average labor 

rate of $80 per work hour. The total fleet 


hsrobinson on PROD1PC76 with PROPOSALS
Federal Register / Vol. 72, No. 37 / Monday, February 26, 2007 / Proposed Rules 8311 

cost is estimated to be between $456,460 

and $1,018,770. 

ESTIMATED COSTS

Airplane 

group 

Work 

hours Parts Cost per airplane 

1 .............. 8 $2,508 $3,148 

2 .............. 9 4,237 4,957 

3 .............. 10 6,226 7,026 

4 .............. 8 4,473 5,113 

5 .............. 6 3,674 4,154 

Authority for This Rulemaking 

Title 49 of the United States Code 

specifies the FAA’s authority to issue 

rules on aviation safety. Subtitle I, 

section 106, describes the authority of 

the FAA Administrator. Subtitle VII, 

Aviation Programs, describes in more 

detail the scope of the Agency’s 

authority. 

We are issuing this rulemaking under 

the authority described in subtitle VII, 

part A, subpart III, section 44701, 

‘‘General requirements.’’ Under that 

section, Congress charges the FAA with 

promoting safe flight of civil aircraft in 

air commerce by prescribing regulations 

for practices, methods, and procedures 

the Administrator finds necessary for 

safety in air commerce. This regulation 

is within the scope of that authority 

because it addresses an unsafe condition 

that is likely to exist or develop on 

products identified in this rulemaking 

action. 

Regulatory Findings 

We have determined that this 

proposed AD would not have federalism 

implications under Executive Order 

13132. This proposed AD would not 

have a substantial direct effect on the 

States, on the relationship between the 

national Government and the States, or 

on the distribution of power and 

responsibilities among the various 

levels of government. 

For the reasons discussed above, I 

certify that the proposed regulation: 

1. Is not a ‘‘significant regulatory 

action’’ under Executive Order 12866; 

2. Is not a ‘‘significant rule’’ under the 

DOT Regulatory Policies and Procedures 

(44 FR 11034, February 26, 1979); and 

3. Will not have a significant 

economic impact, positive or negative, 

on a substantial number of small entities 

under the criteria of the Regulatory 

Flexibility Act. 

We prepared a regulatory evaluation 

of the estimated costs to comply with 

this proposed AD and placed it in the 

AD docket. See the ADDRESSES section 

for a location to examine the regulatory 

evaluation. 

List of Subjects in 14 CFR Part 39 

Air transportation, Aircraft, Aviation 

safety, Safety. 

The Proposed Amendment 

Accordingly, under the authority 

delegated to me by the Administrator, 

the FAA proposes to amend 14 CFR part 

39 as follows: 

PART 39—AIRWORTHINESS 

DIRECTIVES 

1. The authority citation for part 39 

continues to read as follows: 

Authority: 49 U.S.C. 106(g), 40113, 44701. 

§ 39.13 [Amended] 

2. The Federal Aviation 

Administration (FAA) amends § 39.13 

by adding the following new 

airworthiness directive (AD): 

McDonnell Douglas: Docket No. FAA–2007–

27334; Directorate Identifier 2006–NM–

279–AD. 

Comments Due Date 

(a) The FAA must receive comments on 

this AD action by April 12, 2007. 

Affected ADs 

(b) None. 

Applicability 

(c) This AD applies to McDonnell Douglas 

Model DC–8–33, –42, and –43 airplanes; 

Model DC–8–51, –52, –53, and –55 airplanes; 

Model DC–8F–54 and –55 airplanes; Model 

DC–8–61, –62, and –63 airplanes; Model DC–

8–61F, –62F, and –63F airplanes; Model DC–

8–72 airplanes; and Model DC–8–71F, –72F, 

and –73F airplanes; certificated in any 

category; as identified in Boeing Service 

Bulletin DC8–28–091, dated November 7, 

2006. 

Unsafe Condition 

(d) This AD results from fuel system 

reviews conducted by the manufacturer. We 

are issuing this AD to prevent point-ofcontact arcing or filament heating damage in 

the fuel lines that could create a potential 

ignition source, which, in combination with 

flammable fuel vapors, could cause a fuel 

tank explosion and consequent loss of the 

airplane. 

Compliance 

(e) You are responsible for having the 

actions required by this AD performed within 

the compliance times specified, unless the 

actions have already been done. 

Installation of Bonding Jumpers 

(f) Within 60 months after the effective 

date of this AD, install bonding jumpers to 

the airplane wing structure from the fuel 

system in-line electrical solenoid valves 

along the left and right wing front spar, in 

accordance with the Accomplishment 

Instructions of Boeing Service Bulletin DC8–

28–091, dated November 7, 2006. 

Alternative Methods of Compliance 

(AMOCs) 

(g)(1) The Manager, Los Angeles Aircraft 

Certification Office (ACO), FAA, has the 

authority to approve AMOCs for this AD, if 

requested in accordance with the procedures 

found in 14 CFR 39.19. 

(2) Before using any AMOC approved in 

accordance with § 39.19 on any airplane to 

which the AMOC applies, notify the 

appropriate principal inspector in the FAA 

Flight Standards Certificate Holding District 

Office. 

Issued in Renton, Washington, on February 

16, 2007. 

Ali Bahrami, 

Manager, Transport Airplane Directorate, 

Aircraft Certification Service. 

[FR Doc. E7–3165 Filed 2–23–07; 8:45 am] 

BILLING CODE 4910–13–P 

DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION 

Federal Aviation Administration 

14 CFR Part 39 

[Docket No. FAA–2007–27341; Directorate 

Identifier 2006–NM–272–AD] 

RIN 2120–AA64 

Airworthiness Directives; McDonnell 

Douglas Model MD–11 and MD–11F 

Airplanes 

AGENCY: Federal Aviation 

Administration (FAA), Department of 

Transportation (DOT). 

ACTION: Notice of proposed rulemaking 

(NPRM). 

SUMMARY: The FAA proposes to adopt a 

new airworthiness directive (AD) for all 

McDonnell Douglas Model MD–11 and 

MD–11F airplanes. This proposed AD 

would require installing bracket 

assemblies and jumper wires in the 

center main wheel well to improve the 

bonding path between the structure 

(wall) of the lower auxiliary fuel tank 

and its internal fuel pumps; measuring 

the electrical resistance between the fuel 

pump housings and the fuel tank 

structure; and doing corrective actions if 

necessary. This proposed AD results 

from fuel system reviews conducted by 

the manufacturer. We are proposing this 

AD to detect and correct an inadequate 

bond between the internal fuel pump 

housings and the structure of the lower 

auxiliary fuel tank. This condition, if 

not corrected, could fail to meet fault 

current requirements and result in a 

potential ignition source that, in 

combination with flammable fuel 

vapors, could cause a fuel tank 

explosion and consequent loss of the 

airplane. 


hsrobinson on PROD1PC76 with PROPOSALS