[Cite as M.K. v. A.C.K. , 2020-Ohio-400.]

COURT OF APPEALS FAIRFIELD COUNTY, OHIO FIFTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

M.K. : JUDGES: : : Hon. W. Scott Gwin, P.J. Plaintiff-Appellee : Hon. William B . Hoffman, J. : Hon. Patricia A. Delane y , J. -vs- : : Case No. 2019 CA 00023 : A.C.K. : : : Defendant-Appellan t : O P I N I O N

CHARACTER OF PROCEEDING: Appeal from the Fairfield County Court of Common Pleas, Domestic Relations Division, Case No. 18 DV 108

JUDGMENT: DISMISSED

DATE OF JUDGMENT ENTRY: February 5, 2020

APPEARANCES:

For Plaintiff-Appellee: For Defendant-Appellant: JASON A. PRICE APRIL CAMPBELL 126 East Chestnut Stree t 545 Metro Place South, Suite 100 Lancaster, OH 43130 Dublin, OH 43017Fairfield County, Case No. 2019 CA 00023 2
Delaney, J. {¶1} Defendant-Appellant A.C.K. appeals the April 11, 2019 Dome stic Violence Civil Protection Order granted by the Fairfield County Court of Common Pleas, Domestic Relations Division. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY {¶2} W.K. and J.K. are the minor children of M.K. (“Father”) an d PlaintiffAppellee M.K. (“Mother”). Father is married to Defendant-Appell ant A.C.K. Child Endangering and Assault Conviction {¶3} In 2016, W.K. and J.K. were delivered to Father’s home for visitation. The children were in the care of A.C.K. while Father was at work. W hile he was staying with Father and A.C.K., W.K. went to preschool where one of the teac hers observed severe black, blue, purple, and red bruising across W.K.’s buttocks. W hen the teacher asked how he was injured, W.K. responded that “[A.C.K.] did it at dad dy’s house.” The teacher reported the incident to her supervisor and made a report to Ch ild Protective Services. Mother was also contacted and she took W.K. to Nationwide Child ren’s Hospital for an evaluation. The hospital determined that “[g]iven the location and number of contusions on patient’s buttocks, patient’s injuries are consisted [sic] w ith nonaccidental injury.” Mother filed a report with the Fairfield County Sheriff’s Offic e on July 14, 2016. {¶4} On October 5, 2016, A.C.K. was charged with violations of R.C. 2903.13 (assault), 2919.22 (endangering children), and 2923.03 (complic ity). The matter proceeded to a jury trial before the Fairfield County Municipal Court where on August 28, 2018, A.C.K. was found guilty of violations of R.C. 2919.22(A) and 2919.22(B)(1) (Endangering Children) and R.C. 2903.13(A) (Assault).Fairfield County, Case No. 2019 CA 00023 3
{¶5} The municipal court held a sentencing hearing on October 3 , 2018, where it ordered, in part, no contact between A.C.K. and W.K. until f urther order of the court. The municipal court granted A.C.K. a stay of sentencing pending her appeal of her conviction and sentence. The stay of sentencing included the no contact order between A.C.K. and W.K. {¶6} On October 10, 2018, A.C.K. filed a notice of appeal of he r conviction and sentence for child endangering and assault. On September 9, 201 9, this Court affirmed the conviction and sentence in State v. A.C ., 5th Dist. Fairfield No. 19-CA-43, 2019-Ohio3650. Petition for Domestic Violence Civil Protection Order {¶7} On October 24, 2018, Mother filed a Petition for Domestic Violence Civil Protection Order (“DVCPO”) with the Fairfield County Court of C ommon Pleas, Domestic Relations Division, on behalf of the minor children and against A.C.K. Mother stated in her petition that after A.C.K.’s sentencing hearing, A.C.K. lou dly stated towards Mother that “karma and me are going to get you.” Mother further allege d that two weeks after A.C.K.’s conviction, A.C.K. told W.K. at his sibling’s softball game that if he came near Mother, W.K. would spend the rest of the day in the corner of h is bedroom. Mother was afraid that A.C.K. would continue to take her anger out on her children. Mother expressed that she did not want to stop visitation between Father and the children. {¶8} The trial court granted an ex parte DVCPO on October 24, 2 018. A full hearing was referred to the magistrate and held on February 22, 2019 and April 5, 2019.Fairfield County, Case No. 2019 CA 00023 4
{¶9} On April 11, 2019, the magistrate granted a four-year DVCP O against A.C.K. The order was adopted by the trial court on the same day . In conjunction with the order, the magistrate filed Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law. {¶10} A.C.K. did not file objec tions to the trial court’s adopt ion of the magistrate’s decision granting the DVCPO pursuant to Civ.R. 65.1(G). {¶11} On May 9, 2019, A.C.K. filed a notice of appeal of the Ap ril 11, 2019 DVCPO. ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR {¶12} A.C.K. raises one Assignment of Error: {¶13} “THE DECISION TO GRANT THE PROTECTION ORDER IN THIS CASE WAS PLAIN ERROR: THERE WAS NO DANGER OF FUTURE DOMESTIC VIOLENC E FOR W.K. NOR WAS THERE ANY DOMESTIC VIOLENCE OR THREAT OF IT FO R J.K.” ANALYSIS {¶14} The trial court granted Mother, on behalf of her minor ch ildren, a DVCPO pursuant to R.C. 3113.31. The rules governing civil protection orders are set forth in Civ.R. 65.1. According to Civ.R. 65.1(F)(3), civil protection order pe titions may be referred to a magistrate for determination, but “[a] magistrate’s denial or g ranting of a protection order after a full hearing * * * does not constitute a magistrate’s o rder or a magistrate’s decision under Civ.R. 53(D)(2) or (3) and is not subject to the requirem ents of those rules.” Civ.R. 65.1(F)(3)(b). A magistrate’s denial or granting of a protectio n order after a full hearing is not effective unless adopted by the court. Civ.R. 65.1(F)(3)(c)

.Fairfield County, Case No. 2019 CA 00023 5
{¶15} “A party may file written objections to a court's adoptio n, modification, or rejection of a magistrate's denial or granting of a protection order after a full hearing, or any terms of such an order, within fourteen days of the court's filing of the order.” Civ.R. 65.1(F)(3)(d)(i). Objections bas ed on evidence of record must b e supported by a transcript or, if a transcript is not available, an affidavit o f that evidence. Civ.R. 65.1(F)(3)(d)(iii). An order entered by the court under Civ.R. 65.1(F)(3)(c) or (e) is a final, appealable order. Civ.R. 65.1(G). Pursuant to a July 1, 2016 am endment to Civ.R. 65.1, however, “ a party must timely file objections to such an order under division (F)(3)(d) of this rule prior to filing an appeal , and the timely filing of such objections shall stay the running of the time for appeal until the filing of the court's ruling on the objections.” (Emphasis added.) Civ.R. 65.1(G). The amendment was specificall y made “to require that a party must file objections prior to filing an appeal from a t rial court's otherwise appealable adoption, modification, or rejection of a magistrate 's ruling.” C.F. v. T.H.R ., 10th Dist. Franklin No. 18AP-536, 2019-Ohio-488, 2019 WL 549166 , ¶ 5 citing Civ.R. 65.1, Division (G) notes. {¶16} The Second, Third, Sixth, Seventh, Ninth, and Tenth appel late districts have addressed Civ.R. 65.1(G) and the failure to file timely objecti ons prior to filing an appeal. Our colleagues have held the requirements of Civ.R. 65.1(G) are mandatory and a party’s failure to file timely objections to a trial court’s adoption o f a magistrate’s decision granting or denying a civil protection or der prior to filing an appeal i s a violation of Civ.R. 65.1(G) and as such, the appeal of the civil protection order must be d ismissed. See K.R. v. T.B ., 10th Dist. Franklin No. 17AP–302, 2017–Ohio–8647, ¶ 4–6 (dismis sing appeal pursuant to Civ.R. 65.1(G)); C.F. v. T.H.R ., 10th Dist. Franklin No. 18AP-536, 2019-Ohio-488Fairfield County, Case No. 2019 CA 00023 6
(dismissing appeal pursuant to Civ.R. 65.1(G)); J.S. v. D.E ., 7th Dist. Mahoning No. 17 MA 0032, 2017–Ohio–7507, ¶ 17–22 (dismissing appeal when writte n objections not timely filed); K.U. v. M.S ., 7th Dist. Mahoning No. 16 MA 0165, 2017–Ohio–8029, ¶ 17– 18 (stating that without objections filed appellate court has n o jurisdiction); A.S. v. D.S ., 9th Dist. Medina No. 16CA0080–M, 2017–Ohio–7782, ¶ 5–6 (dismiss ing appeal without addressing merits pursuant to Civ.R. 65.1(G)); Hetrick v. Lockwood , 6th Dist. Sandusky No. S-17-014, 2018-Ohio-118, 2018 WL 388965, ¶ 8 (dismissing ap peal when appellant failed to file timely objections to trial court’s adoption of m agistrate’s granting of CSPO after full hearing); Danison v. Blinco , 3rd Dist. Crawford, No. 3-18-19, 2019-Ohio-2767, ¶ 8 (failure to file objections to trial court’s adoption of magi strate’s decision failed to preserve appellant’s arguments for appeal); See also Frith v. Frith , 9th Dist. Summit No. 28361, 2017–Ohio–7848, ¶ 4–6 (dismissing due to trial court not ruling on appellant's timely filed objections prior to the appeal as required under C iv.R. 65.1(G)); Runkle v. Stewart , 2nd Dist. Miami No. 2018-CA-27, 2019-Ohio-2356, ¶ 11 (affirme d judgment of trial court after appellant failed to file timely objections to trial court’s adoption of magistrate’s decision denying DVCPO after full hearing). But see Saqr v. Naji , 1st Dist. Hamilton No. C–160850, 2017–Ohio–8142, ¶ 14–19 (allowing appeal despite no objections filed because no notice that objections must be file d was provided). {¶17} Here, the record shows that A.C.K. failed to file timely objections to the trial court’s April 11, 2019 adoption of the magistrate’s decision gr anting the DVCPO. A.C.K. argues in her appeal that this Court should use the “plain erro r” standard to review the trial court’s decision to adopt the magistrate’s decision grant ing the DVCPO. A.C.K., however, has not presented any argument or cited to any case la w to support herFairfield County, Case No. 2019 CA 00023 7
contention that we should ignore the guidance of our brethren a ppellate districts and adopt a plain error standard of review when a party fails to fo llow the requirements of Civ.R. 65.1(G). {¶18} We hold that without timely filed objections under Civ.R. 65.1(G), A.C.K. may not challenge the trial court’s decision on appeal. Accordi ngly, we decline to address the merits and the appeal is dismissed pursuant to Civ.R. 65.1( G). CONCLUSION {¶19} The appeal of the April 11, 2019 DVCPO issued by the Fair field County Court of Common Pleas, Domestic Relations Division, is dismisse d. By: Delaney, J., Gwin, P.J. and Hoffman, J., concur.