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[Congressional Bills 118th Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[S. 4177 Introduced in Senate (IS)]

<DOC>

118th CONGRESS
  2d Session
                                S. 4177

      To implement the recommendations of the final report of the 
Congressional Commission on the Strategic Posture of the United States, 
                        and for other purposes.

_______________________________________________________________________

                   IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES

                             April 18, 2024

  Mrs. Fischer (for herself, Mr. Wicker, and Mr. King) introduced the 
 following bill; which was read twice and referred to the Committee on 
                             Armed Services

_______________________________________________________________________

                                 A BILL

 
      To implement the recommendations of the final report of the 
Congressional Commission on the Strategic Posture of the United States, 
                        and for other purposes.

    Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the 
United States of America in Congress assembled,

SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.

    This Act may be cited as the ``Restoring American Deterrence Act of 
2024''.

SEC. 2. FINDINGS.

    Congress finds the following:
            (1) On October 12, 2023, the Congressional Commission on 
        the Strategic Posture of the United States (referred to in this 
        section as the ``Commission'') released a final report entitled 
        ``America's Strategic Posture''.
            (2) The report, the consensus product of a 12-person 
        bipartisan commission led by the Honorable Madelyn Creedon and 
        former Senator Jon Kyl--
                    (A) examined the latest intelligence available on 
                current and projected global strategic threats;
                    (B) assessed the adequacy of existing United States 
                strategies, policies, and capabilities for addressing 
                such threats; and
                    (C) provided a series of findings and 
                recommendations, which were subsequently made available 
                to the President, Congress, and the general public.
            (3) The findings of the Commission reflect a rapidly 
        deteriorating international security situation that is becoming 
        far more dangerous for the United States and its allies and 
        partners.
            (4) The rapid and unprecedented growth of the nuclear 
        arsenal of the People's Republic of China and the massive 
        expansion of the armed forces of the People's Republic of China 
        across all domains have forever altered the global balance of 
        power.
            (5) The various arms of the People's Liberation Army can no 
        longer be dismissed as an afterthought, and increasingly 
        aggressive behavior by the People's Republic of China, 
        particularly with regard to the United States and its allies 
        and partners in the Asia-Pacific region, offers little 
        assurance that the rise of the People's Republic of China will 
        remain peaceful.
            (6) The Government of the Russian Federation owns, and will 
        likely maintain for the foreseeable future, the largest nuclear 
        arsenal on Earth.
            (7) While the war following the unprovoked invasion of 
        Ukraine by the Russian Federation has diminished the 
        conventional armed forces of the Russian Federation, the 
        Government of the Russian Federation--
                    (A) continues to expand and diversify the nuclear 
                arsenal, air and missile defenses, and space, cyber, 
                biological, and chemical weapons capabilities of the 
                Russian Federation; and
                    (B) regularly flaunts such capabilities as to 
                threaten and intimidate regional neighbors.
            (8) Continued efforts by the Democratic People's Republic 
        of Korea to expand and diversify its nuclear arsenal, long-
        range missile systems, and chemical and biological weapons 
        programs and the clear willingness to leverage such systems and 
        programs to threaten and intimidate regional neighbors poses a 
        growing danger to stability in Northeast Asia.
            (9) The growth of the intercontinental ballistic missile 
        forces of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea presents an 
        acute danger to the people of the United States, considering 
        such systems may soon be capable of overwhelming the mainland 
        missile defenses of the United States.
            (10) The long history of aggression and support for global 
        terrorism by the Islamic Republic of Iran, including through 
        recent use of Hamas proxies to brutally attack Israeli and 
        United States citizens, demonstrates that the Islamic Republic 
        of Iran has no interest in the goals of international stability 
        and peaceful coexistence.
            (11) The Islamic Republic of Iran is committed to a long-
        term goal of further developing increasingly destabilizing 
        missile technologies and acquiring nuclear weapons to dominate 
        the greater Middle East.
            (12) Taken together, such findings reflect a global 
        security environment very different from any the United States 
        has ever encountered.
            (13) While the United States served as a bulwark against 
        the Soviet Union, enduring the distant existential threat the 
        Government of the Soviet Union posed for decades, and defied 
        the persistent daily threat of terrorism from the earliest days 
        of the 21st century, the United States has never faced a more 
        complex set of global threats than are arrayed before it as of 
        the date of the enactment of this Act.
            (14) The United States, in order to maintain its position 
        in the international order, or quite possibly its very 
        survival, must recognize this new threat environment, and 
        urgently take prompt, decisive action to transform its aging 
        array of defenses, renovate long-neglected industrial 
        capabilities, rebuild a strong and vibrant workforce, rebuild 
        allied confidence in the support and leadership of the United 
        States, and craft a common, unifying vision of purpose for all 
        United States citizens.

SEC. 3. STATEMENT OF POLICY.

    It is the policy of the United States--
            (1) that the deterrence of strategic attacks, and in 
        particular nuclear attacks, against the United States and its 
        allies is the highest defense priority of the United States; 
        and
            (2) to marshal the full weight of statutory and regulatory 
        measures available to the United States Government to ensure 
        that the Secretary of Defense and the Secretary of Energy are 
        provided with all necessary authorities and resources required 
        to ensure the maintenance of a modern, effective strategic 
        deterrent to meet the emerging suite of unprecedented strategic 
        threats against the United States.

SEC. 4. ASSESSMENT OF UPDATED FORCE SIZING REQUIREMENTS.

    (a) In General.--Not later than 1 year after the date of the 
enactment of this Act, the Secretary of Defense and the Chairman of the 
Joint Chiefs of Staff shall submit to the congressional defense 
committees a strategy that enables the United States to concurrently--
            (1) achieve the nuclear employment objectives of the 
        President against any adversary that conducts a strategic 
        attack against the United States or its allies;
            (2) hold at risk all classes of adversary targets described 
        in the nuclear weapons employment guidance issued by the 
        President as of the date of the enactment of this Act;
            (3) defeat the conventional military aggression of a major 
        adversary in one geographic theater, while simultaneously 
        providing a credible conventional deterrent to opportunistic 
        aggression in a separate geographic theater;
            (4) provide a credible defense against limited long-range 
        strikes against the United States homeland;
            (5) satisfy requirements of the combatant commands for the 
        presence of surface and subsurface Navy forces at rates of 80 
        percent or more; and
            (6) maintain the capacity to regularly place a portion of 
        the strategic bomber fleets of the United States on alert while 
        not substantially undermining the requirements of the combatant 
        commands for the presence of conventional bombers.
    (b) Elements.--The strategy required by subsection (a) shall 
include the following elements:
            (1) An assessment of the amount of nuclear and conventional 
        forces necessary to implement such strategy.
            (2) A description of the classes of targets necessary to 
        hold at risk via nuclear forces in order to achieve the 
        requirements of the United States Strategic Command and the 
        deterrence and assurance objectives of the United States.
            (3) A comparison of the quantity of targets held at risk 
        via the nuclear forces of the United States at the end of each 
        presidential administration since January 21, 1977, and targets 
        that are held at risk as of the date of the submission of the 
        strategy.
            (4) A projection of the planned growth in potential target 
        quantities due to the expansion and diversification of likely 
        adversary capabilities during the period beginning on the date 
        of the enactment of this Act and ending on the date that is 10 
        years after the date of the enactment of this Act.
            (5) A comparison of the quantities and various employment 
        options available in the nuclear weapons stockpile of the 
        United States at the end of each presidential administration 
        since January 21, 1977, and options that are available as of 
        the date of the submission of the strategy.
            (6) A projection of the planned quantities and employment 
        options that will be available in the nuclear weapons stockpile 
        of the United States during the period beginning on the date of 
        the enactment of this Act and ending on the date that is 10 
        years after the date of the enactment of this Act.
            (7) An assessment of the impact of delays in ongoing or 
        planned modernization programs of nuclear, missile defense, 
        space, or conventional military forces of the United States.
            (8) Any other factors the Secretary or the Chairman believe 
        pertinent for assessing force sizing requirements.
    (c) Form.--The strategy required by subsection (a) shall be 
submitted in classified form and shall include a unclassified summary.
    (d) Congressional Defense Committees Defined.--In this section, the 
term ``congressional defense committees'' means--
            (1) the Committee on Armed Services and the Committee on 
        Appropriations of the Senate; and
            (2) the Committee on Armed Services and the Committee on 
        Appropriations of the House of Representatives.

SEC. 5. MODERNIZATION OF THE INTEGRATED TACTICAL WARNING AND ATTACK 
              ASSESSMENT SYSTEM.

    (a) In General.--Not later than 120 days after the date of the 
enactment of this Act, the Secretary of Defense and the Chairman of the 
Joint Chiefs of Staff, in coordination with the Commander of United 
States Strategic Command, the Commander of the United States Space 
Command, and the Commander of the United States Northern Command, shall 
develop a plan for the comprehensive modernization of the United States 
integrated tactical warning and attack assessment system (referred to 
in this section as the ``system'').
    (b) Inclusion of Nontraditional Sensors.--The plan required by 
subsection (a) shall include a strategy for incorporating information 
from nontraditional data streams of the system, including sensor 
architectures designed for missile defenses, to provide Federal 
Government officials with greater fidelity and improved threat 
characterization, while minimizing potential degradation in system 
reliability and integrity.
    (c) Report Required.--Not later than 30 days after concluding the 
development of the plan required by subsection (a), the Secretary of 
Defense shall submit to the congressional defense committees--
            (1) a report summarizing the plan; and
            (2) initial acquisition cost estimates and timelines 
        necessary to implement the plan.
    (d) Format.--The report required by subsection (c) shall be 
submitted in a classified form and shall include an unclassified 
summary.
    (e) Congressional Defense Committees Defined.--In this section, the 
term ``congressional defense committees'' means--
            (1) the Committee on Armed Services and the Committee on 
        Appropriations of the Senate; and
            (2) the Committee on Armed Services and the Committee on 
        Appropriations of the House of Representatives.

SEC. 6. NATIONAL WORKFORCE DEVELOPMENT STRATEGY.

    (a) In General.--Not later than 90 days after the date of the 
enactment of this Act, the Secretary of Defense, in coordination with 
the Secretary of Energy, the Secretary of the Treasury, the Secretary 
of Labor, the Secretary of Education, and the Secretary of Commerce, 
shall develop a strategy for collaborating with State and local 
governments to promote the development of a skilled manufacturing and 
high-demand vocational trade workforce to support the expansion of the 
national technology and industrial base and nuclear security 
enterprise.
    (b) Reports Required.--
            (1) Strategy implementation.--Not later than 120 days after 
        the development of the strategy described in subsection (a), 
        the Secretary of Defense shall submit to Congress a report that 
        outlines the strategy and includes a detailed description of 
        measures to implement the strategy, including planned schedules 
        and progress milestones.
            (2) Annual implementation progress.--Not later than 
        November 15, 2024, and annually thereafter, the Secretary of 
        Defense shall submit to Congress a report on any progress made 
        in implementing the strategy.
    (c) Definitions.--In this section:
            (1) National technology and industrial base.--The term 
        ``national technology and industrial base'' has the meaning 
        given that term in section 4801 of title 10, United States 
        Code.
            (2) Nuclear security enterprise.--The term ``nuclear 
        security enterprise'' has the meaning given that term in 
        section 4002 of the Atomic Energy Defense Act (50 U.S.C. 2501).

SEC. 7. ESTABLISHMENT OF A NATIONAL INTEGRATED AIR AND MISSILE DEFENSE 
              ARCHITECTURE FOR THE UNITED STATES.

    (a) In General.--Not later than 180 days after the date of the 
enactment of this Act, the Secretary of Defense and the Chairman of the 
Joint Chiefs of Staff, in consultation with the Commander of the United 
States Northern Command, the Commander of the United States Space 
Command, and the Director of the Missile Defense Agency, shall develop 
a comprehensive integrated architecture for defending the United States 
against all forms of missile attacks.
    (b) Elements.--The architecture required by subsection (a) shall 
include the following elements:
            (1) An identification of terrestrial, maritime, orbital, 
        and cyber technological capabilities to address nonballistic 
        and ballistic missile threats to the United States, including 
        the sensor, command and control, and missile defeat systems 
        that the Secretary and Chairman determine are required for the 
        operation of an integrated missile defense architecture for the 
        United States during the 10-year period beginning on the date 
        of the enactment of this Act.
            (2) The technological requirements to ensure compatibility 
        with the integrated air and missile defense capabilities of the 
        North Atlantic Treaty Organization and integrated air and 
        missile defense architecture in the Indo-Pacific region that is 
        under development as of the date of the enactment of this Act.
            (3) An integrated, time-phased development, procurement, 
        and deployment schedule for the systems comprising the 
        specified architecture.
            (4) The development and integration risk of the proposed 
        architecture.
            (5) The personnel required to operate the proposed 
        architecture, including opportunities for reducing the 
        anticipated personnel requirements through increased use of 
        automation.
            (6) Any other matters the Secretary of Defense and the 
        Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff consider appropriate.
    (c) Designation of Official Responsible for Architecture 
Development.--
            (1) Designation.--Not later than 90 days after the date of 
        the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of Defense shall 
        designate a senior official of the Department of Defense who 
        shall be responsible for the architecture specified in 
        subsection (a).
            (2) Duties.--The duties of the official designated under 
        paragraph (1) shall include the following:
                    (A) Designing the defensive architecture for the 
                United States.
                    (B) Overseeing development of an integrated missile 
                defense acquisition strategy for the United States.
                    (C) Ensuring the budgets of each military 
                department and defense agency are appropriate for the 
                architecture required by subsection (a).
                    (D) Siting the integrated missile defense systems 
                comprising the architecture described in subsection 
                (a).
                    (E) Overseeing long-term acquisition and 
                sustainment of the architecture.
                    (F) Such other duties as the Secretary determines 
                appropriate.
            (3) Report required.--Concurrent with the submission of 
        each budget of the President under section 1105(a) of title 31, 
        United States Code, until the end of the period specified in 
        paragraph (4), the official designated under paragraph (1) 
        shall submit to the congressional defense committees a report 
        on the actions taken by the official to carry out the duties 
        set forth under paragraph (2).
            (4) Termination.--The authority of this subsection shall 
        terminate on the date that is 3 years after the date on which 
        the official designated under paragraph (1) determines that the 
        integrated missile defense architecture described in subsection 
        (a) has achieved initial operational capability.
    (d) Congressional Defense Committees Defined.--In this section, the 
term ``congressional defense committees'' means--
            (1) the Committee on Armed Services and the Committee on 
        Appropriations of the Senate; and
            (2) the Committee on Armed Services and the Committee on 
        Appropriations of the House of Representatives.

SEC. 8. PREPARATIONS FOR POSSIBLE DEPLOYMENT OF ADDITIONAL 
              INTERCONTINENTAL BALLISTIC MISSILES.

    (a) Activation Plan.--Not later than 120 days after the date of the 
enactment of this Act, the Secretary of the Air Force, in coordination 
with the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition and Sustainment and 
the Commander of United States Strategic Command, shall develop a plan 
for deploying not more than 50 Sentinel intercontinental ballistic 
missiles in addition to the 400 Minuteman III intercontinental 
ballistic missiles currently deployed, during the planned life of the 
Sentinel intercontinental ballistic missile weapon system.
    (b) Alternative Acquisition Strategy.--In developing the plan 
required by subsection (a), the Secretary shall direct the Program 
Executive Officer for Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles to prepare an 
alternative acquisition strategy for the Sentinel intercontinental 
ballistic missile weapon system that accommodates the deployment of not 
more than 50 additional Sentinel intercontinental ballistic missiles, 
which shall include--
            (1) a plan to procure booster sets that will accommodate 
        the deployment of at least 450 Sentinel intercontinental 
        ballistic missiles during the planned life of the system and 
        satisfy anticipated testing requirements;
            (2) a plan develop and to procure reentry vehicles 
        necessary to support the planned life of the weapon system and 
        satisfy anticipated testing requirements;
            (3) a plan develop and to procure countermeasures to 
        support the deployment of at least 450 Sentinel 
        intercontinental ballistic missiles during the planned life of 
        the system and satisfy anticipated testing requirements;
            (4) a plan to procure ground support and maintenance 
        equipment to support the deployment of at least 450 Sentinel 
        intercontinental ballistic missiles during the planned life of 
        the system; and
            (5) recommendations for adjustments to the baseline 
        acquisition strategy as the Program Executive Officer 
        determines necessary to achieve the plan required by subsection 
        (a).
    (c) Report Required.--Not later than 30 days after the development 
of the plan required by subsection (a), the Secretary of the Air Force 
shall submit to the congressional defense committees a report 
containing a summary of the plan and initial acquisition cost estimates 
and timelines for executing the plan.
    (d) Congressional Defense Committees Defined.--In this section, the 
term ``congressional defense committees'' means--
            (1) the Committee on Armed Services and the Committee on 
        Appropriations of the Senate; and
            (2) the Committee on Armed Services and the Committee on 
        Appropriations of the House of Representatives.

SEC. 9. OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE MANAGEMENT AND PROCESS 
              IMPROVEMENTS.

    (a) Establishment of Assistant Secretary of Defense for Nuclear 
Deterrence Policy and Programs.--Section 138(b)(4) of title 10, United 
States Code, is amended to read as follows:
            ``(4) One of the Assistant Secretaries is the Assistant 
        Secretary of Defense for Nuclear Deterrence Policy and 
        Programs. The principal duty of the Assistant Secretary shall 
        be the overall supervision (including oversight of policy and 
        resources) of nuclear deterrence activities of the Department 
        of Defense. The Assistant Secretary is the principal civilian 
        adviser to the Secretary of Defense on nuclear deterrence 
        policies, operations, and associated programs within the senior 
        management of the Department of Defense.
                    ``(A) Subject to the authority, direction, and 
                control of the Secretary of Defense, the Assistant 
                Secretary shall--
                            ``(i) advise and assist the Secretary of 
                        Defense, the Under Secretary of Defense for 
                        Acquisition and Sustainment, and the Under 
                        Secretary of Defense for Policy in the 
                        development and supervision of policy, program 
                        planning and execution, and allocation and use 
                        of resources for the activities of the 
                        Department of Defense on all matters relating 
                        to the sustainment, operation, and 
                        modernization of United States nuclear forces;
                            ``(ii) communicate views on issues within 
                        the responsibility of the Assistant Secretary 
                        directly to the Secretary of Defense and the 
                        Deputy Secretary of Defense without obtaining 
                        the approval or concurrence of any other 
                        official within the Department of Defense;
                            ``(iii) serve as the Staff Director of the 
                        Nuclear Weapons Council established by section 
                        179 of this title;
                            ``(iv) serve as the principal interface 
                        with the Department of Energy on issues 
                        relating to nuclear fuels, and in coordination 
                        with the Assistant Secretary of Defense for 
                        Energy, Installations, and Environment, advise 
                        the Secretary of Defense on nuclear energy 
                        matters; and
                            ``(v) advise the Secretary of Defense, the 
                        Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition and 
                        Sustainment, and the Under Secretary of Defense 
                        for Policy on all matters relating to defending 
                        against chemical, biological, and other weapons 
                        of mass destruction.
                    ``(B) In the discharge of the responsibilities 
                specified in subparagraph (A), the Assistant Secretary 
                is immediately subordinate to the Secretary of Defense. 
                Unless otherwise directed by the President or statute, 
                no officer other than those specified in subparagraph 
                (A)(i) may intervene to exercise authority, direction, 
                or control over the Assistant Secretary in the 
                discharge of such responsibilities.''.
    (b) Modification of Duties for Under Secretary of Defense for 
Acquisition and Sustainment.--Section 133b of title 10, United States 
Code, is amended--
            (1) in paragraph (5)--
                    (A) in subparagraph (B), by striking ``; and'' and 
                inserting a semicolon; and
                    (B) by adding after subparagraph (C), the 
                following:
                    ``(D) chairman of the Nuclear Weapons Council 
                established by section 179 of this title; and
                    ``(E) co-chairman of the Council on Oversight of 
                the National Leadership Command, Control, and 
                Communications System established by section 171a of 
                this title;''; and
            (2) by amending paragraph (6) to read as follows:
            ``(6) overseeing--
                    ``(A) the sustainment and modernization of United 
                States nuclear forces, including the nuclear command, 
                control, and communications system; and
                    ``(B) military department and Defense Agency 
                programs to develop capabilities to counter weapons of 
                mass destruction;''.
    (c) Conforming Amendments.--Section 179 of title 10, United States 
Code, is amended by striking ``Nuclear, Chemical, and Biological 
Defense Programs'' each place it appears and inserting ``Nuclear 
Deterrence Policy and Programs''.

SEC. 10. NATIONAL NUCLEAR SECURITY ADMINISTRATION MANAGEMENT AND 
              PROCESS IMPROVEMENTS.

    (a) Modifications to National Nuclear Security Administration 
Act.--The National Nuclear Security Administration Act (50 U.S.C. 2401 
et seq.) is amended--
            (1) in section 3211--
                    (A) by amending subsection (b)(2) to read as 
                follows:
            ``(2) To support the deterrence of strategic attacks 
        against the United States by maintaining and enhancing the 
        performance, reliability, security, and safety of the United 
        States nuclear weapons stockpile, including the ability to 
        design, produce, and test nuclear weapons as necessary in order 
        to meet national security requirements.''; and
                    (B) in subsection (c), by redesignating paragraphs 
                (1) through (3) as paragraphs (2) through (4), 
                respectively, and inserting the following new paragraph 
                (1):
            ``(1) fulfilling, to the maximum extent possible, the 
        requirements for nuclear weapons of the Department of 
        Defense;'';
            (2) in section 3213(a)(2), by inserting ``infrastructure 
        construction and maintenance,'' after ``nuclear weapons,'';
            (3) by amending section 3214(b)(1) to read as follows:
            ``(1) Supporting the deterrence of strategic attacks by 
        maintaining and enhancing the performance, reliability, and 
        security of the United States nuclear weapons stockpile, 
        including the ability to design, produce, and test as necessary 
        in order to meet national security requirements.''; and
            (4) in section 3264, by striking ``for the use'' and 
        inserting ``for the cost-reimbursable use''.
    (b) Modifications to Nonproliferation and National Security 
Scholarship and Fellowship Programs.--Section 3113 of the Duncan Hunter 
National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2009 (50 U.S.C. 
2444) is amended--
            (1) by striking ``Department of Energy'' each place it 
        appears and inserting ``National Nuclear Security 
        Administration''; and
            (2) by striking ``of the Department'' each place it appears 
        and inserting ``of the Administration'';
    (c) Modifications to Certain Nuclear Weapons Stockpile Matters.--
The Atomic Energy Defense Act (50 U.S.C. 2501 et seq.) is amended--
            (1) in section 4201(b)--
                    (A) by striking paragraph (5);
                    (B) by redesignating paragraphs (1) through (4) as 
                paragraphs (2) through (5), respectively;
                    (C) by inserting after the matter preceding 
                paragraph (2), as so redesignated, the following new 
                paragraph (1):
            ``(1) An increased level of effort for the construction of 
        new facilities and the modernization of existing facilities 
        with production and manufacturing capabilities that are 
        necessary to support the deterrence of strategic attacks 
        against the United States by maintaining and enhancing the 
        performance, reliability, and security of the United States 
        nuclear weapons stockpile, including--
                    ``(A) the nuclear weapons production facilities; 
                and
                    ``(B) production and manufacturing capabilities 
                resident in the national security laboratories.'';
                    (D) in paragraph (2), as so redesignated, by 
                striking ``An increased level of effort'' and inserting 
                ``Support'';
                    (E) in paragraph (3), as so redesignated, by 
                striking ``An increased level of effort'' and inserting 
                ``Support''; and
                    (F) by amending paragraph (4), as so redesignated, 
                to read as follows:
            ``(4) Support for the modernization of facilities and 
        projects that contribute to the experimental capabilities of 
        the United States that support the sustainment and 
        modernization of the United States nuclear weapons stockpile 
        and the capabilities required to assess nuclear weapons 
        effects.'';
            (2) in section 4204--
                    (A) in subsection (a)--
                            (i) in the matter preceding paragraph (1)--
                                    (I) by inserting ``, modernization, 
                                and replacement, as required,'' after 
                                ``effective management''; and
                                    (II) by striking ``, including the 
                                extension of the effective life of such 
                                weapons'';
                            (ii) in paragraph (1), by striking 
                        ``increase the reliability, safety, and 
                        security'' and inserting ``enhance the 
                        performance and reliability'';
                            (iii) by redesignating paragraphs (3), (4), 
                        and (5) as paragraphs (4), (5), and (6), 
                        respectively;
                            (iv) by inserting after paragraph (2) the 
                        following new paragraph (3):
            ``(3) To maintain the safety and security of the nuclear 
        weapons stockpile.''; and
                            (v) by amending paragraph (4), as so 
                        redesignated, to read as follows:
            ``(4) To optimize the future size of the nuclear weapons 
        stockpile.''; and
                    (B) in subsection (b)--
                            (i) in paragraph (1)--
                                    (I) by striking ``made to achieve'' 
                                and inserting ``consistent with''; and
                                    (II) by striking ``; and'' and 
                                inserting a semicolon;
                            (ii) by redesignating paragraph (2) as 
                        paragraph (3);
                            (iii) by inserting after paragraph (1) the 
                        following new paragraph (2):
            ``(2) any changes made to the stockpile consistent with the 
        objectives identified in subsection (a) are carried out in a 
        cost effective manner; and''; and
                            (iv) in paragraph (3)--
                                    (I) by amending subparagraph (A) to 
                                read as follows:
                    ``(A) are well understood and certifiable without 
                the need to resume underground nuclear weapons 
                testing''; and
                                    (II) by adding at the end the 
                                following new subparagraph:
                    ``(C) develop future generations of design, 
                certification, and production expertise in the nuclear 
                security enterprise to support the fulfillment of 
                mission requirements of the future stockpile.'';
            (3) in section 4209(a)(1), in the matter preceding 
        subparagraph (A), by striking ``phase 1 or phase 6.1'' and 
        inserting ``phase 2 or phase 6.2'';
            (4) in section 4212--
                    (A) in subsection (a)(1), by striking, ``as 
                specified in the most recent Nuclear Posture Review'';
                    (B) in subsection (b)--
                            (i) in paragraph (1), by inserting ``and 
                        high explosives manufacturing'' after ``weapons 
                        assembly'';
                            (ii) in paragraph (3), by striking 
                        ``fissile materials components processing and 
                        fabrication'' and inserting ``processing'';
                            (iii) by redesignating paragraph (4) as 
                        paragraph (5); and
                            (iv) by inserting after paragraph (3), the 
                        following new paragraph (4):
            ``(4) The fissile material component processing and 
        fabrication capabilities of the Savannah River Plutonium 
        Processing Facility and the Los Alamos National Laboratory.''; 
        and
                    (C) by striking subsection (c);
            (5) by striking section 4216;
            (6) in section 4405--
                    (A) by amending subsection (a) to read as follows:
    ``(a) Accelerated Cleanup.--The Secretary of Energy shall 
accelerate the schedule for defense environmental cleanup activities 
and projects for a site at a Department of Energy defense nuclear 
facility if the Secretary determines that such an accelerated schedule 
will accelerate the recapitalization, modernization, or replacement of 
National Nuclear Security Administration facilities supporting the 
nuclear weapons stockpile, achieve meaningful, long-term cost savings 
to the Federal Government, or could substantially accelerate the 
release of land for local reuse without undermining national security 
objectives.''; and
                    (B) in subsection (b)--
                            (i) by redesignating paragraphs (1) through 
                        (4) as paragraphs (2) through (5), 
                        respectively; and
                            (ii) by inserting after the matter 
                        preceding paragraph (2), as so redesignated, 
                        the following new paragraph (1):
            ``(1) The extent to which accelerated cleanup schedules can 
        contribute to a more rapid modernization of National Nuclear 
        Security Administration facilities.''; and
            (7) in section 4713--
                    (A) in the heading of subsection (a)(1), by 
                inserting ``and new nuclear weapon program'' after 
                ``extension''; and
                    (B) by inserting ``or new nuclear weapon program'' 
                after ``stockpile life extension'' each place it 
                appears.

SEC. 11. MATTERS RELATING TO THE DEFENSE PRODUCTION ACT.

    The Defense Production Act of 1950 (50 U.S.C. 4501 et seq.) is 
amended--
            (1) in section 301--
                    (A) in subsection(a)(3)(A)(i), by striking ``, in 
                advance,''; and
                    (B) in subsection (d)(1)(A), by striking 
                ``$50,000,000'' and inserting ``$150,000,000''; and
            (2) in section 304(e), by striking ``$750,000,000'' each 
        place it appears and inserting ``$1,500,000,000''.

SEC. 12. RESTORATION OF A DOMESTIC URANIUM ENRICHMENT CAPABILITY.

    (a) Sense of Congress.--It is the Sense of Congress that--
            (1) the inability of the United States to domestically 
        produce unencumbered enriched uranium undermines the national 
        security of the United States and represents an unnecessary 
        hurdle on the path to energy independence of the United States;
            (2) existing programs within the Department of Energy to 
        explore various enrichment technologies are not advancing on a 
        pace to rectify such inability with any apparent urgency; and
            (3) without clear statutory guidance to the contrary, 
        bureaucratic inertia will prevail and continue to drag out the 
        to domestically produce unencumbered enriched uranium for 
        another decade or longer with little demonstrable progress 
        toward restoring a scalable domestic uranium enrichment 
        capability.
    (b) In General.--Not later than 90 days after the date of the 
enactment of this Act, the Secretary of Energy shall conduct an 
assessment to evaluate at least 2, but not more than 4, geographically 
disparate possible locations in the United States that would be best 
suited to host a modular, scalable facility for the domestic enrichment 
of unencumbered uranium, including highly-enriched uranium suitable for 
defense applications.
    (c) Environmental Documentation.--Once a location has been selected 
pursuant to subsection (d)(2), the Secretary shall issue a notice of 
intent to prepare an environmental document in accordance with the 
National Environmental Policy Act of 1969 (42 U.S.C. 4321 et seq.).
    (d) Report Required.--Not later than 150 days after commencing the 
assessment required by subsection (b), the Secretary of Energy shall 
submit to the congressional defense committees a report outlining the 
results of such assessment, including--
            (1) an initial cost assessment for the construction at 
        least one facility; and
            (2) a statement declaring a preferred location or locations 
        from among the locations evaluated pursuant to subsection (b).
    (e) Congressional Defense Committees Defined.--In this section, the 
term ``congressional defense committees'' means--
            (1) the Committee on Armed Services and the Committee on 
        Appropriations of the Senate; and
            (2) the Committee on Armed Services and the Committee on 
        Appropriations of the House of Representatives.
                                 <all>
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