9666 Federal Register / Vol. 72, No. 42 / Monday, March 5, 2007 / Rules and Regulations 

238–7199 for more information about this 

AD. 

(t) General Electric Company Service 

Bulletins CF6–80C2 S/B 72–1206, dated 

December 23, 2005, and CF6–80C2 S/B 72–

1207, Revision 01, dated July 05, 2006, 

pertain to the subject of this AD. 

Issued in Burlington, Massachusetts, on 

February 27, 2007. 

Peter A. White, 

Acting Manager, Engine and Propeller 

Directorate, Aircraft Certification Service. 

[FR Doc. 07–986 Filed 3–2–07; 8:45 am] 

BILLING CODE 4910–13–P 

DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION 

Federal Aviation Administration 

14 CFR Part 39 

[Docket No. FAA–2006–26378; Directorate 

Identifier 2006–NM–230–AD; Amendment 

39–14972; AD 2007–05–11] 

RIN 2120–AA64 

Airworthiness Directives; Bombardier 

Model CL–600–2B16 (CL–604) 

Airplanes and Model CL–600–2B19 

(Regional Jet Series 100 & 440) 

Airplanes 

AGENCY: Federal Aviation 

Administration (FAA), Department of 

Transportation (DOT). 

ACTION: Final rule; request for 

comments. 

SUMMARY: The FAA is superseding two 

existing airworthiness directives (ADs), 

that apply to certain Bombardier Model 

CL–600–2B16 (CL–604) airplanes and 

Model CL–600–2B19 (Regional Jet 

Series 100 & 440) airplanes. These 

models may be referred to by their 

marketing designations as RJ100, RJ200, 

RJ440, CRJ100, CRJ200, CRJ440, and 

CL–65. One existing AD requires 

replacing the horizontal stabilizer trim 

control unit (HSTCU) with a new 

HSTCU. The other existing AD requires 

revising the airplane flight manual 

(AFM) to advise the flightcrew of 

procedures to follow in the event of 

stabilizer trim runaway, and in the 

event of MACH TRIM, STAB TRIM, and 

horizontal stabilizer trim malfunctions; 

and revising the AFM to require a 

review of the location of certain circuit 

breakers. That AD also requires doing a 

functional check of the stabilizer trim 

system and installing circuit breaker 

identification collars, and provides an 

optional terminating action. This new 

AD requires the previously optional 

terminating action and requires further 

revisions to the AFM. This AD also 

requires the removal of certain AFM 

revisions. This AD results from reports 

of trim problems including 

uncommanded trim, trim in the 

opposite direction to that selected, loss 

of trim position indication and, in one 

case, potential loss of trim disconnect 

capability. We are issuing this AD to 

prevent these events, which could result 

in conditions that vary from reduced 

controllability of the airplane to loss of 

control of the airplane. 

DATES: This AD becomes effective 

March 20, 2007. 

The Director of the Federal Register 

approved the incorporation by reference 

of certain publications listed in the AD 

as of March 20, 2007. 

On November 14, 2006 (71 FR 63219, 

October 30, 2006), the Director of the 

Federal Register approved the 

incorporation by reference of certain 

other publications. 

On July 30, 1998 (63 FR 34574, June 

25, 1998), the Director of the Federal 

Register approved the incorporation by 

reference of a certain other publication. 

We must receive any comments on 

this AD by April 4, 2007. 

ADDRESSES: Use one of the following 

addresses to submit comments on this 

AD. 

• DOT Docket Web site: Go to http:// 

dms.dot.gov and follow the instructions 

for sending your comments 

electronically. 

• Government-wide rulemaking Web 

site: Go to http://www.regulations.gov 

and follow the instructions for sending 

your comments electronically. 

• Mail: Docket Management Facility, 

U.S. Department of Transportation, 400 

Seventh Street, SW., Nassif Building, 

Room PL–401, Washington, DC 20590. 

• Fax: (202) 493–2251. 

• Hand Delivery: Room PL–401 on 

the plaza level of the Nassif Building, 

400 Seventh Street, SW., Washington, 

DC, between 9 a.m. and 5 p.m., Monday 

through Friday, except Federal holidays. 

Contact Bombardier, Inc., Canadair, 

Aerospace Group, P.O. Box 6087, 

Station Centre-ville, Montreal, Quebec 

H3C 3G9, Canada, for service 

information identified in this AD. 

You may examine the contents of the 

AD docket on the Internet at http:// 

dms.dot.gov, or in person at the Docket 

Management Facility, U.S. Department 

of Transportation, 400 Seventh Street, 

SW., Room PL–401, on the plaza level 

of the Nassif Building, Washington, DC. 

This docket number is FAA–2006–

26378; the directorate identifier for this 

docket is 2006–NM–230–AD. 

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: 

Daniel Parrillo, Aerospace Engineer, 

Systems and Flight Test Branch, ANE–

172, FAA, New York Aircraft 

Certification Office, 1600 Stewart 

Avenue, Suite 410, Westbury, New York 

11590; telephone (516) 228–7305; fax 

(516) 794–5531. 

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: 

Discussion 

On October 13, 2006, the FAA issued 

a supplemental notice of proposed 

rulemaking (NPRM) to amend 14 CFR 

part 39 to include an AD that 

supersedes AD 2006–22–06, amendment 

39–14803 (71 FR 63219, October 30, 

2006). The existing AD applies to 

certain Bombardier Model CL–600–

2B16 (CL–604) airplanes and Model CL–

600–2B19 (Regional Jet Series 100 & 

440) airplanes. That supplemental 

NPRM was published in the Federal 

Register on December 28, 2006 (71 FR 

78096). That supplemental NPRM 

proposed to retain the requirements of 

AD 2006–22–06 and to require the 

previously optional terminating action 

(installation of a new horizontal 

stabilizer trim control unit (HSTCU)). 

That supplemental NPRM also proposed 

to require, for certain airplanes, reinserting the applicable temporary 

revisions of the Emergency and 

Abnormal Procedures sections of the 

airplane flight manual (AFM) under 

certain conditions. 

Actions Since Supplemental NPRM 

Was Issued 

Since we issued that supplemental 

NPRM, Bombardier has issued new 

temporary revisions (TRs) to the AFMs 

as described in a comment submitted by 

the National Transportation Safety 

Board (NTSB) (see ‘‘Request to Revise 

AFM Procedures’’ paragraph below). In 

the comment, the NTSB presents data to 

indicate that changes to the AFMs are 

necessary to address the identified 

unsafe condition. We have coordinated 

with Transport Canada Civil Aviation 

(TCCA) on this issue and concur that 

changes to the AFMs are necessary. In 

consideration of these new data, we 

have determined that the AFMs must be 

revised to include the new TRs within 

14 days after the effective date of this 

AD. 

The FAA finds that, with respect to 

this additional requirement, since a 

situation exists that requires immediate 

adoption of this requirement, notice and 

time for prior public comment hereon 

are impracticable, and good cause exists 

for making this amendment effective in 

less than 30 days. Therefore, this AD 

will include the requirements specified 

in the supplemental NPRM (except the 

proposed requirement to re-insert TRs to 

the AFMs), as well as the certain new 

requirements discussed below. The new 

requirements include revising the AFMs 

to include the new TRs. In addition, we 


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are superseding AD 98–13–24, 

amendment 39–10615 (63 FR 34574, 

June 25, 1998). See ‘‘Request to Clarify 

Related AD’’ paragraph below. This AD 

restates the requirement of AD 98–13–

24 to install a certain HSTCU and 

specifies that doing the terminating 

action required by this new AD 

(installing a new HSTCU) terminates 

that earlier requirement. 

Comments 

We provided the public the 

opportunity to participate in the 

development of this AD. We have 

considered the comments that have 

been received. 

Request To Revise AFM Procedures 

The NTSB requests that we revise the 

AFM procedures specified in the 

supplemental NPRM. The NTSB notes 

that the supplemental NPRM states that 

AD 2006–22–06 requires and the 

supplemental NPRM proposes to 

require: 

• Revising the Emergency and 

Abnormal Procedures sections of the 

AFM to advise flight crews of 

procedures to follow in the event of 

MACH TRIM, STAB TRIM, and 

horizontal stabilizer trim malfunctions; 

• Revising the Normal section of the 

AFM to require a review of the location 

of certain circuit breakers and a 

functional check of the stabilizer trim 

system [required only by AD 2006–22–

06]; and 

• Installing circuit breaker 

identification collars [required only by 

AD 2006–22–06]. 

The NTSB summarizes the guidance 

provided to pilots in the revised 

Emergency Procedures section as 

follows: 

• Assume manual control of the 

control column and override the 

runaway. 

• Press, hold, and release the STAB 

TRIM disconnect switch. 

• If trim motion continues, pull the 

circuit breakers. 

Based on the examination of corroded 

motherboards and findings during the 

investigations of the three previous 

incidents, the NTSB believes that the 

revised AFM procedures should 

emphasize that, likely in all cases, an 

uncommanded movement of the 

horizontal stabilizer trim is a result of a 

short-circuit of the first officer’s trim 

circuits. In addition, because the circuit 

breakers are accessible only to the first 

officer in Model CL–600–2B16 

airplanes, the NTSB suggests that the 

Emergency Procedures be revised to 

indicate that control should be 

immediately transferred to the captain’s 

controls to arrest the runaway trim with 

the captain’s trim switch. Finally, 

because the only way to arrest a failure 

mode that occurred only with the trim 

channels disengaged was to pull the 

circuit breakers, the NTSB suggests that 

the procedures should emphasize 

pulling the circuit breakers if the trim 

channels are disengaged. 

We agree that the AFM should be 

revised. However, we disagree with the 

emphasis on trying to disengage the trim 

on the captain’s side. We consider that 

it is possible to have contamination on 

the left- or right-hand side; therefore, 

both sides should attempt a 

disengagement. 

We agree that control must be 

transferred to the left-hand side to 

facilitate access to the circuit breakers 

on the right-hand side. However, we 

consider that the first priority, after 

regaining control by the pilot flying, is 

to disconnect the system using the 

disconnect switches, and that control be 

passed to the left-hand side subsequent 

to this step. 

We disagree with the suggestion to 

use the captain’s trim switch to arrest 

the trim runaway. There have been 

cases identified of motherboard short 

circuits where operation of the trim 

switch would not arrest the runaway. 

Given the minimal time available to 

arrest a runaway, priority must be given 

to the most probable means of arresting 

the surface motion. These priorities are, 

first the control column disconnect 

switches, and second, the circuit 

breakers. 

We also disagree with depending on 

the Engaged/Disengaged trim channels 

annunciation to pull the circuit 

breakers. Instead, the AFM will be 

changed to remove such reference from 

the procedure and require that the 

circuit breakers be pulled in all cases. 

We agree to change the AFM 

procedure to reflect the changes below: 

• Control column—Assume manual 

control and override runaway. 

• Both STAB TRIM Disconnect 

switches—Press, hold and release. 

• Control—Transfer to pilot (LH) side. 

• STAB CH 1 and CH 2 HSTCU 

circuit breakers—Open. 

The above procedures will be 

included as memory/immediate action 

items. 

Bombardier has issued and we have 

reviewed the temporary revisions (TRs) 

specified in the table below. 

TABLE—TRS

For Bombardier Model— Use— Dated— To the—

CL–600–2B16 (CL–604) airplanes Canadair Challenger TR 604/21–2 January 30, 2007 .......................... Canadair Challenger CL–604 

AFM, PSP 604–1. 

CL–600–2B19 (Regional Jet Series 100 & 440) airplanes.Canadair Regional Jet TR RJ/ 

152–6.

January 26, 2007 .......................... Canadair Regional Jet AFM, CSP 

A–012. 

TR 604/21–2 supersedes Canadair 

Challenger TR 604/21–1, dated October 

3, 2006, and TR RJ/152–6 supersedes 

Canadair Regional Jet TR RJ/152–5, 

dated October 3, 2006. Both TRs 

describe revising the Emergency and 

Abnormal Procedures sections of the 

applicable AFM to advise the flightcrew 

of additional procedures to follow in the 

event of stabilizer trim runaway and to 

advise the flightcrew of revised 

procedures to follow in the event of 

MACH TRIM, STAB TRIM, and 

horizontal stabilizer trim malfunctions. 

The new TRs must be inserted into 

the applicable AFM within 14 days after 

the effective date of this AD. We have 

determined that this revision is 

necessary to address uncommanded 

trim, trim in the opposite direction to 

that selected, loss of trim position 

indication and, in one case, potential 

loss of trim disconnect capability, 

which could result in conditions that 

vary from reduced controllability of the 

airplane to loss of control of the 

airplane. We have also determined that 

this revision provides a much more 

efficient procedure and a significant 

improvement for recovery from the 

stated unsafe condition. We have 

coordinated with TCCA on this issue. 

We have added paragraphs (m) and (n) 

of this AD accordingly to incorporate 

these AFM revisions. 

We have also removed the ‘‘Reinsert 

AFM Revisions’’ paragraph from this 

AD (paragraph (n) of the supplemental 

NPRM). Because this AD requires new 

AFM revisions, operators do not need to 

reinsert the old AFM revisions that may 


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have been removed in accordance with 

AD 2006–22–06. 

Request To Clarify the Unsafe 

Condition 

The NTSB requests that we clarify the 

unsafe condition to state accurately the 

potential severity of uncommanded 

motion of the horizontal stabilizer trim 

on the affected airplanes. The NTSB 

states that the severity can range from 

major to catastrophic, based on the 

assessment of airplane performance 

under various runaway stabilizer trim 

conditions and the circumstances of the 

three recent reported incidents. 

The NTSB states that pilots from 

Bombardier Flight Test, TCCA, the FAA, 

and the NTSB have performed a 

comprehensive assessment of Model 

CL–600–2B16 and CL–600–2B19 

airplane performance under various 

runaway stabilizer trim conditions using 

full flight simulators, desktop 

simulations, and test airplanes. The 

NTSB notes that the consensus from 

those efforts is that, depending on the 

nature of the runaway condition, the 

risk assessment can range from major to 

catastrophic. 

The NTSB also notes that the 

variables that affect the operational 

safety risk are the direction of the trim 

runaway, the ability to disconnect or 

override the trim, and whether the 

runaway is intermittent or constant. The 

NTSB states that the worst-case scenario 

(resulting in complete loss of airplane 

control) would be a constant trim 

runaway in the nose-up direction 

without the ability to disconnect or 

override the trim, and at the other end 

of the hazard assessment is an 

intermittent runaway trim in the nosedown direction with the ability to 

disconnect and override the trim. The 

NTSB has determined that the 

intermittent runaway trim scenario, if 

managed properly with no other 

extenuating circumstances, could be 

relatively benign; however, the NTSB 

explains that functional capabilities 

would still be reduced while crew 

workload and distress would increase, 

potentially affecting the crew’s 

performance of other tasks. The NTSB 

concludes that this condition could end 

catastrophically if managed poorly or if 

other factors, such as weather, traffic, or 

other system failures, complicate 

operations. 

We agree to clarify the unsafe 

condition specified in this AD for the 

reasons provided by the NTSB. We have 

revised the unsafe condition in the 

Summary and paragraph (d) of this AD 

to read: 

This AD results from reports of trim 

problems including uncommanded trim, trim 

in the opposite direction to that selected, loss 

of trim position indication and, in one case, 

potential loss of trim disconnect capability. 

We are issuing this AD to prevent these 

events, which could result in conditions that 

vary from reduced controllability of the 

airplane to loss of control of the airplane. 

Request To Clarify Related AD 

Comair also requests that we clarify 

whether this supplemental NPRM 

supersedes AD 98–13–24. Comair asks if 

the following requirement for certain 

airplanes in AD 98–13–24 also applies 

to the supplemental NPRM: ‘‘replace the 

HSTCU with a new HSTCU having part 

number 601R92301–9.’’ Comair points 

out that AD 98–13–24 does not 

acknowledge replacing with a higher 

dash number (the supplemental NPRM 

specifies, and this new AD requires, 

replacement with a HSTCU having part 

number 601R92301–15 or higher dash 

number). 

We acknowledge the need to clarify 

how AD 98–13–24 relates to this AD. 

AD 98–13–24, which applies to Model 

CL–600–2B19 (Regional Jet Series 100 & 

440) airplanes, serial numbers 7003 

through 7112 inclusive, requires the 

installation of the HSTCU, part number 

(P/N) 601R92301–9, within 18 months 

after the effective date of that AD as a 

terminating action for other actions 

specified in that AD. Since AD 98–13–

24 became effective on July 30, 1998, all 

Model CL–600–2B19 (Regional Jet 

Series 100 & 440) airplanes in the 

United States are required to be in 

compliance. If any airplane is imported, 

it must be in compliance with all 

applicable ADs, including AD 98–13–

24. 

As this new AD requires the 

replacement of a part already cited in 

AD 98–13–24, we determined that this 

could lead to confusion regarding 

applicability and result in unnecessary 

record keeping. This new AD requires 

that the HSTCU be replaced with a 

higher part number (HSTCU P/N 

601R92301–15 or higher dash number). 

Therefore, we have determined that 

this AD should supersede AD 98–13–24 

as well as AD 2006–22–06 (the 

supplemental NPRM proposed to 

supersede AD 2006–22–06). We have 

revised paragraph (b) of this AD to read: 

‘‘This AD supersedes AD 98–13–24 

and AD 2006–22–06.’’

We have also restated the 

requirements of paragraph (b) of AD 98–

13–24 as paragraph (f) of this AD. We 

have revised the remaining paragraph 

identifiers accordingly. 

All of the airplanes on the U.S. 

Register affected by AD 98–13–24 are 

already in compliance with the actions 

required by AD 98–13–24; therefore, the 

requirements and costs to U.S. operators 

described in the supplemental NPRM 

will not change. We have determined 

that providing notice and opportunity 

for public comment on superseding AD 

98–13–24 is unnecessary before this AD 

is issued. 

Requests To Extend Compliance Time 

The Regional Airline Association 

(RAA), on behalf of its members Air 

Wisconsin, Mesa Airlines, PSA Airlines, 

and Comair, requests that we extend the 

9-month compliance time for the 

terminating action to read, ‘‘within 12 

months after the effective date of this 

AD.’’ RAA notes that TCCA mandated a 

12-month retrofit from the TCCA 

airworthiness directive’s published date 

in October but the TCCA’s airworthiness 

directive is applicable only to the 

relatively small fleet of Model CL–600–

2B19 (Regional Jet Series 100 & 440) 

airplanes that operate in Canada. RAA 

recommends that we consult with 

Sagem (the parts manufacturer) to 

finalize our decision on a suitable 

compliance period and to consider that 

the airworthiness concern has never 

occurred within the regional fleet, and 

interim operational measures are 

currently in effect. 

Mesa Airlines states there have been 

no documented failures on the Model 

CL–600–2B19 (Regional Jet Series 100 & 

440) airplanes and that the newly 

imposed circuit breaker identification 

and AFM revision will preclude an 

unlikely failure from becoming an 

incident. Mesa Airlines recommends 

that 6 months be added to the 

compliance time for these airplanes. 

Air Wisconsin concurs with the 

comments from Mesa Airlines. Air 

Wisconsin states that it doubts that the 

parts schedule will be able to be 

maintained and notes that an optimistic 

parts schedule issued by Bombardier 

will have the operator installing parts 

into October 2007. PSA Airlines agrees 

with Mesa Airlines and Air Wisconsin 

that the 9-month compliance time is not 

realistic. 

Comair requests that we contact 

Bombardier and Sagem to determine if 

the schedule is realistic and will not 

place an undue burden on the operators. 

Comair notes that it has received units 

that failed prior to first flight and that 

these occurrences are not allotted for in 

the delivery schedule. Comair also 

states that it is nine units behind in 

receiving upgraded units based on the 

proposed shipping schedule. 

We disagree, because in developing 

an appropriate compliance time for this 

action, we considered the urgency 

associated with the subject unsafe 

condition, the availability of required 


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parts, and the practical aspect of 

accomplishing the required installation 

within a period of time that corresponds 

to the normal scheduled maintenance 

for most affected operators. According 

to Bombardier, enough required parts 

will be available to modify the U.S. fleet 

within the proposed compliance time. 

However, according to the provisions of 

paragraph (q) of this AD, we may 

approve requests to adjust the 

compliance time if the request includes 

data that prove that the new compliance 

time would provide an acceptable level 

of safety. We have not revised this AD 

in this regard. 

Request To Reduce Compliance Time 

The NTSB requests that we reduce the 

9-month compliance time to do the 

terminating action specified in 

supplemental NPRM. The NTSB is 

concerned that this compliance time 

may not sufficiently protect the fleet of 

affected airplanes from this hazardous 

condition. The NTSB notes that 

although the three previous in-flight 

incidents all involved Model CL–600–

2B16 airplanes, a review of FAA service 

difficulty reports (SDR) for Bombardier 

CRJ 100/200 airplanes revealed more 

than 500 anomalies with stabilizer trim 

in the last six years, including at least 

eight reports of uncommanded 

movement of the horizontal stabilizer 

that were reported in that time. 

The NTSB received statistics from the 

HSTCU manufacturer (Sagem Avionics, 

Inc.) that showed an average return rate 

of approximately 425 HSTCUs per year 

with approximately 10 percent of 

HSTCU motherboards found to have 

some level of corrosion. The NTSB 

states that none of these boards had 

corrosion on the specific pins that 

control the captain’s trim commands, 

which is significant because in the event 

of a trim runaway, a command from the 

captain’s trim switch could override an 

uncommanded trim movement caused 

by the first officer’s circuits. 

The NTSB states that various shortcircuit scenarios were then extensively 

tested and that for every scenario tested 

(except for one), the captain’s trim 

switch could be used to arrest or 

override a runaway trim. The NTSB 

notes that analysis of this condition to 

date suggests that any of the 

motherboards could be affected by 

corrosion and that corrosion can usually 

only be detected by disassembly of the 

HSTCU. The NTSB points out that 

HSTCUs with extensively corroded 

motherboards have passed built-in-testequipment tests, as well as the 

manufacturer’s acceptance test 

procedure, which could result in faulty 

HSTCUs not being removed from 

service. The NTSB adds that the boards 

examined were not cleaned sufficiently 

following the manufacturing process, 

which, in conjunction with sufficient 

moisture by condensation, could result 

in corrosion and pin-to-pin shorting and 

lead to trim runaway or several less 

significant anomalies. The NTSB states 

that the sampling of corroded boards 

would suggest that perhaps 50 airplanes 

are currently operating with 

contaminated motherboards, which, 

when coupled with sufficient moisture, 

will cause malfunctions. Data evaluated 

so far by NTSB investigators suggests 

that corrosion-induced runaway events 

occur randomly, independent of the age 

of the affected motherboard. 

The NTSB notes that a continuing 

airworthiness assessment performed by 

Bombardier estimated the probability of 

the corrosion failure mode causing 

uncommanded continuous trim 

movement at full speed of the horizontal 

stabilizer without disconnect capability 

to be 7.6 × 10¥8 per flight hour. 

However, the NTSB believes that, 

regardless of trim runaway direction or 

disconnect capability, any 

uncommanded runaway event presents 

the flight crew with a hazardous 

situation that, depending on other 

operational factors, may result in an 

accident. Accordingly, using the three 

in-flight incidents, the eight events from 

the SDR database, and the combined 

fleet history of 13 million flight hours, 

the NTSB believes a more conservative 

estimate of incident probability is 8.5 × 

10¥7 per flight hour. The NTSB believes 

that this estimate may be optimistic 

considering it is likely that more of the 

SDRs were actually trim runaway events 

that were not correctly diagnosed. The 

NTSB states that data provided by 

Bombardier indicates that the average 

combined fleet utilization is 2.8 million 

flight hours per year. The NTSB 

considers that the fleet may accumulate 

this number of flight hours over the AD 

compliance interval and therefore as 

many as two uncommanded runaway 

events could be expected to occur before 

the proposed AD is fully complied with. 

Even with this more conservative 

estimate, the NTSB notes that the three 

in-flight events have occurred very 

recently in the fleet’s 13-million-flighthour history, which suggests that some 

of the factors driving uncommanded 

trim events may not have been present 

or consistent over the entire history. 

Therefore, the NTSB concludes that the 

true probability of future events, in 

particular over the compliance period, 

is difficult to estimate accurately. 

The NTSB states that it is aware that 

Bombardier has been working with the 

HSTCU manufacturer to accelerate 

hardware production in regards to this 

AD. However, the NTSB is concerned 

that the FAA’s proposed compliance 

time is formulated based on the quoted 

production rate and that uncertainty 

about the safety risk warrants priority 

consideration. Therefore, the NTSB 

strongly encourages the FAA to consider 

a shorter compliance time that provides 

reasonable assurance that the corrective 

action will be fully implemented 

without risking additional runaway 

events. 

We disagree with the request to 

reduce the compliance time because in 

developing an appropriate compliance 

time for this action, we considered the 

urgency associated with the subject 

unsafe condition, the availability of 

required parts, and the practical aspect 

of accomplishing the required 

installation within a period of time that 

corresponds to the normal scheduled 

maintenance for most affected operators. 

The FAA’s and TCCA’s harmonized 

position is that the stated compliance 

time of 9 months strikes the correct 

balance of risk mitigation. Bombardier 

has committed to the delivery of 

modified HSTCUs to meet this 

schedule. Any shortening of the 

compliance time may result in fleet 

groundings since there will not be 

sufficient modified HSTCUs available. 

However, as stated previously, we have 

revised the AFM procedures to provide 

a much more efficient procedure and a 

significant improvement for recovery 

from the stated unsafe condition. 

Request To Remove First Flight of Day 

Functional Test 

Air Wisconsin requests that we 

remove the requirement for the 

airplane’s first flight of the day 

functional test specified in the 

supplemental NPRM. The commenter 

states that the requirement was removed 

from the AFM at Revision 55 in July 

2001 and therefore, there was no 

requirement to do this action for over 5 

years until it was again required by AD 

2006–22–06. The commenter notes that 

the terminating action in the 

supplemental NPRM allows operators to 

remove the temporary revision to 

abnormal procedures and the circuit 

breaker identification collars. The 

commenter concludes that the 

requirement for a daily functional test 

should be removed because the 

supplemental NPRM does not contain 

justification for retaining the test. 

We partially agree. We intended in 

AD 2006–22–06 for the first flight of the 

day check of the pitch trim disconnect 

switch to give crews a way to know 

daily that the disconnect switch is 

available and functional, because use of 


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the pitch trim disconnect can 

significantly mitigate the severity of 

uncommanded trim movement. 

Installing the modified HSTCUs 

required by this AD is terminating 

action for certain actions in AD 2006–

22–06 and mitigates the higher risk of 

uncommanded movement. Therefore, 

the functional test is not necessary 

because the replacement has already 

mitigated the risks. 

We have revised this AD to remove 

the requirement for this functional test 

in the Model CL–600–2B19 (Regional Jet 

Series 100 & 440) airplanes. Therefore, 

we have revised paragraph (o)(1) of this 

AD to require the removal of the AFM 

revisions required by paragraphs (j) and 

(k) of this AD after the installation 

required by paragraph (o) of this AD is 

done. Model CL–600–2B19 (Regional Jet 

Series 100 & 440) airplanes have had a 

history of pitch trim disconnect switch 

failures, which cause loss of both 

Channel 1 and 2 with resultant loss of 

pitch trim. We have been advised that 

exercising the switch increases wear 

and induces additional failures. That is 

the reason why this check was removed 

from the Canadair Regional Jet AFM at 

an earlier date. The Stab Trim System 

Reliability including switch reliability is 

covered in FAA Safety 

Recommendation 04.093. We have been 

strongly recommending a new switch, 

or a life limit on the existing switch, as 

well as other system improvements. 

Since Model CL–600–2B16 (CL–604) 

airplanes incur much less usage than 

Model CL–600–2B19 (Regional Jet 

Series 100 & 440) airplanes, switch wear 

is not considered a driver and hence the 

Stab Trim Check was recommended for 

the Model CL–600–2B16 (CL–604) 

airplanes. 

Also, since the Model CL–600–2B16 

(CL–604) fleet already contains this 

functional test in its airplane flight 

manual, it will be recommended but not 

mandated that Model CL–604 crews 

continue to perform this functional test. 

Therefore, we have added a note after 

paragraph (o)(1) of this AD stating: 

It is recommended for Model CL–600–2B16 

(CL–604) operators that the functional check 

of the stabilizer trim system on the aircraft’s 

first flight of the day continue to be 

performed in accordance with the Normal 

Procedures Section of the Canadair 

Challenger CL–604 AFM. 

Request for Alternative Method of 

Compliance 

Comair requests that we provide an 

alternative method of compliance for 

the actions specified in paragraph (l) of 

the supplemental NPRM. Comair notes 

that paragraph (l) specifies to do the 

installation, for certain airplanes, in 

accordance with Bombardier Service 

Bulletin 601R–27–147, dated September 

28, 2006, and paragraph B.(2) of the 

Accomplishment Instructions of the 

service bulletin specifies to do Sagem 

Service Bulletin HSTCU–27–011. 

Comair states that operators cannot 

‘‘do’’ the Sagem service bulletin because 

units must be returned to Sagem for the 

upgrade. Comair states that this makes 

the installation a replacement of the 

HSTCU with the upgraded HSTCU. 

Comair states that the airplane 

maintenance manual (AMM) procedure 

for installation of the HSTCU, task 27–

41–01–400–801, requires the same 

functional check and operational check 

called out in the referenced service 

bulletin. We infer that Comair requests 

that we refer to the AMM procedure as 

an alternative method of compliance. 

We disagree. Operators are not 

required to do the Sagem service 

bulletin. Paragraph (o) of this AD 

(paragraph (l) in the supplemental 

NPRM) requires installing the HSTCU 

P/N 601R92301–15 (Vendor P/N 7060–

10) or higher dash number in 

accordance with the Accomplishment 

Instructions of Bombardier Service 

Bulletin 601R–27–147 (for Model CL–

600–2B19 (Regional Jet Series 100 & 

440) airplanes). Although paragraph B.2 

of the Accomplishment Instructions in 

Bombardier Service Bulletin 601R–27–

147 states ‘‘Do the Avionics service 

bulletin HSTCU–27–011,’’ this AD 

requires only that the HSTCU be 

installed and does not require operators 

to perform the actual modifications. 

In addition, we do not agree with 

referring to the AMM reference in this 

AD as a method of compliance for 

installing the modified HSTCU. The 

installation must be done in accordance 

with Bombardier Service Bulletin 601R–

27–147. Bombardier Service Bulletin 

601R–27–147 refers to the procedures in 

AMM 27–41–01–400–801 for the 

installation. Doing the procedures in 

any revision of the AMM is acceptable 

for complying with the installation 

requirements of this AD. In addition, 

according to the provisions of paragraph 

(q) of this AD, we may approve requests 

for alternative compliance methods if 

the request includes data that prove that 

the actions would provide an acceptable 

level of safety. We have not revised this 

AD in this regard. 

Request To Revise Cost Paragraph 

RAA also request that we revise the 

cost of the installation. RAA states that 

one of its members pointed out that the 

cost to upgrade to a unit ‘‘¥10’’ is 

$15,000. 

We do not agree to revise the cost of 

an upgrade to $15,000. Operators should 

note that when we calculate estimated 

costs, we do not consider job set up, 

close up, etc., to be part of the work 

hour calculation. Also, although the 

calculations in the supplemental NPRM 

used a figure of 11 work hours for 

installation, in fact, the only work hour 

numbers that should be used for the 

estimate should be 1 work hour for 

‘‘Procedure’’ as specified in Bombardier 

Service Bulletin 601R–27–147. For the 

parts costs, we referred to the ‘‘Material 

Information’’ section in Sagem Service 

Bulletin HSTCU–27–011, dated 

September 22, 2006, which specifies a 

range from $0 to upgrade Sagem P/N 

7060–9A that is under warranty up to 

$3,995 to upgrade a Sagem P/N 7060–

8 or older version that is not under 

warranty. We have not revised this AD 

in this regard because the cost of 

compliance paragraph is not restated in 

this type of rulemaking action. 

Request To Disallow Removal of Circuit 

Breaker Collars 

The Air Line Pilots Association 

(ALPA) requests that we disallow the 

removal of the circuit breaker 

identification collars that is allowed in 

paragraph (l) of the supplemental NPRM 

(paragraph (o) of this AD). ALPA states 

that procedures in place at several 

carriers rely on the crew’s ability to 

readily identify the circuit breakers, and 

the existing circuit breaker collars 

facilitate that procedure. ALPA expects 

that even with the improvement 

represented by the supplemental NPRM, 

the procedures will continue to remain 

available to crews, so leaving the collars 

in place represents a safety benefit. 

We disagree because the wording in 

the AD allows for the removal of the 

collars but does not mandate the action. 

The circuit breaker collars were 

considered an interim action for quick 

identification in the case of runaway 

trim with an associated pitch trim 

system disconnect failure. The 

installation of the modified HSTCUs is 

considered terminating action for this 

risk. Therefore, we are not imposing the 

additional requirement for operators to 

maintain the circuit breaker collars after 

the installation has already mitigated 

the risks. We have not revised this AD 

in this regard. 

Conclusion 

We have carefully reviewed the 

available data, including the comments 

that have been received, and determined 

that air safety and the public interest 

require adopting the AD with the 

changes described previously. 


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FAA’s Determination and Requirements 

of This AD 

These airplanes are manufactured in 

Canada and are type certificated for 

operation in the United States under the 

provisions of section 21.29 of the 

Federal Aviation Regulations (14 CFR 

21.29) and the applicable bilateral 

airworthiness agreement. Pursuant to 

this bilateral airworthiness agreement, 

TCCA has kept the FAA informed of the 

situation described above. We have 

examined TCCA’s findings, evaluated 

all pertinent information, and 

determined that AD action is necessary 

for airplanes of this type design that are 

certificated for operation in the United 

States. 

Therefore, we are issuing this AD to 

supersede AD 2006–22–06 and AD 98–

13–24 and to continue to require the 

actions specified in those ADs. This AD 

also requires doing the terminating 

action (installation of a new HSTCU), 

and revising the Emergency and 

Abnormal Procedures sections of the 

AFM, which replace the existing 

revisions. This AD also requires the 

removal of certain AFM revisions. 

Change to Supplemental NPRM 

As a result of superseding AD 98–13–

24 and adding an action due to the new 

service information, we have changed 

certain paragraph identifiers and added 

others. 

FAA’s Determination of the Effective 

Date 

An unsafe condition exists that 

requires the immediate adoption of this 

AD; therefore, providing notice and 

opportunity for public comment before 

the AD is issued is impracticable, and 

good cause exists to make this AD 

effective in less than 30 days. 

Comments Invited 

This AD is a final rule that involves 

requirements that affect flight safety and 

was not preceded by notice and an 

opportunity for public comment; 

however, we invite you to submit any 

relevant written data, views, or 

arguments regarding this AD. Send your 

comments to an address listed in the 

ADDRESSES section. Include ‘‘Docket No. 

FAA–2006–26378; Directorate Identifier 

2006–NM–230–AD’’ at the beginning of 

your comments. We specifically invite 

comments on the overall regulatory, 

economic, environmental, and energy 

aspects of the AD that might suggest a 

need to modify it. 

We will post all comments we 

receive, without change, to http:// 

dms.dot.gov, including any personal 

information you provide. We will also 

post a report summarizing each 

substantive verbal contact with FAA 

personnel concerning this AD. Using the 

search function of that Web site, anyone 

can find and read the comments in any 

of our dockets, including the name of 

the individual who sent the comment 

(or signed the comment on behalf of an 

association, business, labor union, etc.). 

You can review the DOT’s complete 

Privacy Act Statement in the Federal 

Register published on April 11, 2000 

(65 FR 19477–78), or you can visit 

http://dms.dot.gov. 

Examining the Docket 

You may examine the AD docket on 

the Internet at http://dms.dot.gov, or in 

person at the Docket Management 

Facility office between 9 a.m. and 5 

p.m., Monday through Friday, except 

Federal holidays. The Docket 

Management Facility office (telephone 

(800) 647–5227) is located on the plaza 

level of the Nassif Building at the DOT 

street address stated in the ADDRESSES

section. Comments will be available in 

the AD docket shortly after the Docket 

Management System receives them. 

Authority for This Rulemaking 

Title 49 of the United States Code 

specifies the FAA’s authority to issue 

rules on aviation safety. Subtitle I, 

Section 106, describes the authority of 

the FAA Administrator. Subtitle VII, 

Aviation Programs, describes in more 

detail the scope of the Agency’s 

authority. 

We are issuing this rulemaking under 

the authority described in Subtitle VII, 

Part A, Subpart III, Section 44701, 

‘‘General requirements.’’ Under that 

section, Congress charges the FAA with 

promoting safe flight of civil aircraft in 

air commerce by prescribing regulations 

for practices, methods, and procedures 

the Administrator finds necessary for 

safety in air commerce. This regulation 

is within the scope of that authority 

because it addresses an unsafe condition 

that is likely to exist or develop on 

products identified in this rulemaking 

action. 

Regulatory Findings 

We have determined that this AD will 

not have federalism implications under 

Executive Order 13132. This AD will 

not have a substantial direct effect on 

the States, on the relationship between 

the national government and the States, 

or on the distribution of power and 

responsibilities among the various 

levels of government. 

For the reasons discussed above, I 

certify that the regulation: 

1. Is not a ‘‘significant regulatory 

action’’ under Executive Order 12866; 

2. Is not a ‘‘significant rule’’ under the 

DOT Regulatory Policies and Procedures 

(44 FR 11034, February 26, 1979); and 

3. Will not have a significant 

economic impact, positive or negative, 

on a substantial number of small entities 

under the criteria of the Regulatory 

Flexibility Act. 

We prepared a regulatory evaluation 

of the estimated costs to comply with 

this AD and placed it in the AD docket. 

See the ADDRESSES section for a location 

to examine the regulatory evaluation. 

List of Subjects in 14 CFR Part 39 

Air transportation, Aircraft, Aviation 

safety, Incorporation by reference, 

Safety. 

Adoption of the Amendment 

■ Accordingly, under the authority 

delegated to me by the Administrator, 

the FAA amends part 39 of the Federal 

Aviation Regulations (14 CFR part 39) as 

follows: 

PART 39—AIRWORTHINESS 

DIRECTIVES 

■ 1. The authority citation for part 39 

continues to read as follows: 

Authority: 49 U.S.C. 106(g), 40113, 44701. 

§ 39.13 [Amended] 

■ 2. The Federal Aviation 

Administration (FAA) amends § 39.13 

by removing amendment 39–10615 (63 

FR 34574, June 25, 1998) and 

amendment 39–14803 (71 FR 63219, 

October 30, 2006) and by adding the 

following new airworthiness directive 

(AD): 

2007–05–11 Bombardier, Inc. (Formerly 

Canadair): Docket No. FAA 2006–26378; 

Directorate Identifier 2006–NM–230–AD; 

Amendment 39–14972. 

Effective Date 

(a) This AD becomes effective March 20, 

2007. 

Affected ADs 

(b) This AD supersedes AD 98–13–24 and 

AD 2006–22–06. 

Applicability 

(c) This AD applies to Bombardier Model 

CL–600–2B16 (CL–604) airplanes, serial 

numbers 5301 through 5665 inclusive; and 

Model CL–600–2B19 (Regional Jet Series 100 

& 440) airplanes, serial numbers 7003 

through 7990 inclusive and 8000 through 

8066 inclusive; certificated in any category. 

Note 1: The Model CL–600–2B19 (Regional 

Jet Series 100 & 440) airplanes may be 

referred to by their marketing designations as 

RJ100, RJ200, RJ440, CRJ100, CRJ200, 

CRJ440, and CL–65. 

Unsafe Condition 

(d) This AD results from reports of trim 

problems including uncommanded trim, trim 


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in the opposite direction to that selected, loss 

of trim position indication and, in one case, 

potential loss of trim disconnect capability. 

We are issuing this AD to prevent these 

events, which could result in conditions that 

vary from reduced controllability of the 

airplane to loss of control of the airplane. 

Compliance 

(e) You are responsible for having the 

actions required by this AD performed within 

the compliance times specified, unless the 

actions have already been done. 

Restatement of Certain Requirements of AD 

98–13–24 

Replacement of Horizontal Stabilizer Trim 

Control Unit (HSTCU) 

(f) For Model CL–600–2B19 (Regional Jet 

Series 100) airplanes, serial numbers 7003 

through 7112 inclusive: Within 18 months 

after July 30, 1998 (the effective date of AD 

98–13–24), replace the HSTCU with a new 

HSTCU having part number 601R92301–9, 

and reactivate the mach trim switch/light (if 

deactivated), in accordance with Bombardier 

Service Bulletin S.B. 601R–27–053, Revision 

B, dated February 21, 1997. Doing paragraph 

(o) of this AD terminates the requirements of 

this paragraph. 

Note 2: Accomplishment of paragraph (f) of 

this AD, prior to July 30, 1998, in accordance 

with Bombardier Service Bulletin S.B. 601R–

27–053, dated May 27, 1996; or Revision A, 

dated August 26, 1996; is considered 

acceptable for compliance with the 

applicable actions specified in paragraph (f) 

of this AD. 

Restatement of Certain Requirements of AD 

2006–22–06 

Airplane Flight Manual (AFM) Revisions 

(g) Within 14 days after November 14, 2006 

(the effective date of AD 2006–22–06), make 

the applicable AFM revisions specified in 

paragraph (g)(1) or (g)(2) of this AD by 

incorporating the applicable Canadair 

(Bombardier) temporary revisions (TRs) 

identified in Table 1 of this AD into the 

applicable AFM. Doing the revision specified 

in paragraph (m) of this AD terminates the 

requirements of this paragraph for those 

airplanes only. 

(1) For Model CL–600–2B16 (CL–604) 

airplanes: Revise the Emergency and 

Abnormal Procedures sections of the AFM to 

advise the flightcrew of additional 

procedures to follow in the event of stabilizer 

trim runaway and to advise the flightcrew of 

revised procedures to follow in the event of 

MACH TRIM, STAB TRIM, and horizontal 

stabilizer trim malfunctions. 

(2) For Model CL–600–2B19 (Regional Jet 

Series 100 & 440) airplanes: Revise the 

Emergency and Abnormal Procedures 

sections of the AFM to advise the flightcrew 

of revised procedures to follow in the event 

of stabilizer trim runaway and in the event 

of MACH TRIM, STAB TRIM, and horizontal 

stabilizer trim malfunctions. 

TABLE 1—TRS

For Bombardier Model— Use— Dated— To the—

CL–600–2B16 (CL–604) airplanes Canadair Challenger TR 604/21–1 October 3, 2006 ............................ Canadair Challenger CL–604 

AFM, PSP 604–1. 

CL–600–2B19 (Regional Jet Series 100 & 440) airplanes.Canadair Regional Jet TR RJ/ 

152–5.

October 3, 2006 ............................ Canadair Regional Jet AFM, CSP 

A–012. 

(h) When the applicable TR specified in 

paragraph (g) of this AD has been included 

in the general revisions of the applicable 

AFM, those general revisions may be inserted 

into the AFM and the applicable TR may be 

removed, provided the relevant information 

in the general revisions is identical to that in 

the TR. 

Installation of Circuit Breaker Identification 

Collars 

(i) Within 14 days after November 14, 

2006, install circuit breaker identification 

collars in accordance with Bombardier 

Modification Summary Package 

IS601R27410051, Revision C, dated 

September 29, 2006 (for Model CL–600–2B19 

(Regional Jet Series 100 & 440) airplanes); or 

the Accomplishment Instructions of 

Bombardier Alert Service Bulletin A604–27–

029, dated September 28, 2006 (for Model 

CL–600–2B16 (CL–604) airplanes); as 

applicable. 

Additional AFM Revision 

(j) For Model CL–600–2B19 (Regional Jet 

Series 100 & 440) airplanes: Within 14 days 

after November 14, 2006, revise the Normal 

section of the Canadair Regional Jet AFM, 

CSP A–012, to include the statement 

specified in Figure 1 of this AD. This may be 

done by inserting a copy of Figure 1 of this 

AD into the AFM. 

‘‘Prior to the flightcrew’s first flight of the 

day, do the following actions: 

1. Review the location of the STAB CH1 

HSTCU and STAB CH2 HSTCU circuit 

breakers. 

2. Complete a functional check of the 

stabilizer trim system as detailed below. 

Control Wheel Stab Trim Disconnect Check 

Control Wheel Stab Trim Disconnect switches . . . . Check • Make sure STAB TRIM caution message is out. 

• Activate the pilot’s Control Wheel Stab Trim Disconnect switch 

and make sure the STAB TRIM caution message comes on. 

NOTE: 

During ground testing only, do not activate the Control Wheel Stab 

Trim Disconnect switch if the horizontal stabilizer trim is in motion. 

• Engage the STAB TRIM switches and make sure the STAB TRIM 

caution message is out. 

• Activate the co-pilot’s Control Wheel Stab Trim Disconnect 

switch and make sure the STAB TRIM caution message comes on. 

• Engage the STAB TRIM and MACH TRIM switches and make sure 

the STAB TRIM and MACH TRIM caution messages are out.’’

Figure 1 

Note 3: When a statement identical to that 

in paragraph (j) of this AD has been included 

in the general revisions of the applicable 

AFM, those general revisions may be inserted 

into the AFM, and the copy of this AD may 

be removed from the AFM. 

(k) For Model CL–600–2B16 (CL–604) 

airplanes: Within 14 days after November 14, 

2006, revise the Normal section of the 

Canadair Challenger CL–604 AFM, PSP 604–

1, to include the following statement. This 

may be done by inserting a copy of this AD 

into the AFM. 

‘‘Prior to the flightcrew’s first flight of the 

day, do the following actions: 

1. Review the location of the STAB CH1 

HSTCU and STAB CH2 HSTCU circuit 

breakers. 

2. Check the stabilizer trim system as 

detailed in CL–604 AFM ‘Normal Procedures’

section titled ‘Flight Controls Trim Systems, 

Before Flight—First Flight of the Day.’ ’’

Note 4: When a statement identical to that 

in paragraph (k) of this AD has been included 

in the general revisions of the applicable 

AFM, those general revisions may be inserted 

into the AFM, and the copy of this AD may 

be removed from the AFM. 

Previous Actions Accomplished According to 

Modification Summary Package 

(l) Actions accomplished before November 

14, 2006, in accordance with Bombardier 

Modification Summary Package 


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IS601R27410051, Revision A, dated 

September 18, 2006; or Revision B, dated 

September 27, 2006; are considered 

acceptable for compliance with the action 

specified in paragraph (i) of this AD, 

provided that the circuit breaker collars meet 

the color requirements of Bombardier 

Modification Summary Package 

IS601R27410051, Revision C, dated 

September 29, 2006. 

New Requirements of This AD 

New Revised AFM Revisions 

(m) Within 14 days after the effective date 

of this AD, make the applicable AFM 

revisions specified in paragraph (m)(1) or 

(m)(2) of this AD by incorporating the 

applicable Canadair (Bombardier) TRs 

identified in Table 2 of this AD into the 

applicable AFM, and after doing the revision, 

remove the applicable AFM revision required 

by paragraph (g) of this AD from the 

applicable AFM. Doing the applicable 

revision specified in this paragraph 

terminates the requirements of paragraph (g) 

for that airplane. 

(1) For Model CL–600–2B16 (CL–604) 

airplanes: Revise the Emergency and 

Abnormal Procedures sections of the AFM to 

advise the flightcrew of procedures to follow 

in the event of stabilizer trim runaway and 

in the event of MACH TRIM, STAB TRIM, 

and horizontal stabilizer trim malfunctions. 

(2) For Model CL–600–2B19 (Regional Jet 

Series 100 & 440) airplanes: Revise the 

Emergency and Abnormal Procedures 

sections of the AFM to advise the flightcrew 

of revised procedures to follow in the event 

of stabilizer trim runaway and in the event 

of MACH TRIM, STAB TRIM, and horizontal 

stabilizer trim malfunctions. 

TABLE 2.—REVISED TRS

For Bombardier Model— Use— Dated— To the—

CL–600–2B16 (CL–604) airplanes Canadair Challenger TR 604/21–2 January 30, 2007 .......................... Canadair Challenger CL–604 

AFM, PSP 604–1. 

CL–600–2B19 (Regional Jet Series 100 & 440) airplanes.Canadair Regional Jet TR RJ/ 

152–6.

January 26, 2007 .......................... Canadair Regional Jet AFM, CSP 

A–012. 

(n) When the applicable TR specified in 

paragraph (m) of this AD has been included 

in the general revisions of the applicable 

AFM, those general revisions may be inserted 

into the AFM and the applicable TR may be 

removed. 

Terminating Action—Installation of New, 

Improved Part 

(o) Within 9 months after the effective date 

of this AD, install HSTCU, part number 

(P/N) 601R92301–15 (vendor P/N 7060–10) 

or higher dash number, in accordance with 

the Accomplishment Instructions of 

Bombardier Alert Service Bulletin A604–27–

029, dated September 28, 2006 (for Model 

CL–600–2B16 (CL–604) airplanes); or 

Bombardier Service Bulletin 601R–27–147, 

dated September 28, 2006 (for Model CL–

600–2B19 (Regional Jet Series 100 & 440) 

airplanes); as applicable. Doing this 

installation terminates the requirements of 

paragraph (f) of this AD. After doing this 

installation, the circuit breaker identification 

collars required by paragraph (i) of this AD 

may be removed. After doing this 

installation, the requirements specified in 

paragraphs (o)(1) and (o)(2) of this AD must 

be followed. 

(1) Within 14 days after doing the 

installation or within 14 days after the 

effective date of this AD, whichever occurs 

later, the AFM revisions required by 

paragraphs (j) and (k) of this AD must be 

removed from the AFM. 

Note 5: It is recommended for Model CL–

600–2B16 (CL–604) operators that the 

functional check of the stabilizer trim system 

on the aircraft’s first flight of the day 

continue to be performed in accordance with 

the Normal Procedures Section of the 

Canadair Challenger CL–604 AFM. 

(2) After doing the installation, the AFM 

revisions required by paragraph (g) of this AD 

may be removed from the applicable AFM, 

but only if the removal of the AFM revisions 

was done before the effective date of this AD. 

Note 6: Bombardier Service Bulletin 601R–

27–147, dated September 28, 2006, refers to 

Sagem Service Bulletin HSTCU–27–011, 

dated September 22, 2006, as an additional 

source of service information for 

accomplishment of the installation. 

Service Bulletin Exception 

(p) Although Bombardier Alert Service 

Bulletin A604–27–029, dated September 28, 

2006, specifies to return certain parts to the 

manufacturer, this AD does not include that 

requirement. 

Alternative Methods of Compliance 

(AMOCs) 

(q)(1) The Manager, New York Aircraft 

Certification Office, FAA, has the authority to 

approve AMOCs for this AD, if requested in 

accordance with the procedures found in 14 

CFR 39.19. 

(2) Before using any AMOC approved in 

accordance with § 39.19 on any airplane to 

which the AMOC applies, notify the 

appropriate principal inspector in the FAA 

Flight Standards Certificate Holding District 

Office. 

Related Information 

(r) Canadian airworthiness directives CF–

2006–20R1, dated October 4, 2006, and CF–

2006–21R1, dated October 3, 2006, also 

address the subject of this AD. 

Material Incorporated by Reference 

(s) You must use Bombardier Modification 

Summary Package IS601R27410051, Revision 

C, dated September 29, 2006; the service 

bulletins listed in Table 3 of this AD; and the 

temporary revisions listed in Table 4 of this 

AD; as applicable, to perform the actions that 

are required by this AD, unless the AD 

specifies otherwise. 

TABLE 3.—SERVICE BULLETINS INCORPORATED BY REFERENCE

Service bulletin Revision level Date 

Bombardier Alert Service Bulletin A604–27–029 ................... Original .................. September 28, 2006. 

Bombardier Service Bulletin S.B. 601R–27–053 ................... B ............................ February 21, 1997. 

Bombardier Service Bulletin 601R–27–147 ........................... Original .................. September 28, 2006. 

TABLE 4.—ALL TEMPORARY REVISIONS INCORPORATED BY REFERENCE

Temporary revision— Dated— To the—

Canadair Challenger Temporary Revision 604/21–1 ............. October 3, 2006 ..... Canadair Challenger CL–604 Airplane Flight Manual, PSP 

604–1. 

Canadair Challenger Temporary Revision 604/21–2 ............. January 30, 2007 ... Canadair Challenger CL–604 Airplane Flight Manual, PSP 

604–1. 


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TABLE 4.—ALL TEMPORARY REVISIONS INCORPORATED BY REFERENCE—Continued 

Temporary revision— Dated— To the—

Canadair Regional Jet Temporary Revision RJ/152–5 .......... October 3, 2006 ..... Canadair Regional Jet Airplane Flight Manual, CSP A–012. 

Canadair Regional Jet Temporary Revision RJ/152–6 .......... January 26, 2007 ... Canadair Regional Jet Airplane Flight Manual, CSP A–012. 

(1) The Director of the Federal Register 

approved the incorporation by reference of 

the temporary revisions listed in Table 5 of 

this AD in accordance with 5 U.S.C. 552(a) 

and 1 CFR part 51. 

TABLE 5.—NEW TEMPORARY REVISIONS INCORPORATED BY REFERENCE

Temporary revision— Dated— To the—

Canadair Challenger Temporary Revision 604/21–2 ............. January 30, 2007 ... Canadair Challenger CL–604 Airplane Flight Manual, PSP 

604–1. 

Canadair Regional Jet Temporary Revision RJ/152–6 .......... January 26, 2007 ... Canadair Regional Jet Airplane Flight Manual, CSP A–012. 

(2) On November 14, 2006 (71 FR 63219, 

October 30, 2006), the Director of the Federal 

Register approved the incorporation by 

reference of Bombardier Alert Service 

Bulletin A604–27–029, dated September 28, 

2006; Bombardier Service Bulletin 601R–27–

147, dated September 28, 2006; Bombardier 

Modification Summary Package 

IS601R27410051, Revision C, dated 

September 29, 2006; and the temporary 

revisions listed in Table 6 of this AD in 

accordance with 5 U.S.C. 552(a) and 1 CFR 

part 51. 

TABLE 6.—PREVIOUS TEMPORARY REVISIONS INCORPORATED BY REFERENCE

Temporary revision— Dated— To the—

Canadair Challenger Temporary Revision 604/21–1 ............. October 3, 2006 ..... Canadair Challenger CL–604 Airplane Flight Manual, PSP 

604–1. 

Canadair Regional Jet Temporary Revision RJ/152–5 .......... October 3, 2006 ..... Canadair Regional Jet Airplane Flight Manual, CSP A–012. 

(3) On July 30, 1998 (63 FR 34574, June 25, 

1998), the Director of the Federal Register 

approved the incorporation by reference of 

Bombardier Service Bulletin S.B. 601R–27–

053, Revision B, dated February 21, 1997; in 

accordance with 5 U.S.C. 552(a) and 1 CFR 

part 51. 

(4) Contact Bombardier, Inc., Canadair, 

Aerospace Group, P.O. Box 6087, Station 

Centre-ville, Montreal, Quebec H3C 3G9, 

Canada, for a copy of this service 

information. You may review copies at the 

FAA, Transport Airplane Directorate, 1601 

Lind Avenue, SW., Renton, Washington; or at 

the National Archives and Records 

Administration (NARA). For information on 

the availability of this material at NARA, call 

202–741–6030, or go to: http:// 

www.archives.gov/federal-register/cfr/ibrlocations.html. 

Issued in Renton, Washington, on February 

21, 2007. 

Ali Bahrami, 

Manager, Transport Airplane Directorate, 

Aircraft Certification Service. 

[FR Doc. E7–3661 Filed 3–2–07; 8:45 am] 

BILLING CODE 4910–13–P 

DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND 

HUMAN SERVICES 

Food and Drug Administration 

21 CFR Part 14 

Advisory Committee: Change of Name 

and Function 

AGENCY: Food and Drug Administration, 

HHS. 

ACTION: Final rule. 

SUMMARY: The Food and Drug 

Administration (FDA) is amending the 

standing advisory committees’

regulations to change the name and 

function of the Advisory Committee for 

Pharmaceutical Science. This action is 

being taken to reflect changes made to 

the charter for this advisory committee. 

DATES: This rule is effective March 5, 

2007. 

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: 

Theresa Green, Committee Management 

Officer (HF–4), Food and Drug 

Administration, 5600 Fishers Lane, 

Rockville, MD 20857, 301–827–1220. 

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: FDA is 

announcing that the name of the 

Advisory Committee for Pharmaceutical 

Science, which was established on 

January 22, 1990, has been changed. The 

name Advisory Committee for 

Pharmaceutical Science and Clinical 

Pharmacology more accurately describes 

the subject areas for which the 

committee is responsible. The 

committee shall provide advice on 

scientific, clinical and technical issues 

related to safety and effectiveness of 

drug products for use in the treatment 

of a broad spectrum of human diseases, 

the quality characteristics which such 

drugs purport or are represented to have 

and as required, any other product for 

which FDA has regulatory 

responsibility, and make appropriate 

recommendations to the Commissioner 

of Food and Drugs. The Committee may 

also review agency sponsored 

intramural and extramural biomedical 

research programs in support of FDA’s 

drug regulatory responsibilities and its 

critical path initiatives related to 

improving the efficacy and safety of 

drugs and improving the efficiency of 

drug development. 

FDA is revising § 14.100(c)(16) (21 

CFR 14.100(c)(16)) to reflect these 

changes. In this document, FDA is 

hereby formally changing the name and 

the function of the committee by 

revising § 14.100(c)(16). Publication of 

this final rule constitutes a final action 

on this change under the Administrative 

Procedure Act. Under 5 U.S.C. 553(b)(B) 


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