### IN THE COURT OF APP EALS OF TENNESS EE AT NAS HVILLE Jul y 9, 200 4 S es sio n
ESTAT E OF J ASON J ENKI NS
Ap pe a l f ro m th e Cir c uit

Cou rt fo r D a vid so n Co un ty No. 00C-2944

No. M2003-01561-COA- R3-CV - F iled Novem ber 16, 2004

This is a suit for pe rsonal injuries broug ht by the mother of a

mentally challeng ed 17 y ear

old boy
occur ring when his tea cher

attempted to transf

er him fr om one cha ir to another and tripped over a near by rocke r. Ne ither his teac her nor the Defenda nt Nurse who immediately attended to him af

ter the ac cident dete cted the f rac tured leg . Young J ason Jenkins di ed fr om cause s unrelate d to the
acc ident, and his suit was revive d agai nst Defe ndants, Metropolitan Gove rnment of Na shville, Davidson County , Mary

Ann Armbrister , and Lisa Morrow. T he ca se was voluntarily dismiss ed as to Defe ndant teac her Ms. Arm brister, a nd a settlement wa s rea ched be tween Plaintiff a nd Metropolitan Government of Da vidson County . The trial c ourt sust ai n ed a M o tion for Summary J udg ment on behalf

of Ms. Morrow f

rom which Plaintiff appe als. We affirm the action of the trial
c ou rt

. Tenn. R. App . P . 3 Appeal as of Right; Judgme nt of th e Circ uit Court Affir m e d and R e m ande d

W I L L I AM B. C A IN , J ., delivere d the opinion of the court, in which W I L L I AM C. K O CH , J R ., P.J ., M.S., and F R ANK G. C L EME NT , J R ., J ., joined.
G. Kline Preston, IV, Nashville, Te nnessee , for the a ppellant, Tammie Fr alix , Administratrix of the Es ta te of Jaso n Jen kin s. C. Hay es Cooney , Nashville, Tenne ssee, f or the a ppellee, Lisa Morrow.

OP IN ION

J ason Jenkins was a mentally challeng ed 17-y ear-old child enrolled in Harris-Hillman School’s specia l education prog ram. Metr opolitan Government of Davidson County operated Har ris-Hillman School for the disable d, and employ ed Mary Ann Armbrister

as a te acher at the school. Lisa Morrow w as a lice nsed pra cti cal nurse at Ha rris-Hillman and a lso an employ ee of Me tr op oli ta n G ov e rn me nt. I t is a lle g e d b y Pla int if f andun dis pu te d b y

De fe nd a nts that bo th M s.-2-

Armbrister and Ms. Mo rr o w were employ ees of Metropolitan Government and, at the time of the incidents involved in the ca se, wer e acting within the c ourse a nd scope of their employ ment. Venue and jurisdiction are based upon Te nnessee Code Annotated se ction 29-20-101, et se q., the Tenne ssee Go ve rn me nta l T ort Lia

bil ity Ac t.

I t is a lle g e d and est abli sh e d b y the un dis pu te d p ro of

that, o n N ov e mbe r 1 2, 19 99 , M s. Armbrister, w hile holding Jason in her arms, tripped and fe ll a t t em p t i n g to transfe r him from one
c ha ir to ano th er. Jas on Jenkins wa s a tte nd e d at th e sc e ne bo th b y Ms. Armbrist e r andby

Ms. Mo rr ow

. Th e ex ist e nc e or e xten t of his inj urie s w a s n ot i mme diate ly dis c ov e re d b y

e ith e r M s. Armbrister or Ms. Morrow. When he was returne d home by bus at the end of the day , his mother immediately

took J ason to Vande rbilt Hospital at which ti m e h i s b ro k en leg was discove red and treated.

On Oc tob e r 6 , 2 00 0, Jaso n Jen kin s, by ne xt frie nda ndmothe r, Ta mmy F ra lix, f ile d th is s uit for pe rsonal injuries in the Circuit Court of Da vidson County

. W h i l e t h e suit was pending on Janu ary 3, 20 02 , Jas on Jenkins un e xpe c te dly die d of c a us e s n ot c on ne c te d w ith his inj urie s, a ndthi s suit was revive d in the name of his estate. Metropolitan Gove rnment answe red the Complai nt essentially denying alleg ations of proxi mate neg lige nce and by way of af firmative de fense asserted discretiona ryfu n ct i o n i m m u n i t y fr o ml i ab i l i t y

p u rs u an tt o T en n es s ee C o d e A n n o t at ed s ection 29-20- 205(1). Ms. Armbrister answe red e ssentially denying all alleg ations of proxim ate ne g lige nce and by way of a ff ir ma tiv e de fe ns e a sse rt e d th a t no ac tio n for pe rs on a l in

jurie s c ou ld b e br ou g ht a g a ins t her be cause she was persona lly immune f rom such claims under Tenne ssee Code A nnotated sec tion 29-20-310.

Ms. Morrow answe red the claim pointing out that she w as a lice nsed pra ctical nur se and not
a re g istered nur se but was, at all times, an employ ee of Metropolitan Government acting within the scope and course of her

employ ment. She further asserted the af

firmative de fense of compa rative fa ult on the pa rt of Co- De fe nd a nts

. Sin c e Pla int if

f d ism iss e d h e r c a se a g a ins t Ms

. Arm bris te r, a nd se ttl e d h e r c a se a s to De fe nd a nt M e tr op oli ta n G ov e rn me nt o f D a vid so n Co un ty , the c a se re ma ins be fo re the c ou rt on ly as to Ms. Mor ro w an d only in her c apac ity

as a “ health ca

re pr actitioner” within the meaning of Tenne ssee Code Annotated section 29-20-310( b). Ex cept f or such status she is immune, just as the teac her Ms. Armbrister i s immune, under the terms of that same statute. Hi ll v . Ci ty of G e rm an tow n , 31 S.W .3d 234 (Tenn. 2000)

.
Te nn e sse e Cod e An no ta te d s e c tio n 2 9- 20 -3 10 (b ) p ro vid e s:

No c la im m a y

bebr ou g ht a g a inst a n e mpl oy e e or jud g me nt e nte re d a g a ins t
a n e mpl oy e e fo r d a ma g e s f or wh ic h th e immun it y of the g ov e rn me nta l e nti ty is
remo v e d b y

th is c h ap te r

u n le s s th e c laim

is o n e f o r me d ic a l m a lp r a c ti c e b roug ht ag ainst a hea lth care prac titioner. No claim for medical m alpra ctice may be broug ht ag ainst a hea lt h car e pra ctitioner or judg ment enter ed ag ainst a hea lth care-3-

pr a c tit ion e r f

or dam ages f

or wh ic h th e g ov e rn me nta l e nti ty is l ia ble un de r this chapte r, unless the a mount of damag es sough t or judg ment enter ed excee ds the min imu m limits se t out in § 29 -2 0- 40 3 or the a mou nt of ins ur a nc e c ov e ra g e a c tua lly
c arrie d b y the g ov e rn me nta l e nti ty , w hic he ve r i s g re a te r, a ndthe g ov e rn me nta l e nti ty is also made a party defe ndant to the action. As used in this subsection, “he alth car e prac titioner” m eans phy sicians l icense d under tit le 63, chapter 6, a nd nurses lice nsed under title 63, cha

pter 7.
Tenn. Code Ann. § 29- 20-310(b)

.
B e c aus e Ms. Mo rr ow i s a li cense d p ra c tic a l nu rs e , s he is s ub je c t to lia bil ity fo r p ro xima te neg lige nce unde r the provisions of Te nnessee Code Annotated se ction 29-26-115, e t seq.

Whil e bo th pa

rt ie s ass e rt the sin g le iss ue on app e a l of wh e the r o r n ot the tr ia l c ou rt e rr e d in g ranting summary

judgme nt to Ms. Morrow, it appea rs that three sub-issues are actua lly involved:

1. Did the rule in Tra ns po rts , Inc. v. P e rry , 414 S.W .2d p. 1 (Tenn. 1967) survive the implementation of compar ative faul t p ri n ci ples set forth in McI ntyre v . Ballentine , 833 S.W .2d 52 (Tenn. 1992) ? 2. Did Plaintiff offer any expert testimonyto establish a di sputed question of m aterial fac t as to the standard of acc eptable profe ssional pr actice and any deviation there from as is require d in medical malpra ctice a ctions by the provisions of Tenn. Code A nn. § 29-26-115( a)? 3

. I n c o n s id e r in g mo ti o n s f o r s u mm ar y ju d g me n t is th e c o u r t li mi te d to c o n s idering the respe ctive stateme nts of undisputed fac ts und er T en n

. R . Civ. P . 56.03 rathe r than considering the entire rec ord bef ore the court including affidavits, depositions, and other materia ls designated in Tenn. R. Civ. P. rule 56.06?
Prior to the decision of the Supre me Court in McI ntyre v. Ballentine , 833 S.W .2d 52 (Tenn. 1992), Tenne ssee r ecog nized the well-settl ed co m m on law rule that neg lige nce and contributory neg lige nce pr esente d “ ‘ a ll or nothing’ ” questions. 833 S.W .2d 52 at 54. By the same c ommon law rule, proximate contributory neg lige nce a

bsolutely barr ed re covery

by Plaintiff. T

albot v. Taylor , 18 4 Te nn . 428 , 432 , 201 S.W. 2d1, 3 ( Te nn . 1 93 5) ; Hudson v. Gaitan , 675 S.W .2d 699, 704 (Tenn. 1984). The bur den of proof was on Plaintiff to establish the prox imate neglig ence of De fendant by a preponderance of

the evidenc e. DeGloppe r v. Nashville Railway and Light Co. , 123 Tenn. 633, 134 S. W

. 6 0 9 (Tenn. 1911) . Nothing in the Mc In ty re c omp arativ e fa

ult sy ste m ha s c ha ng e d th is b as i c re s p o n s i b i l i t y o f P l ai n t i ff

. T h e ru l e, as re i t er at ed an d s u p p l em en t ed fo l l o wi n g McClenanhan v. Cooley , 8 06 S.W. 2d76 7 ( Te nn . 1 99 1) , re c og nize s Pla int if f’ s bu rd e n of pr oo f a s to b othc aus e in fac t and proxim ate c ause. Se e W as te Ma na ge me nt v
. So ut h C ent ra l B ell , 15 S.W .3d 425, 430 (Tenn.Ct.App. 1997). A cting under the common law rule th es u p r e me court de cided Transport s, Inc.
v . P e rry , 414 S.W .2d 1 (Tenn. 1967)

. I n that case Mrs. Viola Perry , injured while a passeng er in a n automobile, broug ht suit against the o wner and driver of the bus involved in a r ear end collision. Th e e vid e nc e be fo re the jury a s to the inj urie s to Mr s. Pe rry wa s c on fl ic tin g pa

rt ic ula rl y a s to-4-

whether or not surg ery

subsequent to the acc ident had exacer bated her condition. In determining the
case the court held:

Th e re wa s so me e vid e nc e fr om w hic h th e jury mig ht h a ve fo un d th a t th e los s of c on tin e nc e , n umb ne ss i n th e va g ina a nd ot he r c omp la int s late r r e po rt e d b y Mr s. P er ry we re due to the laminectomy or exploratory

surg ery itself, and plaintiff
c or re c tly ins ist s th a t if

thi s w e re true , th e de fe nd a nts wo uldsti ll b e lia ble fo r the sa me if the su rg e ry

its e lf wa s ma de ne c e ssa

ry a ndwa s it se lf a dir e c t andpr oximate re su lt of the inj ury sustained in the ac cident. The re w as material evidenc e, howe ver, f rom which t h e j u ry could have found that the surg ery perf ormed wa s not really

made
ne c e ssa ry by a ny inj ury or a g g ra vatio n th e re of

su staine d inthi s a c c ide nt. Thi s C o urt, like most others, rec og nizes that if one is injured by the neg lige nce of

another , and these injuries are ag g ravated by medical tre atment (e ither pr ud e nt o r n e g lig e nt) , th e ne g lig e nc e of the wr on g do e r caus ing the orig ina l in jury is reg arde d as the proximate cause of the da mag e subseque ntly flowing from the medical tre atment., See Rev ell v. Mc Caughan , 162 Tenn. 532, 538, 39 S.W.2d 269 (1 93 1) ; Sh ipl ey v
. W

ell wo od Silk Thr owi ng Mi lls , 164 Tenn. 281, 47 S.W.2d 561 (1 93 2) ; Mallette v. M

ercury Outboard Supply Co. , 204 Tenn. 438, 450, 321 S.W.2d 816 (1959). We do not under s t an d t h at the def endants c ontrovert this well settled principle of la w.

Tra ns po rts , I nc . v . P e rry , 414 S.W .2d 1, 4-5 (Te nn. 1967).
Two y ear s after McIn ty re thi s cou rt fi rs t addre sse d the qu e sti on of wh e the r o r n ot the ru le in Tra ns po rts , I nc . v . P e rrysurvived McI ntyre v . Ballentine

. I n re af fi rm i n g Tra ns

po rts , I nc . v . P e rry , this court rea soned:

Abolition of the common law rule w ould effe ctively shift the burden of proving medical ne g lige nce ( or its absenc e) from the defendant to the plaintiff. To pr ote c t th e mse lv es, pl a int if fs in f utu re c a se s w ou ld f

e e l c omp e lle d to tim e ly

na me medical pr ovider s as d ef endants in any

suit where the neg lige nce of the orig inal tortfea sor led to the nece s s i t y for medic al ca re, w hether

or not medica l neg lige nce was actua lly suspected. I n case s like the prese nt one , wher e this was not done, a nd the one y ear

statute of limitations for filing medic al malpra ct i ce cl ai ms passed,
a llo wi ng the de fe nd a nt t o a lle g e me dic a l neg lig e nc e a s a n a ff ir ma tiv e de fe ns e wo uld
un fair ly pr e jud ic e the plaint if

f’ s r ig ht t o a

fu ll r e c ov e ry

fo r h e r i nju ri e s. By reta ining the common law rule, as other jurisdictions that have adopt ed compar ative neg lige nce ha ve appa rently done, we do not penalize the injured plaint if f, no r do w e e lim inate a ny re me die s p re vio us ly

a va ila ble to the de fe nd a nt. Thoug h he may

not assert the ne g lige nce of a subseque nt medical provide r as a n a ff ir ma tiv e de fe ns e to re du c e his lia bil ity to the plaint if

f, the de fe nd a nt m a y

sti ll f ile
a thi rd pa rty c la im or a se pa

rate su it in subr og a tio n to re de e m his o wn ri g hts a g a ins t the neg lige nt prac titioner.-5-

At k ins on v . H

e mp hil l , 199 4 WL 45 63 49 , *3 ( Te nn .Ct .A pp . 1 99 4) (n o a pp . to app e a l f

ile d) (f oo tno te omitted).

I n 1998 the Eastern Section of this court followed At k ins on v . H

e mp hil lin Troy v. He rndon , 1998 WL 820698 (Tenn.Ct.App. 1998) ( no app. to appe al filed).

Whil e the c a se a t ba

r w a s o n a

pp e a l, the Wes te rnSe c tio n o f this c ou rt iss ue d its op ini on in Jack son v. Hamilton , W2000-01992-COA-R3-CV, 2003 WL 22718386 (Tenn.Ct.Ap p. May 21, 2003) ( perm.app.de nied

NFC May

10, 2004). I n that case Plaintiffs appea led a $600 verdic t and the Court of Appea ls, rely ing on At k ins on v . H

e mp hil land Troy v. He rndon , reve rsed the trial court a nd
re m an d ed fo r an ew tri al , h o l d i n g:

B e c aus e we up ho ld the c omm on la w ru le of the orig ina l to rt fe a so r’ s li abil ity for subseque n t m edical complications, we find that the trial court c ommitt ed prejudicia l error

when it re fused to instruct the jury on this rule of law. In light of the dispo s i t i o n o f t h is issue, the only other issue this Court needs to addr ess is issue
seven a bove. Am endin g Defendan t’s Answer De fe nd a nts a sse rt

that, i f this Cou rt

sh ou ld re ma nd thi s app e a l for a ne w t ri a l, Def endants should be pe rmitted to amend their an swer to include the af firmative d e f e n s e o f th e c o mp ar a ti v e f

au lt o f D r

. Ro b in s o n , th e Plaintiff ’ s c h ir o p r a c to r

. We fin d , as the Atkinson and Troy courts did, that such a n amendment would be inconsistent with the common law rule of h o l d i n g the orig inal tortfea sor liable for
su bs e qu e nt m e dic a l tr e a tme nt. Th ou g h, a t fi rs t g la nc e , th is m a y se e m a ha rs h r e su lt for a defe ndant, as the Court in Atkinson noted, such de fend an t co u l d have the alternatives of impleading a third party to the orig inal suit or suing the me dical p rovi der unde r a the ory

of subrog ation. Id. a t * 5

. T h e r e f o r e , w e d e n yDe fe nd a nts relief to amend their answer.
2003 WL 22718386, at *6.

On De c e mbe r 3 1, 20 03 , D e fe nd a nt f ile d it s a pp lic a tio n to app e a l Jack

son v. Hamilton to the Supreme Court and, on May 10, 2004, the Supreme Court de nied the application but designated the op ini on “ no t to be c ite d” pu rs ua nt t o Su pr e me Cou rt Rul e 4. Se c tio n ( F )( 1) of that rule pr ovid es: “I f an a pplication for permission to a ppeal is he rea fter de nied by this court with a ‘Not for

Citation’ desig natio n , t h e o p inion of the intermediate appellate court ha s no prec edential va lue.” Since Jack son v. Hamilton was pre dicated e ntirely on the survival of the c ommon law rule in Tra ns po rt, Inc. v . Perry, as that rule w as re iterate d by this court in Atkinson and Herndon , we must conclude that the Sup re me Cou rt

ha s se ri ou s q ue sti on s a

bo ut the su rv iva l of

the c omm on la w r

ule ite rate d in Tra ns po rt, In c . v . P e rry . Since we have an ample basis for deciding this case on g rounds other tha n the survival or non- survival of the c ommon law rule in Pe rry , we pr etermit the issue.-6-

I n a suit for malpractice ag ainst a “healthca re pr actitioner” employ ed by a loca l gove rnment entity and exempted from the pr otection offe red to other local g overnme nt empl o y ees unde r Tenne ssee Code A nnotated sec tion 29 -2 0 -3 1 0 (b), Plaintiff fa ces the ordinary burdens in a malprac tice ac tion which are imposed by Tenne ssee Code Annotated se ction 29-26-115. Plaintiff must prove:
(1) The rec og nized standard of a cce ptable pr o fe s s ional prac tice in the p r o f e s s io n a n d th e s p e c ia lty th e r e o f, if a n y , th a t th e d e f e n d a n t p r a c ti ces in the
c ommun ity

in w hic h th e de fe nd a nt p ra c tic e s o r i n a sim ila r com mu ni ty a t th e tim e the alleg ed injury

or wrong ful ac tion occurr ed; (2) That the defe ndant acted wit h less than or failed to act with ordinary and
rea sonable c are in acc ordanc e with such standa rd; and (3) As a pro x i m ate r esult of the def endant’ s neg lige nt act or omission, the plaintiff suffe red injuries w hich would not otherwise ha ve occ urre d.
Tenn. Code Ann. § 29- 26-115(a ).

“ I n Te nn e sse e , e xpe rt

te sti mon y

is r e qu ir e d to e sta

bli sh ne g lig e nc e a ndpr oximate c a us e in malprac tice ac tions unless the alleg ed malpra ctice is within the common k n o wledg e of lay men.” Aye rs v. Rutherford Hospital, Inc. , 68 9 S.W. 2d 15 5, 16 0 ( Te nn .Ct .A pp . 1 98 4) ; Bursack v . W ilson , 982 S.W .2d 341, 343 (Tenn.Ct.App. 1998).
Plaintiff attempts to establish her ma lprac tice cla im by the af fidavit of Ka

ren S. Ward, a
c le arl y qu a lif ie d r e g ist e re d n ur se ho ldi ng a Ph. D fr om Corne ll Un ive rs ity a nda Ma ste r’ s D e g re e in ps y c hiatr ic nu rs ing fr om V a nd e rb ilt . Sh e op ine s:

The a cce ptable standa

rd of prac tical nursing prac tice on Nove mber 12, 1999, did not permit Mrs. Morrow, a licensed pr actica l nurse, to conduct an asse ssment of Mr. J enkins . U nd e r the a c c e pta ble stand ardof

pr a c tic a l nu rs ing pr a c tic e , M rs

. Morrow ha d a duty

to refe r Mr. Jenkins to an appropriate h ea l thcar e provide r for
app ro pria te a sse ssm e nt. Th e failu re to d o s o c on sti tut e s a br e a c h of the a c c e pta ble standard of

prac tical nursing prac tice. Clear - or uncle ar - verba liz ation of pain in a spe cific site shoul d n ot have de te rm ine d o ne way

or the oth e r h ow to c on du c t th e a sse ssm e nt. Mr . Jen kin s’ lim itatio ns on c ommun ic a tio n mand a te d a c omp le te a ndtho ro ug h a sse ssm e nt. Th is i n c l u d e d r e m o v a l o f h i s c l o t h i n g t o e x a m i n e h i s l o w e r e x tr e m i t i e s i n t h e i r

e n t i r e t y. The failure t o d o s o constitutes a bre ach of the ac cepta

ble standar d of pra ctical nursing prac tice. Gi ve n th e natur e a nde xten t of the fr a c tur e , it is c le ar that th is i nju ry wo uld have be en discove red if a proper asses s m en t had bee n perf ormed by a compe tent healthca re pr ovider.-7- As a dir e c t a ndpr oximate re su lt o f M rs . M or ro w’ s b re a c h o f the a c c e pta ble standard of profe ssional nursing pr actice , Mr. J enkins’ tre atment for this sig nificant fr a c tur e wa s u nn e c e ssa

ri ly de la y e d f or se ve ra l ho ur s.
Th e re c or d o n app e a l a lso c on ta ins the de po sit ionte sti mon y of Dr . N e il E . G re e n, As so c ia te Professor of

Pediatrics at Vanderbilt University Medica l Center, who testified:
Q. Okay

. Can y ou tell from the rec ords t hat y ou’ve r eviewe d whether or not J ason Jenkins has suffere d any perma nent injury

as a r esult of this frac ture? A

. H e h a s s u f

f e r e d n o p e r m a n e n ti n

j u r y. Q. Ok a y . A ndc a n - - c a n y ou te ll us whe the r o r n ot i n y ou r o pin ionhis trea t m en t wa s - - the delay of treatment, if injury

did occur

earlier in the day , was w o r s e - - w o r s e n e d h i s i n

j u r i e s i n a n y w a y o r

r e t ar d e d h i s h e a l i n g i n a n y w a y? A. No , it

didno t.

Plain tiff ar g ues that since D r. Gre en’s testimony is not included in the Statement of Undisputed Fa cts fi l ed b y De fendant pursuant to Tenn. R. Civ. P. 56.03, the court is barre d from considering Dr. Gr een’ s testimonyin ruling on the Motion for Summary J udg ment. This positi on is w ith ou t me ri t. T he sp e c if ic a tio n o f m a te ri a l f

a c ts und e r T e nn . R. Civ . P. 56 .0 3 is de sig ne d “ to assist the court in a scertaining whether there are any materia l f acts in dispute.” T.R.C.P

. 56.03. The statement re quired unde r the rule is aux iliary to the motion in order to assist the court in re ndering judgme nt on the motion “forthw i t h i f the pleading s, depositions, answers to interr og atories, a nd admissions on file, tog ether with the aff

idavits, if any , show that there is no ge nuine issue as to any
ma te ri a l fa c t and that the mov ing pa rty is en tit le d to jud g me nt a s a ma tte r o f l a w. ” Te nn . R. Civ . P. 56.04.

I n By rd

v . H all , 8 47 S.W. 2d20 8 (T e nn . 199 3) the Sup re me Cou rt of Te nn e sse e sp e c if

ic a lly endorse d the re as o n i n g of the United States Supre me Court in Ce lot ex Cor p. v . Ca tre tt , 4 77 U. S. 317, 106 S.Ct

. 2548, 91 L .Ed.2d 265 (1986). Justi ce B rennan pointed out in Celotex the mechanics by which a moving party

car ries his burden unde r rule 56.
Rather, a s the Court confirms, a party who m oves for summary judgme nt on the groundth a t th e n o n mo v in g p ar ty h a s n o e v id e n c e mu s t a f

f irmati v e ly

s h o w the absenc e of e vidence in the rec ord. This may require the m oving party to depose the nonmoving pa

rty ’s witnesses or to e stablish thein a d e q u a c y o f d o c u me n ta

r y e vidence

. I f the re is l ite ra lly

no e vid e nc e in the re c or d, the mov ing pa rt y ma y de mon str a te thi s by revie wing for the c ourt the admissions, interrog atories, a nd other e x chang es be tw e e n th e pa

rt ie s th a t are in the re c or d. Ei the r w a y , h owe ver, the mov ing pa rt y mus t a ff ir ma tiv e ly

demons tr a te that th e re is n o e vid e nc e in the re c or d to su pp ort a judgme nt for the nonmoving party

.
Ce lotex v . Ca tre tt , 91 L .Ed.2d 265, 279.-8-

At th e t i m e t h e T ennesse e Supreme Court decided By rd v . H all , T e nn e sse e Rul e s o f C ivi l Procedur e, Rule 56.03 provided the parameters of the trial court’s consideration:

The motion shall be serve d at l east thi rty (30) day s befor e the time fixed for the hea ring . The a dverse party

prior to t he day

of hea ring may serve opposing aff ida vit s. Th e jud g me nt s ou g ht s ha ll b e re nd e re d f orthw ith if

the ple a din g s, deposit ions, answer s to interrog atories, a nd admissions on file, toge ther with the aff idavits, if any , show that there is no g enuine issue as to any materia l f act and that the mov ing pa

rty is en tit le d to a judg me nt as a ma tte r o f l a w. A s umm ary jud g me nt, i n t er l o cu t o ryi n ch ar ac t er , m ayb e r en d er ed o n t h e i s s u e o f l i ab i l i t y al o n e a l t h o u gh the re is a g e nu ine iss ue a s to the a mou nt o f d a ma g e s. Tenn. R. Civ. P. 56.03 (1993).

This is the Rule 56.03 that was c onstrued by the Tenne ssee Supre me Court in By rd v . H all , 847 S.W .2d 208 (Tenn. 1993) . Tenne ssee f irst adopted the “ specifying material fa cts” proc edure now embodied in Rule 56.03 in 1997. The a dvisory commission at that tim e stated “ new r ule 56.03 trac ks the lang uag e of a

local fe deral ru l e i n t h e Middle District of Tenne ssee. The commission be lie ve s it

wi ll n ot o nly

a ssi st the c ou rt in fo c us ing on the c ru c ia l portio ns of the re c or d, bu t it wi ll
cause lawy ers to asc erta in whether there is ‘a g enuine issue a s to any materia l fac t.’ ”

Th e “ c on c ise state me nts of ma te ri a l f a c t,” re qu ir e d s inc e the 19 97 a me nd me nt t o T e nn . R. Civ . P. 56 .0 3, are sig nif

ic a nt fe a tur e s of the su mma ry jud g me nt pr oc e du re

. Th e se state me nts a ssi st with docket control and e nable the c ourts to decide summary judgme nts moti ons eff

iciently and eff ectively

. See J

ackson v . Finnegan, He nderson, Far a b o w, Ga r rett, and Dunner , 101 F.3d 145, 151 (D.C.Cir. 1996). T hey

serve as “r oad maps” and trial c ourts should not be require d to proce ed further if they are not provided. Owens v. Bristol Motor Speedway, I nc. , 77 S.W .3d 771, 774 (T e nn .Ct .A pp . 2 00 1). Thus , r e qu ir ing c omp lia nc e by bo th p art ie s w ith Te nn . R. Civ . P. 56 .0 3 is justified. See Gardels v. Central Intelligence Agenc y , 637 F.2d 770, 773 ( D.C.Cir. 1980).

Howeve r, a de cis i o n t o grant a summary

judgme nt must ul timately be base d on the “plea dings, de positions, answers to interrog atories, a nd admissio n s o n file, tog ether with the aff idavits, if any .” See Ten n. R. Ci v. P. 5 6. 04 . T hu s, wh ile the Te nn . R. Civ . P. 56 .0 3 c on c ise statement poi nts the court to the portions of the re cord that are particula rly rele vant to the summary judgme nt motion, i t does not replac e the e videntiary materia ls on which it is based.

Ms. Morrow’s Te nn. R. Civ. P . 56.03 concise statement was filed on November 28, 2001. I t di d n ot r e fe r t o D r. Gr e e n’ s o pin ionthat he r c on du c t ha d n ot c a us e d a ny a dd iti on a l inju ry

be c aus e Dr. Gr een ha d not y et been deposed. I n fac t, he was deposed the same day that Ms. Morrow filed her Te nn. R. Civ. P . 56.03 statement. The pla intiff’s at t o rney participated in this deposition and
cross-e x amined Dr . Gre en. Dr . Gre en wa s actua lly Met ro ’s wit ness. Following Dr. Gr een’ s depo s i t i o n , M et ro m o v ed fo r s u m m ar y j u d gm en t

. It s ac co m p an y i n g T en n

. R

. C i v

. P

. 5 6

. 03 statement-9-

ref err ed to Dr. G ree n’s opinion that “[t] he delay in treatment did not worse n Plaintiff’s injury in any
w a y o r r e ta r d h is h e a li n g ina n y

w a y

. ” [T R. 1 1 3 , ¶

2 2 ].

Af te r the plaint if

f dis mis se d its ca se a g a ins t Metro , it wo uld ha ve be e n be tte r pr a c tic e fo r M s Morrow to a mend her T en n

. R . Civ. P . 56.03 concise statement to include Dr . Gre en’s opinion. Howeve r, t he plainti ff knew about Dr. Green’ s causation opinion and was awa re that at least one of the def endants intende d to use this opinion to c halleng e the plaintiff’ s abilityto prove c ausation. The plaintiff m ad e n o eff

ort to shore up its evidenc e of c ausation during the six teen months betwe en Metro’s motion for summary judgme nt and the entry of t he order granting Ms. Morrow’s summary judgme nt motion. Under these fac ts, the plaintiff was not pr ejudiced by the fa ct that Ms. Morrow’ s Tenn. R. Civ. P. 56.03 concise statement did not ref er to Dr . Gre en’s c ausation opinion.

The e vidence considere d in the light most favor able to Plaintiff r evea ls that the conduct of Ms. Morrow play ed no part in causing the fracture to y oung J ason’s leg. She was not present at the time Ms. Armbrister fell and J ason suffe red his injuries. She came upon the sce ne af terwa rds and examined him for injuries and did not discover the fra cture . Even if one conce des that the failure to diag nose the fr actur e wa s neg lige nt, the critica l question under the statute is w h ether Plaintiff “suff ere d injuries which would not otherw ise have occur red.” Tenn. Code Ann. § 29- 26-115(a )(3)

. Th e a ff ida vit of Ka re n S. War d est abli sh e s only that the ne g lig e nc e of Ms. Mo rr ow wa s r e sp on sib le for the fac t that “tre atment for this signific ant fracture was unne cessa rily delay ed for

sever al hours.”

I t is clear that the fra cture of the leg occur red be fore Ms. Mor

row came upon the sce ne. No proof is off

ere d that the delay

in treatment of the fra cture d leg cause d any exacer bation of the injury
or a dd iti on a l pain that othe rw ise wo uldno t ha ve oc c ur re d. Th e a ff

ida vit of Ms. War d d oe s n ot r e fu te the testimony

of Dr. G ree n that J ason Jenkins suffere d no perma nent injury as a result of the a ccide nt
or as a result of the tre atment by Ms. Morrow. F urther c ritical is the undisputed stat em ent of Dr. G r e e n t h a tt h e f

a i l u r e t o d i s c o v e r

t h e f r a c t u r e d i d n o t“ w o r s e n ( e d ) h i s i n j u r i e s ?”

So it is th a t matt e r s w h ic h mu s t b e e s ta b li s h e d b y e xp e r t te s ti mo n y u n d e r the Tenne ssee Medica l Malprac tice Ac t are simplynot established in this recor d, and summary judgme nt was properly g rante d by

the trial court. Se e Es tat e of H e nd e rso n v . Mire , 955 S.W .2d 56, 59 (Tenn.A pp. 19 97 ); Roddy v . Volunteer Me dical Clini c, Inc

. , 9 26 S.W. 2d57 2, 57 7 ( Te nn .Ct .A pp . 1 99 6) ; Parker
v . V an de rb ilt Un iv e rsi ty , 7 6 7 S

. W

. 2 d 4 1 2 , 4 2 0 ( T e n n

. C t

. A p p

. 1 9 8 8 ) ; Do len v. Cunningham , 648 S.W .2d 652, 654 (Tenn.Ct.App. 1982); Te nn. Code Ann. § 29-26- 115.
The judg ment of the trial court is a ffirme d with c osts of the cause assessed to Appellant. The
c a s e i s r e m a n d e d t o t h e tr i a l c o u r tf o r c o l l e c t i o n o f

c o s t s a n d a n y f

u r t h e r p r o c e e d i n g s n e c e s s ar y.

___________________________________ WI LL I AM B. CAIN, J UDGE