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### No. 04-1305 IRVING FLIEGLER, Appellant

v. COMMISS IONER OF

SOCIAL S ECURITY

APPEAL FROM THE UNI TED STATES DIST RICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY D.C. CivilNo. 02-cv-02644 District Judge: T he H onorab le Faith S. H ochbe rg

Submitte d Under Third Circ uit LAR 34.1(a)

November 2, 2004

Bef or e: ALI TO, BARRY, and FU EN TE S, Circuit Judges (Opinion Fi led: December 16, 2004)

OPI NION

BA RR Y, Circuit

Judge The primaryissue r aised i n this appeal i s whether I rving Fl iegle r, who seeks Soci al Secu rity retiremen t bene fits, is entitled to a statu tory exem ption f rom the W indfa ll2

El im in ati on Pr ov isi on s (“ W EP ”) of th e S oc ial Se cu rity A ct ( “th e A ct” ). S pe cif ica lly, Fliegle r challe nges the C om missio ner’s d eterm ination that ne ither 19 73 n or 19 96 co uld be co unted tow ard h is years of cove red em ployme nt and , thus, tha t he w as un able to establ ish hi s enti tlement to the WEP exemption. The Distri ct Court de termine d that t he Co mm issio ner ’s fa ctua l find ing s w ere s upp orte d by su bsta ntial evid enc e in th e rec ord , see 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) , and concl uded that Fliegl er’s retirement benefi ts were subj ect t o the WEP . In addi tion, the Dist rict Court rej ected Fl iegle r’s argument that he was denied due pro ces s in th e pr oce edin gs b efo re th e A LJ. W e ha ve ju risdi ction pur sua nt to 28 U .S.C . § 1291. While we exerc ise pl enaryreview of the legalissues present ed, we are bound by the Commissione r’s fa ctual findings so long as t hey are support ed by s ubstantial e vidence in th e rec ord

. See Sykes v. Apfel , 228 F.3 d 25 9, 26 2 (3 d C ir. 20 00) . W e w ill aff irm. I. Bac kground Bec ause we write o nly for the parties, o ur disc ussion of the record is limited to those fac ts bearing directl y on our disposi tion of t

his appeal . In 1997, Fliegl er retired from private employ ment and appli ed for retirement insurance benefit s (“RIB”) under the Act. Given that Fli egler a lso re ceives a n annual pensi on from the feder al government based on his former service as a n Administr ative Law Judge, his RIB would normal ly be subject to offset under the WEP. Fli egler c ontended, however, that he had 30 y ears of covered employ ment in the private sector , the reby entitling hi m to a stat utoryexemption from the WEP.1 The D istrict Court should n ot have ad dressed F lieger’s argum ents conce rning qua rters

of coverage gi ven that

the only releva nt figure for purpos es of applying the WEP is the number of ye ars of cover age. See 20 C .F.R. § 404 .213(d). Q uarters of co verage are 3 After a series of admi nist rati ve proceedi ngs, the Commissioner de termine d that Fliegl er had demonstr ated onl y 29 y ears of covered employ ment and that he was not exempt from the WEP. In par ticul ar, t he Commissioner reject ed Fliegl er’s argument that 1973 and 1996 could be counted as y ears of covered employ ment. As note d above, Fliegler unsuccessfull y chall enged this decision in the District Court, and also unsuccessf

ully clai med that he was deni ed due process during t he proceedi ngs before t he ALJ. II . Ap pl ic abi li ty o f t he WEP The parti es agree t

hat Fli egler e stabl ished 29 y ears of covered employ ment. The only disput e is whether

he quali fied for a

year of covered employment in ei ther 1973 or 199 6. Ifso, h is R IB w oul d be fully e xem pt fr om the W EP off set. See 42 U .S.C . § 415(a)( 7)(D); 20 C. F.R. § 404. 213(e)( 5). We willconsider the two dis puted y ears i n turn. A. 1973 In order for 1973 to qualify as a y ear of covered employment for WE P purposes, Flie gler wa s req uire d to sho w a min imu m o f $2 700 in co ver ed e arn ing s. See 20 C .F.R . § 404, Su bpt. C, A pp. IV . Fli egler a dmits t hat he earned only$1716 from covered se lfemployment

in 1973. He cannot , the refore, count 1973 as a y ear of cover ed emp loymen t. 1cou nted in d eterm inin g an ind ivid ual’ s ins ure d sta tus u nde r the So cial S ecu rity pro gra m.

See 20 C .F.R. § 404 , Subpt. B (“ Insured S tatus and Q uarters of C overage ”). Fliegler’s insu red statu s is n ot in disp ute.

2 Specifi call y, § 403(b) est ablis hes a deduction from an i ndividual ’s benefi ts when that ind ivid ual’ s ea rnin gs in a giv en m ont h ex cee d a c ertai n am oun t. 4 B. 1996 With respec t to 1996, the question is whether the$465 paid to Fl iegle r by the Wo olworth C orp. on Jan uary 6, 1997 sh ould be c redited as part of his wag es for 199 6. If the an swe r is yes, the pa rties agre e that 1 996 qualif ies as a year of c over ed em ployme nt. As the Commissioner

noted, the defi niti on of “wages” that Fliegl er propose s is not relevant here. B y its own terms, the pro vision Fliegler cites, 42 U .S.C. § 403 (f)(5)(A), applie s onlyin the narrow context of calcul ating de ductions for work under subs ecti on (b). 2 There is no reason to conc lude that Congress i ntended the § 403(f) defi niti on of wages to apply to any ot her interpretive issues ari sing under the SSA, particularlybecause the SSA includes a generaldefini tion of t he term “wages. ” See 42 U .S.C . § 40 9. Unfortunate ly , § 409 fai ls t o address t he questi on of whether an employ ee’s wages sho uld be c red ited t o th e year in w hich they a ccru e or to th e year in w hich they a re p aid. Correspondi ng regulat

ions, however, est ablis h that “ [w]ages are received byan employ ee at the time they are [actual ly or constructi vely ] paid bythe employ er to t he employ ee.” 20 C .F.R. § 404 .1042. Th is regulation, wh ich serves to fill a gap in the statutory defin ition of wa ges, d oes n ot app ear to b e an u nreas onab le con struction of § 409 , and is3 Both parti es, as well as t he District Court , ci te to t he defini tion of “ earnings ” found at 20 C .F.R. § 404 .429. S ubse ction (a ) of tha t regula tion, ho we ver, m akes clear th at its application i s limited t o Subpart E of § 40 4, which is entitl ed “Deduc tions; Reductions; and No npa ymen ts of Be nef its.” T he r egu latio n im plem entin g th e W EP , 20 C .F.R . § 404 .213, is lo cated in Su bpar t C of § 40 4, and theref ore it un clear w hethe r § 40 4.429 is even rel evant t o this case. Thi s iss ue need not be addressed, however, becaus e § 404.429(c) expressly adopts the definiti on of wag es found in Subpart K, w hich includes § 404.1042. 5 theref ore enti tled to Chevron deference. 3 See Chevron, U.S. A., Inc. v. NaturalRes. Def. Council, Inc. , 467 U .S. 837 (198 4). Fliegle r doe s not d ispute th e fac t that he wa s not actua lly paid the $ 465 in 1 996

. Instead, his posi tion is t hat he was cons tructive ly paid in 1996. Under the rul e establ ished in § 404.1042( b), cons tructive pay ment occurs when wages ar e “credi ted to t he account of, or s et asi de for, a n employe e so that theymay be dra wn upon by the empl oyee at any time al though not t

hen actual ly recei ved.” Viewing t he enti re record, the re was subs tantial ev idenc e to su ppo rt the C om missio ner’s f actua l determ ination that W oolw orth did n ot ma intain a policy pe rmitting emp loyees to d raw upo n their w ages prior to receiv ing the ir payche cks o r that Flie gler’s w ages had b een s et aside for h im. Fo r this

reason, Fliegl er’s reliance on LaBonne is m isgu ided , see LaBonne v. Heckler , 580 F. Supp. 558, 560- 561 (D. Minn. 1984) ( “[W]ages would have been pai d to LaBonne earl ier [than the date he r eceived hi s pay check] had he s o request ed.”), and Fliegl er cannot establish cons tructive payme nt.6 III. Due Process Fliegl er als o argues that his due process right s were viol ated becaus e he was not given an adequate opportuni ty to cros s-examine c ertai n key witnesses. We disagree. The ALJ’s October 26, 2000 letter advis ed Fliegl er, among other thi ngs, of hi s right to eit her “submit wri tten que sti ons” to adver se witnes ses or t o “request a supplement al hearing” at which he would be all owed to conduct “s uch oral que sti oning of [those] witnesses as may be required for a ful l and tr ue discl osure of the facts .” App. at 163-64. I n his re sponse, Fliegl er decl ined to a vail hi mself of ei ther option, i nstead compl aining t hat his due process rights had not been respected with reference to i nterrogatories of those witnesses, and req ues ting that t he A LJ r end er a d ecis ion

. Id. at 165 . Bec ause Fliegle r wa ived h is righ t to co nfr ont tho se w itnes ses, h is du e pr oce ss cla im is wit hou t me rit. IV. Conclusion For th e r ea so ns se t f

or th ab ove , t

he or de r o f the Dis tric t C our t wi llbe AFFI RMED.