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*********************************************** 
TLOA OF CT, LLC v. MARCELINO

TAIPE ET AL.

(AC 45844)

Alvord, Prescott and Clark, Js.

Syllabus

The plaintiff assignee of a municipal tax lien on certain real property in the

city of Bridgeport owned by the defendant sought to foreclose the lien.

At the time the defendant purchased the property in January, 2016, there

were unpaid taxes assessed on the property from 2015. In April, 2017,

the city filed the certificate of lien on the land records for the 2015

taxes owed on the property and subsequently assigned the tax lien to

the plaintiff’s predecessor in interest, which assigned the lien to the

plaintiff. The defendant paid his property taxes as he received bills from

the city. The first property tax bill he received was sent by the city to

the defendant in July, 2017, at which time the city had already recorded

and assigned to the plaintiff’s predecessor in interest the tax lien, which

remained due and owing on the property. The defendant never made

any payments to the plaintiff in connection with the assigned lien. In

May, 2020, the plaintiff commenced this action seeking to foreclose on

the tax lien. In his answer, the defendant asserted that, under the applicable statute (§ 12-144b), the city was required to apply the amounts that

he had paid from 2017 to 2020 first to the oldest outstanding taxes owed

on the property, which he claimed were the taxes owed on the 2015

tax lien, by transferring those amounts to the plaintiff before applying

any such amounts to the taxes that were due and owing to the city. The

parties each filed a motion for summary judgment. The trial court granted

the plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment as to liability only and

denied the defendant’s motion for summary judgment, concluding that

the plaintiff had established its prima facie case for foreclosure of a tax

lien and that the defendant’s asserted special defense of setoff was not

viable. On the defendant’s appeal to this court from the trial court’s

judgment of foreclosure by sale, held that the trial court properly granted

the plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment and denied the defendant’s

motion for summary judgment: contrary to the defendant’s argument,

the tax lien in question, once assigned, was no longer a debt owed to

the city and, under such circumstances, the city had no legal obligation

to forward to the plaintiff any tax payments that it received from the

defendant, as § 12-144b makes no reference to third-party assignees of

tax liens, and, had the legislature intended to require municipalities to

do so, it easily could have accomplished that goal by using language

making it clear that municipalities must transfer payments they receive

or recover to third-party holders of previously assigned tax liens; moreover, when § 12-144b is viewed in relation to the statute concerning

third-party assignees (§ 12-195h), and in the absence of any language

whatsoever within § 12-144b referencing third-party holders of assigned

tax liens, it cannot reasonably be inferred, solely from the language in

§ 12-144b requiring municipalities to ‘‘apply’’ tax payments that they

receive or recover to ‘‘outstanding secured taxes,’’ that the legislature

intended to require municipalities to act, in effect, as loan servicers for

third-party holders of municipal tax liens.

Argued May 9—officially released July 25, 2023

Procedural History

Action to foreclose a tax lien on certain real property

owned by the named defendant, and for other relief,

brought to the Superior Court in the judicial district

of Fairfield, where the court, Spader, J., granted the

plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment as to liability

only and denied the named defendant’s motion for summary judgment; thereafter, the court, Cirello, J., ren-
dered a judgment of foreclosure by sale, from which

the named defendant appealed to this court. Affirmed.

Thomas L. Kanasky, Jr., for the appellant (named

defendant).

Gary J. Greene, with whom, on the brief, was Sean

V. Patel, for the appellee (plaintiff).
Opinion

CLARK, J. In this foreclosure action, the defendant

Marcelino Taipe1 appeals from the judgment of foreclosure by sale rendered by the trial court in favor of the

plaintiff, TLOA of CT, LLC. On appeal, the defendant

claims that the court erred in granting the plaintiff’s

motion for summary judgment as to liability only and

denying his motion for summary judgment. In particular, the defendant contends that the court improperly

concluded that the city of Bridgeport (city) complied

with General Statutes § 12-144b when it applied the

defendant’s tax payments to his current taxes owed to

the city, rather than to the tax lien at issue in this appeal,

which the city had already assigned to the plaintiff’s

predecessor in interest prior to receiving the payments

at issue. We affirm the judgment of the court.

The following facts and procedural history are relevant to our resolution of this appeal. On January 21,

2016, the defendant purchased the property located at

85 Gem Avenue in Bridgeport (property). At the time

of the purchase, there were unpaid taxes assessed on

the property from 2015. The court found that the city

likely sent the 2015 tax bill to one of the previous owners

of the property and that the defendant likely never

received a 2015 tax bill from the city.

On April 5, 2017, the city filed a certificate of lien on

the land records for the 2015 taxes owed on the property

(tax lien). The city subsequently assigned the tax lien

to TLOA Acquisitions, LLC-Series 2 on May 17, 2017,

and recorded the assignment on May 18, 2017. TLOA

Acquisitions, LLC-Series 2 thereafter assigned the tax

lien to the plaintiff on October 27, 2017. That assignment

was recorded on the city’s land records on December

11, 2017.

The defendant, after purchasing the property, paid

his property taxes as he received bills from the city.

The first property tax bill he received, which was for

the 2016 grand list, was sent by the city to the defendant

in July, 2017. As a result, by the time the defendant

received his first tax bill in July, 2017, the city had

already recorded and assigned to the plaintiff’s predecessor in interest the tax lien, which remained due and

owing on the property. The defendant has not made

any payments to the plaintiff in connection with the

assigned lien.

On May 13, 2020, the plaintiff commenced this action

seeking to foreclose on the tax lien. On November 18,

2021, the defendant filed his answer and a special

defense. The defendant asserted that he was entitled

to a right of setoff pursuant to General Statutes § 52-

139 for municipal real estate tax payments that he made

to the city from 2017 to 2020.2 Specifically, he argued

that § 12-144b required the city to apply the amounts

that he had paid for those tax years first to the oldest
outstanding taxes owed on the property, which he

claimed were the taxes owed on the tax lien. Even

though the city had already assigned the tax lien to the

plaintiff by the time the defendant made those payments, the defendant nonetheless claimed that § 12-

144b required the city to ‘‘apply’’ his payments to the

taxes owed under that lien by transferring those

amounts to the plaintiff before applying any such

amounts to the taxes that were due and owing to the

city.

On December 2, 2021, the plaintiff filed a motion for

summary judgment as to liability. On January 7, 2022,

the defendant filed an opposition to the plaintiff’s

motion for summary judgment and his own motion for

summary judgment. In his motion for summary judgment, the defendant claimed that he was ‘‘entitled to

summary judgment on his special defense of setoff for

subsequent tax payments made to the [city’s] tax collector, which should have been applied to and paid off the

tax lien being foreclosed by the plaintiff’’ in accordance

with § 12-144b.

On May 11, 2022, the court, Spader, J., granted the

plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment as to liability

only and denied the defendant’s motion for summary

judgment. The court concluded that the plaintiff had

established its prima facie case for foreclosure of a tax

lien and that neither of the defendant’s asserted special

defenses were viable. The court also denied the defendant’s motion for summary judgment, stating that,

although it ‘‘disagree[d] that payments ha[d] been misapplied by the city . . . the only way those payments

could cause a setoff herein is if there was an overpayment being held by the city that should resolve this

debt.’’ (Emphasis omitted.) Having concluded that the

defendant’s special defense of setoff failed as a matter

of law, and that no genuine issue of material fact existed

with respect to the defendant’s liability on the assigned

tax lien, the court granted the plaintiff’s motion for

summary judgment as to liability only and denied the

defendant’s motion for summary judgment.

On May 13, 2022, the plaintiff filed a motion for judgment of strict foreclosure. On September 7, 2022, the

court, Cirello, J., rendered a judgment of foreclosure

by sale and set the sale date for December 10, 2022.3

The defendant timely appealed. Additional facts and

procedural history will be set forth as necessary.

On appeal, the defendant claims that the court ‘‘erred

in denying the defendant’s motion for summary judgment on his claim of setoff in holding that’’ § 12-144b

does not apply ‘‘to assigned tax liens.’’ Although the

defendant labeled his defense before the trial court as

one of setoff, the substance of the allegations in his

special defense sound in a defense of payment.4

In

asserting that the city misapplied his tax payments, the

defendant argues that the payments he made to the city
should have been applied to the tax lien held by the

plaintiff, extinguishing it, and thereby precluding this

foreclosure action. In disposing of the defendant’s argument, the court determined that the city had properly

applied his tax payments. On appeal, the defendant

claims that the court misconstrued and misapplied

§ 12-144b.

The plaintiff contends in its appellee brief that the

issue of payment was not properly presented to the

trial court and preserved for appeal and that this court

should therefore limit its analysis to whether the court

properly concluded that there was no genuine issue of

material fact with respect to the defendant’s special

defense of setoff. We conclude that the arguments the

defendant asserts on appeal were sufficiently raised and

addressed below and that limiting our review strictly

to the defense of setoff would be to exalt form over

substance.5 See Fitzsimons v. Fitzsimons, 116 Conn.

App. 449, 455 n.5, 975 A.2d 729 (2009) (‘‘[u]nder these

circumstances and lacking any claim, much less analysis, of prejudice by the [plaintiff], we will not exalt form

over substance’’). Nevertheless, for the reasons that

follow, we conclude that the court properly granted the

plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment and denied

the defendant’s motion for summary judgment.

We begin by setting forth our standard of review.

‘‘The scope of our review of the trial court’s decision

to grant [a] motion for summary judgment is plenary.

. . . Practice Book [§ 17-49] provides that summary

judgment shall be rendered forthwith if the pleadings,

affidavits and any other proof submitted show that there

is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the

moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of

law. . . . The party seeking summary judgment has the

burden of showing the absence of any genuine issue

[of] material facts which, under applicable principles

of substantive law, entitle him to a judgment as a matter

of law . . . . A material fact . . . [is] a fact which will

make a difference in the result of the case.’’ (Citation

omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Shoreline

Shellfish, LLC v. Branford, 336 Conn. 403, 410, 246 A.3d

470 (2020).

Because the defendant’s claim on appeal rests, in

part, on the meaning and application of § 12-144b, a

question of statutory interpretation is also presented.

‘‘When we are called upon to construe a statute that is

implicated by a summary judgment motion, our review

is plenary.’’ Doe v. West Hartford, 328 Conn. 172, 181,

177 A.3d 1128 (2018). ‘‘When construing a statute, [o]ur

fundamental objective is to ascertain and give effect to

the apparent intent of the legislature. . . . In other

words, we seek to determine, in a reasoned manner,

the meaning of the statutory language as applied to the

facts of [the] case, including the question of whether

the language actually does apply. . . . In seeking to
determine that meaning, General Statutes § 1-2z directs

us first to consider the text of the statute itself and its

relationship to other statutes. If, after examining such

text and considering such relationship, the meaning of

such text is plain and unambiguous and does not yield

absurd or unworkable results, extratextual evidence of

the meaning of the statute shall not be considered.’’

(Internal quotation marks omitted.) Cerame v. Lamont,

346 Conn. 422, 426, 291 A.3d 601 (2023). ‘‘Importantly,

ambiguity exists only if the statutory language at issue

is susceptible to more than one plausible interpretation.

. . . In other words, statutory language does not

become ambiguous merely because the parties contend

for different meanings.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Connecticut Housing Finance Authority v. Alfaro, 328 Conn. 134, 142, 176 A.3d 1146 (2018).

We now turn to the merits of the defendant’s claim

on appeal. Our rules of practice clearly delineate what

a plaintiff must prove when seeking to foreclose on a

municipal tax lien. Practice Book § 10-70 (a) provides:

‘‘In any action to foreclose a municipal tax or assessment lien the plaintiff need only allege and prove: (1)

the ownership of the liened premises on the date when

the same went into the tax list, or when said assessment

was made; (2) that thereafter a tax in the amount specified in the list, or such assessment in the amount made,

was duly and properly assessed upon the property and

became due and payable; (3) (to be used only in cases

where the lien has been continued by certificate) that

thereafter a certificate of lien for the amount thereof

was duly and properly filed and recorded in the land

records of the said town on the date stated; (4) that

no part of the same has been paid; and (5) other encumbrances as required by the preceding section.’’ (Emphasis added).

The defendant argues that the plaintiff was not entitled to summary judgment because, in his view, even

though the city already had assigned the tax lien to a

third-party assignee prior to the time he made any tax

payments to the city, § 12-144b required the city to

transfer his payments to the plaintiff, as the successor

to the original assignee, in satisfaction of his obligations

under the lien before applying any amounts to taxes

owed to the city for subsequent tax years. The defendant notes that § 12-144b requires a municipality to

apply all tax payments first to any ‘‘outstanding unsecured taxes . . . paying the oldest such tax first,’’ and

then to any ‘‘outstanding secured taxes . . . paying the

oldest such tax first.’’ The defendant contends that,

because General Statutes § 12-1726 creates a statutory

lien over all municipal taxes owed for real property

from the date of assessment, and there was no evidence

that he owed personal property taxes, there were no

‘‘unsecured taxes’’ owed on the property at the time of

his payments. He further contends that, because the

2015 tax was the oldest secured tax owed on the prop-
erty when he made his payments and § 12-144b required

the city to ‘‘apply’’ his tax payments first to the oldest

outstanding secured tax, the city was required to apply

his payments to the previously assigned tax lien before

applying those amounts to real property taxes that he

owed to the city for subsequent tax years by transferring

to the plaintiff the amount owed on the tax lien.

The plaintiff counters that § 12-144b imposes no obligation on a municipality to transfer tax payments to a

holder of an assigned tax lien before applying such

payments to taxes that are due and owing to a municipality. The plaintiff also argues that the defendant’s

claim rests upon an incorrect construction of § 12-144b.

Specifically, the plaintiff argues that the taxes that were

due and owing to the city at the time the defendant

made his payments constituted ‘‘unsecured taxes’’ and

that § 12-144b required the city to apply those payments

to such amounts before applying any amounts to

‘‘secured taxes,’’ which it contends are limited to those

taxes for which a lien has been recorded on the land

records.

We need not decide whether, as the defendant contends, all real property taxes are ‘‘secured taxes’’ for

purposes of § 12-144b or, instead, as the plaintiff contends, real property taxes are ‘‘secured taxes’’ for purposes of that statute only if a lien for such amount is

recorded on the land records, because we agree with

the plaintiff that the tax lien in question, once assigned,

was no longer a debt owed to the city and that, under

such circumstances, the city had no legal obligation to

forward to the plaintiff any tax payments that it received

from the defendant.

We begin with the language of § 12-144b. That statute

provides in relevant part that, ‘‘[e]xcept as otherwise

provided by the general statutes, all payments made to

or recovered by the municipality shall be applied (1)

first, for any outstanding unsecured taxes, to expenses

concerning such unsecured taxes, including attorney’s

fees, collection expenses, collector’s fees and other

expenses and charges related to all delinquencies owed

by the party liable therefor before the interest accrued,

then to the principal of such outstanding unsecured

taxes, paying the oldest such tax first, and (2) for any

outstanding secured taxes, first to expenses concerning

such secured taxes, including attorney’s fees, collection

expenses, collector’s fees and other expenses and

charges related to all delinquencies owed by the party

liable therefor before the interest accrued, then to the

principal of such outstanding secured taxes, paying the

oldest such tax first. . . .’’ General Statutes § 12-144b.

On the basis of the clear language of the statute,

when a municipality receives or recovers a tax payment,

it must first apply such payments to ‘‘outstanding unsecured taxes,’’ beginning with the oldest such tax. Once

a municipality has applied such payments to any out-
standing unsecured taxes and fees associated with

those taxes, in the order set out in the statute, a municipality must then apply payments to any outstanding

secured taxes, beginning with the oldest such tax, again

following the order set out in the statute.

The defendant contends that § 12-144b imposes upon

a municipality an obligation to ‘‘apply’’ tax payments it

receives or recovers to a tax lien that a municipality

previously assigned to a third party by transferring such

amounts to the current holder of the tax lien. Section

12-144b, however, makes no reference to third-party

assignees of tax liens. Had the legislature intended to

require municipalities to undertake the burdensome

and administratively difficult responsibilities that the

defendant’s interpretation would create,7

it easily could

have accomplished that goal by using language making

it clear that municipalities must transfer payments they

receive or recover to third-party holders of previously

assigned tax liens. See Scholastic Book Clubs, Inc. v.

Commissioner of Revenue Services, 304 Conn. 204, 219,

38 A.3d 1183 (‘‘it is a well settled principle of statutory

construction that the legislature knows how to convey

its intent expressly’’), cert. denied, 568 U.S. 940, 133 S.

Ct. 425, 184 L. Ed. 2d 255 (2012). Indeed, the legislature

has demonstrated that it is more than capable of using

language directly addressing such liens. General Statutes § 12-195h broadly regulates the manner in which

municipalities may assign tax liens, enumerates the

rights, powers and duties of third-party assignees seeking to enforce or foreclose upon municipal tax liens,

and establishes extensive notice requirements governing collection efforts by third-party assignees. See, e.g.,

General Statutes § 12-195h (d) and (e)8

; see also American Tax Funding, LLC v. First Eagle Corp., 196 Conn.

App. 298, 300, 229 A.3d 1218 (§ 12-195h ‘‘permits a

municipality to assign for consideration liens filed by

the tax collector’’), cert. denied, 335 Conn. 942, 237

A.3d 729 (2020). When viewed in relation to § 12-195h,

and in the absence of any language whatsoever within

§ 12-144b referencing third-party holders of assigned

tax liens, it cannot reasonably be inferred, solely from

the language in § 12-144b requiring municipalities to

‘‘apply’’ tax payments that they receive or recover to

‘‘outstanding secured taxes,’’ that the legislature

intended to require municipalities to act, in effect, as

loan servicers for third-party holders of municipal

tax liens.

In this case, it is undisputed that, by the time the

defendant made his first tax payment to the city, the

city already had assigned the tax lien. At that point, the

city was under no obligation to forward payments that

it received from the defendant to the plaintiff or any

subsequent assignee of the tax lien rather than applying

the defendant’s tax payments to taxes that the defendant owed to the city. Accordingly, we conclude that

the court properly granted the plaintiff’s motion for
summary judgment and denied the defendant’s motion

for summary judgment.

The judgment is affirmed.

In this opinion the other judges concurred.

1 The complaint also named as defendants the Water Pollution Control

Authority of the city of Bridgeport and the Aquarion Water Company. Neither

of these additional defendants is participating in the present appeal, and,

thus, all references to the defendant in this opinion are to Marcelino Taipe.

2 On December 15, 2021, the defendant filed a request for leave to amend

his answer and special defense in order to add an additional special defense.

That defense is not pertinent to this appeal.

3 The court found that the amount of debt was $15,498.63 and that the

fair market value of the property was $310,000.

4

‘‘Payment, such that a debt is no longer owed to a plaintiff, is a valid

defense to liability in a foreclosure action.’’ JPMorgan Chase Bank, National

Assn. v. Syed, 197 Conn. App. 129, 143, 231 A.3d 286 (2020). ‘‘[W]hether

payment was tendered is a question of fact appropriately decided by the

trier of fact.’’ Homecomings Financial Network, Inc. v. Starbala, 85 Conn.

App. 284, 289, 857 A.2d 366 (2004); see also Practice Book § 10-50.

5 Because we construe the defendant’s sole claim on appeal to be one of

payment, and not setoff, and because the defendant failed to brief the issue

of setoff in his principal appellate brief, we deem any claim regarding setoff

abandoned and decline to review it on appeal. ‘‘[W]e are not required to

review issues that have been improperly presented to this court through an

inadequate brief. . . . Analysis, rather than mere abstract assertion, is

required in order to avoid abandoning an issue by failure to brief the issue

properly.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Burton v. Dept. of Environmental Protection, 337 Conn. 781, 803, 256 A.3d 655 (2021); see also Morrissey-Manter v. Saint Francis Hospital & Medical Center, 166 Conn. App.

510, 527, 142 A.3d 363 (‘‘appellate courts will treat as abandoned claims

that are not briefed adequately’’), cert. denied, 323 Conn. 924, 149 A.3d

982 (2016).

6 General Statutes § 12-172 provides in relevant part: ‘‘The interest of each

person in each item of real estate, which has been legally set in his assessment list, shall be subject to a lien for that part of his taxes laid upon the

valuation of such interest, as found in such list when finally completed, as

such part may be increased by interest, fees and charges, and a lien for any

obligation to make a payment in lieu of any such taxes, as defined in section

12-171. Such lien, unless otherwise specially provided by law, shall exist

from the first day of October or other assessment date of the municipality

in the year previous to that in which such tax, or the first installment thereof,

became due until two years after such tax or first installment thereof became

due and, during its existence, shall take precedence of all transfers and

encumbrances in any manner affecting such interest in such item, or any

part of it. . . .’’

7 Although we conclude that the language of § 12-144b is conclusive with

respect to the defendant’s claim, we note that the defendant’s interpretation,

if accepted, would require a municipality, upon receipt of a tax payment,

(a) to determine whether it has assigned to a third party a tax lien that it

once held with respect to a given property; (b) to identify and locate the

current holder of any such lien; (c) to determine the amounts currently

owed on any such lien; and (d) to transfer to the current holder of the lien

all or a portion of the tax payments the municipality has received. Such an

interpretation would run afoul of the tenet of statutory construction requiring

us to interpret statutes in a manner that avoids bizarre or unworkable results.

See Wilkins v. Connecticut Childbirth & Women’s Center, 314 Conn. 709,

723, 104 A.3d 671 (2014) (‘‘[i]t is axiomatic that [w]e must interpret the

statute so that it does not lead to absurd or unworkable results’’ (internal

quotation marks omitted)).

8 General Statutes § 12-195h provides in relevant part: ‘‘(d) The assignee,

or any subsequent assignee, shall provide written notice of an assignment,

not later than sixty days after the date of such assignment, to the owner

and any holder of a mortgage, on the real property that is the subject of

the assignment, provided such owner or holder is of record as of the date

of such assignment. Such notice shall include information sufficient to identify (1) the property that is subject to the lien and in which the holder has

an interest, (2) the name and addresses of the assignee, and (3) the amount

of unpaid taxes, interest and fees being assigned relative to the subject
property as of the date of the assignment.

‘‘(e) Not less than sixty days prior to commencing an action to foreclose

a lien under this section, the assignee shall provide a written notice, by

first-class mail, to the holders of all first or second security interests on the

property subject to the lien that were recorded before the date the assessment the lien sought to be enforced became delinquent. Such notice shall

set forth: (1) The amount of unpaid debt owed to the assignee as of the

date of the notice; (2) the amount of any attorney’s fees and costs incurred

by the assignee in the enforcement of the lien as of the date of the notice;

(3) a statement of the assignee’s intention to foreclose the lien if the amounts

set forth pursuant to subdivisions (1) and (2) of this subsection are not paid

to the assignee on or before sixty days after the date the notice is provided;

(4) the assignee’s contact information, including, but not limited to, the

assignee’s name, mailing address, telephone number and electronic mail

address, if any; and (5) instructions concerning the acceptable means of

making a payment on the amounts owed to the assignee as set forth pursuant

to subdivisions (1) and (2) of this subsection. Any notice required under

this subsection shall be effective upon the date such notice is provided. . . .’’