Filed 8/27/20 Quality Control Restoration v. Shakian CA2/1

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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION ONE

QUALITY CONTROL 

RESTORATION,

Plaintiff and Respondent,

v.

VATCHE SAHAKIAN,

Defendant and Appellant.

 B293426

 (Los Angeles County

 Super. Ct. No. EC068466)

APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of Los 

Angeles County, William D. Stewart, Judge. Affirmed.

Hartsuyker, Stratman & Williams-Abrego, Jeffrey E. 

Lerman; Veatch Carlson and Serena L. Nervez for Defendant and 

Appellant.

Cole Pedroza, Kenneth R. Pedroza, Joshua C. Traver, Scott 

M. Klausner; Fierstadt Law Group, Jack A. Fierstadt and

Brandon A. Carroll for Plaintiff and Respondent.

_______________________
2

Defendant Vatche Sahakian appeals the trial court’s denial 

of his special motion to strike under section 425.16 of the Code of 

Civil Procedure (anti-SLAPP). We have jurisdiction under Code 

of Civil Procedure1 sections 425.16, subdivision (i), and 904.1. 

We affirm.

BACKGROUND

Plaintiff Quality Control Restoration, doing business as

Quality Control Services (QCS), is a repair and damage 

restoration service based in La Verne, California. Sahakian is a 

unit owner and resident in the 134-unit Cordova Park Villas 

(CPV) condominium complex in Pasadena, California. Prior to 

the events alleged in this action, QCS had been hired by the CPV 

homeowners’ association (HOA) to perform a number of repair 

projects on the property.

Over the years, CPV residents would provide QCS with a 

key to their units so that work could be performed. In May of 

2017, QCS was hired to perform repairs in a number of units that 

included Sahakian’s unit. However, Sahakian was unwilling to 

provide a key for access, and insisted on being present to provide 

access at times convenient to him. Scheduling disputes arose and 

the work QCS was to perform was delayed. QCS contends that 

this led Sahakian to institute a campaign to disparage and 

defame QCS.

“In or about June of 2017,” QCS’s complaint alleges, 

“[Sahakian] sent a letter to all CPV residents expressing concerns 

about HOA operations. Specifically, [Sahakian]’s letter stated: 

1 Unless otherwise specified, all statutory references herein 

are to the Code of Civil Procedure.
3

[¶] In recent years, QCS has been almost exclusively contracted 

for all repairs, yet their service has not always been adequate. 

For example, sometimes units have incurred damages during and 

because of these repairs, and these damages have not been 

addressed. Additionally, these repairs are done at a very slow 

pace—often at great inconvenience to owners/tenants and 

sometimes leading to more repairs and cost for the HOA. In 

some cases, the work has even been substandard and/or did not 

address, the problem at hand. Some of us have noticed waste in 

material and supplies. In one instance, an owner independently 

obtained bids on the exact same repairs; the estimate QCS gave 

was almost two times costlier that that of two other reputable 

companies, and QCS asked for thrice the time to complete work.”

In April of 2018, QCS filed a civil action for slander per se 

and libel per se against Sahakian. In July of 2018, Sahakian 

filed a special motion to strike under section 425.16 (antiSLAPP), with the hearing set for August 24, 2018. This motion 

included a declaration from Sahakian attaching the entire letter 

from which the paragraph quoted above was excerpted in the 

complaint.

QCS opposed the motion on August 13, 2018, including

declarations from Rick Landi (owner of QCS), Phillip DeSautell 

(a CPV unit owner), and Brad Chisler (another CPV unit owner). 

These declarations sought to refute the statements made by 

Sahakian, alleged damage caused to QCS by Sahakian, and set 

forth additional examples of statements about QCS by Sahakian

asserted to be false. Sahakian filed a reply brief in support of the 

motion, challenging the showing made by QCS.

The trial court heard the motion on August 24, 2018, and

denied it. The trial court held that Sahakian had failed to 
4

establish that the QCS complaint was directed to one of the 

protected activities under section 425.16, subdivision (e). The 

court did not reach the question of whether there was a 

probability that QCS would prevail on its claims under section 

425.16, subdivision (b)(1). This appeal by Sahakian followed.

DISCUSSION

A. Applicable Law

The requirements for anti-SLAPP motions under section 

425.16 are familiar. Section 425.16 provides, inter alia, that “[a] 

cause of action against a person arising from any act of that 

person in furtherance of the person’s right of petition or free 

speech under the United States Constitution or the California 

Constitution in connection with a public issue shall be subject to 

a special motion to strike, unless the court determines that the 

plaintiff has established that there is a probability that the 

plaintiff will prevail on the claim.” (Id., subd. (b)(1).) An “ ‘act in 

furtherance of a person’s right of petition or free speech . . . in 

connection with a public issue’ ” is defined in section 425.16 to 

include, in relevant part: “any . . . conduct in furtherance of the 

exercise of the constitutional right of petition or the 

constitutional right of free speech in connection with a public 

issue or an issue of public interest.” (Id., subd. (e)(4).)

The Legislature enacted section 425.16 to prevent and 

deter “lawsuits brought primarily to chill the valid exercise of the 

constitutional rights of freedom of speech and petition for the 

redress of grievances.” (§ 425.16, subd. (a).) Thus, the purpose of 

the anti-SLAPP law is “not [to] insulate defendants from any

liability for claims arising from the protected rights of petition or 

speech. It only provides a procedure for weeding out, at an early 
5

stage, meritless claims arising from protected activity.” (Baral v. 

Schnitt (2016) 1 Cal.5th 376, 384 (Baral).)

When a party moves to strike a cause of action under the 

anti-SLAPP law, a trial court evaluates the special motion to 

strike using a two-prong test: (1) has the moving party “made a 

threshold showing that the challenged cause of action arises from 

protected activity” (Rusheen v. Cohen (2006) 37 Cal.4th 1048, 

1056) and, if so, (2) has the non-moving party demonstrated that 

the challenged cause of action has “ ‘minimal merit’ ” by making 

“a prima facie factual showing sufficient to sustain” a judgment 

in its favor. (Baral, supra, 1 Cal.5th at p. 385; Navellier v. 

Sletten (2002) 29 Cal.4th 82, 93-94; see § 425.16, subd. (b)(1).)

After the first prong is satisfied by the moving party, the burden 

shifts to the non-moving party to “demonstrate that each 

challenged claim based on protected activity is legally sufficient 

and factually substantiated.” (Baral, at p. 396.) If the plaintiff 

can show a probability of prevailing on any part of its claim, the 

cause of action is not meritless and will not be stricken. (Oasis 

West Realty, LLC v. Goldman (2011) 51 Cal.4th 811, 820.)

B. Standard of Review

We review a trial court’s ruling on a special motion to 

strike pursuant to section 425.16 under the de novo standard. 

(Monster Energy Co. v. Schechter (2019) 7 Cal.5th 781, 788; Park 

v. Board of Trustees of California State University (2017) 2 

Cal.5th 1057, 1067.) “In other words, we employ the same twopronged procedure as the trial court in determining whether the 

anti-SLAPP motion was properly granted.” (Mendoza v. ADP 

Screening & Selection Services, Inc. (2010) 182 Cal.App.4th 1644, 

1652.)
6

As does the trial court, we “consider the pleadings, and 

supporting and opposing affidavits stating the facts upon which 

the liability or defense is based.” (§ 425.16, subd. (b)(2).) In 

considering the pleadings and declarations, we do not make 

credibility determinations or compare the weight of the evidence; 

instead, we accept the opposing party’s evidence as true and 

evaluate the moving party’s evidence only to determine if it has 

defeated the opposing party’s evidence as a matter of law. 

(Soukup v. Law Offices of Herbert Hafif (2006) 39 Cal.4th 260, 

269, fn. 3.)

C. Prong 1: Arising from Protected Activity

Sahakian’s initial burden is to show that the two causes of 

action in QCS’s complaint against Sahakian arise from protected 

activity on his part. (Park v. Board of Trustees of California State 

University, supra, 2 Cal.5th at p. 1061.)

QCS’s libel per se and slander per se causes of action are 

based on written and oral communications by Sahakian to fellow 

residents and unit owners at the CPV complex concerning alleged 

deficiencies in the work by QCS and excessive cost and 

inconvenience to the homeowners for this work. The question 

before the trial court, and before us on de novo review, is whether 

Sahakian’s communications to CPV owners and residents

constitute “conduct in furtherance of the exercise of the 

constitutional right of petition or the constitutional right of free 

speech in connection with a public issue or an issue of public 

interest” within the meaning of section 425.16, subdivision (e)(4).

The full text of Sahakian’s letter to CPV owners and 

residents was submitted in support of Sahakian’s anti-SLAPP 

motion, and is set forth in the Appendix to this opinion. The 

letter begins: “Dear neighbor, [¶] We write to you on behalf of a 
7

small group of owners that have recently grown concerned about 

our Cordova complex and the operations of our HOA. We greatly 

value the service of our HOA Board members who have 

volunteered to do an often thankless job representing our 

collective interests. However, several recent developments 

suggest that we have inadvertently entered a mode of operation 

that is not necessarily in the best interest of all the owners and 

the long term health of our HOA.” The letter then sets out a 

number of concerns (focusing significant attention on the work of 

QCS), and concludes with a one-page proposed draft letter to be 

sent to the HOA setting out these concerns, as well as an 

announcement of a meeting of homeowners to discuss these 

issues.

The trial court determined that Sahakian had not 

demonstrated that his conduct fell with the first prong of section 

425.16, noting that “[Sahakian’s] letter at issue was circulated 

amongst fellow residents and had not yet been presented to the 

CPV’s HOA, nor were the residents’ complaints about [QCS’s] 

repair performance at issue before the HOA.” The trial court 

ruled that Sahakian’s communication therefore did not arise in a 

setting where “homeowners were in active disputes with their 

respective HOAs” nor address “an ongoing dispute that would 

potentially affect the fellow residents.” Accordingly, the trial 

court ruled that Sahakian had not established that his letter 

involved protected activity under section 425.16 (the first antiSLAPP prong). The trial court did not reach the second question 

whether QCS had established sufficient probability that it would 

prevail on its claims.

In reviewing the trial court’s analysis of this issue, we are 

guided by the California Supreme Court’s recent statement that 
8

“context matters” in analyzing anti-SLAPP motions premised on 

free speech claims under section 425.16, subdivision (e)(4). 

(FilmOn.com Inc. v. DoubleVerify Inc. (2019) 7 Cal.5th 133, 149

[“court must consider the context as well as the content of a 

statement in determining whether that statement furthers the 

exercise of constitutional speech rights in connection with a 

matter of public interest”].) We conclude that the trial court’s 

distinction based on whether an active dispute with the HOA had

actually commenced leads to an excessively narrow construction 

of section 425.16, subdivision (e)(4), contrary to the statutory 

directive in section 425.16, subdivision (a), that “this section shall 

be construed broadly” in order “to encourage continued 

participation in matters of public significance.”

The context here clearly involves an effort by Sahakian to 

enlist support from fellow unit owners in taking formal steps to 

raise with the HOA and “remedy” what he contended were 

serious shortcomings in the governance provided by the HOA, 

which impacted all unit owners. Case law recognizes that this 

sufficiently constitutes an issue of public interest for purposes of 

section 425.16. “The definition of ‘public interest’ within the 

meaning of the anti-SLAPP statute has been broadly construed to 

include not only governmental matters, but also private conduct 

that impacts a broad segment of society and/or that affects a 

community in a manner similar to that of a governmental entity.” 

(Damon v. Ocean Hills Journalism Club (2000) 85 Cal.App.4th 

468, 479 (Damon).)2 “ ‘Although matters of public interest 

2 In support of its finding that the “issue of public interest” 

criterion had been met in that case, the Damon court cited 

Chantiles v. Lake Forest II Master Homeowners Assn. (1995) 37 

Cal.App.4th 914, where the court observed: “For many 
9

include legislative and governmental activities, they may also 

include activities that involve private persons and entities, 

especially when a large, powerful organization may impact the 

lives of many individuals.’ [Citations.]” (Macias v. Hartwell

(1997) 55 Cal.App.4th 669, 674.)

Here, the applicable public interest is criticism of the 

manner in which the HOA governed and managed the finances of 

CPV, including an examination of the community benefits 

received under the prior special assessment and whether to 

continue entering into similar construction contracts in the 

future. Similar to Damon, Sahakian’s statements concerned 

(1) the decision of unit owners whether to vote for another special

assessment for construction work, and (2) the competency of the

HOA to engage in construction work that was in the best interest 

Californians, the homeowners association functions as a second 

municipal government, regulating many aspects of their daily 

lives. The court in Cohen v. Kite Hill Community Assn. (1983) 

142 Cal.App.3d 642 . . . noted the ‘quasi-governmental’ nature of 

homeowners associations. ‘ “[U]pon analysis of the association’s 

functions, one clearly sees the association as a quasi-government 

entity paralleling in almost every case the powers, duties, and 

responsibilities of a municipal government. As a ‘minigovernment,’ the association provides to its members, in almost 

every case, utility services, road maintenance, street and common 

area lighting, and refuse removal. In many cases, it also provides 

security services and various forms of communication within the 

community. There is, moreover, a clear analogy to the municipal 

police and public safety functions. All of these functions are 

financed through assessments or taxes levied upon the members 

of the community, with powers vested in the board of directors 

. . . clearly analogous to the governing body of a municipality.” ’ 

(Id. at p. 651 . . . .)” (Chantiles, supra, at p. 922.)
10

of the CPV residents. Sahakian’s statements encouraged the 

community to participate in the decision-making process

regarding the impending special assessment to support yet 

another construction contract. (See Country Side Villas 

Homeowners Assn. v. Ivie (2011) 193 Cal.App.4th 1110, 1118 [“It 

is clear from the evidence that the action in this case arose from 

[the defendant’s] exercise of her right of free speech in criticizing 

and speaking out against the action of [the plaintiff’s] board”].)

While it is correct that the court in Colyear v. Rolling Hills 

Community Assn. of Rancho Palos Verdes (2017) 9 Cal.App.5th 

119 found that the applicability of tree-trimming covenants to 

lots not expressly burdened by them, and the HOA’s authority to

enforce such covenants, “was an ongoing topic of debate between

the board and homeowners, resulting in multiple hearings, 

letters, and several changes to the board’s policy” (id. at p. 133), 

we find nothing in this decision suggesting that the coverage of 

section 425.16, subdivision (e)(4), can only apply where an active 

controversy involving the HOA has actually arisen, as the trial 

court here ruled. The communication by Sahakian clearly 

contemplated that such controversy was imminent. The trial 

court’s distinction based on whether the HOA itself was yet 

actively involved in the nascent dispute is not a valid one, 

because it does not properly focus on the nature of Sahakian’s 

communications as addressing “a public issue or an issue of 

public interest.” Thus, while we agree with the trial court’s 

observation that “[n]ot every mundane communication between a 

homeowners association and a homeowner gives rise to a freedom 

of speech issue” (Turner v. Vista Pointe Ridge Homeowners Assn.

(2009) 180 Cal.App.4th 676, 679), we conclude that this 

communication was one that falls under the protection of the first 
11

prong of section 425.16, because it was addressed to all CPV unit 

owners and touched on matters of interest to those unit owners. 

Thus, the trial court erred in denying Sahakian’s motion on the 

basis that he had not satisfied the first prong.

D. Prong 2: Probability of Prevailing on the Merits

Although we have concluded that the trial court erred in 

ruling that the first prong under section 425.16 had not been 

satisfied, that does not end the analysis of whether the antiSLAPP motion to strike should have been granted. Under the 

statute, satisfying the first prong simply shifts to the plaintiff the 

burden of demonstrating merit in its alleged causes of action 

under the second prong. (Baral, supra, 1 Cal.5th at p. 396.) The 

trial court did not examine this question, having ended its 

analysis once it concluded that prong 1 was not satisfied.

We could remand this matter to permit the trial court to

make an initial determination whether prong 2 has been satisfied 

by QCS, but we do not believe it makes sense to do so here. We 

have before us the submissions made to the trial court. Our

review of the trial court’s order denying the anti-SLAPP motion is

de novo. (Neville v. Chudacoff (2008) 160 Cal.App.4th 1255, 

1262.) “Because the motion raises only questions of law 

regarding the construction and effect of the supporting and 

opposing papers, this court [can] make its own independent 

determination of the questions of law raised in the motion.” 

(Spitler v. Children’s Institute International (1992) 11 

Cal.App.4th 432, 439.) Where there is sufficient legal ground in 

the record to support the trial court’s order, the order may be 

upheld regardless of the grounds relied upon by the trial court. 

(Becerra v. County of Santa Cruz (1998) 68 Cal.App.4th 1450, 

1457.) We must affirm on any ground supported by the record.
12

(Jimenez v. County of Los Angeles (2005) 130 Cal.App.4th 133, 

140.)3

The second prong of the anti-SLAPP analysis requires QCS

to show a probability of prevailing on its causes of action. The 

court ruling on such a motion does not weigh evidence or resolve 

conflicting factual claims. Its inquiry is limited to whether QCS 

has stated a legally sufficient claim and made a prima facie

factual showing sufficient to sustain a favorable judgment if the 

evidence is credited. The court accepts QCS’s evidence as true 

and evaluates Sahakian’s showing only to determine if it defeats 

QCS’s claim as a matter of law. (Baral, supra, 1 Cal.5th at 

pp. 384-385; Wilson v. Parker, Covert & Chidester (2002) 28 

Cal.4th 811, 821.) “[A]t the second stage of an anti-SLAPP 

hearing, the court may consider affidavits, declarations, and their 

equivalents if it is reasonably possible the proffered evidence set 

out in those statements will be admissible at trial.” (Sweetwater 

Union High School Dist. v. Gilbane Building Co. (2019) 6 Cal.5th 

931, 949.) “[C]laims with the requisite minimal merit may 

proceed.” (Navellier v. Sletten, supra, 29 Cal.4th at p. 94.)

1. The Legal Framework

“The tort of defamation ‘involves (a) a publication that is 

(b) false, (c) defamatory, and (d) unprivileged, and that (e) has a 

natural tendency to injure or that causes special damage.’ (5 

Witkin, Summary of Cal. Law (10th ed. 2005) Torts, § 529, p. 782, 

citing Civ. Code, §§ 45-46 and cases.)” (Taus v. Loftus (2007) 40 

3 While these cases address appellate review of the 

granting of summary judgment motions, the same principle is 

applicable to de novo review of a special motion to strike under 

section 425.16.
13

Cal.4th 683, 720.) “Defamation is effected by either of the 

following: [¶] (a) Libel. [¶] (b) Slander.” (Civ. Code, § 44.) “Libel 

is a false and unprivileged publication by writing, printing, 

picture, effigy, or other fixed representation to the eye, which 

exposes any person to hatred, contempt, ridicule, or obloquy, or 

which causes him to be shunned or avoided, or which has a 

tendency to injure him in his occupation.” (Civ. Code, § 45.) “A 

libel which is defamatory of the plaintiff without the necessity of 

explanatory matter, such as an inducement, innuendo or other 

extrinsic fact, is said to be a libel on its face.” (Civ. Code, § 45a.)

“Slander is a false and unprivileged publication, orally 

uttered, and also communications by radio or any mechanical or 

other means which: [¶] 1. Charges any person with crime, or 

with having been indicted, convicted, or punished for crime; 

[¶] . . . [¶] 3. Tends directly to injure him in respect to his office, 

profession, trade or business, either by imputing to him general 

disqualification in those respects which the office or other 

occupation peculiarly requires, or by imputing something with 

reference to his office, profession, trade, or business that has a 

natural tendency to lessen its profits; [¶] . . . or [¶] 5. Which, by 

natural consequence, causes actual damage.” (Civ. Code, § 46.) 

Statements in these categories are considered slanderous per se, 

and actionable without proof of special damage. (Burrill v. Nair

(2013) 217 Cal.App.4th 357, 382, disapproved on other grounds in

Baral, supra, 1 Cal.5th at p. 395, fn. 11.)

2. QCS’s Evidence Under Prong 2

QCS alleges the required elements described above in its 

complaint. We focus on the evidence submitted by QCS in 

opposition to Sahakian’s anti-SLAPP motion.
14

a. Declaration of Rick Landi

The declaration submitted by Rick Landi stated as follows: 

Rick Landi is the owner of QCS, and has personal knowledge of 

the matters set forth. QCS is a licensed general contractor in 

California. QCS has been contracted to perform various repair 

and maintenance projects at CPV since 2012. At all times while 

working on the CPV property, QCS has maintained an active 

contractor’s license and all required insurance.

In 2013, QCS began a large project to replace all of the hot 

and cold water pipes within each unit at the CPV complex, 

replace the vertical cast iron sewer drain pipes, paint the entire 

complex, and replace all of the wood railings on the balconies 

with welded and painted steel. Prior to being awarded the 

contract for this work, QCS submitted estimates for the work to 

the HOA board. QCS was awarded the contract as it was the 

lowest bidder for the project. This project was completed within 

budget and on schedule.

While completing that project, if QCS was responsible for 

causing any damage to a unit, QCS repaired that damage at its 

own expense.

As a result of the false statements that have been spread by 

Sahakian, QCS was prevented from completing work that it had 

been contracted to perform at CPV and has lost the opportunity 

to perform future work at the property. QCS’s reputation within 

the community has been damaged as a direct result of false 

statements made by Sahakian.

In the construction industry, a contractor’s reputation is an 

extremely important factor when trying to secure contracts for 

future work. QCS has lost approximately $125,000 and may 
15

continue to suffer damage in the future as a result of Sahakian’s 

intentional misrepresentations concerning QCS.

When QCS became aware of the false statements being 

spread throughout the CPV community, QCS provided 

information to Sahakian to rebut his claims. This included 

providing licensing and insurance information which Sahakian 

proclaimed QCS did not have. Even after receiving this

information Sahakian continued to spread the misinformation 

and outright lies.

b. Declaration of Phillip DeSautell

The declaration submitted by Phillip DeSautell stated as 

follows: DeSautell has owned a condominium in the CPV 

complex since 2012. He has worked in the construction industry 

for over 30 years and is familiar with construction relating to 

large complexes and buildings. He has personal knowledge of the 

matters set forth in the declaration. He served on the HOA board 

from 2013 to 2018, and was president from 2015 to 2018. During 

his time on the board, he helped to oversee several construction 

and maintenance projects, as well as any corresponding special 

assessments for the homeowners.

The HOA used a construction consultant, Jerry Acker, to 

assess and review the construction and maintenance needs at the 

property, obtain and review bids from contractors, negotiate bids 

and contracts, inspect work during and after projects, and act as 

a liaison between the HOA and any contractors performing work. 

During DeSautell’s time on the board, the HOA contracted with 

QCS for several projects, including plumbing, painting, repairs to 

balconies, in addition to regular maintenance work. The overall 

quality of QCS’s work was good.
16

In mid-2017, Sahakian began a campaign within the HOA 

to disparage the board and QCS. Since then, DeSautell has 

personally witnessed Sahakian tell several homeowners, in 

person and in writing, that QCS does not have a contractor’s 

license, does not carry workmen’s compensation insurance, and 

performs substandard work. The statements have been made 

both in and out of official association meetings. Sahakian has on 

several occasions posted notices containing these statements on 

doors within the complex and has sent emails with these 

statements to owners. In addition, Sahakian has told 

homeowners that QCS was hired for projects that were never put 

out for bid and that QCS was awarded the projects even though 

its estimates were not the lowest. However, QCS was awarded 

all of its contracts based on it being the lowest bidder. The HOA 

board would attempt to obtain at least 3 bids on all the work 

performed at CPV.

Sahakian stated to the homeowners that an audit had been 

completed and it was discovered that approximately $1.1 million 

was wrongfully paid to QCS and that he was going to get QCS to 

repay that money to the HOA. The “audit,” however, was simply 

a report totaling amounts paid to QCS over a period of time and 

the auditor did not make a conclusion that the money was 

wrongfully paid.

Sahakian sent out a letter to all of the owners at CPV 

(which is attached to the declaration) that contained false 

statements regarding QCS’s work as it related to a special 

assessment in 2013. DeSautell, as president of the CPV HOA 

board during the entire time of all of QCS’s work on the special 

assessment, states unequivocally that QCS did good quality 

workmanship work, as required by its contracts. Sahakian 
17

stated, “On numerous occasions units were damaged by QCS, 

who refused to fix things at their expense.” However, if there 

was any damage caused by QCS during the repairs, QCS 

repaired all damages at its cost and each owner signed a form 

upon completion of the work stating that all of the required 

repairs had been completed. Sahakian also stated, “Due to poor 

planning, management, and cost overruns, the 2013 assessment 

was insufficient to pay for the entire piping project.” However, 

the project was completed on schedule and within budget. 

Sahakian has been informed on multiple occasions by DeSautell, 

other members of the former board, and individuals at QCS that 

the statements he has made regarding QCS are not true, yet 

Sahakian has continued to make the statements and spread 

misinformation around the community.

c. Declaration of Brad Chisler

The declaration submitted by Brad Chisler stated as 

follows: Chisler has owned a condominium unit at CPV since 

2014. He has been a project manager supervisor for the 

Community Development Commission in Los Angeles County 

since 2008 and is familiar with construction relating to large 

complexes and buildings. He has personal knowledge of the 

matters set forth in the declaration.

Chisler served on the contracts committee for the HOA 

from 2014 to 2017. Chisler’s tasks on the contracts committee 

included helping to oversee maintenance and repair work at CPV, 

with the largest responsibility being to help manage large 

construction projects that were undertaken with funds from a 

special assessment of the homeowners from 2013. Chisler would 

generally meet bi-monthly with Jerry Acker (the HOA’s 

construction consultant), Scott Long (the on-site property 
18

manager), and Rick Landi and/or other individuals from QCS. 

These meetings would go over QCS’s scope of work, review QCS’s

completed work, review estimates and billings, and discuss any 

concerns or complaints related to the ongoing construction

projects at the property.

Chisler has personally witnessed Sahakian tell 

homeowners, in person and in writing, that QCS does not have a 

contractor’s license, does not carry workmen’s compensation 

insurance, and performed work for the HOA without a contract 

and without bidding. Sahakian has on several occasions posted 

notices containing these statements on doors within the complex 

and has sent emails with the statements to owners.

Sahakian sent an email to Chisler and other unit owners 

(attached as an exhibit to the declaration) stating that an 

investigation of the HOA finances had been completed and that it 

“concluded that about $1.2 million of HOA funds was spent by 

previous boards over a period of three years, without contract and 

often with no bidding, exclusively on [QCS].” It also stated that 

“[f]urther investigations on the legal front determined potentially 

serious issues with licensing and overcharging by QCS.” A 

subsequent email from Sahakian to unit owners (also attached as 

an exhibit to the declaration) again states that the “audit” found 

that QCS was awarded work without contracts and without 

bidding. Sahakian’s statements have resulted in the termination 

of QCS’s work for the HOA at CPV.

3. QCS Has Sufficiently Shown a Probability of 

Prevailing

On this record, QCS has shown a probability of success 

sufficient to defeat Sahakian’s claim that the suit lacks even 

minimal merit. QCS has submitted competent evidence (which 
19

we must take as true in this setting) to demonstrate (a)

publication of oral and written statements about QCS by 

Sahakian (which he does not dispute), (b) the falsity of those 

statements, (c) the defamatory character of those statements, 

(d) the absence of any applicable privilege, and (e) the injury to 

QCS therefrom.

QCS has sufficiently demonstrated both libel per se and 

slander per se. For example, Sahakian’s assertions that QCS has 

worked without a valid contractor’s license constitute accusation 

of criminal conduct, as it would be a misdemeanor for QCS to do 

so.4 Similarly, failure to carry workers’ compensation insurance, 

as asserted by Sahakian, is also a misdemeanor.5 QCS has also 

submitted evidence of other false assertions published by 

Sahakian concerning QCS and its work for CPV that would tend

4 Business and Professions Code section 7028, subdivision

(a)(1), states in pertinent part: “(a) Unless exempted from this 

chapter, it is a misdemeanor for a person to engage in the 

business of, or act in the capacity of, a contractor within this 

state under either of the following conditions: [¶] (1) The person 

is not licensed in accordance with this chapter.”

5 Labor Code section 3700.5, subdivision (a), provides: “The 

failure to secure the payment of compensation as required by this 

article by one who knew, or because of his or her knowledge or 

experience should be reasonably expected to have known, of the 

obligation to secure the payment of compensation, is a 

misdemeanor punishable by imprisonment in the county jail for 

up to one year, or by a fine of up to double the amount of 

premium, as determined by the court, that would otherwise have 

been due to secure the payment of compensation during the time 

compensation was not secured, but not less than ten thousand 

dollars ($10,000), or by both that imprisonment and fine.”
20

to injure it in its business within the meaning of Civil Code 

sections 45 and 46.

Thus, QCS has met its burden of showing its defamation 

claims have “ ‘minimal merit’ sufficient to defeat an anti-SLAPP 

motion.” (Monster Energy Co. v. Schechter, supra, 7 Cal.5th at 

p. 796, quoting Oasis West Realty, LLC v. Goldman, supra, 51 

Cal.4th at p. 825.) “Only a cause of action that satisfies both

prongs of the anti-SLAPP statute—i.e., that arises from protected 

speech or petitioning and lacks even minimal merit—is a SLAPP, 

subject to being stricken under the statute.” (Navellier v. Sletten, 

supra, 29 Cal.4th at p. 89.)

We emphasize that our conclusion as to the satisfaction of 

prong 2 for purposes of this motion does not imply any view as to 

QCS’s ultimate ability to prove its claims in this action.6

6 Section 425.16, subdivision (b)(3), provides: “If the court 

determines that the plaintiff has established a probability that he 

or she will prevail on the claim, neither that determination nor 

the fact of that determination shall be admissible in evidence at 

any later stage of the case, or in any subsequent action, and no 

burden of proof or degree of proof otherwise applicable shall be 

affected by that determination in any later stage of the case or in 

any subsequent proceeding.”
21

DISPOSITION

The trial court’s denial of the anti-SLAPP motion is 

affirmed. QCS shall recover its costs on appeal.

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED

SINANIAN, J.*

We concur:

ROTHSCHILD, P. J.

BENDIX, J.

* Judge of the Los Angeles Superior Court, assigned by the 

Chief Justice pursuant to article VI, section 6 of the California 

Constitution.
APPENDIX

Letter from Sahakian

“Dear neighbor,

“We write to you on behalf of a small group of owners that have 

recently grown concerned about our Cordova complex and the 

operations of our HOA. We greatly value the service of our HOA 

Board members who have volunteered to do an often thankless 

job representing our collective interests. However, several recent 

developments suggest that we have inadvertently entered a mode 

of operation that is not necessarily in the best interest of all the 

owners and the long term health of our HOA. To be specific, we 

point out a short list of issues of concern:

“- In 2012, an $10-15,000 per unit cost was incurred on the 

owners through an assessment to replace all pipes across all 

units. It has become evident since then that the contractual 

terms and subsequent work, done by QCS, were associated with 

several shortcomings and had ended up costing the HOA more 

than originally planned.

“- In a rather short time after this large assessment, there is now 

talk for another $20,000 per unit assessment that lumps 

together a bunch of improvements: some of these may be of 

urgent need, such as proper termite treatment, while others, such 

as replacing all of the plants, seem to have a significant cosmetic 

component, and yet would constitute the bulk of the cost.

“- In recent years, QCS has been almost exclusively contracted 

for all repairs, yet their service has not always been adequate. 

For example, sometimes units have incurred damages during and 

because of these repairs, and these damages have not been 

addressed. Additionally, these repairs are done at a very slow 

pace– often at great inconvenience to owners/tenants and 

sometimes leading to more repairs and cost for the HOA. In 

some cases, the work has even been substandard and/or did not 

address the problem at hand. Some of us have noticed waste in 
2

material and supplies. In one Instance, an owner independently 

obtained bids on the exact same repairs: the estimate QCS gave 

was almost two times costlier than that of two other reputable 

companies, and QCS asked for thrice the time to complete the 

work.

“There are undoubtedly other issues to list, and we hope to collect 

and document them with your help. The purpose of this letter is, 

however, not to criticize but to offer constructive advice to the 

HOA Board on how to proceed in the future. We would like to 

draft a letter to the Board with the help of all owners interested 

in contributing their suggestions. This letter would then be 

signed by the majority of the owners. The goal is to avoid future 

frustration and potential legal challenges by the owners/tenants 

that would invariably end up costing all of us.

“On the back of this page is the first rough draft of the letter, 

compiled by just a few of us. We would like to ask you to review it 

and, if you have any suggestions, to either send them to us 

electronically or make them in person at an upcoming meeting 

(please see the details below).

“The goal is to draft a document that most of us would sign, and 

to present to the Board as a set of recommendations and 

guidelines. The letter can properly document our concerns and 

provide meaningful and concrete suggestions on which the Board 

can act. Given the challenges that the Cordova complex faces in 

the near future, we feel drafting such a comprehensive letter is 

important and to the benefit of all those invested in this complex.

“Thank you for reading this letter, and we look forward to 

hearing from you all.

“Recommendations to the HOA Board on behalf of the owners 

regarding future operations of the HOA (draft):
3

“- Any repair work costing more than $4,000 (the common 

minimum for contract work in the area) should include at least 

two independent bids, as opposed to being accorded to QCS by 

default. The bid details should be made public and available to 

any owner to inspect. In choosing the winning bid, consideration 

should be given not only to the cost, but also to the proposed 

duration of the work. This is intended to minimize inconvenience 

to the owners. To minimize logistical overhead, perhaps it might 

be best for the HOA to work regularly with 3-4 contractors. 

Contracting only QCS for most repair work, while being 

convenient, is not working well anymore. The Board may want to 

also consider one or more on-site and competent handy-people 

invested only in Cordova to address most minor jobs. All repairs 

should be inspected afterwards. If it is found that the job was not 

done properly, the issue should be addressed by the contractor(s).

“- Any major repair contract should include a warranty. 

Contracts should stipulate that any damage to an owner’s 

property caused by construction workers should be repaired by 

the construction company at no additional cost to the HOA.

“- Unless in case of an emergency, the owners cannot be required 

to give keys to their units to a construction company. Access to a 

unit’s common area—unless it is an emergency—should be 

arranged in close coordination with the owners involved; the 

scheduling must not be unreasonably inconvenient to the owners.

“- Future assessments of significant repairs/improvements to our 

complex should be presented as one assessment per one issue, as 

opposed to lumping several projects into one vote item. This will 

allow the owners to target their votes more carefully. A single 

voting ballot may include, when needed, several assessment 

items with separate voting on each item.

“- If an assessment does not receive majority vote, the Board 

should not fall back on raising HOA fees as a means to pay for a 

project that was not supported by a majority of the owners. A 

negative vote has meaning, and is an indication of the will of the 

HOA. A negative vote suggests further discussion is needed, and 

reevaluation of the priorities and details of the project is in order.
4

“- No person or company can be contracted to work on the 

complex if the person or the head of the associated company is a 

relative of any Board member.

“- To increase transparency, the monthly Board meeting minutes, 

along with a monthly detailed record of all bids, construction 

costs, and assessments should be emailed to all owners of 

Cordova.

“This is only a first draft, and we welcome any and all 

recommendations from the owners.

“To provide suggestions/comments:

- Electronically, go to https://[xxx].herokuapp.com.

“You will be asked a username/password to log in. Use . . . for 

username, and . . . for password.

“- In person, please come to the owners’ meeting we are 

organizing on Sunday, July 9th at 2pm, at the Recreation 

room.

“With kind regards,

“Vatche Sahakian and Julie Sushytska, . . . on behalf of a group 

of concerned owners.

“For direct email contact, use . . . .”