Air University

Lance W. Lord, Lt Gen, Commander

Air Command and Staff College

John T. Sheridan, Brig Gen (Sel), Commandant

Richard R. Muller, PhD, Dean

Mung Lun L. Yuen, Capt, Series Editor

Richard R. Muller, PhD, Essay Advisor

Air University (AU) Library/AU Press

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Please send inquiries or comments to:

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The Wright Flyer Papers

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Internet: Munglun.Yuen@maxwell.af.mil
AIR COMMAND AND STAFF COLLEGE

AIR UNIVERSITY

They Too Served

496th Fighter Training Group,

1943–45

DAVID H. KELLEY

Major, USAF

Air Command and Staff College

Wright Flyer Paper No. 13

MAXWELL AIR FORCE BASE, ALABAMA

April 2001
Disclaimer

Opinions, conclusions, and recommendations expressed or implied within are

solely those of the author and do not necessarily represent the views of Air

University, the United States Air Force, the Department of Defense, or any other

US government agency. Cleared for public release: distribution unlimited.

ii

This Wright Flyer Paper and others in the series are available electronically at the Air University Research Web site

http://research.maxwell.af.mil under “Research Papers”

then “Special Collections.”
Foreword

It is my great pleasure to present another of the Wright

Flyer Papers series. In this series, Air Command and Staff

College (ACSC) recognizes and publishes the “best of the

best” student research projects from the prior academic

year. The ACSC research program encourages our students to move beyond the school’s core curriculum in their

own professional development and in “advancing aerospace power.” The series title reflects our desire to perpetuate the pioneering spirit embodied in earlier generations

of airmen. Projects selected for publication combine solid

research, innovative thought, and lucid presentation in

exploring war at the operational level. With this broad perspective, the Wright Flyer Papers engage an eclectic range

of doctrinal, technological, organizational, and operational

questions. Some of these studies provide new solutions to

familiar problems. Others encourage us to leave the familiar behind in pursuing new possibilities. By making these

research studies available in the Wright Flyer Papers,

ACSC hopes to encourage critical examination of the findings and to stimulate further research in these areas.

John T. Sheridan, Brig Gen (Sel)

Commandant

iii
Preface

In 1944 a young man from Nahant, Massachusetts, experienced World War II as an unsung corporal assigned to an

unheralded unit near an obscure English village. Few history books recall his war. But he and his unit personified

a brand of service—seldom newsworthy, often tedious,

always selfless—that underpinned Allied victory. This man

was my father. This research paper is his unit’s story.

I thank the staff of the Air Force Historical Research

Agency, especially Donna Billingsley and Deanna Kendrick,

for their cheerful and patient assistance during my research.

Diana Simpson, Judy Osborne, and the staff of the Air

University Library were universally helpful. Pam

Hollabaugh’s template wizardry and dynamism were wonderful. Thanks to Ron Parker, native of Goxhill, England,

for his heartfelt leadership in successfully preserving

memories of Anglo–American brotherhood in Goxhill before

it was too late.

Dr. Richard R. Muller, dean of Education and Curriculum,

thank you for your guidance and contagious sense of wonder

in events long past. Finally, my appreciation to the anonymous adjutants, clerks, and executive officers who recorded

a glimpse of life in the 496th Fighter Training Group.

v
Abstract

In-theater combat crew replacement centers (CCRC) represented a brief but important stop for aircrews training as

replacements for personnel lost in the European theater

during World War II. The Eighth Air Force’s 496th Fighter

Training Group operated a fighter CCRC at Goxhill, England,

and illustrated the unique challenges and successes of the

CCRC mission. The 496th Fighter Training Group overcame maintenance shortfalls, aircraft shortages, and persistent morale issues to train more than 2,400 fighter

pilots for combat duty in the Lockheed P-38 Lightning and

North American P-51 Mustang.

vii
PART I

Historical Background
Introduction

This Command desires no Flying School graduates without

specialized transition training.

—Message Gen Carl A. “Tooey” Spaatz to

Gen Henry H. “Hap” Arnold, 29 March 1943

The decisive contribution of US Army Air Forces (AAF)

tactical airpower to Allied victory in World War II is well

known. In Europe, Eighth Air Force long-range fighter

escorts permitted strategic bombers to penetrate German

airspace against the Luftwaffe. Eighth Air Force fighter

pilots became saviors for embattled bomber crews courageously flying precision daylight raids on German industrial, power, transportation, and military networks. Eighth

and Ninth Air Forces fighter pilots were equally skillful in

prosecuting interdiction and close air support (CAS) missions against German targets. What did it take to fight

with skill and verve in high-performance fighter aircraft?

Teaching a man to fly was one thing: What specialized

training was required to couple a skilled pilot to a highperformance weapon system and create a man-machine

package of singular lethality?

Purpose

This research paper outlines the historical accounts of

the 496th Fighter Training Group (FTG) from activation in

December 1943 through inactivation in April 1945. The

496th was an Eighth Air Force in-theater combat crew

replacement center (CCRC) in the European theater of

operations (ETO). The primary mission of the 496th was to

train rated pilots in the Lockheed P-38 Lightning and

North American P-51 Mustang for assignment to combat

units in the Eighth and Ninth Air Forces.

Methodology

This research paper uses two principal types of sources.

First, unit- and command-level documents archived at the

Air Force Historical Research Agency (AFHRA) at Maxwell

AFB, Alabama, provided original material. Documentation

3
included monthly unit histories for the 496th and subordinate units as well as miscellaneous correspondence and

memoranda. Monthly reports were available for most of the

496th’s existence and provided a narrative of activities,

challenges, and successes. The daily special order supplied snapshots of the 496th during war—a promotion list

might be followed by an order for the remains of a student

pilot killed in an accident to be “shipped without delay via

rail baggage” to the American Military Cemetery in

Cambridge.1 A comparatively small selection of related

orders and correspondence from superior units was also

available. Most of the original material was classified

Secret or Restricted but was declassified following the war.

This research paper retains British spelling convention

(e.g., theatre, centre, etc.) where it appears in direct quotations. 

Some comments are warranted regarding the primary

sources used. Unit histories, orders, and correspondence

were official documents and, as such, include a professional discretion that may mask genuine events or intentions. The histories appeared to be relatively objective. But

unit histories were, after all, intended to report conditions

up the military chain of command—so bias, gripes, and

soft-pedaling problems all probably occurred to some

extent.

Second, published sources complemented the primary

materials and established background and historical context for the 496th. These sources represented a range of

publication dates from the late 1940s to April 2000;

American, British, and German authorship; and formality

that varied from official government reports to self-published volumes on life in the 496th.

This research paper provides a chronological rendering

of the 496th’s history. It begins by outlining the historical

background underlying unit activation in late 1943 and

introduces the concept of in-theater replacement training

for fighter aircrews. Buildup to peak operations in mid1944 led to geographic dispersion, new missions, and

eventual inactivation in April 1945. Anecdotes and recollections reveal personal elements of life in the 496th. The

paper concludes by summarizing the group’s contributions

to Allied air victory in Europe. 

4 THEY TOO SERVED
The 496th served as the primary dedicated CCRC for P38 and P-51 aircraft in the ETO. It represented a brief but

vital phase in the life of more than 2,400 student pilots

who completed training before joining combat units. While

the group’s precise contributions cannot be calculated, the

recognized prowess of Lightning and Mustang crews in

1944–45 suggested the 496th successfully fulfilled a critical need.

Historical Background

The AAF that activated the 496th in December 1943

possessed a global war-fighting capability far surpassing

that of the Army Air Corps from which it evolved beginning

in the late 1930s. According to the AAF official history, “the

whole story of Air Corps activity in the period 1939–41 may

be conceived as a race against time in a desperate effort to

overtake Axis air forces which had long been on a war

basis.”2 In a series of escalating measures, President

Franklin D. Roosevelt and Congress approved the manpower and material resources the AAF would require to

help counter the Axis threat: it was clear the cost in blood

and treasure would be dear.

The Case for Long-Range Escort

The Eighth Air Force was activated in May 1942 and

quickly became the primary American contribution to the

strategic air war against Nazi Germany. Together with

nighttime area raids by the Royal Air Force (RAF) Bomber

Command, Eighth Air Force high-altitude precision daylight bombing (HAPDB) would constitute the Combined

Bomber Offensive (CBO).

A fundamental flaw in HAPDB doctrine eventually led

the AAF to implement long-range fighter escort.

Unescorted HAPDB grew out of a popular belief that fast,

heavily armed bombers could protect themselves against

the air defenses of an industrial adversary.3 In practice the

costs of unescorted HAPDB proved excessive. The Army Air

Forces in World War II characterized the lack of long-range

escort as the service’s “most glaring pre-war omission.”4

“For a while in late 1942 and early 1943 some Eighth Air

KELLEY 5
Force officers professed to be confident that the American

heavy bombers could fight their way through German

fighter opposition. But their hopes died out as the missions over German soil, begun early in 1943, began to run

into stiff resistance; and as the spring and summer campaigns progressed, it became increasingly evident that

some sort of escort would be required if daylight strategic

bombing were to continue as a successful undertaking.”5

Establishing a viable, long-range fighter-escort capability became paramount. The AAF’s approach involved

increasing the range of existing and projected fighters

using drop tanks that enabled fighters to carry additional

fuel. P-47 Thunderbolt, P-38 Lightning, and P-51 Mustang

fighters were all equipped with drop tanks by March

1944.6 The Mustang would eventually escort the bomber

force beyond Berlin and back, earning widespread recognition as the preeminent fighter of the war. In addition, all

three fighters (especially the former two) served with distinction in ground support roles with both Eighth and

Ninth Air Forces. 

Eighth Air Force—Early Fighter Crew Training

The 496th’s parent organization, the Eighth Air Force,

was formally activated on 5 May 1942 under the command

of Maj Gen Carl A. “Tooey” Spaatz. Army Chief of Staff Gen

George C. Marshall provided Spaatz with clear guidance:

“All air units initially based [in the United Kingdom] were

to be integrated into the Eighth Air Force. The basic role of

AAF fighter units was to be direct support of bomber operations.”7 The AAF’s early fighter aircrew training concept

for the ETO can be summarized as follows: 

• Stateside AAF organizations were responsible for

procuring, classifying, and training pilots who were

commissioned, awarded wings, and assigned to specific aircraft types. 

• Next, operational training units (OTU) in the United

States provided aircraft-specific transition training

plus gunnery, tactics, and procedures required for

combat. 

6 THEY TOO SERVED
• Then aircrews were assigned to overseas combat units

for local orientation, more specific unit training, and

line duty.

However, this process was designed for whole units destined to train and deploy together. Attrition would cost aircraft and crews. Large numbers of replacement crews

would be required, and senior leaders knew it.

Combat Crew Replacement Center

The seed concept for the in-theater CCRC appeared in

Brig Gen Ira C. Eaker’s May 1942 plan for deploying the

Eighth Air Force to the United Kingdom. Eaker stated that

“in order to supply replacement combat crews it is necessary to set up O.T.U.’s one per wing, in this theatre. The

plan calls for taking the combat crew graduate . . . from

our standard schools in the U.S., sending him to this theatre and placing him immediately in an O.T.U. Here he will

be given transitional training so that he can fit into a combat squadron with the minimum number of freshman missions.”8

The AAF established a stateside replacement training

unit (RTU) system in parallel with stateside OTUs to help

prepare individual aircrews to replace combat losses. A

postwar US Air Force (USAF) study explained that “early in

the war OTU was the more important of the two types of

operational training; as more and more units moved overseas, RTU became progressively of greater consequence.

By early 1944, OTU was almost at an end.”9 But combat

units still had to bridge the gap between stateside training

and each replacement crew’s readiness for its first combat

mission. General Eaker’s idea of an OTU attached to every

fighter group became impractical as attrition rose. “The

overseas air forces,” according to the USAF study, “were

anxious to reduce this burdensome amount of training to

a minimum so that they might concentrate more exclusively on the performance of their mission as combat air

forces.”10 The Eighth Air Force eventually consolidated the

replacement training function into dedicated training

groups called CCRCs. 

KELLEY 7
The CCRC concept relied on seasoned combat veterans

to instruct replacement pilots in aerial warfare.11 CCRC

organization and functions ran parallel to combat groups,

and CCRCs were established separately for fighter and

bomber aircraft. A commanding officer (colonel) exercised

command over his station, “troops occupied in the service

and supply of the station, those occupied in station complement and airdrome defense functions and those

involved in the training function itself.”12 A full-strength

fighter CCRC with two flying training squadrons was

designed to have a permanent complement of at least 75

officers and 280 enlisted men, plus assigned students.13

Since the P-38 and P-51 were single-place aircraft, the

terms combat crew, student, and pilot were synonymous in

the 496th.

By late 1943 the European air war was consuming men

and materials at a frightening rate. The Eighth Air Force

positioned itself to consolidate operational training for

replacement aircrews: the time for the 496th had arrived.

Notes

1. Headquarters Combat Crew Replacement Center (CCRC) No. 8,

Special Order 125, 9 May 1944.

2. Wesley Frank Craven and James Lea Cate, eds., The Army Air

Forces in World War II, vol. 1, Plans and Early Operations, January 1939

to August 1942 (1949; new imprint, Washington, D.C.: Office of Air Force

History, 1983), 106.

3. Alan Stephens, ed., The War in the Air 1914–1994 (Royal Australian

Air Force Fairbairn, Australia: Air Power Studies Centre, 1994), 59.

British Prime Minister Stanley Baldwin created the catchphrase underlying this belief in 1932. “I think it well . . . for the man in the street to realize,” Baldwin warned, “that there is no power on earth that can protect

him from bombing, whatever people may tell him. The bomber will always

get through.” American strategic air doctrine developed at the Air Corps

Tactical School (ACTS) during the interwar years embraced this maxim

and led to the HAPDB concept.

4. Wesley Frank Craven and James Lea Cate, eds., The Army Air

Forces in World War II, vol. 6, Men and Planes (1949; new imprint,

Washington, D.C.: Office of Air Force History, 1983), xiv.

5. Wesley Frank Craven and James Lea Cate, eds., The Army Air

Forces in World War II, vol. 2, Europe: Torch to Pointblank, August 1942 to

December 1943 (1949; new imprint, Washington, D.C.: Office of Air Force

History, 1983), 679–80.

6. Ibid., 680, 705.

7. Craven and Cate, vol. 1, 589, 590.

8. Brig Gen Ira C. Eaker, chief, American Observer Group, Plan for

Bomber Command and Constituent Units to Arrive in the UK, staff study,

8 THEY TOO SERVED
1942, 10. Combat crew training represented a small portion of the work

ahead. The Army Air Forces in World War II (Craven and Cate, eds., vol. 1,

618) underscored the magnitude of the task confronting Eaker this way:

“The establishment of another great air force in a country smaller than

the state of Alabama (virtually all of the Eighth would be stationed in

England proper), and one that was already crowded with airdromes and

teeming with air traffic, would require all of the administrative skill, experience, and patience with which both the RAF and the AAF were

endowed.”

9. Combat Crew and Unit Training in the AAF 1939–1945, Army Air

Forces Historical Study 61 (Washington, D.C.: Air Historical Office,

August 1949), 114.

10. Ibid., 60.

11. Roger A. Freeman, The Mighty Eighth: A History of the Units, Men,

and Machines of the US 8th Air Force (New York: Orion, 1989), 106. Brig

Gen Edmund W. Hill, commanding general of Eighth Air Force Composite

Command, emphasized this point in an early CCRC staffing plan: “It is

strongly recommended that a minimum of 50% of the air crew instructor

personnel be provided by the selection of outstanding officers and

enlisted men with recent operational experience. The R.A.F. experience in

this same regard has amply proven the justification for such an initial

sacrifice of the use of operationally qualified personnel in order that the

indoctrination of new air crews may be complete. These instructor personnel could later be returned to operations by rotation.”

12. Col Stewart W. Towle, chief of staff, Eighth Fighter Command, to

commanding general, Eighth Air Force, letter, subject: Activation of New

Units, 21 May 1943.

13. Ibid.

KELLEY 9
PART II

496th Fighter Training

Group Story
Activation—1943

A new batch of Yanks had turned up at Goxhill (rumoured to

have crossed in the Queen Mary). They seem smarter and

friendlier than the last lot. 

—British diary entry

The story of the 496th in 1943 is brief. The group was

activated in Northern Ireland and almost immediately

transferred to England closer to combat units that would

need replacement pilots. The village of Goxhill became

home, and Goxhill remains the principal site with which

the group is associated.

The 496th FTG was activated on 11 December 1943 at

AAF station F-237, County Down, Northern Ireland, under

Eighth Air Force Composite Command.1 The AAF used

numerical designators (Field - #) instead of airfield names

for security: airfield names were typically associated with

neighboring towns and enabled the enemy to match AAF

units with their exact locations. Eighth Composite

Command had been established in August 1942 to provide

operational training.2 As the war progressed, training

responsibilities shifted between Composite Command and

Fighter Command based on bureaucratic prerogatives and

resources. An initial report noted that the 496th’s “early

history in Ireland was practically nil; manned only with

sufficient personnel to constitute an activated organization;

it had no function.”3 Within the month the 496th would

acquire dedicated manpower and a more permanent home.

On 27 December 1943 the 496th was administratively

transferred without personnel to Eighth Fighter Command

and assigned to AAF Station F-345 to operate CCRC No.

8.4 F-345 was Goxhill airfield, located in Lincolnshire

County, England, approximately eight miles south of the

city of Hull and the Humber River. Figure 1 depicts the

locations of Goxhill plus Halesworth (where the group later

transferred) and Atcham (home of a sister training group).

Col Harold W. McGee, F-345 station commander,

assumed command of the 496th. Support units already on

station but previously attached to the 67th Fighter Wing

(FW) were consolidated into the new group, and Colonel

13
McGee began CCRC preparations. He had no time to

waste: classes were scheduled to begin on 3 January 1944.

The 496th’s new home represented a typical station for

Eighth Air Force units. Construction of the Goxhill airfield

began in October 1940, and the site opened as an RAF No.

1 Group (Bomber Command) base on 26 June 1941.5 A

succession of RAF units used the airfield until Eighth Air

Force was granted control in August 1942.6 Six separate

Eighth Air Force fighter groups then passed through

Goxhill as an interim station before the 496th was

assigned at the end of 1943.7 Two 3,300-foot runways supplemented a primary 4,800-foot runway—all built on a flat

agricultural plane a few miles from the village of Goxhill.8

Brick buildings housed a control tower and essential operational functions; three large steel hangars shielded maintenance functions; and Nissen huts provided housing,

mess, leisure, and related space. Dispersion of the major

sites provided passive defense against air attack and made

bicycles a virtual requirement for shuttling between sta14 THEY TOO SERVED

GOXHILL

LONDON

ATCHAM HALESWORTH

Figure 1. Key Locations
tion functions.9 Goxhill’s location to the north—away from

scores of Eighth Air Force and RAF bases in East Anglia—

separated student pilots from high-density combat air traffic but allowed them to experience weather and geography

matching what they would later see in operational units.

The 496th was organized according to the standard

CCRC model. Headquarters and the Headquarters Squadron

provided command and administration. Most 496th personnel were assigned to the training squadrons. The 554th

Fighter Training Squadron (FTS) was responsible for P-38

training, operations, and maintenance while the 555th

FTS was responsible for P-51 functions. Other units provided support functions (ordnance, quartermaster, etc.).

The 2d and 3d Target and Tow Gunnery Flights provided

ground-based and aerial gunnery services.10

Potential group strength (total 686) by spring 1944 was

129 officers, 11 warrant officers, and 546 enlisted men

based on a planned maximum of 250 student replacement

pilots.11 Personnel immediately began arriving from units

in the United Kingdom, Iceland, and the United States. The

new year promised rapid expansion and hard work in the

months ahead.

Evolution and Operations—1944

The bulk of the 496th’s operations was compressed into

a single eventful year. In 1944 Allied momentum meant

good news began to outweigh bad, and the D-day invasion

on 6 June established a foothold on Nazi soil. Allied air

muscle became increasingly dominant. By year’s end the

Allies—despite setbacks such as the Battle of the Bulge

and the appearance of German jet aircraft—were clearly on

the road to victory in Europe.

Capabilities and Challenges

Because Goxhill had previously served as a transient

base for fighter units, the 496th was able to benefit from

selected personnel who remained on station and were

assigned to the new group. Colonel McGee had served as

station commander for approximately six months before

the 496th was assigned to Goxhill. The 84th Service

KELLEY 15
Squadron was redesignated the 332d Service Squadron

and assisted the new 554th and 555th FTSs with maintenance tasks including furnishing tools and equipment.

More important, the 332d continued to operate the Station

Air Corps Supply, “greatly facilitating the obtaining of necessary Air Corps supplies.”12 Further continuity was provided by the 79th Service Group, redesignated the 333d

Service Group and used for station headquarters functions. The 13th Station Complement Squadron remained

in place and supplied experienced personnel for the headquarters, operations, communications, and Link trainer

sections. Quartermaster, signal, military police, and ordnance companies all remained in place and continued to

perform their assigned duties. A group history explained

that “in addition to . . . functions these organizations continued to operate the station messes, clubs, motor pool

and other activities until the progress in organization of

the group permitted it to assume its share of these activities.”13 Administrative and support functions thus started

with a strong foundation. Major challenges stemmed from

the fact that previous station operations centered around

the Republic P-47 Thunderbolt, while the 496th was

tasked with P-38 and P-51 training. Gaining proficiency

and experience with these aircraft was the group’s biggest

challenge.

The first major obstacle of the 496th in January 1944

was a shortage of trained personnel, particularly in the

maintenance areas. The new-year effort was to consolidate

Eighth Air Force fighter training according to aircraft type.

A sister group, the 495th FTG, had been established and

assigned to AAF station F-342 at Atcham, Shropshire

County, on 25 December 1943.14 Previous Atcham units

had experience with the P-38, and the new 495th was

assigned P-47 CCRC duties. The two groups traded P-47

mechanics for P-38 mechanics to boost their expertise in

both groups.15 In addition, “during these formulative

stages constant officer meetings were held to discuss general problems and several officers visited Station F-342 . . .

to learn from its experiences.”16 In the maintenance sections, “a strenuous on the job training program and experience gained during long days of work” also helped.17

16 THEY TOO SERVED
Colonel McGee was not able to report satisfactory ground

crew proficiency until May 1944. 

The second major challenge for the 496th was a shortage of capable training aircraft. The group depended on

senior headquarters for relief in this area since aircraft

were allocated at the group level. The 496th gained gradually used aircraft from combat groups and other training

units. Unfortunately, most of these were “war-weary”

planes with high hours and commensurate maintenance

requirements.18 By April the 496th had more than 50 aircraft that were sufficient to execute its assigned training

mission without undue measures.19

Training for Eighth and Ninth Air Forces

Once operational, the 496th supplied replacement crews

to both the Eighth and Ninth Air Forces. Headquarters

Ninth Air Force had been moved to England in July 1943

“to lead the U.S. tactical air force intended to support the

cross-channel invasion,” primarily with CAS and interdiction.20 In practice the division of responsibilities between

the two air forces blurred over time, and their missions

became increasingly complementary.21 The P-38 and P-51

were assigned to both air forces. 

In February 1944 General Spaatz, as commanding general of US Strategic Air Forces in Europe, issued a directive assigning CCRC graduates by aircraft type. His basic

policy assigned heavy bomber plus P-38, P-47, and P-51

crews to the Eighth, while medium bomber, cargo, and certain specialized crews went to the Ninth.22 However, the

policy also directed that a portion of P-38, P-47, and P-51

crews be assigned to the Ninth according to the proportion

of Ninth Air Force groups flying these aircraft.23 The exact

proportion remained fluid for the rest of the war, but the

496th had to prepare replacement pilots for assignment to

either air force and a variety of potential missions. The

496th’s 20-day ground training syllabus (dated May 1944)

illustrated this multimission training with instruction in

air tactics, dive bombing, and ground strafing.24 Flying

training was similarly varied. This approach afforded senior commanders flexibility to assign graduate pilots as

needed based on fluid requirements.

KELLEY 17
Mission Execution

The primary mission of the 496th was to prepare pilots

for combat duty in the P-38 or P-51. Replacement pilots

arrived with previous time in type (P-38 or P-51) and completed a ground school course. P-38 replacement pilots

also received flight instruction. Beginning in June 1944, P51 transition pilots were introduced to the Mustang

through ground school plus flying training.25 Replacement

and transition graduates all went on to operational groups

to replace attrition losses. In addition, a small number of

bomber pilots were cross trained in the P-38 or P-51 for

the Bomber Scouting Force.26 Students were almost exclusively first or second lieutenants. 

Training centered around a ground school of classroom

lectures, written examinations, and practical drills (e.g.,

water survival and rescue), plus flying training when applicable. The curriculum evolved from student feedback, aircraft modifications, the instructor cadre, and the availability of advanced training aids.27 According to the USAF Air

Historical Office, “as in all types of air training, the twin

goals of training were individual proficiency and teamwork.”28 The group focused on the skills and temperament

needed to fight effectively and survive in the air, and

assigned combat veterans as instructors.29 One instructor

described the gravity of the enterprise this way. “A belligerent spirit and the desire to kill,” he explained, “must

be imbued in all replacement pilots. Lack of aggressive

spirit and desire to destroy the enemy will result in hesitancy and indecision which are fatal in combat.”30 The

496th’s task was to couple this spirit with the skills and

specialized information pilots required for combat.

Ground School. The replacement pilot ground school

curriculum was baselined at 30 days when the 496th was

established, then shortened to 20 days in mid-March.

Ground school was the same for P-38 and P-51 replacement pilots except for an additional five-hour engineering

block for the P-38 students. The twin-engine P-38 was

more complicated than the single-engine P-51. New training aids including films and additional Link trainers

(ground-based simulators), an enlarged training center,

and refined lectures were credited for allowing the 496th to

18 THEY TOO SERVED
accelerate ground training.31 The 20-day ground curriculum included heavy emphasis on intelligence topics, and

within the intelligence portion aircraft recognition represented the single largest block of instruction. Period photographs of CCRC and combat unit pilot lounges are telling

in this respect: hanging models and posted silhouettes of

Allied, Luftwaffe, and Italian aircraft reinforced combat

crews’ ability to distinguish friend from foe. 

June 1944 featured a series of modifications in the

ground school. The geography portion of the curriculum

was expanded “as a result of constant and almost unanimous requests from the Replacement Pilots.”32 The geography phase taught student pilots key European geographic features for airborne recognition. An eight-hour

block was added to the P-38 curriculum to take advantage

of a newly assigned P-38 mobile training unit (MTU). The

MTU provided a hands-on aircraft systems model for

pilots, mechanics, and technicians. Finally, a special 10-

day transition course was added for P-51 transition pilots

new to the Mustang.

The P-38 MTU proved very successful for the 496th. The

group reported that “the method of presentation and ability of the instructors together with the excellent facilities

available made this an outstanding course from which the

pilots derived considerable benefit and in which they

exhibited a definite interest.”33 The 496th promptly

requested a similar device for P-51 instruction and proficiency, and this new capability arrived in August.

Flying Training. Flying training complemented the

ground school and was designed to expose students to aerial combat tactics, techniques, and procedures in their

particular aircraft type. The training curriculum baselined

in January put little emphasis on flying hours. This policy—coupled with a shortage of aircraft and severe difficulty maintaining aircraft in flying condition—limited early

classes to an average of less than five hours flying time per

student.34 In March the 496th reversed emphasis to make

flying time the top priority for student pilots. By May the

group could report that “the arrival of an increasing number of aircraft and strenuous efforts to improve maintenance and painstaking and accurate scheduling of flying

KELLEY 19
resulted in a gradual rise to an average of ten hours or

more per pilot.”35

The flying syllabus published in May provided a nominal

training profile but allowed for the vagaries of students,

instructors, equipment, and weather. Comments in the

syllabus noted that it was “up to the instructor to increase

or decrease instruction as to the requirements of the individual pilot.”36 Furthermore, policy held that instructors

were not to “place any replacement pilot up for posting

until he is considered satisfactory in all phases of flying.”37

The P-51 transition syllabus began with five introductory

hours then continued with more advanced instruction. P38 and P-51 replacement syllabi were identical except for

an additional two hours of single engine operation time for

the P-38. 

P-38 Lightning. The P-38 was designed in 1937 as a

high-altitude interceptor. Lockheed produced a total of

9,536 Lightnings during 1940–45 for use in escort, photo

reconnaissance, fighter-bomber and night interceptor

roles.38 Typical armament included four .50-caliber

machine guns and one 20-millimeter cannon, plus bombs

when required. German pilots nicknamed the P-38 Der

Gabelschwanz Teufel (the Fork-tailed Devil)39 or Bel (sic)

Ami Zwei-Schwane (roughly, Two-tailed Yank).40

The P-38 was a challenge for new pilots.

Compressibility—a phenomenon which could cause airspeed over certain parts of the aircraft to exceed the speed

of sound during steep dives—could render the aircraft

uncontrollable. Dive brakes installed on later models

beginning in 1944 alleviated this problem, but pilots had

to remain wary of excessive speed.41 One Lightning pilot

recounted the consequences of failing to do so: 

By holding such a steep angle too long I entered compressibility,

that dread condition in a P-38 where the aircraft goes out of control and tucks under in a fateful dive for the earth . . . so I start all

known procedures for getting a P-38 out of compression. I cut and

saw the throttles, I kick alternate rudder; I push and pull on the

stick but to no avail. I’m heading straight vertical. I try the trim tab

and thought I felt a change. Not much but ever so little. I crank

back and forth and she starts coming out. Beads of cold sweat are

popping out of my pores.42

Powerful but complicated engines with turbosuperchargers were especially troublesome in early variants of

20 THEY TOO SERVED
the P-38. In hundreds of instances a P-38 engine lost a

major component such as a connecting rod and frequently

caught fire as a result.43 Asymmetric thrust created by failure of one engine could easily prove fatal for student pilots.

A Luftwaffe pilot explained how German pilots were taught

“to exploit its weaknesses like the blind spot presented by

its odd configuration below and behind its tail, which

allowed us to sneak up on it . . . and its biggest drawback

was that it could be easily identified from long distances.”44

The Lightning’s difficult reputation proved tough to

shake. By mid-April 1944 the 496th had experienced a

dozen P-38 accidents.45 During 19–20 April Eighth Air

Force officials sent Lockheed chief test pilot Tony LeVier to

Goxhill to help develop confidence in the aircraft. Two P-38

replacement pilots had been killed within the previous

week. LeVier recounted,

A most deplorable situation had arisen over the past ten days. They

were losing an enormous number of pilots in transition training

that was going on up there—more than was even conceivable; even

if you didn’t know what you were doing you shouldn’t lose them like

that. I went up there immediately and the things I found out

amazed me.

To begin with the base commander didn’t like P-38s. He admitted

at the bar that night that he was strictly a P-40 man, and we

thought to ourselves it was a fine state of affairs to have the

instructors against the airplane they were teaching people to fly. As

a result, he had the most misinformed group of pilots I have ever

had contact with, and their feelings toward the P-38 weren’t fit to

print. In view of this situation, when I gave them my demonstration

the next day I really poured it on. It included things I normally

wouldn’t do. I went all-out to prove that any young man with average intelligence and courage could fly the P-38 just as well as

myself. These kids were young, twenty or twenty-one years old on

the average, and all they needed was good leaders.

Before I went up I told them the manoevres they were going to see

would prove to them that their mistakes were uncalled for, and

their buddies were killed because they were not trained properly.

When I came down I had never seen such enthusiasm; it was just

as if they had been saved from he--. After that, I think they were all

convinced, even the base commander, that the airplane had real

possibilities and was far from being the killer it was tagged for.46

P-51 Mustang. The P-51 Mustang was designed in

1940 based on improvements developed for the Curtiss P40 Warhawk. The RAF initially used the P-51 for ground

support, but subsequent “cross-breeding” of the P-51 with

KELLEY 21
the powerful Merlin engine created a premier high-altitude

escort and interceptor. During 1941–45, 14,490 P-51s

were produced.47 Armament included six .50-caliber

machine guns, plus rockets or bombs when required. 

Flying the P-51 also required concentration and skill in

a new pilot. “The veterans were such skilled fighter pilots,

they could do anything with the airplane,” explained P-51

ace Robert J. Goebel. “It was easy to lose sight of what a

daunting prospect it was for these newcomers, fresh from

the States, to take the Mustang up for the first time.”48 The

torque produced by the Merlin power plant far exceeded

that of less capable aircraft, so ground handling, takeoffs,

and landings presented a new experience. A 496th veteran

remembered one unfortunate P-51 transition pilot

attempting his first takeoff: “Without taking preliminary

training in a much slower and easier handled AT-6 trainer

plane, he took off in one of our P-51’s. His takeoff was very

erratic and all of us watching at the time, knew he was in

deep trouble. . . . His plane crashed over the River Humber

and he was killed.”49

Fuel management was more involved in the P-51 than in

less advanced aircraft. The Mustang was equipped with a

fuselage tank, two wing tanks, and for long-duration missions, two drop tanks. When the 85-gallon fuselage tank

was half full or more, performance in tight turns suffered

markedly. Pilots had to account for this control effect when

selecting between tanks on long missions.50 The watercooled Merlin engine created another complication for

pilots. The Merlin’s cooling system was highly susceptible

to damage. Historian Roger A. Freeman explained how “a

Mustang pilot flew in dread of that sudden rise in temperature indicating a punctured cooling system and the imminent seizure or disintegration of the engine.”51 Ground

attack missions were particularly hazardous for the P-51

in this regard, and the Mustang was used primarily for

(higher altitude) escort as a result.

Despite limitations the Mustang’s superb performance

enabled it to avoid the Lightning’s troublesome reputation.

Student pilots generally enjoyed the P-51 once they understood its characteristics. One P-51 pilot exclaimed, “flying

the Mustang was like strapping on a Buck Rogers flying

22 THEY TOO SERVED
belt and after flying in it, you didn’t feel like flying anything

else for years.”52

Preparation for Combat. Knowledge of the combat

environment and aircraft proficiency were only part of the

496th’s training package. Determination and youthful

bravado were equally important in the budding fighter

pilot. Don Kocher transitioned to the P-51 with the 496th:

When the instructor was satisfied that you knew the location of

everything, you took the aircraft in the air for an orientation flight,

alone, to learn its flight characteristics. This first flight could be

hair-raising because you can’t be absolutely certain of the outcome

of any manoeuvre until you try it and learn how the aircraft

responds.

Most of our flying at Goxhill was alone practising acrobatics and

just getting to know the aircraft. Flying with the instructor, we

worked on combat formation flying and mock dog-fights.

I did indulge in some low flying around Grimsby and the beach off

Cleethorpes. There is something very exhilarating about seeing the

ground flash past and under the wings of a speeding aircraft very

low. . . . At least that is what it seemed when I was a 20 year old.

The object of some of this low flying over the beach probably was to

impress any of the girls that might be watching. . . . Couldn’t make

many passes in case someone reported the aircraft number. . . .

This buzzing was frowned upon. A lot of this buzzing took place

after two pilots had been practising dog fighting and were heading

back to the landing field.53

Another student pilot illustrated the delicate balance

pilots had to strike between aggressiveness and caution:

Some time during my stay at Goxhill, we received reports and

movies from wing cameras of quite a number of our pilots being too

anxious to get credit for a kill and too often they would follow a

damaged German plane down and forget to pull out until too late,

crashing into the ground behind the enemy plane . . . then we had

to change our training methods. From one of our two Link trainers

. . . we had removed the canopy and mounted a gunsight (removed

from a damaged aircraft) and set up a model German aircraft in the

window area where our young pilots could sight in on them—all the

while keeping their eyes on their altimeter, needless to say that

after these boys were shown a few movies they took more interest

in what they were taught in our modified Link trainer.54

The realism provided by the 496th was one of the final

phases in a pilot’s preparation for combat. Only a small

portion of the 496th, the instructor corps, was directly

engaged with the student pilots. Operating and maintainKELLEY 23
ing the station, classrooms, Link trainers, and aircraft that

formed the foundation for training was another endeavor.

Support and Maintenance. While flying operations

were the most visible portion of the group’s activities, most

of the 496th’s men served in background roles such as

administration, station support, and maintenance.

Gunnery ranges, runways, navigation aids, ground trainers, communications equipment, the fuel depot, lodging,

and mess facilities all required constant attention. Ground

crews in the 554th and 555th FTSs did their best to maintain war-weary aircraft. Crew chiefs and specialists in

areas such as armament, avionics, engines, and

hydraulics performed regular servicing, routine inspections and adjustments, and minor repairs (first and second

echelon maintenance).55 The maintenance challenges

faced by the 496th were nothing new to the Eighth, and a

legacy of maintenance difficulties plagued the 496th

throughout CCRC operations.56 War-weary aircraft—coupled

with aircraft shortages and constant deficiencies in experienced maintenance personnel—led the group to conclude

in August 1944 that “aircraft maintenance has, during the

entire history of CCRC #8 been its most pressing problem.”57

Group and squadron reports consistently cited aircraft

war weariness as a major maintenance factor.58 P-38s and

P-51s assigned to the group were mostly castoffs from

combat units. As aircraft aged they became more susceptible to breakdowns, required time-consuming overhauls,

and became outdated when more advanced models

appeared. Spare parts did not appear to be a serious problem for the group. Aircraft inventory was essentially a

function of two factors: excess combat aircraft available for

CCRC assignment and losses due to accidents. Until

August 1944 the group was hard-pressed to meet flying

requirements with assigned aircraft. In August the 496th

received an influx of P-51s concurrent with the transfer of

P-38 aircraft and P-38 CCRC functions to another base.

Goxhill’s P-51 inventory then stabilized at approximately

60–75 aircraft, with one-half to two-thirds of the inventory

usually mission capable on any given day.59 The third

major maintenance limitation—experienced personnel—

reflected the AAF’s enormous wartime challenge of classifying, training, and assigning the prodigious mechanics

24 THEY TOO SERVED
and technicians needed for a worldwide inventory that

reached 79,908 aircraft in July 1944.60 Aircraft mechanics

completed a 16-week basic course plus, in some cases,

advanced training in a particular subsystem. Other specialties underwent their own training ranging up to six

months or more.61 On-the-job experience under the tutelage of senior personnel was the final training ground. The

496th used extensive on-the-job training, transferees, offstation technical schools operated by Eighth Air Force

Service Command, and MTUs to address shortfalls in

maintenance personnel.62 On-the-job training and transferees proved especially helpful when the group relinquished P-38 responsibilities in August. Most of the P-38

support personnel were retained and cross-trained for P51 responsibilities, and more than 12 inbound transfers

brought additional P-51 experience.63

The satisfaction gained from keeping aircraft in operation had a cost. The group recorded how in one stretch

“the men worked far into the night, after a full day’s work,

to complete maintenance on their aircraft and have it in

commission for the following day’s flying. Men scrambled

over their planes in between flights to remove paint,

grease, gas, etc., and thus allow the next pilot to use the

plane in as good a condition as they possibly could.”64 One

Goxhill ground crew veteran recalled an exciting—if hazardous—aspect of work on the flight line:

The crews had to hand-crank the P-38’s to start them. We wound

up an energizer and on the given signal, the pilot engaged the

starter and kicked the engine off. With one engine running, the

generator output would start the other engine unassisted. With the

pilots using the hand primer in this method we had lots of fires

under the engines of the P-38s and -47’s when they were overprimed. We really sweated out some pilots more than others. About

the time you were ready to unleash the fire extinguisher, the engine

would finally kick off and blow out the fire with propwash.65

There were positive aspects to support duties. For example, an armament officer explained how “the 496th maintained an aerial gunnery range (Holmpton Range) on the

coast of Withernsea. During gunnery practice, four or five

people from the armament section would go to Withernsea

on temporary duty to set up targets and score hits.

Withernsea was a beautiful village, the people were

friendly and gracious, and this was delightful duty.”66

KELLEY 25
Little touches helped. Outstanding effort might gain a unit

a two-day pass, while coffee and donuts from the Red

Cross coffee wagon brightened long hours on the flight line.

The final major factor impacting the 496th’s ability to

execute its training mission was weather. Weather played

a profound part in all United Kingdom flying operations,

and Lincolnshire County was no exception. In October

1944 the group’s historian summarized 10 months of flying operations by noting, “the weather seems to have been

almost unvarying in its unsuitability.”67 Fortunately, the

local hosts were more welcoming.

Wartime in Goxhill

Relations between station personnel and the British

were generally excellent. Mutual respect and common purpose bridged minor cultural gaps. The Eighth had relied

heavily on British experience, assistance, and resources

from the beginning. British contributions in weather, intelligence, communications, air traffic control, and air

defense for Eighth Air Force installations were common;

and Goxhill airfield was no exception.68

Local residents were no strangers to war when the 496th

arrived, as Goxhill native Ron Parker recalled:

After the Munich affair in 1938, a degree of change began to

develop and the military projects were soon making their presence

felt locally. . . . The final year of the decade saw a mammoth change

in the lives of the residents, namely, the fitting of Gas Masks, new

personal identification. A census preparing our village community

to receive an influx of evacuees from the urban districts, mainly

Hull, in the event of hostilities breaking out. . . . By September

1939 people were being told about Black-out precautions and the

impending food rationing system. Instruction in the formation of

air-raid warden units and the familiarisation with the tone and

duration of the air-raid sirens. . . . Sunday, September 3rd brought

the official declaration of war. . . . The short summer nights of June

(1940) saw air-raids on the ports of Hull. During a three-night

operation, we were to witness at close range the destruction of

seven miles of Dockland across the river, by fire and H.E. (high

explosive) bombs, together with large sections of the city. Even the

rural areas like Goxhill didn’t escape and at various times received

random sticks of bombs.69

British troops and the Home Guard—a civil defense outfit—operated searchlight units and light antiaircraft gun

emplacements for air defense of the village.70 Roadblocks

26 THEY TOO SERVED
and several small fortifications with light machine guns

were further reminders of war.

Goxhill—nicknamed Goat Hill by US soldiers—offered a

mix of familiar and new for members of the 496th. The

Brocklesby Hunt and Generous Briton provided a taste of

British pub life.71 The Red Cross in nearby Grimsby was a

favorite destination, where one veteran recalled he “could

get a bed for 50 cents U.S., and food was also available. We

could catch the train after duty hours, spend the night,

and return on an early morning train in time for work. On

these trips it was not unusual to see Buzz Bombs at dusk

and contrails from V-2 rockets at dawn, so we always tried

to get a seat on the east side of the train.”72 The group generously opened social activities to local citizens, and soldiers were encouraged to bring food on the many occasions

when locals invited them for tea or supper. Years of

rationing made the British especially appreciative of treats

such as fresh oranges, Coca-Cola, or a ham. The 496th’s

annual Christmas party offered local children small gifts

and an abundance of sweets.

Recreation and Morale. Routine in the 496th centered

around the training mission and the support functions

required to operate the station and its aircraft. The distinction between officer and enlisted was important in any

AAF flying unit. The officer corps at Goxhill included permanent party plus student pilots who transited through

the station for brief periods (two to four weeks was typical).

Enlisted men outnumbered officers four-to-one, were paid

less, and enjoyed a quality of life below officers but often

far above the local populace. 

Life in the 496th was not all work. Long hours were not

unusual, but recreation activities lessened the burden and

improved morale. In his 1942 report, General Eaker discussed at length his expectations to provide the Eighth as

near as possible with food, living conditions, and activities

similar to American standards.73 By the time the 496th

was activated, the Eighth had a well-established infrastructure to satisfy the basic needs of its men. Unit histories for the 496th and subordinate units paid heavy attention to activities—including movies, a gymnasium, a

library, chapel services—and athletics—including softball,

volleyball, and gardening. An officers’ club served commisKELLEY 27
sioned officers, while the post exchange offered enlisted

men a parlor for beer and soft drinks. The American Red

Cross operated the Aero Club with dances, games, and

various parties for the enlisted men. Local women were frequent guests at station social functions, and a number of

men from the group married British women. Several factors made morale a persistent issue, however.

The nature of the 496th’s mission, limited promotions

for enlisted men, and tedium all made morale suffer.

Training missions lacked the glamour and excitement of

combat. The 496th was ineligible for combat-related citations

and decorations, but comparable duties in fighting units

earned soldiers these rewards and the associated spotlight. A top-heavy enlisted force made promotion opportunities for junior enlisted men rare. Monotonous duties

such as military drill compounded the equation.74

Maintaining morale was a constant challenge for station

leadership. 

Unit history reports discussed morale with candor. An

August 1944 report illustrated how station leadership tried

to assess the intangibles of welfare and morale:

Venereal disease problems still plague the station and a strenuous

effort to halt it has been ineffective. Military courtesy standards fell

through and resulted in a three hour course being given all personnel during the month. Morale is seriously affected by lack of

promotional opportunities due to filled up T.O.’s [Table of

Organization]. The Fighter Training Group which was activated

overseas and assigned number of high ranking enlisted men left

few opportunities to reward capable men resulting in some degree

of dissatisfaction. That factor together with the monotonous role of

a training command are difficult to overcome. The station’s participation in the Eighth Air Force War Bond Drive met with success

with a subscription of 159% of its quota. The purchase of bonds

has effectively reduced the cash available and will minimize some

of the problems arising out of excessive spending by troops.75

Records indicated the 183d Medical Dispensary plotted

venereal disease incidence as a primary indicator of morale

and off-duty discipline. Absent without leave (AWOL) and

various infringements were tracked and reported to

Colonel McGee in a similar fashion. The group conducted

courts-martial for offenses such as petty theft and going

AWOL. The vast majority of discipline problems were minor

infractions reflecting the understandable frustrations of

28 THEY TOO SERVED
young soldiers—mostly conscripts—assigned to low-profile

duties in a support unit.

Anxiety and Confidence—Operation Overlord 

During May and June the Allied invasion of Europe was

the pivotal event for the 496th. In May the group put heavy

emphasis on station defense and force protection, including several major exercises plus daily ground defense

alerts at the end of the month. The exercises covered a

wide range of potential German threats including day or

night bomber raids, airborne assault, sabotage, and poison gas attack.76 By June measures included 24-hour

manning of antiaircraft guns (usually nighttime only), double-strength guard units, firearms assigned to all station

personnel, and tight restrictions on station access. Anxiety

peaked with the invasion on 6 June. According to the

group history, “D day caused a stir of excitement divided

between hope and concern particularly over the weather,

omni-present in the minds of airmen. As the days passed

the alertness against possible counteraction lessened; not

officially but in the minds of the individuals. Many of the

Replacement Pilots anxious to participate in the fray welcomed the orders posting them to groups immediately,

some of whom had not begun training.”77 By late June the

496th reduced defensive measures as threat conditions

returned to a normal level.

P-38 Lightning Operations End—August

The most important event to affect the group in August

was Eighth Composite Command’s decision to consolidate

P-38 CCRC functions in the 495th FTG at AAF station F342, Atcham, on 14 August.78 The 496th’s P-38 aircraft,

type-specific training materials, and P-38 instructor corps

were quickly transferred to Atcham; and the 554th FTS

was assigned training and maintenance responsibilities for

the P-51. This new role meant P-38 ground crews had to

begin crossover training to assume P-51 duties. The move

consolidated P-51 CCRC functions in the 496th and simplified training, operations, and logistics requirements at

Goxhill to a single aircraft type.79

KELLEY 29
Command Realignments

Autumn 1944 began a series of command realignments

affecting the 496th. The first change—announced in midSeptember and effective 1 October—reassigned the 496th

and its sister group (495th FTG) from Composite

Command to Fighter Command. This move was designed

to give Fighter Command greater control over operational

training, but the decision to reestablish OTUs at operational fighter groups several weeks later made the move

moot. The 496th remained under Fighter Command until

early December when it was reassigned to the 2d Bomb

Division, Eighth Bomber Command, and transferred to a

new station. In February 1945 the 2d Bomb Division was

redesignated the 2d Air Division to reflect the attachment

of fighter wings. The 65th FW was attached to the 2d Air

Division, adding an intermediate level of command. By late

February organizational stability was achieved—the 496th

FTG reported to the 65th FW which reported to the 2d Air

Division, Eighth Bomber Command. This chain of command remained in place until the 496th was inactivated in

April.80 The realignments had little effect on 496th FTG

operations since the group’s primary mission was abolished in October 1944. The impact on the 496th was primarily administrative.

CCRC Operations End—October

In October a change in in-theater operational training

policy ended the group’s CCRC mission. Training responsibilities for the 496th and its sister group were terminated

on 26 October.81 The Eighth restored the concept of OTUs

within operational fighter groups. This approach allowed

replacement crews to train with the same group they

would eventually join in combat. The advantages of the intheater OTU outweighed misgivings about the burdens

imposed on combat units. Senior leaders sought a simpler,

more seamless transition for new combat pilots in these

“clobber colleges.” According to Freeman, 

the value of the scheme soon made itself plain . . . in that the

trainees quickly became imbued with the spirit of the group and

were eager to take part in combat flights. Moreover, in obtaining the

necessary final polish to their art they became versed in the opera30 THEY TOO SERVED
tional peculiarities pertaining to their particular group, and were as

up to date on the latest procedures and tactics as the operational

pilots themselves. This, in fact, was the idea behind the scheme, a

smooth transition for the newcomer.82

The end of CCRC responsibilities brought a lull to the

496th.. The group transferred aircraft and training materials to other units but retained most personnel and maintenance equipment. Soldiers were kept occupied with

ground defense exercises, military training, and sports.

Farewell to Goxhill—November–December

In a quick succession of moves, the 496th vacated Goxhill

airfield at the end of 1944. First, on 18 November the 2d

Gunnery and Tow Target Flight was reassigned and moved

by air and truck convoy to AAF station F-373 at Leiston. The

554th FTS was reassigned to the 3d Bomb Division and

transferred to AAF station F-157 at Raydon with the 353d

Fighter Group (a P-51 operational unit) in early December.

The 333d Service Group and 1148th Quartermaster

Company detachments were reassigned to the 1st Bomb

Division but remained on detached service to the 496th

and would accompany the group to its new station.

On 9 December the group received orders for a permanent change of station to AAF station F-365 at Halesworth,

Suffolk County. Located in the village of Holton in East

Anglia, just eight miles from the English Channel,

Halesworth airfield had been hurriedly vacated by the

489th Bombardment Group (Heavy) several weeks earlier.83 The 496th quickly drew up transfer plans, sent an

advance echelon on 10 December to prepare the station,

and completed the move to Halesworth on 15 December.

The group noted, “upon arrival at Station 365 it was found

in a deplorable state due undoubtedly to the hurried

departure to the Zone of Interior by the previous occupants. The station being non-operational, all personnel

were employed in a large scale rehabilitation program and

by 31 December, the station was made livable though a

great deal of work remains.”84

Goxhill airfield was transferred to RAF Fighter

Command on 20 January 1945, used primarily for bomb

KELLEY 31
storage, and eventually inactivated on 14 December

1953.85

Endgame—1945

The 496th began 1945 with a reduced mission at a new

home. A unit history recorded that the group was assigned

“as the coordinator of 2nd Air Division activities of Station

365. They were a unit without a tactical objective. They

were engaged in preparing the Station for whatever purpose it might be asked to accomplish.”86 In its final months

the group provided manpower, maintenance, and support

services for an air-sea rescue squadron and other

Halesworth units. The group also serviced aircraft diverted

to Halesworth by combat damage, malfunction, or weather.

Late Operations

During the first half of January, the 496th continued

station repair and cleanup activities.87 In mid-January the

5th Emergency Rescue Squadron, 1st Gunnery and Tow

Target Flight, and 2d Weather and Relay Flight were

assigned to Halesworth.88 The rescue squadron arrived

with experienced staff and established procedures. This

fact—and the squadron’s unique mission (unrelated to

pilot training)—allowed the squadron to function with a

high degree of autonomy. 

The 5th Emergency Rescue Squadron quickly became

the dominant unit at Halesworth in terms of assigned personnel, aircraft inventory, and operations tempo.89 By 31

January it operated with nine officers and 122 enlisted

men, many of these reassigned from the 555th FTS. The

squadron used three types of aircraft to perform search

and rescue for aircrews forced down over water. War-weary

P-47 Thunderbolts modified to carry smoke markers and

air-drop dinghy packs were used as spotters. Twin-engine

OA-10A Catalina amphibians could land in water to pick

up downed crews. Several B-17G airborne lifeboats were

assigned in March. The B-17s carried a provisioned, seaworthy, rigid lifeboat that could be dropped by parachute

to seaborne aircrews. The rescue squadron remained

extremely active while assigned to Halesworth, flying over

32 THEY TOO SERVED
300 sorties per month and executing scores of successful

rescues.90 One P-47 and two OA-10 Catalinas were lost

during this period.91

The 1st Gunnery and Tow Target Flight numbered

approximately 40 personnel and towed aerial targets for

various fighter groups of the 65th FW. The unit flew a variety of aircraft including the P-47 Thunderbolt, A-35

Vengeance, A-20 Havoc and B-26 Marauder.92 The 2d

Weather and Relay Flight, with more than 90 officers and

men, used modified B-24 bombers as long-range weather

observation platforms.93

Inactivation 

The 496th was inactivated on 26 April 1945, two weeks

before the German surrender. The rescue squadron and

other attached Halesworth units stayed and reported

directly to the 65th FW. Virtually all remaining 496th FTG

personnel were reassigned to the 332d Air Service

Squadron to await the end of European hostilities and

subsequent reassignment or discharge. Halesworth airfield

was transferred to RAF Bomber Command on 5 June 1945

and closed for flying in February 1946.94

Contributions

The 496th FTG made its primary contributions to the

war operating as CCRC No. 8 during January–October

1944. After October 1944 the group was relegated to less

substantive missions unrelated to fighter training.

Trained Combat Crew 

During 10 months of CCRC No. 8 operations, 2,481 student pilots entered training with the 496th. With the number of students assigned in each, there were four categories:

1. P-38 Lightning replacement pilots (ground and flight

training)—718

2. P-51 Mustang replacement pilots (some received

ground training only)—567

KELLEY 33
3. P-51 Mustang transition pilots (new to aircraft;

ground and flight training)—1,179

4. Bomber Scouting Force pilots (ground and flight

training; aircraft not specified)—1795

Category two, P-51 Mustang replacement pilots,

included some pilots who had recently received P-51-type

training in the United States and did not require extensive

additional flying training. These students only attended

ground school with the 496th for theater familiarization.

Category four included Eighth Bomber Command bomber

pilots who cross-trained into fighters to scout weather conditions. 

A total of 2,434—or 98.1 percent—of entering student

pilots successfully graduated.96 A few graduates went to

other units for additional training, but records indicated

that the great majority were posted to operational groups

in the Eighth and Ninth Air Forces.97 Table 1 replicates a

table from group records, and lists descriptive data for

each of the group’s 43 classes.98

Accidents and Losses 

Aircraft accidents were an unfortunate fact of life in the

496th. Seven student pilots were seriously injured, 23

killed, and 53 aircraft were lost in 117 major accidents.99

Table 2 replicates an accident analysis table from group

records.100

Observations

Several observations are notable. The group appeared to

gain efficiencies and effectiveness over time. Condensing

replacement pilot ground school training from 30 to 20

days was one example. Curriculum modifications and the

addition of MTUs suggested CCRC No. 8 constantly refined

its courses. Strong, sustained effort allowed the group to

overcome many shortfalls in aircraft maintenance.

Maintenance improvements and increases in aircraft

inventory contributed to a marked increase in the average

amount of flying training provided students.

34 THEY TOO SERVED
KELLEY 35

Class # Arrival Departure Type # Students # Killed Avg Flt

Time/Student

1 2-Jan 7-Feb P-51 32 2:50

2 2-Jan 19-Jan P-51 7 None

3 29-Jan 24-Feb P-38 82 5:05

4 1-Feb 26-Feb P-51 72 2:03

5 1-Mar 27-Mar P-38 51 6:40

6 15-Mar 15-Apr P-51 9 8:34

7 17-Mar 3-Apr P-51 41 2:55

8 17-Mar 17-Apr P-51 40 6:38

9 24-Mar 22-Apr P-38 29 7:15

10 1-Apr 22-Apr P-38 69 2 4:10

11 8-Apr 1-May P-51 75 8:17

12 13-Apr 8-May P-38 36 6:07

13 20-Apr 15-May P-38 75 1 4:06

14 20-Apr 15-May P-51 16 14:36

15 28-Apr 25-May P-51 56 13:48

16 3-May 23-May P-38 51 3 9:43

17 3-May 23-May P-51 51 11:55

18 18-May 15-Jun New 94 4 15:45

19 18-May 13-Jun P-38 111 2 6:43

20 20-May 13-Jun P-38 34 1 7:00

21 7-Jun 13-Jun P-51 63 None

22 28-May 12-Jul New 83 1 13:42

23 8-Jun 12-Jul New 31 3 13:42

24 13-Jun 14-Jul P-38 106 11:43

25 17-Jun 30-Jun P-51 30 None

26 3-Jul 1-Aug P-38 6 36:41

27 29-Jun 1-Aug New 54 21:25

28 12-Jul 26-Jul P-51 75 None

29 16-Jul 8-Aug New 106 2 14:08

30 16-Jul 8-Aug P-38 50 22:00

31 16-Jul 3-Aug P-51 40 None

32 26-Jul 16-Aug New 80 1 15:25

33 26-Jul 16-Aug P-38 6 21:28

34 6-Aug 4-Sep New 134 1 16:05

35 18-Aug 1-Sep P-51 25 None

36 21-Aug 15-Sep New 71 14:27

37 25-Aug 20-Sep New 67 13:17

38 26-Aug 20-Sep New 14 14:31

39 28-Aug 9-Sep New 8 1 19:18

40 30-Aug 26-Sep New 144 12:42

41 28-Sep 17-Oct New 8 20:11

42 29-Sep 27-Oct New 242 13:17

43 Varied Varied New 7 1 Unknown

Totals 2,481 23 13:46

Table 1

Class Data
Injuries or fatal accidents accounted for all but 18 students who did not complete CCRC training. The extraordinarily high graduation rate suggested CCRC No. 8 was not

intended to sort out pilots unfit for combat; instead, the

CCRC was a “finishing school” for pilots already considered suitable for fighter duty. 

Table 2 indicates 496th FTG students were approximately twice as likely to suffer accidents in the P-38 as the

P-51 (6.2 versus 3.1 accidents/1,000 hours). Significantly

higher P-38 aircraft loss, pilot fatality, and pilot injury

rates suggested P-38 accidents were also more severe. All

36 THEY TOO SERVED

Accident Analysis, AAF Station F-345 January–October 1944

Casualties

Aircraft

Hours

#Accidents

Planes Lost

Pilots Killed

Pilots Injured

Accidents

Planes Lost

Pilots Killed

Pilots Injured

Flight

Landing

Taxiing

Takeoff

Other

Material Failure

Pilot Errors

Other

Rate/1,000 hours Type of Accident Cause

P-51 71 22 10 3 3.1 0.94 0.43 0.13 29 26 14

5

2 0 9.15

13

9.2

4

22.15 13

53.15

29.5

82.65

1 1

19 3 1

15

41

24

53

0.54

0.22

1.75

0.75

4.16

1.7

6.2

3.8

4

7

13

23

31

53

46

117

23,417

7,432

30,849

P-38

Totals

Table 2

Accident Analysis

Source: Headquarters 496th Fighter Training Group, Historical Data, GP-496-HI(F) in USAF

collection, AFHRA, Maxwell AFB, Ala., October 1944.

Source: Headquarters 496th Fighter Training Group, Historical Data, GP-496-HI(F) in USAF

collection, AFHRA, Maxwell AFB, Ala., October 1944.

Legend:

Class #: Sequential number of each incoming class

Arrival, Departure: Self-explanatory

Type: Category of student pilots. Bomber Scouting Force pilots

----were folded into these categories.

P-38 = P-38 replacement 

P-51 = P-51 replacement

New = P-51 transition 

# Students: Number of students entering at class start

# Killed: Student pilots killed in training accidents

Avg Flt Time/Student: Average flying training provided each

----student (hours:minutes)
these figures appeared to buttress the aircraft’s dangerous

reputation among student pilots. More detailed analysis of

CCRC operations, including aircrew training and accidents, provides an opportunity for further research.

The Big Picture

The 496th FTG represented one small segment of a massive AAF training apparatus that produced more than

35,500 fighter pilots in the final two and one-half years of

the war.101 The group’s precise contributions to Allied victory in the air over Europe were difficult to define. The

major problem is a lack of similar units for comparison.

The only other dedicated fighter CCRC in Europe, the

495th FTG, primarily flew the P-47 Thunderbolt.102

The period during which the 496th trained pilots provided an important context for this research paper. By the

time the group began CCRC operations in January 1944,

the desperate days of the early air war had passed. The

Allies steadily gained advantages over the Luftwaffe in

resources, equipment, and training. Graduate replacement

and transition pilots entered a fight that was always

deadly. But the later a new AAF fighter pilot entered combat, the greater his odds of enjoying numerical and tactical superiority over his opponent.

Luftwaffe training during 1944–45 offered a particularly

relevant counterpoint. Historian Alfred Price explained

that by May 1944, “under the severest pressure to produce

replacements to fill the gaps in the ranks of the fighter

force, the German fighter training schools were reaching a

stage close to chaos.”103 In summer 1944 AAF replacement

pilots reported for combat duty with an average of 360

hours total flying time; their German counterparts averaged 100 hours or less.104 This disparity grew in the last

year of the war. “The Luftwaffe,” explained historian W. A.

Jacobs, “was caught in an increasingly vicious circle. As

its less qualified pilots entered the force, they were killed

or injured at increasing rates because they had to fight

fresh pilots who were better trained as well as the veterans

whose experience made them more lethal adversaries with

each passing day.”105 By 1945 German replacement pilots

KELLEY 37
faced tragically long odds. Hans-Ulrich Flade joined his

Luftwaffe fighter unit in February 1945:

Each morning we pilots had breakfast together, and the replacements would come in. The older pilots regarded the young newcomers as though they had only days to live—and with reason, for

the standard of fighter conversion training was now so low that

most of the new pilots flew only two or three missions before they

were shot down. I remember many conversations along these

lines—not exactly a cheerful subject for a young man who had just

joined his first operational unit!106 

Aircrew training was a recognized factor in the success

of AAF fighter forces against the Luftwaffe.107 Senior

Luftwaffe remarks offered perhaps the most meaningful

evaluations of American aircrew skills. Generalleutnant

Adolf Galland directed the Luftwaffe fighter force for

approximately three years during the war.108 In April 1944

Galland wrote that AAF pilots were “exceptionally well

trained” and in another passage recorded, “the standard of

the Americans is extraordinarily high.”109 A different

German commander remarked, “it was primarily the high

quality of their training which enabled American fighter

pilots to execute their unparalleled and difficult . . . missions.”110 The 496th helped earn such acknowledgments

by overcoming maintenance shortfalls, aircraft shortages,

and persistent morale issues to train successfully more

than 2,400 fighter pilots.

The true contributions of the 496th FTG transcend

numbers. The intangibles that distinguished aces from the

defeated did not lend themselves to precise measurement.

The CCRC was responsible for imparting technical and

manual proficiency, a team orientation and fighting spirit.

The 496th represented a small but vital link in the complex

chain of events that turned young men into air warriors.

Notes

1. History, 496th Fighter Training Group (FTG), January–February

1944, 1.

2. Wesley Frank Craven and James Lea Cate, eds., The Army Air

Forces in World War II, vol. 1, Plans and Early Operations, January 1939

to August 1942 (l948–1958; new imprint, Washington, D.C.: Office of Air

Force History, 1983), 616.

3. History, 496th FTG, December 1943 to 1 June 1944, 1; and Roger

A. Freeman, The Mighty Eighth: A History of the Units, Men, and Machines

of the US 8th Air Force (New York: Orion Books, 1970), 237. Freeman

38 THEY TOO SERVED
explained such paper activations were not unusual at the time: “Units of

the USAAF were first constituted—in simple language, a designation for

a unit was put on the books. Activation was to bring a unit into physical

existence by assigning personnel and equipment. However, because of

shortages and the overloading of training facilities, many wartime activations were initially of a token nature with perhaps one officer and one

enlisted man assigned. Sometimes it was purely a ‘paper’ activation, the

order to activate was made but personnel were not assigned for some

weeks. Many Eighth Air Force groups began life in this way and were

often transferred ‘less personnel and equipment’ to another base before

the first batches of men arrived to make it a physical entity. The original

cadres frequently came from old established groups which performed an

amoeba act.”

4. History, 496th FTG, January–February 1944, 1.

5. Roger A. Freeman, Airfields of the Eighth—Then and Now (London:

Battle of Britain Prints International, 1978), 99.

6. Ibid., 99.

7. Freeman, The Mighty Eighth, 238–52. Freeman explained that

“Goxhill . . . served as an interim station for newly arrived fighter units

where personnel could be instructed in operational procedure etc. peculiar to the ETO.” These early groups made infrastructure improvements

that would later benefit the 496th, including an enlisted recreation facility and improvements to the officers’ club and various work areas.

8. Len Dixon and Ronald Parker, eds., Goxhill at War (St. Paul, Minn.:

Phalanx Publishing Co., 1994), 17.

9. Wesley Frank Craven and James Lea Cate, eds., The Army Air

Forces in World War II, vol. 2, Europe—Torch to Pointblank, August 1942 to

December 1943 (l948–1958; new imprint, Washington, D.C.: Office of Air

Force History, 1983), 608.

10. Maj William A. Sherwin, assistant adjutant general, Headquarters

Eighth Fighter Command, to commanding officer, 67th Fighter Wing and

commanding officer, AAF Station F-342, letter, subject: Designation of

C.C.R.C., 26 December 1943.

11. History, 496th FTG, December 1943 to 1 June 1944, 1.

12. Ibid.

13. Ibid.

14. Freeman, The Mighty Eighth, 262. 

15. History, 496th FTG, December 1943 to 1 June 1944, 2.

16. Ibid.

17. Ibid.

18. Craven and Cate, eds., The Army Air Forces in World War II, vol. 6,

Men and Planes (l948–1958; new imprint, Washington, D.C.: Office of Air

Force History, 1983), 394. The editors outlined “the concept of war-weary

aircraft which came into use during the war to describe individual planes

that had outlived their combat usefulness and were retired from combat

service.”

19. History, 496th FTG, December 1943 to 1 June 1944, 2.

20. Richard G. Davis, Carl A. Spaatz and the Air War in Europe

(Washington, D.C.: Center for Air Force History, 1996), 250.

21. Ibid., 316, 317, 360. Davis explained how, between January and

March 1944, fighter commanders in the Eighth adopted an increasingly

aggressive strategy to conduct offensive counterair attacks in the air and,

eventually, on the ground. “By the end of January, the Eighth abandoned

pure close escort, substituting a system based on the doctrine of ‘ultimate

pursuit,’ which allowed U.S. fighters to follow the enemy, wherever he

KELLEY 39
might be, until they destroyed him in the air or on the ground.” In addition, “strategic missions consisted of much more than simply flying the

heavy bombers and escorts to their objectives and returning them.

Punishing the Luftwaffe as well as destroying targets required large-scale

assistance from the Ninth.”

22. Col J. B. Gordon, assistant adjutant general, Headquarters US

Strategic Air Forces in Europe, to commanding general, Eighth Air Force,

and Ninth Air Force, Eighth AFRD, letter, subject: Assignment of

Replacement Combat Crews, 26 February1944.

23. Ibid.

24. Lt Col Joseph F. Hunker, director of training, Training

Memorandum 50-1, 8 May 1944.

25. Combat Crew and Unit Training in the AAF 1939–1945, Army Air

Forces Historical Study 61 (Washington, D.C.: Air Historical Office,

August 1949), 35. The stateside AAF Training Command performed transition training for all fighter types except the P-47 and P-51. Transition

for these aircraft was normally accomplished in-theater.

26. Alfred Price, Battle over the Reich (New York: Scribner, 1973), 177.

Bomber Scouts flew ahead of their bomb groups and relayed weather

information back to their force commanders, who then decided between

striking main or alternate targets.

27. Col H. G. Culton, adjutant general, Headquarters Eighth Air Force,

to commanding general, Eighth Air Force Service Command et al., letter,

subject: Combat Crew Replacement Training Responsibilities, 30 August

1943. Fighter Command had significant influence over the training materials used by Composite Command. In August 1943 Headquarters Eighth

Air Force directed Fighter Command to furnish Composite Command

“such training syllabi and pertinent training literature” necessary for

CCRC fighter training. More pointedly, the Eighth decreed that “training

standards for fighter replacement crews will conform to the wishes of the

Commanding General, VIII Fighter Command.”

28. Combat Crew and Unit Training, 35.

29. Maj Gen Carl Spaatz, commanding general, Eighth Air Force, to

chief of the Army Air Forces, letter, subject: Combat Crew Replacements,

13 July 1942. Eighth Air Force policy recognized the importance of combat experience in CCRC instructors. “In the event that personnel for operating the CCRC stations are not available for dispatch to this theater,”

Spaatz reported, “it will be necessary to reduce the operating strength of

the Eighth Air Force by diverting combat units for the purpose.”

30. Martin Bowman, 8th Air Force at War—Memories and Missions,

England 1942–45 (Sparkford, U.K.: Patrick Stephens, 1994), 99.

31. History, 496th FTG, December 1943 to 1 June 1944, 2.

32. History, 496th FTG, June 1944, 1.

33. History, 496th FTG, July 1944, 1.

34. History, 496th FTG, December 1943 to 1 June 1944, 3.

35. Ibid.

36. Hunker, Memorandum 50-1.

37. Ibid.

38. Craven and Cate, vol. 6, 215.

39. Dixon and Parker, 39.

40. John M. Gray, The 55th Fighter Group versus the Luftwaffe (North

Branch, Minn.: Specialty Press, 1998), 17.

41. John D. Mullins, An Escort of P-38s: The 1st Fighter Group in World

War II (St. Paul, Minn.: Phalanx Publishing Co., 1995), 25.

42. Ibid., 122.

40 THEY TOO SERVED
43. Gray, 27–29.

44. Ibid., 17.

45. History, 496th FTG, October 1944.

46. Dixon and Parker, 41, 42.

47. Martin W. Bowman, The USAAF Handbook 1939–1945

(Mechanicsburg, Pa.: Stackpole Books, 1997), 149.

48. Robert J. Goebel, Mustang Ace: Memoirs of a P-51 Fighter Pilot

(Pacifica, Calif.: Pacifica Press, 1991), 210, 211.

49. Ron Parker, ed., A Village at War: Goxhill (St. Paul, Minn.: Phalanx

Publishing Co., 1996), 125.

50. Goebel, 85. Mustang pilots had to balance the potential control

problem posed by a full fuselage tank against the range benefits of selecting drop tanks for the initial phase of the mission to conserve fuselage

and wing tank fuel. Once drop tanks were released, any remaining fuel in

the drop tanks was lost.

51. Freeman, The Mighty Eighth,188.

52. Gray, 59.

53. Dixon and Parker, 70–72.

54. Parker, 129, 130.

55. Craven and Cate, vol. 6, 388, 389, 630. Depots at other stations

performed periodic overhauls, structural repairs, and other intensive

functions under third and fourth echelon maintenance. AAF Regulation

65-1, 14 August 1942, defined and discussed the echelons of aircraft

maintenance as follows:

1st Echelon: That maintenance performed by the air echelon of the

combat unit. 

2d Echelon: That maintenance performed by the ground echelon of 

the combat unit, air base squadrons, and airways 

detachments.

3d Echelon: That maintenance performed by service groups and

subdepots.

4th Echelon: That maintenance performed by air depot groups and

air depots.

First echelon maintenance will normally consist of servicing airplanes

and airplane equipment, preflight and daily inspections, and minor

repairs, adjustments, and replacements.

Second echelon maintenance will normally consist of servicing airplanes and airplane equipment, performance of the periodic preventative

inspections and such adjustments, repairs, and replacements as may be

accomplished by the use of hand tools and mobile equipment.

Third echelon maintenance embraces repairs and replacements

requiring mobile machinery and other equipment of such weight and bulk

that ground means of transportation is necessary. This echelon includes

field repairs and salvage, removal and replacement of major unit assemblies, fabrication of minor parts and minor repairs.

Fourth echelon maintenance includes all operations necessary to completely restore worn or damaged aircraft to a condition of tactical serviceability and the periodic major overhaul of engines, unit assemblies, accessories, and auxiliary equipment; the fabrication of such parts as may be

required in an emergency or as directed in technical instructions; the

accomplishment of technical compliance changes as directed; replacement, repair, and service checking of auxiliary equipment; and the recovery, reclamation, or repair and return to service of aircraft incapable of

flight.

KELLEY 41
56. Craven and Cate, vol. 1, 633. The official history reported, “no part

of the problem of establishing an American air force in Britain was more

fundamental, or entailed more difficulties, than that of providing adequate supply and maintenance.”

57. History, 496th FTG, August 1944, 1.

58. History, 496th FTG, July 1944, 1. “Greater efficiency could be

attained by the assignment of better conditioned aircraft” typified frequent entries citing the effects of war-weariness.

59. History, 496th FTG, September 1944, 1, 2. 

60. Craven and Cate, vol. 6, 423, 449. A 1941 AAF appeal for recruits

noted “that for every plane in the air from six to twenty-two maintenance

men were required on the ground.”

61. Ibid., 638. For example, radio operator-mechanics took an 18- to

26-week course that enabled them “to operate an aircraft radio station at

a speed of sixteen words a minute [Morse code] and to perform first and

second echelon maintenance of all equipment.”

62. History, 496th FTG, August 1944, 1.

63. Ibid. In August the group also instituted a production line maintenance system for periodic inspections. Operating at night, the inspection section assigned mechanics and technicians to specific subsystems

or inspection phases. Men were allowed to rotate through different stations to retain overall knowledge and reduce monotony. While the relatively small aircraft inventory at Goxhill limited the efficiency of this

approach, the group retained production line inspections for the remainder of CCRC operations. Reports in 1945 did not indicate whether this

practice continued after the CCRC mission terminated.

64. History, 554th Fighter Training Squadron, September 1944, 2.

65. Parker, 94.

66. Dixon and Parker, 97.

67. History, 496th FTG, October 1944, 1.

68. Craven and Cate, vol. 1, 651. Eaker recognized the British for their

cooperation and fellowship in a June 1942 report to Spaatz, concluding,

“We are extremely proud of the relations we have been able to establish

between our British Allies and ourselves, and we are very hopeful that the

present basis can be continued, and that all incoming staff and tactical

commanders will take the same pains we have to nurture and maintain

the excellent relations which now exist.”

69. Dixon and Parker, 11–14.

70. Ibid., 151.

71. Ibid., 16.

72. Ibid., 98. Another Goxhill veteran remembered “the V-1 and V-2

onslaught very well. Quite often the V-1’s would come right over our base

sounding like heavy trucks trying to climb a hill. We would all hope and

pray they would not run out of fuel and fall on us. . . . Sometimes, at

night we could see the lights of the flames across the North Sea when the

V-2’s were launched.”

73. Brig Gen Ira C. Eaker, chief, American Observer Group, Plan for

Bomber Command and Constituent Units to arrive in U.K., staff study,

1942, 13, 14. Eaker’s report to AAF headquarters paid considerable

attention to the needs of Eighth Air Force soldiers destined for the United

Kingdom: “It is earnestly recommended that the following principles be

followed to insure a high morale:

1. In all our decisions and planning in all echelons insist on maintaining the food and shelter of our troops on a level with our normal field

conditions at home. This means that the rations should be on the

42 THEY TOO SERVED
normal American field scale and that housing air space, heating and

comfort be at least equal to our normal field conditions. It is submitted that whereas the British standard is adequate for the British

soldier because it is what he is accustomed to, it will be inadequate

for the American soldier because he is accustomed to another standard.

2. The foregoing recommendations do not mean that I intend to coddle

the U.S. soldier, show him special consideration, or emphasize the

disparity between his standard of living or scale of pay than the

British. It does mean that I recognize the paramount importance of

morale for air combat and maintenance crews and appreciate some

of the more important factors in keeping it high.”

74. Dixon and Parker, 97. An armament officer described an additional factor affecting scores of men: “Many of the 496th personnel had

been stationed in Iceland prior to assignment to Station 345. In fact they

had believed they were returning to the U.S. when they left Iceland.

Understandably, the morale was low for some time after their arrival at

Goxhill.”

75. History, 496th FTG, August 1944, 2.

76. Col Harry W. McGee, commanding officer, AAF Station F-345, to

commanding general, Eighth Air Force Composite Command, letter, subject: Report of Defense Exercise, 31 May 1944.

77. History, 496th FTG, June 1944, 1.

78. History, 496th FTG, August 1944, 1.

79. Freeman, The Mighty Eighth, 190. The move also reflected Eighth

Fighter Command’s transition away from the Lightning: the command

flew its final P-38 fighter sortie on 9 October 1944.

80. Ibid. This series of realignments was intended to link fighters and

bombers more closely in a single command structure. Fighter wings were

now assigned to bombardment divisions. Freeman outlined the rationale

for these changes by explaining how “the 65th, 66th, and 67th Wings,

now under the 2d, 3d, and 1st Divisions respectively, were a further step

to making the divisions an air force within an air force. The chief advantage was a simplified chain of command and easier planning of fighter

support for bomber operations, with each fighter wing supporting its

respective Division. In practice, fighter groups often supported bombers

from other Divisions. . . . The new move gave each division planning

responsibility for its own fighter wing.”

81. History, 496th FTG, October 1944, 1.

82. Freeman, The Mighty Eighth,191.

83. Freeman, Airfields of the Eighth, 111.

84. History, 496th FTG, November–December 1944, 2.

85. Freeman, Airfields of the Eighth, 99.

86. History, 496th FTG, January 1945, 1.

87. Ibid. The group also organized a new Information and Education

Section to provide courses and educational outlets for assigned personnel. These opportunities were increasingly geared toward postwar civilian

work (clerical, business, etc.) as the European war drew to a close.

88. History, Headquarters and Headquarters Squadron, 496th FTG,

January 1945, 1.

89. Headquarters AAF Station-365, Special Order 29, 31 January

1945.

90. History, 5th Emergency Rescue Squadron, April 1945.

91. Freeman, The Mighty Eighth, 263.

92. History, 1st Gunnery and Tow Target Flight, January 1945, 1.

KELLEY 43
93. History, 496th FTG, February 1945.

94. Freeman, Airfields of the Eighth, 111.

95. History, 496th FTG, October 1944.

96. Ibid.

97. Ibid. No breakout of Eighth versus Ninth Air Force assignments

was found during this research.

98. Ibid. Unfortunately, group and higher headquarters records

reviewed in the Air Force Historical Research Agency (AFHRA) did not

include explanatory notes regarding this table. It was unclear, for example, which classes included Bomber Scouting Force pilots and what aircraft they flew. Similarly, group records listed names, dates, and locations of student fatalities but not causes. Lack of explanatory material

limited the opportunity to critically analyze this data.

99. Ibid.

100. Ibid. Group and higher headquarters records reviewed in the

AFHRA did not include explanatory notes regarding this table.

Assignment of Material Failure, Pilot Errors, or Other causes included

decimal fractions. This practice would have allowed the group to attribute a single accident to multiple causes. In each row, the sum of the three

causes exceeded the actual accident count by a small number; no explanation was provided. Lack of explanatory material limited the opportunity

to critically analyze this data.

101. Craven and Cate, vol. 6, 608.

102. History, 495th FTG, January–April 1945. This research found no

summary of 495th FTG class data, pilot graduates, or related data in a

brief review of AFHRA materials and published literature. The official AAF

history (Craven and Cate, eds.) provided a brief discussion of the CCRC

concept but no concrete analysis of CCRC contributions. Other sources

cited in this research were similarly barren.

103. Alfred Price, Battle over the Reich (New York: Scribner, 1973),

132. Deficiencies in the quality and quantity of instructors, suitable

training aircraft, and aviation fuel all plagued German replacement pilot

training late in the war.

104. W. A. Jacobs, “Operation OVERLORD,” in Case Studies in the

Achievement of Air Superiority, ed. Benjamin Franklin Cooling

(Washington, D.C.: Center for Air Force History, 1991), 276. Comparative

estimates in The Army Air Forces in World War II (Craven and Cate, eds.)

and Price’s Battle over the Reich closely agree with Jacobs’s figures.

105. Jacobs, 276. 

106. Price, 133, 173–75. Price offered further illustration by describing replacement training for the Messerschmidt 109G Gustav, a relatively

powerful fighter: “The conversion course on to the ‘Gustav’ amounted to

a mere thirty flying hours on the type, barely sufficient to enable a pilot

to take off and land safely and carry out the simpler manouvres. To fly an

aircraft in combat, especially against a well-equipped foe, a pilot must

know and be able to operate his machine to the very limits of its performance envelope. Putting pilots with such a sketchy training into action

against the Mustangs was to send them to near-certain death; yet this

was what happened to the majority who were now posted straight to the

German operational units.”

107. Alfred Price, The Last Year of the Luftwaffe—May 1944 to May

1945 (Osceola, Wis.: Motorbooks International, 1991), 49. Price’s account

is typical: “The arrival of the American long-range escort fighters in force

over Germany, during the spring of 1944, sealed the fate of the Luftwaffe.

The USAAF quickly established air superiority over the enemy homeland

44 THEY TOO SERVED
and held it for the rest of the war. In a large measure this superiority was

due to better pilot training and, later, superior numbers of fighters in

operation.”

108. Alfred Price, Luftwaffe Handbook 1939–1945 (New York: Scribner,

1977), 99, 100.

109. Stephen L. McFarland and Wesley Phillips Newton, To Command

the Sky: The Battle for Air Superiority over Germany, 1942–1944

(Washington, D.C.: Smithsonian Institution Press, 1991), 235; and

Generalleutnant Adolf Galland, The First and the Last—The Rise and Fall

of the German Fighter Forces, 1938–1945, trans. Mervyn Savill (New York:

Henry Holt and Co., 1954), 250.

110. McFarland and Newton, 79.

KELLEY 45
PART III

Glossary and Bibliography
Glossary

AAF Army Air Forces

ABL airborne lifeboat

ACSC Air Command and Staff College

ACTS Air Corps Tactical School

AFHRA Air Force Historical Research Agency

AU Air University

AWOL absent without leave 

CAS close air support

CBO Combined Bomber Offensive

CCRC Combat Crew Replacement Center

ETO European theater of operations

FTG Fighter Training Group

FTS Fighter Training Squadron

FW Fighter Wing

HAPDB high-altitude precision daylight 

bombing

HE high explosive

Luftwaffe German Air Force

MTU mobile training unit

OTU operational training unit

OVERLORD code name for Allied invasion of 

occupied France

RAF Royal Air Force

RTU replacement training unit

USAF United States Air Force

49
Bibliography

Primary Sources

Blake, Steve. Adorimini (“Up and at ‘Em!”): A History of the

82nd Fighter Group in World War II. Marceline, Mo.:

Walsworth Publishing Co., 1992.

Bowman, Martin W. 8th Air Force at War: Memories and

Missions, England 1942–45. Sparkford, U.K.: Patrick

Stephens, 1994.

––––––. The USAAF Handbook 1939–1945. Mechanicsburg,

Pa.: Stackpole Books, 1997.

Combat Crew and Unit Training in the AAF 1939–1945.

Army Air Forces Historical Study 61, Washington,

D.C.: Air Historical Office, August 1949.

Cooling, Benjamin Franklin, ed. Case Studies in the

Achievement of Air Superiority. Washington, D.C.:

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