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AIR WAR COLLEGE

AIR UNIVERSITY

Operations other than War

Who Says Warriors Don’t Do Windows

Charles W. Hasskamp

Lieutenant Colonel, USAF

Air War College

Maxwell Paper No. 13

MAXWELL AIR FORCE BASE, ALABAMA

March 1998
Disclaimer

This publication was produced in the Department of Defense school environme

the interest of academic freedom and the advancement of national defense re

concepts. The views expressed in this publication are those of the author an

not reflect the official policy or position of the Department of Defense or the U

States government.

This publication has been reviewed by security and policy review authorities a

cleared for public release.

ii
Foreword

This study examines the rise of operations other th

war (OOTW) as a new and prominent tasking for the arm

services of the United States. The author, Lt Col Char

W. Hasskamp, USAF, is an advocate of the OOTW missi

and he argues that the US Special Forces Command is 

excellent instrument for the task.

The author bases his position on these points. First, 

end of the cold war has provided the United States a r

pite from the focused geopolitical strategy and challenge 

“containment.” Unfortunately, without the stability coer

by a bipolar world, the shutters have come off and 

shades have gone up on “windows” that reveal a new wo

disorder. While the world has an increasingly interdepe

ent global economy, the legacies of weapons of mass 

struction, terrorism, drug trafficking, and religious a

ethnic extremism generate increasing threats to that fr

market, democratic ideal the American public espouses 

all countries. Second, the US government’s current 

tional security strategy emphasizes “engagement and 

largement” as they factor into US preventive diploma

The national military strategy emphasizes “flexible and 

lective engagement” which relates to preventive deterren

Both of these strategies emphasize the use of US milit

forces for considerable work other than fighting the 

tion’s wars—that is, for OOTW.

As recent experience shows, there is considerable pr

sure to use the American military as an arbitrator a

peacemaker to the world. This study examines the ar

ments for and against expanding our military’s nontra

tional roles and missions. It concludes that the US arm

forces can do and will continue to be able to perform 

excellent job in operations other than war, as they h

done in the past. The danger is that this endeavor co

jeopardize the readiness of a force structure necessary 

maintain the more traditional war-fighting capabilities. T

study suggests that an actually smaller force and sma

defense budget can still accomplish the primary mission 

fighting the nation’s wars while also undertaking the m

iad of peacetime engagements and conflict preventions 

iii
leaders have ordered. Moreover, the Special Operatio

Command, which has the skill and will to serve well in 

full spectrum of armed conflict, also has the cultural, 

cial, and technical know-how to perform the more comp

chores of nation building and humanitarian operations.

As we wrestle with the ongoing parade of “opportuniti

that continue to present themselves in the new world d

order, we will do well to consider Lieutenant Colo

Hasskamp’s means of doing more with fewer.

TIMOTHY A. KINN

Major General, US

Commandant

Air War College

iv
Operations other than War

Who Says Warriors Don’t Do Windows?

Our planet will be filled with barbarism for a long time to come.

Violence is epidemic in this post-cold-war [era] of raging na -

tional, religious, ethnic, and racial conflict. When vital US inter -

ests are directly threatened, of course we must be prepared to

fight. But in many cases we must accept the sad necessity of

living with tragedies that are beyond our power to control or our

wisdom to cure. What President Kennedy said in 1961 applies

more than ever today: “We must face the fact that the US is

neither omnipotent nor omniscient—that we are only 6% of the

world’s population—that we cannot impose our will upon the

other 94%—that we cannot right every wrong or reverse each

adversity—and that therefore there cannot be an American so -

lution to every world problem.”

—Arthur D. Schlesinger Jr.

The above perspective on what United States foreign po

should be is not much different from the perspective t

many governments have of their responsibilities in their m

limited areas of activity. For example, on a US military

military assistance visit to Chad in 1996, the American c

tingent was attempting to convince the Chad armed for

leadership that they should use their country’s military 

sources to improve Chad’s social, economic, and political s

bility by doing public works and civil affairs. Chad milit

personnel, trained as traditional, elitist warriors, refu

even to talk about such proposals. This frustrated the Am

can contingent and prompted one listener to observe t

“obviously, warriors don’t do windows,” at least in Chad. 1

Should the United States military be this constrain

Can and should they be limited to only fighting and w

ning the nation’s traditional, conventional wars? If 

military is going to be tasked to do operations other th

war (OOTW), what force structure could both be ready 

fight wars (destroy houses) and routinely to resolve c

flicts short of war (clean windows)—to do such chores 

nation building, counterdrug/counterterrorist operatio

arms control, and peace operations?

The purpose of this study is to analyze the implicatio

of the apparent paradigm shift in what our civilian lead

require—and that elements of the citizenry expect—of the 

military instrument of power. With the cold war over, 

1
national security strategy includes the reaffirmation of 

mocracy as a primary objective and the promotion of glo

free market economics to consolidate and strengthen dem

cratic gains. Achieving these ends requires a peaceful proc

for resolving societal conflicts, for generating needed reform

and for making transitions in governments. Since the Uni

States has no “peer competitor” or major military threat 

the short term, nonvital and often humanitarian conce

are consuming larger portions of US military bud-gets a

personnel. This study argues that this new emphasis i

viable and relevant focus for our country and that the m

tary clearly has the duty, competency, and capability 

shoulder these roles and missions.

This study addresses why the US military can do th

chores, despite contrary arguments, and who within 

armed forces is already doing these extraordinary missi

and can continue to do them without compromising ope

tional readiness or fiscal parameters. The OOTW miss

does require a new cooperation and coordination with 

tional and international nonmilitary agencies, organizatio

and coalitions to achieve its objectives. Success or failure 

achieving these objectives is often not easy to determi

Regardless of the opposition, difficulties, and potential lo

term nature of these taskings, both the pains and 

“panes” can be and should be resolved by a greater empha

and expansion of our existing “warrior-diplomat” organ

tion—the Special Operations Forces.

Has the World Changed

Its “Housekeeping” Needs?

The world now taking shape is not only new but new in en -

tirely new ways. Something is happening to the nation-state

itself. Governments, everywhere, irrespective of ideology, ap -

pear inadequate to the new challenges.

—Richard J. Barnet

According to the National Defense University’s Institute 

National Strategic Studies, analysis of the emerging inter

tional system now needs at least three geostrategic persp

tives: from the top down, major powers have changed; amo

states, there are categories determined by success at est
lishing democracy and free-market prosperity; and fr

the bottom up, transnational problems have becom

more important part of the world scene. 2

 In addition, 

overriding characteristics of the world’s environment invo

uncertainties and changes which seem more numerous a

complex than during the cold war. Have the major pow

and their relationships changed? At the end of the cold w

some argued that the United States had become the s

major power. However, the US has not shown a proclivity 

dominate the world to the detriment of those countries t

previously had major status. While some aspects of coope

tion between these powers may have diminished over tim

disagreements remain open to discussion and negotiati

and antagonistic economic and political blocs have not b

consolidated. Clashes among the great powers do not se

likely in the near future.

The cold war’s end also terminated the categorizing 

states based on an industrialized free world, a commun

world, and an underdeveloped third world. Categories 

states in the new world order (or disorder) might now 

more effectively characterized as:

1. market democracies: free, prosperous, and be

joined by newly industrialized countries in East As

parts of Latin America, and Central Europe;

2. transitional states: ex-communist, India, South 

rica, progressing from lower economic baselines, 

creating dilemmas for freedom and prosperity 

semiauthoritarian politics;

3. troubled states: primarily in Africa, falling beh

economically, politically, and ecologically a

plagued with ethnic and/or religious extremism. 3

Still another international characterization would cla

ify states by “tiers.” The “first tier” countries form the c

of developed economies with shared ideologies and mi

conflicts, while the “second tier” is formed of one-ti

“third world” states. This second tier is further subdivid

into those states that are developed economically, but fr

ile in terms of democracy; resource-rich nondemocrac

with little developed infrastructure; partially develop

with some qualitative economic improvement; and devel
ing with some good prospects. Finally, the failed states a

failing states are those where virtual anarchy exists or 

cently existed—countries like Somalia, Haiti, Liberia, 

erra Leone, and Bosnia. Some failing states are activ

becoming “failed states”—Ethiopia, Georgia, Zaire. Ob

ously, some countries have characteristics of more th

one group.4

The “containment” effect of the cold war largely p

vented the window panes of the global structure fr

breaking and showering glass onto states other than 

superpowers. Unfortunately, the two sides often igno

the task of helping to build long-term, self-sustaining e

nomic and political capabilities for the newer nations. P

viding military and economic aid to weak and corrupt 

gimes did little to promote democratic politics, mar

economies, or the institutions to support them. 5

 When 

“shutters” came off, a number of the newer countries w

revealed to be failed nation-states or close to that status

One result is that global security problems have acce

ated and are increasingly concentrated in the old third wo

countries; they can generally be categorized as being po

cal, economic, ethnic, or religious in nature. 6

 This is 

denced, for example, by recent conflicts and turmoil in B

nia, Somalia, Rwanda, Liberia, and Haiti. These confl

generate emotional appeals for humanitarian or peace ope

tions regardless of relevance to fundamental US interests.

A listing of these pains/panes, from US Army Field M

ual 100-5, Operations, gives a more graphic idea of 

nature and extent of the “operations short of war” 

which the United States and other countries are involved

Noncombatant Evacuation Operations Nation Assistance

 (Mogadishu) (Somalia)

Arms Control Security Assistance

Humanitarian Assistance/Disaster Relief Peacekeeping

 (Rwanda) (Bosnia)

Support to Domestic Authorities Counterdrug

 (Hurricane Andrew) (Peru and Bolivia

Counterterrorism Peace Enforcement

 (Achille Lauro) (Haiti and Beirut)

Show of Force Attacks and Raids

 (Kuwait) (Libya)
United Nations peacekeeping operations also provid

global view of some of the windows that the rest of 

world has also thought deserved attention: 7

UNTSO UNIMOGIP UNFICYP

 (Israel) (India-Pakistan) (Cyprus)

UNDOF UNIFIL UNIKOM

 (Golan Heights) (Lebanon) (Iraq-Kuwait)

MINORSO UNOMIG UNOMIL

 (West Sahara) (Georgia) (Liberia)

UNMIH UNAMIR UNMOT

 (Haiti) (Rwanda) (Tajikistan)

UNAVEM UNPROFOR UNPREDEP

 (Angola) (Bosnia) (Macedonia)

UNMIBH UNMOP UNTAES

 (Bosnia) (Croatia) (East Slavonia)

UNEF I UNOC UNTEA

 (Israel-Egypt) (Congo) (West New Guin

UNYOM UNEF II UNIIMOG

 (Yemen) (Sinai) (Iraq-Iran)

UNOSAL UNTAC UNOSOM

 (El Salvador) (Cambodia) (Somalia)

In short, the world has changed. The cold war’s e

showed what disorder lay underneath, and the globali

tion of security challenges has prompted numerous cou

tries to prepare for and conduct nonmilitary operations.

The National Security Strategy

How does the United States government view our cou

try’s role in dealing with the post-cold-war order and dis

der? The Clinton administration’s national security str

egy (NSS) is premised on a belief that the line between 

domestic and foreign policies is disappearing and that 

economy must remain vital to sustain our foreign ini

tives and our global influence.8

 But the strategy also id

tifies dangers that have become threats to our natio

well-being.

Currently, the NSS has three central objectives or co

ponents: enhancing security, bolstering economic prosp

ity, and promoting democracy. The administration s

these as mutually supportive:

Secure nations are more likely to support free trade and maintain

democratic structures. Free market nations with growin

economies and open trade ties are more likely to feel secure and

work toward freedom and democratic states are less likely t

threaten our interests and more likely to cooperate . . . to mee
security threats [and to] promote free trade and sustainabl

development. These goals are supported by ensuring Americ

remains engaged in the world.9

These goals are also supported by “enlarging” the co

munity of secure free-market and democratic nations. B

this enlargement of the tasks is best defined when fac

the threats of the new world order. Moreover, the N

expands the use of various instruments of power, inclu

ing the military, to protect not only the nation’s “vital int

ests” but US interests and values more generally.

Within this context the NSS envisions measures to s

democratic reversals, enhance security with humanitar

assistance, stem disruption from refugee migrations, a

improve infrastructure and economic conditions that 

contributors to instability.10 From this comes the expand

responsibility to keep threats from festering, to deter 

gression, and to foster the peaceful resolution of dangero

conflicts. In the execution of this national strategy, milit

force is recognized as an “indispensable element” of 

nation’s power along with economic and political me

ures.11

The primary focus of US military involvement is on 

hancing US national security. Military forces are a

planned as critical to the success of this strategy. The 

must deploy robust and flexible military forces that c

face four principal dangers:

1. Weapons of mass destruction—nuclear, biologi

chemical.

2. Regional instability—border disputes; ethnic, r

gious, and territorial aggression.

3. Transnational dangers—terrorism, drug trafficki

refugee migration.

4. Dangers to democracy and reform—humanitar

and disaster relief.12

The latter two categories specifically call for speciali

units and capabilities.

Peace operations are clearly identified as a means 

support the national security strategy.13 In peace ope

tions the national strategy envisions certain military ass

supporting the situation before a combat response is 

quired. Airlift, intelligence, and communications will c
tinue to be offered. In meeting the goals of promoting 

mocracy, military forces are also inextricably involved. T

strategy emphasizes that these resources will be used 

deal with torture, tyranny, and repression for ideolog

and moral reasons, as well as pragmatic ones.

The National Military Strategy

The US armed forces, assigned the duty of perform

OOTW, have at least given lip service to that duty by incor

rating these missions into their own national military str

egy (NMS). The strategy is one of flexible and selective 

gagement that accepts the challenge of the “new strate

era” to advance US national interests in peacetime. The 

jectives, components, and tasks are represented in Table 1

Peacetime engagement describes noncombat activi

that US military members engage in daily worldwide. T

Table 1

Achieving National Military Objectives

Promote Stability

through Regional Cooperation

and Constructive Interaction

Thwart Aggression

through Credible Deterrence and

Robust War-fighting Capabilities

Peacetime Engagement Deterrence and Conflict

Prevention

Fight and Win

Military-to-Military

Contacts

Nuclear Deterrence Clear ObjectiveDecisive Force

Nation Assistance Regional Alliances War Power Projection

Security Assistance Crisis Response Fight Combined/Join

Humanitarian Operations Arms Control Win Information War

Counterdrug/terrorism

Peacekeeping

Noncombatant Evacuation

Sanction Enforcement

Peace Enforcement

Counter Weapons of 

Mass Destruction

Two MajorRegional-Conflict Focu

Force Generation

Win the Peace

Source: National Military Strategy [NMS] 1995, cover letter by CJCS Gen John Shalikashvili (Wash

D.C.: GPO, 1995).
programs build stability by increasing mutual trust, fam

arity, communication, training, interoperability, and e

cational exchanges. Nation assistance is designed 

counter lawlessness, subversion, and insurgency. Secu

assistance is intended to reduce the need for a large 

overseas presence. Humanitarian operations offer uniq

capabilities in logistics and security for responding to 

sasters and refugee contingencies. Peacekeeping is 

pressly recognized as “different from traditional milit

operations in the tasks and capabilities they require,” 

for which appropriate doctrine and training continues 

be developed.15 The NMS also envisions vigorous efforts 

the deterrence and conflict prevention fields that inclu

adapting regional alliances by facilitating participation 

nontraditional out-of-area operations where the use 

force or threat of force is interwoven with diplomatic a

economic efforts, often involving both governmental a

nongovernmental organizations (NGO). Finally, the 

tional military strategy has the fundamental objective 

fight and win the nation’s wars. Power projection, joint w

fighting, force generation, and handling two major regio

contingencies are mentioned.16

This national military strategy, or plan, admits that 

world’s issues are more complex, more regional, and m

diverse than before. It also acknowledges that combat

the security dangers requires a high operational tem

with the need for “warriors” to be flexible, ready, and 

pable of responding quickly and decisively. However, 

US armed forces have had to deal with serious bud-get

concerns with no major threat on the horizon. The emp

sis is on smaller, more efficient, integrated Guard-

serve-active duty forces with limited presence overse

Briefings at the Air War College in 1997 showed that 

1992 there was approximately a 25 percent reduction 

military personnel pursuant to Gen Colin Powell’s “b

force”; in 1993 bombers, missiles, and other items w

cut back as strategic arms reductions lowered forces 

percent; in 1994 the “Bottoms-Up Review” forced a 

percent reduction; and in 1997 the Quadrennial Defen

Review, based on a balanced budget initiative, proba

meant further reductions.17
Furthermore, the NMS expects that by 1999 the US m

tary will see:

1. Total active end strength down from 2,130,000 

1,445,000 people;

2. Army divisions decline from 18 to 10;

3. Air Force fighter wings drop from 24 to 13;

4. Navy battle force ships fall from 567 to 346;

5. Marine Corps force structure remain, but reduced 

23,000 personnel;

6. Selected Reserve decline from 1,170,000 to 894,0

and

7. Coast Guard end strength down from 44,000 

36,300.18

These trends are further represented in Table 2 and Ta

3 below.19

Table 2

Budget Trends

Figures compiled by the Pentagon’s comptroller show the downward tren

end strength and spending for each branch of the service between fiscal 1

and fiscal 1997, which began 1 October. Spending figures are adjusted 

inflation to 1997 dollars.

End strengths for each service:

Year Army Navy

Marine

Corps

Navy/

Marines

Air

Force Total

1990 751,000 583,000 197,000 780,000 539,000 2,070,

1997 495,000 407,000 174,000 581,000 381,000 1,457,

Change –256,000 –176,000 –23,000 –199,000 –158,000 –613,

% change –34.1 –30.2 –11.7 –25.5 –29.3 –29.6

Spending for each service (in billions of dollars):

Year Army Navy

Marine

Corps

Navy/

Marines

Air

Force Total

1990 $95.3 - - - - - - 118.7 113.5 327.5

1997 61.2 - - - - - - 75.8 72.3 209.3

Change –34.1 - - - - - - –42.9 –41.2 –118.2

% change –35.8 - - - - - - –36.1 –36.3 – 36.1

Source: Senior Air Force officer, address to Air War College, Maxwell AFB, Ala., 22 January 1997.
With the prospects of doing more with less, the cont

ued high “ops tempo” of certain units, and a concern 

not having a sufficiently trained force for “war fighting,

is small wonder that criticism of the OOTW mission 

heard. The popular refrains of “it’s not my job,” or “I’m h

to fly and to fight,” or “I signed on to fight, not feed,” 

“warriors don’t do windows” are with us. But they do 

reflect the operational future, nor the new world disor

that has produced these challenges.20

Strategy Says: Do the Windows (OOTW)

Constabulary missions are different from fighting and winning

wars . . . more police-like than war-like. They are reactive

more than proactive. . . . The purpose . . . is not to defeat an

enemy, . . . there can be no expectation of winning any more

than we can expect to win a war against crime . . . we can

only hope to reduce violations to a more acceptable level.

These are conditions for which neither our equipment nor our

doctrine have been designed. We design our forces for speed,

stealth, destructiveness, payload, and range. Our doctrine em -

phasizes surprise, initiative, freedom of action, mass, shock,

and the principles of war. These qualities are only occasion -

ally pertinent to constabulary missions.

—Carl H. Builder

Table 3

Defense Spending

Shown is the Clinton administration’s budget proposal for fiscal 1998 and fu

years. Budget authority (spending commitments) for 1998 is $2.8 billion ab

what the administration last year planned for 1998, but $2.1 billion below 

level Congress appropriated for 1997. While budget authority can reflect c

mitments of more than one year, budget outlays are the actual spending 

posed in a given year. Figures are in billions.

FY ’97 FY ’98 FY ’99 FY ’00 FY ’01 FY ’02

Budget

Authority

$250.0 $250.7 $256.3 $262.8 $269.6 $277.5

Outlays $254.3 $247.5 $249.3 $255.2 $256.2

Source: Senior Air Force officer, address to Air War College, Maxwell AFB, Ala., 22 January 1997.
Lt Col Charles Dunlap, US Air Force (USAF), a Natio

War College award-winning essayist and judge advoca

provocatively argues that the “armed forces [should] foc

exclusively on indisputably military duties” and “not 

fuse our energies away from our fundamental responsib

ties for war-fighting.”21 Other concerns mentioned ab

doing OOTW are that it politicizes the military instead 

professionalizing it and undermines civilian control; 

tasks create a disinclination to be “fighters”; and the risk 

casualties is not offset by easily recognizable national 

terests. Dunlap’s points lend support to those argu

against restoration-of-democracy missions as in Haiti, 

manitarian support to Rwanda and Somalia, counterd

operations in Latin America, and a panoply of other pe

operations. Others, like Doug Bandow, oppose intervent

in Central Africa because we “compound foreign traged

by making casualties of our fellow citizens.” 22 He arg

that the crises in the world are the same, only the victi

differ, and

it is not right to expect 18-year-old Americans to be guardians of a

de facto global empire, risking their lives when their own nation’

security is not at stake. . . . Americans like to solve problems, bu

we can’t put dissolving nation-states back together, and th

underlying causes of bitter conflicts that go back centuries will no

disappear with the presence of US soldiers. At worst we’ll find

ourselves taking sides and dying in a civil war like Lebanon. 23

Donald Snow’s graphic perspective of the never-end

new internal war cycle, shown in figure 1, illustrates 

dilemmas. If there is no breaking this cycle, why get on 

carousel?

David Sorenson writes that peacekeeping can hav

drastic impact on the identity of “professional” soldier

The events surrounding operations in Lebanon (1983) a

Somalia (1993) are to him “bitter experiences” that are r

sons for avoiding low intensity conflict (LIC) and peace 

erations in the future.25 Indeed, many US military are 

adequately trained for operations other than war. Sorens

further elaborates:

1. Military duties are secondary to political, econom

and humanitarian concerns, which results in a 

cline of readiness and training.
2. Few feel that assignments in LIC or peace operatio

are career-enhancing, nor are they the best incent

for recruitment and retention.

3. In budgetary declines, war-fighting responsibili

should have emphasis.

4. LIC duty causes morale problems—policing is lo

term boredom.

5. Massive application of force replaced by com

management is costly and inconclusive; the enem

illusive and unidentifiable.

6. The traditional barriers between civilians and m

tary will erode.26

Furthermore, Morris Janowitz states, “The military 

tablishment becomes a constabulary force when it is c

tinuously prepared to act, committed to the minimum u

of force, and seeks viable international relations rat

than victory, because it has incorporated a protective m

tary posture.”27 Charles Moskos argues that rather th

3. Crisis Worsening

 mediation failing

 NGO frustration

1. Crisis Forming

10. Crisis Returning/Reforming

9. Outside Withdrawal

 hand off to UN

 NGOs stay

7. Outside Frustratio

 lack of progress o

 ingratitude if take 

2. NGO, PVO Arrive

 nonstate diplomats

 (nonpartisian)

6. Outside Dilemma

 blame fixing

 reconciliation not wa

5. Outside Intervention

 crisis passes

 order restored

 (but not get better)

4. Crisis Explodes

 media attention

 public horror

 do something

8. Outside Disillusion

 public opinion

 determined to leave

ð ð

Ò

Ò Ú

Ò Ú

Ô

Ú

Ô

Source: Donald M. Snow, “New Internal Wars,” in Uncivil Wars (Boulder, Colo.: Lynne Rienner Pub

1997), 120.

Figure 1. New Internal War Cycle
being concerned only with the efficient achievement of v

tory, the “peacekeeper” is charged with maintaining 

peace even to the detriment of military consideration

These distinctions are set out in Army field manuals. 

100-5, Operations, provides guidance on precondition

responses for combat operations, including violent off

sive action.29 FM 100-23, Peace Operations, gives crite

for peace operations that include restraint, control of c

sent, level of violence, and impartiality. 30

The resistance to the OOTW mission continues desp

US national policy embracing operations other than w

Ever since the United States “won all the battles but l

the war” in Vietnam, many in the US military have take

position that despite the primacy of civilian control, limi

operations still need to meet certain rigorous criteria bef

the military is employed. For example, Defense Secret

Caspar Weinberger, in a classic listing, argued that be

US troops are committed:

1. “Vital” interests must be at stake.

2. The United States must commit in sufficient

numbers to win.

3. Political and military objectives must be clearly

defined.

4. Objectives and forces must be continually reas -

sessed.

5. Support from the American people must be pre -

sent.

6. Force is the means of last resort. 31

As with most controversial decisions, however, the “bott

line” actually may be money. Difficult, complex, long-te

operations require personnel, equipment, and other 

sources that, we have seen, have been in decline. Large p

tions of the US population, represented by Congress, 

typically concerned with domestic issues rather than fore

policy. Without a clear military threat, budgetary restrai

will always have influence on the military’s attitude ab

OOTW, even if there are no other objections. But the probl

is aggravated when forces being kept ready for war have th
funds depleted by unplanned OOTW. When this happens 

military has to ask for reimbursement or special approp

tions. In the meantime, normal readiness, training, and 

erations are suspended, and there is no incentive to eng

in or expand these taskings in the future. The current 

fense secretary, William Cohen, recognized the fu

ing/tasking dilemma: “We are faced with a choice of 

ducing our commitment or reducing our capability. . 

We’re overcommitted and underfunded.”32

Historical Experience

The distinction between warfare and crime is becoming less

clear every day, especially when such lethal materials and

expertise are being smuggled across borders, when organized

crimegroups are involved in smuggling everything from weap -

ons of mass destruction, to drugs, to illegal aliens, and when

terrorists maintain sophisticated international financial networks. . . . In the process of improving our defenses we must

be mindful of our political traditions that separate civilian law

enforcement from the military and limit government’s intrusion

into our lives, but these important sensitivities must not be

allowed to paralyze us.

—Senator Sam Nunn

Despite former senator Nunn’s caveat, it is clear t

the US military has been doing OOTW—“windows”—o

routine basis since its formation. Indeed, if one were 

calculate the amount of time spent “doing wars” vers

the years spent accomplishing the other economic, po

cal, or social objectives that the armed forces have tra

tionally been used for, one could hardly consider su

activities “outside the scope” of military employment. F

ure 2 reflects a number of US military guided operatio

involving civil affairs, protection of US citizens and pr

erty in foreign countries, law enforcement, and huma

tarian and disaster relief.

The complaint that the US military should not do c

stabulary missions is also not supported historica

The American military has been assigned numerous c

stabulary missions in peacetime and in the aftermath 

wars. These include the pacification of our territor

west, the suppression of rebellions in the Philippin

and Nicaragua, other operations during both world wa
and in one major regional contingency—Desert Storm

There may be a need to prioritize because of smaller for

and budgets, but to say these missions are beyond the 

military is a clear error.

Political Experience

In the view of former secretary of defense Les Aspin, “O

erations directed at alleviating human suffering and meet

the needs of victims of social dislocation, economic str

political conflict, or natural disasters can, in some cases, 

the best foreign policy instrument available to the Uni

States.”39 As described above, the national security strat

and the national military strategy state that operations ot

than war are of high national interest, and they are spe

cally designated as military missions. The strategy does 

relegate OOTW to secondary resources, personnel, equ

ment, or logistics. There is no debate that it is the civil

leadership that determines the country’s national intere

that leadership also ultimately determines what the arm

forces will be used for. It is true that our leadership chose 

deemphasize OOTW when the cold-war challenge was m

important. But once that threat changed, more attention co

be and has been paid to these “brushfires.” If a primary goa

to deter war and deal with threats before they become “fo

fires,” OOTW makes sense. It is a logical arena for prevent

diplomacy.

Civil Affairs33 Protection of US Assets34

– Exploration of America’s West, roads, – Stop piracy out of Libya

 telegraphs, forts, and ports – Assist noncombatant

– Governmental authority in southern states evacuation operation/Boxer

 and Alaska Rebellion (China)

– Panama Canal construction

– Oceanic and foreign marine exploration Law Enforcement35

– Mail service – Indian uprisings

– Forest fire watch – Pursuit of Pancho Villa (Mexico

Humanitarian36 Disaster Relief37

– Berlin airlift – Flood relief in Texas, Ethiopia,

– Crop dusting in Los Angeles, Oregon, and Nicaragua

 and the Philippines – Volcano evacuations

 (Congo and Costa Rica)

Figure 2. Historical OOTW
Statutory Basis

Organizationally, the US Army Special Forces were est

lished in the early 1950s to create trained personnel to 

OOTW.40 In 1986 Senators William Cohen (R.-Maine) a

Sam Nunn (D.-Ga.) sponsored legislation that manda

appointment of an assistant to the secretary of defense 

special operations and low intensity conflict, as well as 

creation of a unified command, the US Special Operatio

Command (SOCOM).41 Congress has also specifically ide

fied and legislated that the military can be used for n

combat roles. The United States Code, Title 10, provides 

military with statutory authority for enforcing federal la

aiding civilian law enforcement, and assisting humanit

ian efforts.42

Regulatory Action

Strategy and planning for OOTW has been further insti

tionalized in doctrine and service publications. In particu

Joint Publication 3-07, Joint Doctrine for Operations Ot

than War, recognizes that a wide range of operations 

peacetime to compel compliance (strikes, peace enforceme

counterterrorism, etc.) is necessary to demonstrate US 

solve and capability.43 A detailed description and definition 

each type of activity such as humanitarian assistance, s

port in counterdrug operations, arms control, a

peacekeeping is provided along with examples of each. 44

Moral Basis

The most recent and emotional rationale for intervent

by the US military in peacekeeping and humanitarian 

tions is that it is morally necessary. This justification h

been used despite the lack of clear, direct, or even indir

demonstrations of consequence for US national intere

Nevertheless, as James Holl writes, “There is little myst

regarding where the world’s deadly conflicts are or the ext

of the damage that they bring. The list is sadly familiar 

most informed people.”45 Edward Luttwak argues for in

vention on the grounds that if belligerents see that no p

ticular penalty is to be paid for illegal warfare, then restra

erodes everywhere. He also states that the US “moral ec
omy is damaged if it remains a passive witness to aggr

sions replete with atrocities on a large scale.” 46

Others add a perspective on societal ethics that g

beyond the international exception that allows intervent

in genocide situations. One writes: “In the face of ‘eth

cleansing’ and in the face of other circumstances where 

chance of escalation to global war is significantly m

mized, there may be a higher obligation to intervene.” 47

Capability as a Basis

In late 1996 Gen Dennis Reimer, Army chief of st

noted proudly that “we’ve done the Somalias, the Bosni

the Haitis, the security at the Olympics, and the firefig

ing in western states . . . and they’ve all been done well

In speaking about the future, General Reimer referred 

the Army’s long tradition of doing things other than w

ning the nation’s wars as being the “rapid reaction force 

the global village . . . providing a range of military ope

tions short of war.”49 Nation building, responding to na

ral and man-made disasters, civil disturbances, and c

action projects are all appropriate for a land force wh

has the flexibility to do a range of missions across a cont

uum from peace to war.

When it comes to airlift, logistics, surveillance, a

maintaining air supremacy, there is no better resou

than the US Air Force. Steven Metz suggests that the 

Force would not require any radical changes in force str

ture to be more active in peace support operations. Adju

ment in training and doctrine would be appropriate. 50 T

US Navy is capable of maintaining a forward presen

providing the bulk of logistical support, and affectin

rapid littoral response. In summary, the US armed for

are capable of doing OOTW, and it is a legitimate, codifi

viable mission.

Which Warrior Washes the Windows?

The fact that these [military operations] are “other than war”

implies that they are less important, significant, costly or

deadly. All these assumptions are false.

—Grant T. Hammond
We now know why the military has done and is going 

continue doing operations other than war. But who in 

military can actually accomplish these missions with

sacrificing the “different” readiness demanded for fight

traditional wars? There has been an obvious and incre

ingly pronounced emphasis on identifying “special” peo

to conduct OOTW. President Bush supported improved 

and US peacekeeping efforts to include specifically dev

oped and trained units for unilateral or multinatio

peace operations.51 President Clinton called for a 

peacekeeping headquarters, planning staff, and logis

center.52 The reality is that these operations do comp

with more traditional missions for time, personnel, a

more importantly, budget. Can there still be a comprom

between having forces ready to fight wars while also be

trained and capable of doing OOTW? Boutros Boutr

Ghali, while secretary general of the United Nations, 

quested member countries to “hold ready, at an agr

period of notice, specially trained units for peacekeep

service (emphasis added).”53 Boutros-Ghali’s request p

vides the namesake answer: special operations for

(SOF).

OOTW Specialists in the Profession of Arm

In 1986 Senator Cohen (later to be named secretary 

defense) and Senator Nunn conceived the idea that a p

ticular part of the US military should be chartered to ca

out counterterrorism, special reconnaissance, psycholo

cal operations, and civil affairs. William Boykin states t

“Congress was trying to tell the Executive Branch to lo

beyond the Cold War. More than direct military power 

required to cope with terrorism, insurgency, counterins

gency and other forms of low intensity conflict.” 54 Si

ations in Iran, Grenada, Vietnam, Beirut, and elsewh

drove lawmakers to force the Defense Department 

consider a unified combat command for special ope

tions. Subsequently, Public Law 99-661, The Defe

Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1987, directed the 

mation of the United States Special Operations Co

mand. It created a specific budget for SOF, Major Fo
Program 11, and required that SOF commanders in unif

commands be general officers.55 Public Law 100-

passed in December 1987, and Public Law 100-4

passed in September 1988, established the United Sta

Special Operations Command and authorized the orga

zation’s commander in chief (CINCSOC) to develop a

procure SOF-unique equipment and direct and cont

all funds for units assigned to USSOCOM. 56

SOF Doctrine

Joint Pub 3-05, Doctrine for Joint Special Operatio

and the 1996 posture statement of the US Special Ope

tions Forces also provide definitive and institutionali

authority for SOF assuming the lead and the suppor

role in OOTW.57 The special operations forces are expres

given three purposes in the 1996 defense secretary’s rep

to the president and Congress:

1. Expand range of options for decision makers in 

ses and conflicts below the threshold of war: for 

ample, terrorism, insurgency, sabotage;

2. Act as force multipliers for conventional forces; an

3. Expand capabilities requiring exceptional sensitiv

noncombatant missions, humanitarian and secu

assistance, and peace operations.58

Doctrine is even more specific as to why SOF should 

what CINCSOC calls “warrior diplomats.”

SOF are not bound by any specific environment, a

SOF missions may be conducted across the entire ope

tional continuum.59 Originally, five principal missio

were detailed for special operations forces: unconv

tional warfare, direct action, special reconnaissance, f

eign internal defense, and counterterrorism. Curren

counterproliferation, psychological operations, civil 

fairs, and information warfare have been elevated 

separate principal missions.60 However, joint doctr

also expressly states that the inherent capabilities 

SOF make them suitable for humanitarian actions a

for counterdrug and recovery operations. 61 In additi

the 1996 posture statement includes security assistan

countermine activities, coalition support, and special 
tivities.62 Peacetime military operations are specifica

recognized as a method of providing humanitarian ass

tance or training indigenous personnel to develop a m

tary/paramilitary infrastructure and capability— to rem

the underlying causes of armed conflict or war. 63 Wit

this framework Joint Pub 3-0, Doctrine for Joint Ope

tions, is referenced. For joint tasks it includes such roles 

peace building, peace enforcement, peacekeeping, pea

making, and peace operations.64 Clearly, these activi

are also within the scope of the windows for special ope

tions.

SOF Organizations

USSOCOM’s four component special operations co

mands (SOC) are the Army Special Operations Comma

Air Force Special Operations Command, Naval Spec

Warfare Command, and the Joint Special Operations Co

mand.65 The Army is responsible for active and rese

special forces, rangers, special operations aviation, civil 

fairs, and psychological operations.66 The Air Force is 

sponsible for worldwide deployment of active duty, gua

and reserve SOF that provide airlift, suppress

fires/close air support, search and recovery, psycholog

operations, forward arming and refueling, reconnaissan

weather observations, and communications in remote a

austere locations.67 The Navy provides maritime and riv

ine sea-air-land (SEAL) teams and special boat team

The Joint Command, established in 1980, is a joint he

quarters to study special operations requirements, ens

interoperability/standardization, plan and conduct jo

exercises and training, and develop joint special operat

tactics.69

The SOCs and their resources are organized to be 

geographical or theater commander’s source of expert

in all areas of special operations, with a separate e

ment to plan and control the employment of SOF. S

resources are matched to mission requirements, a

joint special operation task forces are established wh

required. SOF units are also prepared to operate w

combined forces.70
SOF Capabilities and Competencies

The organizational descriptions of units give some id

of their potential capabilities. But to get a real idea of h

these personnel are ideally suited to OOTW tasks, we m

look at the manpower skills and equipment that fulfill d

trinal and organizational responsibilities. A summary 

SOF characteristics includes:

Joint Pub 3-05. – Detailed area or geographical orientation

including mastery of language, customs, and culture.

– Capability to execute all foreseeable operations in the full rang

of the area’s environmental conditions.

– Small units with high levels of personal and professiona

maturity.

– Experience or training usually in more than one principal field

engineering, medicine, public safety, economics, agriculture, an

legal systems.

– The only civil affairs and psychological operations in the Defens

Department (emphasis added).

– Capability to advise, train, and assist indigenous populations o

officials or other US forces in peacetime military operations

hostilities short of war, and war.71

1996 Posture Statement. – Rapid deployability, flexibility

versatility in penetration and strike capabilities; response with

speed, stealth, and precision by land, sea, and air.

– Total Force concept implementation—about 44,000 end strength

for FY 97 with approximately one-third from Reserve and Nationa

Guard units.

– High retention rates for officers and enlisted personnel—high

morale and job satisfaction.

– Training can be institutionalized by service; provided for specifi

mission tasks, or joint with conventional forces of the US or hos

nations.72

The above is nothing less than a blueprint with spec

cations in the OOTW contract that are precisely tailored 

the military “window” experts. Apparently, and more 

portantly, there is every intention of improving these ca

bilities in the future. Joint Vision 2010 is a plan for h

America’s military will channel vitality and innovation 

its people and leverage technological opportunities 

achieve new levels of effectiveness. Four trends are not

increasing precision of weapons and delivery; increas

the menu of weapons from traditional lethality to n

lethality; increasing stealth and invisibility of our forc

and improving information integration from sensors 
shooters.73 This embraces humanitarian and peacekeep

missions and the fact that these are already core com

tencies of special operations forces.

USSOCOM’s vision for the future, SOF 2020, builds 

Joint Vision 2010 and states, “SOF will be regionally 

ented—culturally, linguistically, and politically—while 

maining a rapidly deployable, agile, joint force with ca

bilities ranging from less-than-lethal to precision surg

strikes.”74 SOF will be prepared to respond “asymmetrica

to both traditional and nontraditional forms of conflict

This vision provides core characteristics that correspond 

the above trends, and it makes SOF the “First Force.” T

expectations are that “SOF ‘Warrior Diplomats’ will . 

influence, advise, train, and interact with foreign for

and populations.”76

Individually, the services have also signed up to 

need for dealing with new problems. A Naval Studies Bo

recommended emphazing intelligence and psycholog

operations because of increased Marine Corps involvem

with populations ashore (peacekeeping and nation-bu

ing operations) and Navy involvement with them at 

(boarding ships, assisting refugees, and countering terr

ism). Specifically the report recommended the Mar

Corps be included in the capability to integrate “approp

ate” Army units into their operations. This was becau

Army units already had significant competency in deal

with populations, from psychological operations to est

lishing civil governments and keeping civic order. The co

mittee concluded that “joint” attention to research a

technology must be given for subduing populations 

relatively benign ways [using] less-than-lethal means 

make them immobile or passive.”77

In a National Security Report, the Reserve Officer’s As

ciation notes that by 2001 the National Guard and Rese

will have been reduced another 20 percent from 1996 l

els, but will comprise 3 percent more (35 to 38 percent

the total military force.78 More specifically, the total Ar

will be 50 percent Guard and Reserve personnel wh

provide the following capabilities:

– Army Reserve

– – Will have 100 percent of the forces that provide fresh wate

supply, 95 percent of civil affairs units, 85 percent of medica
brigades, 75 percent of chemical defense battalions, and 70 percen

of heavy combat engineer battalions.

– – Will have combat forces for two major regional conflicts (eigh

divisions, 15 enhanced brigades, three combat units).

– Air Force Reserve

– – Will have 80 percent of the aerial port units, 60 percent o

tactical airlift and air rescue and recovery, and 50 percent of aeria

refueling units.

– Navy Reserve

– – Will have 100 percent of heavy logistics support units, 90

percent of the cargo loading units, and 60 percent of the mobil

construction battalions.79

In March 1996, the reserve officers association repor

that the Army National Guard’s combat forces far exceed

a two-major-regional-conflict requirement and that l

than 10 brigades were necessary for success in war. The

fore, the association recommended that even with the 

duction of forces and budget decline, reserve combat for

could be eliminated, some others converted to peace ope

tions, and the readiness of the reserve and total fo

would not suffer. The point is that these specialty rese

forces could easily and best be employed by integrat

with the active duty joint special operations forces. 80

Finally, what are the actual numbers involved in co

and manpower for “doing windows” with SOF versus so

other demolition employee? Gen Ronald Fogleman belie

OOTWs “don’t affect the readiness of the majority of o

fighting forces.” He stated that of the 391,000 personnel 

active duty in the Air Force, 81,000 were forward-station

in Europe, the Pacific, or Southern Command, but ope

tionally only 10,320 were away from their homes suppo

ing some crisis or contingency. “If you stand back and lo

objectively at that, 10,320 people out of a force of 391,0

is not very many people.”81 In every operation SOF ass

have participated. Further, SOF resources generally con

tute a small portion of the Defense Department’s budg

with fiscal year 1997 funding at $3.06 billion. The Uni

States has a ready, highly capable, and flexible joint s

cial operations force that can do missions spanning 

entire spectrum of conflict, but they do so with only 

percent of the manpower (46,000 personnel) and 1.3 p

cent of the defense budget actually dedicated to SOF 

erations.82 This last statistic is the evidence that SOF p
vides “more bang for the buck” and more efficiency, eff

tiveness, and force multiplication with which to lever

military capabilities.

What’s the Window Washer’s Recent

Past Employment Record?

On paper, at least, we have seen that the US military a

especially SOF should be the obvious and logical choice 

operations other than war. Detractors still abound, howev

and the reality of many past operations short of war is t

they did in fact have problems in their execution and 

fulfillment of objectives. Yet, I believe it was not necessa

the use of the military that was wrong, but the way it w

used; command and control problems created the issu

Individual and tactical capabilities (will and skill) were less 

fault than the lack of clarity or knowledge of the strate

objectives. An assessment of various operations follows.

Vietnam. In hindsight, some may argue that strategic

the Vietnam conflict was a “broken window” that conv

tional forces did not, or could not, fix, given their limitatio

However, studies of how some aspects of the Vietnam W

were prosecuted are significantly positive.83 For example, 

Marine combined action platoon (CAP) program in South 

etnam has been judged as having “worked superbly.” 84 A C

had 35 men: 20 local Vietnamese militia, 14 US marines, a

a Navy corpsman trained in customs, courtesies, cultu

and language. They shared ideas, lived together in Vietna

ese hamlets, and expanded civic action programs. 85 CAP m

rines worked with the US Agency for International Devel

ment, the Cooperative for American Relief Everywh

(CARE), and the Catholic Relief Service.86 Between 1965 

1968, CAPs enhanced cohesion and reliability of South V

namese militia forces and had some tactical successes 

eliminating Vietcong influence.87 Lt Gen Lewis W. Walt, co

mander of the Third Marine Amphibious Force in 1965, 

calls the instructions to those going to Vietnam to “tem

the fight with an understanding of the people, compass

towards them, and the exercise of good works in the mids

war.”88

Somalia. Refugees running for their lives, burdening th

neighbor’s food supply and economics; rampant crime; loot
and blockages of civilian relief efforts drove US intervent

in Somalia in 1992.89 President Bush’s objective was lim

to “opening the supply routes, to get the food moving, and 

prepare the way for a UN peacekeeping force to keep it movi

This operation is not open-ended.”90 Stopping the dying wa

fundamental objective. Ultimately, however, a shift to nat

building and then to taking sides seems to have occur

under the Clinton administration.91 But was the failure 

achieving the “new” objectives due to inappropriate use of m

tary force, or was it more due to using the military for m

risk-oriented roles without anticipating increased casualties

is inconsistent to want to use force and expect to do so r

free. The real test is minimizing losses by using the right 

sets, the right way, at the right time, and for the necess

length of time. Chester Crocker makes the point that at le

Somalia was “left better than we found it.” 92

Bosnia. The jury is still out for the most part on the c

tinuing operation in Bosnia. However, the first ground m

sion (UN Protection Force) attempt at peacekeeping and de

ering food, water, and medical supplies was success

Special operations forces played a key role in initiating c

tact with the parties for civil affairs and humanitarian rel

Fred Hiatt writes, “What was done was far more useful th

doing nothing. . . . Some military missions may be justifie

they improve a situation without curing it.” 93 Unfortunat

the implementation force (IFOR) assumed the mission 

peace enforcement and had to create a secure environm

before nation building, restoration of the economy, electio

refugee resettlement, and arms control could proceed. 

cording to William Johnsen, this operation has been 

benchmark with the one-year deadline forcing the factions 

resolve issues rather than IFOR and other international 

ganizations having to do it all.94 Implementing the milit

provisions of the Dayton accords is proceeding m

smoothly than expected, but the civil elements are n

Johnsen’s conclusion is emphatic as far as this window 

the world is concerned: “Military forces . . . have playe

critical and successful role in halting conflict and bring

stability to the region [and] the basis of a lasting settlem

will depend to a significant degree on the ability of 

outside military force . . . that provide[s] unique capab
ties essential for conduct of the mission (e.g., attack h

copters, intelligence, theater communications, civil affa

and psychological operations).”95 This is clearly an 

dorsement for a well-trained SOF taking the lead.

Retired general John Shalikashvili reminds us that stab

zation in Bosnia has been working, and although IFOR 

quired 17,000 troops, the follow-on force was to be 8,500 

1997 and only 5,500 in 1998.96 Critics contend the milit

is ill suited to nation building in Bosnia, but peace is s

being maintained and at acceptable cost. Christop

Shepherd responds to concerns that OOTW missions ta

time from training in other combat missions with the 

sertion that the benefits outweigh the costs/risks. He c

cedes that there may be some inability to execute com

missions if policy makers do not recognize a need for fo

structure adjustments; however, a relatively small 

crease in proficiency on some combat tasks has been off

by more than a year of relative peace in a historically v

lent region.97 Lastly, Gen George Joulwan, former supre

allied commander of NATO forces and commander of 

Forces in Europe, stated that the Bosnia deployment “h

helped [troop] readiness. In the area of communicatio

intelligence, and logistics, readiness has gone up and re

listments are higher than the Army’s goals because of 

troops’ sense of mission and purpose.” 98

Panama and Northern Iraq. An analysis of two other 

erations also contributes evidence that SOF are essential 

OOTW and that results would have improved if they h

been the supported (or lead) force rather than the support

force. Operation Promote Liberty in Panama was primaril

nation-building operation to re-establish democracy in P

ama in conjunction with Operation Just Cause, which was 

remove Manuel Noriega. The major effort required setting 

a trained civilian police force. Deficiencies included legitim

ing the civilian government too soon, premature and unco

dinated interagency transition of responsibilities, and a l

of civilian capabilities in training/maintaining indigen

assets. According to Maj James Klingaman, those pr

lems would have been resolved or precluded with S

oversight. Operation Provide Comfort in northern Iraq p

vided assistance to the Kurdish refugees fleeing Sadd
Hussein’s repression with a facet of peace enforceme

Though the conventional forces ran a successful operati

Klingaman’s analysis argues that special operations w

the “glue that [held] the operation together, provided 

synergy,” and kept lines of communication open to all 

volved.99 These cases make strong arguments for insti

tionalizing SOCOM for future humanitarian operations.

Other Windows. Indirect US military intervention a

contributed to positive results in El Salvador. US supp

took 11 years, and it cost $6 billion and 20 American liv

but the final result was a democratic government with 

proved human rights and market reforms. This civil w

assistance was low profile and supported by a long-te

commitment. It succeeded because the right military a

(special operations) had the opportunity, training, a

ability to do the task of counterinsurgency. 100

Another successful employment of SOF capabilities 

curred in the military training program in formerly Marx

Mozambique during July 1996. This was a “low-key” ope

tion involving 11 members of the Third Airborne Group, 

Special Forces, focusing on small units and leadership

And we should not forget the Marine expeditionary unit (s

cial operations capable) that reinforced the US embassy 

Liberia for four months in 1996, ensuring security and 

supply while disorder ruled the day.102 Finally, it is to 

noted that special forces, providing unique support, tra

portation, and communication to the military operation a

mission in Ecuador and Peru, have kept the remote bor

dispute there quiet since a brief war arose in 1995. 103

What Waits for Warriors and Windows?

[Our foreign policy successes have occurred] because we refuse

to listen to those who said that with the Cold War over America

could choose escapism over engagement. . . . The fact is America

remains the indispensable nation. There are times when Amer -

ica, and only America, can make a difference between war and

peace, between freedom and repression, between hope and

fear. Of course, we can’t take on all the world’s burden. But

where our interests and values demand it and where we can

make a difference, America must act and lead.

—President William Clinton
The foundation of the world’s “house” does not app

threatened by any major catastrophe in the next 25 yea

Yet, numerous uncovered windows are chipped, broken

fracturing. A few insights and perceptions from senior 

erators are useful. General Reimer, the Army chief of st

expects that “operations other than war are going to be 

norm, the nation needs an adequate number of soldiers 

do those missions, and if we trade off too much e

strength, later we will pay that bill in blood.” 104

The former chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JC

General Shalikashvili, believes the military must cha

with the changing demands on the world and the Uni

States. He argues that interventions like Bosnia, Haiti, a

Rwanda must be included in future plans even thou

they are not a direct threat because we must “make s

we shape the environment in such a way that these les

threats to our lesser interests don’t grow . . . into som

thing worse.”105 Retired general John Vessey, another f

mer chairman of the JCS with 46 years of military servi

echoes General Shalikashvili: “Forces are needed to defe

against ‘big accidents’ that could grow out of little ac

dents like in the past—and there are a lot of those 

there.”106

The former Air Force chief of staff, Gen Ronald Foglem

acknowledges that the use of military forces for peaceke

ing and other nonwar-fighting operations “is a reality t

needs to be addressed as a part of the QDR [quadrenn

defense review], especially ‘lesser regional contingencies’ 

like those carried out in Somalia, Bosnia, and Rwanda.” 

states that during the last major defense strategy review 

1993, known as the “Bottom Up Review,” these operatio

were not an issue because they were handled ad hoc—

approach using leftover forces that needs to change. 107 G

Charles C. Krulak, commandant of the US Marine Cor

is of the opinion that the Marines have always had the le

in doing “such other things as the President may dire

and he is proud to have the Marine Corps improving 

these OOTW even with reduced strength and budget. 

adds that “within three blocks you can have a sold

wrapping a baby, spreading one’s arms to separate sides 

defending himself with arms, and the military has 
change its socialization to do this.” 108 Of singular imp

tance are the expectations of Defense Secretary Willi

Cohen. He stresses that deployments for peacekeeping a

humanitarian missions will continue. “While we are 

and cannot be the world’s policeman,” he says, “neit

can we become a prisoner of world events, isolated, tuck

safely away in a continental cocoon.” 109

Expert Recommendations

The military, and especially the Special Operatio

Forces, clearly meet the future employment contract spe

fications and expectations of our nation’s strategy ba

on their core competencies and capabilities. However, 

experts also have identified concerns from a force struct

perspective and have provided relevant suggestions 

maintaining readiness as resources decline. Retired g

eral Fred Woerner advises that “consolidating (the c

war) victory requires a continuing US role and new stra

gies to strengthen democratic institutions.”110

General Fogleman states that based on realities, fo

structure should be shaped to better handle operatio

other than war: “You ought to equip them and focus th

on nonwar-fighting missions.” His formula for the fut

American force structure is one capable of winning o

and-a-half major conflicts. Others would be left to han

one-half or one-quarter challenges, which may requ

meeting the national security challenges with an exp

sion of expeditionary mobile forces.111 General Reimer r

ommends more psychological operations and civil affa

personnel as well as security police, combat support, a

combat service support units, because the new style of w

requires a different fighter.112 The former chief of the J

also realizes that though US troops are not prepared to 

international policemen, their new roles represen

change that the QDR should consider in designing fut

forces.113 The consensus is that more specialists in OO

are necessary and that “war readiness” or ability to 

spond to fighting the nation’s wars need not suffer.

William Mendel notes that civilian agencies cannot h

dle OOTW tasks because they have neither an adequ
response to military force used against them nor the 

ganizational or logistical assets for large operations. The

fore, he makes a number of suggestions. First, th

should be a standing joint military planning staff 

OOTW with apportioned forces that would be trained 

join with government, nongovernment, and internatio

organizations in dealing with operations short of war

this arrangement were made permanent, with an est

lished command structure, the command would deve

expertise in interagency and international matters, act u

laterally or with others, be cost-effective, and avoid 

degradation of readiness in conventional forces by reliev

them of OOTW missions. Mendel recommends that liais

representatives from private, interagency, and nongove

mental organizations work with his idea of a “joint enga

ment command (JEC) reporting directly to the natio

command authorities or serving as a subunified comma

of USSOC.” Organized functionally, his JEC would h

reserves playing a major role, supplying engineering, me

cal, civil affairs, security police, security assistance, a

logistics components in addition to special operations p

sonnel that include psychological operations and inte

gence units. Mendel believes that by “better organiz

what is now on hand” we would not create more fo

structure, and “the Armed Forces could remain un

deviled by OOTW missions, free to concentrate on train

for decisive battles of annihilation.”114 Mendel’s princip

are sound, but creating a JEC would duplicate an eff

already available in USSOC and add another layer of u

needed military bureaucracy.

One last observation comes from a white paper by 

Strategic Aerospace Warfare Study Panel. That paper 

sumes that militarily, at least until 2025, no single pow

or combination of hostile powers will develop to match a

challenge US superiority. Any attempt to challenge the 

would be evolutionary and visible enough to allow su

cient reaction time for meeting any spectrum of warfare

Thus, a force structure with a greater ratio of SOF, in

grated with Guard and Reserve personnel (who do a gr

portion of OOTW already), will be better able to do all 

nation’s assigned “windows” as well as have plenty of ti
to take care of the “house.” SOF are force multipliers. Th

expertise, maturity, and technology allow them to acco

plish more tasks with fewer numbers. Their demonstra

ability to work within the Total Force concept and w

coalition forces and indigenous personnel further redu

the numbers of active duty US forces required. Our spec

“subcontractors” in the profession of arms are more e

cient and effective in doing the growing assortment of “o

jobs” than our general contractors are.

Conclusion

Peacekeeping is not a mission for soldiers, but only soldiers

can do it.

—Boutros Boutros-Ghali

The above quote has two facets. First, peace operatio

(or any other OOTW) are not the normal missions 

armed forces as a whole are groomed for. Second, soldi

can do OOTW, have done them and done them well, a

should do even better in the future when the force str

ture is properly adjusted for these taskings. In fact, wi

out a military threat to the nation’s survival on the ho

zon, it is now more critical to have the capability to de

war and exercise preventive diplomacy than to have a fo

unable to react to anything but war. Unfortunately, th

are still many who oppose having the military do anyth

but prepare for total war, and it would be surprising not 

find most of them within the military. Frankly, it is time 

stop complaining. Operations other than war are tasks 

military has done for a long time, even in periods of aust

ity. Now that resources are again constrained, but 

world’s threats have proliferated, there is every reason 

keep those programs which represent effective, efficie

and intelligent methods of realizing our national secu

objectives.

Windows (OOTW) are already within the US militar

contractual obligations, and their relevance is likely to 

crease through predictably greater US participation 

United Nations-sanctioned operations. Special operati

units and organizational structures are in existence 

meet foreseeable contingencies. Special forces are prim
ily staffed to work in a joint, combined, and interagen

way. All that is needed is an emphasis on expanding s

cial operations forces, including the continued integrat

of Guard and Reserve personnel. The numbers do not h

to be large—technology, training, and talent allow more 

be accomplished with less, and mass applications of fo

will not be needed anyway. Operational tempo for all for

can be reduced, and yet, if combat operations are nec

sary, the core of conventional warriors will still be rea

More importantly, SOF are trained to be involved in 

broad spectrum of conflict. They can quickly make 

transition to combat readiness from a very restrictive c

flict environment, thereby reducing the need for a la

standing military of just “war fighters.”

We must not lose sight of the fact that with an ev

broadening definition of national security, the US milit

should not be solely burdened with doing these windo

Global security now requires efforts on the part of inter

tional governmental agencies, private volunteer organi

tions, private organizations, and other instruments 

power from around the world. The SOF have a special de

cation and capability to deter escalation of conflict by 

volvement in operations other than war. They are, 

should be, the basic building blocks for “engaging and 

larging” as befits our national security strategy.

In this post-cold-war world, without a major thre

OOTW should be considered “windows of opportunity” 

helping to stabilize the world, promoting social and e

nomic equity, and minimizing or containing the disastro

effects of failed states. Let us not merely pay lip service 

warrior diplomacy.

We conclude this study with an observation from Lt 

Robert Poyner: As “we move from adolescence to adu

hood, [we] put simpler things behind us and enter a 

more complex, sophisticated world . . . and realize t

many nontraditional taskings . . . (e.g., humanitarian 

lief, peacekeeping, peacemaking, counternarcotics, e

nestle quite well under the framework of projecting inf

ence, which could be a helping hand just as easily a

fist.”116
Notes

1. Col Bryant Shaw, USAF, interview by author, Air War College, M

well Air Force Base (AFB), Ala., October 1996.

2. Strategic Assessment 1996: Instruments of U.S. Power (Washing

D.C.: National Defense University Press, November 1995), 1.

3. Ibid., 3

4. Donald M. Snow, “New Internal War,” lecture, Air War Coll

Maxwell AFB, Ala., September 1996

5. Robert H. Dorff, “Democratization and Failed States: The Challe

of Ungovernability,” Parameters, Summer 1996, 17–31.

6. Snow.

7. Ibid.

8. A National Security Strategy of Engagement and Enlargem

(Washington, D.C.: The White House, February 1996), i.

9. Ibid., ii. Author’s emphasis.

10. Ibid., 32–34.

11. Ibid., iii.

12. Ibid., 13.

13. Ibid., 22–23.

14. National Military Strategy [NMS] 1995, cover letter by CJCS 

John Shalikashvili (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office [G

1995), 4.

15. Ibid., 9.

16. Ibid., 10–12.

17. Ibid.

18. Ibid., 17.

19. Senior Air Force officer, address to Air War College, Maxwell A

Ala., 22 January 1997.

20. Editorial, Air Force Times, 20 January 1997, 14.

21. Charles J. Dunlap Jr., “The Origins of the American Military C

of 2012,” Parameters, Winter 1992–93, 287.

22. Doug Bandow, “We Can’t Cure All Global Ills,” USA Today

November 1996.

23. Ibid.

24. David S. Sorenson, “Soldiers, States, and Systems: Civil-Mili

Relations in the Post-Cold War World” (Paper originally presented at 

Mershon Center Conference on Civil-Military Relations, Ohio State 

versity, December 1992), 18.

25. Ibid.

26. Ibid., 27–32.

27. Quoted in Sorenson, 18.

28. Ibid.

29. FM 100-5, Operations (Washington, D.C.: Department of 

Army, June 1993), 2-9 to 2-12.

30. FM 100-23, Peace Operations (Washington, D.C.: Departmen

the Army, 8 April 1994), 1-5 to 1-8.

31. Ethics and American Power (Washington, D.C.: Ethics and Pu

Policy Center, May 1995), 7–8.
32. Quoted in James Kittlefield, “The Last Superpower,” Governm

Executive, December 1994, 14.

33. Samuel P. Huntington, “New Contingencies, Old Robes,” J

Forces Quarterly, Autumn 1993, 29.

34. Carl E. Mundy Jr., “The Marines are Old Hands at Humanita

Intervention,” Armed Forces Journal International, February 1993, 42–

35. Ronald R. Fogleman, “Air Force in Operations Other than W

Defense Issues, vol. 10, no. 1, 1.

36. Ibid.

37. Bruce D. Callender, “A History of Helping,” Air Force Magazin

(March 1994): 76, 79.

38. Carl H. Builder, “Ten Messages for the Chief from One Membe

the Strategic Warfare Panel of the Air Force 2025 Study,” 25 Janu

1996 draft of presentation to the SAW panel, 12–14 February 1996, M

well AFB, Ala., 16.

39. Les Aspin, Report on the Bottom-Up Review, October 1993, 75.

40. Aaron Bank, From OSS to Green Beret (Novato, Calif.: Pres

Press, 1986), 171.

41. John Collins, Special Operations Forces, An Assessment 1986–1

(Washington, D.C.: Congressional Research Service, 1993), 8–9.

42. Armed Forces, United States Code, Title 10, secs. 332, 371

401–2 (1991).

43. Joint Pub 3-07, Joint Doctrine for Operations Other than War

June 1995, viii.

44. Ibid., III-1 to III-15.

45. James E. Holl, “Common Parameters: Conditions Preven

Deadly Conflict” (Paper to the Carnegie Commission on Preventing De

Conflict, 1996).

46. Edward N. Luttwak, “Toward Post-Heroic Warfare,” Foreign Af

74 (May/June 1995): 109, 114.

47. As cited in Stephen S. Rosenfeld, “When Intervention Gets 

Green Light,” Washington Post, 20 September 1996, 23.

48. Quoted in Patrick Pexton, “Future Seizes Operations Other T

War,” Army Times, 19 November 1996, 8.

49. Ibid.

50. Steven Metz, “The Air Force Role in United Nations Peacekeepi

Airpower Journal 7, no. 4 (Winter 1993): 68, 84.

51. President George Bush, “The United Nations: Forging a Genu

Global Community,” US Department of State Dispatch 3, no. 39 (28 

tember 1992): 721–24.

52. President William Clinton, “Reforming the United Nations,” 

Speeches, 15 October 1993.

53. Boutros Boutros-Ghali, “Empowering the United Nations,” For

Affairs, Winter 1992/1993, 89–102.

54. William G. Boykin, “Special Operations and Low Intensity Con

Legislation: What Was Passed and Have the Voids Been Filled” (Individ

Study Project, US Army War College, 1991), 35.

55. Collins, 8–9.

56. Ibid., 9–10.
57. Department of Defense Annual Report to the Congress , pt. 4, 

fense Components,” chap. 22, “Special Operations Forces,” March 19

199–204.

58. Ibid.

59. Joint Pub 3-05, Doctrine for Joint Special Operations (Washing

D.C.: GPO, October 1992), I-6.

60. USSOF Posture Statement (Washington, D.C.: GPO, 1996), 31–

61. Joint Pub 3-05, II-2.

62. Posture Statement, 32.

63. Joint Pub 3-05, I-8.

64. Joint Pub 3-0, Doctrine for Joint Operations (Washington, D

GPO, 1993), G-3015.

65. Joint Pub 3-05, III-1.

66. Ibid., Appendix A, A1–A8.

67. Ibid., Appendix C, C-3 to C-5.

68. Ibid., Appendix B, B-1 to B-3.

69. Posture Statement, 42.

70. Ibid., III-6, 7.

71. Ibid., I-7, II-13, A-7, B-3.

72. Ibid, 2–7.

73. Ibid., 11–13.

74. US Special Operations Command, Special Operations Forces 

sion 2020 (Washington, D.C.: USSOC, 1996), 22.

75. Ibid., 7.

76. Ibid.

77. National Research Council, Naval Studies Board, The Navy 

Marine Corps in Regional Conflict in the 21st Century (Washington, D

National Academy Press, 1996), 87–88.

78. ”Reserve Officer’s Association National Security Report, GAO 

timony: Reserve Issues Pertaining to Readiness,” The Officer 72, n

(May 1996): 20–21.

79. Ibid.

80. Ibid., 21

81. Gen Ronald Fogleman, interview with Al Rod, reporter for Maxw

Gunter Dispatch, 23 August 1996, 5.

82. Posture Statement, 29.

83. Dennis R. Lewis, Operations Other than War: Limitations, Tem

tions, and Prescriptions, defense analytical study (Maxwell AFB, Ala.

War College, April 1995), 8–11.

84. Andrew F. Krepinevich Jr., The Army in Vietnam (Baltimore: Jo

Hopkins, 1990), 1975.

85. David H. Wagner, “A Handful of Marines,” Marine Corps Gaz

March 1968, 44.

86. D. L. Evans Jr., “USMC Civil Affairs in Vietnam,” in The Marin

Vietnam 1954–1973, An Anthology and Annotated Bibliography (Wash

ton, D.C.: Headquarters US Marine Corps, 1985), 318.

87. Lewis, 8–11.

88. Quoted in Lewis, 9.

89. Rick Hurckes, Military Missions Other Than War—2025, vo

(Maxwell AFB, Ala.: Air Command and Staff College, May 1995), II-35.
90. Bush, “Humanitarian Mission to Somalia,” US Department of S

Dispatch 13, no. 49 (7 December 1992): 865.

91. John R. Bolton, “Wrong Turn in Somalia,” Foreign Affairs 23, n

(January/February 1994): 60.

92. Chester A. Crocker, “The Lessons of Somalia—Not Everyth

Went Wrong,” Foreign Affairs 74 (May/June 1995): 3.

93. Fred Hiatt, “Shaky Grounds for Military Intervention,” Washin

Post, 7 October 1996, 21.

94. William T. Johnsen, “US Participation in IFOR: A Marathon, N

Sprint” (Carlisle Barracks, Pa.: Army War College, Strategic Studies In

tute, 20 June 1996), 1.

95. Ibid., 30.

96. George C. Wilson, “Troops Stay Busy with New Missions,” 

Force Times, 2 December 1996.

97. Christopher L. Shepherd, “Minor Expense in the Purchas

Peace,” Wall Street Journal, 17 December 1996, 23.

98. Joulwan quoted in Dana Priest, Washington Post, 14 Jan

1997, 11.

99. James J. Klingaman, Proponency for Military Operations O

Than War: The Case for The United States Special Operations Comm

(master’s thesis, US Army Command and General Staff College, 19

51–59, 72.

100. Victor M. Rosello, “Lessons from El Salvador,” Parameters, W

ter 1993–94, 100–2.

101. ”US Helps Train Mozambique Soldiers,” Washington Times, 4 

gust 1996, 9.

102. ”Marines Pull Out of Liberia,” Navy Times, 12 August 1996, 2

103. Jorge Banaks, United Press International release in the Wash

ton Times, 14 January 1997, 10

104. Pexton, 8.

105. Gen John Shalikashvili, USA Today, 11 December 1996, 1.

106. Gen Jack Vessey, lecture, Air War College, Maxwell AFB, Ala

January 1997.

107. Ibid.

108. Gen Charles C. Krulak, lecture, Air War College, Maxwell A

Ala., 15 January 1997.

109. Rick Maze, Air Force Times, 3 February 1997, 3.

110. Gen Fred F. Woerner Jr., Retired, “Introduction,” Joint Pub 

07, I-1.

111. Metz.

112. Gen Dennis Reimer as quoted in Pexton.

113. Shalikashvili.

114. William W. Mendel, “New Forces for Engagement Policy,” J

Forces Quarterly 10 (Winter 1995–96): 28–29.

115. Aerospace Power for the 21st Century: A Theory to Fly By (w

paper from the Strategic Aerospace Warfare Study Panel, 4 October 19

28.

116. Robert D. Poyner, “Childhood’s End: A Personal View of the 

ture of Air Power and the Air Force,” Airpower Journal 10, no. 2 (Sum

1996): 116.