J-A26011-20

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA

v.

VINCENT HARRIS 

Appellant

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 IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

 PENNSYLVANIA

 No. 1512 EDA 2019

Appeal from the PCRA Order Entered April 22, 2019

In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County Criminal Division at 

No(s): CP-51-CR-0006880-2013

BEFORE: BENDER, P.J.E., LAZARUS, J., and STEVENS, P.J.E.*

MEMORANDUM BY BENDER, P.J.E.: FILED JANUARY 12, 2021

Appellant, Vincent Harris, appeals from the post-conviction court’s April 

22, 2019 order denying his timely-filed petition under the Post Conviction 

Relief Act (PCRA), 42 Pa.C.S. §§ 9541-9542. After careful review, we affirm.

The PCRA court provided a detailed summary of the facts and procedural 

history of this case in its Pa.R.A.P. 1925(a) opinion, which we adopt herein. 

See PCRA Court Opinion (PCO), 11/1/19, at 2-5. We only briefly note that 

Appellant was convicted of first-degree murder and related offenses on March 

27, 2015. He was sentenced that same day to an aggregate term of life 

imprisonment, without the possibility of parole. He filed a timely direct appeal, 

and after we affirmed his judgment of sentence, our Supreme Court denied 

his petition for allowance of appeal. Commonwealth v. Harris, 158 A.3d 

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* Former Justice specially assigned to the Superior Court.
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192 (Pa. Super. 2016) (unpublished memorandum), appeal denied, 166 A.3d 

1210 (Pa. 2017).

Appellant thereafter filed a timely, pro se PCRA petition. Counsel was 

appointed and filed an amended petition, claiming that Appellant’s trial 

counsel acted ineffectively by not objecting to certain testimony by a 

Commonwealth witness. According to Appellant, the at-issue testimony 

indicated that an eyewitness to the murder, Duron Flynn, was not present to 

testify at trial because he was afraid of retaliation. Appellant asserted that his 

counsel should have objected to this testimony because it improperly 

suggested to the jury that Appellant had threatened Flynn, when there was 

no evidence that he had done so. 

On March 19, 2019, the PCRA court issued a Pa.R.Crim.P. 907 notice of 

its intent to dismiss Appellant’s petition without a hearing. He did not respond, 

and on April 22, 2019, the court dismissed his petition. Appellant filed a timely 

notice of appeal. The court did not order him to file a Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b) 

concise statement of errors complained of on appeal. The court filed its Rule 

1925(a) opinion on November 1, 2019.

Herein, Appellant states one issue for our review:

I. Did the [t]rial/PCRA [c]ourt err in dismissing the PCRA 

[petition], without a hearing, even though Appellant pled that he 

was victimized by ineffective assistance of counsel who failed to 

object to the jury[’s] being told by the [p]rosecutor that a witness 

failed to appear[] because the witness feared for his safety?

Appellant’s Brief at 3.
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First, “[t]his Court’s standard of review from the grant or denial of postconviction relief is limited to examining whether the lower court’s 

determination is supported by the evidence of record and whether it is free of 

legal error.” Commonwealth v. Morales, 701 A.2d 516, 520 (Pa. 1997) 

(citing Commonwealth v. Travaglia, 661 A.2d 352, 356 n.4 (Pa. 1995)). 

Where, as here, a petitioner claims that he received ineffective assistance of 

counsel, our Supreme Court has stated that:

[A] PCRA petitioner will be granted relief only when he proves, by 

a preponderance of the evidence, that his conviction or sentence 

resulted from the “[i]neffective assistance of counsel which, in the 

circumstances of the particular case, so undermined the truthdetermining process that no reliable adjudication of guilt or 

innocence could have taken place.” Generally, counsel’s 

performance is presumed to be constitutionally adequate, and 

counsel will only be deemed ineffective upon a sufficient showing 

by the petitioner. To obtain relief, a petitioner must demonstrate 

that counsel’s performance was deficient and that the deficiency 

prejudiced the petitioner. A petitioner establishes prejudice when 

he demonstrates “that there is a reasonable probability that, but 

for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding 

would have been different.” ... [A] properly pled claim of 

ineffectiveness posits that: (1) the underlying legal issue has 

arguable merit; (2) counsel’s actions lacked an objective 

reasonable basis; and (3) actual prejudice befell the petitioner 

from counsel’s act or omission. 

Commonwealth v. Johnson, 966 A.2d 523, 532-33 (Pa. 2009) (citations 

omitted). 

In this case, we have reviewed the certified record, the briefs of the 

parties, and the applicable law. Additionally, we have reviewed the thorough 

and well-crafted opinion of the Honorable Genece Brinkley of the Court of 

Common Pleas of Philadelphia County. We conclude that Judge Brinkley’s
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extensive, well-reasoned opinion accurately disposes of the issue presented 

by Appellant. Accordingly, we adopt her opinion as our own and affirm the 

order denying Appellant’s PCRA petition for the reasons set forth therein.

Order affirmed.

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 1/12/2021
Circulated 12/18/2020 12:35 PM