Filed 8/18/23 P. v. Ranft CA2/6

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions 

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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION SIX

THE PEOPLE,

 Plaintiff and Respondent,

v.

STERLING PAUL RANFT,

 Defendant and Appellant.

2d Crim. No. B321598

(Super. Ct. No. 21CR06283)

(Santa Barbara County)

Sterling Paul Ranft appeals from the judgment after a jury 

convicted him of custodial possession of a weapon (Pen. Code,1

§ 4502, subd. (a)).

2 The trial court subsequently found true 

allegations that Ranft suffered a prior strike conviction (§§ 667, 

subds. (b)-(i), 1170.12, subds. (a)-(d)), that his convictions were of 

increasing seriousness (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 4.421(b)(2)), that 

he served a prior term in prison (id., rule 4.421(b)(3)), that he 

1 Statutory references are to the Penal Code.

2 Ranft also pleaded guilty to resisting arrest (§ 148, subd. 

(a)(1)). That conviction is not at issue in this appeal. 
2

was on parole when he possessed a weapon (id., rule 4.421(b)(4)), 

and that his performance on parole was unsatisfactory (id., rule 

4.421(b)(5)). It sentenced him to eight years in state prison (the 

upper term of four years, doubled). 

Ranft contends the judgment should be reversed because: 

(1) his Faretta3 waiver was invalid, (2) he was restrained during 

trial, (3) the trial court misinstructed the jury, and (4) the errors, 

considered cumulatively, deprived him of due process. Ranft also 

contends the matter should be remanded for resentencing 

because: (5) his admission to the prior strike was invalid, and (6) 

the court should have applied the amendments set forth in

Senate Bill No. 81 (2021-2022 Reg. Sess.) (Stats. 2021, ch. 721, 

§ 1) and struck the prior strike. We affirm.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

Santa Barbara County Sheriff’s Deputy Anthony Ramirez 

was processing arrestees at the county jail’s Inmate Receiving 

Center. When searching Ranft’s bedroll for contraband, Deputy 

Ramirez noticed that a cup containing crunched-up paper felt 

heavy. Upon removing the paper, he found a five-inch piece of 

metal wrapped in fabric. It appeared to be a “shank.” Ranft told 

Deputy Ramirez that he had found the shank in the dress-out 

area of the receiving center. 

Deputy Ramirez notified Deputy Crystal Poquette that he 

had found a shank. Detective Poquette examined the item and 

believed it could be used to stab someone, or perhaps even kill 

them. She believed the item had been brought into the jail 

because it was made of metal that did not come from a bunk and 

the fabric it was wrapped in could not be found inside. 

Additionally, the pointed end of the shank had not been fully 

3 Faretta v. California (1975) 422 U.S. 806 (Faretta).
3

sharpened, which suggested it had been brought into jail in an 

inmate’s rectum. 

DISCUSSION

Guilt phase issues

1. The Faretta waiver

Ranft first contends the judgment should be reversed 

because his Faretta waiver was invalid. We disagree.

a. Background

At a December 2021 pretrial conference, Ranft said that he 

“wanted to go on [his] own or be presented with a different” 

attorney because of a breakdown in communication with 

appointed counsel. The trial court replied that trial was set for 

February 2022 and that if new counsel were appointed there was 

“going to be a setback.” Ranft replied, “That’s why my first 

option was to represent myself.” The court then asked if Ranft 

would be ready for a February trial if he elected to represent 

himself. He said that he would. 

At a hearing three weeks later, Ranft was adamant that he 

wanted to represent himself. He did not request a different 

attorney. 

The trial court heard Ranft’s Faretta motion the following

week. At the hearing the court asked if Ranft understood how 

burdens of proof and defenses worked in a criminal trial. Ranft 

replied that he had “been through the trial process before.” The 

court also delineated the potential perils of self-representation, 

including that Ranft would “not be able to appeal on the ground 

that [he] did not have a lawyer” if he were convicted. Ranft said 

that he understood. The court then asked Ranft if he wanted

additional time to consider his decision to represent himself. 

Ranft responded that he just wanted to resolve the case so that 
4

he could be placed on probation; he only raised the Faretta 

motion to get the process moving. 

The trial court told Ranft that probation was not an option 

in his case. The court also told Ranft that he had the option of 

keeping current counsel. Ranft refused; he wanted no further 

delay. The court replied that he would not go to trial any sooner 

if he represented himself. Ranft said he understood, and 

reiterated his desire to do so. The court granted his request. 

b. Discussion

A defendant has a constitutional right to represent 

themselves at trial. (Faretta, supra, 422 U.S. at p. 819.) The 

trial court must permit a defendant to do so if they make their 

request: (1) knowingly and intelligently (id. at p. 835), (2) 

unequivocally (ibid.), and (3) “within a reasonable time prior to 

the commencement of trial” (People v. Windham (1977) 19 Cal.3d 

121, 128). To determine whether a Faretta waiver was valid, we 

review the entire record de novo (People v. Marshall (1997) 15 

Cal.4th 1, 24) to determine whether it “demonstrates that the 

defendant understood the disadvantages of self-representation, 

including the risks and complexities of the particular case”

(People v. Bloom (1989) 48 Cal.3d 1194, 1225 (Bloom)). The 

defendant bears the burden of showing the invalidity of their 

waiver. (People v. Mellor (1984) 161 Cal.App.3d 32, 37.)

Ranft has not borne his burden here. He first claims his 

Faretta waiver was invalid because the trial court granted his 

self-representation request without conducting a hearing

pursuant to People v. Marsden (1970) 2 Cal.3d 118. Such a 

hearing is required “when there is ‘at least some clear indication 

by defendant,’ either personally or through [their] current 

counsel, that [they] ‘want[] a substitute attorney.’ ” (People v.
5

Sanchez (2011) 53 Cal.4th 80, 90.) A Marsden hearing is not 

required, however, if the defendant merely expresses 

dissatisfaction with counsel. (People v. Burton (1989) 48 Cal.3d 

843, 855 (Burton).) The failure to conduct a required Marsden

hearing can result in an invalid Faretta waiver. (See, e.g., People

v. Hill (1983) 148 Cal.App.3d 744, 755-756; People v. Cruz (1978) 

83 Cal.App.3d 308, 317-318.)

Here, there was no clear indication that Ranft wanted to 

substitute attorneys. At a pretrial conference, Ranft said that he 

“wanted to go on [his] own or be presented with a different” 

attorney. But when informed that substituting attorneys would 

likely delay trial, Ranft said that his “first option was to 

represent [him]self.” Then, at subsequent hearings, Ranft 

reiterated his desire to represent himself several times. No 

Marsden hearing is required when a defendant repeatedly insists 

on representing themselves. (Burton, supra, 48 Cal.3d at p. 855; 

see also People v. Mendoza (2000) 24 Cal.4th 130, 156-157, 

superseded by statute on another point as stated in People v.

Brooks (2017) 3 Cal.5th 1, 62, fn. 8.)

Moreover, even if Ranft did clearly indicate that he wanted 

to substitute attorneys, we would conclude that he abandoned his 

request. Ranft obliquely raised his desire to substitute attorneys 

once, but then never brought up the matter again. That 

constitutes the abandonment of any Marsden request. (People v. 

Jones (2012) 210 Cal.App.4th 355, 362.) Ranft’s Faretta waiver 

was not invalid due to the lack of a Marsden hearing.

Alternatively, Ranft asserts his Faretta waiver was invalid 

because the trial court failed to inform him that he could not 

raise a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel on appeal if it 

permitted him to represent himself. But the court told Ranft that 
6

he would “not be able to appeal on the ground that [he] did not 

have a lawyer” if it granted his Faretta motion and he were later 

convicted. And even if it hadn’t, our Supreme Court has rejected 

Ranft’s assertion. (Bloom, supra, 48 Cal.3d at p. 1225.) We do 

too. (Auto Equity Sales, Inc. v. Superior Court (1962) 57 Cal.2d 

450, 455.) Ranft’s Faretta waiver was valid.

2. The wrist restraint

Ranft next contends the judgment should be reversed 

because the trial court ordered him to wear a wrist restraint 

during trial. We again disagree.

a. Background

Prior to trial, county counsel moved to restrain Ranft in the 

courtroom. According to Deputy Poquette, Ranft had fought with 

other inmates in December 2021, had a shank in his bedroll in 

July 2021, refused to comply with a strip search and had to be 

sent to a more secure housing unit in August 2018, threatened 

other inmates with assault in March 2018, and refused to comply 

with instructions to be seated in court in June 2016. Based on 

these incidents, county counsel moved the trial court to order the 

use of a wrist restraint and leg shackles. 

The trial court granted county counsel’s motion as to the 

wrist restraint. It instructed all parties to remain seated during 

jury selection and trial to hide the restraint. The prosecutor also 

noted there would be black fabric around the counsel table “so the 

jury [wouldn’t] be able to see” it. 

Ranft later said that he “[j]ust wanted to comment on the 

prejudicial nature of the handcuffs, just get it on the record.” The 

trial court said that jurors could not see the wrist restraint if 

Ranft remained seated and kept his hand in his lap. He could 
7

also use his jacket to cover the restraint. The court warned him 

when the jacket possibly did not. 

The prosecutor asked whether the trial court was going to 

instruct jurors pursuant to CALCRIM No. 204. Ranft said that 

he did not want the instruction. The prosecutor replied that she 

had nevertheless included it in the jury packet because she had 

seen Ranft’s wrist restraint during jury selection. Jurors may 

also have seen the restraint when Ranft scratched his face. The 

court said that the matter was up to Ranft since no juror had said 

they could see the restraint, though some had said that they had 

seen his feet. Ranft confirmed that jurors had seen his sandals, 

not the restraint. He reiterated that he did not want the court to 

instruct the jury with CALCRIM No. 204. 

b. Discussion

A “ ‘trial court has broad power to maintain courtroom 

security and orderly proceedings.’ ” (People v. Stevens (2009) 47 

Cal.4th 625, 632.) But “extraordinary security practices” like 

wrist restraints “carry an inordinate risk of infringing [on] a 

criminal defendant’s right to a fair trial” because they “may erode 

the presumption of innocence.” (Ibid.) Such “exceptional 

practices must be justified by a particularized showing of 

manifest need sufficient to overcome the substantial risk of 

prejudice they pose.” (Ibid.)

A “manifest need can be made with ‘ “evidence that the 

defendant has threatened jail deputies, possessed weapons in 

custody, threatened or assaulted other inmates, and/or engaged 

in violent outbursts in court.” ’ ” (People v. Young (2019) 7 

Cal.5th 905, 934 (Young).) A manifest need can also be made by 

showing that the “ ‘defendant poses a safety risk[] [or] a flight 

risk, or [that they are] likely to disrupt the proceedings or 
8

otherwise engage in nonconforming behavior.’ ” (People v. 

Virgil (2011) 51 Cal.4th 1210, 1270.) If the trial court determines 

that such a need exists, the restraints ordered “ ‘should be as 

unobtrusive as possible, although as effective as necessary under 

the circumstances.’ ” (People v. Mar (2002) 28 Cal.4th 1201, 

1217.) We review for abuse of discretion. (Young, at p. 934.) 

There was no abuse of discretion here. Ranft accrued 

several disciplinary infractions while in custody in the years prior 

to trial. He fought with other inmates, had a shank in his 

bedroll, refused to comply with deputies’ commands, and 

threatened other inmates. He had also previously disrupted trial 

proceedings. Ordering him to wear a wrist restraint was 

accordingly proper. (Young, supra, 7 Cal.5th at pp. 934-935

[restraints appropriate where defendant had “ ‘numerous 

problems while in custody’ ”]; People v. Bryant, Smith and

Wheeler (2014) 60 Cal.4th 335, 388-393 (Bryant, Smith and

Wheeler) [restraints appropriate where defendants previously 

disrupted court proceedings].)

“The trial court [also] imposed the least[-]intrusive means 

of restraint to accomplish its goal of maintaining courtroom 

safety.” (People v. Billie (2017) 10 Cal.App.5th 434, 438.) Ranft 

had one hand free throughout trial. His restrained wrist was 

kept in his lap, under a jacket, hidden by a black table skirt. And 

all parties remained seated throughout trial. Such mitigation 

measures rendered Ranft’s wrist restraint as unobtrusive as 

possible. (Id. at pp. 438-439.)

Ranft complains that the trial court did not hold a hearing 

on the motion to restrain him and instead left the decision to 

county counsel. But no formal hearing was required. (Bryant,

Smith and Wheeler, supra, 60 Cal.4th at p. 391.) And “[t]he court 
9

here was clearly aware of its obligation to make its own 

determination on the need for restraints.” (Ibid.) It discussed 

the matter on no fewer than five occasions, indicated that it had a 

copy of county counsel’s motion, and ensured that all parties did 

too. We presume the court considered the evidence attached to 

the motion when granting it. (People v. Weaver (2001) 26 Cal.4th 

876, 919.) That the court rejected the request for leg shackles,

took pains to ensure that Ranft’s wrist restraint was as hidden as 

possible, and gave him the option of telling jurors that they could 

not infer guilt if they saw it reinforces our presumption that the 

court understood the standards for granting county counsel’s 

motion. (Cf. People v. Jones (2017) 3 Cal.5th 583, 616 [appellate 

court presumes trial court knows and properly applies the law].) 

There was no error.

Any error also would have been harmless. Courts “have 

consistently found any unjustified or unadmonished [restraint]

harmless where there was no evidence it was seen by the jury.” 

(People v. Tuilaepa (1992) 4 Cal.4th 569, 583-584; see also People 

v. Anderson (2001) 25 Cal.4th 543, 596 [compiling cases].) This is 

because “[t]he potential effect on the presumption of innocence is 

eliminated if the jury does not see the” restraint. (People v.

Jackson (1993) 14 Cal.App.4th 1818, 1829.) Here, Ranft points to 

no evidence showing that any juror was aware he was wearing a 

wrist restraint. Instead, he speculates that jurors may have seen 

the restraint because the trial court and prosecutor each briefly 

saw it. Speculation is not evidence. (People v. Waidla (2000) 22 

Cal.4th 690, 735.) Any unjustified restraint was harmless.

3. Jury instructions

Next, Ranft contends the trial court should have sua sponte 

instructed the jury on attempted possession of a weapon in jail in 
10

addition to instructing on actual possession. But a court has such 

an instructional duty only if there is substantial evidence the 

defendant is guilty of the attempted crime. (People v. Strunk

(1995) 31 Cal.App.4th 265, 271 (Strunk).) No such duty arises 

where, as here, there is no substantial evidence that the

defendant did not possess a weapon. (Id. at p. 272.) Because 

Deputy Ramirez located a shank inside Ranft’s bedroll, an 

instruction on attempted possession was not required.

Ranft attempts to salvage his instructional error claim by 

arguing that jurors could have found him guilty of attempted 

possession of a weapon because Deputy Ramirez and Deputy 

Poquette both testified the shank was not sharp. To him, this 

purported dullness would have permitted jurors to conclude 

either that the shank was not “capable of ready use as a stabbing 

weapon” or that it could not “inflict great bodily injury or death”

and was thus not a dirk or dagger. (See § 16470 [defining dirk or 

dagger].) But at trial, Ranft never argued that the shank’s 

dullness prevented it from being a dirk or dagger. He cannot 

raise this argument for the first time on appeal. (People v. Powell

(2018) 6 Cal.5th 136, 169.)

Moreover, Ranft’s argument ignores Deputy Poquette’s 

testimony that the shank could be used to stab or even kill 

someone—despite not being fully sharpened. It ignores the 

deputy’s testimony that she had seen duller items be used as 

stabbing weapons. And it ignores the jury’s finding that the 

shank was, in fact, a dirk or dagger. (See People v. Belloso (2019) 

42 Cal.App.5th 647, 653 [whether instrument a dirk or dagger is 

a factual question for the jury].) There was not substantial 

evidence that Ranft merely attempted to possess a dirk or dagger. 

(Strunk, supra, 31 Cal.App.4th at p. 271; see People v. Breverman
11

(1998) 19 Cal.4th 142, 162 [“existence of ‘any evidence, no matter 

how weak’ will not justify instructions on” attempted offense].) 

The trial court was thus not required to sua sponte instruct the 

jury on attempted possession of a weapon in jail.

4. Cumulative prejudice

Finally, Ranft contends the judgment should be reversed 

because the errors that occurred during the proceedings below, 

considered cumulatively, violated his due process right to a fair 

trial. Because we reject all Ranft’s claims of error, he cannot 

show cumulative prejudice. (People v. Jablonski (2006) 37 

Cal.4th 774, 810.)

Sentencing issues

1. Prior strike admission

Ranft first challenges his sentence by claiming that his 

admission of a prior strike conviction was invalid because he was 

not informed of, and thus did not waive, the privilege against 

self-incrimination and the right to confront his accusers. We are 

not persuaded.

“[B]efore a [trial] court accepts [a defendant’s] admission 

that [they have] suffered prior felony convictions, express and 

specific admonitions as to the constitutional rights waived by 

[the] admission” are required. (In re Yurko (1974) 10 Cal.3d 857, 

863.) The requisite admonitions include that the admission 

waives the privilege against self-incrimination, the right to a jury 

trial, and the right to confront one’s accusers. (Id. at p. 863, fn. 

5.) If these admonitions are not provided, the admission is 

nevertheless valid so long as the record affirmatively discloses 

that it was knowing and voluntary under the totality of the 

circumstances. (People v. Farwell (2018) 5 Cal.5th 295, 303-304.) 
12

The trial court here did not ensure that Ranft received the 

requisite admonitions. While the jury deliberated, the court 

asked Ranft how he wanted to proceed on the prior strike 

allegation. Ranft said that he planned to admit the allegation. 

The prosecutor took Ranft’s admission: “So, Mr. Ranft, you have a 

right to have a jury trial on your strike prior offense, which is 

that you were convicted of a violation of Penal Code [s]ection 245, 

[subdivision (a)(2)], in Santa Barbara Superior Court case 

number 1465394 on August 5, 2016. [¶] Do you admit or deny 

that that offense is a serious felony within the meaning of Penal 

Code [s]ection 667, [subdivisions (d) and (e)]?” Ranft admitted 

the offense. The prosecutor then confirmed that Ranft wanted to 

“waive [his] right to have a trial on that prior and just admit it.” 

Ranft said that he did. 

At no time during the colloquy did the prosecutor explain 

that, by admitting his prior conviction, Ranft was waiving the 

privilege against self-incrimination and the right to confront his 

accusers. Despite the lack of admonitions, however, we conclude 

that Ranft’s admission was valid. When Ranft executed his 

Faretta waiver prior to trial, he confirmed that he understood his 

constitutional rights, including the privilege against 

self-incrimination and the right to confront his accusers. He 

reiterated that understanding when the trial court accepted the 

Faretta waiver. He later confirmed he was waiving those rights 

when he executed the form in which he pleaded guilty to resisting 

arrest and when the court accepted his plea. These factors weigh 

in favor of a knowing and voluntary waiver. (See, e.g., People v.

Forrest (1990) 221 Cal.App.3d 675, 678–679 [prior conviction 

admission valid where defendant advised of rights during plea 

colloquy earlier in proceeding].) Additionally, this was not 
13

Ranft’s first brush with the criminal justice system; he said that 

he had “been through the trial process before.” This is also 

relevant to whether Ranft knowingly waived his constitutional 

rights. (People v. Mosby (2004) 33 Cal.4th 353, 365.) The record 

here affirmatively discloses that Ranft’s waiver was valid under 

the totality of the circumstances.

2. Senate Bill No. 81

Finally, Ranft contends the trial court should have struck 

his prior strike pursuant to section 1385, as amended by Senate 

Bill No. 81 (2021-2022 Reg. Sess.). But Senate Bill No. 81’s 

amendments to section 1385 took effect on January 1, 2022. 

(People v. Burke (2023) 89 Cal.App.5th 237, 242 (Burke).) Ranft 

was sentenced the following June. Had Ranft wanted the court 

to apply the provisions of Senate Bill No. 81 at sentencing, he 

should have asked it to do so. Because he did not, his contention 

is forfeited. (People v. Scott (1994) 9 Cal.4th 331, 351.)

It also lacks merit. “Senate Bill No. 81 . . . amended section 

1385 to add specific mitigating factors the trial court must 

consider when deciding whether to strike enhancements from a 

defendant’s sentence.” (Burke, supra, 89 Cal.App.5th at pp. 242-

243, italics added.) “The term ‘enhancement’ has a 

well-established technical meaning in California law”; it is “ ‘ “an 

additional term of imprisonment added to the base term.” ’ ” (Id.

at p. 243.) “It is equally well established that the Three Strikes 

law is . . . an alternative sentencing scheme,” not an 

enhancement. (Ibid.) As such, Senate Bill No. 81’s amendments 

to section 1385 do not apply to sentences imposed under the 

Three Strikes law. (Burke, at pp. 243-244.)
14

DISPOSITION

The judgment is affirmed.

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED.

BALTODANO, J.

We concur:

GILBERT, P. J.

CODY, J.
Pauline Maxwell, Judge

Superior Court County of Santa Barbara

______________________________

Wayne C. Tobin, under appointment by the Court of 

Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.

Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief 

Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Assistant 

Attorney General, Steven D. Matthews and Michael J. Wise, 

Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.