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AIR WAR COLLEGE

AIR UNIVERSITY

Airpower, Chaos, and

Infrastructure

Lords of the Rings

EDWARD J. FELKER

Lieutenant Colonel, USAF

Air War College

Maxwell Paper No. 14

MAXWELL AIR FORCE BASE, ALABAMA

July 1998
Disclaimer

Opinions, conclusions, and recommendations expressed or implied within are s

those of the author and do not necessarily represent the views of Air University

United States Air Force, the Department of Defense, or any other US govern

agency. Cleared for public release: distribution unlimited.

ii
Foreword

This interesting study by Lt Col Edward J. Felker, 

Air Force, describes a methodology to exploit airpower’s 

pacities at the operational and strategic levels of wa r

focuses on the third ring (infrastructure) of John A. W

den III’s theory of five strategic rings, which the aut

argues is often neglected in the debate over the importan

of leadership (first ring) versus fielded forces (fifth rin

The author emphasizes that lines of communicatio

transmit all of society’s military, economic, and polit

goods, services, and information. Infrastructure provi

the framework that links the various elements of a natio

power. This infrastructure contains critical nodes that 

vulnerable to airpower. By understanding this infrastr

ture, we better understand an adversary as a compl

adaptive, and open system.

Colonel Felker’s paper espouses a practical theory of a

power based on the synergistic relationship among socie

structure and lines of communications that comprise 

frastructure. Rather than isolating different elements o

society and their concomitant targets, the theory views t

gets in a more holistic way. Of note, the theory articula

a culturally based paradigm with airpower applied agai

the linkages within a society’s system processes, rat

than a “one-size-fits-all” target list that attacks form. T

theory describes a way to think about airpower, not a w

to execute its missions.

TIMOTHY A. KINN

Major General, US

Commandant

Air War College

iii

About the Author

Lt Col Edward J. Felker, USAF, is a maintenance a

logistics officer with additional experience in munitio

and nuclear planning. His early degrees include work 

Ball State University, the Army Command and Gene

Staff College, and the School of Advanced Airpower Stud

Colonel Felker is a graduate of the Air War College, class 

1998.

v
Airpower, Chaos, and Infrastructure

Lords of the Rings

Airpower can either paralyze the enemy’s military action or

compel him to devote to the defense of his bases and commu -

nications a share of his straitened resources far greater than

what we need in the attack.

—Winston Churchill

For the past 34 years, I have been a student of airpowe 

sometimes a practitioner, always an observer. I have str

gled to understand the best way to employ airpower a

have come to believe that what matters most is und

standing our adversaries’ values. The enemy determi

his centers of gravity (COG), not those who study the 

emy. To be most effective, airpower must be used agai

those vulnerabilities that create the greatest system

shock in the fabric of a societal structure. Anything l

only chips away at the margins.

Airpower theorists have studied long and hard ab

airpower shaping battlefields and killing tanks one a

time. But if the Air Force accepts its basic doctrinal ten

of flexibility and versatility to exploit mass and maneu

simultaneously at any level of warfare, then airpowe

range, speed, reach, and lethality should have far grea

impact at operational and strategic levels than at tacti

levels. This is not to say the Air Force should aband

airpower’s impact on the ground scheme of maneuv

That, however, should not be our only focus.

We need to also study how to degrade and destroy 

adversaries’ ability to transmit their military, political, a

economic goods, services, and information. This is w

airpower can best contribute to the fight to achieve ope

tional and strategic aims. Infrastructure, defining both t

ditional and emerging lines of communications, prese

increasingly lucrative targets for airpower. As airmen m

into an age dominated by information, fraught with unc

tainty, and laced with a healthy dose of the unknown, th

need a vision to guide airpower’s practical application; a

their vision should focus on lines of communications t

will increasingly define modern societies.

1
This paper does not try to depict how airpower alone c

win wars. It does try to explain in what situations airpow

might possess great effect in tomorrow’s conflicts. It ta

a practical approach by synthesizing portions of John 

Warden III, Antoine-Henri Jomini, and chaos theory. B

in any case, the importance of Warden’s “third ring”—

frastructure—is paramount.

Infrastructure

The history of war proves that nine out of ten times an army

has been destroyed because its supply lines have been cut off.

—Gen Douglas MacArthu

During the cold war, Allied Air Forces Central Eur

(AAFCE) at Ramstein, West Germany, studied the Wars

Pact fuel system and rejected it as a viable target becaus

“would take too many sorties to kill it.” 1

 AAFCE treated 

destruction of the fuel infrastructure form rather than 

exploitation as a necessary process within Soviet milit

doctrine. AAFCE planners were captured by the paradigm 

regarding fuel as a single target set comprising far m

numerous aim points than could be reasonably attacked

In the mid-1980s, Air Force Checkmate restudied t

fuel system as a process necessary for Soviet military d

trine to support a breakthrough on the northern plain 

Germany. By viewing the fuel system as a link betwe

Soviet military doctrine and the commander’s operatio

scheme of maneuver, Checkmate identified 10 critical a

vulnerable army-level fuel supply nodes. The new stu

identified approximately 40 aim points that could disr

operational-level fuel flow, thereby negating Soviet forc

ability to supply themselves during breakthrough ope

tions. The sortie count to achieve this disruption of a log

tic infrastructure changed from AAFCE’s original “seve

thousand” estimate to a more realistic 150. Checkm

planners had considered the fuel system as an infrastr

ture that provided linkage between Soviet military doctr

and operational art. They reduced the target set to m

ageable numbers by finding the most vulnerable no

presenting the greatest potential for degradation at the s
gle most important time. This example highlights an id

taken from chaos theory that the vulnerability of an en

system (the adversary’s operational and doctrinal cultu

is determined by the vulnerability of nodes linking the s

tem together (infrastructure).

Though provocative and instrumental in stimulating 

bate over airpower’s efficacy, the debate over Warden’s 

strategic ring theory has neglected three of his rings—orga

essentials, population, and infrastructure. The debate 

centered on fielded forces versus leadership.2

 Of the th

neglected rings, infrastructure (the third ring) might prov

the best approach to airpower in future operations.

Infrastructure comprises dynamic systems. Put simp

infrastructure binds a society because it carries its po

cal, military, and economic communications: goods, servic

and information. Infrastructure becomes a COG becaus

serves as form and function. Bridges, highways, railro

tracks, and fiber-optic cables with their correspond

trucks, trains, and servers constitute form. But form 

secondary to the processes or functions these compone

of infrastructure routinely engage—communications.

Societal Structure and

Lines of Communications

In the Gulf War, two military modes, Second Wave and Third

Wave, were employed. The Iraqi forces, especially after most

of their radar and surveillance were excised, were a conven -

tional “military machine.” Machines are the brute technology of

the Second Wave era, powerful but stupid. By contrast, the

allied force was not a machine, but a system with far greater

internal feedback, communication, and self-regulatory adjustment capability. It was, in fact, in part at least, a Third Wave

“thinking system.” Only when this principle is fully understood

can we glimpse the future of armed violence.

—Alvin and Heidi Toffler

To understand how military power (and especially 

power) can contribute to achieving strategic and operatio

aims, one must begin by understanding the adversary’s so

ety and culture. Alvin and Heidi Toffler observed that “

way we make war reflects the way we make wealth.” 3
The Toffler Societal Model

The Tofflers describe societies as first wave (agraria

second wave (industrial), and third wave (informational).

First Wave

First-wave agrarian civilizations are inescapably 

tached to the land. They are a product of the agricultu

revolution whose leitmotif is subsistence and surviv

Its infrastructure is preindustrial, heavily dependent 

agricultural goods, and reliant on other societies for m

terials and markets. Societal structure is concentra

on a handful of resources, a stunted manufacturing s

tor, and underdeveloped services. These factors grea

reduce both internal and external linkages for the so

ety, which typically remains low on the interdependen

or connectivity scale.5

First-wave warfare is marked by battles regulated 

the growing season and agricultural calendar. It p

force against force in a conflict over possessions. Mu

of the operational strategy is regulated by the search 

fodder and organization of the supply trains. First-w

warfare bears the unmistakable stamp of the agrar

economies that gave rise to it, not so much in terms 

technology, but in organization, communication, log

tics, and administration, as well as reward structur

leadership styles, and cultural assumptions. Agrar

societies are difficult to coerce with airpower becau

they lack well-developed infrastructure linkages that c

be exploited.

Second Wave

Second-wave societies are industrial and marked 

large quantities of labor and mass production. Industri

zation results in greater connectivity between the prod

tion of goods, services, and information and their c

sumption within the society. As markets expand throu

imports and exports, these societies become more globa

connected. This vast connectivity forms an infrastruct

based on the production and control of goods, servic

and information. Land, labor, raw materials, and cap
are the main factors in second-wave economies. Mass p

duction, bureaucracy, and tangible value are the und

pinnings of wealth. Infrastructure linkages are conc

trated on mass production and mass consumpt

processes, in essence, the logistics of wealth. 6

Second-wave warfare’s main feature is the mass 

struction of industrial powers. John Keegan points 

that twentieth century European civilization left “the wo

it dominated pregnant with war.”7

 The nineteenth cent

industrial revolution created enormous wealth, energy, a

production. It created productive and exploitative ind

tries—foundries, engineering works, textile factories, sh

yards, mines, and so forth—far greater than ever en

sioned by the intellectual fathers of the industr

revolution. More important, the productive regions of 

world were interconnected by roads, railways, shipp

lanes, and telegraph and telephone lines. Accompany

these were schools, universities, libraries, laboratories, a

churches that constituted a network of world civilizati

The industrial revolution also spawned armies possess

vast capabilities to destroy the very things that made so

ety industrialized.

Third Wave

In third-wave societies, knowledge—data, informati

images, symbols, culture, ideology, and values—is the c

tral resource of the economy. This allows these econom

to reduce the mass associated with the second wave, 

create wealth in exponential quantity. The right knowle

reduces labor, inventory, energy, and raw materials, 

well as the time, money, and space necessary to produ

wealth. Third-wave societies build new infrastructure li

ages inside and outside their societies based on accum

lating knowledge. The finite amount of land, labor, r

materials, and capital is replaced by the quest for in

haustible knowledge. New societal values emerge based 

on hard value (form), but on the process needed to acqu

generate, distribute, and apply knowledge. Mass prod

tion is replaced by demassification that leads to a red

tion in the activity necessary to produce the same leve

wealth used in first- and second-wave societies. Demass
cation also flattens the leadership hierarchies necessary 

govern second-wave structures. Industrial plant and le

ership are dispersed and networked.

In third-wave societies, economies of scale are f

quently outweighed by “diseconomies” of complexity. R

ing complexity necessitates a high order of systemic in

gration in the infrastructure that links the soci

together. What emerges is a vast informational netw

that replaces much of the second-wave infrastructu

In their external relations, third-wave societies evo

into hyperconnected communities. They fracture i

smaller parts as they demassify. An extremely comp

global system of often competing and different intere

results. Paradoxically, the most powerful societies l

the United States, Japan, and Europe need the m

linkages because they become interdependent with 

outside world to sustain their advanced economi

Taken together, this amounts to what the Tofflers 

scribe as a “monumental change in how wealth is c

ated” and, for our purposes, an equally remarka

change in how war is waged. 9

The Gulf War can be regarded as a precursor of thi

wave warfare. It emphasized precision targeting rat

than mass destruction, operational effectiveness based 

the transfer of massive quantities of information, and 

formation dominance to generate an operational tem

that eluded the enemy’s ability to observe, orient, deci

and act. John Boyd coined the term OODA loop (obse

orient, decide, act) to describe this cycle of perception, 

cision, and action.10 Boyd’s notion of an organism’s int

action with the environment touches chaos theory. He c

tends that an organism observes and orients itself in su

a way to succeed and prosper by adapting and shaping 

environment to its own ends. The environment is, howev

not inert but adaptive in its own right and often chaotic 

behavior. Like the weather, which comprises only one of 

elements, the environment is bounded but is unpredicta

and highly sensitive to small variations in initial con

tions. Societal structure may, in this sense, be viewed 

another element of the environment.
Understanding societal structure is crucial to discern

the processes that underpin it, and where vulnerabilit

might be militarily exploited. The Tofflers provide a go

model to relate societal structure (culture), the prod

tion of wealth (economics), and warfare. This model 

also useful in determining how societies transmit th

wealth. Communications carry the society’s goods, servic

and information. Infrastructure then circumscribes 

process for distributing a society’s communicatio

whose lines are defined by geography and cultu

Hence, communications are as much the function of v

ues as geography.

Defining Lines of Communications

Joint Publication (JP) 3-0, Doctrine for Joint Operatio

describes lines of communications as “all the routes, la

water, and air, which connect an operating military fo

with a base of operations and along which supplies and m

tary forces move.” It treats lines of communications a

subset of “lines of operation . . . the directional orientation 

the force in time and space in relation to the enemy . . . t

connects the force with its base of operations and its obj

tives.” This latter distinction implies the lines are more th

physical since they also connect force with objectives. F

thermore, JP 3-0 goes on to note that these lines take o

three-dimensional quality and “pertain to more than just m

neuver.” Joint doctrine defines them as a way for joint fo

commanders to focus “combat power effects toward a desi

end (to) . . . converge on and defeat enemy centers of gr

ity.”11

This definitional landscape splits hairs over focus

operations on form or process. A better and more re

vant definition of lines of communications is the inf

structure for the transmission (to include collecti

processing, analyzing, and disseminating) of all forms 

goods, services, and information. This definition ma

no distinction among military, economic, political, 

cultural lines of communications. Additionally, a m

universal definition of lines of communications ma

implicit the integration of all societal infrastructure.
Jomini’s Lines of Communications

Jomini provides the first exposition of military force 

cused on infrastructure. In Treatise on Grand Military 

erations (Paris, 1865), Jomini notes that (1) strategy is 

key to warfare, (2) all strategy is controlled by invaria

scientific principles, and (3) these principles describe off

sive action to mass forces against weaker forces at so

decisive point to lead to victory. He describes these deci

points in geographical terms: a road junction, river cross

mountain pass, supply base, or an open flank. Jomini s

decisive points as elements vulnerable to attack or capt

that would imperil or seriously weaken the enemy. With

exception, enemy dispositions and supply lines define de

sive points within Jomini’s construct. Jomini uses Napo

onic historical examples to emphasize interior versus c

centric lines of communications.12

Rather than positing a pure theoretical constru

Jomini transforms the intellectual component of war i

operational art. Lines of communications have natural a

physical characteristics; however, they also portend stra

gic choice. His theory attempts to provide an operatio

template to describe where to fight, for what purpose, a

with what force.13

Jomini reinforces the importance of infrastructure. 

conceptual lines of communications are more than terr

rial. They become maneuver lines of operation in much 

same way that Air Force Doctrine Document 1 (AFDD 

describes airpower as a maneuver force and Joint Vis

2010 describes dominant maneuver.14 To Jomini, whet

describing Napoleonic success, Frederick II’s less sp

tacular victories, or the outcome of all warfare past a

future, infrastructure targets had similar characteristic

For example, he was less concerned with the char

teristics of bridges than with the total strategic and ope

tional value of the transportation infrastructure that det

mined how a commander conducted warfare. Making 

proper strategic choice was not a matter of servicing s

cific targets. Choices were made for operational and stra

gic decisiveness. In much the same manner as Boyd 

ticulates his OODA loop, Jomini described a construct 

commanders to apply decisive, aggressive, offensive act
to deprive the enemy of “time to think and act, with su

rior force at the time and place of battle is the best guara

tee of victory.”16

Chaos Theory, Warden, and Infrastructure

For want of a nail the shoe was lost . . . For want of a shoe the

horse was lost . . . For want of a horse the rider was lost . . . For

want of a rider the battle was lost . . . For want of a battle the

kingdom was lost . . . and all for the want of a horseshoe na il.

—Poor Richard

This quote exemplifies the chain of events that mi

cause a chaotic outcome in an otherwise orderly wo

Warden’s (infrastructure) third ring, Jomini’s lines of co

munications, and chaos theory provide a synthetic base 

a general theory of airpower.

Understanding Chaos Theory

The word chaos has many interpretations. Webst

New World Dictionary defines it as “extreme confusion 

disorder.”17 Contrary to what the name implies, chaos t

ory studies sequential events in perceived chaotic beh

iors in the hope of finding order. Paradoxical as it m

seem, chaos is neither random nor erratic. Scientific a

mathematical literature defines chaos theory18 as “the 

ence of complex, dynamic nonlinear systems . . . (a

since organizations are complex, dynamic systems, ch

is the science of organization.”19 The theory lies at the 

defined, somewhat arbitrary, border between mathema

and physics (and as some critics might imply—alchemy).

Chaos theory applies to dynamic systems—systems t

contain a very large number of shifting and varying com

nent parts.20 These parts are interconnected and inter

lated in some fashion. The stock market illustrates t

principle. A look at the daily market indicators dem

strates it is not static. Individual brokers, investors, a

the companies whose stocks are traded comprise inter

lated subsystems of the stock-market system.

Within these dynamic systems, nonperiodic order exis

that is, seemingly random collections of data can yield 
derly yet nonrecurrent patterns. Even though the patte

may appear repetitive, they are not. If the patterns 

truly repeated, the system behavior would follow a def

tive path, and would no longer be chaotic and apparen

unpredictable. Weather patterns illustrate this princip

At a given location, weather cycles through seaso

changes are well defined; however, from year to year 

cycles vary.

Such chaotic systems exhibit sensitive dependence up

initial conditions; that is, a slight change in any one of 

initial inputs leads to disproportionately divergent o

comes.21 This principle is one of the most important fact

for military planners. The essence of the principle is t

small changes or perturbations may result in very dif

ent, and sometimes unpredictable, behaviors at la

times. The fact that order exists suggests that patterns c

be predicted in at least weakly chaotic systems. 22

Complex system structures resemble fractals—patte

formed by an iterative process that display self-similar

Self-similarity means that small bits and pieces of 

structure are similar to the overall shape from which th

came. If a branch of a cauliflower head were dissected, 

smaller piece would look very similar to the whole. T

iterative process uses the output, like the dissection of 

cauliflower, as the next input. This input is then furt

dissected into its iterative output, and so on. Each outp

possesses the self-similarity of its corresponding input. 2

Scaling describes how objects retain self-similarity wh

viewed from different distances. In nature, a mountain p

vides an excellent illustration of this property. From a d

tance, the mountain appears rugged. As one gets closer a

examines a small peak of the mountain, the same rugg

ness repeats. Viewing one outcrop of this peak closer a

shows the same ruggedness. This scaling property can c

tinue all the way down to the microscopic level. 24

Chaos draws a fine line between the predictable a

unpredictable. Initial conditions are sensitive and are of

popularized in chaos literature as the “butterfly effect

where a butterfly flapping its wings over Brazil can spa

a hurricane in the Caribbean Sea. 26 This means sm

changes may result in very different behaviors at la
times; however, it might be possible to place bounds o

range of behaviors if they are weakly chaotic. We can th

make assertions about the future states that the syst

might pass through, even though we cannot exactly pred

the form of those states.

Linear systems display two important characterist

Input and output are proportional; if input doubles, out

doubles. Second, linear systems obey the superposit

rule; that is, several simultaneously applied inputs t

system yield an output whose total equals the sum of 

inputs. A system is linear when it has proportionality a

superposition. These properties give linear systems th

predictable behavior.

We tend to treat most systems as if they were linear

factory is a good example. We predict that if we add 

certain number of people, or additional inventory, we w

increase the output by a comparable amount. What g

into the system should be a predictor of what comes o

But in reality factories do not operate this way. Change 

number of people and inventory and a widely differing o

put might occur—far from what we predicted. This is 

cause factories are nonlinear systems that do not obey 

properties of proportionality and superposition. Small 

puts may yield huge outputs depending upon the nature 

the system.27 Additionally, nonlinear systems will attem

to self-regulate with internal modifications as a cop

mechanism to external disturbance.28

The subsystems that organize a society—for examp

leadership; command and control; electrical power prod

tion and distribution; petroleum, oil, and lubricant (P

networks; finance and banking; telecommunications; a

other subsystems—also form systems. Each system 

subsystem is more or less vulnerable to internal and ext

nal disturbances. Many of the systems and subsystems 

interconnected and interact with each other. These linka

define the normal operation of the systems and convey n

linear, chaotic processes. Disturbances in one subsystem 

the system may have effects on other subsystems that 

completely out of proportion to the initial disturbances, 

may ripple through the entire system via the direct and in

rect linkages, thus affecting all the subsystems.
An understanding of chaos allows us to find boun

and/or patterns within systems that appear to be, but m

not be completely, unpredictable. This understanding 

lows us a measure of predictability when a number of 

teractive systems are involved. Crucial to applying ch

theory to warfare in coherent fashion is a comprehens

of the enemy’s culture and a contextual notion of its s

tems, subsystems, linkages, and critical vulnerabilities.

In spite of what we might think is obvious about cha

chaos and order are not opposites of each other. They 

rather yin and yang, inseparably intertwined. Chaos the

is a conceptual device for describing an incredibly comp

world. While theory may fall short of an absolute insi

into complex systems, it at least provides a powerful “na

gational tool” to perceive the conditions on the edges 

chaos.

A Practical Example of Chaos

An electrical power grid provides an excellent example 

chaos. The power grid from generation station, transform

substations, to customers, forms a networked system. T

network’s exponential branching demonstrates comp

scaling. Complexity and underlying order makes the s

tem susceptible to failure. If a generator is removed, 

some other power isolation occurs, the system attempts 

self-regulate to compensate for the power well and 

quency droop. Other power suppliers, whether backup s

tems or outside sources, attempt to take up the slack

the reserve is insufficient, or the system is already at pe

production, the energy well might cause a failure in 

entire grid. Circuit breakers are provided to disconnect 

energy well to prevent catastrophic failure. But if the 

cuit breakers are defective, and/or other power generat

stations are taken off-line, the energy well and frequen

droop can cause a surge or bow wave that also might br

the entire system down. Once this bow wave begins, i

impossible to stop unless the defective part in the syst

can be quickly located and replaced. Self -regulat

keeps the system precariously balanced on the edge 

chaos, where any subsequent minute pulse might resul
unexpected catastrophic system failure. Conversely, an 

adequate reserve allows a wave of dynamically unsta

energy to propagate throughout the system and also c

figure it for failure. The power system is interconnected a

interrelated to other systems of the society. Just as the u

stable energy propagated throughout the power grid, a ca

strophic failure of the power grid can propagate through

the interrelated systems (transportation, communicatio

industrial production, computer networks, etc.)

Warfare on the Edge of Chaos

It is important to understand the behavior of a chao

system, particularly the relationship between input a

outcome. If a society at war were perceived as a chao

system, then the application of force is an input and cor

sponding behavior an outcome. The unpredictability 

outcome, bounded in the extremes by indifference and 

nihilation, defines chaos, or at best, nonlinearity. A

Beyerchen points out that war is inherently nonlinear, a

that its character changes in ways that continually a

the political ends that guide war. Politics, then, is m

than a guiding hand for war. It is power, and the cycl

from violence to power and back again is an intrinsic p

of war. Beyerchen points out:

We can never recover the precise initial conditions even of known

developments in past wars, much less developments in curren

wars distorted by the fog of uncertainty. Interactions at every scale 

. . between adversaries amplify microcauses and produc

unexpected macroeffects.29

In general, most military theorists assume that giv

enough information, outcomes become predictable, a

courses of actions can be generated to meet objective

Emergent behavior is an important characteristic of c

otic systems.31 Interactions within the system can lead 

emerging global properties that are strikingly different fr

the behaviors of the individual subsystems. These glo

properties are impossible to predict from prior knowle

of the components and then affect the entire environm

that the components “see,” thereby influencing their 

havior. A synergistic feed-back loop forms such that 

interactions between the subsystems determine the glo
properties, which in turn influence the subsystems the

selves. Each subsystem exhibits its own emergent beh

ior, and in turn influences the global behavior of the ent

system.

This spiral of behavior—global properties—can be b

seen in the stock market. Interactions among the trad

(buying and selling) can prompt global properties (rise a

fall of the Dow-Jones Industrial Average). Sometimes 

degree of analysis of individual trader actions can pred

the Dow. Each trader then interprets the Dow trend a

reacts in a given way (perhaps selling when the Dow g

up). The competition and rivalry among the traders res

in an emergent behavior on the part of the system bas

on the individual perceptions of the global properties. 3

this case, a market that appears to be selling off sto

might result in emergent action on the part of the trad

to start buying.

An emergent behavior pattern on the part of comp

system implies that reductionist analysis has limits. As 

analyst attempts to deconstruct the system into sma

parts, the analysis usually focuses on the properties of 

pieces, rather than the dynamics of the system. 33 But 

studying the parts instead of the system as a whole, glo

properties are lost. The blurring of emergent behavior 

curs because the global properties are functions of 

interaction among the subsystems and their effects. Thi

what occurred in AAFCE’s study of Soviet fuel. The glo

property of the Soviet fuel system was lost because 

planners had focused on the characteristics of the stor

sites (subsystems) as individuals, not the interaction of 

components of an entire system (within the concept

framework of Soviet military doctrine). Checkmate applie

holistic approach to include the interaction of the subs

tems and the global properties (the fuel system’s impact 

Soviet military doctrine). The result was a nodal analysis t

did not treat the subsystems in isolation but focused on 

global properties of the entire system.

This point is crucial in understanding chaos theor

contribution to armed conflict, since “war is . . . an act 

force to compel our enemy to do our will.” 34 The target a

timing of attack should be designed to trigger a mecha n
that precipitates a desired outcome. If the global propert

of the enemy system are not considered, then the spec

results will probably not occur. At worst, the connect

between the desired outcome and the attack breaks; 

best, the outcome is blurred because the system’s comp

behavior cannot be assessed against the input. The Roll

Thunder campaign in the Vietnam conflict illustrates t

point.

Rolling Thunder was an air interdiction campaign 

signed to cut off the insurgent Vietcong in the South fr

North Vietnamese support. The primary targets were tra

portation, storage, and some North Vietnamese indust

plants.35 American planners attacked second-wave targ

in an attempt to influence first-wave warfare. 36 Contem

rary analysis labels Rolling Thunder a failure. The pl

ners concluded that without direct support from the Nor

the insurgent war in the South was doomed. One reas

for Rolling Thunder’s failure was that the planners m

dentified infrastructure linkage between the North V

namese and the Vietcong in the South. The actual link

was between the source of the Vietcong’s power (the soci

of the South) and their cultural and ideological force, 

North Vietnam. Rather than relying on an infrastructu

the Vietcong derived their power from word-of-mouth, 

cialization, ideology, politicization, and “family.” North 

etnam could not be coerced by airpower during the sou

ern insurgent phase because there was no infrastruct

linking them to the Vietcong beyond people in communi

tion.37 Airpower never provoked an acute cost-ben

analysis. The insurgents were never coerced by airpow

because there was no linkage between their emergent 

havior and the system global properties.

Later, bombing in Linebacker I and II was more succe

ful at coercing North Vietnam because the insurgent w

had subsided in the South, and first-wave warfare h

transitioned into second wave. Infrastructure linkage 

came more “conventionally based.” Once the North V

namese became reliant on their infrastructure linkages 

communication, transportation, technology, logistics, a

command and control, airpower was better able to coerc

A more pronounced infrastructure linkage existed betw
the North Vietnamese emergent behavior and its glo

properties.

Chaos theory suggests that some systems are unp

dictable, so gathering more information to improve pred

tion is impossible and becomes counterproductive when 

creates a false sense of security. 39 As we explore what 

formation dominance means in the future, we must und

stand that perfect situational awareness is an illusion

Enhanced technology might help pierce the fog of w

however, it will never eliminate it. Reductionist meth

simply do not work for chaotic systems. Complexity e

phasizes both structure and behavior, with neither be

100 percent predictable. Our understanding of informat

dominance says that comprehensive situational awaren

will be required not only to locate the target and establ

targeting parameters but also to gauge the effectiveness 

the attack and its impact on the enemy. To wage inform

tion warfare to the fullest extent of our capabilities, m

tary planners will have to develop a better understand

of how cultures are linked, and where those linkages 

most vulnerable.

If the planners understand the structure and linkag

military actions become more than a continually mov

and unfolding series of targets. Chaos theory states t

since initial conditions and behavior are unpredictab

end states are also unpredictable. The form of the compl

adaptive systems may be ill defined; its processes, ho

ever, have structure.41

Figure 1 illustrates how chaos theory and system 

namics might be relevant to military planners. Since ch

theory can only approximate reality because initial con

tions are never known and end states are unpredictab

the processes that link subsystems are more import

than their form.

Figure 1 depicts a factor overlooked by early airpow

theorists. War occurs between and within societies; the

fore, to understand war, one must understand how soc

ties are structured. Initial conditions are modified and 

acted upon by all elements of a society over time a

become end states. A society’s structure is based on 

processes that link its elements of power. Initial conditio
become end states as a result of the interactions amo

the societal linking processes. These processes are ill

trated in figure 1 as the lines that connect the vario

subsystems of the society. This weblike network forms 

infrastructure that binds a society together. Any theory 

airpower that overlooks or omits the societal and cultu

elements underlying the value system of the adversary 

inherently incomplete.

The Strategic Bombing Survey of the war in Europe d

ing World War II noted that careful selection of targets 

air attack should have emphasized the German experien

In particular, it concluded that “the Germans were 

more concerned over attacks on one or more of their ba

industries and services—their oil, chemical, or steel ind

tries or their power or transportation network—than th

were over attacks on their armament industry or the c

areas. The most serious attacks were those which 

stroyed the industry or service which most indispe 

ably served other industries.”42 This observation runs 

Figure 1. Chaos as a Military Strategy Model
actly counter to the Allied Combined Bomber Offens

whose priority was German war production. 43 The Al

had made the same mistake as the AAFCE planners. Th

had failed to identify the infrastructure deemed indispe

able by the adversarial culture. The Allies failed to det

mine the culturally relevant infrastructure because the 

formation on the “German economy . . . at the outset of 

war was inadequate.”44

The Strategic Bombing Survey reinforces the logic 

considering society and culture. Rather than describ

the process, we would be left with only the form. Th

then, becomes a description of specific targets: switch

nodes, telephone exchanges, computer networks, bridg

choke points, and so forth. We would have a compreh

sive target set; however, we would have little und

standing of what any given target contributes to the p

cess that links various systems. To impact societ

decision making, we need to affect its process, not sim

attack its form. A theory focused on process leads to tar

selections in specific and unique situations relevant to 

interrelations of the subsystems of the adversary’s s

tems. Key targets are based on linkages within the imp

tant elements of an adversary’s power structure. The t

gets are less a finite description of specifics and mor

description of system linkage. As such, a practical the

is culture bound, because culture determines the va

placed on components of the adversary’s system and det

mines the form and process.

Infrastructure:

Warden’s Third Strategic Ring

Rethinking Warden’s third strategic ring provides a m

jor element to form our practical guide to applying a

power in the future. Combining chaos and Jomini provi

a framework to look at the transmission of goods, servic

and information within a social context to identify poten

COGs. By combining this idea with a revised way to v

Warden, we develop a theory of airpower that is infrastr

ture centered, operational- and strategic-COG driven, a

culturally determined.
While a student at National War College, Warden wr

an academic thesis, later published as “The Air Campaig

Warden’s thesis focused on COGs and interdiction. 45 

advocated that airpower’s inherent speed, range, and fle

bility allowed it to extend beyond the bloody battle to str

a full spectrum of enemy capabilities in a swift and de

sive manner.46 Warden’s thesis focused on the Clausew

ian idea of COG refined as “that point where the enemy 

most vulnerable and the point where an attack will h

the best chance of being decisive.” 47

Although Warden’s thesis discussed the importance 

COGs, it lacked a conceptual model to simplify the re

tionship between COGs and airpower. In 1988, he beg

work on an organizing scheme to explain his thesis a

produced a model formed by five concentric rings depic

in figure 2 below.

Warden’s five-ring model views the enemy as a hier

chical system composed of five subsystems: leadership, 

ganic essentials, infrastructure, population, and field

Figure 2. Warden’s Five-Ring Model
military forces.48 Figure 2 depicts the subsystems as 

concentric rings with the innermost ring, leadership, be

the most critical for the system to operate. Criticality 

creases as one moves outward, with the least critical r

being fielded military forces. Within each ring is a coll

tion of COGs for that particular ring. If the COGs are n

tralized, the function of the ring (or subsystem) ceas

According to Warden, other rings are affected depending 

whether the subsystem destroyed is an inner or outer r

Herein lies one of the greatest weaknesses of Warde

model. Rather than a separate and independent ring, inf

structure permeates the entire system. Rather than an 

ner ring affecting the outcome of an outer ring, perhap

is the infrastructure that binds the entire system and 

the mechanism for the interdependence of all the rings.

Warden decomposed each ring into its own set of 

rings with the same concentric structure (leadership, 

ganic essentials, etc.) that describes the complete syste

These subsystems can continue to be broken down (scali

into fractals until true COGs emerge. Warden’s five-r

model implicitly contains the linkages between the vario

components of an enemy system. Warden’s central the

is that for the most effective use, airpower should focus 

leadership. In the practical application of his theory, on

left asking the following questions: What is a leaders

target? Can leadership be affected in ways other than 

rect attack? If infrastructure links the subsystems, migh

be the most important target? Although Warden’s theory 

compelling in its focus on the mind of the leader, that m

not always be the most important target.

Chaos theory helps us understand that Warden’s rin

are linked and interdependent rather than independe

Chaos helps explain how linkage of the various syste

allows an attack on one subsystem to have tremendo

effect on another, for example, how a concentrated atta

on infrastructure might alter leadership behavior.

Reformulating Warden’s Model

Warden’s model explicitly neglects how infrastruct

might be the mechanism by which coercion occurs. 
portraying five subrings of the same structure within 

major rings (fractals), Warden hints implicitly at t

linkage. Within these subrings, linkage is probably ma

through the physical infrastructure comprising the su

systems.49 They include command and control, transp

tation, support, communications, logistics, and so for

Rather than a separate infrastructure ring, the ot

four rings of Warden’s model become interconnected a

interrelated through infrastructure. With so much of 

debate over Warden’s theory focused on the first r

(leadership) versus fifth ring (fielded forces) debate, 

frastructure (third ring) as a complex system linkage 

lost. Also lost is Warden’s potential utility for third-w

warfare.

Figure 3. A New Model for Societal Structure
Figure 3 offers an alternative to Warden’s model. A r

comprising three segments depicts the core of a societ

population, organic essentials, and leadership. These th

subsystems are interrelated and are much the same 

Warden articulates them; however, they are not hierarc

cal. The new model depicts third-wave warfare, wher

Warden’s model addresses second-wave warfare where 

cisions on targeting had to be hierarchical. Surround

the core subsystems of the society are the fielded milit

forces that protect the others from outside influence. In 

center of the figure is a black area that represents 

society’s infrastructure. It is depicted in such a way tha

links every subsystem of the society.

The infrastructure depicted in figure 3 binds every su

system of its society in an interrelated structure. Ch

theory is important to understanding the mechanics of 

infrastructure. Attacking infrastructure in any spec

subsystem of society can have effects on other subsystem

for example, attacking a fiber-optic network node can 

multaneously impact banking, industrial production, a

telecommunications (organic essentials); military co

mand and control, intelligence dissemination, and logist

database integration (military forces); and National Co

mand Authorities communications, strategic intelligen

and propaganda production (leadership). Already effec

in second-wave warfare, attacking infrastructure in thi

wave warfare may be the only alternative because (1) le

ership is flattened and dispersed, (2) organic essentials 

scaled down and dispersed, (3) population is beneath 

scruples to attack directly, and (4) military forces are fir

wave, out of fashion, and fight back.

Warden notes that “the essence of war is applying pr

sure against the enemy’s innermost ring, its comma

structure.”50 A final element of his theory is that of para

attack. After understanding the enemy as a system, 

problem becomes one of reducing the enemy to the desi

level or paralysis. Warden notes that the number of v

targets obtained by studying the enemy system is relativ

small, and if struck in parallel (near simultaneously), da

age to the enemy becomes insuperable. As one studies 

idea in greater detail, one sees its application i s directly 
lated to the transmission of the society’s goods, servic

and information—its lines of communications. Ward

pays too little attention to the notion that these syste

are linked through their infrastructures. What better w

to induce paralysis than attacking the nervous syste

especially when the brain is elusive or inaccessible? If 

mind of the commander (“first-ring” leadership) is imp

tant, then “third-ring” infrastructure may be the m

doable way to influence the leaders. Loss of important 

frastructure may become what matters most.

Synthesizing a Different Approach for

Applying Airpower in the Information Age

Science today stands on something of a divide. For two centu -

ries it has been exploring systems that are either intrinsically

simple or that are capable of being analyzed into simple com -

ponents. The fact that such a dogma as “vary the factors one

at a time” could be accepted for a century, shows that scien -

tists were largely concerned in investigating such systems as

allowed this method; for this method is often fundamentally

impossible in complex systems.

—Ross W. Ashby

Understanding the nature of cultural patterns can p

vide insight into the dynamics of the systems compris

the culture. Chaos theory can help us reduce the fog a

friction, understand the uncertainties of warfare, a

bound the range of future outcomes in employing milit

force. But research into chaos is relatively new, and 

formulation into comprehensive algorithms has only 

gun. More important, application of chaos to the milit

planning process is even more recent—yet, history d

provide a window to explore new ideas for the future.

Three Examples of Airpower,

Chaos, and Infrastructure

We can explore three historical examples applicable 

our study—two from World War II and one from the rec

Gulf War.
World War II Campaign against

German Transportation

In the 1930s, the Air Corps Tactical School (ACTS) dev

oped a strategic bombing theory known as the “indust

web.” Led by Harold George, Don Wilson, and a handfu

other faculty, ACTS focused on a belief that econom

were intricate and interconnected entities that rested 

certain basic industries (transportation, steel, iron ore, a

electrical power). Destroying one or more of the threads 

this “web” would unravel the economic and social fabric 

an adversary. The subsequent collapse of national mor

and economic means of waging war would bring about 

capitulation of the adversary.51 On the surface, this is a

the worldview expressed by Warden. Paradoxically, he a

many other air planners treat the interconnections 

tween the elements of a society, especially its economy, 

secondary in importance to the things connected.

In practice, many airpower enthusiasts behaved exac

as Ashby describes. They dissected elements of a soci

into component parts and targeted each in isolation fr

the global properties of the system. During World War 

the industrial web idea influenced planners to search 

bottlenecks. The Committee of Operations Analysts wrot

memo to Gen Henry H. “Hap” Arnold in March 1943 t

reflects this observation best:

In the determination of target priorities, there should be considered

(a) the indispensability of the product to the enemy war economy

(b) the enemy position as to current production, capacity fo

production and stocks on hand; (c) the enemy requirements for th

product for various degrees of activity; (d) the possibilities o

substitution for the product; (e) the number, distribution and

vulnerability of vital installations; (f) the recuperative possibilities o

the industry; and (g) the time lag between the destruction of th

installations and the desired effect upon the enemy’s war effort. 52

Once industries were identified, the planning tended 

focus on destroying individual target sets rather than 

tacking key interconnected links in different sets. T

trend is apparent when comparing Air War Plans Divisi

1 (AWPD/1), Munitions Requirements of the Army Air For

and AWPD/42, Requirements for Air Ascendancy. T

plans identified the German electrical power system, tra

portation, petroleum and synthetic oil, and morale for p
sible air attack.53 US Army Air Corps planners in Eur

believed destroying synthetic oil and selected military 

dustry (airframe, aircraft engine, and ball bearings) wo

collapse Germany’s ability to support the war. The targ

identified within AWPD/1 and AWPD/42 came from 

study of New York City. The ACTS industrial web the

mirror-imaged US strengths onto Germany. ACTS plann

had not conducted a detailed study of German societ

Both plans provided great detail on target sets, but rar

was the effect of attacking one viewed in light of its imp

on disrupting another. The net result was when one s

tem failed to yield the desired results, priorities shifted 

another target.55 The targeting of the German rail transp

tation is a case in point.

Air Marshal Sir Arthur W. Tedder believed transpor

tion was Germany’s “Achilles’ heel”; however, he only s

ceeded in having transportation listed as a secondary t

get for radar bombing when weather was bad. In the win

of 1945, weather was generally bad on the European con

nent, and German railroads were bombed extensively. R

transportation turned out to be vital for both military a

economic reasons, although the Allies did not realize it 

the time.56 The marshaling yard subsystem also contain

critical command, control, and communications nodes.

The sustained bombing against the marshaling ya

paralyzed Germany’s rail system, and it was unable to 

liver bulk coal from the mines. This degraded electri

power production and coke manufacturing for the iron a

steel industry; aluminum, copper, and war materiel p

duction virtually halted. When the trains stopped, Germ

war industry could not ship supplies to the troops need

them most, especially on the eastern front. Lateral re

forcement was almost impossible because of the lack of 

transport. Civilian morale suffered because heating f

was scarce and trains could not be sent to southeast

Europe for the grain harvests. All these were unintend

consequences the air planners missed because they h

focused only on the form of the German rail system rat

than its process of linking population, fielded forces, a

organic essentials.57 Japanese shipping provides anot

compelling example for the same time period.
Aerial Mining Campaign of the

Japanese Home Waters

The Army Air Forces’ aerial minelaying operations in 

pan’s home waters (Operation Starvation) in 1945 allo

us retroactively to explore the relationships among a

power, chaos, and infrastructure. Although not plann

the comparison of intended to unintended consequences 

the operation is revealing.

In midsummer 1944, Adm Chester W. Nimitz’s staff 

veloped a plan to use B-29s to mine Japanese home w

ters.58 The operation was named Operation Starvation 

cause it intended to strangle what remained of 

Japanese sea lines of communications in 1945. 59 T

plan’s architects believed that aerial mining would sta

both Japan’s industry and population, thereby fata

weakening Japan’s will to continue the war. The plan c

tained three operational objectives: prevent raw mater

and food from reaching Japan, prevent the supply a

deployment of Japanese military forces, and disrupt m

time transportation within the Inland Sea. 60 Without 

aid of a formal understanding of chaos theory, the pl

ners had defined a complex system (Japanese populat

and industry) that was vulnerable to chaos by employ

airpower (B-29 aerial mining) against infrastructure (Ja

nese maritime shipping) to achieve a strategic aim (weak

Japan’s will to continue the war).

General Arnold, Army Air Forces chief of staff; Maj G

Laurence S. Kuter, chief of plans, Air Staff); and Brig G

Haywood S. Hansell Jr., chief of staff, Twentieth Air For

were opposed to the plan. They saw the long-awaited de

onstration of the independent capability of airpower wit

reach. Aerial mining represented yet another attempt 

divert strategic airpower from its primary mission—strate

bombardment of industry and population.61 Unlike 

theater planners, the airpower advocates viewed ae

mining within the narrow paradigm of individual tar

form, rather than in the context of process within a co

plex system.

General Arnold compromised once Twentieth Air Fo

reached full strength and “weather precluded normal vis

bombing operations . . . in the primary mission.” 62 Even 
airpower advocates remained cautious about what ae

mining might contribute to achieving the strategic aim

Brig Gen Lauris Norstad, the new Twentieth Air Force ch

of staff, made it clear that “the commitment to mining w

experimental [and] should not interfere with establish

bombardment policies.”64

The Strategic Bombing Survey concluded that “min

perhaps more than any other weapon of equal accompli

ment, were orphans during the war.” 65 To most airmen

mine was only effective in sinking a ship (an independ

tactical event). Bombing industrial and population cent

were the most attractive uses of strategic airpower to 

airpower advocates. They understood that by 1945 Ja

nese industry had dispersed as a result of strategic bom

ing (a third-wave effect from a second-wave course of 

tion). In fact, this was the rationale used to just

incendiary bombing of the cities. What planners did 

understand was this dispersal also made the Japan

critically dependent on traffic from their inland seapo

Bombing a dispersed manufacturing base became irr

vant if raw materials and energy were unavailable. Airm

were unable to discern the linkage, especially infrastr

ture, that determined this segment of Japanese culture.

On 27 March 1945, Operation Starvation began, a

ended 14 August.66 In all, 1,529 sorties were flown (o

5.7 percent of XXI Bomber Command’s total sorties dur

this period) with 12,135 mines laid in 26 fields on 46 se

rate missions.67 XXI Bomber Command lost 15 B-29s (

percent loss rate) while sinking or damaging 670 sh

totaling 1,252,256 tons (62.5 percent of shipping exist

at that time).68

The outcome of the operation included operational a

strategic effects never considered by the planners. The 

eration imposed a blockading effect that hampered Ja

nese army offenses in China during 1945. 69 The Strate

Bombing Survey noted that Operation Starvation w

“among the most significant contributions of Army air 

the strategic war against merchant shipping . . . (becau

it) reduced the remaining merchant shipping, virtua

closed the vital Shimonoseki Strait and ports not acces

ble to Allied submarines, denied access to repair yar
and threw the administration of shipping into . . . hopel

confusion.”70

Before the war, the Japanese had not invested in cou

termine capabilities. By war’s end they had devoted m

than 35 million yen, 20,000 men, and 349 ships to defe

against the mining campaign. These statistics include n

ther the small suicide craft to detonate the mines nor 

searchlights and antiaircraft artillery drawn away from 

cities to cover the most important mining targets. 71 Mo

over, the Naval Analysis Division of the bombing sur

judged aircraft “to be generally superior to other means 

laying mines.”72

Perhaps the most telling analysis of Operation Star

tion came from postwar interviews of Japanese officia

Japan’s former prime minister, Prince Fumimaro Kon

said that the aerial sinking of Japanese vessels and 

B-29 harbor-mining operations were as equally effective 

the direct B-29 attacks on industry. 73 Takashi Komat

director of a Tokyo steel company, reinforced the form

prime minister’s view by stressing that although bomb

badly hurt factories, the denial of essential raw materi

from the loss of shipping was a greater loss. 74 Capt Ky

Tamura, a Japanese minesweeping officer stated, “The 

sult of B-29 mining was so effective against the shipp

that it eventually starved the country. I think you co

have shortened the war by beginning earlier.” 75

Operation Starvation was a part of the concurrent su

marine and air attack on Japanese merchant shippi

The bombing survey notes that of the 8.9 million tons 

merchant shipping sunk or damaged, 54.7 percent w

credited to submarines, 30.8 percent to direct air atta

9.3 percent to mines (largely dropped by B-29s), and 

rest to gunfire and accidents.76 Though the mining con

bution seems small, it represented a 41⁄2-month B-29, co

pared to a 441⁄2-month submarine, effort. S. W. Roskil

British naval historian noted that

the blockade had, in fact, been far more successful than we realized

at the time. Though the submarines had been the first and main

instrument for its enforcement, it was the air-land mines which

finally strangled Japan.77
The Desert Storm Strategic Bombing Campaign

(Instant Thunder)

The reductionist approach employed by the World Wa

planners has evolved, if not been wholly transformed, 

day. In articulating Instant Thunder, the strategic bomb

phase of the Gulf War, planners postulated a series 

outcomes that appear to have corrected the oversights 

earlier World War II planners. Instant Thunder plann

contains discrete projections about how various subs

tems of the Iraqi society might be linked. Infrastruct

targets were identified and the bounds of emergent beh

ior were estimated based on successfully striking th

targets from the air. The Instant Thunder plan stated th

the destruction of a few key elements of the Iraqi electri

distribution will plunge much of Baghdad into darkness

elimination of half-a-dozen key POL facilities will have immediat

effects on the military and civilian sectors; interdiction of severa

key transportation nodes will impede reinforcement and sto

operations of Iraqi forces in Kuwait and along the Iranian border

negating the telecommunications system and Saddam Hussein’

internal control forces will isolate him from the populace . . . th

psychological impact on the Iraqi populace of being open t

remitting air attack will be a powerful reminder of the bankruptc

and impotence of the Saddam Hussein regime . . . when taken in

toto, the result of Operation INSTANT THUNDER will be th

progressive and systemic collapse of Saddam Hussein’s entire wa

machine and despotic regime.78

But although the Instant Thunder planners specula

on outcome, they forecasted in a relative vacuum. Like 

World War II planners, the Instant Thunder planners 

not perform detailed systems analyses detailing the nat

and structure of Iraq’s culture. In devising Instant Thu

der, Checkmate planners tried to identify targets t

would cut across all the rings of Warden’s model to inf

strategic paralysis on the system. The targets they iden

fied possessed form but had no bearing on the proces

that bound the society together. As chaos theory sugges

outcomes could not be predicted because the initial con

tions and the functioning of the linking processes w

unknown. What resulted was a set of independent t

gets focused on Iraq’s internal control network, nucle

biological-chemical capability, telecommunications, ind

trial and transportation systems, and critical milit
systems. As in prior conflicts, airmen recognized comp

interconnections among the elements of a society, but th

could not exploit them because the planners did not rec

nize their interrelationships. The net result of the Inst

Thunder plan was that targeting and timing were corr

because the identified targets were struck and extensiv

damaged, but the anticipated end state did not occur 

cause the linkage of targets and aims was missing or 

best misguided.

From the Past, the Future

Having developed the theoretical underpinning (the Tof

societal structure, Jomini’s lines of communications, ch

theory’s ideas about complexity, and Warden’s infrastr

ture), all that remains is to assemble them in a reason

fashion. In the final analysis, airpower theorizing bows 

the throne of targeting because you cannot bomb with 

idea or a theoretical construct. Airpower targeting for 

future also stands at the same divide that Ashby noted. 

have reached the point where we can begin disassembl

the old reductionist targeting process. Rather than se

rating different elements of a society and their concomit

targets in isolation, we need to approach the practical 

plication of airpower from a synergistic or holistic vi

point. An adversary’s society is generally a complex str

ture, and we need to target it as such.

One might assume that conflict in the future might 

conducted at the strategic level and take advantage 

American technological capabilities that become incre

ingly pronounced to provide commensurately greater lev

age. If we stay only at the tactical level of attacking milit

forces, we will make only marginal improvements in 

ability to conduct second-wave warfare. If we strive to 

pact the adversary’s infrastructure in a way that has 

greatest strategic and operational effect, we might att

our objectives without the need to engage in widespre

and possibly prolonged destructive warfare.

By focusing at the strategic and operational level, we 

immediately forced to answer several basic questio

What national security objectives (political, economic, 
cial, and military) are we trying to accomplish? What m

tary objectives will support attaining these objectiv

What do we know about the adversary, and how does 

adversary structure his society? Where are the most de

sive points to leverage disruption of the adversary’s socie

structure (its infrastructure)?

Using Warden’s model, fielded forces would be the m

logical object of second-wave warfare, for in the age of m

warfare, one could not “get at” any of the other rings (es

cially leadership) without first breaking down the natio

military line of defense. World War II in Europe illustra

the point. Eighth Air Force was assigned the task in Ope

tion Pointblank (the Combined Bomber Offensive of 19

to achieve air superiority over Europe as an intermedi

objective of the highest priority.79 This was necessary 

fore either the invasion of Europe or the full weight of 

strategic bombing campaign could take effect.

If the Tofflers and Warden are correct, third-wave, para

and hyperwarfare enables us to bypass, penetrate, and o

erwise overcome all or most of the fielded forces to str

directly at other subsystems. We have seen how infrastructu

and especially those linkages that define the communicatio

goods, services, and information, might have the great

operational and strategic effect. As we enter the informat

age, much of this infrastructure will be information bas

Comprehensive situational awareness must be used to co

plement the twin capabilities of exact intelligence gathered 

real time and precision weapons delivered from stealthy p

forms. Some targets will be vulnerable to soft-kill mec

nisms, such as computer virus attacks to disable a natio

telephone switching system, intrusive electronic warfare 

wipe out an adversary’s logistics inventory database, or 

electromagnetic pulse to disrupt electronic systems. Rega

less of the method we employ in our attacks, infrastruct

linkages in an adversary’s society provide the best target 

to achieve operational and strategic objectives. Targeting 

airpower in the future should consider the following:

Political Infrastructure

• National governmental apparatus and centers—he

quarters or administrative offices; National Comma
Authorities (individuals or groups); command/contr

communications nodes (hard or soft) that support 

tional leadership; command posts (mobile/fix

air/land/sea); and ministry-level offices.

• Internal state police and control forces—headquart

for internal control agencies (“secret police”); inte

gence collection systems (i.e., SIGINT [signals inte

gence] intercept); databases supporting internal c

trol systems.

• Propaganda systems (domestic and internationa

propaganda production facilities; public affairs-t

offices and organizations; linkages to public diploma

religious and cultural centers and networks; linka

into area/international telecommunications network

Information Infrastructure

• Telecommunications (radio and TV); public and 

cure switching networks; radio relay facilities; t

phone exchanges; fiber-optic networks, nodes, and 

peater stations; microwave transmission netwo

and nodes; satellite communications nodes; compu

and data processing centers; national C3

I centers.

Economic Infrastructure

• Energy and power production (electrical and POL

transformer stations; distribution nodes; control c

ters for POL production; pump and compressor s

tions; electrical control facilities; cooling system

power transformers and substations; fuel dispens

manifolds; pipelines; distribution terminals; liq

natural gas plants and storage; backup systems; f

storage for backup systems; transportation system 

resupply fuel; dispatch centers.

• Transportation—traffic control at choke poin

bridges, rail yards, critical interchanges; air tra

control centers; airports; ports, ocean terminals, 

tankers, and offshore unloading sites; inland wat

ways, barges, and off-loading sites; motor traffick

facilities; rail fuel storage facilities; computer a

electronic supporting infrastructure for the transp
tation systems; intermodal ties; repair facilities; tra

signal controls; canal locks.

• Financial centers and networks—institutions (ban

trading centers, etc.); currency controls and depos

ries; databases for financial management.

Industrial Production Infrastructure

• Inventory management systems; computer-assisted 

sign facilities; computer-controlled production; rob

assembly systems; automated product distribution s

tems; production support systems and infrastructu

raw material request and distribution systems.

Population Stability Infrastructure

• Control points for food and water distribution s

tems; cultural icons to include statues, memori

and monuments.

Military Infrastructure

• Warning systems and sensors; defense command a

control centers; satellite communications (SATCO

links to space-based systems; control centers a

command posts (fixed, mobile, air, land, sea); we

ons of mass destruction (research and developm

[R&D], storage, nodes controlling release and empl

ment); intelligence collection, processing, and d

semination; logistics management and databas

force deployment and employment control infrastr

ture; electronic communications and data processin

The target nodes above were selected based on their 

tential synergies with the infrastructure of culture. T

parallel what might be seen in second- and third-w

cultures. They do not reflect, however, a universal appli

bility across every society. Each adversary must be exa

ined within its own cultural context to discern relevant 

frastructure. The list does not take into account des

variances; for example, not every pipeline is identical. S

ergistic system impact is the most critical factor in cons

ering any of the listed nodes; for example, a pipeline dis
bution node might affect transportation (railroad eng

fuel), power production (generator fuel), military (veh

fuel), population stability (gasoline distribution), and in

mation (telecommunications backup generator fuel) sim

taneously. This example illustrates target values in ter

of system processes, not in isolated value of the form in 

petroleum subsystem. As a society becomes more th

wave in structure, the preceding list becomes more re

vant to the operational and strategic employment of 

power.

Summary

All societies rely on the movement of goods, servic

and information. How this movement occurs in mod

societies is a cultural variable. An infrastructure, based 

these lines of communications, binds the elements o

society together. This infrastructure forms a complex s

tem that responds to self-regulation against disrupt

within the construct of chaos theory. Airpower is an eff

tive and decisive military instrument of influence in a 

cietal system. By understanding a culture and its system

linkages, we can employ airpower to achieve direct ope

tional and strategic aims. Understanding a society’s inf

structure, lines of communications, and propensity 

chaos form a basis for a general theory of airpower.

Conclusion

Most air and space forces can perform multiple functions to

achieve various strategic, operational, or tactical effects; some

perform them in unique ways. It is this inherent versatility

when combined with the speed, flexibility and global nature of

our reach and perspective that generates the unique Air Force

contribution to joint force capability. These battle-proven

functions can be conducted at any level of war and enable the

Air Force to shape and control the battlespace.

—AFDD 1, Air Force Basic Doctrin

Almost all airpower theory focuses on COGs in one fo

or another. As airmen move from theory to practice, isola

and single-focused applications of airpower usually emer
in the target sets. These target sets usually focused 

form, not societal process. The problem with this approa

was that the target set represented the perceived values 

the theorist, not the adversary. The future battle space w

take on new dimensions in mobility, lethality, and sco

but one constant will remain—the strategic aim will contin

to serve as the guide for planning. 80 Although speed of 

modern battle will surely blur the distinction between 

quential and parallel operations, the linkage between st

tegic aims and enemy COGs should focus our efforts.

This paper offers an application of airpower based 

understanding the adversary’s lines of communications 

potentially the most vulnerable links in the structure of 

society. Airpower’s flexibility and versatility put these li

of communications at risk.

Airpower is an excellent coercion tool. Some might arg

it is the preferred choice.81 To make the strategy work, o

must understand the adversary, not just search for in

pendent targets. If we are ever to achieve informat

dominance in tomorrow’s battle space, we need to do 

more than locate and strike targets in isolation. We m

also process knowledge and comprehension of the crit

nodes in the enemy’s national infrastructure, how its 

litical and other vital systems function, whether these s

tems possess exploitable vulnerabilities, and how the 

versary’s informational and other systems work.

The recently completed report of the National Defe

Panel notes that future military power projection sho

focus on disabling an enemy’s strategic COGs. It sta

that to do this we must “rapidly target and access whate

an adversary values most, the loss of which would ren

him either unable or unwilling to continue his host

ties.”82 The report notes that this has always been an 

jective of war, though difficult to achieve because of unc

tainty and friction. This paper has offered one view on h

airpower might best serve the National Defense Pan

view of the future.

Notes

1. Colonel Warden uses this study as the introduction to prese

tions he gives at Air War College Senior Leadership seminars to show 
Force thought had a dramatic change during the mid-1980s. He cites 

study as an example of the break in the old “target servicing” paradigm

2. Robert A. Pape, Bombing to Win: Air Power and Coercion in 

(Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1996).

3. Alvin and Heidi Toffler, War and Antiwar: Survival at the Daw

the Twenty-First Century (Boston: Little, Brown, and Co., 1993), 3.

4. Leitmotif comes from a style that Wagnerian opera uses to repe

marked melodic phrase or figure; in its current vernacular it mean

dominant recurring theme.

5. Toffler, 3–25 and 246.

6. Ibid., 38–43.

7. John Keegan, The Second World War (New York: Penguin Bo

1989), 12.

8. Toffler, 57–63.

9. Ibid., 63.

10. Grant T. Hammond, “The Essential Boyd,” paper, Maxwell A

Ala.: Air War College, 1997, 5–9.

11. Joint Publication 3-0, Doctrine for Joint Operations (Washing

D.C.: Joint Chiefs of Staff, 1 February 1995), III–17.

12. John Shy, “Jomini” in Peter Paret, ed., Makers of Modern Strat

from Machiavelli to the Nuclear Age (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton Unive

Press, 1986), 146, 154, 159.

13. Ibid., 166.

14. Air Force Doctrine Document 1 (AFDD 1), Air Force Basic Doct

September 1997, says it is a decisive advantage. “The ability of airpo

to engage at any place in minimum time, from either centralized or wi

dispersed locations, and to shape the conflict, describes an impor

aspect of dominant maneuver. Air and space forces are inherently man

ver forces, with unmatched organic lethal and nonlethal ‘firepower,’ ” 

JV 2010 states that “dominant maneuver will be the multidimensi

application of information, engagement, and mobility capabilities, to p

tion and employ widely dispersed . . . forces to accomplish the assig

operational tasks.” See Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Vision 2010 (Wash

ton, D.C.: Government Printing Office [GPO], July 1996), 20.

15. Shy, 167.

16. Ibid., 168.

17. Webster’s New World Dictionary, 2d ed. (New York: Simon 

Schuster, 1982), 125.

18. It is beyond the scope of this paper to explain the mathemat

theorems contained in chaos theory. In fact, it is beyond the scope of 

author’s understanding. Chaos theory can be understood in terms o

practical manifestations without understanding its exceptionally com

mathematical underpinnings.

19. Laurie Fitzgerald, “What is Chaos?” Available from

http://www.orgmind.com/chaos.html.

20. Steven R. Mann, “Chaos Theory and Strategic Thought,” Para

ters 22, no. 3 (Autumn 1992): 54–68.

21. A chaotic (or chaordic) system is defined as a complex and dyna

cal arrangement of connections between elements forming a unified w

the behavior of which is both simultaneously unpredictable (chaotic) 
patterned (orderly). Chaos is the science of such chaotic and orderly, 

is chaordic entities found in abundance throughout the universe. 

Fitzgerald, 1.

22. Uri Merry, “Nonlinear Organizational Dynamics,” n.p.; on-line

ternet, n.d., available from http://pw2.netcom.com/~nmerry/art2.htm

23. Edward Ott, Chaos in Dynamical Systems (Cambridge, Engl

Cambridge University Press, 1993), 31–44 and 57–59.

24. Ibid.

25. James Gleick, Chaos: Making a New Science (New York: Pen

Books, 1988), 104.

26. The “Butterfly Effect” is a good example of the paradox of ch

theory. In reality, it seems to be an ambiguity that this effect might oc

The math of the theory shows it might be possible for the butterfly to h

this effect; however, the null set does not yield a result that says 

butterfly could not possibly have the effect.

27. Joseph O’Connor, “Thinking Past the Obvious: What is a Syste

Available from

http://www.radix.net/~crbnblu/assoc/oconnor/chapt1.htm.

28. Stuart A. Kauffman, The Origins of Order: Self-Organization 

Selection in Evolution (New York: Oxford University Press, 1993), 191.

29. Alan Beyerchen, “Clausewitz, Nonlinearity, and the Unpredictab

of War,” International Security 17, no. 3 (Winter 1992–1993): 80.

30. Clausewitz shows this to be the essence of why military lead

need theory, “Theory will have fulfilled its main task when it is use

analyze the constituent elements of war, to distinguish precisely wha

first sight seems fused, to explain in full the properties of the me

employed and to show their probable effects, to define clearly the na

of the ends in view, and to illuminate all phases of warfare in a thoro

critical inquiry.” Carl von Clausewitz, On War, ed. and trans. Mic

Howard and Peter Paret (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Pr

1984), 141.

31. Roger Lewin, “The Right Connections,” New Scientist 137, 

1859 (February 1993): 12–13.

32. M. Mitchell Waldrop, Complexity: The Emerging Science at 

Edge of Order and Chaos (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1992), 88.

33. Gregoire Nocolis and Ilya Prigogine, Exploring Complexity: An I

duction (New York: W. H. Freeman and Co., 1989), 13.

34. Clausewitz, 75.

35. Mark Clodfelter, The Limits of Airpower: The American Bombin

North Vietnam (New York: Free Press, 1989), 102–7.

36. Ibid., 144.

37. Ibid., 205.

38. Ibid.

39. T. J. Cartwright, “Planning and Chaos Theory,” Journal of Am

can Planning Association 57, no. 1 (Winter 1991): 44–56.

40. Kenneth Allard, Command, Control, and the Common Defense, 

ed. (Washington, D.C.: National Defense University Press, 1990), 297–

41. Cartwright, 53.

42. US Strategic Bombing Surveys (European War) (Pacific War) (M

well AFB, Ala.: Air University Press, 1987), 39.
43. Richard G. Davis, Carl A. Spaatz and the Air War in Europe (W

ington, D.C.: Office of Air Force History, 1993), 345–52.

44. Strategic Bombing Surveys, 39.

45. Clausewitz defines center of gravity as “the hub of all power 

movement on which everything depends. That is the point against wh

all our energies should be directed.” See Clausewitz, 597–98.

46. John A. Warden III, The Air Campaign: Planning for Com

(Washington, D.C.: National Defense University Press, 1988), 9, 51

94–95.

47. Ibid., 9.

48. John A. Warden III, “The Enemy as a System,” Airpower Journ

no. 1 (Spring 1995): 41–55.

49. Ibid., 45–46.

50. Ibid., 49.

51. Robert T. Finney, History of the Air Corps Tactical Sch

1920–1940 (Washington, D.C.: Center for Air Force History, 1992), 67–

52. Guido Perera, History of the Organization and Operations of 

Committee of Operations Analysts, 16 November 1942–October 1

(Maxwell AFB, Ala.: USAF Historical Research Agency), vol. 2, tab 22, 

118.01.

53. Air War Plans Division-1 (AWPD/1), Munitions Requirements o

Army Air Force, 9 July 1941, tab no. 1, 1–6.

54. Air Corps Tactical School, National Economic Structure (Max

Field, Ala., 5 April 1938), 1–12; and New York Industrial Area (6 A

1939), 16–21.

55. Haywood S. Hansell Jr., The Air Plan That Defeated Hitler (Atla

Higgins-McArthur/Longino & Porter, Inc., 1972), 163–65.

56. Alfred C. Mierzejewski, The Collapse of the German Econ

(1944–1945): Allied Air Power and the German National Railway (Ch

Hill, N.C.: University of North Carolina Press, 1963), 168–76.

57. Strategic Bombing Surveys, 37.

58. Wesley Frank Craven and James Lea Cate, The Army Air Force

World War II, vol. 5, The Pacific: Matterhorn to Nagasaki, June 19

August 1945 (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1953), 662.

59. The earlier submarine campaign had reduced Japanese marit

shipping capability from 6,823,000 tons at the start of the wa

2,000,000 at the start of Operation Starvation. See ibid.

60. Headquarters Twentieth Air Force, A-3, “Starvation: Phase An

sis of Strategic Mining Blockade of the Japanese Empire,” 1945, 3. Fo

in USAF Historical Research Agency, file no. 760.491-1.

61. Haywood S. Hansell Jr., Strategic Air War against Japan (W

ington, D.C.: GPO, 1980), 42.

62. Henry H. Arnold, Global Mission (New York: Harper, 1949), 541

63. In his memoir, General Arnold wrote how essential it was to m

the maximum number of bombers possible to destroy Japan’s wa r-ma

capability. He described Admiral Nimitz’s desire for B-29s (to aerial m

as a purely “tactical purpose.” See ibid., 550.

64. Craven and Cate, 666.
65. US Strategic Bombing Survey (Pacific War), Naval Analysis D

sion, The Offensive Minelaying Campaign Against Japan (Washing

D.C.: GPO, 1 November 1946), 25.

66. Frederick M. Salagar, Lessons from an Aerial Mining Camp

(Operation Starvation), RAND Report R-1322-PR (Santa Monica, C

RAND, April 1974), 30.

67. The Offensive Minelaying Campaign, 1.

68. Ellis A. Johnson and David A. Katcher, Mines against Ja

(Silver Spring, Md.: US Naval Ordnance Laboratory, 1973), 30.

69. The Offensive Minelaying Campaign, 9–14.

70. US Strategic Bombing Survey (Pacific War), Transportation Divis

The War against Japanese Transportation, 1941–1945 (Washington, D

GPO, 1947), 8.

71. The Offensive Minelaying Campaign, 27.

72. Robert C. Duncan, America’s Use of Sea Mines (Silver Spring, 

US Naval Ordnance Laboratory, 1962), 157.

73. Headquarters Army Air Forces, A-2, Strategic Effectiveness of A

Mine Warfare, Air Intelligence Division Study no. 131 (Washington, D

Air Intelligence Division, 27 September 1946), 5.

74. Ibid., 7.

75. US Strategic Bombing Survey (Pacific War), Naval Analysis D

sion, The Interrogation of Japanese Officials (Washington, D.C.: G

1946), vol. 1, Interrogation Nav. No. 26, 22 October 1945, 117.

76. US Strategic Bombing Survey, Summary Report (Pacific W

(Washington, D.C.: GPO, 1 July 1946), 11.

77. S. W. Roskill, The War at Sea, 1939–1945, vol. 4, pt. 2, History o

Second World War (London: Her Majesty’s Stationery Office, 1961), 37

78. It is still unclear what the strategic impact was of the strat

bombing phase of Desert Storm actually achieved. The degradation of 

Iraqi military forces at the operational level is well documented. The s

tegic aims as quoted clearly did not occur. See Department of the 

Force, Checkmate, Proposed Iraq Air Campaign Outline Plan: INST

THUNDER (Maxwell AFB, Ala.: USAF Historical Research Agency, 16 A u

1991), file CHSH 1-2, 1-3.

79. Davis, 287–90.

80. JV 2010, 13–19.

81. Ben Lambeth of RAND Corporation says “airpower, with its ne

acquired capabilities over the past decade for precision standoff att

now commands a strong presumption of being the tool of choice for sh

ing the contours of war as the supported rather than the suppor

combat element.” See Benjamin S. Lambeth, “Bounding the Air Po

Debate,” Strategic Review 25, no. 4 (Fall 1997): 54.

82. National Defense Panel, Transforming Defense: National Securi

the 21st Century, final report (Arlington, Va.: National Defense Pa

December 1997), 35.