UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 14-4663

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff - Appellee,

v.

SERGIO LOPEZ REYNA, a/k/a La Cra,

Defendant - Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern 

District of North Carolina, at Raleigh. James C. Dever, III,

Chief District Judge. (5:13-cr-00205-D-1)

Submitted: April 13, 2015 Decided: May 26, 2015

Before AGEE, WYNN, and DIAZ, Circuit Judges.

Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

Elisa Cyre Salmon, SALMON & GILMORE, LLP, Lillington, North 

Carolina, for Appellant. Thomas G. Walker, United States 

Attorney, Jennifer P. May-Parker, Yvonne V. Watford-McKinney, 

Assistant United States Attorney, Raleigh, North Carolina, for 

Appellee.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
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PER CURIAM:

Sergio Lopez Reyna appeals the aggregate 171-month, withinGuidelines sentence imposed following his guilty pleas to 

carjacking, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 2119, 2 (2012), and 

brandishing a firearm in furtherance of a crime of violence, in 

violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 924(c)(1)(A)(ii), 2 (2012). Reyna 

argues on appeal that the district court was required to hold an 

evidentiary hearing on the application of the three-level 

leadership enhancement, clearly erred when it applied this 

enhancement, clearly erred when it refused to apply a two-level 

reduction for acceptance of responsibility, and imposed a 

substantively unreasonable sentence. We affirm.

Reyna first challenges the district court’s failure to 

conduct an evidentiary hearing on his objection to the 

leadership enhancement. Ordinarily, we review the district 

court’s denial of an evidentiary hearing at sentencing for abuse 

of discretion. See United States v. Pologruto, 914 F.2d 67 (5th 

Cir. 1990). Issues raised for the first time on appeal, 

however, are reviewed for plain error only. Henderson v. United 

States, 133 S. Ct. 1121, 1125, 1126 (2013); see Fed. R. Crim. P. 

52(b). Although the parties disagree as to whether Reyna 

preserved the issue, we need not resolve this dispute because we 

conclude the district court did not abuse its discretion.
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“Where the reliability of evidence is an issue[,] the court 

should conduct an evidentiary hearing to determine the same.” 

United States v. Wilkinson, 590 F.3d 259, 269 (4th Cir. 2010) 

(internal alteration and quotation marks omitted). While “the 

court must ensure that the parties have an adequate opportunity 

to present relevant information [on a disputed issue],” there is 

no affirmative requirement that the court allow live testimony. 

U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual § 6A1.3, cmt. (2013). After 

review of the record, we conclude Reyna was provided an adequate 

opportunity to present information relevant to the disputed 

leadership enhancement, and we therefore discern no error.

Next, Reyna argues that the district court clearly erred 

when it applied the three-level leadership enhancement. We 

review sentences for reasonableness “under a deferential abuseof-discretion standard.” Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 41 

(2007). This review entails appellate consideration of both the 

procedural and substantive reasonableness of the sentence. Id.

at 51. We first ensure that the district court committed no 

“significant procedural error,” including improper calculation 

of the Guidelines range, insufficient consideration of the 18 

U.S.C. § 3553(a) (2012) factors, and inadequate explanation of 

the sentence imposed. Id.

The district court’s imposition of a role adjustment is a 

factual determination reviewed for clear error. United States 
4

v. Kellam, 568 F.3d 125, 147-48 (4th Cir. 2009). A three-level 

enhancement under USSG § 3B1.1(b) is warranted if “the defendant 

was a manager or supervisor (but not an organizer or leader) and 

the criminal activity involved five or more participants.” To 

qualify for such an enhancement, the defendant must have managed 

or supervised “one or more other participants.” USSG § 3B1.1, 

cmt. n.2. The enhancement is appropriate where the evidence 

demonstrates that the defendant “controlled the activities of 

other participants” or “exercised management responsibility.” 

United States v. Slade, 631 F.3d 185, 190 (4th Cir. 2011).

We conclude that the district court did not clearly err 

when it applied this enhancement. Reyna chose the location for 

the carjacking; instructed a coconspirator how to get to the 

club and where to park; and directed two coconspirators to 

approach the victim with him.

Next, Reyna contends the district court should have applied 

a two-level reduction for acceptance of responsibility, arguing 

that the court erroneously considered that he denied personally 

possessing the firearm underlying the brandishing charge. The 

determination of whether a defendant merits an acceptance of 

responsibility adjustment is a factual issue and thus reviewed 

for clear error. United States v. Burns, ___ F.3d ___, 2015 WL

615678, at *4 (4th Cir. Feb. 13, 2015). “[T]he sentencing judge 

is in a unique position to evaluate a defendant’s acceptance of 
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responsibility, and thus . . . the determination of the 

sentencing judge is entitled to great deference on review.” 

Elliott v. United States, 332 F.3d 753, 761 (4th Cir. 2003) 

(internal alteration and quotation marks omitted). This court 

may reverse the district court’s finding only when “left with 

the definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been 

committed.” United States v. Dugger, 485 F.3d 236, 239 (4th 

Cir. 2007) (internal quotation marks omitted).

We perceive no clear error in the district court’s 

decision. As the district court concluded, Reyna frivolously 

denied relevant conduct by denying possessing or brandishing a 

firearm during the carjacking. The district court is permitted 

to consider a defendant’s denial of facts underlying a § 924(c) 

charge in deciding whether to grant the reduction. See United 

States v. Hargrove, 478 F.3d 195, 201 (4th Cir. 2007).

Finally, Reyna contends that his sentence is substantively 

unreasonable. If a sentence is procedurally reasonable, we then 

consider whether it is substantively reasonable, “taking into 

account the totality of the circumstances.” Gall, 552 U.S. at 

51. “Any sentence that is within or below a properly calculated 

Guidelines range is presumptively [substantively] reasonable. 

Such a presumption can only be rebutted by showing that the 

sentence is unreasonable when measured against the 18 U.S.C. 

§ 3553(a) factors.” United States v. Louthian, 756 F.3d 295, 
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306 (4th Cir.) (citation omitted), cert. denied, 135 S. Ct. 421 

(2014).

We conclude that Reyna has failed to rebut the presumed 

reasonableness of his within-Guidelines sentence. The district 

court weighed Reyna’s lack of a criminal history against the 

conduct underlying his convictions and concluded that a sentence 

within the Guidelines range was necessary to reflect the serious 

nature of the offense and to protect the public and provide 

general deterrence.

Accordingly, we affirm the district court’s judgment. We 

dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal 

contentions are adequately presented in the material before this 

court and argument will not aid the decisional process.

AFFIRMED