RENDERED: OCTOBER 14, 2022; 10:00 A.M.

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED

Commonwealth of Kentucky

Court of Appeals

NO. 2021-CA-0348-MR

STEVEN WAYNE ARNETT APPELLANT

APPEAL FROM GREEN CIRCUIT COURT

v. HONORABLE SAMUEL TODD SPALDING, JUDGE

ACTION NO. 07-CI-00148

MONICA MICHELLE CHILDRESS APPELLEE

OPINION

AFFIRMING

**   **  **

BEFORE: CLAYTON, CHIEF JUDGE; COMBS AND JONES, JUDGES.

JONES, JUDGE: Steven Wayne Arnett appeals a judgment of the Green Circuit 

Court in favor of his ex-wife, Monica Michelle Childress, for $8,640 and accrued 

interest of 6% representing an arrearage of what he owed Childress pursuant to the 

terms of their 2007 divorce decree. Arnett asserts the circuit court erred in 

awarding Childress post-judgment interest. Upon review, we affirm.
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The factual and procedural history of this matter is as follows. On 

November 16, 2007, during their divorce proceedings in Green Circuit Court, 

Arnett and Childress entered into a separation agreement which provided in 

relevant part: 

In full settlement of all personal property, [Arnett] shall 

further pay to [Childress] the amount of twenty-six 

thousand eight hundred fifty dollars ($26,850.00) in the 

following increments, to wit: 

. . .

b. [Arnett] shall pay to [Childress] ten thousand dollars 

($10,000.00) on April 1, 2008; and

c. [Arnett] shall pay to [Childress] ten thousand dollars 

($10,000.00) on July 1, 2008.

On December 26, 2007, when the parties’ marriage was dissolved, the 

circuit court incorporated the parties’ separation agreement into its divorce decree. 

Notably, the separation agreement and divorce decree were both silent regarding 

interest. 

The record is also silent until October 7, 2020, when Childress filed a 

motion to hold Arnett in contempt. In her motion, Childress informed the circuit 

court that Arnett had yet to pay her anything toward the outstanding amounts set 

forth above; and she asked the circuit court to compel Arnett to pay her the 
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outstanding $20,000 he owed “with interest thereon pursuant to KRS1 360.040.” 

However, at the initial contempt hearing that followed, Arnett denied Childress’s 

contention. He represented he had paid Childress most or all of what was owed –

not so much in money, but by providing her services pursuant to what he asserted

had been a valid modification of the parties’ separation agreement. 

On January 22, 2021, the circuit court held an evidentiary hearing 

regarding Arnett’s assertion that he was entitled, due to a post-decree modification 

of the separation agreement, to have the value of services he had rendered for 

Childress credited toward what he owed her. The footage of that hearing is not of 

record, nor did Arnett designate it as part of the record. Thus, we are left to 

presume that the findings of fact set forth in the circuit court’s January 26, 2021,

order, which recounted and relied upon much of what was apparently adduced at 

that hearing, were consistent with the evidence. See Commonwealth, Dep’t of 

Highways v. Richardson, 424 S.W.2d 601, 603 (Ky. 1967), as modified on denial 

of reh’g (Feb. 23, 1968).

To summarize, it was undisputed that Arnett failed to pay Childress 

any of the $20,000 he owed her pursuant to the separation agreement and decree. 

However, the circuit court found the parties had verbally – and validly – agreed to 

modify their separation agreement sometime after December 26, 2007, to permit 

1 Kentucky Revised Statute.
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Arnett to perform various jobs for Childress and to offset the value of his work 

from the $20,000 judgment. The circuit court also found that Arnett had 

performed several odd jobs for Childress during the intervening years, and thus 

“significant work” pursuant to their modified agreement.

But, as recognized by the circuit court, there were problems with the 

parties’ agreement. Arnett and Childress never agreed upon a monetary value for 

any of the work Arnett performed pursuant to the modified agreement. And, for 

the most part, the two of them either could not recall or could not agree when he

performed the work. As the circuit court found, Arnett first attempted to itemize 

and value his work for Childress in 2019, “only after being contacted by 

[Childress] about the payment of the indebtedness owed.” Consequently, the 

circuit court devoted much of its order to itemizing and assigning monetary values 

to the various jobs Arnett had performed for Childress over the years pursuant to 

the parties’ modified agreement. Ultimately, the circuit court concluded that the 

value of Arnett’s services totaled $11,360, leaving $8,640 due to Childress. The 

circuit court then ordered that the arrearage “shall bear interest at the legal rate of 

six (6) percent, effective July 1, 2008.”

Arnett moved the circuit court to alter, amend, or vacate its arrearage 

judgment, arguing in relevant part: 

In the case at bar, [Childress] was aware of the terms of 

the settlement agreement and chose not to file a Motion 
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to enforce the agreement until 12 years after the last 

payment required by the Settlement Agreement was due. 

Additionally, [Arnett] and [Childress] modified the 

agreement to allow [Arnett] to work off the amount 

owed. Had [Arnett] been aware [Childress] was going to 

renege on the modified agreement and demand payment 

plus interest, he would have made the payments years 

ago. It is a flagrant miscarriage of justice to award 

[Childress] interest in the case at bar, especially 

considering the amount of interest owed would result in 

doubling the amount owed to [Childress] pursuant to the 

parties’ modified agreement.

The circuit court denied Arnett’s motion. In its February 23, 2021,

order to that effect, it began by noting the general rule, as set forth in Doyle v. 

Doyle, 549 S.W.3d 450 (Ky. 2018), that all judgments bear interest. It went on to 

recognize that it lacked the discretion to either deny interest or depart from the 

statutorily mandated rate of interest without first determining that the claim was 

unliquidated or an interest rate was specified in a separate written agreement. Id. 

at 456. Further, the circuit court held that while the “damages ordered are best 

characterized as unliquidated,” which provided it discretion to determine an 

interest rate less than the statutory amount pursuant to KRS 360.040(4), the 

equities did not favor a lesser amount here. In relevant part, it explained: 

[T]he coercive measures of the statute are necessary to 

encourage a party to make timely payments. While this 

Court does find there was an oral agreement [Arnett] 

would do work in exchange for a reduction of payment, 

there is no dispute the payment of the remaining balance 

is long overdue in the current case. Additionally, the 

initial agreement in this case was entered on November 
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16, 2007. [Arnett] was to pay $10,000 by April 1, 2008 

and the final payment was to be made on July 1, 2008. It 

is undisputed [Arnett] did not complete the excavation 

work until 2014 at the earliest. Additionally, [Arnett] 

completed the septic work in 2014. It is unclear as to 

when the other services were provided. [Arnett] had the 

responsibility to pay and this Court has been generous in 

crediting [Arnett] with the work performed to offset his 

obligation. Accordingly, this Court finds the order of 

pre-judgment interest is equitable. Interest will be 

ordered at the statutory rate of 6% outlined within KRS 

360.040 from the date of original decree of dissolution 

for the unpaid amount.

This appeal followed. To be clear, the parties do not contest that 

Arnett was entitled to an $11,360 credit against what he owed Childress pursuant 

to the separation agreement and divorce decree pursuant to a valid post-decree 

modification. They do not contest the circuit court’s finding that, due to the 

parties’ poor recordkeeping and lack of agreement regarding the value of Arnett’s 

services, the arrearage judgment represented an award of unliquidated damages. 

Rather, only one issue is presented. Arnett’s sole argument is that the circuit court 

erred by directing him to pay any interest whatsoever in relation to Childress’s 

judgment against him. In support, Arnett cites Guthrie v. Guthrie, 429 S.W.2d 32 

(Ky. 1968), where our then highest court held that although interest should be 

imposed on past due child support, it may be denied where there are circumstances 

making it inequitable. The Guthrie Court concluded that where the father in that 

matter had paid for the children’s expenses rather than his child support obligation, 
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the equities could weigh in favor of relieving him of paying interest on the amount 

owed. Id. at 37.

Before discussing how Arnett believes the “equities” weighed in his 

favor, we note Arnett ignores that what our highest court stated in Guthrie (i.e., 

that judgment interest may be entirely denied) is at odds with its more recent and 

binding pronouncement in Doyle: “All judgments bear interest.” Doyle, 549 

S.W.3d at 456 (emphasis added). If Guthrie represents any viable exception to that 

rule, it is an exception that clearly does not apply to these facts: Guthrie involved 

interest on payments of child support, whereas Doyle – like this matter –

specifically involved interest on an outstanding obligation stemming from the 

division of marital assets. Thus, irrespective of his reasoning, Arnett is incorrect in 

arguing he was entitled to pay no judgment interest.

With that said, we now proceed to how, in Arnett’s view, the 

“equities” favored his case. Arnett first contends Childress prejudiced him by 

failing to seek judicial enforcement of their 2007 divorce decree until October 7, 

2020.

We disagree. Childress acted within the time permitted by the 

applicable statute of limitations to collect the arrearage and interest owed to her 

pursuant to the divorce decree. KRS 413.090(1). Principles of equity, such as 

laches or estoppel by acquiescence, may not be used to bar the collection of 
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arrearages within the applicable limitations period. Heisley v. Heisley, 676 S.W.2d 

477, 477 (Ky. App. 1984). Moreover, relative to the specific issue of judgment 

interest, Childress’s delay is not a factor to be considered at all. In Doyle, 549 

S.W.3d at 457, our Supreme Court observed that where a former spouse failed to 

comply with a court order, criticism of the efforts of his former partner to collect 

should have no bearing on the imposition of interest that accrued by operation of

law. The court observed that the provisions of KRS 360.040 are not designed to be 

punitive but are meant to encourage a judgment debtor to comply promptly with 

the terms of the judgment and to compensate the judgment creditor for the 

judgment debtor’s use of her money. Id. at 458. 

As for the remainder of his arguments regarding how the “equities” 

weighed in his favor, Arnett next contends: 

[T]he parties’ modified the agreement and [Arnett] made 

reasonable and diligent efforts to comply with the 

modified agreement to work off the balance owed to 

[Childress]. Further, has [sic] [Arnett] been aware 

[Childress] was going to renege on her part of the 

modified agreement and demand full payment plus 

interest, he would have made payments on the balance 

rather than allowing 12 years of interest accrue against 

him.

Regarding Arnett’s assertion that he made “reasonable and diligent 

efforts to comply with the modified agreement to work off the balance owed” to 

Childress, the circuit court made no such finding; and Arnett cites no evidence of 
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record favoring his argument. True, the circuit court gave him a credit for what it 

determined was the reasonable value of the work he performed under the modified 

agreement; but when Arnett and Childress entered that agreement is not evident 

from the record. Thus, it is unclear how long Childress may have waited for Arnett 

to perform any given service. To the extent the circuit court assigned any time 

frame to any of the work Arnett performed under the agreement, it could only state 

Arnett performed some of it in 2014. 

As to Arnett’s assertion that he “would have made payments on the 

balance rather than allowing 12 years of interest accrue against him[,]” the circuit 

court likewise made no such finding, and Arnett cites no evidence of record 

favoring his argument. It is unclear how long Childress may have waited –

unsuccessfully – for Arnett to pay her anything before she ultimately agreed to 

allow him to credit services toward his debt. Again, however, to the extent the 

circuit court assigned any date to any of the work Arnett performed under the 

parties’ modified agreement, it could only state Arnett performed it in 2014 –

approximately seven years after Arnett’s $20,000 debt to Childress had already 

become an outstanding obligation.

As to his assertion that Childress “renege[d] on her part of the 

modified agreement” by demanding judgment interest, the circuit court only 

determined the modified agreement permitted Arnett to perform various jobs for 
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Childress and to offset the value of his work from the $20,000 judgment. The 

circuit court made no determination that the modified agreement also provided 

Arnett would not owe Childress judgment interest on what remained of the 

principal balance. Nor, for that matter, does Arnett cite any evidence indicating 

Childress ever represented to him – much less agreed with him – that he would not 

owe her judgment interest on what remained. 

Instead, reading between the lines of his brief, it appears much of 

what led Arnett to believe he could “work off” an interest-free $20,000 balance

owed to Childress arises from his own unilateral assumption; specifically, his 

assumption that because the parties’ November 16, 2007 separation agreement – as 

incorporated into the December 26, 2007 divorce decree – was silent regarding 

interest, no interest would ever be owed. However, it is inarguable that “everyone 

is presumed to know the law; therefore, ignorance of the law is not an excuse.” 

Dep’t of Revenue, Finance v. Revelation Energy, LLC, 544 S.W.3d 170, 176 (Ky. 

App. 2018). And here, the law provided at all relevant times that a judgment

merely silent about interest should not be interpreted as an interest-free judgment. 

See, e.g., Commonwealth, Dep’t of Highways v. Young, 380 S.W.2d 239, 240 (Ky.

1964) (“[T]he fact that a judgment or decree is silent as to interest will not prevent 

the recovery of interest thereon.”). 
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Indeed, this rule has been applied before in the same situation. In 

Hoskins v. Hoskins, 15 S.W.3d 733 (Ky. App. 2000), the parties, Pam and Kevin, 

entered into a property settlement agreement which required Kevin to pay Pam 

$7,500 within three years of October 10, 1990. Their agreement was incorporated 

into the trial court’s subsequent divorce decree; however, their agreement and 

divorce decree made no mention of judgment interest. Id. at 733-34. Thereafter, 

Kevin refused to pay by the deadline; and Pam sought an order compelling Kevin 

to pay her $7,500 pursuant to the terms of the agreement, plus interest at the annual 

rate of 12% from October 10, 1993.

2

 Id. at 734. 

Ultimately, the trial court entered judgment in Pam’s favor for $7,500, 

but only with interest accrued from the date of its dispositive judgment (i.e., 

October 7, 1998). Id. On appeal, this Court reversed and remanded the case to the 

trial court with directions to award Pam post-judgment interest at the statutory rate 

of 12% from October 10, 1993, on Kevin’s $7,500 delinquent debt unless the trial 

court found such an award to be inequitable. Id. at 735. We explained: 

In Courtenay [v. Wilhoit, 655 S.W.2d 41 (Ky. App. 

1983)], the property settlement agreement that was 

incorporated into the divorce decree ordered the husband 

to pay the wife $140,000 in 121 equal monthly 

installment payments for her share of the property 

division. Both the agreement and the decree were silent 

with respect to interest. The wife later moved the court

2 The version of KRS 360.040 effective at that time (and until June 29, 2017) provided that 

“12%” was the default rate of statutory interest.
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to award her interest on the amount from the date of the 

agreement. The court held that the interest statute 

applied to the separation agreement incorporated into the 

divorce decree, “but not until a judgment comes into 

being via a delinquent payment.” Id. at 42. In other 

words, the husband was not required to pay interest 

unless he missed a payment. The court held that since 

the husband had kept his payments current, there was no 

judgment to which KRS 360.040 could apply. Id.

Under the principles of Courtenay, the provision in 

the property settlement agreement and decree ordering 

Kevin to pay Pam $7,500 within three years from the 

date of the agreement became an enforceable judgment 

when the payment became delinquent at the end of three 

years. Furthermore, KRS 403.180(5) provides that 

“[t]erms of the agreement set forth in the decree are 

enforceable by all remedies available for enforcement of 

a judgment, including contempt, and are enforceable as 

contract terms.” Thus, we conclude that the trial court 

erred in its 1998 order when it stated that there was no 

judgment in effect until that time. Pam was therefore 

entitled to interest under KRS 360.040 at the annual rate 

of 12% from October 10, 1993, unless such an award 

would be inequitable. Courtenay, 655 S.W.2d at 42. See 

also Stone v. Ky. Ins. Guaranty Ass’n, Ky. App., 908 

S.W.2d 675, 677 (1995); Guthrie v. Guthrie, Ky., 429 

S.W.2d 32, 36 (1968); Young v. Young, Ky., 479 S.W.2d 

20, 22 (1972); Hardin v. Hardin, Ky. App., 711 S.W.2d 

863, 865 (1986).

Id. at 734-35 (footnote omitted).

As in Hoskins, the provisions in the property settlement agreement 

and decree ordering Arnett to pay Childress $10,000 on April 1, 2008, and $10,000 

on July 1, 2008, became enforceable judgments – and entitled Childress to post-
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judgment interest despite the separation agreement’s and divorce decree’s silence 

on that point – when those respective payments became delinquent.

We review awards of post-judgment interest under the abuse of 

discretion standard. Hazel Enterprises, LLC v. Ray, 510 S.W.3d 840, 843 (Ky. 

App. 2017). Here, in sum, Arnett presents nothing demonstrating the circuit 

court’s award of 6% interest in its arrearage judgment was inequitable to him, or 

that the circuit court otherwise committed an abuse of its discretion that prejudiced 

his interests. To the contrary, the circuit court effectively pretended that Arnett 

had rendered all his services for Childress before the $20,000 he owed her had 

become delinquent, as it only assessed judgment interest on $8,640 (i.e., what 

remained of what he owed her, minus his setoff for services rendered).

Additionally, the circuit court assessed post-judgment interest from 

July 1, 2008, at a rate of only 6%. It could have held that judgment interest

accrued on Childress’s judgment at a rate of up to 12% until June 29, 2017 – the 

effective date of the most recent enactment of KRS 360.040, which only 

prospectively lowered statutory judgment interest from 12% to its current rate of

6%. See Ridge v. Ridge, 572 S.W.2d 859, 861 (Ky. 1978) (explaining the 

prospective rather than retroactive effect of a statutory amendment of a postjudgment interest rate). The circuit court balanced the facts and equities in an 

appropriate manner, and its ultimate decision “falls within a range of permissible 
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decisions.” Miller v. Eldridge, 146 S.W.3d 909, 915 (Ky. 2004). In short, Arnett 

presents no basis of error. We therefore, AFFIRM.

ALL CONCUR.

BRIEF FOR APPELLANT:

Elmer J. George

Lebanon, Kentucky

BRIEF FOR APPELLEE:

Theodore H. Lavit

Lebanon, Kentucky