T he H onor abl e Si dney H
. St ei n, of t he U ni t ed St at es D i s t r i ct C our t f or t he So ut her n D i s t r i ct of N ew Y or k, * s i t t i ng by des i gn at i on. 1 07- 4178- pr H enr y v. R i cks UN ITED STA TES CO URT OF AP P EALS F OR TH E S ECO N D CI RCU IT Aug us t T er m 2 008 (A rgue d: J un e 19 , 20 09 Dec id ed: Aug us t 1 0, 2 009 Ame nd ed: Aug

us t 1 0, 2 009 ) Docket No. 07-4178-pr L U C AS H EN RY , Peti

ti o ne r- Appella nt , v. T H O M AS RI CKS , Su per

in te nd ent , Responden t-Appellee
. B ef or e: M I NE R and C AB R ANES , Circuit Judges, and S T E IN , D is tr ict J ud ge. * Fo llo win g de ni al o f l eave fo r fu r th er app eal o f as tat e co nv

ict io n f or dep r avedin di ff

er enc e
mu r der , People v. He nry , 95 N. Y.2 d 9 05 ( 200 0) ; see N.Y. Pena l Law § 1 25.25(2), petitioner sought habea s r elief. The United Sta tes Dis trict Court for the Northern Dis trict of New York (Gary L. Sh ar pe, Judge

) d eni ed the p et

it io n b ut gr ant ed p et

it io ner ’s mo ti onfo r

a Cer ti fi cat e of

App ealab ili ty . Pe ti ti on er th en ap peal ed. Fi r s t, we h ol d that r ecen t d ecis io ns by the N ew Yo r k Co ur t o f A pp eals announcing

a cha nge in NewYork’s law of deprave d indifference murder are not applica ble to pet it io ner ’s con

vic ti on . Se con d, add r es s in g a m att er of fi r s t i mp r es s io n i n o ur

Cir cui t, we h ol d that the Due Process Clause of the Four teenth Amendme nt of the United States Constitution does not2

require the retroactive appli cation of the newinterpretation of N.Y. Penal Law§ 125.25 (2) on collat er al r evi ew o f p et

it io ner ’s con

vic ti on . Af fi r med
. L I S A E. F L EI S C HMA NN , As s is tan t A tt orney Gen er al (Andrew D. Cuomo, A ttorney General, Barbara D. Un de rw oo d, So li ci torGe ne ra l, R ose a nn B. M acKe chnie, Dep ut

y So lic it or Gen er al f or Cr im in al M att er s , on the brief

), Of fi ce o f the A tt or ney

Gen er al of th e St ate of

New Yor k, N ew Yo r k, N Y, for Appellee Thomas Ricks
. R O BERT N. I S S EKS (A lex Sm ith, on the brief ), Mid dl et own , N Y, for Appellan t Luca s Henry
. J OS É A. C AB R ANES , Circuit Jud ge : Petitioner-appellant Luca s Henry was convicted i n 1997 in NewYork state court of one
cou nt of dep r avedin di ff

er enc e mu r der
. See

N. Y. P enal

La w § 12 5.2 5(

2) . H e no w ch all eng es an Aug us t 2 1, 2 007 ju dgm ent

of th e Unit ed S tat es Di s tr

ict Cou r t f or th e No r th er n D is tr

ict of New Yor k ( Gar

y L . Sh ar pe, Judge

) d eny in g hi s pet

it io n f or a wr it of hab eas corpu s pu r s uan t t o 2 8 U. S.C. § 225 4. See Henry

v. Ricks, No. 01-cv-1361, 200 7 WL 240692 8, at *2 (N.D.N.Y . Aug. 21 , 2007). In
acco r dan ce wi tha Cer ti fi cat e of App ealab ili ty

(“ COA”) gr ant ed b y the D is tr ict Cou r t, [ A 6- 8] Henry
co nte nd s tha t th e h ol di ng

of t he Ne w Y ork

C ou rt o f A pp ea ls t ha t “ som eo ne wh o i nte nd s to c a use
s er io us ph ys ical

in ju ry do es no t c om mi t d epr avedin di ff er enc e mu r der ,” People v. Suarez , 6 N .Y. 3d 202 , 21 1 ( 200 5) , m er ely c lar

if iedth e law

app lic abl e at

th e t im e of hi s con vic ti onandth at his
co nv ic ti on mu st be va ca te d b ec a use the evid en ce a dd uc ed a t tri a l d em on stra te d h is i nte nt t o c a use
s er io us ph ys ical

in ju ry t o h is vic ti m, th us mak in g in te nt io nal mu r der a mo r e app r op r

iat e ch arge. Hen ry als o ar

gue s th at, inany e ven t, “r et r oact ive app lic ati on[o f the af

or eme nt io nedr ul e] i s
man dat or y as a mat te r

of fe der al d ue p r oce s s andequ al p r ot ect io n. ” Ap pellan t’ s B r . 14
.N. Y. P enal La w § 12 5.2 5(

2) pr ov id es : “Aper s onis guilt

y of mu r der inth e s eco nddegr ee 2 whe n[ ,]
. . . [u

]n der cir cum s tan ces evi nci ng adep r avedin di ff er enc e t o h um an l

if e, h e r eckl es s ly enga ges in conduct whi ch crea tes a grave risk of death to another person, and thereby ca uses the death o f a no th er

per s on. . . .” 3

BAC KGROUND T he f ollo wing f act s ar e un di s pu te d ex cep t t o the e xt ent no te d. OnFe br uar

y 23 , 19 93, He nry sho t A nth on y Bo ok a rd i n a n a pa rtme nt i n th e p re sen ce of se ve ra l i nd iv id ua ls. Henry immediatel y depa rted, leaving those bystanders behind with Bookard, who die d in the apa rtment several minutes later. La te r, H en ry re tur ne d to the a pa rtme nt a nd , wit h th e h el p o f se ve ra l o the rs, pl acedB oo kar d’ s bo dy i n the tr un k o f acar andth en b ur

iedth e bo dy i n a s no w ban k n ear an elem ent ary s cho ol
. On Decembe r 20, 1995, an One ida C ounty grand jury cha rged Henry with two c ounts of murder in the s econd de gree—one c ount of intentional murder in the second degree a nd one count of mu r der inth e s eco nddegr ee u nd er a dep r avedin di ff

er enc e theo ry. N .Y. Pe nal La w § 12 5.2 5. On January 23, 1997 , a jury found Henry guilty of depraved indifference murder, in viola tion of N.Y. Pena l Law § 1 25.25(2), but he was ac quitted of intentional murder. On April 4, 1997, Henry 2

was s ent enc ed t o anin det er mi nat e pr is ons ent enc e of

tw ent y- fi ve ye ar s to lif

e. Hen ry app eale d his con

vic ti on , ar gui ng, amo ng o th er

thin gs , that

th e evi den ce ad du ced at trial was not suff

icient to establish his guilt. The New York State S upreme Court, Appell ate Division, affirmed his conviction, People v. He nry , 70 6 N .Y. S.2 d 5 65 ( 4th D ep’ t 2 000), andth e Ne w Yor k Co ur t o f A pp eals deniedleav e t o ap peal , see Pe ople v. Henry , 95 N.Y.2 d 905 (2000). I n 2 001 , H enr

y, p r oce edi ng pro se , f

ile d a p et it io n f or a wr it of hab eas corpu s inth e Di s tr ict Cou r t p ur s uan t t o 2 8 U. S.C. § 22 54. T he D is tr ict Cou r t r ef er r ed the m att er

to M agis tr ate J ud ge Dav id E. P eeb les , wh o, onNo vem ber 2, 2 005 , f ile d a r epo r t an d r eco mm end ati onadv is in g that4

Henry’s petition be denie d. In objecting to the Magistrate Judge’s report , Henry argued—this time th r ough c ou ns el— th at his con vic ti oncould no t s tan d b ecau s e the i nt er venin g ho ld in g of

th e Ne w York Court of Appeals in People v. Suarez , 6 N.Y.3d 2 02 (2005), whic h was deci ded after the Magistrate Judge had filed his report and recommendation, “[made ] it clea r that a ‘point[-]blank shooting [is ] insuff

icient to establish depraved i ndifference murder.’” Petitioner’s Objection to the M agis tr ate J ud ge’ s Repo r t an d Rec om men dat io n, Henry v

. Ricks, N o. 01- cv- 136 1, (

N. D. N. Y. F eb. 14, 200 6) (quo ti ng Suarez

, 6 N.Y.3d a t 208) (som e bracke ts added). Notwithst anding He nry’s objection, the Distr ict Court adopted the Mag istr ate Judge’s recommenda tion, reasoning that, although the New Yor k Co ur t o f A pp eals hadr ecen tly alt er ed N ew Yo r k’s law o f d epr avedin di ff er enc e mu r der ina “m ate r

ial way, ” He nr

y was no t e nt

it ledto r eli ef

bec aus e the al te r ati ondi d n ot app ly
r et r oact ive ly. Henry , 20 07 WL

240 692 8, a t * 1. Following the District Court’s denial of relief, Henry moved for a COA so that this Court
could r evi ew “t

wo c on s ti tu ti on al co nt ent

io ns .” A ff

. inSu pp or t o f P et ’r s M ot . f or COA, Henry v

. Ricks, N o. 01 -c v-0 13 61 , a t 1 (N. D. N. Y . S ep t. 19 , 2 00 7) (“ Motio n fo r C OA ”) . In hi s mo vi ng pa pe rs, Henry informed the Distr

ict Court that he wished to argue that (1) purs uant to decision in Dixon v. Miller , 293 F.3d 74 (2d C ir. 2002), the deci sions of the New York C ourt of Appea ls in Suarez

and People v. Go nza lez

, 1 N .Y. 3d464(2 004

), as well as other cas es , m us t b e app lie d i n o ur collat er al review of his conviction be cause they “constitut[ed] a clarifica tion” of the law a s it existed at the time of his conviction and “not a chang e[ ] in the law ,” Motion for COA a t 2, and (2) even i f the decisions marked a cha nge in NewYork’s law of deprave d indifference murder, “as a matter of fe der al co ns ti tu ti on al l aw” the c han ge m us t b e app lie d r et r oact ive ly, id. at 1 -2
. T he D is tr ict Cou r t gr ant ed the M ot

io n f or a COAinfull, Henry v

. Ricks, N o. 01- cv- 136 1,5

200 7 WL 335 306 7, a t * 1 (

N. D. N. Y. N ov . 9, 200 7) , an d thi s app eal f ollo wed
. DISCUSSI ON We r evi ew de novo

a district court’s denial of a petition for a writ of habeas corpus . See, e.g. , Anderson v. Miller

, 34 6 F .3d315 , 32 4 (

2dCir . 20 03) . Wh er e a cl aim fo r po s t- con vic ti onr eli ef

has been a djudica ted on the merits in s tate court, we ma y grant habe as relief only if “the a djudica tion of the cla im . . . (1) resulted in a decision that wa s contrary to, or involved a n unreasonable a pplica tion of , cl ear ly es tab lis hedFe der al l aw, as det er mi nedby the S up r eme Cou r t o f the U ni te d S tat es ; o r (2)
r es ul te d i n a d ecis io n b as ed o n anun r eas on abl e de te r mi nat io n o f t he f act s inlig ht of th e evi den ce pr es ent ed i n the S tat e co ur t p r oce edi ng. ” 28 U.S .C. § 225 4( d)
. Under the Due Process Clause of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments, no conviction may be sus tained “e xcept upon proof beyond reasonable doubt of every fact nec essary to const itute th e cr im e . . . ch arged .” In

re Wins hip , 397 U.S. 3 58, 364 (1970). A habea s petitioner “is entitled to hab eas corpu s r eli ef

if it is fo un d that

up onth e r eco r d ev

id enc e add uce d at

th e t r ial no r ati on al tr

ier of fa ct could hav e f

ou ndpr oo f o f g

uilt bey on d a r eas on abl e do ub t. ” Eina ugler v. Supreme Court of New York , 109 F.3d 836, 83 9 (2d Cir. 1997) (quoting Ja ck so n v. V

ir gi nia , 44 3 U. S. 3 07, 324(1 979 ) ( in te r nal qu ot ati onmar ks om it te d)
. A. Wheneval uat

in g the s uf

fi cien cy o f the e vid enc e add uce d at a s tat e co ur t c r

im in al pr oce edi ng, we “l oo k t o s tat e law to det er mi ne the e lem ent s ” of th e r elev ant

cr im e. Fama v. Co mm’r of Corr. Ser vs. , 23 5 F .3d804 , 81 1 (

2dCir . 20 00) ; see also Dixon , 29 3 F .3dat 7 9 ( “T he s tat e co ur t’ s interpretation of the proof required must

be appli ed on colla teral reviewto prevent a viola tion of the Due Process Clause of the Four teenth Amendme nt . . . .”). Purs uant to our decision in Dixon ,6

which, for purposes relevant to this appea l, simply applie d the Supreme Court’s holding in Fiore v. Whi te , 53 1 U. S. 2 25 (

200 1) —“[ w]h er e a s tat e’s hi ghe s t c ou r t f or th e f ir s t t im e in te r pr et s a cr

im in al
statute to r equire proof of a particular eleme nt and that interpretation does not create a ne w lawbut
mer ely c lar

if ies what th e law was at the t

im e of a def end ant ’s con

vic ti on ”— w e app ly the n ew in te r pr et ati onof

th e cr im in al s tatut e oncollat er al r evi ew o f the c onvic ti on . Dixon , 29 3 F .3dat 7 9 (c it in g Fiore, 53 1 U. S. a t 2 28)
. It is undisputed that a recent line of opinions by the New York C ourt of Appea ls, beginning with Gonzalez

, affected our understanding of N.Y. Penal Law § 125 .25(2), which de scribes the of fe ns e of dep r avedin di ff

er enc e mu r der

un der New Yor k la w. See Po licano v. Herbert

, 7 N .Y. 3d 588 , 600-01 (2006) (noting that Gonzalez ands ub s equ ent

cas es , in clu di ng Pe o

ple v. P ay ne , 3 N .Y. 3d 266 , 272 (2 004 ), Suarez , 6 N.Y.3d a t 212, and Pe o

ple v. F ei ng o ld , 7 N .Y. 3d 288 (2 006 ), hav e “r ecas t” th e law of depraved indifference murder). In these cases, the New York C ourt of Appea ls explaine d that, contrary to prior

interpretations of

N.Y. Pena l Law § 1 25.25(2), New Y ork law does not permit a jury to convict a de fendant of depraved indifference murder where the evidenc e demonstrates the def end ant ’s in te nt

to kill the v

ict im
. See Gonzalez

, 1 N.Y.3d a t 468 (“Depraved indi fference murder . . . involve s a killing in w hich the defenda nt does not have a c onscious objective to ca use death but in s te ad i s r eckl es s ly i ndif

fe r ent , d epr aved ly s o, to whe th er death o ccu r s .”)
. Henry argues that he is entitled to appli cation of the rule articula ted in Gonzalez bec aus e,
acco r di ng t o H enr

y, that dec is io n an d s ub s equ ent

dec is io ns of

th e Ne w Yor k Co ur t o f A pp eals
mer ely “ clar

if ied ” N ew Yo r k la

w as it exi s te d at th e t im e of hi s con vic ti on . Ap pellan t’ s B r . 11 . F ar fr om as s er ti ng a ct ual

in no cen ce o r

a lack of in te nt to kill h is vic ti m, he c on te nd s th at the e vid enc e adduce d at his trial amply demonstrated his intent to wound the victim mortally. Henry urges that,7

inlig ht of th e evi den ce o f his in te nt , the e vid enc e was no t s uf fi cien t t o co nv

ict hi m o f d epr aved in di ff er enc e mu r der

un der th e ne w pr on ou nce men t o f the l aw by th e Ne w Yor k Co ur t o f A pp eals
as to N. Y. P enal

La w § 12 5.2 5(

2) . F or th r igh tly co nce di ng that

hi s po s it io n i s “di s tu r bi ng, ” App ell ant ’s B r . 15 , H enr

y po s it s th at his cul pab ili ty —that is , h is in te nt

to kill B oo kar d—no w en ti tl es hi m t o the i s s uan ce o f the G r eat Wr it
. Hen ry’s argum ent

th at the r ecen t d ecis io ns of th e Ne w Yor k Co ur t o f A pp eals mer ely clarified the la w as it existed at the time his convic tion beca me final is squarely foreclosed by the holding of the New Y ork Court of Appeals in Po lic ano v. Herbert

, in whic h the state’s highest court exp lai nedth at the r ecen t d ecis io ns mar keda cha nge inth e law th at did no t ap ply r et r oact ive ly. See 7 N.Y.3d a t 603 (“This r aises the question whether our pos t-[2002] case lawapplie s r etroactively to defendant’s case. . . . We conclude that it does not.”). We ce rtified the following question to the New Yor k Co ur t o f A pp eals : “ In [2 001 ] , wh at w er e the e s tab lis hedelem ent s of dep r aved in di ff er enc e mu r der ? ” Policano v. Her bert , 453 F.3d 75, 76 (2d C ir. 2006) (emphasis added). In respons e, NewYork’s highest court explained that, from 1983, whe n it decide d People v. Registe r , 60 N.Y.2d 270 (1983), through 2002, when i t affirmed Register in People v. Sanchez

, 98 N.Y.2 d 373 (2002), “r eckl es s nes s , p ur e ands im pl e, [ was ] the mens rea

fo r dep r avedin di ff

er enc e mu r der ,” an d d epr aved in di ff er enc e mu r der

was di s ti ngu

is hab le f r om man s laught er

no t b y the r equ

ir ed mens rea , “‘but by the objective circumstances in which the act occ ur[ed]’” which “ define[d] the degree of ris k created by th e de fe nd ant .” Po lic

ano , 7 N .Y. 3dat 5 97 (qu ot in g Register

, 60 N. Y.2 d at

278 ). Fr om 198 3 t o 2 002 “the very fac ts es tablishing a risk of death approachi ng certainty a nd thus pr esenting compell ing circumstantial evide nce of intent—for example, a point blank shooting of a victim in the head —l ike wis e de mo ns tr ate d d epr avedin di ff er enc e.” Po lic

ano , 7 N. Y .3 d a t 6 01 . In oth erwo rds,8

un der this pr e- Gonzalez

r ul e, anin di

vid ual could , ins om e cas es , b e co nv ict ed o f d epr aved in di ff er enc e mu r der

evenwhe r e the e vid enc e s ugg es te d that he m ay ha

ve i nt end ed t o k

ill hi s vic ti m. Se e i d. at 600 (noting that, prior to the 2004 decision in Gonzalez , “it [was] not a va lid cha llenge to the
con vic ti onof r eckl es s mu r der

th at the e vid enc e t end ed t o es tab lis h d ef end ant ’s guilt

of in te nt io nal
mu r der ” ( in te r nal qu ot ati onmar ks om it te d) ). I n l igh t o f the e xp lic it

gui dan ce o f the N ew Yo r k Co ur t o f A pp eals , we r eco gni zed th at Gonzalez and subsequent decisions of that court announce d a cha nge in NewYork law —not a clarifica tion of it—and “did not reflect the applic able l aw for purpos es” of a convic tion affirmed by th e Ne w Yor k Co ur t o f A pp eals in200 1. Po lic ano , 507 F.3d at 114. It f

ollows that Gonzalez

and its pr oge ny did no t r ef

lect th e law app lic abl e t o H enr

y’s 199 7 co nv

ict io n, whi ch w as af

fi r medondi r ect app eal i n 2 000
. See Henry , 95 N.Y.2 d at 905 (deny ing lea ve to appe al). For this reason, our holding in Dixon does not require that we apply the new inte rpretation of N.Y. Penal Law § 125.25(2) by the New Yor k Co ur t o f A pp eals inou r collat er al r evi ew o f H enr

y’s con vic ti on . B. We nowturn to Henr

y’s contention that “retroactive a pplica tion of [ Gonzalez ] is mandatory
as a mat te r

of fe der al d ue p r oce s s andequ al p r ot ect io n. ” Ap pellan t’ s B r . 14 . T hi s clai m i s di s ti nct from his position that, under Dixon , h e is ent it ledto app lic ati onof

a new in te r pr et ati onof

New York law . Henry assumes f or purpos es of his second argument that Gonzalez mar keda cha nge in th e law th at p os t- dat ed his con

vic ti on—as op po s ed t o a m er e cla r if icat io n o f the l aw as it

exi s te d at the time of his conviction—but urges that, under the circumstances pres ented in this case, the
r equ ir eme nt s of

th e Du e P r oce s s andth e Equ al P r ot ect io n Cl aus es com pel

us to app ly the n ew in te r pr et ati onof

N. Y. P enal

La w § 12 5.2 5(

2) by the N ew Yo r k Co ur t o f A pp eals r et r oact ive ly.Hen ry of fe r s no s up po r t f

or hi s clai m that

th e Equ al P r ot ect

io n Cl aus e r equ

ir es 1 applic ation of the decision of the New Y ork Court of Appeals in Gonzalez to hi s cas e, an d we di s cer n n o p lau s ib le b as is fo r s ucha pr op os it

io n. See, e.g. , Fiore

v. White , 149 F.3d 221, 22 6 (3d Cir. 199 8) (A lit o, J. ) ( “T he [Su pr eme ] Co ur t h as nev er

ti ed [ fe der al r et r oact

ivi ty r ul es ] t o the Eq

ual Pr ot ect io n Cl aus e.” ), rev’d on other

gro und s by Fior e , 531 U.S. a t 228-29. Acc ordingly, we limit our discuss ion to whether the Due Process Clause manda tes applica tion of Go nzal ez to Hen ry’s pet

it io n. On at lea st t

wo occ asions after it decided Wainwri gh t , the S up r eme Cou r t h as hadbef or e it 2 th e qu es ti onwhe th er

du e pr oce s s r equ

ir es th e r et r oact

ive app lic ati onof

a ju di cially an no un ced chang e in a state’s criminal law. In Fiore, the Court “granted c ertiorari in part to decide when, or whether, the Federal Due Process Cla use requires a State to apply a new interpretation of a state cr im in al s tatut e r et r oact

ive ly t o cas es oncollat er al r evi ew.” 528 U.S . at 226 . H owe ver , af

te r cer ti fy in g a ques ti onto th e P enn s ylv ani a Su pr eme Cou r t, th e Cou r t d et er mi nedth at ther e hadbee n no chan ge i n s tat e law

and , h enc e, “ r et r oact

ivi ty [wa s ] n ot at i s s ue. ” Id

. Similarly, i n Bunkley v. Fl o ri da , the Co ur t r ema nd ed the c as e t o the F lo r id a Su pr eme Cou r t s o that it could con s id er

whe n th e ch ang e ins tat e law

occ ur r ed an d thu s di d n ot con s id er whe th er du e pr oce s s r equ

ir ed r et r oact

ive app lic ati onof

a new in te r pr et ati onof

a s tat e cr im in al s tatut e. 5 38 U .S. 835 , 84 0- 41 ( 200 3)
. 9 T he ques ti onwhe th er , o r

un der what cir cum s tan ces , d ue p r oce s s r equ ir es th at anew in te r pr et ati onof

a cr im in al s tatut e by

a s tat e’s hi ghe s t c ou r t b e app lie d r et r oact ive ly o n co lla te r al
r evi ew is on e of

fi r s t i mp r es s io n i n thi s Cir cui t. Ou r ho ld in g inDixon

di d n ot add r es s th e is s ue; a 1 clar if icat io n o f the l aw as it

has alway s exi s te d p r es ent s , b y de fi ni ti on , “‘ no is s ue o f r et r oact ivi ty .’” Dixon , 29 3 F .3dat 7 9 ( qu ot in g Fiore, 531 U.S. a t 228). As noted, in Policano v. Her bert , a p anel of this court held that an indivi dual whose c onviction for depraved indifference murder under New Y ork law be came final in 2001 w as not entitled to habea s r elief bec ause the dec isions of the New Y ork Court of Appeals in Gonzalez and subsequent cases did not apply a t the time his conviction bec ame fi nal
. Po lic

ano , 507 F.3d at 114-16. How ever, that pane l did not expressly consider whether due pr oce s s r equ

ir ed the r et r oact

ive app lic ati onof

th e ne w r ul e. The Supreme Court has held that the Constitution does not r equire a state’s highest court “t o m ake r et r oact

ive it s new

con s truct io n o f [ a cr im in al] s tatut e.” Wainwri

gh t v . S to ne , 41 4 U. S. 2 1, 23-24 (1973). This conclusion followed from the principle that “[a ] state in defining the limits of 210

adherenc e to precede nt may make a choic e for its elf betwee n the principle of forward operation and th at o f r elat

io n b ackw ar d. ” Id

. (internal quotation marks omitted). Fu r th er mo r e, “ [i ]t may s ay that decisions of its highest court, though later overruled, are lawnone the less for intermediate
tr ans act io ns .” Id . ( qu ot in g Great N. Ry. Co. v. Sunb urst Oil & R ef. Co. , 28 7 U. S. 3 58, 364(1 932) (internal quotation marks omitted)). Where, as here, a state’s highest court has determined that a new rule doe s not apply retroactively, we “a re not at liberty, for anything contai ned in the Constitution of the United Sta tes, to thrust upon [s tate] courts a different conception either of the bi ndin g f or ce o f p r eced ent

or of th e me ani ng o f j udici al p r oce s s .” Great N. Ry. Co. , 28 7 U. S. a t 3 66; see also Po lic

ano , 45 3 F .3dat 8 3 (

Raggi , J ., dis s ent in g f r om a denial

of r ehe ar in g en banc ) (“[T] he Constitution does not compel retr oactive applic ation of state law.” ); Fiore v. White , 14 9 F .3d221 , 22 4 (3 d Ci r . 19 98) (Alit o, J

.) (“ [S ]t ate cou r ts ar e un der no con s ti tu ti on al o bl

igat io n t o ap ply thei r dec is io ns r et r oact

ive ly. ”) , rev’d on other

gro und s by Fior e , 53 1 U. S. a t 2 28- 29. Were w e to adopt Henry’s position, we would c all into question core principle s governing the retroactive appl ication of judic ially announce d chang es in federal criminal l aw. The Supreme Court has applied a judicia lly a nnounced c hange in subs tantive federal criminal law retroactively on collat er al r evi ew wh er e the n ew in te r pr et ati ones tab lis hedth at apr is on er was con vic te d “f or an ac t that the law[did] no t mak e c ri minal ,” and w here retroactive a pplica tion was nece ss ary to avoid a “‘c om pl et e mi s car r

iage of ju s ti ce’” un der

“‘e xcep ti on al ci r cum s tan ces .’” Davis v. United States, 41 7 U.S . 33 3, 3 46 ( 197 4) (e mp has is add ed) . I n the c on te xt of cr im in al p r oce du r e, the Co ur t h as
r eco gni zedth at o nly “wat er s hed ” pr in cip les of con s ti tu ti on al l aw th at “ im pl icat e the f un dam ent al fair nes s of th e t r ial ” m ay be app lie d r et r oact ive ly. T eag ue v. Lane , 48 9 U. S. 2 88, 311 -1 2 ( 198 9)
. Acco r di ngl

y, i t i s well

es tab lis hedth at d ue p r oce s s do es no t r equ ir e f ede r al co ur ts to giv e r et r oact ive11

ef fe ct to new r ul es of cr im in al p r oce du r e that

af fe ct th e ele men ts of

fe der al cr im es . See, e.g. , Co le

man v. United States, 329 F.3d 77, 89 (2d C ir. 2003) (holding that Appr en di does not apply retroactively to a petition for a writ of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 22 55). Generally , “any conviction free from federal constitutional error at t he ti me i t be came fin al , will b e f ou nd , u po n r ef

lect io n, to hav e be en fu nd ame nt ally f

air andcon du ct ed u nd er

th os e pr oce du r es es s ent

ial to th e s ub s tan ce o f afull hear in g.” T eag ue , 48 9 U. S. a t 3 11 ( emp has is add ed) (i nt er nal qu ot ati onmar ks om it te d)
. We de cline He nry’s invitation to hold that, in this ins tance, due process r equires more of
states than of federal courts. Mor eover, our recent dec ision in Po lic ano was consistent with the Supreme Court’s opinion in Wainwri gh t , an d i t c on fi r med

—ev en i f i t did no t e xp lic it ly h ol d— th at du e pr oce s s di d n ot

man dat e the r et r oact

ive app lic ati onof

th e po s t- 200 4 in te r pr et ati onof th e Ne w Yor k Co ur t o f A pp eals oncollat er al r evi ew. Se e Po lic ano , 50 7 F .3dat 1 14 (

ho ld in g that

pet it io ner was not entitled to relief beca use the decision of the New Y ork Court of Appeals in Gonzalez “did not reflect the applic able l aw for purpos es of [his ] petition”). In s hort, because the C onstitut ion “has no voice upon the subject,” states may deve lop and app ly thei r

ownr ul es of

r et r oact ivi ty , Great N. Ry. Co. , 287 U.S. a t 364, eve n in the context of
cr im in al l aw, se e Wai

nwr ig ht , 414 U.S. a t 24. In this case, the Ne w York C ourt of Appea ls applied its
ownpr eced ent

to det er mi ne whether

it s new in te r pr et ati onof

N. Y. P enal

La w § 12 5.2 5(

2) app lie d
r et r oact ive ly an d co ncl ud ed that

it di d n ot . Se e Po lic

ano , 7 N.Y.3d a t 603 (evalua ting “three factors to determine whe ther a new prec edent operates retroactively ” and holding that retroactive operation
was no t w ar r ant ed)
. We hol d that, under the circumstances presented here, the Due Process Clause does not require the retroactive appli cation of a ne w interpretation of a criminal statute by the Ne w York Court of Appeals in our collate ral review of a conviction. See ante , n ot e 3.12 CONCLUSI ON Fo r r eas on s s tat ed ab ov e, the A ugu s t 2 1, 2 007 ju dgm ent of th e Di s tr ict Cou r t i s AF FI RM ED.