Department of Homeland Security

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Legal Training Division 

February 2014

THE

FEDERAL LAW ENFORCEMENT

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Welcome to this installment of The Federal Law Enforcement Informer (The Informer). The Legal Training Division of the 

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In This Issue 

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Schedule

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Case Summaries

Circuit Courts of Appeals

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 2nd Circuit 4th Circuit 5th Circuit 6th Circuit 

 7th Circuit 8th Circuit 10th Circuit 11th Circuit

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Free FLETC Informer Webinar Series Schedule

February / March 2014

(See the page 6 for instructions on how to participate in a webinar)

1. Government Workplace Searches

1-hour webinar presented by John Besselman, FLETC Legal Division.

This webinar examines how public employees might create a Reasonable Expectation of Privacy in 

their workplaces (computers, cars, offices, etc.), and, if so, how the government can intrude on that 

REP. This course is recommended for government supervisors, the IG community, and those whose 

duties include internal investigations. 

Date and Time:

 

Thursday February 27, 2014: 2:30 pm EST 

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2. What are Kalkines and Garrity Warnings?

1-hour webinar presented by John Besselman, FLETC Legal Division

This webinar will explore the self-incrimination rights possessed by government employees when 

confronted by the public employer. This course is recommended for public supervisors, the IG 

community and those whose duties include conducting internal investigations

Date and Time: 

Monday March 24, 2014: 8:30 am EDT 

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3. Warrantless Searches and Seizures under Exigent Circumstances Part I: The Overview

1-hour webinar presented by Bruce-Alan Barnard, FLETC Legal Division

The first installment in a four-part series on exigent circumstances under the Fourth Amendment.

Dates and Times: 

Tuesday March 4, 2014: 12:30 pm EST 

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Monday March 17, 2014: 1:30 pm EDT 

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4. Warrantless Searches and Seizures under Exigent Circumstances Part II: Emergency Doctrine

1-hour webinar presented by Bruce-Alan Barnard, FLETC Legal Division

This is the second installment in a four-part series on exigent circumstances under the Fourth

Amendment. Prerequisite: Exigent Circumstances I: The Overview

Date and Time: 

Monday March 17, 2014: 2:30 pm EDT 

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5. Warrantless Searches and Seizures under Exigent Circumstances Part III: Destruction of 

Evidence

1-hour webinar presented by Bruce-Alan Barnard, FLETC Legal Division

This is the third installment in a four-part series on exigent circumstances under the Fourth Amendment. 

Prerequisite: Exigent Circumstances Part I.

Dates and Times: 

Tuesday March 4, 2014: 1:30 pm EST 

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Wednesday March 19, 2014: 1:30 pm EDT

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law enforcement officers who have mandated three-hour legal update training requirements.

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7. Law Enforcement Legal Update Training (2-Hour Version)

2-hour webinar presented by Bruce-Alan Barnard, FLETC Legal Division

This is a two-hour block of instruction designed to meet the training requirements for state and federal 

law enforcement officers who have mandated two-hour legal update training requirements.

Date and Time: 

Wednesday March 12, 2014: 8:30 am EDT 

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8. Understanding the Administrative / Inspection Search

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This unique government authority and its limitations can be misunderstood. This webinar will explain 

how, why and when an agency has the ability to conduct an administrative inspection. All are 

welcome to attend. Recommended for those agencies that possess an inspection power.

Date and Time: 

Thursday March 13, 2014: 1:30 pm EDT 

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9. The Rules of Search Warrant Execution

1-hour webinar presented by John Besselman, FLETC Legal Division

This course looks at the rules that govern the proper execution of a search warrant, including the who, 

how, what, when and where of service. Items discussed will include who can issue and serve a search 

warrant, the use of force to execute the warrant, and how to properly and lawfully close out the 

warrant process. 

Date and Time:

Tuesday March 11, 2014: 2:30pm EDT

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10. HIPPA and the Law Enforcement Officer

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Affairs

This webinar will provide a general overview of HIPAA legislation, including a look at the 

definitions under Privacy Rule, who and what is covered under this rule, and provides examples of 

specific exemptions and the impact on law enforcement operations. Mr. Kels will be available for a 

Q&A session at the conclusion of the webinar.

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Tuesday March 18, 2014: 9:30am EDT

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CASE SUMMARIES

Circuit Courts of Appeals

2nd Circuit

McColley v. County of Rensselaer, 2014 U.S. App. LEXIS 1124 (2d Cir. N.Y. Jan. 21, 2014)

As part of a drug investigation, a police officer submitted a search warrant application to obtain four 

warrants to search four residences, including Ronita McColley’s apartment. The search warrant 

application was based upon information received from a confidential informant (CI). The CI told the 

officer he had been taken to an apartment to purchase crack cocaine from a local drug dealer. 

However, the CI made no mention of McColley or any other woman being present in the apartment at 

the time. The CI also told the officer about three other residences the drug dealer maintained to sell 

drugs, which were the subject of the other three search warrants. The officer confirmed the address 

of the apartment, learned McColley lived there, that she had no criminal history, and that she had a 

young child. The officer also conducted surveillance on McColley’s apartment, but did not observe 

any drug or criminal activity. 

In the officer’s search warrant application, he identified individuals who lived at each of the 

residences and their connection to drug dealing or criminal activity, with the exception of McColley. 

The officer did not mention McColley’s identity, lack of criminal record or that she was a resident in 

the apartment. The officer only stated the apartment was a location for the drug dealer to conduct 

transactions. In addition, the officer did not mention the surveillance that had been conducted on 

McColley’s apartment and the lack of drug or criminal activity that had been observed.

After obtaining a warrant, the police searched McColley’s apartment but did not discover drugs, 

weapons, money or evidence of criminal activity. McColley sued the officer who drafted the search 

warrant affidavit and his agency. Among her claims, McColley argued the officer violated the Fourth 

Amendment by omitting material facts from the search warrant affidavit that, if included and 

considered by the judge, would not have established probable cause to search her apartment. 

The court held the officer was not entitled to qualified immunity because information omitted from 

the affidavit was necessary to the finding of probable cause. Probable cause is determined by a court 

considering the totality of the circumstances, not just the particular facts favored by the police officer 

applying for the search warrant. The first material omission in the affidavit was the failure to 

mention McColley at all. The officer knew McColley had no criminal history or any ties to any of 

the targets of the drug investigation, that she lived at the apartment with her child and that the CI did 

not mention a woman being present during the drug deal. The court noted the omission of McColley 

from the affidavit was more glaring because the officer included the identities of the residents of the 

other three residences and their connection to the drug trade. If the officer had identified McColley in 

the affidavit, the judge who issued the search warrant would have questioned the officer’s claim that 

the drug dealer had “custody and control” over the apartment. 

The second material omission from the affidavit occurred when the officer failed to mention the 

police surveillance of McColley’s apartment and the fact that no criminal activity was observed. 

While the police were not required to corroborate the CI’s claims, once the officers conducted this 

surveillance and did not observe any criminal activity, the lack of corroboration should have been 

7
included in the affidavit. The court suggested if the surveillance had established evidence of criminal 

activity at McColley’s apartment, the officer would have included that information in the affidavit. 

Again, the court noted, because the outcome of the surveillance was not the one the officer would 

have preferred, that did not make the information immaterial for a determination of probable cause. 

Click HERE for the court’s opinion.

*****

4th Circuit

United States v. Green, 2014 U.S. App. LEXIS 952 (4th Cir. Va. Jan. 17, 2014)

A police officer pulled over Green’s vehicle because the windows appeared to be excessively tinted 

and the license plate was partially obscured in violation of Virginia law. While the officer ran a 

computer check on Green’s license and registration, he noticed Green appeared to be excessively 

nervous, that Green’s vehicle contained a strong odor of air freshener and that it had a “lived-in” 

look. A few minutes later, the officer learned Green had a protective order against him, which 

prompted the officer to request additional information from his dispatcher. In the meantime, the 

officer checked the tint on Green’s vehicle, discovering it was illegal. After asking Green about the 

presence of drugs in the vehicle, which Green denied, the officer requested a check of Green’s 

criminal history from his dispatcher. While waiting for dispatch to respond, the officer directed a 

back-up officer to conduct a free-air sniff of Green’s vehicle using a drug-detection dog. After the 

drug-detection dog alerted to the presence of narcotics, the officers searched Green’s vehicle and 

discovered just over one kilogram of cocaine and $7,000 in cash. Approximately fourteen minutes 

had elapsed between the time the officer stopped Green and the drug-detection dog alerted on Green’s 

vehicle. The government indicted Green for possession with intent to distribute cocaine.

Green argued the cocaine should have been suppressed because the scope and duration of the traffic 

stop were unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment. In addition, Green argued the drug-detection 

dog’s track record was not sufficiently reliable for the dog’s positive alert to establish probable cause 

to search his vehicle. 

The court disagreed, holding Green was lawfully seized for the traffic violation when the dog sniff 

occurred. During a routine traffic stop, an officer may request a driver’s license and vehicle 

registration, run a computer check, and issue a citation. An officer may also conduct an exterior dog 

sniff of the vehicle as long as it is performed within the time reasonably required to issue a traffic 

citation. Here, the officer told Green why he had been pulled over, requested Green’s license and 

registration and then immediately began verifying Green’s information on his computer and through 

his dispatcher. While waiting for a response, the officer checked the window tint on Green’s vehicle 

and requested a check of Green’s criminal history. The sniff by the drug-detection dog occurred 

while the officer was waiting for this information and did not unreasonably prolong Green’s 

detention. 

The court further held the drug-detection dog’s field performance records, degree of training, 

performance during training and recertification exercises and his evaluations by two different 

handlers, established the dog’s reliability in detecting drugs. As a result, when the dog alerted to the 

presence of narcotics in Green’s vehicle, the officers had probable cause to search it. 

Click HERE for the court’s opinion.

8
*****

5th Circuit

United States v. Robinson, 2014 U.S. App. LEXIS 1493 (5th Cir. Miss. Jan. 24, 2014)

Federal agents discovered a person with the username “lowkey” sent images of child pornography 

over the internet in June and July 2010 using the instant messaging service ICQ. Information 

embedded with the images indicated the images had been taken in May 2008 and January 2009. The 

agents obtained subscriber information and Internet Protocol logs for the “lowkey” account and 

determined the account had been accessed numerous times from a particular IP address assigned to a 

roofing company. The agents determined the child in the images was Robinson’s young son and that 

Robinson was a vice-president of the company. 

Federal agents obtained a warrant to search Robinson’s business office and house for evidence 

connected to the production and distribution of child pornography. At Robinson’s office, agents 

found a computer and thumb drive that contained images and videos of child pornography. At 

Robinson’s house, agents found clothing, household items and furniture that appeared in the images.

Robinson argued the evidence seized from his office should have been suppressed because the search 

warrant affidavit was misleading and it omitted important information. First, Robinson claimed the 

affidavit failed to disclose the available records for the “lowkey” account dated back only to October 

2010, several months after the seized images were sent. Second, Robinson argued the affidavit failed 

to disclose these records showed the “lowkey” account had been accessed by another IP address not 

associated with his roofing company. Robinson claimed these omissions made it falsely appear an IP 

address associated with his roofing company sent the images in June and July 2010.

The court disagreed, holding even if the omitted information had been included in the affidavit, there 

still would have been probable cause to support the issuance of a search warrant for Robinson’s 

office. The affidavit stated the “lowkey” account had most recently been accessed from an IP address 

assigned to Robinson’s company. The agents determined this same IP address had been used to login 

to the “lowkey” account on multiple occasions. Consequently, even if the affidavit stated the agents 

did not have records for the specific dates when the images were transmitted, these facts would still 

establish a “fair probability that contraband or evidence of a crime” would be found at Robinson’s 

office. 

Robinson also argued the affidavit contained no information indicating he or his son lived at his 

current address when the images were taken in May 2008 and January 2009. As a result, Robinson 

claimed the evidence seized from his house should have been suppressed. Robinson further argued 

the affidavit contained no information indicating it was likely the clothing or household items visible 

in the images would be present in his home more than two years later.

Again, the court disagreed and held the information used to establish probable cause was not stale. 

First, even if Robinson had moved to a different address after the images were taken, it would be 

reasonable to believe that evidence of the production, distribution or possession of child pornography 

might be found at Robinson’s current residence because child pornography offenses are often carried 

out over a long period and in a suspect’s home. Second, it would be reasonable to conclude the 

household items visible in the background of the images, the victim’s clothing, or the camera used to 

take the images would be located at Robinson’s current residence, even if Robinson and his family 

had moved after the images were taken. 

9
Click HERE for the court’s opinion.

*****

6th Circuit

United States v. Seymour, 2014 U.S. App. LEXIS 760 (6th Cir. Ohio January 15, 2014)

Police officers conducted a traffic stop on Powell’s vehicle. Before the vehicle came to a complete 

stop, Seymour, the front seat passenger, jumped out and fled on foot. Three police officers ran after 

Seymour. During the foot chase, one of the officers saw Seymour reach into his waistband and 

remove a handgun. At that moment, another officer tackled Seymour, causing Seymour to drop the 

gun, which the officers recovered. 

The government indicted Seymour for being a felon in possession of a firearm. Seymour argued he 

was seized for Fourth Amendment purposes once Powell’s vehicle was pulled over by the police. As 

a result, Seymour claimed, the handgun should have been suppressed because the officers did not 

have probable cause to arrest him at the moment of his seizure.

The court disagreed. Even though a traffic stop constitutes a seizure of the passengers in a vehicle, in 

this case, Seymour did not submit to the officers’ show of authority because he exited Powell’s 

vehicle before it came to a complete stop and then ran away from the officers. Seymour was seized 

only after the police officer tackled him. By this time, the officers had probable cause to arrest 

Seymour for a weapons violation because the officers saw Seymour reaching into his waistband and 

then holding a handgun during the chase. 

Click HERE for the court’s opinion.

*****

United States v. McMullin, 2014 U.S. App. LEXIS 1076 (6th Cir. Mich. January 21, 2014)

A woman called the police and reported three men were attempting to break into her house through a 

front window. When police officers approached the house on foot approximately ten minutes later, 

they saw McMullin standing close to the front window of the woman’s house. McMullin saw the 

officers and began to walk toward them. The officers told McMullin to stop and show his hands. 

McMullin complied and told the officers he was “here for his people.” Concerned for their safety and 

believing McMullin might be a suspect in the break-in, the officers frisked him for weapons and 

recovered a handgun from his front waistband. The officers discovered McMullin was not involved 

with the break-in; however, McMullin was charged with being a felon in possession of a firearm. 

McMillian argued the officers did not have reasonable suspicion to either stop or frisk him; therefore, 

the firearm recovered from his waistband should have been suppressed.

The court disagreed. First, the officers had reasonable suspicion to stop McMullin when they saw 

him standing near the front window of the house where an attempted break-in had been reported a 

few minutes earlier. Second, while this circuit has not specifically found that reasonable suspicion of 

breaking and entering or burglary raises sufficient suspicion that the suspect may be armed and 

dangerous, the officers in this case testified in their experiences, burglary suspects are often armed 

and dangerous. Consequently, the officers were justified in frisking McMullin and removing the

firearm from his waistband. The court added that McMullin’s ambiguous statement that he was “here 

10
for his people,” when considered with the other circumstances, was not enough to dispel the officers’ 

reasonable suspicion to stop or frisk McMullin.

Click HERE for the court’s opinion.

*****

7th Circuit

United States v. Richards, 2014 U.S. App. LEXIS 1967 (7th Cir. Ind. Jan. 31, 2014)

Police officers had an arrest warrant for Wilson. After learning Wilson was at a particular residence, 

officers went there and knocked on the door. The person who answered the door invited the officers 

inside the house to speak with the homeowner, Rawls. The officers spoke with Rawls, who was 

eighty-six years old. Rawls denied Wilson was present, but gave the officers consent to search his 

home. The officers saw several people as they walked through the house, but not Wilson. In the 

kitchen, the officers smelled the strong odor of marijuana and saw crack cocaine, as well as a small 

amount of marijuana, and drug paraphernalia. One of the officers ordered Rawl’s nephew, Richards, 

to stand up so the officer could perform a Terry frisk. After Richards refused, a brief altercation 

followed, but the officers quickly subdued and handcuffed Richards. While lifting Richards from the 

floor, a handgun fell out of his waistband. The officers then continued to search the house and entered 

a bedroom Richards used when he visited his uncle. The doorframe had a hasp and padlock, but the 

door was unlocked, so the officer entered the room. Inside the room, the officers saw an open 

briefcase that contained cocaine. Richards was charged with several drug and firearm offenses.

Richards argued his eighty-six year old uncle was not capable of giving the officers valid consent to 

enter his home because his advanced age left him “confused” and “out of touch with reality.”

The court disagreed. First, Rawls, as the homeowner, had authority to consent to a search of his 

house. In addition, the court found Rawls consent was voluntary. Even though he was old and had 

difficulty walking, Rawls exhibited no signs that he lacked the intelligence or mental capacity to 

voluntarily consent. One of the officers, who was trained to recognize the signs of mental illness,

testified Rawls appeared to have all his “mental faculties” about him. As a result, nothing would 

have put a reasonable officer on notice that Rawls’ mental state was so impaired that he could not 

provide voluntary consent to search his house. 

Next, even though the bedroom was in Rawl’s house, Richards argued Rawls did not have actual 

authority to consent to its search by the officers. 

The court agreed. Common authority is not based on a property interest in the area to be searched, 

but rather whether the consenting person has joint access or control of the area. Here, Richards had 

been staying in Rawl’s house approximately three times a week for eight months prior to his arrest. 

When he was there, Richards stayed alone in the bedroom and frequently locked the door with a 

padlock. In addition, Rawls did not have a key and had no access to the bedroom unless Richards 

unlocked it. Consequently, the court concluded Richards had established a reasonable expectation of 

privacy in the bedroom and Rawls did not have the actual authority to consent to its search by the 

officers. 

However, the court held the search was lawful, because Rawls had apparent authority to consent to 

the officers’ search of the bedroom. Police officers may conduct a warrantless search if they 

reasonably, although mistakenly, believe that the person consenting has authority over the area to be 

11
searched based on the facts known to them at the time. In this case, when Rawls gave the officers 

consent to search his house, Rawls did not tell the officers to avoid Richard’s bedroom or restrict 

their search and Rawls never told the officers he lived with anyone else. The padlock on the door to 

the bedroom was unlocked when the officers searched the room and the officers did not know Rawls 

did not have a key to the padlock. In fact, the court noted, it was reasonable for the officers to 

believe Rawls had placed the padlock on the door, not Richards. 

Based on these facts, the court held it was reasonable for the officers to believe Rawls had access to 

and authority over all of the rooms in his house and could consent to a search of the entire premises. 

Click HERE for the court’s opinion.

*****

8th Circuit

United States v. Stringer, 739 F.3d 391 (8th Cir. Mo. Jan. 6, 2014)

A police officer saw Stringer’s vehicle leaving a residence known for drug activity and conducted a 

traffic stop after he saw Stringer’s vehicle did not have license plates or working taillights. When the 

officer approached the vehicle, he saw two young female passengers who appeared to be under the 

influence of illegal drugs. After the officer verified the vehicle had a legal title, he told Stringer he 

was free to go, but that Stringer could not drive the vehicle without license plates and working 

taillights. When Stringer got out of the car to attempt to fix the taillights, the officer saw a knife in 

Stringer’s pocket and asked him to remove it. Stringer emptied his pockets and in addition to the 

knife, Stringer removed a contact lens case. The officer asked for permission to examine the case and 

Stringer consented. Upon opening the case, the officer saw a white crystalline substance around the 

lid and a white “blob” in the center of each compartment. The officer detained Stringer until another 

officer arrived with a drug test kit. After the contact lens case tested positive for methamphetamine, 

the officer arrested Stringer. Another officer arrived with a drug-detection dog that alerted to the 

presence of narcotics in Stringer’s car. The officer searched Stringer’s car and found an open purse 

that belonged to the fifteen-year old female passenger. The officer searched a cell phone in the purse, 

looking for drug related evidence, but instead found images of the minor female and Stringer 

engaging in sexual intercourse. The officer also found a cell phone and a digital camera in the 

vehicle that belonged Stringer, which both contained images similar to those found on the female’s 

cell phone. 

Stringer was convicted of production of child pornography.

Stringer argued the officer violated the Fourth Amendment by detaining him after the officer 

confirmed Stringer had a valid driver’s license and the vehicle was validly registered in Arkansas.

The court disagreed. Even if Stringer continued to be seized after the completion of the traffic stop, 

the court held the officer had reasonable suspicion to believe Stringer was involved in narcotics 

offenses. First, the officer had first-hand knowledge that the house Stringer had left was known for 

drug transactions. Second, the officer’s saw the fifteen-year old female passenger had very dilated 

pupils, which the officer knew was a sign of drug impairment. Third, the officer saw the contact lens 

case containing the crystalline substance and white “blobs” he suspected was methamphetamine. 

The court further held the officer had probable cause to search the car under the automobile exception 

to the Fourth Amendment’s warrant requirement based on the positive field test of the contact lens 

12
case for methamphetamine and the drug-dog’s alert. Under the automobile exception, the officers 

were entitled to search the car and any closed containers inside it. The court found Stringer did not 

have standing to object to the search the female-passenger’s cell phone because he did not have a 

reasonable expectation of privacy in it. Consequently, Stringer could not challenge the seizure of the 

images of child pornography discovered on her cell phone. Because the court found the images from 

the female passenger’s cell phone were sufficient to sustain Stringer’s conviction, the court did not 

rule on whether or not the evidence obtained from Stringer’s cell phone or digital camera were 

lawfully obtained as part of the officer’s warrantless search under the automobile exception.

Click HERE for the court’s opinion.

*****

United States v. Goodrich, 2014 U.S. App. LEXIS 414 (8th Cir. Mo. Jan. 9, 2014)

Police officers responded to a call of a break-in at a house Goodrich rented. Upon arrival, a witness 

told the officers he heard a gunshot and the officers saw people inside the house. One man ran from 

the house and was arrested after he dropped a bag of marijuana and two handguns on the ground. 

The officers arrested a second man as he attempted to exit the house through a window. Goodrich 

arrived at the house shortly after the police. Because of the reported gunshot, the officers decided to 

conduct a protective sweep of the house for additional intruders or possible victims. The officers 

asked Goodrich to open the front door but he refused. The officers told Goodrich if he did not open 

the door, the officers would force their way inside. After Goodrich unlocked the door, the officers 

conducted a 20-25 minute sweep of the house, looking under beds, in closets, and anywhere else they 

believed suspects or victims might be located. During the sweep, the officers saw a firearm on a bed 

and an open diaper box containing individually wrapped baggies of marijuana. 

After the sweep, the officers decided to conduct a second search. An officer gave Goodrich a 

consent-to-search form. Goodrich read the form and asked the officer what would happen if he 

refused consent to search. The officer told Goodrich he would obtain a search warrant. Goodrich 

signed the form; the officers search the house and recovered firearms, marijuana, cash and drug 

paraphernalia. 

The government indicted Goodrich for drug and firearms offenses. Goodrich argued the protective 

sweep violated the Fourth Amendment because he only allowed the officers into his house after they 

threatened to “break the door down” if he did not open it. Goodrich also argued the police used 

threats to coerce his subsequent consent to search the house. 

The court disagreed. The officers did not need Goodrich’s consent to conduct the protective sweep. 

When the officers arrived, a witness told them a gun had been fired and the officers arrested one of 

the suspects with a firearm. Under these circumstances, the officers reasonably believed that a 

shooting victim or additional armed suspect might be in the house. This reasonable belief justified 

the officers’ warrantless entry of the house, with or without Goodrich’s consent. In addition, the 

court held 20-25 minutes was a reasonable amount of time for the officers to conduct the sweep and 

that the officers properly limited the sweep to places where suspects or victims might be located. 

The court also held Goodrich voluntarily consented to the search of his house because the officers did 

not threaten him, Goodrich read and understood the consent-to-search form and Goodrich did not 

object while the officers searched the house. 

Click HERE for the court’s opinion.

13
*****

United States v. Rodriguez, 2014 U.S. App. LEXIS 1897 (8th Cir. Neb. Jan. 31, 2014)

A police officer conducted a traffic stop after he saw Rodriguez’s car veer onto the shoulder of the 

road then swerve back into the lane of travel. The officer conducted a records check on Rodriguez 

and the front seat passenger. After the officer issued Rodriguez a written warning, he asked 

Rodriguez for permission to walk his drug-sniffing dog around the car. When Rodriguez refused, the 

officer directed Rodriguez to get out of the car until a back-up officer could arrive. After the back-up 

officer arrived, the officer walked his dog around Rodriguez’s car and the dog alerted to the presence 

of drugs. The officer searched Rodriguez’s car, found a large bag of methamphetamine and arrested 

Rodriguez. Approximately seven or eight minutes elapsed from the time the officer issued the 

written warning until the dog alerted on Rodriguez’s car. 

Rodriguez argued as soon as the officer issued the written warning, the officer did not have 

reasonable suspicion to detain him on the side of the road while he waited for the back-up officer to 

arrive. 

The court disagreed. Without deciding whether the officer had reasonable suspicion to continue to 

detain Rodriguez after he issued the written warning, the court held the traffic stop was not 

unreasonably prolonged by the dog sniff. Although the dog was located in the officer’s patrol car, the 

officer waited to use it until the back-up officer arrived for safety reasons because there were two 

individuals in Rodriguez’s car. Although Rodriguez was detained for an additional seven or eight 

minutes, the court concluded such a delay was reasonable and only constituted a de minimis intrusion 

on Rodriguez’s personal liberty. 

Click HERE for the court’s opinion.

*****

10th Circuit

United States v. Wells, 739 F.3d 511 (10th Cir. Okla. 2014)

Federal agents suspected Officer Gray, a Tulsa police officer, was stealing money and drugs from 

suspects he detained. An undercover federal agent posed as a drug dealer named Joker and rented a 

motel room in Tulsa, which was outfitted with hidden audio and video recording equipment. In 

addition, there was $13,620 in government funds hidden in the room. After federal agents instructed 

a cooperating witness to tell Gray a drug dealer with large quantities of drugs and cash was 

conducting business from the motel room, Officer Gray, Officer Wells and Officer Hill went to the 

motel and encountered Joker in the lobby. The officers handcuffed Joker and detained him in a patrol 

car. After Wells obtained Joker’s consent to search, Wells and Gray went to Joker’s room. The 

audio and video recordings in Joker’s room established Wells and Gray stole $2,000 from the room 

and later allowed other officers to take an additional amount of money. 

The government indicted Wells for a variety of offenses involving official corruption. Wells argued 

the trial court should have suppressed the audio and video recordings that documented his activities in 

the motel room because Joker was not present in the room when these activities were captured.

First, while 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510-2520 (Title III) regulates the interception and recording of audio 

communications, the court stated Title III only applies to communications that are made where the 

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speaker has a reasonable expectation of privacy. Similarly, video surveillance will not violate the 

Fourth Amendment if the person whose actions are being recorded has no reasonable expectation of 

privacy at the time of the surveillance. 

Second, the court noted the Tenth Circuit has not been generous in recognizing the privacy rights of 

individuals found in hotel or motel rooms that were not rented in their names. The Tenth Circuit has 

required that such individuals present evidence establishing they are guests of the renter, rather than 

individuals merely present on the premises. 

In this case, Wells was not Joker’s guest nor did he have any socially meaningful connection to the 

motel room. After obtaining Joker’s consent to enter the room, Wells spent approximately fifteen 

minutes in the room outside Joker’s presence. Wells was merely legally present in the room for a 

very limited amount of time. Consequently, the court concluded Wells did not have a reasonable 

expectation of privacy in any of his communications in Joker’s motel room when he was outside 

Joker’s presence. 

Click HERE for the court’s opinion.

*****

United States v. Christy, 739 F.3d 534 (10th Cir. N.M. 2014)

Christy met a sixteen-year old girl, K.Y., online and exchanged sexually explicit emails and 

photographs with her. After K.Y.’s parents reported her missing, federal agents in California 

discovered the sexually explicit emails and photographs. The agents also learned Christy lived in 

New Mexico and that around the time of K.Y.’s disappearance, Christy had traveled to California and 

then back to New Mexico. Federal agents in California contacted the local sheriff’s office in New 

Mexico, who dispatched two police officers to Christy’s house to conduct a welfare check on K.Y. 

One of the officers walked to the rear of the house and looked through a crack in the blinds covering a 

window and saw K.Y. wearing a brassiere and underwear, smiling and holding a rope. Concerned for 

K.Y’s safety, the officer asked his sergeant for permission to force entry into the house and for 

backup. When the officer looked back through the window, K.Y. was no longer wearing the 

brassiere, she was bound by the rope and the officer saw camera flashes. When backup arrived, the 

officers made a warrantless entry into the house and arrested Christy. During their protective sweep, 

the officers found pornographic material in the house. After being Mirandized, Christy made several 

incriminating statements. Based in part on the officers’ observations in the house and Christy’s 

statements after his arrest, the officers obtained warrants to search Christy’s house, cell phone, 

vehicle, computer and person. Pursuant to the search warrants, the police discovered, among other 

things, child pornography, to include images of K.Y.

Christy argued the warrantless entry and search of his house, including his statements to the officers, 

as well as all of the evidence obtained pursuant to the search warrants should have been suppressed. 

The district court held the officers violated the Fourth Amendment when they entered Christy’s house 

without a warrant. However, the court held any illegally seized evidence was still admissible against 

Christy under the inevitable discovery doctrine. The court determined if the illegal search had not 

occurred, the officers would have legally obtained a warrant and discovered the evidence anyway.

The court of appeals agreed. Under the inevitable discovery doctrine, illegally obtained evidence 

may be admitted if it ultimately or inevitably would have been discovered by lawful means. Here, the 

officers had probable cause to obtain a warrant based on the information they knew before they 

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entered Christy’s house without a warrant. The officers knew K.Y. was a minor, there was a large 

age difference between her and Christy, the two had exchanged sexually explicit pictures and Christy 

traveled across state lines with K.Y. Given those facts, it was reasonable for the officers to believe 

there was a sexual relationship between Christy and K.Y. and that Christy had violated California law 

and federal law. As a result, the officer would have obtained a search warrant and the evidence in 

question would have been discovered legally, had the illegal search not discovered it first. 

Click HERE for the court’s opinion.

*****

United States v. Gordon, 2014 U.S. App. LEXIS 1524 (10th Cir. Utah Jan. 27, 2014)

Brandi Thaxton called 911 to report an incident of domestic violence that had occurred two days 

earlier. Thaxton, who was upset and crying, told the dispatcher her boyfriend, Gordon, assaulted her 

and broke her glasses. Thaxton also said Gordon had swung a samurai sword at her and told the 

dispatcher she believed Gordon would harm her after he found out she had called the police. Police 

officers responded to Gordon’s house and entered without Gordon’s consent. After an officer located 

Thaxton hiding in the basement, Thaxton led the officer upstairs to a bedroom to show him her 

broken glasses. Near the bedroom door, the officer saw a gun case, which contained a loaded 

shotgun. The officer seized the shotgun and three swords he found in the hallway. After the officer 

arrested Gordon for aggravated assault and Thaxton was transported by EMS to the hospital, the 

officer locked the house and transported Gordon to the county jail. On the way to the jail, while still 

in possession of Gordon’s shotgun, the officer learned Gordon was a convicted felon. The 

government indicted Gordon for being in possession of a firearm. 

Gordon argued the shotgun should have been suppressed because the officers violated the Fourth 

Amendment by entering his house without a warrant or his consent and then seizing his shotgun 

without justification.

First, the court held the officers’ entry into Gordon’s house was reasonable due to exigent 

circumstances. Even though Gordon assaulted Thaxton two day earlier, when the officers entered 

Gordon’s house they knew Thaxton was upset, crying and afraid she would be seriously harmed 

when Gordon discovered she had called the police. 

Second, the court held it was reasonable for the officer to accompany Thaxton from the basement to 

the upstairs bedroom to retrieve her glasses. 

Third, the court held it was reasonable for the officer to initially seize Gordon’s shotgun for safety 

reasons when the officer first saw it. However, once Gordon was in custody on the way to jail, and 

the house was secured, the court concluded the officer had no legal justification to continue his 

seizure of Gordon’s shotgun. The court emphasized the plain view doctrine did not apply because the 

officer did not discover incriminating nature of the shotgun, specifically that Gordon was a convicted 

felon and could not lawfully possess a firearm, until he was transporting Gordon to jail. 

Finally, the court explained while the officer’s only mistake was not returning the shotgun before 

securing Gordon’s house, only a few minutes elapsed between the time the officer locked the house 

and discovered Gordon was a convicted felon. Because this amount of time was a de minimis

intrusion Gordon’s rights, and Gordon was lawfully in custody at the time, the court held suppression 

of the shotgun was not warranted. 

Click HERE for the court’s opinion. 

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*****

United States v. Harmon, 2014 U.S. App. LEXIS 1525 (10th Cir. N.M. Jan. 27, 2014)

A police officer stopped Harmon after the officer saw Harmon’s car weaving within his lane and the 

front and rear passenger tires of Harmon’s car cross over the outer white line, or fog line, one time. 

The officer believed touching the fog line violated New Mexico law and was concerned that Harmon 

might be intoxicated or fatigued.

After issuing Harmon a written warning for failing to maintain a lane, the officer obtained consent to 

search Harmon’s car. During the search, the officer found packages of marijuana and cocaine hidden 

in the spare tire. The government indicted Harmon for two drug offenses.

Harmon argued on appeal the officer did not have reasonable suspicion to justify the traffic stop. 

The court disagreed. The court noted the officer saw Harmon’s car weaving and that its front and 

rear passenger wheels crossed the fog line. In addition, the court stated there was no evidence 

indicating difficult driving conditions or adverse weather existed that could have explained Harmon’s 

driving errors. Consequently, the combination of these facts gave the officer reasonable suspicion to 

stop Harmon to investigate whether he was driving while impaired. 

Click HERE for the court’s opinion.

*****

11th Circuit

United States v. Ransfer, 2014 U.S. App. LEXIS 1669 (11th Cir. Fla. Jan. 28, 2014)

In May 2011, police officers installed a GPS tracking device without a warrant on a vehicle used by 

Ransfer and several co-defendants who were suspects in a series of robberies. At trial, evidence 

obtained from the GPS tracking was admitted against Ransfer as well as incriminating statements he 

made after his arrest. Ransfer argued the warrantless installation of the tracking device violated the 

Fourth Amendment. Ransfer further claimed his statements to the officers were not voluntary and he 

was not aware of the Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination.

The court disagreed. The court noted the warrantless installation of the GPS tracking device occurred 

before the United States Supreme Court decision in U.S. v. Jones. Consequently, the officers relied in 

good faith on existing case law which held it did not violate the Fourth Amendment to install an 

electronic tracking device on the outside of a vehicle without a warrant. 

In addition, the court held Ransfer’s incriminating statements to the officers were admissible. First, 

Ransfer signed a form waiving his Miranda rights, which the officers went over with him before he 

signed it. Second, despite his relative youth, there was no evidence showing Ransfer did not 

understand these rights. Finally, the court held Ransfer’s statements to the officers were voluntary 

and not the result of coercion.

Click HERE for the court’s opinion.

*****

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