a

GAO

United States General Accounting Office

Report to Congressional Committees

September 2003 HOMELAND 

SECURITY

Risks Facing Key 

Border and 

Transportation 

Security Program 

Need to Be Addressed

GAO-03-1083
DHS’s fiscal year 2003 US-VISIT expenditure plan and related documentation 

partially satisfied the conditions imposed by the Congress, which include 

meeting the capital planning and investment control review requirements of 

the Office of Management and Budget (OMB). For example, DHS fulfilled the 

OMB requirement that agencies state whether projects are approved by 

investment review boards and reviewed by Chief Financial and Procurement 

Officers; the plan was conditionally approved by DHS’s review board, which 

includes DHS’s Chief Financial and Procurement Officers. On the other 

hand, OMB guidance requires that agency plans summarize life cycle costs 

and include a cost/benefit analysis that covers return on investment. DHS 

has not yet established a date and plan for developing these for US-VISIT, 

although program officials stated that they intend to do so.

GAO also identified 10 factors (see figure) affecting US-VISIT and concluded 

that the program is a very risky endeavor. Some risk factors are inherent to 

the program, such as its mission criticality, its size and complexity, and its 

enormous potential costs. Others, however, arise from the program’s 

relatively immature state of governance and management. For example, 

although the program has governmentwide scope, an accountable 

governance structure to direct and oversee the program that reflects this 

scope is not yet established. In addition, a US-VISIT program management 

capability has yet to be established, important aspects defining the 

program’s operating environment are not decided, facility needs are unclear 

and challenging, and the mission value to be derived from the program’s 

initial operating capability is unknown. Because of the risk factors, GAO 

concluded that it is uncertain that US-VISIT will be able to measurably and 

appreciably achieve DHS’s stated goals for the program. Further, DHS’s 

near-term investment in the program is at risk of not delivering promised 

capabilities on time and within budget and not producing mission value 

commensurate with investment costs. 

Factors That Collectively Make US-VISIT a Risky Endeavor 

The Department of Homeland 

Security (DHS) plans to establish a 

program to strengthen 

management of the pre-entry, 

entry, status, and exit of foreign 

nationals who travel to the United 

States. The goals of the program, 

known as the United States Visitor 

and Immigrant Status Indicator 

Technology (US-VISIT), are to 

facilitate legitimate trade and 

travel, enhance national security, 

and adhere to U.S. privacy laws and 

policies. By congressional 

mandate, DHS is to develop and 

submit for approval an expenditure 

plan for US-VISIT that satisfies 

certain conditions, including being 

reviewed by GAO. GAO was asked 

to determine, among other things, 

whether the plan satisfies these 

conditions and to provide 

observations about the plan and 

DHS’s management of the program. 

GAO is making a number of 

recommendations to the Secretary 

of DHS aimed at minimizing the 

risks facing US-VISIT, including 

(1) establishing an executive body, 

composed of appropriate 

stakeholder representatives, to 

guide and direct the program, be 

held accountable for the program’s 

progress and outcomes, and 

address key program issues and 

make associated decisions and 

(2) taking steps to establish an 

effective program management 

capability. DHS concurred with our 

recommendations and stated that it 

has made progress toward 

addressing them. 

www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-03-1083 

To view the full product, including the scope 

and methodology, click on the link above. 

For more information, contact Randolph C. 

Hite at (202) 512-3439 or hiter@gao.gov. 

Highlights of GAO-03-1083, a report to 

Subcommittees on Homeland Security, 

Senate and House Committees on 

Appropriations 

September 2003

HOMELAND SECURITY 

Risks Facing Key Border and 

Transportation Security Program Need to 

Be Addressed 
Page i GAO-03-1083 Homeland Security

Contents

Letter 1

Recommendations for Executive Action 6

Agency Comments 7

Appendixes

Appendix I: Briefing to the Staffs of the Subcommittees on Homeland 

Security, Senate and House Committees on Appropriations 9

Appendix II: Comments from the Department of Homeland Security 97

Abbreviations

ADIS Arrival Departure Information System 

APIS Advance Passenger Information System 

CCD Consular Consolidated Database

CLAIMS 3 Computer Linked Application Information Management 

System 3

CLASS Consular Lookout and Support System 

DHS Department of Homeland Security

EA enterprise architecture

IBIS Interagency Border Inspection System 

IDENT Automated Biometric Identification System

INS Immigration and Naturalization Service

IRB Investment Review Board

IT information technology 

NIIS Non-Immigrant Information System

NSEERS National Security Entry-Exit Registration System

OMB Office of Management and Budget

POE port of entry

SA-CMM® Software Acquisition Capability Maturity Model®

SEI Software Engineering Institute

SEVIS Student Exchange Visitor Information System

US-VISIT U.S. Visitor and Immigrant Status Indicator Technology 
Contents

Page ii GAO-03-1083 Homeland Security

This is a work of the U.S. government and is not subject to copyright protection in the 

United States. It may be reproduced and distributed in its entirety without further 

permission from GAO. However, because this work may contain copyrighted images or 

other material, permission from the copyright holder may be necessary if you wish to 

reproduce this material separately.
Page 1 GAO-03-1083 Homeland Security

United States General Accounting Office

Washington, D.C. 20548

A

September 19, 2003 Letr

The Honorable Thad Cochran

Chairman

The Honorable Robert C. Byrd

Ranking Minority Member

Subcommittee on Homeland Security 

Committee on Appropriations

United States Senate

The Honorable Harold Rogers

Chairman

The Honorable Martin Olav Sabo

Ranking Minority Member

Subcommittee on Homeland Security

Committee on Appropriations

House of Representatives 

Pursuant to the Consolidated Appropriations Resolution, 2003,1 the 

Department of Homeland Security (DHS) submitted to Congress in June 

2003 its fiscal year 2003 expenditure plan for the United States Visitor and 

Immigrant Status Indicator Technology (US-VISIT) program. US-VISIT is a 

governmentwide program intended to improve the nation’s capacity for 

collecting information on foreign nationals who travel to the United States, 

as well as control the pre-entry, entry, status, and exit of these travelers. 

The goals for US-VISIT are to facilitate legitimate travel and trade, enhance 

national security, and adhere to U.S. privacy laws and policies. As also 

required by the Consolidated Appropriations Resolution, 2003, we 

reviewed the expenditure plan. Our objectives were to (1) determine 

whether the US-VISIT fiscal year 2003 expenditure plan satisfies certain 

legislative conditions specified in the Consolidated Appropriations 

Resolution, 2003; (2) determine the status of our US-VISIT open 

recommendations; and (3) provide any other observations about the 

expenditure plan and DHS’s management of US-VISIT. The specified 

legislative conditions are that the plan meet the capital planning and 

investment control review requirements established by the Office of 

Management and Budget (OMB), including OMB Circular A-11, part 3; that 

it comply with the acquisition rules, requirements, guidelines, and systems 

1

P.L. 108-7 (Feb. 20, 2003).
Page 2 GAO-03-1083 Homeland Security

acquisition management practices of the federal government; and that it be 

reviewed by GAO.

On July 18, 2003, we provided your offices a written briefing detailing the 

results of our review. This report summarizes and transmits this briefing. 

The full briefing, including our scope and methodology, is reprinted as 

appendix I.

Concerning our first objective, DHS partially satisfied those legislative 

conditions specified in the Consolidated Appropriations Resolution, 2003, 

that are applicable to it. That is, the plan, including related program 

documentation and program officials’ statements, satisfied or provided for 

satisfying many, but not all of the key aspects of (1) OMB’s capital planning 

and investment control review requirements; and (2) federal acquisition 

rules, requirements, guidelines, and systems acquisition management 

practices. For example, DHS fulfilled the OMB requirement that agencies 

state whether projects are approved by investment review boards and 

reviewed by Chief Financial and Procurement Officers; the plan was 

conditionally approved by DHS’s review board, which includes DHS’s Chief 

Financial and Procurement Officers. On the other hand, OMB guidance 

requires that agency plans summarize life cycle costs and include a 

cost/benefit analysis that covers return on investment. DHS has not yet 

established a date and plan for developing a current life cycle cost and a 

cost/benefit analysis for US-VISIT, although program officials stated that 

they intend to do so.

Concerning our second objective, DHS has initiated action to implement or 

has partially implemented most, but not all of the recommendations 

contained in our report on the fiscal year 2002 expenditure plan.2

 Each 

recommendation, along with the status of each, is summarized below.

• We recommended that DHS develop a system security plan and privacy 

impact assessment. The department has action under way to address 

this recommendation. Specifically, DHS reported that it has defined 

security and privacy requirements and has drafted a security plan and a 

privacy impact assessment.

2

U.S. General Accounting Office, Information Technology: Homeland Security Needs to 

Improve Entry Exit System Expenditure Planning, GAO-03-563 (Washington, D.C.: June 9, 

2003).
Page 3 GAO-03-1083 Homeland Security

• We recommended that DHS ensure that controls in the area of 

acquisition planning, solicitation, requirements management, program 

management, contract tracking and oversight, and evaluation are 

implemented in accordance with the Software Engineering Institute’s 

(SEI) guidance.3 The department plans to implement this 

recommendation. Specifically, DHS has recently approved a program 

management structure that includes functions consistent with these 

controls; however, it has not yet developed explicit plans or time frames 

for defining and implementing them.

• We recommended that DHS ensure that future expenditure plans are 

provided to the department’s House and Senate Appropriations 

Subcommittees in advance of US-VISIT funds being obligated. With 

respect to the fiscal year 2003 expenditure plan, DHS partially satisfied 

this recommendation. Specifically, it provided this plan to the Senate 

and House Appropriations Subcommittees on Homeland Security in 

June 2003. However, following DHS’s request for use of $5 to $7 million 

in March 2003, the April 2003 House Conference Report4

 recommended 

that DHS use $5 million for US-VISIT. DHS subsequently allocated the $5 

million to the US-VISIT program.

• We recommended that DHS ensure that future expenditure plans fully 

disclose US-VISIT system capabilities, schedule, cost, and benefits. With 

respect to the fiscal year 2003 expenditure plan, DHS has partially 

satisfied this recommendation. Specifically, this plan describes highlevel capabilities by increment, high-level schedule estimates, and 

categories of expenditures. However, the plan does not associate these 

categories of expenditure to incremental capabilities, time frames, and 

benefits. Moreover, the plan does not identify expected benefits in 

tangible, measurable, and meaningful terms, nor does it associate 

benefits with increments. 

Finally, we identified 10 factors that make US-VISIT a risky endeavor. Some 

of these risk factors are inherent to the program, and others are a product 

of the program’s relatively immature state of governance and management. 

The specific risk factors that we identified are as follows:

3

Carnegie Mellon Software Engineering Institute, Software Acquisition Capability 

Maturity Model , Version 1.03 (March 2002) defines acquisition process management 

controls for planning, managing, and controlling software-intensive system acquisitions.

4

H.R. Conf. Rep. No. 108-76, at 80 (2003).
Page 4 GAO-03-1083 Homeland Security

• US-VISIT is critical to the department’s mission in preventing the entry 

of persons who pose a threat to our nation into the United States. The 

missed entry of just one of these persons could have severe 

consequences.

• US-VISIT is large in scope and complex. For example, the program is to 

(1) support a large governmentwide process involving multiple 

departments and agencies, (2) modify and expand facilities at over 150 

land ports of entry, and (3) interconnect about 20 existing systems.

• To meet US-VISIT’s daunting milestones,5 DHS has chosen to implement 

temporary solutions, largely because over the last 7 years, limited 

progress has been made in addressing key legislative requirements. For 

example, to meet deadlines at land ports of entry, DHS plans to develop 

and implement interim, or temporary, system and facility solutions. 

• The program will be a costly undertaking. In February 2003, DHS 

estimated that the program would cost about $7.2 billion through fiscal 

year 2014. However, this estimate is outdated and does not include, for 

example, the State Department’s cost to implement visas with 

biometrics, which we previously estimated could add as much as $15 

billion to the program’s cost through 2014.6

• The performance of initial increments of the US-VISIT system depends 

on the performance of existing systems that are to be interfaced. Some 

of these systems, such as the Student and Exchange Visitor Information 

System7

 and the Computer Linked Application Information Management 

System 3,8 have known system availability problems that could limit USVISIT system performance. 

5

For example, the Immigration and Naturalization Service Data Management Improvement 

Act of 2000 (P.L. 106-215, June 15, 2000) requires that US-VISIT be implemented at all air and 

sea ports of entry by December 31, 2003; at the 50 highest volume land ports of entry by 

December 31, 2004; and at all remaining ports of entry by December 31, 2005.

6

U.S. General Accounting Office, Technology Assessment: Using Biometrics for Border 

Security, GAO-03-174 (Washington, D.C.: Nov. 15, 2002).

7

The Student and Exchange Visitor Information System contains information on foreign 

students.

8

The Computer Linked Application Information Management System 3 contains information 

on foreign nationals who request benefits, such as change of status or extension of stay.
Page 5 GAO-03-1083 Homeland Security

• US-VISIT is not currently directed and overseen by an accountable 

governance structure that reflects the program’s governmentwide scope 

and that includes the appropriate leaders from each stakeholder 

organization, that is, those who can make and enforce decisions and 

commit resources. 

• The US-VISIT program office does not have the capabilities (people, 

processes, and tools) to effectively manage the program. For example, 

this office has not yet been adequately staffed, specific roles and 

responsibilities have not been defined, and acquisition management 

process controls have not been developed and implemented. Moreover, 

DHS has not defined specific plans and time frames for doing so. 

• Key information about the operational context surrounding US-VISIT 

that is necessary to effectively define, establish, and implement the 

program is not yet available. As a result, DHS is making certain 

assumptions and decisions in order to meet near-term deadlines, such as 

the use of a two-fingerprint biometric; these assumptions and decisions 

would require system rework if they prove inconsistent with subsequent 

operational context policy or standards decisions.

• Construction of US-VISIT facility solutions, both interim and permanent, 

pose serious challenges for a number of reasons. For example, existing 

facilities do not support existing entry and exit processes at a number of 

land ports of entry, border crossing wait times are very sensitive to very 

small increases in processing times at certain high-volume land ports of 

entry, and interim facility solutions must satisfy yet-to-be defined 

program requirements.

• The mission value to be gained from the initial US-VISIT operational 

capability planned for December 31, 2003, is not currently known. In 

particular, DHS has not defined specific, measurable benefits expected 

from this initial operating capability, in large part because it has yet to 

define the processes that will govern how entry and exit activities will 

be performed. This uncertainty is compounded by the fact that this 

initial operating capability is to be constrained by existing facilities and 

personnel and it is not to result in increases in border crossing wait 

times.

In conclusion, US-VISIT is a risky undertaking because it is to support a 

critical mission, its scope is large and complex, it must meet a demanding 

implementation schedule, and its potential cost is enormous. Generally, 
Page 6 GAO-03-1083 Homeland Security

these risk factors are inherent to the program and cannot be easily 

changed. However, compounding these inherent risk factors are a number 

of others that are attributable to the program’s current state of governance 

and management and its acquisition approach, as described above. Further, 

DHS did not fully satisfy the legislative conditions imposed by the Congress 

and has yet to fully implement our previous recommendations, both of 

which were aimed at reducing risk. Because of all these risk factors, it is 

uncertain that US-VISIT will be able to measurably and appreciably achieve 

DHS’s stated goals of facilitating legitimate travel and trade, enhancing 

national security, and adhering to U.S. privacy laws and policies. Moreover, 

DHS’s near-term investment in the program is at risk of not delivering 

promised capabilities on time and within budget, and not producing 

mission value commensurate with investment costs. Thus, it is imperative 

that the factors that contribute to this level of risk be addressed thoroughly 

and expeditiously.

Recommendations for 

Executive Action

To address US-VISIT as a governmentwide program and to minimize the 

risks facing the program, we recommend that the Secretary of Homeland 

Security, in collaboration with cabinet officials from US-VISIT stakeholder 

departments and agencies, 

• establish and charter an executive body, chaired by the Secretary’s 

designee, potentially co-chaired by the leadership from key stakeholder 

departments and agencies, and composed of appropriate senior-level 

representatives from DHS and each stakeholder organization, to guide 

and direct the US-VISIT program; and 

• direct this executive body to immediately take steps to (1) ensure that 

the human capital and financial resources are expeditiously provided to 

establish a fully functional and effective US-VISIT program office and 

associated management capability, (2) clarify the operational context 

within which US-VISIT must operate, and (3) decide whether proposed 

US-VISIT increments will produce mission value commensurate with 

costs and risks and disclose to the Congress planned actions based on 

this body’s decisions.

Further, we recommend that the Secretary, through the Under Secretary for 

Border and Transportation Security, direct the US-VISIT Program Director 

to expeditiously establish an effective program management capability, 

including immediately 
Page 7 GAO-03-1083 Homeland Security

• defining program office positional roles, responsibilities, and 

relationships;

• developing and implementing a human capital strategy that provides for 

staffing these positions with individuals who have the requisite core 

competencies (knowledge, skills, and abilities);

• developing and implementing a plan for satisfying key SEI acquisition 

management controls, to include acquisition planning, solicitation, 

requirements development and management, project management, 

contractor tracking and oversight, evaluation, and transition to support;

• developing and implementing a risk management plan and ensuring that 

all high risks and their status are reported regularly to the executive 

body;

• defining performance standards for each US-VISIT system increment 

that are measurable and reflect the limitations imposed by relying on 

existing systems for these system increments; and 

• developing an analysis of incremental program costs, benefits, and risks, 

and providing this analysis to the executive body, to assist it in the 

body’s deliberations and decision making.

Agency Comments In written comments on a draft of this report signed by the Director, USVISIT, DHS concurred with our recommendations and stated that it has 

recently made progress toward addressing them. In particular, DHS stated 

that it has approved the proposed US-VISIT organizational structure and 

identified necessary staff positions, and that it is working with the Office of 

Personnel Management to draft position descriptions and prepare for 

recruitment. Also, it stated that the US-VISIT program office is staffed with 

51 detailees from various DHS components and agencies. Last, it stated 

that it has in place an Investment Review Board that has twice reviewed 

US-VISIT, has established a DHS framework for addressing policy 

questions, and has plans to establish a US-VISIT Advisory Council. DHS’s 

comments are reprinted in appendix II.

We are sending copies of this report to the Chairmen and Ranking Minority 

Members of other Senate and House committees and subcommittees that 
Page 8 GAO-03-1083 Homeland Security

have authorization and oversight responsibilities for homeland security. We 

are also sending copies to the Secretary of State and the Director of OMB. 

We also will make copies available to others upon request. In addition, the 

report will be available at no charge on the GAO Web site at 

http://www.gao.gov.

Should you or your staff have any questions on matters discussed in this 

report, please contact me at (202) 512-3439. I can also be reached by E-mail 

at Hiter@gao.gov. Key contributors to this report were Seto Bagdoyan, 

Barbara Collier, Deborah Davis, Neil Doherty, Rebecca Gambler, Tamra 

Goldstein, James Houtz, Richard Hung, Tammi Nguyen, and Mark Tremba.

Randolph C. Hite

Director, Information Technology Architecture

 and Systems Issues
Page 9 GAO-03-1083 Homeland Security

Appendix I

Briefing to the Staffs of the Subcommittees on Apendxies

Homeland Security, Senate and House 

Committees on Appropriations ApendxiI

1

Information Technology:Risks Facing Key 

Homeland Security Program Need to Be 

Addressed

Briefing to the Staffs of the

Subcommittees on Homeland Security

Senate and House Committee on Appropriations

July 18, 2003
Appendix I

Briefing to the Staffs of the Subcommittees 

on Homeland Security, Senate and House 

Committees on Appropriations

Page 10 GAO-03-1083 Homeland Security

2

Briefing Overview

• Introduction

• Objectives

• Results in Brief

• Background

• Results

• Legislative Conditions

• Status of Recommendations

• Observations

• Conclusions

• Recommendations

• Agency Comments

• Attachment I. Legislative History

• Attachment II. Scope and Methodology
Appendix I

Briefing to the Staffs of the Subcommittees 

on Homeland Security, Senate and House 

Committees on Appropriations

Page 11 GAO-03-1083 Homeland Security

3

Introduction

Seven years ago, the Congress passed legislation that directed the former 

Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) to develop an entry exit system. 

Pursuant to this and related legislative direction,1 INS established the entry exit 

program about 16 months ago. Subsequently, INS was merged into the 

Department of Homeland Security (DHS), and the entry exit program was renamed 

the United States Visitor and Immigrant Status Indicator Technology (US-VISIT). 

US-VISIT is a governmentwide program that is to improve the processes, policies, 

and systems used to collect information on foreign nationals who travel to the 

United States, and to track entries, exits, and stays of travelers.

DHS’s stated goals for US-VISIT are to 

• facilitate legitimate travel and trade, 

• enhance national security, and 

• adhere to U.S. privacy laws and policies.

1 See attachment I for a listing of relevant legislation.
Appendix I

Briefing to the Staffs of the Subcommittees 

on Homeland Security, Senate and House 

Committees on Appropriations

Page 12 GAO-03-1083 Homeland Security

4

Introduction

The US-VISIT program involves the interdependent application of people, processes,

technology, and facilities.

Note: GAO analysis based on DHS data.
Appendix I

Briefing to the Staffs of the Subcommittees 

on Homeland Security, Senate and House 

Committees on Appropriations

Page 13 GAO-03-1083 Homeland Security

5

Introduction

The Consolidated Appropriations Resolution, 2003,1 prohibits DHS from obligating 

any funds appropriated in the act for the entry exit system (now US-VISIT), until it 

submits a plan for expenditure that satisfies the following legislative conditions.

• It meets the capital planning and investment control review requirements

established by the Office of Management and Budget (OMB), including OMB 

Circular A-11, part 3.2

• It complies with the acquisition rules, requirements, guidelines, and systems 

acquisition management practices of the federal government.

• It is reviewed by GAO.

1 P.L. 108-7 (Feb. 20, 2003).

2 OMB Circular A-11 establishes policy for planning, budgeting, acquisition, and management of federal 

capital assets.
Appendix I

Briefing to the Staffs of the Subcommittees 

on Homeland Security, Senate and House 

Committees on Appropriations

Page 14 GAO-03-1083 Homeland Security

6

Introduction

In fiscal year 2003, Justice requested $380 million for the entry exit program (now 

US-VISIT)—$362 million in new funding and $18 million in fiscal year 2003 base 

resources.

• In conjunction with the Consolidated Appropriations Resolution, 2003, the 

conference report1 recommended $362 million for the entry exit system (now 

US-VISIT) and related information technology (IT) infrastructure upgrades.

• According to DHS officials, the $18 million in base resources was to come from 

a user fee account. However, according to these officials, given the decrease 

in user fee receipts since September 11, 2001, it is unclear whether the $18 

million will be available for the US VISIT program.

DHS submitted its fiscal year 2003 expenditure plan for $375 million2 on June 5, 

2003, to its House and Senate Appropriations Subcommittees on Homeland 

Security.

1 H.R. Conf. Rep. No. 108-10, at 623 (2003).

2 In April 2003, H.R. Conf. Rep. No. 108-76 at 80 (2003), recommended that DHS use $5 million for USVISIT. The $5 million was not included in the expenditure plan submitted to the Appropriations 

Subcommittees in June 2003. 
Appendix I

Briefing to the Staffs of the Subcommittees 

on Homeland Security, Senate and House 

Committees on Appropriations

Page 15 GAO-03-1083 Homeland Security

7

Objectives

As agreed, our objectives were to

1. determine whether the US-VISIT fiscal year 2003 expenditure plan satisfies the 

legislative conditions,

2. determine the status of our US-VISIT open recommendations, and 

3. provide any other observations about the expenditure plan and DHS’s 

management of US-VISIT.

We conducted our work at DHS headquarters in Washington, D.C., from April 

through July 2003 in accordance with generally accepted government auditing 

standards. Details of our scope and methodology are given in attachment II.
Appendix I

Briefing to the Staffs of the Subcommittees 

on Homeland Security, Senate and House 

Committees on Appropriations

Page 16 GAO-03-1083 Homeland Security

8

Results in Brief: Objective 1

Legislative Conditions

DHS’s expenditure plan partially satisfies the legislative conditions.

Legislative conditions Partially satisfies2 Does not satisfy3

√

√

1. Meets the capital planning and 

investment control review 

requirements established by OMB, 

including OMB Circular A-11, part 3.

2. Complies with the acquisition rules, 

requirements, guidelines, and 

systems acquisition management 

practices of the federal government.

3. Is reviewed by GAO.

Fully satisfies1

√

1 Satisfies or provides for satisfying every aspect of the condition that we reviewed.

2 Satisfies or provides for satisfying many, but not all, key aspects of the condition that we reviewed.

3 Satisfies or provides for satisfying few, if any, of the key aspects of the condition that we reviewed. 
Appendix I

Briefing to the Staffs of the Subcommittees 

on Homeland Security, Senate and House 

Committees on Appropriations

Page 17 GAO-03-1083 Homeland Security

9

Results in Brief: Objective 2

Open Recommendations 

Status of DHS actions to implement our open recommendations.

Status

GAO open recommendations Complete Partially complete In progress Planned

1. Develop a system security plan and 

privacy impact assessment.

2. Ensure that controls in the area of 

acquisition planning, solicitation, 

requirements management, project

management, contract tracking and 

oversight, and evaluation are 

implemented in accordance with SEI1

guidance.

√

√

(continued next slide)

1 The Software Acquisition Capability Maturity Model® developed by Carnegie Mellon University’s Software 

Engineering Institute (SEI) defines acquisition process management controls for planning, managing, and 

controlling software-intensive system acquisitions.
Appendix I

Briefing to the Staffs of the Subcommittees 

on Homeland Security, Senate and House 

Committees on Appropriations

Page 18 GAO-03-1083 Homeland Security

10

Results in Brief: Objective 2 

Open Recommendations 

GAO open recommendations

3. Ensure that future expenditure plans 

are provided to DHS’s House and 

Senate Appropriations 

Subcommittees in advance of USVISIT funds being obligated.

4. Ensure that future expenditure plans 

fully disclose what US-VISIT system 

capabilities and benefits are to be 

delivered, by when, and at what cost.

Status

√ 

1

Complete Partially complete In progress Planned

1 With respect to the fiscal year 2003 expenditure plan.

√ 

1
Appendix I

Briefing to the Staffs of the Subcommittees 

on Homeland Security, Senate and House 

Committees on Appropriations

Page 19 GAO-03-1083 Homeland Security

11

Results in Brief: Objective 3

Observations: Risk Factors

US-VISIT is a high risk endeavor. We have identified 10 risk factors affecting USVISIT:

• Mission is critical. The missed entry of one person who poses a threat to the 

United States could have severe consequences. 

• Scope is large and complex. Controlling the pre-entry, entry, status, and exit 

of millions of travelers is a large and complex process.

• Milestones are challenging. Progress and current status of the program 

makes satisfying legislatively mandated milestones difficult. 

• Potential cost is significant. DHS has estimated that the program will cost 

$7.2 billion through fiscal year 2014, and this estimate does not include all 

costs and may underestimate some others.

• Existing systems have known problems. The program is to initially rely on 

existing systems with known problems that could limit US-VISIT performance.
Appendix I

Briefing to the Staffs of the Subcommittees 

on Homeland Security, Senate and House 

Committees on Appropriations

Page 20 GAO-03-1083 Homeland Security

12

Results in Brief: Objective 3

Observations: Risk Factors

• Governance structure is not established. The program is not currently 

governed by an accountable body that reflects its governmentwide scope and 

that can make and enforce decisions and commit resources for all program

stakeholders.

• Program management capability is not implemented. The program office is 

not yet adequately staffed, roles and responsibilities are not yet clearly defined, 

and acquisition management processes are not yet established. 

• Operational context is unsettled. Operational issues have not been decided, 

such as which rules and standards will govern implementation of biometrics

technology.

• Near-term facilities solutions pose challenges. Interim facility planning for 

high-volume land ports of entry (POEs) must satisfy demanding as well as yetto-be defined requirements.

• Mission value of first increment is currently unknown. The benefits versus 

costs of the first increment are not yet known. 
Appendix I

Briefing to the Staffs of the Subcommittees 

on Homeland Security, Senate and House 

Committees on Appropriations

Page 21 GAO-03-1083 Homeland Security

13

Results in Brief: Objective 3

Observation

Risk Factors Affecting US-VISIT

Unless these risk factors are effectively addressed, US-VISIT is likely to fall short of 

envisioned expectations.
Appendix I

Briefing to the Staffs of the Subcommittees 

on Homeland Security, Senate and House 

Committees on Appropriations

Page 22 GAO-03-1083 Homeland Security

14

Results in Brief

To address these risk factors, we are making recommendations to the Secretary of 

Homeland Security.

We provided DHS a draft of this briefing. In its oral comments, DHS agreed with 

our findings, conclusions, and recommendations. 
Appendix I

Briefing to the Staffs of the Subcommittees 

on Homeland Security, Senate and House 

Committees on Appropriations

Page 23 GAO-03-1083 Homeland Security

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All persons that legally enter the United States must pass through one of more than 

300 land, sea, or air ports of entry (POEs), and must undergo a primary inspection. 

In fiscal year 2002, about 440 million primary inspections were conducted on 

foreign nationals and U.S. citizens.

Total 330 440,421,794 100

Sea 42 12,369,035 3

Air 123 69,679,190 16

Land 165 358,373,569 81

Percentage of 

inspections

Number of

inspections

Number of

Type of POEs POEs

Source: DHS.

Note: GAO analysis based on DHS data.

Background

Border Inspection by POE
Appendix I

Briefing to the Staffs of the Subcommittees 

on Homeland Security, Senate and House 

Committees on Appropriations

Page 24 GAO-03-1083 Homeland Security

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Background

US-VISIT Overview

US-VISIT is a governmentwide endeavor intended to facilitate legitimate travel and 

trade, enhance national security, and adhere to U.S. privacy laws and policies by 

• collecting, maintaining, and sharing information on individuals who enter and 

exit the United States; 

• identifying individuals who (1) have overstayed or violated the terms of their 

visit; (2) can receive, extend, or adjust their immigration status; and (3) should 

be apprehended or detained by law enforcement officials;

• detecting fraudulent travel documents, verifying traveler identity, and 

determining traveler admissibility through the use of biometrics; and

• facilitating information sharing and coordination within the border management 

community.
Appendix I

Briefing to the Staffs of the Subcommittees 

on Homeland Security, Senate and House 

Committees on Appropriations

Page 25 GAO-03-1083 Homeland Security

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Background

US-VISIT Organization

Within DHS,1 organizational responsibility for the US-VISIT program is within the

Border and Transportation Security Directorate. 

In June 2003, DHS established a US-VISIT program office with responsibility for 

managing the acquisition, deployment, operation, and sustainment of the US-VISIT 

system and supporting people (e.g., inspectors), processes (e.g., entry exit policies 

and procedures), and facilities (e.g., inspection booths) associated with the 

program.

The following graphic shows the organizational ownership for the US-VISIT

program.

1 In January 2003, we designated the implementation and transformation of DHS as a high risk program for 

the following three reasons: (1) the size and complexity of the undertaking, (2) the wide array of existing

challenges of the component agencies being merged within DHS, and (3) the potentially serious 

consequences of DHS’s failure to effectively carry out its mission. (U.S. General Accounting Office, Major

Management Challenges and Program Risks: Department of Homeland Security, GAO-03-102 (Washington, 

D.C.: January 2003)).
Appendix I

Briefing to the Staffs of the Subcommittees 

on Homeland Security, Senate and House 

Committees on Appropriations

Page 26 GAO-03-1083 Homeland Security

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Background

US-VISIT Organization

Organizational Placement of US-VISIT Program (partial DHS organization chart)

Note: GAO analysis based on DHS data. As of May 2003, the US-VISIT program office reports directly to 

the Under Secretary for Border and Transportation Security.
Appendix I

Briefing to the Staffs of the Subcommittees 

on Homeland Security, Senate and House 

Committees on Appropriations

Page 27 GAO-03-1083 Homeland Security

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Background

Acquisition Strategy

Acquisition Strategy

DHS plans to deliver US-VISIT capability incrementally. Currently DHS has defined 

four increments, with Increments 1 through 3 being interim, or temporary, solutions, 

and increment 4 being the strategic solution and consisting of a series of

increments. Increments 1 through 3 include the interfacing and enhancement of 

existing system capabilities and the deployment of these capabilities at air, sea, 

and land POEs; the design and construction of interim facilities1 at land POEs; and 

the development and implementation of revised border inspection procedures.

1 DHS is planning to construct interim, or temporary, facilities at land POEs to meet established milestones, 

while concurrently developing permanent solutions at these POEs.
Appendix I

Briefing to the Staffs of the Subcommittees 

on Homeland Security, Senate and House 

Committees on Appropriations

Page 28 GAO-03-1083 Homeland Security

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Background

Acquisition Strategy

According to DHS, Increment 1 is to deliver an initial system operating capability to 

all air and sea POEs by December 31, 2003, that includes

• recording the arrival and departure of foreign nationals using passenger and 

crew manifest data,

• identifying travelers who have overstayed their visits or changed their visitor 

status, and

• interfacing seven existing systems that contain data about foreign nationals.

Increment 1 is to also verify travelers’ identities upon entry into the United States 

through the use of biometrics and checks against watch lists (e.g., the Interagency 

Border Inspection System—IBIS) at air POEs and 13 of 42 sea POEs, but only for 

those cruise lines that currently have inspections stations.

Increment 1 is also to include developing policies and procedures and providing the 

associated training for an interim inspection process. 

Increment 1 may include an exit capability beyond the capture of the manifest data.
Appendix I

Briefing to the Staffs of the Subcommittees 

on Homeland Security, Senate and House 

Committees on Appropriations

Page 29 GAO-03-1083 Homeland Security

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Background

Acquisition Strategy

Increment 1 is not intended to include the installation or acquisition of additional 

facilities at air and sea POEs, or employment of additional inspectors.

Increment 2 is to deploy Increment 1 system capability and design and construct 

interim facilities (e.g., additional inspection booths) at the 50 highest volume land 

POEs by December 31, 2004. It is also to include

• the use of radio frequency technology1 for vehicles and pedestrians that are 

pre-cleared, and

• the use of technology to read travel documents with biometrics.2

Increment 3 is to deploy Increment 2 system capability and design and construct 

interim facilities at all remaining land POEs by December 31, 2005. 

Increment 4 is to deliver a new, yet-to-be-defined, integrated system solution to a 

yet-to-be-defined number of POEs by December 31, 2006. 

1 DHS plans to issue radio frequency-enabled proximity cards. As the person or vehicle passes through the

inspection lane, the data on the card are read by an antenna and displayed on the inspector’s screen.

2 By October 26, 2004.
Appendix I

Briefing to the Staffs of the Subcommittees 

on Homeland Security, Senate and House 

Committees on Appropriations

Page 30 GAO-03-1083 Homeland Security

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Background

Acquisition Strategy 

For the system, DHS plans are to award a single, indefinite-delivery/indefinitequantity (IDIQ)1 type contract to a prime contractor capable of integrating existing 

and new business processes and technologies. DHS plans to issue a request for 

proposal for the prime contractor in November 2003. The prime contractor is to be 

responsible for Increment 4 and is to assist in the deployment of Increments 2 and 

3. DHS plans to use existing contractors to interface and enhance the existing 

systems for Increment 1.

For facilities, the department plans to award contracts for the design and 

construction of interim facilities at each land POE through the General Services 

Administration (GSA). DHS is working with GSA to obligate $17 million for the 

award of interim facilities design contracts beginning in August 2003. DHS plans to 

award interim facilities construction contracts for the 50 highest volume land POEs

through GSA beginning in February 2004 using anticipated fiscal year 2004 funds.

1 An IDIQ contract is a flexible contract that provides for an indefinite quantity, within stated limits, of supplies 

or services during a fixed period of time. The government schedules deliveries or performance by placing 

orders with the contractor.
Appendix I

Briefing to the Staffs of the Subcommittees 

on Homeland Security, Senate and House 

Committees on Appropriations

Page 31 GAO-03-1083 Homeland Security

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Background

Acquisition Strategy 

For human capital, DHS has not yet defined its strategy. However, for Increment 1, 

it does not plan to acquire any additional inspection staff. According to program 

officials, the department is developing a training plan for inspectors for Increment 1, 

and it expects to complete training by the end of December 2003.

DHS is currently developing the policies, procedures, and guidance for 

implementing Increment 1. It expects to complete development by the end of 

October 2003.
Appendix I

Briefing to the Staffs of the Subcommittees 

on Homeland Security, Senate and House 

Committees on Appropriations

Page 32 GAO-03-1083 Homeland Security

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Background

Component Systems

Component Systems

US-VISIT (Increments 1 through 4) is to include the interfacing and integration of

over 20 existing systems. For example, Increment 1 includes the following existing 

systems:

• Arrival Departure Information System (ADIS), a database that stores traveler 

arrival and departure data and can perform query functions;

• Advance Passenger Information System (APIS), a system that captures arrival 

and departure manifest information;

• Interagency Border Inspection System (IBIS), a system that maintains lookout 

data and interfaces with other agencies databases, and is currently used by 

inspectors at POEs to verify traveler information and modify data; 

• Automated Biometric Identification System (IDENT), a system that collects and 

stores biometric data for foreign visitors;
Appendix I

Briefing to the Staffs of the Subcommittees 

on Homeland Security, Senate and House 

Committees on Appropriations

Page 33 GAO-03-1083 Homeland Security

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Background

Component Systems

• Student Exchange Visitor Information System (SEVIS), a system that contains 

information on foreign students; and

• Computer Linked Application Information Management System (CLAIMS 3), a 

system that contains information on foreign nationals who request benefits,

such as change of status or extension of stay.

• Consular Consolidated Database (CCD), a system that includes information on 

whether a visa applicant has previously applied for a visa or currently has a 

valid U.S. visa.
Appendix I

Briefing to the Staffs of the Subcommittees 

on Homeland Security, Senate and House 

Committees on Appropriations

Page 34 GAO-03-1083 Homeland Security

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Background

Review of Prior Expenditure Plan 

GAO’s Review of Fiscal Year 2002 Expenditure Plan

In our report on the fiscal year 2002 expenditure plan,1 we concluded that

• the plan partially satisfied the legislative conditions;

• INS intended to acquire and deploy a system with functional and performance 

capabilities consistent with the general scope of capabilities under various 

laws; and

• the plan did not provide sufficient information to allow Congress to oversee the 

program.

1 U.S. General Accounting Office, Information Technology: Homeland Security Needs to Improve Entry Exit

System Expenditure Planning, GAO-03-563 (Washington, D.C.: June 9, 2003).
Appendix I

Briefing to the Staffs of the Subcommittees 

on Homeland Security, Senate and House 

Committees on Appropriations

Page 35 GAO-03-1083 Homeland Security

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Background

Review of Prior Expenditure Plan 

Accordingly, we made recommendations, including

• developing a system security plan and privacy impact assessment;

• ensuring that controls in the area of acquisition planning, solicitation, 

requirements development and management, project management, contract 

tracking and oversight, and evaluation be implemented in accordance with SEI 

guidance;

• ensuring that future expenditure plans be provided to the department’s House 

and Senate Appropriations Subcommittees in advance of US-VISIT funds 

being obligated; and

• ensuring that future expenditure plans fully disclose US-VISIT system 

capabilities, schedule, cost, and benefits to be delivered.
Appendix I

Briefing to the Staffs of the Subcommittees 

on Homeland Security, Senate and House 

Committees on Appropriations

Page 36 GAO-03-1083 Homeland Security

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Background

Review of Current Expenditure Plan

Fiscal Year 2003 Expenditure Plan Summary (see next slides for descriptions)

Areas of expenditure Amount

Total $ 375,000,0001

Proof of Concept Demonstrations: NSEERS reimbursement

NSEERS

Facial Verification Test

System Enhancement & Infrastructure Upgrades

POE IT and Communication Upgrades

Facilities Planning, Analysis, & Design

Training

Program Management Support

Operations & Systems Sustainment

$ 10,500,000

9,500,000

1,500,000

155,000,000

85,000,000

60,000,000

3,500,000

30,000,000

20,000,000

Source: DHS.

1 In April 2003, H.R. Conf. Rep. No. 108-76 at 80 (2003), recommended that DHS use $5 million for USVISIT. The $5 million was not included in the expenditure plan submitted to the Appropriations 

Subcommittees in June 2003. 
Appendix I

Briefing to the Staffs of the Subcommittees 

on Homeland Security, Senate and House 

Committees on Appropriations

Page 37 GAO-03-1083 Homeland Security

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Background

Current Expenditure Plan

Descriptions

Proof of Concept Demonstrations: This area includes reimbursement to DHS’s 

Bureau of Citizenship and Immigration Services for previously conducted 

registration activities associated with the National Security Entry-Exit Registration 

System (NSEERS).1 Costs in this area also include those for software changes 

made to IDENT to accommodate NSEERS, for the purchase and deployment of 

additional IDENT/ENFORCE workstations to POEs and district offices, and for 

training staff on these system changes. In addition, this area includes a pilot with 

the Australian government to test facial recognition, in which the Australian 

government will provide a select group of commercial pilots traveling between 

Australia and the United States with passports that have biometrics encoded on a 

chip; these passports will allow DHS to test the reading of the biometric information 

and to conduct facial verification matching tests.

1 NSEERS consists of (1) a modified version of the Enforcement Case Tracking System (ENFORCE), 

(2) deployments of the Automated Biometric Identification System (IDENT), and (3) updated polices and 

procedures covering the registration of certain nonimmigrants. ENFORCE is a case management system

that supports the apprehension and booking process for illegal aliens. IDENT is a database of more than 

4.5 million foreign visitors’ fingerprints (two prints) and photos.
Appendix I

Briefing to the Staffs of the Subcommittees 

on Homeland Security, Senate and House 

Committees on Appropriations

Page 38 GAO-03-1083 Homeland Security

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Background

Current Expenditure Plan

System Enhancement & Infrastructure Upgrades: This area includes the 

enhancement of existing information systems, telecommunications upgrades 

between the Justice and Customs data centers, an additional server to 

accommodate increased workload, and wide-area network upgrades to support 

additional processing and bandwidth requirements relative to the transmission of 

biometrics data.

POE IT and Communication Upgrades: This area includes upgrades to the 

hardware (e.g., desktop computers, scanners, biometric devices) and 

communications infrastructure at the POEs.
Appendix I

Briefing to the Staffs of the Subcommittees 

on Homeland Security, Senate and House 

Committees on Appropriations

Page 39 GAO-03-1083 Homeland Security

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Background

Current Expenditure Plan

Facilities Planning, Analysis, & Design: This area includes modeling air, sea, 

and the 50 highest volume land POEs for interim facilities and planning for 

permanent facilities; conducting environmental assessments; acquiring space for 

US-VISIT enrollment centers at the 50 highest volume land POEs; developing site 

plans; awarding design contracts for interim facilities at the 50 highest volume land 

POEs; conducting feasibility studies and developing master plans to begin 

collecting data and coordinating existing activities and projects for future 

requirements; and providing facility-related program and project management 

support.

Training: This area includes initial training for personnel to use the US-VISIT 

system.

Program Management Support: This area includes establishing a program 

management office to manage the US-VISIT program and engaging program 

management support contractors.

Operations & Systems Sustainment: This area includes increased maintenance 

and technical support to meet the system performance requirements.
Appendix I

Briefing to the Staffs of the Subcommittees 

on Homeland Security, Senate and House 

Committees on Appropriations

Page 40 GAO-03-1083 Homeland Security

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Background

Funding

US-VISIT Available Appropriations, DHS Allocations, and Obligations for

Fiscal Year 2002 and 2003

Available

appropriations (millions) 1 Obligated (millions)2 DHS allocations (millions) Fiscal year

FY 2003

FY 2002

Total

$ 4.2 

3.24

$ 380.0

13.3

$ 52.53

— 4

$ 393.3 $ 7.4

Source: DHS.

1 Of the $449.8 million lump sum appropriated for Enforcement and Border Affairs in the Department of 

Defense and Emergency Supplemental Appropriations for Recovery from and Response to Terrorist Attacks 

on the United States Act, 2002 (P.L.107-117), the conference report (H.R. Conf. Rep. No. 107-350, at 416 

(2001)) recommended that INS use $13.3 million in appropriations for the entry exit system (now USVISIT). This amount is available until expended. Of the $2.8 billion lump sum appropriated for Immigration 

Enforcement and Border Affairs for fiscal year 2003, the conference report (H.R. Conf. Rep. No. 108-10, at 

623 (2003)) recommended that INS use $362 million for what is now US-VISIT. These funds expire at the 

end of fiscal year 2003. According to DHS officials, an additional $18 million in base resources was to be 

available from a user fee account. Given the decrease in user fee receipts since September 11, 2001, these

officials stated that the $18 million may not be available for the US-VISIT program.
Appendix I

Briefing to the Staffs of the Subcommittees 

on Homeland Security, Senate and House 

Committees on Appropriations

Page 41 GAO-03-1083 Homeland Security

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Background

Funding Approvals

2 As of June 12, 2003.

3 In April 2003, H.R. Conf. Rep. No. 108-76, at 80 (2003), recommended that DHS use $5 million for USVISIT. DHS allocated this $5 million to the US-VISIT program. After submitting the expenditure plan to its 

appropriations subcommittees in June, DHS allocated $47.5 million to the US-VISIT program.

4 On August 2, 2002, the Congress enacted the 2002 Supplemental Appropriations Act for Further 

Recovery From and Response to Terrorist Attacks on the United States (P.L.107-206, Aug. 2, 2002), which

prohibited INS from obligating funds for the entry exit system (from either of the two supplemental

appropriations) until the agency submitted an expenditure plan to the appropriations committees that 

satisfied certain legislative conditions imposed by the act. Before August 2, 2002, the former INS had 

obligated $3.2 million.
Appendix I

Briefing to the Staffs of the Subcommittees 

on Homeland Security, Senate and House 

Committees on Appropriations

Page 42 GAO-03-1083 Homeland Security

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Background

US-VISIT Timeline

US-VISIT Timeline

Note: GAO analysis of DHS data.

1 The Visa Waiver System electronically collects arrival and departure information for all passengers and crew members who 

are provided a waiver and who arrive and depart U.S. airports and seaports.
Appendix I

Briefing to the Staffs of the Subcommittees 

on Homeland Security, Senate and House 

Committees on Appropriations

Page 43 GAO-03-1083 Homeland Security

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Objective 1 Results 

Legislative Conditions

US-VISIT expenditure plan partially satisfies the legislative conditions.

Condition 1 partially met. The plan, including related program documentation and 

program officials’ statements, partially meets the capital planning and investment 

control review requirements established by OMB, including OMB Circular A-11, 

part 3, which establishes policy for planning, budgeting, acquisition, and 

management of federal capital assets.

Details of our analysis are shown on the table that follows.
Appendix I

Briefing to the Staffs of the Subcommittees 

on Homeland Security, Senate and House 

Committees on Appropriations

Page 44 GAO-03-1083 Homeland Security

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Objective 1 Results 

Legislative Conditions

Examples of A-11 conditions Results of our analysis

Indicate whether the project was

approved by Investment Review Board

(IRB) and reviewed by Chief Financial

and Procurement Officers.

The plan was conditionally approved by DHS’s IRB, which is

chaired by the Deputy Secretary and composed of department

executives, including DHS’s Chief Financial and Procurement

Officers.

Provide justification and describe

acquisition strategy.

The plan provides a high-level justification and description of

the acquisition strategy for Increment 1. DHS plans to use

existing contracts to interface and enhance existing systems

for Increment 1.

Summarize life cycle costs and

cost/benefit analysis, including the

return on investment.

DHS does not have current life cycle costs nor a current

cost/benefit analysis for US-VISIT, but plans to develop these.

However, a date and plan for doing so have not been

established.1

Address enterprise architecture. The plan states that US-VISIT is identified in DHS’s enterprise

architecture (EA), but it does not explain how this project

conforms to DHS’s EA, which is currently under development.

Further, DHS officials could not provide evidence of USVISIT’s alignment with DHS’s EA activities.1

Address security and privacy. According to program officials, security and privacy

requirements have been defined, and a draft security plan and

privacy assessment is currently under review. 1 These areas are more fully discussed in the observation section of the briefing.
Appendix I

Briefing to the Staffs of the Subcommittees 

on Homeland Security, Senate and House 

Committees on Appropriations

Page 45 GAO-03-1083 Homeland Security

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Objective 1 Results

Legislative Conditions

Condition 2 partially met. The plan, including related program documentation and 

program officials’ statements, partially complies with the acquisition rules, 

requirements, guidelines, and systems acquisition management practices of the 

federal government. These provide a management framework based on the use of 

rigorous and disciplined processes for planning, managing, and controlling the 

acquisition of IT resources, including acquisition planning, solicitation, requirements 

development and management, project management, contract tracking and 

oversight, and evaluation. 

Details of our analysis are shown on the table that follows.
Appendix I

Briefing to the Staffs of the Subcommittees 

on Homeland Security, Senate and House 

Committees on Appropriations

Page 46 GAO-03-1083 Homeland Security

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Objective 1 Results

Legislative Conditions

Examples of practices Results of our analysis

Acquisition planning.1

Ensures that reasonable

planning for the

acquisition is conducted,

including, among other

things, developing an

acquisition strategy and

plan, determining the cost

and schedule, identifying

risks, and defining

requirements.

For various reasons, including the recent transition to DHS, many of the

acquisition planning documents that had been prepared for the former entry exit

system are outdated. For example, INS had developed an acquisition plan, as 

required by INS acquisition policies and procedures that outlined its approach and

strategy for acquiring the entry exit system. According to DHS officials, the plan is

no longer current.

DHS officials stated that they have updated some of these acquisition planning

documents, submitted them to the IRB on June 30, 2003, and plan to meet with

the IRB on July 17, 2003. DHS plans to update additional planning documents by

August 7, 2003. For example, DHS plans to update its acquisition plan and

develop a life cycle cost estimate and risk management plan for Increment 1.

Project management.1

Provides for the

management of activities

within the project office

and supporting

contractors to ensure a 

timely, efficient, and costeffective acquisition.

According to US-VISIT program officials, interfacing and enhancing existing

systems under Increment 1 are being managed according to the former INS’s

SDLC.2

 However, they could not provide evidence to support this statement;

because of time constraints, we did not verify whether these contractors and

associated DHS acquisition entities were following the SDLC.

These officials also stated that US-VISIT will transition to DHS’s SDLC when it is

completed. However, they did not know when the DHS SDLC would be complete,

and therefore when US-VISIT will transition. 1 These practices are addressed in our observations section.

2

 An SDLC (Systems Development Life Cycle) is a management process that specifies, for a series of “cradle to grave” phases,

the development activities to be performed, products to be generated, and the decision points to determine whether the project is

ready for the next phase.
Appendix I

Briefing to the Staffs of the Subcommittees 

on Homeland Security, Senate and House 

Committees on Appropriations

Page 47 GAO-03-1083 Homeland Security

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Objective 1 Results 

Legislative Conditions

Condition 3 met. The plan satisfies the requirement that it be reviewed by GAO. 

Our review was completed on July 18, 2003.
Appendix I

Briefing to the Staffs of the Subcommittees 

on Homeland Security, Senate and House 

Committees on Appropriations

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Objective 2 Results 

Open Recommendations

Open Recommendation 1: Develop a system security plan and privacy impact 

assessment.

Status: In progress

The expenditure plan states that adequate security and privacy related measures 

are to be built into the US-VISIT system and that these measures will comply with 

emerging DHS security policies, relevant security-related laws, OMB circulars, and 

privacy guidelines of the federal Chief Information Officer Council’s best practices. 

According to program officials, system security and privacy requirements have 

been defined, and a draft security plan and privacy assessment is currently under 

review.
Appendix I

Briefing to the Staffs of the Subcommittees 

on Homeland Security, Senate and House 

Committees on Appropriations

Page 49 GAO-03-1083 Homeland Security

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Objective 2 Results 

Open Recommendations

Open Recommendation 2: Ensure that controls in the area of acquisition 

planning, solicitation, requirements development and management, project

management, contract tracking and oversight, and evaluation be implemented in 

accordance with SEI guidance.

Status: Planned

DHS has recently approved a program management structure that includes 

functions consistent with these acquisition management controls: acquisition

planning, solicitation, requirements development and management, project

management, contract tracking and oversight, and evaluation. According to the USVISIT Program Director, these functions will be performed consistent with SEI’s

guidance. However, the department does not currently have explicit plans and 

associated time frames for developing and implementing these acquisition 

management controls.
Appendix I

Briefing to the Staffs of the Subcommittees 

on Homeland Security, Senate and House 

Committees on Appropriations

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Objective 2 Results 

Open Recommendations

Open Recommendation 3: Ensure that future expenditure plans be provided to

the Department’s House and Senate Appropriations Subcommittees in advance of 

US-VISIT funds being obligated.

Status: Partially complete 

In fiscal year 2003, Justice requested $380 million for the entry exit program (now 

US-VISIT)—$362 million in new funding and $18 million in fiscal year 2003 base 

resources.1 In conjunction with the Consolidated Appropriations Resolution, 2003,

the conference report2 recommended $362 million for the entry exit system (now 

US-VISIT) and related IT infrastructure upgrades.

In June 2003, DHS provided its fiscal year 2003 expenditure plan to the Senate 

and House Appropriations Subcommittees on Homeland Security. In April 2003, 

H.R. Conf. Rep. No. 108-76, at 80 (2003), recommended that DHS use $5 million 

for US-VISIT. DHS allocated this $5 million to the US-VISIT program. 

1 According to DHS officials, the $18 million in base resources was to come from the user fee account. 

However, according to these officials, given the decrease in user fee receipts since September 11, 2001, it is 

unclear whether that $18 million will be available for the US-VISIT program.

2 H.R. Conf. Rep. No. 108-10, at 623 (2003).
Appendix I

Briefing to the Staffs of the Subcommittees 

on Homeland Security, Senate and House 

Committees on Appropriations

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Objective 2 Results 

Open Recommendations

Open Recommendation 4: Ensure that future expenditure plans fully disclose USVISIT system capabilities, schedule, cost, and benefits to be delivered.

Status: Partially complete

The expenditure plan identifies high-level capabilities by increment, such as 

• recording the arrival and departure of foreign nationals using passenger and 

crew manifest data,

• implementing biometrics, and

• being interoperable with other entities, including law enforcement and 

intelligence agencies.

The plan also identifies a high-level schedule for implementing the system. For 

example, Increment 1 is to be implemented by December 31, 2003; Increment 2 by 

December 31, 2004; and Increment 3 by December 31, 2005. 
Appendix I

Briefing to the Staffs of the Subcommittees 

on Homeland Security, Senate and House 

Committees on Appropriations

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Objective 2 Results 

Open Recommendations

The plan also includes categories of expenditures, such as system enhancements 

and infrastructure upgrades, facilities planning, analysis and design, and POE IT 

and communications upgrades. However, the plan does not explicitly associate

costs with incremental capabilities, time frames, and benefits. For example, the 

plan does not state how much of the $85 million for POE IT and communications 

upgrades DHS plans to use for Increment 1 or for other increments.

The plan identifies high-level goals for Increment 1 (i.e., positively impact national 

security and overall efforts in the war against terrorism). However, it does not 

identify expected benefits in tangible, measurable, and thus meaningful terms, nor 

does it associate benefits with increments. Therefore, it does not provide the basic 

data needed to measure return on investment. US-VISIT program officials stated 

that they intend to estimate program costs and benefits, but they did not have time 

frames for doing so.
Appendix I

Briefing to the Staffs of the Subcommittees 

on Homeland Security, Senate and House 

Committees on Appropriations

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Objective 3 Results 

Observations

Observation: US-VISIT is a high risk endeavor.

Ten separate factors collectively expose the US-VISIT program to a high level of 

risk. Some of these risk factors are inherent to the program, such as those 

associated with its mission criticality and complexity. Others are a product of the 

program’s relatively immature state of governance and management. Unless these 

risk factors are effectively addressed, US-VISIT is likely to fall short of envisioned 

expectations.
Appendix I

Briefing to the Staffs of the Subcommittees 

on Homeland Security, Senate and House 

Committees on Appropriations

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Objective 3 Results 

Observations: Criticality

a. Mission is critical.

• In fiscal year 2002, there were about 279 million inspections of foreign

nationals at U.S. POEs. The missed entry of just one person who poses a 

threat to the United States can have severe consequences. One of DHS’s

critical missions is to prevent such an entry, and it intends to rely heavily on 

US-VISIT to help it do so. 

• Additionally, the US-VISIT system is to assist law enforcement in identifying 

those visitors who overstay or otherwise violate the terms of their visas.

• Further, in announcing the US-VISIT system, the Under Secretary stated that 

the system would “give America a 21st Century ‘smart border’—one that 

speeds through legitimate trade and travel, but stops terrorists in their tracks.” 
Appendix I

Briefing to the Staffs of the Subcommittees 

on Homeland Security, Senate and House 

Committees on Appropriations

Page 55 GAO-03-1083 Homeland Security

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Objective 3 Results 

Observations: Complexity

b. Scope is large and complex.

• US-VISIT is to support and refine a large and complex governmentwide 

process involving multiple departments and agencies. This process is to 

control the pre-entry, entry, status, and exit of hundreds of millions of foreign 

national travelers to and from the United States at over 300 air, sea, and land 

POEs. It also requires the modification and expansion of facilities at over 150 

land POEs. The graphic below depicts the high-level border security 

processes. The following graphics depict the subprocesses. 
Appendix I

Briefing to the Staffs of the Subcommittees 

on Homeland Security, Senate and House 

Committees on Appropriations

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Objective 3 Results 

Observations: Complexity

Simplified Diagram of Current Pre-entry Process

1 The Consular Lookout and Support System (CLASS) is a name check system that contains records of people who may be 

ineligible to receive a passport or visa. 
Appendix I

Briefing to the Staffs of the Subcommittees 

on Homeland Security, Senate and House 

Committees on Appropriations

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Objective 3 Results 

Observations: Complexity

1 The Non-Immigrant 

Information System (NIIS) 

collects arrival and departure 

Form I-94 data and reports 

information on overstays.

Simplified Diagram of 

Current Entry Process
Appendix I

Briefing to the Staffs of the Subcommittees 

on Homeland Security, Senate and House 

Committees on Appropriations

Page 58 GAO-03-1083 Homeland Security

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Objective 3 Results 

Observations: Complexity

Simplified Diagram of the Current Status Process

1 The National Crime Information Center (NCIC) provides information on wanted persons and criminal histories.
Appendix I

Briefing to the Staffs of the Subcommittees 

on Homeland Security, Senate and House 

Committees on Appropriations

Page 59 GAO-03-1083 Homeland Security

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Objective 3 Results 

Observations: Complexity

Simplified Diagram of the Current Exit Process
Appendix I

Briefing to the Staffs of the Subcommittees 

on Homeland Security, Senate and House 

Committees on Appropriations

Page 60 GAO-03-1083 Homeland Security

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Objective 3 Results 

Observations: Complexity

As mentioned previously, US-VISIT (Increments 1 through 4) is to include the 

interfacing and integration of over 20 existing systems. Increment 1 includes the 

following seven existing systems:

• Arrival Departure Information System,

• Advance Passenger Information System, 

• Interagency Border Inspection System, 

• Automated Biometric Identification System, 

• Student Exchange Visitor Information System, 

• Computer Linked Application Information Management System, and 

• Consular Consolidated Database.

The following graphic shows the systems and their relationships.
Appendix I

Briefing to the Staffs of the Subcommittees 

on Homeland Security, Senate and House 

Committees on Appropriations

Page 61 GAO-03-1083 Homeland Security

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Objective 3 Results 

Observations: Complexity

Simplified Diagram of US-VISIT Increment 1 Component Systems and 

Relationships

1 Fingerprint Identification Number.
Appendix I

Briefing to the Staffs of the Subcommittees 

on Homeland Security, Senate and House 

Committees on Appropriations

Page 62 GAO-03-1083 Homeland Security

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Objective 3 Results 

Observations: Challenging Milestones

c. Milestones are challenging.

Key US-VISIT milestones are legislatively mandated. For example, the Immigration 

and Naturalization Service Data Management Improvement Act of 20001 requires

that US-VISIT be implemented at all air and sea POEs by December 31, 2003; at 

the 50 highest volume land POEs by December 31, 2004; and at all remaining 

POEs by December 31, 2005. 

Because of limited progress over the last 7 years in addressing entry exit legislative 

requirements, including the above cited milestones, DHS acknowledges that it 

cannot complete permanent solutions in these time frames and thus now plans to 

implement interim, or temporary solutions. For example, as previously described, 

Increments 1 through 3 include the interfacing of existing systems and the design 

and construction of interim facilities at land POEs. Further, DHS officials have 

stated that it will be difficult to develop and implement even the interim solutions at 

some of the highest volume land POEs (such as San Ysidro, CA; Otay Mesa, CA; 

and Laredo, TX) by December 31, 2004, because even minor changes in the 

inspection time can greatly impact the average wait time at these high-volume 

POEs.

1 P.L. 106-215 (June 15, 2000).
Appendix I

Briefing to the Staffs of the Subcommittees 

on Homeland Security, Senate and House 

Committees on Appropriations

Page 63 GAO-03-1083 Homeland Security

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Objective 3 Results 

Observations: Cost

d. Potential cost is significant.

The potential governmentwide cost of US-VISIT over just a 10-year period will likely 

be in the tens of billions of dollars.

In February 2003, DHS estimated the total overall cost of the US-VISIT program to 

be about $7.2 billion through fiscal year 2014. This estimate includes system 

investment costs, such as IT hardware and communications infrastructure, 

software enhancements and interfaces, as well as the cost of facilities and 

additional inspectors. It also includes system and facilities operation and 

maintenance costs.
Appendix I

Briefing to the Staffs of the Subcommittees 

on Homeland Security, Senate and House 

Committees on Appropriations

Page 64 GAO-03-1083 Homeland Security

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Objective 3 Results 

Observations: Cost

• The estimate does include the cost of planning, designing, and constructing 

permanent facilities, which according to DHS is about $2.9 billion.1 This

estimate is based on the assumptions that (1) no additional traffic lanes will be 

required to support the entry processes and (2) exit facilities will mirror entry 

facilities (i.e., that a land POE with 10 entry traffic lanes will require 10 exit 

traffic lanes). The estimate includes the costs to design and construct building 

space to house additional computer equipment and inspectors, as well as the 

costs for highway reconfiguration at land POEs.

The estimate does not include the costs to design and construct interim 

facilities at land POEs. DHS officials estimate that the cost of constructing the 

interim facilities at the 50 highest volume POEs is about $218 million. 

1 The $2.9 billion is a parametric cost estimate. Parametric cost estimating is a technique used in the 

planning, budgeting, and conceptual stages of projects. This technique expedites the development of order 

of magnitude benchmark estimates when discrete estimating techniques are not possible or would require 

inordinate amounts of time and resources to produce similar results. Estimates such as this can vary ±30

to 50 percent.
Appendix I

Briefing to the Staffs of the Subcommittees 

on Homeland Security, Senate and House 

Committees on Appropriations

Page 65 GAO-03-1083 Homeland Security

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Objective 3 Results 

Observations: Cost

• The estimate does include the cost of implementing biometrics. However, 

these costs may be understated because it does not include, for example, 

State Department costs. Specifically, in November 2002,1 we reported that a 

rough order of magnitude estimate of the cost to implement visas with

biometrics would be between $1.3 billion and $2.9 billion initially and between

$0.7 and $1.5 billion annually thereafter. This estimate is based on certain 

assumptions, including that all current visa-issuing embassies and consulates 

will be equipped to collect biometrics from visa applicants. Assuming that 

biometrics are implemented by December 2004, this means that the recurring

cost of having biometric visas through DHS’s fiscal year 2014 life cycle period 

would be between $7 and $15 billion; in contrast, DHS has estimated a cost of

about $7.2 billion for the entire program through fiscal year 2014.

1 U.S. General Accounting Office, Technology Assessment: Using Biometrics for Border Security, GAO-03-

174 (Washington, D.C.: Nov. 15, 2002).
Appendix I

Briefing to the Staffs of the Subcommittees 

on Homeland Security, Senate and House 

Committees on Appropriations

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Objective 3 Results 

Observations: Existing Problems

e. Existing systems have known problems. 

The system performance of US-VISIT Increments 1, 2, and 3 is largely dependent 

on the performance of the existing systems that are to be interfaced to form it. For 

example, US-VISIT system availability and associated downtime will be 

constrained by the availability of the interfaced systems. In this regard, some of the 

existing systems have known problems that could limit US-VISIT performance. For 

example:

• Recent reports have identified problems with the availability and reliability of 

SEVIS, which is the Internet-based system designed to manage and monitor 

foreign students in the United States. For example, in April 2003, the Justice 

Inspector General reported that many users had difficulty logging on to the 

system, and that as the volume of users grew, the system became increasingly 

sluggish.1 Other reports indicated that university representatives complained that 

it was taking hours to log on to the system and to enter a single record, or 

worse, that the system accepted the record and later deleted it.

1 Statement of Glenn A. Fine, Inspector General, U.S. Department of Justice, “Implementation of the Student 

and Exchange Visitor Information System (SEVIS)” (Apr. 2, 2003).
Appendix I

Briefing to the Staffs of the Subcommittees 

on Homeland Security, Senate and House 

Committees on Appropriations

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Objective 3 Results 

Observations: Existing Problems

• Similarly, we reported in May 20011 that CLAIMS 3 is unreliable; this system 

contains information on foreign nationals who request benefits and is used to 

process benefit applications other than naturalization. Specifically, we reported 

that INS officials stated that CLAIMS 3 was frequently unavailable and did not

always update and store important case data when field offices transferred 

data from the local CLAIMS 3 system to the mainframe computer. 

1 U.S. General Accounting Office, Immigration Benefits: Several Factors Impede Timeliness of Application 

Processing, GAO-01-488 (Washington, D.C.: May 4, 2001). 
Appendix I

Briefing to the Staffs of the Subcommittees 

on Homeland Security, Senate and House 

Committees on Appropriations

Page 68 GAO-03-1083 Homeland Security

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Objective 3 Results 

Observations: Governance

f. Governance structure is not established.

Our experience shows that one key to successfully implementing large and 

complex modernization programs that involve multiple organizations, such as USVISIT, is to have an executive body, composed of representatives from each 

stakeholder organization, to guide and direct the program. Among other things, this 

body should (1) be formally chartered, (2) include representatives that are 

empowered to make and enforce decisions and commit resources for their

respective organizations, and (3) be responsible and accountable for the program 

progress and outcomes. 

The US-VISIT program is governmentwide in scope, involving multiple departments

and agencies. However, it is not currently being guided and directed by a 

governance structure that reflects this program scope. Instead, the program relies 

on a combination of 

• the DHS Investment Review Board (IRB), which is the department’s chartered

investment decisionmaking body, made up of senior leadership from the 

department, and 
Appendix I

Briefing to the Staffs of the Subcommittees 

on Homeland Security, Senate and House 

Committees on Appropriations

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Objective 3 Results 

Observations: Governance

• an integrated project team representing many US-VISIT stakeholder 

organizations (e.g., Customs and Border Protection, the Transportation 

Security Administration, and the State Department).

However, the IRB’s chartered mission and authority governs only DHS activities, 

and does not govern non-DHS, stakeholder activities, such as issuing visas and 

passports, and the integrated project team does not include stakeholder 

representatives who can personally commit resources and make and enforce

decisions for their respective organizations. Moreover, according to the US-VISIT 

Program Director, who heads the integrated project team, the integrated project 

team’s role is basically to advise the US-VISIT program office.

The Under Secretary for Transportation and Border Security, who is a member of 

the department’s IRB, is assigned responsibility and accountability for program 

governance. However, the Program Director stated that a governance body with 

appropriate representation from all relevant program stakeholder organizations

would benefit the program. Until such a body is established to address important 

crosscutting issues, such as operational decisions and resource needs, US-VISIT 

is at risk of not delivering promised system capabilities and benefits on time and 

within budget. 
Appendix I

Briefing to the Staffs of the Subcommittees 

on Homeland Security, Senate and House 

Committees on Appropriations

Page 70 GAO-03-1083 Homeland Security

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Objective 3 Results 

Observations: Program Management

g. Program management capability is not implemented.

Our experience with major modernization programs, like US-VISIT, shows that they 

should be managed as a formal program, which includes establishing a program 

office that is (1) adequately staffed (numbers and skill levels), (2) grounded in 

clearly defined roles and responsibilities, and (3) supported by rigorous and 

disciplined acquisition management processes. 

DHS established a US-VISIT program office in June 2003,1 and recently 

determined this office’s staffing needs to be 115 government and 117 contractor 

personnel (in all) to perform key acquisition management functions. The Software 

Engineering Institute’s Software Acquisition Capability Maturity Model (SA-CMM®)2

has defined a suite of key acquisition process areas that are necessary to manage 

the system acquisition program in a rigorous and disciplined fashion. These 

process areas include acquisition planning, requirements development and 

management, project management, solicitation, contract tracking and oversight,

evaluation, and transition to support.

1 The predecessor program office for the entry exit program was established within the former INS in March 2002.

2 Carnegie Mellon Software Engineering Institute, Software Acquisition Capability Maturity Model, Version 1.03 

(March 2002).
Appendix I

Briefing to the Staffs of the Subcommittees 

on Homeland Security, Senate and House 

Committees on Appropriations

Page 71 GAO-03-1083 Homeland Security

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Objective 3 Results 

Observations: Program Management

As of July 10, 2003, the US-VISIT program’s staffing levels were far below DHS’s

stated needs. Specifically, the US-VISIT program officials stated that the program 

office has 10 staff within the program office and another 6 staff that are working 

closely with them. Moreover, specific roles and responsibilities have not been 

defined beyond general statements. Further, plans and associated time frames for 

achieving needed staffing levels and defining roles, responsibilities, and 

relationships have not yet been defined. According to the Program Director, 

positions are to be filled with detailees from various DHS component organizations. 

Positions are also to be filled with full-time equivalent slots from other DHS 

components that are not currently filled. 

Additionally, while the approved program office structure (see slide 65) provides for 

positions to perform the SA-CMM® key process areas, including acquisition 

planning, requirements development and management, project management, and 

contract tracking and oversight, none of the process areas have been defined and 

implemented. In the interim, the program office is relying on the knowledge and 

skills of existing program office staff to execute these important acquisition 

functions.
Appendix I

Briefing to the Staffs of the Subcommittees 

on Homeland Security, Senate and House 

Committees on Appropriations

Page 72 GAO-03-1083 Homeland Security

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Objective 3 Results 

Observations: Program Management

According to the Program Director, needed program staffing and key process areas 

are not yet in place because the program is only now getting off the ground, and it 

will take time to establish a fully functioning and capable program management 

capability. Until the program office is adequately staffed, positional roles and 

responsibilities are clearly defined and understood, and rigorous and disciplined 

acquisition process controls are defined, understood, and followed, DHS’s ongoing

efforts to acquire, deploy, operate, and maintain system capabilities will be at risk 

of not producing promised performance levels, functionality, and associated

benefits on time and within budget. 

The graphic on the next page shows the US VISIT program management structure.
Appendix I

Briefing to the Staffs of the Subcommittees 

on Homeland Security, Senate and House 

Committees on Appropriations

Page 73 GAO-03-1083 Homeland Security

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Objective 3 Results 

Observations: Program Management

Approved US-VISIT Program Management Structure

1 A geographic information system (GIS) is a system of computer software, hardware, and data used to manipulate, analyze, and graphically present

a potentially wide array of information associated with geographic locations.
Appendix I

Briefing to the Staffs of the Subcommittees 

on Homeland Security, Senate and House 

Committees on Appropriations

Page 74 GAO-03-1083 Homeland Security

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Objective 3 Results 

Observations: Operational Context

h. Operational context is unsettled.

To effectively define, establish, and implement a program (particularly one that 

involves restructuring and reengineering the use of people, processes, technology, 

and facilities from physically and culturally divergent organizations), it is essential 

that the program be aligned with a common blueprint, or frame of reference,

governing key aspects of program operations—e.g., what functions are to be 

performed by whom, when and where they are to be performed, what information is 

to be used to perform them, and what rules and standards will govern the 

application of technology to support them. Such a frame of reference is referred to 

as an enterprise architecture (EA). In brief, an EA defines the operations of an 

enterprise, such as DHS, in both business terms (e.g., policies, processes,

information, locations) and technical terms (e.g., hardware and software

standards). It also provides these operational definitions for both the “as is” state 

and the “to be” state, and it includes a transition plan for moving between the two.
Appendix I

Briefing to the Staffs of the Subcommittees 

on Homeland Security, Senate and House 

Committees on Appropriations

Page 75 GAO-03-1083 Homeland Security

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Objective 3 Results 

Observations: Operational Context

The operational context, or EA, within which US-VISIT is to exist has not been 

defined. Currently, DHS is developing an EA and reports that it is to be completed 

by October 2003. If developed effectively, the department’s EA should provide the

operational context necessary to effectively define, establish, and make operational 

US VISIT.

In the absence of an EA, certain policy and standards information that is necessary 

to effectively define, establish, and implement the US-VISIT program is not yet 

available. In particular, policy decisions have not been made governing (1) whether

official travel documents will be required for all persons who enter and exit the 

country, including U.S. and Canadian citizens, and (2) whether biometrics will be 

captured and used for all persons entering and exiting the country, including U.S. 

and Canadian citizens. Some of these policy decisions may necessitate changes to 

existing laws and regulations.

Similarly, certain technology standards, such as the number of fingerprints to be 

collected, are only now emerging, with a tentative agreement to use two 

fingerprints and plans to migrate to eight prints for enrollment. Also, the specific 

processes have yet to be defined (e.g., entry and exit procedures and border 

personnel roles and responsibilities relative to implementation of the procedures).
Appendix I

Briefing to the Staffs of the Subcommittees 

on Homeland Security, Senate and House 

Committees on Appropriations

Page 76 GAO-03-1083 Homeland Security

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Objective 3 Results 

Observations: Operational Context

Because this operational context is unsettled and unclear, the program office is 

making certain assumptions and decisions necessary to meet near-term deadlines, 

such as the use of a two-fingerprint biometric, and adoption of border crossing 

processes that will implement planned system capabilities in whatever way needed 

to avoid (1) requiring additional facilities and personnel for Increment 1 and 

(2) increasing wait times for traffic crossings. If these assumptions and decisions 

are not aligned with DHS’s EA, then near-term investments in systems and 

associated process will need to be reworked or replaced. Moreover, the mission 

value of the planned system capabilities that are actually implemented (made 

operational) at the border could be minimal. For example, inspectors may have to 

limit their use of installed system capabilities (such as those for capturing 

biometrics) to prevent traffic delays.

Unless DHS can coordinate its plans for developing its EA (and thus providing a 

clear operational context) with its near-term implementation plans for US VISIT, the

department is increasing its near-term risk of defining, establishing, and 

implementing a program and supporting system that will not cost-effectively meet 

mission needs.
Appendix I

Briefing to the Staffs of the Subcommittees 

on Homeland Security, Senate and House 

Committees on Appropriations

Page 77 GAO-03-1083 Homeland Security

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Objective 3 Results 

Observations: Near-Term Facilities

I. Near-term facilities solutions pose challenges. 

According to DHS officials, DHS’s existing facilities do not adequately support the 

current entry exit process at land POEs. In particular, more than 100 land POEs

have less than 50 percent of the required capacity to support current inspection 

processes and traffic levels.1 As a result, as part of US VISIT (increment 2), DHS 

plans to construct interim facilities at about 40 of the 50 highest volume land POEs

by December 31, 2004, and construct interim facilities at the remaining portion of 

the 50 by February 2005. To accomplish this, DHS plans to begin awarding design 

contracts in August 2003, and construction contracts in February 2004.

1 Data Management Improvement Act Task Force, First Annual Report to Congress (Washington, D.C.:

December 2002).
Appendix I

Briefing to the Staffs of the Subcommittees 

on Homeland Security, Senate and House 

Committees on Appropriations

Page 78 GAO-03-1083 Homeland Security

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Objective 3 Results 

Observations: Near-Term Facilities

According to DHS officials, the department plans to design and construct interim 

facilities to (1) support the US-VISIT inspection process, technology, and staff 

requirements; and (2) meet current traffic wait time requirements at each land POE. 

To plan for the design and construction of interim facilities that meet these 

requirements, DHS is modeling various inspection process and facilities scenarios 

to define what inspection process to follow and what interim facilities to construct. 

DHS officials told us that preliminary modeling exercises show that 3-, 6-, and 9-

second incremental increases in average inspection times at some high volume 

land POEs can significantly increase average wait times at these POEs. For 

example, peak wait time at the Blaine Peace Arch POE in Washington could 

increase by more than 11 hours if the average inspection increased by 9 seconds.

The modeling exercise was based on two key assumptions: (1) the current staffing 

level and (2) the current number of inspection booths staffed for each POE. (see

figure on next slide for modeling results at six POEs).
Appendix I

Briefing to the Staffs of the Subcommittees 

on Homeland Security, Senate and House 

Committees on Appropriations

Page 79 GAO-03-1083 Homeland Security

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Objective 3 Results 

Observations: Near-Term Facilities

High-Volume Ports Maximum Vehicle Wait Time as a Function of Added 

Inspection Time
Appendix I

Briefing to the Staffs of the Subcommittees 

on Homeland Security, Senate and House 

Committees on Appropriations

Page 80 GAO-03-1083 Homeland Security

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Objective 3 Results 

Observations: Near-Term Facilities

At this point, DHS officials told us that they are planning to satisfy interim facilities 

constraints and requirements by installing temporary booths on existing traffic lanes 

and employing additional inspectors at some of the highest volume land POEs.1

However, they also stated that the high traffic volumes and urban locations of some 

land POEs will make meeting US-VISIT constraints and requirements challenging, 

even on an interim basis. Moreover, given existing facilities constraints, developing 

interim facilities plans without defined inspection process, staff, and technology 

requirements introduces considerable uncertainty and risk that resources invested 

in interim facilities may not fully satisfy constraints and requirements and may not 

be useful in the design and construction of permanent facilities.

1At this point, DHS is not planning to acquire additional land for interim facilities at land ports of entry.
Appendix I

Briefing to the Staffs of the Subcommittees 

on Homeland Security, Senate and House 

Committees on Appropriations

Page 81 GAO-03-1083 Homeland Security

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Objective 3 Results 

Observations: Value of First Increment

j. Mission value of first increment is currently unknown.

OMB Circular Number A-11, part 3, requires that investments in major systems be 

implemented incrementally, with each increment delivering tangible and 

measurable benefits. Incremental investment involves justifying investment in each 

increment on the basis of benefits, costs, and risks.

DHS is pursuing US-VISIT incrementally, but it has not defined the specific benefits

to be provided by Increment 1. 

• The expenditure plan states that Increment 1 will provide “immediate benefits,” 

but it does not describe them. Instead, it describes capabilities to be provided, 

such as the ability to determine whether a foreign national should be admitted 

and perform checks against watch lists. It does not describe in meaningful

terms the benefits that are to result from implementation of these capabilities 

(e.g., X percent reduction in inspection times or Y percent reduction in false 

positive matches against watch lists). 
Appendix I

Briefing to the Staffs of the Subcommittees 

on Homeland Security, Senate and House 

Committees on Appropriations

Page 82 GAO-03-1083 Homeland Security

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Objective 3 Results 

Observations: Value of First Increment

• In fact, because DHS has not yet defined the processes that are to govern the 

extent to which planned Increment 1 system capabilities will be implemented 

(as discussed previously), and because these processes are to be constrained

by existing facilities and personnel and are not to result in increases in wait 

times for traffic crossings, it is not possible at this point to reliably project 

tangible and measurable Increment 1 mission benefits.

The expenditure plan also does not identify the estimated cost of Increment 1. The 

Program Director told us that the $375 million requested in the plan includes not 

only all the funding required for Increment 1, but also funding for later increments.

However, the plan does not separate the funds by increment, and program officials 

did not provide this information. 

To DHS’s credit, the expenditure plan does identify certain program risks, such as 

not having established clear decision authorities for policy and other operational 

questions and schedule slippage due to the aggressive milestones. However, it has 

yet to address how these risks will be mitigated, and the extent to which the status 

of program risks that are deemed “high impact/high probability of occurrence” will 

be disclosed to program executives.
Appendix I

Briefing to the Staffs of the Subcommittees 

on Homeland Security, Senate and House 

Committees on Appropriations

Page 83 GAO-03-1083 Homeland Security

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Objective 3 Results 

Observations: Value of First Increment

In February 2003, DHS developed a benefits and cost analysis for the former entry 

exit program. However, this analysis had limitations, such as an absence of 

meaningful benefit descriptions, and program officials acknowledged that it is out of 

date and is not reflective of current US-VISIT plans. According to these officials, an 

updated analysis will be prepared; however, a date and plan for doing so has not 

been set.

Without a reliable understanding of whether Increment 1 will produce mission value 

commensurate with costs and whether known risks can be effectively mitigated,

DHS is investing in and implementing a near-term solution that is not adequately 

justified.
Appendix I

Briefing to the Staffs of the Subcommittees 

on Homeland Security, Senate and House 

Committees on Appropriations

Page 84 GAO-03-1083 Homeland Security

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Conclusions

The fiscal year 2003 US-VISIT expenditure plan (with related program office 

documentation and representations) either partially satisfies or provides for 

satisfying the legislative conditions imposed by Congress.

The US-VISIT program leadership has expressly committed to developing and 

implementing the program acquisition management capabilities and the

expenditure plan content described in our open recommendations. However, much 

remains to be accomplished before these recommendations are fully implemented.

By definition, US-VISIT is a risky undertaking because it is to perform a critical

mission, its scope is large and complex, it must meet a demanding implementation 

schedule, and its potential cost is enormous. Generally, these risk factors are 

inherent to the program and cannot be easily changed. 
Appendix I

Briefing to the Staffs of the Subcommittees 

on Homeland Security, Senate and House 

Committees on Appropriations

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Conclusions

However, compounding these inherent risk factors are a number of others that are 

attributable to the program’s current state of governance and management and its 

acquisition approach. These include relying on existing systems to provide the 

foundation for the first three program increments (and thus having to accept the 

performance limitations of these existing systems), not having a governance

structure to guide and direct the program office, not having a mature program 

management capability, not having stabilized the operational context within which 

the program is to operate (and thus having to make assumptions about this 

context), not having fully defined near-term facilities solutions, and not knowing the 

mission value that is to be derived from the first US-VISIT increment.

Because of all these risk factors, the ability of US-VISIT to measurably and 

appreciably achieve DHS’s stated goals of facilitate legitimate travel and trade,

enhance national security, and adhere to U.S. privacy laws and policies is

uncertain. Moreover, DHS’s near-term investment in the program is at risk of not 

delivering promised capabilities on time and within budget, and not producing 

mission value commensurate with investment costs. Thus, it is imperative that the 

factors that contribute to this level of risk are addressed thoroughly and 

expeditiously.
Appendix I

Briefing to the Staffs of the Subcommittees 

on Homeland Security, Senate and House 

Committees on Appropriations

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Recommendations for Executive Action

To address US-VISIT as a governmentwide program and to minimize the risks 

facing the program, we recommend that the Secretary of Homeland Security, in 

collaboration with cabinet officials from US-VISIT stakeholder departments and 

agencies,

• establish and charter an executive body, chaired by the Secretary’s designee, 

potentially co-chaired by the leadership from key stakeholder departments and 

agencies, and composed of appropriate senior-level representatives from DHS 

and each stakeholder organization, to guide and direct the US-VISIT program; 

and

• direct this executive body to immediately take steps to (1) ensure that the 

human capital and financial resources are expeditiously provided to establish a 

fully functional and effective US-VISIT program office and associated 

management capability, (2) clarify the operational context within which USVISIT must operate, and (3) decide whether proposed US-VISIT increments 

will produce mission value commensurate with costs and risks and disclose to 

the Congress planned actions based on this body’s decisions.
Appendix I

Briefing to the Staffs of the Subcommittees 

on Homeland Security, Senate and House 

Committees on Appropriations

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Recommendations

Further, we recommend that the Secretary, through the Under Secretary for Border 

and Transportation Security, direct the US-VISIT Program Director to expeditiously 

establish an effective program management capability, including immediately 

• defining program office positional roles, responsibilities, and relationships;

• developing and implementing a human capital strategy that provides for 

staffing these positions with individuals who have the requisite core

competencies (knowledge, skills, and abilities); 

• developing and implementing a plan for satisfying key SEI acquisition 

management controls, to include acquisition planning, solicitation, 

requirements development and management, project management, contractor 

tracking and oversight, evaluation, and transition to support;

• developing and implementing a risk management plan and ensuring that all 

high risks and their status are reported regularly to the executive body;
Appendix I

Briefing to the Staffs of the Subcommittees 

on Homeland Security, Senate and House 

Committees on Appropriations

Page 88 GAO-03-1083 Homeland Security

80

Recommendations

• defining performance standards for each US-VISIT system increment that are 

measurable and reflect the limitations imposed by relying on existing systems 

to form these system increments; and

• developing an analysis of incremental program cost, benefits, and risks, and 

providing this analysis to the executive body, to assist it in the body’s 

deliberations and decision-making.
Appendix I

Briefing to the Staffs of the Subcommittees 

on Homeland Security, Senate and House 

Committees on Appropriations

Page 89 GAO-03-1083 Homeland Security

81

Agency Comments

We provided DHS a draft of this briefing and discussed its contents with the USVISIT Program Director and Deputy Director. In its oral comments, DHS agreed 

with our findings, conclusions, and recommendations. The department also 

provided some technical comments, which we have incorporated into the briefing, 

as appropriate. Further, the US-VISIT Program Director stated that our work was 

very helpful to him and to the program.
Appendix I

Briefing to the Staffs of the Subcommittees 

on Homeland Security, Senate and House 

Committees on Appropriations

Page 90 GAO-03-1083 Homeland Security

82

Attachment I

Legislative History

Legislation Key requirements

Illegal Immigration

Reform and Immigrant

Responsibility Act of

1996

P.L. 104-208

September 30, 1996

By September 30, 1998, the Attorney General shall develop an automated entry exit control

system that—

(1) collects a record of departure for every alien departing the United States and matches it with

the corresponding arrival record and

(2) identifies, through on-line searching procedures, lawfully admitted aliens who overstay their

visas.

Overstay information identified through the system shall be integrated into appropriate

databases of the Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) and the Department of State,

including those used at ports of entry and at consular offices.

Notwithstanding any other provision of federal, state, or local law, a federal, state, or local

government entity or official may not prohibit or in any way restrict any government entity or

official from sending to or receiving from INS information regarding the citizenship or

immigration status, lawful or unlawful, of any individual.

INS Data Management

Improvement Act of

2000

P.L. 106-215

June 15, 2000

For the purposes of this section, the term “integrated entry and exit data system” means an

electronic system that—

(1) provides access to, and integrates, alien arrival and departure data that are (a) authorized or

required to be created or collected under law; (b) in an electronic format; and (c) in a database

of the Department of Justice or the Department of State, including those created or used at

ports of entry and at consular offices;

(2) uses available data described above to produce a report of arriving and departing aliens by 

country of nationality, classification as an immigrant or nonimmigrant, and date of arrival in and 

departure from the United States;

(3) matches an alien’s available arrival data with the alien’s available departure data;

(4) identifies, through on-line searching procedures, lawfully admitted nonimmigrants who may

have remained in the United States beyond the period authorized by the Attorney General; and
Appendix I

Briefing to the Staffs of the Subcommittees 

on Homeland Security, Senate and House 

Committees on Appropriations

Page 91 GAO-03-1083 Homeland Security

83

Attachment I

Legislative History

Legislation Key requirements

INS Data Management

Improvement Act of

2000

P.L. 106-215

June 15, 2000

(cont’d)

(5) otherwise uses available alien arrival and departure data described in paragraph (1) above

to permit the Attorney General to make the reports required under 8 U.S.C. section 1365a(e):

• Number of departure records collected, with an accounting by nationality.

• Number of departure records that were successfully matched to records of arrival, with an 

accounting by nationality and classification as an immigrant or nonimmigrant.

• Number of aliens who arrived pursuant to a nonimmigrant visa, or the Visa Waiver Program,

for whom no matching departure data have been obtained through the system or by other

means as of the end of the alien’s authorized period of stay, with an accounting by nationality

and arrival date in the United States.

• Number of lawfully admitted nonimmigrants identified as visa overstays, with an accounting by

nationality.

The Attorney General shall implement the integrated entry exit system at airports and seaports

by December 31, 2003. System requirements:

• include available arrival/departure data,

• ensure that the arrival/departure data, when collected or created by an immigration officer, are

entered into the system and can be accessed by other officers at other air/seaports.

The Attorney General must implement the system at the 50 busiest land border ports of entry by

December 31, 2004. System requirements:

• Same as specified above

• Arrival/departure data on aliens shall be accessible at other high-traffic land border ports of

entry.

The system shall be fully implemented at all remaining ports of entry by December 31, 2005.
Appendix I

Briefing to the Staffs of the Subcommittees 

on Homeland Security, Senate and House 

Committees on Appropriations

Page 92 GAO-03-1083 Homeland Security

84

Attachment I

Legislative History

Legislation Key requirements

Visa Waiver Permanent

Program Act

P.L. 106-396

October 30, 2000

Not later than October 1, 2001, the Attorney General shall develop and implement a fully automated

entry exit control system that will collect a record of arrival and departure for every alien who arrives

and departs by sea or air at a port of entry in the United States and is provided a waiver. Not later

than October 1, 2002, the system shall enable immigration officers conducting inspections at ports

of entry to obtain from the system, with respect to aliens seeking a waiver, (1) any photograph of

the alien that may be contained in the records of the State Department or INS; and (2) information

on whether the alien has ever been determined to be ineligible to receive a visa or be admitted to

the United States.

The system shall maintain, for a minimum of 10 years, information about each application for

admission made by an alien seeking a waiver.

On and after October 1, 2007, the alien at the time of application for admission must have a valid

unexpired machine-readable passport that satisfies the internationally accepted standard for

machine readability.

Countries designated to participate before May 1, 2000, shall issue machine-readable passports no

later than October 1, 2003.

All Visa Waiver Program (VWP) applicants are to be checked against lookout systems. By October

1, 2002, no waiver may be provided to an alien arriving by air or sea at a port of entry on a carrier

unless the carrier is electronically transmitting passenger data to the entry exit system.

Not less than 1 hour before arrival at port of entry, signatory aircraft transporting VWP aliens must

electronically furnish the passenger data required by the Attorney General in regulations.

The system shall contain sufficient data to permit the Attorney General to calculate, for each

program country and each fiscal year, the portion of nationals of that country who arrive under VWP

at air and sea ports of entry but for whom no record of departure exists, expressed as a percentage

of the total number of such VWP aliens for the particular country.
Appendix I

Briefing to the Staffs of the Subcommittees 

on Homeland Security, Senate and House 

Committees on Appropriations

Page 93 GAO-03-1083 Homeland Security

85

Attachment I

Legislative History

Legislation Key requirements

USA PATRIOT ACT

P.L. 107-56

October 26, 2001

Focus of system development shall be on (a) utilization of biometric technology and (b) tamperresistant documents readable at ports of entry.

The system must be accessible to (a) all consular officers responsible for visa issuance, (b) all

federal inspection agents at all U.S. border inspection points, and (c) all law enforcement and

intelligence officers responsible for investigation or identification of aliens.

The entry exit system must be able to interface with law enforcement databases to be used by

federal law enforcement to identify and detain individuals who pose a threat to the national security

of the United States.

Aviation and

Transportation Security

Act

P.L. 107-71

November 19, 2001

(1) Not later than 60 days after the date of enactment, each air carrier and foreign air carrier

operating a passenger flight in foreign air transportation to the United States shall provide to the

Commissioner of Customs by electronic transmission a passenger and crew manifest containing

the following information:

• The full name of each passenger and crew member.

• The date of birth and citizenship of each passenger and crew member.

• The sex of each passenger and crew member.

• The passport number and country of issuance of each passenger and crew member if required

for travel.

• The U.S. visa number or resident alien card number of each passenger and crew member, as 

applicable.

• Such other information as the Under Secretary of Transportation for Security, in consultation with

the Commissioner of Customs, determines is reasonably necessary to ensure aviation safety.

Carriers may use the advanced passenger information system established under section 431 of the

Tariff Act of 1930 (19 U.S.C. 1431) to provide the information required by the preceding sentence.
Appendix I

Briefing to the Staffs of the Subcommittees 

on Homeland Security, Senate and House 

Committees on Appropriations

Page 94 GAO-03-1083 Homeland Security

86

Attachment I

Legislative History

Legislation Key requirements

Aviation and

Transportation Security

Act

P.L. 107-71

November 19, 2001

(cont’d)

(2) Passenger name records—The carriers shall make passenger name record information

available to the Customs Service upon request.

(3) Transmission of manifest—a passenger and crew manifest required for a flight under paragraph

(1) above shall be transmitted to the Customs Service in advance of the aircraft landing in the

United States in such manner, time, and form as the Customs Service prescribes.

(4)Transmission of manifests to other federal agencies—Upon request, information provided to the

Under Secretary or the Customs Service under this subsection may be shared with other federal

agencies for the purpose of protecting national security.

Enhanced Border

Security and Visa Entry

Reform Act of 2002

P.L. 107-173

May 14, 2002

No later than October 26, 2004, the Secretary of State and the Attorney General shall issue to

aliens only machine-readable, tamper-resistant visas and other travel and entry documents that use

biometrics. In addition to the requirement for biometric identifiers, name-search capacity and

support must also be implemented between 18 months and 4.5 years after the date of enactment.

Not later than October 26, 2004, the Attorney General and Secretary of State shall install at all U.S. 

ports of entry equipment and software to allow biometric comparison and authentication of all U.S. 

visas and other travel and entry documents issued to aliens.

Not later than January 1, 2003, arrival and departure manifests must be electronically provided to

appropriate immigration officers for each passenger (including crew members and any other

occupants) of air and sea carriers at port of entry.

The information to be provided with respect to each person listed on a manifest shall include

(1) complete name; (2) date of birth; (3) citizenship; (4) sex; (5) passport number and country of

issuance; (6) country of residence; (7) U.S. visa number, date, and place of issuance, where

applicable; (8) alien registration number, where applicable; (9) U.S. address while in the United

States; and (10) such other information that the Attorney General, in consultation with the

Secretaries of State and the Treasury, determines as being necessary for the identification of the

persons transported and for the enforcement of the immigration laws and to protect safety and

national security.
Appendix I

Briefing to the Staffs of the Subcommittees 

on Homeland Security, Senate and House 

Committees on Appropriations

Page 95 GAO-03-1083 Homeland Security

87

Attachment II

Scope and Methodology

To accomplish our objectives, we 

• analyzed the expenditure plan against legislative conditions and other relevant 

federal requirements, guidance, and best practices to determine the extent to 

which the conditions were met; 

• analyzed supporting documentation and interviewed program officials to 

determine capabilities in key program management areas, such as acquisition 

planning, enterprise architecture, and project management; 

• analyzed key acquisition management controls documentation and interviewed 

program officials to determine the status of our open recommendations;

• attended program working group meetings; and

• assessed DHS’s plans and ongoing and completed actions to establish and 

implement the US-VISIT program (including acquiring the US-VISIT system, 

expanding and modifying existing port of entry facilities, and developing and 

implementing policies and procedures) and compared them to existing 

guidance to assess risks.
Appendix I

Briefing to the Staffs of the Subcommittees 

on Homeland Security, Senate and House 

Committees on Appropriations

Page 96 GAO-03-1083 Homeland Security

88

Attachment II

Scope and Methodology

We did not independently validate DHS’s provided information.

We conducted our work at DHS headquarters in Washington, D.C., from April 

through July 2003 in accordance with generally accepted government auditing 

standards.
Page 97 GAO-03-1083 Homeland Security

Appendix II

Comments from the Department of Homeland 

Security ApendxiI
Appendix II

Comments from the Department of Homeland 

Security

(310266) Page 98 GAO-03-1083 Homeland Security
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