Present: Hassell, C.J., Lacy, Keenan, Kinser, Lemons, and 

Agee, JJ., and Russell, S.J. 

O. RIDDICK HARRELL, JR. 

v. Record No. 052629 OPINION BY JUSTICE DONALD W. LEMONS 

 November 3, 2006 

CHRISTINA H. HARRELL 

FROM THE COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA 

 In this appeal, we consider whether the Court of Appeals 

erred in affirming the trial court's reservation of spousal 

support to a party without a valid pleading requesting it. 

For the reasons stated below, the judgment of the Court of 

Appeals will be reversed. 

I. Facts and Proceedings Below 

 Christina H. Harrell ("Ms. Harrell") and O. Riddick 

Harrell, Jr. ("Mr. Harrell") were married on November 22, 

1969. The parties separated on June 27, 2003. On June 15, 

2004, Ms. Harrell filed a bill of complaint for a no-fault 

divorce in the Circuit Court of the County of Chesterfield. 

This bill of complaint was filed before the expiration of the 

one year separation period required by Code § 20-91(9)(a). 

The complaint requested that Ms. Harrell "be awarded temporary 

and permanent spousal support." On June 15, 2004, Ms. Harrell 

also filed a motion for relief pendente lite in which she 

moved the court to direct Mr. Harrell to pay temporary spousal 

support. On June 29, 2004, without leave of court, Ms. 
Harrell filed an amended bill of complaint. In her amended 

complaint, Ms. Harrell requested a divorce on the grounds of 

adultery and again requested "temporary and permanent spousal 

support." On July 1, 2004, Mr. Harrell filed an "Answer and 

Motion to Dismiss the Plaintiff's Bill of Complaint for 

Divorce." Included in Mr. Harrell's answer and motion to 

dismiss was a cross-bill in which he requested "that he be 

awarded permanent spousal support." Ms. Harrell did not file 

an answer to the cross-bill. 

 On November 3, 2004, the trial court issued an opinion 

letter in which it ruled on several issues. First, it granted 

Mr. Harrell's "Motion to Dismiss the Bill of Complaint" 

because the bill was filed before the passage of the period of 

separation required by statute. The opinion letter also 

stated that the amended bill of complaint was not properly 

before the Court because Ms. Harrell had not sought leave of 

court to file it pursuant to Rule 1:8. The trial court 

indicated it would grant a divorce based on Mr. Harrell's 

cross-bill. Finally, the trial court indicated that the final 

decree should include a "reservation of Ms. Harrell's right to 

request spousal support pursuant to Va. Code 20-107.1(D)." 

 In response to the November 3, 2004, opinion letter, Ms. 

Harrell filed "Defendant's Omnibus Motion for Relief" 

("omnibus motion") wherein she requested that her amended bill 

2
of complaint be deemed an answer to the cross-bill, thereby 

placing the issue of a permanent award of spousal support 

before the court. She also requested that her "prior 

pleadings" be deemed sufficient to place her request for 

permanent spousal support before the court. 

On January 18, 2005, in a final decree, the trial court 

dismissed Ms. Harrell's bill of complaint and granted a final 

divorce to Mr. Harrell based solely on his cross-bill. The 

trial court's decree ordered that "both parties [were] 

entitled to a reservation of the right to request spousal 

support." The trial court never specifically ruled on Ms. 

Harrell's motion to consider her amended bill of complaint as 

an answer to the cross-bill or to "deem her prior pleadings 

. . . to be responsive pleadings sufficient to place before 

[the trial court] the matter[] of spousal support." 

Significantly, however, in the final decree, the trial court 

does not recite that the amended bill of complaint was one of 

the pleadings it considered and the trial court ordered that 

the bill of complaint be dismissed. 

On February 11, 2005, Mr. Harrell filed a timely notice 

of appeal. The Court of Appeals affirmed the judgment of the 

trial court. Because the Court of Appeals' judgment involves 

a matter of significant precedential value, we granted Mr. 

3
Harrell an appeal to this Court. See Code §§ 17.1-410(B) and 

–411. 

II. Analysis 

 On appeal, Mr. Harrell advances three assignments of 

error. First, "[t]he trial court erred in granting wife 

relief in the absence of a valid pleading." Second, "[t]he 

trial court erred in awarding wife a reservation of spousal 

support in the absence of a specific prayer for that form of 

relief." Third, "[t]he trial court erred in granting wife a 

reservation of spousal support without considering all of the 

factors contained in Virginia Code Section 20-107.1(E)." Ms. 

Harrell assigns cross-error as follows: "The trial court 

erred in dismissing wife's original bill of complaint." Under 

well-established principles, we review such questions of law 

de novo. Westgate at Williamsburg Condominium Ass'n v. Philip 

Richardson Co., 270 Va. 566, 574, 621 S.E.2d 114, 118 (2005). 

Code § 20-79(b) states "[i]n any suit for divorce, the 

court in which the suit is instituted or pending, when either 

party to the proceedings so requests, shall provide in its 

decree . . . support and maintenance for the spouse." 

(Emphasis added.) Pursuant to Code § 20-79(b), a party must 

request spousal support in order to be granted that relief. 

In Potts v. Mathieson Alkali Works, 165 Va. 196, 181 S.E. 

521 (1935), this Court held: 

4
 No court can base its decree upon facts not 

alleged, nor render its judgment upon a right, 

however meritorious, which has not been pleaded and 

claimed. Pleadings are as essential as proof, the 

one being unavailing without the other. 

Id. at 207, 181 S.E. at 525 (citation omitted). 

Ms. Harrell alleges that she properly pled her request 

for spousal support in several of her pleadings: the bill of 

complaint, the amended bill of complaint, the motion for 

relief pendente lite, and in the omnibus motion for relief. 

We will address each in turn. 

In her bill of complaint, Ms. Harrell's grounds for 

divorce were that she and Mr. Harrell had "lived separate and 

apart for a period of more than one year" pursuant to Code 

§ 20-91(9)(a). The bill of complaint also requested that Ms. 

Harrell be awarded "temporary and permanent spousal support." 

However, when Ms. Harrell filed the bill of complaint, she had 

not been separated from Mr. Harrell "without interruption for 

one year" as required by the statute. Code § 20-91(9)(a). 

"[J]urisdiction in divorce suits is purely statutory," Sprouse 

v. Griffin, 250 Va. 46, 50, 458 S.E.2d 770, 772 (1995), and 

this Court has held that "[t]he act relied upon for divorce 

must be alleged and proved to have occurred prior to the 

bringing of the suit, not based upon some act or conduct 

alleged to have taken place during its pendency." Beckner v. 

Beckner, 204 Va. 580, 583, 132 S.E.2d 715, 717-18 (1963). 

5
Consequently, Ms. Harrell failed to state a claim upon which 

relief could be granted. The trial court had subject matter 

jurisdiction over the divorce; however, inadequate grounds 

were alleged in the bill. The trial court properly dismissed 

the bill for this reason. Consequently, the request for 

spousal support contained in the bill of complaint abated with 

its dismissal. 

Ms. Harrell's amended complaint was also properly 

dismissed by the trial court because Ms. Harrell failed to 

seek leave of court prior to amending her pleading pursuant to 

Rule 1:8. Her request for spousal support therein abated with 

the dismissal of the amended bill. 

Ms. Harrell's motion for relief pendente lite was 

insufficient to grant a reservation of permanent spousal 

support pursuant to Code § 20-107.1. A trial court grants 

pendente lite relief pursuant to Code § 20-103, while a 

request for permanent spousal support or a reservation of 

permanent spousal support is made pursuant to Code § 20-107.1. 

The two statutory schemes are separate and distinct. See

Whiting v. Whiting, 262 Va. 3, 4 (2001) ("This Court further 

holds that the pendente lite decree awarding spousal support 

only applied during the pendency of litigation and was 

terminated when the cause was dismissed by the final decree of 

divorce."); Reid v. Reid, 245 Va. 409, 412, 429 S.E.2d 208, 

6
209 (1993) ("The authority granted by § 20-107.1 relates to 

orders entered at the time divorce is awarded or denied and is 

limited to matters of 'maintenance and support.' "). Ms. 

Harrell's request for pendente lite support was not sufficient 

for the trial court to order that Ms. Harrell was "entitled to 

a reservation of the right to request spousal support pursuant 

to Section 20-107.1(D)." 

Additionally, Ms. Harrell could not be granted a 

reservation of spousal support based on her "omnibus motion." 

Ms. Harrell's omnibus motion does not contain an independent 

request for spousal support. In the omnibus motion, Ms. 

Harrell requests that the amended bill of complaint be 

considered an answer to the cross-bill and that all of her 

"prior pleadings" be deemed "sufficient" to place the issue of 

spousal support before the trial court. The trial court did 

not address this matter in its final decree. There was no 

objection to the failure to rule on the motion and no 

assignment of error made on this basis. 

Ms. Harrell failed to request permanent spousal support 

in any valid pleading. Her bill of complaint was properly 

dismissed as premature. Her amended bill of complaint was 

properly dismissed for failing to comply with the requirements 

of Rule 1:8 to obtain leave of court before filing. Any 

request for spousal support contained in either of these 

7
pleadings was rendered a nullity by the respective dismissals. 

Ms. Harrell's separate motion for pendente lite spousal 

support was inadequate to obtain permanent spousal support. 

Ms. Harrell's omnibus motion did not contain an independent 

request for spousal support and the court did not rule on the 

request to deem prior dismissed pleadings as a request for 

permanent spousal support or to consider the amended bill of 

complaint to be an answer to the cross-bill. Ms. Harrell does 

not assign error to the trial court's failure to rule on the 

omnibus motion. Finally, Ms. Harrell filed no answer to the 

cross-bill. 

As a consequence, Ms. Harrell had no valid pleading 

before the trial court requesting permanent spousal support. 

Without such a pleading, it was error for the trial court to 

grant a reservation of spousal support to her pursuant to Code 

§ 20-107.1(D). 

III. Conclusion 

We hold that the trial court erred in its judgment that 

Ms. Harrell was "entitled to a reservation of the right to 

request spousal support pursuant to Section 20-107.1(D)." We 

do not address assignment of error three concerning compliance 

under Code § 20-107.1(E). For the reasons stated herein, the 

assignment of cross-error is without merit. Accordingly, we 

will reverse that portion of the judgment of the Court of 

8
Appeals concerning a reservation of spousal support to Ms. 

Harrell, with directions to the Court of Appeals to remand 

this case to the trial court for entry of a modified decree in 

accordance with this opinion. 

Reversed in part and remanded. 

9