1.

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA

MARK JACKSON,

Plaintiff,

v.

ROHM & HAAS COMPANY, et al.,

Defendants.

Civil Action No. 05-4988

OPINION

March 19, 2009 Pollak, J. 

Plaintiff Mark Jackson has filed a “Motion to Vacate the Reference of the Instant

Matter to Magistrate Judge M. Faith Angell” (Docket No. 196), seeking relief under 28

U.S.C. § 636(c)(4). Defendants have responded in opposition (Docket Nos. 201, 202). 

The motion is ripe for disposition.

I. Background

In 2007, plaintiff Mark Jackson had two separate lawsuits pending before me, one

filed in 2005 and the other in 2006. The suits were related and both arose, in part, from

an earlier 2003 federal lawsuit, dismissed by me in 2005. Magistrate Judge M. Faith

Angell played a valued role in all these actions at different times. In September of 2007, I

decided motions to dismiss in the two pending cases, and then ordered that both cases

Case 2:05-cv-04988-LP Document 248 Filed 03/19/09 Page 1 of 19
 The CAC is 152 pages long and presents twenty-five claims against fifty-one 1 

defendants. Among the claims are multiple allegations, brought against all the

defendants, of obstruction of justice, conspiracy, fraud, retaliation, and other wrongful

acts in violation of the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO).

2.

would be referred, with the consent of all parties, to Judge Angell under 28 U.S.C. §

636(c). 

In May 2008, Judge Angell consolidated the two pending cases and set about the

task of moving them forward, including (1) setting a date for Jackson to submit a

consolidated amended complaint (“CAC”), and (2) outlining proposed discovery

procedure. In June, Jackson submitted the CAC as well as a motion to disqualify 1

Harkins Cunningham, the law firm representing the Rohm & Haas defendants. All

defendants filed motions to dismiss, and the Rohm & Haas defendants filed an opposition

to the motion to disqualify. Judge Angell held a hearing on the disqualification issue in

early August, denying the motion shortly thereafter. 

In mid-September, Jackson filed a motion for a preliminary injunction to bar a

merger between defendant Rohm & Haas and another corporation (not a named party)

and to bar the purchase by defendant Liberty Life of yet another corporation (also not a

named party). In a separate request by letter, Jackson asked that the court issue a “status

quo” order to stop the merger and the acquisition activities from progressing pending

decision on his injunction motion; Judge Angell denied that request. Judge Angell has

issued a number of orders scheduling arguments on defendants’ motions to dismiss and

plaintiff’s motion for an injunction as well as redefining when discovery would begin. 

Case 2:05-cv-04988-LP Document 248 Filed 03/19/09 Page 2 of 19
This summary is but a sketch of all the submissions and decisions in this

2 

consolidated lawsuit since May.

 In the time since plaintiff filed his motion to vacate, Judge Angell also issued a report 3

and recommendation advising that I grant defendants’ motions to dismiss. Jackson

submitted a memorandum regarding this report and recommendation by way of

supplement to his motion to vacate the reference (Docket No. 241).

Jackson himself makes use of the Doe opinion in his motion. I assume its guidance 4 

regarding § 455 was not lost on him, but rather, that he himself considered his averments

as something beyond bias.

3.

She also filed a report and recommendation, in November, advising that I deny Jackson’s

motion for a preliminary injunction. In short, in the months since Judge Angell’s May

2008 consolidation order, this lawsuit has been active and contentious.2

On October 16, 2008, Jackson filed this motion asking me to vacate the reference

of the case to Judge Angell. He seeks to have the case removed from Judge Angell in its

entirety for reasons enumerated below.3

II. Analysis

A. The procedural propriety of the motion

As a preliminary matter, defendants argue that Jackson’s motion amounts to

allegations of bias, and that such allegations must first be lodged with the magistrate

judge as a motion for recusal under 28 U.S.C. § 455 — not as a motion to the district

court judge to vacate the reference under 28 U.S.C. § 636(c)(4). They ask me to dismiss

the motion as procedurally deficient, citing to cases like Doe v. Nat’l Bd. of Med.

Exam’rs, No. Civ. A. 99-4532, 2001 WL 1003206, at * 3 (E.D. Pa. Aug. 14, 2001); and

Clay v. Brown, Hopkins & Stambaugh, 892 F. Supp. 11, 13 (D.D.C. 1995). 

4

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4.

While I agree with defendants’ recitation of the operative procedure concerning

allegations of bias, Jackson’s charges extend beyond that realm. In his motion to vacate,

and in lengthy objections to other orders of Judge Angell, Jackson implies, and also

appears to state directly, that Judge Angell is deliberately obstructing his case and

knowingly colluding with the defendants. The following are but a few examples of such

allegations:

... the Court clearly has permitted improper external influences to

invade the judicial process. At a minimum, the appearance of

judicial bias is inescapable.

Motion to vacate at 14. 

These actions cannot be reconciled with the Magistrate Judge’s

obligation to fairly and impartially determine the matters before her,

and her own statements concerning moving the case forward, but

rather reflect a clear pattern of conduct intended to protect

defendants and to prejudice plaintiff.

Id. at 28.

[T]he present question is ... whether Judge Angell’s actions have

been intended to assist R&H and/or utilized by R&H officials to

avoid the mandated reporting and disclosure requirements.

Amend. Obj. (Docket No. 216) at 12-13. These are deeply serious charges — charges not

simply that Judge Angell is prejudiced against the plaintiff (charges that are disturbing

enough in themselves), but that Judge Angell has taken steps designed to promote

defendants’ position and both disparage and materially disadvantage plaintiff’s position. 

Case 2:05-cv-04988-LP Document 248 Filed 03/19/09 Page 4 of 19
“Notwithstanding any provision of law to the contrary, the court may, for good

5 

cause shown on its own motion, or under extraordinary circumstances shown by

any party, vacate a reference of a civil matter to a magistrate judge under this

subsection.” 

See, e.g., Plaintiff’s Supplemental Memorandum (Docket No. 241) at 1.

6 

7

The motion purports to include a fourth broad area, one that outlines how Judge 

Angell allegedly grew “hostile” toward Jackson at some point this summer in the wake of

events in the litigation and in the corporate lives of two of the defendants. Pl. Motion at

28. All this appears subsumed in the other three areas and therefore does not call for

separate analysis. The same is true of Jackson’s latest arguments in his supplemental

memorandum to this motion (Docket No. 241).

5.

In light of the gravity of the allegations leveled by Jackson against Judge Angell, I

will review the motion under § 636(c)(4).5

B. The substance of the motion

Jackson’s motion stands on three broad propositions, each illustrated by morespecific allegations, that he contends create the kind of “extraordinary circumstances,” 28

U.S.C. § 636(c)(4), that would call for vacating the reference of a case to a magistrate

judge: first, that Judge Angell has demonstrated “severe bias” in favor of the defendants 6

and against plaintiff; second, that Judge Angell has failed to follow her own orders; and

third, that her decisions have improperly advantaged the defendants to the detriment of

the plaintiff. Pl. Motion at 4, 14, 17. In short, Jackson asserts that Judge Angell has 7

shown egregious favoritism for big commercial concerns and disfavor for individual

litigants, himself in particular. He asserts that she has indicated, through orders, that she

will manage this litigation in particular ways, only to conduct herself subsequently in a

Case 2:05-cv-04988-LP Document 248 Filed 03/19/09 Page 5 of 19
6.

fashion directly contrary to those orders. He finally asserts that Judge Angell’s decisions

and actions on a number of issues connected to this lawsuit have intentionally aided the

defendants and obstructed Jackson’s litigation process. The defendants respond, in

summary, that Jackson has failed to demonstrate bias; that he is merely unhappy with

Judge Angell’s decisions; and that he should not be permitted to “judge shop.” 

Once the parties to a civil suit consent to a reference of their case to a magistrate

judge under 28 U.S.C. § 636(c)(1), the district judge may only vacate that reference in

one of two ways: sua sponte for good cause shown, or on motion of a party upon a

showing of “extraordinary circumstances” by that party. 28 U.S.C. § 636(c)(4) (quoted

supra note 5). In seeking to compass the limits of “extraordinary circumstances,” it is

instructive to quote at length from an opinion of the United States District Court for the

District of Columbia:

The legislative history of § 636(c)(4) suggests that the District

Court's power to vacate a referral to a Magistrate Judge should be

exercised only “where it is appropriate to have the trial before an

article III judicial officer because of the extraordinary questions of

law at issue and judicial decision making is likely to have wide

precedential importance.” 12 Charles A. Wright, Arthur R. Miller &

Richard L. Marcus, Federal Practice & Procedure: Civil § 3071.3

(citing S.Rep. No. 74, 96th Cong., 1st Sess 14 (1979)).

Circumstances warranting exercise of this power are described as

“rare.” Id. Although the legislative history sheds no light on the

scope or application of the “good cause shown” and “extraordinary

circumstances” standards, commentators assert that the authority

provided for by § 636(c) was “certainly not meant to permit a party

to argue that rulings by the magistrate judge warranted withdrawal of

the case.” Id. As a general rule, “[c]ourts have not been receptive to

the argument that extraordinary circumstances justified withdrawal

of the case.” Id.

Case 2:05-cv-04988-LP Document 248 Filed 03/19/09 Page 6 of 19
7.

Manion v. American Airlines, Inc., 251 F. Supp.2d 171, 173 (D.D.C. 2003). As directed

by the statute, I will review Jackson’s motion for a proper showing of extraordinary

circumstances. 

I will also consider, for the following reasons, whether I should vacate the

reference mea sponte. First: if, without regard to whether a magistrate judge had been

asked to recuse, I myself were persuaded that a magistrate judge was biased — let alone

intentionally conducting the reference to favor one party and disfavor another — I would

vacate the reference mea sponte, without waiting for a party to demonstrate

“extraordinary circumstances,” in order to ensure fairness and to protect the integrity of

the judicial process. Second: in exercising my mea sponte responsibilities, I would be

prepared to vacate a reference in any situation in which it had become apparent that the

dynamics of the triangular interactions of counsel with each other and with the magistrate

judge had deteriorated in a fashion detrimental to the expeditious movement of the

litigation forward, notwithstanding that the magistrate judge had been entirely blameless. 

1. Alleged demonstrations of “severe bias”

I find on the record no basis for the plaintiff’s charge that Judge Angell is biased

against him and in favor of defendants. In reviewing this charge, I will address the

utterances of Judge Angell to which plaintiff takes particular exceptions in his motion. 

A. Jackson quotes language from an August 6, 2008 hearing before Judge Angell

where she referred to some of the defendants as “large well known respected firms” (Aug.

6, 2008 Hearing Trans. at 30:12-13). Jackson then construes this as an announcement that

Case 2:05-cv-04988-LP Document 248 Filed 03/19/09 Page 7 of 19
 A minute later, Judge Angell reiterated her doubts: 8

You are representing Mr. Jackson’s interest, but I am not sure at this point where his

interests are lost in this complexity of litigation, you know, a hundred and some pages

here, and something else there, and then in the meantime, Mr. Jackson as best I can

figure out, is lost in the forums.

I am not sure he is the subject of this after a while. I don’t [know] whether this

is just an exercise in complexity, whether this is some sort of cause, but I have serious

concerns as to how this has or will benefit Mr. Jackson. If we are looking at the

representation issues, that is some of my concern.

Transcript of August 6, 2008 Hearing.

 The hearing concerned plaintiff’s motion to disqualify the law firm of Harkins 9

Cunningham. Harkins Cunningham not only represents the Rohm & Haas defendants, the

firm itself has been named a defendant. This excerpt begins near the end of plaintiff’s

counsel’s oral argument regarding the motion. 

 

8.

“if (in the Court’s view) defendants are large, well-known, and/or respected, they are

incapable of wrongdoing.” Pl. Motion at 7. On its face, this statement does not suggest

what Jackson asserts that it suggests. Further, the statement appears in a larger exchange

between Judge Angell and plaintiff’s counsel wherein Judge Angell observed,

appropriately, that she could not understand how plaintiff’s counsel could believe that the

huge, complex, multi-faceted litigation he had been pursuing for years “will benefit your

client who is the integral person in this process.” A lengthy excerpt from the hearing is 8

helpful to the analysis here:9

MR. SILVERBERG [plaintiff’s counsel]: One last point which is

that [law firm Harkins Cunningham is] a defendant and an enterprise under

the racketeering statute. Once you are a defendant, and in this particular

instance, a RICO enterprise, you have a self-interest.

Your interest is in vindicating yourself, and once you have an

interest in vindicating yourself, how can you possibly be carrying out the

responsibilities that you need to carry out on behalf of your clients when

Case 2:05-cv-04988-LP Document 248 Filed 03/19/09 Page 8 of 19
9.

your self-interest is in vindicating yourself. I don’t know. I think the

answer is your [sic] can’t, and before they were a defendant, they were still

an enterprise.

They just became a defendant in the consolidated amended

complaint. Again, they were a defendant once before, but they are – they

have been an enterprise in prior iterations of the complaint, before the

consolidated amended complaint. So it still applies.

They still have a self-interest in vindicating themselves and in

vindicating their advice to their clients, and with that present in the case,

they cannot continue to represent these clients under these circumstances.

THE COURT: Counsel, in the most elementary of motions to

disqualify, usually the standing of the opposing counsel is not only the issue

of judicial and efficiency and economy, et cetera, et cetera.

There is a real question about what standing the opposing counsel

has in this type of matter where you are arguing that they have not met their

level of service or their compliance with the ethics rules in their handling of

this case. 

How do you see that you have standing if, in fact, there is

consistency that the notes are what they are, which is notes, and that she did

report? There may be some dispute as to what the wording was, but she

clearly had something to say, which as I recall was the beginning for the

purposes of the process that I have dealt with. 

I have some trouble other than your desire because you believe that,

in fact, they have been less than cooperative on discovery, your desire to

have them disqualified. I don’ t know. That sounds more self-serving than

legitimate.

MR. SILVERBERG: In the section where we identify obstructive

conduct and in the section where we go through each of the disciplinary

rules, every attorney has standing because the rules impose it on every

attorney against every other attorney. 

In the Merlino case we cite to the Court where it talks about an

attorney facing criminal or disciplinary charges for his actions in the case,

aren’t going to be able to pursue the client’s interests free from his own

interests.

What has happened here is that once there is an infection in the

representation, what we have had occur here is there has been an

interference with our ability, the plaintiff’s ability to get the evidence and – 

Case 2:05-cv-04988-LP Document 248 Filed 03/19/09 Page 9 of 19
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THE COURT: Well, that is your representation, that you believe

they have hindered your ability to prosecute your case.

As to whether they have been cooperative or not, I don’t think that

falls squarely within the rules. That may have something to do with my

rules as far as Rule 26 is concerned, but as to whether they are feathering

their own interest as against their clients’ interest, you have raised it, I’m

somewhat uncomfortable with your standing, and obviously I will look at

the consents.

But, I can find in my mind especially in the federal forum, which is

where we are, I can find little other than your own desires to have a more

favorable scenario for the purposes of litigating, I can’t find much else.

You know, your argument that they are, in fact, a RICO enterprise,

that is your representation. There is certainly no finding, there is nothing

that makes it a RICO case on its face. It is your representation that that’s

what this is.

MR. SILVERBERG: We believe we have submitted a

comprehensive motion to the Court –

THE COURT: Oh, you have.

MR. SILVERBERG: – fully supportive of why there should be a

disqualification, and if the Court is of the view that that motion does not

support our position, we will accept the Court’s – obviously accept

whatever the Court decides.

But, beyond what we have submitted in our petition, if the Court

does not believe that is sufficient, then we are going to accept whatever the

Court determines is appropriate.

We believe that that more than satisfies the standard for

disqualification here, particularly with respect to the various conflicts that

have been identified, not just the ones that have been discussed today, but

the ones identified within our submission.

THE COURT: Mr. Reed, is there anything more you want to say?

MR. REED [of Harkins Cunningham]: Very briefly, Your Honor.

There is two points that I feel the need to address very quickly on the rape

issue.

Mr. Silverberg may want to call the Superior Court’s opinion an

anomaly, the Supreme Court issued an opinion and I think it has to be given

– it has weight, it is controlling on that issue.

Case 2:05-cv-04988-LP Document 248 Filed 03/19/09 Page 10 of 19
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Moreover, just one brief excerpt from June McCrory’s testimony,

and which there is many more on page seven of our brief, but she says, “I

told them what happened, and if I’m sleeping and someone starts having

sex with me in my opinion, I didn’t have the choice, so I was forced. I

knew something that I didn’t want to happen in a sexual nature, however

you want to label it.”

She didn’t say the word rape. It certainly sounds like involuntary

sexual conduct to me, sexual assault, however you want to label it. I

honestly don’t know why we’re debating this issue or what real significance

it has to the motion before the Court today. I couldn’t let that go without

reading that excerpt.

I also can’t sit quietly and hear my firm referred to as a RICO

enterprise. The last time we were sued and labeled a RICO enterprise Mr.

Silverberg was sanctioned.

He has no more basis to say it today than he had to say it then, and

that is just not my firm, there are a lot of very good people who are

defendants in this case and respectable companies who are being labeled

RICO enterprises for no reason at all.

His allegations just continue to expand. His latest paper suggests

now that Rohm & Haas is being acquired by Dow in order to build the

RICO enterprise. I mean, it’s just getting absurd.

But, the mere allegation and I will refer the Court to Judge Rambo’s

decision in Dixon, mere allegations are not enough to disqualify. She says

in her opinion, “Plaintiff’s allegations against defendants are simply that,

allegations. If accusations alone were enough, the parties could too easily

interfere with the opposing parties chosen legal representation.

That is exactly what is happening here. Judge Pollak observed in the

Hessling case that you are more likely to find disqualifying conflicts in a

criminal case than you are here. I’m surprised Mr. Silverberg cites a

criminal case, Merlino.

And, by the way, Merlino is an interesting set of facts if you haven’t

looked at it. There the lawyer visited one of the government’s witnesses in

jail, delivered a letter on behalf of an alleged crime family, offered to pay

him money all in an effort – and to convince him that it would be safe to

come to Philadelphia and he wouldn’t be killed, all in an effort, it was

alleged, to interfere with the government’s prosecution. That’s not this

case, Your Honor, not this case here. Thank you, Your Honor. 

THE COURT: The other problem I have, Mr. Silverberg, is I’m not

quite sure how your client is benefitting from a multi-forum extended piece

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12.

of litigation which started out with initially, as I recall, one claim or perhaps

more, but it was focused on one specific incident.

Here we are, as is said, at least five years or three years into the

federal scenario, and the tenth year in this process and, you know, short of

massive class actions, almost nothing I have seen in my years has extended

this long.

I cannot for the life of me understand how you believe this will

benefit your client who is the integral person in this process. He is here, he

has been the named plaintiff throughout this process, but it’s not getting any

clearer. There are more motions, more complaints. In the focus group

concept, I can’t see where this is going for him.

MR. SILVERBERG: We’re doing the best we can, Judge. We filed

in 2003 –

THE COURT: No, counsel, I have trouble with that because I truly

believe that this case doesn’t – it has, but it doesn’t merit the kind of

complexity, the kind of multi-faceted complaints, the kind of motions that

have resulted.

There have been sanctions, there have been other motions, there is –

multitudinous cases come through, and they don’t involve this kind of

constant dispute.

These are, I’m sorry, they are large well known respected firms.

You are representing Mr. Jackson’s interest, but I am not sure at this point

where his interests are lost in this complexity of litigation, you know, a

hundred and some pages here, and something else there, and then in the

meantime, Mr. Jackson as best I can figure out, is lost in the forums.

I am not sure he is the subject of this after a while. I don’t [know]

whether this is just an exercise in complexity, whether this is some sort of

cause, but I have serious concerns as to how this has or will benefit Mr.

Jackson. If we are looking at the representation issues, that is some of my

concern. 

All right. Is there anything else you want to say, Mr. Silverberg?

MR. SILVERBERG: Nothing from the plaintiff.

Transcript of August 6, 2008 Hearing on Pl.’s Motion to Disqualify Counsel for Rohm &

Haas Defendants at 22 - 31. Judge Angell’s observations, which Jackson attacks as

indicative of extreme bias, represent a legitimate area of inquiry for a judge. If it is

Case 2:05-cv-04988-LP Document 248 Filed 03/19/09 Page 12 of 19
In a hearing not long ago, I had occasion to tell both lawyers, on the record, that they 10 

had “dropped the ball.”

 As stated in note 1 supra, Jackson’s complaint charges fifty-one defendants with a 11

variety of claims including conspiracies by all defendants to commit various unlawful

acts.

13.

thought to be out of bounds for a judge to tell a lawyer that he or she is pursuing an

approach that seems to the judge likely to prove unproductive, trial judges — including

the undersigned — should be reversed with frequency. A lawyer who is the recipient of 10

such a comment might well derive some gain from considering whether, by any chance,

the comment may have merit. 

B. In another instance, Jackson quotes a statement by Judge Angell that ends with

the sentence “I think this is some elaborate conceptual scheme and it stretches reality to

believe that these defendants have any of those intents toward Mr. Jackson.” (Aug. 6 11

Trans. at 35: 14-17). Plaintiff then avers that this statement “is a direct attack on the good

faith of plaintiff and plaintiff’s counsel and the credibility of the CAC, and undercuts in

its entirety the Court’s role of fairness and impartiality.” Again, it may be helpful to

quote the record at length; in the following section, the parties are debating plaintiff’s

asserted need to depose Pierre Brondeau, COO of defendant Rohm & Haas:

MR SILVERBERG: But, again, this isn’t my offer of proof as to

why we are taking Mr. Brondeau’s deposition. If [defendants] are going to

file a motion for a protective order, I want to know what the basis would be,

honest. I mean, all of those guys are implicated, Judge. If you look just

from the allegations of the SAC – 

THE COURT: I don’t know that all those guys are implicated. I

remember specifically a time when you told me you hated discovery, you

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14.

basically support the foundation that you are representing and that is not

what discovery is all about.

So, I have no assurances that, in fact, you know anything before you

request the subpoena to find out what you want to know.

MR. SILVERBERG: Well, if they file a motion we will file an

appropriate response, that’s all I can say.

MR. REED: Your honor, we will obviously abide by your ruling and

we will have to live within the rules.

THE COURT: Right.

MR. REED: I would just like to point out that each time we get a

request like this, if we resist it, we’re accused of obstruction of justice. If

we go down to the deposition, then the person is accused of committing

fraud by testifying, and it just gets exponentially broader. There is no better

indication of that than this hundred and fifty-two page complaint.

Now, I know Your Honor had said the last time that we met that you

were not inclined to stay discovery until these motions could – 

THE COURT: Right.

MR. REED: – be addressed but, frankly, this new complaint is so

broad and it names so many people, PriceWaterhouseCoopers is now a

RICO enterprise, Hewitt Associates is a RICO enterprise. We could be

getting dozens, if he had the resources dozens of depositions a day. I mean

– 

MR. SILVERBERG: I mean, with all due respect, it’s just not fair,

Judge.

THE COURT: Well, it is fair.

MR. SILVERBERG: I mean, we’re not here to argue the merits of

the complaint.

THE COURT: Yes.

MR. SILVERBERG: That is what the dismissal motion is for.

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15.

THE COURT: But, counsel, this is where I too share concerns,

because I too am looking at what on its face looked like a fairly reasoned

initial complaint about what happened to Mr. Jackson.

Now, we are so far past that into this elaborate combined concept

complaint – 

MR. SILVERBERG: Yeah, that’s fine. Their motion didn’t even

challenge almost every claim. I mean, all I can do is let them file their

motion and respond, which you have in front of you, Judge. So, I don’t

know why we are doing this today.

THE COURT: Well, we are doing it because I am interested in

commenting on it, and I have that prerogative.

MR. SILVERBERG: And I don’t mean to not respect that. But, their

motion has been filed and we have responded, and I think their motion and

our response pretty much for speak itself.

THE COURT: I am continually concerned with the expansiveness. I

am concerned with what is like a miasma, oh, what is a fair word, this

miasma of your believing that there is an elaborate scheme, collusion,

action somehow directed toward you and/or your client.

In my mind, it’s [sic] stretches very hard any sense of reality. I can’t

figure out where you are going, I can’t figure out how it’s going to benefit

Mr. Jackson. 

All I see is an exercise and one that has already resulted in sanctions,

may have a Rule 11 component to it, and it’s occupying the time of judge,

untold numbers of defendants and their representation, and you, and it’s

judicially inefficient, and I think it is prejudicial on behalf of your client, I

really cannot see how this process is benefitting your client in any way.

I think this is some elaborate conceptual scheme and it stretches

reality to believe that these defendants have any of those intents towards

Mr. Jackson.

MR. SILVERBERG: Your honor, unless there is anything further, I

would just ask to be excused.

Aug. 6 Trans. at 34 - 37. 

Case 2:05-cv-04988-LP Document 248 Filed 03/19/09 Page 15 of 19
Jackson has undertaken to augment his motion to vacate, and to add to his arguments in 12 

support of the motion, in an array of subsequent submissions — Docket Nos. 213, 215,

216, 219, and 220 — seeking relief on different issues. 

As I mentioned in note 3 supra, Jackson also submitted, with leave of the court, a

supplemental memorandum to the motion to vacate that makes further allegations of this

kind. I have focused my efforts here on Jackson’s original motion to vacate, but have

16.

Judge Angell’s words do constitute a strong challenge to the utility, for the

plaintiff, of claims and strategic moves advanced by plaintiff’s counsel. Judges, however,

are permitted, even expected, to engage in such strong challenges. Such challenges do

not, of themselves, betoken bias. They betoken judicial concern for the integrity and

effectiveness of the judicial process.

2. Judge Angell’s alleged deviations from the paths marked out in her prior 

procedural orders

In reviewing Jackson’s contentions in this area, I find no grounds for vacating the

reference. Jackson quotes, in full, Judge Angell’s order of May 21, 2008 wherein she

consolidated Jackson’s two civil suits and ordered him to file a consolidated amended

complaint. The order also contained Judge Angell’s statements that discovery would

include bi-weekly phone conferences and that she would take an active role in managing

the litigation. Jackson contends that Judge Angell has failed to (1) issue a scheduling

order, (2) hold bi-weekly conference calls, and (3) take an active role in advancing the

litigation. In various submissions to me — submissions filed after the motion to vacate

and severally lodging objections to orders or decisions by Judge Angell — Jackson points

to earlier orders by Judge Angell and asserts that the later orders or decisions directly and

deliberately contravene the earlier orders.12 See, e.g., Amend. Obj. (Docket No. 216) at 10 

Case 2:05-cv-04988-LP Document 248 Filed 03/19/09 Page 16 of 19
reviewed his other arguments, which add nothing of substance.

17.

- 11 (arguing that Judge Angell’s decision to stay discovery until after resolution of the

motions for injunction and dismissal constituted an improper reconsideration of an earlier

order staying discovery until after the motions to dismiss, and the appropriate responses,

were filed). 

I do not perceive that Judge Angell’s management of this lawsuit contravenes her

own orders. Nor has Jackson cited to any statute or case that suggests that Judge Angell

has abused her discretion or strayed from accepted practices for oversight of discovery

and motions practice. The CAC is over 150 pages long and involves over two dozen

claims. Since June, Jackson also has, inter alia, filed a motion to disqualify counsel and a

lengthy motion for preliminary injunction. In short, plaintiff’s counsel has undertaken to

pursue complex, and ever-ramifying, litigation, and he has made it more complex by

actively seeking extraordinary relief in addition to the remedies sought through the

complaint itself. I find it altogether expected, and not in the least “extraordinary” under §

636(c)(4), that Judge Angell would need time to make her determinations and that her

management strategy for the case might need to evolve and change. 

3. Alleged “tainted” decisions and intentional advantaging of defendants

In reviewing these most grievous of charges, I again find no circumstances

warranting plaintiff’s requested relief. Plaintiff’s counsel begins by asserting that Judge

Angell “simply ignored the supporting evidence and legal standards” when she denied

plaintiff’s motion to disqualify counsel for the Rohm & Haas defendants. Pl. Motion at

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18.

17. Plaintiff’s counsel then reargues, at some length, portions of his motion to disqualify. 

Id. at 17-22. Next, he outlines bias he perceives in Judge Angell’s denial of his request

for a “status quo” order in late September. Id. at 23. At the end of his motion to vacate,

Jackson weaves an arcane narrative linking the dates of Judge Angell’s various

scheduling orders to the dates of events in the Rohm & Haas merger with another

company that plaintiff sought to block, and then argues that Judge Angell’s decisions, and

her alleged delaying tactics, have intentionally aided the defendants and foiled Jackson’s

attempts to stop illegal activities perpetrated by many of the defendants. Id. at 24-29. 

This sort of slurring and unattractive innuendo appears in subsequent filings. See, e.g., Pl.

Obj. to Order of Nov. 13, 2008 at 19 (“It must be remembered that Judge Angell did not

start disparaging plaintiff’s case, reversing her own Orders, disregarding those of Judge

Pollak, and literally blocking plaintiff’s case until plaintiff connected the Consolidated

Amended Complaint with the proposed R&H/Dow merger, and the severe wrongdoing by

corporate officers, directors, and members of the Haas Family.”).

The more straightforward of these allegations appear to be little more than

dissatisfaction with Judge Angell’s decisions and her manner of address to plaintiff’s

counsel. They offer nothing “extraordinary” under § 636(c)(4) to urge the rarely-granted

relief sought by Jackson. See Manion, 251 F. Supp. at 173. The allegations of deliberate

delay, orders designed to frustrate legitimate legal process, and the like — in short, the

thinly-veiled charges of serious judicial misconduct — fail to convince me to vacate the

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reference because they lack any basis other than plaintiff’s aggressive and unfounded

verbal assault on a respected judge. 

III. Conclusion

The record establishes that Judge Angell has devoted significant time to addressing

this lawsuit — in particular, to resolving Jackson’s many requests for relief. The record

further establishes that Judge Angell has addressed the matters before her in a timely and

efficient manner. The only aspects of the proceedings before Judge Angell that are

“extraordinary” are Jackson’s baseless charges that a judicial officer — whose long career

on the bench has been marked by wisdom, efficiency, compassion, and, of course,

integrity — has engaged in favoritism and obfuscation. Accordingly, there is no basis for

vacating the reference pursuant to § 636(c)(4). Further, I decline to vacate the reference

mea sponte because the record demonstrates not that Judge Angell has failed to conduct

the extended and elaborate proceedings capably, but, rather, that the plaintiff, through his

counsel, has handled his role in the proceedings in a continuously counterproductive

manner. Judge Angell has fulfilled her responsibilities impeccably. 

For the reasons stated above, plaintiff’s motion will be denied. An appropriate

order follows.

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