Disclaimer 

The views in this paper are entirely those of the author expressed under Air University principles 

of academic freedom and do not reflect official views of the School of Advanced Airpower 

Studies, Air University, the U.S. Air Force, or the Department of Defense. In accordance with 

Air Force Regulation 110-8, it is not copyrighted, but is the property of the United States 

Government 
ABSTRACT

When Generals George C. Kenney and Ennis C. Whitehead became the two senior 

commanders of the US Fifth Air Force in July 1942 their work was cut out for them. The 

previous January, the Japanese secured the port of Rabaul in eastern New Britain. They 

immediately began the drive down the east coast of New Guinea with the objective of driving the 

Allies from Port Moresby. For the next year and a half, in some the harshest climate of World 

War II, the Fifth Air Force helped to reverse the tide and drive the Japanese from eastern New 

Guinea. This was accomplished despite the Europe-first policy and an inappropriate doctrine 

based on high altitude, daylight, precision bombing. 

Kenney and Whitehead's first task was to modify existing aircraft and develop a suitable 

doctrine to interdict Japanese shipping between New Britain and New Guinea. In order to 

suppress ship-borne antiaircraft artillery, forward-firing machine guns were mounted in the nose 

of Douglas A-20 light bombers and North American B-25 medium bombers. Low altitude skipbombing tactics were borrowed from the British and perfected by constant practice and 

refinement. 

By February 1943, Allied intelligence, greatly aided by ULTRA intercepts, predicted the 

movement of a Japanese convoy destined for New Guinea. Kenney and Whitehead were 

determined to destroy the convoy with their recently modified commerce destroyer fleet and 

focused all their energies on doing so. A dress rehearsal featuring the Fifth Air Force light and 

medium bombers as the main striking force was conducted in the Port Moresby Harbor. On 

March 3rd after being hit twice by mass, coordinated attacks, the convoy was virtually wiped out 

in what became known as the Battle of the Bismarck Sea. 

That same fleet of light and medium bombers also proved deadly against enemy airfields. 

Aircraft combat range was extended and modifications were made to the bomb bays to accept 

parachute fragmentation bombs. Airfield attack profiles were developed and once again, 

ULTRA provided a suitable target. In preparation for the anticipated Allied ground invasion of 

the Huon Peninsula, the Japanese moved the 4th Air Army to their four bases near Wewak. 

Beginning on August 17th, in a carefully- planned attack, Fifth Air Force bombers caught the 

enemy on the ground. By August 21st, nearly every aircraft at Wewak was destroyed. The 

subsequent Allied invasion was carried out virtually unopposed from the air. 

Fifth Air Force light and medium bomber operations during 1942 and 1943 are textbook 

examples of doctrinal flexibility and extraordinary innovation. The unprecedented success of 

both the Battle of the Bismarck Sea and the Wewak Raid illustrate how airpower became the 

dominant force in the Southwest Pacific. 
LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS 

A/A Antiaircraft artillery 

AAA Antiaircraft artillery 

AAF Army Air Forces 

ACTS Air Corps Tactical School 

AFB Air Force Base 

AIB Allied Intelligence Bureau 

APGC Air Proving Ground Command 

AU Air University 

AUL Air University Library 

CB Central Bureau 

HRA Historical Research Agency 

RAAF Royal Australian Air Force 

RAF Royal Air Force 

RAN Royal Australian Navy 

SWPA Southwest Pacific Area 

USA United States Army 

USAAF United States Army Air Forces 

USAF United States Air Force 

USN United States Navy 

USSBS United States Strategic Bombing Survey 
BIOGRAPHY 

Lieutenant Colonel Timothy D. Gann (BS, University of Southern California; MS, Embry-Riddle 

Aeronautical University) is a KC-IO pilot. A recent graduate of the inaugural class of the School 

of Advanced Airpower Studies, he was just assigned to the Doctrine Division, Headquarters 

USAF/XC, The Pentagon. Also a graduate of Air Command and Staff College, his previous 

assignment was Chief, Military History and Strategy Branch, Air Command and Staff College, 

Maxwell AFB, Alabama. Previous assignments included KC-10s at Seymour Johnson AFB, 

North Carolina, March AFB, California, and Barksdale AFB, Louisiana; and KC-135s at 

Seymour Johnson AFB. 
Introduction

When the New Britain port of Rabaul fell to the Japanese on January 23, 1942, it 

represented a ìbase which could serve as the key staging and supply center for their ambitious 

plan of encircling and dominating the Coral Sea.îl

 Their next task was to capture and control the 

two key land masses that crowned the Coral Sea--the Solomon Islands and New Guinea. 

After retreating from the Philippine Islands to Port Moresby in southeastern New Guinea, 

the Allied Air Forces, and later, the US Fifth Air Force, US air component of the Southwest 

Pacific Area (SWPA), was thrust into the role of leading the fight against the Japanese. The 

challenge was immense. The Europe-first policy meant that few replacement aircraft, let alone 

additional combat groups, would be available for the foreseeable future. Those aircraft that 

survived early combat were badly in need of repair and in their present configuration, ill-suited 

for warfare in the SWPA. Perhaps as important, the USAAF's preferred doctrine of high 

altitude, daylight, precision bombing aimed at the industrial and economic structure of the enemy 

was of little use when the enemy's homeland was over 3500 miles away. 

Warfare in the SWPA in 1942 and 1943 was much different than anywhere else in World 

War II. The combination of the harsh tropical climate and disease-infested jungles of New 

Guinea made overland transportation nearly impossible. Airfields and ground bases became

precious fortresses. Their perimeters were heavily defended with numerous antiaircraft artillery 

(AAA) guns, but the surrounding territory was normally unoccupied. Foraging was sparse, 

making resupply from rear areas essential. The lack of air transportation capability and the great 

distances between Rabaul and bases along the eastern coast of New Guinea put a premium on sea 

lines of communications. The Japanese realized the importance of maintaining the flow of

supplies and armed its vessels with AAA and used its superior Zero fighter to provide escort. 

1 
Given these challenges and the realization that he would have to carry out his mission 

with a minimum of forces, General Douglas MacArthur, Commander in Chief, SWPA, 

structured his concept of operations accordingly. Patterned after the unexpectedly rapid 

Japanese successes in the first four months of the war, MacArthur's campaigns were 

characterized by 

the movement forward of air power by successive bounds in order to gain local air 

superiority, provide adequate cover for the advance of surface elements, and 

isolate each successive enemy position prior to the final assault by all arms.

2

 

By the end of 1943, the Japanese were retreating from New Guinea's Huon Peninsula and 

were abandoning Rabaul. The ability of the Fifth Air Force to successfully accomplish its 

campaign by isolating the battlefield and destroying the Japanese air, ground, and sea forces was 

the key. Major General Charles A. Willoughby, SWPA G-2 affirmed this when he said, 

[I]t was [the Fifth Air Force], which had systematically cut down reinforcements 

and supplies from Rabaul to Buna, that had finally allowed [Major General 

Robert C.] Eichelberger to crash through on the ground...There would be other 

tough engagements on the ground but from 1943 on MacArthur elaborated the 

system of bypassing the Japanese strong points and neutralizing them by 

pounding them by air after their communications from Japan had been slowed or 

cut.3

This decisive use of airpower was not achieved by thousand-plane heavy bomber raids. 

Instead, light and medium bombers flown in squadron-sized formations at minimum altitude

became the main striking force. How was the Fifth Air Force able to succeed so quickly using 

aircraft and tactics deemed of secondary value elsewhere? The answer can be found by 

examining two air campaigns. 

From March 3rd-5th, 1943, during the Battle of the Bismarck Sea, twelve ships 

containing the bulk of the Japanese 51st Division and its equipment were annihilated. Six 

months later, from August 17th-21st, over 200 aircraft, the bulk of the Japanese Fourth Air Army

2 
at Wewak, were destroyed. This paper will elaborate on the contributions made by the Fifth Air 

Force light and medium bombers in those two monumental battles and what factors were most 

responsible for their success. But in order to put events in perspective, a brief prelude will 

review the air situation in the first nine months of the war. This will be followed by a look at the 

careers of the two airmen who led the way. The bulk of the paper will analyze the factors that 

directly contributed to the creation of the sea and airfield interdiction capability. The conclusion 

will note the significance of the achievements and suggest some relevance for the future. 

3 
PART I

Early Operations in the SWPA and Organization of the Air Units

Shortly after securing Rabaul, the Japanese Seventeenth Army established its 

headquarters and began its drive down New Guinea's Papuan Peninsula. On February 9, 1942, 

Gasmata, New Britain, and Lae and Salamaua were captured and became key forward bases. By 

June, the Headquarters of the Japanese Southeastern Fleet was also established at Rabaul which 

included the Eighth Fleet and the Eleventh Air Fleet. Naval aircraft initially assigned to its 

defense and to support ground operations in New Guinea included 60 Zero fighters, 60-80 Nell 

and Betty bombers and over twenty floatplanes and flying boats.4

 In July, the Japanese Army

received an unplanned reinforcement. Those forces originally destined for Midway were 

rerouted to Rabaul with orders to increase the Seventeenth Army's pressure towards Port 

Moresby.5

 No time was wasted: 

On 22 July Major General Tomitaro Horii landed some 4,400 troops at Gona, on 

the northeast coast of Papua. This force quickly occupied Buna; and by 28 July 

elements had penetrated inland to Kokoda, high in the Owen Stanley Mountains, 

where Australian resistance was met. Additional men and supplies poured in, and 

a base of operations was established in the Buna-Gona area. By 22 August over 

11,000 troops had landed, and the drive on Port Moresby began.6

 

Allied aircraft attempted to counter the enemy landings by bombing the Japanese 

convoys from 25,000 feet. Despite meeting no air opposition, ten Boeing B-17 Flying 

Fortressess, five North American B-25 Mitchells, and six Martin B-26 Marauders could only hit 

one transport. One of the bombers and several fighters attempted low altitude strafing and 

bombing attacks, meeting with slightly more success but by the afternoon the troops were safely 

ashore. 

By the time the Fifth Air Force was formally constituted on September 3, 1942 many of 

its men and aircraft had been fighting for as long as nine months.7

 After being badly mauled 

4 
during the initial Japanese attack on the Philippine Islands on December 8, 1941, American air 

units steadily retreated southward to northern Australia. By March, lead elements of the 3rd 

Bombardment Group (Light) began to arrive from the US and absorbed those light and medium

bomber assets that had not perished during the bloody retreat.8

 By April, the 3rd Bomb Group 

was flying sorties against New Guinea targets from the most northerly Allied base at Port 

Moresby. 

The Allied effort to save southeastern New Guinea was known as the Papuan Campaign. 

During the defensive phase, from July 21 to August 25, 1942, Fifth Air Force light and medium

bombers concentrated on two types of missions: Modified Douglas A-20 Havocs strafed enemy 

troop and supply concentrations and B- 25s and B-26s attacked Japanese convoys attempting to 

resupply forces in New Guinea.9

 In an effort to cut-off the Japanese from their supplies, Fifth 

Air Force bombers attacked enemy shipping by staging through Port Moresby, a distance of 700 

miles from their main operating bases in Townsville, Australia.l0 The results were pitiful. 

During the month of August, 19 hits were achieved by dropping 434 bombs resulting in a 4.4% 

probability of hit. Only one transport and one cargo ship was sunk. September was worse. Out 

of 425 bombs dropped, only nine ships were hit and only one cargo ship was sunk resulting in a 

dismal 2.1% probability of hit.ll

 

Fighting on the ground was ferocious. Allied air support, though valuable at times, was 

often ìspottyî and anything but decisive. But behind the scenes, the Fifth Air Force was steadily 

responding to the challenge. Units were being reorganized, outmoded tactics and aircraft 

discarded, and new and better ones developed. 

5 
As commander of the Fifth Air Force, General George C. Kenney and his headquarters 

were located in Brisbane, Australia. Since the bulk of his time was spent supervising his two 

organizations and providing MacArthur with air expertise, an intermediate organization to 

manage combat operations was necessary. 

Accordingly, General [Ennis C.] Whitehead was made deputy air force 

commander and placed directly in charge at Port Moresby of Fifth Air Force, 

Advanced Echelon. ADVON, to use the abbreviated designation, had been 

conceived as a separate, small and highly mobile advanced headquarters, free of 

most administrative details and charged primarily with the immediate direction of

combat operations.12 

By September 30, 1942, there were one light and two medium bomb groups in the V 

Bomber Command, bomber component of the Fifth Air Force. The 22nd Bombardment Group 

(Medium) had 38 B-26Bs; the 38th Bombardment Group (Medium) had 63 B-25s; and the 3rd 

Bomb Group had 13 B-25s, 33 A-20As and 8 Douglas A-24 Dauntlesses which had already been 

pulled from combat.13 Because of the priority given to operations in North Africa, no new 

groups would arrive until mid-March 1943.14 

Beginning in November, the Allied ground forces shifted to the offensive climaxing in 

the defeat of the Japanese at Buna. Meanwhile, Fifth Air Force light and medium bombers 

continued to learn the tough lessons of war. Seeking to implement new counter air techniques, 

airfield attacks using parachute fragmentation (parafrag) bombs were becoming ìhighly 

successful.î15 Strikes against enemy convoys also showed improvement, though the Japanese 

continued to supply their troops. The Fifth Air Force had come a long way in its first five 

months. Kenney summed it up best when he said, ìwe learned a lot and the next one will be 

better.î16 

6 
The Earlier Careers of the Two Airmen at the Top

Kenney arrived in Brisbane on July 28, 1942 and met with MacArthur the next day.17 

Having established an excellent working relationship with the Commander in Chief, Kenney 

immediately set out to energize the badly depressed air forces. During the preceding 25 years, 

his blend of operational, educational, and command experiences prepared him well for the 

challenges ahead. 

Prior to World War I, Kenney attended the Massachusetts Institute of Technology and 

worked as an engineer, eventually heading a small engineering corporation.18 In 1917, he 

enlisted in the US Army. After completing flight training he was sent to Issoudun, France where 

he flew 75 missions in the Great War. In these combat sorties Kenney whet his appetite for what 

was later coined ìattack aviation.î 

In France Kenney met Brig. Gen. William ìBillyî Mitchell. According to 

Kenney, Mitchell directed him to fly ìspecial missions.î These were flights to 

find American troops, sometimes in large numbers, that had become lost...Kenney 

and his cohorts would fly at almost treetop level, looking for American uniforms. 

From that experience, according to Kenney, the idea of ìattack aviationî came to 

him. It was safer to fly at low altitude where aircraft were less exposed to ground 

fire.19 

After the war, unlike many officers who continued to hone their flying skills, Kenney 

ìconcentrated on aeronautical development and its application to warfare.î20 In 1921, he 

graduated from the Air Service Engineering School and finished first in his class. Next, he was 

assigned to the Curtiss factory where he tested aircraft and became the Air Service 

representative.21 Returning to McCook Field, Ohio in 1923, Kenney reported to the Engineering 

Division where once again he demonstrated a knack for innovation.22 

Energetic and restless as ever, he conceived the idea of mounting [machine guns] 

on a plane's wings instead of on the engine cowling where they had to be 

synchronized to fire, at a much slower rate, through the propeller arc. He 

demonstrated its feasibility by attaching two .30-caliber [machine guns] to the 

7 
wings of a considerably modified DH-4. It was an idea ahead of it time, a 

significant though rejected breakthrough in the development of aircraft 

armament.

23 

In 1926, Kenney graduated from the Air Corps Tactical School (ACTS) at Langley Field, 

Virginia, and returned a year later as an instructor in the attack section.24 He put his time to good 

use at the ACTS. Seeking a way to enhance the capability of the low-level aircraft, he helped 

develop the parafrag bomb.25 Kenney was truly an attack aviation enthusiast and presided over 

its zenith at the ACTS. In an interview many years later he reminisced of his days at Langley: 

Well the thing that I was interested in more than anything else was attack. I 

taught attack aviation there (ACTS) and wrote the textbook on it and developed 

the tactics by using the class as tools to build the tactics at low altitude work.26 

When Kenney departed the ACTS, attack aviation slowly declined in importance; due

partly to his absence and partly to the school's growing emphasis on bombardment.27 In 1938, he 

became the Chief, Production Engineering Section at the Air Corps Materiel Division where he 

gained the reputation of a ìtrouble shooter.î28 During this and previous tours at McCook Field, 

Kenney developed his appreciation for the other side of combat airpower--supply, aircraft 

maintenance, and modification. He left there an ìardent advocate of air power and of expanded 

funding for military research and development.î29

As the German war machine rolled through France, Kenney was sent to Paris as the 

Assistant Attache for Air. Observing the Luftwaffe's rapid .successes, he made numerous 

recommendations for improvements in US aircraft.30 Kenney left Europe convinced ìthe U.S. 

Army Air Corps was markedly inferior to the major European air forces in quantity and quality 

of planes and personnel.î31 

Whitehead arrived in Brisbane on July 11, 1942, met with MacArthur and was warmly 

received.32 A little over two weeks later, Whitehead was named Deputy Commander, Fifth Air 

8 
Force. Like Kenney, Whitehead came to the SWPA with talents and experiences that served him

and his future combat crews well. 

Whitehead also enlisted in the US Army during World War I. After flight training he too 

was sent to Issoudun, France where he served as an instructor and test pilot.33 When the war 

ended, he returned to college and graduated from Kansas University with a Bachelor of Arts 

degree in Journalism.

34 Yearning to return to flying, he reentered the service in 1920 and flew 

fighters in the 94th Pursuit Squadron.35 

In 1921, his unit deployed to Langley Field to participate in bombing tests of the 

Ostfriesland under the supervision of Billy Mitchell.36 Whitehead's formation of fighters was the 

first to attack the German battleship giving him the opportunity to witness first-hand the 

vulnerability of a surface vessel to a well-planned aerial attack. In 1926, Whitehead graduated 

from the Air Service Engineering School and, like his future boss, graduated first in his class.37 

After attending the ACTS in 1930, he completed several tours in fighters and reported to the War 

Department General Staff in the Military Intelligence 

Division (G-2). Two years later he became G-2's first chief of the Aviation Section.38 This tour 

in intelligence was particularly beneficial to him and the Fifth Air Force. 

The assignment in Washington was perhaps one of the most important ones that 

Ennis Whitehead ever had, not for the contacts he made, although the contacts 

were important, but for the knowledge which he obtained on the use of air power 

by the Germans and British during the Blitzkrieg days...Through his job with G-2, 

Whitehead learned quickly the flexibility and mobility of air power.39 

While at G-2, Whitehead was able to expand his concept of airpower. One of his 

conclusions was ìthat [airpower] could be used for other things beside [strategic] bombing, 

among them: mine laying, carrying of troops, and interdiction of the battlefield.î40 

MacArthur found two airmen who were eminently qualified to direct the SWPA's air 

9 
campaign. Both were veterans of World War I and excelled in engineering. Though they were 

vocal advocates of airpower and had enjoyed personal contact with Billy Mitchell, neither had 

become strategic bombing zealots. While Kenney was in Europe watching the start of World 

War II, Whitehead was in Washington building an air intelligence framework. Kenney was the 

attack man, Whitehead knew fighters. Their experience and pragmatic attitudes became essential 

ingredients in the Fifth Air Force's recipe for success. Perhaps most important, in a theater

where the size of egos was legendary, the two men worked well as a team. 

Kenney had great confidence in WhiteheadÖHe would forward general 

operational directives from Brisbane, allowing his subordinate great flexibility in 

carrying out the assigned mission. The two men communicated with each other 

practically on a daily basis to work out operational details. They would maintain 

a strong, close personal and professional relationship throughout the war.41 

Their work was cut out for them. In order to get the air war on track they had to find 

some aircraft that could take the fight to the Japanese. 

Enhancing the Air Fleet

In August 1942, the 3rd Bomb Group's 89th Bombardment Squadron received their 

shipment of A-20As from Savannah, Georgia. These A-20s were normally configured with four 

fixed, forward-firing .30-caliber machine guns mounted against the fuselage and three flexible 

guns in the rear gunner section.42 Unfortunately, the squadron's guns did not make the shipment. 

To add to their frustration, with a combat range of only 525 miles, the A-20s lacked the reach to 

strike most Japanese targets. In its present state, the 89th wasn't going to see any fighting in the 

near future. Knowing that replacements were not on the horizon, the mechanics of the 3rd Bomb

Group under the supervision of Major Paul I. (Pappy) Gunn, went to work modifying their A20s. 

10 
To increase the range, two 450-gallon fuel tanks were installed in the forward bomb 

bay.43 The resultant loss of bomb load was offset by inserting four .50-caliber fixed, forwardfiring machine guns in the nose in place of the bombardier station.44 This package installation 

was a design masterpiece and was eventually adopted throughout the Pacific, European, and 

China-Burma-India Theaters. When combined with the remaining four fixed, .30-caliber 

fuselage guns, the A-20A became a potent strafing weapon. 

Prior to departing for Australia, Kenney discovered 3000 parafrag bombs stored in war 

reserve and requested their transfer to the SWPA. These were the same bombs he began 

developing in 1928. A parachute was attached to a 23-pound bomb and given a supersensitive 

instantaneous fuze. The parachute stopped the forward momentum of the bomb and gave the 

low-flying attack aircraft a chance to depart the fragmentation pattern.45 Upon detonation, the 

bomb burst into between 800 and 1200 pieces. It was designed to strike airplanes, small open 

boats, searchlights, trucks, artillery tractors, mechanized forces, personnel and animals--perfect 

for the jungle targets of New Guinea.46 

When the parafrags arrived in late August, Pappy Gunn once again supervised the 

modification effort. A honeycomb rack was fastened to the A-20's rear bomb bay which allowed 

40 or more bombs to be carried.47 After considerable flight testing the new platform was ready 

for combat trials. 

An experiment using parachute bombs was tried in a carefully coordinated attack 

on Buna. On 12 September 1942, seven B-17's swept in through rain squalls and 

heavy antiaircraft fire to drop 300-pound demolition bombs from 3,000 feet on 

the airdrome. These were followed by additional demolition bombs dropped by 

five B-26's from 5,000 feet. Finally, and under a cover provided by [Bell] P400's, A-20s roared over the target area at 70 feet pouring .30- and .50-caliber 

bullets into parked enemy planes and loosing over 300 x 23- pound parachute 

bombs. In spite of poor visibility, all antiaircraft fire was silenced, and the A-20 

group commander claimed 17 Zeros destroyed on the ground...This was the first 

reported use of parachute bombs in the Southwest Pacific.48 

11 
Another unit in the 3rd Bomb Group, the 90th Bombardment Squadron, received B-25Cs 

originally destined for Dutch airmen in the Netherlands East Indies. The B-25s were armed with 

two .50-caliber guns in the upper turret, two more in a retractable belly turret and a single 

flexible .30-caliber gun in the nose.49 After the show put on by the A-20s, Kenney directed 

Pappy Gunn to go to work on the B-25s. His original request was formidable: 

I sent word to...pull the bombardier and everything else out of the nose of a B-25 

medium bomber and fill it full of fifty-caliber guns, with 500 rounds of 

ammunition per gun. I told him I wanted him then to strap some more on the 

sides of the fuselage, and three underneath.50 

After experimentation, the three guns underneath the nose were deemed impractical. 

However, four .50-caliber machine guns in vertical pairs were attached to the side of the fuselage 

and a package installation similar to the A-20 was inserted in the nose. Since the B-25s would 

be flown at low altitude, the tail and belly turrets were removed.51 When the upper turret was 

turned forward, the newly designated B-25C-ls could concentrate ten .50-caliber guns on the 

target. 

These modifications were the first step in transforming the Fifth Air Force light and 

medium bombers into potent killers. Bypassing the normal USAAF bureaucracy and often 

conducting tests in combat, the aircraft were ready in weeks instead of months or years. The 

next step was to train the crews and develop the tactics. 

The Evolution of Skip-Bombing

Reflecting their interwar doctrine, early USAAF units used conventional bombing tactics 

against enemy shipping. Plans called for, ìflights of sufficient size to assure a pattern of 

bombing large enough to cover any possible move of the target in the interval between release 

and impact of the bomb.î52 Typical high altitude attacks were flown at 20,000 feet to avoid the 

12 
effective range of enemy AAA. With a constant shortage of bombers and escort fighters, the 

results were often poor. A tactical study prepared by the USAAF Headquarters determined ìit 

was apparent that the answer still had not been found to the problem of successfully bombing 

floating targets, particularly fleeting or maneuvering targets, with a small force of bombers and 

fighters.î53 

The Fifth Air Force eventually found the answer in skip-bombing. Though they can 

deservedly take credit for skip-bombing's first decisive use, the concept did not originate in the 

SWPA. Earlier in the war, the RAF used this technique to attack German shipping. On

September 4, 1939, 15 Bristol Blenheim bombers assaulted enemy vessels near the entrance to 

Wilhelmshaven. ìThe Blenheims attacked the pocket-battleship Admiral Scheer in the Schillig 

Roads with great gallantry at low level, hitting the ship four times.î54 

In April 1941, General H.H. Arnold visited Great Britain to observe and discuss the war. 

During a dinner hosted by Prime Minister Winston Churchill, several senior British officers 

discussed the merits of skip-bombing. Arnold recalled in his memoirs, ìI learned about skipbombing that nightÖThe British claimed to have had wonderful success with that method and to 

have made far more hits than with high altitude bombing.î55 When Arnold returned to 

Washington, he directed the Air Proving Ground Command (APGC) at Eglin Field, Florida to 

carry out further tests.56 

The test report was formally completed on December 7, 1942. Its objective was to 

ìdetermine the practicability of effectively attacking water-borne surface vessels from minimum 

altitudes with demolition bombs,î57 and to ìdevelop tactics and techniques for accomplishing 

such attacks.î

58 The report fully endorsed the concept and recommended that ìtraining of pilots 

13 
in these techniques be initiated at the earliest possible moment.î59 Two methods of attack were 

deemed highly effective: 

(1) Quartering front attack on armored surface vessels (more than one (1) inch of 

side armor plate) at maximum level flight speed and one hundred-fifty (150) feet 

to three-hundred (300) feet altitude, dropping one-thousand (1,000) pound or twothousand (2,000) pound demolition bombs... 

(2) Broadside attack on unarmored or lightly armored surface vessels (less than 

one (1) inch of side armor plate) at maximum level flight speed and at the 

minimum altitude necessary to clear the target, dropping demolition bombs of any 

appropriate size...60 

In July 1942, during the long flight from the US to Australia, Kenney, who was already 

aware of the Fifth Air Force's poor bombing record, pondered a means to improve their accuracy. 

With a long-held belief in the value of low altitude attacks, he and his aide, Major William Benn, 

discussed the practicality of skip-bombing. During a stop in Nandi in the Fiji Islands, they 

decided to conduct an impromptu test: 

It looked as though there might be something in dropping a bomb, with a fivesecond-delay fuze, from level flight at an altitude of about fifty feet and a few 

hundred feet away from a vessel, with the idea of having the bomb skip along the 

water until it bumped into the side of the ship...The more we talked about the 

scheme, the more enthusiastic we got, so finally we borrowed a B-26 from the 

boys at Nandi, loaded on some dummy bombs, and tried the idea out against some

coral knobs just offshore.61 

Thus, when Kenney and Benn arrived in Australia skip-bombing became a priority. 

Shortly after getting acclimated to his new position, Kenney ìfiredî his aide and appointed Benn 

commander of the 63rd Bombardment Squadron, a B-17 unit in the 43rd Bombardment Group 

(Heavy). In October 1942, Benn initiated skip-bombing tests using his squadron's B-17s. He 

quickly achieved success: 

It was already accepted that their first problem would be to find the correct 

altitude and air speed for the release of the bomb in order that it hit into the side of

the target. The target chosen was a small sand bar surrounded by shallow water. 

This was selected for the initial runs instead of the wrecked ship at Port Moresby 

14 
in order that they could observe the skip of the bomb, and check the distance and 

height...After this preparation, it was decided to make test runs on the wrecked 

ship...The second bomb was a direct hit.62 

However, Benn's enthusiasm for skip-bombing was tempered by his understanding of the 

heavy bomber's limitations. In the after-action notes of the trials, the commander of the 43rd 

Bomb Group cautioned: 

Skip bombing with heavy bombardment aircraft must be considered an attack of 

opportunity. An attempt to skip-bomb a war vessel in the daylight, unsupported, 

would be hazardous, because of lack of speed, maneuverability, and small amount 

of forward fire. Successful daylight attacks have been made on unescorted 

merchant vessels by heavy bombers. Repeated skip bombing attacks in the same

area would result in some form of protection to defeat it...63 

Fortunately, by now the Fifth Air Force had two types of aircraft that exceeded the B-17 

in speed, maneuverability, and forward firepower--the modified A-20As and the B-25C-1s. 

During December, 90th Bomb Squadron crews skip-bombed the Moresby Wreck with their B25C-ls. 

Once the B-25 crews became comfortable with the basic concept they made one key 

refinement. To eliminate the need to calculate the ricochet distance, they timed their release to 

hit the side of the ships, instead of bouncing short. This method was coined ìmasthead heightî 

bombing. ìThe runs on the wreck allowed [the B-25 crews] to pick out a reference point on the 

nose of the airplane to use as a bomb sight, and gave them experience in low level turns and 

confidence in their ability to hit a ship.î64 After sufficient practice, the V Bomber Command 

was so confident of the new masthead technique that they proclaimed, ìA well trained pilot 

should hit a ship nearly every time using the [masthead technique].î65 

Because masthead height bombing required the aircraft to fly immediately over the 

target, determining the correct fuzing delay was critical. Fortunately, as part of the skipbombing tests, the APGC also looked at special fuzes. The report stated: 

15 
A tail fuze...burning in air to produce a minimum of delay of four (4) seconds, 

will provide a probable minimum safety margin of approximately seven-hundred 

(700) feet from the detonation of ricochetting one-hundred (100) pound and fivehundred (500) pound aerial bombs.66 

The APGC specifically approved the use of the M106 type fuze.67 After some further 

experimentation, the Fifth Air Force used the M106 paired with an Australian detonator set for a 

five-second delay.68 Tests using this configuration went reasonably well but not without some

difficulties: 

One plane was badly damaged and made a forced landing on a reef as a result of 

an instantaneous detonation; another bomb hit the wreck and the bomb exploded 

almost instantaneously inside the wreck and splattered the belly of the B-25C-1 

with rust and small fragments but did no other damage.69 

The final evolution in the newly christened ìcommerce destroyerî fleet was to develop a 

tactic to ensure the B-25s could get close enough to the target vessel to release the bomb without 

getting sprayed by AAA. On initial attempts against Japanese shipping, many aircraft had 

returned ìbadly shot up from enemy light- and medium-caliber ship-borne antiaircraft fire.î70 

Ten forward-firing .50-caliber guns would silence most enemy AAA but twenty even sounded 

better. Once again, a suitable tactic was created: 

B-25 crews were trained to attack in pairs simultaneously. One plane strafed the 

vessel from stern to stem and from stem to stern, while the other strafed the vessel 

as it came in on its beam and bombed it. As the result of prolonged practice, pairs 

of B-25's learned to attack a vessel at a gliding speed of 250 to 275 m.p.h., and 

knew the fire power of one B-25 would be raking the side of the vessel during the 

split second that the other strafed and bombed the beam.

71 

The next step for the Fifth Air Force was to find a Japanese convoy and destroy it in a 

decisive engagement before the enemy developed countermeasures. 

16 
Locating the Convoy

At the conclusion of the Papuan Campaign, Fifth Air Force planners probed their 

intelligence sources to find one of the periodic Japanese resupply convoys between Rabaul and 

New Guinea By early 1943, the Allied intelligence capability under the centralized direction of 

Headquarters, SWPA was substantial. Organized shortly after MacArthur's arrival in May, 1942, 

it included: 

(1) Allied Translator and Interpreter Section (ATIS) which trained, organized, and 

sent into the field linguist detachments to interrogate prisoners of war and 

translate captured documents; 

(2) Allied Intelligence Bureau (AIB) which conducted clandestine operations, 

sabotage, and espionage behind the enemy lines and in enemy-held territories;Ö 

(3) Allied Geographical Section (AGS) which gathered and published 

geographical information on areas within the SWPA;... 

(4) Central Bureau (CB) which was an inter-Allied cryptanalytical service, coordinated with British and United States establishments.72 

These organizations and their parent unit, SWPA G-2 were busy during the first two 

months of 1943 trying to determine when the Japanese would reinforce their beleaguered units at 

Lae and Salamaua. In early February, Fifth Air Force reconnaissance coverage intensified and 

evidence of an upcoming operation began to mount: 

At Lae in the first five days of February allied reconnaissance revealed increased 

ground and renewed air activity, the repair of the runway, and construction of the 

blast bays. The air activity suggested the importation of supplies while the repair 

work was recognized as a characteristic enemy effort to recondition the airdrome

for fighter airplanes assigned to protect an expected convoy bringing further 

reinforcements.73 

Reconnaissance flights continued and on February 7th a Japanese floatplane was sighted 

near Gasmata. The enemy typically forward-deployed floatplanes for use as antisubmarine 

patrol for their shipping.74 During the next week, increased Japanese air and submarine activity 

in the vicinity of Lae furthered Allied suspicions.75 

17 
Reconnaissance aircraft also monitored Japanese shipping levels in Rabaul. During 

December 1942 and the first half of January 1943 approximately 65 merchant ships totalling 

200,000 tons were observed. In the last week of January, the number dipped to less than 45 

totalling approximately 170,000 tons. However, beginning on February 12th, and lasting 

throughout the month, the number soared to almost 80 ships in excess of 250,000 tons.76 

By the third week in February, G-2 saw enough and in their daily summary made the 

following prediction: ìMerchant shipping at Rabaul has reached a new high...In view of the 

comparative inactivity in the Solomons, this increase over the normal assumes serious aspects, in 

relation to possible employment against New Guinea.î77 

In addition to scouting reports, G-2 also tapped its highly valuable signals intelligence

sources. Receiving raw decrypts and intercepts from SWPA CB, US Navy, and Allied agencies

in Australia, MacArthur's intelligence personnel integrated this data with aerial reconnaissance 

and provided remarkably accurate predictions.78 On February 19th, the US Navy cryptanalysis 

unit based in Melbourne, Australia presented MacArthur with ULTRA traffic that confidently 

stated ìthe Japanese planned to land at Lae in early March.î79 This unbelievable and timely 

breakthrough was achieved by the kind of interservice cooperation rarely noted in historical 

accounts of the Pacific War: 

Since February 8, navy cryptanalysts in Washington had labored to decipher an 

intercepted Japanese naval message. Eight days later, despite difficulties in 

translation, the broken message revealed that the convoy scheduled to RZM--the 

Japanese designation for Lae--had to be changed to add more destroyer transports. 

Seventeen hours later, a better translation clarified Japanese plans to dispatch 

three separate convoys, one each to land at Madang, Wewak, and Lae. The 

CINCPAC (Commander in Chief, Pacific) Intelligence Bulletin for February 19 

reported the forthcoming simultaneous reinforcement and noted that the 20th and 

41st divisions would be taken to Madang and Wewak in transports while 

transports and destroyers would carry troops to Lae.80 

18 
Allied air planners now knew where the convoys were coming from, their approximate 

size, and departure and arrival dates. But one key piece of information was still missing. Would 

the convoys depart from Rabaul as a unit and spilt up enroute or would they take separate routes? 

To cover all possibilities, Whitehead's men considered three possibilities: The entire convoy 

could land at Madang/Wewak; it could split up with half going to Madang/Wewak and half to 

Lae; or the entire convoy could land at Lae. To cover each contingency, planners devised the 

following strategy: If the entire convoy landed at Madang, the strike would consist of only 

heavy bombers since light and medium bombers lacked sufficient range. If the convoy split, 

heavy bombers would attack the ships heading for Madang and light and medium bombers 

would strike the remainder after passing through the Vitiaz/Dampier Straits. Finally if the entire 

convoy was headed to Lae, a coordinated attack using light, medium, and heavy bombers would 

strike it once within the light bomber's range.81 

Allied reconnaissance flights were stepped up to determine which route the convoy 

would take (i.e., north or south of New Britain) and the destination.82 Once again, these flights 

gave Allied planners valuable clues: 

In the last few days before February 27 there was obtained more evidence 

throughout the coastal area from Lae to Wewak of systematic developments and 

the imminence of substantial reinforcements by convoy. In addition, landing 

barges were seen to approach Salamaua and more submarine traffic was noted at 

Lae.83 

Allied weather forecasters predicted heavy cloud cover in the area north of New Britain 

and clear weather in the south for the first several days of March. From this information Kenney 

and Whitehead deduced that the Japanese would choose the northern route to stay underneath the 

cloud deck.84 At about the same time, Navy cryptanalysis provided even further clarification: 

19 
Washington needed three days to decrypt a February 21 Eleventh Air Fleet message that 

pinpointed a six-ship convoy destined to land the 51st Division about March 5.î85 

The final piece of the puzzle was in place. Combining hard evidence with sound 

judgment and intuition, the Fifth Air Force finally found a suitable target for their commerce 

destroyer fleet. In combat, such an opportunity comes rarely. Kenney and Whitehead were 

determined to make the most of it. 

The Development of the Attack Plan and Dress Rehearsal

With the advantage of surprise, Kenney and Whitehead decided to hit the Japanese 

convoy with a mass, coordinated attack. The A-20s, even with their increased range, had the 

shortest ìlegs.î Thus, a point within their combat radius, just off Finschaven inside the 

Vitiaz/Dampier Straits was selected as the target area. Heavy bombers would track and harass 

the convoy until it cleared the straits and then the entire force would strangle it.86 

The Papuan Campaign and the rigors of flying in the SWPA had taken its toll on the 

Allied Air Force aircraft. On March 1st, the Fifth Air Force was down to only one light and one 

understrength medium bomb group available for action. The 3rd Bomb Group had 17 B-25s and 

15 A-20s and the 38th Bomb Group had 11 B-25s immediately ready. The 22nd Bomb Group 

and its B-26s were so badly shot up they had been sent back to Australia for rest and 

recuperation. The Royal Australian Air Force (RAAF) 9th Group had an additional six A-20s 

(Bostons) and 13 Bristol Beaufighters available.87 With so few aircraft, Whitehead stood down 

the light and medium bombers to ìconserve their strength.î88 The units could afford to rest 

because they had already demonstrated proficiency in the new skip-bombing concept during 

previous crew familiarization flights. ìThe pilots trained for six weeks before the Bismarck Sea 

20 
Convoy engagement and each pilot dropped thirty to forty bombs (one bomb to a run) on the 

Moresby Wreck.î89 

Attacks against an unarmed, stationary hulk only proved the crews could physically hit 

the target. In order to inflict enough damage to the convoy to prevent it from landing men and 

supplies ashore, the Fifth Air Force needed a plan that would deliver an unprecedented degree of 

concentrated, coordinated firepower. Such an attack plan required precision both in planning 

and execution because every available aircraft would play an essential role. 

Mass, coordinated attacks were not invented in the SWPA. A member of Kenney's staff, 

RAAF Group Captain Bill Garing, had participated in coordinated attacks while piloting Short 

Sunderland flying boats in the European Theater.90 Furthermore, when skip-bombing was being 

tested at Eglin, 

[t]he men who supervised the tests and who evaluated the results had the vision to 

foresee how this [skip-bombing] could be part of a broader technique, one which 

would employ low-level attacks as the power punch of mass coordinated 

attacks...91 

Regardless of the payoff, the plan was risky. As previously mentioned, the range of the 

light bombers would determine the location of the ìkill box.î Unfortunately, that point was 

uncomfortably close to the convoy's final destination and afforded little room for error. 

Furthermore, a mass, coordinated attack was by-definition complex. Once the convoy was 

pinpointed, Fifth Air Force planners had to predict its exact time of arrival at the attack location. 

Next, the light and medium bombers would have to launch and affect a rendezvous with the 

participating heavy bombers and friendly fighters. Once assembled, the entire group would 

proceed to the convoy's projected location, After sighting the convoy, they had to readjust the 

formation to properly align the attack elements and commence the attack. All this would have to 

21 
be accomplished while avoiding hostile fighters and AAA as well as the danger of a midair 

collision. During the attack, to avoid fratricide or duplication of effort, sequencing was 

particularly critical. In order to minimize the chance for errors, Whitehead decided to conduct 

two rehearsals. The first was scheduled for February 28th, and the second, March 3rd.92 

On the first rehearsal, an attacking force of 3 B-17's (representing 3 flights), 4 

Beaufighters, 4 B-25's, 4 B-25C- l's and 3 A-20's escorted by 8 [Lockheed] P-38's 

bombed the Moresby Wreck in a coordinated attack which went off smoothly. 

Eight [Bell] P-39's represented the opposition. Nearly all squadron leaders and 

many flight leaders participated and discussed tactics among themselves and with 

their squadrons before and after the -attack.93 

Thus far only the A-20s and B-25C-1s had received the nosegun modifications that 

would suppress the AAA during the masthead height attacks. During the rehearsal, the 

Beaufighter and unmodified B-25 crews combined their individual capabilities to give the B-25s 

protection during the final low altitude runs. The Beaufighters, firing their four 20mm cannons 

and six 30-caliber machine guns cleared a path. Immediately behind and slightly above roared 

the B-25s. At the release point the bombs were dropped and both aircraft escaped with the B-25 

upper turret swung around to fire back at the ships. After the rehearsal the B-25 and Beaufighter 

squadron commanders discussed the results and made necessary adjustments.94 

Participating crews returned to their bases and briefed their squadron mates on the game

plan. The following day, morale was high as the crews waited for the execution message. An 

entry in the 90th Bomb Squadron's log typified the feelings: 

News at night of a 14 ship convoy coming down from Rabaul...are on the north 

coast of New Britain...all of Port Moresby alerted for this shipping...the 90th 

working feverishly...guns loaded...bombs aboard...crews listed...silently, but 

efficiently, the 90th were at their jobsÖ95 

22 
The Convoy is Sighted and the Attacks Commence

On March 1, 1943 at 1500 (New Guinea time), a 90th Bombardment Group (Heavy) 

Consolidated B-24 Liberator sighted the Lae convoy. Its location was about 100 miles west of 

Rabaul heading southwest.96 Throughout the day and night, in very rough weather, heavy 

bombers shadowed the convoy. The first attack occurred on March 2nd. Still out of range of the 

A-20s, 26 B-17s and 2 B-24s, in a ìquick though apparently not predetermined succession of 

bombing runs...flying individually and in elements of two and threeî97 carpetbombed the convoy 

from 4500 to 8000 feet. Escorted by 16 P-38s which engaged an estimated 30 Japanese fighters, 

several ships were hit and presumably sunk. Although several B-17s received some damage, all 

returned to base. Reconnaissance aircraft continued to monitor and strike the convoy throughout 

March 2nd and early March 3rd. 

During the morning of March 3rd, the convoy was within range for the mass, coordinated 

attack. At 0803, the attack order was transmitted: 

ENEMY CONVOY CONSISTING OF ONE CRUISER, SIX DESTROYERS, 

TWO TRANSPORTS, FOUR CARGO APPROACHING NEW GUINEA; 

PROBABLE DESTINATION LAE LAST REPORTED POSITION LATITUDE 

0654S LONGITUDE 14805E, COURSE 270 SPEED 10 TIME 0615/L 

CONVOY PROTECTED BY ENEMY FIGHTERS DURING DAYLIGHT 

HOURS...V BOM COM WITH MAXIMUM STRIKING FORCE OF MEDIUM, 

HEAVY, AND LIGHT BOMBARDMENT SUPPORTED BY P-38'S WILL 

ATTACK ENEMY CONVOY WHEN IN RANGE OF LIGHT 

BOMBARDMENT. THE ATTACK WILL BE MADE BY ONE SQUADRON 

B-17'S (12 AIRPLANES) FOUR SQUADRONS B-25'S ONE SQUADRON 

BEAUFIGHTERS, ONE SQUADRON A-20'S ESCORTED BY TWO 

SQUADRONS P-38'S...98 

Finally, the Fifth Air Force would find out if all the aircraft modifications, tactical

innovations, planning, and practice would payoff. The aircraft assembled at their assigned 

altitudes over Cape Ward Hunt on the north coast of New Guinea. Departing from the

rendezvous point at 0930 they headed for the convoy. The first aircraft to strike were the 

23 
Beaufighters. Flying line abreast, they evaded the destroyer screen and thoroughly strafed the 

merchant ships' decks, superstructure and cargo. Racing in just above and behind them came the 

six unmodified B-25s carrying 500-pound bombs with the 5-second delays.99 

Next from masthead height, were twelve A-20s, loaded with 500-pound bombs. 

According to aircrew reports, of the twenty bombs delivered, ìthey scored ten direct hits and two 

near misses on seven ships.100 Minutes later, B-17s dropped their 1000-pound demolition bombs 

from 6000 to 9000 feet and engaged the estimated 30 enemy fighters.101 Cueing off the low 

altitude B- 25s, another seven B-25s dropped 35 500-pound instantaneously-fuzed bombs from

3000 to 7000 feet.102 They were followed minutes later by another six B-25s at medium level 

dropping 19 bombs. Between the last two medium altitude B-25 attacks came the fleet the Fifth 

Air Force had worked so hard to develop during the last three months. After sighting the 

convoy, twelve B-25C-1s, each carrying three or four 500-pound bombs split into three elements. 

As they approached the convoy, the aircraft peeled off individually and commenced their 

masthead height attacks.103 The results were devastating: 

The [B-25C-1] pilot...made one run on an undamaged destroyer leader or light 

cruiser, and flew through considerable heavy A/A. He saw tracers from light A/A 

just before he opened fire. By tapping the rudders slightly during his approach, he 

covered the deck of the ship and when he levelled off 300 feet from the ship he 

received no fire. His co-pilot dropped two 500 pound bombs; one hit short but the 

other hit the ship just at water level and the explosion rolled it partly over, it 

righted but sank within a few minutes. He hit a medium sized cargo vessel with 

another 500 pound bomb after starting a strafing run. The bomb caused a heavy 

explosion and the ship sank.104 

B-17s flying at 7000 feet continued their horizontal attacks dropping 1000-pound bombs 

throughout the hour. By the time the last bomber left the area, according to observations from

survivors of the Lae convoy, ìevery remaining merchant vessel...was damaged in one way or 

24 
another.î105

 Throughout the morning and early afternoon individual bombers continued to 

monitor and attack the floundering vessels. 

After returning to their airfields, the aircraft reloaded for the second and final coordinated 

attack. Rendezvousing at 1400 hours, four B-25s, eight B-25C-1s and three A-20s struck at 

masthead height; ten B-25s, and five Bostons bombed from medium altitudes (3000 to 6000 feet) 

and eleven B-17s dropped bombs from 7000 feet.

106 Although interrupted by rough weather 

along the route the force sighted the convoy, now dispersed and in disarray. With orders to 

concentrate on the merchant shipping, the crews discovered that few remained. Instead they 

went after the destroyers ìwhich in fact was to be the principal accomplishment of [the] 

afternoon's attacks.î107

 

By this time, the water was full of Japanese survivors in ìall manner of rafts, life boats, 

launches, and barges.î108 Allied aircraft with remaining ammunition strafed them ìto efface 

every possible trace of the convoy so that none of the reinforcements might reach the hardpressed Japanese on New Guineaóa vital consideration to the Allies.î109

 

The Results of the Battle

On the tactical level, the Battle of the Bismarck Sea was a clear rout. The exact number 

of enemy losses remains unclear to this day. However, most post-war accounts agree that eight 

transports and four destroyers along with all the division's equipment were sunk, and 

approximately 2890 out of 8740 ground troops drowned.110 In the air, 60 aircraft were claimed 

destroyed with a further 25-39 probably lost. On the Allied side, three P-38s and one B-17 were 

lost in combat and one B-25 was destroyed in a landing accident. Amazingly, only 14 Allied 

airmen were killed.lll The Japanese ground forces at Lae were left without the necessary 

25 
reinforcement and any hopes of further drives back down the Papuan Peninsula were dashed 

forever. 

However, the Battle of the Bismarck Sea's greater contribution to the eventual Allied 

victory was in the affect it had on the senior leadership on both sides in the Southwest Pacific. 

The utter destruction of the convoy led the Japanese Eighth Area Army at Rabaul to shift its 

reinforcement of New Guinea through more northern bases in Wewak and Madang.112

 ìJapanese 

reaction to the shock was apparent along his entire chain of command. Not until the Leyte 

campaign did he again attempt to resupply in force a beleaguered battlefield in range of 

American medium bombardment.î113 Though some supplies were eventually transported to Lae 

via submarine, barge, or small craft, an ìair blockade had been established--months in advance 

of the Allied conquest of Lae.î114

 

To MacArthur and other former SWPA skeptics, airpower had become the weapon of 

choice for future campaigns. Following the battle MacArthur praised the efforts of his airmen in 

a letter: 

Please extend to all ranks my gratitude and felicitations on the magnificent victory 

which has been achieved. It cannot fail to go down in history as one of the most 

complete and annihilating combats of all time. My pride and satisfaction in you 

all is boundless! signed MacArthur.115 

Notwithstanding MacArthur's knack for overstatement, the battle's overwhelming success 

solidified his growing respect for the importance of airpower in the SWPA. Was this just a 

combination of ìenemy ineptitude, and the superior skill of General Kenney and his pilots--

together with a fair measure of good luck,î as suggested by the imminent Naval historian, 

Samuel Eliot Morison?

116 No doubt Japanese failures and luck were present. But many battles 

have been lost or opportunities wasted when presented a similar opening. Superb leadership, 

innovation, doctrinal flexibility, and initiative gave Kenney and his crews the chance to 

26 
demonstrate their superior skills. March 1943 was a turning point for the Fifth Air Force and in 

many ways the entire USAAF. The ability of airpower to shape a campaign was no longer an 

empty promise. In the words of noted historian, Ronald Spector: 

Kenney's planes had finally achieved what General Billy Mitchell had so breezily 

predicted 15 years before. They had destroyed an enemy fleet at sea unaided by 

naval surface forces. Yet it had required 16 months of war experience, dearly 

bought air bases, especially designed equipment, painstaking training, good 

intelligence and fine weather to accomplish it. No matter. The principle was 

established. Air power was clearly the dominant element in the Southwest 

Pacific...117

27 
PART II

The Strategic Situation in 1943

Shortly after the beginning of the Battle of the Bismarck Sea, MacArthur sent Kenney 

and several other senior members of his staff to Washington for the Pacific Military Conference. 

Two months earlier, the CASABLANCA Conference had already assigned the capture of Rabaul 

as the Pacific Theaters's strategic objective for 1943. The purpose of this conference, which 

included representatives from Admiral Halsey's South Pacific Area Command, the US Joint 

Chiefs of Staff, and their key planners, was to select the exact tactical objectives for operations in 

the two areas.118 

After much discussion and significant compromise, the Joint Chiefs of Staff approved a 

directive on March 28th that included as a second step, ìthe seizure of the Lae-SalamauaFinschafen-Madang area of New Guinea.119

 The SWPA strategy as articulated in the newly 

entitled CARTWHEEL Plan was now becoming familiar: Air attacks to gain air superiority, 

neutralize hostile airfields, and prevent resupply would precede the planned invasion.

120 For 

Kenney and Whitehead this meant the enemy aircraft based in New Guinea had to be destroyed. 

The Buildup of Japanese Air Capability

Rabaul remained the center for power of the Japanese Southeast Area. With an 

unimpeded path to the massive staging area and Combined Fleet Headquarters at Truk, its 

recapture became the focus of Allied strategic efforts during 1942 and 1943. 

Rabaul supported the offensives against the Allied lines of communication, and 

defensively was a bastion which would help defend the Caroline Islands, the 

Netherland Indies, and the Philippines against attack from the south. It was one 

of the most important bases in the semicircular string of island fortresses that 

28 
stretched from Burma through the Indies and the Bismarck Archipelago to the 

Marshall Islands, thence northwest to the Kuriles.121 

The direction of Japanese operations from Rabaul was a dual, but not joint, effort of the 

Imperial Japanese Army and Navy. The Eighth Area Army reported directly to Tokyo while the 

Southeastern Fleet was immediately subordinate to the Combined Fleet at Truk. Army 

operations in eastern New Guinea were supervised by the Eighteenth Army which by early 1943 

was also providing tactical direction to the 6th Air Division. Naval operations were divided 

between the land-based 11th Air Fleet and the principally administrative Eighth Fleet.122

 

After the painful losses from the Battle of the Bismarck Sea and the subsequent failed I 

Operation, Japanese Imperial Headquarters was finally convinced to strengthen its air force units 

in New Guinea. Consequently, on July 27th, the Fourth Air Army was transferred from the 

Netherland East Indies to Rabaul and in August to Wewak, New Guinea. It would eventually 

command the 6th and 7th Air Division, and the 14th Air Brigade. Reaching its peak strength of 

over 500 aircraft and 10,000 personnel shortly after arriving in Wewak, it included 8 fighter 

groups (air regiments) of 36 planes each; 5 bomber groups of 36 planes each; and 5 

reconnaissance squadrons of 12 planes each.123

 

Building the Forward Airfield at Tsili Tsili

In order to contribute to the Allied campaign to take Rabaul, the Fifth Air Force needed 

to secure airfields on the Huon Peninsula. In keeping with the now-established SWPA strategy, 

neutralization of enemy bases within striking distance of Huon had to come first. From March 

through July the Fifth Air Force conducted mostly harassment strikes against enemy airfields 

along New Guinea's northern coast and the shipping between Rabaul and the growing 

29 
headquarters at Wewak. Much like earlier efforts, the effectiveness of Allied strikes was greatly 

hampered by the lack of available aircraft. Further, the Fifth Air Force's premier airfield attack 

assets--the light and medium bombers--needed an emergency airfield halfway between Port 

Moresby and Wewak. Of equal importance, such an airfield could also house a fighter group, 

allowing the P-38s to provide escort for the bombers. 

Kenney and Whitehead were already scouting potential locations south of Lae to base 

their fighters. Flying from fields in southeastern New Guinea, even the twin-engined P-38 

lacked the range to provide sufficient air cover for the anticipated ground invasion.124 Several 

sites were surveyed and in early June, Tsili Tsili, a small village lying about 60 miles west of Lae 

was selected. Kenney immediately dispatched an engineering team to carve out an airdrome. 

For once the inhospitable New Guinea jungle came in handy. By isolating ground bases 

it allowed Kenney and his engineers to consider building the airfield so close to the Japanese 

troops at Lae. But it was still a huge gamble because the Japanese possessed sufficient aircraft 

based in the Lae area for a potentially devastating air attack if the field was discovered. 

The Deception Plan

To protect their airfield construction work, Kenney and Whitehead devised an ingenious 

deception operation. Realizing that the Japanese were expecting some sort of activity in 

preparation for the seizure of Lae, construction was simultaneously begun on an airfield 100 

miles northwest of Lae near Bena Bena. This field, in reality no more than a grass strip, was 

originally intended as an intelligence center and emergency runway. Natives were recruited and 

despite the dearth of heavy equipment and cargo aircraft, engineers made sure dust was raised, 

fires started, and grass huts built to picque the interest of the Japanese.125

 True to form, on June 

30 
14th, the Japanese began an almost daily bombardment of the strip.126 By working around the 

clock, the airfield at Tsili Tsili and accompanying early warning network were completed. On 

July 26th, the first fighters arrived.127 Remarkably, the deception effort was still working. The 

Japanese continued to work over the dummy field at Bena Bena while Tsili Tsili was left

unscathed. Kenney and Whitehead's gamble had paid off. 

Probing the Intelligence Network

Throughout the summer of 1943, the Japanese fortified their air units in the Wewak area. 

The Fifth Air Force carefully monitored the activities using all available intelligence sources. 

Once again, ULTRA proved particularly useful. In early June, ULTRA intercepts uncovered the 

14th Air Regiment's recent deployment to Wewak. Subsequent traffic analysis revealed that 

more aircraft were on the way.128 

The Allies intensified their aerial reconnaissance flights. By the middle of August, 

Kenney and Whitehead could piece together the location and composition of the 6th and 7th Air 

Division and the 14th Air Brigade. Spread amongst the Fourth Air Army's cluster of airfields at 

But, Boram, Dagua, and Wewak, the gradual buildup of Japanese aircraft was peaking. On 

August 13th, 110 bombers and 92 fighters were spotted at the complex.129 

Developing the Tactics for Airfield Destruction

By the summer of 1943, Whitehead and his crews were demonstrating proficiency in 

attacking airfields. Having gained experience by striking bases in the Lae-Salamaua area and 

along the southern coast of New Britain they were developing a proven technique for success. 

Using the weapons acquired in the Papuan Campaign, their plan relied on light and medium

31 
bombers to reap the majority of destruction. The technique was broken down into four distinct 

phases: 

1. Intelligence plots the movement of enemy aircraft in order that the attack may 

be timed for the movement when the heaviest concentration of planes can be hit. 

2. Heavy bombers then deliver the initial blow from medium or high altitudes to 

soften up and tire out the opposition before the medium bombers can attack. 

3. Medium bombers (B-25s sometimes aided by A-20s) follow the heavy 

bombers with a low altitude attack in which the entire airdrome area is strafed and 

clusters of parachute fragmentation bombs are dropped. To accomplish 

maximum results from the strafing attacks, the B-25's were modified to carry 

eight forward firing .50-caliber machine guns. 

4. Assessment of results is the fourth and final phase of these coordinated 

missions. On the basis of careful study both of strike and reconnaissance photos, 

the number of enemy planes destroyed is carefully tabulated.130 

Once intelligence provided a suitable target, crews noted fuel and supply depots along 

with the location of enemy radar sites, AAA positions and ground spotters. Courses of attack 

were planned to avoid known threats while ensuring destruction of both aircraft and facilities.131 

The timing between the high altitude heavy and low altitude medium bombers was the key. To 

confuse the enemy, the Fifth Air Force had devised two methods. ìThe heavy bombers 

frequently attack during the night preceding a minimum altitude daylight mission. Such attacks 

often soften up enemy opposition by tiring out the antiaircraft gunners and by keeping the pilots 

awake during the night.î132 The second option was for heavy bombers to precede the medium

bombers by two or three minutes. ìThis type of attack forces the [Japanese] hand--if he puts his 

fighters in the air, he risks destruction of them by our fighter escort and if he leaves them on the 

ground, combined bombing and strafing will destroy them there.î133 

Once again, the bulk of the destruction would be achieved by the medium bombers. 

Using the experience gained in the earlier modification effort of the 3rd Bomb Group's A-20s, 

Kenney ordered similar honeycomb racks installed in the B-25s. With the forward section of the 

32 
bomb bay filled with fuel, a total of 35 23-pound parafrag bombs could be loaded in the rear 

bomb bay. 

In order to achieve maximum damage, careful coordination between strafing, bombing 

with parafrag clusters, and 100-pound delayed action bombs was planned. Photos (preferably 

oblique) were taken of the target airfields and lines to represent the axis of attack were drawn to 

ensure coverage of the entire runway and dispersal area. Flights in line abreast formation would 

plan to approach from opposite direction, timing their runs so that one flight was strafing while 

the other was dropping parafrags. As the opposing flights approached each other they would 

change altitudes and switch roles. The entire airdrome would be strafed to both cover bombing 

aircraft and to inflict as much damage on grounded aircraft, installations and personnel as 

possible.134 Such an operation required precision flying but by August, Whitehead's crews were 

more than ready. 

The Plan is Executed

With the target date to attack Wewak set for August 17th, efforts were further accelerated 

to supply the airfield at Tsili Tsili. On August 15th, its location was finally discovered and 

attacked by 20-30 Japanese fighters and 12 bombers. Fifth Air Force fighters rose to meet them 

and shot down all the enemy bombers but not before one crashed into the recently constructed 

chapel killing the chaplain and several men. At the time of the attack, twelve Allied transports 

were in the landing pattern and Japanese Oscar fighters shot down two. On August 16th, 95 

Allied transports loaded with 13 55-gallon drums of gasoline each arrived making the airdrome

ready to support the next day's effort. Once again Japanese fighters attacked while the transports 

were arriving but this time no damage was suffered.135

 

33 
For the first strike, Whitehead chose to use heavy bombers at night hoping to catch the 

Japanese unprepared. Between 2100 and midnight on the 16th, 50 heavy bombers took off from

airfields in the Port Moresby area for the three hour flight to the Wewak complex. A total of 48 

aircraft reached the four airfields at But, Boram, Dagua, and Wewak and dropped a combination 

of incendiary, parafrag and demolition bombs.136 

On August 17th, between the hours 0600 and 0630, 63 B-25s took off from Port Moresby 

and Dobodura. Due to a combination of bad weather and the inability of ten of the aircraft to 

release their 300-gallon turret tanks (a mandatory abort item by direction of Whitehead), only 32 

aircraft reached the target.137 The B-25s met light resistance indicating that the heavy bombers 

had achieved their objective of paralyzing the enemy. 

Arriving at the target at 0900 the B-25s commenced their attacks. The results were no 

less than spectacular. Three B-25s from the 405th Bombardment Squadron reached Dagua and 

initiated their runs from 30-50 feet. The pilot report stated: 

40-50 Dinahs, type 100 Helens and type 97 Sallys inadequately dispersed in twos 

and threes in clearing along Southeast side of runway were bombed and 

straffed...Of these enemy planes 8 were reported definitely destroyed and 20 

probably destroyed.138 

The 3rd Bomb Group's three squadrons also struck gold. The 90th Bomb Squadron 

claimed 15 aircraft destroyed at Wewak; the 8th claimed 40-60 destroyed at Boram; and the 13th 

claimed an additional 10 to 20 at Boram.

139 The extremely high tally at Boram was due to a 

combination of superb airmanship and once again, inadequate dispersion by the Japanese. An 

entry in the 3rd Bomb Group Combat Log summarized the attack and showed the degree of 

complete surprise achieved: 

Boram, the principle target, was the first to be hit. The formation of 8th and 13th 

Squadron ships, led by Colonel Donald P. Hall, came around the ridge onto the 

target and took the Nips completely by surprise. Over 100 Japanese aircraft were 

34 
lined up wing tip to wing tip; trucks were moving and personnel were busily at 

work. Col. Hall made the first pass from 100 feet and his initial burst exploded a 

Betty bomber. Our planes which followed bombed and strafed aircraft at the 

strip. When they turned for another pass the parked planes resembled a powder 

train as fire and smoke swiftly moved down the line. Crews of numerous ships 

observed frag bombs exploding in and around parked aircraft. They also saw an 

ammunition dump explode and two fuel dumps catch fire. The field was left in 

shambles; pieces of aircraft scattered allover the area.140

 

The following day Whitehead resumed the effort. In an attempt to confuse the enemy he 

scheduled the heavy bombers to stirke just before the B-25s arrived. Poor weather enroute 

caused 23 of the 49 heavy bombers to turn back.141 Those that reached the target stayed high to 

avoid the AAA and managed to drop a combination of demolition bombs with instantaneous 

fuzes and wire-wrapped bombs with extension fuzes.142 

Moments after impact, 53 B-25s approached the complex. Once again, the medium

bombers accounted for the majority of the damage. They concentrated on the airfields at But and 

Dagua along with supply dumps at Boram and shipping in the Wewak Harbor.143 The attacks 

against But and Dagua were particularly devastating. Despite constant harassment by Japanese 

fighters, B-25s crews claimed a total of 78 aircraft destroyed on the ground and in the air. 

Additionally, three 1500-ton vessels and several barges were struck.144

 By the end of the day, of 

the estimated 225 enemy aircraft in the Wewak area, all but ten were left destroyed or 

unserviceable.145 

The weather forecast for August 19th precluded another day of strikes which allowed 

Whitehead to release his bomber crews for maintenance and rest. During the first two days, the 

lack of ramp space at Tsili Tsili as a result of the flurry of Fifth Air Force fighter operations 

prevented the transport aircraft from landing. During the ìdown dayî on the 19th, Whitehead 

used his cargo aircraft to replenish the fuel stocks at the forward airfield.146

 

35 
August 20th was a heavy bomber day as 24 B-24s with fighter escorts bombed Boram at 

midday destroying several aircraft on the ground and starting large fires around the airdrome. 

Apparently the Japanese took the opportunity during the previous day's lull to resupply their 

forces because 30-35 enemy fighters attempted to intercept the heavy bombers. By now the P38s clearly held the upper hand in aerial combat. Nineteen Japanese fighters were destroyed and 

six others listed as probable. One B-24 was lost.147

 

Once again, Allied intelligence detected another reinforcement of Japanese aircraft. On

the 21st, Whitehead sent the medium bombers one more time. The target for the 18 B-25s was 

Dagua and But. Escorted by 60 P-38s, the Mitchells bombed and strafed the airfields, ìleaving 

34 enemy aircraft on the ground destroyed or badly damaged, silencing antiaircraft positions, and 

destroying one power launch and four barges.î148

 Fifty Japanese fighters attempted interception. 

The B-25s shot down three, one during a strafing pass as the fighter was on takeoff roll and two 

in the air. The P-38s accounted for another 30 definite and 5 probable.149 

The Results of the Raid

Total damage to the Wewak base complex and its aircraft was immense. As is typical in 

such a fast moving operation, accurate damage assessment was impossible. Because Fifth Air 

Force aircraft were timed to arrive over the target simultaneously, the chance of duplicate claims

was high. The majority of weapons dropped by B-25s were relatively light parafrag bombs, 

which though highly effective in rendering the aircraft permanently unserviceable, often left 

them at least partially intact for subsequent aircraft to strike. Nonetheless, the ability of the 

Japanese to launch an attack from New Guinea against Allied ground forces was largely negated. 

In his daily correspondence with Kenney, Whitehead summarized his feelings: 

36 
We are highly pleased with this week's operations. According to our box score, 

our fighters shot down 71 enemy fighters and 12 enemy bombers definite, and 12 

more fighters probable. We definitely lost 7 fighters and 2 others are missing. 

Our bombers certainly destroyed at least 150 enemy airplanes on the ground, shot 

down 26 enemy fighters definite and 11 more probable. We lost 3 B-24s and 2 B25s as a result of combat.150 

MacArthur was equally elated and after the second day's attack released a statement that 

was carried by the New York Times. ìIt was a crippling blow at an opportune 

moment...Numerically, the opposing forces were about equal in strength, but one was in the air 

and the other not. Nothing is so helpless as a plane on the ground.î151 

When questioned after the war, Major General Tanikawa of the Fourth Air Army

confirmed the scale of devastation delivered to the Japanese air capability in New Guinea on the 

first two days of the attack: 

We lost 100 planes including light bombers, fighters and reconnaissance planes. 

It was a decisive Allied victory. We were planning to retain the balance of power 

and were making plans to bomb Port Moresby and other areas. A few days before 

our projected plan was to [materialize], we were bombed at Wewak and our air 

power was severely crippled. Consequently our air power was rapidly 

diminishing and was unable to aid our ground forces effectively which, in the end, 

constituted one of our chief reasons for losing the war.152 

For MacArthur and the men of the SWPA the real payoff of the raid carne two weeks 

later during the beginning of offensive operations along the Huon Peninsula. Confident the Fifth 

Air Force had achieved air superiority, ìa much bolder plan could be ventured.î153

 At sunrise on 

September 4th, the Australian 9th Division landed 20 miles east of Lae. Japanese aircraft 

launched from Rabaul could offer only light resistance and were met by Allied fighters. 

Complete command of the air allowed MacArthur to drop a parachute regiment to seize the 

airstrip at Nadzab located 20 miles northwest of Lae. The next day the Australian 7th Division 

was airlifted into the captured airstrip. On September 16th, Allied forces entered Lae and 

captured it unopposed.154 By mid-October the Huon Peninsula was secured. 

37 
Conclusion

The use of Fifth Air Force light and medium bombers during the Battle of the Bismarck 

Sea and the Wewak Raid highlight two important factors in the command's success--doctrinal 

flexibility and extraordinary innovation. The two are not unrelated. As previously stated, during 

the interwar years the US Army Air Corps was wedded to the doctrine of high altitude, daylight, 

precision bombing aimed at the industrial and economic structure of the enemy. Especially after 

1944, this independent role of airpower proved highly effective. B-17s and B-24s flown from

England and B-29s from the Marianas greatly contributed to the ultimate defeat of the Axis 

powers. But during the first two years of the war in the SWPA, aircraft range limitations coupled 

with the Europe-first policy prevented a role for strategic airpower. It was up to the two men in 

charge--Kenney and Whitehead--to quickly and forcefully shift the role of airpower and 

construct a doctrine better suited for the task at hand. This they were able to do despite not only 

the hardships of the SWPA, but while they were asked to carry the brunt of the combat load. 

Twenty years ago, Michael Howard commented on the necessity of doctrinal flexibility: 

I am tempted indeed to declare dogmatically that whatever doctrine the Armed 

Forces are working on now, they have got it wrong. I am also tempted to declare 

that it does not matter that they have got it wrong. What does matter is their 

capacity to get it right quickly when the moment arrives.155

 

The fact that Kenney was a long-time proponent of attack aviation and that Whitehead 

spent the bulk of his operational career in fighters must have made the transition away from

strategic airpower easier. But the second step--finding the appropriate weapons to match the 

new doctrine--was accomplished primarily by instilling a spirit of innovation throughout the 

command. 

The initial A-20 and B-25 modifications were accomplished at the squadron level. 

Kenney and Whitehead facilitated them by encouraging these efforts. This may seem obvious 

38 
but combat innovations are not without cost. Their benefits must always be weighed against the 

inherent loss in production capability and down time. Kenney and Whitehead, both having 

distinguished themselves as engineering students, were able to manipulate and flex their 

assembly lines and implement the changes while simultaneously shifting to the offensive. 

Innovation was also apparent in the way Kenney and Whitehead crafted the role of 

airpower in their theater. Prevented from using airpower in a strategic role, they resisted the urge 

to become an adjunct to the ground war. Instead, airpower was used in a ìcomplementaryî 

role.156

 During the Buna Campaign, Fifth Air Force bombers, fighters, and troop transports flew 

thousands of sorties in direct support of ground operations. But as decribed in this paper, those 

ground and sea arms also supported the main force--airpower, with the latter providing the bulk 

of the firepower and manuever.157

 

Kenney and Whitehead understood that when the limited airpower resources were 

detached from the ground campaign, they could achieve a far greater effect for the theater. The 

Battle of the Bismarck Sea was an air campaign that supported the theater objective of delaying 

an enemy buildup in New Guinea. No Allied land operations were planned in conjunction with 

the attack. Indeed, Allied land forces were still recovering from the exhausting Papuan 

Campaign. Land operations were planned in conjunction with the Wewak Raid but two weeks 

afterwards and in an area well to the south. By detaching air campaigns from the ground effort, 

Kenney and Whitehead elevated airpower to a position of ìgreatest among equalsî in the SWPA. 

MacArthur affirmed the preeminence of the Fifth Air Force when he declared ìthe purpose of his 

surface operations was to advance his bomb line.î158 

Finally, Kenney and Whitehead's understanding of the operational art placed them in rare 

company.159 For airpower to wield its greatest impact it had to accomplish more than simply 

39 
bomb airfields, shoot down aircraft, or sink ships--it had to change the enemy's behavior. When 

the opportunity for decisive victory presented itself, Kenney and Whitehead diverted all 

available resources to the task. Once the enemy had been bloodied, they refused to let up, instead 

seeking complete annihilation. The Battle of the Bismarck Sea and the Wewak Raid were not 

just one-sided statistical triumphs. Both occurred at a time most opportune for the Allies and 

least for the Japanense. They were combat victories of theater level importance that produced 

affects felt by each arm of the SWPA. 

The war in the Pacific was far from over. Many bitter combined air, naval, and ground 

campaigns lay ahead. But in the first two years of combat, the light and medium bombers of the 

Fifth Air Force had set the standard of excellence that few others would achieve. 

40 
NOTES

1 United States Strategic Bombing Survey (USSBS), The Allied Campaign Against Rabaul, 

(Washington D.C.: Naval Analysis Division, 1946), 7. 

2 Combat Air Forces of World War II, With Atlas, Volume II, Operations in the Mediterranean 

and Pacific Theaters, ed. T. Dodson Stamps and Vincent J. Esposito, (West Point, New 

York: US Military Academy, 1956), 297. 

3 Major General Charles A. Willoughby and John Chamberlain, MacArthur, 1941-1951, (New 

York: McGraw Hill Book Company, 1954), 100. 

4 USSBS, Rabaul, 8. 

5 Ibid. 

6 Stamps, 344. 

7 Stamps, 44. 

8 The Army Air Forces in World War II, Volume I. Plans and Early Operations, January 1930 to 

August 1942, ed. Wesley Frank Craven and James Lea Cate, (Chicago: University of 

Chicago Press, 1948), 414. 

9 Richard L. Watson, Jr., Major, USA, ìAir Action in the Papuan Campaign, 21 July 1942 to 23 

January 1943,î AAF Historical Study No. 17, Assistant Chief of Air Staff, Intelligence, 

Historical Division, AAF, (Maxwell AFB, Alabama: USAF Historical Research Agency 

(USAF/HRA), August 1944), 47, 101-17. 

10 General George C. Kenney, General Kenney Reports, A Personal History of the Pacific War, 

(New York: Duell, Sloan, and Pearce, 1949, reprint Washington D.C.: Office of Air Force 

History, 1987), 34. 

11 Watson, Papuan Campaign, 138-140. 

12 Craven, Vol I, 99. 

13 Watson, Papuan Campaign, 152. 

14 Army Air Forces Statistical Digest, World War II, Prepared by Office of Statistical Control, 

(Washington D.C., 1945), 9. 

15 Watson, Papuan Campaign, 98. 

16 Ibid., 97. 

17 Herman S. Wolk, ìGeorge C. Kenney, MacArthur's Premier Airman,î in We Shall Return--

MacArthur's Commanders and the Defeat of Japan. 1942-1945, ed. William M. Leary, 

(Lexington, Kentucky: University Press of Kentucky, 1988), 93. 

18 Herman S. Wolk, ìGeorge C. Kenney: The Great Innovator,î in Makers of the United States

Air Force, ed. John L. Frisbee, (Washington D.C.: US Government Printing Office (GPO), 

1987), 127. 

19 Ibid., 128. 

20 Kenney, xi. 

21 Frisbee, 128. 

22 Ibid., 129. 

23 Ibid. 

24 Generals of the Army and the Air Force, ed. Lt Col T.M. Dunleavy, USA, (Washington D.C.: 

Dunleavy Publishing Company, November 1954), 7. 

25 Colonel Marvin Stanley, USAF, ìGeneral George C. Kenney, Historical Documentation,î 

(Oral Interview), (Maxwell AFB, Alabama: USAF/HRA, July 1975), 8, K239.0512-747. 

26 Ibid., 6-7. 

41 
27 Thomas H. Greer, The Development of Air Doctrine in the Army Air Arm. 1917-1941, 

(USAF Historical Research Division, Air University (AU), Maxwell AFB, Alabama, 1955, 

reprint Washington D.C.: Office of Air Force History, 1985), 66. 

28 Leary, 91. 

29 D. Clayton James, ìKenney, George Churchill,î in Directory of American Military

Biography, Volume II, H-P, ed. Roger J. Spiller, (Westport, Connecticut: Greenwood Press, 

1984), 553. 

30 Leary, 91. 

31 Spiller, 553. 

32 ìEnnis C. Whitehead, Aerospace Pioneer," Donald M. Goldstein, a PhD Dissertation 

presented to the University of Denver, August 1970, 88. 

33 Ibid., 17. 

34 Generals of the Army and the Air Force, ed. by Lt Col T.M. Dunleavy, USA, (Washington 

D.C.: Dunleavy Publishing Company, October 1954), 23. 

35 Goldstein, 31. 

36 Ibid., 33. 

37 Dunleavy, 23. See also Goldstein, 41. 

38 Dunleavy, 23. 

39 Goldstein, 69. 

40 Ibid., 71. 

41 Leary, 93-94. 

42 T.R. Smith, Project Engineer, ìReport No. SM10908 on History of Light Bomber Series 

Airplanes, December 4, 1944,î Office of the Historian, Douglas Aircraft Company, Long 

Beach, California, 12. 

43 John Alcorn, ìDouglas DB-7/A-20 Havoc, Part I, Attack Bomber, Development History,î in 

Historical Aviation Album, Volume XV, produced by Paul R. Matt, (Temple City, 

California: Historical Aviation Album, 1977), 74. 

44 Donald Hall, Col, USAF, Ret, ìPacific Gunships,î in A-20 Havoc at War, compiled by 

William N. Hess, (New York: Scribners and Son, 1979), 80. 

45 Kenney, 12. 

46 ìLight Bombardment Aviation,î ACTS Textbook, Maxwell Field, Alabama, (Maxwell AFB, 

Alabama: USAF/HRA, January 15, 1940), 16, 248.101-11A. 

47 The Army Air Forces in World War II, Volume IV, The Pacific: Gudalcanal to Saipan, 

August 1942 to July 1944, ed. Wesley Frank Craven and James Lea Cate, (Chicago: 

University of Chicago Press, 1948), 106. 

48 Watson, Papuan Campaign, 45. 

49 Ray Wagner, American Combat Planes. Third Enlarged Edition, (Garden City, New York: 

Doubleday & Company, 1982), 219. 

50 Kenney, 144. 

51 ìReport on Destruction of Japanese Convoy in Bismarck Sea, March 1 to 5, 1943 

(Inclusive),î Headquarters Advance Echelon Fifth Air Force, (Maxwell AFB, Alabama: 

USAF/HRA, April 6, 1943), 1, 730.306-1A. 

52 Craven, Vol I, 217. 

53 ìEpisodes in the History of the Army Air Forces: The Bismarck Sea Action, March 1-4, 

1943,î Historical Division, Office of Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, AAF, (Maxwell 

AFB, Alabama: USAF/HRA, September 1, 1943), 239, 105.1-8. 

42 
54 Max Hastings, Bomber Command, (New York: The Dial Press/James Wade, 1979), 17. See 

also Bomber Command, The Air Ministry Account of the Bomber Command's Offensive 

Against the Axis. by the Great Britain Air Ministry, (New York: Doubleday, Doran & 

Company, 1941), 8; and Martin Middlebrook and Chris Everitt, The Bomber Command War 

Diaries: An Operational Reference Book, 1939-1945, (New York: Penguin Books, 1990), 

22. 

55 General H.H. Arnold, USA, Ret, Global Mission, (New York: Harper and Brothers, 1949), 

230-231. 

56 ìResume of General Arnold's Talk, Monday, May 5, 1941,îHeadquarters, AAF, (Maxwell 

AFB, Alabama: USAF/HRA), 3, 145.83-108. See also Arnold, op. cit., 230-231. 

57 ìFinal Report on Minimum Altitude Attack of Water-Borne Surface Vessels with Aircraft 

Bombs,î Proof Department, Bombing Section, AAF APGC, Eglin Field, (Eglin AFB, 

Florida: USAF Development Test Center History Office, December 7, 1942), 1, Serial No. 

1-42-12. 

58 Ibid. 

59 Ibid., 2. 

60 Ibid., 1-2. 

61 Kenney, 21. 

62 Watson, Papuan Campaign, 170. 

63 Ibid., 173. 

64 Report on Destruction of Japanese Convoy, 2. 

65 Ibid., 3. 

66 ìReport on Special Fuze Testing Phase (S.T. No. 1-42-12) -Low Altitude Attacks of Water 

Borne Surface Vessels with Aircraft Bombs,î Proof Department, Bombing Section, AAF 

APGC, Eglin Field, Florida, (Eglin AFB, Florida: USAF Development Test Center History 

Office, October 31, 1942), 1. 

67 Ibid., 2. 

68 Report on Destruction of Japanese Convoy, 2. 

69 Ibid., 2. 

70 Episodes, 241. 

71 Ibid., 242. 

72 Reports of General MacArthur, The Campaigns of MacArthur in the Pacific, Volume I, 

Prepared by his General Staff, (Washington D.C.: US GPO, 1966), 53. One element of the 

AIB that performed admirably throughout the war was the Royal Australian Navy (RAN) 

ìCoastwatchers.î Two coastwatchers monitored Japanese fleet activities during the Battle 

of the Bismarck Sea from hideouts near Finschaven. Although aerial reconnaissance was 

already reporting the enemy locations, coastwatchers provided data on enemy survivor 

status. See Commander Eric A. Feldt, RAN, The Coastwatchers, (New York: Oxford 

University Press, 1946), 198. 

73 Episodes, 79. 

74 Ibid., 80. 

75 Ibid. 

76 Ibid., 41. 

77 MacArthur Reports, Volume I, 110. 

78 Edward J. Drea, MacArthur's ULTRA: Codebreakin~ and the War Against Japan. 1942-1945, 

(Lawrence, Kansas: University Press of Kansas, 1992), 22. This volume provides an in43 
depth and vivid analysis of the creation, evolution, and operation of signals intelligence in 

the SWPA. 

79 Ibid., 68. 

80 Ibid. 

81 Episodes, 80. 

82 Kenney, 199. 

83 Episodes, 81. 

84 Kenney, 199. 

85 Drea, 68. 

86 Kenney, 200. 

87 Episodes, 44. 

88 Kenney, 198. 

89 Report on Destruction of Japanese Convoy, 2. 

90 Lex McAulay, Battle of the Bismarck Sea, (New York: St Martin's Press, 1991), 19-20. 

91 Episodes, 241. 

92 ìReport on Destruction of the Lae Convoy, Mar 1-12, by the Fifth U.S. Army Air Forces and 

the Ninth Operational Group R.A.A.F.,î United States Pacific Fleet, South Pacific Force, 

Intelligence Division, n.d., (Maxwell AFB, Alabama: USAF/HRA), 2, 730.306-1C. 

93 Ibid. 

94 Ibid., 15. 

95 ì90th Bombardment Squadron World War II Combat Logî (Maxwell AFB, Alabama: 

USAF/HRA, May 1944), 160, SQ-90-HI (Bomb). 

96 Episodes, 83. 

97 Ibid., 91. 

98 V Bomber Command Message 030803/L Mar 43, ìHistory of the 71st Bombardment 

Squadron,î (Maxwell AFB, Alabama: USAF/HRA, September 1946), 1, SQ-71-HI (Bomb). 

99 Episodes, 130 and 147. 

100 Ibid., 139. 

101 Ibid., 143. 

102 V Bomber Command Message, 1. 

103 Episodes, 150. 

104 Report on Destruction of Japanese Convoy, 2. 

105 Episodes, 162. 

106 Ibid., 170. 

107 Ibid., 171. 

108 Ibid., 172. 

109 Ibid., 173. 

110 ìReport on the Battle of the Bismarck Sea, Japanese Interrogations,î (Maxwell AFB, 

Alabama: USAF/HRA, September 24, 1945), 3, 730.306-lD. 

111 Episodes, 220. 

112 Stamps, 355. 

113USSBS, The Fifth Air Force in the War Against Japan, (Washington D.C.: Military Analysis 

Division, 1947), 58. 

114 Craven, Vol IV, 146. 

115 ìLetter from Headquarters Advanced Echelon to All Air Force Units, New Guinea, 5 March 

1943,î (Maxwell AFB, Alabama: USAF/HRA) , 1, 730.2981. 

44 
116 Samuel Eliot Morison, History of United States Naval Operations in World War II. Breakin~ 

the Bismarck Barrier, 22 July 1942-1 May 1944, (Boston: Little Brown and Company, 

1950), 63. 

117 Ronald H. Spector, The Eagle Against the Sun: The American War with Japan, (New York: 

Vintage Books, 1985), 100. 

118 John Miller, Jr., United States Army in World War II, Volume XIII: The War in the Pacific. 

Cartwheel: The Reduction of Rabaul, (Washington D.C.: Office of the Chief of Military 

History, Department of the Army, 1959), 9. 

119 Ibid., 19. 

120 Ibid., 26. 

121 Ibid., 32. 

122 Ibid., 34. 

123 Ibid., 195. See also USSBS, Interrogations of Japanese Officials, Volume II, Washington 

D.C.: Naval Analysis Division, 1946, 404; and George Odgers, Australia in the War 1939-

1945, Series 3 (Air), Volume II: Air War Against Japan 1943-1945, (Canberra: Australian 

War Memorial, 1957), 70. 

l24 Kenney, 251. 

125 Ibid., 253. 

126 Ibid., 262. 

127 Ibid., 271. 

128 Drea, 81. 

129 Richard L. Watson, Jr., Major, USA, ìThe Fifth Air Force in the Huon Peninsula Campaign, 

January to October 1943,î AAF Reference History #13, AAF Historical Office, 

Headquarters, AAF, (Maxwell AFB, Alabama: USAF/HRA, January 1946), 195, 101-13. 

130 USAAF, Office of the Assistant Chief of Air Staff, Intelligence, ìHow the Fifth Air Force 

Destroys Jap Planes on the Ground,î in Special Information Intelligence Report, 

(Washington D.C., No. 43-16, December 15, 1943), 1. 

131 Ibid., 2. 

132 Ibid., 4. 

133 Ibid. 

134 Ibid., 6. 

135 Letter from Whitehead to Kenney, August 16, 1943, Ennis Whitehead Collection, Kenney 

File, (Maxwell AFB, Alabama: USAF/HRA), 1, 168.6008-3. See also Kenney, 276. 

136 Watson, Huon Campaign, 196-197. See also Kenney Reports, 276; and ìHow the Fifth Air 

Force Destroys Jap Planes on the Ground, 5. 

137 Watson, Huon Campaign, 197-198. See also Letter from Whitehead to Kenney, August 16, 

1943, Ennis Whitehead Collection, Kenney File, (Maxwell AFB, Alabama: USAF/HRA}, 

1, 168-6008-3. 

138 ìAccount of Mission 228 General on 17 August 1943,î History of the 38th Bombardment 

Group (M), (Maxwell AFB, Alabama: USAF/HRA), GP-38-HI (Bomb). 

139 Watson, Huon Campaign, 198. 

140 ìHistory of the Third Bombardment Group, 1 July 1919 - 31 March 1944,î (Maxwell AFB, 

Alabama: USAF/HRA), GP-3-HI (Bomb). 

141 Watson, Huon Campaign, 199. See also letter from Whitehead to Kenney, August 18, 1943, 

2. 

142 ìHow the Fifth Air Force Destroys Jap Aircraft on the Ground,î 5. 

45 
143 Whitehead Letter, August 18, 1943, 2. 

144 ìDestruction of Enemy Aircraft at Wewak,î (Maxwell AFB, Alabama: USAF/HRA, 10 

September 1943), 1, 730.168. 

145 Whitehead Letter, August 18, 1943, 2. See also ìEnemy Aircraft Destroyed,î 1. 

146 Whitehead Letter, August 18, 1943, 2. 

147 ìDestruction of Enemy Aircraft at Wewak,î 1. 

148 Ibid., 2. 

149 Letter from Whitehead to Kenney, August 21, 1943, Ennis Whitehead Collection, Kenney 

File, (Maxwell AFB, Alabama: USAF/HRA) , 1, 168-6008-3. 

150 Ibid, 2. 

151 New York Times, August 18, 1943, 8. 1520dgers, 70. 

153 Stamps, 356. 

154 Ibid. 

155 Michael Howard, ìMilitary Science in an Age of Peace,î Journal of the Royal United 

Services Institute for Defence Services, 119 (March 1974): 7. 

156 The term complementary is taken from a recent article by Phillip S. Meilinger, Lt Col, 

USAF, entitled ìThe Problem with our Air Power Doctrine,î Air Power Journal, Spring 

1992. See also ìEssay N, Employing Aerospace Forces: The Operational Art,î Air Force 

Manual 1-1. Basic Aerospace Doctrine of the United States Air Force, Volume II, 

(Washington D.C.: US GPO, March 1992). 

157 This concept was eloquently and forcefully described to me by Dr David Metz of the USAF 

School of Advanced Airpower Studies during a review of an earlier draft of this paper. 

158 USSBS, Air CampaiSlns of the Pacific War, (Washington D.C.: Military Analysis Division, 

1947), 18. 

159 Charles M. Westenhoff, Major, USAF, ìMaster of the Operational Art: General Kenney's 

Early Campaigns,î 1991. This unpublished article is an excellent discussion of General 

Kenney's unique style and capability. I would include General Whitehead in the same

category. 

46 
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53