Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 18A02-1611-CR-2691 |August 4, 2017 Page 1 of 17

MEMORANDUM DECISION 

Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D), 

this Memorandum Decision shall not be 

regarded as precedent or cited before any 

court except for the purpose of establishing 

the defense of res judicata, collateral 

estoppel, or the law of the case. 

ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT

Ronald K. Smith 

Public Defender 

Muncie, Indiana 

ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE

Curtis T. Hill, Jr. 

Attorney General of Indiana 

Jodi Kathryn Stein 

Deputy Attorney General 

Indianapolis, Indiana 

IN THE 

COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA 

Cory M. Wallace, 

Appellant-Defendant, 

v. 

State of Indiana, 

Appellee-Plaintiff 

August 4, 2017 

Court of Appeals Case No. 

18A02-1611-CR-2691 

Appeal from the Delaware Circuit 

Court 

The Honorable Marianne L. 

Vorhees, Judge 

Trial Court Cause No. 

18C01-1508-F1-4 

Vaidik, Chief Judge. 
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Case Summary 

[1] In 2015, Cory Wallace set fire to his Muncie house to cover up the fact that he 

had battered and failed to seek medical care for his four-month-old son, 

resulting in the infant’s death. He was convicted of numerous crimes and 

sentenced to seventy-two years. He now appeals, arguing that the trial court 

erred in admitting numerous pieces of evidence and that the trial court made 

mistakes in sentencing him. Finding no errors, we affirm the trial court in all 

respects. 

Facts and Procedural History 

[2] On February 10, 2015, twenty-two-year-old Wallace and his pregnant wife, 

Sheryl, were living with their four-month-old son, J.W., and Sheryl’s mother in 

Muncie. Twenty days earlier, Wallace had pled guilty in Marion County to 

Class D felony neglect of a dependent for failing to seek medical treatment for 

injuries to another son he had with a different woman and was sentenced to one 

year of house arrest and two years of probation. State’s Ex. 146. At 7:25 p.m., 

while Sheryl’s mother was at work, Wallace called 911 to report that their 

house was on fire and that J.W. was trapped inside. The Muncie Fire 

Department was dispatched at 7:26 p.m. Wallace and Sheryl were waiting 

outside when first responders arrived. Firefighters entered the house and found 

J.W. in his bedroom laying in his playpen with flames nearby. Firefighters 

removed J.W. from his playpen and took him outside where paramedics were 

waiting. From the time of dispatch until the time firefighters handed J.W. to 
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paramedics, less than four minutes had elapsed. Tr. Vol. I p. 94. According to 

firefighters, there “couldn’t have [been] a faster scenario.” Id. at 95. 

[3] Paramedics ran with J.W. to a nearby parked ambulance and conducted an 

assessment; J.W. had no pulse, was not breathing, and had no heartbeat. He 

was pronounced dead at 7:41 p.m. At no time did Wallace or Sheryl approach 

the ambulance to check on their son. Paramedics took J.W.’s body to the 

morgue at IU Health Ball Memorial Hospital. 

[4] Wallace and Sheryl, who had not yet been told by authorities about J.W.’s 

death, were also taken to Ball Memorial Hospital, where they were examined 

by an emergency-room physician, Dr. Ryan Wallace. Wallace told Dr. 

Wallace that he burned his right hand while opening the door to J.W.’s 

bedroom and that he was experiencing shortness of breath and chest pain. 

There was a red area on Wallace’s right hand, but according to Dr. Wallace it 

was not a burn. While in the emergency room, Wallace never asked about 

J.W.; he did, however, ask for pain medicine at least three times. 

[5] Also while in the emergency room, Muncie Police Department Sergeant Seth 

Stanley spoke with Wallace about the events leading up to the 911 call. 

Wallace told Sergeant Stanley that he smelled smoke in the house and went to 

J.W.’s bedroom. He opened the door, at which point he encountered smoke. 

Fire then “flashed” in his face, forcing him to put up his arms to block the fire. 

Id. at 172. Because he could not get to J.W., he and Sheryl exited the house. 

Sergeant Stanley noted several things during his conversation with Wallace: 
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Wallace did not have any burns or singe marks on him despite fire allegedly 

flashing in his face, he had “no emotion,” he was “very calm” and “matter-offact,” and he “never asked about [J.W.].” Id. at 174. 

[6] When the family was brought together to be told about J.W.’s death, Wallace 

showed no change in demeanor, while Sheryl showed relief. Only the extended 

family members were visibly upset by the news. 

[7] While the initial plan had been to bring J.W.’s body to Wallace and Sheryl in 

the emergency room that night, as it was customary to do so, that plan changed 

when Sergeant Stanley was summoned to the morgue to inspect J.W.’s body. 

Because Sergeant Stanley observed injuries to J.W.’s body that were unrelated 

to the fire, the decision was made to begin a criminal investigation into J.W.’s 

death. 

[8] Accordingly, Wallace was interviewed by police in the early-morning hours of 

February 11. He was advised of his Miranda rights and then waived them in 

writing. State’s Ex. 133. Wallace told police that he smelled something 

“funky” around 6:30 p.m., checked the house but found nothing, and then fell 

asleep with Sheryl in their master bedroom. Ex. 112A, p. 111. About thirty 

minutes later, however, he and Sheryl awoke to thick smoke in their bedroom. 

He went to J.W.’s bedroom and saw black smoke at the door and “knew 

immediately something was on fire.” Id. When he opened the door, there was 

a “flash” of fire and he burned his right hand. Id. at 155. Wallace surmised 
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that the space heater in J.W.’s room started the fire. Wallace was allowed to 

leave at the end of the interview. 

[9] Following this interview, the investigation into J.W.’s death continued into the 

spring and summer of 2015. This investigation revealed the following 

information. The forensic pathologist who conducted J.W.’s autopsy 

concluded that J.W. had died before the fire started. The cause of J.W.’s death 

was blunt force trauma to the head, which consisted of a left subdural 

hemorrhage, a left orbital epidural hemorrhage, and cortical contusions. The 

forensic pathologist noted additional injuries to J.W., including a torn 

frenulum1

; scrapes, abrasions, and circular burns to J.W.’s scalp, face, neck, 

ears, chest, back, arms, and legs; and two fractured ribs (one that was new and 

one that was healing). The forensic pathologist determined that J.W.’s injuries 

were caused by inflicted abuse. The investigation also revealed that J.W. had 

never been seen by a pediatrician since he was born. In addition, the Chief Fire 

Investigator for the Muncie Fire Department concluded that the fire originated 

in J.W.’s bedroom, that there were two origins in J.W.’s bedroom (near the 

playpen and near a rocking chair), and that the fire was incendiary, that is, 

intentionally set.2

 Tr. Vol. II pp. 20-23. The State Fire Marshal reached the 

 

1

 The frenulum is the piece of tissue that connects the lips (upper and lower) to the gums. Tr. Vol. II p. 125. 

A torn frenulum is a “sentinel injury” of child abuse, because “it’s a sign of what’s going on with the child.” 

Tr. Vol. III p. 21. A torn frenulum is typically caused by shoving something into the mouth so hard that the 

tissue is torn. Id. at 20. 

2

 The space heater was sent to the United States Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives Fire 

Research Laboratory in Maryland for analysis by an electrical engineer and eliminated as a source of the fire. 
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same conclusions as the Chief Fire Investigator. Finally, the investigation 

revealed striking similarities in injuries between J.W. and Wallace’s other son, 

G.R., who was the victim of his January 2015 neglect conviction. That is, 

G.R., who was about two months old at the time of his injuries, had a torn 

frenulum, injuries to his ear, and fractured ribs. State’s Ex. 147. 

[10] Police scheduled two additional interviews with Wallace, but he did not show 

up for them. On August 7, 2015, Muncie police went to Wallace’s probation 

appointment in Indianapolis, where he was living at the time. They then 

transported Wallace to an Indianapolis Metropolitan Police Department office 

to interview him. Wallace was advised of his Miranda rights and waived them 

in writing. State’s Ex. 114A, pp. 188-90; Ex. 144. Wallace initially repeated his 

story of trying to save J.W. but not being able to do so because of the fire in 

J.W.’s bedroom. But when confronted with the autopsy and fire-investigation 

results, Wallace changed his story: he now blamed Sheryl for injuring J.W. and 

starting the fire. At this point, police—not believing Wallace’s story that Sheryl 

was responsible—told Wallace that the interview was over and escorted him 

out of the interview room. While in the hallway, Wallace told police that he 

would tell them everything if he had a cigarette. After smoking a cigarette, 

Wallace was brought back into the interview room. Upon returning, Wallace 

was reminded that he was “still under Miranda and all that stuff.” State’s Ex. 

114A, p. 404. Wallace acknowledged this and said, “I’ll talk to you guys again. 

I don’t need a lawyer.” Id. Wallace proceeded to tell police that he dropped 

J.W. on the hardwood floor around 2:00 a.m. and panicked. He then put J.W. 
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in his playpen despite knowing that J.W. was injured because he was “in and 

out of it.” Id. at 412. Around 9:00 a.m. Wallace realized that J.W. was dead. 

Wallace admitted starting the fire around 7:00 p.m. by twisting and setting fire 

to notebook paper and then throwing the paper near J.W.’s playpen and 

rocking chair. Wallace was arrested at the end of this interview. 

[11] The State charged Wallace with Count 1: Level 1 felony neglect of a dependent 

resulting in death, Count 2: Level 3 felony battery resulting in serious bodily 

injury to a person less than fourteen years old (broken ribs), Count 3: Level 4 

felony arson, Count 4: Level 5 felony battery to a person less than fourteen 

years old (cuts, lacerations, or abrasions to the skin), and Count 5: Level 6 

felony obstruction of justice (statements made during February 11, 2015 

interview with police).3

 Appellant’s App. Vol. II pp. 26-30. 

[12] Before trial, the State filed a notice of its intent to admit Indiana Evidence Rule 

404(b) evidence in the form of Wallace’s January 2015 conviction in Marion 

County for neglecting G.R. The trial court ruled that this conviction was 

admissible as motive for the arson (to conceal the act of neglect in Delaware 

County), to rebut Wallace’s claim that he accidentally dropped J.W. (lack of 

accident), and under the knowledge exception because it showed that Wallace 

 

3

 Sheryl pled guilty to Level 1 felony neglect of a dependent resulting in death and was sentenced to thirty 

years. 
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knew he was placing J.W. in a dangerous situation. Appellant’s App. Vol. III 

pp. 10-14. 

[13] In addition, Wallace moved to suppress the statements he made to police 

during his interviews on February 11 and August 7, 2015. He claimed that he 

was not properly advised of nor did he waive his Miranda rights. Appellant’s 

App. Vol. II pp. 92, 120. A hearing was held, see Tr. Vol. I pp. 4-31, following 

which the trial court ruled that the statements Wallace made during the 

February 11 interview were admissible, the statements he made during the 

recorded portion of the August 11 interview were admissible, and the 

statements he made in the hallway on August 11 were inadmissible. 

Appellant’s App. Vol. II pp. 189-92. 

[14] A jury trial was held in September 2016. Wallace testified in his own defense 

that he was holding J.W. and that J.W. fell to the floor when Sheryl tried to 

grab J.W. from him; in short, he blamed Sheryl for dropping J.W. He further 

testified that he and Sheryl made the decision to start the fire but that Sheryl 

actually started it. The jury found Wallace guilty as charged. 

[15] At the sentencing hearing, the trial court identified numerous aggravators, some 

of which it found applied to only certain convictions: (1) J.W. was only four 

months old; (2) Wallace was on home detention at the time of J.W.’s death for 

neglect of a dependent, G.R.; (3) Wallace never took J.W. to a pediatrician, 

which was intentional on his part to hide J.W.’s injuries; (4) the injuries to J.W. 

were “gruesome” and beyond words; (5) Wallace showed “zero emotion” and 
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no remorse during the proceedings; (6) Wallace was in a position of trust with 

J.W. and violated that trust; (7) J.W.’s injuries were greater than necessary to 

prove the battery counts; (8) J.W. was “grossly underweight” for his age; (9) the 

purpose of the arson was to burn J.W.’s body so that the authorities could not 

detect the abuse; and (10) Wallace planned the arson by removing the smoke 

detectors before starting the fire to allow more time for the fire to spread 

without alerting anyone. Tr. Vol. III pp. 159-60. The trial court found two 

mitigators, both of which it found had “very minimal weight”: (1) Wallace had 

strong emotional and personal support from family and friends and (2) 

imprisonment would result in undue hardship to his dependents. Id. at 162. 

[16] In pronouncing Wallace’s sentence, the trial court noted that “[i]n almost 

fourteen (14) years of service as a judge in this Court I have never seen such 

horrible injuries inflicted on a child, let alone a helpless infant.” Id. at 165-66. 

The trial court then sentenced Wallace to forty years for Count 1, sixteen years 

for Count 2, ten years for Count 3, six years for Count 4, and one year for 

Count 5. The court ordered Counts 1-4 to be served consecutively and Count 5 

to be served concurrently, for an aggregate term of seventy-two years. 

[17] Wallace now appeals. 
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Discussion and Decision 

[18] On appeal, Wallace raises six issues that challenge the admission of various 

pieces of evidence and his sentence. The State contends that he has waived 

each issue for failing to present cogent reasoning supported by citations to 

authorities and the record. See Ind. Appellate Rule (A)(8)(a). We agree with 

the State that Wallace has waived some of his arguments, and we address the 

remaining ones below. 

I. Admissibility of Statements to Police 

[19] Wallace first contends that the trial court abused its discretion in admitting the 

statements he made to police during the August 7, 2015 interview. At the 

beginning of the August 7 interview, Wallace was advised of his Miranda rights 

and then waived them in writing. State’s Ex. 144. After taking a break and 

returning to the interview room, Wallace was reminded that he was “still under 

Miranda and all that stuff.”4

 State’s Ex. 114A, p. 404. Wallace acknowledged 

this and said, “I’ll talk to you guys again. I don’t need a lawyer.” Id. At this 

point, Wallace admitted dropping J.W. on the floor, panicking, and starting the 

fire as a cover up. 

 

4

 Wallace does not argue that he was entitled to a full Miranda advisement upon his return to the interview 

room as opposed to just a reminder. 
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[20] Wallace argues that police, by conducting the August 7 interview in two parts, 

engaged in the sort of “question-first” “Mirandize-later” approach that was 

condemned by the United States Supreme Court in Missouri v. Seibert, 542 U.S. 

600 (2004). In that case, the Supreme Court disapproved of the interrogation 

technique in which interrogating officers purposefully withhold Miranda

warnings until after a suspect has confessed and thereafter give Miranda

warnings and secure a waiver before obtaining a second, similar confession. Id.

at 611-14. But Wallace was not subjected to pre-Miranda interrogation here. 

Instead, Wallace was given his Miranda warnings and waived them at the very 

beginning of the interview, took a break, and was then reminded about his 

Miranda warnings after resuming the interview, at which point he admitted his 

involvement in J.W.’s death and the fire. There is no violation of Seibert. 

Accordingly, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in admitting the 

statements Wallace made to police during the August 7 interview.5

 

 

5

 To the extent Wallace makes other arguments regarding the statements he made to police during the 

August 7 interview, such as that his waiver was not knowing and voluntary, he has waived them for failing to 

make cogent arguments supported by citations to the record. See App. R. 46(A)(8)(a). 

On a related note, before trial, Wallace filed a motion to redact portions of his statements to police. The trial 

court redacted several portions of Wallace’s statements. See Appellant’s App. Vol. III pp. 163-64. On 

appeal, Wallace argues that the trial court erred in not redacting additional portions. He cites various 

grounds to support these additional redactions, such as Evidence Rules 404 and 704; however, he does not 

list the actual statements he claims should be redacted. Rather, he merely lists the page numbers where these 

allegedly objectionable statements appear, leaving us to guess what the statements are. See Appellant’s Br. p. 

12 (“The objected to portions are as follows: pg. 82, 84-87, 106, 108, 120, 125, 126-128, 137-139, 146, 147-

148, 151, 153, 214, 221, 241.”). He has therefore waived this issue. 
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II. Admissibility of Neglect Conviction 

[21] Wallace next contends that the trial court erred in admitting evidence of his 

January 2015 neglect-of-a-dependent conviction concerning his other son, G.R. 

Indiana Evidence Rule 404(b) provides that evidence of a crime, wrong, or 

other act “is not admissible to prove a person’s character in order to show that 

on a particular occasion the person acted in accordance with the character,” but 

it “may be admissible for another purpose, such as proving motive, opportunity, 

intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, absence of mistake, or lack of 

accident.” Indiana Evidence Rule 403 provides, in turn, that evidence, even if 

relevant, should be excluded “if its probative value is substantially outweighed 

by a danger of one or more of the following: unfair prejudice, confusing the 

issues, misleading the jury, undue delay, or needlessly presenting cumulative 

evidence.” Therefore, when the State seeks to use evidence of a crime, wrong, 

or other act, the court must (1) determine whether the evidence is relevant to a 

matter at issue other than the defendant’s propensity to commit the charged act 

and, if so, (2) balance the probative value of the evidence against its prejudicial 

effect. Hicks v. State, 690 N.E.2d 215, 221 (Ind. 1997). We review a trial court’s 

ruling for an abuse of discretion. Spencer v. State, 703 N.E.2d 1053, 1057 (Ind. 

1999). 

[22] Here, the trial court ruled that Wallace’s neglect conviction was admissible 

under Evidence Rule 404(b) on three separate grounds—motive, lack of 

accident, and knowledge. Appellant’s App. Vol. III p. 14; see also Tr. Vol. I p. 

129 (trial court reaffirming its pretrial ruling when the evidence was admitted 
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during trial). On appeal, Wallace argues that his neglect conviction was not 

admissible to prove “identity” and “intent.” Appellant’s Br. pp. 13-14. But the 

trial court did not admit Wallace’s neglect conviction for either of these 

purposes. Moreover, the trial court expressly found that the conviction was not

admissible to prove identity. Appellant’s App. Vol. III p. 14. And even if the 

neglect conviction was not admissible to prove intent, which we doubt given 

that the admissibility of crimes, wrongs, and other acts to establish intent and 

absence of mistake/lack of accident is well established in child-abuse cases, see 

Ceaser v. State, 964 N.E.2d 911, 915 (Ind. Ct. App. 2012), trans. denied, Wallace 

makes no argument on appeal that the three grounds the trial court found 

applied are improper. We therefore affirm the trial court’s admission of 

Wallace’s earlier neglect conviction. 

III. Dr. Wallace’s Testimony 

[23] Wallace next contends that the trial court erred in admitting Dr. Wallace’s 

testimony that addressed his statements “regarding his treatment.”6

 Appellant’s 

Br. p. 15. He cites Indiana Code section 34-46-3-1, which provides, in relevant 

part: 

 

6

 To the extent Wallace challenges additional portions of Dr. Wallace’s testimony, he has waived such 

challenge for failing to develop it. 
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Except as otherwise provided by statute, the following persons 

shall not be required to testify regarding the following 

communications: 

* * * * * 

(2) Physicians, as to matters communicated to them by patients, 

in the course of their professional business, or advice given in 

such cases. 

(Emphasis added). Dr. Wallace testified that Wallace complained of shortness 

of breath/chest pain and a burn to his right hand. Wallace told Dr. Wallace 

that he fell asleep and woke up when the smoke detector went off. He went to 

his baby’s room and tried to open the door but burned his hand. 

[24] The State responds that Indiana Code section 31-32-11-1 abrogates the 

physician-patient privilege in judicial proceedings resulting from a report of 

child abuse or relating to the subject matter of the report. The statute provides: 

The privileged communication between: 

(1) a husband and wife; 

(2) a health care provider and the health care provider’s patient; 

(3) a: 

(A) licensed social worker; 

(B) licensed clinical social worker; 
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(C) licensed marriage and family therapist; 

(D) licensed mental health counselor; 

(E) licensed addiction counselor; or 

(F) licensed clinical addiction counselor; 

and a client of any of the professionals described in clauses (A) 

through (F); 

(4) a school counselor and a student; or 

(5) a school psychologist and a student; 

is not a ground for excluding evidence in any judicial proceeding 

resulting from a report of a child who may be a victim of child 

abuse or neglect or relating to the subject matter of the report or

failing to report as required by IC 31-33. 

Ind. Code § 31-32-11-1 (emphases added); see J.B. v. E.B., 935 N.E.2d 296, 300 

(Ind. Ct. App. 2010) (“Section 31-32-11-1 is designed to reconcile the operation 

of various privileges with Indiana’s reporting statute, Indiana Code section 31-

33-5-1, which requires any person who has reason to believe that a child is the 

victim of abuse or neglect to make a report.”). 

[25] The State, however, makes no argument that there was a “report” for purposes 

of Section 31-32-11-1. Cf. J.B., 935 N.E.2d at 297 (Father reported his son’s 

inappropriate touching of his daughter to DCS); Hayes v. State, 667 N.E.2d 222 
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(Ind. Ct. App. 1996) (therapist called DCS to report suspected abuse following 

therapy session in which patient admitted molesting his stepdaughter). In any 

event, as the State notes, Wallace’s statements to Dr. Wallace regarding his 

treatment are merely cumulative of statements he made to various other people 

in this case. See, e.g., Tr. Vol I. pp. 164, 172-173; State’s Ex. 112A, pp. 110-12, 

155-56; State’s Ex. 114A, pp. 202-03. Accordingly, even if the trial court erred 

in admitting this testimony, the error is harmless.7

 See Johnson v. State, 6 N.E.3d 

491, 499 (Ind. Ct. App. 2014) (holding that any error in the admission of 

evidence is harmless if it is cumulative of other appropriately admitted 

evidence). 

IV. Sentencing 

[26] Last, Wallace challenges his seventy-two-year sentence. Specifically, he argues 

that the trial court erred in finding two aggravators.8

 Our trial courts enjoy 

broad discretion in finding aggravators, and we will reverse only for an abuse of 

that discretion. Coy v. State, 999 N.E.2d 937, 946 (Ind. Ct. App. 2013). 

 

7

 Wallace also argues that the trial court erred in admitting the testimony of Dr. Tara Harris, a child-abuse 

pediatrician at Riley Hospital. Wallace has waived this issue for failing to present a cogent argument. See

App. R. 46(A)(8)(a). 

8

 Wallace’s brief states: “Wallace submits that the appropriate standard of review is whether the court’s 

sentence was inappropriate in light of both the nature of his offense and his character, pursuant to Appellate 

Rule 7(B).” Appellant’s Br. p. 16. However, it is clear from reading the whole issue that Wallace is really 

challenging the aggravators that the trial court found. There is no analysis in his brief of the nature of the 

offenses and his character. Even if such an argument had been made, it would have been unsuccessful. We 

therefore treat Wallace’s argument as one challenging the trial court’s sentencing discretion. 
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[27] Wallace first argues that the trial court erred in finding as an aggravator that 

J.W.’s injuries were greater than necessary to prove the two battery counts. See

Tr. Vol. III p. 160 (“I also find as aggravators on these two (2) counts the 

injuries to the child were greater than the elements necessary to prove the 

commission of the offenses.”). But Wallace does not develop this argument 

with citation to authority or the record. He has therefore waived it. See App. 

R. 46(A)(8)(a). 

[28] Wallace next argues that the trial court erred in finding as an aggravator that he 

lacked remorse. Wallace claims this aggravator is erroneous because he is 

entitled to maintain his innocence. In support, he cites Bluck v. State, 716 

N.E.2d 507 (Ind. Ct. App. 1999). In that case, we held that a lack of remorse 

by a defendant who insists upon his innocence may be a valid aggravator. Id. at 

513. We acknowledged an exception where the only evidence of the 

defendant’s guilt is the victim’s uncorroborated testimony. Id. Here, however, 

there is considerable evidence of Wallace’s guilt. And, notably, Wallace does 

not contend otherwise. Accordingly, the trial court did not abuse its discretion 

in finding as an aggravator that Wallace lacked remorse. Moreover, even 

without this aggravator, there are numerous aggravators that Wallace does not 

challenge. We therefore affirm Wallace’s seventy-two-year sentence. 

[29] Affirmed. 

Mathias, J., and Crone, J., concur.