IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA 

 

FELIX D. WHITTINGTON, : CIVIL ACTION 

 : 

 Plaintiff : 

 : 

v. : 

: 

DONALD VAUGHN, et al., : 

 : 

 Defendants : No. 02-4346 

ORDER

 AND NOW, this day of 2003, upon consideration of the Commonwealth 

defendants’ motion for summary judgment and Plaintiff’s response hereto (if any), it is 

ORDERED that the said motion is GRANTED. Judgment is entered in favor of SCI Graterford, 

Feild, Canino, Vaughn, DiGuglielmo, Buzzar, and Smith and against Plaintiff. 

 BY THE COURT: 

 _________________________ 

 MARVIN KATZ, J. 

Case 2:02-cv-04346-MK Document 91 Filed 10/14/2003 Page 1 of 25
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA 

 

FELIX D. WHITTINGTON, : CIVIL ACTION 

 : 

 Plaintiff : 

 : 

v. : 

: 

DONALD VAUGHN, et al., : 

 : 

 Defendants : No. 02-4346 

COMMONWEALTH DEFNDANTS’ MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

 Defendants the State Correctional Institution at Graterford (“SCI Graterford”), Feild, 

Canino, Vaughn, DiGuglielmo, Buzzar, and Smith (collectively, the “Commonwealth 

defendants), move the Court, pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 56, to enter judgment in their favor, and 

aver as follows: 

 1. Based upon the facts as submitted in the pleadings, in Plaintiff’s deposition, and in the 

affidavits of defendants Francis “Skip” Feild and [PRISON RECORD OFFICIAL] (attached as 

Exh. D-3), there is no genuine issue as to any material fact. 

 2. The Commonwealth defendants are entitled to judgment as a matter of law because: 

a. Defendant SCI Graterford and the individual Commonwealth defendants in 

their official capacities are protected from suit for damages by virtue of the 

Eleventh Amendment and the “person” requirement of 42 U.S.C. § 1983. 

b. Plaintiff’s civil rights have not been violated for the following reasons: 

(i) Defendant Feild never forcibly medicated Plaintiff with 

psychotropic medication. 

Case 2:02-cv-04346-MK Document 91 Filed 10/14/2003 Page 2 of 25
(ii) Plaintiff does not have a liberty interest in remaining free from a 

more restrictive type of custody. 

(iii) Plaintiff received all the process due at each of his misconduct 

hearings before defendant Canino. 

(iv) Defendant Vaughn’s upholding of the misconduct hearing 

decisions is not be a constitutional violation. 

d. Even if a civil rights violation did occur, defendants DiGuglielmo, Buzzar, 

and Smith were not personally involved in any of these violations. 

e. Even if a civil rights violation did occur, the Commonwealth defendants are 

protected from liability for damages by qualified immunity. 

 This motion is supported by the attached memorandum of law. 

 WHEREFORE, the Commonwealth defendants pray for an order granting judgment in 

their favor, thereby dismissing all claims by Plaintiff against them and affording such further 

relief as is just and proper. 

 D. MICHAEL FISHER 

 ATTORNEY GENERAL 

 BY: s/ Kevin Bradford 

 Kevin R. Bradford 

 Deputy Attorney General 

 Identification No. 88576 

 Susan J. Forney 

 Chief Deputy Attorney General 

 Chief, Litigation Section 

OFFICE OF ATTORNEY GENERAL 

21 South 12th Street, 3rd Floor 

Philadelphia, PA 19107 

Telephone: (215) 560-2262 

Case 2:02-cv-04346-MK Document 91 Filed 10/14/2003 Page 3 of 25
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA 

 

FELIX D. WHITTINGTON, : CIVIL ACTION 

 : 

 Plaintiff : 

 : 

v. : 

: 

DONALD VAUGHN, et al., : 

 : 

 Defendants : No. 02-4346 

MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF COMMONWEALTH DEFENDANTS’ MOTION 

FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

I. STATEMENT OF THE CASE 

 Plaintiff, Felix Whittington, an inmate currently incarcerated at the State Correctional 

Institution at Greene, Pennsylvania (“SCI Greene”) has filed a civil rights complaint naming a 

variety of defendants. The following Commonwealth of Pennsylvania employees and entities 

are among those named as defendants: the State Correctional Institution at Graterford (“SCI 

Graterford”); Donald Vaughn, the ex-Superintendent of SCI Graterford and current Deputy 

Secretary of the Eastern Region of the Pennsylvania Department of Corrections (“DOC”); Mary 

Canino, a DOC Hearing Examiner; and Francis “Skip” Feild, a Major at SCI Graterford 

(collectively, “Commonwealth defendants”). There are other Commonwealth employees that are 

not listed in the caption of the Complaint nor on the Court’s docket, but are named on page 2 of 

Plaintiff’s Complaint in a section where each defendant is to be described. Exhibit. D-1 at § III. 

These individuals are David DiGuglielmo, the ex-Deputy for Facility Management and current 

Acting Superintendent at SCI Graterford; Thomas Buzzar, a Major at SCI Graterford; and Guy 

Smith, a Captain at SCI Graterford. For the sake of clarity and comprehensiveness, the 

Case 2:02-cv-04346-MK Document 91 Filed 10/14/2003 Page 4 of 25
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aforementioned Commonwealth agency and employees will all be considered defendants and 

collectively referred to as the “Commonwealth defendants” from this point forward. 

 Plaintiff’s Complaint, which is a fill-in-the-blanks form used by inmates to initiate civil 

rights proceedings, does not specify his theory of liability as to any of the defendants. The 

Complaint was originally filed on May 6, 2002 in United States District for the Middle District 

of Pennsylvania. On June 28, 2002, this case was transferred to the Eastern District. Beginning 

on July 15, 2002 and continuing until at least June 19, 2003, Plaintiff has regularly mailed letters 

to this Court. On each occasion, this Court has ordered that the clerk file the correspondence of 

record. On November 18, 2002, this Court ordered a Special Report from the DOC regarding 

Plaintiff’s custody status, classification, medical and psychiatric status, and disciplinary history. 

The Special Report was received by the Court and filed on December 18, 2002. Exh. D-2. On 

June 12, 2003, because of the minimal information in the Complaint, the Commonwealth 

defendants filed a motion for a more definite statement. On June 19, 2003, the Court denied this 

motion without prejudice and ordered that the necessary information be gathered through 

discovery. 

 Following a deposition of Plaintiff, where Plaintiff had a full opportunity to address any 

and all claims against the Commonwealth defendants, it is clear that Plaintiff’s alleged civil 

rights violations are based upon the following actions: (1) defendant Feild’s efforts to get 

Plaintiff to take psychotropic medication, (2) defendant Canino’s actions at misconduct hearings, 

and (3) defendant Vaughn’s unfavorable responses to Plaintiff’s misconduct appeals. 

 Defendant SCI Graterford moves for summary judgment since this Court lacks 

jurisdiction over this party. The remaining Commonwealth defendants move for summary 

judgment since they are immune from damages suits in their official capacities and, in their 

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individual capacities, have not violated Plaintiff’s civil rights. Additionally, even if the Court 

finds that any of the Commonwealth defendants did violate the Plaintiff’s civil rights, they are all 

protected from liability for damages by qualified immunity. 

II. STATEMENT OF THE UNDISPUTED FACTS 

 Plaintiff is in DOC custody serving a life sentence for a Murder conviction. Pl. Dep. at 6-

7.1

 From 1994 until 2002, Plaintiff was serving this sentence at SCI Graterford. Plaintiffs’ 

claims arise from this time served at SCI Graterford. 

 Plaintiff is an admitted schizophrenic. Pl. Dep. at 7. He is six feet, two inches tall and 

approximately 253 pounds. Id. at 5. Plaintiff has a history of violent behavior and fire starting. 

Exh. D-2. Plaintiff admits to hearing voices and having mood swings. Id. at 56, 66. Plaintiff 

also believes that he is being controlled or attempted to be controlled through his ears by 

“security monitoring defenses with an electronic device” while at various DOC facilities 

throughout the state, including SCI Graterford. Id. at 64. Plaintiff’s behavior has caused other 

inmates to be afraid of him. Pl. Dep. at 72; Feild Decl., Attachment 1.2

 During Plaintiff’s stay at SCI Graterford, there were times when Plaintiff would take the 

psychotropic medications,3

 prescribed to address his schizophrenia, and there were times that he 

would refuse to take these medications. Pl. Dep. at 12-14, 36-39; Feild Decl. ¶ 5. 

 

1

 Plaintiff’s Deposition is attached to this motion as Exhibit D-3 and will be referred to as “Pl. 

Dep.” throughout the memorandum. 

2

 Defendant Feild's Declaration is attached to this motion as Exhibit D-11 and will be referred to 

as “Feild Decl.” throughout the memorandum. 

3

 Psychotropic medications, which are also referred to as “antipsychotic drugs,” are medications 

commonly used in treating mental disorders such as schizophrenia. Washington v. Harper, 494 

U.S. 210, 214 (1990) (citing Brief for American Psychiatric Association et al., as Amici Curiae

2-3, n. 1). The effect of these drugs is “to alter the chemical balance in the brain, the desired 

result being that the medication will assist the patient in organizing his or her thought processes 

and regaining a rational state of mind.” Id.

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 Plaintiff first had contact with defendant Feild in 1995. Pl. Dep. at 9. At all relevant 

times, defendant Feild was a Unit Manager of the Special Needs Units at SCI Graterford. Feild 

Decl., ¶ 4. From 1995 until Plaintiff’s eventual transfer to SCI Albion in 2002, Plaintiff and 

defendant Feild had frequent discussions regarding Plaintiff’s psychotropic medications. Pl. 

Dep. at 9; Feild Decl. ¶ 5. On at least one occasion, Plaintiff told defendant Feild about the 

voices he hears and the “security monitoring defenses.” Pl. Dep. at 66. These discussions took 

place either in the form of Program Review Committee Hearings, which were scheduled 

meetings also attended by two other prison officials, or as more informal discussions with just 

defendant Feild in his office. Pl. Dep. at 9-11; Feild Decl. ¶ 5. The informal meetings almost 

always took place as a result of disruptive or unusual behavior by Plaintiff. Id. When defendant 

Feild had meetings with Plaintiff, he often urged Plaintiff to take his psychotropic medication 

and Plaintiff always agreed to comply, at least temporarily. Id.

 One time, during one of their informal meetings called as a result of Plaintiff’s behavior, 

defendant Feild told Plaintiff that he would be issued what Plaintiff believed to be a misconduct 

if he refused to take his medication. Pl. Dep. at 45, 50; D-1 at 2.4 Plaintiff agreed to take his 

medication. Id. Defendant Feild did not issue a misconduct or file any other document as a 

result of this discussion. Feild Decl. ¶ 7; Pl.’s Dep. at 14. Defendant Feild never issued Plaintiff 

a single misconduct throughout his incarceration at SCI Graterford (1995 to 2002). Feild Decl. ¶ 

7; Pl.’s Dep. at 50. 

 

4

 Plaintiff believed at this meeting there was a misconduct on defendant Feild’s desk. Pl. Dep. at 

45. Defendant Feild states that, at this meeting, he had on his desk a form used transfer inmates 

to the Restricted Housing Unit in administrative custody (non-disciplinary purposes). Feild 

Decl. ¶ 7. The form used to do this is the same form used to issue misconducts. Id.

Case 2:02-cv-04346-MK Document 91 Filed 10/14/2003 Page 7 of 25
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 Plaintiff did receive numerous misconducts from other prison officials during this time 

period. Pl. Dep. at 21-35; Exhs. D-5 to D-11.5 On every single occasion that Plaintiff received a 

misconduct while at SCI Graterford, he was not taking his psychotropic medications. Pl. Dep. 

The descriptions of each of these misconducts are as follows: 

 On January 29, 1996, Plaintiff was charged with refusing to obey an order; presence in an 

unauthorized area; and lying to an employee (misconduct number 769252). Plaintiff has a 

misconduct hearing before Hearing Examiner Donald Jones, who found Plaintiff guilty of 

refusing to obey an order and presence in an unauthorized area and sentenced Plaintiff to 30 days 

cell restriction. Exh. D-5; Pl. Dep. at 21-23. 

 On September 8, 1996, Plaintiff was charged with refusing to obey an order and using 

abusive or obscene language to an employee (misconduct number 852035). On this occasion, 

the misconduct Hearing Examiner was defendant Mary Canino. Plaintiff pled guilty to using 

abusive or obscene language to an employee. Defendant Canino found that Plaintiff was not 

guilty of the other charge and ordered that he lose his prison job for the charge that he pled guilty 

to. Exh. D-6; Pl. Dep. at 23-24. 

 On November 2, 1996, Plaintiff was charged with threatening an employee or their 

family (misconduct number 864258). Defendant Canino found Plaintiff guilty and ordered 60 

days disciplinary custody.6

 Exh. D-7; Pl. Dep. at 24-26. 

 

5

 Copies of each misconduct report and the accompanying witness/assistance request forms, 

inmate version forms, hearing reports, and appeals to the Superintendent (if any) are attached to 

this motion as exhibits D-4 through D-10. At his deposition, Plaintiff acknowledged each of 

these misconducts and the hearings addressing them. Pl. Dep. at 21-35. 

6

 “Disciplinary custody is the ‘maximum restrictive status of confinement’ for inmates in the 

Pennsylvania prison system.” Mitchell v. Horn, 318 F.3d 523, 532 n.5 (3d Cir. 2003) (quoting

DC-ADM 801 IV(B)). 

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 On August 6, 1997, Plaintiff was charged with refusing to obey an order and lying to an 

employee (misconduct number 788971). Hearing Examiner Donald James found Plaintiff guilty 

of both charges and sentenced him to 60 days disciplinary custody. Exh. D-8; Pl. Dep. 26-28. 

 On December 20, 2000, Plaintiff was charged with threatening an employee or their 

family with bodily harm (misconduct number A-327942). Following Plaintiff’s plea of guilty to 

the charge, Defendant Canino ordered Plaintiff to serve 60 days disciplinary custody and lose his 

prison job. Exh. D-9; Pl. Dep. at 28-30. 

 On April 20, 2001, Plaintiff was charged with threatening an employee or their family 

with bodily harm; indecent exposure; and refusing to obey an order (misconduct number A327928). Defendant Canino found plaintiff guilty of the three charges and ordered 270 days 

disciplinary custody. Exh. D-10; Pl. Dep. at 31-33. 

 On October 5, 2001, Plaintiff was charged with assault; threatening an employee or their 

family with bodily harm; using abusive, obscene, or inappropriate language to an employee; 

refusing to obey an order; and lying to an employee (misconduct number A-293982). Plaintiff 

pled guilty to using abusive, obscene, or inappropriate language to an employee. Defendant 

Canino found Plaintiff guilty of the remaining charges, except for lying to an employee, and 

ordered 180 days of disciplinary custody. Exh. D-11; Pl. Dep. at 34-35. 

 Plaintiff appealed misconduct numbers A-327942 and A-327928 to defendant Vaughn 

who was the Superintendent of SCI Graterford at the time. Defendant Vaughn responded to the 

appeals, upholding defendant Canino’s rulings on both occasions. Exh. D-9, D-10; Pl. Dep. 71-

72. 

Case 2:02-cv-04346-MK Document 91 Filed 10/14/2003 Page 9 of 25
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 Aside from being named on page 2 of Plaintiff’s Complaint in the “Defendants” section, 

DiGuglielmo, Buzzar, and Smith, are not referred to anywhere else in the Complaint. Exh. D-1. 

Furthermore, not one of these names came up during Plaintiff’s deposition. 

III. ARGUMENT 

A. Summary Judgment Standards. 

 The Court should enter summary judgment “if the pleadings, depositions, answers to 

interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no 

genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a 

matter of law.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c). The party seeking summary judgment “bears the initial 

responsibility of informing the district court of the basis for its motion, and identifying those 

portions of ‘the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, 

together with the affidavits, if any,’ which it believes demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue 

of material fact.” Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986). The motion must be 

granted unless the nonmoving party designates specific facts in discovery materials or affidavits 

showing a genuine material factual issue that can only be resolved by a trial or unless the law 

does not support the motion. Id. at 324; Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(e). 

 "Material" facts are those that might affect the outcome of the suit under the substantive 

law governing the claims made. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). An 

issue of fact is "genuine" only "if the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a 

verdict for the nonmoving party" in light of the burdens of proof required by substantive law. Id.

at 248-250, 252-255. Stated another way, the court must enter summary judgment against a 

nonmoving party who fails to make a factual showing sufficient to permit a reasonable jury to 

find an element essential to that party's case and on which that party bears the burden of proof. 

Case 2:02-cv-04346-MK Document 91 Filed 10/14/2003 Page 10 of 25
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Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. at 323. Evidence that is "merely colorable" or "not 

significantly probative" or a mere “scintilla” will not defeat the motion. Anderson v. Liberty 

Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. at 249-252, 256, 257; Miller v. City of Philadelphia, 174 F.3d 368, 377 (3d 

Cir. 1999). Conclusory statements are not facts and cannot create issues of fact. Lujan v. 

National Wildlife Federation, 497 U.S. 871, 888, 889 (1990). 

B. By Virtue of the Eleventh Amendment, this Court Lacks Subject Matter 

Jurisdiction over Plaintiff’s Claims against SCI Graterford. 

 The Eleventh Amendment to the U.S. Constitution immunizes states and their agencies 

from suit in the federal courts. The Eleventh Amendment states: 

 The Judicial power of the United States shall not be construed to extend to any suit in law 

 or equity, commenced or prosecuted against one of the United States by Citizens of 

 another State, or by Citizens or Subjects of any Foreign State. 

U.S. Const., Amend. XI. It is well-established that the Eleventh Amendment immunizes states 

and state agencies from federal court suits by private parties. Idaho v. Coeur d’Alene Tribe of 

Idaho, 521 U.S. 261 (1997); Seminole Tribe of Florida v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 54 (1996); 

Puerto Rico Aqueduct and Sewer Authority v. Metcalf and Eddy, 506 U.S. 139 (1993); Dellmuth 

v. Muth, 491 U.S. 223 (1989); Welch v. Texas Dept. of Highways, 483 U.S. 468 (1987); 

Atascadero State Hospital v. Scanlon, 473 U.S. 234 (1985); Pennhurst State School and Hospital 

v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89 (1984). 

 Eleventh Amendment immunity protects a state from suits regardless of whether the party 

is a citizen of that state or not, Pennhurst, 465 U.S. at 100, and regardless of the type of relief 

sought. Id. at 98. This immunity extends “to suits against departments or agencies of the state 

having no existence apart from the state.” Laskaris v. Thornburgh, 661 F.2d 23, 25 (3d Cir. 

1981), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 886 (1984). 

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 There are two ways to get around a state’s Eleventh Amendment immunity. A state may 

consent to being sued or Congress may specifically abrogate this immunity pursuant to a valid 

exercise of power. See Kimel v. Florida Bd. of Regents, 528 U.S. 62, 72-73 (2000). 

 While a state may consent to be sued in federal court, thereby waiving its immunity, 

Pennsylvania has not done so. To the contrary, as noted in Laskaris, 661 F.2d at 25, by virtue of 

42 Pa.C.S. § 8521 (b), Pennsylvania has explicitly withheld its consent, thereby retaining to the 

fullest possible extent the immunity afforded by the Eleventh Amendment. 

 Eleventh Amendment immunity may also be bypassed when Congress specifically 

abrogates this immunity pursuant to a valid exercise of power. Wheeling and Lake Erie Railway 

Co. v. Public Utility Commission of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, 141 F.3d 88, 91 (3d 

Cir. 1998). However, “Congress did not abrogate state immunity in general in enacting civil 

rights legislation, including § 1983.” Petsinger v. Pa. Department of Transportation, 211 

F.Supp.2d 610, 613 (E.D.Pa. 2002) (citing O’Hara v. Ind. Univ. of Pa., 171 F.Supp. 490, 495 

(W.D.Pa. 2001)). 

 It is well-established that the DOC is part of the executive branch of the Commonwealth 

of Pennsylvania and, therefore, an arm of the state entitled to Eleventh Amendment immunity. 

See Lavia v. Pennsylvania, Dept. of Corrections, 224 F.3d 190, 195 (3d Cir. 2000); Bey v. 

Pennsylvania Dept. of Corrections, 98 F.Supp.2d 650, 657 (E.D.Pa. 2000); 71 P.S. § 61. 

Individual DOC state correctional institutions are merely subdivisions of the DOC and are also 

considered arms of the state entitled to Eleventh Amendment immunity. See Demyun v. 

Pennsylvania Department of Corrections, No. 00-0155, 2001 WL 1083936, at *3 (M.D.Pa. Sept. 

14, 2001). See also Bey, 98 F.Supp.2d at 657 (DOC’s Program Review Committees are arms of 

the state since they are run exclusively by and through the DOC). 

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 Since SCI Graterford is a state entity entitled to Eleventh Amendment protection, there 

exists no subject matter jurisdiction over this party. 

C. SCI Graterford is not a “Person” for § 1983 Purposes. 

 In addition to the protection of Eleventh Amendment immunity, states cannot be sued 

under § 1983. This statute provides in relevant part: 

Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of 

any State or Territory or the District of Columbia, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any 

citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the 

deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, 

shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper 

proceeding for redress. 

42 U.S.C. § 1983 (emphasis added). The Supreme Court has specifically ruled that states and 

their agencies are not considered “persons” for purposes of this statute and thus cannot be subject 

to claims brought pursuant to § 1983. Will v. Michigan Department of State Police, 491 U.S. 58 

(1989). See also, Fidtler v. Pennsylvania Department of Corrections, 55 Fed.Appx. 33, 2002 WL 

31648368 (3d Cir. 2002). The Court explained that governmental entities that are “arms of the 

state” are not considered persons. Will, at 70. 

 As explained above, the DOC, including SCI Graterford, is an arm of the state. Thus SCI 

Graterford is not a “person” for purposes of § 1983 and cannot be sued under this statute. 

D. Plaintiff’s Damages Claims against the Remaining Commonwealth Defendants 

in their Official Capacities are Barred.7

 State officials, when acting in their official capacities, receive the same protection from 

suit provided to their governmental entity. Hafer v. Melo, 502 U.S. 21, 25 (1991). In other 

words, “[a] suit against a state official in his or her official capacity is not a suit against the 

 

7

 The complaint is not clear as to whether the Commonwealth defendants are sued in their 

official or individual capacities, or both. Therefore, this memorandum will address Plaintiff’s 

claims as they relate to both the official and individual capacities of these defendants. 

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official, but rather a suit against the official’s office...As such, it is no different than a suit against 

the state itself.” Chladek v. Commonwealth of Pa., No. 97-0355, 1998 WL 54345, at *5 

(E.D.Pa. Jan. 29, 1998), citing Will, 491 U.S. at 71. 

 Defendants Vaughn, Canino, Feild, DiGuglielmo, Buzzar, and Smith are all state actors 

by virtue of their employment with the DOC. In their official capacities, they receive the same 

protection from damages suits provided by law to their employer, the DOC. 

 As noted above, the DOC is immune from suit by virtue of Eleventh Amendment 

immunity, as well as the “person” requirement of § 1983. A damages suit against these DOC 

employees, in their official capacities, is precluded for these same reasons.8

E. As a Matter of Law, Defendants Feild, Canino, and Vaughn, in their Individual 

Capacities, have not Violated Plaintiff’s civil rights. 

 Plaintiff fails to articulate the specific civil rights that he believes have been violated by 

the Commonwealth defendants. A potential, but unsuccessful, argument is that defendant Feild’s 

requests to Plaintiff to take psychotropic medication violated Plaintiff’s due process rights. 

1. Defendant Feild 

 In Washington v. Harper, 494 U.S. 210 (1990), the Supreme Court addressed the 

involuntary administration of antipsychotic drugs9

 through forcible injection to a schizophrenic 

Washington state prisoner. The Court, in addressing the prisoner’s substantive due process 

 

8

 It should be noted that, pursuant to the Ex parte Young doctrine, state officials are not shielded 

from suit in their official capacities where prospective injunctive relief is sought. See Koslow v. 

Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, 302 F.3d 161, 168 (3d Cir. 2002); Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. 

123, 159-160 (1908). Plaintiff’s Complaint mentions that he seeks compensation and does not 

appear to request any form of prospective injunctive relief. Furthermore, since Plaintiff is no 

longer incarcerated at SCI Graterford, the location of all of the Commonwealth defendants, any 

such claim would be moot. See Sutton v. Rasheed, 323 F.3d 236, 248 (3d Cir. 2003) (“An 

inmate’s transfer from the complained of facility generally moots the equitable and declaratory 

claims”). 

9

 “Antipsychotic drugs” is another word for “psychotropic drugs.” Harper, 494 U.S. at 214. 

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rights, held that, while prisoners have a “significant liberty interest” in not taking unwanted 

antipsychotic medications, this interest may be overcome where the prisoner has a serious mental 

illness, is dangerous to others, and treatment is in the prisoner’s best interest. Id. at 227. 

 While the instant Plaintiff’s mental diagnosis is quite similar to the plaintiff in Harper, 

the facts regarding the administration of the instant Plaintiff’s medication are quite different. 

Namely, the instant Plaintiff has never been forcibly injected with antipsychotic medication by 

defendant Feild or anyone else. Although Plaintiff characterizes defendant Feild’s 

recommendations to Plaintiff to take his antipsychotic medication to treat his schizophrenia as 

forcing Plaintiff to take his medication, this is simply not true. Plaintiff was permitted to refuse 

the medication. There were numerous occasions during his time at SCI Graterford when 

Plaintiff was not taking medications. As Plaintiff freely admits, at the times of each of his seven 

misconducts that he incurred at SCI Graterford, he was not taking his medication. 

 While Plaintiff was sanctioned for his misbehavior, he was never punished for not taking 

his psychotropic medications. Defendant Feild simply urged Plaintiff to take this medication. 

Even the one incident, where defendant Feild was going to send Plaintiff to the Restricted 

Housing Unit (“RHU”) as a result of his disruptive behavior unless he took his medication, did 

not amount to the involuntary medication of Plaintiff. Plaintiff had the option taking or refusing 

the medication. Any transfer to a different location of the prison as a result of this decision 

would not give rise any Constitutional claims, regardless of whether it was for administrative or 

disciplinary purposes. 

 In Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S. 472 (1995), the Supreme Court held that a inmate’s 

transfer to a more intensive type of custody for disciplinary reasons does not create a liberty 

interest, implicating due process rights, unless the change “imposes atypical and significant 

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hardship on the inmate in relation to the ordinary incidents of prison life.” Id. at 486. 

Subsequent to Sandin, the Courts of this Circuit have repeatedly held that temporary transfers to 

SCI Graterford’s RHU, whether for administrative or disciplinary reasons, do not impose such 

hardships and thus do not create a possible due process violation. See Griffin v. Vaughn, 112 

F.3d 703 (3d Cir. 1997); Johnston v. Vaughn, No. 00-1844, 2000 WL 1694029 (E.D.Pa. Nov. 13, 

2000); Rauso v. Vaughn, No. 96-6977, 2000 WL 873285 (E.D.Pa. Jun. 26, 2000). 

 While Plaintiff did spend a significant period of time in the RHU as a result of his 

misconducts, none of the charges related to the failure of Plaintiff to take his psychotropic 

medication. Furthermore, even if Plaintiff had been transferred to the RHU at SCI Graterford for 

simply not taking his medication (something that Plaintiff acknowledges never happened), no 

due process rights would be implicated by such action. 

 Since the only allegations against defendant Feild involve his requests to Plaintiff to take 

his psychotropic medication and these actions cannot be considered a civil rights violation, the 

claims against this defendant cannot stand. 

2. Defendant Canino 

 Plaintiff’s claims against defendant Canino center upon her role as Hearing Examiner in 

several of Plaintiff’s misconduct hearings. Defendant Canino was the Hearing Examiner for five 

of Plaintiff’s misconduct hearings. Plaintiff alleges that of these five hearings, three involved the 

violation of his civil rights. 

 The three misconducts Plaintiff complains about are the last three he received before his 

departure from SCI Graterford in 2002, numbers A-327942, A-327928, and A-293982. 

Plaintiff’s claims have to do with the denial of witnesses and counsel at these hearings and the 

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sentences imposed by defendant Canino. Presumably, Plaintiff argues that these conditions 

violated his due process rights. 

 In Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539 (1974) the Supreme Court outlined the due process 

requirements applicable in prisoner disciplinary proceedings. The Court held that a prisoner is 

entitled to advance written notice of the charges, a written statement by the fact-finder 

identifying the evidence relied upon and reason for the disciplinary action taken, and the 

opportunity to present evidence and call witnesses. Id. at 563-67. The Court noted that prison 

officials should be given broad discretion in permitting witnesses and that “there must be mutual 

accommodations between institutional needs and objectives and the provisions of the 

Constitution that are of general application.” Id. at 556, 566-67. 

 The Wolff court also explained that there is no right to counsel at prison disciplinary 

hearings. 418 U.S. at 570. Where the prisoner is illiterate or, “due to the complexity of the 

issue, the prisoner would be unable to collect and present the evidence necessary for an adequate 

comprehension of the case” the prisoner may seek the assistance of a fellow prisoner or, if 

unavailable, be assisted by staff. Id. 

 In light of Wolff, Plaintiff’s claims based upon the failure of defendant Canino to provide 

him with counsel are baseless. Plaintiff did request assistance in all three misconduct hearings, 

but did not specify any particular individual he sought assistance from. Plaintiff requested that 

he be provided with a lawyer in two of his requests and “inmate and or staff” in the third. 

However, Plaintiff has never alleged that he is illiterate or baffled by the issues these 

misconducts involve. In misconducts A-327942 and A-327928 defendant Canino addressed 

these concerns in writing next to Plaintiff’s assistance request by noting that he did not need 

assistance. 

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 Plaintiff’s claims regarding his witnesses are likewise without merit. Plaintiff pled guilty 

to misconduct number A-327942 which, as defendant Canino noted in writing, negated the need 

for any witnesses. 

 At the hearing for misconduct number A-327928, Corrections Officer Miller appeared 

pursuant to Plaintiff’s request. Plaintiff had requested six prison guards to appear as witnesses. 

Pursuant to prison regulations, inmates are permitted a maximum of three witnesses and only one 

of these three may be a staff member. Plaintiff selected Officer Miller. It is not clear whether 

the “Inmate Brown,” the only non-staff member requested, was present. However Plaintiff 

provides no reason on the request form as to this witness’ relevance. This omission means 

Plaintiff has not complied with the prison’s witness request procedure. 

 The third misconduct hearing that Plaintiff alleges he was denied witnesses for is number 

A-293982. Plaintiff requested two corrections officers as witnesses. This request was rejected 

by defendant Canino because Plaintiff’s witness request form was not timely submitted, as it was 

handed in at the time of the hearing. The witness request form clearly states that it must be 

submitted by 9:00 a.m. the first working day after the inmate receives notice of the hearing. 

Plaintiff admits that his request was not timely, but offers an excuse. He claims that he had filled 

it out in a timely manner, but he was unable to submit it because none of the guards on his 

cellblock would accept it. 

 In Rauso v. Vaughn, No. 96-6977, 2000 WL 873285 (E.D.Pa. Jun. 26, 2000), another 

court of this district was faced with a strikingly similar factual background and argument. In 

Rauso, an SCI Graterford inmate who had a misconduct hearing before defendant Canino had his 

witness request denied because it was untimely. The inmate, who had claimed the reason for the 

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delay was because he did not have a pencil, argued the denial of witnesses was a due process 

violation. 

 The Court found that SCI Graterford’s policy of requiring timely notice of witnesses is 

necessary to meet the legitimate needs and objections of the institution. The determination of 

whether the inmate complied with the rule and whether failure to comply should warrant denial 

of witnesses is within the discretion of hearing examiner. The examiner should have “some 

evidence” supporting the decision. The Court also noted that even if the examiner had abused 

her discretion, it was harmless error since the requested witness was the author of the misconduct 

report, which contained his version of the events. 

 In the instant matter, Defendant Canino ruled that Plaintiff could not have his two 

witnesses present since he submitted his witness request form at the start of the hearing. 

Defendant Canino made the decision despite Plaintiff’s excuse, which he provided to her. Even 

if defendant Canino abused her discretion (a point not conceded), the error was harmless since 

the primary witness Plaintiff requested was Corrections Officer Heffinger who had authored the 

misconduct report which contained his version of the facts that formed the basis of the 

misconduct. The only other witness requested was Corrections Officer Huson, Jr., who Plaintiff 

admits was not present at the time the misconduct was issued and whose only involvement was 

that he served Plaintiff with the notice of the misconduct hearing. Thus, his testimony would be 

immaterial. 

 Plaintiff’s final civil rights claim against defendant Canino appears to be that he is 

generally unhappy with her decisions regarding his guilt and sentence imposed. Plaintiff points 

to nothing specific regarding this allegation other than the fact that Plaintiff believes he is being 

“targeted” by prison officials. He further alleges that if defendant Canino had more thoroughly 

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“investigated” the charges she would realize that on each occasion Plaintiff’s behavior, while in 

violation of the rules was justified which - in turn - would alter her decisions regarding his guilt 

and sentencing. 

 The Supreme Court has held that the decisions of a prison disciplinary board meet due 

process requirements so long as there is “some evidence” supporting the decision. 

Superintendent, Mass. Correctional Institution, Walpole v. Hill, 472 U.S. 445, 455-56 (1985). 

The Court explained that the relevant inquiry is “whether there is any evidence in the record that 

could support the conclusion.” Id.10 

 All three of defendant Canino’s decisions that Plaintiff complains about easily meet this 

standard. As noted, Plaintiff pled guilty to misconduct number A-327942. 

 In misconduct number A-327928, the misconduct report supports all three of the charges 

Plaintiff was charged with. Even Plaintiff’s written version of the events generally coincides 

with the actions described in the misconduct report. There was an abundance of evidence 

supporting defendant Canino’s decision to find Plaintiff guilty. 

 In misconduct A-293982, the misconduct report gives a detailed explanation of the facts 

leading to the misconduct issuance. Plaintiff pled guilty to one of the charges and not guilty to 

the four others. After plaintiff presented his version of the events, defendant Canino found 

Plaintiff guilty of the four remaining charges. The facts provided in the misconduct report 

supported defendant Canino’s decision. The misconduct report alone provides enough evidence 

to meet the “some evidence” standard. Carter v. Kane, 938 F.Supp. 282, 287 (E.D.Pa. 1996). 

 

10 It should be noted that, unlike the instant Plaintiff, the inmate in Hill was actually deprived of 

a liberty interest as a result of the decision, since he had lost good time credits. Id. at 455. 

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 Likewise Plaintiff’s sentences for violating prison rules do not raise due process 

violations. “Discipline by prison officials in response to a wide range of misconduct falls within 

the expected perimeter of the sentence imposed by a court law.” Sandin, 515 U.S. at 485. 

3. Defendant Vaughn 

 Defendant’s claims against defendant Vaughn are based solely upon the fact that he 

sustained the actions of Defendant Canino. Plaintiff appealed misconducts A-327928 and A327942 to defendant Vaughn who upheld the decisions since there were no procedural errors at 

the hearings. 

 There is no constitutional right to administrative appeals of prison disciplinary hearings, 

so any decision of Vaughn in this role has no constitutional significance. Garfield v. Davis, 566 

F.Supp. 1069, 1074 (E.D.Pa. 1983). Additionally, since the claims against defendant Canino are 

without merit (see § E., 2., above), the claims against Vaughn cannot stand. See Bey v. Pa. Dept. 

of Corrections, 98 F.Supp.2d 650, 664 (E.D.Pa. 2000). It is well-established that the theory of 

respondeat superior is inapplicable for civil rights violations by individuals acting under color of 

state law. Durmer v. O’Carroll, 991 F.2d 64, 69 n.14 (3d Cir. 1993).11

F. As a Matter of Law, the Remaining Commonwealth Defendants, in their 

Individual Capacities, have not Violated Plaintiff’s Civil Rights. 

 For acts allegedly taken in their individual capacity, “‘defendant[s] in a civil rights action 

must have personal involvement’ to be liable.” Sutton v. Rasheed, 323 F.3d 236, 249 (3d Cir. 

2003) (quoting Rode v. Dellarciprete, 845 F.2d 1195, 1207 (3d Cir. 1988)). This involvement 

may also be demonstrated through allegations of participation or actual knowledge and 

 

11 Plaintiff did mention at his deposition that he was dissatisfied with his transfer from SCI 

Graterford to another prison. Pl. Dep. at 46-47. Presumably, this claim would be against 

defendant Vaughn who, as the Superintendent, would authorize the transfer. However, this 

claim also fails to raise any constitutional issues. “An inmate has no protectible liberty interest 

in remaining in one place of incarceration as opposed to another.” Debrose v. Chesney, No. 95-

6813, 1996 WL 4093, at *3 (E.D.Pa. 1996). See also Meachum v. Fano, 427 U.S. 215 (1976).

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acquiescence in the violation. Rode, 845 F.3d at 1207. None of the remaining Commonwealth 

defendants are even alleged to have personally participated in a violation. 

 DiGuglielmo, Buzzar, and Smith, whose names appear in the “Defendants” section of 

Plaintiff’s Complaint, are not mentioned anywhere else in the Complaint, including the 

“Statement of the Case” section which instructions the writer to list each defendants’ 

involvement. Additionally, Plaintiff did not make reference to these three individuals during his 

deposition. 

The omission of a defendant’s name from the material allegations of a complaint justifies 

dismissal of the complaint against that defendant. Marvasi v. Shorty, 70 F.R.D. 14, 22-23 

(E.D.Pa. 1976) (citing United States ex rel. Tyler v. Speaker, 471 F.2d 1197 (3d Cir. 1973)). By 

the same token, where there is no indication in the pleadings that a defendant played any role in 

the challenged conduct, the claims against that defendant are subject to dismissal. E.g., EckfordEl v. Toombs, 760 F.Supp. 1267, 1272-73 (W.D. Mich. 1991); Hodgin v. Agents of Montgomery 

County, 619 F.Supp. 1550, 1554 (E.D.Pa. 1985). 

 Since DiGuglielmo, Buzzar, and Smith had absolutely no personal involvement in the 

alleged civil rights violations, any damages claims against them in their individual capacities 

should be dismissed. 

G. Even if any of the Commonwealth Defendants did violate Plaintiff’s Civil 

Rights, they are Protected from Damages Liability by Qualified Immunity. 

 The Commonwealth defendants, as state officials, are entitled to the protection of 

qualified immunity. Qualified immunity protects government officials from damages liability in 

§ 1983 suits unless there has been a constitutional violation of a clearly established right. Conn 

v. Gabbert, 526 U.S. 286, 290 (1999). 

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 In determining the applicability of this immunity, the initial inquiry is whether there has 

in fact been a constitutional violation. Hope v. Pelzer, 536 U.S. 730, 736 (2002), citing Saucier 

v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 201 (2001). The Commonwealth defendants have argued extensively up 

to this point that Plaintiff has suffered no violation of his constitutional rights. 

 If the Court, despite Commonwealth defendants’ argument to the contrary, finds that a 

constitutional violation has occurred, the second step is to determine whether the right violated 

was clearly established. Hope, 536 U.S. at 739, citing Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800 

(1982). “For a constitutional right to be clearly established, its contours ‘must be sufficiently 

clear that a reasonable official would understand that what he is doing violates that right.’” Hope, 

536 U.S. at 739 (quoting Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 640 (1987)). The alleged rights 

in question here - the right of schizophrenic inmate to be free from requests to take his 

psychotropic medication and the right to have counsel and any desired witnesses at a prison 

misconduct hearing - if existent at all, are certainly not clearly established. 

 Given the lengthy and complex set of facts and precedent discussed in detail above, it 

was objectively reasonable for the Commonwealth defendants to act in the manner they did. 

Since reasonable prison officials, like the Commonwealth defendants, would have been unaware 

of any civil rights violations resulting from their conduct, the right was not clearly established. 

 Even if any of the Commonwealth defendants did, somehow violate Plaintiff’s 

constitutional rights, any violation was not of a clearly established right. Thus, they are shielded 

from a § 1983 damages claim by qualified immunity. 

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IV. CONCLUSION 

 Since the material facts are undisputed, judgment in this matter should be entered in favor 

of the Commonwealth defendants as a matter of law, pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 56. 

 D. MICHAEL FISHER 

 ATTORNEY GENERAL 

 BY: s/ Kevin Bradford 

 Kevin R. Bradford 

 Deputy Attorney General 

 Identification No. 88576 

 Susan J. Forney 

 Chief Deputy Attorney General 

 Chief, Litigation Section 

OFFICE OF ATTORNEY GENERAL 

21 South 12th Street, 3rd Floor 

Philadelphia, PA 19107 

Telephone: (215) 560-2262 

Case 2:02-cv-04346-MK Document 91 Filed 10/14/2003 Page 24 of 25
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA 

 

FELIX D. WHITTINGTON, : CIVIL ACTION 

 : 

 Plaintiff : 

 : 

v. : 

: 

DONALD VAUGHN, et al., : 

 : 

 Defendants : No. 02-4346 

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

 I, Kevin R. Bradford, Deputy Attorney General, hereby certify that the within Answer of 

Respondents was electronically filed and is available for viewing and downloading from the ECF 

system at https://ecf.paed.uscourts.gov/. 

 I further certify that a true and correct copy of this document was mailed on October 14, 

2003, by first class mail, postage prepaid to: 

 Felix D. Whittington 

 Inmate No. AY-4935 

 State Correctional Institution 

 at Greene 

 175 Progress Drive 

 Waynesburg, PA 15370 

 D. MICHAEL FISHER 

 ATTORNEY GENERAL 

 BY: s/ Kevin Bradford 

 Kevin R. Bradford 

 Deputy Attorney General 

 Identification No. 88576 

 Susan J. Forney 

 Chief Deputy Attorney General 

 Chief, Litigation Section 

OFFICE OF ATTORNEY GENERAL 

21 South 12th Street, 3rd Floor 

Philadelphia, PA 19107 

Telephone: (215) 560-2262 

Case 2:02-cv-04346-MK Document 91 Filed 10/14/2003 Page 25 of 25