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CHAMPION v. HALL COUNTY

Cite as 309 Neb. 55

Eddy Champion and Fraternal Order of 

Police Lodge No. 78, appellants, v. 

Hall County, Nebraska, 

et al., appellees.

___ N.W.2d ___

Filed April 23, 2021. No. S-20-481.

1. Jurisdiction: Appeal and Error. A jurisdictional question that does not 

involve a factual dispute is determined by an appellate court as a matter 

of law, which requires the appellate court to reach a conclusion independent of the lower court’s decision.

2. Statutes: Appeal and Error. The right of appeal in this state is purely 

statutory; unless a statute provides for an appeal from the decision of a 

quasi-judicial tribunal, such right does not exist.

3. Judgments: Final Orders: Jurisdiction: Appeal and Error.

Proceedings in error under Neb. Rev. Stat. §§ 25-1901 to 25-1908 

(Reissue 2016 & Cum. Supp. 2020) provide a means of judicial review 

of the judgments and final orders of tribunals exercising judicial functions and inferior in jurisdiction to the district court.

4. Judgments: Final Orders: Appeal and Error. A petition in error in the 

district court to review a judgment or final order of an inferior tribunal 

is in its nature an independent proceeding having for its purpose the 

removal of the record from an inferior to a superior tribunal to determine whether the judgment or final order entered is in accordance with 

the law.

5. Appeal and Error: Words and Phrases. A petition in error is the 

removal of proceedings from one court or tribunal to another for review.

6. Judgments: Appeal and Error. A petition in error is designed to review 

the decision of the inferior tribunal and is not to act as a super legislative or administrative agency to come to an independent conclusion.

7. Administrative Law. When exercising rulemaking, administrative agencies act in a quasi-legislative capacity.

Nebraska Supreme Court Online Library

www.nebraska.gov/apps-courts-epub/

05/14/2021 08:10 AM CDT
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8. ____. When administrative agencies are called upon to make factual 

determinations and thus adjudicate, they act in a quasi-judicial capacity.

9. ____. When any tribunal, board, or officer is required to conduct a hearing and receive evidence, it exercises “judicial functions” in determining 

questions of fact.

10. ____. If the decision made by any tribunal, board, or officer is purely 

discretionary after an evaluation of facts, it is a decision of policy or a 

political decision rather than judicial.

11. Administrative Law: Words and Phrases. A function is quasi-judicial 

when the law, in words or by implication, commits to any officer the 

duty of looking into facts, and acting upon them, not in a way which it 

specifically directs, but after a discretion in its nature judicial.

12. Administrative Law: Appeal and Error. The mere act of deciding 

a question of adjudicative fact after an evidentiary hearing, when the 

law has not contemplated the entity and any power to exercise judicial 

functions, does not render any tribunal’s, board’s, or officer’s decision 

reviewable in district court by petition in error.

13. Judgments: Final Orders. Only when the law, by word or implication, 

authorizes the judicial function will the result of that exercise be either 

a “judgment rendered” or “final order” for purposes of Neb. Rev. Stat. 

§ 25-1901 (Reissue 2016).

14. Actions: Words and Phrases. The term “action” is a comprehensive 

one, and is applicable to almost any proceeding in a court of justice by 

which an individual pursues that remedy which the law affords.

15. Final Orders: Words and Phrases. A “special proceeding” occurs 

where the law confers a right and authorizes a special application to a 

court to enforce the right.

16. Contracts: Legislature: Administrative Law: Judgments: Final 

Orders: Jurisdiction: Appeal and Error. Regardless of whether collective bargaining is generally legislatively authorized, the adjudicatory 

procedures set forth in a collective bargaining agreement for a committee that was never expressly contemplated by the Legislature do not 

establish any tribunal, board, or officer inferior in jurisdiction to the 

district court, which is capable of rendering judgments and final orders 

in the exercise of judicial functions for purposes of review by petition 

in error.

Appeal from the District Court for Hall County: John H. 

Marsh, Judge. Affirmed.

Thomas P. McCarty, of Keating, O’Gara, Nedved & Peter, 

P.C., L.L.O., for appellants.
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Cite as 309 Neb. 55

Ashley H. Connell and Erin Ebeler Rolf, of Woods & 

Aitken, L.L.P., for appellees.

Heavican, C.J., Miller-Lerman, Cassel, Stacy, Funke, 

Papik, and Freudenberg, JJ.

Freudenberg, J.

I. NATURE OF CASE

The question presented in this appeal is whether a grievance 

committee of a county with fewer than 150,000 inhabitants 

exercised “judicial functions” for purposes of the petition in 

error statute, 1 when, after a hearing involving the presentation 

of sworn testimony and other evidence, conducted pursuant to 

procedures in the applicable collective bargaining agreement 

giving the aggrieved party the right to an evidentiary hearing, 

the committee decided, under largely undisputed facts, that 

the managerial and disciplinary rights of the applicable collective bargaining agreement permitted the director of the county 

department of corrections to exclude a correctional officer from 

working overtime unarmed transport shifts, as a consequence 

of a prior disciplinary action removing that officer from transport duty. The district court held that it lacked jurisdiction over 

the petition in error, because no statute specifically requires 

an evidentiary hearing before such a grievance committee and 

the grievance committee decided matters of law concerning 

the meaning of the collective bargaining agreement rather than 

matters of disputed fact.

II. BACKGROUND

Eddy Champion, a corrections officer with the Hall County 

Department of Corrections (Department), filed a grievance 

in relation to the denial of overtime working unarmed transport after Champion was subjected to discipline that included 

the indefinite removal from “transport duty.” The parties 

1 Neb. Rev. Stat. § 25-1901 (Reissue 2016).
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followed the grievance procedures set forth as part of a collective bargaining agreement between the Department, as the 

employer, and the Fraternal Order of Police Lodge No. 78 

(FOP), as representative of employee correctional officers and 

corporals of the Department. The collective bargaining agreement was signed by the president of the FOP and the chairperson of the Hall County Board of Corrections and Hall 

County Board of Supervisors. Following an evidentiary hearing before the Hall County Grievance Committee (Grievance 

Committee) and its written decision denying the grievance, 

Champion filed a petition in error, which the district court dismissed for lack of jurisdiction.

1. Disciplinary Action

On January 18, 2019, following an administrative hearing, 

the director of the Department (Director) disciplined Champion 

for sending 48 fellow employees a post on social media he 

had written alluding to a “‘story’” he had to tell about the 

Department’s lying to employees’ families and tricking them in 

order to get information and “‘what they want.’” This revolved 

around the Department’s attempt to get employees’ family 

members’ contact information in order to plan a surprise appreciation project for its officers.

The Director determined that the post sent to fellow employees was in violation of the staff code of conduct provision that 

states, “Staff shall refrain from participating in the spreading 

of rumors, innuendo, or other unfounded information which 

may have a hurtful or negative effect on other employees, the 

Department or any county agency.”

As part of Champion’s discipline, he was “removed from 

transport duty indefinitely effective immediately.”

2. Management and Disciplinary Rules Under 

Collective Bargaining Agreement

In taking this disciplinary measure, the Director relied 

on article 3 of the collective bargaining agreement, which 
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provided: “All management rights, functions, responsibilities 

and authority not specifically limited by the express terms of 

this Agreement are retained by the Employer and remain exclusively within the rights of the Employer.”

This article further specified that management rights 

included, but were “not limited” to,

[t]he right to direct and arrange working forces including 

the right to hire, examine, classify, promote or not to promote, train, transfer, assign, and retain employees; maintain discipline and control and use of Department property; suspend, demote, discharge or take other disciplinary 

action against employees; and to relieve employees from 

duty due to lack of work, lack of funds, a decision to 

subcontract or discontinue Department operations or other 

legitimate reasons.

The rights identified in article 3 “are not in any way intended 

to be exclusive, but are merely intended to illustrate the rights 

retained by the Employer.”

The Director also relied on article 11 of the collective bargaining agreement, which gives the Director the “full discretion and authority to impose disciplinary action.”

Article 11 lists progressive discipline measures that “may 

be used, depending on the particular situation and severity 

of the infraction.” These begin with an oral warning and end 

with suspension. They do not specify a restriction from certain duties.

Article 11 provides: “In most instances this procedure shall 

be followed. However, in instances of flagrant or repeated violations suspension or termination may be used.” But article 11 

then continues:

The . . . Director and the Employer reserves [sic] the 

right to investigate, make judgments, and take appropriate 

disciplinary action in each individual incident. The level 

of severity of any infraction and the level and type of discipline to be imposed is solely at the discretion of the . . . 

Director and the Employer.
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3. Grievance

Champion did not file a grievance immediately from this 

disciplinary action. However, he subsequently filed an informal, and later a formal, grievance in relation to the denial of 

overtime for unarmed transport shifts that the Director denied 

pursuant to the disciplinary action.

(a) General Grievance Procedure Under 

Collective Bargaining Agreement

Grievance procedures set forth in the collective bargaining agreement state that they must begin with an informal 

resolution process involving a problem-solving meeting. If 

the aggrieved party is not satisfied with the response from the 

informal resolution process, the aggrieved party may submit 

the problem, in writing, to the Director, who must respond in 

writing within 14 days. Thereafter, the aggrieved party may 

present the appealed grievance to the Grievance Committee. 

Under the collective bargaining agreement, the Grievance 

Committee is to consist of two or more members of the Hall 

County Board of Corrections appointed by the county board 

chairperson.

(b) Factual Allegations

Champion’s grievance alleged that on February 1, 2019, 

an overtime requirement for an unarmed transport position 

developed and was posted in advance. Champion was the most 

senior officer to request to work the shift, but was denied the 

opportunity. At the time of the grievance, Champion had been 

denied a total of two unarmed transport shifts for which he was 

the most senior officer to sign up.

(c) Overtime Provisions of Collective 

Bargaining Agreement

Champion asserted that these denials violated article 22, 

section 7, of the collective bargaining agreement. Article 

22, section 7, provides: “When an overtime requirement is 
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identified in advance, the Department may post the opening 

and allow staff to sign up. The senior officer will be scheduled 

and expected to work the overtime.”

Champion asserted that the Director lacked the power under 

the collective bargaining agreement to remove him from transport duty, because the “disciplinary actions” described in article 11 therein referred only to oral warnings, written warnings, 

suspension without pay, suspensions with pay, and discharge. 

They did not refer to the removal of what Champion described 

as “negotiated contractual benefits and rights.” Further, 

Champion asserted that the overtime provision of article 22, 

section 7, was an express term of the agreement that specifically limited the Director’s management rights.

Champion sought to distinguish armed transport postings 

from unarmed transport officer postings, stating:

To be sure, [the] Director . . . generally had the right 

to reassign . . . Champion to a post other than his armed

transport post. And, this was a significant change for . . . 

Champion, who was assigned to the armed transport post 

following testing and a competitive selection process. By 

assigning . . . Champion back to a non-transport post, 

[the] Director . . . placed . . . Champion in the same 

position as other officers who are not armed transport 

officers; and all of those other officers not assigned as 

armed transport officers have the right to work unarmed

transport officer overtime shifts based upon seniority.

Champion also thought it arbitrary and capricious to deprive 

him from working as an unarmed transport officer, because 

it had no logical relationship with the actions for which he 

was disciplined.

(d) Director’s Denial of Grievance

On March 15, 2019, the Director denied the formal grievance. The Director noted that transport duty is considered to 

be a “‘plum’” position that was appropriate to take away in 

light of the seriousness of Champion’s inappropriate behavior. 
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And other overtime, not involving transport duties, was still 

available to Champion.

4. Grievance Committee Review

Champion and the FOP appealed to the Grievance Committee 

and sought a hearing pursuant to article 8, section 4, of the bargaining agreement.

(a) Committee Review Procedures Under 

Collective Bargaining Agreement

The collective bargaining agreement sets forth that the 

Grievance Committee shall consist of two or more members of 

the Hall County Board of Corrections appointed by the county 

board chairperson. A meeting of the Grievance Committee 

shall take place in a timely manner after the notice of appeal, 

and it shall furnish the aggrieved party of its disposition in 

writing within 14 days.

The agreement further states: “At a grievance hearing held 

at the request of an employee,” certain procedures “will be 

used.” These include that the hearing will be conducted by 

an attorney who will serve as the hearings officer, who “will 

be responsible for insuring that the evidence is presented in 

an orderly fashion and that all participants are treated with 

respect.” The aggrieved party shall present evidence first, with 

the employer able to ask questions of the aggrieved party or the 

aggrieved party’s witness at the end of the aggrieved party’s 

presentation. The employer shall then present evidence, and 

the aggrieved party may ask questions of the employer or its 

witnesses. Both parties shall designate one person to speak 

on their behalf and to ask questions of the other party or witnesses, and the parties may give a brief statement summarizing 

their respective positions at the end of the presentation of all 

the evidence. The Grievance Committee “shall not ask questions but may, through the Hearings Officer, ask for clarification of statements or evidence.” At the end of the hearing, the 

Grievance Committee “shall privately deliberate” before issuing its written decision concerning the grievance.
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(b) Joint Stipulation of Facts

Before the scheduled hearing, the parties filed with the 

Grievance Committee a joint stipulation of facts. They stipulated that the collective bargaining agreement was in effect 

and applied to Champion. They stipulated that before January 

18, 2019, Champion worked as a corrections officer with the 

additional duty of armed transport. To qualify to work as armed 

transport, Champion had been selected through an examination 

process that included competitive testing and psychological 

examination. The parties stipulated that on several occasions 

beginning on or about February 1, Champion was the most 

senior correctional officer to request to work overtime transport shifts made generally available to the “day shift” officers 

after the overtime had first been offered to and declined by 

the armed transport officers. But he was denied the overtime. 

A total of 76.5 overtime hours were at issue, and the parties 

agreed as to the rate of compensation for those hours in the 

event the Grievance Committee found Champion was entitled 

to them.

(c) Hearing

The Grievance Committee held a hearing on May 22, 2019. 

At the hearing, Champion offered exhibit 1, a copy of the 

stipulated facts, along with its attachments “A” through “D,” 

which represented the collective bargaining agreement, the 

Director’s predisciplinary letter, the final disposition of disciplinary action, and the appeal letter. Champion also offered 

exhibit 2, which contained emails reflecting denials of overtime. Pursuant to a joint stipulation, the exhibits were received.

Champion called several witnesses, including himself, who 

were sworn in before testifying at the hearing.

(i) Champion’s Testimony

In addition to the facts stated in the stipulation and the historical facts reflected in the exhibits, Champion testified that 

from 2010 to 2016, he had been assigned to a full-time transport officer post with the Department. He had to go through 
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a special interview and training process to qualify for that position, because it entailed carrying a weapon.

After 2016, there was less demand for transport and he was 

reassigned “back to shift,” though he still worked some armed 

transport duties. Champion explained that as an armed transport officer, an unarmed transport officer sometimes accompanied him. Champion described that there always had to be at 

least two corrections officers for transports, but only one had 

to be armed.

(ii) FOP President’s Testimony

The FOP president, a fellow corrections officer, also testified on behalf of Champion. He testified that in his experience 

as the vice president and then president of the FOP for the prior 

5 years, he was unaware of overtime ever being denied as part 

of a disciplinary action.

(iii) Director’s Testimony

Champion called the Director to testify, who acknowledged 

that the overtime in question was available to every regular 

corrections officer on the day shift with the sole exception 

of Champion. Champion is the only officer the Director has 

removed from a transport position and the only person whose 

discipline has involved the denial of overtime related to certain duties.

The Director described that nontransport officers during 

their regular shifts often do unarmed transport duties. The 

Director stated that while he considered employment termination as a possible sanction for Champion’s behavior, he decided 

against it. And he was unable to consider a general demotion, 

because Champion did not hold any rank. He did not believe 

a suspension to be adequate, because it lasts a short period of 

time and is soon forgotten. So, the Director decided that the 

removal from certain duties was an appropriate compromise 

short of termination of employment and similar to demotion. 

He wanted to send a message not just to Champion, but to 

other employees.
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While the disciplinary letter did not specifically refer to 

overtime, the Director saw no distinction between Champion’s 

regular shifts and overtime work in relation to the disciplinary prohibition of working transport. The Director observed 

that when he suspends an employee, that employee cannot get 

around the financial consequences of that discipline by working overtime while suspended.

(iv) Opening and Closing Arguments

Both parties made opening and closing arguments at the 

hearing.

Champion argued that article 11 of the collective bargaining 

agreement establishes a scheme of progressive discipline that 

the Director failed to implement. Further, he argued that article 

22, section 7, entitled him, as the senior officer signing up, to 

posted overtime, without any express exception for disciplinary action. This, he argued, limited the Director’s management rights.

Champion asserted that taking away the opportunity to work 

overtime was not set forth in the bargaining agreement as a 

disciplinary action and that if overtime could be taken away 

as a matter of discipline, then so could things such as health 

insurance or leave time. While Champion acknowledged that 

the Director had the authority to generally reassign Champion 

from transport duties, which is an armed transport position, 

he argued that was different from depriving him of unarmed 

transport overtime that has been made generally available to 

day shift corrections officers who are not posted to transport. 

Such overtime, he said, is merely a “ride along with the armed 

transport officer.”

In its closing argument, the Department summarized that 

the case came down to “a dispute of two facts,” which the 

Department described as (1) whether the discipline was limited 

to removing Champion from a transport “post” and (2) what 

the Director’s management rights are.

The Department pointed out that the issue presented was 

not whether disciplinary action was appropriate, which was 
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not grieved. The Department described the transport work as 

involving a lot of free time on the clock, and thus a “plum 

position.” The discipline the Director imposed did not distinguish between armed and unarmed transport and was not limited to a transport “post,” which Champion did not in any event 

have; rather, the disciplinary measure deprived Champion of 

all transport duties.

The Department argued that the deprivation of the ability to 

work transport duties, both armed and unarmed, both during 

regular shifts and overtime, was an “effective way of managing disciplinary problems.” The Department asserted that 

while there was a list in the collective bargaining agreement 

of some examples of acceptable disciplinary measures, nothing therein limited managerial rights to traditional disciplinary 

actions. To the contrary, the collective bargaining agreement 

generally gave the Director sole discretion in determining 

the level and type of discipline to be imposed. Finally, the 

Department asserted that the Director acted reasonably in taking away transport duties as a means of imposing discipline 

akin to demotion.

(d) Grievance Committee’s Decision

The Grievance Committee voted to enter into an executive session, following which the members voted to return to 

regular session to vote. The Grievance Committee then unanimously voted that the Director acted within his rights pursuant to the bargaining agreement. The Grievance Committee 

issued a written decision on May 31, 2019, denying the 

grievance and affirming the Department’s denial of the overtime opportunities.

The Grievance Committee described in its decision that the 

historical facts were not in dispute. And it specifically found 

no merit to Champion’s argument that indefinite suspension 

violated a progressive disciplinary scheme, noting that under 

the bargaining agreement, such a scheme was discretionary. 

The Grievance Committee made no findings regarding the 
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intent of the parties in entering into the collective bargaining agreement.

The Grievance Committee did, however, suggest that the 

suspension from transport duty assignments be subject to 

review by the Director after a specific period of time and that 

his decision to continue the suspension or terminate employment should be communicated to Champion in writing.

5. Petition in Error

Champion and the FOP timely filed a petition in error with 

the district court for Hall County, filing therewith a praecipe 

for transcript and bill of exceptions in accordance with Neb. 

Rev. Stat. § 25-1905 (Reissue 2016). The respondents were 

named as Hall County, Nebraska; the Department; the Hall 

County Board of Corrections; and the Grievance Committee 

(collectively Hall County).

Champion and the FOP assigned as error the Grievance 

Committee’s denial of his grievance in the following respects: 

(1) failing to properly interpret, apply, and enforce article 

22, section 7, of the collective bargaining agreement, which 

entitled Champion, as the most senior officer, to work the 

overtime shifts; (2) concluding that the Director had authority under the bargaining agreement to bar an employee from 

receiving the benefits of article 22, section 7, of the bargaining agreement as a form of “disciplinary action” or “other 

disciplinary action” under the bargaining agreement; (3) failing to define or interpret the bargaining agreement’s phrase 

“disciplinary action” or “other disciplinary action” in article 3 

as limited to traditional forms of disciplinary action, disciplinary actions expressly recognized under the bargaining agreement, and disciplinary actions established by the past practice 

and custom of the parties (none of which allegedly include 

the denial of negotiated overtime rights); (4) interpreting the 

management rights provisions in article 3 of the bargaining 

agreement as superseding the overtime provisions in article 

22, section 7, of the bargaining agreement; (5) failing to give 

full force and effect to article 3’s limiting language that “[a]ll 
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management rights, functions, responsibilities and authority 

not specifically limited by the express terms of this Agreement 

are retained by the Employer and remain exclusively within 

the rights of the Employer”; (6) interpreting the disciplinary 

provisions in article 11 of the bargaining agreement as superseding the overtime provisions in article 22, section 7, of the 

bargaining agreement; (7) concluding that article 11 of the 

bargaining agreement authorized the Director to bar Champion 

from working the overtime shifts at issue; and (8) acting in an 

arbitrary and capricious manner by disregarding the facts and 

circumstances of the case and the substantive rules of the collective bargaining agreement.

Hall County generally admitted all the factual allegations of 

the petition that did not involve interpretation of the bargaining agreement. As affirmative defenses, Hall County alleged 

that the petition failed to state a claim upon which relief could 

be granted, was barred by the doctrine of unclean hands, 

and was barred by Champion and the FOP’s failure to mitigate damages.

The district court dismissed the petition in error for lack of 

jurisdiction. The district court observed that review by petition 

in error under § 25-1901 is for “[a] judgment rendered or final 

order made by any tribunal, board, or officer exercising judicial functions and inferior in jurisdiction to the district court . . 

. .” Further, the district court noted that we have said any tribunal, board, or officer exercises a judicial function if it decides 

a dispute of adjudicative fact or if a statute requires it to act in 

a judicial manner. 2

The court reasoned that no statute required the Grievance 

Committee to act in a judicial manner. And, citing to Kropp 

v. Grand Island Pub. Sch. Dist. No. 2 3 and Hawkins v. 

2 Medicine Creek v. Middle Republican NRD, 296 Neb. 1, 892 N.W.2d 74 

(2017).

3 Kropp v. Grand Island Pub. Sch. Dist. No. 2, 246 Neb. 138, 517 N.W.2d 

113 (1994).
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City of Omaha,

 4 the district court reasoned that the Grievance 

Committee did not in this instance decide a dispute of adjudicative fact, because the facts were not in dispute and neither 

party asserted that the collective bargaining agreement was 

ambiguous. Instead, the Grievance Committee solely determined questions of law relating to the meaning of the collective bargaining agreement and its application to the undisputed 

facts. Therefore, the Grievance Committee did not exercise 

judicial functions.

Champion and the FOP appeal.

III. ASSIGNMENTS OF ERROR

Champion and the FOP assign that the district court erred 

(1) in holding it had no jurisdiction over the petition in error, 

“because the [Grievance] Committee was required, under a 

bargaining agreement, to conduct an adversarial evidentiary 

hearing and, in fact, did so,” and “in relying upon Kropp v. 

Grand Island Pub. School Dist. No. 2, 246 Neb. 138, 517 

N.W.2d 113 (1994) and Hawkins v. City of Omaha, 261 

Neb. 943, 627 N.W.2d 118 (2001) to the extent this Court 

determines overruling these cases is necessary to reverse the 

District Court’s decision” and (2) “when it assumed, without 

deciding, that the bargaining agreement is unambiguous and 

that the [Grievance] Committee was not required to decide an 

adjudicative fact.”

IV. STANDARD OF REVIEW

[1] A jurisdictional question that does not involve a factual 

dispute is determined by an appellate court as a matter of law, 

which requires the appellate court to reach a conclusion independent of the lower court’s decision. 5

4 Hawkins v. City of Omaha, 261 Neb. 943, 627 N.W.2d 118 (2001).

5 See McEwen v. Nebraska State College Sys., 303 Neb. 552, 931 N.W.2d 

120 (2019).
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V. ANALYSIS

[2,3] The question presented in this appeal is whether the 

district court had jurisdiction over Champion and the FOP’s 

petition in error. The right of appeal in this state is purely 

statutory; 6 unless a statute provides for an appeal from the 

decision of a quasi-judicial tribunal, such right does not exist. 7

Proceedings in error under Neb. Rev. Stat. §§ 25-1901 to 

25-1908 (Reissue 2016 & Cum. Supp. 2020) provide a means 

of judicial review of the judgments and final orders of tribunals 

exercising judicial functions and inferior in jurisdiction to the 

district court. 8

[4] A petition in error in the district court to review a judgment or final order of an inferior tribunal is in its nature an 

independent proceeding having for its purpose the removal of 

the record from an inferior to a superior tribunal to determine 

whether the judgment or final order entered is in accordance 

with the law. 9 Rather than a “review on appeal” under Neb. 

Rev. Stat. §§ 25-1911 to 25-1937 (Reissue 2016 & Cum. Supp. 

2020), 10 a petition in error is in the nature of a new action, in 

that a petition in error is required to be perfected, with a summons required to be issued upon the written praecipe of the 

petitioner in error. 11 The subjects of a review on petition in 

error and an appeal are so distinctively different and dissimilar 

that the provisions of the statute relating to each question cannot be taken together and construed as if they were one law 

and effect given to every provision. 12

6 Id.

7 Id.

8 Id.

9 Id.

10 See id.

11 See id.

12 From v. Sutton, 156 Neb. 411, 56 N.W.2d 441 (1953).
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[5,6] At the same time, a petition in error is not a right of 

action and does not exist at common law. 13 It is a legislatively 

created method of review. 14 Thus, a petition in error is in a 

broader sense an appeal, because it is the removal of proceedings from one court or tribunal to another for review. 15 The 

reviewing court may reverse, vacate, or modify the lower judicial tribunal’s judgment or final order for error on the record. 16

In an error proceeding in the district court, that court must look 

to the transcript of the proceedings of the inferior tribunal filed 

with the petition in error to ascertain what happened there. 17

Such a proceeding is ordinarily tried on the appropriate and 

relevant questions of law, set out in the petition in error and 

appearing in the transcript. 18 A petition in error is designed to 

review the decision of the inferior tribunal and is not to act 

as a super legislative or administrative agency to come to an 

independent conclusion. 19

The governing petition in error statute, § 25-1901, provides 

in full:

A judgment rendered or final order made by any tribunal, board, or officer exercising judicial functions 

and inferior in jurisdiction to the district court may be 

reversed, vacated, or modified by the district court, except 

that the district court shall not have jurisdiction over 

(1) appeals from a juvenile court as defined in section 

43-245, (2) appeals from a county court in matters arising under the Nebraska Probate Code or the Nebraska 

13 See McEwen v. Nebraska State College Sys., supra note 5.

14 See id.

15 See id.

16 See § 25-1901, § 25-1911, and Neb. Rev. Stat. § 25-2733 (Reissue 2016). 

See, also, McEwen v. Nebraska State College Sys., supra note 5.

17 In re Estate of Vance, 149 Neb. 220, 30 N.W.2d 677 (1948). 18 Id.

19 Andrews v. City of Fremont, 213 Neb. 148, 328 N.W.2d 194 (1982).
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Uniform Trust Code, in matters involving adoption or 

inheritance tax, or in domestic relations matters, or (3) 

appeals within the jurisdiction of the Tax Equalization 

and Review Commission.

The parties dispute in this appeal whether the Grievance 

Committee was “exercising judicial functions.” But also necessarily presented is whether the Grievance Committee was any 

“tribunal, board, or officer . . . inferior in jurisdiction to the 

district court.” Finally, under the plain language of § 25-1901, 

the Grievance Committee’s decision must have been a “judgment rendered” or “final order” for it to be subject to review by 

a district court under a petition in error.

[7-10] We describe an inferior tribunal, board, or officer’s 

rendition of a judgment or final order in the exercise of 

judicial functions as being “quasi-judicial.” 20 An administrative agency has been said to be a governmental authority, 

other than a court and other than a legislative body, which 

affects the rights of private parties through either adjudication 

or rulemaking. 21 When exercising rulemaking, administrative 

agencies act in a quasi-legislative capacity. 22 When administrative agencies are called upon to make factual determinations and thus adjudicate, they act in a quasi-judicial capacity. 23 We have explained that when any tribunal, board, or 

officer is required to conduct a hearing and receive evidence, 

it exercises “judicial functions” in determining questions of 

fact. 24 In contrast, if the decision made by any tribunal, 

20 See, e.g., In re Application of Olmer, 275 Neb. 852, 752 N.W.2d 124 

(2008); Nicholson v. Red Willow Cty. Sch. Dist. No. 0170, 270 Neb. 

140, 699 N.W.2d 25 (2005); Singleton v. Kimball County Board of 

Commissioners, 203 Neb. 429, 279 N.W.2d 112 (1979); Moser v. Turner, 

180 Neb. 635, 144 N.W.2d 192 (1966).

21 State ex rel. Stenberg v. Murphy, 247 Neb. 358, 527 N.W.2d 185 (1995).

22 See id.

23 See id.

24 See Medicine Creek v. Middle Republican NRD, supra note 2.
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board, or officer is purely discretionary after an evaluation of 

facts, it is a decision of policy or a political decision rather 

than judicial. 25

[11] One of the considerations for a petition in error is 

whether the decision being reviewed has taken place in a way 

that would create a record for meaningful appellate review, 26

but we have explained that a function is not quasi-judicial 

whenever a hearing is required by statute to ascertain some fact 

relevant to the performance of a ministerial duty. 27 Instead, a 

function is quasi-judicial when the law, in words or by implication, commits to any officer the duty of looking into facts, and 

acting upon them, not in a way which it specifically directs, but 

after a discretion in its nature judicial. 28

No statute contemplates the existence of a Grievance Committee, let alone commits to the Grievance Committee the 

duty to act in a judicial manner. The County Civil Service 

Commission Act 29 provides for a civil service commission 

to hear appeals from any employee who is discharged, suspended, or demoted in rank, 30 and the County Civil Service 

Act 31 provides there “shall” be a personnel policy board that 

has the power to review any grievance or case of disciplinary action of a classified service employee. 32 These acts, 

25 See Sarpy Cty. Bd. of Comrs. v. Sarpy Cty. Land Reutil., 9 Neb. App. 552, 

615 N.W.2d 490 (2000).

26 See Hawkins v. City of Omaha, supra note 4.

27 See Singleton v. Kimball County Board of Commissioners, supra note 20. 

See, also, Little v. Board of County Commissioners, 179 Neb. 655, 140 

N.W.2d 1 (1966).

28 State ex rel. School Dist. v. Ellis, 163 Neb. 86, 77 N.W.2d 809 (1956).

29 See Neb. Rev. Stat. §§ 23-401 to 23-418 (Cum. Supp. 2020).

30 § 23-411.

31 Neb. Rev. Stat. §§ 23-2517 to 23-2533 (Reissue 2012 & Cum. Supp. 

2020).

32 § 23-2522(5).
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however, do not apply to counties such as Hall County with 

fewer than 150,000 inhabitants. 33

Hall County is governed by Neb. Rev. Stat. §§ 23-2534 

to 23-2544 (Reissue 2012). Section 23-2534 describes that 

the county board of any county with a population of less 

than 150,000 inhabitants “may” adopt policies and procedures 

pursuant to §§ 23-2534 to 23-2544 which concern employee 

hiring, advancement, training, career development, position 

classification, salary administration, fringe benefits, discharge, 

and other related activities. It also “may” have a personnel 

policy board that, if established, “shall” review any grievance 

or case of disciplinary action of a classified service employee 

when appealed by such employee in accordance with approved 

personnel rules and regulations and issue a determination that 

is binding on all parties concerned. 34

The Grievance Committee is not Hall County’s personnel 

board. Thus, Champion and the FOP do not rely on §§ 23-2534 

to 23-2544 for the source of the Grievance Committee’s judicial power.

Champion and the FOP instead direct us to the county 

board’s general, statutorily conferred powers to enter into contracts in relation to its concerns 35 and Nebraska’s Industrial 

Relations Act, 36 pursuant to which Champion and the FOP 

assert the Hall County Board of Supervisors, as the collective bargaining agent, 37 entered into the collective bargaining 

agreement that specified the adjudicatory procedures utilized. 

Champion and the FOP then direct us to our prior statement that any tribunal, board, or officer exercises a judicial 

33 § 23-2518(2).

34 § 23-2538(5).

35 Neb. Rev. Stat. §§ 23-103 and 23-104 (Reissue 2012).

36 Neb. Rev. Stat. §§ 48-801 to 48-839 (Reissue 2010 & Cum. Supp. 2020).

37 § 48-838.
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function if a statute requires it to act in a judicial manner or if 

it decides a dispute of adjudicative fact. 38

Hall County does not contest that it had the legislatively 

conferred power to enter into the collective bargaining agreement, but argues that such conferral was insufficient to establish the Grievance Committee as having a statutory obligation 

to act in a judicial manner. Relying on the same proposition as 

Champion and the FOP, Hall County states its decision was not 

reviewable unless it decided questions of adjudicative facts. 

Champion and FOP’s disagreement centers on whether the 

Grievance Committee actually decided adjudicative facts.

But we find that the decisive question of appellate jurisdiction is not whether the Grievance Committee decided 

any question of adjudicative fact. The threshold question is 

whether the Legislature conferred quasi-judicial power in the 

first instance. If it did not, then the Grievance Committee’s 

decision, even if of adjudicative facts, was not a judgment 

rendered or final order made by any tribunal, board, or officer 

exercising judicial functions and inferior in jurisdiction to the 

district court.

[12] Our statement referring to deciding a dispute of adjudicative fact or a statute requiring an entity to act in a judicial 

manner has been made in contexts where a law contemplated 

the tribunal, board, or officer in question. The mere act of 

deciding a question of adjudicative fact after an evidentiary 

hearing, when the law has not contemplated the entity and 

any power to exercise judicial functions, does not render any 

tribunal’s, board’s, or officer’s decision reviewable in district 

court by petition in error. That would be an act of self-creation 

at odds with the concepts set forth in § 25-1901 of judgments, 

final orders, inferiority in jurisdiction to the district court, and 

judicial functions.

38 See Medicine Creek v. Middle Republican NRD, supra note 2. See, also, 

Hawkins v. City of Omaha, supra note 4.
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[13-15] Only when the law, by word or implication, authorizes the judicial function will the result of that exercise be 

either a “judgment rendered” or “final order” for purposes 

of § 25-1901. A “judgment” is defined by Neb. Rev. Stat. 

§ 25-1301(1) (Cum. Supp. 2018) as “the final determination 

of the rights of the parties in an action.” The term “action” is 

a comprehensive one, and is applicable to almost any proceeding in a court of justice by which an individual pursues that 

remedy which the law affords.

 39 A “final order” is defined by 

§ 25-1902 as follows:

(a) An order affecting a substantial right in an action, 

when such order in effect determines the action and prevents a judgment;

(b) An order affecting a substantial right made during a 

special proceeding;

(c) An order affecting a substantial right made on 

summary application in an action after a judgment is 

entered; and

(d) An order denying a motion for summary judgment 

when such motion is based on the assertion of sovereign 

immunity or the immunity of a government official.

There is no “final order” unless it is made either in the context 

of an action or a special proceeding. A “special proceeding” 

occurs where the law confers a right and authorizes a special 

application to a court to enforce the right. 40 A special proceeding includes every special statutory remedy that is not in itself 

an action. 41

Entities thus cannot confer upon themselves the power to 

render a “judgment” or “final order” reviewable by a district 

court through an action for petition in error. The law must 

confer it. And the statutes upon which Champion and the 

39 Gibson v. Sidney, 50 Neb. 12, 69 N.W. 314 (1896) (emphasis supplied).

40 In re Claim of Roberts for Attorney Fees, 307 Neb. 346, 949 N.W.2d 299 

(2020) (emphasis supplied).

41 Id.
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FOP rely for the conferral of quasi-judicial power upon the 

Grievance Committee have too tenuous a connection to the 

Grievance Committee and its designated functions for its decisions to be within the purview of the petition in error statutes. 

The county’s adoption of mandatory adjudicatory procedures 

in its exercise of a broad, discretionary authority to enter into 

collective bargaining agreements is not the equivalent of the 

law conferring a remedy to enforce a right.

We observe that in Kropp v. Grand Island Pub. Sch. Dist. 

No. 2,

 42 the statutorily conferred power was the ability to enter 

into collective bargaining agreements for the administration of 

grievances arising under the terms and conditions of employment, and we decided that because the school board grievance 

committee was not required by statute to act in a judicial manner and did not decide a question of adjudicatory fact, there 

was no petition in error jurisdiction. We also observe that in the 

case of Turnbull v. County of Pawnee,

 43 the Nebraska Court of 

Appeals held that because the county board of commissioners 

decided questions of adjudicative fact, there was jurisdiction 

under petition in error to review a decision of the board denying a grievance in accordance with procedures established by a 

collective bargaining agreement.

We do not view these cases as apposite to the case at bar. 

There is no statute that the parties direct us to that specifically 

contemplates, through collective bargaining or otherwise, the 

determinations of grievances by Hall County employees. And, 

unlike the Grievance Committee, the Legislature has specifically contemplated boards of commissioners. 44 We disapprove 

of Turnbull to the extent it is inconsistent with this opinion.

[16] We hold that regardless of whether collective bargaining is generally legislatively authorized, the adjudicatory 

42 Kropp v. Grand Island Pub. Sch. Dist. No. 2, supra note 3.

43 Turnbull v. County of Pawnee, 19 Neb. App. 43, 810 N.W.2d 172 (2011).

44 See Neb. Rev. Stat. § 23-297 (Reissue 2012).
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procedures set forth in a collective bargaining agreement for 

a committee that was never expressly contemplated by the 

Legislature do not establish any tribunal, board, or officer 

inferior in jurisdiction to the district court, which is capable of 

rendering judgments and final orders in the exercise of judicial 

functions for purposes of review by petition in error. In such 

a case, the law, in words or by implication, has not committed 

to any entity the duty of looking into facts, and acting upon 

them, after a discretion that is in its nature judicial. Because 

no statute expressly contemplates the Grievance Committee, its 

decision was not reviewable by petition in error. Accordingly, 

the district court did not err when it dismissed the present petition in error for lack of jurisdiction.

VI. CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the judgment of the 

district court.

Affirmed.