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Filed 12/20/23 P. v. Walton CA3 NOT TO BE PUBLISHED

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

THIRD APPELLATE DISTRICT

(Sacramento)

----

THE PEOPLE,

Plaintiff and Respondent,

v.

GREGORY WAYNE WALTON II,

Defendant and Appellant. C097696

(Super. Ct. No. 22FE011065)

A certificate of rehabilitation and pardon is available to certain felons who have successfully completed their sentences and have undergone an additional period of

rehabil itation. (Pen. Code, §§ 4852.01 et seq.; all further section references are to the
Penal Code.) Here , defendant Gregory Wayne Walton II was convicted of human
trafficking , an offense requiring registration as a sex offender. (§ 236.1, subd. ( b ); § 290,

subd. (c)(1).) Just over five year s later

, he filed a petition for a certificate of

rehabilitation. The trial court denied the petition because defendant was subject to a 10

- year rehabilitation period that had not yet elapsed. The trial court also rejected defendant’s assertion that he qualified for relief from the sex offender registration2

requirement. Defendant argues the trial court erred. We affirm b ecause we conclude the
trial court correctly applied the relevant statutes

.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

Defendant pled no contest to human trafficking ( § 36.1, subd. (b)) on March 13,

2017 , and was sentenced to three years probation on the same day . He completed
probation on March 13, 2020. Three months later, he got a dismissal of hi s conviction
pursuant to section 1203.4.

A little over five years after he was sentenced, defendant filed a petition for
certificate of rehabilitation and pardon. The prosecutor asked the court to drop the
petition as premature

. In attempting to counter the prosecutor’s request , defendant said
he was going to request relief from sex offender registration. The trial court denied defendant’s petition as premature and noted defendant’s
ineligibility to have his registration requir ement terminated. Defendant timely appealed.

DISCUSSION

Defendant contends the trial court erred in two ways: (1) in denying his petition

for a certificate of rehabilitation ; and (2) in concluding he is ineligible for section 290 registration relief und er section 290.5

. N either contention has merit.

I The trial court did not err in denying defendant’s petition
A certificate of rehabilitation is an intermediate step toward securing a full pardon
and allows the superior court to investigate and recommen d pardon applicants to the

governor. ( People v. Ansell (2001) 25 Cal.4th 868, 875

- 876.) A certificate of
rehabilitation procedure is available to felons , with certain exceptions, who have
successfully completed their sentences and have undergone an addit ional and sustained
period of rehabilitation in California. (§ 4852.03, subd. (a); see §§ 4852.01, subds. (a)

- (c), 4852.06; Ansell at p. 875.) The length of the rehabilitation period is a base five years
plus an additional period determined by the petiti oner’s conviction. (See § 4852.03

, subd. (a). ) A person is not eligible to file a petition for a certificate of rehabilitation until
this period has elapsed. (§ 4852.03, subd. (b).)3

Defendant contends he was subject to only the base five

- year period. Defendant is

mistaken. An additional two

- year period is added to the base five year s regardless of the
nature of the conviction. (§ 4852.03, subd. (a)(3).) That additional period increases to
five years, for a total rehabilitation period of 10 years , in the case of a person convicted of committing any offense requiring sex offender registration. (§ 4852.03, subd.
(a)( 2 ) (A); see § 4852.22 [providing discretionary exemption from rehabilitation period
except for offenses requiring section 290 registration] .) Defendant was convicted of

human trafficki ng and that crime requires registration. (§ 290, subd. (c)(1).) Thus, based

on section 4852.03, a 10

- year rehabilitation period applies to defendant. There is no
dispute this 10

- year period ha d no t elapsed when defendant filed his petition.

Defendant claims that a 10

- year rehabilitation period cannot apply because his underlying conviction was dismissed. He appears to rely on section 4852.01, subdivision
(b) within the chapter governing certificates of rehabilitation. But his focus on this

section is too narrow. Section 4852.01 identifies the persons who are eligible to file a
petition. Those persons include persons convicted of a felony violation of a sex offense
who are granted probation, the accusatory pleading of which has been dismissed pursuant

to section 1203.4. (§ 4852.01, subd. (b).) While this section does not set forth rehabilitation periods, it specifies that the person can file a petition “pur suant to the provisions of this chapter.” The chapter includes section 4852.03. We cannot read

section 4852.01, subdivision (b) in isolation while ignoring eligibility requirements found
elsewhere in the chapter. ( People v. Miller (2018) 23 Cal.App.5th 973, 982.)

Defendant also makes the conclusory assertion that the denial of his petition is

unconstitutional. Because th is assertion was not raised in the trial court and lack s analysis or citation to authority, we consider it forfeited. ( Allen v. City of Sacramento
(2015) 234 Cal.App.4th 41, 52 [appellate court is not required to examine undeveloped
claims]; People v. Rudd (1998) 63 Cal.App.4th 620, 628 [constitutional objections must
be interposed before the trial judge to be preserved for appeal] .)

I n sum, the trial court did not err in denying defendant’s petition.4 II

Section 290.5 does not provide defendant relief from registration as a sex offender

Senate Bill No. 384 (2017

- 2018 Reg. Sess.) restructured the sex offender
registration requirements by establishing three tiers of registration. (See § 290

, subd. (d).) Offenders falling in the third tier are subject to lifetime registration. (§ 290

, subd. (d)(3).) Tier three includes persons “convicted of a felony offense described in
subdivision (b) or (c) of Section 236.1” (conviction

- based tier three offenders). (§ 290

, subd. (d)(3)(I).) It also includes persons who committed a tier one or tier two offense
whose risk level is well above average, as specified (risk

- based tier three offenders)

. (§ 290

, subd. (d)(3)(D).)
Because defendant was convicted under subdivision (b) of Section 236.1, he is a

conviction

- based tier three offender and subject to lifetime registration. 1 Defendant’s
contention that he was statutorily entitled t o a risk

- based assessment before being placed

in this tier lacks merit. And he fails to develop any claim that the United States Constitution entitles him to such an assessment or that the entire registration process is
unconstitutional. (See Allen v. Ci ty of Sacramento (2015) 234 Cal.App.4th 41, 52.)

Because of defendant’s status as a conviction

- based tier three offender , there is no
merit to his claim that he is eligible for relief from registration under section 290.5.

Section 290.5 provides such reli ef to three groups: (1) tier one offenders ; (2) tier two

offenders ; and (3) risk

- based tier three offenders. (§ 290.5, subd s

. (a)

- (b).) Defendant
does not fall within those groups , so he is not eligible for registration relief under

section 290.5.

1 Defendant vaguely questions his no contest plea based on coercion and a lack of disclosure of a lifetime registration requirement. But d efendant does not appeal from a timely motion to withdraw his plea. ( § 1018.) Also, defendant does not sufficiently develop this contention or provide a record to support it. ( People v. Za idi (2007) 147 Cal.App.4th 1470, 1481 [defendant must show by evidence in record that he would not have entered plea].)5

Defendant contends he should be eligible for relief because his conviction was

dismissed under section 1203.4. Not so

. “Section 1203.4 dismissal .

. . does not affect sex offender registration.” ( People v. Chatman (2018) 4 Cal.5th 277, 287.) Defendant
also appears to rely on section 290.46 as providing relief from the registration requirement. But that section is inapposite. It requires the Department of Justice to
maintain a public Internet Web site that provides information about registered sex

offe nders. (§ 290.46, subd. (a).) A person may apply for exclusion from the Web site
through the department. (§ 290.46, subd. (d).) The Web site and the exclusion
application are separate from the general sex offender registration requirement and the

relie f provided by section 290.5 that defendant seeks . (See People v. Brandao (2012)

203 Cal.App.4th 436, 44 1 fn. 5 [persons excluded from section 290.46 Internet Web site must continue to register as sex offenders] )

. For these reasons, the trial court corre ctly found defendant ineligible for
registration relief under section 290.5.6 DISPOSITION
The order denying the petition for a certificate of rehabilitation is affirmed.

MESIWALA

, J.

We concur:

HULL, Acting P. J.

MAURO , J.