IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE

EASTERN DISTRICT OF VIRGINIA

Alexandria Division 

SAADIQ LONG, et al.,

 Plaintiffs, 

 v. 

MERRICK GARLAND, et al., 

 Defendants. 

 Case No. 1:15-cv-01642 (MSN/WEF) 

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

 This matter comes before the Court on Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss (Dkt. 72). Plaintiff 

Saadiq Long asserts several constitutional and procedural claims related to his inclusion in the 

Terrorism Screening Database (“TSDB” or “Watchlist”), a governmental tool used to collect and 

share information about suspected terrorists. Another court in this district initially transferred some 

of Long’s claims to the Fourth Circuit pursuant to 49 U.S.C. § 46110 and stayed the remainder of 

his claims. The Fourth Circuit determined it lacked jurisdiction to decide the transferred claims on 

the merits and remanded the case back to this Court for further proceedings. Because Plaintiff 

lacks standing to bring any remaining claims, however, the Court will grant the motion and dismiss 

the complaint. 

I. BACKGROUND

This case has a long history. Plaintiffs Saadiq Long, Juangjan Daves, and Leshauna Daves 

filed this suit in 2015 bringing several claims challenging substantive and procedural aspects 

related to their placement on the Watchlist and its subset—the No Fly List. See Dkt. 1. Judge 

O’Grady stayed the case from 2016 to 2019 for the government to process Plaintiffs’ 

administrative redress requests under the Department of Homeland Security’s Traveler Redress 

Inquiry Program (“DHS TRIP”). See Dkt. 16-32. After the government made final determinations 

regarding the requests, Judge O’Grady lifted the stay, and Plaintiffs filed an amended complaint. 
2

Dkt. 32; 35 (“FAC”). The government moved to dismiss, in part for lack of jurisdiction and also 

for failure to state a claim. See Dkt. 44-45. After Plaintiffs voluntarily dismissed three counts, six 

remained: Fifth Amendment substantive due process challenge (Count I); Fifth Amendment 

procedural due process challenge (Count II); Administrative Procedure Act challenge regarding 

DHS TRIP procedures (Count III); Administrative Procedure Act challenge regarding the sharing 

of Watchlist information to local law enforcement (Count IV); Fifth Amendment equal protection 

challenge (Count V); and a non-delegation challenge (Count VIII). See Dkt. 52. 

Judge O’Grady issued a mixed decision that dismissed the Daves’ claims but transferred 

some of Long’s claims to the Fourth Circuit, while staying the rest of his claims. As to the Daves 

plaintiffs, Judge O’Grady held that they lacked standing because they had not articulated a concrete 

and particularized injury. Dkt. 59 at 28-48. Turning to Long’s claims, Judge O’Grady began by 

considering jurisdiction under 49 U.S.C. § 46110, which establishes that a petitioner may seek 

judicial review of “orders” by the Secretary of Transportation in “the United States Court of 

Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit or in the court of appeals of the United States for the 

circuit in which the person resides.” Judge O’Grady understood this statute to give the appropriate 

court of appeals “exclusive jurisdiction” over such issues, and he concluded that the Plaintiffs’ 

challenges to their No-Fly-List determinations were “orders” within the meaning of § 46110. Dkt. 

59 at 15. Although Long’s facial constitutional challenges were not inescapably intertwined with 

those determinations, “[t]he upshot is that Long’s as-applied challenges to his redress proceedings 

and his ongoing Watchlist status, as determined through DHS TRIP, belong in [the] Fourth 

Circuit.” Id. at 27. And because Long “ask[ed] the Court to consider issues of, inter alia, TSDB 

nomination and inclusion, and ... policies that determine the very existence and composition of 

the No Fly List,” Judge O’Grady “decline[d] to exercise simultaneous jurisdiction over claims that 

might nullify the Fourth Circuit’s review, as such a divestment would be contrary to the clear intent 
3

of § 46110.” Id. at 28. Accordingly, he “sever[ed] Long’s as-applied claims in Counts I, II, III, and 

V” and transferred them to the Fourth Circuit, while staying the remainder of Long’s claims 

pending the Fourth Circuit’s review. Id.

The Fourth Circuit dismissed Long’s as-applied claims that pertained to his No-Fly-List 

status as moot. Before the Fourth Circuit reached its decision, the government removed Long from 

the No Fly List and informed him that he would “not be placed back on the No Fly List based on 

the currently available information.” Long v. Pekoske, 38 F.4th 417, 422 (4th Cir. 2022). 

Accordingly, “satisfied that ... the government will only return Long to the No Fly List on a new 

factual record,” the Fourth Circuit held that “any future controversy over Long’s No-Fly status is 

... distant and hypothetical,” and his claims challenging his No-Fly status were moot. Id. at 423, 

425. 

Although the Fourth Circuit thought it “unclear which of Long’s claims the district court 

intended to transfer”—whether it was only the as-applied No-Fly-List claims, or all of the asapplied claims for Counts I, II, III, and V, including those pertaining to the broader Watchlist—it 

“decline[d] to take a scalpel to Long’s complaint” and simply vacated the transfer order and 

remanded to the district court “with instructions to dismiss as moot Long’s challenges to his status 

on the No Fly List; decide whether it has jurisdiction over the rest of Long’s claims; and if not, 

transfer them to the proper Circuit.” Id. at 427. On those latter two points, the Fourth Circuit 

“decline[d] to decide whether § 46110 deprives the district court of jurisdiction over Long’s 

remaining as-applied challenges” and held that “even if § 46110 applies,” that statute required 

transfer “to either the D.C. Circuit or the Tenth Circuit,” where Long resides. Id. 

The Fourth Circuit mandate was somehow lost in transmission and never docketed in this

case. Roughly six months after the mandate was issued, Plaintiff filed a Consent Motion to 

Supplement Complaint, which brought new allegations that TSA has been reviewing his 
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Transportation Worker Identification Credential (“TWIC”) and Hazmat endorsement applications 

for years without issuing a decision, and that the Oklahoma City Police Department violated

Long’s constitutional rights because of his placement on the Watchlist. Dkt. 61. Almost two 

months later, upon realizing that the mandate was never docketed, Plaintiff filed a notice of the 

mandate, attaching the Fourth Circuit opinion and issuance of the mandate docketed in the Fourth 

Circuit case. Dkt. 63. The Court lifted the stay and ordered renewed briefing on the motion to 

dismiss in light of the passage of time, the Fourth Circuit remand, and intervening case law, 

including Elhady v. Kable, 993 F.3d 208 (4th Cir. 2021). 

The government now moves to dismiss all of Long’s remaining claims for lack of 

jurisdiction, or in the alternative, failure to state a claim. See Dkt. 73 (Def. Mot.). As to jurisdiction, 

the government argues that Long lacks standing on all counts because he has not alleged any injury 

tied to his placement on the Watchlist, or any impending future injury for prospective relief. Id. at 

16-20. The government also argues that the courts of appeals have exclusive jurisdiction pursuant 

to 49 U.S.C. § 46110 over Counts II and III, which challenge the Watchlist on due process grounds 

and under the APA, and that Long’s facial challenges to the No-Fly-List claims are moot. Id. at 

12-16, 22. 

II. ANALYSIS

The Court must dismiss a claim under Rule 12(b)(1) if it lacks subject-matter jurisdiction. 

“[P]laintiff[] bears the burden of proving that subject-matter jurisdiction exists.” The Piney Run 

Preservation Ass’n v. The Cty. Com’rs of Carroll Cty. Md., 523 F.3d 453, 459 (4th Cir. 2008). 

Among other things, in order to establish subject-matter jurisdiction, a plaintiff must prove that he 

has standing under Article III—that is, that there is an actual “case” or “controvers[y].” U.S. Const. 

Art. III § 2. 
5

To establish Article III standing, “[t]he plaintiff must have suffered or be imminently 

threatened with a concrete and particularized ‘injury in fact’ that is fairly traceable to the 

challenged action of the defendant and likely to be redressed by a favorable judicial decision.” 

Lexmark Int’l, Inc. v. Static Control Components, Inc., 572 U.S. 118, 125 (2014) (citing Lujan v. 

Defs. of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560 (1992)). This means that, when seeking prospective 

declaratory relief, as Long does here, a plaintiff must show that the danger of imminent injury is 

“real and immediate, not conjectural or hypothetical.” City of Los Angeles v. Lyons, 461 U.S. 95, 

102 (1983) (cleaned up). Importantly, “[p]ast exposure to illegal conduct does not in itself show a 

present case or controversy regarding injunctive relief.” O’Shea v. Littleton, 414 U.S. 488, 495-96 

(1974). Nor are “allegations of possible future injury ... sufficient.” Clapper v. Amnesty Int’l USA, 

568 U.S. 398, 409 (2013). 

Long’s alleged injuries have shifted since he filed the operative complaint. Notably, after 

Long amended his complaint in 2019, the government removed him from the No Fly List and 

assured that he would “not be placed back on the No Fly List based on the currently available 

information.” Long v. Pekoske, 38 F.4th 417, 422 (4th Cir. 2022). But while Long may now fly 

commercially, he contends that he is still injured because of his alleged placement on the broader 

Watchlist. According to Long, the central “harm in question is the [Terrorist Screening Center’s]

dissemination of Long’s [W]atchlist status.” Dkt. 75 (Pl. Opp.) at 8. Specifically, Long alleges that 

the government’s sharing of this information has caused him: (1) to be “stopped while driving by 

Oklahoma City Police Department officers five times” between November 23, 2022, and January 

12, 2023, for no reason other than his Watchlist status (Dkt. 61-1 (Supp. Compl. ¶ 8)); (2) an 

indefinite delay of his TWIC and Hazmat endorsement applications, which he contends “is an 

attempt to deny both applications without triggering final agency action that would lead to further 

watchlist-related litigation” (id. ¶ 7); and (3) unspecified travel-related harms from the information 
6

being shared with “TSA whenever he flies an airplane” and “CBP whenever he crosses a border” 

(Pl. Opp. at 8 (citing FAC ¶¶ 39, 81, 309)). 

None of these alleged harms establish standing. Nor are there any other allegations in 

Long’s pleadings that provide him with standing. 

First, Long’s repeated stops by the Oklahoma City Police Department do not support his 

standing because there is no longer a “certainly impending” risk of future injury. Clapper v. 

Amnesty Int’l USA, 568 U.S. 398, 401-02 (2013). Long admits that he “entered into a stipulation” 

with the Oklahoma City Police Department, in which it agreed to “not stop Long or any other 

person based solely on that individual’s [Watchlist] status.” Supp. Compl. ¶ 37. Furthermore, Long 

states that the Department presented a training to its officers, which “specified that neither Saadiq 

Long (explicitly) nor any other person listed on the watchlist should be stopped based solely due 

to presence on the list.” Id. ¶ 34. These allegations eliminate any “real and immediate” threat of 

future injury in this context. City of Los Angeles, 461 U.S. at 102.

Second, Long’s pending TWIC and Hazmat endorsement applications are not an injury 

that supports standing. These applications have not been denied; they have not been decided at all 

yet. Supp Compl. ¶¶ 4-5. Long argues that the delay should be treated not only as an “effective

denial[]” (Pl. Opp. at 9), but also as “an attempt to deny both applications without triggering final 

agency action.” Supp. Compl. ¶ 7. But Plaintiff has not pursued the remedies at his disposal to 

compel a timely decision from the agency. See 5 U.S.C. § 706(1); 28 U.S.C. § 1361. The Court 

cannot credit Plaintiff’s speculation in the absence of any other allegations tying this delay to his 

placement on the Watchlist. And in any event, were these applications to be denied, they are plainly 

TSA ordersreviewable under the jurisdiction of the court of appeals pursuant to 49 U.S.C. § 46110. 

Third, Long has not adequately pled any remaining travel-related injury after his removal 

from the No Fly List. Although the operative complaint contains several allegations of travel-
7

related harms (FAC ¶¶ 41, 187, 221-233, 235, 238), including an inability to board commercial 

flights and extensive security screenings, all of these allegations date back to 2013-2016, several 

years before Long was removed from the No Fly List. But Long has not alleged any travel-related 

harms since his removal from the No Fly List. Because “any future controversy over Long’s NoFly status is ... distant and hypothetical,” Long’s existing travel-related allegations, which all 

concern injuries while Long was on the No Fly List, cannot support his standing now. Long, 38 

F.4th at 423, 425.

Indeed, Long concedes this point, stating in his opposition that he “no longer even brings 

a travel-related Due Process claim.” Pl. Opp. at 4. And in opposing the government’s argument 

that he must pursue another DHS TRIP inquiry to exhaust his remaining Watchlist claims, Long

argues that “DHS TRIP only applies to those who have travel-related problems” and that he instead 

suffers harm from the Watchlist “in other ways.” Pl. Opp. at 5. That statement can be fairly 

understood to mean that Long, in fact, no longer has “travel-related problems.” Id.

At times in his opposition (at 4, 15-16), Long also references harm from being “detained” 

or “refused entry” by certain foreign governments, but these allegations too have become stale.

Long alleges that the government shares his “TSDB status” to foreign countries, which in 2015 

triggered his detention in Turkey (FAC ¶¶ 240, 242-43, 245, 252) and inability to enter Qatar and 

the United Arab Emirates (id. ¶¶ 256, 259-61). But these events occurred in 2015, five years before 

Long was removed from the No Fly List. See Long, 38 F.4th at 422. Long alleges that “[s]ubsets 

of TSDB watchlist information,” such as No Fly List status, “are disseminated ... to ... foreign 

countries.” FAC ¶ 80. Given that nearly a decade has passed since these events and that Long is 

no longer on the No Fly List, these harms cannot establish a threat of future imminent injury.1

1 Long also alleged that he has previously been “denied the purchase of a gun” (FAC ¶ 266; see also id. ¶ 234) and 

“had a bank account closed” (id. ¶ 270) due to his Watchlist status. But again, he made these allegations in 2019 prior 

to his removal from the No Fly List, and he has not alleged similar troubles in the time since the government 
8

Tying all these arguments together is Long’s overarching assertion that it is the 

dissemination itself of his Watchlist status that is causing him harm. The Fourth Circuit has been 

clear, however, in rejecting this contention. See Elhady, 993 F.3d at 225. Long cites to El Ali v. 

Barr, 473 F. Supp. 3d 479, 511 n.14 (D. Md. 2020), to support his argument that his “alleged 

harms ... flow from placement in the TSDB.” But the plaintiffs in El Ali had actually been denied 

or lost access to various government credentials or benefits—such as Military Base Access, TWIC, 

TSA Precheck, and Global Entry—because of their Watchlist status. Id. at 497-98, 511. Long has 

simply not alleged anything comparable. See Dkt. 59 at 32 (“Plaintiffs did not allege denial of any 

of these things.”).2

The Court’s decision does not imply, as Long suggests, that he “effectively could never” 

have standing to challenge his alleged Watchlist placement. Pl. Opp. at 8. Whether Long, or anyone 

else, has standing to challenge placement on the Watchlist turns on whether they adequately plead 

a concrete, particularized injury that is traceable to placement on the Watchlist and redressable by 

a court. Long has not done so here.3

* * *

Accordingly, it is hereby 

ORDERED that Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss (Dkt. 72) is GRANTED; and it is further

reevaluated his threat to national security when it removed him from the No Fly List. In any event, the Court has 

already declined to credit these exact allegations for standing purposes. See Dkt. 59 at 32 n.19. 

2 Long’s reliance on U.S. Department of Justice v. Reporters Committee for Freedom of Press, 489 U.S. 749 (1989), 

is misplaced. That case merely held that it was appropriate for the government to rely on the “personal privacy” FOIA 

exemption when refusing to disclose “rap-sheet information” to FOIA requesters. Id. at 779-80. It does not inform 

standing in civil rights lawsuits, nor does it hold that 29 U.S.C. § 534 protects privacy rights. To the contrary, it 

acknowledges that “Congress has authorized rap-sheet dissemination to banks, local licensing officials, the securities 

industry, the nuclear-power industry, and other law enforcement agencies.” Id. at 765. 

3 In addition to lacking standing generally, Long’s facial challenges to the No Fly List are moot after his removal from 

the list because there is not an impending risk of future injury tied to the policy that he challenges. Clapper, 568 U.S. 

at 401; see also Long, 38 F.4th at 425-26; Nur v. Unknown CBP Officers, 2022 WL 16747284, at *8 (E.D. Va. Nov. 

7, 2022) (relying on Long to find that a plaintiff’s facial challenge to CBP policies applicable to individuals on the 

Watchlist, “would be moot if he [were] no longer on the watchlist”).
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ORDERED that Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint (Dkt. 35) is DISMISSED.

The Clerk is directed to close this civil action. 

It is SO ORDERED.

/s/

Hon. Michael S. Nachmanoff

United States District Judge

Alexandria, Virginia

February 23, 2024