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United States v. Abdel Rahman:

Preliminary Charge

Hon. Michael B. Mukasey

Southern District of New York

The following text was prepared by the Southern District of New York s United

States District Judge Michael B. Mukasey to instruct jurors between opening 

statements and presentation of evidence in a trial for seditious conspiracy to conduct a campaign of urban terrorism, including participation in the 1993 bombing

of the World Trade Center and plans to bomb New York landmarks, United 

States v. Abdel Rahman, No. 1:93-cr-181 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 17, 1993).

Introduction

The indictment in this case contains 28 counts or charges. After all the evidence

has been presented, I will instruct you in detail on the rules that define each of

the charges in the indictment. Before we begin, however, I am going to explain

Count One of the indictment, which charges all of the defendants with a crime

that is often referred to as seditious conspiracy, although those words do not

appear in the body of the law that defines the crime. The reason I have singled

out this charge for explanation at the beginning of the trial is that, unlike the

other charges, which involve concepts and rules you have probably heard of before, this count involves some concepts and rules that may not be familiar, and I

thought you should be aware of them while you listen to the evidence instead of

having to wait until the end of the trial to hear about them. Also, the charge in

this count was the subject of some incorrect news reports you may have heard or

seen before you came here, and any misconceptions you may have picked up

from such reports, or from the comments of the lawyers during their openings, should be corrected.

I am also going to touch on a few other matters that I think you should know

before we start, relating to some of the arguments you heard about how religion

is involved in this case, entrapment, and El Sayyid Nosair s state court trial. We

will then begin with the government s presentation of evidence. Again, the purpose of these introductory instructions is to help you put in context the evidence

you may see and hear.

Seditious Conspiracy

Summary of Count One

Count One charges that all of the defendants and other persons participated in a

conspiracy, which is simply an unlawful agreement with each other and with

other persons to do at least one of three things: (1) to levy a war of urban terrorism against the United States, (2) to oppose by force the authority of the United

States, and (3) to prevent, hinder, or delay by force the execution of laws of the

United States.
United States v. Abdel Rahman: Preliminary Charge

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Summary of the Applicable Statute

The statute that you are going to be asked to apply is a federal law, section 2384

of title 18, United States Code, which reads in relevant part as follows:

If two or more persons in any State or Territory, or in any place subject to

the jurisdiction of the United States, conspire to . . . levy war against [the United 

States], or to oppose by force the authority [of the United States], or by force to

prevent, hinder, or delay the execution of any law of the United States, 

they shall be guilty of a crime.

Conspiracy Elements Summary

In order to find a defendant guilty of the crime charged in Count One of the indictment, you must find beyond a reasonable doubt:

First, that two or more persons conspired or agreed with one another;

Second, that such conspiracy had the goal of making war against the United

States, of opposing by force the authority of the United States, or of preventing, hindering, or delaying by force the execution of any law of the United States;

Third, that the conspiracy took place or was intended to have an effect in the

United States, in its territories, or in any place subject to the jurisdiction of the

United States;

Fourth, that the defendant you are considering joined in that agreement with

awareness of one or more of its unlawful goals.

Seditious Conspiracy Element One Existence of Agreement

As I have just told you, the first thing that the government must prove at this trial, 

beyond a reasonable doubt, is that a conspiracy actually existed. The essence of

the crime of conspiracy is an agreement between two or more persons to do

something that violates the law. Whether the agreement is ever carried out, or

whether it succeeds or fails, does not matter. Indeed, the agreement need not be

consistently followed. The unlawful purpose in this case is to wage war against

the United States, to oppose the authority of the United States, or to prevent, hinder, or delay the execution of any law of the United States.

The government must prove, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the particular

conspiracy the defendants are charged with participating in existed, and existed at 

or about the time alleged in the indictment. If you find that the conspiracy

charged in the indictment did not exist, you cannot find any defendant guilty on

Count One of the indictment.

A conspiracy has sometimes been called a partnership for criminal purposes

in which each partner becomes the agent of every other partner and has the authority to act and speak on behalf of every other partner. However, to establish

the existence of a conspiracy, the government is not required to show that two or

more people sat around a table and entered into a formal contract, orally or in

writing, stating that they have formed a conspiracy to violate the law and setting

forth the means by which it was to be carried out or the part to be played by each

conspirator. Indeed, it would be extraordinary if there were such a formal document or specific agreement. It is enough if two or more persons, in any manner,
United States v. Abdel Rahman: Preliminary Charge

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whether they say so directly or not, come to a common understanding to violate

the law. Express language or specific words are not required to indicate agreement to or membership in a conspiracy.

It is important, in order to understand what a conspiracy is, to keep in mind

the difference between the object or goal of the conspiratorial agreement that is, 

the crime that two or more people agree to commit and the agreement itself. A

conspiracy the agreement to commit a crime is a violation of law entirely

separate and distinct from the crime that the members of the conspiracy agree to

commit. Let me give an example that has nothing to do with this case. If two or

more people were to agree to rob a bank, that agreement itself would be a crime. 

It would make no difference, as far as conspiracy law is concerned, whether or

not the conspirators actually carried out their plan to rob the bank. If the government could prove beyond a reasonable doubt that there was an agreement to rob

the bank, those defendants who had agreed to rob the bank would be guilty of

conspiracy. On the other hand, even if the bank actually was robbed by someone, 

there would be a robbery but no conspiracy if the government could not prove

that the person who actually robbed the bank agreed to the robbery beforehand

with another person.

Just as is true of the bank robbery example I used, it does not matter whether

the conspiracy charged in Count One was successful or not. The question is

whether two or more defendants formed an agreement to wage war against the

United States, to oppose its authority by force, or to prevent, hinder, or delay by

force the execution of its laws. If two or more persons did so agree, the crime of

conspiracy is complete. It does not matter whether the persons who formed the

agreement actually carried out their plans, or whether the agreement ultimately

was successful.

Of course, proof concerning the accomplishment of the object of a conspiracy may be the most persuasive evidence of the existence of the conspiracy itself. 

In other words, success of the venture in carrying out an act, if you believe it was 

carried out, is often the best proof of the venture or the agreement. But as I just

said, it is not necessary that a conspiracy actually succeed in its purpose for you

to conclude that it existed. Also, in determining whether there has been an unlawful agreement, you may consider the acts and conduct of the alleged members of

the conspiracy that are done to carry out an apparent criminal purpose. The adage 

actions speak louder than words is applicable here. Often, the only evidence

available is that of disconnected acts on the part of the alleged individual conspirators. However, when taken together and in connection with the reasonable

inferences that flow from them, those acts may show a criminal agreement just as 

conclusively as more direct proof. Whether any acts that are proved during this

trial show a conspiracy, or not, is for you to decide.

If, upon consideration of all the evidence, direct and circumstantial, you find

beyond a reasonable doubt that the minds of at least two persons met that is, that they agreed, as I have explained a conspiratorial agreement to you, to work

together in furtherance of the unlawful scheme alleged in the indictment then 

proof of the existence of the conspiracy is established.
United States v. Abdel Rahman: Preliminary Charge

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Second Element Objects or Goals of the Conspiracy

In Count One, the defendants are charged with agreeing to three goals: (1) to

make war against the United States, (2) to oppose by force the authority of the

United States, and (3) to prevent, hinder, or delay by force the execution of laws

of the United States. Although three separate objects or goals are charged, you

may find the conspiracy proved if it is established that any single one of those 

objects was agreed to by two or more persons. The government is not required to

prove all three goals. However, the government must prove at least one of those

objects or goals beyond a reasonable doubt. If the government has not proved

that at least one of those goals was a goal of the conspiracy charged in Count

One, your verdict must be not guilty.

As you can probably see from the objects or goals I have just described, an

agreement to use force is a necessary ingredient of each. To prove someone

guilty of the conspiracy charged in Count One, the government must show that

the conspirators agreed that physical force would be used. In this case, the indictment charges that the conspirators agreed to use force by planning and carrying out certain acts of violence, including bombings. Again, it is not necessary

for the government to show that force was actually used by the conspirators, but

the government must prove at least that the conspirators intended to use force.

Second Element Intent to Levy War, Forcibly to Oppose the United States, or 

Hinder Execution of United States Law

The three goals of the conspiracy charged in the indictment (1) to wage war

against the United States, (2) to oppose by force the authority of the United

States, and (3) to prevent, hinder, or delay by force the execution of some law of

the United States all have as a common ingredient not only the use of force but

also opposition to the United States, functioning through its government.

In other words, it is not enough for the prosecution to prove that two or more

persons agreed to commit random acts of violence, or to prevent some person or

people who work for the government from doing their job, or simply to violate a

law of the United States. Rather, the prosecution must prove that those who participated in the conspiracy intended to use force for the purpose of attacking the

United States, functioning through its government. In order to prove intent to

attack the United States functioning through its government, the evidence must 

prove that those who participated in the unlawful agreement wanted to use force

that would inflict widespread punishment or suffering as retribution for some

policy or act of the United States government, or that would have the effect of

attempting to force the United States government to perform some act or to

change some policy.

However, when the law uses the words levy war against the United States, that does not mean that the conspirators must have been planning to overthrow

the government, or to replace it with another government, or to seize United

States territory. Nor does it mean that the target of force must necessarily be a

government employee or government property. Rather, I instruct you that an attack even on people who do not work for the government, and even on property

that does not belong to the government, may be considered an act of war
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against the United States if it caused or threatened damage that was widespread

enough to show an intent to threaten the peace and safety of a large segment of

the population, that such widespread damage was intended by members of the

conspiracy, and that the purpose of causing such widespread damage was either

to punish or retaliate against the United States government for an act or policy 

that it followed, or to force the United States government to perform some act or

change some policy.

You should consider the acts, if any, that were planned and how severe the

consequences of each planned act were or might have been as well as the statements and other conduct by defendants that you consider to be relevant. Taking

all these factors into consideration, you must then decide, based on your common 

sense, whether the acts that the conspirators planned to commit could constitute a 

war against the United States as I have explained that concept to you. Again, let me remind you that the only acts you may consider here are those that the

prosecution has proved, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the conspirators either

committed or planned to commit.

To determine whether any of the acts that defendants conspired to commit

constituted opposing by force the authority of the United States, you should

consider whether the proved acts, whether they were actually committed or simply planned, included elements of force and whether they were intended to oppose or undermine the authority of the United States government to conduct one

or more of its official functions. Force is defined in the conventional sense. An

act involves force if it threatens or results in violence, or if it threatens or results

in harming or destroying property, or harming or killing people. An act opposes

the authority of the United States if successfully carried out it would adversely

affect the ability of the United States government to govern the country or to perform one of its proper functions. Here I want to caution you that affecting the

ability of the United States government to govern or to perform one of its proper

functions must be the purpose of the person who commits the act and not merely 

an incidental effect of an act that is planned or carried out for another purpose. In 

other words, in order to be guilty of conspiring to oppose by force the authority

of the United States, a person must intend to oppose the authority of the United

States, and not simply to do something for another purpose even though it may

have the incidental effect of interfering with the authority of the United States.

To determine whether a conspiratorial act by force prevents, hinders, or delays the execution of laws of the United States, you must consider whether the

act would, if successfully carried out, forcibly prevent or interfere with the carrying out of a law of the United States. Again, force is defined in the conventional

sense. An act involves force if it threatens or results in violence, or if it threatens

or results in harming or destroying property, or harming or killing people. The

execution of laws includes enforcing laws of the United States that are found in

statute books, as well as the orders of courts. Once again, I want to caution you, as I did a moment ago in connection with the second alleged goal of the conspiracy, that preventing, hindering, or delaying the carrying out of a law of the

United States must be a purpose of the person who plans or commits the act, and

not merely an incidental effect of an act that is planned or carried out for another

purpose.
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So the question for you to consider is what was in the minds of those who

planned the use of force, if you find any such plan existed. To establish the existence of the conspiracy charged in Count One, the government must prove that

two or more people agreed to use force for the purpose of attacking the United

States, functioning through its government, as I have explained that concept to

you. However, if you find that there was simply an agreement to attack people or

places without an intention to attack the United States, functioning through its

government, then the conspiracy charged in Count One would not be proved and

your obligation would be to return a verdict of not guilty as to that count.

Third Element Within the United States

The third element that the government must prove beyond a reasonable doubt in

order to establish that a conspiracy as charged in Count One existed is that the

conspiracy, as I have explained it to you, was formed or pursued in the United

States or its territories or in a place subject to its jurisdiction. In order to find the

existence of a conspiracy of the sort charged in Count One, you must find that the 

conspiracy was joined by a defendant or pursued in the United States, in its territories, or in any place subject to its jurisdiction.

There may not be any dispute that the specific acts charged, if proved, occurred in the United States. Nonetheless, in order to find the conspiracy charged

in Count One, you must find that a conspiracy with one of the three goals I mentioned was formed or pursued in the United States or its territories or in a place

subject to its jurisdiction.

Fourth Element Participation in the Conspiracy

If you find that the government has proved beyond a reasonable doubt that the

conspiracy charged in the indictment existed, then you must determine whether

each individual defendant was a member of that conspiracy. I remind you that

guilt is individual and that you must consider each defendant s participation or

lack of participation separately. In determining whether the defendant you are

considering became a member of the conspiracy, you must determine not only

whether he participated in it, but whether he did so with knowledge of its unlawful purpose. Did the defendant join with an awareness of at least one of the

unlawful aims and purposes of the conspiracy?

In defining the requirement of participation in the conspiracy, I said that you 

must determine whether or not the defendant you are considering knowingly

joined in the agreement with intent to further at least one of the conspiracy s

three unlawful goals (1) waging a war of urban terrorism against the United

States, (2) opposing by force the government of the United States, or (3) using

force to prevent, hinder, or delay the execution of any law of the United States.

When you consider whether a particular defendant was a member of the conspiracy charged in Count One, you must determine whether he knowingly and

intentionally agreed to further one of the three unlawful purposes of the conspiracy. I have already explained those goals to you when I explained the nature of

the conspiracy charged in Count One, and I am not going to repeat that explana-
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tion here. It is contained on pages 4 through 6 of these instructions and it applies

when you are deciding whether a defendant agreed to further one of those goals.

To have guilty knowledge, a defendant need not know the full extent of the

conspiracy. Similarly, the defendant need not know all of the activities of the

conspiracy. Further, the defendant need not know who all the co-conspirators are. 

Indeed, a single act may be enough to bring the defendant within the membership 

of the conspiracy provided that the defendant was aware of the conspiracy and

knowingly associated himself with its unlawful aims.

Of course, mere association with a conspirator does not make someone a

member of a conspiracy. Nor is knowledge without participation sufficient. What 

is necessary is that the defendant you are considering participated by agreeing to

further one of the unlawful purposes of the conspiracy. In other words, in order to 

participate in a seditious conspiracy, a defendant must have had knowledge of at

least one of the three unlawful purposes of the conspiracy (1) to make war on

the United States, (2) to oppose by force the authority of the United States, or

(3) to prevent, hinder or delay by force the execution of a law of the United

States and must have agreed to aid in the accomplishment of one of those ends. It is not necessary, however, that the defendant received or even anticipated any

financial benefit from his participation in the conspiracy so long as the defendant 

participated in it in the way that I have explained.

If you find that a conspiracy of the kind charged in Count One existed and

that the defendant you are considering participated knowingly and intentionally 

in it, the extent or length of his participation has no bearing on whether or not he

is guilty. A defendant may join a conspiracy at any point after it begins, and

leave before the conspiracy ends, and still be held responsible as a conspirator. Once a conspiracy has been proved, the act of any conspirator becomes, in the

eyes of the law, the act of all of the members of the conspiracy. Thus, if you find

that a seditious conspiracy existed and that a particular defendant participated in

the conspiracy, then that defendant is responsible for all the acts of the conspiracy. Even if the defendant you are considering participated in the conspiracy to a

degree more limited than that of another co-conspirator, that defendant is equally

guilty so long as he was at any time during the relevant period a conspirator.

If you find that a defendant joined the conspiracy charged in Count One, then 

that defendant is presumed to remain a member of the conspiracy and is responsible for all actions taken in furtherance of the conspiracy after he joins

until the conspiracy has been completed or abandoned or otherwise ended, for

example by the arrest of some or all conspirators, or until the defendant has withdrawn from the conspiracy.

The question then is: Did the defendant you are considering join the conspiracy charged in Count One and participate in it with the awareness of at least one

of its basic purposes and aims?

Participation: Unlawful, Intentional, and Knowing

In defining the requirement of participation in the conspiracy, I have used the

words unlawful, intentional, and knowing. As I explained before, the terms 

unlawful, intentional, and knowing mean that you must find beyond a reason-
United States v. Abdel Rahman: Preliminary Charge

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able doubt that the defendant knew what he was doing and he did it deliberately

and voluntarily as opposed to mistakenly or accidentally.

The word unlawful simply means contrary to law, that is, to do something

which the law forbids. Agreeing to engage in sedition, defined as the three goals

of making war against the United States; opposing by force the authority of the

United States; or preventing, hindering, or delaying by force the execution of any 

law of the United States, is unlawful.

A person acts knowingly if he acts purposely and deliberately and not because of mistake or accident or other innocent reason.

A person acts intentionally if he acts voluntarily, willfully, and with a bad

purpose, that is, a purpose to do something the law forbids. Of course, it is not

necessary that the defendant knew that he was violating any particular law. But

you must be convinced beyond a reasonable doubt that he was aware that what he 

was doing was, in general, unlawful.

Your decision whether a defendant acted knowingly, intentionally, or willfully, and whether he joined the conspiracy with intent to accomplish one of its

unlawful goals, involves a decision about that defendant s state of mind. Since it

is not possible to look into a person s mind to see what he was thinking, you

must consider all the facts and circumstances shown by the evidence and exhibits 

in order to determine what his state of mind was.

In our everyday affairs, we are continually called upon to decide from the actions of others what their state of mind is. Experience has taught us that, frequently, actions speak louder than words. Therefore, you may well rely on circumstantial evidence in determining a defendant s state of mind. It is up to you, based on all the evidence, to determine whether each defendant knowingly and

intentionally entered the alleged conspiracy, and whether he did so with one of its 

unlawful goals in mind.

Of course, you may consider a defendant s statements as well if you find

them relevant to the issue of his state of mind.

Agreement with Government Agent Not Sufficient

When I say that the government must prove the existence of an agreement between two or more persons, it is important to recall that an agreement between a

defendant and someone you find to have been a government agent, such as Emad 

Salem, is not enough to establish a conspiracy. The government must prove that

at least two people who were not government agents agreed to at least one of the

goals I described before. If you find that at least two people who were not government agents agreed to one or more of those goals, that is enough to prove the

existence of the conspiracy, even if they also thought that Emad Salem was part

of the conspiracy and not a government agent. Also, it is possible for two people

to agree to one or more of these goals through someone who is a government

agent, but there must be two or more people who are not government agents

agreeing to one or more of these goals, and each must be aware that someone 

other than the government agent also is participating in the conspiracy.
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Religion

I want to say a few words also about how religion may be involved as an issue in

this case, and also about how it is not an issue in this case.

The government has argued to you that among the motives or reasons the defendants had for committing the acts charged in the indictment were certain of

their religious beliefs. Some defendants have argued that the government was

motivated by opposition to their religion in bringing these charges, and some

have argued that their religious beliefs were not a motive for violence.

You will recall that when I described a few moments ago the elements of the

conspiracy charged in Count One, motive was not among them. The government

does not have to prove that someone had a motive or reason for committing a

crime, but only that he acted with the intent to further one of the unlawful goals I

described a few moments ago. A defendant does not have to prove anything, and

certainly not that the government had a motive or reason for bringing charges. However, the government may try to prove and argue a motive and a defendant

may try to prove and argue a motive by the government as well.

Let me illustrate this with an example that has nothing to do with this case. If 

the government charges a defendant with bank robbery, it does not have to prove

the defendant s motive for committing the robbery. However, the government 

may if it wishes present evidence that the defendant needed the money badly as

evidence that he had a motive to rob the bank. Of course, the defendant may try

to show that he was in fact a millionaire, and did not need the money, and argue

that the government was picking on him only because he was wealthy.

However, it is important for you to understand that although the government 

may introduce proof of religious belief and argue motive from that, you may not

find that a defendant committed any offense charged in this indictment merely

because you may disagree with or dislike his religious beliefs, nor may you find

that he did not commit an offense simply because you agree with or admire his

religious beliefs. Every person in this country, including each of these defendants, has the right to believe what he or she wishes. To put the matter simply, if

you find beyond a reasonable doubt that a defendant committed one or more of

the crimes charged in this indictment with the required state of mind, it is not a

defense that he committed the crime in the name of religion, and your verdict as

to that defendant should be guilty. On the other hand, if you find there is not

enough evidence to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that a defendant committed

a crime, his religion cannot provide the basis for a criminal conviction, and your

verdict as to that defendant should be not guilty.

Defense: Entrapment

Some defendants may assert as a defense to some or all of the counts in this indictment that they were the victims of entrapment by an agent of the government. 

The law permits government agents to trap an unwary criminally-minded person, but the law does not permit agents of the government to entrap an unwary innocent person. Thus, a defendant may not be convicted of a crime if it was a government agent who gave the defendant the idea to commit the crime, if it was the

government agent who also persuaded him to commit the crime, and if he was
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not ready and willing to commit the crime before the government agent spoke 

with him.

On the other hand, if the defendant was ready and willing to violate the law, and the government agent merely presented him with an opportunity to do so, that would not constitute entrapment.

Your inquiry on this issue should first be to determine if there is any evidence that a government agent took the first step that led to a crime charged in

the indictment; in other words, that he induced that criminal act. And here inducement means soliciting, proposing, or suggesting that a defendant commit the

crime charged. If you find there was no such evidence of inducement by someone 

who was at the time a government agent, there can be no entrapment and your

inquiry on this defense should end there.

If, on the other hand, you find some evidence that a government agent initiated a criminal act charged in the indictment, then you must decide if the government has satisfied its burden to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant you are considering was predisposed that he was ready and willing before the inducement to commit the crime. The defendant does not have to prove

his lack of predisposition; the government must prove such predisposition beyond a reasonable doubt. The government may prove predisposition in one of

three ways: (1) by proving that the defendant, before any inducement from a

government agent, was already involved in a course of criminal conduct similar

to the one charged here; (2) by proving that the defendant, before any inducement 

from a government agent, had already formed the intention to commit a crime

charged here; or (3) by proving that the defendant readily responded to the inducement, and by doing that showed that he was ready and willing to commit the 

crime charged. If you find beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant was predisposed that is, ready and willing to commit the offenses charged in the indictment, and was simply waiting for a favorable opportunity to commit the offenses charged, then you should find that the defendant was not the victim of entrapment. On the other hand, if you have a reasonable doubt that the defendant

would have committed the offenses charged without the government agent s inducements, you must acquit the defendant of those charges.

You should know that, with respect to the defense of entrapment as well as

other decisions in this case, you must consider each defendant separately. Whether or not you find there was entrapment as to one defendant should not

control your decision as to whether or not any other defendant was entrapped.

Prior State Trial

You were told during jury selection that one defendant, El Sayyid Nosair, was

tried in a New York state court on various charges in connection with the November 5, 1990, murder of Rabbi Meir Kahane. That trial began in November

1991 and ended in December 1991 with an acquittal on some charges and a conviction on others. He was sentenced in January 1992 in connection with the

charges on which he was convicted to a prison term of between seven and one

third and twenty-two years. You may hear about that trial and the resulting sentence during this trial.
United States v. Abdel Rahman: Preliminary Charge

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There are a few things you should understand about that state case and how it 

may be relevant to this case, and also how it is not relevant to this case.

First, you should be aware, and I instruct you, that there is nothing unconstitutional or otherwise unlawful about a person being tried in a federal court on a

federal charge in connection with an act that was also the subject of an earlier

state trial on a state charge. Some of you may have heard of the double jeopardy

clause, but that clause does not apply to a charge brought by a separate government. The federal and state governments are separate. One consequence of that is 

that if a jury reached a particular result in the state case, that result is in no way

binding on you as a federal jury applying federal law. Your decision here is separate from the decision made by a state court jury under state law. Simply because

the state court jury acquitted him on some charges is not evidence supporting an

acquittal here, and simply because the state court jury convicted him on other

charges is not evidence supporting a conviction here.

Second, the way that the earlier state case may be relevant here is that you

may consider how, if at all, the result in that case may have influenced later

events, and may have influenced the conduct of people whose conduct will be the 

subject of testimony here. Also, some witnesses who testified in the state trial

may testify here, and you may very well hear the lawyers mention that trial in

connection with the testimony of those witnesses.

Conclusion

Now I have finished with this preliminary charge, and I thank you for your attention. I want to remind you that I have given you these preliminary instructions

only to introduce you to some concepts that may not be familiar or that you may

have had some mistaken impression about either because of news reports or because what one or another of the lawyers may have said during their opening

statements. I do not mean to suggest by these instructions that these are the only

legal rules that apply to this case. They are not. I gave you some preliminary instructions before the openings and I may be giving you instructions throughout

the trial as to legal rules if it becomes necessary. I will instruct you on all the elements of each of the crimes charged at the end of the trial. Finally, I do not want

any of these instructions to be taken as a comment by me on what the evidence 

will show. I have no idea what it will show, and you are the only judges of what

the evidence proves or does not prove.