a

GAO

United States General Accounting Office

Report to Congressional Requesters

June 2003 BORDER SECURITY

New Policies and 

Procedures Are 

Needed to Fill Gaps in 

the Visa Revocation 

Process

GAO-03-798
The U.S. government has no specific written policy on the use of visa 

revocations as an antiterrorism tool and no written procedures to guide 

State in notifying the relevant agencies of visa revocations on terrorism 

grounds. Further, State, INS, and the FBI do not have written internal 

procedures for notifying their appropriate personnel to take specific actions 

on visas revoked by the State Department. State and INS officials said they 

use the revocation process to prevent suspected terrorists from entering the 

country, but none of the agencies has a policy that covers investigating, 

locating, and taking action when a visa holder has already entered. 

This lack of formal written policies and procedures has contributed to 

systemic weaknesses in the visa revocation process that increase the 

possibility of a suspected terrorist entering or remaining in the United 

States. In our review of 240 visa revocations, we found that 

• appropriate units within INS and the FBI did not always receive 

notifications of all the revocations; 

• names were not consistently posted to the agencies’ watch lists of 

suspected terrorists; 

• 30 individuals whose visas were revoked on terrorism grounds had 

entered the United States either before or after revocation and may 

still remain; and 

• INS and the FBI were not routinely taking actions to investigate, 

locate, or resolve the cases of individuals who remained in the 

United States after their visas were revoked. 

Diagram of Gaps in the Visa Revocation Notification System 

Inconsistent or incomplete 

information flow

No information flow

Sources: GAO and Art Explosion.

Department of State

Bureau of

Consular Affairs 

revokes visas

Department of Homeland Securitya

Department of State

Issuing visas

Managing stays

Controlling entries

Department of Homeland Securitya

Department of Justice

a On March 1, 2003, INS’s various functions transferred to the Department of Homeland Security. 

The National Strategy for 

Homeland Security calls for 

preventing the entry of foreign 

terrorists into our country and 

using all legal means to identify; 

halt; and, where appropriate, 

prosecute or bring immigration or 

other civil charges against 

terrorists in the United States. 

GAO reported in October 2002 that 

the Department of State had 

revoked visas of certain persons 

after it learned they might be 

suspected terrorists, raising 

concerns that some of these 

individuals may have entered the 

United States before or after State’s 

action. Congressional requesters 

asked GAO to (1) identify the 

policies and procedures of State, 

the Immigration and Naturalization 

Service (INS), and the Federal 

Bureau of Investigation (FBI) that 

govern their respective visa 

revocation actions and (2) determine the effectiveness of the 

process. 

GAO makes recommendations to 

the Department of Homeland 

Security, in conjunction with the 

Departments of State and Justice, 

to ensure that when State revokes a

visa because of terrorism concerns, 

the appropriate units within State, 

INS, and the FBI are notified 

immediately and that proper 

actions are taken. Homeland 

Security agreed that the visa 

revocation process needed to be 

strengthened. State and Justice did 

not comment on our 

recommendations. 

www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-03-798.

To view the full product, including the scope 

and methodology, click on the link above. 

For more information, contact Jess T. Ford at 

(202) 512-4128 or fordj@gao.gov. 

Highlights of GAO-03-798, a report to the 

Subcommittee on National Security, 

Emerging Threats, and International 

Relations, House Committee on 

Government Reform, and the Senate 

Committee on Finance 

June 2003

BORDER SECURITY 

New Policies and Procedures Are Needed 

to Fill Gaps in the Visa Revocation 

Process 
Page i GAO-03-798 Border Security: Visa Revocations

Contents

Letter 1

Results in Brief 3

Background 6

Visa Revocation Policies and Procedures 9

Weaknesses Existed in the Visa Revocation Process 15

Conclusions 26

Recommendations for Executive Action 27

Agency Comments and Our Evaluation 27

Appendixes

Appendix I: Scope and Methodology 30

Appendix II: Legal Process for Visa Revocations 33

Authority to Revoke Visas 33

Timing and Effect of Visa Revocations 33

The Legal Process for Removing an Alien Who Is Already in the 

Country 35

Appendix III: Detailed Information on Revoked Visas 37

Appendix IV: Example of a Revocation Cable the Department of State Sent 

to the INS and the FBI 40

Appendix V: Sample of a Revocation Certificate the Department of State 

Sent to the Immigration and Naturalization Service Lookout 

Unit 42

Appendix VI: Comments from the Department of Homeland Security 43

Appendix VII: Comments from the Department of State 44

GAO Comments 48

Tables Table 1: Number of Individuals Whose Visas Were Revoked on 

Terrorism Grounds, by Region and Nationality (Sept. 11, 

2001, through Dec. 31, 2002) 37

Table 2: Number of Visa Revocations, by Class and Type of Visa 

Revoked 39

Figures Figure 1: Overview of the Border Security Process for Controlling 

Entries and Visits of Foreign Visitors 7
Contents

Page ii GAO-03-798 Border Security: Visa Revocations

Figure 2: Diagram of Visa Revocation Notification System That, If 

Fully and Consistently Implemented, Would Provide 

Information to the Appropriate Units at State, Homeland 

Security, and the FBI 14

Figure 3: Diagram of Gaps in the Visa Revocation Notification 

System 17

Figure 4: INS Lookout Unit Receipt of Revocation Notification for 

240 Cases 19

Abbreviations

CLASS Consular Lookout and Support System

FBI Federal Bureau of Investigation

IBIS Interagency Border Inspection System

INA Immigration and Nationality Act

INS Immigration and Naturalization Service

NIIS Nonimmigrant Information System

VGTOF Violent Gang and Terrorist Organization File

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Page 1 GAO-03-798 Border Security: Visa Revocations

United States General Accounting Office

Washington, D.C. 20548

A

June 18, 2003 Lret

The Honorable Christopher Shays

Chairman, Subcommittee on National Security, 

 Emerging Threats, and International Relations

Committee on Government Reform

House of Representatives

The Honorable Charles E. Grassley

Chairman, Committee on Finance

United States Senate

As stated in the President’s National Strategy for Homeland Security,1 the 

U.S. government has no more important mission than protecting the 

homeland from future terrorist attacks. The strategy calls for preventing 

the entry of foreign terrorists into our country and using all legal means to 

identify; halt; and, where appropriate, prosecute or bring immigration or 

other civil charges against terrorists in the United States. In October 2002,2

we reported that the visa process should be strengthened as an 

antiterrorism tool. We found that the Department of State had revoked the 

visas3

 of certain persons as a precautionary measure after it learned that 

they might be suspected terrorists, raising concerns that some of these 

individuals may have entered the United States before or after their visas 

were revoked.

1

Office of Homeland Security, National Strategy for Homeland Security (Washington, D.C.: 

July 2002).

2

U.S. General Accounting Office, Border Security: Visa Process Should be Strengthened as 

an Antiterrorism Tool, GAO-03-132NI (Washington, D.C.: Oct. 21, 2002).

3

In this report, we use the term “visa” to refer to nonimmigrant visas only. The United States 

also grants visas to people who intend to immigrate to the United States. A visa is a travel 

document that allows a foreign visitor to present himself or herself at a port of entry for 

admission to the United States. Citizens of 27 countries that participate in the Visa Waiver 

Program, Canada, and certain other locations are not required to obtain visas for business or 

pleasure stays of short duration. See GAO-03-132NI for more information on the visa 

adjudication process and U.S. General Accounting Office, Border Security: Implications of 

Eliminating the Visa Waiver Program, GAO-03-38 (Washington, D.C.: Nov. 22, 2002), for 

more information on the Visa Waiver Program.
Page 2 GAO-03-798 Border Security: Visa Revocations

At your request, we assessed how the visa revocation process is being used 

as an antiterrorism tool. Specifically, we (1) determined the policies and 

procedures of the State Department, the Immigration and Naturalization 

Service (INS),4

 and the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) that govern 

their respective actions in the visa revocation process and (2) assessed the 

effectiveness of the visa revocation process, specifically (a) the steps State 

took to notify the appropriate units within INS and the FBI of revocations; 

(b) the procedures used by the three agencies to post lookouts on these 

revocations to their terrorist watch lists;5

 (c) whether any of the individuals 

whose visas had been revoked were able to enter the United States before 

or after the revocation; and (d) the actions taken by INS and the FBI to 

investigate; locate; and, where appropriate, clear, remove, or prosecute the 

individuals who did enter the United States and may still remain in the 

country after their visas had been revoked. Our review covered only visas 

that the State Department revoked on terrorism grounds from September 

11, 2001, through December 31, 2002.6

To identify the policies and procedures governing the visa revocation 

process, we interviewed officials from State, INS, and the FBI and reviewed 

relevant documents. To evaluate the effectiveness of the visa revocation 

process, we reviewed all 240 of State’s visa revocations on terrorism 

grounds from September 11, 2001, through December 31, 2002. For each of 

these cases, we obtained information from the State Department to 

determine if, and when, State notified INS and the FBI of the revocations. 

We also obtained information from these agencies to determine if, and 

when, they posted appropriate lookouts on their terrorist watch lists. We 

4

On March 1, 2003, INS became part of three units within the Department of Homeland 

Security. INS inspection functions transferred to the Bureau of Customs and Border 

Protection; its investigative and enforcement functions transferred to the Bureau of 

Immigration and Customs Enforcement; and its immigration services function became part 

of the Bureau of Citizenship and Immigration Services. Because our work focused on visa 

revocation cases that took place before the March 1 reorganization, our report refers to the 

U.S. government’s immigration agency as “INS.”

5

These watch lists are automated databases that contain information about individuals who 

are known or suspected terrorists so that these individuals can be prevented from entering 

the country, apprehended while in the country, or apprehended as they attempt to exit the 

country. Specific entries on watch lists are sometimes referred to as “lookouts.” 

6

The State Department also revokes visas for reasons other than terrorism, such as alien 

smuggling, drug trafficking, and misrepresentation. State Department officials told us that 

visas revoked on terrorism grounds represent a significant portion of all revoked visas, but 

they did not have data available on this matter.
Page 3 GAO-03-798 Border Security: Visa Revocations

reviewed INS arrival and departure data to assess whether any of the 

individuals whose visas had been revoked had entered the United States 

either before or after revocation and whether they may still remain in the 

country. Where available, we supplemented the INS data with information 

from the State Department. We interviewed INS, FBI, and Department of 

Justice officials to discuss what actions INS and the FBI had taken to 

investigate; locate; and, where appropriate, clear, remove, or prosecute 

those individuals who may remain in the United States. Appendix I 

provides more information on our scope and methodology, including the 

limitations to INS and State data that we reviewed.

Results in Brief Our analysis indicates that the U.S. government has no specific written 

policy on the use of visa revocations as an antiterrorism tool and no written 

procedures to guide State in notifying the relevant agencies of visa 

revocations on terrorism grounds. State and INS have written procedures 

that guide some types of visa revocations; however, neither they nor the 

FBI have written internal procedures for notifying their appropriate 

personnel to take specific actions on visas revoked by the State 

Department. State and INS officials could articulate their informal policies 

and procedures for how and for what purpose their agencies have used the 

process to keep terrorists out of the United States, but neither they nor FBI 

officials had policies or procedures that covered investigating, locating, 

and taking appropriate action in cases where the visa holder had already 

entered the country.
Page 4 GAO-03-798 Border Security: Visa Revocations

The lack of formal, written policies and procedures may have contributed 

to systemic weaknesses in the visa revocation process that increase the 

probability of a suspected terrorist entering or remaining in the United 

States. In our review of the 240 visa revocations, we found that (a) 

appropriate units within INS and the FBI did not always receive 

notification of the revocations; (b) lookouts were not consistently posted 

to the agencies’ watch lists of suspected terrorists; (c) 30 individuals whose 

visas were revoked on terrorism grounds entered the United States either 

before or after revocation and may still remain in the country;7

 and (d) INS 

and the FBI were not routinely taking actions to investigate,8 locate, or 

resolve the cases of individuals who remained in the United States after 

their visas were revoked. For instance:

• In a number of cases, notification between State and the appropriate 

units within INS and the FBI did not take place or was not completed in 

a timely manner.9

 For example, INS officials said they did not receive 

any notice of the revocations from State in 43 of the 240 cases. In 

another 47 cases, the INS Lookout Unit received the revocation notice 

only via a cable, State’s backup method of notification. However, these 

cables took, on average, 12 days to reach the Lookout Unit. Although 

State generally sent information cables to the FBI’s main 

communications center to notify it of the revocations, FBI officials 

could not provide us with evidence that the communications center sent 

these cables to the appropriate counterterrorism units.

7

This number is based on our analysis of data we received from INS as of May 19, 2003. On 

May 20 and 21, INS and the FBI, respectively, provided additional information related to this 

matter. We were not able to complete anlaysis of the data prior to the release of this report 

due to the nature and volume of the data. The data could show that the actual number of 

persons is higher or lower than 30.

8

The Attorney General’s Guidelines on General Crimes, Racketeering Enterprise and 

Terrorism Enterprise Investigations provide for graduated levels of investigative activity 

by the FBI, allowing the bureau to act well in advance of the commission of planned 

terrorist acts or other federal crimes. The three levels of investigative activity defined in the 

guidelines are (1) the prompt and extremely limited checking of initial leads, (2) preliminary 

inquiries, and (3) full investigations. In this report, we are not prescribing which level of 

investigative activity is appropriate for persons with revoked visas who may be in the United 

States.

9

We found no evidence of written procedures that define timeliness, but State officials told 

us that they try to send notification to the Lookout Unit the same day the revocation 

certificate is signed.
Page 5 GAO-03-798 Border Security: Visa Revocations

• In cases where the INS Lookout Unit could document that it received a 

notification, it generally posted information on these revocations in its 

lookout database within 1 day of receiving the notice. When the Lookout 

Unit did not receive notification, it could not post information on these 

individuals in its lookout database, precluding INS inspectors at ports of 

entry from knowing that these individuals had had their visas revoked. 

Moreover, the State Department neglected to enter the revocation action 

for 64 of the 240 cases into its own watch list. As a result, these 

individuals could apply at an overseas post for a new visa, and consular 

officers would not necessarily know that their previous visas had been 

revoked for terrorism concerns. FBI officials in mid-May 2003 had not 

determined whether the agency’s Terrorist Watch and Warning Unit had 

received any notice of visa revocations.

• Twenty-nine individuals entered the United States before their visas 

were revoked and may still remain in the country. INS inspectors 

admitted at least 4 other people after the visa revocation, 1 of whom 

may still remain in the country. However, INS inspectors prevented at 

least 14 others from entering the country because the INS watch list 

included information on the revocation action or had another lookout 

on them.

• INS and the FBI did not routinely attempt to investigate or locate any of 

the individuals who entered the United States either before or after their 

visas were revoked and who may still remain in the country. Due to 

congressional interest in specific cases, INS investigators located 4 

individuals in the United States; however, they did not attempt to locate 

other revoked visa holders who may have entered the country. INS 

officials told us that they generally do not investigate these cases 

because it would be challenging to remove these individuals unless they 

were in violation of their immigration status even if the agency could 

locate them. A visa revocation by itself is not a stated grounds for 

removal under the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA).10 FBI officials 

told us that they were not being alerted by State that persons with 

revoked visas could be “possible terrorists.” As a result, the FBI did not 

108 U.S.C. § 1101 et seq. The 1952 Immigration and Nationality Act has been amended several 

times, more recently by the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 

1996 (P.L. 104-208), the Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools 

Required to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism (USA PATRIOT) Act of 2001 (P.L. 107-56), the 

Enhanced Border Security and Visa Entry Reform Act of 2002 (P.L. 107-173), and the 

Homeland Security Act of 2002 (P.L. 107-296).
Page 6 GAO-03-798 Border Security: Visa Revocations

routinely attempt to investigate and locate individuals with revoked 

visas who may have entered the United States.

On March 1, 2003, the Secretary of Homeland Security became responsible 

for issuing regulations and administering and enforcing provisions of U.S. 

immigration law relating to visa issuance.11 Therefore, we are making 

recommendations to the Secretary of Homeland Security, in conjunction 

with the Secretary of State and the Attorney General, to ensure that when 

State revokes a visa because of terrorism concerns, the appropriate units 

within State, Homeland Security, and the FBI are notified immediately and 

that the appropriate actions are taken. We provided a draft of this report to 

the Departments of Homeland Security, State, and Justice for their 

comment. Homeland Security agreed that the visa revocation process 

should be strengthened as an antiterrorism tool and said that it looked 

forward to working with State and Justice to develop and revise current 

policies and procedures that affect the interagency visa revocation process. 

State and Justice did not comment on our recommendations. 

Background Our nation’s border security process for controlling the entry and visits of 

foreign visitors12 consists of three primary functions: (1) issuing visas; (2) 

controlling entries through inspection of passports, visas, and other travel 

documents as well as controlling exits; and (3) managing stays of foreign 

visitors—that is, monitoring these individuals while they are in the country. 

As shown in figure 1, the Departments of State, Homeland Security, and 

Justice play key roles in this process.

11See section 428 of the Homeland Security Act of 2002. 

12For purposes of this report, we define the term “foreign visitors” to mean nonimmigrant 

visa holders.
Page 7 GAO-03-798 Border Security: Visa Revocations

Figure 1: Overview of the Border Security Process for Controlling Entries and Visits 

of Foreign Visitors

a

Now within the Bureau of Customs and Border Protection.

b

Now within the Bureau of Immigration and Customs Enforcement.

The border security process begins at the State Department’s overseas 

consular posts, where consular officers adjudicate visa applications for 

foreign nationals who wish to temporarily enter the United States for visits 

related to business, tourism, or other reasons. At the port of entry, an INS 

inspector determines whether the visa holder is admitted to the United 

States and, if so, how long he or she may remain in the country. Until 

recently, after INS successfully screened and admitted foreign visitors, 

these individuals were generally not monitored unless they came under the 

scrutiny of INS or a law enforcement agency, such as the FBI, for suspected 

immigration violations or other illegal activity.13

13The U.S. government has initiated a number of programs to register and monitor some 

categories of nonimmigrants—including foreign students and exchange visitors, as well as 

certain citizens of selected countries—during their visits to the United States.

Sources: GAO and Art Explosion.

Issuing visas Managing stays Controlling entries

Department of State

Bureau of

Consular Affairs

Overseas 

consular posts

Department of Homeland Security Department of Homeland Security

Department of Justice

Office of Intelligence

Counterterrorism Division

National Joint Terrorism Task Force

INS National Security Unitb INS Inspections Unita

FBI
Page 8 GAO-03-798 Border Security: Visa Revocations

On March 1, 2003, the Department of Homeland Security assumed 

responsibility for many elements of the border security process. For 

example, the new department incorporated the INS Inspections Unit into 

its Bureau of Customs and Border Protection, which will focus its 

operations on the movement of goods and people across U.S. borders. It 

also folded the INS National Security Unit into its Bureau of Immigration 

and Customs Enforcement, which is designed to enforce the full range of 

immigration and customs laws within the United States. According to 

Department of Homeland Security officials, the new department also 

gained broad authority over the visa process under section 428 of the 

Homeland Security Act, covering the development of policies, regulations, 

procedures, and any other guidance that may affect visa issuance or 

revocation.14 The State Department remains responsible for managing the 

consular corps and the function of issuing visas.

The FBI’s Counterterrorism Division, within the Justice Department, plays 

a key role in the border security process. The division includes the Foreign 

Terrorist Tracking Task Force, which is now part of the FBI’s Office of 

Intelligence. The mission of the task force, an interagency group, is to (1) 

deny entry into the United States of aliens associated with, suspected of 

being engaged in, or supporting terrorist activity and (2) aid in supplying 

information to locate, detain, prosecute, or deport any such aliens already 

present in the United States. The National Joint Terrorism Task Force is 

comprised of 36 federal agencies co-located in the Strategic Information 

and Operations Center at FBI headquarters. This task force provides a 

central fusion point for terrorism information and intelligence to the 66 

Joint Terrorism Task Forces, which include state and local law 

enforcement officers, federal agents, and other federal personnel who 

work in the field to prevent and investigate acts of terrorism.

14According to Department of Homeland Security officials, the Departments of State and 

Homeland Security are negotiating a memorandum of understanding to address the scope of 

this authority and the manner in which the two agencies will coordinate visa issuance.
Page 9 GAO-03-798 Border Security: Visa Revocations

At each stage of the process, the responsible departments and agencies rely 

on terrorist or criminal watch list systems—sometimes referred to as tipoff or lookout systems—in fulfilling their respective border security 

missions. For example, State relies on its Consular Lookout and Support 

System (CLASS) as the primary basis for identifying potential terrorists 

among visa applicants. CLASS incorporates information on suspected 

terrorists from State’s interagency terrorist watch list, known as TIPOFF, as 

well as from the FBI, INS, and many other agencies. Further, INS inspectors 

at ports of entry use the Interagency Border Inspection System (IBIS) to 

check whether foreign nationals are inadmissible and should be denied 

entry into the United States. When a person enters the United States by air 

or by sea, INS inspectors are required to check that person against watch 

lists before the person is allowed to enter the country. INS inspectors may 

check persons arriving at land borders against the watch lists, but they are 

not required to do so.15 The exception is for males aged 16 or over from 

certain countries who are required to be checked.

Visa Revocation 

Policies and 

Procedures 

Our analysis indicates that the U.S. government has no specific written 

policy on the use of visa revocations as an antiterrorism tool and no written 

procedures to guide State in notifying the relevant agencies of visa 

revocations on terrorism grounds. State and INS have written procedures 

that guide some types of visa revocations; however, neither they nor the 

FBI have written internal procedures for notifying their appropriate 

personnel to take specific actions on visas revoked by the State 

Department. State and INS officials could articulate their informal policies 

and procedures for how and what purpose their agencies have used the 

process as an antiterrorism tool to keep terrorists out of the United States, 

but neither they nor FBI officials had policies or procedures that covered 

investigating, locating, and taking appropriate action in cases where the 

visa holder had already entered the country. We summarized how 

information on visa revocations would ideally flow among and within these 

three agencies on the basis of our interviews with officials from State, 

Homeland Security, and the FBI and on our analysis of the current visa 

revocation process.

15For more information on the overall border security process and the associated terrorist 

watch lists, see U.S. General Accounting Office, Information Technology: Terrorist Watch 

Lists Should Be Consolidated to Promote Better Integration and Sharing, GAO-03-322

(Washington, D.C.: Apr. 15, 2003).
Page 10 GAO-03-798 Border Security: Visa Revocations

Most Policies Are Informal According to State Department officials, the U.S. government has no 

specific written policy on how agencies should use visa revocations as an 

antiterrorism tool and no written procedures to guide the interagency 

process for revoking visas on terrorism or other grounds. These officials 

explained that prior to September 11, 2001, State revoked only a small 

number of visas for terrorism-related reasons. This relatively small number 

resulted in State and INS operating in an informal manner when 

cooperating on denying admission to revoked visa holders at ports of entry. 

State officials said that State and Justice had agreed to informal 

notification procedures between the two agencies and had crafted 

language for the visa revocation certificates several years ago; however, the 

two agencies did not develop formal written procedures. These officials 

said that State did not coordinate its visa revocations with the FBI. In 

commenting on a draft of this report, State said that the Visa Office 

generally worked under the impression that, under long-standing practice, 

INS was passing relevant information onto the FBI as appropriate. 

State and INS officials articulated their agencies’ policies on how 

revocations help their agencies prevent suspected terrorists from entering 

the United States. State officials told us that they envision the revocation 

process as taking place before the visa holder enters the country. This 

would allow State and other agencies more time to investigate and 

determine whether a suspected terrorist is in fact ineligible for a visa on 

terrorism grounds before allowing the visa holder to enter the country. As 

these officials explained, since the September 11 attacks, State’s Bureau of 

Consular Affairs has been receiving a large volume of information on 

suspected terrorists from the intelligence community, law enforcement 

agencies, overseas posts, and other units within State. The department 

reviews this information to determine if a suspected terrorist has a U.S. 

visa. If the identifying information is incomplete, as is often the case, State 

may have difficulty in determining whether a visa holder with the same or a 

similar name as a suspected terrorist is in fact the suspected terrorist. The 

department may also lack sufficient proof of a specific act that would 

render the suspected terrorist ineligible for a visa, as required by the INA.16

16The Departments of State and Justice hold different views on whether evidence of a 

specific act of terrorism is required before a visa can be denied under the INA’s terrorism 

provision (GAO-03-132NI). In July 2002, an Associate Deputy Attorney General told us that 

(1) the State Department applies too high a standard of evidence to deny a visa under that 

provision and (2) name checks provide sufficient evidence to deny a visa to applicants. 

According to Homeland Security officials, this dispute between the two departments had 

not been resolved as of June 2003.
Page 11 GAO-03-798 Border Security: Visa Revocations

In these cases, State would revoke the person’s visa under the Secretary of 

State’s discretionary authority, requiring the person to reapply for a visa if 

he or she still intended to visit the United States. State would then use the 

visa issuance process to obtain additional biographic and other data on the 

visa applicant and make a determination on the person’s eligibility.

INS officials viewed the process as a means of notifying INS inspectors to 

deny suspected terrorists entry into the United States. These officials did 

not view a visa revocation, even if based on terrorism concerns, as a reason 

for investigating someone who had already entered the United States. They 

said the INA does not specify visa revocation as a reason for removing a 

person from the country. (App. II provides more information on legal issues 

associated with visa revocations.)

According to Justice and FBI officials, the FBI does not yet have a policy on 

how to use the visa revocation process in its counterterrorism efforts. The 

FBI has not developed such a policy because the visa revocation 

information State sends to the bureau does not indicate that the FBI may 

want to take follow-up action in these cases. For instance, the notice of visa 

revocation does not explicitly state that the reason for revocation is 

terrorism-related.

State and INS had written policies that covered some aspects of visa 

revocations. State’s policies and procedures, contained in the Foreign 

Affairs Manual, specify when and for what reason a consular officer may 

or may not revoke a visa, including for terrorism-related reasons. The 

manual instructs consular officers to obtain a security advisory opinion 

from the department before determining that a visa holder is ineligible for a 

visa on terrorism grounds. In practice, according to State officials, this 

means that department officials at headquarters acting under the authority 

of the Secretary of Statenot the consular officers at overseas 

postsrevoke visas on the basis of terrorism concerns. State Department 

officials told us that they follow specific, but unwritten, operating 

procedures when the department revokes visas, as described in more detail 

later in this report. INS has some general policies related to the posting of 

lookouts for inadmissible aliens and for the revocation of visas by 

immigration officers at ports of entry. However, these policies do not call 

for specific actions by appropriate INS personnel with regard to visas 

revoked by the State Department. 
Page 12 GAO-03-798 Border Security: Visa Revocations

How the Visa Revocation 

Process Should Work

Since the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks, State has constantly 

received new information on suspected terrorists from the intelligence 

community, law enforcement agencies, and overseas posts. In some cases, 

State received this information after it had already issued visas to the 

individuals in question; the department would then revoke these visas. 

Under the INA, the Secretary of State has discretionary authority to revoke 

any visa that a consular officer has issued, including cases in which the 

Secretary believes that the visa holder may be ineligible for a visa under the 

INA’s terrorism provision.17 According to State Department officials and 

documents, State revoked visas held by 240 individuals from September 11, 

2001, through December 31, 2002, on terrorism grounds.18 All of these visas 

were revoked as a prudent measure under the Secretary of State’s 

discretionary authority because, as discussed earlier, State believed more 

research on the individuals was necessary before they should be allowed to 

enter the United States. Appendix III provides more information on these 

visas and the persons who held them.

Figure 2 shows how information should flow if State were to notify the 

appropriate homeland security agencies, that is, those agencies charged 

with controlling entry into the United States and investigating potentially 

dangerous terrorists, that the individual with the revoked visa may attempt 

to enter, or may have already entered, the United States. The diagram is 

17Section 221(i) of the INA gives the Secretary of State and consular officers discretionary 

authority to revoke a visa. INA section 212(a)(3)(B) contains the grounds that an alien can 

be deemed inadmissible to the United States for terrorist-related activities. Consular 

officers may revoke a visa in instances prescribed by regulation (22 CFR § 41.122). Such 

instances include if (1) the consular officer finds that the alien is no longer entitled to 

nonimmigrant status specified in the visa; (2) the alien has, since the time that the visa was 

issued, become ineligible to receive a visa under the INA; or (3) the visa has been physically 

removed from the passport in which it was issued. Moreover, regulations also allow 

immigration officers to revoke visas under certain circumstances (22 CFR § 41.122).

18In 105 of these 240 cases, the FBI did not complete a new special clearance procedure for 

certain visa applicants in a timely manner. The U.S. government instituted this new 

clearance procedure, known as the Visas Condor name check, in late January 2002 as a 

means of identifying and denying visas to suspected terrorists. In the 105 cases, State had to 

revoke the visas because the consular officers had already issued the visas before the FBI 

had indicated any interest in the cases. In July 2002, the State Department and the FBI 

changed the Visas Condor procedures to ensure that consular officers do not issue visas to 

the Visas Condor applicants until the FBI clears them. See GAO-03-132NI for more 

information on delays in, and changes to, the Visas Condor name check procedures. In the 

remaining 135 cases, State revoked the visas based on potentially derogatory intelligence 

information that might eventually lead to a finding of inadmissibility under the INA, if that 

information was found to pertain to the individual in question. 
Page 13 GAO-03-798 Border Security: Visa Revocations

based on what officials from State, Homeland Security, and the FBI 

described as the way the process should work, if all of the agencies 

involved were fulfilling their roles.
Page 14 GAO-03-798 Border Security: Visa Revocations

Figure 2: Diagram of Visa Revocation Notification System That, If Fully and 

Consistently Implemented, Would Provide Information to the Appropriate Units at 

State, Homeland Security, and the FBI

a

Now within the Bureau of Customs and Border Protection.

b

Now within the Bureau of Immigration and Customs Enforcement.

Department of State

Bureau of

Consular Affairs 

revokes visas

Information flow

Department of Homeland Security

Department of State

INS Inspections Unita

Overseas consular posts

Office of Intelligence

Counterterrorism Division

FBI

National Joint Terrorism Task Force

Issuing visas

Managing stays

Controlling entries

Department of Homeland Security

Department of Justice

INS National Security Unitb

Sources: GAO and Art Explosion.
Page 15 GAO-03-798 Border Security: Visa Revocations

As the diagram in figure 2 illustrates, State should notify its consular 

officers at overseas posts, the Department of Homeland Security, and the 

FBI at the time of visa revocation. State should notify its consular officers 

so that they would ask for a security advisory opinion before issuing a new 

visa to the person whose visa had been revoked. In addition, State would 

have to provide notice of the revocation, along with supporting evidence, to 

Homeland Security and the FBI. This would allow Homeland Security to 

notify its inspectors at ports of entry so that they could prevent the 

individuals from entering the United States.19 It also would allow Homeland 

Security and the FBI to determine whether the person had already entered 

the country and, if so, to investigate, locate, and take appropriate action in 

each case. Depending on the results of the investigations, appropriate 

actions could include clearing persons who were wrongly suspected of 

terrorism, removing suspected terrorists from the country, or prosecuting 

suspected terrorists on criminal charges.

Weaknesses Existed in 

the Visa Revocation 

Process

We identified systemic weaknesses in the visa revocation process, many of 

which resulted from the informal policies and procedures governing 

actions that State, INS, and the FBI take during the process. In our review 

of the 240 visa revocations, we found that (a) notification of revocations 

did not always reach the appropriate unit within INS and the FBI; (b) State 

did not consistently post lookouts on the individuals; (c) 30 individuals 

whose visas were revoked on terrorism grounds entered the United States 

either before or after the revocation and may still remain in the country; 

and (d) INS and the FBI were not consistently taking action to investigate; 

locate; or, where appropriate, clear, prosecute, or remove any of the people 

who had entered the country before or after their visas were revoked.

Inconsistencies in 

Notification Procedures 

There were weaknesses at several junctures of the notification process that 

caused information on many visa revocations not to be shared among units 

that needed the information at State, INS, and the FBI. Some of these 

weaknesses were due to a breakdown in the notification process from 

State to INS and the FBI, and some were due to problems in the 

distribution of notifications within these agencies to the appropriate unit. 

19It is possible for an individual to present to an immigration inspector a revoked visa that 

appears to be valid, if the visa had not been physically cancelled by writing or stamping 

across the face of the visa to indicate that it had been revoked.
Page 16 GAO-03-798 Border Security: Visa Revocations

For 43 of the 240 revocations we reviewed, INS Lookout Unit officials said 

that they did not receive any notification. In cases where they did receive 

notification, some of them were not received at the Lookout Unit in a 

timely manner because of slow intraagency distribution of the 

notifications. FBI officials said that the agency’s main communications 

center received the notifications, but the officials could not confirm if the 

notifications were then distributed internally to the appropriate 

investigative units at the FBI (see fig. 3).
Page 17 GAO-03-798 Border Security: Visa Revocations

Figure 3: Diagram of Gaps in the Visa Revocation Notification System

a

Now within the Bureau of Customs and Border Protection.

b

Now within the Bureau of Immigration and Customs Enforcement.

Department of State

Bureau of

Consular Affairs 

revokes visas

Department of Homeland Security

Department of State

INS Inspections Unita

Overseas consular posts

Office of Intelligence

Counterterrorism Division

FBI

National Joint Terrorism Task Force

Issuing visas

Managing stays

Controlling entries

Department of Homeland Security

Department of Justice

INS National Security Unitb

Sources: GAO and Art Explosion.

Inconsistent or

incomplete information flow

No information flow
Page 18 GAO-03-798 Border Security: Visa Revocations

State’s Procedures for Notifying 

INS, the FBI, and Overseas Posts 

of Revocations

State Department officials from the Visa Office described the procedures 

they use to notify INS, the FBI, and State’s overseas posts of visas that are 

revoked by the department in Washington. According to State officials, 

once the Deputy Assistant Secretary signs a revocation certificate, the 

department is supposed to take the following actions, as soon as possible 

after the visa is revoked: (1) notify the INS Lookout Unit via a faxed copy of 

the revocation certificate so that the unit can enter the individual into the 

National Automated Immigration Lookout System, which is uploaded into 

IBIS; (2) notify consular officers at all overseas post that the individual may 

be a suspected terrorist by entering a lookout on the person into State’s 

watch list, CLASS; and (3) notify the issuing post via cable so that the post 

can attempt to contact the individual to physically cancel his visa. 

Information-only copies of these cables, which do not explicitly state that 

the reason for the revocation is terrorism-related, are also sent to INS’s and 

FBI’s main communications centers. State officials told us they rely on INS 

and FBI internal distribution mechanisms to ensure that these cables are 

routed to the appropriate units within the agencies. According to these 

officials, they considered faxing the revocation certificate to be the primary 

notification method for the INS Lookout Unit, but the cable was an 

additional backup method. The cables were the only notification method 

used to inform the FBI of the revocation.

The State Visa Office did not keep a central log of visas it revoked on the 

basis of terrorism concerns, nor did it monitor whether notifications were 

sent to other agencies. When we asked for a list of all revoked visas 

between September 11, 2001, and December 31, 2002, Visa Office officials 

had to search through the office’s cable database to create such a list. State 

Department officials said they did not have fax transmission receipts to 

confirm that they sent revocation certificates for each of the 240 cases we 

reviewed. They were able to provide us with 238 revocation cables, almost 

all of which addressed informational copies to INS and the FBI. In 

commenting on a draft of our report, State said that the Visa Office now 

keeps a log of revocation cases and maintains all signed certificates in a 

central file.

INS Lookout Unit Said It Did Not 

Consistently Receive 

Notification

Officials from the INS Lookout Unit provided us with documentation 

indicating that they received notification from the State Department in 197 

of the 240 cases but did not receive notification in the other 43 cases (see 

fig. 4).
Page 19 GAO-03-798 Border Security: Visa Revocations

Figure 4: INS Lookout Unit Receipt of Revocation Notification for 240 Cases

Lookout Unit officials had documentation to show that 150 faxed 

revocation certificates were received in the unit. These faxed certificates 

reached the unit, on average, within 1 to 2 days of State enacting the 

revocation. For 90 cases, however, the documentation provided to us did 

not indicate that the Lookout Unit had received a fax. This was mitigated in 

47 of these cases by the receipt of a revocation cable, although this backup 

method of notification was less timely than the fax. In cases where the 

cable was the only notification received at the Lookout Unit, it took, on 

average, 12 days for the Lookout Unit to receive the cable, although in 1 

case it took 29 days. According to an official from the INS communications 

center, because the cables were marked “information only,” they were 

routed through the Inspections Division first, which then was supposed to 

forward them to the Lookout Unit. He told us that if the cables had been 

marked as “action” or “urgent,” they would have been sent immediately to 

the Lookout Unit. See appendix IV for an example of a revocation cable. 

The Assistant Chief Inspector at the Lookout Unit stressed the importance 

of timeliness in receiving notification, noting that delays of even a few days 

could increase the possibility that an individual with a revoked visa would 

travel to the United States before INS inspectors were aware of the 

revocation. 

The FBI Received Revocation 

Cables but May Not Have 

Distributed Them Internally to 

the Appropriate Investigative 

Units 

The State Department generally included the FBI as an addressee on the 

visa revocation cables. FBI officials with whom we spoke were able to 

verify that State’s revocation cables20 were received electronically in the 

FBI communications center, but they were not able to tell us whether this 

information was distributed to appropriate coordinating and investigative 

Source: GAO analysis of INS Lookout Unit documents.

Cases in which the Lookout Unit received notification 197

 via faxed revocation certificate 150

 via revocation cable only 47

 

Cases in which the Lookout Unit did not receive notification 43

20In 228 cases, the State Department included the FBI as an addressee on the revocation 

cable.
Page 20 GAO-03-798 Border Security: Visa Revocations

units. An FBI official said that after the cables arrived in the 

communications center, they became part of the FBI’s Automated Case 

Support database and a hard copy of the cable was sent to analysts in 

relevant country desk units. The Assistant Director for the Office of 

Intelligence told us that for the FBI to take action on the cables, they would 

have to be directed to the bureau’s Counterterrorism Division. FBI officials 

could not provide evidence that the revocation information reached the 

Counterterrorism Division. Again, the cables did not specify that the 

reason for the revocation was related to terrorism. The cables were 

described by State as information only and did not request or specify any 

action from the FBI. 

Weaknesses Existed in Visa 

Revocation Watch List 

Procedures

In our review of 240 revocations, we identified weaknesses in the steps that 

State, INS, and the FBI took to place these individuals on watch lists as a 

result of the revocation. The State Department did not consistently post 

lookouts on individuals in CLASS after revoking their visas. Moreover, 

State had not started to use a new revocation code created in August 2002 

that was designed to allow revocation lookouts to be shared between 

State’s and INS’s watch lists. The INS Lookout Unit consistently posted 

lookouts on its watch list but was only able to do so in cases where it 

received notification of the revocation. Some of the lookouts posted by the 

Lookout Unit did not contain accurate information due to misinterpretation 

of State’s revocation certificates. 

As of mid-May 2003, FBI officials could not determine which FBI unit, if 

any, added lookouts to their watch lists on individuals with revoked visas 

as a result of receiving the revocation notification from State. 

State Did Not Consistently Post 

Lookouts on Individuals with 

Revoked Visas

We reviewed CLASS records on all 240 individuals whose visas were 

revoked and found that the State Department did not post lookouts within 

a 2-week period of the revocation on 64 of these individuals. Many of the 64 

individuals had other lookouts posted on them on earlier or later dates, but 

the department had not followed its informal policy of entering a lookout at 

the time of the revocation. State officials said that they post lookouts on 

individuals with revoked visas in CLASS so that, if the individual attempts 

to get a new visa, consular officers at overseas posts will know that they 

must request a security advisory opinion on the individual before issuing a 

visa. Without a lookout, it is possible that a new visa could be issued 

without additional security screening.
Page 21 GAO-03-798 Border Security: Visa Revocations

According to State Department officials, State and INS agreed to create a 

specific code for visa revocation lookouts, the VRVK code, which would be 

picked up automatically by INS’s system, IBIS, in its real-time interface 

with CLASS.21 This new code would allow INS inspectors at ports of entry 

to see revocation lookouts that State had posted. According to Department 

of Homeland Security officials, this code should be State’s primary method 

of notifying immigration inspectors at ports of entry that an individual’s 

visa had been revoked, rather than the faxed revocation certificate. State 

said that this code was required for all revocation lookouts as of August 15, 

2002, yet in our review of CLASS records for the 240 visa revocations, we 

saw no evidence that the department was using the VRVK code. The 

department did not enter a lookout using the VRVK code for any of the 27 

visas it revoked between August 15, 2002, and December 31, 2002.22

INS Consistently Posted 

Lookouts but Misread Some 

Information on Revocation 

Certificates

When the INS Lookout Unit received notification from State, it consistently 

posted lookouts in IBIS23 to indicate that State had revoked the visa. The 

Lookout Unit had a policy to post lookouts in IBIS the same day that it 

received the notification. In the 43 cases for which Lookout Unit officials 

said they did not receive notification, they did not post a revocation 

lookout in IBIS because the lookout unit did not have an independent basis 

for posting a revocation absent a notification from State. 

In 21 of the 240 cases, Lookout Unit officials misread information on State’s 

revocation certificate and, as a result, entered incorrect information in IBIS 

on individuals who were born in one country but hold citizenship in 

another. In 16 of these cases, the revocation certificates clearly listed the 

individual’s date and place of birth or nationality, but the lookout unit 

entered place of birth or other erroneous information into IBIS’s nationality 

field. In the remaining 5 cases where the individuals’ place of birth data 

21Revocation lookouts posted by State officials in CLASS prior to August 15, 2002, were 

coded with either a “00” (indicating that a security advisory opinion is required before a visa 

can be granted) or a “P3B” (indicating that the individual might be refused a visa for terrorist 

activities); IBIS did not pick up lookouts with either of these codes in its interface with 

CLASS. State Department officials said that INS elected not to receive P3B lookouts from 

CLASS. In commenting on this report, Homeland Security officials told us that INS had not 

asked for the P3B code to be uploaded into IBIS because State had never told INS that it 

would be using the code to indicate that a visa had been revoked on terrorism grounds. 

22The consular post in Jeddah made VRVK entries in cases where it was notified by the 

department that a visa issued at the post had been revoked.

23The Lookout Unit posts lookouts on its own watch list, the National Automated 

Immigration Lookout System. These lookouts are then uploaded into IBIS every evening.
Page 22 GAO-03-798 Border Security: Visa Revocations

were entered into the nationality field, the revocation certificate did not 

clearly state that the country listed was the individuals’ place of birth. A 

Lookout Unit official confirmed that this error in the lookout could hinder 

an inspector at the port of entry from detecting the person since the 

individual’s passport would indicate a nationality different from his place of 

birth. Lookout Unit officials said it would be helpful if the State 

Department included more information on the revocation certificates, 

including country of citizenship, passport numbers, visa foil numbers, and 

intended itineraries and addresses in the United States if they were listed in 

the visa application. See appendix V for a sample revocation certificate. In 

commenting on a draft of this report, State said that additional information 

is available to Homeland Security officers at ports of entry through State’s 

shared Consular Consolidated Database. 

The FBI Did Not Know If 

Lookouts Were Posted on 

Individuals with Revoked Visas

FBI officials could not determine which unit, if any, received the revocation 

cables or whether any unit posted lookouts on these individuals as a result 

of receiving notification of the revocation from State. In technical 

comments on a draft of this report, the Department of Justice said that the 

FBI maintains only one watch list, the Violent Gang and Terrorist 

Organization File (VGTOF) that is accessed by local and state law 

enforcement officials via the National Crime Information Center. To add a 

person to that list, according to the comments, the following information 

must be provided to the FBI: the person’s full name, complete date of birth, 

physical descriptors, at least one numeric identifier, a contact person with 

a telephone number, and VGTOF-specific classification information.
Page 23 GAO-03-798 Border Security: Visa Revocations

Many Individuals with 

Revoked Visas Entered the 

United States before or after 

Revocation; Some Still 

Remain

In our review of the 240 visa revocations, we found that 30 individuals 

whose visas were revoked on terrorism grounds entered the United States 

either before or after the revocation and may still remain in the country.24

Our analysis of INS arrival and departure information shows that many 

individuals had traveled to the United States before their visas were 

revoked and had remained after the revocation. Several have subsequently 

departed the country, but we determined that 29 of the individuals who 

entered before the revocation may still remain in the country.

INS data also show that INS inspectors admitted at least 4 people after their 

visas were revoked; 3 of these individuals have since departed but 1 may 

still remain in the country. In 1 of these 4 cases, the INS Lookout Unit did 

not receive any revocation notice from State; thus, it did not post a lookout 

in IBIS that could have alerted an inspector at a port of entry to deny 

admission to the individual. In another case, the unit received a notification 

cable 4 days after State had signed the revocation certificate, but the 

individual had already entered the country 2 days earlier. In the third case, 

the unit had posted a lookout the day after the revocation but had 

incorrectly entered the individual’s place of birth, which differed from his 

nationality, in the nationality field. In the last case, INS had received a 

notification from State and had posted lookouts on the INS watch list right 

after the revocation, but an INS inspector allowed the individual to enter 

the United States 1 month later. INS officials could not explain how an 

inspector could miss the lookout and allow this person into the country.

Despite these problems, we noted cases where the visa revocation process 

prevented possible terrorists from entering the country or cleared 

individuals whose visas had been revoked. For example, INS inspectors 

successfully prevented at least 14 of the 240 individuals from entering the 

country because the INS watch list included information on the revocation 

action or had other lookouts on them. In addition, State records showed 

24We determined this number on the basis of INS data in the Nonimmigrant Information 

System (NIIS), which does not have complete arrival and departure records for all non-U.S. 

citizens. NIIS records arrivals and departures of foreign citizens through the collection of I94 forms. Some aliens are required to fill out and turn in these forms to inspectors at air and 

seaports of entries as well as at land borders. (Canadians and U.S. permanent residents are 

not required to fill out I-94 forms when they enter the United States). NIIS does not have 

departure data for aliens if they fail to turn in the bottom portion of their I-94 when they 

depart. In late May 2003, we received additional data from INS and the FBI. We have not 

been able to fully analyze these data due to the nature and volume of the information; 

however, the data may indicate that the number is higher or lower than 30. 
Page 24 GAO-03-798 Border Security: Visa Revocations

that a small number of people reapplied for a new visa after the revocation. 

State used the visa issuance process to fully screen these individuals and 

determined that they did not pose a security threat. In one case, for 

example, the post took a set of fingerprints from an individual whose name 

matched a record in an FBI database. The individual’s fingerprints did not 

match those of the individual in the database, so he was cleared and issued 

a new visa.

INS and the FBI Did Not 

Routinely Take Action on 

Individuals with Revoked 

Visas Who Had Entered the 

United States

The appropriate units in INS and the FBI did not routinely investigate, 

locate, or take any action on individuals who might have remained in the 

United States after their visas were revoked. INS and FBI officials cited a 

variety of legal and procedural challenges to their taking action in these 

cases.

INS Did Not Routinely Attempt 

to Locate Individuals with 

Revoked Visas

In cases where they received the revocation notification from State, INS 

Lookout Unit officials said that they did not routinely check to see whether 

these individuals had already entered the United States, nor did they pass 

information on visa revocations to investigators in the National Security 

Unit.25The National Security Unit, unlike the Lookout Unit, did not receive 

copies of the faxed revocation certificates or cables from the State 

Department. Investigators in this unit said that the Lookout Unit 

occasionally notified them about a revocation for an individual with a hit in 

TIPOFF, State’s interagency terrorist watch list, but that they were not 

typically notified of other visa revocations.

National Security Unit investigators said that they generally did not 

investigate or locate individuals whose visas were revoked for terrorism 

concerns but who may still be in the United States. These investigators said 

that even if they were to receive a revocation notice, the revocation itself 

does not make it illegal for individuals with revoked visas to remain in the 

United States. They said they could investigate the individuals to determine 

if they were violating the terms of their admission, for example, by 

overstaying the amount of time they were granted to remain in the United 

25In May 2003, an official from the Lookout Unit said that her unit recently established a 

procedure in which, upon receiving notification of a revocation, she will query INS 

databases to determine if the individual recently entered the country. She will then give this 

information to investigators in the Bureau of Immigration and Customs Enforcement.
Page 25 GAO-03-798 Border Security: Visa Revocations

States, but the investigators believed that under the INA, the visa 

revocation itself does not affect the alien’s legal status in the United States.

This issue of whether a visa revocation, after an alien is admitted on that 

visa, has the effect of rendering the individual out-of-status is unresolved 

legally, according to officials in the Department of Homeland Security’s 

Office of the Principal Legal Advisor to the Bureau of Immigration and 

Customs Enforcement and Bureau of Citizenship and Immigration 

Services. These officials said that the language that the State Department 

has been using on visa revocation certificates effectively forecloses the 

U.S. government from litigating the issue. The revocation certificates state 

that the revocation shall become effective immediately on the date the 

certificate is signed unless the alien is present in the United States at that 

time, in which case it will become effective immediately upon the alien’s 

departure from the United States (see app. V). Homeland Security officials 

said that if State were to cease using the current language on the revocation 

certificates, the government would no longer be effectively barred from 

litigating the issue and, if a policy decision were made to pursue an 

aggressive litigation strategy, could seek to remove aliens who have been 

admitted but have subsequently had their visas revoked.

Attempting to remove these aliens on the underlying reason for the 

revocation may not be possible for various reasons, according to INS 

officials. First, INS officials stated that the State Department provides very 

little information or evidence relating to the terrorist activities when it 

sends the revocation notice to INS. Without sufficient evidence linking the 

alien to any terrorist-related activities, INS cannot institute removal 

proceedings on the basis of that charge. Second, even if there is evidence, 

INS officials said, sometimes the agency that is the source of the 

information will not authorize the release of that information because it 

could jeopardize ongoing investigations or reveal sources and methods. 

Third, INS officials state that sometimes the evidence that is used to 

support a discretionary revocation from the Secretary of State is not 

sufficient to support a charge of removing an alien in immigration 

proceedings before an immigration judge. (See app. II.) In commenting on 

a draft of our report, State said that most of the time, the information on 

which these revocations is based is classified. If an interested agency seeks 

to review the information for immigration purposes, it is available from 

State’s Bureau of Intelligence and Research or the source agency. 

National Security Unit investigators told us that, because of congressional 

interest, they had investigated and attempted to locate 7 individuals whose 
Page 26 GAO-03-798 Border Security: Visa Revocations

visas were revoked as a result of delayed security checks and who had 

entered the country. They found that 4 of the 7 individuals were in the 

United States and in compliance with the terms of their admission. One 

individual had departed to Canada; the remaining 2 individuals were not 

located.

The FBI Did Not Routinely 

Investigate Individuals with 

Revoked Visas

Although the FBI’s Foreign Terrorist Tracking Task Force followed up on 

many cases in response to congressional interest, FBI officials told us that 

the bureau was not routinely opening investigations as the result of visa 

revocations on terrorism grounds. They said that State’s method of 

notifying the FBI did not clearly indicate that visas had been revoked 

because the visa holder was a possible terrorist. Further, the cables were 

sent as “information only” and did not request specific follow-up action 

from the FBI. State did not attempt to make other contact with the FBI that 

would indicate any urgency in the matter. Moreover, the Department of 

Homeland Security has not yet requested that the FBI take any action with 

regards to visa revocations on terrorism grounds.

In response to congressional interest, the Foreign Terrorist Tracking Task 

Force in late 2002 and early 2003 followed up on the 105 cases of visas that 

were revoked as a result of the Visas Condor name check procedures. In 

February 2003, we asked the task force for information on these 105 cases. 

The task force provided us with some information in a written response on 

May 21, 2003. We did not have time to fully evaluate the response before 

publication of this report because of the nature and volume of additional 

information needed to do so.

Conclusions The visa process can be an important tool to keep potential terrorists from 

entering the United States. Ideally, information on suspected terrorists 

would reach the State Department before it decides to issue a visa. 

However, there will always be some cases when the information arrives too 

late and State has already issued a visa. Revoking a visa can mitigate this 

problem, but only if State promptly notifies the appropriate border control 

and law enforcement agencies and if these agencies act quickly to (1) notify 

border patrol agents and immigration inspectors to deny entry to persons 

with a revoked visa and (2) investigate persons with revoked visas who 

have entered the country. Currently there are major gaps in the notification 

and investigation processes. One reason for this is that there are no 

comprehensive written policies and procedures on how notification of a 

visa revocation should take place and what agencies should do when they 
Page 27 GAO-03-798 Border Security: Visa Revocations

are notified. As a result, there is heightened risk that suspected terrorists 

could enter the country with revoked visas or be allowed to remain after 

their visas are revoked without undergoing investigation or monitoring.

Recommendations for 

Executive Action

To strengthen the visa revocation process as an antiterrorism tool, we 

recommend that the Secretary of Homeland Security, in conjunction with 

the Secretary of State and the Attorney General:

• develop specific policies and procedures for the interagency visa 

revocation process to ensure that notification of visa revocations for 

suspected terrorists and relevant supporting information is transmitted 

from State to immigration and law enforcement agencies, and their 

respective inspection and investigation units, in a timely manner; 

• develop a specific policy on actions that immigration and law 

enforcement agencies should take to investigate and locate individuals 

whose visas have been revoked for terrorism concerns and who remain 

in the United States after revocation; and 

• determine if persons with visas revoked on terrorism grounds are in the 

United States and, if so, whether they pose a security threat.

Agency Comments and 

Our Evaluation

We provided a draft of this report to the Departments of Homeland 

Security, State, and Justice for their comment. 

The Department of Homeland Security agreed that the visa revocation 

process should be strengthened as an antiterrorism tool. It indicated that it 

looked forward to working with State and Justice to develop and revise 

current policies and procedures that affect the interagency visa revocation 

process. Their written comments are in appendix VI. In addition, 

Homeland Security provided technical comments which we have 

incorporated in the report where appropriate.

The Department of State did not comment on our recommendations. 

Instead, State said that the persons who hold visas that the department 

revoked on terrorism grounds were not necessarily terrorists or suspected 

terrorists. State noted that it had revoked the visas because some 

information had surfaced that may disqualify the individual from a visa or 

from admission to the United States, or that in any event warrants 
Page 28 GAO-03-798 Border Security: Visa Revocations

reconsideration of the individual’s visa status. State cited the uncertain 

nature of the information it receives from the intelligence and law 

enforcement communities on which it must base its decision to revoke an 

individual’s visa. State said that it revoked these visas as a precautionary 

measure to preclude a person from gaining admission to this country until 

his or her entitlement to a visa can be reestablished. 

Our report recognizes that the visas were revoked as a precautionary 

measure and that the persons whose visas were revoked may not be 

terrorists. Although we have not reviewed the intelligence or law 

enforcement data provided to State or reviewed by various agencies as part 

of the security check process, there was enough concern that these 240 

persons could pose a terrorism threat to cause State to revoke their visas. 

Our recommendations are designed to ensure that persons whose visas 

have been revoked because of potential terrorism concerns be denied entry 

to the United States and those who may already be in the United States be 

investigated to determine if they pose a security threat. State’s comments 

are reprinted in appendix VII. The State Department also provided 

technical comments that we have incorporated in the report where 

appropriate.

The Department of Justice did not provide official comments on the report. 

However, it did make technical comments that we incorporated in the 

report where appropriate.

We are sending copies of this report to other interested Members of 

Congress. We are also sending copies to the Secretary of Homeland 

Security, the Secretary of State, and the Attorney General. We will make 

copies available to others upon request. In addition, the report will be 

available at no charge on the GAO Web site at http://www.gao.gov.
Page 29 GAO-03-798 Border Security: Visa Revocations

If you or your staff have any questions about this report, please contact me 

at (202) 512-4128. Key contributors to this report were John Brummet, Judy 

McCloskey, Kate Brentzel, Mary Moutsos, and Janey Cohen.

Jess T. Ford

Director, International Affairs and Trade
Page 30 GAO-03-798 Border Security: Visa Revocations

Appendix I

Scope and Methodology AAppenendxIdeisi

The scope of our work covered the interagency process in place for visas 

revoked by the Department of State headquarters and overseas consular 

officers on the basis of terrorism concerns between September 11, 2001, 

and December 31, 2002. To assess the policies and procedures governing 

the visa revocation process, we interviewed officials from State, the 

Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS), and the Federal Bureau of 

Investigation (FBI) and reviewed relevant documents.

To evaluate the effectiveness of the actual visa revocation process, we 

relied on data provided by State’s Visa Office to determine the total number 

of visa revocations from September 11, 2001, through December 31, 2002. 

Visa Office officials provided us with the names of 240 individuals whose 

visas were revoked during that time. These officials were able to provide 

documentation on the revocation for 238 of the 240 individuals. They gave 

us database sheets from the Consular Consolidated Database, which 

provided us with the individuals’ names, biographic data such as dates and 

places of birth, passport numbers, and visa information such as issuing 

posts and types of visa. In 5 cases, the database sheets did not indicate that 

the person held a valid visa at the time of revocation. We kept these cases 

in our scope because State provided us with revocation cables for these 

individuals, indicating that it had revoked at least one visa for them. State’s 

Visa Office also provided us with 238 revocation cables. We also compared 

information in the revocation cable with information contained in 

revocation certificates.

To determine if, and when, State notified INS of the revocations, we asked 

the Visa Office to provide us with documentation to show that either the 

visa revocation was faxed to the INS Lookout Unit or that the revocation 

cables were sent to INS. State did not have documentation that it had faxed 

any of the certificates. Through examining the cables, we determined 

which ones were addressed to INS and when they were sent. To determine 

if, and when, INS received these notifications, we asked the INS Lookout 

Unit for copies of the revocation certificates and cables it received for each 

of the 240 cases. In cases where the Lookout Unit had received a faxed 

copy of the revocation certificate, we collected copies of the certificates 

and examined the time/date stamp on these documents to determine when 

State faxed it to INS. In cases where the Lookout Unit had received a copy 

of the revocation cable, we collected copies of these cables and examined 

handwritten notations on the cables that reflected when they were received 

at the unit. 
Appendix I

Scope and Methodology

Page 31 GAO-03-798 Border Security: Visa Revocations

To determine if, and when, State notified the FBI of the revocations, we 

examined copies of the revocation cables we received from State to 

determine (1) if the FBI was included as an addressee on the cable and (2) 

the date that the cable was sent. To determine whether the FBI had 

received these cables, we interviewed FBI officials from the Office of 

Intelligence, the National Namecheck Program, and the Counterterrorism 

Division.

We obtained information from State, INS, and the FBI to determine if, and 

when, they posted lookouts on the individuals with revoked visas on their 

agencies’ terrorist watch lists. We asked State to provide us with the 

lookouts they posted for each individual in the Consular Lookout and 

Support System (CLASS). A CLASS operator entered the individual’s name, 

date and place of birth, and nationality in the same way that these data 

were listed on the revocation cable or certificate and gave us the printouts 

reflecting all of the CLASS records for that entry. We examined the records 

to ascertain whether, and when, the department entered the individual into 

CLASS and what refusal code was used.

To determine what steps INS took to post lookouts on the individuals with 

revocations, we provided the Lookout Unit with the list of 240 individuals 

and requested copies of the revocation lookouts from the Interagency 

Border Inspection System (IBIS). We examined these records to assess 

whether, and when, the INS Lookout Unit posted a lookout on the 

individuals.

To assess the FBI’s action to post lookouts on these individuals, we 

interviewed officials from the Office of Intelligence to determine whether 

any units posted lookouts as a result of receiving notification of the 

revocations.

To assess INS’s and the FBI’s actions to investigate; locate; and, where 

appropriate, clear, remove, or prosecute the individuals who may have 

entered the United States, we first reviewed INS entry/exit data to 

determine how many individuals entered the country, either before or after 

revocation, and how many may still remain in the country. The INS Lookout 

Unit provided us with all records available from the Nonimmigrant 

Information System (NIIS) on each of the 240 individuals. This system 

records arrivals of foreign citizens through the collection of an I-94 form. 

Some aliens are required to fill out and turn in these forms to inspectors at 

air and sea ports of entries, as well as at land borders. Canadians and U.S. 

permanent residents are not required to fill out I-94 forms when they enter 
Appendix I

Scope and Methodology

Page 32 GAO-03-798 Border Security: Visa Revocations

the United States. Aliens keep one section of the I-94 with them during their 

stay in the United States and are required to turn this in when they depart 

the country. If aliens fail to turn in the bottom portion of their I-94s when 

they depart, NIIS will not have departure information for them. Where 

available, we supplemented NIIS data with information regarding certain 

cases from INS’s National Security Unit and from the State Department’s 

CLASS records. We received additional arrival data on the individuals in 

late May 2003 but have not been able to fully evaluate them for this report. 

We also interviewed INS and FBI officials to discuss what actions they had 

taken to investigate; locate; and, where appropriate, clear, remove, or 

prosecute those individuals who may remain in the United States.

We attempted to review the evidence on which State based the revocations 

for a subset of the 240 visa revocations. We could not do so, however, 

because the sources of the information—the Central Intelligence Agency 

and the FBI—did not grant us access to this information.

We conducted our work from December 2002 through May 2003, in 

accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards.
Page 33 GAO-03-798 Border Security: Visa Revocations

Appendix II

Legal Process for Visa Revocations ApenIdxi

Authority to Revoke 

Visas

The legal process for revocations can begin either with the Secretary of 

State, the consular officer, or an immigration officer. Under the 

Immigration and Nationality Act (INA), the Secretary of State has the 

discretionary authority to revoke a visa previously issued to an alien.1

 The 

Secretary of State has delegated this discretionary authority to the Deputy 

Assistant Secretary for Visa Services. According to State officials, the 

department’s discretionary revocation authority is an important and useful 

tool for State to use to send questionable aliens back to the consulates to 

undergo more scrutiny as they reapply for new visas. 

Consular officers may revoke a visa in instances prescribed by regulation 

(22 CFR § 41.122). Such instances include if (1) the consular officer finds 

that the alien is no longer entitled to nonimmigrant status specified in the 

visa; (2) the alien has, since the time that the visa was issued, become 

ineligible to receive a visa under the INA; or (3) the visa has been physically 

removed from the passport in which it was issued. Moreover, regulations 

also allow immigration officers to revoke visas under certain 

circumstances (22 CFR § 41.122). For example, an immigration officer at a 

port of entry may revoke a visa if the officer notifies the alien that he or she 

appears to be inadmissible to the United States and the alien requests and 

is granted permission to withdraw the application for admission.

Timing and Effect of 

Visa Revocations

If an alien arrives at a port of entry in the United States and learns that his 

visa has already been revoked, as was the case with some of the 

revocations that we reviewed, then the alien is deemed inadmissible and 

the INS agent can deny the alien admission into the United States. The 

authority to refuse admission to such aliens is done under the expedited 

removal process allowed under section 235 of the INA. Under section 

212(a)(7)(B) of the INA, an alien is inadmissible if he does not have a valid 

passport, nonimmigrant visa, or border crossing identification card at the 

time of application for admission. Under the INA’s expedited removal 

process, if an alien is inadmissible under section 212(a)(7), the inspection 

officer may order the alien removed from the United States, without further 

hearing or review, unless the alien can demonstrate a credible fear of 

returning to his home country.

1

See INA § 221(i) (8 U.S.C. § 1201(i)).
Appendix II

Legal Process for Visa Revocations

Page 34 GAO-03-798 Border Security: Visa Revocations

If, however, the alien is already in the country when his visa is revoked, 

then INS is not authorized to simply send the alien home, as it could have 

done had the alien arrived at the port of entry with the revoked visa. 

Rather, if INS determines that the alien falls within the class of aliens who 

are removable on the grounds specified in the INA,2 INS may institute 

removal proceedings against the alien. Such proceedings could be based 

either on an immigration violation after admission3 or on the evidence 

relating to the reason for the visa revocation, such as terrorist-related 

activities. However, INS officials said that in many of these cases, INS does 

not receive much evidence in support of the terrorist charge when they 

receive a revocation from State. Without sufficient evidence, INS cannot 

institute removal proceedings against these aliens.

Revocation of a visa is not a stated grounds for removal under the INA. 

However, the issue of whether a visa revocation, after an alien is admitted 

on that visa, has the effect of rendering the alien out-of-status is unresolved 

legally, according to officials in the Department of Homeland Security’s 

Office of the Principal Legal Advisor to the Bureau of Immigration and 

Customs Enforcement and the Bureau of Citizenship and Immigration 

Services. These officials said that the language that the State Department 

has been using on visa revocation certificates effectively forecloses the 

U.S. government from litigating the issue. The revocation certificates state 

that the revocation shall become effective immediately on the date the 

certificate is signed. However, if the alien is present in the United States at 

that time, it will become effective immediately upon the alien’s departure 

from the United States. Homeland Security officials said that if State were 

to cease using this language on the revocation certificates, the government 

would no longer be effectively barred from litigating the issue, and, if a 

policy decision were made to pursue an aggressive litigation strategy, the 

government could seek to remove aliens who have been admitted but have 

subsequently had their visas revoked.

2

See INA § 237 (8 U.S.C. 1227).

3

One example of such an immigration violation would be if an alien obtains a nonimmigrant 

visa and subsequently engages in unauthorized work. Such activities would violate the 

alien’s immigration status and render the alien removable under section 237(a)(1)(C) of the 

INA.
Appendix II

Legal Process for Visa Revocations

Page 35 GAO-03-798 Border Security: Visa Revocations

The Legal Process for 

Removing an Alien 

Who Is Already in the 

Country

If INS does receive sufficient evidence to support a removal charge against 

an alien and chooses to initiate removal proceedings, then the alien is 

afforded certain due process rights under the INA. For example, section 

240 of the INA states that an immigration judge shall conduct proceedings 

to determine if an alien is removable. During such proceedings, the alien is 

afforded rights that include being apprised of the charges against him and 

the basis for them, having a reasonable opportunity to examine the 

evidence against him, presenting evidence on his behalf, having the 

opportunity to cross-examine witnesses presented by the government, and 

filing administrative and judicial appeals. Moreover, during such removal 

proceedings, once an alien establishes that he was admitted to the United 

States as a nonimmigrant, the government has the burden of proof to 

establish by clear and convincing evidence that the alien is removable.4

 

Initiating such proceedings against an alien whose visa has been revoked 

on the basis of terrorist-related activities can be challenging, according to 

INS attorneys. At some point in the proceedings, either in establishing that 

the alien is removable or at the time the alien requests to be released on 

bond, the government could be called on to disclose any classified or law 

enforcement sensitive information that serves as the basis of the charges 

against the alien. According to INS attorneys, this can be challenging since 

many times the law enforcement or intelligence agencies that are the 

source of the information may not authorize the release of that information 

because it could jeopardize ongoing investigations or reveal sources and 

methods.

In addition to the general removal proceedings, the INA also contains 

special removal proceedings for alien terrorists.5

 These proceedings are 

reserved for alien terrorists as described in section 237 (a)(4)(B) of the INA 

and take place before a special removal court comprised of federal court 

judges. Such proceedings are triggered when the Attorney General certifies 

to the removal court that the alien is a terrorist, that he is physically 

present in the United States, and that using the normal removal procedures 

of the INA would pose a risk to the national security of the United States. If 

4

This standard is different from the standard applied to aliens seeking admission to the 

United States. Such aliens bear the burden of proof to establish that they are clearly and 

beyond a doubt entitled to be admitted to the United States and that they are not 

inadmissible under section 212 of the INA. See section 240 of the INA (8 U.S.C. 1229a).

5

See the INA, §§ 501-507 (8 U.S.C. §§ 1531-1537).
Appendix II

Legal Process for Visa Revocations

Page 36 GAO-03-798 Border Security: Visa Revocations

the court agrees to invoke the special removal procedures, then a hearing is 

held before the removal court. Special provisions are made for the use of 

classified information in such proceedings to minimize the risk of its 

disclosure. However, similar to the removal proceedings under section 240, 

the alien has the right to appeal a decision by the removal court. According 

to INS officials, this court has never been used since its inception in 1996.
Page 37 GAO-03-798 Border Security: Visa Revocations

Appendix III

Detailed Information on Revoked Visas ApenIdxi

This appendix provides information on nonimmigrant visas that the State 

Department revoked on terrorism grounds from September 11, 2001, 

through December 31, 2002—specifically, the nationality of the individuals 

whose visas were revoked and the types of visas that were revoked. 

As shown in table 1, the individuals holding visas that the State Department 

revoked on terrorism grounds came from at least 39 countries. Five 

countries—Saudi Arabia, Iran, Egypt, Pakistan, and Lebanon—accounted 

for 53 percent of these individuals. Overall, most of the 240 people were 

citizens of countries in the Near East and North Africa region.

Table 1: Number of Individuals Whose Visas Were Revoked on Terrorism Grounds, 

by Region and Nationality (Sept. 11, 2001, through Dec. 31, 2002) 

Region/Nationality Number of individuals

Africa

Kenya 1

Sudan 2

Subtotal 3

East Asia and Pacific

Indonesia 8

Malaysia 3

Subtotal 11

Europe and Eurasia

Armenia 2

Austria 1

Bosnia and Herzegovina 1

Croatia 1

Greece 1

Netherlands 3

Romania 2

United Kingdom

Subtotal 12
Appendix III

Detailed Information on Revoked Visas

Page 38 GAO-03-798 Border Security: Visa Revocations

Near East and North Africa

Algeria 3

Bahrain 2

Egypt 21

Iran 22

Jordan 9

Kuwait 4

Lebanon 17

Morocco 6

Oman 2

Qatar 2

Saudi Arabia 50

Syria 7

Tunisia 1

United Arab Emirates 12

Yemen 2

Subtotal 160

South Asia

Afghanistan 2

Bangladesh 3

India 3

Pakistan 18

Subtotal 26

Western Hemisphere

Brazil 2

Colombia 7

Cuba 2

El Salvador 1

Mexico 4

Panama 1

Paraguay 5

Uruguay 1

Subtotal 23

Unknown 5

Total 240

(Continued From Previous Page)

Region/Nationality Number of individuals
Appendix III

Detailed Information on Revoked Visas

Page 39 GAO-03-798 Border Security: Visa Revocations

Table 2 provides information on the types of visas that the State 

Department revoked on terrorism grounds. About 70 percent of the visas 

were for temporary visits for business, pleasure, or both. Seven of these 

visas were in the form of border crossing cards for Canada and Mexico. 

Table 2: Number of Visa Revocations, by Class and Type of Visa Revoked

Visa class Type of visa

Number of 

revocations

Business/Pleasure

B1 Temporary visitor for business 5

B1/B2 Temporary visitor for business and pleasure 135

B1/B2/BBBCC Border crossing card (Mexico) 3

B2 Temporary visitor for pleasure 19

BCC Border crossing card (Canada) 4

Subtotal 166

Other

A1 Ambassador, public minister, or career 

diplomat or consular officer, immediate 

family

1

2 Other foreign government official or 

employee, or immediate family

2

C1/D Combined transit and crewman visa 7

D Crewmember (sea or air) 7

E2 Treaty investor, spouse or child 3

F1 Student 26

H1B Alien in a specialty occupation (profession) 9

H3 Trainee 1

J-1 Exchange visitor 5

L1 Intracompany transferee 1

L2 Spouse or child of intracompany transferee 1

M1 Vocational or other nonacademic student 6

M2 Spouse or child of M-1 1

P1 Internationally recognized athlete or 

member of internationally recognized 

entertainment group

2

Subtotal 72

Unknown 2

Total 240
Page 40 GAO-03-798 Border Security: Visa Revocations

Appendix IV

Example of a Revocation Cable the 

Department of State Sent to the INS and the 

FBI ApenVIdxi
Appendix IV

Example of a Revocation Cable the 

Department of State Sent to the INS and the 

FBI

Page 41 GAO-03-798 Border Security: Visa Revocations
Page 42 GAO-03-798 Border Security: Visa Revocations

Appendix V

Sample of a Revocation Certificate the 

Department of State Sent to the Immigration 

and Naturalization Service Lookout Unit ApenVdxi
Page 43 GAO-03-798 Border Security: Visa Revocations

Appendix VI

Comments from the Department of Homeland 

Security ApenVdxiI
Page 44 GAO-03-798 Border Security: Visa Revocations

Appendix VII

Comments from the Department of State ApenVdxiI

Note: GAO comments 

supplementing those in 

the report text appear 

at the end of this 

appendix.
Appendix VII

Comments from the Department of State

Page 45 GAO-03-798 Border Security: Visa Revocations

See comment 1.

See comment 2.

See comment 2.
Appendix VII

Comments from the Department of State

Page 46 GAO-03-798 Border Security: Visa Revocations

See comment 3.

See comment 4.
Appendix VII

Comments from the Department of State

Page 47 GAO-03-798 Border Security: Visa Revocations
Appendix VII

Comments from the Department of State

Page 48 GAO-03-798 Border Security: Visa Revocations

GAO Comments The following are GAO's comments on the Department of State’s letter 

dated June 10, 2003.

1. The scope of our review covered all visas revoked on terrorism concerns 

by the State Department, including headquarters officials and State’s 

overseas consular officers, from September 11, 2001, through December 31, 

2002. State Department officials determined that the total universe of such 

revocations consisted of 240 cases during that period and provided 

documentation for almost all of them. Headquarters officials, acting under 

the authority of the Secretary of State, revoked the visas in all of the cases. 

As noted in State’s comments, in none of the cases did State believe that it 

had sufficient evidence to support a formal finding of inadmissibility; thus, 

all of the revocations were done as a precautionary measure.

2. Pages 10 and 11 of our report include information on this matter.

3. We agree that these individuals may not be terrorists. However, the State 

Department has revoked their visas because of terrorism concerns. Our 

recommendations are designed to ensure that persons whose visas have 

been revoked because of potential terrorism concerns be denied entry to 

the United States and those that may already be in the United States be 

investigated to determine if they pose a security threat.

4. The Departments of State and Homeland Security have different views 

on this issue. Homeland Security believes that the language that the State 

Department has been using on visa revocation certificates effectively 

forecloses the U.S. government from litigating the issue of whether a visa 

revocation has the effect of rendering the individual as out-of-status (see p. 

25 of our report). Our recommendations, if implemented, would help 

resolve these conflicting views.

(320172)
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