Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 02A04-1706-JT-1343 | January 3, 2018 Page 1 of 19

ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT

Donald J. Frew

Fort Wayne, Indiana

ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE

Curtis T. Hill, Jr.

Attorney General of Indiana

Robert J. Henke

Deputy Attorney General

Indianapolis, Indiana

I N T H E

COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA

In the Matter of the Termination 

of Parent Rights of:

B.L.P. (Minor Child)

and

Br.L.P. (Father),

Appellant-Respondent,

v.

The Indiana Department of 

Child Services,

Appellee-Petitioner

January 3, 2018

Court of Appeals Case No.

02A04-1706-JT-1343

Appeal from the Allen Superior 

Court

The Honorable Sherry A. Hartzler, 

Judge

Trial Court Cause No.

02D08-1607-JT-179

Baker, Judge.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 02A04-1706-JT-1343 | January 3, 2018 Page 2 of 19

[1] Br.L.P. (Father) appeals the trial court’s order terminating his parent-child 

relationship with B.L.P. (Child), arguing that there is insufficient evidence 

supporting the termination order. In addition to reaffirming our prior holding 

that the Interstate Compact on the Placement of Children does not apply to outof-state parents, we find that the evidence is insufficient to support termination. 

Therefore, we reverse and remand.

Facts

[2] Child was born to C.V. (Mother) and Father on March 21, 2005.1 The parents 

were not married, and Child lived with Mother for an unknown period of time 

after he was born. At some point, Child began living with his maternal 

grandmother (Grandmother) after both parents became incarcerated. 

Grandmother intervened in the paternity action and became Child’s legal 

custodian in September 2007. In 2008, Father moved to Atlanta, Georgia, 

because he needed a “change of scenery” and had family members who lived in 

Georgia. Tr. p. 69-70. In May 2012, Father was convicted for “selling and 

dealing in cocaine” in Georgia, and he was incarcerated for that offense until 

May 2014. Id. at 70. As of May 2016, he was no longer on probation or parole 

and had completed all requirements related to his incarceration.

[3] Child has significant behavioral issues and multiple mental health diagnoses, 

and in October 2013, Child began acting out. Grandmother was no longer able 

 

1 Mother is not a party to this appeal.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 02A04-1706-JT-1343 | January 3, 2018 Page 3 of 19

to be Child’s caregiver because of his behavioral issues as well as her own 

physical and mental health and financial limitations.

[4] In October 2013, the Department of Child Services (DCS) filed a petition 

alleging Child to be a Child in Need of Services (CHINS). The CHINS petition 

was based on Grandmother’s inability to be a caregiver for Child as well as 

Mother’s substance abuse and instability and Father’s then-incarceration. At 

that time, DCS removed Child from Grandmother’s care and custody and 

placed him in foster care.

[5] On November 13, 2013, the trial court found Child to be a CHINS. Mother 

and Grandmother were present at the hearing and Father participated 

telephonically. Mother and Grandmother admitted to the allegations in the 

petition. Father admitted that he was incarcerated and, as a result, unable to 

care or provide for Child at that time. That same day, the trial court held a 

dispositional hearing, ordering Father to participate in a “diagnostic evaluation 

within 30 days” of his release from incarceration and for him to follow the 

recommendations of the evaluation; the trial court also authorized supervised 

visitation with Child. Appellant’s App. Vol. II p. 49-50.

[6] Sometime in 2014, after he was released from incarceration, Father began 

having regular phone contact with Child. In August 2015, Father and Child 

began having supervised Skype calls. Luis Hernandez, who supervised those 

calls, testified that Father participated in about 75% of the calls; the 25% he 

missed were the result of technological problems. As time went on, Father’s 
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 02A04-1706-JT-1343 | January 3, 2018 Page 4 of 19

rate of participation improved. Hernandez believed that the interactions 

between Father and Child were positive and stated that Child “looks forward to 

speaking with his father.” Tr. p. 19. Child’s behavior was always appropriate 

during and after that contact with Father, and Hernandez had no concerns 

about Father and Child being in each other’s presence.

[7] Indiana DCS does not have contracts in Georgia with service providers. 

Consequently, while the Family Case Manager recommended a provider to 

Father for the diagnostic evaluation, Father was required to pay for the 

evaluation himself. Father participated in the evaluation but he was surprised 

to learn he had to come back again for a second part. When he went back for 

the second part, “they told me I need to come back for the third part,” 

eventually telling him that it could include “seven or eight” assessments. Id. at 

160. Each time Father went to the provider, he had to pay $300. He could not 

afford to complete all portions of the assessment, and also began to believe that 

the service provider was purposely delaying the process so that he would have 

to spend more money. The provider told Father that it would not release the 

portion of the assessment that he had completed to DCS until Father completed 

the entire assessment, though the Family Case Manager testified that the 

provider informed her that Father “did not come in and sign off so that we can 

um have access to what he completed . . . .” Id. at 127, 160.

[8] At some point in 2016, DCS requested that an evaluation of Father’s life and 

home be completed under the Interstate Compact on the Placement of Children 

(ICPC). After completing the evaluation, the evaluator did not recommend 
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 02A04-1706-JT-1343 | January 3, 2018 Page 5 of 19

placement of Child with Father based on two concerns: first, Father was living 

in a duplex and there were signs of fire damage to the apartment next door; and 

second, Father had recent criminal history.

[9] On July 18, 2016, DCS filed a petition to terminate the parent-child relationship 

between Child and his parents. The termination hearing took place on 

December 8 and 16, 2016. Father participated telephonically. At the time of 

the hearing, Father had full-time employment as a carpenter. He had 

maintained consistent employment since May 2013,2 moving from a position as 

a laborer to a position as a carpenter; Father was on a path “to management as 

a safety carpenter[.]” Id. at 162. He had moved from the duplex to a threebedroom home, which he shared with his girlfriend and her two sons. Father 

was realistic, understanding that Child would not be placed with him 

immediately, so he was also paying rent to a cousin who lived in the area for a 

bedroom for Child, in case Child was permitted to move to Georgia and be 

placed in relative care. Id.

[10] Because of financial constraints as well as his demanding work schedule, Father 

has been unable to travel to Indiana to see Child in person. Child’s foster 

parents traveled to the Georgia area twice since Father was released from 

 

2 Although not entirely clear, it appears that Father was in a work release program before he was released to 

probation in 2014.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 02A04-1706-JT-1343 | January 3, 2018 Page 6 of 19

incarceration in 2014, and those two times are the only occasions on which 

Father and Child have interacted in person.

[11] Throughout the CHINS and termination cases, Father has been cooperative 

and communicative with DCS. He participated telephonically in conferences 

when asked to do so and participated telephonically at all important hearings. 

At the termination hearing, he acknowledged his serious criminal history and 

admitted that he has “made some bad decisions,” but maintained that “I have 

made a new way for my life to live right since I’ve been out to work six days a 

week . . . . I want to show my son . . . hard work will get you where you need 

to get eventually . . . .” Id. at 161. Father insisted that “the lightbulb has finally 

went off. I’ve found a different way to provide for my family and show them 

structure . . . .” Id. at 162.

[12] On April 11, 2017, the trial court issued an order granting DCS’s petition to 

terminate the parent-child relationship.3 In pertinent part, it found and held as 

follows:

28. In approximately 2008, Father moved to Georgia and 

ceased visiting his child or maintaining regular and 

consistent contact.

***

 

3 The trial court terminated the parent-child relationship of both Mother and Father, but Mother has not 

appealed the order.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 02A04-1706-JT-1343 | January 3, 2018 Page 7 of 19

30. During the course of the child’s placement with 

[Grandmother], neither parent provide[d] regular and 

consistent financial and/or material support and care of 

the minor child.

***

37. Since the child has been a ward of the State of Indiana, 

Father has only seen the child two times face to face . . . .

38. Father has never returned to the State of Indiana since 

leaving in 2008. Father cites his work schedule as the 

impairment despite there not being any restrictions on his 

travel since his release and despite the travel being only 

eight (8) hours.

39. The Court finds that Father is gainfully employed and 

living with his girlfriend and her two children. Father has 

two other children who do not reside with him.

40. The Court finds that Father is fully aware of his court 

ordered obligations under the Dispositional Decree; 

however, he never completed his diagnostic assessment 

citing financial reasons despite the fact he is employed 56 

hours per week as a carpenter. Father also claimed that he 

did not want to attend multiple sessions to complete the 

evaluation.

41. The Court finds that although Father completed some 

portions of his diagnostic assessment, he has failed to sign 

a release to [DCS] so that those portions completed could 

be obtained.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 02A04-1706-JT-1343 | January 3, 2018 Page 8 of 19

42. The Court finds that Father has not provided financial 

and/or material support for the child since the child has 

been placed under the supervision of [DCS]. . . .

***

45. The Court finds that Father has not consistently 

participated in his therapeutic visitations[,] failing to 

participate in approximately twenty-five percent (25%) of 

his visitations. . . .

***

[Conclusions of Law]

***

3. The Court concludes that the reasons for the child’s 

placement outside of Mother and Father’s care was 

primarily due to their drug use, incarcerations and inability 

and/or unwillingness to provide care and supervision. 

Due to the parents’ failure to remedy the reasons for 

removal and continued placement outside of their care, the 

child continues to be placed in foster care.

4. The Court concludes that although the child requires 

consistency and stability, Father . . . [has] been unable and 

unwilling to demonstrate an ability to provide this need to 

the child. Father has been inconsistent in his Court 

ordered therapeutic visitations over video 

conferencing. . . . Father has not even physically seen his 

child but for two times in the last three years despite an[] 

ability to do so. The Court concludes that . . . Father’s 

failure to follow through in his services and visitations is 
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 02A04-1706-JT-1343 | January 3, 2018 Page 9 of 19

indicative of [his] instability and inability to remedy the 

reasons for the child’s removal and his placement outside 

of their care. Further, the Court finds that as a result 

of . . . Father’s failure to comply, the continuation of the 

parent-child relationship poses a threat to the well-being of 

the children [sic]. . . .

5. . . . The Court concludes that the termination of parental 

rights and placement for adoption will provide the children 

[sic] with the nurturance[,] care and protection they [sic] 

require. It is therefore in their [sic] best interests that the 

petition to terminate parental rights be granted.

Appealed Order p. 10-13. Father now appeals.

Discussion and Decision

I. ICPC

[13] First, we must evidently again address an issue that has already been decided by 

this Court. Just two years ago, this Court squarely held that “the ICPC does not 

apply to placement with an out-of-state parent.” D.B. v. Ind. Dep’t of Child Servs., 43 

N.E.3d 599, 604 (Ind. Ct. App. 2015) (emphasis added), trans. denied. 

Notwithstanding this unambiguous holding, apparently DCS is still 

requesting—and trial courts are still granting—ICPC evaluations for out-of-state 

parents. 

[14] DCS directs our attention to rules and regulations that have been promulgated 

under the ICPC by the Compact Administrator. Rules and regulations, 
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 02A04-1706-JT-1343 | January 3, 2018 Page 10 of 19

however, do not and cannot trump the plain statutory language enacted by our 

General Assembly. As we already held in D.B.:

Article III of the ICPC sets forth the conditions for placement out 

of state:

(a) A sending agency may not send, bring, or cause to 

be sent or brought into any other party state a child 

for placement in foster care or as a preliminary to a 

possible adoption unless the sending agency complies 

with each requirement under article III and with the 

receiving state’s laws governing the placement of 

children.

(b) Before sending, bringing, or causing any child to be 

sent or brought into a receiving state for placement in 

foster care or as a preliminary to a possible adoption, the 

sending agency shall furnish the appropriate public 

authorities in the receiving state written notice of 

the intention to send, bring, or place the child in the 

receiving state. . . .

I.C. 31-28-4-1 art. III (emphases added). Thus, the plain 

language of the statute makes clear that the ICPC applies only to 

the placement of a child in foster care or as a preliminary to a 

possible adoption.

DCS contends that “the answer to the question of whether the 

ICPC applies is circumstantial in nature.” Appellee’s Br. p. 18. 

To the contrary, the answer to that question is statutory in nature. 

And the statute quite plainly provides that it applies only to 

placement in foster care or a preadoptive home. A biological 

parent is neither of these.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 02A04-1706-JT-1343 | January 3, 2018 Page 11 of 19

Id. (internal footnote omitted) (emphases original). So, yet again, we hold as 

plainly and unambiguously as possible: unless and until the statute is amended, 

the ICPC does not apply to placement with an out-of-state parent. To the 

extent that the termination order in this case relied on the rejected ICPC, we 

discount that basis of the ruling.

II. Termination Order

[15] Father argues that there is insufficient evidence supporting the order 

terminating his relationship with Child. Our standard of review with respect to 

termination of parental rights proceedings is well established. In considering 

whether termination was appropriate, we neither reweigh the evidence nor 

assess witness credibility. K.T.K. v. Ind. Dep’t of Child Servs., 989 N.E.2d 1225, 

1229 (Ind. 2013). We will consider only the evidence and reasonable inferences 

that may be drawn therefrom in support of the judgment, giving due regard to 

the trial court’s opportunity to judge witness credibility firsthand. Id. Where, 

as here, the trial court entered findings of fact and conclusions of law, we will 

not set aside the findings or judgment unless clearly erroneous. Id. In making 

that determination, we must consider whether the evidence clearly and 

convincingly supports the findings, and the findings clearly and convincingly 

support the judgment. Id. at 1229-30. It is “sufficient to show by clear and 

convincing evidence that the child’s emotional and physical development are 

threatened by the respondent parent’s custody.” Bester v. Lake Cty. Office of 

Family & Children, 839 N.E.2d 143, 148 (Ind. 2005).
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 02A04-1706-JT-1343 | January 3, 2018 Page 12 of 19

[16] Indiana Code section 31-35-2-4(b)(2) requires that a petition to terminate 

parental rights for a CHINS must make the following allegations:

(A) that one (1) of the following is true:

(i) The child has been removed from the parent for at 

least six (6) months under a dispositional decree.

(ii) A court has entered a finding under IC 31-34-21-5.6 

that reasonable efforts for family preservation or 

reunification are not required, including a 

description of the court’s finding, the date of the 

finding, and the manner in which the finding was

made.

(iii) The child has been removed from the parent and 

has been under the supervision of a local office or 

probation department for at least fifteen (15) months 

of the most recent twenty-two (22) months, 

beginning with the date the child is removed from 

the home as a result of the child being alleged to be 

a child in need of services or a delinquent child;

(B) that one (1) of the following is true:

(i) There is a reasonable probability that the conditions 

that resulted in the child’s removal or the reasons 

for placement outside the home of the parents will 

not be remedied.

(ii) There is a reasonable probability that the 

continuation of the parent-child relationship poses a 

threat to the well-being of the child.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 02A04-1706-JT-1343 | January 3, 2018 Page 13 of 19

(iii) The child has, on two (2) separate occasions, been 

adjudicated a child in need of services;

(C) that termination is in the best interests of the child; and

(D) that there is a satisfactory plan for the care and treatment 

of the child.

DCS must prove the alleged circumstances by clear and convincing evidence. 

K.T.K., 989 N.E.2d at 1230.

A. Remedy of Conditions Resulting in Removal

[17] Child was initially removed from Father’s care and custody because at the time 

Grandmother was no longer able to care for Child, Father was incarcerated. 

Father is no longer incarcerated. Indeed, he has successfully completed 

probation and/or parole and has no remaining incarceration-related constraints 

on his life. See K.E. v. Ind. Dep’t of Child Servs., 39 N.E.3d 641, 643 (Ind. 2015) 

(holding that “incarceration is an insufficient basis for terminating parental 

rights”). Furthermore, at the time of the hearing, Father had full-time 

employment—indeed, he had maintained full-time employment for over two 

years at the time of the termination hearing. He also had stable housing with 

room for Child should Child be placed in his care—and a bedroom for Child 

available in the residence of a cousin, should Child be placed in relative care.

[18] Child’s placement outside of Father’s care and custody has continued because 

they are still forging a relationship, which is difficult when they live in two 

different states. Father admits that in the past, he was not nearly as involved 
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 02A04-1706-JT-1343 | January 3, 2018 Page 14 of 19

with Child as he should have been. As a result, they do not—yet—have a 

strong bond. But he has worked to better himself and, during the CHINS case, 

worked within his limitations to get to know Child. He participated regularly in 

telephone and Skype calls with Child. While his participation was not 100%, 

the record is undisputed that the reason for the handful of missed calls was 

technological difficulties. And his percentage of participation improved as the 

case progressed (presumably because all technological wrinkles were ironed out 

with time). 

[19] DCS seeks to fault Father for being unable to visit Child in Indiana. But to be 

able to do so, Father would have had to jeopardize his employment. And while 

DCS blithely asserts that “a plane flight from Georgia to Indiana, with a several 

hour face-to-face visit could all be accomplished in one single day,” DCS fails 

to acknowledge the exorbitant cost that such a trip would incur. Appellee’s Br. 

p. 29. By expecting Father to accomplish tasks that are not realistic for most 

people, DCS set Father up to fail from the start.

[20] It is undisputed that at the time of the termination hearing, Father had 

successfully completed probation, was maintaining full-time employment, and 

had stable housing. See In re D.D., 804 N.E.2d 258, 266 (Ind. Ct. App. 2004) 

(noting that the juvenile court must judge a parent’s fitness to care for his child 

at the time of the termination hearing, taking into consideration evidence of 

changed conditions). He has done everything within his power to remedy the 

mistakes of the past and forge a bond with Child. Under these circumstances, 

there is not clear and convincing evidence supporting the trial court’s 
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 02A04-1706-JT-1343 | January 3, 2018 Page 15 of 19

conclusion that there is a reasonable probability that the reasons for Child’s 

placement outside of Father’s care and custody will not be remedied.

B. Threat to Child’s Well-Being

[21] As the statute is phrased in the disjunctive, we must also consider whether DCS 

established by clear and convincing evidence that there is a reasonable 

probability that the continuation of the parent-child relationship poses a threat 

to Child’s well-being. 

[22] The trial court found the following facts in support of its conclusion that Child’s 

well-being was threatened: (1) Father was inconsistent in his participation with 

the Skype calls; (2) Father has only seen Child in person twice in the last three 

years; and (3) Father failed to follow through in his court-ordered diagnostic 

evaluation. Appealed Order p. 13.

[23] With respect to the Skype calls, Father participated in approximately 75% of 

those supervised interactions. It is undisputed that he missed the remaining 

calls because of technological difficulties. As time passed, his percentage 

improved. And the visitation supervisor testified that all interactions between 

Father and Child were “positive,” that Child always “look[ed] forward to 

speaking with his father,” that Child “want[ed] to be there,” and that Child 

exhibited no inappropriate behavior following those calls. Tr. p. 19. The 

supervisor had no concerns about Father and Child being in each other’s 

presence aside from the fact that they have had limited face-to-face interactions. 

Id. at 16, 19.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 02A04-1706-JT-1343 | January 3, 2018 Page 16 of 19

[24] With respect to Father’s limited ability to interact with Child in person, we 

agree that this fact makes this case particularly challenging. But to terminate a 

parent-child relationship because a parent lives out of state, works full-time, and 

cannot afford to fly to another state and home again in the same day is to 

punish a parent for their geographic location and economic wherewithal. We 

decline to sanction this result. 

[25] Finally, with respect to the diagnostic evaluation, we share Father’s confusion 

about the process. We would have suspected that a diagnostic evaluation 

would be similar to Indiana’s substance abuse assessments, which are a one- or, 

perhaps, two-session evaluation of the client, from which stems diagnoses and 

recommendations for further treatment. Father went in with the same 

understanding: 

it was supposed to be a one-time evaluation[.] I went and did it 

then they said it was the second part of the evaluation and I 

would be done[.] [T]hen they told me it was a third part of the 

evaluation and then a fourth part and possibly a fifth part . . . .

Tr. p. 79. They later said “they don’t know” how many sessions there might 

be, telling Father “it could be probably seven or eight assessments . . . .” Id. at 

160. Father was paying for this evaluation out of his own pocket; each time he 

went, he paid $300. He reached a point where he was both understandably 

frustrated by and suspicious of the process and where he was unable to afford to 

continue with it. DCS did not help Father, simply telling him that as it was out 

of state, there was no assistance that could be offered. 
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 02A04-1706-JT-1343 | January 3, 2018 Page 17 of 19

[26] While we acknowledge that Father did, in fact, fail to comply with this court 

order, under these circumstances, we do not believe that his failure to do so 

leads to a conclusion that there is a threat to Child’s well-being if the 

relationship is continued. It is undisputed that Father was cooperative with 

DCS throughout the CHINS case, participated telephonically at all major 

hearings, and telephonically attended “any conferences [DCS] asked him to be 

a part of . . . .” Id. at 127. Consequently, although Father failed to complete 

the diagnostic evaluation, we see no evidence of a pattern of behavior 

demonstrating a lack of cooperation or any indication that he has not taken the 

process entirely seriously.

[27] Nothing in Father’s current circumstances or behavior throughout the CHINS 

case suggests that Child’s well-being is at risk if the relationship is maintained. 

In other words, we do not find that the record holds clear and convincing 

evidence of a reasonable probability that the continuation of the parent-child 

relationship poses a threat to Child’s well-being.

C. Best Interests

[28] Finally, we consider the general question of what is in Child’s best interests. 

Stability and consistency are important for every child, and in this case, Father 

has not historically provided that. He made a series of compounding bad 

decisions over the years that led to a lack of a relationship with Child.

[29] But since he was released from incarceration in 2014, he has made every effort 

to better himself and become a suitable caregiver for his son. He has found and 
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 02A04-1706-JT-1343 | January 3, 2018 Page 18 of 19

maintained full-time employment, and has been successful enough that he is 

now on a path to management. He has stable housing and is even paying his 

cousin to rent a room in her house in case Child were to be sent to live in 

Georgia before it was recommended that Child be placed with Father. All of 

his interactions with Child have been positive, and Child has been eager for 

those to continue. The Family Case Manager testified that Father and Child 

have a good relationship: “they are able to talk about things [and] they are able 

to conversate and um [Child] does ask questions of his dad so yes I think that 

they are working on building a strong relationship.” Id. at 136.

[30] Moreover, while Child has thrived in his foster care placement, at the time of 

the termination hearing, it was not at all clear that his foster mother intended to 

adopt him. Indeed, she has been “back and forth about her willingness to 

adopt” him. Id. at 65. More specifically, the Family Case Manager agreed that 

the foster mother has been unable to reach a decision: “the foster mom is yes I 

am no I’m not yes I am no I’m not because of the child’s behavior issues[.]” Id.

at 134. Essentially, whenever Child had behavioral issues, “the foster mom 

backs away about wanting to adopt him . . . .” Id. at 135. Consequently, it is 

not a given that the termination of the parent-child relationship would lead to 

stability, consistency, or permanency for Child.

[31] Child has a parent who, while living in a different state and having a history of 

poor choices, has made every effort to remedy the situation and become a 

suitable caregiver. Father wants to parent his son, and while they need more 

time—and geographical proximity—to further cement their relationship, we 
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 02A04-1706-JT-1343 | January 3, 2018 Page 19 of 19

simply cannot say that this record holds clear and convincing evidence that the 

termination of this relationship, at this point, is in Child’s best interests.

[32] The judgment of the trial court is reversed and remanded.

Riley, J., concurs.

Brown, J., concurs in result without an opinion.