NOT FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

HECTOR HUGO BRAVO-COCCO, AKA 

Hector Albertene, AKA Hector Bravo, AKA 

Hector H. Bravo, AKA Hector Hugo Bravo, 

AKA Hector Bravo Cocco, AKA Hector 

Hugo Bravo Cocco, AKA Hector Cocco, 

AKA Hector Hugo Cocco, AKA Hector 

Hugo Coco, AKA Hugo Sass, AKA Hugo L. 

Sass, AKA Flaco Three,

Petitioner, 

 v. 

JEFFERSON B. SESSIONS III, United 

States Attorney General,

Respondent.

No. 14-72989

Agency No. A200-080-750

MEMORANDUM*

On Petition for Review of an Order of the

Board of Immigration Appeals

Argued and Submitted January 9, 2018

Pasadena, California

Before: M. SMITH and FRIEDLAND, Circuit Judges, and RAKOFF,** District 

Judge.

 

* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent 

except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.

** The Honorable Jed S. Rakoff, Senior United States District Judge for 

the Southern District of New York, sitting by designation.

FILED

JAN 17 2018

MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK

U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
 2 

Hector Hugo Bravo-Cocco, a native and citizen of Mexico, petitions for 

review of the Board of Immigration Appeals’ (“BIA”) decision dismissing his 

appeal. The BIA affirmed the Immigration Judge’s (“IJ”) order denying BravoCocco’s application for cancellation of removal under 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(b). We 

have jurisdiction under 8 U.S.C. § 1252. We review questions of law de novo. See 

Corona-Mendez v. Holder, 593 F.3d 1143, 1146 (9th Cir. 2010). We review 

administrative findings of fact for substantial evidence. See Urzua Covarrubias v. 

Gonzales, 487 F.3d 742, 747 (9th Cir. 2007). We DENY the petition.

To be eligible for cancellation of removal, an alien must prove, among other 

things, that he has been “a person of good moral character” during the ten years 

preceding his application for relief. 8 U.S.C. §§ 1229a(c)(4)(A)(i), 1229b(b)(1).

The IJ denied Bravo-Cocco’s application, finding that Bravo-Cocco could not be 

“regarded as a person of good moral character” because in the preceding ten years 

he had been “confine[d] to a penal institution for an aggregate period of 180 days 

or more.” The BIA agreed.

1. The Government initially argues that we lack jurisdiction to consider 

Bravo-Cocco’s challenges to the agency’s decision because he failed to raise 

before the BIA the arguments he raises here. We disagree. We have “jurisdiction to 

review a final order of removal and the issues raised in a petition for review only if 

‘the alien has exhausted all administrative remedies available to the alien as of 
 3 

right.’” Figueroa v. Mukasey, 543 F.3d 487, 492 (9th Cir. 2008) (quoting 8 U.S.C. 

§ 1252(d)(1)). “[W]e do not employ the exhaustion doctrine in a formalistic 

manner, but rather inquire into whether the issue was before the BIA such that it 

had an opportunity to correct its error. The exhaustion doctrine requires that the 

petitioner ‘put the BIA on notice’ as to the specific issues . . . .” Id. (quoting Zhang 

v. Ashcroft, 388 F.3d 713, 721 (9th Cir. 2004)). Moreover, Bravo-Cocco was 

proceeding pro se below, and papers of aliens proceeding pro se before the BIA 

must be construed liberally. See Agyeman v. INS, 296 F.3d 871, 877-78 (9th Cir. 

2002).

Under these generous standards, the BIA was on notice as to the specific 

issues Bravo-Cocco raises in this appeal. First, the BIA’s decision actually

addressed the allocation of the burden of proof, placing the burden on BravoCocco. See Rodriguez-Castellon v. Holder, 733 F.3d 847, 852 (9th Cir. 2013) 

(explaining that this court “may review any issue addressed on the merits by the 

BIA”). Second, Bravo-Cocco argued before the BIA that the evidence did not 

support the IJ’s conclusion about his criminal record, identifying specific 

convictions that were dismissed. This is a good example of “inartfully” drafted 

papers that do “not contain the exact legalese” but still identify the issue in lay 

terms. Agyeman, 296 F.3d at 877-78. Accordingly, we have jurisdiction to consider 

Bravo-Cocco’s arguments on appeal.
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2. On the merits, Bravo-Cocco argues that the BIA erred by relying on a 

conviction that was later dismissed under California Penal Code § 1203.4, pursuant 

to which a defendant is, “with certain enumerated exceptions, released ‘from all 

penalties and disabilities’ resulting from [a dismissed] conviction,” People v. Park, 

299 P.3d 1263, 1276 (Cal. 2013) (quoting Cal. Penal Code § 1203.4). We disagree. 

“[A]s a general rule, an expunged conviction qualifies as a conviction under the 

INA.” Ramirez-Castro v. INS, 287 F.3d 1172, 1174 (9th Cir. 2002) (citing MurilloEspinoza v. INS, 261 F.3d 771, 774 (9th Cir. 2001)); see also Nunez-Reyes v. 

Holder, 646 F.3d 684, 690 (9th Cir. 2011) (en banc) (holding that an expunged 

state conviction still qualifies as a “conviction” for federal immigration purposes). 

In particular, “a conviction expunged under [California Penal Code § 1203.4] 

remains a conviction for purposes of federal law.” Ramirez-Castro, 287 F.3d at 

1175.

Bravo-Cocco attempts to distinguish Ramirez-Castro on the ground that it

involved an INA provision targeting a specific kind of criminal conduct that 

Congress had singled out for negative immigration consequences, whereas the INA 

provision at issue here, 8 U.S.C. § 1101(f)(7), “does not identify any particular

forbidden conduct, but instead defers to state law on whether conduct is serious 

enough to justify immigration consequences.” As the Government points out, 

however, § 1101(f)(7) is predicated on the time spent in custody as a result of 
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conviction, and this period of confinement does not change in response to 

expungement under § 1230.4. Moreover, both Ramirez-Castro and this petition 

concern whether the INA’s statutory definition of “conviction” in 8 U.S.C. 

§ 1101(a)(48)(A) includes convictions expunged under California Penal Code 

§ 1203.4. Ramirez-Castro found that it does and therefore forecloses BravoCocco’s argument.

3. Bravo-Cocco also contends that the BIA erred in considering periods of 

pre-conviction detention in determining whether he was eligible for cancellation of 

removal. This argument, too, is foreclosed by binding circuit precedent – as BravoCocco concedes. See Arreguin-Moreno v. Mukasey, 511 F.3d 1229, 1233 (9th Cir. 

2008) (“[W]hen pre-trial detention is credited against the sentence imposed upon 

conviction, the period of pre-trial detention must be considered as confinement as a 

result of a conviction within the meaning of [8 U.S.C.] § 1101(f)(7).”).

4. Finally, Bravo-Cocco argues that the BIA erred in placing the burden of 

proof on him to demonstrate that he had not been incarcerated for 180 days or 

more in the ten years preceding his application for cancellation of removal. We 

need not reach this issue in light of the foregoing determinations. Bravo-Cocco 

challenges the BIA’s calculation of the number of days he spent incarcerated only

on the grounds discussed above and substantial evidence supports the BIA’s 

finding that Bravo-Cocco was incarcerated for more than 180 days – and that 
 6 

would be true of the evidence regardless of who has the burden. See Simeonov v. 

Ashcroft, 371 F.3d 532, 538 (9th Cir. 2004) (courts and agencies are not required 

to reach non-dispositive issues).

PETITION DENIED.