Organizational Concepts for

the Sensor-to-Shooter World 

The Impact of Real-Time Information 

on Airpower Targeting 

WILLIAM G. CHAPMAN, Major, USAF

School of Advanced Airpower Studies 

THESIS PRESENTED TO THE FACULTY OF 

THE SCHOOL OF ADVANCED AIRPOWER STUDIES, 

MAXWELL AIR FORCE BASE, ALABAMA, FOR COMPLETION OF 

GRADUATION REQUIREMENTS, ACADEMIC YEAR 1995–96. 

Air University Press


Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama


May 1997 
DISCLAIMER 

Opinions, conclusions, and recommendations expressed or implied within are solely those of the 

author(s), and do not necessarily represent the views of Air University, the United States Air 

Force, the Department of Defense, or any other US government agency. Cleared for public 

release: distribution unlimited. 

ii 
Contents 

Chapter Page 

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

DISCLAIMER . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ii 

ABSTRACT . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . v 

ABOUT THE AUTHOR . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . vii 

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ix 

INTRODUCTION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 

THE AIR TASKING PROCESS TODAY . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 

SENSOR-TO-SHOOTER CAPABILITY . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17 

ENHANCING JFACC TARGETING FLEXIBILITY . . . . . . . . . 27 

A LOOK TO THE FUTURE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 41 

BIBLIOGRAPHY . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 45 

Illustrations 

Figure 

1 The Air Tasking Process . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8 

2 Targeting Cycle Phases . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11 

3 Notional JFACC Organization (the air operations center) . . . . . . 13 

4 Notional ATO Cycle . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29 

5 Time Line to Produce an Execution-Day ATO . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30 

iii 

Abstract 

The term real-time information into the cockpit (RTIC) involves systems 

capabilities required to provide aircrews timely and essential off-board information 

to allow mission adjustments in response to rapidly changing combat conditions. The 

term military technical revolution (MTR) requires converging technological products 

which have a demonstrated military utility, and military recognition that the 

application of these converging technologies will cause a radical change in the 

character of warfare over a very short period of time. 

RTIC does not foreshadow a coming MTR although it does employ converging 

technological products which have a demonstrated military utility. RTIC is not likely 

to cause radical change to the character of warfare. Nonetheless, it improves a 

commander’s ability to employ operational art—to employ military forces to attain 

strategic and/or operational objectives through the design, organization, integration, 

and conduct of strategies, campaigns, major operations, and battles. 

This thesis assesses the capabilities of RTIC from two perspectives: its impact on 

the air tasking process, and the command and control flexibility it affords the joint 

force air component commander (JFACC). It concludes that the impact on the air 

tasking process is evolutionary, not revolutionary—current RTIC capabilities remain 

largely dependent on human-intensive operations which limit reductions in decision 

cycle times. It further suggests that RTIC’s true impact on targeting is directly 

attributable to the increased flexibility provided to the JFACC for prosecuting the 

execution-day air tasking order. 

v 

About the Author 

Maj William G. Chapman is both a space operations officer and senior navigator.

He has a BS degree from the University of Central Florida and an MA degree from

Webster University. Following his commissioning in 1981, he attended

undergraduate navigator training at Mather Air Force Base (AFB), California. His

first operational flying tour was in the F-4E at Moody AFB, Georgia, where he

upgraded to both instructor weapon systems officer and standardization-evaluation

flight examiner. Major Chapman was reassigned in 1987 to the United States Air

Force Academy (USAFA) where he taught various aviation science courses, served as

the Fighter Operations course director and was chief of standardization-evaluation

for the academy’s T-43 airmanship training squadron. Shortly after reassignment in

the fall of 1990 to RAF Lakenheath, England, he deployed to Taif, Saudi Arabia,

where he flew 23 F-111F combat missions in support of Operation Desert Storm.

Upon redeployment, he served as chief of squadron training and as flight

commander. Major Chapman returned to USAFA in 1992 as chief of the Policy

Division until his selection to attend undergraduate space training. Following

training, he was assigned to Falcon AFB, Colorado, where he served as flight

commander with responsibilities for the defense meteorological satellite program,

defense support program, and Navstar global positioning system. Major Chapman is

a distinguished graduate of the Air Command and Staff College. Upon graduation

from the School of Advanced Airpower Studies, he was assigned to Headquarters

USSPACECOM/J-3, Peterson AFB, Colorado, as chief, Command and Control

Warfare Branch. 

vii 

Acknowledgments 

The advice, admonition, assistance, cajoling, instruction, and guidance of several 

groups and individuals were indispensable as I attempted to turn questions 

regarding sensor-to-shooter capabilities into answers regarding sensor-to-shooter 

employment. I thank Majors Zigfried J. “Ziggy” Dahl, Guido Hawks, and the 

members of the Talon Shooter Team at the Space Warfare Center for enlightening 

my understanding of both the capabilities and possibilities of real-time information 

into the cockpit. Further thanks go to Lt Col Bob Schloss with the CENTAF Air 

Operations Center (AOC) staff who augmented my book knowledge on the activities 

of combat plans and combat operations with actual experience in a functioning AOC. 

I also express my gratitude to Lt Col John Cowen at the US Space Command’s 

Combined Intelligence Center. His patient instruction on the transformation of US 

reconnaissance data into cockpit-useable information was excellent. 

My genuine appreciation likewise goes to my thesis advisor and reader, Maj Bruce 

M. DeBlois and Col Phillip S. Meilinger, respectively, for their direction and insights. 

I owe a final, heartfelt, and enduring word of thanks to my lovely bride, Merri, for 

her patience and encouragement, and to Katie and Danny who learned to accept 

“daddy’s got to go study” with never-ending smiles and hugs. 

ix 
Chapter 1 

Introduction 

Due to battlefield dynamics, the JFACC/JFC (Joint Force Air Component Commander/ 

Joint Force Commander) may be required to make changes to the planned joint air 

operations during execution. 

—Joint Pub 3-56.1, Command 

and Control for Joint Air 

Operations 

Today’s Situation. U-2 signals intelligence equipment picks up an active 

enemy air defense radar. These signals cue the U-2’s advanced synthetic 

aperture radar system to image the area. Data is sent to ground processing 

systems and three hours later,1 the finished product arrives in the hands of 

the joint force air component commander (JFACC) at the air operations 

center (AOC). Evaluation of the images indicates fixed and mobile 

surface-to-surface Scud missile launchers in the area. The decision to attack 

the Scuds is passed from the JFACC to flights of F-15Es through the airborne 

command, control, and communications (ABCCC) aircraft. The fixed Scud 

launchers are destroyed, however, the mobile launchers had moved long 

before the F-15s arrived in the area. 

Tomorrow’s Situation. A defense support program (DSP) satellite 

identifies a ballistic missile launch. Coordinates of a launch ellipse are 

immediately data linked to an on-orbit RC-135 Rivet Joint. Rivet Joint 

sensors refine the launch coordinates in seconds. Precise coordinates are 

simultaneously transmitted to real-time information into the cockpit (RTIC) 

cell within the combat operations division (COD) of the AOC and to an orbiting 

joint surveillance target attack radar system (JSTARS) aircraft. JSTARS 

tracks the Scud launchers2 as they move from their launch locations. 

Meanwhile, the RTIC cell identifies an adequately configured strike package 

en route to another target and redirects it to attack the launchers. The 

redirection uses both secure-voice transmissions to alert the affected crews 

and a direct data link to pass vital mission information. This mission 

information includes an updated flight route, current target-area weather, 

revised threat information along the new flight path, photographs of recently 

targeted Scud transporters-erectors-launchers (TEL) and continuously 

updated sets of latitude, longitude, and elevation for the moving TELs. 

Within minutes, the F-15s acquire radar contact with objects in the reported 

TEL location, use their low-altitude navigation and targeting infrared for 

night (LANTIRN) systems to visually identify the objects as Scud launchers, 

1 
and moments later, employ their weapons on the doomed targets—the strike 

is successful and once again the United States has transformed information 

into combat power. 

Real-time information into the cockpit is a new buzzword in the Air Force 

vernacular. Along with its parent phrase, sensor-to-shooter, RTIC deals with 

the “systems capabilities required to provide aircrews timely and essential 

off-board information to allow mission adjustments in response to rapidly 

changing combat conditions.”3 The essence of RTIC is flexibility, and 

flexibility is a tenet of airpower equal with centralized control.4 At issue is the 

synergy that arises from the application of RTIC technology in an 

environment of centralized command. More specifically, the RTIC flexibility 

made possible by current technologies combined with the unity of command 

embodied in today’s JFACC has matured sufficiently to warrant changes to 

the existing command and control (C2) architecture laid out in Air Force and 

joint doctrine. 

This thesis explores organizational concepts for an RTIC environment that 

is available today. Its focus is on increasing JFACC flexibility by applying 

real-time information to airpower targeting. A look at the air tasking process 

as established in current joint doctrine5 and employed during the Gulf War 

provides the foundation for this analysis of near-term RTIC possibilities. It 

also helps set the boundaries of what this thesis is as well as what it is not. It 

is an examination of C2 organizational architectures that could be employed 

near term (i.e., well within a decade). As such, it explores RTIC as a 

capability that supplements the air tasking process but does not replace it. It 

is oriented toward, though not confined to, air-to-ground actions performed by 

limited sets of weapon platforms6 operating beyond the close battle. 

Additionally, it is a reaffirmation of the value of unity of airpower command7 

employed by today’s JFACC. It is not a proposal to rewrite essay M, “Tenets 

of Aerospace Power”8 in volume 2 of Air Force Manual (AFM) 1-1, Basic 

Aerospace Doctrine of the United States Air Force as De-Centralized Control/ 

Decentralized Execution; rather, it is an investigation aimed at enhancing the 

airpower flexibility available in an appropriately C2 architecture. 

The centralized control and decentralized execution of the Gulf War air 

campaign—its planning, tasking, and execution of an average 2,847 sorties 

per day9—worked well. Though not error free, the C2 team from the JFACC, 

Lt Gen Charles A. Horner, through the tactical air control system (TACS)10 

“spectacularly outperform[ed] the best team of leaders Iraq could put in the 

field.”11 Why do we have a JFACC today, and why did the JFACC C2 concept 

work so well in the Gulf War? The JFACC concept is largely a response to the 

numerous tactical victories and strategic defeat experienced in Vietnam. Lack 

of unified command in air operations in Southeast Asia was arguably a key 

consideration leading to the JFACC concept as outlined in the 

Goldwater-Nichols Act,12 JCS Pub 26, Joint Doctrine for Theater Counterair 

Operations,13 and the current Joint Pub 3-56.1, Command and Control for 

Joint Air Operations.14 Refinement of the JFACC concept came to fruition in 

Desert Storm. General Horner’s command and control was effective for a 

2 
number of reasons. The capability of General Horner’s tactical air control 

system to convert joint force commander (JFC) guidance into explicit aircraft 

missions was a principal reason. More precisely, the tactical air control 

center’s15 ability to control the sorties in today’s war while coordinating the 

specific missions for tomorrow’s war was crucial to the success of the JFACC 

command and control. 

Although it can be argued that the current C2 approach to airpower has not 

been stressed, it seems to be a logical extension of the theoretically and 

historically sound tenet of centralized control. Today’s notional JFACC fights 

the air portion of the theater campaign primarily through his AOC16 which 

disseminates targeting and other guidance via the air tasking order (ATO).17 

The combat operations division of the AOC, through a number of channels, 

can add, delete, or modify missions on the current-day ATO. Combat 

operations may add or delete sorties through direct unit contact. They may 

alter airborne missions through ABCCC or airborne warning and control 

system (AWACS) aircraft. 

RTIC offers a much-improved ability to modify missions and a 

correspondingly enhanced C2 flexibility for the modern JFACC. US 

reconnaissance and sensor capabilities are tremendous. Likewise, US 

information processing and information flow capabilities are extraordinary 

and available, though many are not yet operational. These sensor and 

information transfer capabilities tied with current fighter and weapons 

technologies offer capabilities to today’s JFACC that were only imagined by 

the warriors of Desert Storm. They can provide an advantage in 

“observation-orientation-decision-action” (OODA)18 cycle times over any 

available to potential adversaries. An appropriate C2 architecture, however, is 

needed to fully exploit the capabilities presented by RTIC. 

This thesis provides a three-pronged analysis to identify an organizational 

structure that can properly engage RTIC possibilities and take full advantage 

of the impact that real-time and near-real-time (NRT) information into the 

cockpit can have on airpower targeting. The first two portions of this analysis 

explore the current air tasking process and describe the capabilities of today’s 

sensors, information processing, data links, and shooters. The third segment 

examines a fusion of the two. 

Chapter 2 examines the current air tasking process. An understanding of 

joint air operations development, plans and the planning process, targeting, 

the air tasking cycle, and the command, control, communications, computers, 

and intelligence (C4I) requirements necessary to link these together provides 

the foundation for further RTIC analysis. Understanding today’s air tasking 

process in the context of AOC operations provides a basis for exploring 

JFACC flexibility needs, and presents one-half of the background needed to 

understand the potential offered by RTIC. 

Chapter 3 explores the second half of this background—current 

capabilities. It provides descriptions of current US reconnaissance systems 

and information transfer abilities. This section describes several recent 

demonstrations of sensor-to-shooter capabilities that bear directly on RTIC 

3 
organizational structures. It presents the nodes of the theater air control 

system—specifically, the reconnaissance sensors and weapon systems—and 

the C2 structure that links these together to point out the potential of RTIC 

and the need for a revised C2 architecture. The chapter closes by affirming 

the continuing need for centralized C2 with decentralized execution. 

Chapter 4 articulates the advantages gained by superimposing the 

sensor-to-shooter features described in the third chapter over portions of the 

current air tasking process detailed in the second chapter. It also defines 

organizational changes that will enable the supposed “real-time central 

control, coordination, and integration of ongoing air operations” (emphasis 

added)19 ascribed to the Gulf War to actually take place in real time. 

Finally, chapter 5 moves slightly beyond the thesis’s self-imposed confines 

laid out in the beginning of this chapter and briefly looks at RTIC 

architecture possibilities beyond the near-term future. 

Notes 

1. Capt Daniel E. Johnson, operations officer, Combined Imagery Exploitation Facility 

(CIEF), US Space Command; Warrant Officer Michael E. Waliohn, Canadian Forces CIEF 

NCOIC; and TSgt David A. Grubbs, CIEF Team B Exploitation NCOIC; interviewed by author, 

Combined Intelligence Center, Peterson AFB, Colo., 4–5 April 1996. The significance of this 

time is that it is measured in hours, not seconds or minutes. Three hours represents a realistic 

period for processing and transmitting U-2 material. Actual processing times, however, are 

classified. 

2. Craig Covault, “Joint-STARS Patrols Bosnia,” Aviation Week & Space Technology, 19 

February 1996, 48–49; and Maj Christopher H. Frasier, 11th Space Warning Squadron, Falcon 

AFB, Colo., interviewed by author, 4 January 1996. JSTARS combines synthetic aperture radar 

imaging with moving target indicator data to provide high resolution radar images. This allows 

JSTARS crews to differentiate between stopped vehicles and moving traffic. Furthermore, 

crews can determine whether vehicles are wheeled or tracked by measuring Doppler signatures 

from the advancing and receding treads of individual vehicles. Current Bosnian missions use 

such high resolution radar images to typically scan areas as small as 2 x 4 kilometers (1.2 x 2.5 

nautical miles) in size. DSP and Rivet Joint-supplied coordinates of a Scud launch ellipse allow 

JSTARS crews to focus their efforts in such a small area and track specific vehicles found 

within this area. 

3. Combat Air Forces Mission Need Statement 315-92, Mission Need Statement for 

Real-Time Information in the Cockpit (RTIC), 26 April 1994. 

4. Air Force Manual (AFM) 1-1, Basic Aerospace Doctrine of the United States Air Force, vol. 

1, March 1992, 8. 

5. Primarily Joint Pub 3-56.1, Command and Control for Joint Air Operations, 14 

November 1994. 

6. Cost considerations immediately negate any notion of all fighter, bomber, and attack 

aircraft being fully equipped to perform RTIC missions—those requiring off-board voice and 

data information for retargeting. Much of the RTIC capability available in the near term is 

oriented toward multiseat aircraft employing precision guided munitions (PGM), or single-seat 

PGM-capable aircraft that remain survivable at medium to high altitude in all threat 

environments. RTIC capabilities allowing workloads that do not compromise pilot safety during 

low-altitude, high-threat missions that may entail PGM retargeting will likely be unavailable 

in the near term. F-15E, F-117, and PGM-capable B-1 and B-2 aircraft would be well suited for 

RTIC missions. 

4 
7. This is a slight adaptation of the unity of command principle of war, defined as 

“Ensur[ing] unity of effort for every objective under one responsible commander,” found in AFM 

1-1, vol. 1, 1. 

8. AFM 1-1, vol. 1, 8. 

9. Gulf War Air Power Survey, vol. 1, Planning and Command and Control (Washington, 

D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1993), pt. 2:7. Hereafter cited as GWAPS. 

10. TACS now referred to as the theater air control system. 

11. GWAPS, 329. 

12. Formally titled, “The Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986.” 

13. JCS Pub 26, Joint Doctrine for Theater Counterair Operations, resulted from a joint 

doctrine pilot program established in 1982 by the Joint Chiefs. In 1985, the commander in chief 

of the European Command (CINCEUR) formally submitted to the chiefs a joint doctrine for 

theater counterair operations. One element of this proposed doctrine was the concept of the 

JFACC, an officer appointed by the theater or JFC to plan and coordinate a jointly fought air 

campaign. On 21 February 1986, the chiefs approved CINCEUR’s proposal as JCS Publication 

26. 

14. Joint Pub 3-56.1 provides fundamental principles and doctrine for the command and 

control of joint air operations throughout the range of military operations. It lays out JFACC 

responsibilities and a notional JFACC organization. 

15. The TACC of the Gulf War is today’s air operations center (AOC). 

16. AOC, joint AOC, or combined AOC. 

17. The acronym ATO is used throughout this thesis to represent the air tasking order as 

used during Operation Desert Storm as well as tasking directives such as the integrated 

tasking order used by US forces, Korea, and the air tasking message used during Operation 

Deliberate Force in Bosnia. 

18. Col John R. Boyd, “A Discourse on Winning and Losing,” a collection of unpublished 

briefings and essays (Maxwell AFB, Ala.: Air University Library, August 1987), Document No. 

M-U 30352-16, no. 7791, 2; and Maj David S. Fadok, John Boyd and John Warden: Air Power’s 

Quest for Strategic Paralysis (Maxwell AFB, Ala.: Air University Press, February 1995), 16. 

Colonel Boyd contends that all rational human behavior, individual or organizational, can be 

depicted as a continual cycling through four distinct tasks—observation, orientation, decision, 

and action. Boyd refers to this decision-making cycle as the OODA loop. Using this construct, 

the crux of winning vice losing becomes the relational movement of opponents through their 

respective OODA loops. The winner will be whomever repeatedly observes, orients, decides, 

and acts more rapidly (and accurately) than the enemy. 

19. GWAPS, 139. 

5

Chapter 2 

The Air Tasking Process Today 

The campaign objective, together with its relationships to strategic and tactical objectives, is the paramount consideration in every campaign. . . . Orchestration of 

aerospace missions into an effective campaign in the face of peculiar and often 

rapidly changing situations comprises the airman’s operational art. 

—Air Force Manual 1-1, 

Basic Aerospace Doctrine of the 

United States Air Force, Volume 1 

The air tasking process begins with planning at the strategic level. 

Strategic objectives connect to tactical force employment through planning at 

the operational level which focuses on operational art—the employment of 

military forces to attain strategic and/or operational objectives through the 

design, organization, integration, and conduct of strategies, campaigns, major 

operations, and battles.1 This process concludes at the tactical level with the 

employment of units in combat. 

Knowledge of five areas within this overarching air tasking process is 

critical to an understanding of the full process (fig. 1). First, the overall 

concept of joint air operations development involves the translation of the 

joint force mission into a joint air operations plan. Second, this plan and the 

planning process encompass research into the operational environment, the 

determination of objectives, the identification of a clearly defined strategy, 

and an assessment of center(s) of gravity (COG). Third, a joint targeting 

process matches the objectives and guidance promulgated in the JFACC’s 

plan with inputs from intelligence and operations personnel to select specific 

targets and target sets and to identify the forces needed to achieve desired 

objectives against those targets. Fourth, a joint air tasking cycle provides for 

the effective and efficient employment of available air assets. Fifth, 

appropriate command, control, communications, computers, and intelligence 

(C4I) resources provide the connectivity to ensure the air tasking process is 

not simply a linear process, beginning with the JFC’s theater campaign plan 

and ending with bombs on target, but a cyclical one involving constant 

feedback and continuously updated taskings. Further discussion of these five 

areas will clarify the air tasking process in total. 

7 
Figure 1. The Air Tasking Process 

Concept of Joint Air Operations Development 

Planning for joint air operations begins with understanding the joint force 

mission.2 The JFC’s mission statement expresses what the joint force must 

accomplish and why. It is the driving force for all detailed planning that 

follows and is based on the commander’s strategic appreciation of the various 

factors—political, economic, military, and social—affecting his area of 

responsibility (AOR).3 It is also the articulation of the strategic and 

operational objectives needed to accomplish the mission and forms the basis 

for determining components’ objectives. 

The JFACC uses the JFC mission, strategic appreciation, and objectives to 

devise an estimate of the situation and an appropriate concept of air 

operations. This concept of air operations bridges the gap between 

JFC-delineated objectives and the formulation of a course of action (COA). 

When the JFACC’s COA is approved by the JFC, it becomes the basic concept 

for subsequent air operations and states what will be done. The how is laid 

out in the joint air operations plan and supporting plans such as the master 

air attack plan (MAAP), the air defense plan, and the airspace control plan. 

The JFACC provides daily guidance to the AOC to ensure air operations 

effectively support the joint force objectives while retaining sufficient 

flexibility to adjust to the dynamics inherent in military operations. AOC 

personnel use this guidance to continually refine the MAAP and supporting 

orders, specifically, the air operations order, the airspace control order, and 

the air tasking order. The ATO provides the primary vehicle for 

disseminating the who, when, and where of joint air operations while the 

AOC maintains responsibility for updates and revisions to the current-day, or 

8

execution-day, ATO. This ATO, however, is not the plan, but one product in 

the air operations planning process. 

Joint Air Operations Plans and the Planning Process 

The JFC normally assigns a JFACC responsibility for joint air operations 

planning.4 The JFACC, in turn, develops a joint air operations plan to employ 

that portion of the air effort made available to him for accomplishing the 

JFC’s objectives. This plan documents the JFACC’s scheme for integrating 

and coordinating joint air operations. 

Five phases—operational environment research, objective determination, 

strategy identification, COGs identification, and the joint air operations plan 

development—make up the normal joint air operations planning process. 

Though the phases are not required to be completed in order, each phase 

produces an end product, and at some point, the phases must be integrated 

and the products of each phase must be verified for coherence. The final 

product is the joint air operations plan which details how joint air operations 

integrate with and support the JFC’s theater campaign plan. 

Operational environment research applies Sun Tzu’s dictum: “Know the 

enemy and know yourself; in a hundred battles you will never be in peril.”5 

Today’s phrase for Sun Tzu’s maxim, and the product of this phase, is 

intelligence preparation of the battle space (IPB). Operational environment 

research, like IPB, focuses on gaining information about both friendly and 

enemy capabilities, intentions, and doctrine, and the environment in which 

the operations will take place in order to reduce uncertainties. Its intent is to 

maximize understanding of the opponent, the theater of operations, and the 

friendly forces available to accomplish the JFC’s objective. 

Objective determination is arguably the most crucial of the five phases. 

Clearly defined and quantifiable objectives that contribute to the 

accomplishment of the JFC’s operation result from this phase. These joint air 

objectives flow from the JFC’s objectives and should complement other 

components’ objectives. More than land and maritime power, airpower in 

conjunction with the exploitation of space-based systems can directly impact 

the strategic level of war and can do so in an integrated or independent 

manner, simultaneously or sequentially. The air objectives at each level must 

support the objectives of the higher level and ultimately support the JFC’s 

objectives to ensure unity of effort. 

Strategy identification produces a clearly defined joint air strategy 

statement. The strategy states how the JFACC plans to exploit joint air 

capabilities and forces to support the theater objectives of the JFC. The joint 

air operations plan is how the JFACC communicates, promulgates, and 

articulates this strategy. 

Center(s) of gravity identification is noted in two definitions. Carl von 

Clausewitz defines COGs as “the hub of all power and movement, on which 

9 
everything depends. . . . the point against which all our energies should be 

directed.”6 Joint Pub 1-02 updates the definition slightly stating that centers 

of gravity are “those characteristics, capabilities, or localities from which a 

military force derives its freedom of action, physical strength, or will to 

fight.”7 Both definitions point to the desired product of this phase—the 

identification of those enemy COGs that could be defeated to satisfy the JFC’s 

strategic, operational, and tactical objectives and those friendly COGs to be 

defended. The COGs of interest to the JFC and JFACC are those that, if 

defeated, may have the most decisive results. Airpower has a unique ability to 

attack many of the COGs from the third dimension throughout the AOR, to 

engage target sets associated with each COG, and to engage these targets 

simultaneously as well as sequentially. 

Joint air operations plan development delivers the actual air operations 

plan detailing how joint air operations support the JFC’s campaign plan. This 

plan is based on JFC guidance. It integrates the air effort in achieving JFC 

objectives. It accounts for current and potential enemy offensive and 

defensive threats. The plan indicates necessary phasing of air operations in 

relation to the JFC’s operational phasing and in relation to specific air 

phases. The plan identifies objectives and targets by priority order, describing 

the order in which they should be attacked, the desired results, and the 

weight of effort required to achieve expected results. It details the capabilities 

and forces needed to achieve the previously determined objectives and also 

accounts for systems analysis to identify specific targets that should be 

reattacked to meet the objectives. 

Targeting: The Process and Responsibilities 

Joint Pub 3-0, Doctrine for Joint Operations, describes targeting as “the 

process of selecting targets and matching the appropriate response to them 

taking account of operational requirements and capabilities.”8 This 

straightforward definition is simple, but hardly complete. Targeting is 

certainly not the linear process these few words seem to indicate. Rather, it is 

a cyclical process that operates in the context of friendly requirements and 

capabilities as well as the threats imposed by the adversary. The cycle begins 

with JFC-provided guidance and priorities, and continues with the 

identification of component requirements, the prioritization of these 

requirements, and the acquisition of targets or target sets. It continues with 

actual target attack, and comes full circle with component and JFC 

assessments of the attacks which provide feedback within the cycle, adding 

guidance for future targeting plans. In essence, the continuous targeting cycle 

moves from objectives and guidance and proceeds through execution and 

combat assessment (fig. 2).9 

Targeting matches inputs from intelligence and operations personnel to 

JFC guidance and objectives. Together, this input-guidance mix leads to the 

10 
COMBAT 

ASSESSMENT 

FORCE 

APPLICATION 

WEAPONEERING 

ASSESSMENT 

COMMANDER’S 

OBJECTIVES AND 

GUIDANCE 

EXECUTION 

PLANNING/ 

FORCE 

EXECUTION 

TARGET 

DEVELOPMENT 

Source: Joint Pub 3-56.1, 14 November 1994, IV-1 

Figure 2. Targeting Cycle Phases 

selection of specific targets and the identification of those forces necessary to 

achieve the desired objectives against those targets. 

The JFC may establish and task an organization within staff personnel to 

accomplish broad targeting oversight functions or may delegate the 

responsibility to a subordinate commander (e.g., the JFACC). Typically, the 

JFC organizes a joint targeting coordination board (JTCB),10 which operates 

at the discretion of the JFC who defines its role. It may be an integrating 

center for the targeting effort or it may serve as a JFC-level review 

mechanism. Typically, the JTCB reviews target information, develops 

targeting guidance and priorities, and may prepare and refine joint target 

lists. The JTCB maintains a macrolevel view of the AOR and ensures 

targeting nominations are consistent with the JFC’s campaign plan. 

Likewise, it maintains a complete list of restricted targets, areas where 

special operations forces are operating, and similar areas in need of 

deconfliction to avoid endangering current and future operations. 

The JFC normally delegates the authority for execution planning, 

coordination, and deconfliction associated with joint air targeting to the 

JFACC. It, in turn, must possess a sufficient C2 infrastructure in both 

personnel and equipment. Furthermore, targeting mechanisms dealing with 

detailed planning, weaponeering, and execution are required at the 

component level to facilitate this targeting process. 

11

Synchronization, integration, deconfliction, allocation of forces, and 

weaponeering—matching weapons against target vulnerabilities—are 

essential targeting functions for the JFACC and his staff. All components are 

normally involved in targeting and should establish procedures and 

mechanisms to manage the targeting function.”11 Targets scheduled for 

deliberate attack by component direct support air capabilities/forces should be 

included in the joint ATO, when appropriate, for deconfliction and 

coordination. . . . Therefore, components should provide the JFACC a 

description of their direct support plan through the liaison elements within 

the JAOC.”12 This allows for both coordination and deconfliction between 

each component and within the JFC staff and the JFACC C2 infrastructure. 

Two other specific targeting responsibilities outside the planning, 

coordinating, allocating, synchronizing, and deconfliction previously discussed 

are listed in joint doctrine as JFACC/JFC staff targeting responsibilities.13 

The first is to monitor execution and redirect joint air operations as required. 

The second instructs the JFACC or JFC staff to direct alert joint air 

capabilities/forces for prosecution of real-time targets in support of joint 

forces. Each has a direct bearing on sensor-to-shooter operations. Both occur 

in the execution planning/force execution targeting cycle phase and are the 

ultimate responsibility of the AOC’s combat operations division. 

The Joint Air Tasking Cycle 

To effectively employ the available joint air assets, the JFACC uses a joint 

air tasking cycle. This repetitive process involves six phases to plan, 

coordinate, allocate, and task joint air missions. Phase one, JFC and 

component coordination, produces JFC guidance. Phase two, target 

development, results in the creation of a joint integrated prioritized target list 

(JIPTL). Phase three, weaponeering and allocation, furnishes the MAAP. 

Phase four, ATO development, generates the ATO and its associated special 

instructions (SPINS). Phase five, force execution, leads to combat results. In 

turn, phase six, combat assessment, provides recommendations back to the 

coordination step in phase one. 

This notional air tasking cycle accommodates changing tactical situations, 

revised JFC guidance, and support requests from other component 

commanders. Its phases are very much related to the targeting phases 

depicted in figure 2. In both cases the approach is the same, a systematic 

process matches available forces with targets to achieve operational 

objectives. The JFACC’s air operations center provides the central C2 

structure for accomplishing the planning, developing, and coordinating of the 

air tasking cycle. Figure 3 shows a notional AOC. Two divisions form its core: 

combat plans and combat operations. Combat plans is responsible for 

planning future air operations which includes the responsibility of drafting 

the joint air operations plan to support the JFC’s theater campaign and 

12 
Source: Joint Pub 3-56.1, 14 November 1994, II-6 

Figure 3. Notional JFACC Orgaization (the air operations center) 

building the daily ATO.14 Execution of the daily ATO is carried out by combat 

operations,15 which closely follows current air operations by shifting missions 

from their scheduled times or targets and making other adjustments as the 

situation requires.”16 

Both combat operations and combat plans are integral to the development 

and execution of the ATO. There are usually three ATOs in the air tasking 

cycle at any time: the current or execution-day ATO (today’s plan), the ATO 

in production (tomorrow’s plan), and the ATO in planning (the following day’s 

plan). This standard planning arrangement accordingly follows a three-day or 

72-hour cycle. Combat plans is responsible for planning future air operations. 

It normally develops the air operations strategy and air apportionment 

recommendation and produces the ATO in coordination with the combat 

intelligence division. It supports the ATO development process with 

information on the adversary’s current and future force structure, 

capabilities, and intentions. Combat operations is responsible for monitoring 

and executing current air operations. It normally assumes responsibility for 

the ATO when it is released. 

The air tasking phase specifically critical to the combat operations division 

is phase five, force execution. Real-time flexibility is at a premium during this 

phase. The JFACC, through the combat operations division of the AOC, 

directs the execution and deconflicts all forces made available by the JFC for 

13

the execution-day ATO. Combat operations must be responsive to required 

changes during ATO execution. In-flight reports, initial battle damage 

assessment (BDA), significant weather changes, changing priorities, mission 

aborts, and the identification of time-sensitive targets17 may prompt the 

redirection or retasking of forces before launch or once airborne. During ATO 

execution, combat operations serves as the central agency for revising the 

tasking of individual missions and force packages. It has the attendant 

charge to coordinate and deconflict those changes with the appropriate 

control agencies or components. Current joint doctrine states that “ground or 

airborne command and control platform mission commanders may be 

delegated the authority from the JFACC to redirect sorties/missions made 

available to higher priority targets as necessary.”18 

Command, Control, Communications, 

Computers, and Intelligence (C4I) 

The speed and pace of battle and the agility of forces is continually 

increasing. The commander with the greater ability to evaluate the battlefield 

and expose and exploit an adversary’s vulnerabilities will have the greater 

chance to prevail.”19 These truths were not penned by Sun Tzu or Clausewitz, 

but by the chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS), in his 1993 policy 

memorandum on C2 warfare. Their veracity will likely persist for quite some 

time. TACS currently serves as the JFACC’s vehicle for rapid, agile exposition 

and exploitation of enemy vulnerabilities. 

The TACS is the organization, personnel, procedures, and equipment 

necessary to plan, direct, and control theater air operations and to coordinate 

air operations with other services and allied forces.20 It is the JFACC’s 

primary means of executing assigned duties. It provides the capability for 

centralized control while execution of operations is decentralized to the level 

that permits maximum responsiveness. The AOC, as the senior element of the 

TACS, has the capacity to display the current air and surface situation using 

data from all available sources. It maintains connectivity to various air and 

surface elements of the TACS. The AOC uses the contingency theater 

automated planning system (CTAPS) to produce and disseminate the ATO 

and manage its execution. Through the use of local and remote CTAPS 

terminals, the ground elements of the TACS have an instant computer 

interface capable of transferring time-sensitive operational and intelligence 

information. Similar information is passed from the AOC to air elements such 

as AWACS, ABCCC, and JSTARS via HF, VHF, UHF, SATCOM, tactical 

digital information links (TADIL), and other voice and data links. 

This chapter illustrates the air tasking process as it stands today. Though 

the process works well, it could work better with the integration of RTIC 

technology and the incorporation of an appropriate C2 organizational 

14 
architecture. The following chapter shifts the focus from current airpower 

command and control to current and near-term sensor-to-shooter capability. 

Notes 

1. Joint Pub 5-0, Doctrine for Planning Joint Operations, 13 April 1995, I-2. 

2. Joint Pub 3-56.1, Command and Control for Joint Air Operations, 14 November 1994, 

III-1. 

3. AOR is defined in Joint Pub 1-02, Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and 

Associated Terms, 23 March 1994, as a defined area of land in which responsibility is 

specifically assigned to the commander of the area for the development and maintenance of 

installations, control of movement, and the conduct of tactical operations involving troops 

under the commander’s control, along with parallel authority to exercise these functions.” AOR 

is sometimes used synonymously with joint operations area and is defined as “that portion of 

an area of conflict in which a joint force commander conducts military operations pursuant to 

an assigned mission and the administration incident to such military operations.” 

4. Joint Pub 3-56.1, III-2. 

5. Samuel B. Griffith, ed., Sun Tzu: The Art of War (London: Oxford University Press, 

1971), 84. 

6. Carl von Clausewitz, On War, ed. and trans. by Michael Howard and Peter Paret 

(Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1989), 595–96. 

7. Joint Pub 1-02, 63. 

8. Joint Pub 3-0, Doctrine for Joint Operations, 1 February 1995, III-25. 

9. Joint Pub 3-56.1, IV-1. 

10. Joint Pub 3-0, III-26. 

11. Ibid. 

12. Joint Pub 3-56.1, IV-2-3. 

13. Ibid., IV-3. 

14. Ibid., II-7. 

15. Ibid. 

16. Ibid. 

17. Time-sensitive targets are defined in Joint Pub 1-02 as “those targets requiring 

immediate response because they pose (or will soon pose) a clear and present danger to friendly 

forces or are highly lucrative, fleeting targets of opportunity.” 

18. Joint Pub 3-56.1, IV-11. 

19. Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Memorandum of Policy No. 30, Command and 

Control Warfare, 8 March 1993, 4. 

20. Air Combat Command Instruction 13-AOC, Operational Procedures—Air Operations 

Center, vol. 3, 1 June 1995, 16. 

15

Chapter 3 

Sensor-to-Shooter Capability 

First, we must design our forces to collect all the information possible about potential 

adversaries. Second, we must shorten the time it takes the collected intelligence to reach 

the weapons system. Third, we must get the intelligence to the warfighter in a userfriendly format that allows the warfighter to employ weapons in a timely manner. 

—Lt Col C. R. Davis, USAF 

Airborne Reconnaissance: The Leveraging 

Tool For Our Future Strategy 

Effective employment of air-to-surface airpower has always required an 

ability to identify and locate targets. This is nothing new. From spies in enemy 

territory, to pilots’ eyes, to airborne electromagnetic sensors, to space-based 

satellite reconnaissance systems, putting bombs on target to achieve tactical, 

operational, or strategic effects has relied on the process of converting sensed 

data into useful information—information that is necessary for planning and 

conducting combat operations from the air. Reconnaissance is naturally a 

primary element of this process. The remainder of this process involves both the 

data-to-information conversion and the movement of appropriately formatted 

information from the reconnaissance platform to the attacking weapon 

system. 

Also not new is the quest for more rapid transmission of the sensed 

targeting information from the sensor to the shooter. Col John R. Boyd’s1 

discussion of an observation-orientation-decision-action cycle or OODA loop in 

many ways reflects similar thoughts expressed by Carl von Clausewitz in his 

classic On War. These same thoughts were expressed by Lt Gen Howell M. Estes 

III, director for operations, JCS J-3. Seeing the enemy, taking action before the 

enemy can react is what it’s all about . . . that’s called getting inside the enemy’s 

decision loop. . . . Improving [our abilities on the battlefield] is going to be 

dependent on refining ways to get inside of this loop. An important way to do 

this is to gather the right imagery and to quickly get it to somebody that can do 

something with it. This is the challenge that we all face.2 

To fully comprehend the advantages to be gained by direct sensorto-shooter RTIC operations, one must understand the capabilities provided by 

current reconnaissance systems and the processing that transforms sensed 

data into useable information. With these fundamentals established, this 

chapter proceeds into current RTIC capabilities and concludes with a 

discussion of the continuing need for command and control. 

17 
Reconnaissance Systems 

Throughout the history of warfare, commanders have sought to achieve a 

better understanding of the battlefield situation than that of their enemies. 

Friendly agents in enemy territory provided one means toward that end. 

Advantages gained through observations from some high elevation or 

overlooking promontory offered another. The better views offered by higher 

terrain were augmented by those from tethered observation balloons as early 

as 1792 when the French employed them against Austrian-Prussian forces at 

Valmy.3 The airplane raised observation to new heights—literally and 

figuratively—during the Italian invasion of Libya in 1911 and soon after over 

the battlefields of World War I.4 

Many of the “reconnaissance systems” used during the First World War 

and before remain viable today; spies and eyes serve as prime examples. 

Today’s intelligence agents, though certainly more technologically 

sophisticated than their past counterparts, serve many of the same functions. 

It is the eyes of special operations forces (SOF) that are in many ways the 

same primary sensors used by the cavalry troops of the Napoleonic era. 

Numerous means of gathering enemy information, however, have advanced 

considerably since earlier days. Once inconceivable, systems such as national 

satellites, DSP satellites, defense meteorological satellite program (DMSP) 

satellites, U-2s, unmanned aerial vehicles (UAV), RC-135 Rivet Joints, 

RC-135 Cobra Balls, E-8 JSTARS, and E-3A AWACS, which can provide 

instantaneous or NRT information, exist today. 

There are a variety of ways reconnaissance systems may be categorized to 

aid a discussion of their capabilities. Systems once clearly delineated as 

national, theater, or tactical,5 now have missions and produce information 

that no longer fit into a distinct category. The terms national, theater, and 

tactical no longer provide an adequate tool for clearly categorizing 

reconnaissance systems, just as the terms strategic and tactical rapidly blur 

when applied to modern aircraft capabilities. Grouping systems by type of 

information provided—electro-optical (EO), infrared (IR), synthetic aperture 

radar (SAR), moving target indication (MTI), COMINT, ELINT, HUMINT, 

IMINT, and SIGINT6—is straightforward. This arrangement, however, 

becomes cumbersome for illustrating the relationship between reconnaissance 

collection, data processing, information dissemination, and end user 

application. A more useful classification scheme separates reconnaissance 

into space systems, aerial systems, and surface systems. 

Space Systems. Space systems have become an integral part of the national 

military forces providing support across the operational continuum and at all 

levels of war. Space systems provide information that allows commanders to 

assess the situation, develop concepts of operations, and disseminate changes to 

their forces quickly.7 National reconnaissance, surveillance, and targeting 

acquisition (RSTA) systems provide support to the National Command 

Authorities (NCA) and are also of great utility to combatant commanders. 

18 
Information from national systems is provided to the JFC via service 

component tactical exploitation of national capabilities program (TENCAP) 

systems.8 Discussion of the direct role national space assets may have in the 

collection of reconnaissance or surveillance information is beyond the scope of 

this study. Several nonnational space systems, however, have a direct bearing 

on possible RTIC employment and are discussed below. 

Defense support program (DSP) satellites provide one source of IR data to 

USSPACECOM’s tactical event system. This system is composed of three 

independent elements: attack and launch early reporting to theater (ALERT), 

joint tactical ground station (JTAGS), and tactical detection and reporting 

(TACDAR). Together, these elements ensure theater forces receive assured 

and timely warning of theater ballistic missile (TBM) launches.9 The 

signature of the Iraqi Scud missiles proved to be the principal means of 

launch detection during Operation Desert Storm.10 DSP satellites successfully 

detected all 88 Scud launches during that conflict. They also provided Space 

Command with observations that were then used to calculate the 

approximate location of the missile’s launch site.11 

The defense meteorological support program (DMSP) provides all 

important real-time and NRT weather information. Not only do these 

satellites allow the determination of areas and heights of cloud coverage, they 

also provide the raw data needed to resolve often crucial IR detection ranges 

for forward looking infrared (FLIR), LANTIRN, and other IR systems. 

Aerial Systems. Aerial systems are the primary source of RSTA for the 

JFC. All the services possess and operate these systems, which have varying, 

but complementary, capabilities, limitations, and operating characteristics.12 

The RC-135 Rivet Joint, and to a lesser degree the Navy’s EP-3, carry a vast 

array of passive ELINT and SIGINT collectors to provide real-time threat 

warning, target cueing, and other classified functions via the tactical 

information broadcast service (TIBS) or via tactical receive equipment and 

related applications (TRAP). Rivet Joint broadcasts this information to 

JSTARS and AWACS and, via satellite relay, to numerous users including the 

highest levels of the national command authority. A modified version of Rivet 

Joint, Cobra Ball, includes additional reconnaissance capabilities to include 

systems operating in the IR arena. 

The E-8C JSTARS employs a steerable 25-foot antenna that incorporates 

side-looking airborne radar, SAR, and wide area surveillance/MTI radar modes 

to provide locations, numbers, vehicle differentiation, and direction of movement 

of forces and weapon systems.13 It also has the ability to image surface-to-air 

missile sites, airfields, roadways, and bridges on a real-time basis.14 JSTARS 

can process the data it obtains either on board and data link the processed 

information to the requester, or data link the data directly to its deployable 

ground system where the processing is completed. In either case, the 

information—including SAR imagery—can be sent directly to the user in near 

real time.15 JSTARS employs Joint Tactical Information Distribution System, a 

surveillance and control data link (SCDL), or its onboard SATCOM system for 

information updates, intelligence dissemination, and cross-cueing with AWACS, 

19 
Rivet Joint, EP-3, ES-3, and other airborne and ground sites within and 

beyond line-of-sight. 

E-3A AWACS combines a powerful airborne radar and numerous radio and 

data-link relays to merge air defense radar imagery into a coherent picture of 

the air battle. An important surveillance capability relevant to RTIC 

command and control is AWACS’s ability to provide a real-time update of 

selected airborne weapon systems directly to, among other places, the AOC. 

UAVs bring an additional reconnaissance capability to the theater. The 

CIA-operated Gnat 750-45 Lofty View and the Defense Airborne Reconnaissance Office (DARO) Tier II Predator reportedly carry a 450–500-pound 

payload consisting of a synthetic aperture radar with one foot resolution, 

three EO or IR sensors in a chin turret, and a wideband satellite data-link 

antenna. The Gnat can fly extended distances and still stay on station 24 

hours. The SAR, with its 150 degrees of azimuth and 40 degrees of elevation, 

can cover an 8,000-foot swath at 25,000-foot altitude.16 The combination of 

long loiter times, a multiple sensor array, and a data-link capability allow it 

to transmit “real-time data in the form of moving video instead of the still 

pictures sent through UHF communications.”17 Other UAVs such as the 

Pioneer and Hunter are in the field. Still others, such as the Tier II+ Global 

Hawk and Tier III- DarkStar, may very soon add stealth, 24+-hour loiter, 

MTI, SIGINT, wide band data and communications relay, and other 

capabilities to those of the now operational Lofty View and Predator.18 

The U-2 uses an ASARS-2 (advanced synthetic aperture radar system) to 

digitally format radar images for monitoring target activity to more than 100 

nautical miles from the aircraft’s track. It also has the capability to collect IR 

imagery or employ the senior year electro-optical reconnaissance system 

(SYERS) for photographic imagery. Additionally, the U-2 contains extensive 

COMINT and ELINT collection suites. Though not all of the U-2’s diverse 

products can be transmitted real time, many can. Contingency Automated 

Reconnaissance System sites receive data-linked collections which can be 

processed and forwarded to various users in near real time. 

Surface Systems. One of the principal missions of special operations 

forces is special reconnaissance (SR). SR complements national and theater 

intelligence collection assets by obtaining specific, well-defined, and 

time-sensitive information. It may complement other collection methods 

where there are constraints of weather, terrain masking, hostile countermeasures, or other systems availability. SR is a human intelligence function 

that places the United States or US-controlled “eyes on target” in hostile, 

denied, or politically sensitive territory.19 

The Significance of Intelligence Processing 

Raw reconnaissance data, even when comprehensive and unquestionably 

accurate, are of little use to the war fighter. The data, in its most basic form, 

20 
may be little more than a multitude of ones and zeros in the case of digitally 

transmitted satellite information. It may be a wonderfully clear photographic 

image of some location, but without additional, vital information such as the 

location of the photo, its orientation relative to north, and its time and date of 

origin, the image might be useless. 

To be helpful this data must be processed into useable information. Imagery 

taken from an aerial or space-based sensor generally requires modifications in 

order to be useful. Several “hits” of IR data must be processed to differentiate 

between some ground explosion and a ballistic missile launch. Still more data is 

needed to determine critical information such as missile launch point and 

expected impact area. ELINT data must be meshed with known pulse repetition 

frequency (PRF) information, and perhaps even geolocation information, to 

determine that a radio frequency emitter is a hostile surface-to-air missile target 

tracking radar, not a less threatening early warning radar or some 

communications relay site. Similar processing is needed to transform COMINT, 

HUMINT, and SIGINT data into useable information. 

What drives the significance of intelligence processing in an RTIC 

environment are combat circumstances necessitating the redirection of 

planned sorties. An obvious first concern is the priority of a newly identified 

“pop-up” target. Only those assets planned, or fragged, against lower priority 

targets will be redirected against pop-up targets of higher priority.20 

Many situations call for sortie retaskings. Some demand an immediate 

response by a large and diverse package of weapon systems. Others are less 

urgent or call for a much more limited diversion of aerial assets. Each of the 

four scenarios offered here are not meant to be inclusive nor detailed; rather 

they should illustrate merely a handful of plausible situations where effective 

retasking of airpower assets would be advantageous. 

Scenario One. Aircraft targeted against a high priority target abort their 

mission due to poor weather, lost tanker support, launch runway closure, et 

cetera. Other aircraft, originally planned against a lower priority target, are 

redirected against the first aircraft’s higher priority target. 

Scenario Two. A package en route to a highly defended target loses its 

suppression of enemy air defenses (SEAD) support so it is retasked to a less 

well-defended target. Similarly, an ELINT collector’s discovery of a previously 

unidentified threat in an area targeted by a non-SEAD supported, nonstealthy 

package forces a redirection of that package toward a less threatening 

environment. 

Scenario Three. A pop-up TBM threat21 is identified. As in the first 

scenario, this threat may be attacked by a shooter originally tasked to destroy 

a lower priority target. 

Scenario Four. The commander in chief or JFC designates particular 

“fleeting targets” as high priority targets. An Internal Look ’96 exercise input 

gave the following scenario: HUMINT sources in theater identified a truck 

convoy being loaded with naval mines at a previously suspected, but as yet 

untargeted, weapons storage area. The convoy departed the area for a nearby 

21 
port facility to transfer the mines to awaiting vessels. The situation led to the 

retargeting of missions against both the convoy and the naval vessels. 

Sortie retaskings in such scenarios or similar situations demand 

specialized intelligence processing. Threat briefings based on a planned 

ingress routing may become instantly worthless as a package is redirected. 

Target photos that were once vital, likewise lose their value as a mission is 

retargeted. An airborne crew cannot afford to return to base for new target 

materials. Rather, in an environment of dynamic “on the fly” retargeting, 

sufficient mission materials must find their way to the cockpit, both to ensure 

target destruction and to ensure crew survival. Near-real-time imagery that 

is hours old may be sufficient in some retargeting scenarios but does not 

suffice when minutes count as in scenarios three and four. Target geolocation 

information that is 15 to 20 minutes old may allow a Scud TEL to evade 

attack when real-time information can help assure a kill. 

RTIC would allow aircrews far more effective battle space awareness and 

weapons employment in a retargeting situation. Not only would aircrew 

effectiveness be enhanced, but RTIC could provide the JFACC with an 

observe-orient-decide-act cycle far more condensed than any before. To many, 

the capabilities espoused by RTIC—real-time imagery transfer to the cockpit, 

updated flight routing information, current threat intelligence, direct feed of 

targeting coordinates and weapons delivery parameters, and the like—seem 

plausible enough, but only in a not-too-near future. This future, however, is 

here, today, right now. 

Information Transfer: The “Talon” Possibilities 

Modern theater air warfare operations require the capability to process, 

correlate, and display national as well as organic near-real-time and real-time 

information into the cockpit or directly to advanced weapons systems, and 

real-time information out of the cockpit to enhance combat execution and 

aircrew survival.22 

The key to RTIC is getting the right information, to the right shooter, at the 

right time. This is the goal of the Air Force Tactical Exploitation of National 

Capabilities Talon Shooter program. More specifically, Talon Shooter focuses 

on delivering enhanced real-time and NRT intelligence to and from aircraft 

cockpits, and to the weapons carried on aircraft. In effect, Talon Shooter 

“seeks to develop automated information update capabilities to bridge the gap 

from the aircrew pre-flight briefing to the full mission flight profile (ingress, 

over target, and egress).”23 

The potential mission execution benefits of RTIC enhancements are 

significant, including such things as (1) threat avoidance updates; (2) imagery 

of targets; (3) navigational updates; (4) target location accuracy updates; (5) 

en route and target area weather updates; (6) precision munitions and 

22 
weapons computer updates; (7) retargeting updates; and (8) passing 

immediate BDA from the shooter to rear C2 elements to influence the current 

and next ATO cycle, and similar execution information which can increase the 

likelihood of mission success and aircrew survival.24 

Talon Shooter has demonstrated the validity of the RTIC concept through 

Project Strike I, an Air Combat Command-Space Warfare Center cooperative 

effort conducted in July 1995. Strike I demonstrated significant opportunities 

in five areas: (1) the ability to tailor intelligence to support strike missions in 

progress; (2) the communications-dissemination architecture and connectivity 

to pass data to in-flight aircraft; (3) the interfaces and the actual onboard 

processing capability to display and apply the passed data; (4) the ability to 

conduct a successful target strike based on the use of the data provided; and 

(5) an AOC capability for the JFACC to tailor intelligence, including imagery 

and threat data, for direct dissemination to tactical platforms.25 

The completion of Strike I objectives, exemplified by successes in each of the 

five areas above, moved the project from demonstration status into research, 

development, and acquisition (RD&A). Further research will be carried out 

through a Project Strike II. Acquisition is already under way for quick reaction 

capability (QRC) sets to allow for the modification of six B-1B Lancers to a 

configuration similar to that used for the B-1B portion of Strike I. RTIC is not 

an eccentric concept from some distant ethereal realm, but a demonstrated 

capability available today. 

Though Strike I demonstrated the validity of employing real-time 

information into the cockpit, it did not directly address an overall concept of 

employing RTIC operations. The overriding concern for these operations is to 

provide the necessary mission information to aircrews that will allow 

weapons delivery on target inside the normal mission planning cycle. The 

affected time frame ranges from a mission added to the execution-day ATO 

where target priority and time on target (TOT) considerations preclude 

routine mission planning to a retasked airborne mission already en route to 

a target or flying combat alert. Necessary mission materials may vary with 

the specific weapon systems, however, routinely they would encompass 

ingress and egress routing, en route and target area weather, en route and 

target area threats, routing information (coordinates, charts, fuel 

considerations), weaponeering information (attack parameters), and 

targeting information (IR, radar, or photo imagery). “RTIC operations” 

should not bring instantaneous visions of theater-wide aerial auftragstaktik 

or mission-type orders. Though RTIC should improve battle space 

awareness, it does not represent the fruition of any transparent battlefield 

concept. Perhaps in the not so near future, mission-type orders may be viable 

for air operations during a major regional contingency. Given today’s 

technology, however, and the C2 limitations of this technology, airpower 

remains best served by centralized control with decentralized execution 

rather than decentralized control with decentralized execution. 

23 
The Continuing Need for Command and Control 

Air Force Manual (AFM) 1-1, Basic Aerospace Doctrine of the United States 

Air Force, in its discussion of the tenets of aerospace power, describes 

centralized control as the “master tenet.” It elaborates by stating that 

“without centralized control, commanders cannot exploit the speed and 

flexibility of aerospace platforms to concentrate forces—whether in attack or 

defense—from diverse locations on decisive points, establish and enforce 

theater-wide priorities, execute synergistic campaigns, establish appropriate 

balances, or assure persistent attacks.”26 It further states that too much or 

too little centralization has proved to be counterproductive. Too much 

centralization delays responsiveness; too little leads to dissipation of effort.27 

Clearly, RTIC furnishes an opportunity to shift the degree of centralization 

along this continuum. It allows a move toward greater decentralized control 

by providing the prospect of vastly increasing each aircrew’s “information 

domain” to a degree where individual aircrews can make autonomous 

retasking decisions. More likely in the near term, RTIC shifts the degree of 

centralization in the opposite direction. It gives the JFACC, through the AOC 

staff, the tools to more effectively prosecute the JFC’s objectives. 

Longer term shifts toward decentralization, perhaps even radical changes 

to several long-held tenets of aerospace power, are likely, but only after 

potential problems are addressed and overcome. Three tenets of aerospace 

power—priority, synergy, and concentration—seem most at odds with moves 

toward decentralization. AFM 1-1 rightly points out that an air commander’s 

operational priorities should flow from an informed dialogue with the 

combined or joint force commander. Furthermore, such an exchange will 

make it more likely that the JFC will set priorities based on a thorough 

understanding of the enemy’s capabilities, vulnerabilities, and intent, an 

understanding that is essential lest scarce assets be inadvertently risked 

without having a significant impact on the outcome of the conflict.28 

RTIC-inspired decentralization, though offering improved tactical flexibility, 

may reduce the operational- and strategic-level synergistic effects of more 

centralized control. This decentralization, even though individual aircrew 

battle space awareness is at a peak, still may push airpower employment 

back toward the penny packet bane of previous conflicts. 

Other more practical problems associated with moves toward decentralized 

control remain despite resolutions of priority, synergy, and concentration 

problems. Target deconfliction procedures could prove difficult to establish. 

Ensuring appropriate refueling availability and deconfliction would be no 

small task. Also, one cannot assume that the level of aircrew proficiency is 

uniformly high throughout an entire force. The lieutenant who may be 

exceptionally adroit at tactically employing his aircraft may be wholly 

unprepared to take on the decision-making role essential in a decentralized 

control environment. 

24 
The control of airpower, in the future as well as in the past, whether more 

centralized or less, despite the level of technology used or the size of the forces 

involved, should provide the focus for airpower employment. Appropriate 

control remains essential to maximize airpower’s flexibility and versatility, 

ensure its effective concentration, and properly apply airpower’s tenets of 

priority, synergy, balance, and persistence. 

Notes 

1. Col John R. Boyd, USAF, “A Discourse on Winning and Losing,” a collection of 

unpublished briefings and essays (Maxwell AFB, Ala.: Air University Library, August 1987), 

Document No. M-U 30352-16, no. 7791, 2. 

2. “USIS 2000,” video presentation by the US Space Command Combined Intelligence 

Center, Peterson AFB, Colo., April 1996. 

3. Martin van Creveld, Technology and War: From 2000 B.C. to the Present (New York: Free 

Press, 1989), 184. 

4. Ibid. 

5. Dr. Taylor W. Lawrence, “Battlefield Awareness Program Overview,” slides, March 1996, 7. 

6. Capt Daniel E. Johnson, operations officer, Combined Imagery Exploitation Facility, US 

Space Command, interviewed by author. COMINT, ELINT, HUMINT, IMINT, and SIGINT are 

acronyms for communications intelligence, electronics intelligence, human intelligence, 

imagery intelligence, and signals intelligence. 

7. Joint Pub 3-55, Doctrine for Reconnaissance, Surveillance, and Target Acquisition 

Support for Joint Operations (RSTA), 14 April 1993, II-7. 

8. Ibid., II-8. 

9. Capt Shane Scott, USAF, “Parallel Reporting of Theater Ballistic Missiles,” SWC Space 

Tactics Bulletin, Summer 1995, 8. 

10. Defense Science Board Final Report on “Lessons Learned During Operations Desert 

Shield and Desert Storm,” 8 January 1992, 65. (Secret) Information extracted is unclassified. 

11. Gulf War Air Power Survey, vol. 1, Planning and Command and Control (Washington, 

D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1993), pt. 2:247–48. 

12. Joint Pub 3-55, II-3. 

13. Edward H. Kolcum, “Joint-STARS E-8s Return to U.S.; 20-Aircraft Fleet Believed 

Assured,” Aviation Week & Space Technology, 11 March 1991, 20. 

14. Craig Covault, “Joint-STARS Patrols Bosnia,” Aviation Week & Space Technology, 19 

February 1996, 44. 

15. Joint Pub 3-55, III-3. 

16. “Tier 2 UAV Revealed,” Aviation Week & Space Technology, 7 February 1994, 23. 

17. Stacey Evers, “Gnat-750 May Raise Profile of UAVs,” Aviation Week & Space 

Technology, 7 February 1994, 54–55. 

18. Several sources discuss the capabilities of the Tier II+ and Tier III-, both of which are 

currently undergoing testing. David A. Fulghum, “Air Force Prepares New UAV Acquisitions, 

Operations,” Aviation Week & Space Technology, 27 November 1995, 52; and “Predator, 

DarkStar and other Cult Classics,” The Economist, 17 June 1995, 81, proved most valuable. 

19. Joint Pub 3-05, Doctrine for Joint Special Operations, 28 October 1992, II-7. 

20. Lt Col James R. Brungess, USAF, chief of combat operations, CENTCOM Exercise 

Internal Look ’96, interviewed by author, Camp Blanding, Fla., 21 March 1996. The chief of 

combat operations has the authority to retask aircraft based on mission priorities assigned by 

the JFACC based on CINC guidance. 

21. Gulf War Air Power Survey, vol. 2, Operations and Effects and Effectiveness 

(Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1993), pt. 2, chap. 6 details coalition efforts to 

eliminate the Scud threat posed by Iraq against Saudi Arabia and Israel. 

25 
22. Capt Marta Bertoglio, ed., “AFTENCAP Program Plan FY96,” Space Warfare Center, 

Falcon AFB, Colo., Information Cutoff: 20 August 1995, 4–19. (FOUO) Information extracted is 

unclassified. 

23. Ibid., 4–17. Information extracted is unclassified. 

24. Ibid., 4–18. Information extracted is unclassified. 

25. Ibid. 

26. AFM 1-1, Basic Aerospace Doctrine of the United States Air Force, vol. 2, March 1992, 

113. 

27. Ibid. 

28. Ibid., 116. 

26

Chapter 4 

Enhancing JFACC Targeting Flexibility 

[The long lead time in the Air Tasking Order development process] has sometimes 

been overstated. After the ATO was distributed follow-on coordination and revision 

were required, even with accurate and timely BDA. The issue is not whether the ATO 

was useful but rather how it can be improved. This experience points to the need for 

an interactive planning and information dissemination system that can meet the 

time lines imposed by modern warfare. 

—James A. Winnefeld and 

Dana J. Johnson 

Joint Air Operations 

The air tasking process in Operation Desert Storm met the time lines 

imposed on it by the Gulf War, but it may not have the flexibility necessary 

for today’s wars or for those of the future. In its concluding chapter on 

command and control (C2), the Gulf War Air Power Survey (GWAPS) seems to 

concur with James A. Winnefeld and Dana J. Johnson in this statement: 

“Because war is full of surprises, military leaders must try to create and 

maintain command and control systems (composed of personnel, procedures, 

and equipment) that can adapt to the unexpected by sensing, analyzing, and 

then solving the problems which the surprises endemic to war create.”1 

GWAPS notes that “the combat operations division provided real-time central 

control, coordination, and integration of ongoing air operations for the air 

commander.”2 Real time as used here, however, is a far cry from the type of 

“sensing, analyzing, and solving” or OODA cycle times that may be possible 

with today’s sensors, processors, and information flow capabilities. In the 

search for lessons from the Gulf War, authors such as Winnefeld and Johnson 

criticize the air tasking process, particularly the ATO cycle, for its “lack of 

flexibility.”3 A discussion of C2 architecture involves more than a simple 

investigation regarding the sufficiency of the air tasking process in the Gulf 

War. The misconception that air planners require 48 hours to proceed from 

target identification to target neutralization does not invalidate the reality 

that the JFACC has less than optimum flexibility. In the Gulf War, JFACC 

servicing of targets was rapid; today, it can be quicker. JFACC control was 

flexible; today it should be “fluid.” 

27 
Thinking outside the ATO Paradigm 

According to Capt Lyle G. Bien, US Navy, “the JFACC air tasking order . . . 

proved effective in managing the 3,000 daily sorties flown by Coalition air 

forces during Desert Storm, but the 48-hour ATO cycle did not permit rapid 

response to mobile targets. In a more dynamic war, only a reduced ATO 

cycle—which appears to be almost physically impossible—or a greater 

reliance on aircraft standing strip or airborne alert will be required.”4 

Captain Bien expresses two opinions that seem prevalent regarding the ATO 

cycle: first, the timeline for ATO production is rigid, and second, mobile 

targeting— or time critical targeting (TCT)—is only accomplished through 

the use of ground or airborne alert assets. The so-called 48-hour air tasking 

process previously laid out in chapter 2 has worked well. It proved effective 

during Desert Shield and Desert Storm; it worked well for operations in 

Bosnia; and its usefulness has been born out in numerous exercises from the 

Central Command’s Internal Look to Ulchi Focus Lens in Korea. General 

Horner’s command and control system during Desert Storm, a C2 system 

based on this ATO process, not only worked well but also showed it could 

adapt quickly to changes in the operational situation.5 Execution-day ATO 

interdiction and strategic attack missions were retargeted based on weather 

intelligence,6 BDA,7 and pop-up Scud notifications.8 Similar retaskings took 

place for air refueling,9 battlefield air interdiction (BAI),10 and close air 

support (CAS)11 missions. The fact that a nominal ATO process is roughly 

based on a 48-hour target nomination and planning cycle with a 24-hour 

execution period does not mean it must operate in some fixed, unalterable 

time frame. In Exercise Tandem Thrust ’92 for example, the ATO cycle 

started just 11 hours prior to execution day and worked well for the numbers 

of participating forces involved. A far more serious misperception, however, 

involves the retasking of available assets within the execution-day ATO. 

Captain Bien asserts the response to mobile targets appearing inside a given 

ATO planning cycle—or more broadly, time critical targets—will force a 

greater reliance on ground or airborne alert. He is mistaken. RTIC provides a 

distinct and far better alternative. 

An examination of an ATO cycle’s time line should facilitate an 

understanding of the potential for RTIC applications. Figure 4 presents a 

notional 48-hour ATO cycle. The center of the figure provides a time reference 

for both the recurring meetings listed on the left and targeting events on the 

right. Figure 5 provides an expanded look into the process, delineating which 

group or meeting generates what product. Both figures indicate that fixed 

target nominations are due a full 40 hours prior to the start of the 24-hour 

execution-day ATO. (Note that “mobile targets” in these two figures refer to 

mobile enemy ground units.) Clearly, an attempt to set aside aircraft by 

scheduling ground or air alert missions to deal with high priority targets 

identified within this 40-hour window is less than ideal. Other options must 

be available. 

28 
Source: CENTCOM Exercise Internal Look ’96 

Figure 4. Notional ATO Cycle 

29 
Source: CENTCOM Exercise Internal Look ’96 

Figure 5. Time Line to Produce an Execution-Day ATO 

30 
The ATO paradigm refers to the concept that the only effective air tasking 

is air tasking done in advance. Notional air taskings as presented in figures 4 

and 5 ideally identify all targets to be attacked in a 24-hour execution period 

some 40+ hours in advance of that ATO’s first launch. Current procedures 

exist to add targets identified inside this 40-hour window to this same ATO. 

Missions added to the ATO during the execution period that can still follow 

routine ground planning procedures still fit this paradigm. 

Thinking beyond this ATO paradigm is the responsibility of the combat 

operations division in the AOC. The COD “supervises the execution of the 

ATO, adjusting and refining as necessary to accommodate battlefield 

dynamics.”12 The chief of combat operations (CCO) not only ensures that the 

air tasking done in advance by combat plans is carried out effectively but also 

retasks missions on the published ATO as needed to thoroughly integrate the 

full scope of the air effort toward the attainment of theater objectives.13 Fleet 

Marine Force Manual (FMFM) 3, Command and Control, appropriately 

summarizes the notion: “The measure of command and control effectiveness is 

simple: either our command and control works faster than the enemy’s 

decision and execution cycle or the enemy will own our command and 

control.”14 

An Air Operations Center Rapid Response Cell 

Current US airpower doctrine delegates the COD of the AOC the 

responsibility for monitoring and executing “current joint air operations.” 

Decisions and actions that apply to the current ATO period are executed 

through the COD which normally assumes responsibility for the joint ATO as 

soon as it is released.15 

Situations requiring retasking are identified to the CCO (senior operations 

duty officer, or SODO, outside USCENTAF and LANTAF). The CCO has 

prime responsibility for monitoring and directing the current air situation.16 

The CCO performs these functions with the assistance from the offensive 

operations branch. Offensive operations consists of a cadre experienced in 

battle management and well versed in doctrine and force application.17 These 

personnel are augmented by offensive duty officers, specialists for each 

deployed weapon system and supporting function. Enlisted duty technicians 

assist the processing of immediate air requests and perform routine flight 

following. 

The CCO, through the offensive operations staff, first decides on the 

necessity for retasking a mission on the published ATO based on the situation 

(such as those characterized by the four scenarios discussed in chapter 3), 

target priority and rapidity of response needed. With that judgment made, 

the suitable shooter availability is determined. Is there a shooter in an 

appropriate phase of flight for retasking? Approaching the IP (initial point for 

beginning an attack) is too late. Does the shooter have an appropriate 

31 
weapons load for the given target? Does the shooter have the necessary fuel to 

get to the target and return to base (RTB) or poststrike refuel? If refueling is 

required, are appropriate tanker assets available? Given the aircraft and its 

weapons load, will the en route and target area weather permit mission 

accomplishment? 

With this information, the CCO chooses one of four actions: Action one. 

Retask no one. The target priority is insufficient to warrant retasking on the 

current ATO or appropriate shooters are unavailable for a sufficiently prompt 

response; Action two. Retask a nonairborne, nonalert mission. The target 

priority is sufficient to warrant retasking a mission on the current ATO, 

however, the situation is acceptably stable to allow some mission planning by 

crews prior to takeoff; Action three. Task an airborne or ground alert 

mission; and, Action four. Retask an airborne mission of lower priority or 

retask an available higher priority mission while retasking a lower priority 

mission(s) to cover the retasked higher priority mission.18 

Each of these four actions can occur, have occurred, and will continue to 

occur without the advantages of RTIC. Mission success, however, specifically 

relating to actions three and four can be in doubt even when conditions are 

heavily in the crews’ favor. Concerning The Great Scud Chase during Desert 

Storm, GWAPS recorded, “It was soon clear that only aircraft flying on 

station over the launch sites could attack the mobile launch platforms before 

they escaped. . . . But even then they could have a difficult time. On 9 

February the current operations log reported, ‘Scud launch-Israel. Two 

F-15Es were on station and saw the launch but were unable to find the 

launcher. Two F-15Es on target immediately—two additional F-15Es closed 

within five minutes. No luck.’”19 Along with information, RTIC brings an 

increased probability for mission success. 

Once again, the overriding concern for RTIC, and consequently for an RTIC 

cell, is to provide the necessary mission information—routing information, en 

route and target area weather, en route and target area threats, weaponeering information, and targeting information—to aircrews allowing weapons 

delivery on target inside the normal mission planning cycle. Action one, no 

retasking, obviates the need for RTIC. Action two, though it requires no 

real-time information into the cockpit, can be supported by the unity of action 

provided by an integral RTIC cell. Tasking an alert mission or retasking an 

en route mission, as called for in actions three and four, truly put the concept 

of an RTIC cell to the test. 

A prime consideration for an RTIC cell is its composition. The driver behind 

its organization is the information it must provide to the aircrews of a 

retasked mission. This calls for five elements in the cell: a mission coordinator 

(MC), aircraft specific mission planners (MP), a photo interpreter (PI), an 

intelligence threats representative (IN), and a weather expert (WX). 

Currently, the responsibility for retasking missions falls to the CCO. This 

should continue as mission retaskings split into two branches: retasked 

missions requiring RTIC and retasked missions that do not. The CCO’s 

“second hat” as RTIC MC follows the airpower tenet of centralized control. 

32 
The creation of an RTIC cell does not obligate the division of execution-day 

ATO mission control currently embodied in the CCO. The MC’s role in an 

RTIC cell would be very much akin to the CCO’s present duties of monitoring 

and directing the current air situation. Specifically, the CCO would determine 

the missions to be retargeted and ensure the appropriate information is 

channeled to the crew. MPs, experts in their particular weapon system, take 

on the responsibility of preparing rerouting and weapon-specific attack profile 

information. The PI’s role, in coordination with the MPs, is to select the 

proper imagery from the appropriate source(s) for transmission to the shooter. 

The MP-PI team ensures that routing information, if needed, is passed on the 

correct scale charts, that radar imagery is omitted if not needed, and that 

photo imagery is presented from the best possible perspectives and scales. 

Essentially the MP-PI team makes certain only a proper amount of 

best-possible, weapon-specific information is delivered to the crew. IN 

supports the MPs by integrating real-time and NRT threat information into 

the retargeting process to assure maximum safety for the crews. WX provides 

input to the MC regarding the viability of retargeting a mission based on en 

route and target area weather. WX also feeds this information to the MP-PI 

team to ensure viable routing and to ensure laser, IR contrast, and other 

weather-based considerations are factored into attack options. 

A second essential consideration is the location of the RTIC cell. The 

current configuration of the combat operations division of the AOC furnishes 

a made-to-order environment for the operations of an RTIC cell. The CCO 

position can take on the parallel responsibilities of the RTIC MC. MP, PI, IN, 

and WX expertise is already resident in the COD though additional personnel 

may be required to augment the RTIC cell depending on the level or effort it 

is expected to assume. Naturally the same concerns over in-theater placement 

of the AOC would apply to an RTIC cell adjunct of the COD. The pros and 

cons of AOC locale and possible alternatives to in-theater placement are 

outside the scope of this thesis. Nonetheless, discussions on either side of this 

debate apply equally as well to the placement of an RTIC cell as they do to 

the location of the AOC. 

With an appropriately staffed air operations center RTIC cell in a theater 

hosting RTIC-capable aircraft, how is airpower targeting affected? Is there or 

should there be an impact on targeting at all? Targeting takes on two 

definitions in Joint Pub 1-02. First, it is simply a process for selecting targets 

and matching the appropriate response to them, taking into account 

operational requirements and capabilities.20 Second, it is more meticulously 

defined as the analysis of enemy situations—relative to the commander’s 

mission, objectives, and capabilities at the commander’s disposal—to identify 

and nominate specific vulnerabilities that, if exploited, will accomplish the 

commander’s purpose by delaying, disrupting, disabling, or destroying enemy 

forces or other resources critical to the enemy.21 A third definition deals with 

targeting’s impact on “the mission cycle.” Targeting is discussed as “a decision 

making process used by commanders to employ forces . . . there are six 

33 
general mission steps: detection, location, identification, decision, execution, 

and assessment.”22 

RTIC introduces significant change to targeting as presented in each of 

these definitions. Matching an appropriate response to a selected target in an 

RTIC environment, as described in the first targeting definition, embraces a 

level of airpower flexibility and versatility considerably beyond that described 

in AFM 1-1.23 In light of the rapid pace of the modern battlefield, and 

especially in light of mobile surface-to-air and TBM threats, RTIC allows the 

JFACC, through his staff and TACS, to retask execution-day ATO missions 

far more effectively than previously possible. In an RTIC environment, a 

retasked crew does not depart blindly from a well-planned mission toward a 

set of coordinates associated with some inadequately described target. 

Instead, they maneuver their aircraft from one well-planned mission to 

another, and they do so with impressive battle space awareness. 

RTIC has a lesser impact on targeting from the second definition’s 

perspective. Analysis of the enemy situations is mostly unaffected, however, 

identifying specific vulnerabilities can change. In situations where the United 

States or its coalition partners do not have a surplus of air assets as arguably 

was the case during Desert Storm, RTIC may allow for the creation of a 

dual-focused target priority system and reduce, even obviate, the need for 

targeting via ground or airborne alert assets. One target priority focus would 

replicate today’s JIPTL. The other focus would rank the priorities of 

additional time critical targets. This second focus would expand the overall 

list of targets based on increased vulnerabilities associated with RTIC 

capabilities. Together, the integration of these two focuses would provide the 

CCO invaluable guidance on retasking missions. 

A look at the impact of RTIC on targeting’s mission cycle—detection, 

location, identification, decision, execution, and assessment—reinforces the 

overriding near-term value of the concept. Of the six steps in this cycle, RTIC 

most directly addresses two: decision and execution. RTIC provides vastly 

superior flexibility for the JFACC decision-making process during the actual 

course of battle. Also, it equips the JFACC with a truly remarkable method of 

executing those decisions. Joint Pub 1-02 defines operational art as “the 

employment of military forces to attain strategic and/or operational objectives 

through the design, organization, integration, and conduct of strategies, 

campaigns, major operations, and battles. Operational art translates the joint 

force commander’s strategy into operational design, and, ultimately, tactical 

action, by integrating the key activities at all levels of war.”24 To highlight 

RTIC’s impact on operational art, the definition should be written as, the 

employment of military forces to attain strategic and/or operational objectives 

through the design, organization, integration, and conduct of strategies, 

campaigns, major operations, and battles. Operational art translates the joint 

force commander’s strategy into operational design, and, ultimately, tactical 

action, by integrating the key activities at all levels of war. 

34 
Sensor to Processor to Shooter 

The principal question involved in examining the conversion and transfer 

of sensed data to shooter information is, “What information is required by the 

shooter?” The first piece of information an aircrew needs is the fact that their 

mission is being redirected. Secondly, the crew needs a variety of mission 

information: routing information, en route and target area weather, en route 

and target area threats, targeting information, and weaponeering 

information. Each of these information needs involves some link between a 

sensing or reconnaissance system on one end and the tasked weapons system 

on the other. 

The RTIC cell mission commander does not arbitrarily redirect an 

execution-day ATO mission. Mission retasking decisions are based on a 

variety of factors: mission aborts, previous mission BDA reports, the detection 

of a time critical target, and appropriate shooter availability.25 Each of these 

factors involves sensors of one kind or another. Mission aborts may be 

“sensed” by wing weather personnel who report takeoff field conditions as 

WOXOF (weather of 0 foot ceilings, obscured, 0 foot visibility, and fog) or they 

may be relayed by AWACS as an entire package of bombers, escorts, and 

SEAD assets aborts due to the loss of tanker support. Near-real-time BDA 

reported by an aircrew just experiencing PGM “no-guides” against a high 

priority target was sensed by the aircraft’s onboard delivery system. 

DSP-derived information on the location of a Scud launch may impact 

retargeting decisions. It also may not if appropriately located, appropriately 

armed shooters are unavailable. 

The sensor-to-processor-to-shooter path may be quite clear in situations 

involving weather reports and shooter BDA; it may be less discernible for 

other cases. What is important is the path’s impact on possible RTIC 

operations. 

Sensor-to-processor-to-shooter paths may differ for time critical versus 

nontime critical targeting. Each retasked mission will likely require different 

and often unique information; the applicable sensors may not be the same; 

and required processing may differ. Nonetheless, the path’s impact on 

possible RTIC operations remains critical. 

Diverse yet notably important sensor-to-processor-to-shooter paths are 

exemplified by the following sensor-processor-shooter-RTIC scenario involving 

high priority TBM detection and targeting. Geosynchronous DSP satellites 

identify and down link a host of IR data. Within moments, the data is 

received and separate IR “hits” are correlated by the equipment and 

personnel in the 11th Space Warning Squadron at Falcon AFB, Colorado. 

Several bits of data indicate the possibility of a TBM launch. An aural 

warning goes out to operations centers in the affected theater simultaneously 

with the threat warning sent out via TIBS and TRAP.26 AWACS-provided 

TIBS information displays RTIC-capable shooters en route to targets in an 

area near the TIBS-provided coordinates of the Scud launch site. The CCO 

35 
identifies shooters who are sufficiently far from their targets to negate the 

possibility they have begun their preplanned attack. The CCO verifies that 

their weapons load is compatible for the time critical targeting of a Scud or its 

TEL, and engages the RTIC cell to ensure the threat situation between these 

shooters and the Scud launch site is acceptable, and provides an initial vector 

to the now retasked shooters. As previously arranged, Cobra Ball and 

JSTARS aircraft, upon receipt of the same TIBS Scud launch information, 

reorient their sensors to the launch area. Cobra Ball’s IR and SIGINT sensors 

refine the elliptical area bounding the possible TEL location. This information 

is used by Joint-STARS to locate then track the TEL while simultaneously 

data linking updated TEL coordinates directly to the approaching shooters’ 

weapon systems. Steering cues from the JSTARS link tie in to the shooters’ 

IR targeting systems allowing the aircrews to locate, identify, and destroy the 

TEL and other Scuds readying to launch. 

Certain sensor-to-processor-to-shooter paths require human intensive 

processing; others do not. A brief examination of the mission information 

needs of a redirected aircrew—routing, weather, threats, targeting, and 

weaponeering information—highlights areas where human interaction and 

planning is still critical and underscores areas ripe for automation. 

In an RTIC environment, route determination for a retasked mission is not 

heavily dependent on persons other than the retasked crew. Certainly the 

aircrew must know the location of the target and, in some cases, the location 

of the IP from which the attack will begin, but meticulous preplanning of a 

route to the target or IP could be unnecessary when real-time and NRT 

weather and threat information is available in the cockpit. 

Several reconnaissance systems collect threat information that may impact 

a retasked mission’s route of flight. Regardless of the collection system, 

ELINT and SIGINT processing occur in NRT.27 Processed, threat-specific 

information can be loaded automatically into TIBS/TRAP for immediate 

dissemination throughout the theater. This off-board, broadcast information 

can be transmitted directly to en route aircraft via TADILs. Onboard avionics 

such as the Talon Shooter project’s real-time symmetric multiprocessor 

(RTSMP)—a downsized super computer designed for in-flight use—offer 

further processing of off-board and onboard information to provide 

crew-selectable displays of threat information. Aircrews may elect to 

disregard acquisition systems and display only threats that are within lethal 

range of the aircraft or route of flight. They may color “tag” threats to indicate 

when the information was last updated. The RTSMP can factor aircraft 

altitude, course, and speed into the determination of threats’ lethal radii, and 

display the threats with their associated “lethality rings” to allow the aircrew 

to select appropriate routing.28 Regardless of the information’s display, the 

sensor-to-processor-to-shooter path for threat information is both direct and 

short. 

A similar direct, short path applies to theater weather. This information is 

available in real time and NRT depending on the sensor used and its location 

relative to the theater and could be provided to en route aircrew as part of 

36 
TIBS/TRAP broadcast information. Like threat information, knowledge of en 

route weather may be vital to the determination of a redirected mission’s 

route of flight. Unlike threat information that shooter aircrews can receive 

via TIBS/TRAP then display in a cockpit-selectable fashion, specific 

weather-based weaponeering information such as target detection range or 

laser attenuation specifics requires extensive, less rapid processing. 

In general, weaponeering and targeting involve a degree of expert human 

interaction that, at present, exceeds the capabilities of automated systems. 

Determining the appropriate types and numbers of munitions or the 

necessary aim point that must be hit to achieve a desired effect on a specific 

target remains as much an art as a science. Likewise, the integration of 

targeting with intelligence and operations information on force posture, 

capabilities, weapons effects, objectives, rules of engagement, and doctrine 

requires more than automated systems can provide. 

Though apparently straightforward, the seemingly mundane task of 

obtaining and transmitting appropriate target imagery to a redirected shooter 

illustrates the need for human interaction. Many, if not most imagery 

products not already part of some archive or data base, require significant 

processing to convert raw data into aircrew-useable images and may be 

available only on an NRT basis. Even imagery products immediately at hand 

in an AOC require processing before they are readily useable in the cockpit. 

Systems such as 5D (demand driven direct digital dissemination); power 

scene; imagery data exploitation; and digital imagery exploitation production 

system, either link the AOC to various data bases and archives to bring 

needed imagery in, or allow the manipulation of available imagery to provide 

a set of images specifically oriented to both the attack heading and run-in 

altitude of the diverted attacker.29 These systems allow a mission planner-photo 

interpreter team to provide suitable imagery—optical, SAR, or IR—tailored to 

the weapon system’s crew. This may include a wide-area image to provide 

initial target area recognition cues, a narrower field of view image to refine 

the area perspective to a specific target view, and an image of the specific 

desired munitions point of impact or DMPI. This imagery also may be 

processed to include views of the target appropriately oriented to a given 

attack profile. This processing is not only available, but in many instances is 

extremely important. In other instances, time is the more critical element, 

and less-processed, more rapid information is highly preferable over 

well-processed, slower information. 

Greater automation of information processing holds the promise for more 

rapid decision cycles. Automated information processing, however, does not 

assure automated decision making. Even in an environment of completely 

direct sensor-to-shooter pathways, an RTIC cell will be necessary for effective 

sensor-to-shooter operations until expert systems can provide more fully 

developed mission information and can be more fundamentally integrated 

into the decision-making process. 

37 
Direct Sensor to Shooter 

Currently, little if any data goes directly from sensor to shooter. With 

several reconnaissance systems, however, sufficient onboard processing is 

available to allow the transfer of information, not data, directly to expectant 

shooters. Sufficient communications bandwidth, a severe limitation in the 

past, remains a concern, but is ameliorated in a world of HF, VHF, UHF, 

SHF, SATCOM links, Ku band data links, joint tactical information 

distribution systems, tactical digital information links, tactical data 

information exchange systems, tactical receive equipment, and multimission 

advanced tactical terminals (MATT). 

The information sent directly from the sensor to a shooter can be nearly as 

diverse as the communication paths over which it is sent. HUMINT definitely 

refers to a collection system with onboard processing and is perhaps the 

simplest application of the direct sensor-to-shooter concept. Real-time 

communications from Special Forces personnel can provide excellent, and 

sometimes otherwise unobtainable, information. ELINT and SIGINT 

collections from national sensors can provide NRT threat information that in 

essence travels direct from the sensor to appropriately equipped shooters.30 

Additionally, IMINT in the form of optical, SAR, or IR imagery annotated 

with latitude and longitude of the target can be linked directly from either 

U-2 or Predator aircraft. This imagery may be supplemented with other 

information such as a mobile target’s coordinates, heading, and speed. This 

flow of diverse information into the cockpit, whether from sensor to shooter or 

sensor to processor to shooter, is achievable today with radios such as the 

MATT offering data flow rates approaching 20 kilobytes per second on each of 

its four channels, and onboard processors like the real-time symmetric 

multiprocessor performing 20 million instructions per second throughout the 

dynamic flight environment of the F-15E. High volume information flow, 

however, in only an enabler for RTIC; it is a necessary, but not sufficient 

condition for the overall RTIC concept. 

Integrated Flexibility 

Real-time information into the cockpit complements onboard sensors to 

increase battle space awareness; it does not replace those sensors.31 Similarly, 

RTIC supports the ATO process; it does not replace it. It does not provide a 

panacea to cover for imperfect intelligence, an incomplete command and 

control systems, or insufficient forces. It does, however, bolster a key tenet of 

aerospace power. It provides tremendous flexibility to the JFACC on the 

actual employment of forces. RTIC may even be called, with accuracy, a force 

multiplier. 

Having an RTIC cell does not eliminate the need for the airborne command 

element (ACE) aboard AWACS which can, “when necessary, assume the 

38 
command authority of a tactical air control center over aircraft flying combat 

air patrol with an AWACS or over airborne strike formations preparing for an 

attack mission.”32 It does not replace the battlefield coordination element 

(BCE) aboard ABCCC. Rather, the abilities of an RTIC cell fill a C2 niche in 

the air tasking process in a manner currently unavailable to the ACE, BCE, 

or CCO. An RTIC cell provides an additional dimension of command and 

control that allows for more effective decision making and improved execution 

during the execution-day targeting cycle. 

As with the ATO that at some point must prohibit further changes, the 

flexibility offered by RTIC has limitations as well. Retasking a mission on its 

IP to target run is just as foolish with RTIC as without. Yet along a 

continuum during the execution-day ATO, from a point where target priority 

and TOT considerations preclude routine mission planning to a package 

nearing its IP to target run, real-time information into the cockpit offers an 

OODA cycle unprecedented in aerial warfare. It offers today’s JFACC a tool to 

more effectively employ American airpower and American airmen in combat. 

Notes 

1. Gulf War Air Power Survey, vol. 1, Planning and Command and Control (Washington, 

D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1993), pt. 2:137. 

2. Ibid., 145. 

3. James A. Winnefeld and Dana J. Johnson, Joint Air Operations (Annapolis.: Naval 

Institute Press, 1993), 110. 

4. Capt Lyle G. Bien, USN, “From the Strike Cell,” Proceedings, June 1991, 59. 

5. Gulf War Air Power Survey, vol. 3, Logistics and Support (Washington, D.C.: Government 

Printing Office, 1993), pt. 2:95. 

6. Ibid., 94. 

7. Gulf War Air Power Survey, vol. 5, A Statistical Compendium and Chronology 

(Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1993), pt. 2:234. 

8. Gulf War Air Power Survey, vol. 1, pt. 2:252. 

9. Gulf War Air Power Survey, vol 2, Operations and Effects and Effectiveness (Washington, 

D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1993), pt. 1:204. 

10. Gulf War Air Power Survey, vol. 5, pt. 2:253. 

11. Ibid. 

12. Air Combat Command Instruction (ACCI) 13-AOC, Operational Procedures—Air 

Operations Center, vol. 3, 1 June 1995, 32. 

13. Ibid. 

14. Joint Pub 3-09.3, Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Close Air Support, 1 

December 1995, II-1. 

15. Joint Pub 3-56.1, Command and Control for Joint Air Operations, 14 November 1994, 

C-2. 

16. ACCI 13-AOC vol. 3 on p. 32 states that “the SODO [CCO for USCENTAF] has prime 

responsibility for monitoring the curent air situation and advising the CCO [DCO for 

USCENTAF] of dynamic mission requirmeents and resource status. . . . When a requirment is 

of an immediate nature, the SODCO summarizes the current air situation for the CCO, who 

approves/disapproves adjustments to the published ATO.” During USCENTCOM Exercise 

Internal Look ’96, Lt Col James R. Brungess, USAF, as CCO, had prime responsibility for both 

monitoring and directing adjustments to the published ATO. 

17. Ibid. 

39 
18. Certainly this brings out concerns regarding possible “ripple effects,” however such 

contingencies were exercised during Internal Look ’96. 

19. Gulf War Air Power Survey, vol. 2, pt. 1:188. 

20. Joint Pub 1-02, Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms, 23 

March 1994, 380. 

21. Ibid. 

22. Ibid., 245. 

23. Air Force Manual 1-1, Basic Aerospace Doctrine of the United States Air Force, vol. 2, 

March 1992, 115–16. 

24. Joint Pub 1-02, 274. 

25. Lt Col James R. Brungess, chief of combat operations, CENTCOM Exercise Internal 

Look ’96, Camp Blanding, Fla., interviewed by author, 21 March 1996. 

26. Lt Col Darrell Herriges and Maj Christopher H. Frasier, 11th Space Warning Squadron, 

Falcon AFB, Colo., interviewed by author, 4 January 1996. 

27. Mr. Ronald Cole, Natioal Security Agency Liaison to US Space Command, Peterson 

AFB, Colo., interviewed by author, 3 April 1996. 

28. Capt Geoffrey H. Hills, chief, Space/Weapon Systems Integration, Space Warfare 

Center, Falcon AFB, Colo., interviewed by author, 5 April 1996. 

29. Capt Daniel E. Johnson, operations officer, Combined Imagery Exploitation Facility 

(CIEF), US Space Command; Warrant Officer Michael E. Waliohn, Canadian Forces CIEF 

NCOIC; and TSgt David A. Grubbs, CIEF Team B Exploitation NCOIC, Combined Intelligence 

Center, Peterson AFB, Colo., interviewed by author, 4–5 April 1996. 

30. Larry Arkfeld, “Combat Integration Capability (CIC) Communications Plan: Revision 

A,” unpublished paper prepared for SWC/DOZC, 6 October 1995, 3. 

31. Maj Zigfried J. Dahl, “The Talon Shooter RTIC Road Show,” slides, undated, 31. 

32. Gulf War Air Power Survey, vol. 1, pt. 2:98. 

40

Chapter 5 

A Look to the Future 

If a man does not give thought to problems which are still distant, he will be worried 

by them when they come nearer. 

—Confucius 

The Sayings of Confucius 

The joint campaign should fully exploit the information differential, that is, the 

superior access to and ability to effectively employ information on the strategic, 

operational and tactical situation which advanced US technologies provide our 

forces. 

—Joint Pub 1, Joint Warfare of the 

Armed Forces of the United States 

Referring to an Air Combat Command study on the air campaign in the 

Gulf War conducted by SDS International, Col Bruce Gillette, chief of the Air 

Force Theater Air Defense Requirements Division, said “the study looks at 

what can be done that will give the best payoff [in destroying mobile theater 

ballistic missile launchers]. Should we improve the sensors, the shooters, or 

the command-and-control systems?”1 The answer should be yes. Yes, we 

should improve the sensors. Yes, we should improve the shooters. Yes, we 

should improve the C2 systems. These improvements should not only address 

the threat posed by TBM or the potential offered for theater missile defense 

but also should address the integration of all three—sensors, shooters, and C2 

systems. 

The RTIC cell construct laid out in this thesis offers increased targeting 

flexibility to the modern JFACC, but it is only an incremental step down the 

path toward minimized decision cycles and maximized targeting effectiveness. 

Integrated sensor, shooter, and C2 improvements will allow the US military to 

further its journey down the path toward maximum airpower effectiveness. 

Sensors. A handful of today’s sensors have the ability to directly link 

information to a shooter. Much of this information is threat related; some is 

data related; little is imagery related. An ability to broadcast real-time 

imagery of a stationary or moving target along with specific geolocation and, 

if needed, moving target information, from a wider variety of sensors to 

individual shooters is plausible. IR sensing capabilities added to the entire 

fleet of RC-135s may add a tremendous counter-TBM capability. This 

improvement, refined DSP data processing, and additional IR capabilities and 

41 
sensor range expansions for JSTARS offers added opportunities to precisely 

locate TBM units. 

Various other sensors are on the horizon. RF/seismic sensors capable of 

deriving 3-D conformations of underground structures offer an ability to 

locate, identify, and target underground facilities.2 “Relaxed-optical-tolerance 

imaging”3 presents an opportunity for producing fine resolution, space-based 

imaging at greatly reduced costs by overcoming reduced hardware tolerances 

with postdetection processing (i.e., overcoming low-cost less-capable hardware 

with improved computer software). Microelectromechanical systems, bistatic 

SAR systems, ultraspectral optics, quantum well infrared photodetectors, and 

other obscure technologies appear to offer the promise of continuing 

improvement in sensor systems and their component technologies.4 More 

importantly, the prospect for sensor correlation and fusion in the context of a 

“system of systems” architecture is increasingly bright. 

Shooters. Two areas offer the greatest potential for future improvement to 

the combat air force(s) regarding RTIC: communications and direct weapon 

systems links. Improved communications capabilities for both voice and data 

information flows are a must. The idea that there is a single aircraft sent into 

combat without the threat information capabilities offered by TADIL-J or its 

equivalent seems reprehensible. As RTIC capabilities improve, RTIC-capable 

aircraft should include single-seat as well as multiplace shooters. This may 

prove viable once the integration of off-board information can occur 

automatically with an input feeding directly into the shooters’ navigation and 

targeting systems. A third area of expanding future capabilities does not 

concern RTIC, but real-time information out of the cockpit. Real-time 

information out of the cockpit adds another dimension to the targeting 

flexibility offered by RTIC through improved and more rapid BDA. Another 

clear area regarding the future of RTIC is the expansion of its use from force 

application via deep interdiction and strategic attack missions to force 

application in the CAS and counterair missions. RTIC should also have a 

place in force enhancement missions such as airlift and air refueling. 

C2 Systems. The future may hold the promise for airpower employment 

via the C2 procedures of an auftragstaktik system where mission-type orders 

are employed in a decentralized control-decentralized execution environment. 

This will be truly effective only when the promise of near-complete battle 

space awareness becomes a reality. Until that time, real RTIC C2 advances 

likely will come from ever-widening communications “pipes” allowing 

exponential increases in sensor-to-shooter information flows and sensor 

cross-cueing capabilities. Steady improvements should also occur as the RTIC 

concept goes through the day-to-day learning process of becoming RTIC 

operational reality. 

Systems are required that can support decisions by bringing to bear all 

relevant information, including the fusion and presentation of current and 

historical data from all sources. Dynamic command and control is central to 

increasing the capabilities of airpower. Increases in capability will arise 

primarily from the ability to collect, analyze, and use information to make 

42 
critical decisions to engage the enemy quickly and decisively—in short, to 

maximize the effect on the enemy within the constraints imposed. Certain 

functions are crucial: timely information, timely decisions, proper assignment 

of tasks to computers and automation, and proper synchronization.5 Without 

a determined effort to manage this generation, distribution, storage, fusion, 

and presentation of information to support timely decision making, airpower 

of the twenty-first century will be data rich, information ragged, and decision 

poor. 

The future holds the promise of combining sensor arrays, targeting 

systems, weapons delivery capabilities, and C2 methods in a number of ways 

to allow maximum flexibility for the JFACC. For this concept, for those above, 

and for RTIC in general, the devil is not so much in the details, but in the 

decision—the decision to prioritize these capabilities and make the 

investments required to bring ideas into reality. 

Notes 

1. Frank Oliveri, “Upgrades for Killing Launchers Studied,” Air Force Times, 22 January 

1996, 26. 

2. “New World Vistas: Air and Space Power for the 21st Century,” Sensors Volume, undated 

draft, iv. 

3. Ibid., v. 

4. The New World Vistas’ sensor and attack volumes provide excellent discussions of 

potential advances in sensors, weapons and weapons platforms, command and control, and the 

functional integration of all three. 

5. “New World Vistas,” Attack Volume, undated draft, 7. 

43

Bibliography 

Air Combat Command Instruction 13-AOC. Operational Procedures—Air Operations 

Center, vol. 3, 1 June 1995. 

Air Combat Command Pamphlet 2-2. Joint Force Air Component Commander 

(JFACC) Concept of Operations, 21 August 1992. 

Air Combat Command Regulation 2-1. Air Operations, 31 August 1992. 

Air Force Manual 1-1. Basic Aerospace Doctrine of the United States Air Force. 2 

vols., March 1992. 

Air Force Manual 2-25. “Air Force Operational Doctrine, Space Operations.” Draft, 

April 1993. 

Air Force Regulation 200-16. Intelligence: Air Force Targeting, 28 March 1990. 

Arkfeld, Larry. “Combat Integration Capability (CIC) Communications Plan: Revision A.” Paper prepared for SWC/DOZC, 6 October 1995. 

Army Fact Sheet. “Joint Airpower Application,” 19 November 1993. 

Army Information Papers. “Joint Targeting Coordination Board” and “Joint Force 

Air Component Commander,” 18 November 1993. 

Ball, Desmond. The Intelligence War in the Gulf. Canberra, Australia: Strategic and 

Defence Studies Centre, Australian National University, 1991. 

Bertoglio, Capt Marta, ed. “AFTENCAP Program Plan FY96” (FOUO). Space Warfare Center, Falcon AFB, Colo., August 1995. Information extracted is unclassified. 

Board on Army Science and Technology Commission on Engineering and Technological Systems National Research Council. STAR 21: Strategic Technologies for the 

Army of the Twenty-First Century. Washington, D.C.: National Academy Press, 

1992. 

Boyd, John R. “A Discourse on Winning and Losing.” A collection of unpublished 

briefings and essays. Air University Library, Document No. M-U 30352-16, no. 

7791, August 1987. 

Canaan, James W. “How to Command and Control a War.” Air Force Magazine, April 

1991, 14–17. 

Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Memorandum of Policy No. 30. Command and 

Control Warfare, 8 March 1993. 

Clausewitz, Carl von. On War. Edited and translated by Michael Howard and Peter 

Paret. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1989. 

Clodfelter, Lt Col Mark, and Lt Col John M. Fawcett Jr. “The RMA and Air Force 

Roles, Missions, and Doctrine.” Parameters, Summer 1995, 22–29. 

Correll, John T. “Fogbound in Space.” Air Force Magazine, January 1994, 22–29. 

Combat Air Forces Mission Need Statement 315-92. Mission Need Statement for 

Real-Time Information in the Cockpit (RTIC), 26 April 1994. 

Covault, Craig. “Joint-STARS Patrols Bosnia.” Aviation Week & Space Technology, 

19 February 1996. 

45 
Dahl, Lt Col Ken, Maj Ted Kresge, and Maj Max DeSosa. “A Responsive Air Tasking 

Order (ATO).” Air Land Sea Bulletin 92-3 (September 1992): 17–23. 

Dahl, Maj Zigfried J. “The Talon Shooter RTIC Road Show.” Briefing Slides, undated. 

Davis, Lt Col C. R. “Airborne Reconnaissance: The Leveraging Tool for Our Future 

Strategy.” Fort McNair, Washington, D.C.: Industrial College of the Armed 

Forces, 1995. 

Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA). Assessment of Mission Kill 

Concept, Requirements, and Technologies. Final Report #SPC 1361, SPC Log no. 

90-1987, September 1990. 

Defense Science Board Final Report on “Lessons Learned during Operations Desert 

Shield and Desert Storm.” 8 January 1992. (Secret) Information extracted is 

unclassified. 

Duncan, Lt Col Robert E. “Responsive Air Support-Desert Shield/Storm.” Air Land 

Sea Bulletin 92-3 (September 1992): 8–16. 

Evers, Stacey. “Gnat-750 May Raise Profile of UAVs.” Aviation Week & Space Technology, 7 February 1994, 54–55. 

Fadok, Maj David S. John Boyd and John Warden: Air Power’s Quest for Strategic 

Paralysis. Maxwell AFB, Ala.: Air University Press, February 1995. 

Field Manual 100-5, Operations, June 1993. 

Fulghum, David A. “Air Force Prepares New UAV Acquisitions, Operations.” Aviation Week & Space Technology, 27 November 1995, 52. 

Giboney, Maj Thomas B. “Commanders Control from Information Chaos.” Military 

Review, November 1991, 34–38. 

Griffith, Samuel B., ed. Sun Tzu: The Art of War. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 

1963. 

Gulf War Air Power Survey. Vol. 1, Planning and Command and Control Report, 

March 1993. 

_________. Vol. 2, Operations and Effects and Effectiveness, pts. 1 and 2. 

_________. Vol. 3, Logistics and Support, pt. 2. 

_________. Vol. 5, Chronology, pt. 2. 

Horner, Lt Gen Charles A. “The Air Campaign.” Military Review, September 1991, 

16–27. 

JFACC Primer. Washington, D.C.: Headquarters United States Air Force, Deputy 

Chief of Staff, Plans and Operations, August 1992. 

Joint Pub 1-02. Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms, 

23 March 1994. 

Joint Pub 3-0, Doctrine for Joint Operations, 1 February 1995. 

Joint Pub 3-03, Doctrine for Joint Interdiction Operations, 11 December 1990. 

Joint Pub 3-05. Doctrine for Joint Special Operations, 28 October 1992. 

Joint Pub 3-09.3. Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Close Air Support, 

1 December 1995. 

Joint Pub 3-55. Doctrine for Reconnaissance, Surveillance, and Target Acquisition 

Support for Joint Operations (RSTA), 14 April 1993 

Joint Pub 3-56.1. Command and Control for Joint Air Operations, 14 November 1994. 

Joint Pub 5-0. Doctrine for Planning Joint Operations, 13 April 1995. 

46 
Kolcum, Edward H. “Joint-STARS E-8s Return to U.S.; 20-Aircraft Fleet Believed 

Assured.” Aviation Week & Space Technology, 11 March 1991, 20. 

L’Heureux, Col Richard J. “Tactical Reconnaissance: Opportunities through Integration.” Maxwell AFB, Ala.: Air War College, 1990. 

Lawrence, Dr. Taylor W. Deputy Director Information Systems Office, DARPA. “Battlefield Awareness Program Overview.” Briefing Slides, March 1996. 

Martin, Capt Ron. “The Emergence of the Modern Tactical Air Control System from 

Vietnam to Desert Storm.” Air Land Sea Bulletin 92-1 (March 1992): 7–9. 

McNamara, Maj Stephen J. Airpower’s Gordian Knot: Centralized versus Organic 

Control. Maxwell AFB, Ala.: Air University Press, 1994. 

Meilinger, Col Phillip S. 10 Propositions Regarding Air Power. Air Force History and 

Museums Program, 1995. 

Muir, Cmdr Daniel J. “A View from the Black Hole.” Proceedings, October 1991, 

85–86. 

Naval Doctrine Command. “A Review of JFACC Organization and Processes.” Second draft, 10 November 1993. 

Oliveri, Frank. “Upgrades for Killing Launchers Studied,” Air Force Times, 22 January 

1996, 26. 

Pacific Command Briefing. “JFACC-JTCB Relationship.” Camp Smith, Hawaii, 8 

November 1993. 

Pentland, Maj Patrick. “Putting the Air into AirLand Battle: The Case for Mission 

Order Tasking.” Headquarters AF/XOXFT Concept Paper, 1987. 

Rice, M. A., and A. J. Sammes. Communications and Information Systems for Battlefield Command and Control. London: Brassey’s (U.K.), 1989. 

Richelson, Jeffrey T. “The Future of Space Reconnaissance.” Scientific American, 

January 1991. 

Schmidt, Maj Edward B. “Targeting Organizations: Centralized or Decentralized?” 

Maxwell AFB, Ala.: School of Advanced Airpower Studies, 1993. 

Schneider, Barry R., and Lawrence E. Grinter. Battlefield of the Future: 21st Century 

Warfare Issues. Maxwell AFB, Ala.: Air University Press, 1995. 

Scott, Capt Shane. “Parallel Reporting of Theater Ballistic Missiles,” SWC Space 

Tactics Bulletin, Summer 1995, 8. 

Shaver, Russell, Edward Harshberger, and Natalie Crawford. Modernizing Airpower 

Projection Capabilities. RAND Issue Paper, September 1993. 

Sink, Maj J. Taylor. Rethinking the Air Operations Center: Air Force Command and 

Control in Conventional War. Maxwell AFB, Ala.: Air University Press, 1993. 

Snyder, Frank M. Command and Control: The Literature and Commentaries. Washington, D.C.: National Defense University Press, 1993. 

Tactical Air Command Tactical Analysis Bulletin 92-1. Nellis AFB, Nev., July 1991. 

(Secret) 

“Tier 2 UAV Revealed.” Aviation Week & Space Technology, 7 February 1994, 23. 

Townsley, Col William E. “BCTP and the Tactical Air Control System—What Is 

BCTP?” Air Land Sea Bulletin 92-1 (March 1992): 9–12. 

US Central Command Air Forces. “USCENTAF AirLand Composite Wing Command 

and Control Study.” Shaw AFB, S.C.: USCENTAF/A5-DOCX, 10 March 1994. 

47 
“USIS 2000.” Video presentation by the US Space Command Combined Intelligence 

Center, Peterson AFB, Colo., April 1996. 

US Space Command. United States Space Command Operations Desert Shield and 

Desert Storm Assessment (U). Peterson AFB, Colo., January 1992. (Secret/ 

NOFORN) Information extracted is unclassified. 

Van Creveld, Martin. Technology and War: From 2000 B.C. to the Present. New York: 

The Free Press, 1989. 

Warden, Lt Col John A., III. The Air Campaign: Planning for Combat. Washington, 

D.C.: Pergamon-Brassey’s, 1989. 

Watts, Lt Col Barry D. The Foundations of US Air Doctrine: The Problem of Friction 

in War. Maxwell AFB, Ala.: Air University Press, 1984. 

Welch, Lt Col William G. “Joint Targeting Concept.” Air Land Sea Bulletin 92-2 

(March 1992): 7–10. 

Winnefeld, James A., and Dana J. Johnson. Joint Air Operations: Pursuit of Unity in


Command and Control, 1942–1991. Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 1993.


Yasky, Cmdr Richard J. “Changing the View of Operational Surveillance.” Newport,


R.I.: Naval War College, 1994. 

48