COURT OF APPEALS

DECISION

DATED AND FILED

November 19, 2019

Sheila T. Reiff

Clerk of Court of Appeals

NOTICE

This opinion is subject to further editing. If 

published, the official version will appear in 

the bound volume of the Official Reports. 

A party may file with the Supreme Court a 

petition to review an adverse decision by the 

Court of Appeals. See WIS. STAT. § 808.10 

and RULE 809.62. 

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Cir. Ct. Nos. 2018TP106

2018TP107

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2018TP109

STATE OF WISCONSIN IN COURT OF APPEALS

DISTRICT I

IN RE THE TERMINATION OF PARENTAL RIGHTS TO S.J., A PERSON UNDER THE 

AGE OF 18:

STATE OF WISCONSIN,

PETITIONER,

V.

Z. J.,

RESPONDENT.

IN RE THE TERMINATION OF PARENTAL RIGHTS TO K.J. JR., A PERSON UNDER 

THE AGE OF 18:

STATE OF WISCONSIN,

PETITIONER,

V.

Z. J.,

RESPONDENT.
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IN RE THE TERMINATION OF PARENTAL RIGHTS TO S.J., A PERSON UNDER THE 

AGE OF 18:

STATE OF WISCONSIN,

PETITIONER,

V.

Z. J.,

RESPONDENT.

IN RE THE TERMINATION OF PARENTAL RIGHTS TO S.J., A PERSON UNDER THE 

AGE OF 18:

STATE OF WISCONSIN,

PETITIONER,

V.

Z. J.,

RESPONDENT.

APPEALS from orders of the circuit court for Milwaukee County: 

M. JOSEPH DONALD, Judge. Affirmed. 

¶1 DUGAN, J.1 Z.J. appeals the orders terminating her parental rights 

to her four biological children. The only issue on appeal is Z.J.’s argument that 

 

1

 This appeal is decided by one judge pursuant to WIS. STAT. § 752.31(2)(e) (2017-18). 

All references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to the 2017-18 version unless otherwise noted.
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the trial court erroneously exercised its discretion when it entered default 

judgment against her during the grounds phase of the petitions to terminate her 

parental rights to her children. 2 We disagree and, therefore, affirm the trial court’s 

orders. 

BACKGROUND

¶2 Z.J. is the mother of four children. S.J. is an eight-year-old girl who 

was born on February 12, 2011; K.J. Jr. is a seven-year-old boy who was born on 

February 29, 2012; S.J. is a five-year-old girl who was born on February 4, 2014;

and S.J. is a three-year-old girl who was born on February 27, 2016. 

¶3 The three eldest children were initially removed from Z.J.’s care in 

July 2015 due to ongoing concerns of domestic violence in the home directed at 

her by K.J. Sr., and drug abuse.

3

 They were returned to Z.J.’s care in July 2016, 

after she participated in inpatient drug treatment. Then, in March 2017, the four 

children were removed from Z.J.’s care because she was abusing drugs and 

alcohol, and leaving her children with unsafe caregivers. From March 2017 until 

 

2

 Judge Christopher R. Foley initially presided over the case. Beginning on July 23, 

2018, Judge M. Joseph Donald presided over the case. The case was transferred to Judge Donald 

after Z.J. filed a request for substitution of judges on July 9, 2018. 

Separate cases were filed for each child and Z.J. filed a separate notice of appeal in each 

case. On September 23, 2019, we issued an order consolidating the appeals. 

Although the cases were separate before the trial court, in most instances the parties’ 

papers and court orders in each case were identical, and joint court proceedings were held for the 

four cases. For ease of reading, we refer to documents that were filed in the singular, even 

though actually a particular document was filed in each case. 

3

 The fourth child had not been born yet. 
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February 2018, Z.J. did not participate in any alcohol or drug abuse treatment 

programs, any domestic violence or mental health services, or any visitation. 

Then, in February 2018, she reengaged in services until July or August 2018. 

¶4 On May 25, 2018, the State filed a petition to terminate Z.J.’s 

parental rights to each of her children on the grounds of children in continuing 

need of protective services (CHIPS), and failure to assume parental responsibility.4 

In support of the grounds for termination, the petition alleges that Z.J. failed to 

meet court ordered conditions for the return of her children, including that she 

control her drug and alcohol abuse, of which she had an extensive history, and 

understand how her drug and alcohol abuse affected her children; control her 

mental health, which included a long history of mental health diagnoses including 

bipolar and borderline personality disorders; provide safe care for her children;

and visit her children regularly. 

¶5 On June 13, 2018, Z.J., together with counsel,

5

and J.T.N. appeared 

before the trial court for a plea hearing. The hearing was adjourned so that 

counsel could be appointed to represent J.T.N., who appeared without counsel. 

However, before adjourning the hearing, the trial court advised Z.J. as follows:

 

4

 The petition also sought to terminate the parental rights of K.J. Sr., the father of Z.J.’s 

three older children, and J.T.N., the father of Z.J.’s youngest child, to their children. We have 

only included facts relating to the fathers if necessary for clarity. Any issues relating to either 

father are not part of this appeal. Since the petition refers to the father of Z.J.’s youngest child as 

J.T.N., we use those initials. We note, however, that the hearing transcripts only include his 

given name and surname. 

5

 The attorney, who appeared with Z.J., also advised the trial court that a second attorney 

would also be representing Z.J. Counsel did not provide any explanation for the involvement of a 

second attorney. 
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[Y]ou need to appear for all subsequently[]scheduled 

hearings. You need to be on time for those hearings. You 

need to maintain reasonable communication with [counsel], 

in your case, [Z.J.]

....

You’re going to get asked later in this process to participate 

in a deposition. If you get properly noticed of a deposition, 

you have to appear and participate in that process in good 

faith.

If you didn’t do those things, emphasizing in 

particular appearing for hearings, you could be defaulted, 

lose your right to fight against this, because you didn’t 

come to court or do the other things that need to be done. 

¶6 On July 9, 2018, Z.J. appeared before the trial court, with counsel, 

for a hearing. However, prior to the start of the hearing, Z.J. filed a request for 

substitution of the judge and the hearing was rescheduled. Before adjourning the 

matter, the trial court addressed Z.J. stating, “I’ll advise all the parents you need to 

reappear for the next hearing, all subsequently scheduled hearings, maintain 

contact with your lawyers, cooperate with the discovery process. If you didn’t do 

that you could be defaulted or lose your right to fight against the termination of 

your parental rights.” 

¶7 On July 23, 2018, Z.J. appeared, with counsel, at the rescheduled 

plea hearing before the newly substituted trial court. Z.J. denied the allegations of 

the petition and reserved her right to a jury trial. 

¶8 On August 16, 2018, Z.J. appeared before the trial court with 

counsel. The trial court scheduled a September 27, 2018 hearing on Z.J.’s motion 

for unsupervised visitation. 
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¶9 Z.J.’s counsel appeared at the September 27, 2018 hearing, but Z.J. 

did not appear. Z.J.’s counsel informed the trial court that she did not know where 

Z.J. was that day and she withdrew Z.J.’s motion for unsupervised visitation. The 

State then asked the trial court to take under advisement a request for entry of 

default against Z.J., based on her failure to appear at the hearing and stated that, if 

Z.J. did not appear for her deposition, it would file a motion for default. The trial 

court agreed to take the default request as to Z.J. under advisement. The trial court 

then heard testimony on J.T.N.’s motion for a change of placement. The hearing 

on J.T.N.’s motion was not completed that afternoon, so the hearing was 

adjourned until November 14, 2018. 

¶10 On November 14, 2018, Z.J.’s counsel was present for the hearing—

Z.J. was not. The trial court asked Z.J.’s counsel to explain Z.J.’s absence. Z.J.’s 

counsel responded that Z.J. believed housing was an important part of her case and 

that, in order to obtain housing, she had to attend a housing inspection scheduled 

during a four-hour window that morning. 

¶11 The State then asked the trial court to hold that Z.J. was in default,

subject to prove-up. The State cited Z.J.’s failure to appear for her November 7, 

2018 deposition, without any explanation; an outstanding warrant for Z.J.’s arrest, 

issued because she had absconded from probation; Z.J.’s failure to attend 

visitation with her children since August 2018; and Z.J.’s failure to stay in contact 

with the Division of Milwaukee Child Protective Services as required. The 

guardian ad litem agreed that default should be entered. 

¶12 Counsel for Z.J. asked the trial court to take the default request 

under advisement, arguing that Z.J. was absent that day because the timing of the 
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hearing and the housing inspection coincided and Z.J. felt that housing was “one 

of the more important things” because she needed housing for anything else to 

move forward in the case. 

¶13 The trial court stated that housing was important, but that did not 

explain the missed deposition, and that Z.J. also needed to clear up the warrant. 

The trial court then stated that it would take the motion for default under 

advisement until the next hearing and that, if Z.J. did not appear at that time, it 

would then rule on the motion for default with respect to the grounds phase of the 

proceeding.6 The trial court then heard testimony on J.T.N.’s motion and set a 

December 21, 2018 date to hear the parties’ arguments on J.T.N.’s motion, to 

render its decision on the motion, and to address the State’s motion for default as 

to Z.J. 

¶14 On December 4, 2018, the State filed a motion for default judgment 

based on Z.J.’s failure to appear for her deposition. In an affidavit, the assistant 

district attorney averred that Z.J. had failed to appear for her deposition that was 

originally scheduled for November 7, 2018, and then rescheduled for 

November 29, 2018, without providing any reasons for her absence. The assistant 

district attorney also averred that Z.J. had failed to appear for court proceedings on 

September 27, 2018 and November 14, 2018, although the trial court had ordered 

 

6 Wisconsin has a two-part statutory procedure for the involuntary termination of 

parental rights. Steven V. v. Kelley H., 2004 WI 47, ¶24, 271 Wis. 2d 1, 678 N.W.2d 856. In the 

grounds phase, the petitioner must prove by clear and convincing evidence that at least one of the 

twelve grounds enumerated in WIS. STAT. § 48.415 exists. See WIS. STAT. § 48.31(1); 

Steven V., 271 Wis. 2d 1, ¶¶24-25. In the dispositional phase, the trial court must decide if it is in 

the child’s best interest that the parent’s rights be permanently extinguished. See WIS. STAT.

§ 48.426(2); Steven V., 271 Wis. 2d 1, ¶27.
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her to appear and warned that Z.J. that any failure to appear could result in a 

default finding. 

¶15 At the next proceeding before the trial court on December 21, 2018, 

Z.J. did not appear, although her counsel were present. The trial court asked about 

Z.J.’s whereabouts, and counsel stated that Z.J. was not in custody. The State then 

renewed its request for entry of default against Z.J., stated it had filed a motion for 

default after Z.J. had failed to appear for her deposition on November 28, 2018,

and asked that Z.J.’s counsel be removed. 

¶16 Counsel for Z.J. stated that Z.J. had been in touch with them at 

times, but that she was not in court because she was afraid she would then be 

arrested on the outstanding probation warrant and lose the housing that she had 

just secured. Counsel for Z.J. asked the trial court to allow them to continue 

representing her and that no formal order of default be entered. 

¶17 The trial court asked the guardian ad litem for her position on the 

default request. The guardian ad litem responded that she agreed that default 

should be entered. The trial court then found Z.J.’s “nonappearance to be 

egregious, and ... persistent” and, therefore, the trial court held Z.J. “in default 

with respect to phase one.” The trial court also held that it would allow Z.J.’s 

counsel to remain on the case, at least until the dispositional phase. The trial court 

suggested that Z.J.’s counsel try to get Z.J. to appear, stating that it was 

“extremely important” for it to hear what she had to say. The trial court scheduled 

the matter for a combined prove-up as to the ground phase and a hearing on the 

dispositional phase of the petition to terminate Z.J.’s parental rights. 
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¶18 On February 9, 2019, the trial court presided over the combined 

prove-up and dispositional phase hearing. Z.J. did not appear and her counsel, 

who were present, had no information to provide to the trial court about where she 

was. 

¶19 The trial court heard testimony from a family case manager, who

worked on the case from March 2016 through December 2018, regarding Z.J.’s 

failure to participate in any drug treatment program since August 2018, her failure 

to control her mental health by engaging in required mental health services, her 

failure to provide safe care for her children, and her failure to visit her children. 

The trial court then found that, for the grounds phase, the State had established by 

clear and convincing evidence both Z.J.’s failure to assume parental responsibility 

and that the children were in continuing need of protection and services. It then 

found that Z.J. was unfit to parent her four children. 

¶20 The hearing then shifted to the dispositional phase of the termination 

of parental rights case. The trial court heard additional testimony from the former 

and current family case managers, and one member of each of the two foster 

families with whom the children were living. The trial court then heard the 

parties’ arguments regarding the termination of Z.J.’s parental rights and asked the 

guardian ad litem to state her position. The guardian ad litem recommended that 

Z.J.’s parental rights as to all four children be terminated. 

¶21 The trial court then rendered an oral decision terminating Z.J’s 

parental rights to the four children. It explained its findings, which included a 

finding that all the testimony relating to the statutory factors to be considered in 

deciding whether to terminate a parent’s rights to a child was credible, and 
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addressed the required statutory factors and its consideration of the guardian ad 

litem’s recommendation. The trial court entered orders terminating Z.J.’s parental 

rights on February 20, 2019. 

¶22 This appeal follows. 

¶23 We refer to additional relevant facts in our discussion. 

DISCUSSION

¶24 As noted, Z.J.’s only argument on appeal is that the trial court 

erroneously exercised its discretion when it entered default judgment against her 

during the grounds phase of the petitions to terminate her parental rights to her 

children. 

I. Standard of review and applicable law 

¶25 The decision whether to enter a default judgment rests with the 

sound discretion of the trial court. See Evelyn C.R. v. Tykila S., 2001 WI 110, 

¶18, 246 Wis. 2d 1, 629 N.W.2d 768. When reviewing a discretionary 

determination, “we examine the record to determine if the circuit court logically 

interpreted the facts, applied the proper legal standard, and used a demonstrated, 

rational process to reach a conclusion that a reasonable judge could reach.” See

Brandon Apparel Grp., Inc. v. Pearson Props., Ltd., 2001 WI App 205, ¶10, 247 

Wis. 2d 521, 634 N.W.2d 544. We will uphold the trial court’s factual findings 

unless they are clearly erroneous. See WIS. STAT. § 805.17(2).

¶26 A trial court has “both inherent authority and statutory authority 

under WIS. STAT. §§ 802.10(7), 804.12(2)(a), and 805.03 to sanction” a party “for 
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failing to obey court orders,” which includes entering default judgment against 

that party. Evelyn C.R., 246 Wis. 2d 1, ¶17 (footnotes omitted). “To grant default 

judgment, the circuit court must find that the non-complying party’s conduct is 

without a clear and justifiable excuse and conclude that the noncompliance was 

either egregious or in bad faith.” Brandon Apparel Grp., Inc., 247 Wis. 2d 521, 

¶11. “A circuit court is not required to analyze a specific set of factors before 

awarding a default judgment; instead, it should focus on ‘the degree to which the 

party’s conduct offends the standards of trial practice.’” See id. (citation omitted).

II. The trial court properly exercised its discretion when it 

granted default judgment against Z.J. on the grounds phase of 

the termination of parental rights proceeding 

¶27 In arguing that the trial court erroneously exercised its discretion in 

defaulting her on the grounds phase of the termination of parental rights case, Z.J. 

first argues “[a]lthough Judge Foley told Z.J. during the first two hearings in front 

of him that she had to appear at subsequent hearings and cooperate with the 

discovery process, Judge Foley was not the judge who presided over [the] cases ... 

after the substitution request was approved.” She then asserts that, after a 

substitution request is timely filed, the judge named in the substitution request has 

no further jurisdiction. 

¶28 Z.J. then states that Judge Donald was assigned to her cases after the 

substitution requests were filed. She then asserts that Judge Donald never orally 

or in writing ordered Z.J. to make all court appearances personally or comply with 

discovery requests. Z.J. asserts that 

because [she] was not under an order from Judge Donald—

the court that presided and had jurisdiction over her 

cases—to appear personally at all scheduled hearings or 

comply with discovery requests, it was erroneous for the 
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[trial] court to determine that she disobeyed the court’s 

orders, her conduct was egregious, and default her. 

¶29 Z.J.’s argument is undeveloped. She does not provide any reasoning 

for her bald assertion that the judicial officer who enters a default judgment 

against a party must be the same judicial officer who ordered that party to appear 

at all judicial proceedings and cooperate with discovery or face being held to have 

defaulted. Moreover, she cites no legal authority for the proposition. “Arguments 

unsupported by references to legal authority will not be considered.” State v. 

Pettit, 171 Wis. 2d 627, 646, 492 N.W.2d 633 (Ct. App. 1992). 

¶30 As previously stated, not once but twice, Z.J. was ordered to appear 

for court proceedings and to comply with discovery requests, and told that, if she 

did not do so, she could “lose [her] right to fight against the termination of [her] 

parental rights.”7 She was clearly ordered to comply with those requirements and 

that, if she did not do so, she could face default judgment. We are not persuaded 

by Z.J.s’ first argument.

¶31 Z.J.’s second argument is that her personal appearance at the 

September 27, November 14, and December 21, 2018 hearings was unnecessary 

 

7

 As noted earlier, Judge Foley advised Z.J., at both the June 13, 2018 plea hearing and 

the July 9, 2018 hearing where Z.J. filed the substitution request, that she had to appear at all 

scheduled hearings and comply with discovery requests or she could be subject to default—lose 

her right to fight against the termination of her parental rights. Z.J. appears to argue that Judge 

Foley lost jurisdiction of the cases after the substitution request was filed. Assuming without 

deciding whether Judge Foley lost jurisdiction to issue the order after the substitution request was 

filed, Z.J. does not argue and, therefore, concedes that he had jurisdiction to issue the order at the 

June 13, 2018 hearing. See State v. Pettit, 171 Wis. 2d 627, 646-47, 492 N.W.2d 633 (Ct. App. 

1992) (declining to develop or to consider party’s undeveloped arguments). 
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because the hearings were all scheduled for J.T.N.’s change of placement motion. 

We disagree.

¶32 We begin with the court’s orders. On June 13, 2018, the trial court 

stated that “you need to appear for all subsequently[ ]scheduled hearings.” 

(Emphasis added.) Then, on July 9, 2018, the trial court stated, “I’ll advise all the 

parents you need to reappear for the next hearing, all subsequently scheduled 

hearings[.]” (Emphasis added.) The trial court’s order did not include any 

exceptions to the order that Z.J. appear at any and all subsequently scheduled 

hearings. In addition, the September 27, 2018 hearing was scheduled to address 

Z.J.’s motion for a change in visitation. The motion was only withdrawn at the 

hearing on September 27, 2018, when Z.J. failed to appear. Z.J.’s appearance was 

also never waived at any hearing where she failed to appear. 

¶33 Furthermore, the trial court’s decision to enter default judgment as to 

the grounds phase against Z.J. was not based solely on her failure to make court 

appearances, the trial court also relied upon Z.J.’s failure to appear for her 

depositions. The trial court stated as follows: 

Given her nonappearance—this is the—and I’ve tried many 

times to give her an opportunity to appear in court. Given 

her failure to respond to the scheduled depositions, given 

her failure to appear in court, given the fact that this is the 

second court appearance where the State has made the 

request for default finding, I find her nonappearance to be 

egregious, and it has been persistent, and given that, the 

[c]ourt at this time will find [Z.J.] in default with respect to 

phase one. 

¶34 Z.J.’s third argument is that her fear of losing housing, which was 

one of the conditions for the return of her children, and her fear of being arrested 
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were a justifiable excuse for her failure to appear at the November 14 and 

December 21, 2018 hearings. 

¶35 Z.J.’s counsel presented the general contours of that argument on 

December 21, 2018, in opposition to the State’s request for entry of default 

arguing as follows: 

[S]he was taken into custody on an outstanding child 

support warrant for Marathon County where the intention 

was they were going to remove—or move her up there 

because she was behind on child support for kids that I 

believe are already 18 or close to 18. 

So when that happened, her probation officer put an 

automatic hold on her at the House of Correction. So she 

was sitting and was never brought to Marathon County and 

it took two and-a-half weeks for her probation officer to lift 

that hold. 

In that time she lost her spot at Sojourner. She was 

living in their temporary housing. She lost—I mean, 

everything stopped. It totally threw her off track and she 

struggled mightily to get back on track since then. 

She does have—I believe she does still have a 

warrant through her probation officer. And she’s 

desperately afraid if she goes into custody that she’ll lose 

the housing that she was finally able to secure. 

....

But if it is because she doesn’t want to be taken into 

custody, and this awful cycle starts again and she loses the 

housing she’s been trying for years[,] years to get,.... And 

so I would ask that we be allowed to stay on and she not be 

defaulted. 

¶36 The trial court stated that it was “not unsympathetic to the plight of 

marginalized and poor individuals in our system.” However, the trial court also 

recognized that it had to “balance not only what [was] fair for [Z.J.,] but also what 

[was] fair for the children.” The trial court then found Z.J. in default relying on 
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her “egregious” and “persistent” nonappearance and her failure to respond to 

depositions. Thus, the trial court rejected the contention that Z.J.’s concerns

regarding housing and being taken into custody on the probation arrest warrant 

were a justifiable excuse for her not appearing at scheduled court proceedings. 

¶37 Furthermore, even after finding Z.J. in default, the trial court left the 

door open for her to appear at the combined prove-up on the grounds phase and 

the dispositional phase hearing on February 9, 2019. The trial court stated,

However, what I will do, [Z.J’s trial counsel], is 

allow you to remain on the case until we—until—at least 

until the disposition phase or phase two of the case. If you 

are able to reach out and get her to appear, I—it’s 

extremely important for the [c]ourt to hear her voice. But, 

you know at this point in time, the [c]ourt will default [Z.J.] 

as relates to the grounds phase[.] 

¶38 However, Z.J. did not appear at the combined ground phase proveup and dispositional phase hearing on February 9, 2019. When the trial court 

asked trial counsel about Z.J.’s whereabouts, trial counsel stated that she did not 

have any information that she could provide. The State advised the trial court that 

Z.J. was not in custody and that she remained in absconder status from her 

probation agent. The trial court responded, “All right, then the [c]ourt previously 

has found [Z.J.] in default as relates to the filing of the TPR [termination of 

parental rights], and I will continue that default finding with respect to the 

dispositional phase.” 

¶39 Based on the foregoing, we conclude that the record establishes that,

when entering default against Z.J. during the grounds phase, the trial court 

“logically interpreted the facts, applied the proper legal standard, and used a 

demonstrated, rational process to reach a conclusion that a reasonable judge could 
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reach.” See Brandon Apparel Grp., Inc., 247 Wis. 2d 521, ¶10. Therefore, we 

affirm. 

CONCLUSION

¶40 We conclude that the trial court properly exercised its discretion 

when it entered default judgment against Z.J. during the grounds phase of the 

petitions to terminate her parental rights to her children, and reaffirmed its holding 

when she failed to appear at the combined grounds phase prove-up and 

dispositional phase hearing. Therefore, we affirm the trial court’s orders. 

By the Court.—Orders affirmed. 

This opinion will not be published. WIS. STAT. RULE 

809.23(1)(b)(4).