FILED

January 16, 1998

Cecil W. Crowson

Appellate Court Clerk

IN THE COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS OF TENNESSEE

AT NASHVILLE

DECEMBER 1997 SESSION

CARLTON L. MAYO, ) NO. 01C01-9703-CC-00074

)

Appellant ) MONTGOMERY COUNTY

)

V. ) HON. ROBERT W. WEDEMEYER

) JUDGE

STATE OF TENNESSEE, )

) (Post-Conviction)

Appellee )

FOR THE APPELLANT FOR THE APPELLEE

Carlton L. Mayo, Pro Se John Knox Walkup

Reg. No. 14403-075 QTRL-B Attorney General and Reporter

P.O. Box 4000

Manchester, Kentucky 40962-4000 Elizabeth B. Marney

Assistant Attorney General

450 James Robertson Parkway

Nashville, Tennessee 37243-0493

 

Arthur Bieber

Assistant District Attorney

John W. Carney

District Attorney General

204 Franklin Street

Suite 200

Clarksville, Tennessee 37040

OPINION FILED: 

AFFIRMED PURSUANT TO RULE 20

William M. Barker, Judge
1

The petitio n refers to the tw o pre vious conv iction s by do cke t num bers only. In the tria l court’s

order dismissing the petition for post-conviction relief, the trial court indicated that the underlying

convictions being attacked by the appellant were imposed in 1983 and 1984. In the briefs which the

parties have filed in this Court, they agree that the appellant’s pleas of guilty were to second degree

burglary and possession of marijuana for resale.

2

Opinion

The appellant, Carlton L. Mayo, appeals from the judgment of the Circuit Court

of Montgomery County dismissing his petition for post-conviction relief without the

appointment of counsel or an evidentiary hearing. Following our review of the record

upon appeal, we affirm the trial court pursuant to Rule 20 of the Tennessee Court of

Criminal Appeals. 

On May 14, 1996, the appellant, proceeding pro se, filed an unsworn petition in

the Montgomery County Circuit Court seeking post-conviction relief from two criminal

convictions previously entered against the appellant as a result of his pleas of guilty.1

Although the petition alleges that the appellant had served both of his sentences, he

was nevertheless seeking relief from his state convictions for the reason that he had

been convicted of drug-related offenses in federal court in 1993, and his state

convictions were used to enhance his federal sentence. In his petition, the appellant

alleges that his guilty pleas were not entered voluntarily and knowingly. 

In response to the appellant’s petition for post-conviction relief, the State filed a

motion to dismiss contending that the applicable statute of limitation had expired. The

trial court agreed and dismissed the appellant’s petition. 

On appeal, the appellant argues that the new Post-Conviction Procedure Act,

which became effective May 10, 1995, provided the petitioner with a one-year window

of opportunity from the effective date of the Act within which to file a petition seeking

post-conviction relief notwithstanding the age of the convictions being collaterally

attacked. See Compiler’s Notes to Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-30-201 (1996 Supp.)

referring to Acts 1995, ch. 207 §3. Indeed, a panel of this Court adopted the position

now being argued on appeal by the appellant in the unreported opinion in Arnold
2

In seeking to obtain a ruling that his petition was filed within one (1) year of the effective date of

the new Post-C onvic tion Proce dure Act, th e app ellant argu es in h is brie f that h e pro perly lo dged his

petition at the federal prison postal office on May 7, 1996, and therefore, we should consider the petition

filed that date rather than May 14, 1996, when it was filed by the circuit court clerk. It is unnecessary that

we make such a finding, having concluded that the petition was time-barred regardless of whether it was

filed May 7, 1996, or May 14, 1996.

3

Carter v. State, No. 03C01-9509-CC-00270 (Tenn. Crim. App., at Knoxville, July 11,

1996). However, our supreme court recently reversed this Court’s holding in the Carter

case. The unanimous court ruled that the new Post-Conviction Procedure Act did not

provide a new opportunity for petitioners to file post-conviction proceedings in those

cases where the statute of limitation had expired under the former Post-Conviction

Procedure Act. Carter v. State, 952 S.W.2d 417 (Tenn. 1997). The convictions which

the appellant seeks to collaterally attack in this petition occurred in 1983 and 1984. 

Shortly thereafter, our legislature enacted a three-year statute of limitation that was

applicable to all petitions for post-conviction relief filed on or after July 1, 1986. Tenn.

Code Ann. § 40-30-102 (1986 Supp.). The appellant’s right to file for post-conviction

relief would therefore have been barred on July 1, 1989. See Abston v. State, 749

S.W.2d 487, 488 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1988). Since the instant petition was filed

May 14, 1996,2

 the trial court was correct in finding that the appellant’s petition was

barred by the applicable statute of limitation. Based upon the foregoing, we affirm the

trial court pursuant to Rule 20 of the Tennessee Court of Criminal Appeals.

__________________________

WILLIAM M. BARKER, JUDGE

CONCUR:

______________________________

JOE B. JONES, PRESIDING JUDGE

_____________________________

PAUL G. SUMMERS, JUDGE