GAO-03-879R Joint Tactical Radio System Program

United States General Accounting Office 

Washington, DC 20548 

August 11, 2003 

The Honorable Jerry Lewis 

Chairman 

Subcommittee on Defense 

Committee on Appropriations 

House of Representatives 

The Honorable John P. Murtha 

Ranking Minority Member 

Subcommittee on Defense 

Committee on Appropriations 

House of Representatives 

Subject: Challenges and Risks Associated with the Joint Tactical Radio System 

Program

The recent emergence of software-defined radio technology offers the potential 

to address key communications shortfalls and significantly improve military 

capabilities. The Joint Tactical Radio System (JTRS) program was initiated in 1997 

to develop and apply this technology and to bring together separate service-led 

programs into a joint software-defined radio development effort. JTRS radios are 

intended to interoperate with existing radio systems and provide the war fighter 

with additional communications capability to access maps and other visual data, 

communicate via voice and video with other units and levels of command, and 

obtain information directly from battlefield sensors. As such, the JTRS program is 

considered a major transformational effort for the military and is expected to enable 

information superiority, network-centric warfare as well as modernization efforts, 

such as the Army’s Future Combat Systems.1

 Although total program costs have yet 

to be determined, the Army’s effort to acquire and field close to half of the estimated 

250,000 JTRS radios that are needed is expected to cost $14.4 billion. 

You asked us to review the JTRS program to determine if there are either 

management or technical challenges and risks that could jeopardize a successful 

program outcome. We briefed your staff on May 5, 2003, on the results of our review. 

This report summarizes that information and transmits the briefing itself (see enc. I). 

 

1

 The Future Combat Systems program is a major Army transformational effort, comprised of 

18 networked weapon systems that will replace several current combat systems. 
2 GAO-03-879R Joint Tactical Radio System Program

Challenges Facing the JTRS Program 

We found that the JTRS Program has made considerable progress to date in planning 

and developing key aspects of the JTRS radios. At a fundamental level, a Joint 

Program Office has been established to bring together the services’ individual 

efforts to develop software-defined radios. The program office was instrumental 

in developing a standard software communications architecture that provides a 

foundation for building JTRS radios and evolving an open systems approach to 

facilitate technology insertion. The program office has reduced risk by employing 

an evolutionary acquisition strategy, whereby improved communications capabilities 

will be delivered in increments. 

However, the program still faces several managerial and technological challenges 

that could affect the Department of Defense’s (DOD’s) ability to develop and procure 

JTRS radios successfully. These include managing requirements and funding, 

maturing key technologies, integrating system components, testing, and developing 

secure communications. The most significant challenge we identified is the lack of a 

strong, joint-management structure. 

The current JTRS management structure is made up of a Joint Program Office, 

designated service-led program clusters, and other DOD organizations carrying 

out several related acquisition activities.2 The Joint Program Office is responsible 

for developing the communications architecture, radio waveforms, and security 

components, while the services are primarily responsible for developing, acquiring, 

and funding the actual radios. This structure, while preferable over individual service 

efforts, is still fragmented, making it difficult to resolve interservice differences 

involving requirements and funding, and hampering the production of key program 

documents, as in the following examples: 

• It has been difficult to get the services to commit the funding necessary to 

execute the JTRS program. 

• The program management structure has been unable to get the services to reach 

agreement over new and changing requirements expeditiously. 

• Key program documents, such as the Concept of Operations and Migration 

Plans, have not effectively provided a joint vision for how JTRS capabilities will 

be developed and used. 

As a consequence, several program development efforts, such as handheld radios, 

have been delayed by more than a year. In the meantime, the Army has purchased 

more existing radios with fewer communications capabilities, which may further 

delay the delivery of JTRS capabilities to users. 

Technology maturity is another significant challenge facing the JTRS program. Our 

work on best practices has shown that programs that move to product development 

 

2

 Clusters are radio development efforts that are organized around weapons platforms, such as ground 

vehicles and helicopters, as well as fixed-wing aircraft and maritime systems. 
3 GAO-03-879R Joint Tactical Radio System Program

with immature technologies have greater difficulty meeting cost, schedule, and 

performance requirements than programs that mature technologies before moving 

into product development.3

 The initial JTRS radio development, for helicopters 

and ground vehicles, was allowed to proceed into the Systems Development 

and Demonstration phase with technology readiness levels lower than those 

recommended by best practices. Further, technologies that are critical to several 

JTRS variants—such as miniaturized components, batteries, and multimodal 

antennas—are not sufficiently advanced to meet requirements and will take several 

more years to mature. Examples of other technological challenges include the 

development of complex software, the difficulty of integrating radios with host 

platforms, and a compressed testing schedule. In addition, developing encrypted 

capabilities and secure communications will be difficult because of the complex 

nature of the radio. 

Recommendations for Executive Action 

While significant accomplishments have been realized, management and 

technological challenges exist that could impair JTRS’s success. We recommend 

the Secretary of Defense take steps to strengthen the joint-program management 

structure to facilitate program funding and requirements outcomes and assure 

configuration management of JTRS. In strengthening the structure, the Secretary 

should consider (1) establishing centralized program funding, (2) realigning the Joint 

Program Office under a different organizational arrangement, and (3) placing the 

cluster development programs under the Joint Program Office control. We also 

recommend that the Secretary of Defense take action to ensure the JTRS Program 

realizes its full potential by (1) directing the completion of key program documents 

detailing the program’s vision; (2) making sure key enabling technologies, such as 

networking capabilities, are adequately addressed; and (3) assessing the impact that 

the continued purchase of existing radios may have on JTRS. 

Agency Comments and Our Evaluation 

In written comments to a draft of this report (see enc. II), DOD concurred with our 

findings and both of our recommendations. However, DOD disagreed with one of the 

options we suggested for implementing our recommendation on strengthening the 

JTRS joint management structure. While DOD supports consolidation of all research, 

development, test, and evaluation funding for JTRS, it believes that procurement and 

integration funding is best left in the individual service budgets. We agree that this 

would be a good first step, but we also believe funding needs to be closely monitored 

as the program progresses towards procurement. 

 

3

 U.S. General Accounting Office, Best Practices: Better Matching of Needs and Resources Will Lead to 

Better Weapon System Outcomes, GAO-01-288 (Washington, D.C.: Mar. 8, 2001). 
4 GAO-03-879R Joint Tactical Radio System Program

Scope and Methodology 

To assess the status of the program, we reviewed relevant DOD and service program 

documents and interviewed key officials. In examining the program, we analyzed 

technological and management factors that could affect the program’s success and 

key program development efforts as well as projected funding and schedule profiles. 

We conducted our work from October 2002 through April 2003 in accordance with 

generally accepted government auditing standards. 

- - - - - 

We are sending copies of this report to the Secretary of Defense; Secretary of the Air 

Force; Secretary of the Army; Secretary of the Navy; Commandant of the Marine 

Corps; the Director, Office of Management and Budget; and interested congressional 

committees. We will also make copies available to others upon request. In addition, 

the report will be available at no charge on the GAO Web site at http://www.gao.gov. 

Should you or your staff have any questions on matters discussed in this report, 

please contact me on (202) 512-2811 or John Oppenheim at (202) 512-3111. Principal 

contributors to this report were Joel Christenson, Gary Middleton, John Swain, Hai 

Tran, and Nicole Volchko. 

Paul L. Francis 

Director, Acquisition and Sourcing Management 

Enclosures 
Enclosure I Enclosure I 

5 GAO-03-879R Joint Tactical Radio System Program

Joint Tactical Radio System 

(JTRS) Program

JTRS

Briefing to the 

House Committee on Appropriations

Subcommittee on Defense

May 5, 2003
Enclosure I Enclosure I 

6 GAO-03-879R Joint Tactical Radio System Program

2

Focus of Review

• Are there challenges and risks associated with the JTRS 

program that could jeopardize a successful outcome?
Enclosure I Enclosure I 

7 GAO-03-879R Joint Tactical Radio System Program

3

Briefing Structure

• JTRS background

• Program details

• Factors affecting program success

• Summary observations

• Options to increase likelihood of JTRS program success
Enclosure I Enclosure I 

8 GAO-03-879R Joint Tactical Radio System Program

4

JTRS Background 

Introduction

• JTRS was born out of a desire to address key shortfalls in 

tactical battlefield communications capabilities, and bring 

separate service-led, software-defined radio programs 

together into a joint development effort.

• Many legacy radios do not interoperate with one another, 

are out of date, and are expensive to maintain.

• Recent emergence of software-defined radio technology in 

the commercial sector provides DOD with new opportunities 

to address past problems and increase communications 

capabilities.
Enclosure I Enclosure I 

9 GAO-03-879R Joint Tactical Radio System Program

5

• JTRS:

• Is a major transformational effort for the military

• Enables information superiority, network-centric warfare, and 

modernization efforts such as the Future Combat Systems

• Combines functions and uses common components, 

reducing the unit cost and number of radios needed (250,000 

JTRS radios, compared to 750,000 legacy radios currently in 

use)

• Increases communications capabilities

• High data throughput, improved interoperability, and networking

JTRS Background

Intended Impacts
Enclosure I Enclosure I 

10 GAO-03-879R Joint Tactical Radio System Program

6

• Develop a family of interoperable, digital, modular, softwaredefined radios that:

• Provide voice, data, video capabilities as needed 

• Interoperate with legacy systems (32 legacy waveforms to be 

developed such as Link-16)

• Utilize a common, standard software architecture 

• Provide flexibility to fit radios into a broad range of platforms

• Supply new wideband networking capability—Wideband 

Networking Waveform (WNW)

JTRS Background

Program Objectives
Enclosure I Enclosure I 

11 GAO-03-879R Joint Tactical Radio System Program

7

JTRS Background

Acquisition Strategy

• Employ an evolutionary acquisition approach, fielding 

capabilities in blocks and allowing for technology insertion

• Develop software communications architecture to provide 

foundation for building interoperable radios

• Assign development and acquisition responsibilities to 

different organizations—the Joint Program Office (JPO) to 

develop architecture and manage waveform acquisition, 

while services manage and acquire radios 

• Migrate and field radios in a phased approach as new 

platforms are produced and as legacy systems are retired
Enclosure I Enclosure I 

12 GAO-03-879R Joint Tactical Radio System Program

8

JTRS Background

Program Management Structure

Recommends

JTRS Clusters

A Lead Service 

PMO acquires 

JTRS Radio Sets 

based on Cluster 

requirements 

recommended by 

the Joint Service 

Working Group, 

and approved by 

the DAE

Cluster Radios

PEO

ASD (C3I)

General Officer

Steering Council

Joint Service

Working Group Cluster

PMO SAE

SAE

Waveforms, 

Architecture,

Certification

JPO CIO

Endorses

JTRS Clusters

Recommends

JTRS Clusters

A Lead Service 

PMO acquires 

JTRS Radio Sets 

based on Cluster 

requirements 

recommended by 

the Joint Service 

Working Group, 

and approved by 

the DAE

Cluster Radios

PEO

ASD (C3I)

General Officer

Steering Council

Joint Service

Working Group Cluster

PMO SAE

SAE

Waveforms, 

Architecture,

Certification

JPO CIO

Endorses

JTRS Clusters
Enclosure I Enclosure I 

13 GAO-03-879R Joint Tactical Radio System Program

9

JTRS Background

Program Management Structure

• The JPO, which reports to the Army Acquisition Executive, 

is responsible for:

• Evolving the open systems architecture,

• Developing waveform applications and associated cryptographic 

algorithms,

• Certifying compliance of hardware and software waveforms, and

• Ensuring overall joint interoperability.

• Radio development and acquisition is conducted through 

service-led clusters, based on grouping platforms with 

similar requirements.

• Each cluster to be considered a separate acquisition program; 

currently two acquisition programs have ACAT 1D designations 

(Cluster 1 and JPO/waveform).
Enclosure I Enclosure I 

14 GAO-03-879R Joint Tactical Radio System Program

10

JTRS Background

Program Management Structure

• A Joint Service Working Group and General Officers 

Steering Council monitor, guide, and coordinate 

development of JTRS and provide forum for resolving 

issues.

• Additional guidance and planning are facilitated through 

Integrated Product Teams.

• Funding of JTRS (JPO and clusters) is not centralized but 

comes from individual service budgets.
Enclosure I Enclosure I 

15 GAO-03-879R Joint Tactical Radio System Program

11

Program Details

Marine 

Corps, Air 

Force, and 

Navy

33 

waveforms 

(21 + WNW 

contracted to 

Cluster 1) 

and

26 Cryptographic 

algorithms

Army

N/A

JPO

(ACAT ID)

Special Navy Air Force Army

Operations

Special 

Operations

Lead Army

Service

Navy, Army, 

Marine 

Corps, and 

Special 

Operations

Aviation 

sets (8 

channel)

Airborne

Cluster 4

TBD

TBD

Embedded

Cluster X

Air Force, Air Force

Army, Marine 

Corps, and 

Navy

Air Force, 

Army, Marine 

Corps, and 

Navy

Air Force 

and Marine 

Corps

Other 

Services

Maritime –

fixed station 

set (4 

channel)

Manpack set 

(2 channel)

Handheld set 

(1 and 2 

channel)

Aviation set 

(4 channel),

Ground 

vehicle radio 

(3 channel),

21 legacy 

waveforms, 

and WNW

Deliverables

Maritime & 

fixed station

Helicopters Handheld Manpack

& ground 

vehicles

Platform

Cluster 1 Cluster 2 Cluster 3

(ACAT ID)
Enclosure I Enclosure I 

16 GAO-03-879R Joint Tactical Radio System Program

12

Program Details

Full-rate N/A 3 Q 07 N/A N/A 1 Q 09 4 Q 08 2 Q 09

production

Multifunctional TBD

information 

distribution 

system (I)

Digital modular 

radio (I) or 

multifunctional 

information 

distribution 

system (A)

Multiband, 

multimission

radio (I)

Multiband 

inter/intra 

team radio 

(I)

Possible N/A N/A

interim 

radios (I) or 

alternate 

radios (A)

1 Q 07

3 Q 02

4 Q 97

N/A

$796.3 

million*

JPO 

(ACAT ID)

Required 138,913 72,692 44,175 7,467 9,540 47,270

number of 

radios

Program 2 Q 01 TBD TBD 3 Q 02 3 Q 02 TBD

initiation

4 Q 07

4 Q 04

Unknown

Cluster 4

1 Q 07

2 Q 04

Unknown

Cluster X

Milestone C 2 Q 06 2 Q 06 4 Q 06 4 Q 06

3 Q 03 2 Q 04 1 Q 04

(Delayed)

Milestone B 3 Q 02

$14.4 Unknown Unknown Unknown

billion*

Total 

acquisition 

cost

Cluster 1 Cluster 2 Cluster 3

(ACAT ID)

* Current estimate, base year FY2002 dollars
Enclosure I Enclosure I 

17 GAO-03-879R Joint Tactical Radio System Program

13

Program Details

Total = $5,908.0 million

0.0

200.0

400.0

600.0

800.0

1000.0

1200.0

Dollars in millions

2002 + 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009

Fiscal Year

Identified JTRS Program Funding*

JPO Army Air Force Navy Marine Corps Special Operations Other

* See slide number 29 for information supporting this chart.
Enclosure I Enclosure I 

18 GAO-03-879R Joint Tactical Radio System Program

14

Factors Affecting Program Success

JTRS Knowledge Development

• JTRS is a large, multi-faceted, and complex program that 

will take time to reach its full capabilities.

• Program success will mean developing, producing, and 

delivering joint tactical radios that are affordable, 

interoperable, and offer enhanced communications 

capability.

• GAO’s best practices work has shown that complex 

weapons programs are more likely to reach a successful 

outcome when a high level of knowledge exists about 

critical facets of the product being developed at key 

junctures during its development.
Enclosure I Enclosure I 

19 GAO-03-879R Joint Tactical Radio System Program

15

Factors Affecting Program Success

JTRS Knowledge Development

• The knowledge-based process followed by leading commercial firms 

can be broken down into three key knowledge points:

1. A match must be made between user needs and the available resources—

technology, engineering, time, and funding—before system development is 

launched. The results achieved from this match are balanced and realistic 

requirements, sufficient investment to complete the development, and a firm 

commitment to deliver the product.

2. A product’s design must demonstrate its ability to meet performance 

requirements and be stable about midway through development.

3. The developer must show the product can be manufactured within cost, 

schedule, and quality targets and demonstrate it is reliable before 

production begins.

• To date, the JTRS program has made considerable progress in 

acquiring knowledge on several key aspects of product development, 

but it also faces numerous technical and management challenges that 

could affect a successful outcome.
Enclosure I Enclosure I 

20 GAO-03-879R Joint Tactical Radio System Program

16

Factors Affecting Program Success

Positive Developments

• DOD recognizes the need for a transformational, joint, interoperable 

radio solution to enable network centric operations.

• The evolutionary acquisition strategy for developing and delivering 

JTRS radios can provide improved capabilities at reduced risk.

• As technology advances, enhanced capabilities should be able to be 

added because of the open systems architecture.

• DOD envisions upgrades being delivered through new software, much like 

desktop personal computers.

• Development of a software communications architecture provides a

foundation for building compatible radios and may become the 

standard for software programmable radios.

• Architecture has received strong support from commercial sector and is 

currently going through certification process by the Object Management 

Group.
Enclosure I Enclosure I 

21 GAO-03-879R Joint Tactical Radio System Program

17

• Demonstrated JTRS concept

• Recent test conducted of small network of prototype JTRS radios in 

a field environment exercise

• Established Integrated Product Teams and Joint Services 

Working Group to facilitate coordination and knowledge 

sharing

• Clusters have also established ad hoc communications 

arrangements to augment formal channels

• Cluster 1 program office has recognized product development 

risks and defined risk management processes

• DOD has emphasized competitiveness in contract awards to 

address affordability

• Cluster 1 prime contractor is responsible for qualifying two 

subcontractors to develop and build Cluster 1 JTRS radios

Factors Affecting Program Success

Positive Developments
Enclosure I Enclosure I 

22 GAO-03-879R Joint Tactical Radio System Program

18

Factors Affecting Program Success

Management Challenges

• Managing requirements: Ensuring the services jointly identify and 

coordinate requirements of JTRS has been problematic since the 

program began. Joint program management process has been 

unable to effectively resolve some interservice differences.

• ORD has gone through several iterations since the program began

• Disagreement exists between Army and OSD over new and changing 

requirements for Cluster 2 and proposed Cluster X radios. As a consequence, 

initiation of Cluster 2 development has been delayed more than a year.

• Other differences in meeting requirements have recently surfaced and have 

slowed progress of Clusters 3 and 4 (e.g., how to fold the Multifunctional 

Information Distribution System program into JTRS).

• Further requirements changes (e.g., bringing other information data systems 

like the Joint Tactical Terminal into the JTRS program) may hinder JTRS 

progress.

• Army, as the service acquisition executive, has greater clout over requirements 

determination than other services.
Enclosure I Enclosure I 

23 GAO-03-879R Joint Tactical Radio System Program

19

Factors Affecting Program Success

Management Challenges

• Concept of Operations: Should provide vision for how JTRS 

capabilities will be used in an operational environment and should 

guide key aspects of the program such as requirements definition

and fielding strategies.

• JTRS Concept of Operations has not sufficiently provided this 

perspective.

• According to program officials, Concept of Operations does not 

reflect the joint vision of JTRS but instead reflects service-centric, 

radio-replacement perspective.

• Services are currently revising Concept of Operations, to be issued 

later this year
Enclosure I Enclosure I 

24 GAO-03-879R Joint Tactical Radio System Program

20

Factors Affecting Program Success

Management Challenges

• Funding: Ensuring service funding commitments to cluster radio 

development efforts and articulating overall JTRS program costs 

has been difficult.

• Services have been slow to commit funding to the program, although situation has 

gotten better over time.

• However, services (except for some limited Army funding) have not committed funding to Cluster 2 development.

• Restriction on Special Operations Command funds further hampers program.

• Acquisition costs still undefined for major components of the program.

• JPO must rely on funding by the Army for its activities and has been unable to meet 

staffing goals.

• Migration planning: Creating a road map for integrating JTR sets 

into the services in the most timely, cost efficient, and productive 

way has been difficult.

• An Acquisition Decision Memorandum called for a joint migration plan by October 

2001; still no plan has been issued, although the services are working on one.
Enclosure I Enclosure I 

25 GAO-03-879R Joint Tactical Radio System Program

21

Factors Affecting Program Success

Management Challenges

• Schedule: Direction from DOD leadership is trying to accelerate 

development schedules to field capabilities and meet anticipated

needs.

• Cluster 1 schedule is rated medium to high risk by program office, due to a compressed test and evaluation phase which leaves little room for error.

• Other clusters have taken a significant amount of time to get started.

• Waiver process: Balancing immediate service needs to acquire 

legacy radios with longer-term service JTRS requirements.

• DOD-wide waiver process was created in 1998 to minimize purchases of

legacy radios or development of other radios that are not JTRS compliant.

• Since January 2003 alone, more than $75 million approved for purchases of 

legacy radios to satisfy immediate requirements.

• Army made a significant number purchases of handheld radios via this process while reducing its requirement for JTRS radios.

• Additional funding for legacy radios may increase costs and delay delivery of 

JTRS capabilities to users. 
Enclosure I Enclosure I 

26 GAO-03-879R Joint Tactical Radio System Program

22

Factors Affecting Program Success 

Technology Challenges

• Technology readiness: Continued focus needed on 

maturing and integrating technologies into JTRS 

• Cluster 1 approved at Milestone B with technology readiness 

levels lower than those recommended by best practices.

• Additional technological advances will be needed for handheld 

and embedded radios such as miniaturization, batteries, and 

heat dissipation.

• Furthermore, advanced antennas that can operate over 

different frequencies and transmit and receive with other radios

on-the-move are essential.

• Antenna development is not a part of JTRS program, 

although some research and development efforts are 

underway elsewhere in DOD.
Enclosure I Enclosure I 

27 GAO-03-879R Joint Tactical Radio System Program

23

Factors Affecting Program Success

Technology Challenges

• Waveforms: Adapting waveforms, developing new WNW, and 

transitioning from legacy waveforms to WNW

• Waveform development is software intensive 

• Cluster 1 developing 22 waveforms (21 legacy + WNW)

• WNW development complex (operating frequency, channel bandwidth requirements, hardware processing requirements)

• Software Communications Architecture: Architecture provides a 

core framework for software applications to operate on different

JTRS platforms but alone is not sufficient to ensure interoperability 

• JTRS program must closely manage cluster development efforts to ensure similar interpretation of the architecture, and it must evolve the architecture to 

meet evolving requirements

• Clusters 2 and 3 are evolving existing radios into software communications architecture-compliant as an interim capability, but will begin distinct development efforts for the longer term to achieve JTRS capabilities
Enclosure I Enclosure I 

28 GAO-03-879R Joint Tactical Radio System Program

24

Factors Affecting Program Success

Technology Challenges

• Portability: Ensuring waveform and other software capabilities are 

available to all JTR sets in “plug and play” format.

• Each cluster must adapt “core” waveforms for use in its particular radios.

• Integration: Two key sets of integration issues must be adequately 

addressed—integrating hardware and software components into a 

workable radio that meets requirements and integrating radio sets 

into a broad range of different platforms.

• Radio set integration: Cluster 1 technology readiness assessment highlighted the lack of a hardware and software integrated radio.

• Platform integration: Cluster 4 must plan for over 65 distinct aircraft platforms.

• Testing: Testing process required to ensure interoperability among 

diverse set of radios.

• JPO has established consortium of testing components to coordinate testing, but aggressive testing schedules planned for some clusters.
Enclosure I Enclosure I 

29 GAO-03-879R Joint Tactical Radio System Program

25

Factors Affecting Program Success

Technology Challenges

• Security/encryption: Developing, integrating, and certifying 

security into JTRS sets.

• Requires development of new cryptographic algorithms.

• Must go through a National Security Agency certification process, 

which can be lengthy and is outside control of JTRS program.

• Networking: Development and fielding of networks will be

essential to realize full capabilities of JTRS.

• Services have other network programs underway (e.g., Army 

Warfighter Information Network-Tactical), but it is not clear whether 

they are well coordinated and aligned with JTRS.

• Spectrum management: Obtaining spectrum certification for 

JTRS radios will be challenging because current spectrum 

approval process has never addressed the multi-channel, multimode, multi-frequency nature of software programmable radios.
Enclosure I Enclosure I 

30 GAO-03-879R Joint Tactical Radio System Program

26

Summary Observations

• JTRS is a critical program to the military’s transformational efforts.

• The concept of JTRS and what it can provide for the military is very promising.

• To date, significant accomplishments have been realized such as the software 

communications architecture, open systems approach, demonstration of prototype 

radios, risk management processes, and contract competitiveness.

• However, progress (particularly, in starting several of the clusters) has been 

hampered by difficulties in reaching a match between user requirements and 

resources.

• The lack of a strong joint management structure has made it difficult to resolve 

funding and requirements issues and produce key documents that articulate the 

JTRS vision (Concept of Operations, migration plans). 

• Success will also depend on key enablers that have not been incorporated into 

JTRS development efforts and it is not clear they are being adequately addressed 

elsewhere in DOD—development of networking capabilities and advanced 

antennas.

• Furthermore, the services are spending large amounts of money on legacy radio 

purchases which may have significant impacts on JTRS.
Enclosure I Enclosure I 

31 GAO-03-879R Joint Tactical Radio System Program

27

Options to Increase Likelihood of JTRS 

Program Success

• Strengthen joint management structure to facilitate program funding and 

requirements outcomes and assure configuration management of JTRS. 

For example, consider:

• Establishing centralized program funding

• Realigning JPO under different/rotating/independent leadership

• Putting cluster programs under JPO control

• Complete principal documents (Concept of Operations, migration plans) 

and ensure they provide joint vision for the program

• Ensure that the key enablers that will be necessary for JTRS to reach its 

full capabilities are adequately addressed, such as the

• Need for networking capabilities and 

• Need for technology advances (e.g., miniaturization, batteries, 

antennas) 

• Examine current radio waiver process and assess potential impact that 

continued waiver purchases of legacy radios may have on JTRS
Enclosure I Enclosure I 

32 GAO-03-879R Joint Tactical Radio System Program

Joint Tactical Radio System 

(JTRS) Program

Backup Slide
Enclosure I Enclosure I 

33 GAO-03-879R Joint Tactical Radio System Program

29

Program Details

Identified JTRS Program Funding

Millions of Dollars FY02 + FY03 FY04 FY05 FY06 FY07 FY08 FY09 TOTAL

JPO RDT&E $192.5 $62.9 $134.7 $91.6 $62.8 $55.9 $28.8 $27.3 $656.5

ARMY RDT&E 110.9 95.6 270.8 194.1 122.5 82.6 57 31.4 964.9

ARMY PROCURE 0 0 1.9 159.2 165.6 194.4 185.1 189.8 896

AF RDT&E 4 18.3 54 52.1 112.8 77.9 52.6 37 408.7

AF PROCURE 0 0 0 6.8 134.8 486 537.5 567.6 1732.7

AF O&M 0 0 0 0 0 11.5 11.7 11.8 35

NAVY RDT&E 8.8 19.9 87.9 84.1 57.7 11 9.7 7.1 286.2

NAVY PROCURE 0 0 26 40.6 127.2 123.2 112.7 117.4 547.1

NAVY O&M 0 2.6 2.8 3 3.1 3.2 3.3 3.4 21.4

USMC RDT&E 0 0.6 8.1 8.7 4.1 3.7 1.6 1.6 28.4

USMC PROCURE 0 0 13.9 33.1 32.5 90.9 80.7 73.2 324.3

SOCOM 5 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 5

OTHER 1.2 0.6 0 0 0 0 0 0 1.8

TOTAL $322.4 $200.5 $600.1 $673.3 $823.1 $1,140.3 $1,080.7 $1,067.6 $5,908.0
Enclosure II Enclosure II 

34 GAO-03-879R Joint Tactical Radio System Program

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