IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

No. 15-30462

Summary Calendar

HEATHER HURST, 

 Plaintiff–Appellant,

v.

CAROLYN W. COLVIN, ACTING COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL 

SECURITY, 

 Defendant–Appellee.

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Middle District of Louisiana

USDC No. 3:13-CV-134

Before KING, CLEMENT, and OWEN, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:*

After the Social Security Administration denied Heather Hurst’s 

application for disability insurance benefits, Hurst filed a complaint in district 

court seeking review of the decision. The district court affirmed the denial of 

benefits and Hurst appealed. We affirm the district court and uphold the 

denial of benefits as supported by substantial evidence.

 

* Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined that this opinion should not 

be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH 

CIR. R. 47.5.4.

United States Court of Appeals

Fifth Circuit

FILED

February 12, 2016

Lyle W. Cayce

Clerk

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I

 Hurst applied for disability benefits in November 2010, alleging a 

disability dating back to October 2009 based on lupus, plaque psoriasis, and 

depression. Her application for benefits stated that she worked as an assistant 

director and then as a director at a daycare facility but had to stop working 

due to her symptoms, which included joint pain, swelling, and lesions over 

much of her body. After her application was denied, she requested and 

received an administrative hearing. 

The administrative law judge (ALJ) concluded that Hurst was not 

disabled for purposes of the Social Security Act. As relevant here, the ALJ

found that although Hurst’s obesity and psoriatic arthritis were severe 

impairments, she did not have an impairment listed in Appendix 1 of the 

regulations and retained the residual functional capacity to perform sedentary 

work, including her prior position as a daycare director.1 The agency’s Appeals 

Council denied review. 

Hurst then filed a complaint in district court. The district court affirmed 

the agency’s denial of benefits, adopting the magistrate judge’s 

recommendation and report. That report concluded that the agency’s decision

was supported by substantial evidence. It noted that while the ALJ

erroneously stated that Hurst failed to argue that her conditions satisfied the 

requirements of any impairment listed in Appendix 1, that error was harmless. 

Hurst timely appealed.

 

1 Throughout the text and citations of this opinion, “Appendix 1” refers to the listing 

of impairments found in Appendix 1 to Subpart P of 20 C.F.R. pt. 404.

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II

Our review of disability benefit determinations “is limited 

under 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) to two inquiries: (1) whether substantial evidence of 

record supports the decision; and (2) whether the decision comports with 

proper legal standards.”2 “In applying the ‘substantial evidence’ standard, we 

‘may not reweigh the evidence in the record, nor try the issues de novo, nor 

substitute the Court’s judgment’” for the judgment of the ALJ.3

The Social Security Act defines disability as the “inability to engage in 

any substantial gainful activity by reason of any medically determinable 

physical or mental impairment which can be expected . . . to last for a 

continuous period of not less than 12 months.”4 By regulation, the Social 

Security Administration follows a five-step process to determine whether a 

claimant is disabled.5 In the first two steps, not at issue here, the claimant 

must show she is not currently engaged in substantial gainful activity and has 

a severe impairment.6 Third, she must show that her impairment “meets or 

equals the severity of an impairment listed” in Appendix 1.7 If she makes such 

a showing, the inquiry is at an end and the claimant is entitled to benefits;8

otherwise, we proceed to step four, in which she must show her impairment 

“prevents [her] from doing past relevant work.”9 If she does so, she is entitled 

to benefits unless, at step five, the agency shows that the impairment does not 

prevent her from “mak[ing] an adjustment to other work.”10

 

2 Morgan v. Colvin, 803 F.3d 773, 776 (5th Cir. 2015).

3 Bowling v. Shalala, 36 F.3d 431, 434 (5th Cir. 1994) (per curiam) (brackets omitted) 

(quoting Harrell v. Bowen, 862 F.2d 471, 475 (5th Cir. 1988) (per curiam)).

4 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(1)(A).

5 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)(4); Sun v. Colvin, 793 F.3d 502, 507 (5th Cir. 2015). 6 Sun, 793 F.3d at 507 n.2.

7 Id. (quoting Perez v. Barnhart, 415 F.3d 457, 461 (5th Cir. 2005)).

8 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(d).

9 Sun, 793 F.3d at 507 n.2 (quoting Perez, 415 F.3d at 461). 10 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)(4)(v).

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III

A

Hurst first contends that the ALJ applied the incorrect legal standard at 

step three of the analysis by failing to consider Hurst’s eligibility for benefits

under § 8.05 of Appendix 1, which concerns “extensive skin lesions that persist 

for at least 3 months despite continuing treatment as prescribed.”11

As an initial matter, we acknowledge that the ALJ’s statement that 

Hurst “advanced no argument that he [sic] has a condition which meets . . . the 

requirements of a listed impairment” was incorrect. Indeed, Hurst’s attorney 

argued in the pre-hearing brief and at the hearing that Hurst’s impairments 

met or were equivalent to sections 8.05 (dermatitis) and 14.09 (inflammatory 

arthritis) of Appendix 1. Hurst, citing this court’s decision in Audler v. 

Astrue,12 argues that the ALJ’s failure to address her section 8.05 claim 

requires remand because the decision denying benefits amounts to a “bare 

conclusion . . . beyond meaningful judicial review.” 

Audler, however, does not stand for the proposition that the ALJ’s failure 

to address a claimant’s argument always warrants remand. After determining

that the ALJ’s conclusory rejection of Audler’s argument was not supported by 

a reasoned discussion of the issues, this court then inquired whether that error 

was harmless.13 “Procedural perfection in administrative proceedings is not 

required,” we noted, “as long as the substantial rights of a party have not been 

affected.”14 We remanded Audler’s claim for further proceedings only after 

analyzing the record, which included uncontradicted evidence of severe 

limitations, and concluding that “[a]bsent some explanation from the ALJ to 

 

11 Appendix 1, § 8.05.

12 501 F.3d 446, 448 (5th Cir. 2007).

13 Id. 14 Id. (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Mays v. Bowen, 837 F.2d 1362, 1364 

(5th Cir. 1988) (per curiam)).

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the contrary, Audler would appear to have met her burden of demonstrating” 

that her condition met the requirements of a condition listed in Appendix 1.15

Whether Hurst’s claims require remand depends on whether the ALJ’s error 

“cast[s] into doubt the existence of substantial evidence to support the ALJ's 

decision,” the question to which we now turn.16 

B

Hurst claims the administrative decision denying benefits at step three

“include[d] material misstatements of fact” and “neglected to consider highly 

relevant evidence.” She seeks, among other things, a remand to determine 

whether her conditions qualified as an impairment under section 8.05 of 

Appendix 1.

Section 8.05 is the listing for “dermatitis . . . with extensive skin lesions 

that persist for at least 3 months despite continuing treatment as prescribed.” 

“Extensive skin lesions,” in turn, “are those that involve multiple body sites or 

critical body areas, and result in a very serious limitation.”17 As examples of 

conditions that amount to “very serious limitations” in the context of this 

section, the regulation cites lesions that “very seriously limit” the “use of more 

than one extremity,” “ability to do fine and gross motor movements,” or “ability 

to ambulate.”18

Although the ALJ failed to cite section 8.05 in her decision, she did cite 

considerable evidence that bolstered her conclusion that Hurst “does not have 

an impairment or combination of impairments that meets or medically equals 

the severity” of an impairment listed in Appendix 1. The ALJ’s step-three 

analysis focuses on the assessment of Dr. Angele Bourg, who asserted that 

 

15 Id. at 449.

16 Morris v. Bowen, 864 F.2d 333, 335 (5th Cir. 1988) (per curiam). 17 Appendix 1, § 8.00(C)(1).

18 Id.

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Hurst was disabled because she “would always have difficulty with 

ambulation.” Noting that treatment records revealed “no evidence of 

ineffective ambulation as defined in the listings,” the ALJ gave little weight to 

Dr. Bourg’s opinion. Elsewhere, in her examination of Hurst’s residual 

functional capacity for purposes of the step-four analysis, the ALJ discussed a 

variety of evidence tending to show that Hurst’s statements concerning the 

“intensity, persistence and limiting effects” of her symptoms were not fully

credible. This evidence included a paucity of documented complaints of 

functional limitations in the medical records and examination findings that 

revealed no severe limitations. As the magistrate judge noted, the record also 

includes hearing testimony that Hurst is sometimes able to drive, perform

household chores, care for her child, use a computer, and shop. Taken together, 

this evidence supports a conclusion that Hurst’s lesions do not give rise to a 

very serious limitation within the meaning of the regulations. We thus 

conclude that the ALJ’s failure to explicitly consider section 8.05 was harmless 

error.19

Hurst urges us to reach a different conclusion, noting that she has a 

history of “severe flares of psoriasis,” uses various medications, and is (among 

other things) “unable to get out of bed some mornings.” As we have noted,

Hurst’s evidence is not sufficient to meet her burden of demonstrating 

entitlement to benefits unless it demonstrates that her condition results in 

very serious limitations. Labelling a symptom “severe” or noting that it has 

persisted despite treatment is not enough. Hurst takes issue with the ALJ’s 

resolution of conflicting medical opinions and alleges that the ALJ “ignored 

highly relevant medical evidence” and mischaracterized parts of the medical 

 

19 Compare Appendix 1, § 8.00(C)(1) (condition must result in “very serious limitation” 

to qualify), with id. § 14.09(e)(1) (“Listing-level severity in [this section] is shown by an 

impairment that results in an ‘extreme’ (very serious) limitation.”).

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record, including the frequency of Hurst’s visits to physicians and her use of 

medications. For the reasons described above, however, we conclude that there 

is no doubt that “credible evidentiary choices or medical findings support” the 

ALJ’s decision.20 Finally, Hurst asserts that the district court was “retrying 

the case” and substituting its judgment for the judgment of the Commissioner, 

but the court below undertook only the analysis necessary to determine 

whether the ALJ’s procedural error affected the substantial rights of the 

claimant. The district court held that it did not, and we agree. 

Analysis under section 14.09 of Appendix 1, which addresses 

inflammatory arthritis, yields the same result. Section 14.09 encompasses 

inflammation—often accompanied by joint pain, swelling, and tenderness—

“that results in an ‘extreme’ (very serious) limitation.”21 The ALJ explicitly 

considered Hurst’s eligibility for benefits under this section, and the credibility 

determinations and analysis of the medical evidence are—for the reasons 

discussed above—supported by substantial evidence. 

To the extent Hurst challenges the ALJ’s conclusion at step four that she 

retained the functional capacity to perform her prior work, we find that the 

ALJ’s determinations in this regard are likewise amply supported by 

substantial evidence. The evidence discussed above—including the treatment 

notes and Hurst’s testimony at her hearing—are sufficient to support the ALJ’s 

finding that Hurst is able to perform sedentary work. 

C

Finally, Hurst faults the ALJ for failing to consider a closed period of 

disability. Hurst posits that even though her May 2011 visit to a physician 

“document[ed] improvement” in her condition, the ALJ should have considered 

 

20 Harris v. Apfel, 209 F.3d 413, 417 (5th Cir. 2000). 21 Appendix 1, § 14.09(a), (e)(i).

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whether Hurst was disabled for some twelve-month period ending before that 

time. We disagree. The ALJ considered the entire medical record, including 

evidence relating to visits within the twelve months following the asserted 

onset of disability, in reaching her conclusion. 

* * *

For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the district court is 

AFFIRMED.

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