JUVENILE MIRANDA RIGHTS 

Joey L. Caccarozzo 

Legal Division Intern 

This article will discuss a 

juvenile’s Miranda rights, what constitutes 

a valid waiver of those rights, and what 

officers must do to make sure a juvenile’s 

confession will not be suppressed in court. 

BACKGROUND

Before the twentieth century, 

juveniles were treated and sentenced as 

adults. It was not until the 

Industrialization Era that society 

developed the parens patriae concept, that 

the state could intervene to protect a 

child’s welfare.1

 The juvenile court that 

developed in the 1900’s was very different 

from the adult court by having informal 

proceedings, proceedings based on civil 

law, closed proceedings, emphasis on 

helping the child, and lack of jury trials.2

 The juvenile court system 

remained virtually unchanged until the 

Supreme Court decision, In Re Gault in 

19673

 which held that the due process 

clause of the Fourteenth Amendment 

applied to juvenile court proceedings. The 

opinion states that juveniles have 1) a right 

to notice, 2) a right to counsel, 3) a right to 

confront witnesses, and 4) a privilege 

against self-incrimination in hearings that 

could result in them being confined to an 

institution.4

 The juvenile’s right to notice 

includes being advised in a timely manner 

 

1

 David W. Neubauer, America’s Courts and the 

Criminal Justice System (6th ed., West/Wadsworth 

1998). 

2 Id.

3 Id.

4 In Re Gault, 387 U.S. 1 (1967).

of the charges against them and notice to 

parents when their child has been taken 

into custody. Juveniles have the right to 

have an attorney present during all phases 

of the proceedings. If they cannot afford 

an attorney, one will be appointed for 

them.5

 Juveniles have the right to crossexamine witnesses. Finally, the Court 

extended the Miranda decision to apply to 

juveniles as well as adults. 

 

REQUIREMENTS

FEDERAL JUVENILE DELINQUENCY 

ACT 18 USC § 5033 

Custody prior to appearance before 

magistrate. 

Whenever a juvenile is taken 

into custody for an alleged 

act of juvenile delinquency, 

the arresting officer shall 

immediately advise such 

juvenile of his legal rights, in 

language comprehensive to a 

juvenile, and shall 

immediately notify the 

Attorney General and the 

juvenile’s parents, guardian, 

or custodian of such custody. 

The arresting officer shall 

also notify the parents, 

guardian, or custodian of the 

rights of the juvenile and of 

the nature of the alleged 

offense. 

The juvenile shall be taken 

before a magistrate 

forthwith. In no event shall 

the juvenile be detained for 

longer than a reasonable 

period of time before being 

brought before a magistrate. 

 

5 Id. at 41. 
In Fare v. Michael C., The Supreme Court 

ruled that a totality of the circumstances 

test is adequate to determine a valid 

waiver of rights during an interrogation of 

a juvenile.6 The court must look to all 

circumstances surrounding the 

interrogation. Some factors to consider 

are the juvenile’s age, education, 

experience, intelligence, background, and 

whether the juvenile understands the 

warnings given and the consequences of 

waiving those rights.7

 In this case, the 

juvenile was 16 1⁄2, was currently on 

probation, had a record of prior offenses, 

had spent time in a youth corrections 

camp, was of average intelligence, and 

there was no coercion used. Therefore, 

under the totality of the circumstances, the 

juvenile voluntarily waived his rights and 

the confession was admitted. 

The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals 

uses a three-part test for reviewing 

Juvenile Delinquency Act violations.8

 

First, the Court asks whether the 

government violated § 5033.9 If the 

answer is yes, the next question is whether 

the government’s conduct was so 

outrageous that it deprived the juvenile of 

their due process rights.10 If the answer to 

the second question is yes, then the case is 

reversed.11 Even if the answer is no, the 

court also has discretion to reverse the 

case if the defendant was “prejudiced.”12 

The Ninth Circuit uses a two-step test to 

determine prejudice – 1) was the § 5033 

violation a cause of the confession 

(isolation from family, lack of advice from 

counsel, etc.) and 2) what was the 

 

6 Fare v. Michael C., 442 U.S. 707 (1979). 7 Id. at 725. 8

 U.S. v. Juvenile (RRA-A), 229 F.3d 737 (9th Cir. 

2000). 

9 Id. at 744. 10 Id. at 744. 11 Id. at 744. 12 Id. at 744. 

prejudice caused by the confession.13 For 

example, was the prosecution and 

conviction based primarily on the 

confession? 

 

SCOPE

The State must make a good faith effort 

to locate a juvenile’s parents or 

guardian before beginning questioning. 

In the case U.S. v. Burrous, the 

defendant was arrested for armed 

robbery.14 One of the arresting agents 

asked the defendant three different times 

how his parents or guardian could be 

contacted and the defendant replied that he 

did not know how either his mother, 

father, or brother could be contacted. The 

defendant did not give the agents enough 

information to locate his relatives and he 

did not attempt to contact anyone himself. 

The defendant voluntarily waived his 

Miranda rights and confessed. The court 

ruled that law enforcement officers made 

good faith efforts to locate juvenile’s 

parents and that his confession was 

admissible.15

A juvenile’s parents or guardian must 

be advised of the juvenile’s rights 

immediately, according to §5033. 

In U.S. v. John Doe, the court said 

that even though the agents attempted to 

notify the juvenile’s parents before they 

began to question him, it was three and a 

half hours after he was taken into custody 

and, therefore, not “immediate” under § 

5033.16

 

13 Id. at 747. 14 147 F.3d 111 (2nd Cir. 1998). 15 Id. at 113. 16 219 F.3d 1009, 1015 (9th Cir. 2000). 
The arresting officer has the 

responsibility to notify parents or 

guardians that the juvenile is in 

custody. 

 In U.S. v. Juvenile (RRA-A), the 

arresting officer twice delegated his job of 

notifying a juvenile’s parents or consulate 

- first to an AUSA and second to a 

secretary in the United States Attorney’s 

office.17 (The juvenile was a foreign 

national whose parents were not in the 

United States. Therefore, the appropriate 

consulate should have been contacted.) 

The arresting officer must comply with § 

5033 unless there are extenuating 

circumstances.18 This type of violation 

alone will not result in reversal, because it 

is not considered a due process violation. 

In this case, because the officer delegated 

his duties and the consulate was not 

contacted before the interrogation and the 

court ruled that these § 5033 violations 

were prejudicial. The juvenile’s confession 

was suppressed.19

A juvenile must be brought before a 

magistrate “forthwith,” according to § 

5033. 

 

 The Ninth Circuit held that a 34-

hour delay was reasonable where no 

magistrate judge was available, the agents 

were busy with other urgent cases, and the 

government agreed not to use the prearraignment statement of the juvenile.20 

 A 31-hour delay caused by a U.S. 

Marshal policy that only accepted juvenile 

prisoners at the courthouse between 7:00 

and 8:00 a.m. was ruled “prejudicial.”21

 

17 229 F.3d 737 (9th Cir. 2000). 18 Id. at 745. 

19 Id. at 747. 20 U.S. v. Doe, 701 F.2d 819, 824 (9th Cir. 1983). 21 U.S. v. John Doe, 219 F.3d 1009 (9th Cir. 2000). 

Because the policy assured that the 

arraignment of a juvenile would be 

delayed longer than a “similarly situated 

adult,”22 it violated § 5033 and would not 

be considered an extenuating 

circumstance.23

A juvenile’s confession was considered 

voluntary when his will was overborne 

by his mother, not by police officers, 

after he invoked his right to silence. 

 Officers ceased questioning a 

juvenile after the juvenile invoked his 

right to silence. The juvenile’s mother 

convinced him to talk freely with the 

officer, which lead to his confession. The 

juvenile’s parents were present during the 

interrogation and the law enforcement 

officer did not use any coercion to get the 

juvenile to confess. The juvenile’s 

confession was deemed voluntary by the 

Tenth Circuit.24

A juvenile’s request for counsel and 

right to remain silent should be asserted 

in a clear manner. 

 In Fare v. Michael C., after the 

juvenile was read his Miranda rights, he 

asked to speak to his probation officer.25 

The officers refused and the juvenile was 

again read his rights. This time he agreed 

to speak without an attorney present. A 

probation officer is duty bound to report 

the juvenile if the juvenile gets into 

trouble. Because of this a conflict of 

interest, the probation officer does not 

represent the juvenile in the same sense as 

an attorney.26 There is no right to a 

22 Id. at 1013. 23 Id. at 1014. 24 U.S. v. Erving L., 147 F. 3d 1240 (10th Cir. 

1998). 

25 442 U.S. 707 (1979). 

26 Id. at 720. 
probation officer during questioning; nor 

does such a request constitute an 

invocation of the right to remain silent. 

The juvenile never requested an attorney. 

Based on the taped interrogation, using the 

totality of the circumstances test, the Court 

decided that the juvenile clearly waived 

his Miranda rights. 

CONCLUSION

Once a juvenile is in custody, the 

arresting officer must make a good faith 

effort to notify the juvenile’s parents or 

guardian to tell them that the child has 

been taken into custody, what offense the 

child was accused of committing and the 

juvenile’s Miranda rights. A juvenile’s 

Miranda rights must be given in a 

language that the juvenile can understand. 

The confession must also be otherwise 

voluntary. If the juvenile requests an 

attorney or invokes his/her right to remain 

silent, the interrogation must stop 

immediately. The juvenile must appear 

before a magistrate “forthwith.” If the 

juvenile is not afforded these due process 

rights, the confession may be suppressed.