Filed 8/21/24

CERTIFIED FOR PUBLICATION

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION THREE

THE PEOPLE, 

Plaintiff and Respondent,

v.

EDDIE SORTO,

Defendant and Appellant.

B331652

Los Angeles County

Super. Ct. No. VA090994

APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of 

Los Angeles County, Lisa S. Coen, Judge. Reversed and 

remanded.

James R. Bostwick, Jr., under appointment by the Court 

of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.

Jonathan Grossman and Mi Kim for Pacific Juvenile 

Defender Center as Amicus Curiae on behalf of Defendant 

and Appellant.

Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, 

Chief Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, 

Assistant Attorney General, Noah P. Hill and Steven E. Mercer, 

Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.

_________________________
2

A court sentenced Eddie Sorto to more than 100 years 

in prison for crimes he committed when he was 15 years old. 

After serving 15 years of his sentence, Sorto petitioned for recall 

and resentencing under Penal Code section 1170, subdivision (d) 

(section 1170(d)).1 Sorto acknowledged the statute expressly 

applies only to juvenile offenders sentenced to explicit life 

without the possibility of parole (LWOP) terms. Nevertheless, 

he argued equal protection guarantees relief to offenders, like 

himself, sentenced to long prison terms that are the functional 

equivalent of LWOP.

About a year before the trial court considered Sorto’s 

petition, the court in People v. Heard (2022) 83 Cal.App.5th 608 

(Heard) held juvenile offenders sentenced to functionally

equivalent LWOP terms are entitled to section 1170(d) relief 

under the constitutional guarantee of equal protection. Despite 

this authority, the trial court denied Sorto’s petition on the 

ground that he had not been sentenced to an explicit LWOP term. 

On appeal, Sorto raises the same equal protection argument and 

urges us to follow Heard. The Attorney General argues Heard 

was wrongly decided and is contrary to California Supreme Court 

precedent.

We reject the Attorney General’s arguments and conclude

offenders sentenced to functionally equivalent LWOP terms—

like Sorto—are entitled to section 1170(d) relief under the 

constitutional guarantee of equal protection. We also hold 

parole eligibility under section 3051 does not render those 

offenders ineligible for relief under section 1170(d). Accordingly, 

we reverse the trial court’s denial of Sorto’s petition and remand 

1 Undesignated statutory references are to the Penal Code.
3

the case for the court to consider whether Sorto meets the other 

requirements for relief.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

1. The convictions and sentence

Sorto committed a series of crimes against members of 

a rival gang in August 2005, when he was 15 years old. A jury 

convicted him of first degree murder (§ 187, subd. (a)), assault 

(§ 240), second degree murder (§ 187, subd. (a)), and shooting 

at an occupied motor vehicle (§ 246). The jury also found true 

multiple-murder and gang-murder special-circumstance 

allegations (§ 190.2, subd. (a)(3), (22)), as well as various firearm

and gang enhancement allegations (§§ 12022.53, subds. (b), (c), 

(d), 186.22, subd. (b)(1)(C)). The trial court sentenced Sorto 

to a determinate term of 10 years plus an indeterminate term 

of 130 years to life.2

2. Sorto’s petition for recall and resentencing

In 2023, Sorto filed a petition for recall and resentencing 

under section 1170(d), arguing he satisfied all the statutory 

requirements for relief. Sorto asked the court to recall his 

sentence and send his case to the juvenile court for a transfer 

hearing under Proposition 57 (as approved by voters, Gen. Elec. 

(Nov. 8, 2016)).

Sorto acknowledged that section 1170(d) expressly applies 

only to juvenile offenders sentenced to explicit LWOP terms.

Nevertheless, he argued he is entitled to relief because his 

2 Although the jury convicted Sorto of first degree special 

circumstance murder, he was not eligible for an LWOP sentence 

because he was 15 years old when he committed the crime. (See 

§ 190.5, subd. (b).)
4

sentence is the functional equivalent of LWOP. In support, 

Sorto cited Heard, supra, 83 Cal.App.5th 608, which held 

a juvenile offender sentenced to a term that is the functional 

equivalent of LWOP was eligible for section 1170(d) relief under 

the guarantee of equal protection.

The People opposed Sorto’s petition. Among other things, 

the People argued Sorto is not serving a functionally equivalent 

LWOP sentence because he is eligible for parole during his 25th 

year of incarceration under section 3051. The People also urged 

the court not to apply Heard, arguing it was wrongly decided.

In a reply brief, Sorto argued Heard is binding precedent 

and trial courts are required to follow it.

The court denied Sorto’s petition. Without explanation, 

the court stated it did not find Heard to be “on point with our 

specific factual scenario.” The court then explained that, because 

Sorto is eligible for parole after 25 years under section 3051, 

he is not serving an LWOP sentence. The court held, “as a 

matter of law, because the defendant was not sentenced to life 

without the possibility of parole, he is not entitled to relief under 

[section 1170(d)].” The court did not directly address Sorto’s 

equal protection argument.

Sorto timely appealed.

DISCUSSION

Sorto argues the trial court erred by denying his section 

1170(d) petition because he was not sentenced to an explicit 

LWOP term. Sorto concedes section 1170(d) expressly applies 

only to juvenile offenders sentenced to explicit LWOP terms. 

Nevertheless, he argues the statute violates the equal protection 

clauses of the federal and state constitutions to the extent it 
5

denies relief to juvenile offenders sentenced to the functional 

equivalent of LWOP.

1. Equal protection

The Fourteenth Amendment to the United States 

Constitution and article 1, section 7 of the California Constitution 

prohibit the denial of equal protection of the laws. (U.S. Const., 

14th Amend., § 1; Cal. Const., art. I, § 7, subd. (a).) “At core, the

requirement of equal protection ensures that the government 

does not treat a group of people unequally without some 

justification.” (People v. Chatman (2018) 4 Cal.5th 277, 288 

(Chatman).) 

Where, as here, the challenged law is not based on a 

suspect classification and does not burden fundamental rights, 

the law denies equal protection “only if there is no rational

relationship between a disparity in treatment and some 

legitimate government purpose.” (Chatman, supra, 4 Cal.5th 

at pp. 288–289; see Heard, supra, 83 Cal.App.5th at pp. 631–634 

[applying rational basis review to a claim that section 1170(d) 

violates equal protection].) Under rational basis review, 

we presume a classification in a statute is rational until the 

party challenging it establishes there is no conceivable rational 

basis for the unequal treatment. (Chatman, at p. 289.) “The 

underlying rationale for a statutory classification need not have 

been ‘ “ever actually articulated” ’ by lawmakers, and it does not 

need to ‘ “be empirically substantiated.” ’ [Citation.] Nor does 

the logic behind a potential justification need to be persuasive 

or sensible—rather than simply rational.” (Ibid.)

“This core feature of equal protection sets a high bar 

before a law is deemed to lack even the minimal rationality 

necessary for it to survive constitutional scrutiny. Coupled with 
6

a rebuttable presumption that legislation is constitutional, 

this high bar helps ensure that democratically enacted laws are 

not invalidated merely based on a court’s cursory conclusion that 

a statute’s tradeoffs seem unwise or unfair.” (Chatman, supra, 

4 Cal.5th at p. 289.)

In cases like this one, where the “plaintiffs challenge 

laws drawing distinctions between identifiable groups or 

classes of persons, on the basis that the distinctions drawn 

are inconsistent with equal protection, courts no longer need 

to ask at the threshold whether the two groups are similarly 

situated for purposes of the law in question. The only pertinent 

inquiry is whether the challenged difference in treatment is 

adequately justified under the applicable standard of review.” 

(People v. Hardin (2024) 15 Cal.5th 834, 850–851 (Hardin).)

 We independently review equal protection claims. (People 

v. Morales (2021) 67 Cal.App.5th 326, 345.)

2. Section 1170(d) and related law

In Graham v. Florida (2010) 560 U.S. 48 (Graham), our 

nation’s high court held the Eighth Amendment prohibits LWOP 

sentences for juvenile offenders who committed non-homicide 

offenses. (Id. at p. 82.) In response to Graham, the Legislature 

enacted section 1170(d), creating a recall and resentencing 

procedure for certain juvenile offenders sentenced to LWOP 

terms. (See In re Kirchner (2017) 2 Cal.5th 1040, 1049–1050

(Kirchner).)

Section 1170(d) provides, in relevant part, “[w]hen a 

defendant who was under 18 years of age at the time of the 

commission of the offense for which the defendant was sentenced 

to imprisonment for life without the possibility of parole has 

been incarcerated for at least 15 years, the defendant may submit 
7

to the sentencing court a petition for recall and resentencing.” 

(§ 1170, subd. (d)(1)(A).) The petition must include a statement 

describing the defendant’s remorse, identifying any work towards 

rehabilitation, and stating one of four qualifying circumstances 

is true. (Id., subd. (d)(2).)

As originally enacted, subdivision (d)(2) of section 1170 

directed the trial court to hold a hearing to consider whether 

to recall a defendant’s sentence if the court found, by a 

preponderance of the evidence, the statements in the petition 

to be true. (See former § 1170, subd. (d)(2)(E), Stats. 2012, 

ch. 828, § 2.) In 2016, the Legislature amended the statute

to require courts to recall the sentence of any defendant who 

meets the eligibility criteria. (§ 1170, subd. (d)(5), as amended 

by Stats. 2016, ch. 867, § 2.1.) The court must then hold a 

hearing “to resentence the defendant in the same manner as if 

the defendant had not previously been sentenced, provided that 

the new sentence, if any, is not greater than the initial sentence.” 

(§ 1170, subd. (d)(5).) 

Sometime after the Legislature introduced the legislation 

that added subdivision (d)(2) to section 1170, the United States 

Supreme Court decided Miller v. Alabama (2012) 567 U.S. 460 

(Miller). (See Kirchner, supra, 2 Cal.5th at p. 1049.) In Miller, 

the court held the Eighth Amendment prohibits sentencing 

schemes that mandate LWOP sentences for juvenile offenders 

convicted of certain homicide offenses. (Miller, at p. 465.) 

Two months later, the California Supreme Court held—

in People v. Caballero (2012) 55 Cal.4th 262 (Caballero)—

the prohibition on LWOP sentences for non-homicide juvenile 

offenders also applies to “term-of-years sentence[s] that amount[ ] 

to the functional equivalent of a life without parole sentence.” 
8

(Id. at pp. 267–268.) The court explained a sentence is the 

functional equivalent of LWOP if it includes a “term of years 

with a parole eligibility date that falls outside the juvenile 

offender’s natural life expectancy.” (Ibid.)

In an effort to bring juvenile sentencing into conformity 

with Graham, Miller, and Caballero, the Legislature enacted 

section 3051, which went into effect on January 1, 2014. (See

Stats. 2013, ch. 312, § 4; People v. Franklin (2016) 63 Cal.4th 261, 

268, 277 (Franklin).) Section 3051 requires the Board of Parole 

Hearings to conduct a “youth offender parole hearing” at specified 

times during the incarceration of certain youthful offenders. (See 

§ 3051, subds. (a)(1), (b); Franklin, at p. 277.) As relevant to this 

case, young adult and juvenile offenders convicted of a controlling 

offense “for which the sentence is a life term of 25 years to life 

shall be eligible for release on parole at a youth offender parole 

hearing during the person’s 25th year of incarceration.” (§ 3051, 

subd. (b)(3).) As of January 1, 2018, most juvenile offenders 

sentenced to explicit LWOP terms are also eligible for parole 

during their 25th year of incarceration. (§ 3051, subd. (b)(4), 

as amended by Stats. 2017, ch. 684, § 1.5.) 

3. Section 1170(d)’s exclusion of functionally equivalent 

LWOP offenders violates equal protection

a. The Heard decision

The court in Heard, supra, 83 Cal.App.5th 608, decided 

the precise equal protection issue that Sorto raises in this case. 

In Heard, a court had sentenced the defendant to 23 years plus 

80 years to life for crimes he committed when he was 15 years 

old. (Id. at p. 612.) The defendant petitioned for relief under 

section 1170(d) after serving 15 years of his sentence. The 

trial court denied the petition, finding the defendant ineligible 
9

for relief because he had not been sentenced to an explicit 

LWOP term. (Heard, at p. 612.) 

The defendant appealed, raising two arguments. First, 

he urged the court to interpret section 1170(d) to apply to both 

explicit LWOP offenders and functionally equivalent LWOP 

offenders. (Heard, supra, 83 Cal.App.5th at p. 612.) The court 

rejected the defendant’s interpretation of section 1170(d), holding 

the plain language of the statute limits relief to explicit LWOP 

offenders. (Heard, at p. 626.) 

The defendant alternatively argued denying section 1170(d) 

relief to functionally equivalent LWOP offenders violates the 

constitutional guarantee of equal protection. (Heard, supra, 

83 Cal.App.5th at p. 626.) Because Heard was decided before 

the Supreme Court clarified the standard for equal protection 

challenges (see Hardin, supra, 15 Cal.5th at pp. 850–851), 

the court employed a two-step analysis to decide the issue. 

At the first step, the court concluded the defendant was similarly 

situated to explicit LWOP offenders. (Heard, at p. 628.) 

The court then turned to the second step of the equal 

protection analysis, asking whether the Legislature had a

rational basis to treat differently explicit LWOP offenders and

functionally equivalent LWOP offenders. (Heard, supra, 83 

Cal.App.5th at p. 631.) According to the court, the “People’s sole 

justification for the differential treatment is that the Legislature 

‘could have reasonably concluded that the punishment of [life 

without parole] imposed on those under age 18 could be excessive 

and this was an appropriate means of reform by allowing for 

reconsideration of such a sentence.’ ” (Id. at p. 632.) The court 

rejected this rationale, explaining the same concern applies 
10

equally to juvenile offenders sentenced to the functional 

equivalent of LWOP. (Ibid.) 

After raising two other possible justifications on its own

—but ultimately rejecting both—the court concluded it was 

“unable to identify a rational basis for making juveniles 

sentenced to an explicitly designated life without parole term, 

but not juveniles sentenced to the functional equivalent of 

life without parole, eligible to petition for resentencing under 

section 1170, subdivision (d)(1).” (Heard, supra, 83 Cal.App.5th 

at p. 633.) As a consequence, the court held denying functionally

equivalent LWOP offenders the opportunity to petition for relief 

under section 1170(d) violates their right to equal protection of

the laws. (Heard, at pp. 633–634.)

The trial court in this case declined to follow Heard, 

stating it was not “on point with our specific factual scenario.” 

It is not clear how the court came to that conclusion, as the 

facts in this case and the facts in Heard are nearly identical 

in all relevant respects. As with the defendant in Heard, a jury 

convicted Sorto of crimes he committed when he was 15 years old. 

Also like the defendant in Heard, a court sentenced Sorto to an 

indeterminate life term that provided no meaningful opportunity 

for parole during his lifetime. As in Heard, Sorto filed a petition 

for recall and resentencing under section 1170(d) after serving 

15 years of his sentence, seeking relief on equal protection 

grounds. Given these similarities, Heard is directly on point.

The Attorney General does not attempt to distinguish 

Heard on the facts, and with good reason. Nevertheless, he 

urges us not to follow Heard, asserting it was wrongly decided 

and is inconsistent with California Supreme Court precedent. 

Alternatively, the Attorney General proposes additional reasons
11

—which he apparently did not raise in Heard—why the 

Legislature reasonably could have granted relief to explicit 

LWOP offenders while denying the same relief to functionally

equivalent LWOP offenders. We consider his arguments in turn. 

b. Heard is consistent with Hardin

The Attorney General first argues Heard is inconsistent 

with Hardin, supra, 15 Cal.5th 834, a recent case in which the 

California Supreme Court considered the constitutionality of 

section 3051. According to the Attorney General, Hardin stands 

for the proposition that the concept of a “functional equivalent 

of [LWOP]” sentence should not be extended beyond the Eighth 

Amendment context.

In Hardin, the defendant argued section 3051 violates 

equal protection by granting relief to young adult offenders 

sentenced to functionally equivalent LWOP terms, while denying 

relief to offenders sentenced to explicit LWOP terms. (Hardin, 

supra, 15 Cal.5th at p. 839.) He asserted there is “no reasonable 

basis to conclude that young adult offenders sentenced to 

life without parole are more culpable or less deserving of the 

opportunity for release than other young adult offenders.” 

(Id. at p. 858.) 

In rejecting the defendant’s argument, the California 

Supreme Court acknowledged it had employed the “ ‘functional 

equivalent of a life without parole sentence’ ” description “in 

the context of identifying the category of juvenile offenders 

to whom the Eighth Amendment limitations on life without 

parole sentences apply.” (Hardin, supra, 15 Cal.5th at p. 863.) 

However, the court rejected the idea “that a lengthy term-ofyears sentence is necessarily equivalent to a life without parole 

sentence for all purposes.” (Ibid.) The court instead concluded 
12

it “was not irrational for the Legislature to exclude from 

youth offender parole eligibility those young adults who have 

committed special circumstance murder, an offense deemed 

sufficiently culpable that it merits society’s most stringent 

sanctions.” (Ibid.)

Contrary to the Attorney General’s suggestion, the 

Supreme Court in Hardin did not hold the concept of a functional 

equivalent of LWOP sentence is relevant only in the context 

of Eighth Amendment challenges. Rather, it simply clarified 

that explicit LWOP offenders and functionally equivalent LWOP 

offenders are not identical in all respects and for all purposes. 

That observation is not inconsistent with Heard, as equal 

protection does not require absolute uniformity between two 

groups. (See People v. McKee (2010) 47 Cal.4th 1172, 1202.) 

Instead, what matters is whether the differences between the 

groups reasonably justify the Legislature’s decision to afford 

relief to one, while denying it to the other. (Ibid.) 

If anything, Hardin supports Heard on that issue. Hardin 

holds the Legislature reasonably may disfavor explicit LWOP 

offenders based on the rationale that they are more culpable 

than functionally equivalent LWOP offenders. (Hardin, supra, 

15 Cal.5th at pp. 863–864.) In Heard—as in our case—the court 

considered the opposite situation, asking whether it is reasonable 

to grant relief to explicit LWOP offenders while denying the same 

relief to functionally equivalent LWOP offenders. (Heard, supra, 

83 Cal.App.5th at p. 631.) Although Hardin does not resolve 

that issue, it nevertheless eliminates one possible justification 

for the disparate treatment: the relative culpability of each 

group of offenders.
13

c. Heard is consistent with Franklin

The Attorney General next argues Heard “runs roughshod” 

over the Supreme Court’s decision in Franklin, supra, 63 Cal.4th 

261.

In Franklin, a juvenile offender argued his 50-years-to-life 

sentence was the functional equivalent of LWOP and was 

unconstitutional under Miller, supra, 567 U.S. 460. (Franklin, 

supra, 63 Cal.4th at pp. 268, 271–272.) The Supreme Court 

declined to consider the issue, holding the enactment of 

section 3051 rendered it moot. (Franklin, at p. 268.) The court 

explained that, although the defendant’s original sentence 

continued to apply, section 3051 “superseded” the statutorily 

mandated sentence and made the defendant eligible for parole 

after 25 years. (Franklin, at p. 278.) The court concluded, 

because a 25-years-to-life sentence is not LWOP or its functional 

equivalent, “no Miller claim arises here.” (Id. at pp. 279–280.) 

The Attorney General argues, under Franklin, functionally

equivalent LWOP offenders are no longer serving an explicit 

LWOP sentence or its functional equivalent given they are 

eligible for parole after serving 25 years. The Attorney General 

does not directly argue this renders moot equal protection 

challenges to section 1170(d). Instead—at least as we 

understand the argument—he contends it renders offenders 

like Sorto categorically ineligible for relief under section 1170(d), 

regardless of whether equal protection requires courts to 

apply the statute to functionally equivalent LWOP offenders.

The Attorney General made a nearly identical argument 

in Heard, albeit in a different context. In that case, the Attorney 

General argued the defendant was not similarly situated with 

explicit LWOP offenders—and was therefore not eligible for relief 
14

under section 1170(d)—because “section 3051 has ‘ “reformed” ’ 

[the defendant’s] sentence so that it is no longer the functional 

equivalent of life without parole.” (Heard, supra, 83 Cal.App.5th 

at p. 628.) The court rejected the argument, explaining section 

1170(d) does not expressly require that the defendant currently 

be serving an LWOP sentence. (Heard, at pp. 629–630.) Instead, 

it requires only that the defendant “was sentenced” to an LWOP 

term. (Id. at p. 629; see § 1170, subd. (d)(1)(A).) The court 

reasoned, “[a]lthough under Franklin, [the defendant’s] sentence 

as it currently operates is no longer the functional equivalent 

of life without parole, this does not change the fact that the 

sentence was a [functionally equivalent] life without parole 

sentence at the time it was imposed.” (Heard, at p. 629.) 

The court in People v. Lopez (2016) 4 Cal.App.5th 649

(Lopez), interpreted section 1170(d) the same way. Lopez 

concerned two defendants who were sentenced to LWOP terms 

for non-homicide crimes they committed as juveniles. After the 

United States Supreme Court decided Graham, the defendants 

petitioned for habeas corpus relief on Eighth Amendment 

grounds, and a court reduced their sentences to life with the 

possibility of parole. The defendants then petitioned for relief 

under section 1170(d), which the trial court also granted. (Lopez, 

at pp. 652–653.) The People appealed, arguing the defendants 

were not entitled to relief because they were no longer serving 

LWOP sentences. The Court of Appeal disagreed, explaining 

the plain language of section 1170(d) requires only that the 

defendant “ ‘was sentenced’ ” to an LWOP term. (Lopez, at 

pp. 653–654.) The court noted, if the Legislature “intended to

exclude defendants whose LWOP sentence were modified to cure 
15

an Eighth Amendment/Graham sentencing error, it could have 

so provided.” (Id. at p. 655.) 

This interpretation finds further support in the fact that 

the Legislature amended section 1170(d) several times after 

Lopez was decided, but it has never clarified that an offender 

must currently be serving an LWOP term to be eligible for relief. 

(See, e.g., Stats. 2020, ch. 29, § 15; Stats. 2021, ch. 695, § 5; 

Stats. 2021, ch. 719, § 2; Stats. 2021, ch. 731, § 1.3; Stats. 2022,

ch. 744, § 1.) Nor did the Legislature repeal section 1170(d) 

after it amended section 3051 to grant most juvenile LWOP 

offenders a meaningful possibility of parole during their lifetimes. 

(See § 3051, subd. (b)(4), as amended by Stats. 2017, ch. 684, 

§ 1.5.) Because we may presume the Legislature is aware of 

existing laws and judicial decisions when it enacts and amends 

statutes (Viking Pools, Inc. v. Maloney (1989) 48 Cal.3d 602, 609), 

this history strongly suggests the Legislature agreed with Lopez. 

It also suggests the Legislature intended section 1170(d) to 

provide relief in addition to the relief provided under section 

3051.

The Attorney General makes no effort to address the 

statutory language on which the Heard and Lopez courts relied. 

Nor does he directly challenge their interpretation of section 

1170(d). We agree with Heard and Lopez that the plain language 

of section 1170(d) does not require that the defendant currently 

be serving an LWOP sentence. Accordingly, the fact that section 

3051 superseded Sorto’s sentence is irrelevant. Instead, it is 

enough that he “was sentenced” to the functional equivalent 

of LWOP. (See § 1170, subd. (d)(1).)
16

d. Section 1170(d) can provide meaningful relief 

to functionally equivalent LWOP offenders

The Attorney General asserts the Heard court failed 

to recognize section 1170(d) cannot provide meaningful relief 

to functionally equivalent LWOP offenders. According to 

the Attorney General, the Legislature enacted section 1170(d) 

for the sole purpose of converting LWOP sentences into life 

sentences with the possibility of parole, and the statute “contains 

no mechanism to shorten or otherwise alter indeterminate 

sentences that already provide the possibility of parole.” 

Therefore, he argues, functionally equivalent LWOP offenders 

have already received all the relief section 1170(d) was “intended 

to confer.”

Contrary to the Attorney General’s suggestions, section 

1170(d) plainly has the potential to grant meaningful relief 

to functionally equivalent LWOP offenders. This remains true 

even after the Legislature enacted section 3051. Indeed, the 

simple fact that offenders like Sorto have filed petitions under 

section 1170(d)—after already having received relief under 

section 3051—would seem to refute the Attorney General’s 

contention.

Unlike section 3051—which grants relief by operation 

of law and without any requirement of additional resentencing 

procedures (see Franklin, supra, 63 Cal.4th at pp. 279–280)—

section 1170(d) requires the court to recall an eligible defendant’s 

sentence and “to resentence the defendant in the same manner 

as if the defendant had not previously been sentenced.” (§ 1170, 

subd. (d)(5).) This difference is not merely procedural. At 

resentencing, a trial court has broad discretion to select the term 

of imprisonment, run sentences concurrently or consecutively, 
17

and strike or dismiss enhancements. (See §§ 186.22, subd. (d), 

669, 1385, 12022, subd. (f).) Section 3051 provides no comparable 

relief.

Perhaps more importantly for individuals like Sorto, 

recall and resentencing also entitles eligible offenders to the 

benefits of retroactive ameliorative changes to the law. (See 

People v. Padilla (2022) 13 Cal.5th 152, 158.) For example, if 

the court were to recall Sorto’s sentence, his case might be sent 

to juvenile court under Proposition 57. (See People v. Montes 

(2021) 70 Cal.App.5th 35, 48–49 [ordering a defendant’s case 

transferred to juvenile court under Proposition 57 after his 

sentence was recalled under section 1170(d)].) He also may 

be entitled to relief under Senate Bill No. 1391 (2017–2018 

Reg. Sess.), which prohibits the transfer to criminal court of 

certain juveniles accused of committing crimes when they 

were 14 or 15 years old. (See Welf. & Inst. Code, § 707, subd. 

(a)(1)–(2), as amended by Stats. 2018, ch. 1012, § 1; O.G. v. 

Superior Court (2021) 11 Cal.5th 82, 89.) Although we express 

no opinion as to whether these laws would apply if the court 

recalls Sorto’s sentence, the mere possibility is enough to defeat 

the Attorney General’s contention that section 1170(d) lacks a 

mechanism to grant meaningful relief to functionally equivalent 

LWOP offenders.

e. There is no rational basis to treat functionally

equivalent LWOP offenders less favorably than 

explicit LWOP offenders

The Attorney General alternatively argues the Heard court 

erred in concluding there is no rational basis for section 1170(d)’s 

disparate treatment of explicit LWOP offenders and functionally

equivalent LWOP offenders. The Attorney General proposes 
18

several reasons justifying the Legislature’s decision to grant 

relief to the former group, while denying it to the latter. 

We consider each in turn. 

i. Response to Graham

First, the Attorney General argues the Legislature 

reasonably may have limited section 1170(d) relief to explicit 

LWOP offenders in response to Graham, supra, 560 U.S. 48.

The Attorney General’s argument might have some merit 

if section 1170(d) closely tracked the Supreme Court’s holding 

in that case. It does not. In Graham, the high court held the 

Eighth Amendment bars LWOP sentences for juvenile offenders 

who committed non-homicide crimes. (Graham, supra, 560 U.S. 

at p. 82.) Section 1170(d), however, extends relief to all explicit 

LWOP offenders, not just those who committed non-homicide 

crimes. In fact, an analysis of section 1170(d) by the Assembly 

Committee on Appropriations noted that, of the 295 juveniles 

entitled to relief under the legislation, only three had been 

sentenced to LWOP for non-homicide crimes. (Assem. Com. 

on Appropriations, Rep. on Sen. Bill No. 9 (2011–2012 Reg. Sess.) 

as amended Aug. 15, 2011, p. 3 (Assem. Com. on Appropriations 

Rep.).) 

Because section 1170(d) significantly exceeds Graham’s 

requirements, compliance with that case alone does not provide 

a sufficient justification for the Legislature’s decision not to

extend relief to functionally equivalent LWOP offenders. 

Instead, to survive rational basis review, there must be some 

reasonable explanation for why the Legislature exceeded Graham 

with respect to non-homicide offenders, but did not exceed 

Graham with respect to functionally equivalent LWOP offenders. 

The Attorney General suggests none, nor can we conceive of any
19

on our own. In any event, even if compliance with Graham 

justified the disparate treatment at one time, that justification 

dissipated once the California Supreme Court in Caballero, 

supra, 55 Cal.4th 262, extended Graham’s reasoning to 

functionally equivalent LWOP offenders. 

ii. Moral principles

The Attorney General next argues the Legislature 

reasonably may have provided relief only to explicit LWOP 

offenders because the absence of any possibility of parole is 

a characteristic unique to that group, and condemning minors 

to die in prison is “ ‘barbaric.’ ” (Assem. Com. on Appropriations 

Rep., at p. 2.)

A desire to avoid condemning minors to die in prison 

is obviously a valid reason for the Legislature to grant relief 

to explicit LWOP offenders. However, it does not provide 

a reason to deny the same relief to functionally equivalent 

LWOP offenders. By definition, a functionally equivalent 

LWOP sentence includes a parole eligibility date that falls 

outside the offender’s natural life expectancy. (See Caballero, 

supra, 55 Cal.4th at pp. 267–268.) Therefore, like an explicit 

LWOP sentence, a functionally equivalent LWOP sentence 

provides no meaningful possibility of parole and effectively 

condemns the offender to die in prison. The Attorney General 

suggests no reason—nor can we conceive of any on our own—

why it would be barbaric to condemn explicit LWOP offenders 

to die in prison, but not barbaric to do the same to functionally

equivalent LWOP offenders. Accordingly, the fact that an 

explicit LWOP sentence condemns the offender to die in prison 

does not provide a rational basis for section 1170(d)’s disparate 

treatment.
20

iii. Empirical facts

The Attorney General contends the Legislature reasonably 

may have provided relief only to explicit LWOP offenders to 

address empirical facts unique to LWOP sentences. He points 

to an Assembly Committee analysis that notes (1) the “ ‘U.S. is 

the only country in the world that sentences minors to LWOP’ ”;

(2) “ ‘LWOP for minors provides no deterrent effect on crime 

and is applied disproportionately to persons of color’ ”; (3) “ ‘45% 

of the minors sentenced to LWOP did not personally commit 

murder, but were convicted of felony murder’ ”; and (4) “ ‘over 

75% of the youth sentenced to LWOP acted within a group 

at the time of their crime.’ ” (Assem. Com. on Appropriations 

Rep., at p. 3.) The analysis also notes sentencing minors to 

LWOP terms is “ ‘counter to principles of cognitive and emotional 

development in minors, and all but unprecedented in [the] rest

of the world.’ ” (Id. at p. 2.)

Once again, although these facts provide a reason to 

grant relief to explicit LWOP offenders, they do not provide a 

reason to deny the same relief to functionally equivalent LWOP 

offenders. There is nothing in the record to support the Attorney 

General’s assertion that these empirical facts pertain only to 

explicit LWOP offenders. Nor does the Attorney General propose 

any logical reason why that would be the case. For all we know, 

the same facts apply equally to functionally equivalent LWOP 

offenders. Absent some reason to expect otherwise, the facts 

do not provide a rational basis for section 1170(d)’s disparate 

treatment. 

iv. Fiscal concerns

The Attorney General next argues the Legislature 

reasonably could have limited relief under section 1170(d)
21

in order to restrict the fiscal and administrative burdens of the 

legislation. The Attorney General points out there were fewer 

than 300 juvenile offenders serving explicit LWOP sentences 

at the time the Legislature enacted the statute. He argues it 

was reasonable to save resources by focusing on that limited 

group, as opposed to the “vastly larger” population of juvenile 

offenders serving non-LWOP terms.

Our Supreme Court has explained that “[p]reserving the 

government’s financial integrity and resources is a legitimate 

state interest.” (Chatman, supra, 4 Cal.5th at p. 290.) Moreover, 

equal protection does not require a perfect fit between the 

legislation’s means and the legitimate state interest it is intended 

to serve. (Ibid.) Nevertheless, “an entirely arbitrary decision 

to withhold a benefit from one subset of people, devoid of any 

conceivable degree of coherent justification, might not pass 

rational basis review merely because it decreases the expenditure 

of resources.” (Id. at p. 291.) What matters is whether the 

classification at issue is “a rational means of preserving 

government resources.” (Ibid.) 

Section 1170(d) fails that test. At the outset, it is not 

apparent that extending relief to functionally equivalent LWOP 

offenders would have a meaningful fiscal impact. The Attorney 

General asserts the population of juvenile offenders serving 

non-LWOP life sentences is “vastly larger” than the population 

of explicit LWOP offenders. While that may be true, Sorto 

does not seek relief for all juvenile offenders sentenced 

to indeterminate terms. Rather, he argues only that equal 

protection guarantees relief for juvenile offenders sentenced 

to the functional equivalent of LWOP. Although the record 

does not disclose that group’s population, it is reasonable
22

to expect it to be significantly smaller than the total population 

of juvenile offenders serving indeterminate terms. 

Even if the population of functionally equivalent LWOP 

offenders was relatively large, it is not apparent the government 

would have reasonably expected to preserve resources by 

denying them relief. In fact, based on section 1170(d)’s legislative 

history, it seems the Legislature believed the opposite to be true. 

(Cf. Chatman, supra, 4 Cal.5th at pp. 292–293 [relying on 

the legislative history of a bill to show the Legislature was 

reasonably concerned about the legislation’s cost].) For example, 

a Fiscal Summary by the Senate Appropriations Committee 

noted section 1170(d) may result in net General Fund savings, 

as its resentencing procedure would likely be less expensive 

than resolution of a petition for writ of habeas corpus. (Sen. 

Appropriations Com., Fiscal Summary of Sen. Bill No. 9 (2011–

2012 Reg. Sess.) May 23, 2011, p. 2 (Sen. Appropriations Com. 

Fiscal Summary).) The summary also estimated that reducing 

an LWOP sentence to 25 years would result in an average cost 

savings of $625,000, far outweighing the administrative and 

court costs of the resentencing procedure.3 (Id. at pp. 2–3.) We 

see no reason why the same cost savings would not apply equally 

to functionally equivalent LWOP offenders. If so, extending relief 

to that group would likely save government resources, at least 

in the long term. 

3 The summary noted the savings would be offset somewhat 

by parole supervision costs assessed as a condition of the reduced 

sentence. (Sen. Appropriations Com. Fiscal Summary, at p. 3.) 

Even with that offset, we suspect the savings would be 

significant.
23

The Attorney General notes in passing it is less costly to

grant relief to functionally equivalent LWOP offenders under 

section 3051 than to grant the same group relief under section 

1170(d). While that may be true, the Attorney General overlooks

the fact that the Legislature also granted section 3051 relief to

explicit LWOP offenders. (See § 3051, subd. (b)(4).) That the 

Legislature did not repeal section 1170(d) after doing so strongly 

suggests it was not concerned about the legislation’s relative cost.

v. Culpability

Finally, the Attorney General contends section 1170(d)’s 

disparate treatment is warranted by the fact that an explicit 

LWOP sentence “provides a bright-line test of culpability,” 

while there is no comparable test of culpability for functionally

equivalent LWOP sentences.

To the extent the Attorney General is arguing the 

Legislature may have been concerned that some functionally

equivalent LWOP offenders are more culpable than explicit 

LWOP offenders, the court in Heard rejected a similar argument. 

(See Heard, supra, 83 Cal.App.5th at p. 633.) As that court 

explained, because a functionally equivalent LWOP sentence 

requires multiple convictions, it is conceivable the Legislature 

considered a functionally equivalent LWOP sentence to be more 

serious than an explicit LWOP sentence, which requires only a 

single conviction. However, the court rejected this as a possible 

motivation for section 1170(d)’s disparate treatment because 

the statute does not preclude relief for offenders sentenced to 

explicit LWOP terms plus additional terms for other offenses 

and enhancements. (Heard, at p. 633.) Therefore, the court 

concluded, the “number of offenses theoretically committed 
24

by each group of offenders also fails to justify their disparate 

treatment.” (Ibid.) 

We agree with the Heard court’s reasoning, and the 

circumstances of Sorto’s case aptly illustrate the irrationality 

of using relative culpability to justify section 1170(d)’s disparate 

treatment. The jury convicted Sorto of special circumstance first 

degree murder, which typically results in an LWOP sentence. 

(See § 190.2, subd. (a).) However, because Sorto was 15 years old 

when he committed the crime—and presumably less mature and 

culpable than older offenders—the maximum sentence he could 

receive was 25 years to life. (See § 190.5, subd. (b).) Had Sorto 

instead committed the murder when he was older, he likely 

would have received an LWOP sentence, making him eligible 

to apply for section 1170(d) relief. In other words, had Sorto 

committed the exact same crimes but under circumstances 

indicating he was more culpable, he likely would be eligible 

for relief. We can conceive of no rational basis that would 

justify such a seemingly unreasonable result. 

To summarize, like the court in Heard, we can conceive 

of no rational basis for section 1170(d)’s disparate treatment 

of explicit LWOP offenders and functionally equivalent LWOP 

offenders. (Heard, supra, 83 Cal.App.5th at p. 633.) Therefore, 

we agree with the Heard court that section 1170(d) violates the 

constitutional guarantee of equal protection by denying relief 

to juvenile offenders sentenced to functionally equivalent LWOP 

terms. (Heard, at pp. 633–634.) We also agree with the Heard 

court that parole eligibility under section 3051 does not render 

an offender ineligible for relief under section 1170(d). (Heard, 

at p. 629; see Lopez, supra, 4 Cal.App.5th at p. 655.)
25

Accordingly, we conclude the trial court erred by denying 

Sorto’s section 1170(d) petition “because [he] was not sentenced 

to life without the possibility of parole.” We express no opinion 

on whether Sorto has met section 1170(d)’s other requirements. 

Nor do we express an opinion on what relief the court should 

grant if it concludes Sorto is eligible for recall and resentencing. 

On remand, the trial court shall consider those issues for the 

first time.

DISPOSITION

We reverse the order denying Eddie Sorto’s petition 

for relief under section 1170(d). On remand, the court shall 

reconsider Sorto’s petition in accordance with this opinion. 

CERTIFIED FOR PUBLICATION

EGERTON, J.

We concur:

EDMON, P. J.

ADAMS, J.