a

GAO

United States General Accounting Office

Report to Congressional Committees

May 2003 MILITARY 

TRANSFORMATION

Army’s Evaluation of 

Stryker and M-113A3 

Infantry Carrier 

Vehicles Provided 

Sufficient Data for 

Statutorily Mandated 

Comparison

GAO-03-671
The Army developed a plan, approved by DOD’s Director, Operational Test 

and Evaluation, that met the requirements of the fiscal year 2001 National 

Defense Authorization Act. As required, the plan proposed comparing the 

operational effectiveness and cost of the Stryker and a troop-carrying 

medium armored vehicle selected by the Army—the M-113A3 armored 

personnel carrier. Regarding the operational effectiveness, the plan’s scope 

included the use of various data, such as that obtained during operational 

vignettes, for which all participants and observers received training 

regarding the vehicles, and from technical testing. The plan focused on the 

armored vehicles’ effectiveness; suitability in support of infantry units, such 

as maintenance; and survivability during operations. Regarding the cost 

comparison, the plan proposed that a comprehensive cost analysis be 

conducted between the two vehicles. 

GAO determined, based on its observation and analysis of evaluation plans 

and results, that the Army’s conduct of the plan provided sufficient data to 

determine the two vehicles’ relative effectiveness. To obtain the data 

concerning the vehicles’ operational effectiveness, survivability, and 

suitability, the Army conducted and evaluated operational training events 

and multiple technical tests. According to the Army Test and Evaluation 

Command, both the Stryker and the M-113A3 enabled the infantry to 

complete missions. However, the Command concluded that the Stryker 

provided more advantages in force protection, support for dismounted 

assault, and close fight and mobility and was more survivable against 

ballistic and nonballistic threats. The Army also conducted a comprehensive 

cost analysis. GAO determined that the costs used in the analysis were 

reasonable and provided sufficient data to determine the vehicles’ relative 

cost—with the Stryker being more expensive to acquire than the M-113A3 

but less so to operate and maintain. The Secretary of Defense, as required, 

certified to Congress that the Stryker Brigade Combat Team did not diminish 

Army combat power. 

Army’s Stryker and M-113A3 Armored Vehicles Used in Comparative Evaluation 

The first step of the U.S. Army’s 

ongoing transformation was to 

form two of six planned Interim, 

or Stryker, Brigade Combat teams 

and equip the brigades with a 

new interim armored vehicle—the 

Stryker. The fiscal year 2001 

National Defense Authorization Act 

required the Secretary of the Army 

to develop a plan to compare the 

operational effectiveness and cost 

of an infantry carrier variant of 

the Stryker and a medium Army 

armored vehicle, the Department 

of Defense’s (DOD) director of 

testing and evaluation approve the 

plan, and the Army to conduct the 

operational effectiveness and 

cost comparison. The Secretary 

of Defense was also to certify to 

Congress that Stryker Brigades 

did not diminish the Army’s 

combat power. 

As part of a series of ongoing 

reviews of Army transformation, 

GAO monitored the Army’s 2002 

efforts to (1) assess whether the 

Army’s plan for the comparison 

met the legislative requirements 

and (2) determine whether the 

evaluation’s resulting data were 

sufficient to measure the two 

vehicles’ relative effectiveness. 

GAO is not making any 

recommendations. In commenting 

on a draft of this report, DOD 

concurred with the findings. 

www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-03-671.

To view the full product, including the scope 

and methodology, click on the link above. 

For more information, contact William M. Solis 

at (202) 512-8365 or solisw@gao.gov. 

Highlights of GAO-03-671, a report to 

Congressional Committees 

May 2003

MILITARY TRANSFORMATION 

Army’s Evaluation of Stryker and 

M-113A3 Infantry Carrier Vehicles 

Provided Sufficient Data for Statutorily 

Mandated Comparison 
Page i GAO-03-671 Military Transformation

Contents

Letter 1

Results in Brief 2

Background 3

Army’s Comparative Evaluation Plan Met Legislative 

Requirements 7

Evaluation Provided Sufficient Data for Comparison of Vehicles 11

Secretary of Defense Certified to the Combat Power of the Army 

and Released Funding for the Third Brigade’s Vehicles 21

Agency Comments 22

Scope and Methodology 22

Appendixes

Appendix I: Section from Public Law 106-398 Concerning 

Limitations on Army Transformation Actions 26

Appendix II: Comments from the Department of Defense 29

Table Table 1: Data Source Matrix for the Issues and Sub-Issues in 

the Army’s Evaluation Plan of the Medium Armored 

Vehicles (MAV) 9

Figures Figure 1: Stryker Infantry Carrier Vehicle 5

Figure 2: M-113A3 Armored Personnel Carrier 6

Figure 3: Stryker Infantry Carrier Ingress Excursion 16

Figure 4: M-113A3 Armored Personnel Carrier Egress 

Excursion 17
Contents

Page ii GAO-03-671 Military Transformation

Abbreviations

DOD Department of Defense

MANPRINT Manpower and Personnel Integration

MAV Medium Armored Vehicles

PA&E Program Analysis and Evaluation Directorate

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permission from GAO. It may contain copyrighted graphics, images or other materials. 

Permission from the copyright holder may be necessary should you wish to reproduce 

copyrighted materials separately from GAO’s product.
Page 1 GAO-03-671 Military Transformation

United States General Accounting Office

Washington, D.C. 20548

A

May 30, 2003 Lret

Congressional Committees

In early 2000, the U.S. Army began transforming its force to one that is 

expected to be more strategically responsive, rapidly deployable, and 

able to effectively operate in all types of military operations, whether 

small-scale contingencies or major theater wars. The first step was to form 

two of six planned Interim, or Stryker, Brigade Combat teams and equip the 

brigades with a new interim armored vehicle known as the Stryker. The 

first two brigades are located at Fort Lewis, Washington.

Because these brigades are an entirely new organizational design, many 

questions have arisen as to the unit’s cost, combat effectiveness, and 

suitability. In the fiscal year 2001 National Defense Authorization Act,1

Congress required

• the Secretary of the Army to develop a plan for comparing the 

operational effectiveness and cost of an infantry carrier variant of the 

interim armored vehicle and a medium armored vehicle currently in the 

Army inventory, although the legislation did not provide specifics 

regarding the comparison;

• the Director of Operational Test and Evaluation of the Department of 

Defense (DOD) to approve the comparison plan before the Army could 

carry it out;

• the Army to conduct the operational effectiveness and cost 

comparison; and

• the Secretary of Defense to certify that the Stryker brigade combat team 

did not diminish the Army’s combat power.

The statute further provided that vehicles for the third brigade could not be 

acquired until 30 days after the certification.

See appendix I for the full text of the law.

1

 Floyd D. Spence National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2001, P.L. 106-398 

(Oct. 30, 2000).
Page 2 GAO-03-671 Military Transformation

On the basis of the authority of the Comptroller General, we monitored and 

assessed the Army’s efforts during 2002 to meet the requirements of the 

legislation. In doing so, we observed operational training events held 

at Fort Lewis, Washington, which the Army used to collect comparison 

data, and a vehicle survivability test at Aberdeen Proving Ground, 

Maryland. Our objectives were to (1) assess whether the Army’s plan 

for the comparison met the legislative requirements and (2) determine 

whether the results of the evaluation provided the data needed to measure 

the relative effectiveness of the two vehicles. The report also discusses the 

Secretary of Defense’s report to Congress and certification regarding the 

combat power of the Army. We are providing this report, our fifth in a 

planned series related to Army transformation,2

 to you because of your 

committees’ oversight responsibility.

Results in Brief The Army developed a plan, approved by DOD’s Director, Operational 

Test and Evaluation, which met the requirements of the fiscal year 2001 

National Defense Authorization Act. As contained in the congressional 

mandate, the plan proposed comparing the operational effectiveness and 

cost of the Stryker Infantry Carrier vehicle and the troop-carrying medium 

armored vehicle currently in the Army inventory—the M-113A3 armored 

personnel carrier. With regard to operational effectiveness, the plan’s scope 

included the use of various data, such as that obtained during operational 

vignettes and technical testing. The plan focused on three main comparison 

issues relating to the armored vehicles—their effectiveness, suitability in 

support of infantry units such as vehicle employment and maintenance, 

and survivability during operational missions. Regarding the cost 

comparison, the plan proposed that a comprehensive cost analysis be 

conducted between the two vehicles.

2

 U.S. General Accounting Office, Army Stryker Brigades: Assessment of External 

Logistics Support Should Be Documented for the Congressionally Mandated Review of the 

Army’s Operational Evaluation Plan, GAO-03-484R (Washington, D.C.: Mar. 28, 2003); 

Military Transformation: Army Actions Needed to Enhance Formation of Future 

Interim Brigade Combat Teams, GAO-02-442 (Washington, D.C.: May 17, 2002); Military 

Transformation: Army Has a Comprehensive Plan for Managing Its Transformation but 

Faces Major Challenges, GAO-02-96 (Washington, D.C.: Nov. 16, 2001); Defense Acquisition: 

Army Transformation Faces Weapons Systems Challenges, GAO-01-311 (Washington, D.C.: 

May 21, 2001).
Page 3 GAO-03-671 Military Transformation

Based on our observation and analysis of evaluation plans and results, the 

Army’s implementation of the plan provided sufficient data to determine 

the relative effectiveness of the vehicles. The Army conducted and 

evaluated eight operational training events per vehicle type and data from 

technical tests to compare the operational effectiveness, suitability, and 

survivability between the two vehicles. Prior to the operational vignettes, 

all participants and evaluators received training pertinent to their roles. 

The Army also conducted a comprehensive cost analysis as part of the 

plan. After analyzing the Army’s cost plan and data, we found that the costs 

used were reasonable and provided sufficient data to determine the relative 

cost of the two vehicles. Based on the results of the evaluation, the 

Secretary of Defense certified to Congress that the Stryker brigade combat 

team did not diminish the combat power of the Army. The Secretary of 

Defense also approved obligating funds for the Stryker vehicles to equip 

the third brigade.

In commenting on a draft of this report, DOD concurred with the 

report’s findings.

Background In October 1999, the Secretary and the Chief of Staff of the Army 

unveiled their vision to transform the U.S. Army into a more strategically 

responsive force that could dominate across the full spectrum of military 

operations—from small-scale contingencies to a major theater war. In 

testimony before the U.S. Senate in March 2000,3

 the Chief of Staff of 

the Army stated that the Army had to transform to meet current and 

future strategic requirements such as the rise of sub-national and 

transnational groups, including criminal and terrorist elements that may 

pursue objectives that threaten U.S. interests. The Army believes that the 

transformation is necessary to respond more effectively to (1) the growing 

number of peacekeeping operations and small-scale contingencies and 

(2) the challenges posed by nontraditional threats such as urban operations 

in biological/chemical environments. The Army plans to transform its 

forces over a 30-year period.

In initial efforts to meet this new vision, the Army’s Training and 

Doctrine Command developed a concept that described the capabilities, 

organization, and operations of a new brigade combat team. This brigade 

3

 Testimony before the Committee on Armed Services, U.S. Senate, Mar. 1, 2000.
Page 4 GAO-03-671 Military Transformation

would provide a capability that the Army did not possess: a rapidly 

deployable, early-entry combat force that is lethal, survivable, and capable 

of operating in all types of military operations, from small-scale 

contingencies to a major theater of war. As an early-entry force, the brigade 

is expected to have sufficient built-in combat power to conduct immediate 

combat operations upon arrival in theater if required. The brigade would be 

formed around a new, medium weight, armored vehicle. The Army chose 

an armored wheeled vehicle, designated as the Stryker, as its primary 

combat platform. The Army selected one light infantry brigade and one 

mechanized infantry brigade at Fort Lewis, Washington, to become the first 

Stryker brigade combat teams. The 3rd Brigade of the 2nd Infantry Division 

was selected to transform first.

Congress supported the Army’s efforts to transform into a force that 

not only was lethal, versatile, suitable, and survivable but could also deploy 

rapidly. However, members agreed that the Army must conduct 

an evaluation that compared the operational effectiveness and cost 

between a medium armored vehicle currently in the Army’s inventory 

and the Stryker Infantry Carrier vehicle planned for the brigades. The 

comparative evaluation was formalized in the fiscal year 2001 National 

Defense Authorization Act. For the comparison, the Army selected the 

M-113A3 armored personnel carrier as the medium armored vehicle 

currently in the inventory. Figures 1 and 2 show the Stryker Infantry Carrier 

vehicle and the M-113A3, respectively. The Army began conducting the 

comparison in September 2002.
Page 5 GAO-03-671 Military Transformation

Figure 1: Stryker Infantry Carrier Vehicle

Source: GAO.
Page 6 GAO-03-671 Military Transformation

Figure 2: M-113A3 Armored Personnel Carrier

Source: GAO.
Page 7 GAO-03-671 Military Transformation

Army’s Comparative 

Evaluation Plan 

Met Legislative 

Requirements

The Army-developed and the DOD Operational Test and Evaluation 

Director-approved plan for evaluating the Stryker Infantry Carrier vehicle 

and the M-113A3 armored personnel carrier, currently in the Army’s 

inventory, met legislative requirements to compare both operational 

effectiveness and cost. The Army developed a plan that compared 

the operational effectiveness and cost between the two vehicles. The 

congressional mandate did not provide specifics regarding the comparison 

but specified that DOD’s Director, Operational Test and Evaluation, 

approve the Army’s plan.4

 The purpose of the plan was to (1) assess and 

compare measures of operational effectiveness, suitability, and 

survivability and (2) compare the costs of the two vehicles. As required by 

the statute, the DOD Director, Operational Test and Evaluation, approved 

the operational effectiveness portion of the plan in August 2002 and the 

cost comparison portion in December 2002.

Army’s Plan Evaluated 

Operational Effectiveness, 

Suitability, and Survivability 

of the Two Vehicles

The primary objective of the comparison evaluation was to assess 

and compare measures of operational effectiveness, suitability, and 

survivability for each of the vehicles. The Army Test and Evaluation 

Command developed a detailed comparison evaluation plan that, as the 

law required, was approved by DOD’s Director, Operational Test and 

Evaluation, on August 23, 2002.5

 The plan’s scope included using existing 

data and data developed during physical examination of the vehicles, 

modeling and simulation, and live fire testing of vehicle-mounted weapons. 

Data collected from production verification tests that evaluated vehicle 

performance—such as braking, acceleration, traction, and sustained speed 

over various types of terrain—was also included. The operational portion 

of the comparison involved a series of platoon level tasks, including 

operations in complex rural terrain and urban areas under various light and 

weather conditions. The plan focused on 3 main comparison issues and 

10 sub-issues. The main comparison issues were defined as follows:

4

 The Director of Operational Test and Evaluation is the principal advisor to the 

Secretary of Defense, concerning operational testing, including assessments of 

operational effectiveness, suitability, and survivability of the items tested.

5

 The Army Test and Evaluation Command is the Army’s independent operational 

test activity and is responsible for overall management of the Army test and 

evaluation programs.
Page 8 GAO-03-671 Military Transformation

• Effectiveness: How well the unit performs and what capabilities the 

vehicles provide in support of operational missions.

• Suitability: How the vehicles are deployed, operated, and logistically 

supported while performing tasks that support the infantry platoons in 

conducting their missions.

• Survivability: How well the vehicles protect the crew and infantry 

squad, vehicle system survivability, and the effect of vehicle damage on 

mission performance.

The plan included evaluating each of the issues and sub-issues (see table 1) 

during various evaluation events. These events included examination, 

modeling and simulation, technical testing, and operational testing.

• Examination: A review and analysis of available vehicle design and 

performance data. The vehicles would be physically examined to obtain 

specific measures and characteristics. Existing data was the primary 

source, but other appropriate data sources such as historical data were 

also used.

• Modeling and Simulation: Application of existing and collected data 

to determine the mobility characteristics of the vehicles.

• Technical Testing: The measurement of demonstrated performance 

characteristics and capabilities not available through existing data or 

modeling and simulation. Additional data were provided from events 

held during the acquisition process and ballistic survivability testing at 

the Aberdeen Proving Ground, Maryland, test center.

• Operational Testing: The Army designed operational vignettes to 

directly compare two equally organized and trained infantry platoons. 

The platoons conducted identical tasks and missions against a common 

opposing force with one platoon employing the M-113A3 and the other 

employing the Stryker Infantry Carrier vehicle. The opposing force 

consisted of mounted and dismounted military units, paramilitary 

forces, and civilians.
Page 9 GAO-03-671 Military Transformation

Table 1: Data Source Matrix for the Issues and Sub-Issues in the Army’s Evaluation Plan of the Medium Armored Vehicles (MAV)

DATA SOURCE MATRIX

Evaluation Event Examination

Modeling and 

Simulation Technical Testing

Operational 

Testing

Issue 1. Effectiveness. Does the vehicle support infantry operations?

Sub-Issue 1-1. Mission Support

The MAV must support infantry platoon missions 

and tasks. X

Sub-Issue 1-2. Payload

The MAV must provide the capability to 

effectively stow and transport personnel and 

prescribed equipment. X XX

Sub-Issue 1-3. Tactical Mobility

At gross combat weight, the MAV must 

demonstrate on-road and off-road mobility 

characteristics that support the conduct of 

combat missions. XXXX

Sub-Issue 1-4. Firepower

The MAV crew must be able to employ the 

primary weapon systems to acquire, identify, 

engage, and defeat both point and area targets 

during the day and during periods of limited 

visibility. X XX

Issue 2. Suitability. Is the vehicle suitable for infantry operations?

Evaluation Event Examination

Modeling and 

Simulation Technical Testing

Operational 

Testing

Sub-Issue 2-1. Transportability

The MAV must be strategically transportable and 

deployable by C-17 and/or C-5 aircraft to deploy 

the unit into a theater of operations. The MAV 

must also be transportable by C-130 for intratheater deployment. X X

Sub-Issue 2-2. Reliability and Maintainability

The MAV must demonstrate acceptable 

reliability and maintainability characteristics to 

permit the brigade to complete its designated 

mission. X XX

Sub-Issue 2-3. Integrated Logistics Support

The MAV must be logistically supportable with 

existing and special tools, and the specified 

support and test equipment; demonstrate 

detection and isolation of component failures 

using its built-in test capability; and demonstrate 

an adequate power management capability. X XX
Page 10 GAO-03-671 Military Transformation

Source: GAO analysis of the U.S. Army Test and Evaluation Command’s comparison evaluation plan.

Army Compared Costs as 

Required by the Statute

The Army directed its Cost and Economic Analysis Center to conduct a 

cost comparison between the Stryker Infantry Carrier vehicle and the 

M-113A3 armored personnel carrier. The Analysis Center developed a plan 

to determine and compare the life-cycle costs of the Stryker vehicle to 

the life-cycle costs of the M-113A3 currently in the Army inventory. The 

Army directed that the Analysis Center examine the costs of equipping, 

training, fielding, and maintaining the vehicles for use in the Stryker 

brigades. To determine these costs, the Analysis Center emphasized 

the costs associated with vehicle manufacturing, military personnel, 

replenishment parts, and fuel/petroleum for each vehicle. On October 4, 

2002, the Army submitted the cost comparison portion of the plan to the 

Director, Operational Test and Evaluation, for approval. As required by the 

law, the Director, Operational Test and Evaluation, officially approved that 

portion on December 17, 2002, as the Secretary of the Army submitted the 

comparison evaluation report to DOD.

Sub-Issue 2-4. Manpower and Personnel 

Integration (MANPRINT)

The MAV must demonstrate characteristics that 

address human capabilities and limitations to 

enhance soldier performance and system 

operational effectiveness. X XX

Issue 3. Survivability. Does the vehicle provide protection for crew and system survivability?

Evaluation Event Examination

Modeling and 

Simulation Technical Testing

Operational 

Testing

Sub-Issue 3-1. Ballistic Protection

The MAV must meet the following requirements: 

(1) Minimum direct fire ballistic protection levels 

in terms of integral 7.62-mm armor-piercing and 

14.5-mm and hand-held High Explosive AntiTank weapons; (2) Overhead crew and 

passenger indirect fire ballistic protection against 

152-mm high explosive airburst; (3) All-around 

crew and passenger protection against blast and 

overpressure effects of anti-personnel mines XXX

Sub-Issue 3-2. Non-Ballistic Protection

The vehicle must perform its mission under 

battlefield conditions, including the presence of 

non-ballistic threats. XXXX

(Continued From Previous Page)

DATA SOURCE MATRIX

Evaluation Event Examination

Modeling and 

Simulation Technical Testing

Operational 

Testing
Page 11 GAO-03-671 Military Transformation

Evaluation Provided 

Sufficient Data 

for Comparison 

of Vehicles

Based on our observation of the vignettes, unit and evaluator training, and 

a technical test and on our analysis of the test results and review of cost 

comparison assumptions, the Army’s conduct of the Army Test and 

Evaluation Command plan produced enough data to gauge the relative 

effectiveness and cost of the Stryker Infantry Carrier vehicle and the 

M-113A3 armored personnel carrier. To ensure competency during 

evaluation events, the Army certified that the units conducting the 

operational vignettes received comparable amounts of training in their 

vehicles and that the evaluators were familiar with appropriate infantry 

tactics and doctrine. The purpose of the comparison evaluation plan was to 

collect data to measure the relative effectiveness, suitability, and 

survivability of both vehicles. To do so, the plan consisted of operational 

vignettes, augmented by gunnery exercises, modeling and simulations; 

physical and other vehicle examinations; and technical testing. Comparison 

data included surveys, results of force on force exercises, and mission 

success and task performance ratings. The plan also assessed the costs of 

both vehicles.

Unit and Evaluators 

Certified Prior to Conduct 

of Operational Vignettes

Prior to conducting the operational effectiveness segment of the 

comparison evaluation, the two infantry platoons and the event evaluators 

received training specific to their roles in the comparison. The two infantry 

platoons received training that ensured all participating personnel were 

proficient with the vehicles, digitized equipment, and the associated 

support equipment. For example, one platoon trained on the Stryker 

vehicle while the other trained on the M-113A3 vehicle. All vehicle 

commanders were trained on the M2 .50-caliber machine gun and the MK19 

grenade launcher—the weapon systems for the two types of vehicles. The 

two platoons participated in a 20-day training exercise and practiced 

incorporating the use of the two types of vehicles in missions assigned to a 

platoon in a Stryker brigade combat team. The brigade commander 

certified that the two platoons were trained according to doctrine and that 

both were similarly manned and trained.

During the comparison evaluation, subject matter experts6

 evaluated 

the units’ performance during each operational vignette. Similar to the 

6

 Subject matter experts are usually noncommissioned officers who have extensive 

experience with the studied equipment, recent unit experience, and a background as a 

trainer or in training development.
Page 12 GAO-03-671 Military Transformation

two platoons’ personnel, the evaluators were certified as trained in current 

Infantry doctrine and tactics. Furthermore, personnel from the Army 

Test and Evaluation Command trained the subject matter experts in data 

collection methods, test instrumentation, and familiarization of the vehicle 

types and the terrain in which the vehicles were compared. Prior to 

conducting the operational vignettes, the evaluators participated in a pilot 

test where full data collection and test controls were rehearsed. After 

completing the pilot test, test officials certified that the subject matter 

experts were trained and that they complied with the established data 

collection procedures. The subject matter experts observed each unit and 

recorded comments on task performance and mission success by filling out 

performance matrices. Upon completion of an event, Army Test and 

Evaluation Command data collectors harvested and validated data 

collected during that particular activity. All data collected and validated 

were included in the Army’s database and analyzed by the Army Test and 

Evaluation Command.

Vignettes, Gunnery, and 

Modeling and Simulation 

Used to Determine 

Operational Effectiveness

Effectiveness is an assessment of the extent to which a vehicle allows 

a unit to successfully perform tasks in support of infantry platoons 

conducting missions in an operational environment. To determine 

effectiveness, the Army compared the two vehicles’ capability to 

(1) support infantry platoon missions, (2) move around the battlefield, 

(3) store and move personnel and equipment, and (4) employ their weapon 

systems during day, night, and limited visibility conditions. Data for the 

comparison came from operational vignettes, gunnery, physical 

examination of the vehicles, modeling and simulation, technical testing, 

and operational testing of the vehicles. The most visible of these data 

sources were the operational vignettes conducted at Fort Lewis, and the 

other data collection methods augmented those findings.

The Army conducted the comparison of the two types of vehicles during 

a scheduled training event held from September 12 to October 2, 2002, 

at Fort Lewis. The comparison, used to assess mission support, payload, 

and mobility, included two 2-hour road marches and two platoon-level 

training exercises designed by the 3rd Brigade of the 2nd Infantry 

Division and approved by the Army Test and Evaluation Command. 

During each exercise, the vehicles were loaded with all unit 

personnel and equipment according to unit procedures. The two road 

marches—designed to demonstrate the vehicles’ ability to move on and 

off road, store and transport personnel and equipment, and provide 
Page 13 GAO-03-671 Military Transformation

human factors data—were conducted over varying terrain like paved 

and gravel roads, rutted and uneven trails.

The operational vignettes required the platoons to execute selected 

small-scale contingency missions such as a raid or an attack with 

events lasting from 12 to 17 hours. The evaluations were conducted in 

environments designed to ensure similar training and conditions for both 

platoons and vehicles. For example, the missions were conducted in the 

same light conditions, against the same opposing force and using the same 

doctrine and tactics. Fort Lewis’ terrain is densely wooded and open and 

undulating. Rocky terrain is common. During the vignettes, the vehicles 

were operated over different types of terrain, including paved and gravel 

roads, rutted and uneven wooded trails of varying slopes. In some 

vignettes, the vehicles traversed loose soil about 3 to 6 inches in depth. 

We observed that the Stryker and M-113A3 vehicles were operated over the 

same terrain during the operational vignettes.

The operational comparison was divided into two exercises. To 

compare how the platoons employed the vehicles, we attended the 

same vignettes for both exercises. We observed varying phases of the 

vignettes such as an obstacle breach, checkpoint security operations, 

civilian disturbances, and a rescue of endangered indigenous personnel 

to determine how the subject matter experts and the data collection 

personnel documented the key actions and outcomes as each of the 

platoons conducted its tactical missions.

During the first phase of the training events, we observed that the 

employment of the M-113A3s and the Stryker infantry carriers was 

minimal. For example, both platoon leaders used the vehicles primarily 

as a troop transport and had their soldiers egress from the vehicles before 

reaching the mission site. By doing so, the platoon leaders were unable to 

support their mission by employing the vehicles’ weapons system. During 

the second training exercise, both platoons moved closer to the mission 

site and used the vehicles’ weapons system to support their specific 

mission. Based on our observations and discussions with unit leadership, 

we concluded that this was due to the units’ limited amount of experience 

in employing either of the vehicles. Other factors that impacted the 

vehicles’ employment included platoon composition and command 

guidance. Both platoons were comprised of a mix of soldiers who had 

and had not previously served in mechanized infantry units, and the 

employment of the vehicle was entirely subjective on the part of the 

platoon leadership. Neither platoon had published platoon or company 
Page 14 GAO-03-671 Military Transformation

standard operating procedures for the vehicles. These observations and 

conclusions on the employment of the vehicles were validated in the test 

team observation section of the Test and Evaluation Command’s test 

data report.

Although providing data for all of the sub-issues measuring effectiveness, 

the Army augmented data collected from the vignettes through gunnery 

exercises and modeling and simulation. Upon completion of the vignettes, 

the Army sent both platoons to the Yakima Training Center, Washington, to 

conduct gunnery exercises. While at the training center, live fire of the 

weapons provided additional data to augment observations from the 

vignettes and the previous technical testing. To further evaluate mobility, 

the Army used modeling and simulation at Aberdeen Proving Ground to 

determine how well each vehicle would travel over different terrain types. 

Measurements included movement over simulated terrain in Korea, 

Europe, and Southwest Asia under both wet and dry weather conditions.

We did not observe any significant differences in the way the Army 

compared the two vehicles during the operational vignettes. Subject matter 

experts and test personnel were consistent in their data collection while 

observing vignettes for both the Stryker and the M-113A3 vehicles. 

Moreover, the vignettes provided sufficient data to determine the relative 

operational effectiveness of the two vehicles, and the additional data 

collected accentuated the findings. According to the Army Test and 

Evaluation Command, both vehicles enabled infantry squads to complete 

platoon missions and effectively transport personnel and prescribed 

equipment. The Stryker infantry carrier provided advantages in employing 

its weapon systems and mobility during most situations, and the M-113A3 

had an advantage in off-road mobility.

Human Factors and 

Technical Data Used to 

Assess Vehicle Suitability

Suitability is an assessment of the extent to which a vehicle, when 

deployed to an objective area, can maneuver, be maintained, and supported 

in combat operations. To determine suitability, the Army compared 

(1) transportability, (2) reliability and maintainability, (3) integrated 

logistics support, and (4) MANPRINT7

 data for the two vehicles. Primary 

data for this comparison came from physical examination, technical 

testing, and operational testing of the vehicles. Of the four areas used to 

7

 MANPRINT data measures human factors such as vehicle ride-ability, noise levels, 

and fatigue.
Page 15 GAO-03-671 Military Transformation

compare suitability, manpower and personnel integration was the only area 

that occurred during events that we directly observed. Data collected for 

the other three measures of suitability combined data and information from 

a variety of sources.

Data collection for manpower and personnel integration occurred during 

the vignettes at Fort Lewis and was used to compare the effect of the 

vehicles on soldiers performing necessary tasks. The Army’s MANPRINT 

data collection team collected both quantitative and qualitative data by 

interviewing soldiers and collecting soldier surveys prior to and after the 

completion of certain events. The primary events used to facilitate 

MANPRINT collection were road marches and performance of common 

soldier tasks. Postvignette interviews with soldiers were also used to 

collect data.

The road marches were used to determine the effect that riding in vehicles 

had on soldiers’ stress levels. Two self-assessment questionnaires, one a list 

of adjectives that soldiers checked to indicate their current feelings and the 

other an individual stress rating, were administered prior to and after each 

road march. In addition, data collectors took saliva samples from soldiers 

before and after each road march to determine changes in soldiers’ stress 

levels.8

 To facilitate a comparison, soldiers rotated vehicles during the 

second road march.

To determine the effect of vehicles on common soldier tasks, the Army 

designed short events, entitled excursions, to collect data on the effects 

of entering and exiting the vehicles during a variety of different combat 

situations. After the first road march, each platoon arrived into assembly 

areas and conducted several excursions, with soldiers entering and exiting 

vehicles under duress, in chemical protective gear and while conducting 

casualty evacuations. Data collectors measured the length of time for each 

of these excursions, and upon completion of all events, soldiers filled out 

questionnaires. Figures 3 and 4 show examples of these excursions, with 

soldiers entering a Stryker infantry carrier and leaving a M-113A3.

8

 Within saliva, there is an enzyme called amylase. Research has shown that the 

concentration of salivary amylase reflects substances produced by the body in 

response to stress.
Page 16 GAO-03-671 Military Transformation

Figure 3: Stryker Infantry Carrier Ingress Excursion

Source: GAO.
Page 17 GAO-03-671 Military Transformation

Figure 4: M-113A3 Armored Personnel Carrier Egress Excursion

Source: GAO.
Page 18 GAO-03-671 Military Transformation

Upon completion of each training exercise, soldiers filled out another 

series of questionnaires designed to gauge ergonomic factors. 

Questionnaires, again administered by MANPRINT data collectors, asked 

soldiers about sound level, space, seat comfort, ability to communicate 

within the vehicle, situational awareness, and other safety issues.

To assess transportability, reliability and maintainability, and integrated 

logistics support, the Army relied on existing data from previous events, 

developed projections where data was lacking, or is in the process of 

collecting additional data during the continuing developmental testing. 

Using existing data, the Army determined that both vehicles were 

transportable; however, the M-113A3 was more deployable by air because 

of its reduced weight but less deployable by road because, for longer 

distances, it required either rail or truck support. To assess the Stryker 

vehicle’s reliability and maintainability, the Army is continuing to collect 

data. While the Army is able to claim that there are no specific failure 

patterns, the relatively low number of Stryker miles prevents a statistically 

reliable forecast. To assess the M-113A3’s reliability and maintainability, the 

Army primarily relied on existing data. Because the system is still in 

development, the Army used projections to determine that the Stryker 

vehicle is more logistically supportable because the family of vehicles and 

higher gas mileage reduce the overall size of the logistic footprint. For 

example, the Stryker vehicles are built on a common chassis and thus 

require fewer different parts. Moreover, the Stryker, as a wheeled-vehicle, 

requires fewer mechanics to maintain it.

We did not observe any significant differences in the way the Army 

compared suitability for both types of vehicles. According to our review 

of the Army Test and Evaluation Command report, both vehicles are 

transportable and both have manageable failures for maintenance and 

reliability. In terms of human factors, the MANPRINT data indicate that 

soldiers riding in a Stryker infantry carrier reported reduced fatigue; more 

ability to move within, inside, and outside the vehicle; lower levels of 

stress; less irritation; and a better ability to communicate than those riding 

in a M-113A3.

Vehicle Survivability 

Assessed against a 

Variety of Threats

Survivability is an assessment of the extent to which a vehicle survives 

under different threat conditions and protects the crew and the 

equipment. The Army’s Test and Evaluation Command decided that vehicle 

survivability would be determined through a comparison of existing test 

data, technical data, and modeling and simulation. The vehicles had to 
Page 19 GAO-03-671 Military Transformation

demonstrate that they could provide an adequate level of protection to the 

infantry squad and vehicle crew against threats such as small arms, 

artillery, and mines. The M113A3 was designed to provide protection 

against a standard 7.62mm threat. The Army intended the Stryker to have 

an all-around 7.62mm armor-piercing protection, plus 14.5 mm protection 

on the front, sides, and rear. The top will have 7.62 mm armor-piercing and 

152mm high explosive airburst protection, and protection against 

antipersonnel mines through the vehicle floor. Stryker also has an 

embedded spall liner. Also assessed was the vehicles’ ability to support 

missions under different battlefield conditions such as nuclear, biological, 

and chemical environments. Most of the technical evaluation occurred at 

the Aberdeen Proving Ground test center. The Test Command concluded 

that the Stryker vehicle was more survivable than the M-113A3 against both 

of these types of threats.

We also observed a vehicle survivability test at the Aberdeen test center. 

Based on our observations of the testing and data collection process, we 

determined that the test community had systems designed to collect 

objective, technical data on the vehicles. We obtained and analyzed the Test 

and Evaluation Command’s evaluation report; however, we are unable to 

comment on specific test results because the results are classified and 

technical testing remains ongoing. Our observations and analysis do allow 

us to generally comment that the technical testing procedures appeared to 

be objective and sufficient to provide data to determine the relative 

survivability of the two types of vehicles.

DOD and the Army 

Assessed the Costs 

of Stryker and the 

M-113A3 Vehicles

The Army’s Cost and Economic Analysis Center and DOD’s Program 

Analysis and Evaluation Directorate (PA&E) estimated the life-cycle costs 

of equipping the brigade teams with either the Stryker or the M-113A3 

vehicle. The Center included both investment and operating costs in its 

calculations and defined the appropriate life cycle as 20 years. PA&E, using 

the Center’s cost calculations, applied a slightly different methodology to 

assess the costs for one Stryker brigade. Both PA&E and the Army 

concurred that the Stryker infantry carrier is more expensive than the 

M-113A3. However, each report had a slightly different methodology. We 

reviewed the assumptions of the cost comparison and found they 

conformed to cost analysis guidance provided to federal agencies by the 

Office of Management and Budget. We found no instances in which these 

cost assumptions seemed to favor one vehicle over another. Based on this 

review, the magnitude of the increased costs of the Stryker vehicle 

appeared reasonable.
Page 20 GAO-03-671 Military Transformation

The Stryker vehicle has a higher investment cost than the M-113A3. 

According to both PA&E and the Army cost reports, acquiring a Stryker 

vehicle is $1.42 million each. The acquisition cost for an M-113A3 depends 

on how it is acquired, either through reassigning vehicles currently in the 

Army inventory or upgrading existing M-113A2s.

The Army currently has 4,100 M-113A3s in its inventory, so a zero cost 

investment option would be to assign these existing vehicles to the new 

Stryker brigades. According to the Army, pursuing this course would 

adversely affect the readiness of the losing units, which would then be 

equipped with older versions of the M-113. PA&E noted that the loss 

of vehicles could be accepted as an additional risk to the current force 

structure, which will begin transforming to the future force in 2008. 

A second option would be to upgrade existing M-113A2s. PA&E and 

the Army reports agree that the cost of upgrading an M-113A2 is about 

$303,000 per vehicle with an inherited value of $67,000 per vehicle, making 

the total cost of upgrading at least $370,000 per vehicle.

Capabilities costs are also not reflected in the investment costs of the 

M-113A3. Unlike the M-113A3, the Stryker vehicle was designed with 

two significant capabilities: 14.5-mm armor protection and a Remote 

Weapon Station. The M-113A3’s armor protection is less than the Stryker 

vehicle’s and an upgrade package will cost about $73,000 per vehicle. The 

M-113A3 does not have the Remote Weapon Station, which would cost 

another $200,000 per vehicle. Not included in this estimate are the costs 

of testing and integrating the Remote Weapon Station with the M-113A3, 

assuming that it can be done at all. Moreover, this estimate does not include 

the effect that the additional weight from the armor protection and Remote 

Weapon Station would have on the M-113A3’s transportability or suitability.

PA&E and the Army agreed that the Stryker infantry carrier has lower 

operating costs than the M-113A3. Over a 20-year lifespan, both agencies 

estimated that each Stryker vehicle would cost $2.9 million to operate 

and maintain compared to $3.1 million for the M-113A3. These cost 

savings come from three main areas: fuel efficiency, replacement parts, 

and training costs. Both agencies agree that the Stryker vehicle is 

more fuel-efficient and requires fewer repair parts and consumables. 

Additionally, training costs encompass several different areas, namely 

the cost to train and staff mechanics, as well as instruct new crews on 

how to operate the vehicles.
Page 21 GAO-03-671 Military Transformation

With the exception of the number of brigades used to calculate costs, the 

methodology used by PA&E and the Army to calculate operating costs was 

consistent. The Army based its cost calculations on equipping 6 brigades, 

for a total of 686 vehicles. In contrast, PA&E based its calculations on 

equipping 1 brigade, for a total of 118 vehicles. Although the two methods 

result in different total costs for the vehicle systems, they do not change 

the relative price difference, or the fact that the Stryker vehicle is more 

expensive than the M-113A3.

The Director, Operational Test and Evaluation, officially approved the 

Army’s cost comparison on December 17, 2002. The comparison found that 

the Stryker infantry carrier vehicle was more costly than the M-113A3. 

Based on our review of the methodologies used, we concluded that the cost 

comparison was reasonable.

Secretary of Defense 

Certified to the Combat 

Power of the Army 

and Released Funding 

for the Third 

Brigade’s Vehicles

The Army completed the comparison evaluation and developed a report 

that included reports from the Army Test and Evaluation Command and the 

Army Cost and Economic Analysis Center. On December 17, 2002, the 

Secretary of the Army forwarded a memorandum of certification to the 

Secretary of Defense. The Secretary of the Army certified that, in terms of 

operational effectiveness, the comparison evaluation demonstrated that 

the Stryker infantry carrier vehicle is more survivable and provides better 

overall performance and mobility when employed in combat operations 

than the M-113A3. The Secretary of the Army also certified that the 

Stryker brigade combat team increased the aggregate combat power of 

the U.S. Army.

However, in the report submitted to Congress, DOD’s conclusions were not 

quite as positive. The DOD report, prepared by its PA&E Directorate, 

summarized conclusions based on the Department of the Army report that 

included the Army Test and Evaluation Command and the Army Cost and 

Economic Analysis Center reports. The Director, Operational Test and 

Evaluation, also provided comments from a draft report. The DOD report 

stated that neither vehicle was preferred for all the criteria. The Stryker 

vehicle was superior under some criteria, the M-113A3 was superior on 

others, and the two vehicles were equal on yet others. However, DOD and 

the Army both agreed that the Stryker brigade combat teams would not 

diminish the combat power of the Army, and DOD so certified. As a result 

of the evaluation, the Deputy Secretary of Defense approved obligating the 

funding for the Stryker vehicles to equip the third brigade.
Page 22 GAO-03-671 Military Transformation

Agency Comments In commenting on a draft of this report, DOD concurred with the report’s 

findings. DOD’s response also provided technical comments for clarifying 

two areas in the report, which we incorporated. Appendix II contains the 

full text of DOD’s comments.

Scope and 

Methodology

To determine whether the Army’s plan for the comparison was adequate to 

satisfy legislative requirements, we focused our efforts on understanding 

the Army’s overall comparison evaluation plan. We obtained and analyzed 

the Army’s Comparative Evaluation plan, data collection plans, and 

technical test plans and reviewed comments of the plan provided by 

various DOD and Army agencies. We interviewed officials and analysts 

involved in both the design and evaluation of the plan at Office of the 

Secretary of Defense; Office of the Secretary of the Army; Headquarters, 

Department of the Army; Army Forces Command; Army Training 

and Doctrine Command; Army Tank and Automotive Command; Army 

Operational Test Command and Army Test and Evaluation 

Command; Army Cost and Economic Analysis Center; and I Corps, 

Fort Lewis, Washington.

To determine whether the comparison evaluation plan and its 

implementation would provide the data needed to measure the relative 

effectiveness of the vehicles, we attended the operational vignettes and 

associated training events scheduled in the Army’s plan and reviewed the 

results taken from those events. For example, we reviewed the training 

procedures and attended the training sessions for the data collectors and 

subject matter experts administering the operational vignettes held at 

Fort Lewis, Washington. We examined the methods used by the test 

administrators to collect, store, and process the data. To determine if the 

conditions favored one vehicle over the other, we observed the terrain to 

be used during the operational vignettes. We observed 8 of 16 events 

conducted during the operational vignettes. These events included the road 

march, loading of vehicles, and various tactical missions. In addition, we 

rode in and drove both types of vehicles. We also interviewed the Army 

Operational Test Command officials who were administering the test, as 

well as representatives from the office of DOD’s Director of Operational 

Test and Evaluation and the Institute for Defense Analysis and Army 

commanders of the unit participating in the evaluation. Upon completion of 

the vignettes, we interviewed soldiers who had participated in the events. 

For technical testing, we visited Aberdeen Proving Ground, Maryland. We 

received briefings from the Developmental Test Command as to how the 
Page 23 GAO-03-671 Military Transformation

Army conducts technical tests on vehicles. We obtained and analyzed 

classified and unclassified ballistic testing plans and observed a vehicle 

survivability test that was comparable to other types of technical testing. 

We also reviewed the reports issued by the Office of the Secretary of 

Defense; Program Analysis and Evaluation Directorate; Secretary of 

the Army; the Army Test and Evaluation Command; and the Army Cost 

Economic and Analysis Center. We compared the results and conclusions 

of these reports to our own observations.

We reviewed the Army’s Cost Economic and Analysis Center’s cost report 

and the comments on the report made by the PA&E and the Office of the 

Secretary of Defense regarding cost comparison methodology. While we 

verified the general procedures and assumptions used in these analyses, we 

did not perform detailed checks of the many calculations they entailed.

Our review was performed from May 2002 to May 2003 in accordance with 

generally accepted government audit standards.

We are sending copies of this report to the Secretary of Defense and the 

Director, Office of Management and Budget. We will also make copies 

available to appropriate congressional committees and to other interested 

parties on request. In addition, the report will be available at no cost on the 

GAO Web site at http://www.gao.gov. If you or your staff have any questions 

about this report, please call me at (202) 512-8365.
Page 24 GAO-03-671 Military Transformation

Major contributors to this report were Reginald L. Furr, Jr.; Leo B. Sullivan; 

Robert Ackley; Timothy A. Burke; Kenneth Daniell; M. Jane Hunt; William 

McNaught; Jim Melton; and Sidney Schwartz.

William M. Solis

Director, Defense Capabilities

and Management
Page 25 GAO-03-671 Military Transformation

List of Congressional Committees

The Honorable John W. Warner

Chairman

The Honorable Carl Levin

Ranking Minority Member

Committee on Armed Services

United States Senate

The Honorable Ted Stevens

Chairman

The Honorable Daniel K. Inouye

Ranking Minority Member

Subcommittee on Defense

Committee on Appropriations

United States Senate

The Honorable Duncan Hunter

Chairman

The Honorable Ike Skelton

Ranking Minority Member

Committee on Armed Services

House of Representatives

The Honorable Jerry Lewis

Chairman

The Honorable John P. Murtha

Ranking Minority Member

Subcommittee on Defense

Committee on Appropriations

House of Representatives
Page 26 GAO-03-671 Military Transformation

Appendix I

Section from Public Law 106-398 Concerning Apendxeis

Limitations on Army Transformation Actions ApenIdxi

SEC. 113. REPORTS AND LIMITATIONS RELATING TO ARMY 

TRANSFORMATION.

(a) SECRETARY OF THE ARMY REPORT ON OBJECTIVE FORCE 

DEVELOPMENT PROCESS.—The Secretary of the Army shall submit to 

the congressional defense committees a report on the process for 

developing the objective force in the transformation of the Army.

The report shall include the following:

(1) The operational environments envisioned for the objective force. 

(2) The threat assumptions on which research and development efforts for 

transformation of the Army into the objective force are based. (3) The 

potential operational and organizational concepts for the objective force. 

(4) The operational requirements anticipated for the operational 

requirements document of the objective force. (5) The anticipated schedule 

of Army transformation activities through fiscal year 2012, together with—

(A) the projected funding requirements through that fiscal year for 

research and development activities and procurement activities related to 

transition to the objective force; and (B) a summary of the anticipated 

investments of the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency in 

programs designed to lead to the fielding of future combat systems for the 

objective force. (6) A proposed plan for the comparison referred to in subsection (c).

If any of the information required by paragraphs (1) through (5) is not 

available at the time the report is submitted, the Secretary shall include in 

the report the anticipated schedule for the availability of that information.

(b) SECRETARY OF DEFENSE REPORT ON OBJECTIVE FORCE 

DEVELOPMENT PROCESS.—Not later than March 1, 2001, the Secretary 

of Defense shall submit to the congressional defense committees a report 

on the process for developing the objective force in the transformation of 

the Army. The report shall include the following:

(1) The joint warfighting requirements that will be supported by the 

fielding of the objective force, together with a description of the 

adjustments that are planned to be made in the war plans of the 

commanders of the unified combatant commands in relation to the fielding 

of the objective force. (2) The changes in lift requirements that may result 

from the establishment and fielding of the combat brigades of the objective 

force. (3) The evaluation process that will be used to support 
Appendix I

Section from Public Law 106-398 Concerning 

Limitations on Army Transformation Actions

Page 27 GAO-03-671 Military Transformation

decisionmaking on the course of the Army transformation, including a 

description of the operational evaluations and experimentation that will be 

used to validate the operational requirements for the operational 

requirements document of the objective force.

If any of the information required by paragraphs (1) through (3) is not 

available at the time the report is submitted, the Secretary shall include in 

the report the anticipated schedule for the availability of that information.

(c) COSTS AND EFFECTIVENESS OF MEDIUM ARMORED COMBAT 

VEHICLES FOR THE INTERIM BRIGADE COMBAT TEAMS.—(1) The 

Secretary of the Army shall develop a plan for comparing—(A) the costs 

and operational effectiveness of the infantry carrier variant of the interim 

armored vehicles selected for the infantry battalions of the interim brigade 

combat teams; and (B) the costs and operational effectiveness of the troopcarrying medium armored vehicles currently in the Army inventory for the 

use of infantry battalions. (2) The Secretary of the Army may not carry out 

the comparison described in paragraph (1) until the Director of 

Operational Test and Evaluation of the Department of Defense approves 

the plan for that comparison developed under that paragraph. 

(d) LIMITATION PENDING RECEIPT OF SECRETARY OF THE ARMY 

REPORT.—Not more than 80 percent of the amount appropriated for fiscal 

year 2001 for the procurement of armored vehicles in the family of new 

medium armored vehicles may be obligated until—(1) the Secretary of the 

Army submits to the congressional defense committees the report required 

under subsection (a); and (2) a period of 30 days has elapsed from the date 

of the submittal of such report.

(e) LIMITATION PENDING COMPARISON AND CERTIFICATION.—No 

funds appropriated or otherwise made available to the Department of the 

Army for any fiscal year may be obligated for acquisition of medium 

armored combat vehicles to equip a third interim brigade combat team 

until—(1) the plan for a comparison of costs and operational effectiveness 

developed under subsection (c)(1), as approved under subsection (c)(2), is 

carried out; (2) the Secretary of Defense submits to the congressional 

defense committees, after the completion of the comparison referred to in 

paragraph (1), a certification that—(A) the Secretary approves of the 

obligation of funds for that purpose; and (B) the force structure resulting 

from the acquisition and subsequent operational capability of interim 

brigade combat teams will not diminish the combat power of the
Appendix I

Section from Public Law 106-398 Concerning 

Limitations on Army Transformation Actions

Page 28 GAO-03-671 Military Transformation

Army; and (3) a period of 30 days has elapsed from the date of the 

certification under paragraph (2).

(f ) DEFINITIONS.—In this section:

(1) The term “transformation”, with respect to the Army, means the actions 

being undertaken to transform the Army, as it is constituted in terms of 

organization, equipment, and doctrine in 2000, into the objective force.

(2) The term “objective force” means the Army that has the organizational 

structure, the most advanced equipment that early twenty-first century 

science and technology can provide, and the appropriate doctrine to ensure 

that the Army is responsive, deployable, agile, versatile, lethal, survivable, 

and sustainable for the full spectrum of the operations anticipated to be 

required of the Army during the early years of the twenty-first century 

following 2010.

(3) The term “interim brigade combat team” means an Army brigade that is 

designated by the Secretary of the Army as a brigade combat team and is 

reorganized and equipped with currently available equipment in a 

configuration that effectuates an evolutionary advancement toward 

transformation of the Army to the objective force.
Page 29 GAO-03-671 Military Transformation

Appendix II

Comments from the Department of Defense ApenIdxi

(350179)
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