IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

No. 16-60184

Summary Calendar

HANSAWORLD USA, INCORPORATED, a California corporation, 

 Plaintiff - Appellant

v.

DAMON G. CARPENTER, an individual, 

 Defendant - Appellee

Appeal from the United States District Court for the 

Southern District of Mississippi

USDC No. 2:15-CV-73

Before STEWART, Chief Judge, and JOLLY and JONES, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:*

Plaintiff-Appellant HansaWorld USA, Inc. (“HansaWorld”) brought 

claims of civil conspiracy and violations of Florida’s Civil Remedies for 

Criminal Practice Act, FLA. STAT. § 772.101 (“Florida RICO”) against 

Defendant-Appellee Damon Carpenter (“Carpenter”). Thereafter, HansaWorld

moved to amend its complaint, attempting to add civil Racketeer Influenced 

 

* Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined that this opinion should not 

be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH 

CIR. R. 47.5.4.

United States Court of Appeals

Fifth Circuit

FILED

October 20, 2016

Lyle W. Cayce

Clerk

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and Corrupt Organizations Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1964(c)–(d) (“Federal RICO”) and 

malicious interference claims, which the district court denied as futile. After 

discovery, the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Mississippi 

granted Carpenter’s motion for summary judgment, dismissing HansaWorld’s 

claims. HansaWorld now appeals. We AFFIRM.

I. BACKGROUND

HansaWorld’s former employee, Kimberlee Davenport (“Davenport”), hired 

Carpenter as her attorney after HansaWorld terminated her employment. 

Thereafter, Carpenter represented Davenport for approximately two weeks “for 

the purpose of negotiating with [HansaWorld] . . . to secure the most favorable 

terms possible resulting from [her] departure from that employment.” 

HansaWorld alleges that during the course of her relationship with Carpenter, 

Davenport attempted to extort HansaWorld and unlawfully converted its 

property. After winning its case against Davenport, HansaWorld sought 

judgment against Carpenter in connection with his representation of Davenport. 

HansaWorld initially brought the instant matter in a Florida state court 

in February 2015. Carpenter then removed the case to the U.S. District Court 

for the Southern District of Florida, which on Carpenter’s motion, transferred 

the case to the court below in May 2015. In its original complaint, HansaWorld 

brought Florida RICO and civil conspiracy claims, alleging that Carpenter 

conspired with Davenport to extort payments from it by: (1) making false 

employment discrimination and income tax withholding allegations, (2) 

conspiring with Davenport to shut down HansaWorld’s phone lines, and (3) 

advising Davenport to delay returning the company car. On October 1, 2015, 

the district court denied HansaWorld leave to amend its complaint to include

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charges of malicious interference with business relations and Federal RICO 

claims, finding that it had not pleaded a prima facie case for either claim.1 

On March 8, 2016, the district court granted Carpenter’s motion for 

summary judgment, finding that HansaWorld could not establish an

enterprise or pattern of continuing racketeering activity and had failed to show 

that Carpenter’s actions went beyond the scope of his representation or that 

he had any personal stake in the outcome of Davenport’s dispute with 

HansaWorld.

HansaWorld filed this appeal.

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

This court ordinarily reviews a district court’s denial of a motion for leave 

to amend a complaint for an abuse of discretion. City of Clinton v. Pilgrim’s 

Pride Corp., 632 F.3d 148, 152 (5th Cir. 2010). If, however, the court below 

denied the motion “based solely on futility, we apply a de novo standard of 

review identical, in practice, to the standard used for reviewing a dismissal 

under Rule 12(b)(6).” Id. (citing Wilson v. Bruks-Klockner, Inc., 602 F.3d 363, 

368 (5th Cir. 2010)). Under a Rule 12(b)(6) analysis, a complaint must allege 

enough facts that, if taken as true, “state a claim to relief that is plausible on 

its face.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). A complaint 

that contains no more than “a formulaic recitation of the elements” or presents 

a “legal conclusion couched as a factual allegation” is insufficient. Ashcroft v. 

Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555). 

Similarly, when reviewing a district court’s grant of summary judgment, 

we review the district court’s ruling de novo. Robinson v. Orient Marine Co., 

 

1 Although the district court denied HansaWorld leave to add these two new 

allegations, pursuant to the same motion, the court did grant HansaWorld leave to amend 

its complaint as it related to its Florida RICO allegations, including leave to add any 

additional facts in support thereof. 

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505 F.3d 364, 365 (5th Cir. 2007) (citation omitted). Summary judgment is 

warranted when there is no genuine issue of material fact and the moving 

party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. FED. R. CIV. P. 56(a); 

Robinson, 505 F.3d at 366 (citation omitted). “Unsubstantiated assertions, 

improbable inferences, and unsupported speculation are not sufficient to defeat 

a motion for summary judgment.” Brown v. City of Houston, 337 F.3d 539, 541 

(5th Cir. 2003) (citation omitted). “[R]easonable inferences are to be drawn in 

favor of the non-moving party.” Robinson, 505 F.3d at 366 (citation omitted).

III. DISCUSSION

HansaWorld raises two issues on appeal. First, it asserts that the 

district court erred when it denied HansaWorld’s motion to amend its

complaint to include a malicious interference with business relations claim. 

Second, HansaWorld alleges that the district court erred when it granted 

summary judgment in favor of Carpenter on HansaWorld’s Florida civil 

conspiracy claim. Both issues are discussed in turn.2

A.

HansaWorld first argues that the district court erred when it denied 

HansaWorld’s motion for leave to include a malicious interference with 

business relations claim against Carpenter. We disagree. 

In Mississippi,3 a prima facie case for malicious interference requires a 

plaintiff to show that a person “engage[d] in some act with a malicious intent 

 

2 HansaWorld does not appeal the district court’s dismissal of its Federal or Florida 

RICO claims. 3 In the court below, Carpenter argued that Mississippi law, not Florida law, should 

apply to this case. The district court found through a conflict of laws analysis that Florida 

law controlled. The parties did not dispute, however, that Mississippi law applied to 

HansaWorld’s malicious interference claims; thus, the district court applied Mississippi law 

to that claim. Because this issue is not before the court, we apply, as the district court did, 

Mississippi law to HansaWorld’s malicious interference claims and Florida law to 

HansaWorld’s civil conspiracy claims. See Ferguson v. FDIC, 164 F.3d 894, 897 (5th Cir. 

1999) (citing Kucel v. Walter E. Heller & Co., 813 F.2d 67, 74 (5th Cir. 1987)); Wellogix, Inc. 

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to interfere [with] and injure the business of another, and injury does in fact 

result.” Par Indus. v. Target Container Co., 708 So.2d 44, 48 (Miss. 1998) 

(emphasis added) (quoting Cenac v. Murry, 609 So.2d 1257, 1271 (Miss. 1992)). 

The district court found that HansaWorld failed to allege it suffered any 

injury as a result of Carpenter’s actions. On appeal, HansaWorld argues that 

in stating in its original complaint that “Davenport adversely impacted 

[HansaWorld’s] ability to conduct business and its relationships with 

customers and partners” suffices to meet the injury in fact requirement. Not 

so. Even construed liberally, this allegation cannot overcome 12(b)(6)’s low bar, 

as it is merely “a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action.” 

Richardson v. Axion Logistics, L.L.C., 780 F.3d 304, 306 (5th Cir. 2015) (quoting 

Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555)). Because HansaWorld failed to allege facts 

establishing a prima facie case for this claim, the district court’s refusal to 

grant HansaWorld leave to amend was proper. See Stripling v. Jordan Prod. 

Co., 234 F.3d 863, 872–73 (5th Cir. 2000) (“It is within the district court’s 

discretion to deny a motion to amend if it is futile.”). Accordingly, we find that 

the district court did not err in denying HansaWorld’s motion to amend.

B. 

We now turn to HansaWorld’s argument that the district court erred 

when it granted Carpenter’s motion for summary judgment. 

Under Florida law, an attorney cannot be found to have conspired with 

his client if his alleged bad conduct took place within the scope of his 

representation and he does not have a personal stake in the matter, separate 

and distinct from his client’s interest. Lipsig v. Ramlawi, 760 So.2d 170, 181 

(Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2000) (holding that because “all of [the defendant’s]

 

v. SAP Am., Inc., 58 F. Supp. 3d 766, 775 (S.D. Tex. 2014), aff’d, No. 15-20184, 2016 WL 

2772280 (5th Cir. May 12, 2016). 

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activities were within the scope of his agency as the . . . family attorney” and 

the defendant had no personal stake in the matter, he was entitled to a directed 

verdict on the plaintiff’s civil conspiracy claim); see also Rivers v. Dillards Dep’t

Store, Inc., 698 So.2d 1328, 1333 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1997) (“[A]bsent 

allegations that an employee acted in a personal capacity apart from his 

employee status, [a] corporation cannot conspire with its own . . . employees.” 

(citation omitted)). 

Here, reviewing the facts in the light most favorable to HansaWorld, 

Carpenter’s actions fell squarely within the confines of his employment 

relationship with Davenport. HansaWorld’s assertion that Carpenter 

exceeded the scope of his employment by “conspiring with Davenport to commit 

crimes” is speculative and unsupported by the record. Brown, 337 F.3d at 541. 

Moreover, Carpenter did not have a personal stake in Davenport’s wrongdoing, 

an issue HansaWorld fails to dispute on appeal. Finally, HansaWorld’s argument 

that Carpenter’s relationship with Davenport created a “particular power of 

coercion . . . [that] an individual acting alone does not possess” also fails because 

the alleged bad acts that Davenport committed could have been done with or 

without Carpenter’s assistance. Accordingly, we conclude that because 

HansaWorld has not shown that Carpenter exceeded the scope of his 

representation or had a personal stake in Davenport’s dispute with 

HansaWorld, the district court did not err in granting summary judgment in 

favor of Carpenter. 

IV. CONCLUSION

For the reasons stated above, we AFFIRM the district court’s rulings

in full.

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