* Pursuant to 5 TH C IR

. R. 47.5 the Court has determined that

this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except

under the limited circumstances set forth in 5 TH C IR

. R. 47.5.4. United States Court of Appeals

Fifth Circuit



## FILED

April 18, 2005

Charles R. Fulbruge III

Clerk IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

No. 04-30537

Summary Calendar

WILLIAM R. VANDERWALL,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

versus

GARY Q. PECK, individually, and in

his official capacity as Director

of the Louisiana Department of Health

and Hospital’s (DHH) Office of Public

Health (OPH); ROBERT BOLAND, Attorney,

Defendants-Appellees.

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Eastern District of Louisiana

USDC No. 2:03-CV-3142-K

Before GARWOOD, JOLLY and CLEMENT, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM: *

William R. Vanderwall, representing himself, appeals the

dismissal of his complaint under F ED

. R. C IV

. P. 12(b)(6) for failure

to state a claim for which relief can be granted. We affirm.

We review a dismissal de novo

, assuming the allegations of the2

co mplaint to be true. J ackson v. City of Beaumont Police Dep’t

,

958 F.2d 616, 618 (5th Cir. 1992). Though we construe p ro se

pleadings liberally, Haine s v. Kerner , 92 S. Ct. 594, 595-96

(1972), even pro se litigants must cross some minimal threshold of

clarity. If appellant has achieved this, he has done so only

barely. As best as we can discern, the central allegation of the

complaint, which rambles at considerable length, is that appellant

was denied his civil rights to due process of law when he was

terminated by appellee Peck from his job as an anti-terrorism

planner. Appellant cited 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983, 1985, and 1986 as the

statutory bases for relief.

Apellant raises three points of error: (1) the district court

erred in declining to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over his

state law claims; (2) the district court erred in dismissing his

federal claims; and (3) the district court erred in dismissing his

federal claims with prejudice.

With respect to his first point of error, the district court

only declined to exercise supplemental jurisdiction after

dismissing all of the federal claims. The decision to exercise

supplementa l jurisdiction over state law claims involving nondiverse parties is discretionary and we find no abuse of that

discretion. Bass v. Parkwood Hosp. , 180 F.3d 234, 246 (5th Cir.

1999).

Nor was it an error for the district court to dismiss3

appellant’s various federal claims. To the extent appellant

brought a section 1983 claim against appe llees in their official

capacities, dismissal was proper because Louisiana has Eleventh

Amendment immunity from suit. W ill v. Michigan Dep’t of State

Police

, 109 S. Ct. 2304, 2309-10 (1989). To the extent he brought

a section 1983 claimagainst appellees in their individual

capacities, appellant did not allege facts sufficient to make out

a violation of the constitution. Appellant’s termination violated

due process only if he had a protected property in terest in his

job. W allace v. Shreve Memorial Library , 79 F.3d 427, 429 (5th

Cir. 1996). Whether such an interest exists is a matter of state

law. I d. Appellant furnished the district court a copy of the

typewritten contract which was for a one year term and expressly

authorized earlier termination without cause. In Louisiana, a

person acquires a protectable property interest in a government job

only if the contract has a “for cause” clause, or if the employee

is classified under the state civil service system, which, as a

person s ubject to a specific one-year term, petitioner was not.

See id. ; Pope v. New Orleans City Park

, 672 So.2d 388, 389-90 (La.

Ct. App. 1996) (stating that a person acquires permanent civil

service status only by an express grant ther eof). Appellant,

therefore, has not alleged a claim for relief under the federal

constitution.

The district court was also corre ct when it dismissed4

petitioner’s claims under 42 U.S.C. §§ 1985 and 1986. An element

of a section 1985 claim is that the conspiracy must be based on

invidious discrimination against a protected class. M iss. Women’s

Med. Clinic v. McMillan

, 866 F.2d 788, 793 (5th Cir. 1989). No

reading of appellant’s complaint suggests an allegation that

appellees Peck and Boland conspired against appellant on the basis

of his membership in a protected class. It was also correct for

the district court to dismiss petitioner’s section 1986 claim

because prevailing under section 1985 is a prerequisite for

recovery under section 1986. Id. at 795.

We reject appellant’s argument that the district court erred

in dismissing his federal claims with prejudice. Appellees not

only filed a motion to dismiss, but ha d also filed an answer.

Appellant filed a resp onse to the answer and to the motion to

dismiss of appellees and made other filings below which the

district court considered. He never requested any leave to amend

or further amend or to dismiss without prejudice. He filed no

po st-judgment motion. Accordingly, no error in this respect is

shown.

The judgment is accordingly

AFFIRMED.