IN THE

SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF ARIZONA

STATE OF ARIZONA,

Appellant,

v.

ROBERT FISCHER,

Appellee.

No. CR-15-0380-PR

Filed April 17, 2017

Appeal from the Superior Court in Maricopa County 

The Honorable Karen A. Mullins, Judge

No. CR2012-006869

AFFIRMED

Opinion of the Court of Appeals, Division One

238 Ariz. 309, 360 P.3d 105 (App. 2015)

VACATED IN PART

COUNSEL:

William G. Montgomery, Maricopa County Attorney, Diane Meloche 

(argued), Deputy County Attorney, Phoenix, Attorneys for State of Arizona

Steven C. Biggs (argued), Steven C. Smith, Smith LC, Phoenix, Attorneys 

for Robert Fischer

Timothy J. Eckstein (argued), Randy McDonald, Osborn Maledon, P.A., 

Phoenix, Attorneys for Amicus Curiae Arizona Attorneys for Criminal 

Justice

Mark Brnovich, Arizona Attorney General, Dominic Draye, Solicitor 

General, Joseph T. Maziarz, Chief Counsel, Linley Wilson, Assistant 

Attorney General, Criminal Appeals Section, Phoenix, Attorneys for 

Amicus Curiae Arizona Attorney General
STATE V. FISCHER

Opinion of the Court

2

JUSTICE BRUTINEL authored the opinion of the Court, in which CHIEF

JUSTICE BALES, VICE CHIEF JUSTICE PELANDER, and JUSTICES

TIMMER and BOLICK joined.

JUSTICE BRUTINEL, opinion of the Court:

¶1 A jury found Robert Fischer guilty of second degree murder. 

But the trial court, under Arizona Rule of Criminal Procedure (“Rule”) 

24.1(c)(1), determined that the verdict was contrary to the weight of the 

evidence and granted a new trial. Independently reexamining the 

evidence, the court of appeals concluded that the trial court erred by 

granting a new trial. We hold that the court of appeals exceeded the proper 

scope of deferential appellate review by independently reweighing the 

evidence rather than determining if substantial evidence supported the trial 

judge’s ruling. Because substantial evidence supports the trial court’s 

determination, we affirm the order granting a new trial.

I. BACKGROUND

¶2 Defendant Robert Fischer is an attorney and a former police 

officer. While visiting his family in late December 2010, Fischer, his stepdaughter Belinda, and Belinda’s husband, Lee, stayed up talking and 

drinking. Around 10 p.m., Lee excused himself to make a phone call and

check his email. He returned worried and upset and showed Fischer an 

email about a non-compete agreement. Belinda went to bed around 11:30 

p.m., and Fischer and Lee continued drinking heavily.

¶3 Fischer testified that he awoke the next morning to a popping 

sound and found a man on the kitchen floor in a pool of blood. Confused 

and unaware of the man’s identity, he called 911, and police officers arrived 

shortly thereafter. Lee — the man on the floor — had a single gunshot 

wound to his head; there was a handgun in Lee’s right hand, and his thumb 

was in the trigger guard.

¶4 During his police interview, Fischer seemed confused and 

had difficulty keeping track of the time. Fischer admitted the gun was his 

but explained that he had disassembled it upon arriving at Belinda and 

Lee’s house. Fischer stated that he wanted to help the police figure out what 

had happened but he was unable to remember.
STATE V. FISCHER

Opinion of the Court

3

¶5 The police obtained a search warrant to acquire physical 

evidence from Fischer and Belinda. There was blood on Fischer’s left foot 

and on the left side of his left pajama pant leg. The police swabbed Fischer’s

feet, performed a gunshot residue test, and took fingerprints and a blood 

sample. Crime scene specialists seized and analyzed additional evidence 

from the house.

¶6 The State charged Fischer with second degree murder and 

tried the case on the theory that Fischer shot Lee and then manipulated the 

scene to make it appear that the gunshot wound was self-inflicted. During 

trial, the court admitted expert testimony regarding the blood spatter, the 

gun and its position in Lee’s hand, the DNA and fingerprint evidence, the 

gunshot residue, and the likelihood of Fischer having blacked out from 

alcohol consumption.

¶7 Following the guilty verdict, Fischer moved for a new trial 

under Rule 24.1(c)(1). The trial court considered the evidence and 

determined:

There was, quite simply, no physical evidence 

that the Defendant fired the gun that killed Lee.

The physical evidence establishes only that the 

Defendant was present in a chair near where 

Lee was sitting at the time of [sic] the gun was 

fired. Det. Acosta’s opinion that the Defendant 

staged the scene by manipulating Lee’s body is 

not supported by the physical evidence, lacks 

credibility, and is sheer speculation.

In its lengthy minute entry, the court chronicled the physical evidence 

supporting its conclusion that the guilty verdict was contrary to the weight 

of the evidence and granted the motion for a new trial.

¶8 The court of appeals reversed. State v. Fischer, 238 Ariz. 309, 

322 ¶ 82, 360 P.3d 105, 118 (App. 2015). After independently examining the 

evidence, the court concluded that the jury properly weighed the evidence 

and its verdict was not a miscarriage of justice. Id. at 321 ¶ 76, 360 P.3d 

at 117. The court of appeals also concluded that the trial court abused its 

discretion “by making factual findings that were not supported by the 
STATE V. FISCHER

Opinion of the Court

4

record, and by failing to consider all the evidence in reaching its 

conclusions.” Id. at 316 ¶ 29, 360 P.3d at 112.

¶9 We granted review to consider the proper role of the trial 

court in deciding whether a verdict is contrary to the weight of the 

evidence, a question of statewide importance. We also consider whether 

the court of appeals erred in its independent examination of the evidence 

and conclusion that the trial court abused its discretion. We have 

jurisdiction pursuant to article 6, section 5(3) of the Arizona Constitution 

and A.R.S. § 12-120.24.

II. DISCUSSION

A. Standard of Review

¶10 We review a trial court’s decision to grant a new trial for an 

abuse of discretion. Smith v. Moroney, 79 Ariz. 35, 38-39, 282 P.2d 470, 472 

(1955). We review interpretation and application of court rules de novo. 

Allen v. Sanders, 240 Ariz. 569, 571 ¶ 9, 382 P.3d 784, 786 (2016).

B. Motion for a New Trial

¶11 A court may grant a new trial if “[t]he verdict is contrary to 

law or to the weight of the evidence.” Ariz. R. Crim. P. 24.1(c)(1). Arizona 

courts use essentially the same standard in civil and criminal cases, and we 

therefore consider both civil and criminal case law in our analysis. Compare

Ariz. R. Civ. P. 59(a)(1)(H) (authorizing the court to grant a new trial when 

“the verdict . . . is not supported by the evidence or is contrary to law”) with

Ariz. R. Crim. P. 24.1(c)(1).

¶12 The trial court’s authority to order a new trial when the jury 

verdict is contrary to the weight of the evidence is deeply rooted in our law. 

In 1757, Lord Mansfield wrote that “[t]rials by jury, in civil causes, could 

not subsist now, without a power, somewhere, to grant new trials.” Reeves

v. Markle, 119 Ariz. 159, 163, 579 P.2d 1382, 1386 (1978) (quoting Bright v. 

Eynon, 1 Burr. 390, 393, 97 Eng. Rep. 365, 366 (1757)). The authority to grant 

a new trial was included in Arizona’s original territorial code. Ariz. Howell 

Code ch. XI § 409, 115–16 (1865) (“The court in which a trial is had upon the 

issue of facts, has power to grant a new trial where a verdict has been 

rendered against the defendant, upon his application in the following cases 
STATE V. FISCHER

Opinion of the Court

5

only: . . . 6th. When the verdict is contrary to law or evidence.”). Over the 

past century, this Court has consistently recognized that unjust verdicts, 

while rare, can occur. As we noted in Reeves, “Due to his unique position, 

the trial judge has become the primary buffer against unjust verdicts. He 

performs an indispensable function without which our system of justice 

could not hold out the promise of a[] uniform application of the law.” 119 

Ariz. at 163, 579 P.2d at 1386.

¶13 In 1926, this Court delineated the trial judge’s “duty” to grant 

a new trial:

The trial courts may weigh the evidence, and, if 

they think injustice has been done, should grant 

a new trial. It is their duty to supervise the 

verdict of the jury and grant a new trial if the 

verdict in the opinion of the court is against the 

weight of the evidence, or if it is arbitrary and 

manifestly or clearly wrong, or if it appears to 

be the result of passion, prejudice [or] 

misconduct of the jury.

Huntsman v. First Nat’l Bank, 29 Ariz. 574, 578, 243 P. 598, 600 (1926). The 

Huntsman court held, “If after a full consideration of the case the trial court 

was satisfied that the verdict was not supported by the evidence, and that 

substantial justice had not been done between the parties, it was its duty, in 

the exercise of a sound discretion, to set the verdict aside.” Id. at 579, 243 P. 

at 600 (emphasis added). Subsequent cases have consistently recognized 

the trial judge’s authority to grant a new trial.1

 1 See Dennis v. Stukey, 37 Ariz. 299, 306–07, 294 P. 276, 279 (1930), overruled 

on other grounds by Butane Corp. v. Kirby, 66 Ariz. 272, 284, 187 P.2d 325, 333

(1947); Young Mines Co. v. Citizens’ St. Bank, 37 Ariz. 521, 525–26, 296 P. 247, 

249 (1931); Brownell v. Freedman, 39 Ariz. 385, 389, 6 P.2d 1115, 1116 (1932); 

Richfield Oil Co. v. Estes, 55 Ariz. 81, 84, 98 P.2d 851, 852 (1940); Sadler v. Ariz.

Flour Mills Co., 58 Ariz. 486, 490, 121 P.2d 412, 413–14 (1942); Ruth v. Rhodes, 

66 Ariz. 129, 138–39, 185 P.2d 304, 310 (1947); Zevon v. Tennebaum, 73 Ariz. 

281, 283, 240 P.2d 548, 549 (1952); Smith v. Moroney, 79 Ariz. 35, 38, 282 P.2d 

470, 472 (1955); Caldwell v. Tremper, 90 Ariz. 241, 246, 367 P.2d 266, 269 

(1962); State v. Ross, 97 Ariz. 51, 54, 396 P.2d 619, 621 (1964), overruled in part 

by Yoo Thun Lim v. Crespin, 100 Ariz. 80, 83, 411 P.2d 809, 811 (1966); State v. 
STATE V. FISCHER

Opinion of the Court

6

¶14 The duty to grant a new trial when the verdict is against the 

clear weight of the evidence has been labeled the “thirteenth juror rule,” or 

the “ninth juror rule” in a civil case. See Walsh v. Advanced Cardiac Specialists 

Chartered, 229 Ariz. 193, 197–98 ¶¶ 15–16, 273 P.3d 645, 649–50 (2012). “The 

trial judge, so far as this duty is concerned, sits as a thirteenth juror, and he, 

as well as the jury, must be convinced that the weight of the evidence 

sustains the verdict, or it is his imperative duty to set it aside.” Brownell v. 

Freedman, 39 Ariz. 385, 389, 6 P.2d 1115, 1116 (1932). More recently, this

Court has described the judge’s role in granting a new trial as an exercise 

of “broad” or “wide” discretion, rather than in terms of duty. See City of 

Glendale v. Bradshaw, 114 Ariz. 236, 237–38, 560 P.2d 420, 421–22 (1977).

¶15 Trial judges are given such broad discretion because, like the 

jury, they observed the trial:

The trial judge has the same opportunity of 

seeing the witnesses, learning their interest, 

observing their manner of testifying, and of 

judging the probability of the truthfulness of 

their testimony as has the jury, and, by reason 

of his experience and training, should be better 

able correctly to evaluate the testimony. . . . If 

the evidence accredited by the jury is 

improbable or palpably untrue, he should not 

shirk his duty of granting a new trial. He should 

exercise his power to prevent injustice as well as 

to promote justice.

Dennis v. Stukey, 37 Ariz. 299, 307, 294 P. 276, 279 (1930), overruled on other 

grounds by Butane Corp. v. Kirby, 66 Ariz. 272, 284, 187 P.2d 325, 333 (1947).

Appellate courts, by contrast, defer to the factual findings of the jury and 

generally will not set aside the verdict unless no evidence supports it, even 

if the verdict seems unjust or the result of prejudice. See Huntsman, 29 Ariz. 

at 578–79, 243 P. at 599–600. Therefore, an unjust verdict that is against the 

weight of the evidence will stand unless the trial judge exercises the power 

to set it aside. Dennis, 37 Ariz. at 307, 294 P. at 279.

 

Thomas, 104 Ariz. 408, 411–12, 454 P.2d 153, 156–57 (1969); Cano v. Neill, 12 

Ariz. App. 562, 567–71, 473 P.2d 487, 492–96 (1970); Lyle v. Boyle, 16 Ariz. 

App. 198, 200, 492 P.2d 447, 449 (1972).
STATE V. FISCHER

Opinion of the Court

7

¶16 The State urges us to abandon the thirteenth juror rule and 

prohibit trial courts from independently reweighing the evidence or 

examining witness credibility. Rather, the State argues, and the court of 

appeals ruled, that a trial court should grant a new trial only in the 

extraordinary case where it is “quite clear that the jury has reached a 

seriously erroneous result and it is necessary to set aside the verdict to 

avoid a miscarriage of justice.” Fischer, 238 Ariz. at 315 ¶ 22, 360 P.3d at 111 

(internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Cano v. Neill, 12 Ariz. App. 562,

569, 473 P.2d 487, 494 (1970)). In the State’s view, a new trial is appropriate 

“only where the verdict is objectively unreasonable, manifestly unfair, or so 

outrageous as to shock the conscience.” The State finds support for this 

assertion in Hutcherson v. City of Phoenix, 192 Ariz. 51, 55 ¶ 23, 961 P.2d 449, 

453 (1998) (“The basic question [the trial judge] must ask is whether the jury 

verdict is so ‘manifestly unfair, unreasonable and outrageous as to shock 

the conscience.’”) (citation omitted).

¶17 As the court of appeals noted, it is “not uncommon” for the 

standards governing an order for a new trial and a judgment of acquittal to 

be confused. Fischer, 238 Ariz. at 313 ¶ 18 n.3, 360 P.3d at 109. Compare Ariz. 

R. Crim. P. 24.1(c)(1), with Ariz. R. Crim. P. 20. The State proposes to 

address that confusion by effectively eliminating the difference between the 

two motions. Under the existing Rule 20 standard, to decide a motion for

acquittal based on insufficiency of the evidence, the trial judge must review 

the evidence in the “light most favorable to the state, and all reasonable 

inferences are to be resolved against the defendant” to decide if a 

reasonable person could fairly conclude the defendant is guilty beyond a 

reasonable doubt. State v. Clifton, 134 Ariz. 345, 348, 656 P.2d 634, 637 (App. 

1982); see also State v. West, 226 Ariz. 559, 563 ¶ 18, 250 P.3d 1188, 1192 (2011) 

(“Thus, in ruling on a Rule 20 motion, unlike a motion for a new trial under 

Arizona Rule of Criminal Procedure 24.1(c)(1), a trial court may not reweigh the facts or disregard inferences that might reasonably be drawn 

from the evidence.”). By contrast, in deciding a motion for new trial, a trial 

court may weigh the evidence and make its own determination of the 

credibility of the witnesses. If, after full consideration of the case, the court

is satisfied that the verdict was contrary to the weight of the evidence, it 

may set the verdict aside, even if substantial evidence supports it. Young 

Mines Co. v. Citizens’ St. Bank, 37 Ariz. 521, 525, 296 P. 247, 249 (1931); see 

Huntsman, 29 Ariz. at 579, 243 P. at 600. Under the State’s theory, a trial 

court, unable to weigh evidence or determine credibility, could not set the 

verdict aside despite its firm conviction that the verdict was unjust.
STATE V. FISCHER

Opinion of the Court

8

¶18 We reject the State’s argument that we should strictly limit the 

judge’s role because to do so not only undermines Rule 24.1(c)(1) but also

conflates the standards for a new trial and a judgment of acquittal. 

Precluding the trial court from weighing the evidence and assessing the 

credibility of the witnesses effectively abrogates the authority vested in trial 

courts under Rule 24.1(c)(1) and overturns more than a century of Arizona 

law. We decline to impose such a limitation and disavow the language in 

Hutcherson to the contrary.

¶19 While we reject the State’s argument, we take this opportunity 

to clarify the trial judge’s role in granting a new trial under Rule 24.1(c)(1).

We agree with the court of appeals that a trial court considering a motion 

for a new trial must respect the role of the jury and the integrity of the jury 

trial system. Cal X-Tra v. W.V.S.V. Holdings, L.L.C., 229 Ariz. 377, 403 ¶ 88, 

276 P.3d 11, 37 (App. 2012). It is primarily the province of the jury to 

determine the credibility of witnesses and to find the facts. State v. Boggs, 

218 Ariz. 325, 335 ¶ 39, 185 P.3d 111, 121 (2008) (“Determining veracity and 

credibility lies within the province of the jury”); Estate of Reinen v. N. Ariz. 

Orthopedics, Ltd., 198 Ariz. 283, 287 ¶ 12, 9 P.3d 314, 318 (2000) (“The 

credibility of a witness’ testimony and the weight it should be given are 

issues particularly within the province of the jury.”) (internal quotation 

marks and citation omitted). The judge does not technically sit as a 

“thirteenth juror” in the sense that the judge has a vote in deciding the case, 

much less a vote equal to or greater than that of the jurors; but given the 

judge’s training, experience, and unique vantage point, the judge must have 

substantial latitude in overseeing the jury verdict.

¶20 We are mindful that a judge considering a motion for new 

trial did not have the benefit of participating in jury deliberations. Thus, 

the judge may not set aside a jury verdict simply because “if he had acted 

as trier of the fact, he would have reached a different result.” Cano, 12 Ariz. 

App. at 569, 473 P.2d at 494 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). 

For this reason, we disavow our contrary characterization of the trial court’s 

discretion made in Peak v. Acuna, 203 Ariz. 83, 85 ¶ 9, 50 P.3d 833, 835 (2002) 

(suggesting that a trial court may order a new trial based on a verdict that 

is contrary to the weight of the evidence when “the trial judge simply 

disagrees with the jury’s resolution of conflicting facts”). A trial court’s 

discretion under Rule 24.1(c)(1) is not unlimited, nor does the court have

unbridled “veto” power over a jury verdict such that the court may act as a 
STATE V. FISCHER

Opinion of the Court

9

“super juror” and overturn a verdict merely because the court personally 

disagrees with it.

¶21 The trial judge has broad discretion, however, to find the 

verdict inconsistent with the evidence and grant a new trial, so as to guard 

against arbitrary verdicts. Walsh, 229 Ariz. at 197–98 ¶¶ 15–16, 273 P.3d 

at 649–50. We defer to the discretion of the trial judge who tried the case 

and who personally observed the proceedings. The judge may weigh the 

evidence, make credibility determinations, and set aside the verdict and 

grant a new trial even if there is sufficient evidence in the record to support 

the verdict. Clifton, 134 Ariz. at 348–49, 656 P.2d at 637–38. We emphasize 

that the court does not usurp the role of the jury in granting a new trial 

because the court does not substitute its judgment for that of the jury; it only 

allows the parties a new trial before a different jury. In that regard, the 

judge’s role in granting a motion for new trial differs from the judge’s role 

in granting a motion for acquittal. When the court grants a new trial, the 

jury retains the ultimate decision-making authority. In directing a verdict 

of acquittal, the jury’s role is supplanted by the court.

¶22 We recognize the difficult task the trial court faces in striking 

a balance between honoring the jury’s constitutional role and ensuring that 

a seriously erroneous result does not stand. The purpose of Rule 24.1 is to 

prevent an arbitrary or unjust verdict from becoming an arbitrary or unjust 

judgment. Ultimately, the judge must determine if substantial justice has 

been done between the parties under the standard set forth in Rule 

24.1(c)(1) — whether “[t]he verdict is contrary to law or to the weight of the 

evidence.” See also State v. McIver, 109 Ariz. 71, 72, 505 P.2d 242, 243 (1973); 

Smith, 79 Ariz. at 38, 282 P.2d at 472.

¶23 Our case law provides little additional guidance to the trial 

judge, and commentators have noted the difficulty of formulating a brightline rule or generic test. “Necessarily all formulations are couched in broad 

and general terms that furnish no unerring litmus for a particular case.” 11 

Charles Alan Wright et al., Federal Practice and Procedure § 2806, at 90–91 (3d 

ed. 2012). We are mindful that attempts to refine the standard “may run 

the significant risk of muddling more than they clarify.” Hunter v. Philip 

Morris USA Inc., 364 P.3d 439, 448 (Alaska 2015). But we note that in 

assessing whether the verdict was contrary to the weight of the evidence, 

the trial judge should consider all the evidence presented in the light of the 

judge’s experience and training.
STATE V. FISCHER

Opinion of the Court

10

¶24 The judge should assess the strength of the evidence, 

considering the credibility of the witnesses and conflicting testimony. 12-

59 James Wm. Moore et al., Moore’s Federal Practice – Civil § 59.13 (2016). 

The court should consider the duration of the trial, the complexity of the 

issues in the case, and whether the case involves subjects outside the 

ordinary knowledge of jurors, giving greater scrutiny to more difficult 

cases. The court should make its assessment with a keen recognition of the 

importance of the jury’s role; that the judge would have reached a different 

verdict is not enough to grant a new trial. Finally, the court should explain 

with particularity the reasons why the jury’s verdict is against the clear 

weight of the evidence. See Ariz. R. Civ. P. 59(i) (2017) (previously Rule 

59(m)).

¶25 As the Alaska Supreme Court aptly said, “We commit this 

determination to trial courts’ sound discretion based on our trust in their 

position, expertise, and humility. History has indicated that this trust is 

well deserved.” Hunter, 364 P.3d at 448. Arizona’s trial judges are in the 

best position to decide motions for new trial and are uniquely wellqualified to do so. Likewise, a review of our case law reflects that there is 

little cause for concern about trial courts ordering new trials too frequently

or without a substantial basis. Such motions are rarely granted, and when 

granted (or denied), are almost never reversed on appeal.

C. Appellate Review

¶26 A different standard applies to appellate review. “We have 

invariably held that this court will not disturb a verdict on the ground that 

it is contrary to the weight of the evidence.” Brownell, 39 Ariz. at 389, 6 P.2d 

at 1116. When an appellate court reviews an order granting a new trial for 

abuse of discretion, it “look[s] to the broad scope of the trial and do[es] not 

attempt to reweigh the facts.” Hutcherson, 192 Ariz. at 56 ¶ 27, 961 P.2d 

at 454. The appellate court’s role is to oversee the granting of new trials and 

to ensure that the exercise of a trial court’s broad discretion has a legal,

rather than an arbitrary, basis. Estabrook v. J. C. Penney Co., 105 Ariz. 302, 

305, 464 P.2d 325, 328 (1970). The reviewing court must “inquire whether 

substantial evidence exists to support the trial court’s determination.” 

Reeves, 119 Ariz. at 164, 579 P.2d at 1387. If such evidence exists, then the 

order is within the sound discretion of the trial court and should be 

affirmed. Id.
STATE V. FISCHER

Opinion of the Court

11

¶27 We have repeatedly held that an appellate court “will not 

disturb an order granting a new trial unless the probative force of the 

evidence clearly demonstrates that the trial court’s action is wrong and 

unjust and therefore unreasonable and a manifest abuse of discretion.” 

Smith, 79 Ariz. at 39, 282 P.2d at 472; see also McIver, 109 Ariz. at 72, 505 P.2d 

at 243 (quoting with approval Smith, 79 Ariz. at 39, 282 P.2d at 472); State v. 

Saenz, 88 Ariz. 154, 155, 353 P.2d 1026, 1027 (1960) (same). The question for 

the appellate court is whether the probative force of the evidence supports 

the order granting a new trial, not whether the evidence supports the jury 

verdict.

¶28 The appellate court does not sit as the “fourteenth” juror. See 

Baker-Thomas Lime & Cement Co. v. Ariz. Concrete Pipe Co., 1 Ariz. App. 233, 

237, 401 P.2d 238, 242 (1965) (“The trial judge is a 13th juror. An Appellate 

Court is not a 13th juror. We do not substitute our judgment for that of the 

trial court.”) (citation omitted). The appellate court’s role is not to weigh 

the evidence. It is to determine whether, resolving every conflict in the 

evidence in support of the order, substantial evidence supports the trial 

judge’s order. A trial court ruling granting a new trial “where the evidence 

is equiponderant or nearly so or where there is substantial evidence to 

support the verdict is not error.” Smith, 79 Ariz. at 39, 282 P.2d at 472.

¶29 We see no reason to depart from this rule. We disavow the 

opinions that conflict with this appellate standard of review, such as State 

v. Moya, 129 Ariz. 64, 66, 628 P.2d 947, 949 (1981) (stating, in review of a trial 

court’s order granting a new trial, “It is the duty of this court, under the 

circumstances, to review all of the evidence and to determine whether the 

state proved beyond a reasonable doubt that the crime of murder was 

committed with premeditation.”), and State v. Chase, 78 Ariz. 240, 242, 278 

P.2d 423, 424 (1954) (to same effect).

¶30 The court of appeals in this case exceeded the proper scope of 

review by independently reweighing the evidence. In her minute entry 

ordering a new trial, the trial judge exhaustively discussed the evidence 

presented at trial. Although the court of appeals’ independent evaluation 

of the evidence led it to disagree with the trial court’s evaluation of the 

evidence, we are not persuaded that the trial court disregarded or misstated 

key evidence in granting Fischer’s motion. Rather, the trial court focused

on evidence that the court of appeals discounted, evaluated witness 
STATE V. FISCHER

Opinion of the Court

12

credibility differently, and, ultimately, drew different inferences from the 

evidence than did the court of appeals.

¶31 Considering the trial court’s broad discretionary authority to 

weigh the evidence as required under Rule 24.1(c)(1), we conclude that 

substantial evidence exists to support the trial court’s determination. Thus, 

unlike the court of appeals, we hold that the trial court did not abuse its 

discretion or clearly exceed its authority in granting a new trial.

III. CONCLUSION

¶32 We vacate paragraphs sixteen through eighty-two of the court 

of appeals’ opinion and affirm the trial court’s order granting a new trial. 

This case is remanded to the trial court for further proceedings consistent 

with this opinion.