Filed 4/19/21

CERTIFIED FOR PUBLICATION

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION SEVEN

In re RASHAD D., a Person 

Coming Under the Juvenile 

Court Law.

B307061

(Los Angeles County

Super. Ct. No. 20CCJP01245A)

LOS ANGELES COUNTY 

DEPARTMENT OF 

CHILDREN AND FAMILY 

SERVICES,

Plaintiff and Respondent,

v.

R.D.,

Defendant and Appellant.

APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of 

Los Angeles County, Martha Matthews, Judge. Appeal 

dismissed.
2

Darlene Azevedo Kelly, under appointment by the Court of 

Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant. 

No appearance for Plaintiff and Respondent.

Marrisa Coffey, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, 

for Minor.

______________________

INTRODUCTION

The juvenile court declared three-year-old Rashad D. a

dependent child of the court after sustaining an amended petition 

under Welfare and Institutions Code section 300, 

subdivision (b)(1),1 alleging his mother’s six-year history of illicit 

drug use rendered her incapable of providing regular care and 

supervision of the child. On appeal R.D. (Mother) contends 

evidence of her past substance abuse and a fear she would

relapse were insufficient to support a finding Rashad was at 

substantial risk of serious physical harm, as required for the 

exercise of dependency jurisdiction.

Three months after sustaining the petition, while Mother’s 

appeal of the juvenile court’s jurisdiction finding and disposition 

order was pending, the court terminated jurisdiction and issued a 

custody order awarding sole physical custody of Rashad to 

Mother and joint legal custody to Mother and Deon O., Rashad’s 

father. Mother contends this development does not moot her 

appeal because she previously had sole physical and legal custody 

of Rashad and the new custody order, by awarding Deon joint 

legal custody and expanding his monitored visitation rights, 

1 Statutory references are to this code unless otherwise 

stated.
3

adversely affects her on an ongoing basis. Mother also asks us to 

exercise our discretion to decide the case as one raising an issue 

of broad public interest that is likely to recur.

We dismiss the appeal. Mother is correct that termination 

of dependency jurisdiction does not necessarily moot an appeal 

from a jurisdiction finding that directly results in an adverse 

juvenile custody order. But in most cases, including the one at 

bar, for this court to be able to provide effective relief, the parent 

must appeal not only from the jurisdiction finding and disposition 

order but also from the orders terminating jurisdiction and 

modifying the parent’s prior custody status. Without the second 

appeal, we cannot correct the continuing adverse consequences of 

the allegedly erroneous jurisdiction finding.

As for Mother’s alternate contention, this case does not 

present an issue of broad public interest. The highly fact-specific 

question whether, by the time of the jurisdiction hearing, 

Mother’s current circumstances, in light of her extended history 

of substance abuse, created a substantial risk of serious physical 

harm to her young son is the type of issue presented to appellate 

courts multiple times every year. (See In re David B. (2017) 

12 Cal.App.5th 633, 654 [no basis exists for exercising discretion 

to hear otherwise moot appeal “to address the fact-specific 

questions whether David B. was described by section 300 and 

whether the juvenile court’s determination on that point is 

supported by substantial evidence”]; In re M.C. (2011) 

199 Cal.App.4th 784, 802 [deciding issues of statutory 

interpretation and separation of powers despite mootness, but 

declining to address whether sufficient evidence supported

juvenile court order because that was “not an issue of continuing 

public importance”].)
4

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

1. The Initial Dependency Case

In October 2017 the juvenile court sustained a petition filed 

by the Los Angeles County Department of Children and Family 

Services (Department) pursuant to section 300, subdivision (b)(1), 

on behalf of then-six-month-old Rashad, alleging Mother had a 

four-year history of illicit drug use, was a current user of PCP 

and cocaine and had used PCP and cocaine during her pregnancy 

with Rashad, all of which rendered her incapable of providing 

regular care and supervision of her child; Deon knew of Mother’s 

drug use and failed to protect Rashad; and Deon also had a 

history of substance abuse. Rashad was removed from Mother’s 

and Deon’s custody.

Mother participated in reunification services. Deon failed 

to make substantial progress in his case plan. The juvenile court 

terminated jurisdiction in May 2019 and awarded Mother sole 

physical and legal custody of Rashad. Deon was limited to one 

monitored visit each year, “on or near Father’s Day upon Father’s 

request.” 

2. The New Dependency Petition

In early February 2020 the Department received a report 

that Mother was seen at a drug house and had relapsed. The 

maternal grandmother, with whom Mother had been living when 

the prior dependency case closed, said she had been unable to 

contact Mother for a month. A maternal uncle informed the 

social worker Mother told him in April 2019 that she had started 

using drugs again. He believed Mother had relapsed based on 

her weight loss (estimated at 150 pounds) and the fact she was 

out “all hours of the night before disappearing with the child.” 
5

When reached via telephone by a Department social worker 

on February 20, 2020, Mother said she was living in San 

Bernardino County. She declined to provide her address or agree 

to an interview. 

On March 3, 2020 the Department filed a new dependency 

petition under section 300, subdivision (b)(1), alleging Mother 

“has a six year history [of] illicit drug use including use[ ] of PCP 

and cocaine, and is a current abuser of illicit substances, which 

renders the mother incapable of providing regular care and 

supervision of the child.” The petition also alleged that Deon 

failed to protect Rashad when he knew of Mother’s drug use, had 

a history of substance abuse and was a current abuser of 

substances. Based on the Department’s detention report, the 

court found a prima facie showing had been made that Rashad 

was a child described by section 300 and that detention from the 

parents was necessary to protect the child. 

Interviewed for the jurisdiction/disposition report filed 

May 15, 2020, Mother acknowledged her history of substance 

abuse but denied she was currently using any drugs. She told 

the dependency investigator she was living with her boyfriend in 

Culver City and was sober and participating in a support group. 

As reflected in subsequent reports prior to the rescheduled 

jurisdiction hearing,2 Mother had five negative drug tests and 

two no-shows. 

2 The jurisdiction hearing, originally scheduled for May 1, 

2020, was continued to July 22, 2020 due to COVID-19 

restrictions. Mother made her initial appearance on July 22. At 

that time the court ordered Rashad released to Mother under the 

continued supervision of the Department on condition that she 
6

Contacted again on July 2, 2020 the maternal uncle 

explained the family’s inability to communicate with Mother 

earlier in the year had caused their fear she might have relapsed. 

He explained he had not seen Mother use drugs or get drunk 

after her prior case had closed, and he currently felt Rashad was 

safe with Mother. 

In its original jurisdiction/disposition report the 

Department recommended the court sustain the petition as 

written and remove Rashad from the care and custody of Mother 

and Deon to ensure the child’s safety. In addition to Mother’s 

significant history of drug abuse, the Department was concerned 

“regarding mother’s lack of cooperation and limited 

communication during the referral and dependency 

investigation.” 

In a supplemental report two months later the Department 

requested the court dismiss the petition for lack of evidence. The 

report stated it was the Department’s “impression” “the safety 

and well-being of child Rashad can be ensured in the care and 

custody of [Mother].” 

3. The Jurisdiction/Disposition Hearing

At the outset of the jurisdiction hearing the court confirmed 

the Department’s position was that the situation had stabilized 

and the petition should be dismissed. Counsel for Rashad asked 

the court to sustain the first count of the petition relating to 

and Rashad reside with the maternal grandmother. The 

jurisdiction hearing was continued to August 5, 2020. 
7

Mother, but to conform it to proof by deleting the language 

concerning current substance abuse.3 

Mother testified she had been sober for three years and 

regularly talked to her sponsor. She denied telling her brother 

she had relapsed and said she had not had a significant weight 

loss. Explaining why she had left the maternal grandmother’s 

home without telling her family where she and Rashad were, 

Mother said she had been looking for a place to live with her 

boyfriend and did not feel she needed to communicate with her 

family. 

Following argument of counsel the court sustained “a fairly 

heavily amended version of b-1” to conform to proof, noting there 

really was no evidence of current abuse of illicit substances. As 

amended, the sustained count stated only that Mother’s history of 

illicit drug use placed Rashad at substantial risk of serious 

physical harm. The court struck all references to Deon, who was 

determined to be nonoffending in the amended petition. 

The court declared Rashad a dependent child of the 

juvenile court. The court ordered that Rashad remain released to 

Mother with family maintenance services; set a three-month, 

rather than a six-month, progress review; and, “if everything is 

okay, then dismiss the case then.” Mother’s case plan included 

drug testing and Narcotics Anonymous or other substance abuse 

aftercare. Deon was provided with enhancement services and a 

written schedule for monitored visitation. Mother filed a timely

3 Minor’s counsel added, if Deon was not seeking custody, 

she would “submit on striking him from the petition and just 

reverting to the [juvenile custody order] that is in place from the 

prior case.” 
8

notice of appeal from the August 5, 2020 jurisdiction finding and 

disposition order.

4. Termination of Dependency Jurisdiction

At the section 364 review hearing on November 4, 2020, the 

court found the conditions that justified its initial assumption of 

jurisdiction no longer existed and were not likely to exist if court 

supervision was withdrawn. Because continued supervision was 

no longer required, the court terminated jurisdiction. In its 

minute order the court awarded sole physical custody to Mother 

and joint legal custody to Mother and Deon and ordered 

monitored visits for Deon one time per week for three hours per 

visit with a mutually agreed-upon monitor. The court stayed its 

order until November 10, 2020 for receipt of a proposed juvenile 

custody order to be prepared by Mother’s counsel. On 

November 10, 2020 the court lifted its stay, terminated 

jurisdiction, and signed and entered the juvenile custody order

pursuant to section 362.4.

4

Mother did not appeal the November 4 and 10, 2020 orders 

terminating dependency jurisdiction and issuing the juvenile

custody order.

DISCUSSION

On appeal Mother, while acknowledging someone with her 

history of substance abuse is at risk of relapse and that this risk 

is always worrisome, contends none of the factors the court 

identified as red flags—the maternal uncle’s concerns, her

4 Concurrently with filing his brief in support of the juvenile 

court’s jurisdiction finding, Rashad moved for judicial notice of 

the orders terminating dependency jurisdiction and its juvenile 

custody order. We granted the motion.
9

unexplained absence from the maternal grandmother’s home and 

failure to communicate with her family, and her lack of initial 

cooperation with the Department—constituted substantial 

evidence she was leaning toward, let alone experiencing, a 

relapse. Because her opening brief was filed only two days before 

the three-month review hearing scheduled for November 4, 2020, 

Mother also argued termination of dependency jurisdiction would 

not moot her appeal because the erroneous jurisdiction finding 

and disposition order could influence the Department’s decision 

to file yet another dependency petition in the future. 

As discussed, the juvenile court did terminate jurisdiction 

in November 2020 and concurrently issued a juvenile custody 

order that modified the prior order awarding Mother sole 

physical and legal custody of Rashad. Mother contends in her 

reply brief she is adversely affected by this change in the custody 

orders, which she asserts is based on the erroneous jurisdiction 

finding, thereby justifying appellate review of the merits of her 

challenge to that finding.

An order terminating juvenile court jurisdiction generally 

renders an appeal from an earlier order moot. (In re C.C. (2009) 

172 Cal.App.4th 1481, 1488; see In re I.A. (2011) 201 Cal.App.4th 

1484, 1490 [as “‘“a general rule it is not within the function of the 

court to act upon or decide a moot question or speculative, 

theoretical or abstract question or proposition, or a purely 

academic question, or to give an advisory opinion on such a 

question or proposition”’”].) “[T]he critical factor in considering 

whether a dependency appeal is moot is whether the appellate 

court can provide any effective relief if it finds reversible error.”

(In re N.S. (2016) 245 Cal.App.4th 53, 60; see In re J.P. (2017)

14 Cal.App.5th 616, 623 [a dependency “‘“appeal becomes moot
10

when, through no fault of the respondent, the occurrence of an 

event renders it impossible for the appellate court to grant the 

appellant effective relief”’”]; In re E.T. (2013) 217 Cal.App.4th 

426, 436 [“[a]n appeal may become moot where subsequent 

events, including orders by the juvenile court, render it 

impossible for the reviewing court to grant effective relief”].)

However, dismissal of a dependency appeal for mootness

following termination of jurisdiction “is not automatic, but ‘must

be decided on a case-by-case basis.’” (In re C.C., supra,

172 Cal.App.4th at p. 1488.) As Mother argues, several court of

appeal decisions have held an appeal from jurisdiction findings is

not mooted by termination of jurisdiction when the sustained

findings prompted a juvenile custody order that has continuing,

adverse effects on the appellant’s custody or visitation rights. 

(E.g., In re J.K. (2009) 174 Cal.App.4th 1426, 1431-1432 [appeal 

from jurisdiction findings not moot where sustained findings 

have an adverse effect on custody or visitation rights]; In re A.R.

(2009) 170 Cal.App.4th 733, 740 [termination of jurisdiction did 

not moot appeal where father’s contact with child was “severely 

restricted as a direct result of the jurisdictional and dispositional 

findings and orders”]; In re Joshua C. (1994) 24 Cal.App.4th 

1544, 1547-1548 [father’s appeal not made moot by termination of 

jurisdiction where juvenile court awarded sole physical and legal 

custody to mother and restricted father’s visitation]; cf. In re

N.S., supra, 245 Cal.App.4th at p. 61 [appeal moot where 

jurisdiction findings were not the basis of the custody and 

visitation order].)5

5 Other courts have held termination of dependency 

jurisdiction does not moot an appeal if the challenged finding 
11

We agree an erroneous jurisdiction finding can have 

unfavorable consequences extending beyond termination of 

dependency jurisdiction and that termination does not 

necessarily moot an appeal of such a finding. But to the extent 

an appellant argues, as here, that the challenged jurisdiction 

finding resulted in an adverse juvenile custody order and seeks to 

have that custody order set aside,

6 in addition to the appeal from 

the jurisdiction finding, an appeal from the orders terminating 

jurisdiction and awarding custody is necessary for this court to be 

able to provide effective relief. Unless the appellate court 

reverses or vacates the order terminating dependency, the 

juvenile court has no jurisdiction to conduct further hearings in 

could have consequences for the appellant beyond jurisdiction 

(e.g., In re Briana V. (2015) 236 Cal.App.4th 297, 309) or if the 

purported error “‘“infects the outcome of subsequent 

proceedings”’” (e.g., In re E.T., supra, 217 Cal.App.4th at p. 436). 

Mother’s original argument that the jurisdiction finding might 

influence the Department’s decision to file a new dependency 

petition at some point in the future, however, is too speculative to 

justify appellate review of an otherwise moot case. (See In re 

I.A., supra, 201 Cal.App.4th at p. 1493 [party seeking 

discretionary review must identify specific or practical negative 

consequences arising from the jurisdiction finding that would 

justify such review].)

6 Although Mother specifically asks us only to reverse the 

jurisdiction finding and disposition order, as her argument 

regarding mootness makes plain, the purpose of the appeal is to 

have the juvenile custody order set aside. Without more, reversal 

of the jurisdiction finding, which accurately stated Mother has an 

extended history of drug abuse, accomplishes nothing of 

substance for her. 
12

the now-closed case, including modification of its custody order. 

(See § 304 [juvenile court has exclusive jurisdiction to hear 

proceedings regarding custody “until the time that the petition is 

dismissed or dependency is terminated”]; Cal. Rules of Court, 

rule 5.620(a) [same].) Because Mother did not appeal those 

orders, they are not now before us or otherwise subject to 

appellate review. And because the juvenile court terminated its 

jurisdiction over Rashad and that termination is final, a remand 

for further proceedings in the juvenile court would be 

meaningless. (See In re Michelle M. (1992) 8 Cal.App.4th 326, 

330 [dismissing father’s appeal from jurisdiction findings and 

disposition orders, concluding there was no effective relief that

could be granted because “the juvenile court no longer has 

jurisdiction and we are only reviewing that court’s ruling,” as 

opposed to the subsequent ruling dismissing jurisdiction and 

transferring the matter to the superior court; “[a]ppellant’s 

remedy was to attack the juvenile court’s order terminating 

jurisdiction in order to raise the issues he urges before us”]; see 

also In re J.S. (2011) 199 Cal.App.4th 1291, 1295 [challenge to 

denial of motion to dismiss dependency proceedings leading to 

adverse custody and visitation order not mooted by subsequent 

termination of jurisdiction; “[t]he exit orders are also pending 

appeal, and include adverse custody and visitation orders, which 

were entered as a direct result of matters challenged in this 

appeal”].)7

7 Mother is not left entirely without a remedy. Pursuant to 

Welfare and Institutions Code section 302, subdivision (d), she 

may seek modification of that order in a proceeding under Family 

Code section 3021 if she can demonstrate “there has been a 
13

Our colleagues in Division Eight of this court in In re J.P.,

supra, 14 Cal.App.5th 616 recognized the significance of 

reviewing the termination order in these circumstances. The 

court declined to dismiss a father’s challenge to the adequacy of

his reunification plan as moot following termination of

dependency jurisdiction because his failure to reunify had led to

the loss of custody and restricted visitation rights. (Id. at p. 623.) 

After holding the juvenile court had abused its discretion in 

failing to order effective reunification services for the father, the 

J.P. court reversed the portion of the disposition order requiring 

the father to participate in a full alcohol treatment program and 

remanded the matter to the juvenile court to reconsider its order 

terminating jurisdiction, explaining, “We do not direct that the 

trial court necessarily unravel its subsequent termination of 

jurisdiction, but simply leave it to the trial court to determine the 

appropriate remedy given its erroneous disposition order. But 

the trial court must at least reconsider its termination order in 

light of the views we have expressed.” (Id. at p. 630; see id. at 

pp. 630-631 [“[t]he matter is remanded to the dependency court to 

reconsider its order terminating jurisdiction and for further 

proceedings consistent with this opinion”].) However, the father 

had not appealed the order terminating jurisdiction; and the 

court of appeal did not address its authority, absent such an 

appeal, to direct the juvenile court to reconsider that order or to 

conduct further proceedings in the now-closed dependency case.

significant change of circumstances since the juvenile court 

issued the order and modification of the order is in the best 

interests of the child.”
14

Contrary to our holding today and that of the court in 

In re Michelle M., supra, 8 Cal.App.4th 326, the court of appeal in 

In re Joshua C., supra, 24 Cal.App.4th 1544 expressly held

appeal of the order dismissing the juvenile court proceedings is 

not required to permit continued appellate review of the 

jurisdiction findings upon which an adverse juvenile custody 

order at termination was based. (Id. at p. 1549.) Unlike the case 

at bar, however, the juvenile court had issued its custody order 

and terminated jurisdiction at the disposition hearing. (Id. at 

p. 1547.) Although the father directly challenged only the 

adverse jurisdiction finding on appeal, it appears he appealed 

from the orders made at the disposition hearing, which arguably 

would have permitted the appellate court to reverse the order 

terminating dependency jurisdiction if necessary to provide the 

relief he requested. In any event, because it affirmed the juvenile 

court’s findings after declining to dismiss the appeal as moot (id.

at p. 1549), the Joshua C. court did not need to address how it 

could grant effective relief with the juvenile case closed if the 

termination order was not before it. Similarly in In re J.K., 

supra, 174 Cal.App.4th 1426, the juvenile court issued its custody 

order and terminated jurisdiction at the disposition hearing. 

(Id. at p. 1431.) Although this court found the appeal was not 

moot, we affirmed the jurisdiction findings and disposition order 

and did not reach the question of constructing an effective 

remedy. (See id. at p. 1440.)

Our conclusion as to the need for Mother to have appealed

the orders terminating dependency jurisdiction and awarding

joint legal custody to Deon and her is not altered by the fact she 

argues, in effect, the juvenile court lacked jurisdiction to make 

the new custody order because there was insufficient evidence 
15

she had placed Rashad at substantial risk of serious physical 

harm. As the Supreme Court has explained, “[J]urisdictional

errors are of two types. ‘Lack of jurisdiction in its most

fundamental or strict sense means an entire absence of power to

hear or determine the case, an absence of authority over the

subject matter or the parties.’” (People v. American Contractors

Indemnity Co. (2004) 33 Cal.4th 653, 660.) However, the term

“lack of jurisdiction” may also be applied when the court

possesses jurisdiction over the subject matter and parties in the

fundamental sense but “‘has no “jurisdiction” (or power) to act

except in a particular manner, or to give certain kinds of relief, or

to act without the occurrence of certain procedural

prerequisites.’” (Id. at p. 661.) “When a court lacks jurisdiction

in a fundamental sense, an ensuing judgment is void, and ‘thus

vulnerable to direct or collateral attack at any time.’” (Id. at

p. 660.) By contrast, when a court has fundamental jurisdiction

to act but acts in excess of jurisdiction, its actions are

merely voidable, “[t]hat is, its act or judgment is valid until it is

set aside, and a party may be precluded from setting it aside by

‘principles of estoppel, disfavor of collateral attack or

res judicata.’” (Id. at p. 661.) While a lack of fundamental

jurisdiction may be raised at any time, a challenge to a ruling in

excess of jurisdiction is subject to forfeiture if not timely asserted.

(People v. Allegheny Casualty Co. (2007) 41 Cal.4th 704, 716,

fn. 7; People v. Mower (2002) 28 Cal.4th 457, 474, fn. 6.)

Here, the juvenile court had jurisdiction in a fundamental

sense—authority over the subject matter and the parties. Any

orders made following an erroneous finding to sustain the

section 300 petition were, at most, acts in excess of jurisdiction. 

(See In re Angel S. (2007) 156 Cal.App.4th 1202, 1209 [when a 
16

court with fundamental jurisdiction over the persons and subject 

matter in question acts contrary to a statutory procedure or 

applicable rules, it does not act without jurisdiction, but rather in 

excess of jurisdiction; “[a]cts in excess of jurisdiction are not void 

in any fundamental sense””].)8 Accordingly, by not appealing the

November 4 and 10, 2020 orders terminating dependency

jurisdiction, and awarding joint legal custody to Deon and

expanding his monitored visitation with Rashad, Mother forfeited

any challenge to those rulings, including to the juvenile court’s

jurisdiction to issue them. Absent that additional appeal, we

cannot provide Mother effective relief.

DISPOSITION

The appeal is dismissed.

PERLUSS, P. J.

We concur:

SEGAL, J. FEUER, J.

8 In In re Cristian I. (2014) 224 Cal.App.4th 1088, in 

contrast, the mother argued the juvenile court’s jurisdiction 

findings and disposition order placing her severely abused son 

with his father were void because the Arizona courts had 

exclusive jurisdiction over custody matters under the Uniform 

Child Custody Jurisdiction and Enforcement Act and the 

Los Angeles juvenile court lacked fundamental jurisdiction to 

make anything other than an initial, temporary emergency order. 

(Id. at p. 1092.) Accordingly, we held, although the mother had 

not appealed the juvenile court’s subsequent order terminating 

dependency jurisdiction, her appeal of the jurisdiction findings

and disposition order was not moot. (Id. at p. 1096, fn. 6.)