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Welcome to this installment of The Federal Law Enforcement Informer (The Informer). The Legal Training Division of the Federal 

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and timely United States Supreme Court and federal Circuit Courts of Appeals reviews, interesting developments in the law, and 

legal articles written to clarify or highlight various issues. The views expressed in these articles are the opinions of the author and 

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This edition of The Informer may be cited as 12 INFORMER 18.
2

The Informer – December 2018

Case Summaries

Circuit Courts of Appeals

First Circuit

Begin v. Drouin: Whether an officer was entitled to qualified immunity in a lawsuit 

alleging an excessive use of force after the officer shot a psychiatric patient who was 

stabbing himself in the arm with a knife...........................................................................................3

United States v. Davis: Whether the warrantless impoundment and search of 

the defendant’s vehicle was reasonable under the community caretaking exception........................4

Third Circuit

United States v. Hester: Whether officers established reasonable suspicion of criminal

activity to support a Terry stop of the defendant who was the passenger in car.................................4

Fourth Circuit

United States v. Terry: Whether the warrantless placement of a GPS tracking device

on the defendant’s vehicle violated the Fourth Amendment.............................................................5

Seventh Circuit

United States v. Correa: Whether pressing the button on a seized garage door opener while

driving around a neighborhood to locate a drug stash house constituted a Fourth Amendment

search; whether using a seized door key to enter a building’s locked lobby and then testing a

seized mailbox key to locate a specific unit constituted Fourth Amendment searches; and 

whether the defendant had apparent authority to consent to a search................................................6

United States v. Brixen: Whether sending a message to an arrestee’s seized cell phone and

viewing the message notification constituted an unlawful search under the Fourth Amendment.....7

Strand v. Minchuk: Whether an officer was entitled to qualified immunity in a lawsuit

alleging an excessive use of force after the officer shot the plaintiff at the conclusion of a fight.......8

Eighth Circuit

United States v. Coleman: Whether officers lawfully entered the defendant’s house, 

conducted a lawful protective sweep, and then lawfully searched the defendant’s car

located within the curtilage of the home...........................................................................................9

United States v. Reddick: Whether officers established reasonable suspicion to conduct

a Terry stop and then a Terry frisk..................................................................................................10

Tenth Circuit

United States v. Shrum: Whether the unlawful seizure of the defendant’s home negated 

the defendant’s subsequent consent to search, which led to the discovery of evidence used 

to establish probable cause to obtain a search warrant....................................................................11

♦
3

CASE SUMMARIES

Circuit Courts of Appeal

First Circuit

Begin v. Drouin, 2018 U.S. App. LEXIS 32448 (1st Cir. ME Nov. 16, 2018)

Jason Begin was on supervised release from a psychiatric hospital when hospital officials 

determined that he needed to be recommitted to the facility. Anticipating that Begin would be 

upset by this decision, a hospital official requested that a police officer be present when Begin 

was informed of the decision to recommit. Further, the office was asked to transport Begin to the 

facility upon being recommitted.

When Officer Drouin arrived, hospital officials told her that Begin might become uncooperative 

and that he had some history of violence. At the time, Begin weighed 265 pounds. and Officer 

Drouin was armed with her service gun, an electronic control device, an expandable baton, and 

pepper spray. 

After Begin was told that he was going to be recommitted, he said that he was not going back to 

the hospital. As officer Drouin approached Begin, he stood up, reached into his pocket with his 

right hand, pulled out a black folding knife, and repeatedly slashed his left arm. Begin did not say 

anything during this time and as Begin continued to slash his arm, Officer Drouin shot Begin three 

times. After Begin fell to the floor, Officer Drouin handcuffed him and called for an ambulance. 

Approximately four to six seconds passed from the time Officer Drouin first saw Begin to the 

time she shot him. 

Begin sued Officer Drouin under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, claiming that she used excessive force against 

him in violation of the Fourth Amendment. Officer Begin filed a motion for summary judgment 

based upon qualified immunity.

The court found that to determine whether an objectively reasonable police officer in Officer 

Drouin’s position could have thought it lawful to shoot Begin, it was critical to know the exact 

number and location of each hospital employee relative to Begin at the moment Officer Drouin 

fired. However, the court noted that neither Begin nor Officer Drouin provided a diagram or 

described with any detail the exact location of hospital staff members at the time of the shooting. 

Although it was undisputed that Officer Begin was within twenty feet of Begin when she shot 

him, and that no one was between Officer Drouin and Begin when Begin raised the knife, the 

court was not able to determine the threat Begin posed to others who were nearby. Without this 

information, the court was left with the fact that Officer Drouin knew that Begin was intent on 

harming himself, that he did not threaten to harm anyone else, and that Begin did not receive any

warning or order from Officer Drouin to drop the knife before she shot him. Based on these facts, 

the court held that a reasonable jury could find that find that Officer Drouin violated the Fourth 

Amendment by shooting Begin. The court concluded by adding that its opinion did not mean that 

Office Drouin “did anything wrong,” but that the evidence in the record could support a verdict 

for Begin. 
4

For the court’s opinion: https://cases.justia.com/federal/appellate-courts/ca1/17-1451/17-1451-

2018-11-16.pdf?ts=1542387605

*****

United States v. Davis, 2018 U.S. App. LEXIS 32799 (1st Cir. NH Nov. 20, 2018)

Police officers arrested Davis for driving under the influence of alcohol and/or marijuana. At the 

time of his arrest, Davis was driving his fiancée’s car, which he had parked perpendicularly across 

a designated handicap parking spot. Pursuant to department guidelines, officers contacted a tow 

truck to remove the vehicle. While waiting for the tow truck, an officer conducted an inventory 

search of the vehicle as required by department policy. After finishing the inventory, the officer 

reached into the vehicle to place the keys in the ignition for retrieval by the tow truck operator. 

While doing so, the officer for the first time saw a handgun located between the driver’s seat and 

the center console. The officer removed the weapon from the vehicle out of concern for public 

safety and out of reluctance to leave an item of value in the vehicle. 

The government charged Davis with being a felon in possession of a firearm. 

Davis filed a motion to suppress the handgun, arguing that the decision to impound the vehicle 

violated the Fourth Amendment.

Vehicle impoundments are governed by the “community caretaking exception” to the Fourth 

Amendment’s warrant requirement. The community caretaking exception recognizes that police 

officers perform many community functions apart from investigating crime, such as “removing 

vehicles that impede traffic or threaten public safety and convenience.” As such, courts have held 

that warrantless vehicle impoundments are reasonable when police officers are acting as 

community caretakers and not as criminal investigators. 

In this case, the court held that the officers’ decision to impound Davis’ vehicle was reasonable 

under the community caretaking exception. First, the officers reasonably believed that the vehicle 

could pose a potential safety hazard to as it was parked perpendicularly across a handicap parking 

spot. Second, there was no other driver present to move the vehicle for Davis. 

Davis further argued that the handgun should have been suppressed because it was discovered and

seized after the officer finished the inventory search.

Again, the court disagreed. After conducting the inventory, the officer re-entered the vehicle to 

facilitate the towing. The officer then seized the handgun to protect public safety and to safeguard 

Davis’ property. The court held that the officer’s entry into the vehicle and seizure of the handgun 

for non-investigative purposes were also reasonable under the community caretaking exception. 

For the court’s opinion: https://cases.justia.com/federal/appellate-courts/ca1/17-1692/17-1692-

2018-11-20.pdf?ts=1542740405

*****

Third Circuit

United States v. Hester, 2018 U.S. App. LEXIS 34029 (3d Cir. NJ Nov. 30, 2018)

At approximately 11:40 p.m., Hiddayah Muse parked a car in front of a corner store in Newark, 

New Jersey. Muse left the car idling while she entered the store with Michael Hester waiting in 
5

the front passenger seat. In the meantime, four officers in two police cars, one marked and one 

unmarked, noticed that the idling vehicle was illegally parked. In addition, one of the officers had 

made multiple drug arrests at the store and another officer knew that the store had been the subject 

of several drug investigations. 

As soon as Muse exited the store and re-entered the vehicle, the marked police car pulled up along 

the driver’s side of the car and the unmarked car pulled up behind it. The officers exited their 

cruisers and approached both sides of Muse’s vehicle on foot. When an officer questioned Muse, 

she admitted that she did not have a driver’s license. At that point, the officer directed Muse to 

turn off the engine and step out of the car. Hester, who had remained in the passenger seat, offered 

to drive and then began to rise and exit the vehicle. As he did so, one of the officers saw Hester 

drop a handgun to the floor of the car. After the officer alerted the others to the presence of the 

weapon, Hester attempted to run away but was quickly apprehended. 

The government charged Hester with being a felon in possession of a firearm. 

Hester filed a motion to suppress the handgun. Hester argued that by the time the officers 

discovered the handgun, they had already seized him in violation of the Fourth Amendment. 

As an initial matter, the court had to determine at what point during the encounter the officers 

seized Hester. A person is seized under the Fourth Amendment when he submits to a police 

officer’s show of authority. The court held that the officers’ conduct in positioning their patrol 

cars next to and behind Muse’s vehicle and then approaching Muse’s vehicle on foot constituted 

“a show of authority.” Next, the court held that Hester indeed submitted to the officers’ show of 

authority, and was therefore seized under the Fourth Amendment while he waited in the vehicle 

with Muse prior to and during questioning, before he attempted to flee. 

The court then held that when the officers seized Hester they had reasonable suspicion criminal 

activity was afoot. First, the officers saw a vehicle illegally parked near a crosswalk. Second, the 

vehicle was parked in front of a store with a known history of drug-related activity, close to 

midnight in a high-crime area. Based on these facts, the court concluded that the officers had 

reasonable suspicion to detain the vehicle and its occupants before the officers seized the handgun 

from the vehicle. 

For the court’s opinion: https://cases.justia.com/federal/appellate-courts/ca3/16-3570/16-3570-

2018-11-30.pdf?ts=1543600807

*****

Fourth Circuit

United States v. Terry, 2018 U.S. App. LEXIS 33617 (4th Cir. W. VA. Nov. 30, 2018)

A narcotics task force suspected that Brian Terry was involved in trafficking drugs. While 

conducting surveillance, officers saw Terry driving a Kia Optima and placed a GPS tracking 

device on the vehicle without first obtaining a warrant to do so. Later that day, an officer obtained 

a warrant to place the GPS tracker on the Kia, the same car on which the officers had placed the 

GPS tracker. The officer did not inform the issuing magistrate that officers had already placed 

the GPS tracker on the vehicle. 

Two days later, the officers relied solely on the GPS data to track the Kia to Columbus, Ohio, 

where the task force suspected Terry had gone to obtain drugs. After the vehicle returned to West 
6

Virginia, officers stopped the Kia for traveling five miles per hour over the posted speed limit. 

During the stop, an officer frisked Terry and found methamphetamine and a small amount of 

marijuana on Terry’s person. 

The government charged Terry with possession with intent to distribute methamphetamine. 

Terry filed a motion to suppress the methamphetamine, arguing that the placement of the GPS 

tracker without a warrant violated the Fourth Amendment. The government argued that even if 

the placement of the GPS tracker was unlawful, the lawful traffic stop for speeding, two days 

later, purged the taint of the warrantless GPS installation.

The court disagreed. First, the court held that only two days passed between the unlawful 

placement of the GPS tracker and the discovery of the evidence, which was an insubstantial 

amount of time. Second, the officers stopped the Kia for speeding, a very minor infraction. Third, 

and most importantly, the court held that the officers’ misconduct in this case constituted a flagrant 

disregard for the well-established warrant requirement set forth by the Supreme Court in United 

States v. Jones. To support this position, the court noted at the suppression hearing, the officer 

who placed the GPS tracker on the Kia testified that he knew a warrant was required to place the 

GPS tracking device on the vehicle. The officer further testified that task force officers had affixed 

GPS trackers to cars without first obtaining a warrant in other cases. The court added that the 

exclusionary rule exists to deter this type of official misconduct by police officers. 

For the court’s opinion: https://cases.justia.com/federal/appellate-courts/ca4/17-4799/17-4799-

2018-11-30.pdf?ts=1543608038

*****

Seventh Circuit

United States v. Correa, 2018 U.S. App. LEXIS 31204 (7th Cir. Il Nov. 5, 2018)

Federal agents conducted a traffic stop and arrested Jason Correa after they found cocaine in his 

car. Inside Correa’s car, the agents also discovered four garage door openers, three sets of keys, 

and four cell phones. The agents drove around the neighborhood testing the openers on multiple 

buildings. Eventually, a garage door opened for a multi-story condominium building. The agents 

did not enter the garage, but instead, they used one of the keys seized from Correa’s car to enter 

the locked lobby of the building. Inside the lobby, the agents tested a mailbox key from the same 

key ring on various mailboxes and found a key that fit the mailbox for Unit 702. The agents then 

contacted another agent who obtained Correa’s consent to search Unit 702. The agents entered 

Unit 702 and seized a large quantity of illegal drugs, a firearm, and equipment for weighing and 

packaging drugs. After a neighbor told the agents that Saul Melero, one of the residents of Unit 

702 was standing outside, the agents arrested him.

The government charged Correa and Melero with drug and firearm offenses. 

The defendants filed a motion to suppress the evidence seized during the traffic stop and from 

Unit 702. After the district court denied their motion, the defendants appealed to the Seventh 

Circuit Court of Appeals.

First, the court held that the agents lawfully stopped Correa for a traffic violation, obtained 

voluntary consent so search, and lawfully seized the evidence from Correa’s car, to include the 

garage door openers and keys.
7

Second, the court held that the agent’s use of the opener to locate the garage which it opened was 

not a Fourth Amendment search of the garage. The court reasoned that neither defendant had an 

exclusive property interest in the garage, as it was a shared common area. In addition, even if the 

agents had committed a trespass by using the opener, the trespass would have been against the 

building’s owner, not against the defendants, who were individual tenants. Finally, the court held 

that neither defendant had a reasonable expectation of privacy in the shared parking garage.

Third, the court held that pushing the button on the garage door opener was a search of the opener 

itself under the Fourth Amendment. The court also held that the search was reasonable because 

it only identified the location of the defendants’ building and did not disclose any private 

information about the interior or the contents of the garage.

Fourth, the court held that using the keys to enter the locked building lobby and testing the mailbox 

key were searches under the Fourth Amendment. Again, the court held that these searches were 

reasonable because the defendants had no reasonable expectation of privacy in lobby as it was a 

common area and that the defendants had no right to exclude anyone from this area.

Finally, the court held Correa had apparent authority to consent to the search. When the agent 

asked Correa for consent Unit 702, they knew he had possessed the garage door opener as well as 

keys to the lobby door and mailbox for the unit. Based on these facts, the court concluded that 

the officers could reasonably believe that Correa had authority to consent. 

For the court’s opinion: https://cases.justia.com/federal/appellate-courts/ca7/16-2316/16-2316-

2018-11-05.pdf?ts=1541435443

*****

United States v. Brixen, 2018 U.S. App. LEXIS 31512 (7th Cir. WI Nov. 7, 2018)

A police officer posed as a fourteen-year-old female on a smartphone application called 

“Whisper” under the user name “Bored_4_teen_f.” The officer contacted another user who 

represented himself as a 31-year-old male, later identified as Edmund Brixen, and the two agreed 

to go shopping for “underwear and bras.” To facilitate this meeting, Brixen disclosed his 

telephone number, two photos of himself, and his Snapchat name, “Snappyschrader.” Using 

Snapchat, Brixen arranged to meet “Bored_4_teen_f” at a local supermarket. 

When Brixen arrived, officers arrested him and seized his cell phone, which was powered on at 

the time. After being read his Miranda rights, Brixen agreed to speak with the officers. Brixen 

told the officers he was at the store to purchase groceries and denied he intended to meet anyone. 

To illustrate that the officers knew why Brixen was there and to show Brixen that he had been 

interacting with a police officer, the officer used his police cell phone to send a Snapchat message 

to “Snappyschrader.” Brixen watched as his cell phone, which was held up by the officer, received 

a Snapchat notification indicating that he had received a message from “Bored_4_teen_f.” After 

witnessing the notification, Brixen admitted that he intended to meet a fourteen-year-old female 

to take her shopping for “undergarments.” 

Brixen was released from custody the next day and a short time later, the officer obtained a warrant 

to search Brixen’s cell phone. The search revealed child pornography and evidence that Brixen 

transported a minor across state lines to engage in criminal sexual activity. The government 

charged Brixen with several criminal violations.
8

Brixen argued that the officer’s sending the Snapchat message and then viewing the notification 

on his phone constituted an unlawful search of his phone under Riley v. California. In Riley, the 

Supreme Court held that before searching a cell phone seized incident to an arrest, law 

enforcement officers must generally obtain a warrant. The court noted that Riley and subsequent 

cases involving searches of cell phones incident to arrest involved law enforcement officers 

affirmatively accessing the content within cell phones to obtain evidence against the arrestees. 

In this case, the court held that the officer’s actions did not amount to a search of Brixen’s cell 

phone under Riley. The officer did not open or otherwise manipulate Brixens’ phone, nor did he 

gain access to any of the phone’s content or attempt to retrieve any information from within the 

phone. The court further held that once the officer lawfully seized Brixen’s phone incident to 

arrest that Brixen had no reasonable expectation of privacy in a conspicuous notification that 

appeared on his phone. 

For the court’s opinion: https://cases.justia.com/federal/appellate-courts/ca7/18-1636/18-1636-

2018-11-07.pdf?ts=1541617216

*****

Strand v. Minchuk, 2018 U.S. App. LEXIS 31689 (7th Cir. IN Nov. 8, 2018)

Craig Strand, a commercial truck driver, stopped in Indiana to take a mandatory drug screening 

test. Unable to find a parking at the drug-testing facility, Strand obtained permission to park his 

rig outside a nearby Planned Parenthood office. 

Curtis Minchuk, a local police officer, was working security the same day. Minchuk was wearing 

his police uniform and was working with authorization from his department. When Minchuk 

reported to work, he saw Strand’s truck parked in the lot and wrote two parking tickets, which he 

left on the truck’s windshield. 

When he returned to his truck, Strand saw the parking tickets and was directed by a Planned 

Parenthood employee to discuss them with Officer Minchuk. The two men engaged in a verbal 

altercation concerning the tickets, which turned into a physical altercation, with both men falling 

to the ground. During the fight, Strand punched Officer Minchuk at least three times in the face 

and placed his hands on Officer Minchuk’s throat. The fight ceased when Strand stood up, backed 

four to six feet away from Officer Minchuk, put his hands up and said, “I surrender. Do whatever 

you think you need to do. I surrender. I’m done.” While on the ground, Officer Minchuk fired a 

single shot at Strand, striking him in the abdomen. Strand was later convicted in Indiana state 

court of committing felony battery of a police officer. 

Strand sued Officer Minchuk under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for using excessive use of force against him 

in violation of the Fourth Amendment. 

Officer Minchuk filed a motion for summary judgment based upon qualified immunity. Officer 

Minchuk argued that he reasonably believed Strand was not subdued, and therefore continued to 

present a danger, when he shot Strand. 

The court held that Officer Minchuk was not entitled to qualified immunity. The court found that 

it was undisputed that Officer Minchuk shot Strand after Strand stopped fighting, stood up, 

stepped four to six feet away from Officer Minchuk, raised his hands and stated: “I surrender, 

I’m done.” The court added that it was also undisputed that Strand was not armed and that after 
9

backing away, Strand never threatened Officer Minchuk or did anything to suggest that he might 

resume fighting or reach for a weapon. 

The court concluded that a reasonable jury could find that Officer Minchuk violated Strand’s 

constitutional right to be free from excessive use of force because Strand no longer posed an 

immediate danger to Officer Minchuk at the time he fired the shot. The court noted that additional 

facts needed to be developed a trial to determine whether the “rapidly evolving nature of the 

altercation” justified Officer Minchuk’s use of deadly force or whether “he had time to recalibrate 

the degree of force necessary, in light of Strand’s statement of surrender.” 

For the court’s opinion: https://cases.justia.com/federal/appellate-courts/ca7/18-1514/18-1514-

2018-11-08.pdf?ts=1541705473

*****

Eighth Circuit

United States v. Coleman, 2018 U.S. App. LEXIS 33199 (8th Cir. AR Nov. 27, 2018)

Police officers were dispatched to Coleman’s home for a domestic dispute. When they arrived, 

the officers spoke to Ashlee Phillips, who lived in the home with Coleman. Phillips told the 

officers that Coleman had punched her in the mouth and that he had a gun. The officers entered 

the house with Phillips’ consent and confronted Coleman in the kitchen. Coleman objected to the 

officers’ presence in his house and then ran down the stairs to the basement. After an officer 

ordered him to stop, Coleman walked back up the stairs toward the officer. When the officer 

attempted to arrest Coleman, a struggle ensued and the officer deployed his taser against Coleman, 

who fell down the stairs. The officer secured Coleman at the bottom of the stairs and seized a 

large bag containing a white substance which he suspected to be cocaine and cash from Coleman’s 

The office also seized several small baggies on the stairwell, as well as a handgun and more 

suspected cocaine in a nearby loveseat.

After Coleman was removed from the house, the officers conducted a protective sweep of the 

basement. The officers discovered a door, which they opened using Coleman’s key, provided by 

Phillips. The officers saw a bag of marijuana in plain view on a bed, which they did not disturb. 

The officers stopped their search, secured the house, and obtained a warrant to search Coleman’s 

house. Pursuant to the warrant, the officers searched Coleman’s house and seized additional 

drugs, numerous cell phones, and a rifle. The officers also searched Coleman’s car, which was 

located in the driveway, after a drug-sniffing dog alerted for the presence of narcotics in the 

vehicle. The officers searched the car and seized additional drugs and a firearm. 

The government charged Coleman with a variety of drug and firearm offenses.

Coleman filed a motion to suppress the evidence seized from his house and from his car under 

several legal theories.

First, the court held that the officers’ initial entry into Coleman’s house was lawful because the 

officers entered with Phillips’ consent. Even though Coleman objected to the officers’ presence 

in his house when he encountered them, this objection did not invalidate the officers’ lawful entry.

Second, the court held that the officers’ protective sweep, to include entry into the locked room, 

was reasonable. The court noted that Coleman was in the basement prior to his arrest and the 
10

locked room was connected to the area in which the officers arrested him. In addition, the officers 

knew that other people lived in the house, one firearm had been found, and officers needed to 

investigate the large amount of drugs discovered on the basement floor and nearby loveseat. 

Based on these facts, the court concluded that the officers had a reasonable belief that the basement 

and locked room could harbor a person posing a danger to the officers in the house. 

Third, even though the search warrant did not specifically mention cell phones as items to be 

seized, the court held that cell phones were within the class of “instrumentalities of criminal 

activity” the warrant specifically described. As a result, the court held that officers lawfully seized 

Coleman’s cell phones. 

Finally, the court held that the search of Coleman’s car was lawful because the car was located in 

the driveway and the warrant authorized the officers to search “the premises and curtilage area.” 

The court found that this allowed the officers to either search the vehicle parked in the curtilage, 

or to have a drug dog sniff the vehicle’s exterior to confirm there was probable cause to search 

the vehicle for drugs.

For the court’s opinion: https://cases.justia.com/federal/appellate-courts/ca8/17-2644/17-2644-

2018-11-27.pdf?ts=1543336224

*****

United States v. Reddick, 2018 U.S. App. LEXIS 33597 (8th Cir. AR Nov. 30, 2018)

Police officers responded to a domestic incident involving a vehicle. After the suspect fled on 

foot, Officer Dannar was left at the crime scene to secure the vehicle. During this time, a crowd 

of onlookers gathered around the vehicle. While Officer Dannar directed the onlookers to stay 

back, a man, later identified as Reddick, approached the vehicle several times. Officer Dannar 

repeatedly told Reddick to stop and that “If you’re coming after the car, you’re not going to get 

it.” Officer Dannar testified that he made this comment to Reddick because he knew that persons 

with no legitimate ownership interest in a vehicle abandoned during an incident with police will 

often falsely claim ownership of the abandoned vehicle. Reddick responded by gesturing with his 

arms toward Officer Danner without removing his hand from his large, bulky coat pockets.

A short time later, Sgt. St. Laurent arrived to assist Officer Dannar. Officer Dannar told Sgt. St. 

Laurent about Reddick. Sgt. St. Laurent approached Reddick, asked him what he was doing and 

why he would not leave. During this time, Sgt. St. Laurent repeatedly asked Reddick to remove 

his hands from his pockets. While Reddick would briefly comply and remove his hands, he kept 

placing them back in his pockets. Sgt. St. Laurent was concerned that Reddick might be armed 

because in his experience, individuals carrying weapons will frequently touch it to assure 

themselves that it is still there. As a result, Sgt. St. Laurent frisked Reddick and found a revolver 

in his coat pocket. 

The government charged Reddick with being a felon in possession of a firearm. Reddick filed a 

motion to suppress claiming that Sgt. St. Laurent lacked reasonable suspicion to conduct a Terry

stop and the subsequent Terry frisk.

The court disagreed. First, the court noted that Reddick repeatedly attempted to access the crime 

scene after Officer Dannar told him to stop. In addition, Officer Dannar’s experience with 

individuals attempting to illegally obtain possession of abandoned vehicles during a police 

investigation made him concerned about Reddick’s “direct approach” to the vehicle. Finally, 
11

Reddick gestured with his arms toward the officer while keeping his hands in his pockets. The 

court held that the combination of these facts established reasonable suspicion to believe that 

Reddick was involved in criminal activity, which justified a Terry stop.

Next the court held that Sgt. St. Laurent established reasonable suspicion that Reddick was 

presently armed and dangerous; therefore, Sgt. St. Laurent was justified in conducting a Terry

frisk. Reddick repeatedly placed his hand in his coat pockets in disregard of Sgt. St. Laurent’s 

requests to keep his hands out of his pockets and in a manner consistent with someone who was 

in possession of a weapon. 

For the court’s opinion: https://cases.justia.com/federal/appellate-courts/ca8/17-2741/17-2741-

2018-11-30.pdf?ts=1543595421

*****

Tenth Circuit

United States v. Shrum, 2018 U.S. App. LEXIS 32343 (10th Cir. KS Nov. 15, 2018)

Walt Shrum called 911 in the early morning hours to report that his wife, Candice, was not 

breathing and that she may have overdosed on prescription medication. After Shrum’s wife died 

later that morning at the hospital, Officer Cooke was assigned to investigate her death. Officer 

Cooke had been informed that Candice’s death was not considered to be suspicious. 

Officer Cooke met Shrum at the police station where he told Shrum that he needed to retrieve 

Candice’s medication prior to her autopsy. At approximately 9:30 a.m., Officer Cooke and Shrum 

arrived at Shrum’s house, which had been secured by other officers. After Officer Cooke refused 

to allow Shrum to enter the house, Shrum signed a consent-to-search form which authorized 

Officer Cooke to enter the house to “retrieve medication.” Afterward, Officer Cooke entered 

Shrum’s house, obtained Candice’s medication and took photographs of the kitchen and bedroom.

Officer Cook returned to the police station at approximately 11:00 a.m. where he noticed one of 

the photographs depicted ammunition in plain view in the bedroom closet and learned that Shrum 

was a convicted felon. Officer Cook then met with federal agents who obtained a warrant to 

search Shrum’s house at 10:00 p.m.. The officers executed the warrant at 11:18 p.m. and seized 

ammunition, two firearms, and methamphetamine from Strum’s house, to which the officers had 

continued to deny Strum access.

The government subsequently charged Strum with drug and firearm offenses.

Strum filed a motion to suppress the evidence seized from his house. Strum argued that the 

officers unlawfully seized his home immediately after Candice’s death, which tainted his 

subsequent consent to search the house for Candice’s medication. It was during this alleged 

unlawful entry into the house that Officer Cooke saw the ammunition which established probable 

cause to obtain the search warrant. 

A Fourth Amendment seizure occurs when there is some meaningful government interference 

with a person’s possessory interest in his or her property. First, the court held that “securing” 

Strum’s house without a warrant or an exception to the warrant requirement, while denying Strum 

access to his house constituted a Fourth Amendment seizure. 
12

Second, when Officer Cooke denied Strum access to his house around 9:30 a.m., Cooke had been 

informed that Candice’s death was not considered suspicious and he had no reason to believe that 

Strum or Candice were engaged in criminal activity. The court added that even though Officer 

Cooke established probable cause to obtain a search warrant for Strum’s house at approximately 

11:00 a.m., this had no bearing on the initial, unlawful seizure of Strum’s house. The court 

reminded the officers that an unreasonable warrantless seizure of a person’s home does not 

become reasonable based on facts discovered afterward by the officers. Consequently, the court 

held that law enforcement’s initial securing of Strum’s house on the morning of Candice’s death 

constituted an unreasonable seizure in violation of the Fourth Amendment. 

The court further held that Strum’s consent to search for Candice’s medication was the direct 

result of the illegal seizure of his home and not an act of freewill. First, officers seized Strum’s 

house. Next, Officer Cooke told Strum that the coroner needed medication from the home to 

perform an autopsy. Finally, Officer Cooke denied Strum access to his home to retrieve the 

medication. The court reasoned that if Strum had been allowed to enter his home and retrieve 

Candice’s medication himself, Officer Cooke’s entry into the home pursuant to Strum’s consent 

would have been unnecessary. Consequently, the court concluded that but for Officer Cooke’s 

entry in the home, he never would have seen the ammunition upon which he relied to obtain the 

search warrant which led to the discovery of the evidence used to charge Strum. 

For the court’s opinion: https://cases.justia.com/federal/appellate-courts/ca10/17-3059/17-3059-

2018-11-15.pdf?ts=1542301248

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