Testimony 

Before the Subcommittee on Energy, 

Committee on Science, House of 

Representatives

United States General Accounting Office 

GAO

For Release on Delivery 

Expected at 10:00 a.m. EDT 

Thursday, July 10, 2003 CONTRACT REFORM 

DOE’s Policies and 

Practices in Competing 

Research Laboratory 

Contracts 

Statement of Robin M. Nazzaro, Director, 

Natural Resources and Environment 

GAO-03-932T 
DOE has competed its research laboratory contracts in three main situations—

when the contractor operating the laboratory is a for-profit entity, when mission 

changes warrant a review of the capabilities of other potential contractors, or 

when the incumbent contractor’s performance is unsatisfactory. DOE guidance 

requires that to extend a contract noncompetitively, the department must 

present a convincing case for doing so to the Secretary of Energy. Among other 

things, DOE must certify that competing the contract is not in the best interests 

of the government and must describe the incumbent contractor’s past successful 

performance. 

Of the 16 research laboratory contracts currently in place, DOE has competed 6. 

The remaining 10 contracts have not been competed since the contractors began 

operating the sites--in some cases, since the 1940s. DOE recently decided to 

compete 2 of the 10 contracts that had never before been competed—contracts 

to operate the Los Alamos National Laboratory in New Mexico and the Argonne 

West Laboratory, located at the Idaho National Laboratory. DOE decided to 

compete the Los Alamos contract because of concerns about the contractor’s 

performance, and to compete the Argonne West contract as part of an overall 

effort to separate the Idaho National Laboratory’s nuclear energy research 

mission from the environmental cleanup mission at the Idaho site. 

Competing contracts is one of several mechanisms DOE can use to address 

contractor performance problems or strengthen contract management. 

However, just competing a contract does not ensure that contractor 

performance will improve. Other aspects of DOE’s contract reform initiative 

intended to improve contractor performance included greater use of fixed-price 

contracts instead of cost-reimbursement contracts and establishing or 

strengthening performance-based incentives in existing contracts. In addition, 

GAO has reported that DOE must (1) effectively oversee its contractors’ 

activities in carrying out projects and (2) use appropriate outcome measures to 

assess overall results and apply lessons learned to continually improve its 

contracting practices. GAO’s recent evaluation of DOE’s contract reform efforts 

indicates that DOE is still working to put these management practices and 

outcome measures in place. 

 

 DOE is the largest civiliancontracting agency in the federal 

government, and relies primarily on 

contractors to operate its sites and 

carry out its diverse missions. For 

fiscal year 2003, DOE will spend 

about 90 percent of its total annual 

budget, or $19.8 billion, on 

contracts, including $9.4 billion to 

operate 16 of its research 

laboratories (called federally 

funded research and development 

centers). Since 1990, GAO has 

identified DOE’s contract 

management as high-risk for fraud, 

waste, abuse, and mismanagement. 

In 1994, DOE began reforming its 

contracting practices to, among 

other things, improve contractor 

performance and accountability. As 

part of that effort, DOE has at 

times used competition in awarding 

contracts to manage and operate its 

research laboratories. In 

September 2002, GAO reported on 

the status of contract reform 

efforts in DOE. (Contract Reform: 

DOE Has Made Progress, but 

Actions Needed to Ensure 

Initiatives Have Improved 

Results) [Sep. 2002, GAO-02-798] 

 This testimony discusses some 

of the findings in that report. GAO 

was asked to testify on DOE’s 

rationale for deciding whether to 

compete a laboratory research 

contract, the extent to which DOE 

has competed these contracts, and 

the role of competition and other 

mechanisms in improving 

contractor performance. 

www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-03-932T.

To view the full product, including the scope 

and methodology, click on the link above. 

For more information, contact Robin M. 

Nazzaro (202) 512-3841 or 

nazzaror@gao.gov. 

Highlights of GAO-03-932T, testimony 

before the Subcommittee on Energy, 

Committee on Science, House of 

Representatives 

July 10, 2003 

CONTRACT REFORM 

DOE's Policies and Practices in 

Competing Research Laboratory 

Contracts 
Page 1 GAO-03-932T DOE Laboratory Contracts 

Madam Chairman and Members of the Subcommittee: 

We are pleased to be here today to discuss the Department of Energy’s 

(DOE) use of competition and other mechanisms to help ensure effective 

contractor performance in managing and operating its research 

laboratories. DOE is the largest civilian-contracting agency in the federal 

government, relying primarily on contractors to operate its sites and carry 

out its diverse missions. These missions include not only conducting 

research but also maintaining the nuclear weapons stockpile, and cleaning 

up radioactive and hazardous waste. For fiscal year 2003, DOE will spend 

about 90 percent of its total annual budget, or $19.8 billion, on contracts, 

including $9.4 billion to operate 16 of its research laboratories. 

For over a decade, we, DOE’s Office of Inspector General, and others have 

criticized DOE’s contracting practices, including its failure to hold its 

contractors accountable for results. DOE’s longstanding approach had 

been to develop a broadly defined statement of work, provide 

considerable direction to the contractor, and reimburse virtually all costs. 

This approach placed limited emphasis on cost control or accountability 

for results. Furthermore, poor contractor performance led to schedule 

delays and cost increases on many of the department’s major projects. 

Since 1990, such problems have led us to designate DOE contract 

management—defined broadly to include both contract administration 

and management of projects—as a high-risk area for fraud, waste, abuse, 

and mismanagement. 

In 1994, DOE began its contract reform initiative to improve contractors’ 

performance. Through this initiative DOE intended, among other things, to 

strengthen contracting practices, hold contractors more accountable for 

their performance, and demonstrate progress in achieving the agency’s 

missions. DOE implemented numerous changes, such as performance 

based-contracts with results-oriented measures and a greater use of 

competition in awarding contracts, including contracts to manage and 

operate its research laboratories known as Federally Funded Research 

and Development Centers (FFRDC). According to the Federal Acquisition 

Regulation, FFRDCs are entities that engage in activities sponsored by a 

government agency or agencies to conduct or manage basic or applied 

research and development. Contracts to operate such facilities differ from 

other contracts because the government contemplates a long-term 

relationship with the FFRDC contractor and the contractor has access to 

government data, employees, and facilities beyond that common in a 

normal contractual relationship. 
Page 2 GAO-03-932T DOE Laboratory Contracts 

My testimony today will discuss (1) DOE’s rationale for deciding whether 

to compete a FFRDC contract, (2) the extent to which DOE has competed 

these contracts, and (3) the role of competition and other mechanisms in 

improving contractor performance. Although we have not conducted a 

review solely related to FFRDC contracts, our past work on DOE’s 

contract reform initiative, especially our September 2002 report,1

 focused 

in part on DOE’s use of competition as a tool to improve contractor 

performance, including the contractors that manage and operate DOE’s 

laboratories. My testimony today is based on the findings in that report as 

well as related information we have developed as part of our ongoing 

oversight of DOE’s contracting activities. 

In summary we found the following: 

• DOE has competed its FFRDC contracts in three main situations: when the 

contractor operating the laboratory is a for-profit entity, when mission 

changes warrant a review of the capabilities of other potential contractors, 

or when the incumbent contractor’s performance is unsatisfactory. DOE 

guidance on contracting reflects a strong emphasis on competition that 

exists, in part, as a result of its contract reform initiative. Statutes and 

regulations give DOE considerable flexibility in deciding whether to 

compete or noncompetitively extend a FFRDC contract. However, for 

noncompetitive extensions, DOE guidance requires the department to 

present a convincing case to the Secretary. Among other things, DOE must 

certify that competing the contract is not in the best interests of the 

government and must describe the incumbent contractor’s past successful 

performance. 

• Of the 16 FFRDC contracts in place, DOE has competed 6. It has not 

competed the remaining 10 contracts since the contractors began 

operating the sites—in some cases, since the 1940s. DOE recently decided 

to compete 2 of the 10 contracts that had never before been competed—

contracts to operate the Los Alamos National Laboratory in New Mexico 

and the Argonne West Laboratory, located at the Idaho National 

Laboratory. DOE decided to compete the (1) Los Alamos contract because 

of concerns about the contractor’s performance and (2) Argonne West 

contract as part of an overall effort to separate the Idaho National 

Laboratory’s ongoing research mission from the environmental cleanup 

 1

U.S. General Accounting Office, Contract Reform: DOE Has Made Progress, but Actions 

Needed to Ensure Initiatives Have Improved Results, GAO-02-798 (Washington, D.C.: 

Sept. 13, 2002). 
Page 3 GAO-03-932T DOE Laboratory Contracts 

mission at the Idaho site. 

• Competing contracts is one of several mechanisms DOE can use to 

address contractor performance problems or strengthen contract 

management. However, just competing a contract does not ensure that 

contractor performance will improve. Other aspects of DOE’s contract 

reform initiative intended to improve contractor performance included 

greater use of fixed-price contracts instead of cost-reimbursement 

contracts and establishing or strengthening performance-based incentives 

in existing contracts. In addition, we have reported that DOE must (1) 

effectively oversee its contractors’ activities in carrying out projects and 

(2) use appropriate outcome measures to assess overall results and apply 

lessons learned to continually improve its contracting practices. Our 

recent evaluation of DOE’s contract reform efforts indicates that DOE is 

still working to put these management practices and outcome measures in 

place. 

DOE has a large complex of sites around the country dedicated to 

supporting its missions: sites that were used to produce or process 

materials and components for nuclear weapons and laboratories that 

conduct research on nuclear weapons, defense issues, basic science, and 

other topics. These sites and laboratories are often located on 

government-owned property and facilities, but are usually operated by 

organizations under contract to DOE, including universities or university 

groups, non-profit organizations, or other commercial entities. 

DOE contracting activities are governed by federal laws and regulations. 

Although federal laws generally require federal agencies to use 

competition in selecting a contractor, until the mid-1990s, DOE contracts 

for the management and operation of its sites generally fit within an 

exception that allowed for the use of noncompetitive procedures. Those 

contracts were subject to regulation that established noncompetitive 

extensions of contracts with incumbent contractors as the norm and 

permitted competition only when it appeared likely that the competition 

would result in improved cost or contractor performance and would not 

be contrary to the government’s best interests. In the mid-1990s, DOE 

began a series of contracting reforms to improve its contractors’ 

performance. A key factor of that initiative has been the increasing use of 

competition as a way to select management and operating contractors for 

DOE sites. Although DOE initially focused the increased use of 

competition on its contracts with for-profit organizations, the laboratories 

Background 
Page 4 GAO-03-932T DOE Laboratory Contracts 

operated by universities and other nonprofit organizations have not been 

completely insulated from these changes. 

Contract administration in DOE is carried out by the program offices, with 

guidance and direction from DOE’s Office of Procurement and Assistance 

Management. The management and operating contracts at DOE’s FFRDC 

laboratories are administered primarily by the National Nuclear Security 

Administration, a semi-autonomous agency within DOE; or DOE’s Offices 

of Science, Environmental Management, or Nuclear Energy, Science, and 

Technology. 

DOE has had three main reasons for competing its FFRDC contracts 

instead of extending the contracts noncompetitively: when the contractor 

operating the laboratory is a for-profit entity, when mission changes 

warrant a review of the capabilities of other potential contractors, or when 

the incumbent contractor’s performance is unsatisfactory. Without one of 

these conditions, DOE has generally extended these contracts without 

competition. 

DOE has considerable flexibility in deciding whether to compete a 

management and operating contract for one of its FFRDC laboratories. 

Although federal procurement law specifies a clear preference for 

competition in awarding government contracts, the Competition in 

Contracting Act of 1984 provided for certain conditions under which full 

and open competition is not required. One of these noncompetitive 

conditions occurs when awarding the contract to a particular source is 

necessary to establish or maintain an essential engineering, research, or 

development capability to be provided by an educational or other 

nonprofit institution or a FFRDC. 

The Federal Acquisition Regulation, which implements federal law, 

defines government-wide policy and requirements for FFRDCs, including 

the establishment, use, review, and termination of the FFRDC relationship. 

Under this regulation (1) there must be a written agreement of 

sponsorship between the government and the FFRDC; (2) the sponsoring 

governmental agency must justify its use of the FFRDC; (3) before 

extending the agreement or contract with the FFRDC, the government 

agency must conduct a comprehensive review of the use and need for the 

FFRDC; and (4) when the need for the FFRDC no longer exists, the agency 

may transfer sponsorship to another government agency or phase out the 

FFRDC. 

DOE Has Competed 

FFRDC Contracts for 

Three Main Reasons 
Page 5 GAO-03-932T DOE Laboratory Contracts 

DOE’s 1996 acquisition guidance describes the procedures DOE program 

offices must follow to support any recommendation for a non-competitive 

extension of any major site contract, including a FFRDC contract. This 

guidance indicates a clear preference for competition and requires DOE 

program offices to make a convincing case to the Secretary before a 

noncompetitive contract extension is allowed. This preference for 

competition is an outcome of DOE’s contract reform initiative, which 

concluded that DOE needed to expand the use of competition in awarding 

or renewing contracts. Among other things, the 1996 guidance specifies 

that, before a noncompetitive contract extension can occur, DOE must 

provide 

• a certification that full and open competition is not in the best interest of 

the department, 

• a detailed description of the incumbent contractor’s past performance, 

• an outline of the principal issues and/or significant changes to be 

negotiated in the contract extension, and 

• in the case of FFRDCs, a showing of the continued need for the research 

and development center in accordance with criteria established in the 

Federal Acquisition Regulation. 

In November 2000, DOE’s Office of Procurement and Assistance 

Management issued additional guidance on how to evaluate an incumbent 

contractor’s past performance when deciding whether to extend or 

compete an existing contract. The guidance states that DOE contracting 

officers must review an incumbent contractor’s overall performance 

including technical, administrative, and cost factors, and it outlines the 

information required to support the performance review and the expected 

composition of the evaluation team. When reporting the results of a 

performance evaluation, the team should address all significant areas of 

performance and highlight the incumbent contractor’s strengths and 

weaknesses. The evaluation team’s report serves as the basis for 

determining whether extending a contract is in the best interests of the 

government and is subject to review and concurrence by the responsible 

assistant secretary and DOE’s Procurement Executive. 
Page 6 GAO-03-932T DOE Laboratory Contracts 

In September 2002, we reported that DOE had taken several steps to 

expand competition for its site management and operating FFRDC 

contracts. First, DOE reassessed which sites it should continue to 

designate as federally funded research and development centers. As a 

result of the reassessment, DOE removed 6 of the 22 sites from the FFRDC 

designation. DOE subsequently competed the contracts for two of these—

the Knolls and Bettis Atomic Power Laboratories in New York and 

Pennsylvania. DOE restructured the other four contracts and, because of 

the more limited scope of activities, no longer regards them as major site 

contracts. The six site contracts that DOE has dropped from FFRDC status 

since 1992 are listed in table 1. 

Table 1: Sites Where DOE Has Eliminated the FFRDC Designation 

Site 

Year FFRDC status 

terminated 

Bettis Atomic Power Laboratory, Pennsylvania 1992 

Hanford Engineering Development Laboratory, 

Washington 

1992 

Inhalation Toxicology Research Institute, New Mexico 1995 

Energy Technology Engineering Center, California 1995 

Knolls Atomic Power Laboratory, New York 1992 

Oak Ridge Institute of Science and Education, 

Tennessee 

1999 

Source: GAO analysis of DOE data. 

For the 16 remaining FFRDC contracts that DOE sponsors, DOE has 

competed 6 of them and is planning to compete two additional contracts 

in 2004 and 2005. The 16 current FFRDC sites and the competitive status 

of the site contract are shown in table 2. 

DOE Has Competed 

or Plans to Compete 

Half of Its 16 FFRDC 

Contracts 
Page 7 GAO-03-932T DOE Laboratory Contracts 

Table 2: DOE’s FFRDC Sites and Contract Status 

Site Site contractor Contract status 

Sites with contracts that have not been competed: 

Ames National Laboratory, Iowa Iowa State University Initiated in 1943. 

Argonne National Laboratory, Illinois University of Chicago Initiated in 1946. DOE plans to 

compete the Argonne West 

(Idaho) portion of the contract 

in 2004. 

Fermi National Laboratory, Illinois Universities Research 

Association 

Initiated in 1967. 

Jefferson Laboratory, Virginia Southeastern Universities 

Research Association 

Initiated in 1984. 

Lawrence Berkeley National Laboratory, California University of California Initiated in 1947. 

Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory, California University of California Initiated in 1952. 

Los Alamos National Laboratory, New Mexico University of California Initiated in 1943. DOE plans to 

compete the contract in 2005. 

Pacific Northwest National Laboratory, Washington Battelle Memorial Institute Initiated in 1964. 

Princeton Plasma Physics Laboratory, New Jersey Princeton University Initiated in 1975. 

Stanford Linear Accelerator Facility, California Stanford University Initiated in 1976. 

Sites with competed contracts: 

Brookhaven National Laboratory, New York Brookhaven Science Associates Competed in 1997. 

Idaho National Engineering and Environmental Laboratory, Idaho Bechtel BWTX Idaho, LLC Competed in 1999. DOE plans 

to restructure the site contract 

and compete it in 2004. 

National Renewable Energy Laboratory, Colorado Midwest Research Institute Competed in 1998. 

Oak Ridge National Laboratory, Tennessee UT-Battelle, LLC Competed in 1999. 

Sandia National Laboratory, New Mexico Sandia Corporation Competed in 1993. 

Savannah River Site, South Carolina Westinghouse Savannah River 

Company 

Competed in 1996. 

Source: GAO analysis of DOE data. 

DOE’s decision to compete the six FFRDC sites shown in table 2 is 

consistent with the department’s overall policy on determining when 

competition is appropriate. For example, DOE competed the contract for 

the Brookhaven National Laboratory in 1997, after terminating the 

previous contract for unsatisfactory performance by the incumbent 

contractor. DOE competed the contract for the National Renewable 

Energy Laboratory in 1998 to incorporate additional private sector 

expertise into the management team for the site. This competition resulted 

from an expanded mission at the site to develop innovative renewable 

energy and energy efficient technologies and to incorporate these 

technologies into cost effective new products. For the remaining four 

FFRDC contracts that DOE has competed, the operator of the laboratory 

was a for-profit entity. 
Page 8 GAO-03-932T DOE Laboratory Contracts 

When DOE has decided not to compete its FFRDC contracts but to extend 

them noncompetitively, its decisions have not been without controversy. 

For example, in 2001, DOE extended the management and operating 

contracts with the University of California for the Los Alamos and 

Lawrence Livermore National Laboratories. The University of California 

has operated these sites for 50 years or more and has been the sites’ only 

contractor. In recent years, we and others have documented significant 

problems with laboratory operations and management at these two 

laboratories—particularly in the areas of safeguards, security, and project 

management.2

 Congressional committees and others have called for DOE 

to compete these contracts. Until recently, however, DOE did not compete 

them. Instead, DOE chose to address the performance problems using 

contract mechanisms, such as specific performance measures and interim 

performance assessments. In our September 2002 report, we commented 

that if the University of California did not make significant improvements 

in its performance, DOE may need to reconsider its decision not to 

compete the contracts. 

In April 2003, the Secretary of Energy decided to open the Los Alamos 

National Laboratory contract to competition when the current contract 

expires in September 2005. The Secretary made this decision based on 

“systemic management failures” that came to light in 2002. The 

management failures included inadequate controls over employees’ use of 

government credit cards, inadequate property controls and apparent theft 

of government property, and the firing of investigators attempting to 

identify the extent of management problems at the laboratory. 

DOE has also decided to restructure the FFRDC contracts supporting 

work at the Idaho National Laboratory. Currently the laboratory has two 

FFRDC contracts—(1) a site management contract that includes activities 

ranging from waste cleanup to facility operations activities and (2) a 

contract to operate Argonne National Laboratory, which includes the 

Argonne West facility at the Idaho site. DOE plans to restructure the two 

contracts so that one focuses on the nuclear energy research mission and 

 2

For, example, see U.S. General Accounting Office, Department of Energy: Key Factors 

Underlying Security Problems at DOE Facilities, GAO/T-RCED-99-159 (Washington, D.C.: 

Apr. 20, 1999); U.S. General Accounting Office, Nuclear Security: Improvements Needed in 

DOE’s Safeguards and Security Oversight, GAO/RCED-00-62 (Washington, D.C.: Feb. 24, 

2000); and A Special Investigative Panel, President’s Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board, 

Science at its Best, Security at its Worst: A Report on Security Problems of the U.S. 

Department of Energy (Washington, D.C.: June 1999). 
Page 9 GAO-03-932T DOE Laboratory Contracts 

the other focuses on the cleanup mission at the site. DOE also plans to 

include the activities at Argonne West in the contract competition for the 

site’s research mission and to remove the Argonne West scope of work 

from DOE’s existing contract with the University of Chicago to operate 

Argonne National Laboratory. DOE believes this contract restructuring 

will help revitalize the nuclear energy research mission at the Idaho Site 

and accelerate the environmental cleanup. 

DOE is continuing to examine the nature of its relationship with FFRDC 

contractors and the implications of that relationship for its contracting 

approach. DOE established FFRDCs in part to gain the benefits of having a 

long-term association with the research community beyond that available 

with a normal contractual relationship. However, more recent events are 

causing DOE to rethink its approach. As discussed above, DOE has been 

criticized for not competing laboratory contracts where the contractors 

are performing poorly. Furthermore, annual provisions in the Energy and 

Water Development Appropriations Acts since fiscal year 1998 have 

required DOE to compete the award and extension of management and 

operating contracts, including FFRDC contracts, unless the Secretary 

waives the requirement and notifies the Subcommittees on Energy and 

Water of the House Committee on Appropriations 60 days before contract 

award. 

Given these concerns, in 2003 the Secretary of Energy commissioned an 

independent panel to determine what criteria DOE should consider when 

deciding whether to extend or compete a laboratory management and 

operating contract. The panel is expected to help DOE determine, among 

other things, the conditions under which competition for laboratory 

contracts is appropriate, the appropriate criteria for deciding to compete 

or extend laboratory contracts, the benefits and disadvantages derived 

from competing laboratory contracts, and whether different standards and 

decision criteria should apply depending on whether the contractor is nonprofit, an educational institution, an academic consortium, or a 

commercial entity. 
Page 10 GAO-03-932T DOE Laboratory Contracts 

Competing contracts is one of several mechanisms DOE can use to 

address contractor performance problems or strengthen contract 

management. However, competing a contract does not ensure that 

contractor performance will improve. Other steps DOE has taken as part 

of its contract reform initiative to address contractor performance issues 

include changing the type of contract, such as from a cost-reimbursement 

to a fixed-price contract, or establishing or strengthening performancebased incentives in the contract. For example, in September 2002, we 

reported that DOE now requires performance-based contracts at all of its 

major sites. DOE has also increased over time the proportion of 

contractors’ fees tied to achieving those performance objectives. However, 

DOE has struggled to develop effective performance measures and 

continues to modify and test various performance measures that more 

directly link performance incentives to a site’s strategic objectives. 

Even these changes to DOE’s contracts do not by themselves ensure that 

contractor performance will improve. We have reported that DOE must 

also (1) effectively oversee its contractors’ activities in carrying out 

projects and (2) use appropriate outcome measures to assess overall 

results and apply lessons learned to continually improve its contracting 

practices. Effectively overseeing contractor activities involves, among 

other things, ensuring that appropriate and effective project management 

principles and practices are being used. Since June 1999, DOE has been 

working to implement recommendations by the National Research Council 

on how to improve project management at DOE. In 2003, the National 

Research Council reported that DOE has made progress in improving its 

management of projects but that effective management of projects was not 

fully in place. 

Regarding the use of outcome measures to assess overall results, in 

September 2002, we reported that DOE did not have outcome measures or 

data that could be used to assess the overall results of its contract reform 

initiatives. We recommended that DOE develop an approach to its reform 

initiatives, including its contracting and project management initiatives, 

that is more consistent with the best practices of high-performing 

organizations. DOE is still working to put a best-practices approach in 

place. 

As we reported in 2001, improving an organization’s performance can be 

difficult, especially in an organization like DOE, which has three main 

Competing Its 

Contracts Is One of 

Several Mechanisms 

DOE Has to Address 

Contractor 

Performance, but 

Effective Oversight 

and Improved 

Outcome Measures 

Are Also Needed 
Page 11 GAO-03-932T DOE Laboratory Contracts 

interrelated impediments to improvement—diverse missions, a confusing 

organizational structure, and a weak culture of accountability.3

 However, 

DOE expects to spend hundreds of billions of dollars in future years on 

missions important to the well-being of the American people, such as 

ensuring the safety and reliability of our nuclear weapon stockpile. 

Therefore, the department has compelling reasons to ensure that it has in 

place an effective set of contracting and management practices and 

controls. 

Thank you, Madam Chairman and Members of the Subcommittee. This 

concludes my testimony. I would be pleased to respond to any questions 

that you may have. 

For further information on this testimony, please contact Ms. Robin 

Nazzaro at (202) 512-3841. Individuals making key contributions to this 

testimony included Carole Blackwell, Bob Crystal, Doreen Feldman, Molly 

Laster, Carol Shulman, Stan Stenersen, and Bill Swick. 

 3

U.S. General Accounting Office, Department of Energy: Fundamental Reassessment 

Needed to Address Major Mission, Structure, and Accountability Problems, GAO-02-51

(Washington, D.C.: Dec. 21, 2001). 

Contacts and 

Acknowledgments 

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