The Chicago Seven: 1960s Radicalism 

in the Federal Courts

by

Bruce A. Ragsdale

Director, Federal Judicial History Offi ce, 

Federal Judicial Center

Prepared for inclusion in the project

Federal Trials and Great Debates in United States History

Federal Judicial Center

Federal Judicial History Offi ce

2008

This Federal Judicial Center publication was undertaken in furtherance of the Center’s

statutory mission to “conduct, coordinate, and encourage programs relating to the history

of the judicial branch of the United States government.” The views expressed are those

of the author and not necessarily those of the Federal Judicial Center.
The author thanks I. Scott Messinger and Jonathan W. White for assistance in the 

research for this unit.
The Chicago Seven: 1960s Radicalism in the Federal Courts

iii

Contents

The Chicago Conspiracy Trial: A Short Narrative, 1

Planning for the Democratic National Convention of 1968, 1

Organizing protests at the Democratic convention, 1

Confrontations in Chicago, 2

Investigating the violence, 3

Indictment, 4

Judge and jury, 4

A mistrial for Bobby Seale, 5 

The government’s case, 6

The defense strategy, 6

Procedural disputes, 7

Court theater, 7

Contempt and a verdict, 8

Appeals, 8 

Legacy, 9

The Judicial Process: A Chronology, 11

The Federal Courts and Their Jurisdiction, 13

U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Illinois, 13

U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit, 13

Legal Questions Before the Federal Courts, 15

Were the seven defendants guilty of engaging in a conspiracy to incite a riot? 15

Did the defendants violate the Anti-Riot Act by using interstate commerce with the 

intent to incite a riot and by committing at least one overt act to promote a riot? 15

Were John Froines and Lee Weiner guilty of instructing demonstrators in the 

manufacture and use of incendiary devices? 16

Was the Anti-Riot Act of 1968 unconstitutional? 17

Were the defendants and their attorneys guilty of criminal contempt? 17

Did the jury selection process protect the defendants’ right to a fair trial? 18

Did Judge Hoffman unfairly restrict the defense’s right to submit evidence and call 

witnesses? 19

Did the attitude and demeanor of Judge Hoffman and the government attorneys violate 

the defendants’ right to a fair trial? 20

Legal Arguments in Court, 21

The attorneys for the U.S. government, 21

The attorneys for the defendants, 21
The Chicago Seven: 1960s Radicalism in the Federal Courts

iv

Biographies, 23

The judges

Julius Jennings Hoffman, 23

William Joseph Campbell, 24

Edward T. Gignoux, 25

Walter Joseph Cummings, 27

Thomas Edward Fairchild, 27

Wilbur Frank Pell, Jr., 28

The defendants

Rennie Davis, 28

David Dellinger, 30

John Froines, 31

Tom Hayden, 32

Abbie Hoffman, 34

Jerry Rubin, 36

Bobby Seale, 37

Lee Weiner, 39

The attorneys

Thomas Foran, 40

William Kunstler, 41

Leonard Weinglass, 42

Mayor Richard J. Daley, 43

Media Coverage and Public Debates, 45

Historical Documents, 49

Testimony of Abbie Hoffman, 49

Testimony of Rennie Davis, 54

Assistant U.S. Attorney Richard Schultz, closing argument for the government, 55

Leonard Weinglass, closing argument for the defendants, 57

William Kunstler, closing argument for the defendants, 58

U.S. Attorney Thomas Foran, closing argument for the government, 59

Judge Hoffman, charge to the jury, 60

U. S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit, decision on the defendants’ appeal of the 

contempt convictions, 61

U. S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit, decision on the defendants’ appeal of the 

criminal convictions, 62

Judge Edward Gignoux, decision on the retrial of the contempt convictions—

comments on the proper conduct of a trial, 65
The Chicago Seven: 1960s Radicalism in the Federal Courts

v

Anti-Riot Act, 66

“The Strategy of Confrontation,” report of the Daley administration, 68

Walker Report summary, 69

The committee to defend the conspiracy, 70

Tom Wicker, “‘Other Thoughts’ in Chicago,” 72

Bibliography, 75
The Chicago Seven: 1960s Radicalism in the Federal Courts

1

The Chicago Conspiracy Trial: A Short 

Narrative 

The trial of political activists accused of inciting riots during the Democratic National 

Convention of 1968 attracted national attention and exposed the depths of political 

and cultural divisions at a crucial moment in the nation’s history. The trial of the 

“Chicago Seven” became a defining event in public debates about the Vietnam War, 

the student protest movement, and the fairness of the federal judicial process. 

The defendants and their lawyers used the courtroom as a platform for a broad 

critique of American society and an almost anarchic challenge to the legitimacy 

of governmental authority. The judge in the case displayed open contempt for the 

defendants, and his own unorthodox behavior threatened public confidence in the 

judiciary. The nearly five-month long trial illustrated the contentious and often 

theatrical nature of public affairs during the late 1960s and early 1970s.

Planning for the Democratic National Convention of 1968

In the fall of 1967, the Democratic Party decided to hold its 1968 national convention and the expected renomination of President Lyndon Johnson in Chicago. Mayor 

Richard Daley promised his city would be free of the civil disorders that had broken 

out in major cities in recent summers. By the summer of 1968, the prospects for a 

smooth convention had vanished. Johnson, in the face of growing protests against 

the Vietnam War and after assessing the surprising strength of Eugene McCarthy’s 

campaign for President, withdrew in March from the race for the nomination. The 

assassination of Martin Luther King in April provoked devastating urban riots in 

Chicago and other cities. The assassination of Robert Kennedy in June further shocked 

the nation and complicated the race for the Democratic nomination. The spring 

of 1968 had also brought the Tet offensive against American forces in Vietnam and 

unprecedented student protests on university campuses. By August, many Americans 

believed the nation was in the midst of a profound political and cultural crisis.

Organizing protests at the Democratic convention

In the fall of 1967, members of the National Mobilization Committee to End the 

War in Vietnam proposed a massive anti-war demonstration to coincide with the 

expected renomination of President Johnson in Chicago. The National Mobilization 

Committee was directed by David Dellinger, a long-time pacifist, who had organized 

the march on the Pentagon in October 1967. In early 1968, the National Mobilization 
The Chicago Seven: 1960s Radicalism in the Federal Courts

2

opened a Chicago offi ce directed by Rennie Davis and Tom Hayden, who were leading 

political organizers and former leaders of Students for a Democratic Society.

 A small group of cultural radicals, including Jerry Rubin, who helped Dellinger 

organize the march on the Pentagon, and Abbie Hoffman, an organizer of political 

theater events, planned a “Festival of Life” to counter the Democratic “Convention of 

Death.” Rubin and Hoffman dubbed themselves the Yippie movement, later explained 

as an acronym for the Youth International Party. They planned outdoor concerts, nonviolent self-defense classes, guerrilla theater, and a “nude-in” on a Chicago beach.

 In March, representatives of various left-wing and radical student groups met 

in Lake Villa, Illinois, to discuss coordination of the protests and demonstrations 

planned for the Democratic convention. Tom Hayden and Rennie Davis drafted a 

proposal for various protests of the Vietnam War and social injustice, culminating 

with a mock funeral march to the convention hall on the night Johnson was to be 

renominated. The Lake Villa proposal advised that “the campaign should not plan 

violence and disruption against the Democratic National Convention. It should be 

nonviolent and legal.” The National Mobilization Committee sought permits for 

the proposed march, and the Yippie leaders applied for permits to sleep in the city 

parks, but in negotiations that continued to the week of the convention, the Daley 

administration refused almost all permit requests.

Confrontations in Chicago

On the eve of the convention, Mayor Daley, citing intelligence reports of potential 

violence, put the 12,000 members of the Chicago Police Department on twelve-hour 

shifts and called for the governor to activate the National Guard. The U.S. Army placed 

6,000 troops in position to protect the city during the convention. Both the police 

and the demonstrators organized workshops for training in the event of violence. 

The estimated number of demonstrators who came to Chicago during convention 

week was about 10,000, dramatically less than earlier predictions, but the police were 

determined to present a show of force and to enforce the 11:00 p.m. curfew in the 

parks.

 Beginning on Sunday, August 25, the police and demonstrators clashed in city 

parks where many of the protests were staged and where visiting demonstrators 

hoped to sleep. For three nights, the aggressive police sweep through Lincoln Park 

was met with the demonstrators’ taunting and occasional rocks. With tear gas and 

clubbings, the police forced demonstrators out of the park and into commercial areas, 

where demonstrators smashed windows. Police repeatedly targeted journalists and 

destroyed their cameras. 

 Violence escalated on the afternoon of August 28, when police at the week’s largest rally charged through the crowd in Grant Park to prevent a man from lowering 

a U.S. fl ag. Many in the crowd met the police charge with a volley of rocks and im-
The Chicago Seven: 1960s Radicalism in the Federal Courts

3

provised missiles. After some measure of peace returned, David Dellinger attempted 

to negotiate a permit to march to the convention hall. When the city denied the 

permit and demonstrators attempted to regroup in front of one of the convention 

delegates’ hotels, police lost control of the crowd and violently attempted to clear a 

street intersection. Television cameras recorded indiscriminate police brutality while 

demonstrators chanted “The whole world is watching.” Inside the convention hall 

that night, Senator Abraham Ribicoff of Connecticut condemned the “Gestapo tactics on the streets of Chicago,” while Mayor Daley, in full view of television cameras, 

shouted obscenities and anti-Semitic slurs at the senator. Hubert Humphrey won 

the presidential nomination that night, but the nationally broadcast images of police 

violence and of Daley’s tirade became the lasting memories of the convention.

Investigating the violence

The violence surrounding one of the essential rites of American democracy deepened the widespread perception that the nation faced a political and cultural crisis 

in 1968. The city of Chicago, the U.S. Department of Justice, the House Committee 

on Un-American Activities, and the presidentially appointed National Commission 

on the Causes and Prevention of Violence all responded with investigations of the 

violence. Within days, the Daley administration issued the fi rst report, blaming the 

violence on “outside agitators,” described as “revolutionaries” who came to Chicago 

“for the avowed purpose of a hostile confrontation with law enforcement.” The chair 

of the House Un-American Activities subcommittee, Richard Ichord, suspected communist involvement in the demonstrations, but his hearings devolved into a bizarre 

preview of the conspiracy trial when a shirtless, barefooted Jerry Rubin burst into 

the hearing room with a bandolier of bullets and a toy gun. In December 1968, the 

report of the National Commission on the Causes and Prevention of Violence labeled 

the disturbances in Chicago a “police riot” and presented evidence of “unrestrained 

and indiscriminate police violence on many occasions.” The commission’s Walker 

Report, named after its chair Daniel Walker, acknowledged that demonstrators had 

provoked the police and responded with violence of their own, but it found that the 

“vast majority of the demonstrators were intent on expressing by peaceful means 

their dissent.”

 On September 9, 1968, three days after release of the Daley report, Chief Judge 

William J. Campbell of the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Illinois 

convened a grand jury to investigate whether the organizers of the demonstrations 

had violated federal law and whether any police offi cers had interfered with the civil 

rights of the protestors. The Department of Justice report, however, found no grounds 

for prosecution of demonstrators, and Attorney General Ramsey Clark asked the U.S. 

attorney in Chicago to investigate possible civil rights violations by Chicago police.
The Chicago Seven: 1960s Radicalism in the Federal Courts

4

Indictment

John Mitchell, the new U.S. Attorney General appointed by President Nixon following 

his inauguration in January 1969, worked with the U.S. attorney’s offi ce in Chicago 

to strengthen draft indictments of demonstrators, and Department of Justice offi -

cials asked U.S. Attorney Thomas Foran, a political ally of Mayor Daley, to remain in 

offi ce and direct the prosecution. On March 20, 1969, the grand jury indicted eight 

demonstrators and eight policemen. Seven policemen were charged with assaulting 

demonstrators and the eighth policeman was charged with perjury.

 The indicted demonstrators, soon known as the “Chicago Eight,” were charged 

with conspiring to use interstate commerce with intent to incite a riot. Six of the 

defendants—David Dellinger, Rennie Davis, Tom Hayden, Abbie Hoffman, Jerry 

Rubin, and Bobby Seale of the Black Panther Party—were also charged with crossing 

state lines with the intent to incite a riot. The other two defendants, academics John 

Froines and Lee Weiner, were charged with teaching demonstrators how to construct 

incendiary devices that would be used in civil disturbances. If convicted of all charges, 

each of the defendants faced up to ten years in prison. The case entered the court 

record as United States v. Dellinger et al. These were the fi rst prosecutions under the 

anti-riot provisions of the Civil Rights Act of 1968.

 It was an unlikely group to engage in conspiracy. Dellinger, at 54, had been active 

in pacifi st movements for years before the rise of the student protests of the 1960s. 

Hayden and Davis were skilled organizers with focused political goals, and they had 

never been interested in the street theater and cultural radicalism of Hoffman and 

Rubin. John Froines and Lee Weiner were only marginally involved in the planning 

for the demonstrations, and their participation during the convention differed little 

from that of hundreds of others. The unlikeliest conspirator was Bobby Seale, who 

had never met some of the defendants until they were together in the courtroom and 

who had appeared in Chicago briefl y for a couple of speeches during the convention. 

Seale was one of the founders of the Black Panther Party, which federal and state 

prosecutors had recently targeted in numerous prosecutions around the country.

 The eight were linked less by common action or common political goals than 

by a shared radical critique of U.S. government and society. Rennie Davis thought 

the government “lumped together all the strands of dissent in the sixties,” and Tom 

Hayden concluded that the government had “decided to put radicalism on trial.” On 

the witness stand, Abbie Hoffman dismissed the idea of any conspiracy among the 

eight defendants, adding, “we couldn’t even agree on lunch.” 

Judge and jury

The randomly assigned judge, Julius Jennings Hoffman, became as much of a symbol as any of the defendants. Judge Hoffman’s imperious manner and apparent bias 
The Chicago Seven: 1960s Radicalism in the Federal Courts

5

against the defendants infl amed tensions in what would have been a confrontational 

trial under any circumstances. At 73, Hoffman had been on the federal bench since 

his appointment by Eisenhower in 1953, and lawyers in Chicago described him as a 

judge who usually sided with the government attorneys. Judge Hoffman was proud 

of the effi ciency with which he managed cases, and from the fi rst encounters with the 

defense attorneys, he was determined to show that he would exercise strong control 

over the case. When four of the attorneys serving the defense during the pretrial proceedings withdrew from the case before the start of the trial, Hoffman held them in 

contempt, ordered their arrest, and had two of them jailed. A nationwide protest of 

prominent lawyers convinced Judge Hoffman to relent and accept the new defense 

team of William Kunstler and Leonard Weinglass. Throughout the trial, Kunstler and 

Weinglass aggressively challenged Judge Hoffman’s procedural rulings, which almost 

uniformly affi rmed the motions of the prosecution. 

 In his examination of prospective jurors, Hoffman ignored all but one of the 

questions submitted by the defense attorneys and never asked potential jurors about 

pretrial publicity or about their attitudes toward student radicals or the Vietnam War. 

The jury of ten women and two men was selected in a day. Within a week, Hoffman 

learned that the homes of two jurors had received identical letters saying that the 

Black Panthers were watching them. After one of those two jurors acknowledged 

that she could not be impartial in light of the threat, the judge replaced her with an 

alternate juror and sequestered the remaining jurors for the duration of the trial. 

Seale denied any Black Panther involvement with the letters.

A mistrial for Bobby Seale 

Confl ict over the defense attorneys reemerged when Bobby Seale refused to be represented by anyone other than Charles Garry, who originally agreed to represent 

the defendants but remained in California because of an illness. Judge Hoffman 

refused Seale’s subsequent request to represent himself, and Seale responded with a 

barrage of courtroom denunciations of the judge as a “pig,” a “fascist,” and a “racist.” When the prosecuting attorney accused Seale of encouraging Black Panthers 

in the courtroom to defend him, the proceedings degenerated into worse shouting 

matches. Seale condemned the judge for keeping a picture of the slave owner George 

Washington above the bench, and Hoffman then followed through on his repeated 

warning to restrain Seale. In what provided for many the indelible image of the trial, 

Judge Hoffman ordered U.S. marshals to bind and gag Seale before his appearances 

in the courtroom. Hoffman allowed Seale in court without restraints the following 

week, but when Seale argued for his right to cross-examine a witness, Judge Hoffman 

sentenced him to four years in prison for contempt of court and declared a mistrial 

in the prosecution of Seale. The Chicago Eight were now the Chicago Seven.
The Chicago Seven: 1960s Radicalism in the Federal Courts

6

The government’s case

Seale’s attempts to cross-examine witnesses came as the government presented its case 

against the defendants. Led by Thomas Foran and Assistant U.S. Attorney Richard 

Schultz, the government prosecutors relied primarily on the testimony of undercover 

policemen and informers. Police offi cer Robert Pierson described how he let his hair 

grow, rented a motorcycle, and dressed in biker clothes for convention week. He testifi ed that he heard Abbie Hoffman say that the demonstrators would break windows 

if the police pushed them out of Lincoln Park for a second night, and that Rubin, 

Seale, and Davis had urged crowds to resist the police or to employ violence. William 

Frapolly, another policeman, told the court how he enrolled in an Illinois college, 

grew sideburns and a goatee, and then joined Students for a Democratic Society, the 

National Mobilization Committee, and other peace groups. Frapolly testifi ed that 

he had attended various planning meetings and that he had heard nearly all of the 

defendants state their intention to incite confrontations with the police and to promote other civil disturbances. He also testifi ed that Wiener and Froines had openly 

discussed the use of incendiary devices and chemical bombs. The government called 

53 witnesses, most of whom recounted similar encounters with the defendants. 

The defense strategy

The defendants and their attorneys went well beyond the rebuttal of the criminal 

charges and sought to portray the proceedings as a political trial rather than a criminal prosecution. In their legal arguments, in their courtroom behavior, and in their 

numerous public appearances, they challenged the legitimacy of the court and the 

judge as well as the substance of the indictment. The trial became for the defense an 

opportunity to portray the dissent movement that had converged on Chicago for 

the Democratic Convention.

 The defense called more than 100 witnesses, many of them participants or bystanders in the clashes between the police and the demonstrators. The jury heard 

repeated testimony about unprovoked police violence and the extensive injuries 

among the demonstrators. Well-known writers and performers, including Allen 

Ginsberg, William Styron, Dick Gregory, Norman Mailer, Arlo Guthrie, and Judy 

Collins, testifi ed to the peaceful intent of the defendants. The judge denied the request to subpoena President Johnson. Mayor Daley appeared as a defense witness 

but said little as the judge upheld the government’s objection to most of the defense 

questions.

 Abbie Hoffman and Rennie Davis were the only defendants to testify. Abbie 

Hoffman described himself as a resident of the Woodstock Nation and an orphan 

of America, and he offered a lengthy narrative of his involvement in politics and the 

origins of the Yippie movement. Davis recounted his role in the organization of the 
The Chicago Seven: 1960s Radicalism in the Federal Courts

7

demonstrations and his encounters with the police during the convention. On crossexamination, the government attorneys attempted to establish that use of the words 

“revolution” and “battle” constituted incitements to riot, but the exchanges with the 

defendants made clear how diffi cult it was to connect demonstrators’ rhetoric with 

the violence in Chicago.

Procedural disputes

Much of the trial was consumed by arguments over procedure. Even before the trial 

started, Judge Hoffman granted only thirty days for pretrial motions rather than the 

six months requested by the defense. The judge denied the defense attorneys’ access 

to government evidence obtained without a warrant and barred the defense from 

submitting the Lake Villa document in which Hayden and Davis set out their nonviolent strategy. Judge Hoffman prohibited former Attorney General Ramsey Clark 

from testifying about his opposition to prosecution of demonstrators, and Hoffman 

sharply limited the defense lawyers’ ability to question Mayor Daley. Frequently the 

trial was interrupted by arguments over seemingly petty questions: Could the defendants distribute birthday cake in the courtroom? Could the defendants use the 

public restrooms, or should they be limited to the facilities in the holding rooms? 

Could the musician witnesses sing the songs they performed at demonstrations, or 

was the judge correct in insisting that they recite lyrics? 

Court theater

For the public that followed the trial in the daily media, the substantive arguments and 

procedural questions were overshadowed by the intentionally subversive behavior of 

the defendants and the high-handed dramatics of the judge. Jerry Rubin pleaded not 

guilty with a raised fi st. When introduced to the jury, Abbie Hoffman blew them a 

kiss (and Judge Hoffman ordered them to “disregard that kiss”). The defendants often 

refused to rise when so instructed. On the day of the Moratorium to End the War in 

Vietnam, the defendants draped a Viet Cong fl ag over the defense table. Throughout 

the trial various defendants called out obscenities and labeled the judge and prosecutors liars or Gestapo offi cers. In the most theatrical display of contempt for judicial 

authority, Abbie Hoffman and Jerry Rubin entered the courtroom in judicial robes 

and then fl ung them to the fl oor and stomped on them. 

 Judge Hoffman was all too easily provoked by the antics of the defendants, and his 

own instinct for the theatrical added to the carnival atmosphere. By all accounts, his 

exaggerated reading of the indictment left the jury with no doubt about his opinion of 

the defendants’ guilt. He returned the defendants’ name calling and publicly referred 

to Weinglass as a “wild man.” Reporters described his “mimicking” voice as he read 

the Seale contempt convictions. Judge Hoffman defended himself against personal 
The Chicago Seven: 1960s Radicalism in the Federal Courts

8

insults from the defendants, such as when he answered Seale’s cry of “racist!” with 

an account of his pro-civil rights decisions. The defendants believed Judge Hoffman 

intentionally mispronounced their names, such as when he repeatedly called Dellinger “Dillinger.”

Contempt and a verdict

For all the apparent anarchy in courtroom, Judge Hoffman issued no contempt orders 

until the argument phase closed. Then, while the jury deliberated, the judge cited 

the defendants and their lawyers for 159 counts of criminal contempt and sentenced 

them to prison terms ranging from less than three months for Lee Weiner to more 

than four years for Kunstler. Some of the convictions were for courtroom outbursts 

and profanities, many were for laughter, and others were based on the refusal of 

a defendant to rise as the judge entered or left the courtroom. The lawyers’ were 

repeatedly convicted of contempt for persisting in offering motions or challenging 

a ruling of the judge. The disparities in the sentences surprised many courtroom 

observers. Abbie Hoffman received a much shorter sentence for the cited instances 

of sarcasm and personal insults than Tom Hayden received for his challenges to the 

judge’s procedural decisions.

 After fi ve days of deliberation, the jury on February 19 acquitted all seven defendants of conspiracy and acquitted Froines and Weiner on all charges. The jury found 

the fi ve defendants (other than Froines and Weiner) guilty of traveling between states 

with the intent to incite a riot. Judge Hoffman imposed the maximum sentence of 

fi ve years in prison on each of the defendants found guilty.

 In a separate proceeding in the Northern District of Illinois, a jury acquitted 

seven of the eight indicted policemen. The case against the eighth was dropped.

Appeals 

The defendants and their attorneys appealed to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 

Seventh Circuit for a reversal of the criminal convictions and the contempt citations. 

They argued that the anti-riot provisions of the Civil Rights Act were unconstitutional, 

that Judge Hoffman’s prejudice against the defendants made a fair trial impossible, 

that they had been denied the right to present a full defense and that they had been 

denied the right to an impartial jury. They argued that the judge should not have 

waited until the end of the trial to issue contempt orders and that the conduct cited 

did not legally constitute contempt. They also argued that the excessive sentences 

for contempt violated the requirement for a jury trial in any proceeding resulting in 

greater than six months imprisonment.

 On November 21, 1972, an appeals court panel of Judges Thomas E. Fairchild, 

Wilbur J. Pell, and Walter J. Cummings unanimously overturned the defendants’ 
The Chicago Seven: 1960s Radicalism in the Federal Courts

9

criminal convictions. The court of appeals found that Judge Hoffman had erred in 

not asking potential jurors about political and cultural attitudes or about exposure to 

pretrial publicity, that he had improperly excluded evidence and testimony, and that 

his failure to notify the defense of his communications with the jury was ground for 

reversal. In unsparing language, the court of appeals censured Judge Hoffman and 

the government attorneys for their open hostility toward the defendants and their 

failure to fulfi ll “the standards of our system of justice.” Their demeanor alone, the 

court concluded, was suffi cient reason to reverse the conviction. The reversal left 

open the government’s option of retrying each of the defendants individually, and 

the court of appeals reviewed the evidence that it believed a jury might fi nd suffi cient 

for conviction. In January 1973, the U.S. Department of Justice announced that it 

would not pursue any further prosecution. Only Judge Pell found the Anti-Riot Act 

to be unconstitutional, so that statute stood. 

 On May 11, 1972, in a separate proceeding, the same panel of judges on the 

court of appeals had declared some of the contempt charges against the lawyers to 

be legally insuffi cient, and the court reversed all other contempt convictions, which 

were remanded for retrial before another judge. Judge Edward T. Gignoux, of the 

U.S. District Court for Maine, was assigned by Chief Justice Warren Burger to preside 

at the retrial that began in October 1973. The government reduced the number of 

contempt charges and thereby avoided the requirement of the court of appeals that 

any defendant subject to more than six months’ imprisonment be tried before a jury. 

Gignoux convicted Dellinger, Hoffman, Rubin, and Kunstler of a total of thirteen 

contempt charges, but the judge rejected the U.S. attorney’s argument that “substantial 

jail sentences” were necessary to protect the judicial process and deter others of such 

misbehavior. Gignoux thought that the behavior of the defendants and their lawyers 

could not be considered “apart from the conduct of the trial judge and prosecutors. 

Each reacted to provocation by the other, and the tensions generated during four and 

a half months of so acrimonious a trial cannot be ignored.” He was satisfi ed that the 

judgment alone preserved the integrity of the trial process.

Legacy

The judicial rebuke of Judge Hoffman prompted only minor notice in the national 

media that had so closely followed the trial. In many ways the cultural and political 

moment that defi ned the trial had passed by the fall of 1972. Even the judges of the 

U.S. court of appeals felt the need to remind readers of their opinion of how divided 

the country had been in 1968. The killings at Kent State University in May 1970 had 

changed forever the youth protest movement, which lost much of its political focus. Left-wing political groups like the Students for a Democratic Society had since 

splintered, leaving older leaders like Tom Hayden permanently alienated from the 

increasingly violent agenda of groups like the Weather Underground. The federal 
The Chicago Seven: 1960s Radicalism in the Federal Courts

10

government again relied on the Anti-Riot Act to bring charges against anti-war protestors at the Mayday demonstration in 1971, when Abbie Hoffman, John Froines, and 

Rennie Davis were among those arrested, but the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District 

of Columbia Circuit blocked most of the prosecutions, and the same court in 1973 

found that the mass arrests of nearly 8,000 demonstrators had violated the Fourth 

Amendment of the Constitution. The Chicago trial had established no precedent 

for use of the Anti-Riot Act against political demonstrators. The trial of the Chicago 

Seven lived on less as a legal milestone than as a cultural marker of dissident youth 

culture in the 1960s and the political divisions surrounding the Vietnam War. 
The Chicago Seven: 1960s Radicalism in the Federal Courts

11

The Judicial Process: A Chronology

September 9, 1968

Grand jury convened in the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Illinois 

to investigate whether any demonstrators violated federal law and whether Chicago 

police offi cers violated the civil rights of demonstrators.

March 20, 1969

Grand jury in the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Illinois indicted 

eight persons on charges of conspiracy to travel in interstate commerce with the intent 

to incite riots in Chicago. Six of the defendants were indicted on individual charges 

of traveling in interstate commerce with the intent to incite a riot, in violation of the 

Anti-Riot Act. On the same day, the grand jury indicted seven Chicago police offi cers 

on charges of depriving individuals of their civil rights and an eighth police offi cer 

of perjury before the grand jury.

April 9, 1969

Defendants in the conspiracy case were arraigned in the district court and pleaded 

not guilty.

September 24, 1969

Start of the conspiracy trial.

November 5, 1969

Judge Julius Hoffman declared a mistrial in the prosecution of Bobby Seale and severed his case from the remaining seven defendants. Hoffman also convicted Seale on 

sixteen counts of contempt and sentenced him to four years in prison. 

February 14, 1970

Judge Julius Hoffman convicted the seven defendants and their two attorneys of a 

total of 159 charges of criminal contempt for behavior throughout the trial.

February 19, 1970

The jury acquitted all defendants of the conspiracy charge and defendants Froines 

and Wiener of all charges. The jury found the other fi ve defendants guilty of violating the Anti-Riot Act.
The Chicago Seven: 1960s Radicalism in the Federal Courts

12

May 11, 1972

The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reversed most of the contempt 

convictions, dismissed others, and remanded the remaining contempt charges for 

retrial by another judge in the district court. On the same day, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit, in a separate opinion, dismissed four counts of contempt 

against Bobby Seale and remanded the remaining twelve contempt specifi cations 

against Seale for retrial by another judge.

November 21, 1972

The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reversed the convictions of the fi ve 

defendants on the charge of intent to incite a riot, and the court of appeals remanded 

the cases to the district court for retrial at the discretion of the government.

January 4, 1973

Attorney General Richard Kleindienst announced that the government would not 

retry any of the defendants on the charge of intent to incite a riot.

December 6, 1973

Edward Gignoux, sitting by assignment in the District Court for the Northern District of Illinois at the retrial of the contempt charges, dismissed all contempt charges 

against two of the defendants and attorney Leonard Weinglass, and convicted three of 

the defendants and attorney William Kunstler of a total of thirteen contempt charges. 

Gignoux did not impose any further jail sentence.

.
The Chicago Seven: 1960s Radicalism in the Federal Courts

13

The Federal Courts and Their Jurisdiction

U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Illinois

The Chicago Eight, later Seven, were indicted in the U.S. District Court for the 

Northern District of Illinois on charges of conspiracy to incite riots and on individual 

charges of intent to incite riots or to promote the use of incendiary devices. The court’s 

chief judge, William Campbell, presided over the grand jury investigation. Campbell 

was randomly selected as the trial judge following the grand jury’s indictment, but he 

recused himself because of his familiarity with the evidence presented to the grand 

jury. Then Judge Julius Hoffman was randomly selected to preside over the trial.

 When the defendants appealed their convictions on criminal contempt, all of the 

district court’s active judges, except for Judge Hoffman, petitioned the U.S. Court of 

Appeals for the Seventh Circuit for permission to fi le a brief supporting the broad 

authority and discretion of a trial judge to punish contempt. The court of appeals 

denied permission, saying that it would be almost impossible for the district judges 

to avoid the appearance of supporting one side in the dispute over Judge Hoffman’s 

contempt charges. More than two years later, the U.S. court of appeals reversed the 

contempt convictions and remanded them for retrial by another judge in the district 

court. At the request of the chief judge of the court of appeals, Chief Justice Warren 

Burger designated Judge Edward Gignoux, of the U.S. District Court of Maine, to 

serve on temporary assignment as the judge of the retrial of the contempt charges. 

Gignoux presided over the trial that ended on December 6, 1973, with the conviction 

of three defendants and one of their attorneys on thirteen counts of contempt.

 The district courts were established by the Congress in the Judiciary Act of 1789, 

and they serve as the trial courts in each of the judicial districts of the federal judiciary. 

The U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Illinois was established in 1855, 

when Congress divided Illinois into two judicial districts. Illinois was subsequently 

divided into three judicial districts, but the Northern District has always included 

Chicago. The court’s jurisdiction over the Chicago conspiracy trial was based on 

federal laws making it a crime to travel across state lines with the intent to incite riots 

and on laws making it a crime to demonstrate the use or manufacture of explosives 

that might be used to disrupt commerce.

U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit

The fi ve defendants found guilty in the Chicago conspiracy trial appealed their convictions to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit. All seven defendants 

and their two attorneys also appealed their contempt convictions to the same court. 
The Chicago Seven: 1960s Radicalism in the Federal Courts

14

A panel of three judges, Walter Cummings, Thomas Fairchild, and Wilbur Pell, 

heard arguments in both appeals. On May 11, 1972, in an opinion written by Judge 

Cummings, the panel reversed the contempt convictions of all of the defendants 

and remanded the contempt charges to the district court for retrial. The panel dismissed some of the contempt convictions of attorneys Kunstler and Weinglass and 

reversed the attorneys’ other convictions, which were also remanded to the district 

court. On November 21, 1972, in an opinion written by Judge Fairchild, the panel 

reversed the convictions on the charge of violating the Anti-Riot Act and remanded 

the individual cases to the district court for retrial at the discretion of the government 

attorneys. By a 2–1 vote, the court upheld the constitutionality of the Anti-Riot Act, 

and Judge Pell wrote a dissenting opinion explaining why he thought the act was 

unconstitutional.

 The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit heard various other cases related 

to the conspiracy trial. In the fall of 1969, the court of appeals upheld a district judge’s 

decision rejecting the National Mobilization Committee’s motion for a court order 

halting the grand jury investigation of the demonstrators and for an order declaring 

the Anti-Riot Act unconstitutional. In May 1972, the court of appeals dismissed four 

of Bobby Seale’s contempt convictions, reversed the other twelve, and remanded the 

remaining charges to the district court for retrial before another judge. The court of 

appeals rejected the appeal of the three defendants and attorney William Kunstler, 

who had been found guilty of contempt in the retrial conducted by Judge Gignoux. 

In 1981, following release of information about private communications between 

Judge Hoffman and the U.S. attorney during the original trial, the court of appeals 

upheld Judge Gignoux’s decision not to reverse the contempt convictions. 

 The U.S. courts of appeals were established by the Congress in 1891. A court of 

appeals in each of the regional judicial circuits was established to hear appeals from 

the federal trial courts, and the decisions of the courts of appeals are fi nal in many 

categories of cases. The Seventh Circuit consists of Illinois, Indiana, and Wisconsin, 

and the Seventh Circuit court of appeals has always met in Chicago. 
The Chicago Seven: 1960s Radicalism in the Federal Courts

15

Legal Questions Before the Federal Courts

1. Were the seven defendants guilty of engaging in a 

conspiracy to incite a riot?

No, said the jury in the district court trial.

 The indictment described a conspiracy of the eight defendants, eighteen unindicted coconspirators, and other unknown persons, who traveled in interstate commerce with the intent to incite a riot and to commit overt acts to promote and carry 

out the riot, all in violation of a recent statute passed by Congress in response to the 

urban riots of the mid-1960s. The defendants were also accused of conspiring to 

teach the manufacture and use of incendiary devices and to interfere with the offi cial 

duties of fi remen and law enforcement offi cers. The indictment specifi ed meetings at 

which various defendants planned the demonstrations and confrontations with law 

enforcement offi cers. The indictment also listed speeches and meetings that allegedly 

constituted the overt acts required for conviction under the Anti-Riot Act.

 The government prosecutors argued that the defendants shared a “tacit understanding” of their common goal of provoking a riot, although the eight never met as 

one group. The defense attorneys described the conspiracy charge as absurd on the 

face of it, and directed most of their arguments to disproving the charges of intent 

to incite a riot. 

2. Did the defendants violate the Anti-Riot Act by using 

interstate commerce with the intent to incite a riot and by 

committing at least one overt act to promote a riot?

The jury found fi ve defendants guilty of the charge. The U.S. court of appeals reversed that decision because of errors by the trial judge but found that some of the 

evidence might be suffi cient for conviction if the government chose to retry the fi ve 

persons in individual trials.

 The indictment charged David Dellinger, Rennie Davis, Tom Hayden, Abbie Hoffman, Jerry Rubin, and Bobby Seale with individual violations of the Anti-Riot Act. 

The indictment specifi ed evidence of intent prior to interstate travel and evidence of 

overt acts by which each of the six defendants incited a riot during the convention 

week in Chicago. Seale’s case was separated from the others by Judge Hoffman, and 

the remaining fi ve defendants charged with intent to incite a riot were found guilty 

by the jury.
The Chicago Seven: 1960s Radicalism in the Federal Courts

16

 The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reversed the convictions, but 

concluded that the evidence presented for each defendant might reasonably be interpreted by a jury as proof of guilt. In their detailed review of the evidence against 

each defendant, the three judges who heard the appeal found that the evidence of 

overt acts of inciting a riot was clearer than the evidence of an earlier intent to incite 

a riot. One of the judges did not fi nd any reasonable evidence of earlier intent in 

the case of Dellinger. The court of appeals judges did not conclude that any of the 

defendants was guilty, only that a jury might determine guilt or innocence based on 

the evidence presented at the original trial.

 The court of appeals left for the government the option to retry any or all of the 

defendants, but the court commented on several issues that were likely to arise in a 

new trial. The court of appeals dismissed the defendants’ claim that the testimony 

of undercover policemen violated their constitutional rights, and it denied that defendants had a right to address the jury. In a decision that may have convinced the 

government not to retry, the court of appeals, citing a recent Supreme Court decision, 

said that in any further proceedings, the defendants had a right to review logs of the 

government’s electronic surveillance of them and a right to a hearing to determine if 

evidence obtained through that surveillance violated the defendants’ constitutional 

rights. 

 On January 4, 1973, Attorney General Richard Kleindienst announced that the 

government would not retry any of the defendants on the charge of intent to incite 

a riot.

3. Were John Froines and Lee Weiner guilty of instructing 

demonstrators in the manufacture and use of incendiary 

devices?

No, the jury found Froines and Weiner not guilty of the charge.

 The indictment charged Froines and Weiner with teaching people how to make 

and use an incendiary device and with the intent to incite civil disorder and to disrupt 

interstate commerce through the use of such devices. The U.S. attorneys called on 

undercover policemen for testimony that Froines and Weiner had discussed plans to 

use fl ares as weapons, to purchase chemicals for stink bombs, and to make Molotov 

cocktails for fi rebombing the parking garage under Grant Park. On cross-examination, the principal government witness admitted that he heard Froines say he didn’t 

know how to make a Molotov cocktail. In their closing arguments, both defense attorneys challenged the credibility of the testimony about the Grant Park garage and 

emphasized that police never found any physical evidence of fi rebombs or materials 

to be used in the manufacture of bombs.
The Chicago Seven: 1960s Radicalism in the Federal Courts

17

4. Was the Anti-Riot Act of 1968 unconstitutional? 

No, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit, in a 2–1 decision, decided that 

the act did not violate the Constitution.

 In their appeal, the defendants challenged the constitutionality of the Anti-Riot 

Act under which they had been convicted. Judges Thomas Fairchild and Walter Cummings found that the act was not so vague or so broad as to be unconstitutional, 

although they found that the case raised diffi cult questions. The judges were satisfi ed 

that the act required a suffi ciently close relationship between speech and action that 

demonstrated intent to incite a riot. The act’s requirement of “an overt act” in support of inciting a riot was enough to prevent the act from suppressing or “chilling” 

speech protected by the Constitution.

 Judge Wilbur Pell dissented from the majority opinion, and wrote that the AntiRiot Act was an unconstitutional restriction on free speech. Pell, a recent Nixon appointee, found that the act did not distinguish between speech that advocated violence 

and speech that was directly related to the incitement of violence. The advocacy of 

“an idea or expression of belief” could not be limited under the Constitution. 

 In the fall of 1968, lawyers for the National Mobilization Committee had challenged the constitutionality of the Anti-Riot Act in their suit asking for a court order 

to halt the grand jury inquiry into the demonstrations. On November 1, 1968, Judge 

Abraham Marovitz of the district court for the Northern District of Illinois dismissed 

the suit, and the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit agreed that the challenge to the statute did not raise suffi cient constitutional questions.

5. Were the defendants and their attorneys guilty of 

criminal contempt? 

Judge Hoffman convicted the seven defendants and their two attorneys of 157 counts 

of criminal contempt. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit dismissed 

some of the charges against the attorneys and reversed all other convictions, which 

the appellate court sent back to the district court for retrial before a different judge. 

In the new trial, Judge Edward Gignoux found three of the defendants and one of 

their attorneys guilty of a combined total of thirteen contempts.

 The U.S. court of appeals reversed all of the defendants’ contempt convictions 

and remanded them to the district court for retrial. The court of appeals dismissed 

some of the contempt convictions of attorneys Kunstler and Weinglass because their 

actions involved legitimate efforts to defend their clients; the remaining attorney 

convictions were remanded for new trials. The court of appeals also ruled that any 

defendant subject to more than six months’ imprisonment on the contempt charges 

would be entitled to a trial by jury.
The Chicago Seven: 1960s Radicalism in the Federal Courts

18

 The court of appeals cited recent Supreme Court decisions that restricted a 

district judge’s authority to issue contempt convictions at the conclusion of a trial 

if the allegedly contemptuous behavior involved personal insults that would likely 

create bias in the judge. By the time of the hearings on the Chicago Seven appeals, the 

government attorneys conceded that the defendants’ convictions should be retried 

before another judge in the district court, and the government’s decision to drop 

many of the charges eliminated the need for any jury trials.

 Judge Edward Gignoux presided over the retrial of the fi fty-two remaining contempt charges. Gignoux quickly dismissed two charges and acquitted the defendants 

of twenty-four others, including all of those pending against John Froines and Lee 

Weiner. Following a trial of more than four weeks, Gignoux’s decision on the remaining specifi cations rested on the criteria that the court of appeals had prescribed 

for determining guilt: the contemptuous behavior must have occurred in the court 

or close enough to obstruct the proceedings; the conduct must have violated the 

expected behavior in a courtroom; the individual must have intended to disrupt 

the court proceedings; and the conduct must have resulted in an obstruction of the 

courtroom.

 Gignoux found David Dellinger guilty of seven contempt charges, most involving repeated insults directed at the judge while the jury was present. Jerry Rubin and 

Abbie Hoffman were found guilty of two charges each, including their appearance 

in the courtroom in judicial robes. William Kunstler was guilty of two contempt 

charges for extended attacks on the judge that resulted in a signifi cant disruption in 

the courtroom. Gignoux imposed no jail time for any of the contempt convictions.

6. Did the jury selection process protect the defendants’ 

right to a fair trial?

No. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit found that the district judge 

was in error for failing to ask potential jurors about their exposure to pretrial publicity. 

The court of appeals also found that the district judge should have asked potential 

jurors about their attitudes toward the Vietnam War, the counterculture, and the 

Chicago police.

 The defendants claimed that the “perfunctory” jury selection, completed in one 

day, did not solicit the information necessary to make reasoned challenges to jurors. 

Judge Hoffman asked the defense to submit questions for jurors, but he asked jurors 

only one question from the defense list. The defense submitted many questions about 

attitudes toward the Vietnam War, student dissent, and hippie culture. The defense 

also suggested that the judge ask if the potential jurors knew who Janis Joplin and Jimi 

Hendrix were, if their daughters wore “brassieres all the time,” and if they considered 

“marihuana habit-forming.” The court of appeals considered some of the defense 

questions “inappropriate,” but the court also said that public opinion at the time of 
The Chicago Seven: 1960s Radicalism in the Federal Courts

19

the trial was so divided over the Vietnam War and the rise of the counterculture that 

the judge had an obligation to ask jurors about their views. “We do not believe that 

a prospective juror is so alert to his own prejudices,” that the district court can rely 

on a general question about the ability to be fair. The defense must be able to ask 

specifi c questions about potential prejudices of a juror. The court of appeals decision said that in a case with “widespread publicity about highly dramatic events,” the 

district judge must ask about the impact of pretrial publicity even if, as in this trial, 

the defense had not raised the issue during the selection of the jury. 

 The court of appeals did not accept the defendants’ other argument that the reliance on voter lists for the selection of grand jury members created a biased grand jury. 

The court found that the reliance on voter lists underrepresented young people, but 

that the age imbalance was not so pronounced as to produce a biased grand jury.

7. Did Judge Hoffman unfairly restrict the defense’s right 

to submit evidence and call witnesses?

Yes. The U.S. court of appeals determined that Judge Hoffman had erred in his decision to exclude certain evidence and witnesses for the defense.

 The defense attorneys asked to submit various documents as evidence of their 

claim that the defendants had always intended to engage in peaceful demonstrations 

at the Democratic National Convention. Judge Hoffman excluded these memos and 

magazine interviews on the grounds that they were self-serving declarations of the 

defendants. The court of appeals rejected any blanket rule excluding allegedly selfserving evidence. According to the court of appeals, that standard for evidence was 

rooted in the long-abandoned rule that defendants in criminal trials could not testify 

on their own behalf. The court of appeals called special attention to the Lake Villa 

document drafted by Tom Hayden and Rennie Davis for an organizational meeting 

in March 1968. It was up to the jury, not the judge, to determine if the Lake Villa 

policy of nonviolence represented the intentions of the organizers.

 The court of appeals also found that Judge Hoffman was wrong to sustain the 

prosecutors’ objection to all expert witnesses called by the defense. The court of 

appeals supported a trial judge’s broad discretion in determining the suitability of 

witnesses, but Hoffman had been mistaken to exclude the witnesses called to testify 

about crowd control and law enforcement. The court of appeals determined that 

these witnesses might have helped the jury assess the defense allegation that police 

had provoked the violence. The court of appeals upheld Judge Hoffman’s decision 

to exclude expert witnesses who would have testifi ed about racism and social injustice.

 The court of appeals found that Judge Hoffman should have allowed former 

Attorney General Ramsey Clark to testify before the jury. Clark’s testimony about a 

phone call to Mayor Daley in support of permits for the demonstrators would have 
The Chicago Seven: 1960s Radicalism in the Federal Courts

20

provided important perspective on the defense claim that the defendants sincerely 

tried to obtain legal permits. 

8. Did the attitude and demeanor of Judge Hoffman and 

the government attorneys violate the defendants’ right to a 

fair trial?

Yes. The U.S. Court of Appeals of the Seventh Circuit found that the demeanor of 

the judge and the government attorneys was suffi cient reason to reverse the convictions.

 The court of appeals found that from the opening of the trial, the district judge 

made clear his “deprecatory and often antagonistic attitude toward the defense.” 

Judge Hoffman had consistently made sarcastic and gratuitous criticisms of the 

defense attorneys. The appeals court was especially disturbed that Judge Hoffman 

had denigrated the defense’s key argument that the Daley administration and the 

Chicago police deliberately provoked the demonstrators. Judge Hoffman’s most serious offense, according to the court of appeals, was to make these caustic remarks in 

front of the jury.

 On procedural questions, Judge Hoffman consistently ruled against the defense, 

and he failed to restrain the U.S. attorney’s personal attacks on the defendants. The 

court of appeals considered U.S. Attorney Thomas Foran’s closing arguments, with 

their emphasis on dress and appearance and references to “evil men” and “violent 

anarchists,” beyond all standards of acceptable behavior. The court of appeals acknowledged the disruptive behavior of the defendants, but that behavior did not 

justify a disregard of “the high standards for the conduct of judges and prosecutors.” 

“A defendant ought not to be rewarded for success in baiting the judge and the prosecutor.”
The Chicago Seven: 1960s Radicalism in the Federal Courts

21

Legal Arguments in Court

The attorneys for the U.S. government

U.S. Attorney Thomas Foran and Assistant U.S. Attorney Richard Schultz argued 

that:

1. The seven (originally eight) defendants conspired to provoke government violence 

against the demonstrators at the Democratic National Convention in Chicago. 

The prosecutors acknowledged that the defendants had never met as a group, 

but seven had met in smaller groups to devise their strategy and to coordinate 

demonstrators’ resistance to the police. The testimony of government witnesses 

established a “tacit understanding” among the defendants and a mutual understanding of the goals of the conspiracy.

2. The defendants intended to incite violence by attracting to Chicago very large 

crowds to participate in ostensibly peaceful protests of the Vietnam War and social 

injustice. The defendants incited the demonstrators against the police, the National Guard, and the Army, and the defendants orchestrated confrontations with 

the intent of provoking law enforcement offi cers to respond with violence.

3. The defendants privately and in small gatherings, before and during the week 

of the convention, described their goals of disruption and confrontation, and 

their goal of inciting not only riots in Chicago, but a popular uprising against 

the government. The government attorneys cited the defendants’ rhetoric about 

hoping to “smash the city,” bringing “the United States military machinery to a 

halt,” and creating the “fi rst steps towards the revolution” as proof that the seven 

organizers jointly planned to incite violence in Chicago during the Democratic 

Convention.

4. At least six of the original defendants crossed state lines with the intent to incite 

violence and thus violated the anti-riot provisions of the Civil Rights Act of 

1968.

5. Froines and Weiner discussed the manufacture and possible uses of incendiary 

devices during the convention.

The attorneys for the defendants

William Kunstler and Leonard Weinglass, attorneys for the seven defendants, rejected a strategy that focused closely on disproving the charges in the indictment. 

Rather, they emphasized that this was, in their view, more of a political trial than a 

criminal prosecution. The defense called many witnesses to rebut the testimony of 
The Chicago Seven: 1960s Radicalism in the Federal Courts

22

the undercover police, but their goal was always to establish the peaceable intent of 

the defendants and to expose the political motivation of the prosecution. In their 

opening and closing arguments, the defense attorneys argued that:

1. The U.S. and Chicago governments engaged in a conspiracy to prevent demonstrations against the Vietnam War and related issues. Kunstler argued that “the 

police of this city embarked on an organized conspiracy of berserk brutal action 

against these demonstrators.” 

2. The prosecution witnesses, who were almost all government employees or informants paid by the government, could not offer impartial or credible testimony. 

The defense asked the jury to consider why the government had called no bystanders as witnesses of the violence during the convention.

3. The indictment, and particularly the conspiracy charge, was on the face of it 

absurd. The charges in the indictment implied that seven veterans of the peace 

movement suddenly rejected their long-standing beliefs and embraced a violent 

strategy sure to result in their imprisonment.

4. A large number of witnesses, including prominent politicians and entertainers 

who performed at the protest rallies, testifi ed that they had heard no incitements 

to violence during the planning and staging of rallies surrounding the convention; nor had they witnessed any diversionary tactics designed to provoke police 

violence.

5. The indictment represented an assault on First Amendment rights. With their 

frequent reference to the American Revolution and the Founders, the defense 

attorneys placed the defendants’ activities in Chicago in an American tradition 

of popular defense of liberties.
The Chicago Seven: 1960s Radicalism in the Federal Courts

23

Biographies

The judges

Julius Jennings Hoffman (1895–1983)

Presiding judge at the Chicago conspiracy 

trial 

Judge Julius Hoffman earned as much notoriety for his management of the Chicago 

conspiracy case as the defendants did for 

their disruptive behavior. Hoffman was 

born in Chicago and received his law degree 

from Northwestern University. He entered 

private practice in Chicago in 1915 and 

served as general counsel of the Brunswick-Balke-Collender Company (later the 

Brunswick Corporation) from 1936–1944. 

Hoffman was elected judge of the Cook 

County Superior Court in 1947 and was 

nominated in 1953 by President Eisenhower to the U.S. District Court for the 

Northern District of Illinois. By the time 

of the Chicago conspiracy trial, Hoffman 

was known for his effi cient courtroom. 

Hoffman was randomly assigned to the 

case after Chief Judge William Campbell 

recused himself because of his exposure to 

the evidence presented to the grand jury investigation over which he presided.

 As the trial progressed, Hoffman was unrelenting in his opposition to the defense 

and in his support for the government attorneys. He rejected the defense motion 

requesting six months for the preparation of pretrial motions, and he accepted the 

prosecutions’ recommendation of one month; he ordered the arrest of attorneys who 

assisted in the pre-trial proceedings but who withdrew before the start of the trial; 

he refused to incorporate all but one of the questions submitted by the defense for 

prospective jurors; he disregarded Bobby Seale’s repeated complaints that he was not 

being represented by an attorney of his own choice; he rejected crucial evidence of the 

defendants’ intent, and he barred witnesses, like Ramsey Clark, who were prepared 

Judge Julius J. Hoffman

Courtesy of Bettman/Corbis.
The Chicago Seven: 1960s Radicalism in the Federal Courts

24

to testify to the defendants’ intent to abide by the law; he failed to reveal to the defense his communications with the jury as it deliberated; and he delayed issuing any 

contempt citations until completion of the trial. Many of Judge Hoffman’s individual 

rulings were well within the authority of a district judge, but the cumulative impact, 

combined with his undisguised disdain for the defendants and their attorneys, set 

him up for an unusually personal censure from the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 

Seventh Circuit. That court, in an opinion written by Judge Thomas Fairchild and 

reversing the criminal convictions, found that “the district judge’s deprecatory and 

often antagonistic attitude toward the defense is evident in the record from the very 

beginning.” Judge Hoffman’s order that Seale be bound and gagged brought even 

greater condemnation from the press and Judge Edward Gignoux, who described 

the incident as an “appalling spectacle.”

 Judge Hoffman was not without supporters. On the day after he convicted Bobby 

Seale of contempt, Judge Hoffman entered the dining room of a private club for 

his daily lunch and received a standing ovation from the other guests. When the 

defendants appealed their contempt convictions, Judge Hoffman’s colleagues on the 

district court tried to submit a brief in support of his authority to issue the criminal 

contempt convictions. During the course of the trial, Judge Hoffman received hundreds of supportive letters from the public. The defendants themselves had mixed 

feelings about Judge Hoffman, despite their angry, profanity-laden confrontations 

with him in court, and some later acknowledged that he often made them laugh.

 After the close of the trial, Judge Hoffman left for his home in Florida, but he was 

soon invited by President Nixon to attend the national prayer breakfast at the White 

House, and the Gridiron Club honored Hoffman at its annual dinner in Washington. 

He assumed a reduced caseload in 1972, and served on the court until his death. In 

an interview in 1982, Judge Hoffman said “I did nothing in that trial I am not proud 

of, I presided with dignity. When I felt I had to be fi rm, I was fi rm.”

William Joseph Campbell (1905–1988)

Chief judge of the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Illinois

On September 9, 1968, three days after the Daley administration released its report 

blaming the violence at the Democratic National Convention on outside agitators, 

Chief Judge William Campbell of the Northern District of Illinois convened a grand 

jury to investigate the demonstrators’ possible violation of the federal anti-riot law 

and the police’s possible infringement of civil rights. During the convention, Campbell 

had refused to restrain the police from interfering with reporters. Following release 

of the Walker Report that attributed much of the violence to the police, Campbell 

publicly questioned the motivation for release of the report before it was presented 

to the grand jury, and he suggested that the grand jury might investigate whether 
The Chicago Seven: 1960s Radicalism in the Federal Courts

25

the release of the report was an attempt to infl uence the same grand 

jury’s investigation of the convention violence. After the grand jury 

indicted eight demonstrators and 

eight policemen, the court’s random 

assignment procedure originally 

selected Campbell as the judge for 

the trial of the eight defendants, but 

Campbell recused himself because 

of his detailed knowledge of the 

evidence presented to the grand jury. 

As chief judge of the court during 

the conspiracy trial, Campbell had 

authority over the rules regulating 

media access, and he prohibited 

cameras and sound equipment from 

public areas of the courthouse.

 Campbell was appointed to the 

U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Illinois by President Franklin Roosevelt in 1940. 

Campbell was born in Chicago and 

received his law degree from Loyola 

University. He served as U.S. attorney for the Northern District of Illinois for two 

years before his appointment to the district court. Campbell assumed a reduced 

caseload in March 1970, but he continued to serve as a senior judge until his death.

Edward T. Gignoux (1916–1988)

U.S. district judge for the District of Maine

Chief Justice Warren Burger assigned Edward Gignoux to be the judge for the retrial 

of the contempt charges against the defendants and their attorneys. In its reversal of 

the contempt convictions issued by Judge Hoffman, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 

Seventh Circuit cited a recent Supreme Court opinion as authority for requiring a 

different judge to preside over any retrial of the contempt charges that the government 

attorneys might choose to pursue. By law, the Chief Justice of the United States may 

assign a district judge to preside in a district in another judicial circuit if the chief 

judge of the other circuit specifi es a need. (No judge in the Seventh Circuit, which 

encompasses Illinois, Indiana, and Wisconsin, wanted to preside in the retrial.)

Judge William J. Campbell

Courtesy of the Seventh Circuit Library.
The Chicago Seven: 1960s Radicalism in the Federal Courts

26

 In his personal demeanor and 

his style of case management, 

the highly respected Gignoux 

proved to be the very opposite 

of Judge Hoffman. Years later, 

even William Kunstler offered a 

backhanded compliment. Gignoux, he said, “was a dangerous 

man. He makes the system look 

good.” Gignoux presided at a 

trial with no jury because the 

government attorneys dropped 

enough contempt charges so 

that none of the defendants was 

subject to more than six months’ 

imprisonment if convicted on all 

counts. Acting Attorney General 

Robert Bork recommended not 

retrying the contempts, but the 

U.S. attorney in Chicago, James 

Thompson, thought it was important to pursue some of the 

charges. Gignoux found three of 

the defendants and attorney William Kunstler guilty of a total of 

thirteen contempt charges, but Gignoux refused to impose further jail time on any 

of them. Gignoux’s written decision concluded with an eloquent statement on the 

need for proper courtroom decorum and civility to ensure that citizens can defend 

their civil liberties.

 Gignoux was born in Portland, Maine, and graduated from Harvard College and 

the Harvard Law School. He was appointed to the U.S. District Court for the District 

of Maine by President Eisenhower in 1957. Gignoux again served by assignment to 

another district in 1983 when he presided at the bribery trial of Alcee Hastings, a 

federal judge in the Southern District of Florida. 

Judge Edward T. Gignoux

Garbrecht Law Library, University of Maine School of Law.
The Chicago Seven: 1960s Radicalism in the Federal Courts

27

Judges of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit

Walter Joseph Cummings (1916–1999)

Walter Cummings was appointed to the U.S. Court of 

Appeals for the Seventh Circuit by President Johnson 

in 1966, and he served on the court until his death. 

Cummings was the author of the court’s opinion 

of May 11, 1972, In re David Dellinger et al., which 

overturned the contempt convictions of the defendants and remanded most of the charges for retrial 

by a different judge. The opinion ordered that any 

defendant facing contempt charges subject to more 

than six months’ imprisonment would be entitled 

to a jury trial. Cummings also authored the court’s 

opinion in United States v. Bobby G. Seale, in which 

the appeals court reversed the contempt convictions 

of Bobby Seale and remanded for retrial most of those 

charges, minus four that the court decided were not 

based on behavior that obstructed the trial.

 Cummings graduated from Yale University in 1937 and from the Harvard Law 

School in 1940. He then served as an attorney in the Department of Justice for six 

years, including a term as assistant solicitor general. He later served as the solicitor 

general from 1952–1953, the youngest person to hold that position. Before joining 

the court of appeals, Cummings was in private 

practice in Chicago for twenty years, during 

which time he served as president of the Seventh 

Circuit Bar Association. 

Thomas Edward Fairchild (1912–2007)

Thomas Fairchild was appointed to the U.S. Court 

of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit by President 

Johnson in 1966, and he served until his death 

in 2007, after taking a reduced caseload in 1981. 

Fairchild wrote the court’s opinion of November 

1972 in United States v. David T. Dellinger et al., 

the appeal of the fi ve defendants who had been 

convicted on the charges of inciting a riot. The 

court found several grounds for reversal of the 

convictions, and Fairchild’s opinion censured 

Judge Walter J. Cummings

Courtesy of the Seventh Circuit 

Library.

Judge Thomas E. Fairchild

Courtesy of the Seventh Circuit Library.
The Chicago Seven: 1960s Radicalism in the Federal Courts

28

Judge Julius Hoffman and the government attorneys for their openly critical remarks 

about the defendants and their attorneys. 

 Fairchild received his law degree from the University of Wisconsin in 1938, and 

he worked in private practice before serving as the state attorney general, the U.S. 

attorney for the Western District of Wisconsin, and as a justice of the Wisconsin 

Supreme Court. Fairchild was an unsuccessful candidate for the U.S. Senate in 1950 

and again in 1952, when he challenged incumbent Senator Joseph McCarthy. 

Wilbur Frank Pell, Jr. (1915–2000)

Wilbur Pell was the most recently appointed of 

the three judges who heard the appeals associated 

with the Chicago conspiracy trial. Pell had joined 

the court in April 1970 following his appointment 

by President Nixon. In a dissent from the majority 

opinion of the court on the appeal of the convictions on the charge of incitement to riot, in United 

States v. David T. Dellinger et al., Pell argued that the 

Anti-Riot Act was an unconstitutional infringement 

of free speech. 

 Pell graduated from the Harvard Law School 

in 1940 and practiced law in his native Indiana for 

many years. He also served as an FBI agent and as 

deputy attorney general of Indiana.

The defendants

Rennie Davis (1941– )

Rennie Davis, an early member of the Students for a Democratic Society and a veteran organizer, grew up in Virginia, the son of John C. Davis, chairman of President 

Truman’s Council of Economic Advisers. Rennie Davis attended Oberlin College 

and graduate school at the University of Illinois and the University of Michigan. He 

joined the SDS and became a close friend of one of its leaders, Tom Hayden. Davis 

was for several years involved in the group’s Economic Research and Action Project, 

which worked to organize poor urban neighborhoods. By 1967, Davis was increasingly involved in the SDS anti-war activities.

 Davis and Hayden joined with the National Mobilization Committee to End the 

War in Vietnam in planning massive demonstrations to coincide with the Democratic convention in Chicago. Davis met with offi cials at the Department of Justice 

Judge Wilbur F. Pell, Jr.

Courtesy of the Seventh Circuit 

Library.
The Chicago Seven: 1960s Radicalism in the Federal Courts

29

to seek their help in obtaining permits from the 

city of Chicago. He and Hayden also met with 

attorneys to develop a legal strategy for protection of the demonstrators. In March 1968, Davis 

and Hayden met with nearly 200 activists and 

presented the group with an outline of their plans 

for demonstrations at the convention in Chicago. 

The document, which Judge Hoffman prohibited 

the defense from submitting as evidence, stated 

that the demonstrations “should be nonviolent 

and legal.”

 Davis found himself at the center of the police attack on demonstrators in Grant Park on 

Wednesday of convention week. As he urged the 

crowd to stay calm, the police moved against the 

demonstrators and hit Davis on the head. He was 

both hospitalized and arrested. At the conspiracy 

trial, Davis was one of only two defendants to 

testify, and defense attorney Leonard Weinglass 

asked him to recount the events in Grant Park.

 During the months between the defendants’ 

arraignment and the start of the trial, Davis asked 

Judge Hoffman for permission to travel to North 

Vietnam and to escort home several American 

prisoners of war who were released after negotiations by David Dellinger. Judge Hoffman refused the request, but U.S. Court of 

Appeals Judge Otto Kerner reversed the ruling, allowing Davis to travel. 

 Davis was convicted on the charge of intent to incite a riot, but the conviction 

was reversed by the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit. The government 

declined to retry Davis on the Anti-Riot Act charge. Near the close of the trial, Judge 

Hoffman found Davis guilty of 23 counts of contempt and sentenced him to more than 

two years in jail. The U.S. court of appeals reversed all of the contempt convictions 

and remanded them for retrial. The government brought only two of the charges for 

retrial, and Judge Edward Gignoux found Davis not guilty of the two charges. Gignoux 

found that Davis’s remarks to the jury while Bobby Seale was bound and gagged did 

not cause the breakdown in courtroom decorum, but rather that the disruption of 

the trial resulted from “the appalling spectacle of a bound and gagged defendant and 

the marshals’ efforts to subdue him.” Gignoux also found that the obstruction of the 

trial following the revocation of David Dellinger’s bail was caused by the behavior 

of spectators, not the comments of Davis and other defendants.

Rennie Davis

Courtesy of Bettman/Corbis.
The Chicago Seven: 1960s Radicalism in the Federal Courts

30

 Davis continued his involvement in anti-war activity, including the Washington, 

D.C., Mayday actions of 1971, when Davis was among the many arrested for attempting to shut down the federal government. In 1972, Davis went to India to meet the 

Guru Maharaj Ji, and was converted to the guru’s Divine Light Mission. In the 1980s, 

Davis worked as a venture capital consultant, and in 2008 he is the president of the 

Foundation for a New Humanity.

David Dellinger (1915–2004)

David Dellinger stood apart from the other 

defendants in his age and in his lengthy 

experience as a pacifist and activist for 

social justice. Dellinger was born in Wakefi eld, Massachusetts, to a well-connected 

Republican family. He graduated from Yale 

University and attended Oxford University. 

After serving as an ambulance driver for the 

Loyalists in the Spanish Civil War, he entered 

Union Theological Seminary to study for 

the ministry. When Dellinger refused to 

register for the draft in 1940, he was expelled 

from the seminary and served one year in a 

federal prison. When he refused to appear 

at an draft induction center in 1943, he was 

again convicted and served two years in a 

federal prison. 

 In 1956, Dellinger joined with other 

Christian pacifi sts to establish Liberation

magazine. He organized some of the fi rst 

protests of American involvement in the 

Vietnam War. In 1967, as chair of the National Mobilization Committee to End the 

War in Vietnam, he coordinated a huge antiwar rally in Washington. Dellinger recruited Jerry Rubin to help organize the event 

that culminated with the march to the Pentagon. Beginning in 1967, Dellinger made 

several visits to the Paris peace talks, and in the months preceding the conspiracy 

trial he traveled to Paris to negotiate the release of American prisoners of war and 

then went to North Vietnam to escort the Americans back to the United States. 

 Dellinger, as a co-chair of the National Mobilization Committee, was closely 

involved in planning for the demonstrations in Chicago and hoped to attract huge 

numbers of people, such as had gathered for the march on the Pentagon in October 

David Dellinger

Courtesy of Bettman/Corbis.
The Chicago Seven: 1960s Radicalism in the Federal Courts

31

1967. At the only rally with a city permit, Dellinger directed the events in Grant Park 

on Wednesday of convention week, but when police charged on the crowd after a 

demonstrator lowered the American fl ag, Dellinger’s pleas over the microphone 

could not stop the violence. Dellinger also clashed with Tom Hayden, who wanted the 

demonstrators to defend themselves. Later that day, Dellinger attempted to negotiate 

a permit for a march to the site of the convention, but city offi cials denied it, and the 

worst violence of the week followed when police sought to disperse the assembled 

demonstrators.

 Following the indictment of Dellinger and the seven other participants in the 

demonstrations, he urged the defendants to continue their anti-war activity and to use 

the trial to publicize their views on the war. Dellinger rejected the advice of potential 

defense lawyers who suggested their case should focus on narrow legal questions. 

 The prosecution described Dellinger as “the principal architect especially of the 

riots which occurred on Wednesday,” and the case offi cially bore his name in the court 

records. Near the end of the trial, when a police offi cer serving as a rebuttal witness 

accused Dellinger of inciting violence in Grant Park, Dellinger responded with what 

the New York Times called a “barnyard epithet,” and Judge Hoffman revoked his bail. 

Dellinger’s return to jail prompted the most chaotic scenes in the trial since Bobby 

Seale had been bound and gagged. 

 The jury found Dellinger guilty of intent to incite a riot, but the U.S. court of 

appeals reversed the conviction and remanded the charge for retrial. The government 

declined to retry him. Near the close of the trial, Judge Hoffman convicted Dellinger 

of 32 counts of contempt and sentenced him to more than two years and two months 

in prison. After the court of appeals reversed all of the contempt convictions of the 

defendants, the government brought eight contempt charges against Dellinger on 

retrial, and Judge Edward Gignoux found him guilty of seven—the most for any of 

the defendants or defense attorneys. Dellinger was found guilty on charges related 

to his courtroom statements, many of them personal insults of the judge. Gignoux 

found that Dellinger had spoken out when he was adequately represented by his attorneys, and that the outbursts had signifi cantly obstructed the courtroom proceedings. Gignoux did not sentence Dellinger to any additional time in jail.

 In 1993, Dellinger published an autobiography, From Yale to Jail: The Life Story 

of a Moral Dissenter.

John Froines

At the time of the trial, John Froines was an assistant professor of chemistry at the 

University of Oregon. Froines graduated from the University of California at Berkeley 

in 1963 and received his Ph.D. in chemistry from Yale University in 1966. Froines had 

known Tom Hayden since they had trained together as community activists. Like his 

codefendant Weiner, Froines had served as a marshal for the National Mobilization 
The Chicago Seven: 1960s Radicalism in the Federal Courts

32

Committee in Chicago, but Froines and Weiner 

were the only defendants not related to the 

leadership of a national organization.

 During the defense strategy sessions for the 

trial, Froines was usually allied with Hayden 

in support of a clear political focus. Froines 

traveled with Hayden and Leonard Weinglass 

to the northern Virginia home of former Attorney General Ramsey Clark to ask him to 

testify for the defense. 

 The jury found Froines not guilty of all 

charges in the indictment, but near the close of 

the trial Judge Hoffman convicted Froines on 

ten counts of criminal contempt and sentenced 

him to six and a half months in jail. The U.S. 

Court of Appeals reversed the convictions and 

remanded them for retrial before a different 

judge in the district court. After the government presented its case in the retrial, the judge 

acquitted Froines of all remaining contempt 

charges.

 In the spring of 1971, Froines was arrested 

and again indicted on charges of violating the 

Anti-Riot Act following his involvement in the Mayday Tribe effort to shut down the 

federal government in protest of the war in Vietnam. The government dropped the 

charge. Froines worked for the Occupational Safety and Health Administration during the Carter administration. He later became a professor of environmental health 

sciences at the University of California at Los Angeles and, as of 2008, he serves as 

director of the UCLA Center for Occupational and Environmental Health.

Tom Hayden (1939– )

As a former president of the Students for a Democratic Society and principal author 

of the key manifesto of student dissent, Tom Hayden was one of the most prominent 

leaders of the radical political movements that emerged on college campuses in the 

1960s. Hayden was born in Detroit, and grew up in Royal Oak, Michigan, where he 

attended the church of the radio priest and fervent anti-communist, Father Coughlin. 

Hayden went to the University of Michigan where he served as editor of the Michigan 

Daily and covered the 1960 Democratic convention for his school paper. He joined 

the Students for a Democratic Society, and as president of the group he drafted the 

Port Huron Statement that outlined a vision of participatory democracy and personal 

John Froines

Courtesy of Bettman/Corbis.
The Chicago Seven: 1960s Radicalism in the Federal Courts

33

independence. For several years he worked as a community organizer with an SDS 

project in Newark, New Jersey. Hayden also became increasingly involved in opposition to American involvement in the Vietnam War. In late 1965, Hayden made his 

fi rst trip to North Vietnam, and he later returned to that country and Cambodia to 

secure the release of American prisoners of war.

 In the months before the 1968 Democratic National Convention, Hayden and 

his colleague, Rennie Davis, opened an offi ce in Chicago to plan for a massive demonstration comparable to the anti-war 

mobilization in Washington, D.C., in 

October 1967. Although participation in 

the demonstrations never approached 

the organizers’ goals, Hayden remained 

as a chief organizer of the week’s events, 

even as the demonstrators seemed to 

abandon the focused political agenda 

that Hayden had advocated. 

 Hayden was one of the six individuals cited by a Daley administration 

report blaming violence on “outside 

agitators,” and he was one of the eight 

demonstrators indicted in March 1969. 

As the defendants planned their strategy, Hayden convinced the defendants 

to hire Leonard Weinglass, with whom 

Hayden worked during his community 

organizing in Newark. Throughout the 

trial, Hayden was often at odds with 

other defendants over his determination 

to maintain a political focus in the trial. 

Hayden was impatient with what he saw 

as the unstructured cultural radicalism 

of Jerry Rubin and Abbie Hoffman. 

 The jury found Hayden not guilty of 

the conspiracy charge but guilty of the 

charge of travel with intent to incite a 

riot. The conviction was reversed by the 

U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit and remanded to the district court, but 

the government declined to retry Hayden. Near the close of the trial, Judge Hoffman 

convicted Hayden on eleven counts of contempt and sentenced him to more than 

fourteen months in jail. The U.S. Court of Appeals reversed those criminal contempt 

convictions and remanded the charges for retrial before another judge. The governTom Hayden

Courtesy of Bettman/Corbis.
The Chicago Seven: 1960s Radicalism in the Federal Courts

34

ment brought only one of the contempt charges against Hayden on retrial, and Judge 

Edward Gignoux found Hayden not guilty. Gignoux found that Hayden’s statement 

in court in response to the physical constraint of Bobby Seale was not responsible for 

the disruption of the courtroom, but rather that the disruption of the trial resulted 

from “the appalling spectacle of a bound and gagged defendant and the marshals’ 

efforts to subdue him.”

 Following the Chicago trial, Hayden continued his work in opposition to the 

Vietnam War. While working with the Indochina Peace Campaign in 1972, he met 

Jane Fonda, whom he married. Hayden unsuccessfully challenged incumbent U.S. 

Senator John Tunney in the 1976 California primary. He won election to the California 

State assembly in 1982 and the California Senate in 1992 and served until 2000. 

Abbie Hoffman (1936–1989)

Abbie Hoffman was one of the most visible and familiar of the Chicago Seven defendants, and his style of cultural politics and confrontation defi ned much of the 

defendants’ response to Judge Julius Hoffman and the government prosecutors. The 

two Hoffmans engaged in verbal sparring 

throughout the trial, trading one-liners and 

gaining much of the attention of the press. 

 Hoffman was born in Worcester, Massachusetts, and attended Brandeis University 

and graduate school at the University of 

California at Berkeley. In the early 1960s, 

he became increasingly involved in social 

activism and organized northern support 

for the civil rights movement in the South. 

In the mid-1960s, Hoffman moved to New 

York City and organized political theater. His 

most famous event was in 1967 at the New 

York Stock Exchange, where, after notifying 

the press of their intentions, Hoffman and 

others entered the visitors’ gallery and tossed 

dollar bills to the trading fl oor. As Hoffman 

and other cultural radicals in New York 

planned political theater to coincide with 

the Democratic convention in Chicago, they 

devised the idea of Yippie!, a barely organized 

movement that would simultaneously mimic 

and mock a political party. Their plans for 

Abbie Hoffman

Courtesy of Bettman/Corbis.
The Chicago Seven: 1960s Radicalism in the Federal Courts

35

Chicago focused on a Festival of Life, which they envisioned as part music festival and 

part public presentation of counter-cultural lifestyle, all with the goal of attracting 

television coverage. 

 Hoffman and fellow Yippie Jerry Rubin met with the National Mobilization 

Committee to coordinate demonstrations at the convention, and the Yippie leaders 

moved to Chicago to negotiate permits for their events in public parks, but the alliance between the cultural radicals and the political organizers was always uneasy. 

 Hoffman was highly visible in Chicago during most of the convention week, 

organizing media events and speaking to crowds in Lincoln Park about expected 

confrontations with the Chicago police. On the night of the worst violence, however, 

Hoffman was in jail after his arrest for walking around the city with an obscenity 

written on his forehead in red lipstick. (He claimed he did it to keep his picture out 

of the newspaper.) Hoffman was among those cited by Mayor Daley’s report blaming 

the violence on outside agitators, and he was one the eight indicted for conspiracy 

and intent to incite a riot.

 Hoffman was one of the two defendants to take the witness stand, and his extended 

testimony was a tour de force of his absurdist, subversive verbal style. Hoffman’s 

performance in the courtroom was equally notable, seldom missing an opportunity 

to undermine the legitimacy of the proceedings.

 Judge Hoffman convicted Abbie Hoffman on twenty-three counts of criminal 

contempt but sentenced him to a comparatively light eight months in jail. The U.S. 

court of appeals reversed the contempt convictions and remanded them for retrial 

before another judge. The government prosecuted fi ve of the contempt charges, and 

Judge Edward Gignoux convicted Hoffman on two of the charges and found him 

not guilty of the other three. Gignoux convicted Hoffman of the charge related to an 

extended verbal attack, complete with Yiddish insults, delivered against Judge Hoffman following the revocation of David Dellinger’s bail and on the charge related to 

Abbie Hoffman’s appearance in the courtroom in judicial robes, which he fl ung to 

the fl oor. Although Gignoux found that the judicial robe episode did not actually 

impede the trial, the behavior was “so fl agrant, so outrageous, and so subversive” that 

it rose to the level of “an actual obstruction.” Gignoux did not sentence Hoffman to 

any additional jail time. Hoffman’s conviction on the charge of intent to incite a riot 

was reversed by the court of appeals, and the government made no effort to retry 

him.

 Hoffman published several successful books, including Revolution for the Hell of 

It (1968), Woodstock Nation (1969), and Steal This Book (1970). He went into hiding after an arrest for cocaine possession and lived under an assumed identity for 

nearly six years. Hoffman surrendered himself in 1980, after his successful work as 

an environmental organizer made his exposure likely. He was diagnosed with bipolar 

disorder in 1980, and he committed suicide in 1989.
The Chicago Seven: 1960s Radicalism in the Federal Courts

36

Jerry Rubin (1938–1994)

Like his fellow Yippie, Abbie Hoffman, Jerry Rubin approached the Chicago conspiracy 

trial as an opportunity to present a critique of American society and to challenge the 

legitimacy of the U.S. government.

 Rubin was born in Cincinnati and attended Oberlin College before graduating 

from the University of Cincinnati. He worked 

for a short time as a sports reporter and then 

enrolled in graduate school at the University 

of California at Berkeley. He quickly gave up 

school for political activism and traveled to 

Cuba. Back in Berkeley, Rubin participated 

in the Free Speech Movement in 1964. He 

organized one of the fi rst teach-ins against 

the Vietnam War. He also developed a reputation for theatrical behavior when, in 1966, 

he appeared before the House Un-American 

Activities Committee dressed as an American 

Revolutionary soldier.

 After an unsuccessful run for mayor of 

Berkeley, Rubin moved to New York where he 

merged his political activism with an interest 

in cultural radicalism. He joined with David 

Dellinger of the National Mobilization Committee to organize a massive protest against 

the Vietnam War in October 1967, and it was 

Rubin who proposed to stage the march in 

front of the Pentagon. With Abbie Hoffman, 

Rubin was one of the founders of the Yippie 

movement, and the two of them moved to 

Chicago in the spring of 1968 to organize 

Yippie events and to seek city permits for their gatherings in public parks.

 In the week before the Democratic convention, Rubin appeared at a rally at the 

Chicago Civic Center, where he nominated as president a pig, named “Pigasus.” 

(The organizers were arrested and the pig placed in the custody of the local humane 

society.) Rubin and other Yippies drew on their media skills to spread wild rumors 

of non-existent Yippie plans, including a supposed effort to put LSD in the Chicago 

water supply and a plot to place Yippies disguised as bellhops in the hotels serving 

convention delegates.

Jerry Rubin

Courtesy of Bettman/Corbis.
The Chicago Seven: 1960s Radicalism in the Federal Courts

37

 The Daley report on the convention demonstrations cited Rubin as one of the 

“outside agitators” blamed for the violence. While the grand jury investigated possible 

indictments related to the convention violence, Rubin continued his political theater. 

When the House Un-American Activities Committee in October 1968 held hearings 

on the convention violence, Rubin showed up “bearded, beaded, barefooted, and 

bare-chested,” as the New York Times described him. At additional HUAC hearings 

in December, Rubin arrived at the committee room dressed as Santa Claus. 

 Rubin was convicted of intent to incite a riot, but the U.S. court of appeals reversed the conviction, and the government declined to retry Rubin on the charge.

 At the close of the trial, Judge Hoffman convicted Rubin on fi fteen charges of 

contempt and sentenced him to more than two years in jail. The U.S. Court of Appeals 

for the Seventh Circuit reversed the convictions and remanded the contempt charges 

for retrial before another judge in the district court. The government prosecuted 

only three of the contempt charges, and Judge Edward Gignoux convicted Rubin on 

two of the charges and found Rubin not guilty on the third. The convictions were 

on charges related to a vocal attack on Judge Hoffman following the revocation of 

bail for David Dellinger and to Rubin’s appearance, along with Abbie Hoffman, in 

the courtroom in judicial robes, which they fl ung to the fl oor.

 Rubin drew media attention again in the 1970s when he withdrew from political 

activity and started work as an entrepreneur. In the 1980s, he joined Abbie Hoffman 

on a campus tour dubbed the Yippie versus Yuppie debates. Rubin was killed in a 

pedestrian accident in Los Angeles in 1994.

Bobby Seale (1936– )

Bobby Seale was in many ways the unlikeliest of the conspiracy defendants. Seale had 

met only one other defendant, Jerry Rubin, before their indictment, and some of the 

defendants did not meet him until they fi rst appeared in the courtroom. Seale had 

been in Chicago briefl y during convention week to give two speeches. Although his 

case was severed from the others well before the end of the trial, Seale’s confrontations with Judge Hoffman and Hoffman’s order to have Seale bound and gagged in 

the courtroom remain the most powerful examples of the breakdown of the judicial 

process during the conspiracy trial.

 At the time of the Democratic National Convention, Seale lived in Oakland, 

California, and was chairman of the Black Panther Party. The Black Panthers had 

not participated in the planning for the Chicago demonstrations, but Seale made 

an overnight trip to deliver two speeches. Seale spoke to a rally in Lincoln Park and 

talked of the need for black men to arm themselves in protection against the police, 

whom he repeatedly referred to as the pigs. In the prosecution’s opening statement 

at the trial, Assistant U.S. Attorney Richard Schultz quoted Seale as saying “if they 
The Chicago Seven: 1960s Radicalism in the Federal Courts

38

get in our way, we should kill some of those 

pigs” and talking about “barbecuing that 

pork.” 

 The inclusion of Seale in the conspiracy 

indictment perplexed many people, including the other defendants, but it came at a 

time of numerous prosecutions of Black 

Panther Party members in different parts of 

the country and extensive FBI surveillance of 

the party members. Shortly before the start 

of the Chicago conspiracy trial, Seale and 

other members of the party were indicted 

in Connecticut on charges of conspiracy to 

murder a suspected police informant. Because of the indictment, Seale was the only 

defendant held in jail during the length of 

his time in the Chicago conspiracy trial.

 Seale originally retained the Black Panthers’ lawyer Charles Garry as his attorney, 

and Garry appeared at the defendants’ 

arraignment on April 9. When the trial 

started in September, Garry was recovering from surgery and could not travel, but 

Judge Hoffman refused to delay the start of 

the trial. Seale repeatedly refused to allow 

William Kunstler to represent him, and 

in a series of increasingly hostile confrontations with the judge, Seale attempted 

to cross-examine witnesses and otherwise serve as his own counsel. Many of these 

confrontations ended with Seale’s litany of “liar, pig, fascist.” On October 29, Judge 

Hoffman ordered that Seale be bound and gagged by the marshals before any courtroom appearance. Newspapers across the country and television networks carried 

the courtroom drawings of the violently restrained Seale. Within a week, the judge 

relented, but when Seale again tried to represent himself, Judge Hoffman on November 

5 ordered a mistrial in the prosecution of Seale. Judge Hoffman also convicted Seale 

on sixteen charges of contempt and sentenced him to four years in prison. The day 

before, a group of lawyers from across the country fi led suit in the U.S. district court 

asking for an order stopping the trial until Seale was allowed to represent himself, 

but Judge Edwin Robson dismissed the suit on November 5.

 The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit dismissed four of the contempt 

convictions of Seale and remanded the other twelve for retrial before another judge 

in the district court. The government declined to prosecute the contempt charges. 

Bobby Seale

Courtesy of Bettman/Corbis.
The Chicago Seven: 1960s Radicalism in the Federal Courts

39

The court of appeals did not rule on Seale’s right to a delay in the trial or the right 

to represent himself, but it found that the trial judge was obligated to investigate 

Seale’s claims that he was not being represented by an attorney of his choice. If such 

an inquiry had confi rmed Seale’s account of meetings with his lawyer and found that 

Seale was “free from ulterior motivation,” Judge Hoffman would have been in error 

to force Seale to rely on Kunstler as his lawyer.

 Seale faced trial on the murder conspiracy charges in New Haven, Connecticut, 

where thousands of protestors, including Abbie Hoffman, criticized the alleged harassment of the Black Panther Party. The jury deadlocked on the charges against Seale, 

and he never faced a retrial. In 1973, Seale was a candidate for mayor of Oakland, 

California, but lost to the incumbent in a runoff. Seale later taught political science 

and served as an assistant to the dean at Temple University in Philadelphia. In 1988, 

he published a cookbook, Barbecue’n With Bobby.

Lee Weiner

Lee Weiner was the least familiar of the defendants, with only limited connections to those 

who had planned the Chicago demonstrations. 

At the trial he also was the least visible and, 

according to Tom Hayden, spent much of his 

time in court reading the I Ching. Weiner was a 

research assistant in the sociology department at 

Northwestern University and had served at the 

Chicago demonstrations as a marshal with the 

National Mobilization Committee to End the 

War in Vietnam. He was indicted for conspiracy 

along with the other seven original defendants, 

and he and John Froines were indicted on a 

separate charge of teaching the use of incendiary devices.

 Weiner was acquitted of both the conspiracy 

charge and the incendiary device charge. Judge 

Hoffman convicted Weiner on seven charges 

of criminal contempt and sentenced him to 

two months and eighteen days in jail. The U.S. 

court of appeals reversed the convictions and remanded the charges for retrial before 

another judge. After the government presented its case in the retrial, Judge Edward 

Gignoux acquitted Weiner of all remaining contempt charges.

 Weiner later worked as a political consultant and with the Anti-Defamation 

League in New York City.

Lee Weiner

Courtesy of Bettman/Corbis.
The Chicago Seven: 1960s Radicalism in the Federal Courts

40

The attorneys

Thomas A. Foran (1924–2000)

U.S. attorney for the Northern District of Illinois

As U.S. attorney for the Northern District of Illinois, Thomas Foran was the lead prosecutor in the Chicago conspiracy trial. Foran, with the assistance of Richard Schultz, 

presented a case based largely on the 

testimony of undercover policemen 

and paid informants, who told of the 

defendants’ plans to disrupt Chicago 

during the Democratic convention 

and to provoke law enforcement 

offi cers to resort to violence against 

the demonstrators. Foran aggressively challenged the defense arguments, and his frequent objections 

were almost always sustained by 

Judge Hoffman. Throughout the 

trial, Foran portrayed the defendants as sophisticated revolutionaries who manipulated the alienation 

of young people. He also emphasized that most of the defendants 

were much older than the students 

they attempted to organize. Within 

days of the close of the trial, Foran 

continued to stir controversy when 

he appeared at a public meeting 

at a Chicago high school and used 

anti-gay slurs to describe all of the 

defendants except Bobby Seale.

 In its opinion reversing the 

criminal convictions of fi ve of the defendants, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit criticized Foran for his “considerable number” of derogatory comments 

about the defense. The appeals court found that Foran’s fi nal arguments in the case 

“went at least up to, and probably beyond, the outermost boundary of permissible 

inferences from the evidence in his characterizations of defendants.” The court cited 

as particularly offensive Foran’s references to “evil men” and “anarchists.”

Thomas A. Foran

Courtesy of Bettman/Corbis.
The Chicago Seven: 1960s Radicalism in the Federal Courts

41

 The Chicago-born Foran attended Loyola University and the law school of the 

University of Detroit before entering into private practice in Chicago. He was well 

connected in Democratic circles in Chicago and was appointed U.S. attorney by 

President Johnson in 1968. In his short tenure as U.S. attorney, Foran successfully 

prosecuted a number of individuals involved in organized crime. Following the 

election of a Republican President, Foran intended to resign on July 1, 1969, but 

the Nixon administration’s Justice Department requested that Foran stay on as U.S. 

attorney to prosecute the Chicago conspiracy trial. Following his resignation as U.S. 

attorney in 1970, Foran returned to private practice in Chicago.

William Kunstler (1919–1995)

Attorney for the defendants

William Kunstler served as the lead 

attorney for the defendants in the 

Chicago conspiracy trial and cemented his reputation as a lawyer 

for left-leaning celebrities. Kunstler 

was born in New York City and 

attended Yale University. He then 

served in the military and graduated from Columbia Law School. As 

a law student he wrote for various 

publications and read movie scripts 

for a major studio. In the early years 

of his law practice in New York, 

Kunstler also wrote radio scripts. He 

gained national attention in 1961 

with the publication of a book on 

the controversial death penalty case 

of Caryl Chessman. Kunstler represented various civil rights leaders in 

the 1960s, and he also represented 

celebrity clients like the comedian 

Lenny Bruce. He agreed to represent 

Lee Harvey Oswald after the assassination of President Kennedy, and 

Kunstler later represented Jack Ruby 

in an appeal of Ruby’s conviction 

for murdering Oswald.

William Kunstler

Courtesy of Bettman/Corbis.
The Chicago Seven: 1960s Radicalism in the Federal Courts

42

 Although Kunstler often left the more detailed legal work of the Chicago trial to 

his colleague Leonard Weinglass, it was Kunstler who emphasized what he thought was 

the political character of the trial. He frequently linked the defendants with American Revolutionaries and historical advocates of social justice and political liberty. 

The trial, according to Kunstler’s opening statement, was “a classic example of the 

Government against the people.” “The real conspiracy in this case is the conspiracy 

to curtail and prevent the demonstrations against the war in Vietnam.” Kunstler was 

also a highly visible advocate for the defendants outside the courtroom.

 At the Chicago trial, Kunstler took the lead in challenging Judge Hoffman and 

the government prosecutors. His confrontations with the judge resulted in Judge 

Hoffman issuing contempt convictions on thirty-four charges against Kunstler and 

imposing a jail sentence of more than four years. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the 

Seventh Circuit dismissed nine of the charges and remanded the rest for retrial before another judge. The government dropped all but six of the charges, and at the 

retrial, Judge Edward Gignoux found Kunstler not guilty of four of the charges. The 

fi rst of Kunstler’s contempt convictions resulted from an extended diatribe against 

Judge Hoffman that constituted “outrageous behavior,” according to Gignoux, and 

that resulted in a substantive delay in the trial. The other conviction was based on 

Kunstler’s refusal to obey the judge’s order not to discuss a motion in front of the jury. 

In both instances, Gignoux found that Kunstler’s behavior exceeded any defi nition of 

“vigorous advocacy” of the defendants’ interests. Gignoux imposed no jail sentence 

on Kunstler or the other defendants convicted of contempt.

 In the years following the Chicago conspiracy trial, Kunstler often represented 

well-known radicals and notorious criminal defendants. He also appeared in movies 

and television, occasionally playing himself.

Leonard Weinglass (1933– )

Attorney for the defendants

Leonard Weinglass was the younger and less well-known attorney for the defense. 

Weinglass graduated from George Washington University and the Yale Law School. 

After service in the Air Force, he practiced law in Newark, N.J., and taught at the 

Rutgers Law School. He joined the defense for the Chicago case at the request of Tom 

Hayden, whom he had defended on several minor offenses arising from Hayden’s 

work with the Students for a Democratic Society. Weinglass took responsibility for 

the defense of Hayden, Rennie Davis, Abbie Hoffman, and John Froines. Weeks 

before the trial started, Abbie Hoffman invited Weinglass to accompany him to the 

Woodstock music festival. The defendants later remembered him as the one who 

“always did his homework and was there with the necessary cases and precedents 

when they were needed.”
The Chicago Seven: 1960s Radicalism in the Federal Courts

43

 Near the close of the trial, Judge Julius Hoffman convicted Leonard Weinglass of fourteen 

counts of criminal contempt. The U.S. Court 

of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit dismissed 

seven of those counts and remanded the others 

for retrial before another judge. The government attorneys chose to bring only one of the 

remaining contempt charges against Weinglass 

in the retrial, and Judge Edward Gignoux found 

Weinglass not guilty because the alleged contempt had not obstructed the trial nor had it 

involved personal insults against Judge Hoffman.

 Weinglass later reminisced that he had a 

“sort of wistful regard” for his experience with 

Judge Hoffman. “He had a razor-like wit which 

he would use against you in court. I’d fi nd myself angry and upset but amused at the same 

time.”

 Weinglass continued to represent leftist clients, including members of the Weather 

Underground, and controversial criminal defendants.

Richard J. Daley (1902–1976)

Mayor of Chicago

By 1968, Richard J. Daley had been mayor for more than twenty years, and for much 

of the nation he was the very image of modern Chicago. After service in the Illinois 

legislature and state government under Governor Adlai Stevenson, Daley became chair 

of the Cook County Democratic Central Committee in 1953 and was elected mayor 

two years later. As mayor and party leader, he commanded an extensive organization 

that ensured his reelection and helped him effi ciently deliver municipal services. 

Daley also promoted investments in major public works and private construction 

that helped maintain Chicago’s status among American cities. His political infl uence 

made him an important player in national Democratic politics. By the time of the 

Democratic convention, however, Daley’s style of urban leadership was an anachronism and subject to charges of cronyism and machine politics.

 Daley’s reputation suffered a serious blow in the spring of 1968 during the riots 

that followed the assassination of Martin Luther King. The mayor asked the police 

superintendent to order police to shoot to kill any arsonist and to shoot to maim lootLeonard Weinglass

Courtesy of Bettman/Corbis.
The Chicago Seven: 1960s Radicalism in the Federal Courts

44

ers. A national outcry 

followed. In 1968, 

Daley’s administration was determined 

to prevent any kind 

of civil disturbance 

during the Democratic convention, 

and offi cials refused 

to issue permits requested by demonstrators. The mayor’s 

administration also 

mobilized an overwhelming force of 

police and National Guard troops to 

maintain order in 

the city.

 National media 

covering the convention criticized the police response to the demonstrators, and the television networks 

broadcast Daley’s remarkable tantrum on the fl oor of the convention. Daley responded 

to the public criticism with a hastily prepared report that blamed the convention 

violence on “outside agitators” and a “hard core of revolutionaries.”

 In January 1970, Mayor Daley appeared as a witness for the defense, but his testimony did little to support the defense argument. Daley insisted he had not ordered 

the denial of permits for demonstrators, but for the most part Daley offered little 

beyond praise for his staff and U.S. Attorney Foran. Judge Hoffman sustained most 

of the prosecution’s objections to the defense line of questioning of Daley. Defense 

attorney Kunstler read into the record an “offer of proof,” which allows an attorney 

to present, away from the presence of the jury, information that the judge had not 

allowed them to present through examination of a witness. Kunstler’s order of proof 

alleged a conspiracy of Daley and President Johnson, with the cooperation of the 

U.S. attorney, to prevent any demonstrations against the Vietnam War and social 

injustice.

 Despite the damage to his national reputation following the events of 1968, Daley 

remained popular in much of Chicago and won reelection to a sixth term in 1975.

Mayor Richard J. Daley on the fl oor of the 

Democratic National Convention

Associated Press, 1968.
The Chicago Seven: 1960s Radicalism in the Federal Courts

45

Media Coverage and Public Debates

During the Democratic National Convention of August 1968, network television 

coverage of the confrontations between demonstrators and Chicago police shocked 

the nation and prompted investigations by the city of Chicago, the House Committee 

on Un-American Activities, and the President’s National Commission on the Causes 

and Prevention of Violence. The media images of the violence disrupting the political 

process also intensifi ed demands for the criminal prosecution of the police and the 

demonstrators. The subsequent trial of the demonstrators, closely followed by the 

media, became the center of a national debate on the fairness of the federal judicial 

system and on the culture of dissent that arose in the 1960s. 

 Media coverage had been central to the debate over the demonstrations surrounding the convention, and it would be a subject of controversy leading up to and 

throughout the Chicago Seven trial. On the fi rst anniversary of the convention riots 

and weeks before the opening of the trial, Tom Wicker wrote in the New York Times

“The miracle of television made it visible to all—pierced, at last, the isolation of one 

America from the other, exposed to each the power it faced.”

Chicago police marshal against demonstrators during the 

Democratic National Convention, 1968

Courtesy of the Chicago History Museum.
The Chicago Seven: 1960s Radicalism in the Federal Courts

46

 The role of the media in the Chicago violence was a polarizing issue. In the days 

following the convention, Mayor Daley demanded prime time on each of the television networks for a response to what he characterized as distorted coverage of the 

police violence. Several months later, the Walker Report’s review of police violence 

concluded that “newsmen and photographers were singled out for assault, and their 

equipment deliberately damaged.” Shortly after the report was published, U.S. Attorney Thomas Foran alleged that the television networks had staged shots of the 

demonstrators’ injuries at the hands of the police.

 As the trial began in September 1969, the district court for the Northern District of Illinois attempted to manage the expected media crush. Chief Judge William 

Campbell prohibited cameras and sound equipment from all but one room of the 

courthouse, and Judge Richard Austin dismissed a suit by the American Civil Liberties 

Union challenging the ban. Austin announced that “the quickest way to end demonstrations is to have all cameras fi ve blocks from the building.” Campbell denied a 

request from over 100 attorneys to move the trial to a larger courtroom that could 

accommodate more of the press and hopeful spectators who lined up daily outside 

the federal courthouse, and the U.S. court of appeals upheld Campbell’s decision. 

Judge Hoffman set aside a section of the courtroom for the press with credentials, 

but he prohibited them from wearing press credentials in the courtroom, explaining 

that he didn’t want his courtroom to look like “a furniture convention.” The limited 

access did nothing to deter press interest in the trial, and around twenty news outlets, 

including newspapers like the New York Times and the Washington Post, assigned 

reporters to cover the full length of the proceedings.

 Everyone in the courtroom took notice of the daily coverage of the trial by national print and broadcast media. The defendants’ antics and the long list of celebrity 

witnesses guaranteed an audience well beyond the judge and jury. The defense held 

daily press conferences during the lunch break until the judge warned them not to 

comment on the trial in public. Judge Hoffman proved to be equally adept at attracting press comment, and the chief judge of the court later acknowledged that Judge 

Hoffman “loved the publicity, bad as it was.” 

 The defendants cultivated media coverage outside of the courtroom in their 

efforts to convince the public that the court proceedings amounted to a political 

rather than a criminal trial. At night defendants spoke to community meetings and 

attended fundraisers held by wealthy supporters. One weekend, the defendants traveled to Washington to join a half-million people at a rally against the Vietnam War. 

Their public appearances could have a less serious side as well. On a visit to Chicago’s 

Second City comedy club, Abbie Hoffman responded to an audience request with a 

45-minute satire of Judge Hoffman. In December 1969, the defendants posed in a 

group photo for a holiday card that urged recipients to “Make a New Year’s Resolution—Join the Conspiracy.”
The Chicago Seven: 1960s Radicalism in the Federal Courts

47

Washington Post writer Nicholas Van Hoffman noted within the fi rst weeks of the 

trial that the proceedings had none of the expected characteristics of a criminal trial. 

“No one here at the Great Conspiracy Trial thinks of its outcome in terms of guilt or 

innocence. You are for the government or for the defendants.” A Chicago Sun-Times

reporter found the trial “more sideshow than criminal proceeding.”

 Outside the courtroom, the cultural and political clashes of convention week 

played on as background for the trial. A series of protests and demonstrations, most 

of them small and many barely related to the trial, appeared outside the courthouse. 

The violence of convention week threatened to reappear in October 1969 during 

the self-styled “Days of Rage” organized by the Weatherman group and other radical groups emerging from the break up of the Students for a Democratic Society. 

Protestors clashed with Chicago police and smashed store windows, at one point 

attempting to reach the hotel where Judge Hoffman and his wife lived.

 Very different groups of protestors approached the court to protect defendants’ 

right to representation. When Judge Hoffman threatened to hold the pretrial team 

Demonstrators during the Democratic National Convention, 1968

Courtesy of the Chicago History Museum.
The Chicago Seven: 1960s Radicalism in the Federal Courts

48

of defense lawyers 

in contempt, nationally prominent 

lawyers and law 

professors, including future federal 

judges, converged 

on the courthouse 

to demand a mistrial.

 The gagging of 

Bobby Seale, Judge 

Hoffman’s consistently pro-government rulings, 

and the ill-defi ned 

requirements for 

conviction on the 

conspiracy charge 

led many in the 

press to question 

the impartiality of 

the judicial system. 

Tom Wicker of the 

New York Times asked if the burden of proof “any longer means anything.” J. Anthony 

Lukas noted the many observers “who view what they regard as the excesses on both 

sides as damaging to the American judicial process and raising questions as to how 

a court can effectively dispense justice in cases which arouse such strong political 

passions.” The defendants were only too willing to foster these doubts about justice in 

the federal courts. Rennie Davis said that “Judge Hoffman presides in every court in 

this country.” Alternatively, the letters to the editors of Chicago newspapers indicated 

popular support for Judge Hoffman. 

 The guilty verdict for fi ve of the defendants brought familiar popular protests, 

including a crowd of 5,000 outside the Chicago courthouse and another demonstration in Washington, D.C., where more than 100 people were arrested. The several 

appeals that brought reversals of the convictions and a rebuke of Judge Hoffman were 

prominently reported by the national press, but the popular interest in the case never 

again rose to the levels seen during the trial phase. The proceedings in the court of 

appeals had none of the dramatic interest of the trial, and, perhaps more important, 

the protest movement evident at the Democratic convention declined following the 

killings at Kent State University in the spring of 1970. 

Courtroom drawing of Bobby Seale, seated, bound and gagged 

during the Chicago conspiracy trial

Howard Brodie, artist. 1969. Library of Congress, 

Prints and Photographs Division [LC-USZC4-4870].
The Chicago Seven: 1960s Radicalism in the Federal Courts

49

Historical Documents

Testimony of Abbie Hoffman, December 23 & 29, 1969

Abbie Hoffman and Rennie Davis were the only defendants to testify at the trial. 

Hoffman’s appearance was meant to establish the nonviolent intent of the demonstrations and events planned by the Yippies. His opening remarks were more in the 

nature of a performance than testimony, as was typical of so much of Hoffman’s 

interaction with the court. His answers to the standard opening questions challenged the very forms of a trial and replaced them with something closer to a comedy 

routine. His claim that he was a resident of Woodstock Nation referred to the book 

Hoffman published after attending the music festival in August 1969. Hoffman escorted Leonard Weinglass to Woodstock as an introduction to the counterculture. The 

remarks of December 29 are devoted to the founding and goals of the Yippie party.

 [Document Source: The Conspiracy Trial, eds., Judy Clavir and John Spitzer 

(Indianapolis, IN: Bobbs-Merrill Co., 1970), 344–45, 349–50. ]

 

December 23, 1969

Mr. Weinglass: Will you please identify yourself for the record?

Th e Witness: My name is Abbie. I am an orphan of America.

Mr. Schultz: Your Honor, may the record show it is the defendant Hoff man who 

has taken the stand?

Th e Court: Oh, yes. It may so indicate.

Th e Witness: Well, it is not really my last name.

Mr. Weinglass: Abbie, what is your last name?

Th e Witness: Well, there is some confusion about it because, well, my grandfather, 

he was a Russian Jew, and he decided to protest the anti-Semitism in the Russian 

Army and he slew—

Mr. Schultz: Objection. If the defendant has a last name, let him state it, but 

not—

Th e Court: All we want to know, sir, is your last name.

Th e Witness: My slave name is Hoff man. My real name is Shaboysnakoff . I can’t 

spell it.

Th e Court: Th ere is a lawyer who has fi led his appearance in the name of Abbie 

Hoff man for you. You gave him your name as Abbie Hoff man, did you not?

Th e Witness: Well, no. It was the Government’s idea and the name was Abbott 

Howard.
The Chicago Seven: 1960s Radicalism in the Federal Courts

50

Mr. Weinglass: Where do you reside?

Th e Witness: I live in Woodstock Nation.

Mr. Weinglass: Will you tell the Court and jury where it is?

Th e Witness: Yes. It is a nation of alienated young people. We carry it around with us 

as a state of mind in the same way as the Sioux Indians carried the Sioux nation around 

with them. It is a nation dedicated to cooperation versus competition, to the idea 

that people should have better means of exchange than property or money, that there 

should be some other basis for human interaction. It is a nation dedicated to—

Th e Court: Just where it is, that is all.

Th e Witness: It is in my mind and in the minds of my brothers and sisters. It does 

not consist of property or material but, rather, of ideas and certain values. We believe 

in a society—

Th e Court: No, we want the place of residence, if he has one, place of doing business, 

if you have a business. Nothing about philosophy or India, sir. Just where you live, if 

you have a place to live. Now you said Woodstock. In what state is Woodstock?

Th e Witness: It is in the state of mind, in the mind of myself and my brothers and 

sisters. It is a conspiracy. Presently, the nation is held captive, in the penitentiaries of 

the institutions of a decaying system.

Mr. Weinglass: Can you tell the Court and jury your present age?

Th e Witness: My age is 33. I am a child of the 60s.

Mr. Weinglass: When were you born?

Th e Witness: Psychologically, 1960.

Mr. Schultz: Objection, if the Court please. I move to strike the answer.

Mr. Weinglass: What is the actual date of your birth?

Th e Witness: November 30, 1936.

Mr. Weinglass: Between the date of your birth, November 30, 1936, and May 1, 

1960, what if anything occurred in your life?

Th e Witness: Nothing. I believe it is called an American education.

Mr. Schultz: Objection.

Th e Court: I sustain the objection.

Th e Witness: Huh.

Mr. Weinglass: Abbie, could you tell the Court and jury—

Mr. Schultz: His name isn’t Abbie. I object to this informality.

Mr. Weinglass: Can you tell the Court and jury what is your present occupation?

Th e Witness: I am a cultural revolutionary. Well, I am really a defendant—fulltime.
The Chicago Seven: 1960s Radicalism in the Federal Courts

51

Mr. Weinglass: What do you mean by the phrase “cultural revolutionary”?

Th e Witness: Well, I suppose it is a person who tries to shape and participate in 

the values, and the mores, the customs and the style of living of new people who 

eventually become inhabitants of a new nation and a new society through art and 

poetry, theater, and music.

Mr. Weinglass: What have you done yourself to participate in that revolution?

Th e Witness: Well, I have been a rock and roll singer. I am a reporter with the Liberation News Service. I am a poet. I am a fi lm maker. I made a movie called “Yippies 

Tour Chicago or How I Spent My Summer Vacation.” Currently, I am negotiating 

with United Artists and MGM to do a movie in Hollywood.

 I have written an extensive pamphlet on how to live free in the city of New 

York.

 I have written two books, one called Revolution for Th e Hell of It under the pseudonym Free, and one called, Woodstock Nation.

Mr. Weinglass: Taking you back to the spring of 1960, approximately May 1, 1960, 

will you tell the Court and jury where you were?

Mr. Schultz: 1960?

Th e Witness: Th at’s right.

Mr. Schultz: Objection.

Th e Court: I sustain the objection.

Mr. Weinglass: Your Honor, that date has great relevance to the trial. May 1, 1960, 

was this witness’ fi rst public demonstration. I am going to bring him down through 

Chicago.

Th e Court: Not in my presence, you are not going to bring him down. I sustain the 

objection to the question.

Th e Witness: My background has nothing to do with my state of mind?

Th e Court: Will you remain quiet while I am making a ruling? I know you have no 

respect for me.

Mr. Kunstler: Your Honor, that is totally unwarranted. I think your remarks call for 

a motion for a mistrial.

Th e Court: And your motion calls for a denial of the motion. Mr. Weinglass, continue 

with your examination.

Mr. Kunstler: You denied my motion? I hadn’t even started to argue it.

Th e Court: I don’t need any argument on that one. Th e witness turned his back on 

me while he was on the witness stand.

Th e Witness: I was just looking at the pictures of the longhairs up on the wall. . . . 
The Chicago Seven: 1960s Radicalism in the Federal Courts

52

Th e Witness: Yes.

 We talked about the possibility of having demonstrations at the Democratic 

Convention in Chicago, Illinois, that was going to be occurring that August. I am 

not sure that we knew at that point that it was in Chicago. Wherever it was, we were 

planning on going.

 Jerry Rubin, I believe, said that it would be a good idea to call it the Festival of 

Life in contrast to the Convention of Death, and to have it in some kind of public 

area, like a park or something, in Chicago.

 One thing that I was very particular about was that we didn’t have any concept 

of leadership involved. Th ere was a feeling of young people that they didn’t want 

to listen to leaders. We had to create a kind of situation in which people would be 

allowed to participate and become in a real sense their own leaders.

 I think it was then after this that Paul Krassner said the word “YIPPIE,” and we 

felt that that expressed in a kind of slogan and advertising sense the spirit that we 

wanted to put forth in Chicago, and we adopted that as our password, really.

December 29, 1969

Th e Witness: Anita [Hoff man] said that “Yippie” would be understood by our generation, that straight newspapers like the New York Times and the U.S. Government 

and the courts and everything wouldn’t take it seriously unless it had a formal name, 

so she came up with the name: “Youth International Party.” She said we could play 

a lot of jokes on the concept of “party” because everybody would think that we were 

this huge international conspiracy, but that in actuality we were a party that you had 

fun at.

 Nancy [Kursham] said that fun was an integral ingredient, that people in America, 

because they were being programmed like IBM cards, weren’t having enough fun in 

life and that if you watched television, the only people that you saw having any fun 

were people who were buying lousy junk on television commercials, and that this 

would be a whole new attitude because you would see people, young people, having 

fun while they were protesting the system, and that young people all around this 

country and around the world would be turned on for that kind of an attitude.

 I said that fun was very important, too, that it was a direct rebuttal of the kind 

of ethics and morals that were being put forth in the country to keep people working in a rat race which didn’t make any sense because in a few years that machines 

would do all the work anyway, that there was a whole system of values that people 

were taught to postpone their pleasure, to put all their money in the bank, to buy 

life insurance, a whole bunch of things that didn’t make any sense to our generation 

at all, and that fun actually was becoming quite subversive.

 Jerry said that because of our action at the Stock Exchange in throwing out the 

money, that within a few weeks the Wall Street brokers there had totally enclosed 

the whole stock exchange in bulletproof, shatterproof glass, that cost something like 

$20,000 because they were afraid we’d come back and throw money out again.
The Chicago Seven: 1960s Radicalism in the Federal Courts

53

 He said that for hundreds of years political cartoonists had always pictured corrupt politicians in the guise of a pig, and he said that it would be great theater if we 

ran a pig for President, and we all took that on as like a great idea and that’s more 

or less—that was the founding.

Mr. Weinglass: Th e document that is before you, D-222 for identifi cation, what is 

that document?

Th e Witness: It was our initial call to people to describe what Yippie was about and 

why we were coming to Chicago.

Mr. Weinglass: Now, Abbie, could you read the entire document to the jury.

Th e Witness: It says:

 “A STATEMENT FROM YIP!

 “Join us in Chicago in August for an international festival of youth, music, and 

theater. Rise up and abandon the creeping meatball! Come all you rebels, youth spirits, rock minstrels, truth-seekers, peacock-freaks, poets, barricade-jumpers, dancers, 

lovers and artists!

 “It is summer. It is the last week in August, and the NATIONAL DEATH 

PARTY meets to bless Lyndon Johnson. We are there! Th ere are 50,000 of us 

dancing in the streets, throbbing with amplifi ers and harmony. We are making love 

in the parks. We are reading, singing, laughing, printing newspapers, groping, and 

making a mock convention, and celebrating the birth of FREE AMERICA in our 

own time.

 “Everything will be free. Bring blankets, tents, draft-cards, body-paint, Mr. 

Leary’s Cow, food to share, music, eager skin, and happiness. Th e threats of LBJ, 

Mayor Daley, and J. Edgar Freako will not stop us. We are coming! We are coming 

from all over the world!

 “Th e life of the American spirit is being torn asunder by the forces of violence, 

decay, and the napalm-cancer fi end. We demand the Politics of Ecstasy! We are the 

delicate spores of the new fi erceness that will change America. We will create our 

own reality, we are Free America! And we will not accept the false theater of the 

Death Convention.

 “We will be in Chicago. Begin preparations now! Chicago is yours! Do it!”

 “Do it!” was a slogan like “Yippie.” We use that a lot and it meant that each 

person that came should take on the responsibility for being his own leader—that 

we should, in fact, have a leaderless society.

 We shortly thereafter opened an offi ce and people worked in the offi ce on what 

we call movement salaries, subsistence, thirty dollars a week. We had what the straight 

world would call a staff and an offi ce although we called it an energy center and 

regarded ourselves as a tribe or a family.
The Chicago Seven: 1960s Radicalism in the Federal Courts

54

Testimony of Rennie Davis, January 24, 1970

Rennie Davis offered the court his account of the events in Grant Park on the afternoon of August 28. The rally was one of the only events for which the city of Chicago 

granted a permit, but the event ended with some of the worst violence of the week 

and heightened tensions leading to an even more violent confrontation that evening 

in front of one of the conventions’ delegates’ hotels. Davis testifi ed that he attempted 

to calm the demonstrators and reduce the risk of police violence in the moments 

before he was beaten.

 [Document Source: The Conspiracy Trial, eds., Judy Clavir and John Spitzer 

(Indianapolis, IN: Bobbs-Merrill Co., 1970), 480–81.]

 

Mr. Weinglass: Now, directing your attention to approximately 2:30 in the afternoon 

of that same day, do you recall where you were at that time?

Th e Witness: Yes, I was in Grant Park just south of the refreshment stand. I saw a 

commotion near the fl agpole and shortly after that I heard Dave Dellinger’s voice. 

It was clear that something was happening and Dave indicated that he wanted 

marshals to move to the fl agpole, so I then said to everyone there that we should go 

toward the fl agpole.

Mr. Weinglass: When you went to the fl agpole, did you have anything in your 

hands?

Th e Witness: I had a speaker system with a microphone.

Mr. Weinglass: As you arrived in the vicinity of the fl agpole, what was occurring?

Th e Witness: Th e fl ag had been lowered to halfmast and the police were dragging a 

young man out of the area. Th e police seemed to be withdrawing from the area as I 

arrived, and a lot of people who were gathered around the fl agpole began to throw 

anything they could get their hands on at the police who were withdrawing from 

the crowd. Th ey threw rocks and boards and lunches and anything that was available 

right on the ground. 

Mr. Weinglass: What were you saying, if anything, at that time on the microphone?

Th e Witness: I kept directing the marshals to form a line, link arms, and then I 

constantly urged the people in the crowd to stop throwing things. I said, “You’re 

throwing things at our own people. Move back.”

 As our marshal line grew, I urged our marshal line to now begin to move back 

and move the demonstrators away from the police.

Mr. Weinglass: Where did you go?

Th e Witness: I continued to stand in front of the marshal line that had been 

formed.
The Chicago Seven: 1960s Radicalism in the Federal Courts

55

Mr. Weinglass: What did you then observe happen?

Th e Witness: Well, at that time another squadron of policemen in formation began 

to advance towards my position.

 I was standing in front of our marshal line sort of sandwiched in between our 

marshal line and the advancing police formation.

Mr. Weinglass: What were you doing as the police were advancing?

Th e Witness: Well, as the police advanced, I continued to have my back to the police 

line, basically concerned that the marshal line not break or move. Th en the police 

formation broke and began to run, and at that time I heard several of the men in 

the line yell, quite distinctly, “Kill Davis! Kill Davis!” and they were screaming that 

and the police moved on top of me, and I was trapped between my own marshal line 

and advancing police line.

 Th e fi rst thing that occurred to me was a very powerful blow to the head that 

drove me face fi rst down into the dirt, and then, as I attempted to crawl on my hands 

and knees, the policemen continued to yell, “Kill Davis! Kill Davis!” and continued 

to strike me across the ear and the neck and the back.

 I guess I must have been hit thirty or forty times in the back and I crawled for 

maybe—I don’t know how many feet, ten feet maybe, and I came to a chain fence 

and somehow I managed to crawl either under or through that fence, and a police fell 

over the fence, trying to get me, and another police hit the fence with his nightstick, 

but I had about a second or two in which I could stand and I leaped over a bench 

and over some people and into the park, and then I proceeded to walk toward the 

center of the park.

Mr. Weinglass: As you walked toward the center of the park, what, if anything, happened?

Th e Witness: Well, I guess the fi rst thing that I was conscious of, I looked down, and 

my tie was just solid blood, and I realized that my shirt was just becoming blood, and 

someone took my arm and took me to the east side of the Bandshell, and I laid down, 

and there was a white coat who was bent over me. I remember hearing the voice of 

Carl Oglesby. Carl said, “In order to survive in this country, we have to fi ght,” and 

then—then I lost consciousness.

Assistant U.S. Attorney Richard Schultz, closing argument 

for the government, February 11, 1970

According to Richard Schultz, the seven defendants were united in their determination to provoke violence in Chicago during the Democratic convention. Throughout 

the trial, the prosecution had attempted to explain how the occasional cooperation 

of seven individuals constituted a conspiracy. Here, Schultz describes the defendants’ 

“tacit understanding” of a shared goal. Schultz also dismisses the long efforts to se-
The Chicago Seven: 1960s Radicalism in the Federal Courts

56

cure permits and the talk of nonviolence as a ploy to entice unwitting demonstrators 

into a violent confrontation with police.

 [Document Source: The Conspiracy Trial, eds., Judy Clavir and John Spitzer 

(Indianapolis, IN: Bobbs-Merrill Co., 1970), 552–53.]

 

 Let me briefl y discuss the conspiracy charge.

 We have shown that these defendants, all seven of them, had a mutual understanding to accomplish the objects of the conspiracy, that they had a common 

purpose of bringing disruption and inciting a violence in this city, and that all seven 

of them together participated in working together and siding each other to further 

these plans. Oh, they never explicitly said, “You do that to blow up that,” and “I will 

do that to incite that crowd,” that is not how they did it. It was tacit understanding, 

a working together in all these meetings and all of these conferences that they had, 

and that is how they conspired.

 Th e only diff erence between fi ve of the defendants and the remaining two, Rubin 

and Hoff man, were the ways of getting the people here. Rubin and Hoff man were 

going to get their people here by a music festival, and the others were going to get 

their people here by saying they were going to have a counter-convention of the 

grassroots of America.

 All seven defendants worked together jointly for the common purpose and discussed and planned together for the common purpose of creating violent confl ict 

and disruptions in this city. Th ey were going to incite violence in this city by bringing 

other people here and by coming here themselves. We have proven the defendants 

guilty on the substantive counts as well as the conspiracy charge, as we charge.

 Th e last area I want to cover are march permits. Most of Davis’ direct examination 

was to impress you on how genuinely he tried to get march permits and an assembly 

site at the Amphitheatre. Well, he wanted a march permit and he wanted an assembly 

permit at the Amphitheatre, but it doesn’t follow that because he wanted permits he 

wanted to avoid violence. Don’t be fooled by that. Why did Davis want permits for 

the Amphitheatre? He wanted permits fi rst to make it look like “We are trying to 

avoid violence. We want permits.”

 Number two, he wanted permits because they wanted to be where the TV cameras 

were, at the Amphitheatre.

 And, number three, they wanted permits because they wanted the confrontation 

right at the Amphitheatre, right at the Amphitheatre.
The Chicago Seven: 1960s Radicalism in the Federal Courts

57

Leonard Weinglass, closing argument for the defendants, 

February 12, 1970

In his closing arguments, Defense Attorney Leonard Weinglass sought to undermine 

the prosecution’s defi nition of a conspiracy and to challenge the testimony of government witnesses who claimed the defendants spoke of plans for violence. He then 

fi nished by asserting that the trial was a government effort to suppress dissent and 

that the defendants were in a long tradition of defenders of liberty. When Weinglass 

sought to link the prosecution to the Salem witch trials and the persecution of Jesus, 

the U.S. attorney had had enough, and Judge Hoffman upheld the government’s 

objection. Weinglass’s remarks were part of a sustained effort to convince the jury 

of the political character of the trial and to emphasize the historical importance of 

the outcome. 

 [Document Source: The Conspiracy Trial, eds., Judy Clavir and John Spitzer 

(Indianapolis, IN: Bobbs-Merrill Co., 1970), 561–62.]

 

 It seems to me that if the lesson of the country teaches anything, it is that the 

true patriots are the people who take a position on principle and hold to it, and if 

there are people in this country who feel that the people in Vietnam are not our enemies, but another part of the humanity on this planet against whom this country is 

transgressing, and they take action, peaceful action, to protest their feeling, like Abe 

Lincoln did 120 years ago, there is nothing terribly unpatriotic about it, and rather 

than to derive from hatred for their country, it seems to me to derive from love of 

country, and these people have always had it diffi cult.

 When Dave Dellinger and Tom Hayden and Rennie Davis, all men in the peace 

movement, stated shortly after the Convention, “We have won, we have won,” Mr. 

Schultz attempts to indicate to you that what they were talking about is that they 

have won in their plans to have violence.

 I submit to you that the more reasonable interpretation of that is that people in 

the United States have won and the peace movement has won because people stood 

up for a principle, they stood up for what they thought was right. Th ey were beaten 

and struck down in the streets. Th ey were gassed in the park. But far from defeat, 

they stood, and they stood their ground. What happened here in Chicago during 

the week of the Convention is an unfortunate incident on the record of this country. 

But like all other wrongs that have happened, they can be righted only by people 

who are willing to stand up to the wrong and embrace the truth and the justice that 

they see and to stand by what they believe to be true.

 I submit to you this task is now before you, and whether this wrong, which is the 

prosecution of those who were the victims of offi cial misconduct and are brought to 

trial in an attempt to justify that conduct, is ever righted, resides solely and exclusively 

in your province.
The Chicago Seven: 1960s Radicalism in the Federal Courts

58

 Th roughout history it has always been easy to go along. Th ey did it at the Salem 

witch trials. Th ey went along in Jerusalem—

Mr. Schultz: Oh, objection, if the Court please.

Th e Court: I see no relationship of the Salem witch trials to this courtroom. I don’t 

think it is comparable. I sustain the objection.

Mr. Weinglass: I merely want to indicate to you in fi nishing that this case is more 

than just the defense of seven men. It involves the more basic issue of whether or 

not those who stand up to dare can do so without grave personal risk and I think it 

will be judged in that light, and I think while you deliberate this case, that history 

will hold its breath until you determine whether or not this wrong that we have 

been living with will be righted by a verdict of acquittal for the seven men who are 

on trial here.

 Th ank you.

William Kunstler, closing argument for the defendants, 

February 13, 1970

Kunstler took one last opportunity to argue that the defendants were being prosecuted for their political beliefs, and he set the case in a broad historical context of 

political martyrs. 

 [Document Source: The Conspiracy Trial, eds., Judy Clavir and John Spitzer 

(Indianapolis, IN: Bobbs-Merrill Co., 1970), 567.]

 

 We are living in extremely troubled times, as Mr. Weinglass pointed out. An intolerable war abroad has divided and dismayed us all. Racism at home and poverty at 

home are both causes of despair and discouragement. In a so-called affl uent society, 

we have people starving and people who can’t even begin to approximate the decent 

life.

 Th ese are rough problems, terrible problems, and as has been said by everybody 

in this country, they are so enormous that they stagger the imagination. But they 

don’t go away by destroying their critics. Th ey don’t vanish by sending men to jail. 

Th ey never did and they never will.

 To use these problems by attempting to destroy those who protest against them 

is probably the most indecent thing that we can do. You can crucify a Jesus, you can 

poison a Socrates, you can hang John Brown or Nathan Hale, you can kill a Che 

Guevara, you can jail a Eugene Debs or a Bobby Seale. You can assassinate John Kennedy or a Martin Luther King, but the problems remain. Th e solutions are essentially 

made by continuing and perpetuating with every breath you have the right of men 

to think, the right of men to speak boldly and unafraid, the right to be masters of 
The Chicago Seven: 1960s Radicalism in the Federal Courts

59

their souls, the right to live free and to die free. Th e hangman’s rope never solved a 

single problem except that of one man.

 I think if this case does nothing else, perhaps it will bring into focus that again 

we are in that moment of history when a courtroom becomes the proving ground of 

whether we do live free and whether we do die free. You are in that position now. Suddenly all importance has shifted to you—shifted to you as I guess in the last analysis 

it should go, and it is really your responsibility, I think, to see that men remain able to 

think, to speak boldly and unafraid, to be masters of their souls, and to live and die 

free. And perhaps if you do what is right, perhaps Allen Ginsberg will never have to 

write again as he did in “Howl,” “I saw the best minds of my generation destroyed 

by madness,” perhaps Judy Collins will never have to stand in any courtroom again 

and say as she did, “When will they ever learn? When will they ever learn?”

U.S. Attorney Thomas Foran, closing argument for the 

government, February 13, 1970

For the lead prosecutor, the professed political concerns of the defendants were no 

more than “bunk.” Thomas Foran portrayed the organizers of the demonstrations as 

fomenters of social chaos. In its decision reversing the criminal convictions of fi ve of 

the defendants, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit would cite Foran’s 

closing remarks as evidence of his unacceptable prejudice against the defendants.

 [Document Source: The Conspiracy Trial, eds., Judy Clavir and John Spitzer 

(Indianapolis, IN: Bobbs-Merrill Co., 1970), 572.]

 

 What is their intent? And this is their own words: “To disrupt. To pin delegates 

in the Convention hall. To clog streets. To force the use of troops. To have actions 

so militant the Guard will have to be used. To have war in the streets until there is 

peace in Vietnam. To intimidate the establishment so much it will smash the city. 

Th ousands and thousands of people perform disruptive actions in Chicago. Tear this 

city apart. Fuck up the Convention. Send them out. We’ll start the revolution now. 

Do they want to fi ght? Th e United States is an outlaw nation which had broken all 

the rules so peace demonstrators can break all the rules. Violate all the laws. Go to 

jail. Disrupt the United States Government in every way that you can. See you in 

Chicago.”

 And these men would have you believe that the issue in this case is whether or 

not they really wanted permits.

 Public authority is supposed to stand handcuff ed and mute in the face of people 

like that and say, “We will let you police yourselves”? How would public authority feel if they let that park be full of young kids through that Convention with no 
The Chicago Seven: 1960s Radicalism in the Federal Courts

60

policemen, with no one watching them? What about the rape and the bad trips and 

worse that public authority would be responsible for if it had?

 Th ey tried to give us this bunk that they wanted to talk about racism and the 

war and they wanted a counter-convention. Th ey didn’t do anything but look for a 

confrontation with the police. What they looked for was a fi ght, and all that permits 

had to do with it was where was the fi ght going to be, and that’s all.

 And they are sophisticated and they are smart and they are well-educated. And 

they are as evil as they can be.

Judge Hoffman, charge to the jury, February 14, 1970

Judge Hoffman reminded the jurors of several key points of law that had often been 

lost in the turmoil of the trial. Recent Supreme Court decisions, such as Brandenburg 

v. Ohio, had expanded the First Amendment protections of speech that merely advocated illegal action but that was not directly connected to promoting or encouraging that illegal action. Hoffman also informed the jury that the First Amendment 

protected public assembly without a normally required permit if the individuals 

organizing the assembly made a reasonable effort to obtain a permit. The jurors 

were left to decide if the prosecution had established beyond any reasonable doubt 

that the defendants had intended to incite violence and had taken action to promote 

that violence.

 [Document Source: The Conspiracy Trial, eds., Judy Clavir and John Spitzer 

(Indianapolis, IN: Bobbs-Merrill Co., 1970), 576.]

 

 Ladies and gentlemen of the jury, I shall now instruct you as to what kind of 

conduct is not prohibited by law, and cannot, therefore, constitute grounds for conviction.

 Among the most vital and precious liberties which we Americans enjoy by virtue 

of our Constitution are freedom of speech and freedom of assembly. Th e freedoms 

guaranteed by the First Amendment allow criticism of existing institutions, of political leaders, of domestic and foreign policies and our system of government. Th at 

right is unaff ected by whether or not it may seem to you to be wrong, intemperate 

or off ensive or designed to undermine public confi dence in existing government.

 Th e law distinguishes between mere advocacy of violence or lawlessness without 

more, and advocacy of the use of force or illegality where such advocacy is directed 

to inciting, promoting, or encouraging lawless actions. Th e Constitution does not 

protect speech which is reasonably and knowingly calculated and directed to inciting actions which violate the law. A conviction can rest only on advocacy which 

constitutes a call to imminent unlawful action.

 You must keep in mind this distinction between constitutionally protected and 

unprotected speech.
The Chicago Seven: 1960s Radicalism in the Federal Courts

61

 In addition it is a constitutional exercise of the rights of free speech and assembly 

to march or hold a rally without a permit where applications for permits were made 

in good faith at a reasonable time prior to the date of march or rally and the permits 

were denied arbitrarily or discriminatorily.

 Where the law refers to an act that is committed knowingly and willfully, it 

means that the act was done voluntarily and purposely, not because of mistake or 

accident, with knowledge that it was prohibited by law and with the purpose of 

violating the law. Th us the defendants cannot be found to have acted willfully and 

knowingly unless they or any of them did so with a bad purpose of an evil intent. 

Such knowledge and intent may be proven by the defendants’ conduct and by all of 

the facts and circumstances of the case as shown by the evidence.

 If you are not convinced beyond a reasonable doubt that a defendant acted knowingly and willfully, then you must fi nd that the Government has failed to prove the 

intent necessary and you must, in such an event, acquit that defendant.

U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit, decision on 

the defendants’ appeal of the contempt convictions, 

May 11, 1972

The court of appeals dismissed some of the contempt convictions against the defense 

attorneys and reversed all other contempt convictions of the attorneys as well as the 

defendants. In this excerpt from the opinion written by Judge Walter Cummings, 

the court of appeals addressed the acceptable behavior of attorneys. While acknowledging that the trial judge must have ultimate authority to regulate behavior in the 

courtroom, the court of appeals said that a trial judge cannot punish an attorney 

for reasonable persistence in advocating a client’s case. The court also rejected Judge 

Hoffman’s assumption that an attorney should be held responsible for the courtroom behavior of a client.

 [Document Source: In re Dellinger et al., 461 F.2d 389 (1972).]

 

 And where the judge is arbitrary or aff ords counsel inadequate opportunity to 

argue his position, counsel must be given substantial leeway in pressing his contention, 

for it is through such colloquy that the judge may recognize his mistake and prevent 

error from infecting the record. It is, after all, the full intellectual exchange of ideas 

and positions that best facilitates the resolution of disputes. However, this is not to 

say that attorneys may press their positions beyond the court’s insistent direction to 

desist. On the contrary, the necessity for orderly administration of justice compels 

the view that the judge must have the power to set limits on argument. We simply 

encourage judges to exercise tolerance in determining those limits and to distinguish 

carefully between hesitating, begrudging obedience and open defi ance.
The Chicago Seven: 1960s Radicalism in the Federal Courts

62

 A reading of the specifi cations against the attorneys in this case reveals a pattern in the specifi cations for refusal to obey a court directive to cease argument. 

Th at pattern necessitates a brief comment. Th e record discloses that the trial judge, 

when ordering counsel to terminate their argument or sit down, frequently added a 

rejoinder or coupled the order with a statement which called for a response by the 

attorneys. In such situations, it is our view that an invited, additional response cannot 

subsequently be viewed as a contemptuous violation of the order. . . . 

 Yet another frequent charge against the attorneys is that they failed to aid the 

court in maintaining order. While this charge was often coupled with the additional 

assertion that they actively encouraged their clients in their disruptions, for purposes 

of remand it is necessary to distinguish between the two situations. An attorney has 

no affi rmative obligation to restrain his client under pain of the contempt sanction, 

although we do not express an opinion as to the breach of professional ethics that 

may be involved in this situation. Indeed, compelling an attorney to control the 

conduct of his client under threat of the contempt sanction might well destroy the 

confi dence in the attorney–client relationship which is necessary to a proper and 

adequate defense. However, where an attorney encourages disruptive behavior by a 

client or fans the fl ames of existing frictions, he cannot fi nd immunity from punishment for such conduct.

U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit, decision on 

the defendants’ appeal of the criminal convictions, 

November 21, 1972

The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reversed the criminal convictions of the fi ve defendants and remanded the cases for retrial at the government’s 

discretion. In the opinion written by Judge Thomas Fairchild, the court of appeals 

addressed the defendants’ arguments in favor of various grounds for reversal, including the constitutionality of the Anti-Riot Act, the composition of the grand jury 

and the selection of the petit jury, the trial judge’s rulings on the admissibility of 

evidence and testimony of witnesses, the undisclosed communications between the 

judge and the jury, and the demeanor of the judge and the prosecuting attorneys. 

The court by a vote of 2–1 upheld the constitutionality of the Anti-Riot Act, but it 

found other grounds for reversal.

 [Document Source: United States v. Dellinger, 472 F.2d 340 (1972).]

 

Constitutionality of the Anti-Riot Act

 Th e fi rst amendment is premised upon the value of unfettered speech. Constitutional protection is clearly not to be limited, therefore, to mild or innocuous presentation, and it is unrewarding to search for a formula describing punishable advocacy of 
The Chicago Seven: 1960s Radicalism in the Federal Courts

63

violence in terms of fervor or vigor. Th e real question is whether particular speech is 

intended to and has such capacity to propel action that it is reasonable to treat such 

speech as action.

 Th e test for the attributes which speech in favor of violent action must achieve 

before it may be classifi ed as action and thus removed from fi rst amendment protection has been variously phrased—clear and present danger—directed to inciting and 

likely to incite imminent lawless action—whether the harm sought by expression is 

immediate and instantaneous and irremediable except by punishing the expression 

and thereby preventing the conduct—whether the expression is inseparably locked 

with action. 

 Our question, in examining the validity of the Anti-riot Act on its face is whether, 

properly construed, it punishes speech only when a suffi ciently close relationship 

between such speech and violent action is found to exist. Semantically the cases 

suggest that while a statutory prohibition of advocacy of violence is overbroad, since 

protected speech is included within advocacy, a prohibition of intentional incitement 

of violence is not overbroad. Th e latter depends upon a construction of “incitement” 

which is suffi ciently likely to propel the violent action to be identifi ed with action. 

. . . It seems to us that the threshold defi nition of all categories as “urging or instigating” puts a suffi cient gloss of propulsion on the expression described that it can be 

carved away from the comprehensive protection of the fi rst amendment’s guarantee 

of freedom of speech. 

Jury Selection

 In evaluating this topic, it is important to recall the time when this trial occurred, 

and to recognize that the division in public attitudes toward the Vietnam war has 

changed and is changing still. Th e extent of unpopularity of the war in 1972, when 

this opinion is written, is not a fair index of the probable opinions on that subject in a 

cross section selected in September, 1969. Perspective is important. Th ese defendants’ 

plans for activities in Chicago in August, 1968 were fi rst formed when President 

Johnson was expected to be a candidate to succeed himself. He withdrew March 31, 

1968. Th e 1968 candidacies of Senators Eugene McCarthy and Robert Kennedy, the 

latter assassinated in June, 1968, were associated with anti-war sentiment. Further 

crystallization of anti-war sentiment is associated with the Cambodian venture and 

the Kent State killings, both in the spring of 1970. Th ese episodes had not yet occurred 

when the jury was selected for this trial in September, 1969. We have no doubt that 

defendants brought to trial in 1969 upon charges that their anti-war activities were 

carried beyond constitutional protection were entitled to a testing of their jurors for 

biased attitudes on this subject.

 Perhaps secondary, but signifi cant, were the confl icts of values represented by 

the so-called youth culture—hippies, yippies and freaks—in contrast with the more 

traditional values of the vast majority of the community, presumably including most 

citizens summoned for jury service. Again, we are not unaware that many otherwise 
The Chicago Seven: 1960s Radicalism in the Federal Courts

64

qualifi ed members of the community could not be impartial toward, and in fact 

are often off ended by, persons who wear long hair, beards, and bizarre clothing and 

who seem to avoid the burdens and responsibilities of regular employment. Several 

defendants would exemplify this confl ict.

 A similar confl ict of values was symbolized in the confrontation between the city 

police and the demonstrators. A juror’s basic sympathies with the actors in these events 

could easily impair his ability to consider alternative views of the case as presented in 

court. A venireman’s relationship with law enforcement offi cers would be an important 

factor to be inquired about in evaluating his ability to be an impartial juror. 

 In our view, some minimal inquiry into at least these three basic areas was essential to a fair trial of this extraordinary case, at least when defendants requested such 

inquiry. . . . 

 Th ese cases demonstrate the danger that widespread publicity about highly dramatic events will render prospective jurors incapable of impartial consideration of the 

evidence. We think it must follow that where pretrial publicity is of a character and 

extent to raise a real probability that veniremen have heard and formed opinions about 

the events relevant to a case, and at least where, as here, the defense has brought the 

pretrial publicity to the court’s attention and requested voir dire inquiry, the court must 

make inquiry adequate to determine whether anyone has read or heard about the facts, 

and, if so, what the impact has been on his ability to serve as an impartial juror.

Demeanor of the Judge and Prosecutors

 Th e district judge’s deprecatory and often antagonistic attitude toward the defense 

is evident in the record from the very beginning. It appears in remarks and actions 

both in the presence and absence of the jury.

 Th e defense presented an extensive case, calling more than 100 witnesses. Th e 

judge might, within reason, have alleviated some of the diffi culties defense counsel 

encountered, but he did not do so.

 Th ere are a number of areas in the law of evidence in which lawyers and judges 

diff er considerably in interpretation of the rules and where the application of a rule 

is really governed by the discretion or individual views of the trial judge. When a 

question is leading; when testimony that another person made a statement is admissible because the making of the statement is relevant, even though the statement 

also contains assertions of fact; when a question on cross-examination is outside 

the scope of the direct; when a question is objectionable because repetitive—are all 

examples of such areas. We shall not attempt the task of reviewing all the rulings 

on evidence in this case. It does appear, however, that in comparable situations, the 

judge was more likely to exercise his discretion against the defense than against the 

government.

 Most signifi cant, however, were remarks in the presence of the jury, deprecatory 

of defense counsel and their case. Th ese comments were often touched with sarcasm, 

implying rather than saying outright that defense counsel was inept, bumptious, 
The Chicago Seven: 1960s Radicalism in the Federal Courts

65

or untrustworthy, or that his case lacked merit. Sometimes the comment was not 

associated with any ruling in ordinary course; sometimes gratuitously added to an 

otherwise proper ruling; nearly always unnecessary. Taken individually any one was 

not very signifi cant and might be disregarded as a harmless attempt at humor. But 

cumulatively, they must have telegraphed to the jury the judge’s contempt for the 

defense. . . . 

 In fi nal argument, the United States Attorney went at least up to, and probably 

beyond, the outermost boundary of permissible inferences from the evidence in his 

characterizations of defendants. He referred to them as “evil men,” “liars and obscene 

haters,” “profl igate extremists,” and “violent anarchists.” He suggested one defendant 

was doing well as it got dark because “predators always operate better when it gets 

close to dark.” 

 He yielded to the temptation to exploit the courtroom conduct of various defendants which formed the basis of the contempt citations in In re Dellinger. He told 

the jurors they need not ignore “how those people look and act,” “outbursts in the 

courtroom,” “the sudden respect, the sudden decency” occurring “in the last few days 

as we reach the end of the case,” the suggested similarity between the technique the 

jurors had seen used in the courtroom with the marshals and that allegedly used at 

the time of the convention with the police.

 Dress, personal appearance, and conduct at trial were not probative of guilt. 

Th e district judge properly instructed the jurors that they “must not in any way be 

infl uenced by any possible antagonism you may have toward the defendants or any 

of them, their dress, hair styles, speech, reputation, courtroom demeanor or quality, 

personal philosophy or life style.” Th e United States Attorney should not have urged 

the jury to consider those things.

 We conclude that the demeanor of the judge and prosecutors would require 

reversal if other errors did not. 

Judge Edward Gignoux, decision on the retrial of the 

contempt convictions—comments on the proper conduct 

of a trial, December 6, 1973

Judge Gignoux presided over the retrial of the remaining contempt charges against 

the defendants and their attorneys. After his meticulous review of the contempt 

specifi cations and his rejection of all but thirteen of them, Gignoux addressed the 

impact of Judge Hoffman’s management of the case and the general purpose of rules 

governing courtroom behavior. Gignoux was most concerned with ensuring public 

confi dence in a fair and impartial trial process.

 [Document Source: In re David T. Dellinger et al., 370 F. Supp. 1304, 1321–

23.]

 
The Chicago Seven: 1960s Radicalism in the Federal Courts

66

 From the foregoing, it is apparent that the contumacious conduct of the defendants and their lawyers cannot be considered apart from the conduct of the trial 

judge and prosecutors. Each reacted to provocation by the other, and the tensions 

generated during four and a half months of so acrimonious a trial cannot be ignored. 

Indeed, with the exception of the two specifi cations relating to the “robe” incident 

. . . , the contumacious conduct of the four remaining defendants can, in each instance, reasonably be said to have been in response, albeit an excessive response, to 

peremptory action of the judge.

 Present government counsel urge that substantial jail sentences for these defendants are necessary to vindicate the judicial process and to deter other defendants and 

defense counsel from similar misbehavior. After a careful evaluation of the record, 

however, this Court is convinced that, in the particular circumstances here present, 

the affi rmation of the integrity of trial proceedings and the goal of deterrence have 

both been achieved by the fi ndings of guilt. Th e Court is further persuaded that, at 

this late date, four years after the events which gave rise to these charges, no warrant 

exists for the imposition of jail sentences additional to the periods of imprisonment 

which have already been served by the non-lawyer defendants. While Mr. Kunstler 

was never incarcerated, in the considered judgment of the Court, no purpose, other 

than the impermissible purpose of vindictiveness, would be served by sentencing him 

to prison at this time. Th e condemnation of his conduct and the potentially grave 

consequences of a criminal contempt conviction to a member of the bar should serve 

as adequate deterrents to other lawyers who may be disposed to similar misbehavior.

 In light of the unique character and long history of this case, and the defendants’ 

attack on the integrity and fairness of the American judicial process, a concluding 

observation is appropriate. Th roughout these proceedings, the defense has asserted 

that both the 1969 Anti-Riot Act prosecution and the present contempt proceedings 

have been “political trials” designed to suppress dissent. Th is position, they claim, 

gives them license unilaterally to dispense with the standards of civility to which 

American lawyers and litigants customarily adhere in criminal, as well as civil, trials. 

It is precisely to preserve the opportunity for the fair and dispassionate resolution 

of strenuously contested disputes by an impartial tribunal that rules governing the 

behavior of all the actors in a trial exist. . . . 

 Trials which proceed in accordance with the law, the rules of evidence and the 

standards of demeanor not only reaffi rm the integrity and viability of the judicial 

process, but also serve to insure the ability of each one of us to protect the rights and 

liberties we enjoy as citizens.
The Chicago Seven: 1960s Radicalism in the Federal Courts

67

Anti-Riot Act

The Chicago conspiracy trial defendants were the fi rst individuals prosecuted under 

the anti-riot provisions that Congress incorporated in the Civil Rights Act of 1968. 

The U.S. House of Representatives in 1967 overwhelmingly passed a version of the 

anti-riot provision in response to the urban riots of that summer and assertions 

from some members of Congress that African-American political activists had instigated the violence. The Senate included the provision in an open housing bill, and 

although President Johnson and Attorney General Ramsey Clark did not support 

the anti-riot provision, the administration accepted it to secure passage of the civil 

rights measure. 

 [Document Source: 82 Stat. 75.]

 

2101. Riots

(a) (1) Whoever travels in interstate or foreign commerce or uses any facility of interstate or foreign commerce or uses any facility of interstate or foreign commerce, 

including, but not limited to, the mail, telegraph, telephone, radio, or television, with 

intent – 

 (A) to incite a riot; or (B) to organize, promote, encourage, participate in, or carry 

on a riot; or (C) to commit any act of violence in furtherance of a riot; or (D) to aid 

or abet any person in inciting or participating in or carrying on a riot or committing 

any act of violence in furtherance of a riot; and who either during the course of any 

such travel or use or thereafter performs or attempts to perform any other overt act 

for any purpose specifi ed in subparagraph (A), (B), (C), or (D) of this paragraph 

shall be fi ned not more than $10,000, or imprisoned not more than fi ve years, or 

both. (b) In any prosecution under this section, proof that a defendant engaged or 

attempted to engage in one or more of the overt acts described in subparagraph (A), 

(B), (C), or (D) of paragraph (1) of subsection (a) and (1) has traveled in interstate 

or foreign commerce, or (2) has use of or used any facility of interstate or foreign 

commerce, including but not limited to, mail, telegraph, telephone, radio, or television, to communicate with or broadcast to any person or group of persons prior to 

such overt acts, such travel or use shall be admissible proof to establish that such 

defendant traveled in or used such facility of interstate or foreign commerce. 
The Chicago Seven: 1960s Radicalism in the Federal Courts

68

“The Strategy of Confrontation,” report of the Daley 

administration

Mayor Daley ordered his administration and the city police to prepare a report that 

would correct what Daley characterized as “unfortunate, inaccurate reporting.” The 

report, quickly drafted under the direction of city counsel Raymond Simon, insisted 

that the police had been restrained in the face of revolutionary violence, and it offered statistics on the relatively small number of arrests and injuries. The report 

blamed the violence on the actions of a small group of political activists, and specifi cally cited Rennie Davis, Tom Hayden, Abbie Hoffman, Jerry Rubin, and David 

Dellinger, whose brief biographies showed “that they are not strangers to the tactics 

of confrontation.” The American Civil Liberties Union called the report “utterly 

dishonest.” At a press conference displaying confi scated weapons, including a jarred 

black widow spider, police superintendent James Conlisk announced that in the 

future the Chicago police would use more tear gas to control mobs.

 [Document Source: “The Strategy of Confrontation: Chicago and the Democratic 

National Convention – 1968.” Report prepared by Raymond F. Simon, corporation counsel, City of Chicago, Sept. 6, 1968, pp. 49–50.]

 

Conclusion

 Th e leaders of the dissident movement are nationally known agitators who 

had arrived fresh from triumphs at Berkeley and Columbia. Th eir publicly stated 

purpose in coming to Chicago was twofold. Th e immediate object was to disrupt 

the Convention and the City. Th eir ultimate goal, also publicly proclaimed, was to 

topple what they consider to be the corrupt institutions of our society, educational, 

governmental, etc., by impeding and if possible halting their normal functions while 

exposing the authorities to ridicule and embarrassment. Th ey are anxious to destroy 

these institutions, but it is unclear as to what replacements they envision, as Senator 

Daniel Inouye of Hawaii observed in the Convention’s Keynote address when he 

asked “what trees do they plant?”

 Th e dual goals of immediate disruption and ultimate destruction were pursued 

in Chicago against the government under the guise of a protest against the war in 

Vietnam. Th is promised to be a very successful ploy since, as debates at the Convention 

demonstrated, everyone wants peace and disagreement occurs only over methods.

 In spite of such attractive bait, the guerilla or psychological warfare tactics which 

were employed by these revolutionaries erupted in few serious incidents, the main 

one being an eighteen minute encounter in front of the Hilton Hotel. As is so often 

the case, the trusting, the innocent, and the idealist were taken in and taken over. 

Th e news media, too, responded with surprising naivete and were incredibly misused. 

Indeed, any success the revolutionaries achieved in their ultimate objectives of fomenting hatred and ridicule among the citizenry against the authorities was in large 
The Chicago Seven: 1960s Radicalism in the Federal Courts

69

part attributable to the almost totally sympathetic coverage extended by reporters 

to the revolutionary leaders and more understandably, to the attractive idealistic but 

unwary young people who unwittingly lent them assistance and camoufl age. . . . 

 It seems clear that a nucleus of adult trouble makers avowedly seeking a hostile 

confrontation with the police will be engaging in the same activities detailed in this 

report in other cities and towns across the nation. Th ey have announced their intention “to create 200 to 300 Chicagos.” All who believe in the essential desirability of 

our present form of government are challenged to fi nd the best response to what is 

frequently a violent and revolutionary attack upon our institutions—a response at 

once eff ective yet consistent with the dignity and freedom of each and all our citizens.

Walker Report summary

On September 4, 1968, Milton Eisenhower, chair of the National Commission on 

the Causes and Prevention of Violence, announced that the commission would investigate the violence at the Chicago convention and report its fi ndings to President 

Lyndon Johnson. A Chicago lawyer, Daniel Walker, headed the team of over 200 

members, who interviewed more than 1,400 witnesses to the events and studied FBI 

reports and fi lm of the confrontations. The report released on December 1, 1968, 

characterized the convention violence as a “police riot” and recommended prosecution of police who used indiscriminate violence. The report made clear that the vast 

majority of police had behaved responsibly, but it said that failure to prosecute the 

police who misbehaved would further damage public confi dence in law enforcement. 

Chief Judge William Campbell criticized the release of the report before the completion of the grand jury investigation and suggested that the grand jury might need 

to investigate the motivation for the release. Milton Eisenhower, however, defended 

the commission’s decision to publish the report because of “widespread interest” in 

the fi ndings. The report was unvarnished in its presentation of the language used by 

demonstrators and their provocation of the police, but it also blamed the violence on 

the city government’s refusal to allow permits.

 [Document Source: Rights in Confl ict. Convention Week in Chicago, August 25–

29, 1968. A Report submitted by Daniel Walker, Director of the Chicago Study 

Team, to the National Commission on the Causes and Prevention of Violence. 

Introduction by Max Frankel. New York: E.P. Dutton, 1968. pp. 1, 10–11.]

 

A Summary

 During the week of the Democratic National Convention, the Chicago police 

were the targets of mounting provocation by both word and act. It took the form of 

obscene epithets, and of rocks, sticks, bathroom tiles and even human feces hurled 

at police by demonstrators. Some of these acts had been planned; others were spon-
The Chicago Seven: 1960s Radicalism in the Federal Courts

70

taneous or were themselves provoked by police action. Furthermore, the police had 

been put on edge by widely published threats of attempts to disrupt both the city 

and the Convention.

 Th at was the nature of the provocation. Th e nature of the response was unrestrained and indiscriminate police violence on many occasions, particularly at 

night.

 Th at violence was made all the more shocking by the fact that it was often infl icted 

upon persons who had broken no law, disobeyed no order, made no threat. Th ese 

included peaceful demonstrators, onlookers, and large numbers of residents who 

were simply passing through, or happened to live in, the areas where confrontations 

were occurring. 

 Newsmen and photographers were singled out for assault, and their equipment 

deliberately damaged. Fundamental police training was ignored; and offi cers, when 

on the scene, were often unable to control their men. As one police offi cer put it: 

“What happened didn’t have anything to do with police work.” . . . 

 Police violence was a fact of convention week. Were the policemen who committed 

it a minority? It appears certain that they were—but one which has imposed some of 

the consequences of its actions on the majority, and certainly on their commanders. 

Th ere has been no public condemnation of these violators of sound police procedures 

and common decency by either their commanding offi cers or city offi cials. Nor (at 

the time this Report is being completed—almost three months after the convention) 

has any disciplinary action been taken against most of them. Th at some policemen 

lost control of themselves under exceedingly provocative circumstances can perhaps 

be understood; but not condoned. If no action is taken against them, the eff ect can 

only be to discourage the majority of policemen who acted responsibly, and further 

weaken the bond between police and community.

 Although the crowds were fi nally dispelled on the nights of violence in Chicago, 

the problems they represent have not been. Surely this is not the last time that a 

violent dissenting group will clash head-on with those whose duty it is to enforce 

the law. And the next time the whole world will still be watching.

The committee to defend the conspiracy

A committee of notable writers, academics, and performers published this call for fi -

nancial support of the defendants as they approached the start of the trial. The committee warned that the indictment was part of a government effort to silence political 

dissent and warned that prosecutions under the Anti-Riot Act, which criminalized 

intent rather than actions, would lead to a “police state.” The committee saw the 

trial as an opportunity to educate the public about the issues that had brought the 

demonstrators to the Chicago convention. A week before this letter was published, 

Rennie Davis held a press conference in Chicago to announce fundraising for the 

legal fees. The defendants now referred to themselves as “The Conspiracy” and they 
The Chicago Seven: 1960s Radicalism in the Federal Courts

71

planned meetings across the country to educate the public about the impending trial 

and “to raise questions of who are the criminals in America today.”

 [Document Source: New York Review of Books, v. 12, n. 12 (June 19, 1969).]

 

 Th e federal indictment in Chicago of eight political dissenters for conspiracy to 

promote disorder and riot during the week of the Democratic National Convention 

is one of the most ominous challenges to political liberty since the passing of Senator Joseph R. McCarthy. It calls for a clear and considered response from all who 

believe that the preservation of political dissent is now, more than ever, crucial to the 

survival of democratic process in America.

 . . . We are now organizing a large group of sponsors for a national campaign 

built around the following statement:

 “Eight political activists who were prominent in the mass demonstrations of 

protest during the Democratic National Convention in Chicago are now under 

federal indictment for criminal conspiracy. Th ey are the fi rst persons to be so charged 

under Title 18 of the Civil Rights Act of 1968 which makes it a felony to “travel in 

interstate commerce . . . with the intent to incite, promote, encourage, participate in 

and carry on a riot. . . .”

 “Th e eff ect of this ‘anti-riot’ act is to subvert the fi rst Amendment guarantee 

of free assembly by equating organized political protest with organized violence. 

Potentially, this law is the foundation for a police state in America.

 “In this decade, countless Americans have contributed to the revitalization of 

politics through freedom rides, peace marches and other demonstrations of protest 

against impacted political institutions. Yet, from Bull Connor’s Birmingham to 

Richard Daley’s Chicago, civil authorities have employed police violence to suppress 

‘the right of the people peaceably to assemble,’ repeatedly invoking the specters of 

conspiracy, incitement and riot. Th e Justice Department has now joined the assault 

on free political action.

 “Title 18, the ‘anti-riot’ provision, was attached to the Civil Rights Act of 1968 

by a repressive coalition in the Congress and was aimed at black civil rights activists. 

Enacted in the wake of the urban riots that followed the murder of Martin Luther 

King, the rider found support even among members of the Congress who might 

ordinarily resist the delusion that social disorder is the sinister work of ‘outside agitators.’

 “Th e ‘anti-riot’ clause and the indictment in Chicago are legally and Constitutionally dubious. While acts of violence, incitement and disruption are explicitly 

covered by numerous, long-established state and local laws, conspiracy—which deals 

not with act but with intent—is a vague concept at best. Prosecution for conspiracy 

requires no proof of the commission of a crime, nor even of an attempt. Th us the 
The Chicago Seven: 1960s Radicalism in the Federal Courts

72

prosecution of conspiracy all too easily becomes political harassment of persons who 

hold dissenting ideas.

 “It is especially surprising that this new law should fi rst be tested in connection 

with the Chicago disorders. For the events of convention week do reveal, with terrible 

clarity, that it is local authority and police who decide whether violence attends civil 

demonstration. In this case, the responsibility of the Chicago authorities is the more 

striking when it is remembered that several of the eight men under indictment have 

helped to organize major public demonstrations in other cities, both before and after 

the week of the Democratic National Convention. None of these demonstrations 

resulted in riot. . . . 

 “Confronted by a patently political challenge, the eight defendants have determined on a political response as well as a legal defense. Th rough their trial they will 

carry forward the fi rst constitutional challenge to the anti-riot act. Th ey intend, as 

well, to refocus public attention on the root issues that brought them and thousands 

of others to Chicago and the Democratic National Convention—the war, racism, the 

widening power of the military-academic-industrial complex, the enfeeblement of 

the nation’s political process. As a sign of their refusal to be intimidated by the scare 

label the government would hang upon them, the defendants are calling themselves 

Th e Conspiracy; and they are inviting other Americans who are similarly committed 

to radical change in this nation to join Th e Conspiracy. Th ey are also appealing for 

fi nancial and moral support to Americans who fi nd in this indictment disturbing 

implications for the safeguard of constitutional liberty and a democratic political life. 

. . . 

Peter Babcox, Noam Chomsky, Judy Collins, Harvey Cox, Edgar Z. Friedenberg, 

Michael Harrington, Nat Hentoff , Donald Kalish, Christopher Lasch, Sidney Lens, 

Herbert Magidson, Norman Mailer, Stewart Meacham, Larry David Nachman, 

Conor Cruise O’Brien, Susan Sontag, Benjamin Spock, I. F. Stone, Harold Taylor

Tom Wicker, “‘Other Thoughts’ in Chicago”

Like many journalists covering the Chicago conspiracy trial, Tom Wicker noted that 

the proceedings often bore little resemblance to other criminal trials. In addition to 

the colorful witnesses and the theatrical behavior of the judge and defendants, the 

charge faced by the defendants, according to Wicker, bore little resemblance to other 

criminal charges and raised fundamental questions about the fairness of the law.

 [Document Source: “In the Nation” column, New York Times, Jan. 22, 1970.]

 

 An air of unreality hangs over the trial of the so-called “Chicago Seven,” and not 

merely because it keeps turning up such witnesses as Country Joe, the leader of the 

rock group known as Country Joe and the Fish. 
The Chicago Seven: 1960s Radicalism in the Federal Courts

73

 Bearded, wearing an Indian headband and purple boots, he gave his name as 

Country Joe. And when the prosecution demanded full identifi cation, Judge Julius 

Hoff man replied in tones of resignation: “Well, I assume his Christian name must 

be ‘Country.’”

 But again, it is not just Judge Hoff man’s undeniable theatrical gifts nor even the 

widespread belief—given frequent offi cial voice by the defense counsel—that he 

favors the prosecution, that makes this landmark trial seem so alien to a conventional 

assumption of the fi tness of things.

Issue Obscured

 It is more nearly because there is so little talk or testimony about any of the familiar 

events that might be thought to be at issue. Surprisingly little is being said about the 

actual events that surrounded the Democratic convention of 1968, the marches, the 

police response, the violence in the streets, and although echoes of grim nights in 

Grant Park keep coming through—their vibrations were certainly bad, as Country 

Joe put it—the testimony here is focused elsewhere, and rather hazily at that. . . .

 And that in the fi nal analysis is why this sometimes ludicrous proceeding seems 

to have so little relationship, not only just to what happened in Chicago in August 

of 1968, but to any of our familiar notions of what trials are all about, of what constitutes legal guilt, of what the law’s limits are in America.

 Th e Chicago Seven are not being tried for committing acts of violence in August 

of 1968; nor are they even being tried for having caused the violence that did take 

place.

 Th ey are, rather, charged with “conspiring” to disrupt the convention with 

violence, and it is this “conspiracy”—whether it existed—that is the issue in Judge 

Hoff man’s court. It is at least theoretically possible, therefore, that even had there 

been no violence at all, the Seven could still be on trial here for taking part in the 

alleged conspiracy.

Intentions as Cause

 Violence did, of course, take place in Chicago in August, 1968. It may be that 

some, or all of the defendants intended or hoped for violence. But the intention, on 

the one hand, did not necessarily cause the violence, on the other. If the Seven were 

on trial here to determine whether acts or intentions of theirs did cause the convention-week violence that actually happened, there would be only a factual question 

of guilt or innocence to be determined—the usual business of a criminal trial.

 But that is not the case. Th e defendants here are the fi rst to be tried under a 

provision of the 1968 Civil Rights Act that made it a Federal crime to cross a state 

line with the intention to cause a riot or a disturbance. Th e constitutionality of this 

statute has yet to be determined, but the Chicago trial clearly suggests—as indeed, 
The Chicago Seven: 1960s Radicalism in the Federal Courts

74

does the language of the act—that what it seeks to prohibit or penalize is a state of 

mind, not an overt act.

Burden of Proof

 Ironically, it is also pretty clear from this proceeding how diffi cult it is to prove 

a state of mind, long afterwards. It is probably more diffi cult for the prosecution, on 

whom rests the burden of proof, than for the defendants, which is why Mr. Schultz 

sound so preposterous in his eff orts to show that Rennie Davis was saying one thing 

to Roger Wilkins while “thinking other thoughts.”

 Nevertheless, if the issue of a trial actually comes down to “other thoughts,” rather 

than to actual words and deeds, the deeper question may be whether even “the burden 

of proof ” any longer means anything.
The Chicago Seven: 1960s Radicalism in the Federal Courts

75

Bibliography

The Conspiracy Trial. Eds., Judy Clavir and John Spitzer. Indianapolis, IN: BobbsMerrill Co., 1970.

Danelski, David J. “The Chicago Conspiracy Trial.” In Theodore L. Becker, ed. 

Political Trials. Indianapolis, IN: Bobbs-Merrill Co., 1971, 134–80.

Ely, James W., Jr. “The Chicago Conspiracy Case.” In Michal R. Belknap, ed. American 

Political Trials. Westport: Greenwood Press, 1981, pp. 233–53.

Epstein, Jason. The Great Conspiracy Trial: An Essay on Law, Liberty and the 

Constitution. New York: Random House, 1970.

Hayden, Tom. Reunion: A Memoir. New York: Random House, 1988.

Hayden, Tom. Trial. New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1970.

Hoffman, Abbie. Soon to be a Major Motion Picture. New York: Perigee Books, 

1980.

Kinoy, Arthur, Helene E. Schwartz & Doris Peterson. Conspiracy on Appeal: Appellate 

Brief on Behalf of the Chicago Eight. New York: Agathon Publication Services, Inc., 

1971.

Lahav, Pnina. “Law and Character: Chicago Conspiracy Trial: Character and Judicial 

Discretion,” University of Colorado Law Review (2000), 1327.

Lahav, Pnina. “Theater in the Courtroom: The Chicago Conspiracy Trial,” Cardozo 

Studies in Law and Literature 16 (Fall 2004), 381.

Lukas, J. Anthony. The Barnyard Epithet and Other Obscenities: Notes on the Chicago 

Conspiracy Trial. New York: Harper and Row, 1970.

Mailer, Norman. Miami and the Siege of Chicago: An Informal History of the Republican 

and Democratic Conventions of 1968. New York: World Publishing, 1968.

Raskin, Jonah. For the Hell of It: The Life and Times of Abbie Hoffman. Berkeley: 

University of California Press, 1996.

Rubin, Jerry. Growing (Up) at Thirty-seven. New York: M. Evans and Co., 1976.
The Chicago Seven: 1960s Radicalism in the Federal Courts

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Schultz, John. The Chicago Conspiracy Trial. New York: DaCapo Press, 1993.

Seale, Bobby. The Lonely Rage: The Autobiography of Bobby Seale. New York: Times 

Books, 1978.

Conspiracy in the Streets: The Extraordinary Trial of the Chicago Eight. Edited with an 

Introduction by Jon Weiner. New York: The New Press, 2006.

Rights in Confl ict. Convention Week in Chicago, August 25–29, 1968. A Report 

submitted by Daniel Walker, Director of the Chicago Study Team, to the National 

Commission on the Causes and Prevention of Violence. Introduction by Max 

Frankel. New York: E.P. Dutton, 1968.
The Federal Judicial Center

Board

The Chief Justice of the United States, Chair

Judge Susan H. Black, U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit

Judge David O. Carter, U.S. District Court for the Central District of California

Magistrate Judge Karen Klein, U.S. District Court for the District of North Dakota

Judge Loretta A. Preska, U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York

Judge Philip M. Pro, U.S. District Court for the District of Nevada

Judge Stephen Raslavich, U.S. Bankruptcy Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania

Judge William B. Traxler, Jr., U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit

James C. Duff, Director of the Administrative Offi ce of the U.S. Courts

Director

Judge Barbara J. Rothstein

Deputy Director

John S. Cooke

About the Federal Judicial Center

The Federal Judicial Center is the research and education agency of the federal judicial system. It was established by Congress in 1967 (28 U.S.C. §§ 620–629), on the recommendation of the Judicial Conference of the United States.

By statute, the Chief Justice of the United States chairs the Center’s Board, which also includes the director of the Administrative Offi ce of the U.S. Courts and seven judges elected 

by the Judicial Conference.

The organization of the Center refl ects its primary statutory mandates. The Education 

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