1 

CIVIL LIABILITY FOR 

INTERROGATION VIOLATIONS 

Edmund Zigmund 

Senior Instructor, Legal Division 

Federal Law Enforcement Training Center 

Police questioning is an effective tool for the enforcement of criminal laws.1

 However, coerced 

statements taken in violation of the Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination are 

inadmissible. Also, since Miranda2, courts have protected this right by suppressing any custodial 

statement if police fail to comply with certain procedural safeguards.3

 There are other remedies 

as well, including civil liability. When and how can law enforcement officers be held civilly 

liable for their actions during police interrogation? 

The Fifth Amendment Self-Incrimination Clause

In Chavez v. Martinez, 538 U.S. 760 (2003), police officers shot Martinez during an 

investigation. Chavez, a patrol supervisor, accompanied Martinez to the hospital and then 

questioned Martinez while he was receiving medical treatment. Eventually Martinez admitted 

that he took a gun from the officer’s holster and pointed it at the police. He also admitted that he 

used heroin regularly. At no point during the interview was Martinez given Miranda warnings. 

Martinez was never charged with a crime, and his statements were never used against him in any 

criminal prosecution. He sued Chavez and others under Title 42 U.S.C. §1983, alleging 

violations of his Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination and Fourteenth Amendment 

due process rights. 

The Fifth Amendment Self-Incrimination Clause states that “No person...shall be compelled in 

any criminal case to be a witness against himself....” The Supreme Court held that a violation of 

this clause occurs only when statements are used in a “criminal case.” Martinez was not 

prosecuted for a crime, let alone compelled to be a witness against himself in a criminal case. 

Therefore, this Constitutional privilege was not violated and Chavez is entitled to qualified 

immunity. 

In Robinson v. Gunja, 92 Fed. Appx. 624 (10th Cir. 2004), a federal prisoner appealed the 

dismissal of his Title 42 U.S.C. §1983 complaint filed after a warden decided to terminate his 

telephone access to legal personnel. In his complaint, the prisoner asserted that prison authorities 

violated his Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination by providing him with purportedly 

unmonitored telephone access for legal purposes, monitoring these conversations, and using 

these conversations as the basis for terminating his legal telephone access. The Tenth Circuit 

Court held the prisoner could not establish a claim for the violation of his right against selfincrimination because he did not allege that any of the information obtained from the monitored 

calls was used against him in any “criminal proceeding.” See also Gibson v. Picou, 101 Fed. 

Appx. 154 (7th Cir. 2004); Allison v. Snyder, 332 F.3d 1076 (7th Cir. 2003). 
2 

When is there a “case?” 

In Chavez, the Supreme Court stated: “In our view, a ‘criminal case’ at the very least requires the 

initiation of legal proceedings.” “We need not decide today the precise moment when a ‘criminal 

case’ commences; it is enough to say that police questioning does not constitute a ‘case’....” 

Renda v. King, 347 F.3d 550 (3d Cir. 2003), followed the Chavez case. In Renda, Trooper King 

was investigating Renda’s allegations of domestic abuse against a state trooper who lived with 

her. By telephone, Renda told King she had been slammed into a wall by the trooper at their 

residence earlier that day during an argument. Renda also said she did not want to give a 

statement or file charges and that she wanted to be left alone. After further investigation, King 

interviewed Renda in-person at her friend’s apartment. He did not provide Miranda warnings to 

Renda. She gave a written statement which did not mention the assault that she had reported 

earlier that evening. When asked why, Renda admitted that she had lied earlier. Based upon that 

statement, King then charged Renda with giving false reports to law enforcement authorities. 

The state court suppressed Renda’s statements because she had not been given Miranda

warnings prior to what it concluded was a custodial interrogation. The District Attorney then 

dismissed the case. Renda sued under Title 42 U.S.C. §1983. 

The Third Circuit Court noted the factual difference between Chavez and Renda. In Chavez, the 

plaintiff was never charged with a crime. In Renda, the plaintiff was charged with a crime but the 

charges were later dropped after the state court suppressed the statements obtained in violation of 

Miranda. The Court said that the plaintiff’s statement was used in a criminal case in one sense, 

i.e., to develop probable cause sufficient to charge her. However, the court said, “It is the use of 

coerced statements during a criminal trial, and not in obtaining an indictment, that violates the 

Constitution.” (emphasis added). As such, Renda’s constitutional right against self-incrimination 

was not violated. See also Jacobs v. Md. Dep't of Natural Res., 90 Fed. Appx. 677 (4th Cir. 

2004). 

Miranda

In Dickerson v. U.S., 530 U.S. 428 (2000), the Supreme Court ruled that “Miranda announced a 

constitutional rule that Congress may not supersede legislatively.” The Miranda warnings have 

taken on constitutional stature. (bold added). Is there civil liability then for failing to give the 

warnings or giving them improperly? 

In Chavez, six Supreme Court Justices agreed that mere custodial interrogation absent Miranda

warnings is not a basis for a Title 42 U.S.C. §1983 claim. The “procedural safeguards” required 

by Miranda are “not themselves rights protected by the Constitution but measures to insure that 

the right against compulsory self-incrimination was protected....” (see Michigan v. Tucker, 417 

U.S. 433 (1974)). “All the Fifth Amendment forbids is the introduction of coerced statements at 

trial. Accordingly, Chavez’s failure to read Miranda warnings to Martinez did not violate 

Martinez’s constitutional rights and cannot be grounds for a §1983 action.” 

Following the guidance of Chavez, the Third Circuit Court in Renda held that a plaintiff may not 

base a §1983 claim on the mere fact that the police questioned the plaintiff in custody without 
3 

providing Miranda warnings where there is no claim that the statements obtained in violation of 

Miranda were used against the plaintiff. Violations of the prophylactic Miranda procedures do 

not amount to violations of the Constitution itself. 

The Fourteenth Amendment Due Process Clause

(Fifth Amendment Due Process Clause for federal officers/agents) 

The Supreme Court’s views on the proper scope of the Fifth Amendment’s Self-incrimination 

Clause do not mean that police torture and abuse that result in confessions is constitutionally 

permissible so long as the statements are not used at trial. The Fourteenth Amendment (and the 

Fifth Amendment Due Process Clause) provides that no person shall be deprived of life, liberty, 

or property, without due process of law. In Chavez, the Supreme Court held that convictions 

based on evidence obtained by methods that are so brutal and so offensive to human dignity, that 

“shock the conscience,” violate this Due Process Clause and that this type of police behavior 

may be the basis of a §1983 action. In Miller v. Fenton, 474 U.S. 104, 109 (1985), the Supreme

Court said: “Certain interrogation techniques, either in isolation or as applied to the unique 

characteristics of a particular suspect, are so offensive to a civilized system of justice that they 

must be condemned under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.” A majority in 

Chavez agreed that additional consideration was necessary to determine whether Chavez’s 

actions were so brutal and offensive that they shocked the conscience and, therefore, could 

support Martinez’s claim for a substantive Fourteenth Amendment Due Process violation. This 

issue was remanded to the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals. 

On remand, the Ninth Circuit Court held that “If Martinez’s allegations are proven, it would be 

impossible not to be shocked by Sergeant Chavez’s actions....Under the facts alleged by 

Martinez, Chavez violated Martinez’s clearly established due process rights.”4

 The case is now 

pending trial in the District Court. 

Conclusion

Civil liability under the Fifth Amendment Self-Incrimination Clause and for Miranda violations 

is limited to those cases where the obtained statements are used against the defendant in a 

criminal trial. Liability does not exist if the statements are used for other purposes, like 

investigating police misconduct or developing probable cause to arrest a suspect in a criminal 

case. 

However, there can be civil liability under the Fourteenth Amendment when police use physical 

or mental interrogation techniques so brutal and offensive that they “shock the conscience.” This 

civil liability exists even if the obtained statements are never used in a criminal case against the 

person who was subjected to the interrogation.5

Edmund Zigmund is a Senior Legal Instructor at the Federal Law Enforcement Training Center. He has served as a 

local police officer, state prosecutor, police legal advisor in Pennsylvania, and a legal instructor for the North 

Carolina Justice Academy. 
4 

 

1 Moran v. Burbine, 475 U.S. 412, 426 (1986)

2 384 U.S. 436 (1966)

3 Mason v. Mitchell, 320 F.3d 604, 631 (6th Cir. 2003)

4 Martinez v. City of Oxnard, 337 F.3d 1091 (9th Cir. 2003)

5 See Cooper v. Dupnik, 963 F.2d 1220 (9th Cir. 1992)