[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it may be cited as 

Columbus Bar Assn. v. Reed, Slip Opinion No. 2016-Ohio-834.] 

NOTICE 

This slip opinion is subject to formal revision before it is published in an 

advance sheet of the Ohio Official Reports. Readers are requested to 

promptly notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of Ohio, 65 

South Front Street, Columbus, Ohio 43215, of any typographical or other 

formal errors in the opinion, in order that corrections may be made before 

the opinion is published. 

SLIP OPINION NO. 2016-OHIO-834

COLUMBUS BAR ASSOCIATION v. REED.

[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it 

may be cited as Columbus Bar Assn. v. Reed, Slip Opinion No. 

2016-Ohio-834.] 

Attorneys—Misconduct—Violations of the Rules of Professional Conduct, 

including failing to provide competent representation and failing to respond 

to demand for information by a disciplinary authority during an 

investigation—Two-year suspension with 18 months stayed on conditions. 

(No. 2015-0587—Submitted September 15, 2015—Decided March 8, 2016.) 

ON CERTIFIED REPORT by the Board of Professional Conduct of the Supreme 

Court, No. 2014-050. 

_______________________ 

Per Curiam. 

{¶ 1} Respondent, Joseph Dues Reed of Columbus, Ohio, Attorney 

Registration No. 0025938, was admitted to the practice of law in Ohio in 1983. In 

2000, we sanctioned him with a stayed six-month suspension for neglecting a client 
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2

matter. Columbus Bar Assn. v. Reed, 88 Ohio St.3d 48, 723 N.E.2d 568 (2000). In 

2006, we briefly suspended him for noncompliance with his continuing-legaleducation requirements. See In re Reed, 110 Ohio St.3d 1432, 2006-Ohio-3902, 

852 N.E.2d 182. In December 2015, we suspended him again for noncompliance 

with his continuing-legal-education requirements. 144 Ohio St.3d 1418, 1421, 

2015-Ohio-5126, 41 N.E.3d 1256. 

{¶ 2} In June 2014, relator, Columbus Bar Association, charged him with 

neglecting clients, failing to cooperate in the disciplinary process, and other 

professional misconduct. Based on the parties’ stipulations and Reed’s testimony 

at a hearing before a three-member panel of the Board of Professional Conduct, the 

panel found that he had engaged in most of the charged misconduct, dismissed 

some of the charges, and recommended that we impose a two-year suspension with 

six months stayed on conditions. The board adopted the panel’s findings of fact, 

conclusions of law, and recommended sanction. Reed has filed objections to some 

of the board’s findings and to its recommendation, arguing that his suspension 

should be stayed in its entirety. 

{¶ 3} Based on our review of the record, we accept the board’s findings of 

misconduct but conclude that a two-year suspension, with 18 months stayed on 

conditions, along with a period of monitored probation, is the appropriate sanction 

in this case. 

Misconduct

{¶ 4} The board found that Reed committed professional misconduct in 

three client matters. First, in April 2012, Toni Gravely paid Reed $525 to file an 

Ohio divorce case on her behalf. After accepting Gravely’s money, Reed had no 

further contact with her—despite her repeated attempts to communicate with him. 

Nor did Reed file the divorce complaint, which resulted in her being forced to 

litigate the divorce in West Virginia, where her husband had later filed suit. In 

November 2012, Gravely filed a grievance against Reed, but he failed to respond 
January Term, 2016 

3

to two letters of inquiry from disciplinary counsel. Reed also failed to comply with 

a subpoena seeking his appearance for a deposition concerning the grievance. 

{¶ 5} In the second matter, Reed and a former client, R. Thomas Pierce, 

arbitrated a fee dispute pursuant to the regulations of relator’s fee-dispute 

arbitration program. In January 2013, the arbitrator required Reed to refund $1,125 

to Pierce within ten days of receiving notice of the arbitration award. Reed, 

however, failed to timely refund the money, and after eight months, Pierce was 

forced to hire counsel to secure his money. In March 2014—14 months after the 

arbitration award—Reed paid Pierce’s counsel $1,400, from which Pierce received 

$1,011.85. 

{¶ 6} The third matter involved another case of client neglect. In January 

2013, the girlfriend of Joshua Smith, a prisoner, paid Reed $1,000 to file a motion 

for judicial release and to represent Smith at any ensuing hearing. But Reed neither 

contacted Smith at the prison nor conducted any work on the case; nor did he 

respond to multiple communications from Smith’s father seeking information about 

the matter. In July 2013, Smith’s father filed a grievance with relator, but Reed 

failed to respond to relator’s letters of inquiry. In October 2013, Smith filed a 

request for fee-dispute arbitration with relator, but Reed also failed to respond to 

relator’s letters regarding Smith’s arbitration request. 

{¶ 7} Based on this conduct, the parties stipulated and the board found that 

Reed had violated Prof.Cond.R. 1.1 (requiring a lawyer to provide competent 

representation to a client), 1.3 (requiring a lawyer to act with reasonable diligence 

in representing a client), 1.4(a)(3) (requiring a lawyer to keep the client reasonably 

informed about the status of a matter), 1.4(a)(4) (requiring a lawyer to comply as 

soon as practicable with reasonable requests for information from the client), 8.1(b) 

(prohibiting a lawyer from knowingly failing to respond to a demand for 

information by a disciplinary authority during an investigation), and 8.4(h) 

(prohibiting a lawyer from engaging in conduct that adversely reflects on the 
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lawyer’s fitness to practice law) and former Gov.Bar R. V(4)(G)1 (requiring a 

lawyer to cooperate in a certified grievance committee’s alternative-disputeresolution procedures). Consistent with our opinion in Disciplinary Counsel v. 

Bricker, 137 Ohio St.3d 35, 2013-Ohio-3998, 997 N.E.2d 500, ¶ 21, the board 

expressly found that Reed’s failure to comply with the regulations of relator’s feedispute arbitration program and his failure to cooperate in the disciplinary process, 

including his ignoring a subpoena to appear for a deposition, was sufficiently 

egregious to support a finding that he violated Prof.Cond.R. 8.4(h). We agree with 

the board’s findings of misconduct. 

{¶ 8} Finally, the board’s report indicates that Reed continues to owe 

restitution in the amounts of $375 to Gravely, $113.15 to Pierce,2

 and $1,000 to 

Smith or the Lawyer’s Fund for Client Protection, which the board noted had 

received a claim regarding the Smith matter. 

Sanction

{¶ 9} When imposing sanctions for attorney misconduct, we consider 

several relevant factors, including the ethical duties that the lawyer violated, the 

sanctions imposed in similar cases, and the aggravating and mitigating factors listed 

in Gov.Bar R. V(13). 

Aggravating and mitigating factors 

{¶ 10} The board found the following aggravating factors: prior 

disciplinary offenses, a dishonest or selfish motive, a pattern of misconduct, 

multiple offenses, a lack of cooperation in the disciplinary process, harm to the 

 

1

 Effective January 1, 2015, the provisions previously set forth in Gov.Bar R. V(4)(G) are codified 

in Gov.Bar R. V(9)(G). 140 Ohio St.3d CXIX. 

2

 The board’s report indicates that Reed owes Pierce $114.85. But the difference between the 

amount awarded to Pierce by the arbitrator ($1,125) and the actual amount that Pierce received from 

Reed ($1,011.85) is $113.15—not $114.85. Thus, it appears that the board slightly miscalculated 

the outstanding restitution amount in Pierce’s case. 
January Term, 2016 

5

victims of the misconduct, and a failure to make restitution. See Gov.Bar R. 

V(13)(B)(1) through (5), (8), and (9). The board found no mitigating factors. 

{¶ 11} Reed objects to these findings, arguing that there are factors that the 

board should have considered in mitigation, rather than in aggravation, and 

therefore his suspension should be stayed in its entirety. He argues that because he 

entered into written stipulations with relator, he should be given mitigating credit 

for cooperating in the disciplinary process. He similarly claims that he did not act 

with a dishonest or selfish motive. Reed states that he is a solo practitioner and that 

during the time period of his misconduct, he suffered from serious health 

challenges. He acknowledges that a few cases “fell through the cracks,” but he 

maintains that his misconduct was neither intentional nor motivated by dishonesty 

or selfishness. 

{¶ 12} We cannot conclude that the board erred in finding that Reed’s 

failure to cooperate in the disciplinary process was an aggravating factor. Although 

it is true that he ultimately stipulated to the charged misconduct, he initially failed 

to respond to multiple letters of inquiry and he ignored a subpoena to appear for a 

deposition. However, we agree with Reed that the record does not clearly and 

convincingly demonstrate that he had a dishonest or selfish motive. Reed testified 

that in 2012, pain in his hip made it difficult for him to work throughout the day, 

which led to hip-replacement surgery in August 2012. Reed acknowledged that 

during this time period, he was taking prescription painkillers, and although he did 

not abuse the drugs, he had problems weaning himself off the medication. 

Additionally, Reed testified that in early 2013, he sustained additional injuries from 

an automobile accident. Reed conceded that these health problems and the 

prescription medication may have affected his representation of clients. 

Accordingly, despite the fact that Reed initially stipulated to the aggravating factor 

of having a dishonest or selfish motive, we agree with Reed that the evidence 
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ultimately presented did not clearly establish that aggravating factor. Reed’s 

objections are otherwise overruled. 

Applicable precedent 

{¶ 13} To support its recommended sanction, the board cited Trumbull Cty. 

Bar Assn. v. Large, 134 Ohio St.3d 172, 2012-Ohio-5482, 980 N.E.2d 1021, and 

Toledo Bar Assn. v. Harvey, 141 Ohio St.3d 346, 2014-Ohio-3675, 24 N.E.3d 1106. 

In both cases, the attorneys neglected multiple client matters and failed to fully 

cooperate in the initial disciplinary investigation. Both cases also involved a 

profusion of aggravating factors, including prior discipline, and no mitigating 

factors. We suspended the attorneys for two years but stayed the final six months 

on conditions, including that the attorneys make restitution to their former clients. 

See Large at ¶ 4-5, 11-12, 16, 29, 38; Harvey at ¶ 10, 13-14, 18, 30, 37. 

{¶ 14} We agree with the board that Large and Harvey are instructive to 

this case. However, the attorneys’ misconduct in those cases was slightly more 

varied than Reed’s. For example, in both Large and Harvey, the attorneys also 

violated the rules regulating client trust accounts. See Large at ¶ 10, 16, 22; Harvey

at ¶ 18-22. Additionally, the attorney in Large engaged in dishonest conduct and 

made a false statement to a court. See Large at ¶ 10, 23-28. And the attorney in 

Harvey improperly communicated with a person that he knew was represented by 

counsel in a matter. See Harvey at ¶ 28. The board did not find that Reed engaged 

in any similar conduct, which suggests that a lesser sanction is warranted here. 

Conclusion 

{¶ 15} As we have often explained, “the goal of disciplinary proceedings is 

not to punish the errant lawyer, but to protect the public.” Toledo Bar Assn. v. 

Hales, 120 Ohio St.3d 340, 2008-Ohio-6201, 899 N.E.2d 130, ¶ 21. And “[w]hile 

consistency is also a goal, ‘we examine each case individually and impose the 

discipline we believe appropriate based on the unique circumstances of each case.’ 

” Id., quoting In re Disciplinary Action Against Ruffenach, 486 N.W.2d 387 
January Term, 2016 

7

(Minn.1992). Here, the board recommends that we suspend Reed for two years but 

stay the final six months of his suspension on the conditions that he complete a 

contract with the Ohio Lawyers Assistance Program (“OLAP”) and make 

restitution to all clients. We find, however, that reducing the time period of his 

actual suspension, and instead requiring that he serve a period of monitored 

probation upon his reinstatement, would best accomplish the goals of the 

disciplinary system. 

{¶ 16} Accordingly, Joseph Dues Reed is suspended from the practice of 

law for two years with the final 18 months stayed on the conditions that he (1) make 

restitution to Gravely, Pierce, and Smith, or, if applicable, the Lawyers’ Fund for 

Client Protection, before the end of the stayed period of his suspension, (2) enter 

into and comply with an OLAP contract, and (3) commit no further misconduct. 

Upon reinstatement from his actual suspension, Reed shall serve 18 months of 

monitored probation. If Reed fails to comply with the conditions of the stay, the 

stay will be lifted and Reed will serve the entire two-year suspension. Costs are 

taxed to Reed. 

Judgment accordingly. 

O’CONNOR, C.J., and PFEIFER, O’DONNELL, KENNEDY, and FRENCH, JJ., 

concur. 

LANZINGER and O’NEILL,JJ., and would adopt the position of the board and 

panel and impose a two-year suspension with six months stayed on conditions. 

_________________ 

Jeffrey C. Rogers; Tyack, Blackmore & Liston Co., L.P.A., and James P. 

Tyack; and Lori J. Brown, Bar Counsel, and A. Alysha Clous, Assistant Bar 

Counsel, for relator. 

Joseph Dues Reed, pro se. 

_________________