IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

No. 17-11046

Summary Calendar

GERARD N. MATZEN,

Plaintiff-Appellant

v.

MARSHA MCLANE, In Her Official and Individual Capacity as Executive 

Director, Texas Civil Commitment Office; ERIC TURPIN, Mayor, City of 

Littlefield, Individual Capacity; TINA KOVAR, Facility Director, In Her 

Official and Individual Capacity,

Defendants-Appellees

Appeals from the United States District Court

for the Northern District of Texas

USDC No. 5:16-CV-43

Before BENAVIDES, HIGGINSON, and ENGELHARDT, Circuit Judges. 

PER CURIAM:*

Gerard N. Matzen, who was determined to be a Texas sexually violent 

predator, appeals the partial judgment under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 

54(b) dismissing his 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claims against Marsha McLane, the 

executive director of the Texas Civil Commitment Office, in her individual and 

 

* Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined that this opinion should not 

be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH 

CIR. R. 47.5.4.

United States Court of Appeals

Fifth Circuit

FILED

April 4, 2019

Lyle W. Cayce

Clerk

 Case: 17-11046 Document: 00514902404 Page: 1 Date Filed: 04/04/2019
No. 17-11046

2

official capacities, for lack of subject matter jurisdiction under Federal Rule of 

Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) and for failure to state a claim under Rule 12(b)(6). 

He also appeals the partial judgment dismissing his claims against Tina 

Kovar, the facility director of the Texas Civil Commitment Center, and Eric 

Turpin, the Mayor of the City of Littlefield, in their individual capacities under 

Rule 12(b)(6).

Although Matzen argues that the district court erred in dismissing his 

claims against McLane pursuant to Rule 12(b)(1), we need not address those 

arguments because Matzen has failed to show the district court erred in 

dismissing his claims under Rule 12(b)(6). We review de novo the district 

court’s grant of a Rule 12(b)(6) motion. McLin v. Ard, 866 F.3d 682, 688 (5th 

Cir. 2017).

To the extent Matzen argues that McLane violated his Fourteenth 

Amendment due process rights by subjecting him to prison-like conditions at 

the Texas Civil Commitment Center, he has failed to show how those 

conditions “lacked a reasonable relation to Texas’s twin goals of long-term 

supervision and treatment of sexually violent predators.” Brown v. Taylor, 911 

F.3d 235, 243 (5th Cir. 2018) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). 

Moreover, “restrictive conditions alone do not state a due process claim.” Id. 

Accordingly, Matzen has failed to set forth sufficient facts to state a Fourteenth 

Amendment due process claim. See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009);

Brown, 911 F.3d at 243-44.

Similarly, Matzen has not stated a cognizable First Amendment claim

against McLane. Matzen argues that McLane violated his First Amendment 

right to associate by not allowing him to “contact any person without first 

obtaining permission” and by not allowing him to vote in person during the 

2016 election. However, Matzen admitted that “the civil commitment law in 

 Case: 17-11046 Document: 00514902404 Page: 2 Date Filed: 04/04/2019
No. 17-11046

3

Texas has changed in regards to [a sexually violent predator’s] contact” and 

that he was allowed to vote through absentee ballot. Matzen has not shown 

that the alleged restrictions lacked a reasonable relationship with the state’s 

interests of rehabilitation and security. See O’Lone v. Estate of Shabazz, 482 

U.S. 342, 349 (1987); Ahlers v. Rabinowitz, 684 F.3d 53, 64 (2d Cir. 2012).

Assuming arguendo that Matzen has a substantive due process right to 

adequate sex offender treatment while committed, see Sharp v. Weston, 233 

F.3d 1166, 1172 (9th Cir. 2000), his complaint nevertheless failed to state a 

viable claim for inadequate treatment. While Matzen alleged that his 

therapists did not display a sex offender treatment license, speculated that 

they were not licensed sex offender therapists, and concluded that his 

treatment was inadequate, he did not allege that the treatment he was 

provided was ineffective or failed to give him an opportunity to be cured and 

released. The speculative and conclusory assertions and legal conclusions 

alleged by Matzen were insufficient to state a viable claim. See Iqbal, 556 U.S. 

at 678-79; Gentilello v. Rege, 627 F.3d 540, 544 (5th Cir. 2010). 

Matzen has not briefed any argument renewing his remaining claims 

against McLane or his claims against Kovar and Turpin in their individual 

capacities. By failing to brief any argument renewing these claims, Matzen 

has abandoned them. See Mapes v. Bishop, 541 F.3d 582, 584 (5th Cir. 2008);

Brinkmann v. Dallas Cnty. Deputy Sheriff Abner, 813 F.2d 744, 748 (5th Cir. 

1987).

Finally, Matzen asserts that he should have been given an opportunity 

to amend his § 1983 complaint. The record reflects that Matzen filed a lengthy 

response to McLane’s motion to dismiss. Even with his response, Matzen’s 

claims were found to be inadequate, demonstrating that he had already alleged 

 Case: 17-11046 Document: 00514902404 Page: 3 Date Filed: 04/04/2019
No. 17-11046

4

his best case and that any further amendment would not have stated a valid 

§ 1983 claim. See Bazrowx v. Scott, 136 F.3d 1053, 1054 (5th Cir. 1998).

The judgments of the district court are AFFIRMED. 

 Case: 17-11046 Document: 00514902404 Page: 4 Date Filed: 04/04/2019