a

GAO

United States General Accounting Office

Testimony

Before the Subcommittee on Government Efficiency, 

Financial Management, and Intergovernmental Relations, 

Committee on Government Reform, House of 

Representatives

For Release on Delivery

Expected at 2:00 p.m. EDT

Wednesday, May 19, 2004

NATIONAL 

AERONAUTICS AND 

SPACE ADMINISTRATION

Significant Actions Needed 

to Address Long-standing 

Financial Management 

Problems

Statement of

Gregory D. Kutz

Director, Financial Management and Assurance 

Allen Li 

Director, Acquisition and Sourcing Management

GAO-04-754T
NASA faces major challenges in fundamentally reforming its financial 

management organization and practices. While some areas needing reform 

relate to automated systems, automation alone is not sufficient to transform 

NASA’s financial management culture. Specifically, NASA needs to fully 

integrate its financial management operations with its program management 

decision-making process. Until that occurs, NASA risks addressing the 

symptoms of its problems without resolving the underlying causes. These 

causes include an agency culture that has not fully acknowledged the nature 

and extent of its financial management difficulties and does not link 

financial management to program implications. Historically, NASA 

management has downplayed the severity of its problems and has viewed 

the agency’s financial operation as a function designed to produce clean 

financial audit opinions instead of viewing it as a tool that supports program 

managers in making decisions about program cost and performance. 

GAO’s work has identified several areas of concern: 

• Clean financial audit opinions masked serious financial 

management problems. Financial audits of NASA during the late 

1990s did not provide an accurate picture of the agency’s financial 

management operations, and instead masked serious problems that 

continue to exist today, including significant internal control weaknesses 

and systems that do not comply with federal standards. 

• The new financial management system did not address all key 

stakeholder needs. GAO reported in April 2003 that NASA designed 

and implemented the new system’s core financial module without 

involving key stakeholders, including program managers, cost 

estimators, and the Congress. 

• NASA did not follow key best practices in implementing its new 

financial management system. GAO reported in April 2003 and again 

in November 2003 that the new system may do less and cost more than 

NASA expects because the agency did not follow key best practices for 

acquiring and implementing the system. For example, NASA acquired 

and deployed system components without an enterprise architecture and 

lacked discipline in its cost estimating processes. 

• The new financial management system did not provide key 

external reporting capabilities. GAO reported in November 2003 

that the system would not generate complete and accurate information 

necessary for external reporting of NASA property and budgetary data. 

Finally, if NASA is to reap significant benefits from its new financial 

management system, it must transform its financial management 

organization into a customer-focused partner in program results. This will 

require sustained top leadership attention combined with effective 

organizational alignment, strategic human capital management, and end-toend business process improvement. 

The Subcommittee asked GAO to 

testify on the status of the National 

Aeronautics and Space 

Administration’s (NASA) financial 

management reform efforts. NASA 

faces major challenges that if not 

addressed, will weaken its ability to 

manage its highly complex 

programs. NASA has been on 

GAO’s high-risk list since 1990 

because of its failure to effectively 

oversee its contracts and 

contractors, due in part to the 

agency’s lack of accurate and 

reliable information on contract 

spending. GAO’s statement 

focused on (1) how NASA’s history 

of clean audit opinions served to 

mask the true extent of the 

agency’s financial management 

difficulties; (2) the results of 

NASA’s fiscal year 2003 financial 

statement audit, which are a 

departure from the fiscal year 2002 

results; (3) NASA’s effort to 

implement an integrated financial 

management system; and (4) the 

challenges NASA faces in 

reforming its financial management 

organization. 

Although GAO does not make 

specific recommendations in this 

statement, GAO previously made 

several recommendations to 

improve NASA’s acquisition and 

implementation strategy for its 

financial management system. 

While NASA ultimately agreed to 

implement all of the 

recommendations, it disagreed 

with most of the findings—stating 

that its acquisition and 

implementation strategy had 

already addressed GAO’s concerns. 

www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt? GAO-04-754T.

To view the full product, including the scope 

and methodology, click on the link above. 

For more information, contact Gregory D. 

Kutz at (202) 512-9095 or kutzg@gao.gov. 

Highlights of GAO-04-754T, a testimony

before the Subcommittee on Government 

Efficiency, Financial Management, and 

Intergovernmental Relations, Committee 

on Government Reform, House of 

Representatives 

May 19, 2004

NATIONAL AERONAUTICS AND SPACE 

ADMINISTRATION 

Significant Actions Needed to Address 

Long-standing Financial Management 

Problems 
Page 1 GAO-04-754T 

Mr. Chairman and Members of the Subcommittee:

Thank you for the opportunity to discuss the financial management 

challenges facing the National Aeronautics and Space Administration 

(NASA). Since its inception in 1958, NASA has undertaken numerous 

programs—involving earth and space science, aerospace technology, 

human space flight, and biological and physical research—that have 

resulted in significant scientific and technological advances, enhancing the 

quality of life on earth. In recent years, NASA has experienced a number of 

setbacks with its programs and operations, including massive cost 

overruns associated with the International Space Station and, with the 

Columbia tragedy, the need for the agency to develop return-to-flight 

strategies and mitigate the impact of the loss of the shuttle on the 

construction of the space station. 

On January 14, 2004, President Bush outlined a bold new vision for U.S. 

space exploration that will set a new course for NASA. However, to 

successfully execute this new vision, NASA must address a number of longstanding financial management challenges that threaten NASA’s ability to 

manage its programs, oversee its contractors, and effectively allocate its 

budget across its numerous projects and programs. In fact, since 1990 we 

have identified NASA’s contract management as an area of high risk, in part 

because the agency lacked effective systems and processes for overseeing 

contract spending and performance. NASA has begun taking action to 

address many of these challenges through its effort to implement a new 

integrated financial management system; however, many of NASA’s 

financial management problems are deeply rooted in an agency culture that 

has not fully acknowledged the nature and extent of its financial 

management difficulties and does not view finance as intrinsic to the 

agency’s program management decision process. 

My testimony today will focus on the results of our recent work related to 

NASA’s financial management challenges and the agency’s efforts to 

implement an integrated financial management system. Specifically, I will 

discuss (1) how NASA’s history of clean audit opinions served to mask the 

true extent of the agency’s financial management difficulties; (2) the results 

of NASA’s fiscal year 2003 financial statement audit, which are a departure 

from the fiscal year 2002 results; (3) NASA’s current effort to implement an 

integrated financial management system; and (4) the challenges NASA 

faces in reforming its financial management organization. We have 

performed work and issued several reports in response to legislative 

mandates and at the request of other interested committees. We also 
Page 2 GAO-04-754T 

reviewed the reports of NASA’s Office of Inspector General and the 

independent public accounting firms that audited NASA’s financial 

statements for fiscal year 2003 and for several previous years. With the 

exception of NASA’s financial statements for fiscal year 2002, in which we 

performed a limited-scope review of the financial statement audit 

performed by NASA’s contracted independent public accountant (IPA), we 

did not review the IPA’s underlying audit work. We performed all work in 

accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards. My 

statement today is drawn from the findings and conclusions in GAO’s, 

NASA’s Office of Inspector General’s, and the independent auditors’ 

reports. 

Summary NASA has fundamental problems with its financial management operations 

that not only affect its ability to externally report reliable information, but 

more important, hamper its ability to effectively manage and oversee its 

major programs, such as the space station and the shuttle program. NASA’s 

financial audits during the 1990s masked serious problems with its 

financial management operations that continue today. Specifically, from 

1996 through 2000, NASA was one of the few agencies to be judged by its 

independent auditor at the time, Arthur Andersen, as meeting all of the 

federal financial reporting requirements. However, our work at NASA 

during this same period told a different story. During this period, we issued 

a wide range of reports that detailed the agency’s difficulties associated 

with (1) overseeing its contractors and their financial and program 

performance, (2) controlling program costs and producing credible cost 

estimates, and (3) supporting the amounts that it had reported to the 

Congress as obligated against statutory spending limits for the space 

station and related space shuttle support. We also concluded, based on 

work we performed related to a misstatement in NASA’s fiscal year 1999 

financial statements, that Arthur Andersen’s work did not meet 

professional standards, and we questioned NASA management’s and its 

auditor’s determination that the agency’s systems substantially complied 

with federal standards. 

The results of NASA’s fiscal year 2003 financial statement audit confirm 

that NASA’s financial management problems continue today. NASA’s 

independent auditor, Pricewaterhouse Coopers (PwC), disclaimed an 

opinion on NASA’s fiscal year 2003 financial statements; reported material 

weaknesses in internal controls; and for the third straight year, concluded,
Page 3 GAO-04-754T 

just as we reported in November 2003,1 that the agency’s new financial 

management system did not comply with the requirements of the Federal 

Financial Management Improvement Act of 1996 (FFMIA).2

 Although 

NASA attributed the auditor’s disclaimer of opinion to the agency’s 

implementation of a new financial management system, many of the 

reported problems were long-standing issues not related to implementation 

of the new system. 

Recognizing the importance of successfully implementing an integrated 

financial management system, in April 2000, NASA began an effort known 

as the Integrated Financial Management Program (IFMP). Through IFMP, 

NASA has committed to modernizing its business processes and systems in 

a way that if implemented properly, will introduce interoperability and 

thereby improve the efficiency and effectiveness of its operations as well as 

bring the agency into compliance with federal system requirements. NASA 

has also committed to implementing IFMP within specific cost and 

schedule constraints. In 2003, we issued five reports3

 outlining the 

considerable challenges NASA faces in meeting its IFMP commitments and 

providing NASA the necessary tools to oversee its contracts and manage its 

program. For example, in April 2003, we reported that NASA had deferred 

addressing the needs of key system stakeholders,4

 including program 

1

U.S. General Accounting Office, Business Modernization: NASA’s Integrated Financial 

Management Program Does Not Fully Address Agency’s External Reporting Issues, GAO04-151 (Washington, D.C.: Nov. 21, 2003).

2

FFMIA requires auditors to report whether agencies’ financial management systems 

comply with federal financial management systems requirements, applicable federal 

accounting standards (U.S. generally accepted accounting principles), and the U.S. 

Government Standard General Ledger at the transaction level.

3

U.S. General Accounting Office, Business Modernization: Improvements Needed in 

Management of NASA’s Integrated Financial Management Program, GAO-03-507

(Washington D.C.: Apr. 30, 2003); Information Technology: Architecture Needed to Guide 

NASA's Financial Management Modernization, GAO-04-43 (Washington, D.C.: Nov. 21, 

2003); Business Modernization: Disciplined Processes Needed to Better Manage NASA's 

Integrated Financial Management Program, GAO-04-118 (Washington, D.C.: Nov. 21, 2003); 

Business Modernization: NASA’s Challenges in Managing Its Integrated Financial 

Management Program, GAO-04-255 (Washington, D.C.: Nov. 21, 2003); and GAO-04-151.

4

NASA defined those in the financial accounting arena as the system’s users who, under 

NASA’s plan, would determine the system’s requirements, guide its implementation, and 

define and measure its success. Those who would benefit from the system’s new 

capabilities were identified as stakeholders. Under NASA’s plan, they would be the ultimate 

beneficiaries of the system improvements, but would not have a role in setting requirements 

or measuring and determining the success of the system’s implementation.
Page 4 GAO-04-754T 

managers and cost estimators, and was not following key best practices for 

acquiring and implementing the system. We also reported that NASA 

lacked the disciplined requirements management and testing processes 

needed to reduce the risk associated with its effort to acceptable levels. 

Therefore, NASA did not have reasonable assurance that the program 

would meet its cost, schedule, and performance objectives. Then, in 

November 2003, we reported that NASA (1) acquired and deployed IFMP 

system components without an enterprise architecture, or agencywide 

modernization blueprint, to guide and constrain program investment 

decisions; (2) did not use disciplined cost estimating processes or 

recognized best practices in preparing its life cycle cost estimates; and

(3) had delayed implementation of many key external reporting 

capabilities. We made a number of recommendations in these reports to 

improve NASA’s acquisition and implementation strategy for IFMP. While 

NASA ultimately agreed to implement all of our recommendations, it 

disagreed with most of our findings—stating that its acquisition and 

implementation strategy had already addressed many of our concerns.

Finally, NASA faces significant challenges in overcoming its financial 

management difficulties and reforming its financial management 

operations. For example, NASA’s independent auditor, PwC, attributed 

many of the agency’s financial management problems to a lack of 

understanding by NASA’s staff of federal reporting requirements. In 

addition, over the past 4 years, we have issued numerous reports 

highlighting NASA’s financial management difficulties and making 

recommendations for improvement. However, NASA management has 

been slow to implement these recommendations and in many cases has 

denied the existence of the problems we and others have identified—

instead attributing the agency’s difficulties to the auditor’s sampling 

methodology or the auditor’s lack of understanding of NASA’s overall 

operations. Until NASA fully acknowledges the nature and extent of its 

financial management difficulties and better integrates the agency’s 

financial management operation with its program management decision 

process, NASA will continue to face many of the same financial 

management problems discussed in my testimony today. 
Page 5 GAO-04-754T 

Clean Financial Audit 

Opinions Masked 

Serious Financial 

Management Problems

NASA’s financial audits during the 1990s masked serious problems with its 

financial management operations that continue today. Specifically, from 

1996 through 2000, NASA was one of the few agencies to be judged by its 

independent auditor, Arthur Andersen, as meeting all of the federal 

financial reporting requirements. That is, NASA was one of the few 

agencies to receive an unqualified, or “clean,” opinion on its financial 

statements, with no material internal control weaknesses noted and with 

financial management systems that were reported to be in substantial 

compliance with the requirements of FFMIA. FFMIA, building on previous 

financial management reform legislation, stresses that agencies need to 

have systems that provide managers with the reliable, timely, and accurate 

financial information that they need to ensure accountability on an ongoing 

basis, as well as to make informed decisions on investing resources, 

managing costs, and overseeing programs. Thus, the auditor’s report 

implied that NASA could not only generate reliable information once a year 

for external financial reporting purposes but also could provide the kind of 

information needed for day-to-day management decision making. 

However, as others and we have reported, the independent auditor’s 

reports did not provide an accurate picture of NASA’s financial 

management systems and failed to disclose pervasive financial 

management problems that existed at NASA then and continue today. 

Ultimately, these unqualified opinions and positive reports on NASA’s 

internal controls and systems served only to mask the serious financial 

management problems that existed at NASA throughout this period.

• First in 1990 and then in subsequent years, we identified contract 

management as an area at high risk because of NASA’s inability to 

(1) oversee its contractors and their financial and program performance 

and (2) implement a modern, integrated financial management system, 

which is integral to producing accurate and reliable financial 

information needed to support contract management.5

 During this 

period, we also issued a wide range of reports that detailed the agency’s 

5

At that time, we began a special effort to review and report on the federal program areas 

that our work had identified as high risk because of vulnerabilities to waste, fraud, abuse, 

and mismanagement. We first issued our High-Risk Series in December 1992 and have 

continued to include NASA’s contract management as an area of high risk since. See U.S. 

General Accounting Office, High-Risk Series: NASA Contract Management, GAO/HR-93-11

(Washington, D.C.: December 1992) and Major Management Challenges and Program 

Risks: National Aeronautics and Space Administration, GAO-03-114 (Washington, D.C.: 

January 2003). 
Page 6 GAO-04-754T 

difficulties associated with controlling program costs and producing 

credible cost estimates.

• In 2000, congressional staff members found a $644 million misstatement 

in NASA’s fiscal year 1999 financial statements—an error not previously 

detected by NASA or its independent auditor. As we reported6

 in March 

2001, this error resulted because NASA’s systems could not produce the 

budgetary data required by federal accounting standards. Instead, the 

agency was relying on an ad hoc, year-end data call from its 10 reporting 

units and the aggregation of data using a computer spreadsheet. We 

concluded that Arthur Andersen’s work did not meet professional 

standards, and we questioned NASA management’s and its auditor’s 

determination that the agency’s systems substantially complied with the 

requirements of FFMIA. 

• In 2001 and subsequent years, our work in response to a legislative 

mandate revealed that NASA was unable to support the amounts that it 

had reported to the Congress as obligated against statutory spending 

limits for the space station and related space shuttle support.7

 Here 

again, NASA’s inability to provide this detailed obligation data was 

linked to its lack of a modern, integrated financial management system. 

• Finally, in February 2002, NASA’s new independent auditor, PwC, further 

confirmed NASA’s financial management difficulties and disclaimed an 

opinion on the agency’s fiscal year 2001 financial statements. The audit 

report also identified a number of material internal control weaknesses 

and stated that contrary to previous financial audit reports, NASA’s 

financial management systems did not substantially comply with 

FFMIA. 

6

U.S. General Accounting Office, Financial Management: Misstatement of NASA’s 

Statement of Budgetary Resources, GAO-01-438 (Washington, D.C.: Mar. 30, 2001).

7

U.S. General Accounting Office, NASA: International Space Station and Shuttle Support 

Cost Limits, GAO-01-1000R (Washington, D.C.: Aug. 31, 2001), and NASA: Compliance with 

Cost Limits Cannot Be Verified, GAO-02-504R (Washington, D.C.: Apr. 10, 2002).
Page 7 GAO-04-754T 

• Although NASA received an unqualified opinion on its fiscal year 2002 

financial statements,8

 NASA’s auditor again report material weaknesses 

in NASA’s internal controls over its Property, Plant, and Equipment 

(PP&E) and materials, which make up nearly $37 billion, or 85 percent, 

of NASA’s assets, and over the agency’s processes for preparing its 

financial statements and performance and accountability report. 

According to the auditor’s report, various deficiencies continued to exist 

within NASA’s financial management operations, including

(1) insufficient resources to address the volume of compilation work 

required to prepare NASA financial reports, (2) lack of an integrated 

financial management system, and (3) lack of understanding by NASA 

staff of federal reporting requirements. The nature and extent of the 

reported material weaknesses highlighted the agency’s inability to 

generate reliable data for daily operations and decision making. Thus, it 

is not surprising that the auditor again concluded that NASA’s financial 

management systems did not substantially comply with the 

requirements of FFMIA. 

NASA’s Auditor 

Disclaims an Opinion 

on Fiscal Year 2003 

Financial Statements

NASA’s financial management problems and internal control weaknesses 

continue to exist today. NASA’s auditor, PwC, disclaimed an opinion on 

NASA’s fiscal year 2003 financial statements. According to the auditor’s 

report, NASA was unable to provide PwC sufficient evidence to support the 

financial statements and complete the audit within the time frames 

established by the Office of Management and Budget. In addition, for the 

third straight year, NASA’s independent auditor concluded, just as we

8

We conducted a limited scope review of NASA’s fiscal year 2002 financial statement audit 

performed by NASA’s IPA, PwC, to assist in planning future audits of the U.S. government’s 

consolidated financial statements. Based on our review of PwC’s supporting audit evidence, 

we would not have been able to rely on its work for the purpose of fulfilling our 

responsibilities related to the audit of the U.S. government’s consolidated financial 

statements. We reported in March of 2004 to the NASA Inspector General that our review of 

PwC’s supporting audit evidence revealed deficiencies in audit documentation, audit 

planning, and testing. Specifically, adequate audit tests were not performed for major 

balance sheet line items such as Fund Balance with Treasury; property, plant, and 

equipment (PP&E); and materials. It was not our intent to determine whether the audit 

opinion rendered was appropriate or to reperform any of the auditor’s work. Our 

procedures consisted of an evaluation of evidence obtained from the auditor’s fiscal year 

2002 audit documentation and discussions with audit personnel. We did not independently 

test, reperform, or make supplemental tests of any of the account balances.
Page 8 GAO-04-754T 

reported in November 2003,9 that the agency’s new financial management 

system did not comply with the requirements of FFMIA. Although NASA 

attributed the auditor’s disclaimer of opinion to the agency’s 

implementation of a new financial management system, many of the 

reported problems were long-standing issues not related to implementation 

of the new system. The auditor reported material weaknesses that existed 

throughout NASA’s financial management operations.

• First, NASA was unable to provide reliable documentation and an audit 

trail to support the financial statements. NASA’s auditor reported that in 

an effort to populate its new financial management system, NASA 

summarized the previous 7 years of transaction-level detail from its 

legacy systems and entered the cumulative amount into the new system 

as if the transactions were current-year activity. As a result, many of the 

accounts supporting the financial statements were overstated by 

billions of dollars. In an effort to correct these errors and balance the 

accounts to the general ledger, NASA made net adjustments totaling 

$565 billion but was not able to provide documentation supporting the 

adjustments. 

• Second, NASA’s internal controls over its reconciliation of fund balance 

with Treasury accounts were ineffective. Specifically, NASA failed to 

reconcile its fund balance with Treasury accounts during the year and 

resolve all differences. At year-end, NASA’s general ledger account for 

fund balance with Treasury was materially overstated and did not 

reconcile to the balance reported by Treasury at year-end. To correct 

the overstatement, NASA made $2 billion in unsupported net 

adjustments to its Fund Balance with Treasury account, which had the 

effect of reducing NASA’s recorded balance so it equaled Treasury’s 

reported balance. This type of adjustment is similar to forcing the 

balance recorded in your checkbook at the end of the month to 

reconcile with your bank statement. Instead of trying to determine the 

reason for the error and resolve the difference you, simply “plug” the 

difference to your checkbook balance. NASA’s failure to perform 

reconciliation procedures throughout the year is a fundamental 

breakdown in basic internal controls and illustrates the human capital 

challenges NASA faces in overcoming its financial management 

problems. 

9

GAO-04-151. 
Page 9 GAO-04-754T 

• Third, NASA’s processes for preparing its financial statements continue 

to be ineffective. The continued weaknesses in NASA’s financial 

statement preparation processes resulted in major delays and errors in 

preparing fiscal year-end financial statements. For example, NASA’s 

auditor reported inconsistencies, such as the significant differences 

between the agency’s Fund Balance with Treasury and Treasury’s 

balance that should have been identified and corrected by NASA as part 

of the agency’s internal quality control review process. In addition, 

NASA’s financial statements were not prepared in accordance with 

federal accounting standards. As we reported in November 2003, the 

core financial module did not appropriately capture accrued contract 

costs and accounts payable information in accordance with federal 

accounting standards. Instead, in instances where costs and the 

corresponding liabilities were greater than the associated obligations, 

the differences were transferred outside of the general ledger and held 

in suspense until additional funds were obligated, thus understating 

NASA’s reported program costs and liabilities. Although NASA officials 

stated that as of October 1, 2003, they no longer post costs in excess of 

obligations in a suspense account, their current solution still does not 

appropriately capture accrued cost and accounts payable in accordance 

with federal accounting standards. 

• Finally, NASA continues to lack effective internal controls over PP&E 

and materials. Although NASA reported that a corrective action plan 

had been implemented to address the deficiencies identified in the 

previous year’s audit report, subsequent testing identified major errors 

in contractor-held PP&E and materials.

NASA’s Effort to 

Implement New 

Integrated Financial 

Management System 

NASA’s new financial management system falls short in addressing the 

long-standing financial management issues that have prevented the agency 

from effectively monitoring over 90 percent of its annual budget and 

managing costly and complex programs, such as the International Space 

Station. For years, NASA has cited deficiencies within its financial 

management systems as a primary reason for not having the data required 

to oversee its contractors, accurately account for the full cost of its 

operations, and efficiently produce accurate and reliable information 

needed for both management decision-making and external reporting 

purposes. Recognizing the importance of successfully implementing an 

integrated financial management system, in April 2000, NASA began its 

IFMP effort. When completed, IFMP is planned to consist of nine
Page 10 GAO-04-754T 

modules10 that will support a range of financial, administrative, and 

functional areas. This is NASA’s third attempt at modernizing its financial 

management systems and processes. The first two efforts were eventually 

abandoned after a total of 12 years and a reported $180 million. The 

schedule for implementing IFMP was originally planned for fiscal year 

2008, but after NASA’s new Administrator came on board in fiscal year 

2002, the timeline was accelerated to fiscal year 2006, with the core 

financial module to be completed in fiscal year 2003. As of June 30, 2003, 

NASA reported that it had fully implemented the core financial module at 

all of its 10 operating locations. 

Through IFMP, NASA has committed to modernizing its business processes 

and systems in a way that if implemented properly, will introduce 

interoperability and thereby improve the efficiency and effectiveness of its 

operations as well as bring the agency into compliance with federal 

financial management systems requirements. NASA has also committed to 

implementing IFMP within specific cost and schedule constraints. In 2003, 

we issued five reports11 outlining the considerable challenges NASA faces 

in meeting its IFMP commitments and providing NASA the necessary tools 

to oversee its contracts and manage its program. For example, in April 

2003, we reported that NASA had deferred addressing the needs of key 

system stakeholders,12 including program managers and cost estimators, 

and was not following key best practices for acquiring and implementing 

the system. Then, in November 2003, we reported that NASA (1) acquired 

and deployed system components of IFMP without an enterprise 

architecture, or agencywide modernization blueprint, to guide and 

constrain program investment decisions; (2) did not use disciplined cost 

estimating processes or recognized best practices in preparing its life cycle 

cost estimates; and (3) had delayed implementation of many key external 

reporting capabilities. 

10The nine modules are core financial, resume management, travel management, position 

description management, human resource management, payroll, budget formulation, 

contract administration, and asset management.

11GAO-03-507, GAO-04-43, GAO-04-151, GAO-04-118, and GAO-04-255.

12NASA defined those in the financial accounting arena as the system’s users who, under 

NASA’s plan, would determine the system’s requirements, guide its implementation, and 

define and measure its success. Those who would benefit from the system’s new 

capabilities were identified as stakeholders. Under NASA’s plan, they would be the ultimate 

beneficiaries of the system improvements, but would not have a role in setting requirements 

or measuring and determining the success of the system’s implementation.
Page 11 GAO-04-754T 

IFMP Core Financial 

Module Will Not Fully 

Address the Needs of Key 

Stakeholders

Based on our review of NASA’s three largest space flight programs—the 

space station, the space shuttle, and the Space Launch Initiative,13 in April 

2003 we reported that the core financial module, as currently implemented, 

did not fully address the information requirements of stakeholders such as 

program managers, cost estimators, or the Congress. While NASA 

considers these officials to be the ultimate beneficiaries of the system’s 

improvements, they were not involved in defining or implementing the 

system requirements and will not have a formal role in defining or 

measuring its success. As a result, NASA has neither reengineered its core 

business processes nor established adequate requirements for the system 

to address many of its most significant management challenges, including 

improving contract management; producing credible cost estimates; and 

providing the Congress with appropriate visibility over NASA’s large, 

complex programs. Specific issues for key stakeholders include the 

following: 

• Program managers. To adequately oversee NASA’s largest contracts, 

program managers need reliable contract cost data—both budgeted and 

actual—and the ability to integrate these data with contract schedule14

information to monitor progress on the contract. However, because 

program managers were not involved in defining system requirements 

or reengineering business processes, the core financial module was not 

designed to integrate the cost and schedule data that they need. As a 

result, program managers told us that they would not use the core 

13During the time of our review, NASA was pursuing a program—known as the Space 

Launch Initiative—to build a new generation of space vehicles to replace its aging space 

shuttle. This was part of NASA’s broader plan for the future of space travel—known as 

NASA’s Integrated Space Transportation Plan. On October 21, 2002, NASA postponed 

further implementation of the program to focus on defining the Department of Defense’s 

role, determining future requirements of the International Space Station, and establishing 

the agency’s future space transportation needs. In November 2002, the administration 

submitted to the Congress an amendment to NASA’s fiscal year 2003 budget request to 

implement a new Integrated Space Transportation Plan. The plan made investments 

to extend the space shuttle’s operational life and refocused the Space Launch Initiative 

program on developing an orbital space plane—which provides crew transfer capability to 

and from the space station—and next generation launch technology. The President’s vision 

on space exploration, announced in January 2004, may alter that plan.

14The term “schedule” incorporates both the concept of status of work and whether a 

project or task is being completed within planned time frames. Depending on the nature of 

the work being performed, the method of measuring work progress varies. Work is 

measured in terms of tasks when a specific end product or result is produced. But when 

work does not produce a specific end product or result, level-of-effort or a more timeoriented method of measurement is used. 
Page 12 GAO-04-754T 

financial module to manage programs such as the space station and 

space shuttle and instead would continue to rely on hard copy reports, 

electronic spreadsheets, or other means to monitor contractor 

performance. 

• Cost estimators. In order to estimate the costs of programs, cost 

estimators need reliable contract cost data at a level of detail greater 

than what the core financial module maintains. Although this module is 

technologically capable of maintaining the detail they need, cost 

estimators were not involved in defining the system requirements or 

reengineering business processes. Reengineering is critical here 

because a driving factor in determining what information cost 

estimators receive from contractors is what level of detail the 

contractors are required to provide, based on the contracts that they 

have negotiated with NASA. As a result, NASA has not determined the 

most cost-effective way to satisfy the information needs of its cost 

estimators. Because the core financial module will not contain the 

sufficiently detailed historical cost data necessary for projecting future 

costs, cost estimators will continue to rely on labor-intensive data 

collection efforts after a program is completed. 

• The Congress. Based on our discussions with congressional staffs from 

NASA’s authorizing committees, the agency did not consult with them 

regarding their information needs. Consequently, NASA cannot be sure 

that it is implementing a system that will provide the Congress with the 

information it needs for oversight. 

According to IFMP officials, they chose to forgo certain system capabilities 

to expedite implementation of the core financial module. Thus, while the 

core financial module software is technologically capable of meeting key 

stakeholders’ needs, it has not been configured to do so. IFMP officials 

have stated that these capabilities can be added at a later date. We made 

several recommendations related to engaging stakeholders, including cost 

estimators and program managers, in developing a complete and accurate 

set of requirements. Although NASA officials concurred with our 

recommendations, they disagreed with our finding—stating that they had 

already effectively engaged key stakeholders.
Page 13 GAO-04-754T 

NASA Was Not Following 

Key Best Practices for 

Acquiring and Implementing 

IFMP

We reported in April 2003 that NASA’s approach to implementing its new 

system did not optimize the system’s performance and would likely cost 

more and take longer to implement than necessary. Specifically, NASA was 

not following key best practices for acquiring and implementing the 

system, which may affect the agency’s ability to fully benefit from the new 

system’s capabilities. First, NASA did not analyze the relationships among 

selected and proposed IFMP components to understand the logical and 

physical relationships among the components it acquired. By acquiring 

these IFMP components without first understanding system component 

relationships, NASA increased its risks of implementing a system that will 

not optimize mission performance and will cost more and take longer to 

implement than necessary. Second, although industry best practices and 

NASA’s own system planning documents indicate that detailed 

requirements are needed as the basis for effective system testing, NASA did 

not require documentation of detailed system requirements prior to system 

implementation and testing. NASA’s approach instead relied on certain 

subject matter experts’ knowledge of the detailed requirements necessary 

to evaluate the functionality actually provided. 

We made several recommendations to focus near-term efforts on stabilizing 

the operational effectiveness of deployed IFMP components. While NASA 

officials concurred with our recommendations, they disagreed with our 

findings—stating that they had already implemented effective processes 

related to performing dependency analysis and requirements and testing.

IFMP Components 

Deployed without an 

Enterprise Architecture 

We reported in November 2003 that NASA had acquired and deployed 

system components of IFMP without an enterprise architecture, or 

agencywide modernization blueprint, to guide and constrain program 

investment decisions—actions that increased the chances that these 

system components will require additional time and resources to be 

modified and to operate effectively and efficiently. During the course of our 

review of IFMP, NASA implemented some of these key architecture 

management capabilities, such as having an enterprise architecture 

program office; designating a chief architect; and using an architecture 

development methodology, framework, and automated tools. However, at 

the time, NASA had not yet established other key architecture management 

capabilities, such as designating an accountable corporate entity to lead 

the architecture effort, having an approved policy for developing and 

maintaining the architecture, and implementing an independent 

verification and validation function to provide needed assurance that 
Page 14 GAO-04-754T 

architecture products and architecture management processes are 

effective. 

As NASA proceeds with its enterprise architecture effort, it is critical that it 

employs rigorous and disciplined management practices. Such practices 

form the basis of our architecture management maturity framework,15

which specifies by stages the key architecture management controls that 

are embodied in federal guidance and best practices, provides an explicit 

benchmark for gauging the effectiveness of architecture management, and 

provides a road map for making improvements. GAO made several 

recommendations to ensure that NASA had the necessary agencywide 

context within which to make informed IFMP and other systems 

modernization decisions. NASA agreed that improvements were needed 

and reported that it had efforts under way, consistent with our 

recommendations, to develop an architecture and ensure that IFMP 

proceeded within the context of the architecture. We have not evaluated 

NASA’s progress on these commitments.

IFMP Further Challenged by 

Questionable Cost 

Estimates and an Optimistic 

Schedule

Questionable cost estimates, an optimistic schedule, and insufficient 

processes for ensuring adequate funding reserves have put IFMP at an even 

greater risk of not meeting program objectives. In preparing its life cycle 

cost estimates for IFMP,16 NASA did not use disciplined cost estimating 

processes as required by its standards and recognized best practices. For 

example, NASA’s current IFMP life cycle cost estimate—which totals 

$982.7 million and is 14 percent, or $121.8 million, over the previous IFMP 

life cycle cost estimate—was not prepared on a full-cost basis. The 

estimate included IFMP direct program costs, NASA enterprise support, 

and civil service salaries and benefits, but it did not include the cost of 

retiring the system, enterprise travel costs, the cost of nonleased NASA 

facilities for housing IFMP, and other direct and indirect costs likely to be 

incurred during the life of the program. In addition, NASA did not 

consistently use breakdowns of work in preparing the cost estimate, 

although NASA guidance calls for breaking down work into smaller units to 

facilitate cost estimating and project and contract management as well as 

15U.S. General Accounting Office, Information Technology: A Framework for Assessing 

and Improving Enterprise Architecture Management (Version 1.1), GAO-03-584G

(Washington, D.C.: April 2003).

16Fiscal years 2001 through 2010.
Page 15 GAO-04-754T 

to help ensure that relevant costs are not omitted. In cases where work 

breakdowns were used, the agency did not always show the connection 

between the work breakdown estimates and the official program cost 

estimate. This has been a weakness since the inception of the program. 

Without a reliable life cycle cost estimate, NASA will have difficulty 

controlling program costs.

In addition, NASA’s schedule may not be sufficient to address program 

challenges, such as personnel shortages. To address personnel shortages 

during the implementation of the core financial module, NASA paid nearly 

$400,000 for extra hours worked by center employees and avoided a slip in 

IFMP’s compressed schedule. However, the schedule for implementing the 

budget formulation module has slipped because IFMP implemented this 

module simultaneously with the core financial module—an action advised 

against by a contractor conducting a lessons-learned study—placing heavy 

demand on already scarce resources.

Finally, the program did not consistently perform in-depth analyses of the 

potential cost impact of risks and unknowns specific to IFMP, as required 

by NASA guidance. Instead, the program established funding reserves on 

the basis of reserve levels set by other high-risk NASA programs. As a 

result, reserve funding for IFMP contingencies may be insufficient—which 

is particularly problematic, given the program’s questionable cost estimates 

and optimistic schedule. As we were completing our audit work, one 

module—budget formulation—was already experiencing shortfalls in its 

reserves, and project officials expressed concern that the module’s 

functionality may have to be reduced. Moreover, the program did not 

quantify the cost of high criticality risks—risks that have a high likelihood 

of occurrence and a high magnitude of impact—or link these risks to 

funding reserves to help IFMP develop realistic budget estimates. We made 

recommendations to provide NASA the necessary tools to accurately 

estimate program cost and predict the impact of program challenges. 

Although NASA concurred with our recommendations for corrective 

action, NASA indicated that its current processes were adequate for 

preparing work breakdown structure cost estimates, estimating life-cycle 

costs, and establishing reserves based on IFMP-specific risks. 

Core Financial Module Does 

Not Address Long-standing 

External Reporting Issues 

The core financial module, as currently implemented, also does not address 

many of the agency’s most challenging external reporting issues. 

Specifically, the core financial module does not address NASA’s past 

external reporting problems related to property accounting and budgetary 
Page 16 GAO-04-754T 

accounting. Such shortcomings limit the ability of the Congress and other 

interested parties to evaluate NASA's performance on an ongoing basis 

because NASA's financial management systems do not provide a complete 

accounting of its assets and how funds were spent. If these issues are not 

addressed, NASA will continue to face risks in its ability to adequately 

oversee its programs, manage their costs, and provide meaningful 

information to external parties, such as the Congress. 

• Property accounting. The core financial module has not addressed the 

problems I discussed previously related to material weaknesses in 

NASA’s internal controls over PP&E and materials. NASA’s PP&E and 

materials are physically located throughout the world, at locations 

including NASA centers, contractor facilities, other private or 

government-run facilities, and in space. NASA’s most significant 

challenge, with respect to property accounting, stems from property 

located at contractor facilities, which accounts for almost $11 billion, or 

about one-third, of NASA’s reported $37 billion of PP&E and materials 

and consists primarily of equipment being constructed for NASA or 

items built or purchased for use in the construction process. NASA has 

not reengineered the agency’s processes for capturing contract costs 

associated with PP&E and material, and therefore, does not record 

these property costs in the general ledger at the transaction level. 

Instead, according to NASA officials, the agency plans to continue to

(1) record the cost of PP&E and materials as expenses when initially 

incurred, (2) periodically determine which of those costs should have 

been capitalized, and (3) manually correct these records at a summary 

level. Because NASA does not maintain transaction-level detail, the 

agency is not able to link the money it spends on construction of its 

property to discrete property items and therefore must instead rely 

solely on its contractors to periodically report summary-level 

information on these assets to NASA.

• Budgetary accounting. The software NASA selected, and is now using, 

for its core financial module does not capture and report certain key 

budgetary information needed to prepare its Statement of Budgetary 

Resources. As a result, NASA continues to rely on manual compilations 

and system queries to extract the data needed to prepare the Statement 

of Budgetary Resources—just as it did using its legacy general ledger 

system. According to NASA officials, a “patch” release or software 

upgrade in October 2003 has addressed the issues we identified related 

to budgetary accounting. However, we have not verified NASA’s 

assertion and previously reported that NASA had implemented similar 
Page 17 GAO-04-754T 

“patch” releases that did not fully address this issue. As we reported in 

March 2001, this cumbersome, labor-intensive effort to gather the 

information needed at the end of each fiscal year was the underlying 

cause of a $644 million misstatement in NASA’s fiscal year 1999 

Statement of Budgetary Resources. Although the software that NASA 

purchased for the core financial module was certified by the Joint 

Financial Management Improvement Program (JFMIP) as meeting all 

mandatory system requirements, NASA may have relied too heavily on 

the JFMIP certification. JFMIP has made it clear that its certification, by 

itself, does not automatically ensure compliance with the goals of 

FFMIA. Other important factors that affect compliance with Federal 

Financial Management System Requirements include how well the 

software has been configured to work in the agency’s environment and 

the quality of transaction data in the agency’s feeder systems. As I 

mentioned previously, NASA did not use the disciplined requirements 

management and testing processes necessary to reduce the risks 

associated with its implementation efforts to acceptable levels. 

Therefore, it is not surprising that NASA found that the system was not 

providing the desired functionality or performing as expected.

Core Financial Module Does 

Not Comply with FFMIA 

As I mentioned previously, in November 2003,17 we reported that NASA’s 

new core financial module did not comply substantially with the 

requirements of FFMIA. At the time, NASA disagreed with our conclusions 

and recommendations regarding its financial management systems and 

stated that many of the problems we identified as of June 30, 2003, had 

been resolved by September 30, 2003. However, in February 2004, after 

NASA’s independent auditor also concluded that NASA’s financial 

management system, at September 30, 2003, did not substantially comply 

with the requirements of FFMIA, NASA reversed its position and concurred 

with all of our recommendations. Specifically, NASA agreed to implement 

a corrective action plan that will engage key stakeholders in developing a 

complete and accurate set of user requirements, reengineering its 

acquisition management processes, and bringing its systems into 

compliance with FFMIA.

FFMIA stresses the need for agencies to have systems that can generate 

timely, accurate, and useful financial information with which to make 

17GAO-04-151.
Page 18 GAO-04-754T 

informed decisions, manage daily operations, and ensure accountability on 

an ongoing basis. Compliance with FFMIA goes far beyond receiving a 

“clean” opinion on financial statements. Instead, FFMIA provides agencies 

with the building blocks needed to reform their financial management 

organization and practices, and to support program managers in making 

wise decisions about program cost and performance. However, as we 

reported in April 2003 and in November 2003, NASA’s core financial module 

did not provide program managers, cost estimators, or the Congress with 

managerially relevant cost information that they need to effectively manage 

and oversee NASA’s contracts and programs, such as the International 

Space Station. NASA’s continuing inability to provide its managers with 

timely, relevant data on contract spending and performance is a key reason 

that we continue to report NASA’s contract management as an area of high 

risk. Because this information is not available through the core financial 

module, program managers will continue to rely on hard copy reports, 

electronic spreadsheets, or other means to monitor contractor 

performance. Consequently, NASA risks operating with two sets of 

books—one that is used to report information in the agency’s generalpurpose financial reports and another that is used by program managers to 

run NASA’s projects and programs.

NASA Faces 

Significant Challenges 

in Reforming Its 

Financial Management 

Operations

Many of NASA’s financial management problems are deeply rooted in an 

agency culture that has not fully acknowledged the nature and extent of its 

financial management difficulties and does not see finance as intrinsic to 

the agency’s program management decision process. Over the past 4 

years, we have issued numerous reports highlighting NASA’s financial 

management difficulties and making recommendations for improvement. 

However, NASA management has been slow to implement these 

recommendations and in many cases has denied the existence of the 

problems we and others have identified—instead attributing the agency’s 

difficulties to the auditor’s sampling methodology or the auditor’s lack of 

understanding of NASA’s operations. For example:

• In response to our August 2001 and April 2002 reports on NASA’s 

compliance with the International Space Station and shuttle support 

cost limits, NASA management disagreed with our finding that NASA 

was unable to support the amounts that it had reported to the Congress 

as obligated against the statutory spending limits for the space station 

and related space shuttle support costs. At the time, NASA asserted that 

the obligations were verifiable and that our audit methodology was the 

problem. We planned to use statistical sampling, which is a standard, 
Page 19 GAO-04-754T 

widely used methodology that enables auditors to draw conclusions 

about large populations of transactions by testing a relatively small 

number of those transactions. In order for a statistical sample to be 

valid, the complete population of items of interest must be subject to 

selection and every transaction must have a chance to be selected for 

testing. However, after nearly a year, NASA was not able to provide us 

with a complete population of transactions from which to draw our 

sample. Consequently, we were unable to verify the accuracy of the 

amount NASA reported against the cost limits.

• In a March 20, 2002, statement before this subcommittee NASA 

management attributed its failure to obtain an unqualified opinion on 

the agency’s fiscal year 2001 financial statements to its auditor’s newly 

required protocol for sampling. However, the only thing new about the 

sampling protocol was that NASA’s previous auditor, Arthur Andersen, 

had not employed a similar approach. In fact, to test amounts reported 

on NASA’s fiscal year 2001 financial statements, NASA’s new financial 

statement auditor, PwC, attempted to use standard transaction-based 

statistical sampling similar to the methods we had attempted in our 

effort to audit the underlying support for amounts charged to the 

spending limits. In its audit report, PwC noted that successive 

summarization of data through NASA’s various financial systems 

impeded NASA’s ability to maintain an audit trail down to the detailed 

transaction-level source documentation. For this and other reasons, 

PwC concluded that it was unable to audit NASA’s financial statements.

• In response to our April 2003 report on the status of NASA’s 

implementation of IFMP, NASA management disagreed with all of our 

findings, including our concerns that NASA program managers and cost 

estimators were not adequately involved in defining system 

requirements and, therefore the system did not fully address their 

information needs. In its written comments, NASA dismissed these 

concerns and stated that the problem was a lack of understanding not a 

lack of information, and that it was incumbent upon program managers 

and cost estimators to learn and understand the capabilities of the new 

system and take advantage of them for their specific purposes.

• Finally, in response to our November 2003 report on IFMP’s external 

reporting capabilities, NASA management disagreed with all of our 

conclusions and recommendations, including our conclusion that the 

core financial module, as implemented in June 2003, did not comply 

substantially with FFMIA. In its written comments, dated October 31, 
Page 20 GAO-04-754T 

2003, NASA asserted that many of the problems we identified in June 

2003 were resolved by September 30, 2003. However, NASA’s assertions 

did not prove to be accurate. In January 2004, NASA’s independent 

financial statement auditor confirmed that the problems we identified in 

June 2003 related to NASA’s accrued costs, budgetary accounting, and 

property accounting still existed at September 30, 2003, and that the 

system was not in compliance with FFMIA requirements. NASA 

reversed its position in February 2004 and concurred with our 

recommendations that it implement a corrective action plan that will 

engage key stakeholders in developing a complete and accurate set of 

user requirements, reengineering its acquisition management processes, 

and bringing its systems into compliance with FFMIA. 

The challenges that NASA faces in reforming its financial management 

operations are significant, but not insurmountable. As our prior work18

shows, clear, strong leadership will be critical for ensuring that NASA’s 

financial management organization delivers the kind of analysis and 

forward-looking information needed to effectively manage its many 

complex space programs. Further, in order to reap the full benefit of a 

modern, integrated financial management system, NASA must (1) routinely 

generate reliable cost and performance information and analysis,

(2) undertake other value-added activities that support strategic decision 

making and mission performance, and (3) build a finance team that 

supports the agency’s mission and goals. 

Conclusion Until NASA fully acknowledges the nature and extent of its financial 

management difficulties and better integrates its financial management 

operations with its program management decision process, it will continue 

to face many of the same financial management problems I have discussed 

today. While modernizing NASA’s financial management system is 

essential to enabling the agency to provide its managers with the kind of 

timely, relevant, and reliable information that they need to manage cost, 

measure performance, make program funding decisions, and analyze 

outsourcing or privatization options, NASA cannot rely on technology 

18U.S. General Accounting Office, Executive Guide: Creating Value Through World-class 

Financial Management, GAO/AIMD-00-134 (Washington, D.C.: April 2000). Our executive 

guide was based on practices used by nine leading organizations—Boeing; Chase Manhattan 

Bank; General Electric; Pfizer; Hewlett-Packard; Owens Corning; and the states of 

Massachusetts, Texas, and Virginia.
Page 21 GAO-04-754T 

alone to solve its financial management problems. Rather, transforming 

NASA’s financial management organization will also require sustained top 

leadership attention combined with effective organizational alignment, 

strategic human capital management, and end-to-end business process 

reengineering. This goes far beyond obtaining an unqualified audit opinion 

and requires that agency financial managers focus on their overall 

operations in a strategic way and not be content with an automated system 

that helps the agency get a “clean” audit opinion once a year without 

providing additional value to the program managers and cost estimators 

who use its financial data. 

Mr. Chairman, this concludes our prepared statement. We would be 

pleased to respond to any questions that you or other members of the 

Subcommittee may have. 

Contacts and 

Acknowledgments

For further information regarding this testimony, please contact Gregory D. 

Kutz at (202) 512-9095 or kutzg@gao.gov or Allen Li at (202) 512-3600 or 

lia@gao.gov or Diane Handley at (404) 679-1986 or handley@gao.gov. 

Individuals making key contributions to this testimony included Fannie 

Bivins and Francine DelVecchio.
Page 22 GAO-04-754T 

Related GAO Products

Business Modernization: Disciplined Processes Needed to Better Manage 

NASA’s Integrated Financial Management Program. GAO-04-118. 

Washington, D.C.: November 21, 2003. 

Business Modernization: NASA’s Integrated Financial Management 

Program Does Not Fully Address External Reporting Issues. GAO-04-151. 

Washington, D.C.: November 21, 2003. 

Information Technology: Architecture Needed to Guide NASA’s Financial 

Management Modernization. GAO-04-43. Washington, D.C.: November 21, 

2003.

Business Modernization: Improvements Needed in Management of 

NASA’s Integrated Financial Management Program. GAO-03-507.

Washington D.C.: April 30, 2003. 

Major Management Challenges and Program Risks: National Aeronautics 

and Space Administration. GAO-03-114. Washington, D.C.: January 2003. 

NASA: Compliance With Cost Limits Cannot Be Verified. GAO-02-

504R.Washington, D.C.: April 10, 2002.

NASA: Leadership and Systems Needed to Effect Financial Management 

Improvements. GAO-02-551T. Washington, D.C.: March 20, 2002.

NASA: International Space Station and Shuttle Support Cost 

Limits.GAO-01-1000R. Washington, D.C.: August 31, 2001.

Financial Management: Misstatement of NASA’s Statement of Budgetary 

Resources. GAO-01-438. Washington, D.C.: March 30, 2001.

(192117)
This is a work of the U.S. government and is not subject to copyright protection in the 

United States. It may be reproduced and distributed in its entirety without further 

permission from GAO. However, because this work may contain copyrighted images or 

other material, permission from the copyright holder may be necessary if you wish to 

reproduce this material separately. 
GAO’s Mission The General Accounting Office, the audit, evaluation and investigative arm of 

Congress, exists to support Congress in meeting its constitutional responsibilities 

and to help improve the performance and accountability of the federal government 

for the American people. GAO examines the use of public funds; evaluates federal 

programs and policies; and provides analyses, recommendations, and other 

assistance to help Congress make informed oversight, policy, and funding 

decisions. GAO’s commitment to good government is reflected in its core values of 

accountability, integrity, and reliability.

Obtaining Copies of 

GAO Reports and 

Testimony

The fastest and easiest way to obtain copies of GAO documents at no cost is 

through the Internet. GAO’s Web site (www.gao.gov) contains abstracts and fulltext files of current reports and testimony and an expanding archive of older 

products. The Web site features a search engine to help you locate documents 

using key words and phrases. You can print these documents in their entirety, 

including charts and other graphics.

Each day, GAO issues a list of newly released reports, testimony, and 

correspondence. GAO posts this list, known as “Today’s Reports,” on its Web site 

daily. The list contains links to the full-text document files. To have GAO e-mail this 

list to you every afternoon, go to www.gao.gov and select “Subscribe to 

e-mail alerts” under the “Order GAO Products” heading.

Order by Mail or Phone The first copy of each printed report is free. Additional copies are $2 each. A check 

or money order should be made out to the Superintendent of Documents. GAO 

also accepts VISA and Mastercard. Orders for 100 or more copies mailed to a single 

address are discounted 25 percent. Orders should be sent to:

U.S. General Accounting Office

441 G Street NW, Room LM

Washington, D.C. 20548

To order by Phone: Voice: (202) 512-6000 

TDD: (202) 512-2537 

Fax: (202) 512-6061

To Report Fraud, 

Waste, and Abuse in 

Federal Programs

Contact:

Web site: www.gao.gov/fraudnet/fraudnet.htm

E-mail: fraudnet@gao.gov

Automated answering system: (800) 424-5454 or (202) 512-7470

Public Affairs Jeff Nelligan, Managing Director, NelliganJ@gao.gov (202) 512-4800

U.S. General Accounting Office, 441 G Street NW, Room 7149 

Washington, D.C. 20548
United States

General Accounting Office

Washington, D.C. 20548-0001

Official Business

Penalty for Private Use $300

Address Service Requested

Presorted Standard

Postage & Fees Paid

GAO

Permit No. GI00