## United States Court of Appeals
**For the Eighth Circuit**

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No. 23

- 3297

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United States of America

Plaintiff - Appellee

v.

Lewis Edward Byrd, III

Defendant - Appellant

____________ Appeal from United States District Court for the District of Minnesota

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Submitted: May 6, 2024 Filed: July 5, 2 024 [ Unpublished ]

____________ Before COLLOTON, Chief Judge, SHEPHERD and STRAS, Circuit Judges.

____________

PER CURIAM.

Lewis Edward Byrd, III, appeals the sentence imposed after he was convicted, pursuant to his guilty plea, of unlawful possession of a firearm by a felon , in violation of 18 U.S.C. § § 922(g) (1) and 924(a)(8)

. The district court 1 calculated Byrd ’ s

1 The Honorable Eric C. Tostrud, United States District Judge for the District of Minnesota.-2- United States Sentencing Guidelines range as 46 to 57 months ’ imprisonment but varied upward and imposed a sentence of 72 months ’ imprisonment to be followed by 3 years of supervised release. Having jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291,
we affirm.

B yrd argues that the district court abused its discretion by imposing a substantively unreasonable sentence. “ When we review the imposition of sentences, whether inside or outside the Guidelines range, we apply a deferential
abuse

- of

- discretion standard. ” United States v. Godfrey , 863 F.3d 1088, 1094 (8th Cir. 2017) (citation omitted). “ A district court abuses its discretion when it (1) fails to consider a relevant factor that should have received significant weight; (2) gives significant weight to an i mproper or irrelevant factor; or (3) considers only the appropriate factors but in weighing those factors commits a clear error of judgment. ” United States v. Palkowitsch, 36 F.4th 796, 802 (8th Cir. 2022) (citation omitted). Further, “ [i]t will be the unusual case when we reverse a district court

sentence

— whether within, above, or below the applicable Guidelines range

— as substantively unreasonable. ” Godfrey

, 863 F.3d at 1099 (citation omitted).

Byrd contends the district court committed a clear error of judgment by assigning excessive weight to the consideration reflected in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(2)(A) —“ the need for the sentence imposed

. . . to reflect the seriousness of the offense, to promote respect for the law, and to provide just punishment for the
offense”— by “ linking the firearm

- possession offense to past and future gun violence against women, when the record reflects no such linkage. ” However, Byrd ’ s contention is belied by the record. In explaining its sentence, the district court first
stated that it had considered all of th e § 3553(a) factors and specifically mentioned the need for the sentence to be sufficient, but not greater than necessary, to achieve the purposes of sentencing described in § 3553(a)(2). The district court further noted the nature and circumstances of the offense as described in the unobjected

- to portions of Byrd ’ s Presentence Investigation Report, including that Byrd was found in possession of a loaded firearm and that he lied in purchasing the firearm by representing that he was not a felon. In discussing Byrd ’ s history and characteristics

,-3- pursuant to § 35 53(a)(1), the district court noted Byrd ’ s traumatic childhood, the substance abuse problems of his mother, abandonment by his father, and his subsequent adoption. The district court discussed Byrd ’ s criminal history, per § 3553(a)(1), identifying four “ problematic patterns ” supporting the need for the sentence imposed under § 3553(a)(2)(B) and (C) : a history of violence against women; that the facts underlying his convictions include d “ multiple attempts to flee law enforcement officers by driving vehicles at high rates of speed ” ; that his past supervision history demonstrated repeated violations of release conditions

, including absconding; and that Byrd has not been deterred from engaging in criminal conduct by lengthy terms of imprisonment. The district court concluded by finding that Byrd poses a significant danger to the public

, see id. § 3553(a)(2)(C), and that a significant upward variance was warranted. In short, while clearly noting Byrd ’ s history of violence toward women as well as noting the firearm possession which underlies this conviction, contrary to Byrd ’ s contention, the district court did not focus on nor
even mention past or future gun violence against women.

B yrd ’ s contention boils down to the argument that the district court gave too much weight to the factors reflected in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(2)(A). However, we give the district court “ wide latitude to weigh the § 3553(a) factors

. . . and assign some factors greater weight than others in determining an appropriate sentence. Simply because the district court weighed relevant factors

. . . more heavily than [Byrd] would prefer does not mean the district court abused its discretion. ” United
States v. Farmer

, 647 F.3d 1175, 1179 (8th Cir. 2011) (citation omitted). The district court did not commit a clear error of judgment in weighing the § 3553(a) factors nor did its sentencing decision fall outside of the wide discretion it is afforded.

Ac cordingly, we affirm the judgment of the district court.

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