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December 2020

THE

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Welcome to this installment of The Federal Law Enforcement Informer (The Informer). The Legal Training Division of the Federal 

Law Enforcement Training Centers’ Office of Chief Counsel is dedicated to providing law enforcement officers with quality, useful 

and timely United States Supreme Court and federal Circuit Courts of Appeals reviews, interesting developments in the law, and 

legal articles written to clarify or highlight various issues. The views expressed in these articles are the opinions of the author and 

do not necessarily reflect the views of the Federal Law Enforcement Training Centers. The Informer is researched and written by 

members of the Legal Division. All comments, suggestions, or questions regarding The Informer can be directed to the Editor at 

FLETC-LegalTrainingDivision@dhs.gov. You can join The Informer Mailing List, have The Informer delivered directly to you via 

e-mail, and view copies of the current and past editions of the The Informer by visiting https://www.fletc.gov/informer. 

This edition of The Informer may be cited as 12 INFORMER 20.
2

The Informer – December 2020

Case Summaries

Circuit Courts of Appeals

First Circuit

United States v Simpkins: Whether a police officer’s question to the defendant about

an object he felt in the defendant’s pocket during a frisk fell within the public safety 

exception to Miranda........................................................................................................................5

Fifth Circuit

Rountree v. Lopinto: Whether a police officer was entitled to qualified immunity in a

lawsuit in which the plaintiff claimed the officer’s warrantless seizure of his automobile 

violated the Fourth Amendment.......................................................................................................6

United States v. Beaudion: Whether the defendant had standing under the Fourth

Amendment to challenge the search of his girlfriends’ cell phone and whether the warrant

authorizing the search of the cell phone complied with the Stored Communications Act.................6

Sixth Circuit

United States v Blomquist: Whether the defendant voluntarily consented to a search of 

a greenhouse and chicken coop where the officers discovered an unlawful medical-marijuana 

grow operation.................................................................................................................................8

Eighth Circuit

United States v. Crutchfield: Whether the warrantless entry and sweep of the defendant’s

home was reasonable under the Fourth Amendment........................................................................9

♦

FLETC Informer Webinar Schedule – January 2021

1. Self-Incrimination: Miranda and a Little More – Part One (1-hour)

Presented by John Besselman, Senior Advisor for Training, Office of Chief Counsel, 

Federal Law Enforcement Training Centers, Glynco, Georgia.

This two-part webcast series will explore the Fifth Amendment’s Self-Incrimination 

Clause, with an in-depth review of the Miranda v. Arizona decision, to explore and explain 

the rules as they apply to law enforcement investigations. 

Tuesday, January 12, 2021: 1:30 p.m. Eastern / 12:30 p.m. Central / 11:30 a.m. 

Mountain / 10:30 a.m. Pacific

To participate in this webinar: https://share.dhs.gov/self-incrimination-one/

♦
3

2. Self-Incrimination: Miranda and a Little More – Part Two (1-hour)

Presented by John Besselman, Senior Advisor for Training, Office of Chief Counsel, 

Federal Law Enforcement Training Centers, Glynco, Georgia.

This two-part webinar series concludes with a look at obtaining valid waivers of Miranda

protections, exceptions to the Miranda requirement, and how the Sixth Amendment’s right 

to counsel provision affects law enforcement investigations. 

Wednesday, January 13, 2021: 1:30 p.m. Eastern / 12:30 p.m. Central / 11:30 p.m. 

Mountain / 10:30 a.m. Pacific 

To participate in this webinar: https://share.dhs.gov/self-incrimination-two/

♦

3. Diversity Issues for Leadership (1-hour)

Presented by John Besselman, Senior Advisor for Training, Office of Chief Counsel, 

Federal Law Enforcement Training Centers, Glynco, Georgia.

This webinar will discuss the “value added” to organizations that adopt diversity as part 

of its culture, and examine some psychological reasons that can impede an organization 

from achieving its highest performance.

Wednesday, January 20, 2021: 10:30 a.m. Eastern / 9:30 a.m. Central / 8:30 a.m. 

Mountain / 7:30 a.m. Pacific 

To participate in this webinar: https://share.dhs.gov/diversityissues/

♦

4. The ADA and Policing: What Every Officer Should Know (1-hour)

Presented by Mary M. Mara, Attorney-Advisor/Senior Instructor, Federal Law 

Enforcement Training Centers, Artesia, New Mexico.

We all know that an officer’s use of force is governed by the Fourth Amendment’s 

reasonableness requirement. But what does Title II of the Americans with Disabilities 

Act (ADA) require? What individuals are considered to be “disabled” under the Act and 

what special accommodations must an officer make when investigating, arresting and/or 

using force against an individual with a known or suspected mental or physical disability? 

This 60-minute webinar will discuss the impact of the ADA on policing.

Wednesday January 20, 2021: 3 p.m. Eastern / 2 p.m. Central / 1 p.m. Mountain / 

12 p.m. Pacific

To participate in this webinar: http://share.dhs.gov/informer

♦
4

5. Briefing Skills – Meetings With a Purpose (1-hour)

Presented by John Besselman, Senior Advisor for Training, Office of Chief Counsel, 

Federal Law Enforcement Training Centers, Glynco, Georgia.

This webinar will discuss the basics of briefing the client, your boss, your colleagues, or 

anyone else in your professional life. The lost art of getting-to-the-point is useful – and 

not just for the lawyers in the crowd. Tune in to see what leaders in the field say about 

how to say less and mean more.

Wednesday, January 27, 2021: 2:30 p.m. Eastern / 1:30 p.m. Central / 12:30 p.m. 

Mountain / 11:30 a.m. Pacific 

To participate in this webinar: https://share.dhs.gov/briefingskills/

♦

To Participate in a FLETC Informer Webinar

1. Click on the link to access the Homeland Security Information Network (HSIN).

2. If you have a HSIN account, enter with your login and password information.

3. If you do not have a HSIN account, click on the button next to “Enter as a Guest.”

4. Enter your name and click the “Enter” button.

♦

FLETC Office of Chief Counsel Podcast Series

1. Fundamentals of the Fourth Amendment – A 15-part podcast 

series that covers the following Fourth Amendment topics: 

2. Fifth and Sixth Amendment Series – A 10-Part podcast series that 

covers the following Fifth and Sixth Amendment topics:

Click Here: https://leolaw.podbean.com/

♦

• A Flash History of the Fourth Amendment

• What is a Fourth Amendment Search?

• What is a Fourth Amendment Seizure?

• Fourth Amendment Levels of Suspicion

• Stops and Arrests

• Plain View Seizures

• Mobile Conveyance (Part 1 and Part 2)

• Exigent Circumstances

• Frisks

• Searches Incident to Arrest (SIA)

• Consent (Part 1 and Part 2)

• Inventories

• Inspection Authorities

• What’s In the Fifth Amendment?

• Right Against Self-Incrimination 

• Kalkines / Garrity

• Miranda – The case

• Miranda – Custody 

• Miranda – Interrogation

• Miranda – Waiver 

• Miranda – Invocation of Rights

• Miranda – Grab Bag of Issues

• Sixth Amendment – Right to Counsel
5

 CASE SUMMARIES

 Circuit Courts of Appeals

First Circuit

United States v. Simpkins, 978 F.3d 1 (1st Cir. 2020) 

Based on information provided by a credible informant, the Maine State Police established 

probable cause that the defendant, Rob Simpkins, was transporting controlled substances into the 

state. Once within their jurisdiction, the officers conducted a high-risk traffic stop, in part, because 

they learned from an August 2017 “mental wellness check” that the defendant owned firearms. 

The officers ordered the defendant out of his vehicle at gunpoint and immediately handcuffed 

him. One officer patted him down for weapons. During this pat-down the officer asked the 

defendant if there was “anything on” him. The defendant stated that he had a pocketknife. The 

officer “noticed” something in the defendant’s pocket during the pat-down, apparently by feel, 

and asked, “What’s that?” The defendant replied that it was, “just a little bit of fentanyl.” Soon 

thereafter, the officers arrested the defendant and read him the Miranda Warnings.

The defendant later objected to the government’s use of his “fentanyl” statement made during the 

pat-down because it was made: 1) in response to the government’s questions; 2) while in custody;

and, 3) without having been provided his Miranda warnings. The court was not willing to concede 

the fact that the defendant was “in custody” when he replied to the officer’s question of “What’s 

this?” However, even if it came to that conclusion, the court found that Simkin’s statement was 

not made in violation of the Miranda decision.

Like many general rules, the Miranda rule has its’ exceptions. Perhaps the most important one is 

the permission of officers to ask questions necessary to secure his or her own safety or the safety 

of others. This is generally known as the public safety exception to the Miranda requirements. 

Provided that the officer asks the question in relation to an “objectively reasonable need” to 

address an “immediate danger,” the court will allow the unwarned questioning to occur. Here, 

the court concluded that the officer’s question which elicited the defendant's “fentanyl” statement 

arose out of an objectively reasonable concern for his safety rather than some sort of sly effort to 

obtain testimonial evidence.

The officer posed the question in furtherance of a reasonably conducted check for weapons. 

Furthermore, it followed closely on the heels of the defendant’s admission that he possessed a 

weapon in the form of a pocketknife. Under the public safety exception, the trooper was not 

required to make a split-second decision about whether to subordinate his immediate safety 

concerns to the admissibility of any answers he might receive to his pat-down-related questions. 

Therefore, the court concluded that the defendant’s statements falls under the public safety 

exception. The state did not act in violation of his Miranda protections.

For the court’s opinion: https://cases.justia.com/federal/appellate-courts/ca1/19-1948/19-1948-

2020-10-15.pdf?ts=1602779403

*****
6

Fifth Circuit

Rountree v. Lopinto, 976 F.3d 606 (5th Cir. 2020) 

While driving her son’s car, Mary Rountree had a minor accident with a parked vehicle. She got 

out briefly to check for damage and then drove off. A surveillance camera caught the incident on 

video, which resulted in a complaint with the Sheriff's Office. The Sheriff's Office sent James 

Rountree, the vehicle’s owner and plaintiff, a letter informing him that his car had been involved 

in an accident and requesting that he set up an appointment with the hit-and-run office within 

seven days. James Rountree lived outside of the Unites States, but his father responded to the 

letter. He acknowledged that the vehicle belonged to his son but that no hit-and-run had occurred 

because there was no damage.

An investigating officer spoke to Mr. Rountree’s father on the phone and later went to his parents’ 

apartment in an unsuccessful effort to speak with either Mr. or Mrs. Rountree. Soon thereafter, 

the officer inspected the parking lot of the apartment complex and discovered Rountree’s vehicle. 

He noted damage to the driver's-side rear bumper consistent with where he expected damage to 

be from the accident. The officer called a wrecker and had the vehicle towed. He then left a 

notice on the apartment door and left.

Some weeks later, the Sheriff's Office sent the plaintiff's father a letter informing him that the 

evidentiary hold on the vehicle had been removed. The plaintiff's father and mother went to the 

towing yard to recover the vehicle but, since it was registered in the plaintiff's name, the towing 

company refused to release the vehicle to the plaintiff’s parents. The plaintiff visited the United 

States the following month and paid $1,674.58 to have his vehicle released.

The plaintiff sued the investigating officer, alleging that the seizure was unlawful. The officer 

moved for summary judgment, asserted that the seizure was lawful and, if not, that he was entitled 

to qualified immunity. To overcome this defense, at a minimum, the plaintiff must show the 

defendant violated his constitutional rights. The court noted that under the Fourth Amendment’s 

automobile exception the government can seize a vehicle from a public area without a warrant 

when it has probable cause to believe that the vehicle itself is an instrument or evidence of crime. 

Though a private apartment parking lot is not “public,” neither is it “private” in the sense relevant 

for Fourth Amendment protection. There is no reasonable expectation of privacy in a shared 

apartment parking lot. The officer was entitled to make seizures there. Further, the court found 

that, as there was probable cause to believe the car was an instrument or evidence of crime, a 

warrant was not required to seize it. Therefore, the seizure did not violate the Fourth Amendment 

and the officer was entitled to qualified immunity.

For the court’s opinion: https://cases.justia.com/federal/appellate-courts/ca5/20-30111/20-

30111-2020-10-02.pdf?ts=1601681416

*****

United States v. Beaudion, 979 F.3d 1092 (5th Cir. 2020) 

During a narcotics investigation, police officers learned that Matthew Beaudion and his girlfriend, 

Jessica Davis, were planning to drive from Houston, Texas, to Monroe, Louisiana, with four 

pounds of methamphetamine. As such, a confidential informant (CI) then called Davis on her cell 

phone to arrange a meeting to purchase methamphetamine. 
7

Using this information, officers obtained a search warrant to obtain the GPS coordinates of 

Davis’s cell phone from Verizon over a sixteen-hour period. When Verizon indicated that Davis 

was passing through Shreveport, Louisiana, heading towards Monroe, officers conducted a traffic 

stop. The officers searched the couple’s car and found methamphetamine. The officers arrested 

Davis and Beaudion and recovered Davis’s cell phone from her purse.

The government charged Beaudion with conspiracy to possess with intent to distribute 

methamphetamine. Beaudion filed a motion to suppress the drugs seized during the stop, arguing 

that the warrant that authorized the GPS tracking of Davis’s cell phone failed to comply with the 

Stored Communication Act (SCA). 

As an initial matter, the district court held that Beaudion did not have standing to challenge the 

search of Davis’s cell phone. Before a person can challenge the legality of a search, it must be 

established that the person had a reasonable expectation of privacy in the area or item searched 

by the government. This concept of “Fourth Amendment standing” only allows individuals to 

challenge governmental searches when they allege their “own Fourth Amendment rights were 

infringed by the search or seizure they seek to challenge.” By denying Beaudion’s motion to 

suppress the evidence for lack of standing, the court did not decide whether the search warrant 

complied with the SCA. Afterward, Beaudion plead guilty, however, he reserved the right to 

appeal the denial of his motion to suppress to the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals. 

On appeal, Beaudion claimed that he had a reasonable expectation of privacy in Davis’s cell 

phone; therefore, the district court erred in denying his motion to suppress the drugs seized during 

the stop. Specifically, Beaudion claimed that he had a reasonable expectation of privacy in 

Davis’s cell phone based on the following facts: 1) he purchased the phone and gave it to Davis;

2) he had permission to use the phone; 3) he has password access to the phone; 4) he accessed his 

Facebook account from the phone; and, 5) he used the phone to capture intimate videos of him 

and Davis. 

The court held that the Beaudion’s first fact was irrelevant, as a person does not have standing to 

challenge a search or seizure of property that was voluntarily abandoned or conveyed to another 

person. Next, the court found that the third fact alleged by Beaudion was not supported by any 

evidence presented in the district court. Finally, the court determined that facts two, four, and five 

were, in essence, a claim that Beaudion sometimes used Davis’s phone for personal activities. 

However, the court added, there was no indication that Beaudion ever used or possessed the phone 

outside of Davis’s presence or how often he accessed Facebook or captured intimate videos. 

Instead, the court noted that: 1) Davis was the primary user of the phone; 2) Davis had the phone 

number long before she met Beaudion; 3) Davis maintained possession of the phone throughout 

the day of the arrest; and, 4) Davis’s parents paid the phone bill. Based on these facts, the court 

concluded that while Beaudion might have expected privacy in Davis’s phone, this expectation of 

privacy was not reasonable. As a result, the court found that Beaudion did not have Fourth 

Amendment standing to challenge the search of Davis’s phone.

Next, the court held that even if Beaudion had standing to challenge the GPS search of Davis’s 

phone, the search warrant complied with the SCA. Beaudion claimed the SCA required the 

government to establish probable cause that the subscriber or customer was involved in criminal 

activity. Beaudion argued that the search warrant was improperly issued under the SCA because 

Davis’s parents were the relevant Verizon subscribers.
8

The court disagreed. The court noted that the SCA authorizes the government to “obtain a 

warrant” from a state “court of competent jurisdiction” using “state warrant procedures” upon a 

“showing that there are reasonable grounds to believe that the . . . information sought is relevant 

to an ongoing criminal investigation.” The court found that the warrant in this case complied with 

these provision; therefore, it was properly issued by the state-court judge.

For the court’s opinion: https://cases.justia.com/federal/appellate-courts/ca5/19-30635/19-

30635-2020-11-11.pdf?ts=1605119487

*****

Sixth Circuit

United States v. Blomquist, 976 F.3d 755 (6th Cir. 2020) 

The police went to a property owned by Lee Blomquist’s father to search for marijuana. The 

search warrant authorized a full search of the property. Once there, the officers detained 

Blomquist, the defendant, placed him in handcuffs and advised him of his Miranda rights. The 

defendant was willing to waive his rights and cooperate with the police because, as he stated to 

them, the state authorized his business as a medical-marijuana grow operation. The defendant 

was willing to show the officers paperwork and provide them a tour. The officers removed the 

handcuffs and began the tour. The defendant took the officers to his father's garage and gave them 

a binder of materials, which he claimed validated his business. The officers asked the defendant 

if he would show them where he was growing the marijuana, and he said he would. He then led 

the officers into a nearby chicken coop and showed them five small rooms with scores of 

marijuana plants. The defendant explained that he moved the marijuana plants from the chicken 

coop to nearby greenhouses in warmer weather, where he took the officers next. At no point 

during this interaction did the defendant suggest that the structures were on someone else's 

property, nor was there any visible evidence – such as a fence, barrier, or tree line – indicating as 

much.

The officers asked the defendant where he stored the processed marijuana, and the tour continued. 

He brought them back to his father's garage, pulled down a ladder, and led them up to a locked 

room in the attic. He unlocked the door and let them in. The room contained around 37 pounds 

of marijuana, pre-packaged into baggies.

The officers later learned that the defendant’s medical-marijuana operation was not even close to 

legal. He had broken a host of federal and state laws the state subsequently charged him with a 

series of offenses.

The defendant asked the court to suppress the evidence obtained during the search. The defendant 

argued that the officers exceeded the scope of their search warrant after he established that the 

chicken coop and greenhouses were not on the property covered by that warrant. The defendant 

leased this adjacent property from the owner.

The court found that the defendant voluntarily consented to the search of the premises by giving 

the officers a tour of his operation. For consent to be valid, it must be “free and voluntary,” which 

the government bears the burden of demonstrating by a preponderance of the evidence. The court 

evaluates questions of the validity of consent by considering two questions: 1) whether an 

individual's "actions adequately demonstrated consent," and, 2) whether "other factors 

contaminated" that consent.
9

First, did the defendant’s actions demonstrate consent? After the officers secured the defendant 

and informed him of his rights, he voluntarily showed them his medical-marijuana papers. The 

officers examined the papers and asked the defendant if he would show them his growing 

operation. He agreed and the tour commenced. The defendant led and the officers followed. The 

officers never forced their way into the outbuildings, never told the defendant they would go in 

without his permission, nor stated that their warrant enabled such a search. In short, the court 

found that the defendant’s actions demonstrated consent.

Second, the court considered whether other factors contaminated the defendant’s consent, which 

it examined by looking at the totality of the circumstances. The court considered factors such as: 

the age, intelligence, and education of the individual; whether the individual understands the right 

to refuse to consent; whether the individual understands his or her constitutional rights; the length 

and nature of detention; and the use of coercive conduct by the police. The defendant’s primary 

complaint, which was that his consent was not voluntary because the officers detained him upon 

arrival, was rejected by the court.

The court noted that though the officers briefly detained and handcuffed the defendant as they 

secured the property, they also quickly give him his Miranda warning. The defendant was fully 

aware that the comments he shared with the officers could be used against him. The officers did 

not mistreat him, threaten him, or act unprofessionally in any way. Further still, the defendant 

offered to lead the officers on a tour of the operation, including those areas not covered by the 

search warrant. The court held that the record contained no reason to think that the defendant was 

uniquely susceptible to duress or coercion, he was a mature adult, held a high-school diploma and 

was a trained electrician. He also had an extensive criminal history, giving him ample experience 

with the police and legal system.

Based on these observations, the court held that the defendant voluntarily consented to the tour 

and denied his motion to suppress the evidence he showed the officers.

For the court’s opinion: https://cases.justia.com/federal/appellate-courts/ca6/19-2112/19-2112-

2020-10-07.pdf?ts=1602086415

*****

Eighth Circuit

United States v. Crutchfield, 979 F.3d 614 (8th Cir. 2020) 

Demetrius Crutchfield and another man, Tyler Cannon, were shot while standing at the front door 

of Crutchfield’s home. Cannon drove himself to the hospital, and Crutchfield dragged himself 

into his bedroom and called 911. The first officer to arrive in the vicinity of Crutchfield’s home 

saw a man, Antonio Harris, walking away. Harris knew Crutchfield had been shot and 

accompanied the officer to Crutchfield’s home.

At Crutchfield’s home, officers saw bullet holes near the front door of the residence. The officers 

entered and found Crutchfield in his bedroom, bleeding from a gunshot wound to his groin area, 

and an unfired rifle cartridge on the floor. At some point, an officer entered the kitchen and saw 

what he believed to be drugs on a table. The officer later stated that Harris entered the kitchen 

and seemed to by trying to distract him and retrieve the suspected narcotics. 
10

Outside the house, other officers discovered assault rifles and handguns. Some of the firearms 

were between Crutchfield’s residence and another residence on the property and some beyond a 

fence on an adjacent, abandoned property. 

After an ambulance took Crutchfield away, an officer re-entered the home and saw more suspected 

drugs on bedside table. Afterward, the officers obtained a warrant to search Crutchfield’s home 

and seized, among other things, additional firearms and ammunition. 

After Crutchfield plead guilty to one count of being a felon in possession of a firearm, he appealed 

the district court’s denial of his motion to suppress the evidence seized from his residence. 

Crutchfield argued that the officers’ re-entry into his home, as a subsequent protective sweep, was

unreasonable.

The 8th Circuit Court of Appeals disagreed. First, the court held that officers’ entry into 

Crutchfield’s residence in response to the call for medical aid for a shooting victim did not violate 

the Fourth Amendment. Given the fact of the shooting and the other information known to the 

officers at the time, the court concluded that exigent circumstances made it reasonable to enter the 

residence and look into the rooms to ensure the absence of a shooter or additional victims. The 

court added that, while doing so, officers almost immediately saw ammunition and suspected 

narcotics in plain view. 

Second, the court held that the officer in the kitchen did not unreasonably extend the duration of 

the protective sweep in that area. The court found that the officer in the kitchen remained there 

out of a concern that Harris was attempting to retrieve the suspected narcotics observed in plain 

view on the table. 

Finally, the court held that no information obtained by officers who might have “lingered” in the 

house during the initial entry, nor after their re-entry after the ambulance departed, aided in 

securing the search warrant. Instead, the court found that the officers relied on information 

obtained permissibly and almost immediately upon entry into Crutchfield’s residence. The court 

added that to the extent that any officer might have exceeded the permissible scope of a security 

sweep, any such transgression led, at most, to the discovery of evidence that inevitably would 

have been discovered upon execution of the valid search warrant. 

For the court’s opinion: https://cases.justia.com/federal/appellate-courts/ca8/19-3767/19-3767-

2020-11-02.pdf?ts=1604334619

*****