United States v. Clay: Muhammad Ali’s 

Fight Against the Vietnam Draft

by

Winston Bowman

Associate Historian, Federal Judicial History Office, 

Federal Judicial Center

Prepared for inclusion in the project

Federal Trials and Great Debates in United States History

Federal Judicial Center

Federal Judicial History Office

2018

This Federal Judicial Center publication was undertaken in furtherance of the Center’s 

statutory mission to “conduct, coordinate, and encourage programs relating to the history 

of the judicial branch of the United States government.” While the Center regards the content as responsible and valuable, these materials do not reflect policy or recommendations 

of the Board of the Federal Judicial Center.
2

Contents

United States v. Clay: A Short Narrative, 5

Introduction, 5

The conversion of Cassius Clay, 7

Ali and the draft bureaucracy, 10

Indictment and trial, 13

Sentence and travel restrictions, 15

Initial appeal, 16

Remand and second appeal, 18

Clay v. United States in the Supreme Court, 19

Reception and memory, 21

Alternative paths, 22

Ministerial exemption, 22

Covert surveillance, 23

Constitutional challenges to the draft system, 24

Religious freedom, 26

Themes and questions, 27

The Judicial Process: A Chronology, 29

The Federal Courts and Their Jurisdiction, 31

United States District Court for the Southern District of Texas, 31

United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, 31

Supreme Court of the United States, 32

Legal Questions Before the Federal Courts, 33

Was Ali guilty of violating the Universal Military Training and Service Act by refusing 

to submit to military induction? 33

Did the DOJ’s legal advice to the selective service board of appeals necessitate reversing 

Ali’s conviction? 33

Was the selective service regime created by the Universal Military Training and Service 

Act constitutional? 33

Did the FBI’s warrantless wiretaps of conversations involving Ali taint his criminal 

conviction? 34

Biographies, 35

The judges, 35

Joe McDonald Ingraham, 35

Robert Andrew Ainsworth, Jr., 35

John Marshall Harlan II, 36

William Orville Douglas, 37

Potter Stewart, 39
3

United States v. Clay: Muhammad Ali’s Fight Against the Vietnam Draft

The lawyers, 40

Hayden Covington, 40

Erwin Griswold, 41

Chauncey Eskridge, 42

Charles Morgan, Jr., 42

Morton Susman, 43

Media Coverage and Public Debates, 44

Historical Documents, 49

Universal Military Training and Service Act, 49

Department of Justice legal recommendation letter, 50

New York Times report, 54

Pretrial hearing excerpts, 57

Posttrial testimony of Muhammad Ali, 65

Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit opinion in Clay v. United States, 73

Leonard Schecter, “The Passion of Muhammad Ali,” Esquire, 80

Judge Ingraham’s ruling on wiretaps, 85

Jimmy Cannon, “Cassius Clay is the Sixties,” 86

Oral arguments in Clay v. United States, 87

Supreme Court opinion in Clay v. United States, 94

Jim Murray, “It’s Okay to set Ali free—Many others have paid the price,” Boston Globe, 98

Les Matthews, “Hail Ali’s Victory: Free At Last,” New York Amsterdam News, 100

Muhammad Ali, Foreward to Muhammad Ali’s Greatest Fight, 101

Bibliography, 103

5

United States v. Clay: Muhammad Ali’s Fight Against the Vietnam Draft

United States v. Clay: A Short Narrative

Introduction

On April 28, 1967, forty-six young men walked into a building that had once been a 

federal courthouse in Houston to report for mandatory induction into the military. 

It was a scene that replayed itself countless times across the country during the Vietnam era, when federal law required hundreds of thousands of citizens to serve in the 

armed forces. This induction ceremony, however, was a media event. Outside the 

building, contending groups of protesters (some possibly assembled by unscrupulous 

reporters to add to the drama) waved signs and hurled invective. Inside, two military 

liaisons passed reports to journalists about a single inductee who was the focus of 

all the attention: he passed his physical; his blood was taken as usual; he refused to 

eat a ham sandwich at lunch.

The inductee drawing such intense interest was Muhammad Ali, the undefeated heavyweight champion of the world. Over the past three years, Ali had become 

a national pariah for his views on race, religion, and especially the Vietnam War. 

Claiming that his beliefs as a member and minister of the Nation of Islam, a controversial sect of black Muslims, precluded him from any form of military service, Ali 

had already fought protracted battles in the draft bureaucracy and the federal courts 

in an attempt to avoid induction. He 

had failed at every attempt.

Now, in a simple ceremony freighted with meaning, a soldier would line 

him up with his fellow inductees and 

demand he take a single step forward 

when he heard his name to signify his 

entry into the army. Ali knew that if 

he failed to take this step he would be 

prosecuted in federal court. Should he 

lose at trial, he would face a sentence 

of up to five years in prison and a 

$10,000 fine.

The soldier called out, “Cassius 

Marcellus Clay.” Ali did not move. 

Likely aware that Ali considered this, 

his legal name, a “slave name,” the soldier then called out, “Muhammad Ali.”1 Again, 

1. These materials refer to Ali as “Cassius Clay” or “Clay” prior to his adoption of his Muslim name and 

as “Muhammad Ali” or “Ali” thereafter or where necessary to refer to the man in the abstract. However, it 

should be noted that Ali never legally changed his name and, as a consequence, several of the cases referenced herein refer to him by his former name. These materials refer to the cases by their official titles.

Ali at the Armed Forces Examining and 

Entrance Station in Houston

Courtesy: Library of Congress
United States v. Clay: Muhammad Ali’s Fight Against the Vietnam Draft

6

Ali refused to step forward. He was warned of the legal consequences of his refusal 

to take the step but persisted nonetheless.

After giving his reasons for declining to submit to induction in writing, Ali was led 

to a press room where the normally exuberant champion declined to speak, instead 

handing out copies of a prepared statement reiterating that his faith prevented him 

from joining the military. “I strongly object,” the statement continued, “that so many 

newspapers have given the American public and the world the impression that I have 

only two alternatives in taking this stand: either I go to jail or go to the Army. There 

is another alternative and that alternative is justice.”

Though Ali eventually secured “justice,” he paid a high price for his stand in the 

meantime. He was tried and convicted of draft evasion in federal district court and 

sentenced to the maximum penalty. He was stripped of his titles and suspended 

from boxing during the peak of his career, losing millions of dollars in the process. 

Mainstream America turned its back on a man who seemed happy to beat people 

up for money and fame but unwilling to fight for his country. In response, Ali and 

his legal team launched a lengthy challenge against his conviction that ended with 

victory in the Supreme Court of the United States in 1971. As the nation’s attitudes 

towards the war shifted during this period, many Americans came to respect Ali’s 

resolve and cheered as the man they had once vilified eventually reclaimed his title. 

Several commentators have portrayed Ali’s fight against the draft as a victory for 

freedom of conscience every bit as thrilling, and arguably more important, than his 

exploits in the ring. And, indeed, the symbolism of a defiant black Muslim taking on 

the federal government and winning against long odds and at great personal cost 

resonated throughout the world. Nevertheless, the real story of the case was one dominated by complex procedures and nuanced rulings. Several of Ali’s more sweeping 

legal challenges to the draft failed outright. Indeed, Ali never definitively established 

that he was a bona fide conscientious objector; he succeeded instead by exposing 

flaws in the bureaucratic process by which his objections were initially rejected.

In the interest of clarity, this narrative follows the multiple threads of Ali’s case 

separately. It begins by sketching Ali’s religious conversion and opposition to the 

draft, before tracing his conscientious objector claims from the Selective Service 

System through his criminal trial and multiple appeals. It then reflects on other 

major legal issues raised by Ali’s case. Each of these challenges to his conviction 

failed. Nonetheless, examining these unsuccessful stands can help teachers enliven 

otherwise abstract concepts like judicial review of bureaucratic decisions, the politics 

of the Vietnam era, and the historical theories of contingency and memory. By understanding the meandering path Ali’s case took, moreover, teachers and students can 

gain a more sophisticated appreciation of the ways in which disputes often assume 

different meanings, and are conducted at different registers, inside and outside the 

judicial system.
7

United States v. Clay: Muhammad Ali’s Fight Against the Vietnam Draft

The conversion of Cassius Clay

Cassius Marcellus Clay, Jr., was born in Louisville in 1942. He grew up in modest, 

but not impoverished, circumstances and began boxing at the age of twelve, showing 

a natural aptitude for the sport. Though members of the press and federal judges 

were later incredulous that he could flunk military 

aptitude exams, Clay was a poor student and seems 

to have graduated from high school largely thanks 

to his growing reputation as a boxer. Just weeks 

after graduation, Clay won gold in the light heavyweight division at the 1960 Olympics in Rome. He 

subsequently turned professional and worked his 

way up the ranks until shocking the sports world by 

defeating heavily favored champion Sonny Liston 

on February 25, 1964.

At least from the time he won gold in Rome, 

Clay was an unabashed self-promoter, known as 

much for his puffery and self-aggrandizing doggerel as he was for his boxing. This quality presents 

challenges in gauging the accuracy of claims he 

subsequently made about his early life and religious 

conversion. From most of the available evidence, 

however, it seems that Clay was first exposed to 

the Nation of Islam in 1959 or 1960. During the 

early 1960s, he attended events at mosques, but it 

is hard to say when he became a regular devotee, 

and accounts have differed accordingly. At a 1967 

hearing, Ali’s lawyers offered a plausible synthesis 

of the conflicting evidence by pinning his conversion to the period around the title bout in 1964, while they acknowledged that he 

had been “wavering back and forth, leaning closer and closer” to the Nation of Islam 

in the preceding years.

Clay’s first official declaration of his beliefs came almost immediately after he 

was crowned world champion. Having seen Clay’s controversial friend Malcolm X 

cheer him on from a ringside seat the night before, reporters at his post-match press 

conference asked Clay to confirm or deny rumors that he was a “card-carrying member of the Black Muslims.” Though he indicated he believed in “Allah and in peace,” 

Clay’s initial answer was both ambiguous and defiant. Rejecting the pressure black 

athletes had long endured to appear “credits” to their race, he declared, “I don’t have 

to be what you want me to be, I’m free to be what I want.”

Ali in the ring (1965)

Courtesy: Library of Congress
United States v. Clay: Muhammad Ali’s Fight Against the Vietnam Draft

8

Over the course of innumerable interviews and press conferences in the following 

months, Clay teased out his beliefs in more specific and controversial ways. His personal philosophy seemed contradictory, even incoherent, at times, but the common 

threads were a desire to be let alone and a firm belief that African Americans should 

take pride in themselves and their culture. Rebuffing calls to join the movement for 

racial integration, for example, Clay asserted he was “happy with [his] own kind.” 

At times this attitude could take a more provocative slant. He castigated blacks who 

advocated integration—including popular former champion Floyd Patterson—labeling them “Uncle Toms” and worse. He responded indignantly to journalists and 

promotors who called him by his “slave name” (though most reporters continued to 

do so for years). Later, he suggested that blacks or Muslims who slept with outsiders 

should be put to death. He also divorced his first wife on the grounds that she refused 

to live a devout Muslim lifestyle or wear clothes comporting with Islamic dress codes.

These controversial positions clashed with the expectations of sports fans accustomed to athletes (and especially black athletes) who adopted modest, even banal, 

media profiles. Jack Johnson, the last black champion to adopt a swagger akin to 

Clay’s, had become persona non grata in white society and was eventually imprisoned on dubious charges. Many predicted a comparable fall from grace for the new 

champion, and a number of his critics expressed a racially tinged desire for first his 

boxing opponents and then the judicial system to put him in his place. While Clay 

Malcolm X with Clay shortly after his victory over Liston

Courtesy: Library of Congress
9

United States v. Clay: Muhammad Ali’s Fight Against the Vietnam Draft

seems to have drawn somewhat more support from African Americans, many of 

his views flew in the face of respectable black politics at a time when Congress was 

debating the landmark Civil Rights Act of 1964.

What is more, the religious sect with which Clay was now synonymous was 

mired in its own controversies and conspiracy theories. The Nation of Islam originated with an obscure Detroit-based preacher named W. D. Fard, who developed 

a theology that combined elements of Islam, Black Nationalism, and the American 

premillennialist tradition.2 Among the few thousand converts Fard amassed by 

the early 1930s, Elijah Poole, who later adopted the Islamic surname Muhammad, 

proved a powerful surrogate, taking over the mantle as the group’s temporal leader 

when Ward mysteriously disappeared in 1934. Elijah Muhammad, who was himself 

imprisoned for refusing to fight in World War II, eventually built up the Nation’s 

following, appealing to a hunger for an ideology of black independence in post-war 

America. Nonetheless, the group’s seemingly anti-white rhetoric, insular community, 

and strong following among prison populations led many to question its legitimacy, 

with critics variously labeling the group a cult and a criminal racket.

Though the Nation of Islam expressed ambivalence about boxing and other 

competitive sports, Clay’s rising public profile helped him to meet influential figures 

in the movement, and he eventually befriended 

Malcolm X, the charismatic leader of a group of 

black Muslims in New York City. Malcolm X , who 

initially served as Clay’s most significant spiritual 

mentor, split with Elijah Muhammad shortly after 

Clay’s title victory. Elijah Muhammad’s announcement that Clay would assume a Muslim name, a 

sign of status in the group, was widely interpreted 

as an attempt to keep him within the Nation’s fold 

as Malcolm X attempted to form his own movement more closely aligned with traditional Islamic 

theology. Ali sided with Elijah Muhammad in this 

feud, apparently deferring to him as a father figure.

Throughout Ali’s heyday, there was much 

speculation about the degree to which he was a 

pawn of the Nation of Islam. With the benefit of 

hindsight, it seems that the group often pressured 

its most famous adherent to adopt certain public 

positions but that Ali was also fiercely individualistic and unlikely to have been “brain2. Fard’s name, along with much about his identity and origins, is the subject of much debate 

and conjecture. He has been variously designated “Farrad Mohammad,” “F. Mohammad Ali,” “Professor Ford,” and “Wali Farrad.”

Elijah Muhammad

Courtesy: Smithsonian Institution
United States v. Clay: Muhammad Ali’s Fight Against the Vietnam Draft

10

washed” in the manner some 

of his detractors suggested. 

Ali’s own approach to the 

faith seems to have been genuine but selective. He embraced the injunction against 

eating pork and prayed five 

times a day, for example, but 

maintained something of 

a playboy lifestyle in other 

respects, acquiring a reputation as a womanizer. Certainly, he shunned calls for 

humility throughout his career, something that served 

as partial justification for his 

temporary suspension from the Nation in 1969. Similarly, while Ali was a vigorous 

supporter of the ideal of black pride and rejected integration, he often (though not 

always) disavowed the idea, advocated by some of the Nation’s followers, that whites 

were inherently evil.

Even so, the racial and religious views he did espouse were sufficiently explosive 

to alienate large swaths of the public and spur a wave of rumors about his involvement in subversive activities. Suspicions that the Nation of Islam had intimidated 

Liston into throwing the title fight gained such currency that the champion was a 

five-to-one underdog when the two fought a rematch. Ali knocked Liston out in a 

matter of seconds in the second bout, prompting even more conspiracy theories. That 

Liston, who had worked as a heavy for the mob and served time for armed robbery 

and assaulting a police officer, played the putative “good guy” in the rematch with 

Ali demonstrates the public’s disdain for the latter. When Patterson subsequently 

challenged Ali, Patterson proclaimed he would “bring the title back to America” and 

even offered (perhaps facetiously) to fight Ali for free, provided he could “take the 

title back from the Black Muslim leadership.” Many American sports fans lamented 

Patterson’s later defeat.

Ali and the draft bureaucracy

As his public image continued to deteriorate, Ali’s draft status became a focus of public 

scrutiny. The teenage Clay had registered for selective service, as required by federal 

law, in 1960. At that time, it seems likely he had yet to convert and did not consider 

the prospect of being called up to the military a serious possibility. The Korean War 

had ended several years earlier, and like many Americans, Clay was not even aware 

Ali’s defeat of Patterson had broader implications

Courtesy: Library of Congress
11

United States v. Clay: Muhammad Ali’s Fight Against the Vietnam Draft

there was a conflict in Vietnam in 1960. American involvement in the war escalated 

as Clay rose to prominence, with an attendant increase in the armed forces’ demand 

for troops. As the war effort intensified, so did attention on the draft status of eligible 

celebrities and athletes.

The body charged with determining Ali’s draft status was his local draft board. 

The Selective Service System placed a great deal of power and discretion in the hands 

of these boards, which were staffed by civilians selected by state governors and appointed by the president. These boards determined the eligibility of young men for 

a series of exemptions and deferments based on such criteria as their employment 

in protected professions, family or financial hardship, ongoing education, and 

conscientious objection. The local boards’ decisions could be appealed to a board 

of appeal, which ruled based on a hearing conducted by a judge or an attorney, an 

investigation report compiled by the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) and a 

legal recommendation from the Department of Justice (DOJ). If the board members 

disagreed or the director of the Selective Service System intervened, the National 

Selective Service Appeal Board (also known as the “Presidential Board”) could hear 

a final appeal.

Importantly, objectors could not appeal board decisions in federal court. To 

facilitate the rapid induction of hundreds of thousands of individuals, selective 

service legislation specifically excluded the draft bureaucracy from the sort of judicial review applied to decisions of other federal agencies. Even when an objector 

was criminally prosecuted for failing to comply with an induction order, the judge 

could only reverse draft board determinations unsupported by any “basis in fact,” a 

standard of review that federal courts often stated was “the narrowest known to the 

law.” Given the inherently ambiguous and abstract nature of the beliefs implicated 

by conscientious objection claims, government lawyers rarely failed to find some fact 

supporting a denial of objector status.

Though he was briefly excluded from military service because of a low score on 

an aptitude test, Ali’s local draft board in Louisville classified him 1-A in February 

1966, making him eligible for induction. When a group of reporters informed him 

of the change in his draft status, Ali responded with disbelief, claiming he had been 

singled out. Asked about the war in Vietnam, he infamously replied that he had “no 

quarrel with them Vietcong.” In early 1966, few public figures were so brazen in their 

criticism of the war, and Ali’s comments elicited a wave of outrage.

Statements of this sort did more than damage Ali’s popularity. They jeopardized 

his ability to make a strong conscientious objection case. Conscientious objector status 

was protected by statute rather than constitutional right. To make a valid claim under 

existing statutes and Supreme Court precedents interpreting them, Ali was required 

to demonstrate: (1) that he objected to all wars; (2) that his beliefs were sincere; and 

(3) that his objections were based on religious beliefs (or at least moral convictions 

equivalent to such beliefs). In submissions to his local board in Louisville, Ali argued 
United States v. Clay: Muhammad Ali’s Fight Against the Vietnam Draft

12

that he met these standards because the principles of the Nation of Islam forbade 

him from participating in any war “when not ordered by Allah.”

The Louisville board rejected Ali’s initial request for a conscientious objector 

exemption and he appealed. At the next stage in the administrative proceedings, retired Kentucky state court judge Lawrence Grauman conducted Ali’s board of appeal 

hearing, concluding that Ali had sincere religious scruples against participation in 

all wars. Nonetheless, the DOJ recommended that the board reject Ali’s appeal in 

a detailed legal opinion letter, arguing that Ali failed all three of the conscientious 

objector criteria. Flawed legal analysis in this letter (an abridged version of which 

is included in these materials) ultimately provided the basis for overturning Ali’s 

conviction.3

The DOJ’s lawyers arguably overstated weaknesses in Ali’s claim on at least two 

of the three criteria: sincerity and religious belief. The overwhelming weight of evidence procured by the FBI and Judge Grauman—including statements from dozens 

of individuals familiar with Ali’s character and beliefs—indicated that his objections 

were sincere. Though the DOJ acknowledged this evidence, its lawyers nevertheless 

argued that Ali’s failure to assert his religious objections until his induction was imminent meant he had not established a record of sincerity. While judicial precedents 

suggested that the timing of claims was a factor boards might consider when assessing 

sincerity, there was no rule barring delayed claims in the way the letter intimated, 

provided they were otherwise genuine. Similarly, the DOJ attempted to parse aspects 

of the religious, racial, and political tenets of the Nation of Islam’s teachings to make 

the case that “insofar as [Ali’s objections] are based upon the teachings of the Nation 

of Islam, [they] rest on grounds which primarily are political and racial.” Given the 

capacious interpretation of “religious belief” adopted by the Supreme Court, this 

argument also appears to have been somewhat strained, Ali’s statements on Vietnam 

notwithstanding.

Finally, the letter claimed that as a member of the Nation of Islam, Ali did not 

object to all military conflict, but only to fighting on the side of the white-dominated American government or, at most, for non-Muslims. The DOJ’s position on this 

issue, often known as “selectivity,” was more difficult to gainsay than the others. As 

Justice William O. Douglas would later point out, although it was Ali’s individual 

beliefs that counted, he adhered to a religious tradition that held to a complex but 

longstanding doctrine of holy war . Moreover, Ali occasionally seemed to countenance 

the possibility that he would fight in a war furthering a cause he personally considered 

just. Shortly before he was charged with draft evasion, for instance, he claimed, “If I 

thought my joining the war and possibly dying would bring peace, freedom, justice 

and equality to 21 million so-called Negroes, they would not have to draft me. I 

would join tomorrow.” Hypothetical statements like this might not necessarily have 

3. An abridged version of the DOJ letter is included in these materials.
13

United States v. Clay: Muhammad Ali’s Fight Against the Vietnam Draft

foreclosed Ali’s conscientious objector claims. Even so, the ambiguous nature of the 

evidence on this point suggests it is at least plausible that Ali’s conviction might have 

been sustained had the DOJ relied solely on selectivity.

For the time being, however, there was little sign that Ali’s draft eligibility faced 

any chance of reversal. Apparently acting on the DOJ’s recommendation, the board 

of appeal upheld Ali’s classification. Though the board’s decision was unanimous, 

Lieutenant General Lewis Hershey, the director of the Selective Service System, initiated an appeal to the Presidential Board, which again upheld Ali’s draft eligibility. 

As his setbacks began to pile up, Ali increasingly despaired of the chances the government would recognize his objections. “[W]e’re over there so that the people of 

Vietnam can be free,” he claimed, “[b]ut I’m here in America and I’m being punished 

for upholding my beliefs.”

Though remarks of this sort remained controversial, Ali’s position helped to force 

the hand of some prominent liberals and civil rights leaders in coming out against 

the war and the draft system. In the spring of 1967, Martin Luther King, Jr., who had 

privately criticized the war but previously felt constrained not to condemn American 

military policy in public, gave a joint press conference with Ali in Louisville. Though 

Ali had frequently disparaged the ideal of racial integration for which King fought, 

King acknowledged that, as “Ali has said, we are all victims of the same system of 

oppression.” Shortly thereafter, King gave a series of speeches praising conscientious 

objectors like Ali and predicting (correctly, as it transpired) that this was “just the 

beginning of a massive outpouring of concern and protest activity against this illegal 

and unjust war.” Charles Morgan, Jr., a prominent civil rights lawyer who represented 

both men, later claimed, “When Ali spoke out publicly, he took the consequences, 

and I believe it had an influence on Martin. Here was somebody who had a lot to 

lose and was willing to risk it all to say what he believed.” As King put it, “no matter 

what you think of . . . Ali’s religion, you certainly have to admire his courage.” This 

view continued to gain credence over the coming years.

Indictment and trial

While Ali was beginning to win important allies, however, he had failed to convince 

the draft authorities that his beliefs warranted legal protection. To seek vindication 

in the courts, Ali would now have to either accept induction and sue for his release 

from the military or refuse to serve entirely and risk prosecution. On April 28, 1967, 

he chose the latter path by declining to take the step forward in Houston. (Ali had 

relocated to Houston during the draft proceedings.) Moments after receiving news 

that Ali had formally refused to enter the military, the New York Athletic Commission, a powerful regulatory body in the boxing world, suspended his boxing license. 

Other major licensing organizations soon followed suit, making it virtually impossible 

for Ali to box in the United States. On May 8, 1967, a federal grand jury in the U.S. 
United States v. Clay: Muhammad Ali’s Fight Against the Vietnam Draft

14

District Court for the Southern District of Texas indicted Ali for failure to submit 

to induction.

Hayden Covington and Quinnan Hodges led Ali’s legal team, as they had 

throughout much of the administrative process. Texas attorney Hodges served as 

Covington’s local counsel and provided assistance at several points 

during the case. Himself 

originally from Texas 

but long since based in 

New York, Covington 

had served as general 

counsel to the Watchtower Tract and Bible 

Group, the primary national organization of 

Jehovah’s Witnesses, 

for more than two decades. Although he had 

won several landmark 

Supreme Court victories for the Witnesses 

(who frequently claimed 

objector status) in the 

1940s and 50s, Covington had fallen out with the sect’s hierarchy and been “disfellowshipped” in 1963.

At trial, Covington opted not to emphasize the potential weaknesses in the DOJ’s 

legal recommendations, primarily relying on other defenses, including arguments 

that Ali should be classified as a religious minister and that the draft process itself was 

unfair. Covington likely should have known that the Department’s recommendations 

offered a real opportunity to attack Ali’s classification, however. Several years earlier, 

he had successfully argued an analogous case, Sicurella v. United States (1955), in 

which the Supreme Court reversed the conviction of a conscientious objector because 

of a flawed DOJ recommendation. Importantly, in Sicurella, the Court established 

a rule to the effect that erroneous advice on any element of a conscientious objector 

claim required reversal of a draft evasion conviction, even if a board might have 

decided the case on other, valid grounds. The premise of this rule was that because 

the boards did not produce written opinions stating the rationale for their decisions, 

it was impossible to tell whether an objector’s claim had been denied on proper or 

improper grounds.

Ali surrounded by supporters and press outside the Armed 

Forces Examining and Entrance Station in Houston

Courtesy: Library of Congress
15

United States v. Clay: Muhammad Ali’s Fight Against the Vietnam Draft

The trial began on June 19, 1967, and lasted two days. After the jury of six men 

and six women (all of whom white) was selected, it was sequestered in a nearby hotel 

to avoid the influence of press coverage or other external pressures. The prosecution, 

conducted by U.S. Attorney Morton Susman and Assistant U.S. Attorney Carl Walker, called three military officers to testify that Ali had reported for his induction but 

refused to step forward. Susman called a fourth military officer for the purposes of 

admitting Ali’s voluminous Selective Service file, although the jury was not permitted 

to examine the file in reaching its verdict. Though Covington asked few questions of 

the first three witnesses, he attempted to establish that the government had rushed 

through the classification process and could not possibly have considered the thousands of pages of documents in the file in the time it took to decided Ali’s initial 

classification and subsequent appeals.

The defense also called four witnesses. The first two were clerks for the local 

and appellate boards in Kentucky. Covington attempted to establish through their 

testimony that the boards had been influenced by a host of negative press clippings 

and correspondence that was included in Ali’s draft record and that they had denied 

Ali’s claims without fully assessing their validity. Judge Ingraham, however, limited 

this testimony, reasoning that the clerks were not able to testify about the boards’ 

decision-making processes and that the extraneous documents in the record were 

not material to Ali’s guilt or innocence. In what appears to have been a rather embarrassing misstep, Covington also called a member of the Houston-area board of 

appeals to the stand, only to discover that the individual was not one of the board 

members who had deliberated on Ali’s draft status. After calling a second member 

of the board of appeals, who testified that he spent approximately an hour and a half 

reviewing Ali’s voluminous file, the defense rested.

The court then heard protracted argument from Covington, Hodges, and Susman as to whether there was a basis in fact for Ali’s draft classification. At this stage, 

Covington arguably missed a chance to drive home the flaws in the DOJ’s legal assessment of Ali’s sincerity and religious beliefs, again focusing on other arguments. 

Judge Ingraham ruled that the board had an adequate basis in fact for denying Ali’s 

conscientious objector claims, based largely on the timing of those claims. This logic 

was similar to that employed by the recommendation letter: the timing of Ali’s conscientious objection was too convenient to be credible. At the very least, the judge 

reasoned, it provided some basis for the board’s determination, and the court could 

not go beyond that baseline assessment to evaluate whether the board had in fact 

reached the “correct” result.

Sentence and travel restrictions

With the basis-in-fact question resolved, the jury retired to determine whether Ali 

had intentionally evaded military service. There was little surprise when the jury re-
United States v. Clay: Muhammad Ali’s Fight Against the Vietnam Draft

16

turned a guilty verdict in approximately twenty minutes. Judge Ingraham sentenced 

Ali to the maximum penalty of five years in prison and a $10,000 fine. In setting 

the sentence, the judge noted that the case would almost certainly be appealed and 

that even if the appeal was unsuccessful, the sentence could be subject to a motion 

for reduction. Without suggesting whether he would be inclined to reduce the sentence at that time, the judge indicated that if he showed Ali clemency in the initial 

sentence and that sentence were later reduced, it could produce an unduly liberal 

result. Though there were several other examples of judges imposing the maximum 

sentence on draft evaders, it appears that Ali’s punishment was unusually severe. 

Covington claimed that the average sentence was eighteen months, and even Susman 

indicated he would not oppose a lighter sentence. Importantly, however, the judge 

permitted Ali to remain free on bail during his appeal, which ultimately meant that 

he was not imprisoned.

The verdict still limited Ali’s freedom significantly, however. Shortly after the 

trial, he filed a motion requesting permission to leave the country for a boxing match 

in Japan. While Ali had not testified during his trial, he took the stand in support of 

this motion. Although Ali assured the court he would not flee once abroad, Susman 

used the opportunity to paint him as a disloyal citizen who would likely stay abroad if 

permitted to leave. The prosecutor grilled Ali about his participation in a peace rally 

in California, for instance, suggesting that he had encouraged other young people 

to follow his example in evading military service. Though Ali insisted that, for all 

his criticisms of the war, he remained a loyal American, the court denied his motion 

and ordered him to turn in his passport. Since Ali could neither fight abroad nor at 

home, this ruling seemed to spell the end of his professional boxing career.

Initial appeal

When Ali appealed his conviction to the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, he 

did so without Covington’s assistance. It appears the two fell out shortly after the 

trial. (Hodges took charge of the hearing on Ali’s travel request). Covington subsequently sued Ali for approximately $250,000 in fees he claimed Ali had failed to pay 

him. Though the grounds for this disagreement are unclear and Ali later expressed 

his gratitude for Covington’s work, his legal strategy had not borne much success 

to that point.

Ali’s new legal team was led by civil rights lawyers Charles Morgan, Jr., and 

Chauncey Eskridge. Morgan had built a reputation as an advocate capable of ruffling 

feathers in his native South. His most famous victory came in the seminal voting rights 

case Reynolds v. Sims (1964), in which the Supreme Court established the “one person, 

one vote” standard for electoral apportionment, enhancing the efficacy of urban and 

African-American votes in many previously gerrymandered areas. Eskridge, who had 

previously worked with Ali on other legal matters, was among the nation’s best-known 
17

United States v. Clay: Muhammad Ali’s Fight Against the Vietnam Draft

black lawyers and had represented the Southern Christian Leadership Conference, 

an important civil rights organization, along with its founding president, Dr. King.

Morgan and Eskridge focused much of their attention on attacks on the fairness 

of the trial and administrative procedures. Though they also argued that Ali was 

entitled to conscientious objector status, the court appears to have given little credence to this argument. Circuit Judge Robert Ainsworth’s opinion for the unanimous 

three-judge panel relied on the evidence presented in the DOJ letter to hold there 

was an adequate basis in fact for the finding that Ali’s beliefs were not “truly held.” 

The court did not, however, delve further into the adequacy of the Department’s 

reasoning, simply stating that “the threshold question of sincerity” was one for the 

Selective Service bureaucracy rather than the courts.

Though Ali and his lawyers had failed to persuade the court, by the time the Fifth 

Circuit issued its opinion in 1968, the nation was gradually beginning to reevaluate 

both the war in Vietnam and 

the value of objections like 

his own. When Ali had decried American intervention 

in Vietnam in 1966, he had 

spoken for a small minority 

of the public. At that time, 

most Americans continued 

to credit the Johnson administration’s argument that 

the war was essential to stem 

the spread of Communism 

in Asia. Indeed, this attitude 

briefly entered Ali’s case, 

when Susman expressed 

disbelief that Ali did not 

consider the Vietnam War a 

defensive war against Communism. As the death toll began to mount and news from the front became increasingly negative, however, many Americans soured on the war. On March 31, 1968, 

with anti-war candidate Eugene McCarthy mounting a surprisingly strong primary 

challenge, President Lyndon Johnson decided not to seek his party’s nomination for 

reelection. Far from clarifying the nation’s political situation, Johnson’s decision made 

the Democratic primary even more contentious. The party’s convention in Chicago 

descended into chaos, with police indiscriminately beating anti-war protestors in the 

streets. Further protests on university campuses across the nation spread a growing 

sense of dissatisfaction with the war that was not mollified by the election of Richard 

Nixon. Though Nixon assured the nation that he had a plan to end the war quickly, 

Ali was an early critic of the Vietnam War

Courtesy: Library of Congress
United States v. Clay: Muhammad Ali’s Fight Against the Vietnam Draft

18

it lingered as the decade came to a close, leading more Americans to question the 

war’s purpose and the draft’s legitimacy. As Ali’s case wended its way up and down 

the judicial system during the appeals process, then, it did so against a backdrop of 

changing attitudes to his claims.

Remand and second appeal

Having been rebuffed by the Fifth Circuit, Ali appealed to the Supreme Court, which 

remanded the case to Judge Ingraham’s court for procedural reasons discussed at 

greater length below. After a second appeal, Ali again found himself before the Supreme Court in the 1970–1971 term. Though his distinct lack of success at every prior 

phase of the case might not have augured well for his chances in this final appeal, several developments inside and outside the courtroom may have given the former champion some cause for cautious optimism by 1970. Arguments that conscription unfairly discriminated against 

racial minorities and poor 

whites further undermined 

the legitimacy of the system 

in the eyes of an increasing 

number of Americans. As 

a consequence, views on 

the fairness of both the war 

and the draft that had once 

seemed radical had become 

increasingly commonplace. 

In a special message to Congress in 1970, for example, 

even President Nixon acknowledged that “[w]e all 

know the unfairness of the 

present system.” Against this 

backdrop, many began to 

see Ali’s lengthy opposition 

to mandatory military service as a principled stand against an arbitrary system rather 

than an act of petulance or cowardice.

Ali channeled this changing mood effectively. He arguably made an attractive 

symbol for the anti-war movement as his race and manifest masculinity helped to 

counter the stereotype of the effete, privileged, white objector. He turned this appeal, 

along with his personal charm and passion for conscientious objection, into a second 

career, touring the nation’s universities to give a popular series of speeches. This, in 

turn, led to renewed invitations from mainstream television shows for interviews and 

Public attitudes toward Ali warmed after initial outrage 

over his conversion and draft resistance

Courtesy: Smithsonian Institution
19

United States v. Clay: Muhammad Ali’s Fight Against the Vietnam Draft

self-parodying acting cameos. He endorsed a fast-food chain called Champ Burger. 

He even appeared on Broadway. Just as the public attitude toward the war had cooled 

over the course of Ali’s legal case, perceptions of Ali himself began to warm as the 

image of the gregarious former champ displaced that of the militant black radical in 

the public imagination.

Finally, in 1970, Ali had regained the right to fight. An important part of that 

process came in a federal civil suit in the U.S. District Court for the Southern District 

of New York. Judge Walter Mansfield found that the New York Athletic Commission 

had unfairly singled Ali out for sanctions in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment’s 

Equal Protection Clause. Ali won two bouts before narrowly losing to “Smokin’ Joe” 

Frazier in the “Fight of the Century” just weeks before oral arguments in Clay v. 

United States. For once, Ali would have better luck in court than in the ring.

Clay v. United States in the Supreme Court

In contrast to many other phases of the case, which had dealt with multiple legal 

issues, the Supreme Court focused the appeal in Clay on a single question: should 

Ali’s conviction be vacated “because the denial . . . of a conscientious exemption may 

have been based upon the Department of Justice’s erroneous characterization of his 

objections to participate in wars as ‘political and racial’ rather than ‘religious’?” The 

justices often limit the questions they will review because appeals can present an array 

of intricate questions, only some of which are appropriate for review (the Court does 

not decide state-law matters, for instance). In this instance, Justice William Brennan, 

an influential figure on the Court from 1957 to 1990, seems to have felt that, in view 

of the mounting suspicion that the draft process itself was not fairly administered, the 

Court should not reject such a high-profile conscientious objector claim without at 

least hearing Ali’s arguments. Although he felt the Court’s review should have been 

broader, Brennan apparently persuaded some of his more reluctant colleagues to 

grant certiorari in Clay on this single issue.

Both sets of lawyers seemed intent on broadening their arguments beyond the 

question presented, however. Solicitor General Erwin Griswold effectively conceded 

that Ali’s beliefs were sincere and religious but attempted to sidestep those issues by 

arguing that the only real ground on which the DOJ had made its recommendation 

was that Ali’s objections to war were selective. As law clerk Robert Gooding, Jr., 

noted in a memorandum to Justice Harry Blackmun, this may not have been a “fair 

reading” of the DOJ’s recommendation. Griswold, who had been a long-serving dean 

of Harvard Law School and was one of few high-ranking officials to serve in both 

the Johnson and Nixon administrations, likely felt that the selectivity issue provided 

the government with its strongest argument in light of the weaknesses in the DOJ’s 

earlier analysis.
United States v. Clay: Muhammad Ali’s Fight Against the Vietnam Draft

20

Arguing the case for Ali, Eskridge argued Ali met all three conscientious objection 

criteria (Morgan did not participate at the Supreme Court level). Some commentators, and indeed, some of the justices, criticized Eskridge’s approach for needlessly 

confusing the issues in the case. By broadening his arguments to include questions 

of selectivity, Eskridge also risked playing to the strengths of the government’s case. 

Indeed, the lawyers debated that issue to such an extent at oral argument that Justice 

Potter Stewart expressed concern that the question they were quarrelling over was not 

the one for which the Court had granted certiorari. This seemed to suit Griswold’s 

purpose. Since the question of selectivity was a close one, the Court was less likely 

to overturn the Selective Service System’s ruling on that issue, particularly given the 

level of deference accorded draft classifications.

Following oral argument, the eight justices who heard the case met to deliberate and gave initial indications as to their likely votes. (Justice Thurgood Marshall 

recused himself because he had been Solicitor General when the DOJ wrote its 

opinion letter in the case.) It appears a 5–3 majority tentatively voted to affirm Ali’s 

conviction. Notes taken by Justices Blackmun and Douglas, however, indicate that 

some of those voting to affirm considered the case “very close.” Justice Blackmun’s 

interoffice memoranda suggested that he was undecided prior to oral argument but 

was unimpressed with the case Eskridge laid out (Blackmun, who had a habit of 

grading lawyers’ performances, gave Eskridge a “C”). Similarly, Justice Byron White 

appears to have acknowledged that he might ultimately change his vote.

Chief Justice Warren Burger assigned the task of writing the Court’s majority 

opinion to Justice John Marshall Harlan II. At the urging of his clerks, who evidently 

favored reversing Ali’s conviction, Harlan read excerpts from Elijah Muhammad’s 

Message to the Black Man, which eventually persuaded him that the government’s 

conclusion on the selectivity question was erroneous. Harlan reasoned that the 

wars countenanced by the Nation of Islam were comparable to the apocalyptic fight 

between good and evil contemplated by members of other pacifist sects. Ali’s testimony at Judge Grauman’s hearing confirmed a similar reading of his belief that he 

should fight only in the unlikely event that Allah, acting through Elijah Muhammad, 

commanded him to do so. On June 9, 1971, Harlan wrote a letter to the Chief Justice 

informing him that he had changed his vote and regretted that this left the Court 

both in a 4–4 tie and with little time before the end of the Court’s term to produce a 

new opinion. Apparently attempting to persuade the other justices in the erstwhile 

majority, Harlan then circulated a memorandum containing a draft opinion reversing Ali’s conviction.

Justice Stewart followed suit by circulating an alternative opinion based on the 

narrower ground that Griswold had conceded that the DOJ had erred in advising 

the board that Ali was insincere and that his beliefs were not religious. Since the 

board could have reached its decision on those incorrect bases, there was no need to 

decide the harder question of selectivity. Though Harlan felt this reasoning pressed 
21

United States v. Clay: Muhammad Ali’s Fight Against the Vietnam Draft

Griswold’s concessions further than intended, Stewart’s opinion persuaded a majority 

of his colleagues, who adopted it as the Court’s per curium (a brief opinion of the 

Court as a whole, rather than of any individual justice). Justice Harlan wrote a brief 

concurring opinion that abandoned his original theory that the DOJ had erred in 

finding Ali’s beliefs selective, and instead reasoned that the DOJ’s interpretation of 

the timing of Ali’s claim might be read to set up an improper bright-line rule that 

barred all conscientious objector claims made shortly before induction. Finally, 

Justice Douglas also wrote a concurring opinion that argued Ali’s objections were 

selective but the statutory distinction between selective and universal objections to 

war was unconstitutional.

Reception and memory

On the day the Court heard oral arguments in Clay, Justice Blackmun privately 

despaired that “[t]he Court will be excoriated whether it upholds or reverses” Ali’s 

conviction. Some detractors did lament that Ali had avoided the draft largely because 

he could afford a lengthy legal challenge beyond the means of ordinary inductees.

Nevertheless, fading support for the war and Ali’s own enhanced popularity ensured 

that most observers heralded the Court’s decision. Even so, reaction to the Court’s 

decision often focused on issues other than those on which the Court had ruled. While 

some media outlets noted that the Court’s decision turned on the DOJ’s flawed legal 

advice, many saw the decision as a broader vindication of Ali’s religious rights or a 

symbolic validation of the ability of one man to speak truth to power, an impression 

that grew stronger over time.

The memory of Ali’s legal triumph was likely influenced by his later accomplishments in and out of the ring. In 1974, he regained his title in a thrilling victory against 

the heavily favored George Foreman. He went on to win several other memorable 

victories throughout the 1970s, becoming widely acknowledged as one of the greatest 

athletes of the twentieth century.

After Elijah Muhammad’s death in 1975, the Nation of Islam splintered into two 

major factions: a moderate movement aligned with the traditional tenets of Islam 

and led by Elijah Muhammad’s son Herbert (who had served as Ali’s manager), and 

a radical wing led by the controversial Louis Farrakhan, who continued the Nation’s 

fierce critique of white-dominated society and courted opprobrium with anti-Semitic 

remarks. Ali’s decision to follow Herbert Muhammad’s moderation made his religious 

and racial views more palatable to a broader range of white Americans than they 

had been in the mid-1960s. Public portrayals of Ali’s draft resistance increasingly 

deemphasized the more radical elements of his opposition to the war, such that even 

conservative politicians like Ronald Reagan came to embrace him.

In the mid-1980s, shortly after he retired from boxing for the final time, Ali was 

diagnosed with Parkinson’s syndrome, a nervous system disorder that affects motor 
United States v. Clay: Muhammad Ali’s Fight Against the Vietnam Draft

22

skills. His brave battle against the disease further elevated his public esteem. When 

the United States hosted the Olympic Games in 1996, Ali, though visibly shaking 

from the effects of his condition, seemed the perfect choice to light the symbolic 

flame at the opening ceremony. A number of popular books and films portraying 

his accomplishments, including the biopic Ali, starring Will Smith, and the Academy Award–winning documentary When We Were Kings, further inculcated a heroic 

view of Ali’s objections to the draft. In 2005, President George W. Bush awarded Ali 

the Presidential Medal of Freedom, the nation’s highest civilian honor, noting, in 

language that would have been unthinkable from a conservative leader forty years 

earlier, that Ali’s “deep commitment to equal justice and peace has touched people 

around the world.”

Alternative paths

Despite the widespread admiration Ali eventually gained, his triumph was far from 

inevitable. Moreover, the legal issues that eventually determined the outcome of the 

case did not predominate throughout. Indeed, several other issues assumed greater 

prominence at different stages in the administrative and judicial processes. The 

following sections examine these issues.

Ministerial exemption

Under the Universal Military Training and Service Act, full-time religious 

ministers were exempt from military service and training. Covington’s experience 

litigating on behalf of the Witnesses, a disaggregated group that deemed all of its 

members ministers, led him to advise Ali to seek an exemption as a minister of the 

Nation of Islam. Because Covington injected this claim partway through the draft 

proceedings, it had not been subject to the same legal analysis as Ali’s conscientious 

objector claim. Covington evidently saw this as a tactical advantage at trial, since 

there was a less-developed record for the government to articulate a basis in fact for 

its refusal to acknowledge Ali as a religious minister. The ministerial exemption also 

offered a way around some of the difficult questions of proof posed by conscientious 

objection, since it focused on the objective question whether Ali worked as a minister 

rather than murkier questions about the nature of Ali’s personal beliefs.

Although segments of the press mocked this claim, it was not entirely ridiculous 

to suggest Ali performed significant ministerial duties. Since his official conversion, 

he had traveled the nation making speeches at mosques and explaining the tenets of 

his faith. Elijah Muhammad and several thousand other black Muslims, moreover, 

had stated in writing that Ali performed full-time ministerial work. Covington argued 

that this statement was equivalent to the Pope identifying an individual as a Catholic 

priest—a claim few judges would second-guess.
23

United States v. Clay: Muhammad Ali’s Fight Against the Vietnam Draft

This approach posed its own difficulties, however. First, to qualify for a ministerial 

exemption, Ali would have to prove that he spent the lion’s share of his time preaching. 

Notwithstanding Covington’s insistence that Ali ministered for 160 hours a month, 

many board members and 

government lawyers seemed 

not to credit this claim on the 

grounds that Ali plainly had 

to devote a great deal of time 

to training. Ali’s argument 

that boxing was merely a 

part-time “avocation” that 

facilitated his unpaid ministerial work seemed implausible in view of his remarkable 

success in the ring. Second, 

prior to applying for a ministerial exemption in August of 

1966, Ali had never claimed 

to work as a minister. On the 

conscientious objector form 

he had filed a few months 

earlier, for example, Ali listed his profession as “boxer” and his relationship to the 

Nation of Islam as “member, believer and follower,” rather than minister.

Judge Ingraham ruled at trial that this evidence provided a sufficient basis in 

fact for the Selective Service System to deny Ali’s ministerial claim. The Fifth Circuit 

upheld this ruling along similar lines. When the Supreme Court granted certiorari 

in 1970, the justices declined to hear Ali’s ministerial claim. 

Covert surveillance

At the time Ali initially appealed to the Supreme Court in 1969, the FBI and DOJ 

were embroiled in controversy involving the illegal covert surveillance of domestic 

criminal suspects. In Alderman v. United States (1969), the justices ruled that courts 

could not simply rely on the authorities’ assertion that information obtained via illegal 

surveillance had not influenced the investigation or prosecution of criminal suspects 

whose rights had been violated. Trial judges had to conduct hearings to determine 

whether any illegitimate evidence had tainted the process. The DOJ subsequently 

revealed that several criminal defendants whose cases were then before the Court, 

including Ali, had been subjected to illegal wiretaps. In Giordano v. United States

(1969), the Court remanded several of these cases, including Clay, to their original 

trial courts for hearings on the influence of the surveillance.

Ali attending a speech by Elijah Muhammad

Courtesy: Library of Congress
United States v. Clay: Muhammad Ali’s Fight Against the Vietnam Draft

24

At issue were five eavesdropped conversations involving Ali and other individuals who had been the primary surveillance targets, including two exchanges with 

Elijah Muhammad and a discussion between Ali and the now-deceased King. Ali’s 

attorneys argued that the revelation of these conversations warranted substantial 

investigation into whether the contents of the eavesdropped conversations had 

tainted the government’s handling of Ali’s draft case. They demanded access to any 

other surveillance involving Ali. Judge Ingraham denied these requests but permitted 

Ali’s attorneys to view the contents of four of the conversations and to question the 

FBI agents involved in the surveillance. He also permitted the lawyers to call to the 

stand attorneys who contributed to the DOJ’s recommendation letter to determine 

whether any information obtained via improper wiretaps had informed their analysis 

of the case.

This testimony indicated that the conversations did not influence the determination of Ali’s draft appeal. Moreover, Judge Ingraham held that the content of the 

conversations themselves was so innocuous that it could have had no meaningful 

impact even if the information had been disclosed to the DOJ lawyers. For instance, 

in his conversation with King, Ali apparently warned the civil rights icon to “watch 

out for them whities.” Ali’s lawyers argued that this use of a pejorative racial term 

could have contributed to the DOJ’s conclusion that Ali’s objections to the draft 

were primarily racial and political, rather than religious. Judge Ingraham, however, 

reasoned that

[t]he common slang reference was not within a context which could have 

had any bearing on the defendant’s beliefs. A Negro not a member of the 

Nation of Islam would be as likely to say the same thing. In addition, if it 

had been in such a context, and it could be construed to be even viciously 

derogatory, . . . there was ample evidence from an independent origin before the Department to conclude that the Muslim religion holds the white 

race in contempt.

Finally, Judge Ingraham ruled that the defense was not entitled to disclosure of 

one of the conversations on the grounds that its recording had been authorized by 

the Attorney General for the purposes of gathering foreign intelligence and its continued secrecy was in the national interest. After privately reviewing the conversation, 

however, the judge ruled that its contents were also unlikely to have prejudiced the 

government’s handling of Ali’s draft case. The Fifth Circuit upheld Judge Ingraham’s 

ruling on this issue on the same grounds, and the Supreme Court declined to hear 

a further appeal on the questions raised by the defense.

Constitutional challenges to the draft system

Ali’s legal team attempted to circumvent the draft bureaucracy at several points before his trial by entreating federal district courts in Kentucky and Texas to prohibit 
25

United States v. Clay: Muhammad Ali’s Fight Against the Vietnam Draft

government officials from drafting Ali into the military. Given the limited ability of 

courts to review individual draft board decisions, these suits did not ask the courts to 

reevaluate Ali’s claims for exemptions. Instead, these cases were distinct constitutional 

challenges to the fairness of the military selection process as a whole. In particular, 

Ali’s lawyers emphasized the lack of racial diversity on local draft boards, arguing that 

he had the right to have his eligibility adjudicated in a system that did not exclude 

African Americans from the decision-making process, much as criminal defendants 

have the right to plead their case before a jury selected on nonracial grounds.

At first blush, the claim that the boards were composed along racial lines seemed 

plausible. At the time Ali’s case was processed, there were no African Americans in 

the local or appeals boards for either Louisville or Houston. Although approximately 

7% of Kentucky’s population was African American, blacks accounted for just 0.2% of 

the state’s local board members. In Texas, a state whose population was 12.4% black, 

African Americans filled only 1.1% of local board seats. The picture was even starker in 

some other areas of the country: twenty-three states had no African-American board 

members whatsoever. Although there was little direct proof that this imbalance was 

caused by systematic prejudice, the structure of the Selective Service System arguably 

left it susceptible to invidious motives. The only statutory criteria for the appointment 

of local board members were that they should come from the area over which they 

presided and be appointed by the president on the recommendation of their state’s 

governor. State practices for selecting candidates for gubernatorial nomination varied. 

President Johnson expressed concern that this system might have produced racially 

discriminatory results and set up a commission to investigate the composition of 

draft boards and the methods used to determine draft eligibility.

Even so, the courts uniformly ruled against preempting the administrative process before it had run its course and Ali was either inducted or indicted. Covington 

argued Ali had to be able to raise the racial composition of draft boards as a defense 

at his criminal trial since he could not raise it beforehand. Judge Ingraham disagreed, 

reasoning that statistics alone were insufficient to demonstrate unconstitutional 

prejudice, and curtailed the defense’s ability to obtain further proof of racial bias by 

subpoenaing witnesses or documents from the government on the grounds it would 

turn the trial into a “fishing expedition.” The judge also expressed some hesitancy 

over the notion that Ali would be entitled to a board that represented his group in 

any event and ruled against the admissibility of evidence regarding the composition 

of draft boards in Kentucky and Texas during the trial. It would, Judge Ingraham 

suggested, be impracticable to select a board of any manageable size that would 

represent every race and religion in a given area. Moreover, as Susman argued, any 

problem with the composition of the local boards was not necessarily fatal to the 

fairness of Ali’s selective service classification because the final determination of Ali’s 

draft status had been made by the Presidential Board, one of whose three members 

was African-American.
United States v. Clay: Muhammad Ali’s Fight Against the Vietnam Draft

26

Judge Ingraham similarly ruled the defense could not introduce evidence it 

believed showed that the draft system had singled out Ali for unfair treatment as a 

high-profile and unpopular objector. Covington argued that statements by General 

Hershey and South Carolina Congressman L. Mendel Rivers at the time of Ali’s administrative appeals unduly influenced board members to deny Ali’s conscientious 

objector and ministerial exemption claims. Hershey had expressed confidence that Ali 

would be required to join the military, while Congressman Rivers, then the Chairman 

of the House Armed Services Committee, made a statement that included inflammatory remarks about Ali’s draft status. “If the theologian of Black Muslim power, 

Cassius Clay, is deferred by the Board in Louisville,” he fulminated, “you watch what 

happens in Washington. We are going to do something if that Board takes your boy 

and leaves [Ali] home to double talk.” Covington noted that even more pointed, and 

frequently obscene and racist, comments from members of the public appeared in 

Ali’s draft file, arguing the outcry against Ali’s resistance to the draft had influenced 

decision makers. Judge Ingraham, however, ruled these statements were immaterial 

to the proceedings themselves, reasoning that although he too had received a barrage 

of angry mail about the case, it had had no influence on his decisions.

The Fifth Circuit upheld Judge Ingraham’s rulings on these points, and the Supreme Court declined to hear them on appeal. Nonetheless, they framed much of 

the public debate around the case. Challenges like these helped fuel a robust debate 

about the fundamental fairness of the draft process, particularly as it became clearer 

that wealthy white individuals were less likely to be drafted, and less likely to serve in 

the front lines when drafted, than poor people of color. In this sense, although Ali’s 

racial critique of the war may have complicated the legal status of his conscientious 

objection claim, it resonated with an increasingly persuasive critique of both the 

draft and the war in the court of public opinion.

Religious freedom

Similarly, the courts seldom actually ruled on the rights for which Ali told the public he 

was fighting: religious freedom and liberty of conscience. Even so, these issues formed 

an important part of the legal context of the case. Although the Supreme Court consistently upheld Congress’ power to use conscription to raise an army, it interpreted 

the laws doing so to avoid constitutional challenges on freedom-of-religion grounds. 

The Universal Military Training and Service Act under which Ali was charged, for 

instance, explicitly stated that conscientious objection was not available to individuals 

whose objections were “essentially political, sociological, or philosophical views or 

[derived from] a merely personal moral code.” This language raised the possibility 

that Congress was privileging religious beliefs over atheistic or secular principles 

in violation of the First Amendment’s command that “Congress shall make no law 

“respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof.” In 
27

United States v. Clay: Muhammad Ali’s Fight Against the Vietnam Draft

United States v. Seeger (1965), 

the Court interpreted the act 

to include secular beliefs that 

occupied a similar prominence in one’s life to religion. 

This interpretation arguably 

made it easier for Ali to meet 

the “religious belief” criteria 

for conscientious objection.

While Ali claimed that his 

beliefs prohibited him from 

participating in any military 

service, moreover, his case 

raised the specter of a second 

major First Amendment issue because the government 

characterized his objections 

as selective. Though the full Court did not reach this issue in Clay, Justice Douglas’s 

concurring opinion did. He argued that the rule against selective beliefs impermissibly discriminated against religions that forbade some, but not all, wars. While the 

Court has not adopted this interpretation of the First Amendment in subsequent 

cases (although the draft was abolished in 1973, federal courts continue to hear 

conscientious objection claims from members of the armed forces seeking to end 

their military service), Justice Douglas’s arguments resonated with claims that Ali 

was treated unfairly because he was a member of an unpopular religious minority.

Themes and questions

United States v. Clay raised a number of questions that can be used to illuminate 

major themes in history, government, and civics courses. Throughout the first half 

of the twentieth century, both state and federal governments adopted enhanced 

regulatory authority to deal with the consequences of urbanization, modern technologies, and economic crises. Though many Americans considered these powers 

necessary responses to the complexities of modernity and the rise of corporate power, 

they also came with the risk of abuse. By the early 1940s, reformers emphasized the 

need for access to the courts to protect fundamental liberties against arbitrary exercises of government power. The draft system remained a notable exception to the 

judicial review of administrative agencies, however. Ali’s case gives these seemingly 

abstract developments a more tangible form. The case illustrates the possibilities and 

limitations of judicial review and suggests the potential drawbacks of unchecked administrative power, enabling teachers and students to ask whether the courts should 

examine military affairs and whether it matters who decides a case.

Ali (one in from left) at a Nation of Islam event

Courtesy: Library of Congress
United States v. Clay: Muhammad Ali’s Fight Against the Vietnam Draft

28

Ali’s case also illustrates the messiness of seemingly straightforward legal ideas 

like the free exercise of religion, protection of dissenting views, and racial discrimination. Because Ali’s belief system interwove a racial critique of American society with 

religious compunctions against war, students learning about the case will have to 

recognize the degree to which it is not always easy to say when a government policy 

interferes with religion. Teachers can push students to reckon with such questions 

as “Who should decide what constitutes religious belief?” and “Should we privilege 

religious beliefs over political ideals?” Moreover, the paramount importance of 

fighting and winning a war presents opportunities for teachers to ask what limits 

the government can properly place on basic freedoms in times of war or national 

crisis. Students might also ask what reasonable sacrifices we can expect citizens to 

make in such times.

Finally, United States v. Clay can help introduce students to the otherwise abstruse 

concepts of memory and contingency. Though commentators frequently mention 

Ali’s stand against the draft—as they did, for example, following his participation in 

the Atlanta Olympics—they generally do so as part of a heroic narrative. This version 

of events makes sense given the kudos accorded to the handful of modern athletes 

with records of accomplishment comparable to Ali’s, but it risks both obscuring the 

historical reality of Ali’s situation in the 1960s and eliding the very real chance that 

he could have lost his legal fight. As they were initially expressed, Ali’s critiques of 

both American racism and the Vietnam War did not neatly fit the mold of pacifism 

with which most Americans, then as now, were comfortable. It remains unclear, 

indeed, whether they fully met the legal definition of conscientious objection. Ali’s 

public statements were often provocative and sometimes profane. As a result, he was 

one of the most controversial public figures in America for a time. Yet the image of 

Ali’s objections that took hold in later years was significantly more palatable to most 

Americans. Teachers can use this sea change to illustrate the differences between 

history and memory.

There was nothing inevitable about Ali’s triumph. Before reaching the Supreme 

Court, Ali lost at literally every stage of a lengthy battle in both the federal courts 

and the Selective Service System. The justices themselves initially voted to uphold 

his conviction. That Ali could so easily have gone to prison is a useful illustration 

of the principle that history does not unfold as if preordained. It is also a powerful 

reminder that legal decision makers do not act like computers, generating perfectly 

predictable results by applying established formulas. Judging requires judgment. 

Engaging students in a discussion of how and why the federal courts reached the 

judgments they did in United States v. Clay gives students a fresh appreciation of the 

forces that guide and inform the judicial process, along with the very real impact the 

courts can have on people’s lives and, indeed, on American history.
29

United States v. Clay: Muhammad Ali’s Fight Against the Vietnam Draft

The Judicial Process: A Chronology

April 28, 1967

Ali reports for induction at the Armed Forces Examining and Entrance Station in 

Houston, but refuses to take the step forward symbolizing his entrance into the 

United States military.

May 8, 1967

A grand jury in the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Texas indicts Ali 

for failing to submit for induction.

June 19–20, 1967

Ali is tried in the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Texas before Judge 

Joe Ingraham. The jury finds Ali guilty on June 20, 1967, and Judge Ingraham sentences him to the maximum penalty of five years in prison and a $10,000 fine.

July 7, 1967

Ali testifies in support of an unsuccessful motion before Judge Ingraham requesting permission to leave the country.

May 6, 1968

The Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit upholds Ali’s conviction.

June 6, 1968

The Court of Appeals denies Ali’s motion for a rehearing by the court en banc (a 

meeting of all the judges on the court).

July 15, 1968

Ali petitions for a writ of certiorari with the Supreme Court of the United States.

July 18, 1968

The DOJ requests that the FBI disclose any wiretap surveillance involving Ali.
United States v. Clay: Muhammad Ali’s Fight Against the Vietnam Draft

30

August 8, 1968

The FBI informs the DOJ of five wiretapped conversations involving Ali. The DOJ, 

in turn, discloses this information to the Supreme Court.

March 24, 1969

The Supreme Court remands Ali’s case, along with several other cases involving FBI 

wiretaps, to the district court for further hearings in Giordino v. United States (1969).

June 2–6, 1969

Judge Ingraham presides over hearings into the possibility that illegal wiretaps tainted 

Ali’s prosecution and conviction. He rules that even if the content of the conversations 

had been shared with the DOJ lawyers handling Ali’s case, the conversations were so 

innocuous that they could not have influenced Ali’s prosecution.

July 6, 1970

The Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit upholds Judge Ingraham’s ruling in the 

taint hearing and declines to reexamine Ali’s objections to his original conviction.

August 19, 1970

The Court of Appeal for the Fifth Circuit denies Ali’s request for a rehearing en banc.

January 11, 1971

The Supreme Court grants certiorari on a single issue in the case: whether Ali’s 

conviction should be vacated because of erroneous advice by the DOJ to the effect 

that Ali’s beliefs are not religious.

April 19, 1971

The Supreme Court hears oral arguments in Clay v. United States.

June 28, 1971

The Supreme Court issues its decision, unanimously reversing Ali’s conviction on 

the grounds that the Department of Justice erred in advising the board of appeal that 

Ali’s beliefs were not sincere and not religious in nature.
31

United States v. Clay: Muhammad Ali’s Fight Against the Vietnam Draft

The Federal Courts and Their Jurisdiction

United States District Court for the Southern District of 

Texas

In 1967, Muhammad Ali was prosecuted in the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Texas for failing to submit for military induction. District Judge Joe 

Ingraham presided over the trial. Ali was convicted and sentenced to the maximum 

penalty of five years and a $10,000 fine. After government lawyers revealed on appeal 

that the FBI had illegally wiretapped telephone conversations involving Ali, the Supreme Court of the United States remanded the case back to the court for a hearing 

to determine whether information obtained through the use of these wiretaps tainted 

Ali’s conviction. Judge Ingraham determined that the content of the calls was never 

relayed to DOJ officials advising the draft appeals board on Ali’s conscientious objector claims and that even if that information had been disclosed, it was so innocuous 

it could not possibly have influenced Ali’s eventual prosecution and conviction. The 

Supreme Court of the United States reversed Ali’s conviction in 1971 on the grounds 

that the DOJ had provided erroneous advice to the selective service board of appeals.

The U.S. district courts were established by Congress in the Judiciary Act of 1789. 

Although Congress has modified their jurisdiction several times since their creation, 

federal district courts have been in operation continuously from the passage of that 

Act. Since 1891, they have served as the federal system’s primary trial courts. They 

typically hear two major sets of cases: criminal and civil matters arising under the 

laws and Constitution of the United States and state-law civil cases between litigants 

from different states in which the amount in controversy exceeds a statutory minimum. The Southern District was created in 1902 and includes Houston and the 

surrounding area.

United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit

Ali twice appealed his conviction to the Fifth Circuit. In 1968, Circuit Judge Robert 

Ainsworth wrote for a unanimous three-judge panel upholding Ali’s conviction 

against a series of constitutional and procedural challenges. In 1970, the court upheld 

the district court’s rulings on the wiretapping issue in an opinion, also written by 

Judge Ainsworth, for a different unanimous panel. The Supreme Court overturned 

Ali’s conviction in 1971 on the grounds that the DOJ had provided erroneous advice 

to the selective service board of appeals.

The courts of appeals were established by Congress in 1891. Congress created 

a court of appeals in each of the regional judicial circuits to hear appeals from the 
United States v. Clay: Muhammad Ali’s Fight Against the Vietnam Draft

32

federal trial courts, and the decisions of the courts of appeals are final in many cases. When the court heard Ali’s appeals, its jurisdiction encompassed Alabama, the 

Panama Canal Zone, Florida, Georgia, Louisiana, Mississippi, and Texas. In 1980, 

Congress created an eleventh circuit and divided the states previously in the Fifth 

Circuit between the two circuits. The Fifth Circuit now contains the states of Louisiana, Mississippi, and Texas.

Supreme Court of the United States

The Supreme Court of the United States dealt with two appeals in Ali’s criminal 

case. Before the Court had decided whether to hear the first appeal, the government 

disclosed that the FBI had illegally wiretapped parties, including Ali, to cases pending 

before the Court. The Court remanded the cases in a single opinion in Giordano 

v. United States (1969). In the second appeal, the Court unanimously reversed Ali’s 

conviction after determining that the DOJ had provided erroneous advice to the 

selective service board of appeals.

The Supreme Court is the nation’s highest appellate court. The Constitution 

grants the Supreme Court original jurisdiction in cases in which states are a party 

and those involving diplomats, but leaves for Congress to determine the Court’s size 

and appellate jurisdiction. The Judiciary Act of 1789 established a Supreme Court 

with one chief justice and five associate justices. Congress subsequently increased and 

reduced the number of justices several times during the early and mid-nineteenth 

century, though the Court has retained nine seats since 1869. Throughout its first 

century, the Supreme Court was responsible for deciding most civil appeals, and the 

justices had little control over a docket that was increasingly overcrowded. The Court 

gained discretionary power over the bulk of its appellate docket in 1925.
33

United States v. Clay: Muhammad Ali’s Fight Against the Vietnam Draft

Legal Questions Before the Federal Courts

Was Ali guilty of violating the Universal Military 

Training and Service Act by refusing to submit for 

military induction?

The answer to this question turned on two issues at trial: (1) whether there was a 

basis in fact for the Selective Service System’s denial of his conscientious objector and 

ministerial exemption claims, and (2) whether Ali intentionally refused induction. 

Judge Joe Ingraham ruled that there was a basis in fact for the denial of Ali’s claims. 

The jury found Ali guilty of intentionally failing to submit for induction. The Court 

of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit upheld this decision. However, the Supreme Court 

of the United States later reversed on the grounds discussed in question 2.

Did the DOJ’s legal advice to the selective service board 

of appeal necessitate reversing Ali’s conviction?

Yes. The DOJ advised the board of appeals that Ali failed all three of the criteria for 

establishing a valid conscientious objector claim. Objectors had to show (1) an objection to all wars that (2) was sincere and (3) based on religious belief or training 

or an equivalent moral conviction. Solicitor General Erwin Griswold conceded and 

the Supreme Court subsequently held that Ali met the second and third criteria. The 

Court then determined that the department’s erroneous advice required the justices 

to overturn Ali’s conviction. In a previous case, Sicurella v. United States (1955), the 

Supreme Court had held that inaccurate legal advice to the draft bureaucracy was 

grounds for vacating a conviction even though a draft board might have relied on 

other, proper grounds to deny a conscientious objector claim. This rule was based 

on the lack of a written opinion from the board, which meant it was impossible to 

determine whether the board’s decision was based on proper or improper grounds.

Was the selective service regime created by the Universal 

Military Training and Service Act constitutional?

Yes. Ali mounted several unsuccessful constitutional challenges to the structure of 

the draft administration system. The most substantial of these challenges was that 

African Americans were systemically excluded from service on local and appellate 

draft boards. Both Judge Ingraham and the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit 

rejected these claims. Ali’s attorneys had argued that the boards were analogous to 
United States v. Clay: Muhammad Ali’s Fight Against the Vietnam Draft

34

juries, which Supreme Court precedents established could not be selected according 

to race. Both courts rejected that analogy, with the Fifth Circuit noting that there was 

no meaningful similarity between a criminal punishment and military service. The 

Supreme Court did not address this issue on appeal. Justice William O. Douglas raised 

an additional constitutional objection to the draft system on appeal, reasoning the 

requirement that individuals object to all wars to qualify for conscientious objector 

status improperly prioritized certain types of religious beliefs (total objection to all 

wars) over others (objections, for example, to “unjust” or “unholy” wars). Although 

the rest of the justices did not reach this issue, subsequent decisions continued to 

apply the non-selectivity requirement to conscientious objector claims.

Did the FBI’s warrantless wiretaps of conversations 

involving Ali taint his criminal conviction?

No. After a lengthy hearing on the subject, Judge Ingraham noted that there was no 

evidence that the content of five wiretapped conversations involving Ali had been 

disclosed to the DOJ lawyers who wrote the letter advising the selective service board 

of appeals on Ali’s request for conscientious objector status. The judge held that the 

conversations were, in any event, so innocuous that they could not possibly have 

influenced the handling of Ali’s case. The Fifth Circuit upheld this outcome on the 

same grounds.

Judge Ingraham denied Ali’s defense team access to a fifth wiretapped conversation on the grounds that its disclosure would jeopardize the national interest because 

the wiretap was authorized by the Attorney General for the purposes of foreign 

intelligence surveillance. It remains unclear to whom Ali was speaking in this fifth 

conversation. Judge Ingraham viewed a memorandum reflecting the content of the 

call in private and determined that, like the other conversations, its content was 

innocuous. The Fifth Circuit also upheld this decision. Judge Robert Ainsworth, Jr., 

reasoned that because the wiretap was authorized by the Attorney General for the 

purposes of foreign surveillance, it was not subject to Supreme Court precedents 

requiring disclosure of unlawful wiretaps. Moreover, the members of the panel reviewed the log of the wiretap in camera and agreed with Judge Ingraham’s assessment 

that the communication was innocuous. The Supreme Court did not consider these 

issues on appeal.
35

United States v. Clay: Muhammad Ali’s Fight Against the Vietnam Draft

Biographies

The judges

Joe McDonald Ingraham (1903–1990)

Judge Joe Ingraham presided over Muhammad Ali’s trial for violating the Universal 

Military Training and Service Act. After Ali was convicted, the case was appealed and 

remanded to Ingraham’s court for a lengthy hearing into the potential influence of 

wiretapped conversations involving Ali. In both instances, Judge Ingraham generally 

ruled against Ali on major points of law, but the Supreme Court eventually reversed 

Ali’s conviction on appeal.

Ingraham was born in Oklahoma in 1903. He attended law school at National 

University (now George Washington University Law School), graduating in 1927. He 

initially returned to Oklahoma as a solo practitioner before moving to Texas, where 

he would engage in private practice for the next twenty-six years, with a break for 

service in the Army Air Corps during World War II. After the war, Ingraham became 

active in Texas Republican politics. In 1948, he unsuccessfully ran for Congress and 

later served as the party chairman of Harris County.

In 1954, Ingraham was appointed to the United States District Court for the 

Southern District of Texas, which included Houston. In late 1969, he was appointed 

to the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, which then encompassed 

much of the southern United States. Ingraham retired from active service in 1973. 

He died in 1990.

Robert Andrew Ainsworth, Jr. (1910–

1981)

Judge Robert Andrew Ainsworth wrote two 

opinions for the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit in Clay. The first, 

released in 1968, upheld Ali’s conviction for 

draft evasion. The second, handed down in 

1970, affirmed Judge Ingraham’s opinion that 

subsequently discovered wiretaps of conversations to which Ali was a party did not taint 

the initial prosecution. Though the Supreme 

Court of the United States reviewed the case 

on appeal from this second decision, it did 

not reach the wiretap question and instead 

Judge Robert Andrew Ainsworth

Courtesy: U.S. District Court of the Eastern 

District of Louisiana
United States v. Clay: Muhammad Ali’s Fight Against the Vietnam Draft

36

reversed Ali’s underlying conviction because the Department of Justice had improperly advised the draft board of appeals that Ali’s conscientious objection claims were 

legally deficient.

Judge Ainsworth was born in Gulfport, Mississippi, in 1910, but moved to Austin, 

Texas, in 1917 and then to New Orleans, Louisiana, in 1919, where he would remain 

for much of the rest of his life. Ainsworth attended law school at the city’s Loyola 

University, graduating in 1932, and practiced law there with his brother until 1961, 

except for a brief stint in the Navy during World War II.

In 1961, Ainsworth was appointed to the United States District Court for the 

Eastern District of Louisiana. He was appointed to the United States Court of Appeals 

for the Fifth Circuit in 1966. Ainsworth died in office in 1981.

John Marshall Harlan II (1899–1971)

Justice John Marshall Harlan II wrote a 

one-paragraph concurring opinion in 

Clay that belied the vital role he played 

in the case’s outcome. Initially assigned 

the task of writing an opinion for a divided court upholding Ali’s conviction, 

Harlan became convinced that Ali’s 

objections to the draft warranted legal 

protection. With Justice Potter Stewart, 

Harlan persuaded the remaining justices to reverse Ali’s conviction.

Harlan was born in Chicago in 

1899, the scion of a prominent and 

affluent family of lawyers. His grandfather and namesake, Justice John Marshall Harlan, was one of the most celebrated justices in the Supreme Court’s 

history (the II was not part of Harlan’s 

legal name but is generally used to 

distinguish him from his grandfather). 

Harlan attended Princeton University 

and was a Rhodes Scholar at Balliol 

College, Oxford, where he began to study law. In 1924, he graduated from New York 

Law School and entered practice with a prominent Wall Street firm. He continued 

this practice until 1954, taking several breaks to work as a government lawyer. 

Heavyweight champion and later vocal Ali critic Gene Tunney was one of Harlan’s 

high-profile clients. During World War II, Harlan served as Chief of the Air Corps’ 

Justice John Marshall Harlan II

Courtesy: Library of Congress
37

United States v. Clay: Muhammad Ali’s Fight Against the Vietnam Draft

Operations Analysis Section. On his return to private practice in 1945, he established 

a national reputation as a litigator, arguing several cases before the Supreme Court.

Harlan was appointed to the United States Court of Appeals for the Second 

Circuit on February 10, 1954. Less than a year later, President Dwight Eisenhower 

nominated Harlan to the Supreme Court. Although his confirmation was initially 

delayed by debate over Harlan’s supposedly internationalist leanings and controversy over the Court’s recent decision in Brown v. Board of Education (1954) (the first 

Justice Harlan had famously argued against the constitutionality of segregation in 

the late nineteenth century), he was confirmed by the Senate and joined the Court 

on March 17, 1955.

In many ways, Harlan was an exception to the norm of the Warren Court 

(1953–1969). He was a patrician on a court populated by an unusually high number 

of justices who rose from modest backgrounds. Harlan’s restrained view of the federal 

courts’ role in the American system similarly conflicted with the approaches of many 

of his more avowedly liberal colleagues who saw the Supreme Court as an engine 

of social progress and guardian of subaltern groups. Harlan’s focus on procedural 

fairness over substantive results led some commentators to label him a conservative 

voice on the Court. In part as a result of these differences, and perhaps because of 

his grandfather’s dissents in infamous cases such as Plessy v. Ferguson (1896) and 

Lochner v. New York (1905), Harlan developed a reputation as the Warren Court’s 

“great dissenter.”

Though he differed with his colleagues on several major decisions, Harlan was 

also widely respected for writing lucid, principled opinions that frequently cut across 

partisan lines. Some of his positions in selective service cases are exemplars of his 

willingness to buck assumptions based on his supposedly conservative outlook. For 

instance, in Welsh v. United States (1970), an important precursor to Clay, Harlan 

wrote a concurring opinion that argued a federal statute protecting conscientious 

objections predicated on religious, rather than purely political or philosophical, 

grounds was unconstitutional (the plurality opinion in the case upheld the objector’s 

claim on narrower statutory grounds).

Toward the end of his tenure, Harlan suffered from cancer and failing eyesight. 

Two days after the Court released its decision in Clay, Harlan issued his final opinion, 

dissenting from a decision forbidding prior restraint against the publication of the 

“Pentagon Papers.” His health forced him to retire from active service in September 

1971. He died that December.

William Orville Douglas (1898–1980)

Justice William O. Douglas wrote a concurring opinion in Clay, arguing that conscientious objectors should be exempted from military service regardless of whether 

they object to all wars or only certain types of conflicts. Selective objection had been a 
United States v. Clay: Muhammad Ali’s Fight Against the Vietnam Draft

38

major point of contention during oral arguments, but the Court’s per curium opinion 

decided the case on other grounds.

The longest-serving justice in Supreme Court history, Justice Douglas is widely 

regarded as one of the central figures 

in the Court’s transformation from a 

conservative body hostile to social and 

economic legislation in the 1930s, to an 

institution associated with the protection 

of political and civil liberties in the decades following World War II. Douglas 

was born in 1898 in Minnesota, but his 

family soon relocated to a rural area near 

Yakima, Washington. As a young boy, 

Douglas contracted polio but succeeded 

in warding off the symptoms. He claimed 

to have done so partly by climbing nearby mountains, an account that may have 

been apocryphal but which suggests the 

mythos surrounding his western upbringing and rugged individualism that 

would form an important component of 

his public persona.

Douglas attended Whitman College and briefly worked as a high school teacher 

before attending Columbia Law School. He excelled at Columbia and became an 

adherent of the legal realist jurisprudence for which the school was becoming known. 

After a brief stint in private practice, Douglas became a professor at Columbia before 

moving to Yale Law School, another major center of realist jurisprudence, in 1928. 

At Yale, Douglas established a reputation as one of the nation’s leading scholars on 

corporate regulation and bankruptcy law.

In 1934, Douglas joined the newly formed Securities and Exchange Commission 

(SEC), initially as the temporary director of a study group. He eventually became 

an SEC commissioner and, in 1937, the commission’s chairman. While at the SEC, 

Douglas became a confidant of President Franklin Roosevelt, who nominated him 

to the Supreme Court in 1939, making him the youngest justice since 1811. Douglas 

maintained his close connections to Roosevelt during his early tenure on the court 

and was considered for the vice presidency in 1944, a position many thought tantamount to president-in-waiting as Roosevelt’s health declined. Harry Truman, who 

was selected over Douglas at that time, later offered Douglas the vice presidency, but 

he chose to remain on the Court.

Douglas’s views evolved quickly on the bench. He initially affiliated himself with 

the ideal of judicial restraint that had animated critiques of the Court’s decisions 

Justice William O. Douglas

Courtesy: Library of Congress
39

United States v. Clay: Muhammad Ali’s Fight Against the Vietnam Draft

striking down New Deal legislation. Over the course of the 1940s and 50s, however, he 

increasingly established himself as the Court’s most vocal champion of civil liberties 

and equality, eventually advocating a more robust vision of desegregation, freedom 

of expression, and criminal procedure protections than most of his colleagues.

Though idolized by many on the political left, Douglas was no stranger to controversy. He was married four times, including two marriages to women approximately 

forty years his junior that scandalized Washington society. Unlike most justices, he 

continued to advocate for political and social causes in his extrajudicial writings, 

becoming a major figure in the environmental movement. In his later years on the 

Court, he was also a strident opponent of the Vietnam War and “establishment” 

politics, viewpoints that were arguably reflected in his Clay concurrence. Members 

of the House of Representatives twice tried to impeach Douglas. The first of these 

initiatives was a response to his unpopular decision to stay the execution of alleged 

Soviet spies Julius and Ethel Rosenberg. The second, spearheaded by future President Gerald Ford, was likely motivated by the perception that Douglas’s views were 

too radical.

Douglas suffered a stroke on New Year’s Eve, 1974, that limited his ability to 

continue judicial work. He retired from active service in 1975 and died in 1980.

Potter Stewart (1915–1985)

Though the Supreme Court issued a 

per curium opinion nominally written 

by the Court rather than any individual 

member, Justice Potter Stewart penned 

the opinion in Clay after he and Justice 

Harlan convinced their colleagues 

to join what was initially Stewart’s 

dissenting view that the Court should 

overturn Ali’s criminal conviction.

Like Harlan, Stewart was born into 

a family with judicial pedigree: his 

father had been mayor of Cincinnati 

and then a justice on the Ohio State 

Supreme Court. Born in 1915 in Michigan, Stewart grew up in Cincinnati 

before attending boarding school in 

Connecticut. He attended Cambridge 

University in England on a yearlong 

fellowship before receiving undergraduate and law degrees at Yale University. He entered private practice with a New York 

Justice Potter Stewart

Courtesy: Library of Congress
United States v. Clay: Muhammad Ali’s Fight Against the Vietnam Draft

40

City law firm after graduating in 1941. The next year, he joined the United States Naval 

Reserves, serving aboard oil tankers for much of World War II. He returned to New 

York after the war, before moving back to Cincinnati in 1947, where he continued to 

work in private practice in addition to serving on the city council and as vice mayor.

In 1954, he was appointed to the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth 

Circuit at the unusually young age of thirty-nine. President Dwight Eisenhower gave 

Stewart a recess appointment to the Supreme Court of the United States in 1958 (the 

last recess appointment of a Supreme Court justice to date). He was confirmed by the 

Senate the next year. On the Court, Stewart established a reputation as a moderate 

justice capable of building coalitions and of controlling the shape of legal development with skillfully crafted concurring opinions. He was noted for the pithy prose 

and pragmatic reasoning of his opinions.

Justice Stewart retired from active service on the Supreme Court in 1981 but 

continued to hear a reduced number of cases in the lower courts. He died in 1985 

after suffering a stroke.

The lawyers

Hayden Covington

Hayden Covington was Ali’s first lead counsel in federal court and, in that capacity, 

argued several civil suits attempting to enjoin Ali’s conscription, along with the initial criminal trial. Covington 

pressed for Ali’s classification 

as a minister of the Nation 

of Islam and attempted to 

forestall Ali’s indictment by 

seeking injunctions from 

federal courts in Kentucky 

and Texas prohibiting his 

induction. Following Ali’s 

conviction, Covington and 

Ali fell out, with Covington eventually suing Ali for 

approximately $250,000 in 

unpaid legal fees.

Covington was born and 

raised in Texas, the son of a 

Texas Ranger who urged him 

to pursue a political career. 

Covington with Ali in 1967

Courtesy: Library of Congress
41

United States v. Clay: Muhammad Ali’s Fight Against the Vietnam Draft

Though he showed little interest in politics, Covington pursued a successful private 

practice focusing mainly on business cases, while defending several fellow Witnesses 

on a pro bono basis.

In 1939, Watchtower President Joseph Rutherford called on Covington to become 

the organization’s general counsel. Covington worked in that position from 1939 to 

1963, winning several major cases before the Supreme Court of the United States. 

In the aftermath of Rutherford’s death in 1942, Covington became vice president 

of the group. Its new leader, Nathan Knorr, initially gave Covington freer license to 

run the Witnesses’ legal campaign, but the two men eventually came to loggerheads. 

Covington resigned his vice presidency in 1945, though he continued to serve as 

general counsel until 1963, when he was “disfellowshipped” from the Witnesses.

In his later years, Covington seemingly lost his enthusiasm for the law and descended into a period of alcoholism. Shortly before his death, however, Covington 

reengaged with the Witnesses and actively participated in evangelical work. He 

died in 1978.

Erwin Griswold

As Solicitor General of the United States, Erwin Griswold argued the government’s 

case before the Supreme Court in Clay. He was also a major figure in the development 

of public law and legal education in mid-century America.

Born in Ohio in 1904, Griswold attended Oberlin College and Harvard Law 

School. After a brief stint in private practice in Cleveland, Griswold joined the office 

of the Solicitor General of the United States. There he gained a reputation as a skilled 

advocate, successfully arguing several complex tax cases before the Supreme Court 

of the United States.

In 1934, Griswold returned to Harvard Law School as a professor and served as 

the school’s dean from 1946 to 1967. Griswold’s leadership of the school has often 

been celebrated, coinciding as it did with faculty and student body expansions and the 

first admission of female students. During her Supreme Court confirmation hearings 

in 1993, however, Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg criticized Griswold for fostering a 

condescending attitude toward the first female students at the school.

After he retired from his position at Harvard, President Lyndon Johnson appointed Griswold Solicitor General, a post that called on him to argue the government’s 

positions in many major Supreme Court cases. Griswold remained in his position 

during the early years of the Nixon administration, advocating on behalf of the 

new president’s more conservative agenda. It was during this period that Griswold 

argued Clay.

In his written and oral arguments to the Court, Griswold conceded that Ali’s objections to the draft were sincere and (at least partly) religious. Despite this, Griswold 

claimed that Clay fell within the ambit of precedents that had denied protections 
United States v. Clay: Muhammad Ali’s Fight Against the Vietnam Draft

42

to individuals who selectively objected to some, rather than all, wars. However, the 

Court ultimately determined that since the DOJ had erroneously advised the board 

of appeals that Ali’s objections were neither sincere nor religious, the basis for the 

denial of Ali’s conscientious objector claims was invalid.

After leaving the Solicitor General’s office in 1973, Griswold returned to private 

practice with a prestigious Washington, D.C., law firm and continued to litigate 

high-profile cases before the Supreme Court. He died in 1994 at the age of 90.

Chauncey Eskridge

Chauncey Eskridge argued Ali’s case to the Supreme Court of the United States. He 

also worked with Charles Morgan, Jr., on appeals to the Fifth Circuit and the hearing 

on remand before Judge Ingraham regarding Ali’s wiretapped conversations.

One of the nation’s most prominent African-American attorneys in the 1960s, 

Eskridge graduated from the Tuskegee Institute in 1939. Following service as pilot in 

World War II, he attended John Marshall Law School in Chicago, receiving his law 

degree in 1949. Eskridge made his name representing the Southern Christian Leadership Conference, a prominent civil rights organization led by Martin Luther King, 

Jr. He was with King when he was assassinated in 1968. Eskridge also represented the 

NAACP in Chicago and worked with Ali on legal matters unrelated to his draft case.

Though it ultimately proved successful, some observers have criticized Eskridge’s 

argument before the Supreme Court. Eskridge made the essential points on which 

the Court eventually decided the case but arguably allowed the arguments to focus 

on the more difficult question of the selectivity of Ali’s objections to war.

In 1981, Eskridge was elected an associate judge of the Cook County Circuit 

Court in Illinois. He retired in 1986 and died in 1988.

Charles Morgan, Jr.

Charles Morgan, Jr., joined Ali’s legal team following his criminal trial. He unsuccessfully represented Ali before the Fifth Circuit and in the hearing on remand before 

Judge Ingraham regarding Ali’s wiretapped conversations.

Morgan was born in Ohio in 1930 but moved to Kentucky and then to Alabama 

as a child. He attended the University of Alabama, an institution he would later sue 

to desegregate in one of a long line of cases that antagonized his home state. Arguably 

Morgan’s most influential case was Reynolds v. Sims (1964), a landmark suit against 

gerrymandering in the Alabama legislature that contributed to the Supreme Court’s 

adoption of a “one person, one vote” principle that decreased the power of rural elites 

in the South and increased the efficacy of black and urban voters.

In addition to his civil right work in Alabama, Morgan also championed the cause 

of figures opposing the Vietnam War in the mid and late 1960s. Prior to his work on 

Ali’s case, for example, he represented Julian Bond, an African-American civil rights 
43

United States v. Clay: Muhammad Ali’s Fight Against the Vietnam Draft

leader and politician who was improperly excluded from the Georgia state legislature 

for comments criticizing the Vietnam War.

Though he was respected in national legal circles, Morgan’s advocacy of unpopular causes in the South led to a sustained campaign of harassment from groups like 

the Ku Klux Klan. He was forced to close his legal practice in Birmingham, Alabama, 

because of threats to his family, though he continued to work on civil rights cases 

with organizations such as the American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU). Morgan 

died of complications from Alzheimer’s disease in 2009.

Morton Susman

Morton Susman was the U.S. attorney for the Southern District of Texas, which 

included Houston, from 1966 to 1969. In that capacity, Susman was the lead prosecutor at Ali’s trial.

Susman attended Southern Methodist University, receiving his undergraduate 

degree in 1956 and his law degree in 1958. Prior to the trial, Susman persuaded Judge 

Ingraham to limit the defense’s ability to investigate selective service procedures and 

to restrict the defense team’s arguments about the fairness of that process. At trial, he 

successfully argued that here was a basis in fact for the denial of Ali’s conscientious 

objector and ministerial claims.

Susman entered private practice in Texas after leaving his post as U.S. attorney 

in 1969. He retired in 1997.
United States v. Clay: Muhammad Ali’s Fight Against the Vietnam Draft

44

Media Coverage and Public Debates

Even before his draft case began in earnest, Muhammad Ali was the subject of intense press coverage and media speculation. Arguably the most famous person in 

the world in his heyday, Ali frequently attracted crowds of children, admirers, and 

reporters wherever he went. As he once put it, “The only difference between me and 

the Pied Piper is he didn’t have no Cadillac.” Ali’s public announcements that he had 

converted to Islam and intended to challenge his draft status intensified this media 

coverage. This exposure was broadly negative until the late 1960s, when public attitudes toward both the Vietnam War and Ali’s opposition to the draft slowly began 

to shift. Public attitudes toward Ali and his refusal to serve took a similar course, 

though he may have enjoyed greater support among African Americans and liberal 

whites even at the nadir of his popularity.

As he rose through the ranks of the boxing world, Ali divided public opinion. 

Some saw him as a refreshingly colorful personality in an otherwise staid sport; 

Howard Cosell interviewing Ali in 1965

Courtesy: Library of Congress
45

United States v. Clay: Muhammad Ali’s Fight Against the Vietnam Draft

others found him a shameless braggart with little substance to back up his outlandish boasts. Ali’s self-promotion and schoolyard poetry did not always gel with the 

expectation that athletes should maintain modest and self-effacing public profiles. 

As sports broadcaster Howard Cosell put it, “[o]ld world writers wanted [Ali] to 

live by their code, the same mythological sports legend that through all these years 

these non-contemporary men had been propounding. . . . [T]hey wanted another . 

. . white man’s black man.” Ali’s insistence that he would not “be what [reporters or 

the public] want me to be” flew in the face of these demands, but it also endeared 

him to segments of the public yearning for a renegade sports star.

That this rebellion was tied to Ali’s religious faith further complicated public 

attitudes. At the time Ali announced his conversion to the Nation of Islam, most 

Americans took a dim view of the group. A 1959 television documentary series produced by Mike Wallace entitled The Hate That Hate Produced led many to conclude 

that the Nation of Islam was either a bizarre cult or a hateful terrorist organization. 

Featuring inflammatory public speeches by Malcolm X, the documentary informed 

many Americans’ perceptions of the Nation for years to come. This impression became calcified in the minds of many critics when Malcolm X was gunned down by 

a group of Nation members in 1965. Given the widespread opprobrium trailing the 

Nation, it is little surprise that coverage of Ali’s conversion was largely unflattering. 

Popular sports columnist Jimmy Cannon wrote that, by joining the Nation of Islam, 

Ali had embraced a “more pernicious hate symbol than [German former champion 

Max] Schmeling and Nazism.”

The editorial staffs of most newspapers, including the New York Times, initially 

refused to refer to Ali by his Muslim name, a policy that became a major sticking 

point in his relations with the press. Most individual journalists also insisted on 

calling Ali “Cassius Clay” or adopted the compromise position (also employed by 

Hayden Covington at Ali’s trial) of simply referring to him as “champ.” When Times 

reporter Robert Lipsyte apologized to Ali for using his birth name in his articles, Ali 

responded by mockingly patting his head and reassuring him that he understood 

that Lipsyte was “just the white power structure’s little brother.” In other instances, 

however, Ali could be curt or cross with journalists and others who referred to him 

by his “slave name.”

Ali’s stand against the draft elicited the strongest outcry, however. After Ali first 

claimed that he had “no quarrel” with the Vietcong, he faced a wave of critical editorials across the spectrum of the American press. When he made these remarks in 

early 1966, the war was popular among the public and the press, and Ali’s comments 

appeared both unpatriotic and selfish. Both Ali’s draft board and Judge Joe Ingraham’s 

chambers were inundated with complaints about Ali’s conscientious objection claims, 

and many public figures expressed dissatisfaction with the speed of both the draft 

process and Ali’s criminal prosecution. In August 1966, for instance, the New York 

Times reported that influential Congressman L. Mendel Rivers promised a “‘thor-
United States v. Clay: Muhammad Ali’s Fight Against the Vietnam Draft

46

ough overhaul’ of the religious 

deferment section of the draft 

law” if Ali’s draft board upheld 

his claim. Likewise, when Ali set 

up a title defense in Miami, a local 

councilman objected, claiming he 

“had a right to resent Clay’s refusal 

to serve in the Army with the claim 

he’s a Black Muslim minister” because “the Black Muslims are no 

credit to this country.”

Jackie Robinson, another 

legendary black athlete who sometimes defended Ali’s right to take 

controversial positions, summed up the nation’s mood when he told reporters that 

Ali was “hurting the morale of a lot of young soldiers in Vietnam. The tragedy is that 

he’s made millions of dollars off the American public and now he’s not willing to 

show his appreciation to a country that’s giving him a great opportunity. This hurts 

a great number of people.” Following Ali’s refusal to submit to induction in 1967, the 

New York Times opined that “[c]itizens cannot pick and choose which wars they wish 

to fight any more than they can pick and choose which laws they wish to obey. . . . 

[I]f Cassius Clay and other draft objectors believe the war in Vietnam is unjust,” the 

paper’s editorial board argued, “they have the option of going to jail for their beliefs.”

A minority of Americans, however, supported Ali’s stance. In the aftermath of 

Ali’s refusal to take the step forward, the New York Amsterdam News, a paper with 

a predominantly African-American readership, printed the reactions of dozens 

of “persons-on-the-street,” for example, with responses ranging from outrage, to 

begrudging respect for Ali’s conviction, to ringing endorsements of his anti-war 

sentiments. Similarly, some liberal whites, including the prominent author Norman 

Mailer, made early shows of support for Ali’s resistance.

Ali’s criminal trial was the subject of intense press scrutiny. Judge Ingraham noted 

the large media presence both during the trial and, to a lesser extent, at the remand 

hearing in 1969. He also sequestered the jury overnight during the trial to prevent 

jurors from being influenced by the press coverage of the proceedings and instructed court marshals to ensure newspapers in the jurors’ hotel were clipped to remove 

stories about Ali. Many members of the public were outraged that Ali remained free 

during his appeal, even though he was sentenced to the maximum penalty. One letter to Ali’s draft board (which had no influence over Judge Ingraham’s decision to 

continue Ali’s bail) called the board members “[s]kunks” and “yellow-bellied scum.” 

Another argued that “[t]hat Black Bastard Cassius Clay should be in Vietnam right 

now with our fighting men instead of hiding behind some phony heathen religion. 

Ali speaking to reporters in 1970

Courtesy: Smithsonian Institution
47

United States v. Clay: Muhammad Ali’s Fight Against the Vietnam Draft

He is a disgrace to the sports world[,] his race[,] and his country—and so are you 

for letting him get away with such crap.”

Anger of this sort was not likely to subside easily and, indeed, Ali continued to 

inspire a substantial number of detractors into the 1970s. Nonetheless, the public 

mood gradually began to shift over the course of the late 1960s and early 1970s. Ali 

later stated that the “biggest mistake” he made was announcing his criticisms of the 

war “too early.” As it became clear that racial minorities and poor whites were bearing 

the brunt of the draft and suffered higher casualty rates in combat, a growing number of Americans began to question the fairness of the draft. Indeed, both President 

Lyndon Johnson and his successor, Richard Nixon, acknowledged inequities in the 

Selective Service System. In this climate, Ali’s claims that the system treated African 

Americans unfairly and his critique of the number of African-American board members across the nation seemed more palatable to a broader audience.

When the Supreme Court overturned Ali’s conviction, then, the response was 

broadly positive. The Washington Post, for example, called Ali’s court victory “his 

biggest mismatch,” arguing that “it was never possible to believe that Muhammad 

Ali is associated with many famous images

Courtesy: Library of Congress
United States v. Clay: Muhammad Ali’s Fight Against the Vietnam Draft

48

Ali received fair and impartial treatment from his draft board.” The Los Angeles Sentinel—another publication with a majority-black readership—wrote that the “ruling 

overthrowing [Ali’s sentence] . . . represents a new milestone in race relations in this 

country . . . right along with the historic 1954 school desegregation decision.” Even 

so, not all major news outlets hailed the decision. An editorial in the Boston Globe, 

for example, argued that Ali had received special consideration because of his wealth 

and celebrity, though even this piece conceded it might be better to free Ali than to 

make him a martyr.

While he did not become a martyr, Ali did become a hero to many. As his public 

persona and racial views mellowed and he continued to score remarkable victories 

in the ring (in 1978, he became the first person to win the heavyweight title three 

times), this view gained increasing currency. Ali’s photogenic looks and playful manner helped create a range of indelible images that further reinforced his popularity.

When Ali, visibly shaking from the effects of Parkinson’s syndrome, was the 

surprise honoree chosen to light the flame at the 1996 Olympic Games opening 

ceremony, he elicited a widespread outpouring of acclaim not just for his status as 

a great sportsman, but for the legacy of his battle against the draft. As an editorial 

in the Baltimore Sun asked, “Who could have imagined Ali being recognized as a 

visionary when once he was dismissed as a draft dodger?”
49

United States v. Clay: Muhammad Ali’s Fight Against the Vietnam Draft

Historical Documents

Universal Military Training and Service Act, 65 stat. 75 

§ (6)( j) (1951)

The Universal Military Training and Service Act was the primary selective service 

law in effect when Ali was charged with draft evasion (the Act was amended and 

renamed later in 1967). The section of the Act included below sets forth the criteria 

for conscientious objection and the procedure for appealing unsuccessful claims 

for objector status.

[Document Source: 65 stat. 75 § (6)(j) (1951).]

Nothing contained in this title shall be construed to require any person to be subject 

to combatant training and service in the armed forces of the United States who, by 

reason of religious training and belief, is conscientiously opposed to participation 

in war in any form. Religious training and belief in this connection means an individual’s belief in a relation to a Supreme Being involving duties superior to those 

arising from any human relation, but does not include essentially political, sociological, or philosophical views or a merely personal moral code. Any person claiming 

exemption from combatant training and service because of such conscientious objections whose claim is sustained by the local board shall, if he is inducted into the 

armed forces under this title, be assigned to noncombatant service as defined by the 

President, or shall, if he is found to be conscientiously opposed to participation in 

such noncombatant service, in lieu of such induction, be ordered by his local board, 

subject to such regulations as the President may prescribe, to perform for a period 

equal to the period prescribed in section 4(b) such civilian work contributing to the 

maintenance of the national health, safety, or interest as the local board may deem 

appropriate and any such person who knowingly fails or neglects to obey any such 

order from his local board shall be deemed, for the purposes of section 12 of this title, 

to have knowingly failed or neglected to perform a duty required of him under this 

title. Any person claiming exemption from combatant training and service because of 

such conscientious objections shall, if such claim is not sustained by the local board, 

be entitled to an appeal to the appropriate appeal board. Upon the filing of such 

appeal, the appeal board shall refer any such claim to the Department of Justice for 

inquiry and hearing. The Department of Justice, after appropriate inquiry, shall hold 

a hearing with respect to the character and good faith of the objections of the person 

concerned, and such person shall be notified of the time and place of such hearing. 

The Department of Justice shall, after such hearing, if the objections are found to be 

sustained, recommend to the appeal board that (1) if the objector is inducted into 
United States v. Clay: Muhammad Ali’s Fight Against the Vietnam Draft

50

the armed forces under this title, he shall be assigned to noncombatant service as 

defined by the President, or (2) if the objector is found to be conscientiously opposed 

to participation in such noncombatant service, he shall in lieu of such induction be 

ordered by his local board, subject to such regulations as the President may prescribe, 

to perform for a period equal to the period prescribed in section 4(b) such civilian 

work contributing to the maintenance of the national health, safety, or interest as 

the local board may deem appropriate and any such person who knowingly fails or 

neglects to obey any such order from his local board shall be deemed, for the purposes of section 12 of this title, to have knowingly failed or neglected to perform a 

duty required of him under this title. If after such hearing the Department of Justice 

finds that his objections are not sustained, it shall recommend to the appeal board 

that such objections be not sustained. The appeal board shall, in making its decision, 

give consideration to, but shall not be bound to follow, the recommendation of the 

Department of Justice together with the record on appeal from the local board. Each 

person whose claim for exemption from combatant training and service because of 

conscientious objections is sustained shall be listed by the local board on a register 

of conscientious objectors.

Department of Justice Legal Recommendation Letter, 

November 25, 1966

Until 1967, the DOJ was required by statute to issue legal recommendations to 

selective service appeal boards on conscientious objector claims. This recommendation, which took the form of a letter written by a lawyer from the DOJ, along 

with the records of a hearing conducted by a legally trained appointee (in this case, 

a retired state-court judge from Kentucky), was transmitted to the appeal board 

for its ultimate decision. In Ali’s case, the judge conducting the hearing into Ali’s 

claim concluded that he was sincere and should be reclassified as a conscientious 

objector. Unusually (though not uniquely), the DOJ disagreed with this conclusion 

in its recommendation to the board. This recommendation letter was to become 

a pivotal issue in Ali’s Supreme Court appeal. Arguably a strained construction of 

Ali’s background and legal standing at the time, the letter’s interpretation of the 

law of conscientious objection was further contradicted by subsequent Supreme 

Court opinions adopting a broad interpretation of “religious training and belief.”

[Document Source: T. Oscar Smith to Chairman, Appeal Board, Nov. 25, 

1966 reproduced as Defendant’s Exhibit No. 103 in United States v. Cassius 

Marsellus Clay, Jr. Also known as Muhammad Ali, Case no. 67H94, Criminal 

Case Files, 1908–1979 (48SO69A); Records of the United States District Courts 

for the Southern District of Texas, Record Group 21; National Archives at Fort 

Worth, Texas, folder 9.]
51

United States v. Clay: Muhammad Ali’s Fight Against the Vietnam Draft

Dear Sir:

As required by Section 6(j) of the Universal Military Training and Service Act, as 

amended, an inquiry was made by the Department of Justice in the captioned matter 

and an opportunity to be heard on his claim for exemption as a conscientious objector was given to the registrant by Judge Lawrence S. Grauman, a Hearing Officer 

for the Department of Justice.

. . .

The Hearing Officer concluded that the registrant is sincere in his objection on 

religious grounds to participation in war in any form and he recommended that the 

conscientious objector claim of the registrant be sustained.

It should be noted that while the résumé statement of the attorney for [a group of 

Louisville businessmen sponsoring Ali’s boxing career] did, as noted by the Hearing 

Officer, express the opinion that registrant sincerely believes that he is conscientiously 

opposed to military service, the résumé also reflects that the attorney believed that 

registrant would be sincere in his claim as a conscientious objector “to the extent that 

registrant can be sincere in a belief.” The résumé further reflects that the attorney 

“could not be sure how deeply any human conviction goes with the registrant” and 

that he is “not certain as to what motivates the registrant in this respect.” The attorney added that in view of his past experiences with the registrant changing his mind, 

he would not be surprised “if a year from now the registrant becomes disenchanted 

with the Muslims and voluntarily joins the United States Marines.” The member of 

the sponsoring group, it should be noted, stated that “I’ll go to my grave believing 

registrant is basically a good boy and was brainwashed first by his father and then 

by the Muslims.”

The registrant’s claimed conscientious objection appears to be based essentially 

upon the teachings of the Nation of Islam as interpreted by Elijah Muhammad, and 

registrant’s expressed objection to participation in the Vietnam War.

. . . 

Elijah Muhammad, whom the registrant listed as a reference as well as the person 

upon whom he relies most for religious guidance, is reported in the résumé as stating 

that he is the spiritual advisor of the registrant, that he had explained the teachings of 

the Nation of Islam to the registrant, and had advised him that the teachings preclude 

any member of the Nation of Islam from participation in any form of military service 

“of the United States.” Similarly, other coreligionists stated that the Nation of Islam’s 

religion prohibits service in the military “of the United States.” These statements do 

not appear to preclude military service in any form, but rather are limited to military 

service in the Armed Forces of the United States.

. . .
United States v. Clay: Muhammad Ali’s Fight Against the Vietnam Draft

52

Both “Message to the Blackman” and Muhammad Speaks express essentially the 

view of the Black Muslims that the white man is their enemy, and that the black man 

should disassociate himself from the United States Government and its institutions 

and secure an independent nation for the black man within the United States.

It seems clear that the teachings of the Nation of Islam preclude fighting for 

the United States not because of objections to participation in war in any form but 

rather because of political and racial objections to policies of the United States as 

interpreted by Elijah Muhammad.

Asked by the Hearing Officer whether the registrant would fight in any war 

which Elijah Muhammad directed him to fight in, the registrant replied that if Elijah 

Muhammad:

“looked me in my face and he who I believe is directly from Allah, Almighty God Allah, and if he looked at me and advised me, which I’m sure 

he wouldn’t, to fight in any kind of war, if he advised me to I would.”

The registrant testifies as follows concerning his objections to participation in 

noncombatant service:

“ . . . I wouldn’t raise all this court stuff and I wouldn’t go through all of 

this and lose and give up the millions that I gave up and my image with the 

American public that I would say is completely dead and ruined because 

of us in here now, and so I wouldn’t turn down so many millions and jeopardize my life walking the streets of the South and all of America with no 

bodyguard if I wasn’t sincere in every bit of what the Holy Qur’an and the 

teachings of the Honorable Elijah Muhammad tell us and it is that we are 

not to participate in wars on the side of nobody who—on the side of nonbelievers, and this is a Christian country and this is not a Muslim country 

. . . and the outright, everyday oppressors and enemies are the people as 

a whole, the whites of this nation. So, we are not, according to the Holy 

Qur’an, to even as much as aid in passing a cup of water to the—even a 

wounded. I mean, this is in the Holy Qur’an, and as I said earlier, this is 

not me talking to . . . dodge nothing. This is there before I was borned and 

it will be there when I’m dead, and we believe in not only that part of it, 

but all of it.”

It is therefore our conclusion that registrant’s claimed objections to participation 

in war insofar as they are based upon the teachings of the Nation of Islam, rest on 

grounds which primarily are political and racial. These constitute only objections to 

certain types of war in certain circumstances, rather than a general scruple against 

participation in war in any form. However, only a general scruple against participation in war in any form can support an exemption as a conscientious objector 

under the Act.
53

United States v. Clay: Muhammad Ali’s Fight Against the Vietnam Draft

The registrant has expressed his objections to the particular war in Vietnam. 

Following the reclassification of the registrant from 1-Y to 1-A on February 17, 1966, 

the Chicago Daily News quoted the registrant as stating:

“I am a member of the Muslims and we don’t go to no war unless they are 

declared by Ali himself.4 himself. I don’t have no personal quarrel with 

those Vietcongs.”

“Let me tell you, we Muslims are taught to defend ourselves when we are 

attacked. Those Vietcong are not attacking me. These Vietcong are fighting 

a very nasty war over there. There is a lot of people getting killed. Why 

should we Muslims get involved? Besides, I am fighting for the government every day. I am laying my life on the line for the government. Nine 

out of ten soldiers would not want to be in my place in the ring. It is too 

dangerous.”

Questioned at the hearing whether he made that statement, the registrant admitted he had, although he stated that he had been condemned by Elijah Muhammad 

for making “such a wild boastful statement.”

. . .

. . . Neither the fact that he has no “personal quarrel” with the Viet Cong nor his 

related objection to the Black Muslims getting involved in the Vietnam war constitute 

an objection which the Act recognizes. To qualify for exemption as a conscientious 

objector, the registrant’s objection must be a general scruple against “participation 

in war in any form,” not merely an objection to participation in a particular war.

Moreover, the registrant has not consistently manifested his conscientious-objector claim. Such a course of overt manifestations is requisite to establishing a subjective state of mind and belief. As noted earlier, he made no conscientious-objector 

claim at all prior to being reclassified 1-A in February 1966. Even after that event, 

the record of his efforts to have the local board reconsider his classification indicates 

that the registrant’s primary concern was not his conscientious-objector claim, but 

the financial hardship which would result from his induction into the Armed Forces.

In his letter to the local board on March 17, 1966, registrant stated that his classification from 1-Y to 1-A is legally unjustified and imposes “grave hardships upon 

me as heavyweight champion of the world at now age 24.”

In another letter to his local board, dated April 16, 1966, registrant discusses 

financial obligations and commitments, including money which he owes the Louisville Sponsoring Group, which he made during the time he was 1-Y and before he 

was classified 1-A.

. . .

4. Although the DOJ letter uses the name Ali here, it seems probable, given the context, that Ali 

either referred or intended to refer to Allah.
United States v. Clay: Muhammad Ali’s Fight Against the Vietnam Draft

54

The main thrust of registrant’s letters to his local board following his reclassification from 1-Y to 1-A appears to be more of an argument for one of several classifications other than 1-A, rather than valid support of his conscientious-objector 

claim. In his 8-page letter of April 16, 1966, he devotes three and one-half pages to a 

discussion of why he should not have been classified from 1-Y to 1-A.

. . .

It should also be noted that the registrant did not claim conscientious-objector 

status until after he had been reclassified 1-A in February 1966, although in his testimony at the hearing he variously fixed the time when he became a conscientious 

objector as: 1) three weeks before the first Sonny Liston fight on February 25, 1964, 

2) the hour when he first heard the teachings of Elijah Muhammad in November 

1960 and 1961, 3) “the first time I had to go get tested”, and 4) “after I first heard the 

teachings of . . . how the so-called Negro was treated[.]”

He explained to the Hearing Officer that he did not claim to be a conscientious 

objector when he first became one because war was not pending at that time and he 

had nothing to worry about and had nothing about war on his mind. But a registrant 

has not shown overt manifestations sufficient to establish his subjective belief where, 

as here, his conscientious-objector claim was not asserted until military service became imminent.

The burden of clearly establishing his conscientious-objector claim is upon the 

registrant. The Department of Justice concludes that this registrant failed to sustain 

that burden.

With due regard for the recommendation of the Hearing Officer, the Department 

of Justice finds that the registrant’s conscientious-objector claim is not sustained and 

recommends to your Board that he be not classified in Class 1-O or in Class 1-A-O.

. . .

Sincerely,

T. Oscar Smith

Chief, Conscientious-Objector Section

New York Times Report, April 28, 1967

This New York Times report recounts the events around Ali’s induction ceremony 

and his refusal to enter the military on religious grounds. Though this is a news 

story rather than an editorial, it is worth noting that the author, Robert Lipsyte, 

was initially one of the few major journalists covering Ali’s case to indicate there 

was any substance to Ali’s claims.

[Document Source: Robert Lipsyte, “Clay Refuses Army Oath; Stripped of 

Boxing Crown,” New York Times, 29 April 1985, 1.]
55

United States v. Clay: Muhammad Ali’s Fight Against the Vietnam Draft

Houston, April 28—Cassius Clay refused today, as expected, to take the one step 

forward that would have constituted induction into the armed forces. There was 

no immediate Government action.

Although Government authorities here foresaw several months of preliminary 

moves before Clay would be arrested and charged with a felony, boxing organizations 

instantly stripped the 25-year-old fighter of his world heavyweight championship.

“It will take at least 30 days for Clay to be indicted and it probably will be another 

year and a half before he could be sent to prison since there undoubtedly will be 

appeals through the courts,” United States Attorney Morton Susman said.

Statement Is Issued

Clay, in a statement distributed a few minutes after the announcement of his refusal, 

said: 

“I have searched my conscience and I find I cannot be true to my belief in my religion by accepting such a call.” He has maintained throughout recent unsuccessful 

civil litigation that he is entitled to draft exemption as an appointed minister of the 

Lost-Found Nation of Islam, the so-called Black Musli[m] sect.

Clay, who prefers his Musli[m] name of Muhammad Ali, anticipated the moves 

against his title in his statement, calling them a “continuation of the same artificially 

induced prejudice and discrimination” that had led to the defeat of his various suits 

and appeals in Federal courts, including the Supreme Court.

Hayden C. Covington of New York, Clay’s lawyer, said that further civil action 

to stay criminal proceedings would be initiated. If convicted of refusal to submit to 

induction, Clay is subject to a maximum sentence of five years imprisonment and 

a $10,000 fine.

Mr. Covington, who has defended many Jehovah’s Witnesses in similar cases, has 

repeatedly told Clay during the last few days, “You’ll be unhappy in the fiery furnace 

of criminal proceedings but you’ll come out unsinged.”

As a plaintiff in civil action, the Negro fighter has touched on such politically 

and socially explosive areas as alleged racial imbalance on local Texas draft boards, 

alleged discriminatory action by the Government in response to public pressure, and 

the rights of a minority religion to appoint clergymen.

Full-Time Occupation

As a prospective defendant in criminal proceedings, Clay is expected to attempt 

to establish that “preaching and teaching” the tenets of the Muslims is a full-time 

occupation and that boxing is the “avocation” that financially supports his unpaid 

ministerial duties.
United States v. Clay: Muhammad Ali’s Fight Against the Vietnam Draft

56

Today, Clay reported to the Armed Forces Examining and Entrance Station on 

the third floor of the Federally drab United States Custom House a few minutes before 8 A.M., the ordered time. San Jacinto Street, in downtown Houston, was already 

crowded with television crews and newsmen when Clay stepped out of a taxi cab with 

Covington, Quinnan Hodges, the local associate counsel, and Chauncey Eskridge 

of Chicago, a lawyer for the Rev. Martin Luther King, as well as for Clay and others.

Half a dozen Negro men, apparently en route to work, applauded Clay and 

shouted: “He gets more publicity than Johnson.” Clay was quickly taken upstairs 

and disappeared into the maw of the induction procedure for more than five hours.

Two information officers supplied a stream of printed and oral releases throughout the procedure, including a detailed schedule of examinations and records processing, as well as instant confirmation of Clay’s acceptable blood test and the fact that 

he had obeyed Muslim dietary strictures by passing up the ham sandwich included 

in the inductees’ box lunches.

Such information, however, did not forestall the instigation, by television crews, 

of a small demonstration outside the Custom House. During the morning, five white 

youngsters from the Friends World Institute, a nonaccredited school in Westbury, 

L.I., who had driven all night from a study project in Oklahoma, and half a dozen 

local Negro youths, several wearing Black Power buttons, had appeared on the street.

Groups Use Signs

Continuous and sometimes insulting interviewers eventually provoked both groups, 

separately, to appear with signs. The white group merely asked for the end of the 

Vietnam war and greater efforts for civil rights.

The Negro eventually swelled into a group of about two dozen circling pickets 

carrying hastily scrawled, “Burn, Baby, Burn” signs and singing, “Nothing kills a n----r 

like too much love.” [Slur omitted]. A few of the pickets wore discarded bedsheets 

and table linen wound into African-type garments, but most were young women 

dragged into the little demonstration on their lunch hours.

. . .

Sadly, too, 22-year-old John McCullough, a graduate of Sam Houston State 

College, said: “It’s his prerogative if he’s sincere in his religion, but it’s his duty as a 

citizen to go in. I’m a coward, too.”

46 Called to Report

Then Mr. McCullough, who is white, went up the steps to be inducted. He was 

one of the 46 young men, including Clay, who were called to report on this day.

For Clay, the day ended at 1:10 P.M. Houston time, when Lieut. Col. J. Edwin McKee, 

commander of the station, announced that “Mr. Muhammad Ali has just refused to 

be inducted.”
57

United States v. Clay: Muhammad Ali’s Fight Against the Vietnam Draft

In a prepared statement, Colonel McKee said that notification of the refusal would 

be forwarded to the United States Attorney General’s office, and the national and 

local Selective Service boards. This is the first administrative step toward possible 

arrest, and an injunction to stop it had been denied to Clay yesterday in the United 

States District Court here.

Clay was initially registered for the draft in Louisville, where he was born. He 

obtained a transfer to a Houston board because his ministerial duties had made this 

city his new official residence. He had spent most of his time until last summer in 

Chicago, where the Musli[m] headquarters are situated, in Miami, where he trained, 

or in the cities in which he was fighting.

After Colonel McKee’s brief statement, Clay was brought into a pressroom and 

led into range of 13 television cameras and several dozen microphones. He refused to 

speak as he handed out Xeroxed copies of his statement to selected newsmen, including representatives of the major networks, wire services and The New York Times.

. . .

The statement, in part, declared:

“It is in the light of my consciousness as a Muslim minister and my own 

personal convictions that I take my stand in rejecting the call to be inducted in the armed services. I do so with the full realization of its implications 

and possible consequences. I have searched my conscience and I find I 

cannot be true to my belief in my religion by accepting such a call.

“My decision is a private and individual one and I realize that this is a most 

crucial decision. In taking it I am dependent solely upon Allah as the final 

judge of these actions brought about by my own conscience.

“I strongly object to the fact that so many newspapers have given the American public and the world the impression that I have only two alternatives 

in taking this stand: either I go to jail or go to the Army. There is another 

alternative and that alternative is justice. If justice prevails, if my Constitutional rights are upheld, I will be forced to go neither to the Army nor jail. 

In the end I am confident that justice will come my way for the truth must 

eventually prevail. . . . ”

Pretrial Hearing Excerpts, June 8, 1967

To streamline trial proceedings, many important legal issues are resolved by the 

judge prior to a federal trial. In United States v. Clay, many of these issues centered 

around the defense’s attempts to show that the Selective Service System deliberately 

excluded African Americans from draft boards and that it discriminated against 

Ali. The following excerpts from the two-day pretrial proceedings in Clay illustrate 

the nature of those claims and the government’s successful objections to them. The 
United States v. Clay: Muhammad Ali’s Fight Against the Vietnam Draft

58

issues were raised as a result of the defense team’s attempt to subpoena evidence 

from several individuals and the government’s motion to quash the subpoenas. 

The individual identified as Colonel Hays was Lieutenant Colonel Robert Hays, a 

senior military legal official specializing in selective service cases.

[Document Source: Transcript of Proceedings, The United States v. Cassius 

Marsellus Clay, Jr. Also known as Muhammad Ali, May 8, 1967; Case no. 67H94, 

Criminal Case Files, 1908–1979 (48SO69A); Records of the United States 

District Courts for the Southern District of Texas, Record Group 21; National 

Archives at Fort Worth, Texas, folder 4.]

MR. SUSMAN: Your Honor, our motion to quash the subpoenas duces tecum

has been filed with a short but complete and comprehensive brief. We understand 

from a pleading filed yesterday by Mr. Covington and Mr. Hodges that they are 

abandoning their subpoena directed towards the President.

. . .

MR. COVINGTON: [T]he Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit held that when 

we get to the point of defending the indictment we could go into and urge as a defense 

this matter of imbalance of Negro[es] on the Board and the discrimination. . . . How 

can we prove the discrimination unless we get the subpoenas obeyed?

. . .

THE COURT: You said something about a Negro on the Board. I didn’t get what 

you said, that there was not a Negro on the Board.

MR. COVINGTON: There was no Negro on the Local Board at Louisville at 

the time this process was processed. There was one put on afterwards. There was no 

Negro on the Appeal Board here in Houston that considered his case.

THE COURT: How many members were on those boards you refer to?

MR. COVINGTON: Three on the Board in Louisville, a panel, but there is six 

members of the total Board in Louisville and about 7 or 8 in the Board of Appeals 

here in Houston, and there are 3 on the national board. Incidentally, one member 

of the national board is a Negro.

THE COURT: On the national board of three, is there a Catholic on that board?

. . .

MR. COVINGTON: I think so.

THE COURT: Is there a Jew on that board or a Presbyterian?

MR. COVINGTON: I can’t answer that.

THE COURT: Or a Baptist or a Lutheran? There are so many categories.

MR. COVINGTON: We’re talking here about something that the Supreme Court 

of the United States ruled on in the case of the juries, Your Honor.

THE COURT: Suppose some Presbyterian—
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United States v. Clay: Muhammad Ali’s Fight Against the Vietnam Draft

MR. COVINGTON: We are talking about color or religion.

THE COURT: People do specify religion and I understand you are going to 

speak of religion, too, in this case.

MR. COVINGTON: We are going to show the man is a minister. But our allegations—

THE COURT: I will try to project my thoughts and get straight on the subject. 

Suppose there is no Presbyterian on that board; can we draft Presbyterians?

MR. COVINGTON: I don’t think it is analogous.

THE COURT: You mean a Presbyterian doesn’t have equal rights? If not, I am 

left out because I am a Presbyterian.

. . .

THE COURT: You say you want to show there were no Negroes on certain 

boards?

MR. COVINGTON: On the local board and on the appeal board here in Houston.

THE COURT: Can’t that be stipulated?

MR. COVINGTON: If they will stipulate it constituted discrimination.

THE COURT: You don’t stipulate as to conclusions, as I understand it. You 

stipulate only facts.

MR. COVINGTON: We want to also get the record to show that there has been 

an imbalance in the drafting of Negro registrants, too, and if they will stipulate to 

the imbalance—

THE COURT: Well, imbalance again is a conclusion.

MR. COVINGTON: Well, Your Honor, we are entitled to make our proof, I 

respectfully submit, and that is what the subpoena power of the court is for is to 

enable us to make our defenses. How can we prove our defense if our subpoena 

power is taken away?

THE COURT: If you want to prove there was or was not a Negro on a particular 

board, or the number thereof, I should think that would be stipulated. I know of no 

better proof than a stipulation.

MR. COVINGTON: That’s right, but we want to prove a systematic exclusion 

by the Government.

THE COURT: There again you get into conclusions.

. . .

MR. HODGES: May I address myself to the Court on one point, rather than 

discuss it with Mr. Covington and then state it?

The President of the United States made in one of his press conferences an admission that there has been a discrimination all up and down the line, and he for 

that reason appointed the Burk Marshall Commission, on selective service to study 

the method by which draft board members are selected and the makeup of them. We 

have the published part of the Commission’s report which they wanted published, but 
United States v. Clay: Muhammad Ali’s Fight Against the Vietnam Draft

60

we do not have the notes, the records from which this was taken and we don’t know 

what it contains. We have subpoenaed Bradley Patterson to bring those records here.

. . .

If the situation is so bad the President of the United States admits publicly there 

was discrimination we want to show the discrimination against this man, the Defendant here, and if he has been discriminated against the order is void and his not 

guilty plea should be respected and he should be found not guilty. We can’t simply 

stipulate with Mr. Susman one isolated fact of the composition of the Texas Selective 

Service Appeal Board. We want to show there is a systematic—

THE COURT: I think what you want to do is stipulate conclusions, from listening 

to you and Mr. Covington, rather than facts.

MR. HODGES: We want to make our proof rather than stipulate to a single isolated fact. If then we can show from the records of the Burk Marshall Commission 

there is an overall discrimination—

THE COURT: You said the President said there is discrimination all up and 

down the line. You said someone said the situation is bad. That is a conclusion. 

Certainly it is indefinite. I don’t know what that means. I don’t know that anything 

ever pleases everybody.

MR. HODGES: But the President was ill informed.

THE COURT: I have heard opinions at times that he is ill informed and I hear 

that from various sources.

. . .

MR. SUSMAN: I would like to say from the remarks of counsel today it appears 

Mr. Covington would like to turn this procedure from a judicious trial into a congressional investigation into the Selective Service System. I would like to suggest to 

the Court that because of that it is more properly a congressional matter than judicial 

matter. I understand Mr. Covington is from New York where there is a congressional 

vacancy. I might suggest he pursue that at a different place and time.

. . .

. . . Now, I think we can lay the matter to rest by advising the Court that the classification of Cassius Clay, which is at issue in this case, was his final classification. 

His final classification was by the presidential Appeal Board, which is one-third 

Negro. All the classifications that happened before then are just wiped out. They 

are immaterial because he was classified by the presidential board de novo, and that 

board’s classification was unanimous . . . .

. . .

I would like to say I don’t know whether there has been systematic exclusion or 

not. Every time someone is appointed by the President or the Governor—
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United States v. Clay: Muhammad Ali’s Fight Against the Vietnam Draft

THE COURT: Everyone else is excluded except that one person. Every time one 

appointment is made millions of Americans are excluded.

MR. SUSMAN: I understand Eisenhower systematically excluded Democrats 

from many appointments.

THE COURT: He didn’t exclude enough.

MR. SUSMAN: And Democratic presidents have systematically excluded Republicans.

. . .

I think in the face of the argument these subpoenas are nothing but an attack on 

the whole Selective Service System, which is a congressional function. I have made 

the suggestion as to how that could be pursued.

With that, we close.

MR. COVINGTON: . . . Your Honor, the very fact there may be a Negro on the 

Appeal Board in Washington doesn’t cure the absence of one in Louisville or one on 

the Appeal Board here. A man is entitled to be fairly tried at all levels.

THE COURT: I’m wondering if that is the way they decide appeals. I know 

very little about the working of the draft boards. I registered with the draft board in 

World War II and then volunteered for service. I was never called in the draft. But do 

people line up according to race in determining these matters? Do members line up 

according to the race? Does a Negro member—say if this is a young man, a Negro, 

and here is a white man, and I will send him in the service; is that the way they do it?

MR. COVINGTON: I don’t think so, Your Honor. I think that the thing is that 

the Negro representation on the local board and the Appeal Board would help avoid 

the imbalance of Negroes in the service. I mean, it is quite manifested, the remarks 

that President Johnson made being based on the records we are trying to get here, 

and he found there was systematic exclusion of Negroes from the boards and also 

found that there was systematic discrimination in the Negroes in the service because 

there are a larger number of Negroes in Vietnam than there are whites, in proportion 

to the population.

. . .

Properly you have said that that is a conclusion that was reached by the President, 

but his conclusion was based on the proof that was before his commission . . . . What 

we want is the proof that that Commission had before them and when we have that 

proof that was before them then we will have proof adequate to make our defense 

stand up here that there has been systematic exclusion of the Negro from the local 

board. That is what it is, Your Honor.

That is only one of our points, though, we still come back to the entirely different 

matter—

THE COURT: What will we do, stop drafting Negroes?
United States v. Clay: Muhammad Ali’s Fight Against the Vietnam Draft

62

MR. COVINGTON: I don’t think that is the necessary conclusion at all. We 

are only concerned here with this one case, and it is not a matter of what’s going 

to happen. This is a matter for Congress. We are here to determine whether or not 

there has been violation of the law. . . .

. . .

I respectfully submit that this is a very, very serious matter and one that the 

Government is trying to treat as a trivial matter. But when we start denying a litigant 

the subpoena process of the court it comes close to being a denial of justice . . . . If 

they had some governmental privilege against this they would have pleaded it. They 

didn’t have governmental privilege and they are nonetheless making the subpoenas 

be quashed. We will be woefully and dreadfully harmed and denied the due process 

of law upon the trial of this case if we are not allowed to make our proof. The right to 

be heard is a fundamental right and a right that cannot be frittered away on grounds 

of inconvenience.

. . .

THE COURT: . . . An analogy was drawn between draft boards and juries, and 

everyone gives great lip service to constitutional rights of trial by jury and most everyone charged with crime wants trial by jury. They never seem to be satisfied with 

the jury they get. The way it works in practice is they want their jury, but they don’t 

want it.

. . .

. . . [I]t is immaterial what the President says. Certainly what the President says 

is not law. It is likewise immaterial what a member of Congress says. We all know 

that Congressmen speak out on both sides or on all sides of every subject, both on 

the floors of Congress and elsewhere. There are 535 members of Congress, and of 

course we get a great divergence of views on every subject. So I am of the firm belief 

that it is immaterial what the President said or members of Congress may have said. 

It is immaterial what other persons have said in other places.

What we are interested in in this trial, as in every trial, is what the Defendant did 

or failed to do in this district and division. I will grant the Government’s motion to 

quash the subpoenas duces tecum.

. . .

MR. HODGES: . . . [W]e ask the Court if the Court would reconsider our motion 

for discovery in view of your denial.

. . .

THE COURT: You want to discover what the President said and what the congressmen said and what other people said.
63

United States v. Clay: Muhammad Ali’s Fight Against the Vietnam Draft

MR. COVINGTON: We want to get a discovery of all the things we described in 

our application. We have here what the President said in the documents that have 

been produced for me in Washington, but we want to discover what records they 

have in the Selective Service System with respect to the discrimination of the Negro 

in the System which was called for in our motion for discovery and inspection. . . .

THE COURT: Colonel Hays is here. Won’t he know about discrimination?

MR. COVINGTON: I don’t know. It would depend on the records anyhow, Your 

Honor. We want the records.

THE COURT: What records did you furnish[,] Colonel Hays? What records can 

your office furnish him?

COLONEL HAYS: May it please the Court: the only way you would know if 

there was a Negro on the local board would be to see the board members in person. 

The only way you would know whether the particular registrant was a Negro is to 

see the registrant in person.

THE COURT: Maybe you couldn’t tell them apart anyway, if they looked like 

Adam Clayton Powell.

COLONEL HAYS: That is true, Your Honor. The statuses and regulations do 

not require any such information. We have bandied around the term “discrimination.” The President did not say there was discrimination, nothing in his reports that 

there was discrimination. The only thing he has ever said is to make every attempt 

to see local boards are truly representative of areas, and this is a fishing expedition 

that would not assist the Court in my opinion in any way. Those records would not 

be available unless you could subpoena the records of 33 million registrants from 

4,000 local boards.

MR. COVINGTON: We have this [government report, “In Pursuit of Equality: 

Who Serves if Not All Serve”], on page 80. . . . [T]he Selective Service System did 

compile it for the Burk Marshall Commission. For the State of Kentucky[:] 641 board 

members in the whole state, 2% are negro.

Then on page 81 of this same report it shows in reference to Texas[:] 656 board 

members, of which 1.1[%] are Negro.

There is bound to be a record some place or they never would have had this. . . .

. . .

Here are the President’s remarks, based on the Marshall Commission specifically 

mentions the subject of discrimination right here in this document.

THE COURT: Well, I wish I could define discrimination or I wish someone 

could. Like Colonel Hays, it puzzles me. I can remember when I was a young man 

people would say, “He is a gentleman of discriminating taste.” That was supposed to 

be complimentary. It meant a man of discriminating taste was a man of good taste. 

If you draft the Jones boy and don’t draft the Smith boy, are you discriminating 

against the Joneses?
United States v. Clay: Muhammad Ali’s Fight Against the Vietnam Draft

64

Then sometimes it works the other way. I recall in World War II after our entry 

into the war and many of the young men were offering their services and I had a 

friend, a young lawyer here—he is still at this bar but he is not as young as he was—

who had been a varsity football player at Bryan University and in a football accident 

had broken his forearm and it wasn’t set properly. He was a picture of health and 

robustness and he volunteered and couldn’t pass the physical.

Well, he felt discriminated against because of, as he said, all the little hollow-chested fellows they were taking and they rejected him. So it is hard to know how to please 

people. It is hard to know which way discrimination works.

MR. HODGES: Well, Your Honor, may I comment on that? The way I view it, 

the man with discriminating taste is the man who is very selective.

THE COURT: That’s right, and this is the Selective Service Act. They select some 

and reject some.

MR. HODGES: We are trying to prove they deliberately selected white people 

to serve on these boards and by doing so they have discriminated against our client.

THE COURT: And they deliberately select physicians and dentists and veterinarians and people with other qualifications.

MR. HODGES: In Alabama 275 board members, and not one is a Negro. I think 

Alabama is 40% Negro.

THE COURT: Yes.

MR. COVINGTON: I would like to just mention what the President found here. 

He says, “Unquestionably in the field of Selective Boards in the draft machinery—

there has been discrimination against minority groups.”

Those are his words. Based in this—

THE COURT: Do you know anyone who doesn’t belong to a minority, one or 

more minority groups?

MR. COVINGTON: Well, Your Honor, I can’t say that I can answer that categorically. All I can say is our purpose at this moment is to try to prove this defense 

that we have to the indictment, that there has been discrimination. . . .

Your Honor, the only way that we can make our defense is to see the documents 

and to make the inspection and do the copying of the material on which this 

report was made, and I think that our request to have the discovery and inspection 

reconsidered is—

THE COURT: Well, how would you know when you had everything that went 

into making the report?

MR. COVINGTON: Well, we would take it that the Government has preserved—I 

mean the Commission has preserved the records that they developed in which the 

report was made, and it would be a simple matter to make these available in this case.

THE COURT: What says the prosecution?

MR. SUSMAN: We object to it, Your Honor. First of all, the report and all the 

accompanying evidence would be rank hearsay. It wouldn’t have any place in a 
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United States v. Clay: Muhammad Ali’s Fight Against the Vietnam Draft

Court of Law. This is more a matter for a congressional committee or a presidential 

committee. It is a fishing expedition, it is not covered by Rule 16.

Rule 16 relates to evidence in the hands of the Government or under the Government’s control. This is a presidential commission. It is hardly considered under 

the control of the Department of Justice.

On the face of the motion it is not relevant or material to any issues in this case. 

We discussed fully this morning discrimination. I think we all agreed when someone 

is drafted and someone else is not drafted someone might feel discrimination. When 

someone is appointed to an appointive position someone is left out, and they feel 

discriminated against.

I think counsel has his record. He has made a record and if we get to that point 

the Court’s decision can be tested. This is getting pretty far afield from trying Cassius 

Clay.

THE COURT: I agree, and the objection is sustained.

Posttrial Testimony of Muhammad Ali, July 7, 1967

Ali did not testify during his trial but did take the stand shortly after his conviction 

in support of a motion to permit him to leave the United States to fight in Japan. 

These excerpts from his testimony suggest both the strength of his convictions and 

the legal difficulties those convictions posed.

[Document Source: Transcript of Proceedings, The United States v. Cassius 

Marsellus Clay, Jr. Also known as Muhammad Ali, May 8, 1967; Case no. 67H94, 

Criminal Case Files, 1908-1979 (48SO69A); Records of the United States District 

Courts for the Southern District of Texas, Record Group 21; National Archives 

at Fort Worth, Texas, folder 4.]

BY MR. HODGES:

Q: State your name for the record.

A: Muhammad Ali.

Q: You are also known in this case as Cassius Clay, Jr.?

A: Yes, sir.

. . .

Q: And your avocation is that of a professional boxer?

A: Yes, sir.

. . .

Q: Did you have any other source of income other than fighting?
United States v. Clay: Muhammad Ali’s Fight Against the Vietnam Draft

66

A: No, sir.

. . .

Q: I hand you what has been marked Defendant’s Exhibit Number 2 and I ask 

you if this is a photocopy of a letter agreement between Main Bout, Inc., actually between you through your manager and the Art Life Association of Tokyo, 

which provides that if you are granted permission by this Court to leave the 

country you must first fight under the auspices of that promoter?

A: Yes, sir. That is it.

Q: . . . [A]re you able to arrange the fight, get the promotion without the permission of the Court first?

A: No, sir.

. . .

Q: Now, do you have any purpose at all for leaving the continental United States 

other than to engage in one boxing enterprise and come back immediately? . . .

A: No, sir.

Q: Tell the Court that if the Court will grant you this written permission to leave 

the country, tell the Court in your own words that you will go directly to where 

the Court permits you to go for the period of time the Court permits you to 

go and come directly back during the period of time the Court might see fit. 

I want you to tell the Court that you will do that if the Court will grant you 

permission.

A: Well, Your Honor, I was told the other day that someone thought I might be 

intending to flee the country or make bad remarks about the country, which is 

not so. I will be willing to report daily to an American Embassy of whichever 

country we go to to show how I feel. I would have no reason to flee the country 

or leave America or say bad things about it. Not one word will come from me 

on such.

. . .

Q: The Government has filed in reply to your motion that they are concerned 

that you might flee the jurisdiction of the Court. In your motion have you advised the Court that subject to the Court’s order that any monies that are paid 

to you for your fighting will be paid in this country in trust or in escrow?

A: Yes, sir.

Q: And have you further asked the Court to consider those monies as additional 
67

United States v. Clay: Muhammad Ali’s Fight Against the Vietnam Draft

bail, supplementing your regular bail, conditioned upon your physical return 

to the United Sates.

A: Yes, sir.

Q: You are willing to do this?

A: Yes, sir.

Q: You do own property in this country?

A: Yes, sir.

Q: And you understand should you flee the country that property would be subject to confiscation by the Government?

A: Yes, sir.

. . .

BY MR. SUSMAN:

Q: Is it true you have traveled to Japan in past years?

A: No, sir.

Q: You have never been to Japan?

A: No, sir.

Q: Have you been to Egypt?

A: Yes, sir.

. . .

Q: Who invited you to Egypt?

A: Some Islamic Council, religious group.

Q: They are your friends?

A: Sir?

Q: You know those people and have friendly relations?

A: Yes, sir.

Q: Is it true that . . . several years ago you made the public announcement that you 

would like to fight on the Egyptian side?

A: No, sir.

Q: You deny making that statement?

A: Yes, sir.

Q: Now, it was reported in the newspaper in the last day or so that you have 

signed or autographed draft cards, is that correct?
United States v. Clay: Muhammad Ali’s Fight Against the Vietnam Draft

68

A: Yes, sir.

Q: Where was that?

A: In California.

Q: What part of California?

A: Los Angeles, for the students that handed me a couple of them.

Q: Was that at a big rally?

A: I don’t know what it was. I was invited. It was called a peace rally. I was invited to say a few words. I didn’t talk on none of the war problems, I just talked 

about boxing.

Q: Isn’t it true that you did sign draft cards of some of the students?

A: Yes, sir.

Q: Is it true that they subsequently at that rally burned the draft cards?

A: No, sir. I did not see that.

Q: Did you see that?

A: No, I’m sure they didn’t.

. . .

Q: Did you say that was at a peace rally?

A: Yes, sir.

Q: By that you mean it was a demonstration against the war in Vietnam?

A: I don’t exactly know what it was. I was invited to say a few words and I stayed 

five minutes and left. They wanted me to march, but I left.

. . .

Q: Have you ever participated in burning a draft card?

A: No, sir.

Q: Now, isn’t it correct that you have made statements as to the fact that you have 

no quarrel with the Viet Cong and you would refuse to fight against them?

A: This was a few years ago, yes, sir. At the time I was wrong. I admit saying that 

but it was out of place, but I did say it.

. . .

Q: Now, you understand you have been convicted and sentenced to five years in 

prison?
69

United States v. Clay: Muhammad Ali’s Fight Against the Vietnam Draft

A: Yes, sir.

Q: Am I correct in assuming you had rather not go to prison?

A: Yes, sir.

Q: You now have a valid United States passport, do you not?

A: Yes, sir.

Q: I can’t understand why you went to this peace rally and signed the draft cards 

if it was not for the purpose of encouraging those people in doing what you 

have done in avoiding the draft?

A: No, sir. I made it known to all the cameras and the networks that my being 

here is not to encourage you, and whatever you do is with your own conscience and you will pay the penalty. I told them I’m not here to lead you, I’m 

here as an athlete and sports figure, and I’m glad to be here. I understand this 

is a peace rally and there wouldn’t be no violence when you did march. They 

wanted me to lead and I said, “I’m not leading or encouraging nobody.” That 

is on tape, I told them that.

Q: You knew what a peace rally was and you went and signed draft cards?

A: I didn’t go to sign draft cards. I imagine I signed nine or ten hundred autographs and one or two happened to be a draft card and they took pictures of it 

and blowed that up. One of them was just a card and I didn’t know what it was.

Q: You deny making the statement that the New York Times reported that you 

would fight on the side of the Egyptians?

A: Yes, I deny that, yes, sir.

Q: Is there any other country you would be willing to fight for besides the United 

States?

A: I’m not in no other country. I have no reason to fight any other country.

. . .

Q: Can you honestly tell the Court that you don’t have a greater loyalty to the 

Muslim countries than you do to the United States?

A: Sir?

Q: Your religion is the Muslim religion?

A: To my people in America, first to the people here in America, my people who 

are struggling for freedom, justice and equality. I am not a citizen of no country other than America.

. . .
United States v. Clay: Muhammad Ali’s Fight Against the Vietnam Draft

70

Q: You are personally opposed to the war in Vietnam?

A: Not only Vietnam, but any war, I’m not just picking on Vietnam, but any war.

Q: Didn’t you tell Judge Hannay that you would fight if there were holy wars[?]

A: No, sir. I was mentioning that the Holy Koran mentions that we fight in wars 

declared by Almighty God or a prophet of God, but I’m sure there will be no 

holy wars around here.

Q: Do you recall Judge Hannay asking you which side you would be on if it was a 

war between the Communists and the United States, which side would you be 

on?

A: Naturally I would be against Communism and whoever is fighting against 

them.

Q: I thought you told Judge Hannay you would be neutral?

A: If Communism was coming into America and fighting us, but as far as joining 

up with anyone I would be neutral. If we were attacked and they came in here, 

naturally I would have to fight for my own life.

Q: You mean under those circumstances you would be willing to go into the 

army?

A: Well, if something like that happened I would be forced to, yes, sir, if they attacked us. If there was any army to help keep them out of this country.

Q: Why was it you were not willing to go into the army on April 28th?

MR. HODGES: I think that is immaterial, Your Honor.

THE COURT: Sir?

MR. HODGES: I objected on the grounds of immateriality and irrelevancy as to why.

THE COURT: Overruled.

Q: . . . [Y]ou say now that you would be willing to fight if the Communists were 

invading this country—

A: If this country was physically attacked and we were all in trouble, everybody’s 

religion and belief means nothing.

Q: Don’t you realize we have half a million soldiers in Vietnam now fighting 

against Communism.

A: I don’t know that’s what they were fighting against. I’m talking about coming 

here. I wouldn’t have to join nothing, I would just pick up a rifle and fight if 

they attacked us.

Q: You are willing to serve in the armed forces now?
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United States v. Clay: Muhammad Ali’s Fight Against the Vietnam Draft

A: Anything against my religious beliefs, yes, sir.

Q: You claim this is against your religious beliefs?

A: We don’t believe in being the aggressor. We believe in defending ourselves if 

attacked, that is the way it really is. That is what we are taught. We don’t believe 

in being the aggressor, but defending ourselves if we are attacked.

Q: Haven’t you made statements that you are sympathetic with the Viet Cong?

A: No, sir.

Q: Well, the newspapers have said that.

A: They lied, sir. They lie all the time at me. I didn’t say that.

Q: What did you say about that?

A: I didn’t say nothing about it.

Q: How do you feel about it?

A: I don’t know why you have to put words in my mouth. I was just wanting 

permission to go to Japan and box. I’m not going to run away. I’ll answer your 

questions to the best of my knowledge, but you could ask me a lot[.]

Q: I think your loyalty to the United Sates is on that—

A: My basis on what I’m doing is my religious beliefs, and anybody who studies the Holy Koran. I’m not bucking or talking against the country. I’m just 

sticking to my religious beliefs. I’m not saying I don’t like the country, but I’m 

standing up for my religious belief.

Q: Do you think that the war in Vietnam is a war against Communism?

A: I tell you the honest to God truth, I don’t know nothing about it.

. . .

Q: You said a moment ago you would be willing to fight against Communism?

A: I didn’t say that. I said that if America was attacked, if it’s Communism or who 

it is attacking America, I would have to fight.

Q: You don’t believe the war in Vietnam is a war to protect America?

A: I don’t know. I’m not a politician. I don’t know nothing about Vietnam or 

nothing. I would be lying to you. I swore and took an oath to tell the truth.

. . .

BY MR. HODGES:

Q: . . . Among other things, Mr. Susman said that you had rather not go to prison. 

None of us would want to go to prison. Did you not tell me the day that the 
United States v. Clay: Muhammad Ali’s Fight Against the Vietnam Draft

72

jury was out that you were ready to go that day, that night, when we were sitting up in the Clerk’s office?

A: Yes, sir.

Q: Did you tell Mr. Covington and me that?

A: Yes, sir.

Q: All right. Now, as far as this no quarrel—

THE COURT: We could accommodate him if that is what he 

wants and commit him now.

MR. HODGES: Certain statements were made during the discussion, but he was demonstrating his sincerity to us 

that if this is what the Court wants and the country wants, he’ll do it. We explained to him his legal rights as to that.

Q: I want to ask you a question as an expert. You are and have been and still 

are in the eyes of many people the heavyweight champion of the world. I am 

assuming you are qualified to testify on professional boxing. Could you get 

anybody of any substance to fight you abroad if you went abroad and fleed the 

jurisdiction and were branded by this country a fugitive?

A: No, sir.

Q: All right. Are you still recognized as the heavyweight champion of the world in 

many countries?

A: Yes, sir.

Q: If you did leave this country and jump your bond or bail, do you as an expert 

in this field—would you tell the Court whether or not you could get anybody 

to fight you that would bring a gate big enough to make it worthwhile?

A: I think that leaving this wealthy, good, comfortable country just to box in some 

poor, swampy country that’s being take care of by America—even if I did go 

to prison here and serve the full limit I would just be thirty years old when I 

came out and be free—I would be crazy to spend the rest of my life in another 

country with twenty-two million Negroes, which I dearly love, and be considered a coward in leaving the country when I could do three years or five years 

and then I’d be free, I’d be crazy to leave the country for life just for that.

. . .

BY MR. SUSMAN:

Q: . . . [D]idn’t you make a statement at your trial here last month that you would 

never see a day in prison?
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United States v. Clay: Muhammad Ali’s Fight Against the Vietnam Draft

A: Sir? No, sir. That statement was made by Hayden Covington and my manager 

didn’t like him. We criticized him for it. It only proved that the Court could 

make us go just for saying it. He said two or three times that I would never see 

the inside of jail cell, but it never came from me.

Q: Do you know the only way you can avoid seeing the inside of a federal court is 

to run off ?

A: No, sir. There is justice. I’m sincere in my faith and ministry. If the Supreme 

Court grants me permission we won’t have to go. I don’t think it is right to say 

that we won’t see the jail when we are still before the Court. I think there is a 

possibility. Then if I do, I will just have to go.

. . .

Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit Opinion in Clay v. 

United States

This opinion rejected the initial appeal from Ali’s criminal conviction for draft 

evasion and covers issues such as Ali’s allegations of systematic bias in the draft 

system and a lack of procedural protections during the trial itself. After the court 

denied each of these claims, Ali appealed to the Supreme Court of the United 

States, which sent the case back to the trial court on other grounds. Internal citations have been omitted where appropriate, as have sections of the opinion dealing 

with evidentiary matters and Ali’s claim that the lack of judicial review accorded 

Selective Service System decisions amounted to a bill of attainder. Citations have 

been omitted.

[Document Source: 397 F.2d 901 (1968).]

AINSWORTH, Circuit Judge:

. . .

Cassius Marsellus Clay, Jr., also known as Muhammad Ali, heavyweight professional boxing champion of the world, was convicted after trial by jury on an 

indictment charging violation of 50 U.S.C. App. § 462, for knowingly and willfully 

refusing to report for and submit to induction into the armed forces of the United 

States. Clay’s draft case has been through practically every phase of selective service 

procedure, beginning with the date he registered on April 18, 1960, until he was 

ordered to report but declined to submit to induction on April 28, 1967, and was 

thereafter convicted by jury trial held on June 19, 20, 1967. On four different occasions 

he was classified 1-A (Available for military service) by his local board, twice by two 

different appeal boards (in Kentucky and Texas) and once by the National Selective 
United States v. Clay: Muhammad Ali’s Fight Against the Vietnam Draft

74

Service Appeal Board (the Presidential Appeal Board). In every instance the vote of 

the boards was unanimous.

There has been no administrative process which Clay (Ali) has not sought within the Selective Service System, its local and appeal boards, the Presidential Appeal 

Board and finally the federal courts, in an unsuccessful attempt to evade and escape 

from military service of his country. Being entirely satisfied that he has been fairly 

accorded due process of law, and without discrimination, we affirm his conviction.

. . .

I. THE ALLEGED SYSTEMATIC EXCLUSION OF NEGROES FROM 

SELECTIVE SERVICE BOARDS

. . .

[T]he racial composition of the local and appeal boards about which appellant 

complains, because of the absence of a proportion of Negroes in accordance with 

their ratio to the population, results from appointment by the President upon recommendation of the governor of each state. . . .

. . . It was stipulated in the present record that one of the three members of the 

Presidential Appeal Board was a Negro. However, there was no Negro member on 

any of the local or appeal boards which considered appellant’s draft case.

According to the report of the National Advisory Commission on Selective Service 

(the Marshall Commission), in Kentucky, only 0.2% of 641 local board members is 

Negro, though 7.1% of the total population is Negro. In Texas, only 1.1% of local 

board members is Negro, though 12.4% of the total population is Negro. In the City 

of Louisville, the total population (1964) is 389,044, of which the white population 

is 310,717 and the Negro population 78,245, or 21% of the total population. The 

Jefferson County, Kentucky, total population (1960) number 610,947, of which there 

are 532,057 whites and 78,350 Negroes, or 12.8% of the total population. In Harris 

County, Texas, of a total population of 1,243,158, 19.81%, or 246,351, is Negro.

According to the Marshall Commission Report, the unequal percentage of 

Negroes on draft boards was not peculiar to Kentucky, Texas or the South, but the 

imbalance was nationwide. Only in the District of Columbia and in Delaware were 

there substantial percentages of Negroes on the boards. In twenty-three states, there 

were no Negroes on draft boards, the Report stated.

Nevertheless the Marshall Commission said significantly in its report, “There is 

no evidence that the variability of the Selective Service System leads to any systematic 

biases against poor people, or Negroes, insofar as the final proportion of men serving 

in the Armed Forces is a measure of this.”

. . .

Appellant argues that the quoted statistics evidence racial exclusion in the composition of draft boards, in violation of the Fifth Amendment. . . . He concludes that 
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United States v. Clay: Muhammad Ali’s Fight Against the Vietnam Draft

if systematic exclusion of Negroes is constitutionally barred in the composition of 

juries, their exclusion in the Selective Service System likewise infringes his rights 

and requires a holding that draft boards, such as those in Kentucky and Texas which 

considered appellant’s case, have no jurisdiction over appellant or in fact over any 

Negro. Thus he argues that the local boards have acted beyond their jurisdiction 

and may not act as to that class of registrants (including appellant) against whom 

it is claimed the appointing process has discriminated. Appellant concedes that 

considerable progress in rectifying this disparity in the several states has been made 

since the President’s March 6, 1967, message to Congress on Selective Service, but 

contends that Negroes should not be selected in the future until the alleged systematic 

exclusion of members of that race from draft boards has ceased.

. . .

. . . We do not justify the failure to include substantial numbers of Negroes on 

[draft] boards. The Selective Service System must not only be fair, it must likewise 

have the appearance of fairness. Negro draftees should be selected for military 

service by a system which gives Negro citizens a full participation in the selection 

process. The Marshall Commission affirmed the necessity of greater participation 

by Negroes who are underrepresented as a class on local draft boards. The Commission said that the Negro’s position in the military manpower situation is in many 

ways disproportionate, even though he does not serve in the armed forces out of 

proportion to his percentage to the population. The President in his March 6, 1967, 

message to Congress said in this regard: “The Nation’s requirement that men must 

serve, however, imposes this obligation: that in this land of equals, men are selected 

as equals to serve. A just nation must have the fairest system that can be devised for 

making that selection.” We concur with these remarks to the fullest. But nothing we 

have said justifies exemption from service in the armed forces for Negro registrants.

It is undeniable, as appellant contends, that conscription deprives an individual 

of his liberty and may even take his life. But we cannot properly compare the military 

draft to a criminal prosecution. There is no stigma attached to wearing the military 

uniform of the United States. To the contrary, it is a badge of the highest honor. 

Service under the flag of our country cannot properly be likened to imprisonment 

in a penitentiary. A proud nation with a long tradition of valor and bravery on the 

battlefield, with vivid memories in modern times of distant places . . . where Americans have fought and died to preserve freedom, would never permit a comparison so 

odious. It is the same willingness of Americans to sacrifice their lives in the military 

service of the country which has made it possible to establish the United States as a 

free nation, and which has successfully warded off the encroachments of its enemies. 

“The knowledge that military service must sometimes be borne by—and imposed 

on—free men so their freedom may be preserved is woven deeply into the fabric of 
United States v. Clay: Muhammad Ali’s Fight Against the Vietnam Draft

76

the American experience.” President Johnson, Message on Selective Service to the 

Congress, March 6, 1967.

. . .

Nor is appellant’s argument meritorious that composition of draft boards is 

similar to that of grand and petit juries. The right to trial by jury has specific constitutional authority. However, nothing in the Constitution or the Universal Military 

Training and Service Act requires racially proportionate selective service boards. . . 

. The boards are administrative agencies with specific duties, many of them purely 

ministerial, which are provided for by the Act and Selective Service Regulations. A 

jury’s verdict arrived at by secret deliberation has a finality which is not at all applicable to selective service classification and induction. As we shall see, draft board 

appeals are considered de novo and are not judicial proceedings.

The war powers of Congress to raise and support armies are constitutionally 

authorized and are of paramount public importance because they directly involve 

the protection and preservation of the nation itself. . . . It has been long established 

that there is no constitutional right to exemption from military service by virtue of 

conscientious objection or religious calling. These exemptions do not spring from 

the Constitution but from the Congress. . . .

. . .

. . . Any error or invalidity in the selective service procedures up to and including 

the Presidential Appeal Board was cured by de novo consideration by that board 

which acted in the place and stead of the President himself. One third of the membership of the Presidential Appeal Board (one of three) was a Negro, which is obviously 

a greater proportion than Negroes bear to the total population. The decision of the 

board was unanimous that appellant should be classified 1-A, which action thereby 

cleared the way for his induction into the armed forces. Nowhere in the record in this 

case or in appellant’s brief do we find any specific charge or evidence of discrimination against appellant because he is a Negro. There are conclusory allegations that 

the absence of Negroes from local and appeal boards (other than the Presidential 

Appeal Board) in and of itself establishes discrimination. But we have been unable to 

find any evidence which shows in the slightest particular that the treatment accorded 

Clay (Ali) by any board or member thereof was different from that given to any other 

registrant. Afforded every procedure known to the Act and the regulations, and an 

appeal to the Presidential Appeal Board to which he was not specifically entitled, 

appellant’s refusal of induction and subsequent trial and conviction by a jury are the 

result of his own voluntary choice to violate the law of the land.

. . .
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United States v. Clay: Muhammad Ali’s Fight Against the Vietnam Draft

III. DENIAL OF THE MINISTERIAL EXEMPTION

Scope of Review. In considering the propriety of appellant’s classification, and the 

denial of a ministerial exemption and conscientious objector status, we must keep 

in mind that the Act provides that decisions of the local boards are final.

. . .

[T]he scope of review of local board decisions in draft cases is very limited and 

the range of review is the narrowest known to the law.

. . . Congress gave the courts no general authority of revision over draft board 

proceedings, and we have authority to reverse only if there is a denial of basic procedural fairness or if the conclusion of the board is without any basis in fact.

. . .

The Ministerial Exemption. We turn now to the question of the denial of a ministerial exemption to appellant who claims to be a minister of the Lost Found Nation of 

Islam (Black Muslims). The Act provides that regular or duly ordained ministers of 

religion shall be exempt from service. 

“The term ‘regular minister of religion’ means one who as his customary vocation preaches and teaches the principles of religion of a church, a religious sect, or 

organization of which he is a member, without having been formally ordained as a 

minister of religion, and who is recognized by such church, sect, or organization as 

a regular minister.”

. . . Each registrant must satisfy the Act’s rigid criteria for the exemption. Preaching and teaching the principles of one’s sect, if performed part-time or half-time, 

occasionally or irregularly, are insufficient to bring a registrant under § 6(g). These 

activities must be regularly performed. They must, as the statute reads, comprise the 

registrant’s ‘vocation.’ And since the ministerial exemption is a matter of legislative 

grace, the selective service registrant bears the burden of clearly establishing a right 

to the exemption.”

. . .

Appellant was certified as a minister by the National Secretary of the Lost Found 

Nation of Islam and by its leader, Elijah Muhammad. He contends that he spends 

90% of his time on his ministerial duties. He submitted 43 affidavits and documents 

said to contain the signatures of 3,612 people testifying to his ministerial activities. 

Finally he states that there was no evidence in his file upon which a “basis in fact” 

could be found to support his 1-A classification by the board. We are unable to 

agree with his statements or contentions. The file indicates that appellant joined his 

religious sect in January 1964. He has apparently earned his living as a professional 

boxer for a number of years and became professional heavyweight boxing champion 

of the world on February 25, 1964. Some years earlier he had won the world light 
United States v. Clay: Muhammad Ali’s Fight Against the Vietnam Draft

78

heavyweight boxing championship at the Olympics at Rome. He contends that he 

became a minister of the Muslims in early 1964. In the first information which he 

supplied to his local board on selective service forms, his occupation was shown to 

be that of “professional boxer” and “professional prizefighter.” The Report of Medical 

History dated January 24, 1964 showed his usual occupation to be “boxing.” During 

all this time he made numerous trips to foreign countries to engage in professional 

bouts which he stated required daily physical training and exercise in preparation 

for these prizefights. His Current Information Questionnaire dated February 2, 

1966 listed his occupation as a “professional boxer” and his work as “professional 

fighting.” Then, on February 17, 1966, the eventful and important date in this case, 

his 1-Y classification was changed by the local board to 1-A. Clay (Ali) had never 

stated to his board or claimed to be a minister or a conscientious objector prior to 

that time. He wrote Local Board No. 47 on February 14, 1966, just three days prior 

to his reclassification that “My occupation is professional boxer, and I am at present the Heavyweight Champion of the World.” Even when he filled out the Special 

Form for Conscientious Objector dated February 28, 1966, though claiming to be a 

member of the Nation of Islam, he did not claim to be a minister. His letter of March 

17, 1966 to Local Board No. 47 protested that his reclassification imposed “grave 

hardship upon me as heavyweight champion of the world at now age 24.” When he 

appeared in person before Local Board No. 47 on March 19, 1966, boxing was listed 

as his livelihood. The evidence which the local board had before it was much more 

than necessary to constitute a “basis in fact” for his 1-A classification and denial of 

the ministerial exemption. His vocation is clearly that of a professional boxer.

IV. DENIAL OF CONSCIENTIOUS OBJECTOR STATUS

Appellant’s claim that he is a conscientious objector began on February 18, 1966, 

one day after his reclassification to 1-A, at which time he was furnished the Special 

Form for Conscientious Objector. He was granted a personal appearance before 

Local Board No. 47 on March 19, 1966, pursuant to his request. The board’s record 

of that appearance reflects that he claimed hardship on account of taking care of 

his parents and paying alimony to his former wife. The board’s record states, “His 

religion teaches them not to take part in any way with infidels or any nonreligious 

group. They fight only in self-defense, not war. Boxing is considered his livelihood.” 

Also, “Clay objects to being in service because he has no quarrel with the Viet Cong. 

Clay stated that he could not, without being a hypocrite [sic], take part in anything 

such as war or anything that is against the Moslim religion.” He wrote a lengthy letter 

to his local board dated April 16, 1966, in which he repeated his hardship request as 

the sole support of his mother and on account of having to pay alimony to his first 

wife. He protested that two years of military service would cause him serious financial loss in being unable to pursue his livelihood as a professional boxer. The local 
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United States v. Clay: Muhammad Ali’s Fight Against the Vietnam Draft

board nevertheless reaffirmed the 1-A classification and the registrant appealed to 

the appeal board. On May 6, 1966, the complete file was reviewed by the Kentucky 

Board of Appeals which tentatively determined that the registrant should not be 

classified in Class 1-O (conscientious objector) or in a lower class.

The Department of Justice then requested a Federal Bureau of Investigation 

investigation and a special hearing on the character and good faith of the conscientious objections of the registrant. The special hearing was held on August 23, 1966, 

at Louisville, Kentucky, before former Circuit Judge Lawrence Grauman as hearing 

officer. The hearing officer reported to the Department of Justice that the registrant 

stated his views in a convincing manner, answered all questions forthrightly, that he 

was impressed by the statements, believed the registrant was of good character, morals 

and integrity and sincere in his objection on religious grounds to participation in war 

in any form. He recommended that his conscientious objector claim be sustained. 

However, the Department of Justice in a detailed and comprehensive letter opposed 

his claim and recommended to the Kentucky Board of Appeals that it not be sustained. 

The Department of Justice concluded that registrant’s objections to participation 

in war insofar as they are based upon the teachings of the Nation of Islam “rest on 

grounds which are primarily political and racial. These constitute objections to only 

certain types of war in certain circumstances, rather than a general scruple against 

participation in war in any form.” The Department of Justice pointed out that only 

a general scruple against participation in war in any form can support a claim for 

conscientious objector status. The Department of Justice said that the registrant had 

not consistently manifested his conscientious objector claim and had not shown overt 

manifestations sufficient to establish his subjective belief where his claim was not 

asserted until military service became imminent, not having been made at all prior 

to being reclassified 1-A in February 1966. Numerous statements by the registrant 

made from time to time were quoted by the Department of Justice in justification of 

its recommendation against the registrant’s conscientious objector claim.

. . .

Whether the registrant’s beliefs are “truly held” is the threshold question of sincerity which must be resolved by the board. The “basis in fact” test applied to the 

conscientious objector claim of registrant was fully met in this case. There was more 

than adequate evidence to justify the rejection of his claim.

. . .

The conviction and sentence are, therefore, affirmed.
United States v. Clay: Muhammad Ali’s Fight Against the Vietnam Draft

80

Leonard Schecter, “The Passion of Muhammad Ali” 

(1968)

This excerpted long-form feature on Ali, written during the appeal process when 

Ali was banned from boxing and apparently assumed he would be imprisoned, 

attempts to outline the boxer’s inimitable personality and complex beliefs.

[Document Source: Esquire, April 1968, 126.]

The ex-heavyweight champion of the world fools around in Chicago these days, more 

or less in exile, because he won’t go. He isn’t kidding.

. . .

Muhammad Ali, shirtless, dressed in jeans and chukka boots, sat in the corner of 

his blue velvet couch. He ran his hands over his milk-chocolate torso, caressing, 

slapping, pinching the new flesh around his middle. The color television, set into a 

marble fireplace opposite him in this narrow living room, was tuned to a morning 

game show. He had used the remote-control gadget to turn the sound off but the 

animated lollipops on the screen continued their mindless charade. His eyes, big 

and brown, kept drifting back to the screen. He was talking about how busy he was.

. . .

The expression on his face turned to one of bemused pain. His handsome face, 

unmarked but for a thin white scar in his left eyebrow (the result of a childhood 

accident), is as mobile as that of a rubber puppet and he tugs and twists at it to underline emotion. When he is surprised his eyes pop out of his head and show white 

all around the pupil. When he is sad, his face collapses and one can almost see the 

tears forming. When he is happy his face glows like a pinball machine and his even 

white teeth gleam free games. He uses his voice the way he does his face; he never 

merely quotes anybody, he imitates. He drops it and whispers, he raises it to sound 

like a woman. He straightens up and tightens his throat and enunciates his g’s and 

d’s and he sounds like a white man. He is a performer and he glances often at the 

mirrored wall behind the fireplace to see how he’s coming across.

“It’s impossible for me to dry up and have nothing to do,” he is saying. “I mean I 

just don’t represent boxing. I’m taking a stand for what I believe in and being one 

thousand percent for the freedom of the black people. Naturally those who have the 

same fight, but on a smaller scale, they come to me,” and here he whispers, “‘You 

speak for me, too, brother, you speak for me too. I make my money from Charley 

but I’m with you. Man, I just jump and shout every time I see you tell them.’” Now 
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United States v. Clay: Muhammad Ali’s Fight Against the Vietnam Draft

he raises his voice again. “So I got hundreds of places to go and talk and I’ll always 

have them as long as I’m talking for freedom.”

Ah, freedom. He now is free to talk. He used to be free to fight and he was something 

to see, the speed of him and the beauty of his motion, his huge, smooth body gliding 

in a ballet of boxing, his white ring shoes becoming a furry flurr. He was perhaps the 

best anybody has ever seen, because he had the modern athlete’s body, as swift as it 

was large, and no boxer ever had one like it before. But then a sergeant in a Houston 

Selective Service office asked him to take a step forward and he refused because, he 

said, he was a minister of the Muslim faith in the Nation of Islam. The boxing commission revoked his title as heavyweight champion of the world. Rumors started, 

around the fight business first and then in newspapers. Rumor: he was stony-broke, 

living on heaven knows what, and what had happened to his money? Rumor: he had 

earned more than two million dollars in the ring—his gross earnings as a champion 

were probably twice that, except that fifty percent is conceded to his managers—but 

his co-religionists had stolen it, extorted it, conned him out of it. Rumor: and guess 

who put up the $135,000 for a mosque in Miami?

“I’ll tell you one thing about that,” Muhammad Ali said. Then he told a lot of things. 

They poured out of him like one of his sermons, most of which he excerpts from 

Message to the Blackman by Elijah Muhammad, the self-anointed Messenger of Allah. 

“Many reporters and many people ask me, they say, ‘Champion, how you gonna live? 

Champion, how you eating? How you gonna make it?’ I have this to say to all the 

reporters and all the critics who want to know why I don’t fall and when I’m gonna 

fall. They seem to want to see that. The power structure seems to want to starve me 

out. I mean the punishment, five years in jail, ten-thousand-dollar fine, ain’t enough. 

They want to stop me from working, not only in the country but out of it. Not even 

a license to fight an exhibition for charity. And that’s in this twentieth century. You 

read about these things in the dictatorship countries where a man don’t go along 

with this thing or that and he is completely not allowed to work or to earn a decent 

living. So this is my position. I rely on Allah. I leave it up to Allah. I believe that there 

is no God but Allah and I believe Elijah Muhammad is his own true messenger and 

I’m standing up for my religion and my salvation. If it means suffer, if it means get 

out of the house, give up the cars, I’ll do it. Just give me a pair of blue jeans and a 

leather jacket, give me a stick with a rag on the back with some food in it and say, 

Get on the railroad tracks, and I will do it. I believe that Allah would lead me to a 

gold mine on the train. I might find a million-dollar bill.”

. . .

He has been saying this sort of thing for years and finally it is apparent that he believes 

it. He is burning with fervor. He might even believe that Allah, if not the judicial 
United States v. Clay: Muhammad Ali’s Fight Against the Vietnam Draft

82

system, will save him from prison. “I am looking for Allah to do something,” he says. 

“I am his servant. Allah, they’re punishing your servant.”

Not all the Muslims are this fervent. Says Herbert Muhammad, one of Elijah Muhammad’s eight children and a man who acts as Muhammad Ali’s manager: “Yes, we 

believe Allah will provide. We also believe that Allah helps those who help themselves.”

. . .

I wondered if anybody had encouraged him, offered him a deal perhaps, told him if 

he would just go into the Army he could spend two years entertaining troops, fighting 

exhibitions and the like.

“Every day,” he said. “Everybody. Wherever I go. Businessmen. Black and white. They 

all tell me that. But we don’t take part in no war regardless of who America is fighting.”

I pointed out that pacifism could hardly be part of his religion. Moslems had been 

fighting, often fiercely, for centuries.

“Well, if it was their country at war, like if I was an Egyptian or Arabian or Sudanesian 

and I lived there and it was under attack, well naturally you’d fight.”

He added that he had been urged to protest on grounds other than his religion. “Every day people call me and say, ‘Why don’t you make a protest?’ Joe Namath ain’t 

in. He’s playing football on TV every weekend. George Hamilton ain’t in. He has to 

support his mother and he has twelve bathrooms in the house. Negroes want me to 

say these things. Why should I? If two men rob a bank and I get caught, how come 

I should say, Well, you didn’t get George. We roll the dice, we’ll finish the game.

“Look, the government is nice enough to let me out on bond and travel the country. 

They could confine me to Houston if they want to. So I’m not going to get up and 

talk against the country and do all that protesting. I’m at their mercy.”

If this sounds contradictory, it’s only because it is. On the one hand, he says the 

government is nice to let him travel. And on the other he adds: “You got airplanes 

worth eight million dollars apiece taking off every minute on the minute. You’re just 

loaded with wealth and bus lines and farmland, and one little Negro, who wasn’t 

nothing, you fix it now he can’t make a dollar or two. Imagine, because he don’t go 

along with your way, and he’s not an Uncle Tom for you, the whole nation takes 

more press time with him than a plane crash with a hundred of your white people 

on it. See how devilish this makes this race look?”

On the one hand he says he has lost interest in boxing. “It’s a barbaric European 

sport,” he says in his haughtiest manner. “The more religious I get, the more I don’t 

miss it.” And on the other hand, when he catches a glimpse of himself in a mirror 
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United States v. Clay: Muhammad Ali’s Fight Against the Vietnam Draft

as he walks by, he’ll whirl, strike a fighting pose, and start throwing his lightning 

punches. “Pow, pow, pow!” he says. He likes the way it looks and the way it feels and 

he does roadwork to keep his belly in bounds. If he looks forward to anything at all, 

it’s climbing into the ring with the winner of the heavyweight elimination now being 

staged to replace him as champion. “Look, there’s the championship belt.” It was 

at the bottom of a small china cabinet in the dining room. “It ain’t worth a quarter. 

But it say I won the championship from Sonny Liston. What is it going to say on 

the belt of the other champion, that this title was taken from Muhammad Ali with 

a[n] ink pen?”

. . .

On the one hand he says, “What’s the use complaining? One man complains because 

he got no shoes. One man complains because he got no feet.” But he complains that 

the U.S. Government is trying to starve him into being an Uncle Tom and he complains about not being accepted as a minister of his faith. “My leader has recognized 

me as his minister,” he says. “It’s not for the white man to say this is not your servant, 

Allah. If Pope Paul wrote a letter over here tomorrow that said this man is my priest, 

what you think would happen? What you think would happen?”

. . .

We found ourselves going over some old ground about why he had decided to refuse 

to be drafted. He groped for a new analogy. “You’re Jewish,” he said, “right? Well, 

suppose you was the heavyweight champion of Germany and Germany was going 

to war against Israel and you had a chance to make ten million dollars leading the 

Germans against Israel. What would you do?”

Although it was a thoughtful, even disturbing analogy, I did not believe it quite held 

together. He would not, I said, could not, identify with the Vietnamese as closely as 

a German Jew would identify with Israel. He cheerfully conceded this was true and 

then went on to explain what he had told a delegation of well-known Negro athletes 

who had come to discuss his views with him and perhaps prevail upon him to accept 

military service. When they met, Muhammad Ali said that he would talk first and then 

he would answer questions. He talked for an hour. This is some of what he said: “I 

love my people. The little Negroes, they catching hell. They hungry. They raggedy. 

They getting beat up, shot, killed, just for asking for justice. They can’t eat no good 

food. They can’t get a job. They got no future. They was nothing but slaves and they 

the most hated people. They fought in all the wars, but they live in the worst houses, 

eat the worst food and pay the highest rent, the highest light bill, the highest gas bill. 

Now I’m the one’s catching hell, too. I could make millions if I led my people the 

wrong way, to something I know is wrong. So now I have to make a decision. Step 

into a billion dollars or step into poverty. Step into a billion dollars and denounce 
United States v. Clay: Muhammad Ali’s Fight Against the Vietnam Draft

84

my people or step into poverty and teach them the truth. Damn the money. Damn 

the heavyweight championship. Damn the white people. Damn everything. I will die 

before I sell out my people for the white man’s money.”

Muhammad Ali turned toward me, taking his eyes off the road. They were clear and 

luminous. His face was tight-lipped, serious. “They cried,” he said. “They put their 

head down and they said, ‘You’re right, we’re with you.’ And one of them said, ‘One 

day we might have to do the same thing. Would we be man enough to stand up for 

what we believe?’”

The important thing for Muhammad Ali, despite the hate he manages to engender, 

is to be loved. On the night before a fight he will walk through the Negro district, 

stopping to chat with people on stoops, sit on a garbage can and hold court for a 

large group of open-mouthed little boys and giggling girls. “My people love me,” 

he says, “because they know I gave up all I had for them.” But it’s equally true that 

Muhammad Ali needs their love.

. . .

There were two more things I wanted to discuss with him. I asked him what he wanted out of his life. He said that was easy. “All I want is to be a well-versed minister in 

the Islamic faith. I’d rather be that than have ten million in cash or be the greatest 

fighter in history. I’d rather live in one room with just enough food to eat and drive 

a Volkswagen and be a minister.”

The other thing had to do with something I remembered from a cold, grey morning 

while he was training to fight Zora Folley in New York. We had taken a taxi to the 

Central Park reservoir where he did his roadwork. Then, coming back to the hotel, 

his steamy bulk filling the front of the cab, he turned around suddenly. I was sitting 

in the back with James Ellis, his sparring partner, and Drew Brown, who had the 

unofficial title of assistant trainer. “They let you read the papers in jail?” he asked. 

It was then I knew for certain, although he had not yet announced it, that he would 

not accept induction, that he had made up his mind. And now I wanted to ask him 

how he felt, what he thought, now that he was faced with the reality of prison again, 

as he must have been, suddenly, on that cold morning.

“Who wants to go to jail?” he said. “I’m used to running around free like a little bird. 

In jail you got no wife, no freedom. You can’t eat what you want. I know I’ll get sick. 

Because I’m used to eating a certain way every day for six years. And now, being in 

prison every day, looking out of the cell, not seeing nobody. After getting so used to 

traveling around the country, different countries, eating good every day and sleeping good.” A slight pause. “And going off by yourself if you want. A man’s got to be 

serious in his beliefs to do that.”
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United States v. Clay: Muhammad Ali’s Fight Against the Vietnam Draft

Judge Ingraham’s Ruling on Wiretaps, June 6, 1969

After the Supreme Court remanded Ali’s case, along with several others, in 

Giordano v. United States (1969), Judge Ingraham conducted a lengthy hearing to 

determine whether illegally intercepted telephone conversations involving Ali had 

tainted the Department of Justice’s handing of his case. In the opinion excerpted 

below, he reasoned there was no evidence that DOJ lawyers were aware of the content of the calls and that the content itself was so innocuous that it could not have 

influenced their handling of the case in any event.

[Document Source: United States v. Clay, 386 F. Supp. 926 (1969).]

[T]he only manner in which the . . . conversations were argued relevant to the 

defendant’s conviction centered around the rejection of the defendant’s conscientious 

objector claim. This was a plausible argument, for if the recommendation by the 

Department of Justice to deny the claim was based upon illegally obtained evidence, 

the “basis in fact” which this court found for his classification would have been defective. Without such a “basis of fact,” the defendant could effectively challenge the 

jurisdiction of the draft board which classified him and ordered him to report for 

induction. The specific relevancy sought between the defendant’s classification and 

the overheard conversations involves the statement in the Department of Justice’s 

recommendation that “registrant’s objections to participation in war insofar as they 

are based upon the teachings of the Nation of Islam ‘rest on grounds which are primarily political and racial. These constitute objections to only certain types of war 

in certain circumstances, rather than a general scruple against participation in war 

in any form.’” The defendant attempted to show first, that because Log 2 reflects 

Elijah’s wish that Clay become a minister, and because Log 4 reflects Clay’s reference 

to ‘them whities’, the logs would have a bearing on the Department’s conclusion that 

the defendant’s beliefs were political and racial, rather than religious. He secondly 

attempted to demonstrate how this information was transmitted upward through 

F.B.I. channels, through the Department of Justice and into the recommendation, 

and back to the draft appeals board.

As to the second argument, that the information was used by the Department 

of Justice in making its recommendation, there was positive testimony that the logs 

were not used at all in the preparation of the report. Only the most strained construction of the cross-examination testimony would support a contrary finding. But the 

court need not reach this question, for it believes, and so holds, that the logs are so 

totally innocuous they could not have had any bearing on the defendant’s conviction 

under any circumstances. This is because, first, as regards Log 2, the Department of 

Justice’s duty was to submit a recommendation concerning the defendant’s status 

as a conscientious objector, not a minister. It is obvious that the Department could 

have, had it believed it was warranted, recommended that the defendant be granted 
United States v. Clay: Muhammad Ali’s Fight Against the Vietnam Draft

86

a conscientious objector deferment despite the fact that he was not a minister of his 

religion. Moreover, even if this issue had been before the Department, it is clear that 

the evidence that he was not a minister up to at least March 19, 1966, is overwhelming. Thus examining this log in a light most likely to demonstrate prejudice to the 

defendant, there is more than enough evidence to dispel possible taint. The conclusion 

that the defendant should not have been entitled to a ministerial exemption springs 

clearly from an “independent origin.”

Defendant’s attempt to link Log 4 to his conviction must similarly fail. To construe a passing reference to “them whities” as being the Department’s basis, or even 

partial reason, for holding the defendant’s beliefs to be political and racial is completely untenable. The conversation was not a theological discussion. The common 

slang reference was not within a context which could have had any bearing on the 

defendant’s beliefs. A Negro not a member of the Nation of Islam would be as likely 

to say the same thing. In addition, if it had been in such a context, and it could be 

construed to be even viciously derogatory, again there was ample evidence from an 

independent origin before the Department to conclude that the Muslim religion 

holds the white race in contempt.

As regards Logs 1 and 3, they are so totally innocuous even defendant’s counsel 

could not point to any specific language which could bear on the defendant’s conviction. The thrust of defendant’s argument concerning these logs, as well as Logs 

2 and 4 was that there must have been other matters discussed by the parties which 

were relayed to the Department of Justice. The court does not credit this argument. 

The testimony was clear that the original tapes were erased immediately after the 

logs were typed, and that the logs received in evidence were the only ones prepared. 

The individuals who monitored the conversations in Phoenix testified that they 

communicated no other information to anyone.

Jimmy Cannon, “Cassius Clay is the Sixties” (1970)

In this piece, leading sports writer Jimmy Cannon attempts to sum up his time and 

the controversy swirling around Ali and his conscientious objector claim by arguing that Ali represented much of what was wrong about the 1960s.

[Document Source: Gerald Early, ed., The Muhammad Ali Reader (New 

York: Harper Collins), 81.]

The athlete of the decade has to be Cassius Clay, who is now Muhammad Ali. 

He is all the sixties were. It is as though he were created to represent them. In him is 

the trouble and the wildness and the hysterical gladness and the nonsense and the 

rebellion and the conflicts of race and the yearning for bizarre religions and the cult 
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United States v. Clay: Muhammad Ali’s Fight Against the Vietnam Draft

of the put-on and the changed values that altered the world and the feeling about 

Vietnam in the generation that ridiculed what their parents cherish.

Even Malcolm X is part of what Clay was in the sixties and the historians already 

have celebrated the force of his philosophy on his times. It was Malcolm X who 

persuaded Clay to be a Black Muslim. But Malcolm X was shot in a New York dance 

hall by guys with X’s in their names and Clay would discuss his old friend as a traitor.

The kids shriek when they protest, and Clay would open that immense mouth 

and scream. He goes along with the proposition that reality should be avoided and 

ducks into the cave of his imagination. He seriously discusses great religious philosophies and stands up for segregation and often sounds like he is shilling for the Ku 

Klux Klan when he explains his theories of race.

The character he used as a contender for the heavyweight championship would 

have been all wrong in any other decade. He called himself the greatest and the prettiest and demeaned the guys he had to fight and attempted to humiliate them. He 

was conceited and never stopped bragging, and then suddenly he claimed he was a 

minister of the Black Muslim sect and they convicted him for draft evasion.

The urge for celebrities to be martyrs was another symptom of the sixties and Clay 

went along with the play and seems eager to go to jail for being a devout Muslim. He 

never went to college but he made that scene and now travels around lecturing at 

universities to students who understand his conman comedy and the unsophisticated 

evangelism and kindergarten philosophy.

It was logical he would be called the greatest champion in all the ages of boxing. 

This was a decade when the critics were afraid of things they couldn’t understand 

and honored chaos in the arts. They praised Clay with a wild irresponsibility. He is 

the best around but his reputation was established by two fights with Sonny Liston.

The old head-breaker out of the St. Louis mobs quit, sitting in his corner the first 

time. In the second fight, an effete looping right hand knocked him out in the first 

round, as Clay yelled down at him that people would think it was fake if he didn’t 

get up.

The Sixties were a bad time, but some of the years were wonderful. And, because I 

make my living writing sports, Cassius Clay is the sixties for me.

Oral Arguments in Clay v. United States, April 19, 1971

The oral arguments in Clay reveal the complexities of the case. The Supreme 

Court asked the lawyers to argue a single question: whether the Department of 

Justice’s characterization of Ali’s beliefs as political and racial, rather than religious, necessitated reversing Ali’s conviction. Both attorneys, however, attempted 

to broaden their arguments. Solicitor General Erwin Griswold attempted to reframe the question by arguing that the government had never characterized Ali’s 

beliefs as nonreligious, but had merely made the more defensible claim that his 

religious objections to war were selective. At one point, Justice Potter Stewart ex-
United States v. Clay: Muhammad Ali’s Fight Against the Vietnam Draft

88

pressed frustration with this approach and some of the justices privately grumbled 

that the case had been poorly argued. After a lengthy recitation of the complicated 

procedural history of the case, Ali’s attorney Chauncey Eskridge included arguments about Ali’s sincerity and the nature of Islamic pacifism. The excerpt of the 

oral arguments below begins with this.

[Document Source: Transcribed from a digital recording of oral arguments 

available at https://www.oyez.org/cases/1970/783.]

Justice Douglas: To what extent do the black Muslims follow the teachings of the 

Qur’an? I’m not the world’s best authority on the Qur’an, although I’ve read most of 

it, and as I read it, the Qur’an itself provides for participation in so-called holy wars?

Chauncey Eskridge: Yes, sir. The holy war—

Justice Douglas: . . . I don’t know about the black Muslims, do they adopt the Qur’an 

or—

Chauncey Eskridge: They adopt the Qur’an, especially the one that’s edited by Muhammad—you see, there’s two names; Maulana Muhammad Ali, that’s their official 

version. And it—they use it and they couple it with the black man’s experience in the 

United States. Hence, there’s somewhat, it’s not clear as to how much they interpret 

from the Holy Qur’an, how much they interpret from the Bible or from the Message 

to the Black Man.

Justice Douglas: Are you familiar with the Negre case recently decided by this 

Court?

Chauncey Eskridge: I am, sir.

Justice Douglas: There, there was a—apparently the historic relation of that church 

involved in that case was a segregation of just war. Is this jihad in the Qur’an, the 

equivalent of the just war—

Chauncey Eskridge: Right.

Justice Douglas: As opposed to the unjust war?

Chauncey Eskridge: Your Honor, this is the first time that I had ever heard anybody 

suggest that black Muslim theology came from any just or unjust wars.

Justice Douglas: I’m talking about the jihad which is in the Qur’an as a war that the 

Qur’an embraces as the kind of war. I didn’t agree with the Court in the Negre case, 

but I’m just wondering the relevancy of that here?

Chauncey Eskridge: That war means a theocratic war which is the same as the kind 

of war that Sicurella war. The Jehovah’s Witnesses, they believe in the war of Armageddon, which is a war against right versus wrong.
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United States v. Clay: Muhammad Ali’s Fight Against the Vietnam Draft

Justice Douglas: I think the Mediterranean littoral has seen jihads, well maybe not 

for several hundred years, but historically there’ve been quite a few, haven’t there?

Chauncey Eskridge: There may be, but I doubt that they would be what the Muslims speak of as the Nation of Islam. What they mean by that is not a territorial area, 

but it means the religious group.

Justice Douglas: Yes. Well I’m not trying to attribute to the black Muslims this 

teaching of the Qur’an because I just don’t know, but my question is does the record 

show what the Black Muslims believe in this respect?

. . .

Justice Stewart: Well, “Muslim,” as I understand it, is the Nation of Islam . . . [it] 

certainly cannot be acquainted with the Muslim religion in such nations as Iran and 

Pakistan and the Arab countries of the Middle East.

Chauncey Eskridge: No, sir.

. . .

Justice Stewart: And isn’t it not . . . largely confined to North America, the United 

States of America?

Chauncey Eskridge: It is totally confined.

. . .

Justice Stewart: Right. And so when there’s talk of the defense of Islam, we’re not 

talking necessarily about a war in which a Muslim country would be involved in, 

such as Iran or Pakistan?

Chauncey Eskridge: No, sir. The defense—where they use the word defense, they 

mean the defense of Islam. They mean the defense of religion, not persons.

. . .

Now, we go further. We say that if you read this advice letter in which the Department of Justice disparages the religion, and then . . . they say that his religion is 

racist and political. Then they go on and [say] . . . “The main thrust of the letter that 

he had written in which he claims other, other classifications.” Then they say there’s 

something wrong with this, that he has shifted his position, but remember he was 

1-Y all the way up to February 1966, so that he had no occasion to apply for a lower 

qualification because conscientious objector is higher. . . .

But notwithstanding that, they go on and say “The registrant has not shown . . . 

overt manifestations sufficient to establish his subjective belief whereas here, his conscientious objector claim was not asserted until military service became imminent.” 

In other words, you’re saying that he had a lack of sincerity. Now, not only did this 

mislead the appeal board, we say, but this even misled the Fifth Circuit, because in 
United States v. Clay: Muhammad Ali’s Fight Against the Vietnam Draft

90

the last opinion of the Fifth Circuit on page 249, footnote 9, the Fifth Circuit on its 

opinion says, “The Kentucky appeal board thereafter continued the 1-A classification 

of Clay. That there was also a basis of fact for the numerous local boards, state appeal 

boards and Presidential Appeal Board’s classification of Clay, thereby including an 

adverse determination of the question of Clay’s basic sincerity.”

So that this language, we say of his sincerity threw off not only the appeal board, 

but threw off the Fifth Circuit. We’re asking the Court to take into account that Sicurella also said that where two erroneous positions or one erroneous position was 

given to an appeal board or local draft board that this requires a reversal of a man’s 

conviction because the Court has no way of knowing whether or not one—which 

one the draft board accepted because here, the record does not indicate which one 

of the grounds that the appeal board rested upon.

Chief Justice Burger: Thank you, Mr. Eskridge. Mr. Solicitor General?

. . .

Erwin Griswold: May it please the Court. This is an appeal from a judgement sustaining a conviction for refusal to report for induction. The defense, of course, is the 

question whether the order to report for induction was valid. In the posture of the 

case as it now stands that turns on the propriety of the action of the Selective Service 

System with respect to a claim of conscientious objection.

. . .

Now the transcript of the hearing [during Ali’s selective service appeal] is in the 

appendix, but I think it is very important for the Court to bear in mind what the 

nature of that hearing was. It was not an adversary proceeding. The government was 

not represented except through the hearing officer who it is perfectly plain acted in 

the most impartial way and asked questions for the purpose of clarifying things for 

his own mind, but not in an adversary way. No evidence was offered on behalf of the 

government at this hearing, either with respect to the beliefs of the black Muslim sect 

or the beliefs of the petitioner, except insofar as that may appear from the resume of 

the F.B.I. report which was made as a part of the hearing.

Chief Justice Burger: Are you speaking now, Mr. Solicitor General, of the hearing 

officer appointed in Kentucky?

Erwin Griswold: The hearing officer appointed by the Department of Justice who 

held a hearing in Louisville, Kentucky. In this situation it’s perhaps surprising that 

there is as much evidence as there is of the selective nature of the petitioner’s objections.

There has been one other case before the Court involving a black Muslim. That’s 

the case of United States against Carson, in which this Court denied certiorari in 396 

U.S. 865 and where the Solicitor General in his brief in opposition took the ground 
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United States v. Clay: Muhammad Ali’s Fight Against the Vietnam Draft

that the objection of the black Muslim was essentially a selective objection and I can 

refer to that in connection to what this Court said in the Gillette opinion. There is 

a danger that as between two would-be objectors, both having the same complaint 

against the war, that objector would succeed who is more articulate, better educated 

or better counseled.

Justice Stewart: I think it is common ground, however, Mr. Solicitor General, is it 

not, that the dispositive question is the particularized beliefs of this individual registrant, or that individual registrant, rather than the basic tenets of the religious sect 

to which he adheres?

Erwin Griswold: Yes, Mr. Justice. I fully agree it is the—

Justice Stewart: And it goes both ways, there are two sides to that coin?

Erwin Griswold: I agree that is the beliefs of this individual, except that in this 

case, this individual has stated unequivocally that he accepts the beliefs of the sect, 

and there has been introduced at the hearing as establishing his beliefs documents 

showing the beliefs of the sect and I don’t see how he can disassociate himself from 

these materials which he has offered in support of his position.

. . .

Justice Stewart: What I’m interested in learning is what among the various possible 

bases, what was the basis in fact? Now the various possible bases, at least in this case 

were: (A) that he was insincere; (B) that his objection was not religiously rooted or 

grounded; (C) that his objection was selective, and it was not to war in any form, 

but to . . . a particular war, some wars, but not other wars, there may be others. But 

which of those first three [was the] basis in fact?

Erwin Griswold: Well, I believe that the only one that is before the Court now is the 

latter one. That is the only question—

Justice Stewart: Selective objection?

Erwin Griswold: That is the only question that is covered by the grant of certiorari, whether petitioner’s conviction should be vacated in the light of this Court’s 

decision in Welsh, because the denial to petitioner of a conscientious objector exemption may have been based upon the Department of Justice’s erroneous characterization of his objections to participation in wars as political and racial, rather 

than religious.

Justice Stewart: Well then, we’re not involved with selective objection, are we?

Erwin Griswold: . . . There is in this record a basis in fact for the conclusion that 

the petitioner’s objection, though religious, is selective. Now that is that he is not 

opposed to participation in war in any form as statute requires, but that is in fact 

to oppose to fighting what he regards as the white man’s wars, although having no 
United States v. Clay: Muhammad Ali’s Fight Against the Vietnam Draft

92

religious or conscientious scruples against participation in war which would defend 

the black man’s interest.

Justice Stewart: You don’t question the sincerity of Mr. Ali?

Erwin Griswold: No, Mr. Justice, we do not.

Justice Stewart: Nor as I understand that the fact that it was religiously rooted?

Erwin Griswold: Certainly not, Mr. Justice. We assert that it was religiously rooted, 

just as we did in Negre. No one could conceivably have contended in Negre that his 

objection was not religious.

Justice Stewart: You haven’t—I assume you’re going to deal with the Sicurella case, 

Mr. Solicitor—

Erwin Griswold: Yes, Mr. Justice.

Justice Stewart: Very Good.

Erwin Griswold: The petitioner just doesn’t want to fight the white man’s wars, 

and I can understand that. But it’s not the same sort of belief as the opposition to 

participation in war in any form which is held by the pacifist, and is required by 

the statute. Now surely as has been pointed out, the traditional, historical Muslim 

religion is not pacifist. One need only refer to the crusades and to the more recent 

Seven Days War as adequate evidence of that fact. And although my—counsel for 

the petitioner here differentiated his client from the traditional Muslims, I would 

point out that they introduced in evidence in support of his position a modern 

standard translation of the Qur’an, a translation by a Pakistani, not by a member of 

the black Muslims.

It’s equally sure it seems to me that the black Muslim religion is not regarded as 

pacifist, in the sense at least that the Quakers and the Mennonites are pacifists. As 

this record shows, there are strong racial undertones in the black Muslim religion, 

and in the petitioner’s beliefs. Now, there is thus a basis in fact for a conclusion exactly parallel to that already reached by the Court in Negre that the objections of the 

petitioner here, though undoubtedly religious as Negre’s were are in fact selective.

A different selection to be sure than that made by Negre, but nevertheless selective, 

and thus not within the statutory prescription which allows conscientious objection 

to those who are opposed to participation in war in any form.

Justice Stewart: To what wars do you understand the record shows that he would 

not be opposed?

Erwin Griswold: He would not be opposed to wars in which the black Muslims 

were attacked or involved, and nor would he be opposed to—

Justice Stewart: That would be a civil war, wasn’t it? That would necessarily be a 

civil war, if this religion is pretty well confined in the United States of America?
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United States v. Clay: Muhammad Ali’s Fight Against the Vietnam Draft

Erwin Griswold: That would presumably be some kind of a civil war, but might 

not necessarily be. Again I would like to point out that the record shows that the 

petitioner went to the Middle East, was accorded the great distinction of being allowed to enter the temple at Mecca. His disassociation with the traditional Muslim 

religion is by no means complete, and it’s by no means clear that if the domestic hierarchy of the black Muslims decided that its members should participate in general 

Muslim wars that he would not participate.

Justice Stewart: Well that’s—I had difficulty with this. Are you submitting that this 

record shows that this registrant would fight in a war in which say Algeria, or Jordan, or Iraq, or Pakistan or Iran were engaged? Do you think that’s what—?

Erwin Griswold: Well, he says so. He says specifically that . . . if Elijah Muhammad 

ordered him to do so, which he didn’t think he would, but if Elijah Muhammad ordered him to do so, he would and that I think is inconsistent with a pacifist position.

. . .

Justice Stewart: Mr. Solicitor General, the question, the case you’ve argued is not 

that that was covered by our limited grant of certiorari, is it?

Erwin Griswold: To the best of my ability, Mr. Justice, it has been. I’m sorry if—

Justice Stewart: Well, I just point out that the question to which we limited this 

grant of certiorari was whether petitioner’s conviction should be vacated because 

the denial to him of a conscientious objector exemption may have been based upon 

the Department of Justice’s erroneous characterization of his objection to participation in wars as political and racial, rather than religious. And as I understand it, 

you’ve begun this argument this morning by conceding that they were religious—

Erwin Griswold: And so we have all the way along, Mr. Justice. This is nothing—

Justice Stewart: And that the—you argued the question as to whether or not he was 

a selective objector, which is not the question in which we granted certiorari?

Erwin Griswold: That, Mr. Justice, I think is precisely the situation in the Negre

case. Our position in the Negre case, in those words in our brief was that Negre’s 

essential objection was political and philosophical, and though based on religious 

grounds was not the kind of religious objection which was covered by the statute 

and that is precisely the argument which we make here. We have never contended 

that Clay’s objections were not religious. We have always contended that the nature 

of Clay’s objections is so infused with, so intertwined with political and racial considerations that his religious objections do not make the test of the statute namely 

that he is opposed to participate in war in any form. And I have been endeavoring 

to try to develop my argument within the terms of the grant of certiorari, believing 

or contending that our position here is exactly parallel with that in Negre where the 

contention was undoubtedly religiously motivated.
United States v. Clay: Muhammad Ali’s Fight Against the Vietnam Draft

94

Supreme Court Opinion in Clay v. United States (1971)

The Supreme Court’s per curium opinion, written by Justice Stewart, reversed Ali’s 

conviction on the grounds that the Department of Justice had erroneously advised 

Selective Service System officials that Ali’s conscientious objector claims were not 

sincere and did not derive from religious beliefs. Justices William O. Douglas and 

John Marshall Harlan II wrote separate concurring opinions. Internal citations 

are omitted where appropriate.

[Document Source: Clay v. United States, 403 U.S. 698 (1971).]

PER CURIAM.

The petitioner was convicted for willful refusal to submit to induction into the Armed 

Forces. The judgment of conviction was affirmed by the Court of Appeals for the 

Fifth Circuit. We granted certiorari to consider whether the induction notice was 

invalid because grounded upon an erroneous denial of the petitioner’s claim to be 

classified as a conscientious objector.

I

The petitioner’s application for classification as a conscientious objector was turned 

down by his local draft board, and he took an administrative appeal. The State Appeal 

Board tentatively classified him I-A (eligible for unrestricted military service) and 

referred his file to the Department of Justice for an advisory recommendation, in 

accordance with then-applicable procedures. The FBI then conducted an “inquiry” 

as required by the statute, interviewing some 35 persons, including members of the 

petitioner’s family and many of his friends, neighbors, and business and religious 

associates.

There followed a hearing on “the character and good faith of the [petitioner’s] 

objections” before a hearing officer appointed by the Department. The hearing officer, a retired judge of many years’ experience, heard testimony from the petitioner’s 

mother and father, from one of his attorneys, from a minister of his religion, and 

from the petitioner himself. He also had the benefit of a full report from the FBI. On 

the basis of this record the hearing officer concluded that the registrant was sincere 

in his objection on religious grounds to participation in war in any form, and he 

recommended that the conscientious objector claim be sustained.

Notwithstanding this recommendation, the Department of Justice wrote a 

letter to the Appeal Board, advising it that the petitioner’s conscientious objector 

claim should be denied. Upon receipt of this letter of advice, the Board denied the 

petitioner’s claim without a statement of reasons. After various further proceedings 

which it is not necessary to recount here, the petitioner was ordered to report for 

induction. He refused to take the traditional step forward, and this prosecution and 

conviction followed.
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United States v. Clay: Muhammad Ali’s Fight Against the Vietnam Draft

II

In order to qualify for classification as a conscientious objector, a registrant must 

satisfy three basic tests. He must show that he is conscientiously opposed to war in 

any form. He must show that this opposition is based upon religious training and 

belief, as the term has been construed in our decisions. And he must show that this 

objection is sincere. In applying these tests, the Selective Service System must be 

concerned with the registrant as an individual, not with its own interpretation of the 

dogma of the religious sect, if any, to which he may belong.

In asking us to affirm the judgment of conviction, the Government argues that 

there was a “basis in fact,” for holding that the petitioner is not opposed to “war in 

any form,” but is only selectively opposed to certain wars. Counsel for the petitioner, 

needless to say, takes the opposite position. The issue is one that need not be resolved 

in this case. For we have concluded that even if the Government’s position on this 

question is correct, the conviction before us must still be set aside for another quite 

independent reason.

III

The petitioner’s criminal conviction stemmed from the Selective Service System’s 

denial of his appeal seeking conscientious objector status. That denial, for which no 

reasons were ever given, was, as we have said, based on a recommendation of the 

Department of Justice, overruling its hearing officer and advising the Appeal Board 

that it “finds that the registrant’s conscientious-objector claim is not sustained and 

recommends to your Board that he be not [so] classified.” This finding was contained 

in a long letter of explanation, from which it is evident that Selective Service officials 

were led to believe that the Department had found that the petitioner had failed to 

satisfy each of the three basic tests for qualification as a conscientious objector.

. . .

In this Court the Government has now fully conceded that the petitioner’s beliefs 

are based upon “religious training and belief,” as defined in United States v. Seeger: 

“There is no dispute that petitioner’s professed beliefs were founded on basic tenets 

of the Muslim religion, as he understood them, and derived in substantial part from 

his devotion to Allah as the Supreme Being. Thus, under this Court’s decision in 

United States v. Seeger, his claim unquestionably was within the ‘religious training 

and belief’ clause of the exemption provision.” This concession is clearly correct. For 

the record shows that the petitioner’s beliefs are founded on tenets of the Muslim 

religion as he understands them. They are surely no less religiously based than those 

of the three registrants before this Court in Seeger.

The Government in this Court has also made clear that it no longer questions the 

sincerity of the petitioner’s beliefs. This concession is also correct. The Department 

hearing officer—the only person at the administrative appeal level who carefully ex-
United States v. Clay: Muhammad Ali’s Fight Against the Vietnam Draft

96

amined the petitioner and other witnesses in person and who had the benefit of the 

full FBI file—found “that the registrant is sincere in his objection.” The Department 

of Justice was wrong in advising the Board in terms of a purported rule of law that 

it should disregard this finding simply because of the circumstances and timing of 

the petitioner’s claim.

Since the Appeal Board gave no reasons for its denial of the petitioner’s claim, 

there is absolutely no way of knowing upon which of the three grounds offered in 

the Department’s letter it relied. Yet the Government now acknowledges that two 

of those grounds were not valid. And, the Government’s concession aside, it is indisputably clear, for the reasons stated, that the Department was simply wrong as a 

matter of law in advising that the petitioner’s beliefs were not religiously based and 

were not sincerely held.

This case, therefore, falls squarely within the four corners of this Court’s decision 

in Sicurella v. United States. There as here the Court was asked to hold that an error 

in an advice letter prepared by the Department of Justice did not require reversal of 

a criminal conviction because there was a ground on which the Appeal Board might 

properly have denied a conscientious objector classification. This Court refused to 

consider the proffered alternative ground . . . .

. . .

The doctrine thus articulated 16 years ago in Sicurella was hardly new. It was 

long ago established as essential to the administration of criminal justice. . . .

The long established rule of law embodied in these settled precedents thus clearly 

requires that the judgment before us be reversed.

It is so ordered.

MR. JUSTICE MARSHALL took no part in the consideration or decision of this case.

MR. JUSTICE DOUGLAS, concurring.

I would reverse this judgment of conviction and set the petitioner free.

In Sicurella the wars that the applicant would fight were not “carnal” but those 

“in defense of Kingdom interests.” Since it was impossible to determine on exactly 

which grounds the Appeal Board had based its decision, we reversed the decision 

sustaining the judgment of conviction. We said: “It is difficult for us to believe that 

the Congress had in mind this type of activity when it said the thrust of conscientious 

objection must go to ‘participation in war in any form.’”

In the present case there is no line between “carnal” war and “spiritual” or symbolic wars. Those who know the history of the Mediterranean littoral know that the 

jihad of the Moslem was a bloody war.

This case is very close in its essentials to Negre v. Larson, decided March 8, 1971. 

The church to which that registrant belonged favored “just” wars and provided 

guidelines to define them. The church did not oppose the war in Vietnam but the 
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registrant refused to comply with an order to go to Vietnam because participating 

in that conflict would violate his conscience. The Court refused to grant him relief 

as a conscientious objector, overruling his constitutional claim.

The case of Clay is somewhat different, though analogous. While there are some 

bits of evidence showing conscientious objection to the Vietnam conflict, the basic 

objection was based on the teachings of his religion. He testified that he was

“sincere in every bit of what the Holy Qur’an and the teachings of the Honorable Elijah Muhammad tell us and it is that we are not to participate in 

wars on the side of . . . nonbelievers, and this is a Christian country and this 

is not a Muslim country, and the Government and the history and the facts 

shows that every move toward the Honorable Elijah Muhammad is made 

to distort and is made to ridicule him and is made to condemn him . . . and 

the outright, every day oppressors and enemies are the people as a whole, 

the whites of this nation. So, we are not, according to the Holy Qur’an, to 

even as much as aid in passing a cup of water to the—even a wounded. I 

mean, this is in the Holy Qur’an, and as I said earlier, this is not me talking 

to get the draft board—or to dodge nothing. This is there before I was 

borned and it will be there when I’m dead but we believe in not only that 

part of it, but all of it.”

At another point he testified: “[T]he Holy Qur’an do teach us that we do not take 

part of—in any part of war unless declared by Allah himself, or unless it’s an Islamic 

World War, or a Holy War, and it goes as far—the Holy Qur’an is talking still, and 

saying we are not to even as much as aid the infidels or the nonbelievers in Islam, 

even to as much as handing them a cup of water during battle.”

“So, this is the teachings of the Holy Qur’an before I was born, and the Qur’an, 

we follow not only that part of it, but every part.”

The Koran defines jihad as an injunction to the believers to war against nonbelievers:

“O ye who believe! Shall I guide you to a gainful trade which will save you 

from painful punishment? Believe in Allah and His Apostle and carry on 

warfare (jihad) in the path of Allah with your possessions and your persons. That is better for you. If ye have knowledge, He will forgive your sins, 

and will place you in the Gardens beneath which the streams flow, and in 

fine houses in the Gardens of Eden: that is the great gain.”

. . .

War is not the exclusive type of jihad; there is action by the believer’s heart, by 

his tongue, by his hands, as well as by the sword. . . .

. . .

The jihad is the Moslem’s counterpart of the “just” war as it has been known in 

the West. Neither Clay nor Negre should be subject to punishment because he will 
United States v. Clay: Muhammad Ali’s Fight Against the Vietnam Draft

98

not renounce the “truth” of the teaching of his respective church that wars indeed 

may exist which are just wars in which a Moslem or Catholic has a respective duty 

to participate.

What Clay’s testimony adds up to is that he believes only in war as sanctioned by 

the Koran, that is to say, a religious war against nonbelievers. All other wars are unjust.

That is a matter of belief, of conscience, of religious principle. Both Clay and 

Negre were “by reason of religious training and belief” conscientiously opposed to 

participation in war of the character proscribed by their respective religions. That 

belief is a matter of conscience protected by the First Amendment which Congress 

has no power to qualify or dilute as it did in § 6 (j) of the Military Selective Service 

Act of 1967 when it restricted the exemption to those “conscientiously opposed to 

participation in war in any form.” For the reasons I stated in Negre and in Gillette 

v. United States, that construction puts Clay in a class honored by the First Amendment, even though those schooled in a different conception of “just” wars may find 

it quite irrational.

. . .

MR. JUSTICE HARLAN, concurring in the result.

I concur in the result on the following ground. The Department of Justice advice 

letter was at least susceptible of the reading that petitioner’s proof of sincerity was 

insufficient as a matter of law because his conscientious objector claim had not been 

timely asserted. This would have been erroneous advice had the Department’s letter 

been so read. Since the Appeals Board might have acted on such an interpretation 

of the letter, reversal is required under Sicurella.

Jim Murray, “It’s Okay to set Ali free—Many others have 

paid the price” (1971)

While the Supreme Court’s opinion in Clay was generally well received, some critics complained that Ali’s privileged position had enabled him to challenge the draft 

system in ways that were denied to ordinary inductees. This editorial, written days 

after the Supreme Court announced its decision, is an example of that critique.

[Document Source: Boston Globe, July 1, 1971.]

OK, everybody up! Let’s hear it for the Supreme Court!

Do you realize what these guys have saved us from? The martyrization of Muhammad Ali, that’s what! I get a headache every time I think of it, him caged and 
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United States v. Clay: Muhammad Ali’s Fight Against the Vietnam Draft

chained, a national ulcer on the body of America, a suppurating wound on our prostrate republic. He would be Dreyfus, Joan of Arc, the prisoner of Shark Island, John 

Brown’s Body—a tragic victim of history. Leavenworth would have become another 

Uncle Tom’s Cabin. No matter where you went in the world, you would not dare 

criticize anything, or your host would flare up and say, “Nuts to you! What about 

Muhammad Ali?” He would have been an international embarrassment.

 Besides, what’s one more soldier? We got plenty of kids we can draft, right? 

They’ve only killed over 40,000 over there, and most of those left still have most of 

their arms and legs. You going to make a Federal case out of one guy?

 Of course, none of this weighed in the deliberations, if any, of the court. They 

decided it on law alone. I have great respect for the justices of the Supreme Court, 

even the one who writes for Playboy.

 I will say I was startled at the alacrity with which they turned our pugilist loose. 

It was a shutout; the ex-champ won every round on the card of all eight judges—8–0. 

Usually, these guys vote 6–3 on what time it is. Usually, somebody writes a searing 

dissent opinion scolding the whole world, but this tribunal found Ali “sincere” in 

not wanting to go to war. Well, I would guess so!

 Like I say, I applaud the decision. The United States would have bred a king-size 

scab for itself by imprisoning Robin Hood. Still, I can’t help wishing the decision 

could be retroactive to spare the 140,414 Union soldiers who lost their lives in the 

Civil War. Or the 291,557 killed in World War II. I don’t think the guys who went 

to Shiloh or Tarawa were too crazy about it, either.

 Now, don’t get me wrong. I think it’s a swell idea if a guy can go to a war of his 

choice and say, “I pass,” on the others.

 The Supreme Court, by ruling the Justice Department and the rest of the cognizant jurisprudence in his case were “simply wrong as a matter of law,” summarily 

makes them look like a bunch of bumptious bigots. To be sure, the highest court 

in the land has the wisest barristers, but, surely, some of the lesser beings along the 

way must have looked up some law? Alas, perhaps not. Perhaps the learned justices 

are the only eight people in the United States with the mental capacity to grasp the 

Constitution. At any rate, they’re the only eight who count.

 The argument is posed Ali had suffered enough anyway in his three-year banishment from the ring. Well, that’s true enough. He was down to his last Rolls-Royce. 

And he was gone so long that Joe Frazier, a journeyman in-fighter, was able to build 

himself up to a $20 million gate with Ali. Had Ali fought him in the normal course 

of events along the way, it would have been a Friday night fight on TV.

 Anyway, I’m glad for reasons other than patriotism that our No. 1 pacifist can 

now go around beating the bejabbers out of people for a few million dollars. A lot 

o[f] my rich friends were getting cynical about the court. They were beginning to 
United States v. Clay: Muhammad Ali’s Fight Against the Vietnam Draft

100

think only the poor or the criminally guilty were entitled to the full protection of the 

law. Now we see a millionaire from Cherry Hill, N.J., is getting equal treatment with 

convicted murderers, street rioters and people who sell government secrets. They 

said when President Nixon appointed a court, it would be a rich man’s court and 

darned if they weren’t right! As usual.

Les Matthews, “Hail Ali’s Victory: Free At Last” (1971)

This piece from the front page of one of the nation’s oldest black newspapers attempted to capture more positive reactions to the Supreme Court’s decision by 

asking New Yorkers for their responses to the outcome of the case.

[Document Source: New York Amsterdam News, July 3, 1971.]

The fans are happy over Muhammad Ali’s biggest victory—the 8–0 decision Monday 

by the U.S. Supreme Court.

 Mrs. Dorothy LaRoach, business woman, 125th St: “They knew all the time 

that he was not guilty. I think they should have handed up their decision earlier and 

it would have saved Muhammad Ali and the government a lot of time and money.

 Mrs. Grace Olds, nurse, 135th St: “I was very happy that the Supreme Court 

handed up the decision freeing Muhammad Ali. I was also very proud of him for 

standing his ground. There are so many more who would fight for their convictions 

but cannot foot the bill.”

 Lou Lutour, public relations coordinator for Community School District 5: “Each 

person is entitled to his beliefs, that is why God gives us that inner feeling. Mr. Ali 

felt that he should be exempted from the draft because of his religious holdings and 

God saw to it that he won his case.”

 Vernone E. Johnson, director of “A Beautiful Experience[”] Repertory Theatre: 

“It is about time that a black man has truly won in the courts[.] Ali was sincere in his 

beliefs and he should be respected for this. Because he did have the money to fight 

in the court enabled him to accomplish something that a poor man could never do.”

. . .

 Larry Jamison, a clerk in a liquor store on 86th Street and Amsterdam Avenue: 

“If that’s his religion, what else can he do? He seems fully aware of his religion, so 

why not?

. . .

 Happy after scoring his biggest victory when the Supreme Court reversed the 

draft evasion conviction and ruled that Muhammad’s Muslim faith qualified him 
101

as a conscientious objector, Ali is looking ahead to a return with Joe Frazier the 

heavyweight champ.

. . .

 The victory for Muhammad Ali was also a victory for boxing since his presence 

give[s] the sport a spark and now that he is able to move about freely he will give 

the sport the lift it needs. The versatile Ali, inside and outside the ring, is now being 

recognized by the World Boxing Association which withdrew its recognition after 

he was sentenced to spend five years and pay [a] $10,000 fine.

. . .

 Muhammad Ali gives a lot of credit to the Court decision to his lawyer Chauncey 

Eskridge and Elijah Muhammad, the leader of the Moslem Nation to which Ali will 

return after hanging up his gloves. . . .

Muhammad Ali, Foreword to Muhammad Ali’s 

Greatest Fight (2000)

In this brief forward to a book published in 2000 about his resistance to the 

Vietnam draft, Muhammad Ali reflects on the lessons he took away from his legal 

battle.

[Document Source: Howard L. Bingham and Max Wallace, Muhammad 

Ali’s Greatest Fight: Cassius Clay vs. the United States of America (New York: M. 

Evans, 2000), 9.]

I never thought of myself as great when I refused to go into the army. All I did was 

stand up for what I believed. There were people who thought the war in Vietnam was 

right. And those people, if they went to war, acted just as brave as I did. There were 

people who tried to put me in jail. Some of them were hypocrites, but others did what 

they thought was proper and I can’t condemn them for following their consciences 

either. People say I made a sacrifice, risking jail and my whole career. But God told 

Abraham to kill his son and Abraham was willing to do it, so why shouldn’t I follow 

what I believed? Standing up for my religion made me happy; it wasn’t a sacrifice. 

When people got drafted and sent to Vietnam and didn’t understand what the killing 

was about and came home with one leg and couldn’t get jobs, that was a sacrifice. 

But I believed in what I was doing, so no matter what the government did to me, it 

wasn’t a loss.
United States v. Clay: Muhammad Ali’s Fight Against the Vietnam Draft

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Some people thought I was a hero. Some people said that what I did was wrong. 

But everything I did was according to my conscience. I wasn’t trying to be a leader. 

I just wanted to be free. And I made a stand all people, not just black people, should 

have thought about making, because it wasn’t just black people being drafted. The 

government had a system where the rich man’s son went to college, and the poor 

man’s son went to war. Then, after the rich man’s son got out of college, he did other 

things to keep him out of the army until he was too old to be drafted. So what I did 

was for me, but it was the kind of decision everyone has to make. Freedom means 

being able to follow your religion, but it also means carrying the responsibility to 

choose between right and wrong. So when the time came for me to make up my mind 

about going into the army, I knew people were dying in Vietnam for nothing and 

I knew I should live by what I thought was right. I wanted America to be America. 

And now the whole world knows that, so far as my own beliefs are concerned, I did 

what was right for me.
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Bibliography

Archival and Primary-Source Materials

Muhammad Ali, Also known as Cassius M. Clay, Jr. et al. v. John B. Connally, Governor of Texas et al., April 25, 1967; Case no. 67H333, Civil Case Files, 1938–1976 

(48SO60C); Records of the United States District Courts for the Southern District 

of Texas, Record Group 21; National Archives at Fort Worth, Texas.

Muhammad Ali, et al. v. John B. Connally, et al., April 27, 1967; Case no. 24723, Case 

Files, 1891–1978 (5-9); Records of the United States Court of Appeals Fifth Circuit; Record Group 276; National Archives at Fort Worth, Texas.

Muhammad Ali, et al. v. John B. Connally, et al., April 28, 1967; Case no. 24714, Case 

Files, 1891–1978 (5-9); Records of the United States Court of Appeals Fifth Circuit; Record Group 276; National Archives at Fort Worth, Texas.

Muhammad Ali, et al. v. Ben C. Connally, et al., May 12, 1967; Case no. 24750, Case 

Files, 1891–1978 (5-9); Records of the United States Court of Appeals Fifth Circuit; Record Group 276; National Archives at Fort Worth, Texas.

Muhammad Ali Vault Records, Federal Bureau of Investigation, available at https://

vault.fbi.gov/muhammad-ali.

Harry A. Blackmun Papers, Library of Congress Manuscript Division, Washington, 

D.C.

William Brennan Papers, Library of Congress Manuscript Division, Washington, D.C.

Cassius Marsellus Clay, Jr. v. United States of America, May 6, 1968; Case no. 24991, 

Case Files, 1891–1978 (5-9); Records of the United States Court of Appeals Fifth 

Circuit; Record Group 276; National Archives at Fort Worth, Texas.

William O. Douglas Papers, Library of Congress Manuscript Division, Washington, 

D.C.

John Marshall Harlan II Papers, Library of Congress Manuscript Division, Washington, D.C.

The United States v. Cassius Marsellus Clay, Jr. Also known as Muhammad Ali, May 

8, 1967; Case no. 67H94, Criminal Case Files, 1908–1979 (48SO69A); Records 

of the United States District Courts for the Southern District of Texas, Record 

Group 21; National Archives at Fort Worth, Texas.
United States v. Clay: Muhammad Ali’s Fight Against the Vietnam Draft

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Secondary Sources

Bingham, Howard L. and Wallace, Max. Muhammad Ali’s Greatest Fight: Cassius 

Clay v. The United States of America. New York: M. Evans, 2000.

Early, Gerald, ed. The Muhammad Ali Reader. New York: Harper Collins, 2013.

Gordon, Sarah Barringer. The Spirit of the Law: Religious Voices and the Constitution 

in Modern America. Cambridge, MA: Belknap Press, 2010.

Newman, Thomas S. “Muhammad Ali nee Cassius Clay (the New York Times’ Coverage of Muhammad Ali from September 6, 1960 to April 30, 1967).” (M.A. thesis, 

University of Montana, 1981).

Remnick, David. King of the World. New York: Vintage Books, 1998.

Books Suitable for Students

Freedman, Suzanne. Clay v. United States: Muhammad Ali Objects to War. Springfield, NJ: Enslow Publishers, 1997.

Streissguth, Tom. Clay v. United States and How Muhammad Ali Fought the Draft: 

Debating Supreme Court Decisions. Berkley Heights, NJ: Enslow Publishers, 2006.
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