J-S30013-23

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT O.P. 65.37

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA

v.

URIAH O'CARROLL, 

Appellant

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

 IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

 PENNSYLVANIA

 No. 3047 EDA 2022

Appeal from the PCRA Order Entered November 10, 2022

In the Court of Common Pleas of Lehigh County Criminal Division at 

No(s): CP-39-CR-0003610-2011

BEFORE: BENDER, P.J.E., LAZARUS, J., and SULLIVAN, J.

MEMORANDUM BY BENDER, P.J.E.: FILED NOVEMBER 8, 2023

Appellant, Uriah O’Carroll, appeals pro se from the post-conviction 

court’s November 10, 2022 order denying, as untimely, his petition filed under 

the Post Conviction Relief Act (PCRA), 42 Pa.C.S. §§ 9541-9546. After careful 

review, we affirm.

We need not set forth a detailed summary of the facts of Appellant’s 

case for purposes of this appeal. We only note that on September 4, 2012, 

Appellant entered an open plea to third-degree murder for shooting and killing

Marcus Eggleston, and to attempted homicide for shooting Eggleston’s 

mother, Sandy Falwell, in the head. On October 22, 2012, the trial court 

sentenced Appellant to a term of imprisonment of 20 to 40 years on each

conviction. The trial court ordered the sentences to run consecutively, totaling 

an aggregate term of 40 to 80 years’ incarceration. On July 18, 2013, this

Court affirmed Appellant’s judgment of sentence. See Commonwealth v. 
J-S30013-23

- 2 -

O’Carroll, 82 A.3d 1070 (Pa. Super. 2013) (unpublished memorandum). He 

did not file a petition for allowance of appeal with our Supreme Court.

Appellant thereafter filed a timely, pro se PCRA petition on January 27, 

2014. Counsel was appointed, but ultimately withdrew from representing 

Appellant. The PCRA court issued an order denying Appellant’s petition on 

June 2, 2014. Although Appellant filed a pro se appeal to this Court, he did 

not file it until August 27, 2014. Therefore, we quashed his appeal as untimely

on January 7, 2015. 

On August 26, 2022, Appellant filed the pro se PCRA petition underlying 

his present appeal. Therein, Appellant claimed that in June of 2022, he was 

notified by another inmate that his sentence is illegal pursuant to the rationale 

set forth in Commonwealth v. King, 234 A.3d 549, 562 (Pa. 2020) (holding 

that when the Commonwealth “intends to seek an enhanced sentence for 

attempted murder resulting in serious bodily injury under [18 Pa.C.S. §]

1102(c), the Commonwealth must include a citation to the statutory provision

as well as its language in the charging documents”); see also 18 Pa.C.S. § 

1102(c) (“Attempt, solicitation and conspiracy.--Notwithstanding section 

1103(1) (relating to sentence of imprisonment for felony), a person who has 

been convicted of attempt, solicitation or conspiracy to commit murder, 

murder of an unborn child or murder of a law enforcement officer where 

serious bodily injury results may be sentenced to a term of imprisonment 

which shall be fixed by the court at not more than 40 years. Where serious 

bodily injury does not result, the person may be sentenced to a term of 
J-S30013-23

- 3 -

imprisonment which shall be fixed by the court at not more than 20 years.”). 

Appellant claimed that his discovery of the “new fact” that his sentence is 

purportedly illegal under King triggered the PCRA court’s jurisdiction and 

warranted resentencing.

On October 5, 2022, the PCRA court issued a Pa.R.Crim.P. 907 notice of 

its intent to dismiss Appellant’s petition without a hearing on the basis that it 

was untimely and failed to meet any timeliness exception. Appellant filed a 

timely, pro se response, but on November 10, 2022, the PCRA court issued 

an order dismissing his petition. He filed a timely, pro se notice of appeal. It 

does not appear that the PCRA court ordered Appellant to file a Pa.R.A.P. 

1925(b) statement. On February 3, 2023, the court filed a Rule 1925(a) 

statement indicating it is relying on the rationale set forth in its Rule 907 notice 

to support its dismissal of Appellant’s petition.

Herein, Appellant states one issue for our review:

A. Does not a context-specific circumstance where [A]ppellant was 

unaware of the intricate facts of his case and the law which his 

illegal sentence was predicated upon until he was informed of the 

intricate facts constitute newly discovered facts pursuant to 42 

Pa.C.S. § 9545 since he was not able to discover such intricate 

facts with reasonable diligence because he assumed the 

Commonwealth and the courts acted legally and according to its 

constitutional obligations when imposing a 40 year maximum 

sentence on [A]ppellant for his general attempted murder charge?

Appellant’s Brief at 4 (unnecessary capitalization omitted).

This Court’s standard of review regarding an order denying a petition 

under the PCRA is whether the determination of the PCRA court is supported 

by the evidence of record and is free of legal error. Commonwealth v. 
J-S30013-23

- 4 -

Ragan, 923 A.2d 1169, 1170 (Pa. 2007). We must begin by addressing the 

timeliness of Appellant’s petition, because the PCRA time limitations implicate 

our jurisdiction and may not be altered or disregarded in order to address the 

merits of a petition. See Commonwealth v. Bennett, 930 A.2d 1264, 1267 

(Pa. 2007). Under the PCRA, any petition for post-conviction relief, including 

a second or subsequent one, must be filed within one year of the date the 

judgment of sentence becomes final, unless one of the following exceptions 

set forth in 42 Pa.C.S. § 9545(b)(1)(i)-(iii) applies:

(b) Time for filing petition.--

(1) Any petition under this subchapter, including a second 

or subsequent petition, shall be filed within one year of the 

date the judgment becomes final, unless the petition alleges 

and the petitioner proves that: 

(i) the failure to raise the claim previously was the 

result of interference by government officials with the 

presentation of the claim in violation of the 

Constitution or laws of this Commonwealth or the 

Constitution or laws of the United States;

(ii) the facts upon which the claim is predicated were 

unknown to the petitioner and could not have been 

ascertained by the exercise of due diligence; or 

(iii) the right asserted is a constitutional right that was 

recognized by the Supreme Court of the United States 

or the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania after the time 

period provided in this section and has been held by 

that court to apply retroactively. 

42 Pa.C.S. § 9545(b)(1)(i)-(iii). Additionally, section 9545(b)(2) requires that 

any petition attempting to invoke one of these exceptions “be filed within one 
J-S30013-23

- 5 -

year of the date the claim could have been presented.” 42 Pa.C.S. § 

9545(b)(2).

Here, Appellant’s judgment of sentence became final in 2013 and, thus, 

his petition filed in 2022 is facially untimely. For this Court to have jurisdiction 

to review the merits thereof, Appellant must prove that he meets one of the 

exceptions to the timeliness requirements set forth in 42 Pa.C.S. § 9545(b). 

In this regard, Appellant argues that he meets the newly-discovered-fact

exception of section 9545(b)(1)(ii). According to Appellant, the ‘new fact’ he 

discovered was that his sentence is illegal under our Supreme Court’s decision 

in King. Appellant maintains the King decision’s impact on the legality of his 

sentence was unknown to him, and that he “did not fail to act with due 

diligence for not investigating further into the legality of his sentence because 

he has every right to assume the state could be taken at its word” and that it 

was “acting according to its constitutional obligations.” Appellant’s Brief at 10 

(citation omitted).

Appellant’s argument fails to prove that he meets the newly-discoveredfact exception. To establish this exception, a PCRA petitioner must allege and 

offer to prove that the facts upon which the claim is predicated were not 

previously known to him and could not have been ascertained earlier with the 

exercise of due diligence. See Commonwealth v. Burton, 158 A.3d 618, 

629 (Pa. 2017). It is well-settled, however, that judicial opinions and case

law do not amount to newly-discovered facts under section 9545(b)(1)(ii) of 

the PCRA. See Commonwealth v. Reid, 235 A.3d 1124, 1148 (Pa. 2020); 
J-S30013-23

- 6 -

see also Commonwealth v. Cintora, 69 A.3d 759, 763 (Pa. Super. 2013) 

(explaining that judicial decisions are not newly-discovered facts for purposes 

of the PCRA’s time bar exception). Moreover, under section 9454(b)(2), 

Appellant was required to raise his claim within one year of the date that it 

could have been presented. Since King was decided on July 21, 2020, 

Appellant’s petition filed in August of 2022 clearly fails to meet the one-year 

requirement of section 9545(b)(2). Accordingly, Appellant has not 

demonstrated that his PCRA petition meets any timeliness exception, and the 

court did not err in dismissing it.1

____________________________________________

1 Nevertheless, we note that we agree with the Commonwealth that even if 

Appellant’s petition met a timeliness exception, no relief would be due. The 

King Court found that while formal notice of section 1102(c)’s applicability 

was lacking in that case, that error was harmless, as “King was adequately 

apprised through other means of the Commonwealth’s intentions” to seek an 

enhanced sentence under that provision. King, 234 A.3d at 563. Likewise, 

here, the Commonwealth stresses that Appellant 

was well aware that the Commonwealth sought the serious[-

]bodily[-]injury enhancement. In the Information, the 

Commonwealth charged [Appellant] with Attempted Criminal 

Homicide for shooting Sandy Falwell in the head. It also charged 

[him] with Aggravated Assault for “intentionally, knowingly or 

recklessly caus[ing] serious bodily injury to Sandy Falwell under 

circumstances manifesting extreme indifference to the value of 

human life by shooting Sandy Falwell in the head. 

Commonwealth’s Brief at 13 (unnecessary capitalization omitted). The 

Commonwealth also points out that at Appellant’s guilty plea proceeding, he 

admitted that he shot Ms. Falwell in the head, recognized the severity of her 

injuries, and affirmed his understanding that he faced a maximum sentence 

of 40 to 80 years’ incarceration for both counts to which he was pleading 

guilty. Id. at 13-14 (citing N.T. Guilty Plea, 9/4/12, at 4-5, 8, 11). Given this 

record, we would agree with the Commonwealth that Appellant “knew he 

inflicted serious bodily injury when he shot Ms. Falwell in the head and that 

(Footnote Continued Next Page)
J-S30013-23

- 7 -

Order affirmed.

Date: 11/8/2023

____________________________________________

his maximum exposure for this crime alone was twenty (20) to forty (40) 

years[’] imprisonment.” Id. at 14 (footnote omitted). Thus, even if 

Appellant’s petition met a timeliness exception, we would conclude that any 

error in the Commonwealth’s failing to give him formal notice of its intent to 

seek a sentence under 18 Pa.C.S. § 1102(c) was harmless error.