[DO NOT PUBLISH]

In the

United States Court of Appeals

For the Eleventh Circuit

____________________

No. 20-10155

Non-Argument Calendar

____________________

TAQWA SIDDEEQ, 

Plaintiff-Appellant,

versus

DEKALB COUNTY, GA, 

Defendant-Appellee.

____________________

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Northern District of Georgia

D.C. Docket No. 1:17-cv-01327-SCJ

____________________

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2 Opinion of the Court 20-10155

Before JILL PRYOR, BRANCH, and LUCK, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:

Taqwa Siddeeq, proceeding pro se, appeals the district 

court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of his former 

employer DeKalb County, Georgia (“the County”) on his religious 

discrimination and retaliation claims. As an initial matter, Siddeeq 

argues that the district court abused its discretion by denying his 

belated motion to resubmit his response in opposition to the 

County’s motion for summary judgment, which he filed after the 

County filed its reply to Siddeeq’s initial response in opposition to 

the motion for summary judgment. Further, Siddeeq contends 

that the district court erred in granting summary judgment to the 

County on his religious discrimination claim after erroneously 

concluding that he failed to identify a valid comparator group, and 

therefore did not plead a prima facie case of discrimination. With 

respect to his retaliation claim, Siddeeq argues that the district 

court erred in determining that the temporal proximity between 

his protected activity and the materially adverse employment 

actions was too attenuated to establish causation. 1 

1

Siddeeq raises a bevy of other arguments on appeal that we do not reach. For 

instance, Siddeeq contends that the County’s counsel advised him that he did 

not need to file certain discovery documents, and that his reliance on that 

advice prejudiced his defense. However, because he did not raise this 

argument below, instead introducing it for the first time in his “statement of 

the issues” and then failing to expound his argument beyond a conclusory 

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20-10155 Opinion of the Court 3

After review, we affirm. 

I. Background

In 2003, Siddeeq, a practicing Muslim, founded 

Neighborhood Works Incorporated (“NWI”), a nonprofit seeking 

to provide affordable housing to low-income families in Siddeeq’s 

community. Siddeeq served as NWI’s executive director from its 

founding until September 2010. In 2004, NWI became a 

Community Housing Development Organization (“CHDO”) with 

the State of Georgia, which means that it began receiving 

government funding for “home-assisted activities.” Sometime in 

2009, NWI sought to obtain funding as a CHDO from the County 

for a housing project. 

Soon after, Siddeeq applied for a position with the County 

in the DeKalb Community Development Department (the 

“Department”). During the interview, Melvia Richards, the 

Department’s Housing Manager, told Siddeeq that he “would have 

to disassociate [him]self completely” from NWI as a condition of 

statement, he has abandoned it. See Sapuppo v. Allstate Floridian Ins. Co., 

739 F.3d 678, 680 (11th Cir. 2014); Access Now, Inc. v. Sw. Airlines Co., 385 

F.3d 1324, 1331–32 (11th Cir. 2004). Siddeeq has also abandoned any First 

Amendment “failure to accommodate” and hostile work environment claims 

by failing to assert these claims in his amended complaint or brief them in 

response to the County’s motion for summary judgment. See id. Finally, we 

note that Siddeeq first raised his freedom-of-association claim in his objection 

to the magistrate judge’s recommendation that the district court grant 

summary judgment in favor of the County, thereby waiving it. See Williams 

v. McNeil, 557 F.3d 1287, 1290–91 (11th Cir. 2009). 

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4 Opinion of the Court 20-10155

employment, prompting Siddeeq to withdraw from consideration 

for the position. 

Christine Morris, the Director of the Department, then 

contacted Siddeeq and assured him that not only would he not 

need to dissociate from NWI, but that his job would require 

providing technical assistance to NWI and other DeKalb CHDOs. 

Siddeeq reapplied and, on September 27, 2010, was hired as a 

Housing Specialist in the Department. Because the Department 

paid Siddeeq’s salary using Department of Housing and Urban 

Development (“HUD”) grant funds, he was subject to federal and 

local rules regarding conflicts of interest.2 That same month, 

2 In relevant part, HUD’s conflict of interest rules provide that:

No persons [who are . . . employee[s], agent[s], consultant[s], 

officer[s], or elected official[s] or appointed official[s] of the 

participating jurisdiction, State recipient, or subrecipient which are 

receiving HOME funds] who exercise or have exercised any functions 

or responsibilities with respect to activities assisted by HOME funds 

or who are in a position to participate in a decision-making process or 

gain inside information with regard to these activities may obtain a 

financial interest or financial benefit from a HOME-assisted activity, 

or have a financial interest in any contract, subcontract, or agreement 

with respect to the HOME-assisted activity, or the proceeds from such 

activity, either for themselves or those with whom they have business 

or immediate family ties, during their tenure or for one year 

thereafter. Immediate family ties include (whether by blood, marriage 

or adoption) the spouse, parent (including a stepparent), child 

(including a stepchild), brother, sister (including a stepbrother or 

stepsister), grandparent, grandchild, and in-laws of a covered person.

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20-10155 Opinion of the Court 5

Siddeeq resigned as the executive director of NWI in order to avoid 

having any “financial interest” in its dealings with Department. See 

24 C.F.R. § 92.356(b). Siddeeq claims that, at the time of his hiring, 

he was the only Muslim in the entire Department, and that his 

supervisors were aware of his faith. 

In 2011, the County audited NWI and discovered that 

Siddeeq was a creditor of the organization and continued to have a 

financial interest in it—indeed, NWI owed Siddeeq between 

$60,000–100,000, which Siddeeq had not disclosed when the 

County hired him. 

In September 2012, Siddeeq’s supervisor Christine Morris 

instructed Siddeeq to cease all “business transactions or 

communications with” NWI within 30 days to avoid an apparent 

conflict of interest, and later reissued that instruction in November. 

Siddeeq contends that Morris also prohibited him from 

volunteering with NWI. Undeterred, the next month Siddeeq 

24 C.F.R. § 92.356(b)–(c). Likewise, in relevant part, the DeKalb County 

personnel code prohibits employees from:

(1) Engag[ing] in any business or transaction or hav[ing] a financial 

interest or other personal interest, direct or indirect, which is 

incompatible with the proper discharge of official duties or which 

would tend to impair independence of judgment or action in the 

performance of official duties . . . (4) Participat[ing] in the 

negotiation or the making of any contract with any business or 

entity in which the employee has a financial interest.

DeKalb Cty. Code § 20-20(1)-(4). 

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6 Opinion of the Court 20-10155

inquired with NWI about an invoice payment, prompting Morris 

to suspend, and ultimately terminate, him in late December 2012 

and January 2013, respectively. Siddeeq successfully appealed his 

termination, and, in July 2013, he was reinstated, but was placed in 

a different position as a Senior Center Manager at the DeKalb 

Atlanta Senior Center—although the Department continued to 

pay his salary using HUD funds. On July 24, 2013, the day before 

starting his new position, Siddeeq filed a discrimination charge 

with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (“EEOC”), 

complaining of religious discrimination, prior suspensions he 

experienced, his first termination, and his reassignment to the 

Senior Center upon his reinstatement. 

In September 2013, Morris forwarded to all County 

employees an invitation to attend a prospective homeowner 

information session at Habitat for Humanity, a CHDO receiving 

HUD funds.3 Approximately seven months later, on April 11, 2014, 

Siddeeq e-mailed Morris, requesting that she lift what Siddeeq 

perceived as a prohibition against his volunteering from CHDOs 

receiving funding from the County. She denied his request in 

writing, noting that Siddeeq was still an active employee with the 

Department and that he retained a financial interest in NWI—the 

$60,000-$100,000 that the organization owed him—and therefore 

he still had a conflict of interest. Morris explicitly warned Siddeeq 

3

According to Siddeeq, Habitat for Humanity is a Christian organization. 

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20-10155 Opinion of the Court 7

that “[v]iolations of this directive will lead to disciplinary actions up 

to and including termination of employment.” 

Nevertheless, on August 19, 2014, Siddeeq, acting as a 

representative of NWI, attended a workshop hosted by an 

independent agency funded by HUD. Upon learning of Siddeeq’s 

actions, Ms. Morris sent him a letter indicating the Department’s 

intent to terminate him for insubordination and failure to comply 

with directions to avoid a conflict of interest. Siddeeq 

unsuccessfully appealed his termination. He then filed a second 

complaint with the EEOC, alleging religious discrimination and 

retaliation. The EEOC, finding that Siddeeq had no cause to assert 

his claims, dismissed the complaint and issued Siddeeq a right to 

sue letter on January 19, 2017. 

Siddeeq then filed the underlying civil rights complaint 

against the County, alleging that the County: (1) discriminated 

against him on the basis of his Muslim faith; (2) created and 

subjected him to a hostile work environment on the basis of his 

religious exercise and for filing an EEOC complaint; and (3) fired 

him in retaliation for his filing an EEOC complaint. After 

discovery, the County moved for summary judgment.

The district court clerk sent Siddeeq a notice, informing him 

of the County’s motion for summary judgment and the deadline 

for his response, and advising him that he must designate, by sworn 

affidavit or other materials, specific facts showing genuine issues 

for trial. Additionally, the magistrate judge issued an order 

explaining to Siddeeq what his response should include, and that 

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8 Opinion of the Court 20-10155

the failure to respond to each of the numbered facts in the County’s 

statement of undisputed material facts would result in those facts 

being accepted pursuant to the federal and local rules. See

Fed. R. Civ. P. 56; N.D. Ga. Civ. R. 56.1. 

On June 14, Siddeeq filed a motion for additional time to 

respond to the County’s motion for summary judgment because 

his father was seriously ill, and the magistrate judge granted him a 

five-week extension until July 31, cautioning Siddeeq that he would 

not receive any further extensions. On July 29, Siddeeq filed for 

another extension, citing the recent death of his father, and the 

magistrate judge granted the extension until August 21. The 

magistrate judge stated that no further extensions would be 

granted. 

After Siddeeq finally submitted his response in opposition to 

the motion for summary judgment on August 21, the County 

argued that Siddeeq failed to respond to its statement of undisputed 

material facts. Siddeeq then filed a motion seeking permission to 

resubmit his response to the County’s motion for summary 

judgment. 

Next, the magistrate judge issued a report and 

recommendation (“R&R”) recommending that the district court 

grant the County’s motion for summary judgment. Because 

Siddeeq failed to respond to the County’s statement of undisputed 

material facts in accordance with the federal and local rules, the 

magistrate judge deemed admitted most of the County’s statement 

of undisputed material facts. Relatedly, the magistrate judge 

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20-10155 Opinion of the Court 9

recommended denying Siddeeq’s request to resubmit his response, 

explaining that Siddeeq did not have good cause to resubmit his 

response because he had previously been warned about the 

requirements and, due to the two extensions already granted to 

him, received a total of 82 days to prepare a response.

With regard to Siddeeq’s religious discrimination claim, the 

magistrate judge found that Siddeeq failed to point to any direct 

evidence of discrimination, and that the record evidence did not 

contain any. The magistrate judge also concluded that none of the

purported comparators Siddeeq identified were similarly situated. 

Turning to Siddeeq’s retaliation claim, the magistrate judge 

found that Siddeeq’s filing of his 2013 EEOC complaint constituted 

protected activity, and that he faced adverse employment actions 

in April 2014, when he was allegedly prohibited from volunteering 

with CHDOs, and again in September 2014, when he was 

terminated. However, the magistrate judge concluded that 

Siddeeq failed to present sufficient evidence of a causal connection 

between his filing of the EEOC complaint and those adverse events 

due to the temporal gap between them. Finally, the magistrate 

judge recommended the dismissal of Siddeeq’s claim of a hostile 

work environment. 

Siddeeq raised five objections to the magistrate judge’s 

R&R, including: (1) that the magistrate judge considered key 

evidence of retaliation out of context and failed to consider the oneyear waiting period under 24 C.F.R. § 92.356(b); (2) that the 

magistrate judge overlooked the per se retaliatory nature of the 

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10 Opinion of the Court 20-10155

restrictions imposed on him by the County; and (3) that the 

magistrate judge’s comment that no further extensions would be 

granted denied him the option to request an extension of time. 

The district court adopted the magistrate judge’s report and 

recommendation, overruled Siddeeq’s objections, and granted the 

County’s motion for summary judgment. Siddeeq timely 

appealed.

II. Analysis

A. Siddeeq’s motion to resubmit his response to the County’s 

motion for summary judgment

On appeal, Siddeeq argues that the district court erred in 

denying his motion to resubmit his response in opposition to the 

County’s motion for summary judgment. He maintains that his 

response in opposition to the motion for summary judgment was 

subpar and failed to comply with all of the rules because he was 

grieving the death of his father, which he contends constituted 

good cause for the district court to grant his subsequent motion to 

resubmit his response. 

We review the district court’s decision to deny Siddeeq’s 

request to resubmit his response for an abuse of discretion. Young 

v. City of Palm Bay, 358 F.3d 859, 863 (11th Cir. 2004). Here, the 

district court did not abuse its discretion in denying Siddeeq’s 

request to resubmit his response to the County’s motion for 

summary judgment because the magistrate judge twice granted 

Siddeeq an extension, giving him a total of 82 days to respond to 

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20-10155 Opinion of the Court 11

the motion for summary judgment.4 Additionally, the magistrate 

judge had issued an order explaining to Siddeeq the requirements 

of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56 and Local Rule 56.1, 

including that if he failed to respond to the County’s statement of 

undisputed material facts, those facts may be accepted as true.5 

Yet, Siddeeq filed a response that failed to comply with the rules 

and did not respond to the County’s statement of undisputed facts. 

Once the County asserted in its reply that Siddeeq’s response failed 

to comply with the rules, and, therefore, that the district court was 

required to accept the County’s factual allegations as true, Siddeeq 

filed his motion to resubmit his response—over a month after the 

filing of his initial response. 

4

First, Siddeeq requested a five-week extension to file his response so that he 

could visit his father, who was very ill. The magistrate judge granted this 

extension, but cautioned that no additional extensions would be granted. 

Nevertheless, when Siddeeq’s father passed away and he sought an additional 

three-week extension, the magistrate granted Siddeeq’s motion, but stated in 

the order that “[n]o further extensions will be granted.” 

5 A party has 21 days to respond to a motion for summary judgment. N.D. 

Ga. Civ. R. 56.1(A). The Local Rules also provide that the response “shall 

include” “a response to the movant’s statement of undisputed facts,” 

containing “individually numbered, concise, nonargumentative responses 

corresponding to each of the movant’s numbered undisputed material facts.” 

Id. Civ. R. 56.1(B)(2). The rule cautions that the district court “will deem . . . 

the movant’s facts as admitted unless,” among other things, the respondent 

“directly refutes the movant’s facts with concise responses supported by 

specific citations to evidence.” Id.

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12 Opinion of the Court 20-10155

Although we give liberal construction to pro se pleadings, 

“we nevertheless . . . require them to conform to procedural rules.” 

Albra v. Advan, Inc., 490 F.3d 826, 829 (11th Cir. 2007) (quotation 

omitted). Siddeeq knew the specific consequences that would flow 

from failing to comply with Rule 56.1, and had 82 days to avoid 

incurring them—despite the personal loss he suffered during that 

time. Under these circumstances, the district court did not abuse 

its discretion in denying Siddeeq’s motion to resubmit his response 

brief. See Young, 358 F.3d at 864 (explaining that “[a] district court 

must be able to exercise its managerial power to maintain control 

over its docket,” and that, in deciding whether to grant extensions 

of time, “[t]he district court must consider the equities not only to 

plaintiff . . . , but also to the opposing parties and counsel, as well 

as to the public, including those persons affected by the court’s 

increasingly crowded docket”).

B. Whether the district court erred in granting summary 

judgment to the County on Siddeeq’s substantive claims

“We de novo review a district court’s grant of summary 

judgment,” asking whether the evidence, viewed in the light most 

favorable to the nonmoving party, entitles the moving party to 

judgment as a matter of law. Alvarez v. Royal Atl. Developers, 

Inc., 610 F.3d 1253, 1263–64 (11th Cir. 2010). We may affirm on 

any ground supported by the record. Id. at 1264. Crucially, the 

leniency we afford pro se litigants by construing their pleadings 

liberally does not permit a court “to serve as de facto counsel for a 

party, or to rewrite an otherwise deficient pleading to sustain an 

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20-10155 Opinion of the Court 13

action.” Campbell v. Air Jamaica Ltd., 760 F.3d 1165, 1168–69 (11th 

Cir. 2014) (quotation omitted).

When an appellant, including a pro se appellant, fails to 

challenge properly on appeal one of the grounds on which the 

district court based its judgment, he abandons any challenge to it. 

Timson v. Sampson, 518 F.3d 870, 874 (11th Cir. 2008).

6 An 

appellant may also abandon a claim by raising it for the first time 

in a reply brief. Sapuppo, 739 F.3d at 683. Similarly, a party may 

waive an issue by first raising it late in the proceedings before the 

district court. Thomas v. Bryant, 614 F.3d 1288, 1305–06 (11th Cir. 

2010). Generally, we will not consider an issue raised for the first 

time on appeal. Access Now, Inc. v. Sw. Airlines Co., 385 F.3d 

1324, 1331–32 (11th Cir. 2004).

Moreover, a party failing to object to a magistrate judge’s 

proposed findings or recommendations contained in a R&R 

“waives the right to challenge on appeal the district court’s order 

based on unobjected-to factual and legal conclusions if the party 

was informed of the time period for objecting and the 

consequences on appeal for failing to object.” 11th Cir. R. 3-1; see 

also Harrigan v. Metro Dade Police Dep’t Station #4, 977 F.3d 

6 An appellant also abandons a claim by: (a) making only passing references to 

it, (b) raising it in a perfunctory manner without supporting arguments and 

authority, (c) referring to it only in the “statement of the case” or “summary 

of the argument,” or (d) referring to it only in the background of his or her 

main arguments or burying it within those arguments. Sapuppo, 739 F.3d at 

681. 

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14 Opinion of the Court 20-10155

1185, 1191 (11th Cir. 2020) (explaining that we will apply Rule 3-1 

only where the party was given “clear notice” of the time period 

for objections and the consequences of failing to object).7 

i. Siddeeq’s religious discrimination claim

Siddeeq asserted that the County discriminated against him 

for his Muslim faith when it singled him out for his alleged conflict 

of interest with NWI and prohibited him from associating or 

communicating with any CHDO organizations. He argues that the 

district court erred in concluding that he did not present a similarly 

situated comparator for purposes of establishing a prima facie case 

of discrimination.8 The County argues that Siddeeq waived any 

7

Rule 3-1 provides that:

A party failing to object to a magistrate judge’s finding or 

recommendations contained in a report and recommendation in 

accordance with the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1) waives the 

right to challenge on appeal the district court’s order based on 

unobjected-to factual and legal conclusions if the party was informed 

of the time period for objecting and the consequences on appeal for 

failing to object. In the absence of a proper objection, however, the 

court may review on appeal for plain error if necessary in the interests 

of justice. 

11th Cir. R. 3-1.

8

Siddeeq claims that it was unreasonable for the district court to require him 

to identify specific individual comparators when he was the sole person 

subject to a prohibition on engaging in business transactions or 

communications with any CHDO, and that it ignored record evidence that he 

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20-10155 Opinion of the Court 15

challenge to this claim by failing to object to those portions of the 

R&R. We agree with the County.

The district court denied Siddeeq’s religious discrimination 

claim upon accepting the magistrate judge’s findings that Siddeeq 

failed to identify a valid comparator and that the record did not 

contain direct evidence of discrimination. While Siddeeq filed 

objections to the R&R, he did not object to these findings. In fact, 

he stated affirmatively in his objections that he would “not invest 

in defending the discrimination he believes did occur,” and even 

conceded that “the Court may have a point with respect to 

discrimination.” Furthermore, Siddeeq was informed of the time 

period to object and that “the Court of Appeals will deem waived 

any challenge to which there was no objection, subject to interestsof-justice plain error review” as required for Rule 3-1 to apply. 

Harrigan, 977 F.3d at 1191. Accordingly, we consider any challenge 

to the district court’s treatment of Siddeeq’s discrimination claim 

waived. 11th Cir. R. 3-1.9 Accordingly, we affirm the district 

presented regarding Habitat for Humanity’s Christian affiliation. Regardless, 

Siddeeq maintains that he identified a valid comparator group in proceedings 

below. Additionally, he argues that the County failed to show similar levels 

of concern regarding potential conflicts of interest between its employees and 

Habitat for Humanity, which supports an inference of discriminatory intent. 

9 And, we find nothing in the record that suggests that plain error review is 

appropriate in this appeal, particularly in light of Siddeeq’s concession in his 

objection to the R&R his claim may have been deficient. See Ledford v. 

Peeples, 657 F.3d 1222, 1258 (11th Cir. 2011) (explaining that the plain error 

doctrine “rarely applies in civil cases”).

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16 Opinion of the Court 20-10155

court’s grant of summary judgment on Siddeeq’s discrimination 

claim. 

ii. Siddeeq’s retaliation claim

Next, we turn to and reject Siddeeq’s argument that the 

district court erred by granting summary judgment to the County 

on his retaliation claim. We agree with the district court that 

Siddeeq failed to establish a prima facie case of retaliation because 

there was insufficient temporal proximity between Siddeeq’s filing 

of the July 2013 EEOC complaint and the subsequent adverse 

employment actions to establish a causal relationship. 

Under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (“Title VII”), 

an employer may not retaliate against an employee because the 

employee “has opposed any practice made an unlawful 

employment practice” or “has made a charge” regarding an 

unlawful employment practice under Title VII. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e3(a).

When a plaintiff relies on circumstantial rather than direct 

evidence for a retaliation claim, we generally apply the burden 

shifting framework articulated in McDonnell Douglas.10 Hurlbert 

v. St. Mary’s Health Care Sys., Inc., 439 F.3d 1286, 1297 (11th Cir. 

2006). To establish a prima facie case of retaliation under 

McDonnell Douglas, the plaintiff must show that (1) he engaged in 

a statutorily protected expression, (2) he suffered a materially 

10 McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973).

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20-10155 Opinion of the Court 17

adverse action, and (3) there was a causal link between the adverse 

action and his protected expression. Lucas v. W.W. Grainger, Inc., 

257 F.3d 1249, 1260–61 (11th Cir. 2001). A materially adverse 

employment action is an action that “might have dissuaded a 

reasonable worker from making or supporting a charge of 

discrimination.” Burlington Northern & Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. 

White, 548 U.S. 53, 68 (2006) (quotation marks omitted).

If the plaintiff presents a prima facie case, it creates a 

“presumption that the adverse action was the product of an intent 

to retaliate.” Bryant v. Jones, 575 F.3d 1281, 1308 (11th Cir. 2009). 

The burden of production then shifts to the employer to rebut the 

presumption by articulating a legitimate, non-discriminatory 

reason for the employment action. Id. If the employer produces 

such a reason, the presumption is rebutted, and the plaintiff must 

then demonstrate that the “proffered reason was merely a pretext 

to mask [retaliatory] actions.” Id.

To establish the necessary causation, a plaintiff must 

demonstrate that “[his] protected activity was a but-for cause of the 

alleged adverse action by the employer.” Univ. of Tx. Sw. Med. 

Ctr. v. Nassar, 570 U.S. 338, 362 (2013). “Importantly, throughout 

this entire process, the ultimate burden of persuasion remains on 

the employee.” Sims v. MVM, Inc., 704 F.3d 1327, 1333 (11th Cir. 

2013).

The parties do not dispute that Siddeeq engaged in a 

protected activity when he filed his July 2013 EEOC charge or 

that he suffered an adverse action when his April 2014 request to

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18 Opinion of the Court 20-10155

volunteer with CHDOs was denied and again in September 2014 

when he was terminated. Rather, the district court concluded 

that Siddeeq failed to establish a prima facie case because he failed 

to present any evidence showing a causal connection between the

filing of the July 2013 EEOC complaint and the subsequent 

adverse actions. Nine months passed between Siddeeq’s EEOC 

complaint and the first adverse action, and an additional five 

months lapsed before he was actually fired—a total of fourteen 

months. Finding a temporal connection under these 

circumstances would strain credulity and our precedent. See 

Thomas v. Cooper Lighting, Inc., 506 F.3d 1361, 1364 (11th Cir. 

2007 (explaining that, for purposes of establishing causation, the 

temporal proximity between the protected activity and the 

adverse actions “must be very close” and “[a] three to four month 

disparity” between the two was insufficient to establish causation, 

absent other evidence). 

Hence, the district court did not err by concluding that 

Siddeeq failed to establish a causal relationship between his July 

2013 EEOC complaint and subsequent adverse employment 

actions. Accordingly, because he failed to establish a prima facie

case of retaliation, summary judgment was appropriate.11 

11 Siddeeq make[s various arguments related to why he believes that the 

County’s stated reasons for his termination were pretextual and how he did 

not have a conflict of interest at the time of his termination. Because he failed 

to establish a prima facie case of retaliation, we do not reach these arguments. 

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20-10155 Opinion of the Court 19

AFFIRMED.12 

12 Siddeeq’s motion to supplement the record on appeal is DENIED.

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