If this opinion indicates that it is “FOR PUBLICATION,” it is subject to 

revision until final publication in the Michigan Appeals Reports.

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S T A T E O F M I C H I G A N

C O U R T O F A P P E A L S

SHERRIE DANIEL,

Claimant-Appellee,

UNPUBLISHED

December 26, 2019

v No. 343860

Washtenaw Circuit Court

ANN ARBOR TRANSIT AUTHORITY, also 

known as ANN ARBOR TRANSPORTATION 

AUTHORITY,

LC No. 17-000771-AE

Appellant,

and

DEPARTMENT OF TALENT AND ECONOMIC 

DEVELOPMENT/UNEMPLOYMENT 

INSURANCE AGENCY,

Appellee.

SHERRIE DANIEL,

Claimant-Appellee,

v No. 343866

Washtenaw Circuit Court

ANN ARBOR TRANSIT AUTHORITY, also 

known as ANN ARBOR TRANSPORTATION 

AUTHORITY, 

Appellee,

and

DEPARTMENT OF TALENT AND ECONOMIC 

DEVELOPMENT/UNEMPLOYMENT 

INSURANCE AGENCY,

Appellant.

LC No. 17-000771-AE
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Before: LETICA, P.J., and GADOLA and CAMERON, JJ.

PER CURIAM.

In these consolidated appeals, the Ann Arbor Area Transportation Authority (AAATA)

and the Department of Talent and Economic Development/Unemployment Insurance Agency 

(Agency) appeal by leave granted the order of the circuit court reversing the decision of the 

Michigan Compensation Appellate Commission (MCAC), which affirmed the decision of the 

administrative law judge (ALJ) denying unemployment benefits to claimant Sherrie Daniel. We 

hold that the MCAC correctly concluded that Daniel was disqualified under MCL 421.29 from 

receiving unemployment benefits. Accordingly, we reverse the decision of the circuit court. 

I. FACTS

Before January 5, 2016, Daniel worked as a motor coach operator for the AAATA. On 

June 21, 2015, Daniel suffered a heart attack; she testified that she previously suffered a heart 

attack in 2013. Daniel was on medical leave and received disability payments until 

approximately December 21, 2015. Under the collective bargaining contract with the AAATA, 

Daniel was entitled to an additional six months of unpaid medical leave. Daniel testified that she 

inquired about a desk job with the AAATA but was informed that none were available. She 

therefore took a medical retirement from her position with the AAATA on January 5, 2016, 

claiming her accrued leave time. 

Following her retirement, Daniel applied for unemployment benefits. The Agency 

denied her request, finding that Daniel had quit her job for medical reasons but without good 

cause attributable to the AAATA. Daniel’s appeal of the Agency’s determination was heard by 

an administrative law judge, who determined that because Daniel did not seek to be placed on a 

leave of absence until she recovered, she was disqualified under MCL 421.29 from receiving

unemployment benefits. Daniel appealed to the MCAC, which affirmed the ALJ’s decision. 

Daniel appealed the decision of the MCAC to the circuit court, which reversed the 

decision of the MCAC. The circuit court concluded that Daniel was not required by MCL 

421.29 to request additional leave before resigning because her medical condition was permanent 

and it would have been futile to request indefinite medical leave. The Agency and the AAATA 

now appeal the circuit court’s decision. 

II. DISCUSSION 

The Michigan Employment Security Act (MESA), MCL 421.1 et seq., is a remedial act 

designed to “safeguard the general welfare through the dispensation of benefits intended to 

ameliorate the disastrous effects of involuntary unemployment.” Korzowski v Pollack Indus, 213 

Mich App 223, 228-229; 539 NW2d 741 (1995) (quotation marks and citation omitted). The act 

is to be liberally construed, and the provisions regarding disqualification from benefits are to be 

narrowly construed. Id. 

To receive unemployment benefits under the MESA, however, an individual must be 

eligible under the act. Shirvell v Dep’t of Attorney General, 308 Mich App 702, 755-756; 866

NW2d 478 (2015). To demonstrate eligibility under the MESA, an individual must meet certain 
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threshold requirements set forth in MCL 421.28 such as filing a claim for benefits and seeking 

employment. Id. In addition, an individual will be disqualified for benefits if he or she fails to 

comply with the provisions of MCL 421.29(1)(a), which provides, in pertinent part:

(1) Except as provided in subsection (5), an individual is disqualified from 

receiving benefits if he or she:

(a) Left work voluntarily without good cause attributable to the employer or 

employing unit. An individual who left work is presumed to have left work 

voluntarily without good cause attributable to the employer or employing unit. 

An individual who is absent from work for a period of 3 consecutive work days or 

more without contacting the employer in a manner acceptable to the employer and 

of which the individual was informed at the time of hire shall be considered to 

have voluntarily left work without good cause attributable to the employer. An 

individual who becomes unemployed as a result of negligently losing a 

requirement for the job of which he or she was informed at the time of hire shall 

be considered to have voluntarily left work without good cause attributable to the 

employer. An individual claiming benefits under this act has the burden of proof 

to establish that he or she left work involuntarily or for good cause that was 

attributable to the employer or employing unit. An individual claiming to have 

left work involuntarily for medical reasons must have done all of the following 

before the leaving: secured a statement from a medical professional that 

continuing in the individual’s current job would be harmful to the individual’s 

physical or mental health; unsuccessfully attempted to secure alternative work 

with the employer; and unsuccessfully attempted to be placed on a leave of 

absence with the employer to last until the individual’s mental or physical health 

would no longer be harmed by the current job. [Emphasis added.]

Thus, an individual who leaves work without good cause attributable to the employer 

ordinarily is disqualified from receiving unemployment benefits. MCL 421.29(1)(a); Logan v 

Manpower of Lansing, Inc, 304 Mich App 550, 557; 847 NW2d 679 (2014). An individual who 

claims to have left work involuntarily for medical reasons, however, must demonstrate that 

before leaving work he or she (1) secured a statement from a medical professional that 

continuing in his or her job would be harmful to the individual’s health, (2) unsuccessfully 

attempted to secure alternative work with the employer, and (3) unsuccessfully attempted to be 

placed on a leave of absence until his or her health would no longer be harmed by returning to 

the job. MCL 421.29(1)(a). 

In this case, the Agency and the AAATA contend that Daniel failed to demonstrate the 

third requirement. The ALJ agreed and concluded, in pertinent part:

The Employer’s physician found the Claimant unable to perform her job duties as 

a bus driver. The Claimant asked [the employer] about alternative work. There 

were no other positions open at that time. The Claimant did not ask for an 

extension or additional leave before resigning for medical reasons. The Claimant 

had 12 total continuous months of leave available. . . . She resigned at 
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approximately six months. The Claimant has met the first two requirements of 

the statute, but not the third. Therefore, she is disqualified for benefits. 

The MCAC affirmed the decision of the ALJ. The circuit court, however, reversed the 

decision of the MCAC, holding that Daniel had “fulfilled all three statutory requirements of the 

involuntary leaving for medical reasons provision” of MCL 421.29(1)(a), and thus was qualified 

for benefits under the MESA. 

The MESA expressly provides for judicial review of unemployment benefits claims, 

Hodge v US Security Assoc, Inc, 497 Mich 189, 193; 859 NW2d 683 (2015), as follows, in 

relevant part: 

The circuit court . . . may review questions of fact and law on the record 

made before the [ALJ] and the [MCAC] involved in a final order or decision of 

the [MCAC], and may make further orders in respect to that order or decision as 

justice may require, but the court may reverse an order or decision only if it finds 

that the order or decision is contrary to law or is not supported by competent, 

material, and substantial evidence on the whole record. . . . [MCL 421.38(1).] 

A circuit court reviewing a decision of the MCAC thus must affirm the decision of that 

tribunal if it conforms to the law, and is supported by competent, material, and substantial 

evidence on the entire record. Hodge, 497 Mich at 193. When reviewing a lower court’s review 

of an administrative decision, this Court must determine whether the lower court “applied correct 

legal principles and whether it misapprehended or grossly misapplied the substantial evidence 

test to the agency’s factual findings, which is essentially a clear-error standard of review.” 

Lawrence v Mich Unemployment Ins Agency, 320 Mich App 422, 431; 906 NW2d 482 (2017) 

(quotation marks and citation omitted). Substantial evidence is evidence that “a reasonable mind 

would accept as adequate to support a decision, being more than a mere scintilla, but less than a 

preponderance of the evidence.” Id. (quotation marks and citation omitted). The circuit court is 

not at liberty to substitute its judgment for that of the MCAC if that decision is supported by 

substantial evidence. Hodge, 497 Mich at 193-194. We review the lower court’s legal 

conclusions de novo. Braska v Challenge Mfg Co, 307 Mich App 340, 352; 861 NW2d 289

(2014). In addition, the interpretation of a statute presents an issue of law that we review de 

novo. Muci v State Farm Mut Auto Ins Co, 478 Mich 178, 187; 732 NW2d 88 (2007). 

In this case, we conclude that the circuit court did not correctly apply the MESA and 

misapplied the substantial evidence test to the agency’s factual findings. The parties do not 

dispute, and the ALJ found, that Daniel did not unsuccessfully attempt to be placed on a leave of 

absence until her health would no longer be harmed by returning to her job. The parties also do 

not dispute that Daniel was entitled to up to 12 months consecutive leave of absence for her 

medical condition under the collective bargaining agreement, but chose to retire after six months’ 

leave of absence. Daniel contends, however, and the circuit court reasoned, that a request to 

extend her leave of absence until her health improved would have been futile in this case because 

her medical condition was permanent and her health was never going to improve enough for her 

to resume driving a bus. We disagree that this reasoning overcomes the necessity of proving the 

three requisite statutory elements for demonstrating involuntary leaving for medical reasons. 
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Moreover, contrary to the circuit court’s finding, the record is by no means clear that 

Daniel’s condition was unlikely to improve sufficiently for her to resume her previous job. A 

review of the record indicates that only two medical records were presented before the ALJ. The 

first was a letter from a cardiologist, dated September 30, 2015, which stated, in relevant part:

Mrs. Sherrie Daniel is being treated at the University of Michigan Cardiovascular 

Center for a cardiac condition. We are extending her back to work date. We will 

see her in our cardiology clinic on Wednesday, October 14 to discuss cardiac 

rehab progress and overall cardiac health. We would like to keep her off [work] 

until after this appointment. She will be able to return to work on Monday, 

October 19, 2015. 

The second record was from October 28, 2015, when Daniel presented at Concentra 

Medical Centers with a complaint of “intermittent dizziness.” Her treating physician completed 

a “Return to Work Evaluation,” stating under “Findings/Recommendations” that “@this time pt 

unable to return to work in current position as a DOT driver.” There was no evidence presented 

before the ALJ that Daniel was permanently disabled from bus driving. 

The statutory language unambiguously provides that the claimant must meet the three 

requirements articulated in MCL 421.29(1)(a) before her departure would qualify her for 

unemployment benefits as involuntarily leaving for medical reasons. See MCL 421.29(1)(a). 

The Legislature’s use of the phrase “must have done all of the following” denotes a mandatory 

requirement. Compare Fradco v Dep’t of Treasury, 495 Mich 104, 114; 845 NW2d 81 (2014) 

(“The Legislature’s use of the word ‘shall’ . . . indicates a mandatory and imperative directive.”). 

It is axiomatic that this Court will not read words into or “rewrite or embellish the statute.” See 

Byker v Mannes, 465 Mich 637, 646-647; 641 NW2d 210 (2002). Rather, we are constrained to 

enforce the statute as written. In re Jajuga Estate, 312 Mich App 706, 712; 881 NW2d 487 

(2015). Because Daniel did not unsuccessfully request a leave of absence, the ALJ and MCAC 

correctly found that she is disqualified from receiving unemployment benefits under MCL 

421.29(1)(a). The circuit court therefore misapplied the unambiguous provision of MESA and 

improperly reversed the MCAC. 

Reversed. 

/s/ Anica Letica

/s/ Michael F. Gadola

/s/ Thomas C. Cameron