# United States **Court of Appeals**  **for the Federal Circuit**

______________________ JBF RAK LLC, Plaintiff

- Appellant

v.

UNITED STATES, Defendant

- Appellee

MITSUBISHI POLYESTER FILM, INC., DUPONT TEIJIN FILMS, SKC, I NC., Defendants

______________________

2014

- 1774

______________________ Appeal from the United States Court of International Trade in No. 13- cv

- 00211, Senior Judge Judith M. Barz ilay.

______________________

Decided: June 2 4
, 2015

______________________

J ACK M LAWSKI , Galvin & Ml awski

, New York, NY, argued for plaintiff

- appellant.

M ELISSA M. D EVINE , Commercial Litigation Branch

, Civil Division, United States Department of Justice, Washington, DC, argued for defendant

- appellee. Also represented by J OYCE R. B RANDA , J EANNE E. D AVIDSON , P ATRICIA M. M C C ARTHY ; D EVIN S. S IKES , Office of theJBF RAK LLC V

. U NITED STATES 2

Chief Counsel for Import Administration, United States Department of Commerce, Washington, DC.

______________________
Before D YK , W ALLACH , and H UGHES , Circuit Judges.

W ALLACH , Circuit Judge

. Appellant JBF RAK, LLC (“JBF RAK”) appeals the United States Court of International Trade’s (“CIT”) decision sustaining the U.S. Department of Commerce’s (“Commerce”) final results of the administrative review covering polyethylene terephthalate film (“PET Film”) from the United Arab Emirates (“UAE”) for the period o f review from November 1, 2010 through October 31, 2011. See Polyethylene Terephthalate Film, Sheet, and Strip f

rom the United Arab Emirates , 78 Fed. Reg. 29,700 (Dep’t of Commerce May 21, 2013) (final results of ant idumping duty administrative review; 2010

– 2011 ) (“Final Results”). For the reasons set forth below, we affirm

. B ACKGROUND Commerce issued an antidumping duty order covering PET Film from UAE in November 2008. See Polyethylene Terephthalate Film, Sheet, and Strip from Brazil, the People’s Republic of China, and the United Arab Emirates

, 73 Fed. Reg. 66,595 (Dep’t of Commerce Nov. 10, 2008) (antidumping duty ord er s and amended final determin ation of sales at less than fair value for the United Arab Emirates ). JBF RAK is a manufacturer and exporter of PET Film from UAE, and p ursuant to 19 U.S.C. § 1675(a)(1) (2006), on November 30, 2011, it requested that Commerce conduct an administrative review of the antidumping duty order for this period of review. Co mmerce initiated its review in December 2011. See Initi ation of Antidumping and Countervailing Duty Administrative Reviews and Request fo r Revocation in Part , 76 Fed. Reg . 82,268 (Dep’t of Commerce Dec. 30, 2011) (initiation) . However, before Commerce publishedJBF RAK LLC V

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its preliminary results, Mitsubishi Polyester Film, Inc., SKC, Inc., and Toray Plastics America , Inc. (collectively “domestic prod ucers”) filed an allegation of targeted dumping 1 against JBF RAK on November 16, 2012. In that petition, the domestic producers argued Commerce should not use the average

- to

- average comparison method typically used in administrative reviews 2 because that method w ould not account for the price differences of JBF RAK’s merchandise, and should instead use an average

to

- transaction method of compari son

. On December 7, 2012, Commerce published its pr eliminary results and assigned JBF RAK a dumping ma rgin of 5.31% using its average

- to

- average comparison methodology. See Polyethylene Terephthalate Film, Sheet, and Strip from the United Arab Emirates

, 77 Fed. Reg.

1 Targeted dumping occurs in “ situations where comparable merchandise ‘ differ[s] significantly among purchasers, regions, or periods of time .’ ” U.S. Steel Corp. v. United States , 621 F.3d 1351, 1359 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (quoting 19 U.S.C. § 1677f

- 1(d)(1)(B)).

2 In 2012, Commerce revised its methodology in ad ministrative reviews from using average

- to

- transaction comparisons as its general practice in administrative reviews to average

- to

- average comparisons as the default method for calculating weigh t ed average dumping ma rgins. Union Steel v. United States , 713 F.3d 1101, 1106 n.5 (Fed. Circ. 2013) (citing Antidumping Proceedings: Calculation of th e Weighted

- Average Dumping Margin and Assessment Rate in Certain Antidumping Duty Pr oceedings; Final Modification , 77 Fed. Reg. 8,101 , 8,101 (Feb. 14, 2012) (codified at 19 C.F.R. pt. 351) (Commerce

“ will calculate weighted

- average margins of dumping and

a ntidumping duty assessment rates in a manner which provides offsets for non

- dumped comparisons while using monthly average

- to -average

. . . comparisons in reviews .”).JBF RAK LLC V

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73,010, 73,010

– 11 & n.5 (Dep’t of Commerce Dec. 7, 2012) (preliminary results of antidumping duty administrative review; 2010

– 2011 ) (“ Preliminary Results ”). In its a ccompanying Preliminary Decision Memorandum, Co mmerce indicated it “did not have sufficient time to fully analyze [the targeted dumping issue] for purposes of these preliminary results” an d that it would “address [the domestic producers’] targeted dumping allegation at a later date.” Polyethylene Terephthalate Film, Sheet, and Strip from the United Arab Emirates A- 520

- 803 (Decision Memorandum for the Preliminary Results of Antidumping Duty Administrative Review ) ( Dep’t of Commerce Nov

. 30, 2012) (J.A. 123

– 31).
On March 8, 2013, Commerce published a post

preliminary determination addressing the domestic producers’ allegation of targeted dumping. See Polyet hylene Terephthalate Film, Sheet, and Stri p from the United Arab Emirates , A

- 520

- 803 ( Post

- Preliminary Results Analysis Memo for JBF RAK LLC ) (Dep’t of Commerce Mar. 8, 2013) (J.A. 164

– 65) (“Post

- Preliminary Determination ”). Using an average

- to

- transaction co mparison methodology, Commerce determined JBF RAK had engaged in targeted dumping and assigned it a revised dumping margin of 9.80%. After interested pa rties were invited to comment on Commerce’s targeted dumping analysis, Commerce continued to apply the
average

- to

- transaction compari son methodology and carried on the dumping margin of 9.80%. See Final Results , 78 Fed. Reg. at 29,700

– 01

. JBF RAK appealed to the CIT, and in July 2014, that
court denied JBF RAK’s motion for judgment on the agency record

. JBF RAK LLC v. United States , 991 F. Supp. 2d 1343 (Ct. Int’ l Trade 2014). Before the CIT, JBF RAK challenged , inter alia, Commerce’s targeted dumping analysis, and disputed Commerce’s authority to apply the
average

- to

- transaction comparison method in administr ative reviews. The CI T held that Commerce provided aJBF RAK LLC V

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legitimate explanation for applying the average

- to

transaction method in the review, and sustained the Final Results.
JBF RAK appeals and this court has jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1295(a)(5) (2012).

D ISCUSSION I. Standard of Review and Legal Framework

The court “review[s] a decision of the [ CIT ] evaluating an antidumping determination by Commerce by reappl ying the statutory standard of review that the [ CIT ] a pplied in reviewing the administrative record.” Ta Chen Stainless Steel Pipe, Inc. v. United States , 298 F.3d 1330, 1335 (Fed. Cir. 2002). Thus, this court sustain s “any determination, finding

, or conclusion” made by Commerce unless it is “unsupported by substantial evidence on the record, or otherwise not in accordance with law.” 19 U.S.C. § 1516a(b)(1)(B)(i) (2012).
The antidumping duty statute provides for the appl ication of remedial duties to foreign goods sold, or likely to be sold, in the United States at less than fair value. Id. § 1673 (1) . A dumping margin is the amount by which “‘normal value’ (the price a producer charges in its home market) exceeds the ‘export price’ (the price of the product in the United States) or ‘constructed export price.’” U.S. Steel Corp. v. United States , 621 F.3d 1351, 1353 (Fed. Cir. 2010) ( quoting 19 U.S.C. § 1677(35)( A)). Commerce calculates a “dumping margin” for each entry of subject merchandise that is under review. See 1 9 U.S.C. § 1675(a)(2)(A)(ii) (2006)

. This court employs the two

- part test articulated in Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Cou ncil, Inc. , 467 U.S. 837 (1984) in reviewing Commerce’s interpretation of the statute. We first look to “whether Congress has directly spoken to the precise question at issue.” Id. at 842 . “[ I] f the statute is silent or ambiguousJBF RAK LLC V

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with respect to the specific issue,” we assess whether Commerce’s “answer is based on a permissible constru ction of the statute.” Id. at 843. II. Analysis
On appeal, JBF RAK claims Commerce: (1) unla wfu lly applied its targeted dumping methodology in the co ntext of an administrative review; (2) improperly considered petitioners’ allegation of targeted dumping; (3) unlawfully issued the P ost

- Preliminary D etermination; and (4) failed to consider certain facts about JBF RAK’s pricing practices in its targeted dumping determination. We address these arguments seriatim.

A. Commerce’s Targeted Dumping Analysis Is Not Co ntrary to Law JBF RAK’s primary argument on appeal is that “Commerce improperly considere d the targeting alleg ation by relying on the statutory provision for investig ations

. ” Appe llant’s Br. 7. Specifically, JBF RAK asserts that 19 U.S.C. § 1677f

- 1(d)(1)(B) 3 provides an “exception”

3 In relevant part, 19 U.S.C. § 1677f

- 1(d)(1) and (2)
state: (d) Determination of less t han fair value (1) Investigations (A) In general

In an investigation under part II of this subtitle, [Commerce] shall determine whet her the subject merchandise is being sold in the United States at less than fair value

— (i) by comparing the weighted avera ge of the normal values to the weighted average of the export prices (and constructed export prices) for comparable merchandise, or (ii) by co mparing the normal values of individual transactions to the export prices (or co n-JBF RAK LLC V

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to use an average

- to

- transaction comparison only in investigations, and it cannot be applied in administrative reviews. Id. at 6 . That is, to JBF RAK, because Congress created an explicit exception in the statute for investig ations but did not include on e in the section relating to administrative re views, Commerce is not able to use an “average

- to

- transaction” comparison in administrative reviews. The government counters that the CIT correctly

structed export prices) of individual transa ctions for comparable merchandise. (B) Exception [Commerce] may determine whether the subject merchandise is being sold in the United States at less than fair value by co mparing the weighted average of the normal values to the export prices (o r constructed export prices) of individual transactions for comparable merchandise, if

— (i) there is a pattern of export prices (or constructed e xport prices) for comparable merchandise that differ significantly among purchasers, r egions, or periods of time , and (ii) [Commerce] authority explains why such differences ca nnot be taken into account using a method d escribed in paragraph (1)(A)(i) or (ii). (2) Reviews In a review under section 1675 of this t itle, when comparing export prices (or co nstructed export prices) of individual transactions to the weighted average price of sales of the foreign like product, [Commerce] shall limit its averaging of prices to a period not exceeding the calendar month that corr esponds most closely to the calendar month of the individual export sale. 19 U.S.C. § 1677f

- 1(d).JBF RAK LLC V

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held that Commerce’s interpretation was reasonable and entitl ed to Chevron deference.

Under Chevron step one , this court first looks to “whether Congress has directly spoken to the precise question at issue.” Chevron

, 467 U.S. at 842. JB F RAK contends “the statute is not silent. The provision with respect to investigations creates an ‘exception’ and the provisions immediately after applicable to reviews, do not, and, thus, refute any asserted ambiguity or silence.” Appellant’s Br. 8. Appellant’s expressio unius est exclusio alterius line of reasoning fails. Se ction 1677f

- 1(d)(2) of Title 19 provides for calculating the dumping m argin in administrative reviews; it does not, however, provide the specific methodology to make the comparison between normal value and the actual or c onstructed export price. See 19 U.S.C. § 1677f

- 1(d)(2). Thus, because Congress did not speak to the precise question at issue, we turn to Chevron step two: whether Commerce’s interpretation “ is based on a permissible construction of the statute.” Chevron , 467 U.S. at 843. When a statute fails to make clear “any Congressio nally mandated procedure or methodology for assessment of the statutory tests,” Commerce “may perform its duties in the way it believes most suitable.” U.S. Steel Grp. v. United States

, 96 F.3d 1352, 1362 (Fed. Cir. 1996). Under Chevron , “[i]f Congress has explicitly left a gap for the agency to fill, there is an express delegation of authority to the agency to elucidate a specific provision of the sta tute by regulation. Such legislati ve regulations are given controlling weight unless they are arbitrary, capricious, or manifestly contrary to the statute.” Chevron , 467 U.S. at 843

– 44. Pursuant to 19 C.F.R. § 351.414(b) (2012), “[c] omparison of normal value with export price (co nstruct ed export price),” there are three methods by which value may be compared to export price or constructedJBF RAK LLC V

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export price: (1) average

- to

- average : “a comparison of the weighted average of the normal values with the weighted average of the export prices (and constructed export prices) for comparable merchandise ; ” (2) transaction

- to

transaction : “a comparison of the normal values of ind ividual transactions with the export prices (or constructed export prices) of individual transactions for comparable merchandise ; ” and (3) average

- to

- transaction : “a compar ison of the weighted average of the normal values to the export prices (or constructed export prices) of individual transactions for comparable merchandise.” 19 C.F.R. § 351.414(b)(1)

– (3). The regulation also st ates that in choosing the method of review “ in an investigation or review, [Commerce] will use the average

- to

- average method unless [it] determines another method is appr opriate in a particular case.” Id. at § 351.414(c)(1) (emph asis added)

. Here, Commerce “exercised its gap

- filling discretion by applying a comparison methodology[, i.e. the average

to

- transaction comparison method,] in reviews that para llels the methodology used in investigations.” JBF RAK

, 991 F. Supp. 2d at 1347. JBF RAK points to no authority that contradicts this practice. Thus, contrary to JBF RAK’s claims, Commerce’s decision to apply its average

to

- transaction comparison methodology in the context of an administrative review is reasonable. Because Co ngress did not provide for a direct methodology, Commerce properly “fill[ed] th[at] gap.” Chevron , 467 U.S. at 843.

JBF RAK also contends the Statement of Administr ative Action (“SAA”) accompanying the Uruguay Round Agreements Act “do[es] not provide the authority to apply th e explicit exception for investigations in Section 1677f

1(d)(1)(B) to administrative reviews.” Appellant’s Br. 4. JBF RAK relies on Article 2. 4.2 of the SAA, which states, “[i] n a departure from current U.S. law, Article 2.4.2 provides that in investig ations ( not reviews ), national authorities normally will establish dumping margins byJBF RAK LLC V

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comparing either: a weighted

- average of normal values to a weighted

- average of export prices of comparable me rchandise; or normal value and export price on a transa ction- to

- transaction basis.” Appellant’s Br. 12 (quoti ng SAA, H.R. No. 103

- 316, vol. 1, at 810 (1994)

, reprinted in 1994 U.S.C.C.A.N 4040, 4153 (emphasis added)

. According to JBF RAK, “[t]he parenthetical language in the SAA ‘(not reviews)’ clearly and unambig uously establishes Congress’ understanding of the obligation under the agreement that the targeting allegation is to be consi dered and, if it exists, an alternative comparison method is applied in investigations and ‘not reviews.’” Id. However, this pass age fails to address what methods Commerce may use to make comparisons between normal value and export price or constructed export price in administrative reviews ; it addresses investigations only . Moreover, as the government notes, “the SAA does not limit the pr oceedings in which Commerce may consider an alternate comparison method when an average

- to

- average or tran saction

- to

- transaction method cannot account for a pattern of United States prices that differ significantly among purcha sers, regions, or time periods.” Appellee’s Br. 20 (citing SAA at 842

– 43 ). Accordingly, the CIT correctly concluded that “[t] he fact that the statute is silent with regard to administr ative reviews does not preclude Commerce from filling gaps in the statute to properly ca lculate and assign antidum ping duties.” JBF RAK , 991 F. Supp. 2d at 1348.
B. The Targeted Dumping Allegati on Was Timely Filed Pursuant to 19 C.F.R. § 351.301 4

4 Citations to 19 C.F.R. in this opinion refer to the 2012 version, prior to the revisions that are reflected in the 2013 version, unless otherwise noted.JBF RAK LLC V

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JBF RAK next argues “that [the domestic producers’] untimely allegation of targeted dumping was improperly considered in violation of the time requirements of 19 C.F.R. § 351.301.” Appellant’s Br. 13. JBF RAK first contends the domestic producers’ targeted dumping allegation was in v iolation of § 351.301(c), which provides that rebuttal factual inf ormation must be filed within ten days of service of factual information submitted by any other interested party. See 19 C.F.R. § 351.301(c)(1).
Commerce did not categorize the targeted dumping a llegation as “rebuttal factual information,” as covered by § 351.301(c)(1). J.A. 194 (“While [ 19 C .F.R

. §] 351.301(c) (1 ) pertains to rebuttal factual information, [ the domestic producers’] targeted dumping allegation cannot reasonably be characterized as rebuttal factual information, as JBF [RAK] claims.” ). Commerce e xplained that though the “[domestic producers] used the information on the record of this review for purposes of advocating that [Commerce] consider using a different method to compare normal value and export price ( or constructed export price),” that fact “ does not transform [the domestic producers’] allegation into the submission of facts, for the facts that served as the basis for [the dome stic producers’] claim already were on the record.” J.A. 194

– 95. JBF RAK nevertheless argues that “ [a]s suming that the rebuttal facts must be ‘new,’ although there is no such requirement in the regulation, the allegation herein certainly adduced facts that were not evident from the information on record. . . . Commerce made the questio nable assertion that reliance on record information cannot be ‘new.’” Appellant’s Br. 16. However , JBF RAK points to no evidence whatsoever supporting this assertion and

we accordingly afford it no weight. Be cause the targeted dumping allegation did not present new “facts” for Co mmerce to consider, Commerce did not err in finding the domestic producers’ allegation was timely.JBF RAK LLC V

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Additionally, 19 C.F.R. § 351.301 differentiates between “factual information” under § 351 .301(c), and “certain allegations” under § 351.301(d). Subsec tion (d) detailed the timeline for submission of targeted dumping allegations in investigations under the now

- withdrawn § 351.301 (d)(5) (2007). As Commerce found, the domestic producers’ targeted dumping allegation was akin to

s ubmissions under subsection (d)

. J.A

. 195 (“ Because the nature of the filings list ed in [ 19 C.F.R. § ] 351.301(d) closely resemble [domestic producer s ’] targeted dumping allegation, (and in fact the now

- withdraw n targeted dumping allega tion was listed under that very provi sion), it stands to reason that [Commerce] properly considered [domest ic producer s’] submission as an allega tion and not rebuttal factual information. ” (footnote omitted) )

. Accordingly, domestic producers’ targeted dumping allegations were not included as part of the submissions covered by subsec tion (c), bu t rather, were more closely related to those of subsection (d).

C. The CIT Did Not Abuse I ts Discretion When I t Found JBF RAK Failed to Exhaust I ts Administrative Remedies

JBF RAK also contends Commerce erred i n failing to find the now

- withdrawn 19 C.F.R. § 351.301(d)(5) (2007) barred the domestic producers’ allegations of targeted dumping. JBF RAK argues the CIT abused its discretion when it held JBF RAK failed to exhaust its administr ative remedies, thereby “ depriv[ing] Commerce of the opportunity to ‘apply its expertise, rectify administrative mistakes, and compile a record adequate for judicial review— advancing the twin purposes of protecting a dmi n istrative agency authority and promoting judicial efficiency. ’” JBF RAK , 991 F. Supp. 2d at 1350 (citation omitted).
Relatedly, JBF RAK argues the allegation was u ntimely un der 19 C.F.R. § 351.301(b)(2) because factual information is due “ 140 days after the last day of theJBF RAK LLC V

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anniversary month ” in the final results of an administr ative review, and the domestic producers submitted their targeted dumping allegation after that date.

JBF RAK did not cite to the time limits in 19 C.F.R. § 351.301(d)(5) or (b)(2) after either the Post

- Preliminary Determination or in its administrative briefing to argue that these regulations precluded Commerce from consi dering the targeted dumping allegation. See J.A. 1 40

– 58, 171

– 87 . Under 28 U.S.C. § 2637(d), the CIT “shall, where appropriate, require the exhaustio n of administrative remedies” in civil actions arising from Commerce’s ant idumping duty determinations. The CIT “takes a ‘strict view’ of the requirement that parties exhaust their a dministrative remedies before [Commerce] in trade cases.” Corus Staal BV v. United States , 502 F.3d 1370, 1379 (Fed. Cir. 2007). Because JBF RAK failed to raise these issues before Commerce, the CIT correctly found it had not exhaust ed its administrative remedies. See 19 C.F.R. § 351.309(c)(2) (“The case brief must present a ll arg uments that continue in the submit ter’ s view to be relevant to [Commerce’s] final determination.”).
There are limited exceptions to the exhaustion do ctrine. Essar Steel, Ltd. v. United States , 753 F.3d 1368, 1374 (Fed. Cir. 2014). JBF RAK argues a CIT case deci ded after the Final R esults, Gold East Paper (Jiangsu) Co., v. United States

, 918 F. Supp. 2d 1317 (Ct

. Int ’ l Trade 2013), was an intervening legal authority that excused its failure to exhaust on the theory that

, until Gold East Paper

, JBF RAK thought that § 351.301(d)(5) of the regulations had been effectively withdrawn

. The CIT addressed this argument, explaining it “presents an interesting academic question but it is one the court need not answer.” JBF RAK , 991 F. Supp. 2d at 1350. The CIT held that, even if the regulation applied, “the go vernment may waive its procedural deadlines under ge neral principles of administrative law.” Id. To overcome these principles, JBF RAK was required to show “it wasJBF RAK LLC V

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substantially prejudiced by Commerce’s supposed viol ation of its regulatory deadlines.” Id. On appeal, JBF RAK contends “clearly JBF was substantially prejudiced by the issuance of a second preliminary determination not a uthorized under the statute,” Appellant’s Br. 14, however, JBF RAK provides no further evidence or argument, and we therefore find this contention unpersuasive.
In any event, in Gold East Paper

, the CIT found that Commerce improperly withdrew 19 C.F.R. § 351.414(f)(2) (2007)

, not § 351.301(d)(5) (2007), the regulati on at issue in the instant case. See 918 F. Supp. 2d 1325

– 28 . JBF RAK argues that it did not know it could challenge the withdrawal of § 351.301(d)(5) as inconsistent with the Administrative Procedure Act until Gold East Paper

. Appellant’s Br. 22. Howe ver, “a litigant mus t diligently protect its rights in order to be entitled to relief. ” Mukand Int’l, Ltd. v. United States , 502 F.3d 1366, 1370 (Fed. Cir. 2007). JBF RAK did not raise this issue before Commerce and we will not address it here.

D . Commerce Did Not Err in Issuing the Post

- Preliminary Results
JBF RAK next argues Commerce acted ultra vires when it issued the Post -P reliminary Determination because 19 U.S.C. § 1675(a)(2)(B)(iv) and (C) provide for only preliminary and final determinat ions. Appellant’s Br. 24. The CIT rejected the claim as “a superficial legal argument that ignores general principles of administr ative law.” JBF RAK , 991 F. Supp. 2d at 1352. This court has stated that “ ‘ [a]bsent constitutional constraints or
extreme ly compelling circumstances the administrative agencies should be free to fashion their own rules of procedure and to pursue methods of inquiry c apable of permitting them to dis charge their multitudinous duties. ’ ” PSC VSMPO

- Avisma Corp. v. United States, 688 F.3d 751, 760 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (quoting Vt. Ya nkee Nuclear Power Corp. v. Natural Res. Def. Counci l, Inc ., 435 U.S.JBF RAK LLC V

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519, 543

– 44 (1978)). Here, Commerce issued its P ost

P reliminary Determination , gave parties an opportunity to comment, “and still manag ed to issue the Final Results within the statutory time

- frame.” JBF RAK , 991 F. Supp. 2d at 1353. Accordingly, the CIT correctly found that JBF RAK was not prejudiced by Commerce’s decision to issue

a Post

- Preliminary D etermination.

E . Commerce ’s Interpretation o f 19 U.S.C. § 1677f

1(d)(1)(B)(i) Is Reasonable

JBF RAK argues that “Commerce must consider ev idence that price patterns that meet the Nails T est [ 5 ] do

5 The Nails T est involves a two

- step analysis: In the first stage of the test, the “stan dard

- deviation test,” [Commerce] determine[s] the vo l ume of the allegedly targeted group’s ( i.e ., pu r chaser, region or time period) sales of subject merchandise (by sales volume) that are at prices more than one standa rd deviation below the weighted

- average price of all sales under review, targeted and non

targeted. . . . If that volume did not exceed 33 percent of the total volume of the r espondent’s sales of subject merchandise for the allegedly targeted group, then [Co mmerce does] not conduct the second stage of the Nails Test. If that volume exceeded 33 percent of the total vo l ume of the respon dent’ s sales of subject mercha n dise for the a llegedly targeted group, on the other hand, then [Commerce] proceed[s] to the s econd stage of the Nails Test. In the second stage, the “gap test,” we examined all sales of i dentical merchandise (i.e., by [control number]) sold to the allege dly targeted group which passed the standard

-JBF RAK LLC V

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not constitute targeted dumping.” Appellant’s Br. 26 (capitalization omitted) (italics added); see Certain Steel Nails from the People’s Republic of China , 73 Fed. Reg. 33,977 (Dep’t of Commerce June 16, 2008) (final determ ination of sales at less than fair value and partial affirm ative determination of critical circumstances); Certain Stee l Nails from the United Arab Emirates , 73 Fed. Reg. 33,985 (Dep’t Commerce June 16, 2008) (notice of final determ ination of sales at not less than fair value).

deviation test. From those sales, [Co mmerce] det ermined the total volume of sales for which the difference between the weighted- average price of sales for allegedly targeted group and the next higher weighted- average price of sales to the non

targeted groups exceeds the average price gap (weighted by sa les volume) for the non

targeted groups. [Commerce] weight[s] each of the price gaps between the non -targeted groups by the combined sales volume assoc iated with the pair of prices for the non

targeted groups that defined the price gap. In doing this anal ysis, the allegedly targeted group’s sales were not included in the non

targeted groups; the allegedly tar geted group’ s average price was compared only to the average prices for the non -targeted
groups. If the volume of the sales that met this test exceeded five percent of the total sales volume of subject merchandise to the allegedly targeted group, then [Commerce] determine [s] that targeting occurred and these sales passed the Nails Test. JBF RAK , 991 F. Supp. 2d at 1354 (citation omitted)

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According to JBF RAK, “ because of its sales pra ctice [s ], it could not target customers, regions or periods of time and the pricing pattern found by Commerce was the result of market conditions.” Id. Thus, according to JBF RAK, it was “arbitrary, capricious and an abuse of discr etion to refuse to consider evidence which would tend to establish that the pricing pattern was not due to targeted sales but, instead, was for a valid business purpose.” Id. at 27. The CIT held that 19 U.S.C. § 1677f

- 1(d)(1)(B) defines “targeted dumping” in terms of a pattern of export prices, and that Commerce’s Nails T est reasonably d etermines when such a pattern exists. JBF RAK , 991 F. Supp. 2d 13 55.

Section 1677f

- 1(d)(1)(B) does not require Commerce to determine the reasons why there is a pattern of export prices for comparable merchandise that differs significantly among purchasers, regions, or time periods, nor does it mandate which comparison methods Commerce must use in administrative reviews. As a result, Co mmerce looks to its practices in antidumping duty invest igations for guidance

. Here, the CIT did not err in finding there is no intent requirement in the statute, and we agree with the CIT that requiring Commerce to determine the intent of a targeted dumping respondent “would create a tremendous burden on Commerce that is not required or suggested by t he statute.” JBF RAK , 991 F. Supp. 2d at 1355 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted)

. C ONCLUSION The court has considered JBF RAK’s other arguments and finds them unpersuasive. For the reasons set forth above, the decision of the CIT is

AFFIRM ED