DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

OFF ICE OF JUSTICE PROGRAMS

BJA NI J OJJDP BJS OVC

U.S. Department of Justice

Office of Justice Programs

Office of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention

1999 National

Report Series

Juvenile Justice Bulletin

Shay Bilchik, Administrator

DECEMBER 1999

Juvenile Justice:

A Century of Change

As the

Nation

moves into

the 21st

century, the

reduction

of juvenile

crime, violence, and

victimization

constitutes one of

the most crucial challenges of the new millennium. To meet that

challenge, reliable information is essential. Juvenile Offenders and Victims: 1999 National

Report offers a comprehensive

overview of these pervasive problems

and the response of the juvenile justice

system. The National Report brings

together statistics from a variety of sources

on a wide array of topics, presenting the

information in clear, nontechnical text

enhanced by more than 350 easy-to-read

tables, graphs, and maps.

This Bulletin series is designed to give readers

quick, focused access to some of the most critical

findings from the wealth of data in the National Report.

Each Bulletin in the series highlights selected themes

at the forefront of juvenile justice policymaking and

extracts relevant National Report sections (including

selected graphs and tables).

Administrator’s Message

In 1899, when the first proceeding of a juvenile court

convened in Chicago, it is unlikely that those in the

courtroom were aware of the momentous impact of

their actions. Yet, that beginning provided the foundation for how our Nation deals with juvenile offenders.

A century ago, the focus of the juvenile justice system

was on the juvenile offender—rather than the offense—

and that remains largely true today. The juvenile

court system is based on the principle that youth are

developmentally different from adults and more

amenable to intervention. At its best, the juvenile

court balances rehabilitation and treatment with

appropriate sanctions—including incarceration,

when necessary.

The Illinois statute also gave the court jurisdiction

over dependent, neglected, and delinquent children.

This understanding of the link between child victimization, family disorder, and the potential for child

victims to become offenders without early and

effective intervention continues to be an important

part of the juvenile court philosophy.

This Bulletin provides a thorough, easily understood

description of the development of the juvenile justice

system in the United States. It also uses the most

current data available to look at where we are headed,

and it examines the recent trend of transferring certain

juvenile cases to adult criminal court.

Contrary to what some people believe, today’s U.S.

juvenile justice system is not an “easy out” that gives

a meaningless slap on the wrist to violent youth. Nor

is it a breeding ground for gangs, drugs, and adult

crime. Instead, the juvenile justice system provides

youthful offenders and their victims with a comprehensive, yet balanced approach to justice. Probation,

treatment, and restitution are widely used. For most

juveniles who enter the system, this approach works:

54 percent of males and 73 percent of females never

return to juvenile court on a new referral.

Certainly, there are areas in the juvenile justice system

that need improvement. For example, the system

needs to prepare to handle more female offenders and

offenders under the age of 13, two groups whose

numbers are increasing. Still, the roots of the juvenile

justice system remain strong and need to be supported

by all those committed to improving the lives of our

children. At OJJDP, we intend to continue our efforts

to strengthen the juvenile justice system and achieve

the goals for which the juvenile court was first

established.

Shay Bilchik

Administrator
2 1999 National Report Series

The juvenile justice system was founded on the

concept of rehabilitation through individualized justice

John Augustus—planting the

seeds of juvenile probation

(1847)

“I bailed nineteen boys, from 7 to 15

years of age, and in bailing them it

was understood, and agreed by the

court, that their cases should be

continued from term to term for several months, as a season of probation; thus each month at the calling

of the docket, I would appear in

court, make my report, and thus the

cases would pass on for 5 or 6

months. At the expiration of this

term, twelve of the boys were

brought into court at one time, and

the scene formed a striking and

highly pleasing contrast with their

appearance when first arraigned.

The judge expressed much pleasure as well as surprise at their appearance, and remarked, that the

object of law had been accomplished and expressed his cordial

approval of my plan to save and

reform.”

Early in U.S. history, children

who broke the law were treated

the same as adult criminals

Throughout the late 18th century,

“infants” below the age of reason

(traditionally age 7) were presumed

to be incapable of criminal intent

and were, therefore, exempt from

prosecution and punishment. Children as young as 7, however, could

stand trial in criminal court for offenses committed and, if found

guilty, could be sentenced to prison

or even to death.

The 19th-century movement that

led to the establishment of the juvenile court in the U.S. had its roots in

16th-century European educational

reform movements. These earlier reform movements changed the perception of children from one of miniature adults to one of persons with

less than fully developed moral and

cognitive capacities.

As early as 1825, the Society for the

Prevention of Juvenile Delinquency

was advocating the separation of juvenile and adult offenders. Soon, facilities exclusively for juveniles

were established in most major cities. By mid-century, these privately

operated youth “prisons” were under criticism for various abuses.

Many States then took on the responsibility of operating juvenile

facilities.

The first juvenile court in this

country was established in Cook

County, Illinois, in 1899

Illinois passed the Juvenile Court

Act of 1899, which established the

Nation’s first juvenile court. The

British doctrine of parens patriae

(the State as parent) was the rationale for the right of the State to intervene in the lives of children in a

manner different from the way it intervenes in the lives of adults. The

doctrine was interpreted to mean

that, because children were not of

full legal capacity, the State had the

inherent power and responsibility

to provide protection for children

whose natural parents were not providing appropriate care or supervision. A key element was the focus

on the welfare of the child. Thus,

the delinquent child was also seen

as in need of the court’s benevolent

intervention.

Juvenile courts flourished for the

first half of the 20th century

By 1910, 32 States had established

juvenile courts and/or probation

services. By 1925, all but two States

had followed suit. Rather than

merely punishing delinquents for

their crimes, juvenile courts sought

to turn delinquents into productive

citizens—through treatment.

The mission to help children in

trouble was stated clearly in the

laws that established juvenile

courts. This benevolent mission led

to procedural and substantive differences between the juvenile and

criminal justice systems.

During the next 50 years, most juvenile courts had exclusive original

jurisdiction over all youth under age

18 who were charged with violating

criminal laws. Only if the juvenile

court waived its jurisdiction in a

case could a child be transferred to

criminal court and tried as an adult.

Transfer decisions were made on a

case-by-case basis using a “best

interests of the child and public”

standard, and were thus within the

realm of individualized justice.

The focus on offenders and not

offenses, on rehabilitation and

not punishment, had substantial

procedural impact

Unlike the criminal justice system,

where district attorneys select

cases for trial, the juvenile court

controlled its own intake. And unlike criminal prosecutors, juvenile

court intake considered extra-legal

as well as legal factors in deciding

how to handle cases. Juvenile court

intake also had discretion to handle

cases informally, bypassing judicial

action.
December 1999 3

In the courtroom, juvenile court

hearings were much less formal

than criminal court proceedings. In

this benevolent court—with the express purpose of protecting children—due process protections afforded criminal defendants were

deemed unnecessary. In the early juvenile courts, and even in some to

this day, attorneys for the State and

the youth are not considered essential to the operation of the system,

especially in less serious cases.

A range of dispositional options was

available to a judge wanting to help

rehabilitate a child. Regardless of offense, outcomes ranging from warnings to probation supervision to

training school confinement could

be part of the treatment plan.

Dispositions were tailored to “the

best interests of the child.” Treatment lasted until the child was

“cured” or became an adult (age

21), whichever came first.

As public confidence in the

treatment model waned, due

process protections were

introduced

In the 1950’s and 1960’s, many came

to question the ability of the juvenile court to succeed in rehabilitating delinquent youth. The treatment

techniques available to juvenile justice professionals never reached the

desired levels of effectiveness. Although the goal of rehabilitation

through individualized justice—the

basic philosophy of the juvenile justice system—was not in question,

professionals were concerned about

the growing number of juveniles

institutionalized indefinitely in the

name of treatment.

In a series of decisions beginning in

the 1960’s, the U.S. Supreme Court

required that juvenile courts become more formal—more like criminal courts. Formal hearings were

now required in waiver situations,

and delinquents facing possible confinement were given protection

against self-incrimination and rights

to receive notice of the charges

against them, to present witnesses,

to question witnesses, and to have

an attorney. Proof “beyond a reasonable doubt” rather than merely “a

preponderance of evidence” was

now required for an adjudication.

The Supreme Court, however, still

held that there were enough “differences of substance between the

criminal and juvenile courts . . . to

hold that a jury is not required in

the latter.” (See Supreme Court decisions later in this Bulletin.)

Meanwhile Congress, in the Juvenile

Delinquency Prevention and Control

Act of 1968, recommended that children charged with noncriminal (status) offenses be handled outside

the court system. A few years later,

Some juvenile codes emphasize prevention and treatment goals,

some stress punishment, but most seek a balanced approach

There is much variation in the way

State statutes define the purposes of

their juvenile courts. Some declare

their goals in exhaustive detail, even

listing specific programs and sentencing options; others mention only

broad aims. Most States seek to protect the interests of the child, the family, the community, or a combination

of the three. Nearly all States also include protections of the child’s constitutional and statutory rights. Many

States have amended their purpose

clauses, reflecting philosophical shifts

or changes in emphasis in the overall

approach to juvenile delinquency.

■ Several states have purpose

clauses that are modeled on the

one in the Standard Juvenile

Court Act. The Act was originally

issued in 1925, but the most influential version was prepared

in 1959. The declared purpose

was that “each child coming within the jurisdiction of the court

shall receive...the care, guidance,

and control that will conduce to

his welfare and the best interest

of the state, and that when he is

removed from the control of his

parents the court shall secure for

him care as nearly as possible

equivalent to that which they

should have given him.”

■ In several other States, the purpose clause is based on the language contained in the Legislative

Guide for Drafting Family and Juvenile Court Acts, a publication issued in the late 1960’s. The Guide

declares four purposes: (a) “to

provide for the care, protection,

and wholesome mental and

physical development of children”

involved with the juvenile court;

(b) “to remove from children committing delinquent acts the consequences of criminal behavior, and

to substitute therefor a program of

supervision, care and rehabilitation;” (c) to remove a child from

the home “only when necessary

for his welfare or in the interests

of public safety;” and (d) to assure

all parties “their constitutional and

other legal rights.”

■ As of the end of 1997 legislative session, in 17 States, the juvenile court purpose clause incorporates the language of the

balanced and restorative justice

philosophy, emphasizing offender

accountability, public safety, and

competency development.

Source: Authors’ adaptation of Griffin’s Frequently asked questions: Juvenile court purpose

clauses. State profiles [web site]. Pittsburgh, PA: NCJJ.
4 1999 National Report Series

Congress passed the Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention Act

of 1974, which as a condition for

State participation in the Formula

Grants program required deinstitutionalization of status offenders and

nonoffenders as well as the separation of juvenile delinquents from

adult offenders. (In the 1980 amendments to the 1974 Act, Congress

added a requirement that juveniles

be removed from adult jail and

lockup facilities.) Community-based

programs, diversion, and deinstitutionalization became the banners of

juvenile justice policy in the 1970’s.

In the 1980’s, the pendulum began

to swing toward law and order

During the 1980’s, the public perceived that serious juvenile crime

was increasing and that the system

was too lenient with offenders. Although there was substantial

misperception regarding increases

in juvenile crime, many States responded by passing more punitive

laws. Some laws removed certain

classes of offenders from the juvenile justice system and handled

them as adult criminals in criminal

court. Others required the juvenile

justice system to be more like the

criminal justice system and to treat

certain classes of juvenile offenders

as criminals but in juvenile court.

As a result, offenders charged with

certain offenses are excluded from

juvenile court jurisdiction or face

mandatory or automatic waiver to

criminal court. In some States, concurrent jurisdiction provisions give

prosecutors the discretion to file

certain juvenile cases directly in

criminal court rather than juvenile

court. In some States, some adjudicated juvenile offenders face mandatory sentences.

The core requirements of the Juvenile Justice and Delinquency

Prevention Act primarily address custody issues

The Juvenile Justice and Delinquency

Prevention Act of 1974, as amended,

(the Act) establishes four custodyrelated requirements:

■ The “deinstitutionalization of status

offenders and nonoffenders” requirement (1974) specifies that juveniles

not charged with acts that would be

crimes for adults “shall not be

placed in secure detention facilities

or secure correctional facilities.”

■ The “sight and sound separation”

requirement (1974) specifies that,

“juveniles alleged to be or found to

be delinquent and [status offenders and nonoffenders] shall not be

detained or confined in any institution in which they have contact

with adult persons incarcerated

because they have been convicted

of a crime or are awaiting trial on

criminal charges.” This requires

that juvenile and adult inmates

cannot see each other and no conversation between them is possible.

■ The “jail and lockup removal” requirement (1980) states that juveniles shall not be detained or confined in adult jails or lockups.

There are, however, several exceptions to the jail and lockup removal requirement. Regulations

implementing the Act exempt juveniles held in secure adult facilities

if the juvenile is being tried as a

criminal for a felony or has been

convicted as a criminal felon. In

addition, there is a 6-hour grace

period that allows adult jails and

lockups to hold delinquents temporarily until other arrangements can

be made. Jails and lockups in rural

areas may hold delinquents up to

24 hours under certain conditions.

Some jurisdictions have obtained

approval for separate juvenile detention centers that are collocated

with an adult jail or lockup facility.

■ The “disproportionate confinement

of minority youth” requirement

(1992) specifies that States determine the existence and extent of

the problem in their State and demonstrate efforts to reduce it where it

exists.

Regulations effective December 10,

1996, modify the Act’s requirements in

several ways:

■ Clarify the sight and sound separation requirement—in nonresidential

areas brief, accidental contact is

not a reportable violation.

■ Permit time-phased use of nonresidential areas for both juveniles and

adults in collocated facilities.

■ Expand the 6-hour grace period to

include 6 hours both before and after court appearances.

■ Allow adjudicated delinquents to be

transferred to adult institutions once

they have reached the State’s age

of full criminal responsibility, where

such transfer is expressly authorized by State law.

The revised regulations offer flexibility

to States in carrying out the Act’s requirements. States must agree to comply with each requirement to receive

Formula Grants funds under the Act’s

provisions. States must submit plans

outlining their strategy for meeting the

requirements and other statutory plan

requirements. Noncompliance with

core requirements results in the loss of

25% of the State’s annual Formula

Grants program allocation.

As of 1998, 55 of 57 eligible States and

territories are participating in the Formula Grants program. Annual State

monitoring reports show that the vast

majority are in compliance with the requirements, either reporting no violations or meeting de minimis or other

compliance criteria.
December 1999 5

From 1992 through 1997, legislatures in 47 States and the District

of Columbia enacted laws that made their juvenile justice systems

more punitive

Changes in Changes in

State law or court rule* State law or court rule*

Alabama T C Montana T S C

Alaska T C Nebraska

Arizona T S C Nevada T C

Arkansas T S C New Hampshire T S C

California T C New Jersey S C

Colorado T S C New Mexico T S C

Connecticut T S C New York

Delaware T S C North Carolina T C

D. of Columbia T S North Dakota T C

Florida T S C Ohio T S C

Georgia T S C Oklahoma T S C

Hawaii T C Oregon T S C

Idaho T S C Pennsylvania T C

Illinois T S C Rhode Island T S C

Indiana T S C South Carolina T C

Iowa T S C South Dakota T

Kansas T S C Tennessee T S C

Kentucky T S C Texas T S C

Louisiana T S C Utah T C

Maine C Vermont

Maryland T C Virginia T S C

Massachusetts T S C Washington T C

Michigan S C West Virginia T C

Minnesota T S C Wisconsin T S C

Mississippi T C Wyoming T C

Missouri T S C

*T = Transfer provisions, S = Sentencing authority, C = Confidentiality

Source: Authors’ adaptation of Torbet et al.’s State responses to serious and violent juvenile crime and Torbet and Szymanski’s State legislative responses to violent juvenile crime:

1996–97 update.

The 1990’s have been a time of

unprecedented change as State

legislatures crack down on

juvenile crime

Five areas of change have emerged

as States passed laws designed to

crack down on juvenile crime. These

laws generally involve expanded eligibility for criminal court processing

and adult correctional sanctioning

and reduced confidentiality protections for a subset of juvenile offenders. Between 1992 and 1997, all but

three States changed laws in one or

more of the following areas:

■ Transfer provisions—Laws made

it easier to transfer juvenile offenders from the juvenile justice

system to the criminal justice

system (45 States).

■ Sentencing authority—Laws gave

criminal and juvenile courts expanded sentencing options (31

States).

■ Confidentiality—Laws modified

or removed traditional juvenile

court confidentiality provisions

by making records and proceedings more open (47 States).

In addition to these areas, there was

change relating to:

■ Victims rights—Laws increased

the role of victims of juvenile

crime in the juvenile justice process (22 States).

■ Correctional programming—As

a result of new transfer and sentencing laws, adult and juvenile

correctional administrators developed new programs.

The 1980’s and 1990’s have seen significant change in terms of treating

more juvenile offenders as criminals. Recently, States have been attempting to strike a balance in their

juvenile justice systems among system and offender accountability, offender competency development,

and community protection. Juvenile

code purpose clauses also incorporate restorative justice language (offenders repair the harm done to victims and communities and accept

responsibility for their criminal actions). Many States have added to

the purpose clauses of their juvenile

codes phrases such as:

■ Hold juveniles accountable for

criminal behavior.

■ Provide effective deterrents.

■ Protect the public from criminal

activity.

■ Balance attention to offenders,

victims, and the community.

■ Impose punishment consistent

with the seriousness of the

crime.
6 1999 National Report Series

U.S. Supreme Court cases have had an impact on the

character and procedures of the juvenile justice system

The Supreme Court has made its

mark on juvenile justice

Issues arising from juvenile delinquency proceedings rarely come before the U.S. Supreme Court. Beginning in the late 1960’s, however, the

Court decided a series of landmark

cases that dramatically changed the

character and procedures of the

juvenile justice system.

Kent v. United States

383 U.S. 541, 86 S.Ct. 1045 (1966)

In 1961, while on probation from an

earlier case, Morris Kent, age 16,

was charged with rape and robbery.

Kent confessed to the offense as

well as to several similar incidents.

Assuming that the District of Columbia juvenile court would consider

waiving jurisdiction to the adult system, Kent’s attorney filed a motion

requesting a hearing on the issue of

jurisdiction.

The juvenile court judge did not

rule on this motion filed by Kent’s

attorney. Instead, he entered a motion stating that the court was waiving jurisdiction after making a “full

investigation.” The judge did not describe the investigation or the

grounds for the waiver. Kent was

subsequently found guilty in criminal court on six counts of housebreaking and robbery and sentenced to 30 to 90 years in prison.

Kent’s lawyer sought to have the

criminal indictment dismissed, arguing that the waiver had been invalid.

He also appealed the waiver and

filed a writ of habeas corpus asking

the State to justify Kent’s detention.

Appellate courts rejected both the

appeal and the writ, refused to scrutinize the judge’s “investigation,”

and accepted the waiver as valid. In

appealing to the U.S. Supreme

Court, Kent’s attorney argued that

the judge had not made a complete

investigation and that Kent was denied constitutional rights simply because he was a minor.

The Court ruled the waiver invalid,

stating that Kent was entitled to a

hearing that measured up to “the essentials of due process and fair

treatment,” that Kent’s counsel

should have had access to all

records involved in the waiver, and

that the judge should have provided

a written statement of the reasons

for waiver.

Technically, the Kent decision applied only to D.C. courts, but its impact was more widespread. The

Court raised a potential constitutional challenge to parens patriae as

the foundation of the juvenile court.

In its past decisions, the Court had

interpreted the equal protection

clause of the 14th amendment to

mean that certain classes of people

could receive less due process if a

“compensating benefit” came with

this lesser protection. In theory, the

juvenile court provided less due

process but a greater concern for

the interests of the juvenile. The

Court referred to evidence that this

compensating benefit may not exist

in reality and that juveniles may receive the “worst of both worlds”—

“neither the protection accorded to

adults nor the solicitous care and

regenerative treatment postulated

for children.”

In re Gault

387 U.S. 1, 87 S.Ct. 1428 (1967)

Gerald Gault, age 15, was on probation in Arizona for a minor property

offense when, in 1964, he and a

friend made a crank telephone call

to an adult neighbor, asking her,

“Are your cherries ripe today?” and

“Do you have big bombers?” Identified by the neighbor, the youth were

arrested and detained.

The victim did not appear at the

adjudication hearing, and the court

never resolved the issue of whether

Gault made the “obscene” remarks.

Gault was committed to a training

school for the period of his minority. The maximum sentence for an

adult would have been a $50 fine or

2 months in jail.

An attorney obtained for Gault after

the trial filed a writ of habeas corpus that was eventually heard by

the U.S. Supreme Court. The issue

presented in the case was that

Gault’s constitutional rights (to notice of charges, counsel, questioning

of witnesses, protection against selfincrimination, a transcript of the

proceedings, and appellate review)

were denied.

The Court ruled that in hearings

that could result in commitment to

an institution, juveniles have the

right to notice and counsel, to question witnesses, and to protection

against self-incrimination. The Court

did not rule on a juvenile’s right to

appellate review or transcripts, but

encouraged the States to provide

those rights.

The Court based its ruling on the

fact that Gault was being punished

rather than helped by the juvenile

court. The Court explicitly rejected

the doctrine of parens patriae as the

founding principle of juvenile justice,

describing the concept as murky and

of dubious historical relevance. The

Court concluded that the handling

of Gault’s case violated the due

process clause of the 14th amendment: “Juvenile court history has

again demonstrated that unbridled

discretion, however benevolently
December 1999 7

1965 1970 1975 1980 1985 1990

Kent v. United States (1966)

 Courts must provide the “essen-

 tials of due process” in transferring

 juveniles to the adult system.

Breed v. Jones (1975)

 Waiver of a juvenile to criminal court

 following adjudication in juvenile court

 constitutes double jeopardy.

Oklahoma Publishing Co. v. District Court (1977)

Smith v. Daily Mail Publishing Co. (1979)

 The press may report juvenile court

 proceedings under certain circumstances.

Eddings v. Oklahoma (1982)*

 Defendant’s youthful age should be con-

 sidered a mitigating factor in deciding

 whether to apply the death penalty.

Schall v. Martin (1984)

 Preventive “pretrial” detention of

 juveniles is allowable under certain

 circumstances.

Thompson v. Oklahoma (1988)*

Stanford v. Kentucky (1989)*

 Minimum age for death penalty

 is set at 16.

In re Gault (1967)

 In hearings that could result in commit-

 ment to an institution, juveniles have

 four basic constitutional rights.

In re Winship (1970)

 In delinquency matters, the State

 must prove its case beyond a

 reasonable doubt.

McKeiver v. Pennsylvania (1971)

 Jury trials are not constitutionally

 required in juvenile court hearings.

A series of U.S. Supreme Court decisions made juvenile courts more like criminal courts but maintained

some important differences

motivated, is frequently a poor substitute for principle and procedure.”

In re Winship

397 U.S. 358, 90 S.Ct. 1068 (1970)

Samuel Winship, age 12, was

charged with stealing $112 from a

woman’s purse in a store. A store

employee claimed to have seen

Winship running from the scene just

before the woman noticed the

money was missing; others in the

store stated that the employee was

not in a position to see the money

being taken.

Winship was adjudicated delinquent

and committed to a training school.

New York juvenile courts operated

under the civil court standard of a

“preponderance of evidence.” The

court agreed with Winship’s attorney that there was “reasonable

doubt” of Winship’s guilt, but based

its ruling on the “preponderance” of

evidence.

Upon appeal to the Supreme Court,

the central issue in the case was

whether “proof beyond a reasonable doubt” should be considered

among the “essentials of due process and fair treatment” required

during the adjudicatory stage of the

juvenile court process. The Court

rejected lower court arguments that

juvenile courts were not required to

operate on the same standards as

adult courts because juvenile courts

were designed to “save” rather than

to “punish” children. The Court

ruled that the “reasonable doubt”

standard should be required in all

delinquency adjudications.

McKeiver v. Pennsylvania

403 U.S. 528, 91 S.Ct. 1976 (1971)

Joseph McKeiver, age 16, was

charged with robbery, larceny, and

receiving stolen goods. He and 20 to

30 other youth allegedly chased 3

*For discussion of death penalty case decisions, see page 211 of Juvenile Offenders and Victims: 1999 National Report.
8 1999 National Report Series

youth and took 25 cents from them.

McKeiver met with his attorney for

only a few minutes before his adjudicatory hearing. At the hearing, his

attorney’s request for a jury trial

was denied by the court. He was

subsequently adjudicated and

placed on probation.

The State supreme court cited recent decisions of the U.S. Supreme

Court that had attempted to include

more due process in juvenile court

proceedings without eroding the essential benefits of the juvenile court.

The State supreme court affirmed

the lower court, arguing that of all

due process rights, trial by jury is

most likely to “destroy the traditional

character of juvenile proceedings.”

The U.S. Supreme Court found that

the due process clause of the 14th

amendment did not require jury trials in juvenile court. The impact of

the Court’s Gault and Winship decisions was to enhance the accuracy

of the juvenile court process in the

fact-finding stage. In McKeiver, the

Court argued that juries are not

known to be more accurate than

judges in the adjudication stage and

could be disruptive to the informal

atmosphere of the juvenile court,

tending to make it more adversarial.

Breed v. Jones

421 U.S. 519, 95 S.Ct. 1779 (1975)

In 1970, Gary Jones, age 17, was

charged with armed robbery. Jones

appeared in Los Angeles juvenile

court and was adjudicated delinquent on the original charge and

two other robberies.

At the dispositional hearing, the

judge waived jurisdiction over the

case to criminal court. Counsel for

Jones filed a writ of habeas corpus,

arguing that the waiver to criminal

court violated the double jeopardy

clause of the fifth amendment. The

court denied this petition, saying

that Jones had not been tried twice

because juvenile adjudication is not

a “trial” and does not place a youth

in jeopardy.

Upon appeal, the U.S. Supreme

Court ruled that an adjudication in

juvenile court, in which a juvenile is

found to have violated a criminal

statute, is equivalent to a trial in

criminal court. Thus, Jones had

been placed in double jeopardy. The

Court also specified that jeopardy

applies at the adjudication hearing

when evidence is first presented.

Waiver cannot occur after jeopardy

attaches.

Oklahoma Publishing Company

v. District Court in and for

Oklahoma City

480 U.S. 308, 97 S.Ct. 1045 (1977)

The Oklahoma Publishing Company

case involved a court order prohibiting the press from reporting the

name and photograph of a youth involved in a juvenile court proceeding. The material in question was

obtained legally from a source outside the court. The U.S. Supreme

Court found the court order to be

an unconstitutional infringement on

freedom of the press.

Smith v. Daily Mail Publishing

Company

443 U.S. 97, 99 S.Ct. 2667 (1979)

The Daily Mail case held that State

law cannot stop the press from publishing a juvenile’s name that it obtained independently of the court.

Although the decision did not hold

that the press should have access

to juvenile court files, it held that if

information regarding a juvenile

case is lawfully obtained by the media, the first amendment interest in

a free press takes precedence over

the interests in preserving the anonymity of juvenile defendants.

Schall v. Martin

467 U.S. 253, 104 S.Ct. 2403 (1984)

Gregory Martin, age 14, was arrested in 1977 and charged with robbery, assault, and possession of a

weapon. He and two other youth allegedly hit a boy on the head with a

loaded gun and stole his jacket and

sneakers.

Martin was held pending adjudication because the court found there

was a “serious risk” that he would

commit another crime if released.

Martin’s attorney filed a habeas corpus action challenging the fundamental fairness of preventive detention. The lower appellate courts

reversed the juvenile court’s detention order, arguing in part that pretrial detention is essentially punishment because many juveniles

detained before trial are released

before, or immediately after,

adjudication.

The U.S. Supreme Court upheld the

constitutionality of the preventive

detention statute. The Court stated

that preventive detention serves a

legitimate State objective in protecting both the juvenile and society

from pretrial crime and is not intended to punish the juvenile. The

Court found there were enough procedures in place to protect juveniles

from wrongful deprivation of liberty.

The protections were provided by

notice, a statement of the facts and

reasons for detention, and a probable cause hearing within a short

time. The Court also reasserted the

parens patriae interests of the State

in promoting the welfare of children.
December 1999 9

State statutes define who is under the jurisdiction of

juvenile court

State statutes define age limits

for the original jurisdiction of the

juvenile court

In most States, the juvenile court

has original jurisdiction over all

youth charged with a law violation

who were below the age of 18 at the

time of the offense, arrest, or referral to court. Since 1975, four States

have changed their age criteria: Alabama increased its upper age from

15 to 16 in 1976 and to 17 in 1977;

Wyoming reduced its upper age

from 18 to 17 in 1993; and New

Hampshire and Wisconsin lowered

their upper age from 17 to 16 in

1996.

Oldest age for original juvenile court jurisdiction in delinquency matters:

Age State

15 Connecticut, New York, North

Carolina

16 Georgia, Illinois, Louisiana, Massachusetts, Michigan, Missouri,

New Hampshire, South Carolina,

Texas, Wisconsin

17 Alabama, Alaska, Arizona, Arkansas, California, Colorado, Delaware, District of Columbia,

Florida, Hawaii, Idaho, Indiana,

Iowa, Kansas, Kentucky, Maine,

Maryland, Minnesota, Mississippi,

Montana, Nebraska, Nevada,

New Jersey, New Mexico, North

Dakota, Ohio, Oklahoma, Oregon,

Pennsylvania, Rhode Island,

South Dakota, Tennessee, Utah,

Vermont, Virginia, Washington,

West Virginia, Wyoming

Many States have higher upper ages

of juvenile court jurisdiction in status offense, abuse, neglect, or dependency matters—typically

through age 20.

In many States, the juvenile court

has original jurisdiction over young

adults who committed offenses while

juveniles. Many States exclude married or otherwise emancipated juveniles from juvenile court jurisdiction.

Many States have statutory exceptions to basic age criteria. The exceptions, related to the youth’s age,

alleged offense, and/or prior court

history, place certain youth under

the original jurisdiction of the criminal court. In some States, a combination of the youth’s age, offense,

and prior record places the youth

under the original jurisdiction of

both the juvenile and criminal

courts. In these situations where juvenile and criminal courts have concurrent jurisdiction, the prosecutor

has the authority to decide which

court will initially handle the case.

Statutes in 16 States determine

the lowest age of juvenile court

delinquency jurisdiction

Youngest age for original juvenile court

jurisdiction in delinquency matters:

Age State

 6 North Carolina

 7 Maryland, Massachusetts,

New York

 8 Arizona

10 Arkansas, Colorado, Kansas,

Louisiana, Minnesota, Mississippi, Pennsylvania, South Dakota, Texas, Vermont, Wisconsin

In most States, juvenile court

authority over a youth may

extend beyond the upper age

of original jurisdiction

Through extended jurisdiction

mechanisms, legislatures enable the

court to provide sanctions and services for a duration of time that is in

the best interests of the juvenile and

the public, even for older juveniles

who have reached the age at which

original juvenile court jurisdiction

ends.

Oldest age over which the juvenile

court may retain jurisdiction for disposition purposes in delinquency matters:

Age State

17 Arizona*, North Carolina

18 Alaska, Iowa, Kentucky, Nebraska, Oklahoma, Tennessee

19 Mississippi, North Dakota

20 Alabama, Arkansas, Connecticut,

Delaware, District of Columbia,

Florida, Georgia, Idaho, Illinois,

Indiana, Louisiana, Maine, Maryland, Massachusetts, Michigan,

Minnesota, Missouri, Nevada,

New Hampshire, New Mexico,

New York, Ohio, Pennsylvania,

Rhode Island, South Carolina,

South Dakota, Texas, Utah, Vermont, Virginia, Washington, West

Virginia, Wyoming

22 Kansas

24 California, Montana, Oregon, Wisconsin

** Colorado, Hawaii, New Jersey

*Arizona statute extends jurisdiction through

age 20, but a 1979 State Supreme Court decision held that juvenile court jurisdiction terminates at age 18.

**Until the full term of the disposition order.

Note: Extended jurisdiction may be restricted

to certain offenses or juveniles.

In some States, the juvenile court

may impose adult correctional sanctions on certain adjudicated delinquents that extend the term of confinement well beyond the upper age

of juvenile jurisdiction. Such sentencing options are included in the

set of dispositional options known

as “blended sentencing.”
10 1999 National Report Series

The juvenile justice system differs from the criminal

justice system, but there is common ground

The juvenile justice system

grew out of the criminal

justice system

After working within the criminal

justice system, designers of the

juvenile justice system retained

many of the components of the

criminal justice system as they constructed a new process to respond

to delinquent youth. An understanding of what was retained and what

was changed helps to make clear

the basic differences between the

two systems as they exist today.

During its nearly 100-year history,

the juvenile justice system in the

U.S. has seen fundamental changes

in certain aspects of process and

philosophy. Recently, there has

been some discussion about the

possibility of essentially merging

the juvenile and criminal systems.

An understanding of similarities and

differences between the two systems is valuable in assessing the

implications of the proposed

changes.

■ Youth behavior is malleable.

■ Rehabilitation is usually a viable

goal.

■ Youth are in families and not

independent.

Although the juvenile and criminal justice systems are more alike in some jurisdictions than in others,

generalizations can be made about the distinctions between the two systems and about their common

ground

Juvenile justice system Common ground Criminal justice system

■ Community protection is a primary

goal.

■ Law violators must be held

accountable.

■ Constitutional rights apply.

■ Sanctions should be proportional

to the offense.

■ General deterrence works.

■ Rehabilitation is not a primary

goal.

Operating Assumptions

■ Many specific delinquency prevention activities (e.g., school, church,

recreation) are used.

■ Prevention is intended to change

individual behavior and is often focused on reducing risk factors and

increasing protective factors in the

individual, family, and

community.

■ Specialized “juvenile” units are

used.

■ Some additional behaviors are

prohibited (truancy, running away,

curfew violations).

■ Some limitations are placed on

public access to information.

■ A significant number of youth are

diverted away from the juvenile

justice system, often into alternative programs.

■ Educational approaches are taken

to specific behaviors (drunk driving, drug use).

■ Jurisdiction involves the full range

of criminal behavior.

■ Constitutional and procedural

safeguards exist.

■ Both reactive and proactive approaches (targeted at offense

types, neighborhoods, etc.) are

used.

■ Community policing strategies are

employed.

■ Prevention activities are generalized and are aimed at deterrence

(e.g., Crime Watch).

■ Open public access to all information is required.

■ Law enforcement exercises discretion to divert offenders out of

the criminal justice system.

Prevention

Law Enforcement
December 1999 11

■ In many instances, juvenile court

intake, not the prosecutor, decides

what cases to file.

■ The decision to file a petition for

court action is based on both

social and legal factors.

■ A significant portion of cases are

diverted from formal case

processing.

■ Intake or the prosecutor diverts

cases from formal processing to

services operated by the juvenile

court, prosecutor’s office, or outside agencies.

■ Probable cause must be

established.

■ The prosecutor acts on behalf of

the State.

■ Plea bargaining is common.

■ The prosecution decision is based

largely on legal facts.

■ Prosecution is valuable in building

history for subsequent offenses.

■ Prosecution exercises discretion

to withhold charges or divert offenders out of the criminal justice

system.

Juvenile justice system Common ground Criminal justice system

Adjudication—Conviction

Detention—Jail/lockup

■ Juveniles may be detained for their

own protection or the community’s

protection.

■ Juveniles may not be confined

with adults unless there is “sight

and sound separation.”

■ Juvenile court proceedings are

“quasi-civil” (not criminal) and may

be confidential.

■ If guilt is established, the youth is

adjudicated delinquent regardless

of offense.

■ Right to jury trial is not afforded in

all States.

■ Standard of “proof beyond a reasonable doubt” is required.

■ Rights to be represented by an attorney, to confront witnesses, and

to remain silent are afforded.

■ Appeals to a higher court are

allowed.

■ Experimentation with specialized

courts (i.e., drug courts, gun

courts) is under way.

■ Accused offenders may be held in

custody to ensure their appearance in court.

■ Detention alternatives of home or

electronic detention are used.

■ Defendants have a constitutional

right to a jury trial.

■ Guilt must be established on individual offenses charged for

conviction.

■ All proceedings are open.

■ Accused individuals have the right

to apply for bond/bail release.

Intake—Prosecution
12 1999 National Report Series

■ Decisions are influenced by current offense, offending history, and

social factors.

■ Decisions hold offenders

accountable.

■ Decisions may give consideration

to victims (e.g., restitution and “no

contact” orders).

■ Decisions may not be cruel or

unusual.

■ Sentencing decisions are bound

primarily by the severity of the current offense and by the offender’s

criminal history.

■ Sentencing philosophy is based

largely on proportionality and

punishment.

■ Sentence is often determinate,

based on offense.

■ Disposition decisions are based

on individual and social factors,

offense severity, and youth’s

offense history.

■ Dispositional philosophy includes

a significant rehabilitation

component.

■ Many dispositional alternatives

are operated by the juvenile court.

■ Dispositions cover a wide range of

community-based and residential

services.

■ Disposition orders may be directed to people other than the offender (e.g., parents).

■ Disposition may be indeterminate,

based on progress demonstrated

by the youth.

Juvenile justice system Common ground Criminal justice system

■ Function combines surveillance

and reintegration activities (e.g.,

family, school, work).

■ The behavior of individuals released from correctional settings is

monitored.

■ Violation of conditions can result

in reincarceration.

■ Function is primarily surveillance

and reporting to monitor illicit

behavior.

Disposition—Sentencing

Aftercare—Parole
December 1999 13

All States allow juveniles to be tried as adults in

criminal court under certain circumstances

Transferring juveniles to criminal

court is not a new phenomenon

In some States, provisions that enabled transfer of certain juveniles to

criminal court were in place before

the 1920’s. Other States have permitted transfers since at least the

1940’s. For many years, all States

have had at least one provision for

trying certain youth of juvenile age

as adults in criminal court. Such

provisions are typically limited by

age and offense criteria. Transfer

mechanisms vary regarding where

the responsibility for transfer decisionmaking lies.

Transfer provisions fall into three

general categories:

Judicial waiver: The juvenile court

judge has the authority to waive juvenile court jurisdiction and transfer the case to criminal court. States

may use terms other than judicial

waiver. Some call the process certification, remand, or bind over for

criminal prosecution. Others transfer or decline rather than waive

jurisdiction.

Concurrent jurisdiction: Original jurisdiction for certain cases is shared

by both criminal and juvenile

courts, and the prosecutor has discretion to file such cases in either

court. Transfer under concurrent jurisdiction provisions is also known

as prosecutorial waiver, prosecutor

discretion, or direct file.

Statutory exclusion: State statute

excludes certain juvenile offenders

from juvenile court jurisdiction. Under statutory exclusion provisions,

cases originate in criminal rather

than juvenile court. Statutory exclusion is also known as legislative

exclusion.

■ In States with a combination of transfer mechanisms, the exclusion, mandatory waiver, or concurrent jurisdiction provisions generally target the oldest juveniles and/or those charged with the most

serious offenses, while those charged with relatively less serious offenses and/or younger juveniles may be eligible for discretionary waiver.

Source: Authors’ adaptation of Torbet and Szymanski’s State legislative responses to violent juvenile crime: 1996–97 update.

Most States have a combination of transfer provisions

Once an

adult/

Judicial waiver Concurrent Statutory Reverse always an

Discretionary Presumptive Mandatory jurisdiction exclusion waiver adult

Total number

of States: 46 15 14 15 28 23 31

Alabama

Alaska

Arizona

Arkansas

California

Colorado

Connecticut

Delaware

Dist. of Columbia

Florida

Georgia

Hawaii

Idaho

Illinois

Indiana

Iowa

Kansas

Kentucky

Louisiana

Maine

Maryland

Massachusetts

Michigan

Minnesota

Mississippi

Missouri

Montana

Nebraska

Nevada

New Hampshire

New Jersey

New Mexico

New York

North Carolina

North Dakota

Ohio

Oklahoma

Oregon

Pennsylvania

Rhode Island

South Carolina

South Dakota

Tennessee

Texas

Utah

Vermont

Virginia

Washington

West Virginia

Wisconsin

Wyoming
14 1999 National Report Series

Many States have changed the

boundaries of juvenile court

jurisdiction

Traditionally, discretionary judicial

waiver was the transfer mechanism

on which most States relied. Beginning in the 1970’s and continuing

through the present, however, State

legislatures have increasingly

moved juvenile offenders into criminal court based on age and/or offense seriousness, without the casespecific consideration offered by

the discretionary juvenile court judicial waiver process.

State transfer provisions changed

extensively in the 1990’s. From 1992

through 1997, all but six States enacted or expanded transfer provisions. An increasing number of State

legislatures have enacted mandatory waiver or exclusion statutes.

Less common, then and now, are

concurrent jurisdiction provisions.

In most States, juveniles

convicted in criminal court

cannot be tried in juvenile court

for subsequent offenses

In 31 States, juveniles who have

been tried as adults must be prosecuted in criminal court for any subsequent offenses. Nearly all of these

“once an adult/always an adult” provisions require that the youth must

have been convicted of the offenses

that triggered the initial criminal

prosecution.

Judicial waiver is the most

common transfer provision

In all States except Nebraska, New

Mexico, and New York, juvenile

court judges may waive jurisdiction

over certain cases and transfer

them to criminal court. Such action

is usually in response to a request

by the prosecutor; in several States,

however, juveniles or their parents

may request judicial waiver. In most

States, statutes limit waiver by age

and offense.

Waiver provisions vary in terms of

the degree of decisionmaking flexibility allowed. Under some waiver

provisions, the decision is entirely

discretionary. Under others, there is

a rebuttable presumption in favor of

waiver. Under others, waiver is mandatory once the juvenile court judge

determines that certain statutory

criteria have been met. Mandatory

waiver provisions are distinguished

from statutory exclusion provisions

in that the case originates in juvenile rather than criminal court.

Statutes establish waiver criteria

other than age and offense

In some States, waiver provisions

target youth charged with offenses

involving firearms or other weapons. Most State statutes also limit

judicial waiver to juveniles who are

“no longer amenable to treatment.”

The specific factors that determine

lack of amenability vary, but typically include the juvenile’s offense

history and previous dispositional

outcomes. Such amenability criteria

are generally not included in statutory exclusion or concurrent jurisdiction provisions.

Many statutes instruct juvenile

courts to consider other factors

when making waiver decisions, such

as the availability of dispositional alternatives for treating the juvenile,

the time available for sanctions,

public safety, and the best interests

of the child. The waiver process

must also adhere to certain constitutional principles of fairness (see

Supreme Court decisions earlier in

this Bulletin).
December 1999 15

14

NS

16

NS

15

14

15

14

14

10

15

13

14

16

16

16

NS

15

13

NS

14

12

16

15

15

14

14

NS

NS

14

14

NS

14

12

15

13

14

14

NS

15

14

16

NS

14

14

N

14

14 14 14 14

14 14 14 14

12 12

15 15 15 NS

13

14

NS

13

NS

14

14

NS

10

14

NS

13

14

14

14

NS

15

17

NS

NS

10

14

NS

14

14

NS

14

14

14

13

14

14

14

NS

15

17

NS

NS

16

10

14

NS

14

15

NS

14

16

15

16

10

NS

14

NS

16

14

15

14

14

14

14

NS

14

14

14

16

14 14

NS NS 16 16

NS

b

13

14

a

15

14 15

b

b b

b

b

c c

14

14

14

NS

NS NS

14

In most States, juvenile court judges can waive juvenile court jurisdiction over certain cases and

transfer them to criminal court

Minimum Judicial waiver offense and minimum age criteria, 1997

age for Any Certain Certain Certain Certain

judicial criminal Certain Capital person property drug weapon

State waiver offense felonies crimes Murder offenses offenses offenses offenses

Alabama 14

Alaska NS

Arizona NS

Arkansas 14

California 14

Colorado 12

Connecticut 14

Delaware NS

Dist. of Columbia NS

Florida 14

Georgia 13

Hawaii NS

Idaho NS

Illinois 13

Indiana NS

Iowa 14

Kansas 10

Kentucky 14

Louisiana 14

Maine NS

Maryland NS

Michigan 14

Minnesota 14

Mississippi 13

Missouri 12

Montana NS

Nevada 14

New Hampshire 13

New Jersey 14

North Carolina 13

North Dakota 14

Ohio 14

Oklahoma NS

Oregon NS

Pennsylvania 14

Rhode Island NS

South Carolina NS

South Dakota NS

Tennessee NS

Texas 14

Utah 14

Vermont 10

Virginia 14

Washington NS

West Virginia NS

Wisconsin 14

Wyoming 13

Examples: Alabama allows waiver for any delinquency (criminal) offense involving a juvenile age 14 or older. Arizona allows waiver for any juvenile charged with a felony. New Jersey allows waiver for juveniles age 14 or older who are charged with murder or certain person, property,

drug, or weapon offenses. In New Jersey, juveniles age 14 or older who have prior adjudications or convictions for certain offenses can be

waived regardless of the current offense.

Note: Ages in minimum age column may not apply to all offense restrictions, but represent the youngest possible age at which a juvenile may

be judicially waived to criminal court. “NS” indicates that in at least one of the offense restrictions indicated, no minimum age is specified.

aOnly if committed while escaping from specified juvenile facilities. bRequires prior adjudication(s) or conviction(s), which may be cOnly if committed while in custody. required to have been for the same or a more serious offense type.

Sources: Authors’ adaptation of Griffin et al.’s Trying juveniles as adults in criminal court: An analysis of State transfer provisions.
16 1999 National Report Series

Few States allow prosecutorial

discretion, but many juveniles

are tried as adults in this way

As of the end of the 1997 legislative

session, 15 States had concurrent

jurisdiction provisions, which gave

both juvenile court and criminal

court original jurisdiction in certain

cases. Thus, prosecutors have discretion to file such cases in either

court.

State appellate courts have taken

the view that prosecutor discretion

is equivalent to the routine charging decisions made in criminal

cases. Thus, prosecutorial transfer

is considered an “executive function,” which is not subject to judicial review and is not required to

meet the due process standards

established in Kent. Some States,

however, have written prosecutorial

transfer guidelines.

Concurrent jurisdiction is typically

limited by age and offense criteria.

Often concurrent jurisdiction is limited to cases involving serious, violent, or repeat crimes or offenses involving firearms or other weapons.

Juvenile and criminal courts often

also share jurisdiction over minor

offenses such as traffic, watercraft,

or local ordinance violations.

There are no national data at the

present time on the number of juvenile cases tried in criminal court under concurrent jurisdiction provisions. Florida alone reports an

average of nearly 5,000 such transfers per year.

In States with concurrent jurisdiction, the prosecutor has discretion to file certain cases, generally

involving juveniles charged with serious offenses, in either criminal court or juvenile court

Minimum Concurrent jurisdiction offense and minimum age criteria, 1997

age for Any Certain Certain Certain Certain

concurrent criminal Certain Capital person property drug weapon

State jurisdiction offense felonies crimes Murder offenses offenses offenses offenses

Arizona 14

Arkansas 14

Colorado 14

Dist. of Columbia 16

Florida NS

Georgia NS

Louisiana 15

Massachusetts 14

Michigan 14

Montana 12

Nebraska NS

Oklahoma 15

Vermont 16

Virginia 14

Wyoming 14

Examples: In Arizona, prosecutors have discretion to file directly in criminal court those cases involving juveniles age 14 or older charged

with certain felonies (defined in State statutes). In Florida, prosecutors may “direct file” cases involving juveniles age 16 or older charged

with a misdemeanor (if they have a prior adjudication) or a felony offense, as well as those age 14 or older charged with murder or certain

person, property, or weapon offenses; no minimum age is specified for cases in which a grand jury indicts a juvenile for a capital offense.

Note: Ages in minimum age column may not apply to all offense restrictions, but represent the youngest possible age at which a juvenile

may be filed directly in criminal court. “NS” indicates that in at least one of the offense restrictions indicated, no minimum age is specified.

aApplies to misdemeanors and requires prior adjudication(s), which may be bRequires grand jury indictment.

 required to have been for the same or a more serious offense type. cApplies to misdemeanors.

Source: Authors’ adaptation of Griffin et al.’s Trying juveniles as adults in criminal court: An analysis of State transfer provisions.

14 14 14

14 14

NS 14

16

NS

14

14

16 NS

16

15

14

12

15

14

14

14

16

14

14

16

14

14

14

14

15 15 15

14 14

14 14 14

12 16 16 16

15 15 16 15

14

17 14

14

16 a 16 b

c
December 1999 17

Statutory exclusion accounts for

the largest number of juveniles

tried as adults in criminal court

Legislatures “transfer” large numbers of young offenders to criminal

court by enacting statutes that exclude certain cases from juvenile

court jurisdiction. As of the end of

the 1997 legislative session, 28

States had statutory exclusions. Although not typically thought of as

transfers, large numbers of youth

under age 18 are tried as adults in

the 13 States where the upper age of

juvenile court jurisdiction is 15 or

16. If the 1.8 million 16- and 17-yearolds in these 13 States are referred

to criminal court at the same rate

that 16- and 17-year-olds are referred to juvenile court in other

States, then as many as 218,000

cases involving youth under the age

of 18 could have faced trial in criminal court in 1996 because the offenders were defined as adults under

State laws.

Many States exclude certain serious

offenses from juvenile court jurisdiction. State laws typically also set

age limits for excluded offenses.

The offenses most often excluded

are capital crimes and murders, and

other serious offenses against persons. Some States exclude juveniles

charged with felonies if they have

prior felony adjudications or convictions. Minor offenses, such as traffic, watercraft, fish, or game violations, are often excluded from

juvenile court jurisdiction in States

where they are not covered by concurrent jurisdiction provisions.

Criminal courts may transfer

cases to juvenile court or order

juvenile sanctions

Of the 35 States with statutory exclusion or concurrent jurisdiction

provisions, 20 also have provisions

for transferring “excluded” or “direct filed” cases from criminal court

to juvenile court under certain circumstances. This procedure is

sometimes referred to as “reverse”

waiver or transfer. In some States,

juveniles tried as adults in criminal

court may be transferred to juvenile

court for disposition. Some States

allow juveniles tried as adults in

criminal court to receive dispositions involving either criminal or juvenile court sanctions, under what

have come to be known as “blended

sentencing” provisions.

In most States, no minimum age is specified in at least one judicial waiver, concurrent jurisdiction, or

statutory exclusion provision for transferring juveniles to criminal court

Minimum transfer age indicated in section(s) of juvenile code specifying transfer provisions, 1997

No minimum age 10 12 13 14 15

Alaska Nevada* Kansas Colorado Illinois Alabama New Mexico

Arizona Oklahoma* Vermont Missouri Mississippi Arkansas

Delaware Oregon* Montana New Hampshire California

Dist. of Columbia Pennsylvania New York Connecticut

Florida Rhode Island North Carolina Iowa

Georgia* South Carolina Wyoming Kentucky

Hawaii South Dakota Louisiana

Idaho* Tennessee Massachusetts

Indiana Washington* Michigan

Maine West Virginia Minnesota

Maryland Wisconsin New Jersey

Nebraska North Dakota

Ohio

Texas

Utah

Virginia

*Other sections of State statute specify an age below which children cannot be tried in criminal court. This minimum age for criminal responsibility is 14 in Idaho, 12 in Georgia, 8 in Nevada and Washington, and 7 in Oklahoma. In Washington, 8- to 12-year-olds are presumed to be

incapable of committing a crime. In Oklahoma, in cases involving 7- to 14-year-olds, the State must prove that at the time of the act, the child

knew it was wrong.

Source: Authors’ adaptation of Griffin et al.’s Trying juveniles as adults in criminal court: An analysis of State transfer provisions.
18 1999 National Report Series

In States with statutory exclusion provisions, certain cases involving juveniles originate in criminal

court rather than juvenile court

Minimum Statutory exclusion offense and minimum age criteria, 1997

age for Any Certain Certain Certain Certain

statutory criminal Certain Capital person property drug weapon

State exclusion offense felonies crimes Murder offenses offenses offenses offenses

Alabama 16

Alaska 16

Arizona 15

Delaware 15

Florida NS

Georgia 13

Idaho 14

Illinois 13

Indiana 16

Iowa 16

Louisiana 15

Maryland 14

Massachusetts 14

Minnesota 16

Mississippi 13

Montana 17

Nevada NS

New Mexico 15

New York 13

Oklahoma 13

Oregon 15

Pennsylvania NS

South Carolina 16

South Dakota 16

Utah 16

Vermont 14

Washington 16

Wisconsin NS

Examples: In Delaware, juveniles age 15 or older charged with certain felonies must be tried as adults. In Arizona, juveniles age 15 or older

must be tried as adults if they are charged with murder or certain person offenses or they have prior felony adjudications and are charged with

a felony.

Note: Ages in minimum age column may not apply to all offense restrictions, but represent the youngest possible age at which a juvenile

may be excluded from juvenile court. “NS” indicates that in at least one of the offense restrictions indicated, no minimum age is specified.

aRequires prior adjudication(s) or conviction(s), which may be required to have been for the same or a more serious offense type. bOnly escape or bail violation while subject to prosecution in criminal court. dRequires prior commitment in a secure facility. cRequires grand jury indictment. eOnly if charged while confined or on probation or parole.

Sources: Authors’ adaptation of Griffin et al.’s Trying juveniles as adults in criminal court: An analysis of State transfer provisions.

10

16

NS

16 16

14 14 14

16 16

16

16

15

15 15

13

13 14 14

15

NS NS 16

17 17 17 17 17

13 13

16

14

14 16 16 16

15 15

16 16 16

16 16 16 16 16

15 13 15 15 15

14 14 14 14

13 13

NS NS

15

15 15 15

16 16

16 16 16

a

a

a

d

b

c

a

e

NS
December 1999 19

New laws have had a dramatic impact on sentencing

for serious or violent juvenile offenders

Blended sentencing options create a “middle ground” between

traditional juvenile sanctions and adult sanctions

Blended sentencing option State

Juvenile-exclusive blend: The juvenile court may impose New Mexico

a sanction involving either the juvenile or adult correctional

systems.

Juvenile-inclusive blend: The juvenile court may impose Connecticut

both juvenile and adult correctional sanctions. The adult Kansas

sanction is suspended pending a violation and revocation. Minnesota

Montana

Juvenile-contiguous blend: The juvenile court may Colorado1

impose a juvenile correctional sanction that may remain Massachusetts

in force after the offender is beyond the age of the court’s Rhode Island

extended jurisdiction, at which point the offender may be South Carolina

transferred to the adult correctional system. Texas

Criminal-exclusive blend: The criminal court may impose California

a sanction involving either the juvenile or adult correctional Colorado2

systems. Florida

Idaho

Michigan

Oklahoma

Virginia

West Virginia

Criminal-inclusive blend: The criminal court may impose Arkansas

both juvenile and adult correctional sanctions. The adult Iowa

sanction is suspended, but is reinstated if the terms of the Missouri

juvenile sanction are violated and revoked. Virginia3

Note: Blends apply to a subset of juveniles specified by State statute.

1

Applies to those designated as “aggravated juvenile offenders.”

2

Applies to those designated as “youthful offenders.”

3

Applies to those designated as “violent juvenile felony offenders.”

Source: Authors’ adaptation of Torbet and Szymanski’s State legislative responses to

violent juvenile crime: 1996–97 update.

Juvenile

Juvenile court

Adult

or

Juvenile

Adult

Juvenile court and

Juvenile

Adult

Criminal court and

Juvenile

Criminal court

Adult

or

Juvenile court Juvenile Adult

A trend away from traditional

juvenile dispositions is emerging

Juvenile court dispositions were traditionally based on the offender’s individual characteristics and situation. Dispositions were frequently

indeterminate and generally had rehabilitation as a primary goal. As

many States have shifted the purpose of juvenile court away from rehabilitation and toward punishment,

accountability, and public safety, the

emerging trend is toward dispositions based more on the offense

than the offender. Offense-based

dispositions tend to be determinate

and proportional to the offense; retribution and deterrence replace rehabilitation as the primary goal.

Many State legislatures have

changed disposition and

sentencing options

From 1992 through 1997, statutes requiring mandatory minimum periods of incarceration for certain violent or serious offenders were added

or modified in 16 States.

States have also raised the maximum age of the juvenile court’s continuing jurisdiction over juvenile offenders. Such laws allow juvenile

courts to order dispositions that extend beyond the upper age of original jurisdiction, most often to age

21. From 1992 through 1997, 17

States extended their age limit for

delinquency dispositions.

Perhaps the most dramatic change

will result from “blended sentences.”

Blended sentencing statutes, which

allow courts to impose juvenile and/

or adult correctional sanctions on

certain young offenders, were in

place in 20 States at the end of 1997.
NCJ 178995

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Bulletin

Sources

Information for this Bulletin was taken from chapter 4

of Juvenile Offenders and Victims: 1999 National

Report. For a full listing of sources for this chapter,

see page 109 of the National Report.

Resources

Answers to frequently asked questions about juvenile

justice statistics as well as periodic updates of data

presented in Juvenile Offenders and Victims: 1999

National Report are available on the Internet in the

OJJDP Statistical Briefing Book, which can be accessed

through the OJJDP home page at www.ojjdp.ncjrs.org

through the JJ Facts & Figures prompt.

For information on OJJDP

initiatives related to the reduction

of juvenile crime, violence, and

victimization, contact the Juvenile

Justice Clearinghouse (JJC) at

www.ojjdp.ncjrs.org or call 800–638–8736.

Acknowledgments

Juvenile Offenders and Victims: 1999 National

Report, from which this Bulletin is drawn, was

prepared by the National Center for Juvenile Justice (NCJJ). The authors are Howard N. Snyder and

Melissa Sickmund. The National Report benefited

from the assistance of many individuals in addition

to the authors, including staff at NCJJ, the Office of

Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention, and

the Juvenile Justice Clearinghouse.

Points of view or opinions expressed in this document are those of the

authors and do not necessarily represent the official position or policies of

OJJDP or the U.S. Department of Justice.

The Office of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention is a component of the Office of Justice Programs, which also includes the

Bureau of Justice Assistance, the Bureau of Justice Statistics, the

National Institute of Justice, and the Office for Victims of Crime.

How To Get Your Free Copy

Juvenile Offenders and Victims: 1999 National Report

(NCJ 178257) is available online from the OJJDP Web

site (www.ojjdp.ncjrs.org) under the JJ Facts & Figures

section and the Publications section or can be ordered

from OJJDP’s Juvenile Justice Clearinghouse. Send an

e-mail to puborder@ncjrs.org; call 800–638–8736 (select

option 2); or write to the Juvenile Justice Clearinghouse, P.O. Box 6000, Rockville, MD 20849–6000. Be

sure to ask for NCJ 178257.