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[Congressional Bills 118th Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[S. 4230 Introduced in Senate (IS)]

<DOC>

118th CONGRESS
  2d Session
                                S. 4230

To improve the tracking and processing of security and safety incidents 
   and risks associated with artificial intelligence, and for other 
                               purposes.

_______________________________________________________________________

                   IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES

                              May 1, 2024

Mr. Warner (for himself and Mr. Tillis) introduced the following bill; 
    which was read twice and referred to the Committee on Commerce, 
                      Science, and Transportation

_______________________________________________________________________

                                 A BILL

 
To improve the tracking and processing of security and safety incidents 
   and risks associated with artificial intelligence, and for other 
                               purposes.

    Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the 
United States of America in Congress assembled,

SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.

    This Act may be cited as the ``Secure Artificial Intelligence Act 
of 2024'' or the ``Secure A.I. Act of 2024''.

SEC. 2. DEFINITIONS.

    In this Act:
            (1) Artificial intelligence safety incident.--The term 
        ``artificial intelligence safety incident'' means an event that 
        increases the risk that operation of an artificial intelligence 
        system will--
                    (A) result in physical or psychological harm; or
                    (B) lead to a state in which human life, health, 
                property, or the environment is endangered.
            (2) Artificial intelligence security incident.--The term 
        ``artificial intelligence security incident'' means an event 
        that increases--
                    (A) the risk that operation of an artificial 
                intelligence system occurs in a way that enables the 
                extraction of information about the behavior or 
                characteristics of an artificial intelligence system by 
                a third party; or
                    (B) the ability of a third party to manipulate an 
                artificial intelligence system in order to subvert the 
                confidentiality, integrity, or availability of an 
                artificial intelligence system or adjacent system.
            (3) Artificial intelligence security vulnerability.--The 
        term ``artificial intelligence security vulnerability'' means a 
        weakness in an artificial intelligence system that could be 
        exploited by a third party to subvert, without authorization, 
        the confidentiality, integrity, or availability of an 
        artificial intelligence system, including through techniques 
        such as--
                    (A) data poisoning;
                    (B) evasion attacks;
                    (C) privacy-based attacks; and
                    (D) abuse attacks.
            (4) Counter-artificial intelligence.--The term ``counter-
        artificial intelligence'' means techniques or procedures to 
        extract information about the behavior or characteristics of an 
        artificial intelligence system, or to learn how to manipulate 
        an artificial intelligence system, in order to subvert the 
        confidentiality, integrity, or availability of an artificial 
        intelligence system or adjacent system.

SEC. 3. VOLUNTARY TRACKING AND PROCESSING OF SECURITY AND SAFETY 
              INCIDENTS AND RISKS ASSOCIATED WITH ARTIFICIAL 
              INTELLIGENCE.

    (a) Processes and Procedures for Vulnerability Management.--Not 
later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the 
Director of the National Institute of Standards and Technology shall--
            (1) initiate a process to update processes and procedures 
        associated with the National Vulnerability Database of the 
        Institute to ensure that the database and associated 
        vulnerability management processes incorporate artificial 
        intelligence security vulnerabilities to the greatest extent 
        practicable; and
            (2) identify any characteristics of artificial intelligence 
        security vulnerabilities that make utilization of the National 
        Vulnerability Database inappropriate for their management and 
        develop processes and procedures for vulnerability management 
        for those vulnerabilities.
    (b) Voluntary Tracking of Artificial Intelligence Security and 
Artificial Intelligence Safety Incidents.--
            (1) Voluntary database required.--Not later than 1 year 
        after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Director of 
        the Institute, in coordination with the Director of the 
        Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency, shall--
                    (A) develop and establish a comprehensive, 
                voluntary database to publicly track artificial 
                intelligence security and artificial intelligence 
                safety incidents; and
                    (B) in establishing the database under subparagraph 
                (A)--
                            (i) establish mechanisms by which private 
                        sector entities, public sector organizations, 
                        civil society groups, and academic researchers 
                        may voluntarily share information with the 
                        Institute on confirmed or suspected artificial 
                        intelligence security or artificial 
                        intelligence safety incidents, in a manner that 
                        preserves confidentiality of any affected 
                        party;
                            (ii) leverage, to the greatest extent 
                        possible, standardized disclosure and incident 
                        description formats;
                            (iii) develop processes to associate 
                        reports pertaining to the same incident with a 
                        single incident identifier;
                            (iv) establish classification, information 
                        retrieval, and reporting mechanisms that 
                        sufficiently differentiate between artificial 
                        intelligence security incidents and artificial 
                        intelligence safety incidents; and
                            (v) create appropriate taxonomies to 
                        classify incidents based on relevant 
                        characteristics, impact, or other relevant 
                        criteria.
            (2) Identification and treatment of material artificial 
        intelligence security or artificial intelligence safety 
        risks.--
                    (A) In general.--Upon receipt of relevant 
                information on an artificial intelligence security or 
                artificial intelligence safety incident, the Director 
                of the Institute shall determine whether the described 
                incident presents a material artificial intelligence 
                security or artificial intelligence safety risk 
                sufficient for inclusion in the database developed and 
                established under paragraph (1).
                    (B) Priorities.--In evaluating a reported incident 
                pursuant to paragraph (1), the Director shall 
                prioritize inclusion in the database cases in which a 
                described incident--
                            (i) describes an artificial intelligence 
                        system used in critical infrastructure or 
                        safety-critical systems;
                            (ii) would result in a high-severity or 
                        catastrophic impact to the people or economy of 
                        the United States; or
                            (iii) includes an artificial intelligence 
                        system widely used in commercial or public 
                        sector contexts.
            (3) Reports and anonymity.--The Director shall populate the 
        voluntary database developed and established under paragraph 
        (1) with incidents based on public reports and information 
        shared using the mechanism established pursuant to subparagraph 
        (B)(i) of such paragraph, ensuring that any incident 
        description sufficiently anonymizes those affected, unless 
        those who are affected have consented to their names being 
        included in the database.

SEC. 4. UPDATING PROCESSES AND PROCEDURES RELATING TO COMMON 
              VULNERABILITIES AND EXPOSURES PROGRAM AND EVALUATION OF 
              CONSENSUS STANDARDS RELATING TO ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE 
              SECURITY VULNERABILITY REPORTING.

    (a) Definitions.--In this section:
            (1) Common vulnerabilities and exposures program.--The term 
        ``Common Vulnerabilities and Exposures Program'' means the 
        reference guide and classification system for publicly known 
        information security vulnerabilities sponsored by the 
        Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency.
            (2) Relevant congressional committees.--The term ``relevant 
        congressional committees'' means--
                    (A) the Committee on Homeland Security and 
                Governmental Affairs, the Committee on Commerce, 
                Science, and Transportation, the Select Committee on 
                Intelligence, and the Committee on the Judiciary of the 
                Senate; and
                    (B) the Committee on Oversight and Accountability, 
                the Committee on Energy and Commerce, the Permanent 
                Select Committee on Intelligence, and the Committee on 
                the Judiciary of the House of Representatives.
    (b) In General.--Not later than 180 days after the date of 
enactment of this Act, the Director of the Cybersecurity and 
Infrastructure Security Agency shall--
            (1) initiate a process to update processes and procedures 
        associated with the Common Vulnerabilities and Exposures 
        Program to ensure that the program and associated processes 
        identify and enumerate artificial intelligence security 
        vulnerabilities to the greatest extent practicable; and
            (2) identify any characteristic of artificial intelligence 
        security vulnerabilities that make utilization of the Common 
        Vulnerabilities and Exposures Program inappropriate for their 
        management and develop processes and procedures for 
        vulnerability identification and enumeration for those 
        artificial intelligence security vulnerabilities.
    (c) Evaluation of Consensus Standards.--
            (1) In general.--Not later than 30 days after the date of 
        enactment of this Act, the Director of the National Institute 
        of Standards and Technology shall initiate a multi-stakeholder 
        process to evaluate whether existing voluntary consensus 
        standards for vulnerability reporting effectively accommodate 
        artificial intelligence security vulnerabilities.
            (2) Report.--
                    (A) Submission.--Not later than 180 days after the 
                date on which the evaluation under paragraph (1) is 
                carried out, the Director shall submit a report to the 
                relevant congressional committees on the sufficiency of 
                existing vulnerability reporting processes and 
                standards to accommodate artificial intelligence 
                security vulnerabilities.
                    (B) Post-report action.--If the Director concludes 
                in the report submitted under subparagraph (A) that 
                existing processes do not sufficiently accommodate 
                reporting of artificial intelligence security 
                vulnerabilities, the Director shall initiate a process, 
                in consultation with the Director of the National 
                Institute of Standards and Technology and the Director 
                of the Office of Management and Budget, to update 
                relevant vulnerability reporting processes, including 
                the Department of Homeland Security Binding Operational 
                Directive 20-01, or any subsequent directive.
    (d) Best Practices.--Not later than 90 days after the date of 
enactment of this Act, the Director of the Cybersecurity and 
Infrastructure Security Agency shall, in collaboration with the 
Director of the National Security Agency and the Director of the 
National Institute of Standards and Technology and by leveraging 
efforts of the Information Communications Technology Supply Chain Risk 
Management Task Force to the greatest extent practicable, convene a 
multi-stakeholder process to encourage the development and adoption of 
best practices relating to addressing supply chain risks associated 
with training and maintaining artificial intelligence models, which 
shall ensure consideration of supply chain risks associated with--
            (1) data collection, cleaning, and labeling, particularly 
        the supply chain risks of reliance on remote workforce and 
        foreign labor for such tasks;
            (2) inadequate documentation of training data and test data 
        storage, as well as limited provenance of training data;
            (3) human feedback systems used to refine artificial 
        intelligence systems, particularly the supply chain risks of 
        reliance on remote workforce and foreign labor for such tasks;
            (4) the use of large-scale, open-source datasets, 
        particularly the supply chain risks to repositories that host 
        such datasets for use by public and private sector developers 
        in the United States; and
            (5) the use of proprietary datasets containing sensitive or 
        personally identifiable information.
    (e) Rule of Construction.--To the extent practicable, the Director 
shall examine the reporting requirements pursuant to division Y of the 
Cyber Incident Reporting for Critical Infrastructure Act of 2022 
(Public Law 117-103) and the amendments made by that division and 
ensure that the requirements under this section are not duplicative of 
requirements set forth in that division and the amendments made by that 
division.

SEC. 5. ESTABLISHMENT OF ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE SECURITY CENTER.

    (a) Establishment.--Not later than 90 days after the date of the 
enactment of this Act, the Director of the National Security Agency 
shall establish an Artificial Intelligence Security Center within the 
Cybersecurity Collaboration Center of the National Security Agency.
    (b) Functions.--The functions of the Artificial Intelligence 
Security Center shall be as follows:
            (1) Making available a research test-bed to private sector 
        and academic researchers, on a subsidized basis, to engage in 
        artificial intelligence security research, including through 
        the secure provision of access in a secure environment to 
        proprietary third-party models with the consent of the vendors 
        of the models.
            (2) Developing guidance to prevent or mitigate counter-
        artificial intelligence techniques.
            (3) Promoting secure artificial intelligence adoption 
        practices for managers of national security systems (as defined 
        in section 3552 of title 44, United States Code) and elements 
        of the defense industrial base.
            (4) Coordinating with the Artificial Intelligence Safety 
        Institute within the National Institute of Standards and 
        Technology.
            (5) Such other functions as the Director considers 
        appropriate.
    (c) Test-Bed Requirements.--
            (1) Access and terms of usage.--
                    (A) Researcher access.--The Director shall 
                establish terms of usage governing researcher access to 
                the test-bed made available under subsection (b)(1), 
                with limitations on researcher publication only to the 
                extent necessary to protect classified information or 
                proprietary information concerning third-party models 
                provided through the consent of model vendors.
                    (B) Availability to federal agencies.--The Director 
                shall ensure that the test-bed made available under 
                subsection (b)(1) is also made available to other 
                Federal agencies on a cost-recovery basis.
            (2) Use of certain infrastructure and other resources.--In 
        carrying out subsection (b)(1), the Director shall leverage, to 
        the greatest extent practicable, infrastructure and other 
        resources provided under section 5.2 of the Executive Order 
        dated October 30, 2023 (relating to safe, secure, and 
        trustworthy development and use of artificial intelligence).
    (d) Access to Proprietary Models.--In carrying out this section, 
The Director shall establish such mechanisms as the Director considers 
appropriate, including potential contractual incentives, to ensure the 
provision of access to proprietary models by qualified independent, 
third-party researchers, provided that commercial model vendors have 
voluntarily provided models and associated resources for such testing.
                                 <all>
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