FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

LONE STAR SECURITY & VIDEO, 

INC., a California Corporation,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

and No. 07-56521

FRED PARKS,  D.C. No.

Plaintiff, CV-03-05346-WDK

v.

CITY OF LOS ANGELES,

Defendant-Appellant. 

LONE STAR SECURITY & VIDEO, 

INC., a California Corporation,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

No. 07-56575 and

D.C. No. FRED PARKS,  CV-03-05346-WDK Plaintiff,

OPINION

v.

CITY OF LOS ANGELES,

Defendant-Appellee. 

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Central District of California

William D. Keller, District Judge, Presiding

Argued and Submitted

May 7, 2009—Pasadena, California

Filed July 10, 2009

8591
Before: Betty B. Fletcher, Raymond C. Fisher and

Ronald M. Gould, Circuit Judges.

Opinion by Judge Fisher

8592 LONE STAR SECURITY v. LOS ANGELES
COUNSEL

Rockard J. Delgadillo, City Attorney; Laurie Rittenberg,

Assistant City Attorney; and Michael D. Nagle (argued), Deputy City Attorney, Los Angeles, California, for the defendantappellant-cross-appellee.

George M. Wallace, Wallace, Brown & Schwartz, Pasadena,

California, for the plaintiff-appellee-cross-appellant.

OPINION

FISHER, Circuit Judge:

The City of Los Angeles routinely towed vehicles owned

by Lone Star Security & Video, Inc. (Lone Star) for violating

an ordinance that Lone Star contends was preempted by the

California Vehicle Code. Lone Star brought a claim under 42

U.S.C. § 1983, arguing that because the ordinance was invalid

under state law, the City violated Lone Star’s due process

rights under the United States Constitution. We must decide

not simply whether this claim makes out a federal constitutional violation — it does not — but whether the claim is so

“ ‘wholly insubstantial and frivolous’ ” that the district court

lacked jurisdiction to entertain it. Steel Co. v. Citizens for a

LONE STAR SECURITY v. LOS ANGELES 8595
Better Env’t, 523 U.S. 83, 89 (1998) (quoting Bell v. Hood,

327 U.S. 678, 682-83 (1946)); see 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331, 1343.

We also address whether due process required the City to provide notice to Lone Star, a chronic violator of the ordinance,

each time it towed one of Lone Star’s vehicles. 

BACKGROUND

The California Vehicle Code preempts municipal vehicle

ordinances inconsistent with its provisions. In relevant part,

the Code provides that “no local authority shall enact or

enforce any ordinance on the matters covered by this code

unless expressly authorized herein.” Cal. Veh. Code § 21. The

Code further makes it “unlawful for any peace officer or any

unauthorized person to remove any unattended vehicle from

a highway to a garage or to any other place, except as provided in this code.” Id. § 22650. As an exception to this general prohibition against towing unattended vehicles, the Code

provides that a municipal officer “who is engaged in directing

traffic or enforcing parking laws and regulations . . . of a city”

is authorized to tow a vehicle “parked or left standing upon

a highway for 72 or more consecutive hours in violation of a

local ordinance authorizing removal.” Id. § 22651.

Although the Code provides for the towing of vehicles

parked “for 72 or more consecutive hours,” id. (emphasis

added), the City of Los Angeles enacted a provision that, during the relevant period, prohibited parking in an otherwise

legal public spot “for more than 72 hours in the aggregate

during any period of 73 consecutive hours.” L.A., Cal., Mun.

Code § 80.73.2 (1987) (emphasis added).1 The ordinance fur1Since Lone Star brought this action, Los Angeles Municipal Code

§ 80.73.2 (“Section 80.73.2”) has been amended so that, consistent with

the California Vehicle Code, it simply prohibits publicly parking “for 72

or more consecutive hours.” L.A., Cal., Mun. Code § 80.73.2 (2006).

Hereinafter all citations to “Los Angeles Municipal Code § 80.73.2” and

“Section 80.73.2” refer to Los Angeles Municipal Code § 80.73.2 (1987).

8596 LONE STAR SECURITY v. LOS ANGELES
ther stated that “a vehicle shall be deemed parked or left

standing for . . . 72 hours unless during that period [it] is

either driven a minimum of one mile after leaving the location

where it has been parked or left standing or, within that

period, is removed from any highway, street or alley.” Id.

Lone Star, the plaintiff-cross-appellant in this action, sells

security systems to homes and business. As part of its marketing strategy, Lone Star attached advertisements to a number

of mobile trailers and parked them for extended periods on

residential streets in Los Angeles. Over several years, officers

of the Los Angeles Police Department (LAPD) and Los

Angeles Department of Transportation (LADOT) towed and

impounded 77 of Lone Star’s trailers for having been parked

longer than 72 hours in violation of Los Angeles Municipal

Code § 80.73.2. 

Both LAPD and LADOT officers have forms they may

attach to a vehicle in order to notify its owner that the vehicle

may be towed for being parked longer than 72 hours in violation of Section 80.73.2. The City’s policy is that LAPD and

LADOT officers should attach one of these notice forms to

any vehicle belonging to a first-time offender. The decision

whether to attach the form to a repeat offender’s vehicle,

however, is left to each individual officer’s discretion. It is

unclear from the record whether the City had, at some point,

placed a notice on each of Lone Star’s trailers that it ultimately towed and impounded. Lone Star does not dispute,

however, that it received multiple notices for being parked in

violation of Section 80.73.2 and that, in addition to its trailers

being towed, it was issued hundreds of citations for violating

the ordinance.

In April 2003, Lone Star filed an action in California state

court alleging the City was in unlawful possession of Lone

Star’s trailers that were impounded under Los Angeles

Municipal Code § 80.73.2 because the ordinance was invalid

under the California Vehicle Code. In the state court action,

LONE STAR SECURITY v. LOS ANGELES 8597
Lone Star sought a preliminary injunction to prevent the City

from towing any of its vehicles that the City could not prove

had remained parked in the same location for over 72 consecutive hours without having been moved at least a mile during

that period. The Los Angeles County Superior Court denied

Lone Star’s preliminary injunction request, concluding that it

was unlikely Lone Star could prove that the Los Angeles

Municipal Code was inconsistent with the California Vehicle

Code. 

Lone Star voluntarily dismissed its state court action and

filed the present one in federal court. In this action, Lone Star

raised two claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, contending that its

federal due process rights were violated (1) because the City

provided inadequate notice before towing its vehicles, and (2)

because Los Angeles Municipal Code § 80.73.2 was preempted by the California Vehicle Code and thus invalid.2

Lone Star’s complaint, however, asserts no state law causes

of action. 

The district court granted Lone Star summary judgment on

the ground that Section 80.73.2 is invalid under the California

Vehicle Code, but also held that the City was not constitutionally required to provide Lone Star notice each time it towed

one of Lone Star’s vehicles for violating the 72-hour rule.

Following a bench trial, the district court awarded Lone Star

2Lone Star first raised its invalid-ordinance claim in its motion for summary judgment. The parties fully argued the merits of the claim, however,

and the City did not object to Lone Star’s failure to raise the claim in its

complaint. “When an issue not raised by the pleadings is tried by the parties’ express or implied consent, it must be treated in all respects as if

raised in the pleadings.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(b)(2). “Even when federal

issues have been litigated,” however, “the parties cannot invoke constructive amendment to escape the ordinary boundaries of federal jurisdiction.”

City of Rome, N.Y. v. Verizon Commc’ns, Inc., 362 F.3d 168, 181-82 (2d

Cir. 2004). The waiver is moot, however, in light of our conclusion that

the district court lacked jurisdiction over Lone Star’s invalid-ordinance

claim. 

8598 LONE STAR SECURITY v. LOS ANGELES
damages reflecting the company’s overall losses for all of its

trailers towed under Section 80.73.2 between 2001 and 2003,

irrespective of whether those trailers were in fact parked more

than 72 consecutive hours — such that California Vehicle

Code § 22651(k) would permit their towing — or were simply

parked “for more than 72 hours in the aggregate” during a 73-

hour period. L.A., Cal., Mun. Code § 80.73.2 (1987). The

City timely appealed the district court’s judgment, and Lone

Star timely cross-appealed the district court’s determination

that it received constitutionally sufficient notice before its

vehicles were towed.

DISCUSSION

Lone Star purports to raise two distinct due process claims

in this action. We conclude that the district court lacked subject matter jurisdiction over one of these claims, and properly

rejected the other on its merits.

I. Invalid-Ordinance Claim

Lone Star asserts a due process claim under 42 U.S.C.

§ 1983 based solely on the City having towed its trailers for

being parked in violation of an ordinance that, Lone Star

argues, is invalid under state law (the “invalid-ordinance

claim”). Specifically, Lone Star contends that Los Angeles

Municipal Code § 80.73.2 was preempted by the California

Vehicle Code. The City violated Lone Star’s federal due process rights by enforcing Section 80.73.2, Lone Star argued in

its motion for summary judgment, because “[w]hen a public

authority takes property on the basis of a law that is itself

unauthorized, that taking is improper and a violation of due

process.” The district court accepted Lone Star’s claim, holding that “[t]o the extent that the City of Los Angeles or its

agencies or representatives have towed or impounded” Lone

Star’s vehicles under Section 80.73.2, “those actions have

LONE STAR SECURITY v. LOS ANGELES 8599
been unlawful and deprived plaintiffs of Constitutional rights

under color of law in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983.”

3

The parties never presented to the district court, however,

the question whether it had jurisdiction to address Lone Star’s

invalid-ordinance claim. Because “we have an independent

obligation to examine our own and the district court’s jurisdiction,” Williams v. Boeing Co., 517 F.3d 1120, 1127 (9th

Cir. 2008) (internal quotation marks omitted), we ordered the

parties to file supplemental briefs on “(1) whether Lone Star

asserts a colorable federal constitutional claim in arguing that

Los Angeles Municipal Code § 80.73.2 is invalid under the

California Vehicle Code and (2) if not, whether the district

court had subject matter jurisdiction to consider the claim.”

With the benefit of these submissions, we conclude that Lone

Star’s invalid-ordinance claim fails to raise a colorable federal

question, and the district court therefore lacked subject matter

jurisdiction over the claim.

3On appeal, the City argues that, regardless whether Section 80.73.2 is

valid under state law, the district court’s holding was erroneous because

the City had a separate ordinance in place that, consistent with the California Vehicle Code, authorized LAPD and LADOT officers “to remove

from highways, streets or alleys within the City of Los Angeles . . . any

vehicle which has been parked . . . for 72 or more consecutive hours.”

L.A., Cal., Mun. Code § 80.77(a). 

Although the City presented this argument to the district court before

trial, it waived the argument by failing to present it in opposition to Lone

Star’s motion for summary judgment, and by earlier stipulating that Lone

Star’s trailers had been towed and impounded because they were “parked

in violation of the ‘72 hour rule’ embodied in Los Angeles Municipal

Code section 80.73.2.” See USA Petroleum Co. v. Atl. Richfield Co., 13

F.3d 1276, 1284 (9th Cir. 1994) (“It is a general rule that a party cannot

revisit theories that it raises but abandons at summary judgment.”). Even

if the City had preserved this argument for appeal, however, we could not

reach its merits in light of our conclusion that the district court lacked

jurisdiction over Lone Star’s invalid-ordinance claim. 

8600 LONE STAR SECURITY v. LOS ANGELES
A. Jurisdictional Framework

[1] We do not lightly conclude that a § 1983 claim is so

lacking that it fails to present a federal question. “To state a

claim under § 1983, a plaintiff must,” as Lone Star has done,

“both (1) allege the deprivation of a right secured by the federal Constitution or statutory law, and (2) allege that the

deprivation was committed by a person acting under color of

state law.” Anderson v. Warner, 451 F.3d 1063, 1067 (9th Cir.

2006). Accordingly, “[a]lmost by definition, a claim under

§ 1983 arises under federal law . . . .” Local Union No. 12004,

United Steelworkers of Am. v. Mass., 377 F.3d 64, 75 (1st Cir.

2004). Our inquiry does not end here, however. 

[2] Although a district court typically has subject matter

jurisdiction over a claim “if ‘the right of the petitioners to

recover under their complaint will be sustained if the Constitution and laws of the United States are given one construction and will be defeated if they are given another,’ ” such

jurisdiction is wanting if the claim “ ‘clearly appears to be

immaterial and made solely for the purpose of obtaining jurisdiction or where such a claim is wholly insubstantial and frivolous.’ ” Steel Co., 523 U.S. at 89 (emphasis added) (quoting

Bell, 327 U.S. at 682-83, 685). We must therefore address

whether Lone Star’s § 1983 claim is so untenable that it does

not give rise to federal question jurisdiction. Dismissal for

lack of jurisdiction on this basis “is proper only when the

claim is ‘so insubstantial, implausible, foreclosed by prior

decisions of this Court, or otherwise completely devoid of

merit as not to involve a federal controversy.’ ” Id. (quoting

Oneida Indian Nation of N.Y. v. County of Oneida, 414 U.S.

661, 666 (1974)). 

[3] At least two circuits have addressed whether a due process claim under § 1983 presents a federal question where the

plaintiff alleges only that a municipal ordinance is invalid

under state law; both have answered in the negative. See

Goros v. County of Cook, 489 F.3d 857, 859-60 (7th Cir.

LONE STAR SECURITY v. LOS ANGELES 8601
2007); Norton v. Vill. of Corrales, 103 F.3d 928, 930 (10th

Cir. 1996). For the reasons below, we join these circuits, and

hold that “when an attack on the validity of a city ordinance

is limited to the claim that the ordinance violates state law[,]

. . . the result of error in the administration of state law,

though injury may result, is not a matter of federal judicial

cognizance under the due process clause of the fourteenth

amendment.” Id. (internal quotation marks and alteration

omitted).

B. Analysis

Due process claims under § 1983 typically involve questions of state law. See, e.g., Bd. of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S.

564, 577 (1972) (“Property interests . . . . are created and their

dimensions are defined by existing rules or understandings

that stem from an independent source such as state law . . .

.”). Lone Star, however, contends that its due process rights

were violated solely by virtue of the City’s acting under an

ordinance that is invalid under state law. As explained below,

this due process claim is so implausible that it does not support federal question jurisdiction. See Goros, 489 F.3d at 860

(“Distinguishing between ‘essentially fictitious’ claims that

do not invoke federal jurisdiction and those in which a fairly

debatable claim fails on the merits is essential if the federal

courts are to remain tribunals of limited jurisdiction.”) (citation omitted) (quoting Bailey v. Patterson, 369 U.S. 31, 33

(1962)).

[4] “A due process claim provides subject matter jurisdiction when it is supported by facts ‘sufficient to state a violation of substantive or procedural due process.’ ” Alvarado v.

Table Mountain Rancheria, 509 F.3d 1008, 1017 (9th Cir.

2007) (quoting Anderson v. Babbitt, 230 F.3d 1158, 1163 (9th

Cir. 2000)). Lone Star does not suggest, nor could it, that its

invalid-ordinance claim is based on substantive due process.

The ordinance Lone Star challenges does not interfere with

one of the fundamental rights or liberty interests that enjoy

8602 LONE STAR SECURITY v. LOS ANGELES
“heightened protection against government interference”

under the substantive component of the due process clause.

Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 720 (1997). In addition to restricting legislation that interferes with fundamental

rights, substantive due process also “bar[s] certain government actions regardless of the fairness of the procedures used

to implement them.” Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327, 331

(1986). But this prohibition extends only to executive conduct

that “amount[s] to an ‘abuse of power’ lacking any ‘reasonable justification in the service of a legitimate governmental

objective.’ ” Shanks v. Dressel, 540 F.3d 1082, 1088 (9th Cir.

2008) (quoting County of Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 U.S. 833,

846 (1998)). Lone Star concedes that Section 80.73.2 serves

the rational purpose of “encourag[ing] removal” of any vehicle parked for more than 72 hours in a public place “from its

place of repose,” Scofield v. City of Hillsborough, 862 F.2d

759, 764 (9th Cir. 1988), and therefore cannot contest that the

City advanced this purpose by enforcing the ordinance. Thus,

Lone Star cannot plausibly assert a substantive due process

violation.

[5] Nor does Lone Star make out a colorable procedural

due process claim simply by asserting there is a defect in Section 80.73.2’s state-law pedigree. “To satisfy procedural due

process, a deprivation of life, liberty, or property must be

‘preceded by notice and opportunity for hearing appropriate

to the nature of the case.’ ” In re Yochum, 89 F.3d 661, 672

(9th Cir. 1996) (quoting Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. Loudermill,

470 U.S. 532, 542 (1985)). In its supplemental briefing, Lone

Star argues that if an ordinance is invalid under state law, it

necessarily fails to provide a level of notice sufficient to satisfy due process. The notice and hearing requirements of procedural due process, however, are not so rigid. 

[6] Due process, rather than being “a technical conception

with a fixed content unrelated to time, place and circumstances[,] . . . . is flexible and calls for such procedural protections as the particular situation demands.” Gilbert v. Homar,

LONE STAR SECURITY v. LOS ANGELES 8603
520 U.S. 924, 930 (1997) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted); see also Mitchell v. W.T. Grant Co., 416 U.S.

600, 610 (1974) (“Due process of law guarantees no particular

form of procedure; it protects substantial rights.” (internal

quotation marks omitted)). Accordingly, the relevant question

for due process purposes is not whether Section 80.73.2 is

defective as a matter of state law, but whether the City, in

implementing the ordinance, provided the level of notice

required whenever the government “alter[s] substantive rights

through enactment of rules of general applicability.” United

States v. Locke, 471 U.S. 84, 108 (1985). “[A] legislature generally provides” this level of notice “simply by enacting the

statute, publishing it, and, to the extent the statute regulates

private conduct, affording those within the statute’s reach a

reasonable opportunity both to familiarize themselves with

the general requirements imposed and to comply with those

requirements.” Id. Lone Star does not suggest that Section

80.73.2 is deficient in one of these respects.

[7] Just as “§ 1983 and § 1331 in combination do not allow

state-law claims to be litigated in federal court just because

the defendant is a state actor and the plaintiff takes care to

assert that state law creates a ‘property interest,’ ” federal

courts cannot adjudicate such claims simply because the

plaintiff asserts that a duly enacted ordinance fails to provide

constitutionally sufficient notice. Goros, 489 F.3d at 859

(emphasis omitted). Accordingly, we conclude that Lone

Star’s invalid-ordinance claim alleges no facts that could

plausibly constitute a due process violation.

We further hold that Lone Star’s invalid-ordinance argument not only lacks merit, but, as a due process claim, is

“wholly insubstantial and frivolous.” Steel Co., 523 U.S. at 89

(internal quotation marks omitted). In a case involving federal

interests far more tangible than those Lone Star has identified,

we held that a plaintiff does not make out a § 1983 claim by

alleging only that the government enforced a preempted state

law. See White Mountain Apache Tribe v. Williams, 810 F.2d

8604 LONE STAR SECURITY v. LOS ANGELES
844 (9th Cir. 1987). In White Mountain, the plaintiffs had

been required to pay taxes under two Arizona statutes the

United States Supreme Court later determined to be preempted by federal law, and brought § 1983 claims contending

that their rights had been violated under the Supremacy and

Due Process clauses of the United States Constitution. We

held that the plaintiffs failed to provide a meaningful basis for

evaluating their due process claim, and that “preemption of

state law under the Supremacy Clause — at least if based on

federal occupation of the field or conflict with federal goals

— will not support an action under § 1983.” Id. at 850. Unlike

Lone Star’s invalid-ordinance claim, the plaintiff’s claims in

White Mountain were grounded in federal preemption principles, and our rejection of the claims thus shows how devoid

of merit Lone Star’s due process argument is in this case,

where the ostensible conflict is not between a state statute and

federal law, but merely between a municipal ordinance and a

state statute. 

[8] In short, Lone Star’s claim is premised on a notion of

due process that is facially absurd. It is a tenet of our federal

system that state constitutions are “not taken up into the 14th

Amendment” such that federal courts may strike down a statute as invalid under state law. Pullman Co. v. Knott, 235 U.S.

23, 25 (1914) (Holmes, J.). It is likewise “axiomatic that ‘for

the purposes of the Supremacy Clause, the constitutionality of

local ordinances is analyzed in the same way as that of statewide laws.’ ” Wis. Pub. Intervenor v. Mortier, 501 U.S. 597,

605 (1991) (quoting Hilsborough County v. Automated Med.

Labs., Inc., 471 U.S. 707, 713 (1985)). 

[9] Blind to both these principles, Lone Star advances a

notion of due process that would “demote[ ]” the Constitution

to “a font of tort law.” Lewis, 523 U.S. at 847 n.8. This “approach to § 1983 and the federal-question jurisdiction,” if

accepted, would allow “every claim against any state actor

[to] be litigated in federal court, no matter how small the

stakes and no matter the parties’ citizenships.” Goros, 489

LONE STAR SECURITY v. LOS ANGELES 8605
F.3d at 859. Accordingly, we hold that Lone Star’s invalidordinance claim “is so insubstantial, implausible, foreclosed

by prior decisions . . . [and] otherwise completely devoid of

merit as not to involve a federal controversy.” Steel Co., 523

U.S. at 89 (internal quotation marks omitted).

[10] This holding is, in some respects, a windfall to the

City, which failed to argue that Lone Star could not make out

a cognizable due process claim merely by asserting that Section 80.73.2 is invalid under state law. “[D]efects in our

subject-matter jurisdiction,” however, “go to the inherent

power of the court and cannot be waived or forfeited.” United

States v. Jacobo Castillo, 496 F.3d 947, 952 (9th Cir. 2007)

(en banc). Therefore, despite the City’s failure to raise the

jurisdictional issue, we must reverse the district court’s award

of summary judgment and remand with instructions to dismiss

Lone Star’s invalid-ordinance claim for lack of subject matter

jurisdiction.

II. Notice Claim

In addition to its invalid-ordinance claim, Lone Star argues

that beyond any lack of “statutory” notice resulting from Los

Angeles Municipal Code § 80.73.2 being invalid under state

law, the City failed to provide adequate notice before towing

its trailers for being parked more than 72 hours. The City had

a policy of providing notice to first-time offenders before

towing their vehicles in violation of the 72-hour rule, but left

to the discretion of individual officers the decision whether to

provide pre-towing notice to repeat offenders. Lone Star concedes that the notice provided to first-time offenders was sufficient to satisfy due process, and that it received this notice

on multiple occasions. It argues, however, that the City was

required to provide such advance notice each time it towed

one of Lone Star’s trailers. Although sufficiently colorable to

establish federal question jurisdiction, this due process claim

fails on its merits. 

8606 LONE STAR SECURITY v. LOS ANGELES
[11] Due process “require[s] that notice generally be given

before the government may seize property.” Clement v. City

of Glendale, 518 F.3d 1090, 1093 (9th Cir. 2008). There are,

however, “numerous exceptions to this general rule: The government need not give notice in an emergency, nor if notice

would defeat the entire point of the seizure, nor when the

interest at stake is small relative to the burden that giving

notice would impose.” Id. at 1093-94; see also Scofield, 862

F.2d at 762-64 (holding that city was not required to provide

advance notice before towing unregistered vehicles). In evaluating whether pre-towing notice is constitutionally required in

Lone Star’s situation, we are guided by the context-specific

balancing test set forth in Mathews v. Eldridge:

First, the private interest that will be affected by the

official action; second, the risk of an erroneous

deprivation of such interest through the procedures

used, and the probable value, if any, of additional or

substitute procedural safeguards; and finally, the

Government’s interest, including the function

involved and the fiscal and administrative burdens

that the additional or substitute procedural requirement would entail.

424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976); see Scofield, 862 F.2d at 762-63

(applying test). Weighing these factors, we conclude the

City’s notice policy did not violate Lone Star’s due process

rights.

[12] First, although “[t]he uninterrupted use of one’s vehicle is a significant and substantial private interest,” Scofield,

862 F.2d at 762, Lone Star does not assert such an interest.

See Clement, 518 F.3d at 1094 (concluding that “the owner’s

normal interest in continued use of his vehicle — as a means

of getting from place to place” had “no force” for the seizure

at issue because the plaintiff’s car had “just sat in the parking

lot, unused”). Lone Star was not using its trailers for transportation, but as an advertising medium in residential neighborLONE STAR SECURITY v. LOS ANGELES 8607
hoods. As the district court put it, “[Lone Star] wants to be

able to keep . . . the vans with these advertisements where

they are for as long as [it] can get away with it.” This inappropriate use creates a less substantial interest in the trailers than

had they served as a principal means of transportation.

[13] Second, the “risk of erroneous deprivation” is not substantial. Whatever the risk may be of erroneously towing a

first-time offender’s vehicle for violating the 72-hour rule,

this risk is considerably reduced with respect to chronic

offenders such as Lone Star who demonstrate a pattern of violating the rule. See Clement, 518 F.3d at 1094 (concluding

that there does not “appear to be a significant risk of erroneous towing” for cars not driven by their owners that are

parked in violation of their non-operation certificates); Sutton

v. City of Milwaukee, 672 F.2d 644, 646 (7th Cir. 1982) (“The

determination that a car is illegally parked is pretty cut and

dried. Police officers make mistakes, of course, but in giving

out parking tickets not very many — far fewer than in the

case of moving violations.”).

[14] Third, “implementing parking regulations” is a valid

governmental interest. Scofield, 862 F.2d at 763 (discussing

Sutton, 672 F.2d at 646). “Towing not only implements these

regulations directly by removing illegally parked cars, but the

threat of towing also deters future transgressions.” Id. Lone

Star contends that the only purpose served by the City’s 72-

hour parking rule is that served by laws authorizing the towing of abandoned vehicles. We have recognized that this purpose, “removal of [a] car from its place of repose,” is not

hindered — indeed, it is advanced — by a policy of consistently “giving a pre-towing notice to the owner of an apparently abandoned vehicle.” Id. at 764. 

Beyond the goal of simply removing abandoned vehicles

from shared public space, however, the City has identified a

number of other interests reasonably related to Section

80.73.2, such as preventing vandalism and addressing public

8608 LONE STAR SECURITY v. LOS ANGELES
nuisances such as those caused by Lone Star’s marketing

strategy of parking trailers in residential neighborhoods for

extended periods. The City’s policy of towing chronic offenders’ vehicles without prior notice advances these interests

both by removing the illegally parked vehicles and deterring

recidivism. See id. at 763. The reasonableness of the policy is

well illustrated by this case, where Lone Star’s incentives for

violating the 72-hour rule include not only the commercial

benefits of cost-free, long-term parking in public spaces, but

also the advertising exposure it enjoys by displaying its trailers in residential areas. With these incentives, if the City were

required to provide advance notice each time it towed a

chronic offender’s vehicle, Lone Star would have a strong

interest in monitoring its many trailers and moving only those

on which notice has been posted, leaving the others parked

until an officer happened to spot them. See id. (“[I]f a notice

had to be given before towing an illegally parked car, this

would, in effect, preclude towing of all illegally parked vehicles.”). Such a requirement would leave the City incapable of

using towing to deter Lone Star’s conduct, and thus unable to

advance the interests underlying the 72-hour rule. 

[15] Accordingly, we conclude that “advance notice is

infeasible” under the circumstances presented by this case,

id., and hold that due process did not require the City to provide advance notice to Lone Star, a chronic offender, before

towing its trailers for violating the 72-hour rule.

CONCLUSION

For the reasons above, we hold the City provided constitutionally sufficient notice before towing Lone Star’s vehicles,

and affirm the district court’s rejection of this due process

claim. We further hold the district court lacked subject matter

jurisdiction over Lone Star’s claim that Los Angeles Municipal Code § 80.73.2 is invalid under state law. Lone Star

elected to bring its invalid-ordinance claim only under federal

law, and thus there are no outstanding state-law claims for the

LONE STAR SECURITY v. LOS ANGELES 8609
district court to address by way of supplemental jurisdiction.

See 28 U.S.C. § 1367(a). Because Lone Star is left without

any remaining causes of action, we may not remand to the

district court with instructions to permit Lone Star to amend

its complaint. Accordingly, we affirm the district court’s

rejection of Lone Star’s constitutional notice claim, vacate its

grant of summary judgment on Lone Star’s invalid-ordinance

claim and remand with instructions to dismiss that claim for

lack of jurisdiction. See Goros, 489 F.3d at 860. 

AFFIRMED in part; VACATED in part and REMANDED

with directions. The parties shall bear their own costs on

appeal. 

8610 LONE STAR SECURITY v. LOS ANGELES