[Cite as State v. Wolfe, 2019-Ohio-2294.]

COURT OF APPEALS 

LICKING COUNTY, OHIO 

FIFTH APPELLATE DISTRICT 

STATE OF OHIO 

 Plaintiff-Appellee 

-vsDAVID A. WOLFE 

 Defendant-Appellant 

JUDGES: 

: Hon. W. Scott Gwin, P.J. 

: Hon. John W. Wise, J 

: Hon. Patricia A. Delaney, J. 

: 

: 

: Case No. 18-CA-60 

: 

: 

: OPINION 

CHARACTER OF PROCEEDING: Criminal appeal from the Licking County 

Court of Common Pleas, Case No. 17 CR 

00491 

JUDGMENT: Affirmed 

DATE OF JUDGMENT ENTRY: June 7, 2019 

APPEARANCES: 

For Plaintiff-Appellee For Defendant-Appellant 

WILLIAM HAYES NICHOLAS FAGNANO 

BY:PAULA SAWYERS Burkett & Sanderson, Inc. 

Licking County Prosecutor’s Office 73 North Sixth Street 

20 S. Second Street, 4th Floor Newark, OH 43055 

Newark, OH 43055 

 
[Cite as State v. Wolfe, 2019-Ohio-2294.]

Gwin, P.J. 

{¶1} Appellant David A. Wolfe [“Wolfe”] appeals the decision of the Court of 

Common Pleas, Licking County, which sentenced him for community control violations. 

Facts and Procedural History 

{¶2} On November 21, 2017, Wolfe pled guilty to three counts of Receiving 

Stolen Property, felonies of the fifth degree. Wolfe was sentenced to three years of 

Community Control sanctions. The trial court reserved a prison term of twelve months on 

each count in the event Wolfe was to violate the terms and conditions of his Community 

Control.1

{¶3} On March 15, 2018, Wolfe tested positive for Methamphetamine. Wolfe 

admitted that he had used the drug on March 12, 2018. Further, a home check by Wolfe’s 

probation officer revealed scales and drug masking agents. 

{¶4} On May 2, 2018, Wolfe again tested positive for Methamphetamine. Wolfe 

admitted using the drug on May 1, 2018. Further, Adult Court Services discovered text 

messages in which Wolfe was attempting to contact known offenders in violation of his 

community control. ACS also discovered messages that indicated Wolfe was contacting 

incarcerated individuals. 

{¶5} A Motion to Revoke Wolfe’s Community Control was filed May 8, 2019. 

Wolfe through counsel stipulated to probable cause and admitted the violations. 

Thereafter the trial court imposed a twelve-month sentence on each count to run 

consecutive for an aggregate sentence of thirty-six months. 

 1 The judgment entry states, “The prison terms shall be served consecutively.” 
Licking County, Case No. 18-CA-60 3 

Assignment of Error 

{¶6} Wolfe raises one assignment of error, 

{¶7} “I. THE SENTENCING COURT COMMITTED HARMFUL ERROR WHEN 

IT IMPOSED THE FULL PRISON TERM ON EACH OF HIS THREE COUNTS FOR NONCRIMINAL VIOLATIONS AS THIS IS CONTRARY TO LAW.” 

Law and Analysis

{¶8} In his sole assignment of error, Wolfe maintains that the trial court erred 

when it sentenced him to 12 months in prison on each count because under R.C. 

2929.15(B)(1)(c)(i) the court could only sentence him to a maximum prison term of 90 

days. Specifically, Wolfe argues that his violations were “technical violations,” and thus, 

the trial court could only sentence him to 90 days in prison under R.C. 2929.15(B)(1)(c)(i). 

{¶9} R.C. 2929.15(B)(1)(c)(i) provides: 

 (B)(1) If the conditions of a community control sanction are violated 

or if the offender violates a law or leaves the state without the permission of 

the court or the offender’s probation officer, the sentencing court may 

impose upon the violator one or more of the following penalties: 

 (c) A prison term on the offender pursuant to section 2929.14 of the 

Revised Code and division (B)(3) of this section, provided that a prison term 

imposed under this division is subject to the following limitations, as 

applicable: 

 (i) If the prison term is imposed for any technical violation of the 

conditions of a community control sanction imposed for a felony of the fifth 

degree or for any violation of law committed while under a community 
Licking County, Case No. 18-CA-60 4 

control sanction imposed for such a felony that consists of a new criminal 

offense and that is not a felony, the prison term shall not exceed ninety 

days. 

{¶10} The trial court made no specific finding concerning whether the court 

considered Wolfe’s violations to be “technical” or “non-technical” either at the hearing or 

in the subsequent judgment entry. 

{¶11} This Court has previously considered the meaning of “technical violation” 

pursuant to R.C. 2929.15(B)(1)(c)(i), 

 The Eleventh Appellate District addressed R.C. 2929.15(B) in a case 

where the defendant overdosed on heroin in violation of the terms of her 

community control. State v. Cozzone, 11th Dist. Geauga No. 2017-G-0141, 

2018-Ohio-2249 [––– N.E.3d ––––]. The defendant argued her community 

control violation was technical in nature, and therefore, the maximum prison 

term which could be imposed for the violation was 180 days. The appellate 

court observed the term “technical violation” was not defined in R.C. 

2929.15; however, other appellate districts had addressed “technical 

violations” as they pertained to revocation of community control sanctions 

and parole violations in cases predating the statutory amendment. Id. at ¶ 

38, citing State v. Cearfoss, 5th Dist. Stark No. 2004CA00085, 2004-Ohio7310 [2004 WL 3563911] (defendant’s failure to follow his probation officer’s 

order to open the front door was a “technical violation”); State v. Jenkins, 

2d Dist. Champaign No. 2005-CA-22, 2006-Ohio-2639 [2006 WL 1461119] 

(defendant’s failure to notify his parole officer before moving out of his 
Licking County, Case No. 18-CA-60 5 

residence where a convicted felon resided was “at best a ‘technical’ 

violation”); and Amburgey v. Ohio Adult Parole Auth., 12th Dist. Madison 

No. CA2001-07-016, 2001 WL 1256365, * * * (“technical” violations, in the 

context of parole, are those violations of the terms and conditions of the 

parole agreement which are not criminal in nature, such as failure to report 

to the parole officer, association with known criminals, leaving employment, 

and leaving the state). The Cozzone court concluded overdosing on drugs 

was criminal in nature and therefore could not be considered a “technical 

violation” of community control. Cozzone, supra, at ¶ 39. 

State v. Mannah, 5th Dist. Fairfield No. 17-CA-54, 2018-Ohio-4219, ¶ 9. 

{¶12} We note that, specifically, the court in Cozzone concluded, “[a]lthough 

appellant was not charged or convicted for this conduct, overdosing on drugs is criminal 

in nature and cannot be considered a “technical” violation of the terms and conditions of 

community control.” Cozzone, ¶ 39. See, State v. Nelson, 2nd Dist. Champaign No. 

2018-CA-5, 2018-Ohio-4763, ¶28. 

{¶13} The Supreme Court of Ohio has defined “ ‘technical violations’ [of parole] 

as ‘those violations of the terms and conditions of the parole agreement which are not 

criminal in nature[,] such as failure to report to the parole officer, association with known 

criminals, leaving employment, leaving the State, etc.’” State ex rel. Taylor v. Ohio Adult 

Parole Auth., 66 Ohio St.3d 121, 124, 609 N.E.2d 546 (1993), quoting Inmates’ 

Councilmatic Voice v. Rogers, 541 F.2d 633,635, fn. 2 (6th Dist. 1976). 

{¶14} In the case at bar, Wolfe admitted to ingesting Methamphetamine on March 

12, 2018. His Community Control officer did not immediately file a motion to revoke. 
Licking County, Case No. 18-CA-60 6 

However, when Wolfe admitted that he again ingested Methamphetamine on May 1, 

2018, a violation was filed. Although Wolfe was not charged or convicted for this conduct, 

purchasing, possessing, and using a Schedule II, controlled substance is a felony criminal 

offense. R.C. 2925.11(A)(C)(1)(a)2. Therefore, it could not be considered a “technical 

violation” of community control. State v. Cozzone, 11th Dist. Geauga No. 2017-G-0141, 

2018-Ohio-2249, 114 N.E.3d 601, ¶9. 

{¶15} Wolfe’s sole assignment of error is overruled. 

{¶16} The judgment of the Licking County Court of Common Pleas is affirmed. 

 

 

 

 

 2 Methamphetamine is a Schedule II controlled substance. R.C. 3719.41, Schedule II, (C)(2).