J-A26017-16

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA

v.

DAVID M. KING 

Appellant

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

 IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

 PENNSYLVANIA

 No. 1454 WDA 2015

Appeal from the PCRA Order September 4, 2015

In the Court of Common Pleas of Cambria County 

Criminal Division at No(s): CP-11-CR-0000826-2011

BEFORE: BENDER, P.J.E., RANSOM, J., and MUSMANNO, J.

MEMORANDUM BY RANSOM, J.: FILED NOVEMBER 29, 2016

David M. King appeals from the September 4, 2015 order dismissing 

his PCRA petition for lack of eligibility for relief under Pa.C.S. § 

9541(a)(1)(i). We affirm.

The relevant facts and procedural history are as follows. Appellant 

was the focus of a police investigation into child pornography that found: 

A computer with an IP address was located sharing files on a 

certain network. State police, through their investigation, were 

able to identify the IP address as that of the [Appellant]. The 

investigation took [state police] to [Appellant’s] residence. The 

[Appellant’s] computer was seized, and on [Appellant’s] 

computer there had been several files with underage boys 

engaged in sexual activity.

Notes of Testimony (N.T.), 2/7/2012, at 5-6. 

In January 2012, Appellant was charged with four counts of 

dissemination of photographs or films of child sex acts and ten counts of 
J-A26017-16

- 2 -

possession of child pornography.1 In February 2012, Appellant entered into 

a negotiated plea agreement and pled guilty to one count of possession of 

child pornography, a felony in the third degree. The remaining charges were 

nolle prossed. In exchange for the plea, Appellant signed off on Megan’s 

Law registration and related assessments under 42 Pa.C.S. § 9795.4, 

identified as a “material term and condition of this disposition.” See

Disposition under Pa.R.Crim.P. 590(B), 2/7/2012. Appellant did not object 

to registration under Megan’s Law at that time. 

On May 7, 2012, Appellant was sentenced to six to twenty-three 

months’ incarceration for possession of child pornography with automatic 

parole after six months. Appellant pro se filed a PCRA petition when he did 

not receive automatic parole in October 2012; however, through counsel, his 

petition was withdrawn, and Appellant was released from prison in 

November 2012. Immediately upon release on November 16, 2012, 

Appellant was required to complete Megan’s Law registration pursuant to the 

terms of his plea.

On December 20, 2012, the Sex Offender Registration and Notification 

Act (SORNA) became effective in the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania. 

SORNA requires convicted sex offenders to register with the Pennsylvania 

State Police in accordance with a three-tiered system established by the 

____________________________________________

1 Respectively, 18 Pa.C.S. §§ 6312(c)(1), 6321(d)(1).
J-A26017-16

- 3 -

federal government. 42 Pa.C.S. § 9799.13 (enacted 12/20/2011, effective 

12/20/2012). 

Appellant’s right to pursue collateral relief expired on June 6, 2013. 

See 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9545(b)(1)). Nevertheless, in March 2015, Appellant 

pro se filed a second PCRA petition, this time challenging his plea and 

sentence; however, the PCRA court dismissed his petition without appointing 

counsel or a conducting an evidentiary hearing. See Trial Ct. Order, 

3/10/2015. Appellant did not appeal.

Appellant pro se filed a third PCRA petition challenging his plea and 

sentence on July 10, 2015. Thereafter, Appellant filed an amended, 

counseled petition on September 1, 2015.2 Following a hearing, the PCRA 

court found that Appellant was not eligible for relief and dismissed his 

petition. See Trial Ct. Op., 9/4/2015, at 3. According to the PCRA court, 

Appellant “already served his May 7, 2012 sentence of 6 to 23 months for 

____________________________________________

2

In his third PCRA, Appellant claims, inter alia, that his plea was not 

voluntary for the following reasons:

(1) his prior counsel advised him that his sentence would only be 

90 days; (2) his prior counsel never advised him that he would 

have to register on Megan's Law; and (3) his prior counsel never 

advised him that he would have to attend sexual offenders 

classes at the prison in order to be automatically paroled. The 

second issue in the Appellant's amended PCRA petition was a 

request that his post-sentence /appellate rights be reinstated in 

order to challenge the length of his sentence, as well as the 

requirement that he register on Megan's Law. 

Appellant’s Brief at 5. 
J-A26017-16

- 4 -

possession of child pornography.” See Trial Ct. Op., 9/4/2015, 1-2. Thus, 

Appellant could not claim relief from a sentence that he had already served. 

See id. The PCRA court denied Appellant’s claim, finding that he was not 

eligible for relief “solely based upon his current status as a Megan’s Law 

registrant.” Id. at 3. 

Appellant timely filed a notice of appeal and a court-ordered 1925(b) 

statement. The PCRA court issued a responsive opinion incorporating its 

earlier decision. See Rule 1925(a) Op., 9/18/2015.

On appeal, Appellant presents one issue for review:

Whether the Trial Court erred in dismissing the Appellant's 

current PCRA Petition for lack of jurisdiction (in that the 

Appellant was still a Megan's Law registrant, but was no longer 

serving his sentence for the case he had filed a PCRA Petition)?

Appellant’s Brief at 3. 

We apply the following standard of review. “In reviewing the denial of 

PCRA relief, we examine whether the PCRA court's determination is 

supported by the record and free of legal error.” Commonwealth v. Miller, 

102 A.3d 988, 992 (Pa. Super. 2014) (citations omitted). “[W]here the 

petitioner raises questions of law, our standard of review is de novo and our 

scope of review is plenary.” Commonwealth v. Rigg, 84 A.3d 1080, 1084 

(Pa. Super. 2014) (quoting Commonwealth v. Rykard, 55 A.3d 1177, 

1183 (Pa. Super. 2012)). 

“[T]o be eligible for relief under the PCRA, the petitioner must be 

currently serving a sentence of imprisonment, probation or parole for the 
J-A26017-16

- 5 -

crime.” Commonwealth v. Williams, 977 A.2d 1174, 1176 (Pa. Super. 

2009) (internal quotation marks removed; citation omitted); see 42 

Pa.C.S.A. § 9543(a)(1)(i). ”[T]he PCRA precludes relief for those petitioners 

whose sentences have expired, regardless of the collateral consequences of 

their sentence.” Williams, 977 A.2d at 1176 (citation omitted). In such 

circumstances, dismissal of the petition is proper. Commonwealth v. 

Ahlborn, 699 A.2d 718, 721 (Pa. 1997). 

In this case, Appellant concedes that he is not serving any term of 

imprisonment, parole, or probation, as required by the PCRA. Nevertheless, 

Appellant urges us to recognize that the enactment of SORNA imposed new 

conditions not contemplated at the time he agreed to plead guilty. 

According to Appellant, these conditions are punitive and mirror those 

imposed during incarceration or probation. Appellant’s Brief at 7-8. Thus, 

Appellant requests that this Court carve out an exception to Section 

9543(a)(1)(i) that would create a basis of relief for sex offenders who are no 

longer serving a sentence. Id. at 9. Appellant’s argument is without merit.

3

Registration requirements under Megan’s Law do not establish 

____________________________________________

3 Appellant assertion that he did not know about the Megan’s Law 

requirements is contrary to the certified record, wherein there are several 

documents Appellant signed acknowledging these requirements as a 

circumstance of his punishment. 
J-A26017-16

- 6 -

eligibility for relief under the PCRA. See Williams, 977 A.2d at 1177.4 Like 

Megan’s Law, SORNA requires “registration, notification, and counseling,” 

which, as we have held in the past, “are not criminal punishment, but 

represent non-punitive, regulatory measures designed to safeguard the 

public.” Id. at 1176-79 (citations omitted). SORNA is a supplement to 

Megan’s Law, which “‘shall not be construed as punitive.’” Commonwealth 

v. Perez, 97 A.3d 747, 758 (Pa. Super. 2014) (quoting 42 Pa.C.S. § 

9799.11(b)(2)).5 Consequently, SORNA’s registration, notification, and 

counseling requirements are collateral consequences of Appellant’s 

convictions that constitute non-punitive conditions. See Commonwealth v. 

Farabaugh, 128 A.3d 1191, 1195 (Pa. 2015); Commonwealth v. 

Giannatonio, 114 A.3d 429, 438 (Pa. Super. 2015) (holding that SORNA 

constitutes “remedial legislation with a goal of public safety.”) (quoting 

Commonwealth v. McDonough, 96 A.3d 1067, 1071 (Pa. Super. 2014), 

____________________________________________

4 Reporting requirements of Megan’s Law II do not constitute “a sentence of 

imprisonment, probation or parole for the crime,” for which the PCRA may 

provide relief, but rather a collateral consequence of a criminal conviction. 

Williams, 977 A.2d at 1177; see 42 Pa.C.S. 9543(a)(1)(i). Accordingly, 

“an appellant who is required to submit to the reporting requirements of 

Section 9795.1 of Megan's Law II, [42 Pa.C.S. §§ 9791-9799.7,] but has 

also completed a sentence of imprisonment and/or probation, is not eligible 

for relief under PCRA Section 9543(a)(1)(i).” Williams, 977 A.2d at 1175.

5 The Perez Court upheld retroactive application of SORNA registration 

requirements as constitutional under the Federal and State ex post facto 

clauses. Perez, 97 A.2d at 760; accord Commonwealth v. Turner, 80 

A.3d 754, 758 (Pa. 2013) (“Petitioner has no due process right to be heard 

outside of the limits imposed by Section 9543(a)(1)(i) of the PCRA”). 
J-A26017-16

- 7 -

appeal denied, 108 A.3d 34 (Pa. 2015)); Coppolino v. Noonan, 102 A.3d 

1254, 1276 (Pa. Cwmlth. 2014) (concluding that SORNA is not punitive, 

rather rationally related to public safety), affirmed, 125 A.3d 1196 (Pa. 

2015). Thus, SORNA does not constitute a sentence of imprisonment, 

probation or parole, and therefore, does not establish Appellant’s eligibility 

for relief under the PCRA. Accordingly, the trial court’s dismissal of 

Appellant’s petition was proper. Ahlborn, 699 A.2d at 721. 

Order affirmed.

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 11/29/2016