This court takes judicial notice of the fact that this address is the location of the 1

Domestic Relations Branch of the Family Division of the Court of Common Pleas of

Philadelphia County, which is part of the First Judicial District of Pennsylvania. See

generally First Judicial District of Pennsylvania, 2005 Annual Report 5 (2005) (chart,

“First Judicial District Organization”), available at

http://fjd.phila.gov/pdf/report/2005-First-Judicial-District-Annual-Report.pdf.

To the extent that such judicial notice constitutes consideration of “matters outside

the pleading” under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b), the court will treat

defendant’s motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b), discussed infra, as a motion for summary

judgment under Rule 56. 

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA

WILLIAM YOUNG,

Plaintiff,

v.

DOMESTIC RELATIONS DIVISION

ENFORCEMENT UNIT, 

Defendant.

CIVIL ACTION

No. 05-4498

MEMORANDUM

August 10, 2007

Plaintiff William Young brought this pro se complaint under 42 U.S.C. § 1983,

naming as defendant the “Domestic Relation Division Enforcement Unit, 34 South 11th

St. Phila. PA 19107.” Young states the basis for his claim as follows: 1

In 1989 there was a order against me to pay child support, in 1980 I

Case 2:05-cv-04498-LP Document 12 Filed 08/10/07 Page 1 of 9
 The defendant is represented by counsel for the Administrative Office of the 2

Pennsylvania Courts. It should also be noted that, despite receiving notice of the instant

motion, the plaintiff has filed no response.

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was sentenced to a term of 10 to 20 years. I wasn’t paroled until 1990.

I believe this order violate my constitutional rights. Since I wasn’t

afford a hearing regarding this order. It’s clear that no state can take one’s

property without due process of law, this is what is being done to me.

Compl. ¶ V (Docket No. 6). Young seeks the following relief: “I want this court to enter

a judgement if my constitutional rights have been violated, also I want all the money

which was tooken from me returned.” Compl. ¶ VI.

Defendant, the Domestic Relations Division Enforcement Unit of the Court of

Common Pleas of Philadelphia, moves to dismiss Young’s complaint. See Mot. of 2

Judicial Def. to Dismiss Pl.’s Compl. (Docket No. 10). The defendant contends that the

complaint must be dismissed under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) for lack of

subject matter jurisdiction and under Rule 12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim upon which

relief can be granted. Specifically, the defendant argues that (a) this court lacks

jurisdiction over Young’s suit under the Rooker-Feldman doctrine, because the suit seeks

to challenge the actions, rulings and adjudications of a state court; (b) the defendant is

immune from suit for damages under the Eleventh Amendment of the United States

Constitution; and (c) the defendant is not a “person” that can be sued under 42 U.S.C. §

1983. In addition, the defendant contends that Young cannot save his complaint by

amending it to add judicial officers as defendants, because such officers are entitled to

absolute immunity for actions taken pursuant to their judicial duties.

Case 2:05-cv-04498-LP Document 12 Filed 08/10/07 Page 2 of 9
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This court is required to address the question of jurisdiction first. See Steel Co. v.

Citizens for a Better Env’t, 523 U.S. 83, 94 (1998). 

JURISDICTION

The defendant argues that this court lacks subject matter jurisdiction because

adjudicating Young’s claim would require this court to review the decision of a state

court, in violation of the Rooker-Feldman doctrine. This doctrine has been explained by

the Third Circuit as follows:

Section 1257 of Title 28 of the United States Code bestows upon the

Supreme Court of the United States appellate jurisdiction to review final

judgments of the highest courts of the respective states. The so-called

Rooker-Feldman doctrine teaches that, by negative implication, the inferior

federal courts lack subject matter jurisdiction to review judgments of those

courts. We have interpreted the doctrine to encompass final decisions of

lower state courts as well. . . .

. . .

Rooker-Feldman abstention is necessary to preserve the United

States Supreme Court’s appellate jurisdiction—as well as to limit federal

court review of state court decisions to the avenue provided for such by

Congress.

E.B. v. Verniero, 119 F.3d 1077, 1090 (3d Cir. 1997) (citing Rooker v. Fid. Trust Co., 263

U.S. 413 (1923) and D.C. Court of Appeals v. Feldman, 460 U.S. 462 (1983)); see also

Port Auth. Police Benev. Ass’n, Inc. v. Port Auth. of N.Y. & N.J. Police Dep’t 

973 F.2d 169, 175 & n.3 (3d Cir. 1992). 

“The Rooker-Feldman doctrine provides that federal district courts lack subject

matter jurisdiction to review final adjudications of . . . [state courts] or to evaluate

constitutional claims that are inextricably intertwined with the state court’s [decision] in a

Case 2:05-cv-04498-LP Document 12 Filed 08/10/07 Page 3 of 9
 In Lance, the Court observed that Rooker and Feldman are “the only two cases 3

in which we have applied this rule to find that a federal district court lacked jurisdiction,”

and that “[n]either [case] elaborated a rationale for a wide-reaching bar on the jurisdiction

of lower federal courts.” Lance, 546 U.S. at 463–64. 

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judicial proceeding.” FOCUS v. Allegheny County Court of Common Pleas, 75 F.3d 834,

840 (3d Cir. 1996) (internal quotation marks omitted) (second alteration in original). 

However, “Rooker-Feldman applies only when in order to grant the federal plaintiff the

relief sought, the federal court must determine that the state court judgment was

erroneously entered or must take action that would render that judgment ineffectual.” Id.

(citing Marks v. Stinson, 19 F.3d 873, 886 n. 11 (3d Cir. 1994)); accord Exxon Mobil

Corp. v. Saudi Basic Indus. Corp., 544 U.S. 280, 284 (2005) (holding that “[t]he

Rooker-Feldman doctrine . . . is confined to . . . cases brought by state-court losers

complaining of injuries caused by state-court judgments rendered before the district court

proceedings commenced and inviting district court review and rejection of those

judgments”). The Supreme Court has recently emphasized “the narrowness of the

Rooker-Feldman rule.” Lance v. Dennis, 546 U.S. 459, 464 (2006) (per curiam); see 3

also Exxon Mobil, 544 U.S. at 287–88 & nn.2–3 (2005).

Here, plaintiff Young asks the court (1) to enter a declaratory judgment

establishing that his constitutional right to due process was violated when the state court,

in 1989, entered an “order against [him] to pay child support” without affording him a

hearing; and (2) to return “all the money which was t[a]ken from [him].” Compl. ¶¶

V–VI. Under Rooker-Feldman, this court lacks jurisdiction if, in order to grant the above

Case 2:05-cv-04498-LP Document 12 Filed 08/10/07 Page 4 of 9
 In Ernst, the plaintiff alleged that caseworkers employed by Chester County 4

Children & Youth Services to “prosecute dependency proceedings on behalf of the state”

violated her substantive due process rights through their conduct in the course of statecourt proceedings to adjudicate custody of the plaintiff’s granddaughter. See Ernst, 108

F.3d at 488–91. The Third Circuit held that:

The Rooker-Feldman doctrine did not preclude the [federal] district court

from deciding [Ernst’s] claims [against the defendant caseworkers] because

a ruling that the defendants violated Ernst’s right to substantive due process

by making recommendations to the state court out of malice or personal bias

would not have required the court to find that the state court judgments

made on the basis of those recommendations were erroneous.

Id. at 491–92. Similarly, a ruling in the case at bar that the state court system violated

Young’s procedural due process rights by denying him a hearing before entering the 1989

child support order would not necessarily require a ruling that the judgment reflected in

the 1989 order was itself in error.

See, e.g., Erickson v. Pardus, 127 S. Ct. 2197, 2200 (2007) (per curiam). 5

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relief, the court would have to determine that the Pennsylvania court’s 1989 order was

erroneous (i.e., that Young was not obligated to pay child support), or if relief from this

court would render the 1989 order “ineffectual.” See FOCUS, 75 F.3d at 840. To the

extent that Young asks for the return of money collected from him pursuant to the 1989

order, this would seem to require the court to vacate the 1989 order, and, to that extent,

this court lacks jurisdiction. See Feldman, 460 U.S. at 482 & n.16. On the other hand, to

the extent that the factual predicate of Young’s complaint is not the 1989 order itself, but

an alleged denial of his constitutional rights during the proceedings prior to entry of that

order, it would appear that Rooker-Feldman does not foreclose jurisdiction. Cf. Ernst v.

Child & Youth Servs. of Chester County, 108 F.3d 486, 491–92 (3d Cir. 1997). This 4

court must construe pro se filings liberally and will therefore consider Young’s claim in 5

Case 2:05-cv-04498-LP Document 12 Filed 08/10/07 Page 5 of 9
 While such a liberal construal may save Young’s complaint from dismissal under 6

Rooker-Feldman, other legal doctrines—in particular, Eleventh Amendment

immunity—ultimately prevent Young from sustaining his suit against a unit of the

Pennsylvania state court system. See text infra. Again, in this respect, the case at bar is

comparable to Ernst, discussed supra note 4. See Ernst, 108 F.3d at 491, 493–94

(holding that suit against Child & Family Services caseworkers was not barred by

Rooker-Feldman, but that suit nevertheless was barred because caseworkers enjoyed

absolute immunity from suit on other grounds).

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the light just discussed—that is, as (a) a request for a declaration that the state court

violated his constitutional rights when it denied him a hearing in the course of processing

his case and/or (b) a request for money as damages for that violation of his rights.6

It is true that, in light of Young’s allegation that the 1989 “order violate[d] my

constitutional rights,” Compl. ¶ V (emphasis added), his federal claim might nevertheless

seem to be “inextricably intertwined” with the prior state court adjudication. See FOCUS,

75 F.3d at 841 & n.4. But the Third Circuit has explained that a federal “claim is

inextricably intertwined if the federal claim succeeds only to the extent that the state court

wrongly decided the issues before it.” Id. at 840 (internal quotation marks omitted). 

Here, relief could be granted on Young’s claim, as construed above, without determining

“that the state court wrongly decided the issues before it.” FOCUS, 75 F.3d at 840. 

Therefore, Young’s claim, so construed, is not barred by the Rooker-Feldman doctrine.

See id.; cf. Ernst, 108 F.3d at 491–92; Exxon Mobil, 544 U.S. at 284. 

FAILURE TO STATE A CLAIM ON WHICH RELIEF CAN BE GRANTED

The defendant argues that Young’s section 1983 claim is defective as a matter of

law both because the defendant is not a “person” who can be sued under section 1983,

Case 2:05-cv-04498-LP Document 12 Filed 08/10/07 Page 6 of 9
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and because the defendant is immune from suit under the Eleventh Amendment. These

claims are closely related. See Callahan v. City of Phila., 207 F.3d 668, 673 (3d Cir.

2000) (noting close relation of doctrines and holding that units of the Pennsylvania

judicial system are not “persons” under section 1983); see also Benn v. First Judicial

Dist. of Pa., 426 F.3d 233, 239, 241 (3d Cir. 2005) (citing Callahan and holding that units

of the Pennsylvania judicial system are immune from suit under Eleventh Amendment).

“[F]or over a century . . ., [the Supreme Court] ha[s] made clear that the

Constitution does not provide for federal jurisdiction over suits against nonconsenting

States.” Kimel v. Fla. Bd. of Regents, 528 U.S. 62, 73 (2000). A state’s Eleventh

Amendment immunity applies equally to claims for damages and to claims for equitable

relief (such as requests for declaratory judgments). See Cory v. White, 457 U.S. 85,

90–91 (1982). Furthermore, the defendant correctly points out that a unit of the

Pennsylvania court system—including a municipal court or a court of common pleas—is

considered an “alter ego” of the state of Pennsylvania for Eleventh Amendment purposes. 

Robinson v. Court of Common Pleas of Phila. County, 827 F. Supp. 1210, 1211, 1215

(E.D. Pa. 1993); accord Benn, 426 F.3d at 235, 241 (holding that the First Judicial

District of Pennsylvania and other units of Pennsylvania’s “unified judicial system” are

“state entities” for purposes of Eleventh Amendment immunity) (citing Callahan, 207

F.3d at 670–73); cf. Callahan, 207 F.3d at 668 (finding “Warrant Division of the First

Judicial District” and “Municipal Court Eviction Unit” to be state entities for purposes of

section 1983).

Case 2:05-cv-04498-LP Document 12 Filed 08/10/07 Page 7 of 9
 As the defendant notes, even if Young were to amend his complaint to name 7

individual officers, any judicial officers would be entitled to absolute immunity for all

actions “taken in the[ir] judicial capacity.” Mireles v. Waco, 502 U.S. 9, 11 (1991).

 Even if the Eleventh Amendment were not applicable, the same result would be 8

required pursuant to defendant’s alternate theory that it is not a “person” under section

1983. See Callahan, 207 F.3d at 673; cf. In re Hechinger Inv. Co. of Del., Inc.

335 F.3d 243, 251 (3d Cir. 2003) (holding that consideration of merits claim prior to, or

simultaneous with, consideration of a claim of Eleventh Amendment immunity does not

contravene the Supreme Court’s interdiction against exercise of “hypothetical

jurisdiction,” in Steel Co., 523 U.S. 83).

-8-

“Eleventh Amendment immunity is subject to three exceptions: 1) congressional

abrogation, 2) state waiver, and 3) suits against individual state officers for prospective

relief to end an ongoing violation of federal law.” MCI Telecomm. Corp. v. Bell Atl. Pa.,

271 F.3d 491, 503 (3d Cir. 2001). However, none of the exceptions applies here. 

Congress did not abrogate immunity when enacting section 1983. See Quern v. Jordan,

440 U.S. 332, 345 (1979). There has been no waiver of immunity by the state of

Pennsylvania. See 42 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. §§ 8521–22. And, finally, no individual state

officers are named by Young as defendants. Accordingly, the court agrees with the 7

defendant’s contention that it has Eleventh Amendment immunity which functions as an

absolute bar to Young’s claim. Therefore, dismissal of the complaint under Federal Rule 8

of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)—or, in the alternative, granting of summary judgment in

favor of the defendant under Rule 56(b)—is required.

Dismissal of a pro se complaint in a civil rights case is ordinarily not appropriate

without first providing the plaintiff with an opportunity to amend the complaint to cure

any defects (even where the plaintiff has not requested leave to amend). See Alston v.

Case 2:05-cv-04498-LP Document 12 Filed 08/10/07 Page 8 of 9
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Parker, 363 F.3d 229, 235–36 (3d Cir. 2004); Fletcher-Harlee Corp. v. Pote Concrete

Contractors, Inc., 482 F.3d 247, 251–52 (3d Cir. 2007). However, the court need not

provide such an opportunity where “a curative amendment would be inequitable, futile, or

untimely.” Alston, 363 F.3d at 236. In this case, Young has not merely failed to allege

sufficient facts to support his claim; rather, he has sued a party which cannot be sued,

whatever the factual predicate may be. Under these circumstances, the court finds that

any amendment of Young’s complaint would be futile, and the complaint will therefore

be dismissed.

ORDER

AND NOW, this 10th day of August, 2007, upon consideration of plaintiff

William Young’s Complaint and the motion to dismiss filed by defendant, the Domestic

Relations Division Enforcement Unit of the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia

County, First Judicial District of Pennsylvania, and for the reasons stated in the

accompanying memorandum, it is hereby ORDERED that the defendant’s motion is

GRANTED and the plaintiff’s complaint is DISMISSED.

BY THE COURT:

/s/ Louis H. Pollak

_______________

Pollak, J.

Case 2:05-cv-04498-LP Document 12 Filed 08/10/07 Page 9 of 9