Department of Homeland Security

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April 2014

THE

FEDERAL LAW ENFORCEMENT

-INFORMER- A MONTHLY LEGAL RESOURCE AND COMMENTARY FOR LAW 

ENFORCEMENT OFFICERS AND AGENTS

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Welcome to this installment of The Federal Law Enforcement Informer (The Informer). The Legal Training Division of the 

Federal Law Enforcement Training Centers’ Office of Chief Counsel is dedicated to providing law enforcement officers with 

quality, useful and timely United States Supreme Court and federal Circuit Courts of Appeals reviews, interesting developments in 

the law, and legal articles written to clarify or highlight various issues. The views expressed in these articles are the opinions of the 

author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Federal Law Enforcement Training Centers. The Informer is researched and 

written by members of the Legal Division. All comments, suggestions, or questions regarding The Informer can be directed to the 

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This edition of The Informer may be cited as 4 INFORMER 14.
In This Issue 

Free FLETC Informer Webinar Schedule

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Case Summaries

United States Supreme Court

 Click Here

Circuit Courts of Appeals

 Click Here

1st Circuit 7th Circuit 8th Circuit

9th Circuit 10th Circuit D.C. Circuit

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2013 Case Digests

Click Here

The Case Digests are comprised of all Informer case briefs arranged by 

subject matter and Supreme Court / Circuit. Instead of reviewing individual 

issues of The Informer to find a particular case or area of the law, check the 

case digests. 

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3
Free FLETC Informer Webinar Series Schedule

April / May 2014

(See the top of page 8 for instructions on how to participate in a webinar)

New Calendar View 

1. Curtilage in a Post-Jones Era

2-hour webinar presented by Bruce-Alan Barnard, FLETC Legal Division

This webinar explores the Fourth Amendment concept of curtilage from its inception in U.S. v Dunn, 

to its application after U.S. v. Jones.

Date and Time:

Tuesday April 22, 2014: 9:30 am EDT

To join this meeting: https://share.dhs.gov/bab0401

2. Fourth Amendment Survey I – Searches and Seizures

1-hour webinar presented by John Besselman, FLETC Legal Division

This is the first installment of our four-part series on basic Fourth Amendment concepts. Though I 

expect to occasionally discuss emerging law and recent Supreme Court decisions, this short course is 

intended to reacquaint law enforcement officers with basic legal concepts. Each of the four sessions is 

designed to stand alone to serve as a refresher on the concepts covered for that session. 

Date and Time:

Monday May 19, 2014: 2:30 pm EDT

To join this meeting: https://share.dhs.gov/fourthasurvey01/

3. Fourth Amendment Survey II – Executing a Search Warrant

1-hour webinar presented by John Besselman, FLETC Legal Division

This is the second installment of our review of the basic Fourth Amendment principles that guide 

effective law enforcement practices. This session will cover the law and rules for obtaining and 

executing a lawful search warrant. Participants need not have viewed our previous session to learn 

about this topic. 

Date and Time:

Tuesday May 20, 2014: 2:30 pm EDT

To join this meeting: https://share.dhs.gov/fourthasurvey02/

4
4. Fourth Amendment Survey III – Search Warrant Exceptions with Probable Cause

1-hour webinar presented by John Besselman, FLETC Legal Division.

This is the third installment of our review of the basic Fourth Amendment principles that guide 

effective law enforcement practices. This session will cover exceptions to the search warrant 

requirement that require probable cause. Participants need not have viewed any of our previous 

sessions to learn about warrantless searches such as plain view, the mobile conveyance exception, hot 

pursuit, destruction of evidence, and emergency scenes. 

Date and Time:

Wednesday May 21, 2014: 2:30 pm EDT

To join this meeting: https://share.dhs.gov/fourthasurvey03/

5. Fourth Amendment Survey IV – Search Warrant Exceptions without Probable Cause

1-hour webinar presented by John Besselman, FLETC Legal Division

This is the fourth installment of our review of the basic Fourth Amendment principles that guide 

effective law enforcement practices. This final session will cover exceptions to the search warrant 

requirement that do not require probable cause. Participants need not have viewed any of our 

previous sessions to learn about warrantless, probable cause-less searches such as frisks, SIA, 

consent, inventories and inspections. 

Date and Time:

Thursday May 22, 2014: 2:30 pm EDT

To join this meeting: https://share.dhs.gov/fourthasurvey04/

6. Government Workplace Searches

1-hour webinar presented by John Besselman, FLETC Legal Division.

This webinar examines how public employees might create a Reasonable Expectation of Privacy in 

their workplaces (computers, cars, offices, etc.), and, if so, how the government can intrude on that 

REP. This course is recommended for government supervisors, the IG community, and those whose 

duties include internal investigations. 

Date and Time:

 

Wednesday April 30, 2014: 10:00 am EDT

To join this meeting: https://share.dhs.gov/govtworksearch/

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7. Law Enforcement Legal Refresher Training (2-hours)

2-hour webinar presented by Bruce-Alan Barnard, FLETC Legal Division

This is a two-hour block of instruction focuses on Fourth and Fifth Amendment law and is designed 

to meet the training requirements for state and federal law enforcement officers who have mandated 

two-hour legal refresher training requirements. 

Dates and Times:

Thursday April 24, 2014: 9:30am EDT

Tuesday May 27, 2014: 1:00pm EDT

Thursday May 29, 2014: 3:30pm EDT

To join this meeting on any of the dates listed above: https://share.dhs.gov/lgd0312

8. Miranda 101

1-hour webinar presented by John Besselman, FLETC Legal Division

This course will identify and define the basic parameters of the Miranda v. Arizona decision. In this 

limited overview, the presenter(s) will discuss Police + Custody + Interrogation components that 

make up the basis of the law in this arena. A question and answer session will follow the presentation. 

Date and Time:

Tuesday May 6, 2014: 2:30pm EDT

To join this meeting: https://share.dhs.gov/miranda101/

9. The Rules of Search Warrant Execution

1-hour webinar presented by John Besselman, FLETC Legal Division

This course looks at the rules that govern the proper execution of a search warrant, including the who, 

how, what, when and where of service. Items discussed will include who can issue and serve a search 

warrant, the use of force to execute the warrant, and how to properly and lawfully close out the 

warrant process. 

Date and Time:

Monday April 21, 2014: 9:30am EDT

To join this meeting: https://share.dhs.gov/swexecution/

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FLETC Informer Webinar Schedule - April 2014 

Sun Monday Tuesday Wednesday Thursday Friday Sat

20 21

Rules of Search 

Warrant Execution

9:30 a.m. EDT 1-Hour

https://share.dhs.gov

/swexecution/

22

Curtilage – Post 

Jones

9:30 a.m. EDT

2-Hours

https://share.dhs.gov

/bab0401

23 24

Law Enforcement 

Legal Refresher

9:30 a.m. EDT

2-Hours

https://share.dhs.gov

/lgd0312

25 26

27 28 29 30

Govt. Workplace 

Searches

10:00 a.m. EDT

1-Hour

https://share.dhs.go

v/govtworksearch/

FLETC Informer Webinar Schedule - May 2014 

Sun Monday Tuesday Wednesday Thursday Friday Sat

1 2 3

4 5 6

Miranda 101

2:30 p.m. EDT

1-Hour

https://share.dhs.gov

/miranda101/

7 8 9 10

11 12 13 14 15 16 17

18 19

Fourth Amendment 

Survey I

1-Hour

https://share.dhs.gov

/fourthasurvey01/

20

Fourth Amendment 

Survey II

1-Hour

https://share.dhs.gov

/fourthasurvey02/

21

Fourth Amendment 

Survey III

1-Hour

https://share.dhs.go

v/fourthasurvey03/

22

Fourth Amendment 

Survey IV

1-Hour

https://share.dhs.gov/

fourthasurvey04/

23 24

25 26

MEMORIAL

DAY

27

Law Enforcement 

Legal Refresher

1:00 p.m. EDT

2-Hours

https://share.dhs.gov

/lgd0312

28 29

Law Enforcement 

Legal Refresher

3:30 p.m. EDT

2-Hours

https://share.dhs.gov/l

gd0312

30 31

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To participate in a FLETC Informer Webinar:

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8
CASE SUMMARIES

United States Supreme Court

United States v. Castleman, 2014 U.S. LEXIS 2220 (U.S. Mar. 26, 2014)

In 2001, Castleman pleaded guilty to having “intentionally or knowingly caused bodily injury to” the 

mother of his child, in violation of Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-13-111(b). In 2008, a federal grand jury 

indicted Castleman on two counts of possession of a firearm after being "convicted . . . of a 

misdemeanor crime of domestic violence," in violation of Title 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(9). The district 

court granted Castleman’s motion to dismiss the § 922(g)(9) counts of the indictment. The Sixth 

Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the district court and held Castleman’s conviction in 2001 did not 

qualify as a “misdemeanor crime of domestic violence” because Castleman could have been 

convicted for “causing a slight, nonserious physical injury with conduct that cannot be described as 

violent.” 

The Supreme Court disagreed, holding Castleman’s conviction in 2001 qualified as a “misdemeanor 

crime of domestic violence.” First, under § 922(g)(9) a misdemeanor crime of domestic violence is 

defined as “an offense that . . . has, as an element, the use or attempted use of physical force.” 

Second, the court recognized the common law element of force in the crime of battery “was satisfied 

by even the slightest offensive touching.” Third, because perpetrators of domestic violence are 

“routinely prosecuted under generally applicable assault or battery laws,” it made sense for Congress 

to have classified as a “misdemeanor crime of domestic violence” the type of conduct that supports a 

common-law battery conviction. Fourth, while the words “violent” or “violence” standing alone 

“connote a substantial degree of force,” that is not true of “domestic violence.” “Domestic violence” 

is not a type of “violence” but rather a term of art that covers acts that one might not characterize as 

“violent” in a non-domestic context. Consequently, the court held the requirement of “physical 

force” is satisfied, for the purposes of § 922(g)(9), by the degree of force that supports a common-law 

battery conviction. 

Click HERE for the court’s opinion.

*****

Circuit Courts of Appeals

1st Circuit

United States v. Jacques, 2014 U.S. App. LEXIS 4486 (1st Cir. Mass. Mar. 11, 2014)

Police officers detained Jacques and brought him to the police station for questioning about his 

involvement in a church arson. The officers Mirandized Jacques and Jacques waived his rights. 

During the interview, the officers told Jacques an honest confession might lead to favorable treatment 

by the prosecutor and judge, while a failure to cooperate was likely to result in a maximum sentence. 

The officers also commented on the failing health of Jacques’ father, suggesting that continued 

resistance might deprive Jacques of crucial years with his family. Finally, the officers exaggerated the 

9
strength of the evidence against Jacques and misrepresented the involvement of high-profile federal 

agents in the case. At 1:45 a.m., approximately six and one half hours later, Jacques admitted his 

involvement in the church arson. In addition, Jacques signed a waiver of his right to prompt 

presentment to the United States Magistrate Judge. 

Jacques moved to suppress his incriminating statements, arguing his confession was obtained 

involuntarily because the officers’ coercive tactics had overcome his will. Jacques also argued the 

waiver of his right of presentment was not valid because the officers obtained it more than six-hours 

after his detention. 

First, the court recognized in the First Circuit that confessions are not rendered involuntary when 

police officers promise to bring the defendant’s cooperation to the prosecutor’s attention or by 

suggesting that the defendant’s cooperation may lead to favorable treatment. Next, the court held 

there was no evidence suggesting the officers’ threats of a harsher sentence if Jacques refused to 

cooperate had any meaningful impact on Jacques’ conduct during the interrogation. The officers 

repeated their threats numerous times over the six-hour interrogation without any identifiable effect 

on Jacques. In addition, when Jacques told the officers why he was confessing, he did not mention 

any of the officers’ alleged threats. While the officers’ threats were relevant to a determination of 

voluntariness, in this case Jacques failed to establish his will was overcome by the officer’s threats.

Second, the court held the officers’ comments to Jacques about his father’s health did not coerce 

Jacques into confessing to the arson. The officers’ comments occurred several hours before Jacques 

confessed and Jacques demeanor did not change significantly after the comments. 

Third, the court held the officers’ exaggeration of their case against Jacques, minimizing the gravity 

of Jacques’ offense, and emphasizing the negative media attention Jacques’ trial would generate did 

not constitute coercion. While extreme forms of deception by the police might be sufficient to render 

a suspect’s confession involuntary, the interrogation tactics employed by the officers in this case did 

not amount to coercion in violation of Jacques’ Fifth Amendment rights. 

Finally, the court held the officers did not willfully violate Jacques’ right to prompt presentment. 

Under Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 5(a), a defendant who has been arrested must be brought 

“without unnecessary delay before a magistrate judge.” To protect this right, the McNabb-Mallory

rule established by the Supreme Court holds that confessions made during a period of detention that 

violate the prompt presentment rule are inadmissible in federal court. In response to McNabbMallory, Congress enacted 18 U.S.C. § 3501. Under § 3501, a voluntary confession will not be 

suppressed because of delay in presentment to the magistrate judge as long as the confession was 

obtained within six-hours of arrest. Any voluntary confession obtained after six-hours may still be 

admissible if the judge rules the delay in presentment was reasonable. 

In this case, the officer gave Jacques the written waiver-of-prompt-presentment-form one-minute past 

the six-hour window and Jacques signed the form four-minutes later. Such a brief delay in acquiring 

Jacques’ waiver of his right to presentment was not “unreasonable or unnecessary” so as to require 

suppression of Jacques’ confession. 

Click HERE for the court’s opinion.

***** 

10
Macdonald v. Town of Eastham, 2014 U.S. App. LEXIS 4618 (1st Cir. Mass. Mar. 12, 2014)

Macdonald’s neighbor called the police after she saw the door to Macdonald’s house standing wide 

open. Two police officers interviewed the neighbor, approached Macdonald’s house, and announced 

their presence. After receiving no response, the officers entered Macdonald’s house through the open 

door. While searching the house, the officers discovered a marijuana growing operation. The 

officers arrested Macdonald when he arrived home thirty minutes later.

A state court judge suppressed the evidence discovered in Macdonald’s home and the criminal 

charges against Macdonald were dismissed. Macdonald subsequently sued the town and the police 

officers, claiming the warrantless entry and search of his house violated the Fourth Amendment. 

The court disagreed, holding the officers were entitled to qualified immunity. The officers responded 

to a call from a concerned neighbor, saw the door to Macdonald’s house wide open, announced their 

presence without receiving a reply and then entered the house to check on the welfare of anyone who 

might be inside. Once inside, the officers conducted their search in a routine manner. Under these 

circumstances, the court concluded the law was not clearly established to put a reasonable officer on 

notice that entry into Macdonald’s home might violate the Fourth Amendment. 

Click HERE for the court’s opinion.

*****

7th Circuit

Huff v. Reichert, 2014 U.S. App. LEXIS 4446 (7th Cir. Ill. Mar. 10, 2014)

Officer Reichert conducted a traffic stop on Huff and Seaton, claiming their car had crossed over the 

white divider line on the interstate highway without signaling. After sixteen minutes, Reichert issued 

Huff a written warning. However, Reichert continued to detain Huff and Seaton for an additional 

thirty-four minutes. During this time, Huff conducted a Terry frisk of both men, a dog sniff of the 

car’s exterior and a search of the car’s interior. Reichert found no contraband on Huff, Seaton or in 

their car. Huff and Seaton sued Reichert claiming a variety of Fourth Amendment violations 

concerning the traffic stop and the Terry frisks.

The court affirmed the district court’s denial of qualified immunity for Officer Reichert on all of Huff 

and Seaton’s claims. First, the court held there were genuine issues of material fact as to whether 

Reichert actually witnessed Huff commit a traffic violation. Consequently, it would be up to a jury, 

after hearing both sides, to determine if Reichert conducted a lawful traffic stop or if Reichert only 

conducted the traffic stop because Huff’s car had out-of-state license plates on a portion of highway 

where Reichert claimed a great deal of drug trafficking occurred. 

Second, the court held Reichert’s justification for the initial stop ended when he handed Huff the 

written warning. Reichert’s subsequent thirty-four minute investigation was not reasonably related to 

the reason for the initial stop. In addition, Reichert did not develop reasonable suspicion during the 

initial stop to support the prolonged seizure of Huff, Seaton, or their car. 

Even though Reichert claimed Huff and Seaton were free to leave after he issued the written warning, 

the court disagreed. Reichert told Huff and Seaton they could leave, but not in their car. Reichert told 

Huff and Seaton if they walked away, Reichert would arrest them for unlawfully walking on the 

highway. Reichert told Huff and Seaton they could abandon their car and get in the back of a police 

car and they would be driven to a gas station. If Huff and Seaton chose that option, Reichert said 

11
their car would be towed and impounded because it was illegal to abandon a car on the side of the 

highway. The court concluded under these circumstances, no reasonable person would feel free to 

leave. 

Finally, the court held Reichert did not have reasonable suspicion to believe Huff or Seaton was 

armed and dangerous; therefore, Reichert was not justified in conducting a Terry frisk on either man. 

The court noted if there were a compelling need to frisk Huff or Seaton, one would have expected 

Reichert would not have waited more than twenty-seven minutes into the traffic stop to so. 

Click HERE for the court’s opinion.

*****

White v. Stanley, 2014 U.S. App. LEXIS 4467 (7th Cir. Ill. Mar. 11, 2014)

Police officers went to Hille’s house, without a warrant, to arrest her for possession of a stolen 

vehicle registration sticker. When the officers knocked on the door, Hille’s boyfriend, White,

answered the door. The officers told White they wanted to come inside to speak with Hille. White 

refused to allow the officers to enter the house without a warrant. When White tried to close the 

door, an officer blocked the door with her foot. White turned around and ran back into the house. 

The officers entered the house behind White, tackled him and subdued him after a brief struggle. The 

officers claimed they entered the house because they smelled burning marijuana coming from inside 

the house while they spoke with White at the front door. The officers found Hille inside the house 

smoking marijuana and arrested her. The officers also arrested White for resisting or obstructing a 

peace officer. The charges against White were later dismissed. White sued the officers for false 

arrest. 

First, the court held the smell of burning marijuana, by itself, does not constitute exigent 

circumstances that justify police officers to enter a home without a warrant. However, the court 

further held, when the officers entered Hille’s house, it was not clearly established that the smell of 

burning marijuana, by itself, did not justify the officers’ warrantless entry. As a result, the officers 

were entitled to qualified immunity. The court cautioned that officers, who might be faced with a 

situation like this in the future, should not expect to receive qualified immunity if they make a 

warrantless entry into a home solely based on the smell of burning marijuana. 

Click HERE for the court’s opinion.

*****

8th Circuit

United States v. Vore, 2014 U.S. App. LEXIS 3989 (8th Cir. Iowa Mar. 4, 2014)

Police officers were conducting surveillance of a residence where they suspected stolen trailers were 

being stored. The officers saw Vore and another man attach a trailer to the back of a pick-up truck 

and drive off the property. A police officer conducted a traffic stop after he saw that the trailer did 

not have a visible license plate. During the stop, the officer ran the trailer’s vehicle identification 

number (VIN) through a police database and learned the trailer had been reported stolen. The officer 

also found a loose license plate in the trailer that was registered to another trailer that also had been 

reported stolen. The officers arrested Vore and transported the pick-up truck and trailer to the police 

station. At the police station, the officers searched the pick-up truck and found methamphetamine, 

12
cash and drug paraphernalia. A federal grand jury indicted Vore for possession to distribute 

methamphetamine.

Vore filed a motion to suppress the evidence found in the pick-up truck.

The court held the officers had probable cause to conduct a warrantless search of Vore’s truck under 

the automobile exception to the Fourth Amendment’s warrant requirement. The officers saw Vore 

leave a residence where they suspected stolen trailers were located. Vore’s truck was towing a trailer 

that did not have a visible license plate and that had been reported stolen. Inside the trailer, the 

officers found a license plate for another trailer that had been reported stolen. Based on the truck’s 

nexus to the residence, the stolen trailer the truck was pulling and the stolen license plate in the 

trailer, there was a fair probability the truck contained evidence related to the ownership status and 

theft of the trailers. As a result, the officers did not need a warrant to search Vore’s truck. 

Click HERE for the court’s opinion.

*****

Fagnan v. City of Lino Lakes, 2014 U.S. App. LEXIS 4372 (8th Cir. Minn. Mar. 10, 2014)

Fagnan’s mother called 911 to report a possible gas leak at her house. Police officers accompanied 

the firefighters who were directed to a laundry room in the basement. While the firefighters searched 

for the leak, two police officers saw what they believed to be two sawed-off shotguns in a gun cabinet 

next to the laundry room door. Fagnan told the officers the shotguns were legal. All emergency 

personnel, including the police officers, left the house after the firefighters found no gas leak. 

The police officers eventually obtained a warrant to search Fagnan’s house for sawed-off shotguns. 

After the officers seized the two sawed-off shotguns from the gun cabinet, they arrested Fagnan. 

Fagnan pleaded not guilty and was acquitted at trial. Fagnan later sued the police officers, claiming 

the officers violated the Fourth Amendment when they initially entered the basement with the 

firefighters. Specifically, Fagnan claimed the officers exceeded the scope of their consent to be in 

Fagnan’s house when they stood near the laundry room where they saw the sawed-off shotguns in the 

gun cabinet. 

The court disagreed and held the officers were entitled to qualified immunity. The officers stayed 

near the door to the laundry room while the firefighters searched the room for the gas leak. A 

reasonable person would understand the officers had permission to remain near the location of the 

problem that brought them to the house in the first place. Accordingly, the officers were lawfully in 

the basement when they saw the sawed-off shotguns in plain view in the gun cabinet. 

The court further held that upon seeing the shotguns, the incriminating nature of the firearms was 

immediately apparent to the officers. The requirement that the guns “incriminating nature” be 

“immediately apparent,” does not mean an officer must know the items are contraband. Rather, the 

officer only needs only “probable cause” to connect an object to criminal activity. Here, the officers 

noticed the shotguns appeared to be unlawful because they had standard magazine tubes that hold 

four rounds and that the barrels were cut off just above the magazine tubes. In addition, the officers 

were familiar with shotguns with lawful barrel lengths. 

Click HERE for the court’s opinion.

*****

13
United States v. Noonan, 2014 U.S. App. LEXIS 5228 (8th Cir. Iowa Mar. 20, 2014)

At 2:30 a.m., shortly after the local bars closed, a police officer saw a car operated by Noonan that 

appeared to be travelling fifteen miles per hour under the speed limit. When the officer turned around 

to follow the car, Noonan slowed down and allowed the officer to pass him. Noonan then made a left 

turn down a street occupied by businesses including a mini-storage facility. The officer was aware of 

a rash of burglaries in the area involving storage facilities. As the officer continued down the street, 

he saw Noonan make a U-turn and reenter the road upon which they had originally been traveling. 

When the officer turned around to catch up with Noonan, he saw Noonan make another left hand turn 

in what the officer believed was an effort to evade the officer. The officer conducted a traffic stop 

and arrested Noonan after discovering Noonan had an active arrest warrant for manufacturing 

methamphetamine. During the search incident to arrest, the officer found a methamphetamine pipe in 

Noonan’s pocket. In the back of Noonan’s car, the officer found a black backpack. Because the 

officer knew Noonan to be a “meth cook,” he asked Noonan if the backpack contained a “one-pot.” 

A one pot is a method for manufacturing methamphetamine and the officer knew the chemicals used 

to manufacture methamphetamine were volatile. In addition, the officer knew the Governor’s office 

had recently issued a “One Pot Meth Alert,” which included a warning that “ordinary products are 

dangerous when used to make meth.” Noonan denied there was a meth lab in the backpack but 

admitted there were materials in the backpack that could be used to produce methamphetamine.

The government indicted Noonan for possession of methamphetamine precursors based on the items 

discovered in the backpack. 

Noonan filed a motion to suppress the items seized from the backpack and his post-arrest statements. 

Noonan argued the officer did not have reasonable suspicion to support the traffic stop and that the 

officer was required to give Noonan Miranda warnings before questioning him about the backpack.

The court disagreed. Because the local bars had recently closed, the officer was concerned the car’s 

unusually slow speed meant the driver, Noonan, was impaired. In addition, Noonan’s evasive driving 

and the officer’s knowledge of storage facility burglaries in the area provided the officer reasonable 

suspicion to conduct the traffic stop. 

The court further held Noonan’s post-arrest statements about the contents of the backpack were 

admissible under the public safety exception to Miranda. In this case, it was reasonable for the 

officer to believe that dangerous items related to the manufacture of methamphetamine might be in 

the car and to ask Noonan questions without first providing Noonan Miranda rights. First, the officer 

was aware Noonan was a “meth cook,” and that methamphetamine labs can be extremely volatile. 

Second, the officer’s question about the presence of a “one-pot” was specifically focused on the threat 

an active methamphetamine lab could present to public safety. 

Click HERE for the court’s opinion.

*****

United States v. Douglas, 2014 U.S. App. LEXIS 4473 (8th Cir. Minn. Mar. 11, 2014)

Two different individuals called 911 and reported hearing gunshots from a neighboring property that 

had been vacant since the residence burned down several years earlier. Police officers responded to 

the heavily wooded lot where the officers saw a bonfire in a clearing near where the house once 

stood. The officers encountered Douglas and several other individuals. Douglas told the officers the 

property belonged to his aunt and uncle, who had given him permission to use it. When the officers

14
asked Douglas about the reported gunshots, Douglas denied having a gun and demanded the officers 

leave the property. While performing a protective sweep around the fire, officers saw an empty box 

of ammunition, several recently fired shell casings, and two teenage females hiding behind a vehicle. 

The women said Douglas had been firing a shotgun just before the officers arrived, but stated they did 

not know where the shotgun was located. One of the officers searched the thick brush at the edge of 

the woods and saw a rusted-out refrigerator lying on the ground, approximately twenty to twenty-five 

yards from the fire. The officer saw a shiny black plastic bag, partially covered by a board, inside one 

of the refrigerator’s compartments. The officer moved the board, touched the bag and felt what he 

believed to be the stock of a gun. The officer eventually removed the bag from the refrigerator and 

took a sawed-off shotgun out of the bag. Douglas denied that he owned or ever possessed the bag or 

the shotgun. The officers later discovered the shotgun was lawfully registered to the stepfather of one 

of the other men at the scene. A federal grand jury indicted Douglas for being a felon in possession 

of a firearm. 

Douglas argued the officers violated the Fourth Amendment by searching for and then seizing the 

shotgun.

The court disagreed, holding Douglas had no reasonable expectation of privacy in the plastic bag that 

was visible to anyone standing near the refrigerator, which was located in an “open field.” Even if 

someone had an expectation of privacy in the refrigerator, there was nothing to establish Douglas had 

any connection to the refrigerator as it lay on his aunt and uncle’s property. Next, the court held

Douglas did not establish he had any ownership or possessory interest in the bag in which the shotgun 

was found. To the contrary, Douglas consistently denied that the bag or the shotgun belonged to him. 

Because of these denials, the court ruled Douglas was precluded from claiming that the bag was 

searched and its contents seized in violation of the Fourth Amendment. 

Click HERE for the court’s opinion.

*****

Bechman v. Magill, 2014 U.S. App. LEXIS 4474 (8th Cir. Iowa Mar. 11, 2014)

While conducting a computer check, Officer Magill learned of a “possible” outstanding arrest warrant 

for Bechman. The warrant stemmed from Bechman’s failure to appear in court after having received 

a citation for failing to carry proof of automobile insurance. Magill and another male police officer 

went to Bechman’s house and told Bechman of the existence of a “possible” warrant for her arrest. 

Bechman told the officers the matter had been resolved and the warrant had been recalled. When 

Magill contacted his dispatcher to confirm the validity of the warrant, the dispatcher told Magill

Bechman’s warrant would be confirmed with the Clerk of Court the next morning. Even though 

Magill did not have any reason to arrest Bechman other than the unverified “possible” warrant, 

Magill arrested Bechman. Before the officers arrived, Bechman had been breastfeeding her infant 

and she asked the officers if she could use the bathroom before being taken to jail. The officers

refused to allow Bechman to use the bathroom without the door open and one of the two male police 

officers watching. In addition, the officers would not allow Bechman to exchange her breast milk 

soaked shirt for a dry one or to put on a bra without one of them watching. After Bechman declined, 

the officers handcuffed Bechman and took her to the jail. At the jail, Bechman was strip searched and 

given a body cavity search. Bechman was released the next morning after it was discovered the 

warrant for her arrest had been recalled by the court six months earlier.

Bechman sued Magill and the other officer for a variety of federal and state law claims, arguing the 

officers unlawfully seized her without probable cause in violation of the Fourth Amendment. 

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The officers conceded no valid warrant existed at the time they arrested Bechman; however, the 

officers claimed it was reasonable for them to believe the warrant for Bechman’s arrest was valid. 

The court disagreed. In each case cited to support their position, the police officers were mistakenly 

informed that the arrest warrant for the subject was outstanding. Here, all the officers confirmed was 

the possibility of an outstanding warrant for Bechman’s arrest. When the officers attempted to 

confirm the validity of the warrant, they were told the warrant would be confirmed the next day. The 

officers never confirmed the existence of an arrest warrant for Bechman. As a result, the court agreed 

with the district court, which determined that no reasonable police officer could actually believe 

Bechman’s warrantless arrest was lawful, given the information known to the officers and the 

circumstances surrounding her arrest. 

Click HERE for the court’s opinion.

*****

United States v. Glover, 2014 U.S. App. LEXIS 5389 (8th Cir. Mo. Mar. 24, 2014)

Police officers received an anonymous 911 call that Glover, who was a wanted felon, was located at a 

particular residence. The caller refused to give her name, but gave the officers her callback number. 

The officers verified the information provided by the caller to include the fact Glover had several 

outstanding warrants for his arrest. Officers went to the residence indicated by the caller, which was 

inside a gated community. The officers obtained the gate-code from the caller and saw a vehicle that 

matched the description of a vehicle linked to Glover. The officers knocked on the front door but no 

one answered. The officers called back the anonymous caller who told the officers Glover was still 

inside the residence and planning to flee. The officers looked through a living room window and saw 

Glover inside the residence. The officers then broke open the front door and entered the home. The 

officers arrested Glover and seized firearms, drugs and cash. The government indicted Glover for 

drug and firearm offenses.

Glover filed a motion to suppress the evidence seized inside the home during his arrest.

Police officers with an arrest warrant may lawfully enter the dwelling where the suspect lives when 

the officers have reason to believe the suspect is inside. Whether Glover actually resided in the 

residence was not material because when the officers entered the residence, they reasonably believed 

Glover resided in the home and that he was present at the time. The 911 caller, while choosing to 

remain anonymous, provided consistently accurate and detailed information concerning Glover and 

the gate code to the property. Once outside the residence, the officers saw a vehicle matching a 

vehicle connected to Glover. Consequently, the court held all of the facts available to the officers 

demonstrated the officers’ reasonable belief that Glover resided at the home and was present inside. 

Once inside, the officers conducted a plain view seizure of the incriminating evidence. 

Click HERE for the court’s opinion.

*****

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9th Circuit

United States v. IMM, 2014 U.S. App. LEXIS 5892 (9th Cir. Ariz. Mar. 31, 2014)

IMM, a twelve-year-old boy, was suspected of sexually assaulting his six-year-old cousin. A police 

officer drove to IMM’s home and transported him and his mother to the police station for an 

interview. The officer did not provide IMM Miranda warnings, but instead provided IMM’s mother 

a Parental Consent-to-Interview form and had her sign it. IMM’s mother agreed to wait in the lobby 

while the officer interviewed IMM. At the time of the interview, the officer knew IMM had been in 

special education classes, had emotional problems, and could only read at a second-grade level. 

During the fifty-five minute interview, IMM made incriminating statements to the officer.

Before trial, IMM filed a motion to suppress his incriminating statements because the officer did not 

provide IMM Miranda warnings before questioning him. The district court denied the motion, 

holding IMM was not in custody for Miranda purposes when he made the statements.

The court of appeals reversed. The court held IMM was in custody for Miranda purposes because a 

reasonable twelve-year-old child in IMM’s position would not have felt he was free to terminate the 

interrogation and leave the police station. As a result, the court should have suppressed IMM’s 

incriminating statements. 

First, while IMM’s mother agreed to a voluntary meeting with the officer, there was no evidence 

IMM ever agreed to an interview or understood the interview to be voluntary. All IMM knew was an 

armed police officer arrived at his house and drove him and his mother 30-40 minutes to a police 

station where IMM remained in a small room for nearly an hour of questioning. The court concluded 

it was doubtful a juvenile in IMM’s position would have seen the circumstances of his arrival at the 

police station as the result of a free and voluntary choice to be questioned. 

Second, even though the officer did not raise his voice, he repeatedly confronted IMM with fabricated 

evidence of his guilt and engaged in elaborate deceptions. The officer fed IMM facts that fit the 

officer’s predetermined account of what must have happened, accused IMM of dishonesty whenever 

IMM disagreed with the officer’s false representations, and forced IMM to choose between adopting 

the officer’s false account of events and his own. 

Third, the officer interrogated IMM alone, behind a closed door that appeared to be locked, in a small 

room in a police station located 30-40 minutes away from his home.

Fourth, IMM spend 30-40 minutes in a police car and then nearly one hour being interrogated. 

Under these circumstances, IMM as a juvenile was more likely overwhelmed and intimidated than an 

adult would be by such prolonged direct questioning by an adult police officer. 

Finally, even though IMM was neither handcuffed nor told he was under arrest, the officer’s 

questions were hostile and accusatory. 

Click HERE for the court’s opinion.

*****

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10th Circuit

United States v. Mosley, 2014 U.S. App. LEXIS 3901 (10th Cir. Kan. Mar. 3, 2014)

Police officer received an anonymous tip that two black males were handling a gun while sitting in a 

black Ford Focus while parked in a Denny’s parking lot. Officers responded and saw only one black 

Ford Focus in the parking lot with two black males inside. The officers approached the car with 

weapons drawn and ordered the occupants to raise their hands. The driver immediately complied. 

The passenger, Mosley, did not. Instead, Mosley made movements with his arm that the officers 

believed were consistent with either trying to hide or retrieve a weapon. After ignoring repeated 

commands to put his hands up, Mosley eventually complied. After Mosley raised his hands, an 

officer opened the passenger’s door and ordered Mosley out. Mosley did not immediately comply or 

respond, so the officer pulled Mosley from the car and handcuffed him. Another officer searched 

under the passenger seat and found a handgun. The government indicted Mosley for being a felon in 

possession of a firearm. 

Mosley argued he was seized for Fourth Amendment purposes when the officers pointed their 

weapons at him. Mosley claimed this seizure was not supported by reasonable suspicion because the 

officers were responding to an anonymous tip; therefore, the gun discovered under the passenger’s 

seat should have been suppressed. 

The court disagreed. When an officer does not apply physical force to restrain a suspect, a Fourth 

Amendment seizure occurs only if the officer shows his authority and the suspect submits to the 

assertion of that authority. Here, the officers clearly showed their authority by raising their weapons 

and shouting for the occupants of the car to put their hands up. However, Mosley did not

immediately comply with the officer’s commands. Instead, Mosley began making furtive movements 

consistent with either hiding or retrieving a gun, which was directly contrary to the officer’s 

commands. As a result, Mosley was not seized until he raised his hands. 

The court then held by the time Mosley raised his hands, the officers had established reasonable 

suspicion to support a Terry stop. In addition to Mosley’s furtive movements, the confrontation 

occurred at 3:00 a.m., at a location where the officers had previously responded to gun-related crimes 

in the past. Based on the totality of the circumstances, it was reasonable for the officers to believe 

Mosley was engaged in criminal activity. 

Mosley next argued, even if the officers had reasonable suspicion to justify a Terry stop, the officers’ 

use of force turned the Terry stop into a de facto arrest without probable cause. 

Again, the court disagreed. Police officers may use a reasonable amount of force during a Terry stop 

to ensure their safety, but in many cases, the use of a firearm to effect a Terry stop may turn the stop 

into an arrest. However, under the circumstances, it was reasonable for the officers to point their 

firearms at Mosley to effect the Terry stop. Consequently, the officers’ use of force did not transform 

the Terry stop into a de facto arrest without probable cause. 

Click HERE for the court’s opinion.

*****

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United States v. Fonseca, 2014 U.S. App. LEXIS 4382 (10th Cir. Kan. Mar. 10, 2014)

A police officer was conducting surveillance in an industrial park because of a recent rash of 

automobile burglaries that had occurred at several of the businesses in the area. Around 2:45 a.m., 

the officer saw Fonseca walking through a parking lot carrying a dark bag. The officer approached 

Fonseca and asked to speak with him. Fonseca walked away from the officer, placed the bag on the 

ground, then turned around and walked back toward the officer. The officer asked Fonseca for 

identification, but Fonseca told the officer he did not have any. A few minutes later, Fonseca’s 

girlfriend, White, drove up with another woman, Kaylin, and began speaking to Fonseca. The officer 

asked White to return to her car while the officer talked to Fonseca. On the way back to her car, 

White picked up the bag Fonseca had placed on the ground. After a few minutes, Fonseca gave the 

officer his name and date of birth. When the officer noticed the bag Fonseca had been carrying was 

not on the ground, he asked White if she had moved it. White told the officer she had placed the bag

in the car, claiming the bag belonged to Kaylin. When the officer asked Fonseca why he was 

carrying Kaylin’s bag, Fonseca replied, “I don’t know.” The officer then called dispatch to verify the 

name and birthdate provided by Fonseca. Dispatch confirmed Fonseca’s identify and indicated 

Fonseca had an outstanding warrant for his arrest. After the officer confirmed the validity of the 

warrant, he arrested Fonseca. Following Fonseca’s arrest, the officer walked over to White’s car and 

saw a handgun sticking out of bag Fonseca had been carrying. The officer searched the bag and 

discovered eight stolen handguns. 

The government indicted Fonseca for possession of stolen firearms. After he was convicted, Fonseca 

appealed the denial of his motion to suppress the eight stolen firearms, claiming the officer exceeded 

the scope of the Terry stop. Fonseca argued it was not reasonable for the officer to detain him after 

he initially answered the officer’s questions and had told the officer his name and date of birth, 

approximately twelve minutes into the stop.

The court disagreed, holding it was reasonable for the officer to detain Fonseca for the additional ten 

minutes that passed after he finished questioning Fonseca but before the officer learned of Fonseca’s 

current warrant. During this time, it was reasonable for the officer to locate the bag he had seen 

Fonseca carrying when the officer first approached him. The officer saw Fonseca walking alone in a

high-crime industrial area in the middle of the night. After the officer asked Fonseca to speak with 

him, Fonseca continued to walk away from the officer and then placed the bag on the ground, in what 

appeared to be an effort to distance himself from the bag, before he returned to speak with the officer. 

Finally, when the bag disappeared from the ground where Fonseca had placed it, the officer 

reasonably decided to investigate where the bag had gone and what it might contain. In addition, the 

court concluded it was reasonable for the officer to ask Fonseca why he was carrying the Kaylin’s

bag as he walked alone in that particular location at night. 

Click HERE for the court’s opinion.

*****

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District of Columbia Circuit

United States v. Peyton, 2014 U.S. App. LEXIS 5296 (D.C. Cir. Mar. 21, 2014)

Peyton lived with his great-great-grandmother, Hicks, in a small one-bedroom apartment. Hicks used 

the bedroom while Peyton kept his bed and personal property in the living room. After the police 

received a tip that Peyton was using the apartment to deal drugs, four officers went to the apartment. 

The officers knew Peyton was not home and they hoped Hicks would consent to a search of the 

apartment. Hicks signed a consent-to-search form that stated Hicks was freely agreeing to allow the 

officers to search the entire apartment. When the officers came near Peyton’s bed, Hicks told the 

officers that part of the living room was where Peyton kept his personal property. After one of the 

officers saw a closed shoebox next to Peyton’s bed, he opened it and discovered marijuana, crack 

cocaine and cash. Based on the evidence found in the shoebox, the government indicted Peyton.

Peyton filed a motion to suppress, arguing Hicks did not have authority to consent to a search of the 

shoebox. The trial court disagreed, holding Hicks’ consent to search covered the entire apartment, to 

include the shoebox. 

The court of appeals agreed with Peyton. During the search of the living room, Hicks told the 

officers that Peyton kept his personal property in the area around the bed where the officers found the 

shoebox. The court concluded Hicks’ statement put the officers on notice there was an area of the 

living room that was not hers, and it was not reasonable for the officers to believe that Hicks shared 

use of the closed shoebox. As a result, Hicks did not have apparent authority to consent to a search of 

the shoebox, and the evidence discovered in it should have been suppressed. 

Click HERE for the court’s opinion.

*****

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