IN THE SUPREME COURT OF MISSISSIPPI
N O. 2012-CT-00863-SCT JORDAN DAV

IS a/k/a JORDAN D. DAV IS

v. STATE OF MISSISSIPPI
ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI DATE OF JUDGMENT: 06/18/2012 TRIAL JUDGE: HON. LAMAR PACKARD TRIAL COURT ATTORNEYS: LISA ROSS LAMAR ARLINGTON TERRY W ALLACE COURT FROM W HICH APPEALED: CLAIBORNE COUNTY CIRCUIT COURT ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT: OFFICE OF THE STATE PUBLIC DEFENDER BY: HUNTER NOLAN AIKEN ATTORNEY FOR APPELLEE: OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL BY: MADONNA C. HOLLAND DISTRICT ATTORNEY: ALEXANDER C. MARTIN NATURE OF THE CASE: CRIMINAL - FELONY DISPOSITION: THE JUDGMENT OF THE COURT OF APPEALS IS AFFIRMED IN PART AND REVERSED IN PART. THE JUDGMENT OF THE CIRCUIT COURT OF CLAIBORNE COUNTY IS REVERSED AND RENDERED - 05/07/2015 MOTION FOR REHEARING FILED: MANDATE ISSUED:

EN BANC. CHANDLER, JUSTICE, FOR THE COURT:¶1. Jordan Davis was indicted f or one count o f auto thef

t, one count of grand larceny of

a tractor, and one count of receiving stolen property concerning the sam e tractor. Davis was acquitted of a

uto thef t and g rand larceny but convicted o f r e c e i v i ng stolen property

. On appeal, the State conf

essed error because Claiborne County ’s dual charges against Davis f or stealing and receiving the sam e property violated Mississippi Code Section 9 7-17-70(3)(a). The Court of Appeals r eversed the receiving-stolen-property conviction, but rem anded f or f urther proceedings. Davis v. State , 2014 W L 702284, *2 (Miss. Ct. A p p . F ebruary 25, 2014). W e granted Davis’s petition f or certiorari and n ow r everse and render his conviction.
W e af f i rm in part and reverse in part the judgm ent of the Court of Appeals. W e reverse the judgm ent of

the Circuit Court of Claiborne County and render judgm ent in Davis’s f avor. DISCUSSION ¶2. Michael Dent and his brother-in-law, John Barham W atkins, stored personal property
at their cattle f

arm in C laiborne County

. On N ovem ber 8, 2011, Dent and W atkins discovered several i tem s m issing f

rom the f arm , including an old John Deere tractor, a cotton trailer, a 1950 Chevrolet truck, a 1 950 Studebaker truck, and other item s. T hey notif ied the sherif

f ’s departm ent. Later, Dent and W a tkins d i s covered tracks leading o ut of the f arm to Bulldog Scrap Metal. There, Dent discovered his tractor and a m issing hay f ork. ¶3. A Bulldog Scrap Metal em ploy ee, Darrell Purves, testif ied that, o n October 13, 2011, Davis and Bradf

ord W ren had brought in the tractor, and Purves paid W ren $784.80 f or it.
Purves testif

ied that he initially m ade the receipt out to Davis, but at D avis’s request, he m ade

2it out to W ren. Purves also testif ied that, on Novem

ber 8, 2 011, D avis b rought in the cotton trailer and the 1950 Chevrolet truck. Purves paid Davis $520 f o r both these item s. ¶4. Davis was indicted f o r auto thef

t of the trucks, grand l arceny of the tractor and other item s, receiving s tolen property concerning the tractor, a nd c onspirac y . T h e conspiracy charge was dism issed b ef ore trial. The jury acquitted Davis of auto thef t and g rand larceny , but convicted him of receiving stolen property

. The trial court sentenced Davis to eight y ears with f our y ears suspended. ¶5. This Court assigned Davis’s appeal to the Court of A ppeals. Davis argued that (1) the jury instructions om itted an e ssential elem ent of the of f ense of receiving stolen property ; (2) his charges f

or stealing and receiving the sam e property violated Section 97-17-70(3)(a); and (3) the evidence was insuf f i cient to support the verdict. The State adm itted that the case m ust be reversed and rem anded f or a new trial. The State c o nf essed that th e j u r y i n s t r

u ction on receiving stol e n p r o p e rty had om itted an essential elem ent. The State also adm itted error under S ection 97-17-70(3)(a) d ue to the charges f

or stealing and receiving the sam e property , but, without citation to authority , argued that the error was harm less. ¶6. Section 9 7

- 1 7

- 7 0 c odif i es the crim e of receiving stolen p roperty

. The s tatute provides, in pertinent part: (1) A person com m i ts the crim e o f receiving stolen property if he intentionally possesses, receives, retains or disposes of stolen property knowing that it h as been stolen or having reasonable grounds to believe i t has been stolen, u nless the property i s p o ssessed, received, r e t a i n e d or disposed of with intent to restore it to the owner.

. . .

3(3)(a) Evidence that the p erson charged under this section stole the pr o p erty

that i s th e s ubject of the c harge of receiving stolen property is not a def e nse to a charge unde r t h i s section; however, dual charges of both stealing a nd receiving the same property shall not be brought against a single defendant in a single jurisdiction. Miss. Code Ann. § 97-17-70(3)(a) (Rev. 2014) (em phasis added). ¶7. The Cou r t o f A p p e a ls accepted the State’s conf ession that Davis h ad been charged with both stealing a nd receiving th e s a m e p r o p erty i n the sam e jurisdiction in violation of Section 97-17-70(3)(a). Davis , 2014 W L 702284, at *2. The Court of Appeals rejected the
State’s invitation to apply a harm less-error analy sis, due to the clearly e xpressed l egislative intent that s uch charges “shall not be brought.” I d. W e a gree that the Court of Appeals properly accepted the State’s conf ession of error, b ecause the charges brought against Davis clearly v iolated the plain language o f S e c t i o n 97-17-70(3)(a). And the Court of Appeals correctly rejected the State’s p roposed harm less-error a n aly sis, becaus e the statute plainly
states that such charges “shall n ot be brought.” Miss. Code Ann. § 97-17-70(3)(a) (Rev. 2014). The Court of Appeals a ppropriately determ ined th a t reversal of Davis’s conviction of receiving stolen property was appropriate. ¶8. But the C o u r t o f A p p e a l s erred by rem anding f or f urther proceedings rather than rendering judgm ent. The plain l anguage of S ection 97-17-70(3)(a) d oes not perm it a retrial of Davis f

or receiving stolen property

. As Presiding Judge Irving astutely r ecognized in dissent, th e s t a t ute prohibits the bringing of dual c harges i n a single j urisdiction

. Notice, the prohibition is not against brin g ing dual charges i n a single indictm ent, but against bringing dual charges against a single defendant in a single jurisdiction

. Theref ore, p rosecuting a s ingle def endant i n a single

4jurisdi c t i o n in separate trials – once f or both larceny and receiving stolen property , and once f

or receiving stolen property only – is p r o h i b i ted b y the statute, a s t h e r e i s no way that Davis c a n be retried f or receiving stolen property in Clai b o r n e County , Mississippi, without becom ing the victim of dual charges brought in a single jurisdiction. H e has a lready been a cquitted of one charge – larceny

– brought against h im in Claiborne C ounty

. R etry ing him in C laiborne County on the charge of receiving s t olen property would result i n dual charges being brought against him i n a single jurisdiction, w h i c h i s prohibited by

section 97-17-70(3)(a).
Davis , 2014 W L 702284, at *5 (Irving, PJ, dissenting). ¶9. Under Section 9 7-17-70(3)(a), when a def endant can be charged with either stealing

or receiving the s am e property , the State m ust opt to charge the def

endant with either stealing

or receiving the property

. Davis h as been tried once in Cl a i b o r ne County f or s tealing and receiving the sam e property

. He has been tried and acquitted of stealing the property

. Thus, he c annot be retried f

o r receiving t h e p roperty under the plain t erm s of Section 97-17- 70(3)(a). Theref

ore, we reverse Davis’s conviction of receiving stolen property and render judgm ent in his f

avor. CONCLUSION ¶10. Because Davis cannot be r etried f or receiving s tolen property under Section 97-17- 70(3)(a), we reverse h i s conviction and render judgm ent in his f a vor . T he judgm e nt of the
Court of Appeals is af

f irm e d in part and reversed i n part. The judgm ent of the Circuit Court of Claiborne County

is reversed and we render judgm ent in Davis’s f avor. ¶11. THE JUDGMENT O F THE COURT OF APPEALS IS AFFIRMED IN PART AND REVER S E D IN PART. T HE JUDGMENT O F THE CIRCUIT COURT OF CLAIBORNE COUNTY IS REVERSED AND RENDERED.

5WALLER, C.J., DICKINSON A N D RANDOLPH, P.JJ., LAMAR, KITCHENS,

PIERCE AND K ING, JJ., CONCUR. COLEMAN, J., CONCURS I N PART AND IN RESULT WITHOUT SEPARATE WRITTEN OPINION.

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