J-S54031-16 

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37 

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF 

: PENNSYLVANIA 

v. :

:

BUCKLEY LAWRENCE THOMPSON, :

 :

Appellant : No. 2029 WDA 2015 

Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence December 4, 2015 

in the Court of Common Pleas of Mercer County, 

Criminal Division, No(s): CP-43-CR-0000566-2015 

BEFORE: BENDER, P.J.E., OTT and MUSMANNO, JJ. 

MEMORANDUM BY MUSMANNO, J.: FILED AUGUST 16, 2016 

 Buckley Lawrence Thompson (“Thompson”) appeals from the judgment 

of sentence imposed following his convictions of one count each of 

aggravated assault, simple assault, recklessly endangering another person 

(“REAP”), and harassment.1 We affirm. 

 The trial court set forth the relevant facts as follows: 

[Thompson] was arrested on March 28, 2015, and charged with 

[the above-listed crimes]. The charges arose out of the 

allegation that [Thompson] beat Joseph Steen [“Steen”], age 76, 

about the face and arms with a [six-foot long] bamboo pole[,] 

causing [] Steen a small brain bleed. 

... 

[] Steen testified that [Thompson] lived with him on and off for 

over 20 years. On March 28, 2015, sometime between [3:00 

a.m.] and [4:00 a.m.], [Thompson] came into the residence and 

began to [slap] [] Steen. [Thompson] told [] Steen: “You know 

I do this because I can.” After a few minutes, [Thompson] got a 

[six-foot long] bamboo rod and began to strike [] Steen about 

his head and arms. The rod eventually broke in half. 

 

1

 18 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 2702, 2701, 2705, 2709. 
J-S54031-16 

- 2 - 

The beating stopped and [] Steen tried to get some sleep. When 

he awoke, he had trouble breathing. The police and an 

ambulance were called. 

[] Steen was taken to the emergency room at The Sharon 

Regional Health System. A CAT scan showed a subdural 

hematoma. As a result, [] Steen was transferred to St. 

Elizabeth’s Hospital in Youngstown, Ohio, the closest trauma 

center. 

Trial Court Opinion, 2/2/16, at 1-2. 

After a three-day trial in October 2015, a jury found Thompson found 

guilty of aggravated assault, simple assault, and REAP.2 On December 4, 

2015, the trial court sentenced Thompson to an aggregate term of 8-20 

years in prison. Thompson filed a timely Notice of Appeal and a courtordered Pennsylvania Rule of Appellate Procedure 1925(b) Concise 

Statement. 

On appeal, Thompson raises the following question for our review: 

“Did the trial court err when it denied [] [Thompson’s] eight (8) objections 

and/or requests for mistrials[?]” Brief for Appellant at 4 (capitalization 

omitted). 

Our standard of review is as follows: 

A motion for a mistrial is within the discretion of the trial court. 

A mistrial upon motion of one of the parties is required only 

when an incident is of such a nature that its unavoidable effect is 

to deprive the appellant of a fair and impartial trial. It is within 

the trial court’s discretion to determine whether a defendant was 

prejudiced by the incident that is the basis of a motion for a 

 

2

 The trial court, rather than the jury, found Thompson guilty of harassment. 
J-S54031-16 

- 3 - 

mistrial. On appeal, our standard of review is whether the trial 

court abused that discretion. 

 

An abuse of discretion is more than an error in judgment. On 

appeal, the trial court will not be found to have abused its 

discretion unless the record discloses that the judgment 

exercised by the trial court was manifestly unreasonable, or the 

result of partiality, prejudice, bias, or ill-will.

When the discretion exercised by the trial court is challenged on 

appeal, the party bringing the challenge bears a heavy burden ... 

It is not sufficient to persuade the appellate court that it might 

have reached a different conclusion if, in the first place, [it was] 

charged with the duty imposed on the court below; it is 

necessary to go further and show an abuse of discretionary 

power. 

Commonwealth v. Tejeda, 834 A.2d 619, 623-24 (Pa. Super. 2003) 

(citations and quotations omitted). 

 In Thompson’s first claim, he contends that during jury selection the 

Commonwealth committed a Batson3violation by striking an AfricanAmerican venireperson without race-neutral grounds for doing so. Brief for 

Appellant at 9-10. Thompson asserts that “the reason given by the 

Commonwealth [for striking the juror] was that an unknown individual in the 

District Attorney’s office wrote ‘No’” on the juror’s questionnaire when it was 

circulated throughout the District Attorney’s office. Id. at 10. 

In order to establish a Batson claim, a defendant must establish 

a prima facie case of purposeful discrimination. To do so, a 

defendant must demonstrate that he/she is of a cognizable racial 

group; that the prosecution has exercised peremptory challenges 

to exclude members of that racial group from the panel of 

venirepersons; and finally, that these facts and any other 

relevant circumstances raise an inference that the prosecutor 

 

3 Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1986). 
J-S54031-16 

- 4 - 

used peremptory challenges to exclude venirepersons on the 

basis of race. Implicit in this scheme is the notion that 

peremptory challenges constitute a jury selection practice that 

allows for such discrimination by those who have a design to 

discriminate. If a defendant succeeds in establishing a prima 

facie case of purposeful discrimination, the prosecution is then 

required to provide non-discriminatory reasons for striking the 

potential jurors. 

Commonwealth v. Abu-Jamal, 720 A.2d 79, 113-14 (Pa. 1998) (citations 

omitted). Further, to prove a Batson violation, the moving party must 

provide a full record of the alleged violation. Commonwealth v. Uderra, 

862 A.2d 74, 84 (Pa. 2004). Specifically, the moving party must identify the 

race of all the venirepersons removed by the prosecution, the race of the 

jurors who served, and the race of the jurors acceptable to the 

Commonwealth who were stricken by the defense. Commonwealth v. 

Washington, 927 A.2d 586, 609 (Pa. 2007). 

 Here, Thompson failed to develop even a partial Batson record. See 

Uderra, 862 A.2d at 84. Moreover, even if Thompson had developed a full 

Batson record and established a prima facia case, his contention lacks 

merit. Our review discloses that Assistant District Attorney Mary Odem, 

Esquire (“ADA Odem”) explained that the venireperson in question was 

struck because someone in the District Attorney’s office indicated that the 

venireperson should not be on the jury. N.T. (Excerpt from Jury Selection), 

10/19/15, at 3. The trial judge found Odem’s reasoning to be credible, and 

determined that the race-neutral basis for striking the venireperson was 

persuasive. See id. at 4; see also Commonwealth v. Sanchez, 36 A.3d 
J-S54031-16 

- 5 - 

24, 46 (Pa. 2011) (stating that the trial court judges the credibility of the 

prosecutor in determining the reasoning for striking jurors). Thus, 

Thompson’s first claim does not establish a Batson violation. See 

Sanchez, 36 A.3d at 46 (concluding that the appellant had not provided 

evidence in support of his discrimination claim, and thus could not show that 

the trial court had abused its discretion); see also Commonwealth v. 

Simmons, 662 A.2d 621, 631 (Pa. 1995) (stating that “[t]he use of a 

peremptory challenge on a single person of color without more is insufficient 

to establish a Batson violation.”). 

 In Thompson’s second claim, he argues that “the Commonwealth used 

the term ‘robbed’ when robbery was not a crime charged,” thus prejudicing 

Thompson. Brief for Appellant at 10. 

 Initially, we note that Thompson objected to the Commonwealth’s 

language, but did not seek a mistrial. See N.T., 10/19/15, at 18. Thus, the 

claim is waived.4 See Commonwealth v. Strunk, 953 A.2d 577, 579 (Pa. 

Super. 2008) (stating that “[e]ven where a defendant objects to specific 

 

4

 Even if Thompson had preserved this claim, we would have concluded that 

it lacks merit. Here, during opening statements “the Commonwealth argued 

[that Steen] was robbed of ... love, protection, and security” due to 

Thompson’s beating. N.T., 10/19/15, at 18. Contrary to Thompson’s 

argument, “robbed” is an illustrative term commonly used outside of the 

legal field. The prosecutor’s use of rhetorical flourish would not have 

prejudiced the jury. See Commonwealth v. Thomas, 54 A.3d 332, 339 

(Pa. 2012) (stating that a prosecutor’s claim that a defense attorney was 

attempting to “shoot the messenger” in a case involving the killing of a 

witness was not prejudicial to the defendant as to render the jury incapable 

of delivering a fair verdict). 
J-S54031-16 

- 6 - 

conduct, the failure to request a remedy such as a mistrial or curative 

instruction is sufficient to constitute waiver.”). 

 In Thompson’s third claim, he contends that Steen’s testimony that 

Thompson attempted to strangle him with a t-shirt during the attack 

prejudiced Thompson by introducing an allegation of attempted homicide, a 

crime for which Thompson was not charged. Brief for Appellant at 10-11. 

 Here, Thompson merely objected to this aspect of Steen’s testimony, 

and did not move for a mistrial on this basis. N.T., 10/19/15, at 25-26. 

This claim is thus waived. See Strunk, 953 A.2d at 579. 

 In Thompson’s fourth claim, he contends that Steen’s testimony that, 

following the attack, he told Thompson that an apology was not going to “cut 

it this time” prejudiced Thompson by referencing an uncharged crime. Brief 

for Appellant at 12 (citing N.T., 10/19/15, at 30).

 Thompson’s entire argument consists of two sentences, without 

citation to any relevant authority. See Pa.R.A.P. 2119(a) (stating that 

“[t]he argument shall be divided into as many parts as there are questions 

to be argued ... followed by such discussion and citation of authorities as are 
J-S54031-16 

- 7 - 

deemed pertinent.”). Thus, his claim is waived.5 See Commonwealth v. 

Hakala, 900 A.2d 404, 407 (Pa. Super. 2006) (stating that “because 

[appellant] fails to offer either analysis or case citation in support of the 

relief he seeks, we deem all of his questions waived.”). 

 In Thompson’s fifth claim, he argues that, through the 

Commonwealth’s direct examination of Steen, the Commonwealth 

introduced evidence that Thompson had not contacted or visited Steen 

following the beating. Brief for Appellant at 12. According to Thompson, 

“the questioning [of Steen] was done with the full knowledge that Thompson 

remained incarcerated” at the time and could not have visited Steen, thus 

creating bias and hostility towards Thompson in the minds of the jury. Id. 

 Here, ADA Odem asked Steen whether he “had any contact with 

[Thompson] since [the] incident,” to which Steen responded “[n]o.” N.T., 

10/19/15, at 41. ADA Odem then asked Steen whether Thompson had 

either called or visited him since the incident, and Steen answered “[n]o” to 

both questions. Id. Defense counsel then called for a sidebar, during which 

he objected to the line of questioning and moved for a mistrial. Id. at 41-

 

5

 Even if we were to address this claim, we would conclude that it lacks 

merit. We note that Thompson’s counsel moved for a mistrial following this 

aspect of Steen’s testimony. However, Steen’s vague use of the phrase “this 

time” does not implicate a “distinct crime” committed by Thompson. See 

N.T., 10/19/15, at 30 (wherein the trial court denied the mistrial request). 

Indeed, Steen had already testified that his relationship with Thompson “was 

good for awhile. Then things started changing.” Id. at 21. We would 

conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying 

Thompson’s request for a mistrial. See Tejeda, 834 A.2d at 623. 
J-S54031-16 

- 8 - 

42. The trial judge asked ADA Odem what the purpose of the line of 

questioning was, to which ADA Odem responded, “[Thompson] wrote him a 

letter. He hasn’t called, but he wrote a letter. That’s the contact.” Id. at 

41. ADA Odem explained to the trial judge that Steen thought there had 

been no contact between him and Thompson because Steen did not 

understand that Thompson’s letter to him constituted contact. Id. at 42. 

The trial judge directed Odem to “go to the letter” and not ask Steen about 

Thompson either calling or visiting because such a line of questioning might 

cause a mistrial. Id. The trial judge then denied Thompson’s request for a 

mistrial. Id. Thereafter, the trial judge asked Steen to identify the letter 

and Thompson’s handwriting, and allowed ADA Odem to read a portion of 

the letter in front of the jury.6 Id. at 44.

 Our review of the examination reveals that the Commonwealth was 

laying the foundation for introducing the letter into evidence. See Pa.R.E. 

901 (stating that “[t]o satisfy the requirement of authenticating or 

identifying an item of evidence, the proponent must produce evidence 

 

6

 The letter read as follows: 

Hi Joe. I’m sorry for what I did. I hope you are okay. I feel real 

bad. You have done good for me. The booze is what set it off 

and the cold pills. I seen Dustin, my son, the other day I left at 

Circle K’s. He would not talk to me. It set me off. And I drank 

too much. I’m sorry for putting you through all this. I hope 

they find out what is setting me off. I wish you well. I love you. 

The food in the fridge is probably bad. I will call you in five 

days. Again, I’m sorry. 

N.T., 10/19/15, at 44. 
J-S54031-16 

- 9 - 

sufficient to support a finding that the item is what the proponent claims it 

is.”). Thompson does not take issue with the introduction of the contents of 

the letter, just the line of questioning preceding its introduction. We 

conclude that the trial judge did not abuse his discretion in denying 

Thompson’s request for a mistrial, thus Thompson’s claim must fail. See 

Tejeda, 834 A.2d at 623. 

 In Thompson’s sixth claim, he contends that an employee with the 

Mercer County Clerk of Courts, who was called as a witness by the 

Commonwealth, referenced a prior, nolle prossed burglary charge against 

Thompson during her testimony. Brief for Appellant at 12-13. Thompson 

argues that he was never convicted of burglary and was thus prejudiced by 

this testimony. Id. at 13. 

 Our review discloses that, while outlining two of Thompson’s previous 

criminal dockets, the witness inadvertently and incorrectly stated that 

Thompson had been convicted of burglary. N.T., 10/20/15, at 101-02. 

Instead, Thompson had pled guilty to theft by unlawful taking and theft from 

a motor vehicle. Id. at 103. Thompson moved for a mistrial, asserting that 

the witness’s mistake was prejudicial and could not be corrected by a 

cautionary instruction. Id. at 101. The trial judge denied the request for a 

mistrial and, instead, informed the jury that Thompson had not been 

convicted of burglary. Id. at 104. 
J-S54031-16 

 - 10 - 

 Here, the Commonwealth did not intentionally elicit the reference to 

Thompson’s withdrawn burglary charge. See id. at 100; see also 

Sattazahn 631 A.2d 597, 608 (stating that “[t]he nature of the reference 

and whether the remark was intentionally elicited by the Commonwealth are 

[] factors to be considered in determining whether a mistrial is necessary.”). 

Further, the trial judge quickly clarified to the witness and the jury that the 

witness had misspoken, and that Thompson had not been convicted of 

burglary. N.T., 10/20/15, at 104; see also Sattazahn, 631 A.2d at 608 

(stating that “an immediate curative instruction to the jury may alleviate the 

harm which would otherwise result from reference to prior criminal 

conduct.”). We conclude that Thompson was not prejudiced by this 

exchange, and thus the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying 

motion for a mistrial. See Tejeda, 834 A.2d at 623. 

 In Thompson’s seventh claim, he contends that the trial judge erred by 

not granting a mistrial where Odem referenced the Commonwealth’s “other 

witnesses” despite such witnesses being repeatedly rejected by the court at 

side bar and in recess. Brief for Appellant at 13. Thompson asserts that 

[t]he only plausible reason to call more witnesses by the 

Commonwealth was that the Commonwealth had more evidence 

to prove Thompson’s guilt. And since the trial court was clear in 

its ruling [on the witnesses], making such a request again in 

front of the jury could only have been done to prejudice 

Thompson by that basis. 

Id. 
J-S54031-16 

 - 11 - 

 We note that Thompson did not object to the statement or move for a 

mistrial when the statement was made. Thus, his claim is waived.7 See 

Strunk, 953 A.2d at 579. 

 Finally, Thompson baldly claims that because each of the issues he 

raised should independently warrant a mistrial, the cumulative effect should 

“surely” do the same. Brief for Appellant at 14. However, “[w]here a 

claimant has failed to prove prejudice as the result of any individual errors, 

he cannot prevail on a cumulative effect claim unless he demonstrates how 

the particular cumulation requires a different analysis.” Commonwealth v. 

Wright, 961 A.2d 119, 158 (Pa. 2008). Based upon our foregoing 

discussion, we conclude that this issue lacks merit. 

 Judgment of sentence affirmed. 

 

7

 The trial court addressed Thompson’s claim as follows: 

The first the jury heard the Commonwealth had other witnesses 

that the Court would not permit to testify is not so prejudicial as 

to warrant a mistrial. It is the same as when a Court grants a 

defendant’s objection. The jury is left with an impression there 

is something else, but they are specifically told they are not to 

concern themselves with the ruling. To grant a mistrial under 

these circumstances would make it impossible to try any case.” 

Trial Court Opinion, 2/2/16, at 9; see also N.T., 10/19/15, at 14 (wherein 

the trial judge instructed the jury that “[a] statement by an attorney is not 

evidence.”). 
J-S54031-16 

 - 12 - 

Judgment Entered. 

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq. 

Prothonotary 

Date: 8/16/2016