UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 22-4022

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 

Plaintiff - Appellee, 

v. 

JEREMY HAMLIN, 

Defendant - Appellant. 

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Northern District of West Virginia, at 

Clarksburg. Irene M. Keeley, Senior District Judge. (1:20-cr-00048-IMK-MJA-8) 

Submitted: January 31, 2023 Decided: March 23, 2023

Before GREGORY, Chief Judge, RUSHING, Circuit Judge, and KEENAN, Senior Circuit 

Judge. 

Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion. 

ON BRIEF: Charles T. Berry, Kingmont, West Virginia, for Appellant. Zelda Elizabeth 

Wesley, Assistant United States Attorney, OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES 

ATTORNEY, Clarksburg, West Virginia, for Appellee. 

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit. 

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PER CURIAM: 

Jeremy Hamlin pled guilty, pursuant to a written plea agreement, to maintaining a 

drug-involved premises, in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 856(a)(2). The district court calculated 

Hamlin’s advisory prison range under the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual (2018) at 6 

to 12 months’ imprisonment and sentenced Hamlin to 12 months and 1 day in prison. 

On appeal, Hamlin’s counsel has filed a brief pursuant to Anders v. California, 

386 U.S. 738 (1967), stating that there are no meritorious grounds for appeal, but 

questioning whether the district court reversibly erred in accepting Hamlin’s guilty plea, 

whether trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance, and whether the district court erred 

in imposing Hamlin’s prison sentence. Hamlin was informed of his right to file a pro se

supplemental brief but has not done so. The Government declined to file a brief and does 

not seek to enforce the appeal waiver in Hamlin’s plea agreement.1

 We affirm. 

In federal cases, Fed. R. Crim. P. 11 “governs the duty of the trial judge before 

accepting a guilty plea.” Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238, 243 n.5 (1969). “Before 

accepting a guilty plea, [the district] court, through colloquy with the defendant, must 

ensure that the defendant understands the nature of the charges to which the plea is offered, 

any mandatory minimum penalty, the maximum possible penalty, and the various rights 

the defendant is relinquishing by pleading guilty.” United States v. Williams, 811 F.3d 

621, 622 (4th Cir. 2016) (citing Fed. R. Crim. P. 11(b)). “The court also must determine 

1 Because the Government fails to assert the waiver as a bar to this appeal, we may 

consider the issues raised by counsel and conduct an independent review of the record 

pursuant to Anders. See United States v. Poindexter, 492 F.3d 263, 271 (4th Cir. 2007). 

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that the plea is voluntary and that there is a factual basis for the plea.” Id. Because Hamlin 

did not move in the district court to withdraw his guilty plea, we review the district court’s 

acceptance of it for plain error. United States v. Lockhart, 947 F.3d 187, 191 (4th Cir. 

2020) (en banc). “To succeed under plain error review, a defendant must show that: (1) an 

error occurred; (2) the error was plain; and (3) the error affected his substantial rights.” Id. 

In the guilty plea context, a defendant meets his burden to establish that a plain error 

affected his substantial rights by showing a reasonable probability that he would not have 

pled guilty but for the district court’s error. United States v. Sanya, 774 F.3d 812, 816 

(4th Cir. 2014). We retain the discretion to correct a plain error affecting a defendant’s 

substantial rights “only if the error seriously affects the fairness, integrity or public 

reputation of judicial proceedings.” Lockhart, 947 F.3d at 191 (internal quotation marks 

omitted). 

A magistrate judge conducted the Rule 11 colloquy in Hamlin’s case, and the district 

court adopted the magistrate judge’s recommendation to accept his guilty plea.2

 Our 

review of the record leads us to conclude that the magistrate judge’s omissions under Rule 

11 did not affect Hamlin’s substantial rights. The record also reveals that the plea was 

supported by an independent basis in fact and that Hamlin entered the plea voluntarily and 

with an understanding of the consequences. We therefore discern no plain error warranting 

correction in the acceptance of Hamlin’s guilty plea. 

2 The record establishes that the magistrate judge was authorized to conduct 

Hamlin’s plea colloquy. 

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Next, Anders counsel questions whether trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance 

in not aggressively seeking a more favorable plea agreement for Hamlin and in not insisting 

on a plea agreement that bound the district court. This court typically will not review a 

claim of ineffective assistance of counsel made on direct appeal, United States v. Maynes, 

880 F.3d 110, 113 n.1 (4th Cir. 2018), “[u]nless an attorney’s ineffectiveness conclusively 

appears on the face of the record,” United States v. Faulls, 821 F.3d 502, 507 (4th Cir. 

2016). To demonstrate ineffective assistance of trial counsel, Hamlin must satisfy the 

two-part test set out in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984). He “must show 

that counsel’s performance was [constitutionally] deficient” and “that the deficient 

performance prejudiced the defense.” Id. at 687. After review, we conclude that 

ineffective assistance by trial counsel does not conclusively appear on the face of the 

record. Such claims “should be raised, if at all, in a 28 U.S.C. § 2255 motion.” Faulls, 

821 F.3d at 508. We therefore decline to address these claims at this juncture. 

Anders counsel also questions whether the district court erred in sentencing Hamlin 

to 12 months and 1 day in prison. “This [c]ourt reviews all sentences—whether inside, just 

outside, or significantly outside the Guidelines range—under a deferential abuse-ofdiscretion standard,” United States v. Torres-Reyes, 952 F.3d 147, 151 (4th Cir. 2020) 

(cleaned up), for procedural and substantive reasonableness, United States v. Fowler, 

948 F.3d 663, 668 (4th Cir. 2020). In evaluating procedural reasonableness, this court 

considers whether the district court properly calculated the defendant’s Guidelines range, 

gave the parties an opportunity to argue for an appropriate sentence, considered the 

18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) factors, and sufficiently explained the selected sentence. Id. When 

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rendering a sentence, the district court must make an individualized assessment based on 

the facts presented, state in open court the reasons supporting its chosen sentence, address 

the parties’ nonfrivolous arguments in favor of a particular sentence and, if it rejects them, 

explain why in a manner allowing for meaningful appellate review. United States v. 

Provance, 944 F.3d 213, 218 (4th Cir. 2019). If there are no procedural errors, this court 

then considers the substantive reasonableness of the sentence, evaluating “the totality of 

the circumstances to determine whether the sentencing court abused its discretion in 

concluding that the sentence it chose satisfied the standards set forth in § 3553(a).” United 

States v. Nance, 957 F.3d 204, 212 (4th Cir. 2020) (internal quotation marks omitted). 

After review of the record, we conclude that the district court did not reversibly err 

in calculating Hamlin’s Guidelines range. The district court afforded counsel an adequate 

opportunity to argue for an appropriate sentence and properly heard allocution from 

Hamlin. After considering the arguments of counsel, Hamlin’s allocution, the advisory 

Guidelines range, and the 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) factors, the district court determined that a 

prison term of 12 months and 1 day was warranted based on the nature and circumstances 

of Hamlin’s offense conduct, his history and characteristics, and the needs for the sentence 

imposed to reflect the seriousness of his offense, to promote respect for the law, to provide 

just punishment, to afford adequate deterrence to criminal conduct, and to protect the 

public. See 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(1), (2)(A)-(C). The district court’s explanation was 

sufficient to support the imposition of this term. We also accord “due deference to the 

district court’s decision that the § 3553(a) factors, on a whole,” justified imposition of an

upward variant sentence one day above the top end of the Guidelines range. United 

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States v. Zuk, 874 F.3d 398, 409 (4th Cir. 2017) (internal quotation marks omitted). 

We thus discern no abuse of discretion in the district court’s imposition of Hamlin’s prison 

sentence. 

In accordance with Anders, we have reviewed the entire record in this case and have 

found no meritorious grounds for appeal. We therefore affirm the criminal judgment. This 

court requires that counsel inform Hamlin, in writing, of the right to petition the Supreme 

Court of the United States for further review. If Hamlin requests that a petition be filed, 

but counsel believes that such a petition would be frivolous, then counsel may move in this 

court for leave to withdraw from representation. Counsel’s motion must state that a copy 

thereof was served on Hamlin. 

We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are 

adequately presented in the materials before this court and argument would not aid the 

decisional process. 

AFFIRMED

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