Testimony 

Before the Committee on Transportation 

and Infrastructure, House of 

Representatives

United States General Accounting Office 

GAO

For Release on Delivery 

Expected at 11:00 a.m. EDT 

Tuesday July 22, 2003 TRANSPORTATION 

PROGRAMS 

Opportunities for Oversight 

and Improved Use of 

Taxpayer Funds 

Statement of JayEtta Z. Hecker, Director 

Physical Infrastructure Issues 

GAO-03-1040T 
The federal-aid highway program illustrates the challenge of ensuring that 

federal funds (nearly $30 billion annually) are spent efficiently when projects 

are managed by the states. GAO has raised concerns about cost growth on 

and FHWA’s oversight of major highway and bridge projects. Recent 

proposals to strengthen FHWA’s oversight are responsive to issues and 

options GAO has raised. Options identified in previous GAO work provide 

the Congress with opportunities to build on recent proposals by, among 

other things, clarifying uncertainties about FHWA’s role and authority. 

NHTSA’s highway safety programs illustrate the challenge of evaluating how 

well federally funded state programs are meeting their goals. Over 5 years, 

the Congress provided about $2 billion to the states for programs to reduce 

traffic fatalities, which numbered over 42,000 in 2002. GAO found that 

NHTSA was making limited use of oversight tools that could help states 

better implement their programs and recommended strategies for improving 

the tools’ use that NHTSA has begun to implement. The administration 

recently proposed performance-based grants in this area. 

FTA’s New Starts program illustrates the challenge of developing effective 

processes for evaluating grant proposals. Under the New Starts program, 

which provided about $10 billion in mass transit funding in the past 6 years, 

local transit agencies compete for project funds through grant proposals. 

FTA has developed a systematic process for evaluating these proposals. 

GAO believes that FTA has made substantial progress by implementing this 

process, but our work has raised some concerns, including the extent to 

which the process is able to adequately prioritize the projects. 

The Essential Air Service (EAS) program illustrates the challenge of 

considering modifications to statutorily defined programs in response to 

changing conditions. Under the EAS program, many small communities are 

guaranteed to continue receiving air service through subsidies to carriers. 

However, the program has faced increasing costs and decreasing average 

passenger levels. The Congress, the administration, and GAO have all 

proposed strategies to improve the program’s efficiency by better targeting 

available resources and offering alternatives for sustainable services. 

Key Challenges and Strategies for Managing Four Federal Transportation Programs 

Program 

Highway 

construction 

Highway 

safety 

New Starts 

transit 

Essential Air 

Service 

Challenges Managing cost growth 

on major highway and 

bridge projects 

Enhancing 

effectiveness of 

state safety 

programs 

Selecting best 

projects for limited 

funds 

Adjusting program to 

changing conditions 

 

Strategies

Improve oversight and 

reporting 

Improve use of 

monitoring tools 

Establish sound 

selection process 

Restructure program to 

improve viability 

It is important to ensure that longterm spending on transportation 

programs meets the goals of 

increasing mobility and improving 

transportation safety. In this 

testimony, GAO discusses what 

recently completed work on four 

transportation programs suggests 

about challenges and strategies for 

improving the oversight and use of 

taxpayer funds. These four 

programs are (1) the federal-aid 

highway program, administered by 

the Federal Highway 

Administration (FHWA); (2) 

highway safety programs, 

administered by the National 

Highway Traffic Safety 

Administration (NHTSA); (3) the 

New Starts program, administered 

by the Federal Transit 

Administration (FTA); and (4) the 

Essential Air Service (EAS) 

program, administered out of the 

Office of the Secretary of 

Transportation. 

Differences in the structure of 

these programs have contributed to 

the challenges they illustrate. The 

federal-aid highway program uses 

formulas to apportion funds to the 

states, the highway safety 

programs use formulas and grants, 

the New Starts program uses 

competitive grants, and the EAS 

program provides subsidies. For 

each program, GAO describes in 

general how the program illustrates 

a particular challenge in managing 

or overseeing long-term spending 

and in particular what challenges 

and strategies for addressing the 

challenges GAO and others have 

identified. 

www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-03-1040T.

To view the full product, including the scope 

and methodology, click on the link above. 

For more information, contact JayEtta Hecker 

at (202) 512-2834 or heckerj@gao.gov.

Highlights of GAO-03-1040T, a testimony 

before the Committee on Transportation 

and Infrastructure, House of 

Representatives 

July 22, 2003 

TRANSPORTATION PROGRAMS

Opportunities for Oversight and Improved 

Use of Taxpayer Funds 
Page 1 GAO-03-1040T 

Mr. Chairman and Members of the Committee: 

It is an honor to be here today to participate in your hearing on strategies 

to reduce or prevent waste, fraud, and abuse in transportation programs. 

As requested, I will be discussing what our recently completed work on 

four transportation programs suggests about challenges and strategies for 

improving the oversight and use of taxpayer funds to ensure that long-term 

spending on transportation programs meets the goals of increasing 

mobility and improving transportation safety. 

As you know, many transportation programs rely on dedicated long-term 

funding to achieve specified program objectives. Such funding, which 

generally comes from a trust fund financed by user fees, is designed to 

match the long life, ongoing maintenance needs, and replacement and 

rehabilitation expenditures of large transportation projects. However, 

long-term funding creates certain challenges related to the effective 

oversight and management of the programs, particularly because in some 

cases, funds flow automatically to states, which use the funds to 

implement their own projects. Without effective oversight, investments of 

scarce federal funds in these transportation programs may not achieve 

maximum mobility and safety benefits. 

Transportation legislation has sought to balance the federal interest in 

effective management and oversight with state and local interest in 

flexibility to tailor decisions to local priorities. Transportation legislation 

has also sought to promote multimodal systemwide decision-making while 

continuing distinct modal trust funds. Recently, the Comptroller General 

testified before the House Budget Committee on opportunities for 

improving the oversight and use of taxpayer funds for such spending 

programs.1

 He described three tiers of review, one of which—improving 

 1

Federal Budget: Opportunities for Oversight and Improved Use of Taxpayer Funds, 

(GAO-03-952T, June 2003) 
Page 2 GAO-03-1040T 

economy, efficiency, and effectiveness in mandated federal spending 

programs—is especially pertinent to the programs we will be discussing.2

As agreed with your office, my remarks today will focus on four federal 

transportation programs: (1) the federal-aid highway program, (2) highway 

safety programs, (3) the New Starts transit program, and (4) the Essential 

Air Service program. The size and structure of these programs vary 

considerably. For each program, I will discuss in general how the program 

illustrates a particular challenge in managing or overseeing long-term 

spending programs and in particular what challenges and strategies for 

addressing these challenges we and others have found in evaluating these 

programs. 

Before I discuss each individual program, I’d like to point out how 

structural differences in these programs have contributed to different 

oversight challenges for each. For example, the federal-aid highway 

program uses formulas to apportion federal funds to the states in several 

distinct categories for the purpose of constructing and improving highway 

facilities. Ensuring efficient expenditures of federal funds for what can be 

large, long-term construction projects is an important challenge that has 

grown as the Federal Highway Administration (FHWA) has increasingly 

devolved its oversight responsibilities to the states in recent years. The 

highway safety programs, administered by the National Highway Traffic 

Safety Administration (NHTSA), also use formulas and other criteria to 

apportion funds for state programs designed primarily to improve safety 

through changes in drivers’ behavior. Determining the effectiveness of the 

states’ efforts is a key challenge for these programs, together with 

assessing the efficiency of their expenditures. In contrast, the New Starts 

transit program relies on financial and project justification criteria to 

evaluate and select grant proposals for transit projects through a 

competition for federal funds administered by the Federal Transit 

 2

The three levels of review the Comptroller General discussed also included addressing 

vulnerabilities to fraud, waste, abuse, and mismanagement, particularly in high-risk federal 

programs; and a fundamental re-examination of programs, policies, activities, and 

processes. Because the programs we are discussing today are not on our high-risk list and 

our work in these areas has not focused on fraud or abuse, we are discussing them in the 

context of the longer-term goals of efficiency and effectiveness, which are key to 

appropriately targeting scarce federal resources. Our scope today does not encompass a 

fundamental re-examination of programs, which is also critical to ensuring the effective use 

of federal funds. 
Page 3 GAO-03-1040T 

Administration (FTA).3 While oversight of funded projects is important for 

this program, a key challenge that our work has addressed is how grant 

proposals should be evaluated to identify the best projects for funding. 

Finally, the Essential Air Service (EAS) program is statutorily based in the 

Airline Deregulation Act of 1978. Administered out of the Office of the 

Secretary of Transportation, it subsidizes air carriers’ operations to 

guarantee that certain isolated small communities served by air carriers 

before deregulation continue to receive some scheduled air service. As the 

aviation industry has changed over the years, questions have arisen about 

the program’s sustainability and efficiency. 

My statement is based on a body of GAO reviews of these and other 

transportation programs, many completed at the request of your 

Committee or legislatively mandated. A complete list of related reports 

appears in appendix I. 

In summary: 

• The federal-aid highway program illustrates the challenge of ensuring that 

federal funds are spent efficiently through formula-based programs that 

finance projects that are then largely managed and overseen by the states. 

The program makes nearly $30 billion available to the states for their 

transportation programs annually, including funding for major highway 

and bridge projects. Over the years, we have documented cost growth and 

management deficiencies on these major highway and bridge projects, as 

have the Department of Transportation’s Inspector General and state audit 

and evaluation agencies. Additionally, in 1997, we found that FHWA had 

done little to ensure that containing costs was an integral part of states’ 

project management—in part because FHWA did not believe that 

encouraging or requiring practices to control costs and better manage 

projects was part of its oversight mandate. Since then, FHWA has 

developed strategies to strengthen its oversight, including requirements 

for annual finance plans and greater use of risk-based factors to focus its 

oversight efforts. The administration’s reauthorization proposal also 

includes strategies for strengthening FHWA’s oversight, and we believe 

these are positive steps that are responsive to many of the issues we’ve 

raised in the past. Should the Congress determine that enhancing federal 

oversight of major highway and bridge projects is needed and appropriate, 

 3

In contrast to the New Starts program, there are other transit programs that are formula 

funded; however, we have not evaluated these programs and therefore do not include them 

in our discussion today. 
Page 4 GAO-03-1040T 

in previous work we have identified options that provide the Congress 

opportunities to build on the administration’s proposal during the 

reauthorization process by, among other things, clarifying uncertainties 

about FHWA’s role and authority. 

• The highway safety programs administered by NHTSA illustrate the 

challenge of evaluating how well federally funded and assisted state 

programs are meeting their goals, as well as how efficiently the federal 

funds are being spent. During fiscal years 1998 through 2002, the Congress 

provided about $2 billion to the states for programs designed to reduce the 

number of traffic fatalities, which totaled over 42,000 in 2002. NHTSA has 

tools for overseeing these programs, including improvement plans to help 

states meet their safety goals and management reviews to assess the 

programs’ performance and use of federal funds. However, evaluating how 

well the state programs are meeting their highway safety goals is difficult 

because NHTSA’s guidance does not establish a consistent means of 

measuring progress. Moreover, NHTSA’s regional offices have made 

limited and inconsistent use of improvement plans and management 

reviews, in part because NHTSA’s guidance does not specify criteria for 

conducting them. When NHTSA’s regional offices have conducted 

management reviews of the state programs, they have sometimes found 

inefficient spending and weak controls over federal funds. In April 2003, 

we recommended strategies for improving NHTSA’s use of these tools, 

including developing better guidance on when they should be used. 

NHTSA has begun to implement these recommendations. The 

administration’s recent proposal to reauthorize the Transportation Equity 

Act for the 21st Century (TEA-21) calls for changes in the program that 

would provide even further flexibility to states in using these funds. It 

would also create grant programs based on state performance in two 

areas—reductions in fatalities and safety belt laws and usage. 

• FTA’s New Starts transit program illustrates two management oversight 

challenges: the challenge of developing effective federal processes for 

evaluating grant proposals as well as the already described challenge of 

overseeing projects’ implementation. Under the New Starts program, 

which provided about $10 billion in mass transit funding for fiscal years 

1998-2003 and was authorized by TEA-21, local transit agencies apply and 

compete for project funds on the basis of specific financial and project 

justification criteria. FTA reviews the grant applications and then notifies 

the Congress that it intends to commit New Starts funding to certain 
Page 5 GAO-03-1040T 

projects through full funding grant agreements. 4 Because many transit 

projects compete for New Starts funding, and FTA awards relatively few 

full funding grant agreements each year, it is crucial that the most 

promising projects are selected. FTA is also responsible for overseeing 

funded projects. FTA has implemented strategies to address the twin 

challenges of evaluating projects and overseeing their implementation. 

First, it developed a systematic process for evaluating potential New Starts 

projects competing for federal funding that provides a framework for 

evaluating and selecting projects. We believe that FTA has made 

substantial progress by implementing this process, but our work in recent 

years has raised some concerns, including the extent to which the process 

is able to adequately prioritize the projects. Second, FTA has improved the 

quality of its transit grants management oversight program by upgrading 

its guidance and training of staff and grantees and by strengthening 

oversight procedures. However, oversight remains an area of concern, as 

major transit projects continue to experience cost, schedule, and 

performance problems. The administration’s fiscal year 2004 budget 

proposal contains several initiatives that have both advantages and 

disadvantages, with implications for the cost-effectiveness and 

performance of proposed projects. 

• The Essential Air Service (EAS) program illustrates the challenge of 

considering modifications to statutorily defined programs in response to 

changing conditions. Under the EAS program, small communities that 

received scheduled commercial air service prior to the deregulation of the 

airline industry in 1978 and that meet certain additional criteria are 

guaranteed to continue receiving air service. Although the program was 

originally intended to end in 1988, the Congress later permanently 

authorized it. As the airline industry has evolved over the past 25 years, 

however, the EAS program has faced increasing challenges to remain 

viable. Costs have tripled since 1995 because carriers’ costs have 

increased and revenues have declined as passenger ridership has fallen; 

passengers often prefer to drive to other larger airports nearby for better 

air service. In addition, the number of communities eligible for EAS 

subsidies has increased and may continue to grow in the near term. Within 

the past year, the Congress, the administration, and we have all proposed 

various strategies to improve the EAS program’s overall efficiency and 

effectiveness by better targeting available resources and offering 

alternatives for sustainable services, such as allowing communities to 

 4

A full funding grant agreement is a multiyear contractual agreement between FTA and 

project sponsors for a specified amount of funding. The full amount of funding is 

committed to the projects over a set period. 
Page 6 GAO-03-1040T 

spend subsidy funds on individually-tailored transportation options that 

better meet their needs. 

The federal-aid highway program provides nearly $30 billion annually to 

the states, most of which are formula grant funds that FHWA distributes 

through annual apportionments according to statutory formulas; once 

apportioned, these funds are generally available to each state for eligible 

projects.5

 The responsibility for choosing which projects to fund generally 

rests with state departments of transportation and local planning 

organizations. The states have considerable discretion in selecting specific 

highway projects and in determining how to allocate available federal 

funds among the various projects they have selected. For example, section 

145 of title 23 of the United States Code describes the federal-aid highway 

program as a federally assisted state program and provides that the 

authorization of the appropriation of federal funds or their availability for 

expenditure, “shall in no way infringe on the sovereign rights of the States 

to determine which projects shall be federally financed.” 

A major highway or bridge construction or repair project usually has four 

stages: (1) planning, (2) environmental review, (3) design and property 

acquisition, and (4) construction. While FHWA approves state 

transportation plans, environmental impact assessments, and the 

acquisition of property for highway projects, its role in approving the 

 5

How formulas are designed to distribute federal funds can itself affect the extent to which 

federal funds encourage or leverage the Nation’s total level of highway investment and 

promote the most efficient funding of transportation projects. These issues are outside the 

scope of this testimony’s discussion; however, our recent reports Trends in Federal and 

State Capital Investment in Highways (GAO-03-744R) and Trends in State Capital 

Investment in Highways (GAO-03-915SP) provide information on federal, state, and local 

investment in highways, and variations in states’ levels of ’ investment and effort over time. 

Our follow-on work to that report will more closely examine the interaction between levels 

of federal and state investment, including how the design of formulas may affect this 

interaction. 

Options Exist to 

Address the FederalAid Highway 

Program’s Oversight 

Challenges 
Page 7 GAO-03-1040T 

design and construction of projects varies.6 The state’s activities and 

FHWA’s corresponding approval actions are shown in figure 1. 

Figure 1: State and FHWA Actions on Highway Projects 

 6

FHWA exercises full oversight only of certain high-cost Interstate system projects. On 

projects subject to “full” oversight, FHWA prescribes design and construction standards, 

approves design plans and estimates, approves contract awards, inspects construction 

progress, and renders final acceptance on projects when they are completed. States either 

may assume or are required to assume responsibilities for all other types of projects. See 

U.S. General Accounting Office, Transportation Infrastructure: Cost and Oversight Issues 

on Major Highway and Bridge Projects, GAO-02-702T (Washington, D.C.: May 1, 2002) for 

a more complete description of FHWA’s and the states’ responsibilities. 
Page 8 GAO-03-1040T 

Given the size and significance of the federal-aid highway program’s 

funding and projects, a key challenge for this program is overseeing states’ 

expenditure of public funds to ensure that state projects are well managed 

and successfully financed. Our work—as well as work by the DOT 

Inspector General and by state audit and evaluation agencies—has 

documented cost growth on numerous major highway and bridge projects. 

Let me provide one example. In January 2001, Virginia’s Joint Legislative 

Audit and Review Commission found that final project costs on Virginia 

Department of Transportation projects were well above their cost 

estimates and estimated that the state’s 6-year, $9 billion transportation 

development plan understated the costs of projects by up to $3.5 billion. 

The commission attributed these problems to several factors, including, 

among other things, not adjusting estimates for inflation and expanding 

the scope of projects. 

Our work has identified weaknesses in FHWA’s oversight of projects, 

especially in controlling costs. In 1997, we reported that cost containment 

was not an explicit statutory or regulatory goal of FHWA’s oversight.7

While FHWA influenced the cost-effectiveness of projects when it 

reviewed and approved plans for their design and construction, we found 

it had done little to ensure that cost containment was an integral part of 

the states’ project management. According to FHWA officials, controlling 

costs was not a goal of their oversight, and FHWA had no mandate in law 

to encourage or require practices to contain the costs of major highway 

projects. More recently, an FHWA task force concluded that changes in 

the agency’s oversight role since 1991—when the states assumed greater 

responsibility for overseeing federal-aid projects—had resulted in 

conflicting interpretations of the agency’s role in overseeing projects, and 

that some of the field offices were taking a “hands off” approach to certain 

projects. In June 2001, FHWA issued a policy memorandum, in part to 

clarify that FHWA is ultimately accountable for all projects financed with 

federal funds. As recently as last month, a memorandum posted on 

FHWA’s Web site discussed the laws establishing FHWA and the federalaid highway program, along with congressional and public expectations 

that FHWA “ensure the validity of project cost estimates and schedules.” 

The memorandum concluded, “These expectations may not be in full 

agreement with the role that has been established by these laws.” 

 7

U.S. General Accounting Office, Transportation Infrastructure: Managing the Costs of 

Large-Dollar Highway Projects, GAO/RCED-97-27 (Washington D.C.: Feb. 27, 1997). 

Challenges 
Page 9 GAO-03-1040T 

In addition, we have found that FHWA’s oversight process has not 

promoted reliable cost estimates. While there are many reasons for cost 

increases, we have found, on projects we have reviewed, that initial cost 

estimates were not reliable predictors of the total costs and financing 

needs of projects. Rather, these estimates were generally developed for 

the environmental review—whose purpose is to compare project 

alternatives, not to develop reliable cost estimates. In addition, FHWA had 

no standard requirements for preparing cost estimates, and each state 

used its own methods and included different types of costs in its 

estimates. We have also found that costs exceeded initial estimates on 

projects we have reviewed because (1) initial estimates were modified to 

reflect more detailed plans and specifications as projects were designed 

and (2) the projects’ costs were affected by, among other things, inflation 

and changes in scope to accommodate economic development over time. 

We also found that highway projects take a long time to complete, and that 

the amount of time spent on them is of concern to the Congress, the 

federal government, and the states. Completing a major, new, federally 

funded highway project that has significant environmental impacts 

typically takes from 9 to 19 years and can entail as many as 200 major 

steps requiring actions, approvals, or input from a number of federal, state, 

and other stakeholders.8

Finally, we have noted that in many instances, states construct a major 

project as a series of smaller projects, and FHWA approves the estimated 

cost of each smaller project when it is ready for construction, rather than 

agreeing to the total cost of the major project at the outset. In some 

instances, by the time FHWA considers whether to approve the cost of a 

major project, a public investment decision may, in effect, already have 

been made because substantial funds have been spent on designing the 

project and acquiring property, and many of the increases in the project’s 

estimated costs have already occurred. 

Since 1998, FHWA has taken a number of steps to improve the 

management and oversight of major projects in order to better promote 

cost containment. For example, FHWA implemented TEA-21’s requirement 

that states develop an annual finance plan for any highway or bridge 

 8

U.S. General Accounting Office, Highway Infrastructure: Stakeholders’ Views on Time to 

Conduct Environmental Reviews of Highway Projects, GAO-03-534 (Washington D.C.: 

May 2003). 

Strategies 
Page 10 GAO-03-1040T 

project estimated to cost $1 billion or more and established a major 

projects team that currently tracks and reports each month on 15 such 

projects. FHWA has also moved to incorporate greater risk-based 

management into its oversight in order to identify areas of weakness 

within state transportation programs, set priorities for improvement, and 

work with the states to meet those priorities. 

The administration’s May 2001 reauthorization measure contains 

additional proposed actions. It would introduce more structured FHWA 

oversight requirements, including mandatory annual reviews of state 

transportation agencies’ financial management and “project delivery” 

systems, as well as periodic reviews of states’ practices for estimating 

costs, awarding contracts, and reducing project costs. To improve the 

quality and reliability of cost estimates, it would introduce minimum 

federal standards for states to use in estimating project costs. The measure 

would also strengthen reporting requirements and take new actions to 

reduce fraud.9

Many elements of the administration’s proposal are responsive to 

problems and options we have described in past reports and testimony.10

Should the Congress determine that enhancing federal oversight of major 

highway and bridge projects is needed and appropriate, options we have 

identified in prior work remain available to build on the administration’s 

proposal during the reauthorization process. However, adopting any of 

these options would require balancing the states’ right to select projects 

and desire for flexibility and more autonomy with the federal 

government’s interest in ensuring that billions of federal dollars are spent 

efficiently and effectively. Furthermore, the additional costs of each of 

these options would need to be weighed against its potential benefits. 

Options include the following: 

 9

In particular, the measure requires states or project sponsors to prepare a project 

management plan for projects estimated to cost $1 billion or more that would detail 

processes in place to provide timely information needed to manage projects’ scope, costs, 

schedule, and federal requirements. It would also extend the requirement for annual 

finance plans to projects receiving $100 million or more in federal funds, although approval 

of those plans could be delegated to the states. In addition, among other provisions, the 

proposal would require mandatory debarment of contractors convicted of fraud related to 

federal-aid highway or transit programs, and the suspension of contractors indicted for 

fraud. 

10See, for example, U.S. General Accounting Office, Federal-Aid Highways: Cost and 

Oversight of Major Highway and Bridge Projects—Issues and Options, GAO-03-764T

(Washington, D.C.: May 8, 2003); GAO-02-702T; and GAO/RCED-97-27. 
Page 11 GAO-03-1040T 

• Have FHWA develop and maintain a management information system on 

the cost performance of selected major highway and bridge projects, 

including changes in estimated costs over time and the reasons for such 

changes. Such information could help define the scope of the problem 

with major projects and provide insights needed to fashion appropriate 

solutions. 

• Clarify uncertainties concerning FHWA’s role and authority. As I 

mentioned earlier, the federal-aid highway program is by law a federally 

assisted state program, and FHWA continues to question its authority to 

encourage or require practices to contain the costs of major highway and 

bridge projects. Should uncertainties about FHWA’s role and authority 

continue, another option would be to resolve the uncertainties through 

reauthorization language. 

• Have the states track the progress of projects against their initial baseline 

cost estimates. The Office of Management and Budget requires federal 

agencies, for acquisitions of major capital assets, to prepare baseline cost 

and schedule estimates and to track and report the acquisitions’ cost 

performance. These requirements apply to programs managed by and 

acquisitions made by federal agencies, but they do not apply to the federalaid highway program, a federally assisted state program. Expanding the 

federal government’s practice to the federally assisted highway program 

could improve the management of major projects by providing managers 

with information for identifying and addressing problems early. 

• Establish performance goals and strategies for containing costs as projects 

move through their design and construction phases. Such performance 

goals could provide financial or other incentives to the states for meeting 

agreed-upon goals. Performance provisions such as these have been 

established in other federally assisted grant programs and have also been 

proposed for use in the federal-aid highway program. Requiring or 

encouraging the use of goals and strategies could also improve 

accountability and make cost containment an integral part of how states 

manage projects over time. 

• Consider methods for improving the time it takes to plan and construct 

major federal-aid highway projects—a process that we reported can take 

up to 19 years to complete. Major stakeholders suggested several 

approaches to improving the timeliness of these projects, including (1) 

improving project management, (2) delegating environmental review and 

permitting authority, and (3) improving agency staffing and skills. We have 

recommended that FHWA consider the benefits of the most promising 
Page 12 GAO-03-1040T 

approaches and act to foster the adoption of the most cost-effective and 

feasible approaches.11

• Reexamine the approval process for major highway and bridge projects. 

This option, which would require federal approval of a major project at the 

outset, including its cost estimate and finance plan, would be the most farreaching and the most difficult option to implement. Potential models for 

such a process include the full funding grant agreement used by FTA for 

the New Starts program, and, as I testified last year, a DOT task force’s 

December 2000 recommendation calling for the establishment of a 

separate funding category for initial design work and a new decision point 

for advancing highway projects.12

Over the last 25 years, more than 1.2 million people have died as a result of 

traffic crashes in the United States—more than 42,000 in 2002. Since 1982, 

about 40 percent of traffic deaths were from alcohol-related crashes. In 

addition, traffic crashes are the leading cause of death for people aged 4 

though 33. As figure 2 shows, the total number of traffic fatalities has not 

significantly decreased in recent years. 

 11GAO-03-534; GAO-03-398; GAO-02-1067T. 

12GAO-02-702T. 

NHTSA Makes 

Inconsistent and 

Limited Use of 

Oversight Tools 
Page 13 GAO-03-1040T 

Figure 2: Total Traffic Fatalities and Fatality Rate, 1975-2002 

To improve safety on the nation’s highways, NHTSA administers a number 

of programs, including the core federally funded highway safety program, 

Section 402 State and Community Grants, and several other highway 

safety programs that were authorized in 1998 by TEA-21. The Section 402 

program, established in 1966, makes grants available for each state, based 

on a population and road mileage formula, to carry out traffic safety 

programs designed to influence drivers’ behavior, commonly called 

behavioral safety programs. The TEA-21 programs include seven incentive 

programs, which are designed to reduce traffic deaths and injuries by 

promoting seatbelt use and reducing alcohol-impaired driving, and two 

transfer programs, which penalize states that have not complied with 

federal requirements for enacting repeat-offender and open container laws 

to limit alcohol-impaired driving. Under these transfer programs, 

noncompliant states are required to shift certain funds from federal-aid 

highway programs to projects that concern or improve highway safety. In 

addition, subsequent to TEA-21, the Congress required that, starting later 

this year, states that do not meet federal requirements for establishing 0.08 

blood alcohol content as the state level for drunk driving will have a 

percentage of their federal aid highway funds withheld. During fiscal years 

1998 through 2002, over $2 billion was provided to the states for highway 

safety programs. 
Page 14 GAO-03-1040T 

NHTSA, which oversees the states’ highway safety programs, adopted a 

performance-based approach to oversight in 1998. Under this approach, 

the states and the federal government are to work together to make the 

nation’s highways safer. Each state sets its own safety performance goals 

and develops an annual safety plan that describes projects designed to 

achieve the goals. NHTSA’s 10 regional offices review the states’ annual 

plans and provide technical assistance, advice, and comments.13 NHTSA 

has two tools available to strengthen its monitoring and oversight of the 

state programs—improvement plans that states not making progress 

towards their highway safety goals are to develop, which identify 

programs and activities that a state and NHTSA regional office will 

undertake to help the state meet its goals; and management reviews, 

which generally involve sending a team to a state to review its highway 

safety operations, examine its projects, and determine that it is using 

funds in accordance with requirements. 

Among the key challenges in this area are (1) evaluating how well the 

federally funded state highway safety programs are meeting their goals 

and (2) determining how well the states are spending and controlling their 

federal highway safety funds. In April 2003, we issued a report on NHTSA’s 

oversight of state highway safety programs in which we identified 

weaknesses in NHTSA’s use of improvement plans and management 

reviews.14 Evaluating how well state highway safety programs are meeting 

their goals is difficult because, under NHTSA’s performance-based 

oversight approach, NHTSA’s guidance does not establish a consistent 

means of measuring progress. Although the guidance states that NHTSA 

can require the development and implementation of an improvement plan 

when a state fails to make progress toward its highway safety performance 

goals, the guidance does not establish specific criteria for evaluating 

progress. Rather, the guidance simply states that an improvement plan 

should be developed when a state is making little or no progress toward its 

highway safety goals. As a result, NHTSA’s regional offices have made 

limited and inconsistent use of improvement plans, and some states do not 

have improvement plans, even though their alcohol-related fatality rates 

 13The Federal Motor Carrier Safety Administration also has an oversight role in highway 

safety for motor carrier transportation. 

14U.S. General Accounting Office, Highway Safety: Better Guidance Could Improve 

Oversight of State Highway Safety Programs, GAO-03-474 (Washington, D.C.: Apr. 21, 

2003). 

Challenges 
Page 15 GAO-03-1040T 

have increased or their seat-belt usage rates have declined. Without a 

consistent means of measuring progress, NHTSA and state officials lack 

common expectations about how to define progress, how long states 

should have to demonstrate progress, how to set and measure highway 

safety goals, and when improvement plans should be used to help states 

meet their highway safety goals. 

To determine how well the states are spending and controlling their 

federal highway safety funds, NHTSA’s regional offices can conduct 

management reviews of state highway safety programs. Management 

reviews completed in 2001 and 2002 identified weaknesses in states’ 

highway safety programs that needed correction; however, we found that 

the regional offices were inconsistent in conducting the reviews because 

NHTSA’s guidance does not specify when the reviews should be 

conducted. The identified weaknesses included problems with monitoring 

subgrantees, poor coordination of programs, financial control problems, 

and large unexpended fund balances. Such weaknesses, if not addressed, 

could lead to inefficient or unauthorized uses of federal funds. According 

to NHTSA officials, management reviews also foster productive 

relationships with the states that allow the agency’s regional offices to 

work with the states to correct vulnerabilities. These regions’ ongoing 

involvement with the states also creates opportunities for sharing and 

encouraging the implementation of best practices, which may then lead to 

more effective safety programs and projects. 

To encourage more consistent use of improvement plans and management 

reviews, we made recommendations to improve the guidance to NHTSA’s 

regional offices on when it is appropriate to use these oversight tools. In 

commenting on a draft of the report, NHTSA officials agreed with our 

recommendations and said they had begun taking action to develop 

criteria and guidance for using the tools. 

The administration’s recent proposal to reauthorize TEA-21 would make 

some changes to the safety programs that could also have some impact on 

program efficiencies. For example, the proposal would somewhat simplify 

the current grant structure for NHTSA’s highway safety programs. The 

Section 402 program would have four components: core program formula 

grants, safety belt performance grants, general performance grants, and 

impaired driving discretionary grants. The safety belt performance grants 

would provide funds to states that had passed primary safety belt laws or 

achieved 90 percent safety belt usage. In addition, the general performance 

grant would provide funds based on overall reductions in (1) motor 

Strategies 
Page 16 GAO-03-1040T 

vehicle fatalities, (2) alcohol-related fatalities, and (3) motorcycle, bicycle, 

and pedestrian fatalities. Finally, the Section 402 program would have an 

impaired driving discretionary grant component, which would target funds 

to up to 10 states that had the highest impaired driving fatality numbers or 

fatality rates. In addition to changing the Section 402 program, the 

proposal would expand grants for highway safety information systems and 

create new emergency medical service grants. The proposal leaves intact 

existing penalties related to open container, repeat offender, and 0.08 

blood-alcohol content laws, and establishes a new transfer penalty for 

states that fail to pass a primary safety belt law and have safety belt use 

rates lower than 90 percent by 2005. 

The proposal would also give the states greater flexibility in using their 

highway safety funds. A state could move up to half its highway safety 

construction funds from the Highway Safety Improvement Program into 

the core Section 402 program. A state would also be able to use 100 

percent of its safety belt performance grants for construction purposes if it 

had a primary safety belt law, or 50 percent if the grant was based on high 

safety belt use. States could also use up to 50 percent of their general 

performance grants for safety construction purposes. 

The New Starts transit program identifies and funds fixed guideway 

projects, including rail, bus rapid transit, trolley, and ferry projects. The 

New Starts program provides much of the federal government’s 

investment in urban mass transportation. TEA-21 and subsequent 

amendments authorized approximately $10 billion for New Starts projects 

for fiscal years 1998 through 2003. The administration’s proposal for the 

surface transportation reauthorization, known as the Safe, Accountable, 

Flexible, and Efficient Transportation Equity Act of 2003 (SAFETEA), 

requests that about $9.5 billion be made available for the New Starts 

program for fiscal years 2004 through 2009. 

Unlike the federal highway program and certain transit programs, under 

which funds are automatically distributed to states on the basis of 

formulas, the New Starts program requires local transit agencies to 

compete for New Starts project funds on the basis of specific financial and 

project justification criteria. To obtain New Starts funds, a project must 

progress through a regional review of alternatives, develop preliminary 

engineering plans, and meet FTA’s approval for final design. FTA assesses 

the technical merits of a project proposal and its finance plan and then 

notifies the Congress that it intends to commit New Starts funding to 

certain projects through full funding grant agreements. The agreement 

The New Starts 

Transit Program Has 

Faced Challenges in 

Selection and 

Oversight of Projects 

and Has Taken Steps 

to Address these 

Challenges 
Page 17 GAO-03-1040T 

establishes the terms and conditions for federal participation in the 

project, including the maximum amount of federal funds—no more than 

80 percent of the estimated net cost of the project.15 While the grant 

agreement commits the federal government to providing the federal 

contributions to the project over a number of years, these contributions 

are subject to the annual appropriations process. State or local sources 

provide the remaining funding. The grantee is responsible for all costs 

exceeding the federal share, unless the agreement is amended. 

To meet the nation’s transportation needs, many states and localities are 

planning or building large New Starts projects to replace aging 

infrastructure or build new capacity. They are often costly and require 

large commitments of public resources, which may take several years to 

obtain from federal, state, and local sources. The projects can also be 

technically challenging to construct and require their sponsors to resolve a 

wide range of social, environmental, land-use, and economic issues before 

and during construction. 

It is critical that federal and other transportation officials meet two 

particular challenges that stem from the costly and lengthy federal funding 

commitment associated with New Starts projects. First, they must have a 

sound basis for evaluating and selecting projects. Because many transit 

projects compete for limited federal transit dollars—there are currently 52 

projects in the New Starts “pipeline”—and FTA awards relatively few full 

funding grant agreements each year, it is crucial that local governments 

choose the most promising projects as candidates for New Starts funds 

and that FTA uses a process that effectively selects those projects that 

most clearly meet the program’s goals. 

Second, FTA, like FHWA, has the challenge of overseeing the planning, 

development, and construction of selected projects to ensure they remain 

on schedule and within budget, and deliver their expected performance. In 

the early 1990s, we designated the transit grants management oversight 

program as high risk because it was vulnerable to fraud, waste, abuse, and 

 15In response to language contained in a conference report prepared by the House 

Appropriations Committee, FTA adopted a 60 percent preference policy, which in effect 

generally reduced the level of New Starts federal funding share for projects from 80 

percent to 60 percent. 

Challenges 
Page 18 GAO-03-1040T 

mismanagement.16 While we have removed it from the high-risk 

designation because of improvements FTA has made to this program, we 

have found that major transit projects continue to experience costs and 

schedule problems. For example, in August, 1999, we reported that 6 of 

the 14 transit projects with full funding grant agreements had experienced 

cost increases, and 3 of those projects had experienced cost increases that 

were more than 25 percent over the estimates approved by FTA in grant 

agreements.17 The key reasons for the increases included (1) higher than 

anticipated contract costs, (2) schedule delays, and (3) project scope 

changes and system enhancements. A recent testimony by the Department 

of Transportation’s Inspector General indicates that major transit projects 

continue to experience significant problems including cost increases, 

financing problems, schedule delays, and technical or construction 

difficulties.18

FTA has developed strategies to address the twin challenges of selecting 

the right projects and monitoring their implementation costs, schedule, 

and performance. First, in response to direction in TEA-21, FTA developed 

a systematic process for evaluating and rating potential New Starts 

projects competing for federal funding.19 Under this process, FTA assigns 

individual ratings for a variety of financial and project justification criteria 

and then assigns an overall rating of highly recommended, recommended, 

not recommended, or not rated. These criteria reflect a broad range of 

benefits and effects of the proposed projects, including capital and 

operating finance plans, mobility improvements, environmental benefits, 

operating efficiencies, cost-effectiveness, land use, and other factors. 

According to FTA’s New Starts regulations, a project must have an overall 

rating of at least “recommended” to receive a grant agreement. FTA also 

considers a number of other “readiness” factors before proposing funding 

 16U.S. General Accounting Office, Mass Transit: Challenges in Evaluating, Overseeing, 

and Funding Major Transit Projects (GAO/T-RCED-00-104, Washington, DC: Mar. 8, 2000). 

17U.S. General Accounting Office, Mass Transit: Status of New Starts Transit Projects 

With Full Funding Grant Agreements, GAO/RCED-99-240 (Washington, D.C.: Aug. 19, 

1999). 

18 See U.S. Department of Transportation, Statement of the Honorable Kenneth M. Mead, 

Inspector General, Management of Large Highway and Transit Projects (Washington, 

D.C.: May 1, 2002). 

19The exceptions to the ratings process are projects that are statutorily exempt because 

they request less than $25 million in New Starts funding. 

Strategies 
Page 19 GAO-03-1040T 

for a project. For example, FTA proposes funding only for projects that 

are expected to enter the final design phase and be ready for grant 

agreements within the next fiscal year. Figure 3 illustrates the New Starts 

evaluation and ratings process. 

Figure 3: New Starts Evaluation and Ratings Process 

Note: According to FTA, the optional criterion of “other factors” gives grantees the opportunity to 

provide additional information about the likelihood of a project’s overall success. 

While FTA has made substantial progress in establishing a systematic 

process for evaluating and rating potential projects, our work has raised 

some concerns about the process. For example, to assist FTA in 

prioritizing projects to ensure that the relatively few full funding grant 

agreements go to the most important projects, we recommended in March 

2000 that FTA further prioritize the projects that it rates as highly 

recommended or recommended and ready for New Starts funds.20 FTA has 

not implemented this recommendation. We believe that this 

recommendation is still valid because the funding requested for the many 

 20U.S. General Accounting Office, Mass Transit: Challenges in Evaluating, Overseeing, 

and Funding Major Transit Projects, GAO/T-RCED-00-104 (Washington, D.C.: Mar. 8, 

2000). 
Page 20 GAO-03-1040T 

projects that are expected to compete for grant agreements over the next 

several years is likely to exceed the available federal dollars. A further 

concern about the ratings process stems from FTA’s decision during the 

fiscal year 2004 cycle to propose a project for a full funding grant 

agreement that had been assigned an overall project rating of “not rated,” 

even though FTA’s regulations require that projects have at least a 

“recommended” rating to receive a grant agreement.21 Finally, we found 

that FTA needs to provide clearer information and additional guidance 

about certain changes it made to the evaluation and ratings process for the 

fiscal year 2004 cycle.22

In work that addressed the challenge of overseeing ongoing projects once 

they are selected to receive a full funding grant agreement, we reported in 

March and September 2000 that FTA had improved the quality of the 

transit grants management oversight program through strategies that 

included upgrading its guidance and training of staff and grantees, 

developing standardized oversight procedures, and employing contractor 

staff to strengthen its oversight of grantees. FTA also expanded its 

oversight efforts to include a formal and rigorous assessment of a 

grantee’s financial capacity to build and operate a new project and of the 

financial impact of that project on the existing transit system. These 

assessments, performed by independent accounting firms, are completed 

before FTA commits funds for construction and are updated as needed 

until projects are completed. For projects that already have grant 

agreements, FTA focuses on the grantee’s ability to finish the project on 

time and within the budget established by the grant agreement. 

The administration’s fiscal year 2004 budget proposal contains three New 

Starts initiatives—reducing the maximum federal statutory share to 50 

percent, allowing non-fixed-guideway projects to be funded through New 

Starts, and replacing the “exempt” classification with a streamlined ratings 

 21According to FTA officials, this project could not be rated because its local travel 

forecasting data and models did not support calculation of a new benefits measure required 

for the fiscal year 2004 cycle. The officials told us that they decided to select this project 

for a proposed grant agreement because they believed that the data problems would be 

corrected, and the project would be able to achieve a “recommended” rating and be ready 

for a grant agreement by the end of fiscal year 2004. They said that other proposed projects 

that received overall ratings of “recommended” or higher would not be ready at that time. 

22U.S. General Accounting Office, Mass Transit: FTA Needs to Provide Clear Information 

and Additional Guidance on the New Starts Ratings Process, GAO-03-701 (Washington, 

D.C.: June 23, 2003). 
Page 21 GAO-03-1040T 

process for projects requesting less than $75 million in New Starts funding. 

These proposed initiatives have advantages and disadvantages, with 

implications for the cost-effectiveness and performance of proposed 

projects. First, the reduced federal funding would require local 

communities to increase their funding share, creating more incentive for 

them to propose the most cost-effective projects; however, localities might 

have difficulties generating the increased funding share, and this initiative 

could result in funding inequities for transit projects when compared with 

highway projects. Second, allowing non-fixed guideway projects to be 

funded under New Starts would give local communities more flexibility in 

choosing among transit modes and might promote the use of bus rapid 

transit, whose costs compare favorably with those of light rail systems;23

however, this initiative would change the original fixed guideway 

emphasis of New Starts, which some project sponsors we interviewed 

believe might disadvantage traditional New Starts projects. Finally, 

replacing the “exempt” classification with a streamlined rating process for 

all projects requesting less than $75 million might promote greater 

performance-oriented evaluation since all projects would receive a rating. 

However, this initiative might reduce the number of smaller communities 

that would participate in the New Starts program. 

The Congress established the Essential Air Service (EAS) program as part 

of the Airline Deregulation Act of 1978. The act guaranteed that 

communities served by air carriers before deregulation would continue to 

receive a certain level of scheduled air service. Special provisions 

guaranteed service to Alaskan communities. In general, the act guaranteed 

continued service by authorizing DOT to require carriers to continue 

providing service at these communities. If an air carrier could not continue 

that service without incurring a loss, DOT could then use EAS funds to 

award that carrier a subsidy. Subsidies are to cover the difference between 

a carrier’s projected revenues and expenses and to provide a minimum 

amount of profit. Under the Airline Deregulation Act, the EAS program 

was intended to sunset, or end, after 10 years. In 1987, the Congress 

extended the program for another 10 years, and in 1998, it eliminated the 

sunset provision, thereby permanently authorizing EAS. 

To be eligible for subsidized service, a community must meet three general 

requirements. It must have received scheduled commercial passenger 

 23GAO-03-729T. 

DOT’s Essential Air 

Service Program 

Faces Possible 

Program 

Modifications Due to 

Changing Conditions 
Page 22 GAO-03-1040T 

service as of October 1978, may be no closer than 70 highway miles to a 

medium- or large-hub airport, and must require a subsidy of less than $200 

per person (unless the community is more than 210 highway miles from 

the nearest medium- or large-hub airport, in which case no average perpassenger dollar limit applies). 24

Funding for the EAS program comes from a combination of permanent 

and annual appropriations. Part of its funding comes from the Federal 

Aviation Reauthorization Act of 1996 (P.L. 104-264), which authorized the 

collection of user fees for services provided by the Federal Aviation 

Administration (FAA) to aircraft that neither take off nor land in the 

United States, commonly known as overflight fees. The act also 

permanently appropriated the first $50 million of such fees for EAS and 

safety projects at rural airports. In fiscal year 2003, total EAS program 

appropriations were $113 million. 

As the airline industry has evolved since the industry was deregulated in 

1978, the EAS program has faced increasing challenges to remain viable. 

Since fiscal year 1995, the program’s costs have tripled, rising from $37 

million to $113 million, and they are likely to continue escalating. Several 

factors are likely to affect future subsidy requirements. First, carriers’ 

operating costs have increased over time, in part because of the costs 

associated with meeting federal safety regulations for small aircraft 

beginning in 1996. Second, carriers’ revenues have been limited because 

many individuals traveling to or from EAS-subsidized communities choose 

not to fly from the local airport, but rather to use other larger nearby 

airports, which generally offer more service at lower airfares. On average, 

in 2000, each EAS flight operated with just over 3 passengers. 

Finally, the number of communities eligible for EAS subsidies has 

increased over time, rising from a total of 106 in 1995 to 114 in July 2002 

(79 in the continental United States and 35 in Alaska, Hawaii, and Puerto 

Rico) and again to 133 in April 2003 (96 in the continental United States 

 24The nation’s commercial airports are categorized into four main groupings based on the 

number of passengers boarding an aircraft (enplaned) for all operations of U.S. carriers in 

the United States. A nonhub has less than 0.05 percent of the total annual passenger 

enplanements in the United States in any given year. A small hub has at least 0.05 percent, 

but less than 0.25 percent, of total enplanements. A medium hub has at least 0.25 percent 

and less than 1.0 percent of total U.S. enplanements, and a large hub has 1.0 percent or 

more of total U.S. enplanements. These definitions are contained in statute. 

Challenges 
Page 23 GAO-03-1040T 

and 37 in Alaska, Hawaii, and Puerto Rico). The number of subsidy-eligible 

communities may continue to grow in the near term. Figure 4 shows the 

increase in the number of communities eligible for EAS-subsidized service 

between 1995 and April 2003. 

Figure 4: Increase in EAS-Subsidized Communities between 1995 and April 2003 

Note: Data for April 2003 show the number of communities receiving EAS-subsidized service and 

those where proposed subsidies are under negotiation. 

Over the past year, the Congress, the administration, and we have each 

identified a number of potential strategies generally aimed at enhancing 

the EAS program’s long-term sustainability. These strategies broadly 

address challenges related to the carriers’ cost of providing service and the 

passenger traffic and revenue that carriers can hope to accrue. 

In August 2002, in response to a congressional mandate, we identified and 

evaluated four major categories of options to enhance the long-term 

Strategies 
Page 24 GAO-03-1040T 

viability of the EAS program.25 In no particular order, the options we 

identified were as follows: 

• Better match capacity with community use by increasing the use of 

smaller (i.e., less costly) aircraft and restricting little-used flight 

frequencies. 

• Target subsidized service to more remote communities (i.e., those where 

passengers are less likely to drive to another airport) by changing 

eligibility criteria. 

• Consolidate service to multiple communities into regional airports. 

• Change the form of the federal assistance from carrier subsidies to local 

grants that would allow local communities to match their transportation 

needs with individually tailored transportation options. 

Each of these options could have positive and negative effects, such as 

lowering the program’s costs but possibly adversely affecting the 

economies of the communities that would lose some or all of their direct 

scheduled airline service. 

This year’s House-passed version of the FAA reauthorization bill, H.R. 

2115, also includes various options to restructure air service to small 

communities now served by the EAS program. The bill proposes an 

alternative program (the “community and regional choice program”), 

which would allow communities to opt out of the EAS program and 

receive a grant that they could use to establish and pay for their own 

service, whether scheduled air service, air taxi service, surface 

transportation, or another alternative. 

The complementary Senate FAA reauthorization bill (also H.R. 2115) also 

includes specific provisions designed to restructure the EAS program. This 

bill would set aside some funds for air service marketing to try to attract 

passengers and create a grant program under which up to 10 individual 

communities or a consortium of communities could opt out of the existing 

EAS program and try alternative approaches to improving air service. In 

addition, the bill would preclude DOT from terminating, before the end of 

 25U.S. General Accounting Office, Options to Enhance the Long-term Viability of the 

Essential Air Service Program, GAO-02-997R (Washington, D.C.: Aug. 30, 2002). 
Page 25 GAO-03-1040T 

2004, a community’s eligibility for an EAS subsidy because of decreased 

passenger ridership and revenue. 

The administration’s proposal would generally restrict appropriations to 

the $50 million from overflight fees and would require communities to help 

pay the costs of funding their service. The proposal would also allow 

communities to fund transportation options other than scheduled air 

service, such as on-demand “air taxis” or ground transportation. 

Mr. Chairman, this concludes my prepared statement. I would be pleased 

to answer any questions you or other members of the Committee may 

have. 

For future contacts regarding this testimony, please contact JayEtta 

Hecker at (202) 512-2834. Individuals making key contributions to this 

testimony included Robert Ciszewski, Steven Cohen, Elizabeth Eisenstadt, 

Rita Grieco, Steven Martin, Katherine Siggerud, Glen Trochelman, and 

Alwynne Wilbur. 

Contact and 

Acknowledgments 
Page 26 GAO-03-1040T 

Federal-Aid Highways: Cost and Oversight of Major Highway and 

Bridge Projects—Issues and Options. GAO-03-764T. Washington, D.C.: 

May 8, 2003. 

Transportation Infrastructure Cost and Oversight Issues on Major 

Highway and Bridge Projects. GAO-02-673. Washington, D.C.: May 1, 

2002. 

Surface Infrastructure: Costs, Financing, and Schedules for Large-Dollar 

Transportation Projects. GAO/RCED-98-64. Washington, D.C.: February 

12, 1998. 

DOT’s Budget: Management and Performance Issues Facing the 

Department in Fiscal Year 1999. GAO/T-RCED/AIMD-98-76. Washington, 

D.C.: February 12, 1998. 

Transportation Infrastructure: Managing the Costs of Large-Dollar 

Highway Projects. GAO/RCED-97-27. Washington, D.C.: February 27, 1997. 

Transportation Infrastructure: Progress on and Challenges to Central 

Artery/Tunnel Project’s Costs and Financing. GAO/RCED-97-170. 

Washington, D.C.: July 17, 1997. 

Transportation Infrastructure: Central Artery/Tunnel Project Faces 

Financial Uncertainties. GAO/RCED-96-1313. Washington, D.C.: May 10, 

1996. 

Central Artery/Tunnel Project. GAO/RCED-95-213R. Washington, D.C.: 

June 2, 1995. 

Highway Safety: Research Continues on a Variety of Factors That 

Contribute to Motor Vehicle Crashes. GAO-03-436. Washington, D.C.: 

March 31, 2003. 

Highway Safety: Better Guidance Could Improve Oversight of State 

Highway Safety Programs. GAO-03-474. Washington, D.C.: April 21, 2003. 

Highway Safety: Factors Contributing to Traffic Crashes and NHTSA’s 

Efforts to Address Them. GAO-03-730T. Washington, D.C.: May 22, 2003. 

Appendix 1: Related GAO Products 

Federal-Aid Highways 

Highway Safety 
Page 27 GAO-03-1040T 

Federal Transit Administration: Bus Rapid Transit Offers 

Communities a Flexible Mass Transit Option. GAO-03-729T. Washington, 

D.C.: June 24, 2003. 

Mass Transit: FTA Needs to Provide Clear Information and Additional 

Guidance on the New Starts Ratings Process. GAO-03-701. Washington, 

D.C.: June 23, 2003. 

Mass Transit: FTA’s New Starts Commitments for Fiscal Year 2003. 

GAO-02-603. Washington, D.C.: April 30, 2002. 

Mass Transit: FTA Could Relieve New Starts Program Funding 

Constraints. GAO-01-987. Washington, D.C.: August 15, 2001. 

Mass Transit: Project Management Oversight Benefits and Future 

Funding Requirements. GAO/RCED-99-240. Washington, D.C.: August 19, 

1999. 

Mass Transit: Implementation of FTA’s New Starts Evaluation Process 

and FY 2001 Funding Proposals. GAO/RCED-00-149. Washington, D.C.: 

April 28, 2000. 

Mass Transit: Challenges in Evaluating, Overseeing, and Funding Major 

Transit Projects. GAO/T-RCED-00-104. Washington, DC: Mar. 8, 2000. 

Mass Transit: Status of New Starts Transit Projects With Full Funding 

Grant Agreements, GAO/RCED-99-240. Washington, D.C.: Aug. 19, 1999. 

Mass Transit: FTA’s Progress in Developing and Implementing a New 

Starts Evaluation Process. GAO/RCED-99-113. Washington, D.C.: April 26, 

1999. 

Commercial Aviation: Issues Regarding Federal Assistance for 

Enhancing Air Service to Small Communities. GAO-03-540T. 

Washington, D.C.: March 11, 2003. 

Commercial Aviation: Factors Affecting Efforts to Improve Air Service 

at Small Community Airports. GAO-03-330. Washington, D.C.: January 17, 

2003. 

Commercial Aviation: Financial Condition and Industry Responses 

Affect Competition. GAO-03-171T. Washington, D.C.: October 2, 2002. 

Mass Transit 

Essential Air Service 
Page 28 GAO-03-1040T 

Options to Enhance the Long-term Viability of the Essential Air Service 

Program. GAO-02-997R. Washington, D.C.: Aug. 30, 2002. 

Commercial Aviation: Air Service Trends at Small Communities Since 

October 2000. GAO-02-432. Washington, D.C.: August 30, 2002. 

Essential Air Service: Changes in Passenger Traffic, Subsidy Levels, and 

Air Carrier Costs. T-RCED-00-185. Washington, D.C.: May 25, 2000. 

Essential Air Service: Changes in Subsidy Levels, Air Carrier Costs, and 

Passenger Traffic. RCED-00-34. Washington, D.C.: April 14, 2000. 

(544079) 
This is a work of the U.S. government and is not subject to copyright protection in the 

United States. It may be reproduced and distributed in its entirety without further 

permission from GAO. However, because this work may contain copyrighted images or 

other material, permission from the copyright holder may be necessary if you wish to 

reproduce this material separately. 
The General Accounting Office, the audit, evaluation and investigative arm of 

Congress, exists to support Congress in meeting its constitutional responsibilities 

and to help improve the performance and accountability of the federal 

government for the American people. GAO examines the use of public funds; 

evaluates federal programs and policies; and provides analyses, 

recommendations, and other assistance to help Congress make informed 

oversight, policy, and funding decisions. GAO’s commitment to good government 

is reflected in its core values of accountability, integrity, and reliability. 

The fastest and easiest way to obtain copies of GAO documents at no cost is 

through the Internet. GAO’s Web site (www.gao.gov) contains abstracts and fulltext files of current reports and testimony and an expanding archive of older 

products. The Web site features a search engine to help you locate documents 

using key words and phrases. You can print these documents in their entirety, 

including charts and other graphics. 

Each day, GAO issues a list of newly released reports, testimony, and 

correspondence. GAO posts this list, known as “Today’s Reports,” on its Web site 

daily. The list contains links to the full-text document files. To have GAO e-mail 

this list to you every afternoon, go to www.gao.gov and select “Subscribe to e-mail 

alerts” under the “Order GAO Products” heading. 

The first copy of each printed report is free. Additional copies are $2 each. A 

check or money order should be made out to the Superintendent of Documents. 

GAO also accepts VISA and Mastercard. Orders for 100 or more copies mailed to a 

single address are discounted 25 percent. Orders should be sent to: 

U.S. General Accounting Office 

441 G Street NW, Room LM 

Washington, D.C. 20548 

To order by Phone: Voice: (202) 512-6000 

TDD: (202) 512-2537 

Fax: (202) 512-6061 

Contact: 

Web site: www.gao.gov/fraudnet/fraudnet.htm 

E-mail: fraudnet@gao.gov

Automated answering system: (800) 424-5454 or (202) 512-7470 

Jeff Nelligan, Managing Director, NelliganJ@gao.gov (202) 512-4800 

U.S. General Accounting Office, 441 G Street NW, Room 7149 

Washington, D.C. 20548 

GAO’s Mission 

Obtaining Copies of 

GAO Reports and 

Testimony 

Order by Mail or Phone 

To Report Fraud, 

Waste, and Abuse in 

Federal Programs 

Public Affairs