* Pursuant to Local Rule 47.5, the court has determined that

this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except

under the limited circumstances set forth in Local Rule 47.5.4. UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

__________________

No. 95-60627

Summary Calendar

__________________

JOHN S. JORDAN,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

versus

MIKE MOORE, Attorney General of

the State of Mississippi; RAYMOND ROBERTS,

Superintendent, Mississippi State

Penitentiary,

Defendants-Appellees.

______________________________________________

Appeal from the United States District Court for the

Northern District of Mississippi

(1:91-CV-130-S-D)

______________________________________________

July 3, 1996

Before SMITH, BENAVIDES, and DENNIS, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM: *

John S. Jordan appeals from the district court's denial of his

motion for a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254.

Jordan argues that his attorney denied him the right to testify1 A more detailed procedural histo ry may be found in this

Court's earlier decision. S ee Jordan v. Hargett

, 34 F.3d 310 (5th

Cir. 1994), vacated and remanded , 53 F.3d 94 (5th Cir. 1995).

2 during his state court trial for rape. 1 A defendant in a criminal

proceeding has a fundamental constitutional right to testify in his

or her own defense. Rock v. Arkansas , 483 U.S. 44, 49-53, 107 S.

Ct. 2704, 2708-10, 97 L. Ed.2d 37 (1987). During an evidentiary

hearing before the district court, Jordan's attorney, Donald

Steighner, testified that Jordan wanted to take the stand, but that

he advised against it and Jordan ultimately decided that it would

not be in his best interest to take t he stand. Although Jordan,

his wife, and h is daughter disputed this testimony, the district

court c r edited Steighner's testimony that Jordan accepted his

advice not to testify. We will not disturb that determination on

appeal. The assessment of the credibility of the witnesses is

peculiarly within the province of the district court, and will not

be lightly disturbed. S ee United States v. Casteneda

, 951 F.2d 44,

48 (5th Cir. 1992). Because Steighner's testimony was not

unbelievable, we conclude that the district court did not clearly

err in finding that Jordan accepted his attorney's recommendation

that he not testify.

Having knowingly and voluntarily waived his right to testify,

Jordan will not be heard to complain on appeal that the trial court

or his defense counsel had to specifically establish in the trialcourt record his knowing and voluntary waiver . Although the

controversy over whether a defendant waived his right to testify2 It is obvious that Steighner was aware of the conviction and

that a fair opportunity to contest its use was afforded to Jordan

bec ause Steighner filed a motion in limine that prevented the

prosecution from introducing evidence of the conviction. The

district court granted the motion in part, but noted that at some

point the conviction might become relevant.

3 could be easily avoided if counsel would obtain a signed waiver

from the defendant or the trial court would procure the defendant's

waiver on the record, this practice is not currently required in

this circuit.

Jordan also asserts that even if h e did waive his

constitutional right to testify, such waiver was not voluntary

because it was based upon his attorney's erroneous legal ad vice.

See Jordan v. Hargett

, 34 F.3d 310, 312 (5th Cir. 1994) (waiver of

the right to testify must be knowing, voluntary, and intelligent).

He asserts that one of the considerations in his decision not to

testify was based on the possibility that a conviction more than

ten years old would be received into evidence. He argues that his

attorney, Steighner was unaware that Mississippi law requires that

"the proponent give[] to the adverse party sufficient advance

written notice of intent to use such evidence to provide the

adverse party with a fair opportunity to contest the use of such

evidence." Miss. R. Evid. 609(b).

Contrary to Jordan's assertion that his consent was not

informed and voluntary based on Steighner's unawareness of the Rule

609(b) written notice requirement, 2 a review of the record reveals

that the conviction was only one of several concerns that prompted4

Steighner to advise Jordan against testifying. Steighner testified

during the evidentiary he aring that he was worried if Jordan

testified, "his forcefulness in denying this incident and anything

like it in his life would open doors to the prosecution of farr anging potential for damage." Specifically, Steighner was

concerned that Jo rdan might testify about extraneous offenses or

other matters that would make the convictio n admissible.

Furthermore, Jordan wanted to deny pending charges that he molested

his granddaughter. Steighner was also concerned that if Jordan

testified, the State would offer his daughter as a rebuttal

witness. His daughter, the mother of the child he was accused of

molesti ng in another county, was a "voracious opponent" of

Jordan's, and would have presented damaging testimo ny not only

about Jordan's sexual assault of his granddaughter, but also about

the sexual molestation she had suffered at the hands of Jordan.

Steighner communicated all of these various concerns with Jordan in

advising him not to testify.

Given that Steighner offered several valid reasons for his

decision to advise Jordan against testifying, we conclude that the

district court did not err in finding that Jordan's waiver of his

constitutional right to testify was knowing and voluntary.

AFFIRMED.