J-S64044-18

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA

v.

SHAWN T. WALKER, 

Appellant.

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 IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

 PENNSYLVANIA

 No. 3379 EDA 2017

Appeal from the PCRA Order, September 15, 2017,

in the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County,

Criminal Division at No(s): CP-51-CR-0527701-1991.

BEFORE: BOWES, J., OLSON, J., and KUNSELMAN, J.

MEMORANDUM BY KUNSELMAN, J.: FILED JANUARY 24, 2019

Shawn T. Walker appeals from the order denying his second petition for 

post-conviction relief filed pursuant to the Post Conviction Relief Act (“PCRA”). 

42 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 9541-46. We affirm.

The pertinent facts and procedural history have been summarized as 

follows:

On April 23, 1991, [Walker] forcibly entered the home of 

his former girlfriend, Lisa Johnson, shot and killed a man 

sleeping on the couch, and shot and permanently disabled 

Ms. Johnson. The man sleeping on the couch was Ricardo 

Thomas, a friend of Ms. Johnson’s, who offered to spend the 

night at her home; Ms. Johnson was fearful because 

[Walker] had struck her in the face earlier that day when 

she refused to have sex with him, and then he harassed her 

by phone all evening, demanding to speak to her new 

boyfriend, Tracy “Denzell” Brown. When Mr. Brown left Ms. 

Johnson’s home in the middle of the night, he noticed a car 

parked around the block, later identified as [Walker’s] car. 
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After waiting in his car for about an hour, [Walker] broke 

into Ms. Johnson’s home and shot her and Mr. Thomas.

[Walker] then took numerous pills and admitted himself 

to the hospital for stomach pain. After [Walker] was treated 

and about to be discharged, police spoke with him, told him 

they wanted to question him regarding the shooting, and 

asked him if he would come to headquarters, emphasizing 

that he was not required to come with them. [Walker] 

agreed to go with the officers, and was transported to the 

station without handcuffs. At the station, after waiving his 

rights, [Walker] confessed he had broken in and shot the 

victims, neither of whom were armed; however, at trial, he 

claimed self-defense, testifying that when he entered Ms. 

Johnson’s home, “her and some guy was on the couch, they 

was hugged up.” [Walker] claimed that as he turned to 

leave, the man got up, punched him, and reached for a gun 

in his waistband, so [Walker] reached for his own gun and 

shot him in self-defense. According to [Walker], the police 

fabricated the portions of his statement that were 

contradicted by his trial testimony.

The jury convicted [Walker] of first-degree murder. At 

[the conclusion of] the penalty phase, the jury . . . 

sentenced [Walker] to death. 

[Walker] received new counsel and filed a direct appeal, 

claiming, inter alia, the killing constituted, at most, 

voluntary manslaughter because he killed the victim in the 

heat of passion; the verdict was against the weight of the 

evidence because the Commonwealth failed to prove Walker 

possessed malice or specific intent to kill because the killing 

resulted from his mistaken belief he was defending himself; 

and trial counsel was ineffective for failing to object to 

evidence of [Walker’s] prior bad acts. This Court affirmed, 

finding [Walker’s] claims meritless, Commonwealth v. 

Walker, 540 Pa. 80, 656 A.2d 90 (1995), and the United 

States Supreme Court denied certiorari. Walker v. 

Pennsylvania, 516 U.S. 854, 116 S.Ct. 156, 133 L.Ed.2d 

100 (1995).

[Walker] filed a timely pro se PCRA petition and received 

new counsel, who filed an amended petition, raising 

numerous claims of trial court error and trial counsel’s 

ineffectiveness. The PCRA court granted a hearing on the 
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sole issue of whether trial counsel was ineffective at the 

penalty phase for failing to adequately investigate and 

present specific mitigation evidence. Before the hearings 

were concluded, however, the presiding judge died, and the 

petition was reassigned to another judge. After several 

appointments of new counsel due to [Walker’s] repeated 

expression of dissatisfaction with each attorney, additional 

hearings were held. The PCRA court concluded [Walker’s] 

penalty phase ineffectiveness claim entitled him to relief, 

and ordered a new penalty phase; the court denied all other 

relief. [Walker] appealed from the denial of his guilt phase 

claims.

Commonwealth v. Walker, 36 A.3d 1, 4-5 (Pa. 2011) (footnotes omitted).

1

Walker raised four guilt-phase claims on appeal, including whether the 

Commonwealth violated due process (“Brady claim”) by failing to disclose Mr. 

Thomas’ criminal record to the defense.2 The PCRA court had rejected 

Walker’s Brady claim because Mr. Thomas had an arrest but no convictions, 

and Walker failed to allege that he was aware of the arrest. Our Supreme 

Court agreed, and held further that even if Walker had known of Mr. Thomas’ 

arrest record, such knowledge would not have supported his self-defense 

claim, given the “overwhelming evidence that the murder was deliberate and 

premeditated.” Walker, 36 A.3d at 10. Finding no merit to any other claim, 

the Court affirmed the denial of post-conviction relief.

On July 1, 2016, Walker filed a second pro se PCRA petition, in which he 

again alleged that the Commonwealth violated Brady by not producing the 

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1 Walker’s sentence was later reduced from death to a term of life 

imprisonment.

2 Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 393 (1963).
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victim’s arrest record. On October 24, 2016, Walker filed a supplemental 

petition, citing Dennis v. Secretary, Pennsylvania Department of 

Corrections, 834 F.3d 263 (3d Cir. 2016) (en banc) to support his Brady

claim. The PCRA court appointed counsel, who, on July 12, 2017, filed a 

petition to withdraw and “no-merit” letter pursuant to the dictates of

Commonwealth v. Turner, 544 A.2d 927 (Pa. 1988), and Commonwealth 

v. Finley, 550 A.2d 213 (Pa. Super. 1988)(en banc), because Walker’s Brady 

claim was previously litigated in Walker’s first PCRA and time-barred. 

Thereafter, the PCRA court issued a Pa.R.Crim.P. 907 notice of its intention to 

dismiss Walker’s petition without a hearing. Walker filed a response to both 

this Rule 907 notice as well as PCRA counsel’s Turner/Finley letter. By order 

entered September 15, 2017, the PCRA court denied Walker’s PCRA petition. 

This timely appeal followed. Both Walker and the PCRA court have complied 

with Pa.R.A.P. 1925.

This Court’s standard of review regarding an order dismissing a petition 

under the PCRA is whether the determination of the PCRA court is supported 

by the evidence of record and is free of legal error. Commonwealth v. 

Halley, 870 A.2d 795, 799 n.2 (Pa. 2005). The PCRA court’s findings will not 

be disturbed unless there is no support for the findings in the certified record. 

Commonwealth v. Carr, 768 A.2d 1164, 1166 (Pa. Super. 2001). Moreover, 

a PCRA court may decline to hold a hearing on the petition if the PCRA court 

determines that the petitioner’s claim is patently frivolous and is without a 
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trace of support in either the record or from other evidence. Commonwealth 

v. Jordan, 772 A.2d 1011, 1104 (Pa. Super. 2001).

Before addressing the claims Walker raises on appeal, we must first 

determine whether the PCRA court correctly concluded that Walker’s PCRA

petition is untimely. 

The timeliness of a post-conviction petition is jurisdictional. 

Commonwealth v. Hernandez, 79 A.3d 649, 651 (Pa. Super. 2013). 

Generally, a petition for relief under the PCRA, including a second or 

subsequent petition, must be filed within one year of the date the judgment 

is final unless the petition alleges, and the petitioner proves, that an exception 

to the time for filing the petition, set forth at 42 Pa.C.S.A. sections 

9545(b)(1)(i), (ii), and (iii), is met.3 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9545. A PCRA petition 

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3 The exceptions to the timeliness requirement are:

(i) the failure to raise the claim previously was the result of 

interference of government officials with the presentation of the 

claim in violation of the Constitution or laws of this Commonwealth 

or the Constitution or laws of the United States.

(ii) the facts upon which the claim is predicated were unknown to 

the petitioner and could not have been ascertained by the exercise 

of due diligence; or

(iii) the right asserted is a constitutional right that was recognized 

by the Supreme Court of the United States or the Supreme Court 

of Pennsylvania after the time period provided in this section and 

has been held by that court to apply retroactively.

42 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 9545(b)(1)(i), (ii), and (iii).

 
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invoking one of these statutory exceptions must “be filed within 60 days of 

the date the claims could have been presented.” See Hernandez, 79 A.3d 

651-52 (citations omitted); see also 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9545(b)(2). Finally, 

exceptions to the PCRA’s time bar must be pled in the petition, and may not 

be raised for the first time on appeal. Commonwealth v. Burton, 936 A.2d 

521, 525 (Pa. Super. 2007); see also Pa.R.A.P. 302(a) (providing that issues 

not raised before the lower court are waived and cannot be raised for the first 

time on appeal).

Here, Walker’s judgment of sentence became final on October 2, 1995, 

when the United States Supreme Court denied his writ of certiorari. See 42 

Pa.C.S.A. § 9545(b)(3). Because Walker filed his second PCRA petition over 

twenty years later, it is patently untimely, unless Walker satisfied his burden 

of pleading and proving that one of the enumerated exceptions applies. See

Hernandez, supra.

Walker has failed to establish any exception to the PCRA’s time bar. 

Walker did not explicitly raise a time-bar exception in his original filing, 

although he did reference Weary v. Cain, 136 S.Ct. 1002 (2016), a recent 

U.S. Supreme Court case, which, according to Walker, establishes that 

Pennsylvania precedent had misapplied the high court’s decision in Brady, 

supra. In his supplemental petition Walker asserted that he satisfied the 

PCRA’s time-bar exception regarding a “newly-recognized constitutional right” 
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found at subsection 9545(b)(1)(iii), based upon “the Third Circuit precedential 

decision in [Dennis, supra].” Walker’s Brief at 3.

Initially, the PCRA court found that Walker’s original petition based on 

Weary was untimely because it was “filed almost four months after [the 

Weary] decision, and [Weary] did not create a newly recognized 

retroactive constitutional right.” PCRA Court Opinion, 12/13/17 at 7. 

Moreover, the PCRA court found Walker’s reliance upon Dennis to be 

misplaced. As the PCRA court noted, Dennis “is not a decision of either the 

Supreme Court of the United States or that of Pennsylvania, nor one that 

created a newly recognized retroactive constitutional right.” PCRA Court 

Opinion, 12/13/17, at 2. 

As cogently recognized by the PCRA Court, Walker’s “citations to Dennis 

and Weary were his attempts to make it sound like the Federal Courts have 

changed the constitutional law principles that were applied by our Supreme 

Court in his previous [PCRA] appeal.” PCRA Court Opinion, 12/13/17, at 8. 

Our review supports the PCRA court’s conclusion. Thus, the PCRA court 

correctly held that Walker’s second PCRA was untimely, and Walker has not 

established any time-bar exception. We therefore affirm its order denying 

post-conviction relief.

Order affirmed.
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Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 1/24/19