A NATIONAL

SECURITY

STRATEGY

FOR A

NEW CENTURY

THE WHITE HOUSE

DECEMBER 1999
iii

Preface

Nearly 55 years ago, in his final inaugural

address, President Franklin Delano Roosevelt

reflected on the lessons of the first half of the

20th Century. "We have learned,” he said, “that

we cannot live alone at peace. We have learned

that our own well being is dependent on the well

being of other nations far away. We have

learned to be citizens of the world, members of

the human community."

Those words have more resonance than ever as

we enter the 21st century. America is at the

height of its influence and prosperity. But, at a

time of rapid globalization, when events halfway

around the earth can profoundly affect our safety

and prosperity, America must lead in the world

to protect our people at home and our way of

life. Americans benefit when nations come

together to deter aggression and terrorism, to

resolve conflicts, to prevent the spread of

dangerous weapons, to promote democracy and

human rights, to open markets and create

financial stability, to raise living standards, to

protect the environment – to face challenges

that no nation can meet alone. The United

States remains the world’s most powerful force

for peace, prosperity and the universal values of

democracy and freedom. Our nation’s central

challenge – and our responsibility – is to sustain

that role by seizing the opportunities of this new

global era for the benefit of our own people and

people around the world.

To do that, we are pursuing a forward-looking

national security strategy for the new century.

This report, submitted in accordance with

Section 603 of the Goldwater - Nichols Defense

Department Reorganization Act of 1986, sets

forth that strategy. Its three core objectives are:

• To enhance America’s security.

• To bolster America’s economic prosperity.

• To promote democracy and human rights

abroad.

The United States must have the tools necessary

to carry out this strategy. We have worked to

preserve and enhance the readiness of our

armed forces while pursuing long-term

modernization and providing quality of life

improvements for our men and women in

uniform. To better meet readiness challenges, I

proposed, and Congress passed, a fiscal year

2000 defense budget that increased military pay

and retirement benefits, and significantly

increased funding for readiness and

modernization. I have also proposed a $112

billion increase across fiscal years 2000 to 2005

for readiness, modernization, and other high

priority defense requirements. This is the first

long-term sustained increase in defense

spending in over a decade.

Over the last six months, our military leaders

and I have seen encouraging signs that we have

turned the corner on readiness. Although our

Armed Forces still face readiness challenges,

particularly in recruiting and retaining skilled

individuals, Administration initiatives are helping

us achieve our readiness goals. I am confident

that our military is – and will continue to be –

capable of carrying out our national strategy and

meeting America's defense commitments

around the world.

To be secure, we must not only have a strong

military; we must also continue to lead in limiting

the military threat to our country and the world.

We continue to work vigilantly to curb the spread

of nuclear, chemical and biological weapons and

missiles to deliver them. We are continuing the

START process to reduce Russian and

American nuclear arsenals, while discussing

modification of the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty to

allow for development of a national missile

defense against potential rogue state attacks.

And we remain committed to obtaining Senate

advice and consent to ratification of the

Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty

(CTBT), and to bringing this crucial agreement

into force.
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We must also sustain our commitment to

America’s diplomacy. Every dollar we devote to

preventing conflicts, promoting democracy,

opening markets, and containing disease and

hunger brings a sure return in security and longterm savings. Working with Congress, we were

able to provide enhanced funding to international

affairs accounts and UN arrears, but we need to

sustain this commitment to foreign affairs in the

years ahead.

America must be willing to act alone when our

interests demand it, but we should also support

the institutions and arrangements through which

other countries help us bear the burdens of

leadership. That's why I am pleased that we

reached agreement with Congress on a plan for

paying our dues and debts to the United Nations.

It is why we must do our part when others take

the lead in building peace: whether Europeans

in the Balkans, Asians in East Timor, or Africans

in Sierra Leone. Otherwise we will be left with a

choice in future crises between doing everything

ourselves or doing nothing at all.

America has done much over the past seven

years to build a better world: aiding the

remarkable transitions to free-market democracy

in Eastern Europe; adapting and enlarging

NATO to strengthen Europe’s security; ending

ethnic war in Bosnia and Kosovo; working with

Russia to deactivate thousands of nuclear

weapons from the former Soviet Union; ratifying

START II and the Chemical Weapons

Convention; negotiating the CTBT, and the

Adaptation Agreement on the Conventional

Armed Forces in Europe (CFE) Treaty; securing

a freeze in North Korean fissile material

production; facilitating milestone agreements in

the Middle East peace process; standing up to

the threat posed by Saddam Hussein; reducing

Africa’s debt through the Cologne Initiative and

the Heavily Indebted Poor Countries Initiative

(HIPC); helping to broker peace accords from

Northern Ireland to Sierra Leone to the PeruEcuador border; fostering unprecedented unity,

democracy and progress in the Western

Hemisphere; benefiting our economy by

reaching over 270 free trade agreements,

including the landmark accord to bring China

into the World Trade Organization; and

exercising global leadership to help save Mexico

from economic disaster and to reverse the Asian

financial crisis.

But our work is far from done. American

leadership will remain indispensable to further

important national interests in the coming year:

forging a lasting peace in the Middle East;

securing the peace in the Balkans and Northern

Ireland; helping Russia strengthen its economy

and fight corruption as it heads toward its first

democratic transfer of power; furthering arms

control through discussions with Russia on the

Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty and deeper

reductions in strategic nuclear weapons;

implementing China’s entry into the WTO and

other global institutions while promoting freedom

and human rights there; easing tensions

between India and Pakistan; building on hopeful

developments between Greece and Turkey to

make progress in the Aegean, particularly on

Cyprus; securing new energy routes from the

Caspian Sea that will allow newly independent

states in the Caucasus to prosper; supporting

democratic transitions from Nigeria to Indonesia;

helping Colombia defeat the drug traffickers who

threaten its democracy; fighting weapons

proliferation, terrorism and the nexus between

them; restraining North Korea's and Iran's

missile programs; maintaining vigilance against

Iraq and working to bring about a change in

regime; consolidating reforms to the world’s

financial architecture as the basis for sustained

economic growth; launching a new global trade

round; enacting legislation to promote trade with

Africa and the Caribbean; pressing ahead with

debt relief for countries fighting poverty and

embracing good government; reversing global

climate change; and protecting our oceans.

At this moment in history, the United States is

called upon to lead – to marshal the forces of

freedom and progress; to channel the energies

of the global economy into lasting prosperity; to

reinforce our democratic ideals and values; to

enhance American security and global peace.

We owe it to our children and grandchildren to

meet these challenges and build a better and

safer world.
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I. Introduction

Our national security strategy is designed to meet the

fundamental purposes set out in the preamble to the

Constitution:

 ...provide for the common defence, promote the

general Welfare, and secure the Blessings of

Liberty to ourselves and our Posterity,...

Since the founding of the nation, certain requirements

have remained constant. We must protect the lives

and personal safety of Americans, both at home and

abroad. We must maintain the sovereignty, political

freedom and independence of the United States, with

its values, institutions and territory intact. And, we

must promote the well-being and prosperity of the

nation and its people.

Opportunities and Challenges

The twenty-first Century will be an era of great

promise. Globalization – the process of accelerating

economic, technological, cultural and political

integration – is bringing citizens from all continents

closer together, allowing them to share ideas, goods

and information in an instant. A growing number of

nations around the world have embraced America’s

core values of democratic governance, free-market

economics and respect for fundamental human rights

and the rule of law, creating new opportunities to

promote peace, prosperity and cooperation among

nations. Many former adversaries now work with us

for common goals. The dynamism of the global

economy is transforming commerce, culture,

communications and global relations, creating new

jobs and opportunities for Americans.

Globalization, however, also brings risks. Outlaw

states and ethnic conflicts threaten regional stability

and progress in many important areas of the world.

Weapons of mass destruction (WMD), terrorism, drug

trafficking and other international crime are global

concerns that transcend national borders. Other

problems originating overseas – such as resource

depletion, rapid population growth, environmental

damage, new infectious diseases, pervasive

corruption, and uncontrolled refugee migration – have

increasingly important implications for American

security. Our workers and businesses will suffer if

the global economy is unstable or foreign markets

collapse or lock us out, and the highest domestic

environmental standards will not protect us

adequately if we cannot get others to achieve similar

standards. In short, our citizens have a direct and

increasing stake in the prosperity and stability of

other nations, in their support for international norms

and human rights, in their ability to combat

international crime, in their open markets, and in their

efforts to protect the environment.

National Interests

Since there are always many demands for U.S.

action, our national interests must be clear. These

interests fall into three categories. The first includes

vital interests—those of broad, overriding

importance to the survival, safety and vitality of our

nation. Among these are the physical security of our

territory and that of our allies, the safety of our

citizens, the economic well-being of our society, and

the protection of our critical infrastructures – including

energy, banking and finance, telecommunications,

transportation, water systems and emergency

services – from paralyzing attack. We will do what

we must to defend these interests, including, when

necessary and appropriate, using our military might

unilaterally and decisively.

The second category is important national

interests. These interests do not affect our national

survival, but they do affect our national well-being

and the character of the world in which we live.

Important national interests include, for example,

regions in which we have a sizable economic stake

or commitments to allies, protecting the global

environment from severe harm, and crises with a

potential to generate substantial and highly
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destabilizing refugee flows. Our efforts to halt the

flow of refugees from Haiti and restore democracy in

that country, our participation in NATO operations to

end the brutal conflicts and restore peace in Bosnia

and Kosovo, and our assistance to Asian allies and

friends supporting the transition in East Timor are

examples.

The third category is humanitarian and other

interests. In some circumstances our nation may act

because our values demand it. Examples include

responding to natural and manmade disasters;

promoting human rights and seeking to halt gross

violations of those rights; supporting democratization,

adherence to the rule of law and civilian control of the

military; assisting humanitarian demining; and

promoting sustainable development and

environmental protection. The spread of democracy

and respect for the rule of law helps to create a world

community that is more hospitable to U.S. values and

interests. Whenever possible, we seek to avert

humanitarian disasters and conflict through

diplomacy and cooperation with a wide range of

partners, including other governments, international

institutions and non-governmental organizations.

This may not only save lives, but also prevent crises

from getting worse and becoming a greater drain on

resources.

Threats to U.S. Interests

The security environment in which we live is dynamic

and uncertain, replete with a host of threats and

challenges that have the potential to grow more

deadly.

Regional or State-Centered Threats: A number of

states have the capabilities and the desire to threaten

our national interests through coercion or aggression.

They continue to threaten the sovereignty of their

neighbors, economic stability, and international

access to resources. In many cases, these states

are also actively improving their offensive

capabilities, including efforts to obtain or retain

nuclear, biological or chemical weapons and the

capabilities to deliver these weapons over long

distances.

Transnational threats: These are threats that do not

respect national borders and which often arise from

non-state actors, such as terrorists and criminal

organizations. They threaten U.S. interests, values

and citizens – in the United States and abroad.

Examples include terrorism, drug trafficking and other

international crime, illicit arms trafficking, uncontrolled

refugee migration, and trafficking in human beings,

particularly women and children. We also face

threats to critical national infrastructures, which

increasingly could take the form of a cyber-attack in

addition to physical attack or sabotage, and could

originate from terrorist or criminal groups as well as

hostile states.

Spread of dangerous technologies: Weapons of

mass destruction pose the greatest potential threat to

global stability and security. Proliferation of

advanced weapons and technologies threatens to

provide rogue states, terrorists and international

crime organizations with the means to inflict terrible

damage on the United States, our allies and U.S.

citizens and troops abroad.

Failed states: At times in the new century, we can

expect that, despite international prevention efforts,

some states will be unable to provide basic

governance, safety and security, and opportunities

for their populations, potentially generating internal

conflict, mass migration, famine, epidemic diseases,

environmental disasters, mass killings and

aggression against neighboring states or ethnic

groups – events which can threaten regional security

and U.S. interests.

Other states – though possessing the capacity to

govern – may succumb to the inflammatory rhetoric

of demagogues who blame their nation’s ills on and

persecute specific religious, cultural, racial or tribal

groups. States that fail to respect the rights of their

own citizens and tolerate or actively engage in

human rights abuses, ethnic cleansing or acts of

genocide not only harm their own people, but can

spark civil wars and refugee crises and spill across

national boundaries to destabilize a region.

Foreign intelligence collection: The threat from

foreign intelligence services is more diverse, complex

and difficult to counter than ever before. This threat

is a mix of traditional and non-traditional intelligence

adversaries that have targeted American military,

diplomatic, technological, economic and commercial

secrets. Some foreign intelligence services are

rapidly adopting new technologies and innovative

methods to obtain such secrets, including attempts to

use the global information infrastructure to gain

access to sensitive information via penetration of
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computer systems and networks. We must be

concerned about efforts by non-state actors,

including legitimate organizations, both quasigovernmental and private, and illicit international

criminal organizations, to penetrate and subvert

government institutions or critical sectors of our

economy.

Environmental and health threats: Environmental

and health problems can undermine the welfare of

U.S. citizens, and compromise our national security,

economic and humanitarian interests abroad for

generations. These threats respect no national

boundary. History has shown that international

epidemics, such as polio, tuberculosis and AIDS, can

destroy human life on a scale as great as any war or

terrorist act we have seen, and the resulting burden

on health systems can undermine hard-won

advances in economic and social development and

contribute to the failure of fledgling democracies. In

the future, we face potentially even more devastating

threats if we fail to avert irreparable damage to

regional ecosystems and the global environment.

Other environmental issues, such as competition

over scarce fresh water resources, are a potential

threat to stability in several regions.

A Strategy of Engagement

Our strategy is founded on continued U.S.

engagement and leadership abroad. The United

States must lead abroad if we are to be secure at

home. We cannot lead abroad unless we devote the

necessary resources to military, diplomatic,

intelligence and other efforts. We must be prepared

and willing to use all appropriate instruments of

national power to influence the actions of other states

and non-state actors, to provide global leadership,

and to remain a reliable security partner for the

community of nations that share our interests. The

international community is at times reluctant to act

without American leadership. In some instances, the

United States is the only nation capable of providing

the necessary leadership and capabilities for an

international response to shared challenges. By

exerting our leadership abroad we have deterred

aggression, fostered the resolution of conflicts,

enhanced regional cooperation, strengthened

democracies, stopped human rights abuses, opened

foreign markets and tackled global problems such as

preventing the spread of weapons of mass

destruction, protected the environment, and

combated international corruption.

Our strategy has three core objectives: enhancing

American security; bolstering our economic

prosperity; and promoting democracy and human

rights abroad, which we strongly believe will, in turn,

advance the first two goals. Achieving these

objectives requires sustained, long-term effort. Many

of the threats to our national interests are persistent

or recurring – they cannot be resolved or eliminated

once and for all. American engagement must be

tempered by recognition that there are limits to

America’s involvement in the world, and that

decisions to commit resources must be weighed

against the need to sustain our engagement over the

long term. Our engagement therefore must be

selective, focusing on the threats and opportunities

most relevant to our interests and applying our

resources where we can make the greatest

difference. Additionally, sustaining our engagement

abroad over the long term will require the support of

the American people and the Congress to bear the

costs of defending U.S. interests – in dollars, effort

and, when necessary, with military force.

Implementing the Strategy

International cooperation will be vital for building

security in the next century because many of the

challenges we face cannot be addressed by a single

nation. Many of our security objectives are best

achieved – or can only be achieved – by leveraging

our influence and capabilities through international

organizations, our alliances, or as a leader of an ad

hoc coalition formed around a specific objective.

Leadership in the United Nations and other

international organizations, and durable relationships

with allies and friendly nations, are critical to our

security. A central thrust of our strategy is to

strengthen and adapt the formal relationships we

have with key nations around the world, create new

relationships and structures when necessary, and

enhance the capability of friendly nations to exercise

regional leadership in support of shared goals. At

other times, we seek to shape a favorable

international environment outside of formal structures

by building coalitions of like-minded nations. But we

must always be prepared to act alone when that is

our most advantageous course, or when we have no

alternative.
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Success requires an integrated approach that brings

to bear all the capabilities needed to achieve our

security objectives – particularly in this era when

domestic and foreign policies increasingly overlap.

To effectively shape the international environment

and respond to the full spectrum of potential threats,

our diplomacy, military force, other foreign policy

tools, and domestic preparedness efforts must be

closely coordinated. We will continue to strengthen

and integrate all of these capabilities.

At home, we must have effective capabilities for

thwarting and responding to terrorist acts, countering

international crime and foreign intelligence collection,

and protecting critical national infrastructures. Our

efforts to counter these threats require close

cooperation among Federal agencies, state and local

governments, the industries that own and operate

critical national infrastructures, non-governmental

organizations, and others in the private sector.

The Power of Our Values

Underpinning our international leadership is the

power of our democratic ideals and values. In

crafting our strategy, we recognize that the spread of

democracy, human rights and respect for the rule of

law not only reflects American values, it also

advances both our security and prosperity.

Democratic governments are more likely to cooperate

with each other against common threats, encourage

free trade, promote sustainable economic

development, uphold the rule of law, and protect the

rights of their people. Hence, the trend toward

democracy and free markets throughout the world

advances American interests. The United States will

support this trend by remaining actively engaged in

the world, bolstering democratic institutions and

building the community of like-minded states. This

strategy will take us into the next century.
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II. Advancing U.S. National Interests

In our vision of the world, the United States has close

cooperative relations with the world’s most influential

countries, and has the ability to shape the policies

and actions of those who can affect our national wellbeing. We seek to create a stable, peaceful

international security environment – one in which our

nation, citizens and interests are not threatened; the

health and well-being of our citizens are enhanced by

a cleaner global environment and effective strategies

to combat infectious disease; America continues to

prosper through increasingly open international

markets and sustainable growth in the global

economy; and democratic values and respect for

human rights and the rule of law are increasingly

accepted.

Enhancing Security at

Home and Abroad

Our strategy for enhancing U.S. security has three

components: shaping the international security

environment, responding to threats and crises, and

preparing for an uncertain future.

Shaping the International

Environment

The United States seeks to shape the international

environment through a variety of means, including

diplomacy, economic cooperation, international

assistance, arms control and nonproliferation, and

health initiatives. These activities enhance U.S.

security by promoting regional security; enhancing

economic progress; supporting military activities,

international law enforcement cooperation, and

environmental efforts; and preventing, reducing or

deterring the diverse threats we face today. These

measures adapt and strengthen alliances and

friendships, maintain U.S. influence in key regions,

and encourage adherence to international norms.

The U.S. intelligence community provides critical

support to the full range of our involvement abroad.

Comprehensive collection and analytic capabilities

are needed to provide warning of threats to U.S.

national security, give analytical support to the policy

and military communities, provide near-real time

intelligence while retaining global perspective, identify

opportunities for advancing our national interests,

and maintain our information advantage in the

international arena. We place the highest priority on

monitoring the most serious threats to U.S. security:

states hostile to the United States; countries or other

entities that possess strategic nuclear forces or

control nuclear weapons, other WMD or nuclear

fissile materials; transnational threats, including

terrorism, drug trafficking and other international

crime; potential regional conflicts that might affect

U.S. national security interests; and threats to U.S.

forces and citizens abroad.

Diplomacy

Diplomacy is a vital tool for countering threats to our

national security. The daily business of diplomacy

conducted through our missions and representatives

around the world is an irreplaceable shaping activity.

These efforts are essential to sustaining our

alliances, forcefully articulating U.S. interests,

resolving regional disputes peacefully, averting

humanitarian catastrophe, deterring aggression

against the United States and our friends and allies,

promoting international economic cooperation and

stability, fostering trade and investment opportunities,

and projecting U.S. influence worldwide.

When signs of potential conflict emerge or potential

threats appear, we take action to prevent or reduce

these threats. One of the lessons that repeatedly has

been driven home is the importance of preventive

diplomacy in dealing with conflict and complex

emergencies. Helping prevent nations from failing is

far more effective than rebuilding them after an

internal crisis. Helping people stay in their homes is
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far more beneficial than feeding and housing them in

refugee camps. Helping relief agencies and

international organizations strengthen the institutions

of conflict resolution is much better than healing

ethnic and social divisions that have already

exploded into bloodshed. In short, while crisis

management and crisis resolution are necessary

tasks for our foreign policy, preventive diplomacy is

far preferable.

We must renew our commitment to America’s

diplomacy to ensure we have the diplomatic

representation and voice in international

organizations that are required to support our global

interests. This is central to our ability to retain our

influence on international issues that affect our wellbeing. Our national security requires that we ensure

international organizations such as the United

Nations are as effective and relevant as possible.

We must, therefore, continue to work to ensure that

our financial obligations to international organizations

are met.

Preserving our leadership, influence and credibility in

the world demands that we maintain highly trained

and experienced personnel, a broad range of

capabilities for diplomacy and public diplomacy, and

a secure diplomatic infrastructure abroad.

Modernization of embassies, consulates and our

diplomatic telecommunications and information

infrastructure is essential to advancing and protecting

vital national interests overseas. Our embassies and

consulates host critical elements of peacetime power:

diplomatic personnel, commercial, defense and legal

attaches, and consular and security officers

dedicated to protecting Americans at home and

abroad. The cost of doing these things is a tiny

fraction of the costs of employing our military forces

to cope with crises that might have been averted

through collective international action.

Public Diplomacy

We have an obligation and opportunity to harness the

tools of public diplomacy to advance U.S. leadership

around the world by engaging international publics on

U.S. principles and policies. The global advance of

freedom and information technologies like the

Internet has increased the ability of citizens and

organizations to influence the policies of

governments to an unprecedented degree. This

makes our public diplomacy – efforts to transmit

information and messages to peoples around the

world – an increasingly vital component of our

national security strategy. Our programs enhance

our ability to inform and influence foreign publics in

support of U.S. national interests, and broaden the

dialogue between American citizens and U.S.

institutions and their counterparts abroad.

Effective use of our nation’s information capabilities

to counter misinformation and incitement, mitigate

inter-ethnic conflict, promote independent media

organizations and the free flow of information, and

support democratic participation helps advance U.S.

interests abroad. International Public Information

activities, as defined by the newly promulgated

Presidential Decision Directive 68 (PDD-68), are

designed to improve our capability to coordinate

independent public diplomacy, public affairs and

other national security information-related efforts to

ensure they are more successfully integrated into

foreign and national security policy making and

execution.

International Assistance

From the U.S.-led mobilization to rebuild post-war

Europe to more recent economic success stories

across Asia, Latin America and Africa, U.S. foreign

assistance has helped emerging democracies,

promoted respect for human rights and the rule of

law, expanded free markets, slowed the growth of

international crime, contained major health threats,

improved protection of the environment and natural

resources, slowed population growth, and defused

humanitarian crises. Crises are averted – and U.S.

preventive diplomacy actively reinforced – through

U.S. sustainable development programs that promote

the rights of workers, voluntary family planning, basic

education, environmental protection, democratic

governance, the rule of law, religious freedom, and

the economic empowerment of citizens.

Debt relief is an important element of our overall

effort to alleviate poverty, promote economic

development, and create stronger partners around

the world for trade and investment, security and

democracy. The Cologne Debt Initiative announced

at the 1999 G-8 summit, together with earlier debt

relief commitments, provides for reduction of up to 70

percent of the total debts for heavily indebted poor

countries. This will be a reduction from the current

level of about $127 billion to as low as $37 billion with
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the cancellation of official development assistance

debt by G-8 and other bilateral creditors.

The Cologne Debt Initiative also calls on international

financial institutions to develop a new framework for

linking debt relief with poverty reduction. These

measures center around better targeting of budgetary

resources for priority social expenditures, for health,

child survival, AIDS prevention, education, greater

transparency in government budgeting, and much

wider consultation with civil society in the

development and implementation of economic

programs. In September, President Clinton took our

debt relief efforts a step further. He directed the

Administration to make it possible to forgive 100

percent of the debt these countries owe to the United

States when the money is needed and will be used to

help them finance basic human needs.

When combined with other efforts, such as our

cooperative scientific and technological programs,

U.S. aid initiatives can help reduce the need for

costly military and humanitarian measures. When

assistance programs succeed in promoting

democracy and free markets, substantial growth of

American exports has usually followed. Where crises

have occurred, our assistance programs have helped

alleviate mass human suffering through targeted

relief. Other assistance programs have created a

path out of conflict and dislocation, helped to restore

elementary security and civic institutions, and

promoted political stability and economic recovery.

Arms Control and Nonproliferation

Arms control and nonproliferation initiatives are an

essential element of our national security strategy

and a critical complement to our efforts to defend our

nation through our own military strength. We pursue

verifiable arms control and nonproliferation

agreements that support our efforts to prevent the

spread and use of WMD, prevent the spread of

materials and expertise for producing WMD and the

means of delivering them, halt the use of

conventional weapons that cause unnecessary

suffering, and contribute to regional stability at lower

levels of armaments. In addition, by increasing

transparency in the size, structure and operations of

military forces and building confidence in the

intentions of other countries, arms control

agreements and confidence-building measures

constrain inventories of dangerous weapons, reduce

incentives and opportunities to initiate an attack,

reduce the mutual suspicions that arise from and

spur on armaments competition, and help provide the

assurance of security necessary to strengthen

cooperative relationships and direct resources to

safer, more productive endeavors.

Verifiable reductions in strategic offensive arms and

the steady shift toward less destabilizing systems

remain essential to our strategy. Entry into force of

the START I Treaty in December 1994 charted the

course for reductions in the deployed strategic

nuclear forces of the United States and Russia. The

other countries of the former Soviet Union that had

nuclear weapons on their soil – Belarus, Kazakhstan

and Ukraine – have become non-nuclear weapons

states. Once the START II Treaty enters into force,

the United States and Russia will each be limited to

between 3,000-3,500 accountable strategic nuclear

warheads. START II also will eliminate destabilizing

land-based multiple warhead and heavy missiles. On

September 26, 1997, the United States and Russia

signed a START II Protocol extending the end date

for reductions to 2007, and exchanged letters on

early deactivation by 2003 of those strategic nuclear

delivery systems to be eliminated by 2007.

At the Helsinki Summit in March 1997, Presidents

Clinton and Yeltsin agreed to START III guidelines

that, if adopted, will cap the number of strategic

nuclear warheads deployed in each country at 2,000-

2,500 by the end of 2007 – reducing both our

arsenals by 80 percent from Cold War heights. They

also agreed that, in order to promote the irreversibility

of deep reductions, a START III agreement will

include measures relating to the transparency of

strategic nuclear warhead inventories and the

destruction of strategic nuclear warheads. The

statement also committed the two nations to explore

possible measures relating to non-strategic nuclear

weapons, to include appropriate confidence building

and transparency measures.

The Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty remains a

cornerstone of strategic stability, and the United

States is committed to continued efforts to enhance

the Treaty’s viability and effectiveness. At the

Helsinki Summit, Presidents Clinton and Yeltsin

reaffirmed their commitment to the ABM Treaty and

recognized the need for effective theater missile

defenses in an agreement in principle on
8

demarcation between systems to counter strategic

ballistic missiles and those to counter theater ballistic

missiles.

On September 26, 1997, representatives of the

United States, Russia, Belarus, Kazakhstan and

Ukraine signed or initialed five agreements relating to

the ABM Treaty. At the Cologne G-8 Summit in June

1999, Presidents Clinton and Yeltsin reiterated their

determination to achieve earliest possible ratification

and entry into force of those agreements. The

agreements on demarcation and succession will be

provided to the Senate for its advice and consent

following Russian ratification of START II.

The two presidents also reaffirmed at Cologne their

existing obligations under Article XIII of the ABM

Treaty to consider possible changes in the strategic

situation that have a bearing on the ABM Treaty and,

as appropriate, possible proposals for further

increasing the viability of the Treaty. They also

agreed to begin discussions on the ABM Treaty,

which are now underway in parallel with discussions

on START III. The United States is proposing that

the ABM Treaty be modified to accommodate

possible deployment of a limited National Missile

Defense (NMD) system which would counter new

rogue state threats while preserving strategic

stability.

At the Moscow Summit in September 1998,

Presidents Clinton and Yeltsin agreed on a new

initiative for the exchange of early warning

information on missile launches. The agreement will

significantly reduce the danger that ballistic missiles

could be launched inadvertently on false warning of

attack. It will also promote increased mutual

confidence in the capabilities of the ballistic missile

early warning systems of both sides. The United

States and Russia will develop arrangements for

providing each other with continuous information from

their respective early warning systems on launches of

ballistic missiles and space launch vehicles. As part

of this initiative, the United States and Russia are

establishing a Joint Warning Center in Russia to

continuously monitor early warning data. The United

States and Russia are also working towards

establishing a ballistic missile and space launch

vehicle pre-launch notification regime in which other

states would be invited to participate.

To be secure, we must not only have a strong

military; we must also take the lead in building a

safer, more responsible world. We have a

fundamental responsibility to limit the spread of

nuclear weapons and reduce the danger of nuclear

war. To this end, the United States remains

committed to bringing the Comprehensive Nuclear

Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) into force.

More than 150 countries have signed the Treaty so

far, agreeing to refrain from all nuclear explosive

testing. The CTBT will constrain nuclear weapons

development and will also help prevent nuclear

weapons technologies from spreading to other

countries. The United States ended nuclear testing

seven years ago; the CTBT requires other countries

to refrain from testing, too. We have developed

means of making sure our nuclear weapons work

through non-nuclear tests and computer simulations,

rather than by tests with nuclear explosions, and we

spend $4.5 billion a year to ensure that our nuclear

weapons remain safe and reliable.

The CTBT will put in place a worldwide network for

detecting nuclear explosions. With over 300 stations

around the globe – including 31 in Russia, 11 in

China, and 17 in the Middle East – this international

monitoring system will improve our ability to monitor

suspicious activity and catch cheaters. The United

States already has dozens of monitoring stations of

its own; the CTBT will allow us to take advantage of

other countries’ stations and create new ones, too.

The Treaty also will give us the right to request onsite inspections of suspected nuclear testing sites in

other countries.

The United States will maintain its moratorium on

nuclear testing, and is encouraging all other states to

do the same. We are encouraging all states that

have not done so to sign and ratify the CTBT. We

remain committed to obtaining Senate advice and

consent toward ratification of the CTBT. U.S.

ratification will encourage other states to ratify,

enable the United States to lead the international

effort to gain CTBT entry into force, and strengthen

international norms against nuclear testing.

The Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) is the

cornerstone of international nuclear nonproliferation

efforts and reinforces regional and global security by

creating confidence in the non-nuclear commitments

of its parties. It was an indispensable precondition

for the denuclearization of Ukraine, Kazakhstan,

Belarus and South Africa. We seek to ensure that

the NPT remains a strong and vital element of global
9

security by achieving universal adherence and full

compliance by its parties with their Treaty obligations.

Achieving a successful Review Conference in 2000

will be important to the future of this critical Treaty.

We will vigorously promote the value of the NPT in

preventing the spread of nuclear weapons while

continuing policies designed to reduce U.S. reliance

on nuclear weapons and to work for their ultimate

elimination.

To reinforce the international nuclear nonproliferation

regime, we seek to strengthen the International

Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards system

and achieve a Fissile Material Cutoff Treaty in the

Geneva Conference on Disarmament. Halting

production of fissile materials for nuclear explosions

would cap the supply of nuclear materials available

worldwide for weapons, a key step in halting the

spread of nuclear weapons. A coordinated effort by

the intelligence community and law enforcement

agencies to detect, prevent and deter illegal

trafficking in fissile materials, and the Material

Protection, Control and Accounting program, which

enhances security for nuclear materials having

potential terrorist applications, are also essential to

our counter-proliferation efforts.

Through the Nunn-Lugar Cooperative Threat

Reduction (CTR) Program and other initiatives, we

aim to strengthen controls over weapons-usable

fissile material and prevent the theft or diversion of

WMD and related material and technology from the

former Soviet Union. The CTR Program has

effectively supported enhanced safety, security,

accounting and centralized control measures for

nuclear weapons and fissile materials in the former

Soviet Union. It has assisted Ukraine, Kazakhstan

and Belarus in becoming non-nuclear weapons

states and will continue to assist Russia in meeting

its START obligations. The CTR Program is also

supporting measures to eliminate and prevent the

proliferation of chemical weapons and biological

weapon-related capabilities, and has supported many

ongoing military reductions and reform measures in

the former Soviet Union. We are working to

strengthen the Convention on the Physical Protection

of Nuclear Material to increase accountability and

protection, which complements our effort to enhance

IAEA safeguards.

In 1999, the President launched the Expanded Threat

Reduction Initiative (ETRI). This effort is designed to

address the new security challenges in Russia and

the other Newly Independent States (NIS) caused by

the financial crisis, including preventing WMD

proliferation, reducing the threat posed by residual

WMD, and stabilizing the military. This initiative

builds on the success of existing programs, such as

the CTR program, the Material Protection, Control

and Accounting program and the Science Centers, to

make additional progress in the more challenging

environment now facing Russia and the NIS. ETRI

initiatives will substantially expand our cooperative

efforts to eliminate WMD in the NIS and prevent their

proliferation abroad. A new component of our

nuclear security program will greatly increase the

security of fissile material by concentrating it at fewer,

well-protected sites, and new programs will increase

the security of facilities and experts formerly

associated with the Soviet Union’s biological

weapons effort.

At the Cologne summit in June 1999, the leaders of

the G-8 nations affirmed their intention to establish

arrangements to protect and safely manage

weapons-grade fissile material no longer required for

defense purposes, especially plutonium. They

expressed strong support for initiatives being

undertaken by G-8 countries and others for scientific

and technical cooperation necessary to support

future large-scale disposition programs, invited all

interested countries to support projects for early

implementation of such programs, and urged

establishment of a joint strategy for cooperation in

large-scale disposition projects. They also

recognized that an international approach to

financing will be required – involving both public and

private funds – and agreed to review potential

increases in their resource commitments prior to the

next G-8 Summit in July 2000.

We are purchasing tons of highly enriched uranium

from dismantled Russian nuclear weapons for

conversion into commercial reactor fuel, and working

with Russia to remove 34 metric tons of plutonium

from each country’s nuclear weapons programs and

converting it so that it can never be used in nuclear

weapons. We are redirecting dozens of former

Soviet WMD facilities and tens of thousands of

former Soviet WMD scientists in Eastern Europe and

Eurasia from military activities to beneficial civilian

research. These efforts include implementing a new

biotechnical initiative aimed at increasing

transparency in former Soviet biological weapons

facilities and redirecting their scientists to civilian

commercial, agricultural, and public health activities.
10

In support of U.S. efforts to prevent proliferation of

WMD by organized crime groups and individuals in

the NIS and Eastern Europe, the Departments of

Defense, Energy, Commerce, the U.S. Customs

Service, and the FBI are engaging in programs that

assist governments in developing effective export

control systems and capabilities to prevent, deter, or

detect proliferation of WMD and weapons materials

across borders. These programs provide training,

equipment, advice, and services to law enforcement

and border security agencies in these countries.

We seek to strengthen the Biological Weapons

Convention (BWC) with a new international regime to

ensure compliance. We are negotiating with other

BWC member states in an effort to reach consensus

on a protocol to the BWC that would implement an

inspection system to enhance compliance and

promote transparency. We are also working hard to

implement and enforce the Chemical Weapons

Convention (CWC). The United States Congress

underscored the importance of these efforts in

October 1998 by passing implementing legislation

that makes it possible for the United States to comply

with the requirements in the CWC for commercial

declarations and inspections.

The Administration also seeks to prevent

destabilizing buildups of conventional arms and limit

access to sensitive technical information, equipment

and technologies by strengthening international

regimes, including the Wassenaar Arrangement on

Export Controls for Conventional Arms and Dual-Use

Goods and Technologies, the Australia Group (for

chemical and biological weapons), the Missile

Technology Control Regime, the Nuclear Suppliers

Group, and the Zangger Committee (which ensures

that IAEA safeguards are applied to nuclear exports).

At the NATO 50th Anniversary Summit, Allied leaders

agreed to enhance NATO’s ability to deal both

politically and militarily with the proliferation of

weapons of mass destruction and the means of their

delivery.

Regional nonproliferation efforts are particularly

important in three critical proliferation zones. On the

Korean Peninsula, we are implementing the 1994

Agreed Framework, which requires full compliance by

North Korea with its nonproliferation obligations. We

also seek to convince North Korea to halt its

indigenous missile program and exports of missile

systems and technologies. In the Middle East and

Southwest Asia, we encourage regional confidence

building measures and arms control agreements that

address the legitimate security concerns of all

parties, and continue efforts to thwart and roll back

Iran’s development of WMD and long-range missiles,

and Iraq’s efforts to reconstitute its WMD programs.

In South Asia, we seek to persuade India and

Pakistan to refrain from weaponization or deployment

of nuclear weapons, testing or deploying missiles

capable of delivering nuclear weapons, and further

production of fissile material for nuclear weapons, as

well as to adhere fully to international nonproliferation

standards and to sign and ratify the CTBT.

Over the past three years, the United States has

worked to ensure that the landmark 1990

Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE) Treaty

remains a cornerstone of European peace, security

and stability into the twenty-first century. On

November 19, 1999, we joined the other 29 CFE

States Parties in signing an Adaptation Agreement

that eliminates obsolete bloc-to-bloc limits and

replaces them with nationally based ceilings. It will

also enhance transparency through more information

and inspections, strengthen requirements for host

nation consent to the presence of foreign forces, and

open the treaty to accession by other European

nations. The accompanying CFE Final Act reflects a

number of important political commitments, including

agreements on the complete withdrawal of Russian

armed forces from Moldova and partial withdrawal of

Russian forces from Georgia. President Clinton has

stated that he will only submit the CFE Adaptation

Agreement to the Senate for advice and consent to

ratification when Russian forces have been reduced

to the flank levels set forth in the adapted Treaty.

President Clinton is committed to ending the threat to

innocent civilians from anti-personnel landmines

(APLs). The United States has already taken major

steps toward this goal while ensuring our ability to

meet international obligations and provide for the

safety and security of our men and women in

uniform. President Clinton has directed the Defense

Department to end the use of all APLs, including selfdestructing APLs, outside Korea by 2003 and to

pursue aggressively the objective of having APL

alternatives ready for Korea by 2006. We will also

aggressively pursue alternatives to our mixed antitank systems that contain anti-personnel

submunitions. We have made clear that the United

States will sign the Ottawa Convention by 2006 if by

then we have succeeded in identifying and fielding
11

suitable alternatives to our self-destructing APLs and

mixed anti-tank systems.

In May 1999, we gained Senate advice and consent

to ratification of the Amended Mines Protocol to the

Convention on Conventional Weapons. This

agreement addresses the worldwide humanitarian

problem caused by APLs by banning the use of nondetectable APLs and severely limiting the use of

long-duration APLs to clearly marked and monitored

fields that effectively keep out civilians. We have

established a permanent ban on APL exports and are

seeking to universalize an export ban through the

Conference on Disarmament in Geneva. We are

supporting humanitarian demining programs

worldwide through engagement with mine-afflicted

nations and the international community, and through

our "Demining 2010" initiative have challenged the

world to increase the effectiveness and efficiency of

removing landmines that threaten civilians.

Military Activities

The U.S. military plays a crucial role in shaping the

international security environment in ways that

protect and promote U.S. interests, but is not a

substitute for other forms of engagement, such as

diplomatic, economic, scientific, technological,

cultural and educational activities. Through

overseas presence and peacetime engagement

activities such as defense cooperation, security

assistance, and training and exercises with allies and

friends, our Armed Forces help to deter aggression

and coercion, build coalitions, promote regional

stability and serve as role models for militaries in

emerging democracies. With countries that are

neither staunch friends nor known foes, military

cooperation can serve as a positive means of

building security relationships today that will

contribute to improved relations tomorrow. At the

same time, we remain firmly committed to human

rights and we will continue to ensure that we do not

train or assist known human rights abusers.

Maintaining our overseas presence promotes

regional stability, giving substance to our security

commitments, helping to prevent the development of

power vacuums and instability, and contributing to

deterrence by demonstrating our determination to

defend U.S., allied, and friendly interests in critical

regions. Having credible combat forces forward

deployed in peacetime also better positions the

United States to respond rapidly to crises. Equally

essential is effective global power projection, which is

key to the flexibility demanded of our forces and

provides options for responding to potential crises

and conflicts even when we have no permanent

presence or a limited infrastructure in a region.

Strategic mobility is a key element of our strategy. It

is critical for allowing the United States to be first on

the scene with assistance in many domestic or

international crises, and is a key to successful

American leadership and engagement. Deployment

and sustainment of U.S. and multinational forces

requires maintaining and ensuring access to

sufficient fleets of aircraft, ships, vehicles and trains,

as well as bases, ports, pre-positioned equipment

and other infrastructure.

Although military activities are an important pillar of

our effort to shape the global security environment,

we must always be mindful that the primary mission

of our Armed Forces is to deter and, if necessary, to

fight and win conflicts in which our vital interests are

threatened.

Just as American engagement overall must be

selective—focusing on the threats and opportunities

most relevant to our interests and applying our

resources where we can make the greatest

difference—so must our use of the Armed Forces for

engagement be selective. Engagement activities

must be carefully managed to prevent erosion of our

military’s current and long-term readiness. The

Defense Department's theater engagement planning

process, which was approved by the President in

1997, helps ensure that military engagement

activities are prioritized within and across theaters,

and balanced against available resources. In short,

we must prioritize military engagement activities to

ensure the readiness of our Armed Forces to carry

out crisis response and warfighting missions, as well

as to ensure that we can sustain an appropriate level

of engagement activities over the long term.

Our ability to deter potential adversaries in peacetime

rests on several factors, particularly on our

demonstrated will and ability to uphold our security

commitments when they are challenged. We have

earned this reputation through both our declaratory

policy, which clearly communicates costs to potential

adversaries, and our credible warfighting capability.

This capability is embodied in ready forces and

equipment strategically stationed or deployed
12

forward, in forces in the United States at the

appropriate level of readiness to deploy when

needed, in our ability to gain timely access to critical

regions and infrastructure overseas, and in our

demonstrated ability to form and lead effective

military coalitions. Because terrorist organizations

may not be deterred by traditional means, we must

ensure a robust capability to accurately attribute the

source of attacks against the United States or its

citizens, and to respond effectively and decisively to

protect our national interests.

Our nuclear deterrent posture is one example of how

U.S. military capabilities are used effectively to deter

aggression and coercion against U.S. interests.

Nuclear weapons serve as a guarantee of our

security commitments to allies and a disincentive to

those who would contemplate developing or

otherwise acquiring their own nuclear weapons. Our

military planning for the possible employment of U.S.

strategic nuclear weapons is focused on deterring a

nuclear war and emphasizes the survivability of our

nuclear systems and infrastructure necessary to

endure a preemptive attack and still respond at

overwhelming levels. The United States will continue

to maintain a robust triad of strategic nuclear forces

sufficient to deter any potential adversaries who may

have or seek access to nuclear forces – to convince

them that seeking a nuclear advantage or resorting to

nuclear weapons would be futile. In addition, some

U.S. non-strategic nuclear forces are maintained in a

forward-deployed status in NATO as a visible

reminder of our security commitment.

We must also ensure the continued viability of the

infrastructure that supports U.S. nuclear forces and

weapons. The Stockpile Stewardship Program will

provide high confidence in the safety and reliability of

our nuclear weapons under the Comprehensive

Nuclear Test Ban Treaty.

The United States is committed to preserving

internationally recognized freedom of navigation on

and overflight of the world's oceans, which are critical

to the future strength of our nation and to maintaining

global stability. Freedom of navigation and overflight

are essential to our economic security and for the

worldwide movement and sustainment of U.S.

military forces. These freedoms are codified in the

United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea,

which the President submitted to the Senate in 1994

for advice and consent to ratification. In addition to

lending the certainty of the rule of law to an area

critical to our national security, the Convention

preserves our leadership in global ocean policy.

Thus, the Law of the Sea Convention buttresses the

strategic advantages that the United States gains

from being a global power, and ratification of the

Convention remains a high priority.

We are committed to maintaining U.S. leadership in

space. Unimpeded access to and use of space is a

vital national interest – essential for protecting U.S.

national security, promoting our prosperity and

ensuring our well-being. Consistent with our

international obligations, we will deter threats to our

interests in space, counter hostile efforts against U.S.

access to and use of space, and maintain the ability

to counter space systems and services that could be

used for hostile purposes against our military forces,

command and control systems, or other critical

capabilities. We will maintain our technological

superiority in space systems, and sustain a robust

U.S. space industry and a strong, forward-looking

research base. We also will continue efforts to

prevent the spread of weapons of mass destruction

to space, and will continue to pursue global

partnerships addressing space-related scientific,

economic, environmental and security issues.

We also are committed to maintaining information

superiority – the capability to collect, process, and

disseminate an uninterrupted flow of information

while exploiting and/or denying an adversary’s ability

to do the same. Operational readiness, as well as

the command and control of forces, relies

increasingly on information systems and technology.

We must keep pace with rapidly evolving information

technology so that we can cultivate and harvest the

promise of information superiority among U.S. forces

and coalition partners while exploiting the shortfalls in

our adversaries’ information capabilities.

Quality people – civilian and military – are our most

critical asset in implementing our defense activities.

The quality of our men and women in uniform will be

the deciding factor in future military operations. We

must ensure that we remain the most fully prepared

and best trained military force in the world.

Accordingly, we will continue to place the highest

priority on programs that support recruiting, retention,

quality of life, training and education.
13

International Law Enforcement

Cooperation

As threats to our national security from terrorism,

drug trafficking and other international crime

increase, U.S. and foreign law enforcement and

judicial agencies must continue to find innovative

ways to implement a concerted, global plan to

combat international crime. As highlighted in the

President’s International Crime Control Strategy, one

way to accomplish this is through cooperative

activities, such as overseas law enforcement

presence, that leverage our resources and foster the

establishment of effective working relationships with

foreign law enforcement agencies. U.S. investigators

and prosecutors work to enlist the cooperation of

foreign law enforcement officials, keeping crime away

from American shores, enabling the arrest of many

U.S. fugitives and solving serious U.S. crimes. This

presence creates networks of law enforcement

professionals dedicated to preventing crime and

bringing international criminals to justice.

The Department of State and U.S. federal law

enforcement agencies are engaged in a cooperative

effort to provide assistance to law enforcement

agencies in Central and Eastern Europe and East

Asia through the International Law Enforcement

Academies that have been established in Hungary

and Thailand. The ILEA initiative is a multinational

effort organized by the United States, the host

nations, and other international training partners to

provide mutual assistance and law enforcement

training.

Environmental and Health

Initiatives

Decisions today regarding the environment and

natural resources can affect our security for

generations. Environmental threats do not heed

national borders; environmental peril overseas can

pose long-term dangers to Americans’ security and

well-being. Natural resource scarcities can trigger

and exacerbate conflict. Environmental threats such

as climate change, stratospheric ozone depletion,

introduction of nuisance plant and animal species,

overharvesting of fish, forests and other living natural

resources, and the transnational movement of

hazardous chemicals and waste directly threaten the

health and economic well-being of U.S. citizens.

We have a full diplomatic agenda to respond

aggressively to environmental threats. For example,

at Kyoto in December 1997, the industrialized nations

of the world agreed for the first time to binding limits

on greenhouse gases. This was a vital turning point,

but we must press for participation by key developing

nations and will not submit the Kyoto protocol for

ratification until they have agreed to participate

meaningfully in efforts to address global warming.

Diseases and health risks can no longer be viewed

solely as a domestic concern. Like the global

economy, the health and well-being of all peoples are

becoming increasingly interdependent. With the

movement of millions of people per day across

international borders and the expansion of

international trade, health issues as diverse as

importation of dangerous infectious diseases and

bioterrorism preparedness profoundly affect our

national security. Besides reducing the direct threat

to Americans from disease, healthy populations

internationally provide an essential underpinning for

economic development, democratization and political

stability. We are, therefore, taking a leadership role

to promote international cooperation on health

issues.

Beyond these general concerns, a number of specific

international health issues are critical for our national

security. Because a growing proportion of our

national food supply is coming from international

sources, assuring the safety of the food we consume

must be a priority. The Administration has

announced new and stronger programs to ensure the

safety of imported as well as domestic foods, to be

overseen by the President’s Council on Food Safety.

New and emerging infections such as drug-resistant

tuberculosis and the Ebola virus can move with the

speed of jet travel. We are actively engaged with the

international health community as well as the World

Health Organization to stop the spread of these

dangerous diseases.

The worldwide epidemic HIV/AIDS is destroying

peoples and economies on an unprecedented scale

and is now the number one cause of death in Africa,

killing over 5,500 per day. The Administration has

taken bold new steps to combat this devastating

epidemic, including reaching agreement in 1999 with
14

the G-8 in Cologne to link debt relief with social

programs such as HIV/AIDS prevention. And at the

United Nations in September 1999, the President

committed the United States to a concerted effort to

accelerate the development and delivery of vaccines

for AIDS, malaria, tuberculosis and other diseases

disproportionately affecting the developing world. He

announced plans for a special White House meeting

to strengthen incentives to work with the private

sector on common goals for fighting these diseases.

Responding to Threats and

Crises

Because our shaping efforts alone cannot guarantee

the international security environment we seek, the

United States must be able to respond at home and

abroad to the full spectrum of threats and crises that

may arise. Our resources are finite, so we must be

selective in our responses, focusing on challenges

that most directly affect our interests and engaging

where we can make the most difference. We must

use the most appropriate tool or combination of tools

– diplomacy, public diplomacy, economic measures,

law enforcement, military operations, and others. We

act in alliance or partnership when others share our

interests, but unilaterally when compelling national

interests so demand.

Efforts to deter an adversary – be it an aggressor

nation, terrorist group or criminal organization – can

become the leading edge of crisis response. In this

sense, deterrence straddles the line between shaping

the international environment and responding to

crises. Deterrence in crisis generally involves

signaling the United States’ commitment to a

particular country or interest by enhancing our

warfighting capability in the theater. We may also

choose to make additional statements to

communicate the costs of aggression or coercion to

an adversary, and in some cases may choose to

employ U.S. forces to underline the message and

deter further adventurism.

Transnational Threats

Transnational threats include terrorism, drug

trafficking and other international crime, and illegal

trade in fissile materials and other dangerous

substances.

Terrorism

The United States has made concerted efforts to

deter and punish terrorists, and remains determined

to apprehend and bring to justice those who terrorize

American citizens. We make no concessions to

terrorists. We fully exploit all available legal

mechanisms to punish international terrorists,

eliminate foreign terrorists and their support networks

in our country, and extend the reach of financial

sanctions to international terrorist support networks.

And we seek to eliminate terrorist sanctuaries

overseas, counter state support for terrorism, and

help other governments improve their capabilities to

combat terrorism.

To respond to terrorism incidents overseas, the State

Department leads an interagency team, the Foreign

Emergency Support Team (FEST), which is prepared

to deploy on short notice to the scene of an incident.

FEST teams are tailored to the nature of the event

and include personnel from the State Department,

Defense Department, FBI, and other agencies as

appropriate. Additionally, the FBI has five Rapid

Deployment Teams ready to respond quickly to

terrorist events anywhere in the world. The State

Department is also working on agreements with other

nations on response to WMD incidents overseas.

Whenever possible, we use law enforcement and

diplomatic tools to wage the fight against terrorism.

But there have been, and will be, times when those

tools are not enough. As long as terrorists continue

to target American citizens, we reserve the right to

act in self-defense by striking at their bases and

those who sponsor, assist or actively support them.

On August 20, 1998, acting on convincing information

from a variety of reliable sources that the network of

radical groups affiliated with Osama bin Laden had

planned, financed and carried out the bombings of

our embassies in Nairobi and Dar es Salaam, and

planned future attacks against Americans, the U.S.

Armed Forces carried out strikes on one of the most

active terrorist bases in the world. Located in

Afghanistan, it contained key elements of the bin

Laden network's infrastructure and has served as a

training camp for literally thousands of terrorists from

around the globe. We also struck a plant in

Khartoum, Sudan, that was linked by intelligence

information to chemical weapons and to the bin

Laden terror network. The strikes were a necessary
15

and proportionate response to the imminent threat of

further terrorist attacks against U.S. personnel and

facilities, and demonstrated that no country can be a

safe haven for terrorists.

Drug Trafficking and Other International

Crime

A broad range of criminal activities emanating from

overseas threatens the safety and well-being of the

American people.

Drug Trafficking. We have shown that with

determined and relentless efforts, we can make

significant progress against the scourge of drug

abuse and drug trafficking. For much of this century,

organized crime leaders inside the United States

controlled America’s drug trade. Aggressive law

enforcement efforts have dramatically weakened U.S.

crime syndicates. But international trade in drugs

persists; now led by criminals based in foreign

countries. International drug syndicates, especially

those based in Mexico and Colombia, continue to

diversify and seek new markets in the United States

– moving beyond large cities into smaller

communities and rural towns.

The aim of our drug control strategy is to cut illegal

drug use and availability in the United States by 50

percent by 2007 – and reduce the health and social

consequences of drug use and trafficking by 25

percent over the same period, through expanded

prevention efforts, improved treatment programs,

strengthened law enforcement and tougher

interdiction. Our strategy recognizes that, at home

and abroad, prevention, treatment and economic

alternatives must be integrated with intelligence

collection, law enforcement and interdiction efforts.

Domestically, we seek to educate and enable

America’s youth to reject illegal drugs, increase the

safety of America’s citizens by substantially reducing

drug-related crime and violence, reduce health and

social costs to the public of illegal drug use, reduce

domestic cultivation of cannabis and production of

methamphetamines and other synthetic drugs, and

shield America’s air, land and sea frontiers from the

drug threat. Concerted efforts by the public, all levels

of government and the private sector together with

other governments, private groups and international

organizations will be required for our strategy to

succeed.

Internationally, our strategy recognizes that the most

effective counterdrug operations are mounted at the

source where illegal drugs are grown and produced.

We seek to stop drug trafficking by bolstering the

capabilities of source nations to reduce cultivation

through eradication and development of alternative

crops, and attack production through destruction of

laboratories and control of chemicals used to produce

illegal drugs. In the transit zone between source

regions and the U.S. border, we support interdiction

programs to halt the shipment of illicit drugs. In

concert with allies abroad, we pursue prosecution of

major drug traffickers, destruction of drug trafficking

organizations, prevention of money laundering, and

elimination of criminal financial support networks.

Our strategy also includes efforts to build cooperative

links with foreign law enforcement agencies,

strengthen democratic institutions, assist source

nations to root out corruption, and safeguard human

rights and respect for the rule of law in both source

and transit nations. Additionally, we are engaging

international organizations, financial institutions and

non-governmental organizations in counterdrug

cooperation.

Other International Crime. A free and efficient

market economy requires transparency and effective

law enforcement to combat unlawful activities such

as extortion and corruption that impede rational

business decisions and fair competition. The benefits

of open markets are enhanced by fostering the safe

and secure international movement of passengers

and goods by all modes of transportation.

Additionally, the integrity and reliability of the

international financial system will be improved by

standardizing laws and regulations governing

financial institutions and improving international law

enforcement cooperation in the financial sector.

Corruption and extortion activities by organized crime

groups can also undermine the integrity of

government and imperil fragile democracies. And the

failure of governments to effectively control

international crime rings within their borders – or their

willingness to harbor international criminals –

endangers global stability. There must be no safe

haven where criminals can roam free, beyond the

reach of our extradition and legal assistance treaties.

We are negotiating and implementing new and

updated extradition and mutual legal assistance

treaties, and increasing our enforcement options

through agreements on asset seizure, forfeiture, and
16

money laundering. The new National Money

Laundering Strategy being implemented by the

Departments of Treasury and Justice is increasing

the effectiveness of America’s efforts both

domestically and internationally to deprive organized

crime groups the benefit of their illegal profits.

Initiatives also are under way to accelerate the

criminal identification process and facilitate global

participation in the investigation and prosecution of

criminal activities through the linking of worldwide law

enforcement databases. This will be done in a

manner that protects the privacy of U.S. citizens.

Because of the global nature of information networks,

no area of criminal activity has greater international

implications than high technology crime. Computer

hackers and other cyber-criminals are not hampered

by international boundaries, since information and

transactions involving funds or property can be

transmitted quickly and covertly via telephone and

information systems. Many of the challenges that law

enforcement faces in this area are extremely difficult

to address without international consensus and

cooperation. We seek to develop and implement

new agreements and encourage cooperative

research and development with other nations to

address high technology crime, particularly cybercrime.

Defending the Homeland

Our potential enemies, whether nations or terrorists,

may be more likely in the future to resort to attacks

against vulnerable civilian targets in the United

States. At the same time, easier access to

sophisticated technology means that the destructive

power available to rogue nations and terrorists is

greater than ever. Adversaries may be tempted to

use long-range ballistic missiles or unconventional

tools, such as WMD, financial destabilization, or

information attacks, to threaten our citizens and

critical national infrastructures at home.

The United States will act to deter or prevent such

attacks and, if attacks occur despite those efforts, will

be prepared to defend against them, limit the damage

they cause, and respond effectively against the

perpetrators. At home, we will forge an effective

partnership of Federal, state and local government

agencies, industry and other private sector

organizations.

National Missile Defense

We are committed to meeting the growing danger

posed by nations developing and deploying longrange missiles that could deliver weapons of mass

destruction against the United States. Informed by

the Intelligence Community’s analysis of the August

1998 North Korean flight test of its Taepo Dong I

missile, as well as the report of the Rumsfeld

Commission and other information, the

Administration has concluded that the threat posed

by a rogue state developing an ICBM capable of

striking the United States is growing. The

Intelligence Community estimates that during the

next fifteen years the United States will most likely

face an ICBM threat from North Korea, probably from

Iran, and possibly from Iraq.

We intend to determine in 2000 whether to deploy a

limited national missile defense against ballistic

missile threats to the United States from rogue

states. The Administration's decision will be based

on an assessment of the four factors that must be

taken into account in deciding whether to field this

system: (1) whether the threat is materializing; (2) the

status of the technology based on an initial series of

rigorous flight tests, and the proposed system’s

operational effectiveness; (3) whether the system is

affordable; and (4) the implications that going forward

with NMD deployment would hold for the overall

strategic environment and our arms control

objectives, including efforts to achieve further

reductions in strategic nuclear arms under START II

and START III.

In making our decision, we will review progress in

achieving our arms control objectives, including

negotiating changes to the ABM Treaty that would

permit the deployment of a limited NMD system. At

the Cologne G-8 Summit in June 1999, Presidents

Clinton and Yeltsin agreed to begin discussions on

START III and the ABM Treaty. Their reaffirmation

that under the ABM Treaty the two sides are

obligated to consider possible changes in the

strategic situation that have a bearing on the Treaty

and possible proposals for further increasing the

viability of the Treaty opened the door for discussion

of proposals for modifying the Treaty to

accommodate a limited NMD deployment. The

United States will attempt to negotiate changes to the

ABM Treaty that would be necessary if we decide to

deploy a limited NMD system. At the same time, the
17

Administration has made clear that it will not give any

state a veto over any missile defense deployment

decision that is vital to our national security interests.

Countering Foreign Intelligence

Collection

The United States is a primary target of foreign

intelligence services due to our military, scientific,

technological and economic preeminence. Foreign

intelligence services aggressively seek information

about U.S. political and military intentions and

capabilities, and are stepping up their efforts to

collect classified or sensitive information on U.S.

weapons systems, emerging technologies with

military applications, and related technical methods.

Such information enables potential adversaries to

counter U.S. political and military objectives, develop

sophisticated weapons more quickly and efficiently,

and develop countermeasures against U.S. weapons.

Intelligence collection against U.S. economic,

commercial and proprietary information enables

foreign states and corporations to obtain shortcuts to

industrial development and improve their

competitiveness against U.S. corporations in global

markets. Although difficult to quantify, economic and

industrial espionage result in the loss of millions of

dollars and thousands of jobs annually.

To protect sensitive national security information, we

must be able to effectively counter the collection

efforts of foreign intelligence services through

vigorous counterintelligence efforts and security

programs. Over the last five years, we have created

new counterintelligence mechanisms to address

economic and industrial espionage and implemented

procedures to improve coordination among

intelligence, counterintelligence and law enforcement

agencies. These measures have considerably

strengthened our ability to counter the foreign

intelligence collection threat. We will continue to

refine and enhance our counterintelligence

capabilities as we enter the twenty-first century.

Domestic Preparedness Against

Weapons of Mass Destruction

The Federal Government will respond rapidly and

decisively to any terrorist incident in the United States

involving WMD, working with state and local

governments to restore order and deliver emergency

assistance. The Domestic Terrorism Program is

integrating the capabilities and assets of a number of

Federal agencies to support the FBI, FEMA, the

Department of Health and Human Services, and state

and local governments in crisis response and

managing the consequences of a WMD incident. We

continue to develop and refine a comprehensive

strategy to protect our civilian population from

nuclear, biological and chemical weapons. We are

upgrading our public health and medical surveillance

systems to enhance our preparedness for a biological

or chemical weapons attack, and helping to ensure

that federal, state and local emergency response

personnel have the resources they need to deal with

such a crisis.

Critical Infrastructure Protection

Our national security and our economic prosperity

rest on a foundation of critical infrastructures,

including telecommunications, energy, banking and

finance, transportation, water systems and

emergency services. These infrastructures are

vulnerable to computer-generated and physical

attacks. More than any nation, America is dependent

on cyberspace. We know that other governments

and terrorist groups are creating sophisticated, wellorganized capabilities to launch cyber-attacks against

critical American information networks and the

infrastructures that depend on them.

The President has directed that a plan for defending

our critical infrastructures be in effect by May 2001,

and fully operational by December 2003. Through

this plan we will achieve and maintain the ability to

protect our critical infrastructures from intentional acts

that would significantly diminish the ability of the

Federal Government to perform essential national

security missions. This plan will also help ensure the

general public health and safety; protect the ability of

state and local governments to maintain order and to

deliver minimum essential public services; and work

with the private sector to ensure the orderly

functioning of the economy and the delivery of

essential telecommunications, energy, financial and

transportation services.

The Federal government is committed to building this

capability to defend our critical infrastructures, but it

cannot do it alone. The private sector, as much as

the Federal government, is a target for infrastructure

attacks, whether by cyber or other means. A new
18

partnership between the Federal government and the

private sector is required. Acting jointly, we will work

to identify and eliminate significant vulnerabilities in

our critical infrastructures and the information

systems that support them.

We are creating the systems necessary to detect and

respond to attacks before they can cause serious

damage. For the first time, law enforcement,

intelligence agencies and the private sector will

share, in a manner consistent with U.S. law,

information about cyber-threats, vulnerabilities and

attacks. The Government is developing and

deploying new intrusion detection network

technologies to protect Defense Department and

other critical Federal systems, and we are

encouraging the private sector to develop and deploy

appropriate protective technology as well. A

nationwide system for quickly reconstituting in the

face of a serious cyber-attack is being developed.

Every Federal Department is also developing a plan

to protect its own critical infrastructures, which

include both cyber and physical dimensions.

Finally, we will be building a strong foundation for

continued protection of our critical infrastructures:

increased Federal R&D in information security,

increased investment in training and educating cybersecurity practitioners, and evaluating whether

legislation is necessary to protect both our civil

liberties and our critical infrastructures.

National Security Emergency

Preparedness

We will do all we can to deter and prevent destructive

and threatening forces such as terrorism, WMD use,

disruption of our critical infrastructures, and regional

or state-centered threats from endangering our

citizens. But if an emergency occurs, we must be

prepared to respond effectively at home and abroad

to protect lives and property, mobilize the personnel,

resources and capabilities necessary to effectively

handle the emergency, and ensure the survival of our

institutions and infrastructures. To this end, we will

sustain our efforts to maintain comprehensive, allhazard emergency planning by federal departments,

agencies and the military, as well as a strong and

responsive industrial and technology base, as crucial

national security emergency preparedness

requirements.

Smaller-Scale Contingencies

In addition to defending the U.S. homeland, the

United States must be prepared to respond to the full

range of threats to our interests abroad. Smallerscale contingency operations encompass the full

range of military operations short of major theater

warfare, including humanitarian assistance, peace

operations, enforcing embargoes and no-fly zones,

evacuating U.S. citizens, and reinforcing key allies.

These operations will likely pose frequent challenges

for U.S. military forces and cumulatively require

significant commitments over time. These operations

will also put a premium on the ability of the U.S.

military to work closely and effectively with other U.S.

Government agencies, non-governmental

organizations, regional and international security

organizations and coalition partners.

It often will be in our national interest to proceed in

partnership with other nations to preserve, maintain

and restore peace. American participation in peace

operations takes many forms, such as the NATO-led

coalitions in Bosnia and Kosovo, the American-led

UN force in Haiti, the recently concluded Military

Observer Mission Ecuador and Peru (MOMEP), our

participation in the coalition operation in the Sinai,

military observers in UN missions in Western Sahara,

Georgia and the Middle East, and the UN mission in

East Timor.

The question of command and control in multinational

contingency operations is particularly critical. Under

no circumstances will the President ever relinquish

his constitutional command authority over U.S.

forces, but there may be times in the future, just as in

the past, when it is in our interest to place U.S. forces

under the temporary operational control of a

competent allied or United Nations commander.

Not only must the U.S. military be prepared to

successfully conduct multiple smaller-scale

contingencies worldwide, it must be prepared to do

so in the face of challenges such as terrorism,

information operations and the threat or use of WMD.

U.S. forces must also remain prepared to withdraw

from contingency operations if needed to deploy to a

major theater war. Accordingly, appropriate U.S.

forces will be kept at a high level of readiness and will

be trained, equipped and organized to be capable of

performing multiple missions at one time.
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Major Theater Warfare

Fighting and winning major theater wars is the

ultimate test of our Armed Forces – a test at which

they must always succeed. For the foreseeable

future, the United States, preferably in concert with

allies, must have the capability to deter and, if

deterrence fails, defeat large-scale, cross-border

aggression in two distant theaters in overlapping time

frames. Maintaining a two major theater war

capability reassures our friends and allies and makes

coalition relationships with the United States more

attractive. It deters opportunism elsewhere when we

are heavily involved in deterring or defeating

aggression in one theater, or while conducting

multiple smaller-scale contingencies and

engagement activities in other theaters. It also

provides a hedge against the possibility that we might

encounter threats larger or more difficult than

expected. A strategy for deterring and defeating

aggression in two theaters ensures we maintain the

capability and flexibility to meet unknown future

threats, while continued global engagement helps

preclude such threats from developing.

Fighting and winning major theater wars entails three

challenging requirements. First, we must maintain

the ability to rapidly defeat initial enemy advances

short of the enemy’s objectives in two theaters, in

close succession. We must maintain this ability to

ensure that we can seize the initiative, minimize

territory lost before an invasion is halted and ensure

the integrity of our warfighting coalitions. Failure to

defeat initial enemy advances rapidly would make the

subsequent campaign to evict enemy forces from

captured territory more difficult, lengthy and costly,

and could undermine U.S. credibility and increase the

risk of conflict elsewhere.

Second, the United States must be prepared to fight

and win under conditions where an adversary may

use asymmetric means against us – unconventional

approaches that avoid or undermine our strengths

while exploiting our vulnerabilities. Because of our

conventional military dominance, adversaries are

likely to use asymmetric means, such as WMD,

information operations or terrorism. Such

asymmetric attacks could be used to disrupt the

critical logistics pipeline – from its origins in the

United States, along sea and air routes, at in-transit

refueling and staging bases, to its termination at

airfields, seaports and supply depots in theater – as

well as our forces deployed in the field.

We are enhancing the preparedness of our Armed

Forces to effectively conduct sustained operations

despite the presence, threat or use of WMD. These

efforts include development, procurement and

deployment of theater missile defense systems to

protect forward-deployed military personnel, as well

as improved intelligence collection capabilities,

heightened security awareness and force protection

measures worldwide. We are also enhancing our

ability to defend against hostile information

operations, which could in the future take the form of

a full-scale, strategic information attack against our

critical national infrastructures, government and

economy – as well as attacks directed against our

military forces.

Third, our military must also be able to transition to

fighting major theater wars from a posture of global

engagement – from substantial levels of peacetime

engagement overseas as well as multiple concurrent

smaller-scale contingency operations. Withdrawing

from such operations would pose significant political

and operational challenges. Ultimately, however, the

United States must accept a degree of risk

associated with withdrawing from contingency

operations and engagement activities in order to

reduce the greater risk incurred if we failed to

respond adequately to major theater wars.

The Decision to Employ Military

Forces

The decision whether to use force is dictated first and

foremost by our national interests. In those specific

areas where our vital interests are at stake, our use

of force will be decisive and, if necessary, unilateral.

In situations posing a threat to important national

interests, military forces should only be used if they

advance U.S. interests, they are likely to accomplish

their objectives, the costs and risks of their

employment are commensurate with the interests at

stake, and other non-military means are incapable of

achieving our objectives. Such uses of military forces

should be selective and limited, reflecting the

importance of the interests at stake. We act in

concert with the international community whenever
20

possible, but do not hesitate to act unilaterally when

necessary.

The decision to employ military forces to support our

humanitarian and other interests focuses on the

unique capabilities and resources the military can

bring to bear, rather than on its combat power.

Generally, the military is not the best tool for

humanitarian concerns, but under certain conditions

use of our Armed Forces may be appropriate. Those

conditions are when the scale of a humanitarian

catastrophe dwarfs the ability of civilian relief

agencies to respond, when the need for relief is

urgent and only the military has the ability to provide

an immediate response, when the military is needed

to establish the preconditions necessary for effective

application of other instruments of national power,

when a humanitarian crisis could affect U.S. combat

operations, or when a response otherwise requires

unique military resources. Such efforts by the United

States, preferably in conjunction with other members

of the international community, will be limited in

duration, have a clearly defined mission and end

state, entail minimal risk to American lives, and be

designed to give the affected country the opportunity

to restore its own basic services.

In all cases, the costs and risks of U.S. military

involvement must be commensurate with the

interests at stake. We will be more inclined to act

where there is reason to believe that our action will

bring lasting improvement. Our involvement will be

more circumscribed when regional states or

organizations are better positioned to act than we

are. Even in these cases, however, the United

States will be actively engaged with appropriate

diplomatic, economic and military tools.

In every case, we will consider several critical

questions before committing military force: Have we

explored or exhausted non-military means that offer a

reasonable chance of achieving our goals? Is there a

clearly defined, achievable mission? What is the

threat environment and what risks will our forces

face? What level of effort will be needed to achieve

our goals? What are the potential costs—human and

financial—of the operation? What are the opportunity

costs in terms of maintaining our capability to

respond to higher-priority contingencies? Do we

have milestones and a desired end state to guide a

decision on terminating the mission?

Having decided that use of military forces is

appropriate, the decision on how they will be

employed is based on two guidelines. First, our

forces will have a clear mission and the means to

achieve their objectives decisively. Second, as much

as possible, we will seek the support and

participation of our allies, friends and relevant

international institutions. When our vital interests are

at stake, we are prepared to act alone. But in most

situations, working with other nations increases the

effectiveness of each nation's actions and lessens

everyone's burden.

Sustaining our engagement abroad over the long

term will require the support of the American people

and the Congress to bear the costs of defending U.S.

interests – including the risk of losing American lives.

Some decisions to engage abroad with our military

forces could well face popular opposition, but must

ultimately be judged by whether they advance the

interests of the American people in the long run.

When it is judged to be in America’s interest to

intervene, we must remain clear in our purposes and

resolute in our actions.

Preparing for an Uncertain

Future

We must prepare for an uncertain future even as we

address today's security problems. We need to look

closely at our national security apparatus to ensure

its effectiveness by adapting its institutions to meet

new challenges. This means we must transform our

capabilities and organizations – diplomatic, defense,

intelligence, law enforcement, and economic – to act

swiftly and to anticipate new opportunities and threats

in today’s continually evolving, highly complex

international security environment. Preparing for an

uncertain future also means that we must have a

strong, competitive, technologically superior,

innovative and responsive industrial and research

and development base.

Within the military, transformation requires that we

strike a balance among funding three critical

priorities: maintaining the ability of our forces to

shape and respond today, modernizing to protect the

long-term readiness of the force, and transforming

our unparalleled capabilities to ensure we can

effectively shape and respond in the future.

Transformation also means taking prudent steps to

position ourselves to effectively counter unlikely but

significant future threats, particularly asymmetric
21

threats. We also must work with Allies and coalition

partners to help improve their defense capabilities

and interoperability with our forces, in order to bolster

the effectiveness of multinational operations across

the full spectrum of potential military missions.

Transformation of our military forces is critical to

meeting the military challenges of the next century.

Exploiting the revolution in military affairs is

fundamental if U.S. forces are to retain their

dominance in an uncertain world. Investment in

research and development while closely monitoring

trends in likely future threats are important elements

of our transformation effort. A carefully planned and

focused modernization program will maintain our

technological superiority and replace Cold War-era

equipment with new systems and platforms capable

of supporting the full spectrum of military operations.

Transformation extends well beyond the acquisition

of new military systems – we seek to leverage

technological, doctrinal, operational and

organizational innovations to give U.S. forces greater

capabilities and flexibility. Joint Forces Command

and the Armed Services are pursuing an aggressive,

wide-ranging innovation and experimentation

program to achieve that transformation. The ongoing integration of the Active and Reserve

components into a Total Force is another important

element of the transformation. Despite the rapid

pace of technological innovation, the human

dimension of warfare remains timeless. In this era of

multinational operations and complex threats

involving ethnic, religious, and cultural strife, regional

expertise, language proficiency, and cross-cultural

communications skills have never been more

important to the U.S. military. We will continue to

transform and modernize our forces, ensure the

quality of our personnel, and explore new ways of

optimizing the Total Force for future missions.

To support the readiness, modernization and

transformation of our military forces, we will work with

the Congress to enact legislation to implement the

Defense Reform Initiative, which will free up

resources through a revolution in business affairs.

This effort includes competitive sourcing, acquisition

reform, transformation of logistics, and elimination of

excess infrastructure through two additional base

realignment and closure rounds. The Administration,

in partnership with the Congress, will continue to

assure we maintain the best-trained, best-equipped

and best-led military force in the world for the twentyfirst century.

In the area of law enforcement, the United States is

already facing criminal threats that are much broader

in scope and much more sophisticated than those we

have confronted in the past. Ongoing technological

and economic revolutions such as the Internet and

globalization of markets offer extraordinary benefits,

but will also continue to present new dangers. We

must prepare for the law enforcement challenges

arising from emerging technology, globalization of

trade and finance, and other international dynamics.

Our strategy for the future calls for the development

of new investigative tools and approaches as well as

increased integration of effort among law

enforcement agencies at all levels of government,

both in America and abroad.

We will continue efforts to construct appropriate

twenty-first century national security programs and

structures government-wide. We will continue to

foster innovative approaches and organizational

structures to better protect American lives, property

and interests at home and abroad.

Promoting Prosperity

The second core objective of our national security

strategy is to promote America’s prosperity through

efforts at home and abroad. Our economic and

security interests are inextricably linked. Prosperity at

home depends on stability in key regions with which we

trade or from which we import critical commodities,

such as oil and natural gas. Prosperity also demands

our leadership in international development, financial

and trade institutions. In turn, the strength of our

diplomacy, our ability to maintain an unrivaled military

and the attractiveness of our values abroad depend in

large part on the strength of our economy.

Strengthening Financial

Coordination

As national economies become more integrated

internationally, U.S. prosperity depends more than

ever on economic developments abroad.

Cooperation with other states and international
22

organizations is vital to protecting the health of the

global economic system and responding to financial

crises.

Global financial markets dominated by private capital

flows provide both opportunities and risks, as

highlighted by the international financial crisis of the

past two years. Our goal is to build a stable, resilient

global financial system that promotes strong global

economic growth while providing broad benefits in all

countries. We have worked with our G-7 partners

and the rest of the international community to pursue

reforms in six broad areas: strengthening and

reforming international institutions and arrangements;

enhancing transparency and promoting best

practices; strengthening financial regulation in

industrial countries; strengthening macroeconomic

policies and financial systems in emerging markets;

improving crisis prevention and management, and

involving the private sector; and promoting social

policies to protect the poor and most vulnerable.

The United States has played an important role in

initiating a process of broader participation in

financial architecture discussions, especially to

include a substantial number of emerging market

economies. In furtherance of this goal, we agreed to

create the G-20 to provide a new mechanism for

informal dialogue in the framework of the Bretton

Woods institutional system to broaden the

discussions on key economic and financial policy

issues and promote cooperation to achieve stable

and sustainable world economic growth.

International financial institutions, particularly the

International Monetary Fund (IMF), have an important

role to play in building a stronger global financial

system. To ensure that it is better positioned to meet

the challenges of the changed world, we are pursuing

a number of IMF reforms, including: requiring greater

openness and transparency; building strong national

financial systems; promoting an appropriate role for

the private sector in preventing and resolving

financial crises; and giving greater attention in IMF

country programs to governance, poverty reduction,

social, labor, and environmental concerns.

Promoting an Open Trading

System

In a world where over 96 percent of the world’s

consumers live outside the United States, we must

continue to expand our international trade to sustain

economic growth at home. The rapidly expanding

global economy presents enormous opportunities for

American companies and workers, particularly in

emerging markets. Our prosperity as a nation in the

twenty-first century will depend upon our ability to

compete effectively in international markets.

The Administration remains committed to carrying

forward the success of the Uruguay Round under the

General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT),

and to the success of the World Trade Organization

(WTO) as a forum for openly resolving disputes. We

completed the Information Technology Agreement,

which goes far toward eliminating tariffs on high

technology products, and concluded a landmark

WTO agreement that will dramatically liberalize trade

in telecommunications services. The WTO agenda

includes further negotiations to reform agricultural

trade, liberalize service sector markets, encourage

unfettered development of electronic commerce, and

strengthen protection for intellectual property rights.

We also have a full agenda of accession negotiations

with economies seeking to join the WTO. The United

States is setting high standards for accession in

terms of adherence to the rules and market access.

Accessions offer an opportunity to help ground new

economies in the rules-based trading system and

reinforce their own reform programs.

An OECD Convention on criminalizing the bribery of

foreign officials entered into force in 1999. The

United States and 16 other countries are currently

parties. It provides for a monitoring process, based

on peer review, to evaluate parties' implementation of

the Convention. As parties enact anti-bribery laws,

the tax deductibility of bribes to foreign officials will be

eliminated. We are seeking an agreement in the

WTO on transparency in government procurement.

We have also made important strides on labor issues.

WTO members have affirmed their commitment to

observing core labor standards: the right to organize

and bargain collectively, and prohibitions against

employment discrimination, child labor and forced

labor. We will continue pressing for better integration

of the international core labor standards into the WTO's

work, including through closer WTO interaction with the

International Labor Organization (ILO).

We will continue to ensure that liberalization of trade

does not come at the expense of national security or
23

environmental protection. For example, the national

security, law enforcement and trade policy communities

worked together to make sure that the WTO agreement

liberalizing global investment in telecommunications

was consistent with U.S. national security interests.

Moreover, our leadership in the Uruguay Round

negotiations led to the incorporation of environmental

provisions into the WTO agreements and creation of

the Committee on Trade and Environment, which

continues to pursue the goal of ensuring that trade and

environment policies are mutually supportive.

Although significant differences remain, we made

progress on this broad agenda at the recent WTO

Ministerial meeting in Seattle. We will work to ensure

that a new round of global trade talks includes

bringing down barriers in agriculture, manufacturing

and services, keeping electronic commerce tariff-free,

and ensuring that trade will lift living conditions for

working people everywhere while protecting the

environment. We remain determined to move

forward on the path of free trade and economic

growth while ensuring that a human face is put on the

global economy.

In addition to working in the WTO, the Administration

will continue to press for more open markets through

regional economic organizations – such as the Asia

Pacific Economic Cooperation Forum (APEC), the

Transatlantic Economic Partnership, the President’s

economic partnership with sub-Saharan Africa, and

the Free Trade Area of the Americas (FTAA).

Trade agreement implementing authority is essential

for advancing our nation’s economic interests.

Congress has consistently recognized that the

President must have the authority to break down

foreign trade barriers and create good jobs.

Accordingly, the Administration will continue to work

with Congress to fashion an appropriate grant of fast

track authority.

Enhancing American

Competitiveness

Gaining full benefit of more open markets requires an

integrated strategy that maintains our technological

advantages, promotes American exports abroad, and

ensures that export controls intended to protect our

national security do not unnecessarily make U.S. high

technology companies less competitive globally.

Technological advantage. We will continue to

support a vigorous science and technology base that

promotes economic growth, creates high-wage jobs,

sustains a healthy, educated citizenry, and provides the

basis for our future military systems. We will invest in

education and training to develop a workforce capable

of participating in our rapidly changing economy. And

we will invest in world-class transportation, information

and space infrastructures for the twenty-first century.

Export Advocacy. The Administration created

America’s first national export strategy, reforming the

way government works with the private sector to

expand exports. The Trade Promotion Coordination

Committee has been instrumental in improving export

promotion efforts, coordinating our export financing,

implementing a government-wide advocacy initiative,

and updating market information systems and product

standards education.

The export strategy is working, with the United States

regaining its position as the world’s largest exporter.

While our strong export performance has supported

millions of new, export-related jobs, we must export

more in the years ahead if we are to further strengthen

our trade balance position and raise living standards

with high-wage jobs.

Enhanced Export Control. The United States is a

world leader in high technology exports, including

satellites, cellular phones, computers, information

security, and commercial aircraft. Some of this

technology has direct or indirect military applications,

or may otherwise be used by states or transnational

organizations to threaten our national security. For

that reason, the United States government carefully

controls high technology exports by placing

appropriate restrictions on the sale of goods and

technologies that could be used for military purposes

or otherwise impair our security. These controls

recognize that in an increasingly competitive global

economy where there are many non-U.S. suppliers,

excessive restrictions will not limit the availability of

high technology goods. Rather, they would serve

only to make U.S. high technology companies less

competitive globally, thus losing market share and

becoming less able to produce cutting-edge products

for the U.S. military and our allies.

Our current policy recognizes that we must balance a

variety of factors. While acting to promote high

technology exports by making license decisions more

transparent, predictable and timely through a rigorous
24

licensing process administered by the Department of

Commerce, we also expanded review of dual-use

applications by the Departments of Defense, State

and Energy. If any of these agencies disagree with a

proposed export, it can put the issue into a dispute

resolution process that can ultimately rise to the

President. As a result, reviews of dual-use licenses

are today more thorough than ever before. In the

case of munitions exports, we are committed to a

policy of responsible restraint in the transfer of

conventional arms and technologies that could

contribute to WMD. A key goal in the years ahead is

to strengthen worldwide controls in those areas.

Encryption is an example of a specific technology

where careful balance is required. Export controls on

encryption must be considered as part of an overall

policy that balances several important national

interests, including promoting secure electronic

commerce, protecting privacy rights, supporting

public safety and national security interests, and

maintaining U.S. industry leadership. Over the past

year, the Administration, in consultation with industry

and privacy groups, conducted a review of its

encryption policy as well as foreign and domestic

markets, and announced an updated policy in

September 1999. While continuing a balanced

approach, the new policy significantly streamlines

export controls while protecting critical national

security interests. When the new encryption export

regulation is published in early 2000, U.S. companies

will be afforded new opportunities to sell their

encryption products without limits on key length to

global businesses, commercial organizations and

individuals. Most U.S. mass-market software

products, previously limited to 40 and 56 bit keys, will

be approved for export to any end user.

Similarly, computers are a technology where we must

apply export controls in a manner that addresses our

national security concerns and continues to help

strengthen America’s competitiveness. In doing so,

we face extraordinarily rapid technological changes.

Maintaining outdated controls on commodity level

computers would hurt U.S. companies without

benefiting our national security. Recognizing this, the

Administration announced reforms to export controls

on computers in July 1999 that permit higher levels of

computers to be sold to countries which are friendly

to the United States. For countries that present risks

from a national security viewpoint, the Administration

will continue its policy of maintaining a lower

threshold for military end-users than civilian endusers. Export control agencies will review advances

in computer technology on an ongoing basis and will

provide the President with recommendations to

update computer export controls every six months.

U.S. efforts to stem proliferation cannot be effective

without the cooperation of other countries. We have

strengthened cooperation through the Nuclear

Suppliers Group, the Missile Technology Control

Regime, the Zangger Committee, the Australia Group

for the control of chemical and biological weaponsrelated related items, and the Wassenaar

Arrangement for greater transparency in conventional

arms transfers. These efforts enlist the world

community in the battle against the proliferation of

weapons of mass destruction, advanced conventional

weapons and sensitive technologies, while at the

same time producing a level playing field for U.S.

business by ensuring that our competitors face

corresponding export controls.

Providing for Energy Security

The United States depends on oil for about 40 percent

of its primary energy needs, and roughly half of our oil

needs are met with imports. And although we import

less than 15% of the oil exported from the Persian Gulf,

our allies in Europe and Japan account for about 80%

of those exports. The United States is undergoing a

fundamental shift away from reliance on Middle East

oil. Venezuela is our number one foreign supplier, and

Africa supplies 15% of our imported oil. Canada,

Mexico and Venezuela combined supply almost twice

as much oil to the United States as the Arab OPEC

countries. The Caspian Basin, with potential oil

reserves of 160 billion barrels, promises to play an

increasingly important role in meeting rising world

energy demand in coming decades.

Conservation measures and research leading to

greater energy efficiency and alternative fuels are a

critical element of the U.S. strategy for energy

security. Our research must continue to focus on

developing highly energy-efficient buildings,

appliances, and transportation and industrial

systems, shifting them where possible to alternative

or renewable fuels, such as hydrogen, fuel cell

technology, ethanol, or methanol from biomass.

Conservation and energy research notwithstanding, the

United States will continue to have a vital interest in
25

ensuring access to foreign oil sources. We must

continue to be mindful of the need for regional stability

and security in key producing areas to ensure our

access to, and the free flow of, these resources.

Promoting Sustainable

Development

Developing countries face an array of challenges in

their efforts to achieve broad-based economic and

social progress and participate more fully in the

opportunities presented by globalization. Poor

environmental and natural resource management can

impede sustainable development efforts and promote

regional instability. Many nations are struggling to

provide jobs, education and other services to their

citizens. Three billion people, half the world’s

population, subsist on less than two dollars a day. Their

continued poverty leads to hunger, malnutrition,

economic migration and political unrest. Malaria, AIDS

and other epidemics, including some that can spread

through environmental damage, threaten to overwhelm

the health facilities of developing countries, disrupt

societies and economic growth, and spread disease to

other parts of the world.

Sustainable development brings higher incomes and

more open markets that create steadily expanding

opportunities for U.S. trade and investment. It

improves the prospects for democracy and social

stability in developing countries and increases global

economic growth, on which the demand for U.S.

exports depends. It alleviates pressure on the global

environment, reduces the attraction of the illegal drug

trade and other illicit commerce, and improves health

and economic productivity. U.S. foreign assistance

focuses on five key elements of sustainable

development: broad-based economic growth, human

capacity development, environmental protection,

population and health, and democracy. We will

continue to advocate environmentally sound private

investment and responsible approaches by

international lenders.

Promoting Democracy and

Human Rights

The third core objective of our national security

strategy is to promote democracy, human rights, and

respect for the rule of law. In the past decade, the

movement of nations away from repressive

governance and toward democratic and publicly

accountable institutions has been extraordinary. Since

the success of many of those changes is by no means

assured, our strategy must focus on strengthening the

commitment and capacity of nations to implement

democratic reforms, protect human rights, fight

corruption and increase transparency in government.

Emerging Democracies

The United States works to strengthen democratic and

free market institutions and norms in all countries,

particularly those making the transition from closed to

open societies. This commitment to see freedom and

respect for human rights take hold is not only just, but

pragmatic. Our security depends upon the protection

and expansion of democracy worldwide, without which

repression, corruption and instability could engulf a

number of countries and threaten the stability of entire

regions.

The sometimes-difficult road for new democracies in

the 1990’s demonstrates that free elections are not

enough. Genuine, lasting democracy also requires

respect for human rights, including the right to political

dissent; freedom of religion and belief; an independent

media capable of engaging an informed citizenry; a

robust civil society; the rule of law and an independent

judiciary; open and competitive economic structures;

mechanisms to safeguard minorities from oppressive

rule by the majority; full respect for women’s and

workers’ rights; and civilian control of the military.

The United States is helping consolidate democratic

and market reforms in Central and Eastern Europe

and the newly independent states of the former Soviet

Union. Integrating new democracies in Europe into

European political, economic and security

organizations, such as NATO, OSCE, the EU and the

Council of Europe, will help lock in and preserve the

impressive progress these nations have made in

instituting democratic and market-economic reforms.

Consolidating advances in democracy and free

markets in our own hemisphere remain a priority. In

the Asia Pacific region, economic dynamism is

increasingly associated with political modernization,

democratic evolution, and the widening of the rule of

law. Indonesia’s October 1999 election was a

significant step toward democracy and we will do our

part to help Indonesia continue on that path. In
26

Africa, we are particularly attentive to states, such as

South Africa and Nigeria, whose entry into the

community of market democracies may influence the

future direction of an entire region.

The methods for assisting emerging democracies are

as varied as the nations involved. Our public

diplomacy programs are designed to share our

democratic experience in both government and civil

society with the publics in emerging democracies. We

must continue leading efforts to mobilize international

economic and political resources, as we have with

Russia, Ukraine and other countries in Eastern Europe

and Eurasia and with Southeast Europe. We must take

firm action to help counter attempts to reverse

democracy, as we have in Haiti and Paraguay.

We must help democratizing nations strengthen the

pillars of civil society, supporting administration of

justice and rule of law programs, promoting the

principle of civilian control of the military, and training

foreign police and security forces to solve crimes and

maintain order without violating the basic rights of

their citizens. And we must seek to improve their

market institutions and fight corruption and political

discontent by encouraging good governance practices

and a free and independent local media that promotes

these principles.

Adherence to Universal Human

Rights and Democratic Principles

We must sustain our efforts to press for adherence to

democratic principles, and respect for basic human

rights and the rule of law worldwide, including in

countries that continue to defy democratic advances.

Working bilaterally and through international

institutions, the United States promotes universal

adherence to democratic principles and international

standards of human rights. Our efforts in the United

Nations and other organizations are helping to make

these principles the governing standards for

acceptable international behavior.

Ethnic conflict represents a great challenge to our

values and our security. When it erupts in ethnic

cleansing or genocide, ethnic conflict is a grave

violation of universal human rights. Innocent civilians

should not be subject to forcible relocation or

slaughter because of their religious, ethnic, racial, or

tribal heritage. In addition to being a cause for

concern on humanitarian grounds, ethnic conflict can

threaten regional stability and may give rise to

potentially serious national security concerns.

We will work to strengthen the capacity of the

international community to prevent and, whenever

possible, stop outbreaks of mass killing and

displacement. The United States and other countries

cannot respond to every humanitarian crisis in the

world. But when the world community has the power

to stop genocide and ethnic cleansing, we will work

with our allies and partners, and with the United

Nations, to mobilize against such violence – as we

did in Bosnia and Kosovo.

Our response will not be the same in every case.

Sometimes collective military action is both

appropriate and feasible. Sometimes concerted

economic and political pressure, combined with

diplomacy, is a better answer. The way the

international community responds will depend upon

the capacity of countries to act, and on their

perception of their national interests.

Events in the Bosnia conflict and preceding the 1994

genocide in Rwanda demonstrate the unfortunate

power of inaccurate and malicious information in

conflict-prone situations. We must enhance our ability

to make effective use of our communications and

information capabilities to counter misinformation and

incitement, mitigate ethnic conflict, promote

independent media organizations and the free flow of

information, and support democratic participation.

We will also continue to work – bilaterally and with

international institutions – to ensure that international

human rights principles protect the most vulnerable

or traditionally oppressed groups in the world –

women, children, workers, refugees and other

persecuted persons. To this end, we will seek to

strengthen international mechanisms that promote

human rights and address violations of international

humanitarian law, such as the UN Human Rights

Commission and the international war crimes tribunals

for the former Yugoslavia and Rwanda. We strongly

support wide ratification of the ILO Convention on the

Worst Forms of Child Labor. We also aim to

implement fully those international human rights

treaties to which we are a party.

It is our aim to ensure temporary protection for persons

fleeing situations of armed conflict or generalized

human rights abuses by encouraging governments to
27

not return refugees to countries where they face

persecution or torture. We also seek to focus

additional attention on the more vulnerable or

traditionally oppressed people by spearheading new

international initiatives to combat the sexual

exploitation of minors, child labor, homelessness

among children, and the use of child soldiers.

Violence against and trafficking in women and

children are international problems with national

implications. We have seen cases of trafficking in the

United States for purposes of forced prostitution,

sweatshop labor and domestic servitude. Our efforts

have expanded to combat this problem, both

nationally and internationally, by increasing

awareness, focusing on prevention, providing victim

assistance and protection, and enhancing law

enforcement. The President continues to call upon

the Senate to give its advice and consent to

ratification to the Convention on the Elimination of all

Forms of Discrimination Against Women, which will

enhance our efforts to combat violence against

women, reform unfair inheritance and property rights,

and strengthen women's access to fair employment

and economic opportunity.

Promotion of religious freedom is one of the highest

concerns in our foreign policy. Freedom of thought,

conscience and religion is a bedrock issue for the

American people. To that end, the President signed

the International Religious Freedom Act of 1998, which

provides the flexibility needed to advance religious

freedom and to counter religious persecution. In

September 1999, we completed the first phase outlined

in the Act with publication of the first annual report on

the status of religious freedom worldwide, and in

October, we designated the most severe violators of

religious freedom. The United States is active

throughout the world assisting those who are

persecuted because of their religion and promoting

freedom of religious belief and practice. We will

continue to work with individual nations and with

international institutions to combat religious

persecution and promote religious freedom.

The United States will continue to speak out against

human rights abuses and carry on human rights

dialogues with countries willing to engage with us

constructively. Because police and internal security

services can be a source of human rights violations,

we use training and contacts between U.S. law

enforcement and their foreign counterparts to help

address these problems. We do not provide training

to police or military units implicated in human rights

abuses. When appropriate, we are prepared to take

strong measures against human rights violators.

These include economic sanctions, visa restrictions

and restricting sales of arms and police equipment that

may be used to commit human rights abuses.

Humanitarian Activities

Our efforts to promote democracy and human rights

are complemented by our humanitarian programs,

which are designed to alleviate human suffering,

address resource and economic crises that could

have global implications, pursue appropriate

strategies for economic development, and support

and promote democratic regimes that respect human

rights and the rule of law.

We also must seek to promote reconciliation in states

experiencing civil conflict and to address migration and

refugee crises. To this end, the United States will

provide appropriate financial support and work with

other nations and international bodies, such as the

International Committee of the Red Cross and the UN

High Commissioner for Refugees. We also will assist

efforts to protect the rights of refugees and displaced

persons and to address the economic and social root

causes of internal displacement and international

flight.

Private firms and non-governmental organizations are

natural allies in activities and efforts intended to

address humanitarian crises and bolster democracy

and market economies. We have natural partners in

labor unions, human rights groups, environmental

advocates, chambers of commerce and election

monitors in promoting democracy and respect for

human rights and in providing international

humanitarian assistance; thus, we should promote

democratization efforts through private and nongovernmental groups as well as foreign governments.

Supporting the global movement toward democracy

requires a pragmatic, long-term effort focused on both

values and institutions. Our goal is a broadening of the

community of free-market democracies, and stronger

institutions and international non-governmental

movements committed to human rights and

democratization.
28
29

III. Integrated Regional Approaches

Our policies toward different regions reflect our overall

strategy tailored to their unique challenges and

opportunities.

Europe and Eurasia

European stability is vital to our own security. The

United States has two strategic goals in Europe. The

first is to build a Europe that is truly integrated,

democratic, prosperous and at peace -- a realization

of the vision the United States launched 50 years ago

with the Marshall Plan and the North Atlantic Treaty

Organization (NATO). Our second goal is to work

with our allies and partners across the Atlantic to

meet the global challenges no nation can meet alone.

This means working together to consolidate this

region’s historic transition in favor of democracy and

free markets; to support peace efforts in troubled

regions; to tackle global threats such as

environmental and health problems, terrorism, drug

trafficking, the spread of weapons of mass

destruction and other potentially dangerous

technologies; and to build a more open world

economy without barriers to transatlantic trade and

investment.

Enhancing Security

NATO remains the anchor of American engagement

in Europe and the linchpin of transatlantic security.

As the leading guarantor of European security and a

force for European stability, NATO must play a

leading role in promoting a more integrated and secure

Europe, prepared to respond to new challenges. We

will maintain approximately 100,000 military personnel

in Europe to fulfill our commitments to NATO, provide

a visible deterrent against aggression and coercion,

contribute to regional stability, respond to crises,

sustain our vital transatlantic ties and preserve U.S.

leadership in NATO.

NATO is pursuing several initiatives to enhance its

ability to respond to the new challenges it will face in

the twenty-first century. At NATO's Fiftieth

Anniversary Summit in April 1999, Alliance leaders

adopted an expansive agenda to adapt and prepare

NATO for current and future challenges. This

included an updated Strategic Concept, which

envisions a larger, more capable and more flexible

Alliance, committed to collective defense and able to

undertake new missions. The Defense Capabilities

Initiative aims to improve defense capabilities and

interoperability among NATO military forces, thus

bolstering the effectiveness of multinational

operations across the full spectrum of Alliance

missions, to include Partner forces where

appropriate. The WMD Initiative will increase Alliance

efforts against weapons of mass destruction and their

means of delivery.

NATO enlargement has been a crucial element of the

U.S. and Allied strategy to build an undivided,

peaceful Europe. At the April 1999 NATO Summit,

the alliance welcomed the entry of Poland, Hungary

and the Czech Republic as new members. These

three nations will make the Alliance stronger while

helping to enlarge Europe's zone of democratic

stability.

Together with our Allies, we are pursuing efforts to

help other countries that aspire to membership

become the best possible candidates. These efforts

include the NATO Membership Action Plan and our

Partnership for Peace. We are also continuing

bilateral programs to advance this agenda, such as

the President’s Warsaw Initiative, which is playing a

critical role in promoting Western-style reform of the

armed forces of Central and Eastern Europe and

Eurasia and helping them become more

interoperable with NATO. Some European nations

do not desire NATO membership, but do desire

strengthened ties with the Alliance. The Partnership

for Peace provides an ideal vehicle for such

relationships. It formalizes relations, provides a
30

mechanism for mutual beneficial interaction and

establishes a sound basis for combined action should

that be desired. This can be seen in the major

contributions some Partnership for Peace members

have made to NATO missions in the Balkans.

NATO is pursuing several other initiatives to enhance

its ability to respond to new challenges and deepen

ties between the Alliance and Partner countries.

NATO has launched the Euro-Atlantic Partnership

Council to strengthen political dialogue and practical

cooperation with all Partners, and established a

distinctive partnership with Ukraine, which provides a

framework for enhanced relations and practical

cooperation. As a result of the 1997 NATO-Russia

Founding Act, NATO and Russia launched the

Permanent Joint Council to enhance political

consultation and practical cooperation, while retaining

NATO's decision-making authority. Our shared goal

remains to deepen and expand constructive Russian

participation in the European security system.

The Organization for Security and Cooperation in

Europe (OSCE) has a key role to play in enhancing

Europe’s stability. It provides the United States with

a venue for developing Europe's security architecture

in a manner that complements our NATO strategy. In

many instances, cooperating through the OSCE to

secure peace, deter aggression, and prevent, defuse

and manage crises offers a comparative advantage

because it is more cost effective than unilateral

action. The November 1999 Istanbul OSCE Summit

agreed on principles and modalities to further such

cooperation in the Charter on European Security.

The Charter commits members to, among other

things, the establishment of Rapid Expert Assistance

and Cooperation Teams to assist in conflict

prevention and crisis management. The Charter also

recognizes that European security in the twenty-first

century increasingly depends on building security

within societies as well as security between states.

The United States will continue to give strong support

to the OSCE as our best choice to engage all the

countries of Europe, the Caucasus, and Central Asia

in an effort to advance democracy, human rights and

the rule of law, and to encourage them to support one

another when instability, insecurity and human rights

violations threaten peace in the region.

The Balkans and Southeastern Europe: The

United States has an abiding interest in peace in this

region because continued instability there threatens

European security. We are working to advance the

integration of several new democracies in

Southeastern Europe (Albania, Bosnia, Bulgaria,

Croatia, Macedonia, Romania, and Slovenia) into the

European mainstream. More specifically, the

President's Action Plan for Southeast Europe seeks

to promote further democratic, economic and military

reforms in these countries, to encourage greater

regional cooperation, advance common interests,

such as closer contact with NATO, and increased law

enforcement training and exchanges to assist in the

fight against organized crime. We are working to

promote increased security cooperation among

NATO Allies and Partners in the region through the

Southeast Europe Defense Ministerial process and

NATO’s Southeast Europe Initiative. We are also

working with the region, the EU and others to

strengthen overall democratization, economic

development and security through the Stability Pact

for Southeastern Europe, initiated by the EU and

launched by President Clinton and other leaders at

Sarajevo in July 1999. The Pact also seeks to

deepen regional cooperation and draw those

countries closer to the rest of Europe and the United

States, thereby giving them an opportunity to

demonstrate that they are ready for integration into

Euro-Atlantic institutions.

Kosovo and Serbia-Montenegro: After this year’s

successful NATO intervention in Kosovo, the stability

of the Balkans is still threatened by the vestiges of

ethnic hatred and political repression. As the United

States and NATO remain engaged in helping the

people of the region build a stable and secure future

for the Balkans, we remain prepared to address

renewed threats to the region’s stability.

Constitutional challenges between Serbia and a

democratic and reform-minded Montenegro pose a

danger for renewed conflict. And in Kosovo, the last

decade of Serbia’s systemic repression of Kosovar

Albanians leaves a volatile mixture of

disenfranchisement, displacement and revengeseekers.

NATO military operations against Serbia in the spring

of 1999 had three clear goals: the withdrawal of all

Serb military, paramilitary, and police forces from

Kosovo; the unconditional and safe return of all

refugees and displaced persons to Kosovo; and

deployment of an international security force, with

NATO at its core, to protect all the people of Kosovo

-- Serbs, Albanians and others. Those goals were

achieved. Now, NATO, the UN and the international

community face the challenge of establishing a stable
31

environment that provides for the security and dignity

of all people in Kosovo. Much has been achieved to

this end. Mine fields are being cleared; homes are

being rebuilt; nearly a million Kosovars who returned

to the province are receiving food, shelter and

medicine; investigations into the fate of the missing

are ongoing; and the Kosovar Liberation Army has

been demilitarized.

Over 48,000 troops from 30 countries have

participated in the Kosovo Force (KFOR). Our

European allies have provided the vast majority of

them; America will continue to contribute about

7,000. Russian and other non-NATO participation in

KFOR remains an important demonstration of

international commitment and provides reassurance

to all the people of Kosovo that they will live in peace

and security. KFOR continues to operate under

NATO command and control and rules of

engagement set by NATO. It has the means and the

mandate to protect itself while doing its job. Under

the security environment established by KFOR, the

United Nations has established an interim civilian

administration and a 4,700-person international

police force that will assist the Kosovars in building

institutions of self-government. As local institutions

take hold, and as international and indigenous police

forces establish law and order, NATO will be able to

turn over increasing responsibility to them.

A final challenge will be to encourage Serbia to join

its neighbors in this historic journey to a peaceful,

democratic, united Europe. But as long as Slobodan

Milosevic remains in power we will not provide

support for the reconstruction of Serbia. We are

providing humanitarian aid, and will be willing to help

build a better future for Serbia when its government

represents tolerance and freedom, not repression

and terror. We are also providing support for

democratic forces in Serbia to strengthen

independent political parties and a free media, and to

accelerate Serbia's transition to democracy.

Bosnia and Croatia: Full implementation of the

Dayton Accords is the best hope for creating a selfsustaining peace in Bosnia. NATO-led forces are

contributing to a secure environment in Bosnia and

providing essential support for broader progress in

implementing the Dayton Accords. However, further

progress is necessary to create conditions that will

allow implementation to continue without a major

international military presence. We continue to

support the efforts of the International Criminal Tribunal

for the former Yugoslavia by assisting in the location,

detention and transfer of suspected war criminals, and

supporting the international community’s efforts to

eliminate corruption, expose outside influence, facilitate

the return of refugees, and promote justice and

reconciliation in Bosnia. We are working to accelerate

market economic reforms in Bosnia and Croatia and

support a transition to democracy in Croatia.

Cyprus and the Aegean: Tensions on Cyprus,

Greek-Turkish disagreements in the Aegean and

Turkey’s relationship with the EU have serious

implications for regional stability and the evolution of

European political and security structures. Our goals

are to stabilize the region by reducing long-standing

Greek-Turkish tensions and pursuing a comprehensive

settlement on Cyprus. A democratic, secular, stable

and Western-oriented Turkey is critical to these efforts

and has supported broader U.S. efforts to enhance

stability in Bosnia, the nations of the former Soviet

Union and the Middle East, as well as to contain Iran

and Iraq. The President’s recent trip to Turkey and

Greece highlighted encouraging signs of progress for

reconciliation in the region, including talks on the

Cyprus dispute that are being held under the auspices

of the UN in New York. The EU's historic decision at its

Helsinki Summit to grant candidate status to Turkey

reinforced this positive trend.

The Baltic States: The special nature of our

relationship with Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania is

recognized in the 1998 Charter of Partnership, which

clarifies the principles upon which U.S. relations with

the Baltic states are based and provides a framework

for strengthening ties and pursuing common goals.

These goals include integration of Latvia, Lithuania

and Estonia into the transatlantic community and

development of close, cooperative relationships

among all the states in Northeastern Europe.

Through the Northern European Initiative we seek to

strengthen regional cooperation, enhance regional

security and stability, and promote the growth of

Western institutions, trade and investment by

bringing together the governments and private sector

interests in the Baltic and Nordic countries, Poland,

Germany and Russia.

Northern Ireland: Historic progress was achieved in

implementing the Good Friday Accord when, on

December 2, 1999, an inclusive power-sharing

government was formed in Northern Ireland, the

principle of consent was accepted with respect to any
32

change in the territorial status of Northern Ireland,

new institutions were launched for North-South

cooperation on the island of Ireland, and the Irish

Republican Army named a representative to the

Independent International Commission on

Decommissioning of paramilitary weapons (loyalist

paramilitaries named their representatives to the

commission soon thereafter). These developments

followed continued progress in promoting human

rights and equality in Northern Ireland, including the

important recommendations put forward for police

reform in the Patten Report issued on September 9,

1999.

The United States continues to work with the British

and Irish governments and the political leaders in

Northern Ireland to achieve full implementation of the

Good Friday Accord. Working through the

International Fund for Ireland and the private sector,

we will help the people seize the opportunities that

peace will bring to attract new investment and bridge

the community divide, create new factories,

workplaces and jobs, and establish new centers of

learning for the twenty-first Century.

Russia and the Newly Independent States (NIS):

There is no historical precedent for the transition

underway in Russia, Ukraine, and other NIS. The

United States has core national interests at stake in

those endeavors and has acted quickly to help

people across the NIS to break the back of the Soviet

regime. But the Soviet system’s collapse created

new challenges. In Russia, for example, rigidity often

gave way to laxness and disorder – too many rules

were replaced by too few. The United States’

strategy of engagement with each of the NIS

recognizes that their transformation will be a longterm endeavor, with far-reaching implications for

regional and global stability, as well as

disappointments and setbacks along the way.

Russia, Ukraine, and most other NIS are now

electoral democracies, although we will continue to

engage with all these countries to improve their

electoral processes and help strengthen civil society

by working with grassroots organization, independent

media and emerging entrepreneurs. Though the

transition from communism to market democracy is

far from complete, the NIS have largely dismantled

state controls over their economies and liberalized

prices. It is in our national interest to help them build

the laws, institutions and skills needed for a market

democracy, to fight crime and corruption and to

advance human rights and the rule of law. The

conflict in Chechnya represents a major problem in

Russia’s post-Communist development and

relationship with the international community; the

means Russia is pursuing in Chechnya are

undermining its legitimate objective of upholding its

territorial integrity and protecting citizens from

terrorism and lawlessness.

The United States strategy in Russia and the NIS has

made every American safer. Threat reduction

programs have helped deactivate former Soviet

nuclear warheads and make it far less likely that

sensitive materials, technology, expertise, or

equipment do not fall into the wrong hands. We are

working aggressively to strengthen export controls in

Russia and the other NIS and to stem proliferation of

sensitive missile and nuclear technology to countries

of concern such as Iran. The Administration has

supported the sovereignty and territorial integrity of

the NIS, including through agreement on an adapted

CFE Treaty, which provides schedules for the

withdrawal of Russian forces from Georgia and

Moldova. The integration of Russia, Ukraine, and

other NIS with the new Europe and the international

community remains a key priority. Despite

disagreements over NATO enlargement and the

Kosovo conflict, Russian troops serve shoulder-toshoulder with U.S. and NATO forces in Kosovo and

Bosnia. The United States remains committed to

further development of the NATO-Russia relationship

and the NATO-Ukraine distinctive partnership.

Promoting Prosperity

Europe is a key element in America's global

commercial engagement. Europe and the United

States produce almost half of all global goods and

services; more than 60% of total U.S. investment

abroad is in Europe; and fourteen million workers on

both sides of the Atlantic earn their livelihoods from

transatlantic commerce. As part of the New

Transatlantic Agenda launched in 1995, the United

States and the EU agreed to take concrete steps to

reduce barriers to trade and investment through

creation of an open New Transatlantic Marketplace and

through Mutual Recognition Agreements in goods that

eliminate redundant testing and certification

requirements. Our governments are also cooperating

closely with the civil society dialogues established

under the New Transatlantic Agenda: the Transatlantic
33

Business Dialogue, Transatlantic Consumer Dialogue,

Transatlantic Environment Dialogue, and Transatlantic

Labor Dialogue. These people-to-people dialogues

create opportunities for increased communication

focusing on best practices, and can help their

governments identify and reduce barriers to greater

transatlantic interaction. In return, our governments

should be committed to listen, learn, and facilitate.

Building on the New Transatlantic Agenda, the United

States and the EU launched the Transatlantic

Economic Partnership in 1998 to deepen our

economic relations, reinforce our political ties and

reduce trade frictions. The first element of the

initiative is reducing barriers that affect

manufacturing, agriculture and services. In the

manufacturing area we are focusing on standards

and technical barriers that American businesses have

identified as the most significant obstacle to

expanding trade. In the agricultural area we are

focusing on regulatory barriers that have inhibited the

expansion of agriculture trade, particularly in the

biotechnology area. In the area of services we seek

to facilitate trade in specific service sectors, thereby

creating new opportunities for the service industries

that are already so active in the European market.

The second element of the Transatlantic Economic

Partnership is a broader, cooperative approach to

addressing a wide range of trade issues. We will

continue not imposing duties on electronic

transmissions and develop a work program in the

WTO for electronic commerce. We will seek to adopt

common positions and effective strategies for

accelerating compliance with WTO commitments on

intellectual property. We will seek to promote

government procurement opportunities, including

promoting compatibility of electronic procurement

information and government contracting systems. To

promote fair competition, we will seek to enhance the

compatibility of our procedures with potentially

significant reductions in cost for American

companies.

The United States strongly supports the process of

European integration embodied in the EU. We support

EU enlargement, and we are also encouraging bilateral

trade and investment in non-EU countries. We

recognize that EU nations face significant economic

challenges and that periods of economic stagnation

have eroded public support for funding

outward-looking foreign policies and greater

integration. We are working closely with our

European partners to expand employment, promote

long-term growth and support the New Transatlantic

Agenda.

By supporting historic market reforms in Central and

Eastern Europe and in the NIS, we help new

democracies take root by avoiding conditions, such

as corruption and poverty, that can weaken

democratic governance and erode the appeal of

democratic values. The United States will continue

helping the NIS economies integrate into international

economic and other institutions and develop healthy

business climates. We will continue to promote

political and economic reform in Russia, working to

create a thriving market economy while guarding

against corruption.

We are working with many NIS countries to promote

their accession to the WTO on commercially fair terms.

Building on successful accession of Kyrgyzstan, Latvia

and Estonia, we have made significant progress on the

accession of Georgia, Albania, Armenia, Croatia,

Lithuania and Moldova. We also have held fruitful

discussions on WTO with Russia and Ukraine. We

will continue to mobilize the international community

to provide assistance to support reform and to help

the Central and Eastern European and NIS countries

stimulate foreign and domestic private investment.

We are also encouraging investment in these

countries, especially by U.S. companies.

 We are focusing particular attention on investment in

Caspian energy resources and their export from the

Caucasus region to world markets, thereby expanding

and diversifying world energy supplies and promoting

prosperity in the region. A stable and prosperous

Caucasus and Central Asia will facilitate rapid

development and transport to international markets of

the large Caspian oil and gas resources, with

substantial U.S. commercial participation. Resolution

of regional conflicts such as Nagorno-Karabakh and

Abkhazia is important for creating the stability

necessary for development and transport of Caspian

resources.

On November 18, 1999, President Clinton was

present in Istanbul, Turkey for the signing of the

Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan pipeline agreement and the

Trans-Caspian Gas Pipeline Declaration. We

actively supported the negotiations leading to these

agreements and will continue to be actively engaged

in both pipeline projects. We believe that the BakuTbilisi-Ceyhan pipeline and the trans-Caspian gas
34

pipeline are commercially viable. The Export-Import

Bank and OPIC stand ready to provide the necessary

financing and insurance on a commercial basis to

help bring these projects to fruition. The transCaspian gas pipeline is planned to begin delivering

gas to Turkey in 2002 and the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan

pipeline is planned to begin delivering oil by 2004.

We support these agreements because they will

achieve several important goals. They will help fulfill

our commitment to the prosperity and independence

of the Caspian states. The agreements will help the

development of their societies into democratic, stable

commonwealths, and will bolster relationships among

the states. Countries on both sides of the Caspian –

Azerbaijan, Turkey, Georgia, Kazakhstan and

Turkmenistan – will be working together, united by a

single vision. Development of Caspian energy

resources will improve our energy security, as well as

that of Turkey and other allies. It will create

commercial opportunities for U.S. companies and

other companies around the world. The Baku-TbilisiCeyhan pipeline is also the most environmentally

sound approach to transporting oil resources from the

Caspian region to world markets.

Promoting Democracy

Democratic reforms in Central and Eastern Europe

and Eurasia are the best measures to avert conditions

that could foster ethnic violence and regional conflict.

Already, the prospect of joining or rejoining the

Western democratic family has strengthened the forces

of democracy and reform in many countries of the

region. Together with our West European partners

we are helping these nations build civil societies. For

example, the CIVITAS organization has carried out a

joint civic education program in Bosnia-Herzegovina,

and a similar project is planned for Ukraine.

Throughout the region, targeted exchange programs

have familiarized key decision-makers and opinionmolders with the workings of American democracy.

The independence, sovereignty, territorial integrity, and

democratic and economic reform of the NIS are

important to American interests. To advance these

goals, we are utilizing our bilateral relationships and our

leadership of international institutions to mobilize

governmental and private resources. But the

circumstances affecting the smaller countries depend

in significant measure on the fate of reform in the

largest and most powerful—Russia. The United States

will continue to promote Russian reform and

international integration, and to build on the progress

that already has been made. Our economic and

political support for the Russian government depends

on its commitment to internal reform and a responsible

foreign policy.

East Asia and the Pacific

President Clinton’s vision of a new Pacific community

links security interests with economic growth and our

commitment to democracy and human rights. We

continue to build on that vision, cementing America’s

role as a stabilizing force in a more integrated Asia

Pacific region.

Enhancing Security

Our military presence has been essential to

maintaining the peace and security that have enabled

most nations in the Asia-Pacific region to build thriving

economies for the benefit of all. To deter aggression

and secure our own interests, we maintain about

100,000 military personnel in the region. The U.S.-

Japan security alliance anchors the U.S. presence in

the Asia-Pacific region. Our continuing security role is

further reinforced by our bilateral treaty alliances with

the Republic of Korea, Australia, Thailand and the

Philippines. We are maintaining healthy relations with

the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN)

and supporting regional dialogue – such as in the

ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) – on the full range of

common security challenges.

Japan: The United States and Japan reaffirmed our

bilateral security relationship in the April 1996 Joint

Security Declaration. The alliance remains the

cornerstone for achieving common security

objectives and for maintaining a peaceful and

prosperous environment for the Asia Pacific region as

we enter the twenty-first century. The 1997 revised

Guidelines for U.S.-Japan Defense Cooperation

create a solid basis for more effective and credible

U.S.-Japan cooperation in peacetime, in the event of

an armed attack on Japan, and in situations in areas

surrounding Japan. They provide a general

framework and policy direction for the roles and

missions of the two countries, and ways of

coordinating our efforts in peacetime and
35

contingencies. The revised Guidelines, like the U.S.-

Japan security relationship itself, are not directed

against any other country; rather, they enable the

U.S.-Japan alliance to continue fostering peace and

security throughout the region. In April 1998, in order

to support the new Guidelines, both governments

agreed to a revised Acquisition and Cross-Servicing

Agreement (ACSA) which expands the provision of

supplies and services to include reciprocal provision

of logistics support during situations surrounding

Japan that have an important influence on Japan’s

peace and security. Japan approved implementing

legislation for the Guidelines in the spring of 1999.

Japan’s generous host nation support for the U.S.

overseas presence also serves as a critical strategic

contribution to the alliance and to regional security.

Our bilateral security cooperation has broadened as

a result of recent agreements to undertake joint

research and development on theater missile

defense and to cooperate on Japan’s indigenous

satellite program. Moreover, we work closely with

Japan to promote regional peace and stability, seek

universal adherence to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation

Treaty, and address the dangers posed by transfers

of destabilizing conventional arms and sensitive dualuse technologies. Japan is providing $1 billion to the

Korean Peninsula Energy Development Organization

(KEDO), and consults closely with the United States

and ROK on issues relating to North Korea.

Korean Peninsula: Tensions on the Korean

Peninsula remain the leading threat to peace and

stability in East Asia. The Democratic People's

Republic of Korea (DPRK) has publicly stated a

preference for peaceful reunification, but continues to

dedicate a large portion of its dwindling resources to

its huge military forces. Renewed conflict has been

prevented since 1953 by a combination of the

Armistice Agreement, which brought an end to open

hostilities; the United Nations Command, which has

visibly represented the will of the UN Security Council

to secure peace; and the physical presence of U.S.

and ROK troops in the Combined Forces Command,

which has demonstrated the alliance’s resolve.

President Kim Dae-jung continues to pursue a course

toward peace and stability on the Korean peninsula,

seeking new channels of dialogue with North Korea

and developing areas of cooperation between South

and North. During their July 1999 meeting in

Washington, President Clinton and President Kim

reaffirmed the need for direct dialogue between

South and North to build a more permanent peace,

and the indispensability of the strong U.S.-ROK

defense alliance as a stabilizing pillar for the region.

President Clinton strongly restated his support for

President Kim’s vision of engagement and efforts

toward reconciliation with the North. The United

States is working to create conditions of stability by

maintaining solidarity with our South Korean ally,

emphasizing America’s commitment to shaping a

peaceful and prosperous Korean Peninsula, and

ensuring that an isolated and struggling North Korea

does not opt for a military solution to its political and

economic problems.

Peaceful resolution of the Korean conflict with a

democratic, non-nuclear, reunified peninsula will

enhance peace and security in the East Asian region

and is clearly in our strategic interest. We are willing to

improve bilateral political and economic ties with North

Korea – consistent with the objectives of our alliance

with the ROK – to draw the North into more normal

relations with the region and the rest of the world. But

our willingness to improve bilateral relations will

continue to be commensurate with the North’s

cooperation in efforts to reduce tensions on the

peninsula.

South Korea has set an example for nonproliferation

by forswearing nuclear weapons, accepting IAEA

safeguards, and developing a peaceful nuclear

program that brings benefits to the region. We are

firm that North Korea must maintain the freeze on

production and reprocessing of fissile material,

dismantle its graphite-moderated reactors and related

facilities, and fully comply with its NPT obligations

under the Agreed Framework. The United States, too,

must fulfill its obligations under the Agreed Framework

and the Administration will work with the Congress to

ensure the success of our efforts to address the North

Korean nuclear threat.

Beyond fully implementing the Agreed Framework, we

seek to eliminate North Korea’s development and

export of long-range missiles and weapons of mass

destruction through a step-by-step process. Based on

U.S.-North Korean discussions in September 1999, it is

our understanding that North Korea will continue to

refrain from testing long-range missiles of any kind as

we move toward more normal relations. Working

closely with our ROK and Japanese allies, we will

improve relations with North Korea on the basis of their

moving forward on the missile and WMD agendas, and
36

we will take necessary measures in the other direction

if the North chooses to go down a different path.

The North also needs to engage in a productive

dialogue with South Korea; continue the United Nations

Command-Korean People's Army General Officer

Dialogue at Panmunjom; participate constructively in

the Four Party Talks among the United States, China,

and North and South Korea to reduce tensions and

negotiate a peace agreement; and support our efforts

to recover the remains of American servicemen

missing since the Korean War.

China: A stable, open, prosperous People's

Republic of China (PRC) that respects international

norms and assumes its responsibilities for building a

more peaceful world is clearly and profoundly in our

interests. The prospects for peace and prosperity in

Asia depend heavily on China’s role as a responsible

member of the international community. Our policy

toward China is both principled and pragmatic,

expanding our areas of cooperation while dealing

forthrightly with our differences. Despite strains in the

relationship resulting from the tragic accidental

bombing of the PRC embassy in Belgrade, we have

continued to engage China on these issues.

The United States and China have taken a number of

additional steps to strengthen cooperation in

international affairs: presidential visits to each other's

capitals; establishing the Vice President-Premier

Forum on environment and development; regular

exchanges of visits by cabinet and sub-cabinet

officials to consult on political, military, security, arms

control and human rights issues; establishing a

consultation mechanism to strengthen military

maritime safety; holding discussions on humanitarian

assistance and disaster relief, and environmental

security; and establishing working groups on law

enforcement cooperation. China is also a major

partner in science, technology and health research.

U.S. interests have been advanced in discussions

with China on arms control and nonproliferation

issues. In 1998, the United States and China

announced that they will not target their strategic

nuclear weapons at each other and confirmed their

common goal of halting the spread of WMD. Both

our nations have signed the Comprehensive Test

Ban Treaty. We have consulted on the Missile

Technology Control Regime and missile

nonproliferation, and we continue to press China to

avoid destabilizing missile technology sales to other

countries. Both our nations have signed the

Chemical Weapons Convention, and we have agreed

to further strengthen controls on the export of dualuse chemicals and related production equipment and

technology to assure they are not used for production

of chemical weapons. China also has expanded the

list of chemical precursors that it controls. Both

nations have called for strengthening of the Biological

Weapons Convention and early conclusion of a

protocol establishing a practical and effective

mechanism to enhance compliance and improve

transparency. We also reached agreement with

China on practices for end-use visits on U.S. high

technology exports to China and continue a dialogue

on implementation of this agreement.

China is working with the United States on important

regional security issues. In South Asia, China has

condemned India and Pakistan for conducting

nuclear tests and joined us in urging them to conduct

no more tests, to sign the Comprehensive Test Ban

Treaty, to avoid deploying or testing missiles, and to

work to resolve their differences through dialogue.

On the Korean Peninsula, the United States and

China share an interest in peace and stability. We

have both worked to convince North Korea to freeze

its dangerous nuclear program, and believe the fourparty peace talks are an important tool in working

toward establishment of peace and stability in

Northeast Asia. To help maintain peace, security, and

stability in the Western Pacific and to promote our

broad foreign policy objectives we are implementing

fully the terms of the Taiwan Relations Act by

maintaining robust unofficial relations between the

American people and the people of Taiwan.

Our key security objectives for the future include:

sustaining the strategic dialogue begun by the recent

summits and other high-level exchanges; enhancing

stability in the Taiwan Strait through maintenance of

our “one China” policy, peaceful resolution of crossStrait issues and encouraging dialogue between

Beijing and Taipei; strengthening China's adherence

to international nonproliferation norms, particularly in

export controls on ballistic missile and dual-use

technologies; restarting our bilateral discussions on

arms control ; achieving greater openness and

transparency in China's military; encouraging a

constructive PRC role in international affairs through

active cooperation in multilateral fora such as the

ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) and the Asia Pacific

Economic Cooperation Forum (APEC); and
37

improving law enforcement cooperation in such areas

as counterterrorism and counternarcotics.

Southeast Asia: Our strategic interest in Southeast

Asia centers on developing regional and bilateral

security and economic relationships that assist in

conflict prevention and resolution and expand U.S.

participation in the region’s economies. U.S. security

objectives in the region are: to maintain our security

alliances with Australia, Thailand and the Philippines;

to sustain security access arrangements with

Singapore and other ASEAN countries; and to

encourage the emergence of a strong, cohesive

ASEAN capable of enhancing regional security and

prosperity. The Philippine Senate’s ratification of the

Visiting Forces Agreement (VFA) in May 1999 is one

example of how our continuing engagement

enhances both bilateral defense cooperation as well

as regional security interests.

Our policy combines two approaches. First, we must

maintain our increasingly productive relationship with

ASEAN and enhancing our security dialogue under

the ARF. Second, we must pursue bilateral initiatives

with individual Southeast Asian nations to promote

democracy, human rights and political stability; foster

market-oriented economic reforms; and reduce the

effects of organized crime, particularly the flow of

heroin from Burma and other countries in the region.

In 1999, the United States, in partnership with the

member nations of ASEAN, opened the International

Law Enforcement Academy in Bangkok, Thailand.

Officials of the U.S. Drug Enforcement

Administration, U.S. Customs Service, FBI and other

agencies provide high-caliber training in areas such

as drug trafficking, alien smuggling, cyber crime, and

other transnational threats. The International Law

Enforcement Academy also promotes cooperation

and information sharing, as well as significantly

improving regional counterdrug capabilities.

Promoting Prosperity

A prosperous and open Asia Pacific is key to the

economic health of the United States. On the eve of

the recent financial problems in Asia, the 21

members of APEC – which includes the United

States, Canada, Mexico, Peru, Chile and Russia,

along with East Asian nations – contributed about

one-half of total global gross domestic product and

exports. Thirty percent of U.S. exports go to Asia,

supporting millions of U.S. jobs, and we export more

to Asia than Europe. Our economic objectives in

East Asia include: continued recovery from the recent

financial crisis; further progress within APEC toward

liberalizing trade and investment; increased U.S.

exports to Asian countries through market-opening

measures and leveling the playing field for U.S.

business; and WTO accession for the PRC and

Taiwan on satisfactory commercial terms.

Opportunities for economic growth abound in Asia

and underlie our strong commitment to economic

cooperation, such as via the annual APEC leaders

meetings.

Our economic strategy in Asia has four key elements:

support for economic reforms and market opening;

working with international financial institutions to

provide well-targeted economic and technical

assistance in support of economic reforms; providing

bilateral humanitarian aid and contingency bilateral

financial assistance if needed; and urging strong

policy actions by Japan and the other major

economic powers to promote global growth.

The United States will continue to work with the IMF,

the World Bank, other international financial

institutions, the governments in East Asia and the

private sector to help stabilize financial markets,

restore investor confidence and deepen on-going

reforms in the troubled East Asian economies. In

doing so, we will remain mindful of the need to

promote protection of worker rights. We will continue

to support South Korea, Thailand and Indonesia as

they implement economic reforms designed to foster

financial stability and investor confidence in order to

attract the capital flows required to restore economic

growth. U.S. initiatives in APEC will open new

opportunities for economic cooperation and permit U.S.

companies to expand their involvement in substantial

infrastructure planning and construction throughout the

region. We will continue our efforts to encourage all

Asia Pacific nations to pursue open markets.

China: Bringing the PRC more fully into the global

trading system is manifestly in our national interest.

China is a major potential market for our goods and

services. As we look into the next century, our

exports to China will support hundreds of thousands

of jobs across our country. For this reason, we must

continue our normal trade relationship with China, as

every President has done since 1980, to strengthen

our economic relationship.
38

An important part of integrating China into the marketbased world economic system is opening China’s

highly protected market through elimination of trade

barriers and removal of distorting restraints on

economic activity. We have negotiated and vigorously

enforced landmark agreements to combat piracy of

intellectual property and advance the interests of our

creative industries. We have also negotiated – and

vigorously enforced – agreements on textile trade. We

will continue to press China to open its markets as it

engages in sweeping economic reform and to respect

and adhere to core labor standards as codified by the

ILO. Most recently, we reached agreement to bring

China into the World Trade Organization on fair

commercial terms – a landmark accord that will

create jobs and opportunities for Americans through

opening of Chinese markets, promote economic

reform in China, and help spread the message and

the tools of freedom to the Chinese people.

Japan: The Administration continues to make

progress on increasing market access in Asia’s

largest economy. Since the beginning of the first

Clinton Administration, the United States and Japan

have reached 38 trade agreements designed to open

Japanese markets in key sectors, including autos and

auto parts, telecommunications, civil aviation,

insurance and glass. The Administration also has

intensified efforts to monitor and enforce trade

agreements with Japan to ensure that they are fully

implemented. The United States also uses

multilateral venues, such as WTO dispute settlement

and negotiation of new multilateral agreements, to

further open markets and accomplish our trade

objectives with Japan. The US-Japan Common

Agenda advances our bilateral cooperation with a

major donor ally on global and regional

environmental, scientific, and health issues.

Japan has a crucial role to play in Asia’s economic

recovery: generating substantial growth to help

maintain a growing world economy and absorb a

growing share of imports from emerging markets.

We have encouraged Japan to reform its financial

sector, stimulate domestic demand, deregulate its

economy, and further open its markets to foreign

goods and services.

Republic of Korea: The United States will continue

its strong support for South Korean efforts to reform

its economy, liberalize trade and investment,

strengthen the banking system and implement the

IMF program. We have committed to providing

bilateral finance under appropriate conditions and will

continue to explore concrete steps to promote growth

in both our countries, to more fully open our markets,

and to further integrate the Republic of Korea into the

global economy.

ASEAN: The United States strongly supports efforts

to sustain and strengthen economic recovery in the

ten nations of ASEAN through maintaining our open

market for Southeast Asian goods and services, as

well as our support for IMF-led recovery programs for

several ASEAN nations. Thailand has completed its

IMF-mandated structural reform program and has

turned the corner towards renewed growth.

Indonesia's economy has basically stabilized and the

newly elected democratic government is working on

new lending agreements with the IMF and World

Bank, linked to progress on economic and financial

reform. We applaud ASEAN’s 1998 Hanoi Action

Plan, which calls for accelerated regional economic

integration. We are working toward completion of a

broad commercial agreement with Vietnam that will

open markets and promote economic reform while

allowing us to endorse Normal Trade Relations for

Vietnam, which we also seek for Laos. Working with

ASEAN members to address environmental

degradation in Southeast Asia is a major priority,

from forest fires and haze, to fisheries depletion,

deforestation, and sustainable growth during the

recovery from the Asian financial crisis.

Australia and New Zealand: We are building on our

already close working relationship with Australia and

New Zealand to strengthen our bilateral trade and

economic relationships, build consensus for regional

liberalization, and cooperate in opening the new

round of international trade negotiations at the WTO.

Promoting Democracy

We will continue to support the democratic

aspirations of Asians and to promote respect for

human rights. Our strategy includes: a constructive

approach toward achieving progress on human

rights, religious freedom and rule of law issues with

China; fostering meaningful political dialogue

between the ruling authorities in Burma and the

democratic opposition; promoting democracy and

encouraging greater respect for human rights in

Cambodia; and, in Vietnam, achieving the fullest
39

possible accounting of missing U.S. service members

and promoting greater respect for human rights.

Indonesia: The October 1999 election in which

Abdurrahman Wahid was elected President and

Megawati Sukarnoputri as Vice President was a

historic moment for Indonesia, putting it on course

toward becoming the world’s third largest democracy.

The United States strongly supports a united,

prosperous and democratic Indonesia that plays a

positive role in regional security. We look forward to

working with Indonesia’s new leaders to meet the

challenges of national reconciliation, democratic

reform and economic recovery that lie ahead.

The referendum in East Timor on August 30, 1999

was conducted fairly by the United Nations with the

agreement of the Indonesian Government. It

produced a clear mandate for independence, but

armed groups opposed to independence attempted

to overturn the results through violence. To stop the

violence, restore order and resume the transition

process, the UN Security Council unanimously

approved creation of a Multi-National Force

(INTERFET) led by Australia. INTERFET

accomplished its mission of establishing secure

conditions throughout East Timor and an international

peacekeeping force under UN command (UNTAET)

will take over in early 2000.

The U.S. contribution to INTERFET is relatively

small, but performs highly important functions,

including communications and logistical aid,

intelligence, and airlift of personnel, equipment and

humanitarian materiel. Additionally, elements of the

U.S. Pacific Fleet have been providing support for the

operation. This mission supports our interests by

helping to restore stability to a region of strategic

importance to the United States.

East Timor is now under a UN-administered transition

authority (UNTAET) and in two to three years will

gain full independence. A UNTAET peacekeeping

force will replace INTERFET to prevent further

instability and violence as East Timor becomes an

independent nation.

The Western Hemisphere

Our hemisphere enters the twenty-first century with an

unprecedented opportunity to secure a future of

stability and prosperity – building on the fact that every

nation in the hemisphere except Cuba is democratic

and committed to free market economies. The end of

armed conflict in Central America and other

improvements in regional security have coincided with

remarkable political and economic progress throughout

the Americas. The people of the Americas are taking

advantage of the vast opportunities being created as

emerging markets are connected through electronic

commerce and as robust democracies allow individuals

to more fully express their preferences. Sub-regional

political, economic and security cooperation in North

America, the Caribbean, Central America, the Andean

region and the Southern Cone have contributed

positively to peace and prosperity throughout the

hemisphere. Equally important, the people of the

Americas have reaffirmed their commitment to combat

together the difficult threats posed by drug trafficking

and corruption. The United States seeks to secure the

benefits of this new climate in the hemisphere, while

safeguarding our citizens against these threats.

Enhancing Security

The principal security concerns in the hemisphere are

transnational in nature, such as drug trafficking,

organized crime, money laundering, illegal

immigration, firearms trafficking, and terrorism. In

addition, our hemisphere is leading the way in

recognizing the dangers to national and regional

stability produced by corruption and ineffective legal

systems. All of these threats, especially drug

trafficking, produce adverse social effects that

undermine the sovereignty, democracy and national

security of nations in the hemisphere.

Working through the Organization of American States

(OAS) and other organizations, we are seeking to

eliminate the scourge of drug trafficking in our

hemisphere. The Multilateral Counterdrug Alliance is

striving to better organize and coordinate efforts to

extradite and prosecute individuals charged with drug

trafficking and related crimes; combat money

laundering; seize assets used in criminal activity; halt

illicit traffic in chemical precursors; strike at the

financial support networks; enhance national drug

abuse awareness and treatment programs; and

eliminate illicit crops through alternative development

and eradication programs. We are also pursuing a

number of bilateral and regional counterdrug initiatives.

In the Caribbean, and bilaterally with Mexico and
40

Colombia, we are working to increase counterdrug and

law enforcement cooperation.

We are advancing regional security cooperation

through: bilateral security dialogues; multilateral efforts

in the OAS and Summit of the Americas on

transparency and regional confidence and security

building measures, exercises and exchanges with key

militaries (principally focused on peacekeeping); and

regular Defense Ministerials. Last year, the guarantor

nations of the Peru-Ecuador peace process –

Argentina, Brazil, Chile and the United States –

brought the parties to a permanent solution to this

decades-old border dispute, the resolution of which

was important to regional stability. The Military

Observer Mission, Ecuador-Peru (MOMEP),

composed of the four guarantor nations, successfully

separated the warring factions, creating the mutual

confidence and security necessary to resolve the

dispute. Our efforts to encourage multilateral

cooperation are enhancing confidence and security

within the region and will help expand our

cooperative efforts to combat the transnational

threats to the Western Hemisphere.

Colombia is of particular importance because its

problems extend beyond its borders and have

implications for regional peace and security.

Insurgency, drug trafficking and a growing

paramilitary movement are testing democracy in

Colombia. To turn the tide, President Pastrana

needs U.S. assistance to wage a comprehensive

effort to promote the mutually reinforcing goals of

peace, combating drug trafficking, economic

development, and respect for human rights.

Working closely with us, the Government of Colombia

has developed an aggressive three-year strategy,

Plan Colombia, to revive their economy, strengthen

the democratic pillars of society, promote the peace

process and eliminate sanctuaries for narcotics

producers and traffickers. We will significantly

increase assistance for Plan Colombia in a manner

that will concurrently promote U.S. and Colombian

interests, and we will encourage our allies and

international institutions to do the same.

Promoting Prosperity

Economic growth and integration in the Americas will

profoundly affect the prosperity of the United States

in the twenty-first century. This begins with our

immediate neighbors, Canada and Mexico. Canada is

our largest merchandise export market and trade

partner in the world, and our exports to Canada have

grown rapidly as the U.S.-Canada Free Trade

Agreement phased in. U.S. merchandise exports to

Mexico have nearly doubled since the conclusion of the

North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA),

making Mexico our second largest goods export

market and trading partner. In the hemisphere as a

whole, our trade initiatives offer a historic opportunity to

capitalize on and strengthen the unprecedented trend

toward democracy and free market economics.

We seek to advance the goal of an integrated

hemisphere of free market democracies by building

on NAFTA and obtaining Congressional Fast Track

trade agreement approval procedures. Formal

negotiations are in progress to initiate the Free Trade

Area of the Americas (FTAA) by 2005. The

negotiations cover a broad range of important issues,

including market access, investment, services,

government procurement, dispute settlement,

agriculture, intellectual property rights, competition

policy, subsidies, anti-dumping and countervailing

duties. We will seek to ensure that the agreement

also supports workers rights, environmental

protection and sustainable development. We are also

committed to delivering on the President’s promise to

pursue a comprehensive free trade agreement with

Chile because of its economic performance and its

active role in promoting hemispheric economic

integration. To address the concerns of smaller

economies during the period of transition to the

global economy of the twenty-first century, and in

light of the increased competition NAFTA presents to

Caribbean trade, we are seeking Congressional

approval to provide enhanced trade benefits under

the Caribbean Basin Initiative to help prepare that

region for participation in the FTAA.

The United States will continue its effective

partnership with the IMF, the World Bank, the InterAmerican Development Bank, the governments of

Latin America, and the private sector to help the

region’s countries in their transition to integrated,

mature market economies. A key target of this

partnership is assisting the reform and recovery of

banking sectors hurt by financial market turmoil over

the past several years. We will continue to support

financial and economic reform efforts in Brazil and

Argentina to reduce their vulnerability to external

shocks, as well as helping Ecuador on its difficult

road to economic recovery and sustainable levels of

debt service.
41

We also view it as essential that economic prosperity

in our hemisphere be pursued in an environmentally

sustainable manner. From our shared seas and

freshwater resources to migratory bird species and

transboundary air pollution, the environmental

policies of our neighbors can have a direct impact on

quality of life at home. U.S. Government assistance

to the region recognizes the vital link between

sustainable use of natural resources and long-term

prosperity, a key to developing prosperous trading

partners in this hemisphere.

Promoting Democracy

Many Latin American nations have made tremendous

advances in democracy and economic progress over

the last several years. But our ability to sustain the

hemispheric agenda crafted at the Summit of the

Americas depends in part on meeting the challenges

posed by weak democratic institutions, persistently

high unemployment and crime rates, and serious

income disparities. In some Latin American

countries, citizens will not fully realize the benefits of

political liberalization and economic growth without

regulatory, judicial, law enforcement and educational

reforms, as well as increased efforts to integrate all

members of society into the formal economy.

The hemisphere's leaders are committed to

strengthening democracy, justice and human rights.

They have pledged to intensify efforts to promote

democratic reforms at the regional and local level,

protect the rights of migrant workers and their

families, improve the capabilities and competence of

civil and criminal justice systems, and encourage a

strong and active civil society. Specific initiatives

include: ratification of the Inter-American Convention

Against Corruption to strengthen the integrity of

governmental institutions; creation of a Special

Rapporteur for Freedom of Expression as part of the

Inter-American Commission for Human Rights; and

establishment of an Inter-American Justice Studies

Center to facilitate training of personnel and the

exchange of information and other forms of technical

cooperation to improve judicial systems.

Education is at the centerpiece of reforms aimed at

making democracy work for all the people of the

Americas. The Summit Action Plan adopted at

Santiago in 1998 seeks to ensure by the year 2010

primary education for 100% of children and access to

quality secondary education for at least 75% of young

people.

We are also seeking to strengthen norms for defense

establishments that are supportive of democracy,

transparency, respect for human rights and civilian

control in defense matters. Through continued

engagement with regional armed forces, facilitated by

our own modest military activities and presence in the

region, we are helping to increase civilian expertise in

defense affairs and reinforce the positive trend in

civilian control.

In Haiti we continue to support the consolidation of

democratic institutions, respect for human rights and

economic growth by a Haitian government capable of

managing its own security. In cooperation with the

United Nations and Organization of American States,

we are working with Haiti's Provisional Electoral

Council to pave the way for free, fair, and transparent

local, legislative and presidential elections in 2000.

We are committed to working with our partners in the

region and in the international community to meet the

challenges of institutionalizing Haiti’s economic and

political development, and building an effective and fair

police force and judicial system.

The United States remains committed to promoting a

peaceful transition to democracy in Cuba and

forestalling a mass exodus that would endanger the

lives of migrants and the security of our borders. While

maintaining pressure on the regime to make political

and economic reforms, we continue to encourage the

emergence of a civil society to assist the transition to

democracy when the change comes. As the Cuban

people feel greater incentive to take charge of their

own future, they are more likely to stay at home and

build the informal and formal structures that will make

transition easier. Meanwhile, we remain firmly

committed to bilateral migration accords that ensure

migration in safe, legal and orderly channels.

The Middle East, North

Africa, Southwest and

South Asia

Developments in these regions will profoundly affect

America’s future. They will determine whether a just

and lasting peace can be established between Israel
42

and the Arab countries; whether nations of the region

will fully join our fight against terrorism and drug

trafficking; whether they will agree to stop the spread of

weapons of mass destruction; whether the oil and gas

fields of the Caucasus and Central Asia become

reliable energy sources; and whether respect for basic

human rights and democracy can be institutionalized.

Enhancing Security

The United States has enduring interests in pursuing a

just, lasting and comprehensive Middle East peace,

ensuring the security and well-being of Israel, helping

our Arab friends provide for their security, and

maintaining the free flow of oil. Our strategy reflects

those interests and the unique characteristics of the

region as we work to strengthen peace and stability.

The Middle East Peace Process

A historic transformation is taking place in the political

landscape of the Middle East. Peace agreements are

taking hold, requiring concerted implementation efforts,

and new agreements are being negotiated, which hold

out the hope of ending the conflict between Israel and

its Arab neighbors. The United States - a key architect

and sponsor of the peace process - has a clear

national interest in seeing the process deepen and

widen. We will continue our steady, determined

leadership - standing with those who take risks for

peace, standing against those who would destroy it,

lending our good offices where we can make a

difference and helping bring the concrete benefits of

peace to people’s daily lives.

A significant breakthrough in the Middle East Peace

Process took place in December 1999 when Prime

Minister Barak and President Assad agreed to

resume the Israel-Syrian peace negotiations where

they left off. These negotiations will be high level,

intensive, and conducted with the aim of reaching an

agreement as soon as possible in order to bring a

just and lasting peace between Israel and Syria.

With the resumption of Israeli-Syrian talks, we will

continue working to begin negotiations between

Israel and Lebanon.

On the Palestinian front, Israelis and Palestinians are

turning to the core issues that have defined their

conflict for the past fifty years, seeking to build a lasting

peace based on partnership and cooperation. They

have agreed to seek to reach a permanent status

agreement by September 2000 and the United States

will do everything within its power to help them achieve

that goal. At the same time, both sides will continue to

implement the remaining issues in the Interim

Agreement, the Wye River Memorandum, and the

Sharm el-Sheikh agreement. Our goal remains the

normalization of relations between Israel and all Arab

states. Through the multilateral working groups on

security, refugees, water and the environment, we are

seeking to promote regional cooperation to address

transboundary environmental issues that affect all

parties.

North Africa

The United States has an interest in the stability and

prosperity of North Africa, a region that is undergoing

important changes. In particular, we are seeking to

strengthen our relations with Morocco, Tunisia and

Algeria and to encourage political and economic

reform. Libya continues to be a country of concern

for the national security and foreign policy interests of

the United States. Although the government of Libya

has taken an important positive step away from its

support of terrorism by surrendering the Lockerbie

suspects, our policy toward Libya is designed to

encourage Libya to completely cease its support of

terrorism and block its efforts to obtain weapons of

mass destruction.

Southwest Asia

In Southwest Asia, the United States remains

focused on deterring threats to regional stability and

energy security, countering threats posed by WMD,

and protecting the security of our regional partners,

particularly from the threats posed by Iraq and Iran.

We will continue to encourage members of the Gulf

Cooperation Council (GCC) to work closely on

collective defense and security arrangements, help

individual GCC states meet their defense requirements,

and maintain our bilateral defense relationships.

We will maintain an appropriate military presence in

Southwest Asia using a combination of ground, air

and naval forces. We maintain a continuous military

presence in the Gulf to enhance regional stability and

support our on-going efforts to bring Iraq into
43

compliance with UN Security Council resolutions.

Our forces in the Gulf are backed by our ability to

rapidly reinforce the region in time of crisis, which we

have demonstrated convincingly. We remain

committed to enforcing the no-fly zones over northern

and southern Iraq, which are essential for

implementing the UN Security Council resolutions

and preventing Saddam Hussein from taking largescale military action against Kuwait or the Kurd and

Shia minorities in Iraq.

Our policy toward Iraq is comprised of three central

elements: containment and economic sanctions, to

prevent Saddam from again threatening the stability

of the vital Gulf region; relief for the Iraqi people from

humanitarian suffering via the UN oil-for-food

program; and support to those Iraqis seeking to

replace Saddam’s regime with a government that can

live at peace with its neighbors and its people.

Operation Desert Fox in December 1998 successfully

degraded the threat posed by Iraqi WMD in the wake

of Baghdad’s decision to cease cooperation with UN

weapons inspectors.

In December 1999, the United Nations Security

Council passed UNSCR 1284, a new omnibus

resolution on Iraq. The United States supports

Resolution 1284 because it buttresses the

containment of Iraq. This resolution reflects the

consensus view of the Security Council that Iraq has

still not met its obligations to the international

community and, in particular, has failed to disband

fully its proscribed WMD programs. The resolution

expands the humanitarian aspects of the oil-for-food

program to ensure the well-being of the Iraqi people.

It provides for a robust new disarmament program

that would finish the work begun by UNSCOM. It

would allow for a suspension of the economic

sanctions in return for Iraqi fulfillment of key

disarmament tasks, and would lock in the Security

Council’s control over Iraqi finances to ensure that

Saddam Hussein is never again able to disburse

Iraq’s resources as he would like.

We have consistently maintained that the Iraqi

regime can only have sanctions lifted when it has met

its obligations to the international community.

Saddam’s actions over the past decade make clear

that his regime will not comply with its obligations

under the UN Security Council resolutions designed

to rid Iraq of WMD and their delivery systems.

Because of that and because the Iraqi people will

never be free under the brutal dictatorship of Saddam

Hussein, we actively support those who seek to bring

a new democratic government to power in Baghdad.

We recognize that this may be a slow and difficult

process, but we believe it is the only solution to the

problem of Saddam’s regime.

Our policy toward Iran is aimed at changing the

practices of the Iranian government in several key

areas, including its efforts to obtain WMD and longrange missiles, its support for terrorism and groups

that violently oppose the Middle East peace process,

its attempts to undermine friendly governments in the

region, and its development of offensive military

capabilities that threaten our GCC partners and the

flow of oil. We view signs of change in Iranian

policies with interest, both with regard to the

possibility of Iran assuming its rightful place in the

world community and the chance for better bilateral

ties. We welcome statements by President Khatemi

that advocate a people-to-people dialogue with the

United States.

These positive signs must be balanced against the

reality that Iran's support for terrorism has not yet

ceased and serious violations of human rights

persist. Iran is continuing its efforts to acquire WMD

and develop long range missiles (including the 1,300

kilometer-range Shahab-3 it flight-tested in July

1998). The United States will continue to oppose

Iranian efforts to sponsor terror and to oppose

transfers from any country to Iran of materials and

technologies that could be used to develop longrange missiles or WMD.

We are ready to explore further ways to build mutual

confidence and avoid misunderstandings with Iran.

We will strengthen our cooperation with allies and

friends to encourage positive changes in Iranian

practices that threaten our shared interests. If a

government-to-government dialogue can be initiated

and sustained in a way that addresses the concerns

of both sides, then the United States would be willing

to develop with the Islamic Republic a road map

leading to normal relations.

South Asia

Our strategy for South Asia is designed to help the

peoples of that region enjoy the fruits of democracy by

helping resolve long-standing conflicts, implementing
44

confidence-building measures, and assisting economic

development. Regional stability and improved bilateral

ties are also important for U.S. economic interests in a

region that contains a fifth of the world’s population and

one of its most important emerging markets. In

addition, we seek to work closely with regional

countries to stem the flow of illegal drugs from South

Asia, most notably from Afghanistan. We seek to

establish relationships with India and Pakistan that are

defined in terms of their own individual merits and

reflect the full weight and range of U.S. strategic,

political and economic interests in each country. The

October 1999 coup in Pakistan was a clear setback for

democracy in that region, and we have urged

Pakistan’s leaders to quickly restore civilian rule and

the democratic process.

We seek, as part of our dialogue with India and

Pakistan, to encourage both countries to take steps to

prevent proliferation, reduce the risk of conflict, and

exercise restraint in their nuclear and missile programs.

The Indian and Pakistani nuclear and long-range

missile tests were dangerously destabilizing and

threaten to spark a dangerous arms race in South

Asia. Recent fighting along the Line of Control is a

reminder of the tensions in that part of the world and

of the risk that relatively minor conventional

confrontations could spin out of control, with the most

serious consequences.

In concert with the other permanent members of the

UN Security Council, the G-8 nations, and many

others in the international community, the United

States has called on both nations to sign and ratify

the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty, to take

steps to prevent an arms race in nuclear weapons

and long-range missiles, to resume their direct

dialogue, and take decisive steps to reduce tensions

in South Asia. We also strongly urge these states to

refrain from any actions that would further undermine

regional and global stability, and urge them to join the

clear international consensus in support of

nonproliferation and a cut off of fissile material

production.

Promoting Prosperity

The United States has two principal economic

objectives in the region: to promote regional economic

cooperation and development and to ensure an

unrestricted flow of oil from the region. We seek to

promote regional trade and cooperation on

infrastructure through the peace process, revitalization

of the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) economic

summits, and our Qualifying Industrial Zone program,

which provides economic benefits for certain countries

that enter into business arrangements with Israel. In

South Asia, we will continue to work with the region’s

democracies in their efforts to implement market

reforms, strengthen educational systems, and end the

use of child and sweatshop labor.

Although the United States imports less than 15% of

the oil exported from the Persian Gulf, the region will

remain of vital strategic importance to U.S. national

security due to the global nature of the international oil

market. Previous oil shocks and the Gulf War

underscore that any blockage of Gulf supplies or a

substantial increase in price would immediately affect

the international market, driving up energy costs

everywhere -- ultimately harming the U.S. economy as

well as the economies of our key economic partners in

Europe and Japan. Appropriate responses to events

such as Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait can limit the

magnitude of a crisis in the Gulf and its impact on world

oil markets. Over the longer term, U.S. dependence

on access to these and other foreign oil sources will

remain important as our reserves are depleted. That is

one of many important reasons why the United States

must continue to demonstrate commitment and resolve

in the Persian Gulf.

Promoting Democracy

We encourage the spread of democratic values

throughout the Middle East, North Africa and

Southwest and South Asia and will pursue this

objective aided by constructive dialogue with

countries in the region. In Iran, for example, we hope

the nation's leaders will carry out the people's

mandate for a government that respects and protects

the rule of law, both in its internal and external affairs.

We will promote responsible indigenous moves

toward increasing political participation and

enhancing the quality of governance, and we will

continue to challenge governments in the region to

improve their human rights records. Respect for

human rights also requires rejection of terrorism. If

the nations in the region are to safeguard their own

citizens from the threat of terror, they cannot tolerate

acts of indiscriminate violence against civilians, nor

can they offer refuge to those who commit such acts.
45

Our policies are guided by our profound respect for

Islam. The Muslim religion is the fastest-growing

faith in the United States. We recognize and honor

Islam’s role as a source of inspiration, instruction and

moral guidance for hundreds of millions of people

around the world. U.S. policy in the region is directed

at the actions of governments and terrorist groups,

not peoples or faiths.

Sub-Saharan Africa

In recent years, the United States has engaged in a

concerted effort to transform our relationship with

Africa. We have supported efforts by many African

nations to move toward multi-party democracy, hold

free and fair elections, promote human rights, allow

freedom of the press and association, and reform

their economies. A new, post-colonial political order

is emerging in Africa, with emphasis on democratic

and pragmatic approaches to solving political,

economic and environmental problems, and

developing human and natural resources. U.S.-

Africa ties are deepening, and U.S.-Africa trade is

expanding.

Sustaining these recent successes will require that

we identify those issues that most directly affect our

interests, and on which we can make a difference

through efficient and effective targeting of our

resources. We will promote regional stability through

engagement with sub-regional organizations and key

African states using carefully harmonized U.S.

programs and initiatives. Our immediate objective is

to increase the number of capable states in Africa;

that is, nations that are able to define the challenges

they face, manage their resources to effectively

address those challenges, and build stability and

peace within their borders and their sub-regions.

Enhancing Security

Serious transnational security threats emanate from

pockets of Africa, including state-sponsored

terrorism, drug trafficking, international crime,

environmental degradation and infectious diseases,

especially HIV/AIDS. Since these threats transcend

state borders, they are best addressed through

effective, sustained sub-regional engagement in

Africa. We have already made significant progress in

countering some of these threats – such as by

investing in efforts to combat environmental

degradation and infectious disease, and leading

international efforts to remove mines planted in

previous conflict areas and halt the proliferation of

land mines. We continue efforts to reduce the flow of

illegal drugs through Africa and to curtail international

organized criminal activity based in Africa. We will

improve international intelligence sharing, and train

and assist African law enforcement, intelligence and

border control agencies to detect and prevent

planned terrorist attacks against U.S. targets in

Africa.

We seek to keep Africa free of weapons of mass

destruction by supporting South Africa's nuclear

disarmament and accession to the NPT as a nonnuclear weapon state, supporting the African Nuclear

Weapons Free Zone, and encouraging African

nations to join the BWC and CWC.

Nigeria’s rapid change from an autocratic, military

regime to a civilian, democratically elected

government affords us an opportunity to build

productive security, political and economic relations

with the most populous country in Africa. With nearly

one in six Africans living in Nigeria, the impact of

serious cooperative efforts to tackle mushrooming

crime, drug trafficking and corruption problems could

be enormously beneficial to the United States and a

large proportion of Africans.

The Sierra Leone peace accord signed in July 1999

illustrates that cooperative efforts can resolve longstanding African conflicts. Nigeria played a

leadership role in this effort, working in concert with

the Economic Community of West African States and

supported by the international community. The July

1999 Organization for African Unity (OAU) initiative,

under Algeria’s energetic leadership, for peace

between Eritrea and Ethiopia is another such

example of cooperative peace efforts which we have

actively supported. We believe the Lusaka cease-fire

agreement of July 1999 can bring an end to the war

in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, and its

Joint Military Commission supports the evolution of a

regional collective security arrangement in Central

Africa. Additionally, we are working with the Angolan

government through a Bilateral Consultative

Commission (BCC) on key areas of mutual interest

such as regional security, humanitarian and social

issues, and economic reform.
46

Sudan continues to pose a threat to regional stability

and the national security interests of the United

States. We have moved to counter Sudan’s support

for international terrorism and regional destabilization

by imposing sanctions on the Khartoum regime,

continuing to press for the regime’s isolation through

the UN Security Council, and enhancing the ability of

Sudan’s neighbors to resist Khartoum-backed

insurgencies in their countries through our Frontline

States initiative. We support regional efforts for a just

and fair peace and national reconciliation in Sudan

based on the Inter-Governmental Authority on

Development’s Declaration of Principles.

Persistent conflict and continuing political instability in

some African countries remain obstacles to Africa’s

development and to our national security, political

and economic interests there, including unhampered

access to oil reserves and other important natural

resources. To foster regional stability and peace in

Africa, the United States in 1996 launched the African

Crisis Response Initiative (ACRI) to work with

Africans to enhance their capacity to conduct

effective peacekeeping and humanitarian operations.

We are coordinating with the French, British, other

donor countries and African governments in

developing a regional exercise program to promote

common doctrines and command and control

capability, and interoperability for peacekeeping

missions. We are consulting closely on ACRI activity

with the UN Department of Peacekeeping

Operations, the OAU and its Crisis Management

Center, and African sub-regional organizations

already pursuing similar capability enhancements.

The United States has established the African Center

for Strategic Studies (ACSS) to promote the

exchange of ideas and information tailored

specifically for African security concerns. The goal is

for ACSS to be a source of academic, yet practical,

instruction in promoting civil-military relations and the

skills necessary to make effective national security

decisions in democratic governments. The

curriculum will engage African military and civilian

defense leaders in a substantive dialogue about

defense policy planning, civil-military relations, and

defense resource management in democracies. Our

long-term goal is to support the development of

regional security arrangements and institutions to

prevent and manage armed conflicts and curtail

transnational threats to our collective security.

Promoting Prosperity

A stable, democratic, economically growing Africa will

be a better economic partner, a better partner for

security and peace, and a better partner in the fights

against drug trafficking, crime, terrorism, infectious

diseases and environmental degradation. Lasting

prosperity for Africa will be possible only when Africa

is fully integrated into the global economy.

Further integrating Africa into the global economy will

also directly serve U.S. interests by continuing to

expand an already important new market for U.S.

exports. The more than 700 million people of subSaharan Africa represent one of the world’s largest

basically untapped markets. Although the United

States enjoys only a seven-percent market share in

Africa, already 100,000 American jobs depend on our

exports there. Increasing both the U.S. market share

and the size of the African market will bring tangible

benefits to U.S. workers and increase prosperity and

economic opportunity in Africa. Our aim, therefore, is

to assist African nations to implement economic

reforms, improve public governance and combat

corruption, create favorable climates for trade and

investment, and achieve sustainable development.

To support the economic transformation underway in

Africa, the President in June 1997 launched the

Partnership for Economic Growth and Opportunity in

Africa Initiative. The Administration has implemented

many of the Initiative’s objectives and continues to

work closely with Congress to implement remaining

key elements of this initiative through passage of the

African Growth and Opportunity Act. By significantly

broadening market access, spurring growth and

helping the poorest nations eliminate or reduce their

bilateral debt, the Initiative and the legislation will

better enable us to help African nations undertake

difficult economic reforms and build better lives for

their people through sustainable development.

We are working with African governments on shared

interests in the world trading system, such as

developing electronic commerce, improving WTO

capacity-building functions, and eliminating

agricultural export subsidies. We also are pursuing

initiatives to encourage U.S. trade with and

investment in Africa, including targeted technical

assistance, enhanced debt forgiveness, and

increased bilateral trade ties. We have led the
47

international community in efforts to address Africa’s

crippling debt, through the Cologne Initiative which

substantially deepens relief available under the

Heavily Indebted Poor Countries (HIPC) initiative.

We will continue to work with African countries to

manage and reduce the debt burden in order to

unleash the continent’s economic potential.

To further our trade objectives in Africa, the Ron

Brown Commercial Center was established in

Johannesburg, South Africa in 1998. The Center

provides support for American companies looking to

enter or expand into the sub-Saharan African market,

promotes U.S. exports through a range of support

programs, and facilitates business contacts and

partnerships between African and American

businesses. The President’s historic March 1998 trip

to Africa and the unprecedented March 1999 U.S.-

Africa Ministerial further solidified our partnership with

African nations across a range of security, economic

and political issues.

Helping Africans generate the food and income

necessary to feed themselves is critical for promoting

sustainable growth and development. Despite some

recent progress, the percentage of malnourished

people and lack of diversified sustainable agricultural

production in Africa is the highest of any region in the

world, and more help is greatly needed. In 1998 we

launched the Africa Food Security Initiative, a 10-year

U.S. Agency for International Development-led effort

to help improve agricultural productivity, support

research, expand income-generating projects, and

address nutritional needs for the rural poor.

African nations are also engaged in battle with

diseases, such as malaria and tuberculosis, which

sap economic productivity and development. Worse,

the epidemic of HIV/AIDS continues to attack the

continent, threatening progress on development,

reducing life expectancy, and decreasing GDPs in

the hardest-hit nations. The Administration has made

the battle against AIDS and other diseases a priority

for international action and investment in Africa. Our

global AIDS Initiative has focused special attention

and earmarked resources for Africa.

Promoting Democracy

In Africa as elsewhere, democracies have proved

stronger partners for peace, stability and sustained

prosperity. We will continue to support the important

progress African nations have achieved and to

broaden the growing circle of African democracies.

The restoration of civilian democratic government in

Nigeria can help return that country to its place as a

leader in Africa. Over the past year, the government

and people of Nigeria have succeeded in restoring

democratic civilian government, freed political

prisoners, lifted onerous restrictions on labor unions,

and worked to restore the authority of the judicial

system. Nigeria’s new civilian government has taken

sweeping steps to ensure that the military remains in

the barracks and that fighting corruption will be a top

priority. The peaceful elections in February 1999 and

inauguration of the new civilian government in May

1999 were important steps in this transformation.

As in any democratic transition, Nigeria’s new

government is facing enormous challenges: creating

accountable government, building support within the

military for civilian rule, protecting human rights, and

rebuilding the economy so it benefits all citizens.

President Clinton met with President Obasanjo at the

White House in October 1999 and reaffirmed our

commitment to work with him on the challenges and

security, economic, political and social issues.

Through the Great Lakes Justice Initiative, the United

States is working to help end the cycle of violence

and impunity in the Democratic Republic of Congo,

Rwanda and Burundi, and to support judicial systems

that are impartial, credible, effective and inclusive. In

addition, we will work with our allies to find an

effective formula for promoting stability, democracy

and respect for human rights in the Democratic

Republic of Congo so that it and a democratic Nigeria

can become the regional centers for economic

growth, and democratic empowerment that they can

and should be. In order to help post-apartheid South

Africa achieve its economic, political, democratic and

security goals for all its citizens, we will continue to

provide substantial bilateral assistance, vigorously

promote U.S. trade and investment, and pursue close

cooperation and support for our mutual interests.

Ultimately, the prosperity and security of Africa

depend on African leadership, strong national

institutions, and extensive political and economic

reform. The United States will continue to support

and promote such national reforms and the evolution

of regional arrangements that build cooperation

among African states.
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49

IV. Conclusions

Today, as we reach the twenty-first century, we are

building new frameworks, partnerships and institutions

– and adapting existing ones – to strengthen America’s

security and prosperity. We are working to construct

new cooperative security arrangements and build

peace, contain weapons of mass destruction, fight

terrorism and international crime, rid the world of ethnic

cleansing and genocide, build a truly global economy,

and promote democratic values and economic reform.

This is a moment of historic opportunity to create a

safer, more democratic, and more prosperous

tomorrow -- a better future for our children and

grandchildren.

This promising state of affairs did not just happen, and

there is no guarantee that it will endure. The

contemporary era was forged by steadfast American

leadership over the last half century – through efforts

such as the Marshall Plan, NATO, our security ties in

the Pacific, the United Nations, the International

Monetary Fund and the World Bank. The clear

dangers of the past made the need for national security

commitments and expenditures obvious to the

American people. Today, the task of mobilizing public

support for national security priorities is more

complicated. The complex array of unique dangers,

opportunities and responsibilities outlined in this

strategy are not always readily apparent as we go

about our daily lives focused on immediate concerns.

Yet, in a more integrated and interdependent world, we

must remain actively engaged in world affairs to

successfully advance our national interests.

To be secure and prosperous, America must continue

to lead. Our international leadership focuses on

President Clinton's strategic priorities: efforts to

promote peace and security in key regions of the

world; to create more jobs and opportunities for

Americans through a more open and competitive

trading system that also benefits others around the

world; to increase cooperation in confronting security

threats that threaten our critical infrastructures and

our citizens at home and abroad, yet often defy

borders and unilateral solutions; to strengthen

international arms control and nonproliferation

regimes; to protect the environment and the health of

our citizens; and to strengthen the intelligence,

military, diplomatic and law enforcement tools

necessary to meet these challenges.

Our international leadership is ultimately founded

upon the power of our democratic ideals and values.

The spread of democracy supports American values

and enhances our security and prosperity. The

United States will continue to support the trend

toward democracy and free markets, peace and

security by remaining actively engaged in the world.

Our engagement abroad requires the active, sustained

support of the American people and the bipartisan

support of the U.S. Congress. This Administration

remains committed to explaining our security interests,

objectives and priorities to the nation and seeking the

broadest possible public and congressional support for

our security programs and investments. We will

continue to exercise global leadership in a manner that

reflects our national values, promotes prosperity and

protects the security of this great nation.