U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE

WASHINGTON : 

For sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office

Internet: bookstore.gpo.gov Phone: toll free (866) 512–1800; DC area (202) 512–1800

Fax: (202) 512–2250 Mail: Stop SSOP, Washington, DC 20402–0001

90-159 PS 2004

THE UPCOMING 18TH REGULAR 

MEETING OF THE INTERNATIONAL COMMISSION FOR 

THE CONSERVATION OF 

ATLANTIC TUNAS (ICCAT)

OVERSIGHT HEARING

BEFORE THE

SUBCOMMITTEE ON FISHERIES CONSERVATION, 

WILDLIFE AND OCEANS

OF THE

COMMITTEE ON RESOURCES 

U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

ONE HUNDRED EIGHTH CONGRESS

FIRST SESSION

Thursday, October 30, 2003

Serial No. 108-76

Printed for the use of the Committee on Resources

(

Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.access.gpo.gov/congress/house 

or 

Committee address: http://resourcescommittee.house.gov 

(II)

COMMITTEE ON RESOURCES 

RICHARD W. POMBO, California, Chairman 

NICK J. RAHALL II, West Virginia, Ranking Democrat Member

Don Young, Alaska 

W.J. ‘‘Billy’’ Tauzin, Louisiana 

Jim Saxton, New Jersey 

Elton Gallegly, California 

John J. Duncan, Jr., Tennessee 

Wayne T. Gilchrest, Maryland 

Ken Calvert, California 

Scott McInnis, Colorado 

Barbara Cubin, Wyoming 

George Radanovich, California 

Walter B. Jones, Jr., North Carolina 

Chris Cannon, Utah 

John E. Peterson, Pennsylvania 

Jim Gibbons, Nevada, 

Vice Chairman 

Mark E. Souder, Indiana 

Greg Walden, Oregon 

Thomas G. Tancredo, Colorado 

J.D. Hayworth, Arizona 

Tom Osborne, Nebraska 

Jeff Flake, Arizona 

Dennis R. Rehberg, Montana 

Rick Renzi, Arizona 

Tom Cole, Oklahoma 

Stevan Pearce, New Mexico 

Rob Bishop, Utah 

Devin Nunes, California 

Randy Neugebauer, Texas 

Dale E. Kildee, Michigan 

Eni F.H. Faleomavaega, American Samoa 

Neil Abercrombie, Hawaii 

Solomon P. Ortiz, Texas 

Frank Pallone, Jr., New Jersey 

Calvin M. Dooley, California 

Donna M. Christensen, Virgin Islands 

Ron Kind, Wisconsin 

Jay Inslee, Washington 

Grace F. Napolitano, California 

Tom Udall, New Mexico 

Mark Udall, Colorado 

Anı ́bal Acevedo-Vila ́, Puerto Rico 

Brad Carson, Oklahoma 

Rau ́l M. Grijalva, Arizona 

Dennis A. Cardoza, California 

Madeleine Z. Bordallo, Guam 

George Miller, California 

Edward J. Markey, Massachusetts 

Rube ́n Hinojosa, Texas 

Ciro D. Rodriguez, Texas 

Joe Baca, California 

Betty McCollum, Minnesota

Steven J. Ding, Chief of Staff 

Lisa Pittman, Chief Counsel 

James H. Zoia, Democrat Staff Director 

Jeffrey P. Petrich, Democrat Chief Counsel 

SUBCOMMITTEE ON FISHERIES CONSERVATION, WILDLIFE AND OCEANS 

WAYNE T. GILCHREST, Maryland, Chairman 

FRANK PALLONE, JR., New Jersey, Ranking Democrat Member

Don Young, Alaska 

W.J. ‘‘Billy’’ Tauzin, Louisiana 

Jim Saxton, New Jersey 

Mark E. Souder, Indiana 

Walter B. Jones, Jr., North Carolina 

Randy Neugebauer, Texas 

Richard W. Pombo, California, ex officio 

Eni F.H. Faleomavaega, American Samoa 

Neil Abercrombie, Hawaii 

Solomon P. Ortiz, Texas 

Ron Kind, Wisconsin 

Madeleine Z. Bordallo, Guam 

Nick J. Rahall II, West Virginia, ex officio 

(III)

C O N T E N T S 

Page

Hearing held on Thursday, October 30, 2003 ........................................................ 1

Statement of Members: 

Faleomavaega, Hon. Eni F.H., a Delegate in Congress from American 

Samoa ............................................................................................................ 8

Gilchrest, Hon. Wayne T., a Representative in Congress from the State 

of Maryland ................................................................................................... 1

Prepared statement of ............................................................................... 2

Pallone, Hon. Frank, Jr., a Representative in Congress from the State 

of New Jersey ................................................................................................ 3

Prepared statement of ............................................................................... 4 

Saxton, Hon. Jim, a Representative in Congress from the State of 

New Jersey, Prepared statement of ............................................................ 9

Statement of Witnesses: 

Delaney, Glenn R., U.S. ICCAT Commercial Commissioner ........................ 14

Prepared statement of ............................................................................... 16

Genovese, Michael P., Sr., Commercial Fisherman and Member of the 

U.S. ICCAT Advisory Committee, and Vice President, White Dove, 

Inc. ................................................................................................................. 36

Prepared statement of ............................................................................... 37

Graves, Dr. John E., Chairman, U.S. ICCAT Advisory Committee ............. 43

Prepared statement of ............................................................................... 45

Hayes, Robert G., U.S. ICCAT Recreational Commissioner ......................... 24

Prepared statement of ............................................................................... 26

Hogarth, Dr. William T., Assistant Administrator for Fisheries, National 

Marine Fisheries Service, U.S. Department of Commerce ........................ 10

Prepared statement of ............................................................................... 12

Moore, Herb, Jr., Director of Government Affairs, Recreational Fishing 

Alliance .......................................................................................................... 51

Prepared statement of ............................................................................... 54

Wilmot, Dr. David B., Jr., Member of the U.S. ICCAT Advisory 

Committee, Rising Tide Consulting ............................................................. 46

Prepared statement of ............................................................................... 48

Additional materials supplied: 

Hinman, Ken, President, National Coalition for Marine Conservation, 

Statement submitted for the record ............................................................ 5

(1)

OVERSIGHT HEARING ON THE UPCOMING 

18TH REGULAR MEETING OF THE INTERNATIONAL COMMISSION FOR THE CONSERVATION OF ATLANTIC TUNAS (ICCAT) 

Thursday, October 30, 2003 

U.S. House of Representatives 

Subcommittee on Fisheries Conservation, Wildlife and Oceans 

Committee on Resources 

Washington, D.C. 

The Subcommittee met, pursuant to call, at 2:10 p.m., in Room 

1324, Longworth House Office Building, Hon. Wayne T. Gilchrest 

[Chairman of the Subcommittee] presiding. 

Members Present: Representatives Gilchrest, Pallone, 

Faleomavaega, and Bordallo. 

STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE WAYNE T. GILCHREST, A 

REPRESENTATIVE IN CONGRESS FROM THE STATE OF 

MARYLAND 

Mr. GILCHREST. The Subcommittee will come to order. We appreciate everyone’s forbearance and patience with the ongoing saga of 

the changing descriptions of a college student, slash, whatever 

someone has seen in complex. The Cannon Office Building is still 

locked down, as we understand it. The description has been 

changed from a man to a young woman, long brown hair, pink shirt 

and a backpack. So I think she was one of the New Jersey Devils, 

although I am not sure. Mr. Pallone made some inquiry as to 

where she came from. 

But I appreciate your attendance here. I apologize for starting a 

little bit late. Any updates on security will certainly be passed 

along to all of you, but I would like to welcome you all here this 

afternoon. We look forward to your testimony and a lively hearing 

that is informative. 

Since most of our witnesses are either Commissioners or are 

members of the U.S. ICCAT Advisory Committee, I understand almost everyone here will be traveling to Dublin in just over 2 weeks 

to attend this year’s annual meeting, and I would just recommend 

that you stay away from the Guiness beer over there while you are 

there unless you have a strong stomach. Not everybody agrees with 

that. 

Well, this year’s ICCAT meeting will not involve the renewal of 

any quotas from member nations. I hope the focus will be on 

2

compliance. I know that the U.S. delegation has heard this again 

and again from our members, but it is extremely hard for us to put 

more and more restrictions on our own fishermen when other nations continue to ignore the quotas and conservation recommendations of the Commission. 

Just this week the House passed H. Con. Res. 268, which expresses the sense of Congress regarding the imposition of sanctions 

on nations that are undermining the effectiveness of conservation 

in management measures for Atlantic highly migratory species, including marlin, adopted by the International Commission for the 

Conservation of Atlantic Tunas that are threatening the continued 

viability of the United States commercial and recreational fisheries. 

The petition to list white marlin as endangered on the Endangered Species Act that was filed last year certainly raised the concern that noncompliance by other nations could have disastrous effects on U.S. fishermen, despite causing less than 5 percent of the 

mortality of white marlin. A listing under the Endangered Species 

Act could have closed the recreation of billfish tournaments 

throughout the Atlantic and could have closed a number of commercial fisheries which have incidental interactions with white 

marlin. 

The U.S. has consistently pushed for conservation measures at 

ICCAT. In fact, the U.S. delegation led the efforts to implement the 

swordfish rebuilding plan which has proven to be very successful. 

We need to continue to push for conservation measures that will 

allow species such as marlins to reach a sustainable level, and we 

need to push for binding sanctions for all species that are managed 

by ICCAT. 

And I look forward to your testimony here this afternoon, and I 

am not sure which Members are traveling to Dublin to buttress the 

U.S. efforts over there, but I wish you well in that arena. 

I yield now to the gentleman from New Jersey, Mr. Pallone. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Gilchrest follows:]

Statement of The Honorable Wayne Gilchrest, Chairman,

Subcommittee on Fisheries Conservation, Wildlife and Oceans 

I would like to welcome our witnesses today. 

Since most of our witnesses are either Commissioners or are members of the U.S. 

ICCAT Advisory Committee, I understand almost everyone here will be traveling to 

Dublin in just over two weeks to attend ths year’s annual meeting. 

While this year’s ICCAT meeting will not involve the renewal of any quotas for 

member nations, I hope the focus will be on compliance. 

I know that the U.S. delegation has heard this again and again from our members, but it is extremely hard for us to put more and more restrictions on our own 

fishermen when other nations continue to ignore the quotas and conservation recommendations of the commission. 

Just this week, the House passed H. Con. Res. 268, which expresses the sense 

of Congress regarding the imposition of sanctions on nations that are undermining 

the effectiveness of conservation and management measures for Atlantic highly migratory species, including marlin, adopted by the International Commission for the 

Conservation of Atlantic Tunas and that are threatening the continued viability of 

United States commercial and recreational fisheries. 

The petition to list white marlin as endangered under the Endangered Species Act 

that was filed last year certainly raised the concern that noncompliance by other 

nations could have disastrous effects on U.S. fishermen. Despite causing less than 

5 percent of the mortality of white marlin, a listing under the Endangered Species 

Act could have closed the recreation billfish tournaments throughout the Atlantic 

and could have closed a number of fisheries which have incidental interactions with 

white marlin. 

3

The U.S. has consistently pushed for conservation measures at ICCAT. In fact, 

the U.S. delegation led the efforts to implement the swordfish rebuilding plan which 

has proven to be very successful. 

We need to continue to push for conservation measures that will allow species 

such as marlins to reach a sustainable level, and we need to push for binding sanctions for all species that are managed by ICCAT. 

I look forward to hearing from all of you about the issues that you think will be 

the most crucial for the U.S. delegation at the upcoming meeting and how we can 

be helpful. 

STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE FRANK PALLONE, JR. A 

REPRESENTATIVE IN CONGRESS FROM THE STATE OF NEW 

JERSEY 

Mr. PALLONE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I am one of those that 

is supposed to be going to the ICCAT meeting in Dublin, but I 

guess we don’t really know with the House schedule whether we 

are going to be able to go or not. It will be interesting to see as 

things develop over the next few weeks. 

I just wanted to say I am very pleased to see that so much of 

the Subcommittee’s time and effort is going toward addressing the 

issues associated with our highly migratory species fisheries, especially those managed under ICCAT. Successfully reporting H. Con. 

Res. 268 from the House was certainly an impressive accomplishment, and I hope that those of us here that are attending the upcoming ICCAT meeting will take note of that. 

I would also like to echo, however, the eloquent comments made 

on the House Floor on Tuesday by my colleague Mr. Faleomavaega. 

ICCAT is but one of the—a number of international fisheries management bodies dealing with issues of compliance, illegal trade bycatch and depleted stocks. While Atlantic highly migratory species 

deserve every amount of time we have devoted to them, I know my 

fellow Democrats on this Subcommittee, three of whom are from 

districts literally in the Pacific Ocean, are equally concerned about 

Pacific highly migratory species, and I hope that once we have fulfilled our goals this November in Dublin, we might turn our attention to the far Western coast of our country. 

It is almost universally accepted that the U.S. has been at the 

forefront of international fisheries conservation and management. 

I urge our ICCAT Commissioners to continue this tradition. 

While I have no doubt that historically controversial issues will 

consume our U.S. delegation, I encourage them to think outside of 

the box. 

Increasingly scientists are finding that the removal of top predators from ecosystems have effects that resonate through their respective environments. To demonstrate that the ecosystem effects 

of larger predator removal are not restricted to the Atlantic Ocean 

but are in fact a global problem, I would like to submit an article 

from the proceedings of the National Academy of Science regarding 

the vast changes in the North Pacific food web due to the removal 

of whales by now-defunct industrial whaling practices. 

The article, Mr. Chairman, makes the important point that the 

systematic catch of these large whales remove the major prey for 

Orcas, or killer whales, in the region. And consequently, this led 

to the eventual shift toward the Orcas feeding on smaller marine 

mammals such as seals. 

4

Examples of this phenomena also occurred in terrestrial ecosystems, and therefore I would like to submit for the record an article concerning the systematic effect of wolves returning to Yellowstone for the information of members. I am giving you a lot of 

things for the record here, Mr. Chairman. 

And though it may be difficult, I urge a shift toward an ecosystem-level approach with regard to both the research and the 

management under ICCAT, and I know that you have often talked 

about that, Mr. Gilchrest. 

While we continue to promote compliance and cooperation 

amongst contracting parties, we must also confront the questions 

of how to account for the unregulated fishing of nations who are 

not members of ICCAT. We heard at our September 11th hearing 

that our Administration is limited in its ability to take unilateral 

action against countries to accomplish fisheries management goals. 

Therefore, we as a Congress must actively encourage broader global participation in and adherence to the goals of these international 

organizations. 

As Mr. Balton, the State Department witness, said at our last 

hearing, no one state operating on its own can produce a successful 

solution. Although it appears we have had our hands full negotiating with the current ICCAT members, we should remember that 

any successes are limited to contracting countries. 

I look forward to hearing from all of our witnesses today, to know 

not only what the most pressing issues at ICCAT will be this year 

but also how you suggest we address them in Dublin and beyond. 

And, Mr. Chairman, I just want to take the opportunity to submit another article that I mentioned on our September 11th hearing but didn’t provide for the record. This paper, published in the 

Journal of Science in January, estimates the populations of several 

large coastal and oceanic sharks have declined by over 75 percent 

in the past 15 years. ICCAT compiles data on the bycatch of 

sharks, but it seems that little is being done internationally to prevent their rapid dissemination. 

And finally I would like to submit a statement for the record 

from Mr. Ken Hinman, the President for the National Coalition of 

Marine Conservation. I am giving you all these things for the 

record today and I want to thank you again for having the hearing. 

Mr. GILCHREST. Thank you, Mr. Pallone, and we will try to pursue the reading of those articles, and we will submit them to the 

record. 

[NOTE: Due to copyright restrictions, the articles have been 

retained in the Committee’s official files.] 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Pallone follows:]

Statement of The Honorable Frank Pallone, Ranking Democrat,

Subcommittee on Fisheries Conservation, Wildlife and Oceans 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I am very pleased to see that so much of the Subcommittee’s time and effort is going towards addressing the issues associated with 

our highly migratory species fisheries, especially those managed under the International Convention for the Conservation of Atlantic Tunas (ICCAT). Successfully 

reporting H. Con. Res. 268 from the House is an impressive accomplishment, and 

I hope those of us here that are attending the upcoming ICCAT meeting will take 

note. 

I would like to echo, however, the eloquent comments on the House Floor Tuesday 

of my colleague Mr. Faleomavaega. ICCAT is but one of a number of international 

5

fisheries management bodies dealing with issues of compliance, illegal trade, 

bycatch, and depleted stocks. While Atlantic highly migratory species (HMS) deserve every minute of time we have devoted to them, I know my fellow Democrats 

on the Subcommittee—three of whom are from districts literally in the Pacific 

Ocean—are equally concerned about Pacific HMS. I hope that once we have fulfilled 

our goals this November in Dublin, we might turn our attention to the far Western 

Coast of our country. 

It is almost universally accepted that the U.S. has been at the forefront of international fisheries conservation and management. I urge our ICCAT Commissioners 

to continue this tradition. While I have no doubt that historically controversial 

issues will consume our U.S. delegation, I encourage them to think outside of the 

box. 

Increasingly scientists are finding that the removal of top predators from ecosystems has effects that resonate through their respective environments. To demonstrate that the ecosystem effects of large predator removal are not restricted to 

the Atlantic Ocean, but are in fact a global problem, I would like to submit an article from the Proceedings of the National Academy of Science, regarding the vast 

changes in the North Pacific food web due to the removal of whales by now-defunct 

industrial whaling practices. The article makes the important point that the systematic catch of these large whales removed the major prey items for Orcas, or killer 

whales, in the region. Consequently, this led to the eventual shift toward the Orcas 

feeding on smaller marine mammals, such as seals. 

Examples of this phenomenon also occur in terrestrial ecosystems and therefore 

I would like to submit for the record an article concerning the systemic effect of 

wolves returning to Yellowstone for the information of members. Accordingly, and 

though it may be difficult, I urge a shift toward an ecosystem level approach with 

regard to both the research and management under ICCAT. 

While we continue to promote compliance and cooperation among contracting parties, we must also confront the questions of how to account for the unregulated fishing of nations who are not members of ICCAT. 

We heard at our September 11th hearing that our Administration is limited in 

its ability to take unilateral action against countries to accomplish fisheries management goals. Therefore, we, as a Congress, must actively encourage broader global 

participation in, and adherence to, the goals of these international organizations. 

As Mr. Balton, the State Department witness, said at our last hearing, ‘‘No one 

state operating on its own can produce a successful solution.’’ Although it appears 

we have our hands full negotiating with the current ICCAT members, we should 

remember that any successes are limited to contracting countries. 

I look forward to hearing from all our witnesses today to know not only what the 

most pressing issues at ICCAT will be this year, but also how you suggest we address them in Dublin and beyond. 

Mr. Chairman, I would also like to take this opportunity to submit an article that 

I mentioned at our September 11th hearing, but did not provide for the record. This 

paper, published in the journal Science in January, estimates that populations of 

several large coastal and oceanic sharks have declined by over 75 percent in the 

past 15 years. ICCAT compiles data on the bycatch of sharks, but it seems that little is being done internationally to prevent their rapid decimation. 

Finally, I would like to submit a statement for the record from Mr. Ken Hinman, 

the President of the National Coalition for Marine Conservation. 

Thank you. 

[The statement submitted for the record by Ken Hinman, 

President, National Coalition for Marine Conservation, follows:]

Statement of Ken Hinman, President,

National Coalition for Marine Conservation 

Mr. Chairman and members of the Committee, I appreciate this opportunity to 

submit testimony regarding United States participation in the International Commission for the Conservation of Atlantic Tunas (ICCAT), and specifically, what we, 

as a nation, can do to make the commission more effective in conserving highly migratory species of the Atlantic Ocean. 

The National Coalition for Marine Conservation, the nation’s oldest public 

advocacy organization dedicated exclusively to conserving ocean fish and their 

environment, has been promoting the conservation and management of tunas, 

swordfish and billfish for over 30 years. I have been personally involved in highly 

migratory species conservation, at the national and international levels, for more 

6

than 25 years. During this time, I’ve served on the U.S. Advisory Committee to 

ICCAT and as Chairman of the South Atlantic Council’s Billfish Advisory Panel. I’ve 

published over 100 articles about ‘‘big fish conservation’’ and served for 11 years as 

the regular conservation columnist for Marlin magazine. As program coordinator for 

NCMC’s ‘‘Marine Fisheries Symposium’’ series, I organized the 2nd International 

Billfish Symposium in 1988 (overseeing publication of the two-volume proceedings, 

Planning the Future of Billfishes) and the 1996 symposium on managing highly migratory species of the Pacific Ocean (editing the proceedings, Getting Ahead of the 

Curve: Conserving the Pacific Ocean’s Swordfish, Tunas, Billfish and Sharks). 

Over the past three decades, I have seen ICCAT struggle to control overfishing 

of most of the species under its purview, beginning with bluefin tuna in the 1970s. 

The commission has had precious little success, with the recent exception of North 

Atlantic swordfish, which appears to be in the early stages of recovery. But even 

in the case of swordfish, as with bluefin tuna, the U.S. has often been frustrated 

by the lack of cooperation from other ICCAT members (not to mention the problem 

of illegal and unregulated fishing by nonmembers). 

Although our own record is far from perfect—segments of our own fishing industry have at times thwarted conservation and ignored the best scientific advice for 

short-term gain, and here I’m thinking of bluefin—the U.S. is without question the 

leading voice for conservation and sustainable fisheries at ICCAT. In most cases, we 

have led by example, i.e., by demonstrating our commitment to our professed conservation goals by acting on them first (as the U.S. Magnuson Fishery Conservation 

and Management Act mandates). I’ve said many times that virtually every agreement by ICCAT to conserve Atlantic highly migratory species has originated with 

the U.S. delegation. The converse of that is, without U.S. leadership, ICCAT does 

nothing. 

All of this leads me to what the National Coalition for Marine Conservation considers the most pressing issue before ICCAT over the next few years, and the one 

that demands the most attention from the U.S. delegation—international conservation of Atlantic billfish, specifically blue and white marlin. Because of the dire condition of these fish, and the difficult challenge of minimizing fishing mortality on species that are taken primarily as bycatch in other fisheries, rebuilding marlin populations will require aggressive and sustained leadership by the United States beginning immediately. 

We urge Congress (and the Administration) to insist that the U.S. delegation to 

ICCAT, at each meeting between now and 2005, including the upcoming meeting 

in Dublin, Ireland, be united in its mission—to get the strongest possible conservation of blue and white marlin when the commission reviews the next scheduled assessment in 2005 and develops a long-range billfish rebuilding program. 

* * * * * * *

Populations of blue and white marlin in the Atlantic are at all-time lows. Although recently denied for listing as a threatened or endangered species, the white 

marlin remains a Candidate Species for listing under the U.S. Endangered Species 

Act, because its numbers have dropped to around 6% of historical abundance (i.e., 

before the advent of intensive long-lining in the 1960s). Blue marlin populations are 

only marginally better off. 

ICCAT’s Standing Committee on Research and Statistics will assess the condition 

of blue and white marlin stocks again in 2005. The ICCAT billfish conservation program, adopted in 2000, will be revised, based on that assessment, at the 

November ’05 annual meeting. According to the last assessment in 2000, the white 

marlin population had been overfished to just 13% of the level needed to produce 

the maximum sustainable yield (MSY), while blue marlin was reduced to 40% of its 

estimated MSY level. Both were still in decline three years ago because of excessive 

fishing mortality throughout their range. 

Blue and white marlin are accidentally killed by commercial longlines and nets 

set for swordfish. Today, this bycatch accounts for over 95% of all marlin killed in 

the Atlantic. Current ICCAT regulations strictly limit landings of marlin (although 

indications are that these regulations are not being adhered to). Nevertheless, even 

prohibiting all commercial fishing for marlin would not necessarily recover these 

populations, as they will continue to be caught and killed when commercial vessels 

are fishing for swordfish and tuna. 

We believe the only viable method of recovering marlin stocks in the Atlantic, in 

addition to strict landings limits, is through international time-area closures to 

longline and other indiscriminate fishing methods where marlin congregate to feed 

and spawn. The United States has begun addressing longline bycatch, closing 

known hot spots off Florida, Georgia and South Carolina, and in the Gulf of Mexico. 

7

According to preliminary results, they’ve been effective in reducing bycatch mortality of blue and white marlin. 

The U.S. has recently made substantial progress in bringing U.S. long-lining 

under control. We should continue to monitor the effectiveness of the time-area closures designed to minimize longline bycatch of billfish and other non-target species 

and make sure they remain in place and/or augment if necessary. We should also 

enhance the stellar, and mostly voluntary, conservation efforts of our recreational 

billfish fishermen, who release nearly every marlin they catch, by promoting wider 

use of circle hooks to bring the survival of released billfish as close to 100% as possible. While we can always do more for fish that are in such a depleted state, U.S. 

fishermen—recreational and commercial—have led by example in billfish conservation. It’s now time to put the onus squarely on the fleets of other nations. 

The problem we are dealing with today is almost entirely foreign fleets fishing 

on the high seas, which account for over 95% of total billfish mortality. Unfortunately, as I said, current ICCAT regulations, which only limit landings, not bycatch, 

are inadequate to rebuild severely depleted populations of marlins and may not even 

be enough to stop the decline of white marlin, the most endangered of the billfishes. 

The only way to secure such closures is by working through agreement at ICCAT. 

ICCAT will conduct another billfish stock assessment in 2005, followed by new management measures. Therefore, the next three ICCAT meetings (2003, 2004, and 

2005) will be critical to the future of white and blue marlin. Obtaining international 

longline closures at ICCAT will take dedicated and prolonged leadership from the 

U.S. delegation, since most other countries are opposed to placing restrictions on 

their longline fleets in order to conserve what they consider bycatch. 

The National Coalition for Marine Conservation urges Congress (and the Administration) to make marlin conservation the top priority at ICCAT through the 2005 

meeting. We must make fishery officials from other countries understand how important billfish are to the U.S. public and the U.S. economy. We must be as aggressive in pursuing our national goals for billfish as we have been for bluefin tuna and 

swordfish. 

I repeat—the U.S. must give marlins the same level of attention and commitment 

of resources as have been devoted to bluefin tuna and swordfish at past meetings. 

Moreover, lingering and unresolved bluefin issues must not be allowed to deter the 

U.S. from its billfish conservation goals over the next three years. During the previous three decades, the concerns of the bluefin tuna (and to a lesser extent swordfish) industries have dominated our national ICCAT agenda. Over the next three 

years, that must change, because the marlins are the most severely depleted of the 

ICCAT-managed species and are still in decline; protecting these bycatch species 

will require particularly difficult decisions by our fellow ICCAT members; and, not 

least, the U.S. recreational fisheries that depend on healthy marlin stocks involve 

more fishermen and produce more economic benefit to the nation than the commercial bluefin and swordfish fisheries combined. 

* * * * * * *

In summary, successful international marlin conservation will require a combination of: 

• Continued leadership by example. The U.S. must keep strong and effective U.S. 

billfish conservation measures intact, including time-area closures; 

• A determined strategy. The U.S. must develop a strong conservation plan based 

on the lowest possible landings limits augmented by restrictions on long-lining 

in billfish bycatch ‘‘hot spots.’’ Just as importantly, we must be prepared each 

meeting, not just knowing what we want and being resolved to stand firm. We 

must also have an offensive aggressive strategy for getting what we want; and 

• Aggressive pursuit of our billfish conservation agenda by the U.S. delegation. 

The U.S. must be united in purpose and unflagging in its determination to employ whatever means necessary to achieve its goals, including negotiations at 

the highest levels and trade sanctions, where appropriate. 

Thank you for holding this hearing, for your interest in improving conservation 

through ICCAT, and for considering our views and recommendations. 

Mr. Faleomavaega. 

8

STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE ENI F.H. FALEOMAVAEGA, A 

DELEGATE IN CONGRESS FROM AMERICAN SAMOA 

Mr. FALEOMAVAEGA. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I would like to 

state for the record that I associate myself with the statements and 

the comments made earlier by you, Mr. Chairman, and also our 

Ranking Member of our Fisheries Subcommittee, Mr. Pallone, concerning the issue involving ICCAT. 

The seriousness of the problem goes beyond just to talk about the 

Commission and its activities, and what really concerns me is the 

fact that not only are we on a global scale in looking at things like 

this, conservation of fisheries and the fish stocks, but the fact that 

if it doesn’t exist there is going to be overfishing in the Atlantic. 

Well, guess where they are going to be coming? They are going to 

come to my backyard. In fact, they are already doing that right 

now. 53 percent of the tuna caught in the world right now is in the 

Western and Central Pacific. Fishers from Europe now are already 

in the Pacific waters. Why? Because the situation in the Atlantic 

is getting worse and worse of being overfished. 

And the fact that—with all due respect, I have the highest respect for our members who are members with the ICCAT, but I 

think we have done enough talking. We have done enough rhetoric. 

And as I mentioned on the Floor yesterday, Mr. Chairman, maybe 

to get the attention of our member countries, we ought to extend 

our EEZ zone to a thousand miles so that perhaps we could at least 

do serious conservation measures of the fishery stock that are within the thousand-mile scale and not just 200 miles. Because the seriousness of the situation is that—and I say this in very broad 

terms—the population of the world is increasing, resources are decreasing, and fisheries is among them. 

For the life of me, Mr. Chairman, I don’t know why we have to 

import $9 billion worth of fish from foreign countries, why within 

our own domestic resources we are not able to cultivate and to 

raise fish farms to provide for our own local consumption. That 

amazes me of the situation even in our own sense of priorities, Mr. 

Chairman, with all due respect. I support everything that we do 

with the land grant programs where the Congress appropriates almost a billion dollars a year, but when it comes to sea grant, which 

to me parallels all the things that we are trying to do with the fisheries programs and marine resources, biology, all of this, amazingly 

$70 million nationally to provide for the national program, and it 

just boggles my mind, Mr. Chairman, that somehow in the overall 

situation, somehow the issue of fisheries just is not on the radar 

screen as far as our national priorities are concerned. And I am 

very concerned, not only maybe perhaps in a very selfish reason, 

because I happen to be right in the middle of the Pacific Ocean and 

seeing these resources depleted which affects not just where my 

district is, but it affects all States and Territories. So I sincerely 

hope that our delegation who is prepared to go to this meeting, 

that we come back with more teeth. We really—I am seriously supportive of Congressman Saxton’s resolution. 

If we don’t put sanctions, if we don’t really bear on our fellow 

countries who are members of ICCAT to really come forth and be 

responsible, then we are just spinning our wheels for another 30 

years. In the meantime, the depletion of fish applies and all this 

9

continues to go on. And my concerns is that if it is going to happen 

in the Atlantic, then sure as hell it is going to happen in the Pacific, and it is happening right now in the Pacific. 

So I want to thank you, Mr. Chairman, for calling this hearing, 

and I thank my Ranking Member, Mr. Pallone, also for tremendous 

support. And, again, gentlemen, we support your efforts in ICCAT, 

but I think rhetoric is enough is enough, and we need to really put 

more substance in terms if we are really serious about providing 

conservation measures, because it doesn’t impact our economies. It 

impacts our recreational and our commercial fishing interests here, 

and I just think I am tired of writing papers and shuffling papers. 

Let’s put some teeth in this. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. GILCHREST. Thank you. Mr. Faleomavaega. 

The gentlelady from Guam. 

Ms. BORDALLO. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. The only opening remarks I have is I would like to associate myself with my colleague 

here from American Samoa, Representative Faleomavaega. I too 

represent an area in the Pacific area, and we are concerned. So I 

have the very same concerns as he does, and, Mr. Chairman, I do 

have some questions later for the panel. 

Mr. GILCHREST. Yes. Thank you. 

Ms. BORDALLO. Thank you. 

Mr. GILCHREST. And I think the four of us here and the rest of 

the Subcommittee realizes the difficulty that the witnesses have 

and have had in the past with ICCAT. So we want to send you off 

with all the support that you can get from us, not to bring a sledge 

hammer to the meeting but to buttress your negotiations with as 

much influence as the U.S. can bear on good fisheries management. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Saxton follows:]

Statement of The Honorable Jim Saxton, a Representative in Congress 

from the State of New Jersey 

Good afternoon, Mr. Chairman and members of the Subcommittee. I am pleased 

to be here today to discuss a number of important fisheries conservation issues with 

respect to the upcoming 18th regular meeting of ICCAT. I would like to extend a 

warm welcome to all of our witnesses who took time out of their schedules to be 

with us today. I would like to especially thank Herb Moore, who is here testifying 

on behalf of the Recreational Fishing Alliance, with whom I have done a great deal 

of work over the years. 

House Concurrent Resolution 268, on which Mr. Gilchrest joined with me, as well 

as Mr. Faleomavaega and Mr. Pallone, was introduced on July 25, 2003, and which 

passed out of this Committee and then was passed by the Full House on 

October 28, 2003. 

This resolution expresses the sense of Congress regarding the imposition of trade 

sanctions on nations that are undermining the effectiveness of conservation and 

management measures for Atlantic marlin adopted by the International Convention 

for the Conservation of Atlantic Tunas (ICCAT) and that are threatening the continued viability of United States commercial and recreational fisheries. 

Several hearings have been held prior to this one to examine these issues, and 

it is my hope we can examine them further and hopefully draw some conclusions 

as to how we ought to proceed. One of the biggest of these issues is that of compliance—on many levels. For example: as more than 90 percent of the world’s fish are 

taken within countries’ EEZs, how do we get compliance with international fishery 

regimes within countries’ EEZs? 

Another part of the compliance issue is: since white marlin has been petitioned 

for listing under the U.S. Endangered Species Act and the problem is international 

fishing pressure, how do we get compliance on marlin conservation measures already in place? 

10

Finally, ICCAT was created to protect these species and to work toward attainable management goals to ensure their survival. One question which could be logically asked of this process is: what mechanisms are there within ICCAT to insure 

compliance with member nations? 

I have for a very long time been concerned with the dramatic drop in population 

of white marlin. Prior to the 1960s these species were healthy and thriving, just before the introduction of pelagic longline fishing in the Atlantic Ocean. Since this 

time, the species has steadily plummeted. 

The latest stock assessment I have seen indicates the total Atlantic stock population had declined to less than 12 percent of its maximum sustainable yield level; 

current fishing mortality was estimated to be at least seven times higher than the 

maximum sustainable level; over fishing had taken place for over three decades and 

the stock is less productive than previously estimated, with a maximum sustainable 

yield of less than 1300 metric tons. The bottom line—this species needs an immediate strong conservation measure or it may disappear forever. 

The passage out of the House of H. Con. Res. 268 represents an important step 

in the process of the international conservation of this dwindling species. I have 

spent a great deal of time on this issue, it is important we recognize the bottom 

line is pelagic longline fishing is an indiscriminate, irresponsible way of fishing. 

Though the U.S. longline fleet does contribute to the taking of this species, the majority of bycatch comes from the international fleets and this needs to be stopped. 

I was pleased that the Recreational Fishing Alliance (RFA) filed a petition with 

the U.S. Trade Representative last year, requesting the President take action 

against the European Union under Section 301 of the Trade Act of 1974, as amended. Though this petition was withdrawn, this issue remains a critical one. 

As a contracting nation, the U.S. has a history of compliance with ICCAT quotas 

and conservation measures. However, the European Union, particularly Spain and 

Portugal, has a history of serious non-compliance with ICCAT. For example, the EU 

has consistently exceeded catch limits, quotas, and landing limits for Eastern Atlantic bluefin tuna and ignored rules for the protection of juvenile swordfish. 

In deciding that the white marlin does not warrant as threatened or endangered 

under the Endangered Species Act (ESA), the National Marine Fisheries Service 

said the U.S. accounts for approximately five percent of the total mortality of white 

marlin, while the rest is due to bycatch in international longline fisheries. 

The petition alleges that the EU has committed three unfair trade practices under 

Section 301 including: non-compliance with ICCAT catch limits, quotas, and landing 

limits for certain species of highly migratory fish, non-compliance with ICCAT rules 

for the protection of juvenile fish, and granting subsidies to its fishing industry 

through its Common Fisheries Policy in violation of the WTO Subsidies Agreement. 

The U.S. is a world leader on so many important and complex issues; I do not 

understand why the issue of fisheries management and enforcement of the regulations currently in place both domestically and internationally, seems impossible to 

accomplish. I look forward to working with all of you to find a solution to this grave 

problem. I fear if we do not, many of these species may simply disappear forever, 

which would be tragic. 

Thank you, and I look forward to hearing your testimony. 

Mr. GILCHREST. We will begin with Dr. Hogarth. 

STATEMENT OF DR. WILLIAM T. HOGARTH, ASSISTANT ADMINISTRATOR FOR FISHERIES, NATIONAL MARINE FISHERIES 

SERVICE; 

Dr. HOGARTH. Thank you, Mr. Chairman and members of the 

Subcommittee. It is nice to be here again to talk about the International Commission for the Conservation of Atlantic Tunas, 

ICCAT. We will be holding our 18th regular meeting of ICCAT in 

Dublin, Ireland, on November the 17th through the 24th. I am Bill 

Hogarth, the Assistant Administrator for Fisheries at the National 

Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration, and I am also the U.S. 

Government Commissioner to ICCAT. 

On September 11th of this year, a member of my staff, John 

Dunnigan, testified before this body on the international fisheries 

issues. Many of the issues raised during this hearing concern 

11

ICCAT and remain germane to today’s hearing. But rather than repeating earlier testimony, today I will focus more narrowly on what 

I see are the major issues for the upcoming ICCAT meeting. 

But before getting started in the specifics of the 2003 ICCAT 

agenda, I would like to make a few general comments about the 

Commission. I am sincerely concerned about the future of ICCAT 

as a scientific and management body. This is based on the fact that 

I am concerned that the problems associated with having current 

data and data being submitted on catches to do the stock assessments to carry out the management are lacking, and unless this is 

corrected, I do not see how we can continue to make the decisions 

that the body has to make. 

Also the issue of harvest of undersized fish has to be addressed. 

There is a tremendous number of countries that are taking small 

fish, and this has to be stopped. And then we have to have much 

stronger compliance issues. 

So based on these comments, I will talk about what we see as 

the issues for the upcoming meeting of the Commission. And although there will be no species quotas as such that affect us on the 

agenda this year, there are quite a few issues that we think are 

extremely important for the future of the Commission. 

The meeting will begin with a working group on an integrated 

movement in tuna management. This is something the U.S. pushed 

for very hard at the last meeting, and we are very disappointed it 

has become almost 1 year or will be 1 year before we can get this 

meeting in place. The issues associated with integrated bluefin 

tuna are extremely important to the U.S. 

The data are clear that the East and West stocks of bluefin tuna 

overlap, and our current management approach does not adequately take this biological reality into consideration. ICCAT must 

find ways to appropriately integrate the management of these two 

interdependent stocks. We expect that the first working group 

meeting will set out a structure for future work which will include 

identifying and evaluating the various management options and 

identifying needed research. We understand that the Commission 

would also be considering a recommendation from its science body 

to invest in a comprehensive, coordinated bluefin tuna research 

program. 

Another critical issue facing ICCAT this year is the election of 

the Executive Secretary. There are currently five candidates that 

have made the short list. One of these is from the United States, 

and I consider the United States candidate, Dr. Joe Powers, to be 

the strongest candidate in the field. ICCAT needs a strong leader 

to ensure that the Secretary can meet the challenges associated 

with the increasing commission membership, rising number of conservation management decisions, compliance issues, and the dramatically expanded workload. I believe that the strong science and 

management credentials of Dr. Powers make him the perfect candidate for this position. 

The EC will be supporting their own candidate, and they made 

it very clear that due to the fact they catch the most fish and put 

the most money into the Commission, that they feel like they 

should have the Secretary. So this will be interesting. 

12

A third area of focus this year concerns data, and as I stated previously, the Commission is facing a very critical period. For some 

stocks data are inadequate or are reported so late that ICCAT’s scientific body, the Standard Committee for Research and Statistics, 

cannot conduct robust stock assessments. Without the data, we 

cannot effectively manage ICCAT stocks. 

In addition, you may recall the United States has expressed concern in the past about the lax data collection reported by the EC. 

At the 2002 ICCAT meeting, the EC agreed to measures to improve 

their data collection programs. A couple weeks ago we met with our 

EC counterparts and discussed their progress. While they ensured 

us that the efforts were underway to improve the data situation, 

they have not provided us with the specifics. We will continue to 

seek the information over the coming weeks and months. 

This is an important issue, because it is the factor in a future 

decision concerning a request to certify the EC under the Pelly 

Amendment to the Fishermen’s Protective Act. So, therefore, I will 

be also seeking specific information from the EC regarding conservation measures that have been adopted by ICCAT to reduce 

the harvest of undersized bluefin tuna. 

A fourth area of focus at ICCAT this year is compliance. Compliance issues have been and will continue to be one of the highest 

priority areas for the United States in ICCAT. Since it was included in my earlier testimony, I will not repeat all the gains we 

have made in the area today, but the bottom line is we believe that 

more has to be done. 

In closing, I think there will probably be other matters that arise 

at ICCAT, and each member will have a different perspective on 

what it wants to see done. This is the nature of a regional fisheries 

management organization. For ICCAT, this is especially true given 

the fact that the organization now has 37 members, representing 

both developing and developed states. Despite these challenges, I 

believe progress can be made on the issues outlined above, and in 

that regard I look forward to the support of those Congressional 

Members and staff who will be attending with us on the delegation 

this year. 

I just want to remind you that in 2004, the United States will 

host the ICCAT meeting for the first time in history. It will be in 

New Orleans. In November you will hear more about it. But we 

think it is time to bring this body to the United States. It has so 

many issues that affect our fishermen and we would like to make 

it available to our fishermen. 

Thank you. I look forward to any questions. 

[The prepared statement of Dr. Hogarth follows:]

Statement of William T. Hogarth, Ph.D., Assistant Administrator, National 

Marine Fisheries Service, National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration, U.S. Department of Commerce 

Mr. Chairman and Members of the Subcommittee, thank you for inviting me to 

present testimony on issues facing the International Commission for the Conservation of Atlantic Tunas (ICCAT) at its Eighteenth Regular Meeting, to be held in 

Dublin, Ireland, on November 17-24, 2003. I am Dr. William T. Hogarth, Assistant 

Administrator for Fisheries at the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA). I am also the U.S. Government Commissioner to ICCAT. 

On September 11th of this year, a member of my staff, John H. Dunnigan, testified before this body on international fisheries issues. Many of the issues raised 

13

during that hearing concerned ICCAT and are still germane. Rather than repeating 

earlier testimony, today I will focus more narrowly on what I see as the major 

issues for the upcoming ICCAT meeting. 

Before getting into the specifics of the 2003 ICCAT agenda, I would like to make 

a few general comments about the Commission. ICCAT’s membership has grown 

dramatically in the last few years, due in large part to the successful efforts of the 

organization to address illegal, unreported, and unregulated fishing. The increased 

use of total allowable catches to control fisheries and the development of quota allocation arrangements have also created incentives for countries to join the Commission. The United States is encouraged by this growth since it indicates that ICCAT 

is expanding its influence over Atlantic highly migratory species fisheries. In addition to increased membership, the Commission has also been contending with a significant expansion of its annual workload. Currently, the Commission meets for 8 

days in the fall, in addition to convening a number of intersessional meetings 

throughout the year. To support this workload, ICCAT members must expend increasing amounts of time and energy. With this growth in membership and workload come greater challenges for the organization, and progress on some issues can 

be slower than we would like. On a more positive note, ICCAT will be considering 

ways to improve the functioning of its meetings this fall, and we have made a number of suggestions in this regard. 

For the upcoming 2003 ICCAT Regular Meeting, the Commission will once again 

have a full agenda. Stock issues include albacore, bigeye, and yellowfin tunas, and 

Mediterranean swordfish. Due to U.S. insistence last year, ICCAT will convene a 

working group on November 15 to begin to seriously examine the issue of integrated 

bluefin tuna management. This is an extremely important issue to the U.S., since 

the data are clear that the east and west stocks of bluefin tuna overlap and our 

current management approach does not adequately take this biological reality into 

consideration. ICCAT must find ways to appropriately integrate the management of 

these two interdependent stocks. We expect that the first working group meeting 

will set out a structure for future work, which will include identifying and evaluating various management options and identifying needed research. We understand 

that the Commission will also be considering a recommendation from its science 

body to invest in a comprehensive, coordinated bluefin tuna research program that 

is intended to provide a basis for providing scientific advice on the risks and 

robustness of potential revised management procedures for bluefin tuna. 

Another critical issue facing ICCAT this year is the election of a new Executive 

Secretary. There are currently five candidates, one of which is from the United 

States. I consider the U.S. candidate, Dr. Joseph Powers, to be the strongest candidate in the field. ICCAT needs a strong leader to ensure that the Secretariat can 

meet the challenges associated with the increasing Commission membership, rising 

number of conservation and management decisions, and dramatically expanding 

workload. I believe that the strong scientific and management credentials of Dr. 

Powers make him the perfect candidate for this position. The EC will be supporting 

their own candidate and they have made it known that they feel they should hold 

other positions of power within the Commission. While we feel that the EC certainly 

has an important role to play in ICCAT, we strongly believe that there must be equity within the Commission with regards to its administrative and political leadership. 

A third area of focus this year concerns data. The Commission is facing a critical 

period. For some stocks, data are so inadequate or are reported so late that ICCAT’s 

science body, the Standing Committee for Research and Statistics (SCRS), cannot 

conduct robust stock assessments. To make matters worse, bluefin tuna farming has 

made data collection and verification even more difficult for that species. Without 

good data we cannot effectively manage ICCAT stocks. The obligation to collect and 

report data is no different than the obligation to abide by a conservation measure. 

If countries are not reporting, intentionally misreporting, or reporting so late that 

the SCRS cannot do its job, ICCAT should deal with the issue as a compliance matter. This approach would be possible, since the allocation criteria developed by 

ICCAT in 2001 already link quota access to data reporting. Regarding farming, we 

will support efforts to ensure that there is a proper accounting of the fish entering 

and leaving these farming operations. ICCAT recently held a workshop to identify 

data collection and reporting problems and solutions, which did help to advance the 

debate. We are considering ways to address data issues in ICCAT, including those 

discussed at the recent workshop. 

In addition, you might recall that the United States has expressed concern in the 

past about lax data collection and reporting by the EC. At the 2002 ICCAT meeting, 

the EC agreed to measures to improve their data collection programs. Two weeks 

ago, we met with our EC counterparts and discussed their progress on this matter. 

14

While they assured us that efforts were underway to improve the data situation, 

they were not able to provide specifics. I will continue to seek that information over 

the coming weeks and months. This is an important issue that will factor into a 

future decision concerning a request to certify the EC under the Pelly Amendment 

to the Fishermen’s Protective Act. Similarly, I will also be seeking specific information from the EC regarding conservation measures that have been adopted by 

ICCAT to reduce that harvest of undersized bluefin tuna. At the urging of the 

United States, ICCAT adopted bluefin tuna measures last year to increase the absolute minimum size in the Mediterranean from 3.2 kg to 4.8 kg and, for the Atlantic 

and Mediterranean, reducing the number of fish that can be retained below 6.4 kg. 

ICCAT also is requiring the development of plans setting out how reductions in the 

harvest of undersized bluefin tuna in the Mediterranean will be achieved. 

A fourth area of focus at ICCAT this year is compliance. Compliance issues have 

been, and will continue to be, one of the highest priority areas for the United States 

at ICCAT. Since it is included in earlier testimony, I will not repeat all the gains 

we have made in this area to date. The bottom line is that we believe more needs 

to be done. In addition to improving the implementation of existing measures, the 

overall compliance regime process should be streamlined and the scope broadened 

to improve the use of our trade and quota penalty tools. For example, the existing 

quota penalty provisions should be expanded to cover all species under quantitative 

harvest restriction, including marlins. In the same vein, we support efforts to improve ICCAT’s monitoring and control regime. Effective monitoring and control 

measures are essential for implementation of ICCAT’s rules. Proposals for establishing a vessel monitoring system program and spelling out flag state duties are 

pending before the Commission this year. Other monitoring and control matters will 

also be addressed in future years. 

The other two U.S. Commissioners and I recently met with our European, Japanese, and Canadian counterparts to exchange views on the issues facing ICCAT this 

year. In addition, earlier this week we met with the Advisory Committee to the U.S. 

Section to ICCAT to obtain their advice on the matters I have raised here. These 

are critical steps in the U.S. position development process. The timing of this hearing is such that the final U.S. positions have not yet been set, but I have tried to 

indicate our general views in the major areas of discussion for the upcoming meeting. Undoubtedly, there will be other matters that arise at ICCAT, and each ICCAT 

member will have a different perspective on what is important. This is the nature 

of regional fisheries management organizations. For ICCAT, this is starkly true 

given the fact that the organization now has 37 members representing both developing and developed states. Despite these challenges, I believe progress can be made 

on the issues outlined above. In that regard, I look forward to the support of those 

Congressional members and staff who will be joining the U.S. delegation in Ireland 

this year. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for this opportunity to review the issues that will be 

facing ICCAT in November 2003. This concludes my testimony, and I would be 

pleased to respond to any questions that Members of this Subcommittee may have. 

Thank you very much. 

Mr. GILCHREST. Thank you, Dr. Hogarth. 

There is a tiny little fishing village on the Eastern Shore of 

Maryland called Crisfield, which if New Orleans doesn’t work out—

Dr. HOGARTH. I am not sure that Crisfield could handle all those 

people. 

Mr. GILCHREST. Oh, yeah, we could. Absolutely. 

Mr. Delaney. 

STATEMENT OF GLENN R. DELANEY,

U.S. ICCAT COMMERCIAL COMMISSIONER 

Mr. DELANEY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Good afternoon, members of the Committee. Thank you for holding this hearing, and I 

am especially grateful for the opportunity to testify. Hearings like 

this one, as well as H. Con. Res. 268, are extremely helpful to bring 

focus to the ICCAT issues that we face today. 

Mr. Chairman, I have had the privilege of serving as Commissioner since 1995. The Dublin meeting will be my ninth ICCAT 

15

meeting serving as Commissioner. But I first became involved with 

ICCAT in 1982 as a fisheries staffer on the old Merchant Marine 

and Fisheries Committee, and I have been involved in some capacity ever since. 

With this experience in mind, I would just first like to put the 

U.S. 2003 agenda into context. The ICCAT Convention was signed 

in 1966, and it wasn’t until 1969 that they really had their first 

meeting. In the 1970s and 1980s, these were essentially the dark 

ages of ICCAT. What few decisions were made were made mostly 

for political reasons, and some of those were very bad decisions, 

such as the bluefin tuna management regime for which we continue to pay the price today. Status quo was the mantra of ICCAT, 

and I have to admit the U.S. delegation shared in that view. 

The U.S. did not really get serious about ICCAT until literally 

about 1994, when the leadership of the U.S. ICCAT delegation 

changed dramatically. 

Attached to my testimony is a list of the 122 active ICCAT conservation measures now on the books. About 90 percent of those 

were adopted since the U.S. leadership changed in 1994. The point 

is serious U.S. participation at ICCAT began only about 10 years 

ago. This is an important context in considering of where and why 

we are where we are today. 

The good news is that I think the U.S. is and has been for the 

past decade focused on the correct objectives. Our first priority had 

to be to fill the void by establishing a set of conservation and management rules for each of the many stocks and fisheries. In the 

past few years we have made the necessary transition to really 

zero in on the compliance and enforcement of those conservation 

and management rules. 

Today our primary focus is on the aggressive application of market controls and trade measures to put real teeth behind our comprehensive regime. Having a business background, I tend to advocate a business approach to ICCAT compliance. There can be tradeoffs to this, but I believe that measures that take money away from 

ICCAT violators are the measures that will get their attention. And 

Lord knows, we need their attention. 

The bad news is I don’t think we, the Commissioners, can do this 

ourselves. We really need help. 

Mr. Chairman, ICCAT is an incredibly complex challenge. At any 

given time there are literally thousands of vessels of all sizes and 

gear types fishing for 30 different ICCAT species divided up into 

many separate stocks in a convention area that covers over 20 million square miles of the Atlantic Ocean. These fishing vessels are 

operated by as many as 50 or more ICCAT nations from 5 different 

continents ranging from the poorest and most politically unstable 

to the wealthiest and most technologically sophisticated. 

If I can say so myself, I believe the U.S. Commissioners and our 

outstanding ICCAT team can certainly handle the conservation and 

management end of things, even as complex as they are. However, 

when ICCAT compliance is put into the proper economic and geopolitical terms, that is when I believe we need much higher level 

discussions between our governments. 

The kind of political muscle we need cannot be applied effectively 

at the ICCAT level. To be clear, I am not suggesting ICCAT does 

16

not have a fundamental scientific and environmental mission to 

conserve and manage highly migratory species. It does. However, 

it is much more than that. 

Instead of viewing ICCAT only as a scientific and environmental 

forum, it would be helpful for high-level U.S. economic policymakers to understand and act on the substantial economic implications ICCAT decisions have on thousands of U.S. small businesses 

accounting for a vast amount of economic activity which many, 

many coastal communities depend on from Maine to Texas. Noncompliance by other nations really hits us in our own wallets in the 

form of unfair competition from illegal imports as well as in reduced access of our fishermen to fish stocks damaged by foreign 

overfishing. If we can succeed in getting the right people in the 

U.S. Government to see it that way, I think we will be on our way 

toward solving the toughest issues at ICCAT. 

Mr. Chairman, I have included a number of very specific issues 

and recommendations for your consideration regarding our ICCAT 

agenda this year. Many of these focus on the market controls and 

trade measures I mentioned, but they also include some very important issues regarding white marlin, bluefin tuna and swordfish 

specifically. I would be pleased to elaborate of course on these key 

issues in our ensuing discussion. 

Again, thank you very much for your time and attention to this 

matter by holding this hearing and for moving forward with H. 

Con. Res. 268. 

Mr. Chairman, I just wanted to make another special note, if I 

might. I want to thank especially those Members of Congress and 

their staffs that may be planning and hopefully are able to attend 

the ICCAT meeting next month, and in that respect I would like 

to make what I hope is a helpful suggestion and perhaps one way 

to maximize the impact of your visit, which is very important to us, 

is to request that our U.S. mission in Brussels, where the EC is 

headquartered, arrange for you perhaps to meet with some of your 

fishery counterparts from the European Commission, since we will 

be meeting in an EC member nation in Ireland. That way you 

could help us to deliver the strongest possible message above the 

heads of the EC ICCAT Commissioner and his delegation. It might 

be a good opportunity. There perhaps could be some messages and 

receptivity to our messages at a higher level than the EC Commissioner. 

Thank you again, Mr. Chairman, members of the Committee. I 

appreciate the opportunity. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Delaney follows:]

Statement of Glenn Roger Delaney, U.S. Commissioner to ICCAT 

Mr. Chairman, Members of the Subcommittee, thank you for holding this timely 

and important hearing. And, thank you for this opportunity to provide the following 

testimony regarding ICCAT issues that are important to the 2003 annual meeting. 

I first became involved with ICCAT in 1982 as a staffer on the Merchant Marine 

& Fisheries Committee, Subcommittee on Fisheries & Wildlife Conservation and the 

Environment. In the late 1980s and early 1990s, I participated as an ICCAT industry advisor, and for the past nine years I have served as one of the three U.S. Commissioners. 

Given this background, I would first like to provide a brief historical perspective 

of how and why we are where we are at ICCAT today. I think this would be helpful 

to put the 2003 U.S. ICCAT agenda in the proper context. Then, I will provide some 

17

very specific recommendations for inclusion on the U.S. agenda of ICCAT priorities 

and objectives at the 2003 meeting. 

Historical Context of 2003 Meeting 

Since 1982, ICCAT has gone through a remarkable transformation. During the 

1980s, it would not be unfair to characterize ICCAT as being in the Stone Age of 

fisheries conservation and management. It was during that time such terrible decisions as drawing an arbitrary line down the middle of the Atlantic to divide the 

bluefin tuna population into 2 separate stocks and management regimes were made. 

This placed U.S. bluefin tuna fishermen under an overly conservative and rigid 

management regime while nations fishing in the eastern Atlantic were effectively 

allowed to run amok. This was done more for political expediency than good conservation or smart science (bluefin certainly do not respect an imaginary line drawn 

across the ocean). Today, we still suffer the conservation, political and economic consequences of that decision as we struggle with serious conservation and compliance 

issues in the Mediterranean and an inequitable situation for U.S. fishermen. 

Compliance and enforcement during those years were essentially ‘‘non-issues’’ because, frankly, there were few rules to comply with or to enforce. Year after year, 

my impression of the basic result of the annual ICCAT meeting was for nations to 

report your catches, proclaim ‘‘status quo’’ for the almost nonexistent management 

regime, and go home. Frankly, the U.S. didn’t appear to do much to change or improve that course. 

As stocks began to suffer, U.S. industry and other constituencies did begin pushing a more progressive and conservation-oriented agenda in the late 1980s and early 

1990s. However, it wasn’t until 1994, when the leadership of the U.S. ICCAT Delegation changed dramatically, that a serious U.S. effort to reform ICCAT became possible. 

Since then, the U.S. has asserted itself as an effective leader and voice of conservation at ICCAT. We began a deliberate and stepwise campaign to put in place 

the many basic rules for conserving the stocks, managing the fisheries and collecting 

the data necessary to properly assess stock status and measure the results of the 

management regime. We also moved quickly to put rebuilding plans in place for 

some of the stocks of greatest interest to the U.S., such as swordfish, billfish and 

bluefin tuna. 

The U.S. succeeded in pushing through a comprehensive regime of conservation, 

management, rebuilding, scientific data collection, quota allocation, compliance, 

monitoring, enforcement and trade measures now adopted by ICCAT. A compendium of these many ICCAT measures now on the books is attached to my testimony. 

(see Attachment 1) Today ICCAT is arguably the most progressive international 

fishery conservation and management forum in the world—at least on paper. 

That is not to say we haven’t achieved some remarkably tangible results. For example the rapid rebuilding of the north Atlantic swordfish stock was an extraordinary conservation achievement. But, the truth is that the more rules we put on 

paper, it seems the more these rules are broken by many of the nearly 50 nations 

represented in the ICCAT process. It is becoming a very serious problem with no 

easy solutions. 

Compliance Violations 

Violations fall across the entire spectrum of conservation measures—from quota 

overages and the excessive harvest of juvenile swordfish and tunas to blatant failure 

to submit even the most basic catch data vital to scientific stock assessments. Serious violations also fall across the full spectrum of ICCAT nations—from the least 

developed and most politically unstable to the richest and most technologically advanced. There follow just two examples among the more egregious problem areas, 

but the actual list is much, much longer. 

The bluefin tuna situation in the eastern Atlantic is out of control. The relatively 

recent development of pen-raising technology for rapidly growing and fattening 

bluefin tuna for the high-valued sashimi market has created a black hole in the 

ICCAT management system. We will have to wait until November to see what the 

official numbers are, but we are hearing credible reports that bluefin landings in 

the eastern Atlantic may be as much as 50,000 metric tons—substantially above the 

ICCAT quota and about twice the level recommended by the scientists. Much of this 

fish is going into farming pens and there are serious questions about the correct reporting and accounting of this harvest. The European Union is the major player in 

that situation, but the reality is that nearly all of the nations bordering the Mediterranean contribute to the chaos, particularly those on the north African coast. 

Another tremendous concern is the performance of Taiwan. Fishing vessel operators based in Taiwan, but hidden by many layers of paper companies, have been 

18

the source of a fleet of pirate large-scale pelagic longline vessels using flags of convenience to operate in the Atlantic and throughout the world. These vessels are 

often referred to in international circles as the ‘‘IUU fleet’’ (Illegal Unreported and 

Unregulated). 

Only due to strong pushing by the Japanese government, the Taiwanese government has responded half-heartedly. In addition, Taiwanese fishing companies have 

now deliberately built a fleet of vessels that fall just under the 24 meter minimum 

length for application of most ICCAT measures. These, 23.9 meter vessels have operated extensively in the Caribbean decimating shark stocks and causing serious 

billfish bycatch problems. Even those Taiwanese vessels that actually do fly the Taiwan flag and are large enough to fall under ICCAT jurisdiction are causing serious 

compliance problems with swordfish and bigeye tuna. The government of Taiwan either lacks the means or will to control this situation. 

Current U.S. Focus at ICCAT 

I think the U.S. continues to be on the right track. We are following through on 

the necessary progression of first putting into place the basic conservation rules for 

ICCAT and now we are pursuing a very deliberate process of ratcheting down on 

compliance and enforcement. We must put teeth behind those rules, primarily 

through increasing the scope and effectiveness of market controls and trade measures. In this regard I believe the U.S. is focused on the proper issues, and we are 

being just as aggressive in pursuing the full range of compliance and enforcement 

measures as we were in establishing the basic conservation and management rules 

in the first place. A valid question, however, is whether the U.S. Commissioners 

alone can be successful. 

Market controls and trade measures are the most effective response to compliance 

problems because they take money away from people when they behave badly. It’s 

a great way to get a non-compliant nation’s attention. But, it takes great strength 

and a smart plan to achieve. Market controls and trade measures, as well as more 

effective conservation and management regimes for bluefin tuna and billfish, will 

continue to be among the most difficult to negotiate. While I don’t think there is 

cause for panic, I think all of the Commissioners would agree that we could definitely use some high-level assistance in this current ICCAT era. The U.S. Commissioners will need the strong backing from high levels of U.S. Government including 

Congress to pursue these objectives. 

I have no doubt that we have such backing from Congress and especially the 

members of this Committee. Such efforts as House Concurrent Resolution 268 can 

be particularly helpful in demonstrating to our ICCAT adversaries a sense of U.S. 

Government purpose, resolve and solidarity behind the Commissioner’s efforts at 

ICCAT. That Resolution as well as this hearing also help to raise the issue to a 

higher level of attention within our own Administration. We are beginning to gain 

some serious attention at the highest level of the Department of Commerce thanks 

to your efforts. 

U.S. ICCAT Agenda for 2003

Although our U.S. position has yet to be formally decided, there follows several 

of the more important issues I hope and expect will be on the U.S. agenda of priorities for the 2003 meeting. Please note that I have also identified areas where I 

think Congress can assist our efforts and that some of these would require a financial commitment. 

White Marlin 

In the case of white marlin, a picture is worth a thousand words. The chart that 

follows is an excerpt taken from the 2002 ICCAT white marlin scientific stock assessment and shows the distribution of catch for the decade 1990-1999 across the 

Atlantic. (A complete chart showing the same information for each decade since 

1950 is attached to this testimony. See Attachment 2.)

19

As you can see, the vast majority of white marlin mortality occurs in areas south 

of the equator, especially off the southeastern coast of Brazil. (The distribution of 

blue marlin catch is very similar. See Attachment 3.) This has been a consistent occurrence since the 1960s. As extensive U.S. tagging efforts have confirmed, particularly those supported by The Billfish Foundation, these fish are highly migratory. 

Excessive mortality off the coast of South America will have a direct impact on the 

abundance of white marlin (and blue marlin) off the U.S. east coast. 

Because white marlin is generally a bycatch species in directed fisheries for tuna 

and swordfish, the solution to this problem is not so simple. ICCAT took the first 

step by adopting a U.S. proposal designed to substantially reduce both white and 


90159.001
20

blue marlin mortality through requirements to reduce landings and increase the release of fish that are alive when brought to the boat. 

However, these measures alone are not likely to be sufficient to reduce fishing 

mortality to levels that can rebuild this stock. And, compliance has been a problem. 

I anticipate that the data we receive at ICCAT this year will indicate that Brazil, 

and perhaps Venezuela, will confirm their violation of the ICCAT marlin landing 

reduction requirements. Given the status of white marlin, much more will have to 

be done. There follow two recommendations for U.S. initiative to address this situation. 

1) Strengthen enforcement of white marlin bycatch limits. ICCAT must authorize 

market controls—such as the suspension of eligibility of the violating nation’s vessels to market tuna and swordfish in other ICCAT nations. The key is to authorize 

market or trade sanctions against ICCAT species other than marlin, because marlin 

are not regularly exported to other ICCAT nations and are consumed within the 

harvesting nations. (The U.S. already prohibits sale of Atlantic marlin in the U.S.) 

2) U.S. Cooperative Research Program to reduce white marlin bycatch. In order 

to reduce marlin mortality beyond the current ICCAT live release and landing 

measures, we will have to do better than simply tell other nations they have to stop 

or substantially reduce their directed fishing for tuna and swordfish. I do not believe 

that would be a realistic goal. 

If we expect to achieve any further meaningful reductions in marlin mortality, I 

think the reality is that the United States must take the initiative to develop alternative pelagic longline fishing gear and methods and then export these solutions to 

other ICCAT nations. The truth is that no other nation is likely to take this initiative or make the investment and, frankly, the U.S. has by far the greatest social 

and economic interests in doing so. We are also faced with the continued threat of 

an Endangered Species Act listing, which would have catastrophic impacts on U.S. 

commercial and recreational fisheries. I believe this research program is a very important financial commitment for Congress to consider. 

The first phase of developing such solutions could be achieved through an NMFS 

cooperative research program with U.S. longline fishing vessels. NMFS and the U.S. 

pelagic longline fishery has established a very positive cooperative research relationship through their phenomenally successful experimental fishery to substantially reduce bycatch and nearly eliminate bycatch mortality of sea turtles on the Grand 

Banks (Northeast Distant [NED] statistical area). 

As we learned from the Grand Banks project, the use of special baits and circle 

hooks, specifically designed to reduce bycatch and bycatch mortality of whatever the 

species in question is, holds great promise. The use of hook timers and time-depth 

recorders, used so successfully in the Grand Banks research to understand sea turtle behavior, is also likely to provide extremely valuable information regarding 

marlin behavior and provide clues for how to reduce marlin interactions with 

longline gear. 

It would seem that the second phase of exporting solutions that reduce marlin bycatch and bycatch mortality to foreign fisheries where the preponderance of marlin 

bycatch mortality occurs should be initiated in the areas off of Brazil where marlin 

bycatch has been so highly concentrated for so many years. This is something we 

can initiate through ICCAT. Of course, the same solutions should be implemented 

for U.S. longline fisheries as appropriate. 

Specific ICCAT Trade Measures and Market Controls 

I recommend that the U.S. pursue the following objectives at the 2003 ICCAT 

meeting: 

General: Harmonize the hodgepodge of ICCAT trade and market control measures 

adopted to date into one overarching program that expands these measures to have 

the broadest possible coverage of fish stocks harvested by member and non-member 

nations. 

This initiative is already underway at ICCAT but much more work and strong 

U.S. leadership will be required to get the job done. Notably, the current drafts of 

this Supplemental Trade Measures proposal we have been working on with the EC, 

Japan and Canada over the past year include the crucial multilateral authority for 

ICCAT importing nations to enforce ICCAT bycatch controls (such as for marlin) 

through import restrictions on other, non-bycatch (tuna and swordfish) exports. 

Tuna Farming: Expand the scope of the ICCAT ‘‘positive list’’ market control 

program to include the explosion of poorly regulated bluefin tuna farms in the 

Mediterranean. Currently this program, (which was a U.S. initiative), establishes a 

formal registry of ICCAT vessels and enables member nations to prohibit the 

importation of fish landed by any vessel not on that list. 

21

The U.S. should lead an effort to expand the application of the ICCAT ‘‘positive 

list’’ market controls to bluefin tuna farming pens. 

Billfish: As explained previously, the challenge with white marlin and blue marlin 

is that in most nations’ fisheries it is a bycatch. (This may or may not be the case 

in Ghana, where blue marlin consumption and landings are the highest on record.) 

Billfish bycatch is generally not exported to major market nations like the U.S., 

Japan and EC where effective market controls can be exerted. 

The U.S. should lead an effort to enforce current ICCAT marlin bycatch management measures. I believe immediate action should be considered for some nations 

through the suspension of a violating nation’s ICCAT ‘‘positive list’’ status if that 

nation’s exports include species for which ICCAT has a ‘‘statistical document’’ program (bluefin, swordfish and bigeye tuna). 

Alternatively, if adopted, the Supplemental Trade Measures proposal designed to 

harmonize and expand the scope of existing ICCAT trade measures for both member 

and non-member nations now under consideration by ICCAT potentially provides a 

much broader coverage of the situation. As mentioned earlier in my testimony, this 

proposal includes provisions to restrict non-marlin bycatch exports (such as tuna 

and swordfish) until such time as the violating nation comes into compliance. This 

approach may take another year before it can be applied, but it would effectively 

address the Ghana blue marlin problem by targeting their canned tuna exports for 

control. 

Scientific Data: Incredibly, it appears that some ICCAT member nations are deliberately withholding catch data from ICCAT on key fisheries, such as bluefin tuna. 

I suspect this has been done in order to escape scrutiny and enforcement of compliance measures. This is about as low as it gets. ICCAT data is fundamental to our 

scientific ability to assess the status of the stocks and, therefore, to develop or adjust management measures to achieve the goals or rebuilding stocks and of maximizing the yield from each stock. 

The U.S. should lead an effort for ICCAT to adopt a provision that has the effect 

of automatically suspending ‘‘positive list’’ status for the vessels of any nation that 

fails to submit timely data to ICCAT. 

U.S. Office of Fishery Trade Monitoring and Enforcement: The future of ICCAT, 

and presumably other international fishery management organizations, is the aggressive adoption and implementation of a comprehensive regime of trade measures 

and market controls necessary to effectively enforce the conservation and management program. To be effective, such trade measures and market controls must be 

very closely monitored and enforced by U.S. Government personnel. This is not at 

all intended to be a criticism, but it has been my observation that the NMFS personnel responsible for this activity are already struggling to keep up with what 

ICCAT has on the books today. In anticipation that this activity and workload will 

increase substantially as ICCAT fully develops this regime, and given that an effective U.S. capability to monitor and enforce ICCAT trade and market control measures, I believe Congress and the Administration should seriously consider the establishment of a new office devoted entirely to this mission and this would likely require a financial investment by Congress. 

Limit Exports to ICCAT Quotas: Although certainly not a new idea, there has 

been increased interest in developing ICCAT multilateral authority for member nations to limit the total amount of their imports of a specific ICCAT stock to the 

amount of the exporting nation’s catch quota. 

While on the surface it sounds simple enough, in actuality the implementation 

would be very tricky and this is why the concept has not gained widespread support 

in the past. One very big problem is that ICCAT completely lacks any mechanism 

or resources to keep track of real-time exports of individual ICCAT stocks for each 

exporting nation. Exporting nations generally export ICCAT species to multiple destinations. The problem is how ICCAT and importing nations can determine when 

a nation’s total exports to all nations have reached its total ICCAT catch quota and, 

therefore, when it would be appropriate and effective for individual importing nations to prevent further imports of that stock from that nation. Absent this information, it seems unlikely that this approach will be effective. Nevertheless, because 

management and compliance problems have become so dire it is probably time to 

at least revisit this approach. 

The U.S. should explore the feasibility of developing an effective mechanism for 

providing authority to ICCAT importing nations to limit their imports of an ICCAT 

stock to each exporting nation’s total ICCAT quota. 

Unilateral Trade Measures 

Our efforts at ICCAT are necessarily delimited by recognized principles of international trade law requiring multilateral authority for trade restrictive measures. 

22

I believe this has also been the consistent view of each Administration I have served 

under as Commissioner. 

Nevertheless, as a private citizen I am certainly NOT averse to discussing some 

unilateral approaches which may strengthen our hands at ICCAT. It is a very sensitive issue—both within domestic law and policy circles—as well as at ICCAT. If 

U.S. unilateral trade measures are to be applied against ICCAT nations, this must 

be very well conceived and timed. 

I think the Committee is probably already far more familiar than I with the Pelly 

Act and Section 301 of the Trade Act of 1974, both of which are under current consideration by the Administration for application to ICCAT. 

However, I would also like to reinforce the Committee’s attention to the trade 

measures also on the books within the Atlantic Tunas Convention Act (ACTA). This 

statute is the ‘‘organic Act’’ for U.S. implementation of the ICCAT Convention. 

The ACTA authorizes the Secretary of Commerce to prohibit the entry into the 

United States of any ICCAT-managed species and taken from the ICCAT Convention area (Atlantic Ocean / Mediterranean) in a manner which would diminish the 

effectiveness of ICCAT’s conservation program. The Act authorizes the Secretary to 

prohibit the importation of ICCAT species other than the species for which violations occur. This is central to the ability to effectively enforce bycatch requirements 

for species that only enter international trade in very limited numbers such as 

white and blue marlin. 

I am grateful to the authors, Congressmen Gilchrest and Saxton, that this authority is a particular focus of H. Con. Res. 268. The legislative amendments that created this authority in the 1990s was an initiative and priority of the U.S. fishing 

industry. Unfortunately, it has been my very frustrating experience that the Administration (NMFS) never embraced this authority as the effective tool it could have 

been. Specifically, NOAA/NMFS attorneys interpreted the provisions to require 

automatic sanctions if any nation (or its vessels) was so much as ‘‘identified’’ as diminishing the effectiveness of ICCAT. 

To the contrary, I would argue that the ‘‘consultations’’ provisions of these ACTA 

trade measures deliberately provide an opportunity for the U.S. to enter into a bilateral negotiation with a violating ICCAT nation from a position of great strength, 

and to achieve a constructive, mutually acceptable resolution of the situation without the need to actually apply a trade sanction. 

I hope that the Committee will strongly encourage the Agency to revisit its interpretation of this statute and reconsider its application to any number of situations 

in which ICCAT member nations and non-member nations are clearly, repeatedly 

and, in some cases, deliberately undermining the effectiveness of ICCAT. With the 

proper interpretation of its authority, the Administration could move forward immediately in applying this tool without the need for any further legislative action. 

Bluefin Tuna 

As I mentioned earlier in my testimony, the arbitrary line drawn down the middle 

of the Atlantic Ocean in 1982 split the management of bluefin tuna into two very 

different programs with dire consequences for U.S. fishermen and the resource. In 

the western Atlantic area, the U.S., Canada and Japan have operated for more than 

20 years under a very conservative quota and compliance has been excellent. 

In stark contrast, the eastern Atlantic area, member nations of the European 

Union and other nations bordering the Mediterranean has operated under a very 

liberal quota regime that is literally ten times larger than the western quota. Still, 

overall compliance by eastern Atlantic bluefin fishing nations has been poor. The 

situation is very complex and not consistent among nations—we have cases of some 

nations overfishing their quotas, some declaring autonomous quotas outside ICCAT 

management, and some choosing not to report their catches at all. The situation is 

also not static—each year we are presented with a widely different mix of compliance problems among those nations. 

As you may know, the problem is exacerbated by the recent definitive scientific 

conclusions that even if there are two separate, reproductively distinct stocks originating in the Mediterranean and in the Western Atlantic, the spatial and temporal 

degree of mixing of these two stocks is so great that separate stock management 

cannot be effective. This landmark U.S. scientific research employing state-of-theart satellite tagging technologies and funded directly by Congress has turned bluefin 

tuna science on its head. ICCAT must now answer the very difficult question of how 

to effectively conserve, manage and allocate bluefin tuna across the Atlantic as if 

it were one stock. 

To answer this question, in 2002 the U.S. initiated the establishment of the 

ICCAT Working Group on Integrated and Coordinated Atlantic Bluefin Tuna Management Strategies. This Working Group is unique in that it will bring both sciVerDate 0ct 09 2002 08:46 May 13, 2004 Jkt 088533 PO 00000 Frm 00026 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6621 J:\DOCS\90159.TXT HRESOUR1 PsN: KATHY
23

entists and managers together. Although the first formal meeting of the Working 

Group is scheduled for November 15 in Dublin (just prior to the ICCAT meeting), 

U.S. and other ICCAT scientists have already met to outline the scientific research 

program that will be essential to support this huge endeavor. My understanding is 

that this program will need a budget of $2-3 million per year for several years. 

The key point is that U.S. fishermen have a great stake in how fisheries are managed in the eastern Atlantic. Gross overfishing and noncompliance in the eastern 

Atlantic bluefin tuna fisheries have a direct, negative impact on U.S. fishermen as 

well as U.S. efforts to properly manage and rebuild this fishery. The U.S. must address itself to solving this problem for both parochial and global conservation and 

economic reasons. 

Unfortunately, the reality is that we will have to drag along kicking and screaming those nations that now fish in the eastern Atlantic. For obvious economic reasons, they do not want this Working Group or this scientific research to succeed in 

stopping the out-of-control situation they now enjoy in eastern Atlantic bluefin fisheries. Therefore, I believe it will be necessary for the U.S. to again step up to the 

plate to fund the scientific research crucial to support the Working Group efforts. 

This is a very important financial commitment for Congress to consider. 

The origins of the eastern Atlantic bluefin tuna management problems are incredibly complex and varied. They include the geopolitics of the region, the ineffectiveness of the EC bureaucracy to control member nations, the wide range of the relative state of economic development and political stability within individual nations, 

and even cultural issues, as in the case of the large harvest of juvenile bluefin tuna 

in the Mediterranean that supplies the region’s traditional cuisine. Overlying this 

complex situation is the fact that the Mediterranean is perhaps the most important 

spawning area for bluefin tuna in the Atlantic. 

Although the U.S. has focused a great deal of its attention on the EC, it is not 

so simple to say this is just an EC problem. Nations that participate in these fisheries range from such nations as France, Spain and Italy to Libya, Tunisia, Malta, 

Turkey and Morocco. Nevertheless, my strong personal belief is that the EC must 

become the leader of a regional solution to the problem. Other, less-developed nations in the region, are likely to follow the example of the EC—good or bad. The 

U.S. and other concerned ICCAT nations must continue to put great pressure—at 

the ICCAT level and at much higher levels of the U.S. Government—on the EC to 

adopt the conservation ethic and leadership role necessary to effect a meaningful 

change in the Mediterranean bluefin fisheries. 

I must be frank, however. I don’t know what a single, specific solution to the 

eastern Atlantic bluefin problem is. There is no silver bullet—at least I can’t see 

one. We have invested enormous efforts in attacking this on all fronts at the ICCAT 

level year after year. This year will certainly be no exception and it will consume 

a huge part of our time and attention. 

And, while it is true that each year at ICCAT we chip away at the problem, it 

is also true that each year we are confronted and frustrated by a different and often 

deteriorating set of circumstances. We need real help on this one. I, and others in 

the U.S. ICCAT community have been seeking bilateral interventions from the highest levels of our government with such problem areas as the EC, and I think we 

are beginning to receive it. Congressional actions, such as this hearing and the introduction of H. Con. Res. 268, certainly help a great deal. 

Swordfish 

One important concern I have regarding the north Atlantic swordfish stock is that 

the U.S. protect its current quota share. Years of aggressive domestic bycatch controls combined with the dramatic rebuilding of the north Atlantic swordfish stock 

has left the U.S. pelagic longline fishery without sufficient access to the resource 

to harvest the full U.S. quota. 

Repeated failure of the U.S. to harvest any ICCAT quota places our quota in real 

jeopardy of being reallocated to other nations with poor records of compliance and 

far less control over their vessels than the U.S. The demand for ICCAT swordfish, 

particularly by new ICCAT members and developing nations, far exceeds the scientific total allowable catch. The consequence of such a reallocation to such nations 

would be to undermine the current level of conservation in the fisheries. Far more 

white and blue marlin, small swordfish and sea turtles will be killed if U.S. quota 

is lost to these other nations. 

I believe there are two things the U.S. should do to address this concern. 

1) Re-open the Grand Banks Fishery. This is a U.S. domestic initiative. As explained above, the U.S. is soon to complete an incredibly successful cooperative 

research program to reduce sea turtle bycatch with the U.S. longline industry 

in the NED statistical area. This was conducted under an experimental fishery 

24

permit after the NED area was closed to U.S. longline vessels pursuant to the 

Endangered Species Act (ESA). 

I believe the experimental fishery has far exceeded the sea turtle bycatch and 

mortality reductions of the ESA mandate and that the fishery should be fully reopened early next year. To date, approximately 12-14 U.S. pelagic longline vessels 

have been allowed to participate in the experimental fishery. This fishery could be 

expanded through the reopening of the area and by providing U.S. vessel operators 

the opportunity to refit existing vessels or to build larger vessels that can safely operate so far offshore. 

I don’t want to overstate this, but the expansion of the Grand banks (NED) fishery provides one important opportunity for the U.S. to shift pelagic longline fishing 

effort away from U.S. near-coastal areas to the productive Grand banks swordfish 

and tuna grounds as well, as to more fully harvest the U.S. quota share. 

2) Defend ICCAT Quota. The U.S. must vigorously defend its ICCAT quota share 

of north Atlantic swordfish so that it is not reallocated to nations that do not 

even approach the U.S. level of conservation of directed-species or bycatch species. Failure to achieve this objective will undermine the conservation of many 

ICCAT species. 

NOTE: An attachment to Mr. Delaney’s statement has been retained in the 

Committee’s official files. 

Mr. GILCHREST. Thank you, Mr. Delaney. 

Mr. Hayes. 

STATEMENT OF ROBERT G. HAYES,

U.S. ICCAT RECREATIONAL COMMISSIONER 

Mr. HAYES. It is always a pleasure to come and talk to you, Mr. 

Chairman. The meeting this year I think has been pretty well described by Glenn and by Bill. With my remarks I want to channel 

in the focus of white marlin, because as the Recreational Commissioner that really is the focus that I have got. 

If we look at white marlin, white marlin is a species which is 

caught as a bycatch by, as Glenn points out, by 50 different nations. It is only really in the United States where we view white 

marlin in the tone and the style in which we view it, which is as 

an important economically valuable species to the United States. 

Most other countries don’t. Frankly, they view it as a nuisance. 

So when you begin to talk about white marlin conservation measures internationally, you have to be frankly a little bit more inventive than simply walking out and saying what we need here is 

huge time and area closures or something that is going to close 

down 50 or 49—well, including our own, 50 nations’ commercial 

fleets. Those kind of measures are very difficult to negotiate. 

We have an opportunity this year to negotiate what I view as one 

of those measures that could be extraordinarily helpful, and that 

measure is comprehensive compliance. The trick to ICCAT—and I 

believe the trick in the Pacific—will ultimately be how do you put 

in measures into the importing countries that allow those countries 

to prohibit imports of species that are being conserved when related violations of other species occurs. 

So white marlin is a great example. There is really no international trade in white marlin. You can’t go out and buy a white 

marlin very easily, frankly. In the United States, if you do, you are 

going to be in big trouble. 

What you need is a measure that prevents the import of an 

ICCAT-managed species. Bluefin tuna is an example—if there is a 

violation of some other comprehensive—for example, some other 

25

conservation—measure, the no-landing of—or the discard prohibition—for white marlin. 

Until we get that kind of a comprehensive measure, which I believe your resolution heads us toward, we are not going to solve 

some of these broader issues, particularly issues about things like 

turtles, seabirds, white marlin, blue marlin, sharks, a lot of things 

that are being caught incidentally to other directed fisheries. 

That is sort of the key, in my view, of where we ought to focus 

this year, and we have had some discussions about that and how 

much progress we can make on this. This is not an uncomplicated 

issue, as you can imagine, but that certainly is one of the focuses 

we are going to have. 

I want to describe to you just very quickly what I see is kind of 

the conundrum that we are in. Can you imagine in the United 

States having 50 States which essentially allowed—and we allowed, you know, for whatever reason —illegal activity to occur 

under conservation laws and we simply ignored it or we designed 

things that didn’t work and we didn’t enforce it? It is unimaginable 

in the United States. 

Can you imagine duck hunting, commercial duck hunting, on the 

Eastern Shore to occur and the United States wouldn’t go out there 

and enforce it? Well, frankly, until these measures that Glenn has 

been talking about, those 122 measures were put in place—and we 

need more of them—that is frankly what was going on internationally, not just in the Atlantic but going on in the Pacific. That 

progress that we are making toward this larger comprehensive 

compliance measures is moving in a direction where that is not 

going to occur. That basic conservation ethic that we have here in 

the United States is going to get carried forward. 

Now, one of the questions always is: So what can you do here at 

home, particularly on white marlin? One of the problems we have 

in white marlin is that Glenn Delaney and Bill Hogarth are great 

negotiators, great negotiators, but if you don’t have any science on 

your side, as Bill was saying, if you don’t have the data, you don’t 

have the facts, it is awful tough to negotiate a very good understanding of where you ought to go. 

In the United States what we need is we need to do some research on two issues in white marlin. One is the basic biology. That 

has been clear for some time. Although some of that is going on, 

we need to get at it and get it done. 

The second one is how do long liners with the technology available to them today avoid catching white marlin? It might be time 

and area closures. It might be gear limitations. We are not sure 

what the answers are, and one of the reasons we are not sure is 

because we don’t have a research program to find it out. 

What I would ask the Committee to do is to support the Senate 

in this regard. The Senate has a $2.5 million appropriation in for 

billfish research. The funding that is in the Commerce, Justice, 

State and the Judiciary appropriations bill and has gotten out of 

the full Committee and the Senate, but it is under negotiation at 

the moment. If this Committee could support that $2.5 million, 

maybe we could at least initiate some kind of a billfish program or 

enhance the existing billfish program so that we could get some research done here at home. I can tell you that without a little bit 

26

of research, frankly billfish will have to always be sort of set back 

and will not be very well advanced. 

And I, too, welcome your participation in Ireland and look forward to it, and we hope that Congress can do what it has to do 

and so that you can be available to come visit with us. Thanks. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Hayes follows:]

Statement of Robert G. Hayes, U.S. Commissioner,

International Commission for the Conservation of Atlantic Tunas 

Good afternoon. My name is Bob Hayes and I am the Commissioner to the International Commission for the Conservation of Atlantic Tunas (ICCAT) for recreational interests. I am also the general counsel for the Coastal Conservation Association (CCA). This Committee has always supported the efforts of recreational and 

commercial fishermen to conserve tuna, swordfish and billfish through international 

arrangements like ICCAT. This year, by the passage of H. Con. Res. 268 and 

through your direct participation in the process, you will be reinforcing those efforts. 

I know that I, the other Commissioners, and the recreational community appreciate 

and welcome your participation and support. 

The international management of highly migratory species is at a crossroads. Nowhere in the world is this more of an issue than in the Atlantic Ocean. I would like 

to concentrate on the root of the dilemma and what can be done through ICCAT 

and here at home to advance the conservation of all highly migratory species. First, 

let me describe what is going on in the Atlantic, which today may be as dynamic 

as any time in the history of the fishery. 

Today, there are three distinct forms of activity going on in the Atlantic: 1) harvest by ICCAT-member nations under specific conservation measures; 2) harvest by 

non-member countries; and 3) harvest by vessels that are illegal, unregulated, unreported and now undersized. In addition to this mix, add the commercial phenomenon in the Mediterranean of large scale tuna farming. The directed harvests 

are of swordfish, sharks, yellowfin, bigeye, bluefin and albacore tuna. The bycatch 

includes seabirds, sea turtles, some sharks and billfish, but primarily blue and 

white marlin. The harvesting techniques include longlines, purse seines, and hook 

and line. The fleets include transfer vessels and large catcher processors. The combined fleet consists of thousands of vessels that harvest around 400,000 metric tons 

of tuna and swordfish. Of that, the United States harvests less than 5 percent. 

Oddly enough, the most valuable ICCAT fishery for the United States is billfish, 

about which almost no other ICCAT member seems to care. 

The entity trying to manage all this—ICCAT—includes 37 members representing 

over 60 countries. In the last decade, ICCAT has adopted a series of conservation 

measures to control the harvest of tunas, swordfish and billfishes. These measures 

have generally fallen into two categories—harvest limitations and measures to ensure compliance. During the same period, the harvest effort in the Atlantic by member and non-member nations has grown, and the production capabilities of individual countries have advanced significantly. If we are to accomplish anything this 

year regarding white marlin it has to be in the area of market-based compliance. 

Compliance 

This year, like many in the past, the U.S. focus should be on compliance by member and non-member countries with ICCAT conservation measures. Three ideas 

have surfaced, all of which have merit. The first idea would control bluefin tuna 

quotas by allowing the principal importing country to stop imports from a country’s 

vessels once that country has exceeded its quota. For example, Japan may be importing more bluefin from some eastern bluefin countries than the total allowable 

harvest for those countries. Something is wrong with that. Such a measure will not 

be easy to implement; however, if Japan is willing to use such a measure we ought 

to be wiling to empower them to use it. 

The second enforcement idea that may have some merit is adding tuna farming 

operations to the positive list. Failure to comply with reporting requirements would 

be grounds for delisting a farm. (See discussion of positive and negative lists below.) 

The third option is most intriguing. It would allow importing nations to prohibit 

trade in ICCAT species in the event of any violation of any ICCAT conservation 

measure by any vessel of a contracting or non-contracting party. This would, for the 

first time, link all ICCAT conservation measures with market access for any ICCAT 

species. It would affirm what many have thought all along, that ICCAT marlin restrictions cannot be effective unless importing countries can deny access for other 

valuable ICCAT species. 

27

1There may be significant environmental problems with tuna farming which ICCAT does not 

have the authority to address. 

We need to make progress on all three of these measures this year. 

In addition to compliance there are a number of other important issues, some of 

which are addressed below. The issue of mixing is not included because it is unclear 

where that road will lead. 

Tuna Farming 

In recent years a whole new industry has developed in the Mediterranean. Purse 

seiners now catch small bluefin tuna and put them in pens to grow. They are fed 

in the pens for up to six months and harvested for sale to Japan. This is a very 

high quality product and one that can be sold at a distinct market advantage. The 

size of these operations is enormous and the growth of this sector could outstrip the 

scientific recommended harvest in the Mediterranean. There are single farming operations that hold more bluefin tuna in their pens than are caught in the entire 

western Atlantic. In fact, two years ago the U.S. delegation to ICCAT saw a pen 

operation that contained more tonnage than the entire western bluefin quota. At 

least eight countries are engaged in tuna farming—Spain, Malta, Italy, Tunisia, 

Libya, Cyprus, Turkey and Croatia. Three of the countries—Tunisia, Libya and 

Cyprus—began the activity in 2003. 

Recognizing this explosion in bluefin pen rearing, last year’s ICCAT meeting approved a requirement for countries to report on the practice. These fish are caught 

by purse seiners from a variety of nations. The European Union (EU) recently asserted that all transfers from its member vessels were viewed and recorded by observers. Presumably, those harvests were counted against existing ICCAT quotas. 

The farms present enormous opportunity for illegal activity. Disregarding fishing 

quotas, overfishing, laundering and black marketing are words that many are using 

to describe the possibilities here. Tuna farming 1 in and of itself is not the problem. 

This may be a legitimate way to maximize the value of the fishery; however, because of its size and the potential for abuse this activity must be highly transparent. 

What goes in the pens as well as what comes out must be recorded and member 

nations must comply with the existing quota regime. 

The New Fishing Nations 

In the early days of the Magnuson-Stevens Act, this nation undertook a fishery 

development program designed to maximize its resources out to 200 miles. At the 

time the United States could have been considered a lesser-developed fishing nation. 

Today, the zeal for development of a domestic fishery has been transferred to any 

number of Atlantic coastal nations. As ICCAT compliance quotas have come on line, 

nations previously fishing outside the convention have decided to join. Countries 

joining ICCAT are asking for quotas. Last year, Mexico joined and got a quota for 

both bluefin and swordfish. Iceland joined and asked for a bluefin quota. Malta and 

Cyprus, joining this year, will clearly ask for quotas. 

These demands, coupled with the demand of existing members for increased 

quotas, stress the system. ICCAT cannot sustain comprehensive quota and allocation regimes that simply add up the demands of fishing nations and establish that 

total as the quota, regardless of the science. Last year’s eastern bluefin regime was 

very close to this. The United States argued that the quota should be considerably 

lower. The EU argued that the quota had to cover all nations fishing for eastern 

bluefin and that over time it would equalize because of a reduction in small fish 

catch. Were there a reduction in small fish catch over the next five years, it would 

be possible to sustain the present level of harvest. U.S. constituencies, through the 

use of the Pelly Amendment and Section 301 of the Trade Act of 1974, as amended, 

are ready to apply more pressure if progress is not made. 

Illegal, Unreported and Unregulated Vessels 

Last year I appeared before this Committee to discuss the ICCAT challenges in 

2002. Then, I told the Committee the single most important thing that could be accomplished at ICCAT was a recommendation providing member countries with the 

authority to prevent the imports from illegal, unreported and unregulated (IUU) 

vessels. Two measures were adopted, the so-called ‘‘positive list’’ and ‘‘negative list.’’ 

The National Marine Fisheries Service (NMFS), along with ICCAT and other member nations, is in the process of developing these measures. The measures require 

that imported product (swordfish and bluefin tuna) be registered with the ICCAT 

secretariat (positive list) or, conversely, identified on a list as an IUU vessel (negative list). 

28

Although these measures are new they will control a significant amount of the 

illegal trade coming from these vessels. The United States needs to ensure it implements these measures so as to not disadvantage U.S. commercial fishermen. As 

markets close to IUU product it will flow some place else with significant market 

disruption. The United States needs to prepare to guard against these imports by 

establishing protocols with the Customs Service before major foreign markets are 

closed. 

Report cite to a new IUU fleet—some 100 longline vessels targeting sharks in the 

Caribbean. These are new vessels, all built small enough to avoid the Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) guidance on IUU vessels, which only applies to vessels 

over 24 meters. The new fleet can be described as IUUU, with the last U for undersized. One can only imagine the impact on white marlin from 100 vessels purse 

seining for sharks. Only the comprehensive approach described above will get at 

this problem. 

Solutions 

White marlin presents the biggest highly migratory species (HMS) conservation 

problem in the United States. What can we do? I have, at various times, described 

for this Committee approaches which could lead to the recovery of this stock. First 

and foremost, this is an ICCAT problem. It can only be solved internationally. In 

1988, NMFS made marlin a game fish. It prohibited its sale and import, and landings by recreational fishermen were drastically reduced. Still, the stock declined to 

the point it was considered listable under the Endangered Species Act. ICCAT 

stepped in and made marlin a live release fishery until 2005, when the stock will 

be reevaluated. No one thinks these measures are adequate to recover the stock. So 

how do we recover the stock? 

First, do not list them under the ESA. NMFS was right when it concluded that 

listing was not the right way to achieve recovery. The proper venue is ICCAT, which 

is best persuaded by good science. Senator Kay Bailey Hutchison has requested $2.5 

million in Fiscal Year 2004 funds to do research, but more is needed. The United 

States should embark on three tracks immediately. First, gather the basic scientific 

data so that we can agree on the status of the stock. Second, initiate gear research 

similar to that done for the bycatch of turtles. Third, determine if there are any 

time and area closures where bycatch of white marlin can be reduced. Once we have 

the science we can establish measures to rebuild the stock, but without the science 

improvement will take an act of God. 

Thank you for allowing me to testify here today. I look forward to your questions 

and comments. 

Mr. GILCHREST. I guess this question might be answered by all 

three. Each of you made some comments about the scientific, fundamental scientific conservation mission of ICCAT, and, Bill, you 

were a little bit pessimistic about ICCAT’s future because of its 

lack of scientific data that it is collecting, and you also talked about 

comprehensive, fundamental comprehensive mechanisms to keep 

undersized fish from flooding U.S. markets and the members of 

ICCAT were not in a position to make these geopolitical maneuvers 

or have the influence or make those kinds of decisions. 

So I guess what—and we are going to—I was not sure if I could 

make ICCAT based on our Congressional schedule, my district 

schedule, but I think after what we are hearing today, Mr. Pallone 

and myself and maybe some of the other Members will do everything we can to go at the appropriate time and use our position as 

Members of Congress to help buttress your position with the other 

members. 

When we do that, though, can you be somewhat specific about 

the mechanisms upon which we should push after we get there to 

the other members, our counterparts, other parliaments, members 

of ICCAT. As far as Mr. Delaney, you were referring to this comprehensive mission that could catch some of the problems of the 

other countries in their commercial activities, whether they be 

29

unfair trade practices, stopping undersized fish from coming into 

the U.S., those kinds of things. 

But when we go over there, I think it would be very useful for 

us to have some very specific recommendations that we could make 

to our counterparts, and I guess you could do that in somewhat 

general terms now and in more specific terms in the next week or 

so. 

Mr. DELANEY. Well, the U.S. Commissioners will be sitting down 

with Admiral Lautenbacher and a number of other important people in the Department of Commerce and the Department of State 

very soon to resolve what are the list of specific ICCAT priorities 

for the United States. So that will essentially become our adopted 

U.S. position. And certainly I think in probably all three of our testimonies, we have outlined some very specific issues that are likely 

to be on that list of priorities adopted in that soon to happen meeting. And so that can provide the basis for us to work with you to 

identify, OK, these are our specific trade agenda items that we 

want to pursue, these are our specific white marlin, blue marlin, 

on down the list. And, you know, perhaps there should be an opportunity for us to discuss those prior to leaving or when we are over 

there just prior to entering into the meeting. 

But as I said in my testimony, I think there is perhaps an opportunity—the EC does comprise the largest share of harvest in virtually all of the major species at ICCAT. They have distant water 

fleets, coastal fleets, everything imaginable in between, and the 

Mediterranean situation in particular where we have a lot of the 

problems. And we will be in the EC, and it would seem that our 

U.S. mission in Brussels ought to be able to secure some tension 

of your counterparts in the EC parliament or in their commission 

itself who are responsible for higher-level fisheries policy than just 

their ICCAT Commissioner—

Mr. GILCHREST. This would be in Dublin or Brussels? 

Mr. DELANEY. I don’t see why not. 

Mr. GILCHREST. So it would be important for us to make those 

contacts now prior to heading over? 

Mr. DELANEY. Absolutely. And I think it would certainly create 

a backdrop that would really strengthen our ability to negotiate at 

the Commissioner level if our EC Commissioner, who is in many 

ways our—I don’t know the right word to use—nemesis, foe, opponent in a lot of these conservation and compliance issues. 

Mr. GILCHREST. Is a lot of the problems we are facing now with 

ICCAT the fact that we don’t have enough data at this point? Is 

it that the data is there but the negotiations don’t go well, compliance is ignored? 

Mr. DELANEY. We have—the very first requirement adopted by 

ICCAT in 1969 was for each nation to submit basic catch effort, 

that type of data to ICCAT. It is a scientific organization designed 

to find out how many fish are you catching, put that into a scientific model and determine the status of stocks based on the fishing mortality rates. Very fundamental stuff. 

Today we are experiencing horrible problems with countries not 

reporting, perhaps deliberately, and as a result, stock assessments 

on, for example, eastern bluefin tuna, which has such a great 

30

impact on the western bluefin tuna, and I would love for somebody 

to ask me why we can’t do a—

Mr. GILCHREST. Mr. Pallone will ask you why. I am out of time. 

Mr. DELANEY. We can’t do a stock assessment for the fact that 

nations fail to report their data. So it is a very serious issue. I am 

sorry to take so much time. 

Mr. GILCHREST. Thank you very much. 

I am going to yield—we may have a second round, but I will 

yield to the gentleman from New Jersey, Mr. Pallone. 

Mr. PALLONE. Well, if Mr. Delaney would just elaborate a little 

on the last thing you said. You were talking about the stock assessment, and did you finish what you said? 

Mr. DELANEY. Because of the lack of data and the failure of nations to submit data. 

Mr. PALLONE. So this is the same issue that you raised, Mr. 

Hayes? 

Mr. DELANEY. It is particularly acute for the eastern Atlantic 

bluefin stock, which really affects the western Atlantic stock as 

well. 

Mr. PALLONE. I was going to ask Dr. Hogarth on the compliance 

issue, in your written testimony you say at one point that there are 

proposals for establishing a vessel monitoring system program and 

spelling out flag state duties pending before the Commission this 

year. Did you want to tell us a little bit about those? I think you 

mentioned it previously. 

Dr. HOGARTH. Just a way of keeping up with some of these vessels, we have developed now a positive list so that you have to be 

on this list to sell fish, to be able to buy. 

Part of this continuing compliance is to have vessel monitoring 

systems so that we can know what flag you are flying and to keep 

up with the vessels. It is part of the compliance, and it has been 

fought quite a bit, the vessel monitoring. A lot of the countries do 

not want these type of systems that can track you while you are 

fishing, the way you are fishing. 

Mr. PALLONE. But is the Commission going to adopt this? 

Dr. HOGARTH. We hope so. 

Mr. PALLONE. That would happen at this meeting? 

Dr. HOGARTH. This meeting. 

Mr. PALLONE. So it is one of the things we could advocate when 

we are there, I guess. 

Dr. HOGARTH. Yeah, you could. And let me tell you one story 

from what Glenn said about data. The U.S. sponsored—we put additional money this year into ICCAT to have a data workshop to 

look at the data. Of 37 nations, 7 showed up, and, you know, it is 

just—it is not being taken serious, and when you are doing—if you 

are exceeding your quotas and taking undersized fish, the stock assessment people go there and they cannot do the assessment. I was 

talking the other day to the stock assessment people, I said, well, 

what about bluefin tuna? At this rate that they are taking eastern 

bluefin tuna, aren’t we in danger of losing the stock? They said, 

well, the data is so poor, we don’t know; it could happen next year 

or the year after next. We just don’t know. 

Mr. PALLONE. Is the fact that the countries aren’t conducting 

these stock assessments purposeful? In that they are trying to 

31

avoid it, or they just don’t have the resources that they have been 

allocating or what is the problem? 

Dr. HOGARTH. Well, I think you are dealing with some developing 

countries, but one of the biggest reasons for not reporting is the 

European Union, they have—as I say, they have plenty of money. 

They contribute the most. They have the most countries. I think it 

is a matter of I think if you report it, then you have got to be accountable for it, and then you can do the stock assessments and 

really document what is happening. So if you don’t report it, it 

doesn’t give you—it doesn’t make it easier for us to do the work 

that we have to do. So I think some of it is on purpose, to be honest 

with you. 

Mr. PALLONE. Just not to be bothered and not to—

Dr. HOGARTH. Not to be bothered and not to present the data 

that you can make factual decisions based on it. 

Mr. PALLONE. Mr. Hayes, when you were talking about compliance, you said that we needed measures that allow the states to 

prohibit directed ICCAT species if there is a violation of some other 

conservation measure. Give me some examples of that. 

Mr. HAYES. Marlin I think is a good example, but let me—there 

is today a provision in the ICCAT conservation recommendations 

that essentially requires you to discard all white marlin basically. 

So let’s assume that we have a country that its landings go right 

off the chart and we identify those landings. The measure today 

would be pretty much nonexistent. I mean, it would almost be a—

we would have to go, we would have to identify the country, we 

would have to go through a reasonably long process to identify 

them and say you did wrong. 

The question then is what measure could you take against them? 

Well, the measure is not going to be prevent the import of marlin, 

because there is no export of marlin. So let’s assume that country 

A also has a very large catch of bigeye tuna that they export, let’s 

say, to the United States. The United States could take actions to 

prevent, under what I would like to see, could take actions to prevent the import of bigeye tuna based on the violation that occurred 

to marlin. So what you would do is you are tying them together. 

Now, I am not talking about extending it beyond measures which 

would apply to convention species, but I am talking about tying together all of the convention species. 

Mr. PALLONE. And you would have a hard time getting support 

for that, I guess, huh? The Commission would have to adopt a rule? 

Mr. HAYES. The Commission would clearly have to adopt a rule. 

They clearly would have to identify the violations. Those things 

would all have to occur, but it is, I think, one step beyond where 

we are today. There is no question that if you violate a bluefin tuna 

regulation internationally that individual states have unilateral authority to prevent the import of that bluefin tuna. Those rules are 

basically in place. The idea here is to go one step beyond that and 

deal with the conservation of other species for which there is no direct import. 

Mr. PALLONE. Thank you. 

Mr. GILCHREST. Mr. Faleomavaega. 

Mr. FALEOMAVAEGA. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and I thank the 

members of the panel for their testimony. I wanted to ask Dr. 

32

Hogarth, you mentioned that—what is the annual operating budget 

of ICCAT? I am pleading ignorance here. I don’t know what the—

Dr. HOGARTH. I am going to have to plead ignorance also, but I 

will find that number and get it back to you. 

Mr. FALEOMAVAEGA. You mentioned that the majority of the 

funding comes from the European Commission, and I gather that 

the application of the golden rule, he who has the gold makes the 

rule, so does this give reason why the EC seems to dominate the 

operations of ICCAT? 

Dr. HOGARTH. I think that is the opinion, and when you have got 

that many countries that you can sort of control, I think it is easier 

to control the process. I mean, we met with him. The first thing 

he told us, he said, I contribute the most money, I catch the most 

fish, we expect to have the Executive Secretary, we expect to keep 

the bluefin tuna panel, and so we started from there. 

Mr. FALEOMAVAEGA. So some 37 member countries contract with 

ICCAT. We are at a complete disadvantage in that regard because 

of the sheer numbers. One vote against 36, which predominantly, 

I presume they are all European, doesn’t give us much leverage in 

terms of our concerns when we meet in these meetings. Am I 

wrong on this assessment? 

Dr. HOGARTH. But the EC only gets one vote. Each country gets 

one vote basically, and we try to do things by consensus, but you 

are dealing with, you know, developing countries. I think we have 

a chance. We work well with Canada, Japan and others. So, you 

know, we have the opportunity, but it is a matter of making deals, 

as you all are well aware, and they can maybe do that easier. We 

caused some last year to have to pay for countries to stay because 

they were concerned of how the things were going to turn out. So 

we can have an influence. 

Mr. FALEOMAVAEGA. Mr. Delaney, you had mentioned that it is 

only within the last 10 years that we have finally gotten more substance done by way of proposals within ICCAT meetings, that the 

Administration at that time really pushed hard to make some of 

these changes. 

Does this seem to be the same trend of the current Administration’s efforts to push just as hard as the predecessors? 

Mr. DELANEY. Absolutely. In fact, I wish I had brought it with 

me, but there is sort of a graph showing the annual adoption—the 

number of measures that are adopted at ICCAT in each year, and 

it just continues to rise substantially, and I think this Administration—I don’t know that it was necessarily a political thing, but I 

think that the Commissioners in particular who are leading the 

ICCAT delegation, changed dramatically in the early 1990s and 

came with a fresh and different perspective on what needed to be 

done. And I think that we were listening very closely to the affected constituents, to Members of Congress and sort of rolled up 

our sleeves and said we need to reform this dinosaur called ICCAT 

and try to make it work, because there is no alternative. 

While Dr. Hogarth fears what might happen with regard to 

ICCAT and our future participation, he knows, as we all do, there 

really is no alternative. These are highly migratory species that 

have to be managed through international cooperation. There is no 

other way. So we have to make it work. 

33

Mr. FALEOMAVAEGA. We have the Inter-American Tuna Commission out in La Jolla that manages somewhat the Latin American 

tuna fishing situation, and just last year or this year we have also 

signed off to a tuna convention that is composed of many of the 

Asian and Pacific Island countries. It all comes down to one theme, 

though, Mr. Delaney, is that a lot of rhetoric, but when it comes 

to enforcement, countries like Japan, very, very big fishing, industrial country, very reluctant to come forward. The question of observers on these vessels to make sure that there is compliance, I 

don’t know if ICCAT does the same thing, but we are having problems with that, too. 

So I happen to have the largest tuna canning facility in the 

world, and my humble prediction right now is that we are going 

to be iced out in another 10 years the same way that our textile 

industry is also going to be taken out by other countries, simply because we just don’t have the proper measures to compete with 

lower labor costs from Third World countries. And they are demanding now that they export their tuna duty free to the United 

States, and so we are up against a real difficult situation. I suspect 

we have 110 swordfish fishing vessels from New England that are 

now based out of Hawaii simply because swordfish is out—is overfished in New England area. So we really have some very serious 

problems. 

I would humbly suggest to Mr. Chairman that after the meeting 

of our members of the ICCAT, if they would come back, and we 

ought to have a follow-up hearing and tell us what you encounter, 

and maybe we can prepare the proper legislation to address those 

things that our friends there in Europe are not willing to deal with, 

and I certainly would support it. 

Mr. GILCHREST. We will do that, Mr. Faleomavaega. We do have 

a vote on. Then I will yield at this point to the gentlelady from 

Guam. 

Ms. BORDALLO. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. Thank 

you, gentlemen, for your testimonies. 

Mr. Delaney, you mentioned in your written testimony that Taiwan’s fishing practices leave a lot to be desired. Correct me if I am 

wrong, but Taiwan is not a member of ICCAT? 

Mr. DELANEY. Actually, because of Taiwan’s unusual political 

status as compared to other nations, they are not considered to be 

a contracting party to ICCAT. Nevertheless, they do have a special 

status conferred upon them that is somewhere between a nonmember and a contracting party, which does give them an opportunity to participate in ICCAT fisheries and be part of the management and conservation program. 

Ms. BORDALLO. Well, who keeps an eye over them? It says Japan 

has pressured them to comply with ICCAT. 

Mr. DELANEY. Right. 

Ms. BORDALLO. Is that working? 

Mr. DELANEY. Subject to ICCAT rules and regulations. I think 

because of the relationship between the Japanese fishing industry 

and the Taiwanese fishing industry historically, the Japanese government has had the capability to have more influence over the 

Taiwanese fishing industry than other nations have been able to. 

34

However, my personal view is that the United States is in a position to exert very strong leverage on Taiwan and their practices, 

both inside and outside of ICCAT, and that this is a nation that 

has caused a great deal of problems for us at ICCAT and that 

while what I am saying may not be politically correct in all circles, 

if we are going to make ICCAT work, Taiwan needs to play by the 

rules and be treated with severity when they go off the—

Ms. BORDALLO. So will this be the discussion then at your next 

gathering? 

Mr. DELANEY. I would hope so, and that is an area where I think 

we could use political support, to have you, the U.S. Government, 

feel that it has the wherewithal, the intestinal fortitude, if you will, 

to take on the Taiwanese issue. 

Dr. HOGARTH. On that point real quick, the State Department 

just signed a sort of a memorandum of agreement to work with 

Taiwan—I don’t know exactly what it is called—on some issues, 

and part of that is that they would be in compliance with their 

fishing regulations. So we will use this avenue because Taiwan is 

now fishing in Hawaii. They are everywhere, and they are expanding their fleets, and really we do have to help bring them in. So 

there is an avenue we have through the State Department. 

Ms. BORDALLO. Thank you. 

And my next question is for you, Dr. Hogarth. NOAA Fisheries 

more or less manages and regulates Pacific fishing for the Federal 

Government. Would that be a correct statement? 

Dr. HOGARTH. Yes, ma’am. 

Ms. BORDALLO. And the ICCAT mission is primarily for the Atlantic. 

Dr. Hogarth, what is the level of international cooperation—

Mr. GILCHREST. Could I ask the gentlelady to yield, from Guam, 

just for 1 second? 

Ms. BORDALLO. Yes. 

Mr. GILCHREST. We have unfortunately four votes instead of one. 

That is going to be a considerable amount of time, and I know 

there are some members on the second panel that don’t have that 

much time because we will be gone about 40 minutes. We will return, but I am going to ask Mr. Faleomavaega to chair the hearing 

until we come back so we don’t have any disruption. 

Mr. FALEOMAVAEGA. See, I have already voted, Mr. Chairman. 

Ms. BORDALLO. I have, too. We are delegates. We don’t vote. 

Mr. FALEOMAVAEGA. That is what democracy is all about, Mr. 

Chairman. 

Ms. BORDALLO. Let me repeat that question then. 

Regarding the NOAA, they regulate Pacific fishing for the Federal Government, and ICCAT’s mission is primarily for the Atlantic. What is the lever of international cooperation received by the 

United States in conserving the species of concern in the Pacific? 

Dr. HOGARTH. Right now we are developing a new mechanism for 

the central Pacific in the multilateral conference and we were concerned that Japan was not a member of that, but they have recently agreed to become a part. So that is going to be, I think, a 

great avenue for the Pacific. And then we also have for the eastern 

tropical Pacific the international—the IATTC, and they have done 

pretty good work. In fact, they have a capacity control in there 

35

now, which is one of the few organizations that get capacity in 

place. 

So I think we have two mechanisms, and we have some individual scientific groups in the Pacific. So I think the concern there 

is how are we going to bring this together in the umbrella. We 

have got several small groups doing it, like the eastern tropical, 

western, central Pacific, but these fish don’t recognize these lines; 

so we are going to have to develop an umbrella, so to speak, to get 

the various groups together. But I think we have a good mechanism in the Pacific, I really do. 

Ms. BORDALLO. I was just thinking, inasmuch as you are the 

international group and most of the countries that belong to your 

commission, the Pacific, they are fishing in both the Atlantic and 

the Pacific, and I am wondering if maybe you should enhance the 

scope of your work and include the Pacific. I don’t know whether 

that would be stepping on the toes of the NOAA fisheries, but it 

seems to me you are the international group, you have countries 

from all over the world now as part of your membership, and we 

are coming together. 

As my colleague said, Mr. Faleomavaega, the next problem will 

be the Pacific Ocean where we will be discussing and addressing 

problems of overfishing. So I think that maybe you ought to include 

the Pacific and henceforth be known as ‘‘ICCAPT,’’ if you might 

bring that up. 

Dr. HOGARTH. Well, we did discuss recently, too, about how to get 

IATTC and ICCAT together on maybe some issues, but as we see 

these boats move so much—obviously they are moving, we have got 

them everywhere as we regulate fisheries, and I think FAO does 

some of this but I think we do have to look on a broad spectrum. 

NOAA Fisheries works with all of them. I am in NOAA Fisheries 

and ICCAT Commissioner, but we do work with all of them. So we 

have sort of a central theme within government, NOAA Fisheries, 

and we do that. 

Ms. BORDALLO. It seems to me that ICCAT could enhance their 

mission and include the Pacific area, because as my colleague said, 

these vessels—they go from one ocean to another, and this is—it 

is going to happen very soon. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. FALEOMAVAEGA. [Presiding.] I want to thank Dr. Hogarth 

and Mr. Delaney and Mr. Hayes for your participation and statements this afternoon, and I really appreciate your coming to testify 

this afternoon. 

For the next panel, we have Mr. Michael Genovese, commercial 

fisherman, and member of the U.S. ICCAT Advisory Committee; 

also Vice President of White Dove, Incorporated. Also Dr. John 

Graves, Chairman of the U.S. ICCAT Advisory Committee; Mr. 

Herb Moore, Jr., Director of Government Affairs at Recreational 

Fishing Alliance; and Mr. David Wilmot, Jr., member of the U.S. 

ICCAT Advisory Committee, Rising Tide Consulting. 

I would like to ask Mr. Genovese to testify first. He has a very 

important engagement with his daughter’s graduation, for which I 

would be more than happy to accommodate him for doing so, that 

he may testify first and that he will leave following his testimony. 

I understand that Mr. Moore is not here. He is probably stuck in 

36

the security that we are having at the Cannon Building. But as the 

Chairman said earlier, gentlemen, it is not for lack of interest but 

because of the way the system is set up here in the Congress, these 

votes have to be taken. But I am sure that the Chairman and Mr. 

Pallone will be back as soon as possible. 

MR. FALEOMAVAEGA. Mr. Genovese. 

STATEMENT OF MICHAEL P. GENOVESE, SR., COMMERCIAL 

FISHERMAN AND MEMBER OF THE U.S. ICCAT ADVISORY 

COMMITTEE, VICE PRESIDENT OF WHITE DOVE, INC. 

Mr. GENOVESE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Chairman, it is 

indeed a great privilege to provide this Committee with testimony 

on the upcoming critical meeting of the International Commission 

for the Conservation of Atlantic Tunas in Dublin, Ireland. I have 

been a commercial fisherman for 26 years. My fishing vessel, White 

Dove Too, is one of the five licensed U.S. purse seine vessels authorized to fish for giant Atlantic bluefin tuna. 

I have been a member of the Advisory Committee to the U.S. section of ICCAT since around 1985, and at my own expense I have 

attended numerous international meetings of the Commission. Mr. 

Chairman, for at least the last decade the United States has been 

fortunate to have dedicated and talented U.S. Commissioners leading the U.S. delegation at ICCAT and pioneering highly complex 

multilateral compliance schemes and processes utilizing trade sanctions when justified. 

Despite the tireless effort and remarkable development of important and basic fishery management instruments produced by these 

Commissioners, particularly the current Commissioners, Dr. Bill 

Hogarth, Mr. Glenn Delaney, and Mr. Robert Hayes, I am deeply 

troubled and concerned about the future of ICCAT and its ability 

to meet its conservation objectives, particularly with regards to 

eastern Atlantic bluefin tuna. Many eastern Atlantic countries 

must share responsibility for the current deplorable state of affairs, 

particularly with respect to the current management policies and 

compliance levels for eastern Atlantic bluefin tuna, but none bears 

a greater responsibility than the European Union. 

The EU has almost single-handedly crafted and pushed through 

the most dangerous and outrageous 4-year plan for eastern bluefin 

that ignores scientific advice and also endangers the 1998 rebuilding plan for western Atlantic bluefin tuna. 

Since 1996 ICCAT’s Standing Committee on Research and Statistics, the SCRS, the scientific arm of ICCAT, has recommended that 

the catch of eastern Atlantic bluefin tuna be no more than 25 or 

26,000 metric tons simply to stop the decline in the resource. Despite this very clear warning of resource peril, total combined 

catches of 90,374 metric tons were recorded for the years 1996 

through 2000. 

To provide some perspective, catches on our side of the Atlantic 

have been held by regulation mostly below 3,000 metric tons per 

year since 1981. This 90,000 metric ton overcatch in the East must 

be considered the minimum, given that the scientists repeatedly 

point out considerable underreporting, misreporting, and nonreporting by both member and nonmember countries fishing on 

eastern bluefin tuna. A most fundamental obligation of any fishing 

37

nation is to provide accurate, detailed, and timely information on 

catches to allow scientists to conduct stock assessments. 

With this backdrop, one can imagine the outrage of the U.S. Delegation at the 2001 ICCAT meeting when the EC unveiled its 4-

year plan for quote ‘‘economic stability,’’ unquote, with a starting 

and ending quota level of 32,600 metric tons. That is some 6,000 

metric tons above the dire scientific advice. 

With assistance of Canada, the U.S. rightly blocked the EC proposal by denying consensus in 2001. This outrageous eastern Atlantic bluefin tuna situation is jeopardizing the entire Atlantic and the 

resource in the western Atlantic recovery plan. The combination of 

fish migrations, unequal conservation standards in the East and 

the West, result in much of the western conservation sacrifices 

being squandered and, to say the least, U.S. fishermen are fed up 

with the 28-year-old situation. Gross levels of overfishing and noncompliance in the East must end. 

Mr. Chairman, I believe this Committee can assist the U.S. delegation and improve the ICCAT process and achievement of the 

ICCAT mandate by moving on many of the recommendations suggested in the testimony of U.S. Commercial Commissioner Mr. 

Glenn Delaney at this hearing. U.S. Commissioners need support 

from the highest levels of the Administration and Congress to secure the necessary political leverage to change the political disposition among ICCAT players refusing to adopt minimal conservation 

standards and ethics. To do their job, the Commissioners require 

domestic and international recognition that international fishery 

conservation is a matter important enough to the U.S. Government 

that failure of nations to cooperate will affect their overall relations 

with the United States. 

There can be no doubt that within the international fora for fisheries conservation, the U.S. is the leading voice for tough conservation standards and measures. We often lead by example, subjecting 

our fishermen to even greater fishing restrictions than our foreign 

counterparts. This is clearly the case in commercial and recreational fisheries for Atlantic swordfish and Atlantic bluefin tuna, 

but it is also an established biological reality that we are responsible for a very small portion of the mortality on these stocks. 

We cannot successfully conserve these stocks unilaterally without 

cooperation of all of the major fishing nations. Those U.S. fishermen sacrificing under the burden of ICCAT restrictions have a 

right to expect that the U.S. Government will at least ensure that 

the fish caught in violation of ICCAT programs by contracting parties or by pirate IUU fishing vessels not be allowed to fairly compete with legitimate U.S.-caught fish in the United States markets. 

Thank you very much for this opportunity to share my views on 

the necessary changes to achieve an effective and efficient and fair 

international conservation program at ICCAT. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Genovese follows:]

Statement of Michael P. Genovese, Commercial Fisherman, Member of the 

U.S. ICCAT Advisory Committee, and Vice President, White Dove, Inc. 

Mr. Chairman, it is indeed a great privilege to provide this Committee with testimony on the upcoming critical meetings of the International Commission for the 

Conservation of Atlantic Tunas in Dublin, Ireland. I have been a commercial fishermen my whole life. My fishing vessel White Dove Too is one of five licensed U.S. 

38

purse seine vessels authorized to fish for giant Atlantic bluefin tuna. I have been 

a member of the Advisory Committee to the U.S. Section to ICCAT since around 

1985 and, at my own expense, I have attended numerous international meetings of 

the Commission. 

Mr. Chairman, for at least the last decade the United States has been fortunate 

to have dedicated and talented U.S. Commissioners leading the U.S. delegation at 

ICCAT and pioneering highly complex multilateral compliance schemes and processes utilizing trade sanctions when justified. 

Despite the tireless efforts and remarkable development of important and basic 

fishery management instruments produced by these Commissioners, particularly the 

current Commissioners Dr. Bill Hogarth, Mr. Glenn Delaney and Mr. Robert Hayes, 

I am deeply troubled and concerned about the future of ICCAT and its ability to 

meet its conservation objective, particularly with regards to eastern Atlantic bluefin 

tuna. 

Many eastern Atlantic countries must share responsibility for the current deplorable state of affairs, particularly with respect to current management policies and 

compliance levels for eastern Atlantic bluefin tuna, but none bears a greater responsibility then the European Union. The European Union has almost singlehandedly 

crafted and pushed through a most dangerous and outrageous four-year plan for 

eastern bluefin that ignores scientific advice and also endangers the 1998-rebuilding 

plan for western Atlantic bluefin tuna. I want to review specifically the eastern 

bluefin tuna situation to illustrate for this Committee the potential and real magnitude of damage resulting from the EU’s extremely poor leadership, lack of conservation ethic at ICCAT, and blatant refusal to heed clear and repeated scientific 

advice. 

Since 1996 ICCAT’s Standing Committee on Research and Statistics (SCRS—the 

scientific arm of ICCAT) has recommended that the catch of eastern Atlantic bluefin 

tuna be no more than 25 or 26,000 metric tons (MT) simply to stop the decline of 

the resource. Despite this very clear warning of resource peril, catches of 53,163, 

48,988, 41,688, 35,116 and 36,419 MT were recorded for the years 1996 through 

2000. In just this five-year period Mr. Chairman, catches in the eastern Atlantic (led 

by the E.U.) have exceeded the scientific advice by a stunning 90,374 MT. To provide some perspective, catches off our side of the Atlantic have been held by regulation mostly below 3,000 MT since 1981. This 90,000 MT of overcatch must be considered the minimum given that the scientists repeatedly point out considerable underreporting, misreporting and non-reporting by both member and non-member countries fishing on eastern bluefin tuna. 

Since 1975 ICCAT has had in place various minimum size measures in an attempt to protect juvenile fish and these have been openly and fragrantly ignored 

by longstanding directed fisheries in the Mediterranean Sea and Bay of Biscay. In 

1998, ICCAT implemented a 3.2 kg (about a 7 lb. fish!) minimum size with no tolerance. The latest stock assessment by SCRS notes that 36% of the number of fish 

caught in the Mediterranean were less then 3.2 kg while 40% of the Mediterranean 

catch was under the historical 6.4 kg minimum size. ICCAT scientists continue to 

deplore the fact that catches of age 0 bluefin continue to flourish and be underreported. To place this in perspective, off our shores it is illegal to sell any bluefin 

tuna less than 6’1’’ or about 200 lbs.! This is another example of the U.S. having 

a more restrictive conservation measure than any other country in the world. 

In 2002 the E.U. committed to a major effort to bring under compliance the multitude of fisheries throughout the Mediterranean Sea and Bay of Biscay that target 

small undersize recognizing the great biological risk attendant a four-year quota 

plan greatly in excess of scientific advice. The EU needs to be pressured to provide 

the resources required to define and develop emergency restrictions ending massive 

noncompliance with longstanding ICCAT minimum size agreements. 

A most fundamental obligation of any fishing nation is to provide accurate, detailed and timely information on catches to allow scientists to conduct stock assessments. Attached to my testimony are two pages from the 2002 latest stock assessment for eastern bluefin tuna which provides evidence of irresponsible behavior on 

the part of many eastern countries in not providing basic catch information. On the 

data issue the scientists have now issued this dire warning and I quote: 

‘‘The Committee continues to be strongly concerned about the quality of the 

catch, effort and catch at size data available to conduct quantitative assessments for East Atlantic (and Mediterranean) bluefin tuna now and in the 

future. Unless this situation improves, the quality of the advice that the 

Committee can provide will continue to deteriorate.’’

In 2002 we learned that eastern fishing nations withheld at least 8,898 MT of 

catch from ICCAT preventing a better stock assessment. EC-Greece and EC-Italy 

39

were among the offending non-reporting countries along with Morocco, Tunisia, Turkey and others. 

And finally Mr. Chairman, on the grave status of the eastern bluefin resource the 

scientist offered this perspective: 

‘‘The Committee is concerned about the status of East Atlantic (including 

Mediterranean) bluefin tuna resources in the light of assessment results; 

the historically high reported catches made in 1994-1997 (in excess of 

46,000 MT 1994-97; and in excess of 50,000 MT in 1996), and possible 

underreporting since 1998. Analyses suggest that at current levels of recruitment and the present level of large and small-fish fisheries, catch levels of 26,000 MT or more are not sustainable over the long term.’’

With this backdrop, one can imagine the outrage of the U.S. delegation at the 

2001 ICCAT meeting when the EC unveiled its four year plan for ‘‘economic stability’’ with a starting and ending quota level of 32,600 MT, some 6,000 MT above 

the most dire scientific advice. With the assistance of Canada, the U.S. rightly 

blocked the EC proposal by denying consensus in 2001. Not to be denied in their 

quest, the EC returned in 2002 with the same outrageous plan but also with a 

Machiavellian two-pronged strategy to overcome the expected U.S. resistance. They 

were prepared to pay supporting delegations costs to stay to the very end of the 

meeting and force a vote if necessary. Their backup strategy was to also force linkage of their controversial plan to other conservation agreements desired by the U.S. 

agreements. Not a single individual on the U.S. delegation wanted to see adoption 

of the 2002 EC four year biologically irresponsible plan and this opposition was 

made clear both in private and plenary meetings. But in the end the U.S. would 

have been powerless to prevent its effective implementation by an overwhelming 

vote. 

Attached to my testimony is data from a Japanese bluefin purchasing company 

(with contractual obligations to purchase fish from the tuna farms) summarizing expected production from the Mediterranean tuna farms this year. In 2002 approximately 14,650 MT of bluefin tuna were exported from farms in the Mediterranean 

Sea. According to the attached estimate, the EC’s four year ‘‘economic stability’’ plan 

has given rise to an increase of almost 7,000 MT of farm production to 21,600 in 

2003, the first year of the plan. You will note the increased farm production includes 

Turkey, Malta and Cyprus (totaling 7,250 MT) and these are countries without any 

specific eastern quota, rather they share in a quota category labeled ‘‘Others’’ limited to a total catch of only 1,146. This allows an estimate of a total catch of 38,604 

for 2003 or about 12,000 MT above the scientific advice. 

Mr. Chairman, the rapid development of fish farms for bluefin tuna in the Mediterranean presents a further great threat to the collection of catch data and compliance with country quotas. The farms offer an exceptionally convenient cover or 

‘‘black hole’’ to hide excessive catches by claiming fish growth in the pens and diverting excess production to domestic markets not well-known or restricted. At a 

minimum ICCAT needs to add fish farms to the registry of positive vessels allowed 

to trade in ICCAT species. This should only be done after such fish farms have provided clear evidence of implementation of an ICCAT developed transparent, 

verifiable accounting and tracking system for the weight, date, responsible fishing 

vessel and other pertinent data regarding fish introduced and removed to and from 

the pens. 

Other estimates of the total Mediterranean 2003 catch suggests 50,000 MT may 

be exceeded again. U.S. dealers of bluefin tuna have reported unprecedented levels 

of Mediterranean production flooding the international marketplace including a dramatic rise in exports to the U.S. sashimi markets crushing growing U.S. dealer participation this year. Prices to U.S. fishermen have dropped precipitously from an average of above $10.00 lb. in the late 1990’s to $2.00 or $3.00 lb this year. Many of 

the fish shipped to Japan this year by U.S. dealers have been sold for less then the 

costs of shipping. The oversupply caused by runaway fishing in the Mediterranean 

is obviously causing severe financial injury to U.S. fishermen and fish dealers and 

other supportive industries along the eastern seaboard. 

This outrageous eastern Atlantic bluefin tuna situation is jeopardizing the entire 

Atlantic bluefin resource and the western Atlantic recovery plan. Earlier this week, 

the U.S. ICCAT Advisory Committee met and reviewed the latest high-tech electronic tagging data and the evidence is now exceptionally strong that mixing of fish 

between eastern and western fishing grounds is very extensive. The latest data 

demonstrates that 30% of the fish tagged off North Carolina travel to the Mediterranean Sea where they are subjected to this continuing slaughter. Western fish annually migrate to the central Atlantic again where they are subject to excessive 

eastern Atlantic catch levels. The combination of fish migrations and unequal conservation standards in the east and west results in much of the western conservaVerDate 0ct 09 2002 08:46 May 13, 2004 Jkt 088533 PO 00000 Frm 00043 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6621 J:\DOCS\90159.TXT HRESOUR1 PsN: KATHY
40

tion sacrifices being squandered and, to say the least, U.S. fishermen are fed-up 

with this 28 year old situation. Gross levels of overfishing and non-compliance in 

the east must end. 

Mr. Chairman, I believe this Committee can assist the U.S. Delegation improve 

the ICCAT process and achievement of the ICCAT mandate by moving on many of 

the recommendations suggested earlier today in the testimony of the U.S. Commercial Commissioner Mr. Glenn Delaney at this Hearing. The fundamental problems 

are very clear and include: 1. the lack of political will among certain Nations to support generally accepted conservation standards and the consequent failure to agree 

on policies to achieve conservation objectives; 2. poor compliance records with established conservation agreements by some contracting parties; and, 3. a continuing 

problem with illegal, unregulated and unreported fishing (IUU and often referred 

to as ‘‘pirate fishing’’). In the ICCAT context, the European Community, North African countries bounding the southern coast of the Mediterranean Sea (in particular 

Morocco) and Taiwan standout as countries lacking the political will to embrace the 

responsibilities of conserving our shared highly migratory resources. 

The U.S. Commissioners need support from the highest levels of the Administration and Congress to secure the necessary political leverage required to change the 

political disposition among ICCAT players refusing to adopt minimal conservation 

standards and ethics. The threat and implementation of unilateral trade sanctions 

on fish and other products, foreign aid and linkage of cooperation on fishery matters 

to U.S. positions and actions on other issues of importance to the EC and other nations should all be on the table. To do their job, the Commissioners require domestic 

and international recognition that international fishery conservation is a matter important enough to the U.S. Government that failure to cooperate will affect your 

overall relations with the U.S. Countries need to know and experience that, if they 

undermine the effectiveness of an international conservation agreement, it will cost 

them in all their dealings and relationships with the U.S. 

I urge this Committee to look carefully at Commissioner Delaney’s recommendation to create a new U.S. Office of Fishery Trade Monitoring and Enforcement to 

allow development and implementation of comprehensive regime of trade measures 

including unilateral measures (as necessary and permitted under Pelly Act, Section 

301 of the Trade Act of 1974 and ATCA) and market controls to effectively enforce 

ICCAT conservation programs. There are no international fish police to enforce 

ICCAT measures on the high seas. Instead, the marketplace for these species is the 

arena for effective ICCAT enforcement. 

I would like to call the Committee’s attention to an April 25, 2003, letter (attached) to the Honorable Pascal Lamy, European Community Commissioner for 

Trade from Secretary of Commerce Donald Evans protesting the EU’s lack of political will to follow ICCAT scientific advice on the establishment of sustainable quotas 

for eastern Atlantic bluefin tuna. This letter represents a breakthrough for the U.S. 

Commissioners at ICCAT who have long sought support and action by the Administration to pressure the EU for more conservation leadership within ICCAT. The 

Commissioners’ focus on the EU recognizes that the EU is the most significant harvester in nearly all of the species under ICCAT purview and because of the influence they maintain with North African countries. In this respect, the EU can either 

chose to set a powerful international example of resource stewardship or provide a 

terrible example and excuse for other countries not to comply. 

The letter is a major step forward because it elevates ICCAT into the arena of 

serious bilateral trade relations and policy rather then just another fish or environmental issue. It remains to be seen whether this threat alone will influence a 

change in EU policies or whether further direct interventions by high-ranking officials within the Commerce and State Departments and implementation of trade 

sanctions will be required. We would hope this Committee could find additional avenues to influence further support within the Administration and elsewhere to pressure ICCAT parties for compliance. 

Mr. Chairman, there can be no doubt that within international fora for fisheries 

conservation, the U.S. is the leading voice for tough conservation standards and 

measures. We often lead by example, subjecting our fishermen to even greater fishing restrictions than our foreign counterparts. This is clearly the case in our commercial and recreational fisheries for Atlantic swordfish and Atlantic bluefin tuna. 

But it is also established biological reality that we are responsible for a very small 

portion of mortality on these stocks and we cannot successfully conserve these 

stocks unilaterally without cooperation from all of the major fishing nations. 

In the interest of having conservation programs be efficient and equitable it is 

clear to many in the fishing industry and many in government that the fastest and 

most effective way to improve the international conservation picture is for the U.S. 

to employ such legitimate trade sanctions against countries undermining the 

41

effectiveness of international programs. Those U.S. fishermen sacrificing under the 

burden of ICCAT restrictions have a right to expect that the U.S. Government will, 

at least, insure that fish caught in violation of ICCAT programs by contracting parties or ‘‘pirate’’ IUU fishing vessels not be allowed to unfairly compete with legitimate U.S.-caught fish in U.S. markets. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for this opportunity to share my views on necessary 

changes to achieve an effective, efficient and fair international conservation program 

at ICCAT for our shared highly migratory resources. 

[NOTE: The April 25, 2003, letter follows. Other attachments to Mr. Genovese’s 

statement have been retained in the Committee’s official files. ]


90159.002
42

Mr. FALEOMAVAEGA. If Dr. Graves and Dr. Wilmot will wait for 

just a couple of minutes, we would like to ask Mr. Genovese a couple of questions before he leaves. Mr. Genovese, I just have a couple of questions and I am sure the gentlewoman from Guam has 

likewise. 

You mentioned specifically the European Union as the culprit not 

only for noncompliance, but certainly it does not seem to give much 

credence to some of the standards that ICCAT has set up, and you 

suggested that maybe we need to do something about it. As you 

know, we passed this resolution yesterday—Mr. Saxton had introduced it—and in a very strongly worded provision suggested that 

maybe we ought to look at sanctions as a very serious option if 

these countries do not comply with some of the ICCAT standards. 

What is your thinking along this line, Mr. Genovese? 

Mr. GENOVESE. I think we need to hit them where it hurts, in 

their pocketbook. If the sanctions are able to go through, then it 

would maybe make them wake up and smell the coffee, because 

there is just too much going on over there that they don’t want to 

be responsible for. 

Mr. FALEOMAVAEGA. As a commercial fisherman yourself, what is 

your estimated value of the dollar of losses of our economic situation because of our compliance and yet at a disadvantage where 

these European Union countries are taking advantage of the situation, so to speak? 

Mr. GENOVESE. It would be hard for me to say right off the cuff 

what it is overall, but just this year, for example, with ongoing fish 


90159.003
43

farming in the Mediterranean Sea and overproduction that we 

have numbers on right now—it is in my submitted document—our 

price of fish per pound has gone down 60 percent just this year. 

Mr. FALEOMAVAEGA. Thank you. Ms. Bordallo? 

Ms. BORDALLO. No questions. 

Mr. FALEOMAVAEGA. Thank you, Mr. Genovese. Have a good trip 

and all the best at your daughter’s graduation. 

Mr. FALEOMAVAEGA.

STATEMENT OF JOHN E. GRAVES, CHAIRMAN,

U.S. ICCAT ADVISORY COMMITTEE 

Dr. GRAVES. Mr. Chairman and members of the Subcommittee, 

thank you for providing me the opportunity today to present testimony regarding the upcoming ICCAT meeting. I am John Graves, 

Chairman of the Department of Fishery Science at the Virginia Institute of Marine Science, College of William and Mary. I am also 

the Chair of the U.S. ICCAT Advisory Committee and have served 

in that capacity for the past 8 years. 

The U.S. ICCAT Advisory Committee met from Sunday through 

Tuesday of this week to consider the assessments and recommendations of ICCAT’s scientific body and to discuss a variety 

of issues and options that the United States could propose at this 

year’s Commission meeting. The ICCAT Advisory Committee’s informed deliberations historically provide a starting point for the development of U.S. positions at ICCAT. This year the Committee 

noted many items of high priority for the United States to pursue 

in Dublin and it also discussed many of the challenges that we will 

likely face in achieving our objectives. 

For the past several years, we have been vocal advocates at 

ICCAT for conservation and sound fisheries management, but we 

have faced serious opposition from other members of the Commission. Late on the last day of the 2001 meeting in Murcia, Spain, 

the United States refused to support a punitive conservation recommendation for eastern Atlantic and Mediterranean bluefin tuna 

proposed by the European Community, a measure that would have 

allowed serious overfishing to continue for several years. In previous years the United States had agreed to such measures, in essence believing that a bad management measure was better than 

no measure at all, but this changed in 2001 when the United 

States delegation was unanimous in not supporting the proposed 

measure. The lack of consensus and plenary precipitated a vote 

from the floor, but without a quorum, the meeting ended in a meltdown and many of the pending conservation measures had to be 

adopted by a mail vote. 

Last year promised to be an extremely busy year for ICCAT with 

assessments of western and eastern bluefin tuna, North Atlantic 

and South Atlantic swordfish, bigeye tuna, and white marlin. The 

United States came to the Commission meeting last year in Bilbao, 

Spain, ready to propose conservation measures for each of these 

stocks. 

However, fallout from the previous year’s meeting prevented us 

from attaining several of our objectives. The conduct of the ICCAT 

meeting changed. Upon our arrival, the U.S. Commissioners were 

informed that there would be limited discussion of country 

44

positions in plenary session and that all measures would be linked 

together in a single package to be voted up or down. If necessary, 

there would be votes, but it was made quite clear that the votes 

would not favor the U.S. positions. In order to ensure that conservation measures continued on white marlin, a species that was 

petitioned to be listed under the Endangered Species Act, the 

United States had to agree to catch limits on the other stocks that 

were far from our conservation targets. 

I must note here that it was only through the tenacity of our 

Commissioners that the catch limits were not higher. They did a 

commendable job under very difficult circumstances, but clearly the 

change in meeting conduct limited our ability to influence conservation measures for several stocks. 

The U.S. ICCAT Advisory Committee is also concerned about the 

general lack of compliance by several parties to binding ICCAT 

conservation measures. For the past 6 years, a major focus of the 

U.S. delegations to ICCAT has been to develop, implement, and 

fine-tune a transparent process that ensures compliance with Commission catch limits, size limits, and other conservation measures. 

Each year parties are to submit their compliance tables prior to the 

start of the Commission meeting. 

Compliance with this requirement has been abysmal. Only a few 

tables are available at the start of the meeting, and many that are 

submitted late do not contain the information necessary to evaluate 

compliance. This is especially true for determining compliance with 

minimum size limitations. It would appear that a member can simply avoid compliance by not submitting the required data. 

The effects of the failure to submit data in a timely manner, if 

at all, is not limited to the compliance committee. It is a problem 

that is undermining the very foundation of ICCAT. Over the past 

few years, the lack of data has compromised several stock assessments by ICCAT’s Standing Committee for Research and Statistics. 

Without such data, scientists are forced to make estimates about 

the total landings and size composition for nonreporting countries. 

This adds considerable uncertainty to stock assessment and the resulting scientific advice that is critical for fisheries management. 

Of even greater concern is the realization that some countries 

may be submitting data of dubious quality. The Commission must 

ensure compliance with the timely submission of accurate data, the 

most fundamental responsibility for any nation that is a member 

of ICCAT. 

Despite these many challenges ICCAT faces, it has made considerable progress over the past several years and the United States 

has played a major role in these advances. These include the rebuilding of North Atlantic swordfish, the implementation of a compliance regime, and the development of positive and negative fishing vessel lists that will hopefully close foreign markets to those 

who engage in illegal fishing practices. To be sure, progress is frustratingly slow at ICCAT, but it is the only game in town and we 

must make it work. 

This year we will be taking a well-honed team to Dublin. The 

three U.S. Commissioners have proven to be determined and tireless negotiators for the U.S. positions. They will be supported by 

competent and dedicated staff comprised of individuals from 

45

NMFS, NOAA, the Department of State, and the U.S. ICCAT Advisory Committee. We will undoubtedly encounter stiff opposition in 

the pursuit of our objectives. But when the dust is finally settled, 

I fully expect that we will once again have made progress toward 

the conservation and sound management of these pelagic resources. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman and members of the Subcommittee. 

Mr. FALEOMAVAEGA. Thank you, Dr. Graves. 

[The prepared statement of Dr. Graves follows:]

Statement of John E. Graves, Ph.D., Chair, Department of Fisheries 

Science, Virginia Institute of Marine Science, College of William and 

Mary, Chair, U.S. ICCAT Advisory Committee 

Mr. Chairman and Members of the Subcommittee, thank you for providing me the 

opportunity today to present testimony regarding the upcoming 18th Regular Meeting of the International Commission for the Conservation of Atlantic Tunas (ICCAT) 

in Dublin, Ireland. I am Dr. John E. Graves, Chair of the Department of Fisheries 

Science at the Virginia Institute of Marine Science, College of William and Mary. 

I am also Chair of the U.S. ICCAT Advisory Committee and have served in that 

capacity for the past eight years. 

The U.S. ICCAT Advisory Committee met from Sunday through Tuesday of this 

week to consider the assessments and recommendations of ICCAT’s scientific body, 

the Standing Committee for Research and Statistics (SCRS), and to discuss a variety of issues and options that the United States could propose at this year’s Commission meeting. The ICCAT Advisory Committee’s informed deliberations historically provide a starting point for the development of U.S. positions at ICCAT. This 

year the Committee noted many items of high priority for the United States to pursue in Dublin, and it also discussed many of the challenges that we will likely face 

in achieving our objectives. 

For the past several years we have been vocal advocates at ICCAT for conservation and sound fisheries management, but we have faced serious opposition from 

other members of the Commission. Late on the last day of the 2001 Commission 

meeting in Murcia, Spain, the United States refused to support a putative conservation recommendation for eastern Atlantic and Mediterranean bluefin tuna proposed 

by the European Community, a measure that would have allowed serious overfishing to continue for several years. In previous years the United States had agreed 

to such measures, in essence believing that a bad management measure was better 

than no measure at all. But this changed in 2001 when the U.S. delegation was 

unanimous in not supporting the proposed measure. The lack of consensus precipitated a vote from the floor, but without a quorum, the meeting ended in a meltdown, and many of the pending conservation measures had to be adopted by a mail 

vote. 

Last year promised to be an extremely busy year for ICCAT, with assessments 

of western and eastern Atlantic bluefin tuna, North Atlantic and South Atlantic 

swordfish, bigeye tuna, and white marlin. The United States came to the Commission meeting in Bilbao, Spain, ready to propose conservation measures for each of 

these stocks; however, fallout from the previous year’s meeting prevented us from 

attaining several of our objectives. Upon our arrival the U.S. Commissioners were 

informed that there would be limited discussion of country positions in plenary, and 

that all measures would be linked in a package. If necessary, there would be votes, 

but it was made quite clear that the votes would not favor the U.S. positions. In 

order to ensure that conservation measures continued on white marlin, a species 

that was petitioned to be listed under the Endangered Species Act, the United 

States had to agree to catch limits on the other stocks that were far from our conservative targets. I must note here that it was only through the tenacity of our Commissioners that the catch limits were not higher. They did a commendable job under 

very difficult circumstances. Clearly, the change in meeting conduct limited our ability to influence conservation measures for several stocks. 

The U.S. ICCAT Advisory Committee is concerned about the general lack of compliance by several parties to binding ICCAT conservation measures. For the past six 

years a major focus of the U.S. delegations to ICCAT has been to develop, implement, and fine-tune a transparent process that ensures compliance with Commission catch limits, size limits, and other conservation measures. Each year parties 

are to submit their compliance tables prior to the start of the Commission meeting. 

Compliance with this requirement has been abysmal. Only a few tables are available at the start of the meeting, and many that are submitted late do not contain 

46

the information necessary to evaluate compliance. This is especially true for determining compliance with minimum size limitations. It would appear that a member 

can simply avoid compliance by not submitting the required data. 

The effects of the failure to submit data in a timely manner, if at all, is not limited to the Compliance Committee. It is a problem that is undermining the very 

foundation of ICCAT. Over the past few years the lack of data has compromised several stock assessments by ICCAT’s Standing Committee for Research and Statistics. 

Without such data, scientists are forced to make estimates about the total landings 

and size composition for non-reporting countries. This adds considerable uncertainty 

to the stock assessment and the resulting scientific advice that is critical for effective fisheries management. Of even greater concern is the realization that some 

countries may be submitting data of dubious quality. The Commission must ensure 

compliance with the timely submission of accurate data—the most fundamental responsibility for any nation that is a member of ICCAT. 

Despite the many challenges ICCAT faces, it has made considerable progress over 

the past several years and the United States has played a major role in these advances. These include the rebuilding of the North Atlantic swordfish stock, the implementation of a compliance regime, and the development of positive and negative 

fishing vessel lists that will close foreign markets to those who engage in illegal 

fishing practices. To be sure, progress is frustratingly slow at ICCAT, but it is the 

only game in town and we have to make it work. 

This year we will be taking a well-honed team to Dublin. The three U.S. Commissioners have proven to be determined and tireless negotiators for the U.S. positions. 

They will be supported by a competent and dedicated staff comprising individuals 

from NMFS, NOAA, the Department of State, and the U.S. ICCAT Advisory Committee. We will undoubtedly encounter stiff opposition in the pursuit of our objectives, but when the dust has finally settled I fully expect that we will once again 

have made progress towards the conservation and sound management of these pelagic resources. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. FALEOMAVAEGA. I would like to hear from Dr. Wilmot now. 

And welcome Mr. Moore, who has just made it. 

STATEMENT OF DAVID B. WILMOT, JR., MEMBER OF THE U.S. 

ICCAT ADVISORY COMMITTEE, RISING TIDE CONSULTING 

Dr. WILMOT. Mr. Chairman and members of the Subcommittee, 

my name is David Wilmot, and I appreciate this opportunity to testify today. For the past decade, I have worked to improve the conservation and management of Atlantic and Pacific migratory fish. 

I serve as a member of the U.S. ICCAT Advisory Committee and 

have served on the U.S. delegation to ICCAT numerous times. 

Looking to the upcoming ICCAT meeting and beyond, there are 

several issues that will require the United States’ attention. In my 

written testimony I described the conservation community’s priorities in detail, but today I would like to focus only on our top priority, the conservation of white and blue marlin. 

At the risk of repeating some of the important points already 

made, however, I would like to share a few observations. During 

my years of involvement, I have seen many changes at ICCAT. 

While progress has been made, the Commission continues to struggle to control overfishing and protect the fish and fisheries under 

its purview. 

ICCAT’s list of managed species is a who’s who of overexploited 

fish. With the exception of North Atlantic swordfish, which are 

under an effective rebuilding plan and making rapid recovery, 

many species, including marlin and bluefin tuna, stand at or near 

historic low population levels. 

To its credit, the United States has been the leading voice for 

conservation and sustainable fisheries at ICCAT. The United 

47

States has consistently gone to ICCAT and demonstrated its commitment to conservation. While we have not agreed on every position taken by the U.S., the environmental community has agreed 

with most, and we recognize that current ICCAT conservation 

measures would not exist without the strong and determined leadership of the United States. Yet in too many instances, ICCAT’s 

conservation and management measures have fallen short of what 

was needed because we were thwarted by other ICCAT members. 

You have heard speaker after speaker today describe the problem 

of noncompliance and heard a rising tide of frustration. We share 

the frustration, and we agree that it is time to act. I will simply—

rather than go into the details that have already been well articulated, Mr. Delaney I think really hit it on the head: that until there 

are painful consequences, these countries will not change how they 

do business. There is no reason for them to change how they do 

business, and many good ideas were articulated here today that we 

endorse. 

We believe that the top priority of the United States at ICCAT 

over the next few years is the conservation of Atlantic billfish. Because of the dire condition of these fish and the difficult challenge 

of managing a bycatch species, halting overfishing and rebuilding 

marlin populations will require continued aggressive leadership by 

the United States. Populations of blue and white marlin in the Atlantic are at historic lows. White marlin has the inauspicious distinction of being the most overfished and depleted ICCAT species. 

Although recently denied for listing as a threatened or endangered 

species, the white marlin remains a candidate for listing under the 

Endangered Species Act. 

Improving the conservation of marlin has been a slow and difficult process. Yet the United States, with strong support from the 

environmental, recreational and commercial sectors, has won some 

hard-fought advances. It remains unclear if the measures are 

enough to halt overfishing. Moreover, as with every ICCAT measure, compliance is a problem. Nevertheless, even prohibiting all 

landings for marlin and achieving perfect compliance would not 

necessarily recover these species, as they will continue to be caught 

and killed when commercial longliners and purse seiners are fishing for swordfish and tuna. 

The conservation community believes that the only viable method of recovering marlin stocks in the Atlantic is a combination of 

strict landing limits and international time-area closures where 

marlin congregate to feed and spawn. The United States is already 

successfully using this approach domestically. I will also add that 

we do not have any illusions as to the difficulty of this within 

ICCAT and would add that gear modifications are also going to be 

an important part of moving this forward. 

But the bottom line is that U.S. fishermen, recreational and commercial, have led by example in billfish conservation. It is now time 

to demand more from other nations fishing in the Atlantic who are 

responsible for over 95 percent of the marlin mortality. 

The next ICCAT stock assessment for marlin is not until 2005. 

Considering the slow pace of progress at ICCAT, 2005 is just a moment away; therefore the next three meetings beginning this year 

will be critical to the future of marlin. Advancing international 

48

longline closures at ICCAT will take dedicated and prolonged leadership from the U.S. because most other countries are opposed to 

placing restrictions on their longline fleets in order to conserve 

ICCAT species. In fact, there will be continued resistance of all 

marlin conservation measures by several key ICCAT members. 

Protecting current conservation measures and achieving additional 

ones including time-area closures will be difficult but necessary to 

protect marlin. We ask Congress and the Administration to make 

marlin conservation a top priority between now and 2005. Our 

united mission must be to get the strongest possible conservation 

of blue and white marlin, including a long-term rebuilding plan. 

The United States must continue to help fishery officials from 

other countries understand how important billfish are to U.S. citizens and to the U.S. economy and give marlin the same level of attention and determination that has been enjoyed by bluefin tuna 

and swordfish in past meetings. 

Thank you for this opportunity to testify and for considering my 

views. 

Mr. FALEOMAVAEGA. Thank you, Dr. Wilmot. 

[The prepared statement of Dr. Wilmot follows:]

Statement of David Wilmot, Ph.D., Member, U.S. ICCAT Advisory 

Committee, Co-Founder/Principal, Rising Tide Consulting 

Mr. Chairman, my name is David Wilmot and I appreciate this opportunity to testify regarding the United States participation in the International Commission for 

the Conservation of Atlantic Tunas (ICCAT). I will focus my testimony on issues of 

importance to the conservation community and our suggested priorities for the 

United States at this year’s ICCAT meeting in Dublin, Ireland. 

I am the co-founder and principal of Rising Tide Consulting. For the past decade 

I have been actively working to improve the conservation and management of Atlantic highly migratory fishes, in particular Atlantic highly migratory species (HMS). 

I served as Director of the Ocean Wildlife Campaign, a coalition of environmental 

organizations and leading voice for conserving big fish, from 1995 through 2002. I 

currently serve as a member of the ICCAT Advisory Committee, as well as NMFS’ 

HMS Advisory Panel, and have served on the U.S. Delegation to ICCAT numerous 

times. 

During my years of involvement, I have seen many changes at ICCAT. While 

progress has been made on specific fronts, the Commission continues to struggle to 

control overfishing and protect the fish and fisheries under its purview. ICCAT’s list 

of managed species is a Who’s Who of overexploited fish. With the exception of 

North Atlantic swordfish, which are under an effective rebuilding plan and making 

a rapid recovery, many species, including marlin and bluefin tuna, stand at or near 

historic low population levels. In addition, compliance with fundamental Commission obligations including data collection and reporting, as well as critical conservation measures such a quota limits, remains poor, and, in some cases, is actually getting worse. 

While ICCAT’s poor track record has brought its very credibility into question, to 

its credit, the United States has worked to strengthen the Commission and has been 

the leading voice for conservation and sustainable fisheries (Canada also deserves 

mention for a strong conservation record). The United States has consistently gone 

to ICCAT and demonstrated that its commitment to domestic conservation goals 

also applies internationally. While the environmental community has not agreed 

with every position taken by the United States, we have agreed with the majority 

of positions and recognize that current ICCAT conservation measures would NOT 

exist, without the strong and determined leadership of the United States. Yet, in 

too many instances ICCAT’s conservation and management measures have fallen 

short of what was needed because we were thwarted by other ICCAT members. In 

many cases, key fishing parties such as the European Community and Japan block 

our efforts, or worse, they agree on paper but do not follow through in practice. The 

result is a rising tide of frustration among all sectors in the United States and ever 

increasing threats to the fish. The conservation community shares the frustration 

and wonders if ICCAT members will ever find the political will to do what is necVerDate 0ct 09 2002 08:46 May 13, 2004 Jkt 088533 PO 00000 Frm 00052 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6621 J:\DOCS\90159.TXT HRESOUR1 PsN: KATHY
49

essary. Yet, like the other sectors, my community remains committed to working to 

achieve management and conservation measures that will ensure sustainable Atlantic HMS fisheries. 

Looking to the upcoming meeting and beyond, there are several issues that will 

require the United States’ attention. These include: (1) conservation of white and 

blue marlin; (2) continuing rebuilding of North Atlantic swordfish; (3) halting overfishing of bluefin tuna and rebuilding both eastern and western populations; (4) improving information on bycatch species including sharks; and last, but not least, (5) 

improving compliance with existing and future conservation and management measures. 

Marlin Conservation 

We believe the top priority of the United States at ICCAT over the next few years 

is the conservation of Atlantic billfish, specifically blue and white marlin. Because 

of the dire condition of these fish, and the difficult challenge of managing a bycatch 

species, halting overfishing and rebuilding marlin populations will require continued 

aggressive leadership by the United States. 

Populations of blue and white marlin in the Atlantic are at historic lows. White 

marlin has the inauspicious distinction of being the most overfished and depleted 

ICCAT species. The white marlin population currently stands at only about 14% of 

the level needed to produce MSY and is being fished at a rate more than 8 times 

a sustainable level. Although recently denied for listing as a threatened or endangered species, the white marlin remains a Candidate Species for listing under the 

U.S. Endangered Species Act (ESA). In fact, another ESA review is scheduled for 

2007. Blue marlin populations have also been reduced dramatically and continue to 

be subjected to overfishing. 

Improving the conservation of marlin has been a slow and difficult process, yet 

the United States, with strong support from the environmental, recreational, and 

commercial sectors, has won some hard-fought advances. Current ICCAT regulations strictly limit landings and promote the voluntary release of marlin. These conservation measures have not been in place long enough for the SCRS to evaluate 

their effectiveness. Moreover, as with virtually every ICCAT measure, compliance 

is a problem. Nevertheless, even prohibiting all landings for marlin and achieving 

perfect compliance would not necessarily recover these species, as they will continue 

to be caught and killed when commercial long-liners and purse seiners are fishing 

for swordfish and tuna. 

The conservation community believes the only viable method of recovering marlin 

stocks in the Atlantic is a combination of strict landings limits and international 

time-area closures to longline and other indiscriminate fishing methods where 

marlin congregate to feed and spawn. The United States is already using this approach domestically to reduce marlin bycatch by closing known ‘‘hot spots’’ off the 

southeastern United States, and in the Gulf of Mexico. While designed primarily to 

reduce underage swordfish discards, preliminary results are encouraging for 

marlin—indicating the closures are effective in reducing bycatch mortality of blue 

and white marlin. 

The U.S. should continue to monitor the effectiveness of domestic time-area closures and make sure they remain in place (and are adjusted as necessary). We 

should also continue to investigate potential gear modifications that will minimize 

interactions with billfish and enhance the survival of released billfish. U.S. fishermen—recreational and commercial—have led by example in billfish conservation. It 

is now time to demand more from other nations fishing in the Atlantic Ocean because they are responsible for over 95% of the mortality of billfish mortality. 

The next ICCAT marlin stock assessment is not until 2005. At that time, Phase 

II of the so-called marlin rebuilding plan, which requires development of specific 

timetables to rebuild both white and blue marlin to levels that will support MSY, 

is scheduled to begin. Considering the slow pace of progress at ICCAT, 2005 is just 

a moment away. Therefore, the next three ICCAT meetings (beginning this year) 

will be critical to the future of white and blue marlin. Advancing international 

longline closures at ICCAT will take dedicated and prolonged leadership from the 

United States because most other countries are opposed to placing restrictions on 

their longline fleets in order to conserve bycatch species. In fact, there will be continued resistance to all marlin conservation measures by several key ICCAT members. Protecting current conservation measures and achieving additional ones including time-area closures will be difficult, but necessary to protect marlin. 

We ask Congress to insist that the U.S. delegation to ICCAT, at each meeting between now and 2005, including the upcoming ICCAT meeting, be united in its mission—to get the strongest possible conservation of blue and white marlin as part of 

a long-range billfish rebuilding program when the commission reviews the next 

50

scheduled assessment following the 2005 assessment and develops a long-range billfish rebuilding program. 

Continue Rebuilding Swordfish 

All indications are that North Atlantic swordfish is on its way to recovery. In fact, 

the population may already have rebuilt to a level that can support MSY. While too 

early to declare complete victory, swordfish recovery is a true success story and one 

for which the United States—including conservationists and fishermen—deserve 

credit. 

While there is no new assessment this year and no action is needed on the rebuilding plan, a couple of issues deserve brief mention. First, as a result of the implementation of critical domestic measures to rebuild swordfish and minimize bycatch of undersized swordfish, bluefin tuna, sea turtles, and other species, the commercial (and recreational to a lesser extent) fleet has been undergoing a major transition. One result of this transition has been the inability of the United States fleets 

to catch the ICCAT-designated swordfish quota. 

We feel strongly that the United States should not be ‘‘punished’’ for taking necessary and effective measures to conserve swordfish and reduce bycatch. The United 

States should defend and protect the U.S. North Atlantic swordfish quota, (including 

all underages). 

In addition, if the United States pursues a change from the current ICCAT minimum size regulation, it should use the opportunity to highlight to other ICCAT 

members the potential benefits of time and area closures. We also suggest the 

United States make clear to other countries that all live, undersized fish will be released, the U.S. long-liners and only dead fish landed. 

Improving Conservation of Bluefin Tuna 

The conservation community has not been happy with the risk-prone management 

that the United States has successfully advanced at ICCAT for Western bluefin 

tuna. As there is not a new assessment for Western bluefin tuna, and the quota is 

not open to discussion this year, this debate should wait for another day. There is, 

however, an important one-day meeting just prior to the Commission meeting in 

Dublin, Ireland, that is critically important for the future of bluefin tuna. Results 

presented to the ICCAT Advisory Committee by Stanford Professor Dr. Barbara 

Block on her excellent multi-year Tag-A-Giant Program provide important and compelling evidence that there are indeed two separate stocks of Atlantic bluefin tuna, 

and that more needs to be done to protect western bluefin, in particular on the feeding grounds in the central Atlantic. Without debating mixing models and spawning 

sites, let me simply say that the United States should begin what will be a long 

and difficult process of achieving a more ecologically realistic management strategy 

for bluefin tuna. 

We encourage the United States to continue the process of moving to more ecologically realistic management including support for moving the line to the east (to 

30 degrees for example). However, we strongly urge more attention be paid to ensuring all actions are risk averse for the severely depleted and small western population (as compared to the depleted, but extremely large, population in east). The 

goal of management changes must be to improve the status of the western population and to speed potential recovery (as opposed to getting a quota increase in the 

west). 

Compliance 

Continued lack of real progress on this issue has the potential to destroy ICCAT. 

I am certain that others will provide detailed testimony on ICCAT’s many shortcomings in this area and present ideas for improvement. We have supported and 

will continue to support U.S. leadership as it works to bring member nations in line 

with fulfilling their obligations regarding data collection and reports, as well as adhering to quotas, landing limits, minimum sizes and all of other conservation measures. I will add that, until there is a legitimate consequence to bad behavior, ICCAT 

members (and more join every year because being a member has its benefits—fish 

without consequences) will continue to flaunt the rules. And considering some of the 

worst offenders hold leadership positions in the Commission, this is a difficult issue. 

Sharks and Sea Turtles 

In recent years, we have urged the United States to introduce various resolutions 

designed to remind ICCAT members of their obligations (in most cases, FAO agreements) regarding species killed as bycatch in ICCAT fisheries, including seabirds, 

sharks, and sea turtles. The United States has shown leadership on this issue and 

has had some success. One such resolution on sea turtles will be up for adoption 

this year. We strongly encourage the U.S. Delegation to support the sea turtle 

51

resolution. All sea turtle species are listed as either threatened or endangered under 

the Endangered Species Act, and reducing bycatch in HMS fisheries should be treated with urgency to avoid the devastating leatherback declines we’ve seen in the Pacific. The United States has taken dramatic domestic measures to reduce turtle 

catch, but sea turtles cannot be saved without multilateral action. The United 

States has championed this issue, and we look forward to adopting the resolution 

this year. 

ICCAT is scheduled to perform its first-ever shark assessment in the spring of 

2004. They plan to evaluate the population status of blue and mako sharks. Considering blue sharks are the most common bycatch species on pelagic longlines targeting tunas and swordfish, and the fact that shark species have proven to be particularly vulnerable to overfishing because of their life history characteristics, this 

assessment, while proactive, is long overdue. We encourage the U.S. Delegation to 

remind parties at this year’s ICCAT meeting that they have a responsibility to provide catch data essential to complete the assessment. The assessment was originally 

scheduled for 2002 so the United States should also make sure that no additional 

delays occur. 

Conclusion 

The conservation community urges Congress (and the Administration) to make 

marlin conservation the top priority at ICCAT through the 2005 meeting. The 

United States must continue to help fishery officials from other countries understand how important billfish are to U.S. citizens and the U.S. economy, and give 

marlin the same level of attention and determination that is enjoyed by bluefin tuna 

and swordfish in the past. 

In addition to knowing what we want to accomplish, given the political milieu 

within ICCAT, we must have a coordinated strategy for achieving it. U.S. interests 

and Atlantic HMS needs an effective ICCAT. To repeat the current trends are simply not sustainable. An effective ICCAT will come about only if the United States 

and like-minded members, such as Canada, are even more successful in advancing 

their conservation agendas. 

I believe there are lessons to be learned from the European Community. Taking 

a page out of the EU’s playbook, by developing a more aggressive, comprehensive, 

and long-term strategy to reshape HMS fisheries conservation and management at 

ICCAT and around the world may get us closer to an effective ICCAT. The EU is 

particularly effective at blunting our conservation efforts within ICCAT (how else 

could the fiasco that is eastern bluefin tuna management be described?), as well as 

other international fisheries management bodies. I believe that involvement of the 

U.S. Congress can help set and advance such a strategy. The conservation community looks forward to doing our part and helping the United States achieve real and 

lasting conservation for HMS at this meeting and in the future. 

Thank you for holding this hearing, for your interest in improving conservation 

through ICCAT, and for considering my comments. 

Mr. FALEOMAVAEGA. Mr. Moore. 

STATEMENT OF HERB MOORE, JR., DIRECTOR OF 

GOVERNMENT AFFAIRS, RECREATIONAL FISHING ALLIANCE 

Mr. MOORE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman and members of this 

Committee. My name is Herb Moore. I am Counsel and Director of 

Government Affairs at the Recreational Fishing Alliance. I want to 

thank you for the opportunity to testify here this afternoon. It is 

truly an honor and a privilege to be here before you, and I want 

to apologize for arriving late. I ran into some difficulties this afternoon with buildings being on lockdown. 

The Recreational Fishing Alliance is a national grassroots, political action organization representing individual recreational fishermen and the recreational fishing industry. Our mission is to safeguard the rights of individual saltwater anglers, to protect jobs in 

the marine, boat and tackle industry, and to ensure the long-term 

sustainability of our Nation’s saltwater fisheries. 

Atlantic HMS, as has been touched on a little earlier, have 

tremendous social and economic value to our Nation. Tens of 

52

thousands of individuals pursue HMS to enhance their quality of 

life, and a multi-billion-dollar industry depends on the health of 

these stocks. Commercial overfishing species such as blue and 

white marlin and bluefin tuna threatens to completely undermine 

this sector. Actions must be taken through ICCAT to prevent this 

from happening. 

The U.S. recreational fishing sector has a right to expect foreign 

governments to live up to their treaty obligations. Currently a 

number of contracting nations in ICCAT simply aren’t living up to 

their obligations. The U.S. must take stronger steps to assert the 

interests of the recreational fishing industry at ICCAT. 

Most contracting nations at ICCAT have large commercial fisheries with small recreational components which largely aren’t involved in the process. The U.S. has the opposite. We have a large 

recreational fishery with a smaller commercial fishery. This point 

must be recognized by the entire U.S. delegation, and it must be 

driven home to all ICCAT delegations. There is a major cultural 

and economic difference between the U.S. and other contracting nations. 

Recreational fishing is more than strictly fishing for sport or 

pleasure, and we would like to see that point driven home at 

ICCAT. To illustrate, according to the National Marine Fishery 

Service’s HMS data base, there are currently 18,453 HMS angling 

permit holders and 4,078 HMS Charter/Headboat permit holders 

which carry recreational anglers, versus 298 swordfish-directed or 

incidental longline permit holders here in the U.S. 

Now, by no means are we attempting to devalue the U.S. commercial fishery. We have a very strong relationship with East 

Coast Tuna, who was represented on this panel earlier, and a number of other commercial fishing organizations. In fact, we feel that 

working together is really how we are going to get our goals accomplished. 

However, we feel like they are actually a step ahead of us in the 

game in that they are recognized as an industry, they are recognized for their economic contribution to this Nation, and they are 

recognized for the jobs that are at stake, and the recreational fishing sector needs to be at that level. This recognition needs to be 

more than lip service. It needs to be reflected in policy, particularly 

policy at ICCAT. 

Our Nation has got a vast sector of boat builders that manufacture fishing vessels specifically geared toward targeting HMS. We 

have fishing tackle manufacturers that make a variety of goods 

that are specifically geared toward targeting HMS, all under the 

purview of ICCAT. Party and charter boat business regularly take 

clients out into U.S. waters to fish for HMS, generating millions of 

dollars in tourism for our coastal communities. Bait and tackle retailers sell goods, offer services to these anglers, generating a tremendous amount of money in this country. Marinas offer dockage, 

fuel, services to recreational fishing vessels targeting HMS. 

A variety of other businesses in coastal communities are also 

heavily dependent upon recreational fishing. For example, the Viking Yacht Company in New Gretna, New Jersey, in Mr. Saxton’s 

district, employs over 1,200 people who build a hundred yachts a 

year specifically geared toward targeting HMS. There are also a 

53

number of annual HMS tournaments such as the Ocean City White 

Marlin open in Mr. Gilchrest’s district, where over 400 recreational 

vessels fish each year targeting HMS, contributing over $20 million 

to Ocean City, Maryland in 1 week. These fishermen have a strong 

voluntary conservation ethic and employ gear, rod-and-reel fishing 

gear, which traditionally hasn’t led to overfishing. For example, 

recreational fishermen who target marlin release over 98 percent 

of the fish they encounter. 

Last year the RFA filed a petition under Section 301 of the Trade 

Act of 1974, asserting that other nations’ noncompliance with 

ICCAT is harming U.S. commerce and that these nations need to 

be pushed to comply with ICCAT under the threat of sanctions. We 

don’t want to see sanctions on our friends, particularly in light of 

what else is going on in the world; however, we do want them to 

take ICCAT seriously. We want them to understand what conservation means to the recreational and the fishing industries in 

this country. 

The ICCAT convention is a trade agreement. It sets quotas and 

conservation measures which limit the harvest of HMS, limits and 

has an effect on the play of competitive market forces. Therefore, 

it is a trade agreement. 

Foreign noncompliance with ICCAT is a major burden on U.S. 

commerce, and this point cannot be overlooked. By severely reducing fishing opportunities for the recreational fishing industry, such 

as highly migratory species as white marlin and bluefin tuna become harder and harder to catch, the failure of foreign ICCAT signatories to comply with catch limits and quotas has resulted in increasing restrictions on U.S. Fishermen; for example, current regulations on our recreational fishermen to retain only one bluefin 

tuna per person per trip during a short season; one swordfish per 

person per trip, with a maximum of three per vessel; three yellowfin tuna per person per trip. 

Depleted stocks of HMS, because of foreign overfishing combined 

with these restrictions, have resulted in significant harm to the 

recreational fishing industry. Less fish plus more regulation equals 

significantly less participation. Less participation equals significantly less commerce for our Nation. 

Major U.S. commerce depends on the conservation of HMS. However, the U.S. has traditionally undervalued the U.S. recreational 

fishing sector. The U.S. must begin viewing ICCAT as a trade 

agreement as well as a conservation agreement, considering the 

impact that ICCAT has on U.S. Commerce. With this in mind, the 

U.S. must work to ensure that other nations are complying with 

ICCAT. There is a multi-billion-dollar recreational fishing industry 

at stake. 

We agree with some suggestions that were made earlier that a 

high-level trade office must be engaged in ICCAT to work with Dr. 

Hogarth and his team to achieve our goals. Grant Aldonis, Under 

Secretary of Commerce for International Trade, is engaged in the 

issue, and we feel like this is a level that it needs to be at, an international trade expert advocating for U.S. business, recreational and 

commercial. 

Finally, I would like to commend this Committee for passing 

H.Con.Res. 268. I feel like it is a fantastic step in the right 

54

direction and hopefully it can be a springboard to achieving our 

goals at ICCAT. 

Thank you again, and I would be happy to answer any questions 

that you may have. 

Mr. FALEOMAVAEGA. Thank you Mr. Moore. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Moore follows:]

Statement of Herb Moore, Jr., Counsel and Director of Government Affairs, 

Recreational Fishing Alliance 

I. INTRODUCTION 

The Recreational Fishing Alliance (RFA) is a national, grassroots political action 

organization representing individual recreational fishermen and the recreational 

fishing industry. The RFA Mission is to safeguard the rights of saltwater anglers, 

protect marine, boat and tackle industry jobs, and ensure the long-term sustainability of our Nation’s saltwater fisheries. RFA members include individual anglers, 

boat builders, fishing tackle manufacturers, party and charter boat businesses, bait 

and tackle retailers, marinas, and many other businesses in fishing communities. 

The Atlantic recreational highly migratory species (HMS) fisheries have tremendous social and economic value to the U.S. Tens of thousands of individuals enhance 

their quality of life by fishing for HMS and a multi-billion-dollar industry depends 

on the health of HMS stocks. Commercial overfishing of species such as blue and 

white marlin and bluefin tuna threatens to completely undermine this sector. Actions must be taken through ICCAT to ensure that this does not happen. 

The U.S. recreational fishing sector has a right to expect foreign governments to 

live up to their treaty obligations. A number of contracting nations have not lived 

up to their obligations under the International Convention for the Conservation of 

Atlantic Tunas (‘‘ICCAT’’). The U.S. must take stronger steps to assert the interests 

of the recreational fishing industry through ICCAT. 

II. ECONOMICS OF RECREATIONAL HMS FISHERIES 

While recreational fishing for highly migratory species such as marlin, sailfish, 

swordfish and tuna is a specialized segment of the recreational fishing sector, it has 

a major impact on our Nation’s economy and quality of life. Most contracting nations to ICCAT have large commercial fisheries with small recreational components. 

The U.S. is the opposite; we have large recreational fisheries with smaller commercial fisheries. This point must be recognized and driven home to all ICCAT delegations. 

To illustrate, according to the NMFS HMS database, there are currently 18,453 

HMS Angling Permit holders and 4,078 HMS Charter/Headboat Permit holders 

(which carry recreational anglers) vs. 298 Swordfish Directed or Incidental Longline 

Permit holders. 

There is a vast segment of boat builders, fishing tackle manufacturers, party and 

charter boat businesses, bait and tackle retailers, marinas, and many other businesses in fishing communities which cater specifically to recreational fishermen who 

fish for Atlantic HMS. Individual anglers fish recreationally for marlin, sailfish, 

swordfish and tuna in U.S. waters to enhance their quality of life. Boat builders 

manufacture recreational fishing vessels that are specifically designed and primarily 

used to fish for the species under the purview of ICCAT. Fishing tackle manufacturers make a variety of goods that are used by recreational fishermen to fish for the 

species under the purview of ICCAT. Party and charter boat businesses regularly 

take clients out in U.S. waters to fish for the species under the purview of ICCAT. 

Bait and tackle retailers sell goods and offer services to recreational fishermen to 

fish for the species under the purview of ICCAT. Marinas offer dockage, fuel, and 

services to recreational fishing vessels that target the species under the purview of 

ICCAT. A variety of other businesses in coastal communities are heavily dependent 

on recreational fishing for the species under the purview of ICCAT. 

For example, the Viking Yacht Company in New Gretna, N.J., in Mr. Saxton’s 

District employs over 1,200 people who build 100 yachts a year that are specifically 

designed and primarily used to target highly migratory species. There are also a 

number of annual Atlantic HMS tournaments such as the Ocean City White Marlin 

Open in Mr. Gilchrest’s District that 400 recreational vessels fish each year generating over $20 million in one week for Ocean City, Md. Thus, a large segment of 

the recreational fishing industry is dependent on healthy stocks of highly migratory 

species. 

These fishermen have a strong, voluntary conservation ethic and employ sustainable, inefficient fishing gear that traditionally has not resulted in overfishing. In 

55

fact, recreational fishermen who fish for marlin release over 98% of the fish they 

catch believing that fishing for, hooking, fighting and releasing them to swim another day is a more valuable experience than killing the fish for consumption. 

III. OVERFISHING BY THE EUROPEAN UNION 

The Recreational Fishing Alliance asserts that fishing pressure by the highly subsidized commercial longline vessels of the EU has placed certain highly migratory 

species of the Atlantic Ocean and adjacent seas at risk and resulted in violations 

of the International Convention for the Conservation of Atlantic Tunas (‘‘ICCAT’’), 

a trade treaty that permits the use of trade-related sanctions, and the WTO Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures (‘‘Subsidies Agreement’’). The actions of the EU have turned the International Convention for the Conservation of 

Atlantic Tunas into the International Convention for the Destruction of Atlantic 

Tunas. Less fish plus more regulation of U.S. fishermen equals significantly less 

participation in recreational fishing. Less participation equals significantly less commerce for the recreational fishing industry. 

IV. WHY ICCAT IS A TRADE AGREEMENT 

The ICCAT Convention is a ‘‘trade agreement’’ within the meaning of Section 301 

of the Trade Act of 1974. The domestic implementing legislation for the ICCAT Convention is the Atlantic Tunas Convention Act of 1975 (ATCA). This statute is listed 

in the ‘‘Overview and Compilation of U.S. Trade Statutes’’ published by the Committee on Ways and Means of the House of Representatives (emphasis added), underlining the fact that the ICCAT Convention is a type of trade agreement and the 

ATCA is the U.S. trade statute implementing the ICCAT Convention domestically. 

The ICCAT Convention is an international commodity agreement designed to conserve natural resources by limiting harvesting of fish through a total allowable 

catch (TAC) and individual participating country quotas. As such, the ICCAT Convention is an international commodity agreement that restricts the play of competitive market forces because of its form. The ICCAT Convention is a ‘‘trade agreement’’ because it restricts trade in the fish species that it covers. By limiting the 

volume of fish that may be landed from national vessels, the ICCAT Convention is 

restricting international trade in the covered species. 

V. THE EUROPEAN UNION’S UNFAIR TRADE PRACTICES 

The RFA alleges that the EU has committed three unfair trade practices under 

Section 301 of the Trade Act of 1974, as amended: 

a) it has acted unjustifiably by violating and acting inconsistently with the 

ICCAT Convention by noncompliance with the catch limits, quotas, and landing limits for certain species of HMS and rules for the protection of juvenile 

fish; 

b) it has acted unreasonably by refusing to accept the determination of the scientific advisory body of ICCAT, the Standing Committee on Research and Statistics (SCRS), that the stock for East Atlantic bluefin tuna is over-exploited 

and that the total allowable catch (TAC) for East Atlantic bluefin tuna should 

be limited to 25,000 metric tons, resulting in overfishing of East and West Atlantic bluefin tuna; and 

c) it has provided subsidies to its fishing industry through its Common Fisheries 

Policy (CFP) and its funding mechanism, the Financial Instrument for Fisheries Guidance (FIFG), that violate and are inconsistent with the WTO Subsidies Agreement adopted by the EU and the United States in the Uruguay 

Round of Multilateral Trade Negotiations. 

These unfair trade practices are related because they are all part of a common 

scheme by the European Union. The subsidies granted by the European Union to 

its fishing sector have contributed to increasingly large fleets that participate in 

unsustainable and illegal fishing in the Atlantic Ocean and adjacent seas. The injection of 1.1 billion Euros of public money into the fisheries sector each year in the 

EU represents a significant proportion of the value of the total Community production (7 billion Euros for fish landings). About $440 million a year has been contributed by the EU and national governments to the fisheries sector in subsidies that 

contribute to reducing the costs of the investment of the fisheries sector and thus 

contributes to overfishing. 

Twenty-four percent of the structural aid provided by the EU to its fisheries sector, or about 160 million Euros a year, has been used to promote investment in the 

modernization or renewal of fishing vessels, while 280 million Euros per year are 

paid for the right of about 850 EU vessels to fish outside EU waters under fisheries 

agreements with non-European third countries. The overcapacity in EU fleets has, 

in turn, resulted in overexploitation by the EU of HMS. The trade-distorting EU 

fishing subsidies have had adverse effects on the U.S. commercial and recreational 

56

fishing industries, resulting in serious prejudice to the interests of the United 

States. 

That EU subsidies for its fishing sector have led to overfishing has been recognized by the EU Commission, which has stated bluntly that, ‘‘if current trends continue, many stocks will collapse. At the same time, the available fishing capacity 

of the Community fleets far exceeds that required to harvest fish in a sustainable 

manner.’’ (See ICCAT, 1999 Detailed Report—Swordfish, available at http://

www.iccat.es/, under ‘‘Assessment and Biology,’’ Species Groups, at Table 29.) 

Fueled by its subsidized overcapacity, the EU has violated and acted inconsistently 

with the ICCAT Convention by failing to ensure that vessels registered under its 

laws fish in a manner that is consistent with ICCAT conservation and management 

measures relating to East Atlantic bluefin tuna, North Atlantic swordfish, Atlantic 

white marlin, and Atlantic blue marlin, all of which are highly migratory species. 

The EU has violated the ICCAT Convention by failing to enforce binding ICCAT 

recommendations related to the catch of juvenile swordfish and bluefin tuna. For 

example, despite a tolerance level set at 15% of total landings for undersize fish, 

in 1998 Spain had a landing percentage of juvenile North Atlantic swordfish of 37% 

and Portugal had a landing percentage of 39.5%. Thus, Spain and Portugal caught 

more than twice as many juvenile swordfish as permitted under ICCAT rules. 

The EU has acted inconsistently with the ICCAT Convention by overfishing East 

Atlantic bluefin tuna in contravention of the recommendations of ICCAT’s Standing 

Committee on Research and Statistics (SCRS). Such overfishing not only affects 

East Atlantic bluefin tuna stocks but also West Atlantic bluefin tuna stocks because 

there is significant mixing between the ‘‘two stocks.’’ The unwillingness of the EU 

to accept the scientific advice of the SCRS of ICCAT is part of the pattern of systematic fixing of Total Allowable Catch for fish by the EU members at levels higher 

than indicated in the scientific advice provided to the EU from experts within the 

EU. 

The EU’s actions have placed excessive pressure on several HMS, including the 

Atlantic white marlin, which is at approximately 15% of the maximum sustainable 

yield (MSY) level. Drastic remedial action at the international level forced by the 

United States is required because the level of catch of white marlin by the U.S. domestic vessels operating under the catch-and-release policy is only 5% of the total 

mortality for Atlantic white marlin. 

VI. BURDEN ON U.S. COMMERCE 

The unjustifiable and unreasonable practices of the EU have burdened U.S. commerce by severely reducing fishing opportunities for the recreational fishing industry as highly migratory species such as the white marlin and bluefin tuna become 

harder and harder to catch. Moreover, the failure of foreign ICCAT signatories to 

comply with catch limits and quotas has resulted in increasing restrictions on U.S 

recreational fishermen related to volume of fish they are allowed to land in the 

United States. 

For example, current regulations allow recreational fishermen to retain only one 

bluefin tuna per person per trip during a short season; current regulations allow 

recreational fishermen to retain only three yellowfin tuna per person per trip; current regulations allow recreational fishermen to retain only one swordfish per person per trip and a maximum of only three per vessel. 

Depleted stocks of HMS combined with these restrictions have resulted in significant harm to the recreational fishing industry; Less fish plus more regulation equals 

significantly less participation and less participation equals significantly less commerce. 

VII. CONCLUSION 

Major U.S. commerce depends on the conservation of HMS. However, the U.S. has 

traditionally undervalued the U.S. recreational fishery. The U.S. must begin viewing 

ICCAT as a trade agreement as well as a conservation agreement considering the 

impact that ICCAT has on U.S. commerce. With this in mind, the U.S. must work 

to ensure that other nations are complying with ICCAT quotas and conservation 

measures. There’s a multi-billion-dollar recreational fishing industry at stake. 

Mr. FALEOMAVAEGA. I thank the members of the panel for their 

testimonies. I do have a couple of questions. 

And Dr. Graves, I suppose in listening to the testimony, it makes 

me want to go back to square one, the fact that we started this 

whole adventure 30 years ago with some reasoning behind it. And 

57

I am being somewhat simplistic in my observations of the fact that 

the Atlantic Ocean is a huge ocean, and—I am curious—do we have 

any recreational fishing people from Europe come and fish in our 

waters for reasons why we have some sense of freedom in doing 

this activity? I am curious. 

When Mr. Moore says—and I know this—that the recreational 

fishing industry is a multi-billion-dollar industry, I don’t know if it 

is the same standing with our commercial fishing industry, but it 

is in the billions of dollars, the services, the people that make the 

fishing rods, the boat builders and all of this. 

I was wondering, as Chairman of the ICCAT Advisory Committee, Dr. Graves, I want to go back to square one. Why are we 

with ICCAT in the first place if they are giving us a hard time? 

Dr. GRAVES. The alternative isn’t workable. ICCAT is the only 

forum we have for doing this. These are highly migratory species. 

We can’t just pull out and expect that these fish are going to be 

managed. Our impact on these resources is generally less than 5 

percent of the landings per species. So if we want to continue to 

have access to these resources, we have to work with the other 

countries. We have to convince them that conservation is in their 

best efforts. So I don’t think pulling out of ICCAT is an option. 

The frustrations that we have had dealing with it in the trenches—and like Mr. Delaney, this will be my ninth meeting, ICCAT 

meeting—and, you know, as a professor I am donating my time to 

do this and I am losing hair on the top of my head from slamming 

into the brick wall, I can assure you. But we are making some 

progress, and over this time I think we have done things that are 

the first time ever accomplished in international fora with our compliance, now getting a positive list. We are making headway, but 

it takes a lot of energy to do it. 

We are hoping that through Congress and through our current 

Administration, that at a higher level some of the intransigent nations can be softened up a bit before we go over there, and that is 

where you can help. 

Mr. FALEOMAVAEGA. When you mention higher levels, do you 

mean to the highest levels of the Administration? 

Dr. GRAVES. I do indeed. 

Mr. FALEOMAVAEGA. And the Cabinet level, perhaps the Secretary of Commerce and the Secretary of the Interior, along with 

the President, to really make this point hit home. 

Dr. GRAVES. Yes. The Atlantic Tunas Convention Act is centered 

between the Departments of Commerce and State and I think that 

we should get all the help we can if we are going to—I mean, the 

United States is clearly doing more than its share and I think, as 

Mr. Delaney and Mr. Genovese pointed out, we oftentimes make—

domestically we enact reductions for our fishermen and then we go 

on over to ICCAT, and in that forum to negotiate for other countries to take reductions, we have to take them again. So in effect 

our fishermen have taken two cuts and they have done that to preserve the resource. 

But we are getting to a point now with some of our stocks that 

we are fishing on that our take is minimal. For instance, with the 

blue and white marlin, you know, between commercial and 

recreational landings, where there are no commercials, our 

58

recreational landings are limited to 250 fish, blue marlin and white 

marlin combined, in the United States for the year. 

I don’t know how Dr. Hogarth counts those, but consider the 

range over which those fish can be caught. That is a really difficult 

task, but you compare that with thousands and thousands of fish 

which are landed by other nations. 

Mr. FALEOMAVAEGA. This is what makes it somewhat contradictory. Here we say we count for 250 marlins, but when we ask other 

countries to come up with the same count, they simply say we don’t 

have a count; and in the meantime they might be taking thousands 

of marlins, which makes the ICCAT standards process very unfair, 

unfair not only to our own industry but unfair to us as a country. 

I am troubled by it because there seems to be a double standard. 

I know the same problem that we have with our purse seiners 

in the Pacific when we ask them to put observers, we ask them 

that their purse seining process limit the catch of dolphins. Tell 

that to the other countries of the world and it is almost like kissing 

the wind. They just seem very indifferent. They don’t even seem to 

show any care at all about conservation. 

So I am troubled by it. We are putting a high standard among 

our commercial fishing industry. Recreational fishing people limit 

the amount of catch. We go to the table and our friends from Europe can completely just simply say we won’t have any of it. 

Now, if you were in my shoes or the members of this Committee, 

what would you recommend? I am for sanctions just as recommended by Congressman Saxton in his resolution, and I don’t 

know if this is somewhat of a fear tactic. To me it is not a fear tactic. It is just simply trying to be fair, on a level playing field, and 

I just feel that we have been shortchanged all these years, and I 

think we have had enough of it. 

I mean, I commend you and the members of the Commission to 

go there and bargain and negotiate, but it seems that more and 

more we are not getting our fair share of the action. And I feel very 

strongly that if we don’t do it now, it is going to continue to affect 

negatively not only our recreational fishing industry but other 

parts of our economy that are going to be directly affected negatively. 

So your suggestion that we don’t participate in ICCAT, I am curious, the Atlantic seaboard, how many square miles are we talking 

about? Somebody mentioned 20 million square miles that ICCAT is 

responsible for. I kind of like to count all the way from Maine down 

to Florida. How many square miles of coastal line that is part of 

our zone that we can control, and I assume that beyond that, it is 

under international waters and anybody is fair catch. 

Dr. GRAVES. That is true. And I still think that within ICCAT 

the way to go, as Mr. Delaney and Mr. Hayes said before, is with 

market controls. If we can shut down the markets for the countries 

that are not fishing in order with ICCAT conservation measures, 

if they don’t have a market for their product they are not going to 

continue to fish for it. 

Most—you know, in some instances with the EC, there is a large 

domestic consumption, but a large amount of the product that is 

caught is export. And so if we can shut it down, then they don’t 

have a reason to fish for it. 

59

Mr. FALEOMAVAEGA. Do you strongly recommend that? 

Dr. GRAVES. I would indeed. 

Mr. FALEOMAVAEGA. Shut down any imports that come from the 

ICCAT member countries to this country to show that we are serious about them complying with ICCAT standards. All right. 

Mr. Moore, as the great disciple of the recreational fishing industry, when you say multi-billion-dollars, how many billion of dollars 

are you really talking about? 

Mr. MOORE. We are talking about approximately $60 billion just 

for the saltwater sector. Fresh and saltwater recreational fishing is 

estimated to contribute $112 billion to our Nation’s economy. 

Mr. FALEOMAVAEGA. This is not just the Atlantic but also the Pacific and the Gulf States, so this is nationwide? 

Mr. MOORE. Nationwide. 

Mr. FALEOMAVAEGA. I see. And how much do you think because 

of ICCAT’s lack of cooperativeness and being helpful to our recreational fishing industry—how much are we losing on account of 

ICCAT’s inability to cooperate or to measure up to the standards 

that we expect them to do? 

Mr. MOORE. I think it is a tremendous amount. You know, we 

have given a lot of thought at the Recreational Fishing Alliance. It 

is difficult to come up with an exact number but it is certainly in 

the billions. I tried to touch on it a little bit in my testimony that 

the noncompliance from our partners is leading to less fish in the 

ocean. Recreational fishing as far as it goes is—it is an opportunity 

sport. It is an opportunity business. If the opportunity is there, it 

is going to flourish. If the opportunity isn’t there, it is going to diminish. People are going to do something else. Businesses are going 

to close. So what we have got is with less fish, less opportunities, 

more regulations, it is an industry that is being stifled. 

So I would really be guessing if I came up with a particular number. I don’t want to do that in your Committee, but I would venture 

to say it is upwards in the billions. 

Mr. FALEOMAVAEGA. Can you do us a favor by going through 

your statistical people? Because it really is important for our Committee to know. I don’t want to hazard a guess, no more than if 

I am confronted from my other members who say, how much are 

we really talking about? I think specific numbers would really be 

helpful to the Committee. 

Mr. MOORE. Absolutely. 

Mr. FALEOMAVAEGA. Dr. Wilmot, you mentioned something about 

putting restrictions in landing and another suggestion by Dr. 

Graves. I really, sincerely hope that on your return from your 

meeting in Dublin, and as we have gotten the promise of our 

Chairman that we will hold a follow-up hearing on this, please do 

come up with these recommendations. I think it would be really 

helpful to us. I thought maybe the Chairman was here but he 

hasn’t come in. 

But, Dr. Wilmot, you did mention something about strict landing 

measures, so how do you suggest that we go about doing this? 

Dr. WILMOT. I was referencing white and blue marlin, and the 

Commission has already adopted strict landing requirements. 

Large reductions are called for for both white marlin and blue 

60

marlin. As Dr. Graves mentioned, the United States is limited to 

250 fish. Other nations simply have to do percentage reductions. 

The key there is going to be compliance: Are we going to have 

the data that are necessary to know what is truly being landed and 

therefore know whether or not reductions are being made? And 

then will we have the data to do an appropriate assessment to 

know what the impacts of the reductions are? 

However, the point I was trying to make is that even if all landings are prohibited for marlin, you cannot rebuild the populations. 

It just doesn’t work. It is a bycatch species, the gears interacting 

with them, and the mortality that is high enough that the fish are 

going to die on the hooks or the purse seine nets. Therefore, additional measures are going to be needed. 

Today both gear modifications have been talked about as well as 

the potential of time-area closures. I think that both will be needed. The point is both will be resisted, as well as landings. Marlin 

is not a priority for these other countries. They really don’t care. 

If they didn’t interact with marlin, it would be no loss for them. 

But they are interacting and they are killing a lot of marlin. They 

may not care, but U.S. recreational fishermen care very much. So 

additional measures are going to need to be taken. 

The United States has had a very difficult time elevating the status of marlin, if you will, to the level of a tuna or a swordfish. The 

U.S. has worked extremely hard. Commercial and recreational sectors have worked together to help do this. This has to be continued. 

We know it is a difficult task, and that is why we recommend it 

is a multi-year process that just continues. 

Even though 2005 is the number down the road for when action 

will happen and changes can occur, we can’t wait until the last 

year. Every opportunity, we have to try to advance this. The U.S. 

has been the champion on marlin. We are just asking the U.S. to 

have a coordinated strategic plan for remaining the champion to 

take us even farther. I am very proud of what we have been able 

to accomplish on marlin, but it is not going to be enough. We have 

to do more. 

Mr. FALEOMAVAEGA. Years ago my father-in-law participated in 

an international billfish tournament in Kerns, Australia, and he is 

a member of the 1,000 pound—he caught a black marlin over a 

thousand pounds, and the fish was a monster. I couldn’t believe 

how big. 

I am going to let my good friend, the gentlewoman from Guam, 

to ask some questions and I will hold for now. 

Ms. BORDALLO. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. I certainly 

enjoy having this public hearing all to ourselves. After hearing all 

of the witnesses today, we do have a problem, and someone had 

said—I think they asked the question do you think the U.S. should 

step away from this organization or its leadership role that we are 

taking? And I think someone answered that and said no, it 

wouldn’t be the way to go. 

I personally have led international organizations in my lifetime, 

and I realize it takes, number one, patience; and you must proceed 

with caution because you are dealing with all these international 

countries, and we have problems everywhere today so you have to 

61

be very careful. And I do admire the U.S.’s participation and the 

leadership. 

Dr. Graves, I want to compliment you on your testimony. You 

highlighted the problems with respect to the effectiveness of compliance and because of the failure of ICCAT members to report 

data in a timely manner and an accurate manner. So the questions 

we have to deal with are how best to attack the problems of noncompliance and nonreporting? I am curious to learn what penalties 

or consequences are presently out there for ICCAT to utilize in confronting a member’s lack of cooperation. 

Can you enlighten us about what ICCAT does collectively, if anything, in penalizing nonreporting members? Do these members lose 

any voice in the decisionmaking process? Is their voting authority 

diluted or compromised by their failure to report? And also part of 

this question is what specific recommendation or advice do you 

have for tackling the reporting and the data issues? 

Dr. GRAVES. That is a very perceptive question. First of all, there 

aren’t any penalties associated, really, with nonreporting and that 

is the problem. I mean, you think if you join this organization, you 

are beholden to that. That is a basic responsibility is to report your 

catch, your effort, the size and distribution of your catch, so we can 

go ahead and the scientists can perform the stock assessment. 

But what the United States would like to do, and certainly a 

push and discussion at the Advisory Committee meeting this week, 

was to try and tie in a lot of these things that we take for granted 

that if they are not doing it that that would threaten the country’s 

ability to have their vessels on the positive list; so, in other words, 

their vessels could not unload or export their product. 

So rather than just having it simply for a fishing violation, a 

country would also—its vessels would be at risk if the country 

wasn’t meeting its obligations in terms of reporting data in a timely and accurate fashion. So I think, as was mentioned in the first 

panel here, that will be a big next step for ICCAT. But considering 

what is happening now, if this organization is going to function efficiently, that is where we are going to have to go. It was sort of 

a gentleman’s agreement that people would be providing their data 

and it would be accurate, but now that they are not, we have to 

go and rethink that, and I think that there has to be a penalty associated with that and, as was said before, you hit them in their 

pocket. 

Ms. BORDALLO. In the beginning when ICCAT was first organized, was there better cooperation? 

Dr. GRAVES. There was better cooperation in terms of providing 

data, yes. But now when one of the things that has happened is 

that—and there weren’t really any questions about the validity of 

the data, how accurate it was, but as now we have tied compliance 

to data so that countries are essentially reporting that they are out 

of compliance and will take a penalty, then you run into this problem. And so they are sort of self-reporting their infractions, and we 

do that really well in the United States, but I am not very sure 

that a lot of other parties do that. 

So I think before we had compliance associated with the reporting, you had very accurate numbers. I mean back when the EC was 

separate nations, France gladly reported that they had caught 

62

twice as many of bluefin tuna as they were supposed to. So what? 

At least fora science knew what the fishing mortality was for that 

year. 

Ms. BORDALLO. Yes, thank you. 

Mr. Moore, on the issue of subsidies, if the United States were 

to promote subsidy reductions worldwide, are you concerned that 

the U.S. could potentially come under attack for subsidies the U.S. 

Government gives to fishermen, and what is the current status of 

international discussion on subsidy reduction? 

Mr. MOORE. In filing our petition under Section 301 of the Trade 

Act last year, we did raise that issue. We outlined how the European Union, we believe, is violating a number of trade agreements 

by oversubsidizing their commercial fishing fleet. We feel that by 

oversubsidizing their fleet, they have created an overcapitalized 

fleet that needs to fish, and the result has been overfishing. 

We worked with the Secretary of Commerce, and he expressed a 

lot of our concerns about subsidies, about the European Union’s 

overfishing, about their noncompliance. He expressed those concerns to Franz Fischler from the European Union. His response 

pointed out that U.S. commercial—some U.S. commercial fisheries 

are also subsidized. So that is an issue. As strictly a recreational 

fishing organization, it is not a concern of ours. Our members 

aren’t subsidized by the government. However, it is an issue that 

some of our partners here in the U.S., you know, we would need 

to look at with them. 

Ms. BORDALLO. So you feel then in your own opinion that we 

would come under attack of some kind, disagreement, whatever? 

Mr. MOORE. I think it is an issue and I think it already has been 

raised, considering Mr. Fischler’s response to Secretary Evans. So 

it is an issue that we would need to look at. 

Ms. BORDALLO. Well, it is going to be a delicate situation all the 

way around. I can see that. But I do want to thank you gentlemen 

for your testimony today. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. FALEOMAVAEGA. Gentleman, the Chairman has just called. 

He is still tied up with votes and also additional business on the 

Floor, but he does send his apologies for not being here but would 

like very much that they will be submitting additional questions 

for the record and also for you to follow up with some questions. 

I am sure I share the Chairman’s sentiments and wish you all 

the best on your trip to Dublin. Bring us a four leaf clover. I understand the Irish are not doing too well in the Rugby World Cup 

match tournament that is going on in Australia right now because 

I am vying for the Samoa as well as the All Blacks from New Zealand and the Wallabies from Australia and not the Springboks 

from South Africa. 

With that, Mr. Chairman, I also want unanimous consent that 

the statement by Mr. Saxton be made part of the record, and wish 

you all the best and come back and join us in the next hearing. The 

hearing is adjourned. 

[Whereupon, at 4:05 p.m., the Subcommittee was adjourned.]

Æ