NO. 93-335 

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MONTANA 

1994 

IN RE THE MARRIAGE OF 

DELILAH HANEY, 

Petitioner 

and 

GUY L. HANEY, 

Respondent 

and Respondent, 

and Appellant. 

APPEAL FROM: District Court of the Eighth Judicial District, 

In and for the County of Cascade, 

The Honorable John M. McCarvel, Judge presiding. 

COUNSEL OF RECORD: 

For Appellant: 

Kenneth R. Olson, Attorney at Law, 

Great Falls, Montana 

For Respondent: 

Susan L. Weber, Attorney at Law, 

Great Falls, Montana 

Filed: 

Submitted on Briefs: April 28, 1994 

Decided: October 13, 1994 
Justice John Conway Harrison delivered the Opinion of the Court. 

Guy L. Haney (Guy) appeals an order of the Eighth Judicial 

District Court, Cascade County, which awarded Delilah Haney 

(Delilah) maintenance. We reverse. 

Guy and Delilah were married for thirty-five years. Delilah 

raised the couple's five children who have attained the age of 

majority. Delilah filed for dissolution on June 13, 1990. Guy 

filed his response and the parties agreed to divide the marital 

assets and debts. They could not, however, agree on the 

maintenance issue; Guy argued that he should pay maintenance in the 

amount of $300 per month for two years, while Delilah contended 

that she should be awarded $300 per month for five years. 

Notwithstanding the contention on the part of both Guy and 

Delilah that $300 per month was adequate, with the only question 

being the number of years duration, the District Court awarded 

Delilah permanent maintenance of $400 per month. In addition, that 

amount would increase to $600 per month if Delilah became 

unemployed by reason of age, sickness or disease. 

The court found that Delilah worked three jobs, seven days a 

week, for a net pay of $435 per month while her expenses totaled 

$875. The court found that Guy had the ability to earn 

substantially more income than Delilah, referring to his snow 

removal contract and various equipment which he owned. After 

deducting Guy's living expenses, the District Court concluded that 

Guy would net in excess of $210 per month over and above the $300 

maintenance award to Delilah. That was the apparent basis for the 
District Court's conclusion that Guy had the ability to pay $400 

per month maintenance to Delilah. 

Guy presents the following issue: 

Did the District Court err by awarding Delilah $400 per 

month permanent maintenance? 

It is well settled that this Court will scrutinize the 

district court's legal conclusions and examine whether the court 

interpreted the law correctly. In re Marriage of Danelson (1992), 

253 Mont. 310, 317, 833 P.2d 215, 219-20. After an equitable 

division of marital property, a district court is required to apply 

the two-prong test of 5 40-4-203, MCA, to determine whether a 

maintenance award is appropriate. - See In re Marriage of 

Eschenbacher and Crepeau (1992), 253 Mont. 139, 142-43, 831 P.2d 

1353, 1355-56. Section 40-4-203, MCA, provides in pertinent part: 

(1) In a proceeding for dissolution of marriage . . . the court may grant a maintenance order for either spouse 

only if it finds that the spouse seeking maintenance: 

(a) lacks sufficient property to provide for 

[her] reasonable needs; and 

(b) is unable to support [herlself through 

appropriate employment . . . . [Emphasis 

added. ] 

Here, the District Court found that Delilah worked three jobs, 

seven days a week, for net pay of $435 per month while her expenses 

totalled $875 per month and that she was unable to support herself 

through appropriate employment. The court, however, did not make 

a finding concerning whether Delilah lacked sufficient property to 

provide for her reasonable needs. "Sufficient property" is 

property which is "income-producing rather than income-consuming 
property." Marriaqe of Eschenbacher, 831 P.2d at 1356. 

In this case, a review of the record reveals that the majority 

of the property awarded to Delilah was income-consuming property; 

a car, the trailer house with adjoining land and household 

furnishings. However, Delilah also received income-producing 

property--one-half of Guy's Teamsters pension. The court failed to 

discuss the pension award and to set forth when payments could be 

anticipated under the pension and to then consider the relationship 

to the maintenance award. We conclude this is a basis for 

reversal. 

Without any explanation on the part of the court as to the 

reason it disregarded the agreement of the parties that $300 per 

month for maintenance was appropriate, the District Court awarded 

Delilah permanent maintenance of $400 per month with an escalation 

to $600 per month if Delilah became unemployed. 

Under Rule 54(c), M.R.Civ.P., "every final judgment shall 

grant the relief to which the party in whose favor it is rendered 

is entitled, even if the party has not demanded such relief in his 

pleadings." While that gives a broad discretion to the trial 

court, the discretion under Rule 54(c) must be viewed in light of 

the nature of the case. In re Marriage of Hughes (1989), 236 Mont. 

427, 430, 770 P.2d 499, 501. A district court may not grant relief 

not requested when the facts and issues necessary to support such 

relief have not been tried and proven at trial. Matter of George 

Trust (1992), 253 Mont. 341, 345, 834 P.2d 1378, 1381. In 

dissolution cases, the court's power to grant relief is strictly 
statutory, and with respect to maintenance the court must make 

specific findings under § 40-4-203, MCA. Marriaqe of Huqhs, 770 

P.2d at 501. 

In our review of the record and our application of the 

statutory criteria to the evidence produced, we are unable to find 

support for the exercise of the court's discretion to award 

permanent maintenance when maintenance only for a term of years was 

requested; to award maintenance of $400 per month when $300 per 

month was requested; and finally to award an automatic escalation 

to $600 per month if Delilah becomes unemployed. 

Accordingly we reverse and remand for consideration of this 

issue in accordance with this opinion. 

Reversed and remanded. 

We concur: //-- 

Chief Justi 
Justice Terry N. Trieweiler specially concurring. 

I specially concur with the majority opinion which reverses 

the judgment of the District Court. However, I do not agree with 

the basis for reversal set forth in the majority opinion, nor do I 

agree that this case should be remanded for further proceedings. 

The effect of the positions advocated by the parties in the 

District Court was to stipulate that $300 per month was a 

reasonable amount of maintenance, and to further stipulate that a 

duration for maintenance beyond five years was unreasonable. The 

stipulation was supported by the evidence and did not offend any 

public policy. Therefore, I conclude that it was an abuse of 

discretion for the District Court to ignore the stipulation by 

awarding maintenance in an amount greater than $300, and for a 

duration beyond five years. 

Furthermore, based on the limited nature of the dispute in 

this case, and the fact that there are already inadequate assets 

with which to satisfactorily support both parties, I see no reason 

for either party to exhaust more of those resources on additional 

attorney fees for further legal proceedings. 

Since the District Court found that Delilah was entitled to 

maintenance for longer than was stipulated to by the parties, but 

failed to adhere to the limitation established by the parties, I 

would reverse the judgment of the District Court and remand this 

case to the District Court solely for entry of judgment awarding 

maintenance to Delilah in the amount of $300 per month for a period 

of five years. 
For these reasons, I specially concur with the majority's 

reversal of the District Court.