Office of Inspector General 

Audit Report

SUPERFUND 

Region 1's Implementation of

Superfund Administrative Reforms

E1SFF7-01-0036-8100254

September 29, 1998
Inspector General Division Eastern Audit Division

Conducting the Audit: Boston, Massachusetts

Region Covered: Region 1

Program Offices Involved: Office of Site Remediation & Restoration 

Office of Environmental Stewardship
September 29, 1998

MEMORANDUM

SUBJECT: Audit of Region 1's Implementation of Superfund

Administrative Reforms

Audit Report No. E1SFF7-01-0036-8100254

FROM: Paul D. McKechnie /s/

Divisional Inspector General

Eastern Audit Division

TO: John P. DeVillars

Regional Administrator

EPA - Region 1 - New England

Attached is our audit report, Region 1's Implementation of Superfund Administrative Reforms. 

While this report was based upon a review of Region 1 activities, its conclusions and

recommendations are important to both Region 1 and Headquarters.

This audit report represents the opinion of the OIG. Final determinations on matters in this

audit report will be made by EPA managers in accordance with established EPA audit resolution

procedures. Accordingly, the findings contained in this audit report do not necessarily represent the

final EPA position. 

In this particular audit, the OIG did not measure the audited offices’ performance against the

standards established by the National Contingency Plan (NCP). The findings contained in this audit

report are not binding in any enforcement proceeding brought by EPA or the Department of Justice

under section 107 of the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act

(CERCLA) to recover costs incurred not inconsistent with the NCP.

ACTION REQUIRED

In accordance with EPA Order 2750, you as the action official are required to provide this

office a written response to the audit report within 90 days. Your response should address all

recommendations, and include milestone dates for corrective actions planned, but not completed.
We have no objection to the release of this report to the public.

Should you or your staff have any questions about this report, please contact Linda Fuller,

Team Leader at (617) 565-3160.

Attachment

Distribution: Appendix 3
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

PURPOSE Superfund critics often asked “Why does it take so long and

cost so much?” As a result, the Agency has been

continually seeking ways to make the Superfund process

faster, fairer and more effective. We analyzed some of the

actions taken by the Agency in order to answer the following

questions: 

• Has Region 1 been consistently implementing

reforms at sites when appropriate?

• Is the use of presumptive remedies expediting the

cleanup process?

• Can the impact of Superfund reforms be measured?

RESULTS IN BRIEF Region 1's use of various Superfund reforms helped achieve

the Agency’s goals to improve the equity and effectiveness

of the Superfund process. However, we were unable to

document an overall improvement in expediting the

Superfund process from listing on the National Priorities List

(NPL) to construction completion (pipeline). Prior to the

initiation of Superfund reforms, Region 1 sites took an

average of seven years and two months to reach

construction completion. Afterwards, the average time

increased to nine years and 11 months. We found there

were tradeoffs in implementing the reforms. Improved equity

or community buy-in may come with the price of additional

time spent in the pipeline. Such additional time may or may

not equate to increased costs. Evaluating and measuring

the impact reforms had on the cleanup process was not

required of the Region. We found that Regional staff had

ideas and suggestions about the impact reforms had in the

process. In our opinion, capturing these ideas and

suggestions to measure which reforms had a positive or

negative effect on the entire cleanup process would allow

the Agency to make better informed decisions regarding the
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value of the reforms. We believe the Region and

Headquarters should coordinate an effort to measure reform

performance. Such measurements should carefully examine

how reforms promoting equity and effectiveness have

impacted attaining the goal of expediting the cleanup

process. Based on our review, we believe the goal to

expedite the cleanup process has not been achieved. The

regions can provide the practical knowledge that comes

from implementing the reforms and provide suggestions to

further improve the goals of providing a faster, fairer and

more effective Superfund program.

Region 1 Actively Implemented Reforms

Region 1 successfully piloted and implemented various

Superfund reforms. Benefits such as increased equity, cost

savings, and community buy-in were achieved. Region 1

was one of the few regions to aggressively implement the

Updating Remedy reform, saving $75 million at 11 sites. 

Use of enforcement reforms such as de minimis, mixed

funding, orphan share, and alternative dispute resolution

(ADR) provided greater equity to the Superfund process. In

one case, the use of a Community Advisory Group, another

reform, resulted in not only community consensus but also a

significant cost savings of approximately $45 million by the

adoption of a new remedy. However, these successes also

came with a price. It took five years for the Community

Advisory Group to reach consensus. Enforcement reforms

in particular required greater detailed information and

documentation, thus increasing the amount of time a site

spent in the pipeline. Based on their experience, Regional

enforcement staff provided suggestions to prevent delays in

implementing enforcement reforms.

Region 1 Needs to Assess the Impact of Presumptive

Remedies on the Cleanup Process

Presumptive remedies were developed to streamline the

Remedial Investigation/Feasibility Study (RI/FS) process,

thus saving time and costs. We found, however, that this

reform did not always expedite the Superfund process as
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envisioned. Remedial Project Managers (RPMs) believed

the use of presumptive remedies provided a more focused

RI/FS and promoted consistency. However, the RI/FS

phase for most sites using this reform took longer than the

18 month completion goal set by Headquarters. The

Agency had not developed a plan to evaluate the use of this

reform. As a result, there was no assurance that the use of

presumptive remedies actually saved time or money. 

Additionally, the RPMs said they were unable to quantify

time or cost savings which they believed resulted from the

use of the reform. Without formal measurements and

evaluations, it is difficult to identify why the time savings

were not realized so that appropriate corrections can be

made.

RECOMMENDATIONS We recommend that you instruct the Regional enforcement

staff to work with Headquarters Office of Enforcement &

Compliance Assurance (OECA) staff to determine the

feasibility of implementing Regional recommendations which

could help to expedite the Superfund enforcement process.

We also recommend that you instruct your Office of Site

Remediation & Restoration staff develop an evaluation plan

to determine if the use of presumptive remedies is achieving

its desired results. This evaluation should be coordinated

with Headquarters as part of its analysis of Superfund

Reforms to measure the qualitative and quantitative impacts

on the cleanup process.

REGION 1 COMMENTS Region 1 was pleased to note that the audit findings

confirmed that the Region used reforms and contributed to

the Agency’s goals of improving equity and effectiveness in

program implementation. However, the Region did not

believe the OIG used the appropriate analysis to determine

if the reforms were expediting the process. Region 1 along

with Headquarters program staff provided written comments

to our August 20, 1998 draft report. Their responses have

been summarized at the end of Chapters 2, 3, and 4. The 
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complete Regional and Headquarters responses have been

included as Appendices 1 and 2. An exit conference was

held with Region 1 officials on September 23, 1998.
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TABLE OF CONTENTS

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY ..................................................... i

ABBREVIATIONS ........................................................ vii

CHAPTERS

1. INTRODUCTION ...................................................... 1

Purpose ........................................................ 1

Background ..................................................... 1

Scope and Methodology ........................................... 2

Prior Audit Coverage .............................................. 5

2. REGION 1 ACTIVELY IMPLEMENTED REFORMS ........................... 7

Conclusion .................................................... 14

Recommendations .............................................. 14

Region 1 Comments ............................................. 15

Headquarters Comments ......................................... 16

OIG Comments ................................................. 16

3. EPA NEEDS TO ASSESS THE IMPACT OF 

 PRESUMPTIVE REMEDIES ON THE CLEANUP PROCESS ................. 19

Conclusion .................................................... 24

Recommendations .............................................. 24

Region 1 Comments ............................................. 24

Headquarters Comments ......................................... 25

OIG Comments ................................................. 25

4. REFORMS’ IMPACT NOT FULLY MEASURED ............................ 27

Headquarters Comments ......................................... 28

OIG Comments ................................................. 29

APPENDICES

1. REGIONAL RESPONSE ............................................... 31

2. HEADQUARTERS RESPONSE ......................................... 39

3. DISTRIBUTION ...................................................... 49
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ABBREVIATIONS

ADR Alternative Dispute Resolution

CCL Construction Completion List

CERCLA Comprehensive Environmental Response Compensation and Liability 

Act

CERCLIS Comprehensive Environmental Response Compensation Liability

Information System

EAD Eastern Audit Division

EE/CA Engineering Evaluation/Cost Analysis

EPA U.S. Environmental Protection Agency

FMFIA Federal Managers’ Financial Integrity Act

HAD Headquarters Audit Division

IMC Information Management Coordinator

NPL National Priorities List

OECA Office of Enforcement and Compliance Assurance

OIG Office of Inspector General

OSRE Office of Site Remediation Enforcement

OU Operable Unit

PCB Polychlorinated Biphenyls 

PRP Potential Responsible Party

RD/RA Remedial Design/Remedial Action
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RI/FS Remedial Investigation/Feasibility Study

ROD Record of Decision

RPM Remedial Project Manager

SACM Superfund Accelerated Cleanup Model

SARA Superfund Amendments and Reauthorization Act of 1986

TAG Technical Assistance Grant
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CHAPTER 1 

INTRODUCTION

PURPOSE The Superfund program has often been criticized as being

unfair, too expensive and taking too long. The

Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) developed

Superfund reforms to address that criticism. The Office of

Inspector General conducted an audit of Region 1's

Superfund administrative reforms. 

The objectives of our audit were to answer the following

questions:

• Has Region 1 been consistently implementing

reforms at sites when appropriate? (See Chapter 2)

• Is the use of presumptive remedies expediting the

cleanup process? (See Chapter 3) 

• How well did Region 1 measure the impact of

Superfund reforms? (See Chapter 4)

BACKGROUND In 1980 Congress passed the Comprehensive

Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act

(CERCLA), commonly known as Superfund, to clean up

highly contaminated hazardous waste sites. 

In the past, the Superfund program had been criticized

because of the pace and the cost of cleaning up hazardous

waste sites, the extent to which these sites were cleaned,

the fairness of EPA’s approach for holding waste

contributors liable for cleaning up sites, and the role of

States and communities in the cleanup process.

In response to criticism, the Administration committed to

make clean up of toxic waste sites faster, fairer, and more

efficient. Thus, began three rounds of Superfund
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administrative reforms. The reforms consisted of various

initiatives and pilots that were implemented by the regions.

In June 1993, the Agency announced the first round of

administrative improvements. These administrative reforms

were designed to improve the pace, cost and fairness of the

Superfund program and expand the public involvement. 

Round one consisted of 17 reforms, nine new initiatives and

eight continuing initiatives.

The second round of reforms was announced in February

1995. Round two consisted of 12 administrative reforms

which focused on the following areas: enforcement,

economic development, community involvement and

outreach, environmental justice, consistent program

implementation and State empowerment. 

In October 1995, EPA announced the third and final round

of reforms. This round consisted of 20 reforms designed to

make cost-effective clean up choices that protect public

health and the environment, reduced litigation and

transaction cost, and insured that States and communities

were more informed and involved in clean up decisions.

To complement and expand upon the national reforms

announced by EPA, Region 1 outlined six Superfund

initiatives on February 21, 1995. The goals of these

initiatives were to promote faster cleanups and quicker,

fairer settlements.

SCOPE AND We performed our audit in accordance with Government 

METHODOLOGY Auditing Standards (1994 Revision) issued by the

Comptroller General of the United States for program audits

with the exception of the field work standard on

management controls. We did not assess the validity and

reliability of Comprehensive Environmental Response,

Compensation, and Liability Information System (CERCLIS)

data or system controls.

We conducted our survey fieldwork from June 1997 to

March 1998. The audit phase was performed from March
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1998 to June 1998. As part of our evaluation, we reviewed

Region 1's Fiscal Year (FY) 1995 and 1996 Federal

Managers’ Financial Integrity Act (FMFIA) Assurance 

Letters. These reports did not identify any material

weaknesses or vulnerabilities pertaining to Superfund

reforms. 

Survey Phase We evaluated five reforms utilized by Region 1 that were

announced on February 1, 1995. These included:

• Updating Remedy

• Small Parties

• Innovative Technologies

• Community Empowerment

• Alternatives to Superfund Listing 

We interviewed regional personnel including the Region 1

Ombudsman Site Assessment Manager, Updating

Remedies Project Officer, Superfund Community

Involvement Team Leader, Chief of the Superfund Legal

Office, and Remedial Project Managers. 

In addition, we obtained and reviewed EPA guidance,

directives, and orders, information from the EPA Internet

site, CERCLA, Superfund Amendments and Reauthorization

Act (SARA), rounds one, two, and three of the Superfund

reforms, regional policies on regional reform initiatives,

round one closeout report, Superfund Annual Reforms

Reports for FY 1996 and 1997, and General Accounting

Office (GAO) reports. 

We also obtained and analyzed CERCLIS data, which

contained dates for designation to the NPL and construction

completions. 

Finally, we judgmentally reviewed five Superfund sites which

used round one reforms, to determine if reforms streamlined

and expedited the Superfund cleanup process. We used

selection criteria such as: a high number of reforms used at 
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a site, sites from different States, and sites that used

reforms we had not already selected. These sites included:

• Parker Landfill

• South Municipal Water Supply Well 

• Saco Municipal Landfill

• Bennington Landfill

• Norwood PCB

For each of these sites, we reviewed files at the EPA

Superfund Records Center to obtain site information. This

information included Records of Decision (RODs), fact

sheets, consent decrees, engineering evaluation/cost

analysis (EE/CA), RI/FSs, non time critical actions (NTCRA)

and explanations of significant differences (ESD). We also

interviewed the RPM for each site to determine their

methodology for selecting reforms, evaluating success of

reforms, and documenting cost and time savings as a result

of reforms. 

Audit Phase To determine if Region 1 had been consistently

implementing reforms where appropriate, we judgmentally

selected nine sites from the listing on the NPL. In our

selection criteria we excluded those sites that used round 1

reforms, and sites where construction was completed before

June 1993. We reviewed ROD information, and fact sheets

from the EPA Superfund Records Center. In addition, we

interviewed the RPMs to determine which reforms were

used (if any).

To determine if presumptive remedies expedited the cleanup

process, we analyzed and reviewed ROD information, and

fact sheets from the EPA Superfund Records Center, and

CERCLIS data pertaining to the site. We interviewed RPMs

to determine why the RI/FS took longer than 18 months.

To determine how enforcement reforms impacted the time a

site spends in the Superfund process, we interviewed

Regional as well as Headquarters staff and reviewed the

OIG Headquarters Audit Division (HAD) memorandum on
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the Remedial Design/ Remedial Action (RD/RA) (Report No.

8400015). 

In order to determine how long a site was in the Superfund

process, we subtracted the date a site was listed on the NPL

from the date it was listed on the construction completion

report in CERCLIS.

Finally, we compared the three rounds of reforms to

CERCLA to determine if the reforms significantly deviated

from current law. From this review, we determined that 13 of

49 reforms closely mirrored the language of the existing law. 

Further, we reviewed and compared the definition and goals

of the reforms to the applicable sections of CERCLA.

PRIOR AUDIT The Eastern Audit Division (EAD) issued a Special Review 

COVERAGE of Region 1's Superfund Revitalization Enforcement Pilot

Projects (Report No. 4700001, dated December 21, 1993). 

We reported that Region 1 Superfund staff had effectively

carried out the goals and objectives of their pilot projects. 

We recommended improved communications with

Headquarters regarding pilot status. EAD also issued a

Special Review of Superfund Revitalization Office (SRO)

Administration of Enforcement Pilot Projects (Report No.

4400037, dated March 9, 1994). We reported that the

regions and Headquarters needed to develop an active

partnership by sharing more information.

As previously noted, HAD issued its March 27, 1998

memorandum, “RD/RA Negotiation Time Frames” (Report

No. 8400015). HAD analyzed overall trends in the length of

nationwide RD/RA negotiation time frames and whether

Superfund enforcement reforms affected the length of

negotiations. HAD found that RD/RA negotiating time

frames were longer, cumulatively, during the three years

following the introduction of reforms than in the prior period.
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CHAPTER 2

REGION 1 ACTIVELY IMPLEMENTED REFORMS

Region 1 actively piloted and implemented various

Superfund administrative reforms in such categories as

cleanups, enforcement, and community relations. 

Headquarters staff singled out Region 1 as a leader in

implementing alternative dispute resolutions (ADR) and

updating remedies reforms. For updating remedies, Region

1 documented a cost savings of $75 million for 11 sites. 

Region 1's success was due to viewing the reforms as a way

of doing business and setting priorities for carrying out

certain reforms. However, while reforms may have improved

equity or Agency processes, reforms did not appear to

expedite the Superfund process in general. In fact, some

reforms added time to the process. 

Results of Sample Our sampling of sites showed that Region 1 was

consistently implementing the reforms. For instances when

reforms were not used, the Regional staff provided

reasonable explanations. Some examples of Region 1's

successful implementation of reforms follow.

Updated Remedy (Cleanups) Region 1 was one of the few regions to aggressively 

Reduced Cleanup Cost implement the reform to update Records of Decisions

(RODs). According to the Region 1 Chief of Remedial &

Restoration 1 Branch, the goal of this initiative was to

encourage Regions to systematically identify and revisit

remedy decisions at sites where significant new scientific

information would achieve the current level of environmental

protection in a more cost effective manner. In order to

achieve this objective, a 100 percent review of Region 1's

RODs was undertaken regardless of their dollar amounts. 

As a result, Region 1 claimed to have reduced cleanup

costs by $75 million at 11 sites while ensuring the protection

of public health and the environment. 
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One of the 11 sites was Norwood PCB. According to the

Agency, the updated remedy saved approximately $45

million. Dramatic increases in the price of the original

solvent extraction remedy, space constraints, and safety

issues were some of the reasons given for updating the

remedy.

Although Regional personnel documented estimated cost

savings for updated remedies, there was a lack of specific

national guidance on how cost savings should be

calculated. This resulted in a lack of Regional consistency

in the computation of cost savings because the method used

to calculate these costs were at each RPM’s discretion. 

Nationwide, computations for cost savings were left to the

discretion of Regional staff. Inconsistent measures for

calculating cost differences may not portray accurate cost

savings for this remedy. Providing an established method

for cost savings would also assist RPMs. RPMs would not

have to spend time determining which method to use. 

De Minimis Enforcement Region 1 implemented various enforcement reforms such as 

Reform Fully Implemented de minimis settlements, mixed funding, orphan share, and

alternative dispute resolution (ADR). The Director of the

Policy and Program Evaluation Division, Office of Site

Remediation Enforcement (OSRE), OECA stated that

Region 1 was a leader in the use of ADR. Our review

concentrated on the Region’s use of de minimis settlements.

Region 1 offered de minimis settlements to 77 parties at five

sites. According to Region 1 staff, offering de minimis

settlements had evolved into a way of doing business and

was no longer considered a separate reform. Part of the

objective of the reform was to enter into de minimis

settlements early in the enforcement process. This allowed

Potential Responsible Parties (PRPs) who contributed

minimal amounts of waste to a site to avoid the transaction

and other legal costs they would otherwise incur by

continuing in the litigation or waiting until a later time to

settle. 
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The Region established goals for the number of de minimis

settlements they wanted to make each year and reported

their status to Headquarters. According to Region 1's Chief

of the Superfund Legal Office, he was unaware of any other

Region that had undertaken a broader initiative aimed

specifically at small parties. For example, Region 1 used

“plain English” correspondence, created a small parties

hotline, and accumulated relevant guidance on de minimis

settlement for Regional personnel.

Use of enforcement reforms provided greater fairness to

PRPs. However, at times, RPMs cited these reforms as the

reason for delays in the cleanup process. The Director of

the Policy and Program Evaluation Division, OSRE, OECA

advised us that enforcement reforms were aimed at

improving equity, not timeliness. Both the Director and

Regional staff acknowledged that enforcement reforms may

increase the amount of time a site spends in the pipeline.

Regional enforcement staff described some of the problems

which can contribute to inhibiting a timely de minimis

settlement. These problems included: assembling complete

waste information, devising a fair cutoff for de minimis at

small quantity sites, and setting a fair settlement amount. 

The Regional staff added that PRPs with a larger

involvement at the site may fear they will be the only ones

left after a de minimis settlement and the final remedy will

turn out to be more expensive than originally estimated. To

guard against that possibility, the price to settle may be set

so high that the very small parties will be priced out of the

settlement.

According to the Regional enforcement staff, deadlines

required by law are impossible to meet unless there is (1)

good waste information, (2) a small number of PRPs are

involved, and (3) most of the PRPs are knowledgeable

about CERCLA and have the financial ability to settle with

EPA. However, those ideal circumstances usually do not

exist. Deadlines required by law do not allow enough time

for the PRPs to resolve differences among themselves so as

to form a cohesive group which can then negotiate a final
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deal with EPA. Often there are defunct or insolvent parties

at sites who cannot contribute to the cost of cleanup. To

address this problem, the Regional enforcement staff

suggested that the Agency identify orphan share as early as

possible, preferably at the RI/FS phase. (Orphan share is

the share belonging to the defunct or insolvent parties. EPA

may agree to compensate performing parties a limited

portion of the orphan share.) The Regional staff believed

this would help the PRPs to get a better understanding of

the potential universe of costs and to form that cohesive

group which could then deal with EPA.

Developing allocations was cited as another delaying factor. 

In a written response to our questions, the Regional

enforcement staff stated:

Implementation of reforms relating to allocations can

have the affect [sic] of slowing the process. 

Gathering waste volume information, preparing it for

effective presentation to PRP groups and negotiating

with PRPs to reach consensus on the details of the

allocation for each party in a large group is a

cumbersome and very time consuming process. 

Pursuing allocations at landfill sites is perhaps the

most difficult due to incomplete data or lack of

information on the disposal practices of the PRPS

[sic] over long periods of time. Poor quality or

insufficient data hampers efforts to determine and

defend deminimis [sic] settlements with the smaller

PRPs.

In instances where data is not complete for de minimis or

allocations, the Regional enforcement staff suggested that

the Agency develop standard presumptions to apply so that

these reforms can be used without unnecessarily delaying

the process. They believed orphan share and mixed

funding provided time savings and created a favorable

settlement climate.

Some other suggestions offered by the Regional

enforcement staff to Headquarters included: (1) making
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orphan share available to cash out situations and

owners/operators, at least in some situations (e.g.,

municipalities who own part of a site but are not culpable),

and revise the limitations that presently exist and (2)

becoming more proactive in acting as a national center to

which regions can refer and learn how other regions are

dealing with the reforms.

RD/RA Negotiations Were Delays resulting from implementation of enforcement 

Taking Longer reforms were not unique to Region 1. During assistance

and advisory work done for the Agency at Headquarters, the

OIG analyzed overall trends in the length of nationwide

remedial design/remedial action (RD/RA) negotiation time

frames for fiscal years 1990 - 1996 (RD/RA Negotiation

Time Frames, March 27, 1998). The OIG analyzed whether

Superfund enforcement reforms affected the length of

negotiations. The OIG wanted to pinpoint the effect of major

policy changes. One of the major policy changes the report

noted that coincided with changes in the time frames for

RD/RA negotiations was the advent of the Superfund

reforms. In order to judge the effect of the Superfund

reforms on the length of RD/RA negotiations, the analysts

compared the length of negotiation time frames during a

three year time period just before (fiscal years 1990 - 1992)

and a three year time period immediately after (fiscal years

1994 - 1996) the start of the Superfund reforms, skipping the

year (fiscal year 1993) in which the reforms were actually

implemented. The results showed that RD/RA negotiating

time frames were longer, cumulatively, during the three

years following the introduction of reforms than in the prior

period.

Increased Equity Another example of reforms which promoted equity but 

Can Delay Cleanup increased time spent on cleanups was community

involvement. The primary goal of the various community

involvement reforms was to include all affected parties in the

decision making process. The Agency believed early

community involvement increased the equity of the

Superfund program as it related to the people immediately
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impacted by the site. In this way, revisions and

amendments to the ROD would not be needed. 

According to the Guidance for Community Advisory Groups

at Superfund Sites:

“While recognizing that providing additional

opportunities for community involvement may require

additional time and slow the cleanup process down

initially, EPA believes this is time well spent, and that

early and effective community involvement will

actually save time in the long run.”

According to the Superfund Community Involvement Team

Leader, the reform initiative was measured by whether: (1)

cleanup decisions reflected community input and

involvement, (2) the chosen solution was a consensus

decision of the community, and (3) future reuse was

included in the proposed cleanup options.

Although additional time was needed at two Regional sites,

benefits of reduced costs and community buy in were

derived. At the Pine Street Barge Canal Site, Region 1

presented a plan in 1992 calling for a $50 million remedy at

the site. Since the plan met strong opposition, Region 1 and

the community council agreed to look at a new, less costly

and less intrusive alternative. As a result, five years passed

before a new plan was proposed. In May 1998 the remedy

was estimated to cost $4.3 million. If EPA adopts this

remedy, the PRPs voluntarily agree to contribute another $3

million for environmental projects selected by the

community. 

Although negotiations with the community council took five

years, existing conditions at the site did not pose an

unacceptable human health risk. In 1992, EPA determined

that it was very unlikely for the contaminants to pose a

threat to human health by being released into the air. The

State of Vermont prohibits the use of contaminated

groundwater beneath the site for drinking water. In 1993, 40

drums containing hazardous waste were removed from the
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Federal

 Fiscal

Year

Time between

NPL & CCL

1992 6 Yrs. 3 Mos.

1993 8 Yrs. 11 Mos.

1994 9 Yrs. 8 Mos.

1995 10 Yrs. 11 Mos. 

1996 9 Yrs. 6 Mos. 

1997 9 Yrs. 9 Mos.

1998 14 Yrs. 4 Mos. *

* Only one site construction

completed at end of fieldwork for

site. Studies continued at the site, but there was no

evidence of any further cleanup. An October 1994 progress

report stated that “previous studies performed by contractors

for the EPA has concluded that there appears to be no

human health risk posed by the site.” 

The Pine Street Barge Canal site received much attention

from the Region because it met at least two of the three

criteria used to measure community involvement. According

to the Cleanup Plan Proposal, the Pine Street site was one

of the first sites in the country where a public consensus

group had been used to develop and recommend a

Superfund remedy.

Reforms Did Not Speed Up While use of Superfund reforms improved program equity 

Construction Completions and effectiveness, use did not expedite the time a site

progressed from listing on the NPL to construction

completion. Prior to the announcement of reforms, nine of

26 sites (35 percent) reached construction completion. The

average time taken for

these nine sites was

seven years and two

months. After the

announcement of

reforms, the average

amount of time taken for

the remaining 17 sites (65

percent) to reach

construction completion

was nine years and 11

months. 

Even though sites have

taken longer since

Superfund reforms were

introduced, more sites

have been added or will

be added to the

construction completion list (CCL). There were seven

construction completions in fiscal year 1997, compared to
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two construction completions in each of the three previous

years. According to the Information Management

Coordinator (IMC) in Region 1, there were seven to nine

sites projected for construction completion in 1998. The IMC

believed the main reason why most of these sites reached

construction completion was that they were already in the

Superfund process for a period of time. Most of these sites

were reaching construction completion because of the way

they fell in the pipeline. After further inquiry of Superfund

Branch Chiefs, the IMC reported that reforms played a minor

role in sites reaching construction completion.

CONCLUSION The Region had been actively implementing reforms. These

reforms provided cost savings and greater equity to the

Superfund process. However, the Superfund process was

not expedited by the set of reforms we examined in Region

1. The average time a site reached the construction

completion list increased from seven years and two months

to nine years and 11 months since the initiation of the

Superfund reforms. Enforcement reforms especially could

delay the process. However, Regional enforcement staff

provided suggestions to address this problem (See pages

10 and 11). We believe the Regional enforcement staff’s

suggestions show promise. A further evaluation of

suggestions with Headquarters should be performed to

determine their feasibility.

RECOMMENDATIONS We recommend that you instruct your enforcement staff

work with Headquarters staff to determine the feasibility of

implementing Regional suggestions which could help to

expedite the Superfund enforcement process.
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REGION 1 Region 1 was pleased to receive independent verification 

COMMENTS that Regional staff was using reforms and contributing to the

Agency’s goals of improving equity and effectiveness in

Superfund.

However, Region 1 did not agree with the OIG’s conclusion

related to expediting the cleanup process. Region 1 did not

believe it was appropriate to evaluate time lines at sites

where work was initiated many years prior to the

announcement of the reforms. In their opinion, calculation

should begin at the point in time that a particular reform was

applied to a specific cleanup phase of the sites.

On the issue of inconsistent cost estimate calculations,

Region 1 wrote:

The OIG comments relative to updating remedies

indicate that there is a lack of regional consistency in

how savings were calculated. Each remedy may vary

slightly in the method used to calculate savings due

to differences in the nature of the site and remedy. 

However, each cost saving calculation was consistent

to the extent it included an estimate of construction

costs (capital costs) saved and Operation and

Maintenance (O&M) cost savings in accordance with

national guidance. Also, EPA national guidance

indicates that the accuracy of remedial action cost

estimates in the FS are anticipated to be no better

than +50/-30.

Regarding our recommendation, Region 1 responded:

The Regional enforcement staff have been working

over the years, both internally and with Headquarters

staff, on efforts to expedite the enforcement process. 

We have been very active in our efforts to improve

the enforcement program along the lines suggested

and will continue those efforts.
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HEADQUARTERS Headquarters (and Region 1 agreed) believed it 

COMMENTS was too early to see the impact of the reforms on

construction completions. Headquarters further stated:

... the lengthening of the time frames probably has

more to do with program maturity than anything else. 

The Superfund program was only twelve years old in

June 1993, so the average time to reach construction

completion by 1993 would have to be significantly

less than twelve years. In 1998 the program was 17

years old, so the average age could be longer.

... none of the reforms apply to the entire response

pipeline, so its doubtful that their impact can be

adequately evaluated by looking at the time it takes to

go from NPL listing to construction completion. Each

of the reforms was designed to addresses (sic) a

different aspect of the process.

... the report faults the reforms for not accelerating

the pace of cleanup at sites where work had been

underway for an average of almost 8 years prior to

the reforms.

Headquarters also commented that citizen groups, law suits,

political interest, site size and complexity, etc. also impact

the timeliness of construction completion.

Headquarters commented that implementing the suggestion

made by Regional enforcement staff on making orphan

share available to owners/operators “would conflict with the

direction we have received from Congress on this issue.”

OIG COMMENTS In our opinion, using the NPL listing date as our starting

point is valid because 98 percent of Region 1's NPL sites

were listed prior to October 1, 1995 (the last round of

reforms). One of the criticisms the Agency was trying to

address with the reforms was the slow pace of cleanups. 

Few sites had been removed from the NPL.
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Also, the NPL is a public document. Individuals outside the

Agency can readily review this document to determine how

long a site remains on the list. We believe the Agency has

made great progress in addressing equity and effectiveness

issues. However, Superfund is a long process and in the

opinion of its critics the process must move quicker. We

also believe that expediting the Superfund process still

remains a significant area on which the Agency must focus

more attention. We did attempt to evaluate just one

segment of the Superfund process as it related to one

reform (See Chapter 3). Again in this one instance, we

could not document significant time savings.

Five years have passed since Superfund reforms were first

announced. As we have reported in Chapter 4, many of

these reforms were already a part of the law and not drastic

program departures. In our opinion, sufficient time has

passed for the Agency to start evaluating what it has

accomplished and determining where it wants to head. 

Regarding the Region’s comments on the consistency of

cost estimates, conversations with Headquarters staff

indicated that this was a national issue, not a Regional

issue. We included this information for use by

Headquarters and have not made any Regional

recommendations. Our review of a cost estimate prepared

by Region 1 staff showed that it was reasonably prepared

and documented.

Regarding comments on the audit recommendation, our

recommendation is directed at continued communication

between Headquarters and Regional staff on the subject

issues as opposed to support for a particular suggestion.
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CHAPTER 3

EPA NEEDS TO ASSESS THE IMPACT OF

PRESUMPTIVE REMEDIES ON THE CLEANUP PROCESS

We found the use of presumptive remedies had not provided

all its expected benefits. RPMs believed the use of

presumptive remedies provided a more focused risk

assessment and feasibility study which promoted

consistency. However, the RI/FS phases for most sites

using presumptive remedies have taken longer than the 18

month completion goal set by Headquarters. Further, the

Agency had not developed a plan to evaluate the impact of

this reform. As a result, there was no assurance that the

use of presumptive remedies actually expedited the process

and saved time or money. Additionally, the RPMs said they

were unable to quantify time or cost savings which they

believed resulted from the use of the reform. 

Background The Agency’s Superfund program had been criticized by

Congress and the public for taking too long to decide upon

remedies at sites and for the slow pace of achieving

cleanups. 

In 1991, the Agency began efforts to standardize parts of

the remedy selection process and increased efforts to take

advantage of experience at sites across the country. The

Agency believed that the process of site characterization,

evaluating the feasibility of cleanup options, and design may

have been unnecessarily complex, site-specific and lengthy. 

EPA believed new efforts could save time and money and

would increase national consistency of the Superfund

program.

The objective of the presumptive remedies initiative was to

use the program’s past experience to streamline site

investigation and speed up the selection of cleanup actions.

Over time presumptive remedies were expected to ensure
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consistency in remedy selection and reduce the cost and

time required to clean up similar types of sites.

Presumptive remedies were expected to have several

benefits. They limited the number of technologies

considered, which should promote a more focused data

collection, resulting in streamlined site assessments and

accelerated remedy selection decisions which achieve time

and cost savings. 

Presumptive remedies were tools to help site managers to

focus data collection efforts during the site investigation

(e.g., remedial investigations, removal site evaluation) and

significantly reduce the technology evaluation phase (e.g.,

Engineering Evaluation/Cost Analysis (EE/CA) and/or

Feasibility Study (FS)) for certain site categories. 

EPA developed various presumptive remedies for such site

types as volatile organic compounds (VOCs) in soils, wood

treaters, municipal landfills, and contaminated ground water. 

We focused on the municipal landfill presumptive remedy

because it was easy to identify this site type by simply

reading the name of the site (e.g. Town/City Name Municipal

Landfill) on the NPL.

The Superfund Program Implementation Manual for Fiscal

Year 1994 defined an RI/FS as “an investigation designed to

characterize the site, assess the nature and extent of the

contamination, evaluate potential risk to human health and

the environment, and develop and evaluate potential

remediation alternatives.” It also defined an Operable Unit

(OU) as “the division of a project into meaningful work

elements (events) that can be implemented on different

schedules, resulting in acceleration of cleanups .” A site

can have more than one OU, each with its own RI/FS.

Criteria EPA Directive No. 9355.0-49 FS issued September 1993 for

Presumptive Remedy for CERCLA Municipal Landfill states

that: 
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the biggest savings in time and money can be

realized if streamlining is incorporated at the

beginning of the RI/FS process . . . this directive

addresses those issues identified during the pilots

and highlights streamlining opportunities to be

considered during the scoping component of the

RI/FS. 

Headquarters Remedial Action and Contract Section staff

stated that the goal to complete an RI/FS was within 18

months, but the actual average was two years. 

RI/FS Completion Took For the majority of sites reviewed that used presumptive 

Longer Than Agency remedies, the RI/FS took significantly longer than the

Goal Agency goal of 18 months. 

The Region identified 13 sites

which used a presumptive

remedy. From CERCLIS, we

determined the length of time

it took to complete an RI/FS

for these sites. 

For seven sites representing

nine RI/FSs where the Region

clearly identified an OU as

using a presumptive remedy,

we found that six of nine (66.7

percent) took more than two

years to complete the RI/FS. 

The remaining six of 13 sites

represented 18 RI/FSs and

were not identified in

CERCLIS as using a presumptive remedy. Of the 18

RI/FSs, 16 (88.8 percent) took longer than two years to

complete. 

Municipal Landfill RI/FS Region 1's use of the municipal landfill presumptive remedy 

Not Expedited did not expedite the RI/FS process. A comparison of sites

which used and did not use this presumptive remedy

Completion of

 RI/FS Using 

Presumptive Remedy

1 RI/FS $7 years

1 RI/FS $4 years, < 7 years

1 RI/FS $3 years, < 4 years

1 RI/FS $2 years, < 3 years

2 RI/FS $1 year, < 2 years

1 RI/FS < 1 year

2 RI/FS not completed after

2 years
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NPL SITES REVIEWED THAT USED 

PRESUMPTIVE REMEDY FOR 

MUNICIPAL LANDFILLS

Site

Name

Time to 

Complete

RI/FS

RPMs Reasons for 

Length of Time

Old Southington

Landfill, CT

7 yrs,

20 days

Lawsuits, request for additional

off-site work

Saco Landfill, ME 2 yrs, 6 mos,

25 days

Took no longer than normal

BFI Sanitary 

Landfill, VT

2 yrs, 1 mo,

28 days

Took no longer than normal

Bennington 

 Landfill, VT 

6 yrs, 9 mos

23 days

Additional data needed to be

collected

Parker Landfill,

VT

4 yrs, 7 mos

25 days

Site location in northern VT, &

seasonal time to collect data

showed no significant difference in the time it took to

complete the RI/FS. RPMs usually attributed other factors

such as weather or legal action as the reason for delays

rather than a problem with implementing the presumptive

remedy. 

Of the 13 sites the region identified as using presumptive

remedies, we judgmentally selected five for review. Of the

five sites none of the RI/FSs was accomplished by the

Headquarters goal of 18 months. The RI/FS for two sites

were completed in little more than two years and the other

three were accomplished between four and seven years. 

Of the five sites reviewed the RI/FSs took from two years,

one month and 28 days to seven years 20 days. Even for

sites which took longer than two years to complete the

RI/FS, the RPMs believed the RI/FS completion time was

reasonable. RPMs believed that there were extenuating

circumstances, such as requests for additional offsite work,

lawsuits by citizens, additional data collection, and site

location which extended the RI/FS.
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We reviewed five sites that did not use presumptive remedy. 

One RI/FS was completed in just over two years, while the

others took significantly longer, between four and seven

years. This

completion time was

similar to those sites

which used

presumptive

remedies for

municipal landfills. 

Two of the reasons

why the RI/FSs were

completed in more

than two years

included: State was

lead in developing

RI/FS and significant

community

involvement resulted

in additional work done to alleviate community concerns. 

Benefits from Use of Presumptive remedies provided technical benefits to 

Presumptive Remedies RPMs but it was unclear if time or money was saved. RPMs

believed using presumptive remedies allowed them to be

more focused during the risk assessment and the feasibility

study. However, one RPM believed that time saved during

the risk assessment phase was lost during other aspects of

the cleanup (i.e. ground water studies, air monitoring,

geological studies or enforcement reforms). Another RPM

added that a significant amount of time was not saved

during the remedial investigation phase. At one site which

had already reached construction completion, the decision

to write-off further action for ground water restoration was

facilitated by using the presumptive remedy for Technical

Impracticability of Ground Water Restoration. No RPMs

documented or quantified time savings. Only one RPM

estimated a cost savings, $2 million in reduced transaction

costs in a PRP lead site. However, this estimate was not

documented. Due to a lack of documentation, we could not

SITES THAT DID NOT 

USE PRESUMPTIVE REMEDY

Norwood 

PCB, MA

2 yrs, 4 mos,

8 days

Coakley Landfill,

NH (OU 1) *

4 yrs, 9 mos,

30 days

Central Landfill, 

RI *

7 yrs, 2 mos,

14 days

Winthrop Landfill,

ME

4 yrs, 1 mos,

23 days

Dover Municipal

Landfill, NH

7 yrs, 5 mos,

11 days

* Listed by Regional Staff as Using Presumptive

Remedy but according to RPMs did not.
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verify time or cost savings. At PRP lead sites only the PRP,

not EPA, could quantify the cost savings.

According to the RPM at the South Municipal Landfill site in

New Hampshire, the presumptive remedy for Technical

Impracticability of Ground Water Restoration at Superfund

Sites was not used because the guidance was not available

earlier in the process. However, the RPM was able to use

the guidance to support the decision to write-off further

action for ground water restoration at this site.

CONCLUSION The use of presumptive remedies had mixed results in

Region 1. The RPMs were finding the process beneficial,

but the expected benefits in time and cost savings were not

always achieved or documented. EPA Headquarters gave

the Regions no criteria to measure the success of the

reforms and the Region had not evaluated whether the

reforms were achieving their expected benefits. Evaluating

the use of the presumptive remedies should help to identify

why all the benefits have not been achieved and help to

identify corrective action needed. 

RECOMMENDATIONS We recommend that the Office of Site Remediation &

Restoration staff develop an evaluation plan to determine if

the use of presumptive remedies is achieving its desired

results. This evaluation should be coordinated with

Headquarters as part of its analysis of Superfund Reforms

to measure the qualitative and quantitative impacts on the

cleanup process. 

REGION 1 Region 1 responded:

COMMENTS

Regarding municipal landfills presumptive remedies -

The 18 month time period for RI/FS used by the OIG

as a basis of comparison is an Agency goal. The

study of three landfills conducted by Headquarters in

1996 used a national average of 51 months for the

RI/FS. Current national data indicate a national
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average of approximately 36 months. The current

national average of approximately 36 months would

be a better basis for comparison of the time to

complete a presumptive remedy landfill RI/FS versus

a conventional RI/FS. While we are striving for a

goal, a comparison of the processes as they actually

occur in the field is more representative than

comparison to a goal.

The Region then stated that if the average of 36 months was

used as criteria, four of the seven RI/FSs took less than

three years which would be good news.

HEADQUARTERS Headquarters stated:

COMMENTS

... it would be more useful to simply state the average

time required to complete the RI/FSs. From the data

it appears that the durations have gotten shorter, but

not as short as hoped.

Headquarters also commented that it was unlikely that there

is a cost effective way to estimate the cost and time savings

from using presumptive remedies.

OIG Region 1 makes a good point in showing that 60 percent 

COMMENTS of the seven RI/FSs took less than the nation average. 

However, that still leaves 40 percent which were over the

average. Also, it is unknown at this time the

reasonableness of the national average or even of the

Agency’s goal of 18 months. As a result, we still present

this finding and the recommendation because we believe

the Agency should determine a reasonable goal to strive

towards and measure actual performance against. Without

such measurements, the Agency cannot determine the

effectiveness of its procedures.

Regarding Headquarters comments on the feasibility of

documenting time and cost savings, we made this comment

to inform the reader that while such claims were made, we

could not verify these claims because the necessary

documentation was not developed.
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average of approximately 36 months. The current

national average of approximately 36 months would

be a better basis for comparison of the time to

complete a presumptive remedy landfill RI/FS versus

a conventional RI/FS. While we are striving for a

goal, a comparison of the processes as they actually

occur in the field is more representative than

comparison to a goal.

The Region then stated that if the average of 36 months was

used as criteria, four of the seven RI/FSs took less than

three years which would be good news.

HEADQUARTERS Headquarters stated:

COMMENTS

... it would be more useful to simply state the average

time required to complete the RI/FSs. From the data

it appears that the durations have gotten shorter, but

not as short as hoped.

Headquarters also commented that it was unlikely that there

is a cost effective way to estimate the cost and time savings

from using presumptive remedies.

OIG Region 1 makes a good point in showing that 60 percent 

COMMENTS of the seven RI/FSs took less than the nation average. 

However, that still leaves 40 percent which were over the

average. Also, it is unknown at this time the

reasonableness of the national average or even of the

Agency’s goal of 18 months. As a result, we still present

this finding and the recommendation because we believe

the Agency should determine a reasonable goal to strive

towards and measure actual performance against. Without

such measurements, the Agency cannot determine the

effectiveness of its procedures.

Regarding Headquarters comments on the feasibility of

documenting time and cost savings, we made this comment

to inform the reader that while such claims were made, we

could not verify these claims because the necessary

documentation was not developed.
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CHAPTER 4

 REFORMS’ IMPACT NOT FULLY MEASURED

Introduction Our review was limited to evaluating Region 1's

implementation of Superfund reforms. Overall assessment

of the reforms is a Headquarters responsibility, and

Headquarters should provide guidance to the regions on

measuring the impact of the reforms. We provide the

following solely for information. No action is required by the

Region.

Measuring Reforms The Agency has not fully measured the impact of reform

use. Standardized methods for documenting cost and time

savings were not developed for all reforms. Some reforms

are difficult to measure because intangible benefits are

expected or assumptions must be made on what actions did

not happen. Another problem with measuring the impact of

the reforms is that some reforms are not significantly

different from what was enacted in the law. In such cases, it

may be difficult to attribute a reform’s use to being a “reform”

or being a mandate. Without an accurate assessment, the

success of the reforms cannot be effectively promoted.

Regional staff stated that Headquarters had not asked the

regions to assess the success of the initiatives and they had

not made an evaluation. The Regional staff also believed

that since two years had passed, it was an excellent time for

Headquarters to reassess the value of the reforms and

determine if the reforms were going in the right direction.

The RPMs believed certain reforms saved time or money but

could not always provide support for their claims because

some results cannot be easily measured. As an example,

the RPM at the Norwood PCB site believed use of ADR

saved time and money because a mediator was able to

settle disputes between the PRPs and EPA. However, the 

RPM said it was difficult to determine and document savings

because it was unknown how long litigation would have

lasted without ADR. 
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The updating remedies reform saved costs at various sites. 

However, Headquarters did not provide a standard method

to calculate cost savings, leaving each RPM to determine

their own method. Such an inconsistency may depict an

inaccurate measure of success for this reform. 

Reforms Were Interpretations Many reforms could be directly traced to the Comprehensive

of Existing Law Environmental Response Compensation and Liability Act

(CERCLA). From a review of 49 reforms, 13 were found to

mirror the language of the existing law. Nine of the 13

reforms (69.2 percent) were further clarifications or

interpretations of the existing Superfund law. These reforms

implemented approaches already included in the law. For

example, de minimis was not fully utilized prior to reforms,

even though it was a part of the law [CERCLA § 122(g)]. 

This reform is now used. Another example was community

relations. These reforms merely emphasized community

involvement during remedy selection, even though the law

always required community involvement and was later

amended to provide Technical Assistance Grants.

HEADQUARTERS Headquarters provided:

COMMENTS

... this comment seems to imply that 36 of the 49

reforms have no basis in law. If that is the intent of

the report it should be stated explicitly, ... The simple

fact is that EPA believes that all of the reforms have a

basis in law, which is why they are called

‘Administrative Reforms.’ EPA does not have the

authority to operate outside of its enabling legislation.
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OIG COMMENTS It was not the intention of the OIG to imply that any of the

reforms had no basis in law. The dictionary defines “reform”

as to amend or improve. Our point was that in some cases,

we did not see how the Agency amended or improved what

was already provided for by law. As a result, it would be

difficult to measure a “reform’s” impact if no discernable

change had been made. 
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APPENDIX 1

REGIONAL COMMENTS

UNITED STATES ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY

 REGION I

J.F.K. FEDERAL BUILDING, BOSTON, MA. 02203-2211

MEMORANDUM

DATE: September 17 , 1998

SUBJ: Response to the OIG Draft Audit of Region I’s Implementation of Superfund

Administrative Reforms - Audit Report No. E1SFF7-01-0036

FROM: John P. DeVillars /s/

Regional Administrator

EPA - Region I - New England

TO: Paul D. McKechnie

Divisional Inspector General

Eastern Audit Division

Thank you for the opportunity to review and comment on the draft audit of Region I’s

Implementation of Superfund Administrative Reforms. The response is presented in four parts:

Part 1 - Summary comments on the overall audit approach and recommendations;

Part II - Specific comments relating to policy implications of the recommendations; 

Part III - Specific comments regarding factual accuracy; and 

Part IV - Comments on the request for a Plan for Taking Corrective Action.

Part I - Summary comments of the overall audit approach and recommendations

The comments which follow are in response to the Executive Summary section of the report.

EPA response to the Purpose of the report

 

The audit report purpose should identify the Administrative reforms which are the focus of the

audit. There have been three rounds of Administrative Reforms announced over the past five

years; Round One - June 1993, Round Two - Feb. 1995 and Round Three - Oct. 1995. Rounds

One and Two have been closed out. The Agency has focused most recently on Round Three

Administrative “common sense” Reforms which have as general goals making the Superfund

program Fairer, Faster and More Cost Effective.
APPENDIX 1

32

EPA response to the Results in Brief 

The Region is pleased to note that the audit findings confirm our use of reforms and our

contribution to the Agency’s goals of improving equity and effectiveness in program

implementation. We have worked hard to change the way Superfund is implemented in this

Region. Independent verification of success is very important to our managers and staff.

With regard to the topic of expediting the cleanup process, the Region is concerned with the audit

finding that it took, on average, longer to cleanup sites after reforms than before the

reforms. According to Headquarters national data , the cleanup time line

(listing - construction completion) for post-reform sites is less than for sites started in the prereform (before 10/95) period. Regional data for all sites shows a decrease in the time line from RI

start through construction complete.

Of more significance, however, we believe it is not appropriate to evaluate time lines at sites

where work was initiated many years prior to the reforms being announced. In our opinion, that

calculation should begin at the point in time that a particular reform was applied to a specific

cleanup phase of the sites. For example, the presumptive remedy reforms evaluation time line

should begin when this particular reform was used at a site during the RI/FS. The evaluation

should not begin at listing. Having done this, however, you will still be left with the issue of

separating out the impact of this reform in situations where additional reforms were applied to the

site during the same phase of the process. This point is further expanded upon in

Attachment I . 

The audit findings confirm that the Region has succeeded in implementing reforms. The degree of

success is a reflection of the nature of each reform, site specific applicability of reforms and the

competing goals of the reforms. We do not believe that the intended benefits of all of the reforms

together can be achieved simultaneously at a particular site. Indeed, it is recognized that the goals

of one reform may conflict or compete with the goals of other reforms. As noted in the report,

community involvement and enforcement reforms may conflict with the goal of expediting the

response process at the sites you examined for that phase of the time line. In the future it will be

important to evaluate the length of time it takes from the point in time the reform is initiated at the

site to construction completion, for example, to determine overall impacts on the site cleanup

schedule. Although there are delays at some sites during application of the reform at the

particular phase of the process, future phases of cleanup may be expedited. 

We recommend that the title “Region I Needs to Assess the Impact of Presumptive Remedies in

the Cleanup Process” be changed to read “ Headquarters and Region I -----“.

 

EPA response to Recommendations

The Regional enforcement staff have been working over the years, both internally and with

Headquarters staff, on efforts to expedite the enforcement process. We have been very active in

2
APPENDIX 1

33

our efforts to improve the enforcement program along the lines suggested and will continue those

efforts. 

It would be helpful if you would separate out all suggestions (in the appendix) so that we could

initiate appropriate follow up. 

Headquarters is planning to conduct a more in-depth analysis of the Superfund Reforms. The

analysis will attempt to measure the qualitative and quantitative impacts on the cleanup process

and Agency decision making. An examination of the recommendations regarding presumptive

remedies would be part of such an effort. We recommend that you revise your recommendation to

instruct the Office of Site Remediation & Restoration (OSRR) to develop an evaluation plan to

indicate that the plan be developed in conjunction with Headquarters efforts.

Part II - Specific comments relating to policy implications of the recommendations

OIG Report, Chapter 2, Region I Actively Implements Reforms

Recommendations - We recommend that you instruct your enforcement staff work with

Headquarter staff to determine the feasibility of implementing Regional suggestions which could

help to expedite the Superfund enforcement process.

The regional suggestions identified in the report, pages 10 & 11, are: 

1) identify orphan shares as soon as possible, preferably during the RI/FS phase; 

2) develop standard presumptions regarding allocations for deminimis status determinations;

3) make orphan share available to cash out situations and owners/operators and revise the 

 limitations; and 

4) Headquarters be more proactive as a national center for reforms implementation information.;

EPA Response: The Region has been actively involved on our own efforts, and with Headquarters

on national efforts, to improve PRP search procedures to focus attention of an allocation based

enforcement program. Regional staff were on the national workgroup and 

attended the national conference held in June 1998. The Region is pursuing the PRP search

process in an effort to identify orphan share parties as soon as possible in the search process. The

intent is to do this before the RI/FS start. 

The Region has worked closely with Headquarters and DOJ in efforts to streamline the allocations

process and waste volume determinations necessary to defining deminimis parties. While site

specific factors and PRP attitudes on the subject vary, we believe we have advanced our

understanding of the pros and cons of various approaches. Existing statutory language may 

limit our ability to apply standard presumptions leading to deminimis status determinations.

Headquarters has responded to a range of comments from the regions, PRPs and the public to

make orphan share compensation available to cost recovery cases. The Region will take

advantage of this development in an effort to expedite cost recovery enforcement cases. The

Region and Headquarters have already worked together on ways to create innovative settlement

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34

packages that go beyond the limitation of orphan share policy. These collaborative efforts will

continue. 

OIG Report, Chapter 3, Region I needs to assess the impact of Presumptive Remedies on

the cleanup process

Recommendation - We recommend that the Office of Site Remediation & Restoration staff

develop an evaluation plan to determine if the use of presumptive remedies is achieving its desired

results.

EPA Response: The type of study recommended by the OIG is best done at the national level.

EPA Headquarters has the larger universe of sites needed to establish a valid data base. The

Region does not have enough sites to make this type of study meaningful.

Headquarters is currently conducting an in-depth analysis of time and cost savings estimates for

implementing the municipal landfill, VOCs in soils, wood treaters and groundwater presumptive

remedies across the country. Candidate sites have been selected and a survey instrument has been

developed and distributed. Approximately 80% of the surveys have been completed and returned

to Headquarters. Analysis of the survey data will begin as soon as possible. 

Regarding municipal landfills presumptive remedies - The 18 month time period for RI/FS used by

the OIG as a basis of comparison is an Agency goal. A study of three landfills conducted by

Headquarters in 1996 used a national average of 51 months for the RI/FS. Current national data

indicate a national average of approximately 36 months. The current national average of

approximately 36 months would be a better basis for comparison of the time to complete a

presumptive remedy landfill RI/FS versus a conventional RI/FS. While we are striving for a goal,

a comparison of the processes as they actually occur in the field is more representative than

comparison to a goal. 

For the nine RI/FSs in the Region using the presumptive remedy at seven sites: 

* two are not yet complete so the time to complete is not known; and

* of the seven RI/FSs remaining, four took less than three years (approximately the national

average) and of these four, three took two years or less. This is good news. 

For the municipal landfill sites, the OIG selected five sites for review. None of these were RI/FSs

that took two years or less, although three were available and could have been included in the

review. BFI Landfill and the Saco Landfill took approximately two years from the date of the

AOC to the start of construction of the landfill cap. 

As the OIG report noted, each site has factors that may impede the streamlining of an RI/FS. 

These factors may include enforcement issues or resistance from the public to streamlining the

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35

site characterization for municipal landfills. These factors may be independent of the presumptive

remedy process or they may be a direct result of implementation of the process. 

 

Part III - Specific comments regarding factual accuracy

EPA Response:

Page 3 - The first line in the section entitled “Survey Phase” would be more accurate if it were

changed to read - We evaluated five reforms utilized by Region I that were announced on Feb. 1,

1995. 

Page 4 - In the first sentence of the first paragraph and again in the second sentence of the third

paragraph the word “judgmentally” is used when referring to site selection. The reader would be

better informed if the report included a listing of criteria or factors which influenced your opinion

and judgement. 

Page 8 - In the second and third lines of the second paragraph it would be more accurate if the

text were changed to read - specific national guidance. 

Page 8 - The OIG comments relative to updating remedies indicate that there is a lack of regional

consistency in how savings were calculated. Each remedy may vary slightly in the method used to

calculate savings due to differences in the nature of the site and remedy. However, each cost

saving calculation was consistent to the extent it included an estimate of construction costs 

(capital costs) saved and Operation and Maintenance (O&M) cost savings in accordance with

national guidance. Also, EPA national guidance indicates that the accuracy of remedial action

cost estimates in the FS are anticipated to be no better than +50/-30. 

Page 11 - The OIG report heading at the bottom left of the page would be more accurate if

changed to read - Community Involvement Reforms Can Delay Cleanup, But Can Reduce Costs, 

Increase Buy-In and Save Time of the Life of the Project. The text for this section would be

more accurate if the phrase in line two “increased time spent” were changed to acknowledge that

initial time spent in creating community buy-in could ultimately result in an overall time saving for

the cleanup project. 

Page 12 - The line after the indented quote - The report would better inform the reader if it

indicated who established the measures noted as items 1,2 & 3 and who did the measuring. In

particular, the source of measurement item 3 should be identified. 

Page 12 - The last sentence in the second full paragraph would be more accurate if changed to

read - If EPA adopts this remedy, the PRPs voluntarily agree to contribute another $3 million for

environmental projects selected by the community. 

Page 12 - The first sentence in the last paragraph would be more accurate if changed to read -

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36

Although negotiations with the community council took five years, existing conditions at the site

did not pose an unacceptable human health risk. 

 Page 12 - The last paragraph would be more accurate if an additional sentence were inserted after

“into the air”. The new sentence would read - And, the State of Vermont prohibits the use of

contaminated groundwater beneath the site for drinking water. 

Page 12 - The sense of the paragraph would be more accurate if the sentences beginning “ In

1993" and “Finally an October 1994" were deleted and a new final sentence inserted. The new

final sentence would read - The remedy proposed for the site will address the existing ecological

risk and potential human health risks. 

Page 13 - Text under the heading of “Reforms Did Not Speed Up Construction Completions”

would inform the reader better if it noted that measuring the cleanup time from the time of listing

includes for many, if not most, sites a significant amount of time prior to the announcement of 

Superfund reforms. Time lines noted in the text of “seven years and two months” and “nine years

and eleven months” don’t seem illustrative of the point of the audit when compared to the fact

that reforms were announced in 1993 (five years ago) or 1995 (three years ago). Evaluating

performance from the time of site listing has the effect of holding the program responsible for

achieving goals of reforms prior to the announcement of the reforms. 

Page 14 - “in the already” should be changed to read - already in the. 

Page 17 - Regarding the word “judgmentally”. Refer to our previous comments concerning use

of “judgmentally”.

Page 19 - Regarding benefits and the uncertainty of RI/FS time and money saved through use of

presumptive remedies - The report should acknowledge that at PRP lead sites only the PRP, not

EPA, could quantify the cost savings. 

Page 22 - First full paragraph - As noted previously (see comments above re: Page 8) the Region

consistently used capital costs and O&M costs in evaluating savings. The text should be revised to

note the response. 

Part IV - Comments on the request for a Plan for Taking Corrective Action

EPA response - We would like to discuss the appropriate follow-up at our September 23, 1998

meeting. As a result of that meeting we may want to revise our earlier comments on the

Executive Summary recommendations.

Headquarters provided the Region with comments on various topics in the OIG draft report. 

Those comments have been included as Attachment I. 

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37

If you have any questions contact George Mollineaux, Region I - Audit Coordinator

(617) 565 - 3329 or Dennis Huebner, Office of Site Remediation & Restoration, Associate

Director for Management (617) 918-1203.

Attachment 

7
38

[This page intentionally left blank]
Region 1's Superfund

Administrative Reforms

E1SFF7-01-0036-8100254

39

APPENDIX 2

HEADQUARTERS COMMENTS

Attachment I

9/15/98

COMMENTS ON DRAFT OIG AUDIT OF REGION 1's REFORMS

14. Page i - Results in Brief - the report states that Region 1 sites took 7 years 2 months to reach

construction completion prior to the reforms, and 9 years 11 months after the reforms.

Comment: The first round of reforms was announced in June 1993, so it is impossible for

sites begun after the reforms were initiated to average 10 years in duration. The report’s

analysis has apparently categorized sites according to completion dates rather than start

dates. This causes four significant problems. 

First, the lengthening of the time frames probably has more to do with program maturity than

anything else. The Superfund program was only twelve years old in June 1993, so the

average time to reach construction completion by 1993 would have to be significantly less

than twelve years. In 1998 the program was 17 years old, so the average age could be

longer. In addition, many of the worst sites, sites where work began during the first years of

the program, have been completed recently. These factors neither owe anything to, nor are

likely to be affected by, the administrative reforms. If any programmatic adjustment affected

these sites it is more likely to have been the Enforcement First initiative shifted the focus

away from Fund financed cleanup and onto efforts the get the PRPs to do the work. The

cleanup negotiations that were required as part of that initiative may explain the longer

durations noted by this report. Prior to the Enforcement First initiative, only 35% of

cleanups were conducted by PRPs. After the initiative took effect the PRP involvement

climbed to over 70%, with half of those were achieved only after the very involved process of

negotiating a Consent Decree.

Second, none of the reforms apply to the entire response pipeline, so it is doubtful that their

impact can be adequately evaluated by looking at the time it takes to go from NPL listing to

construction completion. Each of the reforms was designed to addresses a different aspect of

the process. As a result, their impact of any particular reform is going to be most visible

when you focus on that aspect. 

Third, the first round of reforms was announced in June 1993, the second in February 1995,

the third in October 1995. In each case, the reforms went into full effect in the ensuing fiscal

year (FY94, FY96 and FY96 respectively). Yet the report faults the reforms for not

accelerating the pace of cleanup at sites where work had been underway for an average of

almost 8 years prior to the reforms.

1
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40

Lastly, a difficulty that is not addressed in the report is how the analysis accounted for

meaningful differences among sites. For example:

1. what was the impact of activist citizen groups or law suits;

2. was there a higher level of political interest at some sites, such as where there was a

potential for lost jobs, that required more negotiation or a different remedy;

3. what is the effect of site size, remedy selection, and complexity on the length of time

to reach construction completion;

4. did the number of operable units affect the amount of time required; and

5. were any of the sites affected by a failed remedy?

It would be very difficult to draw meaningful comparisons about cost or duration without

taking these, and many other factors that are beyond EPA’s control, into account.

15. Page ii - Based on our review , we believe the goal to expedite the cleanup process has not

been achieved. The regions can provide. . . suggestions to further improve the goals of

providing a faster, fairer and more effective Superfund program.

Comment: Two issues. The first sentence addresses the net effect of the “faster” goal and

ignores the expected countervailing effects of the “fairer” and “more effective” goals. The

reforms have overlapped, so any analysis would have to address the net effect of all three

simultaneously, or focus on sites that employed reforms supporting only one. The second

sentence addresses all three reform areas, but seems to say that the region can suggest

improvements to the goals. Was the intent to say that the regions can suggest ways to

improve performance against the goals?

Expanding on what was said in Comment 1, it is simply too early to see the impact of the

reforms on construction completions. Most of the reforms address the early stages of the

response and enforcement effort. Any impact the speed of cleanup that would be visible

today would be seen in the time required for discreet segments of the process. The recent IG

review of the time required for RD/RA negotiations is an example of a well targeted analysis.

16. Page ii - enforcement reforms in particular required greater (more?) detailed information and

documentation, thus increasing the amount of time a site spent in the pipeline. Based on

experience, regional enforcement staff provided suggestions to prevent delays in

implementing enforcement reforms.

Comments: 

a. This conclusion does not appear to be supported by the analysis presented in the

report.

b. Replace “Based on experience, regional enforcement staff provided suggestions to

prevent delays in implementing enforcement reforms.” with “Based on their

experience, regional enforcement staff provided suggestions that could prevent the

enforcement reforms from slowing the pace of cleanup at individual sites.”

2
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41

c. An important point that is overlooked in the report is the effect of PRP lead responses

on the overall pace of cleanup (as opposed to the time required to complete an

individual site). If the Trustfund suddenly had to pay for the responses currently

performed by PRPs, one of two things would have to happen. Either the pace of

cleanup would fall by 2/3rds, or the Superfund budget would have to triple. For this

reason, reforms that cause small to moderate delays at some individual sites are a

good trade-off if they encourage PRPs to continue taking responsibility for cleanups.

4. Page iii - “...it is difficult to identify why the time savings were not realized...”

Comment: As noted above, the report focuses on the “faster” goal and finds that the goal was

not attained, but neglects the possibility that simultaneous efforts to meet the other goals

tended to extend the time required. In essence, the question should be whether or not the

trade-off is real. Stated another way, would use of the “fairer” and “more effective” reforms

have extended the time frames even further without the “faster” reforms?

5. Page iii - “...Regional recommendation which could help to expedite the Superfund

enforcement process.”

Comment: Please itemize these recommendations somewhere in the report.

6. Page 1 - Purpose

Comment: replace “...criticized as being too expensive and taking too long.” with

“...criticized as being unfair, too expensive and taking too long.”

7. Pg. 2, last paragraph in “Background” section -

Comment: replace “Region 1 outlined five Superfund initiatives on Feb. 21, 1995. The goals

of these initiatives were to promote faster cleanups and quicker, fairer settlements.” with

“Region 1 decided to use five of the Superfund initiatives on Feb. 21, 1995. The goals of

these initiatives were to promote faster cleanups and quicker, fairer settlements.”

8. Page 3 - On the list of reforms

Comment: replace “Small Parties” with “Expedited De Minimis Settlements”

Comment: Where iss “Alternatives to Superfund Listing” addressed in the analysis

9. Page 3 - Interviewed Regional Project Mangers

Comment: should this be Remedial Project Mangers?

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42

10. Page 4 - “Finally, we judgmentally reviewed five Superfund sites which used round one

reforms...”

Comment: The word judgmentally is used several times throughout the report. What does it

mean?

11. Page 4 - “To determine if region 1 had been consistently implementing reforms where

appropriate, we judgmentally selected five sites in which we had no indication of reforms

being used, and four municipal landfills.”

Comments:

a. Again, what does judgmentally mean as used here

b. Is this the same group of five sites listed in the previous section. If not please provide

a list. If it is, please explain how they could “use round one reforms” in the first

instance and have “no indication of reforms” in the second.

c. Please mention briefly that the assessment consisted of interviews to see what

rationale the RPMs offered for not using the reforms. 

12. Page 4 - “To determine if presumptive remedies expedited the cleanup process, we analyzed

and reviewed ROD information, and fact sheets form the EPA Superfund Records Center,

and CERCLIS data pertaining to the site. We interviewed RPMs to determine why the RI/FS

took longer than 18 months”

Comments:

a. What sites were evaluated? Was this the same 5 sites as above, or was it all sites at

which the presumptive remedies reform was applied?

a. What reasons were offered and is the additional time reasonable in light of the reason

given?

b. How many RI/FSs were in the sample, and how many of them were initiated after the

reform? Was the evaluation of the reform limited to those RI/FSs that were started

after the reform?

13. Page 4 - “To determine how enforcement reforms impacted the time a site spends in the

Superfund process, we interviewed Regional as well as Headquarters staff and reviewed the

OIG Headquarters Audit Division (HAD) memorandum on the Remedial Design/Remedial

Action (RD/RA) (Report No. 8400015).”

Comment: It appears that this portion of the analysis was principally a gathering of staff

impressions and did not look at data for specific sites. Is that correct?

14. Page 5 - “Finally, we compared the three rounds of reforms to CERCLA to determine if the

reforms significantly deviated from current law. From this review, we determined that 13 of

49 reforms closely mirrored the language of the existing law. Further, we reviewed and

compared the definition and goal of the reforms to the applicable sections of CERCLA.”

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43

Comments:

a. Does this imply that the other 36 reforms that do not “closely mirror” the existing

law?

b. Please state the purpose of comparing any of the reforms to the existing law.

c. EPA crafted all of the reforms within its interpretation of the applicable laws, that is

why they are called Administrative Reforms. EPA is not allowed to operate outside

of its enabling legislation.

15. Page 7 - “However, while reforms may have improved equity or Agency processes, reforms

did not appear to expedite the Superfund process in general. In fact some reforms added

time to the process.”

Comment: Please replace with “However, while reforms may have improved equity or

Agency processes, increased fairness, and saved costs, reforms did not appear to expedite

the Superfund process in general. In fact some reforms added time to the process.”

16. Page 7 - Updated Remedy - “...the goal of this initiative was to encourage Regions to

systematically identify and revisit remedy decisions at sites where significant new scientific

information would achieve the current level of environmental protection...”

Comment: replace with “...the goal of this initiative was to encourage Regions to

systematically identify and revisit remedy decisions at sites where significant new scientific

information suggested new technologies or techniques that would achieve the same level

of environmental protection...”

17. Page 8 - De Minimis Enforcement

Comments

a. In the first sentence, replace “de minimis” with “expedited de minimis settlements”

b. In the second sentence, replace “Director of the Policy and Program Evaluation

Division, Office of Site Remediation (OSRE)” with “Headquarters”

c. In the second paragraph replace “immaterial” with “minimal”

d. In the third paragraph, replace “The Director of the Policy and Program Evaluation

Division, OSRE, OECA” with “Headquarters”

e. In the fifth paragraph, replace “larger PRP groups” with “PRPs with a larger

involvement at the site”

f. In the fifth paragraph, replace “the price to settle” with “the price of de minimis

settlement”

g. In the sixth paragraph, replace “a small number of PRP are involved” with “the PRPs

are cooperative, or there are not too many involved”

h. In the sixth paragraph, please clarify what is meant by “deadlines required by law are

impossible to meet...” There are no deadlines for de minimis. If the reference is to

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44

the RD/RA 120 day negotiation deadline in the statue, this discussion should be

moved to the “RD/RA Neg.” section on pg. 11.

18. Pg. 10 - Regarding the discussion on allocations

Comment: The discussion of allocations is somewhat misleading. First, because it is located

in the de minimis section, it creates the impression that allocations are limited to de minimis

situations, which is untrue. Second, the presentation also creates the impression that

allocations are stalling many projects and that Superfund has overlooked problems related to

them. The report needs to balance the presentation by noting that:

a. There are only 9 allocation pilots nationwide, and only one of these pilots is in Region

1 (Old Southington Landfill, CT). 

b. Allocation Pilots were designed as a test of specific proposed statutory language (in

the Superfund Reauthorization Act) to see how well it could, or could not, be

implemented. Superfund has already discussed the shortcomings of the SRA

allocation process in several Reforms End of Year Reports.

c. Superfund is not endorsing the SRA allocation pilot process for all sites.

19. Pg. 10 - “...some other suggestions offered by the Regional enforcement staff to

Headquarters included: 1) making orphan share available to cash out situations and

owners/operators, at least in some situations...”

Comments: This suggestion would require careful evaluation.

a. Regarding cash out parties - the principal goal of this reform was to increase the

fairness to the parties performing the cleanups. See the preceding discussion

regarding the effects of losing PRP response actions. Cash out parties do not perform

cleanups and are actually charged a premium. The premium compensates for the fact

that cash out parties settle early and the final cost of the cleanup could be

considerably higher than the estimates used to calculate their liability . De Minimis

parties are already benefitting from the orphan share reform. The question is whether

including the other cashout would have a negative effect on the fairness as perceived

by the settling PRPs.

b. Regarding owner/operators - the SRA and other draft bills on the Hill all stated that

owner/operators should not benefit from orphan share for various reasons (past

owner/operators profited from what occurred at the site current owner/operators get

benefits after site is cleaned up; future owner/operators should be aware of what they

are getting into and not turn a blind eye, generators/transporters did not have control

of waste after it got to the owner/operator site...etc.). Implementing this suggestion

would conflict with the direction we have received from Congress on this issue. 

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45

20. Page 11 - RD/RA Negotiations

Comment: This segment discusses a previous OIG report, and notes that RD/RA negotiations

took longer in the period after the reforms were implemented without actually stating how

much longer the negotiations took or the conclusions of the cited report.

21. Page 11 - Community Involvement -

Comments: 

a. First paragraph - Replace “The Agency believed early community involvement

increased equity of the Superfund program as it related to the people immediately

impacted by the site. In this way, revisions and amendments to the ROD would not

be needed.” with “The Agency believed early community involvement increased the

equity of the Superfund program as it related to the people immediately impacted by

the site, and the additional early involvement of the community would reduce

the number of ROD revisions and amendments needed.”

b. Fourth paragraph - Replace “Although additional time was needed at two Regional

sites, benefits of reduced costs and community buy in were derived.” with “At two

Regional sites, some additional time was needed, but overall costs were reduced and

the community seemed to be more satisfied that their interests were being protected.” 

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46

c. Fourth paragraph - replace “At the Pine Street Barge Canal site, Region 1 presented a

plan in1992 calling for a $50 million remedy at the site. Since the plan met strong

opposition...” with “In 1992, Region 1 presented a plan calling for a $50 million

remedy at the Pine Street Barge Canal site. When the plan met strong opposition...”

d. Fifth paragraph - replace “Although negotiations with the community council took

five years, there did not appear to be any human health risk during that time.” with

“Although negotiations with the community council took five years, there did not

appear to be an increased human health risk during that time.”

22. Page 13 - Reforms Did Not Speed Up Construction Completions

Comments:

a. As noted earlier, not all of the reforms were intended to speed up the process. The

title of this section should be revised to avoid creating the impression that hastening

the construction process was the sole objective of the reforms.

b. First paragraph - replace “While use of Superfund reforms improved program equity

and effectiveness, use did not expedite the time a site progressed from listing on the

NPL to construction completion.” with “The Superfund reforms improved program

equity and effectiveness. It is unclear whether the reforms have reduced the time

required for a site to progress from NPL listing to construction completion.”

c. First paragraph - what group of 26 sites dose this refer to? What was the basis for

their selection?

d. First paragraph - as noted earlier, the analysis in the paragraph is badly flawed. It

attempts to gauge the reforms by the amount of time it took a group of sites that

entered the pipeline 6-8 years before the reforms to reach construction completion. A

meaningful analysis of the reforms must look at those pipeline stages that were the

target of a reform AND were begun after the reform took effect. See note 22.

e. First paragraph - the previous note not withstanding, most readers would get more

out of this discussion if it simply stated the average time required for sites in each of

the two groups.

f. First paragraph - as noted earlier, to be meaningful this analysis must make an effort

to recognize the myriad external factors (i.e., not under EPA’s control) that can affect

the duration of the response

g. Table - a footnote in the table indicates that there was only one FY 1998 construction

completion at the end of the field work for the report. FY 1998 is now complete, so

it would be reasonable to update this simple piece of data.

h. Second paragraph - replace “There were seven construction completions in federal

fiscal year 1997, an increase from the previous three years when only two sites per

Federal fiscal year were completed.” with “There were seven construction

completions in FY 1997, compared to two construction completions in each of the

the three previous years.”

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47

i. Page 14 - end of the paragraph completing the prior discussion - This segment

acknowledges that the reforms had little if anything to do with the time required to

achieve the FY 1998 construction completions, and that those sites had been in the

pipeline for an extended time prior to the reforms. This being the case, why is there

an entire chapter devoted to the fact that the reforms have not had an impact on the

time required to clean-up a site?

j. Conclusion - replace the entire conclusion with the following - “The Region actively

implemented the reforms it chose to use. These reforms saved money and improved

the equity of the Superfund process. However, as of the date of this audit, we were

unable to determine whether or not the reforms had had an effect on the time required

for cleanup. Although there were significantly more construction completions in FY

1997 and FY 1998 than in previous years, the response efforts at these sites were

already in advanced stages when the reforms went into effect. As a result, it is

unlikely that the reforms could have had a significant impact on the time required t

complete these sites. Nonetheless, it does appear that enforcement reforms have the

potential to delay the cleanup process, and Superfund should monitor this issue to

ensure that they are satisfied with the trade-off.”

k. Conclusion - the comment about regional suggestions is omitted from the suggested

conclusion, above, because they have been addressed previously.

l. Recommendations - replace “We recommend that you instruct your enforcement staff

work with Headquarters staff to determine the feasibility of implementing Regional

suggestions which could help to expedite the Superfund enforcement process.” with 

“We recommend that you instruct the regional enforcement staff to work with

Headquarters to identify alternatives that would support the enforcement goals,

increasing fairness and maintaining a high level of PRP lead response work, while at

the same time minimizing the possibility that the pace of individual cleanups might be

slowed. We recognize, however, that most of the cleanup work is being performed

by PRPs, and that maintaining a high level of PRP involvement is critically

important.”

23. Page 17 - RI/FS Took Longer than Agency Goal

Comments:

a. Retitle the section “RI/FS Completion is Quicker than before, but not as quick as had

been hoped.”

b. As suggested above with respect to construction completions, it would be more

useful to simply state the average time required to complete the RI/FSs. From the

data it appears that the durations have gotten shorter, but not as short as hoped..

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48

24. Page 17 - Municipal Landfill RI/FS Not Expedited

Comments: 

a. Second paragraph - again, what does judgmentally mean?

b. Second and Third paragraphs - it would be more meaningful to most readers if you

state the average RI/FS duration for the group, and how it compares to the durations

of similar sites at which the presumptive remedies were not used.

25. Page 19 - Benefits from Use of Presumptive Remedies

Comment: Although we agree with the concept, given the degree of uniqueness of sites and

remedies, it seems unlikely that there is a cost effective way to estimate the cost and time

savings from using presumptive remedies. The simplest method would be to perform the

RI/FS twice (with and without the presumptive remedy) and compare the costs and time

required. But that would defeat the purpose. Another alternative is to use raw averages

from groups of sites, but that ignores the impact of external factors which frequently drive

both costs and time (see the partial list offered at the end of comment 1).

26. Page. 21 - Measuring Reforms - second paragraph - “The Regional staff also believed that

since two years had passed, it was an excellent time for Headquarters to reassess the value of

the reforms and determine if the reforms were going in the right direction.” 

Comment: In a November, 1997, memo entitled “FY98 Reforms Strategy” we did revisit the

reforms and highlighted how they could be measured. We also prepare and annual public

report showing the benefits/measures of 45 round 2 and 3 reforms. It is possible that the

Regional staff interviewed are not aware of these assessments.

27. Page 22 - Reforms Were Interpretations of Existing Law - 

Comments: As noted previously, this comment seems to imply that 36 of the 49 reforms have

no basis in law. If that is the intent of the report it should be stated explicitly and supported

with facts and interpretations that can be reviewed. The simple fact is that EPA believes that

all of the reforms have a basis in law, which is why they are called “Administrative Reforms.” 

EPA does not have the authority to operate outside of its enabling legislation.

10
Region 1's Superfund

Administrative Reforms

E1SFF7-01-0036-8100254

49

APPENDIX 3

DISTRIBUTION

Headquarters

Office of Inspector General - Headquarters (2421)

Agency Audit Follow-up Coordinator (3304)

Agency Audit Follow-up Official (3101)

Assistant Administrator for Solid Waste and Emergency Response (5101)

Director, Office of Emergency and Remedial Response (5201G)

Assistant Administrator for Enforcement and Compliance Assurance (2201A)

Director, Policy and Program Evaluation Division, Office of Enforcement and Compliance

 Assurance, Office of Site Remediation Enforcement (2273A)

Associate Administrator for Congressional & Legislative Affairs (1301)

Associate Administrator for Communications, Education & Public Affairs (1701)

EPA Library (3403)

Region 1

Regional Administrator

Office of Environmental Stewardship

Office of Site Remediation & Restoration

Audit Coordinator

Other

Office of Inspector General - Divisional Audit Offices