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AIR COMMAND AND STAFF COLLEGE

AIR UNIVERSITY

Proposed Core Competencie

for Acquisition

ROBERT S. GREEN

Major, USAF

Air Command and Staff College

Wright Flyer Paper No. 2

MAXWELL AIR FORCE BASE, ALABAMA

February 1998
Disclaimer

Opinions, conclusions, and recommendations expressed or implied within are sole

of the author and do not necessarily represent the views of Air University, the Unite

Air Force, the Department of Defense, or any other US government agency. Cle

public release: distribution unlimited.

ii
Foreword

It is my great pleasure to introduce readers to the W

Flyer Papers series. In this series, Air Command and Staf

lege recognizes and publishes the “best of the best” stu

research projects from the prior academic year. The ACS

search program encourages our students to move beyon

school’s core curriculum in their own professional develop

and in “advancing air and space power.” The series title re

our desire to perpetuate the pioneering spirit embodied in 

lier generations of airmen. Projects selected for public

combine solid research, innovative thought, and lucid pres

tion in exploring war at the operational level. With this 

perspective, the Wright Flyer Papers engage an eclectic ran

doctrinal, technological, organizational, and operational 

tions. Some of these studies provide new solutions to fam

problems. Others encourage us to leave the familiar behi

pursuing new possibilities. By making these research st

available in the Wright Flyer Papers, ACSC hopes to enco

critical examination of the findings and to stimulate fu

research in these areas.

Jerry M. Drennan, Brig Gen, 

Commandant

iii

Preface

Organizational change strategies for acquisition are ess

due to the enormity of change required of the acquisition 

munity. The Congress and the DOD have made many pre

attempts at acquisition reform, but most have had little e

To make sure our current reform efforts make positive, la

changes, we must transform the acquisition culture. To 

little attention has been paid to cultural change aspect

that end, this paper offers some ideas for organizations u

going change for acquisition reform.

I would like to thank the following people for their he

this project. First I want to express my gratitude to Lt Col 

White and Maj Heidi Beason from the Human Systems pro

office, Brooks Air Force Base, Texas. They served as test 

jects for my interview guide development, and their comm

were essential in its refinement. Also, I want to thank Mr. 

Little, Mr. Oscar Soler, and the entire JDAM program offi

taking the time to talk with me. Their information was 

given and very helpful in completing this paper. Any erro

interpreting their information are mine.

v

Abstract

The post-cold-war environment and its reduced budgets 

forced the military to implement acquisition reform. Whi

Department of Defense (DOD) has achieved some succes

pace of reform is still relatively slow and some concern 

about the reform’s breadth and depth. This paper proposes 

competencies for acquisition organizations undergoing cha

These core competencies are derived from a comparis

theory with actual practice. A discussion of possible ch

strategies shows various methods to achieve Kurt Le

framework of organizational change: unfreezing the sy

movement towards a new orientation, and refreezing ne

haviors and attitudes. These strategies are compared wit

case study of successful acquisition reform implemented i

Joint Direct Attack Munitions (JDAM) program office.

Results show a selective and tailored use of the ch

strategies presented. The JDAM program office placed pa

lar emphasis on creating a sense of urgency, communicat

vision, altering key management processes, and attempt

overcome defensive reasoning. This method of employmen

gests strict adherence to a particular step-by-step set of s

gies that may not work for other organizations. Howeve

results also suggest that there are overarching core comp

cies for successful organizational change: creating urg

communicating a vision, setting and meeting high stand

rewarding teamwork, and encouraging constant innovation

vii
Proposed Core Competencies

for Acquisition

The continuous improvement of the acquisition process that has been

occurring with the DOD on an ongoing basis is no longer sufficient

We must now totally re-engineer the system.

— Colleen Preston 

Deputy Undersecretary of 

Defense for Acquisition Reform

Post-cold-war national security requirements, downs

and budget reductions have drastically altered the acqui

environment. To adjust to this new situation, the Depart

of Defense (DOD) began making major changes to the ac

tion process in 1994. There have been many successes, bu

pace of reform is still relatively slow and some concern 

about the reform’s breadth and depth. To that end, th

search presented here proposes core competencies for orga

tions trying to implement positive and sustained acqui

reform.

Since some groundwork is necessary for a full understa

of this proposal, we will first present a brief synopsis of ac

tion reform. We will then review some prominent change s

gies. These strategies serve as the theory behind organiza

change. This theory will then be compared to actual acqui

reform implementation in the Joint Direct Attack Mu

(JDAM) program office. Based on this comparison, a set o

competencies for organizations undergoing drastic chang

be proposed. Finally, areas requiring further research w

addressed.

Background

Our success in the Gulf War combine with post-col

realities to leave the military in a somewhat dichotomous 

ation. The DOD remains committed to a lean, high-techn

force but faces continued budget pressure. In fiscal yea

1997, defense spending will be 40 percent lower than 

1985.1

 Moreover, the procurement budget will be 60 pe

lower than in FY 1985.2

1
Obtaining high-technology equipment with such low bu

poses difficulties for the acquisition system. High-techn

equipment is expensive, and the acquisition system incur

to-40 percent overhead costs. (Compare this with 10 perc

private industry.)3

 The system also has long acquisition 

times, typically taking eight-to-ten years to field a system 

private industry takes only three-to-four years. 4

 And the 

lems are exacerbated by an inability to obtain certain sta

the-art technology because many companies, due to com

government rules and oversight procedures, will not do 

ness with the DOD.5

A myriad of other problems exist, but the bottom lin

stated by Secretary of Defense William Perry, is this: “In to

environment the current process will not always be able to 

the Department’s need. DOD will not be able to carry ou

blueprint without dramatic changes in its acquisition 

cesses.”6

 Because the acquisition system is not functi

properly, the DOD has initiated acquisition reform.

The DOD intends to reengineer the acquisition syste

meet the challenges the system faces now and will face i

future. To begin the process, DOD has created an overall s

ture for reform. (See appendix A.)

Basic DOD acquisition reform principles cover what w

and how we buy it. New practices emphasize the use of 

mercial practices,7

 commercial specifications,8 and comm

products.9

 New regulations also call for streamlining the a

sition process largely through government and industry 

work, simplified oversight, and process control. 10 The u

integrated product teams should foster teamwork among 

sonnel from different functional areas.11 Furthermore, the 

envisions a combination of regulation reduction and emp

ment that will greatly assist the streamlining effort. 12

Implications of Acquisition Reform

These reform principles have a large impact on the ac

tion community. Table 1 summarizes some key trends 

cussed above and in appendix A.

Further complicating matters, the above changes are t

place in an environment of reduced funding and down

(personnel cuts and base closures). In addition, the acqui
community carries the baggage of troubled programs 

hammers and the C-17, for example).

All of this means big changes. As table 1 indicates, the a

sition culture must do some things that are foreign to it

ture. The culture must build trust within and outside the 

ernment, become more efficient by working smarter, re

some control by pushing work to the contractor, be more 

and be more responsive to a rapidly changing environment

Status of Acquisition Reform

With such a large transformation at hand, what are th

sults thus far? As with many such endeavors, there is no 

cut answer to this question.

The Air Force does have some positive statistics, how

Within Air Force Materiel Command (the Air Force’s acqui

arm), request for proposal (RFP) page counts have dropp

70 percent and contract data equipment lists are 77 pe

smaller.13 Also, the Air Force has canceled 68 percent 

acquisition policies with a corresponding 63 percent dr

acquisition policy page count. Under reform, the C-17 pro

appears to have overcome its troubled past—estimates no

clude a cost avoidance of $17 billion and a faster aircraft 

ery schedule.14

Yet, some concern exists as to the breadth, depth, and 

of change. Also, there is a general consensus that there 

long way to go. Dr. Paul G. Kaminski, undersecretary of de

(acquisition and technology), commented that “There is com

ment at the top, and the bottom has embraced the nee

reform—but the middle is not yet convinced.” 15 Recognizin

Table 1

Acquisition Reform Changes

Old Process and Practices New Process and Practices

Functional, Stovepipe Integrated Product Teams

Us (Government) versus Them (Industry) Teamwork, More Reliance on Contractor

Military Specifications and Practices Commercial Specifications and Practices

Long Cycle Times Short Cycle Times

Detailed Regulation & Micromanagement Empowerment
need to increase the pace of reform, he designated 31 May 

as a stand-down day for the entire acquisition work forc

unprecedented step. “That day will be dedicated to incre

our awareness of the acquisition reform initiatives and 

ning to accelerate their implementation.”16

Industry leaders have also spoken out in favor of acceler

the reform. During an American Institute for Aeronautic

Astronautics (AIAA)-sponsored chief executive officer 

panel on acquisition reform, CEOs indicated the reform m

ment still needed work. The CEOs said they observed 

improvement in the government oversight process, but th

change was “evolutionary rather than revolutionary.” 17 

also do not see any change in the effort to build trust bet

government and industry, and they thought there was st

much paperwork in the RFP process. 18 Dr. J. R. Sculley, f

assistant secretary of the Army for research, development

acquisition, and current CEO of Allied Research Corpor

best captures the industry mood with this comment: “Ac

tion reform has been the subject of discussion for too long

we need action. But effective and efficient acquisition will 

pen only when there is greater personal responsibility o

part of all involved. That would be the most important con

tion to reform. . . . Perhaps that’s why many reformers 

need for cultural change in defense.” 19

Organizational Change Strategies

Most managers manage for yesterday’s conditions because yester 

day is where they got their experiences and had their successes.

— Theodore Le

Organizational change strategies offer a means to he

ganizations prepare for the future, so that leaders do no

into the trap mentioned by Professor Leavitt. Change in 

context means altering the organization’s basic assump

These are the beliefs, thoughts, and feelings that the orga

tion has taken for granted; they occur at the uncons

level.20 These assumptions form the basic building bloc

culture. It is the ultimate aim of most change strategi

affect basic assumptions for meaningful, long-lasting chan
To facilitate discussion, we will use the framework laid o

Kurt Lewin: unfreezing the system, movement towards a 

orientation, and refreezing new behaviors and attitudes. 21 

types of change strategies exist, each with its own unique 

acteristics. However, in a general sense, most of them fal

Lewin’s pattern. Their differences occur mainly withi

methods various strategists employ at each of Lewin’s s

Common change methods that stand out in each stage w

examined. Where applicable, key differences will also b

cussed. The strategies presented here take the perspect

the leader; what can the leader do to facilitate organiza

change?

Unfreezing

The first step in the change process is unfreezing. It inv

the creation of disequilibrium in the system. 22 Essentially

one trying to change an organization must do somethi

overcome the organization’s tendency to maintain the s

quo. The key elements in this stage include crisis/urg

vision, and overcoming initial resistance.

Crisis/Urgency

Many experts say an organization must first recognize t

has a significant problem.23 The process usually starts wit

senior leadership. But to unfreeze the system, everyone 

to feel a sense of urgency. Initiating change is easier if 

type of emergency (either internal or external to the orga

tion) exists.24 If change is important but a crisis does not 

the leader may want to consider establishing one to push 

the change process.25 The important concept is to make 

the entire organization has a sense of urgency.

Vision

Research shows that establishing a vision is critical in r

ing the crisis.26 An appropriate vision describes the futur

why people should try to create that future. In additi

establishes direction for change and provides motivation. 

tablishing a vision provides another benefit—psychol

safety.28 A solid vision mitigates the threat people often 
when undergoing change. The vision shows a path by w

workers can restore their sense of equilibrium. The vis

also the link to the next step—overcoming initial resistanc

Overcoming Initial Resistance

Since the organization and its people will tend to 

change, the leader must link the crisis or urgency to goal

ideals that are important to the workers. Group members 

develop some sense of ownership of the problem and of p

tial solutions.29 Leaders facilitate this ownership pr

through communicating the vision and mobilizing the wo

commitment.

Communicating Vision. Leaders must consistently and 

tinually communicate the organization’s vision.30 They s

use many types of forums, and they should ensure tha

message does not take on new meaning as it moves throug

organization. John P. Kotter points out that the leader 

communicate the vision well.31 Some tips to follow include 

ing the vision simple, using examples and metaphors, an

peating key ideas. Perhaps most important, the leader s

explain any inconsistencies between the vision and orga

tional policies.32 Mixed signals confuse employees and sen

message that management has no real commitment to ch

However, some inconsistencies may exist for good reason

laws or resource limitations. If so, senior leadership mu

plain why the inconsistencies exist.

Mobilizing Commitment. To overcome initial resistanc

leader must get workers to begin to take some responsibili

the organization’s direction. Communicating the vision is 

step, but there are also other ways to mobilize commit

First, the leader should manage the transformation perso

not delegate it to lower-level managers. 33 This personal co

ment will show the importance of the transition. In add

however, the leader needs to establish a dedicated group w

the organization to provide the energy necessary fo

change.34 Members of this group must hold positions of p

have expertise, and hold credibility throughout the orga

tion.35 In the process of managing the transition, the leade

needs to align power and resources in a manner cons

with the change.36 Finally, making other adjustments, su
changing work team composition and altering relevant ma

ment processes, should be considered.37

Movement

Movement involves taking the organization from its pr

level to the new, desired level. 38 Edgar H. Schein spea

redefining the organization’s core concepts and basic ass

tions in the movement stage.39 Human resource methods

cation, scope of change, empowerment, and defensive reas

are critical elements of the movement process. There is 

amount of agreement on the use of various human res

methods and education. On the other hand, change strat

offer some unique perspectives on empowerment, sco

change, and defensive reasoning. Strategists differ, howev

whether to focus first on attitude change or behavior chan

Human Resource Methods

Many strategies recommend using the promotion system

selection process, the reward system, and the appraisal sy

to instill change.40 The basic idea is to promote and re

things that produce the necessary change. Promotion

wards, and appraisals are powerful mechanisms. They can 

the leader to put the right people in the right positions, 

the right thing. A leader should use human resource me

throughout the organization. In particular, Noel M. Tichy p

out, the appraisal system is key for middle management. 41

Education

As part of the change process, workers may need to de

new skills, new methods, new concepts, and new though

cesses. It is not reasonable to expect people to change if 

are not provided the necessary tools. Education and tra

can be critical tools in the change process. 42 However

should not expect 20 years of habits to change with a fiv

training class.43 Follow-up training and assistance are n

sary. Kotter feels that attitude training, in addition to ski

cognitive training, is important.44 Such training can help p

improve their support for change.
Scope of Change

In attempting to change an organization, one migh

whether to try massive change across-the-board, or to gen

change little by little. There is certainly a continuum be

these two endpoints. However, Kotter asserts that short

wins are critical to success.45 They provide reinforceme

change concepts.46 Additionally, they help sustain and 

support.47 Chris Argyris also advocates starting out on s

but important, problems.48 Starting out too large can drow

change process. Initiatives will lose steam, and the mainta

of the status quo will have a chance to regroup. One s

observe a cautionary note here, however. The leader s

identify targets and use short-term wins to shape the env

ment for the long-term goals.49

Empowerment

Some of the more recent change strategies advocate em

erment.50 In this context, empowerment means removing o

cles, aligning systems with the organization’s vision, enco

ing risk taking, and giving people the responsibility 

authority to take action on their ideas. 51 One would not 

matically think empowerment an absolute necessity i

change process. Its use would probably depend on the 

assumptions of the organization and the desired cultura

state.

Kotter and Leon W. Hall contend that major changes wi

happen without the help of many people. According to K

the best way to obtain this help is to empower the workers

leader empowers by removing structural barriers, prov

training, and ensuring that workers have the right inform

The leader should also confront supervisors who und

change.52 These actions will create an environment in whic

ployees committed to the new vision can help make it happe 

Defensive Reasoning

One can use all of the above elements and still hav

problem of defensive reasoning. Argyris contends that 

problem must be solved for successful change. He define

fensive reasoning as the “thoughts and actions used to p

individuals’, groups’, and organizations’ usual ways of d
with reality."53 Argyris characterizes it as soft data—priva

ferences that are not publicly testable. 54 He further state

defensive reasoning is ingrained in our thought processes

makes it very difficult to overcome because when one 

confronts another party’s defensive reasoning, both parties 

to engage in bypass routines.55 On the other hand, more s

approaches to dealing with defensive reasoning could f

address the problem or be perceived as being manipulative

To overcome defensive reasoning, Argyris advocates th

of productive reasoning. He characterizes productive reas

as the use of hard data, explicit premises and inferences

publicly testable conclusions.56 In short, one displays pr

tive reasoning by sticking to the facts, allowing the inqu

their assumptions and beliefs, and holding out their co

sions for everyone to check.

Behavior versus Attitude

Most change strategists agree on ultimately altering the 

attitudes and assumptions of culture; however, some disa

ment exists on whether energy should be focused on devel

new attitudes or on developing new behaviors durin

change journey. For purposes of discussion, behavior is de

as an individual’s conscious thoughts and outward ac

Attitudes, on the other hand, reflect things we take for gr

or are only dimly aware of. In other words, attitudes res

the basic assumption level.

Should the organization leader attempt to change atti

or behaviors? Schein argues that changing behavior is n

sary but not sufficient.57 He contends that “some cogniti

definition of some of the core concepts in the assumption 

needs to take place.58 By prescribing attitude training, K

recognizes the importance of addressing attitude changes

does one achieve attitude change? It is achieved prim

through the methods already discussed. The key point is

should not focus solely on behavior, forgetting that the b

line is to alter attitudes.

Having said this, however, we must point out that 

strategies emphasize behavioral change. Michael Ward sa

forts to change attitude first (before behavior is changed

fail.59 He believes that behavior comes first for two rea

people will find it less threatening and, when results are l
to new behavior, new attitudes will follow. 60 Thus, the 

behavior and its associated results are locked in. 61

Refreezing

The final step in the change process is refreezing, w

institutionalizes the change. The goal is to ground new beh

and assumptions in the organization’s culture. In orde

such transformation to settle in, people must see the lin

tween new behaviors and the organization’s success. C

elements of this stage include grafting the new culture t

old, maintaining the new culture, and evaluating progre

wards the desired state. Elements of the previous stage 

tinue to apply.

Grafting

One common theme among experts is that of linking th

culture to the new—grafting. Some of the desired change

probably not be compatible with the old culture, but not e

thing in the old culture will be obsolete. 62 Therefore, the 

should “graft the new practices onto the old roots while k

off the inconsistent pieces.”63

The leader can carry out grafting through several techni

one of which is to publicly mourn the old culture. This w

the workers know that the old way of doing business s

them well, but it is now time to put it to rest. 64 A leader s

also publicly celebrate new models and behaviors that su

the vision.65 Workers will receive confirmation of their e

and see how improved performance is due to new prac

Finally, the leader should use the job selection process. H

and promoting people that fit the new mold will solidify ch

Of course, the other side of this coin is deselecting p

through early retirements and firing.66 Schein also men

promoting subcultures within the organization that are in 

with the desired change.67 Here, promote means elevating 

status by giving them special tasks to accomplish.

Maintenance and Evaluation

To ensure that desired change takes root with desire

sults, the leader must evaluate its progress. And since m
nance is particularly important, the leader must contin

reinforce the new culture.

In addition to normal maintenance and evaluation prac

management should pay special attention to information 

nologies and informal organization networks. New inform

technologies can provide tremendous assistance in contr

the change process. The operative word here is control. 

says developing a good management control system (ver

management information system) will help the leader 

things on track.68 Gathering information from the organiza

informal networks will also help leadership to evaluat

process.69 A leader can often use these networks to send 

receive information faster than in the normal system. Als

leader can selectively promote these networks to help wit

grafting of the new culture.

Maintaining Previous Elements and Methods

In the refreezing stage, the leader should also contin

use the methods discussed in stage two: human resou

education, empowerment, and defensive reasoning. If cha

introduced incrementally, the scope should cover the 

organization by the end of stage three. A good evaluation 

tem will help guide the leader in determining how to con

employing the above methods. As a final point, Hall also 

tions that the vision needs periodic reassessment. 70 Ther

leadership should step back and see if the vision needs r

ment. Feedback from previous evaluations will be helpful.

JDAM Case Study

I ask you to join me in that quest to break down the costly barriers in

our system and create a new acquisition system to provide the fines

equipment for our forces at a cost the nation can afford.

— William Perr

The JDAM system program office (SPO) embraced acqui

reform, breaking down some of the barriers Secretary 

mentions. Consequently, the change strategies pursue

JDAM served as a practical comparison to the theory pres

previously. To develop maximum benefit from this compa

a basic methodology of in-depth interviewing was used
specific results of these interviews form the basis for the 

study discussion presented later.

Methodology

Time limitations forced the selection of a single case s

JDAM was selected because of its success in impleme

acquisition reform. JDAM, one of four Air Force pilot prog

participating in a congressionally mandated acquisition r

test program, was awarded the Air Force Acquisition Ligh

Bolt Award in December 1995.

Background

The JDAM program office was formed in 1994. It dev

affordable and accurate adverse weather guidance ki

1,000- and 2,000-pound bombs carried on a variety of Air 

and Navy aircraft.71

Acquisition Reform Results. JDAM’s results with ac

tion reform thus far have been outstanding. Use of m

specifications was reduced from 87 to none, product dev

ment time was cut from 64 months to 48 months, and J

achieved a total program savings of $2.9 billion. 72

Unique Organization Characteristics. Two things mak

JDAM SPO different from other SPOs. First, as a pilot pro

it had no opportunity to obtain relief from acquisition rule

regulations. JDAM did submit some requests for statutor

regulatory relief, but received nothing to give them any di

advantage over other Air Force SPOs. 73 The second u

characteristic is that the program holds interest at the s

level within DOD. Being part of the pilot program offered v

ity at the highest Air Force and DOD acquisition levels. 

mally, only the largest SPOs have this kind of visibility. Fi

JDAM is relatively small, consisting of 56 people. The Air 

has other small SPOs, but JDAM doesn’t compare with 

program offices whose personnel number from the low to 

dle hundreds.

Data Gathering Method

Since little information was available on how acquisitio

form was implemented in JDAM, interviews with SPO mem
were conducted using purposive, stratified samples. C

people played key roles in the change process, necessi

interviews of them. But their impact varied according to 

agement level, hence the requirement to stratify the sa

The purpose of the interviews was to find out, from a leade

perspective, what the SPO did to change itself. This m

talking with key leaders in the organization. However, i

also important not to underrepresent any level in the orga

tion since each level might have different perspectives o

changes taking place. Therefore, the sample was stratifi

ensure inclusion of selected groups: (1) senior leaders (pro

and deputy program directors), (2) integrated product 

(IPT) leaders, (3) group leaders, and (4) line workers. See a

dix B for the JDAM organization chart and the people sel

for interviews. Twenty-four percent of JDAM SPO pers

were selected.74 Table 2 summarizes the results. Small sa

sizes were offset by the use of ethnographic techniques 

in-depth interviews. The heads of business and product 

opment IPTs were interviewed due to their critical posi

Subjects in the lower two tiers were chosen at random w

their stratified groups.

Interview Technique. A semistructured interview m

was used. This method employs an interview guide for 

tions and topics. The semistructured approach keeps the 

tioning focused, yet provides the freewheeling quality of a

structured interview.75 Since there was only one chance to 

with each person (due to time and funding constraints)

method assured consistency and fostered open-ende

sponses at the same time. The interview guide (appendix C

Table 2

Sample Selections

Organization Level Total Members Interviewed

Program/Deputy Program

Director

 4 3

IPT/Deputy IPT 5 2

Group Leaders 9 3

Line Workers 41 6

 Total 59 14
administered without alteration. It was tested by using 

subjects at the division, branch chief, and line worker lev

the Human Systems program office, Brooks AFB, Texas. F

actual study, a combination of telephone and personal 

views were conducted.

Results

Results of the case study are discussed within Lewin’s f

work. See appendix D for a presentation of the data.

Unfreezing

JDAM leaders used many of the unfreezing elements 

cussed earlier. They placed considerable emphasis on ur

and vision. They also employed several methods to over

initial resistance.

The organization’s sense of urgency appeared strong. A

spondents felt a high sense of urgency. Seven out of 10 sa

SPO director as being the generator of this situation. How

the program director did not discount outside influence

noted that the deputy undersecretary of defense for acqui

reform pushed JDAM as a pilot program.

To help create this perceived crisis and chart a path fo

future, the SPO leaders developed a clear, simple vision. 

saw their primary aim as success in an acquisition r

program, with underlying principles of streamlining, best 

for the dollar, and collaboration with the contractor. The l

developed this vision in concert with all SPO members, a

served as a key method to overcome initial resistance. A

spondents knew the purpose of the organization and its v

Virtually the same description of the vision was given by 

people. SPO leaders achieved this high knowledge rate by 

municating the vision through several methods: leadershi

phasis at meetings, one-on-one contact, and public postin

In addition to communicating the vision, the leaders 

ployed several other methods to overcome initial resistance

program director personally led the transformation. He rem

traditional, but nonvalue-added, acquisition practices in a 

lic manner. This demonstrated the seriousness of the mis

Several workers mentioned the leader as the “driving 

behind changing the organization. The director also delibe
placed change agents in various work groups, an action 

was not obvious to the workers; none of them mentione

intentional placement of change agents in the SPO. Fu

more, the program director implemented a radical reorga

tion in which government personnel teamed directly with 

peting contractors. Eleven people specifically mentione

effect of this reorganization. It appeared to change the pe

tion of government from obtrusive overseer to helpful facili

However, altering the management process was probab

largest contributor to overcoming initial resistance. Everyo

terviewed commented on three practices applied in JDAM 

they did not see applied (at least to the same degree) in 

organizations: removing fear in the organization, setting 

meeting high goals, and questioning their practices as w

those of others. The program director set out to remove the f

making mistakes, and his efforts seemed to work. A typical 

view comment was: “If you’re not making mistakes, you’r

trying hard enough.” Also, the program director challenged p

by setting “stretch goals.” Stretch goals were standards o

reach with normal effort, but attainable with determination

tiative, and creativity. Those interviewed felt a keen desire to 

these standards. Finally, because of the enormous amou

ingrained procedures and practices involved in acquisition

director instilled a questioning attitude across the organiz

Some people stated such things as, “Why do we have to do 

way?” or “Why can’t we do it another way?” Asking “why?

become a mantra within JDAM.

Movement

Of the various ideas presented for moving an organiz

down the path of change, most applicable to JDAM wer

personnel selection process, overcoming defensive reaso

and empowerment. Other methods, like training and th

praisal system, were relevant but less useful. Moreover, 

was disagreement regarding the scope of change and wh

to focus first on attitude or behavior.

Overcoming defensive reasoning seemed to be very im

tant. It is difficult to gauge the degree of defensive reason

an organization without prolonged observation. Neverth

JDAM members seemed to apply Argyris’s productive re

ing. Ten people commented that they willingly challenged 
other’s assumptions and logic. Also, 10 subjects noted 

management always explained the rationale behind sen

decisions. Only one person said management did not ex

decision rationale.

The program director also used the personnel selection 

cess. He interviewed people seeking positions in the SPO

purpose was to select workers who would fit with his v

The leader also released four or five people because he th

they would promote disruptive actions.

Empowerment seemed to have a positive effect, th

agreement among those interviewed was not as strong as 

case of urgency and vision mentioned earlier. Eleven out 

people said empowerment was very important, and the s

leadership in particular felt that people needed a sense of 

ership” in the task they were accomplishing. However, th

plementation of empowerment was not consistent throu

the organization. Eight people felt completely empowered

said the empowerment practiced in the SPO was good but 

be improved. One person declined to comment.

These minor discrepancies in measuring empowerment a

related more to definition than results. The most satisfied p

defined empowerment as a “volume” (or set of boundaries) 

one was free to make decisions within the parameters s

management.76 Those not completely satisfied had a differen

nition (like freedom from review) or did not have a clear idea 

boundaries of their empowerment volume. Despite these 

ences, the SPO’s success seems to suggest that, while emp

ment itself is necessary, it is not necessary to have com

agreement throughout an organization on the amount applie

The training and appraisal systems appeared to be less 

ful than the above methods. Fifty percent of the respon

judged the SPO training very important. To them, the inf

team-building training accomplished earlier in the pro

contained the most benefits. Whereas training was of 

help, four people stated that the appraisal system had a s

what negative effect on the change process. Because the 

did not control appraisals directly, functional organiza

(such as engineering and contracting) outside the SPO 

ducted final review and approval.

Results concerning the scope of change and whether to 

initial efforts on changing attitude or behavior split along s
management lines (program director) and lower level manage

lines (IPT leaders and below). Workers saw the need to ch

everything all at once and to focus on attitudes first. Senior 

ership, on the other hand, saw change concepts being i

mented immediately but results flowing incrementally. The

sults would in turn build upon one another and propel the 

along the path of change. The senior leaders also saw their j

changing behavior first; they did not see how one could di

affect attitude. Still, attitude change was their long-term goal

Refreeze

The SPO still appears to be in the movement stage

change process has been working for only three years. C

quently, its leaders have not placed great emphasis on o

anchoring change. Still, the SPO employed two methods 

the change strategy discussion: spreading success storie

measuring organization progress. The senior leadership 

used two methods from the unfreezing segment: creat

sense of urgency and altering management processes.

The organization has made some effort to spread the wo

success stories and to measure progress towards acquisitio

form. Thirteen people mentioned that continual reinforcem

success helped people to stay on track. “Success breeds suc

was a common statement. Also, the SPO practiced a qual

and quantitative measurement process. Nine people noted th

of metrics to assess progress towards organizational goals. S

leaders also mentioned qualitative assessments like manag

off-sites and managers spending time in work areas. The di

visited different parts of the SPO and talked with people to o

a sense of the organization’s climate. He even actively so

“report cards” from workers on his and the SPO’s performanc

The most common methods used by JDAM to anchor ch

came from the unfreezing segment. First, the leaders cont

their sense of urgency. When the new program director 

in, he deliberately tried to reenergize the organization. T

this, he identified a common enemy—another SPO that 

petes indirectly with JDAM on the same type of munition

program director told the SPO they must do better tha

enemy to remain in business.

Also, the program director continued to challenge the or

zation by setting high standards, a management process 
initially to start the change process. The standards were s

cant and well above what most organizations would con

reasonably attainable. For instance, the SPO developed a 

to cut 15 months off their schedule for obtaining a decisio

low rate initial production (LRIP). Many program offices w

consider merely meeting their schedule for LRIP a tough go

Results thus far indicate that the change strategies are 

ing well, but there is a small caveat. The organization has 

from estimates of over 50 percent resistance to change in

to estimates of less than 25 percent now. Also, the SPO 

been successful in terms of the cost and schedule savings 

tioned earlier. Still, room for improvement exists. Two p

mentioned that the organization reverts back to old bus

practices on occasion and one individual said the SPO 

“fallen down on institutionalizing change.” Furthermore

resistance to change is not negligible. Although seven ind

als said there was virtually no resistance to change, fou

resistance at around 10 or 20 percent and one person s

was over 50 percent. Clearly the organization does not 

with the same unanimity here that it did on other issues.

Recommendations

Americans will always do the right thing after having first exhausted

all other alternatives.

— Winston Chur

A major objective of change strategies is to avoid nonv

alternatives in pursuing organizational change. The goal 

use the correct approach from the start. Proper applicat

these strategies requires two sets of recommendations. Th

set provides suggestions for organizations undergoing ch

for acquisition reform; the second offers research propos

fill gaps in the current study.

Organizational Change Core Competencie

Delineating a list of recommended change strategies w

misinterpret the results of the case study. JDAM leader

plied some strategies but did not use others. In addition, s

gies were tailored to fit the JDAM situation. For instance
used urgency to foster and maintain change. The method

concepts previously discussed will serve as a means to ac

larger goals in most situations, but experience tells us 

what works in one situation may not work in another.

Nevertheless, in comparing JDAM practices with other 

ble change strategies, several necessary organizational cap

ties stand out: urgency, vision, high standards, teamwork

innovation. You will not see a one-to-one corresponden

these capabilities with each change strategy discussed. 

thermore, they do not fall discretely into a particular elem

Lewin’s model; they overlap among the three elements

should a leader apply these capabilities in some specified o

they complement each other in a synergistic fashion. Ra

the leader should employ change strategies as appropria

achieve these five capabilities. An organization must do 

them well, all of the time. In short, they are core compete

for organizations undergoing acquisition reform change.

Creating Urgency

Organizations must develop and maintain a razor-

edge. Research points to urgency as the technique that is 

likely to kick-start the change process. JDAM took it a 

further and used an organizational sense of urgency to m

tain its focus. Creating an outside competitor and promulg

success stories helped keep JDAM working at its limits.

Communicating Vision

Vision is another critical item in change strategy, and J

used it well. JDAM leaders developed a clear vision and 

municated it well. Everyone interviewed had virtually the 

vision description, a situation that helped create a sen

purpose. In talking with the workers, one got the sen

dealing with an elite acquisition team.

Setting and Meeting High Standards

JDAM senior leadership deliberately set high standar

part of the management process. While the research doe

specifically address high standards, this technique had a 

erful effect on the SPO. The leadership not only set high 

but expected the workers to meet them. And the expec
was mutual; workers expected to meet the standards. 

might consider that empowerment is related to high stan

in that it enables people to meet them. However, empower

by itself is not a core competency. While JDAM people a

that empowerment worked well, they did not agree on how 

The leader must practice empowerment to whatever le

needed to meet organizational goals, but this does not n

sarily mean that everyone should feel completely empower

Teamwork

JDAM used a type of teamwork in which everyone w

together for a common goal, but strongly and professio

debated the means to achieve the goal. They operated 

family atmosphere that embraced differences of opinion. J

personnel were willing to challenge one another on tho

and ideas and to use peer pressure to push people for

This inevitably led to disagreements but, like families, the 

viduals involved pulled together when needed. Managin

personnel selection process and providing training in 

building were the only means used to achieve this compet

they are probably not the only methods that will work. JD

teamwork method provides an interesting contrast to t

that outwardly work towards a common goal, yet some

avoid underlying differences to get the job done.

Constant Innovation

Innovation is one of the means used to achieve high stan

and develop the level of teamwork mentioned above. Its incl

as a core competency may be a reflection of new thinking, w

is required for acquisition reform. However, it appears to 

been critical to JDAM success. The organizational pencha

questioning everything served as a prelude for innovative 

During the interviews, the senior leadership emphasized th

cessity of “thinking outside the box.” One example is JD

application of the reorganization. The type of reorganization 

by JDAM may or may not work for other SPOs. In fact, reor

zation as a change strategy may not even be a good idea in 

cases. The important consideration is that the leader of J

analyzed his circumstances and made a bold but appro

move to change the SPO structure.
Recommendations for Further Research

The main contention of this study is that no fundam

checklist of strategies exists, but that there are a certain 

core competencies that an organization must possess to ac

effective organizational change. However, this conclusi

based on a comparison of one organization with the liter

on organizational change. To determine the validity of th

sertion, additional research would need to: (1) study mo

ganizations, (2) thoroughly evaluate proposed compete

and (3) determine how to achieve the necessary competenc

Further research should include using statistically s

practices to investigate more organizations. This would in

random sampling and selecting SPOs of different sizes 

stages of organizational maturity. Such methods would 

more definitive stamp on any research findings.

Also, the investigation should test whether the core co

tencies suggested here hold true among various SPOs

framework may not prove sound: changes, additions, or 

tions may be necessary. If the framework is not valid

studies should provide another model. The acquisition com

nity needs guidance for its leaders, who are struggling 

reform.

Finally, whether new research uses the proposed mod

advocates a new one, it should provide more examples of e

tion. Again, an inflexible step-by-step approach is proba

bad idea. However, the current study mentions little on h

promote innovation or create a highly functional team. Le

need ideas to help them implement aspects of any pro

organizational change model.

Conclusion

Better for most of us to start learning now how to cope with change

to develop whatever leadership potential we have, and to help ou

organizations in the transformation process.

— John P. Kotter

Leading Chang

This paper has recommended some core competencie

organizations undergoing acquisition reform change. Whi

DOD has achieved some success in reform, the breadth, d
and pace of change have not been consistent. Acquisitio

form principles require big changes in the way organizatio

business. Initiating and fostering such large change is di

at the organizational level. The suggested core compete

drawn from a comparison of several possible change stra

with successful acquisition reform in the JDAM program 

should help leaders in their change efforts.

Change strategies were discussed in terms of Lewin’s f

work of organizational change: unfreezing the system, m

towards a new orientation, and refreezing new behavior

attitudes. To unfreeze organizations, leaders create a sen

urgency, communicate a new vision, and use various orga

tional and management tools to overcome initial resist

Once they start the process, the leader causes move

through a variety of means. Human resource methods like 

motions and appraisals reward behavior that promotes ch

Training and education provide necessary skills. Some s

gies also call for empowerment and the use of productive 

soning to involve people in the process and rid them of 

personal biases. Finally, organizations institutionalize ch

by employing techniques grouped under three major categ

grafting the new culture to the old, maintaining and evalu

the process, and continuing to use the methods discussed 

in the movement stage.

JDAM leaders applied some of the strategies prese

adapting them to fit their situation. Key features of the J

application included creating a sense of urgency, commu

ing a vision, altering key management processes, and ove

ing defensive reasoning. JDAM leaders used these method

synergistic fashion, cutting across all three stages of Le

model and tailoring them in ways not addressed by the l

ture. To a lesser degree, they also applied empowerment, 

tive personnel decisions, training, and reorganization. In 

tion, they measured their progress towards their change 

However, these methods appeared to play supporting ro

the key features mentioned above.

Based on comparing possible change strategies wit

JDAM experience, a simplistic application of change stra

misses the fundamental requirement for change. A part

strategy that works in one situation may not work in ano

However, the results of the study suggest that there are 
arching core competencies for successful organizat

change. Developing and maintaining a sense of urgenc

example, helps organizations keep their edge. Communica

vision provides the right focus for the energy that results 

urgency; setting and meeting high standards ensures tha

organization does not become complacent. Building team

which people disagree but pull together when needed 

with urgency and meeting high standards. Finally, encour

innovation is important for fostering creative teamwork 

keeping the organization flexible intellectually. The leader 

combine these competencies in a synergistic fashion and 

tice them constantly.

When asked about the challenge of implementing acqui

reform, Secretary of Defense Perry said, “Why can I pre

that this time the call for reform will succeed? Well, the 

answer, of course, is that we cannot be sure. It is a dau

task. To change in a fundamental way a system as large a

and a system which is so ingrained after four decades of d

opment will be difficult.”77 Hopefully, the core compete

proposed here will provide a framework useful for accom

ing this imposing task.

Notes

1. William Perry, “Mandate for Change,” 9 February 1994, 18; on-li

ternet, 3 December 1996, available from http://www.safaq.hq.af.mil/acq

2. Ibid., 4.

3. “Pentagon Begins the Latest Acquisition Reform Battle,” Jane’s D

Weekly 20, no. 2 (10 July 1993): 19.

4. Perry, 3.

5. Ibid., 1.

6. Ibid.

7. Robert H. Williams, “Dr. Perry Urges Radical Surgery for Acqui

National Defense 78, no. 495 (February 1994): 12.

8. Paul G. Kaminski, “Acquisition Reform Acceleration Day, May 31, 

Program Manager 25, no. 5 (September–October 1996): 28–31.

9. Paul G. Kaminski, undersecretary of defense (acquisition and t

ogy), DOD, memorandum to defense acquisition community, subject: Up

the DOD 5000 Documents, 15 March 1996, 3.

10. Perry, 11.

11. William Perry, “Use of Integrated Product and Process Developme

Integrated Product Teams in DOD Acquisition,” Defense Acquisition Des

CD-ROM, Defense Acquisition Deskbook, JPO, December 1996.

12. Kaminski memorandum, 2.
13. “Lightning Bolts Ignite Acquisition Initiatives,” National Defense 

501 (April 1996): 26.

14. Darleen Druyun, “Acquisition Renaissance: A Cultural Cha

Work,” address to the American Institute of Aeronautics and Astronaut

October 1996, n.p.; on-line, Internet, 3 December 1996, availabl

http://www.safaq.hq.af.mil/acq-ref/std-dwn/culture.pdf.

15. James Laney, “Acquisition Reform: Government and Industry 

Out,” Aerospace America 34, no. 8 (August 1996): 40–42.

16. Paul G. Kaminski, undersecretary of defense (acquisition and 

nology), DOD, memorandum to secretaries of the military depart

subject: Stand-Down Acquisition Reform Acceleration Day, 15 

1996, n.p.; on-line, Internet, 3 December 1996, available from

http://www.safaq.hq.af.mil/acq-ref/std-dwn/stddwn.html.

17. Laney, 41.

18. Ibid., 42.

19. J. R. Sculley, “Achieving Acquisitions Reform Requires More Tha

Laws,” National Defense 81, no. 520 (September 1996): 4.

20. Edgar H. Schein, Organizational Culture and Leadership (San 

cisco, Calif.: Jossey-Bass Publishers, 1992), 22.

21. Kurt Lewin, “Group Decision and Social Change,” in Readings in 

Psychology, ed. Eleanor E. Maccoby et al. (New York: Holt, Rinehart, an

ston, 1958), 210.

22. Ibid., 298.

23. John P. Kotter, Leading Change (Boston: Harvard Business 

Press, 1996), 37.

24. Noel M. Tichy and Mary Anne Devanna, The Transformational 

(New York: John Wiley & Sons Inc., 1990), 47.

25. Kotter, 44.

26. Leon W. Hall, “Six Elements for Implementing and Managing Ch

Leadership & Organizational Development Journal 12, no. 2 (1991): 24–2

27. Kotter, 68.

28. Schein, 299.

29. Ibid.

30. Hall, 25.

31. Kotter, 88.

32. Ibid., 90.

33. Tichy and Devanna, 178.

34. Ibid., 179.

35. Kotter, 57.

36. Brian H. Kleiner and Walter A. Corrigan, “Understanding Organiz

Change,” Leadership & Organizational Development Journal 10, no. 3 

25–31.

37. Tichy and Devanna, 163.

38. Lewin, 211.

39. Schein, 301.

40. Patrick Connor and Linda Lake, Managing Organizational 

(Westport, Conn.: Praeger, 1994), 74.

41. Tichy and Devanna, 246.

42. Conner and Lake, 81.

43. Kotter, 108.
44. Ibid., 109.

45. Ibid., 117.

46. Ibid., 122.

47. Ibid., 123.

48. Chris Argyris, Strategy, Change and Defensive Routines (Bosto

man, 1985), 297–98.

49. Ibid., 125.

50. Kotter, 101.

51. Ibid., 21.

52. Ibid., 115.

53. Argyris, 5.

54. Ibid., 76.

55. Ibid., 72.

56. Ibid., 262.

57. Schein, 302.

58. Ibid., 301.

59. Michael Ward, Why Your Corporate Culture Change Isn’t Workin

What To Do about It (Brookfield, Vt.: Gower, 1994), 53, 56.

60. Ibid., 53.

61. Ibid., 56.

62. Hall, 26.

63. Kotter, 151.

64. Kleiner and Corrigan, 29.

65. Hall, 26.

66. Kotter, 155.

67. Schein, 315.

68. Ward, 102.

69. Tichy and Devanna, 198.

70. Hall, 26.

71. “Pilot and Lead Programs,” 1996, n.p.; on-line, Internet, 3 De

1996, available from http://www.safaq.hq.af.mil/acq-ref/progs.

72. Department of the Air Force, Air Force Acquisition Reform, Apri

11.

73. Lt Col James R. McClendon, deputy director JDAM system p

office, interviewed by author, 24 December 1996.

74. Russell H. Bernard, Research Methods in Anthropology (Walnut 

Calif.: Alta Mira Press, 1994), 79.

75. Ibid., 209.

76. The term volume was mentioned by several of the people interview

volume, they meant a set of boundaries for an individual’s level of em

ment.

77. Williams, 12.
Appendix A

Air Force Lightning Bolt Initiatives

The Air Force has implemented acquisition reform prin

largely through its “lightning bolt” initiatives. Some pretty 

tic goals have been set for streamlining: reducing acqui

cycle time by 50 percent, reducing program office manni

some cases by 50 percent), and improving the request for 

posal (RFP) process.1

 Reducing regulations, developing a 

set of consistent policies, and using training and support t

are also important AF themes. They will help to ensure th

of best business practices.2

 The specific lightning bolt

listed below.

1. Establish a centralized support team to streamli

contract solicitations valued at over $10 million.3

 The 

pose of this team is to institutionalize acquisition reform. 

lar teams will be established at each product and logistic c

to scrub solicitations valued at between $100 thousand 

$10 million.

2. Create a standing acquisition strategy panel 

composed of senior level acquisition personnel from 

office of the Undersecretary of the Air Force for Acqui

(SAF/AQ), Air Force Materiel Command (AFMC), and u

The goal of this lightning bolt is to promote consistency a

acquisition strategies, tailored as needed to the specifics 

program under consideration.

3. Develop a new program office manpower model 

uses the tenets established in streamlining the ma

ment of classified programs. This model is based on ac

tion strategies that use the prime contractor as the sy

integrator and achieves a reduction in program office size 

least 50 percent, including contracted support personnel.

4. Cancel all Air Force Materiel Command Center

acquisition policies by 1 December 1995. The secretari

Staff, and Headquarters AFMC will be the only agencies au

ized to issue acquisition policies, instructions, or guide

including supplements to the federal acquisition regulation

29
5. Reinvent the Air Force oversight and review pro

The goal is to have a paperless decision process, conven

formal review only if there is disagreement within the prog

working-level integrated process team (IPT). SAF/AQ wil

the IPT with membership from the secretariat, Air Staff, an

AFMC.

6. Enhance the role of past performance in source 

tions. Headquarters AFMC led an IPT to revise its policy o

use of past performance in source selections so that it 

equal with technical, management, and cost proposals.

7. Replace acquisition documents with the single a

sition management plan (SAMP). A SAMP will replace nu

ous other documents, including acquisition plans, pro

management plans, and acquisition strategy reports for 

stone reviews.

8. Revise the “program executive officer and desig

acquisition commander portfolio review,” adding a se

that deals specifically with acquisition reform. The pro

managers will develop metrics to track implementation 

quisition initiatives. Metrics will capture specific reform a

ties occurring in each program.

9. Enhance the acquisition workforce with a compr

sive education and training program that integrates a

sition reform initiatives. Headquarters AFMC is leadi

IPT to develop a comprehensive formal education and tra

program for the acquisition workforce. This training pro

will ensure that individuals have the knowledge, skills, abi

and experience needed to perform in an environment 

formed processes with a smaller workforce.

10. Reduce acquisition cycle time by 50 percent. Ph

seeks to reduce the time from a validated user require

until a contract is awarded by 50 percent. Phase 2 will att

to cut down on cycle time after contract award.

11. Streamline science and technology contracting

proved business processes and lessons learned in weapon 

30
tems acquisition will be applied to our science and techn

efforts. Common process will become the standard acro

laboratories.

Notes

1. Assistant Secretary of the Air Force (Acquisition), “Air Force Acqu

Lightning Bolt Initiatives,” 1996; on-line, Internet, 3 December 1996, av

from http://www.safaq.hq.af.mil/acq-ref/bolts/update.html.

2. Darleen Druyun, “Acquisition Renaissance: A Cultural Cha

Work,” address to the American Institute of Aeronautics and Astronaut

October 1996; on-line, Internet, 3 December 1996, available 

http://www.safaq.hq.af.mil/acq-ref/std-dwn/culture.pdf.

3. For all information on the AF Lightning Bolts, see Department of 

Force, Air Force Acquisition Reform, April 1996.

31
Appendix B

JDAM Organization

The following figures illustrate the JDAM organiz

Figure 1 shows the basic organizational structure. Fig

indicates the location in the organization for each inte

respondent.

35
Figure 1. JDAM Organization Cha

MANAGEMENT

INFORMATION

SYSTEMS

PROGRAM DIRECTOR

DEPUTY PROGRAM DIRECTOR

PROJECTS IPT BUSINESS IPT 

PIP FMS CONTRACTS PRGM CTRL PGM MG

IPT LEVEL

GROUP 

LEVEL

Source: JDAM office headquarters

36
Figure 2. JDAM Interview Selectio

MANAGEMENT

INFORMATION

SYSTEMS

PROGRAM DIRECTOR

DEPUTY PROGRAM DIRECTOR

THREE PEOPLE

PROJECTS IPT

BUSINESS IPT

ONE PERSON

PIP FMS CONTRACTS PRGM CTRL ONE PERSON PGM MGT 

IPT LEVEL

GROUP 

LEVEL

ONE PERSON* ONE PERSON* TWO PEOP

*PEOPLE LISTED BELOW THE GROUP LEVEL BOXES ARE LINE WORKERS.

Source: JDAM office headquarters

37

Appendix C

Interview Guide

1. How did the change process start? Emphasize: As appl

acquisition reform.

a. Was the change necessary or required? Why? (c

urgency)

• When did it start?

• Was resistance encountered?

• If resistance was encountered, what percent wa

countered by the SPO?

b. Vision (to include goals and objectives)

• Do you have a vision statement (for the SPO)?

− What is it? When was it accomplished?

− If not, does the SPO use any other metho

convey the organization’s purpose and goals?

− What methods have been used to commun

the vision?

− What has been the reaction of the SPO t

vision?

− Have there been any inconsistencies betwee

vision and SPO actions or policies?

−− If so why? What has been done to expla

resolve the inconsistencies?

c. Has the SPO done any of the following to mobilize 

mitment (give examples)?

• Continuously communicate vision

• Building coalitions and networks (altered work 

compositions)

• Establishing dedicated group(s) to move ou

change (who participates?)

• Distributing resources for alignment with new w

doing business

• Reorganization

• Altering or establishing key management process

2. What are the methods you’ve used to implement and 

gize organizational change? What has worked well? 

hasn’t worked well?

a. Has the SPO used any of the following HR met

promotion, selection, rewards, appraisal system?

41
b. Has the SPO done any education and training? 

types?

• How often does training take place?

• Does follow up training (to include on-the-job) oc

− Under what circumstances?

c. How do you feel about the concept of empowerment

• Has SPO use empowerment to help change proce

− How?

− How do you think empowerment is working o

d. Consider a continuum of making incremental ch

versus a lot of change all at once. Where does the 

fit on this continuum?

e. Defensive reasoning

• What process is used to make decisions (at your 

of decision making)?

• When implementing difficult changes or deci

did any one complain, show reluctance, or e

negative feelings?

− How was this handled?

• When decisions are made, does management ex

them?

• Does management ever give orders or taskings 

out telling why?

f. In a change process like the SPO’s undergone, 

comes first, changing attitude or changing beha

Behavior is the outward actions or thoughts of an 

vidual. Attitude represents an individual’s inner 

basic assumptions, primarily existing at uncons

level.

• What path has the SPO taken?

3. Has the SPO institutionalized organizational change? 

tices, processes, attitudes firmly ingrained, taken for gran

a. Grafting: Has SPO done any of the following?

• Celebrations

• Eulogizing past culture

b. Maintenance and evaluation: Has the SPO done a

the following?

• Articulated the connections between new beh

and organizational success

• Spread the word on success stories (oral, wr

electronic)

42
• Held meetings to assess progress of change

• Made examples, either positive or negative, of c

practices or procedures

• Give rewards, promotions, high appraisals bas

contributions to organizational change

− How often is this done?

− Under what circumstances?

• Has vision been refined since process started?

− If not, any plans to?

• Does the SPO try to measure change?

− What and how?

c. Does SPO make use of the informal organization 

works) to facilitate change?

• Describe use

• How often is this used?

d. Rating change

• Rate the SPO’s cultural change on a percentage 

(100% is complete transformation)

43
Appendix D

Interview Results Matrices

The data on the following pages show the results o

interviews conducted at the Joint Direct Attack Mun

(JDAM) program office. The data are presented in terms 

ganizational change methods and concepts versus manage

level. Showing the data in matrix format helps indicate pat

in change strategies used by JDAM as people at various 

in the organization viewed them.

The matrices display the data from two levels: organiza

change and management. Each matrix reflects a different 

of organizational change: unfreezing, movement, and refre

Within each matrix, the columns indicate various change m

ods and concepts. They include items from the interview 

as well as other ideas that came out during the interv

Some of these methods and comments have levels of d

and some are yes or no responses. The rows show the ma

ment levels in JDAM (see appendix B).

Data include table entries and their associated notes. 

“X” represents a response or comment from a subject ab

particular category. Some entries have notes that provid

ther amplification. The number of entries in a category ma

add up to the total number of people interviewed; not eve

responded to all areas.

47
48
49
50
51
52
53

Acronyms

AFMC Air Force Materiel Command

AIAA American Institute of Aeronautics

and Astronautics

CEO chief executive officer

DOD Department of Defense

FMS foreign military sales

HQ headquarters

HR human resources

IPT integrated product team

JDAM joint direct attack munition

LRIP low rate initial production

PGM MGT program management

PIP product improvement program

PRGM CTRL program control

RFP request for proposal

SAF/AQ undersecretary of the Air Force for acquisiti

SPO System Program Office

55
Glossary

Designated acquisition commander (DAC). Individua

performs the same functions as the program executive o

(PEO) on programs that are not assigned to a PEO, prim

the commanders of product centers. For acquisition pro

activities, DACs, like PEOs, are accountable to the Air 

acquisition executive.

Low rate initial production. Producing the minimum 

tities necessary to provide production configured or r

sentative articles for operational test, establish an initia

duction base for the system, and permit an orderly increa

the production rate for the system.

Integrated product team. Teams composed of r

sentatives from all appropriate functional disciplines wo

together with a team leader to build successful and bala

programs, identify and resolve issues, and make sound 

timely decisions. The purpose of IPT is to make team deci

based on timely input from the entire team, including cu

ers and suppliers.

Military specifications. Documented requirements for 

rials, products, or services to be developed for the military.

Program director. Program manager vested with full au

ity, responsibility, and resources to execute an approved a

sition program on behalf of the Air Force. For acquisitio

lated matters, the program director is accountable t

program executive officer or the designated acquisition 

mander. Also called system program director.

Program executive officer. Corporate operating officia

supervises a portfolio of mission-related acquisition cate

and selected programs. The PEO is accountable to the Air 

acquisition executive.

Program office. See system program office below.

Request for proposal. Formal vehicle by which the go

ment describes requirements for goods or services and s

proposals to fulfill requirements.

System program office. The integrated AFMC organi

responsible for cradle-to-grave military system managemen

57
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