In the United States Court of Federal Claims

No. 18-1566C

(Filed: December 11, 2018)

(Re-Filed: February 5, 2019)1

* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * *

SYNAPTEK, INC.,

Plaintiff,

v.

THE UNITED STATES,

Defendant, 

and

OPEN SAN CONSULTING, LLC,

Intervenor.

* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * *

Jerry A. Miles, Rockville, MD, for plaintiff, with whom was Christine 

Funk. 

Reta Emma Bezak, Trial Attorney, United States Department of 

Justice, Civil Division, Commercial Litigation Branch, Washington, DC, 

with whom were Joseph H. Hunt, Assistant Attorney General, Robert E. 

Kirschman, Jr., Director, Deborah A. Bynum, Assistant Director, for 

defendant. Theresa S. Keenan, Department of the Navy, NAVSUP FLC 

Norfolk, assistant counsel.

 1 This opinion was originally issued under seal to permit the parties an 

opportunity to propose redactions on or before February 4, 2019. The 

government and intervenor proposed redactions on February 4, mooting 

intervenor’s December 31, 2018 motion to redact. Plaintiff did not file 

proposed redactions. We thus adopt defendant’s and intervenor’s agreedupon redactions.

Bid protest; post-award bid 

protest; FAR 15.308 (2018); 

FAR 9.105-2(a)(1) (2018); 

best value determination; 

price reasonableness; 

responsibility determination.
2

Matthew Moriarty, Lawrence, KS, for intervenor. Matthew T. 

Schoonover, Steven J. Koprince, and Haley E. Claxton, of counsel. 

OPINION

BRUGGINK, Judge.

This is a post-award bid protest by Synaptek, Inc. (“Synaptek”), of an 

award by the United States Department of the Navy, NAVSUP Fleet 

Logistics Center (“the Navy”), of a contract for information technology 

(“IT”) support services for the National Defense University (“NDU”) to 

Open SAN Consulting, LLC (“OSC”). 

The parties filed cross-motions for judgment on the administrative 

record. The matter is fully briefed, and we held oral argument on December 

6, 2018. Because the Navy properly documented its award and its analysis 

was reasonable, we grant defendant’s and intervenor’s motions for judgment 

on the administrative record and deny plaintiff’s motion. 

BACKGROUND

The Navy issued a small business set-aside solicitation to procure IT 

services for the NDU, intending to award a single, firm fixed price, indefinite 

delivery, indefinite quantity type contract to the responsible offeror who 

represented the best value to the government. The Navy planned to award a 

contract without discussions and reserved the right to award the contract to 

an offeror who was not the lowest priced offeror. 

The Source Selection Evaluation Board (“SSEB”) would consider the 

following factors, listed in descending order of importance: Management 

Approach, Performance Approach, and Past Performance. Management 

Approach and Performance Approach were rated Unacceptable, Marginal, 

Acceptable, Good, or Outstanding. Past Performance was rated No 

Confidence, Limited Confidence, Neutral Confidence (or Unknown 

Confidence), Satisfactory Confidence, or Substantial Confidence. To be 

eligible for award, an offeror had to be rated at least Acceptable overall. The 

Source Selection Authority (“SSA”) would evaluate price for 

reasonableness. 
3

The Navy received twelve proposals. The SSEB determined that four 

offerors were eligible for award, listed from first to last place: Synaptek, 

OSC, [ ], and [ ]. The SSEB rated Synaptek Outstanding and 

rated OSC Good. [ ]

OSC was rated Outstanding on Management Approach, Good on 

Performance Approach, and Unknown Confidence on Past Performance. On 

Management Approach, the SSEB determined that OSC provided “multiple 

strengths, and risk of unsuccessful performance is low.” Administrative 

Record (“AR”) 522. For Task 5.1 Program Management, the SSEB assigned 

OSC a strength based on OSC’s “management program managed by a long 

term Project Manager and [ ].” Id. It also assigned 

OSC strengths for Task 5.1 for its “holistic 11 area project management 

methodology,” “a proprietary [

],” and “program management 

methodology.” Id. The SSEB assigned strengths to OSC for the rest of the 

Management Approach tasks but noted that OSC’s proposal only marginally 

addressed anticipated risks. Overall, the SSEB found that OSC presented a 

“well-constructed, logical and efficient strategy” for its Management 

Approach and its multiple strengths outweighed the single risk. AR 525. 

On Performance Approach, the SSEB determined that OSC presented 

a “thorough approach to Program Management, Cyber Security and 

Transition.” AR 528. OSC’s weakness was Task 5.6 Technology Planning 

and Modernization, where the SSEB determined that OSC “does not provide 

specifics on how the offeror will embark on the evaluation and identification 

of the needs of the organization.” AR 526-27. The SSEB nevertheless 

determined that OSC “did illustrate an understanding and of approaches to 

modernization in other areas of the document . . . and this is considered 

adequate.” AR 527. The SSEB also noted that OSC did not address certain 

memorandums to record under Cyber Security. The SSEB found that due to 

OSC’s “empowered management style,” “appropriately addressed” Cyber 

Security, and “strong transition plan,” OSC had demonstrated “a wellconstructed, effective approach.” AR 528. 

OSC presented three references for Past Performance; each was

“Somewhat Relevant.” AR 531. The SSEB nevertheless ranked OSC

“Unknown Confidence (Neutral)” because OSC’s “performance record is so 

sparse that no meaningful confidence assessment rating can be reasonably 

assigned.” AR 532. Although it had performed in a DoD environment, 
4

because OSC had not performed in a DoD educational environment, OSC 

did not demonstrate similar complexity. The SSEB noted that OSC’s 

references “indicated a customer focused management that met or exceeded 

timelines, and provided forward facing staff which exceeded quality 

metrics.” AR 533. 

The SSEB rated Synaptek Outstanding on both Management 

Approach and Performance Approach and rated it Substantial Confidence on 

Past Performance. Regarding Management Approach, the SSEB determined 

that Synaptek’s proposal was exceptional, noting, however, that its approach 

to managing its subcontractor performance and its assessment of risks in 

undertaking this project were thorough rather than exceptional. Synaptek’s 

Management Approach, overall, “contained multiple strengths which lend 

toward low risk effective performance.” AR 537. 

Regarding Performance Approach, the SSEB found that Synaptek’s 

approach was exceptional except for Cyber Security Support, which was 

thorough. Synaptek’s Transition-In Plan was exceptional in part because 

GDIT, the incumbent, is a proposed subcontractor for Synaptek. 

Synaptek offered three references, one of which was “Very Relevant” 

while the other two were “Somewhat Relevant.” AR 542. Its first reference 

indicated that it was a subcontractor on the incumbent contract and therefore 

it had similar experience. Overall, the SSEB had a “high expectation that 

Synaptek will successfully perform the required effort.” AR 543. 

In its summary, the SSEB wrote that both OSC and Synaptek received 

Outstanding for the most important factor, Management Approach. “[T]he

Synaptek approach [is] slightly superior as there were no weakness[es] in the 

Synaptek Management Approach while the OSC Edge approach contained a 

significant weakness in risk component.” AR 545. Likewise, Synaptek was 

rated higher than OSC on Performance Approach, because it did not have 

any weaknesses compared to OSC’s Technology and Modernization 

weakness. Finally, although both “received strong feedback, touting high 

quality service[] levels and a strong customer focus,” Synaptek was rated

Substantial Confidence whereas OSC was rated Unknown Confidence. AR 

546. 

Before heading into the SSA’s price evaluation and best value 

determination, Synaptek and OSC held first and second place, respectively,

with [ ] and [ ] the final two acceptable offerors. The price 
5

proposals of all offers ranged from a low of $35,185,276 to a high of 

$79,912,424. The range of acceptable offers included the following price 

proposals: 

Offeror Non-Price 

Rating Total

Price 

above 

Low

NonPrice 

Ranking

[ ] [ ] [ ] LOW 4

OSC Good $44,290,359 [ ] 2

[ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] 3

Synaptek Outstanding $62,009,284 [ ] 1

AR 567.

The total difference between Synaptek and OSC is $17,718,925.

For the SSA’s price analysis, offerors provided fully burdened labor 

hour rates for 32 labor categories, 75% of which were performed in DC, 20% 

performed in Norfolk, Virginia, and 5% performed at the contractor site for 

the five-year ordering period. The price competition was in accordance with 

Federal Acquisition Regulation (“FAR”) 15.404-1(b)(2)(i) (2018) and the 

SSA deemed that section satisfied because two or more responsible offerors, 

competing independently, submitted price offers. The SSA compared the 

total proposed price of the offerors. She then used a comparative analysis to 

determine which proposal represented the best value, considering the “[n]onprice proposal more important than the offeror’s price proposal.” AR 566. 

The SSA concluded that OSC, “as the offer ranked second from a non-price 

standpoint and although slightly higher than the lowest price [ ] offer[,] . . . 

is determined to represent the best value to the Government, price and other 

factors considered.” AR 567. 

The SSA began by explaining that “[p]otential contributors to the 

price delta” between the eligible offerors’ prices include “the fact that direct 

labor rates and indirect cost pools are individual to each company . . . .” AR 

568. Additionally, because each of the labor categories in the solicitation
6

permitted equivalency offsets for education and experience, the solicitation

allowed for “a good deal of flexibility in the development of resource pools 

to satisfy the requirement and thereby contributes to the price delta among 

the offerors.” Id. The SSA determined OSC’s price to be fair and reasonable 

in comparison to the other prices. 

Next, the SSA compared OSC’s price to “prices being paid for similar 

services under the predecessor Task Order.” Id. For “Change Manager” and 

“Cyber Security Specialist,” OSC’s price was [ ] and [ ] higher than 

the historical data. For all other labor categories, OSC’s price was lower, 

ranging from [ ] to [ ] for an average of [ ] lower than the 

historical data. The SSA explained that the difference was at least in part 

attributable to the use of “published GSA Alliant rates” when actual rates 

were not available. The SSA found that OSC’s rates compared favorably to 

the prior contract. 

The SSA also compared OSC’s price to prices obtained through data 

from the Bureau of Labor Statistics and an industry survey. She compared 

not only OSC’s price to that metric but also [ ]’s lower price. The SSA

found that OSC’s rate was favorable and that its lower price may be 

attributable to the use of the Bureau’s hourly mean wage rate, from which 

there could be variance above or below. 

Finally, the SSA compared OSC’s price to the Independent 

Government Estimate (“IGE”). The IGE was $74,158,350, primarily 

calculated using the median GSA Alliant rates, which are drawn from more 

than fifty companies. The GSA Alliant rates contain “a wide range of labor 

category pricing, which results in varying pricing [from] the offerors.” AR 

573. Because the GSA Alliant rates were higher than even the incumbent’s 

published rates and had used a slightly higher than market escalation rate, the 

SSA discounted the helpfulness of the IGE. She assumed that “the 

environment of the instant acquisition maximized competitive behavior 

techniques relative to preparation of proposals.” Id. She acknowledged that 

OSC was lower than the comparative prices but concluded that its price was 

reasonable. 

After this comparison, the SSA conducted the best value 

determination. She began by acknowledging that OSC was ranked second to 

Synaptek on the technical factors. The SSA compared OSC’s and Synaptek’s 

performance on the individual factors. For Management Approach, the most 
7

important factor, she noted that Synaptek demonstrated no weaknesses 

whereas OSC demonstrated one weakness for failure to specifically identify 

risks and mitigation techniques. She wrote that “Synaptek was slightly 

superior to OSC,” even though both offerors were rated Outstanding. AR 

575. For Performance Approach, the SSA reviewed both offers and 

concluded that Synaptek “is considered superior to” OSC even though both 

offerors presented multiple strengths. Id. Synaptek provided a better 

Technology and Modernization plan than OSC, but the SSA noted that OSC 

“appropriately addressed” each area of Cyber Security. Id. Finally, on Past 

Performance, Synaptek was also the technically superior offeror, “[d]ue to 

the strong feedback on the very relevant reference” to the incumbent 

contract. Id. OSC did not provide a very relevant reference even though 

OSC’s experience “demonstrated similar scope and magnitude when viewed 

in the aggregate.” Id. The SSA found that OSC’s primary weakness was lack 

of experience in a DoD educational environment, despite its experience in 

other DoD environments. 

The SSA concluded that Synaptek is “the technically superior 

proposal when compared to OSC Edge based on its slightly superior 

Management Approach and its superior Performance Approach and Past 

Performance.” AR 576. The SSA noted, “However, Synaptek’s price is 

40.1% higher than the OSC Edge proposed price.” Id. She explained why 

Synaptek’s premium was not the best value to the government:

Although the Synaptek Management Approach was 

determined to be slightly superior in the area of risk 

identification[,] the OSC Edge Management Approach was 

nonetheless considered Outstanding, offering a wellconstructed, efficient strategy for performance. The 

Performance Approach of Synaptek was considered 

Outstanding, with multiple strengths; the OSC Edge was 

considered Good, with multiple strengths which offset a 

weakness in the Technology and [M]odernization area. The 

Past Performance of Synaptek was rated Substantial 

Confidence, providing the incumbent reference for which 

above satisfactory performance was supported. OSC Edge 

provided references which were considered somewhat relevant 

in the aggregate; however, the references met the scope and 

magnitude of the requirement but lacked one component of the 
8

complexity of the educational environment. Strong feedback 

was received on the references. Despite a rating of Unknown 

Confidence (Neutral) in Past Performance, it is noted the rating 

stems from the lack of one component of complexity, but 

otherwise meets the requirements. This, along with the strong 

feedback [that] was obtained from the references, limits the 

risk associated with the Neutral rating. OSC Edge received the 

highest rating for the most important factor, a Good rating for 

the second most important factor, and the strong feedback in 

Past Performance. Therefore, the non-price superiority of the 

offer submitted by Synaptek does not warrant a price premium 

of 40.1% (or $17,718,925).

Id. 

The SSA then compared OSC’s offer to the two Acceptable offerors.

The SSA determined that “OSC Edge’s proposal is superior to [ 

] based on OSC Edge’s multiple strengths . . . .” Id. “Both offerors received 

a rating of Unknown Confidence in Past Performance, primarily due to the 

lack of the complexity component of performance in an educational

environment, thereby rendering the ratings approximately equal.” Id. She 

concluded, “As [ ] was ranked below OSC from a non-price 

standpoint, with the OSC considered superior to [ ] in two of the 

three evaluation factors, and priced 20.9% higher than OSC, award to 

[ ] would not be the best value to the Government.” Id.

Likewise, OSC was ranked technically superior on Management 

Approach and Performance Approach compared to [ ]. The SSA found 

that “[a]lthough OSC Edge is priced 2.68% higher than [ ], the strengths 

in the OSC Edge non-price proposal, particularly in the areas of Cyber 

Security, management of personnel qualifications and transition support the 

nominal price difference between OSC Edge and [ ].” AR 577. 

The SSA concluded that OSC’s performance risk is low:

While the Technical Evaluation labeled OSC Edge’s 

Past Performance a rating of Unknown/Neutral, indicating a 

performance record that is so sparse that no meaningful 

confidence assessment rating can be reasonably assigned, the 

SSA reviewed the underlying details of the technical 

evaluation and references OSC Edge provided and considers 
9

OSC Edge’s Past Performance to be more appropriately rated 

Satisfactory Confidence, indicating the Government has a 

reasonable expectation that the offeror will successfully 

perform the required effort.

Id. 

The SSA concluded that OSC could overcome its lack of work in a 

DoD educational environment since it had performed in “multiple DoD 

environments . . . giving the SSA a reasonable expectation that OSC Edge 

would be able to adapt to the educational environment and perform 

satisfactorily. Furthermore, OSC Edge performance met or exceeded all 

quality metrics under the references.” AR 577-78. The SSA wrote that OSC 

had been determined responsible and that its price was fair and reasonable. 

After consideration of the non-price and price factors, the SSA recommended 

award to OSC.

The Navy identified OSC as the apparent awardee on November 22, 

2017. Synaptek filed a size protest on November 14, which the SBA denied. 

Synaptek next filed a protest at the agency on December 13 while 

simultaneously appealing the SBA’s denial of its size protest. The Navy 

dismissed the agency protest as premature on January 3, 2018. The SBA 

OHA denied Synaptek’s appeal.

The Navy awarded the contract to OSC on January 5, issuing a bridge 

contract to the incumbent, GDIT, through February 28 to allow time for 

transition to OSC. Synaptek and Envistacom [

 ] filed GAO protests on January 15 and 16, 2018. GAO dismissed 

these protests as premature, because the Navy had not yet given debriefings. 

The Navy delivered debrief letters on January 31 and both offerors 

filed GAO protests on February 5. GAO dismissed a portion of Synaptek’s 

protest but directed the Navy to respond to certain allegations. 

On February 28, 2018, the Navy issued another bridge action to GDIT 

for performance through July 31. On March 1, the Navy notified GAO that 

it intended to take corrective action regarding the Envistacom and Synaptek 

protests. GAO dismissed the protests on March 8. 

For corrective action, the Navy determined that Envistacom’s 

allegations warranted reevaluation by the SSEB of Envistacom’s proposal. 

The SSA reviewed Synaptek’s allegations and determined that SSEB 
10

reevaluation of Synaptek’s and OSC’s proposal was not necessary, but the 

SSA did choose to consider Synaptek’s allegations in detail in her second 

source selection decision. Ultimately, the SSEB’s reevaluation of 

Envistacom did not change the Navy’s determination of offerors eligible for 

award. After review of Synaptek’s protest allegations, the SSA agreed that 

two positive aspects of OSC’s evaluation should be changed, but that those 

two changes did not alter OSC non-price factor ratings or its overall rating. 

In the second source selection decision, the SSA repeated the 

summary of each proposal before returning to the price analysis. The SSA 

added two price comparison components in the source selection decision.

First, the SSA compared “the average fully burdened rate of the bridge 

action” to “the average proposed fully burdened rate of the instant 

acquisition.” AR 656. She divided “the estimated price by the labor hours for 

both the existing contract and the proposed acquisition.” Id. She found that 

OSC’s “average fully burdened rate for the instant acquisition is [ ] . . .

which is [ ] lower than the existing bridge rates,” [ ]. Id. The SSA 

reasoned that, due to factors such as GDIT’s [ ] pass through rate, 

equivalency offsets, and a competitive environment, OSC’s price was 

reasonable. Id. 

The SSA also added a direct comparison of OSC and Synaptek. 

OSC’s price “is less than, or within a [ ] delta of the proposed Synaptek 

price for approx. [ ] of the proposed labor categories. In addition, there is 

a [ ] delta between the proposed OSC Edge price and the Synaptek price 

for the Operations Manager labor category.” Id. The SSA explained that the 

current solicitation reduced the Operations Manager requirements and this

reduction contributed to the price difference. The SSA noted that the 

equivalency offsets permitted “a good deal of flexibility in the development 

of resource pools to satisfy the requirement and thereby contributes to the 

price delta among the offerors.” Id. The SSA wrote that the Navy anticipated 

offers to create a variety of structures for their labor category proposals. The 

SSA again acknowledged that OSC price was lower than Synaptek’s but 

found OSC’s price fair and reasonable. 

Finally, the SSA reviewed Synaptek’s allegations regarding OSC’s 

deficiencies. The SSA adjusted OSC’s rating in two respects. First, the SSA 

reviewed the SSEB’s evaluation of OSC’s Management Approach. Synaptek 

alleged that OSC impermissibly had failed to indicate a permanent Program 
11

Manager and that OSC’s transitional, independent consultant Program 

Manager created operational risk. 

The SSA found that the solicitation included a Program Manager 

labor category, but that OSC was not required to appoint a permanent 

representative at the outset. OSC should have identified that program 

manager as a consultant, but the SSA did not find OSC’s failure to disclose 

material. The SSA removed OSC’s assigned strength for a long-term Project 

Manager. Since OSC had at least three other named strengths under 

Management Approach and because the [

 ] went beyond the solicitation’s requirements, the SSA determined 

that the removal of one strength did not warrant downgrading OSC from 

Outstanding for Management Approach. 

Second, Synaptek alleged that OSC’s Past Performance was 

overrated, because “[t]he SSEB determined that OSC Edge demonstrated 

similar scope and magnitude when viewed in the aggregate but not similar 

complexity.” AR 662. The SSA reviewed OSC’s references and agreed with 

Synaptek that the original assessment was incorrect. OSC proposed to 

perform 56.5% of the work and only one of its references listed OSC as the 

prime contractor performing the work. That contract involved one of the task 

areas implicated by the solicitation and was [ ] of the magnitude of the

solicitation. Therefore, OSC’s references were not of similar scope, 

magnitude, or complexity. The quality of the performance and reviews 

provided were satisfactory, however. The SSA found that the adjustment to 

how OSC’s references were viewed in the aggregate did not change the 

Unknown Confidence rating. The SSA “acknowledge[d] that OSC’s Past 

Performance does create some risk and this is reflected in the best value trade 

off section below.” AR 662. 

The SSA did not make changes based on Synaptek’s remaining 

allegations. Synaptek argued that OSC’s proposal to [

] created staffing risk. The SSA disagreed, noting that the [

] was permissible and in fact contributed to the strength of 

OSC’s plan. 

Synaptek also alleged that OSC would not be able to hire or retain 

personnel with the required cyber security qualifications. The SSA reviewed 

OSC’s proposal and the SSEB’s evaluation and found that OSC had not 

departed from the solicitation and that its Staff Management Database 
12

appeared capable of ensuring qualified staff. The SSA noted that, if OSC 

failed to retain qualified staff, it would be a contract administration issue. 

Synaptek also critiqued OSC’s ability to comply with the

subcontracting limitation. The SSA’s review satisfied her that OSC had 

proposed its subcontractors properly, explained their role in OSC’s 

performance, and proposed appropriate monitoring to ensure compliance 

with the subcontracting limitation. The SSA noted that actual noncompliance 

during performance was a contract administration issue. 

Finally, Synaptek alleged that OSC’s Performance Approach was 

overrated. The SSA found this allegation to be vague, but nevertheless 

reviewed the SSEB’s evaluation and determined that an adjustment was not 

warranted.

In the SSA’s new best value determination, OSC was in second place, 

even after considering “the noted changes to the evaluation made by the SSA 

through the corrective action.” AR 664. The SSA incorporated the changes 

to OSC’s strengths into the best value analysis and determined, once again, 

that Synaptek was “slightly superior” to OSC on Management Approach, 

“superior” on Performance Approach, and “far superior” on Past 

Performance. AR 665-66. The SSA’s conclusion relied on the comparisons 

between Synaptek and OSC:

Synaptek is considered to be the technically superior 

proposal when compared to OSC Edge based on its slightly 

superior Management Approach and its superior Performance 

Approach and far superior Past Performance. However, 

Synaptek’s price is 40.1 % higher than the OSC Edge proposed 

price. Although the Synaptek Management Approach was 

determined to be slightly superior in the area of risk 

identification; the OSC Edge Management Approach was 

nonetheless considered Outstanding, offering a wellconstructed, efficient strategy for performance. The 

Performance Approach of Synaptek was considered 

Outstanding, with multiple strengths; the OSC Edge was 

considered Good, with multiple strengths which offset a 

weakness in the Technology and modernization area. The Past 

Performance of Synaptek was rated Substantial Confidence, 

providing the incumbent reference for which above 
13

outstanding performance was supported. OSC Edge was rated 

Unknown Confidence (Neutral) in Past Performance, primarily 

based on the lack of similar references by OSC Edge as the 

prime contractor. Despite Synaptek’s proposal being

technically superior to OSC Edge, it is determined that the nonprice superiority of the offer submitted by Synaptek does not 

warrant a price premium of 40.1 % (or $17,718,925). The 

Government acknowledges that OSC Edge provides an 

increased risk of performance when compared to Synaptek, 

largely as a result of the Past Performance factor, and that the 

solicitation stated that the non-price proposal is more important 

than the offeror’s price proposal, however, the price premium 

to Synaptek is too significant. OSC Edge received the highest 

rating for the most important factor, a Good rating for the 

second most important factor, and an Unknown/Neutral rating 

for Past Performance indicating that OSC Edge has the ability 

to perform albeit with a moderate risk of performance. 

AR 666.

The SSA also compared OSC to [ ] and to [ ] again, 

reaching the conclusion that OSC remained the superior offeror. The SSA 

increased OSC’s level of performance risk to “moderate,” but recommended 

award to OSC. AR 668. 

After the Navy awarded the contract to OSC, Synaptek protested once 

again at GAO. GAO ultimately denied the protest, finding that the Navy 

reasonably determined that OSC would adhere to the subcontracting 

limitation and that the Navy’s best value tradeoff was reasonable. 

Synaptek filed its complaint in this court on November 9, 2018. 

DISCUSSION

Synaptek advances three arguments: that the Navy turned the best 

value determination into an award to the lowest price technically acceptable 

offeror; that the Navy’s evaluation of OSC’s technical proposal was 

unreasonable; and that the Navy’s responsibility determination lacked a 
14

rational basis and was not documented properly.2 Our review of the Navy’s 

decision considers whether it was “arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of 

discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law. . . .” 5 U.S.C. § 706 

(2018); 28 U.S.C. §1491(b)(4) (2018).

The present solicitation sought the best value for the government from 

among the eligible proposals. “‘Best value’ means the expected outcome of 

an acquisition that, in the Government’s estimation, provides the greatest 

overall benefit in response to the requirement.” FAR 2.101. The government 

may use a best value tradeoff analysis “when it may be in the best interest of 

the Government to consider award to other than the lowest priced offeror or 

other than the highest technically rated offeror.” FAR 15.101-1(a). When 

making the best value determination, the SSA must use her “independent 

judgment” to decide “based on a comparative assessment of proposals 

against all source selection criteria in the solicitation.” FAR 15.308. The SSA 

must document her decision, including “the rationale for any business 

judgments and tradeoffs made or relied on by the SSA, including benefits 

associated with additional costs. Although the rationale for the selection 

decision must be documented, that documentation need not quantify the 

tradeoffs that led to the decision.” Id. 

A plaintiff seeking to disturb the SSA’s best value determination bears 

a significant burden, because the SSA has a high degree of discretion in 

determining which proposal offers the best value to the government. Galen 

Med. Assocs., Inc. v. United States, 369 F.3d 1324, 1330 (Fed. Cir. 2004); 

E.W. Bliss Co. v. United States, 77 F.3d 445, 449 (Fed. Cir. 1996).

I. The SSA’s Price Analysis and Best Value Determination

Before turning to the SSA’s best value determination, we note that the 

common thread running through Synaptek’s arguments is that OSC’s price 

 2 Synaptek’s argument on its motion for judgment on the administrative 

record omitted certain arguments raised in its complaint: (1) the Navy 

unreasonably rated OSC’s price proposal because OSC’s price proposal is 

unrealistically low; (2) the Navy unreasonably determined that OSC is able 

to comply with the limitation on subcontracting rule; (3) the Navy 

unreasonably failed to conduct corrective action; and (4) GAO’s summary 

dismissal prejudiced Synaptek. As if still advanced, we have considered 

those arguments, and we find that none of these arguments warrant granting

Synaptek’s motion. 
15

proposal is too low to realistically guarantee that the Navy will reap the 

benefits promised in OSC’s proposal. Synaptek does not contend that the 

price analysis itself violated the FAR but rather that it was irrational to 

believe OSC’s price is reasonable. The SSA here was required to review the 

prices for reasonableness, not realism, and we must be careful not to conflate 

the standards. See AR 24. The SSA considered the reasonableness of OSC’s 

price in comparison to the other offerors, Synaptek’s price, the prior contract, 

the bridge contract, the IGE, and market data. It is true that OSC’s price was 

lower than each of these data points, but the SSA did not ignore that fact. 

Instead, the SSA explained why she believed OSC’s price was lower than 

each of the comparison prices. Given that the SSA gave logical reasons why 

OSC’s price could be lower than the others and explained why certain data 

points did not provide an accurate comparison, we see no reason to determine 

that her analysis was irrational. 

Turning to the best value analysis, Synaptek argues that the Navy 

prioritized price over the technical factors in its best value tradeoff, violating 

the terms of the solicitation by swapping a best value tradeoff for a lowest 

price technically acceptable analysis. We disagree. The best indicator that the 

SSA performed a best value analysis is the fact that the SSA recommended 

OSC, not [ ], for award. [ ] had the lowest price proposal and was rated 

Acceptable. OSC, on the other hand, was more expensive than [ ], rated 

Good rather than Acceptable, and was technically superior to both [ ] and 

[ ]. 

Furthermore, price was a factor, even though it was less important 

than the technical factors. The best value analysis must take price into 

account when it is an evaluation factor and the SSA is required to document 

the “benefits associated with additional costs.” FAR 15.308. Here, the SSA 

properly considered whether Synaptek’s plan warranted $17 million in 

additional costs when compared to a “Good” proposal from an offeror whose 

primary disadvantage was not having operated in the NDU educational 

environment. The SSA’s determination that OSC offered the best value to 

the Navy is an example of the government’s flexibility “to consider award to 

other than the lowest priced offeror,” [ ], “or other than the highest 

technically rated offeror,” Synaptek. FAR 15.101-1(a).

Synaptek also contends that the SSA’s source selection decision was 

conclusory, drawing comparisons to First Line Transp. Sec., Inc. v. United 
16

States, 100 Fed. Cl. 359, 382-84 (2011) and Femme Comp Inc. v. United 

States, 83 Fed. Cl. 704, 757-770 (2008). 

In First Line, “[o]n a short form attached to the SSEB 

recommendation, the SSA stated that ‘[a]fter consideration of the 

information provided to me by the technical and price evaluation members 

and after accomplishing an independent review and assessment of the 

technical and price consensus reports, I hereby determine that AKAL 

Security is the best value offer solution by utilizing the trade-off method.’” 

100 Fed. Cl. at 383. Unlike a single form with no explanation, the SSA here

explained her thought process. Particularly in the post-corrective action

source selection decision, the SSA’s decision reflects a judgment that at 

points diverges from or corrects the SSEB’s recommendations and that 

compares OSC not only to the technically superior offer but also to the other 

two eligible proposals.

Moreover, unlike the SSA in Femme Comp Inc. who adopted a flawed 

SSEB technical evaluation and minimized or conflated the difference

between offerors, here in both the original and the post-corrective action 

source selection decision, the SSA repeatedly acknowledged Synaptek’s 

technical superiority, which ranged from “slightly” to “far more” superior 

than OSC. See 83 Fed. Cl. at 757-770. The SSA directly compared the two 

offerors on each technical factor. She weighed the increased risk attributable 

to OSC but found that when the technical superiority of Synaptek was 

coupled with its 40.1% price premium, the Navy was prepared to bear the 

additional moderate risk associated with OSC’s offer that had multiple 

strengths, few weaknesses, and the preferable price. Synaptek believes the 

SSA should have “quantif[ied] the tradeoffs” that led to choosing OSC, 

which is detail that the FAR expressly states the SSA is not required to 

include. FAR 15.308. We agree that the SSA could have made a more 

detailed analysis, but the SSA’s decision is properly documented.

II. Technical Proposal

Regarding the technical proposal, Synaptek makes a variety of 

arguments that OSC was overrated on the first two factors and that the Navy 

ignored risks that it should have considered in OSC’s technical proposal. 

First, Synaptek argues that the Navy did not consider the risk that OSC would 

not be ability to execute its proposal. The SSA did consider OSC’s ability to 

execute its approach, however. See AR 659-62. In the corrective action, the 
17

SSA reviewed OSC’s proposal for all the weaknesses that Synaptek alleged 

and found that the materials OSC provided indicated that it could perform 

successfully, albeit with some risk. Synaptek’s doubts notwithstanding, the 

SSA considered Synaptek’s allegations. 

Synaptek also argues that OSC’s failure to propose a full-time 

Program Manager should have resulted in an assigned weakness. We 

disagree. 

The solicitation required the contractor to “provide a Program 

Manager (PM) as a primary point of contact who shall provide management, 

direction, administration, quality control, and leadership of the execution of 

any TO.” AR 47. The program manager would “serve as the Government’s 

major point-of-contact,” “provide overall leadership and guidance for all 

contractor personnel,” and be “ultimately responsible for the quality and 

efficiency” of performance. AR 68. Additionally, “[t]he PM shall have 

organizational authority to execute the requirements. The PM shall assign 

tasking to contractor personnel, supervise on-going technical efforts, and 

manage overall task order performance.” AR 68. The solicitation does not

require a single, permanent program manager for the duration of the contract. 

OSC named a Program Manager, [ ], AR 260, thus meeting

the Program Manager requirement. Synaptek seizes on the word “on-going,” 

but OSC does not suggest that its Program Manager will not continually 

supervise technical efforts. 

The SSA considered the fact that OSC may present risk due to 

replacing Mr. [ ] after the transitional period. She also accounted for 

OSC’s proposal of a [ ] that was not required by the 

solicitation. Synaptek’s disagreement with the SSA’s reasonable assessment 

that OSC’s Program Manager approach will be effective is insufficient to 

demonstrate the decision was arbitrary and capricious or irrational. 

Synaptek also argued that the Navy overrated OSC’s Performance 

Approach. Synaptek does not actually challenge the content of OSC’s 

proposal, however. Instead, it casts aspersions on OSC’s finances, citing 

materials that were not before the Navy at the time of the SSEB’s or the 

SSA’s evaluation and that we decline to consider. Synaptek does not connect 

the dots as to why the Navy should have abandoned the written proposals 

and sought additional information when the solicitation expressly provided 

that the Navy would not hold discussions. 
18

Synaptek’s related argument that OSC’s Performance Approach is 

overrated because its employees will not have the required certifications is 

without support in the record. OSC’s proposal spelled out its process for 

maintaining certified employees, explained its subcontractors’ roles, and 

warranted that its employees would be properly credentialed. Synaptek may 

disagree, but without more its allegations are insufficient to disturb the 

Navy’s award. 

The last component of Synaptek’s argument that OSC’s Performance 

Approach should not have been rated “Good,” is that the Navy ignored the 

serious risk that OSC will pay its employees at below-market rates. This 

argument is another iteration of Synaptek’s disbelief that an offeror at a price 

point significantly lower than its own could perform the requirements of the 

contract. Synaptek merely presents an alternative way to view the IGE and 

market cost data, which that the SSA viewed differently. But Synaptek does 

not meaningfully challenge the SSA’s explanations for how OSC’s price 

reasonably could differ from the comparison prices. 

OSC made representations in its proposal, on which the SSA was 

entitled to rely, and among those statements was an explanation of how it 

offered competitive employment packages that include more than the base 

salary. In any event, OSC was in the middle of the range of prices for offerors 

overall and slightly lower than the middle of prices from eligible offerors. 

The SSA’s adoption of the Good rating for Performance Approach was not 

unreasonable. 

III. Responsibility Determination 

Finally, Synaptek argues that the Navy did not properly document its 

responsibility determination and, in any event, could not have determined 

rationally that OSC is a responsible offeror. “The contracting officer’s 

signing of a contract constitutes a determination that the prospective 

contractor is responsible with respect to that contract.” FAR 9.105-2(a)(1)

(2018). Contracting officers “are ‘generally given wide discretion’ in making 

responsibility determinations and in determining the amount of information 

that is required to make a responsibility determination.” Impresa 

Construzioni Geom. Domenico Garufi v. United States, 238 F.3d 1324, 1335

(Fed. Cir. 2001) (quoting John C. Grimberg Co. v. United States, 185 F.3d

1297, 1303 (Fed. Cir. 1999)). The court will afford the agency’s 

determination of responsibility the presumption of regularity until the 
19

protestor rebuts the determination with evidence that demonstrates that the 

determination was arbitrary and capricious. Id.

The contracting officer signed the award of the contract to OSC. AR 

780. Moreover, the contracting officer included a checklist responsibility 

determination in her Contract Review Board Presentation after corrective 

action. AR 628. Synaptek has not demonstrated that the agency ignored 

relevant information that was before it or pointed to information that the 

Navy should have sought out that would have disqualified OSC. We will not 

disturb the Navy’s exercise of discretion in determining OSC a responsible 

offeror.

CONCLUSION

In sum, because the Navy properly awarded the contract to OSC, we 

grant defendant’s and intervenor’s motions for judgment on the 

administrative record and deny plaintiff’s motion. The Clerk is directed to 

enter judgment for defendant. No costs.

s/Eric G. Bruggink

ERIC G. BRUGGINK

Senior Judge