Filed 1/25/24 In re Gerardo M. CA2/4

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for 

publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication 

or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION FOUR

In re GERARDO M.,

a Person Coming Under the Juvenile 

Court Law.

 B329704

 (Los Angeles County

 Super. Ct. No. 22CCJP04600)

LOS ANGELES COUNTY 

DEPARTMENT OF CHILDREN 

AND FAMILY SERVICES,

Plaintiff and Appellant,

v.

GERARDO M.,

Defendant and Respondent.

APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of Los Angeles County, 

Terry T. Truong, Judge. Affirmed.

Dawyn R. Harrison, County Counsel, Kim Nemoy, Assistant County 

Counsel, and Stephen Watson, Deputy County Counsel, for Plaintiff and 

Appellant.

Megan Turkat Schirn, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for 

Defendant and Respondent.
2

INTRODUCTION

In 2010, our Legislature passed the California Fostering Connections to 

Success Act to improve the lives of our state’s most vulnerable youth. This 

Act created, in part, Welfare and Institutions Code section 388, subdivision 

(e),1 which allows former foster youth to petition the dependency court to 

reenter extended foster care. In this appeal, the Los Angeles County 

Department of Children and Family Services (DCFS) challenges the juvenile

court’s order granting nonminor, former dependent Gerardo M.’s petition for 

reentry to extended foster care under the supervision of the dependency 

court. (§ 388, subd. (e).) Here we decide whether reentry was in Gerardo’s 

best interest and whether Gerardo intended to comply with the statutory 

requirements of reentry. We conclude the court’s ruling was well within its 

discretion and consistent with the purpose of section 388, subdivision (e), 

which was to assist former foster youth in their transition to adulthood. We 

affirm the order. 

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

On November 5, 2019, Gerardo (born May 2004) was declared a 

dependent child of the juvenile dependency court (§ 300, subds. (a), (b), (d), 

and (j)). He was removed from parental custody and ordered suitably placed. 

After Gerardo’s caregiver and maternal aunt moved out of state, Gerardo 

opted to live in a group home. On October 8, 2020, he was placed at 

Wayfinder, a short-term residential therapeutic placement facility. On 

January 3, 2021, Gerard was arrested for his part in the death of David 

McKnight-Hillman (victim), a staff member at Wayfinder. 

1 All further statutory references are to the Welfare and Institutions 

Code unless otherwise stated. 
3

On March 29, 2022, the juvenile delinquency court sustained a petition

against Gerardo (§ 602), found him guilty of voluntary manslaughter (Pen. 

Code, § 192, subd. (a)), and declared him a ward of the court. The court 

ordered Gerardo to be placed in the care and custody of the probation 

department and ordered him suitably placed at Dorothy Kirby Center

(Dorothy Kirby), a closed and secure facility. Gerardo was ordered to 

participate in 80 hours of community services, write a letter of apology to the 

victim’s family, and participate in counseling for substance abuse, anger 

management, and individual counseling as well as random drug testing. 

In May 2022, Gerardo turned 18 years old. On July 5, 2022, the 

juvenile dependency court terminated jurisdiction over him. Gerardo 

remained under the supervision of the probation department and the 

jurisdiction of the delinquency court. 

On November 22, 2022, while still detained at Dorothy Kirby, Gerardo 

filed a petition (§ 388, subd. (e)) requesting reentry to extended foster care 

under dependency court supervision. In the petition, Gerardo stated he 

planned to meet at least one of the following conditions: (1) attend a high 

school or high school equivalency certificate (GED) program; (2) attend a 

college, community college, or a vocational education program; (3) attend a 

program or take part in activities that would help train him to be employed 

or would help him solve problems that prevented him from finding a job; 

(4) work at least 80 hours a month; or (5) he had an inability to participate in 

(1) through (4) due to a medical condition. 

On December 2, 2022, a social worker interviewed Gerardo. The social 

worker described Gerardo as “not apprehensive” and responsive to her 

questions. Gerardo stated he regretted the role he played in the victim’s 

death and that regret fuels his anger, which in turn he takes out on others. 
4

Gerardo attempted to obtain Independent Living Program (ILP)2 services

through Dorothy Kirby but was rejected due to his criminal conviction. He 

stated that perhaps he “should not have been so honest.” Although Gerardo 

was to have therapy once a week at Dorothy Kirby, he now refused to see his 

assigned therapist based on his belief that she broke his confidentiality. 

When asked about his goals, Gerardo stated he wanted to be placed on a 

transitional independent living plan and finish high school. He also stated 

that he would like to find employment and permanent housing. Gerardo 

admitted there had been some altercations at Dorothy Kirby with others due 

to problems with his anger. DCFS was later provided with the incident 

reports. 

The social worker also spoke to Gerardo’s probation officer, Araceli 

Reyes. When asked about Gerardo’s release date, Reyes repeatedly stated 

that he would be released upon DCFS reopening jurisdiction. When asked if 

dependency jurisdiction was unavailable to Gerardo, Reyes responded 

possibly in March 2023. However, there was no consensus on the completion 

date of his program with Dorothy Kirby. Reyes could not provide any 

information on independent living placements with the probation 

department. 

In its December 8, 2022 response to the petition for reentry, DCFS 

opined that it was in Gerardo’s best interest to remain with the probation 

department as it suited “his overall mental health and structured needs.”

DCFS reasoned that it did not “have the capabilities or placement resources” 

necessary for Gerardo equivalent to the extensive services the probation 

2 The ILP provides training, services, and benefits to assist current and 

former foster youth in achieving self-sufficiency prior to, and after leaving, 

the foster care system. 
5

department was already providing him. Gerardo also did not qualify under 

the provisions of the DCFS extended foster care program due to the severity 

of his voluntary manslaughter conviction. In addition, Gerardo’s criminal 

conviction demonstrated aggressive behavior. Gerardo admitted “he still has 

difficulty in controlling his anger and is refusing medical health services, 

which might pose a risk to himself and . . . others.” DCFS concluded that

“Gerardo is in need of a more restrictive structural locked placement 

environment that only probation can provide for him with the services at this 

time.” Therefore, DCFS recommended that the petition be denied and that 

the probation department continue supervision over Gerardo. 

In a January 4, 2023 letter, Reyes stated that Gerardo had “effectively 

utilize[d] his coping skills to avoid maladaptive behavioral patterns and 

navigate unfavorable situations.” Gerardo met weekly with a mental health 

therapist to decrease negative symptoms and behaviors. He completed a 

substance abuse program, participated in behavioral therapy, and appeared 

“to be motivated to engage in the therapeutic process.” Reyes stated that 

Gerardo’s primary goal was to obtain independent living services upon his 

release from Dorothy Kirby and secure employment. Reyes noted that 

Gerardo had “made substantial progress toward effectively utilizing coping 

skills and maintaining sobriety.”

On January 6, 2023, the social worker spoke with Jasmine M., 

Gerardo’s mother (mother). Mother reported that she spoke to Gerardo daily, 

that they get along well, and always have. Mother stated she wanted 

Gerardo to come live with her. On January 12, 2023, the social worker spoke 

with mother again. Mother reported that Gerardo would often cry and 

complain about his family members. She also reported Gerardo had a bad 

temper that was “worse than hers,” and he had “severe anger issues.” 
6

Mother reiterated she would be willing to have Gerardo live with her but was 

worried “she might not be able to manage his impulsivity and anger.” 

On January 12, 2023, DCFS reported that the probation department 

informed the social worker Gerardo had not been approved to start ILP 

services and could only receive such services when his probation was 

terminated. Gerardo also did not qualify for housing services through the 

Youth Coordinated Entry Services (YCES) and the Los Angeles Homeless 

Services Authority (LAHSA) due to “his history,” his responses to questions 

during interviews, and the reluctance on YCES to take on the “liability.” 

On January 23, 2023, the juvenile delinquency court granted Gerardo’s 

request to be released from Dorothy Kirby to home probation with mother. 

Gerardo remained a ward of the court. His probation terms were the 

following: “no committing any crimes, obeying rules of parents, caregivers, 

[social workers], and no unlawfully threatening[,] hitting, fighting or using 

physical force on any person.” 

On February 9, 2023, a social worker spoke with mother on the phone 

to schedule a home visit. Mother informed the social worker that Gerardo 

was no longer living with her. Mother reported that on January 30, 2023, 

Gerardo got very angry with a male neighbor because the neighbor was 

sexually harassing mother and “calling her bad names.” Gerardo smashed 

mother’s cell phone, grabbed a butcher knife from the kitchen, and 

threatened to kill the neighbor. She did not call the police and instead had 

his adult sister remove him from the home. Mother was able to restrain 

Gerardo in the home and take the knife away. Mother stated she was 

“traumatized” and “scared.” She expressed concerns about Gerardo’s 

inability to control his anger and was worried he might harm or kill someone 
7

in a rage. Mother did not know Gerardo’s current whereabouts but stated 

she would take him back home when he was mentally stable. 

On February 10, 2023, the social worker contacted Gerardo’s newly 

assigned probation officer, Agustina Agredano, to inquire about the knife 

incident and her knowledge of Gerardo’s whereabouts. Agredano stated 

Gerardo called her on the date of the incident. Gerardo told her he found 

“paraphernalia” in the home and as a result got into an argument with 

mother. Agredano was on the telephone with Gerardo during the argument.

She was aware Gerardo had smashed mother’s phone and that his sister had 

picked him up. Because his sister declined to provide housing for Gerardo, 

Agredano located a 90-day shelter for Gerardo. Agredano opined that it was 

not a good plan for Gerardo to reside with mother. She further stated she did

not believe mother’s story about the knife incident. That day, mother 

contacted the social worker and stated she received a call from Agredano 

about the knife incident. Mother then recanted the knife incident and stated 

it did not happen. 

On February 15, 2023, Gerardo told the social worker that he “does not 

want counseling” and “refused to participate in counseling when he was at 

Dorothy Kirby.” On February 17, 2023, Gerardo admitted to Agredano that 

he used methamphetamine on February 8, 2023, but had not consumed any 

illegal substances since that date. He understood it was a violation of his 

probation and agreed to participate in a substance abuse program. 

On February 23, 2023, the juvenile dependency court held a hearing on 

Gerardo’s petition. Agredano testified that she met with Gerardo once a 

week. Gerardo was living at the shelter, and he was participating in case 

management, therapeutic services, and employment training. He was 

scheduled to participate in an outpatient drug program. Counsel for Gerardo 
8

and DCFS then argued the merits of the petition. The court continued the 

matter for receipt of a signed reentry agreement between Gerardo and DCFS. 

A probation progress report dated March 1, 2023 indicated Gerardo

was not in compliance. When the social worker met with him the following 

day, she stated that Gerardo appeared “high.” He admitted he did “smoke 

weed and he smokes weed here and there.” The social worker reported 

Gerardo was unable to complete the intake with an intensive outpatient drug 

program because he was missing documents. Gerardo and the social worker

signed a “Transitional Independent Living Plan & Agreement.” Gerardo and 

the social worker also signed a “Voluntary Re-Entry Agreement For Extended 

Foster Care.” 

In an interim review report dated March 9, 2023, DCFS opined that 

“[c]ontinued supervision by the Probation Department and the juvenile 

delinquency court is in Gerardo’s best interest rather than reentry into 

Extended Foster Care to be supervised by DCFS because the facts clearly 

demonstrate that he requires the structure, services and potential 

placements of that system which were specifically designed to address his 

complex issues including violence, substance abuse and an inability to control 

his anger.” In addition, “Gerardo has not made significant progress toward 

rehabilitation and therefore presents a safety risk.” And “[s]ince Gerardo’s 

release from Dorothy Kirby . . . Gerardo’s conduct did not improve, but 

rather, he regressed.” 

Agredano provided a probation department progress report, dated 

March 24, 2023. Gerardo completed one session of therapy since the last 

court date. On March 13, 2023, the social worker had discussed Gerardo’s 

lack of program participation and established goals for Gerardo, which 

included applying for a California ID, applying for a social security card, 
9

rehabilitation enrollment, and employment training. Gerardo was receptive 

to these recommendations. Gerardo was drug tested on January 25, 2023 

and February 17, 2023. He tested negative for all illegal substances. 

Gerardo admitted to using marijuana occasionally. In the report, Agredano

noted Gerardo continued to report to her when requested, and Gerardo had 

been respectful in all sessions. Gerardo’s behavior and compliance were 

“described as adequate with potential for improvement.” 

On March 26, 2023, Gerardo was arrested for public intoxication. (Pen. 

Code, § 647, subd. (f).) Gerardo was subsequently ordered by the adult 

criminal court to complete 20 hours of an Alcoholics Anonymous (AA) 

program as part of his pre-plea diversion. 

In a report dated May 1, 2023, Agredano stated Gerardo was in 

violation of his probation. However, Agredano entered into “an agreement 

[with] Gerardo to participate in a substance abuse program.”

On May 1, 2023, the juvenile delinquency court held a hearing and 

found Gerardo remained a ward of the court. The court stated the January 

23, 2023 order of home on probation remained in full force and effect. The 

court noted that Gerardo currently lived in a homeless shelter and was

receiving counseling services. Gerardo was admonished about “picking up an 

adult case and his lack of desire to attend school.” 

On May 18, 2023, the hearing on Gerardo’s petition in juvenile 

dependency court resumed. Agredano testified again. She stated that 

Gerardo enrolled at Homeboy Industries (Homeboy) on May 2, 2023. He 

attended Homeboy Monday through Friday, from 9:00 a.m. to 3:00 p.m. At 

Homeboy, Gerardo received employment services and attended a school 

program and an AA class. The school program provided resources for 

Gerardo to attain the four credits needed to complete his high school 
10

education. Gerardo enrolled in the AA class on May 8, 2023, and had

attended three sessions. She reported that once Gerardo receives his credits 

and completes his AA classes, he will be offered a full-time job at Homeboy. 

Gerardo also attended three sessions with a therapist at the shelter where he 

was living. Agredano stated she had been testing Gerardo monthly for 

substances, and he had only tested positive for marijuana. Gerardo freely 

admitted he was using marijuana. Agredano testified she spoke to his 

caseworker at the shelter, and the caseworker stated Gerardo is “doing well,” 

“gets along with the other residents,” and “is in good spirits since he started 

. . . at Homeboy.”

Agredano acknowledged that Gerardo violated probation based on his 

drug use and citation for drinking in public. She emphasized that Gerardo 

was taking the AA class and would participate in a substance abuse program. 

Agredano reported Gerardo was “still in compliance.” Agredano explained 

that the juvenile delinquency court was aware of his probation violations but 

was satisfied with Agredano’s recommendation of AA and a substance abuse 

program. In addition, Gerardo complied with other conditions of probation, 

such as being responsive to Agredano and her recommendations, and his 

involvement with Homeboy. After argument from counsel, the court took the 

matter under submission. 

On May 24, 2023, the juvenile dependency court issued its written 

order granting Gerardo’s petition, over DCFS’s objection.3

DCFS filed a timely notice of appeal. 

3 The court had admitted DCFS reports, juvenile delinquency minute 

orders, a probation officer progress report dated March 24, 2023, and a 

voluntary reentry agreement dated February 22, 2023. 
11

DISCUSSION

I. Legal Framework

Before 2008, most dependent minors became ineligible for foster care 

on their 18th birthday. In 2008, Congress passed the Fostering Connections 

to Success and Increasing Adoptions Act of 2008 (P.L. 110–351) to improve 

the outcomes of minors who aged out of foster care. The legislation provided 

federal funding to reimburse states for part of the cost of providing 

maintenance payments to eligible nonminors who remained in foster care 

after their 18th birthdays. (Congressional Research Service, “Child Welfare: 

The Fostering Connections to Success and Increasing Adoptions Act of 2008 

(P.L. 110–351),” Oct. 9, 2008, pp. 9–10.)

In 2010, in order to take advantage of expanded federal foster care 

funding, our Legislature passed the California Fostering Connections to 

Success Act (Assem. Bill No. 12 (2009–2010 Reg. Sess.) Sept. 30, 2010, as 

amended by Assem. Bill No. 212 (2011–2012 Reg. Sess.) Oct. 4, 2011 (Act)). 

As noted by the Act’s author, the federal legislation “‘provides California with 

an unprecedented opportunity to access federal funding to improve the lives 

of our state’s most vulnerable youth.’” (Assem. Committee on Human 

Resources (Assem. Bill No. 12), Apr. 13, 2009, p. 7.) The goal of the Act was 

“to assist foster youth, or ‘nonminor dependents’ . . . in their transition to 

adulthood by providing them with the opportunity to create a case plan 

alongside their case worker tailored to their individual needs, which charts 

the course towards independence through incremental levels of 

responsibility. It is a voluntary program grounded in evidence of how the 

option of continued support to age 21 can counter the dismal outcomes faced 

by youth who are forced to leave the foster care system at age 18 . . . . [The 

Act] provides nonminors with the option to petition to reenter care if they opt 
12

out of extended care and want to return before age 21, provided they meet the 

eligibility criteria.” (Assem. Committee on Human Resources (Assem. Bill 

No. 212), March 29, 2011, pp. 3–4.) 

As relevant here, section 388, subdivision (e) was added to the Welfare 

and Institutions Code as part of the Act. This statute provides that a 

nonminor, former dependent, ranging from 18 to 21 years of age, may petition 

the juvenile dependency court for purposes of reentry to extended foster care. 

(§ 388, subd. (e)(1)(A), see § 303, subds. (b), (c); California Rules of Court, rule 

5.906.) 

Once a nonminor files a petition, “[t]he court shall resume dependency 

jurisdiction over a former dependent . . . and order that the nonminor’s 

placement and care be under the responsibility of [DCFS] . . . if the court 

finds all of the following: [¶] (i) The nonminor was previously under juvenile 

court jurisdiction, subject to an order for foster care placement when the 

nonminor attained 18 years of age. [¶] (ii) The nonminor has not attained 

21 years of age. [¶] (iii) Reentry and remaining in foster care are in the 

nonminor’s best interests. [¶] (iv) The nonminor intends to satisfy, and 

agrees to satisfy, at least one of the [conditions] set forth in paragraphs (1) to 

(5), inclusive, of subdivision (b) of Section 11403.” (§ 388, subd. (e)(5)(A).) 

Section 11403, subdivision (b) provides the following conditions: “(1) The 

nonminor is completing secondary education or a program leading to an 

equivalent credential. [¶] (2) The nonminor is enrolled in an institution that

provides postsecondary or vocational education. [¶] (3) The nonminor is 

participating in a program or activity designed to promote, or remove 

barriers to employment. [¶] (4) The nonminor is employed for at least 80 

hours per month. [¶] (5) The nonminor is incapable of doing any of the 
13

activities described in subparagraphs (1) to (4), inclusive, due to a medical 

condition.” (§ 11403, subd. (b)(1)–(5).)

On appeal, DCFS only challenges the court’s findings that reentry to 

extended foster care is in Gerardo’s best interest and Gerardo intended to 

comply with one of the required statutory conditions for reentry. (§ 388, 

subd. (e)(5)(A)(iii-iv).) We review the juvenile dependency court’s decision to 

grant the section 388 petition for abuse of discretion. (See In re Stephanie M. 

(1994) 7 Cal.4th 295, 318.)

II. Best Interest

DCFS contends the court abused its discretion in finding that 

dependency jurisdiction was in Gerardo’s best interest. We are not 

persuaded. 

Section 388, subdivision (e)(5)(A)(iii) requires a finding that “[r]eentry 

and remaining in foster care are in the nonminor’s best interests.” DCFS 

notes that this statutory provision does not define “best interests,” and relies 

on In re Robert L. (1998) 68 Cal.App.4th 789 (Robert L.) and In re Holly H.

(2002) 104 Cal.App.4th 1324 (Holly H.) for guidance. In Robert L., the issue 

was whether the juvenile court abused its discretion in continuing 

jurisdiction under section 3034 over two nonminors, who had been in longterm foster care with their maternal grandparents and, at the time of the 

order, were attending college while continuing to live with the grandparents. 

The court’s decision was based upon a finding that continued jurisdiction 

would allow the grandparents to continue receiving funding. This would 

4 Section 303 states: “The court may retain jurisdiction over any person 

who is found to be a ward or dependent child of the juvenile court until the 

ward or dependent child attains 21 years of age.”
14

allow them to pay for the nonminors’ clothing, food, and shelter, and thus 

enable the nonminors to continue as full-time students. (68 Cal.App.4th at p. 

793.) The appellate court stated that “[i]n determining whether to terminate

jurisdiction . . . , the issue to be addressed is the best interest of the child.” 

(Ibid.) Because “best interest” had not been defined, the court was guided by 

section 300.2,5 “which discusses the purpose behind the dependency laws.” 

(Id. at p. 794.) Based on this statute, the court concluded “that exercise of 

jurisdiction must be based upon existing and reasonably foreseeable future 

harm to the welfare of the child.” (Ibid.) The court observed the record was 

devoid of any evidence that the nonminors were being physically, sexually or 

emotionally abused, neglected, or exploited, or that such harm might occur in 

the future. The court concluded that continued jurisdiction on the “sole 

basis” that such would afford special assistance to allow the nonminors to 

complete their college education was an abuse of discretion. (Id. at p. 797.)

In Holly H., the juvenile court terminated jurisdiction over a nonminor 

after finding the social services agency had met the requirements of (the then 

5 Section 300.2 states: “Notwithstanding any other provision of law, the 

purpose of the provisions of this chapter relating to dependent children is to 

provide maximum safety and protection for children who are currently being 

physically, sexually, or emotionally abused, being neglected, or being 

exploited, and to ensure the safety, protection, and physical and emotional 

well-being of children who are at risk of that harm. This safety, protection, 

and physical and emotional well-being may include provision of a full array of 

social and health services to help the child and family and to prevent reabuse 

of children. The focus shall be on the preservation of the family as well as the 

safety, protection, and physical and emotional well-being of the child. The 

provision of a home environment free from the negative effects of substance 

abuse is a necessary condition for the safety, protection and physical and 

emotional well-being of the child. Successful participation in a treatment 

program for substance abuse may be considered in evaluating the home 

environment.” 
15

recently enacted) section 391 by providing the nonminor with certain 

resources,6 and that the nonminor had “given every indication that she [did] 

not want the assistance of the juvenile dependency system.” (104 

Cal.App.4th at p. 1337.) The nonminor appealed. The appellate court

adhered to the decision in Robert L., “that jurisdiction should be retained by 

the juvenile court beyond a dependent’s 18th birthday only when there is an 

existing or reasonably foreseeable threat of harm to the child.” (Id. at p. 

1327.) In light of this standard and “the autonomy to which a person over 18 

is entitled,” the court held it was not an abuse of discretion to “give

substantial deference to the [nonminor’s] wishes before deciding to retain 

jurisdiction.” (Ibid.)

The two cases DCFS relies on for the “best interest” analysis predate 

the codification of section 388, subdivision (e), and are therefore not 

instructive. (See In re Aaron S. (2015) 235 Cal.App.4th 507, 520.) In 

addition, both cases dealt with the issue of whether to terminate jurisdiction

over a nonminor; Robert L. under section 303 and Holly H. under section 391. 

We note that, unlike the nonminor in Holly H., Gerardo gave every indication 

he wanted to reenter dependency jurisdiction in order to take advantage of 

the benefits provided by the Act. Here, we consider a nonminor’s request for 

resumption of dependency jurisdiction after such jurisdiction was terminated. 

Moreover, a “best interest” finding under DCFS’s definition would run 

counter to the purpose of the statute. The purpose of section 388, subdivision 

(e) was to extend payment benefits and provide transitional support services 

for eligible nonminors who would otherwise age out of the foster care system. 

6 “Section 391 contains a legislative directive that before jurisdiction of 

the juvenile court over a dependent child who has reached age 18 is 

terminated, certain minimal assistance and documentation be afforded the 

youth.” (Holly H., supra, 104 Cal.App.4th at p. 1333.) 
16

The Legislature found that former foster youth, when compared with other 

young adults of the same age, are less likely to complete high school, attend 

college, or be employed. (Assem. Committee on Human Services (Assem. Bill 

No. 12), Apr. 13, 2009, pp. 6–7.) They are also more inclined to become 

homeless, incarcerated, and receive government assistance. (Ibid.) As the 

court explained in In re Nadia G. (2013) 216 Cal.App.4th 1110, the purpose of 

the Act was to assist nonminors who were being left to fend for themselves 

when they turned age 18, often without the skills and resources to be selfsupporting. (Id. at pp. 1117–1118; see In re Jesse S. (2017) 12 Cal.App.5th 

611, 617–618; In re K.L. (2012) 210 Cal.App.4th 632, 637 [the Act provided 

“assistance and support in developing a personalized transition plan for all 

youths before they age out of foster care”].) 

In its ruling, the juvenile court found reentry to extended foster care 

was in Gerardo’s best interest because “the services, support, and oversight 

offered through the dependency system is superior to that of the juvenile 

justice system.” “Under the dependency court’s jurisdiction, Gerardo would 

have access to social workers and lawyers who specialize in Nonminor 

Dependency Law, as well as the linkages necessary to transition into fullfledged adulthood.” The court further found that “[h]aving completed his 

program at Dorothy Kirby Center, it is appropriate for the dependency 

system to assist Gerardo as he reintegrates in mainstream society as an 

adult.” The court concluded, “Gerardo deserves a chance to avail himself of 

[the Act’s] services to become a more productive and stable adult—for his

sake and for the sake of society at large.” 

We recognize, as the trial court did, that the purpose of the Act is to 

provide financial support, employment and educational services to 

nonminors, who like Gerardo, have faced adversity and do not yet have the 
17

skills to be independent. We acknowledge that Gerardo committed a heinous 

crime as a minor and was prosecuted for it. The record indicates Gerardo has 

made progress in setting constructive goals and developing appropriate 

coping skills. With the guidance of his probation officer and the mentorship 

and vocational support of Homeboy, Gerardo has taken steps toward 

becoming a contributing member of the community. While we cannot predict 

the future, we believe section 388, subdivision (e) gives nonminors such as 

Gerardo an opportunity to change the trajectory of their lives and become 

productive members of society. 

In light of the statutory intent of section 388, subdivision (e), we hold 

that the court acted within its discretion in finding resumption of dependency 

jurisdiction was in Gerardo’s best interest. 

III. Statutory Conditions of Reentry 

DCFS argues the court also abused its discretion in finding Gerardo 

intended to comply with the statutory conditions of reentry. We disagree. 

In his petition for reentry to extended foster care, Gerardo indicated 

that he planned to meet the conditions listed in subdivision (b) of section 

11403. Gerardo voiced his educational and occupational goals to his social 

worker, and both of his probation officers. Gerardo’s most recent probation 

officer echoed those goals at both hearings on the petition. Specifically, 

Gerardo wanted and intended to finish high school and attain employment 

and permanent housing. He also agreed to a substance abuse program and 

employment services. 

In clarifying its intention for the Act, the Legislature stated that a 

nonminor “should not necessarily already be enrolled in school or have a job 

in order to restart this assistance, but rather be able and express their 
18

intention to comply with the eligibility standards.” (See Assem. Committee 

on Judiciary (Assem. Bill No. 212), March 29, 2011, p. 5.) Contrary to 

DCFS’s contention, a nonminor is not required “to demonstrate that he or she 

already meets one of the allowable five work or education participation 

criteria” set forth in 11403, subdivision (b). (Ibid.) A failure to meet any of 

the statutory requirements is an issue for a future hearing. We decline to 

adopt DCFS’s assessment of Gerardo’s likelihood of success. Therefore, we 

conclude the court acted within its discretion in finding Gerardo intended to 

comply with these statutory requirements. 

DISPOSITION 

The order is affirmed. 

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

ZUKIN, J.

WE CONCUR:

COLLINS, Acting P. J.

MORI, J.