Filed 8/1/23

CERTIFIED FOR PUBLICATION

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION EIGHT

MICHELE EARLEY et al.,

Petitioners,

v.

WORKERS’ 

COMPENSATION APPEALS 

BOARD,

Respondent.

INSURANCE COMPANY OF 

THE STATE OF 

PENNSYLVANIA et al.,

 Real Parties in Interest.

B318842

(W.C.A.B. Nos. 

ADJ4430885, 

ADJ11016330, 

ADJ10047707, 

ADJ9372475, 

ADJ11934915, 

ADJ11733861)

ORIGINAL PROCEEDING in mandate to the Workers’ 

Compensation Appeals Board. Petition granted.

Thomas F. Martin; The Rondeau Law Firm and Charles R. 

Rondeau for Petitioners. 

Mokri Vanis & Jones and Eric J. Danowitz for Amtrust 

North America, Farmers Insurance Exchange, Insurance 
2

Company of the West and Liberty Mutual Insurance Group as 

Amici Curiae on behalf of Petitioners. 

Brissman & Nemat, Best Best & Krieger, Mona Nemat; 

Litigation and Consulting Associates and Timothy I. Mulcahey 

for Mesa Pharmacy, Inc., as Amicus Curiae on behalf of 

Petitioners.

Anne Schmitz and Allison J. Fairchild for Respondent.

No appearance for Real Parties in Interest.

_________________________________

We invalidate a longstanding practice of the Workers’ 

Compensation Appeals Board (Board) in ruling on petitions for 

reconsideration.

A party to a workers’ compensation proceeding can petition 

the Board for reconsideration if that party is unhappy with the 

ruling of either a workers’ compensation judge or the Board itself. 

By statute, the Board must act upon such petitions within 60 

days. To satisfy this requirement, the Board often grants 

petitions for purposes of further study without first deciding 

whether reconsideration is actually warranted. Later—

sometimes many months after the petition for reconsideration 

was filed—the Board issues a decision on the merits affirming, 

reversing, or modifying the ruling at issue. 

Five Petitioners correctly argue the Board’s grant-for-study 

procedure is an unauthorized way to extend the 60-day deadline. 

A statute requires the Board to make a reasoned decision when 

granting reconsideration. The Board may not simply grant 

reconsideration for the purpose of further study. We therefore 

issue a writ of mandate requiring the Board to cease its grant-for-
3

study procedure and to comply with the statute when granting 

reconsideration. 

We also hold that the Board is not required to issue a final 

ruling on the merits within 60 days. Statutory language negates 

the Petitioners’ argument to the contrary.

Section citations are to the Labor Code.

I

We lay out some facts.

A

The Petitioners are Michele Earley, Ashraf Gorgi, Hyun 

Sook Lee, Roman Hernandez Aguilar, and Jose Flores Campos. 

Each is a claimant in a workers’ compensation proceeding. In 

each case, the Board issued a grant-for-study order.

The Petitioners’ grant-for-study orders arose in different 

situations with different timelines. In Earley’s case, the 

employer sought reconsideration of an order by the workers’ 

compensation judge that granted reimbursement for some selfprocured medical treatment. The Board issued its grant-forstudy order on June 29, 2020. Gorgi sought reconsideration of an 

order finding that only one injury was work related. The Board 

issued its grant-for-study order on August 4, 2021. Lee’s 

employer petitioned for reconsideration from an award of 100 

percent permanent disability. The Board issued its grant-forstudy order on September 10, 2021. In Aguilar’s and Flores’s 

cases, the employer sought reconsideration of an order that found 

Aguilar and Flores to be employees. The Board issued its grantfor-study order on September 24, 2021.

The cases are different but the Board’s orders were exactly 

the same: 
4

“Taking into accountthe statutory time constraints for acting

on the petition, and based upon our initial review ofthe record, we

believe reconsideration must be granted to allow sufficient

opportunity to further study the factual and legal issues in this

case. We believe thatthis action is necessary to give us a complete

understanding ofthe record and to enable us to issue a just and

reasoned decision. Reconsideration will be granted for this purpose

and for such further proceedings as we may hereafter determine to

be appropriate.”

The uniform language of these orders reveals a standard 

form and not particularized analyses.

When Petitioners filed their petition in this court, the 

Board had not yet issued a decision in any of their cases. 

However, the Board issued final rulings in each case after 

Petitioners initiated this writ proceeding and before the Board 

filed its initial response to Petitioners’ Petition. The time 

between the filing of the grant-for-study orders and the Board’s 

final decisions ranged from five to 21 months.

B

The Board explained its grant-for-study procedure. It 

generally tries to identify significant cases or those requiring en 

banc review, and cases involving complicated or novel issues. It 

was able to trace the history of this practice to the 1950’s; an 

earlier origin existed but is lost in time. The Board surmised the 

grant-for-study procedure “evolved naturally” from 1913 statutes 

that allowed the Industrial Accident Commission (a precursor to 

the Board) either to grant or to deny rehearing and thereafter to 

issue a decision after rehearing. 

The Board decides most petitions for reconsideration within 

60 days. However, the Board issued grant-for-study orders in 
5

about 19 percent of cases from 2015 to 2019 and in about 38.5 

percent of cases in the pandemic-affected years of 2020 and 2021.

According to the results of a public records request that 

Petitioners served on the Board, as of November 2, 2021, there 

were 543 workers’ compensation cases awaiting a final decision 

in which the Board had issued a grant-for-study order between 

October 1, 2018 and October 1, 2021.

II

The Board must comply with section 5908.5 when it orders 

reconsideration. That is, the Board must state in detail the 

reasons for its decision and the evidence supporting it. Those 

reasons must be based on the grounds identified in section 5903. 

The Board need not, however, issue a final order within 60 days. 

The review necessary to support a decision to grant a petition for 

reconsideration within 60 days does not involve the same burden 

as the preparation of a final ruling. The Board must engage in 

the analysis necessary to permit a reasoned decision as to 

whether reconsideration is warranted based upon the factors 

identified in section 5903 and the evidence in the particular case. 

The Board then can decide whether to affirm, to modify, or to 

vacate the order at issue after further consideration and a more 

thorough review of the record. 

At oral argument, the Board assured us it carefully reviews 

the cases in which it decides to issue a grant-for-study order. A 

careful review is not enough. Section 5908.5 requires the Board 

to go a step further and to explain in its order granting 

reconsideration why it made the decision to grant reconsideration 

based upon the evidence in the particular case.

We proceed in three steps. First we discuss mootness. 

Second, we show section 5908.5 requires the Board to explain its 
6

reasons for granting reconsideration and to identify the evidence 

supporting its decision. Third, we reject the Petitioners’ claim 

that the Board must reach a final decision within 60 days.

A

A writ of mandate to the Board is proper to compel it to 

perform acts required by law. (Code Civ. Proc., § 1085, subd. (a); 

§ 5955; Greener v. Workers’ Comp. Appeals Bd. (1993) 6 Cal.4th 

1028, 1046.) A petitioner must show the Board has a clear duty 

and the petitioner has a beneficial right to have the Board 

perform that duty. (Santa Clara County Counsel Attys. Assn. v. 

Woodside (1994) 7 Cal.4th 525, 539–540 (Santa Clara County).)

The petition now is moot because the Board has issued 

final rulings in each case. Yet we may consider moot issues that 

are of public interest, that are capable of repetition, and that may 

evade review. (Smith v. Superior Court (2020) 52 Cal.App.5th 57, 

68.) This issue is of public interest and is likely to recur. The 

issue also can evade review if the Board repeats what it has done 

here: issue a final ruling after a party seeks writ review. We 

thus consider this petition.

B

Section 5908.5 requires the Board to explain its reasons for 

granting reconsideration and to identify the evidence supporting 

its decision. The statute is clear. The Board must obey it. 

This section states:

“Any decision of the appeals board granting or denying a 

petition for reconsideration or affirming, rescinding, altering, or 

amending the original findings, order, decision, or award following 

reconsideration shall be made by the appeals board and not by a 

workers’ compensation judge and shall be in writing, signed by a 

majority of the appeals board members assigned thereto, and shall 
7

state the evidence relied upon and specify in detail the reasons for 

the decision.” (§ 5908.5, italics added.)

The Board’s reasons must be based on the grounds 

identified in section 5903. (Hall v. Workers’ Comp. Appeals Bd.

(1986) 179 Cal.App.3d 850, 856 (Hall).) Section 5903 specifies 

grounds for rehearing a case, including that the Board acted in 

excess of its powers and so forth. 

Cases applying section 5908.5 recognize that a decision of 

the Board granting or denying a petition for reconsideration must 

state the evidence relied upon and must specify in detail the 

reasons for the decision. (See Le Vesque v. Workers’ Comp. 

Appeals Bd. (1970) 1 Cal.3d 627, 634–635 & fn. 11 (Le Vesque);

Evans v. Workmen’s Comp. Appeals Bd. (1968) 68 Cal.2d 753, 

754–755 (Evans); Hall, supra, 179 Cal.App.3d at pp. 858–859; 

Zozaya v. Workmen’s Comp. Appeals Bd. (1972) 27 Cal.App.3d 

464, 471, fn. 2, 472 (Zozaya); Solomon v. Workmen’s Comp. 

Appeals Bd. (1972) 24 Cal.App.3d 282, 284–286 (Solomon).) 

The Board’s grant-for-study orders in these cases fell short. 

These orders gave no reason for granting reconsideration other 

than a boilerplate statement that further study is necessary 

“based upon our initial review of the record.” A rubber stamp 

could have authored these statements.

In response to this court’s order to show cause, the Board 

explicated, not the governing section 5908.5, but a different 

section: section 5909, which states “[a] petition for 

reconsideration is deemed to have been denied by the appeals 

board unless it is acted upon within 60 days from the date of 

filing.” This point carries no force. Section 5908.5 sets the 

requirements for a decision. Section 5909 explains the 

consequence of no decision. (Cf. Evans, supra, 68 Cal.2d at p. 755 
8

[purpose of § 5908.5 is to help the Board avoid careless or 

arbitrary action, to show reviewing courts the principles the 

Board relied upon, and to make the right of review more 

meaningful].) Section 5909 does not apply here because in each 

of these cases the Board rendered some decision, not no decision.

The Board does not claim that its standard grant-for-study 

order complies with section 5908.5. Rather, its defense of the 

grant-for-study procedure focuses on the long tenure of the 

procedure and the claimed impossibility of issuing a reasoned 

order in all cases. But a long-standing and incorrect procedure 

remains incorrect. And a claim that compliance is impossible is 

in essence a plea for more funding. This claim is misdirected 

because the Court of Appeal is not the entity setting the Board’s 

budget.

At oral argument, the Board also suggested that section 

5908.5 serves no useful function when the Board grants 

reconsideration for further review without the expectation of any 

additional evidence or argument from the parties. Section 5908.5 

does not contain any exception for that situation, however, and 

the Board does not have the authority to ignore the statute. The 

Board’s argument also ignores the reasons our Supreme Court 

identified in Evans for the existence of section 5908.5. Even if 

the Board does not order additional evidence, identifying the 

reasons for reconsideration assists the parties in deciding 

whether to challenge the Board’s decision to grant 

reconsideration through a petition for a writ of mandate, and 

helps the reviewing court if such a petition is filed. And 

requiring the Board to explain its reasons helps to ensure that 

the Board grants a petition for reconsideration only in 

circumstances permitted by section 5903.
9

In addition to the plain language of section 5908.5, 

Petitioners suggest another reason why the Board’s grant-forstudy procedure is improper. Petitioners argue the grant-forstudy practice is an “underground” rulemaking procedure that 

does not comply with the California Administrative Procedure 

Act (Gov. Code, § 11340 et seq.). At oral argument, Petitioners 

conceded a decision on this point would merely be an alternative 

holding. It is unnecessary to reach this argument.

C

Contrary to the Petitioners’ further argument, the Board is 

not required to issue a final ruling on the merits within 60 days. 

The Petitioners maintain that reading sections 5909 and 

5315 together means the Board must finally resolve a petition for 

reconsideration within 60 days. Statutory text invalidates this 

proposed interpretation. We turn to that text.

We repeat our quotation of section 5909:

“A petition for reconsideration is deemed to have been denied 

by the appeals board unless it is acted upon within 60 days from 

the date of filing.” 

This section does not state the Board must issue a final 

decision on the merits of a petition within 60 days.

Next we quote the other provision on which Petitioners 

rely, section 5315:

“Within 60 days after the filing of the findings, decision, 

order or award, the appeals board may confirm, adopt, modify or 

set aside the findings, order, decision, or award of a workers’ 

compensation judge and may, with or without further proceedings, 

and with or without notice, enter its order, findings, decision, or 

award based upon the record in the case.” (Italics added.)
10

The fact that “further proceedings” are permissible before 

the Board enters its own order means that the initial order 

setting aside the workers’ compensation decision need not be 

final. (§ 5315.) 

Case law aligns on this point.

An order granting reconsideration may “set aside” a 

workers’ compensation judge’s decision without substituting the 

Board’s own ruling. For example, in Zozaya, the Board initially 

issued an order granting reconsideration of a referee’s findings 

and award “and ordered that said findings and award be set 

aside.” (Zozaya, supra, 27 Cal.App.3d at p. 466.) Then, after an 

additional medical examination, the Board issued a “ ‘Decision 

After Reconsideration’ ” vacating its earlier order and affirming 

and adopting the referee’s original findings and award. (Id. at p. 

469.) 

Other sections within the statutory scheme, and the cases 

interpreting them, also make clear that a separate ruling on the 

merits may follow an initial order granting reconsideration. 

Section 5906 states that, “[u]pon the filing of a petition for 

reconsideration, or having granted reconsideration upon its own 

motion, the appeals board may, with or without further 

proceedings and with or without notice affirm, rescind, alter, or 

amend” a workers’ compensation judge’s order “on the basis of 

the evidence previously submitted in the case, or may grant 

reconsideration and direct the taking of additional evidence.” 

(Italics added.) Both the reference to further proceedings and the 

taking of additional evidence show that the initial order granting 

reconsideration need not be the final order. (See also Zozaya, 

supra, 27 Cal.App.3d at pp. 468–469 [noting that, in appointing 
11

an additional medical examiner after granting reconsideration, 

the Board acted within the scope of § 5906].) 

Section 5908 permits a final ruling affirming, rescinding, 

altering, or amending the original order that is made “[a]fter the 

taking of additional evidence and a consideration of all of the 

facts.” And section 5908.5 imposes the requirement of a reasoned 

ruling both on the initial decision “granting or denying a petition 

for reconsideration” and a subsequent order “following 

reconsideration.” 

Section 5907 gives the Board the authority to issue a final 

ruling when it grants reconsideration, but it does not require it to 

do so. That section states that “[i]f, at the time of granting 

reconsideration, it appears to the satisfaction of the appeals 

board that no sufficient reason exists for taking further 

testimony, the appeals board may affirm, rescind, alter, or 

amend” the workers compensation judge’s decision, and “may” 

without further proceedings or notice “enter its findings, order, 

decision, or award based upon the record in the case.” Section 

5907’s use of the volitional term “may” does not preclude the 

Board from issuing a later, final decision on the merits after 

reconsideration even without additional evidence. That reading 

is consistent with section 5906, which, as mentioned, permits 

“further proceedings” after granting reconsideration followed by a 

final order “on the basis of the evidence previously submitted in 

the case.”

Petitioners argue that the references in the governing 

statutes to “further proceedings” concerns those situations where 

additional evidence is necessary. Petitioners assert that, when 

sections 5906 and 5907 are read together, they mean that the 

Board may only act as an “appellate tribunal,” and in that 
12

capacity must “either grant or deny reconsideration based upon 

the existing evidentiary record or . . . order further development 

of the record if deemed necessary at the trial level.” Petitioners 

claim that another petition for reconsideration would then be 

necessary following additional evidence and further proceedings 

before the workers’ compensation judge.

That interpretation cannot be reconciled with the statutory 

language for three reasons. 

First, as noted above, section 5908.5 itself contemplates a 

two-step procedure that involves first granting a petition for 

reconsideration and then ruling on the merits. Otherwise, there 

would be no need to distinguish a decision “granting or denying a 

petition for reconsideration” and a decision “affirming, 

rescinding, altering, or amending the original findings, order, 

decision, or award following reconsideration.” (§ 5908.5, italics 

added.) In Le Vesque, our Supreme Court recognized these two 

steps in explaining that the requirements of section 5908.5 must 

be met at each stage: “In granting a petition for 

reconsideration, . . . the appeals board should comply with 

section 5908.5 in order to apprise the parties and the referee as to 

the basis for reconsideration. . . . [I]f the appeals board complies 

with section 5908.5, the parties will understand what new 

evidence or arguments they should present upon 

reconsideration. [Citation.] If the appeals board grants 

reconsideration, and without taking further evidence, affirms, 

rescinds, or amends the original award [citations], Evans 

requires full compliance with section 5908.5.” (Le Vesque, supra, 

1 Cal.3d at p. 635, fn. 11.)

Second, section 5906 permits a two-step procedure even 

when the Board issues a ruling on the existing evidence. That 
13

section states that, “[u]pon the filing of a petition for 

reconsideration,” the Board “may, with or without further 

proceedings . . . affirm, rescind, alter, or amend the order, 

decision, or award made and filed by the appeals board or the 

workers’ compensation judge on the basis of the evidence 

previously submitted in the case, or may grant reconsideration 

and direct the taking of additional evidence.” (§ 5906, italics 

added.) The reference to further proceedings even when the 

Board makes a final ruling based upon the existing evidence 

means the Board may grant reconsideration and later issue a 

ruling on the merits even if it takes no additional evidence. 

Third, as noted above, by using the word “may,” section 

5907 permits the Board to enter a final order at the time it grants 

reconsideration, but it does not require the Board to do so.

Cases recognize that a separate and final ruling on the 

merits may follow an order granting reconsideration. (See, e.g., 

Le Vesque, supra, 1 Cal.3d at pp. 633–634; see also Zozaya, supra, 

27 Cal.App.3d at pp. 468–469 [ruling on the merits issued almost 

six months after the order granting reconsideration]; Solomon, 

supra, 24 Cal.App.3d at p. 287 [holding that noncompliance with 

section 5908.5 in a decision granting reconsideration is not cured 

by subsequent compliance in a decision following 

reconsideration]; Urlwin v. Workers’ Comp. Appeals Bd. (1981) 

126 Cal.App.3d 466, 469–470 [decision after reconsideration 

violated § 5908.5 by purporting to incorporate the petition for 

reconsideration].) 

Our Supreme Court has also explained that “[t]here is no 

provision in chapter 7, dealing with proceedings for 

reconsideration and judicial review, limiting the time within 

which the commission may make its decision on reconsideration, 
14

and in the absence of a statutory limitation none will be implied.” 

(Gonzales v. Industrial Acci. (1958) 50 Cal.2d 360, 364.) 

Petitioners argue that this statement in Gonzales is dicta; we 

disagree and read the statement as necessary to the ruling but 

would count it as compellingly persuasive authority even were it 

a dictum. (Hubbard v. Superior Court (1997) 66 Cal.App.4th 

1163, 1169 [intermediate appellate court justices should follow 

Supreme Court dicta].)

Our Supreme Court has also recognized the Board’s 

authority to issue a final ruling that addresses issues not 

included in its initial grant of reconsideration. In Argonaut Ins. 

Exchange v. Industrial Acci. Comm. (1958) 49 Cal.2d 706, a 

referee approved a compromise and release that awarded a death 

benefit to a deceased worker’s survivors after increasing the 

stipulated amount of attorney fees. The Board granted 

reconsideration on its own motion to review the attorney fee 

decision. In a later “decision after reconsideration,” the Board 

substituted its own findings on the amount of the death benefit. 

In affirming the Board’s decision, the court explained, though the 

commission decided to reconsider the case because of the attorney 

fees, its reconsideration was not limited to this issue. “The 

commission was not required to take further evidence (Lab. Code, 

§§ 5906, 5907) and it could redetermine the case upon the 

existing record pursuant to its statutory powers. (Lab. Code, 

§§ 5900, subd. (a), 5903.)” (Argonaut, at p. 711.) 

This holding shows that the Board may initially grant 

reconsideration and later issue a ruling on the merits 

determining any issues that the Board has the statutory power to 

decide, without additional proceedings and without ordering 

additional evidence. 
15

For these reasons, we also reject Petitioners’ request at oral 

argument that we interpret the term “acted upon” in section 5909 

to require some final action on a petition for reconsideration 

within 60 days. Section 5909 simply requires that the Board 

“act[ ] upon” a petition for reconsideration within 60 days by 

granting or denying the petition, not by finally deciding the 

merits.

III

Petitioners seek an award of attorney fees under Code of 

Civil Procedure section 1021.5. Such an award requires 

Petitioners to show that they were a “successful party,” and also 

that (1) their petition conferred a “significant benefit” on the 

general public or a large class of persons; (2) an attorney fee 

award is appropriate in light of “the necessity and financial 

burden of private enforcement;” and (3) in the interest of justice 

their fees should not be paid out of Petitioners’ recovery, if any. 

(Ibid.) Because this is an original proceeding, this court must 

decide whether Petitioners are entitled to fees under this 

standard and, if so, the amount. (See Cruz v. Superior Court 

(2004) 120 Cal.App.4th 175, 191.) 

Petitioners were partially successful but did not obtain all 

the relief they sought. Petitioners successfully challenged the 

lawfulness of the Board’s current grant-for-study practice, 

resulting in an order that will require the Board to comply with 

section 5908.5 when it grants reconsideration. They did not 

achieve their aim of requiring the Board to issue final rulings on 

petitions for reconsideration within 60 days.

The relief that Petitioners obtained will confer a significant 

benefit on people who obtain a favorable workers’ compensation

ruling that is then challenged through a petition for 
16

reconsideration. The requirement that the Board state the 

reasons for granting reconsideration and the evidence on which it 

relies will permit the parties in such cases to determine whether 

to challenge the Board’s reasons in a petition for a writ of 

mandate. And it will ensure that the Board has granted 

reconsideration only after itself determining that its order is 

based on the grounds identified in section 5903 and justified by 

specific evidence in the case. 

Private enforcement here was both valuable and 

burdensome. Moreover, prosecution of this writ proceeding 

provides a public benefit beyond the compensation that 

Petitioners’ counsel will receive from Petitioners’ workers’ 

compensation cases. 

 We reject the Board’s argument that Petitioners are not 

entitled to fees because a petition for a writ of mandate was not a 

procedurally proper way to require the Board to comply with 

section 5908.5. Contrary to the Board’s claim, Petitioners and 

other parties affected by noncompliant orders do not have an 

adequate legal remedy. Such parties may file a petition for 

review only after the Board has issued a final order. A reviewing 

court’s finding at that point that the Board failed to comply with 

section 5908.5 in granting reconsideration could do no more than 

nullify the proceedings following the grant of reconsideration. 

(See Zozaya, supra, 27 Cal.App.3d at pp. 471-472.) Such a 

finding would simply add delay. It would not require a timely 

justification of the need for reconsideration, and it would not

direct compliance in future cases.

Petitioners meet the statutory requirements for an award 

of attorney fees under Code of Civil Procedure section 1021.5. 
17

We reduce the requested $221,554.50 in fees by one half 

because Petitioners’ success was only partial. (See Chavez v. City 

of Los Angeles (2010) 47 Cal.4th 970, 989-990.) 

The time and effort that Petitioners devoted to 

investigation and briefing of their petition can be divided into the 

time before this court’s order to show cause—when Petitioners 

sought only unsuccessful relief—and the time after the order to 

show cause, when they were ultimately successful on the issue we 

identified for briefing. 

Substantively and procedurally, these two segments of the 

proceeding roughly comprise two halves. Before the order to 

show cause, Petitioners researched and prepared their petition 

and a reply to the Board’s letter response. After the order, 

Petitioners filed a reply to the Board’s formal response, presented 

oral argument, and, at this court’s request, briefed their request 

for attorney fees. Petitioners’ counsel who argued the case 

declared he devoted the bulk of his time on arguments in this 

court to filings before the order (about 118 hours), compared to 

37.5 hours on post-order arguments. However, some portion of 

the time spent in preparation of the petition (such as legal 

research and preparation of the public records request to obtain 

grant-for-study data from the Board) was relevant to the overall 

effort to challenge the Board’s grant-for-study practice. This 

general background work is fairly compensable even though the 

specific argument that Petitioners originally presented to this 

court (i.e., that the Board must issue final rulings on petitions for 

reconsideration within 60 days) was unsuccessful. 

Thus, a 50 percent reduction in the fees that Petitioners 

have requested approximately but reasonably reflects the split in 
18

effort Petitioners devoted to successful and unsuccessful 

arguments.

We also award Petitioners their out-of-pocket appellate 

costs, which they identify as $7,891.63.

DISPOSITION

We grant the requests by Petitioners, the Board, and 

Amicus Curiae for judicial notice of items relating to the 

legislative and statutory history of the Board’s reconsideration 

procedure and to the Board’s records. We issue a peremptory 

writ of mandate commanding the Workers’ Compensation 

Appeals Board to end its practice of granting petitions for 

reconsideration solely for purposes of further study, and to 

comply with section 5908.5 when granting petitions for 

reconsideration, including the requirement that the Board “state 

the evidence relied upon and specify in detail the reasons for its 

decision.” We award petitioners $110,777.25 in attorney fees and 

$7,891.63 in costs.

WILEY, J.

We concur:

STRATTON, P. J.

GRIMES, J.