United States Court of Appeals 

For the Seventh Circuit

Chicago, Illinois 60604

Submitted August 18, 2016*

Decided August 18, 2016

Before

RICHARD A. POSNER, Circuit Judge

FRANK H. EASTERBROOK, Circuit Judge

DIANE S. SYKES, Circuit Judge

No. 16‐1443

MARCIA A. RANSOM,

Plaintiff‐Appellant,

v.

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Defendant‐Appellee.

Appeal from the United States District

Court for the Northern District of Illinois,

Eastern Division.

No. 15cv6108

James B. Zagel,

Judge.

O R D E R

Marcia Ransom, a civilian, worked for the federal government at a Navy

Exchange, a discount store serving primarily members of the Navy. She was fired in

early 2014 for shopping at the store, something that civilians generally may not do.

See 10 U.S.C. § 2488(a), (f); DOD Instruction 1330.21, Enclosure 6 (July 14, 2005) (listing

“authorized patrons”), available at http://www.dtic.mil/whs/directives/corres/pdf/

                                                 

* After examining the briefs and the record, we have concluded that oral

argument is unnecessary. Thus the appeal is submitted on the briefs and the record.

See FED. R. APP. P. 34(a)(2)(C).

NONPRECEDENTIAL DISPOSITION

To be cited only in accordance with Fed. R. App. P. 32.1
No. 16‐1443    Page 2

133021p.pdf. Ransom filed an administrative claim with the Navy—a prerequisite to

filing this suit under the Federal Tort Claims Act, see 28 U.S.C. § 2675(a)—stating that her

supervisor had slandered her by accusing her of shopping.  The Navy denied the claim

and advised her that she had “six months from the date of mailing” of the denial letter

“to file suit in the appropriate Federal district court.” See id. § 2401(b).  Five days after the

six months had run, Ransom filed this action against the federal government. She alleged

that two of her supervisors had slandered her by falsely telling her manager that she had

shopped at the Navy Exchange without authorization. She described her injuries as

“[s]evere mental and emotional stress, financial hardship and relapse of [her]

depression.”

The district court granted the government’s motion to dismiss. The government

had contended that Ransom’s suit was barred by the statute of limitations and by

sovereign immunity. The FTCA claim was barred under 28 U.S.C. § 2401(b) because

Ransom had not sued within six months of the government’s denial of her

administrative claim. And under 28 U.S.C. § 2680(h), the government’s waiver of

sovereign immunity did not apply to a claim that, like Ransom’s slander‐based claim,

arises out of an intentional tort. Ransom responded by raising an equitable‐tolling

argument. She maintained that the court should excuse her untimely filing because the

loss of her job had revived a severe depression and triggered other maladies, such as

fatigue and disorientation. Ransom included with her response a psychiatrist’s report

from five years earlier diagnosing her as having depressive disorder. The district court

rejected Ransom’s equitable‐tolling argument and dismissed the suit as untimely.  

Ransom’s appellate brief doesn’t address the district court’s decision. Instead, she

asserts that sovereign immunity does not block her FTCA suit. But the only FTCA claim

that she pursues on appeal arises out of the allegedly slanderous accusation that she

shopped at the Navy Exchange without permission. As the government rightly argued

in the district court—and repeats on appeal—slander is an intentional tort to which the

FTCA’s waiver of sovereign immunity does not apply. See 28 U.S.C. § 2860(h); Millbrook

v. United States, 133 S. Ct. 1441, 1443 (2013).

Because sovereign immunity bars this suit, we need go no further, but for

completeness we observe that the only contention Ransom raises about the timeliness of

her suit is also meritless. She argues that the mailing of the letter denying her

administrative claim should not have started the six‐month statute of limitations

because, she says, the attorney who wrote and sent the letter represents the government
No. 16‐1443    Page 3

and is therefore biased. This contention is frivolous, as accepting it would render

inoperative the limitations period set out in 28 U.S.C. § 2401(b).

Finally, although Ransom does not dispute the district court’s rejection of her

request for equitable tolling, we note that equitable tolling can apply to complaints filed

under the FTCA, see United States v. Kwai Fun Wong, 135 S. Ct. 1625, 1638 (2015), and a

mental impairment can warrant tolling a federal period of limitations, see Davis v.

Humphreys, 747 F.3d 497, 499 (7th Cir. 2014); Miller v. Runyon, 77 F.3d 189, 191–92

(7th Cir. 1996). We have, however, refrained from articulating precisely when a mental

impairment justifies tolling. See Davis, 747 F.3d at 499–501. And we see no need to do so

here given that Ransom’s suit is barred by sovereign immunity and that she fails on

appeal even to mention equitable tolling.

AFFIRMED.